THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AS A PARADIGM FOR A NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE

by

TREVOR MCMORRIS TATE

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

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for my parents,

for Heather and Sorayya,

and for Janet, Norman and the siblings.

ABSTRACT

In the process of trying to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, the nuclear weapon-free zone approach to regional arms control has been seen by many as a credible alternative to the global Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This study is an attempt to apply the paradigmatic principles, objectives and norms of the Latin American nuclear-free zone Treaty (the most comprehensive of its kind to date), to the Nordic area. The latter has received much attention in the regional arms control literature as a possible de jure nuclear-free zone. The author attempts to show that Nordic Europe bears some similarity to the Latin American region which might not seem apparent at first. It was found that, as a security paradigm, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) portends some important lessons which might prove useful in the establishment of a formal Nordic nuclear-free zone regime. It was also found, however, that the Treaty does not go far enough in satisfying the political, as well as geo-strategic, criteria for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic region.

PREFACE

1. OBJECTIVE

The general aim of this study is to examine and analyse the possibility of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Nordic region, on the basis of the pattern found in the Latin American NWFZ set up by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The study is therefore comparative in nature. It begins from the premise that the nuclear-free zone regime established by the agreement commonly referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco may be potentially transferrable elsewhere in the world, in this instance to Nordic Europe.[1] This may be so notwithstanding a recognition that the security and strategic environment in this area is markedly different from that of Latin America.

Initially signed in 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is said to have been successful so far in fulfilling its major objectives of preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery into Latin America and the Caribbean. The process by which this regime came into being will be delineated. More importantly, the basis for its alleged success will be analysed, focusing on the nature of the treaty provisions it entails and the political conditions and accommodations it embodies.

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[1] For the purposes of this study, Nordic Europe means all the states belonging to the Nordic Council. These are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Such an examination and approach will help to reveal the singular dimensions of the Tlatelolco Treaty pattern that are relevant to any assessment of its potential as a model capable of being adapted in another region. Having examined the pattern exhibited by this Treaty and elucidated the basis for its apparent success, an attempt will be made to analyse the possibility of achieving a NWFZ in the Nordic region along the lines to be found in the Tlatelolco regime.

2. METHOD

In fulfilling these objectives, the study will examine firstly the origins of the nuclear weapon-free zone concept and analyse the salient theoretical arguments underpinning arms control, especially as they relate to regional patterns such as NWFZ's. Secondly it will delineate the principal aspects of the pattern represented by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and evaluate its application to Nordic Europe. Thirdly this study will suggest, based on the evidence and findings, critical adjustments that the Tlatelolco pattern would have to undergo before it could be seen as a viable option for the Nordic region. Finally it will analyse the changes that would be required in the political and strategic environment of Nordic Europe in order for the Tlatelolco pattern to have any relevance.

Throughout, this thesis will stress the political rather than the military, legal and technical content and form of a possible Nordic NWFZ. (This approach is at variance with the general thrust of the existing literature, which tends to emphasise the technical and military aspects of NWFZ proposals.) In addition to defining the scope of the

study, this strategy will permit a more intensive inquiry into the political climate which underscores the military and security landscape of Northern Europe.

3. CONTRIBUTION

As the forthcoming examination will demonstrate, a major gap exists in the literature on NWFZ's. Several proposals have been advanced for setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe. These include Africa, Central Europe, the Balkans, South Asia, the South Pacific and, of course, Northern Europe. Barring the South Pacific, however, none of them has culminated in a formal NWFZ arrangement. This thesis will argue that NWFZ's may be germane to the search for regional forms of arms control. Hence, it will test the applicability of an existing NWFZ paradigm to an area which, since 1963, has been proposed as a possible target for this approach to horizontal arms control.[2] By so doing, the study will contribute to filling a perceived gap in the literature on nuclear weapon-free zones.

The justification for using the pattern established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco to fulfil the study's objectives rests on the following: first, the Tlatelolco regime represents one of only two, and by far the more complete, examples of a denuclearisation treaty having relevance to a populated region - the other being the recently established South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Latin America (including the Caribbean), comprises some 19.5 million square kilometres and is

[2] The term paradigm is used in this study to mean a consistent set of propositions, combining empirical and normative elements, values and collective expectations. See Chapter IV for a further explication.

inhabited by over 200 million people.

Second, based on the theoretical assumptions which underlie arms control, the Treaty of Tlatelolco appears to offer a potentially effective approach to horizontal non-proliferation. In other words, the Tlatelolco pattern may contain some instructive and relevant lessons which may be viable options when analysing the prospects for a Nordic NWFZ.

Third, insofar as general arms control objectives are concerned, the Latin American Treaty may have restrained nuclear arms proliferation to Latin America and thereby enhanced international security. (Some analysts have prima facie even argued that it has contributed to detente between the superpowers.) Seen in this light, one could argue that the Tlatelolco regime has overtime attracted a degree of credibility and predictability.

Fourth, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the only arms control arrangement to incorporate its own comprehensive control and verification system. The evidence indicates that this stringent policing system may have gone some way in constraining the nucler activity of member states, and may have even influenced the nuclear policies of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. All three states are considered to be nuclear-threshold countries, but only the latter two are associated with the Tlatelolco Treaty in any formal way.

Fifth, from the point of view of arms control both Latin America and the Nordic area constitute zones of restraint and low tension. This fact has some bearing on the East-West balance in general and, in particular,

on the political order in the Americas and Europe respectively. It should also enhance the across-systems thrust inherent in this study.

4. ORGANISATION

The study begins with an brief historical analysis of the movement in the arms control community to halt the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, some time is spent examining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed in 1968. The Introduction also touches on the origins and evolution of the nuclear free zone concept and shows how the approach to regional arms control fits into the overall non-proliferation schema. Finally, it delineates the important ways in which the NWFZ concept is thought to portend a potentially more effective means of halting the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than those which formally possess them.

In Chapter II, an attempt is made to examine the central tenets and assumptions underlying arms control. Ostensibly, an endeavour is made to anchor the nuclear-free zone idea in the theoretical arms control framework. These two tasks are pursued on the basis of the preliminary findings of the introductory section, concerning the validity and purposes for which nuclear-free zones exist.[3]

Chapter III examines the process which culminated in the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. It also delineates the pattern of regional arms control established by this

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[3] The terms "nuclear weapon-free zones" and "nuclear-free zones" are used interchangeably, because the former tends to be somewhat unweildly at times.

Treaty, that is, its principal aspects. These will form the basis on which the across-systems analysis of the next Chapter will be done. The section ends with a political assessment of the Latin American nuclear-free zone model from the standpoint of its future efficacy and ability to keep the Continent non-nuclearised.

Chapter IV is the singular aspect of this study; it begins by introducing the conceptual framework within which the Tlatelolco Treaty's potential applicability to the Nordic region occurs. Thus, it examines the concept of paradigm as well as the related notion of regimes and demonstrates in what ways the Tlatelolco Treaty contains elements of both. The author then examines the security policies of each of the five Nordic states (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland), in order to explain how some of the fundamental assumptions behind the respective security policies converge with what the author calls the paradigm-induced principles, objectives, rules and norms of the Tlatelolco Treaty. A brief review of the evolution of the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is undertaken, followed by an attempt to test the above paradigm tendencies of the Latin American Treaty in the context of the specific geo-political and strategic circumstances of the Nordic region. Lastly, an analysis is made of the the salient adaptations that the Tlatelolco regime would have to undergo in order to fit the peculiar political, security and strategic environment that exists in this corner of Europe.

On the basis of the preceeding analyses and findings, the Conclusion re-examines the concept of nuclear weapon-free zones within the framework of regional nuclear arms control efforts. It also passes

judgement on the future viability of this concept and on its concrete expressions thus far. A word is also said about the likelihood of the several other proposals put forward for setting-up NWFZ's in other parts of the world coming to fruition. Lastly, the study reiterates the important factors which militate against the Tlatelolco paradigm ever becoming a viable option for controlling nuclear strategy in the Nordic region. It suggests further some possible political and security changes and accommodations that will be necessary in the Nordic area, per se, and in the European theatre in general, if a NWFZ regime is to be realised there in the foreseeable future.

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of people have helped me in one way or another in bringing this study to fruition. Naturally, I should like to name and thank each one but the constraints of space do not allow. I feel compelled, however, to name a few individuals who have been exceptionally helpful to me. First, I should like to express my gratitude to my advisor, Professor Paul Buteux, who guided the progress of this study over the past several months. I am privileged to have been associated with such an outstanding academician. Second, I want to thank Professor Ken McVicar who gave so generously of his expertise and time in the preparation of this work as well as in several other areas. Third, I wish to thank my colleague Randy Colwell for helping me to grasp the intricacies of the computer: thanks to him, the terminals in the Dafoe Computing Centre no longer intimidate. Fourth, many thanks to my wife Heather who painstakingly edited the draft thesis and was very understanding about my frequent absences from home. Fifth, I must express my appreciation to all my other colleagues (Ben Lombardi and Roy Rempel in particular) who loaned or pointed me to literature which helped me greatly in doing the research for this study. Fifth, let me also say many thanks to Professors Davis Daycock and Geoffrey Lambert whose encouragement and assistance I found quite helpful. Finally, I should like to express my appreciation to the Faculty of Graduate Studies which awarded me a fellowship in my final year at this institution; and to the Department of Political Studies for its Assistantships. Together, these awards helped to ease significantly the financial burden which most graduate students know so well.

CONTENTS

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Proposals for the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ's) have been perennials of the nuclear weapons' era, notably since the Rapacki Plan was put forward in 1957. While there is no rigid definition of the role of nuclear weapon-free zones, such arrangements are generally thought to prevent nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from spreading to states which do not as yet have them (known as horizontal proliferation), and to abrogate altogether their utility in certain parts of the world.[1] Furthermore, nuclear-free zones have been seen by some as a means of checking the rate of increase in the nuclear arsenals of the Great Powers (known as vertical proliferation). Other commentators have argued for a more modest role for NWFZ's: they have suggested that the prospects of limiting nuclear weapons proliferation are not promising. Therefore, NWFZ's should be viewed instead as instruments to help moderate the rate and extent of the nuclear weapons spread, and to assist in coping with the destabilising

[1] This is what is referred to in the arms control literature as the "Nth." country problem. It is thought that a major function of arms control is to combat this problem. See Thomas C. Schelling's and Merton H. Halperin's Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961:pp. 38-39.

effects that such spread might induce.

The possible utility of nuclear weapon-free zones is recognised in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which "acknowledges the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their 'territories."[2] Many commentators have arrived at the conclusion, however, that the NPT alone will not prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons and/or the capability to develop them. It follows that a more effective strategy to check nuclear weapons proliferation will require auxillary or collateral arms control measures which have ultimately the same purpose. Nuclear weapon-free zones are thought to be one such step. They would function in a regional context but, according to proponents of this approach, would help stem nuclear devolution, since the NWFZ concept is underlined by the non-proliferation norm that the dissemination of nuclear weapons could seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.

Nuclear weapon-free zones are justified on two analytically distinct but interrelated grounds. The first has to do with perceived weaknesses inherent in the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself; while the second concerns the assumed advantages of NWFZ's over their international counterpart, the NPT.

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[2] U.S., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1968, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968:p. 464. The specific reference is contained in Article VII of the NPT.

There are four principal areas of dissatisfaction with the Non-proliferation Treaty. First, the claim is made that it is discriminatory, since it imposes obligations on the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), such as inspection under an international safeguard regime, which it does not impose on the nuclear weapon states (NWS). The NPT is therefore an instrument which, according to some, is used to legitimate the status quo,

Second, it has been suggested that the NPT perpetuates the economic advantages enjoyed by the nuclear weapon powers by making peaceful nuclear explosions an exclusive right of the NWS. A number of states, including Argentina, Brazil, and Nigeria have shown an interest in "peaceful atomic devices," and are therefore dissatisfied with their prohibition under the NPT. Furthermore, many states viewed with trepidation the "peaceful" underground nuclear explosion carried out by India in the Rajasthan Desert in 1974. To many, this signalled the start of a programme by India to build and stockpile nuclear arms. Delhi's atomic explosion came at a most inopportune moment, in light of the fact that the first conference called to review the Non-Proliferation regime was slated for the following year in Geneva. The event of 1974 was seen not only as a potential threat to the Non-Proliferation regime, but as further ammunition for those states that wished to see the rules pertaining to peaceful nuclear explosives eased considerably.[3]

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[3] Article V of the NPT requires the NWS to make available peaceful nuclear technology to the NNWS, either on an international or bilateral basis. The Treaty does not permit the non-nuclear powers to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions or to use nuclear materials for military purposes. Following a 1972 U.N. endorsement, the responsibility of assisting the non-nuclear states with their civilian nuclear needs has devolved on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the author is not aware that any nation has actually

A third complaint about the NPT is that it offers an insufficient quid pro quo to the non-nuclear weapon states to undertake nuclear arms control with appropriate inspections, while not making similar demands on the nuclear weapon powers. The former have argued that the latter, especially the superpowers,

> are playing a double game in the disarmament field: they seek to keep the unarmed nonnuclearised while avoiding sacrifices toward denuclearisation of the overarmed.[4]

The nuclear weapon states have responded by saying that the NPT should be considered on its own terms and not as part of a package on nuclear arms control, as that could result in no agreement being reached.

The objective of Article V1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to encourage vertical arms control through a comprehensive test-ban and strategic arms limitation. At the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference, the non-nuclear weapon states also called for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as for a stoppage to the manufacture of fissile material and significant reductions or elimination of nuclear arms stockpiles. Although the nuclear weapon states have gone some way in fulfilling some of these demands (as evidenced by the SALT 1 Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test-Ban Treaty and Vladivostock Accords of 1974, the SALT II Treaty of 1979, and the current INF and START processes), the NNWS have pointed to several remaining shortcomings.

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approached the Agency to seek this form of assistance. Another source of controversy surrounding "peaceful nuclear explosions" is that the superpowers have been unable to arrive at a consensus as to their exact status.

[4] Ashok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979:p. 332.

First, it has been observed that the United States and the Soviet Union are the only ones which have been involved in these processes, even though other nuclear weapon powers like the United Kingdom have taken part in the sponsoring stages. Second, the NNWS hold that the Limited Test-Ban and SALT Treaties are inadequate because, paradoxically, they might function to increase rather than reduce the number and capability of strategic nuclear weapons owned by the superpowers. Third, concern has been expressed about the security of the non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT, which are being asked to give up the option to seek additional security through nuclear weapons. The question, who will safeguard the vital interests of the NNWS? has not been answered in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

United Nations' Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968, coupled with identical commitments made separately by the U.K., the U.S. and the USSR, envisage that these powers will offer immediate assistance, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to any non-nuclear adherent of the NPT which is subjected to a nuclear attack or threat of such attack (known as positive security guarantee). The "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War," (June 1973), also compliments on a bilateral level the guarantee contained in the Security Council Resolution.

These guarantees have been met with a great deal of skepticism on the part of the non-nuclear powers. Some have have pointed out that the five recognised nuclear weapon states are all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council with veto power over its decisions.[5] Given political

[5] See SIPRI, The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT, Stockholm: Almqvist

realities, it is claimed that there can be no assurance that the nuclear powers will provide assistance to the NNWS either individually or in concert. This argument has been given further credibility by the doubts expressed by some European partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (such as Britain and France), which have questioned the credibility of the United States guarantee of assistance to Western Europe in the face of a nuclear attack. In the In the same vein, concern has been voiced about the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to risk their own security by aiding a non-nuclear power which is faced with nuclear aggression, especially if that threat comes from an ally of any of them.

A final cogent criticism of Security Council Resolution 255 is that it anticipates that emerging nuclear weapon states will use their nuclear capability in a less judicious manner than has been the custom. Needless to say, some of the NNWS have read this assumption as having ethnocentric and paternalistic overtones. To be sure, the suggestion has done little to make the Non-Proliferation Treaty more palatable to recalcitrants; instead, it has strengthened their resolve to develop a nuclear capability of their own.[6] And, as one commentator put it,

> We should not shrink from the expectation that nuclear weapons can be made to undergo such a process of normalisation in the future as other weapons have been made to in the past.[7]

& Wiksell for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1975:p. 5.

[6] For a South Asian perspective in line with this thinking see K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Nuclear Policy," in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1975:pp. 125-48.

[7] John J. Weltman, "Nuclear Devolution and World Order," World Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, January 1980:p. 193.

The other front on which the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been attacked concerns its relative worth vis-a-vis nuclear weapon-free zones. Critics of the NPT contend that the latter offers a more effective means of obtaining credible security commitments from the nuclear weapon states. Through the medium of protocols to a NWFZ agreement, the NWS could be requested to pledge formally that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any party to the NWFZ (known as negative security guarantee). This pledge would be achieved by obtaining the signatures and ratifications of the nuclear weapon states, and would be valid under international law. Obviously, it is assumed that states will honour traditional norms of international intercourse, that is to say they will respect their treaty commitments.[8]

In contrast, the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not say anything about guarantees; and the U.N. Security Council Resolution of 1968 has not convinced the non-nuclear powers that the nuclear weapon states would in fact offer them assistance in the face of a nuclear attack or threat of such attack. It is for this reason that supporters of the NWFZ route feel that it offers a better channel through which to extract credible guarantees from the Great Powers.

Nuclear-free zone advocates also contend that this concept encourages more equitable cooperation among nations which share similar developmental and security imperatives. The People's Republic of China, for instance, has argued that the NPT is a "plot" by the superpowers to

[8] If the treaty of Tlatelolco is anything to go by, it is clear that guarantee arrangements embodied in a NWFZ agreement need not be any more effective than the positive guarantee associated with the NPT, since the NWS may attach a host of interpretive clauses to such pledges thus rendering them equally questionable.

protect and perpetuate their hegemonic position in international affairs.[9] Argentina has successfully resisted pressure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it deems to be discriminatory, and has described it as a form of neo-colonialism.[10] Similar sentiments have come from by other developing countries including some which are, ironically, signatories to the NPT. Put another way, the argument suggests that the developed states are the major benefactors of the Non-Proliferation regime, as it legitimates and confirms the political status quo and maintains the economic dependency relationship which exists between the developed and developing worlds. The former are accused of reaping the bulk of the monetary benefits from the NPT through the commercial sale of nuclear power plants and associated technology to the non-nuclear states.

The response which these charges have solicited from the nuclear powers and suppliers is that the asymmetry inherent in the Non-Proliferation regime merely reflects the existing distribution of political and economic power in the world and their own dominant nuclear status. This explanation has done little to allay the suspicions of some of the less advanced nations, which insist that the NPT is a deliberate design on the part of the major powers to maintain a firm handle on the distribution of political and economic power in the international system.

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[9] John Maddox, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers No.113, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1975:p. 5.

[10] See Daniel Poneman, "Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina," Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 1984:p. 858.

Another argument in support of the nuclear-free zone approach to horizontal non-proliferation rests on the belief that NWFZ's could promote better the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy for developmental needs without simultaneously making plutonium dissemination easier. The re-cycling of plutonium in thermal reactors and peaceful atomic explosions have putative peaceful utility, but they have significant military utility as well.[11] It is for this reason that this type of nuclear activity by threshold states is believed to pose a threat to the Non-Proliferation regime. Despite this fear, supporters of NWFZ's hold that this approach would encourage in some regions the setting up of joint nuclear facilities, instead of the present trend towards national nuclear centres which offer less opportunity to obtain greater economies of scale in civilian nuclear energy production.

Yet another advantage of nuclear-free zones that has been cited by advocates is that they take into account the deployment of nuclear weapons by the nuclear states in the territories of the participants in a NWFZ arrangement. It is therefore felt that while the NPT is concerned principally with the question of which states possess nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon-free zone approach is concerned with the geographic

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[11] Uranium 235 (U-235) and plutonium 239 (Pu-239) are the radioactive substances used in nuclear bombs. Uranium enrichment is the process by which the concentration of U-235 in natural uranium is increased, eventually to weapons grade material. Reprocessing is the chemical procedure for extracting Pu-239 from the spent uranium fuel of nuclear reactors, where the plutonium is produced as a waste product. A breeder reactor uses plutonium as a fuel rather than uranium: by atomic fission, additional uranium placed in the breeder is converted into more plutonium than was consumed in the original reaction. Summarised from C.F. Barnaby, Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Pugwash Monograph No. 1, London: Souvenir Press, 1969:pp. 3-15.

distribution of these weapons as well.[12] That is to say, the NWFZ approach argues for a regional strategy whereas the NPT symbolises a universal approach.

