

DRAWING INSIGHT INTO RESPONSIBILITY:
TOWARDS A CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PLANNING

A THESIS SUBMISSION TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING
FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE
UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

BY

PETER G. BURCH

IN PURSUIT OF A
MASTER'S DEGREE IN CITY PLANNING

APRIL 1987 ©

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-37367-9

DRAWING INSIGHT INTO RESPONSIBILITY:
TOWARDS A CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PLANNING

BY

PETER G. BURCH

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

© 1987

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA to lend or sell copies of this thesis, to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF	1
2.0 THE POVERTY OF PLANNING THEORY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF PLANNING	5
2.1 The Traditions and Criticisms of Physical Planning	11
2.2 Allocative Planning: Maximizing the Benefits of Resource Distribution	15
2.3 Rational-Comprehensive Planning: Decision-Making as Applied Science.	22
2.4 Planning as Instrumentalism: Promoting an Open-Ended Decision-Making Process.	30
2.5 Planning as Incrementalism: Sanctifying the Output of the Political Process	39
2.6 Planning as Advocacy: Encouraging Participation in Public Decision-Making	48
2.7 The Poverty of Planning Theory: Planning's "Process/Object" Dilemma Unresolved	55
3.0 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PLANNING.	63
3.1 What is a "Critical Understanding" of Planning?	63
3.2 Some Implications of a "Critical Understanding" of Planning	68
3.3 Some Applications of a "Critical Understanding" of Planning	75
4.0 REFERENCES	80

1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

Planning can be thought of as a process by which knowledge is linked to action in pursuit of selected goals. The bodies of theory which inform this process have frequently been categorized as substantive or procedural. Substantive theory provides models of social relationships, based on scientific methods of observation and analysis, to which planners can refer in their selection of goals and actions. Procedural theory provides models of planning inquiry, based on logical procedures of information gathering and analysis, from which planners can receive a selection of goals and actions. However neither body of theory serves as an adequate guide to the planning process, because neither recognizes the social and historical nature of its content. As such, their findings become standards to which reasonable planners should conform, rather than limited, temporary expressions of changing facts and values which are open to criticism and subject to reform. This latter perspective would flow from a critical understanding of planning, along with an active commitment to the goals of social equality and self-determination, pursued through planning analyses and actions.

This argument rests on six propositions, which this thesis intends to explain and defend. They are as follows:

1. "Planning is a rational activity." Planning represents an independent force for social change, intervening in the social process according to its own sense of reason. Planning is not a natural by-product of material circumstance, evolving according to the dictates

of some physical law. The form and content of its existence, at least to some degree, are its own responsibility, thus yielding the ever-present variation in planning thought and activity.

2. "Planning is not a technical activity." Owing to the independence of its subject matter, to say nothing of its complexity and dynamism, planning cannot provide positive knowledge of the causes and effects of social behavior. To claim that such knowledge is attainable is to ignore the existence of conscious choice in the unfolding of social affairs; social behavior, with its theoretical explanation, is perpetually subject to changing values and ideas. Thus technical expertise, associated with precise and objective decision-making, is an inapplicable characteristic of social decision-making. Such a claim disguises the true nature of planning knowledge, which is inherently imprecise and subjective.

3. "Planning is an ethical activity." Owing to its own essential independence, obviously akin to its subject matter, planning decisions are unavoidably ethical decisions, revolving around questions of value. Both planning and its subject matter represent--at least to some extent--expressions of personal and/or social value or need, rather than physical necessity. Necessity characterizes the relationships between purely physical phenomena, where there are rigid laws of behavior which cannot be circumvented. However it is a misleading and potentially coercive term when used to describe the relationships among people, which are open to critical examination and social change.

4. "Planning should recognize its social responsibility". Given

its rational nature--where actions are based on choice rather than necessity--planning should recognize its responsibility for existing social conditions, which must in part be based on planning decisions and activities. There can be no distinct lines drawn between planning and other forms of social activity--given the complex nature of social interaction--nor can there be any distinct boundaries beyond which planning activity may not cross--given the historical reality of its ever-changing policy agenda. Thus it remains for planning to recognize its responsibility for and to the whole in the assessment of its decisions and activities, in turn increasing its awareness of the need for social reform.

5. "Planning should operate in the interests of social reform."

Given a choice in decision and activity, planning should operate in the interests of social reform, as opposed to preserving the existing structure of social interrelationships. Those interrelationships have exhibited an historical tendency toward change, in turn engendering substantial differentiations in personal freedoms and social conditions. As such, planning should exploit its own opportunities to influence those differentiations, improving the standard of life for those less fortunate in circumstance. Planning has had a history of intervening within the social process, affecting the form and content of all manner of public works and private developments. It remains for planning to extend its focus of concern to the well-being of its entire public, recognizing its potential as an agent for social reform.

6. "Planning should reflect on its decisions and activities."

Planning must assume a critical stance toward all claims to social knowledge, including its own. No one theory or set of theories holds a monopoly on social truth, thus there is little reason to presume the worth of any particular policy stance. This in turn implies the need to increase the flow of information into the planning process, attempting to ensure that as many interests and ideas are represented in the analysis of policy as are possible. It also implies the need to evaluate all decisions after their implementation, in order to determine the degree to which they achieved their intended goals. Finally planning must also be aware of the trends in the overall share of social and economic resources--essentially determining the net costs and benefits of all public and private decisions and actions--thus providing an indication of the overall need for social reform.

This thesis will find support for these propositions in the literature of planning and social theory. The crux of this argument is that planning theory--as represented by substantive or procedural theory--constitutes an artificial representation of the planning process, ignoring the socio-historical nature of its decisions and activities. This thesis intends to promote an understanding of planning as such a social and historical phenomenon, but goes further in suggesting that it has some say in that social history, which should lead to its pursuit of social reform. As such, this may be described as a critical understanding of planning, incorporating the goals of social equality and self-determination.

2.0 THE POVERTY OF PLANNING THEORY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF PLANNING

Andreas Faludi, writing in his book entitled Planning Theory, suggests:

Theories provide explanations. Explanations are responses to states of tension resulting from observing unexpected events. They represent efforts to reduce surprise caused by such events by giving plausible accounts of how they have come about, accounts which must not contradict anything that the subject knows. The moving force behind the desire to reduce surprise is that there are always challenges and opportunities arising in our environment for which we wish to be prepared.

Plausible accounts may be used, not only for explaining events in the past and present, but also as a basis for controlling the future. Thus, human beings are capable, not only of explaining what is, but (within limits) also of making things happen to suit themselves. For instance, they are able to forestall the occurrence of some future event which they think will cause them tension. In the language of this book, equating a state of tension with a problem, human beings can solve, anticipate and forestall problems by invoking accounts of why events occur and then deriving ideas from these accounts of how to prevent problems from arising (1973, 1).

Faludi's dual conception of the nature of theory--serving as a vehicle to both explain and modify observed phenomena--is of obvious and vital importance in the field of planning. Planning involves not so much the explanation of events as the manipulation of those events to resolve social tensions or problems. In the strictest sense, it is the latter which serves as planning's *raison d'être*: planning would be irrelevant if it hadn't the intention (to say nothing of the ability) to alter social relations and achieve selected goals. Explanation in planning is useful only insofar as it provides a basis for action; it

defines the province of planning concern, identifying the nature of current tensions or problems which can then become potentially resolvable through remedial action. Thus it may be said that theory is never simply an explicative device for planners; there is always a normative dimension which demands of planning innovation in pursuit of social change.

Yet there is a curious tension between the explicative and normative dimensions of theory, a tension which Faludi largely ignores--or perhaps deliberately sidesteps. It may seem perfectly logical to suggest--as Faludi does--that explanations be linked to problem-solving. Explanations of the causes and effects of physical behavior--whether in biology, physics, chemistry, or any other branch of the natural sciences--have been and continue to be of great instrumental value to humankind, providing the means to many problem resolutions. The production of medicines, bridges, computers and the like are all concrete examples of the benefits of applied science. In such cases an understanding of the laws of natural behavior leads to control over them, not to the extent that these laws can be altered or rescinded but rather to the extent that they can be harnessed and manipulated to serve human purposes. Thus explanation is vital to the realization of certain normative pursuits.

However tensions do arise between explanation and human purpose when the scientific methods used for studying natural phenomena are applied to social phenomena, particularly in view of the legitimacy of any proposed "laws" of social behavior and the utility of the forms of control which they allow. Explanations of social phenomena--like

those of their natural counterparts--provide "plausible accounts of how they have come about", as Faludi suggests, thus enabling their manipulation and control. But social phenomena are not derived from inalterable laws of behavior which must be respected but by variable choices in behavior which are open to change. The utility of understanding the nature of "what is" in the social sciences--taken for granted in the natural sciences as a given means to the control of "problems"--is therefore dependent on the degree to which those social "laws" or rules of behavior are approved of or valued. Any form of control which results from such explanations necessarily involves the reproduction of those same choices and behaviors, for it is only through their repetition that predictable, positive results can be attained. But those results and that control are won at the expense of fundamental social change and those who place a value on it.

Fundamental social change on the other hand alters the equation from which social "laws" are derived, rendering previous explanations obsolete and irrelevant, at least for purposes of assured control. If social change is viewed as undesirable, then an understanding of the status quo enables its reproduction by design, thus preventing "problems" from arising. However if change is viewed as desirable, with social reality--and the explanation or "laws" which make sense of it--serving as a problem in itself, then that reality would have to be changed, giving up its explanation and the control which goes along with it. In such circumstances it appears necessary to induce rather than avoid surprises, contrary to Faludi's normative expectations. This sets up a conflict between human beings "controlling the future" and "making

things happen to suit themselves", between knowledge and understanding on the one hand and the freedom to act on the other; two aspects of planning activity which Faludi apparently finds mutually compatible.

This tension seems to underlie a split in planning theory itself, as its character is frequently conceived along two broad but separate lines. Faludi refers to the distinction, often drawn, between substantive theories in and procedural theories of planning. Substantive theory, according to Faludi, "helps planners to understand whatever their area of concern may be" (1973, 3). Procedural theory, on the other hand, "can be seen as planners understanding themselves and the ways in which they operate" (1973, 3). Galloway and Mahayni have perhaps a more succinct set of definitions, when they suggest that substantive theory "presents descriptive and predictive theories that address the structure and functioning of a city" (1977, 63), while procedural theory "presents the process of planning, including its ideology, values, purposes, and principles" (1977, 63). Substantive theory therefore emphasizes the merits of explanation in the conduct of planning activity, presumably using this information to further planning ends, however defined. On the other hand, procedural theory studies what those ends should be, recognizing planning as a rational exercise of decision-making which requires the exploration and evaluation of alternative planning norms. Thus the tension between explanation and purpose discussed above appears to have been converted into two distinct schools of planning thought.

As such, however, planning is presented with a problem. If this conception of planning theory is taken literally--substantive and

procedural theory being fully representative of the existing state of investigation into planning--then the social and planning processes have been observed as if segregated from each other, the substance and procedure of planning visually disconnected. Any explanations which result from such investigations must be causally disconnected as well; there can be no direct links established between planning activity and social change if they go deliberately unobserved. Therefore it could be said that this distinction in theory acts to deny planning's active participation in and manipulation of the urban process; it challenges the reality of planning's ongoing interventions into social affairs. Any theory based on such methods represents an artificial, perhaps unreasonable, understanding of planning activity; it isolates planning from the planned, theoretically leaving itself as a "rational" activity with no discernible social impact.

By continuing to distinguish between the procedure and substance of planning, the interrelationship between the planning and social processes will remain unexplored. This should be considered unsatisfactory. Such an explanation would be essential in the formulation of a normative theory of planning. Planning exists as a creation of the social process--brought to life and nurtured within the context of larger socio-economic developments--just as the social process is in some respects a creature of planning--otherwise planning initiatives would be purposeless, without any effect. They are bound together by the control they exercise over each other as working components within the same system. Therefore knowledge of the phenomena to be planned and the phenomenon of planning itself should be combined

in such a way as to provide an understanding of their mutual interaction and joint impact on society. This would further encourage the prevention of the social tensions which Faludi describes through an understanding of planning's relationship and contribution to the very problems it allegedly is designed to resolve. It would assist planning in deciphering its own responsibility for existing social conditions, thus establishing its own need for self-criticism and its own potential for progressive change.

However such a body of theory has not been acquired, and the two schools of planning thought remain isolated from each other, the social impact of planning undefined. Some attempts at synthesis have occurred but they have all been soundly rejected. They are all of some significance however because they form part of a progression of thought in planning, which has a various times encouraged theory-building from both sides of the substantive-explicative, procedural-normative question. Essentially planning theory has moved from a positive, substantive understanding of planning's impact on society--a philosophy embodied in the physical plan--to a relativistic, procedural understanding of planning's role within society--a philosophy embodied in the rational decision-making process. In attempting a new synthesis, it is important to review this evolution in planning theory, examining the pivotal ideas which have led to the current impasse. In order to break this impasse, it is important to understand the logic which has dictated that such a dualism should exist in the first place.

