

Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity

by

Frank M. Secky

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba

© February, 2000



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-51796-9

Canada

**THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE**

Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity

BY

Frank M. Secky

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree
of
Master of Arts**

FRANK M. SECKY ©2000

Permission has been granted to the Library of The University of Manitoba to lend or sell copies of this thesis/practicum, to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis/practicum and to lend or sell copies of the film, and to Dissertations Abstracts International to publish an abstract of this thesis/practicum.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither this thesis/practicum nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

An Abstract of
Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity

a Master's Thesis in Philosophy

by

Frank Michael Secky

The aim of this thesis is to examine the concept of "following a rule" as it is addressed by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* §§143-242 and in certain parts of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. The concept of following a rule is essential for understanding certain key questions in the philosophy of mind as well as the philosophy of social science. Unfortunately, there is little consensus about how we should read Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following. I argue that the claim that rules arise out of a regular social practice does not entail that the community determines the interpretation of rules. The thinkers who claim that the community *does* determine the interpretation of rules, the so-called Community View theorists, are usually concerned to put a stop to possible challenges by a rule sceptic. The Community View theorists believe that the rule sceptic can challenge an individual's rule-following but not the community's rule-following. I claim, however, that the rule sceptic's worry is incoherent and so is the solution to the scepticism, the Community View. In discussing rule-scepticism and the Community View, I focus on Kripke's *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*. Kripke's approach is a sophisticated modification of the Community View. But even though I argue, together with McGinn and Baker and Hacker, that the Community View is fundamentally incorrect, I think that it is interesting to see why this view is so tempting and why some Community View theorists might want to attribute it to Wittgenstein. I believe that in interpreting Wittgenstein, one needs to appreciate the delicate balance between the communitarian and the individualist aspects of his views on meaning and rule-following. Although the community is the most important source of correctness, it does not mean that we can equate the right way of following a rule with the (normative) attitude that the community has towards that rule. Tradition, explicit rules of various sorts and people in a position of power or authority can be also a source of correctness for determining the right way of following a rule.

Detailed Table of Contents

<i>I. INTRODUCTION: RULES AND NORMS</i>	9
---	---

<i>I.A INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS</i>	9
---	---

Thesis statement.

My presuppositions.

<i>I.B CLASSIFYING RULES</i>	13
------------------------------	----

Different conceptions of rules and norms.

<i>I.C EXAMPLES OF RULES WITH DIFFERENT USES</i>	15
--	----

Classifying rules according to their use (legal, mathematical, grammatical, game-rules etc.).

<i>I.D NORMATIVE COMPULSION</i>	16
---------------------------------	----

Classifying rules according to the kind and force of their normative compulsion.

How is normative compulsion different from a natural compulsion? (a preliminary treatment)

I.E FOLLOWING RULES VS. CONFORMING TO RULES 20

Classifying rules according to whether we can speak of an agent (or the lack thereof): following rules vs. conforming to rules or norms.

Why the norms encoded in the brain are not relevant to an account of rule-following?

I.F THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 30

Classifying rules and norms according to their source (verbal instruction, shared ways of life, "practice", observation, conditioning, evolution, cybernetic systems, etc.).

I.G EXPLICIT VS. IMPLICIT RULES 34

Rules as the logical condition acting.

Classifying rules according to the way in which the agent obeys the rule (explicitly or implicitly).

What does constitute the following of a rule in a general sense?

I.H RULES VS. RULE-FORMULATIONS 37

I.I WITTGENSTEIN'S USE OF "RULE" 39

II. THEORIES OF RULE-FOLLOWING 42

II.A REDUCTIONISM VS. NON-REDUCTIONISM 42

Introduction to theories of rules.

Reductionism. Are norms underlain by something non-normative?

II.B ACTUALISM AND DISPOSITIONALISM 46

Dispositionalism and actualism: an introduction and some general difficulties with these concepts.

III. THE "PARADOX" OF PI §201 54

III.A KRIPKE'S "PARADOX"

54

Introduction to Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein.

The "paradox" of Kripke's sceptic.

III.B KRIPKE'S WITTGENSTEIN AND THE REAL WITTGENSTEIN

59

Kripke's "paradox" is not the paradox that Wittgenstein addresses in PI §201.

Why it is very unlikely that Wittgenstein would want to offer a solution to the "sceptical paradox".

III.C WITTGENSTEIN'S PARADOX

63

The sceptic's "paradox" is a paradox for Wittgenstein's interlocutor, rather than for Wittgenstein himself.

III.D REGULISM

65

The regress of interpretations argument revisited.

III.E THE FOLLOWING OF A RULE IS A PRAXIS

68

How is the role of the community in Wittgenstein's account different from that of Kripke's?

IV. THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION

73

IV.A THE COMMUNITY VIEW

73

Community View -- the scepticism about rules applies only to the individualistic conception of rule-following.

Kripke: For A to be in accord with a rule is for the community to have no disposition to reject A. This is incorrect because it is quite possible for the community to be wrong about a particular thing (calculating midsummer's day).

IV.B PRIVATE RULE-FOLLOWING

84

What is the difference between saying that rule following is necessarily public and saying that it is necessarily social? Could there be just one occasion of following a rule? There *could* be just one occasion

of following a rule but that kind of rule-following needs to be social.

V. *SANCTIONS AND PRACTICES* 93

V.A *INTRODUCTION TO BRANDOM* 93

An introduction to Brandom's account of normativity and its connection to Wittgenstein's "rules".

V.B *NORMATIVITY AND CONDITIONING* 97

Brandom's account of operant conditioning and its relation to Wittgenstein's "training".

V.C *DIFFICULTIES WITH BRANDOM'S ACCOUNT* 99

Possible difficulties with Brandom's account of reward and punishment.

V.D *INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SANCTIONS* 101

V.E BRANDOM ON ANIMALS AND INTERNAL SANCTIONS

105

Animals do not act because they do not have a conception of what they are doing. However, this does not entail that animal behaviour cannot be a source of normativity.

Animal behaviour can be interpreted as resulting from the non-propositional attitudes that animals have. Does this entail that animals have beliefs?

How is Brandom faithful to the spirit of the *Philosophical Investigation*?

VI. CONCLUSION

111

Bibliography

114

Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity

by Frank M. Secky

I. INTRODUCTION: RULES AND NORMS

I.A INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS

Although discussions of rules can be traced as far back in the history of philosophy as Plato's *Euthyphro*, and although rules and norms are also addressed by Kant in *The Critique of Pure Reason* in the eighteenth century, the concept of "following a rule" became prominent in philosophy mainly as a result of Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) §§143-242 and in certain parts of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (RFM).

In this thesis I shall address some of the main claims that Wittgenstein makes regarding rules, though I shall conceive my discussion of rules and norms in somewhat broader terms than Wittgenstein. I shall share with Wittgenstein, and other philosophers whose work I am going to discuss, the presupposition

that all intentionality and meaning, whether human or otherwise, is in some sense normative. That meaning is normative is quite apparent when we consider the meaning of everyday words and sentences, for example, when someone alters the meaning of a word ("Just *among* two of us") it comes down to altering the *rule* that governs the use of that word ("*Among* is used to refer to more than two entities"). I shall assume that the kind of normativity that is relevant to specifically human activities, to language and mind, is instituted largely by use and social practices.

In this first chapter I shall set the stage for the thesis by distinguishing rules from other norms, as well as by examining some of the central features of rules and norms. In the subsequent chapters I shall argue that the claim that rules arise out of a regular social practice does not entail that the community determines the interpretation of rules. The thinkers who claim that the community *does* determine the interpretation of rules, the so-called Community View theorists, are usually concerned to put a stop to possible challenges by a rule sceptic. As we shall see, according to the Community View theorists the rule sceptic can challenge an individual's rule-following ("How can you know which rule you have followed?") but not the community's rule-following. The rule sceptic is thus someone who challenges the individual's conception of his own

action, for example, if someone believes that he performs addition the rule sceptic may challenge that person by suggesting that in fact he might be performing a different mathematical operation. I shall claim, however, that the rule sceptic's worry is incoherent and so is the solution to the scepticism, the Community View. In discussing rule-scepticism and the Community View, I shall focus on Kripke's *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*. Kripke's approach is a sophisticated modification of the Community View. But although I argue, together with McGinn and Baker and Hacker¹, that the Community View is fundamentally incorrect, I think that it is interesting to see why this view is so tempting and why someone might want to attribute it to Wittgenstein. I believe that in interpreting Wittgenstein one needs to appreciate the delicate balance between the communitarian and the individualist aspects of his views on meaning and rule-following.

Given the broadly Wittgensteinian framework that an agent can follow a rule only if he can, *in principle*, provide reasons for following the rule, I shall offer a defence of two important

¹ Colin McGinn, *Wittgenstein on Meaning* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Gordon P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Scepticism, Rules and Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

theses about rule-following, namely, that an agent follows a rule only if

1. the rule that he follows is part of an established social practice or its extension by an already socialised individual and/or
2. the agent has individually followed the rule on a number of occasions.

On a superficial reading, it might seem that (1) and (2) contradict each other, or at least that (2) is susceptible to the critique of Wittgenstein's private language argument. I shall show why (1) and (2) are correct.

Lastly, I shall examine Robert Brandom's conception of normativity in *Making it Explicit*. I shall agree closely with Brandom's view that the community is central to an account of rules (norms) and that only rational beings can follow rules. Moreover, I shall agree with Brandom that it makes no sense to reduce normativity to something nonnormative, such as dispositions to act, although I shall argue that Brandom's own position comes dangerously close to reductionism. Finally, I shall address Brandom's view of rewards and punishments. I shall claim that even though rewards and punishments can be normative,

Brandom's emphasis on reward and punishment in the context of social interaction cannot provide us with an account of the kind of normativity that is necessary for language and mind.

I.B CLASSIFYING RULES

Let me start by looking at some of the many ways in which we may conceive of rules and norms. A brief discussion of the ways in which we might want to classify rules will draw our attention to the different layers of meaning of the expressions "rule" and "norm". We can classify rules and norms according to:

1. their use (discussed in section I.C)
2. the kind and apparent force of their normative compulsion (discussed in section I.D)
3. whether we can speak of an agent (or the lack thereof); whether we can speak of following rules or merely conforming to them (discussed in section I.E)
4. their source (shared ways of life, evolution, cybernetical systems) (discussed in section I.F)
5. the way in which the agent follows the rule (explicitly or implicitly) (discussed in section I.G)

6. whether we speak of abstract entities ("the rules themselves") or concrete rule formulations (discussed in section I.H)

Some of these ways of classifying rules are philosophically interesting while others are of marginal interest to philosophy. Some will be merely acknowledged in later sections of this chapter, to close off blind alleys, so to speak, while others will also form the subject-matter of the subsequent chapters. The ways in which I have classified rules are not, of course, the only ones conceivable. For example, Baker and Hacker note that

One might classify rules according to their normative function (viz. to prohibit, prescribe, permit, empower, constitute or identify) or according to their social functions (e.g. to discourage deviant behaviour, encourage desired conduct, create normative relationships at will, and facilitate settlement of disputes). (WRGN 47)

Thus, my way of classifying rules and norms does not aspire to be exhaustive. The aim of my rule taxonomy is rather to bring up certain philosophical points, to sharpen our philosophical perception and throw light on the discussion that is to follow.

I.C EXAMPLES OF RULES WITH DIFFERENT USES

Perhaps the most obvious way to classify rules is according to their use, that is, according to the purposes and functions that they serve. Let me come up with a few examples of rules, to some of which I shall refer later in my discussion:

1. Do not trespass.
2. The bishop moves along the diagonal.
3. Stop at the traffic lights if they are red.
4. Do not eat with your fingers.
5. To open the window, push down the handle.
6. In English, pluralising of most singular substantives is done by adding the suffix -s.
7. Let $y = 2x$.²

² My initial example of a mathematical rule was $\Sigma a_n = 2x$. Dr. Schroeder claimed, probably rightly, that this not a mathematical rule at all so I changed the example to something that both of us could agree on. The reason why I came with this list of rules in the first place was to suggest that "rule" need not be just what we ordinarily call a rule. According to my understanding, a "rule" is anything *normative* that is subject to "interpretation", that is, subject to *misinterpretation* in the sense of the *Investigations* §201 -- be it what we ordinarily call

$$8. \quad (p = q) \equiv [(p \rightarrow q) \& (q \rightarrow p)]$$

The above examples include a legal rule (1), a game rule (2), part of a traffic code (3), a rule of etiquette (4), a guideline or an instruction (5), a rule of English grammar (6), a mathematical instruction (7), and a basic rule of logic (8).

I.D NORMATIVE COMPULSION

The fact that each of the rules from the list in section I.C has a different purpose or function is philosophically not that interesting, but what is philosophically very interesting is the fact that each of the rules in the list seems to have a different kind and force of normative compulsion.³ However, I shall claim

a rule or an instruction, formula, guideline, etc. In other words, a formula can be a kind of rule because its application (the way the algorithm associated with the formula is meant) is not determinate. (Note: Every formula has at least one algorithm associated with it because otherwise the "formula" would amount to nothing more than some scribbles on paper. Thus, it is the algorithm that gives the formula a normative dimension. As I have pointed out above, it makes no sense to speak of a formula in the absence of an algorithm.)

³ Given that some rules seem easier to break than others it

that to whatever extent certain "very rigid rules" might seem impossible to break, Aristotle's Laws of Thought for instance, their force is normative, that is, categorically different from the force of natural compulsion.

