

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE
MANITOBA NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY:
PARTY POLITICS AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY

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BY

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ABSTRACT

Traditional theories of public policy formation in liberal-democratic states that maintain a parliamentary system of government often contain the assumption that elected representatives of the governing political party, particularly cabinet ministers, play a crucial role in the content of government policy outputs. This assumption is explicit in one of the earliest formal expressions of public policy theory, termed the "policy/administration dichotomy", and can often be found in modern parliamentary debates related to ministerial accountability. However, recent empirical studies of policy formation suggest that while prescriptive elements of the dichotomy continue to "condition" institutional arrangements within the Canadian political system, its descriptive elements have lost much of their relevance. In an effort to determine the policy roles of elected representatives in a single provincial policy sector, this paper studied the evolution of telecommunications policy in Manitoba from 1969-1977. During this period the Province was governed by the New Democratic Party led by Edward Schreyer.

Methodology

To hypothesize variable relationships among elements/actors active in the policy process during the period under study, this case study utilized a modified version of the "policy community" model developed by A. Paul Pross. Elements within the policy community were divided into four groups: party based elements (i.e. minister/cabinet, party policy) which were assigned independent and, in the case of party policy, intervening variable roles; non-party based elements (i.e. planners in the civil service, MTS management) which were assigned independent variable roles; contextual elements (i.e. previous policy, the political economy of technological change) which were assigned intervening variable status; and policy outputs which were treated as the dependent variable. The case study was then divided into two sections. The first involved a review of previous policy (from 1906 to 1969) to determine the role that contextual elements played in shaping dominant policy paradigms that existed in the policy community when the NDP took office in 1969. The second section involved an analysis of the role of all variable categories in defining the policy behaviour of the Schreyer administration. The central question asked in the study was: were party based elements/actors crucial in the content of telecommunications policies established by the Schreyer New Democrats.

Results

The most significant finding was that non-party based variables played a more important role than party based variables in defining the content of policy outputs. However, the behaviour of non-party based actors/agencies differed within the policy community. The most important group in defining the content of policy changes were civil service planners who were motivated to develop new policies by the federal government's planning efforts in the 1970's to respond to changes in telecommunications technology. However, another group of non-party based actors, led by MTS management and related interest groups, served to limit the scope of policy change to a relatively narrow range of options. While the Minister/ Cabinet played an important "gatekeeper" role in defining process behaviour in the provincial policy community, this group of actors had little impact on the actual content of policy outputs. In addition, party policy was found to have no impact on the behaviour of actors in the policy community.

In conclusion, the findings of this case study give support to the argument that descriptive elements of the policy/administration dichotomy have little relevance in understanding the evolution of telecommunications policy in Manitoba during the Schreyer administration's term of office.

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CHAPTER I

Politics and Policy Development:

A Strategy for Analysis

In one of the few articles by a Canadian author dedicated to the definition of public policy as an area of academic inquiry, Richard Simeon notes that with the increasing "fashionability" of the discipline has come increased confusion regarding the scope and function of policy research.(1) This observation has particular relevance to the student of public policy embarking on a research project. On the one hand, the relatively small number of active writers in the discipline and the varied nature of their areas of specialization offers the student a broad vista of unexplored or only partly explored "territory" upon which a research specialty can be developed. However, the lack of a strong empirical tradition coupled with the absence of a dominant theoretical "paradigm" forces the researcher to make what are, at times, difficult decisions regarding the "tools" to be utilized in the selection of a strategy for analysis.(2)

One aspect of the "confusion" surrounding the study of public policy is the question of defining what public policy is. In a review of this question Robert Adie and Paul Thomas note that "definitions and conceptualizations abound, and when we cannot agree on what public policy is, then it should come as no surprise that there is much

controversy over how we should go about studying it."(3) Adie and Thomas argue that a good starting point in the development of a definition is Thomas Dye's statement that "public policy is what governments choose to do or not to do."(4) They go on to point out that while this statement serves to narrow public policy to the activities of government institutions it fails to sensitize the reader to the environmental, cultural, and institutional forces that relate to its development.

Another example of an attempt at definition is William and Marsha Chandler's argument that public policy can be defined as "the outputs or products of a political system and can be thought of as patterns of goal-oriented actions".(5) However, this definition is also incomplete on at least three counts. First, it does not differentiate between policy outputs (embodied in governmental policy statements) and policy outcomes (which can be defined as the "real world" impacts of a particular policy). Second, it appears to treat policy as a dependent variable in the policy process without considering that it can also serve as an independent variable (affecting the structure and content of related policy areas). Finally, like Dye's definition, it does not offer the reader a sense of the complex relationship between environmental, cultural, and institutional forces that influence government patterns of "goal-oriented actions".

Among these points the latter is of particular

interest to this research undertaking. Adie and Thomas provide an indication of the problematic questions contained in it by noting the popularity in non-academic circles of what they describe as a "grassroots conceptualization" of the policy process. While they do not offer a detailed discussion of this concept they note that it contains at its base "traditional democratic theory" which "assigns public opinion working through competitive political parties and elected representatives in legislatures a crucial role in determining which issues receive serious consideration."(6) However they go on to point out that this conceptualization may be "too simplistic and somewhat naive" in light of empirical studies on the formation of policy outputs and argue that it is flawed because at least three other groups of actors - senior civil servants, special interest groups, and the mass media - may play a more significant role than political parties in the initiation, formulation, and execution/ implementation of public policy.(7) This argument is supported by John Meisel who emphasizes the role of senior civil servants in policy-making when he notes:

"There is little doubt that a great many decisions about what is placed on the public agenda are forced upon political parties by events, non-political decision makers and, very often, the preferences of powerful civil servants whose responsibility to the politician is increasingly more formal than real...It is indeed questionable whether the government party leader...continues to function as a party

person after accession to power or whether the party role and influence are maintained as a successful administration becomes accustomed to power and develops close relationships with senior civil servants."(8)

While senior civil servants are but one of a much larger group of potential variables/actors in the policy process, their perceived ability to dominate policy formation at the expense of the "role and influence" of a governing party raises a number of questions. Of particular interest to this paper is the question of why the policy agenda of a governing political party is seen by authors such as Meisel to take a secondary role in the formation of government policy. While no definitive answer to this question will be attempted here, a number of partial answers pertaining to parties at the federal level in Canada can be found in the existing literature. For example, in his review of policy-making during the 1930's, J.W. Pickersgill relates that "ideas were what was needed in the formulation of policies to meet the urgent public demand that government, and especially the federal government, should lead the country out of the depression."(9) He goes on to note that while senior civil servants did not "make" government policy during this era, "it would be fair to say that they provided most of the raw material in the form of ideas out of which policy emerged."(10)

In short, both Pickersgill and Meisel imply that ideas and the expertise marshalled to support them are

crucial factors in the initiation and evolution of federal public policy. However, the apparent inability of party based policies to direct government policy behavior cannot simply be attributed to the assumption that senior civil servants are frequently successful when in competition with party based policy ideas at the cabinet level. Rather, it appears that a variety of factors both external and internal to political parties at the federal level impact on their ability to generate ideas upon which policy options can be developed.

Support for this argument can be found in Conrad Winn and John McMenemy's research. In their analysis of the role of federal political parties they compare the organizational structures of the three major parties (Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic Party) with their British counterparts. They conclude that, on the one hand, external factors such as the diverse regional nature of the Canadian state and the absence of "left-right class differences" force a government to practice a "brokerage" style of politics that may override the party based policy aspirations of the governing party.(11) On the other hand, they note that a "crucial" internal factor is the "absence of knowledge about the consequences of government policies" and go on to argue that "compared to British parties, Canadian parties possess very few independent resources in the domains of research and policy making".(12)

The problem of limited research capacity appears to be augmented by problems related to the existing institutional arrangements utilized by the major parties to generate policy. This is supported by Michael Whittington and Richard Van Loon who note the failure of party conventions to serve as viable policy forums. They argue that "for all three parties the convention performs similar functions, related more to improving levels of participation, maintaining group solidarity and garnering free publicity via press and television coverage than establishment of party policy."(13) This, however, is not to say that political parties are obsolete institutions within the broader political process in Canada. There is little dispute in the literature that parties serve a vital role in areas such as the recruitment of political office holders and the motivation of citizens to participate in the electoral process. Rather, when viewed from the narrower perspective of policy making, there appears to be agreement with Winn and McMenemy's general argument that differences in partisan "style and electoral support have a negligible effect on policy."(14)

While an argument that political parties at the federal level play a less than "crucial" role in policy formation can be made utilizing the existing literature, party roles at the provincial level have not received the same degree of attention. Marsha and William Chandler point out that Winn and McMenemy's "negative argument" vis-

a-vis the policy role of federal parties should be treated with some caution:

"...for it is doubtful that it applies equally well for federal and provincial politics...there are reasons for expecting provincial politics to be more ideologically polarized and less brokerage-oriented than are federal politics...Moreover, it is in provincial politics that the protest tradition led to the rise of ideologically distinctive parties (CCF-NDP, Social Credit, P.Q., among others). Indeed, non-traditional parties with a heritage of reaction against Liberal and Conservative dominance have governed in all of the four western provinces for much of the post-war era. These facts do not, of course, repudiate the hypothesis of no partisan policy difference. They do suggest several reasons why one might expect distinctive policy differences to be associated with some parties and governments and not others."(15)

The Chandlers emphasize that while provincial public policy behavior requires further empirical research, there is a growing body of literature that offers a good starting point for the researcher interested in the policy impact of provincial parties. They divide the empirical portion of this literature into three "approaches"(16). The first is defined as a "budgetary approach" in which a correlation is attempted between a party's stated electoral intentions and actual budgetary practice. An example is contained in an article by Simeon and Miller who found "dramatic increases in social welfare spending in British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan immediately after the accession to power of NDP governments."(17) A second approach is contained in "contagion studies" through which the researcher measures the impact of the legislative opposition on policy outputs.

This type of approach has shown that contagion "from the left" (CCF-NDP oppositions) can occur at the provincial level.(18)

The third approach gives more attention to "environmental factors" and is represented by Dale Poel's study of policy diffusion.(19) This study compared the dates that the provinces introduced policies in twenty-five areas and, through statistical analysis, correlated their introduction with a number of socio-economic and political variables including "party ideology". Of particular interest is Poel's finding that "party ideology, to the extent that it is explicit in its policy consequences, can be viewed as a motivating force towards adoption of legislation."(20) More specifically, Poel found that provinces with NDP governments, particularly Saskatchewan, were the first to adopt legislation in eleven of his twenty-five policy areas.(21)

While the Chandlers' review of these approaches notes that all contain methodological flaws and cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of significant differences between the policy behavior of parties at the federal and provincial levels, they nevertheless support their contention that provincial political parties appear to be more important than their federal counterparts in the evolution of public policy in their respective provinces. The intent of this paper is to explore this argument utilizing a case study of a specific policy area in one

province. For this study Manitoba has been chosen due to its history of party polarization along "left-right" lines with both Progressive Conservative and NDP administrations holding office during the last two decades.(22) More specifically, the focus of this research undertaking is the telecommunications policy history of the Schreyer NDP administrations of 1969-1973 and 1973-1977. The central question asked here is: To what degree did the Manitoba New Democratic Party affect the ideas, institutions, and/or processes related to government telecommunications policy during the Schreyer administration?

Policy Analysis and the Policy/Administration Dichotomy

Stated in less formal terms the intent of this paper is to trace the impact of the Manitoba NDP and the Schreyer administration on the content, structures and/or processes of the province's telecommunications policy community. However, prior to entering into the formal case study consideration must be given to two questions that inform the introductory elements of this paper. These questions are germane to social science research and involve, on the one hand, the issue of the researcher's theoretical approach to the empirical data and, on the other, the definition of the major variables and their role in the framework for analysis. In an effort to clarify these questions the remainder of this Chapter will be devoted to the former while the latter will be the subject

of Chapter II.

This paper's interest in the relationship between the political and institutional elements of government is by no means new to public policy research. V. Seymour Wilson, in his review of the theoretical history of the discipline, notes that one of the earliest formal expressions of modern public policy theory is contained in the "policy/administration dichotomy".(23) He argues that this dichotomy represents the conceptual foundation upon which the majority of current theoretical approaches to public policy are based. At its core the dichotomy argues "that policy and politics are closely interrelated, if not synonymous activities, and that they are and should be separated from administration."(24) While the descriptive elements of the dichotomy (related to the separation of policy and administration) have lost much of their relevance in light of empirical studies on modern policy-making(25), Wilson argues that the dichotomy's prescriptive elements continue to influence or "condition" the writing of policy theorists and the behavior of policy system actors:

"The dichotomy remains a powerful philosophy which...refuses to be banished, reappearing often in the guise of accountability. It has guided, and will continue to guide many aspects of the actions and perceptions of politicians, public servants and the public both in the United States and in Canada. If it is not yet apparent, the student will soon realize that the policy/administration dichotomy has a profound influence on just about every aspect of theory and practice in public policy and

administration."(26)

Utilizing this argument Wilson goes on to review the impact of the dichotomy on theories related to complex organizations and, more importantly for this paper, decision-making approaches related directly to the policy process.(27) In his classification of these approaches, which he describes as "partial models", Wilson points out that he is not presenting "water-tight compartments of thought, but...helpful tools in the task of clearing away some conceptual cobwebs in policy analysis."(28) Of specific importance is his distinction between policy "process" and "content" models.

"...if politics is visualized as a process of allocating values by the making of decisions, then the political process must be construed as the central axis around which a number of lesser processes revolve. Process is seen as the "how" of making decisions as distinct from "who" decides...This concern for the linkages between policy process and policy content therefore becomes a central focus for those studying public policy making."(29)

To describe both how Manitoba's telecommunications policy community has evolved and who has played a role in that process, this paper will utilize a framework for analysis that is informed by the "partial model" Wilson describes as the "Interplay of Ideas, Interests and Institutions" approach. While this approach is relatively new to Canadian public policy and lacks a strong empirical tradition, Wilson argues that it offers "tremendous potential" as a research tool.(30) He notes that the

strength of this approach lies in its focus on those characteristics of the policy system that tend to be "de-emphasized" by other models, most notably the interplay between the "structures of political institutions, the social and physical settings which affect the policy environment and the ideology of the social system."(31)

The inability of other approaches to focus on this interplay is apparent in Wilson's discussion of "systems analysis" which, in a variety of forms, has been one of the more popular approaches since the mid-1960's. Wilson provides a detailed review of three variants of this approach(32) and argues that among them "systems comparative data" has seen the most use in Canada.(33) However, he goes on to note that this model tends to veil "the effects of elites, the ideological antecedents of policy, and the influence of intervening institutions in the political system..."(34) and is therefore not as useful as the interplay approach in the analysis of policy systems where these factors may be significant variables.

While Wilson does not go beyond his brief description of the interplay approach to offer suggestions on how it can be utilized in a framework for analysis, a review of a number of authors who have used this approach offers some clues to its application. An example is Hugh Heclo's comparative case study of income maintenance policy in Britain and Sweden.(35) This work, which incorporates the application of behaviouralist learning theory to policy

analysis, combines process and elite concepts in enumerating three elements that are instrumental in the process of "political learning". The first are a group of actors that are described as the "middlemen at the interfaces of various groups" in the policy process. For Heclo these actors serve as the developers of ideas and/or the transmitters of foreign policy experience and are generally found in key business, academic, and bureaucratic elites.(36) The second element is process oriented and contains the political institutions in which organizational interrelationships among various groups are brought together. These institutions define the "state of response readiness" to policy ideas and serve as the "social assembler" of those ideas into formal policy options.(37)

The final element, which combines process and elite concepts, involves the presence or absence of previous policy. Heclo describes this component as the most "pervasive manifestation" of political learning and notes that "the point of emphasis is not to suggest that all development is the replay of past policy: but what is normally considered the dependent variable (policy output) is also an independent variable (in an ongoing process in which everything becomes an intervening variable)."(38) Heclo completes this argument by defining two types of political learning:

1. Classical Conditioning...the "repeated coincidence of conditional with unconditional stimuli" which results in a "predictable pattern of response" over time.(39) This

style of learning is contained in the arguments of the "incrementalists" as policy makers "tinker" with an established policy pattern while maintaining overall continuity with the intent of previous policies. (40)

2. Instrumental Conditioning...while classical conditioning is most relevant in understanding policy continuity, this type of learning is useful in understanding non-incremental policy change. The distinctive feature here is "the addition of environmental consequences (reinforcement) to the basic stimulus-response model, so that reinforcement is not paired with a particular stimulus but is contingent on the response emitted." (41) For Heclo this type of learning has particular relevance during periods of electoral change when there is the greatest potential for changes in the process roles of various elites.

Heclo closes this argument by noting the relevance of his empirical findings to the debate between pluralist (policy process) and elite (policy content) perspectives. (42) He argues that a narrow reading of his work favours the use of elite approaches, particularly those focusing on the role of bureaucratic elites, in a case analysis. However, within the broader context of his political learning model elite and pluralist approaches can be seen as interdependent because "elites in each nation have functioned as the agents of institutional learning, while the plurality of interests and techniques of influence over time have functioned as the agents of societal learning." (43)

The influence of Heclo and other British interplay theorists (44) can be seen in a number of recent works by Canadian policy researchers. One of the better early examples is contained in a paper by Ronald Manzer in which he develops the concept of the relationship between "policy

communities" and "political learning".(45) In his conclusions, Manzer emphasizes the impact of liberal-democratic ideas on the Canadian "policy community" when he argues "the principles of policy which are current in policy-making communities may be taken to represent the product of a developmental process of learning." He goes on to note that "as such, they bear a striking resemblance to the paradigms of scientific communities: they express the current assumptions from which specific policy-making can proceed, they limit the appropriate set of policy instruments, and they summarize the world view of the policy-making community."(46)

A more recent and to date the most detailed discussion of the interplay approach is provided by Bruce Doern and Richard Phidd. In an effort to describe the central elements of their research it is noteworthy that they view public policy as an integral part of Canadian liberal-democratic political culture. For them public policy "...is not merely a mechanistic process of initiation, formulation and implementation, but also a process of expressing hope and of moving peacefully toward an amalgam of ideas and ideals, some of which do conflict with each other."(47) From this perspective they argue that:

"Canadian public policy is best viewed as an interplay among ideas, structures and processes in which the direction of causality operates both ways, from society and economy to politics and government and vice versa... Ideas are a

central element, not in some abstract philosophical sense but because ideas are inherent in behavior and are present in structure and process...The ideas we focus on are of two kinds and they are interrelated. The first kind include the general ideologies as well as the dominant ideas of efficiency, individual liberty, stability,...The second kind are the ideas embedded in key political institutions and in the relations among them..."(48)

For Doern and Phidd the transmission of ideas in a policy community is facilitated by structure and process elements. They note that "structures are formed to institutionalize and entrench ideas...they are capable of promoting ideas and change and of stalemating and preventing the adoption of other ideas."(49) Process elements, on the other hand, are defined in two broad categories "policy field processes (the social versus economic policy process) and instrumental processes (the tax versus regulatory process)."(50) Of particular importance in this portion of their work is the treatment of "governing instruments" as both policy means and ends and the role of information and knowledge in the initiation of policy options.(51)

While Doern and Phidd offer one of the most complete discussions of the interplay approach available to date, their interpretation of it is not without problems. For example, E.C. LeSage Jr. makes a number of criticisms in a recent review article.(52) He takes issue with Doern and Phidd's lack of attention to the question of the behavioral motivations of actors in a policy community and

notes that while the tone of their work approximates Sir Geoffrey Vickers' findings (that the goal of the majority of policy actors is to maintain equilibrium through "norm-holding" and "norm maintaining"), they do not undertake an explicit discussion of this question.(53) A lack of attention to actors in the policy community also forms the basis of a further criticism relating to the bureaucracy's role in the implementation of policy. LeSage notes that while Doern and Phidd acknowledge a policy cycle and "hats are doffed in prefacing recognition of the important function of the bureaucracy in public policy;...we miss a discussion that might crystallize our understanding of how the larger bureaucracy affects policy."(54)

On a more general level LeSage is critical of Doern and Phidd's lack of an explicit discussion of what he describes as the role of the "hegemony of liberalism" in defining the form and content of their "general ideologies" and the ideas embedded in key political institutions. He argues that had more attention been given to this matter they would have been saved from "...having so stridently and repeatedly to debunk the notion that we Canadians have only pragmatic politics" because "...with the ubiquity of liberalism, there is a distinct appearance of pragmatism owing to a lack of debate over fundamental principles."(55) LeSage also examines Doern and Phidd's perspective on the relationship of their the interplay approach to other policy formation models and argues that it:

"...does not offer a theoretical perspective but, rather, a typological one. Thus, claiming its superiority over other more recognizably theoretical approaches is rather like claiming the superiority of oranges over apples without reference to criteria...Those who wish to define social science in terms of modern orthodoxy will claim understanding is achieved through the development of causal theories. Doern and Phidd state frankly that the larger picture really cannot be fully comprehended through any existing, encompassing theory of causality: reality is too complex and the theories too puny."(56)

In summary, this brief review of the interplay approach serves to support Wilson's point that at this stage in its development interplay's "flexibility of being all things to all people seems to be both its greatest weakness as well as its strength."(57) Among its weaknesses one of the more important is the lack of a formal theoretical model upon which a causal framework for analysis can be developed. However, its strengths, particularly the ability to link ideas and ideology to structures and processes within a policy community, make it attractive to this paper's focus of analysis. More specifically, the ability to link these elements lends itself to the study of an area like telecommunications where rapid technological change creates the potential for an "instrumental conditioning" situation within a policy community.(58)

A Strategy for Analysis: The Developmental Model of
A. Paul Pross

Given the theoretical promise of the interplay

approach and the absence of a generally accepted empirical model this study has opted to borrow a model from an author already active within the approach. The model that has been chosen is, to use the terminology of its author A.Paul Pross, still "developmental" in nature and while not explicitly labeled as an interplay model, contains many of its important elements.(59) More specifically, it offers a sound base upon which to explore the linkages between party policy ideas and structure and process elements in a policy community and contains the added benefit of being expressly designed for the analysis of regional and/or provincial policy communities.(60) Pross begins a discussion of his model by noting:

"The framework, then, will start with the supposition that the roots of policy are buried in the deeper understrata of socio-economic conditions and translated into policy terms through the mediation of political institutions which are themselves infused by the beliefs and ideologies generated by the politically relevant aspects of the community culture...the conceptual framework developed here suggests that the policies with which we are concerned are much influenced by two specific phenomena: policy communities and a hierarchy of policies which is distinctly a product of the Canadian experience."(61)

This statement embodies three major features of his model. The first involves "the context for policy formation" which Pross divides into three categories: political culture, political economy, and previous policy. With regard to political culture he argues that it contributes to policy formation in four ways: First, it

allows the political system to persist as a legitimate institution through systems of political socialization; second, it sets boundaries on the types of policy that are acceptable to the society; third, it provides a context for the formulation of ideological approaches; and fourth, it supports a political system that allows a small number of decision-makers (elected politicians) to make major decisions for the community.(62) In short, Pross follows Heclo's reasoning by suggesting that "an understanding of the impact of Canadian political culture on the Canadian policy system requires us to distinguish between mass and elite culture, hypothesizing that mass culture will govern system persistence and will set boundaries to policy action, but that elite culture will more directly affect the kinds of policies which emerge from the system."(63)

What can be seen as a "dualistic" approach to political culture is also contained in Pross's discussion of political economy which he argues "has a fundamental impact on public policy."(64) For Pross, Canadian political economy contains two distinct economic ideologies characterized by a "marginal work world" (embodying traditional "free enterprise" concepts of a capitalist market economy) on the one hand and a "central work world" on the other.(65) He argues that while members of the marginal work world approach policy formation with a traditional perspective on the policy/administration dichotomy, institutions in the central work world have

evolved unique "linkages" within the federal policy community which provide them with greater access to what he describes as the "central planning system".

The final contextual factor is the role of previous policy. To emphasize the impact of various types of policy on the behaviour of a policy community Pross offers a classification scheme based on three assumptions: that some policies are more important than others; that policies are interdependent; and, that the more important policies tend to shape those that are subordinate. It is contained in Table I.i below.

Policy Status	General Function	Examples Affecting Marginal Work World
Paramount	Overarching policies, such as those concerned with maintaining the country, which tend to limit the development or application of all other policies.	The National Policy Certain fundamental economic policies Bilingualism and biculturalism policies National unity policies
Aspirational	Important, generally accepted goals for the community (policy) e.g. Justice, equality, and welfare	Aspirational policies are enshrined only partially in law e.g. in the preambles to legislation citing the need for equality (equalization), justice, etc.
Sector	Regulate, allocate & reallocate within a broad policy field.	Transport policy Resource development Aspects of fiscal & monetary policy Development policy Social policy
Subsidiary	Regulate, allocate & reallocate within specific industries or specific fields of activity.	Forest policy Specific social policies such as day care, U.I.C., etc.
Administrative	Rules, procedures developed to implement programmes, make broad policies workable.	Often very important but frequently of an informal nature or not publicized. Consequently difficult to identify.

Table I.i: A.Paul Pross's Policy Hierarchy (66)

In summary, Pross's contextual factors can be seen as the foundation upon which the interplay of ideas, structures, and processes takes place within a policy community. His effort to develop a model for this interplay is the second major feature of his work. Diagram I.i (below) serves to introduce this model which is based on the argument that most policy outputs are created by "loose alliances of agency units who work in conjunction with a limited range of external actors to develop and promote specific policy."(67) Pross notes that:

"At the heart of the community are the key federal bodies involved: the agency primarily responsible for formulating policy and carrying out programs in the field; the cabinet, and its support structure. None are located at the very centre of the diagram because no one actor is ever consistently dominant. On average, however, because so much of policy-making is routine, the lead agency tends to be most influential over time. Clustered around the core agencies are the most influential, most involved pressure groups and provincial government agencies active in the field, together with other federal agencies whose mandate overlaps that of the lead agency...Despite the arrangement of the diagram it would be a mistake to conceive of the various policy actors revolving around the core actors. Rather they are in constant motion advancing toward and withdrawing from the core as their resources, their interest and the public agenda change.(69)

A notable feature of this model is that it does not assume a traditional hierarchical role for the various institutions of government with Parliament at the pinnacle of the institutional hierarchy. Pross argues that while Parliament serves an important legitimizing role it should

not be seen as the crucial "policy-making" institution because the "bureaucracy alone has both the power, the continuing participation and the breadth of involvement that can make it a focal point for the interests and the interested who constitute the policy community."(70)




Diagram I. i: A. Paul Pross's Conceptual Policy Community(68)

The behaviour of various actors within the community is the third feature of Pross's model and relates directly to his "conceptual framework". This framework divides the various components of the community into two groups: the factors that define the "context for policy formation" which are termed "intervening variables"; and the "independent variables" comprised of those actors who determine policy outputs. Based on this division the remainder of Pross's work is dedicated to theorizing about the ways that the intervening variables impact on the structure of the policy system and the behavior of the actors within a specific policy community.(71) As a major portion of this discussion is focused on policy areas at the federal level it will not be elaborated here.(72) However, two features of his framework have specific importance for this paper: the changing relationship of political parties to the policy community; and the behaviour of three groups of actors within the community.

Pross's position on the changing role of political parties is based on his argument that the evolution of the Canadian state to an increasingly "professional" system of government has forced a decline in party influence vis-a-vis the policy process. This decline, coupled with the growth of the "administrative state", has resulted in the replacement of the representative role of the politician by "functional representation" dominated by networks of pressure groups who provide a "vital communication function

by serving as a link between the administrative agency and its functional constituency."(73) Thus, for Pross:

"...representative government gives way to functional representation, and "politics goes underground". In its place the administrative state creates the special-interest state. The special-interest state is a polity in which policy communication is so arranged that interests are first and foremost identified and drawn in to communication with government, not through their geographic or spatial affiliations, but through their specialized contact with a functionally oriented arm of government. It is a state in which the term "pressure group" takes on a new meaning."(74)

However, he also notes that "it would be foolish to argue that the policy role of political parties in Canada has evaporated entirely."(75) Citing the Chandlers' argument that a change in party control at the provincial level "results in a large scale turnover in decision makers and has extraordinary potential for influencing policy"(76), Pross acknowledges that "there are times-- especially at the provincial level-- when party influence can be immense."(77) As a result this paper's perspective on the NDP in Manitoba will follow Pross's argument that, at the the very least, "the party system consequently serves as the crucial link between the contextual factors shaping policy and the decision process itself."(78) In addition, Pross notes a more practical reason for the involvement of party based actors in policy formation when he points out that:

"Basically we can argue that party intervention in the policy process, is intermittent and depends on both personal factors and on party

understandings of the extent to which policies espoused by the bureaucracy and groups will affect its vital interest, its need for re-election. In other words, our understanding of the interaction of party, bureaucracy and groups in the Canadian policy process has to begin with the assumption that the political party, including its leadership, is not vitally interested in the full range of public policy with which government is concerned."(79)

The second feature of Pross's conceptual argument relates to the behavior of actors in a policy community. Here he combines Hecllo's arguments on the role of ideas and information in the policy process with a discussion of elite theory. It is notable that Pross does not see the civil service as the dominant actor in a policy community. Rather, he argues that "while the policy role of the public service is very extensive it may be dominant only rarely and in fact can be expected to vary a great deal of the time from situation to situation."(80) In short, Pross argues that the formal bureaucracy represents a communications channel, albeit a less than impartial channel, to the political decision maker. In this context he describes it as an "assembly line of thought" in which "the goal at each step along this production line for abstraction is to select and consolidate the amount of information needed by higher level officials to make decisions that the organization at least could consider correct."(81)

Within this "assembly line" analogy, three groups of actors merit the attention of the policy researcher. The

first group are those bureaucrats "who first begin shaping the information which will eventually change policy." (82) For the most part these actors tend to be specialized policy analysts who occupy middle level positions within the bureaucracy. The second group consists of the interest groups that operate at three distinct levels within the policy community: at the policy analyst level they concentrate on supplying technical information to influence specific policy goals; on a more formal level they interact on a personal basis with senior civil servants who are considered members of the bureaucratic elite; and finally, at the the "full dress" level they make formal presentations to cabinet ministers and ministerial committees as well as regulatory boards and commissions. (83)

The impact of the third group of actors is more difficult to assess and will not be a major focus of this study. Drawing on the empirical research of John Porter and Wallace Clement (84), Pross argues that the "permanent elite" must be given consideration in a research model because "the possession of inherited wealth and corporate power brings with it a capacity to command access to public policy decision makers and to exercise leverage over the public sector. (85)

While Pross's model serves as the foundation for this case study, its "developmental" nature creates a number of problems. For the most part they are the result of the

broad and, at times, less than complete definitions utilized within the framework. To his credit Pross is aware of this and notes that "this is not a conceptualization that lends itself to precise, formularistic expression... operationalization will be stymied not only by quantification and measurement but by the fact that each variable appears to weigh differently from policy case to policy case."(86) Prior to Chapter II's discussion of a framework for the analysis of Manitoba's telecommunications policy community, four specific problems are noteworthy. The first relates to Pross's use of the term "intervening variable" to describe what is, in effect, the environmental base of his model.(87) In the social sciences an intervening variable is usually defined as:

"A variable regarded as the explanatory link in the apparent correlation of two other variables. In the case in which there is an intervening variable, a correlation found between two other variables...is due not to any genuine relationship between these variables, but rather to the fact that each is correlated with a third variable. If the intervening variable were controlled...the correlation between the other two variables would disappear."(88)

In short, the defining characteristic of an intervening variable is its ability to establish a direct correlation within the independent/dependent variable relationship. In Pross's model this is problematic given the incomplete nature of variable definitions and their linkages and his lack of any suggestions on how to control

variables to establish an intervening correlation. In an effort to avoid this problem the framework for analysis suggested in Chapter II will impose fairly narrow definitions on the contextual environment and will not, with the exception of one factor, attempt to pose a direct intervening linkage with those independent variables relevant to this study.