2.1 The Traditions and Criticisms of Physical Planning

Physical planning represents a traditional synthesis of procedural and substantive theoretical concerns. Planning is thought of here as a relatively simple activity, its impact strictly confined to matters involving the design and organization of physical space. Webber suggests that "city planning has traditionally perceived the city as a discrete physical entity whose signal traits are size, shape, and density" (1967, 645). Thus, as Webber continues:

Planning procedure revolves around sets of standards for the sizes, locations, capacities, and other physical dimensions of highways, school houses, water systems, library buildings, and the like. In turn, it relies upon long-range forecasts of demand (sometimes called 'requirements'), and upon professionals' judgements of desired future conditions. It results in the declaration of a design (or plan) for facilities that conforms to those standards and judgements and matches the expected loadings (1967, 651).

From this perspective, planning procedures are linked solely to changes in the physical environment, and only to those changes which would follow directly from their regulatory activities. Those activities, as alluded to by Webber, generally involve the design of new physical developments, developments which involve the common use of facilities and services--i.e., roads, schools, sewer and water--and therefore require some form of public supervision and coordination. Planning would consequently be appraised for those standards it set on these new physical improvements--the utility of those components of growth which most overtly and immediately represent or define urban development. Economic and social processes within the city would largely be disconnected from the operation of its plan; while a city may

manipulate some standards of its physical development--along with the immediate social and economic effects of the design upon its users--social and economic change would be thought of as operating mostly out of its mandate and control. On the contrary, as intimated by Webber, planning conforms to the dominant social and economic trends, adapting itself to their demands in the most efficient and aesthetic manner possible. Planning does not lead but follows social and economic change, along with the forces which lie behind them.

However this position has come under some criticism as being shortsighted, ignoring planning's potential for initiating activity in the interests of social reform. As Bailey comments:

Planning is a process of manipulating the physical environment. At its most liberal it may believe, as the whole debate on 'social planning' illustrates, that physical conditions have social co-ordinates and meanings which are important. But all too often the social significance of both the relevant pieces of the physical world and the nature of social relationships which use and are constrained by that world are regarded as out-of-bounds. There seems to be an underlying belief that if the world is not really made up of buildings and the space between them, then there is nothing which can be latched on to in order to engineer and reform that world (1975, 5-6).

There now appears to be a broad consensus of "liberal" opinion that the impact of the plan could be much broader and more profound than once thought. Harvey noted that any distinction drawn between spacial forms and social processes is simply artificial. For Harvey spacial forms should not be viewed as "inanimate objects within which the social process unfolds, but as things which contain social processes in the same manner that social processes are spacial" (1973, 10). Thus any manipulation of physical space is equally a manipulation of the social

process, forming another dimension along with height, width and depth. Davidoff commented that "the city planning profession's historic concern with the physical environment has warped its ability to see physical structures and land as servants to those that use them" (1965, 336). For Davidoff, the physical conditions within a city "take on value only when seen in terms of their social, economic, psychological, physiological or aesthetic effects upon different users (1965, 336). The authors of Winnipeg's original physical development plan cautioned that "any planning decision, to expand the community in a particular direction or to renew a part of the existing community, and to allocate or influence public or private resources to achieve this objective, is, in the last analysis, a decision with lasting social and economic effect" (Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, 1968, 3). For those who manipulate or in some other way influence the physical development of the city, it seems necessary not to underestimate or overlook the extent of these interrelationships.

These viewpoints have been reflected in some extended perspectives on and activities in physical planning. As Witzling writes:

The traditional meaning of physical planning focused upon the design and regulation of major public and private improvements. Now the widened scope of urban planning requires a more general interpretation of the content and purpose of physical planning. For example, when a planner works on a city's economic development policy, he or she may propose certain residential areas for revitalization. The selection of such revitalization areas is a form of physical planning that does not necessarily include any explicit design decision (i.e., no new streets, houses, or any other physical improvements are proposed). Similarly, a social services program might include both a description of the number and type of services to be provided and a physical plan for the distribution of those services. Other situations

involving "new" types of physical planning activities could include: deciding where a new airport should be located; developing the routes and schedules for a mass transit system; and establishing a historic preservation program (1979, 175-176).

"Economic development", "revitalization areas", "social services", "historic preservation" are all new terms in the physical planning vocabulary, terms which denote a new concern for the connections between physical and social development in the city. Thus Witzling is encouraged to redefine physical planning as "the determination of the spacial distribution of human actions and conditions to achieve predetermined goals" (1979, 176). This is a brave definition. Witzling is focusing on the effects of the physical distribution of various forms of activity on the general population and accepting the notion that there are greater needs to fulfill outside of those traditionally concerned with new physical developments and urban expansion. But in recognizing a plurality of differing needs in a developing city, to what degree can they be served through alterations in the physical distribution of activity? What is the extent of the interrelationship between physical design and social change? All of these "liberal" authors direct theory toward a fuller understanding of planning's physical, social, and economic impact on society. Planning actions, irrevocably connected to the physical development of cities through its plans and politics, will have changed the existing order of development, most obviously in a physical sense but most certainly in an economic and social sense as well. But which social changes would be specifically attributable to physical planning activity? And on the flip side of the explanatory aspect of theory, what then should be the normative

relationship between physical planning and social change?

2.2 Allocative Planning: Maximizing the Benefits of Resource

Distribution

At first glance, reaching any absolute conclusions concerning the full impact of planning regulations and activities would seem a difficult task. The nature of the effects of public policy--be it physical, economic or social in nature--can be anything but clear; its impact would vary according to the differing and changing natures of the people and organizations with which it comes into contact. The extent of those contacts can also be difficult to gauge; any initiative, given time, can reverberate throughout its policy environment, influencing either directly or indirectly the entire ongoing stream of social affairs. The social and economic effects of a physical plan would therefore be difficult to trace and substantiate, all the more so when confounded by other forms of social and political activity, whose effects run concurrently with those of the plan.

Allocative planning resolves this dilemma--the uncertainty surrounding the impact of what planners do--by proposing a more simplified, less ambiguous version of planning's social context, emphasizing the order which underlies the complexity. With a perception that society operates (or has the potential to operate) in an intelligible, logical manner, according to set rules of behavior, planning's own role and performance can be better understood and controlled. As such, the social process forms a determinate and salutary backdrop on which to plot the precise impact of planning

policy, its effects easily foreseen in the study of existing patterns of social relationships. The essence of those relationships is presumably that which is outlined in marginal economics, where the turbulent ebb and flow of social activity become the product of a coherent, efficient and equitable economic system (see, for example, Fusfeld, 1977, 83). Planning's role and performance are tied to its support for this system, its activities directed toward the "rationalization" of the economy's constituent parts. Accordingly, planning offers a consolidation of the economy, preserving its structure while manipulating its output. Thus planning policy can be clearly understood as promoting the public's best interests through its continuing support for the economic status quo.

More formally, allocative planning, according to Friedmann, is "concerned with actions that affect the distribution of limited resources among competing users" (1973, 243). Its purpose, he continues, is:

... to employ criteria capable of harmonizing the competing claims of potential resource users. The principle criterion is that of marginal efficiency, in which the social benefits accruing from the last dollar spent in any particular use must be equal to the social benefits in all potential uses (1973, 54).

This definition must be contrasted with that offered by Witzling for physical planning, describing it as a distributor of human actions and conditions. For Friedmann, allocative planning would be a more fundamental method for reaching decisions, subsuming physical planning within its economic framework. As such, planning would acquire a role in all decisions involving the expenditure of resources, not simply in the determination of the physical use of space. Physical planning in

this sense is viewed as just one dimension of an evolving economy, whose rules of marginal efficiency dictate the rational expenditure of both public and private funds.

Marginal efficiency, applied to public matters, is an apparent extension of an individual capability to render rational economic decisions, matching current needs and available resources to their material counterparts in the marketplace. Just as the individual, given a limited budget, must set a value on acquiring alternative types and quantities of goods and services in order to choose a preferred course of action, so might society. Thus planning can examine the expenditures of a civic government, for example, in order to determine what they have achieved and what they have the potential to achieve, given a different allocation of funds. All of this seems captured in the homily of acquiring best value for the money; it appears to be the only logical, rational route to take in making both individual and group decisions.

What then is the social equivalent to an individual's assessment of value? Surely there is a multitude of individual perceptions as to what equals the public good, if a public good can be identified at all? Perhaps it is impossible to reach a rational consensus on policy decisions when addressing a multitude of value propositions as to the best course of collective action? In allocative planning, this is not thought to be so. A compatibility of interests--a community welfare--is thought to underlie that conflux of decisions and activities which constitutes the social process: conflict is illusionary, disappearing in the wake of one common rational plan of action. As Friedmann writes:

The logic of allocative planning requires that the system over which resources are to be distributed

have a single set of comprehensive, system-wide objectives, so ordered that the more inclusive, overriding objectives are placed at the top and the more narrowly conceived instrumental ones at the bottom. This requirement has led planners to the notion of a general or public interest, reflecting a consensus on the society's relevant values. Since a full description of the public interest in this sense is hardly ever formulated by political decision-makers, planners themselves have had to attempt to identify and to order the relevant values. This, in turn, has prompted planners to assume a model of society in which a stable consensus on the relevant values is not only attainable but also predictable. They postulate a society in which enlightened citizens, acting on complete information, will maximize the welfare of the community of which they form a part. In a bird's-eye perspective of central planners, therefore, society appears harmoniously ordered; conflict and struggle are either absent or subordinated to the superior wisdom of a collective mind (i.e., a central planning agency) (1973, 53-54).

Given its existence, how is the notion of community welfare actually defined and what form does a rational plan take, based on this definition? Put simply, the definition flows from the techniques of marginal economic analysis, which yields a plan whose form is only marginally different from that of the society it is intended to serve. As such, community welfare constitutes that set of values and interests which are currently being expressed within the existing economy. In not seeking a more innovative or structural approach to social change, allocative planning confers a "protected" status on these interests and the activities they inspire, a status supposedly derived from their rational nature. Accordingly, they are seen as the end product of an economic process which is both efficient and equitable, a process which encourages the common pursuit of individual goals to the maximum extent possible. Individuals, having the freedom to seek personal gain, maximize their productivity--thus their ingenuity and effectiveness--in

the chase for wages and profits. The competition among producers of goods and labour--having to attract consumer and employer demand--secures their supply at the lowest price possible. Thus these competitive free markets--together with the social and political institutions which lend them support--serve as the means by which both personal fortune and community welfare can be attained, addressing needs according to demand while distributing rewards according to ability and effort. Under such circumstances, public decisions should not involve substantial alterations to the current economic structure in either its arrangements or its allocations. Rather "the superior wisdom of the collective mind" is revealed through analysis of the existing economy, and takes the form of a plan by which it is encouraged and protected.

The encouragement which is spoken of here occurs only when an optimal choice in expenditure is not being made, presumably through a lack of competent analysis or complete information concerning the reasonableness or latitude of existing choice. As social values and circumstances change, "the last dollar spent" on behalf of previous decisions and policies may be put to better use, capturing the full "potential" of the funds available. Planners can provide this sort of analysis and information, setting out a hierarchy of client needs and the entirety of economic means at their disposal. It only remains for the planner to promote the marginal adjustment of current levels of spending--whether in the private or public sectors of the economy--to better match those calculated ends to the given opportunities afforded by the economy. It follows that in this model of the planning process, there is little room, nor need, for fundamental social change; every

allocative decision is based on a model of the future which is only marginally different than that of today. Allocative planning accepts as sacrosanct the existing market economy, together with its rules for acceptable social and economic change. Its logic dictates the existence of a social and economic system which is both understandable and benevolent--it must be so if "rational" decisions are to be reached and the "public interest" is to be served.

There are two fundamental criticisms of allocative planning, criticisms which have served as the benchmark from which much of today's planning theory has sprung forth. Firstly, all of the above serves as an anathema to those who view the economy from a conflictual, rather than consensual perspective, with politics occurring prior to any conceptualization or performance of a "free-functioning" market economy. This argument finds existing market institutions as constraining, rather than encouraging, to many forms of social and economic activity, an arrangement which results in the inequitable growth and control of economic and social resources. If social and political problems ensue from these arrangements--bringing with them demands for planning intervention and social change--then attention must be focused on the institutions which are at the root of the economy's performance and problems, rather than on any marginal, quantitative changes in its existing pattern of resource allocation. It follows that social and economic inequalities are never to be accepted as institutionally necessary--residuals of an efficient and rational economic process--but are to be challenged as problems addressed through institutional, thus political, reform. Planning, as a marginal allocator of resources, is

not meeting this challenge, and is essentially operating on behalf of those political-economic interests which currently dominate society.