As Brandom points out, the laws of nature do not bind us by obligation, but *only* by compulsion (51). The distinction between the compulsion of rules and natural compulsion can be made clear by noting that it is an essential characteristic of rules that they can be violated. If someone does not obey a certain rule, then generally the fault is with the agent himself. On the other hand, if you detect what appears to be a violation of a natural law, then you almost certainly have an indication that the natural law has been wrongly stated. This distinction also plays a key role in the *Investigations* when Wittgenstein attacks the understanding of a rule as an "impersonal mechanism":

initially appears that normative compulsion comes in degrees. It might seem, for example, that the traffic rule (3) is easier to break than the rule of logic (8). However, this way of speaking is only metaphorical and normative compulsion does *not* come in degrees: what *does* come in degrees is the likelihood and severity of punishment for breaking a rule or the perceived importance of the rule, whether at the social or the individual levels.

The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a machine -- I might say at first -- seems to be there in it from the start. What does that mean? -- If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already completely determined. We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. How is this -- do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on?

[. . .] For instance, we give someone [a drawing of a machine] and assume that he will derive the movement of the parts from it. (Just as we can give someone a number by telling him that it is the twenty-fifth in the series 1, 4, 9, 16,). (PI §193)

When Wittgenstein talks here of the "machine-as-symbol" he is warning us not to assimilate normative compulsion to natural compulsion ("the action of a machine-as-symbol"). Moreover, this metaphor concerning a machine shows that normative necessity is quite close to "mechanical necessity" because, after all, "mechanical necessity" is just as non-compelling as normative necessity (rules can be broken just as machine parts can "bend, break off, melt" and so on). However, the machine-as-symbol, that is, a machine to which we do not attribute the possibility

of failing, is a metaphor for a rule that could not be broken. In manuscript 123 (the entry of June 5th), Wittgenstein writes:

Must I represent the rule as an impersonal mechanism which only works on me and through me? For the latter is what mathematicians would like to say. That the rule is an abstract mechanism. (quoted by Hallett 280)

Hallett points out that Wittgenstein here suggests that it is highly misleading to represent the rule as an impersonal mechanism that can *never fail* (280). The early Wittgenstein believed that the rules of logic have a special status due to their high "rigidity", in comparison to which all other rules look like failed replicas:

F.P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a "normative science". I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we often *compare* the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language *must* be playing such a game. [. . .] Logic does not treat of language -- or of thought -- in the sense in

which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon

. . . . (PI §81, cf. BB 25)

Thus, with some "very rigid" rules (such as the rules of mathematics and of logic) we are sometimes tempted to assimilate the normative compulsion of these rules to natural compulsion.⁴ However, this is a mistake because if something is to be a rule, the failure to obey it must be possible (or at least well-defined).

I.E FOLLOWING RULES VS. CONFORMING TO RULES

Turning now to the third distinction that I have made in section I.B, we can say that following a rule, whether explicitly or implicitly, is quite different from merely conforming with the rule. When one follows a rule he always, at the same time, conforms with it, but when someone conforms with a rule he may or may not also follow it. Suppose that A and B live in a country where martial law has been proclaimed. Further suppose that on Monday evening B was arrested on charges of leaving his house after 9 p.m. On Tuesday evening at 10 p.m. A is at home watching

⁴ Or, as I have pointed out above, we mistakenly believe that the normative compulsion of the rules of logic is somehow greater than the normative compulsion of the rules of the road.

the Comedy News Network (CNN) while B is in prison. We can say that on Tuesday both A and B conform with the enacted martial law but only A is following what the law commands. As I have noted above, someone can follow a rule only if he also has the possibility of not following it -- which is not the case for B.

Let me explore another example (I have adapted it from Kenny 152 ff.). Compare the way in which a pianist and a pianola can be said to play a polonaise. While the pianist follows certain rules of translation of musical notation (let us disregard the more complicated scenario in which the pianist plays from memory) the pianola cannot be said to follow any rules at all. The pianola cannot follow any rules because it has no conception of playing music, reading musical notation etc. The distinction comes up clearly when you consider what happens when the pianist and the pianola stop playing suddenly in the middle of a polonaise. In the case of the pianola we start to enquire about what went wrong with the causal mechanism. In the case of the pianist, however, we enquire about the *reason* why he stopped playing. Although we can also say that the "reason" why the pianola stopped playing was that the battery is too old, this should not confuse us: the explanation that the battery is too old is an explanation of a causal relation, not a rational justification. Something very different applies in the case of

the pianist whom we treat as an *agent* who has *reasons* for his *actions*. The pianist can explain, for example, that he likes only the first part of the polonaise and so he is not going to play the second part. In fact, it is precisely because the pianist can (at least in principle) give reasons for his actions that it makes sense to say that he follows rules.

However, someone might object by asking, "But is not the pianola following the same rules that the pianist follows? Are not they playing the same music?" First I must emphasise that I do not deny that the pianola has a certain *function* (that it can perform well or misperform), that the music which is emitted by the pianola is the (correct or incorrect) representation of the same music that the pianist plays. I do not thus deny that some kind of norm is involved both in the case of the pianist and the pianola. If the pianola performs a certain function then there must be a norm which it can conform with or not. For the pianola not to conform with a specified norm amounts to failing to perform its function. We can thus say that the pianola is merely conforming with a certain norm while the pianist, besides conforming with the same norm, is also following certain rules. The pianola, not being an *agent*, that is, not being able to *act*, it cannot fail to obey rules and hence it cannot follow any rules at all. Only agents can follow rules and only agency, in turn,

entails the *possibility* of giving and asking for reasons. This is an assumption that I share with the neo-Wittgensteinian movement, which Baker and Hacker express as follows:

That a person's action is normative, that he is following a rule, that he is guided by a rule (or better, guides himself by reference to a rule) is manifest in the manner in which he uses rules, invokes rule-formulations, refers to rules in *explaining* what he did, *justifying* what he did in the face of criticism, *evaluating* what he did and *correcting* what he did, *criticizing* his mistakes, and so forth. (WRGN 45)

Baker and Hacker emphasise the point that someone can be said to follow a rule only if the rule plays an organic role⁵ in his reason-giving. This means, of course, that only people, agents who are capable of *acting*, can follow rules because machines do not act and cannot give reasons. Hence we can generalise from

⁵ An ordinary computer can be programmed such that it can "give reasons". This is an example of inorganic reason-giving because a machine state, and hence also its reason-giving, is meaningful only in virtue of its being designed by people for a given purpose. This is a fact whether or not an imaginary supercomputer can have machine states that do have intrinsic meaning and as a result can give organic reasons.

the above that people can both follow and conform to rules but machines can only conform to rules. Although the working assumption of this essay will be that the point that Baker and Hacker are making is valid, the passage cited here is possibly misleading because their examples seem to involve only instances in which the agent follows rules explicitly. Baker and Hacker clarify their conception of rule in the following way:

[It is not] enough that the behaviour of someone following a rule merely conforms with the rule (a chess computer follows no rules). Nor is it sufficient that he once learned the rule -- for that is past history . . . and the issue here is his present possession of an ability, not its genesis. Nor would it suffice that the rule might be encoded in his brain (whatever that might mean); for being caused to act by the encoding of a rule is precisely *not* to follow a rule.

(WRGN 45)

This passage is, of course, quite contentious: Fodor, and certain teleosemantic philosophers⁶ (Dretske, Papineau, and

⁶ Teleosemantics, or teleosemanticism, is a theory of mind claiming that the brain is a collection of structures which are *supposed* to stand in correspondence relations to states of affairs in the world. In other words, the brain is nothing

others), would probably disagree, perhaps claiming that being caused to act by the encoding of a rule in one's brain amounts to following that rule. In order to understand such *prima facie* puzzling claims as "a chess computer follows no rules" we have to be aware, first of all, that the concept of "following" is being used by Baker and Hacker (as well as by Wittgenstein) in a very different way than contemporary non-Wittgensteinian philosophers tend to use it.⁷ Thus, chess computers do not, on the

but a collection of representations. We can talk about representations because the states of affairs in the brain, or the brain's structure, correspond to the states of affairs in the world. However, we should not think that any kind of correspondence between states of affairs can be called a representation. A representation is a kind of correspondence in which the isomorphic states of affairs are *supposed* to stand in that relation. According to a teleosemanticist, only minds can represent because only in the case of minds there is *supposed* to be a certain kind of relation between the states of affairs in the world and the physical structures of the mind. Teleosemanticists believe that the brain *instantiates* the mind because all minds are nothing else but systems of interacting representations.

As we shall see later, Wittgensteinian philosophers tend to challenge the relevance of non-rational norms (the type of

Wittgensteinian view, follow the rules of chess because they do not literally act. However, chess computers conform to the rules of chess whenever they "play"⁸ chess with a human or another computer.

If the following of a rule would amount to being merely caused to act by the encoding of a rule then people would be reduced to the kind of complicated physical mechanism that pianolas are and this seems preposterous.⁹ It might be a necessary condition that conforming to a non-rational norm¹⁰

norms that cannot be involved in asking for and giving of reasons) to the kind of intentionality that gives rise to language and mind. As Dr. Schroeder pointed out to me, however, in the present case the emphasis is not on the expression "rule" but on "following". Thus, according to the Wittgensteinian view, a computer can still accord with the rules of chess without following those rules.

⁸ Chess computers cannot be said to play chess in a literal way since playing (in the literal sense) amounts to acting and computers do not act because they do not have intentionality.

⁹ Or I should perhaps say *would be* preposterous. If reductionist philosophers are right then doing what an extremely complicated pianola does *might* be sufficient for having a mind.

¹⁰ Many philosophers use the expression "norm" to refer to

involves the encoding of that norm in the brain; but even if that is the case, it has no relevance to the account of rule-following that I offer here. As I have suggested above, the only way that we can meaningfully talk of following rules is to reserve rule-following for agents, because following a rule is an activity and only agents can act.

Let me return to Baker and Hacker by quoting a passage that is possibly even more controversial:

Current jargon of "neural representations" of rules is manifest nonsense since only symbols with a use can function as a representation (formulation) of a rule, and nerve cells are not symbols. Being knocked sideways by a board on which is written "Turn left!" is not to *follow* the rule to turn left, but only to be caused unwittingly to conform to it.

(WRGN 45)

a class of entities that includes both rules and natural norms. I have no difficulty with this but I shall sometimes designate norms that are not rules as "non-rational norms" (including both natural norms and artifactual norms) to bring up the point that rules are a kind of norm which is defined, at least in part, by the possibility of rational agency.

I take Baker and Hacker to be claiming that there can be no rule-following at the neurological level. Baker and Hacker need not deny, of course, that the brain involves normativity of some kind -- they only need to claim that the kind of normativity that is involved in the brain, specifically the encoding of norms at the neurological level, is irrelevant to the account of rule-following necessary for a successful theory of mind. The point that Baker and Hacker are making, that it makes no sense to speak of rules being encoded at the neurological level, is quite important and I think that it can be supported by the following kind of argument. Suppose that A is born with an innate disposition such that whenever someone gives him a direction then he would look in the direction of the line that extends from that person's wrist to his fingertip. As far as I know the ability to give and take direction by pointing is not inborn in people and hence A's case is rather extraordinary. We can thus say that A has an innate disposition about pointing or that the norms involved in pointing have been encoded in A's brain since his birth. But can we also say that whenever A looks in the direction that he is pointed to then he is following a rule? Suppose that A is born into a culture in which direction is given by pointing with one's elbow, that is, one is supposed to look in the direction of the line that extends from someone's wrist to his elbow. If A would behave in such a culture as he is innately

disposed to, then clearly he would not act in accordance with the rule about pointing that existed in that culture. This shows that whatever norms might be encoded in one's brain, they do not have to enter into my account of rule-following at all. While my example can be interpreted in such a way that it conflicts with the claims of teleosemanticism, my aim was not to show that the teleosemantic account of normativity is incorrect. Rather, I want to point out that the meaning of a rule, unlike the meaning of a natural norm, is inseparable from its use²² or social practice. In other words, in the absence of an established use

²² When Wittgenstein talks about meaning he usually has in mind conventional meaning and it is in this context that he claims that "meaning is use":

The meaning of a word can be fixed by all the rules that govern the word. These rules constitute the meaning and they cannot be fixed by an ostensive definition, but only by the use of the word. The meaning changes when one of its rules changes. (WL 3-4, cf. PI 431 ff.)

In other words, it is the peculiarity of conventional meaning that it is correlative with understanding: marks on a paper by themselves mean nothing if no one understands them, if they do not have a use.

or social practice we can speak of conforming to a rule but not of rule-following. I believe that rule-following is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the kind of intentionality that gives rise to human language and mind, because rule-following entails acting and acting is intentional.¹² The kind of intentionality that is involved in acting is a necessary condition for rule-following because it is inconceivable that someone would be following a rule without acting, as opposed to merely conforming with a rule.

I.F THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY

The fourth distinction that I have made in section I.B is concerned with the sources of normativity. Rules are established solely by convention whereas non-rational norms (that is, all norms other than rules) can be established not only by convention but also by evolution (which gives rise to natural norms) or, as Dr. Schroeder would have it, by a cybernetic system (which can

¹² It is, of course, true that humans can behave in such a way that they do not act and yet the behaviour in question can be intentional. In this passage I was concerned only with the kind of intentionality that is necessary for giving rise to language and mind.

give rise to natural or artifactual¹³ norms) (CST 9 ff.). The split between rules and non-rational norms (or functions) roughly corresponds to the two twentieth century traditions in the philosophy of mind associated with Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom¹⁴ and others on the one hand, and Dretske, Papineau and others on the other. Even if philosophers of different traditions can agree roughly how to conceive of rules and norms, and perhaps even agree on what are the various sources of normativity, there is not any consensus about the relevance of the different kinds of normativity for the kind of intentionality that is involved in language and mind.