A second problem involves Pross's lack of a formal discussion of "process" within the policy community. While comments such as "incremental analysis is the most powerful explanation of the policy process that has been developed thus far"(89) indicate his acceptance of an incrementalist perspective on process, he fails to follow this argument with a discussion of the motivational forces that direct decision-making within a policy community. In light of LeSage's critique of Doern and Phidd's position on process, Pross's model might also have benefited from Vickers' work on normative values in a policy community.

A third problem area is best seen in light of Richard Simeon's discussion of "the problem of the dependent variable."(90) Simeon argues that "little of the literature seems to try systematically to link some set of independent explanatory variables with some dependent ones: few deal with substance of content."(91) This is not to say that Pross's work can be criticized for not attempting specific variable linkages. In his discussion of the role

of previous policy Pross goes beyond simply defining policy outputs as dependent variables by arguing that the type of policy output under study (aspirational, sectoral, etc.) requires the researcher to be sensitive to differing forms of behaviour by independent variables within the policy community. Rather, the basis for criticism in this area is Pross's failure to undertake an explicit discussion of various "dimensions" of the dependent variable. For example, Simeon notes the difference between policy outputs (what a government does) and policy outcomes (the empirical impact of that action).(92) Pross appears to be concerned with both orders of a policy's consequence but does not suggest how this concern can best be dealt with in a case study.

A final problem relates to the application of Pross's model to this paper. He notes that for the researcher interested in a comprehensive analysis of a policy system this model is likely to impose "great demands on the investigator" as one is "forced to establish what large-scale environmental conditions prevail in a policy community and to evaluate their impact, not only on policy itself, but also on the institutions which develop and implement policy."(93) As the focus of this paper is relatively narrow in scope (in that it is interested in a defined interplay of ideas and institutions within a single policy area), Pross's model will be used selectively in Chapter II's formal framework.

While these problems point to the need for selectivity and precision in the operationalization of Pross's model, they do not diminish its importance as one potential solution to the "confusion" surrounding public policy research. In the preface to their monograph on research strategies in political science, David Legee and Wayne Francis note that the history of the discipline's use of methodological techniques can be divided into two historic periods: the period prior to the 1960's in which most research was based on deductive, probabilistic and/or historical techniques; and a "post behavioral" period that began with the publication of Easton's work and introduced "functional" techniques to the literature.(94) In many respects Pross's model, which he describes as "a historical framework that is invested with the techniques of systematic analysis"(95), represents an important synthesis of these two dominant methodological "paradigms" in public policy research.

CHAPTER II

Telecommunications Policy in Manitoba:

A Framework for Analysis

The design and intent of this Chapter is to narrow the focus of this research undertaking to a case specific level. However, prior to outlining the framework for analysis that will be employed, some discussion of the topic of analysis is required. Section 1 opens this discussion with an overview of two studies of the history of the CCF-NDP in Manitoba. This is followed, in Section 2, by a brief introduction to the field of telecommunications. Section 3 then outlines the formal framework for analysis.

The CCF-NDP in Manitoba: An Overview

Until very recently there appears to have been limited academic interest in the history of the CCF-NDP in Manitoba. This gap in the literature has been partially filled by two recent books. The first by Nelson Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP, traces the party's history in a somewhat selective fashion from the turn of the century to the final year of the Schreyer administration in 1977.(1) While Wiseman gives only limited attention to the behavior of the Schreyer administration (2), he provides a number of valuable insights into the structural features and behavioral traditions that affected its policy behavior. He opens his

analysis by noting the diverse ideological orientations of the groups that formed the membership base of the Manitoba CCF during its early years. Included were members of the Independent Farmer Party, the Independent Labour Party, and the League for Social Reconstruction which provided "intellectual content and leadership".(3) This resulted in a fusion of the ideas contained in rural "agrarian protest", labour "christian socialism" and the League's "Britishness and cultural conservatism" and a party organization that "in reality...was always urban-based and urban-led."(4) For Wiseman a direct result of this urban orientation was a general policy position that downplayed "socialist philosophy" in favour of a more pragmatic "eagerness to ameliorate the excesses of capitalism by controlling or transforming it, not by eradicating it."(5)

A second feature of Wiseman's research relates to the impact of the party's size and structure on the behavior of its leadership. During the 1940s and 50s membership was never more than 2000 with the majority of those persons residing in Winnipeg.(6) While membership improved under the NDP banner in the 1960s, particularly in rural areas of the province, by 1969 total membership remained below 5500.(7) As a result executive positions within the party were occupied by a relatively small group of party activists with caucus and party executive positions tending to be interchangeable. Wiseman contrasts this tradition with that of the much larger Saskatchewan NDP:

"In Saskatchewan there was a tradition of excluding members of the caucus from official party posts. In part, this reflected concern about internal party democracy...The weaker Manitoba party, in contrast, relied in the mid-1960s on one MLA to serve as secretary and another, Sidney Green, to serve as president. At a number of conventions there was substantial difficulty in attracting candidates for executive party posts...The Manitoba NDP rank and file was not only weaker than Saskatchewan's but also deferred more consistently to its leaders."(8)

The domination of executive positions in the Manitoba party by politicians and party activists concerned with electoral success is, for Wiseman, an important feature in the development of politically pragmatic party policies. He notes that while CCF-NDP campaign literature stressed democratic policy-making through "delegate conventions and open policy debates", the party's history contains a number of examples that appear to contradict this public image.(9) As a result he argues that by 1969 the party "styled itself as pragmatic, non-ideological, and politically respectable."(10) This is summarized in his conclusion that "pragmatic electoral politics, rather than socialist doctrine, always played a central role in the CCF-NDP's calculations."(11)

Given the comprehensive research base upon which Wiseman's arguments are made, his approach to the behavior of the Schreyer administration is somewhat surprising. Rather than continuing his empirical analysis of the factors that contributed to the party's political pragmatism while in government, Wiseman chooses to critique

the Schreyer administration from "an ideological perspective"(12) using the party's early "socialist" roots as his bench mark for measurement. The result of this approach is predictable, given the trends established in his analysis of the pre-government party, and leads him to conclude that the Schreyer government "did not transform or radically alter the social and economic fabric of the province...there was no evidence that the NDP government had actually threatened the interests or welfare of the dominant classes in society."(13) He does, however, submit that "the Manitoba of the 1970s was certainly transformed from the Manitoba of earlier decades" but argues that the policy initiatives undertaken by the Schreyer administration "were not so much a result of an NDP Government as of broader, national, economic and social trends."(14)

In the context of this paper an important feature of Wiseman's work is that it provides an indication of the role that ideas (related to the party leadership's goal of electoral legitimacy) played in forcing an evolution of the CCF's early socialist philosophy to that of a "small-l liberal" party of the 1970s. However, his less than complete analysis of the behavior of the party in power does raise a number of questions. One of the more important relates to how the political scientist should undertake an assessment of the relationship between "ideology", party policy, and a government's policy

outputs. In this case the use of the party's "socialist" roots provides Wiseman with a sound base upon which to critique the Schreyer administration but also leads him to downplay those aspects of his work that indicate the Manitoba NDP of 1969 was a very different party than the CCF of the 1930s. While he offers examples which indicate that the "left-wing" of the party was unhappy with the Schreyer administration(15), he fails to contrast them with his arguments relating to the party's "small-liberal" evolution by the mid 1970s. For instance his review of the Winnipeg Declaration notes that "by 1956...there was no significant or viable left caucus within the CCF at either the national or Manitoba level."(16) Later he argues that the "image that the NDP tried to project provincially was that of competent technician" in the 1960s (17) and that during the 1970s "the party enthusiastically supported its government."(18) These findings indicate that the majority of the party's rank and file membership were not at odds with the policy ideas of its leadership at the time of the 1969 election and imply that the government (as opposed to the party) might have been more fairly critiqued based on a combination of the party's 1960s and 70s policy resolutions and the government's electoral platform rather than on party ideology of an earlier period.

Wiseman's analysis of the Schreyer administration also emphasizes the pervasiveness of the "grassroots

conceptualization" of the policy process. In his final chapter he notes that Schreyer saw his role as "one of stewardship rather than party agent...his paramount responsibility, he felt, was that of premier rather than party leader."(19) However, rather than analyzing the legitimacy of Schreyer's position he chooses simply to emphasize its negative impacts on the policy role of the party convention. In short, his critique of the party in power appears to be informed by the "grassroots" notion that parties (as opposed to elected officials) should play a crucial role in the policy process. However, he fails to reference this position with a discussion of his normative assumptions related to the policy role of a political party in a liberal-democratic political culture.

A third set of questions that Wiseman's work raises relate directly to this study's focus on the role party policy plays in the formation of government policy outputs. While Wiseman does a good job of supporting his contention that the party's early CCF ideology had little role to play in the Schreyer administration's policy outputs, his argument that government outputs were simply a product of "national trends" neglects the need for a more complete and balanced assessment of the factors that may have influenced government behaviour. For example, a clearer definition of the environmental and structural constraints imposed on a provincial government is implicit in a review of Wiseman's work which notes the need for attention to "the

economic and political realities of governing a have-not province within a federal system...".(20) On the other hand, he neglects the role that the NDP's policy ideas (both provincial and national) may have played in shaping the "national trends" he uses for his comparison. For instance, he compares the policy behavior of "Conservative Ontario" with that of Manitoba(21) but fails to mention the impact of "contagion" from the NDP in the policy behavior of that province.(22)

More importantly, Wiseman fails to note Poel's finding that NDP administrations were among the first to enact legislation in eleven of twenty-five policy areas that were later adopted by non-NDP provincial administrations.(23) In addition to neglecting the potential impact of this leadership on "national trends" he does not explore the reasons for the Saskatchewan government's ability to show leadership in ten of these policy areas. While Poel also does not elaborate on this point, other than to note the role of "ideology", it is likely that the Saskatchewan NDP's past experience in government coupled with the ability of that province's bureaucracy to link party policy with government policy outputs played a role.(24) Wiseman's only attention to the role of the bureaucracy in Manitoba's policy outputs is provided when he notes that a number of convention policy resolutions in the 1970s "were formulated by party members working in government bureaucracy."(25) However, he does

not elaborate on the impact of these actors on the party's behaviour.

To fill a number of the gaps in Wiseman's work one must turn to a second book on Manitoba politics that deals specifically with the behavior of the Schreyer administration. James McAllister's The Government of Edward Schreyer begins by noting that its purpose "is to compare the accomplishments of Manitoba's first NDP government with the good intentions involved in socialist ideology."(26) To facilitate this goal he appears to utilize two levels of analysis. In his opening chapters he gives attention to "the policy pronouncements made by the government and its leaders during the years immediately following the 1969 election"(27) and undertakes a detailed empirical comparison of the government's policy pronouncements with actual policy outputs(28). From this perspective he acknowledges that the Schreyer administration realized limited success in a number of policy areas. For example, in the area of taxation he notes that the government "did shift some of the burden of taxation onto those individuals and corporate interests best able to pay."(29) In addition, he reviews the creation of Autopac and the expansion of social assistance programs such as public housing.(30) Based on this review he acknowledges that "the Party was elected with a limited mandate to implement a certain platform and it did succeed in carrying out some of the proposed measures."(31)

McAllister's second level of analysis, to which he dedicates the bulk of his book, focuses on the behavior of the Schreyer administration from an "ideological" perspective. It is based on four objectives or "goals" that he feels "represent contemporary conceptions of how socialist ideals might be realized within the democratic socialist context." (32) At this level of analysis he argues:

"...to assess what was accomplished by the NDP in Manitoba also requires that we determine how far the party went toward attaining the objectives of social democracy. Beyond the short-term platform outlined during the election campaign, was the NDP in Manitoba able to move any considerable distance toward the implementation of a democratic socialist program?" (33)

McAllister's answer to this question is that the Schreyer administration failed to be innovative and that "even when a need was recognized and the government was determined to take action, the end product of the policy process was slight, changes were at the margin, resulting in the least possible dislocation." (34) In his later chapters he undertakes a review of the "structural barriers" that limited the government's ability to achieve its goals. These include a review of Manitoba's political economy, an analysis of the electoral history of the province, a short history on the evolution of the national CCF-NDP, and a discussion of the organizational structure of the Manitoba party. (35) While detailed attention will not be given to these factors in this overview of

McAllister's work, his analysis of the party's organization in Manitoba, though not nearly as complete as Wiseman's, points to an important relationship between policy ideas generated at the party level and the party leadership's concern with electoral legitimacy. He notes that during the Schreyer years "party conventions became little more than exercises in public relations" largely because members of the caucus and cabinet exerted a high degree of control over the development of resolutions.(36) However, rather than simply criticizing the party leadership for its control of party policy structures McAllister argues that this control resulted in the party's inability "to develop alternate policies and major proposals and this left the Premier and his legislative colleagues dependent upon the government bureaucracy for innovative ideas."(37)

For McAllister the Schreyer administration's dependence on its bureaucracy for policy ideas can be seen in its failure to undertake major structural and process changes after attaining office. He notes that "in terms of bureaucratic reforms, what was most obvious was the degree to which the NDP was willing to leave unchanged the major structures of the Manitoba government."(38) He bases this argument on a comparison of personnel changes between 1969 and 1976 and concludes that "the bureaucracy continued to be controlled, for the most part, by individuals hired by the previous Conservative and Liberal governments."(39) The only sector of the bureaucracy that appears to have

been significantly influenced by the Schreyer administration was the division of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet into a Continuing Programs Secretariat (staffed by employees hired by previous administrations) and a Planning Secretariat composed of personnel that "were at least sympathetic to the NDP." (40) McAllister notes that the latter was conceived as an agent of social change through the application of advanced social science concepts to policy planning and describes it as the "brains trust of social democracy in Manitoba." (41) He argues that while this agency was successful in generating new policy ideas, two factors severely limited its ability to facilitate the translation of those ideas into government policy outputs. First, "it rarely enjoyed a sufficient level of confidence, on the part of the cabinet, to initiate programs and carry them through to implementation" and second, "it could initiate policies, but anything beyond the most preliminary discussions had to be put into effect by the line departments." (42)

While it is not surprising that policy ideas generated by the Planning Secretariat were resisted by line departments that did not share its commitment to radically altering the policy status quo, the cabinet's apparent reluctance to support its "brains trust" is particularly interesting. One of the reasons for this lack of support could be attributed to the occupational makeup of the cabinet, which contained only a small group of individuals

who were well versed in the social science rationales employed by the secretariat to support its policy proposals.(43) However, a more important set of reasons is contained in McAllister's discussion of S.J.R. Noel's concept of "clientelism" and its impact on the policy process in Canada.(44)

Noel argues that with the rapid growth in the public service during the last three decades the bureaucracy has tended to assume the traditional "brokerage" role of the politician given its more frequent contact with government "clients". This trend has forced an interdependent relationship between the cabinet and senior bureaucrats as cabinet ministers increasingly become dependent on this group to assess and define policy options based on its knowledge of the interests involved in a particular policy decision. For Noel this increased interdependence has been fostered, in part, by a shift in the "style" of provincial leadership "with the coming to power of a younger generation of Premiers whose public images are more in keeping with the bureaucratic norms of rationality and efficiency."(45) McAllister uses this argument to suggest that the radical (vis a vis the bureaucratic status quo) policy proposals of the Planning Secretariat failed at the cabinet level because they could not be easily accommodated within the narrow confines of an individual portfolio and therefore lacked ministerial support.(46)

In short, while McAllister's analysis gives

attention to a number of "structural barriers" that limited the Schreyer administration's ability to attain "the good intentions involved in socialist ideology", a crucial factor for him appears to be the party leadership's concern with maintaining electoral legitimacy and the resultant willingness of the government to base its policy decisions on the rationales presented by its bureaucracy. This is emphasized in his argument that the Schreyer administration should be seen as a government that gave a "major role" to its permanent bureaucracy.(47)

Prior to a critique of Wiseman and McAllister's research it should be noted that both offer empirical support for the use of Pross's model as a guide in an analysis of the relationship between party policy and government policy outputs. In Wiseman's case this support flows from his analysis of the party's ideological evolution towards greater conformity with the political culture and indirectly indicates the importance of "contextual" features in shaping behavior within a policy community. McAllister's analysis also points to the importance of contextual features but goes beyond Wiseman by providing an indication of how the policy community further conditions the behavior of party based actors to conform to the institutional and process norms within it (particularly the bureaucratic norms of rationality and efficiency). This does not, however, negate three serious methodological problems inherent in both studies. The

first involves Wiseman and McAllister's lack of attention to the complexity of a political system and the numerous internal and external forces that affect government policy outputs.(48) While McAllister gives more attention to these forces, an explicit discussion of them might have tempered both author's critiques of the party in power.

A second problem relates to Wiseman and McAllister's interpretation of the Manitoba NDP's "ideology".(49) This problem is noted in a review article by Paul Stevenson who is critical of their lack of definitional precision and notes that social-democracy "like "socialism", is a term that has acquired many meanings over the past 150 years."(50) In an effort to offer a more precise classification Stevenson divides early socialist thought into two streams: "evolutionary socialism" and "revolutionary socialism". He then goes on to argue that:

"A third tendency in the European left took firmer root after World War II. That was for "evolutionary socialism" (now "social democracy") to split further into two major tendencies. The evolutionary socialists continued to have an egalitarian socially-owned and democratically planned socialist economy as their eventual long-term goal. But the new tendency (what I call "technocratic social democracy") saw limited reforms of capitalism, or "post-industrialism", as their end-all and be-all...The technocratic orientation is close to but not identical with Keynesian small-l liberalism."(51)

For Stevenson, Wiseman and McAllister appear to accept the CCF/NDP's "socialist" view of itself without actually proving that the Manitoba party of the 1960's and

1970's was anything more than, to use his term, a "technocratic" social-democratic party.(52) In light of LeSage's earlier criticisms of Doern and Phidd's book, it appears that Wiseman and McAllister would also have benefited from an introductory discussion of the "hegemony of liberalism" in Canadian political culture. Such a discussion would have provided a good reference in the definition of the Manitoba NDP's ideology within the broader context of ideas operating within the political culture.

The final set of problems involve the type of argument that Wiseman and McAllister were attempting to make. As this paper has already noted, both authors conclude that the Schreyer administration failed as a "social-democratic" government. However, they do not clearly substantiate that it failed to translate party policies (as distinct from their interpretation of social-democratic ideology) into government policy outputs. Given their concern with critiquing the NDP from an "ideological" perspective, it is likely that an analysis of the relationship between party policy resolutions and government policy outputs was not undertaken because both saw convention resolutions as the products of cabinet/caucus intervention. While their argument that convention resolutions mirrored government policy rather than directed it appears to have validity, a comparison of government policy with party policy would have strengthened

their conclusions. This lack of attention to party policy resolutions is all the more surprising in light of Wiseman and McAllister's recognition of differences in the government's behavior between the first (1969-73) and second (1973-77) terms. For example, Wiseman implies that the Schreyer administration attempted some innovation in its first term when he argues that "after 1973, the government's imagination was spent..."(53). This is mirrored in McAllister's statement that "by the end of the NDP government's first term in office it appears to have ceased to be innovative, ceased to attempt any radical reforms of Manitoba society."(54)

In concluding this overview of Wiseman and McAllister's findings it is arguable that a number of the problems contained in their work flow from a "grassroots conceptualization" of Manitoba's policy community. This is implicit in their assumption that party ideology should have played a crucial role in the policy behavior of the Schreyer administration. While their claim that the party leadership's efforts to attain and/or maintain electoral legitimacy had an impact on the evolution of the party's ideas is valid, their assumption that the party should be a key independent variable in Manitoba's policy community is not supported in the literature. Admittedly, much of the current literature is based on empirical evidence gathered at the federal level and is not directly applicable to an analysis of provincial public policy. However, two

assumptions which flow from this literature will be utilized in this paper's development of a framework for analysis. The first is based on Pross's model, which emphasizes that party ideology/policy should be seen as an intervening rather than as an independent variable in an established policy community. The second flows from LeSage's argument that "insofar as our public policy is concerned, its dominant ideas, structures and processes are dominated and defined by the liberal-democratic perspective."(55) It assumes that while the Manitoba NDP's social-democratic ideological tradition plays a role in the party's "socialist view of itself", a more useful guide to its policy agenda can be found in convention policy resolutions and related policy papers. As a result, this paper will utilize resolutions and policy papers from the 1960s and 70s to define the Manitoba NDP's policy positions on telecommunications.

Telecommunications Policy and Technological Change

While this paper will focus on the NDP's telecommunications policies, it is important to note that since the election of the Schreyer administration the definition of telecommunications as an area of public policy has become increasingly problematic. As the following discussion will indicate, the period covered by this study has seen the scope and nature of public involvement in this area thrown into confusion due to

advances in communications technology. Utilizing 1969 as a reference point, the position taken here is that prior to that year defining telecommunications would not have been difficult as the general field of communications policy was divided into two fairly distinct categories; telecommunications and broadcasting. Following a brief review of the pre-1969 administrative rationales for the separation of these policy areas, the remainder of this Section will explore the role that technological change has played in moving telecommunications policy in the 70's and 80's from, to use Heclo's terminology, a "classical" to an "instrumental conditioning" mode.

Prior to 1969 the primary focus of "telecommunications policy" was the regulation of "common carriers" who, for the most part, were represented by private and publicly owned telephone companies. On the other hand, the central focus of "broadcast policy" was the regulation of enterprises involved in the distribution of audio and/or video signals over the electromagnetic spectrum such as radio and television stations. The differences between these areas can be made conceptually based on two criteria. The first relates to one-way versus two-way information flows. As Carl Beigie notes "telecommunications services can best be described in terms of their ability to reproduce the essential characteristics of face-to-face contacts."(56) He goes on to differentiate

telecommunications from broadcasting by arguing that "the essential difference between mass communications and communications between individuals is that the former consists of a one-way flow of information."(57)

A second and more important criterion relates to the differences between the "carriage" of a signal and its "content". Alphonse Ouimet notes that telecommunications firms have, in the past, been governed by "the principle of content/carrier separation" which states that "a carrier should not determine what it carries and it should not be in a position to compete with those who have to depend on its carriage."(58) For broadcast firms, who may also produce the content they carry, this rule is not applicable.

While these criteria provide a useful conceptual distinction, the administrative rationales for public involvement in both areas serve to further differentiate telecommunications policy-making from that of broadcasting. However, it is first useful to note that such involvement flows from the same legal/constitutional base. R.Brian Woodward et.al. offer a good summary of the role that the British North America Act and related "heads of power" have played in the establishment of the general framework for public involvement and conclude that "...during the course of considerable constitutional interpretation through the years, the courts have come to recognize a wide-ranging federal jurisdiction over most aspects of communications

policy, although the provinces have established de facto jurisdiction in certain limited areas."(59) In addition, W.R. Lederman points out that the right of governments to grant monopoly status to firms that are "natural monopolies" within their jurisdictions has also contributed to the structure of telecommunications policy as the quid pro quo for granting such status has usually involved "some regulation by a governmental public utilities board as to what the company may charge the public for its services."(60)

The administrative rationale for public involvement in telecommunications appears to have originated in the establishment of Canada's first telephone company. While Lederman does not explore the reasons why the Bell Telephone Company was granted monopoly status in 1880(61), it is arguable that economic considerations related to the cost of service to consumers played a major role. The basis for this argument is provided in a brief history of the Manitoba Telephone System (MTS) which indicates that between 1876 and 1893 Alexander Graham Bell's father owned the exclusive Canadian patent rights to the telephone and related distribution equipment.(62) As no other firm could enter into competition with Bell until 1893 it had the advantage of developing distribution systems in the most profitable market areas leaving little incentive for new companies to enter the market. This argument is strengthened when combined with Carl Beigie's discussion

of economies of scale within the telecommunications industry. He notes that the industry displays some of the characteristics of a "natural monopoly" and that "should more than one firm operate in such an industry, total costs of supplying a given level of output will be above the minimum attainable amount, and if all artificial barriers to market exit or merger are removed, the long-term result will be that a single firm will survive."(63) The federal government, having recognized that Bell's technological advantage coupled with economies of scale within the industry would allow it to dominate the market in any event, opted to exchange monopoly status for regulatory control of Bell's pricing structure in an effort to ensure that subscribers would be charged a fair rate for telephone service. From this base the pre-1969 telecommunications policy environment appears to have evolved in an incremental fashion with "rate of return" issues as the primary focus of administrative activity.(64)

While economic rationales appear to have been the sole focus of telecommunications policy-makers prior to 1969, broadcast policy has followed a somewhat less incremental course. Frank Peers argues that public policy related to the early broadcast (radio) industry came in two stages, each based on differing rationales.(65) In the first stage, from 1920 to 1929, "public authorities paid little attention to existing developments, as if broadcasting could be divorced from politics, or as if no

new policies were needed."(66) During this stage the primary question for policy-makers was how to best allocate the limited number of radio frequencies available to ensure that listeners received "clear channel" reception. However, with some six hundred stations operating in the United States and only forty-four in Canada by 1925, questions related to the impact of American broadcasting on the Canadian public became a topic of debate for policy-makers. Peers typifies the nature of this debate by noting that "if men conceive of radio as a powerful means for human communication, they are likely to advocate a different policy for its development and control than if they regard it as a vehicle for the lightest and most casual entertainment..."(67)

This proved to be the essence of a Parliamentary debate in 1928(68), and resulted in the establishment of a Royal Commission on radio broadcasting. The "Aird Commissions" report in September of 1929 ushered in the second stage of public policy development by advocating that broadcasting be brought under public ownership due to its importance as a "public service".(69) While the specific recommendations of the Commission were never enacted as legislation, its position on the importance of broadcasting as a social and cultural medium directly influenced the Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1932 which established the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission.(70) Peers notes that this Act articulated two principles of

public control that have governed broadcast policy since that time. These are the right "to regulate and control broadcasting in Canada...; and to carry on the business of broadcasting in Canada..."(71) The remainder of Peers work (including his 1979 book) is dedicated to an analysis of the role that both public and private interest groups have played in the evolution of broadcast policy. He summarizes this analysis by arguing that the central rationale for broadcast policy has been cultural in nature with economic interests playing a secondary role:

"Essentially, from the 1930's on, the stated objectives remained fairly constant, if not too precise, and their formulation did not arouse much dissent...Broadcasting was to stimulate and encourage feelings of Canadian identity, but at the same time to provide a "window on the world", through information about the outside world, and through the importance of programs-mainly entertainment programs-made elsewhere in the two languages most commonly employed in Canada. The intention, finally, was to have a broadcasting system broadly accountable to public authority for its performance, but without direct political control of its programs. There was one further objective, one not often stated: radio and television were to serve a commercial purpose, through the advertising of goods and services."(72)

In short, the history of communications policy between the 1930s and 1969 was largely incremental in nature with the broadcast sector serving as the primary focus of policy-makers. However, technological advances originating in the 1960s have increasingly forced communications policy into non-incremental modes, particularly in the telecommunications sector. Beigie

provides a good summary of the impact of these technologies on telecommunications policy when he argues that "Public policy response to changes in the industry...has been concentrated for too long on preserving the old through grafting piecemeal amendments to an outdated regulatory framework...Now the old framework is about to burst under the weight of new pressures..."(73) Among the various technological innovations that have brought new "pressures" on the communications policy environment, two have played a key role. The first encompasses the area of signal transmission and relates to the development of "broadband" cable technologies utilizing both coaxial cable and the newer optical fibres.(74) The second involves the application of microprocessor technology to the processing of telecommunications signals and has resulted, according to Douglas Parkhill, in "forcing together the hitherto separate technologies of computers and telecommunications...causing the emergence of what are loosely termed computer/communications systems."(75)

The merging of these technologies has created confusion for communications policy-makers because it has blurred both the conceptual and legal/constitutional lines that originally separated telecommunications from broadcasting. At the conceptual level two changes are noteworthy. First, it has created the potential for cable based broadcasters to move from one-way transmission to interactive forms given the appropriate terminal equipment.

On the other hand, it has allowed common carriers to cross the content/carriage line through the establishment of centralized data banks and the creation of what Parkhill describes as "information utilities."(76)

At the legal/ constitutional level technological change has resulted in a policy environment where "the underlying rationale for government regulation, upon which much of the existing legislative and administrative framework has been constructed, is itself under attack."(77) While this section will not attempt a detailed analysis of the legal/constitutional problems related to the new technologies(78), the net result for policy-makers is that the existing policy framework has, to use Richard Schultz's analogy, become a "maginot line".(79) He argues that, in addition to undermining the concept of natural monopoly in transmission(80), the merging of computers and telecommunications "is forcing upon society a new conception of the role of telecommunications, and more generally "communications", in the economy and society generally."(81)

This new conception is reflected in definitions offered by authors such as David Crane who defines telecommunications as "the modern communications network consisting of telephone and cable-television systems, communications satellites, microwave and land lines, computer communications, and broadcasting systems."(82) While this definition is too broad to be successfully

employed in a case study of Manitoba's telecommunications policy community, it serves to emphasize that during the 1970s and early 80s telecommunications policy-makers at both the federal and provincial levels have increasingly been forced to deal with social, cultural and other issues that have traditionally been the exclusive domain of the broadcast sector. This more general role for the telecommunications policy-maker is also reflected in a number of recent policy oriented works that focus on the role that new technologies have played in what has been described as an "information revolution" in North American society.(83)

The role of technological change in the evolution of telecommunications as a policy area has relevance to this paper's framework for analysis for at least two reasons. First, as Chapter I's discussion of Heclo's work emphasizes, the movement of a policy area from a "classical" to an "instrumental conditioning" mode gives "ideas" greater significance in the policy process and should make their sources more readily identifiable. Given this paper's focus on the policy role of a political party that contains "reformist" elements in its policy orientation, telecommunications policy in the 1970s and 80s offers the researcher a particularly good base upon which to study the role that party based policy ideas play in government policy outputs. The second reason relates to the broader definition that telecommunications assumed in

the 1970's. With reference to Pross's policy hierarchy, it can be argued that by 1969 telecommunications policy was moving from the status of a "subsidiary policy" to that of a "sector policy" making it an area of greater priority for government.

The Framework for Analysis

For the researcher embarking on the construction of a framework for the analysis of some aspect of public policy one of the most difficult realizations is that no existing model or framework comes close to capturing the complexity of a policy system. As a result one is forced to impose arbitrary parameters on variable definition and control in an effort to capture some small part of the broader reality. The use of a model, regardless of its source, is the first step in imposing such parameters. Like Pross's more elaborate model, the framework for analysis presented here can best be described as a historical approach that is invested with the techniques of systematic analysis. However, this framework represents a further step towards narrowing the parameters for research to the case specific level. This step is made with the recognition that it is done at the expense of a more subtle understanding of the complexity of a policy system. Nevertheless, it is hoped that, at the very least, a tentative understanding of the impact of the Schreyer administration on Manitoba's telecommunications policy community can be developed here.

In the introduction to Chapter I it was noted that the central question asked in this study is: To what degree did the Manitoba NDP affect the ideas, institutions, and/or processes related to government telecommunications policy during the Schreyer administration? As Chapter I's discussion of the theoretical framework for this paper has noted, this question is based on an interest in three elements in policy formation; ideas and their role in the content of policy, the institutional structure of a policy community, and the process features of that community. In addition, this study is also interested in the relationship of these elements to a "grassroots conceptualization" of the policy process. However, prior to stating this question in the form of a hypothesis, the concept of a "grassroots conceptualization" requires some elaboration. In their definition of this concept Adie and Thomas imply that it is realized when a political party can be seen to play "a crucial role in determining which issues receive serious consideration." In short, it is realized when a party has an effect on institutional and/or process elements within a policy community. On the other hand, Wiseman and McAllister appear to argue that the concept is realized only when the actual content of a policy can be seen to be affected by the "ideology" of a party. Given that both definitions have relevance, this paper will attempt to deal with both in the following hypothesis:

If party based variables/actors can be seen to have an effect on the ideas, institutions and/or processes within Manitoba's telecommunications policy community then a "grassroots conceptualization" has some degree of relevance in an analysis of telecommunications policy formation during the Schreyer administration.