But can any political reforms be planned in the same manner as resources are distributed in allocative planning, that is according to a set of substantive rules or laws of behavior, but laws which would maximize social utility where allocative planning has failed? Any substantive theory of the planning process suggests that society conforms to a degree of regular behavior which is observable, measurable and confirmable, thus knowable. Many believe that the making of such a substantive classification is impossible due to society's inherent complexity and dynamism, creating enigmatic aspects of collective behavior which cannot be assumed away. The relationships which allocative planning observes and purports to understand are in a constant state of flux, social behavior forever being changed by the growth of new values, ideas and experiences. Therefore allocative planning--like any other model of the planning process--would inevitably misrepresent a social process which isn't subject to description or explanation. Its policy of marginal adjustment in the face of this rapidly changing social world is seen as a policy of too little and too late. Planning can be and must be always prepared to respond in novel ways to an evolving social process which defies substantive classification.

This latter criticism is actually an attack on much more than the allocative model of planning itself. Allocative planning is simply one example of a planning model which presumably makes its recommendations based on an ability to render rational and comprehensive explanations

and decisions. This ability in turn rests on a substantive knowledge base which offers an absolute understanding of the social and planning processes, enough to dictate one best planning response to the social tensions or problems it encounters, closing the opportunity for policy choice around one best alternative for maximum performance. On such a knowledge base rest all claims to planning's technical expertise, whether in physical design, resource allocation, or any other form of planning activity. Its acquisition is the hope of the "rational-comprehensive" school of planning, encompassing a process which represents the means to the substantive knowledge of planning discussed above.

2.3 Rational-Comprehensive Planning: Decision-Making as Applied Science

Barclay Hudson writes that rational-comprehensive or "synoptic" planning, as he also refers to it:

... has roughly four classical elements: (1) goal-setting, (2) identification of policy alternatives, (3) evaluation of means against ends, and (4) implementation of decisions. The process is not always undertaken in this sequence, and each stage permits multiple iterations, feedback loops, and elaboration of sub-processes....

Synoptic planning typically looks at problems from a systems viewpoint, using conceptual or mathematical models relating ends (objectives) to means (resources and constraints), with heavy reliance on numbers and quantitative analysis.

Despite its capacity for great methodological refinement and elaboration, the real power of the synoptic approach is its basic simplicity. The fundamental issues addressed--ends, means, tradeoffs, action-taking--enter into virtually any planning endeavor (1979, 388-389).

As he mentions, Hudson is actually outlining a process of decision-

making which is not unique to formal planning. At its most generic, planning is an activity whose *raison d'être* is the resolution of problems. In these efforts, it is the foremost intention to apply man's reason to action--to consciously organize and direct activity toward a predetermined goal--rather than abandoning action to the whims of fate. Thus in resolving problems, planning commits itself to a "rational" plan of action; and to the belief that man's reason will lead to desired change, achieved through his understanding and control. As such, "rational planning" is an intrinsic and universal human activity.

What then distinguishes "rational-comprehensive" planning from any other form of consciously designed activity? For Faludi, the distinction lies in planning's thoroughness. He writes:

The prescriptions of the rational planning process are that they must evaluate all alternative programs against all of the objectives pursued. The rational planning process is comprehensive (1973, 106).

Rational-comprehensive planning intends to leave nothing overlooked and nothing in doubt as to its recommendations and actions. Altshuler writes that "the 'ideal type' defender of comprehensive planning would contend that a serious effort should be made to plan in detail the future evolution of all important economic and social patterns" (1965, 302-303). Seemingly, in order for this to be possible, society must somehow conform to any and all of planning's demands, as if it were the sole determining factor in social change. Clearly this is neither the outlook nor the intention of rational-comprehensive planning, based as it is on the study of systems. Its comprehensibility flows from its knowledge of, rather than control over, these systems. As such, it intends to conform to society's demands, in terms of supporting the

activities--social, economic and political--by which it exists and is made to work. It follows that in rational-comprehensive planning, society is less open to change, being subject to definitive characterizations which limit its potential for choice in operation. It settles instead for an understanding of the laws according to which society has presumably grown and prospered. It is to these laws that comprehensive planners refer when questioned about the direction public policy should and must take. As Altshuler maintains, "to the extent, then, that comprehensive planning is possible, the correct law for a society is something to be discovered, rather than willed, by public officials" (1965, 303).

It follows in such an argument that rational-comprehensive planning leads to an objective, apolitical form of planning practice, based on access to the relevant body of substantive knowledge about the performance and potential of the social process. Hudson mentioned the use of mathematical models and quantitative analysis to reach such an understanding. Planning expertise should be based not so much on his powers of subjective reasoning as on his access to hard evidence and confirmed causal relationships. Planning relies heavily on science in this regard. As Friedmann and Hudson maintain, "rationalists have pushed their thinking beyond decision theory into policy science, a field of expert analysis where social technologies are applied to problems of strategic decision in the central guidance of social systems" (1974, 8). Thus there is intrinsic in the rational-comprehensive model a belief in the utility of science as both a source for social knowledge and expertise and a resolver of social

problems. The adherence to its process or methods should unfailingly provide the ideal substance of rational decision-making: objective, factual policy information. As Webber maintains:

The attractiveness of the idea of scientific planning has been hard to resist, for it held out the promise of right answers, of revealing what we should want, and of saying what we need to do. It seduces with the prospect of certainty, and thus with the prospect of relief from the discomforts of ambiguity and of having to decide things in the face of conflicting evidence and competing wants (1978, 152).

Unfortunately planning's subject matter is not easily reconciled with scientific study and understanding. Society operates as an extremely complex and dynamic organism; it is constantly evolving into an as yet indiscernable form. Its complexity is noted (somewhat poetically) by Chadwick, who suggests that "man is part of the ecology of the earth; a system of relationships between the earth, its atmosphere, its climates, its vegetation, and its inhabitants of all kinds, which is of great and beautiful complexity, and which is yet an everyday experience for all men" (1978, 2). These are not a static set of relationships. Society's growth and development are fed by changes in the social and physical environment, changes subject to the transformation of social norms, knowledge, activities, and the evolving state of the natural world. As Friedmann and Hudson suggest, "rapid shifts in social institutions, technological possibilities, valuation of objectives, and scientific conceptualization ... create a 'turbulent' environment for decision-making, denying the kind of stable framework necessary for collating relevant information, or making predictions about action consequences, or evaluating their effects" (1974, 8). These transformations do not occur in isolation from each other. They

are in an open state of interaction, there being no checks to their mutual impact over time and space except those artificially conceptually constructed. As noted by Webber:

Many of us have learned to think in the language of complex systemic networks, rather than in the linear one-to-one links within hierarchical structures we were told about in church and school. Inside complex systems, everything is indeed connected to everything else, such that actions taken anywhere reverberate throughout the whole system to affect changes in seemingly far-removed sectors (1978, 155).

Therefore it is apparent that due to its complex and dynamic character, society does not fully lend itself to understanding or predictability, thus to the establishment of some form of social law and control. The notion of comprehensiveness faces a severe challenge. Friedmann comments, with respect to the social context of urban planning:

Metropolitan society is overwhelmed by change, so that many of the keenest minds in the behavioral sciences, whose business it is to explain the fundamental laws of human behavior and organization, have to fall back upon a superior kind of instant journalism. Somewhere underneath the surface there may be laws that are "immutable", but the visible phenomena are so rapidly changing that the laws which presumably govern them become practically inaccessible to scientific means of exploration. The general thus gives way to the particular, ideographic replaces nomothetic science. Under conditions of accelerated change, the past is no longer a reliable guide to a future which must increasingly be improvised (1971, 319).

Science is in essence a process of discovery, a method of investigation which has met with a great deal of success in the analysis and understanding of physical phenomena. Mannheim refers to the sciences as "exact modes of knowing" (1936, 1). Faludi describes these scientific "modes" or "methods" as:

... set[s] of procedural requirements which propositions must meet in order to pass as scientifically valid. By imposing stringent requirements, scientific method forces the scientist to be explicit, to submit all his considerations to public scrutiny, thereby facilitating their testing. In doing so, science contributes to the solution of particular problems [and] it results in a general growth of knowledge ... (1973, 51).

Thus rigorous standards of observation and experimentation are applied to hypothetical claims to knowledge. Rather than accepting these claims at face value, science demands the testing and retesting of these theories using identical procedures under identical conditions in order to disprove or "null" their authenticity. The ultimate hope of science, however, is to gain empirical evidence for the substantiation of hypotheses, to discover those regularities in physical behavior that may be written into laws and used to predict events. In this it has largely succeeded. All branches of the physical sciences have yielded discoveries of truths as they pertain to physical phenomena. The knowledge thus gained has been applied to problems in the real world, permitting many improvements in technology, along with their subsequent economic and social benefits. This is the strength of science as a method of inquiry. It has been used to practical advantage to gain a measure of control over some important aspects of social life. It is a strength social science had hoped to emulate.

On the other hand, science requires rigid experimental methods with a set and controllable number of variables to achieve its most certain results. The farther away from laboratory-like conditions, the greater the risk of confounded results. Analysis of phenomena is made more difficult because conditions are more complex and are uncontrolled; an

increasing number of experimental variables are subject to unmanipulated change from an increasing number of external influences. Under these conditions, even while relationships between variables may be sorted out and established in some instances, these relationships can be only temporary due to the unstable, changing environment in which they occur. Therefore influences of cause and effect are difficult to substantiate, and impossible to sustain. Away from a stable environment, the generation and testing of hypotheses requires the erection of artificial conceptual barriers which isolate "key" variables within conceptually bound fields of space and time. These barriers are erected by choice on the basis of value or ideology, there being no alternative means by which to conduct the investigation. This is the area of research in which social science, planning and evaluation find themselves, their work essentially value-laden, speculative and noncumulative owing to the open and changing social equation with which they must work. Science proves to be an uncertain witness to social change, and an uncertain method for arriving at social truth and knowledge. Therefore it becomes difficult to assign it much importance in the generation and evaluation of social policy.

As a result, planning finds itself presented with a difficult problem. Planning's claim to comprehensiveness has served to legitimize its function as a public decision-maker and resolver of social problems, setting it apart from supposedly less informed, more sectarian interests. Its expertise in determining the most appropriate social goals and the means to their achievement has set a place for the planning profession within the public bureaucracy. Presumably such expertise

rests on an objective, scientific understanding of the social process and planning's impact on that process. But if this understanding is not grounded in fact but in a particularly chosen fiction, if the basis of "knowledge" is subjective rather than scientific, then planning policy could no longer be considered as an explicit exercise of comprehensive choice. A redefinition of planning would become necessary, as would a reappraisal of the assumed utility of its policy decisions.

Could it therefore be said that planning involves the exercise of random or irrational choice, to the extent of its incapability in understanding the phenomena which it wishes to control? Alonso has written that "it does seem likely that history may continue to outpace our ability to grasp and deal with our urban problems, and that, like generals, city planners may be fated to fight the day's battles with the outworn ideas of their last war" (1967, 596). Perhaps the use of "outworn ideas" in resolving social tensions or conflicts is not unlike howling at the moon, if both their chances of success or failure are equally as great (or as remote)? This of course is a superficial appraisal of planning's capabilities, given its record of achievement in producing desired or intended changes in the social and physical environment. Social crises and planning responses have occurred and will continue to occur in history, whether or not there is a complete understanding of the problems. The key is not in the understanding but in the successful accomplishment of the task set before it. The overall impact of any such accomplishment is of course impossible to judge, given society's complexity and dynamism. However, for planners, this is a relatively unimportant aspect of their activity. Their intervention

is demanded and occurs in the here and now, as a necessary response to a problem or conflict situation. It thus becomes a necessary component of social growth and control, and its abandonment in the face of uncertainty would surely constitute an irrational response to ever-present social needs.

If planning cannot be comprehensive, then how should it perform its role in resolving these problems? What goals should it pursue and what means should it employ if there is no clear guidance in these matters? Whose values should prevail in the wake of such confusion, where a precise and objective policy analysis and response is impossible to calculate? The answer lies for most in the rejection of any forms of substantive knowledge and any reference to planning as a technical activity. It lies with a recognition of planning as a general process of decision-making, serving as an instrument for the practical accomplishment of goals rather than a source for substantive comprehensive plans.

