A Brave New Citizenry: Exploring Canadian Welfare State Retrenchment through Changing Citizenship

By

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Abstract

In the early 1970s, the Canadian welfare state began a radical transformation in which Canadians were left with a weaker social safety net in the areas of income supports, social services, and social legislation, a transformation that Canadians are coping with today. This thesis is an investigation of the extent to which Canadians found this transformation in their welfare state desirable. Using the Canadian Election Study from 1965 to 2011, I demonstrate that Canadians underwent an ideological shift within this time frame in which “being Canadian” has acquired connotations of self-reliance through work and the market, a phenomenon I refer to as the individuation of the Canadian citizenry. I conclude that while Canadians may have undergone significant individuation from the 1970s to the present, Canadians are still considerably collective with respect to more inclusive social policy areas such as healthcare and education.
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In writing a thesis or dissertation, one begins to truly appreciate the African proverb that it takes a whole village to raise a child. While nowhere near the effort of raising a child, this thesis is the product of not just my own efforts, but the special efforts of several different persons. To my advisor, Dr. Gregg Olsen, and my supervisory committee, Dr. Tracey Peter and Dr. Jim Mulvale, a simple “thank you” seems inadequate. You have been both remarkably helpful and efficient as this thesis came to completion, and I could not have asked for a group of scholars that care more about both their students and social justice. In the Department of Sociology, Margaret Currie, Dianne Bulback, and Donna Alexiuk tirelessly help paperwork-drenched students like myself navigate through reams of bureaucracy, and for that they receive my utmost appreciation. They should write a thesis on how to keep a department running smoothly. And to my fellow graduate students, Ryan Catte, Jill Patterson, and James Gacek—you make wonderful idea-bouncers. Thank you for your excellent feedback, and more importantly, your excellent friendship.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Scholars of the welfare state and social development such as Gary Teeple (2000) have noted that the “neoliberalization” of welfare states in the West has intensified since the 1960s and 70s. While this is true for most Western countries such as the United States, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, Canada has particularly undergone drastic change, losing much of the “social” in its formerly “social liberal” character (Olsen 2002). In other words, Canada is among the most glaring examples of the global shift toward a more purely liberal-residual welfare state, abandoning solidaristic-universalistic elements, including citizenship entitlements and universal programs (Myles 1996). After the implementation of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966, the Canadian welfare state was scaled back incrementally in the policy domains of (un)employment insurance, elder and child support, social assistance, and others. In addition, at the provincial level, more and more services are becoming privatized or contracted out by government. The increasingly means-tested and meagre support has had harmful social results, even including the death of one Ontario woman (Chunn and Gavigan 2004).

This retrenchment in the Canadian welfare state has occurred concomitantly with changes in how Canadians think about their membership in Canadian society and, consequently, their rights and entitlements. Canadians “learned”, for example, to simply be happy to even have a job, and that systemic problems including unemployment are to be solved individually (Snider 2000; Jenson and Phillips 2001). Even after the 2007-8 financial crisis and the rise of the Occupy movement to address global economic inequality as a causal mechanism, a part of the North American public reaction (including that of Canada) was to scoff and resort to individualist explanations why the movement took shape (Lang and Lang 2012). Those participating were too lazy to find a real job, for example, or were inexperienced students who know nothing about how
the “real world” works. This individualist mindset to unemployment is a marked change from the late 19th and early 20th century, when high rates of unemployment and precarious work intensified Canadians’ entitlements to various de-commodifying measures (Guest 1997). In other words, the Canadian sociological imagination around inequality and precarious employment/unemployment seems to have been damaged by the time of the Occupy movement. Meanwhile, income inequality continues to rise in Canada (Yalnizyan 2013).

There are presently two primary “society-centred” explanations in welfare state theory to connect the attitudes of a people and their welfare state’s development, both of which have shifted with neoliberalization and globalization (Olsen 2002). The “culturalist” camp, which argues that welfare states are a function of a nation-state’s political culture, typically justifies the status quo with an apolitical view on how welfare states develop. In addition, it does not adequately take into account how welfare states change. David Brady (2009), who synthesizes multiple theories to explain changes in the welfare state, has commented on how culture and ideology can and do change depending on socio-economic environments, but argues that power is a key variable that must be included. The other major camp, power resources theory (PRT), takes as its starting point organization and strength of labour, primarily through unions and a (presumably connected) social democratic political party. These “resources” help give labour “teeth” against the power of capital (Korpi 1998).

These two accounts of welfare state development, however, remain largely mute toward each other. I propose a lens of citizenship to examine the retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state over the past forty years, and how Canadians felt and feel about this shift. Citizenship (or citizenship regimes) refers to the ways in which citizens think about their state and how the state should act, what entitlements and obligations each individual citizen should possess, and how
citizens should interact politically (cf. Tonkens 2012; Jenson and Phillips 2001; Twine 1994). Scholars of citizenship have also commented on how culture, power, and state structures all interact within the concept of citizenship, and have argued that citizenship can change based on shift in the political environment (cf. Brodie 2008; Foote 2005; Mercer 2002).

This thesis has citizenship as its main focus, which can link power relations with political culture. Through an analysis of Canadian political attitudes towards the Canadian welfare state, policy environment, and other citizens, I argue that Canadians have moved from a more solidaristic-leaning social underpinning to a more individual-oriented, self-centered understanding of Canadian citizenship comparable to Newman’s (2013) commentary on Western European citizenship. I use the term individuation of the Canadian citizenry to capture this process. Citizenship (particularly social citizenship) in this way reciprocally interacts with the welfare state; both have changed significantly to support the de-regulated “free” market, as precarious employment increases and the social safety net retracts. Using data from the Canadian Elections Study over the past fifty years, I apply the concept of individuation of the Canadian citizenry to answer a key question, posed by Kalenthaler and Ceccoli (2008) in Western European research: to what extent do Canadians think of themselves first, and others second, with respect to welfare state provision? This will allow us to begin commenting on the state and nature of individuation in Canada.

This thesis has three main goals, which are uncovered in the pages that follow. First, the thesis aims to establish the concept of individuation of the citizenry, drawing on historical and contemporary literature around welfare states and citizenship, political culture, and power resources theory. Second, the thesis aims to empirically support the idea that power resources and political culture are interlocked influences on how Canadians feel about their welfare states,
rather than two ships passing in the night, which is how they are implicitly characterized in current welfare state literature. Thirdly, the thesis aims to use the results of the study and begin discussing a program of research around individuation that would utilize a comparative approach, resulting in a primitive typology between nations. Although Canada is used as one case in this study due to constraints of time and resources, I provide a cursory overview of how individuation may have affected the countries of the United States and Sweden.

These goals are accomplished specifically in the following six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of Canadian welfare state retrenchment around the welfare state “pillars” of income supports, social services, and social legislation or “legal welfare”, which together form *the welfare state* (Olsen 2002, 2011). Chapter 3 is a comprehensive theoretical examination of political culture, power resources, and scholarly discussions around citizenship and citizen-identities, and how each of them connect to the welfare state. In Chapter 3, I also focus on the Canadian context to propose and develop the idea of *individuation* of the citizenry, and I conclude with some theoretical caveats and considerations. Chapters 4 and 5 are an empirical examination of how political culture and power resources are in fact interlocked influences on how Canadians feel about their welfare state, and what sorts of social programming in Canada receives support from public opinion. Chapter 6 provides a commentary on the extent and nature of Canadian individuation, and the results of the study contributes to literature on Canadian citizenship. While Canadians are amenable toward collective programming such as healthcare and education, in which investment benefits “all” Canadians, they are far more critical of spending in “targeted” areas, including social assistance and spending on immigrants and minorities. I conclude that Canadians have experienced *some* individuation, although they are not severely or fully individuated (which is a more accurate
characterization of the United States). In the seventh chapter, I conclude with some final observations about individuation in Canada, and suggest further avenues for research in this area.
Chapter 2: The Decline of the Canadian Welfare State

CANADA: A ‘SOCIAL LIBERAL’ WELFARE STATE

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) well-known “welfare worlds” typology sets out three ideal types of welfare states. The “liberal” welfare state consists of meagre support, typically accompanied by extensive means tests to ensure that one is “deserving” to receive state support or welfare. Anglophone countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia are, all to some extent, rooted in this tradition; self-reliance based on labour is prioritized over the guarantee of social provisions (Olsen 2002). Social-democratic welfare states, in contrast, are characterized by universal/citizenship entitlements, relatively generous income supports, and are much more de-commodifying; citizens of such welfare states are not expected to rely on their own labour to the same extent as their liberal counterparts. The Nordic countries of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland are more closely approximate this ideal type, where individuals pay higher taxes but receive more social supports. Last, there is a “conservative” welfare regime rooted in classical conservatism in which hierarchy is seen as natural and should be preserved (Olsen 2011); social entitlements are based on economic contributions made by an individual, which serves to preserve fissures in social class. Several Western European and Mediterranean countries, including France and Germany, best approximate this particular type of welfare regime.

While Canada can be pigeonholed as a “liberal” welfare state alongside its fellow Anglo-Saxon1 countries such as the U.S. and United Kingdom in this typology, it has been understood by scholars that Canada does share certain social-democratic traits. For example, Canadian

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1 While Canada is often discussed as a country of Anglo-Saxon descent by welfare state scholars, it is important to note Canada’s unique history of (a collectivist) French and Quebecois influence on Canadian political culture during and after confederation (Dickinson and Young 2003).
citizens are entitled to universal health insurance, socializing the responsibility for injuries, serious illness and disease, and other “medically necessary” treatment. Post-secondary education is also more accessible in Canada than in the United States, placing it closer to the Swedish model on that dimension (Peter et al. 2010). For these reasons, Canada has been discussed as a ‘social liberal’ welfare state (Olsen 1998), falling somewhere between the ideal “liberal” and ideal “social-democratic” welfare state. Because the Canadian welfare state still relies on means tests and other forms of filters to determine who is “deserving,” it is historically aligned more closely to the liberal welfare state. However, it has been argued that Canada has lost much of the “social” in “social liberal”, with significant changes made to its welfare state beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 2000s (Olsen 2002). What follows is a brief history and discussion of the retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state, tracking cuts in the three welfare “pillars” of the welfare state: income supports, social services and social legislation (“legal welfare”) (Olsen 2013b: 338).

CANADIANS AND THEIR WELFARE STATE: A BRIEF HISTORY

The Canadian welfare state has roots in Elizabethan Poor Laws transplanted to British North America from Britain. Before Confederation in 1867, caring for the poor and sick was framed as a social responsibility through the Elizabethan lens; poorhouses and workhouses were designed for those who could not work and the able-bodied unemployed, respectively. However, with time, poorhouses began taking on the role of caring for all dependents—orphans, vagrants, and infants, and quickly became “one of the most depressing institutions ever devised by humans” (Guest 1997: 13). With the splitting of British North America into Upper and Lower Canada, the Elizabethan lens was rejected. Caring for the poor was no longer a social responsibility in Upper
Canada; rather, individuals were increasingly seen as responsible for their own well-being (Splane 1965). In Lower Canada (Quebec), French Canadians looked to Catholic and religious benevolence to take care of the poor (Guest 1997). Prisons, churches, and families became the primary institutions to care for the “socially unfit”; this was a historical and sociological break from the (limited) public responsibility for the poor in British North America.

Into the later 19th century, a number of consecutive business recessions, which particularly affected arriving immigrants into Canada, ensured that “unemployment had ceased to be a novelty” (Wallace 1950: 387). Canadians understood more so that unemployment was not the fault of the individual, but of the social structure (Guest 1997: 71). With the onset of the First and Second World Wars, however, the translation of political will into the development of social policy was stunted until the 1940s, when talks of unemployment insurance, healthcare, income supports, and child/elderly benefits became more prevalent (Kurdle and Marmor 1981). After the Second World War, a series of policy changes implementing unemployment insurance (1940), child allowances (1945) and old age security (1951) culminated in the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966, which reduced levels of poverty and inequality to below that of the United States (Myles 1996). Until its “peak” in 1971, Canada was developing a “mature welfare state” that was as close as it came to a social-democratic welfare state since colonization (Hicks 2008).

Beginning in the early 1970s, the United States and Canada began to follow the United Kingdom through another historical cycle of heavy punitive measures against the poor. All three countries saw a return to understanding poverty as dealing with the “socially unfit”, much like how poverty was framed after Confederation and the English “welfare revolution” of 1832, where poverty became an individual responsibility. There grew an acceptance of “the perversity thesis” in public discourse, especially in the United Kingdom and the U.S., which states that the
poor must be motivated to work in order to “earn their keep” rather than rely on state support (Harvey and Reed 1996; Somers and Block 2005). As the developed welfare state gave way to a neo-liberal and work-oriented welfare state, there was also a shift in how state dependency was perceived, largely replicating the past shift to the punitive “New Elizabethan Poor Law” of 1832 from the “Old Elizabethan Poor Law” of 1601 (see Furniss and Tilton, 1977).

The public understanding of dependency is important, because it can legitimate and/or set limits on welfare policy direction (Fineman 2006). The idea of dependency on the state, in a neo-liberal era, is always understood as socially harmful; those who are unwilling to work are harming themselves as well as the ideal of the responsible, tax-paying citizen. Therefore, the tax-paying citizen has a justifiable right to try to economically sever himself or herself from the weight of those who cannot, or will not, autonomously contribute to society through labour (ibid).

Dependency did not always imply a lack of willingness for the poor to become autonomous. As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon (1994) point out, “dependency” in pre-industrial feudal society was natural and inevitable, since superiors were endowed with divine right. A serf’s reliance on a lord was an indirect reliance on God, and the public schema of being “dependent” was that of a regular or normal state. The poor law of 1601 focused on how the poor were too independent, and that they needed to enter relations of dependency (i.e., belonging to a lord or someone of a higher social status) to remedy their situation. With the advent of commodification, and ownership of labour shifting from the socially superior to the workers who had to sell their labour for wages, the notion of dependency shifted from natural relationships between serf and lord to individual responsibility. This shift was fully realized in the unfolding of the Industrial Revolution. The “New Poor Law” of 1832 reflected this ideological assumption
of autonomy, as did welfare retrenchment that began in the 1970s. The welfare expansion occurring from the late 19th century to 1971 in Canada should be seen as more of a temporary buffer to punitive frameworks of dealing with poverty, rather than the norm.

CANADIAN SOCIAL POLICY IN A NEO-LIBERAL ERA

Canadian welfare state retrenchment was considerably more incremental and much slower than in the United States or the UK. After 1971, the Canadian welfare state, and the attitudes of Canadians toward expanding social policy, began a gradual about-face. As Grady, Howse, and Maxwell (1995: 19) note, Canadians were fed up with falling wages, economic stagnation and inflation (“stagflation”), and “the broad social consensus of the postwar period began to break down.” The new role of Canadian governments and political leaders for Canadians was to “shrink governments, reduce taxes, and get out of the way of private investors and citizens” (ibid). There became an increased reliance on fiscal welfare (e.g. tax breaks), which, as Hugh Heclo (1981: 396) argues, hinders solidarity among the public. In short, Canadians became increasingly comfortable with an increased level of commodication, abandoning many citizenship entitlements by the 1990s and moving toward an American-style liberal welfare state (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990; Myles 1996). As explained in Chapter 3, this change in perspective was not spontaneous—it was influenced by business-friendly “solutions” to stagflation pushed by right-wing think tanks, the media, and others.