It is against this background that a study of nuclear weapon-free zones might gain justification. Given the myriad criticisms which have been made against the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it seems fair to conclude that the nuclear-free zone route portends one credible option through which the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons can be effectively managed and made survivable.

The NPT expires in 1995, and there is no assurance that it will be renewed. The atmosphere at the Review Conference held in Geneva in September 1985 was very tense. Third World states criticised the superpowers for failing to work toward nuclear arms control, a promise embedded in the NPT. To some of the more vocal anti-NPT states, like India, that failure smacked of hypocrisy. The biggest fear is that many of the restive nations might want to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995; in which case, the attention of the non-proliferation community might be turned increasingly towards alternative measures such as nuclear-free zones.

These considerations direct attention to a study of the potential transferability (in a paradigmatic sense) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to the Nordic region, which has received much attention in the nuclear weapon-free zone literature. They also call for a review of the other

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[12] Ilkka Pastinen, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty - Five Years After: Problems and Prospects of the Review Conference, in A Nuclear-Free Zone and Nordic Security, a special issue of Ulkopolitiikka, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1975:p. 11.

nuclear-free zones in existence; of the major proposals which have been introduced over a period of nearly three decades; as well as for a more comprehensive understanding of the theoretical arguments which are underpinned by the concept of nuclear-free zones. All three tasks are addressed in this study.

There is no unequivocal definition of a NWFZ; nevertheless, it is generally recognised that there are certain basic principles which should be contained in any proposal to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone. These principles were established by a U.N. study conducted in 1975.[13] The Committee which prepared the Report acknowledged that the diverse political conditions which existed in various parts of the world precluded the formulation of an a priori definition of a nuclear-free zone. Nevertheless, it submitted that a NWFZ should ensure that the area to which it is applicable is completely free of nuclear weapons, that the NWFZ proposal comes from governments in the region, that adherence to the NWFZ agreement is voluntary but that all states with significant military capability participate. It was also recommended that there be an effective system of control and verification, that the geographic boundaries of the NWFZ are clearly defined, that the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the region is ensured, and that the nuclear-free zone is established by a multilateral treaty of unlimited duration.

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[13] Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects, special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, New York: United Nations, 1976, A/10027/Add. 1, Sales No. E.76.1.7.

On the basis of these guidelines, it is possible (in the abstract) to call any region which has no nuclear weapons at a given point in time a nuclear weapon-free zone; thus, one might well refer to most areas of the globe as being "nuclear weapon-free." Moreover, it might be prudent to draw a distinction between what one analyst referred to as "continent zones" and "tension zones." The former concerns large, clearly defined regions (such as entire continents like Africa, Latin America and Antarctica), as well as to outer space and the seabed. These areas tend to be low conflict areas, in that the conflicts usually associated with East-West strategic competition are either non-existent or are not prominent enough to affect the overall balance. The latter, on the other hand, show evidence of a high degree of superpower rivalry and potential for confrontation, since there is usually a considerable amount of nuclear (and other) forces deployed in or in close proximity to the area in question. Therefore, the possibility of conflict tends to have serious implications for international peace and security.[14]

In addition, many experts would argue that the most desirable form that a nuclear-free zone can take is a multilateral agreement having binding force in international law. In fact, all the denuclearisation agreements which have come into being so far have followed this pattern. Some commentators have pointed out nevertheless that a nuclear-free zone is also possible on the basis of mutual declarations, agreements or guarantees between the states in a particular region. Among other things, such a contract might include joint pledges not to acquire, test, or stockpile nuclear weapons and/or explosives. It may also

[14] See Bertel Huerlin, "Nuclear-Free Zones," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1966:pp. 12-13.

involve mutual declarations confirming the non-nuclear status of their territories. Such action would meet the objective of disengagement and point the way towards a more comprehensive future arrangement.[15]

In the U.N. Study, no consensus was reached on some important issues considered to be relevant to the concept of NWFZ's. These included questions about the need to resolve underlying political problems prior to the establishment of a nucler-free zone; the need to obtain guarantees from the Great Powers that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states participating in the NWFZ; the status of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's) which might be carried out by zone countries; the relationship between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and nuclear-free zones; and lastly, the consequences of a NWFZ on existing security arrangements in specific regions.

The debate surrounding the nuclear-free zone topic has often grappled with the question of transit or transportation privileges for airplanes and vessels belonging to the nuclear weapon states, and which might be carrying nuclear weapons. Some are of the opinion that granting this type of immunity would only undermine the credibility of a nuclear-free zone. Others have argued for flexibility, and have suggested that in some areas transit and transportation freedom may have to be acknowledged, either because to ban it may cause the nuclear powers not to want to grant security guarantees, or because doing so would prove difficult to police. Whatever the decision arrived at, it is clear that

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[15] This may be a logical beginning insofar as the Nordic area is concerned.

this aspect of the nuclear-free zone concept will have a critical bearing on extra-zonal powers' rights to move nuclear weapons through any area covered under a NWFZ arrangement. Concomitantly, as has been pointed out before, it might have a significant bearing on the amount of support that the nuclear weapon states are prepared to lend to the NWFZ.

1.2 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DENUCLEARISATION REGIMES AND AGREEMENTS

The actual form of nuclear-free zones has varied from one region to the next, with the Latin American model being the most developed. Other less complex forms of nuclear-free zones are those represented by the the Antarctic Treaty (1961) which led to the denuclearisation of Antarctica; the Outer Space Treaty (1967) which banned the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space and other celestial bodies; and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972) which prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor. These are actually in the form of "nonarmament" measures and concern mainly the capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. While important symbolically, they "impose a spatial abstention rather than call for any reduction, control or prohibition of existing nuclear weapons systems.[16] Therefore, their main importance lies not so much in their substance but rather in their worth as measures which demonstrate the interest of the superpowers in working towards detente. On the other hand, the Tlatelolco Treaty and the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga are restraining instruments by a group of states in a certain region. The

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[16] Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, "Introduction - Nuclear Proliferation: To Bell the Cats or Catch the Mice?" in Marwah and Schulz, eds., Near-Nuclear Countries, p. 10.

distinguishing feature of these agreements is that they apply to populated areas of the globe and thus command special attention.

Both forms of nuclear weapon-free zones constitute institutional systems, however, which include norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Secondly, they are both recognised forms of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Thirdly, they are premised on the belief that regional security measures can help to reduce both the incentives for acquiring nuclear arms and the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on a certain location. These developments are in turn thought to reinforce the international non-proliferation regime by eschewing nuclear activity that is not regulated under international agreements or treaties. The international Non-Proliferation regime and its regional counterparts (such as NWFZ's) are not seen as rivals but as complementary measures to strengthen the norms and principles which restrain states in their weapons policies and make departures from these norms and principles less likely.

A number of proposals (some concrete, others vague) have been advanced since the late 1950's with regard to NWFZ's. Several of these have been reflected in the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.[17] However, very few have culminated in NWFZ treaties or

[17] For example, in 1974, a watershed year insofar as NWFZ's were concerned, the 29th. General Assembly's agenda included Resolutions 3258 and 3262 which dealt with Additional Protocols 1 and 2, respectively, to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; 3259 relating to the Indian Ocean "zone of Peace;" 3265 pertaining to the South Asian NWFZ proposal; and 3263 regarding a Middle East NWFZ. Also, the "Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly," (1978) and the "Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly," (1982) both devoted entirely to the subject of disarmament, examined the matter of NWFZ's. The former, echoing a similar view to that expressed in a 1975 report on NWFZ's prepared by

agreements. The Antarctic Treaty of 23 June 1961, demilitarising the continent of Antarctica, marked the first occasion on which a "nuclear weapon-free zone" was established. In addition, proposals of various types have been introduced to keep densely populated regions free of nuclear weapons. These include Africa, the Balkans, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, Northern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and the South Pacific. Of these, only two have so far achieved the status of a NWFZ, viz., Latin America and, recently, the South Pacific; and in neither case have the full requirements of the treaty establishing the zone been met.

1.3 CONCLUSION

The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was thought by many to be the best possible means of halting the spread of nuclear weapons to more states than the five which are formally thought to possess them. Moreover, it was seen as a medium through which the qualitative competition in nuclear weapons could be slowed down. A gradual downward slide in the world's nuclear stockpiles coupled with an active programme of arms control and disarmament would improve, so it was felt, the security of the non-nuclear weapon states. This healthy outlook mirrored accurately the positive signals which followed the resolution

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a group of government officials, stated that "the process of establishing [NWFZ's] in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons." See Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, Vantage Conference Report, Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, 1975:p. 6; Department for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations Disarmement Yearbook, Vol. 7, 1982:chap. X1, p. 258; and CCD, Comprehensive Study.

of the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

This environment was however short-lived, as the decade of the 1970s brought with it a new round of technological developments in both the quantity and quality of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union. At the same time, India detonated a nuclear device which renewed fears that the process of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was underway. A deep sense of frustration developed among the non-nuclear countries, which perceived that they would have to grapple with some of the same political and security problems with which they were faced prior to 1968.

The NPT was negotiated on the basis of a trade-off between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. The former agreed to give up the political and security benefits that are thought to accompany the possession of nuclear weapons; while the latter promised to help the non-nuclear powers to acquire the technology and resources to carry on their peaceful nuclear policies. Not long after the NPT was signed, three of the five nuclear powers entered into an agreement under the auspices of the UN Security Council to grant positive security guarantees to their non-nuclear NPT counterparts. By this <u>quid pro quo</u>, the non-nuclear nations placed voluntarily their present and future nuclear programmes under the umbrella of what became known as the Non-Proliferation Regime. This system came up against a great deal of criticism from both NPT and non-NPT states. Despite, the fact that the NPT has been much maligned, it has more or less managed to survive while undergoing many substantive and procedurial changes.

The non-proliferation review conferences, which have been held every five years since 1975, have kept the question of security for the non-nuclear weapon states high on their agendas. There is still no consensus within the arms control community, however, on the question of whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear countries would enhance or lower their security and that of the international system.[18]

The multilateral arms control measure that nuclear-free zones embody has come to be seen as a viable alternative response to the problems of horizontal proliferation and regional security. At the same time, NWFZ's supposedly function as collateral arrangements vis-a-vis the global non-proliferation regime.[19]

The search for alternative ways of putting an end to the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons no doubt led to the debate of the mid-1970's on the relative merits and demerits of the nuclear-free zone concept as an arms control alternative. Adherents of the theory claimed that a NWFZ goes beyond the NPT because it removes permanently an area from the nuclear weapons framework.[20] Detractors argue on the other hand that the

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[18] For two views which argue that it would, see Subrahmanyam's "India's Nuclear Policy," in Marwah & Schulz, eds., Near-Nuclear Countries, pp. 125-148, and Kenneth Waltz's, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers No. 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975. For an opposing view see Joseph S. Nye's "The Logic of Inequality," Foreign Policy, No. 59, Summer 1985:pp. 123-31.

[19] See David Gompert's "Introduction: Nuclear Proliferation and the 1980's Project," in Ted Greenwood, et al., Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control, with an introduction by David C. Gompert, New York: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977:pp. 21-22.

[20] It is not necessarily true, of course, that all NWFZ's (like the

nuclear-free zone approach encourages piecemeal policies to horizontal arms control, and takes away from its fundamental goals which are global arms limitation and disarmament. They add that NWFZ arrangements legitimate the "arms race" amongst a select few.[21]

Despite many valid judgements, the nuclear weapon-free zone approach to horizontal proliferation has managed to stay on the arms control programmes of many regional states in Nordic Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere. Also, it remains a prominent item of discussion at many forums like the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. It has also received attention from the Great Powers and from security organisations such as NATO.

A nuclear-free zone can be conceptualised as one instrument among several arms control policy options. Its primary objective is to reduce bi-polar strategic pressures and political tension in a certain geographical domain.[22] Put differently, a NWFZ is designed to provide the political and military pre-requisites for stability and security in a specific area of the globe. This would in turn exercise a positive influence on arms control and disarmament efforts in other parts of the

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Tlatelolco Treaty) must be permanent arrangements. Holst, for example, has argued that insofar as the Nordic region is concerned, a NWFZ would be a peacetime arrangement. This is probably a universal truth, since a denuclearisation regime can function only as long as the NWS will allow. See Holst's "The Pattern of Nordic Security," prepared for publication in Daedalus, (vol. 113, No. 2, Spring 1984), a special issue devoted to the Nordic countries, NUPI/Notat, No. 273 (A), June 1983:p. 18.

[21] See Subrahmanyam's "India's Nuclear Policy," p. 146.

[22] Tapani Vaatoranta, "Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Countries: Nuclear Status and Policies," in Kari Mottela, ed., Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe: Problems and Prospects of Arms Control, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983, pp. 67-68.

world. NWFZ proponents grant that nuclear weapons carry international implications, but submit that a regional step-by-step programme would help counteract the trend towards regional nuclear arms proliferation, which they see as occuring with increasing frequency since the start of the 1970's. The U.N. Study of 1975, conducted by an expert group, indicated that regional arms races are growing and exacerbating political tensions in some regions of the world. It concluded that this trend could threaten international peace and security.[23]

Nuclear-free zones can function therefore as regional stabilisers. Their establishment might also generate collective political and security benefits to regional states. In Latin America, for example, the enthusiasm which greeted the NWFZ proposition by the large majority of states was in no small way due to a perception that it would give them greater say in how the security and political environment of their region is shaped. It has been suggested also that the NWFZ approach helps to reduce the potential impact that nuclear weapons have on the political process, that is to say, nuclear-free zones may make the political agenda less dependent upon matters having to do with nuclear weapons.[24] A related purpose that nuclear-free zones are thought to serve is that of raising the nuclear threshold by making it less likely that states will want to bridge the gap between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare, in the event that they are faced with a serious crisis

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[23] CCD, Comprehensive Study, chap. III.

[24] J.J.Holst, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Europe: An Option for the Future?," Transcript of a Lecture Delivered at the NATO Defence College During the Information Period of NATO Civil Dignataries, Rome, April 12, 1983, NUPI Notat, No. 269(B), April 1983, p. 8.

or an outbreak of conflict.[25]

Finally, a NWFZ may contribute to an atmosphere of detente and confidence-building. It may also remove or reduce the role that nuclear weapons are assigned in the strategic doctrines and security policies of nations. This is because states which adhere to a multilateral arms control regime do not need to anticipate unduly the probability that a quarrel with its neighbours will lead to conflict involving the use of nuclear arms. It creates what in the language of arms control is referred to as "strategic stability.[26] At the same time, this calculation reduces the pressures towards pre-emptive military action, since the putative agggressor may well be restrained by perceptions of what he can accomplish with the weaponry he has available.

Bearing in mind the foregoing preliminary conclusions concerning the purpose and objectives that nuclear weapon-free zones are thought to serve, and having examined their relative merits through the prism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this study can now proceed to a more in-depth treatment of the central theoretical assumptions which are underpinned by modern arms control. It can also attempt to locate more analytically the concept of nuclear-free zones in the overall arms control framework. These are the chief issues which will be addressed in the next Chapter.

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[25] Ibid.

[26] For further elucidation of this concept see Schelling's and Halperin's Strategy, p. 50.

Chapter II

THE THEORY OF ARMS CONTROL - WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

2.1 ARMS CONTROL IN GENERAL: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Efforts aimed at preventing war or reducing the level of damage which results from it are not new. Nations have, in the past, made various attempts to outlaw war: they have imposed ethical and moral barriers against it and have created norms of conduct and tribunals for peaceful mediation and settlement of conflicts. States have also attempted to avert war by forming alliances and other such arrangements for collective defence and security, in the hope that would-be enemies might be deterred from launching attacks against them and their allies.

Prior to the genesis of nuclear weapons, however, these and similar means of controlling war were seldom successful or permanent. The advent of nuclear weapons, and their use during the closing phase of World War II, brought to the fore a dramatic and lasting awareness of the capacity of these weapons to cause mass destrucion. This in turn led to a re-assessment and transformation of concepts of war and of peace.

Although the terms 'arms control' and 'disarmament' are often used synonymously, it is prudent to maintain a conceptual distinction between the two. Arms control refers to limitations on the amounts and/or the

quality of certain categories of weapons. Disarmament is a far more comprehensive term and refers to the elimination of certain types or even all weapons.[1]

Several assumptions underlie the impulse of nations towards arms control. The first related to the desire to regulate the way in which (conventional) warfare was fought. This led to a number of agreements designed to make conflicts less inhumane and to limit the level of damage. Among them were the restraints put on certain types of weaponry and on the treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war.

The second arose out of the liberal-democratic ambience of the nineteenth century. According to this assumption, war was irrational and destructive and so were the preparations for it. This argument became a resilient motif of the period despite the juxtaposed view that some wars were "just." The former conception of war directly stemmed from studies on the nature and dynamics of societies. It was believed that all societies shared a basic commanality of interests, and that any differences which arose between them could therefore be settled peacefully. Hence, the suggestion that war was irrational inevitably led some to conclude that the instruments used to fight them were inherently evil - necessary evils at times, perhaps, but ones which warranted efforts to control them.

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[1] Richard Dean Burns, SALT, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: An Introduction to Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament, Occasional Paper No. 6, Los Angeles, Calif.: Centre for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University, n.d., pp. 58-62. It should be noted that some analysts, such as J. David Singer, argue the reverse; that is, they believe disarmament is one aspect of arms control.

This view was not unique to the nineteenth century actually. The earliest condemnations of war can be found in the sixteenth century writings of Erasmus, who maintained that war was the "stupidest of all gods." He pronounced it irrational, neither glorious or necessary, and suggested that those who fought it were worthy of contempt only.[2]

Two hundred years were to elapse before the outcry against the institution of war re-surfaced, even though Hugo Grotius began his De Jure Belli ac Pacis of 1625 with a denunciation of the "license in making war" which was prevalent around him, and "of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed.[3] The French monk, Emeric Cruce, who was the first to raise the idea of a United Nations Assembly to settle international disputes by compulsory arbitration, took up the mantle left by Grotius and pursued the crusade against war in an even more zealous manner. He decried war in truly Erasmian fashion:

> We must abandon these barbaric habits [warfare] and show mankind the way of humanity and true honour, that they may cease to live in so brutal a fashion.[4]

While Thomas Moore and Grotius felt that some wars could be just, Cruce did not. He argued that war was a bi-product of the twin vices of arrogance and brutality; abandon these and war would cease.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, political thinkers like Francis Bacon, John Locke, de Montesquieu and others began to conceptualise war as a necessary evil which arose out of the fact of

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[2] Cited in Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1978:p. 14.

[3] Ibid., p. 19.

[4] Cited Ibid.

social organisation and statehood. They argued that in a world where there was no final arbiter, war was sometimes necessary and justifiable if it were fought in the defence of the state and society. Jean-Jacques Rousseau went even further than that: to him war was an inevitable outcome of the social contract. The only way wars could be stopped was by destroying the state.[5] Rousseau was the first to realise that this would not happen, of course. He later joined a group of influential French thinkers whose main thesis was that the causes of war had nothing to do with the imperfections of society but with the wilful machinations of statesmen.[6] This theme became the chief intellectual orthodoxy of the period of the Enlightenment.

The merchantilism of the eighteenth century gave rise to several wars, which in turn devastated the economies of many European nations especially those of France and Spain. It was in this ravaged atmosphere that many French economist began their campaign against war. Scholars such as Jean-Francis Melon (1673-1738), the Marquis D'Argenson (1694-1757), and Ange Goudar (1720-1791), devoted much time in studying the contradictions between war and international commerce. They came to the conclusion that no one benefited from war except a handful of contractors, shipbuilders and, naturally, armaments manufacturers. By the mid-eighteenth century, Adam Smith and his colleagues had emerged with the theory that the laws of nature dictated peace and cooperation, and that it was only what Karl Marx was to call later a sense of "false consciousness" that motivated states to wage war against one another.

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[5] E.C. Vaughan, Political Writings of J.J. Rousseau, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962:pp. 292-306.

