The Rwandan Genocide and the Media:
A Two-Stage Analysis of Newspaper Coverage

by

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ABSTRACT

The Rwandan genocide exhibited a faster rate of killing than any genocide in recent history, taking place over 100 days; however, at the time of its occurrence, it was relatively ignored by the international community. In 2005, Major General Romeo Dallaire singled out the Western press coverage and condemned it for its failure to adequately publicize the genocide. Nevertheless, few studies have analysed the media’s coverage of the genocide and no studies have looked at Canadian media or the criminal aspects of the genocide reporting.

This study examined articles printed in the New York Times and the Globe and Mail and consisted of a two-stage content and discourse analysis. The content analysis involved analysis of 17 variables in 577 articles, while the discourse analysis examined the extent to which common themes associated with crime served as a framework for making sense of the Rwandan genocide in 311 articles. As part of the discourse analysis, the data was assessed through a cultural criminological perspective which focused on five criminological themes; crime, perpetrators, victims, law enforcers and law and order.

Overall, the results show that Rwanda was presented in the media as a chaotic and primitive country, in many ways beyond the reach of law, and therefore the language of crime was rarely used to describe the genocide. The planning, organization and systematic perpetration of the genocide were largely ignored and the media instead presented genocide in Rwanda as a natural and anarchic result of a primitive and tribal society.
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INTRODUCTION

Nineteen-forty-five marked the end of World War II and the international community’s commitment to “never again” allow genocide to occur under their watchful eyes. On October 24, 1945, the United Nations (UN) was created to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends (United Nations 2004).

Various laws were enacted to ensure that the UN’s mandate was met, and one such law was the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Genocide Convention\(^1\) was the “first international human rights convention” (Springer 2006: 22) and gave definition to the crime of genocide. Along with the definition of genocide, Article I of the convention states that the signatories will “confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish”. Further Article VIII states that any signatory “may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide”.

However, nearly 50 years later, the world was a passive spectator to an event that should never have been allowed to happen. During 100 days, between April 6 and July 19, 1994, the African country of Rwanda experienced a genocide in which approximately 800,000 people were killed (Barnett 2002, Pottier 2002 and Kent 2006). Although evidence existed to suggest that genocide was imminent, and then occurring, few in the

\(^1\) The full text of the convention can be found at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm
international community acknowledged it as such and even fewer considered intervening to end the violence. This failure of the international community to intervene is one of the twentieth century’s greatest tragedies. The 1948 Genocide Convention requires the international community to intervene in cases of genocide and to prevent and punish all acts of genocide. However, when push came to shove, the international community denied the fact that genocide was occurring in Rwanda, which legally let them off the hook. It was not until after the genocide that the international community admitted to failing in Rwanda by not intervening.

On May 25, 1994, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave a press conference and admitted to this failure.

I will try not to be emotional…Let us recognize that this is a failure…not only of the UN but also of the international community. All of us are responsible for this failure. I have tried. I was in contact with different heads of state and I begged them to send troops…I failed. It is a scandal. I am the first one to say it and I am ready to repeat it (Melvern 2000: 196).

In March 1998, Bill Clinton, who was President of the United States (US) during the genocide, visited Kigali and spoke to genocide survivors, assistance workers, and US and Rwandan government officials. His statement communicated the same sentiments:

All over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror. The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began…we did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name genocide…Never again must we be shy in the face of the evidence (Melvern 2000: 230).

In the years since the genocide, the international community has been blamed for not intervening. More recently, in 2005, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the designated
Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), single out and condemned Western press coverage of the genocide. Dallaire believed that the media had the power to stop the violence that was occurring in Rwanda but failed to use it.

In the third week it became obvious to me that the only influence I had left was the media. I turned to them. The media had the power to shame the international community to action…Editors decided to keep it at a low profile and not bring it to the attention of the international community. The Western press coverage contributed to the genocide itself (Dallaire quoted in The New Times 2005).

Further, Dallaire is not alone in his condemnation of the Western media coverage of the genocide (Thompson 2007), yet few individuals back these claims with evidence. It is for this reason that I intend to analyse how two North American newspapers covered the crisis in Rwanda. I will use a combination of content and discourse analysis and the main focus of my research will be to examine the extent to which “crime” served as a framework for making sense of the Rwandan genocide. In conducting my research, my analysis will focus on five criminological themes: crime, perpetrators, victims, law enforcers and law and order.
CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before the coverage of the Rwandan genocide can be analysed, it is important to understand the roots of the violence and the role of the international community in this history. This chapter provides a brief historical overview of Rwanda and its people. As well, it examines how the international community dealt with Rwanda prior to and during the genocide. This background information is important because one cannot fully comprehend the choices made by journalists and editors in representing the Rwandan genocide without some sense of the historical complexity of Rwandan society.

Rwanda’s History

There are two prominent and competing narratives of Rwanda’s history of conflict and violence. The first is a historical account that suggests that Rwanda’s inhabitants were peaceful cohabitating ethnic groups until they were subjected to colonial control by Germany and Belgium. In this account, the Twa (0.5 percent) were the first to migrate to Rwanda, followed by the Hutu (87 percent) and then the Tutsi (12.5 percent), with the latter said to have arrived in the fourteenth or fifteenth century (Pottier 2002). Over time, a system was developed in which Tutsi kings “employed cattle, land and military chiefs to rule over local groups of the majority Hutu and minority Twa and Tutsi peoples” (Corey and Joireman 2004:75). While oral traditions testify to instances of brutality by the Tutsi kings towards their Hutu subjects, the pre-colonial relationship between the two groups was considered to be mainly peaceful. The average Hutu and Tutsi lived similarly, spoke the same language, practiced common religious beliefs, developed common traditions of music and dance, and intermarried. Any differences
between the two groups tended to be occupational, and even then, the occupational barriers allowed easy movement, which also caused the ethnic identities of the two groups to be malleable. For example, the Hutu tended to work primarily in agriculture while the Tutsi were mainly cattle herders; however, a Hutu could become a Tutsi through cattle ownership. When the colonial authorities arrived, they brought their “conceptions of race and policies of favouritism” and “created an atmosphere of ethnic rivalry in which the Tutsi were elevated above the Hutu” (Corey and Joireman 2004: 74). This historical narrative is favoured by the current government and the Tutsi population.

The second narrative, favoured by the Hutu, sees ethnic discord rooted in the pre-colonial history and worsened by colonial domination. More emphasis is placed on the nature of the Tutsi’s pre-colonial domination and this perspective claims that the Tutsi conquered the Hutu and oppressed them as their servants. For example, Hutu were required to provide labour to Tutsi chiefs in return for the right to occupy land and this created a caste-like system. Also, some individuals (Corey and Joireman 2004) claim that the Tutsi were able to advance their power and prestige among the Hutu by making social claims to aristocracy and by the fact that they were perceived to be more physically attractive. This narrative views the social inequalities between the two groups as emerging in the pre-colonial period and as being responsible for laying the framework for future discrimination. Therefore, by the time the colonialists arrived, the Hutu were already being subjugated by the Tutsi. Regardless of which perspective one accepts, it is clear there were divisions between the interests of the Tutsi and Hutu going into the colonial period and these were exacerbated through colonial domination.
In 1885, Rwanda’s colonial period began when Germany claimed the region; however, it did not obtain full colonial power until 1910. In governing the territory, Germany used indirect governance, such as ruling through the Tutsi kings and local chiefs. In 1916, the Belgians gained control of Rwanda through military action and after World War I, the League of Nations Mandate officially granted Belgium the colonial authority of Rwanda. During the colonial development of Rwanda by the Belgians, the pre-colonial labour obligations of the Hutu to the Tutsi were reinforced, which resulted in the ruling elite becoming more distant from the peasant class. As well, the Belgians introduced racial identification cards, which defined the holder as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.

When Rwanda was close to independence, Belgium transferred its allegiance from the Tutsi to the Hutu and in 1959 Belgium supported a Hutu-led revolution to overthrow Tutsi power. During this revolution, many Tutsi were killed, thousands fled and the Hutu gained ruling authority. “The revolution began a cycle of ethnic violence that would recur over and over in the post independence era” (Corey and Joireman 2004: 77). On July 1, 1962, Rwanda gained independence and in 1963 and 1969, thousands of Tutsi fled or were displaced during massacres. In 1973, General Juvénal Habyarimana displaced the Rwandan government in a military coup and institutionalized policies that encouraged ethnic discrimination.

During this period, groups of Tutsi exiles located in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire formed different political and military groups to better their political and social standings. However, they were never truly accepted by their host countries and longed to be able to return to Rwanda. The largest of these refugee groups was the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which was formed by Tutsi refugees in Uganda. The RPF
advocated the right for refugees to be able to return to Rwanda, while the “Hutu ideologists depicted the RPF as a foreign-inspired reactionary political force” (Lehmann 1999: 86) and enemies to the Rwandan state.

On October 1, 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda seeking the end of Tutsi exclusion, as well as fighting for the end of ethnic division and the removal of the compulsory ID cards (Melvern 2004). This invasion marked the beginning of a civil war. Between 1990 and 1994, Rwanda’s national army, Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), worked together with “politically powerful Hutu extremists [who] organized civilian death squads and radical militia groups that trained men to follow orders, act collectively and engage in mass killings” (Corey and Joireman 2004: 78). These death squads (Interahamwe) mainly consisted of unemployed youth who did not own land and were conditioned to believe the Tutsi population was the cause of their problems. Thus began the planning of the future genocide.

On August 4, 1993, President Habyarimana signed the Arusha Peace Accords at the insistence of international donors. The Accords were meant to bring an end to the civil war and to implement a transitional government that would see the Tutsi and the Hutu work together. The international community celebrated the signing of the Accords and promised to help implement them by providing a UN peacekeeping force known as UNAMIR. However, the Accords were flawed in that they threatened supporters of the extremist Hutu state, who felt that they were not represented during the negotiation process, with the loss of power. Furthermore, beginning in April 1994, some Rwandese army officers claimed that if the Arusha Accords were carried out, they would “liquidate the Tutsi” (Belgian Senate Commission d’Enquête quoted in Melvern 2000:108).
On October 21, 1993, the Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, in neighbouring Burundi was murdered by members of his primarily Tutsi army. Burundi had ethnic divisions similar to those in Rwanda, except that after its independence in 1962 the Tutsi maintained political control. The Hutu in Rwanda believed that with the election of a Hutu president in Burundi the RPF would be discouraged from invading Rwanda. However, within days of Ndadaye’s murder, 50,000 civilians, most of them Hutu, were killed in Burundi and ethnic hatred was also fuelled in Rwanda. Some of Rwanda’s Hutu extremists saw the assassination as proof that the Tutsi were intent on controlling the entire region and would do anything to ensure their domination. Two days later, in response to these fears, Hutu Power, an ideology used by the extremists to claim that the Tutsi needed to be eliminated, was formally launched and the blueprints for the future genocide were drawn up.

Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994 upon his return from a sub-regional summit meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, where the urgency of implementing the Accords was stressed. After the plane was shot down, roadblocks were instantly set up throughout Kigali and armed men were dispatched. Concurrently, claims were made over the airwaves that the Belgian peacekeepers were to blame for the death of President Habyarimana (Melvern 2000). While it is not known who shot down the plane, Hutu extremists used the event to reinitiate the attack against the Tutsi and Hutu

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2 The difference between Hutu extremists and moderate Hutus were that the Hutu extremists were violently opposed to sharing any power with the Tutsi, whereas the moderate Hutu favored the Arusha Accords and the sharing of power with the Tutsi.

3 “The identity of those responsible for the killing of President Habyarimana remains a subject of intense speculation and controversy” (Robinson and Ghahraman 2008: 982). In November 2006, French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière identified Paul Kagame, the commander of the RPF, as issuing the order to shoot down the plane. In February 2008, an investigation in Spain by Judge Fernando Andreu Merelles came to the same conclusion. However, others believe that the plane was shot down by Hutu extremists who were against the implementation of the Arusha Accords.
moderates. Thus, the downing of the president’s plane marked the beginning of the genocide. Within 36 hours the RPF returned to its offensive stance and fought a civil war to end the unfolding genocide.

The genocide lasted 100 days, during which time approximately 800,000 people were killed (Barnett 2002, Pottier 2002 and Kent 2006). This works out to 333 1/3 deaths per hour and 5½ deaths per minute (Barnett 2002), making it the fastest genocide in history. There were three phases of the genocide. The first phase involved the elimination of political and intellectual leaders, opinion makers and human rights activists. Roadblocks were set up to screen individuals who were trying to leave, and eventually these roadblocks were used as sites of execution, extortion and rape. The second phase involved the rounding up of Tutsi and moderate Hutu who sympathized with the Tutsi. These individuals were concentrated in places, such as schools, churches and other public buildings before being executed. The final phase of the genocide involved “the exhortation of perpetrators to continue the genocidal slaughter until all of the defined group had been identified and eliminated” (Jamieson 1999: 140). This phase also expanded its definition of who to target and the new definition included previously untargeted groups, such as children of mixed ethnic parentage.

On July 19, 1994, the civil war officially ended when the RPF gained control of Kigali and set up a new government. With the new government established, one of the fastest exoduses of refugees in history took place. Refugees were flowing into Goma at a rate of 600 people per minute or 10 to 15 thousand people per hour (Moeller 1999). However, many of these refugees were not fleeing the killings but were the perpetrators of the genocide who were afraid of retribution by the RPF.
The International Community and Rwanda: Prior to the Genocide

In the months leading up to the genocide, there was evidence of the impending genocide. A year after the genocide, Colonel Luc Marchal wrote a confidential report that claimed that “everyone knew, even in Belgium, what was going to happen for the plan of genocide was in place for a long time” (cited in Melvern 2004: 126). The permanent members of the UN Security Council, which included the US, the United Kingdom (UK), China, Russia and France, were better informed than non-permanent members due to their intelligence-gathering capabilities (Melvern 2004). The US had information predicting the death of up to 500,000 people, while the UK had information about the dangers in Rwanda (Melvern 2004). However, the international community did nothing to stop the violence and instead claimed ignorance.

On December 3, 1993, an anonymous letter written by senior officers of FAR and the Gendarmerie was sent to Major-General Romeo Dallaire, warning of a plot by Habyarimana to incite massacres in order to prevent the implementation of the Arusha Accords. “I received a letter…which informed me that there were elements close to the president who were out to sabotage the peace process, with potentially devastating consequences. The conspiracy’s opening act would be a massacre of Tutsis” (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003: 121). Further, in January 1994, the CIA gave the US State Department a report, which claimed that the Arusha Accords would fail and, as a result, violence would be inevitable. It warned that if the hostilities resumed in Rwanda, more than 500,000 people would die. This report was only given to UNAMIR after the end of the genocide and once the damage was done.
On January 11, 1994, Dallaire faxed a message to Major-General Maurice Baril at UN headquarters in New York. The Hutu prime minister-designate, Faustin Twagiramungu, had put him in contact with a high level Interahamwe trainer, Jean Pierre, who told him that in October 1993 he was ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He assumed that these lists would be used to find and exterminate the Tutsi because the Interahamwe were being trained to kill 1,000 people in 20 minutes (Melvern 2000).

He was willing to reveal the location of a major arms cache in exchange for the protection of him and his family. Afterwards, he agreed to go public to let the media know about the plans of the Hutu extremists. On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent a message to UN headquarters in New York, indicating that he intended to seize the weapons within 36 hours because he believed that going after the arms cache was “militarily feasible and morally justified, considering its modest scale and likely costs” (Anglin 2002:11). However, the UN feared that taking any action would result in serious political repercussions because the disastrous consequences of Somalia were still fresh in their minds.4 Also, Baril did not believe that the UN had the resources to intervene, even if it was authorized. The UN’s Security Council was not kept fully informed of the unstable conditions in Rwanda. Only the Americans, the French and the Belgians had been fully briefed on Dallaire’s report because they were seen as the countries that had the most influence. Moreover, the UN claimed that the Rwandan government needed to be told of any security violations so that it could work alongside the UN.

On another occasion, Dallaire was told of the aims of the extremists, which included a return to civil war, the killing of Hutu opposition supporters and trying to get

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4 On October 3, 1993, ten months after the US sent troops to Somalia as part of a low-risk humanitarian mission, 18 American soldiers were killed, another 73 were wounded and a Black Hawk helicopter was captured. One of the dead soldier’s bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.
the Belgian peacekeepers to leave, by killing some if necessary (Anglin 2002). On February 3, 1994, Dallaire wrote to New York saying “we can expect more frequent and more violent demonstrations, more grenade and armed attacks on ethnic and political groups, more assassinations and... Each day of delay in authorising deterrent arms recovery operations will result in an ever deteriorating security situation” (cited in Melvern 2000: 99). On February 11, the Belgians asked UNAMIR to take a firmer stance because of warnings they received that there would be large-scale violence. Washington and London dismissed these claims and pressured the UN to pull peacekeepers out of Rwanda.

Throughout February and March, Dallaire asked five more times to have the authority to intervene militarily. Again, he was told to work with the Rwandan government, which, according to Dallaire, was impossible. One UN staff officer described the situation as follows:

We only conducted one raid with the Gendarmerie. They would always cancel out, be late, not have fuel, and not have vehicles. Always some excuse why they couldn’t act. On the one occasion we did conduct a raid, they acted like a bunch of boobs and the mission resulted in nothing. They were committed to another op on 7 April [the day after the plane crash] which never came off... yet, once the killing began, they ran flawless cordon and searches to assist the Interahamwe (Anglin 2002: 14).

The International Community and Rwanda: During the Genocide

At the outbreak of the genocide, the UN Security Council created resolution 909, which extended UNAMIR’s mandate for six weeks. They reinforced the view that UNAMIR’s mandate was to maintain and restore the ceasefire and that if the Rwandan parties failed to comply with this, the UN would withdraw UNAMIR. Dallaire believed
that this sent the wrong message because “it confirmed for all Rwandans – the moderates attempting to hang on to hope and the extremists plotting extermination – that the world didn’t give a damn about Rwanda” (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003: 220).

Less than a week into the genocide, European troops entered Rwanda to rescue European expatriates and within four days, almost all of the expatriates had been removed. Although the presence of foreign peacekeepers may have deterred killing, they only stayed long enough to ensure the safety of their citizens. In addition, during these rescue missions, Dallaire was told not to compromise his impartiality with the “feuding groups” and to only take risks and participate in combat to ensure the safety and rescue of expatriates. He later described this period as the time the “world moved from disinterest in Rwanda to the abandonment of Rwandans to their fate. The swift evacuation of the foreign nationals was the signal for the genocidaires to move toward the apocalypse” (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003: 291).

Within a week, ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed by the extremists and Brussels withdrew its entire contingent of 450 peacekeepers, which constituted the backbone of UNAMIR. This was done without consulting Dallaire. By April 20, UNAMIR’s numbers were reduced to 1,705 from their original 2,486 and this number was further reduced to 640 by the end of April (Anglin 2002). Once the UN began to withdraw its troops from Kigali, Canada was the only Western country to send reinforcements (Pottier 2002). Various African countries offered to send troops to Rwanda but these troops needed the UN to underwrite the costs. This was impossible because the UN’s finances were dependent on Western states, which declined to offer any monetary assistance (Melvern 2000). At the time, the US government publicly denied
that the killing situation was genocide and opposed intervention. The US had considerable power in the Security Council and was able to silence calls for intervention and obstruct those who wished to intervene by drowning out their voices (Barnett 2002).

On April 8, Dallaire cabled New York and reported “there was a well-planned, organized, deliberate and orchestrated campaign of terror, with indications of large-scale massacres, and with the Tutsi as targets” (Melvern 2000: 146) and on April 9, the first large scale massacre was viewed by peacekeepers at Gikondo, a Catholic mission operated by Polish priests and nuns. During mass, the presidential guard and the Interahamwe entered the church and began killing most of the 500 people in attendance. In response to pleas of help, Polish peacekeepers were sent to the mission, where they discovered the mutilated remains of men, women and children. The peacekeepers took photos of all the disfigured bodies and took note of Tutsi identity cards, which were found partially burned. The peacekeepers recognized that these massacres were acts of genocide and thought that the photos would alert the world to what was commencing in Rwanda. In addition, French journalist Philippe Ceppi wrote an article on these massacres in the French newspaper Libération, which described the situation as genocide (Melvern 2000). However, after this first mention of genocide in the media, the term was forgotten.

On April 13, the first official notification on the occurrence of genocide was sent in a letter from the RPF to Colin Keating, the President of the Security Council, but their voices were ignored.

A crime of genocide has been committed against the Rwandese people in the presence of a UN international force, and the international community has stood by and only watched. Efforts have been mobilised to rescue foreign nationals from the
horrifying events in Rwanda, but there has been no concrete action on the part of the international community to protect innocent Rwandese children, women and men who have been crying for help (cited in Melvern 2004: 198).

Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, sent a similar letter on April 19. He wrote to Keating about how the killings constituted genocide and called on the Security Council to end the genocide and punish the offenders. For two months after April 6, the Security Council avoided using the word genocide, which allowed UNAMIR to remain neutral. If they had used the word genocide to describe the situation, they would have been morally and legally obliged to prevent the violence and punish the guilty.5

On April 15, the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher sent a message to Madeleine Albright, the US representative to the UN;

The international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible…We will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda…in the current environment in Rwanda, there is no role for a United Nations peacekeeping force…Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm (Anglin 2002: 24).

