Canada and ‘Re-engaging’ United Nations Peacekeeping.
A Critical Examination.

by
Daria Goncharova

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Studies
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg

Copyright © 2018 Daria Goncharova
Abstract

With the advent of Justin Trudeau in 2015, Canada appears to be determined to revitalize its historic role as a peacekeeper. Central is whether Canada truly abandoned UN peacekeeping *per se*. In order to answer this question, the following needs to be addressed. The first relates to the meaning of UN peacekeeping and the evolution of peacekeeping’s aims, tools, and basic principles, such as consent, impartiality, and the appropriate use of force. The second concerns the role of Canada in UN peacekeeping from 1947 to 2017. Given the nature of UN peacekeeping and Canada’s role from 1947 to 2017, the rhetoric of Trudeau government is confusing. Canada never truly disengaged from UN peacekeeping. Rather, for a variety of reasons, it shifted from UN-led to UN-approved peace operations. If the Trudeau government’s re-engagement means he intends to support UN-led missions rather than UN-approved peace operations in contradiction from the current trend, this has several implications that require careful examination. The final chapter articulates some of these implications.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Jim Fergusson. I appreciate his time, patience, guidance, and support. Thank you so much for helping me improve my writing skills and critical thinking. I am also thankful to Dr. Andrea Charron for her recommendations and valuable comments. I thank the University of Manitoba, especially International Centre, Student Life, and, of course, the Department of Political Studies for all opportunities in which I was involved. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Reg Urbanowski from the College of Rehabilitation Sciences for the opportunity to work on other research interests.

I am grateful to my parents, Evgenia and Stanislav, who believe in me and give me enormous support in all my endeavours. I am very thankful for my mom’s motivational speeches and dad’s encouragement. I would also like to thank my true love, Vinicius, who not only supported and encouraged me but also discussed with me UN peacekeeping and Canada and read my endless drafts.
Table of Contents

Abstract.......................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... iii
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................... v
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ xi
List of Figures ............................................................................................................... xii
Chapter One .................................................................................................................. 13
  Introduction ................................................................................................................. 13
Chapter Two .................................................................................................................. 22
  United Nations Peacekeeping ..................................................................................... 22
    UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War ........................................................................... 23
    UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War ............................................................. 39
    Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 64
Chapter Three .............................................................................................................. 67
  Canada and United Nations Peacekeeping ................................................................. 67
    Canada’s Participation in Peace Operations in the UN Frameworks ...................... 68
    Canada’s Reorientation in UN Peacekeeping ............................................................ 73
    Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 84
Chapter Four .............................................................................................................. 86
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 86
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 92
Appendix A .................................................................................................................... 103
  Summary of the Main UN Documents ...................................................................... 103
Appendix B .................................................................................................................... 105
  United Nations and Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN Peace Operations over the Cold War ............................................................................................................. 105
Appendix C .................................................................................................................... 120
  Peace operations in the UN Framework with Canadian Uniformed Personnel Participation over 1948 - 2017 ........................................................................................ 120
List of Acronyms

AU African Union
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
CAF Canadian Armed Forces
CANLOG Canadian Logistics Company
CAR Central African Republic
CF Canadian Forces
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CMO Chief Military Observer
CP Conflict Prevention
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team
DCB Defence and Related Security Capacity Building
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DOMREP Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
EU CJA European Union Council Joint Action
EUFOR European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
FIB Force Intervention Brigade
GNI Gross National Income (GNI)
GAC Global Affairs Canada
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIF-H</td>
<td>Multinational Interim Force in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWS</td>
<td>No Exit Without Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYU</td>
<td>New York University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSGAP</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOP</td>
<td>Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>School of Advanced International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Senior Management Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>Troop-Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbr</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>First United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCI</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCIP</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCKO</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>Second United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEFME</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMOG</td>
<td>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission Staff Office Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPAs</td>
<td>United Nations Protected Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>UN Standby Arrangement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOB</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Traditional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTCOK</td>
<td>United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTEA</td>
<td>United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTERM</td>
<td>United Nations Terminology Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 1 - Summary of the Main UN Documents ................................................................. 103
Table 2 - United Nations and Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN Peace Operations over the Cold War.......................................................................................................................... 105
Table 3 - UN-led Peace Operations .................................................................................... 120
Table 4 - UN-approved Peace Operations ......................................................................... 127
List of Figures

Figure 1: Canadian Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations in the UN Frameworks, 1948-2016 ........................................69
Figure 2: Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN-led Peace Operations, 1948-2016 ..............71
Figure 3: Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN-approved Peace Operations, 1948-2016 ... 72
Chapter One
Introduction

Since its formation, UN peacekeeping\(^1\) has occupied a special place in Canadian rhetoric. During the 2015 Canadian federal election campaign, Justin Trudeau, then the Liberal candidate for Prime Minister of Canada, stated: “We will renew Canada’s commitment to peacekeeping operations.”\(^2\) According to his election platform, today’s ongoing conflicts have created a demand for Canada to re-engage in “international peace operations with the United Nations.”\(^3\) The Liberals pointed out that these operations could be realized through specialized capabilities ranging from medical assistance to technical support. Justin Trudeau also mentioned emerging possibilities for Canada such as the provision of well-trained, rapidly deployable personnel along with mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters units, and civilian police assistance. What is more, the expectation was that given concerns about the behaviour of some peacekeepers (especially those sent from developing countries) involved in the rape and pillage of civilians whom they are supposed to protect, Canadian peacekeepers would ensure rigorous monitoring of any misconduct while deployed on peace operations. In addition, the Liberal campaign platform promised to “contribute more to the United Nations’ mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.”\(^4\)

After the Liberal Party victory, Justin Trudeau launched his policy on the revitalization of Canada in UN peacekeeping. In the *Minister of National Defence’s Mandate Letter*, Justin

---

\(^1\) Within the framework of this thesis, UN peacekeeping, UN peacekeeping operations/missions, UN peace operations, UN peace support operations, as well as UN-led peacekeeping/peace operations/peace support operations are used interchangeably.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.
Trudeau reaffirmed his intentions *vis-à-vis* peacekeeping as expressed during the election campaign. He also called for closer cooperation of the Minister of National Defence with the Minister of Foreign Affairs “to renew Canada’s commitment to United Nations peace operations.” The *Defence Policy Review (2016) Public Consultation Document* underscored Canada’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget, its capacity building capability in training other peacekeeping forces, and the need to reform UN peacekeeping. This document also brought forward for public discussion the contributions the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) could make to UN peace operations. Later, the 2016-2017 Report on Plans and Priorities from the Department of National Defence, defined Canada’s contribution to international peace and security through “renewing Canada’s proud tradition of international leadership,” not, frankly, dissimilar from the Conservative government’s formulation of “projecting leadership abroad.”

In March 2016, at the United Nations’ headquarters in New York, Justin Trudeau officially stated that Canada would stand for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2021. He also added that one of the components of this campaign would involve a greater commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. In June 2016, Stéphane Dion, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the Security Council with four core propositions concerning the

---


8 “Canada First Defence Strategy” (National Defence, 2008).


10 Stéphane Dion was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from November 2015 to January 2017. He was replaced by Chrystia Freeland on 10 January 2017.
protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping missions. The first focused on the improvement of accountability mechanisms for better tracking failures among peacekeepers in civilian protection.\(^\text{11}\) The second stressed the necessity for clear civilian protection mandates from the Security Council.\(^\text{12}\) The third called for the collaboration of the United Nations with both regional and other international organizations.\(^\text{13}\) The last underscored the importance of training before the actual deployment of troops.\(^\text{14}\) During National Peacekeepers’ Day on the 9\(^\text{th}\) of August, Justin Trudeau again emphasized that Canada would move forward with UN peace support operations by increasing training capacities and the number of personnel.\(^\text{15}\)

After September 2016, the Liberal government moved from rhetoric to policy making. After the 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial, conducted in London, the UK, the Liberals made the following announcements. First, the Liberal government re-established Canada’s International Police Peacekeeping Program\(^\text{16}\) for the next five years “with renewed funding of $46.9 million per year provided through Budget 2016 for the first three years to allow for the deployment of up to 150 police officers.”\(^\text{17}\)


\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.


Next, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)\textsuperscript{18} was replaced by the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs).\textsuperscript{19} Overall, the PSOPs underscored three international peace and stability priorities: leadership on stabilization and fragile states policy; support to coordinated responses by the Government of Canada to conflicts and crises abroad, and the design and delivery of catalytic stabilization initiatives.\textsuperscript{20} The program was approved with a budget of $450 million over the next three years and transferred under the guidance of Global Affairs Canada.\textsuperscript{21} According to the PSOPs, the main international peace and stability priorities should cover countries like Ukraine, Lebanon, Syria, Colombia, Mali, Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{22}

The Liberal government also pledged that up to 600 Canadian Armed Forces personnel would be deployed in UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{23} Harjit Sajjan, the Minister of National Defence, promised to provide more details on the government’s peacekeeping plan by the end of 2016 after his visits to Africa. Nevertheless, the deadline was not met.

In June 2017, the government issued \textit{Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy} (2017). This policy review outlined Canada’s future international engagements including its commitments to the UN. The roles of the CAF are based on the same three pillars


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} “Peace and Stabilization Operations Program.”

\textsuperscript{23} “Canada to Support Peace Operations.”
as formulated by previous governments: strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world. The latter states that Canada’s contributions to a more stable, peaceful world would be made “through peace support operations and peacekeeping.”

The policy review also provided detailed budgetary projections. In order to meet Canada’s defence needs, annual defence spending would increase from $18.9 billion in 2016-2017 to $32.7 billion in 2026-2027. The document highlighted three key security trends: the evolving balance of power; the changing nature of conflict, and the rapid evolution of technology. Specifically, the changing nature of conflict mentions such challenges as global terrorism and the changing nature of peace operations.

This policy review emphasized eight types of operations ranging from counter-terrorism operations undertaken with NATO or as a coalition effort to peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral partners. Canada’s contribution in peace operations and stabilization missions includes four core elements: provision of Canadian personnel and training for UN peace operations; strengthening Canadian support for conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding; promotion of women and youth in peace and security, and reforming UN peace operations. This section adds Canada’s continuing intentions on the prevention of child soldiers as well as in the development of a stronger partnership with such actors as the European Union, the African Union, and like-

---


25 Ibid., 43. The annual defence spending are indicated on a cash basis. On an accrual basis, the annual spending will grow from $17.1 billion in 2016-2017 to $24.6 billion in 2026-2027. The difference between cash and accrual basis, see Ibid., 43.

26 Ibid., 49.

27 Ibid., 106.

28 Ibid., 84.
minded states, like those of the Francophonie. It also mentions that UN-led and UN-sanctioned structures are one of the best means for Canada to promote international stability.\textsuperscript{29}

The policy review also stated that the Canadian Armed Forces would be prepared to undertake operations aimed at the defence of Canada, NORAD obligations, with new capacities in some areas, commitments to NATO allies under Article 5, and a range of international peace and security operations with different capacities.\textsuperscript{30} Specifically, these capacities entail simultaneously two sustained deployments of around 500-1500 personnel, an one time-limited deployment of around 500-1500 personnel, two sustained deployments of around 100-150 personnel, two time-limited deployment of around 100-150 personnel, one Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, and one non-combatant evacuation operation.\textsuperscript{31}

Despite all these statements, this document fails to provide specifics on peacekeeping commitments. It is only known that the possible locations for the potential peace operations are directed towards the African countries of the Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali. Also, the Liberal government appears to focus its peacekeeping interests on Francophone countries.\textsuperscript{32} These countries are on the table because they are the most unstable and, as a consequence, the main recipients of UN troops.

The most recent announcements of the Liberal government regarding Canada’s commitments to UN peacekeeping were made during the November 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial summit, conducted in Vancouver, Canada. The Prime Minister announced the launch of two initiatives: the \textit{Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations}, designed to

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 84.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 106.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 106.

\textsuperscript{32} From current fifteen peacekeeping operations, Haiti, the Central African Republic, the Congo and Mali are Francophone countries.
increase the proportion of women deployed in UN peace operations, as well as the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers, aimed at ending recruitment of child soldiers and violations against children. In addition, the Liberals stated their intentions to implement innovative training programs to improve the overall effectiveness of UN peace operations.

Lastly, the current government pledged to contribute around 200 ground troops along with accompanying equipment to a Quick Reaction Force, as well as provide an aviation task force of Chinook and Griffon helicopters, and a C-130 Hercules. These 200 troops are supposed to be part of those 600 promised earlier troops. However, the location for these troops is still under discussion. It is also unclear the role and place of remaining 400 troops and 150 police officers, also promised during the previous UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial. This failure to deliver, at least for the time being, may relate to the initial misplaced rhetoric of the Liberal government.

By stating that Canada needs to revitalize its historic role as a peacekeeper, the Liberal government raised a lot of questions. One of the key questions is whether or not Canada truly abandoned UN peacekeeping per se. In order to answer this question, the following needs to

---


34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.


38 This information is as of January 5, 2018.

be addressed. The first relates to the meaning of UN peacekeeping. The second concerns the role of Canada in UN peacekeeping over 1947 to 2017. After exploring both aspects, the study concludes with some potential implications for Canada in light of its revitalization as a peacekeeper.

The thesis relies on a literature review, as well as primary and secondary documents. The literature review encompasses both historical and contemporary issues. In addition, the thesis provides empirical data on Canadian uniformed personnel (troops, military observers, police) for both UN-led and UN-approved peace operations\(^4\) between 1948 and 2017. Although other contributions of Canada to UN peace operations, such as training, capacity building, expert assistance, and financial contributions, are mentioned, they were not quantified because they require separate in-depth analysis.

The structure of the thesis is organized into four chapters. Having outlined how this thesis is organized and provided background concerning the Liberal government’s lofty peacekeeping intentions, Chapter Two discusses the concept of UN peacekeeping. In so doing, it provides the framework for the thesis. The chapter examines the main UN documents concerning the concept of UN peacekeeping. The chapter evaluates the definition of UN peacekeeping for both the Cold War and the post-Cold War period.\(^4\) The chapter also sheds light on the evolution of UN peacekeeping aims, tools, and basic principles, such as consent, impartiality, and the appropriate use of force.

---

\(^4\) The thesis employs “UN-approved peace operations” as operations which are mandated or approved and then mandated by the Security Council to coalitions of willing Member States or regional organizations. UN-approved peace operations include UN-authorizing, also known as UN-sanctioned or UN-mandated, peace operations. The term “UN-approved peace operations” was adapted from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, see “Peacekeeping | SAIS,” Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, accessed August 9, 2017, https://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/peacekeeping. The thesis employs “peace operations in the UN frameworks” as a collective word for UN-led and UN-approved peace operations. Peace operations which are not mandated by the Security Council and which are led by multinational forces outside of the United Nations are not considered in this thesis.

\(^4\) The year of the division between the Cold War and the post-Cold War period can vary. According to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1988 is a year which divides the Cold War from the post-Cold War period.
Chapter Three situates UN peacekeeping in the context of Canada. This chapter addresses a key issue raised by the Liberal government. It examines Canada's involvement in UN peacekeeping from 1948 to 2017. The chapter employs statistics regarding Canadian uniformed personnel in UN-led as well as UN-approved peace operations. The chapter gives the explanation why Canada's commitments to UN peacekeeping took different forms after the end of the Cold War. The chapter also looks at doctrinal thinking regarding Canadian defence and security.