[6] Michael Howard, Liberal Conscience, p. 23.

They held that it was the job of good government to avoid war by creating more and more wealth.[7]

In Prussia, Emanuel Kant introduced his Perpetual Peace in 1795. Kant's views on war were in many ways quite Hobbesian. He held that war was the natural outcome of the founding of states, and that peace could only come about through war. As he put it,

> ---through the excessive and never-realised preparations for them [wars], through the want which every state even in the midst of peace must feel, nature drives man to make attempts at first quite inadequate, to leave the lawless state of savages and enter a league of nations; where each state, even the smallest, may expect his security and his rights - not from its own power or its own legal views, but alone from this great league of nations, from a united power, and from the decision according to laws adopted by the united will.[8]

Thus, as far as Kant was concerned a "hidden hand" was leading mankind to "perpetual peace" through war. This is not to imply that Kant gloried in the thought of war; on the contrary, he believed it to be the very antithesis of moral precepts. Peace to him meant the highest good. Its establishment constituted "the entire end and purpose of a theory of rights within the limits of pure reason.[9] Therefore, Kant saw the creation of "republican constitutions," that is, responsible governments, as being the medium through which a condition of lasting peace could be attained.

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[7] Ibid., p. 25.

[8] Quoted in C. J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948:p. 30.

[9] Ibid., pp. 85-86.

After Kant came the Marquis de Condorcet who claimed that the people are by nature peace loving. However, their leaders and sovereigns prevented them from enjoying peace by forever plunging them into new wars. In short, "war," for de Condorcet, "was rooted in the vested interest of the ruling classes, of the aristocracy against the Third Estate, and it would not disappear until those classes were overthrown".[10] de Condorcet was convinced that alliances and diplomats were the chief instigators of war. In a different world where reason and ethics would rule, alliances and diplomacy would be redundant, and an era of peace would ensue.

Many followers of de Condorcet saw just such a world emerging across the Atlantic. Thomas Paine was probably the greatest admirer of the new American Republic. He felt America would be a harbinger of peace because it had abolished the monarchy and the aristocracy. In his pamphlet, The Rights of Man (1791-92), Paine synthesises the notions of war which have been presented in this discussion. He was of the view that America was to be the Mecca of his time; "What Athens was in miniature, " he wrote, "America will be in magnitude." And in lamenting the plight of man, he wrote that the source of poverty and general human wretchedness lay

> ---not in any natural defect in the principles of civilisation but in preventing those principles having a universal operation; the consequence of which is a perpetual system of war and expense that drains the country and defeats the general felicity of which civilisation is capable.[11]

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[10] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[11] Quoted Ibid., p. 29.

The solution to the problem of war as Paine saw it was to inaugurate an era of commerce: this would eliminate war and transform the uncivilised face of governments, which incited war by accusing each other of treachery, conspiracy and veiled aspirations.

Within the space of a few short weeks after Paine had published his treatise, Europe was plunged into twenty five years of continuous war which aroused suspicions and jealousies of a magnitude that was to last until almost the end of the nineteenth century. By the close of the eighteenth century, however, a coherent liberal theory of international relations had emerged. Paine's re-casting of the views of the Enlightenment left its permanent stamp on nineteenth century thinking about issues of war and peace. The new spirit of liberalism which took hold in Europe in post-Painesque Europe has survived despite the trauma of the revolutionary and Napoleanic wars, the ensuing wars of national liberation, and the unsurpassable banalities of two World Wars. The original view of the philosophes of the eighteenth century, that international disputes could be settled peacefully, has remained the fundamental liberal motif of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has influenced much of the thinking about international law and relations in general and about arms control in particular.

In the third assumption, not only were more weapons more dangerous than fewer weapons but newer ones were potentially more destructive than older ones. The advances in technology, which accompanied the Industrial Revolution, made it possible to construct more sophisticated and more lethal weapons. This fact not only lent further currency to the above proposition but gave rise also to the conclusion that technology

increased the probability of war. This meant that not only would the weapons of war have to be controlled but also the technology which made them possible.

A fourth and related assumption was underpinned by the belief that trade in arms was very different from trade in commodities such as tractors or grain. In fact, the Covenant of the League of Nations stated that "The members of the League agree [that] the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections;" hence the contention that war and its associated features were abnormal and posed a threat to international order. Arms control was then a way to identify the machinery with which war was conducted and a route through which limits could be placed on these instruments.

The fifth assumption, which received wide support from experts and the public alike, was referred to as the "arms race theory." Its proponents claimed that there was an integral relationship between the security calculations of country A and country B. Military moves initiated by one strongly interacted with those of the other and in identifiable ways. For example, if A thought that B was increasing its arsenals or its expenditure on them, in such a way as might pose a danger to it, then A would act by increasing its level of weapons or the resources it allocated to acquiring them. B would then increase its force levels and so on. This action-reaction phenomenon can be highly unstable, since it might cause the other side to overreact by attacking in anticipation of being attacked. An "arms race" can therefore lead to one of two things: war or an exhaustion of both countries limited resources.

The sixth theoretical argument, called the "first strike instability" theory, suggested that if the offensive forces of actors A and B were such that a preemptive strike (that is, an attack launched by one actor against a perceived adversary because it thought that the latter was about to attack it) by one party against the other could lead to the attacking party gaining the upper hand, then a misunderstanding of one kind or another might actually prompt either side to attack the other, in the hope of gaining a decisive advantage. This phenomenon is generally regarded as "pre-emptive instability," a situation which arms control is supposed to remedy or at least manage.[12]

This view stemmed directly from the assertion common among many analysts that armaments are simply a reflection of underlying political tensions which themselves have many causes. Hence, arms control should be concerned with removing the hostilities and tensions of which arms are symptomatic, rather than focusing on the arms themselves. Support for this "indirect" approach arose from the perception that the causes of the "arms race" lay deeper than in the existence of weapons. A series of proposals from the 1920's (and perhaps from as far back as the 1688 Treaty of Munster) can be directly attributed to this line of thinking.

Even in the post-1945 period, the indirect approach has continued to galvanise support in the form of "confidence-building measures" (CBM's). In its most basic form, CBM's describe the steps taken to reduce suspicion, fear and uncertainty, and to clarify the putative aggressor's

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[12] See ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 2nd. edition, with a new Introduction by Dan Caldwell, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1984: p. xxiv.

intentions. As Holst and Melander explained,

> confidence building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats...by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity. Ideally, they would shorten the shadows of military force, and confidence would be enhanced to the extent that the option of surprise military action receded into the background.[13]

The above conceptualisation is fairly representative of the central motivations behind CBM's. They stress measures which are designed to make the adversary's intentions less ambiguous and less uncertain insofar as his purposes (and military capabilities) are concerned. Another function of CBM's is to increase the threshold against preemptive or surprise attack.[14]

Among the more recent psychological and political measures which have been established to clarify intentions, reduce uncertainties and the danger of surprise attack are the Egyptian-Israeli Accord (1975) calling for the establishment of a "buffer zone" in the Sinai; the agreement between the USA and the USSR regarding the use of National Technical Means (NTM's) to verify compliance with various Strategic Arms Limitation accords (1972); the "Hot Line" agreements (1963 and 1971);

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[13] Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen A. Melander, "European Security and Confidence-Building Measures," Survival, Vol. XIX, No. 4, July/August 1977:pp. 147-148. See also Adam Rotfeld's "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience," in Stephen Larabee and Dietrich Stobbe, eds., Confidence Building Measures in Europe, East-West Monograph No. 1, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies:pp. 91-133.

[14] For an excellent, and perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed review of the history and theory of CBM's see James MacIntosh's Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No. 1, prepared for The Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985:pp. 1-136.

and the accord to avoid accidents on or over the high seas (1972). Also falling under the purview of CBM's would be the various agreements between the superpowers to prevent accidental war: viz., the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), the Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War (1971), and the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War (1971).[15]

All these agreements attain to some extent the "functional equivalence" of confidence-building. However, a more precise conceptualisation of the term grew out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).[16] The Final Act of the CSCE contains a number of CBM's. Among other things, they called for prior notification to be given of large manoeuvres, and encouraged the exchange of military observers. The Final Act stated that the participants in the CSCE acknowledged

> the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstandings or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities.[17]

This is perhaps the most outstanding multilateral expression of the functions of confidence-building measures, since the statement highlights the double activities of tension curtailment and uncertainty

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[15] For the complete texts of these and other CBM's see ACDA, Disarmament Agreements.

[16] The CSCE opened on 3 July 1973 in Helsinki, had its second sitting in Geneva between September 1973-July 1975, and concluded on 1 August 1975. Albania was the only European non-participant. See MacIntosh's Confidence Building Measures, p. 29.

[17] Quoted Ibid., p. 31.

reduction. In the Madrid Final Act of September 1983 (the result of the second CSCE Review Conference), it was stated that:

> The aim of the conference is to undertake in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament.[18]

The CSCE process has accomplished very modest outcomes, but it has in some ways helped to allay East-West fears about each side's strategic and military intentions. In this respect, the CSCE has served to lessen the incentives for preemptive or pre-meditated attack. As Schelling and Halperin wrote in a seminal work published in 1961:

> ---the urge to pre-empt is an aggravating factor: it converts a possibility of war into an anticipation of war, [thus] precipitating war. The pre-emptive advantage makes a suspicion of war a cause of war. If the actions, false alarms, accidental events, mischief or other occurrences that bring the pre-emptive urge into play can be minimised and damped (sic) by cooperative arrangements [CBM's] or arms control, the danger of pre-emptive war may be reduced.[19]

In sum, therefore, the first-strike instability theory points to the dangers inherent in strategic uncertainty in terms of its capacity to precipitate war intentionally or otherwise. Arms control, through the vehicle of confidence-building instruments, may help to stabilise expectations assuming that each party is able to re-assure the other

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[18] Quoted Ibid., p. 36. Under the Helsinki Final Act, notification must be given of military exercises involving a total of 25,000 troops or more, and this notification must be given 21 days or more in advance. These and other CBM's entailed in the Final Act were reviewed at two follow-up conferences in Belgrade (1977) and Madrid (1980). No consensus was reached at the first. The Madrid Concluding Document did however express an agreement to hold a conference to discuss further CBM's - such as a reduced floor of 18,000 troops for manoeuvre notices, and an extension of the notification period from 21 to 30 days. See Ibid., p. 37.

[19] Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961:pp. 10-11.

that its strategic posture does not signal the onset of conflict. Insofar as CBM's ameliorate this kind of anticipitation, they dampen the urgency to preempt. Finally, they reduce fears and create a climate in which dialogue on more concrete arms control measures can take place. This is precisely what is meant by addressing the underlying political problems which create barriers to arms control.

In their work referred to above, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin identified three primary goals of arms control: first, to reduce the risk of war; second; to limit the destructiveness of war should it occur; and third, to reduce the cost of national defence. The authors held that

> [arms control] rests on the recognition that...military relations with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interests in the avoidance of war that neither side wants, in minimising the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.[20]

As regards the objective of reducing the risk of war, they noted that the role of military forces, particularly in the nuclear age, was not merely to deter an adversary but to avoid false alarms and misunderstandings that may lead to a confrontation having disastrous consequences for all concerned. Thus, potential adversaries must engage

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[20] Ibid., p. 1. Different analysts have argued over the degree of importance that should be attached to this trinity of objectives, but they have basically accepted it as the very foundation of arms control. President Nixon referred to them in his 1970 "State of the World" address as the basis of the U.S. SALT initiatives: "We should seek to maintain our security whenever possible through cooperative efforts with other nations at the lowest possible level of uncertainty, cost, and potential devastation." See Richard Nixon's U.S. Foreign Policy in the Seventies: A New Strategy for Peace, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970:p. 143.

in implicit or explicit dialogue with each other, in order to ensure that crises do not occur due to unfounded suspicions and misperceptions which are often the result of mis-judgements.[21]

The basic feature of arms control is, therefore, the recognition that the security imperatives of states may coincide, and that reciprocity and cooperation might be mutually beneficial. This conception of arms control may take different forms: reductions in certain categories of weapons or in armed forces, qualitative modifications in weaponry, or alternative arrangements with regard to the deployment of forces. The main question is not so much to what extent military forces are reduced but to what degree this creates a more stable security environment. This implies, among other things, that arms control must first be concerned with establishing regimes that will ensure that the parties end up with more, not less, security. Put another way, it is the degree to which phenomena such as "accidental wars" are managed, and effective norms of behaviour and enhanced intelligence about each other's military doctrines and modes of weapons deployment established, that arms control fulfils its primary objectives.

According to Schelling and Halperin, the characteristics of modern weapons have given a decided advantage to the side which, sensing that war is imminent, strikes first. That is to say, the technological advances made in weapons design have exacerbated the mistrust inherent in the political conflicts existing amongst likely enemies.[22] While the destructive capability of present day weapons has made nations more

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[21] See the foregoing discussion on confidence-building measures.

[22] Schelling and Halperin, Strategy, p. 4.

weary about settling disputes militarily, it has also made them aware of the consequences which could arise from failure to control or manage the capabilities inherent in the technology which makes these weapons possible. Arms control is partly intended to try and place controls over military technology and modern weapons by creating cooperative mechanisms intended to offset, minimise, compensate or deflate some of the qualities they possess.[23] Agreements on arms control are seen as enhancing those aspects of technology which are perceived to be in the joint interest of putative adversaries, while constraining those which may in the long run prove disadvantageous to both sides.[24]

While it is reasonable to assume that armaments are not the cause but the reflection of underlying political conflicts, it stands to reason that a state's perceptions of the security calculus and the risks it poses might influence the military posture of that state. In other

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[23] Ibid.

[24] This argument may be somewhat questionable in the 1980's, and will be probably difficult to sustain in the next decade or two as weapons continue to become smaller and more difficult for enemy forces to locate. In the near future, qualitative arms limitation may be infeasible, since the size and mobility of new nuclear weapons will make it impossible to find a politically and technically acceptable means of verifying their numbers. In short, rapid technological progress is making arms control propositions such as the one postulated by Schelling and Halperin progressively obsolete. The paradox is that the deployment of these mobile, undetectable weapons could well reduce further the chances of a nuclear war. Moreover, once strategic weapons become untargetable, the compulsion to deploy more weapons may also decrease, since counterforce strategies usually call for large quantities of weapons. Thus, there might even be economic benefits. In a world where nuclear weapons will not be wished away, nations may have to make the best of a bad situation by taking advantage of the possibilities for even further stability in the nuclear weapons field that the new technology is portending. For a convincing analysis in support of this view see Bruce D. Berkowitz' "Technological Progress, Strategic Weapons and American Nuclear Policy," (pp.241-58); and Kevin N. Lewis' "Balance and Counterbalance: Technology and the Arms Race," (pp. 259-68), Forum:

words, it is fair to assume that threat perceptions have an impact on weapons acquisition.[25] It is assumed, ipso facto, that although arms control is unable to eliminate the political and ideological differences which divide nations, it can nevertheless reduce the risk of war by making it necessary for states to design their military strategies, doctrines and weapons more prudently. It may also affect the way forces and weapons are deployed, such that it does not create undue fear in the minds of others. In short, norms of behaviour and carefully constructed regimes can be established which define the "rules of the game" and the parameters of operation more explicitly. By so doing, states improve mutual expectations concerning such matters as reaction and modes of response to perceived threat or to apparent unstable points in the military and security milieu.

As one analyst pointed out, each party in an arms race is extremely suspicious of the antagonist's efforts to outdo it in the acquisition of weapons regarded as essential to its security. Moreover, aside from measures such as the "hot line" between the superpowers, it is not at all easy to determine objectively, let alone get international agreement on, the type of arms limitation accords that would in fact give rise to less catastrophe and greater stability.[26]

Technology and Arms Control, Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 1985.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," International Security, Vol.1, No. 1, Summer 1976:p. 20.

The second function of arms control, according to Schelling and Halperin, is to reduce the damage to life and property should war break out; that is, if deterrence fails.[27] Presumably this is achieved by reducing the capability of states to destroy each other's society, meaning to lower or place limits on the stockpile of weapons (especially nuclear) and their means of delivery. This is the fundamental premise underlying arms agreements which seek reductions in the ability of states to wage war against each other. It is assumed that an attack by an aggressor could be deterred without an over-preponderance of weapons and weapons systems.[28] If substantial reductions in armaments can be achieved, the likelihood of one party seizing the opportunity to start a war might be lessened. At the same time, the chances that war would come to an end might improve before the antagonist had an opportunity to replenish his supply of weaponry.

This theoretical mind-set has become rather hackneyed in arms control discussions, especially in the analyses of those who contend that sharp curtailments in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers (mainly) would

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[27] The central proposition of the doctrine of deterrence is that peace can be preserved by the threat of mutual assured destruction. That is, the infliction of unacceptable damage on the party(ies) which begins war or endangers the vital security interests of another. In short, deterrence is a concept based primarily on threat and intimidation.

[28] Schelling and Halperin, Strategy, p. 17. This argument is clearly a reflection of the concept of finite or even minimum deterrence. It is the same assertion which produced the doctrine of "assured destruction" developed by former U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara in 1964. The doctrine suggested that the USA would need only sufficient strategic forces, even after absorbing a counterforce first-strike, to inflict a theoretical level of unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. The resources required to accomplish this would be finite, numerically manageable, and requiring no technological improvements in the accuracy of strategic bombers and the like. This prompted the famous question, How much is enough?

be desirable in security terms. The school of thought which postulates complete nuclear disarmament goes even further, since it calls for an ultimate reduction in nuclear weapons to zero level.

Given that nuclear weapons are present in large, but balanced, numbers it is possible, perhaps even certain, that a drastic cut in the nuclear stockpiles of the USA and the USSR would upset the bi-polar strategic balance. A number of political and military factors support this reasoning. First, military capabilities are essential but not adequate for strategic stability. The interplay between the military and political dimensions must invariably be taken into account. Although the superpowers are the dominant nuclear powers, there are at least three or four other nations which possess nuclear weapons. While the Soviet Union has often expressed concern about British and French nuclear capabilities, and the USA about Chinese capabilitiy, the fact remains that these states do not figure greatly in the strategic equation. Yet, as one commentator has convincingly argued:

> With sharp bilateral reductions by the superpowers, [Britain, China and France] could become "instant superpowers," because (1) the superpower arsenals would be reduced towards their levels and (2) the smaller nuclear powers might have an incentive that does not realistically exists today to start increasing their levels in direct competition with the present superpowers. In a world of three or more superpowers, deterrence and strategic calculations would be transformed. The instability of alliance diplomacy could return to a dominant role in international relations - with far greater risks than in the prenuclear world.[29]

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[29] Francis P. Hoeber, "How Little is Enough?" International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1978/1979:p. 64.

It is also possible that drastic cuts in the nuclear stockpiles of the USA and the USSR, in the presumed interest of arms control, could create incentives for so-called "Nth" countries to pursue more vigorously their nuclear options. It may have taken China fifteen years or so to enter the "nuclear club," and perhaps ten years before India was able to detonate its atomic device. However, the economic and political costs that threshold nations may have to undergo to become nuclear weapon states could seem less formidable than they do at present. Put differently, the economic and political costs that new nations would have to incur to become nuclear powers at competitive levels could appear less overwhelming than they are now, if the USA and the USSR were to reduce their strategic forces drastically. Hence, one would be merely aggravating the potential for horizontal proliferation by reversing vertical proliferation. Most policymakers would probably prefer to live with familiar uncertainties than face another round of uncharted quandary.[30]

At another level, drastic cuts in the strategic arsenals of the superpowers would likely call into question the credibility of the nuclear shield that each extends over its allies in Europe. A weakening of the strategic nuclear guarantee over NATO Europe, for example, may raise the possibilities of a conventional war on the Continent - one which the West could only hope to win by a massive re-allocation of economic resources from the civilian to the weapons sector. This is

[30] There are several other military and technical aspects which this approach to arms control theory ignore. Hoeber has amply treated with them in his article above: they include cheating, technological surprise, exploitation of current arms control loopholes, and outright undermining of present restrictions under the SALT agreements. These developments could have far-reaching implications.

because the Soviet Union now enjoys a sizeable lead in conventional strength, one which the NATO Alliance would be hardpressed to match.