2.4 Planning as Instrumentalism: Promoting an Open-Ended Decision-Making Process

Planning will take on another form to that offered by its "rational-comprehensive" school; a complete and objective expression of planning's relationship to the social process is impossible to conjure up and misleading to suggest. It will obviously be something less than this, a more temporary proposition which would unavoidably await its own refutation. As such, it would have a status similar to theory in the physical sciences, subject to testing and retesting in order to disprove

its proposed hypotheses. However, unlike science, there could be no expectation of uncovering underlying absolute truths or laws of behavior. Social analysis and understanding will always be weak; the turbulence in society always reflected in the diversity of social and planning thought and activity. Thus, at least for Webber:

... the trait distinguishing planning modes of thought from others is that persisting analysis and evaluation of alternative actions, alternative ends, alternative outcomes, alternative redistributions, and, in turn, alternative reactions to prior actions. In this context, planning is fundamentally a cognitive style, not a substantive field, not a specialized departmentalized function in an organization, not a set of technical knowledge, certainly not an ideologically derived set of substantive goals about housing, economic development, human welfare, or anything else. In its generic essence, it is a special way of thinking about pluralities of individual and group wants and a special approach to satisfying those variously competing wants (1978, 158).

According to Webber, planning loses sight of any specific social objective, necessarily so because of the impossibility of generating a body of substantive theory to explain planning's influence on the social process. With planning actions having no definite social impact, planning itself is left with no definitive social responsibility or public purpose. Rather that purpose shifts over to questions of procedure in making planning decisions, as opposed to questions dealing with their specific substantive outcomes. These procedural questions tend to center on the methods used to acquire and analyse the information on which planning decisions are based. Friedmann and Hudson note that rational decision-making constitutes "a set of methods designed to prepare information in such a way that decisions can be made more rationally" (1974, 8), apparently abandoning the goal of

identifying one best--or "most rational"-- policy response. As Davidoff and Reiner suggest in their "choice theory" of "nonarbitrary" planning:

We plan in a world of limited knowledge, a world in which facts are probabilistic and values debatable. Under such circumstances 'correct' decisions do not exist.... In such a situation, the goal for decision-making should be increasing the degree of assurance (of decision-makers and clients) that the choice made was at least as reasonable or more reasonable than any other alternative. This goal is best attained by bringing to bear on every decision the greatest amount of relevant information concerning the ramifications of all alternatives (1962, 110).

If one theory is never fully sufficient in the search for a direction to planning policy, then a host of theories and policy alternatives should be considered, each perspective representing--to a greater and less degree--a portion of the whole. It follows that one measure of a successful planning exercise would entail the number of policy options considered in its process of decision-making, counteracting any arbitrary limits placed on the search for problem solutions. In this sense, as suggested by Webber, planning becomes a metaphor for "thinking" or, perhaps more succinctly, "learning", in recognition of its theoretical limitations. Therefore planning in the first instance should be an open process of decision-making, delivering the widest possible range of thought and opinion. As Davidoff and Reiner further council, "even if the planner prefers a single alternative, a preference we believe he should assert as strongly as desired and permitted, he has the obligation to detail objectively and explicitly the meaning and implication of each alternative" (1962, 111). For Davidoff and Reiner, "objectivity" refers more to a practice of prolonged research and full disclosure rather than to the accuracy of

the research results.

Presupposing that this "objective and explicit" investigation takes place, what then becomes the next step in the planning process, and where will it eventually lead? Quite obviously a choice must be made among the vast array of alternatives unearthed by the research, closing around one preferred choice. What will be the nature of that choice and what will it accomplish? Of course both of these questions are felt to be unanswerable in any specific sense, owing to the enigmatic nature of the social and planning processes. But it is felt, quite logically, that the choice will be better made based on more information than less, becoming more reasonable as more of the implications of that decision are discussed, criticized, and further understood. Planning thus becomes an instrument to an indefinite social end, a learning process which could eventually lead planning down any number of roads in its pursuit of policy. Nevertheless this is a prospect for planning which, for many, holds a great deal of value.

Faludi offers his understanding of this "instrumentalist" view of planning, and contrasts it with what he terms the "realist" or scientific perspective:

... realists hold that a good theory provides a map of the world as it is and therefore prefer a deductive model of explanation based on laws. The instrumentalist view is that good theories are guides to successful action, no matter whether they represent the world accurately or not. But, of course, the more they do this, the better they guide action. Instrumentalism therefore gives no licence for disregarding empirical findings. It is only more sympathetic to man as an actor wishing to orient himself here and now than realism is (1973, 26-27).

Faludi supports the instrumentalist view of planning for a number of

reasons, some of which are touched on earlier. Firstly, time constraints severely limit the comprehensiveness of research carried out in public decision-making, it taking place in "a run-away world in which action is taken all the time, either with or without adequate intelligence" (1973, 27). Practical knowledge under such circumstances is a necessary substitute for a precise scientific understanding of an issue, political action a better response than further research. Secondly, had there been ample time available for research, the results would invariably be disappointing. Social science has yet to build an adequate theory to explain the workings of the social process, thus planning's place within that process. It will almost certainly have continuing difficulties in this regard, owing to the complexity and dynamism of its object, and the inherent biases contained within its subject--the scientist him or herself. Thirdly, faced with inadequate time and understanding of an issue, instrumentalism complements the way in which most human activity is directed--based as it is on uncertainty and imprecision--by offering an explicit rationale--as opposed to a random impulse--for action, which can later be subject to criticism and revision. Thus a body of theory may be built up over time regarding the practical results of this "experiment", without the logistical difficulties associated with formal science. Finally, instrumental planning offers a conceptual framework by which people who share planning's concerns can communicate with each other; empirical support or criticism of planning's policies and programs can be publicized, setting in motion a process of continuous conceptual and practical improvement: in short social learning.

Thus it is that rational planning rejects, at least temporarily, substantive theory, thereby distinguishing itself from those for whom it plans. Planners are unable to understand their overall influence on the social process, thus are unable to judge whether it is good, bad or indifferent. Rather planners must judge themselves simply on their record of achieving the goals which have been set for them, derived from an open process of information-gathering and decision-making. This emphasis placed on the procedure of planning seeks to compensate in some way for the unavoidable uncertainty and ignorance inherent in the planning task. It demands a process of continual analysis and reevaluation of planning hypotheses in order to improve on their limited correspondence with the real world. In so doing, it opens up the potential for problem-solving and self-determination through the control which comes with an increased practical understanding of the world. Therefore it is an inarguably appropriate normative model for planning, as far as this proposition goes. Procedural theory constitutes, at least for Faludi, "the view of planning as a rational process of thought and action which ultimately aims (as science does) at promoting human growth" (1973, 25), where:

... growth as process refers mainly to learning and creativity, defined as the gaining of insights into the existing order of things, and the transformation of that order into a new one. It is the process by which man creates himself ... (1973, 41).

By way of criticism, "rational decision-making"--as it is described above--provides little guidance in the actual exercise of policy choice. Firstly, it proposes an ideal framework for the gathering of information and the extension of the investigation, without providing guidelines to

the actual setting of research limits. Planning cannot possibly evaluate all potential alternatives for problem-solving and public action. Choices must be made immediately, reducing the universe of opinion to a manageable size, restricting the area of search to enable the process of policy analysis and selection to take place. Webber, and Davidoff and Reiner, offer planners a normative goal which cannot possibly be reached, and which must be reconciled with the practical limitations of research.

Secondly, a final decision must eventually be made concerning the direction that planning policy should take. Faludi advises planners to seek out the means to "successful" action, without setting down the purposes which those actions should serve. Clearly this directive could lead planning in any number of policy directions, from constructing social housing to building concentration camps for the inhabitants. If meeting the task is planning's sole normative guideline, then it is clearly at sea on any ethical questions which may pop up in its discussions and activities. However, Faludi's general advice would most probably lead back into physical and allocative planning, which have already established their "instrumental" worth in accomplishing the tasks set before them. Again this does not raise the question of whose sense of worth is associated with these "practical" successes. Because his analysis reaches no further, Faludi apparently presumes that instrumental planning--with its open-ended guidelines--promotes everyone's interests, to the exclusion of none. And this seems to be a difficult proposition to support, given the political environment in which planning takes place.

With regard to final policy selection, perhaps there is a logical next step in isolating a preferred choice. As this choice is never a matter of fact but always a question of value, then it seems to follow that planners should have some idea of which values they should embrace and whose interests they should serve. However, in rational decision-making, this is considered to be a needless exercise of introspection, and possibly an undemocratic one as well. If planners were encouraged to hold particular ethical stances on public issues--embracing for example social equality as its guiding principle--it would necessarily lead them to further define the conditions under which it could be achieved--for example equal housing, educational, and employment opportunities. Unfortunately, it remains an impossible task to generate the policies by which those goals and objectives could be absolutely, positively achieved, as this is the province of a discredited substantive theory. Planning decisions inevitably contain errors, whether in the short, middle or long-term; with no positive knowledge base on which to commit themselves, the adoption of a "planning ethic" becomes essentially meaningless, without a clear social correlate. In fact it is far more likely that the embrace of any planning philosophy with a positivistic approach to social problems would conversely stymie or delay the learning process, in essence substituting political ideology over social reality. Therefore it remains for planners to adopt no particular position as the object of their concerns, for fear of distorting the learning process.

There is also some question as to the role which planners should play within the political process, particularly with respect to their

choosing of the values which they intend to serve. Surely planners are not to impose their will on the public but rather the reverse, with the public having its values served through planning policy. No set of professionals should be empowered to dictate the nature of the public interest. Officials are elected to represent this interest, and if this isn't satisfactory--i.e., where representatives haven't a clear understanding of the public will as it pertains to an issue or issues--then the public's direct participation can be procured. It is therefore inappropriate and unnecessary for planners to concern themselves with their own set of values in dealing with public issues. The public have every right to determine the content and direction of planning policy on their own or through their representatives. Planning must be a populist rather than elitest institution, as befits society's democratic tradition.

Therefore it follows that planning should not deal with ethical questions in their search for policy, attempting to limit their choice of alternatives to those which are considered "good" as opposed to "bad". It has been suggested here that there are no "good" or "bad" policies, just "effective" or "ineffective" ones, depending on whether or not they achieved their chosen end. "Effective" policy will always be a function of social learning, changing as new and better methods of goal-achievement are made available through social research, experimentation and understanding. As such, planning's purpose must in part involve the removal of any obstacle to social learning. Yet such obstacles will inevitably stand in the way of any decision-making process, if for no other reason than the practical limitations placed on

the size of its field of research. As mentioned above, investigations can't go on forever, and, as befits this proposition, planning must find an alternative methodology which comfortably narrows the field of research to within reasonable limits. Alternatives of this kind have been suggested and they begin with an understanding of planning as being part of a political process, which in turn places certain practical or pragmatic demands on the planner. Given the limits of planning knowledge, this model behooves the planner to operate from precedent, paying homage to the democratic process of which it forms a part, while at the same time ensuring--as much as is possible--agreement on and passage through of planning's recommendations for political action.

2.5 Planning as Incrementalism: Sanctifying the Output of the Political Process

Incremental planning represents the application of "successive limited comparisons" to policy problems, which, according to Lindblom, involves "continually building out of the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees" (1959, 81). Its effect is the marginal advancement of social change, achieved through a process which takes policy precedent as the effective guideline for the selection of planning objectives and policies. The social value of incremental planning apparently lies within the status quo, whose interests are protected by this method of setting policy by reference to precedent, rather than by the pursuit of innovation or more radical change. However there is the presumption that incrementalism serves as the best possible response to policy problems, given the planner's lack of a

strong theoretical and political base from which to operate, and the assumed efficacy of existing social, economic and political institutions.

Lindblom illustrates this argument with reference to the hypothetical problem of creating a policy for the control of inflation. For Lindblom, if one was to follow the guidelines of the rational model, the planner would examine all "related values" to that of inflation control--including full employment, reasonable business profits and protection of savings--ideally ranking them in order of their social importance. This would of course require an extensive survey of the public in order to determine the quantity and quality of those alternative ends. Then all alternative policies and their outcomes would be examined in relation to their achievement of those ends, calculating the "value" tradeoffs which would be required when choosing one policy over another. This would demand a comprehensive examination of existing social and political theory in order to understand, as much as possible, the causal relationships between political activity and social change. Finally he would be able to select the policy alternative which produces the greatest amount of social value, according to its particular combination of value achievements.

Contrary to this prospective process of decision-making, Lindblom suggests:

An alternative line of attack would be to set as his principle objective, either explicitly or without conscious thought, the relatively simple goal of keeping prices level. This objective might be compromised or complicated by only a few other goals, such as full employment. He would in fact disregard most other social values as beyond his present interest, and he would for the moment not even

attempt to rank the few values that he regarded as immediately relevant. Were he pressed, he would quickly admit that he was ignoring many related values and many possible important consequences of his policies.