The Canadian welfare state was subjected to broad cuts in the period following its maturity. As Olsen (2013) notes, income supports, social services and social legislation (“legal welfare”, such as labour laws, child protection laws, and rent controls) each form a “pillar” of modern welfare states. Each of these pillars in Canada have eroded in some form since the
1970s. While a full investigation of each of these pillars is beyond the scope of this study, I have selected the most discussed aspects of the welfare state in Canadian literature for review. These include elderly and child benefits, (un)employment insurance, and social assistance (income supports); healthcare and post-secondary education (social services); and employment stability legislation, particularly those laws that foster unionization and long-term stable employment (social legislation or legal welfare).

**Income Supports**

*Elder and Child Support.* Beginning in the early 1950s, Canada began developing inclusive and non-contributory citizenship entitlements for the elderly and children. In 1951, the means test was eliminated for Old Age Security (OAS); all Canadians 65 and over, regardless of income, received an allowance. The Canada Pension Plan (CPP), as a form of social insurance which Canadians pay into during their working lives, was fully indexed each year. Families with children, too, received a family allowance regardless of income beginning in 1945. In the early to late 1980s, the Progressive Conservatives (PCs), under the banner of “social responsibility”, began imposing restrictions on both demogrants and attempted to only partially index the CPP, despite Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s claim that universal social programming was a “sacred trust” (Evans 2006). These were decisions were later reversed due to opposition from the elderly, but returned in the 1980s (Finkel 2006). In 1987, the 1951 income test for OAS was re-imposed, and surtaxes on both OAS and family allowances were also put in place (ibid). In 1993, the Mulroney government entirely eliminated the family allowance, instead advancing the “child tax benefit” (CTB), an income support based on income rather than entitlement. Although the CTB
was part of a parliamentary package to stop rising rates of Canadian child poverty, it did little to accomplish this task (Sanchez Garcia 2002).

The newly amalgamated Conservative Party of Canada, elected in 2006, has raised the eligible age to collect OAS from 65 to 67, and has incentivized elders to hold off collecting such benefits by increasing them 0.6% per month of deferral (Service Canada 2014b). In addition, the original 1993 CTB gave way to the Canadian Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), which continues to act as a source of income-dependent fiscal welfare to families with children. In 2006, the Conservatives also introduced a “Universal Child Care Benefit”. While the name superficially sounds like a return to universal entitlement, it is progressively taxed. Because it is counted as taxable income, the CCTB will provide less income support to all families (Battle, Torjman and Mendelson 2006). However, families in middle and upper classes benefit most from this policy scheme. Welfare schemes of this type, where households are given tax breaks to retain more of their own earnings (fiscal welfare), reduce social solidarity and lower support for more comprehensive programming which can alleviate some of the most drastic poverty in countries (Edlund 2007).

Despite the above developments in the CPP/QPP and OAS, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), another income-tested benefit available to those who receive OAS, is largely responsible for keeping rates of elder poverty in Canada below the OECD average (Brown 2011). First introduced in 1967, the GIS has since become a permanent component of old age security, providing elders at risk of poverty with another layer of income security through a monthly payment. The success of this program in Canada runs counter to much of the above narrative, and provides a useful counterexample of how social policy can prevent or alleviate poor economic conditions.
(un)Employment Insurance. Unemployment insurance (now “employment insurance”) has also changed drastically with the transition to a neo-liberal welfare state. In 1971, five years after the implementation of the Canada Assistance Plan, 96% of the unemployed were entitled to benefits; with the rollbacks of the 1970s and 1980s, that number was more than halved to 41% in the 1990s (Finkel 2006). UI was narrowed in 1975 by the Liberal government with a more extensive means test, and in 1990, it was entirely overhauled by the Mulroney government (Evans 2006). With the overhaul, those who voluntarily left employment were no longer eligible, wait times doubled to twelve weeks, and benefits were cut from 32 to 27 weeks. Moreover, the approach of the federal government was the development of human capital rather than that of job creation; emphasis on education and job training ignored the shifting employment structure of the Canadian economy to low-wage and short-term work (cf. Sack et al. 2011; Banting 2005). While emphasis continues to be on finding employment, present-day Employment Insurance has changed since the radical cutbacks of the Progressive Conservatives. Individuals can receive benefits for 14–45 weeks depending on the level of unemployment in their province after a two-week waiting period (Service Canada 2014a).

Social Assistance and “Workfare”. Social assistance and employment services swelled alongside other income supports during the 1960s and early 1970s (Morgan 1980). During the expansion of the Canadian welfare state in the 1960s, income distribution was more “transfer-intensive” than its American counterpart, meaning that programming prioritized financial autonomy over job placement. The poor more than ever were de-commodified, and social inequality and poverty rates fell below that of the U.S. (Myles 1996). Into the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government, as well as all provinces and territories, became more concerned with finding individuals employment. As the federal government replaced cost-sharing schemes with
“block funding” based on tax points (meaning the federal government would give less cash, and provinces would have to make up the difference individually through taxes at their level), all provinces sought ways to balance the budgets (Finkel 2006).

The result of these changes, *inter alia*, was that by the late 1990s, all provinces and territories had some “welfare-to-work” programming, all of which stressed self-reliance and independence (Gorlick and Brethour 1999). As Jamie Peck (2001) notes, welfare-to-work policies typically see modest success at best due to their stigmatizing nature and focus on short-term employment rather than long-term skill development, reproducing economic uncertainty (also see Schustereder 2010). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the National Council of Welfare critiqued such policies that led to negative results, including the necessity of local food banks in Canada (Finkel 2006); in 2012, the Conservative Party of Canada cut all funding to NCW, effectively ending it. Inequality in Canada continues to deepen as a result of this move away from transfer-intensive programming and a focus on employment (Yalnizyan 2013), further undoing the work done in the 1960s.

**Social Services**

*Healthcare.* Although healthcare in Canada continues to be a national symbol of identity, and Canadians fiercely defend universal health insurance in opposition to “Americanization”, it has and continues to face challenges under the guise of austerity (Armstrong and Armstrong 2010). In 1971, Canadians witnessed the implementation of a national healthcare plan that began in Saskatchewan under Tommy Douglas’s CCF provincial government. Beginning in the later 1970s, healthcare came under attack by business interests just like other social institutions (Coburn 2001). However, business interests were considerably more torn on the issue of
healthcare than other social services, since healthcare helps to alleviate labour costs if workers become sick or injured. This reason, along with strong public support, created a protective barrier for Canadian healthcare against private interests (ibid). Healthcare was not immune to “stagflation”, however. As Pat and Hugh Armstrong (2008) note, the aforementioned switch to Federal “block funding” that so adversely affected social assistance also affected healthcare, which is a provincial responsibility under the Canadian constitution. The PCs and Liberals, from 1984 to 2004, slashed funding to healthcare and cited the federal deficit as motivation. In 2004, however, public outcry over these cuts became louder, and the Liberal government under Prime Minister Paul Martin increased contributions to provinces in response.

Rather than attack healthcare directly because of its social support, it has been suggested by scholars that business interests are clever at utilizing the public system in their own favour. One example is the recent popularity of “P3” hospitals—public-private partnerships in which governments and private organizations share financial and administrative responsibilities for hospitals. P3s in Canada are increasing in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia (Armstrong and Armstrong 2008). In such hospitals, a “private consortium” of property managers and service providers carry out services such as laundry, food, and building maintenance (Shrybman 2007). This prevents clinical staff, which report to a public board, and administrative/service staff, which report to private organizations, from sharing a common mission with respect to patient care. This means a lower quality environment for patients and staff alike (ibid).

P3s also foster environments that are more conducive for business interests than the public interest. For example, private clinics, which are often integrated into P3 hospitals, can charge user fees for services that are not deemed “medically necessary” such as eye exams (Armstrong and Armstrong 2008). Since the Canada Health Act is not specific with respect to
what is and is not “medically necessary,” private clinics will perform “non-necessary” services that can be done quickly at low costs to maximize profit. This is referred to as “cream-skimming”, and it is not unique to P3s; private clinics all around Canada take advantage of public health insurance in this way (ibid). Should there be more complicated issues with a particular patient, the clinic will refer the patient back to the public system, which takes on a disproportionate amount of complex and expensive procedures (Williams et al. 2001).

Importantly, P3 contracts can last upwards of 25 years, while regular service contracts may last only two or three years. Private services under P3s do not have an incentive to provide quality services to renew a contract, and are free to cut corners and costs—less cleaning, cheaper and less nutritious food, and so on (Shrybman 2007). While on its face Canadian healthcare continues to be funded generously and provided, it too is being subjected to a number of changes in alignment with market logic.

Post-Secondary Education (PSE). Recent literature on Canadian PSE suggests that Canadian universities are “drifting” in two, interconnected directions: vocationalism and corporatization. With respect to the “vocationalizing” of universities, as Côte and Allahar (2011) note, it is increasingly the case that students take courses expecting to learn immediately applicable skills capable of helping them find a job. In addition, universities are branding themselves after this demand, offering more “applied” courses that claim students will learn “hands-on” knowledge. This has been particularly the case in Canadian criminology classes, where more and more students expect to learn “skills” like how to process arrests, profile criminals, and technological skills on par with shows like CSI or Criminal Minds (Huey 2011).

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While scholars have argued that the entire Canadian education system is shifting to fit the needs of neo-liberal labour markets by focusing on skills, as well as advertising to students (see Emberley and Newell 1994), this section focuses on post-secondary education for two reasons. First, simply for the sake of brevity; a complete discussion of educational reform is beyond the scope of this brief overview. Second, PSE is seen by Canadians as a source of upward social mobility; as such, it is important to Canadians. This idea will be re-visited in Chapters 5 and 6.
When students find out that much of what they learn is not meant to be applied, but rather theoretical problems and investigation, they experience a “crisis” wherein they disconnect from critical thinking and their main goal becomes the acquisition of a credential rather than engagement in critical thinking (Côté and Allahar 2011). The gearing of students toward the idea of learning “applied skills” not only serves the function of providing markets with trained and disciplined workers, but bestows upon students a “social consciousness” that does not upset the current socio-economic order (Brownlee 2013: 204).

The drift toward corporatization is another troubling development in Canadian PSE. This refers to the trend of universities increasingly governing themselves as private companies as public funding decreases. This has been a trend since the 1960s, when the post-war goal of “universal access” to higher education was replaced by policies of regulated tuition prices, which still aimed to make higher education broadly accessible by lowering fees (Thomas-Long 2010). Along with healthcare, universities were significantly affected into the 1980s as grant programs were ended due to the transformation of federal transfers into block funding (ibid). As a result, universities have had to acquire revenue from other sources, mainly private organizations and individuals who move into campuses to advertise, and to create programs geared toward business interests such as accounting and finance (Brownlee 2013; Côté and Allahar 2011). As a result, programs which encourage critical thought and academic investigation must cope with less resources; this is especially true of Canadian PhD programs (Thomas-Long 2010).

The drift toward both vocationalism and corporatization are creating a “systemic crisis” in which training, rather than education, is becoming the focal point for universities (Côté and Allahar 2011: 103). The former refers to a “narrow range of skills and information associated
with a discrete or specific task, challenge, or problem” while the latter provides critical thinking associated with a “more cultured, open-minded and civic-minded citizenry” (ibid: 14). Of course, the latter is crucial to ensure a properly working democracy, capable of critically evaluating information given to them through outlets like the media. However, the increasing focus on training is not sparking resistance among the Canadian public, but rather, pressure on universities to become accountable for producing “useful” graduates (Huey 2011). Often, programs like philosophy or sociology are met with disbelief or quizzical reactions. People’s first question consists of, “what can you do with that?” On the other hand, programs such as chemistry or engineering, which more closely resemble training, are seen as “useful” and a path to sure employment. While these programs are certainly necessary and do foster critical and creative thinking, Côte and Allahar (2011) warn that an unwavering faith in “hard sciences” as the solution to social problems can produce more social ills.

*Social Legislation (Legal Welfare).*

Social legislation, or “legal welfare”, refers to “various forms of regulatory and protective, preventative, or proactive social legislation” (Olsen 2002: 27). While legal welfare encompasses a broad range of legislative protections, including health and safety legislation and child protection laws (among others), labour protections and security are most relevant to this discussion of Canadian welfare state decline. This is because such protections were a “central pillar” of the “mature” Canadian welfare state, and the effectiveness of such protections act as a barometer for how social legislation eases the commodification of Canadians (Vosko 2005: 11). Ineffective labour regulations translate more easily into higher inequality. As one might expect, Canadian workers are considerably less protected today than in the post-WWII era, and
increasingly rely on unstable sources of income; this is also true of nearly all Western European countries and the United States (Perulli 2011).

The post-WWII welfare state expanded labour protections and security along with income supports and social services. Canadian workers began to demand more stable and secure sources of income as WWII came to a close, motivated by economic prosperity from the war and frustration from the Great Depression (Lewchuk et al. 2011: 45). The “Standard Employment Relationship” (SER) became the norm for Canadian workers. This meant that a worker would sell their labour power consistently to one organization or firm for all, or the majority, of their working lives (Vosko 2005). Prior to WWII, this was not the case; there was considerable insecurity among several Canadian industries, and labour policy was geared toward finding workers to build infrastructure as a quasi-public relief system (ibid).

As Canadians began to demand more security in their work, companies also began enjoying the benefits of having permanent employees. As opposed to being primarily concerned with profits, many companies were mostly concerned with the efficiency of workers, and the implementation of an “efficiency wage” by many companies indicated a desire for less staff turnover and employee loyalty (Lewchuk et al. 2011). In 1944, the Order-in-Council PC 1003, passed by the Federal government, gave workers the right to vote for union representatives, established the right of workers to bargain collectively, and ensured companies bargained in good faith with their employees (Vosko 2005). It became a general expectation that holiday pay, sick pay, and other benefits would be extended by employers to workers.

Such legislation took for granted the SER in its implementation. Full-time employees in Canada remain entitled to holiday and sick pay, as well as collective bargaining. However, it is the nature of employment itself rather than protective legislative framework that has changed. As
Judy Fudge (2012) notes, globalization and neo-liberalism has changed the norms of the Canadian labour relationship. With new tools available to firms and organizations such as capital strike and capital flight, in which they relocate to low-taxed and low-regulated areas, employers have begun demanding more “flexible” labour from the Canadian population. This re-oriented the incentives of organizations such that “how to buy labour cheaply, how to extract the maximum effort from workers in the short run, and how to minimize tax burdens all took on a new urgency for employers who showed a renewed interest in less permanent employment relationships” (Lewchuk et al. 2011: 52). Rather than working for only one company and gathering the benefits attached to such work, Canadians increasingly must resort to part-time work, multiple jobs, self-employment, and work through temporary third-party agencies (Sack et al. 2011). These sorts of employment arrangements offer little job security, few or no benefits, and are a source of stress and uncertainty, despite the fact that many of these workers do similar work to that of full-time permanent employees (Lewchuk et al. 2011). In sum, employers have been incentivized to ensure the work they offer does not follow the SER model. Social legislation around the employment relationship has not been able to keep pace with this changing labour market.

Due to the changing nature of employment itself, social legislation that once guaranteed the benefits and security of full-time fails to provide either of these for more and more Canadians. Bernstein and colleagues (2005) discuss the inadequate legislative developments since 1975 that fail to guarantee employment for the majority of Canadians. Procedural standards, they note, have been prioritized over substantive standards. This means that mechanisms through which concerns are addressed, such as occupational health and safety committees, are the focus rather than workplace quality and actual health and safety standards.
(also see Snider 2000). As a result, many employees are subjected to increasingly hazardous conditions and materials. While employees can voice concerns to such committees in theory, they either do not know their own rights, or fear (illegal) disciplinary action by the employer for voicing discontent. Likewise, *legal gaps* can create problems for some workers, for whom protective legislation simply does not exist. For example, carriers of the Winnipeg Free Press were not considered employees eligible for EI and CPP, but had collective bargaining rights (Cranford et al. 2005).

Employers, in short, are increasingly taking advantage of such legal gaps and making work increasingly precarious. The welfare state, through its social-legislative arm, has helped employers by continuing to neglect new forms of work that do not reflect the SER. Not only does this lack of recognition of new forms of work injure employees by depriving them of a stable work environment and benefits, but it also reinforces unequal power relations by silencing the voices of workers in increasingly stressful and precarious positions. Canadians, as a result of this, have learned to simply be content with having a job (Snider 2000).

Changes in the pillars of income supports, social services, and social legislation (labour relations) did not come about as radically as they did in the United States, under Reagan, or in the UK, under Thatcher. Canadian governments took a much more incremental approach to retracting the welfare state (Evans 2006). Despite this difference, however, Olsen (2002: 181-182) has stated “it is perhaps in Canada that welfare retrenchment has been most far-reaching because the welfare state there is being radically reorganized.” There has been a significant shift towards fiscal welfare and reliance on market relations. This is not only detrimental to the socio-economic health of Canada as inequality continues to climb, but also to the social well-being of its citizens, which is positively correlated with de-commodifying measures (Radcliff 2013).
This dramatic shift raises several questions. To what extent did Canadians really support the “fiscalization” and erasure in these policy areas? Olsen (2002) describes two “society-centred” theories of the welfare state that take into account both the welfare state in a given nation-state, and support for it among citizenry. These include the “political culture” and “power resource” approaches. I argue that these two approaches should be synthesized into a theory of citizenship to better explain the shift in the Canadian welfare state, and the Canadian public attitude toward social provision.
CULTURE AND POWER: WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY

Theorists of political culture argue that welfare state development, and the level of welfare state generosity in a given country, are functions of the dominant values and ideology of a nation-state’s citizens (Olsen 2011). Jared Wesley (2011: 4) defines political culture as “a set of common political values and assumptions that underpin a given political system … [it is] a collection of often unspoken assumptions and axioms” on which political life is based. Political cultures are linked to social institutions because attitudes of the public toward social policy, entitlements, and other state functions feed into, and are reflected by, institutional arrangements (cf. Henderson 2007: 217; Sanscartier 2014). The prevailing theme among the central thinkers for this theoretical camp with respect to welfare state development is that “everybody has what they want.” Welfare states exist in various forms because different populations want those forms; Americans, for example, want little and have little; Swedes want more, and have more. While some thinkers do target ideology and culture as a platform for change (see Brady 2009), the culture tradition is very much entrenched in the notion that welfare states have developed as citizens want them.

The Canadian “social liberal” welfare state, in this view, is the product of a “Tory streak” leftover from the influx of loyalists after the American Revolution. Louis Hartz (1964) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1969; 1990) have commented extensively on this cultural infusion that carried into British North America, leading to the Elizabethan lens of the collective responsibility for poverty. Political cultures congealed around these “waves” of settlers into British North America, leading to the preservation of some traces of noblesse oblige from classical
conservative thought in Britain (Olsen 2002); that the wealthy, to some degree at least, are responsible to ensure the well-being of the poor. The U.S., having cut colonial ties in the late 18th century, never had the opportunity to transmute a political climate based on class relations between aristocracy and non-landowners.

While the idea of a “tory streak” is the traditional explanation for Canada’s more collectivist political culture, especially in contrast to the United States, it is important to recognize that Canadian values also draw on Indigenous culture. John Ralston Saul (2008) discards the loyalist explanation of Canadian political culture, favouring an explanation of how Indigenous values are embedded into contemporary Canadian society. The (now waning) socialized responsibility for the poor, as well as socialized health insurance, may also have been influenced by longstanding values of communitarianism and collective responsibility derived from Indigenous influence on colonial traders and settlers. Welfare state retrenchment is therefore an abandonment of Indigenous values in this light, which parallels racist discourses that have permeated Canadian public discourse around Indigenous peoples.

Also important are the effects of French Canada. The influx of newcomers from France with its own feudal background and the establishment of New France and its seigneurial system brought about a collectively-oriented view of poverty and other social ills, translating into more generous social policy over time (see Conrad 2012). Theorists of political culture have noted a number of other factors that influenced Canada’s contemporary political culture. The fact that Canada relies largely on natural resources for its economy (staples theory) contributed to many individualist and property-oriented sentiments³ in many provinces (Wiseman 2007). Additionally, certain large events that support or challenge political cultures and widely held

³ For example, since boats are central to the livelihood of fishers, and land is central to the livelihood of farmers, the protection of private property becomes a significant aspect of those lifestyles.
beliefs, such as the Winnipeg General Strike, the oil boom, or the Great Depression (‘formative events’ and ‘quakes’), have significant implications for how political cultures develop (ibid). For such reasons and more, Canadians have traditionally held more collective political beliefs than Americans, but not as collective as of those of the Scandinavian countries.

The result, since the implementation of Elizabethan Poor Laws into the 19th and 20th centuries, has been a “distinctly un-American strain of paternalist thought on the right” in Canada (Kurdle and Marmor 1981: 89). This has translated into more generous social programming over time, with Canada never quite reaching the “liberal welfare state” that the United States much more closely approximates. Simultaneously, however, Canada has never reached the “social-democratic welfare state” to the extent of countries such as Sweden. Despite the preservation of noblesse oblige from British to Canadian political culture, there has always been an emphasis on self-reliance from the origins of the Canadian welfare state (Guest 1997). This was also a gift from the loyalist influx. The practical effects are that indicators of collective activity like union membership have historically superseded those of the US, but have never reached Swedish levels (Olsen 2002).

While political cultures do measure some dimension of reality among a citizenry’s attitudes and corresponding welfare state generosity, this approach is plagued with problems. There are three issues in particular that are relevant to this discussion. First, cultural theories such as these do not adequately explain changes to welfare states over time. Second, citizens can disagree profoundly with the direction of social policy in their country. Third, and perhaps most importantly for this discussion, cultural theories neglect the role of power. From the above discussion concerning changes to the Canadian welfare state, it should be clear that income supports, social services and social legislation have all been altered such that Canadians now
lead more economically uncertain lives. If the “tory streak” that led Canadians to an initially
“mature welfare state” somehow changed in order to support such changes, theorists of political
culture would need to account for how such shifts in political culture occur. Scholars like David
Brady (2009) argue that cultures, ideologies, and values of citizens can in fact be changed. Being
repeatedly told that “there is no alternative” to regressive policies by media and government can
significantly limit discourse around politics. However, in order to discuss how changes in culture
come about, one must also focus on power relations (ibid).

With respect to the second problem of incongruence between social policy and public
opinion, American literature in the area of political cultures and social policy is particularly
indicative that citizens may not agree with welfare state development. On the one hand, scholars
like Anthony King (1973) argue that the U.S. welfare state is meagre because this is the
collective consensus of Americans; in short, it is what Americans want. On the other hand, work
by scholars such as Fay Cook and Edith Barrett (1992) show that American citizens did believe
that recipients of many welfare programs, including the now-defunct Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), were not simply systemic drains but citizens in need. Further, they
believed in a Canadian-style healthcare system. Nonetheless, Americans experienced reforms
under the Reagan and Clinton era which led to more extensive means tests and welfare-to-work
programming, including Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). Neither of these
programs was effective in reducing poverty or finding Americans jobs; yet, they were
constructed as political successes (Schram and Soss 2002). The conclusions of those such as
William Epstein (2010: 5) are particularly unimpressive, given that public opinion and social
policy do not always match:
Social critics who define social conditions as problematic often fail to accept the amoral functionality of enduring social arrangements and the profound degree to which the culture has reached a satisfying consensus.

The mistaken conclusion that there exists an “amoral functionality” among citizens highlights the third problem in the political culture literature: it ignores the role of power in welfare state development (Stewart 1990; Olsen 2002). Power resources theory (PRT), an alternative to theories of political culture, focuses on the class struggle between capital and labour. Historically, labour has two primary resources: organizational resources (unions) and institutional resources (labour and social-democratic parties that represent their interests in the political system). The two are most powerful when linked; in Canada, for example, unions have historically provided the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and New Democratic Party (NDP) with public support and funding at federal and provincial levels (Brooks 2012). The provincial CCF party in Saskatchewan, for example, was responsible for the initial implementation of universal healthcare entitlements which later spread to other provinces. Although other factors are important to consider⁴, organized labour played a key role in supporting this implementation, which has become a significant part of Canadian identity (Armstrong and Armstrong 2008).

⁴In the case of Saskatchewan, organized labour was not the only constituency that helped to establish the CCF. Other cultural influences played a significant role in establishing fostering the more collective sentiments of Saskatchewan political culture. What Seymour Martin Lipset (1971) calls agrarian populism is especially important. Namely, farmers—especially those who travelled north from America after the American Civil War—were particularly vulnerable to market forces, and found themselves increasingly in debt to afford equipment at the mercy of bankers. Fierce resistance to monopoly capitalism, a result from the constant economic pressures of farming, developed into a publically-oriented population among many Canadian rural populations. The Great Depression only catalyzed such sentiments. The social gospel movement was also significant in the formation of the CCF and subsequent developments such as Canadian healthcare. The inclusive and collective (“love thy neighbor”) doctrine of this particular strand of Protestant intellectualism sought solutions for ills among social institutions and social relationships, rather than just solutions for individuals, a marked break with former religious doctrine which held “intensely individualistic” conceptions of humans and society and their potential for good (Allen 1975: 3). This branch of Protestantism informed a young Tommy Douglas, who played a key role in the early CCF and in establishing Canadian healthcare as Premier of Saskatchewan after 1944. This doctrine also inspired expanded notions of Canadian citizenship to include more collective welfare provisions as well as ending policies such as racial segregation in Saskatchewan (cf. MacDonald 2001; Patrias 2006).
In capturing the struggle between classes this way, PRT is more flexible than the
culturalist camp at explaining how and why welfare states have changed. Scholars of
globalization can point to the rise of capital strike and capital flight as new “tools” in capital’s
toolbox, along with the linkage of ideological vehicles like think tanks to the boards of many
corporate firms (cf. Carroll and Shaw 2001; Brownlee 2005; Carroll 2010). The result has been
that many of the “power resources” that labour once relied on have been fundamentally
undermined, and a new “common sense” has permeated the thinking of the citizenry of many
Western countries. This new “common sense” infuses social life with market principles (e.g.
self-sufficiency), which have become naturalized (Radcliff 2013). As citizens have less power to
wield through unions and labour/social-democratic parties, they have little option but to accept
these new conditions of fewer social safety nets and labour market insecurity.

If political culture is “a set of common political values and assumptions” (Wesley 2011: 4) that set limits to social policy development, such values and assumptions have clearly changed
along with social policy in Canada. Rather than look at attitudes and values of political cultures
in isolation, or look at power relations separately from culture, we should begin to synthesize the
influences of culture and power into a more holistic framework, better able to avoid the problems
that cultural theorists have encountered. We must understand and respect the fact that culture,
power, and welfare states are all fundamentally linked (Olsen 2011: 189). We should further
recognize that

[w]elfare states, ideology and interest are so bound up in each other that it is not
necessary to sort out which came first. What is important is understanding how
social equality results from the reciprocal relationships among welfare states,
ideologies, and interests. Through these relationships, countries socialize the
responsibility of preventing citizens from being poor. (Brady 2009: 8)
I argue that by locating values and assumptions not as a part of political culture, but rather as part of the political identity of citizenship, we can better understand the ways in which power can affect them. I wish to now illustrate how this understanding can be more productively accomplished through synthesizing cultural and power resource frameworks through a lens of citizenship.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE INDIVIDUATION OF THE CANADIAN CITIZENRY

Citizenship: T.H. Marshall and Beyond

Scholars have long thought of citizenship as more than a legal status. In common discourse, “citizenship” in a country brings with it a certain set of rights. For example, sections 3 and 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the right to vote and serve as a member of legislature, and mobility rights, respectively) only apply to citizens. However, theorists of citizenship beginning with Aristotle have understood that citizenship is “participation in or membership of a community. Different types of political community give rise to different forms of citizenship” (Barbalet 1988: 2). T.H. Marshall (1964), in his influential work Citizenship and Social Class, unraveled modern citizenship into civil, political, and social strands. They refer to negative liberties, the right to participate in political affairs, and the “right to a modicum of economic welfare and security,” respectively (ibid: 71). Each of these was implemented in the 18th (civil), 19th (political), and 20th (social) centuries throughout Europe and North America. This work has been particularly influential in subsequent conceptualizations of citizenship in Western literature.

5 These are defined as freedom from the state; that is, to have the state not interfere with one’s life. One example in Canada is s.8 of the Charter, or “the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”
Since Marshall wrote what is widely considered to be the most influential work on Western citizenship studies, he has been criticized on several fronts by feminist scholars, scholars of race and ethnicity, and other critical thinkers (Turner 2001). Marshall’s work has been criticized as assuming a white male population; taking for granted the conceptualization of the state in granting civil, political, and social rights and entitlements; failing to adequately take into account social divisions along racial, gendered, or ethnic lines; failing to adequately conceptualize work external to the labour force (e.g. unpaid labour in the home); and, most prominent among Marshall’s critics, his conceptualization of citizenship as a one-way, linearly evolving mechanism (cf. Barbalet 1988; Turner 1990, 1997; Plummer 2003).

Notwithstanding these critiques, it is clear that Marshall was instrumental in advancing citizenship studies, which either built off of his theorizing or off of its critiques. He was particularly pivotal in forming what is often called the “second wave” of interest in citizenship studies (Isin and Turner 2007). The “third” wave, beginning in the early 1990s, is predicated on the sensitivity to sources of identity ignored by Marshall; most notably race, gender, and sexual orientation/gender identity, among others. Feminist studies of citizenship, for example, have attempted to expand the concept to analyze the political rights and constraints of women, while others debate whether or not “citizenship”, as a concept developed by males and for males, should or can even be applied to feminist analyses (Siim 2000; Lister 2003). Other scholars of citizenship note that it is an “arena” of struggle within which multiple political actors compete for discursive and political recognition and/or redistribution, negating Marshall’s linear perspective in favour of a site of struggle (Brodie 1996; Isin et al. 2008; Newman 2013).

Citizenship studies have also expanded to include examining the rights and entitlements of those outside the traditional nuclear family such as LGBTQ individuals (see Roseneil 2010; Santos
2012) and analyze ethno-cultural and racial relations (e.g. Vink and Bauböck 2013; Levanon and Lewin-Epstein 2010). The result is that we now see academic discussion around bodily citizenship (Outshoorn, Kulawik, Dudova and Prata 2012), sexual citizenship (Plummer 2003; Santos 2012), reproductive citizenship (Turner 2001), and intimate citizenship (Plummer 2003; Roseneil 2010), among others. These studies are predominantly from European scholars and have received little attention from North American sociologists.

The common thread running through these varying conceptualizations of citizenship is a discussion of the duties and obligations as well as the rights and entitlements that are protected, supported, and challenged by social, political, and legal structures along varying axes (Lister 2003; Mason 2012). Moving beyond only legally protected rights, such as the right of same-sex marriage in Canada, citizenship orients members of political groups as to what is acceptable and not acceptable — that is, the ways of framing and speaking about particular topics, what claims to make on government, and what sorts of political actions or protest to engage in. Sexual citizenship, for example, encompasses the rights and rights-based discourse of individuals engaging in non-traditional relationships. Whether or not a gay man is a sexual citizen opens up questions around the belonging and exclusion of gay men from political life, and the sorts of claims they can make on the state and other citizens. The identity of “gay”, or LGBTQ, comes with a certain kind of “voice, a recognized type, a locus, a position, a subjectivity” which is constructed by the elements of citizenship (Plummer 2003: 59). Hence, we see the rise of the term “citizen-identity” (Heater 2004).

Importantly, citizenship is not simply an institution which instructs people on how to act. The diverse array of scholarly discussion around citizenship does not portray people as passively accepting the citizen-identities accorded to them by other citizens and political institutions.
Citizenship studies, especially those undertaken by feminists, place human agency as central to any conceptualization or analysis (Lister 2003). However, such agency is “mediated by cultural understandings” of what is and is not acceptable; these understandings are both accepted and challenged as groups are both included and excluded by citizenship (ibid, 38; Isin et al., 2008). Along this line, feminist analysis of social movements through a citizenship lens places a premium on the agency of women, rather than their portrayal as passive “victims” of patriarchal regimes. The influences of both culture and power are equally important in how citizenship is constructed and framed, and in how the agency of citizens, is understood.

The idea that citizenship is a type of belonging to a polity has been expanded in the literature since Marshall’s work. More recent theorizing around citizenship has understood it as a political identity that the members of a nation-state (or even those who simply live within its borders) take on as part of “belonging” to a country. As an identity, it guides and shapes the political thoughts and actions of the members of the polity (Newman 2013). This includes attitudes and values towards various political objects such as social policy.

Culture, Power, and Citizen-Identities

The ways in which citizenship operates are largely dependent on the power relations within a nation-state. As hinted at above, citizenship has been conceptualized as a political arena in which political agents from “above” and “below” struggle over what sorts of rights, entitlements, and obligations come with membership to a political community, and in turn, the political qualities that community assumes (cf. White 1999; Isin et al. 2008). A nation in which citizens value the de-commodification of individuals through income supports and social services, and in which workers are feel entitled high quality
work and benefits (e.g. Sweden), has more equal power relations than in nations where this is not the case (e.g. the United States). Through power resources, actors from “below” can work to embed more entitlements within citizenship.

Therefore, a commitment to “equality of opportunity” or “equality of outcome”, and the corresponding forms of social provisions, will be inscribed by the quality of citizenship in a capitalist nation-state (Olsen 2011). As a form of identity, citizenship frames the ways in which members of a community think about their state, their rights and entitlements, and the actions of other citizens; it guides what individuals should and should not do (Mason 2012). As such, it has tangible policy outcomes. This is captured in the definition of “citizenship regimes”: the “institutional arrangements, rules and understandings, and power relations that guide and shape current policy decisions, state expenditures, framing rules, feeling rules and claims-making by citizens” (Tonkens 2012: 201).

While a full investigation of citizenship regimes is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to understand that the “institutional rules and understandings” shaped by citizenship (which is itself contested) involve the fusion of both attitudes and values (political culture), and power relations between labour, capital, and the state (power resources). Scholars of “cultural citizenship” including John Foote (2005) and Colin Mercer (2002) understand that culture and power relations are subject to “rapid and

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6 Here, “rights” refer to legal/constititutional rights, specifically the idea of “social rights”. The right to an education, healthcare, unemployment provisions, and so on are understood as being located here (Olsen 2011). Other rights include natural rights, which are understood as pre-social rights (e.g. the right to life), or human rights, which are internationally agreed upon but not enforced (e.g. right to water and safe housing). For a full discussion on various types of rights, see Olsen 2011, pp. 99-112. These are derived from citizenship, and not from being a human being. In other words, legal/constitutional rights are socially contextualized, with which this discussion is concerned.

7 Tonkens here refers to feeling rules as theorized by Arlie Hochschild, in which different social environments, including entire nations linked by a unified vision of being a “good citizen”, allow and disallow certain feelings and emotions (e.g., being ashamed to receive employment insurance or social assistance cheques).
extensive change in their surrounding environments” (Foote 2005: 91). That is, power relations in society can shape the attitudes and values of individuals. Citizenship, as I present it in this study, is the conduit through which power relations shape political attitudes and values. As Derek Heater (2004: 187) suggests, “[i]dentity and virtue invest the concept of citizenship with power.” Because it is a form of identity and an “ideal” that bridges power with political values (i.e. the ideal of a “good” or “upstanding” citizen), citizenship possesses depoliticizing qualities; in other words, it naturalizes the “way things are” (Twine 1994).

However, the identity and virtue bound with up citizenship is a moving target. This notion brings us to the second way in which citizenship is better suited for explaining welfare state retrenchment. Specifically, the idea of what constitutes the behaviour of a “good citizen” and the ways in which children and individuals should be politically socialized is subject to change, and indeed, has changed. This is how we might account for the fact that claims-making on the state (e.g. collecting social assistance) in the West has gone from the right of an autonomous and “good” citizen to one of a systemic drain (Ben-Ishai 2012; Brodie 1996). The power that Heater (2004) describes as being “vested” in citizenship through identity and virtue is of the “three-dimensional” variety.” Steven Lukes (2005) notes that “three-dimensional power” captures the way in which superficially “natural” social relations are constructed, which benefits some and disadvantages others. This type of power is structural and circuitous. This is more sophisticated than the first or second dimensions of power, which refer to observable power struggles and power over political agenda-setting, respectively. What Lukes calls the adaptive preferences of individuals—contextual motivations that present themselves as immediate and natural for acting or not acting on various issues—can be thought of as housed within citizenship
with respect to political actions. These preferences, shaped by this structural power, can also work *against* the interests of those who act on them; for example, women and transgendered individuals avoiding areas they perceive as dangerous are based on a very real and immediate fear of violence, but in their avoidance they participate in the reproduction of socio-spatial inequality.

The identities and virtue of Canadian citizenship are increasingly bound up with avoiding state dependency, and economic self-reliance. This means that it *feels good* to exercise citizenship through individualistic means: labour, consumption, or receiving tax breaks, for example. Conversely, it is *degrading* or *embarrassing* to have to rely on social assistance, unemployment insurance, or resort to workfare programs, which are considerably stigmatizing with rules such as mandatory drug testing (Peck 2001; also see Eden and Lein 1996; Shipler 2004). This shift in what it means to be a “good citizen”, and its requirements of economic self-reliance, means that organizational resources from “below” (such as unions) that advocate for advancement of the collectivity have less meaning to those who stand to benefit most from them. A worker who feels as though union dues would be a waste of money, for example, is acting on the immediate and individualized adaptive preferences of neo-liberal citizenship, rather than preferences and feelings that unions are a form of solidaristic insurance against exploitation and unstable work conditions. Likewise, Canadians trapped in precarious employment conditions focus more on finding their next source of income rather than resort to income supports or social services (see Lewchuk et al. 2011). The shame stemming from the individualized adaptive preferences found within the Canadian political identity encourages a very narrow focus on simply finding the next job, rather than on entitlements to a “modicum” of economic security.

The “common frame of reference” (Chong 1996) for Canadians is increasingly one of self-
reliance, and anything other than self-reliance (i.e., dependence) means that one cannot be a full member of society.\(^8\)

While current discussions of citizenship and citizenship regimes capture important dynamics to do with ethno-cultural relations (e.g. Levanon and Lewin-Epstein 2010; Tonkens 2012; Vink and Bauböck 2013), they do not conceptualize citizenship (particularly social citizenship) as fundamentally linked into a nation’s welfare state. The “individuation of the Canadian citizenry”, in contrast, theoretically departs from the understanding that citizenship is a source of socio-political identity and as such, includes and excludes various rights and entitlements, which are manifested by the changing welfare state. Below, I elaborate on this concept of individuation of citizenship, and then move into a discussion of its empirical examination in the Canadian population.

*Individuation of the Canadian Citizenry*

When investigating to what extent, why, and how Canadians wanted their welfare state to be re-organized, as argued above, we must take into account how citizenship regimes have changed. I propose that this change can be described as the *individuation of the Canadian citizenry*, which has occurred concomitantly with retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state. The concept of “citizenry individuation” more generally captures the extent to which citizens are “detached from the solidaristic and collective foundations on which welfare states were created” (Newman 2013: 42), and subscribe to principles of market fundamentalism including competition, reliance on the market, and consumption as part of exercising citizenship and being

\(^8\) Although this discussion primarily refers to state dependence, it should be recognized that dependence on the civil sector, including *informal welfare* and *community welfare* such as relying on parents, friends, charities, food banks, etc., is often also stigmatized (Olsen 2002: 22-23). *Employment-based or commercial welfare*, conversely, is not stigmatized because they are tied to labour and consumption (e.g. purchasing healthcare or homecare).
a “good citizen”.\footnote{Conversely, individuation also captures the extent to which \textit{work} and \textit{dependency} are mutually exclusive in particular national discourses. This ideological binary—which holds that one is \textit{either} contributing to society or “draining the system” by oversimplifying complex social processes—is transmuted into the concrete citizen duty of avoiding state dependency (Mason 2012).} Part and parcel of individuated citizenship involves what Chunn and Gavigan (2004) call the “deputization” of citizens, pitting them against one another in an effort to informally and discursively police market participation (“get a job!”), and to use peer pressure to encourage the avoidance of de-commodifying measures such as Employment Insurance and social assistance. A common-sense, “me-first” discourse is therefore a product of this process.

Literature on Canadian citizenship points toward this idea. Janine Brodie (2008) argues that social citizenship—and with it, the entitlements and rights of Canadians—has been “re-casted” so that the collective good is equated with that of the individual among citizens. In other words, the \textit{adaptive preferences} of Canadians have been altered; there is a belief that fiscalization, erasure, and monetization of the welfare state is in fact an individual good because commodification defines good citizenship, despite the fact that such measures work against middle and lower classes, leaving them vulnerable to the tides of the market (cf. Habibov and Fan 2007; Kenworthy 1999). Further, Jenson and Phillips (2001) have noted Canadians “learned” with the change of citizenship regime and the implementation of the \textit{Charter of Rights and Freedoms} that social problems are to be tackled individually. For example, Canadian feminists have found it increasingly difficult to create solidaristic social movements beginning in the 1980s, instead turning to the legal system (including the Supreme Court of Canada) to advocate and secure rights for women (Bashkevin 1998). Ed Schrecker (1999) and Melanie White (1999) too have noted there is a “crisis” in Canadian citizenship—that because citizenship is increasingly equated with consumption and labour, it increasingly is not a helpful concept in framing social issues collectively.
This is not to say that citizenship is unalterable by those who work within its discursive and political frameworks. It has been done before—for example, the Famous Five gaining recognition of women as “persons” in Canada in 1929 (Kome 1985). As stated above, agency is central to studying citizenship, since it is agents who work to construct citizenship identities and regimes. However, the process of “enacting citizenship”—how Egin Isin and colleagues (2008) refer to re-politicizing issues through citizenship discourses—has fundamentally changed. Enacting citizenship is now bound up with processes of social exclusion along gender, race and class as citizenship “organize[s] people according to the desires and goals of the global finance and corporate services” (Good-Gingrich 2003: 11). The increasing equation of the “collective good” with “individual good” within the exercise of citizenship means that inequalities along these lines become hidden, and the “collective individualization” (Brodie 2008) of the marginalized occurs. For example, despite the fact that First Nations are over-represented below the poverty line and in prisons, it just so happens that each one of these poor and incarcerated persons is individually responsible for their own predicament. The use of “snitch lines” in Ontario and other mechanisms for the informal policing of commodification of labour are consistent with such animosity towards collective entitlements (Chunn and Gavigan 2004; Peck 2001). The discursive policing of others therefore reinforces one’s own status as a “good citizen”, while simultaneously ignoring systemic inequalities.

The re-casting of “the social” to narrow the exercise of citizenship, and to include mechanisms of such social exclusion—the individuation of Canadians—occurs as the market “frees” itself from regulatory mechanisms that defined the post-WWII “Golden Age of Capitalism” (Bresser-Pereira 2010). As Margaret Somers and Fred Block (2005; 2014) note, however, “the market” is never actually “freed” from the social institutions that enable its
existence. They use the term *ideational embeddedness* to capture the different ways in which social institutions support market processes through the changing of dominant ideology and rationalities within those institutions. Capitalist markets are always somehow embedded within social institutions—whereas the latter supported the former once through regulatory mechanisms, granting them legitimacy and avoiding the “fiscal crisis of the state” described by O’Connor (2001), they now do so through different means. With respect to the welfare state, this means the responsibilization of units and departments to make do with less funding, translating into fewer or less quality services for citizens. When we see citizenship as a social institution, that it is as a source of power and identity, we can describe it as legitimating markets in a stronger way through the individualization of adaptive preferences. Hence, the receiving of tax breaks *feels* good as a citizen, since it enables exercise of citizenship through choice and consumption (cf. Heater 2004; Finkel 2006). Simultaneously, fiscal welfare enables the discursive policing of commodification since only market resources are seen as legitimate. In short, fiscal welfare benefits can help to nurture individualized citizen-identities, and both of these elements work together to coordinate actions in favour of de-regulated markets which stress self-reliance and avoidance of state support (see Hall and Soskice 2001).

Like de-commodification, individuation is a matter of *degree*, which enables a more theoretically sophisticated analysis of how welfare regimes exist. With the digestion of collective social assumptions related to the social re-embedding of markets, Canadians will tend to have more faith in market solutions and mechanisms (McMurtry 2013). They will place blame on the marginalized for their own plight (and this will happen among the marginalized themselves) (cf. Edin and Lein 1997; Shipler 2004; Brodie 2008). Canadians will also fear their own “social death by moral failure” (Wacquant 2009). These are features that come about as citizens are
individuated, since reliance on any means but the market in order to live is not simply “cheating the system” but “cheating citizenship” itself. Further, labour is not simply a means of living under an individuated citizenship regime; it can and should be a source of happiness, fulfillment and health (Newman 2013). It captures the ways in which “projects of citizenship” in Canada have made Canadians political islands, and may be considered a subjective analytical companion to objective conditions of commodification with which, I hypothesize, is positively correlated (ibid).

Specifically, then, individuation refers to the dual-pronged process through which being a “good citizen” is increasingly equated to commodification (reliance on labour\textsuperscript{10} for well-being), as well as consumption and choice (see Mason 2012, Brodie 2008 and Giroux 2008 for a triangulated discussion). As this version of good citizenship is exercised more by Canadians, social exclusion of those who cannot work and consume privately, and cutbacks to the welfare state, are legitimated and even welcomed by citizens. This is visually represented below, in figure 1. Individuated citizens, to varying degrees, exercise “good citizenship” through the dual processes of commodification and consumption. These are bound with labour and exercising “choice”, though they are separated here for heuristic purposes. As this belief and faith in market processes increases within the population, the exercise of “good” citizenship excludes those who experience structural barriers to commodification and consumption in the ways listed above.

\textsuperscript{10} While I predominantly refer to participation in the labour market, reliance on the market can also be indirect. For example, a woman who chooses to stay home to raise her children, and has a male breadwinner spouse, will not be seen as “dependent” because she is doing appropriately gendered work, as Brodie (1996) suggests. Domestic labour, then, can also be included in this definition of individuation, since it involves indirect reliance on the market rather than reliance on the state (also see Schecter, 1998).
Despite the fact that Canadians have less entitlement to income supports, social services and stable work, they nonetheless believe the market should be the only source of economic security. This is a process that is intensifying as neo-liberal “projects of citizenship” are underway in the West (see Newman 2013).

AN INDIVIDUATED CITIZENRY: CAVEATS

It should be noted that while much of the Canadian literature around individualization of social problems and citizenship discourses centres on Canadians, there is evidence that this will vary among provinces. First, it has been argued that Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario fall under different welfare regimes, implying varying levels of support for de-
commodifying social policy (Bernard and Saint-Arnaud 2004). Quebec and Alberta in particular show striking differences in areas related to income supports and social services, with the former falling closer to the social-democratic welfare regime and the latter the liberal regime. Second, attitudinal data indicate that provincial residency does significantly influence support for state intervention in the economy (Henderson 2010). Quebecers are most likely to trust government in the area of social policy and development, while Newfoundlanders are least likely to do so. As such, any investigation of changing Canadian citizenship should be done so with this caveat in mind.

In addition, it is worth pointing out before moving to methodology and analysis that it is not prudent to expect Canadians simply becoming more fiscally conservative over time. As John Myles (2015, also see Banting and Myles 2013) has recently pointed out, we should consider carefully the idea of the “fading of redistributive politics” in Canada. This is a more “cautious metaphor” that takes into account the fact that welfare state development has not simply declined, but has fluctuated since the late 1990s and early 2000s (ibid: 2). As alluded to in Chapter 2, Canadians have repeatedly demanded more investment in social services such as healthcare and education. (Armstrong and Armstrong 2010). As Jonas Edlund (2007) has pointed out, this is to be expected since universal programs and services receive more widespread support than targeted programs, one factor behind the more egalitarian citizenries of countries with social-democratic welfare states.

The idea of a “fading of redistributive politics” has been parsed more finely in recent research by Bob Andersen and Josh Curtis (2013). They find that Canadians do not simply oppose social spending more over time, but rather, become more generous when the economy does well, and become less generous when economic conditions are sluggish. In addition, they
found that Canadians with higher incomes are less likely to believe that the government should provide for all members of society. This attunes us to the fact that any theory of citizenship, at least in a Canadian context, should not simply try to prove a unidimensional, intensifying opposition to social spending. Rather, it should draw attention to *individuation of citizen considerations* and the *breakdown of citizen solidarity*. If wealthier Canadians feel more generous in healthy economic times, as Andersen and Curtis suggest, it is likely more due to an individual sense of benevolence rather than a sense of being Canadian. The following methodological design and empirical analysis take these caveats into account.
Chapter 4: Methodology

This study uses quantitative methodology in order to establish to what extent, and in what ways, Canadians have been individuated in the process the retrenchment of the welfare state.

The analysis centres on a main question that can assist in measuring individuation in Canada:

(1) To what extent do Canadians think about themselves first with respect to welfare state provisions, and how do power resources affect this?

This broad question will be addressed by answering these sub-questions:

a. To what extent did Canadians resent paying taxes during the dramatic shift in the Canadian welfare state, and into the present?
   (i). Which Canadians resented paying taxes?

b. How do Canadians feel about social spending with respect to universal social services (healthcare, education) and more targeted provisions (social assistance, immigrants and minorities)?
   (i). How does belonging to a union and/or identifying with a social democratic party affect what Canadians believe their state should and should not spend on, in different areas of welfare?

The conceptual pathway of the study is depicted in figure 2, below.
Figure 2: Conceptual map of the empirical study. The variables of interest are *power resources* and *political culture*, which together construct the institutional understandings attached to citizen-identities.

In reality, of course, this model is much more complex. As noted in Chapter 3, welfare states, political cultures, ideologies, and power relations all interact to influence citizens’ support for welfare states. In addition, citizenship and citizenship regimes are not rigid, dictatorial frameworks, but are shaped and changed by the agency of citizens and other interests, resulting in the expansion and contraction of rights, duties, obligations, and entitlements. For the purposes of brevity in this study, this one-way conceptualization will be employed. “Welfare state development”, as I have laid out in Chapter 2, has already been established as declining in Canadian policy literature. This study examines the corresponding shift in citizenship.
Study and operationalization of individuation

As discussed in the preceding chapters, the process of citizenry individuation is large, complex, and could be measured in a number of different ways, both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, a content or discourse analysis of throne speeches since the 1960s would uncover many of the political “codes” (Wesley 2011) that governments have conveyed to Canadians, constraining and encouraging new discourses of citizenship. Likewise, public opinion can be analyzed to evaluate the mindset of Canadians with respect to social policy.

While future research should incorporate both of these techniques to try to triangulate how Canadian citizenship has changed, this study focuses on the latter approach of analyzing public opinion through quantitative methodology. This approach allows us to make inferences of what all Canadians think about social policy. While a qualitative component should be added in future research to create a mixed-methods study, Canadians’ own beliefs toward the welfare state are prioritized here over governments’ discursive tactics due to time and resource constraints.

For the purposes of this study, research by Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli (2008) in Western Europe provide useful guidance of how we can begin to measure the individuation of the Canadian citizenry, and is the basis of question (1). Their results of public attitudes toward social spending and provisions indicated that “when people think about responsibility for welfare provision, they immediately think about ‘what’s in it for me?’” (ibid: 1054). This means that programming is most successful when there is perceived immediacy to benefits. This measure—the extent to which citizens think about themselves first when asked about welfare state provisions—will be used to measure individuation in Canada through a longitudinal data analysis in different spending areas. If individuation is very strong, we would expect that Canadians able to do so would want to effectively buy themselves out of collective responsibility, following the
ideas of Schrecker (1999). This would manifest itself as citizens wanting government to spend less on not only targeted programs such as social assistance, but also on healthcare and education, instead seeking access to private alternatives. If individuation is “cushioned”, we might expect more support for universal programming while targeted programming would receive less. Of course, according to figure 2, this will vary depending on the level of association with organizational and institutional power resources.

This study, designed to draw some conclusions on the extent of individuation in Canada, is found in more detail below. Answering the aforementioned sub-questions of the study will allow us to draw conclusions to the extent that Canadians think “what’s in it for me?” when thinking about welfare provisions. I now turn to a discussion of the dataset and methods employed to investigate individuation of the Canadian citizenry.

DATA AND METHODS

Dataset

Data used will be from the Canadian Election Study (CES), which is a phone-conducted study taking place before, during, and after every Canadian federal election since 1965. These data are a representative sample of adult Canadians. In older studies, cluster sampling and random number selection based on the registered voting list was used, and the survey was carried out through a combination of mailback and telephone surveys. Since 1993, random-digit dialing has been employed to get a national sample, along with a follow-up mailback survey (cf. Lambert et. al 1986; Northup 2010). The CES is used regularly in the work of political sociologists and
political scientists.\textsuperscript{11} While sampling sizes vary for each survey, all surveys fall between \( n=2,119 \) (1965) and \( n=4,323 \) (2004). The CES asks Canadians questions about a range of political topics including feelings towards government spending, paying taxes, unemployment, feelings towards newcomers and immigrants, and other government and citizen behaviours.

The CES is being used for two reasons. First, it asks Canadians questions about a host of questions relevant to taxes, social spending, voting habits, political interests (e.g. belonging to or believing in the value of labour unions), and socio-demographic information including age, family income, education level, and gender. These questions are relevant to the model in figure 2; for example, identifying with or voting for the NDP and belonging to a labour union indicate an alignment with organizational and institutional power resources in a citizen’s life. Second, the CES is the only dataset that consistently spans four decades, beginning in 1965 and continuing to 2011. As such, it has a temporal length that allows an investigation of how Canadians felt about taxes and spending before, during, and after the most dramatic shifts in the Canadian welfare state. The methodology in this study is broken down into two parts, the first addressing question (1) and (1a), with the second addressing question (2) above.

\textit{Measures.} The dependent variable in both parts of the analysis asks whether or not Canadians feel that the government is \textit{wasting} tax money.\textsuperscript{12} This variable is not a perfect measure of \textit{resentment} towards paying taxes, because one can still believe in paying taxes, while wishing the government would simply spend it elsewhere. In addition, it does not specify if government is at the federal or provincial level. However, the variable of perceived waste by

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} Most of the Canadian Election Study surveys since 1965 are publically available and can be found at the CES official website, http://ces-eec.org/.

\textsuperscript{12} In all years except 1979 and 1984, the question posed in the CES was if government was wasting (1) \textit{a lot} of tax money, (2) \textit{some} tax money, or (3) \textit{none at all}. For 1979 and 1984, the question consisted of a Likert scale in response to the statement, “People in the government waste tax money” from strongly agree to strongly disagree, on a five-point scale. For these years, “strongly agree” was substituted for “a lot”, since they both imply that the respondent in question has an unyielding and clear belief that government is wasting tax money.}
government of tax money is useful here for two reasons. First, it is the only attitudinal variable that is consistent from 1965 to 2011, allowing for a reliable long-term trend analysis. Second, as I explain below, the second part of the study specifies how Canadians feel government is wasting tax money (on healthcare, welfare, education, and immigrants and minorities). Third, although it does not specify the level of government to respondents, respondents are likely unaware of what is provincial and federal jurisdiction with respect to welfare state duties. In addition, the federal government still provides financial support to provinces in the form of the Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST). As such, treating “government” as a unified concept for respondents does not compromise the concept it is measuring. Although the question asks Canadians if government is wasting taxes, it does not require a tremendous inferential leap to assume that if one believes government is wasting taxes, he or she will resent paying them. Overall, the variable speaks to the level of trust that Canadians have in the government of the day with respect to the collective welfare of Canadians. The less that citizens identify with their state, the less effective the state can be with respect to creating welfare policy since individuals see government as “interfering” with their private affairs (McMurtry 2013). As such, the variable indicates an important precursor for individuation. This dependent variable is analyzed first, before moving into bivariate analyses. For bivariate and trivariate analyses, a chi-square test of significance ($X^2$) was calculated, and cramer’s V ($\phi_c$) is reported to assess effect size of independent variables on dependent variables.

The study is broken down into its bivariate and trivariate components and described in fuller detail below.

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13 This is a limitation shared with research by Andersen and Curtis (2013), which reached the same conclusion stated here.
Components of the Study

Bivariate analysis. For the first component of the study, the independent variables include party voted for in the last federal election, in addition to socio-demographic variables. These are applied to the belief of the respondent that the government is wasting considerable amounts of tax money. Socio-demographics analyzed from 1965 to 2011 included age, family income, sex, level of education, province of residence, and whether or not the respondent belongs to a union. These trend analyses demonstrate to what extent respondents grew to resent paying taxes and who they were in socio-demographic terms, in addition to hinting at whether or not organizational/institutional power resources affects resentment towards paying taxes. For categorical variables—sex, union membership, province of residence, and voting behaviour—bar graphs (and line graphs, in the case of province of residence) are presented to examine differences among the categories. For continuous variables—level of education (treated as continuous in this study), age, and family income—the overall mean of the population is subtracted from the mean of those who believe government is wasting “a lot” of tax money.\(^{14}\) This will give an overview if resentment toward paying taxes is a specific subset of the population (younger compared to older, more educated compared to less educated, etc), or inclusive of many or most Canadians.

Trivariate analyses. The second component of the study consists of two trivariate analyses which will still take resentment toward paying taxes as the dependent variable. Again, this variable is a crude measure of trust in government. The dependent variables in these analyses

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\(^{14}\) For family income and level of education, scores were standardized to maintain consistency across years, since these are measured differently in some years. For instance, the 1965 and 1968s CES surveys asked respondents for their total years of schooling, while more recent surveys ask their highest level of educational attainment. Income was standardized due to inflation. For these variables, the differences in the Z-score for those who believe that government is wasting a significant amount of tax money are reported in a line graph.
consist of respondents’ views on whether or not the government should spend more, the same, or less in the areas of healthcare, education, welfare\textsuperscript{15}, and immigrants and minorities. These latter variables are aligned with the attitudinal dimensions of social spending in various areas, which are attitudinal dimensions associated with political culture. The third set of variables in the study consist of whether or not the respondent belongs to a union, and what, if any, federal political party they identify with.\textsuperscript{16} For the latter variable, categories consisted of conservative, liberal, and “social democratic”, a composite variable of different centre-left and leftist parties.\textsuperscript{17} These two variables incorporate the influence of “power resources” on attitudinal beliefs, both of which combined constitute citizenship-identities. The second question in particular is advantageous because it not only asks for what party a respondent voted, but what party, if any, is a part of the respondent’s political identity. For this analysis, the 2011 CES dataset was used for a cross-sectional analysis. While this was initially to be a trend study consisting of two or three data points, differences between datasets over time are too great to permit this sort of analysis.

This second component of the study serves two purposes. First, it informs us of the extent to which citizen solidarity has eroded in Canada as of 2011. In conjunction with the first part of the study, it allows us to reach some reasonable conclusions about the extent of the individuation of Canadian citizenship over time. Second, it serves to validate the model shown in figure 2. It is expected that those who belong to a union, and who identify with a social democratic party will support more collective approaches with respect to welfare provision. This proposition rests on

\textsuperscript{15} While all of the supports, services and legal protections discussed in Chapter 2 are defined there as welfare provision, “welfare” as it is presented here is social assistance, a targeted, means-tested program designed to redistribute wealth through direct transfers (see Myles 1996).

\textsuperscript{16} The question was stated to respondents as “In federal politics, you usually think of yourself as…”.

\textsuperscript{17} For the purposes of this analysis, the NDP, Bloc Quebecois, and the Green Party were re-coded into a “Social Democratic” category, since they campaign on left-wing social policy platforms. While the Bloc is specific to Quebec, it has historically been the champion of Quebecois interests in federal government (Brooks 2012). As such, social democrats in Quebec may have voted for the Bloc rather than the NDP, and should still be included in this part of the ideological spectrum.
the assumption that collective narratives around government responsibilities are fostered when a citizen identifies with organizational or institutional power resources, and with it, more faith in the state’s ability to provide for the population. Or, as Margaret Somers (2008: 202) states, the influences of culture and power intermingle to widen the collective framing capabilities of citizens, since they have more access to collective narratives and to other individuals who will validate these narratives.
UNIVARIATE RESULTS: RESENTING TAXES

Before exploring the results from bivariate and trivariate analyses, it is useful to have an initial overview of how all Canadians felt toward how well the government of the day used tax money, in turn giving us a glimpse into how well Canadians trust the government with its revenue. The percentage of Canadians reporting that they feel the government wasted “a lot” of tax money is shown in figure 3, from 1965 to 2011.

Figure 3: Percent of Canadians reporting that they feel government wastes “a lot” of tax money.

The trend here follows what we might expect, given the discussion of welfare state retrenchment in Chapter 2. The lowest reported number, around 9% of Canadians, came two
years after the passing of the CAP in 1966. By 1979, this number had grown to approximately 12% of Canadians, and grew at a very steep rate into the late 1980s and early 1990s, peaking at 80%. This perception of government wasting tax money declined into the early 2000s and remained stable during the most recent years, but did not fall below 55%.

These data should be observed keeping two historical facts in mind. First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, this trend matches the increasing sense of individualized responsibility in relation to Canadian welfare state. With the development of the “mature” Canadian welfare state in the 1960s, mistrust in what the government does with its tax money is very low. As more Canadians benefitted from expanded healthcare and education spending, more generous support for elders, and citizenship entitlements, a higher level of trust in state spending was cultivated (see Edlund 2007).

However, the data in figure 3 clearly indicate a hike in resentment toward taxes during the period of intense welfare retrenchment in the late 1970s and the 1980s (see Chapter 3). The other important point of history to keep in mind, the animosity between English and French Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s, likely inflates these numbers. As Brooks (2012) points out, with the failure of both the Meech Lake Accord (1987) and the Charlottetown Accord (1992), much of Quebec resented English Canada for failing to recognize its unique history and trying to pacify its attempts at sovereignty, while much of English Canada resented Quebec for wanting special treatment from the Federal government. In the end, Brian Mulroney’s attempts at satisfying both parties failed miserably, and contributed to the end of his political career. Therefore, the peak that we observe in this trend of seeing taxes as wasted in 1993 is likely due to resentment not only towards how tax money itself is spent, but resentment toward government
for its failure to reconcile the demands of both sides of the division between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Results show that there has been a clear building resentment against taxes that has mirrored Canadian welfare state retrenchment. The following bivariate analyses break this trend down further into more specific demographics and voting patterns.

BIVARIATE ANALYSES: WHO RESENTED TAXES?

Socio-demographics

The variables of age, education, family income (continuous variables), sex, province of residence, and whether or not the respondent belongs to a union (discrete variables), were analyzed in relation to the proportion of Canadians who felt that government was wasting “a lot” of tax money (dependent variable). The discrete variables of sex and belonging to a union were not significant with respect to the dependent variable. For continuous variables, figures 4, 5, and 6 below show results for the trend analyses. Province of residence will be discussed afterward.

From figure 4, we can see that age had no impact on whether or not one felt that government was wasting a lot of tax money. While the mean age for these respondents rose slightly from 1979 to 1984, by 1993 there was no difference between the overall mean and the mean of those who felt government was wasting a lot of tax money. When considered together, we can conclude from figures 3 and 4 that Canadians across their lifespans have built up an increasing resentment towards how government spends taxes.
Figure 5 reports a similar trend for respondents’ levels of education. As mentioned in Chapter 4, education variables across the surveys were standardized. Like age, the effect of education on the belief that government is wasting a lot of tax money is very small, and then ceases to have any sort of effect as of 1993. The biggest effect, found in 1984, is that those who believe that the government is wasting “a lot” of tax money has a score -0.1—a tenth of a standard deviation—lower than the general population. The negligibility of this effect leads us to conclude that the waning in trust in government spending holds for Canadians of all educational levels.
Like education, family income was also standardized and examined in tandem with the dependent variable. The trend analysis for family income is found in figure 6, below.

Income follows the pattern exhibited by age and education, suggesting that resentment towards government spending is widespread and consistent among Canadians. While the graph does show slightly lower values in 1984 and 2000, and slightly higher values in 1993 and 2004, these differences—less than a tenth of a standard deviation—are not substantial enough to suggest family income has any sort of impact on the belief that government is wasting “a lot” of its tax dollars.
As noted near the end of Chapter 3, research has suggested that political beliefs towards government and government spending will vary by province. Therefore it is important to examine this final demographic variable. For simplicity’s sake, figure 7 below groups some of the provinces into regions, while figure 8 breaks gives a breakdown of all ten provinces. The years for figure 8 were chosen because they illustrated the most dramatic flux in resentment of taxes.

Figure 7 has a telling story that matches with figure 3. Most of the provinces and regions mirror the univariate analysis, which suggests a steep incline in resentment during the welfare state retrenchment described in Chapter 2. The province that stands out most is Quebec, which had a very substantial 47 percent increase in those who believed that government was wasting “a
lot” of tax money from 1984 to 1993. This may have been related to resentment in Quebec in relation to the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords. The inferential leap from “distrust in government” to “resenting taxes” suffers when applied to Quebec, due to its historical context and unique position within the Canadian federation. As previous research has suggested, Quebec is in fact a province with a more collective orientation to welfare provision than others, having a unique childcare program and a more left-leaning political culture (cf. Bernard and Saint-Armand 2004; Henderson 2010). Data for Quebec presented here should be interpreted with this in mind.\footnote{While it may seem paradoxical that a province with a left-leaning political culture resents paying taxes the most, this may be explained by the fact that Quebecers resent federal tax as opposed to provincial tax. The survey was conducted around the time of federal elections, and as such, may have elicited a negative response from Quebecers.}

![Figure 7: Percentage of those who believed that government was wasting “a lot” of tax money, by province. All reported figures were significant, p < .001.](image-url)
Bivariate analyses: voting trends

In addition to socio-demographics, voting trends were observed among those who believed that the government wasted a lot of tax money. The results for this analysis are in figure 9.

Figure 9 shows some historical consistency. Those who believe that the government wastes a lot of tax money are most likely to vote for a conservative party of the day\(^\text{19}\), followed by the Liberal Party of Canada, with the NDP receiving the least of the respondent’s votes. The Green Party, which made a mark on the voting map beginning in 2004, was included for the years it was involved in Federal elections.

\(^{19}\) Right-wing parties were grouped for the purposes of analysis; for example, from 1993-2000, the Reform Party and the Progressive Conservatives were both counted as “Conservative”.

Figure 8: Percentage of those who believed that government was wasting “a lot” of tax money, by province, for 1968, 1993, 2004 and 2011.
Overall, these results are not particularly surprising. Those who have more trust in government as the “rower” of the country are more likely to vote for a political party which campaigns for heavier government involvement, including progressive taxation and expanding social programming. Likewise, those who believe the government wastes more tax money will be more inclined to vote for a party seeking to limit the role of government in the life of citizens and the economy. Figure 9 also provides some tangential support for the model in figure 2; those who place more trust in government and are more supportive of paying taxes express their political support by voting for a social democratic party (and are therefore capable of political expression through an institutional power resource).

Note that for the year 2011, NDP and Conservative numbers are tied. This may be related to the large electoral gains by the NDP in Quebec that year after frustration with the Bloc...
Quebecois, who won the lowest number of seats in the House of Commons since the party’s inception.

Last, I will discuss the implications of the trivariate portion of the study which examines attitudes towards social spending and wasted tax money, in conjunction with union membership and identifying with a political party.

TRIVARIATE ANALYSIS: EXAMINING POWER RESOURCES

Trivariate results: Unions, political identity and individuation

The results for the first trivariate analysis looking at beliefs in wasted taxes, attitudes towards social spending in the areas of healthcare, education, social assistance and immigrants/minorities, and union membership, are found in appendix A.

Results for healthcare and education (Tables 1 and 1.1) are similar; there are no significant differences in beliefs toward special spending in either areas between union members and non-members. The table for healthcare is particularly notable. For respondents who are not in a union and believe that the government is wasting tax money, 80% reported they would like to see increases in healthcare spending, while only 3.4% said they would like to see less spending in this area. The numbers for education, while slightly more modest, still show very strong support for education spending despite not being in a union and believing the government is wasting “a lot” of tax money. Nearly three quarters of respondents in both of these categories reported that the government should spend more on education (73%), while only 3.1% reported they would like to see less spending.
With respect to support for social assistance (Table 1.2), union membership has far greater impact than on healthcare and education. There are significant differences in attitudes toward social spending between members of a union ($\phi_c = .217$) and non-members ($\phi_c = 0.134$, $p = .010$). 35% of respondents belonging to a union reported they felt that government should spend *more* on social assistance, compared to 23% of those who did not belong to a union. Those who believe that the government wastes only some, or no tax money at all, are also more amenable to social assistance spending when part of a union. 43% of those who felt that the government does a reasonably good job at using tax money felt *more* of that tax money should go toward social assistance, while only 24% of their non-union counterparts felt the same way. Therefore, union membership is associated with more collective generosity among Canadians. To a lesser extent, this is the case even with those who resent what they see as their tax dollars go to waste; while 28% of these union members wanted more spending on social assistance, 21% non-members reported the same.

For spending on immigrants and minorities (Table 1.3), we observe an effect of union membership that sits about halfway between its impact on healthcare and education on the one hand, and social assistance on the other ($\phi_c = .150$ for union members; $\phi_c = .167$ for non-members). There are significant differences between union members and non-members with respect to social spending on this specific population. The majority of both members and non-members report wanting to keep spending constant; however, union members are somewhat more amenable to this form of spending than their counterparts. When respondents believed government was wasting a lot of tax money, 27% of union members wanted to spend less on immigrants and minorities, whereas 35% of non-members felt similarly. In addition, whereas 10% of non-members wanted to spend more on this area when they believed government was
wasting tax money, 15% of members wanted to spend more. While such differences are not large, they are statistically significant and worth pointing out, as they mark a halfway point between the other areas of social spending.

Overall, Canadians are generally more supportive of spending on healthcare and education, and less supportive of spending on social assistance and immigrants and minorities. While union membership counteracts some of the lack of support for the latter two spending areas, it is does not eliminate it. This finding supports the notion that Canadians prioritize programs which benefit all Canadians over those which support only the neediest.

_Trivariate analysis: Party identity, wasted taxes and social spending_

The second trivariate analysis examines beliefs in wasted taxes, attitudes towards social spending in the areas of healthcare, education, social assistance and immigrants/minorities, and union membership. The data upon which this analysis is based are found in appendix B.

Comparison among these three variables largely corroborates the first trivariate analysis. With respect to healthcare (Table 2) and education (Table 2.1), the vast majority of Canadians support _more_ spending in both areas regardless of with which political party they identify. While there were no significant differences among party identification for attitudes towards education, healthcare did have significant differences; whereas 65% of those who identified as Conservative wanted to spend more on healthcare ($\phi_c = .169$), 78% of those identifying with a social democratic party reported the same ($\phi_c = .200$), as did 77% of those who reported the Liberal party; 74% of those who identified with no party also wanted to spend more in healthcare ($\phi_c = .171$). Thus, while those who identified with the Conservative party are a little less likely to want to spend _more_ on healthcare, the majority of Canadians across the board want to see more
spent in this area. Looking at values for $\varphi_c$, identifying with a social democratic party had a very slightly higher impact than identification with other parties.

A particularly interesting finding of table 2 is that, regardless of party identification, Canadians who believe that the government is wasting a lot of tax money are far more likely to believe that the government should be spending more on healthcare (with the exception of those who identified with the Liberal party, where the difference was much more modest). Canadians of all ideologies who believe that the government is wasting tax money believe that more of that money should be spent on healthcare. This demonstrates very strong support for healthcare spending in Canada.

Consistent with the first trivariate analysis, Canadians are far less amenable to spending on social assistance than they are on more inclusive social services. While analysis of those who identified with the Liberal party did not yield statistically significant results ($X^2 = .070$), all other parties did. For those who identify with the Conservative party ($\varphi_c = .131$), respondents are significantly less likely to want to see more spending on social assistance (18%) in contrast with those who identify with no party at all (34.5%) ($\varphi_c = .205$). Likewise, those who identified with a social democratic party ($\varphi_c = .147$) were far more likely than any other party (or no party) to want to spend more on social assistance (46%). Conversely, those who identified with a social democratic party were less likely to want to reduce spending for social assistance (9.6%), compared to their counterparts who were Conservative (23.9%) or had no party alignments (19.6%). Whether or not respondents believed the government was wasting tax money did not have any substantial effect either way. Identifying with a social democratic party, unsurprisingly, acts as a large cushion against animosity toward social assistance. The reverse is also true; if one
believes the government should spend more on social assistance, they are more likely to identify with a social democratic party.

For spending on immigrants and minorities (Table 2.3), results closely followed that of Table 1.3. While all Canadians are generally less favourable to spending on immigrants and minorities, identifying with a social democratic party (much like being a union member) somewhat buffers animosity toward this area of social policy. Compared to those who did not identify with a party ($\phi_c = .218$), those who identified with a social democratic party ($\phi_c = .185$) were slightly less likely to want to cut funding to immigrants and minorities (22% compared to 30%). However, those who identified with the Liberal party ($\phi_c = .166$) reported similar feelings about spending in this area as the social democratic party.\textsuperscript{20} As discussed in the following chapter, this is to be expected since the Liberal Party of Canada has historically “owned” the issue of multiculturalism, dating back to Prime Minister Trudeau (Brooks 2012). As such, respondents who identify positively with multiculturalism issue will be shared between the Liberal Party and social democratic parties.

In conclusion, association with power resources—belonging to a union and identifying with a social democratic party—act as a significant buffer to animosity against class-based targeted spending (social assistance), a moderate buffer to animosity to ethnicity-based targeted spending (immigrants and minorities), has little to no effect in the areas of healthcare and education spending. Detailed explanations for these results, in addition to answers for the questions posed in Chapter 4, follow in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{20} Results for the Conservative respondents were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = .073$).
Chapter 6: Discussion of Individuation in Canada

Recall from Chapter 4 the following questions that were posed regarding the extent of citizenry individuation in Canada:

(1) To what extent to Canadians think about themselves first with respect to welfare state provisions, and how do power resources affect this?

and that in turn, this umbrella question will be answered by answering two sub-questions:

a. To what extent did Canadians resent paying taxes during the dramatic shift in the Canadian welfare state, and into the present?

   a(i) Which Canadians resented paying taxes?

b. How do Canadians feel about social spending with respect to universal social services (healthcare, education) and more targeted provisions (social assistance, immigrants and minorities)?

   b(i) How does belonging to a union and/or identifying with a social democratic party affect what Canadians believe their state should and should not spend in different areas of welfare?

With respect to question (a) and (a(i)), it is apparent that Canadians increasingly grew to resent paying taxes during the dramatic shift in the Canadian welfare state beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1990s. In contrast to the era of welfare expansion in the 1960s culminating in the Canada Assistance Plan, a lack of trust in how the government spends its tax money—taken here to be as a proxy for resentment of paying taxes—grew significantly. With respect to who grew distrustful of government spending, the answer is evidently everyone\(^2\), from the trend

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\(^2\) That is, everyone along the axes of age, gender, union membership, and socio-economic status. Race and ethnicity did not have a consistent variable in the CES, and as such had to be excluded.
analyses reported in Chapter 5. Canadians of all incomes, education levels, and ages, regardless of sex or union memberships, shared this distrust as time went on.

Growing resentment toward taxes is problematic for welfare states. This resentment towards paying taxes—even if the causes are mixed, as in the case of Quebec and support there for sovereignty or in the Western provinces with their feelings of alienation in relation to central Canada—means that the government’s legitimacy as a collective provider for citizens is undermined. The state instead is perceived as an agency that helps some and excludes others; the welfare state is especially vulnerable to such characterization (Schram 2000). This process can be understood as a sort of precursor to individuation. The connection between citizens and their government is increasingly weakened over time, creating the conditions for a new sense of citizenship that places emphasis on self-reliance through commodification and consumption.

With respect to question (b), it is apparent that spending in healthcare or education—spending on universal services or services perceived to be for everyone—is very well supported in Canada. These are services which are useful, or perceived as useful, for everybody. These findings support prior research done by Armstrong and Armstrong (2010) as well as Thomas-Long (2010). Healthcare is effectively inseparable from the Canadian identity, in part because it helps to distance the Canadian identity from the American identity. As such, since the 1990s, Canadians of all ideologies and political stripes have argued for more healthcare spending, a finding corroborated in Chapter 5. In addition, post-secondary education is still seen by Canadians as the main path through which upward social mobility is achieved; as such, it too is widely supported by Canadians. As shown in Chapter 2, however, governments are not
responding to public demand for increased spending in these areas. This disconnect, and its possible causes and consequences, are discussed later in this chapter.