Arms control may also help to limit damage even after a war has begun. By exercising restraint, adversaries can create mutual expectations and establish the sort of understanding which may directly affect the level of damage that ensues:

> --- the kind of arms control required for terminating a war will depend on an awareness of the problem and [on] some exploration of its implications beforehand and it will require communications, reconnaissance, and command responsibilities.[31]

Arms control can serve also to decrease the cost of defence preparation, that is, it portends sound monetary benefits.[32] Modern governments find themselves faced with many economic and social problems, such as chronic levels of unemployment and runaway inflation. The concomitant difficulties are a growing competitiveness amongst various sectors of the society for scarce resources which must come from an already overtaxed population. Competitive arms build-up (such as the one the "arms race" theory is supposed to describe) causes governments to shift scarce resources from the civilian to the military sector. Thus, decision-makers often spend money on acquiring weapons and weapons systems that they know objectively to be of doubtful utility, but which they feel nevertheless bound to secure for political reasons.[33] This situation is compounded by the fact that individuals making up the

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[31] Schelling and Halperin, Strategy, p. 23. Emphasis in the original.

[32] See Herman Kahn's and Anthony Weiner's "Technological Innovation and the Future of Strategic Warfare," Astronautics and Aeronautics, December 1967:p. 28. Cited in Brodie's "Objectives," p. 19.

[33] Idem, "Objectives," p. 20.

military elite of each country often identify with special projects for which they may have lobbied hard. This can lead to a strong opposition or reluctance to dismantle weapons or cancel programmes which later fall under the umbrella of an arms limitation agreement or treaty.

Hence, apart from being potentially destabilising, the "arms race" is undoubtedly costly. If arms control can help to limit the cost of such a competition, by placing acceptable and stable limits on weapons and their delivery systems, then it might serve to promote national development as well. It is reasonable to assume that most governments face similar problems with respect to resource generation and allocation, and it is on this assumption that the above claim is based. It has no doubt led many commentators to argue that the economic aspect of arms control is a common factor influencing the weapons policies of all governments irrespective of their ideological leanings.[34]

Few would argue that arms control provides one rationale for avoiding significant spending in certain areas of defence. However, this does not provide a total justification for some nations. Strategic stability between the superpowers depends on how credible deterrent forces are perceived to be. This in turn relies on the amount of money spent on ensuring that that balance remains at an equivalent level vis-a-vis the potential adversary.

Secondly, agreements such as the SALT accords have been conceived of as complements, not adjuncts, to the strategic forces which maintain the nuclear balance.[35] Arms control at the level of the central balance can

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[34] Ibid., p. 33.

thus help to manage and reduce - but certainly not eliminate - the nuclear competition between the Soviet Union and the USA.

Thirdly, strategic forces and the cost to upgrade them are not so much part of the arms control equation as they are often part of the domestic picture. This is particularly apropos the United States where the Executive Branch, the Congress, the Pentagon and the influential military-industrial institutions all play an acute role in the formulation of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.[36]

Fourthly, over the long term deep cuts in nuclear stockpiles in the USA and the USSR may necessitate major revisions of the requirements of deterrence, of strategic planning, and of war manuals. The indication is that strategic forces still constitute a relatively small segment of the total defence budget in the United States. Many American analysts have argued that it may be unwise to cut these expenditures in a drastic way, because doing so might precipitate a crisis which no one wants. It could be argued therefore that expenditures on strategic systems are "cost effective." This is why arms control does not lead necessarily to the kind of reductions for which many hope.

Notwithstanding these analytical caveats, it seems justified to suggest, as George Zane has, that arms control agreements like the SALT ones may encourage "cost avoidance" by helping to clarify the threat posed to a state by the putative adversary. In other words, arms control may negate the need to plan for "worst case" scenarios. Conversely, in

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[35] Roger Zane George, "The Economics of Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1978/79:p. 110.

[36] Ibid., p. 97.

the absence of an arms control regime, the pertinent actors may undertake weapons projects which may prove economically burdensome to society. Arms control may also have a "cost reduction" effect if it can make deployment of certain weapons unnecessary, thus forcing less spending.[37] Indeed, one analyst has written in regards to the SALT 1 Treaty, that

> The United States can now more comfortably discount its worst fears about the growth of Soviet forces. With [SALT] 1 in place, the worst case build-up projected by some analysts is not very likely to occur, whatever the earlier intentions (or hopes) of Soviet force planners.[38]

Similiarly, the actors involved in arms control negotiations may be able to avoid embarking on a "quick fix" deployment programme which would lead to further costs on both sides.

In sum, the economic benefits of arms control do not appear to be as clear-cut as the theoretical literature would lead one to believe. If arms control agreements lead to "cost-avoidance" and "cost reductions" at significant levels then the case might be made; however, as an analysis of current U.S. policy will show, cost factors do not necessarily occupy a high position on the security agenda. It is questionable the degree to which the Reagan administration is influenced by notions of monetary savings in formulating its weapons procurement policy. In actual fact, the U.S. administration has justified its hefty strategic defence budget on the grounds that it is necessary to bring the Soviet Union to the bargaining table.

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[37] Ibid., p. 110.

[38] G.W. Rathjens, Abram Chayes, and J.P. Ruina, Nuclear Arms Control Agreements: Process and Impact, Washington, D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974:p. 13.

Bernard Brodie has argued very strongly for the economic element in arms control. He suggested that "in a pragmatic approach to arms control, the objective of saving money really deserves a superior rating to that of saving the world".[39] Most people would probably disagree with Broadie's priorities. And it is precisely because many put the interest of mankind above money that they would relegate the cost factor to the bottom of the arms control agenda. The truth is that arms control has to be viewed through the prism of threat perceptions, the requirements of maintaining stability in the international system, and the steps which states think they must take to prepare for the former and preserve the latter.

The discussion so far has tended to stress the three primary aims of reducing the probability of war, tempering the level of destruction should it occur and obtaining monetary benefits. However, invariably the the reference is to conflict or the possibility of conflict between the Great Powers, viz. the United States and the Soviet Union.

To be sure, though, arms control must cover a wider range of other security issues which impinge on global security. Beginning in the late 1950's and the 1960's, the view developed that it should be a proximate goal of arms control to curtail or contain the horizontal or geographical diffusion of military power. This theme received notable expression in the attempts to control nuclear weapons proliferation. The validity of the argument rested on the claim that international security was endangered by the spread of such weapons. As Brodie asserted,

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[39] Ibid., p. 33.

> There is little overt dissension anywhere to the belief, which is almost universal in the United States, that the general proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-possessing nations would be a threat to world peace.[40]

The spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than those which presently have them (referred to as horizontal proliferation), was thought to increase the likelihood or danger of "accidental" or "catalytic" war.[41] It could also facilitate nuclear threats by states which, for one reason or another, decided to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict with an adversary. And most disturbing of all, proponents of horizontal arms control contended, international society as a whole was likely to be held hostage if nuclear weapons proliferated beyond the boundaries of sovereign states and became the tools of non-state actors.[42]

These assumptions led to two things: the creation of a nuclear non-proliferation regime, whose primary element was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT.[43] The second development

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[40] Ibid., p. 22.

[41] An "accidental" war is one caused by error or inadvertent accident. It is a war which none of the parties involved expected or wanted. A "catalytic" war is one started by a third party, with nuclear weapons possibly. This could in turn precipitate a general war involving the major powers which, believing that one has broken out or is on the verge of doing so, decide to act. See Schelling and Halperin, Strategy, pp. 14-15.

[42] Hedley Bull, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," International Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2, April 1975:pp. 175-89.

[43] The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 in London, Moscow, and Washington; it entered into force on 5 March 1970. As of June 1985, 124 states have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 93 states have ratified it. Two of states which formally possess nuclear weapons, the PRC and France have not signed the NPT on the grounds that it is inherently discriminatory against non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT contains provisions for the non-transfer of nuclear

was the accession of several states to collateral arms control measures and norms relating to horizontal proliferation, one prime example being nuclear-free zones.[44]

The NPT, which came out of discussions between the U.S., the USSR and the U.K. on the control of nuclear weapons and technology, was based upon the premise that the world would be a more unstable place, in security terms, if additional countries developed the capability to produce nuclear bombs. More precisely, it was felt that one of the ways in which arms control could benefit both the U.S. and the USSR, and curtail the chances of there being ever a direct confrontation between them, was by preventing the spread of these weapons and the technology to manufacture them to new states. Therefore, the perception was created that, insofar as security was concerned, the control of "strategic" weapons was not the only factor in maintaining global stability - nor was it the only context in which issues relating to international

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weapons by the NWS to the non-nuclear states. In addition, the latter formally renounce the right to build nuclear weapons. They also give up some of their sovereignty by agreeing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to their nuclear technology on their soil and to demand similar inspection agreements from customers for their nuclear exports. The non-nuclear countries are in turn guaranteed access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology with the assistance of the nuclear weapon powers. See ACDA, Disarmament Agreements, p. xxvi, and International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1985:p. 33. The text of the NPT may be found in Documents, 1968, pp. 461-65.

[44] The decision to establish regime norms and practices aimed at stemming the spread of nuclear weapons (initiated by mainly the two superpowers soon after France and the People's Republic of China detonated nuclear devices in 1960 and 1964 respectively), was a result of meetings of the ENDC from 1965-1967 and informal meetings between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko. See ACDA, "A Typology of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements," Disarmament Agreements, Appendix 1:p. xivi.

security might be settled.

New cooperative patterns of control had to be devised to cope effectively with the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons; and to try to overcome the condition referred to as the "security dilemma." According to this theory, the international system is anarchic. Given this situation, all states seek to increase their level of security by acquiring defensive or offensive weapons. However, an improvement in the defensive capabilities of one state in a lawless international environment has the effect of lowering the security enjoyed by other states; or, as Jervis put it, "[i]n international politics...one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others".[45]

The primary consequence that states face with respect to the security dilemma is that the usual means of providing for their security - the competitive means - may only mean that they end up having less security than before; the reason being that moves to increase one's security may set-off a chain reaction that lessens the incentives for others to cooperate in maintaining stability and a level of trust in the international system. The other consequence of the security dilemma stems not so much from the cost the state might incur in trying to augment its security, but from the loss of the option to reap potential gains from cooperation and the increase dangers that a new round of arms competition and potential conflict might engender.[46]

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[45] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1978:p. 170.

[46] Ibid., p. 176.

State actors can have greater confidence in the international system, despite its presumed anarchic character, if it is believed that there is some effective machinery (regime) to regulate and manage an issue area, in this instance nuclear arms proliferation. Put another way, the possibility of achieving "nuclear peace" could improve if the security environment at the international or regional level can be re-structured in such a way as to become valued in its own right, because most of the actors agree to be restrained in pursuing the nuclear option or are sufficiently deterred from pursuing that option. At the same time, states must be given reasonable assurance that the status quo powers will work towards better management of their own relationship vis-a-vis nuclear weapons. This will strengthen the atmosphere of security and detente and enhance the possibilities of overcoming the security dilemma.

2.2 THE THEORY OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

The concept of a "nuclear weapon-free zone" underscores a recognition that the management and control of horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation cannot be realistically separated from vertical proliferation. The idea may be seen, therefore, as falling at the juncture between horizontal proliferation and vertical proliferation.[47] A NWFZ would establish rules - such as prohibitions against the deployment and transit of nuclear weapons in a specific geographical location - and embody the principle of "negative security guarantees," both of which are supposed to put restraints on the behaviour of the

[47] Sverre Lodgaard, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the North? A Reappraisal," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.1, 1980:p. 33.

states in or associated with any such agreement. The signatories to a NWFZ would anticipate that the pledges they have jointly undertaken will be honoured by each of the parties.[48] Likewise, the question of establishing reciprocal norms would extend to the nuclear weapon states. Nuclear-free zone organisers usually hope that the nuclear powers will agree to exercise some restraint by agreeing to respect the status of the NWFZ. Among other things, this could mean committing themselves to negative security pledges. Consequently, a NWFZ would apparently not only curtail horizontal proliferation in a certain region of the planet but would also limit vertical proliferation because of the commitments with which the NWS would hopefully comply.[49]

A NWFZ is a multilateral arrangement with the ostensible goal of achieving regional denuclearisation. Assuming this objective can be attained, a nuclear-free zone may in turn establish the pre-conditions for further arms control and disarmament. A study done by a group of experts, under the auspices of the U.N., indicated that although the most urgent problems of nuclear disarmament were universal in character, yet a significant proportion of the (nuclear) arms build-up occurred in a regional context.[50] Regional arms competition involving both the U.S.

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[48] See the Introduction to this study for a delineation of the major principles which are underpinned by the concept of nuclear weapon-free zones.

[49] Whatever the arrangements arrived at with respect to a NWFZ, it is clear that the "non-deployment" provision will set a certain limit on the vertical proliferation of nuclear arms. If the NWS agree to offer negative security guarantees to the NWFZ signatories - and these must in common sense terms be considered essential features of any NWFZ proposal - then the military and political utility of nuclear weapons will tend to decline. See Lodgaard's "Reappraisal," p. 33.

[50] CCD, Comprehensive Study, p. 29.

and the USSR is growing in most parts of the world, according to the study, and exacerbating the political tensions which often exist between nations. From time to time, these regional tensions precipitate armed conflict and make it necessary for policymakers to search for new ways to avoid the political and security dilemmas which often result from regional "arms races." The NWFZ proposals which have surfaced in both Europe and many parts of the Third World since the late 1950's are indicative of this security dilemma. Thus, it has been argued that

> If the nuclear option is primarily tied to regional considerations - as is usually the case with today's threshold countries, the NWFZ concept may also offer a framework within which political and military pressures towards acquisition of such weapons can be removed. A NWFZ can therefore provide the legal as well as the politico-military solution to the obstacles to dedicated non-nuclear status.[51]

The NWFZ concept has become, in short, a legitimate political organ in the search for suitable means of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Many analysts who have written on NWFZ's, have stressed that the establishment of such zones would bring tangible political and security benefits especially to the less powerful states.[52]

The supporters of the NWFZ route to regional arms control contend that NWFZ's enhance the security of the member countries by enabling them to avoid involvement in Great Power competition, and, in the long run, a possible nuclear war between the superpowers.[53] On the other

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[51] Lodgaard, "Reappraisal," p. 33.

[52] NWFZ's are in general more strongly advocated by small and middle powers (Australia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Mexico among others), which feel that this type of arms control provides them with greater opportunities to shape the military and security developments in their respective regions.

[53] This is the <u>ultima ratio</u> of a great number of NWFZ proposals which

hand, opponents of the concept have often suggested as a counter-argument that nuclear-free zones might in fact reduce the security of the states which are parties to such arrangements, particularly those which might belong to military and security alliances. They hold that such regimes would likely undercut the ability of nuclear weapons to serve as agents of deterrence -which is seen as their primary function- in certain parts of the world, thus rendering them redundant in military and political terms.

Proponents of NWFZ's point out the obvious, however: that nuclear-free zones apply only to nuclear weapons. Hence, their establishment is no indication that the affected states would be prevented from achieving suitable and satisfactory defence, because they can improve conventional military strength to required levels if they so choose.[54]

Whatever the merits and demerits of of the debate might be, it seems reasonable to propose that states that do not have nuclear weapons, are not members of military arrangements which rely on the use of nuclear weapons for defence and deterrent purposes, and that do not engage in collaborative efforts with any NWS, are not likely to be the first targets of a nuclear attack. This proposition is closely linked to the

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have been advanced to date, including that for the Nordic region. In fact, the late President Kekkonen made this a primary objective of his campaign to denuclearise Northern Europe. See his speech to the Paasikivi Society, in Helsinki, on 28 May 1963. As well, see Osmo Apunen's "Three 'Waves' of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980's," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 1, 1980:pp. 16-23.

[54] Jakko Kalela & Raimo Vayrynen, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Past Experiences and New Perspectives," in Kari Mottola, ed., Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe - Problems and Prospects of Arms Control, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983:p. 69.

role of a NWFZ in keeping its members outside the ambit of a future nuclear war and in limiting the damage they might suffer.[55] Seen in this light a NWFZ, as one form of regional arms control, underscores the degree of stability and the shape and likely outcome of a possible military conflict in the region it purports to serve. A NWFZ might be able to increase regional stability by removing sources of strategic tension, thus alleviating the need of potential adversaries to monitor and speculate constantly about the defensive or offensive measures being taken by other powers which figure in their strategic calculations.[56]

Insofar as NWFZ proposals emanating from the Third World are concerned, these are primarily aimed at removing the nuclear monopoly established by one or more NWS in a specified geographical location or undermining such a monopoly as the case may be. If achieved, this would presumably enhance the security of the states in the region in question (as implied earlier), by removing or lowering the possibility of their becoming targets in a nuclear exchange between some or all of the nuclear weapon powers.

An associated objective would be to prevent the NWS from placing their nuclear weapons in certain areas where presently they are being transported or deployed. One such popular venue is at sea where nuclear arms are regularly moved from one place to the next on board submarines

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[55] The argument takes into account the fact that, in the event of a general nuclear war, no part of the world is likely to be saved from its destructive consequences. This is a direct result of the genesis of long-range bombers and the capabilities of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), both of which are major components of the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers.

[56] This analysis applies mainly to states located in "tension" zones, such as the Nordic region of Europe and the Middle East.

and on surface vessels. If a NWFZ agreement can curtail the movement of nuclear submarines through waters close to the territories of NWFZ states, then it is said that certain security risks are eliminated or reduced with respect to the non-nuclear nations. The preceeding discussion points to one of the basic assumptions of the NWFZ concept: it is conceived of as a tool to alleviate the possibility of direct confrontation between the Great Powers vis-a-vis specific regions. and as a corollary to promote a favourable political climate and improve security in those places.[57]

There is, so it would seem, a direct correlation between strategic instability and the credibility of NWFZ proposals. Policymakers, especially those located in strategic areas of the world (such as Northern Europe), are evidently motivated by an instinct for self-preservation when they issue calls for the establishment of a NWFZ in their areas. This drive to secure the nation-state and its citizens from attack or aggression is self-evident enough; more centrally, however, it highlights the fact that geography and political realities are key determinants of a state's behaviour. In terms of NWFZ's, the enthusiasm which sometimes accompany their introduction is based upon a

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[57] It is instructive to note, as Kalela and Vayrynen have done, that the importance of NWFZ's seem to climb when relations between the Great Powers are poor, and the nuclear arms competition appears headed towards a new threshold. This was the situation in 1957-58 when the the deployment of tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe and the entry of the FRG into NATO were slated to take place. Also, the threat of a new wave of nuclear proliferation in the 1970's, after India carried out a PNE, fostered several calls for NWFZ's as a possible solution to this phenomenon. More recently, NWFZs have gained added validity, notably in Europe, just prior to the deployment by the U.S. of new Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. The event gave some cause for concern about the security problems these INF's might pose for European states.

perception that further deepening of tension between the major powers in a certain arena could alter drastically the security of a nation or group of nations, for the worse.

Be that as it may, the logic behind the nuclear-free zone approach goes one step further. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which addresses the transfer of nuclear weapons from the nuclear powers to the non-nuclear states, contains a reference to regional arms control and by inference to nuclear-free zones.[58] If a region is recognised by a treaty or similar document to be a NWFZ, then, in principle, nuclear weapons in whatever form cannot be introduced into it - ownership notwithstanding. In theory, therefore, a NWFZ would, as stated earlier, prevent to some degree horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.[59] Furthermore, most of the nuclear weapon states, including the U.S., tend to view nuclear weapon-free zones as collateral measures to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[60] In other words, these mechanisms would supposedly be supportive of the Non-Proliferation regime.[61] This

[58] Article 7 reads: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." CCD, Documents, 1968, p. 463.

[59] See Osmo Apunen's "The Problem of the Guarantees of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," in Kari Mottola, ed., A Nuclear-Free Zone and Nordic Security, a condensed English ed. of Ulkopolitiikka, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of Internationl Affairs, 1975:p. 15.

[60] Even before the NPT came into force in March 1970, the U.S. had acknowledged that under certain circumstances NWFZ's might be especially useful in curtailing the further spread of nuclear weapons. See Bertel Huerlin's "Nuclear-Free Zones," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1966:p. 22.