As a second step, he would outline those relatively few policy alternatives that occurred to him. He would then compare them. In comparing his limited number of alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, he would not ordinarily find a body of theory precise enough to carry him through a comparison of their respective consequences. Instead he would rely heavily on the record of past experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future (1959, 79).

Lindblom prefers this incremental method of decision-making for a number of reasons. Primarily he questions planning's ability and pronounced obligation to examine and rank all alternative ends, followed by all alternative means, during the course of rendering policy. With regard to ends, there are of course considerable difficulties in gathering a list of potential alternatives: public perceptions of social value and need are subject to considerable variation, which yields considerable variation in prescriptions for social change and public action. There are also problems in determining the applicability or, better yet, the inapplicability of those prescriptions to the policy question at hand: for example, a policy for the control of inflation could conceivably impact on virtually every aspect of social life, proving most any form of social goal relevant to that policy's evaluation. Thus there are enormous difficulties in quantifying clients' values and needs with respect to any issue, due to their variation and that policy's potential effect.

However, presupposing a representative list of alternative ends is assembled, there remain still further problems in determining their

rank, that is in drawing up a list of priorities which the policy in question must address. There are of course the inevitable conflicts between rival ends--and the individuals and groups which they represent--each demanding priority in terms of its implementation. A simple majority of support for one alternative over another should not necessarily rule the evaluation if intensity of support is to be considered relevant to the issue. So the question turns to rating that intensity in terms of its weight set against others. This demands some form of tangible indication of an alternative's relative worth: the sacrifices which would be made and the costs which would be born in order that one objective be chosen over another. Of course additional consideration must then be made of the individual's capacity for making sacrifices and bearing costs, which would involve the analysis of the conditions under which the individual lives and the resources which are at his or her disposal. It follows that a willingness to incur a large expense in support of a preferred alternative may have little to do with an intensity of feeling or need, and much more to do with a simple ability to pay. It also follows that the evaluator in question would have considerable difficulties in qualifying his or her list of prospective alternative ends.

But going further, presupposing that a reasonable method is employed in the assessment of expressed values and needs, it must also be added that policy questions will invariably relate to the marginal differences between them and not to their absolute exchange. Each policy alternative will commonly address a variety of similar needs and values but do so with differing strengths or emphases. For example,

public participation may be an integral part of all identified policy alternatives, though some may have made provision for more participation than others. In such a situation, it isn't enough to know that participation is a value to be pursued over some other in the selection of policy; planners must be made to respond to the question of how much participation is required in order to meet the need. A rational decision would therefore demand a calculation of the marginal utility of all identified objectives, in expectation of assessing the relative worth of alternative policies holding similar values but in differing amounts.

For Lindblom, accepting the tenets of rational decision-making involves accepting the need to fully complete the aggregations and comparisons of ends listed above, at least to the best of planning's ability; the identification of social needs should not be subject to any type of precondition. To proceed otherwise would unnecessarily straitjacket the rational process, where goals are meant to be served, rather than constrained, within a social world of indeterminate malleability. Lindblom however abandons these guidelines as being incalculable and impracticable. For him, this vast array of calculations on the relative merits of abstract concepts can have little relevance in the actual exercise of policy choice, if for no other reasons than they are impossible to compute without reference to the actual policy in question. The realities of public decision-making call on him to suggest:

The only practical way to disclose one's relevant marginal values even to oneself is to describe the policy one chooses to achieve them. Except roughly and vaguely, I know of no way to describe--or even to

understand--what my relative evaluations are for, say, freedom and security, speed and accuracy in government decisions, or low taxes and better schools than to describe my preferences among specific policy choices that might be made between the alternatives in each of the pairs (1959, 82).

Therefore, in Lindblom's model, the selection of social goals or objectives becomes dependent on the selection of alternative policies, there being no other practical way of reaching an understanding of ends except by reference to means. In his own words, "one simultaneously chooses a policy to attain certain objectives and chooses the objectives themselves" (1959, 82). Thus a seemingly impossible search for what constitutes "the public interest" is replaced by a survey of potential public actions and the marginal differences between them; any debate on abstract ideals is forcibly brought down to earth.

But what constitutes a "potential" public action under such circumstances? Surely this could also lead to endless delays in the decision-making process, the problem remaining equally complex and incalculable owing to the open opportunities for political activity and the uncertain nature of their consequences. For Lindblom there is a ready response to this dilemma, embodied in the process of incremental decision-making. As he maintains:

Making policy is at best a very rough process. Neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated error in predicting the consequences of policy moves. A wise policy-maker consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through a succession of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes in several ways.

In the first place, past sequences of policy steps have given him knowledge about the probable

consequences of further similar steps. Second, he need not attempt big jumps towards his goals that would require predictions beyond his or anyone else's knowledge, because he never expects his policy to be a final resolution of a problem. His decision is only one step, one that if successful can be followed by another. Third, he is in effect able to test his previous predictions as he moves on to each further step. Lastly, he often can remedy a past error fairly quickly--more quickly than if policy proceeded through more distinct steps widely spaced in time (1959, 86).

Thus incremental decision-making works within the boundaries of existing social knowledge, as illuminated by an historical understanding of past policies and their consequences. In so doing it attempts to incur a minimum level of social risk--i.e. disruption--in its interventions into the social system. If social change and social risk are therefore held to be synonymous, then there must be some merit to Lindblom's argument.

Additionally, however, there are some major political advantages to proceeding incrementally, advantages which would also be in keeping with "the popular will". Despite wishes to the contrary, public policy is always in part determined through a process of negotiation and consensus-building; as alluded to above, it is not a simple by-product of scientific research and rational thought. Agreement on the substance and direction of policy must somehow be forged among decision-makers before any actions can be taken on the public's behalf. There are obvious difficulties in finding a policy which would encompass all declared values or needs, yet it is only through such a policy that common agreement can be ensured. Without express limits to such open and unrealistic expectations, policy agreements may be extremely difficult to achieve.

Incrementalism circumvents this problem by clearly setting out the

grounds for compromise. As policies must be drafted on the basis of incremental change, there are considerably fewer policy options to consider, providing considerably less ground for political disagreement. There are also fewer political risks in proposing policies which are only marginally different from those of the status quo, thus the existing structure of political authority. Finally--and perhaps most importantly--as this authority is derived from democratic means, the pursuit of an incremental change in policy must essentially be in keeping with the "popular will", thus respecting the outcomes of previous electoral decisions and the policies which were the result. Lindblom suggests that "democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments" (1959, 84), essentially because political parties differ so little in their approaches to policy questions. As party behavior is "rooted in public attitudes" (1959, 85), it follows that incremental change serves the public interest in matters of public decision-making. Thus, in summary, by accepting the incremental model, planning should both gain political success--in the sense that its policy recommendations can be more readily agreed upon and implemented--and reduce social risks--by avoiding the use of innovative policies which have uncertain (perhaps dangerous?) social consequences.

Criticism of incremental planning was alluded to by Lindblom himself when he wrote that his model:

... is without a built-in safeguard for all relevant values, and it also may lead the decision-maker to overlook excellent policies for no other reason than they are not suggested by the chain of successive policy steps leading up to the present. Hence, it ought to be said that under this method .. policies

will continue to be as foolish as they are wise
(1959, 87-88).

This seems a daunting prospect for planned intervention into the social process, if such a method could be considered planning at all. Nevertheless Lindblom felt that his model was "certainly superior to a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness" (1959, 88), and, while theoretically lacking in content, the widespread unofficial method of policy formulation used by most administrators in practice. Lindblom's defence will offer little consolation to those who believe that his fatalistic attitude toward social change is entirely inaccurate, unnecessary and misleading. It is thought inaccurate because it accepts by default a view of society as an harmonious system of effective interrelationships, requiring little change, whereas simple observation reveals a society plagued by social and economic inequalities. It is thought unnecessary because society need not endure wide-spread social problems and inequalities as a mandatory aspect of its existence, if for no other reason than the greater social and political "risks" in policy-making which could be taken on their behalf. It is thought misleading because it supports positions of social and economic privilege through its pronounced fear of social change and its appeal to the common good. For critics of incrementalism, a greater choice of policies must be available, and a greater purpose in planning must be pursued.

As the rational model overemphasized planning's freedom from all forms of constraints--in terms of resources for research and potential for understanding--the incremental model may be characterized as a method which overemphasizes the lack of freedom in making policy decisions, and which totally acquiesces to prevailing social and

political reality. Therefore the process must be altered to allow for more open decision-making, decision-making which allows for the consideration of policies with more far-reaching effects, thus reforming the society in more fundamental ways. The planning process must be made to be more "rational"--responding to a wider range of social needs and objectives--and this could be accomplished through adjustments made to the political process, jointly increasing its number of participants and its potential for progressive social change.

2.6 Planning as Advocacy: Encouraging Participation in Public Decision-Making

Advocacy planning encourages increased participation in the planning process, promoting a practice which, according to Davidoff, "openly invites political and social values to be examined and debated" (1965, 331). The purpose of extending political debate is to seek fundamental social change, change which responds to conflicts surrounding questions of social justice. For Davidoff, these conflicts relate particularly to the prevailing allocation of social and economic resources. He writes that "the justice of the present social allocation of wealth, knowledge, skill, and other social goods is clearly in debate" (1965, 331). The extended debate encouraged by Davidoff is thought to lead to a positive change in these allocations. As additional opinions are made known and introduced into the political process, so might they change the collective political resolve to address conditions of social and economic disparity. Thus Davidoff's central proposition is that equal opportunity in political debate will

eventually lead to improvements in the social and economic condition of those that take part.

Davidoff builds this proposition out of an awareness of the political, as opposed to "rational", nature of all public decision-making. He finds that "determinations of what serves the public interest, in a society containing many diverse interest groups, are always of a highly contentious nature" (1965, 332). They remain contentious because of this diversity he speaks of is irreducible, each group vying for its own distinctive form of social, thus political, control. This process will see only one set of interests prevail once a final decision is reached, with the rest sharing the social and economic costs of losing the decision. Planning's prospects for determining "one best" policy response under such circumstances are therefore dismissed as illusionary. Davidoff maintains that "the right course of action is always a matter of choice, never of fact" (1965, 332). Thus the illusion of planning objectivity and rationality--associated with the myth of "maximizing" the "public's interest"--is replaced by an awareness of the political nature of its decision-making--the mostly arbitrary fight for social and economic power and privilege.

As such, planning is presented with a choice as to which particular set of interests it will support. With this comes an awareness that its traditional practice has yielded a single unitary plan, presumably encompassing--in one policy--the full range of interests involved in the decision-making process and, more importantly, all of those interests feeling the effects of the plan. For Davidoff, the logic of the "master" plan dictates entirely against the political realities of

decision-making, and obscures the ongoing need for an aggressive and comprehensive form of policy debate. As Davidoff observes:

If the social, economic, and political ramifications of a plan are contentious, then why is it those in opposition to the agency do not prepare one of their own? It is interesting to observe that 'rational' theories of planning have called for consideration of alternative courses of action by planning agencies. As a matter of rationality it has been argued that all of the alternative choices open as means to the ends sought be examined. But those, including myself, who have recommended agency consideration of alternatives have placed upon the agency planner the burden of inventing 'a few representative alternatives'. The agency planner has been given the duty of constructing a model of the political spectrum, and charged with sorting out what he conceives to be worthy alternatives. This duty has placed too great a burden on the agency planner, and has failed to provide for the formulation of alternatives by the interest groups who will eventually be affected by the completed plans (1965, 332).

Therefore it remains for planning to improve its comprehensiveness by extending public participation as far as is possible in its decision-making process. This should result in an increasing number of opposing plans and policies being placed under political consideration, thereby better reflecting society's pluralistic nature and democratic norms. For Davidoff, policy precedents and political traditions are not accepted as an expression of the popular will, as they are in incremental planning, but are subject to analysis and reform, in recognition of their controversial character.

However the planner doesn't fulfill his role by simply encouraging public participation. According to Davidoff, the planner can only ensure a proper exchange of views by actively engaging in the debate himself, as an advocate representing one of the interested parties. As

he suggests:

Where plural planning is practised, advocacy becomes the means of professional support for competing claims about how the community should develop. Pluralism in support of political contention describes the process; advocacy describes the role performed by the professional in the process. Where unitary planning prevails, advocacy is not of paramount importance, for there is little or no competition for the plan prepared by the public agency. The concept of advocacy as taken from legal practice implies the opposition of at least two contending viewpoints in an adversary proceeding.

The legal advocate must plead for his own and his client's sense of legal propriety or justice. The planner as advocate would plead for his own and his client's view of the good society. The advocate planner would be more than a provider of information, an analyst of current trends, a simulator of future conditions, and a detailer of means. In addition to carrying out these necessary parts of planning he would be a proponent of specific substantive solutions (1965, 333).

