

Conflict Transformation and Permanent Peace in Keana Local Government Council of  
Nasarawa State, Nigeria: The Roles, Motives, Objectives, Strategies and Tactics of the  
Religious and Traditional Leaders

by

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## **Abstract**

Keana Local Government Council (LGC) in the Southern Senatorial District of Nasarawa state, Nigeria, experienced a devastating inter-ethnic conflict between 2001-2002, and has since then enjoyed uninterrupted durable peace. Motivated therefore by the desire to know more about the conflict, how this durable peace was achieved and most importantly the transformative roles, strategies and tactics adopted by the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC in addressing the conflict and attaining this feat, this study relied on (1) conflict transformation and other theories to elaborate some key concepts, (2) and used simple qualitative methodology to collect data from the religious and traditional leaders, and to analyse it for the primary purpose of highlighting their significant responsorial contributions

Mutual mistrust, political marginalization, unattended land skirmishes and brutal murder emerged as the primary causes of the conflict. With their status and roles as motivators, mobilizers and peace diplomats, and aided tactically by personal courage, fearlessness and love for the people, the religious and traditional leaders were able to strategically address the conflict with sustainable dialogue, interactive problem-solving meetings, religious rituals, traditional mores, peace education and youth mobilization.

Based on these transformative contributions, this study makes these positional statements: (1) the Keana communities hold these leaders with tenacity as auspicious elements of their histories and social welfare, (2) these leaders are local non-state peace actors and epistemic communities which ideologists, state-crafters, peace researchers and practitioners ought to work with as co-actors in peace processes and social development.

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To my mother and siblings, thank you for being there for each other and for your immeasurable love and confidence in me.

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to  
the late Joseph Amoor Genger.

He passed on during the course of this work.

As a father, he ensured that all of us, his children,  
received formal education,  
remain God fearing  
and are useful to the society.

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## Chapter 1: General Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction

It is perhaps important to start by giving a brief picture of Nigeria and trim it down to the North Central Zone, Nasarawa state, Nasarawa Southern Senatorial District and Keana Local Government Council (LGC). This background is necessary for the clear understanding of the research questions, namely the causes of the 2001-2002 conflict, its emergent legacies and most significantly the relevant contributions made by the religious and traditional leaders to transform durable peace into permanent peace. The study data was generated from secondary sources and qualitative methods, namely by interrogating 7 direct and 6 indirect participants (the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC)<sup>1</sup> with the 6 research questions.

In 1841, the British came to present day Nigeria, via Lagos, for two reasons. They were intent on freeing the Egba people from slavery raids by the Lagosians and they intended to exploit palm oil for industrial use in Europe. It can be argued that these two factors also were used as the major strategies in the campaign to end the slave trade and initiate economic exploitation in Africa. The later years of the British in Nigeria, known as the era of colonial administration, lasted until Nigeria gained independence as a conglomeration of diverse ethno-religious groups lumped together into one national entity on the 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1960.

Nigeria is known for her demographic compositions in terms of ethnicity and religion. Scholarship (Usuh, 2008) has correctly captured Nigeria's ethnographic context as a

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<sup>1</sup> The terms "traditional" and "religious" leaders are operationalized in this work with respect to how they are understood and used by the people of Keana LGC. Thus, the term "traditional" refers to the chiefs of the three Alago communities (Keana, Agaza and Alosi) and the Tiv community representative. The term "religious" refers to the ministers and leaders of the three faith communities in Keana LGC: Islam, Christianity and the Alago indigenous religion.

plethora of over 416 diverse ethno-religious nationalities which had no or little diplomatic contacts before the colonial era. Unfortunately ethnicity and religion have heavily contributed to the defamation of the country with inglorious relationships between groups and persistent and gory ethno-religious conflicts since independence.

Today, Nigeria is a country of more than 167 million people. It is characterized by elites which have polarized and fractionalized, as well as differentiated and instrumentalized, ethnic and religious identities for interests that are selfish, sectarian, and simply non-nationalistic (Toyin, 1998; Haliru, 2012; Aduba, 2011; Adesoji, 2013). Ethnic differentiation is manifest in the dis-serving philosophy of one being an indigene and the other a settler; a commonplace reality in Nigerian communities. The indigene-settler differentiation is harmful and very much a public flaunt of the country's constitution which confers equal citizenship to all Nigerians irrespective of where they live (Adamu, 2001, 2002). On the other hand, the country's religiosity is replete with bigotry which has often led to gruesome conflicts. Commenting on the impact of the two Semitic religions on Africa in general, Hamdesa Tusso (2014) asserts that Christianity and Islam have debased Africa's traditional worldview and religion, and have also implanted the culture of religious *othering* among Africans. While this general assertion is valid in Nigeria, the religious and ethnic identities and struggles are so intertwined that you cannot talk of one without the other (Paden, 2005). Studies (IFAD, 2007; Agbiboa, 2012; Aduba, 20; Forest, 2012) have asserted there is a very strong relationship between ethnic and religious consciousness which is used for ethno-religious mobilization in Nigeria. They liken it to a catalyst whose reactions have continued to pose threats to social relationships and co-operative existence in the country.

Nigeria has six geo-political zones. The North-Central zone consists of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau states. According to Best (2005), the zone has the “highest socio-political and religious plurality of any regional units of the Nigerian Federation” (Best, 2005). Of the 416 tribal groups identified in Nigeria by the colonial regime in 1926 (Usuh, 2008), 50 – 70% of them are found in this region (Aboki, 2004; Usuh, 2008). Unfortunately, however, the zone is vulnerable to inter-group tensions and conflicts because it is highly polarized along ethnic and religious lines. Toyin (1998) attests to this by reporting that, to this day, the zone is a hunting ground for converts by the competing Semitic religions, and the present democratic dispensation has aroused unhealthy political assertiveness. The combination of the two has given birth to the culture of discrimination, suspicion, tension, and violence. Since 1999, very many unforgettable ethno-religious conflicts occurred in some states of the zone such as those involving Tiv vs Jukun and Jukun vs Kuteb in Taraba State, the Tiv vs other ethnic groups in Nasarawa state, and the Hausa/Fulani vs Anaguta, Afizere and Berom in Plateau state and Fulani vs Tiv in Benue state (Aboki, 2004, Kwaja, 2009, Alloy, 2012, Chukwuma & Atelhe, 2014).

This research study is centered on the 2001-2002 conflict that took place in the Southern Senatorial District of Nasarawa state. Nasarawa state was created on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October, 1996. “It shares common boundaries with Plateau State to the North and Kaduna State to the East, Benue state to the South and Abuja [Nigeria’s Federal Capital] to the West” (Aboki, 2004). The 2006 census reported in Citypopulation, (2014) indicates that the state has a total population of 1.9 million people. Its location in the volatile North Central region has exposed it to a recorded history of persistent ethnic violence since its

creation.

The Southern Senatorial District of the state is composed of five (5) Local Government Councils (LGCs) which are bordering their counterparts in the northern axis of Benue state. The five southern senatorial LGCs of Nasarawas state are Awe, Doma, Keana, Lafia, and Obi. Their counterparts in Benue are Gwer-West, Guma, and Katsina-Ala. Benue state is predominantly Tiv, and for ancestral, colonial and political reasons they also have very high populations in other Nigerian states like Nasarawa, Taraba, and Plateau. The Tiv, Agatu, Alago, Akye, Eggon, Fulani, Gwandara, Hausa, Jukun, Mighili, Kanuri, Kwalla, and some other visiting ethnic groups, co-habit the Southern Senatorial District. Also due to the geographical location of this district and Keana LGC in the volatile region it is not surprising to see that they too are smeared with the history of phenomenal ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts. The major issues causing conflict between the constitutive communities include: ethnic identity consciousness and differentiation, resource control, and the ethnic, religious, and political aspirations aimed at subjugating the other. Thus discriminatory concepts like “stranger”, “settler” and “non-indigene” are commonplace in both the Southern Senatorial District and Keana LGC.

Once again, the purview of this study is the 2001-2002 conflict in the southern senatorial district, its effect in Keana LGC and how the transformative contributions by the religious and traditional leaders in the LGC have achieved more than 10 years of durable peace. Even though the conflict has been correctly described as “inter-ethnic” (Adamu, 2001, 2002, 2003; Farouk, 2004, viii; Aluaigba, 2011, 87), and popularly postulated as a war by the allied forces of the Alago, Kanuri, Hausa, Kwalla, Fulan and

Eggon ethnic groups against the Tiv ethnic community (Aboki, 2004, 52; Alubo, 2006, 142; Aluiagba, 2011, 87), on the other, it can be said to be free of strong religious connotations. As earlier stated, the ethnic groups in this part of the country usually mix religion and ethnicity so intricately that any attempt to disconnect them dilutes the truth of the matter. Hence, the texture of the 2001-2002 conflict is understood in this work as ethno-religious. The 2001-2002 crises brought about heinous aftermaths. In magnitude and extent it was large-scale and with internecine consequences, but the Tivs suffered most grievously because of the combined attacks against them. The total casualty is put at over 50,000. Internally displaced persons were more than 500,000 and properties worth millions of Nigerian naira were destroyed (Aboki, 2004, 90, 103).

The intense fighting was put off because the parties accepted cease-fire, which was made possible by the combined approaches of consultations, conferences, meetings, interactive workshops, negotiations, speeches, appeals and security interventions by NGOs, state and national governments and political representatives (Aboki, 2004). Even though peace returned to the Southern Senatorial District in 2002, it is regrettable to report that a few conflicts have taken place recently in some other parts of the District, and not in Keana LGC. For example, in 2012 and 2013, ethno-political conflicts occurred between the Eggons and Alagos, in Lafia and Obi LGCs. Shortly before conducting the research interviews for this thesis, a violent conflict was fought against the Tivs of Benue State by the marauding Fulanis. The conflict is over, but the Senatorial District and Keana LGC are implicated as third parties because the Fulani mercenaries camped in some parts of their territory without any opposition. Credit can be given to the religious and traditional leaders in Keana who work tirelessly to ensure that all erupted conflicts and

broken relationships are transformed for peaceful co-existence.

Despite the existence of over a decade of durable peace and the people's hope for permanent peace, in Keana LGC today, there is still the lingering presence of the factors that precipitated the 2001-2002 conflict and the legacies that emerged from it. In the conception of Galtung (1975), this situation is akin to negative peace (no more violence) and not positive peace because of the continued existence of the causative factors, the emergent legacies and the need to transform all conflict issues and structures.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

My research investigation was concerned with identifying the roles, motives, objectives, strategies and tactics that the religious and traditional leaders used to transform the 2001-2002 conflict and attain durable peace in Keana LGC. This thesis is therefore a direct reporting of the findings related to the research problem. In every conflict-ridden area, every period of peace that is achieved is highly appreciated, especially the peace under study which has lasted for more than 10 years. In fact, explorative questions are being asked about the processes that enhanced the durable peace and the significant factors that nurtured the processes. This is because many post conflict peace accords did not last beyond the next day (Borer, et. al., 2006). The truth of this point is illustrated in the return of hostilities between Israel and Gaza after the 2014 ceasefire collapsed after just one day (Ramadan & Benmeleh, 2014). With this unfortunate illustration in mind, the 10+ years of durable peace in Keana will be investigated to uncover how it happened and how the processes can be used in other conflict contexts. As in all of Nigeria, religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC

embody the core of the “cultural assumptions” of the people. Their roles, objectives and tactics do significantly determine what goes on in their communities and how they are sustaining a peaceful community.

As a way of investigating the research problem, I developed six (6) incisive questions to help me to acquire “rich information” about my research topic: Conflict Transformation In Keana LGC, Nasarawa State: The Roles, Motives, Objectives, Strategies and Tactics of the Religious and Traditional Leaders. Following upon interviews with traditional leaders, I also employed the necessary steps to analyze, interpret and comprehensibly report my findings. The primary research question is: how have you as a religious/traditional leader in Keana LGC contributed to the achievement of the more than 10 years of durable peace in the area, since the 2001-2002 inter-ethnic conflict? The secondary research questions include: (1) what will you say are the causative factors and the emerging legacies of the 2001-2002 conflict? (2) How are you, as a religious/traditional leader in Keana LGC addressing the causative factors and legacies of the 2001-2002 conflict in order to achieve permanent peace? (3) What are the motives and objectives that encourage you as a religious/traditional leader in Keana LGC to embark on the transformation of the 2001-2002 conflict? (4) What are the strategies and tactics that you used as a religious/traditional leader to transform the conflict in question? (5) Describe how the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC mutually engage in the transformation of conflicts in the area?

After analyzing the answers derived from these questions in the light of my theoretical framework, I hoped to establish that as “middle-range leaders” (Lederach, 1997, p. 41), religious and traditional powers are significant non-state actors whose

conflict transformation roles, motives, objectives and strategies should be not ignored in peacemaking and conflict resolution studies. This is because just as other populations (actors, agencies and leaderships) are given cognizance in the scientific study, analysis and approach to conflict, a similar attitude should be taken with regards to religious and traditional leaders. The concluding chapter of this study will strongly articulate that despite the whirlpool of liberal ideologies which undermine religious and traditional institutions, in Africa, these types of leaderships authorities are unequivocally important to the scheme of things and search for peace, especially in conflict ridden communities.

### **1.3 Methodology of Study**

The methodology used to inquire into the research problem is the basic qualitative approach. My instruments were semi-structured interviews done by way of one-on-one oral interactions. I asked questions in an open-ended manner. In order to highlight my findings and report them succinctly, I identified, analysed and interpreted the recurrent topics, variables, categories and emotive information with respect to the roles, motives, objectives, strategies and tactics used by the religious and traditional leaders to transform the 2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC.

### **1.4 Scope and Limitation of Study**

This study is focused on the 2001-2002 inter-ethnic conflict between the Tiv and the other ethnic alliances as it happened in Keana LGC and how durable peace was returned to the area. I did not deal on the 2014 crisis between the Benue Tiv population and the marauding Fulanis who camped in the thick bushes of Keana landscape, thereby

implicating it as a third party to the crisis (Daniel, 2014). In terms of sampled population, it is leaders of the four traditional and three religious authorities in Keana LGC. These are the Tiv Development Association (TIDA), and the Keana, Agaza, and Alosi chiefdoms, as well as the three religious classifications: Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Jam`atu Nasril Islam (JNI) and Indigenous Religious Community. The overall intent is the exploration of the conflict, how it happened in Keana and how the leaders in question contributed to the transformation of the conflict and the issues and persons strongly associated with it.

There are some limitations to this study. The work did not intend to investigate the security strategies employed by the governments of Nasarawa state and Keana LGC because they do not fall within the research problem. Also, the study did not investigate other organized groups because they are not the targeted participants but the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC. It is also not the intention of the study to test the veracity of the information shared by the research participants (for example, by interviewing another set of people), but to understand how the religious and traditional leaders have been going about their peace work and the motives that have encouraged them. It was therefore proper that the research questions should strictly be limited to the religious and traditional leaders and their pacific activities that gave birth to durable peace since 2002.

### **1.5 Significance of Study**

The primary strength of this study is the additional knowledge it brings to the field of Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) by exploring and highlighting the significant roles

that religious and traditional leaders in Nigeria play in simmering inter-ethnic tensions and transforming any form of violent encounters. PACS can use the findings of this work to argue for multi-track approaches to conflict resolution as well as indigenous responses to conflict contexts.

There is the continuing need for scholarship to strongly assert the indispensability of religious and traditional leaders, especially from indigenous cultures, and their conflict transformation strategies in peace and conflict studies field. In my interactions with students and colleagues in the field and study of literature in the field of PACS, I have come to realize two things:

(a) The romanticization of the superiority of liberal culture over non-western and non-liberal cultures is destructive and an unacceptable development. Liberal and West are used interchangeably in this work with to reference to the geographical Western Europe and North America and their econo-political ideologies whose constitutive elements are science, technocracy, democracy, free market and trade, human rights, militarism and humanitarianism. Woodrow Wilson named this rationality a ~~new~~ "new order", George Bush called it ~~the~~ "the liberal world order" which America must propagate for every modern society adopt (Woodhouse et al., 2011, 274; Bush, 2002). The conceptualization of the liberal in peace and conflict studies is well done by Mac Ginty and Richmond who refer to it as the ~~Western~~ "Western rationality, with its diktats of universality and modernisation" [which ~~is~~ "is challenged in different ways" by the local, traditional, non-Western or global south communities and their worldviews (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, 736). This is the sense liberal or western are used throughout this work. In opposition, scholarly works on anti-colonialism, such as Walker (2004) and Jeong (2000) have described the imposition

of the liberal culture on the indigenous worldviews as “ontological violence” (Walker, 2004, p. 527) and “epistemological violence” (Jeong, 2000, p. 263). Jeong observes that Western ideologies of peace and development violate indigenous worldviews by undermining and distorting their mechanisms of self-reliance. In the same vein, Walker rejects Western societies’ imposition of their models without considering indigenous worldviews, thus perpetuating their ontological violence on local processes.

(b) Secularization is romanticized to the disregard of religion. Religion is no longer perceived as an agent for social change and peace but as a factor that causes violence which it cannot resolve; accordingly, it should be left out of serious and scientific discourses in PACS. Prominent scholarly and theological works have, however, condemned this attitude as unwarranted. Conversely they have cited many instances where religion and religious leaders have transformed soured relationships and conflicts and thus argued that the two cannot be disregarded and dispensed within any responsible search for tenable approaches to conflict resolution today (Rose & Ignatieff, 1968; Johnston & Sampson, 1994; Knitter, 2002; Knitter, 2008; Troy, 2014; Dupuis, 2001; Little & Appleby, 2004, 2000). In the same light Tusso (2014) argues that the best of religion with regards to the promotion of peace can be enjoyed when every religious pedagogy is respectful of all persons, cultures and religions and abhors the doctrines of replacement and super-secession in addition to making a “difference in reference to to promotong peace in a society and, indeed, in the world” (p. 158). Inspired by this background, I am, in part, using this work to passionately argue that religious and traditional institutions from indigenous contexts are indispensable peace actors, and they should be included in every responsible discourse that seeks to understand conflict and ways of

approaching it. Religious and traditional leaders from indigenous backgrounds should no more be spurned with distortion, subordination and underestimation; especially where the influences of liberal thoughts and political systems are very strong as stated by Walker and Jeong above. Despite the chauvinism of postmodernism, these institutions have continued to constitute the intrinsic elements of the indigenous peoples' worldview or components of their primordial identity. They have continued to be primordial marks of identity and cultural factors for social welfare and harmony in indigenous communities.

Finally, the information generated from this study can be used by the concerned communities to educate their members about the 2001-2002 conflict in terms of causative factors and emergent legacies and how, with their cooperation, they can be dealt with or transformed. Future researchers will also refer to this study. Policy makers especially those in Nasarawa state and Nigeria will see the findings of this study useful for the formulation of policies that acknowledge and necessarily include religious and traditional leaders in government programs for peace and conflict transformation.

## **1.6 Conclusion**

As a prologue to the thesis, this chapter argues that the colonial legacy in Nigeria and the country's ethno-religious diversity, which is highly concentrated in the North Central geopolitical zone, have not been properly harnessed since independence. This has left the country, most especially the North Central zone where Keana LGC is situated, very vulnerable to ethnic and ethno-religious tensions, rifts and devastating violence.

The next chapter gives details about Keana LGC: the people, their land and politics. It also demonstrates how these elements influenced the 2001-2002 conflict.

## **Chapter 2: Background to the 2001-2002 Conflict in Keana LGC**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter explores the identities of the Alago and Tiv people who are the dominant ethnic groups in Keana LGC and how their individual narratives explain the origin of the council. Keana LGC has three salient *geos*: location, politics and sphere which have economic, political, cultural, religious and social implications in the life of communities co-existing in the area. While analysing the implications of these categorical elements, the chapter depicts how they serve as resources and factors that make Keana LGC vulnerable to violent competition among the co-existing communities and the emergence of the 2001-2002 conflict.

### **2.2 The People and Origin of Keana LGC**

Basically, there are two major dominant ethnic populations of Keana LGC which also hold contesting narratives about the origin or founding of the town. They are the Alago and the Tiv, and each has its version of the origin of Keana. It is significant to note at this juncture that the disagreeing views they hold about the origin of Keana and the –settler” impression the Alago have about the status of the Tiv in Keana are conflictive factors that are well connected to the air of distrust, discrimination, and tension that characterizes their present relationship. It is not too early to mention at this point that despite the disparity of narratives, the two groups have lived together peacefully for many years. Another ethnic group found in the Keana geographical area is the Fulani nomadic community. Their status in Keana is noncontroversial. They are nomads who come in and go out of Keana seasonally in search of grazing foliage for their cattle. Their association

with conflicts in this area is with respect to the scramble for grazing land, cattle encroachment, and destruction of farms. These issues have often provoked conflict between them and the Alago-Tiv farming communities. Characteristically, the Alago-Tiv conflict is entrenched in their primordial narratives and consciousness while the narratives of the seasonal Fulani-farmers conflicts are built around competition for pastoral, subsistence and ecological advantages (Chukwuma & Atelhe, 2014). On the whole, both the Alago-Tiv and Fulani-farmers conflicts and their violent dynamics should be given the attention for resolution.

The Alago narratives argue that they founded Keana about 1232 AD. Written traditions (*Keana in Perspective*, 2004; Aboki, 2004; Danglah, 2012) posit that the Alago ethnic group was one of the confederacies of the great Kwararafa kingdom. At the collapse of the kingdom and the dis-integration of the component tribes in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the Alago sojourned at Idah, in the Igala kingdom (another offshoot of Kwararafa kingdom). Here they assisted the Igala king in his many military exploits which earned him successful independence from the Jukun and Benin powers. During the post-war peaceful period, in accord with an earlier agreement with the Idah sovereignty, the Alago asked to establish their ruling dynasty over the Igala kingdom, but the Idah ruling pogrom objected. This brewed tension. As a result, under the leadership of Akyana Adi and Osabonya Ogoshi, the Alago left the Igala kingdom. Having moved north-ward, across the River Benue, they settled at Ogede. Here at Ogede, Akyana Adi discovered a salt stream while on his hunting expedition. He concealed this discovery from his brother, Osabonya Ogoshi. When in later years Ogoshi suggested they should relocate farther west from Ogede, Adi perfidiously refused to go with him but chose to stay back in order

to own the salt plain he had until now concealed from Ogoshi. On knowing about the perfidy and concealment, Ogoshi plotted to attack his brother but was discouraged by his followers. The shame of the entire episode fastened the movement of Ogoshi and his followers to farther west of Ogede where they founded what is known today as Doma town and Chiefdom, while Adi and his followers remained at Ogede, which later transformed into Keana town and Chiefdom. With the passing of time, some followers of Adi relocated from Ogede and established other Alago towns: Olosoho, Alosi, Ibi, Owena, Obi, Assakio, and Agaza. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the British made Keana chiefdom a colonial administrative center. In the post-independence era, the entire landmarks of Keana and the other chiefdoms, towns, and settlements with shared ancestral, political and historical traditions were in 1996 conglomerated into one piece (1,048 km<sup>2</sup>) to form what we have today as Keana LGC. For political and traditional reasons the two Alago chiefdoms of Alosi and Agaza are existing in Keana LGC under the paramount authority of the Keana traditional stool (Campbell-Irons, 1919; Keana in Perspective, 2004; Aboki, 2004). With regards to their nonviolent encounters with other tribes in Nasarawa southern district and Keana LGC, the Alago assert that before the arrival of the British administration, they had encounter with two major tribes: Mighili and Tiv. The Alago agree with the Divisional Officer's Report of 1930 which says the Mighili (another extraction of the fallen Kwararafa kingdom) were in their present ancestral abodes before the arrival of Alago in Keana (Keana in Perspective, 2004). However, this 1930 report is contrary to Evoy's later reports that the Mighili arrived in their present abodes in the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries (Evoy, 1984). The Alago narratives indicate that the Tiv were the second group they encountered and give two

reasons for this initial contact. In one account, they say that the Alago asked for Tiv military support in order to ward off the marauding Jihadists who were coming from Nasarawa and Keffi emirates (Morgan, 1919; Aboki, 2004) after which the Tiv chose to remain in Keana (Avav, 1993; Ezekiel, 2014). Based on the archival references of Morgan (1919, p.133) and those made in *Keana in perspective 1232-2004* (2004) on the Coronation of the 33<sup>rd</sup> Osana of Keana, HRH Emmanuel Elayo, this military expedition took place during the chieftaincy of Osana Ozegya Adi II between 1782-1789; a time when the Islamic flag-bearers from Nasarawa and Keffi strongholds were forcing their way down the Benue valley. In the second narrative, the Tiv, in their search of farmlands, were welcomed into Keana during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century chieftaincy of Osana Eladoga Onyatikpo (Keana in Perspective, 2004). With a fraternal tone, the Alago acknowledge that they co-existed with the Tiv people peacefully before, during and after the arrival of the colonial regime, down into the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In other words, during colonial administration, the Alago lived together in Keana district under Lafia Native Authority. Together with the Tiv, Wukari, Lafia and Nasarawa Native Authorities (NAs), they formed the British administrative province of Benue, with headquarters in Makurdi. Furthermore, the Alago narratives conclude that the merger of Lafia NA with the Tiv NA enhanced the Tiv penetration into the rest of Alago land (Aboki, 2004). In summary, the Alago narratives imply that they founded Keana in 1232, and only later, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, came into relationship with the Tiv for military and farming reasons.

Concerning the origin of the Tiv and their presence in Keana LGC, three ancestral and historical conjectures are found in available scholarship. Historiographers on the Tiv people posit that Swem is the ancestral home of the Tiv as well as the place from where

they migrated to their different abodes in the Benue valley. However, in their respective works, scholars like Bohannan (1953), Dorward (1971), Orkar (1979), Makar (1994), Moti & Wegh (2001), and Dzurgba (2007), describe *Swem* not as a place of Tiv origin but as the place where the Tiv sojourned before moving down to the Benue valley. Another theoretical narrative associates Tiv origin with the decentralized Bantu ethnic communities. This theory premises its arguments on the similarities between the Tiv and the Bantu in terms of folklore, songs, religious beliefs, concepts, rituals, physical traits as well as agricultural and iron works. This Bantu narrative is prominent in the works of European scholars like Temple (1919), Abraham (1940), Bohannan (1953), Downes (1971), and indigenous scholars like Tseayo (1975), Gbor (1981), Makar (1994) Wang (2004), Torkula (2006), Tyough (2014). The Bantu narrative is also supported by official government documents. Basically this Bantu narrative sees the Tiv as an extraction of the Bantu tribe that lived in Central Africa around the Shaba area (the present Democratic Republic of Congo). This narrative argues that the early discovery of copper and iron which enabled the manufacture of agricultural tools and weapons for hunting was also responsible for the dispersion of the Bantu population to different parts of Africa in search of farming and hunting reserves. This dispersal took the man called *Tiv* and his descendants through different lands, wars and geographical challenges until they finally settled in the Benue Valley, their present ancestral abode (Temple, 1919, Torkula, 2006). With regards to dating, there is no common agreement in the literature as to the exact date of their arrival in the Benue valley; nevertheless, it is generally conjectured to be around 1750 AD (Gbor, 1981, Torkula, 2006, Benue Document, 2014, Tyough, 2014). The Tiv are traditionally agrarian and socially egalitarian.

How have Tiv narratives responded to the questions about the date and the way they initially encountered the Alago in Keana? Aboki (2004) presents the Tiv narrative which dates their initial encounter with the Alago of Keana in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, and reasserts that the Alago moved into the area after the fall of the Kwararafa kingdom and their sojourn in Idah. There are two other explanations with regards to the Tiv-Alago encounter. First, Torkula (2004) suggests it was by military conquests. He explains that the Tiv defeated the Chamba who persistently attacked them on the Western and Eastern banks of River Katsina-Ala and the Western bank of River Tor-Donga. This defeat served as a morale booster which enabled them to spread more rapidly by further dislodging and occupying the lands of other ethnic groups through warfare. Torkula illustrates his argument by reporting that on the North east of the valley, the Ushitire, Ukum, Iharev, Masev and Nongov pushed the Jukun, Alago and Mighili further out to make room for their habitation. The second explanation argues that the encounter was enabled by their interspersed agrarian and settlement patterns. The Tiv practice wide-spread settlement in order that each clan and household would have enough land to settle, to re-locate, to hunt and to practice fallowed-farming. It is worthy to know that this second argument has got both positive and negative implications. Positively, by this settlement pattern the Tiv were open to the possibility of encountering or being encountered by the other tribes who would become their neighbours (Temple, 1919; Makar, 1990; Keana in Perspective Committee, 2004; Aboki, 2004; Akevi, 2012). Negatively, some people have interpreted the agrarian and settlement patterns as tendencies of imperialism and expansionism which should be seriously curtailed (Ruxton, 1919; Aboki, 2004).