On April 21, the Security Council voted to withdraw the majority of the peacekeepers and to leave a small skeleton crew of 270 “to mediate between the two armies and facilitate human relief…to the extent feasible” (Melvern 2000: 173). They insisted on completely pulling UNAMIR out of Rwanda, because they were supposed to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accords, which after the start of the genocide

5 The use of the word genocide to describe a violent situation obligates the UN and the international community to intervene under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This intervention requires the prevention and punishment of all acts of genocide.
as seen as pointless (Anglin 2002). Moreover, they described the violence as random and perpetrated by both the Hutu and the Tutsi.

On April 28, Oxfam released a press release titled, “Oxfam fears genocide is happening in Rwanda”. Dallaire asked the UN headquarters in New York whether the situation in Rwanda could be called genocide, but he never received a response. Still, he began to use the term “genocide” in all his correspondences shortly after April 24 (Melvern 2004), which caused controversy in New York and other world capitals.

On April 29, two days before he would lose his presidency in the Security Council, Keating attempted to convince the council that Rwanda was experiencing genocide and that something needed to be done to stop it. He had the support of Argentina, Spain and the Czech Republic, but the US and Britain objected to the use of the term “genocide”, while France wanted the blame for the killings to be attributed to the RPF (Melvern 2004). The Security Council agreed to hold a press conference and a public debate; however, at the press conference, the term “genocide” was never used to describe the situation, although the violence was described as “acts of genocide”.

Finally, on May 4, Boutros-Ghali went on Nightline and reported that genocide had occurred in Rwanda and claimed that 5,000 troops could have prevented the massacres. Then on May 13, Boutros-Ghali suggested to the Security Council that Dallaire’s original request for 5500 soldiers be implemented (Resolution 918).

On June 17, France announced that it was sending troops to Rwanda to protect the threatened population; however, this act was questioned because France was considered a contributing party to the massacres. Dallaire believed that the French were only interested in stopping the RPF from taking control of Rwanda and was against their
involvement. Nevertheless, on June 22, “the Security Council authorized the French
government to conduct Opération Turquoise, a unilateral military operation…whose
stated purpose was to protect the refugees in some areas and secure humanitarian aid”
(Dorn and Matloff 2000: 40). On July 4, 2,500 French soldiers were welcomed by the
interim government. Upon their arrival, they set up a safe zone in South-Western
Rwanda, which eventually comprised a fifth of Rwanda. This zone was described as
being a humanitarian protected zone for all Rwandans; however, it mostly provided an
area of safe retreat for perpetrators of the genocide and the government’s army. The
French did not disarm the civilians or militia and they continued their reign of terror in
the camps.

In the US “stabilizing the internal situation appeared to officials at the Pentagon
and elsewhere to be a black hole of commitment. But once the slaughter ended and the
refugees settled in camps at the borders, a potential military debacle turned into a double
humanitarian effort that the U.S. forces were well equipped to solve. So the Americans
went in” (Moeller 1999: 225). The US sent approximately 4,000 troops to reinforce the
hundreds of Americans who had went to Africa to volunteer in the refugee camps;
however, it should be noted that these troops were not to be involved in peacekeeping
missions.

In sum, the Rwandan genocide was the product of a difficult colonial history, and
was facilitated by geopolitical arrangements that left Rwanda beyond the arena of
strategic importance. This is a complicated backdrop to genocide – one upon which the
media often projected its own biases and imaginings about the Rwandan situation.
CHAPTER 2
WESTERN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

However serious events may be, however high the number of victims, they do not take place unless one journalist is present to notify the world. Sometimes they take place through short notes circulated by international wire services. They may produce a moment of surprise, but they do not make news.

Nothing remains of those events. One proof is the initial tragedy that overwhelmed Burundi and Rwanda. For months, hundreds of thousands of deaths merited little or almost no international attention. Only when the crisis had become recognized as a form of genocide of such massive proportions did the mainstream media pay attention (Colombo 1995: 85).

The focus of this chapter is on how the Western media reported on Rwanda. It will examine the coverage of Rwanda by the media prior to the genocide and the coverage that took place throughout the genocide. Furthermore, this chapter looks at previous studies that have analysed the media’s coverage of the Rwandan genocide and report on their findings.

Prior to the Genocide

Prior to the genocide, newspapers published very little about Rwanda. However, information on massacres and genocide had been available in English since the late 1950s. In 1959, after thousands of Tutsi were killed and thousands fled, the UN General Assembly sent a special commission to Rwanda, which reported that “racism bordered on ‘Nazism against the Tutsi minorities’ and that the government together with the Belgian authorities were to blame” (Melvern 2004: 7). A few years later, in April of 1964, the Fabian Society in London published a pamphlet titled “Massacre in Rwanda” (Melvern 2000).
In the 1990s, references to genocide became more direct as the term began to be used to describe the escalating violence in Rwanda. On February 9, 1993, French journalist Stephen Smith of the French newspaper Libération wrote about potential genocide;

In the far hills of Rwanda...France is supporting a regime which for two years, with a militia and death squads, has been trying to organize the extermination of the minority Tutsi [sic]... the death squads, organized in a Réseau Zéro [Network Zero] by the President’s clan, are operating a genocide against the Tutsi, as though it were a public service (quoted in Melvern 2000: 44 and Melvern 2004: 41).

Furthermore, in March 1993, the “Report of the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990” was published. In a press release of the report, William Schabas wrote about claims of genocide and war crimes taking place in Rwanda. However, when the report came out, there was little international concern. The Belgian ambassador was recalled from Kigali for consultations and “the Rwandese ambassador in Brussels was told that Belgium would reconsider its economic and military aid unless steps were taken to rectify the situation” (Melvern 2000: 56). The ambassador from France claimed that the reports of massacres were simply rumours (Melvern 2000).

During the Genocide

Once the genocide began, international reporting on Rwanda slowly increased. However, there are mixed opinions on how the international media covered the events that transpired in Rwanda. At the beginning of the genocide, some individuals believed that there was limited coverage of the genocide (Lorch 1995, Giles 2004 and Thompson 2007). The first reason given for the limited coverage has been the fact that media outlets
were tied up and did not have enough reporters to send to Rwanda. In 1994, there were over 50 conflicts going on in the world (Nibley 1995: 39). Many journalists and television crews that were located in Africa were covering the April 27th presidential election in South Africa (Giles 2004) and international television crews were also tied up in Bosnia, Haiti and at the O.J. Simpson trial.

Another reason given for the inadequate coverage was the fact that even if a reporter wanted to cover the events taking place in Rwanda, it was difficult and risky to access the country (Borton, Brusset and Hallam 1996 and Giles 2004). On April 14, all but 5 Western journalists were evacuated from the Hôtel des Mille Collines by UN peacekeepers (Moeller 1999 and Melvern 2000). If a journalist wanted to enter or re-enter Rwanda there were only two ways to do so. The first involved flying in on a Canadian Air Force flight, but these were frequently cancelled due to the fighting. The second was to enter by road from Uganda with an armed escort. Once in Kigali, Dallaire ensured the protection of journalists because his reports to his leaders in New York had not provoked any action and he believed that “the media can be an ally and a weapon equal to battalions on the ground” (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003: 332).

Jean-Guy Plante, the spokesman for the UN forces in Kigali, helped organize the reporters in Rwanda and created a rotation system between Nairobi and Kigali. Plante then had UN vans, rooms at a hotel, food cards and access to electronic hook ups at the force headquarters made available to the journalists. The reporters were guaranteed security, at least one story a day and delivery of their stories to Nairobi. Dallaire also promised that any night a journalist wanted an interview with him, it would be allowed. Dallaire claimed that “the media was the weapon I used to strike the conscience of the
world and try to prod the international community into action” (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003: 333). However, even with all that he offered, he claimed that Rwanda was still ignored in favour of other stories. Dallaire expressed these sentiments on one occasion in which he spent almost an hour with the international media, accusing them fairly candidly of dropping the ball. As far as I was concerned, their mission was to report the truth and to embarrass the fence-sitting political leaders in their home countries without reserve, to never let them off the hook for the Rwandan genocide (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003: 417).

Richard Dowden (1995) claimed that his newspaper editors, The Independent (London), felt that they did not need to send anyone to cover Rwanda because it was a small war that no one would miss. Initially, correspondents based in Nairobi reported the crisis but “when the news editors in London and Washington were listening to the reports, their responses were something to this effect: Oh, it is Fred in Nairobi calling again. It is another nasty, horrid little war in Africa. That is all it is” (Dowden 1995: 86). With respect to British coverage, he felt that editors did not deem the crisis important enough and within a few days of the plane crash, the London Times wrote several articles regarding the fate of Rwanda’s gorillas. There was also some coverage on the crash, the murder of the Belgian soldiers and the evacuation of the foreigners but beyond this there was not much Rwanda coverage. Foreign stories tended to focus on the crisis in Bosnia.

Dowden (1995) claims that it took some time before his editors realized that the crisis in Rwanda was different. By the time they were willing to go in and cover the story, it was difficult to find a safe way into Rwanda and once inside, it was difficult for reporters to communicate with their editors. Dowden (2004) claims that it was “impossible to get the story out without leaving Rwanda. Telephones did not work, and
mobile phones did not reach that far in those days...Once out, it might be impossible to get back in again” (p. 285). Satellite telephones could transmit messages easily but for those without, they had to wait to be brought out of Rwanda before they could send their reports. Dowden also claimed that journalists who had covered Africa for a long time were disillusioned by the time the genocide began and were not willing to risk their lives anymore.

With respect to the BBC, Tom Giles (2004) explained why his network did not show the “appalling” pictures coming out of Rwanda. He attributed this to the fact that months earlier there was a complaint at the BBC that photos of a massacre in Burundi were shown on the lunchtime news. Therefore, even though a BBC team had gathered a risky and graphic report that showed the scale of the violence, the footage was “deemed too graphic for British viewers” (Giles 2004: 2). The cameraman was later told to take less distinct pictures that were more impressionistic. As a result, it would take more than 6 weeks for the BBC to air graphic stories. When a story was finally aired, the BBC wanted human-interest stories from the refugee camps. It was not until June 27 that “Journey into Darkness”, a feature on the true scale of violence that occurred at Nyarubuye, was broadcast.

Other individuals claim that the coverage of the genocide was filled with misconceptions about the unfolding events. In 1996, the Steering Committee for the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda wrote a report titled “The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience”. This report chastised the international press for characterizing the genocide as simple tribal warfare. The report claimed that the media’s failure to report the violence as
genocide contributed to public indifference and inaction from the international community (Melvern 2000). Further, the report claimed that the international media played a mixed role in the Rwandan crisis. While the media were a major factor in generating worldwide humanitarian relief for the refugees, distorted reporting on events leading to the genocide itself were a contributing factor to the failure of the international community to take more effective action to stem the genocide (The Danish Foreign Ministry cited in Lehmann 1999: 96).

Additionally, Micheal Barnett (2002) claims that misconceptions about Rwanda’s history and politics were advanced by the media’s coverage of the genocide. During the first three weeks of the genocide, the Western press tended to describe the situation as an ancient tribal war and portrayed the Hutu and Tutsi as clashing tribes. The violence was portrayed as “a senseless civil war, a tribal conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, in which old conflicts and bitter rivalries led to an almost primitive savagery” (Melvern 2000: 4). Jane Hunter (1994) claims that television reports aired horrific accounts of the “tribal violence” and newspapers placed stories such as these on their front pages. However, she claims stories that delved into the political nature of the attacks were usually buried within the newspapers. In addition, Roger Winter, director of the US Committee for Refugees, who had worked with Rwandese refugees prior to the genocide, wrote an article explaining that the violence was politically motivated. He concluded that describing the violence as simple tribal war was a “fatalistically superficial interpretation” (quoted in Adelman, Suhrke and Jones 1996). However, most American newspapers refused to publish the article, which was printed in the Globe and Mail on April 14.
Kuperman (2000) believes that the Western media misconceptions about the genocide are partially to blame for the Rwandan genocide because they did not recognize the extent of the violence or draw enough attention to it and it took nearly three weeks for the media to report that a killing campaign was underway in Rwanda. He claims that there were four main problems with the Western media’s reporting of the genocide. First, the media “mistook the genocide for civil war” (p. 1). Second, four days after the president’s plane crashed, reports claimed that the violence was diminishing when in fact the opposite was true. He attributes these claims to the fact that there were fewer reports on the violence because most journalists and expatriates had fled the country. He also attributed this to the fact that press coverage in some European countries stopped for four days starting April 8. The third problem he lists is that the media underestimated the number of deaths. Finally, he argues that the media primarily focused on Kigali, which represented only four percent of Rwanda’s population. There were few reports on violence outside of Kigali and, when it was reported, it was represented as the mutual violence of a civil war.

In February 1994, Mark Doyle (cited in Carleton University 2004) was told by an African ambassador in Kigali that “a big story could happen here” due to the Hutu parties blocking the installation of the transitional government (p. 9). When the plane crashed, he knew that he had to get back to Rwanda to cover the huge story that was about to take place. He was able to return to Rwanda behind the advancing RPF, where he originally saw the “shooting war”, and eventually he arrived in Kigali, where he saw the “genocide war”. He admits that during the early days of the genocide, he was “guilty of misinterpreting the situation” (p. 10). These misinterpretations are due to the fact that the
press spent more time with the RPF because “they were winning the shooting war, and the positions on the other side kept on moving backwards” (quoted in Carleton University 2004: 11). Also, the genocide was occurring on the other side, which caused it to be a dangerous environment on which to report.

Conversely, there are some individuals who claim that the media’s coverage was not as bad as others suggest. Samantha Powers (2002) argues that “for all the flaws in the coverage…the major media gave anybody reading or watching cause for grave alarm” (p. 256). She bases this on the fact that there were reports from witnesses about how many were killed. Moreover, Moeller (1999) views the US’ media coverage, especially the print media’s coverage, of the Rwandan genocide as “a fine example of what journalism should be” (p. 318). She claims that the story was eventually told, even when it was evident that the public did not really care about it (a poll found that only 1 percent of television viewers were interested in the genocide) (Moeller 1999). She felt that “it was in the telling of the genocide in Rwanda that the media came closest to remembering their reason for existence – not as a carrier for advertisements and commercials, but as the chief source of information for Americans to learn the world” (Moeller 1999: 319).

Anne Chaon (cited in Carleton University 2004), who worked for Agence France Press, notes that her employer was one of the few media agencies that stayed in Rwanda during the genocide. However, she claims that there was little coverage of the genocide in France and that the term was only used when it was part of a quotation from another source. She attributes this to the fact that French journalists were afraid to use the term “genocide” because of the potential consequences for the newspaper if the situation turned out not to be genocide. She claims that in 1989, the French press reported on the
discovery of mass graves in Timisoara, Romania; however, in actuality, the graves were communal graves from a local hospital. At the time, the editors were “traumatized” by the mistake and thus became “too” careful with the language they used to describe certain phenomena (cited in Carleton University 2004). They were afraid to make the same mistake in Rwanda. Chaon (cited in Carleton University 2004) also claims that news stories were available to the public but that it was up to the public to consume the information. “Now reporters were there. Pictures were available. Texts were available. If your reader, if the people you speak to do not want to listen to your story you can’t force them to. They just have to turn the button off the BBC, and editors can refuse to accept your reports” (quoted in Carleton University 2004: 8).

On July 19, the RPF declared a ceasefire and the international media focused their attention on one of the fastest refugee exoduses in history. The refugee population in Zaire was 1.8 million individuals, while the total number of Rwandans outside Rwanda was 2.5 million (Melvern 2004). By August 7, 50,000 refugees had died of cholera (Moeller 1999) and it was this situation that drew the media’s attention. “However great the suffering in the camps in Goma, it was nothing compared with the horror of the genocide. But it was Goma, not the genocide, that moved the international community to action” (James Schofield quoted in Moeller 1999: 297). In July, there were approximately 500 journalists and technicians in Goma, with no comparable coverage in Rwanda (Melvern 2004). Nik Gowing (1997) claims that the international media coverage of Rwanda did not pick up until cholera victims in Goma were shown on TV and that this was due to the fact that “it was as much a public relations show as a way to provide substantive aid. Especially in the U.S. case, it was high-profile, low risk, very
visible, and conceived for maximum media impact so that the public would conclude that ‘something is being done’” (p. 17).

Lorch (1995) claims that the differences in coverage were due to how the two situations were portrayed. In the US, the media portrayed the genocide as an African story, whereas the refugee camp in Goma, Zaire was depicted as a world tragedy, to which Westerners would be able to relate.

One British journalist, who has covered Sub-Saharan Africa for more than five years, was so tortured by his paper’s differing reactions to the two crises that he resigned in protest. ‘Do you think we did enough?’ he asked me in September 1994 as we chatted about Rwanda. ‘It is our fault that the world didn’t react to the massacres (Lorch 1995: 101).

Lorch (1995) also talks of an American radio journalist based in Nairobi who asked his editors that more reporters be sent to cover the crisis emerging in Rwanda but he received no response. However, the same editors sent supplementary reporters to Rwanda when the French military arrived in Rwanda in July to cover the “big story”.

**Previous Studies of the Media Coverage of the Rwandan Genocide**

There have been three comprehensive studies and one report that have analysed the media’s coverage of Rwanda. These include an analysis of news reports featured in weekly news magazines, an analysis of photojournalism featured in the *New York Times* between 1989 and 1994, a content analysis of US television coverage of the Rwandan genocide and a review of media reports from multiple Western countries.

The first study was published in 1997(a) by Melissa Wall who looked at 38 full-length news reports that were written in 1994 and featured in *Newsweek, Time* and *U.S. News and World Report*. She chose news magazines “because they tend to summarize
the dominant reading of a news event, and also because the writing used in them is believed to be colourful and full of visual images” (p. 124). When looking at these articles, she analyzed the sources, metaphors, portrayals, agencies and keywords.

One of the first things that Wall (1997a) analysed was the reporters’ informants. She found that the most quoted source was aid workers (22 percent), followed by ordinary local people (21 percent). People opposed to the extremists, such as the RPF and opposition party members accounted for 14 percent, while Western officials and the UN accounted each for 13 percent. Local officials, who included the ruling party and former military members, comprised 9 percent of the sources, while experts, regional (individuals from other African countries) and “others” accounted for 5 percent, 2 percent and 1 percent respectively. She found it interesting that human rights experts or academics comprised only 5 percent because these sources would have been easily accessible to Westerners and some groups, such as Human Rights Watch Africa, were publishing well-documented information regularly. She also found it significant that only a small percentage of information was gathered from people in other African countries who might have been able to provide an African point of view on the situation.

Next, Wall (1997a) collapsed the above categories into Rwandans and non-Rwandans. She found that 48 percent of sources were non-Rwandan, 44 percent were Rwandan and 8 percent were unidentifiable. While these numbers suggest that Rwandans were given a fairly equal voice on the situation, Wall (1997a) claims that when other results were considered, the way in which Rwandans were presented was much more negative. For example, of the representations of Rwandans (N=76), 74 percent depicted Rwandans as passive, 7 percent saw them as solving their problems and
9 percent were neutral on the situation. Of the representations of non-Rwandans (N=19), 19 percent saw Rwandans as being passive 75 percent saw them as solving their problems, and 6 percent were neutral. Moreover, an analysis of the headlines further supported her claim that Rwandans were presented in a negative light. In her analysis of the headlines, Wall (1997a) looked at whether a cause or solution to the crisis was given. She found that 71 percent did not list a cause or solution for the crisis in Rwanda and that only 16 percent listed a cause. However, even when causes were provided, they either indirectly referred to ethnicity or directly referred to tribalism. Of the 13 percent that did offer a solution, the claim was that Westerners were the only people capable of providing a solution.

Based on her findings, Wall (1997a) identified 5 recurring themes in the articles. The first theme she identified was that “the Rwanda violence was the result of irrational tribalism” (p. 126). She found that the articles chose to report the violence as being tribal in origin and ignored the political aspects of the violence. She claimed that nowhere did the news reports mention that a certain political group initiated the violence, and instead of naming specific groups, the stories referred to them in tribal or ethnic terms. Further, the violence was described as being a product of fate and beyond human control. The violence was seen to be present in every Rwandan and the Rwandans were time bombs waiting to “burst into savage slaughter at any time” (Wall 1997a: 126).

The second theme she identified was that “Rwandan people are little better than animals, ranging from the barbaric to the helpless and pathetic” (Wall 1997a: 126). Wall (1997a) argues that while ordinary Rwandans were the second most quoted group, their voices were placed “within a framework that consistently presented them as either
pathetic and helpless victims, or as barbaric savages” (p. 127). There was no mention of individuals who fought back, those who did not follow along and those who helped each other out. When Rwandans were not presented as passive, they tended to be described as non-rational animals who lacked humanity.

The third theme encompasses the idea that “the violence is incomprehensible, and thus is explained through comparison to Biblical myths, supernatural causes, natural disasters or diseases” (Wall 1997a: 126). The violence was described as being beyond the comprehension of Western logic and therefore the articles were unable to provide the reader with the underlying causes of the violence. References to the Bible give the impression that Rwanda is so behind the West that the Bible is the only available frame of reference. Moreover, supernatural comparisons suggest that in Rwanda, “modern reason and rational thought have yet to take root” (Wall 1997a: 129). Further, comparing the movement of Rwandans to natural occurrences, such as the movement of water, implies that human intervention cannot stop these movements because they are the result of nature.