For Davidoff, social justice can be achieved as long as everyone participates equally in the process of planning for it. The planner as advocate plays perhaps the key role in this process, enabling all sides to communicate with each other and "the powers that be" on an effective basis, ensuring a "fair fight" over policy direction. However his role is not limited to simply advocating his client's position, pleading for its acceptance, whatever its faults, before the political "courts". The advocate must also serve as an educator, "informing other groups, including public agencies, of the conditions, problems, and outlook of the group he represents[s]" (1965, 332). He must also play the role of student, altering his and his client's position as its errors and biases are made known by the opposition. Davidoff suggests that such lessons provide a powerful incentive to the advocate because, "while painful to the planner whose bias is exposed (and no planner can be entirely free

of bias), the net effect of confrontation between advocates of alternative plans would be more and careful research" (1965, 333). Thus there are many demands placed on the advocate planner, but demands which, once met, should lead to stronger political representations of clients and stronger substantive solutions to problems.

However it must be remembered that any substantive solution--whatever its merits--is less important than the decision-making process of which it forms a part. There is the recognition in advocacy planning that any decision reached, whatever its merits, can at best represent only a partial solution to the perceived problem; something is always being overlooked and conditions inevitably change. Therefore the key component in advocacy planning is a rigorous political process. Planners are told they can no longer be passive witnesses to the ongoing political debate which surrounds them; they must choose the social values and conditions for which they can fight, or have them chosen for them--truly an irrational and irresponsible planning response. This will inevitably draw them into conflict with opposing interests and policies, and it is this conflict which Davidoff promotes as the essential source for social change and means to social progress. For Davidoff, proper decisions can be reached if they emerge from a fully comprehensive and vigorous debate, weighing the strengths and weaknesses of all the various arguments of the affected parties. Davidoff bases this proposition on his understanding of adversarial law, a method of decision-making which unveils "the truth" through a vigorous exchange of partisan information. As he suggests:

The idealized political process in a democracy serves the search for truth in much the same manner

as due process of law. Fair notice and hearings, production of supporting evidence, cross examination, reasoned decision are all means employed to arrive at relative truth: a just decision (1965, 333).

In sum then, Davidoff, unlike the others previously cited, explicitly recognizes the political dimension of planning activity, not in the passive sense of being an instrument of the popular will, but in the activist sense of being a reformer to that will. Planning's purpose is not simply to provide the means to accomplishing the government's declared ends out of respect for its popular democratic base. Rather planning must analyse and evaluate the political process itself to see if it lives up to its democratic ideals. Those ideals, at least for Davidoff, lend themselves to social progress through their encouragement of public participation in political debate, thus opening up a critical exchange of arguments and ideas. Planners must facilitates this by introducing more and better information into the process, encouraging a more precise and comprehensive analysis and evaluation of policy issues. Thus what Davidoff is advocating is essentially a rational decision-making process, for out of the conflict between advocates and their clients presumably emerges the voice of reason in public affairs.

Criticism of advocacy planning surrounds the premise that increased participation in the political process will lead to substantial social and economic change, particularly by way of the reforms which Davidoff had in mind. The belief that there are recognizable structural impediments to change built into the political process itself is dismissed, in preference to the belief that social justice will prevail as long as there is a vigorous and open exchange of information. Decisions are felt to be based on the veracity of ideas, not on the

powers that lie behind them or preside over them. Substantive theories of the political economy are therefore dismissed (or at least ignored), in favour of a procedural theory of rational decision-making. For Davidoff, there are apparently no clear and direct solutions to the problem of social inequality, offering instead an assurance that all rival solutions will be heard in political debate. For many this doesn't go far enough, disregarding what is already known of the social process, its material/structural base, and the positive relationship between politics and poverty. In this view, special interests will continue to dominate the debate and set the political agenda, advocacy planning serving as little more than a liberal myth which makes assurances of social progress while avoiding--through procedural means--the direct substantive measures necessary to bring it about.

Neither does Davidoff appreciate the difference between reenacting events as they occurred in the past--which is the forte of the adversarial system of justice--and projecting those events into the future--as the basis for public policy. The adversarial process may discover historical inaccuracies in its assessment of opposing viewpoints, but this is of little relevance when deciding what policy should and could usher society into the future. All of this centers on the question of what constitutes social truth. Davidoff maintains that vigorous debate will lead to better theory development and superior means by which to render judgements. This implies that while the current functional understanding of society and the planning process is weak and inadequate, it will somehow improve with continuing debate. Thus "the truth" as it pertains to planning matters will reveal itself

over time. This proposition serves as an anathema to those who believe that the current understanding of social phenomena is all that's possible, given its complexity and dynamism. Under such circumstances, decisions can only be relative to the limited and temporary perspective of the observer/actor--a perspective tied to a particular vantage point in space and time. Therefore a political decision described as reasonable or possessing a measure of "relative truth" is a generous characterization; it can at best be only an arbitrary--essentially irrational--response to social tensions, a product of political whimsy rather than understanding.

2.7 The Poverty of Planning Theory: Planning's "Process/Object"

Dilemma Unresolved

Advocacy planning represents one point along a continuum in planning theory, a temporary stopping point in the ongoing search for a suitable understanding of planning activity. Each of the planning models described above constitutes a different proposition about the relationship between the social and planning processes; they link concerted action to social change. Advocacy planning falls under the category of procedural theory--along with the rational and incremental decision-making models--because it removes all but the most generally defined social impacts from its prospectus, concentrating its gaze on the process by which it renders its decisions rather than on their actual substantive effects. On the other hand substantive theory--represented by the physical, allocative, and rational/comprehensive models--promises positive results from its

prescribed methods, offering a definitive object on which to apply its reforms, and tying specific social impacts to planning activities. Both of these general planning theories have come under attack, and with some justification. For on either side of the question the methods are inadequate, each possessing certain logical attributes which are undeniable, but not progressing far enough in capturing the essence of planning's nature.

First it may be profitable to defend once again against the charge that advocacy planning constitutes an irrational, arbitrary activity--a charge which could be levelled against the entire range of planning theories and activities. The charge represents a challenge to planning's potential for acquiring an understanding of its social impact, given the complex and ever-changing social environment in which it operates. This renders all planning efforts meaningless and misleading, the effects of its activities incalculable and uncontrollable, its lack of social knowledge translating into an inability to accomplish its goals.

In its defence, it should be noted that planning models are not simply descriptive or analytic, in the sense of establishing an understanding of planning's immediate (and perhaps perpetual?) character. They are also prescriptive, in the sense of recognizing social needs and conflicts, and acting upon them. They all therefore emphasize, to a greater and less degree, planning's capability for authoring some degree of social change, independent of its social circumstances. As Davidoff and Reiner comment:

A belief in the possibility of effective
planning rests on the assumption that man controls

his destiny: either by affecting the rate and direction of ongoing change or by initiating such motion. Planning is often relied on to achieve such control. Many of the reform features of city planning can be traced to a conviction that it is possible to improve man's conditions or to arrest decline (1966, 106).

Without such a possibility, planning is simply irrelevant, an idle spectator or reluctant contributor to changing events beyond its control. However this seems an unlikely prospect for planning, given its record of public intervention in the face of threatening social problems. Planning--as one of a number of successful political initiatives--has a history of goal selection and achievement; its efforts--be it in health regulation, service provision, development subsidization or building renovation--have clearly yielded substantive results which would not have otherwise occurred. As such, it seems difficult to concede that planning is an irrational activity. Rationality here can be held synonymous with intelligence, the intelligence associated with conscious as opposed to inanimate nature. It allows for the selection of goals and activities, even as the full repercussions of those selections may prove to be immeasurable. Inanimate nature does not have the luxury of an even limited choice in existence, with no prospect for making decisions or achieving goals, a form of behavior which is truly irrational.

Of course there is another sense of rationality which must also be considered and which is frequently mentioned in the planning literature. For Altshuler, this refers to the instrumental meaning of rationality, where, "once goals are know, means need only be conducive to their achievement: i.e., rational" (1965, 333). In this sense, rationality,

is held synonymous with knowledge, as opposed to simple intelligence; for planning it often symbolizes a certainty in understanding and an expertise in the resolution of social problems. The source for this technical expertise lies with the methods of observation and analysis associated with science, methods which have proven successful in understanding the laws of inanimate behavior. Planning must search out and acquire similar laws of social behavior, establishing the links between the causes planning employs and the effects they bring about. Planning must determine how the social process works and responds to treatment. Otherwise it will never become the problem resolver it was intended to be, and will never achieve the professional legitimacy of other similar disciplines in the field of applied science.

Unfortunately the object of planning's concern, like its subject, is animate; it is composed of those people and organizations who feel the effects of the plan, but who are also independent in terms of their reaction. Planners do not have a choice in action which is not afforded to those for whom it plans. Its independent behavior can be seen simply as an extension of human nature, where all activity--social, educational, vocational, political--has an element of choice, even if the options are sometimes severely limited. This independence introduces an element of novelty and unpredictability into the social process, thereby defying its intelligibility. Thus a fundamental paradox reveals itself in terms of the goal of rationality which has often been set for planning. The very nature of planning discredits the notion of its rationality because social independence precludes knowledge of and control over social behavior--at least in the

scientific sense of a precise and perpetual understanding of its causes and effects. The demand for political management of social problems and social change is set neatly against the need for a reliable body of social knowledge--the reality of either necessarily precludes the existence of the other.

Thus planning is left without a body of knowledge which can define its character and offer full meaning to its activities. As such, its efforts in resolving social problems actually constitute a form of conceptual compromise between the duality of social rationality and irrationality; they assume a middle ground between understanding and control, and social drift. Planning under such circumstances is often thought of as a rational decision-making process, an intellectual enterprise which does its best in problem-solving, given the inherent and inevitable weaknesses in its knowledge base. Its purpose can involve nothing more than the achievement of the goals it sets for itself or has set for it, without much consideration for where they may eventually lead: there can be little knowledge of the longer-term, larger-scale ramifications of planning actions. Presumably this is all of which planning is capable: managing social change in this limited, ad hoc manner. To be rational then is to work for the achievement of goals, however they're determined and whatever their implications, storing the record of their pursuit and achievement for future reference and purposes; as such, it can have no better metaphor than that of an active and inquiring mind.

This particular perception of the planning function shows up prominently in the literature of city planning, and is apparently

representative of the understanding of a great many practising planners. Rationality serves as a convenient understanding of planning because it removes any sense of self-doubt in assessing the utility and significance of its work, and concurrently obscures the potential for an even better understanding and control of the planning process, for whatever ends. Paris alludes to this:

The use of rationality as a guiding principle of planning is ... tautological: of course planning should be rational, what else could we have it be? That, however, tells us nothing specific about 'planning' as it exists as particular institutional or professional activities. Indeed it obscures what is specific about planning as an occupation, i.e. the very institutional contexts in which it operates, which vary considerably over time and between societies. Thus 'urban planning' is contemporary USA, 'town and country planning' under the Town and Country Act, 1947 in Britain, and early post-war Soviet economic planning have been quite different things. To presume otherwise is to operate a principle of universality to 'planning' which utterly disregards what actually happens; it is a static, technocratic and ahistorical view of social relations which cannot explain why particular forms of 'rational' planning exist under different conditions of social and economic organization (1982, 6).

For Paris, the concept of "rationality" itself is subject to a wide variety of interpretation in planning, interpretations which have substantive counterparts in the real world, an aspect of rational decision-making which runs contrary to the tenets of its classical model. Paris points out the divergence of planning activity which has occurred in different societies at different times. This is indicative of the connections that can be drawn between planning practices and policies and the existing state of the social process. Paris suggests:

To view planning theory as a separate, internally coherent set of procedural logics, operating in 'given situations' is thus to ignore

what is crucial for any real understanding of particular forms of planning, i.e. the inter-relationships over time between the development of such forms, the practice of 'planning' as a job or profession, and the significance of those forms and practices within particular societies. At best it is a cookbook of instructions for doing planning-as-a-job but at worst it could be a deliberate attempt to focus on the uncontroversial and the mundane at the expense of a critical understanding of the nature and significance of specific institutional forms (1982, 7).

A critical understanding of planning would represent a synthesis of procedural and substantive planning propositions. On the one hand, planning has been seen as the collective exercise of human intelligence, openly applying itself to social problems on behalf of social ideals, performing as an instrument of social progress. This proposition appears reasonable, given man's historic capacity for technical invention in the pursuit of social change. Under these circumstances, planning need only proceed in an unstructured fashion, accumulating knowledge as it acquires additional means of social control. On the other hand, planning has often been seen more as a product than as a producer of social change, a component part of an evolving social structure whose dictates it must inevitably follow. This also appears reasonable, given the scarcity of resources available to the planner--be they natural, intellectual, economic or political--and the restrictions they collectively place on planning's designs for the future. Planning's potential for changing both itself and the world around it must in some ways be a function of the environment in which it operates.

Two propositions, both reasonable, and planning placed squarely in the middle, as an adjudicator over the realm of social possibility. This is the situation in which planning finds itself, involved in a

dilemma of confused identity and responsibility. And the dilemma becomes all the more acute when the shortcomings of both perspectives become apparent. Planning cannot function strictly according to substantive theory--becoming a by-product of scientific, structural laws of social behavior--because this ignores the "rational choice" component in the existing social equation, thereby placing artificial limits on planning's potential to induce structural change. On the other hand, it can't function strictly according to procedural theory--becoming an open process of decision-making with limitless possibilities--because this ignores the structural obstacles to social change, in turn overlooking planning's own role in consolidating the status quo. Planning constitutes neither an entirely procedural nor substantive set of concerns, neither devoted to the abstract analysis of planning procedures and norms, nor to the scientific study of social causes and their effects. Somehow it involves both, a situation so far ignored by most of planning theory. Somehow a new understanding must be found which resolves this "process/object" dilemma, which allows for both more comprehensive and progressive decisions to be made. That would constitute a critical understanding of planning.

3.0 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PLANNING

Paris has recommended that planners acquire "a critical understanding of the nature and significance of specific institutional forms" (1982, 7), including that of planning. What does he mean by this, and how exactly would this "critical understanding" differ from that offered by planning's substantive and procedural theory? Furthermore, having acquired such an understanding, what are the implications for planning practice, in terms of transforming this "knowledge" into action? These are the questions which will be responded to in this conclusion to the thesis.

3.1 What Is a "Critical Understanding" of Planning?

As he alluded to above, Paris explains that:

Axiomatic to this approach is the view that particular social forms can only be comprehended through an analysis of their development through time and their relations to society as a whole. Thus the significance of town planning is not merely that it is a form of 'rational' behavior applied to urban development, but that it has developed in a particular socio-legal context, during a period of social and economic change, and has been part of a process of social transformation and class struggle. It has not been separate from other changes, rather it has been part of, reflected, and contributed to such change (1982, 7).

Paris finds planning--one among a number of social institutions--to be neither dependent nor independent of its social and historical circumstances. It is both a product and producer of social change. Paris chose to illustrate this point earlier with reference to the planning carried out in Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union at different points in their histories. While all may be considered

examples of "rational" planning--employing technical means to achieve selected goals--they differ dramatically in their real accomplishments. Why is this so? The simplest answer--one that Paris clearly rejects--is that it merely reflects their choice of ends and means, and the role of planning as an independent, "rational" agent for social change. The problems which require addressing, the needs which should be met, are subject to differing opinions, setting out what are considered to be reasonable grounds for social change. Planning can be and has been thought of as a vehicle to decipher those opinions through its communication with the public--or their representatives--which in turn leads to the development of a plan of action by which the public can be served. It is under such a set of general assumptions that planning is promoted as a "rational decision-making process", as Paris put it "a form of 'rational' behavior applied to urban development".

This is so vague an understanding of planning that it loses any sense of real meaning, while leaving in its wake an undeserved and misleading sense of legitimacy. The accomplishments of planning cannot simply be attributed to a collective exercise of intelligence or reason. It is too superficial an explanation, ignoring the actual process by which planning reaches its decisions, and the real factors which influence the exercise of reason in public affairs. Perhaps the most obvious influence is the nature of the political system in which such an exercise takes place. Paris spoke of planning as developing within "a particular socio-legal context", thus serving as a function of politics. Not all principles and opinions prove equally valid in the eyes of political authority. The means by which authority is gained and

exercised is crucial to this question of validity. The knowledge, expectations and interests of those who participate in the political decision-making process have the potential to be reflected in the ends and means of public policy. Those who are excluded have no means by which their views can be made known or accepted, unless identical to those of an active participant. Thus the opinions which are brought into effect are structured to a certain extent, reason being subject to the influence of politics and the institutions through which it is practised. This idea of politics playing a role in planning has achieved some currency in both "incremental decision-making" and "advocacy planning", though they differ on its actual characteristics (i.e. the degree to which politics has achieved or could achieve a public consensus). The planning situations in Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union would also reflect this consideration, in that clear distinctions exist between their respective political systems in terms of who may participate in public decision-making and what ideas may be entertained.

Additionally, there are the very real limits to social change which influence the exercise of reason in planning. Choice will always be mitigated by the opportunities afforded by material reality, tied to the existing physical, technological and intellectual capabilities of humankind. Paris spoke of planning as a reflection of its circumstances; this is the area where that reflection is the clearest, where there is no capacity for independent action. Perhaps the most obvious of these influences are the physical limitations to change, the fundamental, unimpeachable laws of nature which prescribe certain

elements of human behavior. For example, humankind must eventually encounter its own biological needs and physiological limitations when pursuing any plans for the future; reason is unavoidably bound to their influence. Marx wrote that "men must be in a position to live in order to 'make history'" (1970, 48). It is only through continued physical existence that any ideas or purposes can be entertained at all. And this in turn is tied to the existing state of technology, and the ideas and purposes on which it is based. The technical means by which humankind secures its existence say a great deal about the social and economic conditions in which it finds itself. Organized around such instruments, humankind performs within a structure which colours all of its other activities. It may remain a moot point about the form of organization, but the existing store of technical knowledge and practical capability must at some point be taken as a given. This consideration clearly reflects on the entire body of substantive theory, which sets down "realistic" guidelines to the exercise of reason in planning, based on the observation and analysis of existing activities and relationships. It would also play a role in the development of the various forms of "rational" planning noted above, which must yield to the real limits of choice present in their own particular situation.

Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, there are the more subtle--and all-pervading--influences of space and time over the exercise of reason, which seems to have escaped the notice of both substantive and procedural theory. Knowledge, expectations and interests are forged out of contact with the real world: they are influenced by what is experienced, what is taught, and what is learned.

These in turn reflect, at least to some degree, the social and historical circumstances in which they are located. As Mannheim explains:

Just as it would be incorrect to attempt to derive a language merely from observing a single individual, who speaks not a language of his own but rather that of his contemporaries and predecessors who have prepared the path for him, so it is incorrect to explain the totality of an outlook only with reference to its genesis in the mind of the individual. Only in a quite limited sense does the single individual create out of himself the mode of speech and thought we attribute to him. He speaks the language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. He finds at his disposal only certain words and their meanings. These not only determine to a large extent the avenues of approach to the surrounding world, but they also show at the same time from which angle and in which context of activity objects have hitherto been perceptible and accessible to the group or the individual (1936, 2-3).

For Mannheim, thought must be comprehended "in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation out of which individually differentiated thought only gradually emerges" (1936, 3). This is not dissimilar to Paris' approach to a critical understanding of planning, one of a number of institutions which "can only be comprehended through an analysis of their development through time and their relations to society as a whole" (1982, 7). The accomplishments of planning in Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, or for that matter in any other practising country, are in part a function of social history; there is no escaping its influence, regardless of social or political philosophy. Braudel wrote that "man lives from choice in the framework of his own experience, trapped in his former achievements for generations on end" (1979, 56). This is both an explanatory and cautionary note which is of

importance to both planning and the public it represents. Braudel, along with Mannheim and Paris, remind planners of the limited and temporary nature of their activities and the ideas on which they are based; planning cannot be a vehicle to independent, objective decision-making, standing above politics and self-interest. This provides a new perspective on the nature of "rational" planning, which--at least for the purposes of this thesis--constitutes a first step in the development of a critical understanding of planning.

3.2 Some Implications of a "Critical Understanding" of Planning

Paris, among others, has provided an alternative way of understanding the social process, and planning's role within that process. It is a process based on human activity fuelled by reason, but reason mitigated by real circumstance, most importantly by social history. But how should this knowledge of the social and historical nature of planning change its approach to decision-making? Initially, it should lead planning toward a heightened sense of responsibility for the conditions in which it finds itself. Clearly social change isn't governed by forces outside of the control of humankind, outside of the bounds of reason; planning is essentially a product of social rather than natural history. As such, social conditions are not born of necessity--to be endured as manifestations of some natural or "God-given" law--but of the values, ideas, activities and relationships which characterize society at any given place in time. Those values, ideas, activities and relationships have been informed and/or supported by planning analyses and activities, and therefore planning itself must

bear some responsibility for the state of society in which it is practised.

However, it must be added that this responsibility is obscured by the content of planning's substantive and procedural theory, where the study of social activities and relationships is distinguished from the study of planning values and ideas. Examined separately, there are no clear connections drawn between the planner and the planned, providing no indication of planning's social impact. Thus while reason is recognized as a force for social change--a force which planning employs presumably for the public's benefit--planning theory does not reveal the conditions for which that exercise of reason is responsible. This is justified on the basis that there can be no clear connections drawn between planning actions and their effects, connections which are impossible to trace given the complex and dynamic nature of the social process. However, while this is true, it fails to recognize planning's overall responsibility for the development of society as a whole. As such, while there can be no clear connections drawn between planning and any other facet of social change, there are also no distinct lines which can be drawn between them. More importantly, and less abstractly, there are also no distinct boundaries beyond which planning activity may not cross, as indicated by its ever-expanding role in the physical, social and economic development of society. Thus it remains for planning to recognize its responsibility for and to the whole in its assessment of its social impact, a responsibility born either directly through its own activities, or indirectly through its potential to initiate or encourage social change.

* Social history provides planning with an extended understanding of its own role within and responsibility for the social process. But why is it described as a critical understanding of planning? This stems from the recognition of reality as the product of human activity--at least to some degree--which therefore makes it subject to criticism and reform. If humankind is the producer of its own historical way of life, then, if this proves unsatisfactory, humankind has the opportunity to change it. This potential for reform has been clearly expressed in history, where changing approaches to social, economic, and political behavior have led to differing quantities and qualities of life. It has not been clearly expressed in either substantive or procedural theory, where passive observances of existing behavior or blind elicitation of current opinion work to conceal the possibility that all may--or perhaps should--change. Such support for the claims of scientific, rational decision-making can easily be translated into an affirmation of the status quo--noting the relationship between choice and experience discussed above--especially when used as the basis for planning action. Thus, for example, decisions based on the work of advocacy planners--drawing people and their opinions into the decision-making process--or allocative planners--observing economic behavior and relationships--could amount to the same thing. Together they express both parts of the working whole, the choices--based on experience--which have led to particular forms of social and economic behavior. To affirm such behavior can in part be justified on the basis of necessity--in recognition of the real limits to change imposed on human behavior, as discussed above--but in other ways simply represents a predilection of

thought or reason, ignoring the potential for reform of existing behavior or opinions. It is just this potential which planning should take advantage of, exploring the realm of social possibility in the interests of social reform.

But all of this discussion has taken place in a very general sense. This opportunity for reform must be informed by actual need. What is planning's "real situation" or current "framework of experience", and how should it be changed? For Paris, planning takes place within a society dominated by private enterprise, with all of its social and economic implications. He suggests that, "town planning is a state activity, regulated by law, carried out by bureaucrats and private entrepreneurs in a relationship with elected politicians, in the context of continuing private accumulation of capital" (1982, 3). Planning coexists with the latter phenomena, which in turn links it to particular forms of social and economic cooperation, and to conflict. In a general sense, the absence of restraint in economic activity--realized for some in the accumulation of capital--has concurrently led to restricted economic opportunities for others--resulting in the presence of class struggle, as alluded to above by Paris. Of special significance to this struggle is the domination of labour by capital, a form of economic rule which exists alongside that of any political authority. This distinction in class has tended to form the cutting edge between distinct standards of living and personal freedom. Put simply, economic and social prospects have been better for those that own and/or control the means of production, worse for those who work under them. History has born witness to the realities of "free enterprise" and capitalist

endeavor, where material wealth and social privilege have always existed alongside extremes in poverty and social disadvantage. Of course, it has also witnessed variations in this pattern, where changes in political behavior have mitigated the worst effects of industrial capitalism, particularly in times of widespread disease, depression, or some other form of social or economic disaster.