[61] A security regime may be understood as "those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour, in the belief that others will reciprocate." A NWFZ is a collaborative effort to overcome the "prisoner's dilemma" discussed above. For

integral linkage between the Non-Proliferation regime established by the NPT and the NWFZ concept gives an indication of the reason why some supporters of the latter visualise it as a means of filling the gaps inherent in the former.[62]

Additionally, NWFZ's are considered to have other advantages - such as the potential to extract so-called security guarantees from the nuclear powers. These commitments, referred to as "negative" or "positive" security guarantees, give concrete expression to the integrity of the NWFZ in question.[63] It has been suggested that security guarantees interact in such a way as to reduce instability and military uncertainty in a given region, since they tend to promote dialogue and the exchange of information among the participants on military and security concerns. These in turn alter actor expectations, so that a greater level of coordination and new forms of security are obtained.

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further elucidation of the concept of regimes see Robert Jervis' "Security Regimes," International Organisation, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982:pp. 357-60; Robert O. Keohane's and J.S. Nye's Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977:chap. 1; Oran Young's "International Regimes;" Ernst Haas' "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics, Vol. XXX11, No. 3, April 1980:pp. 330-56 and pp. 357-405 respectively; as well as Chapter 3 of this study.

[62] The Kekkonen Plan of the 1960's regarding a Nordic NWFZ was conceived as part of a broader plan to contain nuclear weapons proliferation generally.

[63] "Negative security guarantees" are undertakings by the guarantors (usually the NWS) that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states comprising a NWFZ and will respect the nuclear weapon-free status of the zone. "Positive security guarantees" imply that the guarantors agree to come to the aid of NWFZ states should they be the objects of a nuclear weapon attack, provided that certain a priori conditions are met. These two types of 'guarantees' are justified on the basis that to give up the option to possess nuclear weapons is potentially to diminish one's own security in relation to states outside the particular NWFZ umbrella. Thus, these actions are a partial answer to the question: what are the NWS

The improvement in communication which flows normally from this kind of regime helps member states to cope better with uncertainty.[64] In this sense a NWFZ becomes a "collective good." As one analyst put it:

> Security based on the commitment of nuclear weapon powers not to deploy nuclear explosives or their launchers in the zone and their pledge not to use nuclear weapons or their threat against the members of a zone is both in joint supply and non-excludable.[65]

NWFZ's are also seen as providing substantial benefits to the nuclear powers. They help apparently to change the logic of Great Power relations, because possible doubts concerning the strategic risks involved in assessing (and perhaps mis-judging) each other's security policy vis-a-vis a stated region may decline significantly. Put differently, the evaluation by the major powers of the strategic factors at work in a given area can be put on a more sober footing. This is especially so in an area like Northern Europe, where the interest symmetry between the U.S. and the USSR is very uncertain and is continually disputed.[66]

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prepared to do in order to uphold the security of a group of states? A concrete example of a "negative" type security guarantee is Additional Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has been duly signed by all the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. For an extensive treatment of the various aspects of the guarantee concept see Osmo Apunen's "The Problem of the Guarantee of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," in Mottola, ed., Ulkopolitiika, condensed English ed., esp. pp. 19-26.

[64] See Robert O. Keohane's "The Demand for International Regimes," International Organisation, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982:pp. 345-51.

[65] Raimo Vayrynen, "Military Alliances, Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 50.

[66] Ibid., p. 51.

The question, then, is what makes this development possible. The answer presumably lies in the nature of the guarantees that would be given by the nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states, viz., to uphold the integrity of the NWFZ by not introducing nuclear weapons or their means of delivery into the zone (however that is defined), and by extending to the zonal states positive and/or negative security commitments.

The NWFZ concept has been seen furthermore as an instrument of foreign policy, especially in attempts to improve the detente between East and West and in instituting a "confidence-building regime."[67] In his analysis of the political principles underpinning the NWFZ concept, Eric Alfsen observed that "the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to the relaxation of tension which is necessary to preserve peace in a tense international 'situation."[68] In this context, the main channel through which a NWFZ might serve as a confidence-building measure would be in helping to reduce the risk of war, primarily in an atmosphere of hostility and crisis escalation, when the pressures and incentives to resort to early use of nuclear weapons are greatest. A NWFZ can serve also as a "buffer" between power blocs. It may not, as a corollary, reduce tensions between adversaries, but may temper the role

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[67] This function of a NWFZ is particularly germane to the European theatre, where there is a great concentration of nuclear weapons. Further, in light of the military and strategic postures of the superpowers, Europe remains the most strategic and geo-politically sensitive region of the planet. This is precisely why some commentators maintain that a NWFZ in the Nordic area or any other part of the Continent might create more strategic and security problems than it solves.

[68] Erik Alfsen, "A Plea for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the North," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 12, No.3, 1981:p. 248.

that nuclear weapons can play in conflict resolution and in the conduct of international affairs.

Moreover, the establishment of a NWFZ in what has been described as a "tension zone" might raise the threshold when it comes to contemplating the use of nuclear weapons to fight a war.[69] More importantly, it would elevate the level of confidence that potential aggressors have in each other's declared intention to refrain from using nuclear weapons and concomitantly lessen the chances of preemption, as outlined above.[70] To be sure, though, the extent to which a NWFZ could contribute realistically to a relaxation of tensions (detente), by lowering the reliance on the use of nuclear arms as instruments of policy, would depend on the credibility of the agreement and on the nature of the commitments it entails. Ambiguities surrounding issues such as whether or not the treaty permits peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's) would only invite unnecessary controversy and undercut the effectiveness of the zone.

In theory, a NWFZ in and of itself might not be able to influence the incentives for states not to want to resort to early use of nuclear weapons - or acquire them as the case may be. Nevertheless, it could be a vital link in a broader process affecting the deployment of nuclear weapon systems in an area close to a nuclear-free zone. The presence of such weapons in a locality contiguous to a NWFZ could prevent some

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[69] See Chapter 1 (pp. 11-12), for a conceptualisation of the term "tension zone."

[70] J.J. Holst, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area: Conditions and Options - A Norwegian View," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1983:pp. 228-38.

states from becoming parties to the agreement. It may also encourage alliance formation, whereby third parties are given the right to deploy nuclear arms on the territories of states which are already signatories to a NWFZ treaty. Some would argue that this pattern would be inimical to the objectives of a NWFZ. Therefore, if a NWFZ is strengthened from the simple reason that states do not feel threatened by the presence of nuclear weapons in short proximity to the zone, it might act as a further stabilising force in the long term.[71] In sum, it appears that a NWFZ could contribute to a broader pattern of security by facilitating the process of detente and by serving as a "confidence-building measure." As the Working Group of the Norwegian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament asserted:

> The major aim of NWFZ's is detente. By removing the threat of nuclear attack on or from certain areas, such zones will contribute to reducing tension between the power blocs, which in turn may pave the way for further confidence-building[72]

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[71] Holst made a similar point in his analysis of the Nordic NWFZ proposal. The deployment of strategic weapons by the Soviet Union on the Kola Peninsula was sugested as one factor which posed the risk of inadvertent nuclear weapon escalation on the one hand, and an obstacle to the establishment of a NWFZ in Nordic Europe on the other. Presumably, to make a collateral deal possible, the Soviet government would have to agree to remove its nuclear weapons from the area. The same can be said for the establishment of permanent naval detachments by the superpowers in the Norwegian Sea. If a way could be found to restrain the USA and the USSR in Northern Europe, then the prospects for a Nordic NWFZ might improve.

[72] Neitil Atomvapen, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Countries: A Preliminary Study," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1982:p. 190. There is, however, another view which suggests that the success of NWFZ's may depend upon prior relaxation of tensions between the superpowers, coupled with a reduced strategic interest on the part of the Great Powers in the region concerned. See also CCD, Comprehensive Study, p. 30.

This is especially pertinent to tension zones. There is, however, one caveat: a NWFZ can only be expected to improve relations between power blocs insofar as it is conceived within a much broader framework of arms control, in which it would then be one aspect of a process. Otherwise, it could undermine the security of states which may be dependent on extra-zonal security regimes, such as are some of the Nordic countries vis-a-vis NATO.[73]

Yet another argument behind the NWFZ idea is the assertion that it could benefit a group of states (notably the developing ones) by establishing a framework for regional cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power.[74] Under normal circumstances, nations maintain the right to benefit from the exploitation of nuclear energy in the interest of their economic development. A NWFZ agreement might be said to promote the "positive" aspects of nuclear power by paving the way for the establishment of regional nuclear facilities to encourage the pooling of resources and expertise in the interest of all the parties, in a manner consistent with the goals and provisions of NWFZ agreements. As the UN study referred to above put it:

> The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the application of an effective safeguards system in the zone could facilitate regional and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[75]

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[73] J.J.Holst, "The Challenge from Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1983:p. 230.

[74] CCD, Comprehensive Study, Chap. VII.

[75] Ibid., p. 52. The purpose of a safeguard system, such as the one operated by the IAEA, is to ensure that all nuclear activities within a designated NWFZ are limited to peaceful purposes, instead of being diverted into the building of nuclear weapons or similar devices. The question of whether or not so-called PNE's in fact represent a

2.3 CONCLUSION

The foregoing has been an attempt to place the concept of a NWFZ within a theoretical framework of general and regional arms control; and to elaborate on the concept by identifying the principal analytical assumptions that underscore the establishment of such zones.

The theoretical literature indicates that arms control is thought to be, inter alia, a credible means to prevent or at least lower the propensity for conflict in the international system. As Paul Warnke, former director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency observed, the fundamental justification for arms control negotiations is that realistically conceived, effective and verifiable arms control contributes to the security of all the parties involved.[76] In other words, arms control regimes of whatever kind (nuclear arms control in

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peaceful use of nuclear energy is not at all clear. Some analysts claim that PNE's could be used as the basis for developing nuclear weapons, since there is no essential difference between the technology of a nuclear explosive device used to manufacture a nuclear bomb and a peaceful nuclear explosion. Others maintain that the principle of the "inalienable right of states" must include the right to conduct PNE's. The USA and the USSR signed a draft PNE Treaty in May 1976. They agreed not to carry out any PNE in excess of 150 kiloton yield, not to transact any group explosions (made up of several explosions) above 1,500 kilotons, and not to discharge any group explosion having a combined yield of over 150 kilotons, unless the individual explosions can be measured by mutually agreed on means of verification. The superpowers also re-affirmed their commitment to the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty as well as their freedom to carry out PNE's in third states in accordance with the above guidelines. The TTBT/PNE package was never brought before the full Senate of the USA for a vote, so it never came into force. Both states have said, however, that they will conform to the Treaties' stipulations. See ACDA, Disarmament Agreements, pp. 171-76 for texts of both treaties.

[76] Paul Warnke, "Arms Control: A Global Imperative," 1978 Gabriel Silver Memorial Lecture, Columbia University School of International Affairs, 3 April 1978. Quoted in Atsuhiko Yatabe's, "A Review of Arms Control in the Postwar Period," in Barton and Ryukichi, eds., Arms

this sense) can strengthen national security as well as international security. This is because a state's security is based not only on the level of its military preparedness but also on the the presence or not of a stable military and political environment. More effective management of, and reductions in, the level of nuclear armaments in the world might engender a higher degree of stability and security. This could come about through several means including agreements between the superpowers on limiting strategic weapon levels; the creation of regimes, like the NPT, that are international in scope, or through the establishment of regional machineries such as NWFZ's which are designed to engender more stability and to make the international system more secure. If these criteria are met in one form or another, then the basic objectives of arms control will have been achieved.

The structure of the nuclear Non-Proliferation regime makes it possible to conclude that arms control should not search for absolute answers but for a process which leans toward a "moving target." This goal may well be to reduce the danger of surprise attack, stop or slow down the "arms race," increase the nuclear threshold, or re-direct resources towards peaceful programmes including those concerned with civil nuclear enterprise.

Nuclear arms control postulates that nations, assumed to have an *a priori* interest in preventing a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons, will carve out common, acceptable grounds for agreement in a step by step process designed to gradually overcome elements of mutual distrust. The concomitant objective is to build a community of shared

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Control II, p. 27.

interests which can be credibly sustained.

Nuclear weapon-free zones comprise a form of multilateral, regional arms control. It has been argued that they have the potential to contribute to a process of detente and to neutralise tensions that might otherwise lead to confrontation between nations. As a limited arms control instrument, NWFZ's may be important not only in a symbolic sense, but insofar as they function as "test cases" for more far-reaching arms control measures at some point in the future. They may also be useful in helping decision-makers to evaluate the efficiency of various inspection and control machineries - including those operating at the global level. In addition, NWFZ's may point to new ways of improving safeguard systems.

The parties to a NWFZ agreement could conceivably benefit from it by being able to gauge the impact the agreement has on the morale and readiness of their military forces to respond to crisis situations, and to assess public attitudes towards inspectorates and the like. Moreover, a NWFZ may give rise to observable changes in the pertinent regional system, which could in turn suggest how the regime has affected the security objectives and imperatives of the relevant actors. In short, limited measures like NWFZ's may be instructive preliminaries to more ambitious arms control regimes because they inevitably alter the domestic and external environment in a political and military sense.

Many of the above assumptions about the logic of nuclear weapon-free zones in the arms control agenda, influenced the efforts at making the Latin American continent free of nuclear weapons. The next chapter examines the outcome of those assumptions, that is, the Treaty of

Tlatelolco, and looks at some of the politics which informed and likely will continue to influence the Tlatelolco experiment.

Chapter III

THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

3.1 THE HISTORY AND MAKING OF THE TLATELOLCO REGIME

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is different from other arms control agreements generally recognised as "nuclear weapon-free zones" in the sense that it represents one of only two (and by far the more complete) examples of a denuclearisation regime to be established in a populated area of the planet. Latin America and the Caribbean comprise some 19.5 million square kilometeres and are inhabited by over 200 million people.[1]

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is widely seen as having been the chief engine behind the establishment of a NWFZ in Latin America.[2] While this conflict, involving both the United States and the Soviet Union, was peacefully settled, certain Latin American states became acutely cognisant of the potential danger to their security which could result from a confrontation in their region in which the two

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[1] ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 6th. ed., with a new Introduction by Dan Caldwell, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1984: p.59.

[2] For the purposes of this study, Latin America will normally be taken to include the Caribbean as well.

superpowers were the main antagonists; and especially one where nuclear weapons came into play. As an indication that they had understood the security and political benefits to be derived from keeping Latin America "nuclear weapon-free," the Permanent Representatives to the U.N. of Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile introduced in the General Assembly a draft resolution calling for the South American continent to be declared a denuclearised zone.[3] Prior to the introduction of this resolution, only Costa Rica and Mexico had expressed an interest in creating a NWFZ regime in Latin America, as a whole or in part.

Not long after introducing the denuclearisation resolution, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador sponsored another resolution concerned with the same issue. The draft called upon Latin American states to establish a NWFZ by agreeing not to manufacture, receive, store, or test nuclear weapons on their territories. In an allusion to Cuba, the resolution stated that any Latin American country which had nuclear weapons on its territory should take immediate steps to remove them.[4] However, it was

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[3] For detailed analyses of the origins, content and record of the Preparatory Commission set up to draft the denuclearisation treaty for Latin America, and of the Treaty of Tlatelolco itself, see Alfonso Garcia Robles' The Denuclearisation of Latin America, trans. by Marjorie Urquidi, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967; John R. Redick's The Politics of Denuclearisation, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1970; H. Gross Espiell's "The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," IAEA Bulletin, No. 22, August 1980:pp. 81-86; J.R. Martinez Cobo's "The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America," IAEA Bulletin, No. 24, June 1982:pp. 56-58; and John R. Redick's "The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-Proliferation in Latin America," in George Quester, ed., Nuclear Proliferation, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981:pp. 103-34. For the wording of Protocol II and US ratification, as well as for the complete Text of the Tlatelolco Treaty, see U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS No. 7137, 1971:pp. 754-786.

[4] "Revised Four Power Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Denuclearised Zone, November

during the eighteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly that the call for a NWFZ in Latin America gained momentum. In April 1963, the above four states, along with Mexico, introduced yet another resolution which called on Latin American nations to cooperate to establish a NWFZ in their region.

Following the presentation of this "Five Power Declaration," several regional states began discussions on the question of a Latin American denuclearisation zone. In November 1963, led by Brazil, a different resolution addressing the meaning of a NWFZ agreement in Latin America was forwarded to, and debated, on the floor of the General Assembly.[5] The draft resolution was approved by a majority of the member states without any negative votes on 27 November 1963.[6] Resolution 1911 encouraged Latin American states to begin consultations with a view to creating a NWFZ in their area via a multilateral agreement.

15, 1962," Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963:pp. 1056-57.

[5] "Five Power Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Latin America, April 29, 1963," Documents, 1963, pp. 182-83. The resolution primarily sought U.N. endorsement and support for the creation of a NWFZ in Latin America. See also "Statement by the Brazilian Foreign Minister (de Araujo Castro) to the General Assembly - Prohibition of Underground Nuclear Tests, September 19, 1963," Ibid., p.508.

[6] Ninety one states voted in favour of Resolution 1911, none voted against and fifteen abstained. The U.S. and all the other states of the Americas, with the exception of Venezuela, voted for the Resolution. Cuba and the USSR voted against it. See "General Assembly Resolution 1911(XVIII): Denuclearisation of Latin America, November 27, 1963," Ibid., pp. 628-29. For a detailed account of the positions of the two superpowers and the other major actors see Redick's Politics of Denuclearisation, Garcia Robles' Denuclearisation of Latin America Official Records of the General Assembly, Documents A/C. 1./PV 1889, and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/PV 53) for detailed accounts of the position of the USSR. For the U.S. viewpoint, see Don L. Etchinson's "United States Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons and Latin America," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Miami, 1981 and Davis R. Robinson's "The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the

The positive response given to the idea of a Latin American denuclearised zone agreement by the international community was interpreted by leading zonal states as a clear signal to proceed with negotiations leading to the establishment of such a zone. Under the leadership of Mexico, private talks were held between the regional countries; and in November 1964, representatives of seventeen Latin American states attended the "Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearisation of Latin America" held in Mexico City. At this meeting, a "Preparatory Commission" chaired by Garcia Robles was set up to formulate a draft multilateral treaty for the purpose of establishing a NWFZ in Latin America.[7] The Commission met in Mexico City on a total of four occasions during March 1965 and February 1967.[8] The primary issues consulted on were the specific obligations of member states under a proposed NWFZ treaty, the definition of the geographical scope of the proposed zone, verification and control mechanisms to be adopted, the relationship between the Latin American states and the nuclear weapon states, and how the territories situated within the zone but belonging

United States: A Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 1975:pp. 282-309.

[7] Garcia Robles, who was later awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, became known as the "father" of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

[8] The Preparatory Commission was made up of twenty one regional states, excluding Cuba which declined participation as a matter of principle. In addition, observers from the U.S., Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China were invited. Cuba has steadfastly maintained that it could not entertain the suggestion of establishing a nuclear- free zone in Latin America until the U.S. agreed to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone, and dismantled its military bases in Guantanamo Bay and in other parts of Latin America. See Lynn H. Miller's "The Denuclearisation of Latin America: Implications for Arms Control," Report prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (ACDA/WEC-126), Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968:p. 3.

to extra-regional powers should be treated.

By the time the second session of the Committee had ended, in September 1965, several of these factors had been resolved, and a preliminary draft containing key articles of the denuclearisation treaty was prepared. These articles consisted of the basic principles which were to guide the remaining sessions of the Commission. Most of them were later incorporated into the final draft treaty and contained the following provisions:

1. Contracting parties would not manufacture, receive or store nuclear weapons for themselves or anyone else on their territory;
2. a permanent agency comprised of all the Parties would be founded to administer the treaty and establish a workable control system;
3. all parties to the Treaty would adopt the safeguard procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
4. explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes would be allowed with the supervision of the Treaty Agency and the IAEA as long as certain other criteria were met; and, finally,
5. a "nuclear weapon" would be defined as an explosion of radioactive isotopes in an uncontrolled manner, which was capable of mass destruction, injury or poisoning.[9]

The Preparatory Commission, at its third sitting held from April 19 - March 4, 1966, unanimously adopted a draft instrument called "Proposals for the Preparation of the Treaty on the Denuclearisation of Latin

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[9] "Final Act of the Second Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearisation of Latin America, September 2, 1965," in Documents, pp. 535-36.