In *Naturalizing the Mind*, Dretske distinguishes between conventionally assigned functions and functions that are naturally acquired. People are the source of conventional functions whereas natural selection is the main source of natural

¹³ By "artifactual norms" I mean the kind of norms that are created by the operation of manmade cybernetic systems (artifacts) and whose function or meaning may or may not depend on the social context.

¹⁴ As we shall see in chapter V, Brandomian norms elude an easy classification, because they are supposedly giving rise to language and mind while at the same time being created at the unconscious level.

functions. That a thing has a function, whether conventional or natural, presupposes the involvement of rules or norms: it makes sense to speak of a function being performed well, or of a thing malfunctioning, only if there is a norm that says (or establishes) what is the given thing's function. The function of a teacher is to teach children and the teacher can thus perform his function well or not. Similarly, the function of a toaster is to toast bread and again the toaster can perform its function well or not. Each of these manmade functions thus depends on some kind of a source of correctness or a norm.¹⁵ These sources of correctness may involve the intentions of the designer, the purposes of the user, the established way of doing things, conditioning, cybernetic systems (both natural and artifactual) or simply whatever facilitates the survival of the species. There are, of course, many other sources of correctness but only some sources of correctness are relevant to specifically human activities, to the kind of normativity that is involved in language and mind.

¹⁵ It should be noted that *natural* functions do not depend on any norms at all but are a species of norms themselves. Non-natural functions are normative but are not norms only by themselves (their normativity depends on, in part, the intentions of the designer, the purposes of the user, etc.).

It is the peculiarity of some norms that they are, at least in part, constituted by a physical mechanism, for example, the existence of the right kind of a physical mechanism can be sufficient for the existence of a biological norm. However, the existence of a physical mechanism¹⁶ is not sufficient for the existence of rules, for example, the physical existence of a chessboard and chessmen is not sufficient for having the rules of chess. In order to have chess we have to have chess players and, for example, a tradition of playing chess from which the rules of chess spring. Thus, the reason why the existence of a physical mechanism is not sufficient for having rules is that the existence of all rules depends on the existence of social beings who use those rules. It is possible to object that there are many rules that do not have any use at all, for example, the rules of boring games that no one plays, but I shall suggest that objections of this kind are incoherent, or at least misleading, because (1) rules that do not have a use are not rules in the literal sense or, more importantly, (2) the existence of, for example, the rules of boring games that no one plays still depends on an agent who formulated them.

¹⁶ Or, as Dr. Schroeder would like to specify, the existence of a *non-personal* physical mechanism is insufficient for having rules. (Whatever "personal physical mechanisms" might be.)

Returning to my example involving a pianola we can thus say that the pianola conforms with a given norm in virtue of a certain physical mechanism. Unlike the case of a biological norm, however, the physical mechanism of the pianola (the cylinder with spikes) constitutes the encoding of the norm only in part, because the norm is also partially defined by our expectations, that is to say, by our giving the pianola a certain function and expecting that it will perform that function in a specified way. The norms that the pianola is constrained by are of a quite different sort than the rules that the pianist follows -- but there also has to be something in common to both of these cases because the result is the "same" kind of music. I think that we can avoid talking about "underlying norms" by pointing out that both the pianist and the pianola can conform to the same rule, although only the pianist *follows* that rule.

I.G EXPLICIT VS. IMPLICIT RULES

The penultimate classification that I have made in the list in section I.B distinguishes between explicit and implicit rules. Although it is true that any rule can, in principle, be stated explicitly, it must not be thought that whenever I follow a rule I am following it explicitly. The "in principle" clause is thus very important, because people can follow rules implicitly even

though no one has ever thought of formulating them explicitly, for example the rules of Latin before any grammarians came along and formulated Latin grammar in the form of explicit rules. Rules in the sense in which I am going to discuss them in this thesis are the logical condition of acting, as opposed to other kinds of behaviour or a mere natural occurrence, that is to say, all actions, or all meaningful behaviour, involve the following of rules, whether explicit ("conscious") or implicit ("unconscious").

All of the eight rules that I have listed in section I.B enable me to engage myself in some kind of activity. Even the first kind of rule, the precept "Do not trespass", although it limits my freedom to some extent, it also enables me to act in a certain way, namely as a law-abiding traveller etc. If I would act without regard to any rules at all¹⁷ then it would not make

¹⁷ That is, if this were conceptually possible. If I were to act in such a way that I would, for example, violate all rules that I were to encounter then I could still be said to follow the rule, "Break all the rules that you encounter". I can also behave in such a way that I do not follow any rules at all, for example, when I have an epileptic seizure, but since having an epileptic seizure is not acting, this kind of behaviour has no relevance to an account of rule-following.

sense to say that I am really acting, because the very possibility of acting is enabled by my following some kind of rule, by restricting my action in some way. What distinguishes actions from other kinds of behaviour is the fact that in the case of actions failure is well-defined. But this is only another way of saying that choosing between various actions comes down to choosing between different *rules* that are to guide my action. When we say that A has failed in performing a certain action we really say that A has violated a rule that governs the performance of that action.

As I have suggested above, actions, as opposed to other kinds of behaviour, are intelligible only in the context of asking for and giving of reasons. That is to say, the fact that all rules have to be, at least potentially, explicit makes them *propositional* in character. However, this statement is possibly misleading because someone might think that since a reference to an explicit rule is needed, the explicit rule is more fundamental. In fact, I shall argue in chapter II that the implicit rule, the rule grounded in practice, is more fundamental than the explicit one. It would be more precise to say that there is only one kind of rule that can be followed in two ways: explicitly or implicitly. One can follow a rule such that he

guides himself by the rule (he *obeys* it *explicitly*) or else he is guided by the rule (he follows it *implicitly*).

I.H RULES VS. RULE-FORMULATIONS

The last classification that I have made in section I.B is not concerned with kinds of rule but rather with the difference between rule formulations and the "rules themselves". It is clear that rules cannot be identified with rule formulations because one particular rule can be formulated in several different languages, it can be expressed in various styles and so on. But does this mean that rules are abstract entities, that they have some kind of ontological status in the way that, for example, Plato's Forms have a certain ontological status? I think that the incoherence of what we may call "normative nominalism" (rules are to be identified with rule formulations) does not imply "normative realism" (rules have a Platonic reality of some sort). As Baker and Hacker note, one reason to think that neither of the two extreme views is correct is that rules and rule formulations are often interchangeable or that the "grammar of `rule' and `rule-formulation' runs, for a stretch, along parallel tracks" (WRGN 42). This is an important point but not a point that can easily satisfy us because, as we shall see later, the "normative Platonist" can easily resolve certain

difficulties about rule-following that the "normative non-Platonist" has to struggle with. This is, of course, not to say that rules exist in some kind of Platonic reality but that "normative Platonism" can be persuasive when viewed in a certain kind of light and hence we should not dismiss it too quickly.

Another way that we can frame this question is to ask whether rules are a kind of norm or whether they are an expression of norms. Let us assume, for the purposes of this thesis, that rules are a kind of norm. We have to be aware, however, that norm in this sense describes the *class* of normative entities (rules, natural norms, functions) as opposed to itself being, for example, a kind of artifactual norm. It is also worth observing that any norm (that is, any rule, natural norm or function) is distinct from a norm-formulation (that is, rule-formulation, natural norm-formulation or function-formulation). What this clearly suggests is that norm-formulations are merely epiphenomena (the function of an animal heart is to pump blood whether or not there are any people around to formulate the heart's function). But though it is possible to ask about the ontological status of the various norms, as opposed to norm-

formulations, this question is too general to be directly relevant to the present thesis.¹⁸ It is sufficient when we define norms as distinct from norm-formulations and leave it at that.

I.I WITTGENSTEIN'S USE OF "RULE"

In order to prepare us for the discussion in the subsequent chapters, I shall conclude chapter I with a brief description of Wittgenstein's use of the expression "rule". According to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, language is a system of definite and hidden rules (TLP 4.023, 4.002). The rules of the tractarian language are definite in the way that the rules of calculus are definite. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein compares language to games rather than to calculus.

¹⁸ As we shall see later, however, the distinction between rules and rule-formulations is central to this thesis. Since my present general account of norms and norm-formulations suggests that rules in their propositional form, that is, rule formulations, are merely epiphenomena we shall be able to conclude that what is actually followed are not the rule-formulations (as the regulists would have it) but rather the "rules themselves", the rules grounded in practice (as the Wittgensteinians would have it).

Throughout the *Investigations* we read that speaking is like playing chess and words are like chess pieces. The metaphor of language-game captures the later Wittgenstein's conception of language quite well because when one *plays* a game he often does not *think* but only *acts* and *reacts*. The later Wittgenstein is concerned with deeds rather than with the tractarian systems of hidden rules and this is partly because at the bottom of the language-game lies acting (OC §204). Moreover, both language and games are rule-guided activities and this strengthens the analogy between language and games.

As Brandom notes, the later Wittgenstein uses "rule" (*Regel*) in three different senses (64 ff.):

1. whatever one consults while being engaged in a certain activity: *an explicit rule*
2. whatever guides one's conduct, whether it be *an explicit or an implicit rule*
3. whatever is subject to *normative assessment*, whether one is "following a rule" and is aware of following it (explicitly or implicitly) or not (also cf. PI §54, §81)

I have used and I shall continue to use the expression "rule" in the first two senses. I find the third sense rather problematic because it is in a danger of being mixed up with a mere regularity, "a natural law". Moreover, the third sense of *Regel* seems to conflate being a rule with being regulated. Let me elucidate Wittgenstein's third sense of "rule" by considering such an activity as giving direction. If someone directs me to St John's College by pointing I *might* be following an explicit rule such as "When someone gives you a direction, look in the direction of the line that extends from that person's wrist to his fingertip". It is also possible that I might follow this rule implicitly. But in what sense could it be said that I looked in the direction of the fingertip *without* following any rule, whether explicit or implicit? Presumably, that would be the case if looking in the direction of the fingertip was natural for people, for example, if there had been encoded a certain kind of *norm* in every man's brain since his birth. This kind of case involves "rule" in the third sense -- a case in which I would prefer, as I have already indicated, to use the expression "non-rational norm". In other words, the third sense of "rule" that Brandom identified is not a rule at all, at least not in my terminology, even though Wittgenstein might have used the German expression *Regel* in all three cases. The fact that an event can be described in normative terms does not mean that it involves a

rule (in my sense) although, of course, the event has to involve a norm of some kind.

II. THEORIES OF RULE-FOLLOWING

II.A REDUCTIONISM VS. NON-REDUCTIONISM

In chapter I, I have outlined some of the various ways in which we can conceive of rules. I would like to start this chapter by briefly looking at how we can classify the competing theories of rules. We can identify two very broad categories of theories, namely non-reductionist and reductionist. Non-reductionists believe that our normative concepts cannot be reduced to something non-normative, such as to dispositions to act, and that rules and their applications are *internally* related. Hence I shall also call non-reductionist philosophers "internalists" because the expression "internalism" captures the central tenet of non-reductionism that I am interested in. There are various degrees in which a non-reductionist can be committed to internalism about rules. The common ground among internalists seems to be that rules and their applications are internally related in the sense of a particular rule being inseparable from the way it is applied in *practice* while at the same time the practice of the community does not determine the correctness of

the application of rules in particular instances. There is an internal relation¹⁹ between a given rule and its application and it is irrelevant, for example, how the majority of the members of a community is *disposed* to follow that rule.²⁰

¹⁹ An internal relation can be defined such that the relation between two entities is internal if and only if it is inconceivable that the entities do not stand in that relation (cf. TLP 4.123). If an object is red, for instance, it is internally related to all green objects such that it is of a different colour than the said green objects. We can thus say that the internal relation between two or more entities is analogous to the analyticity of two or more propositions.

A more relevant sense in which we can speak about "internal relation" is with reference to the internal relation of the central concepts involved in rule-following. In §225 of the *Investigations*, for example, Wittgenstein makes the important point that "The use of the word 'rule' and the use of the word 'same' are interwoven. (As are the use of 'proposition' and the use of 'true'.)"

²⁰ This claim is, of course, quite contentious, because, as we shall see later, it directly counters the claims of the Community View.

Internalism about rules is, or appears to be, dangerously close to the rules-as-rails view which is discussed by McDowell (145 ff.). At its extreme this view is a kind of "Platonism" proclaiming that the applications of rules are already determined or "pre-interpreted", quite independently of human dispositions, customs etc. Wittgenstein expresses this view as follows:

Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule. (PI §218)

As I have pointed out above, the internalists believe that the relation between a rule and its application is internal, that is to say, it does not depend on, for example, dispositions. But if the correctness of the application of a rule is related only to the rule itself, is not the application of a rule somehow determined or "pre-interpreted"? If all of the applications of a rule were to be "pre-interpreted" then our picture of a rule would be that of "rails invisibly laid to infinity", that is to say, a picture of objective interpretations of rules existing in some kind of Platonic realm. But, of course, all of the leading internalists working on the philosophy of mind, namely Gordon

Baker, Peter M.S. Hacker and Colin McGinn, would vehemently deny this accusation that is sometimes raised against them (cf. Malcolm 147 ff.). This accusation would not affect Robert Brandom who also counts himself to be a normative non-reductionist but, as we shall see in chapter V, if he is a non-reductionist at all, it is in a different sense from the internalist philosophers that I have just mentioned. I shall further elaborate on internalism in chapter IV.