The fourth theme suggests that “neighbouring African countries are just as violent and thus unable to help solve Rwanda’s problems” (Wall 1997a: 126). The news magazine articles analysed claim that no logical solutions exist because the surrounding countries are chaotic and unstable. She also suggests that the surrounding countries appeared unable to help because regional perspectives were almost never given (only 2 percent).

The fifth and final theme was that “only the West is capable of solving Rwanda’s problems” (Wall 1997a: 126). When the articles portrayed any positive actions taken to
deal with the violence, the people involved were almost always described as Westerners. This portrayal was reinforced by the fact that Westerners were relied on for quotations and used as primary sources. As a result, Westerners were seen as the only cure for Rwanda’s ailments. Of the Western countries mentioned, Wall (1997a) found that France was most frequently mentioned as potentially able to solve the conflict, while the US was presented as the preferred saviour.

In a follow-up article, Wall (1997b) compares her findings with the news magazine coverage of Bosnia and Rwanda. This article is important because, although the events occurred during the same period, they were portrayed very differently. Rwanda’s violence was seen as being typical of Africa and thus unavoidable. However, Bosnia’s violence was understood as a conscious decision on the part of participants to seek revenge for past wrongs. She attributes this to the fact that Bosnia is considered a part of the West, while Rwanda is perceived to be inferior to the West. In addition, no linear explanation was given for the Rwandan violence. Instead, a circular reasoning was used to claim that the violence was caused by Rwanda’s innate tendencies towards violence.

A second study was published in 1998 by Niranjan S. Karnik (1998a) who conducted an analysis of the New York Times photojournalistic coverage of Rwanda between 1989 and 1994. She “chose the New York Times because of its status as ‘a paper of record’ and based on the belief that the best newspaper in the country should have the best reporting” (p. 612). Her research found that prior to the genocide there were only a few articles that made any mention of Rwanda. In 1990, there were 16 stories, two pictures and one map on Rwanda and in 1991, the newspaper mostly reported
on AIDS and birth control as well as a brief mention of the civil war. In 1992, the first casualty of the civil war presented was a silverback gorilla for which Rwanda was famous. It was not until 1994 that stories and pictures of the individuals killed in the civil war began to emerge.

Karnik (1998a) found that the main coverage of the Rwandan crisis began to appear April 7, 1994 and that the photos “were largely centered on the human dimensions of war and violence” (Karnik 1998a: 614). In April and May, the front-page stories emphasised the predominant role of the military and soldiers. The focus of the photos that accompanied these articles was almost always on men with weapons or male soldiers riding in trucks. When the RPF gained some successes, Karnik (1998a) found that the focus shifted towards pictures of single bodies. In addition, she claims that generally, the bodies shown were male.

Women and children became the primary subjects of pictures only when the refugee situation became the focus of the stories (Karnik 1998a and Karnik1998b). The exodus of refugees was usually photographically portrayed as comprised of women, children, the old and infirm. Nevertheless, the texts that accompanied these refugee pictures talked about the Hutu killers hiding in the refugee camps, which caused the pictures to imply that the individuals shown were guilty of hiding Hutus. In late summer and fall, when infectious diseases began killing the refugees, Karnik (1998a) found that the images shifted to focus on un-gendered bodies stacked in mass graves. However, one interesting fact that she notes is that the photos did not show the international actors who could have prevented these deaths.
A third study was published in 1999 by Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus who conducted a content analysis of the US’ television coverage of the Rwandan genocide. They used broadcast transcripts from *ABC World News* (n=92) and *CNN* (n=423) for a 5-month period between April and August 1994. They used all of the transcripts from *ABC World News* and a sample of the transcripts from *CNN*. They also obtained data for *NBC Nightly News* and *CBS Evening News*. The authors looked at the frequency of Rwandan stories, the length of the stories in minutes, the placement of the stories within the news program, who the reporter was and the origin of the story. The study was supplemented by the fieldwork of one of the authors, who was stationed in Nairobi during the first few weeks of the genocide. “For more than three weeks he interviewed correspondents, attended news conferences, spoke with diplomats, and attended editorial meetings concerning strategies for covering the emerging situation in Rwanda” (Livingston and Eachus 1999: 211).

Based on their research, Livingston and Eachus (1999) found that during the first 3 months of the genocide television coverage was modest. They found that television coverage only remained focused on the story when the topics were refugees and disease. In their study, they broke the television coverage into 3 phases. Phase one consisted of coverage prior to Habyarimana’s plane crash and was pretty much non-existent. They believe that this was the most important phase because of what was not reported and that due to the lack of coverage in this phase, coverage of subsequent phases was sometimes superficial. The networks seemed to believe nothing of importance had happened there prior to their arrival and that as with other regions and other ‘ethnic conflicts’, the violence in Rwanda was the result of the ‘resurgence
of ancient ethnic hatreds’ mysteriously and inextricably exploding
to the surface (Livingston and Eachus 1999: 215).

Phase two occurred in the weeks following the crash, during the wide-scale
massacres. The authors observed that there was a substantial increase in news coverage;
however, the coverage was still relatively modest with respect to the scale of the killing.
When the massacres were described, they were usually described as ethnic or tribal in
nature. However, they argue that more sophisticated explanations were offered further
into the development of the genocide. In May 1994, there was a peak in the coverage
which the authors explain as being the result of the large number of television crews who
came to Rwanda after the South African elections. In mid-June, the television coverage
became almost non-existent, which Livingston and Eachus (1999) attribute to the
emergence of other Western, news stories. These stories included the exodus of Haitian
refugees to the US, the O.J. Simpson story, and the genocide occurring in Bosnia.

Finally, phase three constituted the majority of the television coverage. It began
in July in conjunction with the refugee exodus to the camps in Zaire and Tanzania.
However, the focus tended to be on the 1.2 million, mostly Hutu, refugees who were
dying from “dehydration, cholera, and dysentery” (Livingston and Eachus 1999: 221).
They attribute the large media focus on the refugee situation to the fact that covering
Rwanda during the genocide was hard and risky. Access to Rwanda was not easy, and
once inside the battlefields, journalists risked becoming victims of the violence. Thus, as
a result, journalists chose to cover the easy access refugee camps, which portrayed
familiar actors from the West with whom the viewers could identify.

Johan Pottier (2002) reviewed media reports from the US, Britain, France,
Belgium and the Netherlands and studied how the narratives were structured. He
concluded that refugees in Goma were given high visibility, while the victims of genocide were virtually ignored. However, he did find that there were exceptions, where the genocide was adequately covered. He found that the Belgium press were well informed and effectively covered and analysed the genocide. As an example of this coverage, he describes how the De Standaard newspaper reported two hypotheses, two days after the president’s plane was shot down, as to who was to blame. Further, other papers, such as Le Soir, La Libre Belgique and Knack paid close attention to Rwanda’s troubled politics.

Pottier (2002) also claims that in the Netherlands the general public did not know much about Rwanda prior to the genocide but that their interest grew as the crisis worsened. “Dutch media work is of interest because its journalists and commentators were in a position to cross-check their information: Anglophone voices could be compared with what was being said in Belgium and France” (Pottier 2002: 61).

Pottier also found that in France, Stephan Smith of Libération critically analysed the genocide, but he was basically alone on this matter. For the most part, French journalists reported on the intervention issues, such as Opération Turquoise and the Goma refugees. Smith reported on France’s role in Rwanda and the genocide as well as the roles of the death squads. He also focused on France’s contributions to the genocide and issues that showed France’s support of Habyarimana’s Rwanda, while the rest of the French media focused on France’s “positive relations with Habyarimana’s Rwanda” (Pottier 2002: 62).

With respect to Britain and the US, Pottier (2002) concludes that their main focus was on the humanitarian assistance and acts of charity. Both countries never really
focused on Rwandan politics and were more interested in the refugee situation taking place in Goma. When they did cover the genocide, he claims that “media ignorance about Rwanda and its past manifested itself early on in the crisis in two ways: first, in the way ‘tribalism’ entered the reporting; and second, in the way certain journalists acted as scribes for the RPF’s rewriting of history project” (Pottier 2002: 64). The RPF was made up of mainly English-speaking individuals, while members of FAR were mostly French-speaking. This resulted in distorted one-sided accounts of Rwanda’s history.

As previously mentioned, there were only a few studies that analysed how the Western media covered the Rwandan Genocide. My research builds on the literature by comparing coverage of the genocide in both an American and a Canadian newspaper with an emphasis on the extent to which crime served as a framework for making sense of the Rwandan genocide. Thus, I will focus on criminological themes such as crime, perpetrators, victims, law enforcers and law and order.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ANALYSING CRIME IN THE MEDIA

This chapter introduces a cultural criminological theoretical framework that will be used in my discourse analysis of newspaper coverage of the Rwandan genocide. This framework is selected because cultural criminology emphasizes the ways in which the media constructs and covers crime, as well as the ways in which the discourse of crime operates as a sense-making tool for comprehending social problems.

Mediated Constructions of Crime and Crime Control

The media, as an institution, is crucial in the “creation, classification and distribution of cultural knowledge” (Sanders and Lyon 1995: 2) and it can take its audience to events half-way around the world. It is very influential in sending out information and messages that will have a large impact on its audience and is a highly effective tool that subtly and overtly serves the interests of powerful, complex bureaucratic structures. Many of the public’s perceptions of criminals, victims and agents of social control are determined by how the media present these actors, indeed, much of the public’s knowledge about crime and the criminal justice system is derived from the media (Dowler 2003 and Potter and Kappeler 2006).

The audiences for these mediated constructions are diversely composed and as a result, interpret these constructs in a diverse manner. These audiences incorporate the media’s meanings into their daily lives in different ways and some may recontextualise, remake or reverse the meanings of the mass media. However, the messages that the
media presents to its heterogeneous audience tend to provide an unrealistic, clear-cut and understandable picture of the world. The messages are generally chosen and shaped so as to “offer an identifiable portrayal of established values, interests, and normative expectations” (Sanders and Lyon 1995: 26). In choosing what to present, the media gives and enhances the social status of certain individuals or groups while devaluing the status of others. The media presents what interests the public as well as what is of interest to the news agency owners, and what is presented is based on the needs of the agency at a specific time. For example, if the news agency is trying to attract more readers from a specific age group, they may report more stories that are relevant to the age group.

The media forms a cultural industry in which “they sell their products. The shape and content of these products will be influenced by the economic interests of the organization producing the products” (Potter and Kappeler 2006: 14). As such, the American forms of media serve to inform the public while making a profit as a business.

When the media enter the realm of crime, it is the commodification process that is at work with the dynamics of the communications marketplace being the driving force. Consumption and communication come together to form the engine room of criminalization (Presdee 2000: 26).

Crime thus becomes a commodity whose perception is mediated by the media. To obtain information and facts, the media must rely on individuals who control knowledge. Thus, in order to continue to receive information from these individuals, the media must construct news that is favourable to them.

Due to the fact that the media has an agenda-setting role, in which it identifies which subjects are important for publication, “the world portrayed in the media can be disembodied, sensationalistic and stereotypical” (McCormick 1995: 7). The same
principles apply to the media’s coverage of crime. In general then, when looking at the
media and crime, the crime images shown by the media are constructions as opposed to
reflections of reality. Thus, the audience is bombarded with distorted, constructed and
manipulated (McCormick 1995) images of crime, agents of control and the criminal
justice system, which distorts the public’s perception of these crimes (Potter and
Kappeler 2006). Moreover, “the media can also play a reactive role, trivializing violent
crimes…so people become desensitized, misconstruing violence” (McCormick 1995: 4).

Thus, comprehending how the media constructs its stories enables the reader to be
more critical. It is only with further analysis that the reader can identify what cultural
tropes related to crime and law are employed (or absent) and how these tropes affect the
reader’s perception of the situation. This is extremely relevant for analysing the media’s
coverage of genocides because the media is one of the first institutions to report that a
crime has occurred and its descriptions of genocide are easily accessible to audiences the
world over. Furthermore, “part of countering a genocide is ensuring that the events are
remembered and talked about, that the history is written down, discussed and passed on”
(Springer 2006:92). However, if the media’s account of a genocide is distorted or
trivialized, it can fall to the wayside and the crime can continue unabated. It is for this
reason that I chose to analyse the extent to which crime served as a framework for
making sense of the Rwandan genocide in the media’s coverage of this event. This study
is necessary because, with regards to the coverage of the Rwandan genocide, the media is
said to have played an important role in how the world viewed and reacted to the
Rwandan genocide. During the outbreak of the genocide, it is claimed that the media was
not there to cover the story and when the story was told, the violence was downplayed,
with no mention of genocide. This study examines the extent to which the media relied on the more common normative discourses of crimes to understand and make sense of what transpired in Rwanda.

In addition, the study of genocide as a crime is important because “as genocide has become more repugnant, as it has come to seem unthinkable, it has actually become commonplace” (Smith 2000 cited in Morrison 2004b: 79). Yet, in general, criminology has traditionally ignored acts of genocide, as genocides do not “provide data for developing or testing criminological theories” (Morrison 2004a: 343). Instead, genocide is generally seen as occupying the domain of history or international relations while “criminology occupies the territory of everyday life within the defining legitimacy of the nation state” (Morrison 2004a: 343). However, in recent years research has argued that genocide does belong to the realm of criminology albeit a less mainstream criminology (Morrison 2004a and Morrison 2004b). The criminology that I am referring to is cultural criminology, which facilitates the study of genocide because it allows crime and criminality to be examined from new perspectives and expands the ways we study crime. Cultural criminology goes beyond the development and testing of criminological theories by focusing more on how crime is the product of culture (and culture is infused with crime) and relies on the analysis of public representations of crime, including the ways in which the media represent crime.

**Cultural Criminology**

Cultural criminology represents a new orientation that is emerging in sociology, criminology and criminal justice. Cultural criminology is “the placing of crime and its control in the context of culture; that is, viewing both crime and the agencies of control as
cultural products – as creative constructs” (Hayward and Young 2004: 259). Cultural criminology explores the common ground between collective behaviour that is organized around imagery, style and symbolic meaning and collective behaviour that is categorized as being criminal by legal and political authorities. It looks at the interactions that take place between crime and culture in contemporary social life and focuses on the meaning around these interactions. For example, it looks at the way non-criminal activities and events can be construed to appear criminal by being portrayed in a criminal manner, as well as how criminal activities can be depicted as non-criminal. It examines a wide variety of cultural productions as the basis of its data, as this evidence plays an important role in the telling of crime (Presdee 2000). This evidence is, in essence, anything cultural created by humans that can be studied and can include such things as books, newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, television shows or photographs.

The term “cultural criminology”, developed by Jeff Ferrell and Clinton R. Sanders in 1995, is used to refer to the fact that many criminologists are giving more analytic attention to popular constructions of culture, such as the mass media’s constructions of crime and its control. Although the term is new, the perspective of cultural criminology is as old as the representation of crime, criminals and the criminal justice system in different forms of media, such as newspapers, radio, film and television.

Cultural criminology emerged out of the tradition of cultural analysis, which started in the 20th century with Durkheim, Parsons and Merton. It also evolved from the environmental and spatial approaches used by early urban ethnographers.

This tradition embraced cultural stories of street people, hooligans and gangs, of bank robbers, and street muggers, of police life, prison life and prison death. Quiet stories, dramatic stories,
dangerous stories, depicting the span of human life gone wrong and laid bare (Presdee 2004: 282).

Out of this tradition came a new understanding of how important it is to examine cultural forms and artefacts within a criminological discourse. The basic attempt of cultural criminology is to integrate the field of cultural studies with the field of criminology. “Cultural criminology uses the ‘evidence’ of everyday existence, wherever it is found and in whatever form it can be found; the debris of everyday life is its ‘data’” (Presdee 2000:15). For the purpose of my research, the “debris” that served as my data was documents published in the New York Times and the Globe and Mail.

Many of cultural criminology’s foundational perspectives have been taken from “the British/Birmingham School of cultural studies and the British ‘new criminology’ of the 1970s” (Ferrell 1999: 396). The works of Clarke (1976), Hall and Jefferson (1976), Hebdige (1988), McRobbie (1980) and Willis (1990) have directed cultural criminologists to try to understand aspects of deviant and criminal subcultures and how symbolism and style are important in shaping the meanings and identities of subcultures (cited in Ferrell 1999). Moreover, cultural criminology has a hybrid orientation and draws from perspectives beyond the British cultural studies of the 1970s. “With its focus on representation, image, and style, cultural criminology incorporates not only the insights of cultural studies, but the intellectual reorientation afforded by postmodernism” (Ferrell 1999: 397). Using postmodernism allows cultural criminology to view form as content, style as substance and to find meaning in presentation and representation. From this point of view, the study of crime is not simply a straightforward examination of criminals, criminal events and the media’s coverage of these, “but rather a journey into the spectacle and carnival of crime, a walk down an infinite hall of mirrors where images
created and consumed by criminals, criminal subcultures, control agents, media institutions, and audiences bounce endlessly off the other” (Ferrell 1999: 397). Therefore, cultural criminologists explore the networks that construct crime and crime control, the forms of media that circulate these constructs and the “discursive interconnections that emerge between media institutions, crime control agents, and criminal subcultures” (Ferrell 1999: 397).

Along with its foundations in cultural studies and postmodernism, cultural criminology is also rooted in sociology. However, due to its development out of sociological criminology, it has drawn more on sociological orientations and is more closely connected with criminology than the sociology of culture. “Central among these is the interactionist tradition in the sociology of deviance and criminology” (Ferrell 1999: 397). Using this method, cultural criminologists study the various interactions through which the definition of crime is constructed. These include the interactions of criminals, agents of control, producers of media and others. Furthermore, this method tries to refine the symbolic aspect of “symbolic interaction” by focusing on the social and political constructions of crime and the ways that the media has created these constructions. This aspect of cultural criminology is relevant in my study with regards to whether or not the term “genocide” is mentioned in the articles. Genocide is the “crime of crimes” and without the use of the term to describe such events, these events may not be seen or portrayed as criminal. Defining the events as genocide is the basis for describing the events as criminal and with this portrayal of criminal events comes the assumption that preventative or punitive measures need to be taken.
Finally, cultural criminology emerges out of the critical traditions of sociology, criminology and cultural studies. This allows cultural criminology to incorporate a variety of critical perspectives on crime and its control. The use of these critical perspectives aid cultural criminologists in their attempt “to unravel the politics of crime as played out through the mediated anti-crime campaigns; through evocative cultural constructions of deviance, crime, and marginality; and through criminalized subcultures and their resistance to legal control” (Ferrell 1999: 398).

Due to the fact that its foundations are historical and theoretical, cultural criminology is able to incorporate the more traditional sociological perspectives with the more recent cultural studies and postmodern approaches. This allows cultural criminology to embody the creative tension that usually exists between sociology and cultural studies and postmodernism.

Cultural criminology, although a relatively recent perspective, offers a rich and varied approach to the study of crime. This study borrows from cultural criminology its focus on the ways in which crime is represented in the media, but also how the language of crime is drawn upon or avoided in relation to genocidal events such as the Rwandan genocide.
CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Methods

I used both quantitative (content analysis) and qualitative (discourse analysis) methods as part of a two-stage research design in my examination of the *New York Times*’s and the *Globe and Mail*’s coverage of the Rwandan genocide. I used a combination of both content analysis and discourse analysis because both methods are useful for illustrating the media’s portrayal of the Rwandan genocide. In particular, the use of these two methodological techniques allowed my research to yield data on different aspects of the articles’ coverage of the Rwandan genocide. Conducting a two-stage research design allowed for the weaknesses of each method to be addressed by the other and hopefully provided more rounded results. I chose to use content analysis because quantitative research is the ideal method to analyse large samples “because it facilitates the ‘systematic’ and ‘objective’ rendering of data” (Reason and Garcia 2007: 308). Content analysis can use large samples because the units it analyzes are explicit, objective and mutually exclusive. Moreover, content analysis is a quantitative research method that has been used extensively in the study of media (Reason and Garcia 2007).

For the purpose of my research I used Ina Bertrand and Peter Hughes’ (2005) definition of content analysis. While their definition is narrower in scope than others, their definition is well suited to my study of media content. In *Media Research Methods*, Bertrand and Hughes (2005) define content analysis as “a form of textual analysis in which units of measurement are defined which can be applied to a text, and the resulting data can be interpreted quantitatively (and sometimes qualitatively)” (p. 254). This
collected data allows the researcher to identify recurring patterns and characteristics and allows the measurement of the relationships between the variables.

Content analysis is a useful methodology as “it is capable, first of accepting relatively unstructured symbolic communications as data and, second, of analyzing unobserved phenomena through the medium of data connected with the phenomena, regardless of whether language is involved” (Krippendorff 1980: 33). Some of the strengths of this method for my research were that the research was inexpensive, as I only needed to obtain the material to be studied. Second, my research material was relatively easy to obtain as the archived materials were readily available on the internet. Third, this method was unobtrusive to people’s personal lives and caused no ethical problems. Fourth, content analysis can deal with current or past events and does not depend on the memory of witnesses to these events. Finally, this method allowed for the use of a large amount of data.

