

Defence Strategy: Intelligence and Management of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

by

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Abstract

The phenomenon of Boko Haram (BH) terrorism in Nigeria has generated security concerns. Since the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria BH has carried out more lethal attacks than any other terrorist organisation in Africa. The U.S. Department of State country report on terrorism indicates that Boko Haram has contributed extremely to the growth of terrorism globally. Pathetically, despite huge government budget on security and military operations in the quest to combat BH, evidence shows that the Nigerian State is far from winning the war on terror. Security and defence scholars have made efforts to understand the sect activities that have undermined Nigeria National Security. This indicates that Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy is devoid of the vital ingredient of intelligence. BH mode of operation is covert and can only be defeated through strategic and tactical intelligence which is shrouded in secrecy of information and operations. This research focuses on the significance of intelligence in the campaign against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

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Chapter One

Understanding Intelligence: Conceptual Discourse

A cursory review of the literature indicates that intelligence has been conceptualised and presented by scholars and practitioners in diverse contexts. Gustavo (2005) observed that there is no universally acceptable definition of the concept of intelligence as most scholars look at the definition from different scope and perception. Powers (as cited in Randol, 2009) observed that one of the most meaningful purposes of intelligence is to predict where future security challenges may arise. Security intelligence may be defined as, "...the threat of major, politically motivated violence, or equal grievous harm to national security or the economy, inflicted within the nation's territorial limits by international terrorists, homegrown terrorists, or spies or saboteurs employed or financed by foreign nations" (Posner, 2002, as cited in Randol, 2009: 9).

The United States Joint chief of staff (as cited in Duyan, 2012) conceptualised intelligence as Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. According to CIA (as cited in Warner 1985: 16) "intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us, the prelude to decision and action by policymakers." Hoffman (as cited in Oghi & Unumen, 2014: 2) sees as intelligence as the "collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns areas of operations and potentially significant to planning." Intelligence, with regards to the military, could be strategic, tactical and counter intelligence. Intelligence in this context is a response to a specific question or issue, structured to provide a basis for action and presented to an individual or group empowered to act.

It is worth noting that information is not intelligence, and gathering information is not carrying out competitive intelligence (Rudolph, Gilmont, Magee & Smith, 1991). According to

Lowenthal (as cited in Warner, 1985: 18) notes that, *“Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.”*

According to Shulsky and Schmitt (2002: 1) “The term ‘intelligence’ is applied to different kinds of information activities and organisation. Intelligence is the information relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with actual and potential adversaries.” This definition seems to have been drawn from the state-centric perspective of national security with emphasis on information relevant only to government even though the advantages and the application are relevant universally and not restricted to government enterprises alone.

The goal of intelligence is one of “eliminating or reducing uncertainty for government decision- makers” (Clapper, 1995 as cited in Johnson 2010: 6). Johnson (2010: 6) states that “The purpose of intelligence in simple terms therefore is to provide information to policy makers that may help illuminate their decision options”

Intelligence as Information

Knowledge is the acquaintance, awareness, and understanding familiarity with an object, subject, phenomena and ideas. Knowledge is information and being informed. Intelligence is knowledge beforehand thereby aiding better understanding, prevention and or management of situations, threats and issues. It is used in estimating the cognitive capacity, psychomotor dexterity, and even effective accuracy of an individual or subject.

Intelligence is knowledge acquired and structures, processes and functions involved in acquiring knowledge in resolving tasks, queries and issues (Thomas, 2013). Intelligence is extracted from the analysis of information but the resultant intelligence is in itself information. Intelligence is evaluated and analysed information that could aid policy development, planning and action. Information is knowledge of every description acquired in any manner. It includes anything that is known, regardless of how it may have been discovered. Information begins as unrefined, raw data that is scattered and unprocessed. Intelligence is information that has been collected, (evaluated and analysed), and focused to meet stated or understood needs of a decision-maker (the customer).

It is the end product of a complex analytic process and is used as the basis for making informed decisions and taking action. Intelligence, consistent with Aliemeka, can be understood as refined statistics aimed at comparing the effect of particular rules, or for the identification, evaluation and mitigation of precise troubles. It may be categorised into current (tactical) and forecast (strategic) intelligence (Aliemeka, 2012:13).

Intelligence beyond Information

Lowenthal (2002) is of the view that intelligence is something broader than statistics and its processing for policymakers and commanders, is one way or the other exclusive or clandestine. Shulsky and Schmitt (2002), report that the concept of intelligence has been perceived and presented in different contexts and is taken to have the same meaning as information. Warner (1985) observed that, Policymakers and commanders need facts to do their jobs, and they are entitled to call that information something they like. Warner (1985:3) argues that, "For producers of intelligence, however, the equation "intelligence = data" is too indistinct

to provide actual guidance of their activities.” Warner further stated that intelligence is beyond the spies missions and operations rather it’s the observation of the advisory.

According to Chertoff (as cited by Randol 2009: 8) “Surveillance, interactions—each of which may be taken in isolation as not a particularly meaningful piece of information, but when fused together, gives us a sense of the patterns and the flow that really is at the core of what intelligence analysis is all about.” Rudolph, Gilmont, Magee & Smith, (1991: 35) in their classical work on intelligence stated that “Intelligence in this context is a response to a specific question or issue, structured to provide a basis for action and presented to an individual or group empowered to act.” It is important to understand that there is a difference between intelligence and information.

Media and Intelligence

Hollywood and popular tradition has often played a vital role in shaping both legitimate and public attitudes toward intelligence (Gustavo, 2005). Fictional representations of worldwide politics have played a critical position in the conceptions of the public. West (2004) argues that the reality of intelligence operations cannot be portrayed entirely accurately in works of fiction (as cited in Gustavo, 2005). Intelligence has constantly been a fascinating difficulty for filmmakers and audiences, despite the fact that as an America intelligence officer has mentioned: “Spy movies are to real life intelligence work what Donald Duck movies are to understanding the Environment” (Gustavo, 2005: 5). In such occasions public opinion will regularly speculate with conspiracy theories due to the inherent secrecy surrounding intelligence operations (Gustavo, 2005). It is right here that intelligence research can play a vital position in teaching society and correcting such unusual misunderstandings (Goldberg, 2004 as cited in Gustavo,

2005). The way to increase the public consciousness and positive reaction of the intelligence activities is by allowing the general public benefit directly from intelligence products and information (Gustavo, 2005). According to Bruneau and Dombroski (2014: 2) , “Reform in the intelligence sector has been difficult because of this pervasive public distrust of institutions, as well as the common problem of politicization of the bureaucracy, and the consequent lack of a corporate culture or tradition of public service.”

Intelligence and Secrecy

Warner (1985) and Shulsky (2002) emphasize the importance of secrecy in intelligence operations and activities. Gustavo (2005:4) further observes that, “Intelligence seems little different from information, except for the fact that it is almost always secret”. Warner, (1985:6) states that, “It calls intelligence an activity and a product, says it is conducted in confidential circumstances on behalf of states so that policymakers can understand foreign developments, and that it includes clandestine operations that are performed to cause certain effects in foreign lands.”

Pfaltzgraff & Warren (1981) as quoted by Gustavo (2005:6) argue that, “Though some grade of secrecy is necessary to protect sources, in this profession there is a complex code of integrity in the pursuit of knowledge; at the same time, a very ambiguous and complex relationship exists that limits the disclosure of older intelligence material.” Lowenthal as cited by Hammond (2015:10) suggest that “intelligence exists because governments seek to hide information from other governments, which in turn, seek to discover hidden information by means that they wish to keep secret.”

Intelligence Structure

Ratcliffe views intelligence “as a structure, a process and a product.” He explains that intelligence units are typically units with specialized skills and people within police departments. According to Ratcliffe, “Intelligence is also a process, incorporating a continuous cycle of tasking, data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback, prior to the next, or a refined task, this continuous process is responsible for the generation of an intelligence product, which is designed to shape the thinking of decision-makers” (Ratcliffe, 2003: 3 & 4).

This perception, therefore, distinguishes various components/elements of intelligence (structure, process and product). Intelligence as a structure refers to the organisations and agencies that are authorised by law to gather process and convert information into intelligence for use in national security management. Intelligence is information and know-how on an adversary or opponent received via observation, research, evaluation, and expertise. According to US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010: 114) “Intelligence is also the result of collecting, gathering, processing, integrating, analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating information concerning foreign countries or areas.”

The whole efforts at spying, gathering of and analysing information are geared to have fore knowledge of threats to aid the prevention or effective management in any eventuality. The intelligence structures and processes are administered and actuated by human resource capacities and function. Intelligence in this context is a function. It is the function of determination of requirements, planning, direction and tasking, collection, processing and analysing of information, dissemination of intelligence to consumers and administration of feedback.

Intelligence as a function spells out the routine duties, activities and productive services performed by personnel of the intelligence community and establishment. It is instructive to

observe that intelligence in the context of cognitive evaluation entails a capacity to recall knowledge and appropriate response to cognitive, psychomotor and affective stimuli and learning tasks.

Intelligence as information is about fore knowledge appropriate for action in resolution of real or perceived threats. In addition to their specific functions, responsibilities, tasks, intelligence agencies generally have the following functions, provide analysis of impending crises, give early warning of impending crises, serve national and international crisis management by helping to discern the intentions of current or potential opponents, Inform national defence planning and military operations, protect secrets, both of their own sources and activities, and those of other state agencies; and may act covertly to influence the outcome of events in favour of national interests.

Security is the assurance of safety and the absence of fear of imminent or impending danger. It could be apt to estimate intelligence as security or at best that security is all about intelligence, as intelligence is the thrust of security. Security intelligence refers to the information whose substance is relevant to the appropriate organs of the state in the formulation and execution of national security policies.

Community policing implies and requires the police to identify the intelligence requirements and security challenges within the community with the members of the community; identifying the information requirements together with members of the community and to involve members of the community in sourcing for information necessary for solving the security challenges in the community. Community policing is an organization-wide philosophy and management approach that promotes partnerships, proactive problem solving, and

community engagement to address the causes of crime, fear of crime, and other community issues (Carter, 1997).