Reductionists believe that our normative practices are underlain by something non-normative. We can subdivide reductionist theories according to the non-normative foundation of normativity that they rely on. With respect to philosophers whose work is relevant to this thesis, we can distinguish primarily between reductions of normative properties to dispositions and to actual behaviour. It should be noted that in all cases the norms to which the reductionist wants to reduce behaviour (dispositions, actual behaviour) are those that make language and mind possible, not non-rational norms of the kind that make hearts possible. Some well-known normative reductionists include²¹ Peter Winch (*The Idea of Social Science*),

²¹ In *Discussions of Wittgenstein*, Rush Rhees sometimes talks like a normative reductionist, but I have not read enough by him on this subject to be able to include him in this group

Norman Malcolm (*Nothing is Hidden*), Christopher Peacocke ("Rule-Following"), Robert Fogelin (*Wittgenstein*), Crispin Wright (*Wittgenstein on the Foundation of Mathematics*), Saul A. Kripke (*Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*), and Hilary Putnam (*Realism and Reason*). All of the reductionists that I have just mentioned espouse some form of the "Community View", that is, they believe that what gives substance to rules are social dispositions or the actual behaviour of an entire community as opposed to the dispositions or actual behaviour of an individual considered in isolation.²² In the next section I shall introduce these two views in a little bit more detail.

II.B ACTUALISM AND DISPOSITIONALISM

Community actualism is the view that actual past behaviour of the members of a community determines the correctness of the application of rules. The individual's actual behaviour, when taken only by itself, is quite unimportant, for example, red is

of thinkers.

²² A reductionist philosopher who does not espouse the Community View but believes in the foundational role of individual dispositions is Gilbert Ryle. However, although Ryle is a dispositionalist about the mind he is not a *normative* theorist about the mind.

what most people actually call "red", that is to say, red is what most people have called "red" in the past. For example, if a single individual were to describe the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag as "blue" then this single individual's actual behaviour would have no influence whatsoever on the rules governing "red". In other words, what is at the basis of community actualism is a variation on the democratic principle²³ that the majority is always right.

²³ But this principle should be perhaps called "mobocratic" because in representative democracies the principle that the majority is always "right" (whatever that might mean) is regarded only as a theoretical guideline that has little contact with social reality. That is to say, in representative democracies there is a gap between what is desired by the people and what is desired by their representatives. This gap is possible because the "truth" possessed by the representatives is generally regarded as of a greater value than the truth that is held by the majority of the people because the representatives are, supposedly, better acquainted with the questions at issue, rely on the advice of various experts and so on. This simple fact suggests that it is not the case, as the Community View theorists suppose, that it is the dispositions or actual behaviour of the majority that defines what is correct and what is not. (See below.)

One of the difficulties with this version of the Community View is that there cannot be a correct application of rules if there are no precedents to a given activity at the level of a community.²⁴ Taken to an extreme, this view would seem to entail that if a new rule is formulated there cannot be a correct way of following it for the first time. However, although this is a serious difficulty I believe that in the context of this thesis the far greater difficulty is the inability of community actualism to distinguish between a claim's being correct because it accords with an objective standard, a rule, and a claim's being correct because it accords with what most people actually do. It is this second difficulty, at the heart of which is the assumption that rule-following is *necessarily* social, that I shall focus on in my discussion of Kripke in the following two chapters.

²⁴ Dr. Schroeder suggested to me that in several sections of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein seems to espouse a version of normative actualism according to which actual *future* behaviour determines, for instance, how I meant to go on (cf. PI §§187, 190). It is true that Wittgenstein talks in this way but I think that the main emphasis in passages such as PI §187 is on the fact that at *present* the interpretation of a rule is not determined, that is, the steps that I am to take do not somehow exist prior to my interpretation of those steps by actually taking them.

The community disposition thesis avoids the lesser difficulty of community actualism that can result from the lack of precedent behaviour by focusing solely on dispositions, that is, potential future behaviour. According to community dispositionalism, dispositions of members of a community determine the correct application of rules, for example, red is what most people are *disposed* to call "red" whether or not someone has *actually* used the predicate "red" in the past or not. In other words, dispositions are actual "attitudes of the mind" that determine the propriety of an action. However, as Kripke points out, we cannot ultimately distinguish between a correct performance and an incorrect performance because the only thing that counts are the individual's dispositions. When someone is disposed to always make a particular mistake, for example, to call the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag "blue", then there is no way to distinguish correct performance from incorrect performance since both calling it "red" and calling it "blue" are simply dispositions (29-30). When I follow Kripke in claiming that dispositionalists cannot distinguish correct performance from incorrect performance by referring to dispositions I am claiming, in effect, that dispositionalists conflate performances that are correct because they accord with given dispositions and performances that are correct because they accord with given rules. For example, there can be a rule

defining "red" by a reference to the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag but the dispositionalist view implies that when someone calls the maple leaf "blue" then he is correct in virtue of the fact that he is *disposed* to call the maple leaf blue. It must be realised, of course, that the dispositionalist can object that what really counts are the dispositions of the community rather than the dispositions of the individual. Even so, we can raise the same objection regarding the dispositions of the community as we have raised regarding the dispositions of the individual -- there is no reason why the community as a whole could not make mistakes in following a particular rule. For example, there can suddenly erupt a global chemical war and once it is over all of the survivors can have their sensory apparatus damaged in such a way that they are disposed to call the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag blue. Even if all people on Earth were disposed to call the Canadian maple leaf "blue" that does not mean that it is really blue. Of course, the reason why all the survivors of the chemical war are wrong about calling the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag blue, even though all of them are *disposed* to call it blue, is that they violate the rule for using the expression "blue". I have defined "red" above as being the colour of the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag, and hence the maple leaf is red regardless of anyone's dispositions, and we can make a rule for "blue" in a

similar way.²⁵ Moreover, Kripke is quite right when he claims that

The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of the finiteness of my actual past performance by appealing to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious fact: not only my actual performance, but also the totality of my dispositions, is finite. It is not true, for example, that if queried about the sum of any two numbers, no matter how large, I will reply with their actual sum, for some pairs of numbers are simply too large for my mind -- or my brain -- to grasp. (Kripke 26-7)

As we shall see later, since dispositions cover only a finite segment of, for example, a given mathematical function, two

²⁵ To avoid someone's objection that perhaps the chemical warfare did not damage people's sensory apparatus but changed the chemical constitution of all objects in such a way that, for example, the autumnal maple leaves are now blue, we can define "red" by specifying its wavelength. In this way we can show that the rule for using "red" is quite objective and it is this objective rule that defines our use of "red", not people's dispositions.

individuals may agree on their computations even though they are actually computing different mathematical functions.

Thus, we can conclude that dispositions cannot be normative because, as we have seen above, it makes no sense to speak of a norm without the possibility of violating it. Dispositions cannot be violated because it would not make any sense to say that someone has acted in accordance with or against his dispositions.²⁶ A community dispositionalist can object, of course, that a norm is violated not when an individual acts against his dispositions but when his action is in conflict with the dispositions of a community. This conflict can come about in various ways. It is possible to say, for instance, that someone has acted against his dispositions if we introduce the

²⁶ Dr. Gerwin has made the interesting objection that when I make a typing error I might possibly act against my disposition to spell the word correctly. However, I do not think that this objection can endanger my general line of argument at all. The reason is that there is nothing normative in my disposition to spell a given word in a particular way, that is to say, the reason why I call a particular typing error *an error* is not because it conflicts with my disposition to spell the word in a given way but because it conflicts with the rules of English spelling.

distinction between "higher order dispositions" (those of the experts, for example) and "lower order dispositions" (those of the commons, for instance) in the way that certain soft determinists distinguish between "higher order desires" and "lower order desires". But then the "higher order dispositions" would be in some sense "right" regardless of how many people had those dispositions and hence dispositions would cease to be the kind of brute facts that are required for a truly dispositionalist theory of normativity. At the same time, if we were to say that a norm is violated whenever an individual's disposition conflicts with the dispositions of the *majority* of the members of a community then we could also ask what it is about the dispositions of the majority that it makes them in some sense "right", or at any rate, a standard according to which other dispositions can be "measured". I shall address this difficulty in more detail in chapter IV because it does not concern only dispositionalism but all versions of the Community View, including Kripke's actualism. It is worth noting that Kripke's actualist account has also dispositionalist elements, although it is not necessarily the case that it is these dispositionalist elements that make the present difficulty relevant for him (cf. Kripke 90 ff., quoted below). Kripke is probably right when he notes that Wittgenstein's views have dispositional elements in it, although, of course, that does not

mean that Wittgenstein should be thought of as a dispositionalist (25).

III. THE "PARADOX" OF PI §201

III.A KRIPKE'S "PARADOX"

One of the most debated interpretations of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is Kripke's *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*. Kripke thinks that the "paradox" of §201 is "perhaps the central problem" of the *Philosophical Investigations* and may be regarded as a "new form of philosophical scepticism" (Kripke 7). According to Kripke's interpretation of the rule-following considerations in the *Philosophical Investigations*, were it not for the "sceptical solution", Wittgenstein would reach the paradoxical conclusion that there are no facts about what a speaker means by a given expression (Kripke 21 ff.) Kripke's "sceptical paradox" culminates in the claim that rules cannot guide one's action and as a result, were it not for the "sceptical solution", all language would be meaningless (Kripke 21).²⁷

²⁷

Any interpretation of Kripke's *Wittgenstein* has to be problematic from the beginning because Kripke does not clearly

But although §201 is the focal point for Kripke's interpretation of the *Investigations*, he sets up his sceptical problem rather differently. The question of Kripke's sceptic is this: "How do you know that you have always meant 'addition' by '+', not 'quaddition'?"²⁸ For Kripke's sceptic, "quaddition" is

attribute the "sceptical paradox" to himself nor to Wittgenstein but claims that it is "rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke 5). I think that the "paradox" that Kripke presents us with is quite different from the one that Wittgenstein treats in the *Investigations* §201 and hence I shall talk about "Kripke's paradox" although it would be perhaps more precise to call it "Kripkenstein's paradox".

²⁸ In *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, Goodman provides us with a sceptical technique that can be used to challenge any predicates by means of their temporal definition, for example, "green" can be contrasted with "grue", where "grue" means "green until time t and blue thereafter". Thus, we can predicate of a grue object that it is green at $t-1$ and blue at $t+1$. Kripke essentially applies Goodman's sceptical technique about predication to rules (Kripke 20 ff.). Wittgenstein himself used a similar example, the one involving the recalcitrant pupil (PI §§143, 185). In §185, for instance, Wittgenstein considers that someone might understand the order "add 2" as "add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on". Nonetheless, since

an arithmetical operation like addition, but whose operator is "quus" (" \oplus ") rather than "plus" (Kripke 9):

$$x \oplus y = x + y, \text{ if } x, y < 57$$

$$x \oplus y = 5, \text{ if } x, y \geq 57$$

Kripke's sceptic asks, "How do you know that your response to '67 + 58' was always supposed to be '125' and not '5'?" The sceptic doubts whether anything that I have done in the past can justify the answer "125" rather than "5". It is quite possible that whenever I used "plus" in the past I always meant "quus" because, by hypothesis, I have never made it explicit for myself that I do not follow the rules of "quaddition" (Kripke 13). In other words, the actual use of "+" underdetermines which function is involved, because, by hypothesis, I always apply the function only to the finite range of numbers that are smaller than 57 although in fact I could have always meant "quaddition". On this account, no

Kripke's example involves rules, rather than colour predicates or orders given to pupils, it is much less plausible, because rules generally do not exist in isolation but are interconnected with other rules. Thus, for example, when we give the sum of 57 and 68 as 5 we also violate the rule that says that the addition of given two numbers cannot be smaller than either of the numbers to be added (see below).

function can have any meaning, because it is open to an infinity of interpretations. As Kripke claims,

When I respond in one way rather than another to such a problem as "68 + 57", I can have no justification for one response rather than another. Since the sceptic who supposes that I meant quus cannot be answered, there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning plus and my meaning quus. Indeed, there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning a definite function by "plus" (which determines my responses in new cases) and my meaning nothing at all. (21)

Kripke is not afraid to conclude that, were it not for the "sceptical solution", language would be meaningless, because "if there was no such thing as my meaning plus rather than quus in the past, neither can there be any such thing in the present" (Kripke 21). Kripke claims that a straight solution to the paradox must give an account of what present facts constitute my meaning plus and not quus, but this seems impossible because anything that I offer as a justification of my meaning plus rather than quus, be it my state of consciousness or my dispositions, may be rejected by the sceptic as open to further doubt. For example, a person's present dispositions can be

challenged by noting that we do not really know what are his present dispositions until he has acted on them and after he has acted in a given way we can challenge his claim that he acted as a result of his dispositions and so on.²⁹ The way in which we might challenge someone's dispositions is not important. The crucial point is that as long as we search for a *fact* that would constitute an individual's meaning plus we cannot attain our aim because *any fact* can be challenged *in principle*. In other words, if we want to give an account of our meaning plus, or our meaning anything at all, we have to abandon the idea that it is a fact that constitutes that meaning. This is the conclusion that Kripke draws from Wittgenstein when he says, prior to presenting his "sceptical solution" to the problem, that "there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word" (55). However, as we shall see in the next section, Kripke here misses the intent of Wittgenstein's arguments. The issue is not whether I am now following a rule in accord with how I previously followed it, but whether I am following the rule in accord with its meaning.