It should be noted, however, that content analysis is not perfect and does have problems, which I tried to address as best as possible in my research. The first problem of content analysis is that it is difficult to know whether a particular sample is representative of a certain phenomenon. Since I used all articles written about the Rwandan genocide between April 6, 1994 and July 23, 1994, I believe that the results are representative of the two newspapers’ coverage of the Rwandan genocide during that time period. A second problem of content analysis is that coding the material properly is important because without proper reliable coding different researchers would not be able to compare their results. In order to obtain a reliable coding system, I needed to make operational definitions of the various variables being analysed. This can be difficult as
mutually exclusive definitions can be hard to create and were subject to my views on the phenomena being studied. In order to combat this problem, I sampled articles from each newspaper throughout my period of analysis and developed my categories based on my findings. Third, content analysis focuses on the counting of text rather than analysing the content, which limits understanding of the meanings of a given text. It is often seen as “a simplistic means-to-an-end method” (Reason and Garcia 2007: 307). I resolved this issue by including discourse analysis as part of my research method. Discourse analysis was an important research complement to my content analysis because it allowed me to analyse the fine detail that was lost through the content analysis. All of the details, such as word choice, in a discourse are there for a reason, and deserve close attention.

For the purposes of the cultural criminological perspective employed in this thesis, qualitative discourse analysis was essential because it allowed me to concentrate more on the identification of themes, dispositions, ideologies, symbols, beliefs and principles. This approach allowed for deeper interpretation and required an understanding of the social context of the media discourses to facilitate this interpretation. However, if I had simply limited my analysis to discourse analysis, generalizations, long term trends and trends across representative ranges of sources would have been difficult to make. As such, the gathering of data through content analysis provided guidance for the discourse analysis of the meanings and interpretations suggested in the media’s application of these themes. This allowed “the quantitative component to map out general patterns and the qualitative phase to reveal processes and the perspectives of those actually involved in situations” (Bryman and Burgess 1994: 222).
Discourse analysis is made up of a series of interdisciplinary approaches that can be applied to study a variety of social domains in a variety of areas of study. In general, the term “discourse analysis” has been applied in very different ways in the social sciences and as such, “the term discourse analysis is very ambiguous” (Stubbs 1983: 1, Phillips and Jorgensen 2002 and Slembrouk 2006). For the purpose of my research study, I described discourse analysis as follows. Discourse analysis is a method used to examine the different patterns that emerge from individual utterances through participation in various social domains. “Our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 1). When looking at mass communication, Teun van Dijk (1995) “claims that in order to understand the role of the new media and their ‘messages,’ one needs to pay detailed attention to the structures and strategies of such discourses and to the ways these relate to institutional arrangements” (p. 10). For example, topics or quotation patterns in the media may be a reflection of the sources the media had access to while headlines may influence how the readers interpret a report and react to it.

With regards to discourse analysis, three features are important to its practice (Potter and Wetherell 1994). First, “it is concerned with talk and texts as social practices; and as such it pays close attention to features which would traditionally be classed as linguistic content – meanings and topics – as well as attending to features of linguistic form such as grammar and cohesion” (Potter and Wetherell 1994: 48). However, this type of discourse analysis is used to answer sociological questions instead of linguistic ones. Second, discourse analysis is concerned with action, construction and variability.
Actions can be performed differently through speech and writing, and the accomplishment of the nature of these actions is partially constructed by various discourses, such as linguistic resources, styles and rhetorical devices. One aim of discourse analysis is to “reveal the operation of these constructive processes. Once discourse is conceptualized in this way it becomes clear that there will be significant variation in, for example, descriptions of a phenomenon, as participants perform different kinds of actions” (Potter and Wetherell 1994: 48). Attention to this variation allowed me to focus my attention to the differences within a specific text, to the variations within the speech of a speaker or the variations found within a single document. However, while variations within a single source are often more analytically revealing, variation between texts is much more striking (Potter and Wetherell 1994). Third, discourse analysis is concerned with “the rhetorical or argumentative organization of talk and texts” (Potter and Wetherell 1994: 48). This feature highlights the way in which discursive versions of phenomenon are designed to compete with real or potential alternatives.

The Newspapers

I chose to analyse the Globe and Mail and the New York Times because they are the leading newspapers for Canada and the US respectively. I chose to study a Canadian newspaper because I had been unable to find any references to how Canadian media covered the genocide and an analysis of Canadian media is important because Major General Romeo Dallaire is Canadian and Canada was the only Western country to send reinforcements to Rwanda when the UN began to withdraw its troops (Pottier 2002). Furthermore, I chose the Globe and Mail to represent Canadian coverage of the genocide because “the Globe and Mail has remained firmly in place as Canada’s leading national
newspaper and has made impressive gains in circulation and readership despite increased competition” (Globe and Mail 2005: 2). Secondly, the Globe and Mail’s strengths are its coverage of international news stories and the Globe and Mail was the first Canadian newspaper to set up a permanent news bureau in Africa. “Its large staff of foreign correspondents and its foreign news bureaus have given the Globe and Mail’s international coverage great strength” (Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009).

I chose to study an American newspaper because the US played an important role in influencing the UN to pull UNAMIR out of Rwanda and I had been unable to locate any detailed analyses that examined the written content of an American newspaper. I chose the New York Times because it is considered the pre-eminent paper of the US and has been described as a “traditional, elite news source” (PEW Research Centre 1995: 1 and Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007) that has printed “twice as many foreign stories as the average regional newspaper” (PEW Research Centre 1995: 10). In a study reporting human rights violations between 1978 and 1987 in the New York Times, Time magazine and CBS evening news, Jay S. Ovsiovitch (cited in Caliendo, Gibney and Payne 1999) found that more than 88 percent of them were reported in the New York Times. In addition, a 1992 survey by Peter Kann found that the New York Times employed 37 foreign correspondents, more than its competitors at the Los Angeles Times (32), the Washington Post (25) and the Wall Street Journal (22) (Hess 1996). Finally, with regards to the Rwandan genocide, Susan Moeller (1999) claims that the New York Times and the Washington Post provided the best coverage of the genocide in the US.
The Approach

Using the internet, and more specifically the University of Manitoba’s electronic libraries database, I obtained copies of all of the documents that referenced Rwanda in the Globe and Mail and the New York Times between the start of the genocide on April 6, 1994 and July 23, 1994, four days after the end of the genocide. I chose this start date because previous research (Myers, Klak and Koehl 1996, Karnik 1998a and Livingston and Eachus 1999) had found that relatively few articles were written about Rwanda prior to the beginning of the genocide. I chose to end my research four days after the end of the genocide, because the focus of the articles then shifted to focus on the refugee situation and on the world sending aid for the refugees.

To obtain my documents, I searched the electronic journals of each newspaper for the term “Rwanda” during the period specified above. For the New York Times this produced 374 hits and for the Globe and Mail it produced 203 hits.6 In addition, I used an electronic CD Rom for the Globe and Mail, which identified articles that my original search failed to retrieve. I used the CD Rom for the Globe and Mail because the electronic journal for the Globe and Mail provided only a snapshot of an entire page, which required me to find the article that used the term “Rwanda”. This was different from the electronic journal for the New York Times, which provided a PDF file for every hit of the term “Rwanda”. Next, I printed off all the hits that referenced Rwanda.

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6 One reason contributing to the lower number of hits for the Globe and Mail is that it did not print an edition on Sundays.
The first step of my analysis entailed reading a sample of the articles from each newspaper and using my findings to create the categories I used in my content analysis. With my findings, I was able to identify categories of analysis and create operational definitions. I chose to analyse 17 variables for my content analysis, which included basic identifiers such as: the document number as it related to its search result in the newspaper's database, the title of the document, the publication date of the document, the publisher of the document, the location of the document in the newspaper and the type of document. I also chose to analyse the focus of the document, the degree to which it was focused on the Rwandan situation, reference to identifiable and abstract crimes, the use of the term “genocide”, the depiction of war and the portrayal of victims. The results of my content analysis can be found in chapter 5 and a copy of my codebook and the required definitions required for these variables are found in Appendix A on page 119. Finally, I created a database in SPSS Windows to analyse these variables.

The second step involved a general reading of the all the documents and identifying my findings in the SPSS database. The findings obtained from this first reading were used to conduct my content analysis and identify which documents would be used for my discourse analysis. From this first reading I was able to separate the documents into articles (NYT=240, GM=175), letters to the editor (NYT=18, GM=12), summaries directing the reader to an article (NYT=91, GM=8), advertisements (NYT=5, GM=7) and “other” documents (NYT=21, GM=1), which included TV listings,

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7 The sample included all articles printed in both the New York Times and the Globe and Mail on the following dates: April 7-8, 1994 (first few days of the Genocide), April 11-14, 1994 (evacuation of the expatriates), April 21-23, 1994 (reduction in UNAMIR troops) and May 5-6, 1994 (admission of genocide).
quotations, photos\textsuperscript{8} and obituaries. Next I took all the articles and removed the ones that were identified as being historical/informative (NYT=9, GM=7) or where Rwanda was mentioned in passing (NYT=66, GM=42). This left me with articles that described the Rwandan situation (NYT=97, GM=70) and that were on subjects related to the Rwandan situation (NYT=88, GM=68). It was the latter two types of articles that I used to conduct my discourse analysis.

The final step involved rereading the articles that described the Rwandan situation or were on subjects related to the Rwandan situation. From these articles I extracted and recorded data relevant to my discourse analysis and separated them into 5 thematic categories: crime, perpetrators, victims, law enforcers and law and order. Next, I used these 5 criminological themes to examine the extent to which crime served as a framework for making sense of the Rwandan genocide and the findings are identified in chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{8} Specifically, where no written content accompanies the photo other than a caption directly underneath the photo.
CHAPTER 5

RESULTS: CONTENT ANALYSIS

Stage one of my research involved a content analysis of 17 variables. In conducting my research, my analysis focused on the coverage, focus, crime, war and victims.

1. Coverage

Content analysis of the 180 articles printed in the *New York Times* and the 131 articles printed in the *Globe and Mail* revealed that coverage of the Rwandan genocide was largely restricted to the inside pages of the two newspapers. My results from the *New York Times* show that more than three-quarters (138) of the articles were published on inside pages, while 22 percent (40) received front page attention. The last 1 percent (2) were published on the front pages of an inside section. With regards to articles printed in the *Globe and Mail*, the newspaper published a slightly higher percentage of its articles on the front page. The *Globe and Mail* published 28 percent (37) of its Rwandan articles on their front page and 71 percent (93) on inside pages. Less than 1 percent (1) of the articles on the Rwandan genocide were featured on the front page of an inside section.

However, the aforementioned percentages are not an accurate reflection of the coverage presented on the front page because multiple articles were printed on given days, while some days had no coverage. Therefore, I re-examined the data taking into account that the *New York Times* published 180 articles over 108 days, while the *Globe and Mail* published 131 articles over 93 days. Consequently, I found that of the 180 articles printed in the *New York Times*, articles on Rwanda appeared on the front page on
37 days (34 percent). The *Globe and Mail* revealed only slightly higher results. Of the 131 articles printed in the *Globe and Mail*, articles on Rwanda appeared on the front page on 34 days (37 percent). While both percentages are slightly higher than previously mentioned, they are still small considering the gravity of the situation in Rwanda. The fact that only 34 percent and 37 percent of the articles were presented on the front page is a significant finding because the front page of a newspaper is where the editor presents what is felt to be the most important stories of the day and these stories are meant to sell papers by catching the reader’s attention. These findings suggest that articles written on the situation in Rwanda were not important enough to make the front page or were not viewed as being strong enough to sell papers. However, without further research, it is difficult to determine the exact reasons for Rwanda’s lack of coverage on the front pages.

2. **Focus**

When I analysed when articles were published on the front page, the *New York Times* had two main clusters of dates while the *Globe and Mail* had three. The first cluster of daily front page exposure was between April 7 and April 14, 1994 in the *New York Times* and between April 7 and April 13, 1994 in the *Globe and Mail*. During this period, the articles focused on the violence emerging in Rwanda and the evacuation of foreigners. However, after this period, front page coverage was much more sporadic, suggesting that while the outbreak of the violence was seen to be newsworthy, the continuing violence was an everyday occurrence for the African country and not significant enough to make the front page.

The second cluster of front page coverage in the *Globe and Mail* occurred between May 2 and May 7, 1994. This period gave coverage to a wide variety of subject
matter; including the refugee situation (2 articles), the violence and descriptive deaths of Rwandans (1 article) and the involvement of Canada in the whole situation (2 articles).

This result is consistent with the *Globe and Mail’s* front page coverage between April 14 and July 8, 1994, which included subject matter such as violence, the refugee situation, the involvement of the UN, Canada and France, and the Rwandan gorilla. The *New York Times* also showed similar results between April 15 and July 14, 1994. Their front page coverage included subject matter such as violence, the refugee situation, the involvement of the UN, France, Europe and US and the impact the situation was having in Uganda.

The last cluster of front page coverage occurred between July 15 and July 23, 1994 in the *New York Times* and between July 9 and July 23, 1994 in the *Globe and Mail*. This period of coverage was completely different from the front page coverage at the outbreak of the genocide, as the articles primarily focused on the refugee situation. In the *New York Times, 90 percent of the articles printed on the front page dealt with the refugee situation. Also, except for July 20, at least one article a day was published on the front page and on July 22 and 23, two articles were published on the front page. With regards to the *Globe and Mail, 73 percent of their front page articles focused on the refugee situation. Also, except for July 13, at least one article was published on the front page per day and on July 9, 12 and 14, two articles were published on the front page. Based on previous research (Livingston and Eachus 1999 and Pottier 2002) that found that the coverage on Rwanda increased during the refugee situation, I feel that it is safe to assume that the frequency of articles printed on the front page of the *New York Times* increased with the refugee crisis. This finding is important because it suggests that the situation in Rwanda became more newsworthy with the increasing refugee crisis.
My analysis also identified that 45 percent (81) of the articles in the *New York Times* and 50 percent (66) of the articles in the *Globe and Mail* focused on the Rwandan situation, which refers to the violent or refugee events that took place in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994. Furthermore, 47 percent (85 and 62 respectively) focused on subjects related to the Rwandan situation. Subjects related to the Rwandan situation refer to articles where the main subject is related to the situation in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994, but does not go into great detail about the violent or refugee events occurring in Rwanda. For example, the article could focus on a country’s response to the Rwandan situation, but the situation in Rwanda is not described in detail and only briefly mentioned. The last 8 percent (14) in the *New York Times* and 2 percent (3) in the *Globe and Mail* focused on both the Rwandan situation and the historical/informative aspects of Rwanda. However, collapsing category “both 1 and 2” (Rwandan situation and historical/informative aspects) into Rwandan situation, revealed that more than half, 53 percent in the *New York Times* and 52 percent in the *Globe and Mail*, of the articles focused on the Rwandan situation.

The fact that between 47 and 48 percent of the articles focused on subjects related to the Rwandan situation is interesting because the majority of these articles focused on how Western nations and the UN were reacting to the situation in Rwanda. The fact that nearly half of the articles focused on the actions (or inactions) of Western nations and the UN suggests that the journalists were attempting to distance the audience from the events in Rwanda. Instead of focusing on the African conflict in Rwanda, the journalists gave the audience stories to which they could more closely relate due to their Western subject
matter. This focus on the Western elements of the genocide caused the Rwandan genocide to be overshadowed and to be presented as less newsworthy.

When the articles that focused on the Rwandan situation were more closely analysed, the data identified that 41 percent (39) of the articles in the *New York Times* and 59 percent (41) of the articles in the *Globe and Mail* focused on the violence of the Rwandan genocide while 27 percent (26) and 25 percent (17) respectively focused on the refugee aspects throughout and after the genocide. The last 32 percent (30) of the articles in the *New York Times* and 16 percent (11) in the *Globe and Mail* focused on both the violence and the refugee situations. This is interesting because the *Globe and Mail* focused exclusively on the violence in 18 percent more of its articles than the *New York Times*, but covered the refugee situation fairly similarly. Instead, the *New York Times* chose to cover more of the violence in Rwanda in conjunction with the refugee situation.

3. **Crime**

In the *New York Times*, 51 percent (91) of the articles used identifiable crimes in describing the acts occurring in Rwanda, while 60 percent (79) of the articles in the *Globe and Mail* used identifiable crimes. Some of the identifiable crimes included theft, assassination, murder and abduction. With regard to abstract representations of crime, 63 percent (114) of the articles in the *New York Times* and 75 percent (98) in the *Globe and Mail* identified the acts occurring in Rwanda in an abstract manner. Abstract representations of crime refer to terms given to the situation that are not identifiable crimes and leave the interpretation of the situation up to the reader. These types of crime include massacres, slaughter, butchery and blood imagery, such as blood baths, bloodletting and bloodshed. I find it interesting that crime was described more in an
abstract manner than an identifiable manner because by being abstract, the actions are not automatically perceived as being criminal according to the law. When identifiable crimes are used, the chosen criminal term initiates a reaction that the act was a violation of the law and needs to be punished. However, when abstract terms are used to describe acts of violence, these actions are not initially seen as violations of the law. The analysis of crimes will be further developed in the discourse analysis section below.

The crime of genocide was analysed separately from the analysis of identifiable crimes because genocide is the most serious form of crime against humanity and has generally been omitted from the realm of criminology. The term genocide was used in 25 (14 percent) articles in the *New York Times*; however, of those 25 articles, only 22 (88 percent) of the articles used the term to refer to the actual events occurring in Rwanda. In the *Globe and Mail*, only 13 (10 percent) of the articles used the term genocide and of those 13 articles, the term referred to the events occurring in Rwanda in 11 (85 percent) of the articles. The fact that only 12 percent of the *New York Times’* articles and 8 percent of the articles in the *Globe and Mail* referred to the situation in Rwanda as genocide is very important and will be analysed more in depth in the discourse analysis section.

4. **War**

My analysis of whether the situation was portrayed as war revealed that 64 percent (115) of the articles in the *New York Times* and 73 percent (96) in the *Globe and Mail* described the situation as war. It is interesting to note that the situation was described as war five times more than the Rwandan situation was described as genocide in the *New York Times* and nearly nine times more in the *Globe and Mail*. I would have
expected the percentage of articles describing war and genocide to be much closer due to the fact that the civil war and genocide were taking place simultaneously. As was discussed in Chapter 2 above, the term “genocide” started to be used in April and on May 4, Boutros-Ghali went on Nightline and reported that genocide had occurred in Rwanda. However, this acknowledgement of genocide was largely ignored by the two newspapers in preference for covering the war.

On further breaking down the portrayal of war into smaller categories, my analysis revealed that 44 percent (50) of the *New York Times* articles described the situation as civil war while 26 percent (30) described it as ethnic or tribal war. Only two percent (2) described the situation as political war while another one percent (1) described it as guerrilla warfare. Fifteen percent (17) of the articles described the war as a combination of all the types listed above, while the type of war was not clear in 13 percent (15) of the articles. In the *Globe and Mail*, 41 percent (39) of the articles described the situation as civil war and 25 percent (24) described it as ethnic or tribal war. Another two percent (2) described it as political war and another two percent (2) described the situation as a “shooting war” (Associated Press, Reuter, CP and Staff 1994: A15) and “obscure African war” (Anonymous 1994d). The type of war described was not clear in 14 percent (13) of the articles.

5. **Victims**

My analysis of victims revealed that 80 percent (144) of the articles in the *New York Times* and 89 percent (117) in the *Globe and Mail* mention victims of the Rwandan genocide. Of the articles that mention victims, 59 percent (85) and 50 percent (59) respectively, portrayed the victims in a descriptive manner in which the reader could put
a face to them and identify them. Further analysis of the description of the victims will be conducted in Chapter 6 below.

I also analysed the number of victims that were reported as being killed during the violence. This was important to analyse because “establishing a reliable toll of those killed in the genocide…is important to counter denials, exaggerations, and lies” (Des Forges 1999). In my analysis of the victims reported in the *New York Times*, I found a major inconsistency in the articles. While, I acknowledge that estimating the number of people killed during genocide can be difficult, the numbers reported were so varied that they, at times, downplayed the severity of the situation. The main problem that I found with the numbers was that on one occasion, a large number would be used to estimate the number of dead and then a short time later a much smaller estimate would be cited. There was no real consistency in the numbers reported. This is evident in table 1, which shows the number of victims in the order they were reported. While the table does not reflect the days the numbers were published, it does show the trend of the numbers being grossly different from one publication to the next and as fluctuating greatly over time. As a result, the reader is unable to develop a clear picture of how many people died in Rwanda and who might view the situation as being less critical than it actually was.

Table 1: Number of victims published in the *New York Times* between April 6, 1994 and July 23, 1994.
My analysis of the *Globe and Mail* provided a much more consistent representation of the number of victims killed during the genocide. This is evident in table 2, which shows the number of victims in the order they were reported. As with my analysis of the *New York Times*, the table does not reflect the days the numbers were published, but simply shows the trend of the numbers being presented. While the numbers reported in the *Globe and Mail* do fluctuate, they do not fluctuate at extreme levels and tend to illustrate a general increase in the numbers of victims reported. As such, the reporting by the *Globe and Mail* would have caused the reader to have a better idea of the number of victims and a greater chance of viewing the situation as being critical.

Table 2: Number of victims published in the *Globe and Mail* between April 6, 1994 and July 23, 1994.