America".[10] This document was a much more elaborate one than the two previous versions and was approved by the Commission in May 1966. Copies were despatched to governments and to international and regional organisations which, for one reason or another, had an interest in the Latin American proposal. This was done in order to ascertain their views on the draft proposals.

Aware that a NWFZ would be of little use without the "blessings" and cooperation of the nuclear states and the powers having claims over territories lying within the zone, the Commission decided to attach two separate annexes or protocols to cover both groupings of nations and situations. Thus, unlike the Latin American states, non-regional powers falling in either of the above two categories would be requested to sign the pertinent protocol(s) to the draft treaty without actually becoming parties to the treaty itself.[11]

Protocol 1 was directed to the states which owned territories in Latin America. The latter was defined as comprising territories lying south of the Rio Grande including Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Additionally, it included not only the territorial waters of the states involved but purported to extend also to parts of the high seas. The powers to which Protocol 1 would apply were the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and the Netherlands.

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[10] Robles, Denuclearisation of Latin America, pp. 115-137.

[11] Refer to Appendix II for the status of signatures and ratifications of Additional Protocols I and II, and to Appendix III for a map of the Latin American NWFZ (exluding U.S. territory).

Protocol 2 concerned the five acknowledged nuclear weapon powers, viz., the People's Republic of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.[12] Its purpose was to get the five nuclear powers to provide the signatory states with negative security guarantees. Under the terms of this Protocol, therefore, the five nuclear weapon states would promise not to use nuclear weapons against Latin American countries which became parties to the NWFZ treaty.

Protocols 1 and 2 were significant because they underscored the generally accepted assertion that a NWFZ would be practically useless without the necessary support and guarantee of the Great Powers, which also happen to be the recognised nuclear countries. Moreover, the Latin American nations realised that they would in effect be limiting their freedom of manoeuvre by becoming parties to a NWFZ agreement without obtaining commensurate concessions from the nuclear states, and from those extra-zonal ones that owned territories within the region.[13] The architects of the draft treaty anticipated also that a nuclear-free zone would provide substantial security benefits to the signatories: it would

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[12] The Latin American countries also expected India to become a signatory to Protocol 2, presumably because of its peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974. See Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Some Comments and Views of OPANAL with Respect to Article VII and Other Related Provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT/CONF./9), Geneva, 24 February 1975:p. 5 and pp. 29-31.

[13] This consideration was especially apropos the U.S. Not only was it subject to the contents of the two draft protocols, but Washington has played traditionally a dominant role in ensuring the defence of the entire Western Hemisphere. For a detailed account of the United States' response to the Latin American NWFZ proposal, see "Letter from the American Ambassador at Mexico (Freeman) to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearisation of Latin America (Garcia Robles), August 29, 1966," in ACDA, Documents, 1966, pp. 622-28.

reduce or eliminate the probability that Latin America might become an unwilling participant in a nuclear conflict involving the Great Powers, and shield the region from nuclear attack. to become pre-occupied with preparations for a nuclear attack against them. They could then concentrate their energies and resources on social and economic programmes that would benefit their respective societies.[14]

The Preparatory Commission met again in September 1966 and January 1967 to try and iron out certain controversial issues. These included the relationship that would exist between the treaty's control agency and the IAEA, the definition of nuclear weapons, and the question of whether or not peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's) would be permitted. The Commission also discussed the territory to be covered by the treaty, and the manner in which it should be worded to ensure that the nuclear powers would support it.[15]

After several painstaking meetings and much compromising, the final draft of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America received the unanimous approval of the Preparatory Commission. It was opened for signature on 14 February 1967. Fourteen of the twenty one states represented on the Commission signed. The Tlatelolco Treaty has since been signed and ratified by most Latin American states.[16]

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[14] Redick, "Tlatelolco Regime," p. 138.

[15] Ibid.

[16] For a complete list of the states that have signed and/or ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as for the list of states for which the Treaty is in force (viz. those countries that have signed a Declaration of Waiver under Article 28, para. II), see Appendix 1. As of April 1985 - Argentina has not ratified the Treaty; Brazil and Chile have both signed and ratified it but have not entered a Declaration of Waiver to allow the Treaty to be in force for them;

Protocol 2 has been signed and ratified by all the nuclear weapon states. Insofar as Protocol 1 is concerned, France is the only non-zonal state owning territory in Latin America that has not ratified it.[17]

Subsequent to its commendation by the General Assembly, a variety of states made speeches relevant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco both within and outside the United Nations. Of note were the remarks made by Brazil, Mexico, the USA, the USSR, Cuba, the Netherlands and the U.K. At the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) session in 1967 the Mexican government stressed the hope that the Treaty of Tlatelolco would receive the support of the international community.[18] The U.S. tended to emphasise the positive aspects of the agreement and avoided any mention of the two Protocols to the Treaty, even though it became clear that it had difficulty with them. The American Representative nevertheless said that, as the United States understood the Treaty, peaceful nuclear explosions were not permitted.[19] Brazil also gave its general support

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Cuba, Dominica, Haiti, St. Vincent & the Grenadines are not parties to the Treaty. Cuba has long objected to a Latin American NWFZ given the pre-existing politico-military environment. Belize and Guyana have not been invited by the General Conference to participate in the Agreement because of unsettled territorial claims or disputes vis-a-vis Guatemala and Venezuela respectively.

[17] "Status of Signatures and Ratifications of Additional Protocols 1 and II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, (CG/267), 30 April 1985.

[18] "Statement by the Mexican representative (Garcia Robles) to the ENDC: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, 21 February 1967;" and "Statement by the Mexican Representative (Garcia Robles) to the ENDC: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone and Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 21, 1967," in ACDA, Documents, 1967, pp.99-103 and pp. 162-168 respectively.

[19] "Statement by [the] ACDA Director, Foster, to the ENDC: Latin

but argued that in its view the Treaty sanctioned the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions by member states.[20] In view of its sizeable resource base, Brazil apparently did not feel it would be in its national interest to forgo the right to carry out such activities.

At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, both the USSR and Cuba rejected the Treaty. The former, while commending the countries of Latin America for reaching an accord on the denuclearisation of their region, accused the U.S. of undermining the nascent regime. The Soviet Union observed that there was a lack of consensus surrounding the vital matter of PNE's, and expressed doubts about the efficacy of the boundaries which the Treaty incorporated. This was in reference to the apparent extension of the Treaty beyond the territorial waters of the Latin American region. Finally, Moscow stated that in its opinion a major deficiency of the Treaty was its failure to prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through the territories of signatory states. It noted that military vessels belonging to the United States often carried nuclear weapons on board on their passage through the Panama Canal Zone, and might even be transporting such weapons on land in localities over which the USA exercised de jure or de facto ownership.[21] Cuba repeated its longstanding position that a genuine NWFZ regime in Latin America

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American Nuclear Free Zone, 7 March 1967," Ibid., pp. 126-28.

[20] "Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Azeredo da Silveira) to the ENDC: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 14 March 1967;" and "Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Azeredo da Silveira) to the ENDC: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, 31 August 1967," Ibid., pp. 135-42 and pp. 368-71 respectively.

[21] "Statement by the Soviet Representative (Mendelevich) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty, October 27, 1967," Ibid., pp. 539-46.

was possible only when the U.S. decided to dismantle its military facilities in the Caribbean (including those on Guantanamo Bay), and agreed to refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the Latin American/Caribbean region by any means.[22]

In contrast, both the U.K. and the Netherlands declared their support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and gave assurances that they would commit themselves to the relevant protocols.[23] As owners of territories within the Zone both nations were eligible to sign Protocol 1; and as a nuclear weapon power the United Kingdom was expected to sign Protocol 2. The signal support of Britain and the Netherlands for the Treaty at such an early stage after its inception not only lent some degree of recognition to it, but underscored as well a certain sympathy for the Latin American objective of reaching a credible arms control agreement.

On 5 December 1967, the General Assembly of the U.N. endorsed the Treaty of Tlatelolco by a vote of eighty two to zero, with twenty abstentions.[24] The Resolution (286) outlined briefly the aims and objectives of the Tlatelolco Treaty. Its "historical significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons" was commended;

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[22] "Statement by the Cuban Representative (Alarcon de Quesada) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, October 26, 1967," Ibid., pp. 538-39.

[23] "Statement by the British Representative (Caradon) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty, 26 October 1967;" and "Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Eschuzier) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty, October 25, 1967," Ibid., pp. 533-35 and pp. 531-32 respectively.

[24] The U.S. voted in favour of the Treaty. Among the abstainers were the USSR, Cuba, France and Guyana. See "General Assembly Resolution 2286(XXII): Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, December 5, 1967;" and ACDA, Documents, 1967, pp. 764-66.

and the states which were eligible to make commitments to the Treaty and its two Protocols were "invited" to sign and ratify it. The initial achievements of the Tlatelolco Treaty process was indicative of the determination of a group of states, which perceived a common threat to their security, to undertake concerted action to establish a NWFZ - the first of its kind to bear application to a densely populated area. If arms control represents a step by step approach towards better management of the instruments of war, then the final document establishing a Latin American NWFZ regime can be said to have begun a process whereby a more complete NWFZ might one day be accomplished.[25]

While there are grounds for concluding that no cultural factors stood in the way of obtaining a nuclear-free zone regime in Latin America, there were nevertheless a number of complex issues with which the negotiators had to grapple. Some, ideology for instance, necessitated important compromises that may have hindered the achievement of a more far-reaching NWFZ agreement. Despite this, however, the Latin American countries have gained some success in formally declaring their region a nuclear-free area. In the long term, given certain positive changes in the perceptions that some states have concerning the political and strategic constraints on their decision not to participate in the Tlatelolco process, a more complete and credible NWFZ is possible. It is obvious that before this can happen the major regional powers - Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba - will have to be persuaded that their commitment to the Treaty is in their best interests. The Tlatelolco Treaty will also have to achieve more recognition and credibility abroad

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[25] Etchinson, United States Foreign Policy, p. 149.

particularly amongst the major powers.[26]

3.2 THE TLATELOLCO TREATY

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was established on the basis of a multilateral, treaty-writing formula.[27] The principal organ of the Treaty is called the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). It is responsible for, among other things, supervising compliance with the provisions of the Treaty (Articles 7-11). OPANAL operates through a General Conference made up of all the contracting parties which have equal voting power and arrive at decisions by a two thirds majority vote. A five member Council, elected for a four year term by the General Conference, was formed with due consideration given to geographical distribution. This body functions by simple majority. The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General who is the chief executive officer of OPANAL. The Secretariat ensures that the control system established by the Treaty functions properly, implements

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[26] The Treaty did not come into force until April 22, 1968. Twenty six countries have signed and all but three now adhere fully to the Tlatelolco Treaty. See OPANAL, General Conference, 9th. Regular Session, 7-9 May 1985, Report of the Secretary General, May 1983-April 1985 (CG/264).

[27] Some analysts suggest the so-called NPT-NWFZ approach as an alternative to the treaty-writing approach to a NWFZ. By this formula, the parties to a NWFZ agreement would first become full signatories to the Non-proliferation Treaty; second make a solemn declaration not to produce, acquire or by any other means possess nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives; third not allow a third party to station nuclear arms or associated devices on their territories; and fourth undertake full-scope safeguard agreements with the IAEA. These pledges would be reciprocal, and presumably the nuclear weapon states would agree to grant negative security guarantees and/or no-first use pledges to the non-nuclear states. The NPT-NWFZ concept has influenced NWFZ proposals emanating from the U.N. since 1974, especially those that relate to the Middle East.

the decisions of the General Conference, and handles all communications with the contracting parties on a wide range of issues pertaining to the Regime and its operations.

The primary obligations of the parties under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are set out in Article 1, viz.,

A. The Contracting Parties undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction and to prohibit in their respective territories

1. the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and
2. the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.

B. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorising directly or indirectly; or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.[28]

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[28] ACDA, Documents, 1967, p. 71.

The Treaty contains important provisions for verification: the signatories undertake to make separate agreements with the IAEA for application of its safeguards to any peaceful nuclear activity or project that they might undertake in the future.[29] Furthermore, an internal agency - the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon in Latin America - was established. Its role is to supplement the safeguards of the IAEA and ensure general compliance with the terms of the Treaty.[30] Together, this system allows for proper inspection, observation, and reporting of all nuclear facilities and activities related to the Treaty. It also guarantees that the exchange of mutually beneficial information between the parties is facilitated.

One of the main criticisms levelled against the IAEA safeguard machinery is that states may only invite the Agency to apply safeguards to some of their facilities and not to others. This, however, is not the

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[29] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is comprised of 112 member states, was established in Vienna in July 1957 and is a central organ of the international Non-Proliferation regime. Under its machinery, non-nuclear weapon countries agree to file with the Agency regular detailed reports pertaining to their civilian nuclear activities, and to allow IAEA inspectors to visit their nuclear facilities in order to verify these reports and to ascertain that there has been no diversion of material from civilian into military purposes. This safeguard system is an important aspect of the arrangement under which the NNWS are given assistance with their peaceful nuclear energy needs, in return for their acceptance of the obligations which IAEA safeguards place upon them. Contrary to some opinion, safeguards need not be fool-proof to deter diversion and exercise significant political restraints. So far the IAEA has not detected any diversion of fissile material. (See Hans Blix's "Safeguards and Non-Proliferation," IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1985:pp. 3-8.) Aside from the IAEA safeguard system, further guidelines for the management of nuclear material were established in 1976 when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in London. This "club" established certain criteria in its supply of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology. The guidelines do not permit nuclear explosions by the recipients, ensure that all sensitive nuclear technology is safeguarded for 20 years, certify that suppliers do not deliver material that could make it possible

case for the majority of states which have acceded to the Non-proliferation Treaty, and is not at all so with respect to the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This is because the signatories have agreed to submit all their nuclear facilities, present and future, to the regulatory controls of both the IAEA and OPANAL.[31] The safeguards of the Tlatelolco Treaty go a significant step beyond those of the NPT in requiring the signatory states to allow the IAEA to audit all their nuclear facilities, to carry out sensitive inventories and inspections on their territories, and to grant the Council of the control agency (OPANAL) to administer "special inspections" if the need arises. According to paragraph 1V of Article 13,

> [t]he contracting parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the suspicion of violation of this Treaty.[32]

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for recipients to carry out enrichments beyond 20 percent, and ensure that the storage of fissile material is by mutual consent of the receiver and the supplier. While these guidelines, which were agreed on in September 1977, have been shown to contain loopholes, they do go some way in preventing competition amongst the group of 15 suppliers from undermining safeguards in the transfer of nuclear materials to NNWS. For further information on bilateral restraints agreed on by the NSG, see Ashok Kapur's International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979:chap. 3; D.A.V. Fischer's and Paul Szaz' Safeguarding the Atom, A Critical Appraisal, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1985; and IAEA's IAEA Safeguards: An Introduction, IAEA Safeguard Information Series No. 3 (IAEA/SG/INF/3), Vienna: IAEA Publications, 1981.

[30] Organismo Para La Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina (Spanish acronym), sometimes referred to simply as the Agency or OPANAL in this study. The newly-appointed Secretary-General of this body is Snr. Jose R. Martinez Cobo who replaced H. Gross Espiell in 1985.

[31] Blix, "Safeguards and Non-Proliferation," p. 6.

[32] ACDA, Documents, 1967, p. 31.

Thus, unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the verification process found in the Tlatelolco Treaty tends to be more comprehensive. It is also potentially more effective because the NPT places full reliance on IAEA safeguards and does not have its own control system.

The question of coercive infringement of state sovereignty does not appear to arise either, because the signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty agree, as a matter of self-interest, to allow the safeguard procedures to apply to them. Politically, this may be seen as a conscious attempt by these states to re- assure neighbours and the international community that the pursuit of peaceful nuclear endeavours does not leave room for the diversion of fissile material into nuclear weapons production.[33]

The Treaty of Tlatelolco permits signatories to use exclusively for peaceful purposes nuclear materials and facilities to which they have access. Moreover, the parties are apparently allowed to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, to collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, and to utilise devices similar to those used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons for carrying out such explosions. These can occur despite the fact that some have interpreted the Treaty to mean

[33] To date eighteen of the ratifying signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have signed full safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Notable exceptions are the three apparent nuclear threshold countries, namely Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The two former states have refused to place their entire nuclear programmes under the IAEA safeguards. Argentina and Brazil are known to be pursuing unsafeguarded reprocessing or enrichment projects that, according to some experts, could give nuclear weapons material to the former by 1986 and to the latter by 1990. This probability, it is believed, does not augur well for the international Non-Proliferation regime or for its regional counterpart the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For a more complete examination of the nuclear activities and capabilities of Argentina and Brazil, see the insightful analysis by Leonard S. Spector entitled "Silent Spread," Foreign Policy, No. 58, Spring 1985:pp. 53-78, and Ashok Kapur's Multilateral Diplomacy, p. 5.

that any nuclear explosion must take place in the context of Articles 1 and 1V of the Tlatelolco Treaty. This issue has created a great deal of confusion and ambiguity. Both the U.S. and Soviet governments, for example, filed interpretive remarks at the time they ratified Protocol 2 stating that peaceful nuclear explosions are not permitted under the Treaty. Most of the signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty have concurred with this view. The Mexican government for one has argued that Article 18 is subsumed under Article 5, and that present technology makes it impossible to separate a "peaceful nuclear explosive" from other types of explosives.

H. Gross Espiell, the former secretary-general of OPANAL, stressed that the provisions of Article 18, with respect to peaceful nuclear explosives, do not mean that member states may develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.[34] However, any explosion of this nature would fall within the purview of Articles 1 and II which state that the contracting parties may neither test, use, manufacture, produce or acquire nuclear weapons by any other means. Also, they cannot engage, encourage, authorise or participate in any way in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of such weapons.[35] Furthermore, Article 5 of the Treaty defines a nuclear weapon as

> --- any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrollable manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike

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[34] H. Gross Espiell, Torno al Tratado de Tlatelolco y la Proscripcion de las Nucleares en America Latina, Mexico: Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 1973. Article 1V of the NPT also recognises the potential benefit that could accrue to member states from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions but with the cooperation of the NWS. See ACDA's Documents, 1968, p. 463.

[35] Ibid., p. 71.

purposes.[36]

Thus in Espiell's terms, while it would appear that PNE's are permissable in theory, they seem to be proscribed if the devices used to conduct them have a group of characteristics that are associated with nuclear warfare, since that would place them in the category of a nuclear weapon.

However, Argentina, for example, holds that Article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco

> recognises the right of the Contracting Parties by their own means or in association with Third Parties to carry out explosions for peaceful purposes including explosions which may call for the use of instruments similar to those used in atomic weapons.[37]

During the Tlatelolco negotiations, the Argentine representatives argued for a normative interpretation of the key element which, in their view, distinguished a peaceful nuclear explosive from a weapon, viz., the "intent" of the user.[38] This stance of the Argentine government has remained basically unchanged since the Treaty's inception, although Argentina has voluntarily refrained from exercising its 'right' to conduct PNE's. According to some commentators, Buenos Aires nevertheless has left a 'window' open for the possibility of developing PNE's in the event that national security interests demand that this be done.[39] The

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[36] Ibid., p. 72. It should be noted that neither the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) nor the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) contains a definition of nuclear weapons.

[37] U.N., Official Records of the General Assembly: Document A/C.1/PV 15, 10 October 1967.

[38] Redick, "Tlatelolco Regime," pp. 103-134.

[39] See Ibid. and Juan E. Gugliamelli's "Argentina Ratifica el Tratado de Tlatelolco, Mientras las Superpotencias Condicionan su Adhesion al Sugundo Protocolo Adicional," Estrategia, May - August 1978.

fact that both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Argentina to accept the prohibition against peaceful nuclear explosions lends weight to this view.