²⁹ Although this kind of scepticism must somehow challenge the facts that supposedly constitute an actor's meaning plus, this challenge need not involve the questioning of the actor's truthfulness at all. It is quite sufficient for us to question his ability to *discern* the relevant facts.

III.B KRIPKE'S WITTGENSTEIN AND THE REAL WITTGENSTEIN

Kripke claims that "Wittgenstein holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus" (70-1, cf. 21 ff.). This claim is incorrect because §201 of the *Investigations* is not concerned with Kripke-type "paradox", that no fact determines what a person means, but with a different paradox, that no rule can be followed without an interpretation (or so it seems), and yet this generates a regress of interpretations. It is also incorrect, or at least highly misleading, to say that Wittgenstein offers a "sceptical solution" because in the *Investigations* §201 Wittgenstein does not accept the sceptic's worries as legitimate in the first place. As I shall argue later in this section, given Wittgenstein's well-known view of the problems of philosophy in general and of paradoxical problems in particular, it is highly unlikely that Wittgenstein would seriously consider any need for a "solution" to Kripke-type scepticism. More importantly, however, I shall argue in the next section that in the *Investigations* §201, Wittgenstein immediately rejects the interlocutor's "sceptical paradox".

It is interesting that Kripke claims that Wittgenstein is a common sense philosopher (63), but goes on to attribute the

"sceptical paradox" to Wittgenstein. Kripke's "paradox" seems very remote from common sense and completely alien to Wittgenstein's usual philosophical positions. Kripke's "sceptical paradox" leads us to doubt whether we use our words in the same sense as we have done in the past, and ultimately we are led to a global scepticism according to which language is meaningless. This is precisely the kind of position that Wittgenstein has been against throughout his life, and hence it is very unlikely that Wittgenstein would seriously consider any need for the "sceptical solution" that Kripke ascribes to him as well. In the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein wrote:

Scepticism is *not* irrefutable, but *obvious nonsense* if it tries to doubt where no question can be asked. For doubt can only exist where a question exists; a question can only exist where an answer exists, and this can only exist where something *can be said*. (65, cf. TLP 6.51)

And in the late *On Certainty* he wrote in the same vein that

If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. (§115)

In other words, Wittgenstein claims that global scepticism is incoherent and that I can doubt only if I have a *ground* for doubting. In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein repudiates the kind of scepticism that is closely³⁰ related to Kripke's:

If someone wanted to arouse doubts in me and spoke like this: here your memory is deceiving you, there you've been taken in, there again you have not been thorough enough in satisfying yourself, etc., and if I did not allow myself to be shaken but kept to my certainty -- then my doing so cannot be wrong, even if only because this is just what defines a game. (§497)

Wittgenstein's general aim in doing philosophy is to eliminate philosophical muddles (PI §109), or more poetically, "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309). I have quoted Wittgenstein above as saying that scepticism is not irrefutable but obvious *nonsense*. It follows that it makes no

³⁰ Dr. Schroeder pointed out to me that in *On Certainty* Wittgenstein repudiates Pyrrhonic rather than semantic scepticism. I do not think that in the present instance it is useful to distinguish between different *kinds* of scepticism because, as I want to point out, Wittgenstein repudiates *all* scepticism.

sense to say that in the *Investigations* §201 Wittgenstein wants to offer a *solution* to the "sceptical paradox" because in the Wittgensteinian context, rather than looking for a solution to a paradox one should look for a *dissolution* of it.³¹

In the remainder of this chapter I shall explain the nature of Kripke's "sceptical paradox" and compare it with Wittgenstein's account of the paradox in the *Investigations* §201. In the next chapter I shall evaluate his "solution" to the paradox. I shall argue that there is no need for the "sceptical solution" because the "sceptical paradox" can be dissolved by paying attention to the "grammar" of the concept of "rule".

³¹ Dr. Schroeder has objected that the "sceptical solution" is precisely an attempt to dissolve the paradox. I want to suggest, however, that this formulation is highly misleading. Wittgenstein can be said to *dissolve* the paradox because he does not think that the paradox is genuine. The Community View theorists, on the other hand, have to offer their "sceptical solution", rather than dissolution, because they believe that the paradox is genuine.

III.C WITTGENSTEIN'S PARADOX

In the *Investigations* §201 Wittgenstein examines how it is possible for a rule to determine a unique course of action that agrees with it:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (PI §201)

I want to claim that while Wittgenstein speaks here of a "paradox" it is not Kripke's sceptical paradox at all. What at first appears to be a paradox is only a "misunderstanding" and Wittgenstein dissolves this misunderstanding right away, thereby eliminating any need for a "sceptical solution". Let me quote §201b, which is completely ignored by Kripke, and in which Wittgenstein immediately rejects the "sceptical paradox":

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contended us

at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.

It is clear that Wittgenstein does not reject the truism that rules guide action, but what he *does* reject is that all instances of following a rule must involve interpretations. In other words, Wittgenstein sees the "sceptical paradox" as relevant only to someone who believes that grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation, but he clearly states that we *need not* accept this picture. This directly conflicts with Kripke's *Wittgenstein*, because Kripke essentially tries to make plausible a view that Wittgenstein is attacking, namely, that the "sceptical paradox" makes our concept of rule incoherent, while claiming that it is Wittgenstein's own view. Kripke's sceptic at times shares his view with Wittgenstein's interlocutor, but not with Wittgenstein himself.³²

³² Kripke can be interpreted as claiming that his sceptic raises the doubts of Wittgenstein's interlocutor, while Kripke's solution gives Wittgenstein's response to the interlocutor. Although Kripke himself appears to think in this way I shall argue that Kripke's claims are misguided.

III.D REGULISM

The view that is espoused by Wittgenstein's interlocutor is usually designated as regulism. Regulism is the expression of a worry that is initially quite understandable, namely, how is it possible to decide what amounts to the right way of following a rule without a reference to an explicit rule? Suppose that in the Middle Ages there was a country in which the traffic code was not stated explicitly, for example, there might be only a *tradition* of driving on the right side of the road, or most people might simply be *inclined* to drive on the right side. In this case, and in all cases that are similar, the regulist would claim that we can speak of a rule only because we are able to make a reference to some kind of explicit rule. Although in our example we do not actually have an explicit rule, we can potentially state it ("Drive on the right side of the road"). The regulist claims that it is this explicit rule that underlies the practice of driving on the right side of the road because if there were no explicit rule it would not be possible to say that people are *supposed* to drive on the right side, that is, it would not be possible to say that someone has violated the rule by driving on the left side. The regulist believes that the implicit proprieties of practice are to be understood as expressions of some underlying rules that are explicit.

Therefore, the regulist's challenge is roughly this, "In what sense is it possible to 'adjudicate' between the right way and the wrong way of following a rule without an appeal to an explicit rule?"

In the *Investigations* §201, Wittgenstein answers the regulist's challenge by means of the regress of interpretations argument. Wittgenstein's interlocutor, who is a regulist, claims that every action in accordance with a rule is an interpretation of it by some other rule, that is to say, every implicit rule-following presupposes a reference to an underlying explicit rule. Wittgenstein answers his regulist interlocutor by noting that if you would always need one rule to interpret another then this would generate an infinite regress of interpretations. Wittgenstein's conclusion is that "there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not an interpretation*" (PI §201).

The application of a rule is something that can be done correctly or not and hence an action that is in accordance with one "interpretation" of a rule might not be in accordance with another. In Wittgenstein's sense, "interpretation" is something explicit, something that stands *between* the rule and the actual, practical application of the rule, and as a result an "interpretation" of a rule cannot *by itself* determine in which

way we are to follow it because otherwise we would need another interpretation "standing behind it" and this would lead to the regress of interpretations.³³

We have seen that the presupposition of the sceptic and of Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the *Investigations* §198 is that if meaning is to be "objective" (or perhaps merely possible) there must be something that determines the meaning ("interpretation") of a rule in all possible circumstances. Wittgenstein answers the sceptic in the *Investigations* §202 by saying that "obeying a rule" is a "practice". This answer entails that the practical, implicit rules are more fundamental to an account of rule-following than the theoretical, regulist, explicit rules. "But then," someone might object, "how is Wittgenstein's claim that 'obeying a rule' is a 'practice' different from Kripke's

³³ Wittgenstein's claim is that it makes no sense to speak of an interpretation if by "interpretation" we understand an intermediary between the rule and the application of the rule (what we actually do). There is, of course, nothing wrong with saying that someone interpreted a given rule by *acting* upon it in *practice* except that it conflicts with Wittgenstein's preferred usage of "interpretation". Wittgenstein's objections are directed only against the kind of interpretation that involves explicit, intellectualist rules.

'sceptical solution' that obeying a rule is 'a complete, actual practice of a community over time'?"³⁴ In the following section I shall explain why I think that Wittgenstein's concept of "practice" and the role of the community in his account of rules is quite different from that of Kripke.

III.E THE FOLLOWING OF A RULE IS A PRAXIS

When Wittgenstein claims that "following a rule" is a "practice", or a customary "way of acting" (PI §202), we need not think of this "practice" as "necessarily social" as Kripke and other Community View theorists do. It is true that Wittgenstein sometimes uses "practice" and "institution" interchangeably but I do not think that this is the case in the *Investigations* §202. While "institution" always refers to a *social* practice, *Praxis*³⁵ does not have to refer to a social practice at all. Wittgenstein's point is not that language is necessarily social

³⁴ I am thankful to Dr. Schroeder for raising this important objection.

³⁵ Wittgenstein's German expression *Praxis* is usually translated as "practice" and this preserves the original indeterminateness about the social aspect of following rules because *Praxis* can mean both an individual practice (drill, practicum) and social practice (institution).

but rather that "words are deeds". But if I say that a rule need not be "necessarily social" do not I imply that following a rule might be "private"? Does not Wittgenstein warn us in the *Investigations* §202 that "to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule"? Does it make sense to say, "the way the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken"? (RFM I/§2, my italics) I think that the point of the *Investigations* §202 is to show that following a rule is not an "inner process" -- what steps are to be taken is not determined by the "meaning in my head".

Wittgenstein makes a similar point in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* I/§3 where he notes that asking the question, "How do I know how to continue the series 20004, 20006, . . .?" is like asking, "How do I know that this colour is 'red'?" Wittgenstein wants to point out something like this. The private rule-following applies especially to mental ostensive definitions that presuppose that between my saying "red" and my seeing a red patch is a mediating mental process of recognition and this is precisely the kind of case in which following a rule and thinking one is following a rule collapse into each other. As if in the process of colour recognition it could make sense to have a mental colour chart that could be laid against the visual image of the red patch. To think that the process of recognition

necessarily involves mental images is incoherent precisely because those mental images themselves would be subject to "recognition". Similarly, one might think that between my doing x and my understanding the rule for x there necessarily intervenes an "interpretation" of x . We have seen that between my doing x and my understanding the rule for x there cannot be any intervening "interpretation" of x (the substitution of one expression of the rule for x for another) because this would lead to a regress of interpretations. Thus, what Wittgenstein claims in the *Investigations* §§201-2 is that the foundations of language games (being able to say "red", being able to follow a rule for x) are not in private experience, but in "practice", a normative regularity of conduct, and that following a rule cannot be a matter of "interpretation".

For Wittgenstein, a formulation of a rule is always open to interpretation, just like a signpost:

Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? (PI §85)

If we are confronted with the rule "add two" it will not do to mention the formula " $\Sigma a_n = 2x$ " since " $\Sigma a_n = 2x$ " is subject to interpretation as well. Enumerating the sequence of numbers "996, 998, 1000, 1002 and so on" exemplifies the succession " $\Sigma a_n = 2x$ " but the succession is still open to interpretation. (What do we mean by "and so on"? Do we mean "and so on" up to 2000 or do we mean "and so on *ad inf.*"? (cf. PI §208).)

In *The Idea of Social Science*, Winch brings up a similar example involving someone who is in the process of learning English. If we define to the pupil the word "Everest" ostensively (by actually pointing to the Mount Everest) we cannot be sure whether he has made the correct connection because he might think, for example, that we are ostensively defining for him the word "mountain". If the student of English made the correct connection, he would start to use the word "Everest" in the same way as we use it, but if he made the wrong connection, he would, for example, start to use the word "Everest" in the way that we use the expression "mountain". This shows that the meaning of the word "same" depends on the context in which we use it. The word "same" acquires a definite sense only by being used in accordance with a rule, for example, a man who uses the word "mountain" to refer to Mount Everest on one occasion and Mont Blanc on another occasion uses the word "mountain" in accordance

with our ordinary rules. One of the consequences that we can draw from this example is that it is insufficient to say that someone is following a rule if he acts on the same occasion in the same manner because the very meaning of the word "same" is partly drawn from the rule itself. In other words, there is an internal relation between the concepts "rule" and "same" or, as Wittgenstein puts it, "The use of the word `rule' and the use of the word `same' are interwoven" (*Investigations* §225, cf. *The Idea* 27-8). But it is not just the internal relations between the central concepts that are involved in rule-following that are of interest to us, it is also the internal relation between these concepts and the *Praxis* of rule-following itself. I shall devote the next chapter, in part, to issues of this kind.

IV. THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION

IV.A THE COMMUNITY VIEW

Let me now examine Kripke's solution to the "paradox" of the *Investigations* §201. As I have noted in II.A, Kripke is a reductionist, and to be more precise he espouses a somewhat idiosyncratic form of actualism. Kripke's idiosyncrasy consists in his denial that the community determines the correctness of an application of a rule, or at least that it determines it in any direct manner. Instead of the usual claim of the Community View theorists that what amounts to the correct way of following a rule is the kind of rule-following that most members of the community engage in, Kripke offers us the platitude that "if everyone agrees upon a certain answer, then no one will feel justified in calling the answer wrong" (112).