![Graph showing the number of victims published in the Globe and Mail between April 6, 1994 and July 23, 1994.](image)

Content analysis of the information gathered from the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* suggests that the Rwandan genocide was insufficient in comparison to the gravity of the situation. Some of the main findings that support this are low front page coverage, the fact that nearly 50 percent of the articles are not directly focused on the genocide, i.e., the fact that crimes were more likely to be described in an abstract manner, and the low use of the term genocide. As a result, the genocide was portrayed as not being newsworthy enough to sell newspapers and that Western elements of the genocide were nearly as important as the actual Rwandan elements. Moreover, the high
use of abstract descriptions of crime resulted in actions not automatically being perceived as criminal, and by referring to the situation as war 5 times more than genocide, the killings were seen as an internal problem as opposed to an international crime.
CHAPTER 6

RESULTS: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The main focus of my research was to examine the extent to which “crime” served as a framework for making sense of the Rwandan genocide. In conducting my research, my analysis focused on 5 criminological themes: crime; perpetrators; victims; law enforcers; and law and order.

1. Crime of Genocide

What we learned from Rwanda is that the worst inhumanity we can imagine will come again. If there’s a lesson, it is that having seen it before doesn’t immunize us. The opposite may be true: the more we see it the more we accept it as part of our condition.


In analysing the New York Time’s and the Globe and Mail’s coverage of the crime of genocide in Rwanda, I looked at two aspects of genocide:

a) Genocide as killing members of a group;
b) Other crimes of genocide.

On August 24, 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill addressed Great Britain in a radio broadcast and described the mass exterminations carried out by the Germans. He spoke of whole districts being destroyed by the use of systematic and merciless butchery and of displays of brutal ruthlessness. He ended his broadcast by proclaiming that “we are in the presence of a crime without a name”. Three years later, in 1944, Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in the preface of his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, giving a name to the actions that Churchill had described. In its inaugural definition, genocide was meant to describe an attempt to destroy a nation or ethnic group; however, four years later the term was given a more detailed and technical
definition. Article II of the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* defines genocide as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

**a) Genocide as Killing Members of a Group**

The definition of genocide was the first step in acknowledging and addressing this ancient, yet only recently codified, crime, and laid out the mandate for international action. Nevertheless, even with a criminal definition for the atrocious events in hand, we have witnessed multiple failures to acknowledge the crime as it is occurring, thus limiting the possibilities for prevention and punishment.

As previously mentioned, the term “genocide” was used in only 25 of the articles analysed in the *New York Times* and was applied directly to the Rwandan genocide in 22 of those articles. Furthermore, the term “genocide” was used in 7 (32 percent) editorials and 15 (68 percent) articles. The distinction between editorials and articles is important for the analysis of the term “genocide” because the editorials (Anonymous 1994b, Anonymous 1994c, Kasfir 1994 and Rosenblatt 1994) tended to use the term to describe
the situation in Rwanda whereas the journalists writing the articles tended not to describe
the situation as genocide and only used the term when quoting sources.

The term “genocide” was first used in an editorial published on April 23, 1994.
The author states that “what looks very much like genocide has been taking place in
Rwanda. People are pulled from cars and buses, ordered to show their identity papers
and then killed on the spot if they belong to the wrong ethnic group” (Anonymous 1994a: 24). Although the author is hesitant in calling the crime genocide, it is the first mention
of genocide in the New York Times and this editorial examines and attempts to explain
the genocidal conflict.

“Fighting erupted on April 6, when a plane carrying the Presidents
of Rwanda and neighboring Burundi mysteriously crashed…the
credible suspicion is that they were killed by Hutu hardliners in
Rwanda who oppose reconciliation with the Tutsi people.
Everywhere in Rwanda, the Tutsi are now being targeted by Hutu

On May 11, 1994, a second editorial, written by Alison Des Forges, a human
rights activist and African historian, was published. In the editorial titled “Genocide: It’s
a Fact in Rwanda”, Des Forges states that the genocide began on April 6, 1994 and that
“governments hesitate to call the horror by its name, for to do so would oblige them to
act…to prevent and punish it” (Des Forges 1994: A25). However, for her, calling the
violence genocide is less important than governments taking action to discourage and
stop the violence and protect civilians. “Yet whether or not we call it genocide, our
Government and others must pledge never to aid a regime built on the bodies of 200,000

The term “genocide” was first used in a New York Times article on May 4, 1994,
when the article quoted Boutros-Ghali as saying “a force was necessary to ‘defuse the
conflict, to stop the genocide’’ (Lewis 1994f: A9). However, Lewis (1994f) did not use the term “genocide” when describing the violence occurring in Rwanda. This use of genocide in quotations but not in journalistic accounts was found throughout the *New York Times* coverage of the genocide (Kinzer 1994 and Lorch 1994o). This reluctance by the journalists to describe the situation as genocide and to reserve the use of the term for quotations can also be problematic. This is greatly evident in an article published on May 17, 1994, in which Rwanda’s foreign minister, Jerome Bicamumpaka, a Hutu who was starting a two-year term as a member of the UN Council is described as giving a speech to the UN Council where he “vehemently denounced the rival Tutsi ethnic group, accusing them and their backers in Uganda of launching a genocidal war against his people” (Lewis 1994h: A1). Later in the article, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, was quoted as saying that the delays in “confronting genocide in Rwanda is appalling”. This quotation from Roth does not distinguish between who is perpetrating the genocide and who it is being perpetrated against, and when placed beside the previous quotation above, the impression is given that genocide is being committed by the Tutsi. Further, the journalist quotes these two individuals as using the term “genocide” but describes the situation as civil war.

Moreover, at times, the journalists acknowledge that the term “genocide” is being used by some individuals, but also give the impression that this usage is incorrect or open to debate. “Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed exasperation today…He called the continuing slaughter there ‘genocide’” (Lewis 1994i: A1) (italics added for emphasis). “The United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has said the Security Council’s slow response to what he has termed ‘genocide’ in Rwanda is ‘a
scandal’” (Lewis 1994j: A8) (italics added for emphasis). “Some American officials and human rights organizations have called the massacres genocide” (Bonner 1994a: A1) (italics added for emphasis). Instead of genocide, these journalists used terms such as massacres, slaughter and bloodletting to describe the situation. While describing situations in different terms than sources may be a common technique used by journalists, it would have been more effective if the journalists had attempted to explain why the quoted sources believed the situation to be genocide instead of simply avoiding the use of the term.

On June 10, 1994, the New York Times published an article titled “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide’.” In the article, the journalist wrote that a Clinton administration spokesman was advised not to call the mass murders genocide and that he was advised to only say that “acts of genocide may have occurred”. The article outlined that some senior officials believed the mass murders were genocide and that calling it genocide “could inflame public calls for action the Administration is unwilling to take…’Genocide is a word that carries an enormous amount of responsibility’…If the United States joined in describing the killings as genocide…it would be natural – and unwelcome – for voters to expect that the response would include dispatching troops” (Jehl 1994a: A8).

It wasn’t until the end of the genocide that the New York Times used the term “genocide” outright to describe the situation in Rwanda (Cushman Jr. 1994). On July 15, 1994, Bonner (1994d) stated that responsible Hutus would be tracked down and prosecuted for their role in the “genocidal campaign against the Rwandan Tutsi” (p. A1). An article published on July 22, 1994 stated that Rwanda was “a country wracked by four
years of war and three months of genocide” (Kasfir 1994: A27) and the next day, it was reported that “genocidal massacres...began in Rwanda within hours after the country’s President...[was] killed in a plane crash” (Jehl 1994b: 5).

As previously mentioned, the term “genocide” was used in 13 articles in the *Globe and Mail* but only to refer directly to the situation in Rwanda in 11 of those articles. The use of the term differed greatly from its use in the *New York Times*. Compared to the *New York Times*, the term “genocide” was only used in 1 (9 percent) editorial and the other 10 (91 percent) uses of the term were in articles. Furthermore, the use of the term was less prominent in the *Globe and Mail* compared to the *New York Times*.

The first use of the term “genocide” appeared in an article on April 29, 1994, nearly a week after the term was introduced in the *New York Times*. Unlike the term’s first mention in the *New York Times*, the introduction of the term by the *Globe and Mail* was curt, with the subject being changed before the topic was fully addressed. In addition, the term was used in a similar fashion in the articles printed later in the *New York Times*, where it appeared the author did not share the same opinion as the user of the term.

The Pope appealed for an end to what he called genocide in Rwanda...‘the tragedy of those people seems to be endless...barbarism, vendetta killing, innocent blood spilled, everywhere horror and death’ the Pope said. ‘I invite all leaders...to stop this genocide’ (Sallot 1994b: A13) (italics added for emphasis).

The article did return to the idea of genocide; however, it did not use the term and again gave the impression that the opinion was not that of the journalist. “Elements of the Rwandan presidential guard went on a rampage killing opposition politicians, Tutsis and
Human Rights groups say it is clear that Tutsis are now being targeted” (Sallot 1994b: A13) (italics added for emphasis).

Articles discussing the violence and only using the term “genocide” when giving a quotation or attributing the term’s use to another individual or organization were very common in the Globe and Mail (Reuters News Agency 1994c, Reuters News Agency 1994e Sallot 1994e and Sallot 1994f). This was evident on May 6, 1994, in an article that discussed the violence and the resulting deaths that had occurred. The journalist used terms such as massacres and carnage to describe the situation, but the term “genocide” was used only when the author presented the view of UN officers.

Horrified by the scale of the killings, many UN officers say they want to see international tribunals convened to bring political leaders to trial for genocide. UN sources say it is clear that rival politicians have incited tribal fears and hatreds among an uneducated population, stirring people to frenzy in a bid for power” (Sallot 1994e: A1).

This was further evident on May 14, 1994 when the RPF were reported as saying “their only objective is to stop the massacres of Tutsis and to bring to justice the political leaders who were responsible for genocide” (Sallot 1994f: D3). Throughout the rest of the article, Sallot (1994f) described the situation as war, slaughter and a killing rampage.

This use of the term “genocide”, followed by descriptions of massacres, slaughter and similar terms was common in the Globe and Mail coverage. As such, the Globe and Mail did a disservice in its coverage of the Rwandan genocide. By introducing the term in an article but then proceeding to describe the violence with other terms, the Globe and Mail distorted the coverage of genocide and concealed the extent to which the crime of genocide was occurring. On July 12, 1994, Picard (1994a) described how “there were genocidal attacks” but then ignored the term for the rest of the article. Picard (1994a)
focused more on “the incomprehensibly brutal slaughter”, “the killing rampage” and the “savagery in the streets and in the hills” (p. A9) to describe the situation. This was also evident on July 16, 1994 when the paper reported that according to the RPF, “genocidal killers” were hiding among the refugees at a camp (Picard 1994e); however, throughout the rest of the article, the term “genocide” was avoided in favour of other terms. For example “Rwandans flee the butchery in their homeland”, “200,000 perhaps as many as 500,000, are believed to have been slaughtered”, “RPF will seek revenge for the massacre of Tutsis” and “the slaughter continues” (Picard 1994e: A1, A8) were all used instead of “genocide”.

The last use of the term “genocide” in the articles that I analysed was in an editorial titled “Of Political Will and Rwanda” printed on July 19, 1994. The use of the term was in the context of the refugee situation and the main focus of the article was the exodus of the refugees and the crisis that it would bring. The term “genocide” was used to describe the situation that arose after the death of the Rwandan President and was simply stated to lay the setting for the flight of refugees. The article did not give much credit to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda and was more concerned with how the refugee crisis could have been stopped. For the author, the genocide seemed to be unstoppable; “No one can say the UN could have kept the peace, for there was no peace to keep, but its presence might have allowed a humanitarian operation to take root” (Anonymous 1994f: A16). Furthermore, the author presented the genocide as simply a cause of the emerging refugee crisis. “In the end, the UN can only be as effective as its members want it to be. They decided early that Rwanda wasn’t important enough. Because they refused to address the cause, they now face the calamity” (Anonymous
By simply stating that the genocide was a cause in the refugee crisis, the author devalued the events that occurred during the previous three-and-a-half months. This devaluation was achieved by the editorial mainly focusing on the refugee crisis and stating that had the international community entered Rwanda earlier, and set up safe havens for the refugees, the exodus might have been prevented. The article barely mentions the genocide and the 800,000 people killed and how stopping the genocide could have possibly prevented the exodus. Moreover, the article stated that “the crisis in Central Africa is now the worst in the world” (Anonymous 1994f: A16), which seems to imply that the refugee situation is much worse than the genocide it followed.

Based on my findings, there are two key themes in how the two newspapers framed the crime of genocide with regards to the killing of individuals. The first theme is that terms other than “genocide” were used to depict the situation as brutal tribalism, seemingly beyond the realm of law, which relieved the international community from any legal responsibility to act to stop it. Instead of describing the violence as a modern, pre-mediated and systematic genocide, the New York Times and the Globe and Mail chose to describe the situation as irrational tribalism. By describing the genocide in a distorted manner, the two newspapers diminished the criminal aspects of the violence and thus presented the situation as a “typical” African problem.

In general, there were a few terms that were consistently used to tribalize the genocide. Carnage, savagery, butchery and slaughter were all used to describe the violence that was occurring in Rwanda. By definition, these terms mean “the savage and excessive killing of people” (WordNet) and insinuate that the killing was done by an uncivilized or primitive people. In the Globe and Mail, one article discussed “the
Rwandan carnage as troops butchered civilians” (Reuters News Agency 1994a: A12) while another stated that “evidence of the carnage is not far from the [refugee] camp…with no progress being made toward ending the savagery in Rwanda” (Chenault 1994: A16). In the New York Times, an article described “the ethnic slaughter that followed the death of President Juvénal Habyarimana” and how “two million people have fled their homes to avoid the fighting and ethnic savagery” (AP 1994c: A5). By describing the violence in such terms, criminal elements of the violence were replaced with perceived natural and tribal elements and thus the acts were not viewed with a criminal justice normative lens through which expectations that perpetrators should be held accountable might take hold.

Other terms that were used to describe the violence as primitive rather than genocidal were ethnic and tribal. The New York Times was filled with accounts of “ethnic mayhem” (Lewis 1994g: E2), “tribal strife” (Van Gelder 1994: A8), “ethnic cleansing” (Lorch 1994m: 1) and “tribal conflict” (Lewis 1994j). The Globe and Mail reported similar accounts such as “ethnic violence” (McCullum 1994a: A1), settling of “tribal scores” (Reuters and CP 1994: A12), “mass tribal carnage” (Reuters News Agency 1994b: A12) and “ethnic slaughter” (Picard 1994c:A12). The use of these terms is more direct in conveying the message that the violence was not outwardly criminal because it emanated from an apparently lawless, unstable and uncivilized society. By resorting to the simplification and naturalization of the violence, the two papers diminished the extent to which the genocide was planned and strategically carried out. As a result, the crime of genocide is ignored and replaced with an image of primitive chaos.
The second theme is that the use of terms other than “genocide” depicted the situation as indiscriminate violence. This is an important theme, as by definition, genocide is a series of purposeful, orchestrated acts that are committed with the intent to destroy a specific group. Therefore, by describing the violence as indiscriminate, the newspapers eliminated the possibility of the reader interpreting the violence as simply genocide. Some of the terms that were used to identify the violence as indiscriminate were blood terms such as bloodbath, bloodletting and bloodshed. When described as indiscriminate slaughter, these acts of violence are separated from the calculated and strategic crime of genocide. With regards to these terms, the New York Times described how “the United States discussed proposals for ending the bloodshed” (AP 1994b: A9) and how “one evacuation ended in bloodshed” (Lorch 1994l: A10). The Globe and Mail described how “the death toll in the bloodbath could run into the thousands” (Sallot 1994a: A1) and how “tribal bloodletting” and “tribal bloodshed” had spread to the countryside while in Kigali “the bloodletting showed no signs of abating” (Reuters and CP 1994: A12). While these terms may be graphic in their references to blood and incite a reaction from the reader, they distort the motives that make the acts criminal and reduce the chances that the reader will view the acts as a violation of the UN genocide convention.

While the two newspapers reported the situation in a tribal and unorganized fashion, it is well known that the genocide was in fact the result of careful planning and systematic execution. According to Gérard Prunier (1995), prior to the genocide “all the pre-conditions for a genocide were present: a well-organised civil service, a small tightly-controlled land area, a disciplined and orderly population, reasonably good

9 Bloodbath, bloodletting and bloodshed can all be defined as indiscriminate slaughter (WordNet).
communications and a coherent ideology containing the necessary lethal potential” (p. 238). However, this was not the picture that the newspapers presented. Instead, the two newspapers chose to define the situation as a “typical African” problem in a primitive country, which resulted in the criminal actions being distorted. By ignoring the genocide, the newspapers failed to sufficiently identify the acts as criminal, and a crime which was never to happen again, was allowed to proceed virtually undetected by the two papers.

The language of crime, which at times can ignore some types of harm, such as white collar crime, does provide a cultural framework for articulating and understanding extremely violent actions. Therefore, the newspapers failure to identify violent actions as amounting to the crime of genocide contributed to the international society’s weakened moral stance against the Rwandan genocide. By not employing the correct language to describe these clearly destructive events, society’s moral compass remained inactive, which caused society to be oblivious to the violent actions occurring in a seemingly far distant land.

Before proceeding, it is important to mention some of the positive aspects of the newspaper coverage. The first is that that there were cases where the violence was being defined as organized, systematic and criminal; however these representations were few and far between. With regards to the New York Times, on a few occasions, the paper described the violence as evolving into “what appears to be a methodical killing of Tutsi” (Lorch 1994f: A7), while on another occasion they quoted Allison Des Forges, as stating that “this is not a tribal conflict but a coldblooded ruthless, cynical plot” (Lorch 1994j: A3). Furthermore, the New York Times reported the account of a Tutsi refugee who described how “the militias had been planning the attack for a while. ‘It was not
something they acted upon spontaneously’ she said. ‘They had been thinking about it. Before they would talk about such things, but we thought it was just words’” (Lorch 1994n: A8). However, as aforementioned these accounts were the minority and were greatly outnumbered by the articles describing the violence as primitive and natural. In addition, when these accounts were present, they usually also contained the non-criminal terms described above, which reduced the likelihood that the acts would be interpreted as being criminal.

With regards to the Globe and Mail, the paper was less inclined to describe the acts as having been systematically carried out; however, unlike the New York Times, it used the term “murder” to describe some of the killings. By defining some killings as murder, the Globe and Mail acknowledged that some of the acts were criminal and were relatable to the “Western” world. By using the term “murder”, the Globe and Mail reported a tangible crime with which the reader could identify. The Globe and Mail described how some Rwandan aid workers were murdered (Associated Press, Reuter, CP and Staff 1994) and how civilians were “brutally murdered” in a “murderous frenzy”\(^{10}\) (Reuter, AP and CP 1994: A11). Furthermore, they wrote accounts about the murder of 60 teenaged boys by the Hutu militias (Anonymous 1994e) as well as the murder of Rwandan clergy (Associated Press and Reuter 1994c). However, as with the systematic accounts of violence reported in the New York Times, the use of the term murder was generally accompanied by the non-criminal terms described above and was not used at a high frequency throughout the period analysed. As such, the reader was inundated with non-criminal terms that overshadowed the descriptions of murder.

\(^{10}\) However, by describing the situation as a “frenzy”, the author also suggests that the situation was out-of-control and less than calculated.
b) Other Crimes of Genocide

This section of my analysis focuses on crimes that cover categories “b” to “d” of the Genocide Convention. In the Rwandan context, this will include crimes that cause serious bodily or mental harm, crimes that are inflicted to bring about the physical destruction of a group in whole or in part and crimes that are intended to prevent births. Crimes that I have included in this category are abduction, theft, abuse, torture and rape. However, based on my research, not much was reported on these crimes in either the *New York Times* or the *Globe and Mail*.

With regards to abductions\(^{11}\), the crime was presented in three articles in the *New York Times* (Reuters 1994b, Reuters 1994c and Schmidt 1994a) and was always described as resulting in death. Those abducted were generally described as taking refuge from the violence and were chosen because of who they were. The crime of abduction was covered similarly in the *Globe and Mail* and was reported in four articles (AP, CP, Reuter and Staff 1994, Associated Press and Reuter 1994b, Reuters News Agency 1994d and Sallot 1994a). In all cases, the abductions were a result of who the individuals were and generally resulted in their deaths.

The crime of theft\(^{12}\) was published in two articles (Lorch 1994a and Lorch 1994b) in the *New York Times* and was described as houses and shops being broken into and looted at the outbreak of the genocide. In the *Globe and Mail*, the crime of theft was discussed in 11 articles and described two different situations. As in the *New York Times*, the initial descriptions of theft took place at the outbreak of the genocide and included the looting of houses and shops (AP, CP, Reuter and Staff. 1994, AP, Reuter, CP 1994, AP,

\(^{11}\) “The criminal act of capturing and carrying away by force a family member” (WordNet).
\(^{12}\) The act of taking something from someone unlawfully (WordNet).
Reuter, NYT and CP 1994, McCullum 1994b and Sallot 1994e). The second stage of theft that the Globe and Mail described took place in the refugee camps near the end of the genocide. These descriptions of theft were different from the theft described at the beginning of the genocide because the thefts were from a person rather than a building. This gave a more personal sense of the crime and the reader was more likely to sympathize with the victim. For example, the articles described how “the refugees complain of violent extortion and theft of what few possessions they have” (Picard 1994e: A8) and how “Zairian troops have been looting refugees, and robbed at least two Western reporters at gunpoint” (Picard 1994f: A7).