Intelligence as a Product

Intelligence as a product is value added knowledge usable for plans and action. Intelligence as a structure and function is about administration of information to facilitate fore-knowledge of threats with a view to preventing or effective management. Pillar (2017: 108) observed that “The biggest challenge is the inherent difficulty of discovering plots that involve small numbers of people who do their planning and preparation in secret and are highly conscious of operational security”. Metscher and Gilbride (2005: 3) argued that “Intelligence is a product created through the process of collecting, collating, and analysing data, for dissemination as usable information that typically assesses events, locations or adversaries, to allow the appropriate deployment of resources to reach the desired outcome.” The president is the most senior client of intelligence in any country, who gets and makes use of intelligence directly and this usually is fashioned by using political thoughts.

Intelligence as an Academic Discipline

Gustavo (2005: 2) notes that “Intelligence is all but absent, in the work of most international relations theorists and it does not figure in any key International relations theory debates between realist, liberal, institutionalism, constructivist and postmodernist approaches.” Even though that intelligence has been practiced in its extraordinary forms throughout history it appears paradoxical that it has only effectively been ‘an educational field for half a century’

(Gustavo, 2005). There has been restricted interest and research among scholars in the field of international relations to focus on intelligence as an academic discipline (Gustavo, 2005).

Michael and Hochstein (1994) as noted by Gustavo (2005:2) observed that “while intelligence studies had developed into an identifiable intellectual community, there was a noticeable failure to integrate intelligence studies, even in a primitive way, into the mainstream of research in international relations.” Intelligence studies as an academic field can be a multidisciplinary that can cover a wide range of subjects (Gustavo, 2005).

In an effort to describe the significance of intelligence Gustavo (2005: 3) argued that “it can be convincingly argued that Intelligence Studies requires greater potency in the domain of academia as well as a significant appeal to a wider field of study. It is interesting to note that, while there exists an implicit assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the realist field, contemporary neo-realist writers have largely ignored intelligence in their reflections.”

Gustavo (2005: 14) concluded that “except for the CIA and a few others, intelligence organisations all over the world refuse to declassify their files.” He continues, “It is interesting to note that, while there exists an implicit assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the realist field, contemporary neo-realist writers have largely ignored intelligence in their reflections.”

The classical philosophers had enthused ‘man, know thyself’. Sun Tzu and Griffith (1964) uphold that knowing oneself and knowing the other is a recipe for the skillful engagement in preventing or averting danger. Sun Tzu further upholds that subduing the adversary’s military without battle is the most skillful not one hundred victories in one hundred battles. In tandem with the Sun Tzu, this capacity in self-knowledge and fore-knowledge of the other in aid of skillful engagement is the phenomena acclaimed as intelligence in contemporary strategic and

security praxis. Intelligence is about knowledge that would facilitate skillful engagements. The level of intelligence operation however depends on the character of the environment and the complexity of the intelligence requirement.

Tactical Intelligence

According to Flavius-Cristian and Andreea (2013: 6), “Tactical Intelligence is translated as Tactical Information and it is used within the operational units that include, among other things, information from human sources (*human intelligence*), information obtained from open source (*open source intelligence*), the Imagistic Information (*imagery intelligence*) and direct observation (*direct observation*)” (Githens & Hugnbank, 2010, as cited in Flavius-Cristian & Andreea, 2013: 6).

Soldiers fighting insurgents and terrorism need private sources in order to identify threat and respond effectively (Flavius-Cristian & Andreea 2013). Githens & Hugnbank (2010: 32) “These particular sources require trained and dedicated street cops who can think on their feet and identify the simplest of cultural patterns and behavioral modifications of those who regularly work, play and live within their assigned patrol areas.” Githens & Hugnbank (2010: 33) further explains that “Tactical intelligence is crucial in counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare. Initiative and surprise can be achieved only if the tactical intelligence mission is effective and all possible vetted sources must be utilized to their optimal potential, including those frequently ignored.”

Strategic Intelligence

Flavius-Cristian & Andreea (2013: 6) explains that “The official definition used by the Pentagon is equally simple: "the information is required for stating/planning strategies, policies and military operations nationally and in the theater of operations."

This would have implied that strategic intelligence operates only in the realm of national defence without regards to internal security requirements, as it may, in that context, be focusing only on external threats. However, it is apt to observe that strategic intelligence has its significance only in the context of delivering tactical objectives. This is why McDowell (2008: 5) advances that: “Strategic intelligence analysis can be considered a specific form of research that addresses any issue at the level of breadth and detail necessary to describe threats, risks, and opportunities in a way that helps determine programs and policies.” He further states that, “Strategic intelligence and analysis practice focuses on being able to creatively think one’s way through issues at a macro level, yet constantly retain pragmatic links to the inevitable tactical and operational impact and outcomes” (McDowell, 2008: 7). Kuosa (2014) expatiating on the operational requirements of strategic intelligence better accurately referred to as national security intelligence as opined by advances that:

“Strategic intelligence deals with national or corporate long-term strategic issues. It operates simultaneously with three functionalities: intelligence, strategic foresight, and visionary management. Its customers are senior policy-makers in versatile organisations capable of strategically impacting the game in which they are involved. Kuosa (2014:122)”

The praxis of strategic intelligence and its capabilities is not limited on public policy-making. It also involves interest in the understanding of how the principles of strategic intelligence could be utilised within the intelligence community and its practices; “how to bridge

the gap between the prevailing theory of intelligence processes and its actual practice” and “how intelligence could better bring right-time data for policy makers.”

Githens & Hugnbank (2010: 32) stated that the “functional ability to "predict" when and where future operational terrorist acts might occur and which tactical targets might prove more advantageous for a terrorist organization whether it is psychological, economical, or political in nature through the use of gathered and processed data from varying sources that places homeland defense in better offensive and defensive postures to successfully preempt and thwart their next attack.”

Intelligence Process or Cycle

The consumer’s guide to intelligence (as cited in CIA, 1999) defines Intelligence process as converted information made available to users. The process begins with identifying the issues in which policy makers are interested and defining the answers they need to make educated decisions regarding those issues.


Intelligence processed can be said to consist of the following steps: ‘tasking, data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback, prior to the next or a refine task’ (Ratcliffe, 2003:4). This process is also referred to as the intelligence cycle. Recent studies have identified that this cycle commences from the identification and determination of intelligence and information requirements before planning, direction and tasking, collection of data, processing, analysis, dissemination and re-evaluation.

The conceptualisation of intelligence as a cyclical process implies that intelligence is operating in a unit-threats environment. But the security threat environment is complex and multifaceted operating sequentially, simultaneously and randomly within the dynamics of

society. Security threats are therefore systemic and could be better understood as a process. It is important to note, however, that like the case in all cyclical theories, the presentation of the intelligence process as a cyclical system renders the determination of its commencement stage difficult and or arbitrary because the cycle is depicted in a circle which is continuous.

Figure 1

The Intelligence Cycle



Source (Fahey, 2012).

National or Domestic Intelligence

Bruneau and Dombroski, (2014: 3) stated that “While in most instances the intelligence service rhetorically linked internal opposition to putative foreign enemies, the overwhelming focus of the intelligence service in most countries was on domestic opposition” The Central Intelligence Agency (1991, cited in Johnson 2010:6) states that ‘national security intelligence is the knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us- the prelude to presidential decisions and actions.’ Johnson explicates that:

This definition points to intelligence as a matter of ‘situational awareness’, that, understands events and conditions throughout the world faced by policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders. In this vein, when people speak of intelligence they are referring to information-tangible data about personalities and events around the globe. This information is communicated by intelligence officers to policymakers in the form of oral briefings, memoranda, and more formal reports, either short or long, all focused on bringing a leader up-to-date on current events on investing the policymaker with a more in-depth comprehension of a topic based on exhaustive research. The amount of information that could be valuable in making a political, economic, diplomatic, or military decision is potentially vast, and its collection is limited only by a nation’s available resources to fund espionage rings, surveillance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft and listening devices, plus its skill in ferreting out pertinent data (‘signals’) from the vast sea of irrelevant information (‘noise’).

Aligning with the dominant nuances of the concept Johnson (2010:6) observes that national security intelligence, other than as information product, can refer also to a process in the context of the intelligence cycle; as a set of missions carried out by a nation’s secret agencies; and may refer to a cluster of people and organisations that carry out the missions of collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. The scholar elucidates that national security intelligence may be different from strategic intelligence, though the concepts are used interchangeably as it encompasses tactical as well as strategic intelligence. This explanation is

apt and instructive in exploring the scope and core of strategic intelligence in internal security management.

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Kuosa (2014) expatiating on the operational requirements of strategic intelligence better accurately referred to as national security intelligence, He further advances that:

“Strategic intelligence deals with national or corporate long-term strategic issues. It operates simultaneously with three functionalities: intelligence, strategic foresight, and visionary management. Its customers are senior policy-makers in versatile organisations capable of strategically impacting the game in which they are involved” Kuosa (2014:15).

The praxis of strategic intelligence and its capabilities is not limited to public policy-making. It also involves interest in the understanding of how the principles of strategic intelligence could be utilised within the intelligence community and its practices; “how to bridge the gap between the prevailing theory of intelligence processes and its actual practice” and “how intelligence could better bring right-time data for policy makers”.

Essentially national security intelligence is the collection, analysis and utilization of analysed information in guiding national tactical and strategic actions and policies and plans. The process of generating national security intelligence involves the systematic determination of

intelligence and information requirements, development of requisite information collection plans, tasking of collectors that are directing the information collection activities (planning and direction); exploitation of sources and delivery of information to intelligence centers (collection); processing involving collation, evaluation and presentation of the information for analysis. The dissemination that is timely delivery by appropriate means in the applicable format to the consumer or client, action that is utilization of the intelligence product, and feedback involving re-evaluation of the whole process to facilitate attempts at filling observed gaps and emergent related developments.