We shall initially ask whether, apart from Wittgenstein's accepting the "sceptical paradox" or not, the "sceptical solution", for example Kripke's Community View, is a valid account of how meaning is possible. Thinkers like Kripke believe that the scepticism about rules applies only to the individualistic conception of rule-following. According to Kripke, when someone uses a word correctly he uses it in

agreement with a linguistic community. That someone means addition by "+" is warranted only if his responses agree with those of some community in which "+" is used. Kripke thus conceives the concept of rule (and meaning) to be essentially social rather than individualistic. To follow a rule means to act such that one's responses agree with those of a particular community (Kripke 96). But what is so special about a community that only the community can determine meaning? Or is Kripke's point that what is meant by "correct" is simply what most people do? Does it make sense to conceive normativity in "democratic" terms?

Kripke's solution to the "sceptical paradox" consists in the community "fixing", albeit in a somewhat loose sense, the meaning of utterances in all possible circumstances, and thereby preventing the introduction of unwanted interpretations of a rule. Kripke summarizes his position as follows:

Jones is entitled, subject to correction by others, provisionally to say, "I mean addition by `plus'", whenever he has the feeling of confidence -- "now I can go on!" -- that he can give "correct" responses in new cases; and he is entitled, again provisionally and subject to correction by others, to judge a new response to be "correct" simply

because it is the response he is inclined to give. These inclinations (both Jones's general inclination that he has "got it" and his particular inclination to give particular answers in particular addition problems) are to be regarded as primitive. (90-1)

But does it make sense to reduce normativity to a "feeling of confidence" or an inclination (whether individual or communal)? It is logically impossible to give an account of normativity by referring to what people *would* do in given circumstances unless we presuppose that their dispositions either constitute or comply with a standard of correctness, a rule. However, saying that the community has to comply with a given standard of correctness amounts to the denial of the community disposition thesis because the community disposition thesis was supposed to give a reductive analysis of rules in terms of community dispositions. To give an analysis of rules in terms of community dispositions that are themselves subject to standards of correctness is to give up the possibility of reduction. We are thus left with the claim that following a rule *correctly* amounts to acting in the same way as most people are inclined to, and this does not seem right. As Baker and Hacker put it,

There is something very wrong about recent talk of "following one's inclinations" when applying rules. We do not teach children arithmetic by teaching them to follow their *inclinations*. We do not even teach them to have the same *inclinations* as we have. We teach them to follow arithmetical *rules*, we teach them that getting such-and-such results is what *counts* as following this or that rule. (SRL 39, n. 56)

Thus, it makes no sense to say that when we follow rules, we simply follow our inclinations. Here the defender of the community disposition thesis might think of normativity as of the rules of English spelling. What is the "correct" spelling in given circumstances is the spelling that linguists encounter most often in corpus dictionaries³⁶ and is eventually taught in schools. From the fact that normative practice may *sometimes* be collective does not follow that the kind of normativity that is involved in language and mind is a matter of collective

³⁶ Corpus dictionaries, unlike conventional dictionaries, are not prescriptive but merely descriptive. Whereas corpus dictionaries merely *describe* the most common usage of a word that we can encounter in books, periodicals and ordinary speech, conventional dictionaries can be taken to *prescribe* how we should use a given word or which word is appropriate in a given context.

dispositions. The only way that the community could determine the application of a rule would be if the community as a whole could not be wrong in accepting a given interpretation, but this makes no sense:

If the leader of the community instructed his people to sacrifice to the gods on midsummer's day, they may well miscalculate the day, and later discover that they had misapplied the law (equally, just one of them might make this discovery, and despite his being right, be disbelieved by the rest). So, up to a point, general consensus is compatible with misapplication. (SRL 74)

While I believe that the point that Baker and Hacker make regarding the possibility of a community being wrong in accepting an interpretation of a rule clearly shows that Kripke's view is untenable, Dr. Schroeder raised the following objection on behalf of Kripke:

There might be a gap between what the community accepts at a certain time and what the community accepts on average over many different times. One could make the average determine the true norm, not the present inclinations.

Although this objection is quite interesting I do not think that it can work. If we would allow a gap to exist between what the community accepts at t_1 and what the community accepts at t_2 , then it would follow that either the community was right at t_1 or it was right at t_2 . Saying that the community was right about the application of a rule at t_1 , for example, would raise the question of what it is about the actual behaviour (or dispositions) of the community at t_1 which makes the community right about the application of the rule. Of course, saying that at t_1 it is also something else besides the actual behaviour (or dispositions) of the community that determines what amounts to the right way of following a rule would grant me my point that the actual behaviour (or dispositions) of the community cannot determine what amounts to the right way of following a rule.

The second part of the objection suggests that we could take the average to "determine the true norm, not the present inclinations". Here I only need to refer back to the spelling example. Most North Americans do not spell certain words according to the rules of English spelling (or it is possible to imagine that this is the case for the sake of the argument). Does it follow that the average actual behaviour or dispositions of the community can determine the rules of English spelling? Unless I am inclined to believe that I can learn how to spell

from my first year students then there is no way that talking about the *average* inclinations of the community can be helpful.

It is true that rule-following presupposes agreement, but community agreement *by itself* cannot usually make a particular instance of rule-following "correct" or "incorrect".³⁷ McDowell makes the same point when he notes that Kripke's theory is not able to distinguish between the *normative status* of a claim (the claim's being correct according to some objective standard) and the *normative attitude* that a community has towards it (that most members of a community are inclined to believe that *x* is the case) (Brandom 660, n. 52). The "community" is made up of people who often make quite *different* assessments. Moreover, the value that is given to an assessment by an individual member of a community is not always the same, because certain members of a community are experts, have a different social status, and so

³⁷ Cases where the community can make instances of rule-following correct or incorrect are usually those where the rules are not established with any degree of permanence (Latin grammar before any grammarians came along). The general point here is that the community is only one of the sources of correctness. The others include tradition, the experts, explicit rules of various sorts, but also, perhaps, people in a position of power or authority.

on. Kripke is aware of the difficulties that the community view involves, and he states his views carefully:

What follows from these assertability conditions is not that the answer everyone gives to an addition problem is, by definition, the correct one, but rather the platitude that, if everyone agrees upon a certain answer, then no one will feel justified in calling the answer wrong. (112)

What seems certain, however, is that for Kripke our justifications are ultimately sanctioned by the actual behaviour of the community, but as Baker and Hacker point out,

these too can be challenged by a tough-minded sceptic. And at this point we can give him no further justification. All we can do is huddle together and announce in unison: "This is what we do". (SRL 70)

But in that case we need to ask what role the community has in our justifications. There seems to be no reason for the community having a "special status" for our justifications. How is the community view's bedrock, "This is what we do", different from, or superior to, the individual's bedrock, "This is simply what I do"? (PI §217, my italics) The danger here seems to be

that the Community View theorists might think that the community provides an "objective" interpretation (not "interpretation"!) of a rule, "objective" in the sense that the interpretation does not belong to anyone in particular. Given a certain rule, the community follows it (interprets it) in a certain way and thereby provides a standard of correctness for all members of the community. This "standard of correctness" can be nothing more than an objective interpretation of a rule because it is possible to imagine that an individual, another community or the same community at a different time would interpret (follow) the rule in a different way. Thus, the Community View theorists believe that the community provides a standard of correctness which makes particular interpretations (cases of rule-following) right or wrong whereas, as we have seen, the standards of correctness are not created by a community (the community can provide us only with objective interpretations of a rule) but by a practice. However, as I have pointed out above, the presupposition that the application of a rule must be mediated by an interpretation, whether individual or "objective" (social), is precisely the target of Wittgenstein's attack in the *Investigations* §201 and elsewhere. The presupposition of the sceptic is this: if meaning is to be "objective" (or perhaps merely possible) there must be *something* that "fixes" the meaning in all possible circumstances. It is precisely this craving for the "something",

the rational basis that Wittgenstein repudiates, that leads Kripke to introduce the community:

Eventually the process must stop -- "justifications come to an end somewhere" -- and I am left with a rule which is completely unreduced to any other. How can I justify my present application of such a rule, when a sceptic could easily interpret it so as to yield any of an indefinite number of other results? It seems that my application of it is an unjustified stab in the dark. I apply the rule *blindly*. (Kripke 17)

Yes, reasons *must* come to an end, but so should the worry that my application is an "unjustified stab in the dark" because having exhausted all justifications is not the same as not having any justification at all. We can think of our justifications as of an "ornamental coping that supports nothing" (PI §217). My understanding of a rule cannot be exhibited by an "interpretation", but only by actually following it or, as Wittgenstein puts it:

As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. (OC §110)

But even ungrounded action, as opposed to mere behaviour, is always in some sense rooted in practice, or better, a normative regularity of conduct. If we believe that this "practice" need not be social then the claim that normativity involves a regularity of conduct may be taken to imply that whether Robinson Crusoe is following a rule correctly is not determined by what others are or might be doing. Kripke, however, seems to claim the opposite:

The falsity of the private model need not mean that a *physically isolated* individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual, *considered in isolation* (whether or not he is physically isolated), cannot be said to do so. (Kripke 110)

In other words, an individual considered independently of his community cannot be said to follow any rules at all. But why should one think that only socialised people can follow rules and create meanings? Is it because unsocialised people, people living in a complete absence of ordinary social milieu, lack language? We may observe that only people can give reasons for following rules and only people can follow rules of high complexity, but giving actual reasons need not come into their rule-following at all and the rules that they follow may be the

simple rules that animals are capable of according with as well. Given that A acts in accordance with a rule *r* there is no reason to think that the actions of B and C (in respect of *r*) somehow determine whether A is following *r* or not. Whether A is following *r* depends only on A's actions and what *r* is. What is then the role of the community in the *Investigations*? In the following section I shall argue that whatever role the community has in Wittgenstein's account this role is not reductive as is the case with the Community View theorists. The practice of the community provides us with language and thereby with concepts but the community itself cannot *determine* the standards of correctness that are relevant to language and mind.

IV.B PRIVATE RULE-FOLLOWING

In the *Investigations* §199 Wittgenstein asks, "Is what we call 'obeying a rule' something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do so only once in his life?" and he answers, "It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule". McGinn rightly asks what is going on here -- why is Wittgenstein only half-answering his question? What becomes of the "one man"?³⁵ McGinn suggests

³⁵ Dr. Gerwin has suggested to me that rather than asking whether a particular rule might be followed only once by only one

that if there is just one man then he must follow a given rule more than once, but if there is more than one man then it is sufficient that the rule *be followed* more than once -- regardless of whether an individual man follows the rule just once or not at all (McGinn 80-1). In other words, the possibility of rules depends on their being followed on more than one occasion, but

person the question might ask "whether there might be only one occasion on which any person followed any rule". In other words, the question would be asking whether a totally unprecedented rule-following would be possible. Wittgenstein has italicised "one" in "one man" and this to me indicates that he is concerned with the question whether a particular individual can follow a rule for the first time. But this is compatible with saying that Wittgenstein is concerned with the question of whether unprecedented rule-following is possible because a particular individual can follow a rule, for all we know, that has never been followed before in his community or outside it. The view that it is impossible for any man to follow any rule for the first time springs from the strong community thesis which claims that an individual cannot follow a rule if there is no precedent in the practice of the community. But the strong community thesis is clearly absurd because it does not allow for any innovative rule-following. (For following a rule for the first time see below in this section.)

there is no requirement that these rules be previously established within a community. This "multiple use conception of following a rule"³⁹ (for lack of a better designation) has a much greater "family resemblance" to the positions of Dretske, Papineau and other contemporary philosophers than the community view conception of rule-following. For example, in Dretske's learning-history move the emphasis is also on the multiplicity of accordances with a norm rather than on the multiplicity of learners who accord with the norm, that is to say, according to

³⁹ In the multiple use conception of following a rule, the emphasis is on the multiplicity of rule-following rather than on the multiplicity of rule-followers. There is an apparent difficulty with this view when we are confronted with rules that have never been followed, for example, the rules of a boring game or the rules for the evacuation of the vicinity of a nuclear power plant that has never had any kind of accident. The reason why we can sometimes speak of rules even though no one has ever followed them is that we understand what the rules mean and how we would go about following those rules (this could not be said about a rule that would, for example, attempt to instruct us how we should draw a round square). Therefore, although the multiple use conception of rule-following is clearly not applicable to explicit rules that have never been followed, we can use this conception to elucidate cases of following implicit rules.

both views the community is not regarded as the primary source of normativity. But otherwise there are, of course, radical differences between Dretske and the multiple use conception of rule-following. The multiple use conception, which I take to be Wittgenstein's own position, assumes that meaning is use and that words have meaning because they are used *repeatedly* in a given way. It so happens that most examples of meaning that we usually come to think of are cases of conventional meaning but this, of course, does not entail that conventional meaning is the *only* kind of meaning -- or that it is the only "real meaning". The multiple use conception of rule-following does entail that one can follow a rule only in virtue of that rule being part of a "practice" or "custom" (cf. PI §202), but we should not think that "practices" and "customs" are inconceivable in social isolation. Thus, according to the multiple use conception of rule-following, normativity arises out of a regularity of conduct of sufficient complexity, whether individual or social, although, of course, this is not to say that normativity is reducible to regularities of conduct.