The crime of abuse\(^\text{13}\) was mentioned in one article in the New York Times and in no articles in the Globe and Mail. The one article in the New York Times that mentioned abuse gave the impression that the crime was excusable, as the abuse of civilians by the RPF was for the most part attributed to battle-fatigue and stress (Bonner 1994d) and thus not entirely the fault of the soldiers involved. The crime of torture\(^\text{14}\) was only mentioned in one article in the New York Times (Rosenblatt 1994) and not much was written on it other than it was carried out by the Hutu. The Globe and Mail had a slightly higher coverage of torture and reported on it in four articles. However, three-quarters of their coverage was on the torture of the ten Belgians who were killed at the outbreak of the genocide (Associated Press, Reuter, CP and Staff 1994, Picard 1994b and Sallot 1994b) while the last article described how a report alleged that the RPF were torturing civilians

\(^{13}\) Cruel or inhumane treatment (WordNet).

\(^{14}\) The deliberate, systematic, or wanton infliction of physical or mental suffering by one or more persons in an attempt to force another person to yield information or to make a confession or for any other reason (WordNet).
even though the RPF denied this and human-rights workers had seen no proof of this (Associated Press and Reuter 1994a).

The last crime that I analysed was rape\textsuperscript{15}. Previous research has shown that “during the genocide, tens of thousands of women and girls were raped” (Des Forges 1999: 215) and that

\begin{quote}
the rapes of Rwandan Tutsi women were on a vastly greater scale than in the former Yugoslavia. Both in their murderous dimension – with rape frequently followed by killing, either immediately or after a period of forced sexual servitude – and in the element of savage mutilation (Jones 2002: 81).
\end{quote}

However, rape was reported only two times in the *New York Times* and it was not described as a witnessed event. Instead, rape was either described as being condoned by the officers of the Rwandan army (Lorch 1994q) or as being a punishable action by the RPF. “General Kagame has told the United Nations that several soldiers have been court-martialed for abuse of civilians and that at least one was executed after being convicted of rape” (Bonner 1994d: A10). The *Globe and Mail* printed three times as many articles on rape as the *New York Times*, but the number of articles reporting on rape was still low at six articles. The first account of rape was printed on April 18, 1994 under the heading *Raping, Killing Gain Momentum* (Associated Press and CP 1994), suggesting that rape was frequently taking place even though the newspaper coverage did not support this. However, even with the low number of articles, the *Globe and Mail* produced a much more vivid and descriptive picture of the crime of rape in Rwanda. An article published on April 18, 1994 acknowledged that rape was an integral part of the genocide and described how “Rwandan soldiers raped and hacked to death civilians” and how “women are raped first, then killed” (Associated Press and CP 1994: A1). This

\textsuperscript{15} The crime of forcing a woman to submit to sexual intercourse against her will (WordNet).
description of women being raped then killed was reiterated on May 16, 1994 (Fritz 1994). The *Globe and Mail* reported on how young girls were also the victims of rape, showing that the crime was oblivious to age. “One little girl was anally raped by someone she can identify as a man with a gun” (Sallot 1994c: A14) and girls were reported as being taken from orphanages to be raped (Picard 1994d). In another account, the RPF described the Rwandan government as “rapists and defilers of children” (Picard 1994c: A12). The effects of rape were also discussed on July 12, 1994, when the *Globe and Mail* reported how close to 40 percent of the population may be infected with HIV/AIDS and that rape was one of the contributing factors (Picard 1994a).

As a result of the lack of coverage of other crimes of genocide, the reader was not given a complete picture of the situation in Rwanda. By choosing not to focus on the crimes described above, the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* failed to convey the complexity of the situation in Rwanda. By ignoring the five crimes mentioned above, the reader was left with the image of primitive and indiscriminate violence described in the previous section. Moreover, the crimes noted in this section are acts that the reader would instantly recognize as being criminal and expect punishment for if they were to occur in their home country; however, by barely reporting on these easily identifiable crimes, the situation in Rwanda became a distant problem to which the reader could not relate.

Furthermore, with regards to abduction, abuse, and torture, these crimes may have been under reported by the media due to the fact that they most likely resulted in the death of an “African” victim. The fact that the victims were “African” may have resulted in the two newspapers devoting less coverage to these crimes as their deaths were less
newsworthy than the deaths of Westerners. This was especially evident in the coverage of torture. With regards to torture, 75 percent of the crime’s coverage was devoted to the torture and killing of the Belgian UN forces, which suggests that “Western” victims of the crime made the crime more newsworthy. With regards to theft, the low coverage in the media may have been due to standard “Western” reporting. In general, this crime does not merit much coverage in “Western” society where the focus is usually “if it bleeds it leads”. Thus, media coverage of theft is low because it is not seen as newsworthy due to a lack of sensational details.

The most interesting aspect of my analysis of other crimes of genocide is the lack of articles reporting rape. Due to the lack of reporting on this crime, the reader is given the impression that acts of rape were infrequent in Rwanda. However, as previously mentioned, rape occurred quite frequently. Therefore, the lack of coverage of rape may be due to the fact that many women were killed after being raped or that those who survived were fearful of the stigma attached to being raped and chose not to share their experiences.

2. **Perpetrators**

To watch them turn from the most wonderful, the most smiling, the most gentle of people to such treacherous murderers is beyond comprehension…It is almost as if someone flips a switch.

Dr. Per Houmann (Schmidt 1994d: A6)

As was identified by the crime section above, the genocidal events in Rwanda were rarely represented in formal criminal justice terms. However, perpetrators of deadly acts were described in some articles, and it is worthwhile to examine whether or not criminal justice frames were used in the representations of these actors. For the purpose
of my analysis of the perpetrators of the genocide, I define the perpetrators as individuals who committed acts that are now known to be criminal, although at the time of reporting these actions were described as resulting from tribalism and indiscriminate violence. My analysis involves looking at two groups; the first group is the RPF/Tutsi and the second the Rwandan government/Army/Militia/Hutu. Although the RPF did have Hutu members and not all Hutu belonged to the Rwandan government, army or militias, I chose to break them down into these categories because this is how they were generally presented in the New York Times and the Globe and Mail. The New York Times often reported that “the Rwandan Army…is predominantly made up of members of the Hutu tribe” and “the Rwandan Patriotic Front is made up of mostly Tutsis” (Lewis 1994e: 1) while the Globe and Mail often reported on “the Hutu-dominated government and Tutsi-led rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front” (Sallot 1994e: A1).

a) RPF/Tutsi

The RPF was a highly disciplined military organization that consisted mainly of Tutsi refugees in Uganda as well as some Hutus. The RPF were responsible for ending the genocide by defeating the military and civilian factions responsible. The RPF saved Tutsi from the killings and secured land to which the refugees could return. However, during their campaign, they were also responsible for killing thousands of individuals, which included government troops, members of the militia and unarmed civilians. “They may have slaughtered tens of thousands during the four months of combat from April to July” (Des Forges 1999) but the killing of civilians has been poorly documented. Those killed included civilians in camps set up by the RPF because of accusations that they participated in the genocide or because of reasons that stemmed from interrogations by
the RPF. Some civilians were also killed because “they were linked with parties opposed to the RPF or showed potential for becoming political leaders rather than they were thought guilty of involvement in the genocide” (Des Forges 1999).

The first account of the RPF as potential perpetrators was published on May 1, 1994 in the *New York Times*. The *New York Times* reported that there were claims by Hutu refugees entering Tanzania that they were fleeing the RPF who were killing people (Lorch 1994h). The following day, the *New York Times* reported how several Rwandans interviewed said that like the Hutu militias, the rebel soldiers had lists of people they searched for and killed, but no one interviewed had witnessed the killings or any massacres. In fact several people said massacres of Tutsis had been carried out by Hutu militias before the rebels had arrived. They said the rebels told the Hutus to leave their homes, part of a tactic they had used before in an effort to clear fighting areas of civilians as well as to avoid accusations that the Patriotic Front was involved in civilian massacres... ‘Almost all the people in our area were Tutsis killed by Hutu militia. The front came and they had lists and they killed only those on the lists’ (Lorch 1994i: A10).

On May 18, the newspaper reported how eyewitness accounts of killings by the RPF were being told by refugees fleeing into Tanzania. However, the *New York Times* described how “the scope of the killings” was “small compared with the slaughter by Government troops” (Lorch 1994k: A6). The RPF was described as being much more disciplined and organized than the Rwandan military, insisting that its soldiers would not retaliate with revenge killings. However, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was reported as describing “rebel assaults on unarmed civilians” (Lorch 1994k: A6). There were also reports on how journalists had witnessed RPF executions of soldiers and that Africa Watch claimed the RPF had committed “summary executions of specifically targeted people, for looting and in some cases for forced labor, but...they have not been
involved in any large-scale massacres as the Hutu military and militias have” (Lorch 1994o: A10).

On June 10, 1994 (Lewis 1994j), the *New York Times* reported how members of the RPF killed the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kigali, two other bishops and ten priests. The article went on to describe how an official of the RPF described the killings as being carried out by misguided rebel soldiers who were undisciplined and that they believed that those killed were implicated in the killings of their families. The article also described how the RPF indicated that these soldiers would be punished. On another occasion, the *New York Times* reported that the Hutu feared the RPF because they had been bombarded by propaganda against the Tutsis and also due to the fear that the RPF would avenge the deaths of the Tutsis. However, the article ended by reporting that the military officers with UNAMIR claimed that the RPF were remarkably disciplined and that any abuses against civilians were mainly due to battle fatigue and stress. In addition, it was reported that General Kagame told the UN that several soldiers were court-marshalled for abusing civilians and that one was executed after being convicted of rape (Bonner 1994d).

The *New York Times* also reported that the RPF were responsible for rights violations, though rights organizations said they are not guilty of mass killings of civilians, which has characterized the Government’s war against the Tutsi. ‘The R.P.F. does not have a good human-rights record…There are documented cases of killing of suspected militia members and indiscriminate targets. However the R.P.F. is not implicated in the genocide…The major reason for the abatement of the killings has been the advance of the R.P.F.’ (Bonner 1994b: A7).
On July 22, 1994, the *New York Times* again described how the cases of human rights abuses by the RPF had been documented, which included the execution of civilians. However the article describes how “these abuses occurred despite the code of conduct issued to soldiers, especially when inadequately trained soldiers were recruited as the front rapidly expanded its territory during the last three months” (Kasfir 1994: A27).

The *Globe and Mail* provided less coverage in which the RPF were described as the perpetrators of crimes. One of the first accounts was on May 3, 1994 when the newspaper described how Hutu refugees were sneaking past RPF border patrollers into Tanzania and that the refugees were afraid of the RPF (AP, Reuter 1994a). Two weeks later, on May 18, 1994, the *Globe and Mail* reported how the UNHCR had received reports that the RPF were torturing civilians. The article went on to describe that the RPF denied the claims; “It isn’t true we have been torturing and killing people. We haven’t done that and we don’t intend to” (Associated Press and Reuter 1994a: A9). Moreover, human rights workers, reporters and aid officials were reported as saying that there was no evidence of the RPF harming civilians. The first confirmation that the RPF were harming civilians was on June 10, 1994, when the *Globe and Mail* reported that the RPF had admitted that four of their soldiers had killed thirteen Rwandan clergymen who they were supposed to be guarding. However, along with this admission came the explanation that “it was done by some of our misguided soldiers” (Sallot 1994h: A14). Even near the end of the genocide, there were reports that the Hutu refugees were fleeing from Rwanda to Zaire because they feared that the RPF would take revenge; however, the *Globe and
Mail reported that there was little evidence to support this fear (Picard 1994c and Picard 1994e).

My analysis of the reporting of the RPF as perpetrators reveals that although the RPF were occasionally identified as being responsible for criminal actions, their criminal actions were most frequently described as unfounded accusations, downplayed or justified. Even when there was proof that the RPF had killed civilians, the two newspapers generally downplayed this action by suggesting the violence was due to stress or fatigue, or by comparing it to the large numbers killed by the government. As such, the two newspapers tended to not perceive them as the “bad guys” and presented them more as the “good guys” who made understandable mistakes. In addition, the newspapers identified a solution for the violence that was “home grown” and gave the reader the impression that outside intervention was not required. The RPF were not really portrayed as perpetrators of the violence, making them appear an ideal force for resolving the genocide. More on the role of the RPF will be discussed in the section below on law and order.

b) Militia/Government/Army/Hutu

In order to carry out the genocide, the Rwandan government mobilized “the structures that already existed – administrative, political, and military – and called upon personnel to execute a campaign to kill Tutsi and Hutu presumed to oppose Hutu Power” (Des Forges 1999). The military, which consisted of soldiers and the National Police, “killed civilians and they gave permission, set the example, and commanded others to kill” (Des Forges 1999). It was the military that initiated and directed the killing and the military was responsible for leading the militia and civilians in the killings and
distributing weapons to civilians. The militia was largely made up of political organizations and “provided the civilian striking force of the genocide” (Des Forges 1999). Two of the main militias were the Impuzamugambi, which was created by the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), and the Interahamwe, which emerged as a youth group out of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND). Throughout the genocide, there were approximately twenty to thirty thousand militia members (Des Forges 1999). For the purpose of my analysis of this group, I refer to all the aforementioned individuals as Hutu extremists.

With regards to the Hutu extremists, the New York Times reported on how, at the outbreak of the genocide, the Presidential Guard, the army, the police and “gangs of young men wielding clubs and machetes” (Schmidt 1994a: A1) went on a rampage, and were responsible for killings and abductions. A few days later, the newspaper reported how Rwandan soldiers and civilians were seen armed with machetes, spears and bows and arrows roaming the streets of Kigali (Lorch 1994a) and how the streets were filled with gangs of young drunk men, many of them soldiers (Schmidt 1994c). Phil Van Lanen, a relief worker with the Seventh-day Adventist Church mission in Rwanda, was quoted as describing the situation as “gangs of wild-eyed young men, who were always outside, somewhere, waving clubs and machetes and looking for someone to kill” (Schmidt 1994d: A6). By April 14, 1994, Kigali was described as being ruled by drunken soldiers and marauding gangs and the Rwandan army was described as being made up of many “highly undisciplined conscripts” (Lorch 1994b: A12). The New York Times also reported how “Hutu mobs went on a rampage, killing Tutsi wherever they found them” (Bonner 1994c: A8) and that “aside from some elite units, most of the
soldiers and militiamen were undisciplined, and that drinking and rape were condoned by their officers” (Lorch 1994q: A6).

The New York Times also reported that most of the killings had been perpetrated by the Rwandan army, militias and Hutu civilians. On April 24, 1994, the New York Times reported that independent observers blamed most of the killings on the government and just over a month later it reported how most of the civilians murdered “were killed by the presidential guard, army units and civilian gangs organized by extremist Hutu politicians” (AP 1994d: A5). On June 3, 1994, the New York Times described how “the mass killings have mostly been done by Hutu military and the extremist militias, youths trained by the military and the former ruling party of Rwanda” (Lorch 1994n: A8). This opinion was also expressed on July 11 and 19, 1994, when the newspaper reported that the militias were responsible for carrying out most of the killings (Bonner 1994c and Lorch 1994q). After the end of the genocide, the New York Times also reported that “the ousted Government was directly responsible for most of the deaths of civilians” and “organized the militias that killed most of the civilians…The former Government considered massacring its citizens its central mission” (Kasfir 1994: A27).

With regards to the Hutu extremists as perpetrators of the genocide, the Globe and Mail reported how at the outbreak of the genocide, “rampaging troops killed Rwanda’s acting prime minister”, “members of the security forces and gangs of youths wielding machetes and clubs rampaged through the capital” and how “the presidential guard has been particularly ruthless and particularly brutal” (AP, CP, Reuter and Staff 1994: A1). On April 12, 1994, the Globe and Mail described how gangs were killing hospital patients, Tutsis in churches and “refugees in the town hall” and how “gangs of heavily
armed, drunken Hutu tribesmen hunted down and killed any members of the minority Tutsi tribe they could find” (Reuters and CP 1994: A12). This “fury of killing” was attributed to rogue elements of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan army and armed gangs (AP, Reuter, NYT and CP 1994). On May 2 and 4, 1994, it was reported that the Hutu youth militia gangs were out-of-control (Sallot 1994c and Sallot 1994d) and the Globe and Mail also described the youth gang militias as being “nominally allied with the government but really under no control” and how they “pose a different security threat. Often crazed by drugs, or drunk on banana beer, they terrorize villages, set up road blocks on highways and attack people with machetes” (Sallot 1994e: A1). On May 20, 1994, it was reported how

Hutu extremists unleashed the death squads. Often they’re motley collections of villagers who say they have been armed and often assisted by the army or local officials to kill the ‘enemies’ in their midst. In any event, the result has been a succession of merciless, eerily robotic killing sprees, carried out regardless of the victim’s age or gender (Fritz 1994c: A18).

The Globe and Mail also reported that the paramilitary youth militias were responsible for most of the killings and that they were frequently drunk on banana beer (Sallot 1994b). On April 30, 1994, it was reported that the “government forces and militias sought revenge against the minority Tutsi clan” and that most civilians killed, had “been killed, mainly by sections of the government forces or extremist Hutu militias from Mr. Habyarimana’s MRND party” (Reuters News Agency 1994a: A12). Furthermore, the Globe and Mail reported that the RPF accused the Rwandan government of being lawless and “criminals, who have been doing all the killing…They consider the government an illegitimate body dominated by extremist Hutus whom they blame for much of the killing” (Associated Press 1994b: A13). Civilian gangs, consisting mainly of
Hutus were blamed for most of the killings on May 28, 1994 (AP, Reuter 1994b) and a month later, the *Globe and Mail* reported that the government was training “murderous civilian militias” (Fritz 1994d: A1), which were responsible for most of the killings. Again, on July 5, 1994, most of the killings were attributed to “government-affiliated militias largely made up of members of the Hutu majority” (Reuter and Associated Press 1994c: A8).

Based on my analysis of the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail*, it is evident that they both consider the Hutu extremists as perpetrators of the violence and, in contrast to their portrayal of RPF violence, do not downplay their actions. However, as with the crime of genocide, the two newspapers tend to tribalize the Hutu extremists, which removes a certain degree of calculated agency from the equation and suggests a lack of control by the perpetrators. The language which was used to describe the Hutu extremists suggests that their actions were natural and beyond their control and by describing them as “wild-eyed”, “Hutu tribesmen”, “brutal and ruthless” and crazed, the two newspapers ignored the extent to which they systematically carried out the genocide and worked together for a common goal. Instead, the reader is left with an image of primitive “Africans” who are doing what comes natural.

However, juxtaposed against the tribalized image of the Hutu extremists was an image of the Hutu extremists as calculated killers. Even though the two newspapers tended to tribalize the Hutu extremists, they also attempted to fit the group into a Western criminal justice model by identifying them as being guilty of the killings and deserving of punishment. They did this by constantly associating most of the killings with Hutu extremists and also through the use of the term “gangs” to describe them. By definition,
the term means an association of criminals (WordNet), which implies that the Hutu extremists were more than tribesmen and were in fact working together. Moreover, by using the term “gangs”, the newspapers automatically applied a criminal affiliation to the Hutu extremists and allowed the reader to have a criminal understanding of the group. This understanding is based on the fact that the term “gangs” is commonly used to describe criminal associations that exist in society and that stories on gangs are frequently reported in the media. Some of the more popular representations of gangs are delinquent youth, ethnic gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs and traditional criminal organizations, such as the mafia. As with their makeup, gang activities are diverse and can range anywhere from anarchic and out of control behaviour to organized and structured behaviour.

3. Victims

On July 29 President Clinton ordered 200 U.S. troops to occupy the Kigali airport so that relief could be flown directly into Rwanda. Ahead of their arrival, Dallaire says he got a phone call. A U.S. officer was wondering precisely how many Rwandans had died. Dallaire was puzzled and asked why he wanted to know. ‘We are doing our calculations back here’, the U.S. officer said, ‘and one American casualty is worth about 85,000 Rwandan dead’ (Powers 2002: 381).

At the outbreak of the genocide, the focus of the New York Times was largely on the situation of foreigners in Rwanda, even though they were not the intended victims of the violence. Interestingly enough, on April 9, 1994, an article claimed that “the killings so far were directed at Rwandans rather than foreigners” (Schmidt 1994b: 6) but then continued to write that foreigner lives were put at risk by Rwandans who sought refuge in areas inhabited by foreigners. During the next 4 to 5 days of coverage, the rescuing of foreigners was the main focus of coverage even though there were no reports of foreign
casualties (McFadden 1994). “Violence was rampant, an official said. Americans were not being singled out for attacks. But the general level of violence created a serious danger, and other Westerners were being manhandled” (Pear 1994: 6). In addition, the article went on to state that President Clinton stressed “the importance of doing everything possible to insure the safety of the Americans, and doing whatever we could – which frankly isn’t very much – to stabilize the situation in Rwanda” (Pear 1994: 6). The New York Times also described how “the foreigners were in the middle of the violence, but most were immune from harm in the ethnic war” (Lorch 1994a: A13) and how “foreigners have generally not been the targets of the blood feud” (Schmidt 1994c: A12).