While this hypothesis will serve as the central focus of this paper, Chapter I's discussion of an "empirical perspective" indicates the need for a null hypothesis based on the potential effect of bureaucratic and other non-party based variables in the policy process. Stated in formal terms this hypothesis argues that:

If non-party based variables/actors can be seen to have a greater degree of effect on the ideas, institutions and/or processes within Manitoba's telecommunications policy community than party based actors then a "grassroots conceptualization of the policy process has little or no relevance in an analysis of telecommunications policy formation during the Schreyer administration.

Admittedly these hypotheses are not without problems and, if nothing else, serve to support the argument that the imposition of operational parameters tends to obscure the more subtle realities of a policy system. One of the more obvious involves the use of a null hypothesis which implies that a significant role for non-party based variables rules out the possibility of a significant role for party based variables within the same policy situation. Just as politics in general requires compromises among competing interests, it is assumed here that some degree of compromise between party and non-party based elements can be found in a policy output. A second problem relates to the highly subjective nature of defining the degree of

"effect" that the various variables may have on policy behavior. In an effort to "control" this problem Chapter III and IV will offer a detailed history of Manitoba's telecommunications policy community prior to attempting to analyze the role of variables within the framework.

Turning to the actual framework, four groups of elements play a major role. The main elements within the three dynamic groups (contextual elements, non-party based elements, and party based elements) are contained in Diagram II.i which represents a simplified and slightly modified version of Pross's model.(84) It is important to note that the intent of this Diagram is not to define all of the possible elements within Manitoba's telecommunications policy community.(85) Rather, it is to establish the main variable groups within the framework.

In keeping with Pross's more elaborate model, the first feature of this Diagram is that it rests on a foundation made up of elements that define the context for policy formation. While these elements are crucial in the definition of ideas, structures, and processes within the policy community, the difficult task of operationalizing political culture to show a causal correlation will not be attempted in the formal case study. However, previous policy and one aspect of the political economy of telecommunications, technology and the changes it has engendered, will be assigned an intervening causal role in the framework. With respect to the latter this is based on




Diagram II.i: Key Elements in the Framework for Analysis

Section 2's discussion of the role of technology in moving telecommunications from a "classical" to an "instrumental" conditioning mode.

The second group of elements are defined as non-party based policy community elements. This category includes the structures, processes and actors that are "full-time" components of the policy community involved in the planning and application of telecommunications policy. This group has been assigned independent variable status in the framework and is considered to be the main source of non-party based ideas in the policy formation process. Directly related to this group are various interest groups (notably the Federal government and its agencies) and elites. While these actors play an intervening role in policy formation (as they are an important source of ideas for non-party based actors), with the exception of the Federal government a specific causal role will not be assigned to them in this framework.(86)

The third group, party based elements, is the most problematic category in this framework. As this group contains elements that operate within the policy community (ie. cabinet ministers, politically appointed policy planners, and appointees to MTS's Board of Commissioners) as well as those that inhabit its fringes (ie. the convention, party executive, and related policy committee's), a distinction in their causal roles is required. The latter sub-group of elements, which serve as

the conduit for party policy ideas, will be treated as an intervening variable in this framework. Intervening rather than independent status has been assigned to this sub-group because the former, while somewhat dependent on the latter for policy ideas, are subject to non-party based forces within the policy community. As a result, party based elements operating within the policy community will be assigned independent variable status given their role as "gatekeepers" through which party policy ideas must pass to become policy outputs.(87)

The fourth group of elements, which are not specified in Diagram II.i, fall under the heading of "telecommunications policy" and represent the dependent variable in this framework. In light of Chapter I's discussion of Simeon's article, two dimensions of this variable and the parameters applied to them in this framework require attention. First, the primary focus here will be on telecommunications policy "outputs" as opposed to "outcomes". However, the full range of outputs will not be given attention in this study. Based on a modified version of Pross's policy hierarchy Table II.i divides them into four policy categories. Within this framework Sector, Subsidiary, and Administrative policies will be the primary focus of attention.

The second of Simeon's dimensions, the difference between the "policy actions" of a government and "quasi-policies" also requires clarification. In this study

Policy Status	General Function	Examples in Manitoba's Telecommunications Policy Community
Aspirational	Important, generally accepted goals for the policy community.	Public ownership of the telecommunications system.
Sector	The general policy goals of the government and the allocation of resources to those goals.	Development of the principle of "cross-subsidization" to provide service to rural areas.
Subsidiary	Specific policy goals within central telecommunications agencies.	The expansion of service and its ongoing improvement through new technologies.
Administrative	The management of MTS by its senior personnel; the regulation of MTS by the PUB.	Management decisions affecting the day-to-day operations of the utility; PUB "rate of return" regulation.

Table II.i: Manitoba's Telecommunications Policy Hierarchy

attention will be limited to the policy actions of the government within a fairly narrow scope. However, as Woodrow et.al. note, during the 1960s and 70s a number of provinces attempted to utilize their constitutional powers in the area of education to establish agencies for the distribution of television and radio programs. Most notable among them were Quebec and Ontario who "took the lead in the late 1960s in establishing communications authorities and producing and disseminating educational programs..."(88) As a result, telecommunications related outputs from the Department of Education will also be given limited attention.

Having defined the parameters and causal relationships of the major variables, the final feature of this framework involves the format for analysis. On a number of occasions it has been noted that the roles of the various variables will be defined within a case study format. However, as Dennis Forcese and Stephen Richer note, the case study format can be placed on a continuum that has at one pole an "explanatory format" and at the other pole a "descriptive format". For them "the object of the explanatory study is to test specifically hypothesized relationships among variables..."(89) while the descriptive format has as its objective "the exploration and clarification of some phenomena where accurate information is lacking."(90) As Manitoba's telecommunications sector has been given little attention by independent researchers in the past, this study should be seen as "descriptive" in its intent.

The descriptive nature of this study is evidenced in the type of case study that will be utilized in this paper and is based on Harry Eckstein's argument that case studies can be divided into five general categories. Given this study's interest in utilizing Pross's "developmental" model, the "plausibility probe" seems to offer the greatest potential in that "plausibility here means something more than a belief in the potential validity plain and simple, for hypotheses are unlikely ever to be formulated unless considered potentially valid; it also means something less

than actual validity, for which rigorous testing is required."(91)

In addition to testing the "plausibility" of this framework's hypotheses, this study will also attempt to capture the dynamic nature of Pross's model. That a case study approach can capture this dynamism is a central point in an article by Heclo who notes that:

"Perhaps the greatest area of promise in case studies concerns their ability to "move" with the reality of dynamic factors... On the one hand, the approach seems particularly well suited to the delineation of dynamic forces in the sense of concentrating on "how things work." On the other hand, most case studies have been unnecessarily static by failing to investigate how "the working of things" changes...Thus, the popular decision-making approach in policy case studies has typically led to analyses which stop at the point of decision rather than more broadly and more realistically considering the decision sequences which constitute an on-going policy..."(92)

CHAPTER III

The Context for Policy Formation:

1906-1969

The first group of variables to receive attention in this case study are those defined in the framework for analysis as contextual elements. The intent of this Chapter is to trace the role of these elements in the historical development of Manitoba's telecommunications policy community prior to the election of the Schreyer administration in 1969.

Private Enterprise vs Public Pressure: 1880-1906

While the bulk of this Chapter is dedicated to the history of the Manitoba Telephone System (MTS) and its predecessor Manitoba Government Telephones (MGT), it is important to note that the telephone system in Manitoba was initiated through private as opposed to public entrepreneurship. In 1878, two years after Alexander Graham Bell received a patent for the telephone, a telegraph manager, Horace McDougall, was appointed the agent for the Bell Telephone Company in Western Canada and by 1880 had constructed an exchange in Winnipeg consisting of twenty-six subscribers.(1) Following its receipt of a Federal Charter in 1880 (2), Bell purchased McDougall's interests in Manitoba and by 1882 had established exchanges in Winnipeg, Brandon and Portage La Prairie. However, Bell was slow to develop its long-

distance capacity and it was not until 1887 that the first long-distance call was made in Manitoba on a 22 mile line from Winnipeg to Selkirk.

The expiry of Bell's exclusive patent for the telephone in 1893 cleared the way for other companies to compete with Bell in Manitoba. The threat of competition appears to have increased Bell's rural construction program and by 1900 some 235 miles of long-distance lines linked Winnipeg with five rural communities. One of the major sources of competition came from rural municipalities within the province who, angered by Bell's reluctance to service rural areas, set out to establish their own exchanges. In 1898 these municipalities, led by Neepawa, lobbied the provincial government for the right to set up municipal exchanges.(3) As the Municipal Act of the day did not allow them to establish commercial undertakings, the provincial government took its first step into telecommunications policy in 1899 by passing an amendment to the Municipal Act permitting municipal ownership of local telephone exchanges.(4)

The first municipal exchange was opened in Neepawa in 1900 and within three years six rural communities were served by their own exchanges. While they provided local service, Bell was not obligated nor was it inclined to connect them to its long-distance lines. This led to a new round of lobbying by the municipalities for provincial development of long-distance lines to connect the municipal

exchanges and appears to have been fueled by public acceptance of government involvement in this and other sectors of Manitoba's economy. This is noted in W.L. Morton's discussion of the public take-over of telephones between 1906 and 1908 by the Conservative administration of Premier R.P. Roblin (which will be given detailed attention in the following Section). He points out that "the ready adoption by a Conservative government of the principle of public ownership of community services monopolistic in character was not surprising, as the principle was one widely advocated at the time without regard to party."(5) He also notes the province's involvement in other public undertakings during the first decade of the 20th century including the City of Winnipeg's purchase of a hydro-electric plant and the Roblin government's unsuccessful foray into the grain elevator business.(6)

While Morton does not offer a discussion of the reasons why the principle of public ownership was "widely advocated" at this time, John Richards and Larry Pratt provide some clues to its development in the prairie region.(7) They begin their analysis by arguing that "we cannot agree that the provincial state lacks either competence or the capacity for entrepreneurial initiative...Nor can we accept the image of the provinces as the captive dependencies of instruments of international capital."(8) To support this point they cite Nelles and Armstrong's study of the public takeover of hydro-electric

installations by Ontario(9) and argue that when provincial governments in Canada have found themselves caught between the needs of national and/or international "capital" (to maximize rates of return on investment) and the demands of the local policy community (for an equitable distribution of the wealth created and/or services offered by a business undertaking) they have, at times, opted for public entrepreneurship as a policy option.(10)

For Richards and Pratt the rationales for public involvement in the prairie economy were often borrowed from Ontario.(11) While this policy option appears to have fallen from favor in Ontario during the 1930's(12), they contend that the unique political economy and culture of the prairies served to maintain support for it through the 1970's. For example, they point out that the sparsely distributed population in Alberta coupled with the recognition that enhanced communications and transportation services would serve to stimulate economic development caused that province's Liberal administrations of 1905-1921 to embark on extensive public development of railway and telephone services. They note that low-cost telephone service had a "considerable impact" on the integration of Alberta society in that "it helped to break down the isolation of farms and remote towns, stimulated the expansion of business activities and agricultural development in a country of immense distances and short growing seasons, and, by facilitating effective

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organization and communications, played a role in the growth of the co-operative movement in the west."(13)

While environmental factors such as the geography and demography of the prairies coupled with the "staple economy" of the region offered a fertile ground for the development of public entrepreneurship, Richards and Pratt also note that the political culture of the region was the "fertilizer" that stimulated its development. In their discussion of the role of "populism" in shaping public policy in the region(14) they note, for example, that the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association (formed in 1903) was the first formal expression of populism on the prairies and had a substantial impact on public policy in Manitoba.(15) This is evident in the evolution of telecommunications policy for it was this organization that supported the municipalities in their lobby for provincial development of long-distance lines to connect municipal exchanges between 1904 and 1906.(16)

The strength of this lobby, coupled with the application of two private firms to enter the Manitoba market, forced the Conservative administration of R.P. Roblin to take a more active role in telecommunications policy. On January 26, 1905 the Select Standing Committee on Private Bills of the Provincial Legislature, in a report that recommended the rejection of the private applications (made by the Independent Telephone Company and the Northwest Telephone Company), called on the legislature to

"enquire into the whole matter of the telephone service with a view to either taking over the present system in the province or building a new one, to be owned and operated by the Government for and in the interest of the people...".(17) During the spring and summer of 1905 the government considered the question and on November 23, 1905, Roblin reported the results of a government study to the legislature:

"The government is prepared to recommend to the legislature the establishment of a telephone system in the province of Manitoba to be owned and controlled by the municipalities and the government jointly... we have reached this conclusion from the fact that the telephone is, and must be, necessarily one of the natural monopolies, and yet is one of the most desirable and necessary facilities for the dispatch of business and for the convenience and pleasure of the people. Therefore, the price of telephones should be made so low that laboring men and artisans can have the convenience and advantage of the telephone, as well as the merchant, the professional man and the gentleman of leisure, and it is our intention to recommend to parliament a proposition of this kind with a view of giving a telephone system to all classes at cost."(18)

Following this speech the government established a second committee, headed by then Attorney-General Colin Campbell, which presented two Bills to the legislature.(19) Their passage, on March 16, 1906, formally began the "first phase" of public involvement in Manitoba's telecommunications policy community and gave the province broad powers to "purchase, lease, construct, extend, maintain or operate within the province of Manitoba

a telephone or telegraph system or systems...". Municipal involvement in the proposed system was outlined in Sections 8 and 9 of Chapter 89 through the province's right to "sell or lease to any municipality in the said Province the whole or any part or parts of any telephone system or systems...".

Manitoba Government Telephones and the Manitoba Telephone System: 1906-1969

With the passage of Chapters 89 and 90 in 1906 the province, armed with the legal right to expropriate Bell's Manitoba plant, called on the Federal government to modify Bell's charter to ensure that it would not contest expropriation in the Federal courts and/or enter into competition with Manitoba at some later date. This request was denied by the Federal government who argued that the findings of The Bell Telephone Case of 1905 established that telecommunications undertakings were a Federal concern subject only to Federal charter.(20) This left the province with two options, either build its own system under provincial charter to compete with Bell or purchase the existing Bell plant with guarantees from the company that it would not re-enter the Manitoba market at some later date. In an effort to strengthen his negotiating position with Bell, Roblin attempted to utilize the referenda provisions of Chapter 90 in the December, 1906 municipal elections.(21) Electors were asked: "Shall this municipality own and operate its own telephone?" The

response to this question was marginally supportive at best. While 13,688 votes were cast in favor with 11,569 against, the proposition was rejected in 67 of Manitoba's 123 municipalities.(22)

Given limited municipal support the Roblin administration undertook two policy changes. First, it secured the passage of new legislation related to the administration of the proposed system in February of 1907.(23) The second was to emphasize public ownership of telephones in the 1907 general election which returned the Roblin government. Mavor notes that Roblin utilized the 1907 victory to argue that his "proposed telephone policy was vindicated and that it was supported by public opinion."(24) This appears to have been accepted by Bell and in the fall of 1907 negotiations began for the purchase of its plant. In the final week of December the sale of Bell's plant was announced effective January 15, 1908, with a purchase price of \$3,300,000.(25) This was followed by legislation that formally established the administrative foundation of the new system which, through an Order-in-Council passed on the day of the purchase, was named Manitoba Government Telephones (MGT).(26) With its passage the day-to-day operations of the new system were assigned to a Telephone Commission appointed by and answerable to the Minister of the newly created Department of Telephones and Telegraphs. Mavor is quite critical of this legislation and notes:

"In spite of the government's explicit pledge that political considerations would be eliminated from the telephones management, such considerations appeared at the very outset and, as a matter of fact, dominated the Telephone Commission throughout its existence...Even in matters of detail the commission was subjected to pressures by members of the provincial cabinet... Recommendations even as to employment of individuals were made by Cabinet Ministers; and although the Commission was under no statutory obligation to act upon these "recommendations", nevertheless it was well understood that the smooth working of the Commissioner's relations with government depended upon the adoption of the "recommendations", which were always orally communicated."(27)

Following the purchase MGT embarked on a period of rapid growth and by the end of 1908 6,000 new subscribers and nearly 1,500 miles of line had been added. In the following year, 5,300 new subscribers joined the system following rate reductions of between 16 and 30 percent.(28) Whether this rapid growth and rate decrease were the result of Roblin's public position (contained in his 1905 speech) that the goal of public ownership was "giving a telephone system to all classes at cost" or were motivated by more pragmatic partisan considerations is a matter of some debate. Mavor argues that the latter was the case and notes that "the first effect of political control was perhaps in the matter of construction."(29) This position is supported in an editorial in the Manitoba Free Press which followed the 1910 re-election of the Roblin government and provides an indication of the public controversy that surrounded the government's administration

of MGT:

"The experience of the people of Woodridge district...is typical of the experience in numerous other districts of the province... It was judged highly desirable by the government that, in the interests of pure and undefiled politics, several car loads of telephone poles should be shipped out to Woodridge for election campaign purposes-fishing poles for votes would be a more apt description of them...Numerous voters were engaged at a rate of \$6 a day per man and team for the telephone line construction work, which it was announced would be gone on with immediately after the election; but before a fortnight had elapsed after the votes were counted, a train of empty flat cars came along, gathered up the poles and brought them back into Winnipeg."(30)

The controversy over MGT that followed the 1910 elections was given further impetus in December of 1911 when MGT Chief Commissioner, F.C. Paterson, announced that rate adjustments would have to be made in 1912 to meet an anticipated loss of \$153,000. These adjustments were to take the form of a "measured rate" for Winnipeg subscribers through which, for example, business subscribers would be allowed 100 local calls per month at a flat rate but would be charged two cents for each additional local call in the billing period.(31) This proposal raised the ire of the business community which, led by the Liberal opposition, forced Roblin to establish a commission of inquiry in January of 1912 to investigate the administration of MGT.

The Commission, headed by Judge C. Locke, began its hearings in early February and in June of 1912 released its findings to the public:

"The Commission found that the system was well

built and well equipped and was providing good service to the public, but that it had been extravagantly administered and without a proper system of accounting. The Commission also recommended against the proposed rate changes. It would appear from an examination of available records, that major contributing factors to the difficulties experienced by the Telephone System at that time were excessive supervision by the government and complete government control of finances."(32)

The government appears to have anticipated the Commission's findings and prior to the release of the Report introduced two legislative changes that signal the beginning of the erosion of direct cabinet control of MGT. The first was an amendment to Chapter 89 which, in part, gave MGT's Commission greater discretionary powers in the day-to-day administration of the utility.(33) The second established a Municipal and Public Utilities Board headed by a Commissioner with jurisdiction over MGT's rates and depreciation reserve.(34) In what appears to be a further attempt by Roblin to deflect criticism of his government's management of MGT, the publication of the Locke Commission report was followed by the resignation of all three of MGT's original commissioners on July 1, 1912, and their replacement the following day by a single commissioner. In addition, an advisory board, consisting of the Minister, the new Telephone Commissioner and the Utilities Board Commissioner was established and provided at least the appearance of independence from direct cabinet control.

Mavor argues that the Commission's resignation and ensuing structural changes brought to an end the first

phase of MGT's history. In summarizing this phase, three factors appear to have played a crucial role: "populist" support of public involvement in the development of utilities "monopolistic in character"; translation of that support by lobby groups into policy options for the Manitoba policy community; and the Roblin government's ability to translate those options into politically beneficial policy outputs. Among these factors the latter appears to be the most important in defining the character of policy outputs during this period. Mavor supports this when he describes this phase as being "dominated by political influence and political considerations, more or less effectively concealed behind the elaborate pretenses and the fair words of the government."(35)

It is noteworthy that during the 1914 general election, in which the Roblin government was returned by a narrow margin, "the management of the telephone system was one of the chief issues of contention."(36) Following the May 12, 1915 resignation of the Roblin administration over charges of political corruption(37), the newly appointed Liberal government of T.C. Norris undertook an audit of MGT. According to Goldenberg the audit found that "the book value of the assets on December 31st, 1914, was overstated by \$1,138,569 of which \$802,836 was attributable to goodwill included in the \$3,300,000 lump sum purchase in 1908..."(38) Presumably this "goodwill" purchase was made to ensure Bell would not re-enter the Manitoba market at

some later date, however, the Report offers no explanation of its inclusion in the purchase price.

The second phase of telecommunications policy development, from 1915-1945, began when the Norris administration assumed office. It initially pursued "a policy of economy and reduced new construction to a minimum"(39) which was forced on the new government by World War I's impact on the availability of equipment and skilled labor.(40) With the end of the War demand for telephone service increased and in 1919-20 more than 14,000 new subscribers were added to the system, annual gross revenues increased to \$2,586,966, and the total value of the system rose to \$15.5 million. This period also saw a decrease in the overt political control of MGT which Goldenberg attributes to the "wise exercise of authority" by the Public Utility Commissioner who "diminished the possibilities of political pressure for the extension of lines and the purchase of supplies; approved necessary changes in rates; and facilitated the setting up of satisfactory accounts for the system."(41)

While the immediate post-war expansion of MGT should have increased its net revenues, growth in demand took place during a period of high inflation which saw the utility record net losses of \$25,619 in 1919 and \$392,688 in 1920. These losses, coupled with sporadic failures in the new automatic exchanges installed in Brandon in 1917

and Winnipeg in 1919, resulted in the hiring of a firm of consulting engineers to review MGT's operations. A central recommendation in their report, which was made public on February 5, 1921, was that MGT should be reorganized on a "functional basis".(42) This was followed six days later by the appointment of a new MGT Commissioner, J.E. Lowry, who held this position until his retirement in 1945.

Within three months of Lowry's appointment a number of changes in the system's operation occurred including a change of name to the Manitoba Telephone System (MTS).(43) In addition, this period saw MTS make application to the Municipal and Public Utilities Commissioner for a general increase in telephone rates, the first since 1912. Following a series of public hearings an average increase of 28 percent was granted with Winnipeg subscribers receiving the smallest increase (20 percent for residential and 28 percent for business users) and rural subscribers the largest (35 percent for residential and 45 percent for businesses).(44) While these increases recognized the higher cost of serving rural areas, they also provided the basis for MTS's first explicit policy statement on the principle of cross-subsidization through which revenues for the high density, low-cost urban areas would be used to subsidize the higher-cost rural areas:

"...it should be also realized that the system is obligated to some extent to extend the value of its service, even at a loss, to points that have no other means of direct communications, as telephone service is one of the greatest

factors in the development of the province. This, of course, being beneficial to all should be spread as equitably as possible over the balance of the system."(45)

The 1921 rate change was accompanied by a general policy of retrenchment in an effort to cushion the impact of the post-war agricultural depression on revenues.(46) While this policy limited construction, particularly in rural areas, the 1920s saw a number of significant developments in MTS's policy orientation. These included a reduction in labor costs through the conversion of all exchanges in Winnipeg from manual to automatic by 1926 and the extension of long-distance services to all U.S. and many European points by 1928.

The most significant development, however, was MTS's entry into broadcast technology. In 1922, station CJCN, owned jointly by the Winnipeg Tribune and the Manitoba Free Press, brought commercial radio broadcasting to Manitoba.(47) Within the first year of its operation the venture encountered financial difficulties and the two newspapers, in an effort to minimize their losses, approached the provincial government with an offer of sale. During negotiations with the newspapers, the Province indicated to the Federal government that it was prepared to take over the station in exchange for a joint cost-sharing arrangement on the revenues collected for the licensing of home receiving sets and, more importantly, a guarantee of provincial monopoly over broadcast undertakings.(48)

Armed with an agreement from the Federal government, the Province completed its negotiations and on March 8, 1923 station CKY began broadcasting as an MTS facility.

The policy rationales related to Manitoba's entry into broadcasting are contained in MTS's 1923 Annual Report. The first notes that:

"The reason for provincial control of commercial broadcasting was that not more than one station could be supported by the business likely to emanate from the sale and operation of receiving sets; that a number of stations, owing to interference and indifferent broadcasts, would be a deterrent to the art, and it has become apparent that some expense was necessary (which the newspapers found out) as such stations would be compelled to go out of business, thereby leaving a large number of people with sets for reception and nothing to receive."(49)

In addition to this rationale two others played a role in the purchase. The first was a recognition of the cultural importance of broadcasting which, in the 1923 Annual Report, is noted as a concern that "...from a publicity viewpoint the identity of the province could be better preserved with the operation of one Manitoba station, than would be the case with several."(50) A second and more important rationale relates to the potential for long-distance competition from private firms created by new radio broadcast technologies. In a discussion of the province's negotiated monopoly over all broadcasting, including point-to-point radio transmission, the Annual Report notes:

"That this move was justified as far as the

protection to the telephone plant was concerned is evidenced from the fact that at least two manufacturers were approached by one of our principal long-distance users for a number of radio stations across the prairies, which, if practical, as undoubtedly it will be in the not too far distant future, would have meant a considerable loss to our revenue...".(51)

The decision to enter broadcasting appears to have been justified on financial grounds and by its second year of operation CKY showed a modest profit of \$666.32. This success led to the opening of CKX Brandon in 1928 to provide regional service to the south-western region of the province.(52)

In general, the organizational and technical changes made by MTS during the 1920s resulted in a sound financial position by 1929.(53) While the economic depression of the 1930s saw a predictable decline in the demand for service(54), this period also saw MTS achieve increased policy independence from the cabinet which is reflected in three policy changes. The first relates to the financial management of the System. Prior to 1931 MTS was financed entirely by the Province and, as a result, the cabinet was required to submit its budget and related capital investment plans to the legislature for debate and approval. As MTS accumulated capital reserves during the 1920s its dependence on the provincial treasury lessened and by 1931 the System was able to finance all of its capital requirements through its reserves. Goldenberg argues that this financial independence reduced political

debates regarding the operations of MTS by eliminating the need for legislative approval of the System's budget. He notes "the fact that no capital advances have been required for the government since 1931 has undoubtedly contributed to the absence of debate."(55)

This increased financial independence appears to have contributed to a second change related to MTS's decision to participate in the "All Canadian Telephone Route" the following year. This project saw MTS (as opposed to the provincial government) enter into an agreement with six other Canadian telephone companies to form a national long-distance system that allowed Canadians to "phone sea-to-sea without leaving national boundaries."(56)

A third and more important indicator of MTS's increasing control of telecommunications policy relates to the passage of a new Manitoba Telephone Act in 1933.(57) In many respects this Act, which replaced the original Act of 1906, served to formalize the independence from direct cabinet control that MTS had achieved since its creation in 1908. As Goldenberg offers a detailed summary of this act a complete review will not be undertaken here.(58) However, one of the more noteworthy changes was the definition of the "Manitoba Telephone Commission" as a "body corporate".(59) The Commission, which depending on the wishes of the Premier could consist of from one to three Commissioners, acquired many of the powers previously vested in the Department of Telephones and Telegraphs

(which was abolished under this Act). With this redistribution of administrative responsibility the Attorney-General automatically assumed cabinet responsibility for the Commission unless otherwise designated by the Premier. In addition, the cabinet retained control over any borrowing for capital projects made outside of the capital reserve fund and, along with the Public Utilities Commissioner, had final say in any changes to MTS's rate structure.

The passage of the 1933 Act was the last major policy change during the 1930s as MTS settled into a pattern of minimal growth in response to the economic depression. It was not until 1940 that further policy changes were undertaken following Carl Goldenberg's review of the province's commercial enterprises. Goldenberg found that, in general, MTS was providing "a satisfactory quality of service" and had "thereby acquired the goodwill of the public." (60) His main recommendations dealt with the administration of the system. While MTS had achieved legislative independence under the 1933 Act, Goldenberg noted that it had yet to achieve legal independence as "the system has been functioning under the legislation of 1933 although it does not appear that the "Manitoba Telephone Commission" has ever been appointed or constituted a body corporate as required by the Act." (61) As a result he advocated the formal appointment of at least one person to the Commission to fulfill the provisions of the 1933

Act.(62) In the event that only one of a possible three commissioners was appointed, Goldenberg also suggested that an "executive committee" be appointed to "advise on the formulation of policy" for the system. The rationales used to support the establishment of such a committee provide an indication of Goldenberg's concern that the opportunity for "cabinet interference" in MTS's operations should be minimized:

"The Executive Committee, consisting of the commissioner and of two executive officers of the system, who together have been in large part responsible for its efficient management, should provide, if it functions properly, an assurance of continued efficiency in management;...It will thereby attempt to combine business management with a greater degree of public accountability. For the purposes of such accountability, the records and minutes should be made available to the Minister, who, if he judges it necessary, could also meet with the Executive Committee, but not as a member of it...It must be clear, however, that such meetings with the Minister are not intended to introduce interference in the internal administration of the system. The setting up of the Executive Committee...is recommended in order to satisfy the basic requirement of business administration and of responsible government."(63)

Goldenberg's recommendations were accepted with little modification by the government and resulted in an amendment to the 1933 Act.(64) With this amendment Lowry assumed the title of Chief Commissioner and General Manager of MTS with the Assistant General Manager and Comptroller serving as members of the Executive Committee. It is noteworthy that this amendment also legally formalized the change of name from MGT to MTS.(65)

The third phase of telecommunications policy development in Manitoba began with Canada's entry into World War II and a resultant improvement in MTS's financial condition. During the early 1940s the demand for telecommunications services in Manitoba began to increase as the province became an important center for allied aircrew training and by 1942 MTS was showing a surplus of over \$700,000.(66) The improved financial situation gave rise to the suggestion that a portion of the System's profits be paid to the Province to assist in repayment of the debt it had accumulated during the 1930s. As a result the Liberal-Progressive government of Premier S.S.Garson introduced a Bill in the 1943-44 session of the legislature providing for the transfer of \$419,000 to the province from MTS's 1943 surplus of \$1,035,879.(67) The debate surrounding this Bill provides an indication of the CCF's policies at the time. While further attention to the party's early policy positions will be provided in the following Chapter, during the debate the CCF caucus argued that any profits from MTS should be turned back to subscribers in the form of reduced rates. Premier Garson's response was to argue that a reduction in rates would only leave the government with "a problem on our hands because when the telephone business returns to a normal level after the war, the reduced rates would not be sufficient to enable the Commission to operate."(68) The Bill received Royal Assent in April of 1944.