Conversely, Canadians of all backgrounds and political stripes are far more critical of targeted spending provisions, which encompass social assistance and spending on immigrants and minorities in this study. The majority of Canadians believe that spending in these areas should either be steady, or should be reduced. Very few Canadians (aside from those who are associated with the power resources of unions or social democratic parties) believe that more should be spent in either of these areas, especially when they believe that the government is wasting tax money. Those Canadians would rather see spending on healthcare and education—even when they believe that the government is wasting tax money. Thus those who feel a significant disconnection from government are much more critical of spending on targeted provisions and much more amenable to spending that will benefit them more directly.

In addition, looking at the answer for question (b(i)), there is support for the model illustrated in figure 2 (p. 43). Association with power resources—being a member of a union and identifying with a social democratic political party—do impact support for spending on more targeted social provisions. As described in Chapter 4, those who are associated with either of these organizational or institutional power resources are more likely to want to spend more on social assistance, and are more amenable to spending on immigrants and minorities. This is also true when those individuals believe that the government is wasting a significant amount of tax money. As such, power resources act as a sort of “buffer” against the animosity towards targeted provisions, fostering a more collective mindset (and allowing its expressions via political

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22 It is worth repeating here that while identifying with a political party and supporting more spending on social assistance/immigrants and minorities is not a simple “cause” and “effect”, the variable is important because it shows that progressive Canadians have a political outlet through which they can channel their political views and attitudes. This sets Canada apart from the United States, where no well-established social democratic party exists.
channels). As Keith Baker (1990: 5) suggests, political languages made available to social agents act as the public frames through which private experiences are both interpreted and expressed. Such languages are the fusion of power (in this case, power “from below”) and political culture—power that makes available particular channels of political expression. In addition, Canadian power resources also act as a buffer against feeling disconnected from government, resulting in individuals still believing that more should be spent on social assistance (and in the case of spending on immigrants/minorities, not as many believing that less should be spent). This is due to the fact that more collective political languages are made available to those who belong to unions, or express their collectivism through a social democratic party.

This finding is particularly important given its implications with respect to falling unionization rates. In Canada, national unionization rates fell from 37.6% in 1981 to 29.9% in 2012. This drop is even more salient for men, whose union memberships fell from 42.1% in 1981 to 28.5% in 2012 (Galarneau and Sohn 2013). This in sharp contrast to the bursts of growth which strengthened Canadian unions after the Great Depression and into the 1970s; often, union memberships would swell by 15-20% annually in the 1940s and 50s, setting the stage for welfare state expansion in the 1960s (Swindinsky 1974). This process was reversed in the 1970s and 80s. While an in-depth discussion of the exact causes of this reversal are beyond the scope of this chapter, Canadian scholars have discussed the growth of corporate think tanks and lack of capital investment in sectors with high rates of unionization as part of a “corporate offensive” (Brownlee 2005, Carroll and Shaw 2001). In addition, markers of globalization such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have made it increasingly difficult for labour’s one tool—labour strikes—to be used effectively (Reshef 1990). The actions taken by the “Canadian

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23 Think tanks such as the Conference Board of Canada, the Fraser Institute, and the C.D. Howe Institute regularly publish works which place blame for many economic ills on unions. These works are subsequently highlighted in news reports and other media, impacting public opinion (Carroll and Shaw 2001).
ruling class” and the Canadian government to breed contempt and distrust of unions among Canadian citizens have resulted in decreasing faith in the process of collective bargaining, a marked shift from the days of the standard employment relationship outlined in Chapter 2. And, as explained above, declining union strength does not simply result in a loss of organizational power resources for workers, but the ability to access collective frames of understanding that enhance citizen solidarity.

To return to question (1), we may conclude that Canadians have undergone some individuation. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a “purely” individuated citizenry will more closely resemble the United States, where citizens are more likely to only think of themselves with respect to welfare state provisions, opting to keep their own incomes to purchase private services (see Giroux 2008). This leads to very high resentment towards taxes and crumbling support for the welfare state. However, it appears that Canadians still very much support more collective provisions, while being more critical with respect to targeted ones; Canadians have not yet reached the point where healthcare and education have to be purchased privately rather than having them publically delivered and funded through taxes, as Schrecker (1999) has suggested. However, the higher animosity toward targeted provisions does suggest that the collective mindset has been eroded to some extent, since social assistance or spending on immigrants and minorities do not benefit “all” Canadians.

We may thus conclude that while Canadians are not individuated to the point where private alternatives are a priority, they have increasingly thought of themselves first when it comes to welfare provisions, consistent with the European findings of Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli (2008) applied to our Canadian context. These results also support the arguments of Edlund (2007) on a smaller scale. While social democratic and liberal welfare states receive more and
less support respectively because of the nature of their welfare programming. Canada, which has been historically somewhere near the centre of these two as a “social liberal” welfare state, relies on elements of both types of welfare states. Thus support among Canadians is split between those elements that are consistent with social-democratic welfare provision, especially healthcare and education 24 in Canada, and those elements that are consistent with liberal welfare provision, which includes social assistance and other forms of targeted spending.

TROUBLING TRENDS: HEALTHCARE AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURE

Despite the fact that Canadians want more spending in healthcare and education, these welfare sectors are still eroding alongside other components of the Canadian welfare state, albeit in different ways. As noted in Chapter 2, while spending and program cuts are not as obvious in Canadian healthcare, private interests are finding innovative ways to generate profit on the back of the public system. More and more privatized services—such as clinics and contracted services—are springing up and taking root in hospitals that supported by both public and private spending (Shrybman 2007). Practices such as “cream-skimming” and increasing numbers of private providers of hospital food, laundry, and other goods and services, are eroding the quality of the overall system for the gains of those who own such companies. In addition, as noted in Chapter 2, such practices place more strain on the public system.

Education, too, is worrisome. As with healthcare, private services and options are increasingly providing Canadians with fewer reliable education “choices”. What is particularly disturbing, as Côte and Allahar (2011) note, is that it is not simply that less public money is being spent on Canadian universities and colleges. Rather, it is the demand by students shifting

24 As Peter, Edgerton and Roberts (2010) note, the expenditure that Canada as a whole provides to post-secondary education makes it resemble a social-democratic welfare state for this area of spending.
from “education” to “training”, as noted in Chapter 2. This means more Canadians are interested in acquiring job-specific skills that can be “put to use” and are indifferent towards a broad education and cultivation of critical thinking, which are required if one is to be an informed and engaged citizen. In addition, as tuition fees become more expensive, students (and their families) demand “more for their dollar”, which typically means skills that are directly transferable to jobs. As Jamie Brownlee (2013) has noted, the equivalence of education to training means a much more complacent workforce that does not question the current social order.

The issue is not simply contained within publically supported universities and colleges. Everest College, a privately owned and operated chain of “career colleges” based in the United States, recently (at the time of writing) closed fourteen locations based in Ontario (Evans 2015). The sudden closing, due to the Ontario government revoking Everest’s provincial registration, has left several students confused and angry about their personal situations. In addition, it has effectively tarnished the credentials of those who attended these schools. While information is still unfolding at the time of writing, the chain is shutting down more locations in the United States, displacing tens of thousands of students (Kirkham 2015). This sort of market-driven model for meeting the demand of “training”, rather than “education”, clearly has weaknesses. For instance, Everest has been accused of fabricating data boasting its rates of job placement rates and student success in the labour market, indicating the possibility that such institutions prey on the rising demand for training conceived in narrow and limited ways.

The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the begin extrapolation of the results of this study into a more comprehensive theory of individuation of citizenship. I begin with commentary in the Canadian context on how individuation relates to current Canadian welfare state literature, before moving to a brief comparative analysis and discussion of a possible typology.
INDIVIDUATION: LESSONS LEARNED

As noted in Chapter 4, recent Canadian welfare state literature has focused on what Myles (2015, also see Banting and Myles 2013) refers to as the fading of redistributive politics in Canada. The results of this study support this more “cautious” metaphor, since it places emphasis on the declining support for redistributive measures. Indeed, as Myles has noted, we should not imagine Canadians simply becoming more fiscally conservative. Social assistance and spending on minorities and immigrants, since they are targeted programs and constitute targeted spending, are more subject to scrutiny among the Canadian population (Myles 1996, Andersen and Curtis 2013).

However, by seeing these results within a framework of citizenship individuation, we can begin to move toward more nuanced understandings of how and why Canadians feel the way they do toward public spending and redistribution. Recent research by Andersen and Curtis (2013) has shown that Canadians have not simply become more fiscally conservative over time, which is the bleak picture either presented or implied by many of the scholars mentioned in Chapter 3. Specifically, they show that Canadian public attitude towards spending occurs in a cyclical rather than linear fashion; Canadians are more favourable to public spending when the economy is performing well, and less favourable when the economy is performing poorly. The univariate results in figure 3 corroborate these results; Canadians do not simply grow to resent taxes, resentment builds and declines similar to results reported by Andersen and Curtis. The authors attribute this to higher-income Canadians feeling particularly generous when the economy generates individually lucrative conditions, although they advance this proposition with caution. It is tempting to write off the fluctuating generosity of wealthier Canadians as a
“cushioning” of individuation from a more collective political culture or the historical strength of Canadian labour.\textsuperscript{25} Certainly, this is one consideration.

However, the logic is likely more complicated than this. First, attitudes toward public spending should be cautiously considered with respect to individuation. The “projects of citizenship” that Western nation-states take on do not necessarily correspond to public opinion, but may instead try to shape and influence it; Andersen and Curtis (2013) confirm this has been the case in the Canadian context. In an important U.S. study, Cook and Barrett (1993) note how privatized health insurance was introduced in the U.S. despite the majority of Americans preferring a Canadian-style healthcare system. Stefan Svallfors (2011) also shows that this is the case in Sweden, where many social services are being privatized under the guise of “consumer choice” despite the fact that public opinion still very much favours the public system (also see Olsen 2013).

More importantly, while data on public opinion in regard to government spending may only capture one side of individuation, it does highlight an important consideration. The concept of citizen individuation in Canada should not be advanced as a simple argument that Canadians are becoming more fiscally conservative; rather, it should focus on the individualization of citizen considerations, which does not necessarily manifest itself as a unidimensional antipathy towards all social spending. If wealthy Canadians are more generous mainly during economic growth, generosity is more likely based off an individual sense of benevolence than on the basis of collective citizen solidarity; advancing economic interests on the basis of citizen solidarity has been increasingly difficult to accomplish, especially in liberal market economies (Edlund 2007, Isin et al. 2008). These results corroborate this idea—Canadians think of themselves first and

\textsuperscript{25} Andersen and Curtis (2013) hint at this, stating that Canadians are altogether more favourable to redistribution than their American counterparts due to the presence of the NDP in Canada. However, the presence of the NDP is only one feature of the Canadian political context that has cushioned individuation, as discussed in Chapter 3.
others second with respect to welfare state provisions. We might consider there to be a *distal* individuation of the Canadian citizenry which breeds *proximal* attitudes toward public spending in certain economic conditions. The “fading of redistributive politics” in a Canadian context should take this possibility into account.

With respect to the results of this study, power resources help to foster a higher sense of citizen solidarity, at least along socio-economic lines. The tables in appendix B allow us to infer that members of a union have greater access to political languages that allow them to frame a wider variety of social problems as public, compared to those who do not have such access. Likewise, social democratic parties allow more progressive Canadians to take on a legitimized institutional identity, as a “social democrat”, and can impact the ways in which Canadians feel toward spending simply by acting as a leftist presence in the Canadian political scene (Andersen and Curtis 2013). As such, we should understand both political culture—manifested here as the attitudes toward social expenditures—and power resources as tightly interlocked. Both work together to constitute what it means to live in Canada and to be Canadian.

*Expanding and locating individuation: the international context*

As noted above, Canada had developed a “somewhat” individuated citizenship regime in conjunction with welfare state retrenchment. While support for collectively-oriented programs remains high, it is significantly less for provisions targeted at Canada’s least fortunate. As noted in Chapter 3, individuation, like (de)commodification, is a matter of degree. As such, if Canada is “somewhat” individuated, we may expect other countries to be more or less individuated, too. While a detailed examination of other countries is beyond the scope of this study, which examined Canada as a case study, a cursory glimpse of how individuated other countries are may
be of value for future research. Below, I will briefly examine the United States and Sweden in relation to Canada. These countries are chosen because they are wealthy capitalist countries that vary widely with respect to de-commodification. Following the analysis in Chapter 3, we would expect that commodification and individuation are correlated.

The United States. Welfare state literature in the United States has a key focus the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which had significant implications for Americans (Schram 2000, Reese 2011). For this reason, it has been referred to as the “welfare revolution” by various scholars (see Somers and Block 2005). This act made accessing social assistance and unemployment benefits complex and difficult for American citizens. Programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) were changed into programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which, as the name alone suggests, are more difficult to access and more stingy in their levels of support. Increasingly, Americans are told to provide for their own well-being through the market and through consumption. As Henry Giroux (2008) explains in a scathing critique of American neo-liberalism and PRWORA, the extent to which one can “consume” in the U.S. determines “the good life”. PRWORA was re-authorized in 2006, and has been hailed by many policymakers as President Clinton’s greatest accomplishment, primarily because welfare caseloads in the U.S. significantly declined after passage into law of PRWORA (Ridzi 2009).

The fact that PRWORA’s success has been measured merely by reduction in welfare caseloads is a simple, yet telling illustration of how sacrosanct the avoidance of dependency has become in the United States. Welfare reforms are construed as successes as the number of people receiving benefits decrease simply because welfare dependency is so loathed in the U.S. Statistically, PRWORA has done little to move people from welfare into the labour market,
where they can be “independent” (ibid, Peck 2001, Ridzi 2009). Rather, the “American work mania” (Schorr 1999) creates a political terrain in which government dependence is simply unacceptable. In addition, those dependent on government programming are automatically seen as “cheating the system”, despite the fact that the American labour market is constructed to create a “surplus army” of labour (Schram 2000; Rank 2004). While “Obamacare” somewhat de-commodified injuries and illnesses of Americans through the Affordable Care Act, it has sparked the creation and deployment of an extremist but powerful right-wing group known as the “Tea Party” (Somers and Block 2014). It seems apparent, then, that the American citizenry has been effectively individuated; self-identification with market forces is rampant in the U.S. There has been little cushioning by the U.S. culture-power nexus to prevent ideological and policy barriers that separate those who “work” from those who are seen as “dependent”. Being a good citizen in the United States means avoiding dependency on government at all costs, even for provisions such as healthcare. To do otherwise is “un-American”.26

Sweden. While the literature on the extent of Swedish welfare retrenchment has been laced with “doomsday predictions”, it still remains the world leader for comprehensiveness and generosity (Bergh 2008). As previously noted, alterations to the Swedish welfare state have primarily been accomplished by selling social programs as a “choice” through private alternatives, most notably elder care and child care (Olsen 2013). The inroads that have been made have been attributed largely to a shift in the balance of power between labour and capital in Sweden, the breakdown of organized labour in the 1980s and 1990s, and a division in public opinion between upper and lower classes regarding high taxes in the 1980s (cf. Olsen 1998;

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26 The term “un-American” is unique to the United States; no other country has an equivalent (e.g. “un-Canadian, un-German or un-French). The term un-American implies that what is not American is just as important as what is; in this case, welfare dependency is important to avoid, lest one becomes a de-facto non-citizen. (see Schram 2000, Schram and Soss 2002, Giroux 2008 and Ridzi 2009 for a more detailed analysis of the American context).
Despite all of these domestic shifts, Swedes still support a generous and comprehensive welfare state, and they believe market forces should not be solely responsible for determining the well-being of Swedish citizens (Svallfors 2004, Svallfors 2011).