It seems plausible to argue that Argentine resistance to accept a ban on PNE's is related to the attitude of the Great Powers towards the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Indeed, Argentina has asserted that the superpowers' insistence on a prohibitive interpretation of Article 18 of the Tlatelolco Treaty amounts to a "modification of the rights of Tlatelolco Treaty parties by the nuclear weapon states.[40] Furthermore, Buenos Aires has suggested that the wording of the statements by the Soviet Union and the United States, which were tabled on ratification of Protocol 2, coupled with the U.S. position on the matter of the transit and transport of nuclear weapons through the zone, are tantamount to a reservation rather than an interpretation.

In response, the United States has said that a difference of interpretation between the nuclear weapon states, or between the latter and some of the parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty, does not render the Treaty inoperative or undermine its central objectives. Instead, Washington has argued, the interpretive element points to the inherent flexibility of the Tlatelolco approach, and pave the way for the creation of a more complete nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America.[41]

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[40] Redick,"Tlatelolco Regime," p. 122.

[41] U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Testimony of Charles Van Doren of the ACDA, Hearings Before the United States Senate, August 15, 1978:p. 21.

It may be useful at this point to elaborate briefly on Argentina's position vis-a-vis PNE's. At first sight, it might appear that the Argentine attitude towards peaceful nuclear explosions was meant to undermine the Tlatelolco regime. However, even if it had no intention of carrying out such activities, Argentina might still find it effective politically to retain (without pursuing) the option to carry out PNE's. The point is that ambiguous nuclear objectives may be useful in extracting political concessions from those states which are most concerned to stop nuclear proliferation; or beneficial simply in terms of the psychological impact of knowing that one has achieved a certain amount of nuclear independence. In the same breath, although Argentina may never intend to acquire nuclear weapons, it may still wish to conclude that the Treaty permits signatories to carry out PNE's in light of other foreign policy considerations. Prominent among these would be the continuing dispute between Argentina and Britain over ownership of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, a dispute which erupted into war between the two nations in 1981; and the Argentine fear of Brazilian hegemony on the South American continent. The latter may be seen as an aspect of the traditional rivalry that has been at the core of Brazilian-Argentinian relations for decades.[42] Hence, Buenos Aires may be waiting for Britain to make concessions with regard to its claim on the Malvinas Islands, as well as watching to see what Brazil's intentions are with regard to nuclear weapons and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, before it decides to participate more fully in the

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[42] For further analysis of Argentine-Brazilian relations, see Daniel Poneman's "Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina" and David J. Myers' "Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option," Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 1984:pp. 853-80, 881-911 respectively.

Tlatelolco process. To summarise, Argentina may have very sound political reasons for retaining the option to conduct PNE's (and perhaps to acquire nuclear weapons). These motivations stem from an assessment of foreign policy objectives, from the military-security situation vis-a-vis Brazil, and from psychological considerations.[43] Deliberate obfuscation can be said to characterise Argentine attitude to its nuclear programme. As Poneman put it,

> --- ambiguous declaratory policy, together with the selection and sedulous development of weapon-usable technologies, suggest an ernest Argentine interest in a nuclear weapons option. This option is desired to maintain domestic political support for the nuclear programme and to exert leverage throughout Latin America and the world.[44]

The framers of the Tlatelolco Treaty established specific measures for the management of PNE's should they become feasible in the future. In paragraphs II and III of Article 18, the signatories undertook to provide adequate notice to OPANAL and the IAEA of their intention to carry out a peaceful nuclear explosion. Furthermore, they pledged to provide accurate information on the nature of the device to be used, the source from which it would be obtained, the place and purpose of the scheduled explosion, the preparations made for the Agency and the IAEA

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[43] Insofar as Argentina is concerned, the possibility of "going nuclear" significantly colours its stance on peaceful nuclear explosions. Such activities are perceived as steps in the continuum leading to the acquisition of a nuclear bomb, which is also one of its long-term options. Brazil's nuclear programme began with the 1974 agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to supply eight (safeguarded) nuclear reactors. The contract was read by Buenos Aires as a clear indication of Brazil's intention to build a nuclear bomb. On this point see Juan E. Guglialmelli's "The Brazilian-German Nuclear Deal: A View From Argentina," Survival, July/August 1976 (abridged from the Argentine journal Estrategia), and for further background on the deal see Norman Gall's "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," Foreign Policy, No. 23, Summer 1976:pp. 155-201.

[44] Poneman, "Prospects for Argentina," p. 860.

to observe it, and the anticipated force of the explosion. Finally, the parties agreed to provide information on the level of radioactive fallout, if any, which might result from the explosion, and the steps which they have taken to prevent possible damage to the population, environment and territories of zonal states.

The Secretary-General of the Agency, or technical experts acting under directives of the Agency's Council, as well as IAEA personnel, have unrestricted access to the area in which the explosion is slated to occur, in order to ascertain that the nuclear activity conforms to the information provided by the party making the test and to the general guidelines of the Treaty.[45]

There is no explicit ban on the transit of nuclear weapons through the nuclear-free zone; however, the Preparatory Commission decided that 'transit' in this context means maritime and air transit - not transit by land which is expressly prohibited. In addition, when transport and transit privileges are accorded to third parties, these are granted on the basis of the "right of innocent passage" as set out in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.[46] The question is also addressed in Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, where it is stated that the nuclear weapon states are not to introduce nuclear weapons into the NWFZ.[47] Although this Protocol has received

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[45] ACDA, Documents, 1967, pp. 77-78.

[46] See United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 516 (1958), No. 7477, p. 205, for the precise wording of this Convention.

[47] When the U.S. deposited its instruments of ratification of Protocol 2 in May 1971, it did so on the understanding that transit rights were not affected. For the Text of the U.S. Senate resolution regarding ratification of Protocol II see ACDA, Documents, 1971, pp. 197-201.

adherence from the five recognised nuclear weapon states, a number have submitted statements of understanding and declarations regarding transit privileges which in effect cast doubt on the motives and credibility of their commitment to the denuclearisation regime of Latin America.[48]

The drafters of the Treaty of Tlatelolco envisaged that the latter would one day apply to parts of the high seas.[49] This will come into effect apparently when all the states to which the Treaty is opened have committed themselves fully to it and to the Additional Protocols, and after the states in the zone have made appropriate agreements with the IAEA concerning their nuclear activities in accordance with Article 28. The physical scope proposed in the Treaty has created a certain amount of ambiguity, which in turn has led some of the nuclear powers to conclude that the Tlatelolco agreement would be in violation of international law if it were to affect states' freedom of passage across

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Of note is the fact that both the PRC and the USSR were at first opposed to that section of the Treaty relating to transit rights. For their views see Ibid., pp. 808-9; and Official Records of the General Assembly, A/C. I/PV.1889, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, (CCD/PV.553), USSR only.

[48] It should be pointed out, for example, that the Tlatelolco Treaty benefits the USA insofar as it acts as a deterrent to any nuclear power which might be inclined to try and station nuclear weapons on Latin American soil as occurred in 1962. As well, the Tlatelolco Treaty's comprehensive control and verification apparatus, via the IAEA and OPANAL, lent a needed impetus to efforts aimed at producing a more universal Non-Proliferation regime. For a detailed analysis and examination of the U.S. relationship to the Treaty of Tlatelolco from the Kennedy administration to the early Reagan period, see Etchinson's United States Foreign Policy.

[49] See Article 4, para. 2. The specific areas referred to in the Treaty are portions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For some unknown reason the Treaty's geographic boundaries also extend to as far North as the waters off the coast of North Carolina. See George Quester's "Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America," Current History, February 1982:pp. 54-55.

the high seas. In response to this observation, the formulators of the Treaty have said that the extension of the NWFZ to certain parts of the high seas does not contravene established principles of international law. They go on to point out that this aspect of the Tlatelolco Treaty was acknowledged by non-zonal maritime nations and, tacitly, by the international community as a result of the passage of several resolutions in the General Assembly commending the Latin American Treaty.[50]

As part of the control system, the signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are required to submit semi-annual reports to OPANAL and the IAEA, confirming that the terms of the Treaty have not been violated in their respective territories (Article 14). Furthermore, the Secretary-General of OPANAL may request extraordinary reports concerning the nuclear activities of any or all signatory states as he sees fit.

The Council, which is charged with ensuring the proper operation of the control machinery established by the Treaty, and the IAEA, have the authority to carry out special inspections under Article 16.[51] The Council will take action if a party has reason to suspect that a violation of the Treaty has taken place or is likely to do so, and

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[50] Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects, special report of the CCD, 1976 (A/10027/Add. 1), pp. 17-18; and Gross Espiell's "Non-Proliferation in Latin America." A notable Resolution was 2286(XXII) of 5 December 1967 in which the General Assembly greeted "with special satisfaction" the Treaty of Tlatelolco and impressed upon the states of Latin America and the Caribbean to take steps to become parties to it.

[51] The IAEA enjoys this right in accordance with Article 13, viz. each state which is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco must negotiate an agreement with the IAEA for the application of its safeguards to all nuclear activities of that state.

request it to make the necessary investigations. An alleged violation by a party (or parties) may be reported as having occurred on its own territory, on that of another treaty partner, or anywhere else on its behalf. Any signatory that has been accused of violating a provision of the Treaty may also ask the Council to conduct an inspection of its nuclear facilities in order to clear itself of any wrongdoing.[52]

Signatory states are expected to grant free access to the inspectors of the Council in the performance of their duties. This may involve the examination of sensitive nuclear projects being undertaken by a state. Moreover, since the Secretary-General of the Council is required to submit a report of each special inspection to the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, it is likely that, in the abstract, this stipulation would serve to constrain any zonal state which might consider diverting nuclear material into the production of weapons or similar devices. On the basis of this inspection scheme, it is fair to say that the Tlatelolco Treaty has been so structured as to reasonably ensure that the parties live up to their commitments.[53]

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[52] ACDA, Documents, 1967, p. 77.

[53] Despite the evidently stringent and thorough pattern of safeguards created by the Latin American NWFZ treaty, there is probably still room for the parties to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities. This would enable them to develop at minimum the capability to produce nuclear weapons. In fact, some experts believe that Argentina and Brazil may have already achieved that status; that is to say, they are "nuclear threshold" states. A number of analysts see this anomaly as a chief shortcoming of existing NWFZ proposals in general. Richard K. Betts, for example, writes that "A nuclear-weapon-free zone would be useful as a symbol of a legal constraint on changing intentions but not as a constraint on threshold capability. Nor would it eliminate incentives for nuclear weapons as deterrents to aggressors with conventional forces." This is a sobering point with respect to the Treaty of Tlatelolco vis-a-vis Argentina and Brazil which have not yet become full parties to the Treaty. See Richard K. Betts et al., "India, Pakistan and Iran," in Joseph A. Yager, ed.,

The provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with regard to violations under Article 20 are that the General Conference informs a contracting party, which has allegedly violated a provision of the Treaty, of the charge against it. The Conference may also make any recommendations it considers advisable. If the conclusion is reached that the violation poses a threat to international security, then the Council is obliged to report the matter to the Security Council, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the IAEA for possible action.

The Tlatelolco Treaty is unspecific concerning the range of actions that may be taken by any or all of the above institutions. (It is assumed that each would be guided by its own Charter.) What seems to be obvious, however, is that the resolution of the problem would rest primarily with the Security Council of the United Nations. In this sense, the pattern is similar to that embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and amounts to the Permanent Members of that institution taking action on which they could all agree.[54]

Non-Proliferation and United States Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980:p. 342; and Paul F. Power's "The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as a Military Denuclearisation Model for the Middle East," paper presented at the 24th. annual convention of the International Studies Association held at Mexico City 5-9 April 1983:p. 2. (Cited by consent of the author.)

[54] It is easy to imagine the problems that might ensue if a violation of the terms of the Treaty was found to be serious enough to require action from the Security Council. Most likely, one or more of the Permanent Members would oppose sanctions for various political and strategic reasons. There is a risk in speculating too much at this juncture, though, since this requirement has never been put to the test.

The Treaty recognises the a priori rights and obligations of the contracting states. Article 21 states that these rights and obligations, as set out in the Charter of the U.N., are not affected by the Tlatelolco agreement. This acknowledgement of a sovereign state's right to security is important because, in effect, it is an admission that a nuclear-free zone agreement does not cancel the prerogative of nations to make provisions for their self-defence, either alone or in consort with allies; nor does it prevent them from becoming involved in other security arrangements. What it does proscribe, however, is a contracting state's right to use nuclear weapons and their associated instruments to defend itself against aggression.

A related provision of the Tlatelolco Treaty (Article 20), outlines the procedure for the settlement of disputes which may arise from the application of the Treaty. If a disagreement cannot be resolved internally, it is referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the parties to the controversy. This feature lends further international scope to the Treaty, as does the range of future activities envisioned for OPANAL and the possibility for involvement by the U.N. Security Council in disputes between member states.

Accompanying the Treaty are two Protocols: Additional Protocol 1 calls upon nations outside the Treaty Zone to apply the denuclearisation provisions of the Treaty to territories which they own or control in the Zone. The effect of this addition to the Treaty is to make these colonial areas subject to the same safeguards and rules to which the independent zone states are to adhere. In Resolution 2286(XXII) of 5 December 1967 and 3262(XXIX) of 9 December 1974, the U.N. General

Assembly called upon the states concerned to sign and ratify Protocol 1.[55]

During the drafting of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Preparatory Commission realised that a NWFZ would be of little value without the support of the nuclear weapon states. Consequently, Additional Protocol 2 was adopted after consultations between the Latin American group and some of the nuclear weapon powers. The result of these consultations led to the addition of this Protocol. It stated that the nuclear weapon states agree to respect the denuclearised status of the Zone, not to contribute to acts involving violation of the obligations of the contracting parties, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. In short, they pledged negative security guarantees. France, Great Britain, the USA., the People's Republic of China, and the USSR have all adhered to Protocol 2, some having made interpretive statements concerning different paragraphs of the Protocol and the conditions of their adherence.[56] It is interesting

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[55] Protocol 1 has been signed and ratified by the U.S., the U.K. and the Netherlands. France has signed but not ratified it, declaring that in matters of defence France had only one policy which it applies to all its territories. As a result, no distinction could be made between one part of the Republic and another. It followed, therefore, that since France is a nuclear weapon power no section of its territory could become a NWFZ. See A/C.1/PV.2018:pp. 32-41; for information on the current status of Protocol 1 see OPANAL, "Status of the Treaty and Its Additional Protocols 1 and 2 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," (CG/267), Mexico City, Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 30 April 1985 or Appendix II.

[56] For a comprehensive document containing all the declarations made by the five nuclear powers upon signing Protocol 2 as well as statements made by nations which have signed and/or ratified Protocol 2, see Report of the Implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Some Comments and Views of OPANAL with Respect to Article VII and other Related Provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Geneva: Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 24

to note that this marked the first time that an arms control instrument had been signed and ratified by the five formal nuclear weapon powers independently. One could attribute this development to either an indication of the national interests of all five powers being concurrently served by adherence, or to the view that Latin America does not figure prominently on the geo-strategic map of the Great Powers.[57]

The final aspect of the Tlatelolco Treaty which is worthy of note is the provision for withdrawal of member states. According to Article 30, any party exercising its right as a sovereign nation may denounce the Treaty by giving three month's notice in writing to the Secretary-General of the Agency. OPANAL will then inform the Security Council and the OAS. Thus while the Tlatelolco regime is in theory in force indefinitely, the parties are not bound by it forever. They may withdraw their support if circumstances lead them to think that their national interests and security are no longer being served by it. Again, this arrangement bears similarity to the NPT's withdrawal provisions and undoubtedly underscores the theme that any non-proliferation regime must ultimately be based upon respect for the sovereignty of participating states.

February 1975.

[57] Although it does not specify, presumably the negative security pledges also imply a no-first use commitment. This means that the nuclear weapon powers would agree not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. For a detailed analysis of possible guarantee arrangements, see Osmo Apunen's "The Problem of the Guarantee of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," in A Nuclear-Free Zone and Nordic Security, condensed English ed. of Ulkopolitiikka, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1975:pp. 13-27.

3.3 CONCLUSION

Soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a movement to create a denuclearised zone in the Latin American region was launched. At the forefront was a small group of states which included Mexico and Brazil. Subsequently, a nuclear weapon-free zone agreement was drafted paving the way for what many hope will be a permanent denuclearisation regime in Latin America in the future. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1967 and came into force in 1968.

The Tlatelolco Treaty represents what is called the step-by-step approach to arms control - a horizontal arms control measure - which is designed to facilitate the ultimate goal of "general and complete disarmament." The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 dramatically conveyed to the Latin American states the fact that their region was not to be excluded from the strategic plans and global rivalry of the superpowers. The nuclear-free zone process was initiated with the aim of avoiding a future crisis of the magnitude of the Cuban one, and to preclude the possibility of a nuclear-arms race on the Continent. Most Latin American states have acceded to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The verification mechanism it established appears to be functioning satisfactorily; and the permanent body set-up to supervise the operations of the Treaty has gained a good deal of respect from regional and other governments, and from international institutions such as the U.N. and the IAEA.

It would be misleading, however, to leave the impression that all is well with the Tlatelolco Treaty, or that the major obstacles which continue to hamper its ability to achieve a denuclearised Latin American

can be controlled if not overcome. A number of serious political (and other) problems face the treaty. First, is the very tentative support which the two key states in the region - Argentina and Brazil primarily - have given the nuclear-free zone Treaty so far. Second, is the position of Cuba which has demurred to the Treaty in full. Third, is the continuing uncertainty over France's willingness to let the Tlatelolco framework extend to its Departments in the Caribbean and South America. Fourth, is the extent to which the guarantees provided by the Great Powers can stand the test of time and persuade the current recalcitrants to reconsider their security fears. Sixth, is the continuing controversy surrounding the status of peaceful nuclear explosions and the outcome of Brazilian-Argentine diplomacy in this area. Seventh, is the important question of the future viability of the Tlatelolco Treaty as a struggling regime, in the face of increasing international pressures for Argentina and/or Brazil to engineer their nuclear option.

To be sure, these are fundamentally political issues, although many commentators have tended to view them in legal-technical terms; and an assessment of the utility of the Latin American nuclear-free zone Treaty must occur against the backdrop of the political parameters within which the Treaty operates. The success or failure of the Tlatelolco arms control process will depend not so much, if at all, on the internal or regional dynamics of the Treaty itself but on broader developments which express the interaction between the local and international environments. This "interface" between the regional context and the international system is a function of the national, geo-political and strategic interests of the key regional actors namely, Argentina,

Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.[58]

Argentina and Brazil, for example, may continue to pay lip service to the Treaty of Tlatelolco while remaining aloof from it in terms of not giving up the nuclear option; in which case no one will ever know for certain if it was the treaty itself which was instrumental in keeping Latin America nuclear weapon-free. This appears to be the likely development over the next decade or so, but gradual nuclearisation of the Continent is the inevitable tendency. In this sense, the interests of Argentina and Brazil converge. The attitude of these two regional hegemons towards nuclear proliferation in general has conditioned their responsiveness to the Tlatelolco Treaty. Despite being continental rivals, both states share a consensus regarding the implications of superpower domination in the fields of nuclear weapons proliferation and other arms control issues. This noticeable Argentine-Brazilian collusion is closely tied to the paradigm tendencies of other anti-status quo countries like India and Pakistan.

The fact, too, that a few major industrial powers in Western Europe, such as France and West Germany, have shown their willingness to place economics over their fear of nuclear proliferation implies that there is ample room for the devolution of nuclear technology to middle powers in Latin America. If this is correct, then U.S.-USSR manoeuvreability in international forums having to do with non-proliferation topics is bound to suffer further decline. As Ashok Kapur wrote,

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[58] This conclusion focuses only on Argentina and Brazil, since it is their intentions and activities as nuclear threshold states which will, in the long term, determine the status of the Tlatelolco regime.

> The Superpowers are still important, but they are no longer able to negotiate international outcomes that can ignore the quest of an altered world order by many states in contemporary world politics.[59]

According to the realist paradigm, states attain their goals through the amassing and utilisation of "power resources." This claim has led to the conclusion that the only states which enjoy real power in the international system are those which possess nuclear weapons capability.[60] The ostensible function of nuclear weapons, therefore, is deterrence - defined as the putative aggressor's uncertainty about the other actor's capabilities and likely response in a crisis the intention being to prevent the adversary from undercutting one's national goals and interests.[61]

There is every reason to think that both Argentina and Brazil subscribe to this view of the political utility of nuclear weapons.[62] Thus, it is not that both nations disagree with the structuralist framework of international relations; what they detest strongly is

> ---the attempt by the top members of the international hierarchy to freeze the membership of the club of powerful nations: to prevent new recruitment, to discard useless members, and, above all, to disallow the downward mobility of

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[59] Kapur, Multilateral Diplomacy, pp. 331-32.