A second major event during the early years of this phase was the loss, in 1947, of CKY and CKX from MTS control. This event has its beginnings in the 1920s and is detailed in Peers' account of federal attempts to gain full jurisdictional control of the commercial broadcasting sector. He notes that in 1929 the Quebec Legislature passed a Radio Broadcasting Act which authorized it "to establish a broadcasting station or to make arrangements with existing stations to carry programs prepared by the government."(69) This Act was challenged in court by the Federal government, who claimed sole jurisdiction over broadcasting, and on June 30, 1931 the Supreme Court handed down a decision favoring the Federal position.(70) Following a Privy Council appeal, which also found in favor of the Federal position, the Federal government established a special parliamentary committee known as the 1932 Radio Committee.(71) The recommendations of this Committee resulted in the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act of 1932 which set the legislative stage for the eventual takeover of CKY by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.(72)

While the Federal government obtained jurisdictional control of broadcasting with the 1931 Supreme Court decision, it did not move immediately to limit provincial ownership of broadcast facilities. Peers notes that during the 1930s federal policies discouraged private ownership. This is evidenced by the Broadcasting Commission's

refusal to grant power increases to private stations in the 1932-35 period while at the same time allowing CKY to increase its output from 5000 to 15,000 watts.(73) However, with the advent of World War II the Federal government's policy position began to shift. This shift is evident in Ottawa's refusal to grant the Alberta government two separate licence applications to establish a broadcast facility in 1944.(74) Saskatchewan's efforts to purchase an existing private station in Moose Jaw in 1946 is another example. In his response to Saskatchewan's application, the then minister responsible for broadcasting, C.D. Howe, indicated that no further broadcasting licences would be granted to "other governments or corporations owned by other governments" and that negotiations for the purchase of the Manitoba stations by the federal government were underway.(75)

The negotiations for the sale of CKY and CKX went on for more than a year and in December of 1947 the federal government announced that it would build a new 50,000 watt station that would operate on CKY's frequency. The provinces's response was to announce that CKY and CKX would be offered for sale to the highest bidder.(76) This was followed, in January of 1948, with the announcement that CKY had been sold to the CBC for \$200,000 and that CKX had been purchased by a private Brandon syndicate for \$65,000. While there is no indication of MTS's position on the sale, the provincial government appears to have resigned itself

to the removal of the stations from provincial control. When questioned about the reason for the sale Premier Garson indicated that the continued operation of the stations by the province had "constituted an embarrassment to national radio policy" and therefore had to be completed.(77)

While the loss of CKY and CKX (which had consistently made a profit under MTS ownership) had a negative impact on MTS's revenues, the government's willingness to give up their control without a fight was related, in part, to a substantial increase in telephone subscribers during the late 1940s and early 1950s. A comparison of the 1945 and 1954 Annual Reports indicates that any losses resulting from the sale of the stations were offset as subscriptions rose from 95,631 to 202,673 and the value of MTS's plant increased from \$24.4 to \$76.5 million. The expansion was directly related to a national trend which, from 1951-1960, saw Canadians make more telephone calls per capita than any other nation with Manitoba leading this trend by a "wide margin".(78) However, in its efforts to meet expanding demands on the system, MTS's image as a profit-making corporation began to suffer. In the 1951-52 fiscal year net revenues dropped over 50 percent and by the end of the 1953-54 fiscal year the utility showed a deficit of \$111,422, the first since 1932.(79)

The reasons for MTS's less than sound financial situation by the end of the 1953-54 fiscal year were

related to the costs involved in plant expansion. Nowhere were these costs more evident than in the Northern area of the province which, during the late 1940s and early 50s saw a marked increase in service with little prospect of short or medium run profitability. In 1948, with the population north of the 53rd parallel nearing 7,000, MTS undertook the establishment of a radio-telephone service which by 1951 served 15 northern population centers. This was followed by increased mining exploration in the north and, as a result, MTS embarked on a major upgrading of its northern system which by 1955 totaled 153 radio-telephone stations.(80) With the opening of the Thompson area in the late 1950s further services were added including the land-line connection of Thompson and Churchill to The Pas in 1957. In short, while Annual Reports of the era do not provide an explicit indication of MTS's use as a tool for economic development in the North, a 1955 MTS Progress Report to the cabinet indicates the System's growing importance in infrastructure development in the natural resource sector:

"With the System's recognition of the importance of the oil industry in the Virden area, a survey was made with a view of providing a mobile telephone service that would serve the various companies operating in the area. As a result, equipment has been selected and ordered for a terminal base station and eighteen mobile subscribers."(81)

While MTS's expansion may have assisted economic development it also accelerated its budgetary problems and

by the end of the 1954-55 fiscal year the deficit had grown to over \$700,000. MTS's response was to make application to the Municipal and Public Utilities Board for the first general increase in telephone rates in 34 years. As was the case in 1912 and 1921, the prospect of higher rates focused public attention on MTS and, in keeping with Pross's arguments regarding self-interest as a motivation for political involvement in the policy process, forced the cabinet to renew its long dormant interest in telecommunications policy.

Substantial rate increases for rural subscribers, in an effort by MTS to reduce the level of "cross-subsidization" that had built up over the years, was the main focus of public concern. At one of the Utilities Board's hearings in Brandon a number of rural organizations argued "that present farm incomes could not stand the increases, and that the boosts were not 17 per cent, as advertised by the system, but ran as high as 70 percent when discounts and other points were considered." (82) The opposition parties in the legislature were also critical. For example, the Progressive Conservative MLA from Turtle Mountain constituency, Errick Willis, described MTS as the government's "sacred cow" and called for a "thorough investigation" of the utility. (83) A similar position was taken by the CCF who reiterated their earlier position that "public ownership had been created not for profits but to serve the public at cost." (84) The Utilities Board appears

to have agreed with the concerns expressed by rural groups and, in June of 1955, announced some reduction in the proposed rural rate increases.(85)

The government's response to the 1955 rate controversy was to amend the Manitoba Telephone Act. While this Act had undergone revision in 1954(86), the 1955 amendments were more extensive than those undertaken the previous year.(87) This is evidenced in a number of changes to the 1954 Act including: moving the right of expropriation from the Crown to the Telephone Commission (Sections 6 and 7) and giving the Commission full control of the purchase and sale of lands (Sections 8, 9, and 10); the removal of Section 5.(3) of the 1954 Act deeming only one Commissioner as necessary in the operation of the Commission; a significant expansion in the powers of the Commission over all financial matters related to its operation (Section 16); and the removal of Section 10.(e.iv) of the 1954 Act regarding the transfer of MTS profits to the provincial treasury. In addition, the automatic designation of the Attorney-General in Section 2.(a) of the 1954 and previous Acts was removed and this responsibility was transferred to the newly created portfolio of Minister of Public Utilities (Section 2.(c)).

With increased rates and greater flexibility in the internal management of the System, MTS's financial position began to improve with a surplus of \$236,889 indicated in the 1955-56 Annual Report. A large part of MTS's continued

financial improvement during the remainder of the 1950s is attributable to growth in long-distance revenues which were facilitated by the introduction of micro-wave technology. In 1956 Winnipeg was connected to Bell Canada's Ontario micro-wave system and by 1958 the Trans-Canada micro-wave system was completed with a resultant drop in long-distance costs and increased use of telecommunications for a variety of communications purposes.(88) One of the more important uses of the new system was to introduce CBC network television to Winnipeg which, since 1954, had been served by local service only. In addition to the advent of micro-wave technology, the final years of this phase also saw further amendment to the Telephone Act which expanded the definition of a "telephone".(89)

While the third phase of telecommunications policy development in Manitoba saw MTS increase its policy independence from the cabinet, the next phase began a reversal of that trend. This fourth phase can be dated from the general election of 1958 which, in addition to resulting in a change in the governing party, also saw television technology become a factor in the province's policy community. The response of the governing Liberal party of Premier D.L. Campbell to television technology in some respects parallels the "political" response of the Roblin government to telephone technology during the first phase of development. Six days prior to the June 18, 1958 general election, Premier Campbell announced that the

government had signed an agreement with a private firm to extend television service to Dauphin. In what seems to be an obvious attempt to gain support in the northern areas of the province the government indicated that the agreement contained the "option to extend the service further north and to other settled parts of the province." (90)

While this agreement was terminated by the newly elected minority Progressive Conservative government of Duff Roblin, a number of events which followed it provide an indication of the growing importance of television in the provincial policy community. For example, during the May 1959 general election in Manitoba the federal government announced that it was lifting the CBC's monopoly on television broadcasting and would allow the introduction of private stations to Winnipeg. (91) While this announcement appears to have prevented the question of expanded television service from becoming an issue in the provincial election campaign, the Winnipeg Free Press indicates that for the first time in Manitoba's history television saw "extensive use" as an advertising medium and was used to make the "final appeals" to voters. (92) In short, the use of television in this campaign had the indirect effect of sensitizing party based actors in Manitoba's policy community to the importance of television as a tool in shaping public opinion and resulted in the Roblin administration's post election efforts to increase

cabinet control of the policy community.

The Roblin administration's efforts to increase its level of control in the policy community can be seen in four major policy decisions taken during the new government's first full term. The first was the separation of the public utilities function from the Municipal and Public Utilities Board and the creation of a separate Public Utilities Board (PUB) which provided the government with increased regulatory control over MTS's operation.(93) This was followed by announcement of an "Organizational Study" of MTS's management structure. The study was released in 1961 and indicated the need to restructure MTS "to provide better operational control."(94) The government's response was to amend the 1955 Act with a Bill that included a re-definition of the size of the Commission from "one, two, or three commissioners" to "not fewer than three or more than five" (Section 2.(12.1) and the legal separation of the position of Chairman of the Commission (formally known as the "Chief Commissioner") from that of the General Manager (Section 2 (12.2)).(95) This amendment also further revised the definition of a "telephone" to reflect the changing nature of telecommunications technology.(96)

A fourth policy decision involved the makeup of the new MTS Commission, which was appointed in September of 1962. With the appointment of five persons the Commission consisted of more than a single individual for the first

time since 1912. While the former Chief Commissioner, J.F. Mills, continued to hold the title of Chairman of the Commission and General Manager, his loss of policy control is evident in then Public Utilities Minister Sterling Lyon's announcement that the expansion to a five member Commission brought "a corporate form of administration to the System to give guidance and to assume responsibility in direct policies of the utility."(97) The emphasis on political direction can be seen in the placement of the Deputy Minister of Mines and Natural Resources, J. Stuart Anderson, in the the role of Vice-Chairman and a government MLA for Morris, H.P. Shewman, as a member of the Commission. Their placement gave the government a direct communications link with the activities of the Commission which was augmented by the two remaining members who were also partisan appointees. They were W.T. Wylie, who was also a member of the government's Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future, and J.H. Chipperfield, a rural businessman.(98)

Upon taking office the new commissioners found themselves responsible for a telecommunications system that had grown to a total value of \$161.2 million with over 310,000 telephones in service. While telephone service continued to be the central focus of MTS's activities, the increased importance of television technology in Manitoba's policy community is evident in two policy initiatives undertaken in late 1962. The first saw MTS facilitate CTV

network service to Winnipeg through the Trans-Canada micro-wave system. This was followed by the extension of CBC television programming to Flin Flon and The Pas using MTS micro-wave towers as broadcast towers.(99)

The policy changes instituted during 1962 appear to have been satisfactory to Manitoba's electorate and during the December 1962 general election, which returned the Roblin government, telecommunications policy was not an issue.(100) Following its re-election the government appears to have been satisfied that its first term policy changes were keeping pace with emerging technological developments and no significant policy changes were forthcoming during the first three years of its second full term (which ran from December 1962 to June 1966).(101) However, a number of events occurred at the federal level which forced further policy activity in 1966. The first was the publication of the findings of the Fowler Committee on Broadcasting in 1965.(102) This was followed by the Federal government's White Paper on Broadcasting which echoed the Fowler Committee's finding that broadcast policy was of major significance to Canada as a nation and "may well be regarded as the central nervous system of Canadian nationhood."(103) In addition this period saw the court affirm the Federal government's exclusive control of cable television undertakings through the Victoria Cablevision case of 1965.(104)

With the Federal government's recognition of

communications as an important social medium and a clarification of its policy position, Roblin undertook a number of policy changes in 1966. Provision was made for the expansion of the Telephone Commission through legislation permitting a total membership of seven persons.(105) The government did not, however, add new members immediately and with the loss of J.S. Anderson in 1966 the Commission remained at four persons through 1969 with Mills continuing in his dual role. This was followed by the publication of Manitoba's response to the Fowler Commission which called on the Federal government to expand television service to a number of Northern Manitoba communities.(106) Of particular importance is a section sub-titled "Television as an Instrument of Development" which clearly expresses the Province's position on telecommunications as an instrument of economic and cultural development:

"Experience in Flin Flon, Manitoba as in other communities, confirms that communities that lack connected television cannot compete for labour with communities that do have direct or connected television. Flin Flon, for example, has lost miners to other mining centres in Canada with connected television, in spite of the fact that the workers in question had been employed for many years...they left in part because of the desire of their families, as well as their own desire, to have access to connected television, with all that this implies in terms of being located in the mainstream of Canadian information and thought. The hard and inescapable fact is that the absence of television within a region is prejudicial to the development of that region."(107)

The Brief goes on to outline service requirements for the northern region and closes with a notable display of salesmanship regarding MTS's ability to act as a common carrier for the expanded services requested in the Brief:

"It is recognized that the transmitting of television signals requires the equivalent of 600 long distance telephone lines and that the connecting of Flin Flon and The Pas to "live" CBC programmes originating in Winnipeg would involve an expenditure of close to \$1,000,000 to provide the necessary transmission lines. The Manitoba Telephone System is perfectly prepared to build this line given an appropriate contract with the CBC that visualized the amortization of this cost over an appropriate period of time."(108)

This Brief was presented prior to the government's entry into the June 1966 provincial election which saw Roblin stress "the government's northern development policy" during a televised leaders debate.(109) The election returned Roblin with a reduced majority and also saw the introduction of a new set of actors in the provincial policy community. In the fall of 1966 MTS was approached by representatives of two groups of investors who were interested in establishing a cable television system in Winnipeg. While the Federal Department of Transport had responsibility for issuing Cable licences, there was only minimal regulation of Cable firms at the time particularly in the area of signal distribution and rate structures.(110) Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective outlines three types of potential agreement that were discussed during negotiations between

MTS and the prospective cable operators:

"1. Pole Attachment Agreement. Under this plan, the cable company owns all of its own hardware, and is allowed to attach it to the common carrier's poles for a fee... Generally, pole attachment agreements prohibit the cable systems from providing point-to-point telecommunications services in addition to their television importation function.

2. Partial Agreement. Under this plan, the cable system pays for the installation of the coaxial cable distribution hardware, although ownership of this cable is held by the common carrier... In effect, the cable company makes a lump sum payment for the cable distribution system at the time of construction, instead of paying the full cost of leasing the cable from the carrier over a longer period of time...

3. Full Lease Agreement. Under the full lease agreement, all of the hardware would be owned by the common carrier, and leased on a per-channel and/or per-subscriber basis to the cable television company. While such agreements would appear to offer the most logical and efficient use of the new broadband hardware, cable television companies have generally been unwilling to sign them."(111)

While MTS was interested in obtaining a full lease agreement, the cable firms sought a pole attachment plan during the negotiations. As a result the Commission opted for a compromise and in 1967 signed a "partial agreement" with the two firms. While the significance of this agreement will be given attention in subsequent chapters, it is important to note that MTS wrote a number of safeguards into this agreement including the option to have the contract evolve into a full lease. As a later government discussion paper notes, an important feature of this contract was that "the cable television companies could lease required spectrum space for programming

purposes from MTS, but would not be able to control the other channels on the cable." (112) This was the last major event in the fourth phase of MTS's development which ended with the election of the Schreyer administration in 1969.

Educational Telecommunications in Manitoba

While MTS served as the main instrument of telecommunications policy until 1969, the activities of one other member of the policy community requires attention in this overview. The history of educational telecommunications in Manitoba began in 1925 when the Manitoba Teachers Federation, in co-operation with CKY, produced a number of programs during non-school hours that were designed to supplement the existing curriculum. (113) A favorable response to these programs led the provincial Department of Education to take an interest in broadcasting and in 1931 it initiated a series of programs based on curriculum materials. While the economic depression and resultant government budget cutbacks ended these programs after one year, they resumed in 1937 on a limited basis and, in 1938, were expanded to two and one-half hours of programming per week. (114) Their success and similar successes in the other prairie provinces, caused the then Manitoba Minister of Education, Ivan Schultz, to suggest a joint meeting of the four Western provinces to explore the possibility of co-operation in the production of radio programs. The result was the formation of the Western

School Broadcasts Region in 1940.

The formation of the Western group was followed, in 1943, by the establishment of a National Advisory Council on School Broadcasts. It was formed to co-ordinate the production of school broadcasts with the CBC, which became the central production agency for the programs. A provincial study of Educational Broadcasting describes this Council as an "organizational freak" created largely to occupy a middle ground between provincial jurisdictional control of education and the Federal government's control of broadcasting and the CBC.(115) It argues that one result of the Council's need to balance jurisdictional concerns was a lack of innovation and a "single-minded fixation on the one purpose of piping external productions into the classroom."(116)

The appearance of television technology in 1954 produced little change in this goal and rather than taking advantage of the innovative possibilities created by the new medium, the Council appears to have treated it as a visual extension of the radio system. While some experimentation with television was undertaken in Ontario and Quebec (the first provinces to have television broadcast facilities) by the Council(117), the greater production costs coupled with the reluctance of a number of provinces to increase funding to the Council resulted in the suspension of television experimentation in 1956.

Manitoba's response was to become the first province to undertake independent television experimentation in co-operation with its local CBC station. In early 1958, six half-hour programs were produced by the School Broadcasts Branch of the Manitoba Department of Education, which was formed in 1945 and headed by Miss Gertrude McCance. The success of these programs caused the other western provinces, under the auspices of the Western Broadcasts Committee, to produce an expanded series of programs in 1960.(118)

Spurred by the success of Manitoba's experimentation, the National Advisory Council undertook, once again, to become involved in television production. The combination of Manitoba's local production and the increased availability of National programs resulted in 143 programs being made available by 1964 and the recognition of Manitoba as a national leader in the use of telecommunications for educational purposes. One survey of educational television in Canada indicates that in that year the number of Manitoba classrooms using television as a teaching aid increased by 50 percent.(119)

In addition to MTS's role in initiating educational broadcasting in Manitoba, the System also was involved in two experiments by the School Broadcasts Branch during the 1960s. The first, initiated in 1966, saw the establishment of an experimental closed-circuit television system to two Winnipeg Schools. The second utilized a Visual Electronic

Remote Blackboard (VERB) technology. VERB integrated an audio connection with a device that transmitted written material allowing a teacher to lecture to a classroom at a distance. While the closed-circuit system was expanded in the 1970s and will receive attention in the following Chapter, VERB was abandoned because the technology was "to television as oxcarts are to jet flight".(120)

In conclusion, this overview serves to emphasize three points. First, it is evident that the history of policy control by party based actors in Manitoba's policy community was by no means linear. While cabinet control was dominant during the early stages of MGT/MTS's development and decreased through the 1920s, 30s and 40s, the growing importance of telecommunications as a component of the economic infrastructure (particularly in northern areas of the province) began a reversal of this trend. The introduction of television technology in the late 1950s coupled with a change in governing parties further accelerated the trend to increased involvement by party-based actors in the policy community. As a result a fair degree of cabinet involvement in the policy community appears to have been an accepted fact by 1969.

The second point is that Doern and Phidd's argument regarding the role that ideas embedded in an institution play in the policy process is supported in this overview. This can be seen in Table III.i's comparison of ideas developed early in the life of the policy community with

those in the 1960s. Their argument is particularly relevant given that policy leadership in the community saw major shifts during the first four phases of development (from control by party based actors in the first to control by MTS in the second to an equilibrium between the two by the fourth phase).

Policy Type	Early Policy Idea	Policy Ideas in the 1960s
Aspirational	Telephone System represents a natural monopoly and should be maintained within the public domain.	The concept of MTS as a Crown Corporation does not appear to have ever been challenged and was secure in 1969.
Sector	Roblin's 1905 speech defines "giving a telephone system to all classes" as his government's goal.	This goal gave rise to the policy of "cross-subsidization" which does not appear to have ever been challenged.
Subsidiary	The goal of a telephone in every home flowed from the government's Sectoral goals.	People of Service notes that "by the mid-1960s the goal.. was fairly well accomplished.(121)
Administrative	The centralization of policy-formation within the Telephone Commission with limited external control(with the exception of rate regulation through the PUB).	While some political controls were re-introduced in the 1960s, MTS maintained a fair degree of independence within the policy community.

Table III.i: The Role of Early Policy Ideas in the 1960's

The importance of institutional ideas is also evident in the relatively minor changes in the institutional structure of the policy community that

occurred prior to 1969. While the fourth phase saw some enhancement of the policy role of existing institutions such as the Telephone Commission and the PUB, the most significant changes involved an increase in the number and importance of interest groups connected to the policy community. This is noted in Diagram III.i which outlines the 1969 pre-election policy community. Of particular importance are three interest groups which include:

1. The Trans-Canada Telephone System...which appears to have assumed an increasingly important role in shaping the application of new telecommunications technology. A review of MTS Annual Reports indicates that ideas related to the application of new technologies were generated by this actor. This includes the use of micro-wave and satellite technology in the 1950s and 60s.(122)
2. The Federal Government...while limited to influencing ideas related to the broadcast sector, the creation of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) in 1968 was to have a significant impact on the provincial policy community in the 1970's. Further attention will be given to the role of this actor in the following Chapter.
3. Special Interest Groups...including the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA), the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB), and northern community based groups. Prior to the creation of the CRTC and the resultant development of comprehensive guidelines for cable television and broadcast regulation, the CCTA and CAB were very active in the provincial community (particularly the CCTA who played a role in the 1967 negotiations between MTS and the Cable Companies).(123)

Finally, it appears that the general orientation of Manitoba's policy community was consistent with those in other Canadian jurisdictions prior to 1969. Brian Woodrow and Kenneth Woodside provide a comparison of the policy position of Canadian telecommunications carriers in the early 1970s and note the following similarities(124):




Diagram III.i: Manitoba's Pre-Election Policy Community

- Pricing policies that tended to follow "value-of-service" rather than "cost-of-service" principles and were applied on a "system-wide, flat-rate, and route-averaged" basis.
- A rate structure designed to meet overall "revenue requirements" which ensured a rate of return to the System sufficient to allow it to recover the costs of its investment as well as to make a "satisfactory" profit.
- A non-competitive relationship with other telephone companies which facilitated a form of "private sector cooperative federalism" among the various Canadian companies.
- A generally "depoliticized" environment characterized by the absence of Federal-Provincial conflicts over telecommunications policy.

They note that two major values dominated the essentially stable pattern of policy-formation displayed by the national telecommunications policy community prior to the 1970s. These values are evident in the policy history of MGT/MTS and include:

"...an emphasis on customer service rather than pricing alone and an overriding concern for the growth and welfare of the public telephone network...The emphasis on quality of service...arose largely from traditional common carrier regulatory principles of "just and reasonable rates" and "non-discriminatory access"...The continuing concern for the viability of the network gave a collectivist and even paternalistic orientation to thinking within the telephone industry, with a strong commitment to extension of universal service to all subscribers within a company's territory...this mind-set helps to explain the attitude taken by many telephone industry people towards its substantial accomplishments and prospects for continued success. In the widely-used idiom of telephone industry executives, which has also become their standard defence against the onslaught of technological change and increased competition, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"."(125)

CHAPTER IV

Political Change and the Policy Community:

1969-1977

This Chapter will turn its attention to the effect of the election of the Schreyer administration on policy formation. Section 1 introduces the Chapter by means of a brief analysis of party policy prior to the NDP's election. Section 2 provides an overview of the early stages of the fifth phase of telecommunications policy development, from 1969-1973, and is followed by a review of the government's second term policy outputs in Section 3.

Party Policy Prior to 1969

While this paper will focus on policy resolutions passed after 1961 it is noteworthy that the Manitoba NDP's telecommunications policies appear to have originated in the British Labor movement prior to the turn of the century. Wiseman notes that in Britain there was strong support among trade unionists for public ownership of utilities and that these "gas and water socialists" carried this idea with them into the various Labor organizations that contributed to the formation of the Manitoba CCF.(1) The first explicit articulation of the principle of public ownership of utilities by the CCF/NDP is contained in the "Calgary Programme" of 1932 which preceded the formation of the party and called for "the social ownership, development, operation and control of utilities

and natural resources."(2) These principles were given substance a year later with the creation of the CCF and the publication of the "Regina Manifesto". This document served as the CCF's central policy platform until 1956 and called for:

"SOCIALIZATION (DOMINION, PROVINCIAL, OR MUNICIPAL) OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRIC POWER AND ALL OTHER INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES ESSENTIAL TO SOCIAL PLANNING... Transportation, communications and electric power must come first in a list of industries to be socialized... management... will be vested in boards who will be appointed for their competence in the industry...the rigidity of Civil Service rules should be avoided and likewise the evils of the patronage system... Workers in these public industries must be free to organize in trade unions and must be given the right to participate in the management of the industry."(3)

As Manitoba already maintained public ownership of MTS, the CCF's major policy differences with provincial governments prior to 1956 were limited (as was noted in Chapter III) to advocating a strict policy of "service at cost" for MTS.(4) The "Winnipeg Declaration" of 1956 does not appear to have altered this position and saw the party place an additional emphasis on the application of "scientific and technological advances" in a planned fashion.(5). Wiseman notes that the formation of the NDP in 1961 saw the adoption of a policy platform that was "virtually identical to the CCF's platforms of the late 1950's."(6) A review of the Manitoba NDP's convention policy resolutions between 1961 and 1969 indicates that no resolutions relating to telecommunications were added by

the "new" party.(7)

As the NDP does not appear to have altered the CCF's policies on public utilities prior to its election, Table IV:i offers a summary of its policy platform in 1969. Also included is a listing of policy outputs that the Schreyer administration might be expected to develop based on a "grassroots conceptualization" of the policy process.

Policy Type	CCF/NDP Platform	Potential Outputs
Aspirational	Principle of public ownership of Telecom facilities.	Similar to platform position.
Sector	Co-ordination of public resources in an integrated planning system.	Expansion of telecom system to facilitate other policy goals (ie. educational telecom).
Subsidiary	Expansion of telecom services to all citizens "at cost".	Maintenance of goal of telephone in every home and continued support of cross subsidization to achieve that goal; rates based on service at cost principles.
Administrative	Management of public utilities by "independent" boards appointed on the basis of competence as opposed to patronage; worker participation in the management of the utility.	Similar to the platform position.

Table IV.i: The CCF/NDP's Pre-election Telecommunications Policy Platform

The "potential outputs" are offered to provide an initial basis for comparison of the NDP's policies with

actual behavior. They assume a "grassroots conceptualization" of the policy process and imply that the Schreyer administration would be likely to develop policy outputs that reflected a greater degree of public entrepreneurship than those produced by previous "conservative" administrations. While this assumption will be tested in this and the following Chapter, it is supported in a recent article by Marsha Chandler.(8)

In her analysis of the role of "partisanship" in provincial public policy, Chandler argues that the "party-politics" model (which is similar to a grassroots conceptualization in that it is based on the premise that political parties have an independent effect on policy choice) "is potentially a strong explanatory and predictive tool."(9) She indicates that "not only are governments of the left more likely to employ crown corporations, but they also do so with greater frequency"(10). Following a discussion of the use of crown corporations as policy instruments(11), she concludes that:

"Even more crucial than the distinctive partisan propensities to establish crown corporations is the difference in the purposes for which crown corporations have been employed...For the most part, Conservatives, Liberals and other non-left parties have viewed public ownership not as an instrument for controlling or shaping the economy but rather as an alternative to incentives, subsidies and the like in support of the private sector. The left, on the other hand, has sought to employ crown corporations as instruments of economic and social control in line with the goals of redistribution and deconcentrations of power.(12)

Political Learning and the Policy Community:1969-1973

In general, Chandler's arguments regarding the role of partisanship in the development of "public enterprise" would appear to be supported if one were to utilize the NDP's election promises during the 1969 campaign as the basis for that argument. While telecommunications policy was not an issue, a review of Winnipeg Free Press campaign coverage indicates that the party's platform contained a number of major commitments to the utilization of public corporations as instruments of economic and social development.(13) Following the election the controversial nature of a number of these commitments (particularly the establishment of the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation) coupled with the Schreyer government's general lack of experience appears to have forced the cabinet to focus its energies on meeting its election commitments. As a result, telecommunications policy underwent little change during the first two years of the administration with MTS continuing in its pre-election role as the sole planning institution within the policy community.(14)

The Schreyer administration's lack of attention to telecommunications policy during its first two years is evidenced in a review of MTS's 1969-70 and 1970-71 Annual Reports. While the 1966 legislative changes allowed the government to appoint up to seven commissioners, the 1969-70 Annual Report indicates that the Commission remained at

four persons with only one member of the pre-election commission, J.H. Chipperfield, being replaced following the expiry of his term.(15) The expiry of the term of a second member of the pre-election Commission resulted in further changes in 1971, including the Commission's expansion to five persons(16). However, these changes do not appear to have significantly altered MTS's policy behavior which can be summarized as a continuation of the policy trends established during the fourth phase of development.(17)

While the Schreyer administration's efforts to meet its election commitments contributed to its lack of interest in altering the policy community status quo during the 1969-71 period, another contributing factor was a series of policy changes by the Federal government. In light of Manitoba's lack of any formal planning capacity to respond to these changes, it appears that the community was left unsure of what policy options to pursue. The first area where these changes took place was in broadcasting and cable television and originated with the passage of a new Federal Broadcasting Act in 1968.(18) This Act, which also created the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), articulated the Federal government's perception of its right to exclusive jurisdiction over all broadcast undertakings including cable television.(19) While it did not directly threaten Manitoba's jurisdictional control of MTS, it did have an indirect impact on future provincial

entrepreneurship in telecommunications. An indication of the CRTC's role in shaping the province's policy options is contained in two federal Orders-in-Council passed in 1970. The first required the province to make application to the CRTC if it wanted to utilize space on Winnipeg's cable system(20). The second directed the CRTC not to grant broadcasting or cable television licences to any provincial government or its agencies or crown corporations.(21) These Orders were followed, in July of 1971, by a general CRTC policy statement on telecommunications.(22)

Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective

notes the importance of this statement for Manitoba:

"...to date the CRTC has rejected a utility approach for cable television...it appears that this rejection...is based not on a desire to let monopoly profits go forever unregulated, but rather a concern that a utility approach carries with it a commitment to cross-subsidizing the extension of Cable television, and therefore, in effect, subsidizing the entry of American television into Canada."(23)

In summary, while the July 1971 CRTC statement recognized the "natural monopoly" characteristics of cable television (which can be seen in its policy of licensing only one outlet to serve a given area), its refusal to license common carriers (which would have allowed the introduction of rate principles based on cross-subsidization thereby allowing the expansion of cable systems and their American programming to rural areas of Canada) effectively eliminated MTS from entering the cable market.(24) That the CRTC was determined not to allow

common carriers to operate cable undertakings can also be seen in its policy requiring private licencees to own at least the head-end amplifiers and lines leading from, in Manitoba's case, MTS's lines into the cable subscribers home (these lines are known as "house drops" or simply as "drops").

In addition to the CRTC's role in shaping Manitoba's future policy options in the cable television market, a second group of policy changes at the federal level in the early 1970's created a potential threat to the independence of Manitoba's existing policy status quo. In 1969 the Telecommunications Regulation Branch of the Federal Department of Transport was transferred to the newly-created Department of Communications (DOC). This transfer gave DOC responsibility for the licencing and regulation of microwave systems and increased the Federal government's ability to "play an important role in regulating the use of microwave by common carriers and by private cable companies and broadcasters." (25)

While these changes did not have an immediate impact on MTS's operations (26), it soon became apparent to all of the provinces that the Federal government was undergoing a fundamental change in its position on telecommunications policy. Richard Shultz supports this point when he notes that ideas related to the application of microprocessor technology to telecommunications systems resulted in a shift from a federal emphasis on the "individual impacts"

of policy (evidenced in its pre-1969 emphasis on rate of return regulation) to a concern with telecommunications "societal impacts".(27) This shift is evident in the Federal government's 1970 initiation of its "Telecommission Inquiry" which was headed by two senior members of the DOC who organized "a series of multi-disciplinary seminars participated in by some 400 Canadian authorities drawn from the widest possible variety of backgrounds...".(28) It resulted in a number of discussion papers that were summarized in Instant World: A Report on Telecommunications In Canada.(29) While Instant World does not outline specific federal policies, it does provide a good indication of the effect of ideas related to the new technologies in broadening the scope of federal policy to the "societal" level. This is reflected in a discussion by its authors on an alternative title for the Report:

"An alternative title, which was rejected by the narrowest of margins, was Connect; Inter-Connect; Dis-Connect. "Connect" was intended here as a synonym for the right to communicate; "inter-connect" was used to express the principle that all users of communications systems should have the right, under equitable conditions, to connect their equipment to the basic national system; "dis-connect" was used to convey...the right not to communicate and not to be communicated to...".(30)

In addition to Instant World's importance in emphasizing the Federal government's new focus on telecommunications policy, it also served as the primary stimulus for the first significant change in Manitoba's policy community since the expansion of the MTS Commission

in 1962. However, the conduit for the "ideas" represented in Instant World was not MTS. Rather, two party based actors played a significant role in raising telecommunications profile at the cabinet level. The first was Kenneth Goldstein, an Executive Assistant to Premier Schreyer. Goldstein, who had returned to Manitoba in 1969 to assist with the election campaign, had previously served as a communications consultant to the Ontario NDP. In his capacity as an assistant to Schreyer he was asked to coordinate the Province's response to a number of federal requests for a policy statement from Manitoba on telecommunications. Recognizing that the province did not have a comprehensive policy position and lacked the resources to develop such a position, Goldstein suggested to Schreyer that the cabinet allocate funds to facilitate telecommunications research. Following cabinet approval, he took a leave from his position in September of 1971 to pursue research in the area of broadcasting, cable television, and media economics.(31)

The second party based actor to play a role was then Public Works Minister Russell Doern, a former MTS Commissioner. Doern appears to have been the only member of the Schreyer cabinet with a high degree of interest in telecommunications policy and "actively pursued augmentation of the province's telecommunications planning capacity whenever the issue was discussed in cabinet."(32) Goldstein's and Doern's actions resulted in cabinet

approval of research funds for Goldstein as well as funds for hiring a second researcher. However, rather than assigning this person to the Minister Responsible for MTS, the cabinet opted to augment the budget of the Management Committee of Cabinet. In October of 1971 Charles Thompson, a former journalist and electronics engineer, was hired by Management Committee in this capacity.(33)

At the time of his appointment, Thompson's mandate was to study Instant World and related materials and to report to cabinet on its policy implications for Manitoba.(34) While his salary was paid by Management Committee, he was instructed to report to Doern who, in turn, was responsible for presenting his findings to cabinet. According to Thompson this rather unconventional arrangement reflected two cabinet concerns at the time. The first was that MTS's legislative mandate was not broad enough to include new "content services" that were outside of its traditional common carrier mandate. Assuming that MTS's mandate could be broadened to include such services, the second was that the System would not be able and/or willing to respond to the new policy environment in an innovative fashion.

Thompson argues that the latter concern was due, in part, to management attitudes at MTS. According to Thompson, MTS was "very protective of its independence from the government and did not feel that the cabinet should be involved in policy management of the System."(35) This

preoccupation with maintaining an "arms length" relationship from the government appears to have been a response to management perceptions that Manitoba's other major public utility, Manitoba Hydro, had become too "political" in the 1960's and that MTS was in danger of following the same path.(36)

A second reason for this concern has particular relevance to the framework for analysis employed in this paper. At the time of his hiring, Thompson notes that MTS's attitude to telecommunications policy could best be described as a "traditional black telephone" approach:

"...MTS's management seemed to consider anything beyond basic telephone service, which was symbolized by the standard black desk telephone, as outside of their policy mandate. For them the services offered by the new technologies, which implied breaking the long established rule of content/ carrier separation, occupied the realm of entertainment, not telecommunications. They (MTS's management) argued that these services should be the policy domain of some other agency of government. In short, their approach to the new technologies was archaic and they saw little need for changing the policy status quo that had evolved since the creation of MGT in 1908."(37)

This observation indicates that the ideas embedded in MTS's institutional policy perspective had become so entrenched that it was unable to break free of its "classical conditioning" and, therefore, was unwilling to explore the policy options created by the changing technological environment. This inability and/or unwillingness to become involved in policy formation

pertaining to those services offered by the new technologies that did not directly relate to "telephones" appears to be an important factor in the cabinet's decision to create a policy formation capacity independent of the System.

While the creation of an independent research capacity was the first major event in the evolution of the institutional and process structure of Manitoba's policy community under the Schreyer administration, two additional events in late 1971 and early 1972 are also significant. The first occurred at the NDP's November 1971 Provincial Convention which saw the party pass its first telecommunications related policy resolution since its formation in 1961:

"WHEREAS cable communication is important to the future development of Manitoba, and
WHEREAS the cable communications industry must not be developed by private business which is motivated by private profit rather than by public interest.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Manitoba Government should take over control and ownership of all intra-provincial cable systems"(38)

In addition to indicating the party's interest in having the government pursue telecommunications policies that were consistent with its traditional policy platform, this resolution also appears to have contributed to a change in telecommunications status vis-a-vis the cabinet.(39) A second event that contributed to this change was Thompson's completion of his first report to the

cabinet.(40) His main recommendation was the establishment of a Planning Secretariat that "would demonstrate to Ottawa, in a tangible way, our concern and desire to be involved in the formulation of Canadian Communications policy."(41) The first goal of this proposed Secretariat would be the co-ordination of inter-provincial policy vis-a-vis the federal government. As his report indicates, Thompson had already taken steps in this area by organizing a "meeting of Provincial Communications staff in Winnipeg April 17, 1972, to pursue inter-provincial discussion at the staff level and to explore feasibility of a joint meeting of Federal and Provincial Communications Ministers."(42)

While the April meeting will be given attention below, Thompson's position on the establishment of a formal planning capacity was accepted by the cabinet and is evidenced in the July 1972 appointment of Kenneth Goldstein (who had returned to Manitoba after completing his graduate studies) as Associate Deputy Minister, Communications within the Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services.(43) Thompson then moved from the Management Committee to the newly formed Communications and Information Services Division of the Department as Acting Director, Telecommunications Policy Research.(44)

With this new administrative arrangement the fifth phase of telecommunications policy in Manitoba began in earnest as the policy community embarked on a period of

intensive "political learning". Goldstein describes the initial efforts of the Communications Division as an attempt "to get up to speed on a number of policy areas so that we would not get caught napping by either the Federal government or the changing technology."(45) The four major areas that the Division attempted to "get up to speed" on were; broadcasting and cable television policy, common carrier policies, computer communications, and educational telecommunications. Goldstein was responsible for broadcasting and cable television and began developing a policy response to the Federal government, community interest groups (who at the time were pressuring the government for improved television service), and the provincial party's 1971 policy resolution.(46) The response to the two former groups can be found in an October 1972 News Release announcing the Province's intent to lobby the Federal government for an expansion of television services to a number of northern communities.(47) Included in this Release is a series of questions with answers from Goldstein's Minister, Al Mackling. His answer to the question "What do you see as the Provincial role in the Communications field?" was:

"We have to remember, of course, that broadcasting comes under Federal jurisdiction, specifically the jurisdiction of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, and the Federal Department of Communications for technical matters. We see the Provincial role essentially as one of co-ordination and encouragement of all of the parties that have to come together to extend television service

within the province. Thus, we are prepared to offer the Province's good offices for discussions between broadcasters, and we also can draw on the engineering expertise of the Manitoba Telephone System to help point out to private broadcasters or the CBC the most economical way of extending service."(48)

On the other hand, the government's response to the 1971 party resolution (and to a number of new resolutions for consideration at the November 1972 Provincial Convention) was presented by Mackling in a speech written by Goldstein for the 1972 Convention.(49) The contents of this speech can be divided into three parts. The first offers an "economic argument" against the 1971 and proposed 1972 resolutions by noting that "cable television is not the most economical method of extending multi-channel services to small communities...consequently...a province-wide cable television system would have to operate at a loss."(50) This is followed by a "philosophical argument" which runs as follows: because cable television is a form of subscription television which includes both Canadian and American networks; and, because "no citizen of a rural or remote area should have to pay any sort of fee or charge to receive the three Canadian networks" (CBC, CTV, and Global); and, because a public province-wide cable network would "put the provincial government in the business of subsidizing the wiring-up of Manitoba for the wholesale importation of three U.S. networks"; the extension of television services in Manitoba would be best served by the following resolution(51):

"WHEREAS too many areas of rural and northern Manitoba are not being adequately served by private broadcasters, and
WHEREAS private broadcasters have too often blocked the extension of more channels into their areas in order to preserve their vested economic interests, and
WHEREAS we believe that no citizen of a rural or remote areas should have to pay any form of fee or subscription to receive the full Canadian broadcasting service that is available free in the large urban areas, and
WHEREAS we believe that private broadcasters have too long avoided their responsibility to use their profits for better local programming and for community access programs,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that this convention urge the provincial government to use the medium of the Manitoba Telephone System to make three free Canadian television services available to all Manitobans as soon as possible, using the most economical combination of broadcast transmission, cable distribution, or both, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this convention urge the provincial government to implement policies, in co-operation with the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, to give greater citizen access to broadcasting, and more and better local programming, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this convention go on record as favouring federal and provincial action to use urban cable television profits to assist extension of broadcast services to rural areas, and to assist the production and transmission of educational television."(52)

In short, the government's initial position on broadcasting and cable television was, in many respects, similar to the position taken by the Roblin administration in its 1966 response to the Fowler Commission.(53) While the 1966 response did not deal with the cable issue and emphasized social and economic rationales rather than "philosophical" arguments, both positions focus on pressuring the federal government to facilitate the

expansion of television service with MTS acting as the common carrier for network signals.

Goldstein argues that the similarity in the two positions, which he admits could both be labeled "small-c conservative"(54), was largely a result of three sets of factors. The first set fall under the heading of economic cost/benefits. Goldstein notes that a study conducted for him by MTS while he was completing his graduate research indicated that "with the existing technology it was simply not practical to consider a public cable system even in large rural communities such as Dauphin and Swan River."(55) On the other hand, as Mackling's 1972 Convention speech notes, "it is possible to extend conventional broadcast transmission of three Canadian networks to 99 per cent of Manitobans, at little or no cost to the public purse."(56) In addition to the costs involved with a public ownership option, the broadcast option contained the added benefit of providing MTS with increased business (through its role as a common carrier for network signals) which, in turn, would have allowed it to justify the capital costs involved in improving the quality of telephone service to rural and northern communities.

The second set of factors that contributed to Manitoba's initial position were legal in nature. In 1972 MTS was less than half way through the term of its 1967 contract with the two Winnipeg cable firms and "any attempt

to break the terms of those contracts would have created serious legal problems for MTS and the government."(57) In addition, the establishment of a provincially owned cable system paralleling and/or in place of the existing arrangement would also have created legal conflicts with the Federal government. This is noted in an untitled report prepared by Thompson on the question of jurisdiction in the area of cable television. It notes that "even if it might be possible to challenge the claim of the Federal government to exclusive jurisdiction in this area, either in the courts or at the conference table, any provincial legislation passed to control cablevision at the present time would probably be declared to be ultra vires."(58)

The third set of factors that shaped Manitoba's initial broadcasting and cable television position relate to Thompson's efforts to establish a forum for inter-provincial consultation on telecommunications policy. The April 17, 1972 meeting of representatives from provincial communications planning divisions organized by him resulted in the establishment of an "Inter-Provincial Working Group". It submitted a report in August that called for a meeting of provincial Ministers of Communications to take place in November of that year.(59) The prospect of this meeting resulted in greater pressure on the Communications Division to produce a comprehensive strategy that, in addition to meeting Manitoba's needs, could also be linked

to other provincial interests in an effort to develop a consensus position for an anticipated Federal-Provincial conference in 1973. The result can be seen in Mackling's opening remarks to the November 1972 Inter-Provincial Conference on Communications in Quebec City:

"Our provincial goal is, simply, that no citizen of a rural or remote area should have to pay any form of fee or subscription charge to receive the same television services as are available free in the province's most populous centers. We have moved, therefore, to facilitate a greater degree of co-ordination between the CBC, private broadcasters, and the Manitoba Telephone System... to extend second channel live television service to northern Manitoba, within three years, and third channel live television service throughout the province as soon as possible thereafter ...Manitoba's approach to communications might best be described as pragmatic... for our primary concern is the consumer of communications services of the present and the future."(60)

In addition to the economic and legal rationales for Manitoba's "pragmatic" position, this speech also indicates the province's initial stance on a potential negotiating position with the Federal government. The apparent willingness to accept the Federal claim of jurisdictional control over broadcasting and cable television was, as Goldstein notes, premised "not so much on the development of a conscious trade-off negotiating position as it was on the hope that the Federal government would be more flexible regarding provincial concerns in other areas."(61)

One such area related to Federal common carrier policies. This is evidenced in a pre-conference meeting in Edmonton of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta's

Communications Ministers which resulted in a joint statement criticizing two areas of Federal policy that were seen by the prairie Ministers as "potentially damaging" to their common carriers:

--The willingness of Ottawa to encourage "cream-skimming" and unnecessary duplication in long-haul microwave routes. The three ministers agreed that it was unfair to allow one carrier (CN/CP Telecommunications) to serve only the heavy traffic routes, with no obligation to help pay the costs of serving less lucrative routes (such as the north) while the prairie utilities were responsible for providing service to all areas, both profitable and unprofitable.

--The development of policies on interconnection of terminal devices to telephone company lines. Ottawa is presently developing policies on the desirability of allowing terminal devices to be connected to telephone lines with little or no restrictions. This could result in a situation where equipment is used, in effect, to re-sell services that should be purchased from the telephone companies. Such an interconnection policy could deprive the utilities of revenue that is used to help serve rural and northern areas."(62)

These concerns were emphasized by Manitoba at the Quebec City Conference in a resolution on the question of inter-connection of non-carrier-owned terminal devices to the public switched telephone network. It was unanimously adopted by the Conference and, in summary, called for Federal-Provincial discussions on this and other related issues to be "carried on in an orderly federal-provincial manner, rather than a series of provincial responses to federal initiatives under a timetable set by Ottawa."(63)

A second policy area of concern to Manitoba related to the release of the Federal Computer Communications Task

Force Report just prior to the Conference.(64) While it emphasized the development of better Canadian data processing facilities in an effort to stem "trans-border data flows" to the United States, Thompson's research had alerted the cabinet to "the increasing centralization of corporate computer activities from several self-contained regional sites to a single amalgamated operation within the "golden triangle"."(65) The result was a Provincial position that stressed "...if tools are available to make data processing grow in Canada rather than the United States, then these same tools must be equally available to make data processing grow in Canada's regions, rather than concentrating in one or two major urban centres."(66)

The final area of concern involves the development of educational telecommunications. As Brian Woodrow et.al. point out, disagreements with federal educational broadcasting policy had been an issue of long standing concern for the provinces.(67) They note that while an arrangement adopted in 1972 provided for "an interdelegation of administrative power", the financing of program development continued to be an area of concern for the provinces. This is reflected in Manitoba's position:

"...we must question the claims made for the federal government's decision last summer to allow licensing of arms-length provincial corporations to do educational broadcasting. We feel this is a change of form but not of substance. Because to Manitoba, all this means is that Ottawa will now allow us to spend taxpayers money on transmitters. Manitoba believes that much stricter requirements should

be applied to the CBC, commercial broadcasters and cable television firms so that a greater contribution to educational program production and transmission is realized from these sources."(68)

In summary, the Quebec City Conference served to consolidate Manitoba's initial fifth phase position. Goldstein notes that the general focus during this period was to emphasize to Ottawa the need to consider provincial concerns and "to make the federal initiatives unravel themselves on a regional basis which was not occurring at the time."(69) In short, the Federal concern with the "societal" impacts of telecommunications caused it to ignore the threats to regional interests created by advocacy of a national strategy that included competition among common carriers. This threat was most acutely felt by the prairie provinces and their public telephone systems.

In addition to the Quebec City Conference's role in consolidating Manitoba's initial policy position, it also had an indirect effect on the structure of the province's policy community. The increased workload on the Communications Division to prepare for the Conference resulted in cabinet's acceptance of the creation of a "Task Force" to develop a formal telecommunications position paper.(70) The hiring of researchers (on a term contract basis) for this Task Force began in December of 1972 and resulted in an increase in the Communications Division's research staff to six persons.(71)

The last significant event in the policy community prior to the June 1973 election was the Federal government's publication of a Green Paper on Communications.(72) This Paper presented a number of specific Federal proposals and while its rhetoric was conciliatory and stressed that "...national communications policy should ensure that federal and provincial aims and activities can be effectively harmonized..."(73), it presented little modification in Ottawa's earlier positions. Woodrow et.al. provide a good summary of its contents:

"It began by reasserting the primacy of federal jurisdiction in most areas of communications policy... and went on to suggest the need for a comprehensive revision of federal legislation... On federal-provincial relations it attempted to sidestep provincial jurisdictional claims by suggesting a variety of "consultative arrangements" designed to allow for consideration of provincial views and interests within the framework of national policy-making... In effect, the federal government sought to placate the provincial governments through consultative and administrative means, while conceding no significant changes in jurisdictional or regulatory authority."(74)

In addition to responding to the federal initiatives, the Communications Division also played an "activist" role within the provincial community. Thompson notes that throughout this period he was involved in "the initiation of numerous meetings with various groups interested in utilizing the technology."(75) Notable among these groups were: northern communities interested in improved telephone




Diagram IV.i: The Policy Community in 1973

and television services; business groups exploring the potential benefits of a computer communications grid; educators seeking the development of better facilities for the teaching of computer science; and arts groups wanting to use a broadband network for the transmission of live cultural events to communities outside of Winnipeg.

In conclusion, the ideas engendered by the new technology and the Federal government's response to them played a crucial role in moving Manitoba's policy community from a "classical" to an "instrumental" conditioning mode. As Diagram IV.i above indicates, this period saw an increase in the size and complexity of the community as it attempted to respond to a rapidly changing technological and political environment. MTS's hesitancy to move to an instrumental mode and the government's decision to create a separate planning capacity appears to be a major factor in what can be seen as a further loss by MTS of its second and third phase position of policy leadership in the community. This is evidenced in the government's decision to utilize the Communications Division as its contact point for interest groups, which, in turn, further increased the prominence of the Division within the community during the first term of the Schreyer administration.

Policy Ideas vs Policy Outputs: 1973-1977

The June 1973 election campaign saw telecommunications as an issue for the first time since

1958. In an election speech Mackling chose a convention of the Manitoba Community Newspapers Association to discuss the role of telecommunications in the Schreyer administration's plans for the development of "a new rural society". He opened his speech by noting that "...the provincial government believes that there should be a "stay option", so that citizens of any part of Manitoba should have the freedom to choose to live a productive and satisfying life anywhere in Manitoba."(76) One "key" to maintaining this option was telecommunications technology which is described in the speech as "a substitute for transportation...as a factor in the delivery of goods, services, and information."(77) Based on this definition Mackling described four areas where telecommunications could facilitate a "stay option" policy strategy(78):

1. Telecommunications to Assist Business and Industry- here two roles were suggested: assistance in the conversion of small retail businesses to "electronic point of sale equipment" which could be linked to a central data processing outlet; and the "decentralization of larger businesses into smaller communities.(pp.4-6)
2. Telecommunications to assist the Delivery of Health Services- here audio and visual links to large centers were envisaged so that specialists could assist local practitioners in the diagnosis of patients.(pp.6-7)
3. Telecommunications to Improve Educational Opportunities- here a number of roles were suggested based on the development of an integrated communications grid for the transmission of course materials and the teaching of computer science.(pp.7-8)
4. Telecommunications to Provide Improved Cultural and Entertainment Facilities- this point included the government's commitment to lobby the federal government to provide licenses for the broadcasting

of three networks to "virtually all Manitobans within the next five years" as well as a commitment to study the development of a microwave grid to facilitate the transmission of live cultural and sports events from Winnipeg to rural community theatres equipped with projection televisions.(pp.9-12)

While this speech does not contain specific commitments and/or a time frame for the introduction of these services, it does indicate that the government was considering a response to the changing technological environment. However, because Mackling did not discuss the question of ownership of the "head ends" for a number of these proposed services (ie, the data processing equipment for retailers or the production facilities for cultural and sports programming), it is not clear whether the ideas contained in this speech have any relationship to party policy. What can be said with some degree of certainty is that the "stay option" concept and the development of services around it was a feature of the Schreyer administration's election strategy prior to the 1973 campaign. This is evidenced in Guidelines For The Seventies which notes three components of the government's commitment to utilizing "its resources to improve the economic situation for local consumers and local producers." They include: the "promotion" of co-operatives; the "encouragement of individual entrepreneurship via the continued provision of certain key inputs..."; and "the use of crown corporations...to provide essential goods and services which private enterprise has

failed to supply...".(79) In the context of these commitments one question that was not addressed in Mackling's speech was whether the government intended to take advantage of the "public enterprise" potential of the new services or whether it intended to treat MTS as a "key input" (in its traditional common carrier role) as was the case during its first term.(80)

Following the June 28th election Mackling's personal defeat resulted in the appointment of Ian Turnbull, M.L.A. as the Minister of Consumer, Corporate, and Internal Services and the Minister Responsible for the Manitoba Telephone System. The combination of the Communications Division and MTS under one Minister does not, however, appear to have been motivated by any long range plans to more fully integrate the policy roles of the two agencies. Rather, as Goldstein notes, it was seen as "functional" from an administrative perspective.(81)

Turnbull's appointment was followed by the completion of two of the "Task Force" research papers. The first was a study of educational telecommunications.(82) It pointed out that after two decades of utilizing the CBC's production facilities "the rosy relationship that existed in the past between the School Broadcasts Branch and the CBC is breaking down, and Branch officials are no longer confident that things can continue on the same footing."(83) Following a detailed discussion of the future communications requirements of the School Broadcasts

Branch, this paper suggests that an alternative to utilizing the CBC would be the establishment of two agencies to facilitate the development of "non-commercial" television programming. The first was a "Manitoba Television Authority" with two major functions; the operation of a "narrow-cast" distribution network owned by MTS for educational and community programming and "the creation of Manitoba-originated packages for use in the distribution network" through the establishment of a publicly owned central production facility and a series of smaller regional studios.(84) The second agency involved the conversion of the Queen's Printer to the "Queen's Media Office". In addition to its traditional roles, this agency would "take the requirements set by the Manitoba Television Authority...and insure that the required programs come into being by utilizing all available facilities in the province...".(85)

This study was followed in October by the publication of a discussion paper based on the Communications Division's computer communications research.(86) It utilized federal documents to support an argument that "decentralization of data processing could bring to the less-developed regions a source of highly-skilled jobs, and the related benefits that come from creating a "critical mass" of skilled people in a particular area."(87) It also contained four recommendations that were consistent with the government's pre-Task Force interest in forcing federal

policies to "unravel themselves on a regional basis". (88)

In addition to the completion of these research papers in the fall of 1973, the Communications Division was also active in the area of federal-provincial relations. The final preparations for a late November Federal-Provincial Conference of Communications Ministers began in September with a meeting of the the Ministers from the four western provinces in Saskatoon. At this meeting a joint statement was released outlining three issues of concern to the Ministers. The first, which relates to the October Computer Communications Discussion Paper, called on the Federal government to decentralize its computer centres. The second called for "agreement that there should be no federal control or regulation over long-distance telephone rates". The final concern focused on relations with the Federal government and requested an opportunity for "specific provincial input into the development of cable television policy." (89) These concerns were reiterated in a speech by Turnbull at an October Provincial Communications Ministers' meeting at which he outlined Manitoba's position on the division of federal-provincial jurisdiction in five specific areas:

- "1. Broadcasting by hertzian waves radiated through the air must be primarily a federal matter, for the sake of national standards, both technical and cultural;
2. Those portions of a coaxial cable television operation which carry signals originating with off-air broadcasting are also a legitimate matter for federal concern, but not necessarily exclusive of provincial inputs;

3. All remaining closed-circuit and potential carrier functions of a coaxial system (including pay-t.v.) are under provincial jurisdiction, and in Manitoba, these functions have generally been reserved by contract for the Manitoba Telephone System;
4. The question of interconnection of terminal devices is one of provincial jurisdiction;
5. Computer/Communications rates and policies fall within the concern of the province; as part of the policy of the provincially-owned telecommunications carrier."(90)

Turnbull carried this position to a November Federal-Provincial Ministers conference in Ottawa. His opening statement to the Conference outlined Manitoba's main areas of concern and emphasized the Province's feeling that "federal policy-makers appear to be over-looking the fact that telecommunications in Canada's three prairie provinces has been developed to reflect social policy goals."(91) While Manitoba came to the conference prepared to discuss jurisdictional matters, Schultz notes that "the federal government, while acknowledging a legitimate provincial interest in many areas, would only entertain discussion of administrative mechanisms and consultative procedures, at ministerial, official, and regulatory agency levels."(92) As a result the conference ended, as one newspaper report notes, "...prematurely with the federal position in disarray as the provincial ministers mounted a concerted campaign to force the federal government into unconditional negotiations."(93)

The last major event in 1973 occurred at the NDP's December Party Convention and saw the passage of the only

telecommunications related policy resolution during the Schreyer administration's second term. It was similar in intent to the 1971 resolution and, like it, was submitted by a constituency association as opposed to being written by Communications Division staff and presented by its Minister:

"WHEREAS cable television is recognized as a utility, using the facilities of the Manitoba Telephone System, a crown corporation;
BE IT RESOLVED that the Manitoba Government consider procedures to acquire at least a controlling equity in this utility."(94)

The spring of 1974 saw no reduction in the pace of events within the policy community. The first was the March completion of a Task Force research paper on the history and performance of MTS.(95) An important component of this paper was a number of recommendations for the improvement of MTS's telephone services.(96) These recommendations appear to have been developed in co-operation with MTS and, based on a review of MTS Annual Reports, are reflected in a number of policy decisions made by the System during the remainder of the Schreyer administration's second term. They include:

- "(1) Provision of standard grade toll service to the approximately 10,000 residents of northern Manitoba who must depend on unreliable hf radio service for contact with the outside world;
- (2) Reduction of loading on multi-party lines;
- (3) Provision of individual line service to all communities which have the required size and density;
- (4) A phasing-out of rural construction limits."(97)

This was followed by the completion of the only Task

Force study to be published by the government.

Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective(98) is one of the most important documents written during the Schreyer administration and served as the central plank of the government's cable and broadcasting policy platform during the remainder of its term. The first four Chapters of this study offer a detailed overview of the technological, legal/constitutional, and economic environment related to telecommunications in Manitoba prior to 1974. Of particular note is a section on "Constitutional and Legal Issues". It points out that while Federal jurisdiction over broadcasting was well grounded in legal precedent, a number of "gray areas" existed "concerning the degree of control over cable hardware that the federal authority can exercise by virtue of its jurisdiction over broadcast-originated cable functions."(99) Utilizing legal cases related to transportation disputes the government argued that:

"If one takes the view that a broadcasting receiving undertaking is not the physical collection of cables, amplifiers, etc., but rather the business activity for which the federal license was issued, namely broadcasting receiving, then it is clear that federal jurisdiction over broadcast-related functions on the cable can easily be accommodated within an arrangement whereby the cable operator leases channels from a provincial common carrier. In such a case, the coaxial cable could be seen as analogous to a provincial road (an "electronic highway" in this case). The federally-regulated undertaking would then be the broadcasting receiving business. And other

traffic- in this case functions of a common carrier nature- could be carried on according to common carrier priorities of relevance to the particular province."(100)

Based on this position Broadcasting and Cable Television opens its final Chapter by arguing that "the goals for future development are clear: both the quality and the quantity of broadcast services should be improved, especially in rural and northern areas, and greater opportunity must be provided for regional and local expression in the broadcast media."(101) This is followed by a review of three possible delivery systems for meeting this goal: a publicly owned system utilizing MTS as the common carrier; a private "competitive enterprise" system; and, a "private monopoly unregulated as to rate of return". The latter, which the government argued approximated the structure of the existing cable system in Manitoba, is described as "clearly the least desirable; yet is is somewhat ironic that this form carries with it the potential to damage the viability of the two more desirable forms of economic organization..."(102)

Utilizing the transportation analogy noted earlier, the ideal delivery system suggested in Broadcasting and Cable Television is a mixed public-private network in which the Province would own the "electronic highway" with regulation of the "private" traffic on the highway jointly divided between it and the Federal Government. Such a system required two specific changes in the existing

institutional arrangement which served as the focus of the Communications Division's activities during the remainder of the government's second term. First, a change in the CRTC's policies regarding the regulation of "unregulated rate of return" private cable companies and the development of a mechanism to channel "excess profits" generated by broadcast and cable undertakings into the development of regional/community programming.(103) The second was the conversion of MTS's 1969 "partial agreement" with the two Winnipeg Cable Companies to a full lease arrangement and is premised on the argument that:

"...a full lease would enable MTS to lay out cable in such a way that when future common carrier services become feasible they could be introduced without the unnecessary waste of installing a second cable. Under full lease, any duly licensed cable television operator would be able to lease channels from MTS to operate a broadcast receiving business...The full lease arrangement would also make it easier for local entrepreneurs and community groups to be licensed as cable operators in smaller communities, since they would not require the large initial capital investment needed under other hardware arrangements."(104)

The positions contained in Broadcasting and Cable Television were echoed in a presentation by Turnbull to the CRTC following the paper's release.(105) In summary, he reiterated Manitoba's support of federal jurisdiction through the CRTC of all broadcast related "programming" while emphasizing Manitoba's right to regulate all "non-programming services carried by MTS. This presentation was followed by a series of meetings between the two levels of

government which continued into 1975.(106)

While no further study papers were released during the remainder of 1974 and into 1975, this period also saw three major managerial changes in the policy community. The first was a change in the administration of MTS. In April 1974 Mills tendered his resignation and, in a break with the tradition of promoting from within the System, the cabinet appointed the head of its Management Committee, Gordon Holland, as the new Chairman of the Telephone Commission and MTS's General Manager. Turnbull notes that the cabinet's decision to appoint a person from outside of the System was, in part, premised on the perception that MTS's management had become "inbred" and Mills retirement "presented a good opportunity to introduce managerial ideas more consistent with the existing policy environment."(107)

The second change occurred in February 1975 and saw Goldstein resign his position to return to communications consulting. He was replaced by Doug Smith in an Assistant, rather than an Associate Deputy Minister capacity, who had joined Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services in 1973.(108) Finally, in April 1975, the two remaining communications researchers (Starr and Thompson) were separated from the Information Services Branch and placed in a newly created Telecommunications Development Branch.(109)

While the impact of these changes on the institutional structure of the policy community was

minimal, they appear to have resulted in significant process changes as MTS began a gradual return to a position of leadership in the policy community. This is evidenced in Starr's confirmation that with Goldstein's resignation and the allocation of only two research positions to the Telecommunications Development Branch, forward planning effectively ceased as "the Branch was forced to concentrate its energies on co-ordinating Federal-Provincial relations." (110) Starr also indicated that by early 1975 MTS had created an office to assist community groups interested in applying to the CRTC for cable licenses and had assumed much of the interest group "brokerage" role previously managed by the Communications and Information Services Division.

Further evidence of MTS's reassertion of leadership can be found in an Act introduced to the legislature in January, 1975 which resulted in the first expansion of MTS's mandate in almost 20 years. (111) Section 1 of this Act saw the addition of a definition of "data processing" as "a process whereby a computer is used to manipulate information, including the function of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging, calculating and transferring data according to programmed instruction and those activities required to support this process." (112) Section 2 then introduced a new definition for MTS which is described as "a telecommunications system and data processing system and includes all the works owned, held or used for the purposes

thereof or in connection therewith or with their operation thereof;".(113)

The expansion of the System's mandate was followed in September of 1975 by MTS's purchase of the assets of the Manitoba Government Computer Centre for \$1,800,000 and the creation of Manitoba Data Services (MDS) as a "financially separate Division of the System under a Director, who reports to a committee of the MTS Board."(114) MTS's 1975-76 Annual Report provides a number of rationales for this arrangement:

"It would provide the Province with efficient, comprehensive services and prevent unnecessary duplication. The data processing needs of the business community outside Winnipeg would be better served. Also, by providing a facility of suitable capacity, at competitive prices, business which had been flowing out of Manitoba could be retained in the Province. At the same time, employment would be available to well-trained Manitobans who might otherwise need to seek employment elsewhere."(115)

While 1975 saw MTS reassert its leadership in the policy community, the Telecommunications Development Branch continued to play an important role in the area of federal-provincial relations. In February of 1975 the Federal government announced a new set of cable television policies in its Grey Paper.(116) Woodward et.al. note that the federal position presented in this paper, when taken together with the Green Paper, offers "...a stubborn defense of the continuing need for centralized nation-wide control in the communications field."(117) It was followed

by a May 1975 Federal-Provincial Conference of Communications Ministers at which a Joint Provincial Statement representing the provinces response to the Grey Paper was presented.(118)

Two months later both levels of government returned to the conference table but, as Schultz notes, "the July 1975 meeting ended in the same fashion as its predecessors, with no progress made on any of the issues plus a reinforced degree of animosity among the participants."(119) He goes on to note that following the 1975 conferences "the federal government decided, as it had suggested in the Grey Paper, that if it could control the provision of basic programming services, it was prepared to negotiate with the provinces to cede to them control over other aspects of cable regulation."(120) In Manitoba's case the substance of these negotiations is outlined in an internal Telecommunications Development Branch document that describes an April 13, 1976 meeting between Turnbull and then Federal Communications Minister Mme. Sauve at which:

"Both Ministers agreed that CRCT policy making should be stopped with Mme. Sauve assuring Mr. Turnbull that "future policy respecting a provincial role in cable television will be decided between Ministers". Mr. Turnbull was pleased that Mme. Sauve was prepared to consider regional variations rather than the CRTC monolithic approach to regulation. In agreeing to on-going discussions on matters of mutual concern, Mr. Turnbull re-iterated the provincial policy on telecommunications hardware. "We are interested in MTS hardware ownership and provision by MTS over that

hardware of limited network or point to point video service, voice service, data service and the like. We are not interested in using the cable system to disrupt the economics of the broadcasting system by making available additional entertainment programming choices". He concluded that all non-broadcast aspects of cable should be reserved for the provincial common carrier."(121)

Turnbull's position at this meeting was also contained in his May 3, 1976 presentation to the CRTC at which he noted that his meeting with Mme. Sauve had expressed "a clear recognition that the provinces have a legitimate interest in the development of broadcasting and cable television within their borders..."(122) However, any optimism that provincial concerns could be resolved was tested by a September 16 CRTC decision to grant cable television licences to three private firms wanting to provide service to a number of rural Manitoba communities. This decision imposed hardware ownership requirements on the licensees that were not contained in the draft MTS contracts offered to them prior to their application to the CRTC. A government News Release on the decision quotes Turnbull as noting that the hardware requirements made "a mockery of the federal government's oft stated commitment to negotiate arrangements with the provinces for sharing of responsibilities for cable television."(123) It also notes that he would be contacting Mme. Sauve "in an attempt to resolve the situation."(124)

The "resolution" was announced on November 12 by Rene Toupin, who assumed the Consumer, Corporate, and Internal

Services portfolio on September 21, 1976, and took the form of a Canada-Manitoba Agreement.(125) Under this agreement MTS was allowed to own all of the coaxial cable and related equipment for the distribution of coaxial cable and provincial responsibility for the regulation of other telecommunications services was recognized in the Agreement. At the same time federal jurisdiction over certain broadcast-related services on the "electronic highway" were affirmed. Manitoba's position on the Agreement is summarized in a news release issued at the time which quotes Toupin as stating that "from our point of view, the key is that the federal government has agreed that cable television operators may lease from MTS the cable and other equipment required for local distribution of services...This is in harmony with provincial policy that was adopted in 1967 and has been re-iterated on numerous occasions since then."(126) The News Release also notes that the Federal Cabinet had set aside the CRTC's September cable decision and that the next goal for the Province was to get the CRTC to proceed with new hearings.(127)

Those hearings got underway in June of 1977 and saw both of the Winnipeg Cable Companies and CCTA make presentations opposing the Canada-Manitoba Agreement.(128) Two points related to the hearing are noteworthy. First, the re-emergence of MTS as the dominant actor in Manitoba's policy community is evidenced by its presentation of a

separate brief to the hearing.(129) Second, the CRTC's opposition to the Canada-Manitoba Agreement and its support for the CCTA's position can be seen in CRTC Chairman, H.J Boyle's response to a Mr. Mitchell, representing Winnipeg Videon. At the opening of Videon's presentation Mitchell is quoted as saying "Mr. Chairman, I saw you with that hammer in your hand and I thought you decided you were going to hammer out a deal today one way or another." To this Boyle replies "I only had a lease on it. They took it away from me."(130)

The CRTC's opposition is more apparent in its August decision to licence four applicants to deliver cable television to 29 Manitoba communities. While MTS was given control over the drops People of Service notes that "the CRTC instructed the four successful applicants to form a consortium with the two Winnipeg Cable operators (ACOM-Association of Cable Operators of Manitoba) to devise a cost-sharing plan which would allow the delivery of American television signals from Tolstoi (near the U.S. border, south of Winnipeg) to all licensed communities."(131) In effect, this gave the two established Winnipeg operators, who owned the Tolstoi "head-end", a degree of control over the provincial cable system and was to be a source of future provincial disputes with the Federal government.

This decision was the last major event in the policy community prior to the October 11, 1977 defeat of the

Schreyer administration by the Progressive Conservatives led by Sterling Lyon. A review of the election coverage by the Winnipeg Free Press indicates that telecommunications was not a major issue during the campaign. While an analysis of the policy community from the perspective of this paper's framework for analysis will be the focus of Chapter V, it should be noted that one reason for the "narrowing" of telecommunications policy debates to an almost exclusive interest in cable television jurisdiction by the second term was a result of the failure of the Federal-Provincial Conferences in 1974 and 1975. Schultz makes this point and argues that following the July 1975 conference:

"Negotiations did not end but became much more focused... the most important feature of the post-1975 negotiations was that... negotiations concentrated almost exclusively on two issues: the delegation of some degree of responsibility for cable to the provinces, and an enlarged degree of political control over the federal regulatory agency, the CRTC."(132)

CHAPTER V

Party Policy, Contextual Variables and the Policy

Community: Analysis and Conclusions

In this paper's introductory Chapters it was noted that the central question asked here is: To what degree did the Manitoba NDP affect the ideas, institutions and/or processes related to government telecommunications policy during the Schreyer administration? In addition, these chapters expressed an interest in relating these factors to the relevance of a "grassroots conceptualization" in understanding both the content and structural/process features of policy formation within the province during the period under study. In an effort to answer these questions this chapter is divided into three sections. The first will offer an analysis of the effect of party based variables/actors within the policy community. It will be followed by an analysis of the effect of the contextual and non-party based variables/actors on the policy community. The final section will conclude this paper with a summary of its findings.

Party Policy and Party Based Actors

In Chapter II's discussion of the framework for analysis it was stated that the main hypothesis for this study is:

If party based variables/actors can be seen to have an effect on the ideas, institutions and/or processes within Manitoba's

telecommunications policy community then a "grassroots conceptualization" has some degree of relevance in an analysis of telecommunications policy formation during the Schreyer administration.

This Chapter also noted that a "grassroots conceptualization" of the policy process implies a concern with two features of policy formation. On the one hand, the role of a governing party in affecting the institutional and/or process elements of a policy community and, on the other, the impact of party "ideas" on the content of policy outputs. The first portion of this Section will attempt to explore the effect of the Manitoba NDP's policy platform, which in this framework is treated as a potential intervening variable, on the content of policy. However, prior to this discussion the status of the 1972 policy resolution must first be determined.

If one takes the position that the 1972 resolution presented by Mackling is "party policy" because it was passed by the convention delegates and is a part of the party's official policy platform, then it can be argued that party ideas had a substantial effect on telecommunications policy formation during the Schreyer administration. This is due to the resolution's consistency with the policy strategy adopted by the government following its passage. However, Wiseman and McAllister both question whether policy resolutions developed at the "bureaucratic" level should be considered legitimate reflections of the attitudes of the rank-and-

file party membership. Given this paper's interest in the source and role of ideas in the policy process, the position taken here is that the 1972 resolution should not be considered as a legitimate factor in an analysis of the role of party "ideas" in the content of government policy. It is premised on the fact that the 1972 resolution was not developed nor did it reach the convention plenary in the usual fashion. Within the NDP the route that a resolution must normally take to become a part of the general policy platform is:

1. Formulation at the constituency association level and passage of the resolution by a constituency association executive who, in effect, "sponsor" the resolution.
2. Review of the resolution by a committee of the party's provincial executive to determine its acceptability for placement on the agenda of the convention "panels" (which review resolutions by policy area).
3. Review by the panel of the resolution to determine whether it is acceptable, needs modification, and/or should be presented to the convention plenary for discussion and passage.
4. Discussion at the plenary level and approval/rejection of the resolution.(1)

The 1972 resolution was only presented at the plenary level of the convention and, as Mackling's speech indicates, was designed to forestall consideration of resolutions that had passed through the first three steps.(2) While the fact that the convention plenary approved the resolution gives it technical legitimacy, the government's avoidance of debate at the other three levels and its presentation by the Minister, as opposed to sponsorship by a constituency association, served to

minimize the opportunity for critical debate. As a result, this resolution is better seen, to use McAllister's description of the relationship of the Schreyer administration to the convention process, as a "public relations exercise" on the part of the government rather than a legitimate attempt to develop policy in a "democratic fashion".(3) This is further evidenced by the 1972 resolution's inconsistency with the "ideas" contained in the 1971 and 1973 resolutions. These resolutions specifically call on the government to, as is stated in the 1973 resolution, "consider procedures to acquire at least a controlling equity" in the existing Winnipeg cable system. However, the 1972 resolution contains no such emphasis on "public entrepreneurship" in the provision of existing or new telecommunications services outside of MTS's mandate as a telephone system.

Excluding the 1972 resolution, an analysis of the role of party ideas can be divided into two periods; the pre-1971 resolution period, when the ideas contained in the traditional party platform applied (see Table IV.i), and the period following the passage of this resolution. Turning to the former period an argument could be made that party policy was evident in government policy given the Schreyer administration's continued support for MTS as a public enterprise. While valid, this argument has limited relevance in this study as the question here is not whether the NDP affected "aspirational" policy goals within the

community (given the community's traditional acceptance of the concept of public ownership), but whether it had an impact on the other three policy levels in Pross's hierarchy (see Table II.i). On the Sector, Subsidiary, and Administrative levels no indication can be found that party policy had any effect. As was noted in Chapter IV, the Schreyer administration showed little early interest in the policy community and did not change institutional and/or process elements within it. For example, no evidence was found that the government considered introducing long standing party based policies such as the institution of service-at-cost principles or the appointment of a labour representative on the Telephone Commission.

Following passage of the 1971 resolution there is also no indication that party demands for expanded public involvement in the area of cable television were a factor in policy formation. This is particularly evident in the the area of educational television where the government was not bound by the same legal/jurisdictional constraints as it was in the commercial broadcasting and cable television sector. While the Communications Division study on educational telecommunications offered a number of policy options which would have allowed the province to expand its presence in this area, as well as facilitating its "stay option" policies, they never got past the discussion stage. Goldstein argues that the government's lack of "follow through" in this area was a result of "the system's

inability to absorb too much change."(4) Thompson is more direct when he notes that "the government simply wasn't willing to spend a lot of money in an area where it wouldn't net much voter recognition."(5)

In short, this paper's finding is that party policy had little effect on government policy and should not be considered as an intervening variable in an analysis of telecommunications policy during the Schreyer administration. While the one event in the policy community where a new public enterprise was created, the establishment of Manitoba Data Services, would appear to weaken this position, according to the Minister responsible for its establishment this decision was motivated by "logical administrative rationales" rather than an "ideological" commitment to the expansion of public enterprise.(6) In addition, all of the former Communications Division staff members interviewed for this study indicated that at no time did cabinet members or party officials attempt to direct their activities or apply pressure to have party policy ideas included in the development of policy options. Goldstein's observation is instructive with respect to the general question of party policy influence in the telecommunications sector when he notes that "during the time I was with the government the role of party policy was almost zero, as a practical consequence it was zero."(7)

In addition to the Manitoba NDP's policy platform

this paper's framework also questioned whether policies developed by other NDP provincial administrations might have played an intervening role in policy formation. During the 1970's two provinces were governed by NDP administrations; Saskatchewan from 1971 to 1982 and British Columbia from 1972 to 1975. As the aspirational policy base for British Columbia's telecommunications community supports private ownership of the common carrier and was not altered by the NDP in that province, it will not be considered in this analysis. However, Saskatchewan offers a particularly useful basis for comparison due to a number of similarities with Manitoba, notably the policy community's traditional support for public ownership of its common carrier. While the Saskatchewan NDP's effect on Manitoba requires further analysis, a tentative answer to the question of its intervening role is that it was minimal. This is based on Herschel Hardin's analysis of the Saskatchewan NDP's response to the question of jurisdictional control of cable television in which he points out that in 1972:

"The government of Allan Blakeney announced that cable television would be created as a crown corporation and would take advantage of facilities owned by Saskatchewan Telecommunications (SaskTel), the provincially owned telephone system. Non-profit community organizations would run local programming service after obtaining a licence from the CRTC...Saskatchewan took the view, as Blakeney was later to explain, that federal agencies did not have clear constitutional jurisdiction over cable television, as they did over radio and television stations."(8)

As was noted in Chapter IV, this was not the position taken by the Manitoba government which at no point in the community's history questioned federal jurisdiction over any aspect of "programming services". In short, Saskatchewan's support of the use of public enterprise in the delivery of cable television and related services cannot be found in Manitoba's policy position. This is evident in the 1977 discussion paper on the Canada-Manitoba Agreement which notes that :

"...the federal and provincial governments will have to make separate decisions on whether or not competition should be allowed within their respective spheres of authority. However, it is suggested that, for those services under provincial jurisdiction provincial policies should be biased in favor of a competitive environment, with minimal restrictions on entry into the field, and a rate structure for spectrum space which encourages the use of cable by as many users as possible. Thus, home-alarm services, or teleshopping services, could be provided by many entrepreneurs, instead of just one."(9)

Having excluded party policy ideas as a factor in policy formation, the next group of party based variables are those that have been given independent status in the policy community. However, prior to an analysis of this group attention must first be given to defining Goldstein's status vis-a-vis the framework for analysis. While it is evident that he can be considered a party based actor while serving as an Executive Assistant, his move to the Associate Deputy Minister's position raises the question of whether he should be treated as a non-party

based actor following this appointment. Based on a discussion with him, in which he gave no indication that he saw himself or was seen by his Minister as being responsible for integrating party policy into policy options developed by the Communications Division, the position taken here is that he should be treated as a non-party based actor after July, 1972. As has already been noted, Goldstein's only relationship to party policy was to respond to "unrealistic" policy resolutions by assisting his Minister in the development of resolutions that were consistent with government policy. That there was no response to the 1973 resolution indicates that even this role was not seen as important by that time.

The exclusion of Goldstein from this variable category leaves two groups of actors; the Telephone Commission and the Minister/Cabinet. The former appears to have had no independent role in the policy process. All of the actors interviewed for this study indicated that, outside of management questions internal to MTS, non-management actors on the Commission did not contribute to the broader policy process during the Schreyer administration and served mainly as a "rubber stamp" for management decisions. In short, the Commission can not be considered as even a minor independent variable in policy formation.

This leaves an assessment of the role of the Minister/Cabinet which had a substantial effect on the

ideas, institutions and processes within the policy community. Turning first to this group's impact on ideas, it is useful to differentiate its role in the content of policy from the selection and prioritization of those policies. In the area of content Chapter IV indicates that party based actors played a negligible role and were dependent on non-party based variables for both definition of policy goals and the policy options surrounding those goals. This is supported by Turnbull who confirmed that the Communications Division "made" policy and that, for the most part, he "responded to Goldstein's group who largely directed policy activities."(10)

While the Minister/Cabinet had little impact on the content of policy, this group did have an effect on the selection and prioritization of policy options and was an effective "gatekeeper" in the policy process. For example, Chapter IV's discussion of the "Task Force" studies indicates that while the Communications Division was intent on developing an integrated policy strategy designed to meet both current and future policy needs, the Minister/Cabinet chose to give priority to only three policy goals within its general strategy to force federal policies to "unravel on a regional basis": clarification of Manitoba's jurisdictional rights vis-a-vis the status of MTS as the sole common carrier within the province; modification of Federal broadcast and cable television policies to allow expansion of "programming services" to

rural and remote communities; and support for efforts to force the Federal Government to decentralize its data processing facilities.(11)

While it could be argued that all three goals were motivated by "aspirational" party policy relating to the maintenance of MTS as a public corporation, a more pragmatic motivational agenda is also evident. For example, the introduction of common carrier competition either from CN-CP Telecommunications in the area of inter-provincial signals or from the local cable companies in the area of "non-programming services" would have had a negative impact on MTS revenues and, were the cable companies able to expand their operations, might have resulted in MTS's displacement as the major urban telecommunications carrier in Winnipeg.(12) The erosion of MTS's market would have seriously affected MTS's ability to cross-subsidize rural markets which would have been used by the opposition parties as an example of the government's "mismanagement" of public resources.(13) On the other hand, expansion of broadcast services to northern constituencies and the creation or expansion of federal data processing facilities contained positive political benefits for the government. The former provided the basis for an electoral position that the government was meeting the needs of northern residents while the latter offered the potential of positive benefits for the provincial economy in the form of employment and capital investment.

Turning to the Minister/Cabinet's effect on the institutional structure of the policy community, Chapter IV's overview of Goldstein and Thompson's hiring and the subsequent creation of the Communications Division provides evidence of its independent role in this area. However, as was the case in the area of policy ideas, no evidence can be found that the government's primary motivation for institutional change was premised on party ideas. When questioned on the institutional changes made during his term as Minister, Turnbull's response was that all were premised on "logical administrative rationales".(14) That these rationales had more to do with the government's "vital interest" than they did with party policy is best evidenced in the lack of change in MTS's institutional status quo. As was noted in Chapter IV, while party policy emphasized the use of crown corporations as a policy instrument, the government chose to create a new policy instrument rather than risk a potential political controversy that might have resulted from attempts to "repair" the existing instrument.(15)

The final feature of this group's behavior relates to its effect on process in the community. After 1971 it appears to be substantial and is evidenced by the impact of establishment of the Communications Division on MTS's displacement as the policy formation leader in the community. However, Goldstein's 1975 resignation and the government's subsequent decision to convert the

Communications Division from a planning agency to an office for co-ordinating Federal-Provincial relations resulted in a reversal of the trend started in 1972. As Chapter IV notes, by 1976 MTS had successfully reasserted its traditional leadership role in the community.

In short, this group's overall effect on process is not as significant as it might initially seem. While further attention will be given to this argument in the following Section, three factors played a role in dampening this impact in the later stages of the Schreyer administration. The first was Goldstein's resignation as Associate Deputy Minister. It is evident that the government had a high degree of confidence in him due, in part, to his former role as a party based actor. This provided the Communications Division with a level of access to and credibility with the cabinet that it does not appear to have enjoyed following his departure. A second factor relates to Schultz's observation that, following the 1975 Federal-Provincial conferences negotiations concentrated almost exclusively on issues related to the carriage of cable television. As the Communications Division had already developed a comprehensive policy position in this area, Starr notes that the government lost interest in the community as it became "more interested in crisis management rather than in long term planning."(16)

A final factor relates to MTS's takeover of the "brokerage" role in the community following the creation of

the Telecommunications Development Branch. This is evident in a Brandon Sun article on the CRTC's decision to grant the Westman Media Co-operative a cable licence to service 19 western Manitoba communities. In this article much of the credit for the success of the application is given to MTS which is described as "coming to the rescue" of the co-op and providing "much of the technical help" in developing the licence application.(17)

Relating these findings to the hypothesis for this study it can be argued that while NDP policy played no role in the content or selection of government policy, party based actors did have a significant short term independent effect on institutional and process elements in the policy community but do not appear to have had a similar long term impact. Relating this finding to "the degree of relevance" that a "grassroots conceptualization" has in an analysis of Manitoba's telecommunications policy community, it can be said to have had a relatively high degree of short term relevance if one opts to utilize the Adie and Thomas definition which implies that it is realized when party based variables can be seen to play "a crucial role in determining which issues receive consideration". However, if one chooses to support the implications of Wiseman and McAllister's analysis (that the conceptualization is only realized when the actual content of policy is affected by party based variables) then it appears to have limited relevance in understanding the behavior of the policy

community. As the question of the theoretical validity of either definition of the conceptualization is beyond the scope of this research undertaking, an answer to the central question posed here is dependent on the readers assessment of the relative validity of these definitions in developing a better understanding of Manitoba's telecommunications policy process. Central to this assessment is the question of the validity of Schreyer's position that, as Wiseman notes, his relationship to policy formation was "one of stewardship rather than party agent...his paramount responsibility, he felt was that of Premier rather than party leader."(18)

In summary, while the validity of varying definitions of a "grassroots conceptualization" is not within the scope of this study, these findings do offer support for two of Pross's arguments contained in his developmental model. First, it is evident that, at the very least, "the party system consequently serves as a crucial link between the contextual factors shaping policy and the decision process itself.(19) However, intervention of party based actors in the policy process to provide this link appears in this case to be "intermittent and depends on both personal factors and on party understandings of the extent to which policies espoused by the bureaucracy and interest groups will affect its vital interest, its need for re-election."(20)

Contextual Variables, Ideas, and the Policy Community

If party based actors/variables played a minimal role in the content of telecommunications policy during the Schreyer administration, then one question that remains to be answered here relates to the effect of the contextual and non-party based elements on policy formation. To facilitate an analysis of this question the role of these variables will be discussed in an integrated fashion utilizing, on the one hand, the political economy of technology and, on the other, previous policy as the basis for analysis.

Turning first to the question of technology's role in Manitoba's policy community, this study's findings indicate that it played a crucial intervening role in shaping policy selection and institutional and process elements within the policy community during the Schreyer administration. However, this variable is assigned intervening, as opposed to independent status, because Manitoba's shift to an "instrumental conditioning" mode in the early 1970's was not a direct response to technological change. Rather, it was made in response to a policy shift at the Federal level. As a result, technology's intervening status must be referenced to a discussion of the effect of federal policy outputs on the provincial policy community.

In Chapter IV it was noted that the application of microprocessor technology to telecommunications systems

engendered the development of a new set of ideas within the federal policy community which resulted in a shift from, as Schultz notes, a concern with the "individual impacts" of policy to a "societal" perspective. This shift was reflected in the Federal government's development of a national telecommunications strategy that emphasized liberalized inter-connect policies and inter-provincial common carrier competition and, as a result, ignored provincial interests particularly those of provinces maintaining publicly owned common carriers. The impact of the shift on Manitoba's policy community was twofold. At the institutional/ process level it resulted in the government's decision to augment the existing institutional structure in an effort to develop a response to what was seen as a potential threat to an area of traditional provincial jurisdiction. This, in turn, resulted in Goldstein's and Thompson's hiring and led to the creation of the Communications Division which, in addition to altering the institutional structure of the policy community, also had a short term effect on process within it.

At the policy selection level this shift forced Manitoba to give priority to the three major policy goals noted in Section 1 as the province sought a compromise with the Federal government to remove the threat to MTS's future financial viability posed by the federal position on liberalized interconnection and competition policies. This

resulted in provincial acceptance of federal jurisdiction in the area of "programming services" on cable in the hope that the federal government would, in turn, accept the province's position on monopoly control of the carriage of "non-programing services". In short, the role of the Federal government in the evolution of Manitoba's policy community under the Schreyer administration is best summarized by Goldstein who notes that it was the "trigger" for many of the changes that occurred during that period.(21)

While technological change and the Federal government's response to it "triggered" changes in Manitoba's policy community, previous policy was the crucial variable in defining the content of Manitoba's policy response. However, while technology intervened to force change, previous policy limited its scope and defined the content of policy options through its "conditioning" effect on the attitudes and behaviour of actors and institutions in the policy community. This argument has its basis in Chapter III's overview of the history of MTS which found that by the 1960's its institutional policy perspective was consistent with the "ideas" that Woodrow and Woodside argue were a dominant feature of the policy perspective of all Canadian common carriers at that time. Among these ideas, two of the more important in the evolution of Manitoba's policy community were a strict adherence to the content/carrier separation

rule and a "black telephone" perspective on technological change that Woodrow and Woodside describe as an "if it ain't broke don't fix it" attitude.

The most important of these ideas relative to the role of MTS's institutional perspective on policy content during the Schreyer administration was the content/carrier separation rule. Its effect is evident during the negotiations with the firms that were party to the 1967 partial agreement on cable television which saw MTS give no consideration to the option of total public ownership of cable television distribution and, short of that, a hesitancy to stand firm on a full lease arrangement.(22) As a result when the Schreyer administration entered office its potential use of the public enterprise policy option for the delivery of new telecommunications services was already limited for two reasons. On the one hand, the legal controversy that would have resulted from the government's attempts to either buy into the cable companies or, given the limited likelihood of this option, from attempts to pressure these firms out of the market by altering the terms of the agreement, would have proven costly and may have been politically damaging during a period when the government was attempting to recover from the Autopac debate. On the other hand, private control of the most marketable service that could be offered as part of a "broad band" telecommunications package to subscribers (cable television) in the most lucrative market in the

province (Winnipeg) raised two questions. First, whether it would be cost effective for MTS to commit capital reserves to the construction of a province-wide delivery system for services that, other than cable television, were largely unproven in the marketplace. Second, whether it was politically expedient for the government to commit funds to the development of public firms to produce the "content" for these services given MTS's inability to effectively "cross-subsidize" rates (which would have been possible given MTS control of the cable television market in Winnipeg).

The net effect of MTS's adherence to the content/carrier separation rule, particularly as it relates to the 1967 partial agreement, was to reinforce MTS's role as a "common carrier" rather than, to use the language of Guidelines For the Seventies, as a vehicle to provide "goods and services which private enterprise has failed to supply..."(23) This resulted in the Communications Division's emphasis on a "mixed public private strategy" as it sought policy options that facilitated the development of a province-wide broad band system that did not require the expenditure of large amounts of public funds. In some respects this response was similar to the ideas contained in the Roblin administration's 1966 Brief to the Fowler Commission which, as was noted in Chapter III, called for a mixed public private strategy to expand private broadcast services in the province with MTS acting as the common

carrier for network signals.

In addition to the role of the content/carrier separation rule in limiting policy options available to the policy community, MTS's "black telephone" perspective on technological change coupled with its efforts to maintain an "arms length" relationship from the government served to further condition the behavior of actors in the community. In Chapter IV it was noted that Thompson was the only long term member of the Communications Division with engineering expertise. The remainder of the staff were former journalists and appear to have depended on MTS's engineering staff to define the technological scope of the policy options they were developing. Given that the System was committed to the use of cable and micro-wave based delivery technology it appears that other options, for example the use of satellite technology, were never given serious consideration in the policy formation process. Thompson supports this point when he notes that "there was no end to what could have been done practically, however, MTS's refusal to consider alternate technologies and, short of such considerations, its hesitancy to alter its rate structure to accommodate the delivery of experimental services contributed to the policy strategy that emerged."(24)

In summary, previous policy and MTS's related efforts to maintain the policy status quo in the community were crucial factors in the content of policy outputs during the

Schreyer administrations's two terms of office. While the Communications Division was able to develop a comprehensive, integrated policy response to technological change, previous policy and the demands that it engendered limited the Division's ability to gain support for their plans at the cabinet level. As a result the only area where the Division was successful was in maintaining Manitoba's national leadership in the co-ordination of inter-provincial policy responses to the Federal government.(25) It should also be noted that the other actor in the community, the School Broadcasts Branch, also played a limited role the behaviour of the policy community during the period under study.

Conclusion

In an effort to conclude this study three points are noteworthy. First, while party based actors at the Minister/Cabinet level were effective "gatekeepers" in the selection and prioritization of policy ideas in the community and had some impact on institutional and process elements, they cannot be considered "crucial" variables in the evolution of policy during the period covered by this case study. This is the case for two reasons. On the one hand, as Wiseman points out, the Manitoba NDP leadership's tradition of pragmatism vis-a-vis the role of party policy in the electoral process resulted in the cabinet's acceptance of Schreyer's "stewardship" position regarding

government policy formation. As a result party policy was utilized selectively by the cabinet and in those areas where it was seen as "unrealistic" it was either ignored or, if the policy sector was a high enough priority, it was modified by cabinet members at the convention plenary to bring it in line with government policy. On the other hand, the complex and highly technical nature of telecommunications policy does not appear to have been well suited to the convention policy formation process. For example, while the 1971 and 1973 resolutions emphasized public ownership of cable television, they were not comprehensive in nature relative to the issues that the Minister/Cabinet were attempting to deal with at the time. This raises the question of whether the party based actors can be criticized for ignoring party policy in this area during the Schreyer administration. While the answer to this question is once again dependent on the readers assessment of varying definitions of a "grassroots conceptualization", it is important to note that party based actors do not appear to have considered the need for delegate research and education in policy areas requiring a detailed understanding of the issues under consideration.

Given the party leadership's pragmatic perspective on policy formation and the inability of the convention process to develop comprehensive policy resolutions, the Minister/Cabinet opted to utilize non-party based actors in

the policy formation process. However, while this group of actors were important both in the promotion of new ideas and in limiting the scope of policy options, a second point is that they were also not crucial in the evolution of policy during the Schreyer administration. At best this variable group served an important role as, to use Pross's term, an "assembly line of thought" in the policy community. Their behaviour, however, particularly that of MTS, suggests that Vickers' arguments regarding the role of bureaucratic actors in "norm-holding" within a policy community is applicable in this case.(26)

A second point is that the contextual variables given attention in this study, when linked to the behavior of certain actors/institutions, appear to be crucial in understanding policy formation in this case. However, the role of these variables was dichotomous with ideas related to technology serving to force the community into an "instrumental conditioning" mode while traditional ideas contained in previous policy served to maintain the community's continuity with fourth phase policy trends. While this study found that previous policy was the dominant independent variable(which lends support to Pross's argument that "incremental analysis is the most powerful explanation of the policy process that has been developed thus far"(27)), further study of later phases of the policy community is required before support for this argument can be made with any degree of certainty. This is

based on Schultz's article which notes that technological change has continued to force an "instrumental conditioning" situation at the federal policy community level into the 1980's.(28)

Finally, the use of Pross's model in this study requires attention. While this paper has selectively utilized his theoretical arguments and has modified his framework for analysis to accommodate specific research interests(29), Pross's efforts to develop "a historical framework that is invested with the techniques of systematic analysis" has resulted in a useful approach to public policy analysis. As this model requires further empirical testing and criticism, no absolute assessment of its value can be determined here. However, its emphasis on, to use Wilson's terms, "the ideological antecedents of policy, and the influence of intervening institutions in the political system"(30) makes it particularly useful in an analysis of the relationship of party based variables to other variables in a provincial policy community.