As Gregg Olsen (2013) notes, the consecration of self-reliance and the avoidance of state dependency has not taken a firm hold in Sweden. While parts of the international community may view Swedes as “lazy welfare dependents”, Swedes themselves have not questioned the right of citizens to services; rather, the services themselves have changed form to fit into neo-liberal markets (ibid). Much like the “profitization” of the Canadian healthcare system, which is insulated from outright dismantling by public opinion, the Swedish welfare state as a whole is still very much intact. A reasonable conclusion is that while Swedish citizens are undergoing a “citizen-consumer” project, where Swedes are changed from citizens to consumers, this process of individuation has been cushioned by a more collective political culture and stronger history of power resources.

_A typology of individuation._ From this brief analysis, we can reasonably imagine a typology of individuation as it affects different countries, ranging from “hard” (e.g. the United States) to “soft” (e.g. Sweden), with some countries in the middle (e.g. Canada). For those countries that have been extensively individuated, private alternatives through the market are pursued, and expanded public welfare services receive little to no support. For those countries that have undergone “soft” individuation, services are still public entitlements; however, they have undergone a number of changes to conform to market rationalities, including (in some cases) the expectation of generating profit and doing “more with less”. For other countries and their welfare states, such as Germany or France with a “familialistic” or “conservative” orientation, it is possible that their citizenries undergo a sort of “cleaved” individuation, where
those in advantaged social positions are seen as entitled to public welfare provision, whereas the disadvantaged are not. However, further empirical research would be needed to substantiate such a claim.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Limitations

From this study we can conclude that, alongside the retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state in the 1980s and through to the present, the Canadian citizenry has undergone a substantial degree of individuation. While Canadians of all political backgrounds would like to see more support for “inclusive” programming, such as healthcare and education, they are much more critical of targeted spending provisions, including social assistance and spending on immigrants and minorities. However, it is also apparent that private alternatives for healthcare and education are not seen as desirable. Thus the study also supports the idea that Canadian public opinion with respect to the welfare state is nuanced; it is not simply calling for a fiscally conservative regime of spending cuts.

What is likely is that we are seeing a decline in the legitimacy of *citizen solidarity* as a basis of claims-making on the state. While attitudes toward public spending may fluctuate over time and display dichotomous tendencies depending on specific policy areas, it can be reasonably suggested that the Canadian identity is losing its collective components. While those Canadians who are part of a union and who identify with a social democratic party are more supportive of government spending, it is clear that most Canadians do not feel this way. In conjunction with the trend analyses laid out in Chapter 5, the disconnect between Canadians and their government has grown over time and has paralleled the scaling back of the welfare state over the past thirty to forty years.

Future research on the process of citizenship individuation should branch out in two directions. First, engaging in other ways of measuring individuation, such as doing textual analysis of throne and/or budget speeches of Canada or other countries, would be useful in helping us understand the themes and symbols that governments utilize to advance particular
discourses of citizenship (Brodie 2008). This would uncover the ways in which governments are trying to “re-make” their citizens through various “projects”, such as those described by Janet Newman27 (2013). Second, studies of individuation should be undertaken in an international context, in countries with different types of welfare states. A typology which links up with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classic welfare worlds typology would be useful to characterize not only the welfare states in each country, but the attitudes and feelings of citizens toward the welfare state and its provisions and how these are changing over time. It would also give greater insight into the connections between citizens and their welfare states; for example, in the Canadian and American contexts, fiscal welfare policies, such as income splitting and tax cuts, nurture individualized citizen-identities by separating economic life from universal components of the welfare state.

Another way in which the study of individuation should advance is the incorporation of racialization and gendered meanings. As noted in Chapter 3, “work” takes on a number of meanings when gender comes into play. Unpaid work in the home, volunteer work, and other forms of activity external to the labour force should be studied in conjunction with public attitudes towards how these fit into being a “good” citizen. While the variables used in this dataset did not allow for this type of analysis, welfare state literature and scholarly conversations on dependency, highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, suggest that these would be fruitful avenues of research.

As with any study that uses secondary data, this one faced a number of limitations. The first and perhaps most obvious are the issues with a main variable of study, whether or not

27 These include the worker citizen, where citizens are expected gain their identity and well-being from their jobs; the citizen-consumer, where citizens are expected to exercise “choice” through the marketplace, such as purchasing social provisions; the participating citizen, where individualized roles in local governments and citizen boards should be taken up; and the responsible citizen, where citizens are expected to provide for their own welfare. This last project is particularly important for citizenship individuation.
Canadians feel the government is wasting tax money. There are a number of problems with this variable. One of them is history. The people of Quebec and the Western provinces have other reasons to resent government. These reasons include the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords in the case of Quebec, and alienation of the Western provinces from central Canada. Another limitation in measuring perceived waste of tax money is that Canadians likely think about the spending habits of the government of the day, rather than their feelings about welfare state spending of the Canadian state in broader institutional terms.

Notwithstanding these major limitations, this study has measured several variables consistently from the 1960s to recent times. Although it may have measured some “collateral resentment” from other historical events, the increase in citizens’ distrust of government spending does indicate a cleavage between government and the citizenry that comprises the potential for comprehensive social policy (Svallfors 2007, 2011). As such, it may be seen as a “precursor” to individuation, since lack of trust in how the state uses taxes is a necessary (but insufficient) condition for the transformations of citizenship outlined in Chapter 3.

There were some limitations to the data set: the Canadian Election Study has somewhat inconsistent measurements and variables over its forty-year run. For example, the areas of healthcare, education, social assistance, and minorities and immigrants were incorporated into the study due to availability. Other questions about spending on older Canadians, (un)employment insurance, or families and children were asked in earlier surveys but discontinued in more recent surveys. In addition, many of the questions were posed differently from one survey to the next. For instance, in some years a four point Likert scale was used to assess whether or not the government spends too much in various policy areas. Elsewhere, a dichotomous variable was used asking participants to answer “yes” or “no”. This makes it
impossible to keep measurements completely consistent over the decades. However, the CES 2011 was chosen to give the best possible recent look. While the study was to originally include another year in the 1980s or 1990s to get a sense of the change in spending attitudes over time, this was not possible given the aforementioned inconsistencies.

Last, the concept of *citizenship*, as a combination of power resources and political culture, is inferred from the tables in appendix B. While there is clearly evidence that demonstrates that association with power resources affects attitudes towards social spending, one must wonder whether or not, when presented the word *Canadian*, Canadian respondents would answer differently due to sentiments associated with Canadian civic religion (such as multiculturalism and anti-Americanism). To directly measure conceptions of citizenship cross-nationally, a new survey should be constructed that asks Canadians and members of other nation-states what is and is not included in the responsibilities, obligations, entitlements and duties of being a citizen of their own particular country. This study provides a starting point from which future research of this sort could be conducted. While there are current datasets that begin measuring these (such as the International Social Survey Programme and the World Values Survey), a survey that measures the direct link between citizen-identity and welfare state provisions has yet to be designed. While such a task was beyond the scope of this particular study, the results here suggest that it would be a worthwhile endeavour.

Overall, being a “good” Canadian citizen has increasingly meant avoiding government dependence—especially dependence on social assistance. But Canadians are far from being completely individuated in their conception of citizenship, at least when compared to American citizens. Perhaps it is the case that Canadian citizens have undergone more individuation than their American or Swedish counterparts over the last three to four decades, consistent with
Olsen’s (2002) comment that the Canadian welfare state has seen more radical changes than welfare states in the U.S. or Sweden. Nonetheless, this study does demonstrate that Canadians still adhere to collective beliefs in universal approaches to welfare provision.

This finding provides some hope for organizations such as the Basic Income Canada Network (BICN), which is working to ensure that all Canadians have a guaranteed adequate income in order to live comfortably. Basic income is at its core a collective provision, for “catching” those who fall below the poverty line. It is promising is that the campaign has received some attention from mainstream media (e.g. Shingler 2014). However, what remains to be seen is whether or not basic income will be viewed by the public like healthcare or education—something that benefits “all” Canadians—or as a “targeted” provision, a program that helps only those who need it. What is certain is that the issue is more complex than Canadians simply rejecting it outright due to automatic and strong antipathy towards public spending. If this study is any indication, one potential hurdle for basic income among the Canadian public might be the fact that no work requirement is necessary to receive the benefit (Pasma 2014).

In conclusion, this study demonstrates—albeit imperfectly—that “individuation” is a concept worth further investigation, and that it has impacted Canadians in significant ways. While a cursory examination of the United States and Sweden was included alongside Canada, further research should investigate the level of individuation in these countries—along with the “familialistic” welfare states such as those in Germany and France—in order to further advance our cross-national understanding of the process of individuation. A possible typology built on the conceptual and theoretical foundations of this thesis, which captures the intersections of political
culture and power resources, can open up research in new areas to do with citizenship, identities, political belonging, and identification with welfare states.
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Appendix A²⁸: Trivariate analysis 1 – Unions, social spending, and wasting taxes

Table 1: Union membership, belief in wasted taxes, and government spending on healthcare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief in wasted taxes:</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare:</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(68.9%)</td>
<td>(78%)</td>
<td>(74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(30.3%)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td>(24.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8%)</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare:</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(63.6%)</td>
<td>(80.0%)</td>
<td>(72.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.5%)</td>
<td>(16.6%)</td>
<td>(24.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>(3.4%)</td>
<td>(2.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁸ *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 for all tables.
Table 1.1: Union membership, belief and wasted taxes, and government spending on education

Belief in wasted taxes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(69.7%)</td>
<td>(78.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(74.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29.3%)</td>
<td>(18.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(23.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.8%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>119</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(65.6%)</td>
<td>(73.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(69.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33.5%)</td>
<td>(23.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>(3.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>221</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.2: Union membership, belief and wasted taxes, and government spending on “welfare”

Belief in wasted taxes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>Government Spending on Welfare:</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes***</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(43.2%)</td>
<td>(28.4%)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(48.3%)</td>
<td>(48.6%)</td>
<td>(48.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.5%)</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
<td>(16.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No***</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24.2%)</td>
<td>(21.2%)</td>
<td>(22.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(60.3%)</td>
<td>(52.1%)</td>
<td>(55.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(15.5%)</td>
<td>(26.7)</td>
<td>(21.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.3: Union membership, belief and wasted taxes, and government spending on immigrants and minorities

**Belief in wasted taxes:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrants and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minorities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
<td>(14.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as now</td>
<td>(71.3%)</td>
<td>(57.8%)</td>
<td>(63.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15.7%)</td>
<td>(27.2%)</td>
<td>(22.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrants and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minorities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.7%)</td>
<td>(10.1%)</td>
<td>(11.2%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spend the same</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>301</td>
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<td>as now</td>
<td>(67.6%)</td>
<td>(54.9%)</td>
<td>(60.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19.7%)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(28.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>499</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Trivariate analysis 2 – Political party identification, social spending, and wasting taxes

Table 2: Party alignment, belief in wasted taxes, and government spending on healthcare

Belief in wasted taxes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party alignment</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Healthcare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(72.9%)</td>
<td>(79.9%)</td>
<td>(76.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27.1%)</td>
<td>(16.8%)</td>
<td>(21.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>(1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Healthcare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53.6%)</td>
<td>(61.4%)</td>
<td>(57.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40.1%)</td>
<td>(34.2%)</td>
<td>(39.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.4%)</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(2.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Healthcare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None***</td>
<td>Government Spending on Healthcare:</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Healthcare:</th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>67</th>
<th>(30.6%)</th>
<th>(14.1%)</th>
<th>(20.1%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(0.8%)</td>
<td>(1.9%)</td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  | Spend the same as now | (68.6%) | (84%) | (78.4%) |
|                  | Spend less            | (30.6%) | (14.1%) | (20.1%) |
|                  | Total                 | 100%     | 100%    | 100%    |
Table 2.1: Party alignment, belief in wasted taxes, and government spending on education

Belief in wasted taxes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party alignment</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>135 (70.3%)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>56 (29.2%)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>124 (58.5%)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>85 (40.1%)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>3 (1.4%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>89 (72.4%)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

108
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Government Spending on Education:</th>
<th>Spend more</th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(68.3%)</td>
<td>(30.7%)</td>
<td>(1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>166</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(70.0%)</td>
<td>(30.7%)</td>
<td>(1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Government Spending on Education:</th>
<th>Spend more</th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(71.3%)</td>
<td>(26.5%)</td>
<td>(2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>136</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(71.3%)</td>
<td>(26.5%)</td>
<td>(2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2: Party alignment, belief in wasted taxes, and government spending on “welfare”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party alignment</th>
<th>Belief in wasted taxes:</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
<td>Government Spending on Welfare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34.4%)</td>
<td>(27.5%)</td>
<td>(30.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(56.1%)</td>
<td>(55.9%)</td>
<td>(26.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9.5%)</td>
<td>(16.7%)</td>
<td>(13.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong>*</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Democratic</strong>*</td>
<td>Government Spending on Welfare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(51.7%)</td>
<td>(42.2%)</td>
<td>(45.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(16.8%)</td>
<td>(19.3%)</td>
<td>(18.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34.4%)</td>
<td>(27.5%)</td>
<td>(30.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending on Welfare:</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None***</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.4%)</td>
<td>(52.5%)</td>
<td>(10.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Spending on Welfare:</th>
<th>Spend more</th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None***</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32.4%)</td>
<td>(45.1%)</td>
<td>(12.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Spending on Welfare:</th>
<th>Spend more</th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None***</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34.5%)</td>
<td>(44.8%)</td>
<td>(9.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.3: Party alignment, belief in wasted taxes, and government spending on immigrants and minorities

#### Belief in wasted taxes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party alignment</th>
<th>Government Spending on Immigrants and minorities:</th>
<th>Some or none</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal**</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.2%)</td>
<td>(13.3%)</td>
<td>(15.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(68.8%)</td>
<td>(59.2%)</td>
<td>(63.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td>(27.5%)</td>
<td>(21.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>186</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.3%)</td>
<td>(7.5%)</td>
<td>(6.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend the same as now</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64.1%)</td>
<td>(53.3%)</td>
<td>(58.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend less</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.6%)</td>
<td>(39.2%)</td>
<td>(34.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic**</td>
<td>Spend more</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.6%)</td>
<td>(13.8%)</td>
<td>(16.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
minorities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spend more</strong></td>
<td>15 (15.6%)</td>
<td>25 (19.1%)</td>
<td>40 (17.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spend the same as now</strong></td>
<td>62 (64.6%)</td>
<td>57 (41.2%)</td>
<td>119 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spend less</strong></td>
<td>19 (19.8%)</td>
<td>49 (37.4%)</td>
<td>68 (30.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>96 (100%)</td>
<td>131 (100%)</td>
<td>227 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending on Immigrants and minorities:</td>
<td>116 (100%)</td>
<td>210 (100%)</td>
<td>326 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>