The Globe and Mail also concentrated on the situation of the foreigners, even though they were not being targeted. On April 8, 1994, two days into the genocide, the Globe and Mail reported how there were no reports of attacks against the 100 Canadians living in Rwanda, other than a report that a Canadian married to a Rwandan and their two children were presumed to have been killed (AP, CP, Reuter and Staff 1994). The next day, it was also reported that the fighting was so intense that Canadians “were told to stay indoors for their own safety” and that other countries were preparing to remove their foreign nationals (Sallot 1994a: A1). Furthermore, it was reported that Belgium had stated it would “take unspecified measures to guarantee” the safety of their nationals (Sallot 1994a: A2) and that according to a Foreign Affairs spokesman, “Canadians and other foreigners are ‘at considerable risk from the continuing fighting’…but there is no indication that foreigners have been especially targeted” (Sallot 1994a: A2). The Globe and Mail also reported how “thousands of people died in fighting and ethnic violence” but that “endangered Westerners” were the ones being flown to safety (AP, Reuter, CP
1994: A1). On April 15, 1994, it appeared that the *Globe and Mail* was going to address the considerable focus on foreigners when it reported that Amnesty International had stated that “the evacuation of foreigners coordinated by Belgium, France and the United States has overshadowed the plight of the thousands of Rwanda citizens still at risk of being killed in the chaos” (AP, Reuter and CP 1994: A13). However, right after this quotation, the article reported on the ten Belgians that were killed and that Westerners were threatened unless they could prove that they were not Belgians. In addition, mention of the Rwandan victims was limited to “ethnic fighting” (AP, Reuter and CP 1994: A13).

By focusing on the evacuation of the foreigners, both newspapers ignored the real victims of the violence and instead manipulated the situation to portray the foreigners as the ones who needed saving. As a result, at the outbreak of the genocide, the African victims were overlooked and the Western evacuees became the focal point, even though they only accounted for “a total of 3,900 people of 22 nationalities” (Melvern 2004: 186). This portrayal allowed the reader to sympathize with the Western “victim” because the victim was just like them and caused the African victim to be viewed as less significant and possibly even as source of the foreigners’ problems. Furthermore, by focusing on the foreigners, the newspapers ensured that their “rescue” was portrayed as a positive mission by the international community, which resulted in the lack of an international will to end the genocide to be overlooked and the Rwandan victims to be overshadowed. This may have resulted in a diminished sense of moral responsibility among the readers, who had they identified more closely with the Rwandan victims, might have been more likely to demand that action be taken to save them.
With regards to the Rwandan victims at the outbreak of the genocide, the New York Times gave very few details and the victims were usually described as corpses or bodies. It described “streets and alleys lined with corpses”, how “workers in Kigali had counted 1,000 bodies at one hospital alone” and how there were “bodies piled in the centers of streets and laid out in lines on the sides of roads” (Schmidt 1994c: A12). On April 12, 1994, it was reported that there were “trucks piled with corpses” and “bodies of Tutsi victims stacked against walls” (Schmidt 1994d: A6). As the genocide progressed, the victims were described in more detail, but the overall coverage of them was low. There were a few articles dedicated to the experiences of victims (AP 1994a, Bonner 1994a, Greenhouse 1994 and Lorch 1994f), but for the most part, they were generally described in a sentence here and there. When they were described, the New York Times tended to describe the victims as Tutsi. On April 11, 1994, the New York Times described how “members of the Tutsi ethnic group were among the worst hit in the first night of fighting” (Lorch 1994a: A13) and two weeks later, it described how “it appeared that most of the victims were from the minority Tutsi tribe, which has been associated with the rebels or supporters of opposition parties” (Reuters 1994a: 30).

The New York Times’ coverage of the victims may have contributed to readers distancing themselves from the victims. This distance was the result of the New York Times describing victims as inanimate beings and as Tutsi. By describing the victims as bodies and corpses, it would have been difficult for the reader to identify with the victim, as there was no common humanity to which they could relate. However, describing the victims as Tutsi tribalized the victim and masked their broader human identity. By tribalizing the victim, the reader may be led to view the victim as part of a doomed
collective, rather than as a living and complex individual with human rights, dignity, and respect. Thus, tribalization of the victim can result in the reader not being able to connect with the victim, as Tutsi is a description of a uniform group that is not identifiable in the Western World. Prior to the genocide, many Westerners probably never heard the term “Tutsi” and as such could not identify with a Tutsi. The result is that the reader is distanced from the victim and may feel no moral responsibility towards the victim. However, on the other hand, by describing the victims as members of the Tutsi tribe, the reader was able to identify the reason for which the victim was killed and had a better chance of interpreting the situation as genocide.

The coverage of the victims by the *Globe and Mail* was different from the *New York Times* in that it did not focus so much on the ethnicity of the victims or objectify them as bodies. Instead, the *Globe and Mail* described the victims as Rwandans, civilians and people, which is in line with their use of the term “genocide”. The term “genocide” was relatively unused by the *Globe and Mail*, so it is not surprising that its description of the victims was not based on ethnic notions. However, by ignoring the ethnicity of those killed and identifying the victims as being Rwandans, the *Globe and Mail* distorted the way in which the reader may have understood the genocide and the victims. By not identifying the victims as being targeted because of their ethnicity, the newspaper lowered the chances that the violence would be viewed as genocide. On the other hand, by identifying the victims as civilians, Rwandans and people the *Globe and Mail* did not tribalize the victims, as was prevalent in the *New York Times*, and the reader may have been more likely to identify with the victim.
While the terms used to describe the victims were less descriptive than the *New York Times*, based on the content analysis above, the *Globe and Mail* used more adjectives to describe the victims.

### 4. Law Enforcers

In Rwanda...people learned long ago not to count too much on others. They have a proverb...It goes: ‘When life is thrown up, every man will catch his own.

Ron Clark (Schmidt 1994d: A6)

In my analysis of the law enforcers in Rwanda, I focused on one external group, the United Nations, and one internal group, the Rwandan police. I chose to include the UN in my analysis of law enforcers in Rwanda due to the fact that dealing with genocide is not just the responsibility of one country’s police force, since the Genocide Convention requires that the global community intervene in cases of genocide to prevent and punish all those involved. As well, the UN had already established a peace-keeping force in Rwanda\(^\text{16}\) and the “United Nations is an international organization…committed to maintaining international peace and security” (United Nations 2009).

#### a) The United Nations

According to Allison Des Forges (1999),

as the killers began their assaults, everyone in Rwanda – Rwandan and foreigner – looked to UNAMIR to see what it would do. The killers watched to see if it would threaten them; by and large, it did not. People at risk counted on it to protect them; for the vast majority of Rwandans, it did not do that either.

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\(^{16}\) UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, was established by the UN to help with the implementation of the Arusha Accords, which were to end the three-year civil war between the Rwandan government and the RPF.
Prior to the outbreak of the genocide, the *New York Times* described the UN as a peacekeeping force that was sent to Rwanda in order to help stabilize the country and restore order (Lewis 1994a). The *New York Times* reported that the main roles of the UN peacekeepers were to: patrol a demilitarized buffer zone that separated the RPF-controlled zone from the Government-controlled zone; work with the local police to uphold security in Kigali and insure the protection of opposition politicians who were joining the transitional government; and prevent both the RPF and the Government from bringing more weapons into Rwanda (Lewis 1994b). However, once the violence erupted on April 6, 1994, the *New York Times* presented the UN as having little chance of fulfilling their mission of carrying out a peace accord (McFadden 1994). Instead, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the UN mediator in Rwanda, claimed the best assistance the peacekeepers could provide was to try to negotiate a cease-fire so that the peace negotiations could continue (Lewis 1994b). On April 15, 1994, the *New York Times* published an article entitled “U.N. in Rwanda says it is powerless to halt the violence” that described how the UN could not stop or prevent the killing. Instead it was reported that the UN was restricted to monitoring a peace agreement that had been broken, due to the mandate it was under. Their new role was to try and bring about a ceasefire and act as a mediator between warring parties (Lorch 1994c). “Since the current fighting resumed, the United Nations troops have stood by helplessly…The Security Council said the United Nations mission would remain in Kigali only if the Government forces and the rebels could reach a peace agreement” (Lorch 1994d: A8).

Moreover, the *New York Times* portrayed the UN force as an organization unable to or unwilling to stop the violence. On April 15, 1994, in an article entitled “For West,
Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle”, the *New York Times* blatantly reported that “no member of the United Nations with an army strong enough to make a difference is willing to risk the lives of its troops for a failed central African nation-state with a centuries-old history of tribal warfare and deep distrust of outside intervention” (Sciolino 1994a: A3). Just over a week later, the *New York Times* published an editorial accusing the UN of giving up when it decided to pull all but a few troops out of Rwanda.

The U.N. Security Council threw in the bloodied towel when it decided unanimously...to cut back the blue-helmeted force to 270 soldiers...However morally unsettling, the pullout fairly reflects the unwillingness of most U.N. members to recruit a force big enough to stop a genocidal conflict (Anonymous 1994a: 24).

However, the editorial goes on to claim that the world has few ways to respond effectively when a nation’s violence leads to the breakdown of civil order, and that the “U.N. force was meant to police a peace, not take sides in a civil war” (Anonymous 1994a: 24). In May and June, 1994, the *New York Times* published similar sentiments about the inaction of the UN and on May 20, 1994, it was reported that in Kigali, the UN troops could “do little but wait for reinforcements” (Lorch 1994l: A10). Additionally, on May 31, 1994, the paper reported that Denis Poise, a rebel leader, accused the UN of standing by during the bloodshed, and that many of the massacres “occurred under the noses of the blue helmets” (AP 1994d: A5).

The *Globe and Mail* presented the UN in a more positive light. At the outbreak of the genocide, the *Globe and Mail* presented the UN’s mission as administering the Arusha Accords but acknowledged the fact that “they are lightly armed and do not have a mandate to use force to defend themselves” (Sallot 1994a: A2). On April 14, 1994, the newspaper expressed similar views when it described how the UN force was sent to
Rwanda to implement a peace accord that had ended a three-year civil war but that its force’s mandate became outdated once the violence started (Reuter and Associated Press 1994a). The following day, the Globe and Mail published an article entitled “UN forces assailed as impotent”. In the article, there are accounts from foreigners stating that the UN was ineffectual but the article continues by claiming that the “criticism levelled against the lightly armed 2,500-member United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda…appears to be unfair in terms of its mandate” (McCullum 1994b: A13). On April 21, 1994, under the heading “Mere presence of UN a deterrent”, the Globe and Mail reported that General Dallaire claimed the fighting would be more brutal if the UN observers were not present.

‘I think our mere presence here has been a deterrent,’ he said defending the UN Assistance Mission he leads against criticisms that it has been ineffectual. The force is only equipped with small arms and is allowed to use them only if attacked. ‘We are peacekeepers in the middle of a shooting war. I am exceptionally limited in what I can do when the fighting is going on’ (Associated Press, Reuter, CP and Staff 1994: A15).

The UN was also described as being “an outnumbered force trying to protect millions of civilians” and that “with less than a full battalion, the UN force is stretched so thin it is unable to provide full-time protection at refugee camps” (Sallot 1994d: A2).

Furthermore, on May 20, 1994, Jeff Sallot wrote about his experience with the UN while on assignment in Rwanda. He described how the UN was providing security at refugee camps and providing basic necessities to civilians. As well, he wrote that

Canadians should be particularly proud of this UN operation. It is being run by a Canadian officer, Major-General Romeo Dallaire. And the only lifeline into Kigali at the moment is the Canadian Forces military transport planes flying the risky run from the Nairobi staging area (Sallot 1994g: A18).
The coverage of the United Nations by both newspapers gave the impression that the UN was unable to protect the Rwandans from the genocide. The *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* presented the genocide as a Rwandan problem in which the international community, through the UN, was unable to or unwilling to help. As such, Rwanda was presented as a chaotic country in which the international peace force was incapable of assisting. However, one main difference between the two newspapers was that the *Globe and Mail* suggested that it was not the UN’s fault that they were mostly ineffective but rather their mandate restricted their involvement. As such, while the *Globe and Mail* viewed Rwanda as a chaotic place, it also identified the fact that more resources and a change in their mandate would have allowed the UN to step in and save Rwanda. This was in contrast to the *New York Times*, which portrayed the situation in Rwanda as beyond the help of the international community and as a lost cause.

b) The Rwandan Police

According to Alison Des Forges (1999), the National Police (*gendarmes*)...and communal police played a larger part in the slaughter than is generally realized. In addition to leading the first killings in the capital and in other urban centers, soldiers and National Police directed all the major massacres throughout the country.

Des Forges’ arguments that the police played a larger part in the genocide than is realized are supported by the amount of coverage the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* gave to the Rwandan police. My analysis of both newspapers revealed that the Rwandan police were only mentioned in nine articles in the *New York Times* and six times in the *Globe and Mail*. In general, the reporting of the police was limited to one or two sentences per article.
Police are agents given the authority to enforce law and to maintain order in society. However, in my analysis, this definition did not fit the portrayal of the Rwandan police. On the contrary, the police were portrayed as disregarding the law and creating disorder in society, which was evident in the *New York Times* on numerous occasions. On April 8, 1994, the *New York Times* reported how “disparate army and police forces went on a rampage, reportedly killing the country’s interim Prime Minister and at least 10 Belgium peacekeeping soldiers” (Schmidt 1994a: A1). In addition, on two separate occasions, the police were portrayed as removing refugees from their places of shelter and killing them on the spot. On April 21, 1994, the *New York Times* described a situation in which the police executed 16 people who were pulled from a group of refugees huddled in a Kigali stadium (Lorch 1994e) and a week later, the police were described as shooting and throwing grenades at 5,000 refugees who were trying to escape from a soccer stadium in Cyangugu. The refugees had fled to the stadium to escape militant groups but “the local police later refused to let them leave” (Lewis 1994d: 7).

This portrayal of the police as disregarding the law and causing disorder was also prevalent in the coverage by the *Globe and Mail*. At the outbreak of the genocide, the *Globe and Mail* described how the security forces were rampaging through Kigali killing civilians. “Members of the security forces…rampaged through the capital, Kigali, settling tribal scores by hacking and clubbing people at random” (AP, CP, Reuter and Staff 1994: A1) and Kigali “had been turned into a killing ground by rampaging gangs and security forces” (Sallot 1994a: A1). Also, as in the *New York Times*, the police were described as executing 16 people who had taken refuge in a stadium (Associated Press, Reuter, CP and Staff 1994). The dissolution of Rwanda’s police force was also evident.
on May 5, 1994 when the *Globe and Mail* described it more as an accomplice to the murders as opposed to an enforcer of the law. “What remains of the local police is unreliable. In fact...police have identified Tutsi refugees to the youth gangs so the Tutsis can be hauled off and killed” (Sallot 1994c: A14). Moreover, even when the *Globe and Mail* reported on a situation in which a police force was regrouping, the situation was framed in a negative manner. Under the headline “Death Squads Form Refugee Police Force”, the article describes how relief workers believed that militia members that fled to Tanzania had regrouped as a police force and may have been responsible for some killings in the camp.

The camp is 95-per-cent Hutu, and the UN has allowed the Hutu communities that fled Rwanda to re-form their village-based structures. This means that the same local administrators responsible for organizing the massacres in Rwanda...are now running their ‘police’ in Ngara (Observer News Service 1994: A14).

My analysis also revealed that when the police were not described as participating in the genocide, they were described as having no real control over the law or its enforcement. The *New York Times* reported that “some drunken Hutu militiamen with grenades, guns and machetes had become a law unto themselves. Even...the police seemed to defer to them at the frequent roadblocks” (Reuter 1994: A3). Furthermore, on June 25, 1994, the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* both described how French soldiers were taking over the protection of a Tutsi refugee camp because the police did not adequately shield them from Hutu militia (Associated Press 1994c and Simons 1994). “11 Rwandan policemen supposedly guarding the camp” of Tutsi refugees “have not stopped sporadic murder raids by Hutu militiamen” (Associated Press 1994c: A12). On another occasion, when a mass grave was found by French paratroopers, the police,
priests and local residents nervously refused to talk about what happened (Reuters 1994d).

However, in two articles in the *New York Times*, the police were portrayed in a more positive light. On April 11, 1994, the gendarmes were described as leading the American evacuation convoys out of Rwanda (Schmidt 1994c) and on June 15, 1994, the Government police cleared the path for UN military observers who felt threatened by militias manning the roadblocks (Reuters 1994b).

For the most part, the police were reported as either corrupt or incapable of performing their duties, yet when they were presented in a positive light, the actions involved foreigners. It is interesting that when it came to assisting foreigners, the police were presented as willing to lend a helping hand, but when it came to dealing with their fellow Rwandans, the police were presented as not doing their job. As a result, this gives the impression that the Rwandan police are unable to or unwilling to enforce the law in Rwanda to protect its civilians and are thus incapable of providing a safe environment for Rwandans. Thus, the reader is left with the impression that Rwanda is filled with a population that is unable to control itself as even those in authority positions are out of control and active participants in the genocide.

Furthermore, the inability of the police to enforce the law in Rwanda suggests that Rwandan society is so completely beyond control that even the police, who are normally responsible for enforcing the law, are corrupt and contribute to the society’s disorder. This is in line with my earlier analysis which found that the conflict in Rwanda was portrayed in a tribalized and primitive fashion, resulting in the situation being viewed as a natural event that occurs in a less developed society. By presenting the police as
uncontrollable, Rwandan society and the genocide are further tribalized, which results in Rwanda being perceived as a disordered country, where society, including the police, is unable to control itself.

5. **Law and Order**

Only after the cessation of hostilities can law and order be expected, but a lasting peace is not achievable unless it carries with it the imperative of law...therefore...the most fundamental requirement, and a primary objective, of a lasting peace is the reestablishment of the rule of law

(Plunkett 1998:63)

a) **Law and Order (or the lack of)**

My analysis of the *New York Times* revealed that Rwanda was presented as a country without law and order. Even before the scope of the violence was published, Rwanda was presented as lacking order, setting the country up as one in which chaos is a natural event. In the first article printed on Rwanda, detailing the death of the two presidents, the *New York Times* wrote that “the United Nations recently deployed a 2,500-member peacekeeping force in Rwanda to try to stabilize the country and restore order” (Lewis 1994a: A10). This representation of Rwanda as lacking order was continued on April 8, 1994, when the *New York Times* presented Kigali as a lawless city.

Kigali dissolved into terror and chaos...leaving it unclear who was in charge and even who was battling whom...Residents and relief workers inside Kigali described a city that appears to have been given over to anarchy...Officials on the scene were urging the military and the police to form an interim authority that would stabilize the situation (Schmidt 1994a: A1, A2).

This was further emphasized on April 14, 1994 in an article titled “Anarchy Rules Rwanda’s Capital and Drunken Soldiers Roam City”, which described Kigali as a place
where “no one is in control and discipline is non existent” (Lorch 1994b: A12). Even when soldiers manned the roadblocks near Kigali, no one seemed to be in charge. When there were multiple soldiers at a roadblock, each soldier gave different instructions to those trying to pass (Lorch 1994b).

However, as the genocide progressed, Rwanda as a whole was identified as a country lacking law and order. On April 15, 1994, the New York Times described Rwanda as a country jolted “into an uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness and terror” (Sciolino 1994a: A3). As the genocide progressed and reports of RPF retaliations against Hutu came to light, the New York Times wrote that the “war in Rwanda is beyond rules and control” (Lorch 1994k: A6).

My analysis of the Globe and Mail produced similar findings to those of the New York Times. From the outbreak of the genocide, the Globe and Mail also described Rwanda as a country without law and order and initially attributed this to ethnic tensions. The first article printed on April 7, 1994 reported on the death of the Rwandan President and how it was going to impact the stability of the country. The article claimed that the country was already experiencing ethnic violence, “racked by fighting between the rival Hutu and Tutsi peoples” and that the Hutu President’s death was sure to inflame the tensions between the two groups (AP 1994e). The following day, the Globe and Mail went on to report how Kigali was being ruled by “violence and chaos” and how “members of the security forces and gangs of youths…rampaged through the capital, Kigali, settling tribal scores” (AP, CP, Reuter and Staff 1994: A1). On April 11, 1994, the situation was described as “savage chaos” (AP, Reuter, CP 1994: A1) and on April 12 and 15, 1994, Rwanda was described as being subjected to “madness and chaos”
(McCullum 1994a: A1) and was “falling further into gruesome anarchy” (AP, Reuter and CP 1994: A13). In addition, the article from April 15, 1994 described the “fighting and the mayhem in Kigali” as “deeply rooted in the decades-old feud between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups” (AP, Reuter and CP 1994: A13). This theme of social instability perpetrated by the ethnicities of the fighting groups was further presented on April 18, 1994 when one witness was reported as describing the “mayhem” as quickly taking over and “civilians turn[ing] on each other in ethnic revenge” (Associated Press and CP 1994: A1). Moreover, the fighting was described as savage and “no one appeared to be in control of Kigali” (Associated Press and CP 1994: A1).

Two of the more prevalent terms to describe the status of law and order in Rwanda were chaos\(^{17}\) and anarchy\(^{18}\). It is interesting that these two terms were used to describe the situation in Rwanda, because, by definition, both terms describe a state of disorder. At first glance this would seem correct as both the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* described the situation in Rwanda as lacking order and as previously mentioned, no one was in charge; however, in hindsight, the situation in Rwanda was anything but disordered. In order for the genocide to proceed at the level it did in Rwanda, it had to be highly organized. According to Des Forges (1999) “the rapidity of the first killings...resulted more from ruthlessness and organization than from great numbers”. This is supported by the fact that prior to April 6, 1994, weapons were distributed and troops were trained and at the outbreak of the genocide, roadblocks went up instantly and the systematic killings began with efficiency.