By way of critique, Torkula's first argument is less plausible to me because there is

no Alago narrative that indicates they were conquered in any war or dislodged by any group. In fact Aboki (2004) reports the Alago's assertion that they "have never been conquered or subjected to any other power by war" (p.15). However, if they do not acknowledge military conquest by the Tiv, what informed their decision to invite them into military collaboration against the Jihadists? The second argument is rather plausible. It holds that the Tiv clans of Isherev, Utyondo and Nongov came into initial encounter and eventual co-existence with the Alago through the widespread settlement and agrarian patterns described above (Temple, 1919; Makar, 1974; Tseayo, 1975; Aboki, 2004; Akevi, 2012). From this initial encounter, since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century (Gbor, 1981; Torkula, 2006; Tyough, 2014), their presence was established in Kean region, and by the later centuries they became phenomenally commonplace in areas like Awe and Azara. An insightful quote from Webster (1984) captures the scenario clearly:

In the nineteenth century large numbers of Tiv moved in. They formed no chiefdoms but became the most numerous people in every chiefdom. All the ruling groups lived in towns and villages depending on salt production, crafts, trade, and tribute. The Tiv were and are exclusively rural cultivators. Towns people in all eight chiefdoms [in Awe polity] were either exclusively or a mixture of Jukun, Abakwariga, Kanuri, Hausa, or Alago, while the rural areas were uniformly Tiv. (p.332)

The fundamental points we can derive from the two genealogical narratives and their critique are as I remarked above that, despite the existing contradictions in the groups' narratives about how and when Keana was founded, one fact remains. Prior to 2001, the Tiv and Alago lived together as brothers in Keana. There were no overt conflicts between them until this peaceful atmosphere was disrupted by the 2001-2002 conflict. To this day, both groups incredulously live in suspicion of each other. This means that, although there is a negative peace of no violence, there is no positive peace because of the extant

structure of suspicion and discrimination. In fact, this causative structure is also one of the ongoing legacies of the 2001-2002 conflict; a reality which the religious and traditional leaders in Keana have earmarked as part of their efforts to transform.

### **2.3 Geographic Location of Keana LGC**

Keana is situated in the southern region of Nasarawa state, 68 kilometers from Lafia the capital city and 50 kilometers away from the northern River Benue. Nasarawa state has 23 administrative Local Government Councils (LGCs). Keana is one of the five councils that constitute the Southern Senatorial District. Keana was affected in the 2001-2002 conflict because of its physical location in the district. This “location” can be explained in three different ways:

(a) Geo-politically, Keana exists within the North-Central Zone of Nigeria, a zone that has always had constant political tensions and electoral violence because of competing interests that are personal and sectarian. Due to its large population and a contesting religious atmosphere, many elites target it for political manipulation, thus exposing their people to ethnic, political and religious violence. Recent remarks by two political figures of the zone illustrate this point. Tyoden (2013)<sup>2</sup> boldly asserts that the zone will not be a mere participant in the country’s political dispensation but shall remain its prime mover. While maintaining the same position, Jang (2014)<sup>3</sup> confidently elaborates that the zone has the numerical strength and influence to determine the country’s president in every election and it will always put this wherewithal into use at the right times come what may. It is in this environment of violent political contestation

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<sup>2</sup> Sony Tyoden was the elected Deputy Governor of Plateau State, 2015-2019.

<sup>3</sup> Jonah Jang was the serving Governor of Plateau State, 2011-2015.

that Keana sees itself situated geo-politically.

(b) Geographically, Keana is located in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, the crucible of the highest concentration of the country's ethnic communities. The ethnic groups in this region are known for their violently expressed sectarian consciousness and struggles variegated in ethno-religious differentiation and exclusion. The ethnic diversity, or better put, the ethnic pluralism in this region and Keana in particular, has not been a factor at the service of the people's needs, but a disservice with violent occurrences. The abysmal situation has not only destroyed lives and property but, according to Kwaja (2009), has also threatened the consolidation of democracy in the country. Focusing in on the Southern Senatorial Zone and Keana LGC, Aboki (2004) says this unhealthy inter-ethnic relationship also contributed to the eruption of the 2001-2002 conflict in the whole district.

(c) Keana is also situated in the geo-sphere known as the Benue Valley, whose geology and topology are chiefly favourable for agricultural activities like farming and grazing. This geo-physical area is a fertile savanna grassland with sparse forests. The topography is a strip of plateau with undulating lowlands, shallow valleys and a few hills and igneous rocks. In addition, the woodland savannah region has a tropical climate of two seasons: rainy, April-October, and dry, November-March (Torkula, 2004; Nuhu & Ahmed, 2013; Chukwuma & Atelhe, 2014). This implies that, like its counterpart communities in this geographical area, Keana is richly endowed with a favorable climate and vegetation as well as a wide expanse of fertile land for farming and grazing. Though rich with favorable atmospheric conditions, the communities within the Benue valley are be-deviled by frequent violent uprisings. Some of the reasons for this include: inter-ethnic

competition to acquire and control land, economic resources and political power; the 2001-2002 crisis and the recent 2014 Fulani-Tiv crisis are good examples.

The three *geos* described above are favorable for migration, economy, politics and religious proselytizing. This thesis project has laid bare the fact that these same values have made the region vulnerable to violent competition among the existing communities for scarce advantages (Aluaigba, 2011; Chukwuma & Atelhe, 2014). This is the context wherein Keana is situated, and the phenomenon of conflictual relationship between the Tiv, Alago and Fulani in this area is, therefore not unlikely unless viable social constructive processes are put in place.

#### **2.4 The Economic and Political Terrain of Keana LGC**

There are five prominent aspects that define the economic and political terrain of Keana LGC and affect the relationship between the Alago and Tiv people. They include: farming, mining, grazing, marketing and civil/public service. The favourable geosphere of a fertile savannah, attractive foliage, balanced climatic conditions of wet and dry seasons is no doubt a marvelous gift for agricultural activities. Accordingly, the major economic activity in Keana is farming.

While the Alago are also farmers, my research discovered that the Tiv are more efficient/productive farmers. Some of the important food crops produced here include: yams, maize, guinea corn, rice, groundnuts and melon as well as fruits and vegetables. There is no official statistic but, all of my interviewees strongly assert that the tonnes of agricultural products that go out of Keana LGC annually are almost equal to the combined tonnes that leave Assakio, Doma, Awe, Jenkwe, Nasarawa Eggon, and other

areas of the state.

Mining is another contributor to the economic wealth of the Keana people. Nasarawa state is richly blessed with granite, baryte, limestone, salt, and other precious stones (Chukwuma & Atelhe, 2014). Of these, salt and baryte are mined in Keana LGC. I discovered from my interviews that as a matter of choice the Alago are traditionally salt miners while the Tiv are solely farmers. Danglah (2012) situates the beginning of Keana salt mining in 1232, the same date alleged for the founding of Keana. Before Danglah's work, Lovejoy (1986) had argued that Keana salt mining and distribution started and flourished in the mid 18<sup>th</sup> century along the prosperous Central Sudan market route. According to Lovejoy, the salt fields of Keana and those of Awe, Azara, Keana and Moi-Igbo were the most popular ones in the Benue Valley. Before the arrival of European salt via the Royal Niger Company in 1832, Keana salt was traded to the Hausa merchants from Kano, Bauchi, Zaria, Gombe who exchanged horses, cattle, textiles, and other goods, for salt. Despite the sale of European salt from 1832, trade in Keana salt went up to over 400 tonnes at 6.8kg in the year, 1920. By 1971, the distribution of salt from Keana and from Tiv salt fields located outside of Keana geographic region hit 980 tonnes. But, the continuous importation of European salt and European economic policies aimed at making indigenous economies perpetually dependant, ruined the Salt of the Desert Sun market along the Central Sudan trading route (Lovejoy, 1986). This is how the prominence of Keana salt diminished to its insignificant level today.

Traditionally, the male Alago family heads allocate salt pots to their women who are entrusted with the salt mining processes. Hinton, Veiga & Benhoff (2003) and Danglah (2012) point out that globally, as in Keana, the women folk were entrusted with the

artisanal mining of salt and other stones. Economically, Keana salt was used for culinary, medicinal and industrial purposes and for “chewing tobacco and snuff” (Lovejoy, 1986, p. 25). Today, Keana salt mining is on a very minimal level, and mostly for subsistence. The government has also not fulfilled its promise of raising the venture to large-scale industrial and commercial production, so (as asserted by Avre, 2006), Keana salt is still mined by Alago women who continue to live below the poverty line because the salt industry has not been upgraded from its traditional nature of mining. Even though the Tiv in Keana geographical region do not compete for the ownership of salt wells, their non-inclusion in this economic terrain is conflictive because it is on the account of differentiation, exclusion and inequality.

Another economic wealth in Keana LGC is the Tuesday market. On this day, traders from far and near patronize the Keana market in great numbers for commercial transactions. This is the day agricultural produce from Keana is traded for cash. Apart from the usual scuffle associated with a market, the market has not been a factor connected to any conflict between the Tiv and Alago; rather, they collaborate to ensure its growth for mutual benefits in the formation and provision of vigilance committee.

The civil/public service is another economic benefit to Keana people, especially the Alago group. The Alago have the highest number of public servants and they also dominate all political positions appropriated to the area. Paid governance or costed democracy is the culture in Nigeria, and the Alago public officers enjoy so many financial and prestigious benefits from it that the poorly represented Tiv have not hidden their chagrin and reactions. During my interview with Alexander Mabaume, the Tiv traditional leader, he reiterated the Tiv’s complaint against the exclusionary and discriminatory

attitudes with regards to employment opportunities allotted to them in the civil and public service. To the Tiv, this structure of inequality is unfavorable, unacceptable and capable of causing perpetual protestation.

Grazing is another economic activity found in Keana. Neither the Alago nor Tiv are nomadic or herdsmen; however, the Fulani are. As seasonal migrants, the Fulani move into Keana when the vegetation is exuberant and leave when there is very little for their herd. The grazing activity has regularly birthed violent land skirmishes between the Fulani grazers and sedentary farmers (Tiv, Alago, & Mighili) in the Zone, Keana LGC and with the neighbouring Tiv communities of Guma LGC, Benue state, as was the case during the research interviews.<sup>4</sup>

From the above analysis, we see clearly that a prosperous economic atmosphere exists in Keana LGC. However, with the existing structure of economic imbalance and social inequality, conflict relationships will continue to prevail between the Tiv and Alago. The Tiv expect that they should also be politically recognized as indigenes of Keana and not settlers. Unless this “settler” identity status ascribed to them is overturned, the problem of inequality and discrimination will not be transformed. If not, the Tiv reveal that they will continue with the ongoing ethnic assimilation and construction process in order to also compete for the available advantages in the polity of Keana. Aluaigba (2011) describes the Tiv emancipatory struggle as a growing mobilization for them to enjoy equal rights to representation, employment, income, and status as citizens of one Nigeria. All participants in this study acknowledged that the Tiv have been complaining against

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<sup>4</sup> During the research interviews, heavy marauding attacks on the Tiv communities in Guma LGC by the Fulani had just reached a cease-fire agreement. Fulani mercenaries captured and occupied some Tiv ancestral homes in Keana LGC, and continued from there to launch offensive attacks on the Tiv in Guma LGC (Daniel, 2014). Although significant, this conflict is not considered in this thesis because its primary focus is the 2001-2002 crisis; perhaps, future studies may investigate it.

these economic and political improprieties. The Tiv have promised to oppose this structural injustice and fight for its transformation but via dialogical engagement (Alexander, 2014).

## **2.5 The Traditions and Religions of the People of Keana**

Apart from being politically organized around the 3<sup>rd</sup> tier government (i.e. LGC), the Alago and Tiv of Keana are also strongly organized around their respective traditional and religious capitals. In their different narratives, each group identifies the other as *brothers* who are so made by the historical circumstances of military coalition and agricultural collaboration. Yet, they have not allowed this historical filial relationship to enable them use revisit their traditional and religious institutions and use them as capital for a united identity, but have always used them to mobilize themselves, reassert their positions and proclaim their ethnic identities as separate groups.

Aboki asserts that “the Alago have strong attachment to their traditional institutions” (Aboki, 2004 p. 29). This means, they are very much conscious of their ancestral and migration narratives in relation to their present settlements: Keana and the other Alago towns like Agaza, Alosi and Obi. Akyana Adi, their progenitor and founder of Keana settlement, is not only central in all their social and political discourses but is also their unifying factor. In terms of social organization, Alago family units are headed by fathers, who are in turn overseen by the oldest in the extended family circle. Traditionally also, they are a monarchical people who are ruled by their chiefs or traditional rulers, the successors of their progenitors who founded the Alago settlements and chiefdoms of Keana, Alosi and Agaza, all in Keana LGC. As is generally applicable to traditional

rulers in Africa, the Alago look up to the traditional leaders as the custodians of their values, welfare and beliefs. The traditional ruler of Keana chiefdom is addressed as the *Osana*, and His Royal Highness, Emmanuel Oyatikpo Elayo, the present *Osana* of Keana is the 33<sup>rd</sup> on the throne. The traditional leader of Alosi is addressed as the *Oseshi*, and His Royal Highness Alhaji Mohammadu Agye Usman is the serving *Oseshi* of Alosi. *Osoku* is the official title of the chief of Agaza, with Very Rev. Useni Oduh as the serving 17<sup>th</sup> *Osoku* of Agaza. Commenting on their working relationship with others, Aboki (2004) states that these traditional leaders are assisted in their daily administration by the traditional title-holders or courtiers whose consultative opinions determine the final decisions that are binding on all subjects.

Keana LGC has three faith traditions and associate communities: Indigenous, Christianity and Islam. Though representatives of each faith are found in the three groups, the Alago are generally followers of Christianity or Islam. However, the combustibility of religious consciousness in Nigeria made the census officers omit “religion” as an item in the 2006 head count. Therefore, there are no accurate government statistics on the religious composition of the Alago people in Keana. Nevertheless, the Chief-Priest and leader of the indigenous faith community, Osikigu Agede, reported during our interview that there are approximately 50 Alago families in the indigenous faith, far less than the thousands in Christianity and Islam. Responding to questions about cohesion and harmony, the Alago participants testified that there is a strong collaboration between them; sustained more by the shared consciousness of their common ancestral history than their religious affiliations. They added that their religious difference is not allowed to preclude them from interacting at social and religious events which are organized by the religious

–other”. In fact, the fundamental factor that unites them is the shared consciousness of a common progenitor and ancestral land. United by these, they are able to confront any internal or external developments that threaten their unity and welfare of their people.

The Tiv are also very traditional and religious. Prior to British colonial administration, Aluaigba (2011) explains that the traditional political system of the Tiv was a decentralized one whereby power did not reside in one person as a paramount ruler or chief. Their social organization was constructed around gerontocracy, where the oldest men were compound and kindred heads. However, the British government altered this structure by imposing monarchical leadership on them. Thus, in 1946, the Tiv had their first paramount ruler, who to this date is referred to as the *Tor Tiv*, and his traditional stool is in Gboko (Benue state). Below the *Tor Tiv*, are the *U-Ter* (Fathers).<sup>5</sup> The *U-Ter* are the traditional leaders of all the Tiv clans in Benue. These clans are politically organized under the administrative platform of Local Government Councils. In states such as Nasarawa and Taraba, where the Tiv have significant primordial presence, the *U-Ter* institutions are established to serve as icons of culture and unity. In addition to the *U-Ter*, the people are also led by the *presidents* or *chairmen* of the various Tiv social and cultural associations around the world. It is worthy to mention here that all the *U-Ter* and *presidents* show loyal subservience to their paramount figure, the *Tor Tiv*. Due to some political hurdles, the Tiv in Nasarawa state are not able to establish the *U-Ter* in the five local government councils in the Southern Senatorial District. In alternative, they have the *Ter Nasarawa* (father of Nasarawa State) and his subordinates, the presidents of the local government Tiv Development Associations (TIDA). At the time of this writing, Mr.

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<sup>5</sup> The Tiv worldwide have this order of traditional leadership: on top of the ladder is the *Tor Tiv* (Chief of all the Tiv people), *U Ter* (Fathers of the Tiv clans) and the presidents of Tiv Associations who are answerable to both the *Tor Tiv* and the *U-Ter*.

Adzahan Mabume Alexander is the Secretary General of TIDA Nasarawa state, and TIDA the president of Keana LGC. It is in his capacity as the latter that he is ascribed the status of “traditional leader” of the Tiv in Keana. He performs his roles in consultation with all family and compound heads as well as the leaders of the gender and age-groups under his jurisdiction. Also, he unfailingly collaborates with *Ter Nasarawa*. As the Tiv traditional leader in Keana LGC, Adzahan was chosen to be interviewed for this study.

Compared to the Alago, the Tiv are dominantly Christians. As pointed out earlier, the most recent (2006) census omitted a break-down of statistics on religious compositions in Nigeria. Nevertheless, one can still make a plausible assertion that there are no Tiv Muslims in Keana LGC and, even if there were, they are unnoticeable and insignificant statistically. To solidify this point, the serving and past leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), as well as my Tiv interviewees, posit that every Tiv community is identifiably Christian, and when their numbers are added to the Alago Christian communities the total number of Christians in Keana LGC will be very huge. It is evidentially and also logically argued as we see below that from the earliest times, the Tiv population in this region has been on the increase, and in contemporary times this has become a matter of great socio-political concern (Webster, 1984; Eyoth, 1996; Aboki, 2004). Administrative documents cited by Temples (1919) state that at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Tiv population in Lafia Area was 429 and the total population of Alago in “Lafia, Abuja, Waku and Konton Karfi was 3,800” (p. 521). This number increased geometrically in subsequent years. Eyoh (1996) indicates that in 1938 the official archives showed there were 5,977 Tiv and 11, 858 Alago in Lafia division, and by 1950 their number became outrageous. In his anthropological report on the 2001-2002 conflict,

Aboki (2004) cites the 1963 population figures which indicate that the Tiv had over half (289,559) of the 424,219 total population in Lafia Division. He also pointed out that the rising population of the Tiv created fears among their neighbours and the conflict in question was used to contain the threats posed by the increasing population. In fact, the reports by Evoy and Aboki are confirmation of the acknowledgment made by Webster (1984) that the Tiv had the largest population in this division since the dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Two points are important in this demographic analysis. First, the enlarging Tiv population has always been Christian and, when added to the sizable Alago Christian numbers, the two will produce an overwhelming Christian population in Keana LGC. Second, this analysis calls into question *the* work of Liman & Wakama (2012) *Muslims of Nasarawa State: A Survey* which obliquely estimates an 80% Muslim population in Keana. While their use of qualitative methodology is appropriate, the interview sampling should have been a homogeneous model that picks representatives from all the religious communities of Keana LGC, especially the faith leaders. Rather they randomly sampled only the resident Muslims which according to them “was based on their importance in the governance of the state”...“prominent Islamic organizations” and “in the society” (p. 3). Generally, it can be understood that truly in Nigeria, Christianity and Islam are in an unhealthy competition for political, religious and demographic control with the characteristic of bigotry. However, every scholarship on these faiths should exhibit a great sense of responsibility by divesting itself of any sentiments and biased reporting in order to rightly inform and appropriately influence public policies. Even though socially it is very difficult to dissociate religious sentiments from ethnic issues in the country (Paden,

2005), scholarship must attempt at making morally responsible articulations about them.

There is a strong connection between the 2001-2002 conflict and how the Alago and Tiv have clung to their respective traditional and religious capitals. Each of the groups has used the two primordial elements to construct their collective identity for the differentiation and exclusion of the other, an unfortunate situation that is precarious to peaceful co-existence and social harmony.

## **2.6 The People, their Land, the Politics and the Conflict (Aboki, 2004)**

The four themes that compose this sub-heading have been lightly touched on in the preceding subtitles and paragraphs. They are the substantial issues that form the entire texture of the 2001-2002 conflict in terms of factors and actors. Above, some of the issues were identified as the causative factors, and others as the emergent legacies of the conflict. On the other hand, those with a human face were presented as the actors who are working towards transforming the conflict with respect to their fundamental objectives and strategies.

To summarize, we learned that there are two major primordial ethnic groups co-existing in Keana LGC; the Alago and Tiv peoples. With regards to land, we learned how each of them is tenaciously holding onto their respective traditional narratives in order to establish their relationship to the land and its advantages and to also attain their preconceived goals. The Alago are using their traditional identity as a resource for ethnic “assimilation” and to “differentiate” themselves from the Tiv (“settlers” in the land, even though they are described as brothers) as the legitimate owners and *indigenes* of Keana. On the other hand, the Tiv are using their traditional narratives to challenge the

*settler* status ascribed to them and to claim that, by the virtue of their genealogical connections to the land, they are also *indigenes* and, on that basis should have equal access to available political and economic advantages. This inter-play of association, perception and ascription has impacted deeply on the political processes and decisions between these two groups in the local government.

The religious life of the two groups not only impacted the 2001-2002 conflict but has continued to influence their social and political processes. References are constantly made about a competing spirit between the Christian and Muslim populations in Keana. This has bred some level of differentiation and animosity between the diverse religious communities. There are evidences which show that the 2001-2002 conflict had religious connotations, even though it is often presented as a socio-political occurrence. What else can be said when it is clear that in Nigeria there has traditionally been no clear distinction between ethnicity, religion and politics; they necessarily influence each other.

The growing Tiv population, today seen as influential among the economic, educational and political powers in this area, was not perceived as significant in the last six decades. Thanks to the ongoing democratic processes, the associated potentials of the increasing Tiv population has brought them to the limelight and conversely has created an atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion. Thus, rather than interpreting all potentials available in the two groups as resources to be used for the common good, the Tiv and Alago have misconstrued them and have misdirected them for ethnic construction, domination, exclusion and destruction. The need to change this pattern of perception, structure and relationship is obvious.

This is the complex context that influenced the 2001-2002 conflict. In agreement

with Aboki (2004), this study supports the view that the 2001-2002 conflict context should be allowed to challenge the two groups into a balanced re-examination of their histories. These available traits of tradition, modernity, religion, education, economy and population should be used as resources for minimizing the existing vices and enhancing shared peace and development. In the light of this plausible position and step, this study aims at demonstrating how the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC have been contributing their wisdom to this noble vision. It seeks to highlight how their spiritual roles, objectives, motives, strategies and tactics have transformed the sour relationship between the two groups and the legacies that emerged from the 2001-2002 conflict.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter highlighted the major themes and issues (politics, the economy, culture, religion and natural resources) that constitute the discrepant narratives of both the Tiv and Alago communities in relation to their origins as well as their arrival in and their co-existence in Keana LGC. These themes, as will become evident in later Chapters, have become reasons for distrust, discord and divisive competition among the two groups; culminating in the 2001-2002 conflict.

The next chapter explores the theories that throw light on ethnicity and inter-ethnic conflicts and their possible solutions. The Chapters following it report on how the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC struggled against this atmosphere of distrust and conflict.

## **Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework**

### **3.1 Introduction**

We see in this chapter, six theoretical trajectories that offer useful and informative insights to this study of the 2001-2002 Keana LGC conflict. The first theoretical direction, adaptive narrative, plays a significant explanatory role in understanding ethnic identity and conflict, and the causes, consequences and best responses to conflictive ethnicity and violent inter-ethnic relations. The second theoretical projection describes how adaptive narrative is able elucidate the antinomies and complications that abound in historical narratives of ethnic communities and their affiliation with others. The third theoretical trajectory is an exposé of the meaning and the parameters of durable and permanent peace. The fourth theoretical direction looks at the current discourse on leadership, specifically “dynamic leadership” in relation to religious and traditional leaderships, very much oriented towards how these two institutions are celebrated among the Africans and, by implication, the Keana ethnic communities. In fact, these two leadership institutions are tenaciously upheld because they possess relevant contributions to to the welfare and destiny of the people, thus the fifth theoretical focus is on the roles, motives, objectives and strategies of religious and traditional leaders in transforming the social and conflict contexts of their people. The sixth theoretical route defines conflict transformation and explicates its fundamental parameters and the basic goals of transforming violent social contexts and structures as well as violent relational perceptions, feelings, narratives and assertions.

### 3.2 Ethnicity and Inter-Ethnic Conflict

It was not until the 1930s, even more precisely in 1935, that the term ‘race’ was replaced with the concept ‘ethnic group’ to describe a large people with shared cultural traits, in order to repudiate the deprecatory ideology of racism (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Cohen, 1978). McKay and Lewins (1978) observe that by the 1960s, increasing social science scholarship focused mostly on evaluating the importance and non-importance of ethnicity as a modern day social phenomenon. McKay and Lewins critiqued that this research approach failed to clarify the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ and to explain why ethnic groups emerge, persist and disappear. In the same light, Hatcher accuses social scientists from that time of often being more content to acknowledge ethnicity “as a given, a defining attribute of a particular social group” rather than considering ethnicity as a universal phenomenon that deserved critical exposition (1975, p.1152). In his works, *Ethnicity and Ethnic Group: A Conceptual Analysis and Reformulation* (1978) and *An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena* (1982), McKay aggregated the perspectives that prevailed in the available literature on this topic into: primordialist and mobilizationist. According to McKay, these two perspectives prove that ethnicity and ethnic grouping are of phenomenal salience in human society. The perspectives explain ethnicity, on the one hand, as referring to a people whose affinity is sustained by their realization and consciousness that their relationship emanated from the fervently shared traditional endowments of consanguinity, kinship, religion, ancestry, and territory (primordial). On the other hand, they clarify that, on the basis of this relationship, people can organize or be organized to access social, political, and material advantages (mobilizationist). He argues that it is a deficiency of

reductionism for the primordialists to insist that ethnicity is a psychological reality that is restricted to the mental realm of the people and for the mobilizationists to restrict ethnicity to their social experiences. Finally, McKay articulates that the two perspectives should not be seen as mutually exclusive in analysing and understanding ethnicity but as approaches that inter-relate and form a matrix model of interaction. It is based on this understanding, that the social implications of ethnicity and ethnic groups or ethnic based conflicts can be cogently developed.

Building on the leverage of McKay's argument, Gur (2000), Dunaway (2003), and Jenne (2011) investigated the implications of ethnicity and ethnic based conflicts since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In their separate works, these scholars posit that, after the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced increasing cases of ethnic conflicts, especially during the 1990s (Gurr, 2000; Dunaway, 2003; Jenne, 2011). Ethnicity and associated issues are identified as prominent features of every social unit. It is a truism that ethnicity is a people's trademark, and an inherent and overt dynamic that impacts on all other social aspects of their lives (Horowitz, 1985; Rapoport, 1996; Fox, 1999; Gurr, 2000; Cordell & Wolff, 2009; Jenne, 2011; Kauffman, 2012). Gurr (2000) had stipulated that ethnic consciousness and ethnic conflicts are restricted to global south communities because they are non-democratic or fledgling democracies. This position is countered by the edited work of Joseph Rudolf (2003), *Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts*. Rudolf offers 38 researched papers which purposefully argue that the proliferating questions and challenges about ethnicity are globally commonplace, and that the respective governments rejected the idea of partitioning, but adopted other strategies to manage the cases that have been identified in the work. The strategies include:

accommodation, reintegration, protection of collective rights, negotiation and mutual consensus (Gurr, 2000; Rudolf, 2003). Partitioning is not recommended by democratic philosophy as a way of resolving inter-ethnic conflicts because of its “flawed premises and weak empirical support” Jenne (2011). Jenne (2011) cites the balkanization of Yugoslavia from the former USSR in 1991 and the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, as examples of unsuccessful resolution of ethnic conflicts with partitioning.

The works of Horowitz (1985) and Gurr (2000) suggest a useful definition of ethnicity, as that collective consciousness or affiliation of a people which is tied around the shared factors of descent, experience and cultural traits. People who have a differently shared ethnic consciousness and ties, are appropriately described as ethnic groups. “Ethnic groups are people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on belief in common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits” (Gurr (2000, p. 5). Referring to the inherence of ethnicity in all peoples, Gurr, offers an historical investigation to show how this overt aspect of the peoples’ “multiple identities” invokes three significant concerns: 1, the observed political divisions and contentions, often seen between the minority and national peoples of the same state; 2, the way conditions such as identity, incentives, capacities and scarce opportunities nourish contentions; 3, how the divisions and contentions can perhaps be managed. To achieve this goal, Gurr recommends the use of three analytic assumptions or perspectives that will enhance comprehensive understanding and approach: the primordialist, the instrumentalist and the constructivist. Primordial analysis looks at ethnic collectivities as people with shared essential, transcending and enduring trademarks of a common progenitor as well as historical encounters and cultural features which are variegated in behaviours, religious

beliefs, language and dress, physique, region of residence and traditional occupations. On their part, instrumentalists assert that the emergence of modern liberal states impacted on ethnic groups with political characteristics. Therefore, ethnicity and ethnic groups are collective bodies which are formed by reasons of birth of members or the mobilization of a number of people for political actions and liberation. Constructivism analyses ethnic consciousness as an “adaptive or contingent” strategy, where people create and recreate themselves in order to better respond to their environmental and political challenges. In relation to inter-ethnic contests, Gurr (2002) states that these three analytic lenses are able to visualize why ethnic identities and consciousness matter so much in people’s social life and why they have a preponderance for violence. The wide implication of Gurr’s theory is that, when endangered by any form of differential treatment, primordial ethnic groups will easily adapt themselves into ethno-political categories and become instruments of struggle for security, status, wellbeing and access to power. This metamorphosis usually ends up in crisis, just as the fractionalization against the Tiv in Nasarawa South Senatorial Zone led to the 2001-2002 pandemonium and has heightened ethno-political mobilizations among the Tiv and Alago in Keana LGC. Lonsdale (2010) describes ethnic harmony built around the primordial elements as “moral ethnicity” (p. 15) and ethnicity instrumentalized by the elites as “political tribalism” (p. 17). Lonsdale goes on to advise that, in analysing ethnicity and ethnic conflict, a combination of the three analytic observations, and not an alternative, must be made. This study took cognizance of Lonsdale’s contributions and advice, but no particular political patron was mentioned as the factor behind political “tribalism”, as the religious and traditional leaders are evidently the mobilizers of moral ethnicity.