FOOTNOTESCHAPTER I

1. Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. IX No. 4 (December 1976):549.
2. For a review of the concept of theoretical paradigms see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2nd Ed.(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970). Also note that this paper utilizes the terms "strategy" and "framework" to distinguish the theoretical model which serves as the base for analysis from the case specific framework utilized in later Chapters.
3. Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1982) p.92.
4. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy 3rd. Ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978) p.3.
5. Marsha A. Chandler and William M. Chandler, Public Policy and Provincial Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979) p.2.
6. Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration, p.90.
7. Ibid.; pp.90-91. A related discussion, on the distinction between "elite" and "egalitarian" approaches to the policy process, can be found in John Shiry, "Mass Values and Systems Outputs: A Critique of An Assumption of Socialization Theory," in Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada, Jon H. Pammett and Michael S. Whittington eds. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976) pp.36-58.
8. John Meisel, "The Decline of Party in Canada," in Party Politics in Canada 4th Ed., H.G. Thorburn ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 120-21. Other examples of this perspective can be found in the articles contained in David M. Cameron, ed., Power and Responsibility in the Public Service (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1978) and Canadian Public Administration Vol.27 No. 4 (Winter 1984) which contains papers delivered at the Institutes' Seventeenth National Seminar on the theme "Responsibility and the Senior Public Service".
9. J.W. Pickersgill, "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Canadian Public Administration Vol.15 no.3 (Fall 1972):418-427 at p.423.
10. Ibid.; p.424.
11. Conrad Winn and John McMenemy eds., Political Parties in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976). See

- pp.269-272 for a discussion of these "environmental factors".
12. Ibid.; p.268. Note that it is probable that the parties they studied have expanded their research capacities to some degree since 1976.
 13. Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System 3rd Ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981) p.322.
 14. Winn and McMenemy, Political Parties in Canada, p.1. An empirical example is contained in John Langford's review of the reorganization of the Federal Transport portfolio in which he dedicates a single page to the role of Liberal Party policy in the portfolio's reorganization. See John W. Langford, Transport in Transition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976) p.43.
 15. Marsha and William Chandler, Public Policy and Provincial Politics, p.67
 16. Ibid.; A review of these approaches is contained on pp.68-69.
 17. Richard Simeon and E. Robert Miller, "Regional Variations in Public Policy," in Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life, David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon eds. (Toronto: Methuen, 1980) p.274. Also see Dale H. Poel, "Canadian Provincial and American State Policy: A Qualitative Explication of An Empirical Difference," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 1972.
 18. An example of this approach can be found in Norman Penner, "Ontario the Dominant Province," in Canadian Provincial Politics 2nd Ed., Martin Robin ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1978). Also see William M. Chandler, "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact: Contagion From the Left," Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.10 No.4 (December, 1977):755-80
 19. Dale H. Poel, "The Diffusion of Legislation Among the Canadian Provinces: A Statistical Analysis," Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.IX No. 4 (December, 1976): 605-626.
 20. Ibid.; p.620. It is important to note that in this statement Poel implies that "ideology" can have both a broad and a narrow definition. An example of a broad definition argues that ideology is "a system of interdependent ideas (beliefs, traditions, principles, and myths) held by a social group...which reflects, rationalizes, and defends its particular...political and economic institutional interests and commitments." (See George A. Theodorson and Achilles G. Theodorson, Modern Dictionary of Sociology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969) p.195.) Poel, on the other hand, appears to be using a narrow

definition of the term as it relates to "explicit policy consequences." In an effort to introduce a degree of definitional precision, this paper will use the term "ideology" in its broad sense. The term "party policy" will be utilized to define specific ideologically based statements (such as party convention resolutions) that are intended to act "as a motivating force towards the adoption of legislation" on the government that will be studied in this paper.

21. Ibid.; See Table II p.612.
22. For a good review of the recent political history of the three prairie provinces and an analysis of some of the factors relating to polarization see Roger Gibbins, Prairie Politics and Society (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980).
23. V. Seymour Wilson, Canadian Public Policy and Administration: Theory and Environment (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981).
24. Ibid.; p.72. Wilson notes the philosophical underpinnings of the dichotomy appear to have evolved independently in Britain and the U.S. in the late 19th century. He argues that the U.S. definition of the dichotomy flows from an article written by Woodrow Wilson in 1887. See Footnotes 14 and 15 p.101 for his references.
25. Ibid.; For a detailed discussion of the descriptive and normative assumptions of the dichotomy see pp. 72-75.
26. Ibid.; p.99.
27. Ibid.; For Wilson's review of theories of complex organizations see Chapter V, pp. 108-136. For his review of decision-making theories see Chapter VI, pp. 137-192.
28. Ibid.; p.160. His classification is presented in diagrammatic form on p.162 and is one of the few attempts by a Canadian author to organize theories related to public policy analysis in a comprehensive fashion. Another example of this exercise, albeit less comprehensive, is contained in Peter Aucoin, "Public Policy Theory and Analysis," in Public Policy in Canada, G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin eds. (Toronto: MacMillian, 1979) pp.1-26. A somewhat different perspective on the problem of classification has been developed by Richard Simeon. In his article on the study of public policy he reviews various "approaches" to the field. See Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," op.cit.. It is important to note that all of these authors are in general agreement with Aucoin's statement on p.5 of his article that:
 "There has not yet emerged a general theory that has been accepted as the framework for

the analysis of public policy. There still remains...a marked disjunction of theories and models among students of this phenomena. This disjunction is due not only to the different foci but also the different levels of analysis of the several approaches which have been developed."

29. Ibid.; p.176.
30. Ibid.; His discussion of this approach is contained on pp.170-172.
31. Ibid.; p.170.
32. Ibid.; See pp.164-168 for his review of the systems approach.
33. Poel's 1976 study, op.cit., is a good example of this variant of the systems approach. For a general criticism of this approach see Joyce Mathews Munns, "The Environment, Politics and Policy Literature: A Critique and Reformulation," The Western Political Quarterly Vol.28 No. 4 (December 1975):646-667.
34. Ibid.; p.167.
35. Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (London: Yale University Press, 1974).
36. Ibid.; For a more complete description see pp.308-309
37. Ibid.; For a complete description see pp.310-312. It is noteworthy that among the various institutions Heclo found that bureaucracy played the most important role in the movement of an idea through the policy process. See pp.301-304 for a specific discussion of this finding.
38. Ibid.; p.315.
39. Ibid.; p.315.
40. A good example of current incrementalist thought is contained in Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking the Truth to Power (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979). For a less recent outline of this approach see David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy for Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963).
41. Ibid.; p.316.
42. For another discussion of the pluralist perspective see Wilson, Canadian Public Policy and Administration, pp.81-97.
43. Ibid.; p.319.
44. For example Anthony King. See Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis," British Journal of Political Science Vol.3 (July 1973):291-313.
45. Ronald Manzer, "Public Policies in Canada: A Developmental Perspective," a paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Edmonton, 1975.
46. Ibid.; p.35. Manzer's ideas, particularly the role of liberal-democratic ideology, are more fully developed in his recent monograph. See The

Development of Public Policies in Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985).

47. G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) p.567.
48. Ibid.; p.560. Also see pp.50-59.
49. Ibid.; p.567.
50. Ibid.; pp.567-568.
51. Ibid.; See Chapters 12 and 13 respectively for a discussion of these concepts.
52. E.C. LeSage Jr., "A hitch-hiker's guide to Ottawa public policy," Canadian Public Administration Vol. 28 No.3 (Fall 1985):463-476.
53. Ibid.; pp.472-73. Also see Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement: A Study of Policymaking (London: Chapman and Hall, 1965).
54. Ibid.; p.475.
55. Ibid.; p.468.
56. Ibid.; p.475.
57. Wilson, Canadian Public Policy and Administration, p.172.
58. This point is more fully discussed in Chapter II.
59. A. Paul Pross, Duality and Public Policy: A Conceptual Framework For Analyzing the Policy System of Atlantic Canada (Halifax: Dalhousie Institute of Public Affairs, 1980). On p.5 he notes that Hecllo's work directly informs his model.
60. Pross's model has been expressly developed for analysis of social policy in the Atlantic Region. As this policy sector involves joint federal-provincial areas of responsibility the model is heavily weighted to the analysis of federal-provincial relations in this area. Given the focus of this paper, aspects of the model relating to the role of the federal government will be given less emphasis.
61. Ibid.; p.66.
62. Ibid.; p.287.
63. Ibid.; p.288.
64. Ibid.; p.88.
65. Here Pross is informed by Galbraith's dual labour market theory. See John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). For Pross's discussion of political economy see pp.88-115.
66. Ibid.; Table III-2, p.134.
67. Ibid.; p.229.
68. Ibid.; p.258.
69. Ibid.; p.257.
70. Ibid.; p.282-283.
71. Ibid.; For a complete discussion of this framework see Chapter VI, pp. 281-312.
72. This is not to say that federal policy does not have a high degree of impact on Manitoba's

Telecommunications policy community. However, because a major portion of Manitoba's telecommunications sector is publically owned a high degree of control over policy decisions is maintained within provincial jurisdiction. The question of drawing boundaries for analysis will be given further attention in Chapter II.

73. A. Paul Pross, "Space, Function, and Interest: The Problem of Legitimacy in the Canadian State," in The Administrative State in Canada, O.P. Divedi ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) p. 115.
74. Ibid.; p.116.
75. Pross, Duality and Public Policy, p.169.
76. Marsha A. Chandler and William M. Chandler, Public Policy and Provincial Politics, p.39.
77. Pross, Duality and Public Policy, p.169.
78. Ibid.; p.172. This point will be given further elaboration in Chapter II.
79. Ibid.; p.308.
80. Ibid.; p.198.
81. Ibid.; p.233.
82. Ibid.; p.243.
83. Ibid.; p.191. For Pross's review of pressure group behaviour see pp.173-192.
84. See John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) and Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975).
85. Pross, Duality and Public Policy, p.216.
86. Ibid.; p.286.
87. Pross appears to draw on the environmentalist tradition in defining his contextual variables. However, on p.281 he notes that his model differs from the environmentalists "in the emphasis we have placed on the policy impacts of the machinery of government, particularly the administrative machinery." For a brief description of the environmental perspective see Aucoin, "Public-Policy Theory and Analysis," pp.11-12.
88. Theodorson and Theodorson, Modern Dictionary of Sociology, p.458.
89. Pross, Duality and Public Policy, p.49. In a later article Pross notes the pervasiveness of incrementalist logic in the management of the Federal government during the 1970s. See A.Paul Pross, "From System to Serendipity: The Practice and Study of Public Policy in the Trudeau Years," Canadian Public Administration Vol.24 No.4 (Winter 1982): 520-544.
90. Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," p.552.
91. Ibid.; p.552.
92. Ibid.; For a complete discussion of his various dimensions see pp. 559-566.

93. Ibid.; p.65.
94. David C. Legee and Wayne L. Francis, Political Research: Design, Measurement and Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p.vii.
95. Pross, Duality and Public Policy, p.157.

CHAPTER II

1. Nelson Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP (Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 1983).
2. Ibid.; only the final Chapter, pp. 125-146, deals with the behavior of the party in power.
3. Ibid.; see pp. 10-23 for a detailed history.
4. Ibid.; p.82.
5. Ibid.; p.15.
6. Ibid.; see Table 5, p.66, for membership totals from 1947 to 1957.
7. Ibid.; see Table 8, p.111, for membership totals from 1961 to 1970.
8. Ibid.; p.113.
9. Ibid.; p.78. One such example occurred in 1940 and involves the party's decision to enter into a coalition with the Bracken government. See p.31. A second relates to the debate surrounding the formation of the NDP and involves the actions of then party leader, Russ Paulley. See pp.97-102.
10. Ibid.; p.138.
11. Ibid.; p.150.
12. Ibid.; p.125.
13. Ibid.; p.139.
14. Ibid.; p.141.
15. Ibid.; these examples are contained on pp.138-139 and document the dissolution of the New Democratic Youth in 1972 and the refusal of one of the leading leftists in the caucus, Cy Gonick, to seek renomination in 1973.
16. Ibid.; p.76.
17. Ibid.; p.109.
18. Ibid.; p.133. Note that he supports this argument using party membership figures which show a threefold increase in the 1970's from 5500 members in 1969 to over 16,000 in 1977.
19. Ibid.; p.132.
20. See "Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP," a review by Paul Thomas in Canadian Public Administration Vol.28 No.2 (Summer 1985) pp.336-37.
21. Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, p.141.
22. See William M. Chandler, "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact: Contagion From the Left," op.cit..
23. See Dale H. Poel, "The Diffusion of Legislation Among

- the Canadian Provinces: A Statistical Analysis," op.cit..
24. Support for this argument can be found in John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979). On p.257 they note that "Blakeney was determined to revive the progressive Fabian tradition of the professional CCF bureaucracy." For an analysis of the role of the Saskatchewan bureaucracy in the early years of the CCF in that province see Seymour M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968) pp.309-17.
 25. Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, p.132.
 26. James A. McAllister, The Government of Edward Schreyer (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), p.3.
 27. Ibid.; p.6. Note that he depends on the government's 1973 publication Guidelines for the Seventies (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, March 1973) for this comparison.
 28. Ibid.; the policy areas covered in these chapters include: Legislative and Bureaucratic Reforms pp.20-31; Taxes and Spending pp.32-53; and the Schreyer government's policies pp.54-79.
 29. Ibid.; p.42.
 30. Ibid.; see pp.64-67 for his assessment of Autopac and pp.59-60 for a review of public housing policy.
 31. Ibid.; p.52.
 32. Ibid.; p.4. These goals are defined on pp.4-5.
 33. Ibid.; p.52
 34. Ibid.; p.79.
 35. Ibid.; see Chapter 6 "Manitoba as a Political Base" pp.80-87; Chapter 9 "Elections in Manitoba" pp.110-124; Chapter 8 "The CCF-NDP" pp.95-109; and Chapter 10 "The Party Organization" pp.125-141.
 36. Ibid.; p.139.
 37. Ibid.; p.141.
 38. Ibid.; p.25.
 39. Ibid.; p.159.
 40. Ibid.; p.28.
 41. Ibid.; p.29. He also notes that the Planning Secretariat contained "enough people with Ph.D or at least M.A. degrees to staff a moderately large university department of economics or political science."
 42. Ibid.; p.29.
 43. Ibid.; His analysis of the makeup of the Schreyer cabinets is contained on pp.151-155.
 44. See S.J.R. Noel, "Leadership and Clientelism," in The Provincial Political Systems, David J. Bellamy, Jon H. Pammett, and Donald C. Rowat, eds. (Toronto: Methuen, 1976), pp.197-213. McAllister's discussion of this article is contained on pp. 160-162.

45. Ibid.; p.208.
46. McAllister, The Government of Edward Schreyer. This argument is made on pp.161-62.
47. Ibid.; p.78.
48. Pross's model provides a good typology of these factors.
49. In this area McAllister is more explicit than Wiseman in offering an interpretation of the party's ideology (see. pp.4-5). Wiseman, on the other hand, tends to rely on the CCF's early ideological positions for his interpretation. For an alternate discussion of the national CCF's ideology and history see Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
50. See "Social Democracy in Manitoba" a review by Paul Stevenson in Canadian Dimension Vol.19 No.3 (July-August 1985) p.38.
51. Ibid.; p.38.
52. This is of particular importance in Wiseman's case given his criticism of the party's "small-l liberal" evolution.
53. Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, p.140.
54. McAllister, The Government of Edward Schreyer, p.68.
55. E.C. LeSage, "A hitch-hiker's guide to Ottawa public policy," p.468.
56. Carl E. Beigie, "An Economic Framework for Policy Action in Canadian Telecommunications," in Telecommunications For Canada, H.Edward English, ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1973) p.44
57. Ibid.; p.46.
58. Alphonse Quimet, "The Communications Revolution and Canadian Sovereignty," in Gutenberg Two: The New Electronics and Social Change, David Godfrey and Douglas Parkhill eds. (Toronto: Press Porcepic, 1980) p.137.
59. R. Brian Woodrow et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy (Montreal: C.D. Howe Institute, 1980) p.9.
60. W.R. Lederman, "Telecommunications and the Federal Constitution of Canada," in Telecommunications for Canada, p.352.
61. Ibid.; While he does not provide rationales, he does offer a discussion of the 1880 Act on pp.349-350.
62. Manitoba Telephone System, People of Service: A Brief History of the Manitoba Telephone System, (undated), p.59.
63. Beigie, "An Economic Framework for Policy Action in Canadian Telecommunications," p.59.
64. For a discussion of early administrative rationales in the industry see Howard Windsor and Peter Aucoin "The Regulation of Telephone Service in Nova Scotia," in The Regulatory Process in Canada, G.Bruce Doern, ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978). In their discussion

of the early history of regulation in that province they note "The role in regulating private enterprise in the telephone service industry...was considered primarily as a response to demands for supervision of rates or prices and not for enforcement of service standards. The demands for rate regulation had constituted the principle impetus to government action...". See pp.238-39. For a detailed review of the general structure of the industry in the early 1970's see Beigie, op.cit., pp.70-100. It is important to note that the majority of telephone companies are regulated at the Federal level. However the three Prairie telephone utilities are publically owned and regulated by agencies within their respective provincial governments.

65. Frank W. Peers, The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting: 1920-1951 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969). Also see Frank W. Peers, The Public Eye: Television and the Politics of Canadian Broadcasting: 1952-1968 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).
66. Peers, The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, p.12.
67. Ibid.; p.14.
68. Ibid.; pp.32-36.
69. Ibid.; see pp.44-54 for a review of the Commission's report.
70. Ibid.; see pp.102-136 for a review of this Act.
71. Ibid.; p.103.
72. Peers, The Public Eye, p.414.
73. Beigie, "An Economic Framework for Policy Action in Canadian Telecommunications," p.38.
74. For a discussion of the carriage capabilities of the new cable technologies see John Madden, "Simple Notes on a Complex Future," in Gutenberg Two, p.65.
75. Douglas Parkhill, "The Necessary Structure," in Gutenberg Two, p.69.
76. Ibid.; On pp.74-80 Parkhill provides a listing of the potential "interactive" services created by the new technologies.
77. R.Brian Woodrow et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy, p.18.
78. For a detailed discussion of the legal/constitutional questions raised by the new technologies see R.Brian Woodrow et.al. and W.R. Lederman op.cit.. Also see Robert J. Buchan et.al., Telecommunications Regulation and the Constitution (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982).
79. Richard J. Schultz, "Regulation as Maginot Line: Confronting the Technological Revolution in Telecommunications," Canadian Public Administration Vol.26 No.2 (Summer 1983) pp.203-218.
80. Ibid.; p.208.
81. Ibid.; p.211.

82. David Crane, A Dictionary of Canadian Economics (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1980) p.335.
83. In addition to a number of the works cited above, which represent a Canadian perspective on the impact of technological change in the telecommunications sector, the following American publications are also useful references. Glen O. Robinson, ed. Communications For Tomorrow: Policy Perspectives for the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1978) and Herbert S. Dordick et.al. The Emerging Network Marketplace (Norwood: Ablex, 1981).
84. For the purposes of this study policy output elements, which are defined as the dependent variable, are deemed to be static. While the discussion of Heclo's work in Chapter I indicates that in their broadest application policy outputs can be seen as independent variables "in an ongoing process in which everything becomes an intervening variable", no attempt will be made at operationalizing the dependent variable in a dynamic fashion.
85. Detailed diagrams of the actors in the policy community will be presented at varying stages in the case study.
86. Given this study's focus on the relationship between party based ideas and actors within the policy community, a direct causal role has not been assigned to these actors. However, when ideas within the community can be directly linked to these actors their impact will be noted.
87. The role of "gatekeeping" is an important concept in organizational communications theory. For a discussion of the role of gatekeepers in an organizational hierarchy see K.H. Roberts et.al., "Organizational Theory and Organizational Communication: A Communication Failure?", in Communication in Organizations, Lyman W. Porter and Karlene H. Roberts, eds. (New York: Penguin Books, 1977) pp.95-117.
88. R.Brian Woodrow et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy, p.16.
89. Dennis Forcese and Stephen Richer, Social Research Methods (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1973) p.89.
90. Ibid.; p.79.
91. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science Vol.7, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby eds., (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975) p.108.
92. Hugh Heclo, "Review Article: Public Policy Analysis," British Journal of Political Science Vol.2 (January 1972): 93-94.

CHAPTER III

1. Manitoba Telephone System, People of Service, p.2.
2. See W.R. Lederman, "Telecommunications and the Federal Constitution of Canada," pp.349-50 for a discussion of this Charter.
3. James Mavor, Government Telephones: The Experience of Manitoba, Canada (Toronto: The Maclean Publishing Company, 1917) p.15.
4. The Municipal Electric Light, Gas and Telephone Act, Statutes of Manitoba 62-63 Vic., 1899 Chapter 25.
5. W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History 2nd Ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p.290.
6. Ibid.; See pp. 306-308 for a discussion of the development of Winnipeg Hydro and pp.299-300 and p.313 for an analysis of the Roblin administration's foray into public ownership of grain elevators.
7. John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979). Note that while this book does not offer much by way of detail on the history of prairie public utilities, it does provide a number of insights into their development. More specifically, on p.11 the authors describe the focus of their work as "the new mineral staple industries-oil, gas, and potash-all of which have been characterized by a traditional dominance of American capital...".
8. Ibid.; pp.7-8.
9. See C. Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, "Private Property in Peril: Ontario Businessmen and the Federal System, 1898-1911," in Enterprise and National Development, G. Porter and R. Cuff eds. (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973) pp.20-38.
10. Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, p.8.
11. Ibid.; On p. 114 they note that in Saskatchewan Ontario Hydro was considered a "major precedent for publicly owned power in Canada, and one which the CCF repeatedly referred." For a detailed analysis of the development of Ontario Hydro see H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forest, Mines, and Hydro-electric Power in Ontario 1849-1941 (Toronto: Macmillian, 1974)
12. In the conclusion of The Politics of Development, Nelles notes that "In Ontario during the 1930's the intimate personal and institutional relationship of government and business magnified the task of a people, whose democratic will was weak,...During this period the province lost its responsible government...". See p.487.
13. Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, p.18.
14. Ibid.; See pp.20-38 for this discussion.

15. Ibid.; p.28. In his discussion of the formation of this Association, Morton op.cit. on p.228 emphasizes this point: "To the will of the farming community, thus expressed by an organization no political party could match, the Roblin government and both political parties gave instant and respectful heed."
16. See Morton, Manitoba: A History, pp.288-290 for a discussion of the Association's involvement in the telephone debate.
17. As quoted in an editorial in the Winnipeg Telegram, 27 January, 1905.
18. As quoted in an editorial in the Manitoba Free Press 24 November, 1905.
19. An Act respecting Government Telephone and Telegraph Systems, Statutes of Manitoba 5-6 Edw. VII, 1906 Chapter 89; and An Act Respecting Municipal Telephone Systems, Statutes of Manitoba 5-6 Edw. VII, 1906 Chapter 90.
20. This case was known as Toronto Corporation vs. The Bell Telephone Company of Canada (1905) and helped establish federal jurisdiction in the area of telecommunications. It appears that the federal government denied Manitoba's request in an effort to maintain exclusive control of telecommunications services in Canada. For a complete discussion of this case and its impact on Manitoba see Lederman op.cit, pp.363-375.
21. Ibid.; Sections 9, 10, and 11 of Chapter 90 provided municipal electors with the right to hold referendums to determine whether their municipalities should construct a telephone exchange.
22. Mavor, Government Telephones, p.24.
23. An Act to amend The Act respecting Government Telephone and Telegraph Systems, Statutes of Manitoba 6-7 Edw. VII, 1907 Chapter 45; and An Act to amend The Act respecting Municipal Telephone Systems, Statutes of Manitoba 6-7 Edw. VII, 1907 Chapter 46.
24. Mavor, Government Telephones, p.25.
25. Details of the purchase are contained in Carl Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, (Winnipeg: King's Printer for Manitoba, 1940), pp.4-6. Note that at the time of the purchase Bell had a total of 14,042 subscribers. In addition, the system connected with 3,000 subscribers of independent or municipally owned systems.
26. An Act respecting the Department of Telephones and Telegraphs, Statutes of Manitoba 7-8 Edw. VII, 1908 Chapter 63. This Act did not replace the 1906 act (Chapter 89) and was restricted to the organization, functions, and powers of the new Department.
27. Mavor, Government Telephones, pp.38-40.
28. Ibid.; See p.63 for a comparison of MGT's 1909 rates with those of Bell Canada in Ontario.

29. Ibid.; p.38.
30. Manitoba Free Press, 8 October, 1910.
31. See the Winnipeg Telegram, 13 December, 1911 for a report on the proposed adjustments.
32. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, p.6.
33. An Act to amend An Act respecting Government Telephone and Telegraph Systems, Statutes of Manitoba 2 Geo.V, 1912 Chapter 92. This amendment was the first in a series of legislative changes that helped develop MGT'S "arms length" relationship with the provincial government.
34. An Act respecting the Municipal and Public Utilities Board, Statutes of Manitoba 2 Geo. V, 1912 Chapter 66.
35. Mavor, Government Telephones, p.113.
36. Ibid.; p.143.
37. See Morton, Manitoba: A History, pp.337-343 for a discussion of the 1914 election and the subsequent events that lead to the appointment of the Norris government.
38. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, p.7.
39. Ibid.; p.8.
40. People of Service, p.8, notes that "there were shortages in cable and equipment of all kinds, and worst of all, many of MGT's most experienced men went overseas."
41. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, p.8.
42. Ibid.; p.9. Note that the Advisory Board that was established in 1912 had ceased to function by 1920.
43. Ibid.; p.9. Goldenberg notes that "Although the system has been designated by the latter name since the change was made by Mr. Lowry, there does not appear to be any Act of the Legislature or any Order-in-Council authorizing the change of name." The official change did not take place until 1941, some 20 years later, when a number of recommendations made by Goldenberg were incorporated into amendments to the telephone Act.
44. The new rate structure and the rationales for them are contained in MTS's Fourteenth Annual Report, 30 November, 1921. Note that the increase in Brandon and Portage La Prairie were not as high as in other rural areas of the province.
45. Ibid.; p.4. Also see p.4 of the Fifteenth Annual Report, 30 November 1922 for an indication of the costs involved in servicing rural areas.
46. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey. Pages 10-12 offer an overview of the development of the system between 1920 and 1933.

47. See Peers, The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, p.27 for a discussion of the role of newspapers in the evolution of radio broadcasting in Canada.
48. Ibid.; on p.27 Peers notes the nature of the agreement on licencing fees but does not mention the question of provincial monopoly control. However, on p.49 he notes "It will be recalled that in one province, Manitoba, a provincial agency had a monopoly of all broadcasting."
49. Manitoba Telephone System, Sixteenth Annual Report, 30 November, 1923, p.25.
50. Ibid.; p.25. While this Report does not identify a specific threat to the Province's identity, Peers op.cit. notes a general concern during this period with U.S. signals crossing the Canadian border.
51. Ibid.; p.25.
52. Operational statements for CKY and CKX are contained in MTS Annual Reports for the years that they operated as public stations.
53. A comparison of the 1921 and 1929 Annual Reports indicates that in 1921 65,552 telephones were in use, net revenues were -\$538,000 and total plant value was \$14.3 million. By 1929 76,042 telephones were in service, net revenues were \$281,199, and total plant value was \$19.8 million.
54. See People of Service, pp.14-15, for a discussion of MTS's response to the 1930's depression.
55. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, p.13.
56. People of Service, p.14. This system later became known as the Trans Canada Telephone System. It recently changed its name to Telecom Canada.
57. An Act respecting Telephones and Telegraphs and the Telephone System of the Province, Statutes of Manitoba, 1933 Chapter 46.
58. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, p.13-19.
59. See Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter 46.
60. Goldenberg, Government Commercial Enterprises Survey, p.52.
61. Ibid.; p.12.
62. Ibid.; p.43. Note that while Lowry held the title of Commissioner and General Manager, the "Commission" does not appear to have functioned as a legal body.
63. Ibid.; p.50.
64. An Act to amend The Manitoba Telephone Act, Statutes of Manitoba, 1940 Chapter 53. Section 3 relates to the establishment of an Executive Committee.
65. Ibid.; Section 1.
66. People of Service, p.18, notes that communications systems for the British Commonwealth Air Training bases alone "were more like small cities in size and requirements."

67. An Act to amend The Manitoba Telephone System Act, Statutes of Manitoba, 1944 Chapter 43.
68. As quoted in the Winnipeg Free Press, 24 March, 1944. Note that between 1944 and 1951 MTS Annual Reports indicate that nearly \$10 million in profits was transferred to the provincial treasury. Also note that in 1946 MTS changed its fiscal year from the calendar year to an April 1 to March 30 system. This appears to have been done to conform with the Province's accounting system.
69. Peers, The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, p.69.
70. Ibid.; p.71.
71. Ibid.; The activities of the committee are covered on pp.78-102. It is important to note that, on p.89, Peers points out that Manitoba was in favor of the development of a national broadcasting system although at that time the question of ownership of the regional stations was not clear.
72. Ibid.; pp.78-136 details the early impact of this Act. For Manitoba the most important effect was to negate its 1922 agreement with the Federal government which gave the province a broadcasting monopoly. This is evidenced in the granting of a licence to James Richardson and Sons in 1933 to operate Station CJRC without prior consultation with the province. See p.113 for Peer's mention of the Richardson station.
73. Ibid.; p.161. Also see p.214 which indicates that the CBC saw CKY as an important regional station in the development of a national broadcasting system.
74. Ibid.; p.375. Note that the Alberta Government cited Manitoba as a precedent for such an application and, through Alberta Government Telephones, had been involved since 1943 in a station licenced to the University of Alberta.
75. Ibid.; p.376.
76. Winnipeg Free Press, 11 December, 1947.
77. As quoted in Ibid.
78. People of Service, p.21.
79. The 1950-51 Annual Report indicates that net revenues were \$1,266,804. From this amount \$1,150,000 was transferred to the provincial treasury, the last such transfer of this kind. In the 1951-52 fiscal year revenues dropped to \$604,505 and in 1952-53 fell over 60 percent to \$273,180.
80. This information is contained in a 16 January, 1956 Progress Report for the Year 1955 submitted to the cabinet by MTS.
81. Ibid.; p.6.
82. Winnipeg Free Press, 18 March, 1955.
83. As quoted in Ibid..
84. Mr. A. Grey (CCF Winnipeg North) as quoted in Ibid..
85. See Schedule 1 of The Municipal and Public Utilities

- Board Order No. 250/55, June 28, 1955.
86. In March of 1954 assent was given to An Act Respecting Telephones and the Telephone System of the Province, Statutes of Manitoba, 1954 Chapter 263. This Act, which replaced the 1933 Act (Chapter 46) included most of the 1944 amendments (Chapter 43). It maintained the Attorney-General as the principle minister for telephones (Section 2.(a)) and emphasized that only one Commissioner was required for the operation of the Commission (Section 5.(3)) and that Commissioner would hold the positions of Chairman of the Commission and General Manager on a full time basis (Section 6.(1)). It also re-affirmed the concept of an executive committee and further clarified its role (Section 9). In short, other than updating and clarifying the provisions of Chapters 46 and 43) the only major change in this Act was to bring into law MTS's 1946 decision to change its reporting system from the calander year to a fiscal year beginning in April and ending in March of the next year (Section 2.(b)).
87. An Act respecting Telephones and Telegraphs and the Telephone System of the Province, Statutes of Manitoba, 1955 Chapter 76.
88. People of Service, p. 22, notes that with micro-wave technology "Manitobans benefited from the first in a series of reduction in long distance charges including several drops in the Trans-Canada rates and the elimination of special Northern long-distance charges."
89. An Act to amend The Manitoba Telephone Act, Statutes of Manitoba, 1957 Chapter 72. Section 2.(g) of the 1955 Act simply defined a "telephone" as including "telephone by wire, telephone without wires, or radio transmission;...". This amendment expanded this definition in Section 1.(g) to read "'telephone" means an instrument or device into which messages may be spoken or introduced for transmission over the Commission's system by wire, without wires or by radio transmission or by which such messages may be recorded heard or seen...". These changes appear to reflect the governments increasing awareness of the changing nature of telecommunications technology.
90. Winnipeg Free Press, 12 June, 1958. This agreement would have seen the province pay \$50,000 for the construction of five broadcast towers for the re-broadcast of CBC television signals from Winnipeg. However, the CBC does not appear to have been a party to this agreement.
91. Winnipeg Free Press, 1 May, 1959.
92. See the Winnipeg Free Press, 12 May, 1959 for a report on the use of television in the election campaign. It is also interesting to note that a

separate article in the same issue gives attention to a speech made by Marshall McLuhan to the Winnipeg Sales and Advertising Club on the role of the mass media in modern society. While his presence appears to be unrelated to the election campaign it serves to indicate that ideas related to the impact of television on society were current at the time.

93. See An Act To Establish A Public Utilities Board, Statutes of Manitoba, 1959 (2nd Sess.) Chapter 51. Of interest is Section 79 which restricts the joint use of "the means of distribution, including poles, conduits, or other equipment" without PUB approval. This appears to have been directed at MTS and, given that cable television technology was in operation in the U.S., gave the government a degree of control over any future cable agreements that MTS might enter into.
94. Manitoba Telephone System Organizational Study, (Winnipeg, Bell Canada Administrative Planning Group, April 1961), Section 2 p.1.
95. An Act to amend The Manitoba Telephone Act, Statutes of Manitoba, 1962 Chapter 75. Note that Section 13.(2) of this Act states that the Chairman of the Commission "may also be appointed to be the General Manager."
96. Ibid.; Section 1.(e) dropped the definition of a "telephone" entirely in favor of a definition of the "telephone system" which reads: "'system" means a telephone, telegraph or radio telecommunications system or a combination of any such system, or any similar means of communications operated by the use of electrical energy; and also includes all the works, owned, held, or used, for the purpose thereof or in connection therewith or with the operation thereof."
97. As quoted in the Winnipeg Free Press, 1 September, 1962.
98. The partisan nature of the appointments was confirmed in a March 6, 1986 interview with Mr. J.H. Chipperfield, a member of the Commission from 1962 to 1969. In that interview Mr. Chipperfield indicated that at the time of his appointment to the Commission the government "wanted MTS to be more accountable to the government and wanted it to improve its rural and northern service."
99. The details of these initiatives and related operational information is contained in a Progress Report for the Year 1962 submitted to the government by MTS in January of 1963.
100. It is noteworthy that the 1962 election saw the first televised all-party debate in Canadian history. For a review of this debate see the Winnipeg Free Press, 12 December, 1962.

101. For example People of Service, p.22, indicates that the most significant change during this phase was the introduction of Direct Distance Dialing.
102. For a discussion of the Fowler Committee's activities and findings see Peers, The Public Eye, pp.305-351.
103. Government of Canada, White Paper on Broadcasting (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1966) p.4.
104. For a brief review of this Case see Government of Manitoba, Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective (Winnipeg: Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, 1974) p.23.
105. An Act to amend The Manitoba Telephone Act, Statutes of Manitoba, 1966 Chapter 67.
106. Government of Manitoba, Northern Television Transmission in Manitoba: A Brief Presented to the Government of Canada, February 1966. The March 6, 1986 interview with Mr. Chipperfield indicates that this Brief was written by MTS staff after consultation with the Commission.
107. Ibid.; p.9.
108. Ibid.; p.14.
109. Winnipeg Free Press, 20 June, 1966. This issue contains a full review of the television debate. The use of MTS as a key economic infra-structure component in the government's northern development strategy was confirmed in the March 6, 1986 interview with Mr. Chipperfield.
110. See Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective, pp.23-25 for a discussion of the legal and regulatory environment at the time of the negotiations. This position is supported in the March 6, 1986 interview with Mr. Chipperfield. He indicates that the Commission was directly involved in the negotiations with Greater Winnipeg Cablevision and Winnipeg Videon. An example of the lack of regulation can be seen in MTS's ability to divide the service areas for the two firms. According to Mr. Chipperfield, Winnipeg Videon was awarded the largest service area (west of the Red River) because it was the first firm to approach MTS. The smaller area (east of the Red River) was given to the second applicant, Greater Winnipeg Cablevision.
111. Ibid.; pp.19-20.
112. Government of Manitoba, The Canada-Manitoba Agreement and the Future of Cable Communications in Manitoba, (Winnipeg: Department of Consumer, Corporate, and Internal Services, June, 1977) p.6.
113. Much of the historical fact for this Section is drawn from an unpublished study paper titled "Educational Telecommunications in Manitoba", prepared by the Manitoba Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services (August, 1973). See pp.4-18.

114. Ibid.; p.5, indicates that in 1938 the broadcasts reached approx. 70 schools and had an audience of 5,500 students.
115. Ibid.; p.7.
116. Ibid.; p.8.
117. Ibid.; See pp.9-12.
118. For example the Winnipeg Free Press, 6 May, 1959, notes that the Manitoba School Broadcasts Branch received an award from the American Institute for Education by Radio-Television for these programs.
119. Earl Rosen ed., Educational Television: Canada (Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1967), pp.23-24. It is noteworthy that while Manitoba was producing programs in 1957-58 larger provinces, such as Ontario and Quebec did not begin independent production until 1965. See pp.24-30.
120. "Educational Telecommunications in Manitoba," p.108.
121. People of Service, p.22.
122. For example p.13 of the 1967-68 Annual Report indicates that Trans-Canada, of which Manitoba was a member, had "made a joint proposal to the Federal government to provide a domestic satellite communications system to serve the whole of Canada." This proposal contributed to the creation of Telesat Canada by the Federal government in 1969.
123. This was confirmed in the March 6, 1986 interview with Mr. Chipperfield. He indicated that the CCTA played a role in establishing the negotiating position of the cable companies.
124. R. Brian Woodrow and Kenneth B. Woodside, "Players, Stakes and Politics in the Future of Telecommunications Regulation in Canada," a paper presented to the Conference on Competition and Technological Change: The Impact on Telecommunications Policy and Regulation, Toronto, September 1984. These points are contained on pp.7-8.
125. Ibid.; pp.8-9.

CHAPTER IV

1. Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, p.8.
2. The texts of the 1932 "Calgary Program" and the 1933 "Regina Manifesto" are contained in Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of A Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) pp.303-13.
3. Ibid.; pp.306-307.
4. For examples of this position see the Winnipeg Free Press, 24 March, 1944 and 18 March, 1955.
5. See Young, The Anatomy of a Party, pp.314-15 for the Declaration's position on public utilities and

technological change.

6. Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, p.107.
7. See Manitoba New Democratic Party, A Summary of Policies and Principles: 1961-1982 (Winnipeg: undated) p.54.
8. Marsha A. Chandler, "State Enterprise and Partisanship in Provincial Politics," Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.15 No.4 (December, 1982):711-740.
9. Ibid.; p.717.
10. Ibid.; p.723.
11. Ibid.; p.730-35.
12. Ibid.; p.740.
13. For a review of the NDP's legislative priorities see the Winnipeg Free Press, 26 June, 1969. Examples of the new government's commitment to the use of public enterprise include: the formation of a public automobile insurance corporation; enhancement of the Manitoba Development Fund; and the development of a public housing corporation.
14. See Thomas Peterson, "Manitoba: Ethnic and Class Politics," in Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces 2nd Ed., Martin Robin ed. (Scarborough, Prentice-Hall, 1978) pp.61-119. On p. 102 he notes "in 1970, the legislature was reduced to near bedlam and fisticuffs when the NDP established a government monopoly over automobile insurance." This point was also confirmed during an April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein, who was an Executive Assistant to Premier Schryer from July 1969 to August 1971. Goldstein notes that during this period "MTS was no trouble and therefore did not receive much cabinet attention." The first NDP MLA to hold cabinet responsibility for MTS was S.M. Cherniack, who was also the Finance Minister. He held this responsibility from July 15, 1969 to August 17, 1970 and was replaced by Peter Burtniak who held it until July 4, 1973.
15. Chipperfield was replaced by government MLA, Russell Doern, who only served one year on the Commission. It is notable that D.M. Stanes, a former Progressive Conservative MLA, and N.E. Rodger were retained. In a March 6, 1986 interview, Mr. Chipperfield indicated that the government appears to have followed a policy of allowing the pre-election commissioners to serve their full terms and that no pressure was placed on them to resign. This is evidenced by Mr. Rodger's presence on the Commission until 1972.
16. The 1970-71 Annual Report indicates that the Commission was structured as follows: Peter Burtniak, Minister Responsible for MTS; J.F. Mills continuing in the dual role of Chairman and General Manager;

J.D. Turnbull, MLA (replacing Russell Doern); G.R. Fines (replacing D.M. Stanes); A. H. Kimacovich (new appointee); and N.E. Rodger (pre-election appointee). This structure remained the same through the 1971-72 fiscal year.

17. A review of the 1969-70, 1970-71, and 1971-72 Annual Reports indicates that the only policy change was an intensification of the northern services expansion initiated by the Roblin administration (see p. 5 of these Reports for details). This review also indicates that: the Trans-Canada Telephone System remained the main source of technological change for MTS (see p.6 of the Reports); there was no attempt to introduce worker participation to the Management of the System; and, more importantly, there was no attempt to bring MTS's financial administration closer to "service at cost" principles (see p.2 of the Reports which indicate that net revenues increased .34 per cent in 1969-70, .26 per cent in 1970-71, and 1.17 percent in 1971-72 using the previous year's net revenues as the base).
18. For a brief review of the 1968 Act from Manitoba's perspective see Government of Manitoba, Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective, pp.28-34.
19. For a good review of the policy rationales that contributed to the establishment and mandate of the CRTC see Herschel Hardin, Closed Circuits: The Sellout of Canadian Television (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1985) pp. 1-26.
20. Order-in-Council P.C. 1970-496, March 19, 1970; SOR/70-113, Canada Gazette, Part II, April 4, 1970, p.381.
21. This Order was amended in 1972 to allow the granting of licenses to "arms-length" corporations established by a province for the purpose of educational broadcasting. See Order-in-Council P.M. 1972-1569, July 13, 1972; SOR/72-216, Canada Gazette, Part II, July 26, p.1047.
22. See Government of Canada, Canadian Broadcasting: A Single System (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).
23. Government of Manitoba, Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective, pp.33-34.
24. Ibid.; this argument is made in more detail on pp. 37-38.
25. Ibid.; pp.36-37.
26. Ibid.; p.37 notes that these changes did not negatively affect MTS because the DOC followed a policy of encouraging "the development of microwave through the existing common carriers, because of their high quality of construction and maintenance, rather than allowing the proliferation of duplicate microwave systems."

27. Richard Schultz, "Partners in a Game Without Masters: Reconstructing the Telecommunications Regulatory System," in Telecommunications Regulation and the Constitution, Robert J. Buchan et.al. (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982) p.48.
28. It was headed by Allan E. Gottlieb, Deputy Minister of Communications and was co-ordinated by Richard J. Gwyn, Director of Environmental Planning in the DOC. Their description of the structure of the Inquiry is contained in an article by them titled "Social Planning of Communications," in Communications in Canadian Society 2nd Ed., Benjamin D. Singer ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975) p.93. Note that the Manitoba Government nor MTS was invited to make presentations to the Telecommision Seminars. However, MTS was indirectly represented by the Trans-Canada Telephone System.
29. Government of Canada, Instant World: A Report on Telecommunications In Canada (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971).
30. Gottlieb and Gwyn, "Social Planning and Communications," p. 96.
31. These events were related in the April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein. Note that in September of 1971 he entered a graduate program in the United States and returned to employment with the Province in July of 1972.
32. March 26, 1986 interview with Mr. Doern. In that interview he noted that Burtniak, who was also Minister of Highways, was not particularly interested in telecommunications and appeared to be satisfied to let MTS determine policy. This was confirmed in an April 15, 1986 interview with then MTS Commissioner and NDP MLA Ian Turnbull who observed that Burtniak "did not appear to be interested in playing an activist role in the area."
33. At the time of the creation of this position the government does not appear to have been interested in linking telecommunications with party policy. This is evidenced in the method of Thompson's hiring (through regular Civil Service Commission competition) and in his assignment to Management Committee instead of the more partisan Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet.
34. February 20, 1986 interview with Charles Thompson. His first presentation to cabinet was titled Tele/Computer/ Communications (December 8, 1971). While the main thrust of this paper was to highlight the need for further research to counter federal policies, it is noteworthy that another area of attention was the effect of computer data-base centralization in eastern Canada on Manitoba's economy (see pp.21-24). This was a result of

Thompson's other main task during the initial stages of his employment which was to formulate and present Manitoba's position to a Federal Computer Communications Task Force. The Province's position in this area at that time was to call for further consultation at the Ministerial level.

35. The April 15, 1986 interview with the Hon. Ian Turnbull lends support to this position. He noted that MTS's management maintained a very "traditional" perspective on MTS's autonomy from the government. This perspective was also evident in MTS's perception that "it did not see any need to become involved in policy development in areas that were not directly related to the System's common carrier mandate."
36. Thompson's argument is supported in a review of the Winnipeg Free Press during the 1969 election campaign which gave coverage to the controversy surrounding the flooding of South Indian Lake. More specifically, a 19 June, 1969 article notes that the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood had accused Manitoba Hydro of "participating in the election in a pro-government manner." In short, it appears that MTS's management did not want to see MTS policy become a topic of future election campaigns.
37. February 20, 1986 interview with Charles Thompson.
38. Manitoba New Democratic Party, Manitoba New Democrat, Vol.2 No.2 (February, 1972) p.7. It is important to note that party convention resolutions are not binding on the government in the NDP. However, they are emphasized in this paper to provide an indication of the position of party based actors at the "grassroots" level.
39. Utilizing Pross's policy hierarchy this change could be described as a move from a "subsidiary" to a "sector" policy status.
40. This unpublished report was titled "The Canadian Communications Scene and Manitoba's Position, March 31, 1972.
41. Ibid.; p.8.
42. Ibid.; p.4.
43. This Department was created by the NDP following the elimination of the Provincial Secretary's Department in August of 1970. Its first Minister was Ben Hanuschak who held the portfolio from August 20, 1970 to December 1, 1970. It was then given to Al Mackling who held it until July 4, 1973. At the time of Goldstein's appointment it contained a number of communications related agencies including the Queen's Printer and the Information Services Branch (the latter was responsible for the production of Government press releases and public information distribution).
44. A Manitoba Civil Service Commission Position

Description written by Thompson at the time of his move to Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services provides an indication of the mandate of the Communications Division. Section A. (Duties) indicates that his primary tasks included:

"Directs work of researchers on telecommunications policy projects such as extension of television service to the North, cable television, interconnection, computer communications, etc.

Liason with Manitoba Telephone System's Government and Broadcast Industry Department.

Liason with officials of the Federal Department of Communications, the CRTC, other provincial governments, and community groups and organizations in Manitoba."

Note that MTS's Government and Broadcast Industry Department was formed in April of 1972. In an April 8, 1986 interview Thompson noted that its development was, in part, a response to the government's creation of an independent planning capacity. He also observed that it was, for the most part, staffed by engineers and dealt mainly with the engineering problems related to changes on common carrier technology. It did not in any way deal with the broader political and economic aspects of the changing policy environment.

45. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.

46. It is important to note that the 1971 policy resolution was not a factor in the development of the government's initial response. In the April 16, 1986 interview Goldstein indicated that while the 1971 resolution had been brought to his attention, he was not instructed to study the feasibility of a public takeover of the private cable network. He also noted that "the 1971 resolution was seen as unrealistic by the government and my responsibility was to generate a more realistic resolution for the upcoming convention."

47. Government of Manitoba, "Manitoba Calls for Expanded Northern Television Services," (Information Services Branch News Release, October 5, 1972).

48. Ibid.; p.3.

49. Government of Manitoba, "Excerpt from a Submission by Hon. Al Mackling, Provincial Minister Responsible for Communications on the subject of Cable Television and Extension of T.V. Service," presented to the 1972 Provincial Convention of the Manitoba New Democratic Party, December 16, 1972. Note that the proposed 1972 resolutions went well beyond the 1971 call for government takeover of existing private cable systems by advocating the establishment of a single province-wide public cable system. Page 1 of this submission notes that the new resolutions were sponsored by

constituency associations "served by Brandon television, which until now has been a single channel service, with little or no community programming."

50. Ibid.; p.2.
51. Ibid.; This argument is contained in detail on pp. 2-3.
52. Ibid.; p.4. This resolution is also contained on p.54 of Manitoba New Democratic Party, Summary of Policies and Principles: 1961-1982, and appears to have replaced the 1971 resolution which is not contained in this Summary.
53. See Government of Manitoba, Northern Television Transmission in Manitoba: A Brief Presented to the Government of Canada, op.cit..
54. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
55. Ibid.; Note that this study involved the costs of introducing cable television to Dauphin and Swan River. A summary of the findings contained in it can be found in Government of Manitoba, Broadcasting and Cable Television: A Manitoba Perspective, pp. 15-16. Also note that Goldstein indicated that the initiation of this study had no relationship to the passage of the 1971 party resolution.
56. Government of Manitoba, "Excerpt from a Submission by Hon. Al Mackling, Provincial Minister responsible for Communications, on the subject of Cable Television and Extension of T.V. Service," p.3.
57. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
58. P.6 of an untitled and undated study on the constitutional aspects of communications. The April 8, 1986 interview with Charles Thompson confirmed that it was written by him in January of 1972.
59. Inter-Provincial Working Group, Communications, August 15, 1972, p.2. This Group was made up of representatives from New Brunswick (representing the Atlantic Region), Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. It was chaired by Charles Thompson.
60. Government of Manitoba, "Opening Statement by Hon. A.H. Mackling on Manitoba's Priorities in Communications," presented to the Interprovincial Conference on Communications, Quebec City, November 21, 1972, pp 4-5.
61. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
62. Government of Manitoba, "Western Communications Ministers Seek Talks," (Information Services Branch News Release, October 13, 1972) p.1. Schultz, on p.58 of "Partners in a Game Without Masters," notes that Alberta had a special interest in these issues due to "the federal governments decision to allow CP Telecommunications to build a microwave extension within the province...". On the same page he also notes that in 1972 "those provinces that regulated or owned telephone companies were also concerned about

- the competitive threat posed by the federal government's creation of Telesat Canada as the monopoly carrier for all satellite communications."
63. Government of Manitoba, "Manitoba Sees Progress in Communications Talks," (Information Services Branch News Release, November 24, 1972) p.1. The text of the resolution is contained on p.2.
 64. The recommendations contained in this Report can be found in Government of Canada, Computer/Communications Policy: A Position Statement by the Government of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada; 1973).
 65. Government of Manitoba, Tele/Computer/Communications, p.22. This Report goes on to note that "...the most obvious example of this is the continuing de-emphasis of both Air Canada and Eaton's operations in the Winnipeg area.
 66. Government of Manitoba, "Opening Statement by Hon. A.H. Mackling on Manitoba's Priorities in Communications," p.3.
 67. See R. Brian Woodrow et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy, pp. 30-31 for a brief history of conflicts in this area.
 68. Government of Manitoba, "Opening Statement by Hon. A.H. Mackling on Manitoba's Priorities in Communications," p.5.
 69. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
 70. Mackling's announcement of the Task Force is contained in Government of Manitoba, "Telecommunications Paper Being Prepared," (Information Services Branch News Release, November 17, 1972). Note that the position paper was "tentatively scheduled for completion by mid-summer, 1973."
 71. In addition to Goldstein and Thompson the researchers hired in this period and their assignments include: Richard Starr, history of common carrier policy; Robert Babe, common carrier rate structuring and performance; Mike McGarry, computer communications; and Joe Wiesenfeld, Educational Telecommunications. These persons were with the Division for varying terms and were joined by other consultants brought in by Goldstein on a short term basis. Note that Goldstein's intent at the time was to create a four section paper covering the above areas. However, this did not occur as will be noted in the following section's review of the Division's research outputs. It is also of interest that only Robert Babe, who was completing his Ph.D at the time, had specialized academic training in telecommunications. The other three were all former journalists.
 72. Government of Canada, Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada: A Position Paper of the Government

of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) (hereafter Green Paper).

73. Ibid.; p.4. Specific proposals for Federal-Provincial consultation are contained on pp.29-31.
74. Woodrow et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy, pp.33-34.
75. April 23, 1986 interview with Charles Thompson.
76. Government of Manitoba, "Text of An Address by Hon. Al Mackling Minister of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services on Telecommunications and The New Rural Society," delivered to the 54th Annual Convention of the Manitoba Community Newspapers Association, Winnipeg, June 15, 1973. This address received coverage in the 16 June, 1973 edition of the Winnipeg Free Press. Note that this speech was written by Goldstein and has its basis in a spring 1973 Communications Division Seminar conducted by Mr. Peter Goldmark. Goldmark was a consultant who had previously been involved in a "New Rural Society" project in the United States.
77. Ibid.; p.2.
78. Ibid.; These points are listed on p.3 and are described in the remainder of the speech.
79. Government of Manitoba, Guidelines for the Seventies: Introduction and Economic Analysis (Vol. 1) (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, March 1973), p.135. Note that this document was the most comprehensive statement of aims and objectives produced by the Schreyer administration.
80. If some degree of public entrepreneurship in the provision of these services (which were not bound by the same constraints as cable television) is shown by the government in its second term then party policy can be seen to have played a role in the policy process.
81. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein. He noted that he had advocated the creation of a "functional arrangement" for some time and the change in cabinet portfolio's provided the opportunity. This was supported by the Hon. Ian Turnbull, in an April 15, 1986 interview, who noted that "the decision was one of practical management".
82. Government of Manitoba, "Educational Telecommunications in Manitoba: Proposals for a "Narrow-Cast" System Design," August, 1973. As was noted in Chapter III, this paper was not published and appears to have served as a discussion paper only.
83. Ibid.; pp.18-19.
84. Ibid.; p.103.
85. Ibid.; p.105.
86. Government of Manitoba, Regional Development of

Electronic Data Processing in Canada: The Role of the Federal Government (Winnipeg: Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, October 1973).

87. Ibid.; p.8.
88. Ibid.; The recommendations are contained on p.8. Note that the Paper received positive support in the national media. For example, see The Financial Post, 17 November 1973.
89. These concerns are listed in Government of Manitoba, "West Takes Joint Stand on Communications Issues," (Information Services Branch News Release, September 6, 1973)
90. Government of Manitoba, "Opening Statement by Hon. Ian Turnbull Minister Responsible for Communications to the Conference of Provincial Ministers of Communications," Moncton, October 2, 1973, pp.2-3.
91. Government of Manitoba, "Federal Initiatives Ignore Western Communications Goals," (Information Services Branch News Release, November 30, 1973). A review of Manitoba's position is contained on pp.2-3.
92. Schultz, "Partners in a Game Without Masters," p.59.
93. Globe and Mail, 1 December, 1973.
94. Manitoba New Democratic Party, Summary of Policies and Principles: 1961-1982, p.54.
95. This paper was never given a title as it was intended to serve as the first Chapter of Goldstein's proposed four section position paper. It was completed in March of 1974 and bears the title: "Chapter 1 History and Performance of the Manitoba Telephone System. Richard Starr, in a February 27, 1986 interview indicated that the first portion of the paper (history) was written by him while the "performance" section was based on Robert Babe's research.
96. Ibid.; On p.101 the paper notes that "In subsequent chapters, reference will be made to the future role of the Manitoba Telephone System as a carrier of new and advanced modes of telecommunications."
97. Ibid.; p.101. These recommendations are outlined in more detail on pp. 101-104. Note that MTS's 1974-75 Annual Report provides an indication of the Communications Division's leadership in the policy community. P.12 of the Annual Report echoes recommendation (1) when it notes that "the System is expanding and improving community services for about 20,000 residents in 45 permanent communities" in the north. Recommendations (2) and (3) are reflected on p.14 with the announcement that "the system will continue its program to reduce multi-party line loadings to no more than four customers per line" and "the introduction of dial telephone service to fifteen additional communities."
98. op.cit.. Note that key contributors to this paper

were Goldstein, Thompson, and Starr.

99. Ibid.; p.23.
100. Ibid.; p.24. The cases used to make this argument are summarized on pp. 23-24.
101. Ibid.; p.73.
102. Ibid.; p.73. The basis for this argument is twofold. On the one hand, the wholesale importation of American programming by the cable companies was seen as having a negative effect on private commercial broadcasters in the province. On the other, cable company control of the drops provided them with the ability to offer "non-programing" services creating the potential for future competition with MTS.
103. Ibid.; These changes are suggested on p.74.
104. Ibid.; p.75. Note that these suggestions are followed, on pp.75-76, by a brief summary of the changes in policy required to facilitate the extension of broadcast and cable services in the province.
105. Government of Manitoba, "Presentation by the Hon. Ian Turnbull Minister Responsible for Communications to the Canadian Radio-Television Commission," Winnipeg, May 14, 1974.
106. Note that by May of 1974 the Communications Division had been reduced to two researchers; Thompson and Starr.
107. April 15, 1986 interview with the Hon. Ian Turnbull.
108. His original appointment is noted in Government of Manitoba, "Information Inventory to be Undertaken," (Winnipeg: Information Services Branch News Release, September 7, 1973). His appointment as Assistant Deputy Minister is outlined in a February 7, 1975 Information Services Branch News Release titled "Doug Smith Named to Communications Post."
109. See Government of Manitoba, Program Encyclopedia: Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, (Winnipeg, Queen's Printer, March 1977) pp.19-20 for an overview of the "Program Objectives" and "Activities" of the Branch. Note that Starr and Thompson were the only researchers in what was to remain a two person Branch.
110. February 27, 1986 interview with Richard Starr.
111. An Act to amend The Manitoba Telephone Act and to Authorize The Expenditure of Moneys for Capital Purposes of The Manitoba Telephone System and Authorize the Borrowing of the Same, Statutes of Manitoba, 1975 Chapter 26. Note this Bill received Royal Assent on June 19, 1975.
112. Ibid.; Section 1 (c.1).
113. Ibid.; Section 2 (1).
114. Manitoba Telephone System, Annual Report 1975-76, p.13.
115. Ibid.; p.13.

116. Government of Canada, Canadian Radio-Television Commission Policy Announcement on Cable Television, (Ottawa: Information Canada, February, 1975) (hereafter Grey Paper).
117. Woodward et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy, p.35. Their review of the contents of the Grey Paper is contained on pp.34-35.
118. Ibid.; A summary of this response is contained on pp.35-36.
119. Schultz, "Partners in a Game Without Masters," p.60. A review of the July Conference is also contained in Woodward et.al., Conflict Over Communications Policy, pp.36-37.
120. Ibid.; p.61.
121. This is contained on p.3 on an untitled and undated five page document which summarizes Manitoba's 1975-76 responses to federal communications proposals. In a February 27, 1986 interview Richard Starr confirmed that he was its author and that it was written in August of 1976.
122. Government of Manitoba, "Presentation by the Hon. Ian Turnbull Minister of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services to the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission," Winnipeg, May 3, 1976, p.2. Note that on April 1, 1976 the CRTC acquired jurisdiction over federally-regulated telecommunications carriers from the Canadian Transport Commission.
123. Government of Manitoba, "Turnbull Criticizes CRTC Cable Licence Decisions," (Information Services Branch News Release, September 17, 1976) p.2.
124. Ibid.; p.1.
125. In a September 1976 cabinet shuffle Turnbull moved to the Department of Education. The announcement of the Canada-Manitoba Agreement is contained in Government of Manitoba "Manitoba Signs Cable Pact With Ottawa," (Information Services Branch News Release, November 12, 1976).
126. Ibid.; p.1. For a more detailed overview of the agreement see Government of Manitoba, The Canada-Manitoba Agreement and the Future of Cable Communications in Manitoba, (Winnipeg: Department of Consumer, Corporate, and Internal Services, June, 1977). For the CRTC's perspective on the Agreement see Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, Annual Report 1976-77 (Ottawa, 1977) pp.10-11.
127. Ibid.; p.2.
128. See transcripts of the "Public Hearing of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission held at the Winnipeg Inn, Winnipeg, Manitoba," The Hearing was held June 7-9, 1977. Vol. 1 of the transcripts (June 7) contains the CCTA's

presentation on pp.4-62. It is followed by presentations by Greater Winnipeg Cablevision (p.64) and Winnipeg Videon Limited (p.127)

- 129. Ibid.; MTS's presentation begins on p.159.
- 130. Ibid.; p.127.
- 131. Manitoba Telephone System, People of Service, p.28.
- 132. Schultz, "Partners in a Game Without Masters," p.60.

CHAPTER V

- 1. September 12, 1985 interview with Ms. B.Barret, Assistant Provincial Secretary, Manitoba New Democratic Party. Note that other groups represented by delegates at the convention can also sponsor a resolution. These include Union locals and the Manitoba Young New Democrats (MYND).
- 2. Government of Manitoba, "Excerpt from a Submission by Hon. Al Mackling, Provincial Minister Responsible for Communications on the Subject of Cable Television and Extension of T.V. Services," presented to the 1972 Provincial Convention of the Manitoba New Democratic Party, December 16, 1972. On p.1 he notes that "We have before us at this convention a number of resolutions calling for a province-wide cable television system under public ownership; we must also take into account the decision of our provincial convention a year ago in favor of such a course of action.
- 3. Note that there are provisions for the presentation of an "emergency resolution" at the plenary level. However, Mackling's speech does not indicate that his resolution was presented in this context. Also it should once again be noted that in the NDP convention policy resolutions are not binding on the caucus and/or government.
- 4. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
- 5. February 27, 1986 interview with Charles Thompson.
- 6. In an April 22, 1986 interview with the Hon. Ian Turnbull the former Minister noted that the decision to transfer the government's computer centre to MTS was based on "logical administrative rationales" and not on party policies.
- 7. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
- 8. Hardin, Closed Circuits: The Sellout of Canadian Television, p.197.
- 9. Government of Manitoba, The Canada-Manitoba Agreement and the Future of Cable Communications in Manitoba, p.11.
- 10. April 15, 1986 interview with the Hon. Ian Turnbull.
- 11. Note that these goals are contained in the two Task Force studies made public by the government. Also

- note that the decision to selectively publish these studies provides an example of the government's "gatekeeper" role in the policy community.
12. Note that Government of Manitoba, The Canada-Manitoba Agreement and the Future of Cable Communications in Manitoba, offers a scenario on pp.4-5 which raises this possibility.
 13. A consistent theme in the Progressive Conservative party's opposition to the Schreyer administration was the government's "mismanagement" of public resources. For example, Peterson notes that one factor in the government's defeat in 1977 was "its disconcerting record of financial losses, particularly in ill-fated public enterprises." See Thomas Peterson, "Manitoba: Ethnic and Class Politics," in Canadian Provincial Politics, Martin Robin ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p.105.
 14. April 15, 1986 and April 22, 1986 interview with the Hon. Ian Turnbull.
 15. Throughout its term of office the government had the option of expanding the MTS Commission to seven persons and could have separated the Chairman's position from that of the General Manager at any point. That it did not choose to do so at the time of Holland's appointment, which would have been a good opportunity, is evidence of its lack of interest in altering MTS's institutional status quo.
 16. February 27, 1986 interview with Richard Starr.
 17. Brandon Sun, 31 August, 1977.
 18. Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, p.132.
 19. Pross, Quality and Public Policy, p.172.
 20. Ibid.; p.308.
 21. April 16, 1986 interview with Kenneth Goldstein.
 22. That total public ownership was not considered was confirmed in a March 6, 1986 interview with Mr. J.H. Chipperfield who noted that legal precedent, notably the 1965 Victoria Cablevision Ltd. case, and management's position that cable television "was not a part of MTS's mandate" played a role. As for the reasons why a firm position on a full lease agreement was not taken, Mr. Chipperfield indicated that the fact that partial agreements were the norm in eastern Canada played a role.
 23. Government of Manitoba, Guidelines for the Seventies: Introduction and Economic Analysis (Vol.1), p.135
 24. April 23, 1986 interview with Charles Thompson.
 25. For example Schultz notes that the Canada-Manitoba Agreement was important on the national level because "this agreement became a precedent in as much as shortly after, the federal Minister of Communications offered the provinces, at the 1978 conference in Charlottetown, a compromise agreement wherein, in part, for provincial acceptance of federal

jurisdiction over pay TV the federal government would transfer some of its responsibilities over cable television." See Richard Schultz, Delegation and Cable Distribution Systems: A Negative Assessment (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1981), p.1.

26. See Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement: A Study of Policymaking (London: Chapman and Hall, 1965).
27. Pross, Duality and Public Policy, p.49.
28. Richard Schultz, "Regulation as Maginot Line: Confronting the Technological Revolution in Telecommunications," Canadian Public Administration Vol.26 No.2 (Summer 1983): 203-218.
29. In particular note that only limited attention was given to the role of pressure groups in the policy community. This is not to say that they were not important actors in the policy community. Rather, given the focus of telecommunications related interest groups on the federal level their impact cannot be determined without a complete analysis of the behavior of the federal policy community and the role of these groups in shaping policy outputs at that level.
30. Wilson, Canadian Public Policy and Administration, p.167.

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