Baker and Hacker claim that Crusoe living on a solitary island can distinguish when he follows a rule and when he does not without any reference to a community:

If, when drunk, Crusoe plays patience ("Solitaire"!) and, putting down two red cards instead of one, thinks that the game has come out, then he is under the illusion that he has followed the rules of the game. And when he wakes up in the morning and looks at the cards left on the table, he will realize, just as you or I would, that he has broken the rules. How does he know that the rules of patience do not dictate "When drunk, put down two red cards . . ."? How does he know that last night he was not playing such a version of patience? Exactly as anyone else knows or would know! That is not what he calls "patience". That is not what he calls "a correct move". (SRL 80)

It is clear that Crusoe can have understanding of "patience" independently of a community, because it is quite possible that the majority of people in the community have no understanding of -- that is, they can misapply the rules for -- "patience". It is logically possible, although not likely, that Crusoe be right in his application of a rule of "patience" while the entire community is wrong.

Patience is a game that is socially well-established and someone might think that Crusoe can be said to follow its rules only because there is behavioural isomorphism between the

solitary Crusoe and the social practices of a physically distant community.⁴⁰ That is not the case. Suppose that Crusoe becomes tired of the old patience and decides to play a new game that he is going to call qatience. No one has ever played qatience before and Crusoe is the first person to follow the rules of qatience; the rules of qatience exist only in Crusoe's mind. If Crusoe starts to like qatience and he plays it many times then he is clearly following the rules of qatience. But let us suppose that Crusoe does not like qatience and he is going to play it only once. Should we say that Crusoe has followed the rules of qatience that have existed only in his mind even though he has played in accordance with those rules only once? Our intuition is to say that Crusoe *did* follow the rules of qatience even though he has played it only once, but this would seem to go against what I have said above about rule-following, namely that rule-following is a matter of social practice or it requires multiple occasions. I would like to suggest, following Wittgenstein, that Crusoe does in fact follow the rules of qatience because he already has a general conception of what game is and what it is like to follow the rules of games, or to put it differently, Crusoe had been already initiated into the social practice of playing games. Wittgenstein makes a closely related point in Manuscript 164:

⁴⁰ This is, roughly, Kripke's view (cf. Kripke 110).

Granted, I could invent a board game today which was never actually played. I would simply describe it. But that is possible only because similar games already exist, that is, because such games are *played*. (Man. 164, 93, quoted by Hallett 287-8; cf. *Investigations* §204)

In other words, even if Crusoe only writes down the rules of qatience without ever playing it once, we can already speak about rules because Crusoe has a conception of game rules and what following game rules is like. Claiming that Crusoe cannot follow the rules of qatience because no one has ever played qatience before would be unintelligible. Individual rule-following has to be possible or else no one would be able to state new rules and follow them for the first time. We would be limited only to the rules that are already part of our social life and this position is clearly untenable. As we have seen above, rules are related *internally* to their applications -- they are not related *externally* to a communal agreement. Whether one understands a rule depends on whether he is able to follow it, and what counts as following it is possible to determine only in the context of social practice and a regular use of that rule.

But does not the multiple use conception of rule-following leave our flanks open to the attack of the sceptic, who can

always claim that I can never know whether what I mean by "+" today is the same as yesterday? Does it follow that since reasons come to an end what we mean by a given rule just "hangs in the air"? What we mean by a given a rule *appears* to "hang in the air" in the sense that we cannot give any further justification for the rule, but in the more important sense it does not "hang in the air" at all because what we mean by a rule is "grounded" in our *ability* to act in accordance with the rule. As McGinn puts it:

of course our reasons come to an end but this does not mean we are in any sort of epistemological trouble: that I cannot *prove* to a determined sceptic that my present use of "+" is correct does not show that I do not know how to apply it correctly or that I have anything less than a perfect right to proceed as I feel inclined. (72)

As we have seen above, we can doubt only if we have a ground for doubting. Only if there are genuine rules, only if something counts as following a rule, and everything else as going against it, is there a possibility to interpret a rule correctly or incorrectly. It makes sense to doubt the individual steps within a language game, but it makes no sense to doubt the language game itself.

Therefore, Kripke's proposed "sceptical solution" is unnecessary because the "sceptical paradox" dissolves by itself when we realise that the sceptic's global doubt is incoherent. As I have argued above, the sceptical solution goes against Wittgenstein's claim that a rule can be applied without being interpreted because the "community standard" that the sceptical solution provides us with is nothing more than an objective interpretation of rules. I should like to say that following a rule is ultimately not mediated by any interpretation at all: when one acts, all interpretation must cease. In other words, in the end I follow the rule "blindly", but this "blindness" is like that of a bat because there is no need to "see" further justifications. Wittgenstein's presentation of the "paradox" in the *Investigations* §201 is not intended to put forward a new kind of scepticism; rather it is yet another attack on the inner process model: Wittgenstein's emphatic denial that following a rule involves the inner process of "interpretation".

V. SANCTIONS AND PRACTICES

V.A INTRODUCTION TO BRANDOM

In this chapter I would like to develop the distinction between implicit rules and non-rational norms that I have made in chapter I. This distinction is difficult to make but at the same time it is central to the Wittgensteinian conception of rules. Part of the difficulty in making the distinction between implicit rules and non-rational norms stems from the fact that an implicit rule can be distinguished from a non-rational norm only by its origin. But if we were unable to give an account of implicit rules then we would be left only with explicit rules on the one hand and non-rational norms (as distinct from rules) on the other. Explicit rules are quite insufficient for the Wittgensteinian account of normativity because, as we have seen above, they ultimately lead to regulism and to the regress of interpretations. However, non-rational norms are also insufficient because these norms operate at the unconscious level while rationality, the asking for and giving of reasons, is central to the Wittgensteinian account of normativity (cf. WRGN 45). It follows that in the absence of following implicit rules the account of normativity that one could give would have to make use of non-rational norms, perhaps even including the

sort of norms that are at the basis of teleosemanticism, and this would, of course, amount to the denial of the Wittgensteinian conception of normativity.⁴²

I am also going to challenge the coherence of Brandom's two claims that (1) the norms that are relevant to language and mind are created at the unconscious level by social practices while at the same time (2) the social practices that animals engage in are not normative, or at least not normative in the crucial sense of being able to give rise to an animal mind. Brandom is well aware of this difficulty and he tries to resolve it by claiming that animals do not have minds because the norms that animals can be subjected to do not have sufficient complexity for the creation of the mind. Although I think that Brandom's way of dealing with this difficulty is along the right lines it cannot adequately resolve the question whether animals have minds or not. I shall suggest that the main reason why Brandom's kind of answer does not work is that if we allow the creation of the norms that are relevant to language and mind to occur at the unconscious level then there are no good reasons for claiming, as Brandom claims,

⁴² A similar point was made by Dr. Schroeder in his talk on Robert Brandom entitled "Troubling Foundations for Cathedral Semantics", although the conclusions that he has drawn from it were radically different.

that animals do not have beliefs, desires, and intentions, in short that animals do not have minds, because we do not have good criteria for deciding what norms are complex and what norms are simple. I think that in Brandom's case the view that the complex norms are the ones that give rise to language is lurking in the background and if this were indeed the case then Brandom would not be able to distinguish between simple and complex norms in a non-question-begging way. It is of no help to claim that the complex norms are the ones responsible for language and mind when the initial question was how we distinguish what practices can give rise to mind.

In examining Robert Brandom's conception of normativity in *Making it Explicit*, I shall agree closely with Brandom's view that the community is central to an account of rules (norms) and that only rational beings can follow rules. Moreover, I shall agree with Brandom that it makes no sense to reduce normativity to something nonnormative, such as dispositions to act, although I shall argue that Brandom's own position comes dangerously close to reductionism. Finally, I shall address Brandom's view of rewards and punishments. I shall claim that even though rewards and punishments can be normative, Brandom's emphasis on reward and punishment in the context of social interaction cannot

provide us with an account of the kind of normativity that is necessary for language and mind.

In *Making It Explicit*, Robert Brandom attempts to explicate implicit rule-following in terms of the practice of sanctioning (37). As I have pointed out above, an account of implicit rule-following is vital to the Wittgensteinian conception of normativity. However, Brandom's way of dealing with this issue is problematic because although he gives a clear expression of certain ideas that are only latent in the *Investigations*, he also appears to give a reductionist account of normativity that might (*prima facie*) endanger the entire Wittgensteinian conception of normativity. Brandom is quite friendly to the Wittgensteinian conception of rule-following and himself claims to pursue three of Wittgenstein's grand themes:

The insistence on the *normative* character of language and intentionality, the *pragmatist* commitment to understanding these norms in terms of practices rather than exclusively in terms of rules, and the recognition of the essentially *social* character of such norms. (Brandom 55)

Brandom stipulates the meaning of "rule" as "explicit rule" and uses the expression "norm" where more orthodox Wittgensteinians

would prefer "implicit rule". But this is not merely a point about usage because, as I shall argue, Brandom in the end cannot adequately distinguish between non-rational norms and implicit rules. This is all the more dangerous because a teleosemanticist can use Brandom's claims to point out the ultimately somewhat elusive role that rules play in the Wittgensteinian account of normativity. If rules were grounded in non-rational norms, as Brandom's position can be interpreted to be by an unfriendly critic, would not the postulation of rules be merely secondary to a viable account of normativity?

V.B NORMATIVITY AND CONDITIONING

Brandom takes as his starting point Wittgenstein's claim that the connection between an expression of a rule and the act that counts as in accord with it is forged, among other means, by training. Someone like Brandom, who believes that this connection is central, is understandably dissatisfied with Wittgenstein's cursory treatment of this issue:

What has the expression of a rule -- say a sign-post -- got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? -- Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to

react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so
react to it. (PI §198)

Wittgenstein leaves it at that. Brandom generalises from training⁴² to make the claim that the kind of normativity which is relevant to language and mind is established by current practices of reward and punishment, that is, by the repeated application of reward for correct performance and punishment for incorrect performance. In normative terms:

Only insofar as regularities are brought about and sustained by effective assessments of propriety, in the form of responsive classifications of performances as correct or incorrect, are regularities taken to have specifically normative force. The possibility of incorrect, inappropriate, or mistaken performances -- those that do not accord with the norm -- is explicitly allowed for. (Brandom 35)

By applying reward and punishment to normativity, Brandom is able to explain how norms can arise in people who are subject to

⁴² Training often takes the form of conditioning but it would be a serious mistake to regard "training" and "conditioning" as more or less interchangeable.

reward and punishment. Brandom gives an example of a sanctioner who guards the entrance into a hut and beats with a stick anyone who enters the hut without a given leaf (44). The beating with a stick creates a norm that can be made explicit as, for example, "Do not enter the hut without a leaf". However, it must be realised that in this context Brandom need not talk about explicit rules at all because he believes, like Wittgenstein, that implicit rules (norms) are more fundamental than explicit ones (Brandom 26). It is merely a contingent fact that we can make Brandom's kind of norms explicit (just as we can give a verbal expression to biological norms).

V.C DIFFICULTIES WITH BRANDOM'S ACCOUNT

However, someone might rightly ask about the source of normativity for people who apply reward and punishment to others. If one were to say that the sanctioners follow explicit rules then that would make Brandom's account susceptible to the criticism of the regress argument. But if one were to say that the sanctioners follow implicit rules then we are immediately faced with the question of who inculcated these rules in the sanctioners. Brandom here needs to postulate other sanctioners who themselves have been sanctioned previously and this creates the difficulty of our not being able to account for an origin of

a given practice. What would it mean to say that a new practice emerged in a society? I think that the way that he answers this difficulty is very illustrative of the connection between his sanction theory and Wittgenstein. Brandom claims that

The issue of what it would be for there to be norms implicit in practice ought to be kept distinct from the issue of how such practices might in fact plausibly arise. (Brandom 658-9, note 45)

In other words, Brandom dismisses questions about the ultimate emergence of normativity as irrelevant. For Brandom, norms have their origin in what we might call "practices of sanctioning" and the questions about the origin of these practices have no bearing on whether or not certain rules of language, conduct and so on exist at the present. For Wittgenstein, rules have their origin in "forms of life" and it makes no sense to try to go "beyond" the form of life and ask about its emergence. However, it is essential to both Wittgenstein and Brandom that the question of the emergence of practices is somehow dismissed, and I think that Brandom's answer in the end boils down to the same answer that Wittgenstein gives.

V.D INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SANCTIONS

Brandom gives his theory an interesting twist by introducing the concept of "internal" and "external" sanctions. External sanctions are specifiable in nonnormative terms (beating with sticks, incarceration) whereas internal sanctions are specifiable only in terms of other norms ("No picnic this weekend allowed!", "You will not be permitted to attend the festival!") (44). Initially, it would seem that a viable account of normativity has to rely ultimately on the existence of external sanctions (Brandom 161 ff.). It is true, a critic might say, that sanctions can be specified in normative terms; but if there were no sanctions behind norms at all then norms would ultimately fail to have (normative) compulsion. This view seems *prima facie* persuasive because to a large extent it coincides with our common sense understanding of social norms (the law of the road, for example) as being "backed up" or "substantiated" by sanctions or penalties. But how about the rules of chess? The rules of chess surely cannot be reduced to any sanctions and this is true of a great many of other rules. Clearly, that some social norms have to be enforced by means of threats, penalties or incarceration does not show at all that external sanctions are necessary for normativity. As Wittgenstein points out:

And if e.g. you play a game, you hold by its rules. And it is an interesting fact that people set up rules for pleasure, and then hold by them. (RFM V.45)

Under the Brandomian account of normativity, internal sanctions do not depend on external sanctions, which is clear from Brandom's vehement rejection of normative reductionism, in particular of dispositionalism:

The social regularity view conflates [norms implicit in practice and matter-of-fact regularities (individual and communal, e.g. the regularities of measuring)], and so misunderstands Wittgenstein's remarks about the significance of matter-of-factual regularities, by taking them to involve commitment to the possibility of a reduction of the normative to the dispositional. (46)

Brandom thus insists, following Wittgenstein, that dispositions are not normative (cf. Brandom 29). In fact, Brandom's conception of internal sanctions is designed precisely to halt attempts for reducing the normative into something nonnormative. If we would interpret Brandom's internal sanctions as ultimately having their foundation in external sanctions then we would have to regard him as a normative reductionist because normativity

would have foundation in external facts, for example, in beating with a stick.