Donald Horowitz, in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985) digs into the question of why ethnicity is a salient trait in divided societies. His findings demonstrate that the interrelationship between the two human factors (progenitors and elites) and the two fundamental perspectives (ethnic assimilation and ethnic differentiation) are key to answering the question. Horowitz explains that progenitors and elites usually acknowledge the indispensability of ethnic consciousness to their people, but they do so for different reasons. Progenitors essentialize ethnicity as a heritage never to be lost but be employed for ethnic “assimilation” or “long reach of ethnic affiliations”. The elites, however, reverse the order by recreating ethnicity as the basis for initiating or opposing “differentiation”. Thus, rather than focusing on the transmission of ethnic identity to subsequent generations, the elites instrumentalize it for the pursuance of political interests that are more personal to them, rather than to the community as a whole. It is, therefore, the elites and not the elders who create the atmosphere for ethnic conflict. In fact, Horowitz, a scholar whose life is deeply rooted in the state system posits that “ethnic conflict is artificial” because ethnicity is not a conflictive phenomenon in itself but a designation used improperly by the elites to enable their enjoyment of the personal “benefits of modernity: good jobs, urban amenities, access to schools, travel and prestige” (pp. 101-106). During my interviews, I discovered from my participants that peaceful co-existence, collaboration, integration and development in Keana LGC can be sustained or extinguished, but depending on the choice the Alago elites make. In fact, the elites will easily enjoy support because the masses are at their beck and call. To enjoy sustainable peace, the elites must capitalize on the willing disposition of their people for equity and peace with the Tiv, as it is already evolving and not use them (especially the idle youths)

as pawns for violence for their selfish interests. As Horowitz (1985) puts it, often ethnic members are being used as soldiers who don't fight for "real" issues and "enemies", so as to better their own fortunes, but for the issues of the elites (pp. 101 & 106). Neo-Gramscians wonder how elites are able to instrumentalize ethnicity by building common sense in the people. Praise-worthily, the elites in Keana are transforming relationship between Alago and Tiv and addressing the decried political marginalization against the latter.

What are ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts, and why do occur? Cordell and Wolff (2009) throw light on these questions as they define, analyze and suggest responses to ethnic conflict. Like Horowitz, they make the preliminary statement that ethnicity in itself is not the "ultimate, irreducible source of violent conflicts" (p. 4) although it often forms an important part of the explanation. Ethnic groups may have inter-ethnic relations, but until it assumes a social texture of tensed disagreement and violence the relationships can be termed conflictive. Thus, Cordell and Wolff (2009) concede that ethnic conflict is the situation where two or more ethnic actors pursue incompatible goals with each claiming its own as objective; yet do so on exclusively ethnic terms and using ethnic distinctions: "Whatever the concrete issues may be over which conflict erupts, at least one of the parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms" (p. 4). In other words, ethnic differentiation determines the tone of communication and relationship that go on between the ethnic groups. Rational choice to secure scarce advantages informed by the fear of the competing and offensive presence of the other as well as the social-psychological feeling against the existing dis-favourable inequality are the independent variables that Cordell and Wolff identify as the universal causes of distasteful inter-ethnic relations. It is a rule

of thumb in conflict studies and resolution that a thorough analysis before constructing a remedial approach. In this light, Cordell and Wolff ask whether or not any theory can adequately analyze or explain the causes, consequences and responses to ethnic conflict. Their answer is a four level-of-analysis model developed from a comparative study of: (a) the analytic works on international relations by David Singer (1961), (b) ethnicity, inter-ethnic relations and wars by Kenneth Waltz (1959), and (c) ethnic conflicts by Jack Levy (2001). Singer's two-level-of-analysis theory emphasizes the significance of considering the global and national dimensions of international relations and ethnic conflicts. The three-level-of-analysis theory of war and conflict by Waltz expounds on human nature, aggressive state and international systems as significant factors in conflict. The multiple-level-of-analysis theory of Levy suggests that all conflict variables should be divided into independent (triggering factors) and dependent (combustible situations) in order to obtain comprehensive knowledge and develop positive responses to conflict. After using their four-level model to analyze the ethnic conflicts in Ireland, Kosovo, Cyprus, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kashmir and Sri Lanka, Cordell and Wolff came to the remarkable conclusion, in line with the instrumentalist perspective, that ethnic conflicts are systematic activities of violence aimed at achieving the strategic purposes of the community, but at times siphoned off by the elites for their personal interests. They also strongly assert that their four-level model is appropriate for both the analysis and the development of suitable responses to ethnic conflicts. This is because the model offers analytic tools or questions capable of helping peace agents to identify a conflict as ethnic as well as to clearly grasp the roles of the conflict actors and the social structures in the eruption, escalation and transformation of the conflict at levels that are

local, state, regional, and global. The ultimate goal of the four way analysis model is the generation and processing of information that will equip policy makers with the right knowledge from which to formulate positive responsorial policies to conflicts.

According to Posner (2005), scholars (e.g., Horowitz, 1985; Rapoport, 1996; Gurr, 2000; Varshney, 2003, 2009) have established that, although ethnicity, nationality and religion are divisional, there is no disconnection between these elements because they are intertwined. Religion is a composite aspect of ethnicity and ethnicities amalgamate to form nation states which in turn are hosts to religious and ethnic communities. The nondetachable relationship between these composite elements is such that any attempt at separating them is but a mere “semantic quibble” (Varshney, 2009, p. 277). The unfortunate phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict beats imagination, and it also raises the questions about why members of the same ethno-religious community become gruesomely violent to themselves, thereby creating a situation that be best described as intra-ethno-religious conflict? How does violence against ethnicity become violence against religion thereby assuming the nomenclature of ethno-religious rancour? Examples of ethno-religious conflicts abound, as exists between Irish Catholics and Protestants, Kashmir Hindus and Muslims and Nigerian Hausa Muslims and Christians. Generally, the dynamics of social conflicts are explained by the theoretical frameworks of conflict escalation (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) and conflict Transformation (Lederach, 2003). Since the point being made at this juncture is about exploring explanation to the question, “why ethno-religious conflicts in particular occur?” the theoretical works of Rapoport (1996) and Fox (1999) are cited here most especially. Like Cordell & Wolff (2009), Rapoport and Fox argue separately that rational choice to secure scarce advantages and the

social-psychological feelings against all forms of inequality are fundamental causes of ethno-religious disputes. For Fox (1999), an ethnic group repulses when its religious identity has been differentiated and threatened. And when the group is eventually instrumentally mobilized by its elites for collective actions that fight back, the situation becomes a religiously motivated struggle. In the process of verifying his theory of ethno-religious conflict, Fox found that his six hypotheses were all present in the cases he examined. This made him to plausibly describe the conflict cases as ethno-religious because each of them had one or more of his six hypotheses: religious discrimination, religious grievances, religious provocations, religious mobilization, affirmation of religious legitimacy, and struggle for group cohesion on religious grounds. Rapoport's 1996 study, *The Importance of Space in Ethno-Religious Strife*, found that, in addition to these six hypothesis, religious fundamentalism, residual impacts of imperialism, rise or creation of new states, arrival of new population and the construction of new identities also played important roles in the eruption ethno-religious conflicts. Thus, for both Rapoport and Fox, a conflict is ethno-religious when a people's religious trait is conspicuously emphasized. In the 2001-2002 conflict which is the focus of this thesis, the destruction of both the primordial monuments and religious spaces were inspired by religious thrusts, thus giving the conflict an ethno-religious texture.

Varshney (2009) expounds on the ambivalence of ethnicity and ethno-religiosity by reframing the three traditional analytic lenses (primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism) by adding a fourth analytic lens, institutionalism. Institutionalism acknowledges that pluralism of political institutions encourages ethnic multiplication and regional variations and this kind of development is not favorable to emphasis on social

homogeneity. However, from my perspective, Varshney could have included a fifth lens; historicism. By *historicism* I mean the hermeneutics of placing great importance on the contextual developments such as imperialism, state creation, identity formation and integration and immigration which are unavoidable and seriously, they significantly impact on every human community. Generally, the function of these analytic lenses is seen in how they successfully make a panoramic exposé of the ambivalence of ethnicity and associated elements like elites, identity, religion etc.

Estaban, Mayoral & Ray (2012) succinctly explain the conflict dimensions of ethnicity and ethno-religiosity. According to them, all explanations proffered for broken relationships related to ethnicity and religion can be split between these two factors that underscore the relationship between ethnicity and conflict namely; fractionalization and polarization. Fractionalization is the situation where there are clear emphases on distinction and diversity from the other, so much so that conflictive counteraction becomes a strong possibility. Polarization refers to a situation where there is emphatic antagonism fueled by the factors of “~~a~~alienation” from the other groups and “~~i~~identification” with one’s own group. Polarization and fractionalization are often used as strategies by the majority or minority ethnic group when pursuing its own interests or those of its elites.

Weber (1968) elucidates four classical orientations of social actions; invariably ethnic conflicts. By instrumental-rationality (also known as rational choice) he refers to actions and choices aimed at realising self-interests and calculated goals. Value-rationality implies actions and behaviours targeted for a value for its own sake, be it ethical, aesthetic, religious, group. Norm-oriented rationality refers to reliance on the normativity

of tradition for group mobilization and action. Affective or impulsive rationality is involved when conflicts and actions are conditioned by emotional impulses such as affection, polemics, stereotyping and hostility.

Ethnic and ethno-religious relations are not ontologically conflictive (Horowitz, 1985; Cordell & Wolff, 2009) yet their belligerent manifestations are doubtlessly phenomenal. Is there any rationality for ethnic and ethno-religious conflict? In other words, aren't ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts irrational? Two schools of thought have emerged on this question. The rationality school argues that ethnic conflicts are inevitably transitive, that the reasons behind them are rational enough, and they are replications of the choice rationality and value rationality. Thus according to Horowitz (1985) ethnicities must differentiate to survive. For Cordell & Wolff (2009), ethnic groups must choose to defend themselves and from what Posen calls a "security dilemma" (1993, p. 27). The core argument of the rationality school is that because the existence of security dilemmas, ethnic and ethno-religious cleavages can rationally mobilize for violent actions. Conflict is therefore an instrument for creativity, liberation and progress. The implications of the rationalist argument is that its protagonists are pessimists and fatalists who intransigently think that humans are so depraved that they cannot improve their lot unless violently. Also because they think that our irredeemable depravity will continuously impact our social choices and interactions with security dilemmas which can only be resolved with violent approaches. The non-rationalists reject the rationalist conclusion that "ethnic conflict is rational when looked at through the lens of an amalgamation of rational-choice theory and interpretivism"; i.e., value-rationality or social-psychological reactions (Langridge, 2012). Non-rationalists strongly assert that conflict is intransitive, it is an

aberration, it is evitable and a pathological condition that can be reversed. There is no rationality for ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts and a significant return should be made to the “non-instrumental forms of behaviour” (Bates, 1998, Bjorkqvist, 2009). There is no intrinsic slur in norm-orientated rationality and affective/impulse rationality as people can use them for essentialism, assimilation, mobilization and social relationships characterized with dignity, respect and recognition. When acted upon and instrumentalized into mythologies of “symbolic politics”, “fixed identities”, “hostile attitudes” (Kaufman, 2006), and when “activated and amplified” (Oberschall, 2000) into “cognitive crisis frames” by chauvinists and nationalists, the collaboration of norm-oriented and affective rationalities, hitherto a resource for mobilization and development, will unfortunately become a tool for institutionalizing hatred and establishing a lifestyle that typifies “security dilemma” (Zartman, 2007, p. 223)

There was no deserving reason for the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, and the Serbs and Croats in former Yugoslavia, to instrumentalize primordial or norm-rationality and affective rationality and create institutions of war, destruction and genocide (Kaufman, 2006, Oberschall, 2000). Ethnic groups may mobilize themselves around primordial rationality, but they must with affective rationality, come to see the other as a non-lethal variation of the shared community and worthy of collaborating with to face the common future. This position may be criticized for lacking evidence of non-instrumentalized ethnic behaviour and being fool-hardy for trusting in the stark absence of non-violent human actions. It is important to note that violent conflict has no justification, for this reason the non-rationalists have remained adamant in condemning all forms of conflict and in this case inter-ethnic violence. Many non-rationalist scholars have produced

anthropological works supporting their position, arguing that ethnic conflicts have no rationality, and so violence is evitable (Sponsel & Gregor, 1994; Fry & Bjorkqvist, 2009; Fry, 2005). The 2015 *World Development Report* (WDR) is both explorative and suggestive on the topic of rational choice. The report explores “neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, behavioral economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology” and establishes that our rational choices emanate from our mental, societal and cultural operations. It however it is not rational when the choice is violent for any reason, but rational when every choice is bias free and development oriented.

What may be panacea for violent inter-ethnic relations? A suggestion has been made that since warring ethnic groups can no longer co-exist in a common society but be perpetually combating each other, they should be partitioned into independent territories (Jenne, 2011). Dissatisfied with the partitioning theory, Jenne (2011) advocates for the reintegration of existing primordial societies into the social and political processes. Recognizing the multicultural nature of the society today, Varshney encourages the promotion of inter-ethnic civil societies which will in turn enhance inter-ethnic relations and collaboration (Varshney, 2001). The present study supports the view that it is possible for the Alago and Tiv ethnic groups to essentialize themselves around their respective primordial narratives and still see themselves as members of the Keana community. Instead of in conflict with one another, they can come to see themselves as variations of each other and so capable of collaborating for peace and development. Their familiarity with the paradigm of irrationality of inter-ethnic and ethno-religious violent conflicts can make them repulsive to any form of instrumentalization by chauvinists and nationalists.

Credible discourse on any form of conflict must have a spark of psychological

analysis. The work on ethnic conflict by Mays, Bullock, Rosenzeig & Wessells (1998) is used in this thesis to advance an argument for widening the scope of ethnic conflict transformation to include the psychological perspectives of the people. The authors relate ethnic conflict to the people's psychological interests and positions such as identity, symbols, legitimacy, memory and the perception of justice, and they observe that the failure to satisfy any of these interests or the deprivation of them will create tensions among the people. In light of the non-rationality of ethnic conflicts, they suggest that the psychological interests of the people or victims of the conflict must be addressed by processes that de-emphasize intolerance, reduce existential fears, improve intergroup relations and treat traumatic conditions (Mays, 1998).

There are only two major works specifically written on the 2001-2002 conflict in Nasarawa South Senatorial Zone and Keana LGC. Nawani Aboki's 2004 book, *And the Innocent Died: The People, Their Land and the Politics*, remains the most prominent anthropological report on the conflict. The second major source of information on the conflict are the media broadcasts and official addresses of Abudallahi Adamu (then governor of Nasarawa state). Although they are not government green, blue and white papers (i.e., consultation, descriptive, positional documents), they are a collection of very significant and important statements on the conflict. Both the anthropological work of Aboki and the public materials of Adamu (cited above) are used in this study; not as theoretical sources per se, but as informative literature. The salient points in the materials include identification and description of the conflict as decimating inter-ethnic violence of high magnitude, condemnation of the crisis itself, enumeration of ongoing management efforts, and an appeal for peaceful co-existence between groups in the state.

Reinforcing the assertions made by Aboki, Adamu's speeches tag the conflict as inter-ethnic. Even though the conflict had been described as ethnic cleansing against the Tiv people, the governor refutes this. Characterizing any insinuation of this type as mere propaganda, rumor, and the handiwork of the enemies of the state, he called on the Tiv people to ignore it (Adamu, 2001). Further, Adamu decries the unfortunate spread of ethnic conflicts in the country since the return of Nigeria to democratic leadership and out-rightly rebuffs situations where aggrieved people are using religion to fight for ethnic interests or as a weapon to gain advantages and win sympathy (Adamu, 2002). In *Citizenship, "Indigeneship" and Conflict in Central Nigeria: Options for Constitutional Remedies*, Adamu identifies the three big designations commonplace to Nigerians: citizenship, indigeneship and non-indigeneship.<sup>6</sup> He argues that, while those born of Nigerian parents at home and abroad as well as those other nationals who naturalize with Nigeria are citizens of the country, the present emphases on indigeneship and non-indigeneship is a Nigerian "coinage" for ethnic discrimination. Nigerians have no problem with sharing citizenship, he said, but it is a problem for them to share the indigeneship of their locality with others. Therefore, on the basis of the political reason that indigenes must have their rights over the non-indigenes or settlers, Adamu asserts, like Aboki, that the 2001-2002 Keana LGC crisis was caused by this unconstitutional perception of the Alago people against the non-indigene Tiv group (Adamu, 2002).

Regarding the causes of the 2001-2002 conflict, Aboki and Adamu in their separate works enumerate several factors that fueled the Nasarawa south inter-ethnic upheaval. These are similar to those found in the already cited work of Rapoport (1996) and include

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<sup>6</sup> Adamu explains that, by "indigene", Nigerians mean the traditional members of a particular place and state and not those who only migrated to the region.

migration, land scramble, threatening population growth, competition for educational, political, religious and modern opportunities, as well as ethnic differentiation and suspicion, and anti-poverty reactions. In his speeches concerning the 2001-2002 conflict, Adamu did not acknowledge the indispensable role of religious leaders in the management of the conflict to the same degree as he recognized those of the traditional leaders. On his part, however, Aboki does give credence to the positive contributions that both religious and traditional leaders, as well as non-governmental organizations, are capable of offering during emergency times. In fact, he dedicated two chapters to enumerating transformative contributions, such as consultations, reconciliation and humanitarian interventions, which were initiated and collaborated upon by these groups. Even though the state government did not accord paramount peacemaking tasks to these actors, or engage religious leaders in its transformative processes, this study found out that religious leaders in the Nasarawa state and Keana LGC most specifically were not daunted by this and creatively initiated their own conflict transformation strategies and humanitarian gestures in support of those of the government.

### **3.3 Durable and Permanent Peace**

This research is much more interested in the theoretical concept of permanent peace in relation to Keana LGC than in general. Nevertheless, before focusing on the specifics of this study it is important to highlight some significant research from the literature concerning peace. Theorists, practitioners, researchers, diplomats and interveners approach conflict so as to enhance its prevention, analysis, mediation and, as theorized by John Burton, for the *provention* of social and cultural structures of conflict (Burton, 1990,

1997). Various researchers have proven the presupposition that, fundamentally, all human cultures love and work for peace (Anderson, 1985; Schellenberg, 1996; Jeong, 2000; Anderson, 2004; Fry, 2007; Clements, 2008). Thus it is unfortunate that, despite available evidence, some people (including some scholars; e.g., Smock, 2006 and Roger, 1990) continue to lack optimism for achieving peace through the resources provided by pacific religious culture. Perhaps it is against those who grimace at the suggestion of an emergence of peace from the religious domain, or any other social spheres, that Anderson (1985) makes this clear articulation: “in summary, there have been internal and external, positive and negative, and religious and secular definitions of peace. Peace has been waged through both force and love. Since all these definitions refer to various aspects of human life, it might be worth considering the proposition that peace is not completely established until these different dimensions of life are all fulfilled” (p. 103). Anderson argues further that humanity does not first desire violence, but peace; and the desire for peace is not only the “manifestation of the will of humanity” but an alignment to the “will of God” (p.103). He further observes that, due to complicated historical and cultural factors, there are different worldviews on peace and our search for it must be in line with appreciable elements. This study draws on the expository works of Royce Anderson (2004) and some African writers. Expanding on the work of L. G. Anderson (1985), Royce Anderson (2004) reports his findings on the Western and Oriental worldviews on peace. He states that the West understands and approaches peace from the stance of negotiated strength and contractual relations and pacts, which is why, he says, peace is mostly described and defined in the West as “the absence of violence” and as a systemic “state” (Anderson, 2004). Although he does not reference the African worldview,

Anderson (2004) demonstrates that some Eastern traditions (e.g. Hebrew, Arabic, Hindu, Chinese and Japanese) see peace as ‘condition’ within the cosmological order and an orientation in human ontology. Thus unlike the West, the East sees peace as a natural given rather than a social condition that is being constructed by negotiation to have “the absence of negative characteristics” (Anderson, 2004, p. 102). The works of Fogarty (1992), Chernus (1993), and Galtung (1996) all attest to the plausibility of this contrast; thus making it noncontroversial. Anderson (2004) introduces the sense of measurability to peace talk. He explains that peace is both “state” and “condition” and in either ways it is measurable. Objectively, peace is measured when it is perceived as an existing phenomenon and it is measured subjectively when personal testimonies, contextual references and statistical scaling (long or short term, high, medium or low level) attest to its existence. Mac Ginty (2013) agrees with Anderson on the measureability of peace but the references and testimonies for its empirical existence have to be made by the local conflict community. He however objects to statistical scaling of peace, arguing that as a Western or technocratic measurement, it is obsessed with quantitative and qualitative econometric number about peace without giving the correct picture of the correct situation; orthodox scales of peace are often wrong “in that they are technically correct but report a very misleading picture” (p. 58). In this analysis Anderson and Mac Ginty are, perhaps, laying the foundation for the descriptions of peace as temporary, durable, and permanent. African writers Mbiti (1991), Masina (2000), and Tutu (2004) have explained that peace in the African traditional and religious worldviews means an attitude or moral conduct which is innate, with a fundamental teleology which values communal harmony and welfare. To Africans, peace is woven into the philosophical and sociological concept

of *ubuntu*, which represents the inextricable relationships among members of the community and their shared commitment to sustaining its harmony and welfare; every individual exists because others exist.

By way of summarizing this discussion two points can be highlighted. First, peace for all cultures means a prevailing atmosphere where individuals in social relationships are able to live and develop their full potentialities without any form of obstruction and restraint. Second, though all cultures are aware that human relationships are often disrupted by conflict, they are not daunted from highly valuing peace and teaching that it is priceless. For the fact that this effort will not be easy, it does not it is utopian. Chernus exhorts that it is realizable ~~if~~ if peace researchers can articulate the paradigm, they may find a responsive new audience among their students (Chernus, 1993, p. 121).

Discourses in peace and conflict studies are continually advancing our understanding especially on the measurability of conflict. Scholarship, government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have advanced studies and findings that measure violence, peace and safety on the bases of levels, length (duration) and types as well as the statistics measurement of the goals and objectives of peace approaches. It is with this background that violence, peace, safety, interventions are being articulated as permanent, durable, long-term, short-term, high, low, successful or failed (Taisier, 2004; AU Document; 2014, Hoffman, 2010; Anna, 2012). Having adopted and situated the measures of peace as permanent and durable, this study argues that the people of Keana LGC do not want anything less than permanent peace after the 10+ years of durable peace they have had since the 2001-2002 conflict.

This research was able to identify two types of scholarly advocacy for peace with

regards to conflict stricken areas. Scholarly works that have World Wars I & II and nuclear threats in mind, put forward strong arguments in favour of permanent peace from nuclear and ideological wars (Gundlach, 1942; Slick, 1958; Piel, 1962); Mayer, 1962; U Thant, 1964). Scholarship written in light of post-independent conflicts and intra-state civil wars make a strong appeal for durable peace to advance into permanent peace within nation states (Taisier & Matthews, 2004; Borer, 2006; Jeong, 2005; Zartman, 2008; Eck, 2010; Ohmura, 2011). Incidentally, none of the authors above has consistently worked with the concept of “permanent peace” and developed it in-depth. Even though each of them has interchangeably used related concepts like “total peace”, “durable peace”, “peacebuilding”, “long-term peace” and “sustainable peace”, what they are commonly asking for is the peace that is permanent. According to Slick, permanent peace or total peace is not the temporary absence of violence but a social evolution where fighting is no longer contemplated as the alternative to non-violence; a situation where human and material resources are used for “living instead of dying” and an ideological orientation where permanent peace becomes everyone’s ultimate goal (Slick, 1958, p. 15). Writing against the backdrop of the two World Wars, Slick lists his conditions for permanent peace as follows: support for the UN, creation of an international police force, and subscription to international criminal law (Slick, 1958). Strangely, Slick observes that *permanent* peace is everyone’s need, but people hesitate to embark on it because they see it as a project “too big” and the problems as “too great” (Slick, 1958, p. 106). This observation, perhaps explains why many people prefer to argue for the lower category, namely, *durable* peace. The *Center for Global Nonkilling* (CGNK) refuses is firm on its option for permanent. It also reaffirms that permanent peace is not Utopian but achievable

if nations will spend on development than military might. From psychological perspectives, Gundlach (1940, 311) argues that what makes a true ceasefire into peace is a situation when the psycho-social dynamics of control, cooperation and relationship are reconstructed toward attaining permanent peace. In other words, permanent peace is achievable when we do not contemplate anything less than peace in any instance.

On the other hand, when scholars talk about *durable* peace, they are referring to the period of peace which exists after a ceasefire has been reached. It is during that long-term stability of enduring peace (Taisier & Matthews, 2004, 3) when the conditions of negotiated peace are being implemented (Eck, 2010, 115). The conditions that enhance durable peace include: inclusivity, common ownership of the process, people participation, consensus, compromise, needs satisfaction, economic and political non-restrictions (Eck, 2010; Zartman, 2007; Taisier & Matthews, 2004). The idea of durable peace was perhaps first conceived in 1940 by Luigi Villari who enumerated non-state interference, toleration of difference, non-proselytism, non-exploitation of minorities, non-conflagration of conflicts, non-partitioning, economic concessions, etc. as “foundations of a durable peace” (Villari, 1940, 89).

The sharp distinction between permanent and durable peace is seen in the following analysis. While permanent peace is a project aimed at the total termination of conflict or the non-contemplation of its recurrence, durable peace, in contradistinction, believes that the achievement of any length of post-conflict peace can become an instrument for gaining permanent peace. Minimum peace is enough to lead to maximum peace. Even though scholars like Jeong (2005), Borer (2005), and Zartman (2007) argue for a minimum of five years of nonviolence before it is appropriate to use the term durable

peace, one clear truth is that the ultimate “will of humanity” is permanent peace, and minimum or durable peace is capable of bringing about permanent peace. As a matter of fact, each/all of the conditions that enhance durable peace as listed above can advance permanent peace.

Keana LGC has had more than ten years of durable peace. What it needs now is the attainment of permanent peace enhanced by the ancillaries of sincere desire for common welfare, non-differentiation, and rejection of violent engagements. In this light, the present research study can be described as essentially an investigation into how the conflict transformation efforts of the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC achieved durable peace, as a step towards attaining permanent peace in the area. The study focuses on how their roles, motives, goals, objectives and strategies are addressing the residual causes and legacies of the 2001-2002 conflict in order to attain permanent peace.

### **3.4 Leadership: Religious and Traditional Leaders**

Weber (1968), Rost & Burns (1991), Bryson & Crosby (1992), Northouse (2004), Kort (2008), Yukl, (2008), Batanda (2009) and Winkler (2010), have provided useful insights into the definitions, theories, types, kinds, essences, goals, and other implications, of leadership; be it religious, traditional, political, or organizational, in contemporary times. Scholarship has floated many definitions of leadership; Rost & Burns (1991) studied 221 of them and their implications for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Kort (2008) describes the plethora of leadership theories and definitions as “superfluous” articulations of basically the same point; leadership is about getting people to do something they mutually agree

about. Despite Kort's caution, however, this study made use of three kinds of leadership theories and one definition in order to ably do its investigations and clearly explain its discoveries.

From the plethora of leadership theories, Yukl (2008) and Winkler (2010) draw out three kinds. According to Yukl, strategic leadership theories enrich our understanding of leadership by identifying the way leadership is going and the force behind its trend. Winkler looks at both classical and contemporary leadership theories and styles. The classical leadership theories focus on what effective leadership should be; thereby offering leaders a list of ancillary traits that should define effective leadership. Contemporary leadership theories, for their part, provide an overview of the entire leadership process by evaluating and explaining the effectiveness of all operating dynamics in leadership. With the tone of the classical theorists, Winkler recommends that every leadership style in our age must be adorned with charismatic traits such as sharp creativity, distributed leadership and transformative interactions with followers in order to confront emerging challenges. Before Winkler's recommendation, Bryson & Crosby (1992) had identified two types of leadership: "in-charge" and "shared-power". With a preference for the latter, they assert that gone are the theories that called for "being in-charge" leadership type. What is apropos for the current democratic culture is "shared-power" leadership. Shared-power leadership creates room for individuals, organizations and institutions so that the "diversity of voices and needs are being heard and addressed" (p. xii) and everyone is motivated to follow, dialogue, and participate. The success of shared-power is not hinged solely on its democratic approach, it is also enabled by the availability of enhancing factors; those which Yukl (2008) calls efficient

leadership ~~performance~~ determinants”. Some of the ~~performance~~ determinants” are: the followers’ focus and actions for the achievement of communal welfare, the members’ inner desire, unquenchable motivations and undaunted disposition to attain set goals, the availability and use of human, cultural, environmental, and historical capital and the leadership’s finesse to use dialogical influence and to harness other factors for the attainment of the group’s set goals (Yukl, 2008). Bass & Steidlmeier (1999) observe that transformational and shared/charismatic leaderships differ only on semantics but not by definition. Thus they appraise the ethics, character and authenticity of charismatic or transformational leadership on the parameters of total selflessness and absence of deception and exploitation of followers.

As to whether various types of civil leadership have authority side by side within the modern state, Max Weber (1968) describes the interactions between them as ~~state-society~~” relations. He posits that state authority (executive members, legislators, bureaucrats), charismatic authority (heroism, dynamism, creativity and exceptionality of citizens) and traditional authority (priests, clan leaders, family heads and patriarchs) are all capable of contributing to the attainment of social welfare if they each play their roles well. The criticism made by neo-Weberians, that Weber was too convinced there will be no conflict but perpetual collaboration between the three power institutions, is answered by Winkler with the suggestion that if every leadership institution works with charismatic principles conflict will be very unlikely. This is because leadership, as defined by Norton (2004), is that process whereby the individual dialogically influences the group members and interacts with all associated units toward achieving goals that are mutually benefiting. The strong salient point in this definition is the influence that the leader exerts on the

available performance determinants. For our contemporary society, “shared-leadership” is the apropos because of it emphasizes the understanding of the self and others, nurturing a truly humane community, encouraging the free flow of communication, going for the ultimate from competing options, and coordinating the implementation of decided tasks (Bryson & Crosby, 1996).