The final chapter, Chapter Four, summarizes what has been learned about the concept of UN peacekeeping and Canadian role in it over the whole period from 1948 to 2017. In so doing, the chapter evaluates the rhetoric of the Liberal government and potential implications for the chosen policy course.
The term peacekeeping came into use in the United Nations’ vocabulary in 1947. For the period of its existence, UN peacekeeping has changed considerably. It started from traditional peacekeeping field operations, such as observing ‘neutral zones’ and interposing forces between interstate combatants, and evolved into peace operations which are situated in intrastate conflicts and may involve not only peacekeeping employing both military and civilian personnel but also conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and regional arrangements.

The chapter aims to define the concept of UN peacekeeping over the whole period of its existence between 1947 and 2017 and look at the evolution of its aims, tools, and basic principles such as consent, impartiality, and the appropriate use of force. The chapter categorizes the evolution of UN peacekeeping in accordance with UN documents. Due to numerous existing categorizations of UN peacekeeping in the academia, the chapter does not employ such categories as “generations” or any other typologies of peacekeeping offered by academics and research centres.42

The chapter consists of two sections. The first section examines UN peacekeeping origins. This sets the foundation for understanding its evolution in the post-Cold War period. The second section sheds light on the most important post-Cold War UN documents which have contributed to the development of the concept of UN peacekeeping. This section also briefly examines UN-regional cooperation.

42 Besides UN documents, there is a considerable amount of literature on the concept of UN peacekeeping and its evolution over time. Academic literature often explains how the concept of peacekeeping evolved in terms of generations or, in other words, which types of peacekeeping appeared over time. Academia characterizes peacekeeping during the Cold War as traditional, classic or first-generation. Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period is often referred to second-generation. However, some scholars and research centres prefer not to generalize peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War. As a result, they create more than two types or generations of peacekeeping.
UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War

After the Second World War, the UN collective security system was supposed to be based on consensus among the permanent Member States of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Nevertheless, with the beginning of the Cold War and the inevitable rivalry between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, this system became ineffective in dealing with threats to international peace and security. Under these circumstances, the UN found “a more narrow security role.” The United Nations came to be associated with such activities as mediation, the monitoring of cease-fire agreements, and the separation of hostile armed parties of the conflict. This led to two types of field operations: military observer missions, first implemented in the Balkans in 1947, and lightly armed peacekeeping missions, first employed during the Suez crisis in 1956. Both types of operations are often referred as “peacekeeping.” The notion of peacekeeping is not mentioned, however, anywhere in the UN Charter. Thus, before discussing the types of

43 Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe, and Roger Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 1997., 25. “Collective security is the premised on the idea that security is in the interest of all states, and threats to security often require a coordinated international response. States agree to confront security threats and to share in the costs of maintaining or enforcing the peace.” The legal ground for the United Nations collective security system lies in beforementioned Chapter VII as well as Chapter VI and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The idea of collective security system had already existed. The first effort to create the system of collective security was taken by the League of Nations.


46 Durch., 1.

47 Ibid., 1.

48 Sometimes observer missions are used as a separate category. However, in the post-Cold War UN documents, these types of missions are referred to traditional peacekeeping. Hence, “traditional peacekeeping” or “the traditional concept of peacekeeping” are employed throughout this thesis to describe these two types of missions.
missions completed during the Cold War, it is important to outline the authority on which Member States are conferred in order to carry out UN peacekeeping.

In Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the drafters articulated the main purposes of the UN. The first is to

maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.49

Further, Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”50 According to Article 24(1), the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.51 The five permanent members52 of the Security Council have a veto, which they may cast during voting procedures on all matters, except procedural issues. The decisions of the Security Council on all matters except procedural issues require “an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”53

49 “Chapter I: Purposes and Principles,” United Nations, June 17, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html. Besides the maintenance of international peace and security, the Member States agreed to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”; “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character”; and “be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”

50 “Chapter I: Purposes and Principles.”


52 Five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council include China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation, which is the successor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) since 1991.

Chapter VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter afford the Security Council with a host of measures to maintain international peace and security. All three chapters provide the foundation for the development of UN peacekeeping. However, Chapter VIII, which is on regional arrangements, became applicable only in the post-Cold War period, when the Security Council started to delegate peace operations to regional agencies.\(^\text{54}\) Moreover, during the Cold War, regional organizations either did not function as a peacekeeping actor, for example in the case of NATO, or were too weak to undertake such an action, such as the case of the Organization of African Unity,\(^\text{55}\) now known as the African Union.

According to Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), the conflicting parties, first of all, should seek a solution for their dispute by peaceful means such as “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Art. 33).\(^\text{56}\) If these methods fail, then the parties can bring a dispute to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly (Art. 35).\(^\text{57}\) Upon the request of conflicting parties, the Security Council may give recommendations. However, the decision to take these recommendations remains with the belligerents (Art. 38).\(^\text{58}\) Hence, the Security Council may recommend and encourage, but cannot compel parties to take actions unless they invoke Chapter VII.

\(^{54}\) The role of regional arrangements is discussed in the next section of this Chapter.


\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) “Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes.”
Under the authorizations of Chapter VII (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), the Security Council may decide if there is, indeed, a threat to international peace and security (Art.39). In the case of a threat, the UN Security Council may take provisional measures (Art. 40), including measures not involving the use of force such as the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (Art. 41), and measures involving the use of force through “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations” (Art. 42).

There were only two cases when the UN formally used military force, the Korean War and the Gulf War, and yet, these were not under Article 42 but under the general Chapter VII moniker.

In the implementation of enforcement action, the limits of the mandate, in theory, are determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) (Art. 45). In fact, the MSC has never been effective given that its membership includes the top military General of the P5, which, from the very beginning, could need agree to meet. Both the Korean War and the Gulf War were under the leadership of the United States. The MSC fulfills only an advisory function for the Security Council. The Member States of the United Nations also have “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack

---


60 “Chapter VII: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”


62 “Chapter VII: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”
occurs against [them], until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (Art. 51). Based on the measures proposed by Chapter VI and VII, it is noticeable that the drafters of the UN Charter had assumed that threat would take a form of an interstate, not intrastate conflict.

Finally, Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) points out that the development of the pacific settlement of local disputes should be primarily addressed through regional agencies and only then the Security Council. However, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (Art. 53). Therefore, on the one hand, Chapter VIII allows the Security Council to use regional agencies for enforcement actions. On the other hand, the coercive measures under Chapter VII cannot be taken without the authorization of the Security Council.

In the context of the Cold War, it became clear that, owing to the veto granted to the permanent members of the Security Council, the collective security measures would never be used against one of the great powers. Also, it was unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to launch a collective security operation authorized under Chapter VII. The only exception over the Cold War was the Korean War, when the Security Council adopted the resolution because the Soviet Union’s representative was absent. Hence, the UN

---

63 Ibid.

64 The difference between two types of conflicts, see footnote 116 below.


67 Ibid.

68 The Soviet Union boycotted proceedings in support of the People's Republic of China.
had to find a more modest alternative in order to maintain international peace and security. This alternative was found in peacekeeping.

The birth of UN peacekeeping is associated with the period from 1947 to 1956. The first features of United Nations observer missions can be found in the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). In December 1946, the Security Council established a Commission of Investigation to inspect claims made by Greece regarding the activities of its northern communist neighbours, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The Commission recommended creating the UNSCOB to monitor the Greek border. While the Soviet Union and its allies opposed a new commission, the United States pushed for a resolution to establish UNSCOB. Due to the gridlock in the Security Council, the United States proposed to move the matter to the General Assembly agenda.\textsuperscript{69} Eventually, the new commission created by the GA resolution 109 (II) started its work in 1947. The UNSCOB consisted of military observers deployed in six areas along Greek northern border. The committee employed good offices to settle disputes and observe violations of the peace. Even though UNSCOB was not under a UN command, it was created and deployed by the United Nations. The UN flag and ID badges were used for the first time.\textsuperscript{70}

Other prototypes of traditional observer missions were also implemented in Korea and Indonesia. In 1947, the General Assembly established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). Its mandate included observing election processes, promoting the withdrawal of occupying forces, and guiding the political transition to full independence.\textsuperscript{71} In 1948, the General Assembly took the recommendations of UNTCOK and

\textsuperscript{69} Jocelyn. Coulon, \textit{Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping?}, 2.

\textsuperscript{70} Jocelyn. Coulon.

formed the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), which had the similar responsibilities with the added tasks of observing and reporting the progress on Korea’s situation. In 1950, owing to the report of two Australian military observers, Major F.S.B Peach and Squadron Leader R.J. Rankin, it was concluded that North Korea initiated the act of aggression against the south.\textsuperscript{72} This evidence became the main ground for the further actions of the Security Council.

In 1947, the Netherlands resumed their hostilities against the Indonesian independence movement in northeast Sumatra. Due to the conflict, the Security Council created two bodies, the Consular Commission and the Good Offices Commission, which were responsible for reporting any developments on the ceasefire agreements. In 1949, the Security Council replaced the Committee of Good Offices by United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI). Its mandate encompassed the same duties as it was assigned before for the Committee of Good Offices, but with the focus on three tasks: first, the establishment of the Interim Federal Government in Indonesia not later than 15 March 1949, second, monitoring the local elections, and third, ensuring “the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia…at the earliest possible date and in any case, not later than 1 July 1950.”\textsuperscript{73} The Consular Commission continued to function as a facilitating body by providing military observers and other staff and facilities.

The responsibilities of observer missions in Korea and Indonesia had the similar features. Both were in charge of observing, reporting and monitoring elections. Also, these observer missions faced the same problems. First, only few Member States were involved and were

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

eager to provide military observers. Second, there was a lack of cooperation from the conflicting parties. In case of Korea, it led to the war.

The first commonly recognized United Nations traditional observer missions were the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). They became recognized because these missions founded most of rules and principles for further UN observer missions. In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved a plan for the partition of Palestine, which meant the establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with a neutral status for Jerusalem under the supervision of the UN.74 The plan did not satisfy the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States. In May 1948, Britain released its mandate over Palestine, and the State of Israel was officially declared taking from some of the Palestinian territory. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, with the support of Arab States, began hostilities against Israel. In response, the Security Council called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce should be supervised by a UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, of Sweden, with a group of military observers.75 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) started its work in 1948.

Around the same time in the southern Asia, there was another emerging conflict. In 1947, India and Pakistan obtained independence, while the state of Jammu and Kashmir became disputed territory between these two countries. In January 1948, the United Nations established the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute.76

---


75 Ibid.

The commission was led by a Military Adviser with the assistance of military observers. In January 1949, the first group of observers, as part of UNMOGIP, arrived in the mission area. After the conclusion of the Karachi Agreement between India and Pakistan, the UNCIP was dissolved, while the military observers continued to monitor the ceasefire line between the conflicting parties.

American Ralph Bunche, Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs from 1955 to 1967 and Undersecretary-General from 1968 to 1977, made the biggest contribution to the principles of observer missions. Being the UN chief mediator of UNTSO in 1948, he laid the foundation for future peacekeeping operations. According to his instructions, military observers under the United Nations authority were to be completely objective in terms of observing and recording activities, adhere to the principles of impartiality over the conflict situation, and be visibly identified as UN personnel (even though observers wore national uniforms, they had a United Nations armband. Blue berets with UN badge were invented in November 1956).

These observer missions clearly fit into Chapter VI of the UN Charter in which the use of force is prohibited. The only circumstances when observers are allowed to use force is self-defence if they are physically threatened. Observers can be deployed only when a peace agreement or cease-fire arrangement is in place. Observers operate with the consent of the parties and are dependent on the cooperation of the parties for their effectiveness. As a result, they have no power to enforce any decisions and cannot prevent violations of agreements. They

---

77 Ibid.


80 Ibid.
can merely record them. However, the presence of observers is considered as a deterrent to future violations of the truce.\textsuperscript{81} Thus, the main responsibility of observers includes reporting incidents, or any complaints to their military supervisors and the mediator, where the latter reports directly to the Secretary-General and subsequently the Security Council.\textsuperscript{82} Importantly, in the early years, the troops were under the command of the Secretary-General.

These observer missions became forerunners for what is now referred to as traditional UN peacekeeping missions. Bellamy and Williams point out that while UNSCOB, UNTSO, and UNMOGIP articulated key concepts of UN peacekeeping, such as impartiality of military observers and host nation consent, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) set up in the Sinai in 1956 formalized the traditional conception of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{83} The UNEF I showed the capability of the UN to resolve a critical crisis. It was especially important in the context of both the Cold War and the process of decolonization. Most of the principles elaborated during this first peacekeeping operation not only became the basis for peacekeeping missions over the Cold War, but also remain influential today. This operation moved from observing and supervising to an interposing strategy.

The Suez crisis began over the access to the Suez Canal in the summer of 1956 among Egypt, Israel, Britain, and France. By the end of October, the conflict escalated. On 29 October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt.\textsuperscript{84} Two days later, Britain and France intervened under the pretense of enforcing a cease-fire between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and ensuring “free passage for shipping through the Canal until a peace could be brokered.”\textsuperscript{85} In response to suspicious

\begin{itemize}
  \item[Ibid.]
  \item[Ibid.]
  \item Alex J. Bellamy, \textit{Understanding Peacekeeping}, 2nd ed.. (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2010), 176.
  \item This attack was a part of a secret plan elaborated by Britain, France, and Israel.
  \item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
actions of Israel, Britain, and France, the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, tried to submit draft resolutions calling for Israel to immediately withdraw from Egypt. Due to strong interests in the Middle East, Britain and France vetoed these resolutions.

As a result of the vetoes, the Security Council could not pass any resolutions on the situation. Therefore, the matter was transferred to the General Assembly under the General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) entitled “Uniting for Peace resolution,” which in turn resulted in an emergency special session of the General Assembly. The Assembly called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from occupied territories. It also created the first United Nations Emergency Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. The complex nature of Suez crisis required more than just military observers. It required the rapid deployment of military forces. As such, the General Assembly, limited in terms of enforcement actions, established a novel kind of field operation: interposition of forces. As noted, this kind of operation was not envisaged in the UN Charter and, consequently, demanded guidelines among member states.

86 As noted, the veto blocked the work of the Security Council. The General Assembly was looking for alternative ways to resolve regional conflicts. For example, in response to the Soviet Union’s strategy to veto any decisions by the Security Council on the Korean War, in 1950 after the initial resolution allowing member states to aid South Korea, the General Assembly adopted the resolution 377 A known also as “Uniting for Peace” resolution or “Acheson Plan.” The resolution established the mechanism of the “emergency special session.” In the case of the deadlock of the Security Council, an urgent security matter could be transferred to the General Assembly even without the consent of all the permanent members of the Security Council. In effect, the resolution challenged the monopoly of the Security Council over the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it did not give the General Assembly the ability to take mandatory action. See, Ray Smith, “Peacekeeping without the Secretary-General: The Korean Armistice Arrangements,” accessed May 11, 2017, http://media.peaceopstraining.org/theses/smith.pdf., 7.


88 Ibid. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was later given the I to distinguish from subsequent missions.