It has within such circumstances that planning itself was born and nurtured, as a reaction to social and economic inequality and the conflicts they inspired. Benevolo has suggested that "the birth of town-planning did not coincide with the technical and economic movements which created and transformed the industrial town; it emerged later, when these changes began to be felt to their full extent and when they began to conflict, making some kind of corrective intervention inevitable" (1967, xi). Thus, for Benevolo, planning itself was held synonymous with social reform, inspired by two factors: "the economic and social changes which produced the inequalities of the first decades of the nineteenth century, and the changes in political theory and public opinion which meant that these disparities were not longer accepted as inevitable but were regarded as obstacles that could and should be removed" (1967, xi). As these changes were associated with the accumulation and development of private capital--the means by which goods and services are produced in order to return a profit--the *raison d'etre* of planning appears to be much the same today: to correct imbalances in an economic system which has for the most part been left along. Planning remains tied to the dynamics of capitalism, even while claiming its independence in the pursuit of "rational" planning

decisions. If reform is to be the object of such decisions, then its impact will ultimately be mitigated by the institutions of capital, as long as they remain in place. As Paris cautions, "it is only once we can demystify what appears to be a system of planning urban development, and understand the real limits on equitable imposed by the process of capitalist accumulation, that we can move forward to a genuinely humane and equitable system of urban and regional planning" (1982, 11).

What are those limits to economic reform? Is there a prescription which planning can provide for social equality? Unfortunately not, leaving its pursuit something of a mystery. As this thesis has gone to great lengths to explain, planning is not a scientific activity, providing positive answers to questions concerning the nature of the social process. This process is both complex--everything is connected to everything else--and dynamic--everything changes in relation to everything else. It is driven by individual and institutional choices which are influenced--but not determined--by outside forces, such as changes in economic policy. Thus the impact of economic reform is both unpredictable and uncontrollable, uncontained over time and space and confounded by other outside influences. It would touch on people's lives in unexpected ways, beyond any any narrow economic concerns which such reforms may have in mind. Thus, in recognizing the present connection between the institutions of capital--symbolized by private property and "free enterprise"--and economic and social disparities, there are no clear means by which they should be reformed or eliminated, and no form of expertise to clarify the problem.

With their removal--perhaps to be replaced by a system of public

control--society is still left with the problems of their administration--requiring an alternative hierarchy of command, operating under an alternative set of precepts. Those precepts and that command will be tied to an alternative set of interests, forged out of their own particular experiences, their own social history. They cannot be characterized as objective, independent or value-free. Thus they cannot represent every interest or purpose, which obviously presents some difficulties for a planning policy concerned with social equality. The subsequent impact of any changes brought about through these alternative arrangements--maintaining the institutions but changing their goals--in no way guarantees a beneficial and/or equitable social outcome. Thus the limits to economic reform--i.e. the degree to which disparities can be eliminated--remain to be seen or experienced.

As such fundamental to the pursuit of economic reform is the need for full participation in its analysis and evaluation. The consequences of any such action are indeterminable, yet they will be real enough for those who must eventually feel its impact. Thus planning--and in a general sense society--requires a mechanism by which the analysis and evaluation of policy is entrenched within the decision-making process. Planning cannot assume the existence of any technical expertise on these matters, and must assume a critical stance toward any claims of social knowledge, including its own. No one theory or set of theories holds a monopoly on social truth, thus there is little reason to presume the worth of any particular economic or social reform. It follows that the best source of information for the analysis and evaluation of reform, and the proper judge of any intended or implemented action, is the

public at large. It is only through their understanding of and agreement to reform that planning should proceed; it is they who must face the risks and bear the consequences of any public action. Thus perhaps more fundamental to the pursuit of equality in economic affairs is the right to self-determination, made possible through a means to initiate, reflect on and change decisions and actions which affect social and economic life. Planning shouldn't look to replace private capital with an alternative hierarchy of control, wielding power according to its own set of alternative demands. Rather planning should work to ensure that power itself is evenly distributed in society, over and above any narrow material or political concerns.

3.3 Some Applications of a "Critical Understanding" of Planning

Armed with a critical understanding, planning would recognize its responsibility for the social conditions in which it operates, its potential as a vehicle for the pursuit of social and economic reform, and its need to encourage reflection and self-determination in the exercise of reason in public affairs. But what does this mean for the actual practice of planning? Clearly reform and reflection have been part of the planning vocabulary for quite some time. To a greater and less degree, the procedural models of planning promote a decision-making process which is both orientated toward progressive change--in the sense of addressing individual and group wants--and continuous in its analysis and evaluation of decisions. Perhaps it only remains to continue the fight for more progressive policy decisions, through an even greater awareness of and responsibility for social needs? This has been

suggested by Eversley (1973) and Kiernan (1982) for example, who implore planners to recognize themselves as distributors of scarce resources, and to act accordingly. Thus planning can attempt to win reforms at the political level out of which it currently operates, biasing the distribution of the resources under its control in favor of those who need them most. By way of example, Kiernan suggests that more jobs could be assigned to special needs groups during the construction of public facilities, more facilities could be provided in low income areas devoid of private facilities, and more alternative housing units could be provided in any areas whose housing is slated for demolition. Overall, however, it must be recognized that planning by itself is simply a marginal actor within the economic framework in which it finds itself. Its efforts are not dissimilar in style to those produced in allocative planning, where the output of the economy is marginally adjusted to achieve some goal, leaving its structure essentially intact. And the winning of any reforms through this approach is by no means assured, it being dependent on the support of the local powers-that-be.

Progressive decisions, however, are not generated solely by planners. A second possibility for the pursuit of reform involves forging agreement at other political levels, for example at the federal and provincial levels of government. As such, the political economy is seen as responding to the need for change as more of the public becomes enlightened as to its potential for reform. Perhaps, by way of example, one could cite the development of political interest groups, such as those associated with poverty, women or labour, who have acquired rights and rewards which would otherwise have been denied them, had they not

organized and made their demands known. Certainly history indicates a number of important reforms which have been introduced into society through the political process, including that of planning itself. Pursuing politics at higher levels has its obvious advantages, in the sense that many of the issues dealt with have far-reaching effects which require political jurisdiction over a much greater area in order to achieve some level of control; however this comes with its disadvantages in the sense that such jurisdictions require much higher levels of popular support in order to win any reforms. This option of course is not dissimilar to that of advocacy planning, where social justice presumably emerges out of an extensive public debate, provided of course that common (or at least majority) agreement is reached on the relevant issue. It only remains for planning to declare its own interests in social reform, which in turn demands an alliance with those groups who also have reform as their foremost goal.

However, there is a fundamental problem with the approaches to planning responsibility, reform and reflection listed above. Both continue to place their faith in existing political institutions to serve the interests of social equality and self-determination, presumably through the practice of a higher sense of reason, incorporating more progressive policies and programs. Thus they recognize no problem with the institutions themselves that a change in goals can't correct. However such a proposition cannot be reconciled with the limits to reason outlined above, particularly with respect to social history. As such, inherent in the pursuit of any form of reason is subjectivity and self-interest; there are no universal definitions

of truth nor prescriptions of justice embodied in any planning or political philosophy. With no foresight or independence, the institutions which make "rational" decisions on behalf of the public are inherently coercive, subjecting them to a plan for the future which is imprecise at best, and deliberately self-serving at worst. Thus, while progressive decisions have and can be made through politics--of which history supplies ample evidence--the goals of social equality and self-determination will forever be denied--as history also indicates. Institutionalized reason is inherently coercive, perhaps treating the symptoms of social and economic disparity but never addressing the cure, a cure which lies in part with its own dismemberment.

Thus another alternative approach to the pursuit of social and economic reform involves operating from outside the existing political economy, relying on one's own resources and skills--and preferably those of a like-minded community--to achieve social and economic goals. As such, a degree of economic and political self-determination is achieved, fulfilling a role in a more responsive, smaller democracy. Planning can play a role in encouraging or supporting such cooperative organizations, through the provision of the skills and resources it has at its disposal. But it must be kept in mind that the very existence of planning, with its "rational" schemes and pretensions of reform, works to counter those efforts. The variations in "rational" planning noted earlier by Paris carry with them a significance which goes far beyond a simple awareness that some forms of planning are more successful than others, perhaps encouraging planners to experiment with alternative ends and means of reform. More importantly, they offer evidence that the

pursuit of reform through planning has had very limited success, even when approached with the best of intentions. Perhaps it is time that planners stopped looking for alternative answers to questions of reform and reflection, social equality and self-determination, and began to look critically at themselves, as an institution which has consistently failed to deliver the goods. With "rationality" exposed as a false hope, why continue to plan?

REFERENCES

- Alexander, Ernest. "After Rationality, What?". Journal of the American Planning Association (JAPA) 50 (Winter 1984).
- _____. "Planning Theory". In Anthony J. Catanese and James C. Snyder, eds. Introduction to Urban Planning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- _____. "Policy Analysis". In Anthony J. Catanese and James C. Snyder, eds. Introduction to Urban Planning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Alonso, William. "Planning as a Profession". In H. Wentworth Eldredge, ed. Taming Megalopolis, vol. 2: How to Manage an Urbanized World. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Banfield, Edward C. "Supplement: Note on Conceptual Scheme" in Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield. Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1955.
- Benevolo, L. The Origins of Modern Town Planning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971.
- Bernstein, R.J. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jananovich, 1976.
- Bookchin, Murray. The Limits of the City. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1974.
- Braudel, Fernand. The Structures of Everyday Life. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.
- Catanese, A.J. "History and Trends of Urban Planning". In Anthony J. Catanese and James C. Snyder, eds. Introduction to Urban Planning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Chadwick, George. A Systems View of Planning, 2nd ed. Oxford: Pergamon, 1973.
- Davidoff, Paul. "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning". JAIP 31 (November 1965).
- Davidoff, Paul and Reiner, Thomas A. "A Choice Theory of Planning". JAIP 28 (May 1962).
- Eversely, David. The Planner in Society. London: Faber and Faber, 1973.

- Faludi, Andreas. Planning Theory. Oxford: Pergamon, 1973.
- Fusfeld, Daniel R. The Age of the Economist. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1977.
- Friedmann, John. "The Future of Comprehensive Urban Planning: A Critique". Public Administration Review (no. 3 1971).
- _____. "Planning as a Vocation". Plan Canada 6 (no. 3 1966).
- _____. Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning. Anchor Books: Garden City, New York, 1973.
- Friedmann, John and Hudson, Barclay. "Knowledge and Action: A Guide to Planning Theory". JAIP 40 (January 1974).
- Galloway, Thomas D. and Mahayni, Riad G. "Planning Theory in Retrospect: The Process of Paradigm Change". JAIP 43 (January 1977).
- Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interest. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
- _____. Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- Hampden-Turner, Charles. Radical Man. London: Duckworth, 1971.
- Harvey, David. Social Justice and the City. Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Hoos, Ida R. Systems Analysis in Public Policy. Berkely: University of California Press, 1972.
- Horkheimer, Max. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Continuum, 1972.
- Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage Books, 1961.
- Jay, Martin. The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973.
- Kiernan, Matthew. "Ideology and the Precarious Future of the Canadian Planning Profession". Plan Canada 22 (March 1982).
- Klosterman, Richard E. "Fact and Value in Planning". JAIP 49 (Spring 1982).
- Kitcher, Philip. Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.

- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Lichfield, Nathaniel, Kettle, Peter and Whitbread, Michael. Evaluation in the Planning Process. Oxford: Pergamon, 1973.
- Long, Norman. "Planning and Politics in Urban Development". JAIP 25 (no. 6 1959).
- Lowry, Ira S. "A Short Course in Model Design". Journal of the American Institute of Planners (JAIP) 31 (May 1965).
- Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harvest Books, 1936.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers, 1970.
- Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg - Planning Division. The Metropolitan Development Plan, 1968.
- Miller, George A., Galanter, Eugene, and Pribram, Karl H. Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York: Holt, 1960.
- Mumford, Lewis. The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects. New York: Harbinger Books, 1961.
- Paris, Chris, ed. Critical Readings in Planning Theory. Oxford: * Pergamon, 1982.
- Paris, David C. and Reynolds, James F. The Logic of Policy Inquiry. New York: Longman, 1983.
- Patton, Carl. Review of "Five Titles on Policy Analysis". Journal of Planning Education and Research (JPER) 2 (Winter 1983).
- Rein, Martin. Social Science and Public Policy. Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books, 1976.
- Saunders, Peter. Social Theory and the Urban Question. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981.
- Smith, Michael P. The City and Social Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
- Webber, Melvin M. "A Difference Paradigm for Planning". In Robert W. Burchell and George Sternlieb, eds. Planning Theory in the 1980's. * New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1978.

- _____. "The Roles of Intelligence Systems in Urban Systems Planning". In H. Wentworth Eldredge, ed. Taming Megalopolis, vol. 2: How to Manage an Urbanized World. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Wirth, Louis. "Preface to Ideology and Utopia". In Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harvest Books, 1936.
- Witzling, Larry. "Physical Planning". In Anthony J. Catanese and James C. Snyder, eds. Introduction to Urban Planning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. "If Planning is Everything, Maybe it's Nothing" in Policy Sciences 4, 1973.