Drawing on the insights from this analysis, this thesis study was able to correctly identify two points about the religious and traditional leaderships in Keana. Both leaderships belong to the Weberian traditional authority and they have they are aware of the imperative to collaborating with the state in promoting the peoples’ welfare and survival without compromising this duty. They are also open to the innovative or shared leadership and all of its descriptive characteristics they are also prepared to apply the required tactics such as persistence, education and appeals in order to make themselves, their leadership trends and the operating dynamics successful or their entire leadership system as effective as it ought to. Though a people of triple historical and structural heritages (African culture, Islamic religion and colonialism), Africans have continued to hold onto the legitimacy of their religious and traditional institutions (Mazrui, 1986, Mbiti, 1990) and I observed during the interviews that the religious and traditional leaders in Keana have constantly referred to the values of these institutions in their as they seek to transform their conflicts.

A growing body of literature in peacebuilding has focused on describing, defining, characterizing and identifying the peacemaking contributions made separately by traditional and religious institutions (Ademolekun, 1988; Akpan, 1994; Zartman, 2000; Appleby, 2000; Little & Appleby; 2004, Blench, Tuso, 2014). There is, however, little

scholarship that discusses their combined peacebuilding engagements. In part, this study is filling up this void by looking at the collaborative work done by the two social institutions for the transformation of the 2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC.

In pre-colonial Africa, religious and traditional institutions were subsumed into what Mbiti (1991) describes as traditional leadership, an inextinguishable aspect of African culture and cosmology. In Africa, today as in the past, the traditional leadership office (e.g., kings, chiefs, queens, rainmakers, or priests) is mythically linked to God who is responsible for sending leaders who shoulder the cultural, political and religious responsibilities for their communities. Of course, disagreements occurred between traditional rulers (monarchs) and religious leaders especially on who succeeds the throne but they were able to resolve them and about job descriptions but they were able to recognize and respect the bounds and limits of their respective authorities. Mazrui (1986), Adamolekun (1988), Blench (2006), and Tusso (2014), acknowledge the exogenous impacts of colonialism and Semitic spirituality on Africa and its worldviews. Mazrui and Tusso articulate that the encroachment by these two introduced Westphalian political systems and religious contradictions, thus leaving the legacies which Mazrui describes as “triple heritages” or puzzles (African tradition, Islam and Eurocentric culture). Africa is still trying to solve this threefold heritage especially by re-considering and returning the relevance of religious and traditional institutions in their modern political processes. For example as reported by Blench (2006), in countries such as Tanzania and Ghana, traditional leadership institutions were targeted for elimination by colonial and post-colonial African leaders who were trained in socialist ideologies. However, the deep rootedness of traditional leaderships in African enabled these institutions to survive all

exterminable attempts so that, even where they had tended to wither, today they are resurgent, developing, flourishing, and multiplying. This is especially so in Ghana and Nigeria where “there are many more ‘traditional’ rulers today than at independence” (Blench, 2006, p.2).

The obvious question is, “Why has this resurgence been accepted by current politicians?” Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo (2012) argue that traditional leadership is a “social capital”, defined by Benk (2005) as a social given which has the capability of holding together group members and mobilizing them for mutually beneficial ends. Given this great potential, political leaders in Africa see, in traditional leaderships, appreciable values for conflict resolution, mass mobilization for development, and social cohesion (Blench, 2006; Birgit, 2001; Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo, 2012). A current trend in this regard is the proliferation of training workshops organized by different national and local governments for traditional leaders on peace, conflict resolution, and development (Leadership, 2014; Search for Common Ground, 2014). Abusively, however, some politicians have cryptically reconstructed traditional leaders into occupants of political positions, electoral vote mongers, and political godfathers (Adamelokun, 1988; Akpan, 1994; Blench, 2006). The search for transformative responses to conflicts in Africa has suggested that traditional leaders should become more actively involved in the process of conflict resolution as non-state advocates, mobilizers, and agents of peace (Batanda, 2009; Abdulrahman, 2008; Mayanja, 2013).

Judging from the above arguments, traditional leaders are conceptualized in this study as those who, by succession, appointment, or election, are recognized by their community members as leaders and custodians of the people’s ancestral heritage, social

identity, moral and spiritual values, welfare and prosperity and, in light of the present political dispensation, paternal figures to both the government and community. Even though politicians have infiltrated traditional leadership stools with political incursions, and exerted state constitutional powers over them in the post-independence era, traditional leadership institutions have not lost their credibility as social capital before the local communities. This study realized that in Keana LGC, traditional leaders have also maintained commendable capabilities for transforming prevailing conflicts. The practice of collaborative peacemaking as a strategy by traditional leaders generally in Africa captivates Zartman (2007). With reference to the works of Tusso (2000), Menkhaus (2000), and Masina (2000), he perfectly describes the strategy as “collective security”—“a loose community system in which the members band together to deal with a deviant party, reintegrating it back into the community” (p. 223). This study, in fact, found that traditional leaders in Keana LGC work with an inclusive approach which reaches out to every significant figure or group to create cordial relationships among their people. The peacemaking contributions by religious leadership and institutions have begun to enjoy increasing recognition. Smock (2006), for example, asserts: “The field of religious peacemaking is also maturing. With more sophisticated reflections of its growing experience, a body of knowledge is developing” (p. 1).

The Christian Leadership Center (2006) and Winston (2002) have attested to the relationship of the Spiritual Being, the believing community and religious leadership. These two sources observed that with the Supreme Being behind religious leadership formation and functioning Christian leadership therefore must exhibit some fundamental elements: they must be called, they ought to develop competent relationship with the faith

community, they must increase in confidence by having great knowledge of their faith traditions, and their character and image must be representative of servant-leader who is integral, respectful, just, moral, dialogical and able to harnesses the “performance determinants” to attain desired goals. Even though Mbiti finely defines religious leadership within a traditional African worldview, it has a universal representation because it contains with the four fundamental elements listed above. According to Mbiti, religious leaders are those men and women who are highly esteemed by the people as God’s (Ultimate Being) ministers and prophets, mediating between them and the Supreme One; conducting religious rituals, ceremonies, prayers, worship and divinations for the people (Mbiti, 1991, 12).

Scholarly discussions have touched on religious leadership and peacemaking. The work of Roger (1990) and the 1990s programs and publications of USIP, illustrated in the work of Smock (2006), having agreed that religion is ambivalent, went on to draw the conclusion that religion is however more tilted to and involved in conflicts than otherwise. This position is countered by Appleby (2000), Little & Appleby (2004), Assefa (1990), Reyhler (1997) Sandal (2011), Smock (2009), and Smock & Qamar-ul Huda (2009), who explore many areas where religion, religious leaders, and religious institutions, have proven to be peaceable and relevant to conflict transformation. Reyhler (1997), Assefa (1990) and Sandal (2011) describe religious leaders as significant assets to peace processes. Scholarship has identified many instances where religious leaders have facilitated peace processes. Jelen (1993) enumerates the political and peacemaking works of Christian leaders across the world. Smock & Qamar-ul Huda (2009) illustrate how Islamic leaders are increasingly engaged in peace works by condemning adherents

involved in religious violence and by initiating dialogue interactions, peace education programs, and peacebuilding activities, as efforts aimed at transforming conflict.

Considering the above and the peace work of religious leaders in the South African anti-apartheid struggles (e.g.. Archbishop Desmond Tutu), the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, the Indonesian Malino Peace Agreement, , and the reality of peace and inter-faith dialogue in Macedonia and Sudan, Sandal asserts that it is apropos to bring religious leaders into the “epistemic communities”. Haas (1992) defined epistemic communities as a network of professionals whose knowledge and expertise on societal needs and shared norms are relevant to public policy making. In agreement with Sandal, Thomas (2005) situates religious leaders under the Weberian traditional epistemic authorities in state-society relations.

In this regard, Foucault's (1970) articulation of the *Faces of Human Knowledge* has great implications for religion as an epistemic resource. He asserts that epistemic resources mean those people and components of knowledge that have the capacity and tested methods for laudably addressing prevalent historical issues and the factors that inform their emergence. These empirical issues may be spiritual or social. As for Lederach (1997), religious leaders are “epistemes” because of their mid-level and grassroots positions in social leadership. It is worthy of note that in 2000 the UN acknowledged religious leaders as epistemic communities whose expertise and opinions should be given deliberate recognition in public decision-making and political considerations. It can be argued, however, that even though religious leaders may be assets and epistemic resources, this does not make them the panacea to every conflict. Thus, while they made significant interventions during conflicts in Tajikistan and

Indonesia (Saunders 2003, Zartman, 2008), they have been ancillary factors to other secular peace efforts such as those in Nigeria, Sudan, Macedonia and in the Israel-Palestinian conflicts (Smock, 2006).

In answer to the question Are all religious leaders agents of peace?, Appleby (2009) differentiates between religious fighters and extremists, whom he condemnably describes as agents of violence, and religious leaders whom he commendably refers to as exercising spiritual leadership and pedagogic roles which have earned for them the description of peace actors. It is attested by Appleby (2000), Little & Appleby (2004) and Tusso (2014) that such religious leaders are aware of their paramount duties to proclaim peace and engage in non-conflict activities with the motive of transforming conflictive relationships and social structures towards peaceful co-existence. The religious leadership existing in Keana LGC is not any different from that expounded above. This study has found spiritual leaders who have been managing the religious affairs of their given faith communities while collaborating with the religious others and traditional leaderships in active service of the peaceful and social transformation of the Keana council.

Effective leadership is the major point emphasized in the theoretical works of Bryson & Crosby (1992) as well as Winkler (2010) and Northouse (2013), which were explored above. According to these scholars, effective leadership is an interactive, inclusive, creative process that eventually meets the common good of the people. At the base of their success are the enhancing functions of their roles, motives, objectives, goals, strategic and tactics which have been highlighted in the works of Ademolekun, Akpan, Zartman, Appleby, Little & Appleby, Blench, Tusso on religious and traditional leaderships. The implication, therefore, is that the religious and traditional leaderships in

Keana LGC must all be effective. In fact, their effectiveness was clearly illustrated in the way they allowed the active dynamics of roles, motives, objectives, goals, strategies, and tactics, to function in their approaches to transform the 2001-2002 ethno-religious conflict, as well as other micro conflicts in their domains.

### **3.5 Roles, Motives, Objectives, Strategies and Tactics**

Roles have been conceptualized by cultural, personality, and psycho-social analysts (Zurcher, 1983; Stets & Thai, 2009; Aronson, 2007; Olson & Hergenhahn, 2011; Gioscia, 2013) around four key themes: social positions, consensual expectations, relevant others, and performed activities. These four themes are found in the three definitions of roles proffered by Gioscia: (1) role as the incarnation or manifestation of personality, (2) role as the expression or exercise of personality in the social culture, (3) role as the mediated or synthesized communication of meaning by the personality. Gioscia (2013) further argues that social setting and role shape each other. Synthesizing the above listed theoretical works, this study describes roles in its own words as those unanimous attitudes, behaviours, and activities, expected of both the leader and the social group toward the attainment of the perceived goals or objectives. With regards to the case under consideration, this means the attainment of permanent peace in Keana LGC.

Every human activity is motivated or imbued with a cause. According to the social and behavioral sciences, the initiation, direction, intensity, persistence, and commitment to every engagement is occasioned by factors which are collectively described as motives. These motives may be intrinsic and/or extrinsic (Sullivan, 2009). From a more psychological perspective, James Williams (1910) describes motives in affective,

cognitive, and conative terms. Affective motives are those forceful, expansive, and agitative feelings that move us to act. Cognitive motives are those leading or key ideas that determine the type of action we should take. By way of illustration, Williams states that brutality was a key idea to the ancient Romans and war was their chief action. Conative motives are those perceptions we make of the prevailing social context and how these perceptions influence the measures we take to adapt to the context. According to Roquillo (2011), every leadership should be motivated by the factors of values, goals and mission. From this short discourse, motives are defined in this work as those personal, institutional, and communal cravings for various goods, virtues, and conditions that will satisfy our desires; be they expansive, cognitive or conative. The unwanted violence and conflict in Keana and the modest desire for peace are the obvious motives sustaining the conflict transformation processes in the area.

Rightly associated with motives are goals and objectives. This work, however, is focused on objectives rather than goals. For the purposes of this study, objectives are those specific ideals, results, and aspects which are the hallmarks of goals, so that achieving them implies attaining the aspired goals. In other words, the attainment of goals is dependent on the achievement of objectives; the latter are the means for reaching the former (Hedstrom, 2011; Olson & Hergenbahn, 2011, 336). Based on conflict transformation theory, when Keana cultural leaders achieve the paramount objective of transforming the conflictive ideas, perceptions, relationships, and structure of the community, they will have attained their desired goals: integral development, self-sufficiency, institutionalization of peace, and harmonious co-existence.

The term “strategy” (derived from the Greek word *strategia* meaning “plan of the

leaders”) first appeared in classical works on military operations but became multi-dimensionally used since the World War II (Littler, 2014; McGee, 2014; Nolan, 2002; Pill, 2009; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Thus, in international relations and political science strategy is a design meant to enhance the nation’s defense, foreign policy, military wars, and diplomatic interventions (Littler, 2014; Nolan, 2014). In public relations, management and business studies, strategy means the coordination of skills and resources for competitive and cooperate achievements, now and in the future (McGee, 2014; Littler, 2014; Franklin, 2009). I wish to observe that there is lack of indepth analytic scholarship on the functionality of strategy in Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS). Unlike political science, international relations and management studies which explore the concept with depth, PACS only makes secondary reference to it when analyzing conflict resolution themes like “sources”, “dynamics”, “narrative analysis”, “situations”, “culture”, “negotiation”, “informal roles”, and “structural transformation” (See the works of Druckman, 2008; Jeong, 2005; Borer et. al. 2006; and others). For this reason, I relied heavily on the work of Pruitt and Rubin (1986) to describe how strategies and tactics are operationlized in this study. Pruitt and Rubin describe strategies as the “moves or ways of pursuing” the settlement of conflict or the “active efforts to resolve [a] controversy” (p. 3). The likely strategies conflict parties use to reach their aspirations include: contending, yielding, problem-solving, withdrawing and inaction. They define tactics as the moves or skills that conflict parties use to argue or sustain their positions such as ingratiation, gamesmanship (attention diversion), persuasive argumentation, promises and threats, and irrevocable commitment. The inter-relationship between strategies and tactics is that the former as planned activities can only attain their preconceived “objectives or ends”, if

enabled by the latter as required skills. For example, problem-solving as a strategy will have to depend on commitment and patience as the required tactics for it to succeed. This study uses strategies and tactics in the same light as Pruitt & Rubin, as the different activities and actions (strategies) and the enabling moral attitudes or virtues (tactics) that the religious and traditional leaders employed in transforming the 2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC. Prominent among their strategies was interactive dialogue and meeting and patience, transparency and love were the supporting tactics or virtues.

### **3.6 Conflict Transformation**

Conflict transformation theory is a filler of the loopholes found in other conflict theories, but chiefly in the theory of conflict resolution. Early literature on conflict resolution was North American (Doucet, 2007) and began to appear during the World War I era (Kriesberg, 2007). Kriesberg dissects the centennial development of conflict resolution theory by articulating that it evolved as a product of the diverse scholarly, practice and organizational approaches in international relations through four historical periods. Its first formal appearance, hatched by the Wilsonian idealism, was between 1914-1945. Wilsonianism argued for the resolution of international bickering and the enhancement of a harmonious world in the future through the internalization of democratic and economic ideas. The 1946-1969 phase featured literature and academic centers that condemned nuclear annihilation. The *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, for example, began in 1957 and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution was established in 1959. By 1970-85, conflict resolution as a discipline crystalized with multiple academic activities and publications on the idea. The fourth historical period

began with the proliferation of conflicts since the mid-1980's. Conflict resolution acquired a texture of insufficiency as the number of inter-group or intra-state conflicts, based on emerging issues related to ethnicity, identity, religion, and language, seemed intractable. As a result conflict resolution subdivided into a number of emerging approaches; some of which are conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict prevention, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peacemaking and conflict transformation. After years of practicing conflict resolution and the emergent alternatives, Lederach, for example, settled on the area of conflict transformation which he asserts is more comprehensive and value laden thus accurate because he is "engaged in constructive change efforts that include and go beyond, the resolution of specific problems" (Lederach, 2000, p. 4)

In the 1970s, some European structural theorists like Senghaas (1973), Krippendorf (1973), and Galtung (1971), had started to analyse the idea of conflict formation. Galtung's later evaluation (1996) introduced "a rich brew of core concepts" relevant to the gradual development of conflict transformation (Miall, 2001). In 1990s, the North American works of Kriesberg (1989), Adam Curle (1990), Azar (1990), Burton (1990), Värynen (1991), Rupesinghe (1994), Schwerin (1995) used the concept of transformation in peace and conflict studies with to explain how conflicts form and emerge as a result of asymmetric relationships and structure. As he draws out the essence of conflict transformation, Azar (1990) argues that it is more suitable for the dimensions of contemporary conflicts in fragile states. Lederach's, practical experiences and scholarship on conflict resolution informed his idea of developing conflict transformation as a theoretical niche in the field of peace and conflict studies. Speaking on this, he says: "I

first began to formulate the concept of an infrastructure for peace in the 1980s” (Lederach, 2013, p. 7) and it was embedded in a framework of conflict transformation that entertains a two-fold question: how do we end something destructive that is not desired (armed conflict, for example) and at the same time build toward that which is desired (respectful and cooperative relationships, for example)?” (p. 10). Lederach’s *infrastructure for peace* concept took its place fully in the theory of *conflict transformation* during the 1990s, (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 2003). His theory developed from a number of publications ~~in~~ the late 1980s/early 1990s”. The most influential and widely used are *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (1995) and *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997) (Paffehnholz, 2013, p. 14).

As it is common with new theoretical developments, Botes (2003) says that conflict transformation, as an invention within the broader field of peace and conflict studies, is improving itself; it is ~~still~~ in a process of defining, shaping and creating” (p.1). On the one hand, the scholarship of Botes (2003), Paffehnholz (2014), Miall (2001), Wright (2004), and Lederach himself (2003, 2013), have described Lederach as the ~~protagonist~~” and the most ~~comprehensive~~” theorist and practitioner of conflict transformation in peacebuilding. On the other hand, many other early and subsequent scholarly works focused on furthering the analytic exploration and appreciation of conflict transformation as a theory.<sup>7</sup> For example, Bush & Folger (1996) point out the two goals of conflict transformation and articulate five procedures that are used for conflict transformation. The two goals are (i) empowerment, that is making conflict parties to be able can see things as they really are for decisive self-initiated action and (2) recognition, that is

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<sup>7</sup> For instance, Galtung (1995), Rupesinghe (1995), Baruch & Folger (1994, 1996), Schwerin (1995), Spencer & Spencer (1995), Värnyen (1991), Kriesberg (2009), Miall (2001), Botes (2003) Doucet (2007), McGlynn & McAuley (2011).

teaching them to recognize and respect each other's person, perspectives and concern. According to their research, the effective conflict transformer is one who exhibits ten fundamental hallmarks of (1) reiterating to the parties that attaining the two goals (empowerment and recognition) is the major task of their transformative interaction, (2) stating to the parties that the realization of goals rests in their hands. (3) Attitudinally, the conflict transformer must respect the parties' views and decision, (4) must believe in their competences and motives, (5) should allow parties to express themselves and their emotions, (6) should guide them as they recount past histories (7) help them to explore their uncertainties, (8) cleverly focus on the unfolding transformative interaction, (9) must consider that intervention will be likely long-term and (10) should feel fulfilled even when goals are achieved in small measure. The five transformative approaches to conflict articulated by Bush & Folger (1996) include: transformative mediation, personal and conflict transformation, analytical problem-solving interactions, dialogue, constructive confrontation and collaborative learning. Though as an aspect of alternative dispute resolution, Bush & Folger report from empirical findings that the primary goals of conflict transformation can also be achieved in liberal justificatory processes.

Basically, the provenance of conflict transformation theory was intended to be a shift from other peace and conflict theories such as conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict settlement, peacebuilding and peacemaking (Miall, 2001, Lederach, 2003, Botes, 2003, Paffenholz, 2013). According to Botes (2003), some scholars like Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999) view conflict transformation as an extension of conflict resolution, but a heavier scholarly argument from its proponents view it as a departure from other theories because its precise purview is an encapsulation of the ~~the~~

overall peacemaking and peacebuilding venture” (p. 5). Furthermore, Lederach and others explain that the shift in focus was necessitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall (Paffenholz, 2013). The post-cold war period surfaced social influences which call for fostering improved interrelationships between persons, groups and nations (Lederach, 2013; Tongeren, Ojielo & Brand-Jacobsen, 2013). As a result of victory of liberalism over communism, Lederach argues, the prevailing voice enjoined all think-tanks, diplomatic opportunities, policy makers and social processes to gear their efforts towards favouring active involvement of local civil societies in democratic processes across cultures, and to do so with a suitable theoretical principle, if there was to be hope of any pragmatic outcome. In agreement, Botes states that the relevance of the theoretical principle is dependent on its ability to adopt a holistic approach, a defining feature that contrasts it from existing peace theories and makes it capable of meeting the inadequacies identified in them (Botes, 2013). Restating this assertion, Mitchell (2002) says that conflict transformation theory is “a process that will make up for the inadequacies of mere resolution” (p.1). Illustratively, Paffenholz reports that the long-term armed conflicts in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia and El Salvador in the 1980s, and the Yugoslavian and Rwandan genocides as well as the Angolan recurrent conflict in the 1990s, clearly begged for new approaches. Conflict resolution, conflict management and peacebuilding had proven to be limited and “failed to put an end to conflicts and bring peace” (p.15). The general reason given for their failure is that, they are prescriptive in nature and, by this, they transferred processes that were alien and not workable to the local contexts. Other shortcomings noted by Lederach and other scholars are in the light of what they emphasize as their primary goals. Earlier emphases do not concentrate on

the essential element that connects the conflict parties, namely the continued relationship between them (Lederach, 2013; Botes, 2003; Miall, 2001). For example, as its fundamental goal, conflict resolution theory only emphasizes the elimination or reduction of conflict and the problems that caused it. Both conflict settlement and peacemaking (often used interchangeably) emphasize positive peace or the state of no violence and peaceful co-existence. Lederach's (2015) critique of conflict settlement and peacemaking states that they do not make a precedent impact, but wait until conflict has taken place or post-accord peace has been reached before initiating responsorial processes. Lederach (1995) reports that earlier scholars of conflict management (e.g., Thomas, 1976 and Wehr, 1979) are opposed to conflict resolution as the concentration of efforts to eliminate conflict. The primary attention during any crisis, according to Lederach, should be the management of unhealthy outcomes. Explaining further, he and other later management theorists advocate for the creation of special management designs that will curtail escalation, enable de-escalation and support the alleviation of the impacts of conflict (Costantino & Merchant, 1995). Against management, conflict transformationals articulate that human relations and social structures are not "managed" and "resolved"; if only this is done, the people and the structures will fail again. Instead, because ontologically they have potential for change, the participants should be approached with the intention of having them transformed from violence to peace (Augburger, 1992, Botes, 2003). Another general argument in disfavor of the other conflict approach theories is that they rarely include the available resources of persons, cultural worldviews and creative powers within the conflict context.

The short-term framing for intervention, undue interference by sponsors, financial

constraints from donors and lack of inclusivity (targeting only the armed parties) in conflict resolution have brought it under the critic's sledge who point out that these factors have made the approach susceptible and vulnerable to manipulation and failure. By way of example, Lederach uses Boutros Boutros-Ghali (UN Secretary General, 1992-1996) and the loophole in his agenda for peacbuilding, Lederach argues that it did not respect available local capital, was exclusive in scope, and waited for conflict to occur and subside before swinging into action (Lederach, 2013). Conflict transformation, an alternative holistic approach, seeks to fill up the vacuum found in the other theories by emphasizing the "elicitive model". This approach is inclusive, participatory and it gives primary consideration to "implicit conflict knowledge" (e.g., it employs the peacemaking resources of the conflict context) (Paffenholz, 2013; Lederach, 1996, p.56). The popularity of conflict transformation theory among scholars in contemporary debate and research has been built on the fact that it gives primary consideration to endogenous resources before it considers external assistance. Reacting to the intended shift, Paffenholz (2010, 2013) says this is the "largest contribution of the conflict transformation school" (2013, p. 15). Lederach reveals that his peace research and practice experiences in Africa, Central America, Europe, Middle East on peacbuilding in the areas of organization, participation, presentation and facilitation of conferences, workshops, seminars, mediation and research investigations, enabled him to see the enumerated inadequacies in the other approaches and informed his conceptualization of conflict transformation to make up for them. Since other theories ask questions about conflict and its outcomes, he observed the need for a theory that will ask questions about conflict, outcome and the continuing relationships of parties (Lederach, 1995, 1997, 2003,

2013, Wright, 2004).

The essentialization of peace and social relationship in conflict transformation is worth looking at. In *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (2003), Lederach conceptualizes peace within the ambiance of social relationship, a purview that is similar to the African value of *ubuntu*. Lederach insists that human relationships are supreme and their continuity is everyone's business. This is because between all people there is an indestructible spiritual connection; that is, the connectivity of their humanities. This is what *ubuntu* implies. As a social principle that is nurtured in the people, *ubuntu* guides them into appreciating their inter-connectedness and the associated obligation of acting for communal harmony and welfare. When Lederach identifies and advocates for the transformation of feelings, perceptions and the construction of positive personal, relational, structural and cultural influences, he is putting forward ideas in harmony with the concept of *ubuntu*. Peace conceptualized in this way means peace has two dimensions; a negative aspect (lack of violence) and positive aspect (structural justice). Thus, for Lederach, peace is an internal condition manifested in non-violence and just structures.

The need for the restoration of peace when it is disrupted by conflict or violence is a serious business that prompts questions about both negative and positive peace; how can a conflict situation be ended and analysed in order to restore justice and peace? Scholars responding to these questions advise that in order to develop an effective approach, theorists, researchers and practitioners must begin by analysing the conflict (Cheldelin, Druckman & Fast, 2008) and identify its type (Sandole, 2008), its sources (Rubenstein, 2008) and its dynamics (D'Estrée, 2008). Transformational scholars, especially Lederach, add that achieving a comprehensive conflict analysis and the identifying of its associated

aspects is dependent on how conflict is defined and understood. Thus Lederach (1997) pictures conflict as the existence of tension or as the growth of tension between inter-relating parties. Human beings are necessarily meant to inter-relate and so, when relationships begin to sour, the transformative process must be applied to transform the unwanted development and its consequences.

Lederach's theory proposes a *conceptual framework* of three lenses for perceiving, analysing and approaching a "conflict topography" (Lederach, 2003, pp. 7-13). He technically describes the transformative frame as *the long view of conflict* (Lederach, 1995, p. 12), and enumerates the following as its constitutive lenses. *Looking*, as the first lens, implies focusing on the "immediate situation" or the "presenting problem" (i.e., the prevailing conflict context). *Seeing*, as the second lens, means analysing the undercurrents (causes and aftermaths) and the "patterns of relationship" (inner thrusts and dynamics of needs, perceptions, ideas, interests, identity, and power) of the conflict, while the *transformational lens* refers to the construction and implementation of the transformation model on the "immediate situation" and "patterns of relationship." These three lenses thus answer the two dimensional question of conflict transformation theory: "how do we end something destructive that is not desired and at the same time build toward that which is desired (respectful and cooperative relationships)?" (Lederach, 2013). Basically, the paramount concern of the conflict transformation theory and its conceptual framework is the interpretation of conflict and its associated elements of ideas, relationships, and structure, as well as impacts and legacies, in a constructive fashion.

According to Doucet (2007), it is the constructive consideration of these elements that is the actual process of conflict transformation. However, the success of this process

is dependent on the existence of a proper disposition among all the involved actors and significant others. A disposition is “proper” only when the actors exhibit a readiness to change their destructive ideas, perceptions, relationships and structure. It requires enthusiasm for active involvement in the process, an openness for forgiveness, the desire to correct all wrongs and to reform the conflict structure, the yearning for the restoration of broken relationships, and most especially an unwavering commitment to the entire transformation process.

Some more topical issues about conflict transformation are its thesis, definition, principles, goals, tools, processes, actors, scope and dynamics as well as the when, how, what and who of its practice. Since this approach of conflict transformation is holistic, it is proper that its thesis should be all encompassing. From works cited above, the fundamental thesis of conflict transformation is its emphasis on the inclusion of all those who are associated with the conflict and conflict community in order to recreate a healthy society and inter-relationship among the people. Thus, mutual respect as well as personal and communal ideas, perceptions, feelings and communication are targeted for transformation toward fostering favourable interrelationship and social structures such that the new community now develops abhorrence and repulsion for any potential of violence.

According to Lederach and Miall (2004), the major goals of conflict transformation include (a) the transformation of events and associated realities by constructing and reconstructing them, (b) the transformation of conflictive perceptions of the self, others, issues and intentions, (c) the restoration of relationship and re-establishment of fluid communication between former conflict parties, and (d) the transformation of the

continuing social structures from destructive patterns to constructive perspectives (Lederach, 1995). In terms of scope, conflict transformation theory has a wide spectrum defined by inclusivity; an openness to work with all parties and addresses all questions about the conflict. This wide scope includes openness to armed and unarmed parties, long-term and continuous intervention, sustainability, and the use of both local and external resources and tools. Concerning the parties, there are those who are directly affected by the conflict as well as their leaderships and sympathizers, whom Lederach (1997) collectively calls transformation actors. In order to describe and explain their roles clearly, Lederach has explained them as operating on three levels: the top (military, political, religious and other visible leaders), middle-range (ethnic, religious, academic and humanitarian figures with high respect) and grass-root (local leaders, leaders of NGOs, community developers and group representatives). In this vertical order, all those who are visibly involved in dealing with the situation are included.

When should conflict transformation begin and end? For how long should it last? In all his works, Lederach asserts that the transformation process begins when through long-view the contradiction of ideas, feelings and tensions is perceived at its cradle or when unpeacefulness is beginning to develop. Since social relationships are unending, conflict transformation as a process is on-going or sustainable. Building on the idea of Curle (1971), Lederach (1995) argues that, unlike conflict theories which are outcome based, in conflict transformation, “process matters more than outcome”. Outcome-based approaches do not last, they are short-term. Process-based transformation does last, it is long-term and, more than that, it is sustainable and continuous because of its focus on dialogue and relationship. Fundamentally, conflict transformation is nourished by a few

guiding principles, namely the importance of reconstructing the parties' perceptions and ideas about each other, the restructuring of violent social institutions or contexts, and the restoration of good relationship between parties hitherto destroyed by the conflict. Conflict transformation also makes use of some tools to achieve its goals and sustain the guiding principles. The major tools available to it are derived from the entire conflict context. They include the conflict actors who shared within the three levels, the local thought patterns of the conflict community, the cultural worldviews of the people (their weaknesses, their strengths and their intentions), and a community participatory procedure. The practice of conflict transformation discovered recently that "insider mediators" are also significant tools for getting the people's trust for dialogical interactions (Lederach, 2013). Respective strategies of education, *conscientization*, advocacy, mediation and confrontation are also considered as tools (Curle, 1971; Lederach, 1995). Conflict transformation encourages the use of socio-economic resources and funds from governments, supporters, and interested donors (Wright, 2004).

Shirch (2005) regrets that scholars and practitioners in peacebuilding do not often highlight the importance of ritual; despite its having a great peace potential. She advocates for the use of rituals as a tool among peacebuilders because they communicate peace through symbols, senses and emotions and elicit transformation of the "people's worldviews, identities and relationships with others" (p. 2). In relation to this view, Lederach's *The Journey Toward Reconciliation* (1999) explores the spiritual foundations that undergird his peace work and have sustained him in his practice in the face of hate and attacks. He posits that a spiritual foundation, in the form of rituals built on truth, justice, mercy and peace, will offer positive life-giving energy to both conflict parties and

facilitators and support them in pantomiming the process, amidst all challenges. to a successful end (Wright, 2004). Acknowledging that fear and distrust are the major obstacles to peaceful relationships, Mariya Yevsyukova (1997) referred to Mark Chupp (1993) who proffered that conflict transformation should serve as a process to melt and replace all hurdles with trust and commitment for the attainment of “internal, relational and structural change”.

In his development of this theory, Lederach broke the ice for those who wonder how peace processes, and in this case conflict transformation, can be started. In two works: *From the Ground Up* (2000) and *A Handbook of International Peacebuilding* (2002) Lederach and his colleagues elaborate on some ways engagement in conflict transformation can be initiated and the necessary principles that will guide intervenors in their decisions and operations. Usually the transformer is called upon by the conflict community or concerned persons or NGOs to make useful contributions and, very often, the peace agent is sponsored for this project. Transformers also get involved through volition. Taking a long view of the conflict, and motivated by a moral philosophy that values life and co-existence, the transformation agents will choose to embark on such a peace project. Very many times, they form themselves into a combined team of experts, scholars and practitioners. Others are obliged to participate in conflict intervention because the philosophy and duties of their social status and positions make it peremptory on them. Those in government positions and epistemic communities such as religious and traditional leaders, for example, are bound by their positions to work for the welfare of their people (Sandal, 2011; Bartanda, 2009; Haas, 1989).

The guidelines for conflict interveners include “getting a sense of the big picture” of

the conflict and its type, sources, dynamics and failed approaches. Would be transformers necessarily have to be knowledgeable about ~~the~~ context: geography of protracted conflict” since they will be using the local resources. When transformers answer the conflict community question —so ~~æ~~ you coming to help us?” in the affirmative, it implies they are now fully committed, to the success and sustainability of the transformation process in spite of all hazards. Interveners need to mark out some of their responsibilities. When Lederach talks about ~~in~~intervention matters: from money to ethics” he means the duty of identifying whose responsibility it is to intervene and whose duty it is to fund each segment throughout the process. Finally it is the responsibility of interveners to decide *ab initio* that they are not only embarking on the project but are also fully committed to it, although they can choose to continue or withdraw at any point.

Based on the above analysis and primary findings, this study is able to produce the following *inter-relational linear* chart or model (below) which illustrates the major elements and processes that are salient to conflict transformation. The chart is described as *inter-relational* because the designated steps within it are continually related to each other. It is also *linear* because the transformer is seen moving from one step to another. The first step on the chart is the analytic long view of the conflict context in terms of looking at the presenting problems and discerning the meaning behind them. With knowledge about the conflict, the second step necessarily asks the question: ~~How~~ do we end something destructive that is not desired (armed conflict) and at the same time build toward that which is desired” (respectful and cooperative relationships)? The third step requires interveners to remind themselves of the overall guiding principles of the process; namely the re-engineering of all parties’ conflictive perceptions and ideas, the

restructuring of social institutions, and the restoration of good relationship between and among parties. The fourth step is the action step; that is, the actual initiation of the transformation process by the intervener. This can be done by means of processes such as mediation, problem-solving or facilitation. The fifth step requires the intervener to identify the long-term and continual scope (which, of course, should be all inclusive). Sixth, the choice of tools should be made and the tools need to be clearly outlined for quick reference. They must take account of the entire set of cultural assumptions of the local context such as the patterns, weaknesses and strengths, values, and aspirations of the people. The seventh step requires the intervener to facilitate interaction among conflict community members to enable them to determine their own goals and objectives. However, Nicholas Burbules (1993) has cautioned on this that the facilitator must not determine the outcome of the process but the interacting members should create their decisions and describe how they will actualize them. The eighth step deals with the cognizance that should be given to the sustainability of the process. This step is important because conflict transformation is not outcome-based but process-based since it is concerned with ongoing relationship and the continued existence of the society.



Figure 1.

There are many strengths embedded in Lederach's theory. His emphasis and proclaimed concern for the transformation of fractured social relationships in conflict communities through sustainable interactive processes and reconciliation is outstanding. For this reason, conflict communities will not settle for anything less than this kind of

approach. Its scope comprehensively encompasses the other conflict approaches and all those who in direct or indirect ways are associated with the conflict. Moreover it is an approach whose processes elicit dynamism in the conflict community and recognizes the community's cultural assumptions. It will easily enjoy the people's enthusiastic participation and will very likely bring about good outcomes. Quoting Butterfield (1953), Lynch (2014) asserts that despite the pessimism and the attendant negation of religion by social humanists and secularists, religion has continually "represented and upheld the element of continuity in our civilization" (p. 84). The inclusion and mixture of religious, spiritual and secular elements in Lederach's theory is therefore not only an illustration of the significance of religion in modern civilization but also an exhibition of the optimism that the individual is not sandwiched by religion and secularism, but the individual who is both spiritual and physical is rather the protégé of religion, humanities and secularism.

Despite the strengths of this theory, Paffenholz (2014) reports that "Lederach's theory has not been without its critics" (p. 14). For Fatherston (2000) the theory lacks the power of analysis. Paffenholz observes that the theory has limited role for outsiders and that Lederach has made an uncritical articulation about local resources (assumptions). These criticisms are unacceptable to a host of scholars including Mac Ginty (2006, 2008, 2013), Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) and Zartman (2000). They have consistently argued that the success of any peace approach is very much dependent on the use of local resources and Lederach (1997) has clearly enumerated and adequately described them as "cultural assumptions of the people" (1997, p. 8). With regards to the need for a powerful of analytic tool, the critical the long view process has satisfied the requirement with its incisive questioning. Against the criticism that the theory is too religious, many scholars,

such as Niebuhr (2014) and Ignatieff (2001), say that such a religious approach is acceptable. According to Niebuhr, “strictly speaking there is no such thing as secularism” because its discourses cannot escape resort to some principle that is higher than human reason (p. 204). Moreover, when secular discourses are so homo-centric, then “human reason, the individual, or the community, becomes its god”. Ignatieff refers to “human rights as idolatry: humanism worshiping itself” (p.53). In answer to the question asked by Lynch (2014), in the face of conflict “what is the Christian to do?” (p. 87), Lederach clearly demonstrates in his theory how scientists can blend well with epistemic communities for human welfare. To again quote Paffenholz (2013), “despite criticism and further development of the theory, Lederach’s original theory has emerged as one of the main peacebuilding theories that both integrates other conceptual works as well as exerting a considerable impact on peacebuilding and practice” (p.17).

Another critical observation worthy of mention is that the proponents of conflict transformation do not argue that this theory is a universal solution for every conflict, especially succession struggles such as those by the Lozi in Zambia, the Quebecois in Canada and the Scots in the United Kingdom. The essential goal of conflict transformation theory—the mutual re-framing of the disputants’ conflictive ideas, perception, feelings, interests and system—is, however, applicable to every conflict while recognizing that negotiation, interactive problem-solving, management, arbitration and adjudication may be the appropriate mechanisms. Sandole (2008) argues that every conflict has its own peculiar defining factors and features, implying that there are particular responsorial approaches suitable for each conflict situation. In the situation where the conflict context is a complexity of factors and dynamics, Diamond and

McDonald (1996) suggest that the multi-track approach can be adopted. When conflicts are hinged on the friction of feelings, ideas, perceptions, interests and social structures, and continued co-existence and relationship are unavoidable (such as between the Alago and Tiv in Keana LGC), then conflict transformation becomes the suitable model because of its emphasis on the reconstruction of conflictive factors, transformation of relationship and reformation of the society.

What is the hybrid definition of conflict transformation? Considering the preceding paragraphs, this study will define conflict transformation as the process that works towards the reconstruction of human, social, structural, organizational and perceptual contradictions which oftentimes come to manifest as conflict. This means, conflict transformation engages the disputants in the way that they will be able to reconsider their sour relationship by using their cultural assumptions (worldviews, natural endowments, human capacities, customs, and epistemic figures e.g religious and traditional leaders) to reframe their contradictory interests, intentions, ideas, perceptions and social system. It was in this context that this study was constructed using research questions aimed at highlighting the roles, motives, objectives, strategies and tactics the epistemic actors (the religious and traditional leaders) in Keana LGC are using to transform the conflict under consideration.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

This chapter indicates that broken social relationships and inter-ethnic conflicts can be transformed. The conflict transformative powers of religious and traditional leaders especially in indigenous societies have proven that they are relevant to peace processes as

actors and epistemic communities whose contributions are useful for policy making. The next chapter describes the research methodology that was used to investigate how the 2001-2002 inter-ethnic conflict in Keana LGC occurred and how it has been responded to by the epistemic communities: religious and traditional leaders, while keeping in mind the key concepts articulated in the theoretical framework.

## **Chapter 4: Research Methodology**

### **4.1 Introduction**

I used qualitative research methodology and two data collection techniques to investigate the causes and aftermaths of the conflict 2001-2002 in Keana LGC as well as the transformative contributions by the religious and traditional leaders. The primary data collection technique was interviewing; conducted on a one-to-one basis with open-ended questions. Seven traditional and religious leaders and six auxiliary traditional title holders from Keana LGC were interviewed. The secondary data collection technique was a critical review of documents relevant to the research problem which have been largely cited in this thesis. The “six steps” related to educational research, suggested by John Creswell (2012, p. 237), were used for analysis, interpretation and reporting of the generated data in this thesis

### **4.2 Research Participants, Rationale and Ethical Considerations**

At this juncture, it is important to state that, throughout the thesis process, I consciously maintained both my identity as a student and positionality as a researcher. In terms of reflexivity, I was neutral and did not allow personal opinions and ideas to bring bias and prejudice into the data interpretation so as to produce, as much as is humanly possible, an objective and a credible research report.

Creswell (2012) states that “in qualitative research you select people and sites that can best help you understand the central phenomenon” (p. 206). In this light, my research site was Keana LGC. Eventhough my initial sample population was the seven religious and traditional leaders in the LGC, I ended up interviewing six more participants.

Research scholars have acknowledged that initial research sample can change or be reconstituted if the field experiences differ from what was prefigured (Baker & Eward; 2006, Creswell, 2012). Meaning, there is likelihood that additional survey sample will emerge in the course of the study, which is called indirect participants. Literature (Erik & Ulke, 2009; Bound, 2009) have described direct participants as the original research respondents who were initially identified for the study and indirect participants are those unforeseen respondents who were later discovered and necessarily included because of their spurious relationship to the study. It is in this light that my sample survey later bloated to thirteen. The three direct religious leaders interviewed were: Fr. Joseph Edeh, the current chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) - CAN is the umbrella body for all Christians in the country, Mallam Abdullahi Yusuf, the present chairman of the Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) - the unity body for Nigerian Muslims and Osikigu Agede, the chief priest and leader of the indigenous religious community in Keana. Two indirect religious leaders interviewed were the former Keana LGC CAN chairmen: Rev. Ezekiel Ozegya (2003-2007 and Fr. George shenge (2004-2013). The four direct traditional leaders interviewed belong to either of the two Semitic (revealed) religions<sup>8</sup>, and they include: His Royal Highness (HRH) Sir Emmanuel Onyatikpo Elayo KSJ, the Osana (chief) of Keana, HRH retired Rev. Useni Oduh, the Osoku (chief) of Agaza and HRH Alhaji Mohammadu Agye Usman, the Oseshi (chief) of Alosi and the representative of the Tiv community in Keana LGC (who asked for anonymity). The other indirect participants interviewed are the auxiliaries of HRH Rev. Useni Oduh (Rtd) who asked them to also respond to some of the research questions, and they are Paul

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<sup>8</sup> Conversion, adherence and membership in either Christianity or Islam, by African traditional leaders became a common experience after the arrival of these two revealed religions.

Onyapo (*Ubandoma of Agaza*), Danjuma Ikpanago (*Osiki of Agaza*) and Sabo Otoshi (*Moyi of Agaza*). As already indicated above, the indirect sample has been included because the participants are closely associated with the research questions. Also because they were included during the interview by a direct participant, and this is within the precincts of semi-structured interviews, which give flexibility to the participants to approach research questions the way they want and the researchers the allowance of “adopting the social actors’ points of view” (Balike, 2000, p. 253) in order to comprehensibly explore the central phenomenon.

Social scientists are clear on the questions about the rationale for selecting research participants: direct or indirect. Apart from accepting that additional participants can be included (Patton, 1990; McCracken, 1988; DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree; 2006, Sapsford & Jupp, 2006). They have also consistently stated that matters of research contexts and participants size, whether large or small are at the discretion of the researcher. Thus Sapsford & Jupp, (2006) state that issues like these are “matters of judgment” (p. 20) of the researcher based on clear rationale. It will be more discrete according to DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree (2006), to have both the context and participants small, fairly homogeneous and seriously related to the research question in order to avoid complexity however unless where inevitable additional participants can be included. While summarizing the arguments of social scientists on the questions about context and sample size, in *How Many Qualitative Interviews Is Enough?: Experts Voices And Early Career Reflections On Sampling And Cases In Qualitative Research*, Baker & Edward (2006) conclude that a good research population size can range between 6-20 for MA research projects and 50+ for PhD works.

In addition to the arguments presented above, the rationale articulated by the following scholars also informed my choice of the thirteen participants. According to Charmaz (2006), the qualitative researcher must avoid getting into the level of data saturation; i.e., avoid adding or including research a source that does not provide useful data. The researcher must also avoid collecting useless data; i.e., data that does not connect with the theoretical framework of the project (Rebar et. al. 2011). This means that researchers are to look for the subjective role-players who are targeted in the study statement and those who, in the course of investigation, have been deemed significant as back-up players because they have additional information relevant to the inquiry. Another guiding rationale is that the participants must be selected in agreement with the Research Ethics Board requirements which centrally demand respect for the human dignity of the participants, their practical concerns, their environment (research site) and their epistemological processes (thought patterns). Keeping to the ethical requirements also helps the researchers to stay within methodological limits thus avoiding complexity. The fundamental implication of these principles is that the number of participants will likely be small. If, however, the sample size is going to be enlarged in order to obtain the needed data for a proper analysis, qualitative researchers should state this possibility right from the outset (Baker & Edward, 2006). Judging from these two preceding sentences, any reasonable sample size is acceptable as long as it is backed by a clear rationale. I am very clear as to the objective of my research: to investigate how religious and traditional leaders are doing conflict transformation in Keana LGC and how they are able to achieve the over 10 years of durable peace as they look forward to establishing permanent nonviolent relationships among the co-existing communities. My familiarity with Keana

as the research site is not only advantageous, it also suggests that my choice of seven primary role-players and six secondary interviewees is appropriate for the study. They not only provide rich information as the targeted population but, because they represent of all of the traditional and religious groups, the data obtained from them provided an adequate response to the research questions and objectives without the risk of reaching data saturation.

Contemporary scholarships on leadership (Meidl, 1995; Melissa et. al., 2010; Kean, Haycock-Stuart, Baggaley et. al.; 2011, Edmond, 2011) advocate for a shift from a “leader-centric” research focus towards a “followership perception of leadership” (Kean et. al., 2011, p. 509). Miendl (1995) describes this shift as the “romance of leadership” (p. 330), where researchers seek to know the evaluative references and perceptions followers make of their leaders. It would have been a worthwhile venture to investigate how the followership populations in Keana LGC perceive the transformative activities of their leaders in the light of the 2001-2002 conflict. However, considering the clear objective of this study (articulated in the rationale above) this research did not focus on “leadership-followership inter-dependencies” (Edmonds, 2011, p. 17); nor did it interview the followership to evaluate and validate the peace activities of their leaders. While remaining strictly focused on its objective, the study sought to identify and comprehend how the two leadership groups in Keana LGC have transformatively impacted on the conflict in question.

With a strong belief in the ethical creed that research exercises must be aimed at contributing to the welfare of the participants and their communities (Frankfort-Nachmia & Nachmias, 1996), this study was passionately concerned with how benefiting it will be

to the people of Keana LGC. I was not seeing or using the participants and sites as “curiosities”, “artifacts”, or “guinea pigs” for my own interest. I approached them with a sincere sense of respect, confidentiality, collaboration and friendship (Coburn, 2013, Dei, 2013). In order to be sure of free assent to participate, interviewees signed the consent form indicating their understanding of the ethical issues involved and willingness to participate (Berg, 2004). I am familiar with Keana LGC and the two ethnic communities involved in the 2001-2002 violent conflict. However, as I conducted my research with the members of this community, I tried very much to be neutral and sincere so that my questions were not slanted with bias or prejudice, in order that answers from the respondents would not be infected by my assumptions.

### **4.3 Data: Sources, Analysis and Interpretation**

In collecting data, this study adopted a qualitative research design and used primary and secondary tools for gathering information. According to Creswell (2012) this approach is a fit because it addresses the research issues and concerns by asking one or more participants questions in order to obtain information related to the research problem. In addition, Bruce Berg, (2004) states that qualitative technique and its investigative tools dissect research matters by using one or another of these three questioning or interview formats: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Creswell (2012) identifies four types of semi-structured format, namely one-on-one, focus groups, telephone, and e-mail. He also argues that each of them has the option of asking close-ended or open-ended questions. Open-ended questions enable both the interviewer and interviewee to develop their own thoughts and use their own words; thereby allowing for an in-depth exploration

of the topic (Britten, 1996, Berg, 2004, Creswell, 2012). The advantage of adopting this investigative approach is that it made my predetermined topics and questions of inquiry clearly comprehensible to me and the participants. In fact, my use of one-on-one interviews, in which I asked questions and recorded answers from one participant at a time, facilitated a great sharing of significant data by them. Concerning the secondary tool for sourcing data, despite the scarcity of materials that directly dwell on the 2001-2002 conflict, associated literature was able to provide some useful information on the conflict; most especially on significant issues that related to it.

In order to make my research study and reporting credible, I followed the data analysis and interpretation steps as described and recommended in the works of Holsti (1969), Bodgan & Biklen (2007) and Creswell (2012). Qualitative data analysis and interpretation is the process of making sense out of the collected texts and pictures by identifying and ascribing specified characteristics to them (Holsti, 1969). While data analysis is specifically about identifying and assigning codes to major ideas in the data and categorizing them into units for the sake of tracing their commonalities, data interpretation refers to developing the coded ideas or themes into meaningful sentences and relating them to the literature review and theoretical framework in order to broaden an understanding of the study (Bodgan & Biklen, 2007). Creswell (2012, p.237) identifies –six steps in in analyzing and interpreting qualitative data”: (1) collection of all field-notes and transcriptions of interviews, (2) reading the scripted data and coding the points made by the participants, (3) using the coded data or points about places or people to develop themes for telling the story or explaining the phenomena, (4) interpreting the meaning of the research findings and the advancement of personal views, making

comparison with the reviewed literature and suggesting limitations as well as possibilities for future research, (5) validating the accuracy of the findings, and (6) reporting the research findings.

With analysis and interpretation I was able to identify the salient elements in the data such as major themes or recurrent points, latent and patent emotions, behavioural patterns, and insider terms. These salient points were categorized under the major themes that are highlighted in my theoretical framework and research questions. Following these steps made it easy for me to communicate what my interviewees said in a clear and straightforward narrative but also suggested ways to attain permanent peace after over 10 years of durable peace through the conflict transformative works of the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC. By and large, this process has significantly facilitated the final production of this thesis.

#### **4.4 Research Questions**

Research questions are intended to provide critical information that relates to the primary concern of the study and to facilitate an in-depth understanding of the phenomena investigated. In this light, therefore, I began with one major research question which generated some more detailed secondary inquiries or sub-questions; all in an effort to explore how the transformative roles, motives, objectives and strategies of the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC enhanced the attainment of durable peace in Keana by way of addressing the causes and legacies of the 2001-2002 conflict and how these same mechanisms may help in bringing permanent peace to the area.

The primary research question is: how have the religious and traditional leaders in

Keana LGC contributed to the achievement of more than 10 years of durable peace in the area? The following incisive sub-questions were also asked: (1) What are the causative factors and the emerging legacies of the past conflict? (2) How are the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC addressing the causative factors and legacies of past conflict in order to achieve permanent peace? (3) What are the motives and objectives that encourage religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC to participate in conflict transformation? (4) What strategies do the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC use to transform conflict in their area? (5) How do the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC mutually engage for conflict transformation?

#### **4.5 Rationale for Methodology**

Fundamentally, I used qualitative methodology for this study because of its flexibility in investigating and “adopting the social actors’ points of view” (Blaike, 2000, 253). The flexibility is pictured in that it allows participants to tell their stories or offer their responses to the questions in the way they want; thereby ensuring free exploration of the central point of concern: how religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC are involved in conflict transformation and the search for permanent peace. Important too is the fact that this methodology also satisfied my desire to encounter the participants on a personal level and to listen to their insights into my questions and to the concepts I used in framing the research topic and theoretical framework. These concepts included ethnicity, ethno-religious conflict, permanent peace, religious and traditional leaderships and their transformative roles; as well as motives, objectives and strategies associated with conflict transformation.

## **4.6 Conclusion**

Even though qualitative methodology necessarily guides the researcher into using preconceived significant ideas to explain the research topic and theoretical framework, it does not, however, necessitate the study to try any given theory or to emerge with one. In this light, therefore, the methodology used in this study was not intended to test a theory. Instead, it was intent on exploring the biting issues embedded in my research topic, problem and questions, and then reporting its findings. In addition, this thesis wants to explicate its significance to peace practice and scholarship and its value for policy formulation on peaceful-coexistence.

## **Chapter 5: Data Presentation and Analysis**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The central point in this chapter is data presentation and analysis, demonstrating how the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC, have been able to transform the 2001-2002 conflict. Sapsford & Jupp (2006) observe that there is no set of rules outlining how to use semi-structured data. Accordingly, the researcher began by identifying the main data categories, themes and ideas and discussing them in the way of addressing the research problem. To apply these analytic steps, this chapter will be divided into a number of sections. The first section will be a brief introduction of the participants and their leadership backgrounds. Then, each of the succeeding sections will address one of the six research questions. Each section or question is treated as a data category; e.g., the transformative roles, the transformative strategies and tactics. As already stated, in order to explain what each data category is saying, the major themes and ideas in the information provided by the participants will be identified and analysed toward answering the central research question: how are the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC transforming the 2001-2002 conflict?

### **5.2 The Religious and Traditional Leaders in Keana LGC**

A total of 13 interviewees participated in this study; 7 direct participants and 5 indirect participants. The direct participants are 4 traditional leaders and 3 religious leaders. The indirect participants are 3 traditional leadership auxiliaries to the chief of Agaza and 2 past CAN chairmen.

The 4 direct traditional leaders are:

a) HRH Sir Emmanuel Onyatikpo Elayo (KSM), a Knight of St. Mulumba (KSM). As the 33<sup>rd</sup> serving *Osana* of Keana kingdom (installed in 2004), HRH Elayo was a successful civil servant and an elected Senator. The seat of the *Osana* is first class and paramount, in that whoever is the *Osana* is automatically the chairman of the traditional council of Keana LGC, meaning that all other traditional leaders in the council are under his administrative authority. He can summon them to his palace and, in dialogue with them, develop ideals that will be communicated to their subjects.

b) HRH Very Rev. Useni Oduh is a retired pastor with the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), since 1967. He retired in 1994 and was succeeded by his late brother as the 17<sup>th</sup> *Osuku* of Agaza chiefdom.

c) HRH Alhaji Mohammadu Agye Usman is the *Oseshi* of Aloshi. He came to the throne in 2010, the same year his predecessor, HRH Mr. Solomon Obiakpa, died. He is a farmer.

d) The Tiv spokesperson, who has opted for anonymity explained that the Tiv people are found in all the LGCs of Nasarawa state, including Keana. They are mobilized under the Tiv Development Association (TIDA), each with its chairman. Every TIDA chairman is answerable to the *Ter* of Nasarawa state and at the same time the custodian of the Tiv culture and values at the LGC level.

The 3 indirect traditional auxiliaries assisting the *Osuku* of Agaza are Paul Onyapo, the *Ubandoma* of Agaza, Danjuma Ikpanago, the *Osiki* of Agaza, and Sabo Otoshi, the *moyi* of Agaza. They are included in the interviews because they were asked to respond to some of the research questions.

The three religious leaders interviewed for the research are:

- a) Mr. Abdullahi Yusuf, the leader of the Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) in Keana LGC since 1986. JNI is the umbrella body for all Muslims in Nigeria.
- b) Mr. Osikigu Agede is the chief priest and leader of the Alago indigenous religious community in Keana for the past 60 years, after succeeding his father. He also has a chieftaincy title, the *Osabwa*, which means the highest king-maker in the *Osana* palace.
- c) Fr. Joseph Edeh is the chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Pastor of St. John's Catholic Church, Keana, since 2013.

The indirect religious leaders interviewed are the past CAN chairmen: Rev. Ezekiel Ozegya (2000-2004) and Fr. George Shenge (2007-2013). Up to the time of writing, the researcher was not able to contact Rev. Abednego Musa who was the Keana LGC CAN chairman from 2004-2007, for an interview.

### **5.3 Contributions and Roles Towards Transforming the Conflict**

This category elaborates upon the contributions made by the religious and traditional leaders as they performed different roles in their efforts to transform the 2001-2002 conflict, typically associating themselves with shared-leadership because they are collectively involved with the following roles in the promotion of social welfare in Keana LGC.

### **5.3.1 Motivators**

From the theoretical background, we learned that effective leaders are motivators of their people toward attaining institutional and communal values whether by appealing, exhorting, agitating, facilitating their followers towards them (James, 1910; Roquillo, 2011; Yukl, 2008). Each of the leaders indicated how they motivate their respective communities through exhortations and advocacies to love, be hospitable and peaceful. In this light, HRH Sir Elayo explains himself: “one of my clear roles is to motivate the people who are directly under me: the Alagos, the Tivs, the Fulanis and other smaller communities to love and be in peace”. Equally, HRH Alhaji Usman said he motivated his people against a spillover of the conflict in his chiefdom with non-violence appeals. On his part, HRH Rev. Oduh asked the Alago and Tiv in his chiefdom to sit and reflect on how their great grandparents were able to co-exist peacefully and then emulate their exemplary lives. According to Rev. Oduh:

Our elders were receptive and very peaceful with the Tivs. We witnessed and inherited this cordiality, we will perpetuate it. We will not depart from this heritage and tradition. I will exhort and motivate them to remember and imitate their elders.

### **5.3.2 Mobilizers**

The leaders also mobilized themselves and their communities for active participation in the implementation of peace decisions. Rev. Ozegya said he took the initiative to mobilize fellow pastors, church members and community stakeholders, a move which brought about great transformative activities. This humble initiative, he said, led to the creation of an Alago delegation that sought after and met with the Tiv people in Kadarko, where many of them were taking refuge. During the third meeting between the Tiv and

Alago representatives, a peace-accord was endorsed at the Federal Girls College, Keana. Key points in the peace accord were mutual apologies for violent relations and resolve never to launch attacks on each other but collaborate for peaceful co-existence. This great achievement led to the return of the Tiv people and the birth of durable peace in Keana LGC.

It was after this meeting that the Tiv returned and we have been living in peace, with nobody killing any one, no hunting of anybody, no one provoking the other, and we have been living together peacefully to this time.

The youths were specifically mobilized against violence and for hospitality. Referring to HRH Rev. Oduh, Mr. John said –Baba as a peace preacher mobilized the (Alago) youths in his chieftdom to offer help to the Tivs who were fleeing. He also cautioned them against laughing at or attacking them, describing that such acts were unfair and could bring misfortune to those who perpetrate them”. The current CAN chairman, Fr. Edeh, mobilized the youth against participation in violence and against idle roaming. He succeeded in turning them around into organized groups that can access government loans for small scale businesses. He believes that when youth are employed, they will reject every act of thuggery.

### **5.3.3 Custodians**

Mbiti (1990) said traditional and religious leaderships in Africa act primarily as guardians of the inherited values of their people. Mazrui (1986) and Adamolekun (1988) witness that the Westphalian political system and Semitic religions have not been able to destroy this traditional role. Thus, as custodians, the leaders said making references to inherited values of peace, like hospitality and fraternity, helped in transforming the

conflicts. So Fr. Shenge, although himself a religious leader, always reminded the Alago to return to the historical narratives and see how the Tiv people helped them (Alago) to settle here and how they have co-existed peacefully over the centuries. In addition”, he said, I preach the value of forgiveness and tolerance to them, unless we refer to history and appreciate each other peace can be uninterrupted in the land”. Speaking in the same vein, HRH Rev. Oduh stated: our elders were receptive of and lived peacefully with the Tiv. To this moment we are nurturing the values of mutuality and unity and giving no room to differentiation”. In a like manner, HRH Alhaji Usman said we are still training our children with our cultural values of peaceful co-existence and hospitality”. The Tiv community leader said he tells his people to revive their heritage of love for life and restraint from violence. He commended the other traditional leaders for truly teaching cordiality to their communities. Calls to revive and resort to African cultural principles of peacemaking are amiable to Africans as they continue to search for African solutions to African problems” (Sesay & Omotosho, 2011). The revivalist discourse in this study is not anything less than illustration of the feasibility of this search.

#### **5.3.4 Peace Diplomats**

Peace diplomats” organized and attended meetings, visited and consulted with others, and exhorted and pacified their communities. The key diplomatic words that characterized their responses were meet, consult, dialogue, negotiate, appeal, exhort, and pacify in their advocacy for the return of relational and social order in the LGC. The Tiv representative acknowledged how the late *Osana* of Keana, Mr. Otaki Ozegya (1963-2003), travelled to the place where some Tiv people had fled in order to

hold discussions for the return of peace and the return of the fleeing Tiv people to their homes. The Tiv representative and Fr. Edeh also held diplomatic dialogues with the LGC officials on solidifying peace in the council, explaining how the Tiv people could enjoy considerable political representation in the local government council, by election and appointment. Their roles in this regard are in harmony with Track II diplomacy in peacemaking which McDonald & Diamond (1996) recommend, and its protagonist Joseph Montville (Davidson & Montville, 1982) defines as the unofficial, open minded, altruistic and strategic interaction that appeals to common human capabilities for goodwill, reasonableness and peace.

### **5.3.5 Transformative Agents**

Lederach (1995) and Folger & Bush (1996) enumerated transformative mediation, interactive problem-solving, constructive confrontation and dialogical engagement as some ways of transforming conflicts. As we saw in the preceding paragraphs, the leaders adopted these forms at different times, thus acting as conflict transformative agents. When in 2001 the Tiv besieged the Alago in Keana town and attacked the Alago in Agaza chiefdom, and when there were tensions and fears of reprisal attacks by the two communities (Tiv and Alago) in Alosi, all of the traditional and religious leaders were involved in activities to douse tensions and disarm combatants through meetings and consultations. “I can remember we held a series of meetings battling and rubbing minds (sharing ideas) on how the crisis and broken relationship can be reconstructed”, says the Tiv representative. For HRH Alhaji Usman, “prayers, pleas and consultations deescalated and transformed the situation, and today we are interacting as usual”. HRH Rev. Oduh said:

–even though they (Tiv) attacked us, cut me with machetes and killed our people (Alago), I cautioned my people against retaliation and exhorted them to forgive and re-assimilate them into the community as our brothers and friends in wealth”. Since the return of the Tiv people to Agaza, including those who actually attacked the chiefdom, both groups have been living, interacting, socializing and developing the town together. HRH Oduh noted that the regular meetings he holds with the two communities in his palace help to account for the existing peace among them.

### **5.3.6 Religious Peace Actors**

While responding to the 2001-2002 conflict, the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC played the role of religious peace actors. The possibility of this role is articulated by Mbiti (1990) and Paden (2005). Mbiti (1969) asserted that “Africans are notoriously religious” in all their affairs (p. 1). Reiterating the assertion with regards to Nigerians, Paden (2005) said in all their dealings, Nigerians don’t distinguish religion from political, traditional, and economic aspects, such that to the question about the factors that inform their social experiences, they would say “the answer is all of the above” (p. 54). Although a traditional leader, HRH Elayo reported that he usually applies traditional and religious resources during peacemaking: “my people indeed need the tutelage that tells them about God and peace, with this they will live in wisdom, and I engage them by telling them that God wants peace and love to reign among us in order to develop, progress and understanding”. In the same vein, the chiefs of Agaza and Alosi also said resorting to their religious values, they have always prayed and preached for nonviolence and peaceful co-existence to their communities. It was obvious for the religious leaders to refer to their

faith assumptions in the transformation of the conflict. Thus, Mr. Yusuf, the JNI leader reported that “we said prayers and preached for peace during the time of the conflict”. Mr. Agede, the chief priest of the Alago indigenous religion, said that during worship “we consulted the oracle, offered sacrifices, exhorted ourselves and poured oblations for peace to return to the land”. Designating the peace roles of these leaders as religious peace actors as depicted above accedes with Appleby’s (2000) definition of religious peace actors as leaders who use their faith formation and powers for peacebuilding.

#### **5.4 Causes and Legacies of the Conflict**

This section presents the data category that deals on the remote and trigger causes and the ensuing legacies of the conflict. It has already been established that the 2001-2002 conflict took place across the five LGCs of the Southern Senatorial Zone of Nasarawa state. Nevertheless it is important to set forth the remote and triggering factors that led to the eruption of the conflict and its emergent legacies within the Zone and Keana LGC.

##### **5.4.1 Remote Factors**

The work of Aboki (2004), the speeches of the state governor during the conflict (Adamu 2001, 2002), and responses of the research participants, demonstrate that two remote factors smoldered beneath the conflict and one immediate factor triggered the spill-over attacks in the entire Zone, including Keana LGC. The two remote factors are political marginalization and land skirmishes. The triggering factor is the beheading of the *Azara* chief, HRH Musa Ibrahim, as described in a later paragraph.

#### **5.4.1a Political Marginalization**

Political marginalization, as we have seen, was perpetrated by the coalition of other ethnic groups in the Zone against their Tiv counterpart. As a panacea, the Tiv people began to use their increasing population to mobilize and empower themselves through educational development, organized nucleated settlements, and strong political consultations for equal rights and indigeneship. But, unfortunately, this development was perceived by the other groups as a threat to their political interests. Perceiving the Tiv people with fear and repulsion, they eventually schemed and targeted them for violent destabilization. Commenting on the entire 2001-2002 conflict, Aboki (2004), Adamu (2001, 2002), and the research participants in this study, agree that political marginalization was the major cause of the conflict. In fact, the Nasarawa state Judicial Commission of Inquiry is quoted as saying that “the rising political profile of the Tiv in the State was becoming a matter of concern to other ethnic groups in the State” (Aboki, p. 75).

#### **5.4.1b Land Skirmishes: Fulani Grazers - Tiv Farmers**

The Tiv farmers and Fulani grazers in the Zone are reportedly known to have had repeated micro violent conflicts between themselves. The Tiv always accused the Fulani of destructively grazing animals on their farms, and the Fulani always accused the Tiv of stealing their cows. These skirmishes were reported to the state government but, according to the commissions of inquiry, the government failed to competently deal with the issues. This non-action allowed the sour relationship between the two groups to increase and explode into macro violence. Aboki (2004) said, one memorandum reported that the situation degenerated to the level where, “the Fulani recruited mercenaries to protect their

cattle” (p. 76) and another memo stated that ~~the~~ Fulani received support from the North (mercenaries and funds) to retaliate destruction suffered in the hands of the Tiv” (p. 79). In addition, the Tiv perennially accused the Alago and the other ethnic groups in the Senatorial Zone of ganging up against them, but the latter have consistently dissociated themselves saying that ~~they~~ were not part of the crisis as they continued to maintain peace in their various towns and villages...(and) in spite of their support to the Tiv during their time of need; the Tiv attacked them without reason” (p. 79).

#### **5.4.2 Triggering Factor**

The triggering factor here is the direct action that sparked off the 2001-2002 conflict, namely the beheading of the chief of Azara in Awe LGC.

##### **5.4.2a Beheading of the Sarkin Azara**

The state Commission of Inquiry reported that prior to the beheading of HRH Musa Ibrahim, the *Sarkin* (chief) Azara, the Tiv people were subjected to political marginalization in the Awe LGC and Azara chiefdom. Despite their earlier arrival and numerical strength in Awe and Azara over the Kwalla people, the Tiv were denied selections to become district and village heads, because the late chief of Azara decided to, at least partially, favour the Kwalla. According to Aboki (2004), one of the memoranda demonstrated how this injustice heightened the rancour between the Tiv and the Kwalla until it finally ~~fanned~~ the embers of petitions and violence in the area and the subsequent killing of the *Sarkin* Azara” (p. 76). On the basis of this rancour, the Tiv have been suspected of this murder although they continue to refute the accusation. To this day, the

actual culprit has not been identified. With the beheading of HRH Musa Ibrahim, what started as a micro conflict in Azara conflagrated into a macro crisis, and the already existing political fears paved way for mayhem to spread across the Southern Senatorial Zone and into Keana LGC.

#### **5.4.3 Spill-over Attacks in Keana LGC**

According to all of the participants in this study, two chiefdoms in Keana LGCs were actually attacked as a spill-over effect of the violence in Azara. Mr. Agede, Rev. Ezekiel and Mr Yusuf testified that the Tiv actually laid siege to the Keana chiefdom/town but withdrew without attacking. According to Mr. Yusuf, “Keana was besieged, but not attacked; they (Tiv) said Keana has not done anything to us, then they left”. For Mr. Agede, the Tiv did not attack Keana “due to strong security presence”. Agaza chiefdom/town was, however, unfortunately attacked. The *Moyi* and *Osiki* of Agaza simultaneously elaborated that, “the Tiv attacked us, and inflicted machete cuts on the chief right in his palace, shot his wife, burned down houses, killed 7 people and animals”. With regards to Alosi, HRH Alhaji Usman said there was only a whirlpool of tension and fear of reprisal attacks, and these gripped both the Tiv and Alago people, for these reasons some of them fled the chiefdom, but have since come back.

#### 5.4.4 Reasons for the Spill-over Attacks in Keana LGC

##### 5.4.4a Anger and Mistrust

None of those interviewed clearly explained why the two chiefdoms in Keana LGC were attacked. However, each of them referred to the beheading of Azara chief as precipitating the gruesome attacks on the Tiv people who fled in large numbers. Asked if this sparked anger and motivated the Tiv people to retaliate, the *Osoku*, *Moyi*, *Ubandoma* and *Osiki* of Agaza surmised that it was very likely that the attack on Agaza “was [a] reprisal and because they were angry”.

Mistrust and suspicion between the Alago and Tiv are other reasons for the reprisal attacks. Aboki indicates that the two groups attested to this point when, in separate memoranda, they stated that the Alago were attacked because the Tiv suspected them with complicity and “being behind the mass killing and burning of the Tiv” (p. 52). Explaining the causes of the mistrust and suspicion, Aboki identifies two factors: the animosities were informed by antecedent skirmishes between the two groups, and because of Alago’s perpetual political suppression and overt jealousy of the Tiv (given the latter’s increasing political, agricultural and educational growing profiles). Though logically provoked by these factors, the reprisal attacks took place in some parts of Keana LGC are not justifiable.

Pruitt & Rubin (1986) acknowledge that mutual suspicion and mistrust, as factors that spark and escalate conflict, usually impact negatively on social relationships. Borer et al. (2006) observe that many post-conflict peace accords don’t last because the mistrust and suspicion are left un-transformed and resurface. Thus, Lederach (1995) urges that mistrust and suspicion (products of feelings, perceptions and ideas) must be transformed so that the emerging relationship will be characteristically peaceful and mutual.

#### **5.4.4b Ethnic Assimilation and Differentiation**

The research participants talked about ethnic differentiation and subjugation, projecting them to be additional explanations as to why the reprisal attacks took place in Keana LGC. They decry that the cordial relationship between the Tiv and Alago, which existed in the interests of security and agriculture since the pre-colonial era, was unfortunately disrupted by the 2001-2002 conflict. Even though HRH Sir Elayo will not accede to the assertion that boundary disputes and ethno-religious differentiation were the main reasons for the conflict, they are implied in his response. He stated that “what might cause the conflict is the pressure of other small groups of people, who are submerging and pressing other ones; either because of language [ethnic] difference or religious beliefs, or the thickly populated ones that are bright are trying to cover the small units that have not come up also”. Mr. Yusuf, Fr. Edeh and Fr. George also blamed the eruption of the conflict on the same reasons. According to Mr. Yusuf, “the factors that brought lack of peaceful co-existence among us today are ethnic consciousness and selfishness”.

Two points need to be emphasized here. Rather than allow or use their ethnic identities in the service of their mutually shared socio-political goals, the Alago and Tiv allowed ethnic consciousness to be used by their respective minority group, betrayed by their small numerical strength, as an instrument for ethnic and political differentiation and subjugation. It is worth recalling the assertions made by Falola (1998) and Paden (2005) that many interconnected issues combine to cause conflicts in Nigeria. These scholars argue that in Nigeria, ethnic, religious, political and economic interests are intertwined to such an extent that it becomes difficult to say which one of them is not influential in or responsible for a conflict. Thus, even though ethnic differentiation may have been identified as a causative

factor of the 2001-2002 killings and destructions in Keana LGC, it is difficult to totally dissociate this issue from others such as land, boundaries, religion and economics.

#### **5.4.4c Citizenship, Indigenship and Settler Issues**

Adamu (2002) loudly decried the unholy development, whereby Nigerians have eschewed the constitutional identity of citizenship and replaced it with ~~–indigeneship~~” and ~~–non-indigeneship~~” or ~~–settlement~~” on their co-patriots. While they have no problem with sharing citizenship, it is a problem for them to share the indigeneship of their locality with ~~–settlers~~”; i.e., their co-patriots who have come to live with them from other ethnic and geopolitical units. For political reasons, the indigenes can access all of the political advantages in the locality, but the settlers have to rely solely on the benefits of their government jobs or personal business that brought them into the area. In this light, Adamu contends that the 2001-2002 conflict was remotely caused by these contentious factors, whereby the Alago have disfranchised the Tiv by ascribing settler status to them, a designation that the Tiv vehemently opposed. Agreeing with Adamu, the Tiv representative recounted the agonies faced by the Tiv because of this ascription; ~~–for~~ generation upon generation, we have been existing here. My great great grandparents were born on this soil. Thus, I see no reason somebody will label me a mere settler who should not be given indigene certificate. By all standards, this should not be a privilege but a right enjoyable to all the Tiv in Keana LGC”. On their part, the Alago participants in the study stated that the Tiv can bring up such matters for discussion and re-alignment. Actually, the Tiv representative and Fr. Edeh remarked that as a result of ongoing dialogue and negotiation, there have been improvements, but much more should be done.

#### **5.4.4d Religious Sentiments**

As already observed above, in Nigeria, politics, economy and religion interact and permeate each other to such an extent that when it comes to explaining why conflicts happen –the answer is all of the above” (Paden, 2005, p. 54). In general, scholars like Posner (2005), Varsney (2009), Rapoport (1996) and Fox (1999) see a strong relationship between ethnicity and religion. Posner and Varsney posit that there is an inseparably intertwined relationship between religion, nationality and ethnicity. In fact, he argues, from a primordial perspective, ethnicity encompasses all the others. This is why Rapoport and Fox assert that when an ethnic group feels its primordial identity (comprising religion, politics, language, values, etc.) is differentiated and threatened, the group will certainly resist. Interestingly, the participants in this study did not bring up religion as one of the strong or immediate reasons for the conflict in the Zone or Keana LGC, but referenced it as an issue that had subtle influence. For example, as CAN chairman during the conflict, Rev. Ozegya sought to know why a church in a Tiv settlement had been torched and why the conflict was being divested of its religious implications. In order not to aggravate the situation, since peace agreement was in sight, he was counseled to suspend his questions for another time. Aboki (2004) reports that –50 churches were razed down” (p. 75) in the other LGCs of the Zone. So, even though religion was not formally reported as a major factor for the rise and spill-over of the conflict, it can be deduced from these evidences that there were religious undertones in the conflict.

#### 5.4.4e Land Factor

Land was mentioned in the interviews as a remote factor of the 2001-2002 conflict in the Southern Senatorial Zone, also as one of the reasons of the reprisal attacks in Keana LGC. The complicity of land in the conflict is based on use and status in relation to the teeming Tiv population in the whole of the Zone. By use, it means the Tivs' occupation of land in terms of housing and farming. By status, it means the contested ascription of *settler* (non-owners of the land) status on the Tiv by the Alago who claim the *indigene* (ancestral owners of the land) status for themselves. According to Aboki (2004), in one of their memoranda, the Tiv said that when the Alago and the other ethnic groups, especially in Obi, Lafia and Awe LGCs, realized how much they had increased in number and used land, they began to agitate –and seek for opportunities to reclaim it from the Tiv” (p. 50). The Alago's memorandum to the state commission of inquiry is paradoxical in statement. It reports Alago's obvious complaint against the expansion of the Tiv; however, it did not accept the accusation that they fought in order to reclaim lands from the Tiv people. The paradox is further illustrated in Osana's explanation of why there were reprisal attacks in Keana LGC. He said that –even though we always have arguments about land and boundary encroachment between Benue and Nasarawa states, the talk of boundary as a factor of the conflict here in Keana is also not right”. From another angle, Fr. Shenge argued that land was a factor of the conflict in Keana LGC and on the ground of discriminatory labeling. In other words, in order to deny indigeneship status to the Tiv, the Alago and the other ethnic groups in Zone have continually described them as *settlers* or *non-indigenes*, and the Tiv are not happy with this. In addition, the Tiv representative registered his disgust for this labeling, he reports that –the Tiv migrated and have lived for many years in this area and yet

they are still been considered *non-indigenes*” and refused indigene certificates. He states further that this non-indigene ascription is responsible for their being politically discriminated against, their increasing distrust and suspicion of the Alago’s intentions around this issue and the tensed relationship between them. Despite the paradoxical position of the Alago, land is no doubt one of the factors of the conflict in the Zone, and its spill over effects in Keana LGC. This notwithstanding, the Tiv representative affirms that they will not stop using transformative dialogue for change.

## **5.5 Legacies of the Conflict**

Conflicts never come and go without leaving significant legacies; i.e., residues of the conflict causes and emerging developments, issues, and consequences. While positive legacies can be improved upon, the negative issues and problems will have to be transformed to avoid a relapse. From the research participants and secondary sources, specifically the works of Aboki (2004) and Adamu (2001, 2002), the following are identified as positive and negative legacies. The negative ones are categorized into psycho-social, economic, political and environmental outcomes.

### **5.5.1 Positive Legacies**

The main positive outcome that benefits the communities in Keana LGC is that the conflict raised the government’s consciousness with regards to the need for swift preventive and remedial responses to conflicts, even when relationships begin to turn combusive. Consider one example; the use of propaganda during the conflict. While it served the Tiv by galvanizing effort for the cessation of fire and relief, it was not as

effective for the Alago. However, the two communities have now come to understand both the harmful and constructive sides of propaganda and are learning how to harness it for collaborated development. The conflict has led to the creation of peace committee by the present *Osana* of Keana, HRH Sir Elayo. He said –as their paramount traditional leader, I had no option than to form various committees for all the ethnic groups and tribes in Keana LGC and a central one with equal representation, for peace and development”.

Notable, also, is the improvement in Tiv political empowerment as the result of initial and ongoing dialogue in this regard. For sure, this is a sign of more good things to come. Rather than remain interspersed, the Tiv have now nucleated their settlement pattern. According to the Tiv representative, this will enable them to access government projects so as to grow into developed towns. The soured relationship between the groups is still a matter of concern, but this issue, just like the ideas and demands of each group, have become part of the agenda for ongoing transformative dialogues. Moreover, the Tiv representative has attested that, despite some lingering issues, the relationship between the groups has improved. In addition, all of the participants in this study indicate that, in all the chiefdoms in Keana LGC, mistrust and suspicion have been seriously transformed into greater mutual confidence, respect, collaboration and social harmony.

## **5.5.2 Negative Legacies**

### **5.5.2a Psycho-social Impacts**

The conflict brought to the surface issues that impacted on the social and psychological life of the two communities. In the case of relationship, earlier fissures widened as mutual suspicion, mistrust and anger increased. Asked if these two are still

residual, the Tiv representative answered affirmatively ~~yes~~”, acknowledging that there is still some distrust and fear because of the industrious propensity of the Tiv. Also, in many ways they are being balkanized by the LGC, which is run by Alago administrators. Fr. Shenge said that the call to end mutual suspicion and advocacy for ~~togetherness~~ and mutual respect” has become the regular theme of his sermons and speeches. All the participants acknowledged there was serious hunger and suffering because of food crises in the forms of shortages, since farmlands and farm produce were massively destroyed and the local markets eventually closed down. HRH Sir Elayo, Mr. Yusuf and Rev. Ezegya recounted that reprisal attacks introduced criminal activities like theft and vandalism. Additional consequences enumerated by Aboki (2004) include high cases of homelessness and internally displaced persons, injured victims, abused women and children and, above all, terrific loss of lives and traumatized survivors.

### **5.5.2b Economic Losses**

Because of dawn and dusk spill-over attacks, the major weekly markets that drew people from across the nation were disrupted and finally closed down, as traders feared to patronize them. The closure of the weekly markets, coupled with the destruction of farm products and the fear of going to the farms, the economic portfolio of the people dropped massively and subsistence became very hard. In the words of Fr. Shenge, ~~there was~~ [a] drop in market attendance and this had devastating economic consequences and shortage of food on our tables”. Aboki (2004) observed that the extra-budgetary figures that would have been used for economic empowerment were instead needed for relief materials, infrastructural reconstruction and the rehabilitation of victims.

### **5.5.2c Political Issues**

Political issues are not an emergent problem but a residual of past disaffection. The Tiv representative continued to observe that, even though there are some positive political changes in the post-conflict dispensation, Tiv settlements are still being balkanized. This means that their large settlement are split and merged with non-Tiv communities thus making them ineligible for becoming electoral wards. Also their traditional leadership institutions are not being elevated to District levels, thus denied of having Tiv District Authorities. In other words political discrimination against the Tiv has led to a strong demand for the elevation of Tiv settlements to higher political and traditional levels of authority in Keana LGC. Though, Alago responses did not directly touch on this outcome, they however spoke in exoneration arguing that in the past they always nominated the Tiv to present them. HRH Sir Elayo and Rev. Ezegya cited instances of the nomination of Mr. Athanasius and Mr. Aondo Gbev for Federal and local councils. HRH Sir Elayo said: ~~In~~ the reconstituted authority of Lafia, Mr. Aondo Gbev was brought in as a councillor representing the Tiv and myself representing the Alago...I opted for a Tiv man, Athanasius for the Federal House slot that comprised Awe, Doma and Keana”.

### **5.5.2d Environmental Consequences**

In some conflicts, environmental factors like land, water and air are destroyed or polluted because of the destruction of flora, fauna and aqua or submerged explosives, thus making the life of survivors unsafe. The major environmental problems identified in the conflict under study are hunger and diseases. Children suffered from malnutrition and cholera and some died due to lack of sufficient medical care (Aboki, 2004).

In conclusion, all of the participants agreed that the devastating legacies of the conflict had serious impacts on everyone in Keana LGC. Apart from hating the fact that their relationship nose-dived, and is still under transformation and improvement, they also dread how the conflict has reversed their previous social, economic and developmental strides; a situation they are all grappling hard to transform and reverse. In the next section we will consider how they are addressing these legacies, especially residues of causative factors and lingering negative outcomes?

## **5.6 How Conflict Causes and Legacies were Addressed**

This section highlights the major themes that explicate the swift actions the leaders took to address the immediate outcomes of the conflict, as distinguished from strategies which refer to both the short term and long term activities or plans to transform the entire aspects of the conflict.

### **5.6.1 Humanitarian Assistance**

This came mostly in the form of relief materials. Usually the relief initiatives are connected to donors outside the conflict context. But in the case of Keana, it is praise-worthy to note that the religious and traditional leaders initiated this gesture at their local level, thus bulking up the relief that came from external sources. External donors included the National Emergency Management Agency of Nigeria (NEMA), State governments, local NGOs, private groups and individuals (Aboki, 2004). Rev. Ozegya and Mr. Yusuf reported on how the community was asked to support the victims of the conflict, especially the Tiv when they were fleeing during the conflict and when they returned after

it. In Agaza chiefdom, HRH Rev. Oduh asked the people to donate relief materials for the Alago victims of the Tiv attack and for the Tiv returnees. In reaffirmation, Mr. Otoshi (*Moyi* of Agaza) said “with regards to food and clothes, he (Rev. Oduh) asked the community members to share the little they had with victims from the two tribes, and they should collaborate in housing the homeless victims and repairing affected houses”. These respondents said relief materials in the forms food stuff, clothes, money and roofing materials (zinc and nails) from outside and inside were distributed to all the Alago and Tiv victims through council wards and the Churches and Mosques in the LGC.

### **5.6.2 Information Dissemination**

In order to keep themselves and their communities abreast with all the happenings, efforts, decisions and appeals from meetings and consultations, each leader took information sharing very seriously. They personally informed each other and their groups about any new development that emerged. While the others said this approach helped to calm down fears, to reaffirm growing confidence, and to influence transformative behaviours, the Tiv representative said it also enhanced the level of trust his people had in him, because there was transparency with regards to financial and material issues and there was clear knowledge of required actions.

### **5.6.3 Hospitality**

The campaign for hospitality was meant for fleeing victims during the conflict and for all on the return of those who fled. It was variegated in the provision of shelter, food and relief as well as forgiveness, reconciliation and humane treatment. The Tiv victims who

were fleeing through Alago settlements were offered shelter and food. They were also asked to stay in the school buildings provided by the local government authority as refugee camps. The chief of Agaza said that before he himself was physically attacked he had gone around his chiefdom and had engaged a Tiv man, Mr. Peter Akosu, to go around Keana LGC to calm the Tiv and reassure them of safety. Mr. Ikpanako testified how undeterred by attack, the Agaza chief went around asking for hospitality for the returning Tiv people through forgiveness and reconciliation. He also went around to verify the implementation of all directives. On his part, the chief of Alosi narrated how his predecessor, HRH Mr. Solomon Obiokpa (the serving *Oseshi* during the conflict) constantly interacted with the Alago and Tiv people, strengthening them against all fears and warning them against reprisal violence. For this reason no attack actually took place in Alosi, and all those who couldn't stand the fear and fled have long since returned and all are living in peace to this day. The *Oseshi* informed me that he has a Tiv wife.

#### **5.6.4 Dialogue and Appeals**

These swift responses were also given to the immediate legacies of the conflict in relation to forgiveness, reconciliation and rehabilitation. The Tiv representative reported that meetings, consultations and dialogues were held even when the winds of the conflict were blowing, even when reprisal attacks took place, and even after peace returned to the LGC. In fact, he said, –dialogue and appeals are still ongoing in order to continue to address salient legacies associated with the conflict. Furthermore, he said: –I will commend the late Osana of Keana who was on throne for his efforts. He did his best at consultative dialogue and appeals in order to see that peace returned and social problems of the conflict

were addressed”. All of the participants reported that, to date, they are still holding consultations and making appeals so that the residual issues associated with the conflict, and any new ones, are collaboratively addressed. Mr. Yusuf and Rev. Ozegya noted that the Tiv in the LGC can always report their concerns to the appropriate quarters for redress. The Tiv representative reassured him that they will continue to dialogue and make appeals for their plights to be eradicated.

### **5.6.5 Youth Mobilization and Committees**

Using *conscientization*, education and socialization, Fr. Edeh demonstrated how he is able to mobilize the youth against conflict. He started to do this with his own church youth before reaching out to youth from all divides. He reported how, with the help of Ms. Asibi Omeri, he organized a mobilization and empowerment paper which he titled “Who is My Neighbour?”. According to Fr. Edeh, there have been no transformative programs for youth. By focusing on them now, he hopes to continue the transformative contributions aimed at addressing the lingering legacies of the conflict associated with their demographic, namely unemployment and lack of proper mobilization.

According to HRH Sir Elayo, his predecessor did much to address the immediate concerns emerging from the conflict. Since his own assumption of office, therefore, he opted for the formation of a central peace and development committee; a mix of all tribal groups, and subcommittees for all the tribes in the LGC. This effort is, he said, just one of his many contributions to continuing the transformation of the conflict. These committees which hitherto didn’t exist will be an additional apparatus resolving conflicts and ensuring the continual growth of cordiality between the communities.

## **5.7 Transformative Motives and Objectives**

What were the transformative factors that motivated the religious and traditional leaders, and what are the objectives that they hope to achieve from the different peacemaking activities they have been performing? This section will elaborate on the impulses, cravings or motives that pushed the religious and traditional leaders to initiate, intensify, persist and commit themselves to transforming the conflict and all matters that are associated with it. Concerning objectives, the section will highlight those specific ideals, results and aspects that the leaders hoped to achieve with their conflict transformation strategies.