89 This conflict was especially complex because it was potentially a superpower showdown. It threatened to divide the United States and Great Britain.
Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961, along with other influential advisors, including Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson, former President of the General Assembly, conceived of the guidelines for the first UN Emergency Force. In his second and final report on the plan for an emergency UN Force, Dag Hammarskjöld emphasized five comprehensive principles for the conduct of UNEF I. First, the Force should be based on the principles reflected in the UN Charter and commanded by a UN-appointed chief military officer, which should be responsible to the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. The authority of the UN-appointed chief military officer should be independent of any national interests and should meet goals set by the UN, not individual states. It is noteworthy that, due to complex nature of the conflict, the Secretary-General could no longer be a mission commander. The second guideline derived from the context of the Cold War and special interests of great powers in the Middle East – especially the Suez Canal crisis; the permanent members of the Security Council were not recommended to take part in the composition of the staff and contingents. Third, the operation should be conducted only with the consent of the parties and in cooperation with local authorities. This principle also explained the nature of the operation as an interposition of forces. “It would be more than an observer corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it was stationed; nor should the Force have functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions, on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all necessary steps to comply with the recommendations of the General Assembly.” The fourth guideline should have touched on

---

90 Lester Pearson offered to establish an emergency international UN force. In other words, he proposed an interposition of forces under the UN command.


92 United Nations. Department of Public Information., 38. This recommendation was made primarily to keep Great Britain and France out of the Suez Crisis. Also, in the first report on the plan for an emergency UN Force, Dag Hammarskjöld highlighted that the force for UNEF I should be constituted of middle and smaller powers.

93 Ibid.
financing, but provided no more than a statement that the Member States involved in the force were expected to cover the expenses of equipment and salaries.\textsuperscript{94} The last principle recognized that, due to a lack of time, the question of participation in the Force and other unresolved matters on the operation would be first discussed in a small committee, and only then, those issues would be brought to the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{95}

Another important aspect raised during UNEF I was the use of force. This peacekeeping operation was not authorized under Article 42 of Chapter VII. However, similar to previously observer missions, soldiers deployed as part of the mission were allowed to use weapons in self-defence if they were physically threatened with force as per normal rules of engagement of military forces. Overall, Dag Hammarskjöld defined peacekeeping “within the framework of the Charter, saying that peacekeeping falls under ‘Chapter VI and a half’ of the Charter, somewhere between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully (outlined in Chapter VI) on the one hand, and more forceful, less ‘consent-based’ action (Chapter VII) on the other.”\textsuperscript{96}

Over the Cold War period, UN peacekeeping was performed by two types of field operations: observer missions and lightly armed peacekeeping missions. However, there were some notable exceptions.\textsuperscript{97} Moreover, most of the operations during the Cold War had only military components and did not have the modern day “whole-of-government” partners.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 39.


\textsuperscript{97} Some UN peacekeeping operations of the Cold War had functions of not only monitoring ‘neutral zones’ and interposing forces but also peacemaking, state-building, and humanitarian assistance. These operations include the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), a small political transition mission in West New Guinea (UNTEA/UNSF), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the UN formed both short-term peacekeeping missions, such as the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) and the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), and long-term peacekeeping missions in such locations as Cyprus and the Middle East. All of these initiatives typically occurred in the period following a ceasefire agreement and were to facilitate political dialogue between conflicting parties. In other words, there was peace to be kept.

To sum up, owing to the flexibility of the UN Charter, UN peacekeeping appeared as *ad hoc* response to particular conflict situations, and its legal framework was generated through practical application. Moreover, most peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were improvised to the situation but following some common principles and guidelines. The guidelines were implemented gradually over the course of the development of the concept of UN peacekeeping. To illustrate, blue berets and then helmets as a distinguishing feature of UN military personnel, were introduced in 1956 during UNEF I. Previously, UN peacekeepers wore only UN armbands. The Office for Special Political Affairs, the predecessor of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), was the responsible body for infrastructure and planning of UN peacekeeping missions but was created only in 1961.

Initially, the peacekeeping budget was the part of the UN regular budget. In 1963, the budget for UN peacekeeping was separated from the regular budget but was based on the same formula of assessments for the regular budget of the United Nations, i.e. it was a reflection of

---


99 Bellamy, 49.

100 Blue berets were used in the early years of peacekeeping; blue helmets were introduced because the conflicts became more complicated, involving non-state actors, and UN personnel could be shot at.

a state’s GDP.\textsuperscript{102} The first budget was adopted by the General Assembly resolution on Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1973. This budget system established four types of states’ contributions: the permanent members of the Security Council, economically developed Member States, less economically developed Member States, and the least economically developed Member States.\textsuperscript{103} In 2001, the budget system introduced ten levels of contribution.\textsuperscript{104}

Over the Cold War and its fifteen peacekeeping missions,\textsuperscript{105} the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping were established. They are premised on host state consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. The first component, consent, implies that the state on whose territory peacekeeping forces would be deployed has to give its permission including which troops are deployed. If for any reason, permission is withdrawn, peacekeepers must leave the country accordingly.\textsuperscript{106} The second principle means that peacekeepers do not represent interests of any side and do not intervene in the fighting; “there is no designed aggressor, and the


\textsuperscript{104} “55/235. Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (United Nations), accessed May 11, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/235., 2. Since the 1990s the budget has been growing and the financial burden was becoming especially bigger for the permanent member states of the Security Council. In 2001 the budget system based on four levels of contribution was replaced by the one which implies ten levels of contribution, categorized from A to J. This budget system relieved the expenditures of the permanent member states and offered a considerable discount on peacekeeping dues to least economically developed countries belonging to categories I and J. See also, Bellamy, \textit{Understanding Peacekeeping}, 61.

\textsuperscript{105} Fifteen UN peacekeeping operations were counted for the period from 1948 to 1988.

peacekeeping forces are to implement their mandate without discrimination.” The requirement of the minimum use of force allows peacekeepers only to carry light weapons, typically rifles or side arms, and to use force only in self-defence and, since 1973, in defence of their mandate as well. National military and later police personnel are the only sources for the UN uniformed forces (i.e. no hired mercenaries). Among other characteristics, it is worth emphasizing the prerequisite of a ceasefire agreement, the contribution of contingents on a voluntary basis, the multinational composition under UN command, and international backing especially from the Security Council.

It is noticeable that over the Cold War, the UN did not provide a definition of UN peacekeeping. Rather, definitions of traditional peacekeeping are found in the academic community. For instance, Paul F. Diehl defines peacekeeping as “The imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal in military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved.” According to Rosalyn Higgins and Brigadier Michael Harbottle,

---

107 Diehl., 7.

108 Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” *International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (July 1993): 451–64, doi:10.2307/2622309, 455. Since peacekeepers were frequently blocked by armed persons to fulfill their mandate, for instance, soldiers of one of the conflicting parties could create a roadblock and refuse a UN convoy in passing through, the use of force began to apply in defence of the mandate as well. Later the Brahimi Report will elaborate more on the use of force in defence of the mandate. See, the section on UN peacekeeping in Post-Cold War.

109 Police personnel have been deploying in UN peace operations since the 1960s. Traditionally, the mandate of police officers include monitoring, observing, and reporting. In the post-Cold War, the responsibilities of police were extended.


111 “Peacekeeping | SAIS.”


113 “Peacekeeping | SAIS.”
peacekeeping “is the act of peaceful third-party intervention where the practitioner remains wholly impartial and uninvolved in the dispute of the parties concerned: where its terms of reference are founded on negotiation and mediation and not on enforcement action.”  

Marrack Goulding explains traditional peacekeeping as follows:

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.

All of these definitions explicitly underscore “the holy trinity” of traditional peacekeeping - consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. They also point to the interstate nature of conflict. Another important feature noted by Rosalyn Higgins and Brigadier Michael Harbottle is that during the Cold War peacekeeping does not include enforcement action. Peacekeeping emerged due to “the inability of the Security Council to put in place the collective security system of Chapter VII of the Charter.”

**UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War**

After the end of the Cold War, a new international context changed the nature of armed conflicts and led to a shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts. The most common form of

---


115 Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping.”, 455. It is worth mentioning that Marrack Goulding served as UN Under-Secretary-General from 1986 to 1997. However, this definition reflects the interpretation of Marrack Goulding, not the United Nations.

116 Bellamy, *Understanding Peacekeeping.*, 173. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams called consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force as the “holy trinity” of traditional peacekeeping.


118 “Definitions,” Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, n.d., http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) also defines the following forms of armed conflict: extrastate, interstate, intrastate, internationalized intrastate. An extrastate conflict, also known an extra-
armed conflict, intrastate, peaked at around fifty conflicts in 1991. In 1946, it was about seventeen conflicts.\textsuperscript{119} Even though the number of civil conflicts has been rising since the end of the Second World War,\textsuperscript{120} according to Roger Mac Ginty and Gillian Robinson, these conflicts, especially ethnic,\textsuperscript{121} have become more prominent since the 1990s. They explain this trend by the following factors. To begin with, the end of the Cold War confrontation led to the emergence of ethnicity and identity issues in national and international politics agendas.\textsuperscript{122}

Second, many states lost their external sources of support. They became weaker in terms of capacity for governance. At the same time, with increased transnational flows and means of communications, non-state entities became more powerful and independent of state control. As a result, these states began to undergo ethnic and identity-related upheavals.\textsuperscript{123} Third, the revolution in technologies, including the electronic media and the activation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), created better public access to information and, consequently, caused better visibility of ethnic conflicts\textsuperscript{124} to which the UN was expected to respond.

---

systemic conflict, is “a conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. These conflicts are by definition territorial, since the government side is fighting to retain control of a territory outside the state system.” This type of conflict ended in 1974 and basically involve colonial conflict. An interstate conflict is “a conflict between two or more governments.” An intrastate conflict, also known a civil conflict or a civil war, is “a conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries.” An intrastate conflict with foreign involvement, also known internationalized intrastate, is “an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict.”


\textsuperscript{120} Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér., 729.

\textsuperscript{121} Thakur and Schnabel, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations., 28. Roger Mac Ginty and Gillian Robinson explain the term “ethnic conflict” as an intergroup conflict “that often occur within a state boundary, although they can spill across international boundaries.” They also warn that ethnic conflict “should not be taken to mean that the conflicts are sparked by ethnicity.”

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} Thakur and Schnabel, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations., 29-30.
Regarding the nature of armed conflicts, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996, noted that, since the end of the Cold War, the cohesion of states have become impregnated with “brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife.” The continuing proliferation of both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, as well as revolution in communication and technologies, brought risks such as “ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals.”

Rupert Smith adds that the nature of conflicts shifted from industrial war to “war amongst the people.” He characterizes “war amongst the people” by six fundamental trends. First, political objectives are not achieved by a strategic military target. They tend to have more “sophisticated approaches,” such as economic inducement or political pressure. Second, conflicts occur among the people, not on the battlefields. Third, conflicts are timeless; “in other words, modern military operations are, in practice, dealt with as one amongst many activities of our states and can be sustained nearly endlessly.” Fourth, one of the strategic goals of modern conflicts is to preserve forces rather than put them at risks. Fifth, weapons’ systems are used “in ways for which they were not originally designed and purchased.”

---


126 Ibid., Para. 12.


128 Ibid., 269.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid., 292.

131 Ibid., 269.

132 Ibid., 297.
Finally, combatants can be non-state actors and represent multinational groupings rather than more traditional state-based alliances and coalitions.\(^{133}\)

This new international context increased the demand for UN peacekeeping operations even more than in the period of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1994, the Security Council launched twenty new operations, “raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000”\(^{134}\) while, over 1948-1988, the total number of peacekeeping operations was fifteen. In the second half of the 1990s, the United Nations established six additional operations. In subsequent years, the Council authorized new peace operations in African countries. As of 2017, there are fifteen peacekeeping operations with around 94,154 uniformed personnel consisting of 1,496 military observers, 79,175 military, and 11,527 police officers.\(^{135}\)

Since the 1990s traditional peacekeeping is nearly unrecognizable. It is no longer perceived as a ‘homogeneous activity.’\(^{136}\) This new nature of UN peacekeeping requires re-conceptualization of the term and its activities. In January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of heads of State or Government to discuss the changes and new expectations for the United Nations in light of the end of the Cold War. Upon the request of the Security Council,

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 269.


Boutros Boutros-Ghali was tasked with undertaking an “analysis and recommendations” to strengthen the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. In June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping*. The Secretary-General attempted to assert a broad UN mandate. In *An Agenda for Peace*, he added preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping alongside peace enforcement and peacebuilding.

According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacekeeping is “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” In comparison to the definitions of traditional peacekeeping, presented above, the notion of peacekeeping now includes not only a military component but also the assistance of civilians, especially police. The Secretary-General emphasized that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officers, refugee and humanitarian aid experts, and police occupy the same important place as the military in UN peace operations.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed that peacekeeping is closely related to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, which, in turn, were formulated as “action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occurred” and “action to bring hostile parties

---


139 Ibid., Para. 52.

to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the
Charter of the United Nations.”

Dag Hammarskjöld first articulated the idea of preventive diplomacy in the 1960s. Preventive diplomacy was presaged by Article 99 of the UN Charter that states “the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Since the foundation of the United Nations, Secretary-Generals have employed this article to gather information about situations, establish contacts with those concerned, and send emissaries to examine situations. However, a clearer understanding of preventive diplomacy occurred in the post-Cold War period due to the increasing number of conflicts and their high costs in terms of human lives lost. Preventive diplomacy has largely remained the responsibility of the Secretary-General’s “good offices,” but it also includes the involvement of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other actors such as UN agencies and regional organizations.

According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the components of preventive diplomacy include confidence-building measures, early warning based on information gathering, a careful analysis of formal and informal facts causing the conflict, and preventive deployment. The latter is the newest type of responsibility and occupies a special place in preventive measures.

141 Ibid.


144 The examples of Cold War preventive diplomacy, see “Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations | UN Chronicle.” Also, it is worth mentioning that the frequency of the usage of Article 99 of the UN Charter depends on the Secretary-General.

Deployment can be realized both at the request of all conflicting parties, or at the request of only one side. This measure could be in the form of demilitarized zones established either on both sides or one side of a borderline.\textsuperscript{146}

For a long time, the idea of peacemaking was not separated from preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping and the tasks of peacemaking remained somewhere between these two. Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that in most cases peacemaking is often the premise for peacekeeping. Peacemaking relies on Chapter VI, although it may include all peaceful means listed in Article 33 of the UN Charter. The ‘good offices’ of UN Secretary-General is also an often-implemented diplomatic action in the peacemaking process.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali also popularized the concepts of peace enforcement and peacebuilding. However, the Secretary-General did not define peace enforcement. Instead, he introduced peace enforcement units as follows:

\begin{quote}
the Council consider[s] the utilization of peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General...Such peace-enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which Governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

Boutros Boutros-Ghali separates the idea of peacekeeping from peace enforcement, suggesting that peace enforcement might use offensive action to restore peace. Importantly, peace enforcement requires different preparations in terms of training and equipment as it implies a more dangerous environment. Also, in defining peace enforcement units, Boutros Boutros-Ghali implicitly raised the idea of a UN standing army. However, his proposal on enforcement units was not supported by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Nonetheless, the

\textsuperscript{146} Boutros-Ghali., Para. 33.
\textsuperscript{147} Boutros-Ghali., Para. 44.
Security Council raised the need for rapid reaction forces and, as a consequence, triggered initiatives for their creation.\textsuperscript{148}

The concept of peacebuilding came into use within the UN with Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report. He addressed it as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”\textsuperscript{149} Johan Galtung first introduced the concept of peacebuilding in the 1970s. Sustainable peace cannot be achieved without addressing causes of the conflict and supporting local peace management and conflict resolution resources.\textsuperscript{150}

An Agenda for Peace made it clear that peacekeeping alone is not enough to ensure lasting peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding became part of a continuum. For this reason, there was a need for a concept which would cover all activities involving the support of peace process. Hence, peace operations became this ‘umbrella concept.’ This concept includes not only keeping the peace, but also preventive deployments, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding missions, electoral assistance, peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{151} At times the notion of peacekeeping came to be used not as a subcategory but as a collective concept as well. However, this is problematic, given the principles of peacekeeping developed during the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{148} In 1994, the idea of rapidly deployable forces evolved into UN Standby Arrangement System (UN SAS). The further contribution to rapid reaction capability was made by national studies from the Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark. For a review of UN rapidly deployable force and its developments, see H. Peter Langille, “Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces,” International Peacekeeping Spring (2000).