But although Brandom is probably right that the kind of normativity that is relevant to language and mind may be created by the repeated application of reward for correct performance and punishment for incorrect performance, it is clearly not true that *all* action is the result of sanctions, even if "internal", in any strong sense. I have quoted Wittgenstein above as noting that people set up rules for pleasure and then hold by them. I can even invent rules of a simple game that I shall play only by myself, perhaps something like solitaire. But where does reward and punishment come into this? What kind of sanction is involved if I break a rule of solitaire other than the fact that I do not play solitaire any more? I do not think that it is helpful to say that the fact that I am not playing solitaire any more is a punishment. The only plausible objection, at least *prima facie*, that a would-be Brandomian could make is to note that when I *do* play solitaire then I gain a reward from it, namely playing it gives me pleasure. But this kind of objection is confused because it conflates the supposedly normative reward with the clearly nonnormative pleasure. There cannot be anything normative about my having pleasure while playing solitaire just as there cannot be anything normative about my other dispositions

-- after all, I could be disposed to dislike solitaire. We can make a similar kind of observation about all activities that people engage in for pleasure -- reading Plato or Tolstoy, going for a walk, listening to a Chopin concerto. We can be disposed to engage in these activities or we can feel that they are important, but we do not engage in these sorts of activities because of a possible reward or punishment. I think that Brandom's account cannot deal adequately with cases like these, and hence the account relying on repeated use, which I have discussed in the previous two chapters and which I take to reflect Wittgenstein's own view, is preferable to Brandom's. Brandom's account can perhaps clarify certain aspects of rule-following but it cannot adequately address rule-following in general.

Although I have noted that the multiple use conception of rule-following is preferable to Brandom's account I did not want to suggest, contrary to Brandom, that the community has no place in our rule-following. I believe that the community has a key role in an account of rule-following, but its role is not on the stage. The role of the community is like that of a stage-setter whose task is to set the stage with props for the use of the actors without partaking in the play himself. The practice of the community over long periods of time provides the individual agents with a complex framework of concepts or rules that the

agents can follow. However, the community is not somehow "above" the framework of concepts and rules, but is rather constituted by these concepts and rules. After all, the community is not a special kind of metaphysical entity that can create and determine the meaning of rules, as the Community View theorists seem to imply, but rather the community is a collection of individual rule-followers who can be correct in their application of a rule in virtue of an accord between the rule and its application, not in virtue of an accord between the individual's application and the community's majority or average application. Although individual agents can give rise to rules by a repeated practice, the individuals can typically partake in that practice only in virtue of possessing certain concepts that are given them by the community. But even though I have made some arguments that support this view of normativity in the previous chapters I shall not argue for it any further.

V.E BRANDOM ON ANIMALS AND INTERNAL SANCTIONS

Sanctions that give rise to language and mind depend entirely on internal sanctions, that is, on a normative system that does not involve any external sanctions. Only sapient beings can be subjected to internal sanctions, because internal sanctions involve reasons and thereby also a propositional

content (cf. Brandom 42 ff.). Brandom concedes that the emphasis on sapience risks "ignoring the sorts of beliefs and desires that are appropriately attributed to non- or pre-linguistic animals" (Brandom 7) but nonetheless goes on to say that animals do not have minds and hence also lack beliefs, desires, and intentions in the literal sense. A dog has beliefs only in the metaphorical sense in which machines with sensors can be said to possess "beliefs" about states of affairs in the physical world. Brandom would thus say that animals possess only derived (or metaphorical) intentionality whereas language users possess intrinsic intentionality. I shall suggest that given the general scheme of Brandom's account, he is committed to the view that animals do have minds.

Let us now reconsider Brandom's example with the sanctioner guarding the entrance into a hut. Suppose that the sanctioner who guards the entrance into the hut is particularly diligent and when a dog attempts to enter the hut he hits it several times with a stick. Further suppose that the dog is quite intelligent and after some time it is able to enter the hut with a leaf in its mouth.⁴³ Let us also suppose that a human being was

⁴³ Hitting the dog with a stick would not probably be the best way to train the dog to behave in accordance with the "leaf rule". It would most probably be better to use positive

conditioned by the sanctioner in the same manner and that the same results were achieved -- both the human being and the dog now enter the hut only with the prescribed leaf. Can we say that both in the case of the human being and the dog a norm was created? Brandom would probably say "yes" and he might even allow that the same norm was created both in the case of the dog and in that of the human being. But suppose that the sanctioner did not actually hit the human being with a stick but was only *supposed* to do so. In this case, the human being would be conditioned only by means of an internal sanction, by the *possibility* of being hit. But internal sanctions need not involve physical threats at all. Internal sanctions can involve, for example, the possibility that A might not be permitted to attend a particular festival. We assume that A has a desire to attend the festival and hence the denial of the permission to attend works as an internal sanction. Since a dog, for obvious reasons, could not be subjected to this kind of internal sanction, we can say that the main difference between conditioning people and animals is that in the case of animals, norms have to be reduced to something nonnormative whereas in the

reinforcement (a piece of meat, for example) to train the dog to "do" the trick; but since Brandom seems to have an enormous predilection for hitting with sticks as a method of sanctioning, let us suppose that hitting the dog with a stick really works.

case of sapient beings there is no (theoretical) need for this kind of reduction to the nonnormative. In other words, the norms of animals are reducible to external sanctions whereas the norms of human beings need not be reducible to external sanctions and can consist (theoretically) only of internal sanctions. Moreover, Brandom claims that the difference between men and animals is also in the complexity of norms that each can accord with. Men can engage in highly complex activities whereas animal behaviour can be subjected only to comparatively simple normative systems.

Internal sanctions are central to Brandom's account of normativity. However, we should not think that internal sanctions take the form of explicit rules because Brandom is well aware of the dangers of regulism. That is to say, if society was made up, from the normative point of view, merely of large sets of explicit rules, then Brandom's project would be incoherent. Brandom thus needs to connect somehow internal sanctions with social practices, and he does this by noting that social practices can be normative because society as a whole tends to reduce unwanted behaviour and encourage desired behaviour. But if Brandom wants to explain the creation of norms at the social level by appealing to internal sanctions then he must appeal to a form of encouragement of desired behaviour and discouragement of

unwanted behaviour that will operate at the *unconscious* level, or implicitly.⁴⁴ But if this is the case, if Brandomian norms really operate at the unconscious level, someone might ask how is the creation of norms in animals really different from the creation of norms in human beings. Of course, Brandom will reply that the difference is in the complexity of norms and in the possibility of their reduction to something nonnormative. For Brandom, to have sapience (and mind) one has to have reasons for his behaviour. The trouble with Brandom's theory is that one need not have reasons for the type of behaviour that is the result of Brandomian norms, because this behaviour can be inculcated unconsciously, and reasons, of course, do not exist at the unconscious level. It would thus seem that the sharp distinction between sapients and non-sapients that Brandom makes at the beginning of *Making it Explicit* is invalid on his own account. If we allow that both human and animal behaviour can result from Brandomian norms, then, given that we subscribe to a normative theory of mind, it seems incoherent to claim, as Brandom claims, that animals do not have beliefs, desires, and intentions, in short that they lack mind (cf. Brandom 7). I personally do not see any danger in allowing animals to have beliefs and mind -- given that we are well aware that animals'

⁴⁴ But, of course, the fact that Brandom relies on operant conditioning need not mean that he is a reductionist.

beliefs are quite different from our beliefs, especially in terms of complexity, although Brandom apparently does.

If Brandom would like to insist that animals do not have minds (beliefs, desires, intentions) then he would probably have to abandon his theory of normativity. It is incoherent to claim both that animals do not have minds *and* that norms are acquired by an unconscious mechanism because, given the unconscious source of normativity, there is no way to distinguish between the norms of human beings and animals, and as a result there is no ground for claiming that animals do not have minds. I do not think that Brandom's requirement of complexity is sufficient to make the distinction, because we do not have any ready criterion for deciding which normative system is "complex" and which normative system is "simple". But there is an even greater difficulty for Brandom. If the mechanisms by which norms arise are unconscious, it might be suggested that there is no reason for being satisfied only with Brandom's preferred method of norm creation -- operant conditioning. A teleosemanticist can suggest evolution and the like. However, considering this question in any detail is beyond the scope of this thesis.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have seen that an agent follows a rule only if

1. the rule that he follows is part of an established social practice or its extension by an already socialised individual and/or
2. the agent has individually followed the rule on a number of occasions

These two theses about rule-following entail that the life of the community is central to an account of rule-following, because it is the community which creates the complex net of language-games over a period of time. However, it would be a mistake to believe, as the dispositionalists and actualists believe, that the community can determine what constitutes an accord with a rule and what constitutes a violation of it. Although the community is the most important source of correctness it does not mean that we can equate the right way of following a rule with the (normative) attitude that the community has towards that rule. Tradition, explicit rules of various sorts and people in a position of power or authority can be also a source of correctness for determining the right way of following a rule.

As we have seen, dispositions cannot be normative because it makes no sense to speak of a norm without the possibility of violating it. Dispositions cannot be violated because it would not make any sense to say that someone has acted in accordance with or against his dispositions. A community dispositionalist can object, of course, that a norm is violated not when an individual acts against his dispositions but when his action is in conflict with the dispositions of a community. But the community dispositionalist is simply confused here because once a certain rule becomes a part of a form of life, anyone can follow the rule correctly or incorrectly, and it is irrelevant whether the people who follow the rule correctly are in the majority or not. Moreover, there is not any reason for thinking that the community should have a "special status" in the context of our justifications of following a rule. A thorough-going sceptic can challenge the community dispositions or actual behaviour in the same manner that he can challenge the individual's dispositions or actual behaviour.

In *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*, Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be attempting to provide a reductive account of intentionality. I have argued that Wittgenstein attempts nothing of the sort. Kripke considers the challenges of a rule sceptic, the challenges that put to question which rule an

agent has followed, and takes them to show, to put it crudely, that unless we take the community's attitudes towards rule-following to be normative, rule-following, and hence also meaning, is impossible. I have argued that Kripke's "sceptical solution", the claim that the community determines what amounts to the right way of following a rule, is conceptually incoherent. Kripke's assertion that it is Wittgenstein who provides the "sceptical solution" is a mistaken way to read Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is not interested in a reductive analysis of the mental, rather, he is concerned to show that the mental is not reducible to private experiences or mental imagery.

Most of the central issues of this thesis have revolved around the role of the community in determining the correctness of rule-following. I hope to have shown that in interpreting Wittgenstein one needs to appreciate the delicate balance between the communitarian and the individualist aspects of his views on meaning and rule-following.

Bibliography

- Baker, Gordon P. and P.M.S. Hacker. *Scepticism, Rules and Language*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. Abbr. SRL.
- . *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning*. Vol. I. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1980.
- . *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*. Vol. II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Abbr. WRGN.
- Brandom, Robert. *Making it Explicit*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1994.
- Dretske, Fred. *Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1988. Abbr. EB.
- . *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995.
- Ginet, Carl. "Wittgenstein's Claim that there Could not be Just One Occasion of Obeying a Rule." *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein: Logical Necessity and Rules*. Vol. X. Ed. John V. Canfield. London: Garland, 1986. 190-201.

Hallett, Garth. *A Companion to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977.

Holtzman, Steven H. and Christopher M. Leich, ed. *Wittgenstein: to Follow a Rule*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

Katz, Jerrold J. *The Metaphysics of Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1990.

Kenny, Anthony. *The Metaphysics of Mind*. Oxford: OUP, 1992.

Kripke, Saul A. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1982.

Malcolm, Norman. "Wittgenstein on Language and Rules." *Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays 1978-1989*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995. 145-71.

McDowell, John. "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following." Holtzman and Leich, eds. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

McGinn, Colin. *Wittgenstein on Meaning*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.

Schroeder, Timothy Allan. "The Cybernetic Supposed-to."

Unpublished. Abbr. CST.

Schroeder, Timothy Allan. "Troubling Foundations for Cathedral Semantics." A conference contribution.

Schwyzer, Hubert. "Rules and Practices." *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein: Logical Necessity and Rules*. Vol. X. Ed. John V. Canfield. London: Garland, 1986. 173-89.

Sellars, Wilfrid. "Some Reflections on Language Games." *Science, Perception and Reality*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 321-58.

Winch, Peter. *The Idea of Social Science*, 2nd ed. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1990.

---, ed. *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-16*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1961. Abbr. NB.

---. *On Certainty*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969. Abbr. OC.

- . *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. Cambridge: MIT, 1967. Abbr. RFM.

- . *Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press Inc., 1983.

- . *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations*. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. Abbr. BB.

- . *Philosophical Investigations*. 3rd ed. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1968. Abbr. PI.

- . *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961. Abbr. TLP.

- . *Wittgenstein's Lectures 1932-1935*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Abbr. WL.