The process continues seemingly cyclically such that it is described as the national security intelligence cycle. The national security intelligence process entails the effective deployment of intelligence managers, intelligence information collectors and field operators; intelligence analysts; intelligence consumers, clients and the public.

Foresight in National Security Intelligence

National security intelligence in the context of strategic intelligence involves foresight and future domains activities. Kuosa (2014: 32) reports that “the term ‘foresight’ refers to a systematic process where one attempts to say something comprehensive and grounded about the futures probabilities, change drivers, change factors, interrelations, and options for actions.

National security intelligence depends on ‘resources’; ‘data needs’; ‘creative thinking’; ‘bonding between Practitioners and Management’; and ‘reliability of judgments and forecasts’ impactful to the organisation.” He contends that:

The guiding principle of all foresight ‘is that the future cannot be predicted, as it is not here yet. In particular, the forming and outcomes of social phenomena are too complex to be comprehensively understood much in advance. At best, alternative scenarios and some probabilities beyond linear predictions can be attributed to emerging social phenomena. Yet, the

future can be created through the actions of today – and therefore partly known too. And much of the future exists already in today’s values, objectives, drivers, and trends and those can be studied systematically. (Kuosa, 2014, 32)

Kuosa (2014: 32) stated that,

The process of foresight is meant to be systematic and holistic and it is supposed to integrate hindsight, insight, and forecasting in a meaningful way. The backbone of foresight is (hind) sight which is about more or less systematically understanding the past processes and constraints of change. The body of foresight is (in) sight which is an attempt to comprehensively understand the true nature of the present and its structures, actors, and drivers. The eyesight of foresight is (fore) casting which refers to understanding the probable path-dependencies of existing trends, phenomena, and visionary thinking.

Insight, in this context is defined by Clive Simmonds, (as cited in Kuosa, 2014: 32) as “the ability to perceive the true nature of a thing, especially through intuitive understanding (in this context, what and how something is happening, who is making it happen and why) it is the ability to look beyond, behind, and through the actions of others to the new principles that they are consciously or unconsciously disclosing.” Once an initial understanding has been established, then further searching is rendered much easier.

Richard Slaughter, (as cited in Kuosa, 2014: 33) presents foresight “as a process that attempts to broaden the boundaries of perception by assessing the implications of present actions, decisions, etc. (consequent assessment), by detecting and avoiding problems before they occur (early warning and guidance), by considering the present implications of possible future events (pro-active strategy formulation), and by envisioning aspects of desired futures (preparing scenarios).”

Further, the European Union Regional Foresight (FOREN) report (2001 cited in Kuosa, 2014: 33) defines foresight as follows.

Foresight is a systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-to-long-term vision-building process aimed at present-day decisions and mobilizing joint actions. Foresight arises from a convergence of trends underlying recent developments in the fields

of 'policy analysis', 'strategic planning' and 'future studies'. It brings together key agents of change and various sources of knowledge in order to develop strategic visions and anticipatory intelligence.

Chapter Two

Terrorism

Terrorism has been a major concern for the United Nations and national governments since the 1960s. The 9/11 attacks changed the structure, character, actors and concepts of terrorism. Terrorism has been an important cause of insecurity in the world. “[Terrorism] also represents the most serious threat to human life and liberty, democracy and other fundamental values that the democratic communities promote” (National Security Strategy of Romania, 2007:13).

Terrorist attacks are designed to achieve three goals: to create a sense of insecurity among the public, to show the inability to contain terrorism, and to promote the ideology of the terrorists (Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2011). However, there have been several debates over the years on what the concept of terrorism means. The fact that there is no universally accepted definition of the concept has made it difficult for intelligence to be carried out on terrorist activities.

In an effort to answer the question of what terrorism means this study explores the similarities and differences in definitions of scholars. The importance of defining the concept is because it affects how law enforcement agencies prosecute and combat terror. Further analysis in this chapter explains various types, structure and membership of terrorist organisations, how they operate and carry out their activities. The problem of intelligence on terrorism is discussed in details in this chapter.

Terrorism: Conceptual Discussion

The word 'terrorism' in general is linked to the French word '*terreur*' which literally means fear or dread. The term is also linked to the Latin derivative '*terrorem*', which equally means fright, fear, or terror. Literally, terrorism is defined as 'the systematic use of violence, terror and intimidation to achieve an end' (Oche, 2007:7). Their targets are usually government, the public or individual and the objective is political.

Imobighe (2006:7-8) contends that terrorism and counter-terrorism are mutually linked in a confrontational, action-reaction relationship and 'have been with the human race since the dawn of recorded history'. However, terrorism assumed a global scale after the September 11, 2001, bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. in the United States.

The US government defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (US Department of State, 2001: 13). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives." This definition includes three elements: terrorist activities are illegal and involve the use of force, the actions intend to intimidate or coerce, and the actions are committed in support of political or social objectives.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 1994 defines terrorism as: "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever

the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”

Imobighe (2006:17-18) provides a synthesized definition from the perspectives of the environment, peculiar nature of the response, target and objective of terrorism and advances that:

Terrorism can be said to represent the indiscriminate and random use of different levels of violence against an opponent or the ancillary interests of such an opponent, with whom one has an adversarial relationship in order to strike fear and impose one’s will on it, or tailor its action towards desired goals.

This definition presents terrorism as a violent tool employable and deployed by opposing sides in any form of struggle for power and tends to divest the concept of the emotional stereotypes and criminal encumbrances that elicit a subjective perception of the concept.

Adopting a behavioural approach, Crelinsten (2009: 122-123) defines terrorism as:

The combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed without warning, that is directed against one set of targets (the direct victims) in order to coerce compliance or to compel allegiance from the second set of targets (targets of demand) and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (targets of terror or target of attention).

Crelinsten presents terrorism as a form of communication directed towards at least four different types of audiences. These are the direct victims, which includes surviving victims, families and friends of victims; targets of attention, who are the people who identify with the victims, which includes national and global elites, the mass public, and the media; as well as sympathizers, followers, and supporters of the terrorists, including potential recruits, and targets of demands (whether explicit or not) such as government officials, law enforcement, military, peace-keepers, humanitarian agencies and other agents of social control (Crelinsten 2009: 122-123).

Crelinsten’s definition tends to resolve a crucial issue of lack of universal objective standard implicit in defining terrorism from the perspective of criminality and purpose of the terrorists as the definition focuses on what terrorists do (behaviour). However, in the Nigerian

context terrorism is a crime codified by law. The Organization for African Unity, now the African Union, 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism defines terrorism Article 1:

Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state and which may endanger the life, physical integrity, freedom, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member of or group of persons, or cause or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage, and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles or; disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency or; create general insurrection in a state.

The Nigeria's Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, as Amended in 2013, (Part 1, Sections 1&2, Pg. 4) defines a "terrorist as a person who knowingly does, attempts or threatens to do an act preparatory to or in furtherance of an act of terrorism; commits to do anything that is reasonably necessary to promote an act of terrorism; or assists or facilitates the activities of persons engaged in an act of terrorism commits an offence under this Act."

However, demonstration or stoppage of work is not a terrorist act within the meaning of this definition provided that the act is not intended to result in any harm referred to in subsection (2) (b) (i), (ii) or (iv) of this section. In the context of law enforcement and policing, terrorism presents itself in deliberate incidents and acts of sabotage, criminal bombings, arsons, vandalism; assassination; kidnapping; armed robbery, militancy, trafficking in illegal small arms and light weapons, transnational organised crimes, subversion and propaganda, espionage, cyber-terror, echo-terror, bioterror and the attendant criminal acts and consequences.

Structure and Types of Terrorist Organization

There are two types of terrorist activities: international and domestic. International terrorism is practiced with the deliberate intention of affecting the structure and distribution of power in entire areas of the world and even at the level of global society itself. Reinares (2005: 1) argued that “the individuals and groups who carry it out have extended their activities to a significant number of countries and geopolitical regions, in accordance with their declared aims.”

Hazard Mitigation Plan (2011:2) stated that “International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside a country, or whose activities transcend their national boundaries.”

Rand (as cited in Sandler, 2014: 258) conceptualise “domestic terrorism as homegrown that has consequences for just the host country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies.” Sandler (2014) argue that in a domestic incident, the perpetrators, victims, and audience are all in the host country and moreover, there is no foreign sponsorship or involvement in a domestic terrorist event. According to Global Terrorism Index (2016: 46) “domestic terror groups are most often motivated by anti-government sentiment, nationalism, separatism, racism, bigotry or anarchy, they argue that due to the array of different motivations behind domestic terrorist groups and the varying circumstances under which they come into existence, it is difficult to establish a profile of a ‘generic domestic terrorist.’”

According to Choi & Piazza (2016: 41),


This experience of grievance prompts a group to develop an enhanced sense of collective identity, as well as a strong sense of alienation from the political, ethnic or religious majority in society, which, in turn, only serves to reinforce further the salience of group grievances. As domestic terrorist organizations tend to create fewer cells and specialized teams, they are generally smaller in size than international terrorist organizations which often operate in several countries. Even so, there is a strong theoretical base to support the notion that countries with large ethnic populations excluded from political power would experience higher levels of domestic terrorist activity. Gurr’s (1968, 1970, 1993, 1996, 2000) work on deprivation as the

root cause of riots, rebellion, and civil war helps to provide some of the theoretical motivation for a politically excluded ethnic group to support or engage in domestic terrorism. (Choi & Piazza, 2016: 41).

Hamilton (2007:1) asserts that, “A terrorist organization’s structure, membership, resources, and security determine its capabilities and reach and that knowledge of current and emergent models of terrorist organization improves an understanding and situational awareness of terrorism in a contemporary operational environment.” Hamilton argues that terrorist groups that carry out attacks for political purposes often must do so through the development of a more hierarchical structure.

Figure 2 summarizes the hierarchical structures of politically-motivated terrorist groups:

Figure 2 Typical Levels of Organization



Sources: Hamilton (2007)

Leaders coordinate attacks and also promote the ideology using violence. Cadres are the high and mid-level foot soldiers of the organization, engaging in activities such as intelligence,

communications, and bomb making. Active supporters tend to be professionals in academics or industries who sponsor terrorist activities and provide surveillance. Passive supporters are average citizens who tend to find the ideology appealing but do not carry out attacks (Hamilton, 2007).

Problems of Intelligence on Terrorism

Pillar (2017: 108) observed that “The biggest challenge is the inherent difficulty of discovering plots that involve small numbers of people who do their planning and preparation in secret and are highly conscious of operational security.” Maddrell (2009) (as cited in Wardlaw and Bammer, 2015:108) explains that “The danger of intelligence gaps arising has increased because, when compared with the attack preparations of states, those of targets such as terrorists may be more difficult to discern and thus offer less strategic warning.”

Martin (2016: 17) observe that, “At the same time, the majority of security challenges are borderless, conducted by non-state actors or isolated cells that are more difficult to track, as well as by lone-wolf perpetrators loosely associated with terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which are extremely difficult to identify.”

The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), (2006: 2) stated

...because of major terrorist actions in recent years, intelligence services have come under increased scrutiny and criticism. This has focused on the issues of operational failures, such as failing to predict terrorist attacks or lacking the knowledge and capability to prevent them; organizational deficiencies, such as not sharing intelligence with other intelligence services and government departments and resisting reorganization and reform, and democratic malpractice, including violating citizen’s rights to privacy, not cooperating with other branches of government such as parliament and the courts, unlawful detentions, mistreatment (even torture) of detainees, unlawful interrogation techniques, the transfer of detainees to countries with more relaxed standards on the use of coercive techniques (rendition) and accommodating politicians in the politicisation and misuse of intelligence.

Martin (2016: 17) state that, “There has been an increase in the number and complexity of the threats that intelligence agencies are struggling to respond to. Intelligence work increasingly occurs in the public sphere, with policymakers highlighting more and more the crucial role of intelligence in justifying policy decisions.” Pillar (2017: 109) further stated that “The unrealistic public expectations, especially the expectation that with enough intelligence gathering skill and dot-connecting acumen, any such secret plots ought to be discovered.”

Hertzberger (2007: 98) notes that, “the intelligence services are under increasing pressure from civil society and the media to prevent and thwart terrorist attacks, if an attack occurs; fingers are quickly pointed to the mishaps of national intelligence and/or security services.” According to Martin (2016: 17) “It has also led to incredible pressure on agencies, as executive decision-makers now expect immediate, real-time intelligence, and intelligence producers have to compete with the wide variety of online, unverified information available to their consumers”

DCAF (2006: 3) note that,

The work of the intelligence services has become more time-sensitive, complex, dangerous and controversial. Effective decision and policymaking is increasingly dependent upon early identification of problems, rapid assessment of the likely consequences of decisions and real-time monitoring of their implementation. With changes in the strategic environment, there has been an increase in the number and kind of consumers of intelligence, both domestic and foreign. Their needs vary enormously. Only if top executive decision- and policymakers are well informed can they provide the necessary guidance to intelligence services and make sound judgments on policy. The operations of intelligence services have become increasingly dependent on data that is difficult and dangerous to collect. Maintaining secrets is increasingly difficult, for both technical and political reasons. National intelligence services need to be able to work with their counterparts in other countries if they are to fulfil their missions; yet this can be complicated by mutual suspicion and differences in practices among partner services.

Hertzberger (2007: 3) observe that, “Decision makers and agencies face legal, technical, political, cultural, organizational and even personal obstacles when sharing information.”

Best (2003: 4) observe that, “any renewed emphasis on human intelligence necessarily will involve a willingness to accept risks of complicated and dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals who may be in positions to provide valuable information”

Wardlaw and Bammer (2015: 108) state that, “information has exploded in amount and ubiquity, and sorting for relevance has become one of the most critical jobs of the intelligence analyst.” Builta and Heller (2004: 4) argue that “despite what is frequently trumpeted as major success in information sharing, the practical reality for most intelligence analysts is that information sharing among counter-terrorism intelligence organizations is in many ways no further along in sum than it was on 10 September 2001.”

Martin (2016: 13) argue that, “the most complex questions around intelligence gathering are often based on the interrelationship between ethics and law; what is morally questionable yet legal, or morally justifiable but illegal.” He furthers his argument by stating that “Moral questions surrounding mass surveillance or interrogation methods become far more complex when one considers their use not as unethical as such, but as a prioritisation of national security and the security of the majority, over the security of an individual.”

According to Pillar (2017: 108) “Yet another challenge is the inherent tension between security measures taken in the name of counterterrorism and the values of liberal democracies, especially regarding such things as surveillance and privacy but also involving personal liberties.” Martin (2016: 13) state that, “The use of enhanced interrogation techniques is one of many issues that have resulted in a fundamental questioning of intelligence and its role in democratic societies over the past decade, deciding what constitutes ethical behaviour can be extremely complex in such scenarios and lies at the heart of this debate.”

According to Tokimi (2015: 196)

claims for liberty in the modern world often run up against the counter demand for security while much of the discussion and practices surrounding security centres on its relationship and effect on liberty. The paradox presented in reconciling the two ideals is that acts of terrorism thrive or appear to thrive in democratic societies as protected individual liberties such as freedom of association, movement and expression which are perceived as conducive to planning and executing acts of violence. The debate has been thought out in terms of what direction the balance should be tipped between security and liberty.

Chapter Three

Boko Haram: The Enemy Within

The Nigerian state is deeply divided. Smyth and Robinson (2001) (as cited in Ambe-Uva, (2010: 44) states that, “Political issues are usually violently contested along complex ethnic, religious and regional lines.” Agbaje (2007) cited in Ofongo (2016: 149) suggest “that the phenomenon of violent insurgency has become such a defining feature of the Nigerian scene in recent times that it is often not realized that its roots stretch back at least to the colonial period.”

Uduma (2013: 34) stated that, “Colonial policies which emphasized ethnic, regional and religious differences in the conception and implementation of social, economic and educational programmes created ethnic-regional political educational imbalances that were important in the mobilization and manipulation of ethnic-regional identities. Colonial policies nurtured and created a dichotomy of “we” vs “they” North versus South, Hausa Fulani versus Yoruba versus Igbo, majority versus minority groups.” The colonial state was undemocratic, ruthless and arbitrary in the sense that its policies completely changed the African political and socio-cultural landscape.

According to Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 17) “The colonial state ... pursued divide and rule policies that entrenched systems of ethnic segmentation and polarization. These included the discriminatory recruitment into the army and the police, the exclusion of Christians and southerners from the core north and their restriction to strangers’ quarters, and the privileges accorded rulers of major groups in the regions, all of which bequeathed a fatal legacy.”

Nigeria seems to face different shades of unending insurrection, against which both the country’s internal security agencies and the armed forces have been deployed. The problem

started with the Niger Delta region, where the youth took up arms to redress long years of neglect despite the fact that this region provides the petroleum resources that lubricate its entire economy (Imobighe and Ebohon, 2012).

Ofongo (2016:149) stated that, “the simmering violence being witnessed in Nigeria today has been linked directly to the fragile and weak character of the State, the foundation of which was arguably laid by colonial rule. The emergence of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria’s northeastern region has been linked with peoples’ attempts at the mobilization of ethnic and religious identity to gain an advantage in the country.”

The main purpose of this chapter is to examine Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. This chapter is structured into three major parts. First, it gives an account of the origin and emergence of the terrorist sect answering the questions of why the group emerged, who are their sponsors and who are perpetrators of terrorism? Second, the motivation, triggers and objectives of the group and its implication for the growth of radical Islamic doctrine in Nigeria, and the tactics and strategy of the group in carrying out their operations on the soft target are examined.

Boko Haram: Origin, Emergence and Sponsors

Osumah, (2013: 541) argues that, “Boko Haram is very ideologically driven and the term Boko Haram is derived from the Hausa word boko meaning ‘Animist, Western, or otherwise non-Islamic education’ and the Arabic word haram figuratively meaning ‘sin’ but literally meaning ‘forbidden’. Figuratively it means ‘Western or non-Islamic education is a sin.’” Boko Haram was established under the leadership of late Islamic cleric Mohammed Yusuf. The sect repudiates secularism and Western education, particularly geology, darwinian evolution, genetic engineering, astronomy, philosophy, and sociology, which are in conflict with the Qur’an.”

Weeraratne (2017: 612) notes that, “While the group is universally referred to as Boko Haram, the name was not chosen by the group itself. The group was given this name by villagers given its frequent diatribes against Western civilization. The movement preaches an anti-Statist ideology, chastises the Nigerian religious and political establishment as “irredeemable,” and calls for the widespread application of Sharia law as the instrument of governance.”

Osumah (2013: 542) notes that,

Boko Haram opposes secularism and seeks to Islamize Nigeria. Boko Haram is not the first group to seek the Islamization of Nigeria. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was a Zaria-based Islamic movement founded by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzakky when he was an undergraduate at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Kaduna State in the early 1970s, has sought to impose Islam. By 1979, Zakzakky’s inspiration came from the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Muslim struggle to eliminate un-Islamic governments in the Middle East.

Boko Haram claims to be guided by an Islamic ideology that combines a political doctrine and programme of action pursued through open Jihad (Holy War). The sect accepts this ideology as superior to western values, secular governments, democratic values and practices. Members are made to believe that they are not criminals subject to rules of the constitution, which they believe represent western values.

Sergie and Johnson (2015) argue that, “The group’s aim is to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of criminal Sharia Courts across the country. Mohammed Yusuf was a trained Salafist and was strongly influenced by IbnTaymiyyah, a 14th Century Islamic scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered to be a major theorist for the radical groups in the Middle East. Since 2009 when the terror campaign was formally launched by Boko Haram, the Nigerian insurgency land scope has become more intense and factionalized.”

The Boko Haram group generates funds from both internal and external sources. It receives religious donations from members and sympathizers, canvasses for donations from the

public under the pretext of building mosques, in addition to selling Islamic books, and invests in legitimate businesses of members and shares profits. The group is also involved in extortion of earmarked persons or organizations through threats and bank robbery. Their external sources of funds are believed to be from Al-Qaida affiliates. Boko Haram receives considerable financial, military, and training support from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM and its splinter organisation, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

Barna (2014: 11) state that, “It also generates funds through drug trafficking (West Africa is a transit region for cocaine and heroin from South America to Europe), weapons trafficking (especially from Libya and Chad), smuggling, kidnappings and begging. Some of the funding, which is used variously for personal enrichment, payments to members, purchase of arms and information, communication and protection, is also believed to come from ‘government blackmail’.

Osumah, (2013: 541) explains that, “Boko Haram has resorted to various sources to fund its operations. It is alleged to rob banks, while some prominent Northern politicians and traditional rulers are purported to provide it with financial support. Boko Haram is also alleged to source funds from sympathetic countries or groups across North Africa and the Middle East.” Barna (2014: 11) note that, “The funding sources and operational links of Boko Haram are not well documented, and are assumed to exist by experts and journalists; they are hard to discern, which makes the efforts of the Nigerian government to cut off Boko Haram’s funding difficult.”

Gourley (2012) notes that the sect’s link with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates in Mali, Sudan and Somalia, from where it derives ideological impetus and support, in terms of funds, training in the art of terror and mercenaries to boost its rank of fighters. The UmmulQurah Camp in Mauritania and the desert camps in North Eastern Mali are

training destinations where several of the sect's foot soldiers have also received training. The character and modus operandi of Boko Haram activities are also indicative of its ties with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which advocates Jihad to enforce strict Sharia Law and annihilate real and perceived enemies of its agenda.

Boko Haram: Motivations and Triggers

Ofongo (2016: 149) argues that, "While the Islamic sect makes constant headlines across the globe owing to its bombing spree, kidnapping of authority figures and young women, and growing links to transnational terrorist organizations especially Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Deep-seated poverty, unemployment, socio-political alienation, inequality, and illiteracy have been identified as creating the basis for insurgency and other forms of violent conflict in Nigeria." Osumah (2013: 542) "In Nigeria, the vast majority of the people subsist on less than a dollar a day. In particular, more of the poor people are found in many of the Northern states (which have been Boko Haram hotbeds) than in the rest of Nigeria."

Table 1 summarizes the percentage of the population living under conditions of poverty in each of the Nigeria's geopolitical zones:

Table 1: The Percentage of Poverty by Geopolitical Zone, Nigeria

Geopolitical Zone	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004	2010
South-South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1	63.8
South-East	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5	26.7	67.0
South-West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43.0	59.1
North-Central	32.2	50.8	46.0	64.7	67.0	67.5
North-East	35.6	54.9	54.0	70.1	72.2	76.3
North-West	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.2	71.2	77.7

Source: (British Council, 2012, as cited in Ofongo, 2016: 152)

Table 1 demonstrates how poverty is particularly concentrated in the north of Nigeria. Poverty is defined in this context with the availability to have food, shelter, good healthcare, good education and employment. As Ofongo (2016: 152) notes, “This explains the notion of violence is paramount; when there is no food, shelter, good health, good education and employment, the next line of action is to destabilize the polity hence the emergence of the Boko Haram mayhem.” According to Osuma (2013: 543), “The religious extremists and ethnic warlords need little effort to brainwash and mobilize the hungry and poor in both the cities and villages to engage in the insurgency.”

The quality of life of North-Easterners is the poorest in the country in terms of youth literacy, secondary school attendance, and availability of potable water, small and medium scale businesses and some other indicators (Aghedo, 2014). Poor governance has been implicated in the high level of poverty in the area and the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism as was the case with the Maitatsine revolt in the 1980s (Aghedo, 2014). As note earlier, Boko Haram-related

violence has destroyed over 12,000 lives and property worth several million in recent years. As a result, most part of the North-East has been under emergency rule in the last two years in an attempt to contain Boko Haram violence (Agbiboa, 2014). Boko Haram benefited from the large number of underprivileged youths who associate their economic misfortunes with the character of the Nigerian state and the inept nature of its custodians (Aghedo and Eke, 2013, Eke 2013).

Despite the rhetoric of Islamic purity that characterizes the group's narratives, several studies have shown that underdevelopment and illiteracy engendered by prolonged years of elite insensitivity, corruption, repression and human right violations are at the root of the terrorism (Osumah, 2013; Ofongo, 2016).

Despite its ethno-religious diversity, Islam remains the dominant religion especially in such states as Borno, Bauchi, and Gombe. Even though the minority ethnic areas of Adamawa and Taraba States identify more with the North-Central zone owing to religious and political affinity, yet they continue to see themselves as part of the pre-1967 Northern Region. The zone occupies an area of 107,862 square miles and currently comprises the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe.

In early 19th century, two prominent centres of power arose in the sprawling northern region, namely the Kingdom of Borno under the leadership of Shehu of Borno in the North-East and the Caliphate of Sokoto in the North-West. Despite the ravaging onslaught of the 1804 Jihad that swept across much of today's northern region (including the North-Central), Borno was unconquered and managed to remain independent, and was thus not incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate.

Historically, the region had highly centralized states before the imposition of colonial rule (Ajayi, 2011). Much of the instability and violence in Nigeria's Northeast region and in

several other parts of the country are a result of illiteracy and unemployment. Though the northern elite has dominated political power in post-independence Nigeria, the Northern Region (mainly the North-East) has been characterized by want and squalor as manifested by the lack of basic socio-economic necessities that enhance the quality of human life. Even by Nigerian standards, the North-East is poor. The incidence of chronic malnutrition (indicated by stunting, wasting and underweight of children) is highest in the region. This poor quality of life has been linked to long years of “exploitation, oppression and economic disempowerment of the peasantry by an insensitive and parasitic ruling class” (International IDEA, 2000:268).

Though the Nigerian economy is the third fastest growing in the world, yet the country’s enormous petrodollars are concentrated in a few hands to the resentment and anger of the poor, especially the youth demographic cohort. Over 40 million youths are unemployed in Nigeria. The 2012 Poverty Survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows that 69% of Nigerians are defined as poor (112 million people) a huge increase from just 17 million in 1980 (Rogers, 2012). Though mass poverty cuts across the country, the incidence of relative poverty in the Northern Region is higher than the national average. The systematic weakening of the state in Nigeria and the resultant incapacity to guarantee the fulfilment of its essential responsibilities have also been indicted in the emergence of Boko Haram (Eke, 2013).

Also, besides youth, women have been badly hit by relative deprivations in the area. Despite the foregrounding of women’s rights in both local and international fora including the Nairobi Women’s Conference of 1985 and the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, the ‘woman question’ has received little attention across Northern Nigeria particularly in the North-East.

Even though the enfranchisement of women in the North-East in 1979 (over three decades behind their counterparts in southern Nigeria) was judged as an epochal event, a patriarchal culture, monetization of party politics and a high level of female illiteracy continue to foreclose the political inclusion and development of women. In fact, a majority of women remain excluded from the socio-economic public space (Suleiman and Karim, 2015).

As a result of these factors, the Northern Region, chiefly the North-East has been enmeshed in criminal violence and multiple identity conflicts. The spate of internal insecurity has been compounded by cross-border banditry which has further accentuated the phenomena of armed robbery and cattle rustling in recent years. Cross-border banditry has been facilitated by several illegal entries- and exit-points into the country. Indeed, Borno and Yobe States share expansive porous borders with Niger and Chad Republics, while Adamawa and Taraba States have similar borders with Cameroon to the east.

The permeable nature of the borders aids incursion of criminal gangs and rebel elements from neighbouring countries into Nigeria as exemplified by a Chadian rebel faction which established a camp in Abadam area of Borno State and terrorized the inhabitants of the area in 1998 (International IDEA, 2000). The Tuareg rebels of the Tubo in the Niger Republic also engaged in banditry activities in the North-East of Nigeria to sustain their uprising against their home government in Niamey.

In response to the menace of cross-border banditry and armed robbery, the six states of the North-East instituted a military/Police Task Force tagged 'Operation Zaki' in 1995 and later a Joint Military Operation by Nigeria, Niger and Chad tagged 'Operation Flush Out' was set up to mitigate criminal violence in the border areas. These internal and external sources of

insecurity coupled with mass illiteracy and squalor heighten the conflicted dilemmas of researching the region.

Boko Haram: Strategy and Casualties

“The operational base and activities of Boko Haram have been in major cities in states in the North-East geopolitical zone, such as Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Bauchi. Its operations have been extended to some cities in other states such as Kogi, Kaduna, Kano, Gombe, Niger, and Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory.” (Osumah, 2013: 542). “Moreover, the group has unleashed female suicide bombers, targeted high-profile political figures, and cultivated ever-deepening ties with regional jihadists. Boko Haram-related violence has accounted for nearly 5,000 fatalities in the first seven months of 2014, underlining the growing destructiveness of the insurgency.” (Weeraratne, 2017: 611).

Burns (2015: 13) explains that, “Boko Haram has increased its use of kidnapping, particularly women and children, for purposes as diverse as slavery and creating dissatisfaction with the Nigerian government. Boko Haram kidnappings began in 2011 and 2012 after the Nigerian government detained more than 100 wives and children of Boko Haram leaders. Boko Haram takes the women and girls to temporary camps and then later to houses in towns and villages where it has safe houses for indoctrination.”

Boko Haram constructs IEDs from materials such as commercial-grade explosives purchased on the black market or stolen from mining companies. Explosives used in recent bomb attacks have been of the quality used for blasting rocks in mining operations. Boko Haram also uses fertilizer to create homemade explosives (HME)” (Burns, 2015: 12).

Table 2 provides a sampling of recent independent explosive device (IED) attacks in Nigeria:

Table 2: Recent IED Attacks in Nigeria

Date	Location and number of Casualties
14 February 2014	A car bomb at a market in Maduguri killed at least 19 people.
12 May 2014	A suicide bomber killed four civilians in the Sabon Gari area of Kano.
18 May 2014	A bomb at the School of Hygiene killed eight people in Kano city.
23 June 2014	A bomb at the School of Hygiene killed eight people in Kano city.
23 June 2014	A car bomb killed three soldiers at a checkpoint in Gwoza, Borno.
25 June 2014	Twenty-two people died when a bomb exploded at the Banex Plaza shopping centre in Abuja.
23 July 2014	Two bombs killed around 40 people close to a square where a prominent Islamic cleric was speaking to a crowd in Kaduna city. The cleric is a critic of Boko Haram.
27 July 2014	Five civilians and one soldier died when a bomb was thrown at people leaving church in Kano city, Kano
31 July 2014	Two people died when a suicide bomber, alleged to be a child, detonated her explosives outside Kano State Polytechnic in Kano, Kano.
28 November 2014	Boko Haram attacked the Mosque of the Emir of Kano during weekly prayers with two suicide bombers and gunmen killing at least 120 people and wounding another 270 people.
10 January 2015	A bomb at Monday Market killed at least 12 people in Maiduguri, Borno. The bomb may have been carried by a girl.
11 January 2015	Two female suicide bombers detonated twin bombs at the GSM market, close to Brima Primary school, killing eight people in Potiskum, Yobe
1 February 2015	A suicide bomber killed himself and seven others outside a politician's home in Potiskum, Yobe.
2 February 2015	A bomb exploded in a parking lot outside a stadium in the northeastern Gombe where Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was speaking at a re-election campaign
22 February 2015	A bomb carried by a girl exploded and killed five at GSM Market in Potiskum, Yobe.
24 February 2015	A bomb attack killed 10 at a crowded bus station in Potiskum, Yobe
26 February 2015	A suicide bomber killed 18 people at Tashar Gandu bus station in Biu, Borno.

Source: Burns (2015: 12-13) Threat Tactics Report on Boko Haram (2015) (US Army Unclassified)

Table 2 illustrates the extent of IED casualties and violence in Nigeria.

Imobighe (2006) recommends “an integrated conflict management approach in combating terrorism. According to him, this adoption is based on the utilization of problem solving techniques to comprehensively address the phenomenon of terrorism, this technique comprises of conflict prevention, peace promotion, conflict control, conflict abatement and conflict resolution.” (Imobighe, 2006; Ofongo, 2016). “This means that a broad-based approach against terrorism that focuses not only on state-centric security but on human security, with a view to addressing the root causes of insecurity should be adopted.” (Ofongo, 2016: 159).

Chapter Four

Intelligence Failure and the Nigeria Security Tragedy

Intelligence is the most vital instrument of any state and good intelligence is the best defense of a state. McDowell (2008: 75) state that, “This form of intelligence may be localized at district or regional level, or it may be conducted at a headquarters level close to the organizational and national clients, whether they are in corporate executives, senior government officials, group commanders, or politicians. In essence, in the law enforcement context, strategic intelligence provides senior managers and executives (at *all* levels) with insight and understanding into current and emerging trends; changes in the crime environment; threats to public safety and order; opportunities for controlling action and the development of counter-programs and likely avenues for change to policies, strategies, programs, and legislation.”

This chapter examines the concepts of intelligence failure and its implication to a state’s counterterrorism strategy. Further discussed in this chapter are the structure, organisation and management of intelligence in Nigeria and how the forces of ethnicity, religion and corruption have affected Nigeria counterterrorism strategy.

Intelligence Failure: what it means?

Literally, intelligence failure implies that intelligence was not available to, or fell short of, or could not serve its purpose of aiding policy makers to take the correct decisions as may be revealed by later information and occurrence. Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:63) define intelligence failure as “essentially a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interest.” Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:62) further assert that, “whether it is subjectively surprised by what happens

is less important than the fact that the government or the military is doing or continues to do the wrong thing. And that ‘the possible failure of intelligence to assess a situation correctly is a danger coeval to intelligence itself.’”

Jervis (2001:2) advances that:

The most obvious sense of intelligence failure is a mismatch between the estimates and what later information reveals. This is simultaneously the most important and least interesting sense of the term. It is the most important because to the extent that policy depends on accurate assessments, almost the only thing that matters is accuracy. In two ways the brute fact of the intelligence failure is uninteresting. First it does not take much analysis to decide that there was a failure, all that is required is the observation that subsequent events did not match the assessment. Second, that the fact that intelligence is in error does not surprise scholars and should not surprise policymakers.

Mark Lowenthal (cited in Brockington, 2012: 8) sees “an intelligence failure is the inability of one or more parts of the intelligence process—collection, evaluation and analysis, production, dissemination—to produce timely, accurate intelligence on an issue or event of importance to national interests’.” Brockington (2012: 8) observes that whereas Shulsky’s definition gives an impression of misunderstanding of intelligence by consumers as the core in intelligence failure; Lowenthal’s definition presents faulty analysis process as central to intelligence failure. This is reconciled in Brockington (2012: 9) “intelligence failure is the result of an adversary’s actions that were not identified during the intelligence cycle and achieves strategic surprise, despite the government having all the information necessary to anticipate the events and its consequences.”

Intelligence failure is a hitch at any stage or by any actor in the intelligence process that results in inaction and or inappropriate action that is inimical, or detrimental to national interest or the interest of an actor. Shulsky and Schmitt (2002: 64) note that, “this involves instances in which relevant information cannot be obtained at all and or disorder of the analytical process that causes data to be ignored or misinterpreted and instances in which there are supervening

institutional limitations.” The consequences are usually surprise attacks, operational and tactical failures, or ignorance of the real facts of a situation resulting in the continuation of a wrong policy.

Intelligence is a word describing a perceived reality, event, action, state of affairs, subject or object. It could only seem plausible to estimate that intelligence like most concepts in social inquiries has its definitional and conceptual nuances in relation to contexts, subject, object, environment and usage/register. However, security praxis calls for precise, concise and indeed operational rather scientific concepts to facilitate objective application in furtherance of security administration.

Jervis (2001:1) observes that,

despite the fact that most theories of international politics assume that actors see the world fairly accurately, many wars are preceded if not caused by failures to predict what others will do, and almost by definition crises involve intelligence failures.” He argues that “all too often, intelligence and critics rely on intuitive ways of and rhetorical forms of exposition. More careful, disciplined, and explicit reasoning will not automatically yield the right answers but will produce better analysis, do better job of revealing where the key differences in opinion lie, and increase the chances of being correct.

At certain historical intervals critical observers are often shocked when a supposedly sophisticated nation is rattled by a sudden collapse of security apparatus. How can one explain the assassination of Anwar Sadat of Egypt in October 1981? In spite of the sophistication of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence, Yitzhak Rabin was shot publicly in 1995. Not until after the collapse of Iraq’s Saddam Huseini, did the world get to know that there was no single nuclear project in Iraq. On more than one occasion the whole world had been informed that Osama bin Laden has been killed in either Bora in Afghanistan or elsewhere. It is written by historians, both ancient and modern, that the use of intelligence is as old as man. Alexander the Great of Macedonia has been reported to always have been interested in the size of population, and the

productiveness of the soil of other lands which he would later conquer. The success of Julius Caesar was much more the result of his superior use of intelligence. According to the Duke of Marlborough, 'No war can be conducted successfully without early and good intelligence'. . Intelligence in a nutshell is a *sine qua non* for the survival of a nation.

There is evidence of intelligence failure throughout history. The Pearl Harbour intelligence failure, the failure of Israeli intelligence to foresee the Egyptian-Syrian attack that started the October 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the assessment of Iraqi nuclear capacity, (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002); "the 9/11 attack, the Boston Bombing in USA (Firester 2011, Arase 2013); 'The attempted Christmas Day airplane bombing over Detroit on December 25, 2009, occurred more than eight years after 9/11; five years after the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence fiasco; and after countless commission reports, new congressional legislation, presidential executive orders, and other directives that diagnosed and sought to prevent such intelligence failures through widespread organisational, legal, policy, and tradecraft reforms.'" (Brockington, 2012); the several intelligence failures encountered by the Green Team in the mission to kill Osama Bin Laden (Owen, 2013); the October 1 2010 bombing of Nigeria's Eagle Square; the abduction and continued hostage-taking of more than 276 Chibok girls in Nigeria; are among many incidents cited as cases of intelligence failure.

The dynamics of changes in content and context of information and the inherent flux in the behaviour of an adversary rather affirm that inaccuracies are an integral part of the intelligence process and product. This in part perhaps explains why Sun Tzu insists that intelligence 'cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations, it must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.' Intelligence should be on the 'now' in order to serve optimum utility.

Shulsky and Schmitt (2002) drawing instances from empirical cases identify and advance the causes of intelligence failure as subordination of intelligence to policy, unavailability of information when and where needed, received opinion (conventional wisdom) and mirror imaging by which is meant the judging of unfamiliar situations on the basis of familiar ones.

Jervis (2001) drawing from the lessons of the Iranian revolution and Iraq war adduces the causes of intelligence failure to include too much certainty, no alternatives considered, insufficient imagination, group think, excessive consensus, failure to challenge assumptions, politicization, evidence from comparisons, overlearning, denial and deception, decision makers' needs and intelligence conflict with them, conflicting pressures, confidence and perseverance, resistance to fallback positions, too early or too late, cognitive predispositions, among others.

Olalikan (2013) presents the quality of operatives and analysts, synergy and politics as fundamental factors in intelligence failure. Drawing from the post-cold War and post 9/11 strategic developments and the responses from the United States of America, Firester (2011) advances 'failure to adapt' as a theoretical basis of intelligence failure.

According to Firester (2011: 14)

“It involves more depth and breadth. An example that illustrates the difference between the two follows: When a police department decides to switch to a new uniform it is a mere change. When the department decides that a new approach to crime-fighting is necessary to suit the level and nature of crime in the community, it has adapted. As a theory, “adaptation failure” has been generated and pursued by Amy B. Zegart. Analyzing failed intelligence reforms prior to 9/11. She views efforts to reform as having suffered from a failure to adapt. *Adaptation*, Zegart asserts is a more appropriate term than *change*. Adaptation connotes something entirely distinct from change. When an organization experiences change it is a partial measure. A more robust change may be measured by its magnitude, which may be seen as a transformation. Yet adaptation indicates a recognition that an “improved fit” must develop between an organization and its external environment Zegart asserts that awareness of a changing environment prior to 9/11 had been prevalent within the IC and Congress, and numerous recommendations to better meet the new threats had not produced the requisite adaptation.”

Firester (2011: 18) further asserts that:

“A large body of work regarding intelligence failures has centered on surprise attacks. It is quite ordinary for an IC to experience failure, as it has been suggested that failure is inevitable, natural, and to be expected. In many ways this idea had become a matter of accepted wisdom in the IC: In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational.”

The extant literature indicates that intelligence failure is an integral part of intelligence praxis. Intelligence seeks to reduce uncertainty and not necessarily guarantee certainty. However, the degree of success in this effort at managing uncertainty could be improved with institutional mechanisms that ensure engagement of the requisite quality of intelligence personnel; a culture of competitive analysis and adoption of a ‘devil’s advocate’; reconciliation of intelligence-policy interface; flexible, adaptive empathy and expertise; systemic synergy and fluid information sharing and trans agency collaboration.

Intelligence Failure and the Nigeria Security Tragedy

Intelligence is considered the “first line of defense against terrorists.” Collecting it does no good if it is not analyzed and then shared with the other institutions and agencies combating terrorism. Amaraegbu (2013: 76) “Intelligence gathering is a key element in fighting the chronic and difficult battles that makes up an insurgency. To evaluate accurately terror threats and the character of terrorist organisations is an extremely challenging task for states.”

In Nigeria, there are four statutory security intelligence agencies, the State Security Service (SSS), the Defence Intelligence Agency and the Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB). Though each of the four major Nigerian intelligence agencies has its specific tasks defined by law, to undertake their tasks efficiently and effectively, they are

supposed to coordinate their activities among themselves with the aim of providing adequate security of lives and property. The only existing channels of coordination between them are the Joint Intelligence Board and the Office of the National Security Adviser (Arase, 2013:58-59).

The four security intelligence agencies have different responsibilities relating to intelligence generation concerning internal security, defense and external subversion respectively. The state security services are in charge of protection of government officials and property and gathering vital domestic intelligence, while the defence intelligence agency's main goal is to protect the territorial sovereignty of Nigeria and to promote cooperation with military allies to foster regional and global security. The national intelligence agency is in charge of external intelligence, while the Force Intelligence Bureau was established to gather intelligence for the department of police on criminal activities.

The lead agency for countering terrorism in Nigeria is the office of the National Security Adviser. However, the role of the office has been politicized by forces of religion and ethnicity and this has made it very difficult to gather human intelligence. This weakness has made it possible for foot soldiers of Boko Haram to carry out their attacks on soft targets which include places of worship and businesses. According to Blanchard (2016: 2) "The group has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in Nigeria." He further stated that "According to the State Department's most recent terrorism report (issued in early 2015, prior to Buhari taking office), among the various dynamics limiting the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram were a lack of coordination and cooperation between security agencies; corruption; misallocation of resources; limited requisite databases; the slow pace of the judicial system; and lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to implement anti-terrorism laws" (Blanchard, 2016: 10).

Osumah (2013: 550) stated that,

Furthermore, scathing criticisms from numerous entities about the slow and reactive responses of internal security agencies to the Boko Haram insurgency, failure to muster any credible effort to protect innocent citizens, and shoddy coordination between police and intelligence forces across the country feed into a widespread belief in Nigeria that the current internal security policies and institutions in the country are not functioning well.

The Nigerian security forces in their present state do not appear to be in a position to defeat the terrorists and kidnappers. According to Amaraegbu (2013: 68) “Their ubiquitous roadblocks, token arrests, reactive soldiers neither frighten Boko Haram nor other contestants (kidnappers and armed robbers) with superior fire power.”

This politicalisation of the intelligence community has made recruitments easy for Boko Haram leaders as they capitalize on the political situations (corruption and political instability) of the country. Osumah (2013: 550) state that This is because security issues have allegedly been manipulated by the Nigerian ruling-elite at various levels of government to allow them to set aside huge sums of money as security votes (Money received to counter-terrorism), which is often subject to abuses.”

Informants have directly linked corruption to the lack of weapons to fight terrorism (Pate, 2015). “Nigeria’s effort to defeat Boko Haram has not yielded the expected results, despite allocating approximately 25% of its budget for 2012 to the security in what ought to translate to improved military and intelligence coordination sector.” (Amaraegbu, 2013: 76). Pate (2015: 23) further is opinion that, “several informants allege that money allocated for arming and training forces fighting Boko Haram has instead been misappropriated by military and political leaders for their personal gain.”

According to Blanchard (2016: 12), “The government has arrested several former senior officials on corruption charges, including former President Jonathan’s National Security Advisor,

who has been charged with fraud over a \$2 billion arms deal for equipment that was reportedly never delivered. Jonathan's former chief of defense has been accused of stealing \$20 million from the air force, and, as of late March 2016, some 300 individuals, including army officers, and companies were under investigation for the embezzlement between 2011 and 2015 of an estimated \$240 million in fraudulent or overpaid defense contracts" (Blanchard, 2016: 10).

"The federal government has tried to remain undamaged by the growing Boko Haram menace, but it has several significant weaknesses to overcome: seize the momentum and put the group's elusive leadership under intense pressure, build capacity of the rural villages where the sect find support, provide economic development, partner with communities and encourage neighbourhood watch groups" (Amaraegebu, 2013: 68).

Amaraegebu (2013: 77) notes that "at some point, President Jonathan inadvertently admitted that Nigeria's security and intelligence community, under his watch lack required intelligence capacity to carry out their basic duty of identifying enemy of State."

He further stated that

Some of the [Boko Haram members] are in the executive arm of government, some in the parliament/legislature arm, while some are even in the judiciary. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies. Some continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won't even know the person who will point a gun at you or plant a bomb behind your house. That is how complex the situation is (Adetayo, 2012, as cited in Amaraegebu, 2013: 77).

Amaraegebu (2013: 79) concluded that Boko Haram operates undetected because the local residents do not trust the government well enough to offer intelligence information. According to a report by space for change (2012) cited by Amaraegebu (2013: 79) "Majority of locals are hesitant, or unwilling, to provide information to security operatives about the hideouts and activities of the sect members. Consequently, absolute mistrust, suspicion, and fear characterize the relationship between the security operatives and the civilian populations in the volatile states,

undermining intelligence undertakings that would lead to the definite identification and extirpation of the sect's members and activities.” (Spaces for Change, 2012: 9 as cited in Amaraegbu, 2013: 79).

There is need for human intelligence in other to know the activities and operations of the group “Modern technologies like GPS and satellites have their limitations and these cannot be 100% accurate as human intelligence which is based on primary source” (Amaraegbu, 2013: 79).

Chapter Five

Conclusion

The Responsibility to Secure (R2S)

In contemporary strategic relations the idea of the concentric circles is represented in the international convention of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This is seen among scholars and chroniclers as one of the most important achievements of the World Summit on security in 2005. As note by the The International Development Research Centre, “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) stipulates, first, that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocities; second, that the International community should assist them in doing so; and, third, that, if the state in question fails to act appropriately, the responsibility to do so falls to that larger of states. This principle seeks to guarantee that the international community shall never again fail to act in the face of genocide and other gross forms of human rights abuse in any part of the world” (ICISS, 2001: xi-xii).

However, the contemporary reasoning has not tended to appreciate that protection is a design, a system or mechanism emplaced to ensure security. Protection could influence and guarantee security, but protection is not necessarily security. Security has been conceptualised as a state of human mind, a condition achieved, a process, a product, a development, human rights, or intelligence. However, all these conceptualisations could be operationalized in a feeling of safety, absence of fear and or apprehension of danger to self and accepted values. In fact, protective measures and systems are some times and often times sources or indicators of insecurity. Security therefore is a psychological state. It is an individualised psychological disposition and interpretation of the environment the individual finds herself in.

Here, I propose the idea of the Responsibility to Secure (R2S), which rests substantially on the ability of the state to secure, rather than protect, citizens first. The responsibility to secure is inalienable and localised in the security discourse. Since the R2S is inalienable, therefore, it is incumbent on all citizens to assume the R2P in the pursuit of R2S to achieve security. This thesis aligns with the universal axioms ‘security is our common responsibility’ and ‘security is the business of all’.

In reference to policing, Peel’s ninth principle is instructive, that the evidence of police efficiency is not in the overt presence of policing activities but in the absence of crime and threat to human and community safety. This evinces that police and policing efficiently rest not on the protective machinery and activities but in the absence of fear and apprehension of danger or threat to the people and their valued interests. The idea of protection emphasizes in most cases the emplacement of military response systems of the state.

This is drawn from the state centric perspective of security which does not encapsulate the vital requirements of individual, societal, economic and environmental dimensions of contemporary security praxis. The fundamental function and object of policing is to prevent crime and public disorder, and render public services in order to minimize fear and apprehension of danger among the citizenry. This fact implies that policing national security requirement in contemporary security praxis entails military strategic, economic, societal, individual and environmental dimensions. Policing function is essentially collaborative in substance and context as it is preventative in purpose.

Robert Peel instructively posited that the police and policing require the ownership, acknowledgement and support of the community to thrive and succeed. The pioneer proponent of formal Police organisation therefore conceptualized policing in the context of intelligence-led

policing. Intelligence-led policing is preventative in focus, collaborative in substance and requires various actors or stake holders to contribute in ensuring security through a system referred to as the Intelligence-Led Policing Cycle. These actors include the security managers, intelligence Analysts, the range of sworn and unsworn information collectors, field operators and informants, the community and consumers of intelligence products.

The exposition of R2S explicates the essence of roles of actors in the Principles of policing (Peel, 1829), the collective security strategy of post-World War1 international League of Nations, the post-World War11 concept of national security, Concentric Security Circles theory(Vogt,1990), the theory of security communities (Buzan, 1998); the multilateral policing paradigm (Baker, 2008), national security and defence linkages theory (Imobighe, 2003), Integrated national security theory (Imobighe,2013) theory of intelligence and intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008, Aremu, 2014).

The exposition of the R2S gives a foundation to identify a range of multiplicity of policing organisations and systems, the inherent and incidental roles of the actors in the systems and present a menu for the citizens to choose which to patronize, in the words of Bruce Baker (2008) depending substantially from the citizens' perception of efficiency, accessibility and affordability of the policing services.

The General Systems Theory identifies the key players, actors, the interactions, flow of information and communication within the systems. The theory identifies the relationship among various subsystems interacting to constitute a complex whole; and the interaction between the system and other systems within its environment. It emphasizes the character interaction, communication, interdependence, dependence and independence of the units with a system.

The idea of an open system supports that the system is dynamic, receptive and responsive to the realities in the environment. Intelligence-Led Policing presupposes community partnership, collaboration among agencies within the Intelligence Community; it emphasizes timely acquisition and dissemination of fore-knowledge to consumers or end users. It insists on systematic exploitation and centralized command and control of intelligence processes.

The Intelligence-Led Policing Cycle is an explication of the systematic set of logical thoughts and actions in the process of identifying the intelligence requirements, collecting, processing, analyzing and transforming information into intelligence; dissemination of the intelligence to influence action by the consumers and re-evaluating to identify gaps for further action.

In the circumstances of the revolution in information and communication technology with the attendant dynamics of contemporary security and defence requirements, the application of the General Open Systems Theory to the study of Intelligence Led Policing is apt. This systems approach essentially identifies the enlarging and dynamic range of actors, institutional structures and the environment of the intelligence, policing, security, national security, and Intelligence-Led Policing.

The systems approach sees the international relations as a set of interacting interdependent units constituting a whole. It perceives the global system as an input-output mechanism working automatically for goal attainment and equilibrium of the system. The approach also views the system as a convertor or as a processor of actions or policies input to it.

These inputs are processed within and converted by the system and released as appropriate into the environment as policy outputs, which are fed back into the system as support and demands and the process continues systematically. The systems approach draws analogy

from the functioning of systems in the physical and natural sciences to explain international relations. Its emphasis is on the working mechanism of interrelated parts of a whole, for goals attainment.

The approach aids in determining the international systems capacity for maintaining its equilibrium in the face of stress and for adapting to changes that are forced internally and externally. It assumes that all existing political units interact with one another according to some regular and observable pattern of relationship. Systems are identified by the features of observable units interacting interdependently for common goals attainment, autonomous relationship among these units thus forming a whole within an environment with discernable boundaries, and that these relations are intelligible, that is they could be explained and understood.

Counter-terrorism and National Security Strategy

Counterterrorism approaches are usually in consideration of short-term or long-term; hard power or soft power; unilateralism or multilateralism; tactical or strategic, local or global. The management of terrorism in Nigeria has been a systematic design execution assessment, development and administration of counter-terrorism operations. Counterterrorism represents the various forms of response to pre-empt, prevent and eliminate terrorism. It involves the use of intelligence, counterintelligence, as well as military forces to deal with all forms of terrorist threats (Imobighe 2006: 9).

Within this range, Crelinsten (2009) has distinguished ‘coercive counter terrorism’ involving the criminal justice and war models; Proactive counterterrorism involving intelligence, oversight and accountability, blocking terrorist financing, addressing of social grievances before they escalate into violent agitations effective community security and preventative

intelligence-led policing; Persuasive counter terrorism involving preventive and deterrence response criminal justice administration, information operations, psychological operation, propaganda and effective strategic communication, and offensive application of smart power; Defensive counter terrorism entails preventing attacks by target hardening, critical infrastructure protection, regulating the flow of people, goods, and services; mitigating attacks, natural disasters, public health and integration of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery mechanism; Long term strategic counter terrorism entails a consideration of root causes of terrorism, development, resource utilization, trade, and aid; it also involves promoting human rights, cross-cultural dialogue, education, democratization, environmental protection, and international cooperation.

The counterterrorism architecture in Nigeria presupposes the operation of a grand strategy which requires the systematic coordinated employment of all elements of national power in prosecuting the war against terror. This weakness of the Nigerian state has made it possible for foot soldiers of Boko Haram to carry out their attacks on soft targets (which include places of worship and businesses) without the awareness of security agency. This politicisation of the intelligence community as made recruitments easy for Boko Haram leaders as they capitalize on the political situations (corruption and political instability) of the country.

The overarching vision of the National Security Strategy of Nigeria (2014) is “to make Nigeria a violence-free, safe, self-reliant, prosperous and strong nation. The inherent mission in furtherance of this vision is to apply all elements of national power to ensure physical security, build individual and collective prosperity, cause national development and promote regional, continental and global affairs.”

The National Security Strategy (2014) accordingly “identified national security requirements in the following areas: National defence; political security; economic security; food security; social security; gender security; cultural security; environment security; educational security; health security, science and technology and innovation; space technology; external security; information technology and cyber security; labour security, transportation security; aviation security; maritime security; nuclear security; drug law security; strategic communication; youth security; crises management and critical national assets and infrastructure.”

National security intelligence requires a systematic culture of information collection and analysis and utilization of intelligence in guiding national strategic and tactical policy plans and action. The effective generation and application of national security intelligence has been aptly upheld as one critical asset that would strengthen national security capacity to management terrorism and other security challenges in Nigeria. Strategic policing is about adopting proactive and preventive methods of crime management.

Within the context of this broad conceptualisation of national security, the national security strategy (2014) identified the following existing and potential threats to security in Nigeria:

Domestic terrorism with possible international dimension; border security threat; Attack on Nigeria from hostile neighbours; increased transnational organised crime; risks of insurgency and nationalistic agitations; human trafficking; armed robbery and kidnap for ransom, disruption of oil and gas supplies; smuggling of goods across borders; oil bunkering and piracy, trafficking in drugs; climate change; communal and ethno-religious conflicts; pastoralists and farmers conflicts; politics and federalism in Nigeria; governance; poverty; proliferation of small arms and light weapons; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; illegal immigration; financial crimes cybercrime; natural hazards; The intermingling factors of religious fundamentalism that drives the terrorist campaigns, the political colouration of their activities, the fatalities of their operations and the established international network of the insurgents have combined to make terrorism the current most potent threat to Nigeria’s internal security and national cohesion.

Accordingly, massive law enforcement resources and concerted actions are increasingly being directed to counter terrorism operations.”

State response has been in consolidation and application of law enforcement and strategic counter insurgency operations in the context of Intelligence-Led Policing and Law enforcement; Joint Task Force (JTF) – A multi-agency approach incorporating the Military, Police and State Security Service; Military Action (Involving strikes independently undertaken by the Nigerian Armed Forces) ‘Hearts & Minds’ Approach (Developmental/Educational Projects including the Al-Majiri School Programme in the North) Diplomacy (International/Domestic) - aimed at negotiating and considering amnesty to terrorists, while weakening international support for them; Criminal Justice Approach (Prosecution of terrorist elements – Many have been convicted including Umar Sokoto, the mastermind of the United Nations House Bombing in Abuja.

Strategic Options to Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Framework

There is therefore need for a paradigm shift from the operational reactionary approach to a proactive system of intelligence-led policing; Community partnership; Inter-agencies integrated collaboration, Professionalism and Service to the people. Mainstreaming a proactive security mechanism as desirable as it has often been advanced in most contemporary national security strategies and discourse requires a deliberate resolve to operate dominantly intelligence-led security architecture.

This would require an adequately informed, sincere and determined leadership with a national intelligence-driven security philosophy; an effective and efficient collaboration among security agencies and between security agencies and the community; requisite intelligence technology, with a motivated intelligence community having the requisite human capacities and capabilities. It is apt to note that it will take a while for the nation and security agencies to attain

the operational capacity and professional orientation needed to pursue an effective counter terrorism campaign within the dictates of best international practices. We are making strides in this direction.

Besides, the Nigeria security community should consolidate the extant focus at partnering with all stakeholders in the security architecture, to reviewing and strengthening the following areas in order to advance our national counter terrorism efforts:

- Need to develop ‘*intelligence-led counter terrorism capacity*’ based on stronger synergy between the intelligence bodies in the country and intelligence agencies-community partnership;
- Strengthening of regional cooperation and capacity of neighbouring countries based on the realization that Boko Haram has been exploiting Nigeria’s porous borders and the limited capacities of neighbouring countries to its advantage;
- Prioritize specialized intelligence training for Nigeria Military and Security Forces;
- Address legitimate grievances, while isolating and dealing decisively with criminal elements masquerading as terrorists;
- Develop national strategies targeted at incorporating citizens’ participation in the nation’s counter insurgency initiatives;
- Strengthen national terrorism statutes and the judicial system to ensure speedy dispensation of terrorist-related cases;
- As a strategic approach, develop strategies in partnership with global players, to deal with the ubiquitous influence of AQIM on Boko Haram and other insurgency activities in the sub-region. This will require a broader counter-terrorism approach that will transcend dealing

with the national threat of Boko Haram to building partnerships to defeat AQIM network and limit their expanding influence in Africa. The extent to which this can be done may influence the level of success against domestic terrorism in Nigeria.

The Nigerian community should own up the responsibility to secure and effectively participate as required in supporting the intelligence agencies in the generation of intelligence and operations of community security partnerships. Security is knowledge driven. National security intelligence is founded in knowledge and development of actionable information. Intelligence is hinged on a strong research component and orientation and requires critical thinkers and people with research minds with the attendant attributes of brilliant curiosity, diligence, industry, patience and persistence, painstaking and analytic thoroughness. This a critical area of intellectual and academic development need.

The academia in Nigeria should therefore assume its inherent responsibility to develop faculties and requisite departments for research and intelligence development in synergy with the national security management community in order to produce intellectually grounded and professionally sound intelligence practitioners. Security and intelligence education need be mainstreamed at all levels of educational development process.

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