In the United Nations Terminology Database, a ‘peace support operation’ is the synonym for the term peace operation. They are defined as “field operation[s] deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence.”\footnote{152 “UNTERM The United Nations Terminology Database.”} A ‘peace support operation’ is also employed by NATO and means literally the same thing: “An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations.”\footnote{153 “Informal Interorganizational Military Glossary of Abbreviations, Terms and Definitions Related to Conflict Prevention (CP) and Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB),” accessed May 11, 2017, http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NATO-EU-UN-glossary-on-DCB-and-CP.pdf., 146.} 

As such, peace operations or peace support operations entails not only military, but also political, economic, and social components. Moreover, military force is not necessarily the most important element of the operation. Due to the expansion of functions, contributions to UN peace operations began to vary. This led to the division between countries who provide ‘boots on the ground’ and those who provide specialized expertise and contribute to UN security initiatives and policies.\footnote{154 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009). Since the mid of the 1990s, the top contributors of uniformed personnel in UN peace operations have been from the South. By participating in the field, developing countries have some opportunities. For example, there is a prestige associated with international deployments along with a sense of competition with regional rivals. Also, UN troop reimbursements may give a net financial gain to the contributing government. However, these opportunities are not attractive to wealthier countries, who are concerned about domestic political backlash caused by national losses. As a result, developed countries prefer to contribute to training, reforms and other aspects of UN peace operations.}

The main merit of Agenda for Peace is that most of the elements of peace operations were clearly defined from each other. In the light of the new context, it was the first attempt to adjust the concept of peacekeeping. After a few years, Boutros Boutros-Ghali revised some of his recommendations in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. Referring to the failures
in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, the Secretary-General highlighted the importance of the basic principles of peacekeeping and the need for clear mandates for peacekeeping and enforcement. During these operations, UN peacekeepers were deployed in ongoing conflicts but under traditional peacekeeping mandates. As a result, the continuation of hostilities affected the efficiency of the Force.155

In case of Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali explained that operations “were given additional mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force.”156 James S. Sutterlin adds that the UN was not adequately prepared for the idea of peace enforcement. In the case of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the enforcement measures were taken too late and not enough, while in the case of Somalia, enforcement actions “were precipitate and impractical.”157

Thus, in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stepped back from the initial idea of peace enforcement units. Instead, he distinguished the nature of enforcement actions in a collective security sense, in the sense of war-fighting with a nominated enemy, as it was in Korea in 1950, Kuwait in 1990, and in a crisis management sense when the use of force, other than in self-defence, is permitted as a limited measure necessary for the peacekeeping context.158 The Secretary-General also explained that “neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and

---


158 Peace enforcement in the sense of crisis management, also could be referred as robust peacekeeping, would be more elaborated in the Brahimi Report, discussed below.
control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale.”159 In response to the limited capacity of the United Nations and, at the same time, the high demand for more forceful peacekeeping missions, he offered to delegate such missions to the group of willing member states or regional agencies, especially those with the capacity, for example NATO, as it was in Bosnia and Herzegovina.160 As a result, besides UN-led peace operations, UN-approved peace operations emerged to maintain international peace and security.161

Even though the implementation of UN-approved peace operations is *ad hoc* in nature, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies notes that mandates of UN-approved peace support operations usually follow the standard schema. First, these operations are deployed under Chapter VII with the authorization of the Security Council.162 Second, the leadership of the peace operation may be assigned to a specific Member State, or a regional agency.163 Third, there is a guarantee of the unity of command and control structures to the member state/regional organization.164 Finally, the expenditures of the operation are the full responsibility of participating member states, or the regional organization.165

Regarding other aspects of UN peace operations, in the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali also expressed the need for the unity of command, adequate preparation of member states in terms of training and equipment, effective information capacity and the need to implement post-conflict peacebuilding activities. The Secretary-General stated

159 Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.”, Para. 77.

160 All UN-approved peace operations undertaken in the Balkans, see Appendix C.


162 “Peacekeeping | SAIS.”

163 “Peacekeeping | SAIS.”

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.
that peacebuilding can be undertaken both within peacekeeping mission and without any peacekeeping operation being deployed. In both scenarios, the main goal is to build “structures for the institutionalization of peace.”

On the threshold of the new millennium, The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), also known as the Brahimi Report after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel, became another important UN recommendation document. After the UN experience in the peace operations of the 1990s, and in particular, the UN’s failure in the protection of civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General from 1997 to 2006, established a high-level Panel on UN peace operations to assess the deficiencies in peace and security activities. This Panel produced fifty-seven recommendations, focusing on not only strategic but also administrative and logistical issues.

The Brahimi Report explains conflict prevention and peacemaking as complementary to the other components of peace operations where the former “addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation,” while the latter concerns “conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation.” Peacekeeping is defined as an enterprise “evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.” In this definition, the Brahimi Report introduced and designated the functions of traditional and complex models of peacekeeping.

166 Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,” Para. 49.


168 Ibid., 2.

169 Ibid., 2-3.
In the context of new nature of peace operations, the Report acknowledged the importance of three basic principles, consent, impartiality, and the minimum of use of force, and elucidated each of them. The Report warns that in intrastate conflicts, consent is often manipulated by the conflicting parties.\textsuperscript{170} As a result, withdrawal of consent by one or more of the main conflict parties may jeopardize the rationale and legitimacy of UN peacekeeping mission.

At the same time, the Report clarifies that “impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, when in some cases local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims. Impartiality must mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mission mandate that is rooted in these Charter principles.”\textsuperscript{171} This clarification brings the idea of robust peacekeeping which was vaguely mentioned before in the Supplement. The Brahimi Report defines impartiality as “loyalty” to the mandate of peacekeeping missions and the Chapter principles.\textsuperscript{172} In other words, the Report admits that peacekeepers may use force against those who act against their mandates and the Charter principles on which they rely.

As a result, in terms of the use of force, the Brahimi Report states the following, “once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.”\textsuperscript{173} The Brahimi

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.


Report does not discuss peace enforcement in the sense of war-fighting. Instead, the Report reminds the world that the UN does not wage war. If force is necessary, enforcement actions can be authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{174}

The Report not only defines peacebuilding but also formulates peacebuilding activities. These activities include reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, consolidation of the rule of law, respect for human rights through monitoring, education, and investigation of previous experience, technical assistance for democratic development, and promotion of conflict resolution and reconciliation strategies.\textsuperscript{175} The Report acknowledges that peacebuilding is an integral part of the success of peacekeeping operations. By connecting peacebuilding with peacekeeping in the definition of complex peacekeeping, the Brahimi Report confirms the Security Council’s desire to shift from merely \textit{ad hoc} damage control missions to some limited prevention of future outbreaks of human rights violations. The Report supported the idea of the Secretariat to set up a pilot Peace-building Unit within Department of Political Affairs.\textsuperscript{176}

Besides administrative and logistical recommendations, the Brahimi Report called for clear and achievable mandates. While formulating or extending mission mandates, the Security Council should take into account both desired objectives and available resources. Otherwise, the mismatch between these two elements can lead to distrust from a population in conflict and damage to the reputation and the credibility of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{177} The Report also highlighted the necessity for rapid and effective deployments, in particular, identified

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 12.
deployment timelines for both models of peacekeeping, traditional and complex,\textsuperscript{178} and encouraged the work within the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) for military and police personnel.\textsuperscript{179}

The Brahimi Report also raised the issue of transitional civil administrations.\textsuperscript{180} Until the mid-1990s, the UN had peacekeeping operations with elements of civil administration, including the provision of assistance to transitional governments in El Salvador (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador - ONUSAL) or formal partnerships with retreating occupiers in Namibia and Angola (United Nations Transition Assistance Group - UNTAG).\textsuperscript{181} However, in the late 1990s, the UN became involved in Kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK) and then East Timor (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor - UNTAET). These operations required a full transition to state building that was never part of peacekeeping. As a result, the Report questioned whether or not the UN should develop the capacity for such kind of operations.\textsuperscript{182} To answer this question, the Report recommended: “to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.”\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{178} “The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.”, 15. The Brahimi Report recommended the following deployment timelines. An average traditional peacekeeping mission should be fielded within thirty days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, while a complex peacekeeping mission - within ninety days.

\textsuperscript{179} The UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) has been already discussed. See footnote 146 above.


\textsuperscript{181} Bellamy, \textit{Understanding Peacekeeping}, 256.


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.

Although each of above-mentioned UN documents has its importance, Report of High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, as well as the Capstone doctrine deserve special attention. The Report of High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the 2005 World Summit Outcome contributed to the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an intergovernmental advisory body. The 2005 World Summit Outcome set the main purpose and functions of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. According to the document, the main purpose of the Commission is to provide resources and proper assistance on integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.185 The functions of the PBC are promoting coordination and coherence, supporting resource mobilization, facilitating peacebuilding strategies and programs, serving as a knowledge hub, and conducting advocacy activities.186 In intrastate conflicts, the post-conflict


reconstruction phase is seen as critical as strengthening peacebuilding is a strategy to prevent new outbreaks of dormant conflicts.

The Capstone doctrine, based on seminal works, such as Agenda for Peace and its Supplement, the Brahimi Report, internal and external research, and academic commentary, provides the guiding principles and fundamental objectives of United Nations peace operations for all UN personnel working both in the field and at UN Headquarters, and partners. The Capstone doctrine defines all five areas of peace support operations, including peace enforcement. Accordingly, peace enforcement is defined as “Coercive action undertaken with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” The Capstone doctrine explains the difference between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Robust peacekeeping operates with the consent of the main parties of the conflict and may apply force only at the tactical level, whilst peace enforcement does not necessarily require the consent of the parties and may use force at the strategic or international level under the authorization of the Security Council.

The Capstone doctrine states that with the transformation of the international environment, a new generation of “multidimensional” peacekeeping operations emerges. Multidimensional implies not only “a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities” but also elements of state-building. These multidimensional operations may be deployed in the

---


188 Ibid., 19. The Capstone doctrine does not explain the difference between strategic and international levels of use of force.

189 Ibid., 22. The word “multidimensional” began to be used sometime after the Brahimi Report. The Brahimi Report itself refers to peacekeeping as traditional and complex. In Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2003), multidimensional means “composed of a range of components including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. Some of these operations do not have a military component but
absence of official peace agreements upon the request of the national authorities in order to support the transition to legitimate government. In some rare cases, multidimensional operations may be deployed with the purpose of stimulating the legislative and administrative functions in the conflicting State, “in order to support the transfer of authority from one sovereign entity to another, or until sovereignty questions are fully resolved (as in the case of transitional administrations), or to help the State to establish administrative structures that may not have existed previously.”

The Capstone doctrine distinguishes the functions of traditional and multidimensional models of peacekeeping as follows. According to the traditional model, UN peacekeeping is in charge of observing and reporting conflict situations, supervising ceasefire agreements, creating buffer zones, and undertaking confidence-building measures. In the multidimensional model, besides the functions of the traditional model of peacekeeping, there is also building a secure and stable environment “with full respect for the rule of law and human rights”, facilitating the political process, supporting “the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance,” and ensuring that “all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.”

The distinctive feature of multidimensional peacekeeping is the objective to influence the political process for conflict resolution in relation to a national political dialogue. For this

---

191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., 21.
193 Ibid., 23.
reason, the Capstone Doctrine mentions additional criteria for the successful implementation of peace operations. Besides the three fundamental principles, (consent of the parties, impartiality, and the appropriate use of force), there is also the international legitimacy and credibility of UN peacekeeping operations, as well as promotion of national and local ownership of UN missions. Legitimacy implies “the firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate,” the prudent use of force, personnel discipline, and respect of local customs, laws, and institutions. Credibility concerns rapid deployment as well as resourcing, and the ability to manage expectations effectively. Promotion of national and local ownership means building trust and cooperation among national actors.

The section on peacebuilding also highlights a strong nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This section provides examples of peacebuilding activities which become part of peacekeepers’ job. These activities include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, security sector reform (SSR), mine actions, promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law, assistance to electoral processes, and participation in the restoration of State authority. However, the doctrine recognizes the lack of funding and technical expertise in the implementation of these activities.

Over the past decade, the demand for UN peace operations has not diminished. New conflicts continued to emerge, while the escalation of long-simmering disputes led to civil wars. A growing number of violent extremist and terrorist groups also threaten international peace and security and a poor governance as other reasons for world instability. Hence, many

194 Ibid., 36.
195 Ibid., 37.
196 Ibid., 39.
197 Ibid., 26.
contemporary UN missions continue to operate in insecure environments with complex conflict settings, where there is often no peace to keep. Moreover, the political complexity facing peacekeeping operations and the scope of their mandates, especially the aspects concerning civilian side, remain problematic.\(^\text{198}\)

In 2014, approaching the 15-year anniversary of the Brahimi Report, Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General from 2007 to 2016, established a High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) chaired by Jose Ramos-Horta to revise the current state of peace operations and assess the emerging needs for future operations. In 2015, Ban Ki-moon, the then Secretary-General received the recommendations of the Panel. The HIPPO Report \(^\text{199}\) acknowledges that peace operations have become more professional and capable over the past ten years. However, chronic problems still remain. These include slow reaction to emerging crises, the problem with the formulation of mandates (the mandates are often built as “templates instead of tailored to support situation-specific political strategies”), under-resourced uniformed personnel, and a lack of specialized capabilities.\(^\text{200}\)

The HIPPO Report recommends four essential shifts for the future design and delivery of UN peace operations. First, political solutions should be the core objective in designing UN peace operations.\(^\text{201}\) Second, the UN should embrace the full spectrum of peace operations.\(^\text{202}\)


\(^{201}\) Ibid., viii.

\(^{202}\) Ibid., 4. According to the HIPPO Report, UN peace operations should include the following tools: “special envoys and mediators, political missions (including peacebuilding missions), regional preventive diplomacy offices, observation missions (both ceasefire and electoral missions) to small, technical specialist missions (such as electoral support missions), multidisciplinary operations both large and small drawing on civilian, military and police personnel to support peace process implementation (and have included even transitional authorities with governance functions), as well as advance missions for planning.”
and be more flexible in using its broad spectrum of instruments. In so doing, the UN can determine which approach is best suitable to the conflict situation and political strategy.\textsuperscript{203} Third, there is a need for a stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership with regional agencies.\textsuperscript{204} Fourth, the UN Secretariat should be more field-focused and people-centered.\textsuperscript{205}

To achieve these requirements, the Report offers a set of recommendations to improve some areas of UN peace operations. These areas include conflict prevention and mediation, protection of civilians, sustaining peace, and the use of force. The latter deserves particular attention. It examines the role of peacekeeping. The Report introduces three types of missions that are collectively referred to UN peacekeeping. The Report describes each of these missions as follows. A ceasefire monitoring mission maintains a presence in a latent, or unresolved conflict where political settlements remain illusive.\textsuperscript{206} A peace implementation mission is a multidimensional peacekeeping operation aimed at maintaining a peace agreement, and supporting a political transition.\textsuperscript{207} Conflict management operates in violent conflicts “in the absence of a viable peace process or where the peace process has effectively broken down.”\textsuperscript{208} At the same time, the Report recommends the Security Council rely on \textit{ad hoc} coalitions of member states or regional actors due to their “comparative advantage in speed and capability, as well as in command and control arrangements necessary to conduct sustained combat operations.”\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., viii.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 31.
Recognizing the volatile environments for UN peacekeeping, the Report explains that the UN should be extremely careful when it undertakes enforcement tasks. If enforcement actions are necessary, they should be time-limited, exceptional measure.\textsuperscript{210} The Report also warns that the UN peacekeeping missions must not be part of military counter-terrorism operations.\textsuperscript{211} It adds that there is a need for a clear division of labour and responsibilities in cases where a UN peacekeeping operation works in parallel with a non-UN force undertaking military counter-terrorism or other offensive operations.\textsuperscript{212}

However, whether UN peace operations should be involved in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, remains debatable. Some point out that UN peace operations are already moving towards counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency as evident in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR). As a result, peace operations need to be able to adapt to the threats on the ground. Others, however, reject counter-terrorism, as well as counter-insurgency measures in UN peace operations by highlighting the importance of the traditional principles of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{213}

The HIPPO Report reasserts traditional UN peacekeeping principles. However, it also acknowledges that over past two decades, volatile conflict situations have led to a “flexible and progressive interpretation” of peacekeeping principles.\textsuperscript{214} As an illustration of this flexibility, the Report warns that the principles should never be used as an excuse for inaction to protect civilians or defend the mission proactively.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 32.
Briefly, the HIPPO Report also recommends establishing an international forum on conflict prevention, encouraging the early involvement of the Security Council in potential conflicts, and reinforcing UN Secretariat prevention and mediation efforts. The Report also calls for better protection of civilians. It highlights the continuing gap between available resources and assigned mandates. The Report points out that mandates aimed at protection of civilians must be realistic and have a wider political approach.\(^{216}\) Besides the recommendations devoted to the improvement of such mandates, the Report encourages working closely with local, national, and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective environment.\(^{217}\) On sustaining peace, the Report indicates the need for political vigilance. Peace processes continue even after signing a peace agreement, or holding an election. The international community must “sustain high-level political engagement in support of national efforts to deepen and broaden processes of inclusion and reconciliation,” as well as struggle with the root causes of conflict.\(^{218}\)

The HIPPO Report proposes another set of recommendations devoted to empowering UN peace operations in the field. The Report re-emphasized the importance of some recommendations, which were raised in the Brahimi Report, including achievable mandates and rapid deployment. The Report also added recommendations concerning the role of gender, the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel in peacekeeping operations, and environmental impact assessments.

To start to implement the comprehensive sets of recommendations proposed by the HIPPO Report, later the same year, Ban Ki-moon published his own report, *The Future of UN* 

\(^{216}\) Ibid., ix.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., 27.

\(^{218}\) Ibid., x.
Peace Operations. This Report outlined the priorities and key areas of action for moving forward the recommendations of the Panel to the end of 2016. The current Secretary-General, António Guterres, has shown his willingness to support these reforms. In particular, he has initiated a series of strategic reviews of major peace operations.

Another important aspect of post-Cold War peace operations is UN-regional cooperation. This is a common theme across all the UN post-Cold War documents. An Agenda for Peace acknowledged the relevance of Chapter VIII in this new international environment. It acknowledged that the models of cooperation and the division of responsibilities should depend on the reality of each specific case as each region differs from one another. The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace emphasized the forms of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, shaped in the 1990s during the implementation of peace support operations: consultations, diplomatic and operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. As noted before, the Supplement also recognized a special role of regional organizations, or coalitions of willing member states in peace enforcement authorized under Chapter VII.

---


223 Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.”, Para. 86. Consultations imply the exchange of views on the conflict situation between the UN and the regional agency; consultations can be both formal and less formal. Diplomatic support is when “the regional organization participates in the peacemaking activities of the United Nations and supports them by diplomatic initiatives,” while operational support is when “the United Nations provides technical advice to regional organizations that undertake peacekeeping operations of their own.” Co-deployment is the sharing the burden of UN field operation with regional organizations. Joint operation is the sharing responsibilities over the staffing, direction, and financing between the UN and another regional organization.
The Brahimi Report also encouraged cooperation with regional agencies. However, the Report warned that regional organizations need better training, equipment, logistical support and other resources to be able to participate in UN peace operations, or undertake UN-approved peace operations.\textsuperscript{224} The Capstone doctrine supported the involvement of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, and established conditions for managing complex conflict situations. The doctrine indicated that peace operations could be under the leadership of either the UN or a regional organization. However, hybrid operations are also possible, meaning a joint leadership between UN and another regional organization.\textsuperscript{225}

Finally, in the HIPPO Report, the future design and delivery of UN peace operations was directed at building strong global-regional partnership. Collaboration between the UN and regional agencies should be a key aspect the planning and deploying of all UN peace operations in the future.\textsuperscript{226} Accordingly, since most of the current peace operations are on the African continent, the partnership between the UN and the AU deserves special attention and, as a consequence, should be deeper and more collaborative. The UN and the AU should seek common approaches “through shared assessments, sound consultative mechanisms for decision-making and tools for collaborative planning and operations across the conflict cycle.”\textsuperscript{227}

There is no a single mechanism which coordinates UN-regional cooperation. However, in 2004, an independent report Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications and Responses, prepared by Bruce Jones and Feryal Cherif for UN DPKO Peacekeeping Best


\textsuperscript{225} “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.”, 86.


\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
Practices Unit, attempted to systemize UN-regional cooperation.228 This Report describes UN-regional cooperation as hybrid/joint operations, as mentioned in the Capstone doctrine. The Report identified four types of hybrid frameworks: integrated when UN and non-UN actors have single or joined chain of command; coordinated when UN and non-UN actors are coordinated but have different chains of command; parallel when UN deploys alongside other regional agencies (there is no formal coordination); and sequential when the UN follows other forces.229 Hybrid operations are not a new phenomenon. The missions deployed in the 1990s already featured hybrids. Most of the current operations work in one of hybrid frameworks. Some examples of regional actors include organizations such as the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Conclusion

The concept of UN peacekeeping began to form almost from the beginning of the founding of the organization. The idea of peacekeeping became an alternative way to maintain international peace and security since the initial plan of a collective security system was blocked by the constant confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping were established gradually, mainly through the first observation missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP, and the first formal peacekeeping operation – UNEF I. Most of the operations in the Cold War were UN-led, deployed in interstate conflict, and lacked peace enforcement authority permitted by Chapter VII.


229 Jones, and Cherif.
The end of the Cold War and the shift towards intrastate conflicts in the 1990s affected traditional UN peacekeeping considerably. The terms peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement became inaccurate in the description of the responsibilities undertaken by the UN in intrastate conflicts. Instead, the term peace operation became a collective concept which encompasses not only peacekeeping and peace enforcement but also other areas of peace process including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

The evolution of peacekeeping aims, tools, and basic principles is explicitly reflected in all the UN documents. Specifically, Boutros Boutros-Ghali made the first contribution to the typology of peace operations in his 1992 report and 1995 supplement. The Brahimi Report contributed to the idea of robust peacekeeping, distinguished traditional and complex models of peacekeeping, and initiated the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission. The Capstone doctrine explained the difference between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It also recognized that initial basic principles, such as consent of conflicting parties, impartiality, and the minimum use of force, became insufficient as blue helmets started to participate in national political processes. The HIPPO Report emphasized four essential shifts for the future design and delivery of UN peace operations. It also defined the position of peacekeeping towards enforcement tasks and counter-terrorism operations. Appendix A provides a more extended summary of key points on each examined UN document. Finally, UN-regional cooperation became another distinguishing feature across most of the UN documents. Even though most of time UN-regional cooperation is in ad hoc nature, this cooperation tries to be systemized, for example hybrid missions are evidence of this process.

Thus, since the end of the Cold War, the nature of peacekeeping has been subjected to significant change. Peace operations not only call for rapidly deployable, well-trained personnel, but a sustained focus on human security, which in turn has direct implications for

---

the use of force and require the assistance of regional agencies. Given the evolved nature of UN peacekeeping, the next chapter evaluates UN peacekeeping in the context of Canada.
Chapter Three
Canada and United Nations Peacekeeping

Canada’s involvement started from the beginning of UN peacekeeping. During the Cold War, Canada took part in every UN peacekeeping operation and, as a result, earned the reputation as the peacekeeper, at least within Canada. However, with the evolution of the concept of UN peacekeeping, the Canadian role changed considerably. More specifically, Canada’s involvement in UN peacekeeping took different forms. After the experience in the early 1990s with UN-led operations, Canada shifted towards hybrid peace operations. Canada also became interested in other aspects of UN peace operations. Despite new forms of Canada’s commitments to the UN, the current Trudeau government proposed the revitalization of Canada’s historic role in UN peacekeeping. Importantly, the government pledged to deploy around 750 uniformed personnel in UN peace operations. Thus, in order to question the rhetoric of the Liberal government, it is first important to understand the role of Canada in UN peacekeeping over 1947 to 2017, along with the reasons for Canada’s shift towards UN-approved peace operations.

The chapter consists of two parts. The first part evaluates the trends of Canadian uniformed personnel participation in both UN-led and UN-approved peace operations for the whole period from 1948 to 2017. The second part explains why Canada's commitments to UN peacekeeping took different forms after the end of the Cold War. It examines the factors contributing to Canada’s shift towards UN-approved peace operations. It also looks at doctrinal thinking regarding Canadian defence and security, especially after Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.

231 “Canada to Support Peace Operations.”
Canada’s Participation in Peace Operations in the UN Frameworks

Canada’s experience in UN peacekeeping started with the first observer missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP. However, Canada’s first most significant contribution was made during the creation of the first UN peacekeeping mission in Suez crisis in 1956. Figure 1 shows Canadian uniformed personnel in both UN-led and UN-approved peace operations. During the Cold War, the peak of Canada’s contribution reached around 2,413 personnel in 1964 owing to its major commitments in UNEF I, ONUC, and UNFICYP (Figure 1). Canada also had large contributions in 1974 and 1978 of around 1,836 and 1,855 personnel respectively (Figure 1). These peaks correspond to the emergence of new peacekeeping operations, such as the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Canada’s lowest contribution for the Cold War is associated with two periods. Between 1968 and 1972 Canadian contribution stood at around 745 personnel (Figure 1). Throughout the 1980s, Canada had approximately 970 deployed personnel with its lowest point in 806 personnel in 1987 (Figure 1).

In the post-Cold War period, Canada experienced three mission peaks, exceeding more than 2,700 personnel. In particular, Canada deployed 2,845 personnel in 1993, 3,507 personnel in 2004, and 3,129 personnel in 2011 (Figure 1). While the first peak was related to Canada’s considerable involvement in UN-led peace operations, other two were achieved due to Canada’s commitments to UN-approved peace operations that were often non-UN-led. Between 1989 and 2011, Canada’s lowest values were during the following years: 1,057 personnel in 1991, 1,266 personnel in 1998, and 1,914 personnel in 2005 (Figure 1). Between 2011 and 2015, Canada decreased its uniformed personnel from 3,129 personnel to 117 personnel (Figure 1). Since 2015, Canada had the lowest values for the period starting from the foundation of the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1956.
During the Cold War, Canada’s contribution consisted of only UN-led peace operations. Since the 1990s, Canada started to contribute to not only UN-led, but also UN-approved peace operations that were led by a lead state or another organization. The Figures (2 and 3) below show the involvement of Canadian uniformed personnel separately for UN-led and UN-approved peace operations from 1948 to 2016.

Canada’s commitments to UN-led peace operations changed considerably over the post-Cold War period. From 1989 to 1993, Canada participated in almost all new UN-led peace operations and, as a consequence, expanded its geographical orientation towards Africa, Asia,

---


Statistics for UN-approved peace operations drawn from “The Military Balance,” (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, n.d.). These statistics reflect only Canada’s involvement in NATO-led, UN-approved peace operations. Other UN-approved operations were not reflected in the Figure 1 and Figure 3 due to incomplete statistics on these operations.

Since other UN-approved missions were completed by 2010, the downward trend, noticed after 2011 in peace operations in the UN framework, remains unchanged in case of both including and excluding other UN-approved operations. Dates of all peace operations in the UN frameworks where Canada has been involved from 1948 to 2017 are reflected in Appendix C.
Eastern Europe, and the Americans. Over the whole history of UN-led peace operations, Canada’s largest deployment, around 2,850 uniformed personnel, occurred in 1993 mainly due to its involvement in peace operations of the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (Figure 2). Despite Canada’s continuing involvement in UN-led peace operations in the early 1990s, between 1993 to 2015, Canada experienced three significant downturns in uniformed personnel contributions, from around 2,540 personnel to about 979 personnel in 1995 and 1996, from around 941 personnel to about 286 personnel in 1997 and 1998, and from around 335 personnel to about 174 personnel in 2005 and 2006 (Figure 2). Thus, the difference between 1993 and 2016 is more than 2,740 uniformed personnel (Figure 2). The periods from 1998 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2016 demonstrate a low, but the relatively stable number of Canadian uniformed personnel of roughly 325 personnel and 150 personnel respectively (Figure 2).

As of 30 June 2017, Canadian military and police officers consist of eighty-eight personnel, deployed in six of sixteen UN peace operations. Canada committed six military personnel and fifty-eight individual police officers to Haiti (MINUSTAH), eight military personnel to the Congo (MONUSCO), one staff officer to Cyprus (UNFICYP), five staff officers and four military experts to South Sudan (UNMISS), four military experts to Middle East (UNTSO), and two military experts to Colombia (UNMC). Canada ranks seventy-first out of 127 countries in terms of military and police contributions to UN peace operations.

---

233 From 1989 to 1993, Canada was not involved in the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).


235 Ibid.

236 Ibid. Statistics is provided for June 2017.
As noted, since the 1990s, Canada has shifted to UN-approved missions, including the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the Australian-led operation in East Timor, the U.S.-led operation in Haiti, a range of NATO-led operations, such as stabilization force operations in the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR and SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR), as well as the security assistance force in Afghanistan (ISAF), and the EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR). From 1996 to 2004, Canada’s commitments in UN-approved peace operations increased from around 980 to approximately 3,200 uniformed personnel (Figure 3). From 2005 to 2011, Canada maintained a stable contribution to UN-approved peace operations, with the lowest value at about 1,580 personnel in 2005 and the highest value at around 2,930 personnel in 2011 (Figure 3). This trend was due to the active engagement of Canada in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. From 2011 to 2015, Canada experienced two significant downturns, from around 2,927 personnel to about 534 personnel in 2011 and 2012, as well as from around 955 personnel to approximately five personnel in the period between 2014 and 2015 (Figure 3).

Sources: Based on the data from “Troop and Police Contributors Archive (1990-2015)” n.d.; also see Appendix B. 237

237 Statistics for the period from 1948 to 1990 drawn from multiple sources, see Appendix B. Statistics for the period from 1991 to 2016 drawn from “Troop and Police Contributors Archive (1990-2015).”
Since 2015, Canada largely disengaged from UN-approved peace operations. As of October 2017, it provides only five personnel to KFOR. Other deployments relate to non-UN peace operations, or different kinds of military campaigns. Some examples of current Canada’s abroad involvements include the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, the coalition against Daesh under Operation IMPACT in Iraq, Operation REASSURANCE in the Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{238}

Figure 3

Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN-approved Peace Operations, 1948-2016

\textbf{Source:} Based on the data from “The Military Balance,,” n.d.\textsuperscript{239}

Figure 1 reveals that Canada did not abandon UN peacekeeping \textit{per se}. At the same time, there is a different pattern for UN-led and UN-approved peace operations. The significant downward trend in UN-led peace operations was replaced by UN-approved operations. Specifically, this shift happened in 1996 when the total number of Canadian uniformed personnel was proportionally divided in half between UN-led and UN-approved peace operations (Figure 2 and Figure 3). In further years, the proportion of a total number of


\textsuperscript{239} These statistics reflect only Canada’s involvement in NATO-led, UN-approved peace operations. For this reason, Canada’s involvement in UN-approved operations is showed from 1996 to 2016. However, it started in 1992, when Canada took part in UNITAF. For more explanation, see footnote 228 above.
Canadian personnel moved towards UN-approved peace operations. As a result, over 1998-2015, the trend for peace operations in the UN frameworks follows Canadian participation in UN-approved peace operations, with a slight presence of UN-led operations.

**Canada’s Reorientation in UN Peacekeeping**

The reasons for Canada’s disengagement from UN-led peace operations and, as a consequence, Canada's shift to UN-approved peace operations are closely related to Canadian peacekeeping experience in the early 1990s. Between 1992 and 1993, Canada became involved in three failed UN-led peace operations in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Somalia (UNOSOM II), and Rwanda (UNAMIR). Besides uniformed personnel, Canada provided military commanders, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, UN chief of staff in the Former Yugoslavia, as well as Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire and Major-General Guy Tousignant, UN commanders in Rwanda, who became eyewitnesses to UN failure. Each operation “left a bad aftertaste”\(^{240}\) for Canada’s military, as well as the political establishment.

Initially, UNPROFOR was created as an interim arrangement to establish the conditions necessary for a negotiated resolution of the Yugoslavian crisis. UN troops were responsible for demilitarizing United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia and ensuring the protection of civilians in these areas from armed attacks.\(^{241}\) UN police monitored the work of local police forces. Later, the mandate of the operation became more complicated and expanded to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\(^{242}\)

---


\(^{242}\) Ibid.
Over the duration of the conflict, the UN Security Council passed more than 100 resolutions. These resolutions were the result of the discrepancy between UN mandate and the nature of a conflict that was still ongoing. In other words, there was no peace to keep. In addition, the mission was insufficiently equipped and resourced. As a result of these shortcomings, UNPROFOR could not function properly, and peacekeepers were often placed in greater danger. Canadian military personnel underwent regular military attacks, and eleven soldiers lost their lives during their service with UNPROFOR.

Lenard J. Cohen and Alexander Moens summarize three main lessons learned from the UN peace operation in the Former Yugoslavia. First, political objectives and military means had to be coordinated better. Second, traditional peacekeeping and coercive diplomacy are essentially incompatible. Third, an impartial and lightly armed force is not necessarily an effective way to protect civilians in post-cold war conflicts.

Similar lessons could have been learned from the other two UN peacekeeping operations. Again, the discrepancy between the UN mandate and the nature of the conflict, a lack of resources, and a weak coordination between military and political objectives ensured failure in Somalia and Rwanda. In case of the former, Somalia became catastrophic because of the scandal around the misbehavior of the Canadian airborne unit. Two Canadian soldiers tortured

---


244 Ibid., 5.


247 Ibid., 13-4. The scholars also explain that coercive diplomacy is the privilege of major powers. Middle-sized troop contributors such as Canada did not have a chance to influence a political settlement, they “were left in the extremely undesirable position of being exposed to risks.” The scholars in particular give an example when Canada was not invited in the Contact Group to discuss a political settlement of the Former Yugoslavia.

248 Ibid.
to death a Somali sixteen-years-old boy and then posed for pictures with his body. This scandal resulted in damage to the national reputation and jeopardized the professionalism of the Canadian Forces. In the case of Rwanda, a small peacekeeping mission headed by Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire faced the problem of insufficient support from the other UN Member States, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Security Council, which all together were more preoccupied by the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia. As a result, the mission failed to do anything in order to prevent the genocide commenced by the Hutu against the Tutsi. Overall, the UN was not able to respond effectively to several crises at the same time.

Obviously, the responsibility for failures was on the shoulders of the United Nations, which did not effectively understand or respond to the new nature of conflict. The missions in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrated that they were beyond the traditional concept of UN peacekeeping, requiring a more robust stance, and, as a consequence, more resources. Neither the United Nations, nor Canada were prepared for the high demand for peace operations involving not only peacekeeping but also preventive deployment, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Moreover, both did not have enough experience to operate in intrastate conflicts.

To illustrate, from 1948 to 1988, the UN launched fifteen peacekeeping missions. Canada took part in all of them. Eleven out of fifteen operations were UN traditional peacekeeping missions, while only four could be considered beyond traditional. In the period between 1989

---

249 This is not the only case of misbehaviour of Canadian military. During the peace operation in Former Yugoslavia, forty-seven Canadian officers and soldiers broke military rules by drinking on duty, having sexual relations with nurses and interpreters and physically abusing patients at the Bakovici mental hospital. They also were suspected of black market activities.


251 Names of these fifteen UN peacekeeping operations, see Appendix C. During the Cold War there was no categorization at all in UN peacekeeping. According to the author of this thesis, ONUC, UNTEA/UNSF,
and 1994, the UN launched twenty-one new peacekeeping operations and continued seven operations established in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{252} Six out of twenty-one new operations could be referred to as traditional.\textsuperscript{253} Canada became involved in sixteen out of twenty-one new operations,\textsuperscript{254} but it took part only in three traditional peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{255} At the same time, Canada continued five traditional peacekeeping missions launched in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{256} The demand for UN traditional peacekeeping missions continued to decline in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{257}

To meet the high demand for UN peace operations beyond traditional peacekeeping, the UN started to engage in other types of UN peace operations, as well as strengthen cooperation with regional agencies. These new types of missions would be undertaken by regional agencies, or coalitions of willing member states. As such, with the dramatic decline of traditional

---

\textsuperscript{252} Names of these twenty new and seven previously-launched UN peace operations, see “List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948 - 2013,” United Nations, accessed October 17, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf. The author of this thesis also added in this list of new operations, the mission, such as the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (OUNUVEH).

\textsuperscript{253} There is no official division on types in UN peace operations. Based on the tasks assigned by UN mandates and environment where these operations act, according to the author of this thesis, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), ONUVEH, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) were in the frameworks of traditional peacekeeping.

\textsuperscript{254} Names of these seventeen UN-led peace operations, see Appendix C.

\textsuperscript{255} Canada took part in ONUCA, ONUVEH, UNOMUR.

\textsuperscript{256} These five operations included UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNDOF, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG). In this time, Canada was also committed to UNFICYP. However, this operation had the elements of humanitarian assistance.

\textsuperscript{257} As of 2017, there are fifteen UN peacekeeping operations, where only three could be called as traditional peacekeeping missions, although these three originated from the Cold War. There is indeed no demand for traditional peacekeeping anymore. These three operations include UNTSO, UNMOGIP, and UNDOF. UNFICYP and UNIFIL are not considered as traditional peacekeeping missions, although they were launched in the Cold War. Names of all these fifteen missions, see Chapter One, footnote 133.
peacekeeping opportunities, and the unsuccessful experience in UN-led operations in the early 1990s, Canada, as many other Western countries, shifted to UN-approved missions led by regional organizations or coalitions of willing member states.

In terms of other aspects of post-Cold War UN peace operations, Canada became an active advocate of a human security agenda, and peacebuilding. Canada sponsored and crafted the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P). Among other activities, after the ‘Somalia Affair,’ Canada strengthened its training capacity. Canada became one of the main providers of foreign military, police and civilian training. Since the 1990s, Canada co-chaired

---

258 The focus of the thesis is strictly on Canadian uniformed personnel contribution to UN peace operations. However, this paragraph gives a brief overview of the Canada’s main initiatives in other aspects of UN peace operations. It should be also considered that this paragraph is not aimed to measure Canada’s level of involvement in other areas of UN peace operations.


261 Since 2001 Canada has become one of the main developers and supporters of the responsibility to protect (R2P), the concept which proposed a template for international action when a state fails to protect its citizens against major violations of human rights such as genocide, mass crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic conflict. Specifically, Canada took part in the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In 2001, the ICISS released a report called “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). Despite the controversy over state sovereignty in the concept, Canada took efforts to include R2P at the agenda of 2005 World Summit and its Outcome Document.

the working group at the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Canada also participated in the development of strategic guidebooks and field instructions on peace operations. Despite its low rank in terms of personnel contribution, Canada remained among the top ten financing contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget. It also invested in roundtables, regional seminars, and research on peace support operations. Canada is also involved in several Groups of Friends, such as the Group of Friends of Women, Peace, and Security, the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians and the Group of Friends of R2P. These initiatives show not only that UN peace operations require a broader set of skills and area of knowledge, but also that Canada did not truly disengage from UN peace operations. Rather, Canada’s focus in UN peace operations shifted from pure military involvement to training assistance and the support of UN peace and security reforms.

Canada’s shift to UN-approved missions became evident after the adoption of the 1994 Defence White Paper. In the early 1990s, Canadian military experienced overstretch due to defence budget cuts, combined with an increase in the size and scope of peacekeeping. Canada needed to revise its defence priorities and commitments to the international community. The White Paper recognized that the nature of multilateral operations in support

---


265 More specific examples, see Badescu, “National Security.” 51.

266 Groups of Friends is a community of countries and international organizations which actively promotes one or another peace and security objective at the global, regional and local levels.

of peace and stability had changed considerably. These operations involved not only observer missions and interposition of forces, but also a range of other military activities from preventive deployment to peace enforcement. Recalling the experience in the Gulf War, the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the White Paper identified key characteristics and essential operational considerations for the design of future missions, and thus Canadian commitments. These included a clear and enforceable mandate, commonly accepted reporting authority, appropriate composition of national forces to the mission and effective consultations among mission partners, a clear division of responsibilities between military and civilian resources, the consent of all conflict parties on Canada’s participation in the operation, except for enforcement actions, and operations involving NATO member states.

The White Paper stated that Canada would continue its commitments to international peace and security, “within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.” However, due to the budgetary constraints and the expansion of UN operations in terms of number and scope, Canada would be also more selective in its commitments. Thus, the activation of regional agencies and their ability to undertake more clear and robust mandates, along with the desire of Canada to stay involved and be more cautious and selective in its commitments, UN-approved peace operations became a new opportunity for Canada’s commitments to the international community.

In particular, Canada’s biggest contribution to UN-approved missions related to NATO-led operations. This preference could be explained by the following factors. First, working

---


269 Ibid., 24-5.

270 Ibid., 30.

271 Ibid., 29.
within NATO-led operations is more comfortable due to a “harmonized operational environment created through decades of collaboration, joint exercises and operations, integrated communications systems, and aligned technical capabilities.”

Second, the participation in NATO-led operation guaranteed a U.S. presence. This point is particularly important for Canada as a function of its close bilateral relations with the United States, and the ability of U.S. to provide vital military capabilities, such as strategic lift. Third, NATO had the capacity to deploy considerable military force in order to undertake more robust mandates authorized under Chapter VII. These factors became Canada’s rational to participate in UN-approved peace operations in the Balkans.

Canadian involvement in Afghanistan had a similar rationale, but different political context as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Canada supported the “war on terror” launched by the United States. Canada joined three different missions operating in Afghanistan: the U.S. antiterrorism campaign Operation Enduring Freedom, the UN-authorized NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and UN-led United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Each mission had a distinct mandate. In 2001, the United States with the assistance of Britain launched Operation Enduring Freedom to defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The first Canadian contingents of regular troops were sent in

---


274 Ibid.

275 Ibid.
The same year Canada became involved in UNAMA, which was responsible for supporting the people and government of Afghanistan in achieving peace and stability.\(^\text{277}\)

In 2003 Canadian troops were sent to Kabul as part of ISAF.\(^\text{278}\) The operation was authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII to assist the Afghan government in extending its authority and creating a secure environment.\(^\text{279}\) In 2005, Canada’s role shifted towards the Kandahar region. Due to a resurgence of Taliban activity in the deployed region, the number of soldiers increased and remained high until 2011. In 2011, the focus of the operation shifted to training Afghan army and police. Canada ended its combat role in 2011, and the last Canadian service members left the country in 2014.\(^\text{280}\)

It is important to note that usually UN-approved missions imply a wider use of force.\(^\text{281}\) For instance, Canada’s involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrated the blurred lines between robust peacekeeping authorized under Chapter VII and peace enforcement or war-fighting. Robust peacekeeping seeks to “enhance the security of civilians by protecting them from identified or unidentified third parties or spoilers.”\(^\text{282}\) In the words of the Capstone doctrine, it implies the use of force only at the tactical level. In contrast, peace enforcement or war-fighting includes counterinsurgency, operative and direct intervention to “defeat an


\(^{278}\) “Afghanistan - Canadian Armed Forces - History - Veterans Affairs Canada.”


\(^{280}\) “Afghanistan - Canadian Armed Forces - History - Veterans Affairs Canada.”

\(^{281}\) Appendix C shows the level of the use of force for all UN-led and UN-approved peace missions Canada has been involved from 1948 to 2017.

identified enemy, upon which victory can be claimed.” In the words of the Capstone doctrine, it implies the use of force both at the tactical and the strategic/international levels. At the same time, UN-approved peace operations have a better capacity for war-fighting and are more inclined to use intervention against armed opposition. In contrast, UN-led peace operations may operate in the same dangerous environment and under the same conditions, but be generally less prepared.

After the 9/11 attacks and subsequent Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, Canadian doctrine on security and defence prioritized UN-approved over UN-led peace operations more evident. Moreover, doctrine established a place for more robust military operations targeted against terrorism. These changes were reflected in 2004 Canada’s National Security Policy Securing an Open Society and in the 2005 publication of Canada’s International Policy Statement (IPS). The National Security Policy articulated a range of new initiatives on security issues and pronounced three core national security interests: “protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad,” “ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies,” and “contributing to international security.” The IPS set the priorities and principles in Canada’s foreign policy. Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liegeois state that the IPS reflected the new vision of Canadian Forces and Canada’s place in the international community. Although Canada’s commitments to the UN were not put aside, the IPS emphasized the importance of other priorities including the security of North America.

The IPS recognized the root problems of failed and failing states, global terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and continuing regional tensions as the most

---

283 Ibid.


pressing challenges at the beginning of the 21st century. The IPS confirmed Canada’s commitments to the United Nations, NATO, and coalitions of like-minded states. The latter was formulated as “less formal coalitions of like-minded states, as we have seen in the international campaign against terrorism.” This formulation, as well as other references especially to the problems of failed and failing states, global terrorism, and the importance of continental security reflects the post 9/11 international context.

The IPS listed the types of operations where Canada “must remain capable of participating.” These operations included operations such as the Kosovo air campaign and the operation with the United States in Afghanistan, complex peace support and stabilization missions, such as NATO-led operation in Bosnia and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, maritime interdiction operations, such as those implemented in the Persian Gulf after the first Gulf War, and as part of the campaign against terrorism, traditional peacekeeping and observer operations, such as those conducted by the UN in the Middle East and, more recently in Ethiopia/Eritrea, humanitarian assistance missions, such as the Disaster Assistance Response Team in Honduras, Turkey and, more recently, Sri Lanka, and evacuation operations to assist Canadians in countries threatened by imminent conflict and turmoil, as in Haiti. The IPS also underscored other Canadian interests in UN peace operations, such as the promotion of R2P and the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). Canada did remain committed to

---

288 Ibid., 24.
289 Ibid., 28.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid., 24-5.
traditional peacekeeping and observer missions under UN command. However, Canada preferred UN-approved peace operations in which US-led or like-minded allies were employed.

Canada’s shift towards UN-approved missions was also confirmed in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. The Defence Strategy stated that “projecting leadership abroad” could be in the form of participation in a large-scale international campaign such as those in Afghanistan or as a specific component of a multinational operation, such as a naval task group. The Defence Strategy did not develop any new ideas on Canada’s commitments to the UN peace operations. This doctrinal thinking remained until 2017 Canada’s Defence Policy Review Strong, Secure, Engaged.

Conclusion

Since the end of Cold War, the role of Canada in UN peacekeeping has evolved considerably. In the first half of the 1990s, Canada became involved in failed UN-led peace operations in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. This experience gave a good dose of reality to both the United Nations and Canada. There was a high demand for UN peace operations, but not for traditional peacekeeping. By being more selective, since 1995, Canada shifted to other activities in UN peace operations, such as reform, training assistance, and capacity building. At the same time, as a function of the new environment, Canada preferred to participate in UN-approved, rather than UN-led peace operations. Since the beginning of Afghanistan, Canada’s doctrines on defence also moved towards UN-approved peace operations.

As such, the answer to the question, whether Canada truly abandoned UN peacekeeping per se, is not simple as it seems. By taking into account UN-approved peace operations, Canada

---

has not disengaged from UN peace operations. It merely changed priorities. With the advent of Justin Trudeau in 2015, Canada appears to be determined to revitalize its historic role as a peacekeeper. This determination causes some confusion.
Chapter Four
Conclusion

During the 2015 election campaign, Justin Trudeau argued for the revitalization of Canada’s historic role as a peacekeeper. During next two years after the election, the Liberal government made several important statements regarding its commitments to the UN. Specifically, in March 2016, Justin Trudeau officially stated that Canada would stand for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2020 for the 2021-2022 term. Later the same year, the Liberal government promised to deploy in UN peace operations up to 150 police officers, as well as up to 600 Canadian Armed Forces personnel, and provide funding in the amount of $450 million over three years for a new Peace and Stability Operations Program. These promises faded into the background until the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial.²⁹³ During the ministerial, the government made another range of pledges including the promise to deploy 200 ground troops along with accompanying equipment as part of those promised 600 troops to current UN peace operations. However, the details of the deployment of these 200 troops, as well as the rest of uniformed personnel are still under discussion.

UN peacekeeping evolved considerably over the whole period from 1947 to 2017. During the Cold War, field operations, such as military observer missions and lightly armed peacekeeping missions, later referred as traditional peacekeeping, became the alternatives to initially introduced collective security measures, such as imposing sanctions and applying the use of force under Chapter VII. With the end of the Cold War and the shift to intrastate conflicts, UN peacekeeping started to require a more complex and robust approach.

Since that time, peacekeeping was integrated into the concept of peace operations that includes other elements of conflict resolution, in particular conflict prevention, peacemaking,

²⁹³ The 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial was conducted on 14-15 November 2017 in Vancouver, Canada. The Ministerial hosted more than seventy countries and international organizations.
peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. It also involves regional arrangements. For example, due to the limited capacity of the UN, the Security Council authorized more forceful peace operation, known as UN-approved peace operations, to regional agencies or groups of willing member states. Regarding three essential principles of UN peacekeeping, in the post-Cold War period, they became more flexible in order to permit the use of force in cases of not only self-defence and defence of the mandate, but also the protection of civilians. Despite more robust rules of engagement, peace operations involve peace enforcement only as an exceptional and time-limited measure. They generally do not exercise counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism elements.

Canada has special relations with UN peacekeeping. By contributing to the establishment of the first peacekeeping mission (UNEF I) and then participating in every peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, Canada earned the reputation of a peacekeeper. In the early 1990s, Canada was involved in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. These operations, as well as most other operations of the post-Cold War period, pointed to the irrelevance of traditional peacekeeping. Due to diminishing traditional peacekeeping missions and Canada’s unsuccessful experience in UN-led operations beyond the traditional mandate, Canada reoriented towards other activities in UN peace operations, as well as UN-approved peace operations. Beginning with its complex involvement in the Balkans, Canada moved further and further away from UN-led peace operations. The doctrinal thinking showed Canada’s preference for UN-approved peace operations, rather than UN-led peace operations, except for traditional peacekeeping.

Given both the evolution of UN peacekeeping and Canada’s role in it, especially during the past two decades, the rhetoric of the current Liberal government may be confusing regarding Canada’s commitments to UN peacekeeping. There is a need for the government to clarify its statements on re-engaging UN peace operations as well as revitalizing Canada’s
historic role in UN peacekeeping. As noted, Canada’s historic role as a peacekeeper is mainly associated with traditional UN peacekeeping during the Cold War. When the demand for traditional peacekeeping decreased, Canada shifted towards UN-approved peace operations. Hence, by revitalizing Canada’s historic role nowadays, the government may be expected to make a considerable contribution to current multidimensional and conflict management UN peace operations. Other options such as participation in ongoing traditional peacekeeping missions of the last century, such as UNTSO, UNMOGIP, or UNDOF, or some special political missions led by DPKO would not make Canada a leading nation in UN peace operations. These missions are small and do not require a large military contribution. Another point which should be considered is whether Canada’s re-engaging or revitalizing its participation in UN peace operations should be substituted by UN-approved missions. These operations have different nature and operating mechanisms. They were, however, not in decline, such that Canada does not need to re-engage in them.

The policy course, aimed at deploying uniformed personnel in current multidimensional and conflict management UN-led peace operations, has certain implications that must be clearly identified and articulated. First, it is important to understand the difference between UN-led and UN-approved peace operations. Canada’s experience in more forceful missions undertaken by regional actors could be valuable for current UN peace operations, but it is not the same. UN-approved in comparison to UN-led peace operations have broader level use of force and more robust rules of engagement, although both types of missions may operate in complex conflict situations.

Another difference lies in the environment. UN-approved peace operations ensure better resources, as well as a more harmonized operational environment that is guaranteed by allies and in many cases for Canada by an American presence. Such harmonized cooperation should not be expected in UN-led peace operations. If the government seeks to revitalize UN peace
operations, it automatically means working with African regional actors, including the African Union and ECOWAS. This cooperation would not be the same as with NATO. Moreover, there is a different level of preparedness of troops-contributing countries (TCCs). Personnel of some TCCs are hardly equipped and trained (because some TCCs are themselves struggling with domestic problems)\textsuperscript{294} and, as a consequence, are not always ready to apply the use of force when it is necessary. Due to this fact, there are also more chances of uncertainty on the ground, unexpected caveats, and sometimes cases of disobedience and insubordination.\textsuperscript{295}

The Canadian government should realize that it is a new shift in Canadian defence and security. There is a need for reorientation and proper preparation. If Canada is determined to contribute ‘boots on the ground’ to UN-led peace operations, there is a need to focus more on the training of Canadian personnel. Also, there is a need to clarify how the government would approach it.

Another challenge is the pressure created around the right place where Canadian uniformed personnel could be deployed. Most of current UN peace operations are located in the African continent. The missions in the CAR, Mali, the DRC, and the South Sudan are usually discussed as potential options for Canada’s new or increased involvement.\textsuperscript{296} These missions are in a focus because they are the main recipients of UN troops and, moreover, three of them are francophone.\textsuperscript{297} At the same time, these missions are complex, without a clear exit strategy and in contradiction to essential UN peacekeeping principles. Their mandates include


\textsuperscript{296}As of October 2017, Canada contributes around eight staff officers in MONUSCO.

\textsuperscript{297}The Central African Republic, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo are French speaking countries.
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism tasks. For example, in 2013 in the DRC, the Security Council authorized peace enforcement actions for the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) against identified rebel groups. In 2013 and 2014 in Mali and the CAR, the mandates asked peacekeepers to “stabilize” and “extend state authority” by confronting insurgents and extremist groups in Mali, as well as sectarian groups in the CAR. Importantly, these missions have high fatality rates, especially the operation in Mali.

It is not surprising then that the Liberal government has taken so long to provide details on where, when, and how (and even if) Canadian uniformed personnel will be deployed. The fact is that the options which are on the table are problematic. Given the lack of peace that characterizes most of the operations on the African continent, the current government needs to prepare the public for potential casualties. This will have a significant effect on Canadian public opinion, and place pressure on the government to explain its decision on the basis of national security, rather than its desire for Canada to ‘be back,’ or gain a temporary seat on the UN Security Council.

Finally, there are direct budget implications. Although Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy gradually commits to increase the defence budget, it remains questionable if these plans realize. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee. Only time will show if it is just redistributing the existing budget or it is expanding in order to take on the additional role. At the same time, Canada’s promise to “be in line with its partners in NATO in terms of

---

298 Karlsrud, “UN Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism – A Bridge Too Far?” The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) is a military formation which is part of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

299 Ibid.

defence spending as a percentage of the GDP, "as well as Canada’s military commitments in Iraq, Latvia, and Ukraine should be also kept in mind.

It remains unclear if the promised 600 CAF and 150 police officers are still planned to be deployed to UN peace operations, or just the recent announcement of 200 personnel. Regardless, the Liberal government can be seen to keep its promises by contributing more to reforming UN peace operations and providing expert assistance and training. Even though these roles are behind the scenes and maybe less effective in gaining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, they are a means to demonstrate Canada’s commitments to UN-led peace operations. Even so, Trudeau’s government has created great expectations, especially amongst UN officials, and European countries involved in Africa, that Canada will contribute significant numbers of uniformed personnel. Failure to meet these expectations could damage image of the Trudeau government, both locally and internationally.

Thus, the answer to the main thesis question, whether Canada truly abandoned UN peacekeeping, is obvious. Considering the contemporary meaning of UN peace operations and their elements and mechanisms, contributions to UN peace operations can vary. Canada’s decision to become involve in UN-approved peace operations, as well as other aspects of UN peace operations substituted its role in UN-led peace operations. Hence, the formulation on the revitalization of Canada’s historic role in UN peacekeeping is problematic because it takes Canada back to the past. This rhetoric may be effective to win support domestically and recognition internationally, but it undermines what has been done before. It would have been wiser to focus on what Canada had already done and how it could be improved, rather than re-creating the past. Moreover, this policy course leaves a lot of unanswered questions, which require careful analysis.

---

Bibliography


Bellamy, Alex J. Understanding Peacekeeping. 2nd ed.. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2010.


### Table 1 - Summary of the Main UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Responsible for and Year of Publication</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping/An Agenda for Peace | Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996 (1992) | • The first attempt to assert a broad UN mandate  
• Formulated peacekeeping involving not only military and police personnel but also civilians  
• Formulated preventive diplomacy, including preventive deployment, as well as peacemaking  
• Introduced peace enforcement units  
• Introduced and recognized peacebuilding |
| The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace/Supplement | Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996 (1995) | • Reaffirmed adherence to the basic peacekeeping principles  
• Underlined the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates  
• Re-considered the idea on peace enforcement units  
• Delegated UN mandates under Chapter VII to regional agencies and coalitions of willing member states  
• Recognized the importance of peacebuilding both within peacekeeping mission and without any peacekeeping operation being deployed |
• Introduced of traditional and complex peacekeeping  
• Introduced the idea of robust peacekeeping  
• Formulated peacebuilding activities  
• Recognized the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding  
• Supported the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission  
• Raised the issue of transitional civil administrations |

---

The table is elaborated by the author. It summarizes the key points of the main UN documents described in Chapter One. The summary does not include key points on the UN-regional cooperation.
| United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines/ the Capstone Doctrine | The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 2008 | • Defined all five areas of peace operations including peace enforcement  
• Distinguished robust peacekeeping from peace enforcement  
• Distinguished multidimensional and traditional models of peacekeeping  
• Introduced additional criteria for the successful implementation of peace operations  
• Confirmed the interconnected nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| The Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people/ the HIPPO report | Jose Ramos-Horta, the former President of Timor-Leste from 2008 to 2012 and Nobel Laureate 2015 | • Offered four shifts for the future design and delivery of UN peace operations  
• Defined all tools of UN peace operations  
• Introduced three types of UN peacekeeping missions  
• Defined the position of peacekeeping towards enforcement tasks and counter-terrorism operations  
• Acknowledged “flexible and progressive interpretation” of peacekeeping principles  
• Re-confirmed the importance of such areas as conflict prevention and mediation, protection of civilians, as well as measures aimed at sustaining peace |
Appendix B
United Nations and Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN Peace Operations over the Cold War

Table 2 - United Nations and Canadian Uniformed Personnel in UN Peace Operations over the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission name</th>
<th>Dates of mission</th>
<th>UN Contribution</th>
<th>Dates of Canada’s involvement into mission</th>
<th>Canadian Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) | May 1948 - Present | In 1948, the UN deployed 572 military observers and some supporting technical personnel. By 1954, the number of military observers dropped to forty.  
In 1965, the number of observers reached 140, while in 1966 and 1967 – 133 and 132 respectively. By the end of October 1973, UNTSO had 225 observers. As of 1990, there were 298 observers. A peak of UN military strength was 600. | February 1954 - Present | Operation JADE. Canada’s involvement has been started from 1954. Around twenty officers were the standard number of military personnel till 1993. Since then, this number was reduced to thirteen officers. As of 2016, it consists of four military observers. There are no specific units from Canada in this operation. A peak of Canadian military strength was twenty. |

303 Due to the absence of UN unified databases for the period from 1948 to 1990, this table collects the data from the secondary sources to illustrate the estimated trend of Canadian involvement in UN peace operations from 1948 to 1990. Collected data may have some inaccuracies and estimated values. The peaks of military strength for UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL were defined before 1991.

304 Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping.


306 Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 93.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</th>
<th>January 1949 - Present</th>
<th>The size of UNMOGIP usually fluctuated between thirty-five and sixty-seven military observers between 1949 and 1964. In 1965, the number of observers reached forty-five. In subsequent year, it was estimated thirty-two-thirty-six military personnel. A peak of UN military strength was hundred.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)</td>
<td>November 1956 - June 1967</td>
<td>During the first year of this operation, the UN deployed around 6,000 military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1950 - November 1995</td>
<td>Initially, Canada provided eight military observers. In 1955, one more military observer was sent. Nine years later, Canada sent the RCAF detachment with one Caribou, three officers, and five ground crew from 102 Composite Squadron. By March 1975, Canada returned to its original contribution, namely nine military observers. In 1978, this number was reduced to one. Since 1979 Canada withdrew all military observers. From 1979 to 1995, Canada occasionally provided aircraft to move UNMOGIP headquarters from Rawalpindi to Srinagar and back again. A peak of Canadian military strength was twenty-seven.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


personnel. Since 1957, this number gradually reduced, at withdrawal it was under 3,400 personnel. There were the following reductions: 5,977 in 1957, 5,334 in 1959, 5,159 in 1961, 5,102 in 1963, 4,581 in 1965, and 3,378 in 1967. A peak of UN military strength was 6,000.

December there were 1,000 troops serving in UNEF I. In 1957, Canada committed around 1,172 military personnel. In subsequent years of this operation Canada’s military participation was the following – 983 personnel in 1957, 936 in 1959, 940 in 1963, 954 in 1965, and 795 in 1967.

Canada’s military involvement included 56 Canadian Signal Squadron, 56 Canadian Transport Company, 56 Canadian Infantry Workshop and 56 Canadian Recce Squadron, as well as 115 Air Transport Unit specifically Dakotas, Caribous and Otters. A peak of Canadian military strength was 1,172.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)</th>
<th>June 1958 - December 1958</th>
<th>By June 1958, 94 military observers were deployed. By July, this number increased to 113, and twenty air operations</th>
<th>June 1958 - December 1958</th>
<th>Canadian contingent consisted of seventy-one officers from various units and six non-commissioned officers. There were</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


personnel arrived. By September, the number of ground observers reached 214 whilst the number of air operations personnel – seventy-three. By November, the number of ground observers and air operations personnel increased up to 501 and ninety respectively. By December, less than thirty UNOGIL personnel were deployed in Lebanon. A peak of UN military strength – 591.

| United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) | July 1960 - June 1964 | ONUC was the largest mission for the Cold War period. On average for the first month of the operation, the UN deployed 7,247 troops, by August this number increased to 14,491. In July 1961, ONUC reached its maximum strength with 19,825 troops. Due to withdrawal of brigades from Tunisia and Ghana in December 1961, the number of troops... | August 1960 - June 1964 | Initially, Canada sent eight army officers of UNTSO and UNEF and eleven RCAF officers at ONUC headquarters. One month later, 57 Canadian Signals Unit arrived with total of 275 personnel. For the whole period of Canada’s involvement, the average number of military personnel consisted of around 300. Among Canadian personnel... |

---


reduced by 4,000. However, by January 1963 ONUC again reached more than 19,400 military personnel. The number of troops reduced to 8,000 and 5,871 by July and December 1963 respectively. In early 1964 it remained at 5,500 troops. A peak of UN military strength was 19,828. A significant number were French-speaking. A peak of Canadian military strength included 420 personnel.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1962 – April 1963</td>
<td>There were two military operations in West New Guinea. UNTEA consisted of twenty-one military observers and was provided by a United Nations Security Force (UNSF). The observation mission was finished for one month, right after UNSF started its work. In November 1962, UNSF composed of 1596 military personnel from Pakistan, the United States and Canada. By February 1963, this number increased to 1608. A peak of UN military strength in West New Guinea was 1,608.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


| United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) | June 1963 - September 1964 | The deployed force consisted of six military observers, 114 personnel redeployed from UNEF I from a Yugoslav reconnaissance unit, fifty personnel from Canadian air unit and a small military headquarters staff. A peak of UN military strength was 189.|
| United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) | March 1964 - Present | In June 1964, the size of force was composed of 6,411 military personnel including police forces. By December of the same year, this number reduced to 6,275. In subsequent years, there were the following reductions: 5,764 in 1965, 4,610 by the end of 1966, 4,737 by December 1967, 3,708 between April and December 1968. From 1970 to 1972 the forces of UNFICYP remained at the level of 3,150 personnel. In spring 1974, there was the next reduction of 381 troops. However, after March 1964 - Present | Operation SNOWGOOSE (March 1964 - Ongoing) and Operation GREYBEARD I (March – July 1983). In 1964, Canada deployed the 1st Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (709 personnel), the Reconnaissance Squadron and Royal Canadian Dragoons (ninety-one personnel) as well as a headquarters contingent (178 personnel). In total, Canada sent up to 1,100 personnel. During next two years, this number was reduced to 900 in November 1967 |

---


328 Ibid.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the number of UN military personnel augmented to around 5,000 in August and stabilized at 4,300 by the end of 1974. Finnish and Swedish contingents were withdrawn in October 1977 and February 1987 respectively. As of June 1991, the size of UNFICYP forces was consisted of 2,151 military personnel including police officers. A peak of UN military strength was 6,411.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican</th>
<th>May 1965 - October 1966</th>
<th>This mission was provided by the Military Adviser to the Representative of the Secretary-General and two</th>
<th>June 1965 - October 1966</th>
<th>Canada provided one military observer. A peak of Canadian military strength was 1,100.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic (DOMREP)</th>
<th>military observers.</th>
<th>A peak of UN military strength was consisted of three people.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)</td>
<td>September 1965 - March 1966</td>
<td>In 1965, the UN deployed ninety-six military observers and some military units. By March 1966, the number of military observers dropped to seventy-eight. A peak of UN military strength reached 200 personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force, Middle East / Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFME / UNEF II)</td>
<td>October 1973 - July 1979</td>
<td>By November 1973, the military force of the operation consisted of 2,566 military personnel. In February 1974, troops reached 7,000, but in July this number dropped</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


to 5,079 and increased to 5,527 in June and July of the same year respectively. In subsequent years, the number of military personnel remained closer to 4,000: 3,919 in 1975, 4,174 in 1976, 4,297 in 1977, 4,178 in 1978, 4,031 in 1979. A peak of UN military strength was 7,000.

In 1974, UNDOF was provided with 1,250 military personnel. Since then, this number fluctuated. There were 1,198 personnel in 1975, 1,245 in 1978, 1,289 in 1980, and 1,331 from 1985 to 2012. Operation DANACA (June 1974 – March 2006) and Operation GLADIUS (since March 2006). During 1974-1977, the Canadian contribution to UNDOF was a detached company from 73 Service.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)  
May 1974 - Present  
In 1974, UNDOF was provided with 1,250 military personnel. Since then, this number fluctuated. There were 1,198 personnel in 1975, 1,245 in 1978, 1,289 in 1980, and 1,331 from 1985 to 2012.

July 1974, Canada provided 1,076 military personnel. From 1975 and onward, Canadian military participation remained at the level of around 850 deployed troops, in particular 831 in 1975, 871 in 1976, 855 in 1977, 840 in 1978, and 844 in 1979. Canada's military contribution was consisted of five units such as 73 Canadian Signal Squadron, 73 Canadian Service Battalion, 116 Canadian Air Transport Unit (two Buffalo aircraft), 1st Canadian Signal Regiment, and Canadian Contingent Administrative Unit Middle East. A peak of Canadian military strength was 1,076.
A peak of UN military strength was 1,331. Battalion from UNEF II. It explains the same name of operation as for UNEF II. Starting from 1977, the Canadian UNDOF detachment obtained its technical and operational independence and turned into the Canadian Logistics Company (CANLOG).  

Canada contributed 152 personnel in 1975, 161 in 1978, 220 in 1980, 226 in 1985, and 225 in 1991. In 1992 and 1993 the contingent was reduced to 186. Instead Operation DANACA, Operation GLADIUS started in 2006. It consisted of four officers, then the task force was decreased to two by July 2006, and increased to three in 2011. Since 2012, Canada no longer participating. A peak of Canadian military strength was 226.

---


347 “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation GLADIUS.”

### United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

| March 1978 - Present | Initially, the size of force was consisted of around 4,000 troops. In May 1978, this number augmented to 5,931. In February 1982, the number of troops reached 6,975. In September of the same year, this number reduced by 482 personnel due to French redeployment of troops. However, these personnel were returned by February 1984. As of July 1991, UNIFIL was composed of 5,848 military troops. A peak of UN military strength was 6,975. |
| April 1978 - October 1978 | Operation ANGORA. In April 1978, Canada deployed twelve augmentees from the Canadian Airborne Regiment and a contingent of two units – the Canadian Signal Unit UNIFIL with eighty-nine personnel and the Chief Signal Officer UNIFIL with two personnel. In October, Canada’s mission was completed. Canada has been involved in UNIFIL from time to time, as personnel of UNTSO are often detached to the mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). A peak of Canadian military strength was 120. |

### United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)

| May 1988 - March 1990 | In May 1988, fifty military observers were deployed, forty of which were redeployed from other peace operations such as UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL. By the end of operation, there were thirty-five |
| May 1988 - March 1990 | Canada sent five military observers. Two officers were deployed in Kabul, where one was working in the headquarters, while the other – fulfilling the role of an inspection team leader. Other two Canadians served at UNMOGAP posts. |

---


observers. A peak of UN military strength was fifty. The fifth was deployed in the UNMOGAP headquarters in Pakistan. In 1989, the number of military observers reduced to three. A peak of Canadian military strength was five.

| United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) | August 1988 - February 1991 | In 1988, the UN sent 350 military observers and a signals unit of 525 from Canada. In 1989 the communication unit was withdrawn while by late 1990 the number of observers reduced to 116 where sixty personnel were placed on Iranian side and fifty-six – on Iraqi side. A peak of UN military strength was 875. | August 1988 - February 1991 | Operation VAGABOND. Canada provided a contingent with fifteen military observers, a communication unit of 525 soldiers (88 Canadian Signals Squadron), and 150 vehicles. By March 1989, the communication unit completed its task and was on the way back to Canada. The number of military observers reduced to eight and then four in November 1990 and January 1991 respectively. A peak of Canadian |

---


358 Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 248.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)</th>
<th>January 1989 – June 1991</th>
<th>In 1989, UNAVEM I was consisted of seventy military observers. By November of the same year, the number of observers reduced to sixty. A peak of UN military strength was seventy.</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>None.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)</td>
<td>March 1989 - March 1990</td>
<td>In 1989, UNTAG was consisted of 300 military monitors and observers, three infantry battalions, and logistics units, in total 4,493 personnel. Between January and April 1990, military monitors and observers left Namibia. The first unit of 500 police officers was deployed in April 1989, the second (other 500 police monitors) – between June and August, while the third (other 500 police monitors) – in mid-September of the same year. In 1990, the number of police officers was</td>
<td>March 1989 - March 1990</td>
<td>Operation MATADOR. Canada contributed not only specific units such as logistics unit, air transport unit, and the headquarters but also members from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Canada sent around 300 military personnel and hundred police monitors. A peak of Canadian military strength including police was 400.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

359 Ibid., 382.
A peak of UN military strength including police was 5,993. Operation SULTAN. In December 1989, Canada deployed nine officers as a part of advance party. In 1990, Canadian contribution was consisted of around forty military observers, around 127 personnel from military air unit, and eight CH-139 Jet Ranger helicopters (later four of them were replaced with four CH-135 Twin Hueys). In 1991, due to downsizing the operation, there were around twenty-seven Canadian military observers. A peak of Canadian military strength was 167.

---

361 Ibid., 213.


368 Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, 449. The calculation of military personnel for 1990 and 1991 was based on the average of two provided months – April and October.
A peak of UN military strength was 1,098 military personnel.\textsuperscript{366}

\textsuperscript{365} Durch, \textit{The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping}, 449. The calculation of military personnel for 1990 and 1991 was based on the average of two provided months – April and October.

Appendix C
Peace operations in the UN Framework with Canadian Uniformed Personnel Participation over 1948 - 2017

Table 3 - UN-led Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Mission name</th>
<th>Dates of operation</th>
<th>Dates of Canada’s involvement into operation</th>
<th>Use of force beyond self-defence and beyond defence of mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>May 1948 - Present</td>
<td>February 1954 - Present</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>July 1960 - June 1964</td>
<td>August 1960 - June 1964</td>
<td>The initial mandate was extended in terms of level of force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

369 There are two tables: UN-led peace operations and UN-approved peace operations. Both tables are organized in the chronological order. The use of force authorized by UN Security Council Resolutions was used as a measurement to evaluate the nature of each peace operation where Canada has been involved. However, these tables do not show whether these operations have applied war-fighting elements when they are/were under Chapter VII. The information reflected in tables is as of September 2017.

The list of UN-led peace operations includes the following special political missions (i.e. political missions but led by UN DPKO), involving Canadian uniformed personnel: OSGAP, UNAMET, UNAMA, UNAMI, UNAMIS, UNIOSIL, BINUB, UNMIN, UNMC. The early observer missions with Canadian military participation, such as UNTCOK and UNCOK, are not included in the list of peace operations as they are considered by the UN as prototypes of peacekeeping missions.

Regarding UN-approved peace operations, it is important to note the following. United Nations Command (UNC) under the U.S. lead and U.S.-led Gulf War coalition were not included in the list because they are peace enforcement operations in the collective security sense. IFOR was initially decided outside of the framework of the UN. However, the operation was immediately recognized by a Security Council Resolution. KFOR started as the NATO air campaign carried out from March to June 1999. KFOR became UN-authored peace operation since June 1999. EUFOR Operation Althea was established by EU Council Joint Action (CJA). But it was sanctioned by the UN Security Council and given UN Charter Chapter VII power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Mission/Operation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Authorisation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>March 1964 - Present</td>
<td>March 1964 - Present</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DOMREP</td>
<td>Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
<td>May 1965 - October 1966</td>
<td>June 1965 - October 1966</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
<td>September 1965 - March 1966</td>
<td>September 1965 - March 1966</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>March 1978 - Present</td>
<td>April 1978 - October 1978</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yes, implicit authorization for use of force in UNSC Resolution 161 (21 February 1961) and UNSC Resolution 169 (24 November 1961)

The initial mandate was extended in terms of level of force

Yes, acting under Chapter VII of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Mission/Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>United Nations Charter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
<td>March 1993 - March 1995</td>
<td>March 1993 - April 1994</td>
<td>The initial mandate (UNOSOM I) was extended in terms of level of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Participation Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>UN/AM/ET</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission East Timor</td>
<td>June 1999 – October 1999</td>
<td>June 1999 – October 1999</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004 - Present</td>
<td>June 2004 - Present</td>
<td>Yes, acting under Chapter VII of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mission/Operation</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
<td>April 2013 - Present</td>
<td>Data is not available in Canadian databases. UN data indicates one Canadian</td>
<td>Yes, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Mission name</td>
<td>Dates of operation</td>
<td>Dates of Canada’s involvement into operation</td>
<td>Use of force beyond self-defence and beyond defence of mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Both tables are elaborated by the author based on the information from: A. Stevens 2015, “Current Operations” n.d., “Current Operations List | National Defence and the Canadian