\(^{17}\) “A state of extreme confusion and disorder” (WordNet)

\(^{18}\) “A state of lawlessness and disorder (usually resulting from a failure of government)” (WordNet)
Furthermore, chaos is also defined as a state of confusion\(^{19}\), which could not be further from the truth. In the case of Rwanda, if anyone was confused, it was the newspapers covering the events taking place. By using the term “chaos”, the two newspapers implied that the violence in Rwanda was random and unpredictable; however, as research has shown, this was not the case. On the contrary, in the months leading up to the genocide, there was evidence of the impending violence, and as aforementioned, the US had information predicting the death of up to 500,000 people, while the UK had information about the dangers in Rwanda (Melvern 2004). Moreover, the UN headquarters in New York had received a fax indicating that the Interahamwe were being trained to kill 1,000 people in 20 minutes (Melvern 2000). Even the acts of genocide that were carried out were predictable as the intended victims were known and the motives were broadcast over the national radio station.

Moreover, the coverage in the *Globe and Mail* closely linked the social instability to ethnic and tribal tendencies, which resulted in the violence being viewed as natural and primitive. As was previously mentioned in the crime of genocide section, this perception resulted in the crime of genocide being viewed as expected behaviour of an indigenous state as opposed to a strategic plan carried out by individuals. As a consequence, the disorder is perceived as an event that needs to run its course instead of an event that is preventable and stoppable.

b) **Restoration of Law and Order?**

When it came to the concept of trying to restore law and order, the *New York Times* presented the idea as a lost cause. Outside countries were presented as not able to

\(^{19}\) “Disorder resulting from a failure to behave predictably” (WordNet).
do anything and an administration official was quoted as saying that “the president stressed to them the importance of doing everything possible to insure the safety of the Americans, and doing whatever we could – which frankly isn’t very much – to stabilize the situation in Rwanda” (Pear 1994: 6). Even France and Belgium were reported to have “no intention of trying to restore law and order” (Riding 1994: A12). In general, the West was presented as expressing a “firm pledge to stay away” from “the disintegration of Rwanda into chaos and anarchy” (Sciolino 1994a: A3).

When it came to the UN, the organization was also presented as not able to restore law and order. The *New York Times* reported that Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that a substantial increase to the size of the UN troops could restore order (Lewis 1994c) but instead, the Security Council voted to reduce the numbers to a symbolic size. As a result, the article reported that “the remaining forces from Ghana and Bangladesh were not considered up to the dangerous and sensitive mission of enforcing a return to law and order” (Lewis 1994c: A8). On April 30 and May 1, 1994, Boutros-Ghali was again reported as asking the Security Council to consider taking “forceful action to restore law and order and end the massacres” (Lewis 1994d: 1 and Lewis 1994e: 1).

The only time that the *New York Times* presented the restoration of law and order as achievable was in reference to the RPF. On April 27, 1994, the *New York Times* reported that the RPF “would not stop their drive to ‘liberate’ the country and punish those responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 people” (Lorch 1994g: A5). A week later, the RPF were described as fighting to end the “chaos and killings” (Lorch 1994i: A10) and were said to control half the country. The RPF were also described as
“the cavalry coming to the rescue” by their supporters (Fritz 1994a: A8) and were seen by some as doing a better job of controlling the population than the UN forces (Lorch 1994l). The RPF were also described as quite disciplined (Lorch 1994o, Lorch 1994p and Lorch 1994q) and as ordering their troops not to retaliate against Hutu soldiers and militias (Fritz 1994a). This was evident when the New York Times published how a 16 year old member of the RPF, whose parents were killed at the outbreak of the genocide, claimed “I have a feeling of revenge, but the code prevents it” (Fritz 1994a: A8). The RPF were also reported as saying that they would punish the former government officials that were responsible for the genocide (Kasfir 1994) and pledged “stability and security” for all Rwandans after ending the genocide (Bonner 1994e and Lyons 1994). On July 22, 1994 after the end of the genocide, in an editorial titled “There’s Hope for Rwanda” (Kasfir 1994), Nelson Kasfir wrote that the new government being formed by the RPF had a good chance of ending the violence and restoring order.

Despite the massacres and the intense emotions that will be their long-term inheritance, there is a surprisingly good chance that the new Government the Patriotic Front is forming will end the slaughter of civilians and restore order…The new Rwandan Government is likely to try to build a political order in which Hutus and Tutsis can live together peaceably…If the new leaders incorporate the lessons of democracy and inclusion they learned in Uganda, the arduous process of rebuilding Rwanda will begin (Kasfir 1994: A27).

With regards to the restoration of law and order and outside organizations, the Globe and Mail shared similar views to the New York Times. In an article titled “West Shuns Rwandan Horror”, the Globe and Mail described how Rwanda was disintegrating into “chaos and anarchy”, which “has evoked expressions from the international
community – and a firm pledge to stay away” (Sciolino 1994b: A17). The article goes on to report that

although it has not been exactly articulated this way, no member of the United Nations with an army strong enough to make a difference is willing to risk the lives of its troops for a failed Central African nation-state with a centuries-old history of outside intervention (Sciolino 1994b: A17).

Furthermore, on May 5, 1994, the Globe and Mail reported that “law and order have collapsed in most places. The UN, with its meagre force, cannot restore them”.

With regards to the RPF, early on the Globe and Mail presented the RPF as able to restore law and order. On April 11, 1994, the Globe and Mail reported that Major-General Paul Kagame, military chief of the RPF, stated that the RPF forces were trying to restore order in Kigali and track down the individuals responsible for the killings (AP, Reuter, CP 1994). On April 9, 1994,

Claude Dusaidi, a spokesman for the rebels in New York, said the rebels want to restore order to the capital and to replace military rule with democracy…we hope that, after we restore law and order, we will be able to work out a broad-based government (AP, Reuter, NYT and CP 1994: A1).

The Globe and Mail also reported that in Kigali, the RPF broadcasted that “they intended to move quickly to restore law and order once they wrested control from government officials” (AP, Reuter, NYT and CP 1994: A28). The newspaper also reported how the RPF commanders declared that “they wanted to save the city [Kigali] from a ‘clique of murderers’” (Reuters and CP 1994: A12) and how on April 26, 1994, the RPF rescued hundreds of civilians in Kigali (Reuter and Associated Press 1994b). It was also reported how the RPF were willing to “fight to the end” to stop the government and army from killing civilians (Associated Press 1994a) and how the RPF had captured individuals...
responsible for killing innocent civilians (Fritz 1994). The Associated Press interviewed the captured individuals and “all appeared healthy, there was no evidence of mistreatment” (Fritz 1994: A8). The RPF were presented as re-educating the individuals as opposed to punishing them because they claim they were “exhorted and coerced into killing their neighbours. The instigators…were the government, local officials and army soldiers, who the prisoners said supplied them with weapons ranging from clubs to grenades” (Fritz 1994: A8). The re-education program was described as teaching national unity and the official party line of “no reprisals, no revenge and no punishment” (Fritz 1994: A8). In addition, on May 19, 1994, in an article titled “Why Rwanda may come back to life”, Mark Fritz described how law and order was emerging in a refugee camp. In the camp, Anthanasuis Karisa, a Tutsi political officer for the RPF, was described as laying down the law to the Hutus in the camp. The law was described as settling grievances peacefully, forgetting who was Hutu and who was Tutsi and the two groups working together to survive. The reporter also claimed that “the only chance of peace lies with the Rwandan people” (Fritz 1994c: A18). Near the end of the genocide, the RPF were also described as the saviours of Rwanda (Associated Press and Reuter 1994d).

When the two newspapers discussed how the international communities would not aid in the restoration of law and order, it made it appear as if their simple involvement would solve all of Rwanda’s problems. By simply stating that the international communities would not take part in restoring law and order, law and order could be perceived as something relatively easy to fix for the western world. However, law and order is something that takes time and resources to develop and requires a judiciary
system in place to enforce it. During the genocide, the first group of people to be killed were the political and intellectual leaders, which included judges and lawyers, and soldiers and members of the police were responsible for committing the genocide. Therefore, Rwanda was left with very few resources to restore law and order in a relatively quick manner.

The one organization that was portrayed as able to restore law and order was the RPF. However, as was previously mentioned, restoring law and order takes time and resources.

When the RPF took power in July 1994, restoring law and order to Rwanda represented a huge challenge to the government. The legal system in the country was almost completely destroyed by the civil war and the genocide…Since the genocide, the government has made significant progress toward establishing law and order within Rwanda (Cunningham 2008: 656-657).

As such, while it is positive that the newspapers viewed the RPF as able to restore law and order to the country, it took more than their victory to accomplish this. Furthermore, this notion of the RPF restoring law and order ignores the illegalities committed by the RPF.

The extent to which “crime” served as a framework for making sense of the Rwandan situation was relatively low. Instead, the newspapers tended to rely on stereotypical representations of Africa and described the situation as chaotic and primitive. This distanced the reader from any moral responsibility and promoted the genocide as natural violence that simply needed to run its course. As a result of this distortion, the “crime of all crimes”, genocide, was overlooked and misunderstood by
many of the readers and a crime that was supposed to “never again” take place was allowed to run its horrific course.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

According to Johan Pottier (2002), a social anthropologist, journalistic accounts have become more popular than academic accounts because of “their presumed immediate practical value”. However, he claims that these journalistic accounts need to be scrutinized because they tend to be the result of “scant background information, tight deadlines, the demand for simplified commentary and sometimes manipulation” (p. 1). Based on my analysis above, the representation of the Rwandan genocide by the *New York Times* and the *Globe and Mail* is a prime example of a journalistic account where the data was simplified and manipulated. By using a cultural criminological approach, my thesis was able to accomplish two things. First, it identified the reasons why Rwanda was often ignored and misrepresented by the media. The results of my content analysis are evidence of this poor coverage of the genocide, and the cultural criminological approach guided my research as the media establishes what stories are newsworthy to print.

Second, it demonstrated the ways in which crime discourses were or were not used to represent the Rwandan genocide. The results of my discourse analysis are evidence of this, as they identified how there was a tendency among journalists to describe Rwanda through discourses that are outside of the criminal justice system. As a result, the reader is given the impression that Rwanda did not belong to the ordered and civilized world of law and order. For the most part, the situation in Rwanda was presented as due to chaos and disorder, which emerged because Rwanda was a “primitive society”. This concept of Rwanda as a “primitive” society was prevalent in all aspects of
my analysis and allowed Rwandan society to be presented in contrast to the readers’ own “civilised” and “modern” society. As a result of this dichotomy, the society of the reader is greatly separated from the society presented in Rwanda.

According to Wayne Morrison’s (1995) cultural criminology of genocide, we have “naively labelled the social formations of Europe and North America during the last few centuries ‘modern society’, and relied upon a basic distinction between the social formations and so called primitive or traditional societies” (p. 25). As a result of this naivety, we have made it possible for the Western world to be separated from societies that differ and for these societies to be viewed as less developed than our own. This separation is what allowed the Rwandan genocide to be viewed as taking place in a world completely different from our own, in which the rule of law and crime control do not exist. As a result, the Rwandan genocide is perceived as the consequence of a primitive and chaotic society whose actions are driven by customs and traditions, compared to modern society whose actions are driven by reason and rationality. “Modern society exhibits rationalisation: modern life is a rationalised existence emphasising planning and control” (Morrison 1995: 27).

Inclusive in the understanding of the modern society is the idea of civilization. “The modern person is advanced, in control, skilful, in short civilized; in modernity the civilised man replaces the natural man; he who was located in tradition and custom, whose life chances were dependent upon his locality and environment” (Morrison 1995: 28). Ultimately, this idea of civilization is what separates us from the “savage other” (Morrison 2006) and allows us to represent our space as ordered and safe.

Within the civilised space granted by the power of the sovereign the necessary reference points for social intercourse – expectations,
contracts and truth in speech – are secured in a space of inclusion. Outside may lie a world of darkness. Beyond the reach of the sovereign’s guarantees, lies the land of the ‘other’. But we do not see it. It is however, an invisible presence. Contained in fear, in dreams, in stories told by travellers, the realm of the other is there but unacknowledged. It is the source of danger, of possible intruders, of differences that can upset the balances of the civilised. It is to be mastered and kept at a safe distance” (p. 19).

Both the New York Times and the Globe and Mail utilised this concept of a civilised space and the dark world beyond in their presentation of the Rwandan genocide. By ignoring the organization and systematic execution of the genocide, the two newspapers presented Rwanda as a dangerous country that exists well beyond our borders and whose presence is only made available to the reader through the stories of the journalists. As a result, the reader is made to feel safe in their own country and to appreciate the elements of crime control and law and order that are at work, while at the same time viewing Rwanda as the complete opposite. By failing to use criminological language to describe the genocide in Rwanda, the newspapers offer the reader the impression that the violence is chaotic and could only happen in a foreign primitive land or at best, in our worst dreams. It distances the reader from the situation and enforces the reader’s faith in their country’s criminal justice system. Thus, by not framing the genocide in a criminological fashion, the two newspapers ultimately missed the story and contributed to the misunderstanding of the situation.

One of the main limitations of this research was the large number of articles to analyse. By analysing every article printed between April 6, 1994 and July 23, 1994, it was difficult to conduct a thorough discourse analysis, as according to Reason and Garcia (2007), discourse analysis is useful in analysing smaller samples; “an average of 30 items
in discourse analysis” (p. 308). By using such a large number of articles in my discourse analysis, the findings may be subjected to the interpretation of the researcher as the value of one discourse may be interpreted to outweigh another. As a result, while all articles on the Rwandan situation or subjects related to the Rwandan situation were analysed, future research would benefit from looking at either one or the other as this would limit the sample size and provide for a more thorough analysis. Another possible limitation is that by relying on the electronic journals of each newspaper, articles may have been missed. This problem was experienced with my search of the Globe and Mail, which resulted in my use of an electronic CD Rom for the Globe and Mail to try and correct the problem; however, no such alternative was available for the New York Times. Moreover, by relying solely on electronic search tools, more than daily newspaper articles may have been retrieved. For example, the New York Times also publishes “New York Times Magazine” and a “Week in Review Section” in its Sunday edition, which could skew my findings. By including articles that were subjected to more extensive deadlines, i.e. every Sunday, the immediate interpretation of the situation by the journalist is replaced with a more thought out and possibly more informed article.

Even with the creation of the Genocide Convention, genocide has been allowed to occur. While the media is generally one of the first institutions to report on the violence, by not identifying the situation as criminal, the media is doing a great disservice to its readers. It is evident that the media often misinterprets and simplifies the situation; however, further investigation of the reasons behind these discourses may lead to a change in the way genocide is presented in the future and may result in the reader exerting more moral responsibility.
APPENDIX A

CODEBOOK

v. 1 Article number related to its search result in the newspaper's database (article#)

v. 2 Title (title)

v. 3 Article date (date)

v. 4 Newspaper name (newsnam)
   1. The Globe and Mail
   2. The New York Times

v. 5 Story prominence (prominen)
   1. Front page
   2. Section page one
   3. Inside page

v. 6 Article type (type)
   1. Article
   2. Letter to the editor
   3. Summary directing to the article
   4. Advertisement requesting aid
   5. Other (obituary, time line, correction, TV listings, weekly review)
* If v. 6 = 3 or 4, stop analysis

v. 7 Focus of the article (focus)
   1. Rwandan situation
   2. Historical/informative
   3. Subject related to the Rwandan situation
   4. Rwanda mentioned in passing
   5. Both 1 and 2
* If v. 7 = 4, stop analysis

v. 8 Focus of the Rwandan situation if v. 7 = 1 or 5 (situatio)
   1. Violent
   2. Refugee
   3. Both 1 and 2

v. 9 Is the Rwandan situation portrayed using identifiable crimes? (identcri)
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not applicable if v. 7 = 2
v. 10 Is the Rwandan situation portrayed using abstract criminological references? (abstcrim)
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not applicable if v. 7 = 2

v. 11 Does the article use the term genocide? (genocide)
   1. Yes
   2. No

v. 12 Does the use of the term genocide refer to the situation in Rwanda if v. 11 = 1? (rwangeno)
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not clear

v. 13 Is the Rwandan situation portrayed as war? (war)
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not clear
   4. Not applicable if v. 7 = 2

v. 14 If v. 13 = 1, type of war portrayed (typewar)
   1. Ethnic/Tribal
   2. Civil
   3. Political
   4. Other (guerrilla, shooting)
   5. A combination of 1, 2, 3 and/or 4
   6. Not clear

v. 15 Are victims mentioned? (victim)
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not applicable if v. 7 = 2

v. 16 Is the portrayal of the victims descriptive and identifiable if v. 15 = 1? (descvict)
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not clear

v. 17 Number of victims identified as being killed during the genocide (victim#)
Definitions:

Document number related to its search result in the newspaper's database: Refers to the search result number assigned to a document when searching the two newspapers’ databases using the search term “Rwanda” with the starting date of “April 6, 1994”.

Title: Refers to the document’s headline.

Document date: The date the document was published in a specific newspaper. The date is entered as month, day, and year.

Newspaper name: Refers to the name of the newspaper the document was published in. Either the New York Times or the Globe and Mail.

Story prominence: Refers to the location of the document in a specific newspaper. With respect to documents that are printed on two separate pages, refers to the page the document begins on.
1. Front page: Refers to the front page of the entire newspaper. For example A1 or page 1.
2. Section page one: Refers to the front page of any section of the newspaper excluding the front page. For example B1, C1, D1, World news p.1, Entertainment p.1, etc.
3. Inside page: Any page that is not a front page or section page one. For example B2, C4, D5, World news p. 3, Entertainment p.7, etc.

Document type: Refers to the structure of the document.
1. Article: Refers to nonfictional literary composition that forms part of a publication. Editorials are included in this category.
2. Letter to the editor: Refers to a composition written by a reader and sent into the newspaper for publication.
3. Summary directing to the article: Refers to a brief synopsis of an article directing the reader to the full article on a specific page in the newspaper.
4. Advertisement requesting aid: Refers to a public notice requesting financial aid be donated to help the people and country of Rwanda.
5. Other: Refers to obituaries, television listings, photos without accompanying articles and quotations.

Focus of the article: Refers to the main subject matter discussed throughout the entire article.
1. Rwandan situation: Refers to the violent or refugee events that took place in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994.
2. Historical/informative: Refers to any events that took place in Rwanda prior to April 6, 1994 or provides informational facts about the country of Rwanda and its people.
3. Subject related to the Rwandan situation: Refers to the fact that the main focus of the article is on a subject that is related to the situation in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994, but does not go into great detail about the violent or refugee events occurring in Rwanda. For example, the article could focus on a country’s response to the Rwandan situation but the situation in Rwanda is not described in detail but simply referred to.

4. Rwanda mentioned in passing: Refers to the fact that the main focus of the article is on a subject other than the events occurring in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994 and the term “Rwanda” is used in another context. For example, the focus of the article is on flowers and the article simply refers to fact that one of the florists is from Rwanda or the article is about Rwandans participating in a sporting event.

Focus of the Rwandan situation: Refers to the subject matter of the article with regards to the events that took place in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994.

1. Violent: The events refer to forceful human destruction of property and the physical, mental and verbal harming of others.

2. Refugee: The events refer to internally displaced persons or persons who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality.

3. Both 1 and 2: Refers to the events being a combination of violent and refugee.

Identifiable crimes: Refers to acts that are criminal under law in the country of the paper’s origin. Examples include but are not limited to homicide, theft, abduction, rape and abuse. Genocide is not included in this list as it will be examined separately.

Abstract images: Refers to descriptive terms given to the situation that are not identifiable crimes and leave the interpretation of the situation up to the reader. Examples include but are not limited to massacre, butchery, carnage, blood imagery and slaughter.

Use of the term genocide: Refers to whether the article used the term genocide in its headline or within the body of the article. Does not include captions under photos.

Does the use of the term genocide refer to the situation in Rwanda: Refers to whether the term “genocide” was used to describe the events that occurred in Rwanda starting on April 6, 1994.

Situation portrayed as war: Refers to whether the Rwandan situation was portrayed as large-scale conflict between two or more groups of people, usually under the auspices of the government.
Type of war portrayed: Refers to the reason given that the groups of people are in conflict.
1. Tribal/ethnic war: Refers to the conflicted groups as being non-western and indigenous people who are predisposed to engaging in violent behaviour.
2. Civil war: Refers to the conflicted groups as people belonging to the same country using force to resolve internal conflicts.
3. Political: Refers to the conflicted groups as being members of governing professions.
4. Other: Refers to any reason given that is not mentioned above.
5. A combination of 1, 2, 3 and/or 4: Refers to the fact that more than one type of war was identified in the article.

Victim: Refers to an individual directly or indirectly affected by the events starting on April 6, 1994.

Portrayal of the victims is descriptive and identifiable: Refers to whether the victims of the events starting on April 6, 1994 were portrayed in a manner that the reader could put a face to them or could identify them. Examples include but are not limited to children, women, men, old, young, named victims, etc. Does not include terms such as Rwandans, Tutsi or Hutu or numbers.

Number of victims identified as being killed during the genocide: Refers to how many deaths are attributed to the violence that started on April 6, 1994. When an exact number is not given, i.e. tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, etcetera, double the number given. For example, tens of thousands becomes 20,000 and hundreds of thousands becomes 200,000.
APPENDIX B

LIST OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

New York Times


**Globe and Mail**


REFERENCES


Robinson, Peter and Golriz Ghahraman. 2008. “Can Rwandan President Kagame be held Responsible at the ICTR for the Killing of President Habyarimana?” Journal of International Criminal Justice. 6(5): 981-994.


Gazette. 59(2): 121-134.


(http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn)