

The Rise of Global Private Policing in Africa: Real Need or Imperialist Project?

by

Joseph Yaw Asomah

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
The University of Manitoba
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg

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Abstract

This research project explores critically the broader social context of the rise of global private policing in Africa, using Nigeria and South Africa to provide an in-depth illustrative and comparative context. Drawing on insights from global security and police research, Foucauldian governmentality studies, and postcolonial perspective in particular, the overarching question addressed in this research is that of whether the apparent rise in global private policing in Africa is occasioned by real need, or it constitutes an imperialist project? In other words, how do we make sense of this development? This research finds that private policing is largely a function of a paradigm shift from a collective human security to an individualistic sense of security through greater emphasis on competition, and private property or gain, in contrast to the collective welfare that predominantly characterized most pre-colonial African societies. Accordingly, global private policing is seen largely as a product of long-term historical undercurrents of colonialism and contemporary forms of Western imperialism, and the leadership crisis rooted in high-profile corruption and economic mismanagement in most parts of Africa; however, their impact on the extent of global private policing differs significantly due to the country-specific internal social, political, and economic, dynamics. This research therefore makes a contribution to the theoretical debates surrounding the growth of global private policing, particularly in the African context; and considers the broader implications for security policies grounded in private versus collective human security.

Keywords: social control; crime control; neoliberal globalization; private policing; security; imperialism; social organization; Africa; South Africa; Nigeria

Acknowledgment

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my advisor, Professor Russell Smandych, for his invaluable guidance and indispensable support throughout this research project; and to his affable wife, Kathryn, I say thank you for the warm reception that made me feel at home. I really appreciate these and will always remember them. I am also grateful to Professors Andrew Woolford, the internal committee member, and Baffoe Michael, the external committee member, for their useful suggestions and constructive comments. Additionally, I would like to thank the whole Department of Sociology community at the University of Manitoba for the friendly, accommodative, family-like, and supportive, environment extended to me. I am also greatly indebted to my loving family for their prayers and emotional support; and to my friends for their encouragement. Above all, my deepest appreciation goes to the Almighty God for seeing me through my entire academic journey with a resounding success all this while, despite all the glaring impediments; with Him, all things are really possible. Indeed, words alone are not enough to convey my immeasurable indebtedness to Him. *Meda wo ase.* Thank you.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increased involvement of non-state actors in the governance of social control generally, and crime control in particular—virtually across the globe. Of particular concern is the commoditization of security that results from the engagement of paid non-state actors in these new social control arrangements, usually involving regular payment of an appropriate fee to access security (Johnson & Shearing, 2003; Zedner, 2006; Alhadar, & McCahill, 2011; Aas, 2013; Mulone, 2013). This development towards the commoditization of security is particularly pronounced in the case of private policing (Sklansky, 2006; Berg, 2010; Valverde, 2010). Many cities in the world are now not only patrolled by the public police force, but also by the growing private police personnel. Private policing routinely patrols areas, such as shopping malls, transport terminals, airports, office buildings and leisure facilities, which constitute important domains of public social life (Wakefield, 2003; Lea & Stenson, 2007; Simelane, 2008; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Jones, 2011).

The development towards pluralism in the governance of crime control has been largely linked to global neo-liberal governance that encourages active involvement of individuals, institutions and local communities in managing crime problems and risks (Lea & Stenson, 2007; Jones, 2011; Aas, 2013). This dispersal of responsibility has been described as a “responsibilization” strategy within contemporary social control (Garland, 1996, 2001). Basically, responsibilization reflects a particular way of thinking in which government actively secures the participation of private citizens, non-state actors and agencies in controlling crimes and other unwanted social phenomena (Garland, 1996, 2001; Wacquant, 2003; Aas, 2013). Therefore, the governance of crime control no longer lies with only the state and governmental institutions, but also voluntary and private actors stepping in when

states become unwilling or unable to deal with crime challenges. To some scholars in criminology, the involvement of the private sector in crime control is a healthy development (Dupont, 2004; Kempa, Stenning, & Wood, 2004; Claassen, 2011), as it largely focuses on preventive (problem-solving and non-punitive) dimensions of crime control (Shearing & Stenning, 1981, 1983; Johnson & Shearing, 2003; Wood & Shearing, 2007). This has the prospects of freeing up the public police forces to concentrate on more serious dimensions of crime control. Thus, the fragmentation of security governance should not pose any grave concerns, either for affluent or disadvantaged people and communities.

Additionally, the penetration of a profit-oriented private sector into the field of crime control is not a new phenomenon. Private security arrangements were not uncommon in pre-modern societies (Thompson, 1994), although pre-industrial markets were more limited and localized, unlike the present global nature of the markets dominated by multinational companies (Zedner, 2006). The story of “mercenaries” or “soldiers of fortune” has a long history, and this suggests that it is not wholly true that security governance and provision, as well as the monopoly of violence, has been the sole responsibility or distinguishing characteristic of state sovereignty (Thompson, 1994).

However, the involvement of paid non-state actors in crime control has reached new heights with the accompanying concerns of accountability, transparency, legitimacy and the contested role of the state (Berg, 2010; Alhadar, & McCahill, 2011; Zedner, 2009; Aas, 2013). Accordingly, the privatization of social control has been called into question, especially by the pro-state camp on the ground that governance and provision of security should be the sole prerogative of the state (Loader & Walker, 2007; Zedner, 2009). For instance, Christie (2000) argues that private policing is class biased, and has a potential for abuse in the event of severe conflicts in the polity.

Further, Loader and Walker (2001) contend that a secure environment is something that every citizen is entitled to, and, therefore it should not be limited to only users who can afford the payment of the appropriate charge in order to access it. In effect, the commoditization of basic security goods like private policing has the potential consequence of “reducing citizenship to a brand of consumerism” (Zedner, 2000, p. 209). By implication, this development poses grave concerns for weak states as in Africa, particularly for disadvantaged communities and individuals who cannot afford to purchase security as a commodity at the private security markets. Another key concern has been the spread of governing power to politically unaccountable powerful transnational forces and actors running private policing (Christie, 2000). This suggests that the regulation of private policing might turn out to be a huge challenge in post-colonial and developing countries, where a weak state and its institutions are, perhaps, less likely to effectively regulate private policing.

Amidst these debates, the reality is that private policing is gaining momentum in the global South. The growth of surveillance technologies and private policing is gradually becoming more common in Africa (Cleaver, 2000; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2006; Simelane, 2008), apparently pointing towards commoditization of crime control. In South Africa, for instance, private security personnel now outnumber public police (Kempa & Singh, 2008; CNN, 2013); about 446,000 registered security guards compared to the public police force totaling 270,000 (Cohen, 2014). In this light, there are legitimate concerns about the proliferation of private policing as a result of limited legal frameworks for effective regulation of private policing phenomena to prevent and deal with the potential excesses, such as human rights violations in the global South generally, and Africa in particular. This has mainly served as an impetus to the current study.

While the existing body of literature has generally enhanced our understanding of rising private policing phenomena in Africa, there is limited in-depth study focusing on what

shapes and facilitates this development and its repercussions on disadvantaged people and communities in particular. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis research project is to contribute to filling this research vacuum. The critical question addressed in this research is that of whether the apparent rise in private policing in Africa is occasioned by real need, or, on the other hand, if it constitutes an imperialist project? Interrogating this question has the potential of extending our current knowledge about the increasing commoditization of crime control with reference to Africa, and the implications these developments pose for broader security policies.

In order to make the proposed research more geographically grounded and manageable, it will primarily take the form of an in-depth comparative critical study of Nigeria and South Africa to illustrate the development of global private policing in Africa. Hague, Harrope and Breslin (1998, p. 281) suggest guidelines for a selection of cases for inclusion in focused comparative research, contrasting what they refer to as “most similar” and “most different” designs. They note that:

Most similar design takes similar countries for comparison on the assumption that the more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for differences between them. By contrast, the most different design seeks to show the robustness of a relationship by demonstrating its validity in a range of contrasting settings.

The current study reflects both “most similar and most different” designs to some extent. In terms of similarities, both countries, for example, generally share a history of colonialism and collectivistic African cultural orientations. Broadly, they also appear to be confronted with serious security issues, such as high crime levels in South Africa, and high profile security threats from Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. However, the two countries are different to some extent. For instance, the history of Apartheid, settler colonial status, and the pace of private policing developments are arguably unique to South Africa, while the dominant

presence of multinational oil companies and the Boko Haram insurgency characterized by terrorist style of attack, including suicide bombings, are more distinctive to Nigeria.

Theoretically, this thesis draws on a cluster of insights from global security and police research, Foucauldian governmentality studies, and critical criminological perspectives, particularly postcolonial perspectives, to provide a conceptual framework for analyzing and explaining the global private policing phenomenon in Africa. Organizationally, the thesis consists of nine substantive chapters. Chapter 2 presents the literature review, as well as the theoretical framework for the current study. Chapter 3 discusses the research methods; chapter 4 explores the more general development of global private policing in Africa; chapter 5 interrogates the social organization of Africa, and sets the stage for the current study; chapters 6 and 7 investigate the cases of South Africa and Nigeria respectively; Chapter 8 presents a comparative analysis, while chapter 9 presents the conclusion.

Chapter 2

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This chapter explores the literature on the development of private policing to situate the current study in the appropriate theoretical, methodological, and empirical, contexts. It analyzes relevant concepts, such as security, governance, and policing, and explores the relations between public and private police forces, especially regarding a legitimate use of coercive powers. It also attempts to tease out the points of divergence and convergence between private policing and private security industry. It then examines the rise of private policing on the global level, and the impact of global neoliberal governance on poverty and criminalization. Finally, it discusses the theoretical foundations that undergird and guide the current study.

2.1 Security

The term “security” on one hand suggests a safe, just, and inclusive, climate (Wood & Shearing, 2007); on the other hand, it raises the spectre of repressive state control that involves persecution of minorities and removal of due processes and mechanisms for the protection of people and property (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011). Fundamentally, security is an “umbrella” term under which there are multiple dimensions (Valverde, 2011; Jones, 2011). It can be deployed to describe a subjective feeling of safety, or as an objective state of being protected from the possibility of danger, as well as the means of pursuing either of these streams (Zedner, 2003). The safety aspect of security involves a protection from physical threats, and safeguards for emotional, psychological, and financial wellbeing. This in turn suggests that security is much broader in scope, and, therefore involves a wide range of governing processes (Valverde, 2011) to make it a reality.

Zedner (2009, p. 26-48) highlights dimensions of security from historical to contemporary contexts. A “classical” conception of security was dominant in the 17th

century, where the protection from internal and external threat premised on social contract theory constituted the fundamental duty of the state. Hence, liberal theorists had a narrow conception of the role of the state, reducing it to negative liberty—the protection of life and property as a baseline foundation to facilitate free market development. In the 20th century, “positive liberty” emerged that saw security as a key part of liberty and was conceptualized as “social security”—reflecting a much broader scope and collective sense of social insurance against any probability of poverty, poor education, bad housing, and unemployment (Timmins, 2001). However, the second half of the 20th century saw greater emphasis on “national security” to counter possible threats from external military forces, or internal espionage, targeting sovereign nation states during the Cold War (Williams, 2008; Barrass, 2009). The 1990s saw the rise of “human security” focusing primarily on the security of people rather than the security of nation states (United Nations Development Program, 1994).

Despite these divergent conceptions of primary security concerns, there is a shared commitment to security provision that involves “intentional actions whose purpose is to provide guarantees of safety to subjects, both in the present and in the future” (Johnson & Shearing, 2003, p. 15). The various conceptualizations of security, driven by risk theories (Beck, 1992), have in common “future orientations” that aim at predicting and preventing future harm. This risk-based thinking informs private policing phenomena as it is oriented towards preventing predictable risks, such as loss prevention. Further, the different conceptions of security, such as national security, human security, and social security essentially reflect a broader social context of security, and have implications for security policies. The notion of human security suggests that security measures should take into consideration the social, physical, economic, political, emotional and psychological wellbeing of people. For instance, political instability affects political wellbeing of people, and invariably their sense of security guarantees. In this light, the political wellbeing might

refer to the degree to which people are comfortable and happy with a political climate based on their own assessment of the extent to which they consider their political environment as generally healthy, stable, and friendly.

The actions and inactions of imperialist powers have affected the mode of social organization in Africa—through colonialism and its continued effects, and contemporary global neoliberal reforms—and, for that matter, crime control models. The pre-colonial African sense of security was one of collective social insurance. Security in terms of collective social insurance invokes a feeling of inclusiveness, a sense of community, and collective welfare and interest, which predominantly characterized different parts of pre-colonial Africa and bound African peoples together as one people with one destiny (Gyekye, 1997, 2010). Accordingly, they mostly lived in peace in the absence of the coercive apparatus (such as police) of the nation state (Cohen, 1988). The rising private policing phenomena linked to global neoliberal political-economic governance that places greater emphasis on competition and private gain have until recently been alien to Africa. Private policing is therefore a reflection of many changes in the social organization of African societies following the advent of colonialism to date. The current study considers security issues in Africa with reference to rising private policing phenomena in the broader context of the undercurrents of historical and contemporary forms of Western imperialism, and their impact on human security, as well as the implications these have for security governance.

2.2 Governance

Governance is defined as “the activity (or activities) of ‘governing’—self-conscious attempts to promote various collective outcomes”. Lately, it also refers to “a supposed shift in mentalities and practices of governing and a transformed role of the state within this” (Jones, 2012, p. 745-746). Thus, governance, traditionally conceived, simply refers to the manner of leading, or ruling a state, and so governing power or authority is often linked to state power.

In this view, governance of security is invariably associated with the state authority, and, therefore the state's sole prerogative of providing and regulating security (Christie, 2000). However, recent sociological and criminological work focusing on governance collectively challenges such "state-centred conceptions of the way that governing power is exercised" in contemporary nation states (Jones, 2012, p. 746). For instance, governmentality researchers, following on the insights of Foucault, suggest that the power to govern is no longer confined only to the state and its institutions, but rather dispersed throughout society, involving the participation of individuals (as in self-regulation), and non-state actors in governing processes (Foucault, 1991). The growing prominence of this mode of governance in recent decades has been attributed to the global neoliberal economic and political reforms that have focused on and encourage market consumerism and forms of individual and corporate self-regulation (Aas, 2013). Additionally, the notion of the modern "network society" proposed by Castell (1996) is another strand of governance theory that has been applied to thinking about security. This theoretical strand suggests that governance in contemporary complex societies has been facilitated by the huge breakthrough in information and digital technology that enables the use of the web of communication flows for governing processes.

Non-state theories of governance, such as Foucault's governmentality framework and Castell's network society, collectively suggest a more limited role for the state, while placing greater emphasis on the involvement of non-state actors in the governing processes. Whilst we recognize these developments, we cannot downplay the continued primacy of the state and its institutions in shaping policy-making. When compared with other actors, the state arguably holds a more privileged and influential position derived from its greater financial, legal, and symbolic resources (Bourdieu, 2005; Jones, 2012). However, this idea of governance pluralism is not fundamentally new. For example, within political science, there has been a history of pluralist conceptions of governance, wherein different policy actors

representing different interests of society collaborate in developing and implementing policies (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). These views suggest that the study of governance under the conditions of neoliberalism should focus on attempting to conceptualize and understand how particular approaches to governance, including the governance of security, emerge and work. They also suggest that research on new developments in the governance of security needs to take into account the “fragmentation of policy processes” regarding the “number of actors and networks involved in policy-making, and the complexity of interrelationships between them” (Jones, 2012, p. 747).

Recent research provides evidence that insights derived from Foucault’s governmentality framework are useful in helping to explain changes in the nature of contemporary security governance, which increasingly involves voluntary participation, paid private actors, and public-private partnership (Jones, 2012, p. 748-751). The voluntary dimension refers to the involvement of the non-commercial sector and other voluntary organizations in order framing and maintenance (Lea & Stenson, 2007), largely shaped by “responsibilization” discourse and strategies (Garland, 1996, 2001). Pluralism in the governance of security mostly reflects this neoliberal thinking about security that calls for an active involvement of non-state actors, as evidenced by private policing phenomena. The return to state dominance in security governance is quite probably not feasible (Wood & Shearing, 2007). However, it can also be argued that private policing should not be allowed to supplant public policing, so as to avoid a potential situation where the masses will be denied security, because they cannot afford security as a commodity.

2.3 Policing

Police refer to “the institution—the force or the service”, or “the modern specialized body of people who carry out much of the policing function in today’s society” (Pakes, 2010, p. 42). By contrast, policing suggests any attempt aimed at maintenance of security through

surveillance and the threat of sanction (Reiner, 2000). Policing therefore refers to the “organized forms of order-maintenance, peace-keeping, rule or law enforcement, crime investigation and information-brokering” (Jones & Newburn, 1998, p. 18-19). It involves all formalized mechanisms of ensuring law and order. Policing had its roots in “collective and communal processes of social control, but the emergence of social inequality, hierarchical and more centralized, dominant state systems” gave rise to “specialized police forces” (Robinson & Scaglione, 1987; Newburn & Reiner, 2012, p. 808). In this regard, it has been argued that, historically, state-dominated police functioned as agents of class control rather than ensuring impartial protection (Robinson & Scaglione, 1987, as cited in Newburn & Reiner, 2012, p. 808). According to this neo-Marxist view, police in Western countries have traditionally acted as an instrument of the state for maintaining social order, and as an instrument of the capitalist class for protecting its interests.

Policing may constitute both a security “promise and a threat”—for example, police forces in authoritarian states may be primarily concerned about ensuring that “a tyrannical regime stays in power” (Pakes, 2010, p. 42). This may lead to a particular style of organizing police and policing that often reflects a military or paramilitary character, intended for cracking down on any attempt deemed to be a threat to the regime. This may undermine the protection of the citizenry as a primary goal of policing. Transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy and new democracies may face the challenge of transforming a police force that hitherto operated against the citizenry into one intended to serve them. Ebbe (2000) argues that in some countries, such as Nigeria, Argentina, and Brazil, the police continue to be viewed as instruments of oppression, and, as a result, they are alienated from the communities in which they operate. This alienation has the possibility of stifling information flow from the communities to the police that is potentially vital for tackling crime problems.

For this reason, Pakes (2010, p. 42) argues that policing can very often range from “social work to torture and murder”, depending on a jurisdiction.

In recent years, there has been a controversy surrounding the definition of private policing. This has been due in part to the employment of the concept in divergent contexts, as in bodyguards, the patrolling of property, and the investigation of fraud, and maintenance of order, as well as the existence of different organizational forms (Joh, 2004, 2005). However, there is a point of convergence in terms of pursuing their clients’ objectives. In fact, its “client-driven mandate” is the key defining characteristic of private policing (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Johnson & Shearing, 2003; Joh, 2004). Clients’ needs inform the character of private policing, and the behavior of private police organizations. To achieve these substantive goals, private security organizations, for example, employ four methods (Shearing & Stenning, 1981, 1983). First, private policing (security) focuses on loss prevention (protecting property and asset) rather than crime—hence, it is “disengaged from the moral underpinnings of the criminal law” (Joh, 2004, p. 62). Second, private policing concentrates on preventive measures rather than detection and arrest to control crime and disorder. For instance, private security is not particularly concerned about punishing individual wrongdoers, but rather disrupting such routine activities, and, for this reason, it heavily involves surveillance activities. Third, as private policing is heavily geared towards loss prevention, it involves a private justice system, treating matters private by banning, firing, and fining, rather than prosecution. Finally, there is a close connection between the rise of private police and the emergence of mass private property, which refers to the large spaces, such as malls that are privately owned but used for public purposes. While public police have conventionally taken responsibility for policing public spaces, the private police have taken presumptive charge of private property (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Johnson & Shearing, 2003).

In sum, private policing refers to all of the legally organized forms of for-profit personnel service focusing primarily on controlling crime, protecting property and life, and maintaining order (Jones & Newburn, 1998). In terms of the core function of public policing as including the organized range of activities and processes for ensuring law and order, private policing is not significantly different from public policing given this definition. The major difference lies in the profit orientations and the private ownership which set private policing apart from public policing.

2.4 The Legitimate Use of Coercive Powers in Public and Private Policing

Public police forces are considered an integral part of the “bureaucracy created by the political and legislative processes” and are expected “to maintain public order”, or to keep the peace (Skolnick, 2001, as cited in Joh, 2004, p. 57). They are also in theory accountable to the political and legislative structures that create them. Public police operate within well-defined rules that exist to regulate their conduct. They are charged primarily with enforcing criminal law, detecting and preventing crime (Joh, 2004). The order that police officers reproduce is the result of many factors, such as police officer orientations, the expectations of the general public, and the “situational exigencies” of the individual encounter between the police and the citizen. The behaviour of police patrol officers is as importantly informed by their “working personality”—the blend of danger, authority and accountability to their superiors—as it is by their formal role to the enforcement of the law and maintenance of the social order (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Skolnick, 2001, as cited in Joh, 2004, p. 59).

In general, private police do not have the same legal powers as public police officers; instead, they basically possess the same formal powers as that of citizens (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Jones & Newburn, 1998; Wood & Shearing, 2007). In practice, however, some private police possess more legal powers than the ordinary citizen by virtue of their occupational functions. Deputization fundamentally bestows upon private police many of the

same powers allotted to the public police, as exemplified by campus private police possessing “peace officer” powers (O’ Toole, 1978, as cited in Joh, 2004, p. 64). Many private police officers have become “law enforcement officers—detaining individuals, conducting searches, investigating crimes and maintaining order” (Joh, 2004, p.51). The majority of these private police officers (agencies) perform most of the functions that their counterparts in public police force are mandated to do. Hence, the “common legal characterization” of private security officers as “night watchmen” is outdated and inadequate (Joh, 2004, p.51). Arguably, private police may have some legal basis for exercising coercive power as public police, depending on a particular jurisdiction.

While public police forces are established by and accountable to the state, private police are owned by and accountable to shareholders. As such, there are legitimate concerns about potential excesses of private police organizations. Arguably, this may be especially the case in African countries that have weak regulatory institutions. Even though private police forces might not possess similar powers and functions as conferred on their public counterparts, this might not be the case in practice. It is in this light that a critical examination of the on-going rise in private policing is warranted to discover whose interest this development serves.

2.5 Private Policing and Private Security Industry

Private security industry refers to private companies that provide materials needed for private policing work; but some of these companies also provide security personnel (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Simlane, 2008). On the contrary, private policing is conceived of as an activity and a collection of products on the market. Thus, sociologist Nigel South proposes the use of “private security sector” to incorporate both private policing and private security industry (as cited in Joh, 2004). Others have also combined private security industry, private police and public police under the umbrella term “policing” (Bayley & Shearing, 1996).

Joh (2004, p. 67) argues that “both private policing and private security industry represent separate but overlapping categories.” Accordingly, the private security industry pertains to “for-profit security products and services, which include three broad categories: provision of guards, equipment, and investigating or consulting services”. However, private policing relates to “acquisition and use of these products and services, as well as application of specialized knowledge in areas like crime control, investigation and risk management” (Joh, 2004, p. 67). On this account, private policing refers to “the set of activities whose needs are partially supplied by the security industry” (Joh, 2004, p. 67). This definition implicitly indicates that private policing is wider in scope than the private security industry. In this study, private security sector and private policing are used interchangeably to encompass all manner of involvement of paid non-state actors in governance and provision of security in Africa.

2.6 The Rise of Private Policing—A Conceptual Overview

Risk, insecurity, fear, and exclusion, constitute distinguishing features of late modern societies (Beck, 1992). Beck argues that late modern societies are risk societies, hence constant discourse on how best to manage and prevent security risks. While the 1950s and 1960s were marked with relative stability of class societies in terms of massive employment, secure family life and traditional gender roles, uncertainty and insecurity characterizes the latter stage of modernity. Individualized social inequality and the heightened attention to fear and safety rather than matters concerning class and social justice are pervasive in risk societies. The ideal of equality is supplanted by safety concerns in risk society, hence its propensity to be defensive (Beck, 1992). The globalizing world has been deeply connected with a heightened sense of insecurity through proliferation of images of dangers, such as acts of terrorism and murder cases, which are transformed into national, local, and personal, possibilities (Pratt, 2002). In the world risk society, many different forms of threat, including

terrorism, ecological disasters, economic downturn and financial crises, transcend national borders. Unsurprisingly, fear and security concerns have been at the heart of much criminological research in the last two decades (Aas, 2013). In effect, fear and insecurity constitute by-products of late modernity, marked by liquidity of social bonds occasioned by the end of certainty and stability (Sparks & Hope, 2000).

This security fetishism is theorized as a shift towards postmodernism that marks the end of consistent and established narratives about crime and punishment. This postmodern perspective rejects the conventional criminological causes and consequences of crime, while highlighting segregation (or fragmentation) of societies, and fear, anxiety and unpredictable danger engulfing societies and magnified by the global media, and the apparent inability of governments to address such concerns (Jewkes, 2004). In supporting this view, Noeclueous (2008) contends that we live in an era of security fetishism, which partly creates and shapes the market for private policing; since it is perceived that public policing cannot cope with the rising demand for policing services, or that people have generally lost faith and trust in public policing itself (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2009). Further, the insurance industry often demands the contracting of security services as a precondition for issuing insurance cover (Ericson & Doyle, 2004). Compared with public policing, the private sector provides more flexible security arrangements for dealing with specific security needs (Wood & Shearing, 2007). These increasing demands have partly spurred the rise in private policing.

Fear, insecurity, social divisions, and deepening inequality, alongside changing dynamics of social exclusion, are linked to contemporary global neo-liberal transformations. The neoliberal economic model is characterized by massive “productive dynamism” and the exclusion of vast social districts, regions, and countries (Aas, 2013). Borja and Castells (1997, p. 9) buttress this finding arguing that the hallmark of “the new global economic order is its extraordinary—and simultaneously—inclusive and exclusive nature.” The network

society has resulted in the production of two enclaves, where one is connected globally and characterized by the creation of value and intensive culture of consumption, while the other is marked by a shift from a past state of exploitation to a new order of “structural irrelevance” (Borja & Castells, 1997, p. 9.), resulting in winners and losers respectively (Aas, 2013). This development culminates in the “consolidation of black holes of human misery” in the global economic order (Castells, 1996, p.2). This negative image of globalization is consistent with Bauman’s (2004) view of globalization, as essentially a process of creating a body of structurally irrelevant people that stems from the global expansion of modernity. He argues that the populations who were hitherto experiencing circumstances of exploitation, for example, blue-collar workers in the global North have now in different forms become “irrelevant” in the new economic order, resulting from the transfer of industries to developing countries with relatively cheap labor. Wacquant (2001) buttresses this view arguing that the black American ghetto has turned into a dumping ground rather than a reserve of disposable or expendable industrial labor.

For most of the world’s populations, these global transformations have produced a gulf of poverty and social and political disruptions. About a third of the world’s populations “live on incomes less than one dollar a day,” while the richest 10 per cent of adults constitute 85 per cent of the “world total of global assets” (Aas, 2013, p. 15). Social polarizations are observable at the national and international fronts between well-paid knowledge workers and poorly paid industrial workers and service providers (Perrons, 2004). In the global South, a wave of industrialization has resulted in rural-urban drift, culminating in large populations of urban poor (Aas, 2013). Indeed, the intense economic deprivation and disparities in wealth and power have a persistent history of being linked to crime, particularly by Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars. The circumstances of most peasant populations confined to the growing slums of current metropolises appear to be consistent with Marx’s perspective on the

criminality of the working class (Davis, 2006), although caution should be taken from simple generalizations from poverty and economic deprivations to crime (Aas, 2013). According to Currie (1998), there is a difference between “the market economy and market society.” Market society is one “in which the pursuit of private gain increasingly becomes the originating principle for all areas of social life”, while “all other principles of social or institutional organization become eroded or subordinated to the overarching one of private gain” (Currie, 1998, p. 134). Currie further contends that the expansion of “market societies” spurs crime through various pathways among others, by deepening social inequality and economic deprivation, by weakening the capacities of local communities, by taking away public services from those most in need, and finally, by promoting the culture of “Darwinian competition”. Desire for personal gain forms the basis for social life to the detriment of all other social principles. This indicates that the effects of globalization have criminogenic implications.

However, while the globalizing process produces structural exclusions on one hand, it also creates powerful means of social and cultural inclusion (Aas, 2013). Hence, Young (1999, 2003) describes the “late modern societies as bulimic”, implying that “they are inclusive by culturally” absorbing a large chunk of populations, while they are simultaneously exclusive by rejecting and structurally excluding these same populations. Increasingly, disadvantaged populations are learning more about their marginalization and relative deprivations through constant display of wealth around them, and through television and other media. Globalization therefore constitutes both material and cultural forces, creating a combusive mix of inclusion and exclusion (Aas, 2013).

Neoliberal globalization is also linked to the weakening of the state’s capacity to protect people within its territories. The existence of security gaps, especially in weak states, where the state neglects or is unable to provide for security needs of its citizens, has led to

extreme violence and insecurity as a result of organized crime groups and ethnic militias capitalizing on this apparent security vacuum. In the context of Latin America and Africa, average homicide rates are more than twice as high as in the rest of the world (Aas, 2013). Against this backdrop, there are two choices—encouraging the private security sector, or allowing illegal private authority to fill the gaps in state sovereignty. In this context, it has been argued that the former is preferable to the latter (Aas, 2013).

Furthermore, under the influence of neoliberal policies, there has been a shift from the state monopoly to the minimal state interventions premised on regulatory interventions, privatization of state enterprises, commercialization of public goods, and unfettered market competition (Bourdieu, 2005). One of these transformations of state responsibilities is in the area of social control. From a Foucauldian governmentality perspective, rather than the state and state institutions being directly involved in the regulation of social behavior, societies are increasingly being governed “at a distance” by indirectly drawing upon a web of regulatory techniques, and intervening upon persons and organizations far removed in space and time (Rose, 1999). Contrary to the old Keynesian state, this new regulatory state (Braithwaite, 2000) no longer manages directly the activities of social control nor is it the only actor involved in regulating social life.

While the state is offloading its welfare responsibilities, it re-asserts its power and influence in the area of crime control. The private sector, for example, manages a small segment of the prison populations. It is therefore the state that dominates in formulating penal policies and managing prison populations. In the area of private policing, most of the private security industries are modelled on public police forces, and obtain operational support from them (Aas, 2013). Further, outside of the Anglo-American context, the penetration of prison management firms is significantly limited.

Additionally, the effect of globalization on the state differs across the globe. In the Scandinavian welfare states, there are relatively strong states compared to weaker states in the developing world plagued by ethnic conflict, corruption and organized crime, hence blanket generalizations that the state has lost its grip on exercising sovereignty distorts these differences (Aas, 2013). Even with the acknowledgement of the increasing participation of the private sector in crime control, the primacy of the state is not in dispute (Jones & Newburn, 1998, 2006; Jones, 2011). Economically, the state constructs the image of private security as public good, which private security providers may capitalize on to promote their services (White, 2012). The state is also the bestower of the biggest security contracts to the private security sector. Politically, White contends that the state holds monopoly over regulations, and establishes the norms that help private security sector providers to legitimize their services through incorporating and operating in line with those established norms. According to White (2012), the degree of interaction of both political and economic forces in different countries accounts for the extent and nature of expansion of the private security sector. For this reason, while private security officers massively outweigh police officers in Canada, South Africa and the United States, this is not the case in many European countries (Brodeur, 2010, as cited in White, 2012, p. 98).

Further, the economic context of private sector security expansion affirms the empirical claim of the growth of “mass property” as partly sparking the demand for private policing to ensure primarily loss prevention, as noted by Johnson and Shearing (2003). To understand the growth patterns and dynamics of the private security sector, political and economic contexts need to be understood first along with the rationalities that emerged from such contexts responsible for shaping the patterns and trends of the private security sector and the extent of its expansion. Private security markets reflect the patterns of the political and the economic contexts (internally and internationally). The economic and the political contexts

are mutually constitutive of each other, and, therefore the two must not be investigated in isolation (White, 2012).

2.7 The Impact of Neoliberal Governance on Poverty and Criminalization

Mass poverty and social inequality, heightened economic insecurity, and the increased level of individualism at the expense of social solidarity, have characterized constant global economic restructuring (Massey, et al., 1998; Bourdieu, 2005; Shaviro, 2010). Shaviro (2010, p. 8) argues that “an expansive and predatory capitalism is the only system that has found a way to perpetuate itself by means of its own inequities and crisis.” He contends that nothing has ever “been able to constrain human freedom as comprehensively—or as invisibly—as the neo-liberal market has done” (Shaviro, 2010, p. 10). Neoliberal political-economic ideology forms the basis for rationalizing abject poverty—through the appearance of equal opportunity for all within the unfettered market competition to sustain itself without any strong resistance from the masses (Shaviro, 2010; Herring, 2013). The neo-liberal state is often run as a profit-oriented venture with little concern for the welfare and wellbeing of the citizenry (Bourdieu, 2005; Shaviro, 2010). In effect, neoliberalism produces many losers despite its claim that it genuinely makes every individual freer to act entrepreneurially and profitably (Chow, 2003; Herring, 2013). This ideology fosters an accumulation of wealth by the few through the exploitation of many—individuals, countries and regions (Chow, 2003; Harvey, 2003; Obi, 2010).

Capitalist accumulation by “dispossession” is facilitated by the increasing interconnectivity of the world, particularly through worldwide economic integration. Dispossession stems “from the ways in which capitalism takes away the rights people have over their natural resources” (Logos, n.d., as cited in Obi, 2010, p.221). Harvey (2007, p. 34, as cited in Obi, 2010, p. 221) endorses this position, arguing that accumulation by dispossession constitutes “the ways assets, wealth and income are transferred from the mass

of the population toward the upper classes, or from vulnerable to richer countries”. This accumulation by dispossession is complex and “involves layers and meshes, which bring together various forces and actors at different scales and levels”—such as the states and multinational corporations (Obi, 2010, p. 221). Land grabbing by the large corporations also displaces rural small-scale producers (Akram-lodhi, 2012; Mcmichael, 2012). This leads to an increased poverty—as the affected people are rendered jobless. World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies—for instance, the Structural Adjustment Program—based on neoliberal assumptions have worsened the conditions of poor people, and crippled economic growth (Massey, et al., 1998; Chow, 2003).

Through neoliberal globalization phenomena, trade liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, free trade agreements, and the opening of national borders, multinational corporations have gained momentum in the context of the global South in recent years (Kempa & Singh, 2008; Samara, 2009; Aas, 2013). In affected countries, multinational corporations seem to have displaced small-scale local businesses, and have effectively shattered their means of livelihood (Basok, 2002; Chow, 2003). On this account, for most of the world’s populations, neoliberal global transformations have produced a massive poverty, and social and political chaos (Aas, 2013). The feeling of economic insecurity by a growing army of unemployed and underemployed hands raise a spectre of security threats, as exemplified by the case of Niger Delta in Nigeria (Oriola, 2013).

Against this backdrop, there seems to be a creation of two enclaves—“haves” and “have-nots”—where these parties are conscious of acquiring and maintaining private property. The “haves” are constantly suspicious of the “haves-not,” and, for this reason, they take every step necessary to protect their gains; one of these steps is the resort to private policing to patrol their private property, as exemplified by growing gated communities (Johnson & Shearing, 2003; Kempa & Singh, 2008). Neoliberal consumerism has led to a

situation where a low-consumption capacity has become virtually synonymous with the likelihood of being a crime suspect, and where the identity of people with low-consumption capacity is observable as colour, or race, and manner of dress, or appearance—a culture of “othering” (Kempa & Singh, 2008). Private policing is a form of disciplinary control, which is intended to restrict movement, get rid of particular troublesome behaviors, and ultimately, to destroy or expel “destructive individuals and forces not amenable to remediation” (Jessop, 2007).

Neo-liberal political economic order assumes that political order can be maintained through the enforcement of centrally made rules and maintenance of disciplinary control, while economic and social peace is left at the mercy of market forces. The conceptual separation of political peace from social and economic peace makes the market forces apparently look natural and open to everybody, and this tends to shield the structural inequalities. Consequently, those who are not able to meet the standards of the market are considered morally suspect and excludable (Kempa & Singh, 2008). As a result, neo-liberal governance is credited with the policing of space and the rise of the non-state agents of policing to exclude the “other” (Sklansky, 2006). Considered in this context, the rise of private policing in Africa may be linked to the paradigmatic shift from collective human (social) security to an individualistic sense of security via greater emphasis on private gain through profit maximization. Arguably, a traditional African sense of community has given way to individualism, where individual interests seem to have eclipsed collective interest and social solidarity.

The current study seeks to build on this knowledge about the political and economic context of the rise of private policing phenomena to examine the emergence and present state of the private security sector in selected African countries. As a starting point, it argues that these developments can be better understood within a much broader framework that examines

historical and contemporary forms of Western imperialism that have resulted in widespread economic, political, social, and cultural, dislocations in affected countries (Agozino, 2003; Cunneen, 2011; Shearing & Marks, 2011).

2.8 Theoretical Foundations

Governmentality fundamentally implies that the exercise of governing authority is no longer the sole monopoly of the state and its institutions, but rather dispersed throughout society among a web of individuals, voluntary and private organizations, broadly constituting non-state actors (Foucault, 2004). It suggests a subtle and virtually invisible form of state governance “at a distance” that involves self-regulation along the lines of freedom to make choices, which invariably are aligned with the overall governing objectives of the sovereign nation state (Braithwaite, 2000). Basically, governing authority is exercised by both the state institutions, and, increasingly, by individuals and non-state institutions. Governmentality is attributed to global neoliberal reforms, and characterized by an increasing campaign of individualization, and responsabilization, of social life (Garland, 1996, 2001; Bourdieu, 2005; Shaviro, 2010).

While a governmentality framework is useful for describing and understanding the rise of private policing phenomena, it lacks a critical lens for disentangling and deconstructing the structural and the imperialist context of the rise of global private policing in Africa. In doing so, it also limits the ability to take a critical stance that can enable one “to imagine new realities, which take account of historical and present injustices” to envisage possibilities for new and safer future (Shearing & Marks, 2011, p. 128). On this account, insights from critical criminological and sociological theories—and postcolonial perspectives in particular—will be used in the current study to provide the foundation for an added more critical theoretical framework.

The postcolonial perspective developed in recent years by critical criminologists starts “from a critical and reflexive framework that questions the centrality of Western understanding of crime and control” (Cunneen, 2011, p. 253). It particularly recognizes the significance of history, especially “through understanding the long-term impact of colonization and imperialism,” and it does this through “an analysis of the structures of sentiment and ideology that determine the intersection of race, crime and punishment” (Cunneen, 2011, p. 252). This perspective also recognizes “the role of imperial powers in structuring international economic and political relations” (Cunneen, 2011, p.257). In addition, a postcolonial perspective “broadens our understanding of state crime” and brings to light the fact that the modern nation state was “built on the human rights abuses of the colonized and enslaved peoples” (Cunneen, 2011, p. 253).

Postcolonial writers consider two forms of colonialism—one in which lands were colonized for the purpose of settlement (for example, North America, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa), and the other where the aim of colonialism was economic exploitation (for example, in most parts of Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and south-east Asia). In the first classification, today’s surviving indigenous people continue to make demands for “political recognition of self-determination, reparations and compensations for historical injustices and effective responses to contemporary forms of discrimination” (Cunneen 2011, p. 250). This might explain the massive over representation of the indigenes in the criminal justice system that is present with institutional racism as an extension of colonialism and dispossessions in the settler colonies. In the latter category, colonialism involved substantial economic exploitation of labour and resources, and virtually irreversible fundamental changes to the social organization (Cohen, 1988; Cunneen, 2011; Agozino, 2003). Aas (2011, 2013) further substantiates this position, arguing that the economies of the colonized

countries were shaped to be appendages to imperialist economies in terms of supplying raw materials.

The construction of the “other”, referring to non-European peoples, was and is still intended to serve the economic interests of the West in particular. For this reason, anything connected with the “other”—culture and laws—is virtually considered as inferior and subservient to the “universal claims of Western civilization” (Cunneen, 2011, p. 261), even when there is a strong evidence to the contrary (Beirne, 1983; Cohen, 1988; Cain, 2000; Bowling, 2011). Cain (2000) therefore concludes that criminology’s twin failings are “Orientalism, which romantizes the other”, and “Occidentalism, which denies the possibility of a difference, or seeks to explain it away” (as cited in Bowling, 2011, p. 363). In substantiating this view, Nelken (2009, p. 291-292) highlights the risk of “ethnocentricity—assuming that what we do, our way of thinking about and responding to crime, is universally shared, or at least, that it would be right for everyone else”—and “relativism, the view that we will never really be able to grasp what others are doing and that we have no basis for evaluating whether what they do is right.” Having noted its inapplicability, particularly in non-Western cultural contexts in light of empirical observations, many scholars, including postcolonial writers, throw a challenge to the apparent universal applicability of Western criminological theory (Beirne, 1983; Cohen, 1988; Agozino, 2003; Nelken, 2009). In supporting this position, Bowling (2011) contends that although some Western crime models and criminal justices practices often end up producing harmful results, they are mostly unchallenged even when their failures and flipsides are quite obvious. This has led to a situation where some Western criminologists export crime control models discredited in the West to Third World countries (Cohen, 1988).

However, crime control models that may work well but are situated outside the Western institutional arrangements hardly get recognized. This points to perhaps a sheer

denial of a disturbing reality, as Cohen (2001, p. 1) argues that when people are “presented with information that is too disturbing, threatening or anomalous, to be fully absorbed or openly acknowledged” it is often “repressed, disavowed, pushed aside or reinterpreted” (as cited in Bowling, 2011, p.374). A postcolonial perspective questions the universalization of Western civilization, which is perceived as superior, while denigrating and virtually destroying all other forms of civilization to achieve the sole object of domination—or exploitation through culture of othering (Agozino, 2004; Shearing & Marks, 2011; Cunneen, 2011).

Currently, the impact of colonialism and contemporary forms of imperialism continues to be felt among the colonized people, as Cunneen (2011, p. 253) argues, “Colonization and postcolonial are not historical events but social, political, economic and cultural processes. The postcolonial exists as an aftermath of colonialism and it manifests itself in a range of areas from the cultures of the former imperial powers to the psyches of those that were colonized”. For example, the African sense of promoting collective interests has almost been replaced by the spirit of individualism based on private gain rather than communal gain. In reality, African traditional social control mechanisms, including crime control models have been virtually supplanted by the Western styles of criminal justice systems that emphasize police, courts, correctional services and prisons, and centralized planning (Cohen, 1988). Further, criminogenic factors are individualized, leading to get-tougher-on crime regimes that downplay the social context of crime within global neoliberal economic and political governance (Wacquant, 2003; Muncie, 2005; Shearing & Marks, 2011).

A postcolonial perspective suggests that the universalization of Western crime control models is problematic, because the foundation of crime is mostly context specific. Secondly, the projection of Western crime control models as “a record of progress” is misleading, or

contrary to existing evidence (Cohen, 1988, p.183). Cohen contends that because Western crime control models are not as effective as claimed, the wholesale exportation of Western crime control models to Third World countries, particularly Africa where traditional social control mechanisms are already working almost perfectly poses grave concerns. While criminologists in the West are adopting the African traditional mechanisms of social control—for example, alternative dispute resolution and devolution of crime control governance—surprisingly, some of them are exporting crime control models that are already failing or discredited in the West to the “Third World”. The exportation of “unsuitable crime-control models, particularly those that destroy perfectly workable traditional methods,” is not just “regrettable accidents,” as Cohen (1988, p.183) further contends, “All modes of colonization—whether from missionary zeal; military, economic, or political imperatives; or liberal idealism—consciously intended to destroy or manipulate previous systems”.

The Western legal tradition imposed on colonial states was a means of rationalizing social change and exploitation, as evidenced in the transition from communal to private land ownership whereby “laws of vagrancy are established” (Cohen, 1988, p. 187). Property rights were imposed whereby “patterns of traditional usage and allocation by community leaders are replaced by land ownership and title by law” (Cohen, 1988, p.187). Cohen contends that by “operationalizing property and relationships,” imperial powers “set up a framework of law on one hand, and crime on the other”. However, the criminal justice system supports and legitimates bourgeois and state elites’ domination at the expense of the masses, as Cohen (1988, p. 187) further states that:

The law and the state produce, legitimate and reinforce a structure of inequality. This economic function is coupled with the more general role of law in legitimating the state. And both functions are perpetuated when indigenous political elites replace the European ruling class but continue pursuing the same Western conception of legality imported to the colonies as part of the civilizing mission. Current regimes thus legitimate themselves by appeals not just to democracy, socialism, or nationalism but also to the rule of law.

This highlights the need for a radical departure from the patterns of Western criminological theory that present the criminal justice system as a fair and universal solution to controlling crime everywhere; that supports and legitimizes the state and capital to silence the voices of the marginalized via criminalization of resistance to poor unfriendly policies (Wacquant, 2003). Agozino (2003) concurs with this position, arguing that criminology is underdeveloped in Africa, because mainstream positivist criminology was never and is still not in Africa's interest. He argues that Western criminology was developed at the heart of colonialism to serve imperialist interests—to facilitate the exploitation of the colonized. In light of this, “criminological crisis” continues to confront the post colonized, both at home and in the Diaspora, leading to his proposal for a “counter-colonial” criminology employing comparative methodology for “anti-imperialist scholarship” (Agozino, 2003, p. 35). Contrary to promoting a civilizing mission that would benefit the colonized, colonialism was fundamental for the underdevelopment of Africa through loss of control over conditions of life (Rodney, 1972, as cited in Agozino, 2003). Dispossession, mass killings and forced removal of indigenous peoples cannot pass for the so-called civilizing mission.

The continued pursuit of Western imperialist interest impacts on security situations in countries of the global South, as Cohen (1988, p. 186) argues, “ Clearly, the thesis of high crime rates as an inevitable by-product of industrialization would be replaced by a thesis locating crime as an intrinsic product of the patterns of dependency, exploitation, marginalization and capitalist-intensive industrialization.” This analysis sheds light on the broader context of crime and the implications for crime control in postcolonial countries. A postcolonial perspective suggests that crime problems in these countries have historical roots in colonialism and continued forms of Western imperialism, such as global neoliberal transformations. Before contact with Europeans, “Africanness” was virtually synonymous with communal interest, collective welfare and wellbeing, where the security of each person

was invariably bound up with the security of fellow members of the community (Gyekye, 1997, 2010). This principle of collectivism was essentially one of the powerful mechanisms of African traditional social control (Cohen, 1988; Gyekye, 1997, 2010). In contrast, unfettered market competition grounded in private gain linked to greater autonomy, freedom and opportunity for everyone as espoused by the proponents of global neoliberal reforms was strictly alien in the African context.

Highlighting the underlying interests of the civilizing-mission claim and universalization of Western (imperialist) civilization, a postcolonial perspective also provides critical insights for law reform and criminal justice policy. Importantly, it counters the positions of law and criminology that locate marginalized people within a “false universalism in terms of their capacity to seek protection of law and their experience as law’s subjects,” as victims or offenders, when in fact, they are structurally incapacitated to seek protection under law (Cunneen, 2011, p. 264). In fact, Western law and legal jurisprudence were transplanted onto the colonized peoples as part of the processes to facilitate exploitation. More generally, the conceptions of crime and crime control models in modern Africa can be conceptualized and situated in the broader context of historical and contemporary forms of Western imperialism and domination, as Cunneen (2011, p. 258) contends:

Crime and crime control are embedded in the experiences of colonization. This has implications for how we might explain the over-representation within criminal justice systems of colonized, formerly colonized or enslaved peoples. Both definitions of crime and institutional definitions of criminality can no longer be seen as separate from, or independent of, the broader claims of Western discourses of dominance.

A postcolonial perspective casts doubt on Western criminal justice systems and definitions of crime and crime control models, which often mask injustices against marginalized people, and the excesses of the nation states. This involves individualizing criminogenic factors, such as unemployment, low education, and ethnicity and race. As a result, conventional criminological theory does not take into account the broader context of

historical and contemporary forms of colonialism and imperialism, which have played and continue to play a significant role in disadvantaging marginalized people, while criminalizing any form of resistance to these processes of “othering”—including discrimination and the erosion of opportunities through social, cultural, economic, and political, dislocations (Agozino, 2003, 2004; Oriola, 2006; Cunneen, 2011).

More specifically, in relation to the focus of the current study, a postcolonial perspective may also be useful in analyzing and explaining the rising private policing in Africa, because it suggests a critical consideration of the harm caused historically and that continues to be caused as a result of colonialism and the contemporary legacy of Western imperialism. Critically, it views mainstream positivist criminology as an instrument of imperialism for failing to foreground important issues for criminological research, such as human rights abuses, genocide, campaigns of dispossession, and state violence committed by imperialist powers (Agozino, 2003, 2004; Shearing & Marks, 2011). It also focuses attention to broader issues of “social and political power, to matters of legitimacy, [and] political authority and consent” that collectively shape our definition and understanding of crime and crime control models (Cunneen, 2011, p. 263-264). Additionally, a postcolonial perspective brings to the fore a critical issue of identity in criminology. Social exclusion based on inability to consume (Bauman, 1997) is one of the distinctive marks of social identity reconstruction in the neoliberal social order (Wacquant, 2003; Kempa & Singh, 2008).

Further, the use of a postcolonial perspective is helpful for imagining new possibilities for real social change. It urges African criminology to re-examine and wean itself from an imperialist criminology that predominantly focuses on the criminal justice system, centralized planning, police, courts, prisons, correctional services, and bigger budget allocations for fighting crime that do not reflect African peculiarities. In particular, it urges

African criminology to reconnect with the past, especially social control mechanisms, by drawing lessons that can be applied in the current context to promote collective wellbeing.

The postcolonial perspective also suggests that imperialism has not stopped, but the mode of imperialism has changed from being visible to being almost invisible. We no longer have physical presence of imperialist powers directly ruling the colonized as was largely the case during the era of colonialism, but rather a more subtle—although almost inescapable—and more powerful mode of imperialism, such as global neoliberal transformations, and what Cohen (1988) refers to as “technicist variants”. This is a situation where imperialist powers act as a hub of expertise for policy prescriptions that implicitly serve Western interests in the long term. The current study places the phenomenon of the growth of private policing in this broader context. Specifically, it proposes that the rise of global private policing in Africa can be conceptualized as an outgrowth or consequence of histories of colonialism, together with the associated on-going repercussions, and contemporary forms of Western imperialism, including imported forms of Western technical knowledge and expertise (or “technicist” variants), as noted by Cohen (1988), and global neoliberal transformations.

Whilst a postcolonial perspective is critical of Western forms of imperialism and positivist criminology, it also is implicitly critical of African peoples, particularly those at the helm of affairs for the wholesale importation of Western-originated policy prescriptions, which predominantly are not in the best interest of Africa in view of its unique context. As postcolonial criminologists like Agozino (2003) prescribe, Africans should take their own destiny into their hands and hold themselves responsible for what might go wrong. Those doing criminology in Africa need to break away from the practice of looking up to the West for crime control models, which seem not to reflect African peculiarities.

In this thesis the study of the rise of global private policing in African countries is examined within the broader context of the theoretical perspectives and historical factors discussed above. The specific research questions to be addressed in the current study include:

1. What shapes and facilitates the rise of private policing phenomena in Africa?
2. Whose interest does the apparent rise of private policing phenomena primarily appear to serve?
3. What are the possible implications of the rise of private policing phenomena in Africa for crime control and broader security policies?

In essence, the thesis will develop the argument that an individualistic sense of security, as opposed to collectivistic conception of security, which predominantly characterized African societies prior to contact with Europe, has its roots in historical and contemporary forms of Western imperialism. In view of this, the rise of global private policing in Africa cannot be analyzed independent of historical and contemporary forms of Western imperialism, such as universalization of Western crime control models, and ideologies based on capitalist expansion and neoliberal thinking. This includes the principle of individualism, responsiblization, profit maximization, unfettered market competition, privatization, and a get-tough-on crime stance. With regard to crime control policy, the thesis will also develop the argument that it is time to transcend the culture of get-tough-on crime regimes that individualize crimonogenic factors to consider the broader social context of human security, as a way of reconnecting with African values of solidarity, collective welfare and social security. It therefore also proposes a social movement toward creating more inclusive communities and societies, based on egalitarian principles that take the welfare of people seriously. This requires African leaders in particular to take real actions that promote the wellbeing of people as a whole to help reduce heightened social inequality and

discrimination, which nourishes a polarization of society due to the growing disenchantment with the existing social, economic, and political, order.

Chapter 3

Methodology

In general, well-designed social science research methodology lays out a step-by-step approach for defining research objectives and questions, data collection procedures, data quality procedures, and data analysis and analytical tools used in such a manner that the study can be replicated by any interested researcher (Merriam, 1995; Neuman, 2011). It thus ensures transparency and accountability in the research process to somewhat certify that the results are both acceptable and credible within the academic community.

Further, the particular research methodology employed is typically linked to the theoretical framework underpinning a research project. A postcolonial perspective suggests the need for a nuanced understanding of social reality in relation to reflections on broader questions related to crime, victimization, punishment, and justice, to arrive at culturally appropriate and acceptable interventions (Cunneen, 2011). It recognizes the need to understand the multiple realities of social life (Agozino 2004; Oriola, 2006; Cunneen, 2011; Shearing & Marks, 2011). For this reason, a qualitative approach is appropriate for the study of the rise of global private policing in Africa. The goal of qualitative research is to understand social phenomena in greater depth from the insider's perspectives, most often employing ethnography, participant observation, and exploratory interviews, as the major vehicles for data collection (Berg, 1989; Merriam, 1995). Qualitative approaches involve a commitment to seeing the social world through the lenses of the social actors, either openly or covertly, in order to collect data that reflects reality. Lanier and Briggs (2014, p. 109) add that the purpose of any qualitative study is to "ultimately be able to provide an in-depth and complete understanding of the subject". Qualitative approaches therefore generally aim at developing a thorough and holistic picture of social phenomena. Unlike quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches often provide deeper, more realistic and integrated

meanings behind crime statistics, and broader understanding and appreciation of crime problems and control models (Pakes, 2010; Shearing & Marks, 2011). The primary objective of the current study is to seek to understand developments surrounding the rise of global private policing in a holistic manner, taking into account how they have been shaped by historical, contemporary, contextual and global forces. A qualitative research design therefore makes it possible to focus on the broader context within which to situate the analysis of private policing. This facilitates an in-depth understanding of the complex interplay of factors impinging on private policing phenomena.

In addition, the current study will take the form of comparative criminological research that seeks to explore commonalities and differences in regard to private policing in Africa based on the selected countries, as discussed in the introduction. Comparative criminological research has a potential for “providing a remedy for theoretical short-sightedness” of mainstream criminology by making available empirical and secondary data to enable comparing and contrasting of experiences in one place with another (Bowling, 2012, p. 363). Critical analysis of similarities and differences is more likely to help facilitate the production of “richer” theories that have wider applicability and stronger validity (Larsen & Smandych, 2008; Nelken, 2009). However, transnational criminology moves beyond comparative analysis to explore criminal justice policies and crime problems, such as drug trafficking, which often do not exclusively belong to one place or another, and this has a potential for more effective crime control interventions by analyzing the linkages between (or amongst) crime problems. Global criminology aspires to integrate transnational and cross-cultural comparative criminology to build a globally inclusive and cosmopolitan discipline (Larsen & Smandych, 2008; Nelken, 2009; Aas, 2013). The current study largely falls under comparative criminology and criminal justice research, as it primarily focuses attention on two countries.

Comparative criminology and criminal justice research includes positivist orientations, which strive for universal explanations that traverse cultural and transnational differences, and relativist approaches, that attempt to develop contextually relevant criminological knowledge and theory (Pakes, 2010; Nelken, 2010; Reichel, 2013). Additional reasons for undertaking comparative criminal justice research include learning from the experiences of others, satisfying an “academic curiosity,” facilitating cooperation with other countries in dealing with transnational crime problems (such as drug trafficking), and answering the question of “Where do we stand?” in light of what others do elsewhere (Pakes, 2010, p. 2; Nelken, 2011; Reichel, 2013). Reichel (2013, p.12) suggests three analogous approaches to comparative criminal justice research to exploring this question—historical, political and descriptive. An historical approach fundamentally involves a critical examination of past or earlier experiences, practices and policies to conceivably draw lessons for present and future applications for the betterment of a nation’s justice system. A political approach entails analyzing and understanding how politics (be it local, national, or international) shapes criminal justice structures and practices. For example, the organization and style of policing, whether repressive or not, may depend on whether the political system is democratic or authoritarian (Pakes, 2010; Reichel, 2013).

Finally, a descriptive approach essentially deals with providing a coherent account that sheds light on the organization and structure of a criminal justice system or aspect of it, what it seeks to achieve, and the steps and processes it deploys to achieve those intended objectives (Ingraham, 1987; Reichel, 2013). Describing how something should operate provides the baseline foundations for “analysis and repair” through a critical evaluation as to whether the actual operation conforms to the model (Reichel, 2013, p. 14). Reichel therefore argues that descriptive approaches constitute the first core step in comparative study. In the current study, historical, political, and descriptive, approaches are employed for

complementary purposes in order to provide a more nuanced analysis and understanding of the private policing approach to crime control.

3.1 Data Type, Selection, and Interpretation Strategies

As a literature-based study, the current study draws on relevant secondary data, such as scholarly research, and primary data derived from government websites, and security companies' websites, to illuminate the discussion of the rise of private policing in Africa. The use of secondary data is particularly useful in exploring a wide range of information sources to discover possible patterns and differences that can help to answer the specific research questions posed in the study. The selection of the secondary data was based on its availability and relevance to the research objectives and questions. This is consistent with a convenience sampling technique, which falls under a non-probability sampling method of qualitative research design (Lanier & Briggs, 2014).

Data interpretation is “the actual process of making sense’ of the data and developing or using theory to explain the patterns, or findings the study generated” (Larnie & Briggs, 2014, p. 112). Fundamentally, a qualitative design epistemologically assumes an interpretive analysis rather than statistical reasoning as in quantitative design, which is based on positivist orientations. Interpretive analysis is useful in discovering deeper meanings, thereby facilitating deeper understanding of the social phenomenon (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006; Larnie & Briggs, 2014). The current study is based on a qualitative approach, and therefore, it assumes an interpretive analysis, which involves careful examination of the evidence from the secondary data and offering of logically possible meanings, assumptions, or implications, and how those relate to the research questions. Thematic analysis of the data generated from the relevant existing body of literature is therefore considered appropriate (Neuman, 2011; Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). The thematic analysis provided in subsequent chapters of this thesis is based on the research questions and the theoretical foundations of the current study.

The major limitation of qualitative data interpretation and analysis, and, for that matter, qualitative research design, is the tendency for the researcher to unduly bring to bear his or her biases, prejudices, expectations, beliefs, and preconceived notions, on the entire research process with a likelihood of compromising the results (Neuman, 2011; Larnie & Briggs, 2014, p. 112). This is because the researcher is a principal instrument of data collection and interpretation. To minimize this limitation, the literature search strategy followed in this study has been comprehensive, including both published and unpublished reports and literature, to ensure that a wide range of data sources were selected and interpreted in light of the research objectives and questions addressed in the study.

Chapter 4

Global Private Policing in Africa

This chapter investigates the growth of global private policing with a particular emphasis on South Africa and Nigeria. It commences with analysis of the growth of the global private security firms and their marketing strategies across Africa and in these countries.

4.1 The Growth of Global Private Security Firms

In the current study, the term “global” refers to an assumption of an international, or worldwide, character, and, therefore, the global private policing firms that are the subject of the current study encompass all security firms whose business operations move beyond the borders of their countries of origin. The major global security firms operating in South Africa include Group4Securicor (G4S), Switzerland-based Tyco’s ADT, Stockholm-based Securitas, Chubb, and Erinys International, while the most prominent global companies operating in Nigeria include G4S’s Outsourcing Services Limited (OSL), Gardaworld, and AmorGroup. This study also examines firms that may have originated in either South Africa or Nigeria and have now extended their operations to other African countries.

G4S is the largest security services provider in the world, operating in more than 120 countries across six continents; and the second largest sector employer in the world. In 2004, this British multinational security giant was established when London-based company, Securicor, merged with Danish business Group 4 Falck. Currently, G4S has more than 620,000 employees; and, therefore, it is the third biggest employer within the private sector worldwide, with a capital turnover above \$12 billion in 2012. The company offers a wide range of services, such as the supply of security personnel, response units, and secure prisoner transportation. It closely works with governments to deliver security (Top Powerful Security Companies, 2014).

In Africa, G4S operates in 26 countries; and constitutes the largest security company on the continent, and the largest private employer, serving more than 75,000 customers, and employing more than 120,000 staff. It has achieved specific 'Top Employer' certifications in Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia, and South Africa (G4S South Africa, 2014); and it also has a presence in Sierra Leone (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009). This suggests an extensive expansion of this security giant in Africa.

The history of G4S in South Africa dates back to 1957; since then, it has expanded across the country with approximately 15,000 employees serving many companies spanning the service and extractive sectors. For example, it now serves 38 mining companies, and has security responsibility over seven airports in South Africa. G4S has benefitted from public-private partnership arrangements in South Africa, as reflected in the signing of a 25-year contract to operate Mangaung Correctional Centre (MCC) in 2000. MCC houses 3,000 inmates considered violent and dangerous in South Africa. This public-private partnership (PPP) was the first of its kind in South Africa, and G4S was responsible for designing, constructing, and financing, of the MCC project, which is the largest private prison in South Africa, and the second in the world (G4S South Africa, 2014). MCC is a typical example of a public-private partnership, and G4S has managed this prison facility since its opening in 2000. It is clear that the company has grown dramatically in size and diversity in South Africa considering the contracts it has been winning, for example, the MCC in 2000, and the businesses it has been acquiring, such as Deposita, provider of retail cash solutions, in 2012. The case of G4S demonstrates an expansion of global security firms in South Africa.

In addition, the ADT security firm, which started in the USA in 1874 when the American District Telegraph Company (ADT) was established through the merging of small telegraph delivery companies, has now grown to become a global security firm, operating in

over 50 countries. ADT Security is a subsidiary of the Fortune 500 Company Tyco International that provides fire and security services to about 8 million residential and business customers, including commercial shipping and over 300 airports and transit hubs worldwide. In 2001, it penetrated the South African security market by way of “merging and welding together South Africa’s leading local security companies”; and has rapidly expanded to become the second largest global security that provides diverse commercial security services, such as domestic and community guarding with an armed response component, in the country (ADT, 2009, p. 1). Switzerland-based Tyco’s ADT security has 10,516 employees across South Africa (Cohen, 2014) and its presence further substantiates the growth of the global security firms in South Africa.

Stockholm-based Securitas is the third largest global security firm with 3,110 employees in South Africa. This security giant operates in 52 countries globally across North America, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Asia and Africa; its services cover commercial, industrial and residential sectors, as well as hospitality and educational institutions. In South Africa, Securitas is one of the largest providers of security services, serving about 10,000 customers, and paying annually over ZAR 200 million (a little over \$18 million USD) in wages. It signed its largest corporate contract in June 2010, and has been establishing and growing its security operations with an investment portfolio above ZAR 100 million (over \$9 million USD). The growth of Securitas in South Africa has been facilitated by the acquisition of a number of security-related businesses, including MKB Tactical and Piranha Security CC in 2009, Claw Protection Services in 2010, Orbis Security Services (Pty) Ltd in 2011 (Securitas, 2014), and Rentsec and Vamsa in 2013 (Yonga, 2013). Securitas operates in Egypt in addition to South Africa; and, therefore, the expansion of Securitas further exemplifies the growth of global private policing across Africa and in South Africa.

Chubb also has a strong presence in South Africa. The English brothers, lock makers Charles and Jeremiah Chubb, set up the company now known now as Chubb Fire and Security in 1818. Since 2003, the firm has been owned by U.S. multinational conglomerate United Technologies Corporation (UTC) Fire and Security, and its South African extras consist of electric fencing, armed response teams, a special Chubb911 alongside 24-hour emergency hotline. Chubb911 is an emergency panic button and tracking system that enables a client to instantly connect with the Chubb Monitoring Center, as well as family and friends, about an urgent need for help; as a result, Chubb will dispatch its armed response unit to the registered address (Chubb, n. d.). Ultimately, the presence of Chubb constitutes further testament of the growing presence of the global security firms in South Africa.

Further, the British security company, Erinys International, started operating in South Africa in 2002 when the company was set up. Erinys has its head office in Cyprus, and branches in the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The company works within the mineral extraction, oil and gas, public, and NGO markets, and has targeted Sub-Saharan Africa as its cardinal geographical market. Erinys has its specialty in risk management and mitigation, threat assessments, and the designing and implementation of security strategies at the corporate entity level (Erinys, n. d.; Top Powerful Security Companies, 2014). This security firm also corroborates the assertion that the presence of global security firms in South Africa is growing.

Aside from these global security giants originating primarily from Western countries, there is an emerging crop of security firms with origins in Africa that are also globalizing. Some of these companies are set up and managed by Black Africans, or by White citizens living in Africa; or owned by white foreigners and managed by Africans, or are jointly owned and managed by White foreigners and Africans, to meet the qualifying criteria for licensing. Thus, any security company that falls into any of these categories and operates in more than

one country in Africa is also considered a global security firm in this study; examples include Fidelity Security Services, TSU Protection Services, and Protea Coin Group, with their origins in South Africa.

Fidelity Security Services, situated in Johannesburg, is the country's largest security company, with 26,551 workers, followed by Pretoria-based Protea Coin Group, with 17,500 (Cohen, 2014). Fidelity was established in 1957 with the introduction of Cash Solutions services, followed by the guarding services in 1968; and the company was later merged with Khulani Springbok Patrols (Pty) Ltd in 1999. The Group has been evolving with buy-ins and buy-outs, and with acquisitions adding up to the portfolio of services (Fidelity Security Group, n. d.). Fidelity security now operates in Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia, pointing towards an increasing globalization and growth of this company in Africa. In addition to Fidelity Security Services, TSU Protection Services formed in 1999 to address a security gap in South Africa has now grown into an international company with a heavy presence in Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the DRC, Angola, Zambia, Nigeria, and Ghana. It has specialties in areas, such as maritime security, executive protection and support, and armed personal escorts (TSU Protection Services, 2014). This development substantiates the emergence of the security firms of African origin that are globalizing, and extending their services to most parts of Africa in particular.

Moreover, Pretoria-based Protea Coin Group, which is the second largest security firm in South Africa, is the product of merger agreement between Protea Security and Coin Security Group in July 2007. Protea Security was founded by Jorge Ferreira in 1982, while Coin Security Group was incorporated in July 1979 in Pretoria. The latter established a renowned company training centre called Gijima in 1980 to train security guards as professionals; and this centre was the first to have gained SDAF accreditation for the training

of National Key-Points guards in South Africa. In consequence, Coin Security Group secured government contracts nationally, and provided security guarding services to South African Railways; its later acquisition of Tollgate Transport Management Services from Tollgate Holdings also gave it a new boost or impetus. In 2003, the company acquired JAG, a security company situated in Durban, and the cash in transit operations of Secureco. In 2004, the Group began its international operations in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (Protea Coin Group, 2014). As noted elsewhere in this study, the security firms that have their origin in South Africa are mostly owned by Whites, and those predating 1994 constituted an integral part of the broader instruments of control against the indigenous peoples during the apartheid era; in this regard, South African-originated security firms [that have assumed an international character] are arguably part of the broader global security networks and imperialist control mechanisms.

In the Nigerian context, the global security firms operating in the country include G4S's Outsourcing Services Limited (OSL), Gardaworld, and AmorGroup. Group4Securicor's OSL is a major foreign multinational security company in Nigeria, operating nationally with nearly 3,000 personnel. OSL entered the Nigerian market through a contract with Nigerian Breweries that covered the whole of Nigeria. Later, it won many contracts with commercial entities, such as banks, climaxing this security market breakthrough with the signing of an extensive contract with ChevronTexaco in 2002, which represents one of the Group4Securicor's biggest contracts on the African continent (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2009). This illustrates further the growth of the global private security firms in the Nigerian context.

In 2013, GardaWorld, a Canadian global security firm, began its security business operations in Nigeria out of the growing demand for security, primarily in the oil and gas sector, as exemplified in the insurgencies that pose major security threats, including the

kidnapping of oil workers, confronting the Niger Delta region. This company that is headquartered in Montreal is a subsidiary of Garda Security Corporation; and employs approximately 45,000 staff across North America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. In Africa, it operates in Libya, Mali, and Somalia in addition to Nigeria (GardaWorld, 2014), substantiating the growing entrenchment of global security firms in Africa. Moreover, AmorGroup International is a British security firm that provides private security services linked mainly to the oil and gas sector in Nigeria and Sudan. This security firm, established in 1981, has 38 offices in 27 countries globally (ArmorGroup, n. d.). The presence of G4S, GardaWorld, and AmorGroup International, also evidences the gradual but steady emergence of the global security firms operating in Nigeria.

In relation to the Nigerian context, there is an emerging category of undercover spy private police officers employed by the multinational oil giants. These spy police officers are recruited, and made to undergo training, by the Nigerian Police Force in response to the request from the transnational oil giants; those who successfully complete the training programs are dispatched as unarmed security personnel, under the direct command of the multinational oil giants who pay them. Shell has 12,000 spy police officers to its credit, including an intelligence unit, Exxon Mobile dispatches between 700 and 1,000, while ChevronTexaco has nearly 250 (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, p. 13). These special undercover forces operate alongside the visible global private police officers responsible for the safeguarding of the key installations, premises, and personnel, of the transnational oil companies. In Niger Delta, there has been a development towards the pluralization of security which has taken the character of public-private policing partnerships that bring together public police forces and private security companies, alongside military and navy personnel (University of Warwick, n.d.). It is therefore not surprising to find public police dedicated to the training of undercover private police officers to work for the transnational oil giants.

Clearly, while this new emerging group of private spy police linked to the multinational oil giants of Western origin cannot be strictly classified as global security firms, they further demonstrate Western influences in the running and delivery of security in Nigeria in general terms.

Additionally, in other parts of Africa, global private policing has seen an expansion, as briefly touched on throughout this section. Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) observe that Securitas has expanded in Morocco, while G4S is operating in 29 African countries. They maintain that ADT and Chubb are other major players on the continent, particularly in South Africa's armed response market, whereas companies, such as Risk and Knoll, are located in countries where international capital has a footprint. African security companies are also gaining foothold in neighbouring countries, particularly Kenyan security companies are entering Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania, while South African security companies are seen virtually across the continent (University of Warwick, n. d.). Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) observe that there are approximately 2000 private security companies (inclusive of local ones), employing 375,315 personnel in Kenya. In effect, all those developments in security governance arrangements indicate a growing presence of global private policing in Africa.

In conclusion, it is evident that the presence of global security firms in Africa is growing, at least in the observed countries. Ultimately, the expansion of the global security firms by employee size, the scale of security-related business acquisitions, and the wide-ranging services, suggests a steady growth of global private policing across the African continent. It is also worth stating that data is not readily available to assess directly the impact of the events of September 11 on the rise of global private policing in Africa; nonetheless, the surge in the presence of global security firms in Africa since 2001 may partly be linked to the

increased efforts at enhancing the security of Western interests, including embassies and multinational corporations, following this unrivalled terrorist attack on US soil.

4.2 Marketing Strategies of the Security Firms

The global security firms often tend to highlight security risks, which they claim to be endemic and real, thereby creating a fear of insecurity, and a high sense of urgency regarding the need to take proactive measures (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007; Kempa & Singh, 2008). To this end, they project themselves as having an unequalled capacity for tackling, or minimizing, those imminent risks. To illustrate, Chubb (2014, para. 1) displays an armed robbery episode carried in *Camro Chronicle* captioned *Armed robbery in Glenvista: Ruthless—the woman pleaded with the suspect not to take her ring but they couldn't care less* at its website, presumably to reinforce the haunting reality of the daily security threats in South Africa, and the need to take preventive steps in addressing them. To counteract this imminent security threat, it then boasts of having put together a specialized service, such as armed response teams, electric fencing, and a special Chubb911 24-hour emergency hotline (Chubb, n .d.). Further, the security firms tend to employ images of fear and insecurity as part of the grand marketing strategy to highlight and reinforce the extent of security risks, such as armed robbery (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007). This underscores a sense of exigency in terms of securing the services of private security providers immediately.

In addition to the use of the images of fear and insecurity, the mission statement and marketing information of the security firms reflect a sense of urgency for corporations, governments, NGOs, and wealthy individuals, to take proactive security steps. Targeting partnership with the state in addressing security threats, G4S (n. d., p. 1) thus argues:

Governments are demanding ever-higher compliance standards; the economy demands operational efficiencies; threats from pirates, terror attacks and smuggling are also key challenges. G4S understands the industry and works with ports in many countries. We are able to use our experience, our expertise in logistics, technology, managing the world's biggest security personnel workforce and the knowledge

derived from providing security solutions in diverse regulatory environments around the world to really make a difference.

As a result of the creation of a sense of security threats from everywhere, G4S (n. d. b, p.1) packages its crime-prevention marketing information as follows:

At G4S we focus heavily on intelligence gathering and dissemination from and for various industries. Proper utilisation of the resources at our disposal form a very important part of our strategic crime prevention plan for our customers. In this way G4S will support you to maximise the efficiency of your security, minimise risks to your assets and justify the organisation spend in the following ways: Evaluate crime in your existing and potential site areas in conjunction with market benchmarks, selecting locations based upon this analysis, and track specific trends and implement strategies to mitigate risk...

G4S thus suggests that it has an unparalleled capacity to deal with all manner of security threats confronting governments and businesses in the contemporary unsecured world.

In the same vein, as part of the marketing strategy, Erinys (n. d., p. 1) has packaged its mission statement as follows: “To create and maintain a safe and secure environment to enable our clients to focus on their core activities in order to allow them to achieve their business objectives in remote and difficult places with the minimum acceptable risk to people, assets and reputation”. This claim to having the solutions to deal with the imminent security threats is also reflected in the marketing strategy of ADT Security Solutions, the second largest global security firm in South Africa. ADT Security Solutions (n. d., p. 1) claims, “Our services are indispensable, securing assets with fast Armed Response [Unit] and 24/7 monitoring, as well as a host of sophisticated products. We secure a multitude of South Africans with fully integrated security systems personalised to suit homes, small to large businesses and commercial outlets alike”. It further argues, “Live GPS satellite vehicle tracking in all vehicles provides for faster response times to an emergency contact” (ADT, n. d., p. 1). This virtually reflects the standard approach to marketing by introducing the problem at hand, highlighting its critical nature to induce the desired response, and offering unique solutions to address it.

Furthermore, marketing strategies of the private security sector primarily pit the rich against the poor, citing the potential threats of the latter as a result of their low-consumption capacity. This is typical of a global neoliberal regime that emphasizes “us-and-them” categorizations, and a subsequent get-tough-on crime stance that targets those perceived as not capable of meeting the expectations of the culture of consumerism and the marketized economy (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, 2010). Global neoliberal political-economic governance provides the right ambience within which private policing gets promoted, widely accepted among those who can afford, and legitimized by way of normalizing the commoditization of social and crime control. Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2010) thus argue that in addition to the weak state thesis, and inadequate public police personnel, the commoditization of security, and the existing global security market account for the rise in private policing in most parts of Africa.

In South Africa, research evidence shows that the private policing industry “actively promotes fear and insecurity among those segments of the population with a ‘good life’ to protect” (Bremner, 2004, p. 460–3, Kempa & Singh, 2008, p. 345). The fear that is fomented is premised on “outsiders” or “dangerous others” who are portrayed as posing an imminent threat to the safety and security of the well-to-do in society. In view of the fact that these “dangerous others” cannot participate in the culture of consumption, they are considered as “inferior... as ‘invaders’ who are laying siege to private experiences of a good life” (Bremner, 2004, p. 460–3, Kempa & Singh, 2008, p. 345). As an illustration in the context of South Africa, an advertisement for Maxidoor burglar proofing portrays the criminal as a black, minacious shadow, while the victim is “white, young, blue eyed and female, caught in alarm at her front door” (Homemakers Fair Magazine, 2002, p. 96, as cited in Bremner, 2004, p. 462). The import of this advertisement is that the poor black person represents the dangerous “other”, ready to pounce on and attack—if not restrained or kept at bay by means

of the Maxidoor' burglar proof—the White who has property to protect. Inciting this fear of the other, the potential target of the advertisement—in this case, the white person—is thereby induced to patronize the product. This demonstrates that the advertisement for private policing and security products revolves around, and thrives on, the creation of anxiety, fear and terror, among the rich to induce them regarding an uptake of private policing services.

In sum, private security companies fundamentally adopt an aggressive marketing strategy, as exemplified in well-crafted advertising messages; and facilitated by the images of insecurity, fear and anxiety, carried by the global and local media. Accordingly, the management of private policing firms are both a cause and effect of the hike in private policing, because their own profit margins are significantly dependent on their capacity to capitalize on, and to stoke the already high sense of insecurity, anxiety and fear, pervading the entire polity (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, 2010). To the extent that the feeling of insecurity—whether real or imagined—heightens, the demand for professional policing services invariably rises, as Abrahamsen and Williams (2005, p.5) rightly argue, “As insecurity continues to increase, so does the demand for private security services”. This suggests that the media coverage, or the portrayal, of images of fear and insecurity, the imminent threats of crime, including terrorism, and the general sense of “ontological insecurity” (Giddens, 1990; Aas, 2013) heightened by global neoliberal reforms, such as constant economic restructuring, work to the advantage of the security companies in legitimizing their advertising messages. The following chapters examine in more detail the range of historical and contemporary circumstances that help to explain the origin and consequences of the rise of global private policing in Africa.

Chapter 5

Africa—Establishing the Context

This chapter takes an historical and anthropological approach to examining relevant features of most pre-colonial African societies, such as the nature of social organization, law enforcement, and the delivery of justice, that are important not only for contextualizing, but also for enhancing a more nuanced understanding of post-colonial policing in Africa. It analyzes pre-colonial African core values, and the distinctive character of most African societies. It also explores how contact with imperial powers has largely contributed to the corrosion of the political, economic, social, and cultural, arrangements of most African societies to date, and the security implications thereof. Finally, it analyzes the legacies of colonial policing and their impact on postcolonial policing, and the nature of postcolonial African governance, and how these contribute to shaping the security situations on the continent.

5.1 African Social Organization

In almost every society, the members have common core values, goals, and belief systems that fundamentally define and express their distinctive identity, and bind them together as one people. These values, goals, and beliefs, underpin their way of life as people, and express the bounds of acceptable conduct or behaviour, define the reward system for obedience and exemplary conduct, and the sanctions in place for a breach of any of the societal norms. Further, they generally express the rights, the obligations, responsibilities, and the expectations of the individual, as well as the wider society. More often than not, these social values, and shared beliefs shape and determine the nature of the social relations among the members of that particular society. They also shape the objects and distinctively mold the character of the social arrangement (structure) in that society for the orderly fulfillment of both the individual aspirations, and the shared aspirations of the people. Gyekye (2010, p. 14)

thus argues that “the institutions of various kinds—legal, political, economic, moral and others—are set up in pursuit of certain commonly shared values and goals, that is, a common good which a human society desires to achieve for all of its members”. These fundamental social values, principles, ideals and shared beliefs, which are usually unique to the people, evolve over time, and are generally captured in their culture. Culture therefore defines broadly the way of life of a people, and expresses their complex web of values, beliefs, practices and institutions.

The essence of the shared values, goals and beliefs among African people is to promote the common good (general welfare) of the individual members, and the people as a whole. This common good, according to Gyekye (2010, p. 14), is conceptualized as

peace, happiness or satisfaction (human flourishing), justice, dignity, respect, and so on. There is no human being who does not desire peace, security, freedom, dignity, respect, justice, equality, and satisfaction. It is such a moral, not a weird, notion embracing of fundamental goods—goods that are intrinsic to human fulfillment and to which all individuals desire to have access—that is referred to as the common good.

The common good is thus anything that does not constitute a threat to, but rather inspires the pursuit of, the wellbeing and the security of the individual members, and the wider community collectively.

Central to African shared values (such as hospitality, respect for elders and authority) is the sense of community or communalism that uniquely and largely defines the sense of “Africanness” (Gyekye, 1997, p.36), and the African sense of moral duty to ensure common good. According to Gyekye (2010, p. 14),

The common good is a notion that is conceptually affiliated to the notion of community and, thus, to the notion of human society as such. The common good is an essential feature of the ethics espoused by the communitarian African society. The pursuit of the good of all is the goal of the communitarian society, which the African society is. A sense of the common good—which is a core of shared values—is the underlying presupposition of African social morality.

In effect, the promotion of common good in African societies is intrinsically linked to this most cherished African sense of community, which is the foundation of African social ethic.

For this reason, “individualistic ethics that promote the welfare and interests of the individual” are barely recognized “in African moral thought” (Mbiti, 1970; Gyekye, 2010, p. 14). Accordingly, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya observes that “individualism and self-seeking” is predominantly frowned upon, and so the use of “I” rather than “we” is rare in “public assemblies” (as cited in Gyekye, 1997, p. 36). This presupposes that the spirit of collectivism is deeply entrenched in African societies.

In supporting the communitarian African social life, Mbiti (1970) argues that the individual can only claim that “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am”. This illustrates the strong sense of the community among Africans that motivate them to pursue common good in their everyday social life. He further asserts, “Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the community happens to the individual” (Mbiti, 1970, as cited in Gyekye, 1997, p. 36-37). This conveys the notion that what affects the individual affects the community, and vice versa. A sense of community ensures that “one shares in the fate of the other—bearing one another up”. It also “provides a viable framework for the fulfillment of the individual’s nature or potential, a life in which the products of the exercise of the individual talents or endowments are (nevertheless) regarded as the assets of the community as such” (Gyekye, 1997, p. 75-76). In large measure, this sense of solidarity motivates everyone to ensure common good.

The strong African social ethic premised on the sense of the community finds expression in various maxims that highlight the importance of the shared values, including collective responsibility, cooperation, interdependence, mutual helpfulness, and reciprocal obligations (Ayittey, 2006; Normandy, 2008; Gyekye, 2010). For instance, “The well-being of man depends on his fellow man (*onipa yieye firi onipa*)” shows that the individual fulfillment is significantly contingent on the support of others (Gyekye, 2010, p. 15). Again, the maxim that “your neighbour’s situation is potentially your situation; every other person is

basically you” presupposes that an individual’s failure to show concern, sympathy, and support for others will likely lead to a situation of being denied help when he or she most needs it, and this underlines the principle of reciprocity (Gyekye, 2010, p. 16.). Finally, the proverb that “Man is not a palm-tree that he should be complete (*onipa nye abe na ne ho ahyia ne ho*)” epitomizes the human limitations, and the notion of lack of absolute self-sufficiency (Gyekye, 1997, p. 38, 2010, p. 15). This in turn symbolizes the need for mutual cooperative arrangement in terms of helping one another to ensure fulfillment and satisfaction.

While the sense of communal spirit constitutes the hallmark of African cultures, the element of individuality is not completely lost or discounted. Gyekye (1997, p. 40-41) observes that some African proverbs, such as “Life is war, Life is as you make it”, and “It is our individual efforts that we can struggle for our heads” are emblematic of individualistic values. These proverbs respectively convey the idea that life is characterized by ups and downs that demand a great deal of effort and perseverance on the part of the individual to ensure success; that the individual is responsible for his or her conditions in life; and that the individual effort is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the shared aspirations, needs, and goals of the community. The core difference, however, is the greater emphasis placed on the communal spirit, the pursuit of which invariably paves the way for the maximum actualization and fulfillment of the individual potentials and aspirations. African cultures thus recognize the individuality, as in talents, intellect, free will, initiative, efforts, liberty and autonomy, of members inasmuch as it (that individuality) ensures the promotion of the common good. Put differently, the expression of individuality can best be achieved within the context of inspiring the common good of the larger community. The attainment of individuality is therefore closely linked to the general welfare of the entire community. The

point of communitarian principle is, in large measure, to obviate greed, selfishness, and ill will that are inimical to the pursuit of the common good.

The social ethic of the African societies carries a strong moral duty that the individual owes to others, and to the community in the name of common good. This high sense of moral duty is virtually obligatory, unlike the Western world where that is deemed to be outside the bounds of the call of duty, and so expected not to be honoured (Gyekye, 1997, 2010). To acquire this character or attitude of African sense of morality, the individual is socialized from childhood in order to internalize the shared moral dictates, and will be expected to respond practically and positively to the moral instructions. His or her character, actions and inactions, is evaluated as either good, if it conforms, or bad, if it does not, to the shared moral standards.

The sense of community therefore is a key defining characteristic of African social relations, and this reflects the unique character of the social structure of African societies to ensure its preservation. No society is either absolutely communalistic, or individualistic, what matters most is the degree, otherwise the mix of both, or the primacy of one over the other (Gyekye, 1997, 2010). In African societies, communalistic spirit takes precedence over the individualistic one. It is in this regard that African cultures and societies are regarded largely as more communalistic than individualistic, as pertained in Western context. The sense of community was a powerful mechanism of social control in pre-colonial African societies, because it largely constituted a powerful incentive to ensure law and order that allows for the attainment of the common good.

5.2 Pre-Colonial Policing and Justice in Africa

Traditional African policing systems were grounded in the community, and “closely interlinked with social and religious structures” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, para. 1). Ezeanya (2012a, p.1), contends, “Pre-colonial Africa, for the most part, was founded on

strong ethical values sometimes packaged in spiritual terms, but with the end result of ensuring social justice and compliance”. The protection of life and property in pre-colonial African societies was fundamentally a shared responsibility of the living and the dead alike (Okereke, 1995), as Achebe (1984, p. 85) notes “that the ancestors partook in almost all affairs”, because the land of the living was not far removed from the domain of the ancestors”. In concurring with Achebe, Lanre and Olabisi (2013, p. 52) observe that the notable mechanisms of community-based policing include “communality, collaboration between the living, and the dead members, collective shaming, and royal supervision” that ensured peace and harmony.

In Nigeria, before the imposition of colonization by the British in 1861, traditional customs and beliefs were enforced using community structures, such as age grades, and secret societies or guilds, whose membership varied, including farmers and fishermen. Age grade was a formal organisation whose membership was dependent on pre-determined age range. Among the Yorubas, Igbo and Edo in particular, law enforcement depended hugely on supernatural forces and juju, family heads, age grades, hunters, and warriors (Lanre and Olabisi, 2013). In some places, vigilante groups often acted as the key security body that ensured protection of lives, and property (Williams, 2011). The effectiveness of the community-based policing was never in doubt, as Lanre and Olabisi (2013, p. 51) argue, “The efficacy of the informal pre-colonial police machinery indeed triggered the recent introduction of the community policing strategy in Nigeria”. Indigenous Nigerian communities could therefore maintain law and order using the traditional social control mechanisms without the need for the present day formal Western style of policing (Oluyede, 2002), bedevilled with the widespread corruption, and abuse of power, as exemplified in South Africa (Cock, 2005; Newham & Faull 2011) and Nigeria (Onyeozili, 2005).

A key characteristic of the community-oriented policing style in African societies was the strong communal spirit linked to common good. Blyden (1908, as cited in Lanre and Olabisi, 2013, p. 52) argues:

The tribes have laws regulating every function of human life, and the laws are known to all the members of the tribe, and justice is administered by the tribal chiefs in the presence of the whole people in the village or town, where any violation of tribal law may have taken place. There is no need for Standing Armies. The whole of the villages or town are jointly and severally [guardians] and preservers of peace.

This sense of collectivism and communalistic bond that guaranteed “communal property and cooperative effort” prevented stealing or theft because “everybody has rights and has enough” (Blyden, 1908, as cited in Lanre & Olabisi, 2013, p. 52). Those who violated the societal norms were handed some form of sanctions that depended upon the severity of the offence. In cases involving serious violations, well-established rules, and procedures were followed to establish the truth, and to administer justice. For instance, the matter could be called before the chief and his elders with the presence of almost the whole community for hearing. It was almost impossible to bribe all the elders, and the members of the community who would take part in hearing a case, and this helped ensure a relatively fairer trial and speedier verdict. On the contrary, the present policing style, and court structures patterned on the criminal justice systems of colonial powers are mostly characterized by corruption in most African countries (Human Rights Watch, 2005, 2012; Onyeozili, 2005).

In sum, social and crime control in pre-colonial African societies involved almost every member of the society; the tribal chiefs, the elders, family heads, and the members of the entire community were involved in maintaining law and order. The members of the community internalized the norms, and the values of the society through moral instructions via mores, folklores, storytelling, and so forth (Gyekye, 2010, 1997; Onyeozili, 2005). They were therefore made conscious that crimes, such as sleeping with someone’s wife, or having sex in the bush without even anybody seeing, could still be punishable by the gods, and the

ancestors by imposition of a curse on the offenders. For this reason, pre-colonial policing was usually non-violent, and community-based, driven by the social ethic of seeking common good, as underpinned by the high sense of community that characterized social relations among African peoples. Pre-colonial African societies were therefore not “lawless and disorderly” prior to European contact (Battuta, 1975, as cited in Lanre & Olabisi, 2013, p. 51).

5.3 The History and Impact of Imperialism on African Social Organization

At the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, European powers partitioned Africa to forestall potential conflict among them in their scramble for Africa. This conference marked the formalization of colonial rule. The partitioning of Africa was simple and arbitrary, predicated on the sole interests of the Europeans, with an immense disregard for the common interests of the African peoples (Khapoya, 2012; Ochieni & Nwankwo, 2012). Ali Mazrui (as cited in Khapoya, 2012, p. 104-108) posits three broad reasons for European expedition to the African continent that later led to colonization. The first reason relates to the need to collect scientific knowledge about the “unknown”. Africa bearing the brand of the “Dark Continent” as part of the “othering” processes offered such opportunity to expand the boundaries of scientific knowledge through exploration and discovery. The European explorers discovered the massive resources of Africa, including arable forest, and mineral resources.

The second reason was ethnocentrism, grounded in Christianity that emphasized the need to proselytize to and convert Africans from their traditional religion and beliefs, widely considered to be “primitive and barbaric”, to Christianity. The final reason was premised on imperialism, the inordinate desire of European patriots to make contributions to the greatness of their countries by staking a claim to countries farther away. These reasons are interconnected. For instance, the scientific information gathered about Africa was useful for

the European powers in taking decisions regarding areas that they would like to claim on the basis of, but not exclusively, arable land, favourable weather conditions, and natural resources. The missionaries also worked hand in hand with the European governments, who provided funding for missionaries to educate the Africans, who would be needed to occupy semi-skilled positions in the colonial bureaucracies to serve the interests of the European governments (Khapoya, 2012). The missionaries felt that educating Africans was necessary to elevate them from the condition of barbarism to the European standards of civilization (Khapoya, 2012; Ochieni & Nwankwo, 2012). As a result, colonialism was rationalized as a “civilizing” mission intended to uplift the Africans from their primitive state—the condition of backwardness. This civilizing mission suggests that “a temporary period of political dependence or tutelage was necessary in order for ‘uncivilized’ societies to advance to the point where they were capable of sustaining liberal institutions and self-government” (Kohn, 2014, p. 1).

The reasons offered by Ali Mazrui provide a fundamental point of reference to unearth the real motives for European imperialism. The essence of colonialism is evident in political, cultural, and economic, interests of the imperialist powers. The political interest underscores psychological satisfaction, based on dominance, greatness, and leadership in world affairs, conceived to be derived from the control of a large share of the African continent, or the world (Khapoya, 2012). The cultural reason was a sheer display of arrogance, and cultural superiority on the part of the imperialists, projecting the “other” as inferior and substandard, or “sub-human” (Richard, 2008, p.180). Signs displaying “Europeans Only”, “Africans Only”, and “Africans, and Dogs Not Allowed” speak volumes about the purported European civilizing mission to uplift Africans to equal status of the Europeans (Khapoya, 2012, p. 109). Indigenous cultures, and characteristics of social

organization were frowned upon, suppressed, and therefore not recognized (Ochieni & Nwankwo, 2012).

In addition, the colonizers vehemently pursued racialized policies in the colonies. The British implemented a policy of segregation that saw the creation of different classes of social institutions, like schools, recreational facilities, and hospitals, for different racial groups. For example, there were European schools, African schools, European residences, “African locations”, and racially designated bathrooms. Attempts were made to enact laws to formalize, and institutionalize these forms of racial segregation in some African countries, such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Africans who acquired British cultural practices through education were hardly elevated to the status of British, because “Britishness”, as it were, required both ancestry, and culture (Khapoya, 2012, p. 108). Similarly, the French pursued a policy of assimilation to help transform educated Africans into French. However, only few Africans became French, due to the limited educational facilities in the French colonies. In effect, the so-called civilizing mission turned out largely to be a charade for the economic exploitation that sparked colonialism, as Richard (2008, p. 11) affirms, “The object of colonization was the acquisition of land, minerals, time and other resources”.

In general, the impact of colonialism has been a topic of intense debate. Colonialism helped introduce Western health care, education, criminal and justice structures and practices, centralized political structures (the nation-state concept), and centralized economic planning and management (Khapoya, 2012; Ochieni & Nwankwo, 2012). These structures, however, undermined largely prior African social institutions on all fronts—economically, politically, socially, and culturally—and massively eroded the African sense of collective human security.

Economically, the colonizers were keen on exporting much-needed raw materials, including mineral wealth, from Africa to feed the European industries. At the same time, the

colonial powers exploited the large army of cheap African labour, including the slave trade, as a response to the inherent demands of the growing capitalist economies sweeping across Europe at the time. Cash crops, such as cocoa, and coffee, were introduced to ensure constant supply of the most needed raw materials to fuel European industrial revolution, making African economies dependent in the broader scheme of global capitalism to date. Later, the African continent served, and continues to serve, as a market for the disposal of the surplus products of Western industries (Khapoya, 2012; Ochieni & Nwankwo, 2012). The modification of the traditional existing economic arrangements robbed Africans of control over the conditions of their own lives. For example, the raw-material-producing status subjects Africa to exploitation, as the buyers (colonial powers) determine the prices of the raw materials, as well as the finished products that are exported back to Africa.

More important, in some African countries, including South Africa, and Zimbabwe, the expropriation of arable land by Europeans largely shifted communal land ownership to private ownership in favour of the Whites (Khapoya, 2012; Ochieni & Nwankwo, 2012). This culminated in a situation where the individuals pushed off their own lands had to sell their labour power by working on White-owned farms to survive. To redress this situation after independence, Zimbabwe embarked on land redistribution policy, leading to the loss of land by some of the white segment of the Zimbabwean population to the displeasure of the Western countries. This in turn sparked a wave of Western economic sanctions that have effectively crippled the Zimbabwean economy to date (The Independent, 2013).

The new economic arrangement also allows the state to take ownership of the natural resources, previously owned by communities, under the pretext of the so-called “public interests”, leading to the suffering of the masses, as exemplified by the abject poverty in the oil-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria (Obi, 2010). Further, land became a commodity at the market following colonialism. The communal ownership of land granted the people in the

community the right to use it, but not to own or dispose of it. Land as a commodity has partly contributed to land grabbing that pushes poor people off their lands, and this practice affects their means of livelihood. Moreover, the private property concept introduced an inordinate desire for an acquisition, and a protection of private property, to the detriment of communal ownership and values. This situation helps foment and fan corruption, and contributes to political and economic struggles, which in turn raise human security concerns in contemporary Africa (Ezeanya, 2012a).

Additionally, African countries have become a constant site of experimentation of imperialist economic models, and ideologies that are not in the best interests of Africans to a great extent. Modernization thesis assumes that economic growth is linked to the character of the social structures in the imperialist countries, such as Great Britain. African countries were thus urged to pattern their institutions on the imperialist social institutions, and this inherently contributed to the abandonment or corrosion of traditional social structure, and African core values as communal spirit that is linked to common good. Also, a law and development movement introduced a conceptualization of development in terms of “state-led” economic growth following the modernization of institutions, as fundamental for the establishment of legal uniformity, objectivity, neutrality, consistency, and predictability—collectively regarded as a prerequisite for the development of internal markets (Trubek, 2003, as cited in Corradi & Shotsmans, 2012, p. 4). In this regard, tradition was perceived as backward, and therefore constituted an impediment to development.

However, the observable deteriorating economic conditions, and standards of living in the 1970s led to a paradigm shift—the dependency thesis. This states that underdevelopment is not an upshot of some internal weaknesses, such as local traditions and cultures; instead, it is a consequence of constant domination, and exploitation that stems from the disadvantaged dependent location of developing economies in the structure of the global capitalist system,

where the former constitutes a periphery (Corradi & Shotsmans, 2012). This development model suggests the need to protect local economic interests, cultures and traditions from the invasion of imperialist cultures, considered to have the potential to undermine the former. However, the implementation of this model achieved a limited result due to the top-down approach that characterized the development effort, rather than bottom-up approach with the people at the grassroots as the driving force behind development programs and policies.

Furthermore, at the end of the Cold War in the mid 1990s, along with the general collapse of one party systems, and authoritarian regimes, the expansion of multinational corporations tilted the economic development discourses in favour of a neoliberal market-led approach. The developing world, particularly African countries, in search of possible solutions to their then prevailing economic challenges, such as huge foreign debts, high inflation rates, and poor productivity, had to embrace this new development paradigm. In effect, the Structural Adjustment Programs, and neoliberal global political economic model were requirements for the developing world, particularly Africa, for accessing loans from the powerful international financial institutions, like the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this context, Western (imperialist) law was deemed as a condition for “guaranteeing the efficiency of market exchange, promoting foreign investment, and maintaining macro-economic stability” (Corradi & Shotsmans, 2012 p. 5). Simultaneously, neoliberal thinking inspired criminal justice reforms, including judicial administrative reform and training, substantive commercial law reform, and procedural reform of public administration (Newton, 2004). This development paradigm suggests “open global economy”. To a large extent, the imposition of the neoliberal economic development paradigm on countries accessing loans was probably meant to open up or liberalize the developing economies to facilitate the entry of the multinational corporations that tend often to crowd out similar local companies.

Politically, the arbitrary partitioning of Africa that resulted in the creation of the present nation-states on the continent has immensely been a fundamental source of power struggles, and conflicts within African countries, and across the continent. Colonialism sparked intense ethnic rivalries (Oluwaniyi, 2011) that have been “established by the post-colonial tussle for power among ruling elites, and strengthened by geographic claustrophobia” (Ezeanya, 2012b, p. 2). The civil war involving the Tutsis and Hutus of Rwanda that took on genocidal character epitomizes this observation. This situation was worsened by the divide-and-rule tactics of the colonizer that created unequal development, ethnic and religious rivalries that continue to fuel current problems of ethnic-religious violence, political instability, and discriminations in most countries in Africa (Alemika, 1993; Okereke, 1995; Onyeozili 2005; Oluwaniyi 2011). This suggests that the effects of colonialism strongly linger on, and continue to undermine peace and security on the African continent.

Socially and culturally, the colonial style of education has, very often, alienated, and continues to alienate young people from their own culture, and undermines traditional authority, and moral fabric (Khapoya, 2012; Ochieni & Nwankwo 2012). Further, the colonization of the mind—a state of mind, where most Africans think of almost everything African as inferior, and European as superior (Shearing & Mark, 2011), is an issue in contemporary Africa. This may have whittled down confidence in African capacity to make things, conceivably stifling African creativity, and technological advancement. This may have led to high patronage of European products, helping to create jobs externally, while contributing to a high unemployment rate locally through limited patronage of local products.

Furthermore, the seed of corruption was largely sown during the period of colonization of Africa. Corruption generally refers to “the abuse of power for private gains” (Transparency International, as cited in Ezeanya, 2012a, p. 1). In particular, political

corruption, and an “administrative corruption”—the use of “private payments to public officials to distort the prescribed implementation of official rules and policies” (Hellman & Jones, as cited in Ezeanya, 2012a, p. 1) constitute a grave concern in contemporary Africa (Transparency International, 2014; Hill, 2010). From the prism of the pre-colonial African context, administrative corruption that is widespread across Africa is largely an outgrowth of colonialism (Osoba, 1996; Gyekye, 1997; Ezeanya, 2012a, 2012b). Leadership in Africa was largely turned into “corrupted enterprise” through the processes of colonization. The system of indirect rule, for example, ensured that the colonial powers, mainly Great Britain, governed the colonies through the existing political institutions, where people were usually appointed to be chiefs if they supported colonial rule (Deflem, 1994; Ezeanya, 2012a; Ochieni & Nwankwo 2012). This system presupposes that rather than holding power for the benefit of the people, the rulers assumed power in trust for the imperialist authorities. Again, most individuals, who would otherwise not qualify for chiefs on the ground of lack of good character, and royal family background, were appointed chiefs for having demonstrated loyalty to, and support for, colonial masters.

The brutality of the colonial suppression also contributed to a situation where some indigenous people had to bribe the people connected to colonial administration in order to find an escape route. In several instances, colonial powers recruited the indigenous people at gun point into police forces, known as the “Native Police”, and dispatched them to farther places, where those recruits would least have sympathy for the people they policed due to tribal, and ethnic differences or rivalries (Richards, 2008). These recruits took part in the brutal suppression of the people by the colonial masters to enforce colonial laws, and policies, such as “forced taxation, segregation, and quelling of anti-colonial uprisings” (Ezeanya, 2012a, p. 2). In view of the brutal suppression of the colonized by these recruits, some affected individuals had to give in to the demands by these recruits, or those who had

strong links with the colonial administration, to find favour by escaping the violent oppression. According to Ezeanya (2012a, p.1),

Individuals without character who demanded money in exchange for manipulating the colonial masters enthroned corruption at the highest echelon of governance. To avoid being punished for the grave crime of being citizens, the people saw bribery as a first and last resort, if at all they were to be granted access to the most basic rights.

This suggests that some local people at that time had no alternative than to pay bribes to find some breathing space in the wake of the violent colonial repression. This attitude has persisted to date, as Ezeanya (2012a, p.1) further states that:

At the end of colonialism, the newly independent African government inherited institutions that had internalized a culture of citizen oppression and extortion. The immediate postcolonial police and the military were designed to inflict terror on innocent citizens, and the citizens had internalized the art of buying their way off unwarranted harassment.

In this light, corruption largely arose from, or gained root, in the violent processes of colonialism in Africa.

Echoing similar concerns, Gyekye (1997, p. 201) concurs with this position, arguing that colonial administration promoted corruption as a result of its “more elaborate bureaucracies and complicated ways” of attaining [political] goals, “which gave rise to fresh opportunities for illegitimate and illegal gains”. Osoba (1996, p. 373) adds that “the colonial authorities...presided over [a] fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system which facilitated the appropriation of huge surplus to the metropolis from Nigeria”. Osoba thus traces corruption to authoritarian colonial rule that nurtured and thrived on corruption; this was done through an unfair mode of capitalist accumulation that saw the resources of Africa being moved to the West based on their own terms of trade to serve their interests, without any form of accountability to those colonized.

In addition, a high sense of individualism, which was introduced during colonialism based on capitalism, often tends to give rise to corruption unlike communitarian African social arrangement whose central thrust was to ensure collective interest of the entire

community (Gyekye, 1997). Communitarian African social arrangement therefore served as a formidable institutionalized measure to stave off corruption. However, since contact with the colonial powers, this social organization grounded in communitarian spirit has significantly been eroded. In fact, “Individualism is gaining ground”, and for that matter “the institutions upon which the knowledge and preservation of native law depended on are tending to pass more or less rapidly into desuetude” (as cited in Seidu-Akrofi, 1989, p. 591).

Accountable leadership and good governance existed in most pre-colonial African societies through the strict enforcement of a panoply of rules and, regulations, widely agreed principles, and moral values guiding human interactions. As most of these rules and moral dictates were unwritten, they were usually “couched in supernatural terms to instill fear, and be instilled in the subconscious” (Ezeanya, 2012b, p. 2). To illustrate, the Asante kingdom prospered on strict adherence to rules and regulations. Development projects, including building of roads, promotion of agriculture, commerce, industry and education by means of “self-help and self-reliance”, were carried out. Any serious misconduct, such as squandering of a substantial portion of public money or improper disposal of any chieftaincy-related property, on the part of the king could result in “destoolment” (deposition), while the subjects who flouted the rules were equally subject to sanctions, including curses invoked by the gods and the ancestors. To help avoid “political corruption”, the chief was among others not permitted to “own personal property”, nor to engage in any form of trading to enrich himself (Gyekye, 1997, p. 202).

Further, among the Yoruba of Nigeria, the king-making body, *Oyo-mesi*, played an oversight role by acting as a check against the misuse of power by the King of Oyo. And, among the Igbos in the acephalous society, “the absence of any form of overarching authority”, leadership was in the hands of the people to ensure justice through the joint cooperation of all and sundry, especially the family, and clan heads (Ezeanya, 2012a, p.1).

The existence of checks and balances through strong shared moral ethic, the fear of banishment, public shame and the fear of punishment by the gods, and the ancestors for crimes committed, prevented immensely corruption and corrupt practices. The imposition of Western political structures and culture through violent colonialism predominantly led to the repudiation of these checks and balances embodied in pre-colonial African cultures, and this largely laid the foundation for corrupt practices in contemporary Africa (Alemika, 1993; Osoba, 1996; Okereke, 1995; Onyeozili 2005; Oluwaniyi 2011; Ezeanya, 2012a).

This development has resulted in widespread continental poverty with security implications that continue to shape and facilitate the growth of global private policing. In South Africa, rising poverty levels have contributed to a resurgence of threats of violence (World Report, 2014) that has in turn sparked the demand for private policing. For most black men in the post-apartheid South Africa, private security that is poorly remunerated is the major employment opportunity other than recourse to crime. For this reason, private security is comparable to a new form of colonialism, as Bremner (2004, p. 466) maintains,

In doing so, they re-enact apartheid's violence on them—they are uniformed, trained, sometimes armed, and thereby domesticated. Their bodies are made useful, transfigured as supports for the privileged. They are transformed from unknown 'Other', into domesticated protector, from potential evil into good, from criminal into guard. A new form of colonization is instituted.

Although the structures of colonialism and apartheid may have been demolished officially, yet their distinctive social life in terms of economic, cultural, and social arrangements purposely engineered to disadvantage the South African indigenes continues to live on in large measure.

On the whole, it seems that the negative repercussions of colonialism on the entire African social set up are wide-ranging, deep-rooted, still observable, and felt much more among the masses, and thus stubbornly undeniable. African contact with the imperialist powers since colonialism to date is suggestive of clash of cultural values, and beliefs, with

the dominant European culture almost irreparably shaking the prior African social organisation to its core. This fundamental social change significantly prepared the ground, and continues to do so, for the increasing sense of helplessness, suffering, despair, and human insecurity being witnessed across the entire continent, where the few elites continue to amass wealth, whilst the majority seems to languish in naked poverty, and where the resort to private policing to protect potential security threats from the have-nots appears momentarily to be one of the indispensable solutions.

5.4 Colonial and Postcolonial Policing in Africa

The character and the object of colonial policing can best be understood within the broader context of economic motives of colonialism. Deflem (1994, p. 49) argues, “Most police work, nonetheless, was not so much involved with the prevention and detection of crime, but focused on the economic foundations of colonial power”. In addition, “many private police forces were established by a colonial company, which again shows how law enforcement and commercial imperialism were inextricably linked” (Deflem, 1994, p. 58). This suggests that colonial policing was inextricably linked to the protection of both political and economic interests of the imperial powers, including those of the capitalist class (Tamuno, 1970, p. 38).

In this light, the indigenous people were considered a hindrance to capitalist development (Losurdo, 2011), and this situation was not unique to the African context, but typical of colonialism everywhere, including Australia, New Zealand and North America. Richards (2008, p. 11) substantiates this view, arguing that “Aboriginals were unnecessary to a capitalist Australia. The land they lived upon may be required”. On this account, he further maintains, “There was a direct link between the legal recognition of land grab by the squatters, and the development of specific form of policing” (Richards, 2008, p. 11), and this holds true for many European colonies elsewhere, including South Africa. It is therefore not

surprising that the nature of the colonial policing was fundamentally brutal, and violent, because from the lenses of the imperial powers, that was necessary to crush slightest resistance by the indigenous people to colonial rule (Deflem, 1994). In buttressing this point, Ezeanya (2012a, p. 1) writes that “the police and military were established to crush civilian opposition to colonial rule rather than the need to protect citizens and ensure territorial integrity” in the African context.

The colonized people were generally regarded as sub-standard humans, enemies, potential law-breakers, and, in some cases, undesirables who must be exterminated to pave way for the “superior” whites to settle in (Richards, 2008). By implication, the colonial police forces were charged to apply “deadly force” to facilitate this object of European expansion, as Richards (2008, p. 11-12) maintains:

The tactics used by the Native Police were typical under the rules of frontier colonialism. It readily imposed a regime of terror, confusion and suffering on the enemy. Signs of resistance were usually met with immediate and violent punitive measures, although sometimes, in other parts of the British Empire, prudent retreat and negotiation were chosen instead.

This description sums up or at least offers some insights into the character of the colonial policing. Essentially, colonial police that unleashed violence on the colonized was called differently in different contexts, and, so the term “Native Police” that saw the recruitment of the indigenous people against their will in most cases, was just one of such names (Richards, 2008).

The recruitment of the local people into colonial police forces was very strategic to accelerate colonial expansion at the barest minimum cost in terms of human losses on the part of European police, and the military, and in monetary terms regarding the meagre payments to native recruits. Richards (2008, p. 10) thus argues:

The concept of using indigenous troops to further colonisation and suppress resistance was not new. Like the British, other conquerors had found that Native Forces enjoyed a number of important advantages as imperial soldiers and frontier guards. Indigenous people were familiar with local terrain, customs and languages, and they had an

ability to survive off the land without catastrophic medical problems that affected invading armies and expeditions. British soldiers in the tropics, for example, suffered heavier casualties from ill-health than from conflict. The greatest benefit of all, however, was cost. The Native forces expected less, were paid less, and their overall cost to colonial administrators was much less than for European soldiers.

In addition to the minimal cost of recruiting local people into colonial police forces, it was also advantageous as part of a broader scheme of divide-and-rule tactics employed by colonial powers, as Richards (2008, p.10) further maintains, “The Native police, like other armed colonial formations based on the use of indigenous recruits, took advantage of the use of the fact that Native people had no loyalties to other indigenous groups. Indeed, in some cases, they were sworn enemies, and fought as much in their own interest as for other reasons”. Fundamentally, “the search for Native power base is an essential step in many colonial annexations” (Richards, 2008, p.10). By extension, the colonial powers took advantage of traditional animosity between different tribal and ethnic societies to facilitate brutal repression, and speed up colonial expansion, as well as maintain their grip on power in the conquered territories or colonies.

The recruitment, and often the remote deployment of native recruits driven by divide-and-rule tactics (Tamuno, 1975; Alemika, 1988; Deflem, 1994) was “therefore a fundamental means of achieving the annexation of land, and the suppression of resistance” (Richard, 2008, p.10-11). This also provides insight into the brutal nature of the colonial policing, because one of the assumptions undergirding recruiting, and posting the local police recruits far from where they lived was to encourage violent policing where those policed were more likely to be viewed as alien or enemy. In reality, “violence and terror against indigenous people were central components of European imperialism everywhere” (Richards, 2008, p. 14). Unsurprisingly, the history of colonial policing in Africa is basically a history of violent oppression of the African peoples, as Alemika (1988, p. 164) argues:

The colonial objectives were (to varying degrees during the phases of colonialism in Nigeria) prosecuted through organized governmental violence, vandalism and plunder

on the part of the colonizers. . . . The sundry administrative, coercive and surveillance organs (police, prisons, courts, tribunals, “native” authorities, Residents and District Officers) were established to prosecute, promote, and defend British imperialistic interests in Nigeria.

In South Africa, for example, colonial policing was synonymous with brutal suppression of the non-white population with connivance of the courts, and the endorsement by superiors (Richards, 2008). The police committed atrocities that ranged from torture to mass killings against the indigenous populations with the tacit approval of the dominant white minority. The South African police (SAP) was “increasingly being used as a political tool of repression by the Apartheid regime” that involved a campaign of racial violence against the non-white, predominantly the black populations, with the collusion of the compromised justice structures, by the dominant white minority (Minaar, 2013, p. 61).

In the case of Nigeria, the state-organized colonial police force was a central part of the colonial project that started in 1861 to secure colonial interests, and to protect the colonial administrators (Onyeozili, 2005). The paramilitary character of colonial police was meant “to ward off attackers from the colonial depots of British merchants” (Tamuno, 1975, p. 5, as cited in Lanre & Olabisi, 2013, p. 50), and also to terrorize defiant or rebellious traditional rulers into submission (Ahire, 1991; Lanre & Olabisi, 2013, p. 50). In their contribution, Mbaku and Kimenyi (1995, p. 298) contend that “a colonial police force was never intended to be a crime fighter in the traditional sense. Its main duty was to conquer and subjugate the people...and provide British merchants the wherewithal to monopolize the region’s commercial activities”.

It is arguable that postcolonial policing today reflects largely the culture of violence against citizens that marked colonial policing. The culture of repressive, and corrupt police forces in Africa represent the legacy of colonial policing that was bequeathed after independence, and has been sustained ever since (Alemika, 1993; Okereke, 1995; Onyeozili 2005; Oluwaniyi 2011). Onyeozili (2005, p. 36) thus contends that “the employment of police

resources to advance the colonial political agenda in fact shaped the future of policing as an agency of oppression in the whole history of Nigeria”. Onoge (1993, p. 178) thus maintains that:

The burden of colonial policing was the subordination of the national interests of the people to the political and economic interest of the state. Through armed patrols, raids, arrests and detention, the colonial police protected the colonial economy by policing labour. Through the enforcement of unpopular direct taxation, the raiding of labour camps, and the violent suppression of strikes, the police ensured the creation, supply and discipline of the proletarian labour force required by colonial capitalism... The police, the most visible enforcer of colonial diktat remained immensely unpopular. The police, in the consciousness of the people, became the symbol of the dictatorial establishment rather than the protector of the people’s rights. As the people had no checks over the arbitrariness of the police, they either avoided “police trouble” or mediated inevitable contacts with bribe offerings.

This evidences the legacy of the brutal colonial policing that continues to be felt today, and has contributed to the erosion of trust and confidence in the postcolonial policing in Africa.

In most African states, the police forces still constitute a key instrument of the state that are often employed for keeping an authoritarian, tyrannical, and corrupt regimes in power rather than protecting the citizenry (Onyeozili, 2005; Oluwaniyi 2011). In Nigeria, the general public has often been alienated from the police due to their brutality, unprofessionalism, and corruption. Consequently, there has been a “sustained public outcry against the inefficiency, and brutality” of the national police force (NPF) that has earned the image of being uncivil, partisan, reactive, repressive, and irresponsive (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Onyeozili, 2005). In effect, the Nigerian police forces tend to protect the few who wield political power, and economic resources, while violently suppressing campaigns by the masses for transparency, social justice, equality, probity, responsible leadership, and good governance (Alemika, 1993; Okereke 1995; Onyeozili, 2005; Oluwaniyi 2011).

The violent character of postcolonial policing reveals the true nature of the relations between the state, and the masses in Africa. This development raises security threats that may have contributed to the rising need for private policing on the part of those who can afford it.

This is because the public police cannot be trusted, due in part to inefficiency, and corruption allegations; and partly due to the imminent threat from the masses that are wallowing in poverty, as a result of general mismanagement of the national resources by successive governments.

5.5 Security Implications of Postcolonial Governance in Africa

While the fundamental changes in the organisation of African societies have invariably contributed to the apparent political and economic chaos, most successive African leaders have played a key role, and continue do so, in diverse ways in reversing further the economic fortunes of the continent (Hill, 2010; Newham & Faull, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Transparency International, 2014). In his address to the African Ministerial Forum on Integrated Transport in Africa, the former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria observes, “The lack of real economic development in many African countries is due to poor, and sometimes outright irresponsible leadership” (as cited in Ayittey, 2006, p. 1). He further notes that “corrupt African leaders have stolen at least \$140 billion (£95 billion) from their people in the decades since independence” (The London Independent, 2002, as cited in Ayittey, 2006, p.7). By implication, rather than pursuing sound economic management, and good governance to improve the living conditions of the masses, most African head of states have sought political office to enrich themselves, their families and cronies. This typical African political behaviour and practice has enormously contributed to the festering of political instability, and the systemic dwindling of the economic prospects of the continent (Hill, 2010; Newham & Faull, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Transparency International, 2014).

As expected, most African countries have not made much progress from a comparative perspective, and most of them were even better off at independence than today. At the time of independence, for example, Ghana and South Korea were at par in terms of

development with per capita income of \$200 each. Similarly, Nigeria was also essentially at equal level of development as that of South Korea. However, the economic picture of South Korea, and the two African countries (Ghana and Nigeria) points to a stark disparity in economic progress, as Ayittey (2006, p. 2) argues,

But fifty years later, South Korea's income per capita was about thirty times that of Ghana: \$12,200 versus \$420. Nigeria also stood at the same stage of development with South Korea in 1960, but forty years later, Africa's most populous nation, seems uncharitably mired in convulsive violence, and grinding poverty with nearly the same per capita income as in 1960—as if the economy hibernated.

This demonstrates that South Korea has made much more economic progress, perhaps, due in greater part to the prudent economic management driven by the passion, and unwavering commitment of the past, and current leadership to ensure economic prosperity. Instead of taking responsibility for the current economic conditions of African people, and taking the necessary steps to address the situation, most African leaders have often cited external factors, such as the unfair international economic order, and historical legacies of colonialism, as the major causes. For instance, according to the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), colonialism engendered the subversion of the “traditional structures, institutions and values” that created an economy “subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers” (NEPAD, 2005, para. 21, as cited in Ayittey, 2006, p. 3).

As noted earlier, while asserting that colonialism, and contemporary forms of imperialism have played a part, the economic, social, and political, situations of Africa have been exacerbated significantly by endogenous factors according to the internalist school of thought. These include irresponsible leadership, “bad governance, systemic corruption, capital flight, economic mismanagement, declining investment, collapsed infrastructure, decayed institutions, civil wars, political tyranny, blatant violations of human rights, and military vandalism” (Ayittey, 2006, p. 4). To illustrate, the late President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire

(now the Democratic Republic of Congo), and General Sani Abacha of Nigeria looted their countries' treasuries, and later deposited the monies in Swiss banks (Ayittey, 2006, p. 6). This phenomenon robs the continent of its productive capital that is needed for investment purposes to stimulate much-needed development to help alleviate the suffering of the masses. The internalist school of thought therefore disagrees with the externalist camp that claims that problems in Africa are caused by imperialist powers as discussed.

In another development, President Robert Mugabe bought a new presidential fleet that comprise a state-of-the-art limousine for himself, and one for one of his vice-presidents, two Mercedes Benz sedans, and 19 presidential escort trucks with total value of \$250 million (as cited in Ayittey, 2006, p. 6). In his book entitled, *Black skin, white mask*, Fannon (2008) implicitly expresses the idea that the educated elites in particular identify themselves as white, and, for this reason, they live, think and behave like one. In doing so, it appears that the African educated class, particularly the political elites, have destructively gone beyond reasonable limits, as embodied in their outrageous and ridiculous spending to elevate them to, and maintain, the status of a pseudo-white identity. Using the public service officials to illustrate this situation, Baffoe (2014, p. 41) rightly observes that:

We were very eager to kick out the colonial white man from power but we decided to live like white man did. The postcolonial public service officer decided and has continued to live as the new 'Black-White' man enjoying all the perks and ridiculous and unreasonable benefits, even if the national treasury cannot afford.

In particular, the case of President Robert Mugabe cited above typifies this social canker. As a result, monies meant for development either end up in the pockets of political office holders, or are spent on luxurious projects, and defence logistics for keeping the ruling regime in power; this culminates in rendering the masses poorer, because their general welfare becomes subservient to the parochial interests of the ruling elites to enrich themselves. According to the United Nations, 31 out of the world's 33 poorest countries are located in sub-Saharan Africa (as cited in Hill, 2010, p. 1161), where access to basic needs,

such as drinking water, education, and affordable and quality health care, remains a major challenge. Even in some African countries, predominantly Namibia, South Africa and Botswana, where “pockets of prosperity, and economic growth exist” relative to the bigger picture of other African countries, wealth is usually “concentrated in the hands of a few rather than those of the many” (Hill, 2010, p. 1161).

The suffering of the masses that is partly caused by irresponsible governance, economic mismanagement, and compromised justice structures, poses serious security implications (Hill, 2010, p. 1162; Human Rights Watch, 2012). Hill (2010, p. 1162) clearly highlights this view, arguing that:

The desperation, frustration and anger that poverty invariably stimulates occasionally gives rise to political, economic and social unrest that can have profound consequences both locally and globally. Most notably the suffering of the masses has helped create and sustain insurgent and terrorist groups in many parts of the continent, including the Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (PCUD) in Chad, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) in northern Niger and Mali.

Efforts to reduce the level of poverty in particular and social injustice in general does not only promote human security, and largely quell the tendencies for rebellion, but also the security of the state, which is intrinsically or inextricably linked to the security of the people.

However, most African leaders have continued to impede the actualization of even the modest economic expectations, and potentials of most African people. At worst, the current deplorable living conditions of ordinary African people are a shared responsibility between imperial powers, and the African political elites, as the World Bank (1989, p. 2) rightly contends,

Responsibility for Africa’s economic crisis is shared. Donor agencies and foreign advisers have been heavily involved in past development efforts along with African governments themselves. Governments and donors must be prepared to change their thinking fundamentally in order to revive Africa’s fortunes. However, Africa’s future can only be decided by Africans. External agencies can play at most a supportive role.

This expresses the view that most African leaders have not primarily pursued genuine interests of African states, as Ayittey (2006, p. 6-7) maintains that:

The historical record shows that each foreign entity goes to Africa to pursue its own interests: the Americans, Arabs, Europeans, and Russians. Certainly, the Chinese do not go to Africa because they love black people so much. It is African leaders who must defend and pursue Africa's interests, but do they? Of course not; they are more interested in pursuing their own selfish personal interests. They care less about their people and squander scarce resources on unnecessary luxury items and prestigious projects.

Instead, pervasive corruption and bad governance have bedevilled development efforts in most African states since independence.

Currently, there is still lack of strong political will to fighting corruption in Africa—taking into account the bigger picture on the continent. In Uganda, Human Rights Watch (2013) writes that the Government has not demonstrated any strong commitment for fighting high-profile corruption that involves the key state officials. In echoing similar concerns, Transparency International (2014, para. 1) articulates the negative impact of corruption on development in Africa, arguing, “Around 80 per cent of African people live on less than US\$2 a day; corruption is one factor perpetuating poverty”. It is therefore imperative that African leaders admit this disturbing reality, and identify, pursue, and promote vigorously, national interests that advance the common good of African states. The continued insistence on external forces as the cardinal causes of the economic crisis in most African states seems to be no longer tenable in absolute terms, or at least partially valid.

Chapter 6

The Case of South Africa

This chapter mainly investigates the developments surrounding the rise of private policing in South Africa, situating these developments in their wider historical and contemporary context. It also explores thematically relevant issues, such as the security implications of the military restructuring, poverty, governance and the state security machinery, and how these impact on private policing. Finally, it interrogates how private policing impacts the poor in South Africa.

6.1 Background

Located at the southernmost end of the African continent, South Africa occupies a total land area of about 1.2 million square kilometers, and has a total population of 54 million, with an unemployment rate of 25.5 per cent (Statistics South Africa, 2014). Life expectancy at birth for males was 56 years, and females 62 as in 2012 (World Health Organization, 2014a). The majority of the population in South Africa is Christian, while the remainder is Muslim, Hindu and traditionalist. As a country with an ethnically diverse population, South Africa has 11 official languages, namely Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu (Minnaar, 2013).

The colonial history of South Africa began with the arrival of the Dutch Administrator, Jan van Riebeeck, on April 16, 1652. He established a Dutch colony at the southernmost tip, where the city of Cape Town is now located. Other European settlers arrived, and moved into the interior in the early 1700s. For many centuries, the territory now called South Africa was a battle ground between European settlers and the African indigenes over territorial control. In view of their unique fighting capabilities and weaponry, by the late 1800s, however, the Europeans had gained control over the all the territories that were previously owned and controlled by African peoples (Keegan, 1996; The State University, n. d.; Minnaar, 2013).

Following a peace agreement between the British and the Boers (the Dutch and French Huguenot population) in 1909, all the territories were merged to form one nation that culminated in the creation of South Africa in 1910 (Encyclopedia, 2007; The State University, n. d.). The Boers formed the National Party in 1933 following a persistent yet uneasy union with the British. This National Party gained political power in 1948 on a ticket of Apartheid, a policy that established a systematic racial divide between Europeans and non-Europeans, through anti-African legislation. The Apartheid system saw the establishment of “Homelands” intended to relegate particular ethnic groupings to separate parts of the country, and set up a pass system that was strictly enforced to maintain official racial segregation (Keegan, 1996; Rothberg, 2002; The State University, n. d.).

A racially-based education system that started during colonial rule was further entrenched through apartheid system. Black South Africans did not have access to the quality education system established purposely for the White South Africans to enable them to assume leadership or superior positions in the White-dominated commercial and administrative systems, while non-whites were prepared largely for subordinate roles (The State University, n. d.). The apartheid system was finally abolished in 1994 with Nelson Mandela as the first black president after long years of political pressure from within and without South Africa (Keegan, 1996; Robinson, 1996; Rotberg, 2002).

The abolishment of the apartheid system has sparked intense fear and anxieties among white South Africans populations on the basis of possible revenge following the liberation of the dangerous “other” (Bremner, 2004). This state of heightened fear and anxiety among the European South Africans is further buttressed by Dikeni (2002, p. 71), who argues that:

Fear is probably the major emotion that runs the lives of white people in South Africa. The whites are scared. They are scared of all sorts of things. They are scared of democracy under black majority. They are rattled by prospect of their children sitting at the same desk with black children... Holding the heart of the economy in their sweating palms... They agonize at the chances of a balaclava-ed thief, black like me,

using the night as a camouflage coming to peep into the serenity of their jewelry cases, just for the sake of revenge.

The natural reaction to this sense of insecurity among the Whites is to mobilize defensive mechanisms, such as the private policing services, to counteract this imminent danger.

Additionally, gun ownership was an exclusive preserve of the European populations, as Cock (2005, p. 800) writes, “A militarized form of citizenship characterized the apartheid era in that political citizenship involved compulsory national military service for white males. Blacks were denied access to firearms”. Consequently, gun ownership is now viewed among the blacks as an index of citizenship in the post-apartheid state. This suggests that owning a gun is conceptualized as a marker of freedom and liberation from the tyrannical apartheid state, and as a symbol of belongingness in the post-apartheid state. This prevalence of guns contributes to the violence and criminality engulfing the post-apartheid state and has partly sparked the demand for global private policing, particularly among the white populations.

Unsurprisingly, based on the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the country has the largest private security sector in the world (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010), and there are 9,013 registered active businesses; the private security industry employs over 440,000 officers in over 9000 security businesses (Private Security Regulatory Authority, 2013, p. 12, 34). There are numerous global companies operating in the country, as discussed in chapter 4. Violence and crime continue to be the major challenges confronting the people of South Africa, as the crime rate has generally failed to show a downward trend in South Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2014). Against this backdrop, global private policing is viewed as one of the viable alternatives to crime control and reduction in South Africa.

6.2 Regulation of Private Policing

The regulation of private policing in South Africa started in 1987 with the enactment of the Security Officers Act that resulted in the creation of the Security Officers Board, which sought to regulate, and engage the security industry in the provision, and governance of

security in the apartheid state. Subsequently, the National Key Points Act authorized private security personnel to guard strategically important national installations or facilities, such as fuel plants and military bases. Under this Act, the security officers were largely accorded the powers of search, arrest, and seizure (Berg & Nouveau, 2011).

While the 1987 Act was primarily intended for professionalizing the industry via state-led self-regulation that largely catered to private interests, *Security Officers Amendment Acts of 1992, 1996, 1997*, and *Private Security Industry Regulation Act of 2001* sought to protect public interests in terms of preventing abuse, and ensuring public safety (Berg & Nouveau, 2011). The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) was established based on the Private Security Industry Regulation Act of 2001. This regulatory body takes care of matters concerning applications for registration, suspension or withdrawal of registrations, prevention of exploitation, or abuse of employees, training, service quality, and complaints regarding the private security industry (Private Security Regulatory Authority, 2013). It also conducts an inspection of security businesses to ascertain compliance with or deviations from the Act, while providing an avenue for the general public to lodge complaints relative to private policing for redress.

The PSIA of 2001 spells out the specific requirements for prospective security service providers, and this was intended to screen out (among others) potential criminally minded people, and to help forestall their infiltration into the security industry. For instance, a prospective security service provider must be a citizen or permanent resident in South Africa; must be mentally sound; must have demonstrated compliance with the prescribed training requirements; must have no criminal conviction in the past 10 years; and must not have been found guilty in the last five years based on the PSIA Act of 2001. A potential security service provider must also meet the prescribed infrastructural facilities requirements. Private policing personnel are also required to meet some eligibility criteria similar to those outlined above,

such as not having criminal conviction or any guilty verdict in terms of the Act in the last 5 years, before they are certified or licensed to work as such. Generally, in South Africa, private police officers have powers to stop and search a suspect, seize any suspected stolen item, arrest, and even use lethal force should the potential suspect appear to resort to any threatening resistance to arrest (Berg, 2007; Berg & Nouveau, 2011).

Although the regulatory body seems to be doing well in ensuring compliance with the minimum standards required of the industry, there are crucial challenges that need to be addressed. These include infiltration of criminal syndicates into the industry, unregistered security officers, lack of monitoring of firearms, involvement of foreigners in the industry and general non-compliance with legislation. Also, there are traces of corruption among the employees of the Authority, as one employee was dismissed and written warnings were issued to three others following internal investigations into wrongful conduct (Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, 2013).

6.3 Security Implications of Military Restructuring

The military restructuring and downsizing has contributed to the presence of ex-combatants who tend to resort to crime that partly drives the demand for global private policing. As part of the 1990-1994 transitional processes, seven armed formations were integrated to form the Southern African National Army (SANDF) in the post-apartheid state with the view to avoiding a situation where ex-combatants would resort to criminal acts to survive (Bachelor & Willett, 1998; Cock, 2004, 2005; Cawthra, n. d.). However, military restructuring and downsizing that followed later led to a situation where the total population of the army (SANDF) was cut down from 110,000 as in 1994 to 59,000 in 2003. On the whole, about 30,000 soldiers have been discharged from the SANDF in recent years. This military demobilization affected most of the guerillas, such as those who were part of the military wing of African National Congress during the struggle for independence (Bachelor

& Willett, 1998; Cawthra, n. d.). The presence of ex-combatants without effective social integration, and the relevant employable and entrepreneurial skills, as has been the case throughout the southern African region, has been tied to a propensity to engage in acts of criminality as a means of livelihood (Cock, 2004, 2005). In turn, this situation has contributed to the high crime levels, which have created the perceived need for strengthened security measures, such as private policing in South Africa.

6.4 Security Implications of Widespread Poverty

The structural inequalities and gross disparities in wealth are linked to increased crime that drives the demand for private policing in general, especially among those who can afford it. Naylor (1995, as cited in Cock, 2005, p. 801) thus argues that:

Probably, the single most important thing stoking the [illegal arms] market from the demand side is the prevailing mal-distribution of income, wealth and ecological capital. Until these are fairly and frankly addressed, there is little hope of damping the desire of the disadvantaged to seek the tools and rectify those disparities by violent means.

This suggests that until there is social justice, until people have a credible and legitimate means of meeting their basic needs—food, portable water, decent housing, and quality health care—they are most likely to resort to other ways that are illegitimate and potentially violent. Bremner (2004, p. 462) therefore argues, “Feelings of anxiety, impotence, loss, social decay, frustration and anger have been re-ordered through the rubric of crime”. Rationally, the target of such possible violence attack often mobilizes the necessary security apparatuses, such as private policing uptake, to ensure their safety and security.

6.5 Governance, Justice System and State Security Machinery

The state’s penchant for pursuing neoliberal policies that primarily serve capital interests invariably promotes private policing linked to capital interest in particular. A critical case in point is the shift towards central city improvement district, otherwise known as the “business district”. This type of project originally started in Canada and the United States in

the 1970s (Samara, 2009; Berg, 2010). The business-district project is intended to ensure social redevelopment and revitalization in urban centres, particularly where business activities are reported to be in decline, to help generate investments and employment opportunities. As typical of virtually all neo-liberal-oriented projects, the business district is subject to patent market mechanisms, such as cost recovery, with the private corporations playing a cardinal role in its governance and management. Private-policing firms are generally contracted to police the business district, as is the case in South Africa (Samara, 2009; Berg, 2010). This sheds light on the role of the state in the creation, and legitimization of the market for the growth of private policing services, by setting examples in awarding contracts to private policing firms.

Aside from the state's promotion of private policing, the sheer lack of strong political will to tackle corruption decisively contributes to the erosion of confidence, and trust not only in the government machinery, but also the state institutions, such as criminal justice system. Tamukamoyo (2013) suggests that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) have not been robust enough to spearhead investigations into a wave of corruption dogging South Africa, partly due to leadership failure. The high prevalence of crime in South Africa suggests "weaknesses in building the bonds of community solidarity, weaknesses in the criminal justice system, from investigation of crimes to rehabilitation of offenders, as well as weaknesses in the efficiency of the court system, both in terms of technical and other infrastructure and management" (as cited in South African News Agency, 2009, para. 15). Invariably, there is a general "lack of faith in the rule of law, and the corrupted and biased justice system inherited from apartheid" (Cock, 2005, p. 798).

Regarding the state security apparatus, the post-apartheid police institution is not only incapable of maintaining law and order, but also contributes to criminal violence, for instance, through promoting sale of illegal firearms. In 1997, the police institution reported

1802 guns lost by the police personnel, and this resulted in the charging of only 143 officers (Newham & Faull, 2011, p. 798). This situation has partly led to a corrosion of the trust, and confidence of the citizenry in the police institution in combating crime. This development has served as a catalyst for the growing private security sector as more trusted or preferred alternative among those who can afford. Thus, one of the recommendations of the National Development Plan adopted by Cabinet in 2012 calls for a professionalization of the South Africa Police Service to bolster the trust, and confidence of the public (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).

6.6 Implications of Private Policing

Paasche, Yarwood and Sidaway (2013, p. 1) observe that private policing has “become one of the displacement, especially of so-called ‘undersirables’ from public space associated with private enclaves of consumption”. The essence of keeping “the unwelcome others” on the move is to prevent them from settling down so that they do not get the opportunity to look for chances to commit crime. They argue that there is a gradual development towards limiting the access of the poor to places designated for business purposes, as exemplified in central city improvement districts (CCID) that allow capital and urban developers to sidestep the city municipality and the public police in enforcing spatial regulation by means of private policing. Fundamentally, private policing is a form of disciplinary mechanism of governance that spurs social division between sections of the population. In South Africa, the targets of this disciplinary security are perceived to be mostly young black men placed under constant surveillance simply because they are not neatly dressed and often walk in a group (Bremner, 2004; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Cock, 2005; Samara, 2009). This culminates in the polarization of society by pitting the rich against the poor, and the black against the white. This does not help focus attention on addressing the

undercurrents of security threats—such as the pervasive social deprivation and poverty among the black majority.

Furthermore, as the guardians of the by-law regulations governing the Cape Town central city improvement district, private policing officers are more likely to be involved in abusive behaviour directed towards often the vulnerable and marginalized black people from the townships. By-laws that prohibit, for example, sleeping, and begging for money are virtually linked to the black poor, and, in this case, it behooves the private police officers to clear the streets of these unwanted people; this often involves harassment. For this reason, accusations of private policing personnel forcefully removing street children, and abusing them verbally and physically abound (Breytenbach, 2005). In aligning with this position, the Minister of Police in South Africa, En Mthethwa, acknowledges the potential excesses of private policing, noting, “The recent brutal assault and abuse of an elderly woman in Limpopo province by shopkeepers acting as private security guards, is but one of the many cases that requires us to focus more on abuses and heavy handedness by this industry against poor and vulnerable citizens of our country” (as cited in Private Security Regulatory Authority, 2013, p. 11). This demonstrates that private policing can potentially be abusive, brutal, and unfriendly to the poor if it is not kept in rigorous check.

Finally, recourse to private policing as a market commodity, and a means of securing protection in the post-apartheid state would mean that a large number of poor people will be priced out. Burton, du Plessis, Leggett, Louw, Mistry and van Vuuren (2004) observe that white and Indian South Africans are more likely to patronize the services and security products of private policing officers than their black counterparts. More precisely, about 70 per cent of blacks do not employ any form of security services, and this might point to inability to access them, although further research is needed to confirm this. In sum, private policing is both a product, and a function of neoliberal expansionism, spatial regulation, and

governance that tends to be racialized, exclusionary, repressive, and punitive. For this reason, Samara (2009) notes that private policing has become an effective instrument of a racial project of exclusion under the conditions of democratic dispensation in South Africa.

Chapter 7

The Case of Nigeria

This chapter investigates the rise of private policing in Nigeria. It starts with background information about Nigeria, and the regulation of private policing in the Nigerian context. It also explores thematically relevant issues, such as pervasive poverty, and governance, the justice system, and the state security machinery, and how these interface to impact on private policing. Finally, it interrogates how private policing impacts the poor in Nigeria.

7.1 Background

Nigeria is the most populous sub-Saharan African country in Africa, with a total population of at least 170 million that is almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims (Ploch, 2013). The south east is mainly Christian, while the North is largely Muslim; central Nigeria, commonly referred to as the “Middle Belt”, is predominantly inhabited by Christians, although Muslims dominate in some states. There are 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2012), which shares borders with Niger, Cameroun and the Chad Republic in the north, and the Republic of Benin in the west. Rainy and dry seasons constitute the predominant climatic conditions in the country. Oil production and exportation is largely the mainstay of the economy, alongside agriculture (Lanre & Olabisi, 2013).

Prior to the colonial rule, Nigeria did not exist as a nation, until 1914 when Great Britain amalgamated the Southern and Northern protectorates to constitute one colony that came to be known as Nigeria, which later gained independence on October 1, 1960 (Lanre & Olabisi, 2013). Nigeria is a federal republic state that has 36 states, with Abuja as the federal capital; English is the lingua franca, while Youraba, Igbo, and Hausa, constitute the primary indigenous languages. The country has a bicameral legislature that consists of the Senate with

109 members and a House of Representatives with 360. The president, legislators, and governors of Nigeria are directly elected for a four-year term. Nigeria has been characterized by bad governance, and corruption on a grand scale involving high-ranking political office holders who have contributed to the corrosion of the authority and legitimacy of the polity. The political life of the country has been marked by military regimes interspersed with civilian rule until 1999 when the country returned from military rule to the trajectory of multiparty democracy (Lanre & Olabisi, 2013).

In spite of its massive oil and gas resources, and other natural resources, including gold, columbite, limestone, coal, and bitumen, Nigeria's human development indicators of Nigeria are among the lowest in the world, with more than half the population wallowing in extreme poverty (Ploch, 2013). Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (2012, p. 15) observes that the percentage of Nigerians living in "absolute poverty" rose from 55 to 61 percent between 2004 and 2010 nationwide, while the general poverty rate hit 69 percent. The level of poverty is comparatively more pronounced in the north than the south in Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (2012) reports that seventy (70) percent of the population in the northeast of Nigeria, the traditional stronghold of Boko Haram insurgency, lives on less than a US dollar a day compared to 50 and 59 percent in south west and east Nigeria. Further, life expectancy in Nigeria was 53 years for males and 55 for females as in 2012 (World Health Organization, 2014b).

Extreme poverty of the masses, bad governance, high-profile corruption, religious and ethnic violence—perceived or real injustice—and the Boko Haram insurgence, constitute major problems of governance and security threats in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Ploch, 2013). Meanwhile, the Nigerian Police Force has been implicated in extrajudicial killings, extortion of money from both the crime victims for activating investigations and prosecutions, and from crime suspects as well for the abandonment of crime investigations

and prosecutions—with the highest payer often emerging as the winner (Onyeozili, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2012; World Report, 2014b). Against this backdrop, private policing seems to be one of the attractive mechanisms of crime control. It is estimated that between 1500 and 2000 private policing companies, including global ones as discussed in chapter 4, are present in Nigeria, and these employ over 100,000 people (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2007, 2010).

7.2 Regulation of Private Policing in Nigeria

The *Private Guards Companies Act of 1986* (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1986) regulates private policing in Nigeria. This Act stipulates that private policing companies must be registered as a company, licensed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and wholly owned by Nigerian nationals. Any person involved in criminal offences, such as fraud, theft, and breach of trust, or sacked on disciplinary grounds, whether within or outside Nigeria, is not eligible for a license. Nonetheless, this background-criminal check is seriously compromised by the limited existing criminal-convict databases for the screening of the potential private policing personnel (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005). This indicates that criminals can be recruited as private policing personnel, thereby adding to the security risks.

The Act also states that private policing firms are not permitted to use firearms (Hill, 2010); for this reason, different arrangements on a fee-paying basis exist between the Nigerian Police and the private policing companies that allow for the provision of an armed component to the operations of the private policing companies (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005). Essentially, private policing companies secure an attachment of public mobile police officers to their operations, and this has resulted in substantial public-private, and “global-local” policing partnerships, particularly in the oil-rich Niger Delta. To some extent, however, the contracting of the services of the public police force for private use in the

everyday operations of private policing companies reflects a privatization of the public police force.

In terms of the standard qualification and training, the Act requires that the private policing curriculum and instruction must be sanctioned by the Minister of the Internal Affairs, but this does not happen in practice (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005; Hill, 2010). Thus, training needs and requirements depend on the preferences of the individual private policing companies, while others do not even provide training for their personnel. Regarding wages and working conditions, there are no clear guidelines, and, therefore it is presumed that at least the national minimum wage will be used as a basis for payment. However, some companies' pay package is below the minimum wage, particularly among the unregistered security companies; meanwhile, the private policing officers are often subject to long working hours and late payment of salaries, or, in some cases, they are not paid at all. That notwithstanding, wages and working conditions tend to be relatively better with highly established companies (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005; Kasali, n. d.).

Lastly, the monitoring and review of private policing companies is limited to auditing and inspections of the private policing companies by a variety of different ministries, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and State Security Service. This monitoring is meant to ensure the observance of the labour and immigration laws of Nigeria; oversight role over the quality of standards of policing services is extremely rare (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005). However, following the *Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act No. 2 of 2003, and Amendment Act of 2007*, the Private Guard Companies Department (PGC) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) is officially in charge of overseeing the general supervision and the monitoring of private security companies in Nigeria (Kasali, n. d.).

7.3 Security Implications of Poverty and Environmental Insecurity

The harnessing of oil that has contributed to environmental damage, while the masses are excluded from oil wealth, is linked to the fragile security situation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Soroos (1997, p. 236) writes that if security is fundamentally about “the assurance people have that they will continue to enjoy those things that are most important to their survival and well-being”, then the security of the people of Niger Delta has been undermined by the oil industry. As a result, resistant movements have sprung up to re-assert control over their natural resources, including the oil and gas, to ward off “further alienation, expropriation, and environmental degradation” (Obi, 2005 p. 318). Oriola (2013) therefore argues that the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) employs this environmental framing of the insurgency to appeal to the masses, to legitimize its struggles, and to arouse general sympathy for the movement. These resistance movements adopt a number of tactics, such as kidnapping of oil workers as a way of pressuring the federal government to respond to the desperate call of the aggrieved people for their fair share of the oil wealth. Another reason attributed to kidnapping is to inflict harm on transnational oil companies believed to have colluded with the Nigerian government in the oil extraction that has badly affected the ecosystem. For this reason, criminal acts, and general violence, alongside a high sense of insecurity, have enveloped the oil-rich region in an attempt to disrupt and stop the on-going oil extraction.

Expectedly, the proliferation of private policing is most pronounced as one of the mechanisms of crime prevention and control to guarantee the safety and the security of oil workers, and their key installations (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2007, 2009; 2010; University of Warwick, n.d.). In this regard, Abrahamsen and William (2005, p.12) argue that:

The oil industry represents a growing market for international private security companies in Nigeria, providing, in the words of one oil company director, a more professional and

disciplined guard force that can act as “a buffer” between the state security forces and the oil companies. The privatization of public policing organizations is more extensive in the oil industry than in any other part of Nigerian society and economy. Virtually all levels of public force, including the military, have been integrated into the day-to-day security arrangements of the oil industry to a degree where it is often difficult to determine where public policing ends and private security begins.

This suggests that private policing has become an indispensable part of the security arrangements to secure the running of the oil industry.

7.4 Governance, Justice System and State Security Machinery

The complex nature of accumulation linked to the extraction of oil, involving transnational alliance, and the ruling elites of Nigeria, has been the bane of suffering in the country, particularly in the oil-rich communities. According to Watts (2004, p. 60), this accumulation works through an “oil complex” that consists of:

a statutory monopoly over mineral exploitation, a nationalized oil company (NNPC) that operates through joint ventures with oil majors who are granted territorial concessions, the security apparatuses of the state protecting costly investments and ensuring the continual flow of oil, and an institutional mechanism 'derivation principle' by which federal oil revenues are distributed to the states and producing communities, and not least the oil producing communities themselves.

This presupposes that the federal ruling elite coalition that involves the small number of the ruling class in the Niger Delta benefits most from the oil extraction relative to the citizenry, as Obi (2010, p. 222) maintains that:

...the Nigerian state acts transnationally to facilitate oil extraction, with the ruling elite coalition using state power to accumulate oil wealth. It also uses the ‘privatized’ state and its coercive force—the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) established in 2003—to protect oil installations and facilitate extraction by crushing protest and resistance to oil industry operations. The Nigerian state, the ruling elite, and its transnational partners use oil wealth to reinforce control over power and continue reproducing oil-based, transnational accumulation in the Niger Delta.

This highlights the reasoning behind the militaristic approach to the maintenance of the status quo in Nigeria, despite public outcry against an endemic corruption that denies the citizenry any benefit from the massive oil wealth.

The government has also encouraged and promoted the neoliberal agenda, such as privatization and public-private partnerships, which prepare a fertile ground for the growth of global private policing. In Niger Delta, for instance, there has been a move towards public-private partnerships, or pluralization, as exemplified in partnership policing, which brings together the public police forces and global security firms to form public-private security partnerships, alongside the military and the navy personnel. This partnership policing is aimed at securing the operations of multinational oil firms (University of Warwick, n.d.) Aside from these public-private policing partnerships, the privatization of public policing has been more intensive in the oil-rich region of Niger Delta than anywhere in Nigeria. For example, the protection of Nigerian waters has been outsourced to G4Securicor, a leading global security firm in the world; G4S Nigeria carries out this function, using special emergency response vessels (Group4Securicor Nigeria, n.d.). The reasoning behind this privatization and partnership developments is the perceived efficiency and effectiveness linked to the private sector.

Finally, the apparent rot in the criminal justice structures has massively eroded the trust of the general public in the justice system structures, particularly the police and judiciary, because combating crime and ensuring fair justice administration are, at best, a tangential concern (Okereke 1995; Osoba 1996; Hill, 2010; Oluwaniyi 2011). The global private policing may therefore be seen as an alternative to the absent, or virtually ineffective, public policing in ensuring the security and safety of property and life among the privileged in Nigerian.

7.5 Security Implications of Imperialism and Globalization

The militarized strategy to facilitate an unimpeded extraction of oil enjoys the support of different actors, namely, Western powers with interests in the oil from the Niger Delta, multinational oil corporations backed by their home governments, and the ruling coalition of

Nigeria. In 2008, the British government argued, “The price of oil requires us to look round the world where sources of production can be found; one of the areas, where we can make greatest progress most quickly, is the Niger Delta” (BBC, 2008, p. 1). The United Kingdom (UK) therefore offered to help Nigeria tackle the lawlessness in the Niger Delta without focusing on addressing the underlying grievances. Essentially, the existing power-sharing arrangement reflects “a transnational oil alliance comprising the oil multinationals, their home governments, the Nigerian state, and ruling elite coalitions built within its structure of power, of which a small but significant faction is of Niger Delta origin” (Obi, 2010, p. 220). For this reason, the militarization of the oil-rich Niger Delta that involves the global private policing firms and the state security machinery is not surprising.

Additionally, the global war on terror has also shaped the context for fighting resistance groups in the Niger Delta. These resistance groups are often labeled as terrorist groups with possible links to international terrorist organizations, which are generally perceived as targeting Western nationals and oil interests; in turn, this has partly informed the militaristic approach to resolving the Niger Delta security problems (Pham, 2007). The Nigerian government thus views resistance groups, such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, as terrorists and criminals that must be crushed without any hesitation. Consequently, the undercurrents of the volatile security situations in the Delta are relegated to the background, due to greater emphasis on the militarization and securitization as the more preferred solutions to the security threats. This development may have shaped the growth of the global private policing firms in the Delta to secure the transnational capital, multinational oil firms, and Western oil interests, to facilitate an uninterrupted extraction of oil to meet global oil demands. This may especially be the case, given that one of the G4S’ biggest contracts on the African continent is with ChevronTexaco, an American multinational

energy giant operating in Nigeria, was brokered in 2002 following the events of September 11, 2001.

Finally, the proliferation of small arms and weapons due to the porous nature of African borders has partly given rise to the surge in violent crime that overwhelms the public police force due to the logistical constraints, inadequate police personnel, poor training, and corruption (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005). This has also spurred the high demand for efficient, tailored, and professional, private policing services in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta, and other parts of Africa, where the reputed multinational security companies provide security services, especially to multinational businesses (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007).

7.6 Implications of Private Policing

In a climate of unpredictable security threat from everywhere, especially in the wake of largely inefficient, and sometimes, violent public police force, those who can afford to are living in gated communities in Nigeria; others have secured the services of private security guards to watch over their homes, lives, place of business, and properties (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005; Kasali, n. d.). In this regard, the ordinary citizens who are already struggling for their daily bread are most unlikely to access private security as a commodity due to poverty. Further, the poor employees of security companies, particularly the unregistered ones, are subject to long working hours and low wages of less than US \$40 per month despite high cost of living, especially in the cities of Nigeria. They are also subject to high risk of violent attack, which can result in death or long-term injury without having any genuine insurance cover (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005; Kasali, n. d.).

Finally, there are excesses of private police officers and the security firms, as they tend to overstep their boundaries and infringe upon the fundamental rights of often vulnerable citizens. Hence, Kasali (n. d.) writes that innocent people have been killed or injured as a result of reckless driving by private police officers, presumably in the name of chasing a

criminal. This habit of recklessness and brutality in the discharge of security functions is more likely to further worsen the plight of the poor to seek justice, given their already pre-existing financial and structural incapacitation in hiring the services of professional lawyers to pursue their cause.

Chapter 8

Comparative Analysis

This chapter explores the similarities and differences between South Africa and Nigeria in regard to the rise of global private policing. More generally, it also interrogates the context of global private policing in Africa, and finally seeks to frame concise responses to the key research questions formulated to guide this thesis project.

8.1 Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Nigeria

The general developments that continue to shape and facilitate the rise of global private policing are largely identical or uniform in Nigeria and South Africa. First, the inability of the state security machinery to provide security due to logistical, operational and human resources constraints, culminating in the apparent security vacuum gives rise to the demand for private policing firms to fill this perceived gap. There is also a general lack of trust in the security apparatus of the state, given that the state security machinery and the entire criminal justice system are immensely marked with corruption. In some cases, the brutal and the repressive character of the public police have contributed to the alienation of the public whose cooperation and collaboration with the former is vital for effective crime control. In the extreme instances, the public police forces have been a source of violence and criminality, through the direct engagement in criminal acts, or at least in aiding criminals to commit crime with impunity by releasing vital information, and the selling or lending of sophisticated guns. It also worth noting that there are excesses of private policing, such as the infringement on the fundamental rights of often vulnerable citizens, in both case studies, although in differing degree and extent in terms of the impact and frequency. Further, the poor often tend to have their fundamental rights abused and they bear disproportionately the blunt of the excesses of the global security firms, due to their already pre-existing financial

and structural incapacitation and in particular their lack of means to hire the services of professional lawyers to pursue their cause.

Second, the two countries have been involved in the promotion of the privatization of security, although in different forms and intensity, to support or complement the state security machinery to ensure greater efficiency in addressing security challenges; this creates and legitimizes the security market for the global security firms. Third, the continuous corrosion of the non-Western indigenous crime control mechanisms, such as the observance of collective human security, may have spurred the wave of crime, and, for that reason, global private policing in both case studies. The creation of colonial and later post-colonial states introduced new political structures that reflect social organization in the imperialist countries, such as France and Great Britain, with unique political power arrangements that now cater to the interests of African political elites and former colonial powers. As a result, the interests of the masses are immensely neglected, as exemplified in the Niger Delta environmental crisis linked to the oil resource development that primarily serves the interests of Nigerian political elites and the Western powers. The moral fabric that was originally hinged on the communal spirit of the affected countries has been, and continues, to be eroded by an imperialist culture grounded in capitalist values and philosophy, facilitated by colonialism and the contemporary global neoliberal transformations.

Fourth, Western dominance through [neo]colonialism has structurally placed most African countries in the disadvantaged location as suppliers of cheap raw materials in the broader grand scheme of global capitalism, and this contributes to the reproduction of poverty that has many adverse security implications, as observed in both case studies. Further, the high levels of poverty due to economic mismanagement, corruption, and irresponsible leadership, on the part of mostly the political elites in the observed countries have also created fragile security conditions, especially in Nigeria. This has been worsened by the

Western push for minimal state intervention, linked to neoliberal reforms, which have created a situation where social security is gradually but steadily becoming individualized rather than collective, while public resources are shifting to private hands through often the scandalous processes of privatization. In Nigeria, the political elites seem to have partnered with Western oil giants to continue the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Niger Delta that has contributed to the acceleration of environmental degradation; and this, in turn, has threatened the human security of the affected communities that depend on subsistence agriculture as their primary means of survival. This situation has triggered the insurgencies in the Niger Delta region, and, as a result, public-private policing partnership is more pronounced here than elsewhere in Nigeria to keep the oil and gas industry running.

Fifth, the marketing strategies of security companies heighten the already high sense of fear and the imminent threat of crime to create the demand for their services, and this has contributed in speeding up the development towards an unprecedented global private policing in Nigeria and South Africa. Lastly, the proliferation of arms facilitated by the global neoliberal transformations have also contributed to the rise in crime and violence, and in turn this has partly led to an increased demand for more effective security mechanisms from those who can afford them, such as the perceived efficient private policing firms, as documented in previous studies (University of Warwick, n. d.; Bearpark & Schulz, 2007; Samara, 2009; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010).

While there are many points of convergence regarding the developments of global private policing in the observed countries, the obvious major point of divergence lies in the extent to which those common factors interface to impact differently on security situations; and subsequently, this dictates the magnitude and the prospects of global private policing in the two countries. In the case of South Africa, for instance, the violence and brutal nature of colonial repression, particularly the apartheid regime, has helped shape the somewhat

nihilistic attitude to violence among some indigenous peoples in the post-Apartheid era, as they consider the possession of gun as an index of citizenship. This encourages an increased circulation of guns in the system with the increased likelihood of being used at the least provocation. Also, among the radical indigenes, using violent means to re-claim control of what the White segment of the South African population has appropriated through the racialized processes of colonialism and apartheid is somewhat morally justified. In other words, they think that most White South Africans have taken over their control over their natural resources through colonialism and apartheid; therefore it is high time they used every means to reclaim control of their resources. This apparently contributes to the rise in crime levels and therefore the perceived need to resort to private policing, as a proactive alternative approach to ensure security among Whites who constitute the major clientele base of global private policing in South Africa.

Additionally, the higher presence of global private policing in South Africa compared to Nigeria is largely linked to the settler colonial status of the former that encouraged private policing as an integral part of the imperialist control mechanisms to maintain White privileges, while preserving the structural inequalities among the indigenes. In effect, the dissolution of apartheid rule has not resulted in shattering its fundamental character of economic organization designed deliberately to favour the White minority, whose economic dominance is still very much alive as it was in the days of apartheid in many respects.

Undoubtedly, the complex interface of the widely common factors, such as the implications of — the violent colonialism and contemporary global neoliberal reforms, shape the development of private policing differently in the two countries; this reflects White's (2012) theorization that the complex dynamics of political and economic situations dictate the scale of private policing in a particular jurisdiction or country.

8.2 The Context of Global Private Policing in Africa

According to Kohn (2014, p. 1.), “the term imperialism draws attention to the way that one country exercises power over another, whether through settlement, sovereignty, or indirect mechanisms of control”. In the current study, imperialism reflects this definition, which fundamentally suggests foreign influences in the running of a country. In this light, the imperialist context of rising global private policing in Africa can be viewed primarily from three perspectives. First, the developments that have contributed to the demand for private policing, and that continue to do so, are mostly external in origin, principally from the West, as explained in chapter 5. Those developments are rooted in imperialism, with both an historical context as in colonialism, and the contemporary context in the form of expert knowledge transfer, and ideological influences, such as the global neoliberal political-economic agenda that fosters privatization, unfettered market competition, and the withdrawal of the state support for the poor.

The second dimension of an imperialist context relates to the growth, or the high presence, of the global private security companies operating in Africa to safeguard the interests of the transnational capital, and Western powers, in large measure. In the South African context, the security firms are mostly owned by Whites to secure White wealth and Western interests generally; and in the case of Nigeria, the picture looks the same, given that the heavy presence of the global security firms is linked to the oil and gas sector dominated by oil giants of Western origin. The intense liberalization of most African economies, spearheaded by the global North, in recent decades has facilitated the entry, or the spread, of multinational corporations, including the global security firms. In shedding light on the undercurrents of the rise of global private policing in the African context, Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) contend that neoliberal forms of government that inspire outsourcing of security services, and public-private security partnerships, constitute an important dimension

of the forces propelling this phenomenon. The extension of private policing services to most countries in Africa is an unprecedented development linked to the global spread of capitalist ideology, values and philosophy that are fundamentally alien to most pre-colonial African societies, as explained in detail in chapter 5.

The third dimension relates to the corruption, general economic mismanagement and irresponsible leadership, which results largely from the preceding two factors. Emanating directly from the first imperialist dimension in particular is the re-designing and re-engineering of pre-colonial African social organization patterned on the Western social organization that is largely at variance with African peculiarities, which has resulted in many problems confronting the continent. For instance, political power shifted from the trusted traditional political institutions to those who remained loyal to imperialist powers to serve their common interests, thereby laying the groundwork for the kind of large-scale corruption being witnessed in most parts of the African continent. This problem has been compounded by most successive African political elites, who have actively exploited and consolidated the legacies of colonialism. This includes the divide-and-rule tactics based on ethnic cleavages and tensions, and private gain propelled by self-interests analogous to the capitalist greed, to maintain their grip on political power. These three processes fundamentally intersect in complex ways to create the favourable climate for the growth of global private policing in Africa.

Viewed from a more continental perspective, it is evident that the interplay of factors, including the global spread of market liberalization, the proliferation of arms and weapons, the growth of mass poverty amidst mass wealth, the weak state and the associated security void, and the historical legacies of colonialism, impinge upon fragile security conditions in Africa. These circumstances have enabled the rapid development of private policing in most African countries, as suggested in similar studies (Clapham, 1999; Bremner, 2004; Bearpark

& Schulz, 2007; Gumedze, 2007; Similane, 2008; Samara, 2009; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010). For instance, Clapham (1999, p. 27) argues that the weak state capacity is due largely to colonial “projects of territorial statehood” based on the Weberian conception of modern nation-state that commands legitimate use of force that has not largely served African security interests. Clapham (1999, p. 25) further maintains that:

It was ...one of the key projects of colonial rule to ensure that security derived, and was seen to derive explicitly from the central state, and that any mechanism through which African communities might seek to maintain ‘their own’ security was systematically destroyed or strictly subordinated to the colonial authorities.

The traditional ways of delivering security at the sub-state level were consciously eroded, or unrelentingly undermined, and instead, repressive and coercive police forces that terrorized the colonized people to secure the interests of the colonial powers were instituted. In sharing this observation in the context of Nigeria, Alemika (1988, p. 164) contends, “The sundry administrative, coercive and surveillance organs (police, prisons, courts, tribunals, ‘native’ authorities, Residents and District Officers) were established to prosecute, promote, and defend British imperialistic interests in Nigeria”. Today, public police forces in most parts of Africa continue to be instruments of oppression against ordinary citizens in the name of the so-called national or state security, as documented in recent studies focusing on South Africa (Faull, 2013; Steinberg, 2014). These recent studies suggest the need for an urgent reform of the public police force.

In concurring with this problematic creation of the state and its coercive security apparatuses, Onyeozili (2005 p.47) writes, “Following freedom from the colonial masters, the political class in Nigeria perpetuated the inherited hegemonic policing policy. While adapting to the imperialist culture, the traditional values were compromised, and this had adverse implications for the institution of law enforcement”. Hence, we now have in place imperialist law-enforcement structures that appear not to be robust enough to address Africa’s unique security-related issues like the widespread poverty that has contributed to the creation of the

security vacuum that has activated the demand for private policing. Bearpark & Schulz (2007, p. 54) thus maintain that private policing is primarily “the product of long-term historical development rather than a phenomenon of relatively a recent origin”.

Additionally, the proliferation of small arms and weapons due to the porous nature of African borders has partly given rise to the surge in violent crime that overwhelms the public police force due to the logistical constraints, inadequate police personnel, poor training, and corruption. This has also spurred the high demand for efficient, tailored and professional private policing services, as noted by Bearpark & Schulz (2007). Ultimately, the effects of imperialism, and the corrupt and irresponsible leadership in most parts of Africa, are largely responsible for shaping and facilitating the rise of global private policing in the observed countries in particular, and Africa as a whole.

8.3 Whose Interest Does Private Policing Primarily Serve?

Private policing produces an exclusionary effect, under the guise of creating sanitized economic and cultural space to promote economic growth and investment by way of attracting affluent people who are capable of participating in the culture of consumption, leisure and recreation. In South Africa, private policing has become an instrument of racial divide, as Samara (2009, p.652) writes that the Central City Improvement District (CCID) fundamentally functions as “an apparatus of legitimate racial exclusion under the conditions of neoliberal democracy”. Private policing has been a central instrument for enforcing and overseeing this neoliberal space regulation and governance, often resulting in increased harassment and beatings of the poor (Breytenbach, 2005). Private policing tends to take aim at the removal of an unwanted people from the sanitized privately policed spaces and “deposit” them at the periphery of the city where they “belong”. Hence, Samara (2009, p. 652) further draws attention to the changing or “shifting understanding of citizenship, right and belonging” in the neoliberal space. In many respects, global private policing is a form of

“othering”, particularly in South Africa, given its highly punitive, classist, and racist, character. Private policing officers erect checkpoints, and initiate road closures and so on, thereby restricting access and movement unnecessarily among those who fit their descriptions or labels of the “other”. These labels include lack of industry, general propensity to crime, and a high sense of irresponsibility; all of which are usually determined on the basis of skin color, and manner of dressing (Kempa & Singh, 2008); and this suggests racial profiling against Black South Africans.

Also, the users of private policing services are predominantly property owners, small, medium and large business entities, multinational corporations, embassies and high commissions, political elites, and economically powerful individuals in the observed countries. While private policing largely serves the interests of the powerful class (be it political or economic), transnational capital, and Western powers, the masses often constitute the object of private policing and surveillance activities. It is against this backdrop that Simelane (2008, p. 641) writes, “The policing of space is closely linked to the interests of private property and commodity regimes in cities”; and Samara (2009) corroborates this observation, linking the creation of private police forces to the interests of capital.

Fundamentally, security as a commodity cannot be accessed by those whose need for the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter, and health care, is already a huge challenge in the observed countries. This point is consistent with Kempa and Singh’s (2008) observation that the rejection or unaffordability of marketized private policing is evident in the lesser patronage of such services among the poor Black South Africans. Meanwhile, the brutality of the criminally-minded people rarely distinguishes between the poor and the rich. Consider, for example, the Nigerian situation where roadblocks are set up for attacking and robbing travelers, even in broad daylight, is most likely to affect ordinary people as they tend to have no armed guards to escort or protect them. Thus, the state’s abdication of its role in

the provision of security needs for its citizenry culminates in the rendering of often vulnerable people susceptible to more violence and criminal acts. Another effect is the culture of instant justice as the poor regulation of the activities of private policing and vigilante groupings may mean that the justice delivery is carried outside the boundaries of the legal and formal justice systems or structures. This suggests that the due process of law is least likely to be duly followed to allow a fair hearing and trial of those suspected of any criminal activities. This observation is consistent with the existing literature (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2009, 2010; Samara, 2009)

Further, Gumede (2007, p. 198) contends that the primary beneficiary of the South African security industry is the privileged White population, while “Africans, the historically disadvantaged majority group in the country, benefit least.” First, the owners of the security companies in South Africa are predominantly White, while Africans are employed as security officers with meagre pay packages. Second, the White populations form the “strongest clientele base” for the industry, whereas a few people of African descent buy security services from the security industry. This presupposes that the masses can barely benefit from the commoditization of security; rather, the rise of private policing seems to serve primarily the powerful groups, and the well-established multinational security companies that take advantage of the security vacuum in Africa to deliver professional policing and consulting services. In relation to the local security companies that undoubtedly benefit from this development too, the multinational security companies are better positioned in terms of having a more enhanced competitive edge over their local counterparts by virtue of their unraveled security expertise, and logistical and operational capacities.

In addition, the rise of private policing brings about employment opportunities, and this creation of jobs is inherently positive and negative. It is positive, perhaps, as illustrated by the creation of employment opportunities in reducing the large army of unemployed youth

in the observed countries. Another reason is the contribution of the private policing firms in terms of the payment of taxes and maintenance of peace and security in attracting external investments, although the flooding of the local market by multinational corporations has a high prospect of crowding out similar local businesses. On the other hand, the creation of employment linked to global security companies is intrinsically negative to some extent, given the low salaries and long-working hours that appear to be the norm rather than an exception. Those conditions have the possibility of incentivizing security personnel into indulgence in criminal activities, capitalizing on their acquired security experience, knowledge, and sometimes, access to weaponry, as documented in other studies (Bearpark & Schulz, 2007; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005, 2010).

The multinational companies also benefit from the availability of private professional policing services to enable them to remain in profitable business ventures, as epitomized in the heavy presence of global private policing linked to the oil and gas sector in the Niger Delta. This suggests that the existence and the rise of private policing facilitate and ensure the security of mostly global capital via investments in foreign countries, thereby aiding the globalization of capital and capitalist ideologies. To some extent, those investments engendered by neoliberal globalization processes may benefit the indigenous people as illustrated in the creation of employment opportunities. Yet, in the bigger picture, the global neoliberal transformation processes “disproportionately serve the interests of the global North generally, and more specifically the global capitalist class as a whole” (Asomah, 2014, p. 127). This often occurs through the indiscriminate liberalization of African economies to the detriment of local industries that often struggle to face the keener competition from their well-established Western counterparts.

In conclusion, the demand for private policing constitutes a need to a great extent, considering the urgency to fill the apparent security vacuum in most parts of Africa; this

need, however, is immensely a product of a conflation of several factors of which the historical legacies of colonialism and contemporary forms of imperialism have played a cardinal role. This has further been compounded by corruption, economic mismanagement, and the general irresponsible leadership in most parts of Africa. Essentially, global private policing largely serves the interests of the powerful, including those of the global capitalist class, imperialist powers, and African elites. In particular, the presence of Western multinational security companies enables the imperial powers to gain some form of leverage in terms of exercising power and influence in the security governance that fundamentally protects their political and economic interests. For instance, the heavy presence of global private policing in the Niger Delta is to secure Western oil interests and transnational oil corporations; and this phenomenon is also linked to the protection of White interests and privileges in South Africa. To this end, there is a reason to believe that the rise of global private policing is, in large measure, an imperialist project, whether directly or indirectly, internationally or unintentionally.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

This final chapter presents an overview of the insights from, and the implications of, this research project. It begins with a review of the research findings and their policy implications. It then presents theoretical reflections, and a discussion of the future of global private policing in Africa. It also highlights the major limitations of this study, and suggestions for future research to shed more light on the uncharted territories, or the unsettled contestations and controversies, regarding security governance pluralism in the African context in particular. It finally presents the concluding remarks.

9.1 Review of the Research Findings and Policy Implications

This thesis interrogated the context of the apparent rise in global private policing in Africa, focusing primarily on Nigeria and South Africa for the purpose of an in-depth illustrative and comparative analysis to determine whether it is an imperialist project or a real need; to explore who primarily benefits from this development; and to consider the broader security policies for confronting crime problems. It drew on insights from Foucauldian governmentality studies and a postcolonial perspective in particular to analyze the development of private policing in the African context. This research found that private policing is largely a function of a paradigm shift from collective human security to an individualistic sense of security through greater emphasis on competition, and private property or gain, in contrast to the collective welfare that massively characterized most pre-colonial African societies.

Global private policing is a product of long-term historical undercurrents of colonialism, and of the contemporary manifestation of imperialism in the form of global neoliberal political and economic reforms, as well as the transfer of expert knowledge, including crime control policies; together with a leadership crisis rooted in high-profile

corruption, and the general economic mismanagement in most parts of Africa. This is largely the case in both the Nigerian and South African contexts; however, the impact on the extent of global private policing significantly differs in both cases due to their respective unique internal political and economic dynamics. More generally, this thesis implicates imperialist powers on one hand, and, on the other, Africans themselves, and particularly the successive African ruling elites, in the proliferation of private policing across Africa. This development has been accelerated through the aggressive, embracement and entrenchment of neoliberal values and philosophy in recent decades.

In the Nigerian context, the colonial powers may have generally laid the foundations, directly or indirectly, for the current state of affairs; yet, the successive political elites have predominantly helped in diverse ways to at least maintain the status quo through systemic corruption, and somewhat irresponsible leadership, with the attendant security concerns as demonstrated particularly in the oil-related insurgencies in the Niger Delta. Unsurprisingly, global private policing is more extensive in this oil-rich region, where the line between the public and private policing is blurred to secure the continuous extraction of oil and gas. Moreover, the heavy presence of transnational oil companies has contributed to shaping Nigeria's private security environment, since they rely heavily on private security firms to secure their business premises and to protect personnel from the threat of organized crime, including kidnapping and violent resistance by the so-called non-state-corporate "insurgents". The recourse to increased global private policing as a response to maintaining security in the wake of local insurgencies may not be sustainable in the long term; however, more permanent solutions may rather lie in addressing issues related to poverty, and the exclusion of local people in particular from oil resource wealth.

In the same vein, the distinctive racialized character of the social structure, as a result of colonialism and the brutal apartheid rule, has helped shape criminogenic conditions as

manifested in high crime rates in South Africa. The high levels of poverty in the country are linked to the high propensity to engage in criminal acts to earn means of livelihood among some people, regardless of the consequences in the event of arrest, or being killed. This situation has contributed to high crime levels, which have created the perceived need for strengthened security measures, such as an increased uptake of global private policing. Accordingly, the institutionalization of private policing as an integral part of the apartheid state security apparatus to maintain White wealth and Black poverty continues to live on in the post-apartheid era. On this account, poverty and racism need to be tackled seriously, as they constitute the underlying causes of crime and insecurity experienced by South Africans.

The research undertaken for this study also suggests that the structural dynamics of poverty and crime should be carefully considered and addressed together to ensure human security, rather than relying on aggressive crime prevention and control measures, as in get-tough-on-crime campaigns. The get-tough-on-crime attitude is not the sole viable solution to rising crime; otherwise the US would have been a crime-free country by now (Correctional Service of Canada, 2013). This suggests the need for a combination of more effective crime control and prevention measures on one hand, and more effective solutions to social inequality, poverty, and racism, on the other. Further, this study has shown that the poor often tend to bear the brunt of the excesses of global private police officers, as well as the global security firms, due to the former's already pre-existing financial and structural incapacitation in hiring the services of professional lawyers to pursue their cause.

In addition, it is argued that the demand for private policing constitutes a need to a great extent, given the urgency to fill the apparent security gap in the selected countries, and perhaps in most parts of Africa. However, this need is predominantly a product of an interplay of many forces of which the historical legacies of colonialism and contemporary forms of imperialism have played a central role. Essentially, global private policing

immensely serves the interests of the powerful, including those of the global capitalist class, imperialist powers, and the African elites. Essentially, given the high presence of the [Western-originated] transnational security firms in Africa that fundamentally aim at protecting or securing Western political and economic interests, there is reason to argue that the rise of global private policing is, in large measure, an imperialist project.

In light of the foregoing observations, it is obvious that if Africa is ever to overcome and begin to heal from the harms of imperialism and neo-liberalism, African political elites must begin to pursue and advance national and collective interests that can address at least the basic needs of the citizenry. They also must demonstrate an unflinching commitment to combating corruption by desisting from corrupt practices themselves, punishing severely cronies, and political and administrative officials who nakedly loot national coffers, or through their actions and inactions cause willful financial losses to the states. This, however, must be done in a transparent and fair manner, using due process safeguards enshrined in their respective constitutions. Aside from fighting corruption, infrastructural development needs to be on the political agenda; the provision of, and access to, effective health care delivery, quality sanitation, meaningful education, potable water, and motorable road networks need to be pursued vigorously. Moreover, reforming the security apparatuses of the state to be transparent, proactive, trustworthy, efficient, politically neutral, and human-rights-minded, is also critical to restoring the trust of the people in the state security machinery and the entire justice system.

Ultimately, this research calls on African leaders to wake up and pursue political, social and economic, agendas that advance the general welfare of African peoples. African countries need to map out pragmatic strategies for the pursuit of their core national interests. It also emphasizes the need to decolonize our mentality as people that nothing African works, or is inherently good, which is part of the imperialist project linked to the notion of the

“other”. This research therefore advocates a social movement towards building and sustaining an inclusive society whereby everyone has a sense of belongingness, and a fair share of the national cake, regardless of political affiliations, religion, racial and ethnic background, or gender. Further, African criminologists are also called upon to expose the excesses of the state and imperialism, and how these impact on crime, while highlighting the broader social context of crime problems. In effect, they need to draw attention to the fact that the culture of get tough on crime without poverty-reduction interventions is bound to fail, thereby highlighting the broader social context of crime and security challenges. Finally, strong political activism is required of all well-meaning development partners (including Western states, multinational corporations, and international governmental organizations like the UN or AU), citizens, and the civil society organizations in particular, in holding public officials accountable, and sensitive to the basic needs of the citizenry.

9.2 Theoretical Reflections

Using insights from the postcolonial theory, this research has attempted to reconcile externalist and internalist schools of thought regarding the social, economic, and political, struggles and problems confronting contemporary Africa that intersect in complex ways in producing and reproducing volatile security conditions. The externalist school of thought suggests that colonialism and imperialism has played a major role in shaping the character of post-colonial African social organization that has contributed to the economic and social ills of Africa; while the internalist camp indicates that this situation has been aggravated by successive African leaders through corruption, tyrannical political regimes, political instability, and injustice, among others, since independence. In this light, the role of African criminology is to expose the injustices of imperialism, and the excesses of African states that continue to deepen the woes of African peoples, as suggested in the previous literatures (Cohen, 1988; Agozino, 2003; Oriola, 2006; Larsen & Smandych, 2008; Cunneen, 2011;

Shearing & Marks, 2011). They should also break away from Western criminological theory and knowledge frameworks of crime control that often do not reflect African peculiarities.

In addition, this research further substantiates the observation that a get-tougher-on-crime stance with little regard for understanding the social context of crime holistically in tackling structural inequalities is most likely to fail. This suggests that critical criminological theories, such as postcolonial perspectives, using qualitative approaches are more useful for gaining deeper and more holistic insights into the social context of crime for the purpose of comprehensive crime reduction or control; this is in sharp contrast to positivist-oriented mainstream criminology that adopts quantitative methods, focusing in particular on the frequency of crime and those marginalized people often caught up in crime control mechanisms.

This study also demonstrates that the state plays a leading role in legitimizing the commoditization of security through the formulation of private security policies and regulations, and the provision of markets for private security through outsourcing, as well as public-private security partnership arrangements, as theorized by White (2012). Further, mass wealth and mass poverty partly constitute a driving force behind the expansion of global private policing, as suggested in the literature (Currie, 1998; Johnson & Shearing, 2003; Aas, 2013). While it is the case that many factors may trigger security concerns, it is also undeniable fact that poverty is one of the major undercurrents of crime problems. When people are highly vulnerable, due in part to poverty, they are more likely to be subjected to unthinkable manipulations, such as radicalization into extremist or terrorist groups. Often this is the case when such vulnerable individuals believe that they have no realistic hope of any stake in the fortunes of the society, and, as a result, they feel alienated from society and its values, as suggested by anomie and sub-cultural theories.

Anomie theory assumes that anomic conditions arise when a segment of the population feels alienated, or detached, from the shared goals, norms, expectations and values of the society, as a result of rapid social change, and this may shape criminogenic conditions among the alienated (Durkheim, 1951; Merton, 1938). Further, subcultural theory posits that values, expectations, beliefs, and attitudes, of a social group may promote criminal and violent behaviour among the group members (Miller, 1958; Tanner, 2009). According to Cohen (1955), the delinquent subculture is a response to the perceived or real lack of access to economic and social opportunities, reflecting the effect of structural inequality on crime among working class youth. These insights buttress the point that security is multinational (Valverde, 2011; Zedner, 2009) just as postcolonial theory particularly underlines the broader multifaceted structural context of societal problems like intolerable human insecurity rooted in social injustice that can even trigger national security threats; and, therefore, that human security is as important as the state security.

This research also corroborates the viewpoint that the global spread of private policing is significantly linked to the neoliberal globalization and philosophy that encourage the minimum state intervention, responsabilization, privatization, and public-private partnership arrangements. It thus confirms the spread of governing authority among the web of actors, including the state and non-state actors, as expressed in the literature (Castells, 1996; Foucault, 2004; Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, 2005). In addition, global private policing tends to be classist, racist, exclusionary, and, in some cases, abusive, as exemplified particularly in South Africa; and this reflects the expressed concerns about the spread of governing power to politically unaccountable actors in reference to this sensitive realm of security governance, as already documented (Christie, 2000; Zedner, 2000).

Finally, this study finds no evidence to the effect that increased global private policing would necessarily free up public police forces to expand security services for the poor, or to

concentrate on more serious security issues. This does not, however, discount that possibility, but rather signals the need to investigate the practicality of this theoretical prospect. On the contrary, what the study finds is that public police forces are rather being privatized or deployed for private purposes for fees under the guise of public-private partnerships, as epitomized in the existing security arrangements in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. This situation increases pressures on the already under-resourced public police forces in terms of personnel and operational logistics.

9.3 The Future of Global Private Policing in Africa

The global universalization of capitalist values and philosophy in ordering social life suggests a continuous entrenchment of the glorification of private gain that continues to erode the vestiges of African core values grounded in collective interests. As long as this neoliberal social ordering continues to prevail, with little effort to redistribute resources based on need—which I suspect to be the case without strong political activism—the growth of mass wealth and mass poverty phenomena are most likely to gain further momentum in the future. In turn, this will create the need to protect private businesses and wealth accumulation against the perceived threat from the have-nots that are generally regarded as constituting potential security threats. In this light, the demand for private policing, which is deemed to be more proactive, customized, and effective, in combating crime problems compared to public policing, is likely to be on the ascendency. I therefore share the view of Wood and Shearing (2007) that the return to state dominance in security governance is highly unlikely; and this suggests that private policing has actually come to stay.

9.4 The Study Limitations

The authenticity of data from online sources, such as the websites of security firms, could not be verified by the researcher, and this could compromise the credibility of the findings to some extent. Also, data is not readily available to assess the overall direct impact

of the events of September 11 on the rise of global private policing in Africa. Finally, as a qualitative research study, the findings of this research are not generalizable; however, they are transferrable based on a particular context, as noted by Merriam (1995).

9.5 Suggestions for Future Research

There are outstanding theoretical and practical issues that need further clarifications through rigorous empirical research, employing qualitative or quantitative methods based on the nature of the research questions. These include the need to investigate global private policing in other African countries not included in this research, corporate responsibility for global private policing, the mentalities and technologies of private policing, and the public perceptions of private policing and security officers. Other areas for further studies include exploring the working conditions of private police officers, and whether increases in private policing frees up public police forces to provide more security, especially for the poor, or to concentrate on more serious crime problems.

Additionally, existing evidence on crimes committed by private security personnel, such as the unlawful death of vulnerable people while in custody that often results from a racist culture linked to the global private policing firms, such as G4S, is largely anecdotal in character (Shackle, 2012; Hattenston & Allison, 2014); and, therefore, an investigation into the alleged crimes of global private policing firms is critical to activating an appropriate societal response for redress. The findings of these types of studies would help illuminate important current theoretical and practical concerns regarding global private policing and to suggest other new directions for future research, activism, and policy engagement.

9.6 Concluding Remarks

The rise of global private policing is largely linked to an indiscriminate imperialism, and the irresponsible leadership in most African countries, that have generally undermined a collective human security, culminating in recourse to private policing to contribute to

addressing the resultant security threats and challenges. Private policing is therefore a reflection of many changes in the social organization of most African countries following the advent of colonialism to date. The rise of global private policing in the observed countries is an imperialist project in large measure, given the security implications of imperialism and the huge presence of global private policing firms, which safeguard primarily the interests of imperialist powers and their transnational capitalist class. Although it is true that colonialism and imperialism has fundamentally shaped our social organization to its core, we have the capacity to change the direction of Africa, particularly “black Africa”, from the apparent trajectory of hopelessness, despair, insecurity, and poverty, to a path of hope, shared prosperity, inclusiveness, and collective wellbeing.

African leaders in particular must take responsibility for the fate of Africa. The governance structures, including the executive, the judiciary, the legislative, and the entire criminal justice system, need to be overhauled and reoriented towards meeting the basic needs, such as health care, food, shelter, potable water, and education, of the masses. Hence, the issue of corruption and bad governance must be addressed with a high sense of urgency to reserve resources for reducing poverty and ensuring collective human security. This research highlights the need to revisit core African values, particularly the sense of community that immensely characterized pre-colonial African social relations, rather than the indiscriminate celebration of individual or private gain, as hailed in the contemporary neoliberal regime, mostly at the expense of the collective interests. The promotion of common good linked to the sense of community is critical in achieving human security, which is obviously one of the core prerequisites for regional and global security. Accordingly, broader security policies that address the apparent stark social inequalities in most parts of Africa need careful and serious considerations; on the other hand, African criminologists are called upon to expose the

excesses of the state and the negative repercussions of imperialism and how these interact to create national and global security threats.

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