### **5.7.1 Transformative Motives**

#### **5.7.1a Insecurity and Suffering**

Conflict, especially when violent, is dreadful because its consequences affect the dead with dishonour and the wounded and unhurt survivors with pain and trauma. It is in this light that the Nigerian poet, John Pepper Clark (1970), says in his poem, *Casualties*, that in conflict “we are all casualties”. Aboki (2004) reported how the conflict produced horrific scenes of losses, casualties and pains, hurt and sufferings in terms of hunger, homelessness, sickness and trauma. These agonizing situations were prominent features of some of the emergent legacies as we saw above.

HRH Sir Elayo and Rev. Ozegya reported that the dread of insecurity and the gloom of human suffering disgusted and pushed them into initiating measures to help resolve the conflict. For Rev. Ezekiel, these two elements motivated his mobilization of fellow pastors and Christian leaders for salvific actions. This effort enjoyed the favour of the local

government authority, the Muslim leadership and the traditional leaders, thus leading to cessation of violence and the endorsement for peace in Keana LGC. Motivated by the same factors of insecurity and suffering, the current *Osana*, Sir Elayo, solidified past efforts by creating preventive, swift response and transformative peace committees in the LGC.

### **5.7.1b Fractured Relationship**

Relationship is one of the main targets for reconstruction by conflict transformation. Conflict transformation scholars agree that feelings, perception, ideas, communication patterns, and structures determine the tone of relationships. These can spike heinous conflict when they sour. Thus they must be positively reconstructed or transformed in the face of violent conflict so that the people can always live happily in relationship with one another, as their continued proximity necessitates. In this light, the participants observed that they were motivated to act for peace because of the fractured relationship between the Alago and Tiv people. They consistently referred to each other's community members as "Alago brothers" and "Tiv brothers" in acknowledgment and appreciation of the historical fraternal relationship existing between them.

### **5.7.1c As Custodians of Values**

In the above section on roles, all the participants described themselves as the custodians of their communities' values; be they religious, cultural, traditional and political. In the face of the conflict, therefore, it was appropriate for them to act as the custodians of the values of peace, harmony, hospitality, forgiveness, tolerance and community. The religious faith of the chiefs also motivated them to act in concert with the religious leaders

whose vocation as ~~an~~ambassadors of peace” merged with their own desire to collaborate for the social welfare of the people with regards to every unwanted situation. Referring to Christian pastors and Muslim leaders, Rev. Ozegya said ~~as~~ people of God and guardians of our people, we are to preach peace and work for it and this is why we all went and met the late *Osana* so that together we will initiate peace processes”.

### **5.7.1d Security and Communal Peace**

Apart from hating the broken relationship, the traditional leaders revealed that their own deep heart-felt desire for security and peace in their domains moved their feet into action. Mr. Yusuf said his wish for the development of their ancestral land, Keana LGC, spurred him to act. In the same vein, Rev. Ezekiel said hatred for what he was foreseeing, the eventual destruction of all the achievements in Keana, his home land, pushed him to rise up. The Tiv representative said that his desire for the continued development of his people was a great impulse towards action. The *Osiki* of Agaza reported that, motivated by the desire for the return of peace and security in his chiefdom, his own chief (HRH Rev. Oduh) traversed all the chiefdoms with Mr. Peter Akosu to preach calm, peace, and non-reprisal reactions. Even after he himself was unfortunately attacked he did not deter but went around the chiefdoms again preaching forgiveness. He said: ~~in~~ fact Baba (referring to chief) is a peace preacher; for this reason he called the youth together and cautioned them against retaliatory attacks on the Tiv”. The Tiv representative and HRH Alhaji Usman, respectively, bore witness to the work of the late *Osana* of Keana and the late *Oseshi* of Alosi saying they worked seriously for security and the return of peace during the conflict.

### **5.7.1e Idleness and Employment**

Apart from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), one other important strategy for peacebuilding in post-conflict societies involves the empowerment and employment of the parties and communities (Jeong, 2005). The goal of this strategy is to make the vulnerable become busy and keep them from becoming armies for a fresh conflict. As late as 2013, Fr. Edeh, the current CAN chairman, noticed that youth in Keana idly congregated under tree shades because they were unemployed. Afraid that if left the situation like this, they could be used easily as tools for violence and crime, he embarked on proactive measures to get them employed, especially by organizing them into groups in order to access agricultural and small scale business loans.

### **5.7.2 Transformational Objectives**

#### **5.7.2a Peaceful Environment**

Each of the leaders indicated that they hoped their motivated activities would bring about an ideal peaceful atmosphere across the LGC. The separate works of Mbiti (1990) Masina (2000) and Tutu (2004) emphasize one key fact; peace in the African worldview is a moral attitude that is innate and it keeps developing as the people interact with the primordial values of community, harmony, welfare and restoration. To Africans, there is no peace when, by one's moral orientation, the entire primordial heritage that enhances social welfare is threatened. United by their humanities (*Ubuntu*), every member of the community must continue to nurture good and peaceful relationships with the other and the community as a whole. The community is peaceful because I am peaceful. Peace should not be scaled (i.e., as durable), but as permanent and transitive (having an object). It is

permanent, because peace is an inextinguishable innate possibility in every human person; transitive, because it has the community to impact upon with progressive benefits. As Africans interact with the modern world, there is now an increasing renaissance than before for a return to their primordial values and mechanisms (Masina, 2000; Menkhaus, 2000; Tuso, 2000). This renaissance is nothing other than essentializing their cultural worldviews or educating their people to patronize their traditional and pedagogical institutions whose fundamental ethos promote a “egalitarian collectivism” which has survived the times (Tuso, 2000, p. 93). Essentializing primordial worldviews that are non-discriminatory but egalitarian for Africa’s safety and development is now a noble ongoing project and strategy popularly captioned as “African solutions to African problems” (Sesay & Omotosho, 2011, p. 1; Run, 2013).

Based on the above understanding, HRH Sir Elayo, Pa Agede, Fr. Shenge, and Rev. Ezekiel said that by their motivated actions they anticipated the objective or ideal of a peace that is transitive. For HRH Sir Elayo, it is transitive because the peace “will bring development to his people”. HRH Rev. Oduh said he was motivated to work for the return of peaceful community so that his people would return to the farms, so as to increase food production and the complete reintegration of members into the community. Fr. Shenge and Rev. Ozegya said their interventions were hinged on the objective of having a peace that will enhance the full return of safety for the people to practice their faiths unhindered.

### **5.7.2b Human and Structural Development**

By their motivated engagement, the leaders hoped their people would be able to return to the path of human and social development. The Tiv representative saw his people as

enterprising educationally, economically and politically; notwithstanding the paralyzing impacts of this conflict: ~~–~~even though they do not enjoy equal political advantages, with farming the Tiv man is capable of producing enough food [to] make money, build a house, buy a car and do what he thinks will be good for him”. Rev Ozegya feared Keana, his beloved land, could be structurally and humanly destroyed. Unless he acted, the LGC would go backwards in development, caused by devastating conflict; ~~–~~Keana is my place of birth. If conflict comes, it will not only affect me, but also the Muslims, the Christians, and all others. If anything affects others, it affects me, you and the land. I would prefer all that happens should improve our development”. Fr. Edeh also indicated that development which will enhance the transformation of the 2001-2002 conflict and the prevention of future ones was the major objective for his motivated activities. It is not utopian, he said, if the youths reorient themselves with the knowledge that peace is already inside them and can be manifest through neighbourliness, collaboration, and engagement: ~~–~~their unemployment motivated me to plan and participate in the workshop on empowerment and family, and presenting my paper on family and neighbourliness, I strongly believed I will help them to think toward peace and development [rather] than fighting”.

### **5.7.2c Co-existence and Well-being**

According to the Tiv representative, the object of his motivated efforts was to see the flowering of his hope that the Tiv and Alago will continue to co-exist peacefully as before and sustain the peace with inclusive political participation. HRH Sir Elayo described this objective as ~~–~~peaceful togetherness”. Mr. Yusuf said he looked forward to seeing his motivated actions actualize the ideal of co-existence which he characterized as

togetherness without crime, especially from the Tiv people of Benue state whom their kin here in Keana welcome and allow to cause trouble and go unpunished". In addition to wanting Keana, spared from destruction, to develop, Rev. Ozegya said he was motivated to act so that the ideal of general well-being of the people will become the order of the day: "I saw suffering in the lives of the people. This was sympathetic. This person is like you and how is the person surviving. This factor contributed to my rising to action so that all people will come live together peacefully and well".

## **5.8 Transformative Strategies and Tactics**

This section is a data category that reveals the strategies and tactics used by the religious and traditional leaders to execute their motives and achieve their objectives; especially as ongoing activities. In the interrogative, they put forward two questions: impelled by the legacies of the conflict, what are the strategies and tactics that enabled the leaders to transform the aftermaths of the 2001-2002 conflict and consequently achieve durable peace in the council LGC? What are the long term measures that have been put in place to serve the purpose of conflict transformation in the community?

### **5.8.1 Strategies**

Originally used militarily, but now multi-dimensionally, the term 'strategies' is used in this work as those moves, ways, activities, plans and active efforts made to achieve the pre-conceived objectives (Pruitt & Rubin,1986). In this case, those activities were purposefully employed by the religious and traditional leaders to transform the conflict and its legacies.

Basically, the collected data from this study shows that all of the religious leaders used common strategies. Because they all have a common experience of the environment and conflict context, and because of their social statuses as custodians of the people's social welfare, I discovered they were all motivated by the same reasons and they all participated in the same strategies. Thus, it became easy for me to decipher their strategic activities. They are summarized below in a series of themes.

### **5.8.1a Sustainable Dialogue, Meetings and Consultations**

In their separate works on sustainable dialogue, Saunders (2003) and Zartman (2003) recognize the beneficial impacts of good mutual relationships among those who are doing transformative dialogue. Zartman explains that for fighting to stop, and in order to reconstruct the post violence structure and relationship, peacemakers must resist exclusionary pressures and care about inclusive and mutual engagements (Zartman, 2003). Thus, in Saunders' phraseology, there should be "continuous interaction among significant clusters of citizens" in all levels of the peacemaking process (Saunders, p. 94). In the same vein, Lederach (1997) categorizes peace actors in the conflict context into top, mid-level and grass-root levels. He emphasizes that, as peace actors, participants must be mutually involved. This relationship will not only enhance conflict transformation, but also fish out and eliminate those peace spoilers who benefit from the prolonged conflict.

All of the leaders interviewed for this thesis attested to the fact that continuous dialogical interactions between them has been important and needs to be sustained in the form of regular meetings and consultations. For this reason, they honoured, and continue to honour, all invitations to peace meetings. The Tiv representative captured it well: "holding

meetings and consultations are the strategies I most regularly used”. On the collective level also, he acknowledged that “in order to settle the crisis once and for all, a series of meetings were organized and I attended them; some in Akwanga, Makurdi and many in the palace of the *Osana* of Keana. We held peace and security meetings before, during, and after the conflict between the religious and traditional leaders and government officials”. Rev. Ezekiel, Mr. Yusuf, and all the chiefs reiterated the same point. They called and attended several meetings in the chief palaces, and will continue to meet as a way of continually transforming the 2001-2002 conflict and other problems that will emerge and threaten their existing peaceful life. “Upon hearing of any troubling thing, we will always first meet with our members or convene a sitting at the palace to seek for its solution”, said Mr. Yusuf. The chief of Agaza also indicated that he called several meetings to “inform my people to show hospitality to the fleeing Tiv people, to reject retaliation even after some Tiv people attacked Agaza, and to also inform them of the government’s directives and palliative material sent to us during the heat of the conflict”.

Closely related to holding meetings is the strategy of consultation with other leaders, the elites, their colleagues, and key community members. This is in line with Lederach’s (1997) ladder of peace actors. It must be inclusive, he says, of all the leaders, group representatives and elites of the conflict communities; chosen from among those who are at the top, the middle and the grass-roots of the conflict society. While it was mostly people who were consulted in the situation under study, the religious leaders also said that they consulted their deities through worship and prayers. To quote the chief priest of the Alago indigenous religion: “we contributed a lot by consulting the oracle, by worshipping, talking and offering sacrifices to the oracle. We believed the oracle will help restore peace to the

land”. Rev. Ozegya said, as the CAN chairman, “I saw suffering overwhelming the lives of the people. This was a sympathetic thing...[To this effect] I consulted my fellow pastors and said we should embark on some arrangements at our level as people who work for peace and as the Bible says of us “we are ambassadors of peace”. He confirmed also that the pastors unanimously agreed to consult with the Muslims, the *Osana* and the local government leaders so that their peace initiative would become the collective effort it actually turned out to be.

### **5.8.1b Use of Religious Rituals and Traditional Mores for Peace**

Schirch (2005) correctly articulates that rituals are significant enhancements of peacebuilding. Arguing in the same way, Tusso (2011) goes further to identify and elaborate that spirituality, rituals and community mores are key elements used strategically “in the process of peacemaking” among African societies (p. 34). Schirch defines rituals as repeated special behaviours that use symbols, acts and spaces, to help in manifesting worldviews and bringing about change in a society. While many traditional rituals have secular emphases, religious rituals are those repeated activities that focus on supernatural powers and faith values (Schirch, 2005). Also appraising the use of rituals for peacemaking, Appleby (2009) contrasted religious leaders as “peace actors” and as “agents of violence”; whereas the latter ingloriously use ritual for violence, the former commendably use their religious duties and resources (including rituals) to proclaim peace and address conflicts. It is interesting to note at this juncture that all the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC strategically used religious rituals (prayers, oblations, crusades and exhortations) for peace and conflict transformation purposes. According to the Alago indigenous religion

chief-priest, Mr. Agede, during visits to the shrine, his members would offer oblations and appeal for end of conflict and afterwards drink the local brew, *burukutu*, for peace: –anytime we visited the oracle, we did not request for confusion, war or problem in our kingdom, but for wellbeing and for peace to reign and the farms to yield bumper harvests and do peace-drinking after that”. The Tiv representative said: –as a leader in the Church, I also take the peace message there by exhorting the people and conducting our services for peace”. HRH Rev. Oduh made it very clear that as a retired pastor, now a traditional chief, he uses his dual social status to preach and pray with his people for peace, forgiveness and reconciliation. Fr. Edeh said he hopes to introduce monthly revival crusades featuring exhortations, prayers and worship.

With regards to African spiritual rituals and traditional mores for peace, the *Osana* of Keana and the *Oduh* of Agaza reported how they employed them strategically on the people, especially the youth. According to HRH Sir Elayo, –I always remind them that God commands us to be at peace with one another ... and from our ancestral heritage, we must continue to be hospitable to people”. HRH Rev. Oduh said he used the Alago moral disciplinary rules to encourage hospitality, and to caution against mockery and retaliatory violence against the Tiv, even when spill-over attacks took place.

### **5.8.1c Peace Education and Mobilization**

As custodians of the social values and welfare of their people, the leaders undertook peace education and mobilization of the population. These strategies were done in various ways: education, empowerment schemes, information dissemination and community mobilization. The Tiv representative said he tirelessly educated his people on non-violence

and the hope for a just peace. After the conflict, he mobilized them to be able to access humanitarian materials, important information and educational opportunities that were made available by philanthropists and the State government. HRH Sir Elayo launched a government campaign to build new schools for all the micro settlements within the LGC. He also began mobilizing farmers to access farming incentives, and organized the labour power of the youth to gain employment opportunities. Fr. Edeh engaged the idling youth to aggregate into groups in order to acquire small scale business loans. Scholars in peace studies describe these efforts as processes of rehabilitation in post-conflict peacebuilding (Jeong, 2005). HRH Rev. Oduh, Rev. Ozegya and Mr. Yusuf mobilized the local community to provide relief materials and collaborated in organizing labour for the repair of damaged homes for the fleeing and returning Tiv and for the Alago who suffered reprisal attacks.

#### **5.8.1d Interactive Problem-Solving**

More than 40 years ago Kelman and his colleagues at Harvard University came up with the concept of interactive problem-solving as strategy for resolving international conflicts which are characterized by adversarial and antagonistic attitudes, especially in Middle East (Kelman, 1986). Since then, interactive problem-solving has become a formal strategy for conflict resolution. Interestingly, the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC, with no knowledge of Kelman's theory, used interactive problem-solving as a strategy to transform the 2001-2002 conflict. However, unlike Kelman's whose focus is on antagonistic negotiation, that of the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC was focused on restoring relationship, welcoming each other back into the fold (Keana LGC),

ensuring peaceful co-existence and rebuilding mutual collaboration. This restorative characteristic was manifest in their constant referencing of each other as “our brothers”. Rev. Ozegya says this about the Tiv with regards to fraternity: “we told them, if we do not like you people, why will a Tiv man represent us, the whole of Alago? And in our generation today, we share things with you as our brothers”. To comment on this relationship, note that their interactive problem-solving meetings and consultations were not aimed at successful negotiated positions but on the successful restoration of the conflicting communities into the single peaceful people of Keana LGC, a condition that suitable for the reframing of contradictory interests. Their interactive problem-solving meetings have the features and steps : (restoration, community, harmony, participation, family, forgiveness, reconciliation and spiritual connectivity) typical of every indigenous peacemaking cultures e.g. the *Neoy Gai Geer* (customary committee) of Laos (Stobbe, 2006), “Xhosa practice of *Ubuntu* for South Africa” (Masina, 2000, p. 169), *Bashingantahe* institution of Burundi (Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008) and the *guurti* or *akhyaar* of Somalia (Menkhaus, 2000, p. 186).

### **5.8.1e Collective Security**

One thing that Zartman (2000) observes, and lauds the African peacemaking processes for, is their collective scope. Their “collective security” strategy, a loose community system in which the members band together to interact with the conflict parties and address challenging issues in order to reintegrate each member back into a harmonious whole, is an outstanding feature of African peacemaking mechanisms. The advantage of collective security is that each cluster leader at the meetings acts as the custodian of the group’s

values, which often are focused on social welfare. Collective security also means that the peace participants stand advisable, correctable and blamable before each other. Tusso (2011) has argued indicatively that the admission of wrongdoing and forgiveness are common features of indigenous processes of peacemaking. Collective security also makes the community obey and respect their representatives. It is against the backdrop of these features of collective security that the Tiv people accepted blame for laying siege against Keana town and attacking Agaza, and it was the value of restoration that disposed the Alago to forgive and welcome back their ~~brothers~~”. Collective security is also demonstrated in the various activities of HRH Sir. Elayo in his chiefdom and the LGC. This is evident in his formation of peace and development committees comprising all clusters and his convention of peace meetings for all layers of people in terms of gender and age. The research participants also reported that their people are respectful, obedient, and co-operative with the directives that come from the collective security as a body. In this regard, HRH Alhaji Usman said this of the people in Alosi chiefdom, ~~they~~ (my people) listen to their elders, leaders and chiefs”, and for the Tiv representative ~~they~~ (the Tiv) cooperate with me because they chose and put me forward to lead them”.

### **5.8.2 Tactics**

Pruitt & Rubin (1986) describe tactics as the arts or skills that conflict parties use to achieve and sustain their positions and strategies. According to these scholars, the interrelationship between strategies and tactics lies in the fact that the former refers to activities or actions aimed at attaining preconceived objectives or goals and the latter are the enabling skills, arts and maneuvers that facilitate strategies to reach the envisioned

goals. Some tactics listed by the authors include ingratiation, persuasive argumentation, threats, and irrevocable commitment. In contrast to the tactics listed by Pruitt and Rubin which typify antagonistic, adversarial, competitive or win-lose conflict, those enumerated by the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC are characteristically virtuous and restorative, variegated in affection, communal harmony, collaboration, correction and reintegration.

### **5.8.2a Love for Everyone**

HRH Sir Elayo stated clearly that he internalized the Christian counsel of love and he tries to live by it. He said of himself: ~~my~~ palace is not exclusive or hidden from anybody. I accept and welcome Muslims, Christians and pagans as my brothers and sisters. I earlier said my role is to love and motivate people to do same". By implication, the tactic of love helped him to embark on the transformative strategies that would empower farmers and unemployed youths as well as lead to the construction of educational facilities in the LGC. On the same note, Rev. Ozegya revealed that his love for fellowship and the art of visiting homes have been ~~tactics~~ that helped me in the different ways of transforming the conflict. My love for fellowship binds us. My love for visit, *na zuwa ziara* (visiting homes) is great, and they love this about me". By implication, love as his tactic of approach and practice of the Christian virtue fellowship endeared him to the people and spurred him to initiate the peace consultation as a strategy that received the people's support and eventually led to the return of the Tiv people and contributed to the emergence of durable peace in Keana LGC.

### **5.8.2b Courage and Fearlessness**

In *A Handbook of International Peacebuilding* (2002), Lederach elaborated some significant principles for engaging in transformative activities. Among them is the spirit to be courageous, fearless and committed. When transformers choose in the affirmative to intervene, it means they must be tactically courageous and committed in order to face all the hazards of peace work; ~~–~~know yourself”, ~~–~~be realistic about what you can bring”, ~~–~~be humble”, ~~–~~be bold” (p. 315-19). Rev. Ozegya indicated how these very tactics helped him to carry on his transformative activities: ~~–~~I faced some hardships and challenges while doing my work. Some of my people thought I was supporting the Tiv people so I don’t want any harm to affect the Tiv. Also because they are Christians and I am the CAN leader, I am backing them. I suffered. I was attacked even at home. It was the spirit of God that gave me courage and boldness to go on. I felt these things were in line with the gospel which says preach peace and love even when you are attacked”. The Tiv representative said that boldness also helped him to survive and struggle on when his people grew weary, angry and frustrated about what happened to them: ~~–~~in the midst of all these, I remained tactically strong and continued to pacify them”. The courageous posture of Fr. Shenge was demonstrated in his insistence on telling the two groups to return to history and ~~–~~reappraise their common ground”.

### **5.8.2c Psycho-Social Discipline in Virtues**

This phraseology is the closest I could get for this cluster of tactics. The religious and traditional leaders explained that the tactics enumerated in this section were significant ancillaries to their strategic interventions. They all acknowledged that patience to bear with

one another was salient, especially when they received reactionary actions and words from their communities and from outsiders and when there were delays in the arrival of relief materials or responses to their demands.

Their strategies were also sustained by uncompromising positions on truth, forgiveness and reconciliation, virtues that are typical for indigenous peacemaking. The Tiv representative, in particular, spoke of moral propriety before his people with regards to monetary and material gains. He had to be transparent, he said, by reporting and remitting all that was donated to him and his people, lest they accused him of ‘selling out’. In terms of truth-management, they all reported how importantly they managed some information that emerged or rumours that clouded the air, in order to stave off fears, panic, stampede, or criminal acts. The HRH Rev. Oduh and Mr. Yusuf said that, as part of truth management, they would investigate and ascertain the veracity of some information before putting them up for consideration. Mr. Ikpanako, who is a palace assistant to HRH Rev. Oduh, testified to the accuracy of this, saying “one tactic that he (the chief) taught us is immediate action on any emerging challenges”. With this tactic, witnesses say, their leader was able to prevent the escalation of violence in the chiefdom after the Tiv attack. Mr. Otoshi said: “He rose swiftly despite injuries sustained from the attack to caution against retaliation and exhorted them to be calm”. Mr. Onyapo remarked admirably that the people listened to the chief and there were no retaliatory attacks against the Tiv in the chiefdom. Fr. Edeh highlighted the value of the virtual tactic of humility which nourished the transformative steps among the youth. In his words: “don’t look at yourself as authority over them. Don’t lord it over people, if you do, they will create more trouble, they will disobey you. Be humble and patient. With these I am doing the peacemaking activities I introduced”.

### **5.8.2d Moral Incentives**

The term Moral Incentives implies the use of moral encouragement as a tactic. Some of the leaders said that they always gave moral encouragement to their people especially when they participated actively at meetings, cooperated on formal directives, showed patience, and responded to meeting invitations. The chief of Alosi said that, even though he was threatened with punitive measures by defiant persons, he mostly ended up encouraging them morally by appreciating the peace ideas and peace collaboration they displayed. He also gave them second chances so they could amend their attitudes.

### **5.9 Mutual Relationship**

In the preceding sections, we invariably saw that the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC truly valued interactive activities and mutual relationships. How significant were these relationships to their peace strategies and objectives? Did they, in any way, help them as they approached the conflict? Does their approach appear to be sustainable and portend future benefits? The importance of interpersonal relationships was, as we have seen, clearly illustrated in the two prominent strategies of sustainable dialogue (continuous meetings) and “collective security” (engagement of all clusters). Beyond these acts, the religious and traditional leaders responded in the affirmative to the above questions in the following array of interesting and exemplary themes that constitute the defining elements of the mutual relationships that exist among them.

### **5.9.1 Collaborative Relationship**

From the responses of the interviewees, it became clear that they have personal relationships with one another. This reality is strengthened by the unflinching collaboration they give to each other by responding to meetings, both routine and unprecedented, in order to confront emerging problems: “if not for the sake of collaboration on this issue, we would not hold meetings and all of us be in active attendance”, says Fr. Edeh. “I always attend meetings and other gatherings at the Osana palace in order to show my collaboration for peace”, asserted the *Oduh* of Agaza. He added that even when he also calls for meetings in his palace, leaders of all clusters in his chiefdom, commendably, do attend. Mr. Otoshi confirmed that “baba (the chief) brings all these leaders together and they work together in implementing all decisions”.

### **5.9.2 Indiscriminate**

Despite their different leadership platforms, their different chiefdoms, and their different religions, they did not discriminate. The main reasons for this is that they have a shared ancestral history, shared fraternal historical encounters, patriotic love for the land, and a shared hatred for the conflict and its heinous aftermaths. Fr. Edeh asked this interviewer: “if there was discrimination between us, the leaders, would I take you to the Mosque to look for the JNI leader for this interview?”. The JNI leader attested to the fact that it is because they don’t discriminate on a religious basis that they enjoy the fun of visiting Churches for meetings and social activities and vice versa. He added that “even when the indigenous religion members do their festivals, the ancestral heritage we converted from, we don’t oppose them but stand and watch”. The Osana and other chiefs

observed that their palaces are open to all people without discrimination. Mr. Agede said that, the indigenous faith members don't discriminate either; they live in tolerance and always meet for security concerns without despising the other. The *Osana* described the indiscriminate and mutual relationship as openness to inclusivity. He said: "in the palace here, there is no day that pagans, Christians and Muslims don't come to pay homage. And if their entourage is mixed faith, I ask for opening prayers in one and the closing one in another. And during general meetings or activities, we all come together".

### **5.9.3 Supportive and Respectful**

The key ideas that explain their mutual support and respect are fraternity, respect, support, accessibility and non-interference. The chief of Alosi captured this reality in these words: "we always meet, all of us traditional and religious leaders in support of one another as we try to chart the way forward for peace. We support each other, and are very helpful and cooperating. We collaborate and fraternize so much together. All religious and traditional leaders respect, relate, collaborate and work together". Similarly, the chief of Agaza said: "we support, decide and act to keep the community in peace by watching each other's back". Their mutual relationship and collaboration for peace are further strengthened by respecting each other's legitimacy and powers. Another expression of their support and respect is how they have made themselves accessible to each other, at any time. In the words of Fr. Shenge: "giving access to each other to ease consultations on security information and problems was to us the best; a very good way of showing togetherness, support and regard".

#### **5.9.4 Social and Harmonious**

Other aspects of their mutual relationship are depicted in socialization and harmony. Mr. Agede said that they socialize during festivals by sharing food and paying social visits. They also commiserate with each other when misfortunes befall their different communities; such as funerals and sickness. The JNI leader, Mr. Yusuf, reported: “we all meet when anything happens, there is no differentiation. We do not attend pagan burials as Muslims but will be at their homes to commiserate. We join and celebrate with the Christians during marriages. And at Christmas, the *Osana* cooks and invites us all for meal sharing. You know he is a Christian but we never asked why a Christian is inviting us to a meal. There is a strong solidarity and agreement between us”.

Harmony wise, they consult each other when significant information on security comes up. In the words of Mr. Ezekiel: “we collaborate, and all leaders are in harmony. We give and receive advice. We also make monetary contributions when it is demanded, especially for security reasons. Muslims, Christians and traditionalists all sit together and ask questions like ‘how do we see this issue?’ and ‘What can we do about it?’ We then suggest what ways we can follow and, after agreeing on what to do, we depart with the point and try our best to see it is disseminated or implemented”.

#### **5.10 Conclusion**

The data analysed in this chapter reveals the salutary works of peacemaking done by the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC. Aided by viable strategies, such as dialogue, interactive problem-solving meetings, and youth mobilization, combined with the tactics of courage, steadfastness and commitment to love, these leaders have had a

transformative impact on the sour relationships and slanted political representations in Keana LGC. They have helped to ensure that both the Tiv and Alago communities will continue to co-exist and in a peaceful atmosphere. On these grounds, it can be posited that religious and traditional leaders in this indigenous community, as elsewhere, are great resources to researchers, practitioners and policy makers for peace projects. Leaving them outside of the peace processes creates a vacuum that no others can fill. Engaging them represents a step that is wholistic. The next Chapter articulates in specific terms how indispensable these leaders are to those people and projects concerned with peacemaking.

## **Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This concluding chapter is segmented into three. The first discusses the key findings of the study some of which are: land and political marginalization as the fundamental causes of the 2001-2002 conflict, the return of peace and reconstructed relationship, perception and society as the common concerns of the disputing communities, and collective security and sustainable dialogue as leading strategies to enable attainment of these concerns, thus projecting the religious and traditional leaders as local non-state peace actors and epistemes for peacebuilding. The second section highlights the major contributions of the study as useful information to existing knowledge and for decision-making, thereby asserting firmly that religious and traditional leaders in indigenous and liberal cultures should not be snubbed, for doing so will create a space in social development that only can fill. The third section is a brief summary and conclusion of the study project.

### **6.2 Key Findings of the Study**

#### **6.2.1 Political Marginalization and Gruesome Murder**

Political marginalization based on ethnic differentiation and polarization emerged as one of the remote causes of the conflict in the Southern Senatorial Zone, while the gruesome murder of the Azara traditional leader triggered the spill over reactions in Keana LGC and some other places. Differentiation based on ethnicity (Horowitz, 1985) and ethnic polarization characterized by antagonism (Estaban et al., 2012) are regular strategies that ethnic groups adopt to win social advantages or secure scarce resources in

the face of a competing and offensive presence of the other (Cordell & Wolff, 2009). The respondents indicated that the Alago and the Tiv instrumentalized their ethnic identities by differentiating and polarizing against each other as they scrambled for the available advantages in the Zone and Keana LGC. In his explanation, HRH Sir Elayo lauded the prevailing democratic process but lamented the fact that during this crisis situation some tribal groups who are disadvantaged by small numbers used ethnic and religious factors to create and enter into alliances. The gloomy thing about this, he said, is that the alliances are purported to exclude and suppress the other (Tiv) because they are perceived as a big threat. If left unleashed, such alliances may use their increasing potentials to control all available opportunities. From HRH Sir Elayo's assertions, it can be deduced that the denial of indigene status and certificates, equal political and governmental quotas, as well as village districts, are some of the schemes used by the alliances to suppress the Tiv people all over the Southern Zone. A similar argument was made by the state commission that investigated the conflict. According to Aboki (2004), the commission identified systemic political marginalization as the key factor that led to the inter-ethnic rancour which eventually swelled up to the beheading of the Azara chief in Awe LGC; an event which led to the reprisal attacks in other LGCs, including Keana. Nyukuri (1997) provides additional insights into inter-ethnic conflicts in Africa by saying that they do not occur merely because ethnic groups are bracketed together by colonial administrative structures but because the ethnic groups have numerous socio-ethnic and econo-political grudges within or between them. The spillover attacks in Keana LGC are not justifiable for any reason. Nevertheless, Nyukuri's insights have indicated that grudges, reactionary anger, mistrust, and suspicion can trigger inter-ethnic violence as manifest in the spillover

attacks. The underlying problem here is when ethnicity is not essentialized for “egalitarian collectivism” (Tuso, 2000, p. 93) but instrumentalized by the elites for their vested interests other than the community’s and the community is unaware of this, a prevailing dirt that has smeared Nigeria’s ongoing democratic process.

### **6.2.2 Significant Positive and Negative Outcomes**

Coser (1956) was the first to argue and conceptualize that social conflicts inevitably produce both positive and negative impacts which influence the maintenance, adaptation and re-framing of relationships and structures. This is illustrated in the responses of the research participants who listed both the positive and negative legacies of the 2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC. As a result of the conflict under study, the local and state governments have learned to respond swiftly to any potential conflict while it is still at the formation level. This is because the commission of inquiry indicted the government of inadvertence at some point and non-responsiveness to a large extent during formation of the 2001-2002, that is, when it was smoldering in Awe LGC. Another positive consequence of this conflict is that the Tiv people began to adopt concentrated township settlements, thus able to access some social infrastructures and security apparatuses. Another positive outcome of the conflict is the renewed vigour for collective security as a strategy for peacemaking, particularly in Keana LGC. As reported, HRH Sir Elayo used his office as the chairman of the council of traditional leaders in the LGC to take collective security to a higher level by creating general and sub-committees on peace and development comprising of the leaders, elites and other members of the ethnic and organized groups in the LGC.

The main negative outcomes are psycho-social and economic in nature. Aboki (2004) enumerates the sufferings of the surviving victims, “particularly the Tiv” (p. 89) as hunger, homelessness, sickness, long treks, and injuries. However, he left out the psychological trauma that conflict survivors face due to the loss of dear ones and valued properties. A renowned psychoanalyst, Vamik Volkan, filled this vacuum with his theory of transgenerational transmission of trauma. He proved from his research that conflict survivors consciously or unconsciously have always “deposited” or narrated to their children the large losses, helplessness, victimization and humiliation they suffered from their neighbours during a conflict. He stated further that such depositing becomes an intergenerational transmission of trauma, and noted that every generation which cannot deal with the deposit will in turn pass on the haunting experience to the next generation (1998). The victims of the conflict under study, especially those in Keana LGC, are recounting the traumatic impacts of the loss of dear ones and their economic investments. Rev Ezekiel stated very clearly that human suffering and the fear of having his homeland, Keana, destroyed motivated him to initiate his transformative strategies: consultations, meetings, and relief mobilization.

### **6.2.3 Major Concerns: Peaceful Co-existence and Social Well-being**

The study also discovered that peaceful co-existence and the wellbeing of the people were the major objectives for which the leaders acted strategically. From their perspective, the increasing sense of insecurity which culminated in the beheading of the Azara chief and its spiral impacts in Keana were hurtful. Worse still, the sight of suffering by the large number of displaced people was horrendous. In addition, the atmosphere of mistrust

and suspicion between the two ethnic communities was disgusting. The Tiv representative added that the partial political treatment of his people was unacceptable. Thus, as the custodians of the community's values of security and welfare, the traditional and religious leaders felt obliged to undertake responsorial strategies that would reconstruct their relationships and bring collaborative co-existence and social welfare to the land.

Conflict transformation scholars (Lederach, 1995; Miall, 2004; Doucet, 2007) state that conflict transformation has one primary goal—to minimize conflict by first reconstructing the social relationship that is charred by adversarial ideas, perceptions, views, feelings, communication patterns, and structures and, then, seeking to bring cohesion and social advancement to the troubled society. All of these adversarial elements are encrusted in the factors of mutual mistrust and suspicion between the two ethnic communities. It is therefore not surprising that the leaders, disgusted by this unhealthy relationship between their people, were spurred to embark on coordinated strategies to bring about constructive relationships in the community/LGC.

#### **6.2.4 Sustainable Strategies and Transformation Ancillaries**

The study also discovered that the religious and traditional leaders understood their roles, activities, and tactics as sustainable strategies and ancillaries of conflict transformation. The study also revealed their resolve to use them repeatedly. Using Saunders' (2003) and Nemeroff's (2008) concept of "sustained dialogue", sustainable strategies can be described as those open-ended interactive engagements which aim at analysing a social and relational challenge in order to transform adversarial elements

(such as those mentioned above) that gave birth to it. They are sustainable because by nature they are repeatable and ongoing or each of them is part of a “continuing cycle” (Nemeroff, 2008, p. 226). They are also characteristically inclusive; that is, they involve all “significant clusters of citizens ... across permeable borders” (Saunders, 2003, p. 94). Because they are “repeatable” and “inclusive”, scholars are confident that sustainable strategies have the viability of transforming conflict; especially those based on identity, fear, historic grievance, alienation, and division, such as the 2001-2002 crisis in Keana LGC. It is, therefore, not surprising that interactive sustainable strategies (dialogue, meetings, consultations) are profoundly pinpointed by the leaders as viable measures and ancillaries in the transformation of the 2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC.

### **6.2.5 The Attainment of Permanent Peace is a Possibility**

The people of Keana LGC want the return of peace, not understood as the temporary absence of violence but as a permanent social evolution. By this is meant an evolved transformation of perceptions, ideas, feelings, mindsets, behaviours, relationships and systems so that what is henceforth contemplated as the alternative to violence is no longer just non-violence. A Permanent social evolution involves harnessing human and material resources for social well-being, and requires that this become everyone’s ideological orientation and ultimate goal. According to Slick (1985), permanent peace is everyone’s need, so all community members must embark on this “too big” and “too great” a project. Since permanent peace is everyone’s primary duty, Zartman (2007) and Taisier & Matthews (2004), argue that it must be inclusive, participatory and owned by the conflict community. Unlike durable peace, permanent peace is not measurable; it is an endless

void of non-violence. The way they are interrelated is that, when the community maximises it for this purpose, durable peace can become instrumental to permanent peace. In this light, the study discovered that the mutual relationships enjoyed by the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC are intended to assist them in employing their sustainable strategies efficiently; thereby optimizing the 10+ years of stability for permanent peace.

The leaders expressed their strong optimism for this objective. They believe that that their sustainable strategies are capable of propelling them toward their ultimate goal of permanent peace. This is illustrated in their belief that collective security is their big strength because it is inclusive and locally owned. Mr. Yusuf expresses it thus: ~~we~~ we have an association comprising leaders and representatives of all groups and communities. When anything happens, when we see trouble, we will immediately call ourselves and meet, after which we relay the information and directive to all the community members. This is how we get to have peace. If it is going on this way, it will always go on, even get improved. Conflict never enters a community when there is collaborated security like this. What brought about Boko Haram? [he laughs]. We are not concerned with that and we will not allow it to penetrate us". In other words, collective security is manifested in the enumerated sustainable strategies, shared tactics variegated in abhorrence of violence, and a flair for stability and commitment and peace. The prevailing atmosphere of mutual relationship strengthened by mutual respect, open consultation, accessibility and collaboration portends the possibility of permanent peace.

Another light of hope for permanent peace is shining from the improving political situation, where the Tiv people are now occupying significant political and administrative

positions in the LGC. Fr. Edeh, Rev. Ozegya, and the Tiv representative acknowledge this development and state that despite a residue of suspicion and mistrust, the Tiv now have many of their children in the higher echelons of the LGC administration. HRH Sir Elayo gives his assurance that “if there is anything that will make them happy with us, we will step out to do. We need peace. We know the value of peace. Trouble, anger, killing and so on do not give anything”. Referring to the sustainable strategies, tactics, and common objectives, as well as the mutual collaboration between the leaders, HRH Sir Elayo crowns this discussion on the attainment of permanent peace with these words: “These are steps we are taking. With all these, therefore, I as the paramount traditional ruler of Keana LGC did work to see that this land enjoyed durable peace, and we shall continue in this way till we reach to permanent peace”. In earnest, this reduction in political exclusion means departure from ethno-political manipulation, and in acquiescence to Jenne’s (2011) position an indication that the solution to ethno-political problems is not ethnic partitioning and marginalization but integration.

#### **6.2.6 Religious and Traditional Leaders as Epistemic Communities**

Another significant contribution of this study relates to the ongoing debate as to whether or not religious and traditional leaders are “epistemic communities”. The concept of epistemic communities was first used during the Cold War to describe scientists and their influence on policy makers (Santal, 2011). The definitive works of Foucault (1970) and Haas (1992) have shown that the concept can be applied to other social groups with similar success. Drawing on Foucault and Haas, epistemic communities can be defined as the network of people or experts whose credibility and body of knowledge are relevant to

public policy formulation. Since epistemes can provide relevant contribution to decision-makers Haas (2008) insists that the two must engage in a collaborative relationship of –social-learning and human betterment; when the experts have been able to develop usable knowledge, and the decision-makers feel compelled to apply it” (p. 576). Recently emerging empirical evidences and literature e.g. Sandal (2011), Haas (1989, 2008), Thomas (2005), have made very strong arguments for religious and traditional leaders as epistemic communities. Sandal and Haas tag them directly as epistemic; Thomas constructively situates them within the Weberian traditional epistemic authorities in state-society relations. In 2000 the UN declared religious and traditional as epistemic communities and insisted that their expertise and opinions should be well appraised by decision-makers

Based on the research conducted in Keana LGC, the conflict transformation roles, motives, objectives, strategies and tactics of religious and traditional leaders were effective. This study posits that religious and traditional leaders in indigenous and liberal cultures are indeed great assets to peace processes at the grassroots where they use the cultural assumptions of the people and reframe the contradictory interests, ideas, perceptions, historical narratives and social systems that cause conflicts, and as epistemes they are resources that policy makers in all tiers of the government must not ignore.

### **6.2.7 Local Non-State Peace Actors**

Unlike some peace scholars (Paffenholz, 2009; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006) who situate religious and traditional leaders within the concept of –evil society in peacebuilding”, I prefer to think of the religious and traditional leaders in Keana as local

non-state peace actors. Civil society as a concept is grounded in the historical riotous struggles for rights and political participation from totalitarian regimes by European elites in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). In contrast, the religious and traditional institutions in Africa did not emerge as products of mobilization and struggle for civil participation. Although they did suffer suppression during and shortly after colonial rule, religious and traditional leadership became resurgent in the late 1960s and has been flourishing to this day (Blench, 2006). Even though, like civil societies, they independently perform the social roles of mobilizing the community for development and security, I am more comfortable describing them as local non-state peace actors, an image foreshadowed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

By local non-state peace actors, I mean the locally-based members of the conflict community, who look inwardly to identify their conflicts and invent local and sustainable strategies to transform them without reliance on external or governmental interventions, even though they may accept these as supportive resources. Lederach (1995) refers to this kind of approach as the “elicitive model” of conflict transformation (p. 55). He strongly recommends elicitive, rather than prescriptive, approaches to conflicts in indigenous societies, like Keana LGC. Many civil societies are prescriptive by design and for this reason they subvert local worldviews with alien strategies. Local non-state actors are elicitive in nature and they use their own local resources: community members, wisdom, strengths, creativity and vision etc. to address their social problems. With “the renaissance of interest in ‘the local’ in peace building” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 763), scientists in peace and conflict studies are increasingly advocating that religious and traditional leaders are relevant to conflict transformation in indigenous societies as local

non-state peace actors, as such they should be acknowledged, trusted, respected and supported by researchers and practitioners

### **6.3 Significance of the Study**

With regards to contributions, this study has produced information very significant to existing knowledge, peace studies and practice and policy formulation. The study added information to existing knowledge by exploring the reality of religious and traditional leaders in indigenous cultures (like Africa) and the immense potentialities and indispensable roles they have for peacebuilding. With particular reference to peace studies and practice, the study articulated some of the dynamics that operate as factors and legacies of inter-ethnic conflicts in indigenous cultures; namely, ethnic differentiation and polarization and mutual suspicion and fear. Focusing on how this kind of conflict is being tackled in Keana LGC, the study appraised the key role of religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC as local non-state peace actors who genuinely initiated and adopted successful local peacemaking processes. Their transformative contributions brought about durable peace in the council. They are also very optimistic about launching their community into uninterrupted stability or permanent peace.

In addition, this study has evidenced that the religious and traditional leaders are also epistemic communities with tested and invaluable capabilities, thus making it imperative for public officers to utilize them and create a social-learning relationship with them for the betterment of the human society. This study has shed light on the significant peace and conflict resolution role of the religious and traditional leaders in indigenous or African societies and wants to emphasize their crucial importance. To the indigenous

communities, these leaders will continue to be important constitutive elements of their cultural heritages and worldviews, amazing resources for peacemaking, social welfare and community development and significant agents of improving the ways of understanding traditions and heritage in modern times for conflict transformation. Despite this explicated significance, I want to state that liberal culture has always systematically violated the worldviews of indigenous cultures in African and North and South America. Worse still, this negative stereotyping of traditional cultures has created lack of confidence in members of the indigenous communities and caused them to question and undermine their own capabilities thus making them to settle for dependency on the deciphered “superior” models of the West. This study leads me to counter this development and proffer a healthier orientation to choosing one or the other.

Jeong (2000) and Walker (2004) are scholars of peace and conflict studies. Jeong has argued that using political and economic pressures mediated through imperial globalization and realist structures, liberal worldviews have targeted indigenous systems with scorn, chauvinism and intended disruption, making them unable to develop and lead their communities to self-reliance and, so, becoming perpetual consumers of liberal products. Even more gloomy, Jeong states, is that this subversive subtlety has dominated academia far too long. He describes this uncharitable situation as “epistemological violence” (p. 263). Walker describes it as “ontological violence” (p. 546).

Both Jeong and Walker caution academic mentors and students against what I choose to call academic chauvinism. Jeong suggests that this harm can be transformed with the possible emancipation of intellectual minds from modernist imperial paradigms and a recognition that embedded in the indigenous institutions and practices are stratified

wealth and resources that can significantly help to solve social problems. To Walker, decolonizing all disciplines, especially conflict resolution, can and must be done. The approach to take, she says, is not one “where world religions send missionaries [and] conflict resolutions organisations send trainers” but an approach which seeks to develop “a deeper understanding of, respect for, and acknowledgment of Indigenous worldviews” as prospects for transformative developments (p. 546). In the same vein, Tuso (2011) rues how Western colonization destroyed indigenous processes by treating them as backward and unworthy to be invested and mutilating them as irrelevant, a phenomenon that generated negative effects against the development of non-Western cultures. Tuso argued for critical public and scholarly discourses on decolonization in order to redeem the situation, a recommendation that is supported by this research study.

The truth of the above arguments is further demonstrated by the findings in this study. We saw how indigenous peace actors and processes had positive impacts on the social lives of the people. On a macro level, and given an enabling environment characterized by persistent emphases and support, indigenous processes can even address the scourge of asymmetric conflicts on the African continent by groups like Boko Haram and Al-Shabab. To this end, the African Union (AU) has a broad-based indigenous peace apparatus known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with a philosophical slogan “Try Africa First” or “African Solutions to African Problems”. The local peace actors are designated as the “Panel of the Wise” (POW) and their major role is to mediate in conflict on the regional and inter-regional levels. The peace work done by POW in South Sudan, Dafur, and the Central African Republic (CAR) are rated low by 2010 APSA Assessment report, which went further to indicate that there POW needs

more support and collaboration to deliver optimally. Another factor impairing maximal performance is that African states, imitating the West, continue to use military offensives to address conflicts on the continent., Re-echoing the words of Mac Ginty & Richmond, this study is insisting on “the local turn in peacebuilding as a critical agenda for peace” in Africa (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 763)

Disappointed by prolonged conflicts with religious connotations, the modernists are still using the liberal culture to secularize the human society. Thus, on the one hand the liberal culture is seen growing with confidence in scientific methodologies, while on the other hand it is seen abnegating the role and capability of religion to resolve social conflicts. In his work, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, Appleby (2000) does not abnegate religion, rather he acknowledges its ambivalence and appraises its “strategies for promoting religious peacebuilding” (p. 281). Johnston & Sampson (1994) in their work; *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* and Halafoff & Wright-Neville (2009) in *A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in Countering Terrorism* reply to this abnegation with two strong points. First, they observe that, despite abrasive liberal tendencies, religion has not been destroyed or subjugated; in fact, religion has returned to the world’s stage in recent decades with a resounding significance. Second, they assert that the body of social and conflict resolution works done by religious actors has sufficiently contested any sophism laid against them. The anthropological approach of this study also points to the relevance of inclusive religion to the social life of the people in indigenous societies.

By way of conclusion, a strong argument has been made in the literature, to support the findings of this study that religious and traditional leaders do not deserve scorn and

relegation but inclusion and collaboration as epistemic communities for the betterment of human society, in both liberal and indigenous societies. Studies and practice in peace have the moral and academic obligations to explore indigenous traditional and religious institutions because they portend immense social benefits. Canada for example, has legislated for the academic study and judicial implementation of indigenous peacemaking strategies, also known as restorative justice in all the provinces and territories. Britto & Reimund (2013) acknowledge that since 1970, Canada has been producing policies that aim at “making space for restorative justice in criminal justice and criminology curricula and courses.” Rupert (1995) identifies some of the parameters of restorative peacemaking and they are akin to the conflict transformative strategies and objectives in Keana LGC. The strategic parameters he identified are collective responsibility, healing circle, mutual support, community leaders and local wisdom and the objectives include healing, reconciliation, reintegration and harmony of the parties and community. Canada’s positive approach was stimulated by the need to resolve the long-standing clashes between Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian values, manifest in the “general over-reliance on the use of [the Western justice system of] imprisonment and [the] aboriginal over-representation in prisons” (Prairie, 1999, p. 139).

Notwithstanding the rich and significant insights outlined above, this study is highlighting the following limitations and recommending how future studies can fill up the gap. Asked to identify their strategies, the respondents enumerated sustainable dialogue, meetings, and consultations as interactive problem-solving strategies that they use to transform the conflict. They were however not asked about the steps and skills they used or followed as they facilitated the transformative strategies; dialogue, meetings and

consultation? For this reason, this study recommends for future studies that may investigate and contrast between the indigenous and liberal steps and skills of facilitating interactive problem-solving strategies.

To this day, the Tiv are considered non-indigenes in Keana LGC, and according to the Tiv representative interviewed in this study, all forms of political marginalization meted against them stem from this factor. None of the respondents suggested how this residual cause of the conflict can be transformed. Perhaps an objective study of the indigene-settler problem may come out with the panacea.

#### **6.4 Summary and Conclusion**

Objectively, this study sought to detect the enabling processes with which the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC contributed to the transformation of the 2001-2002 conflict thereby attaining durable peace and continuing their efforts towards the achievement of permanent peace. The study discovered that the eminent roles, motives and objectives of the religious and traditional leaders seriously informed the conflict transformative activities they initiated and performed. Motivated by the scathing impacts of the conflict, and informed by their roles as peace actors, transformative agents, motivators, mobilizers and custodians of the people's cultural heritage, they decided to initiate some strategies and that enabled the various conflicting parties to meet and work together on common welfarist objectives. These objectives included the reconstruction of feelings, ideas, relationships and perception and the attainment of peaceful co-existence and social wellbeing of all the people. Prominent among the creative strategies they used are sustainable dialogue, interactive problem-solving meetings and consultations, peace

education, and collective security. These, in turn, were enabled by the disciplinary tactics and virtues of love, patience, moral propriety, collaboration, inclusivity, mutuality, and firmness. The leaders asserted their determination to repeatedly use their roles, activities and tactics (i.e., sustained strategies) to transition from the over 10 years of durable peace to permanent stability.

The causes of the 2001-2002 conflict are strongly associated with the discriminatory political experiences in the Southern Senatorial Zone, Nasarawa state. As already remarked, instead of using the ongoing democratic process in Nigeria for inclusive participation and collaborated development, the ethnic communities in the Zone have unfortunately resorted to political marginalization and exclusion. This inauspicious development created bad relationship that was defined by mutual fear, suspicion as well as rancour, grudge and violent clashes between the Tiv and the Alago in Keana LGC and the Tiv and others in the entire Senatorial Zone. We also saw that the brutal killing of the chief of Azara triggered the 2001-2002 conflict in Awe LGC and led to the reprisal attacks in Keana LGC. It is clear that the Tiv were targeted with coordinated massive attacks in this conflict, and in anger and reaction, the Tiv retaliated with attacks on Agaza and laid siege against Keana chiefdoms in Keana LGC. Though the Tiv are suspected of beheading the chief of Azara, the actual culprit of the gruesome act has not been identified.

Though the 2001-2002 violent conflict was not a welcome development, the study discovered that it led the government to learn that it has to act swiftly when inter-ethnic rancour is noticed. The conflict also made the Tiv people to re-organize themselves into concentrated township settlements and to mobilize themselves for political struggles. The

respondents also acknowledged that the conflict made them to embark on sustainable dialogical interactions in order to transform their relationship and the conflict legacies such as mutual distrust and political marginalization. Apart from these positive lessons learned from the conflict, the participants decried the negative aftermaths of the conflict such as loss of lives and properties and the transmission of trauma. The religious and traditional leaders in Keana have vowed to continuously use their strategies to transform all lingering aspects of the conflict and eventually achieve permanent peace in the LGC.

This study concludes with a couple of recommendations for further research. The political designations: “indigenes” and “settlers” manifested in this research are still a topic of concern and controversy. Further exploration of these issues will perhaps task both communities to suggest mechanisms for managing identity-based conflicts. Future study which seeks to constructively explain why narratives about the arrival and founding of Keana by the two groups are discrepant and competitive will usefully educate and bolster the ongoing efforts to build sustainable relationship between the two ethnic communities. Lastly, unlike this study which dwelt on investigating the transformative roles and strategies of the religious and traditional leaders in resolving the conflict in Keanu LGC, a future study might investigate whether or not these same leaders played any role in the emergence and escalation of the 2001-2002 conflict.

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## CONSENT FORM

**Research Topic:** Conflict Transformation and Permanent Peace in Keana Local Government Council of Nasarawa State, Nigeria: The Roles, Motives, Objectives, Strategies and Tactics of Religious and Traditional Leaders.

**Principal Researcher:** Genger Peter

**Research Supervisor:** David Creamer, Ed.D.

### Dear participant

This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.

**1 Research Purpose**

The purpose of this study is to elucidate the transformative roles, motives, objectives and strategies of the religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC that led to the over 10 years of durable peace since the 2001-2002 conflict and how their immense potentials for peacemaking can transform the development to permanent peace.

**2 Participant's Involvement and Procedures.**

Your participation in this research will be a one-time one-on-one interview with me. You will be asked a total of six (6) predetermined questions on salient topics, and you are free to answer them as you want. Other than choose the venue of your choice and sit for the interview, you have no other task to perform during the research. The interview will be done in one day and will last for approximately 3hrs.

**3 Media Devices**

I will be using a few materials during the interview with you:

- Pen and paper for taking notes.
- An audio machine to record your information.
- A photo camera, for taking pictures of you and during interview. Pictures may be appended in the final report of the study. You are free to accept or refuse the use of this material.

#### **4 Research Benefits**

- Direct benefits: your peacemaking efforts will be formally acknowledged in this academic report.
- Indirect benefit: your information can be used by the Nasarawa state government to formulate peace policies that are beneficial to the Keana LGC community and the entire state.
- Addition to knowledge: the information you share and are eventually published in this work will enrich the existing body of knowledge about the 2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC and how the religious and traditional leaders in the area meaningfully transformed the conflict to durable peace and are transiting it to permanent peace.

#### **5 Research Risks**

This research will pose the physical inconvenience of having you to sit for 3hrs or less for the interview, but you are free to ask for a break during interview or choose to continue with it on another day and time of your choice.

#### **6 Confidentiality of Data and Participant**

Data collected and your identity will be treated with confidentiality throughout this study. The following steps will be taken to ensure and preserve this confidentiality:

- Collected confidential data will be stored in a protected folder and locked in my personal computer with the password kept from unauthorized persons.
- Only the researcher will have access to the data, unauthorized person will access data only when the individual participant gives consent or the research is disseminated.
- All confidential data will be destroyed after the research is reported and disseminated, by May, 2015.

- 7 Incentives/Appreciation**  
I really appreciate your willingness to share information with me during this study. Giving that in this culture appreciation items are not announced, thus I will beg you to kindly accept the little gesture of gratitude I will offer to you after the interview and when the study is finally reported.
- 8 Withdrawal**  
You are free to communicate to me your intention to withdraw your participation in this study at any time you wish. You are free to withhold any information you do not wish to share during this study. You can also ask for the withdrawal of any information you have shared in this study or your identity.
- 9 Feedback**  
You will be receiving feedback on the information you shared by registered mail, after all field-notes and transcribed data have been compiled in July, 2014. You will also be given a copy of the full research report by May, 2015.
- 10 Dissemination**  
The result of this study will be will be disseminated to you and my school department, my advisor and the Information Ministry of the Nasarawa state government.
- 11 Data Destruction**  
The confidential data you share will be destroyed after the research is reported and disseminated, by May, 2015.

**Consent Expression**

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and /or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be

as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

The University of Manitoba may look at your research records to see that the research is being done in a safe and proper way.

This research has been approved by **Magaret Bowman**. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Coordinator (HEC) at (+1) 204-474-7122. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Participant's Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher's Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

# Research Questionnaire

## Research Topic:

Conflict Transformation and Permanent Peace in Keana Local Government Council of Nasarawa State, Nigeria: The Roles, Motives, Objectives, Strategies and Tactics of the Religious and Traditional Leaders.

**Researcher:** Genger Peter

## Research Committee members:

Dr. David Creamer, SJ (Chair), Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba  
Dr. Hamdesa Tusso, Department of Peace & Conflict Studies, University of Manitoba  
Dr. Jonathan Sears, International Development Studies, University of Winnipeg

**Dear Research Participant**

### Reminders

- 1 The purpose of this research interview is to know from how your transformative roles, motives, objectives and strategies as a religious/traditional leader that led to the over 10 years of durable peace can also bring about permanent peace in Keana LGC.
- 2 You will be asked a total of six (6) questions. You are free to refuse to answer any question and answer questions by telling your story as you want.
- 3 The interview may last for at least 2hrs. You can call for break in between the interview or ask to continue another day and time of your choice.
- 4 You are free to discontinue with the interview or participation in the research at any time of you choose to.
- 5 You are assured of confidentiality and anonymity while the data you share is been analyzed or before it is reported and disseminated.
- 6 Refer to the contact information on the letter of information should you want to register any concern.
- 7 Finally, remember you are participating at this interview because you consented.

### The Research and Interview Questions

- 1 How have you as a (religious/traditional) leader in Keana LGC contributed to the achievement of more than 10 years of durable peace in the area?
- 2 What will you say are the causative factors and the emerging legacies of the

2001-2002 conflict in Keana LGC?

- 3 How are you as a (religious/traditional) leader in Keana LGC addressing the causative factors and legacies of 2001-2002 conflict in order to achieve permanent peace?
- 4 What are the motives and objectives that encouraged you as a (religious/traditional) leader in Keana LGC to participate in the transformation of the 2001-2002 conflict in this Council?
- 5 What strategies and tactics are you as a (religious/traditional) leader in Keana LGC using to transform the 2001-2002 conflict in the Council?
- 6 Explain how you and the other religious and traditional leaders in Keana LGC mutually engaged each other to transform the 2001-2002 conflict and other ones in the Council

Thank you for participating.