[60] This is patently untrue, of course. Britain, which is a nuclear state, has seen its power steadily eroded since the end of World War II. The PRC is also a nuclear power but has little influence on events outside of Asia. Meanwhile, Japan's power has grown tremendously because of its economic resources, even though it has no nuclear weapons.

[61] Harlan Cleveland, "The Real Deterrent," Survival, December 1967:p. 379.

[62] See Kapur, Multilateral Diplomacy, pp. 341-48 for a content analysis of speeches made by Brazilian and Argentine statesmen in the 1970's in support of this author's claim.

> the top members even when their influence and power have deteriorated.[63]

It is well known that Buenos Aires and Brazilia view the Non-Proliferation Treaty as discriminatory. It was Brazil which lobbied hard to leave out of the final declaration of the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, held in New York in May-June 1973, a reference to the NPT.[64] Brazil did not succeeed in its bid, but the attempt underlines the deep dissatisfaction it has concerning the motives of the nuclear weapon states. This is precisely why the NPT was rejected by both Brazil and Argentina in the first place.[65]

Inasmuch as the Tlatelolco Treaty is perceived to have logical connections with the Non-proliferation Treaty, it may be that the former will have to suffer for the latter. The "lip service" which Argentina and Brazil have paid to the Tlatelolco process to date, has less to do with the Treaty's theoretical strengths and more with the fact that it "recognises no category of privileged states".[66] However, the reluctance of both nations to identify more fully with the Tlatelolco process has to be viewed in a wider systemic context. If Argentina and Brazil decide to acquire nuclear weapons at some point in the future, this decision will have very little to do with the Treaty per se and everything to do with their determination to erode the existing distribution of power in

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[63] Ibid., p.343.

[64] Ibid., p. 332.

[65] See Chapter 1 of this study and Kapur's Introduction and Chapter II for a more in-depth review of the objections of some Latin American states to the NPT.

[66] Ibid., p.348

the international system. This accounts for the long held Argentine-Brazilian proposition that the NPT preserves and perpetuates a skewed distribution of power. A statement by the Brazilian Ambassador to the U.N. in 1974 confirms this trend of thought. He stated that

> ---disarmament negotiations have been experiencing a growing bilateralism that limits all initiatives in the matter to the two super-Powers, ...as if the developing nations did not have their own security interests, which are qualitatively different from the security interests of the great Powers or even of the developed nations.[67]

Based upon the above synthesis, it seems reasonable to conclude that neither Brazil or Argentina is likely to take further steps in improving its relationship with the Tlatelolco Treaty in the near term. Such progress will have to await a radical adjustment of the power distribution in the world, in such a way that Brazil's and Argentina's own "power resources" increase significantly. The difficulty is that under prevailing international relations paradigm, this is not likely to occur until they acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear capability. To do so, however, would be to undermine the very foundation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is uncertain at this stage whether or not the Treaty would collapse under the shock of a nuclear weapon power emerging in Latin America, but should this happen it would certainly pose a major challenge to its survival. As the thesis of this conclusion is that gradual nuclearisation of Latin America can be expected, it then appears that the still nascent nuclear-free zone regime will have to cope with some major shocks and challenges in the future. The pace at which this will occur will depend in the final analysis on international nuclear

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[67] "Statement by the Brazilian Ambassador, Sergio Correa Da Costa, First Committee, U.N. General Assembly, 20 Novemebr 1975," Official Text of the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations, pp. 2-3; quoted Ibid.

developments.

Brazilian-Argentine perceptions of superpower behaviour is by certain standards radical. Both nations agree that the detente between the USA and the USSR is due in large measure to their mutual preponderant nuclear weapon status. Nevertheless, they are not convinced that the security of the superpowers means the same thing as the security of the world. Added weight is given to this perception by the fact the detente does not seem to have reduced meaningfully the strategic rivalry between the two major powers which, by all accounts, must be viewed as having the main task of transforming political peace into nuclear peace. Argentina and Brazil share also the view that piecemeal arms control measures (like NWFZ's) give the impression that something is being achieved in disarmament when in fact there is very little progress. They also contend that these measures merely codify the arms race of the superpowers in terms which respond to their own interests and not to those of the international community or of middle and small nations.[68] This belief has prompted Argentinian statesmen to ask, "If the detente process leads to a continued increase in the military might of the great powers, what would happen if the world situation deteriorated"?[69]

The two Latin American hegemonic aspirants recognise the implicit links between vertical and horizontal proliferation. As Brazil's Da Costa remarked,

> [H]orizontal proliferation is not a phenomenon of spontaneous growth, but a political and strategic sub-product of...vertical proliferation: as such it cannot be dealt with

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[68] Kapur, Multilateral Diplomacy, p. 345.

[69] Ibid.

separately.[70]

Given this viewpoint, it is fair to argue that progress in the denuclearisation process inherent in the Tlatelolco Treaty will depend on progress in the realm of central arms control. As long as the superpowers are thought to be failing in their effforts to achieve meaningful and tangible results in limiting their strategic and tactical nuclear stockpiles, there is likely to be further inching by either, or both, Argentina and Brazil to actually "go nuclear." As has already been pointed out, the implications of this for the Treaty of Tlatelolco are negative.

The issue of peaceful nuclear explosions is a contentious one in Latin America. The superpowers are at one in the view that PNE's are not feasible at present and are unlikely to be in the future. Unlike the Tlatelolco Treaty, the NPT does not recognise any distinction between military and peaceful nuclear explosions. This is why Article V of the Treaty makes the nuclear weapon states the only ones which can conduct PNE's or assist other states in conducting them. Brazil for one takes the view that the implementation of Article V would amount to conferring carte blanche the monopoly over this technology to the Great Powers. The truth of this contention is inescapable. Argentina has also criticised what it sees as the unfair premise on which the NPT rests. It charges that the superpowers are more pre-occupied with discussing the PNE question than they are with the subject of a comprehensive test-ban, although the status of PNE's has not yet been decided in any arms control forum, and the IAEA has categorically acknowledged the potential

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[70] Quoted Ibid., p. 345.

developmental benefits that states could derive from this technology. The response of Argentina and Brazil to the argument of the superpowers concerning PNE's is amply captured in this statement by Kapur:

> To equate arbitrarily the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the presumed possibility of producing nuclear weapons and to impose as a consequence, unjustified limitations on the transfer of technology and nuclear material, is tantamount to an attempt to perpetuate the scientific and technological oligopoly established by a handful of industrialised states which is to [the] direct detriment of the interests of the developing countries....[71]

The reason why Argentina's and Brazil's stand on PNE's vis-a-vis the superpowers has implications for the Tlatelolco Treaty is because in signing Protocol 2 to the Treaty, the superpowers made note of their objections to the claim that PNE's are permissable under the agreement. Since neither Latin American state agrees with this interpretation, PNE's become one more political obstacle to their full acceptance of the Tlatelolco process - even though in theory this activity is allowed in the presence of international observers.

The view of the major powers with respect to peaceful nuclear technology stems from the premise that treaties create opportunities; more specifically, that by allowing PNE's in theory, the Tlatelolco Treaty provides an unnecessary loophole for Latin American states so inclined to engage in nuclear proliferation under the guise of peaceful activity. This suggestion, if correct, would border on the absurd since a state's decision to produce nuclear weapons or forgo the option to do so is principally a function of perceived national and security interests combined with the necessary resources to follow through on the

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[71] Quoted Ibid., p. 348.

decision. Treaties may act as institutional constraints on a nation's actions, but they do not foreclose those options forever. This is not to suggest that Argentina or Brazil would break its treaty commitments (presumably it is to avoid such a scenario that neither has decided to adhere fully to the Tlatelolco agreement), but it is to say that the latter cannot be held responsible for Brazil's or Argentina's future behaviour in the nuclear field - except in the sense of serving as a normative constraint.

In order not to leave the impression that the writer expects the Treaty of Tlatelolco to break down soon, the other side of the picture must be examined. Despite the evidence indicating that Buenos Aires and Brazilia (among a host of other Third World states) are unhappy with the existing world order, it is nevertheless true that they recognise the constraints under which they operate and the limits on their capacity to change the pattern of world events.

Assuming that nuclear weapons will one day be introduced into Latin America, it is likely that the country to do so will be Argentina. If it does, however, Brazil will perhaps spare no expense to follow suit. Notwithstanding the degree of convergence in the two states' policies on nuclear proliferation, they have both engaged in tacit and sometimes overt competition for influence in Latin America. Neither could afford to sit back and watch the other make substantial headways over it in terms of nuclear capability. Conversely, neither would be prepared to run the risk of starting a regional arms race in a context where the margin of error can be very high and the likelihood of escaping without being penalised very low. For regional powers, the cost of pursuing the

nuclear option is high at all levels: domestic, intra-regional and international.

It was asserted earlier that the primary function of nuclear weapons resides in their ability to deter potential adversaries. If one Latin American state were to acquire a nuclear capability to counteract a perceived threat from a neighbouring or foreign power, it could have the undesirable effect of sparking a local arms race. Furthermore, once a state decides to become a nuclear power, it cannot afford to stand still. Indeed, the sheer dynamism of the process will leave it little choice but to continue to explore new frontiers. One could take the view, as the neo-realist Kenneth Waltz has done, that the more nuclear weapon states there are the greater the prospects of maintaining international stability; but it is quite possible that if Argentina decided to explode a nuclear device that this could lead to a breakdown of the tacit system of restraint operating between itself and Brazil.[72] As Kapur put it "...even enemies, through constant interactions, acquire some sense of the regional system in which they reside".[73]

Quite apart from the response at the regional level, there would also be implications at the international level. A decision by a Latin American state to "go nuclear" would likely incur strong disapprobation, isolation and tough sanctions from the international community.

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[72] This argument is derived from regime theory which suggests that "in international relations there are...principles, explicit and implicit norms, and written and unwritten rules that are recognised by actors and that govern their behaviour." See Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983:p. 86.

[73] Multilateral Diplomacy, p. 345.

Moreover, there would be intense diplomatic pressure applied to get whichever state it was to reverse its policy. Concomitantly, domestic hardships in the form of factory closures due to lack of raw materials, mass unemployment and shortages of consumer goods could result in instability and the undermining of the government of the day. This is especially apropos Latin American economies which are highly susceptible to shifts in international economic indicators. In short, before deciding to pursue its nuclear option Argentina or any other Latin American actor must measure its determination against experience, intelligence and vital self-interests. These are some of the more central factors working in favour of a strengthening of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

It is perhaps a bit premature to say in what direction the nuclear currents in Latin America will develop. The prognosis advanced at the beginning of this conclusion is premised on the argument that as long as nuclear weapons continue to have some military use and plenty of political advantages, and insofar as they are perceived to confer power, prestige and status in a state-centric international system, certain Latin American actors are unlikely to ratify and allow the Tlatelolco Treaty to apply fully to them. (Ironically, one of the states which has shown great reluctance to do this, Brazil, was also a chief architect of the Treaty.) In short, if the nuclear options of middle powers remain tied to the contours of their regional environment and to the international milieu, then some states are not likely to close-off that option for good.

The Latin American scene will probably continue to be characterised by what Kapur referred to as "nuclear inertia" in the next decade or so. That is to say, insofar as Argentina and Brazil are concerned, their policies on nuclear weapons will continue to be one of retaining the nuclear discretion while in actuality moving very cautiously towards exercising it. This prudent response will serve to allay the fears of their regional counterparts and of each other, while it avoids incurring the wrath of the Great Powers.

Unfortunately, this tendency will continue to shed a cloud of ambiguity on the Tlatelolco Treaty, but that is unavoidable. Progress towards making the Tlatelolco Treaty a more viable horizontal arms control instrument will have to await substantial successes in the arena of vertical nuclear arms control. The risk that some Latin American states may feel compelled to undermine the Tlatelolco Treaty (intentionally or not) is always present, but this claim has to be measured against the greater risk of having no denuclearisation regime at all in Latin America.

Chapter IV

THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AS A PARADIGM FOR A NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

4.1 PARADIGM AND REGIME ASPECTS OF THE TLATELOLCO TREATY

The objective of this section is to introduce the conceptual framework within which the analysis of the Tlatelolco Treaty's potential application to the Nordic area will occur, through an examination of the concept paradigm and of the degree to which the Treaty merits being called a paradigm. A related purpose is to demonstrate that the Tlatelolco Treaty embraces the basic elements of a security regime.

Since the publication of Thomas Kuhn's path-breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the term paradigm has taken its place in the lexicon of the social sciences.[1] Kuhn himself used the concept "paradigm" to apply to the empirical sciences. In the above work, his concern was to account for the development and demise of various branches of the natural sciences. He argued that most members of any scientific academy will be guided by "universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners".[2] This paradigm becomes the

[1] Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

[2] Ibid., p. viii.

raison d'etre for what Kuhn called "normal science," viz., the daily puzzles with which scientists grapple and try to solve.[3] However, each paradigm contains the seeds of its own destruction: that is, a series of unsolvable problems. These anomolies are operationalised as counter-instances in the process of normal scientific activity, and will sometimes call into question the explicit foundation of the paradigm.[4]

Kuhn claimed that "discovery begins with the awareness of anomoly, that is with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science".[5] These anomolies tend to be ignored or suppressed at first, and attempts are made to adjust the anomoly to suit the model. If this proves unsuccessful, however, the basis of the paradigm will be eroded over time. A period of crisis or a "scientific revolution" will set in.[6] The revolution ends only when the old paradigm is replaced by a new framework with the capacity to explain the anomolies which led to the dissolution of the old paradigm. The new paradigm in turn contains fresh, new puzzles to solve.

Kuhn's conception of the nature of scientific activity is a useful way, in the author's opinion, of conceptualising the development and transformation of arms control issues and measures over time. This is not to argue that a social science discipline like political science can be exactly the same as the natural sciences. The former must not only be

[3] Ibid., p. 36.

[4] Ibid., p. 82.

[5] Ibid., p. 52.

[6] Ibid., p. 68.

able to provide explanations, it must also possess critical and interpretitive characteristics.[7] This is why the use of the paradigmatic approach in this study cannot conform strictly to the Kuhnian strictures which, afterall, were applied strictly to the empirically-based sciences. Notwithstanding, there is obvious similarity between Kuhn's conceptualisation and the approach which dominates the thinking of the arms control community. The fundamental difference between the natural science and social science is that the latter

> ---stands in a subject-subject relation to its field of study, not [in] a subject-object relation, it deals with a pre-interpreted world, in which the meanings developed by active subjects enter into the actual constitution or production of that world.[8]

The Treaty of Tlatelolco represents an expression of a group of actors' interpretation of political reality. It was the Cuban Missile Crisis, shocking as it was to Latin American statesmen, which led to the call for a denuclearised Latin America and to the paradigm-guided achievements which resulted from it. As the forthcoming analysis should demonstrate, the actors who were the "founding fathers" of the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone Treaty were guided in their actions by a certain view of the kind of role they believed Latin America could and should play in the international system.

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[7] Richard L. O'Mera, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1984:p. 249.

[8] Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociology, London: Hutchinson, 1976:p. 142. Quoted Ibid.

Bearing this in mind, the concept paradigm is used in this study in a specific, but not altogether idiosyncratic sense, to be compatible with the assumptions and pattern of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. A paradigm is a set of mutually reinforcing basic principles, objectives, rules and norms which taken together form a pattern or structure for a certain issue area. It does not mean a model or theory, although it embraces both in this study.

In general, a paradigm contains a consistent set of propositions combining empirical and normative aspects, that is to say a number of verifiable elements, values and collective expectations. Further, a paradigm defines the principal aspects which make up its structure and specifies, either explicitly or tacitly, the relationship that exists between its constituent parts. Third, a paradigm imputes legitimacy to itself by suggesting that it is sound and deserving of its advocates' support. A fourth characteristic of a paradigm as used here is that it gains its efficacy from the fact that its adherents accept the legitimacy of its core principles, objectives, rules and norms. It follows that supporters of a certain paradigm share basic values and expectations about the possible benefits that allegiance to the paradigm will offer. Lastly, a paradigm constitutes a vague impression of what is a stable world order and how such an order might be promoted in specific issue areas such as nuclear proliferation. From this flows various notions about how this world order can evolve through organisation and management of the particular issue area.

To sum, in this study's terms a paradigm is a systematic, coherent and consistent set of principles, objectives, rules, procedures and

norms. These combine to create a pattern or structure, the elements of which reinforce each other and confer legitimacy and credibility on the paradigm.

The principles embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco underscore some basic tenets of customary international law relating to war and security in the nuclear age; as well, they emphasise discriminate and proportionate warfare if it should ever occur. As a NWFZ, the Treaty of Tlatelolco purports to challenge some of the main assumptions of the power-politics view of present international relations. It would not be unusual for realists to claim that nuclear disengagement is not possible or even desirable. They might argue further that nuclear weapons are political instruments, and that the utility lie in their ability to convey to a putative aggressor the message that severe consequences will follow should it launch a nuclear strike against one or one's allies.

the main claim of the structuralist world view is, however, that states co-exist in a condition of anarchy, and must therefore rely on their own resources to fulfil their security needs.[9] Structuralists hold that the state is the necessary and sufficient actor in the international system. Since they view anarchy as being ubiquitous, it follows that states will always face a shortage of security. Survival therefore becomes the cardinal motif defining the actions of nations. It can be easily seen why in such an environment states lack the necessary confidence in international institutions or regimes to which they may

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[9] The foremost contemporary exponent of this view is perhaps Kenneth Waltz. See his The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers No. 171, London:International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975. See also his Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979.

have to cede a certain degree of their sovereignty over matters normally considered to be the prerogative of the nation state.[10] Another argument of the realist school is that, in a self-help environment, the state must exercise its inherent right to determine what occasions warrant the use of force, and the means (including nuclear weapons) that are appropriate for its self-defence.

The principles which the Tlatelolco Treaty embody challenge this world view. It puts into question the realist assertion that the state is a sufficient actor in international affairs, and that the use of force with the aid of nuclear weapons is justifiable in defending the state against an attack or threat of an attack. The Treaty recognises that security is an interdependent concept which can best be achieved through positive processes leading to the avoidance of nuclear conflict between the Latin American nations. This normative acceptance of the notions of collaboration and "common security" are the central organising motifs on which the Latin American denuclearisation Treaty rests.[11]

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[10] An example of an international arms control regime would be the Non-Proliferation regime and its regional counterpart the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Both embody mechanisms which require their adherents to provide the IAEA and OPANAL access to their nuclear facilities.

[11] See Robert O. Keohane's <u>After Hegemony</u>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. In fairness to structuralism, it should be pointed out that this school of thought does acknowledge the importance of non-state actors, like international organisations, in international relations. It points out, however, that any power they might have is derived from the actions of states or from the willingness of states to permit such institutions a certain amount of power.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco embraces the conviction that nations must begin to organise their security policy in cooperation with one another, and that states can survive best in an atmosphere of collaboration. In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, many Latin American decision-makers came to the conclusion that regional security depended on a commitment to joint survival, rather than on a threat of mutual destruction. This belief was reflected in the Preamble to the Treaty which reads in part:

> ---Latin America...must at the same time [cooperate] in the fulfilment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organisation of American states.[12]

In light of the above discussion, one can now delineate the foremost general principle at work in the Tlatelolco Treaty. Simply put, it is that the use of nuclear weapons (in Latin America) would amount to a violation of the international laws of warfare and would constitute a crime against humanity. As the Preamble also reads,

> ---the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilisation and of mankind itself is to be assured.
>
> ---nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the activity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable.[13]

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[12] U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1967, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1968:p. 70.

[13] Ibid.

The Tlatelolco Treaty represents the efforts of a few actors to comprehend contemporary security reality and to adapt to it by taking collaborative measures to protect their integrity and safeguard their security. In other words, the Treaty represents an institutionalised, cooperative venture at the root of which lies a concern to avoid the deleterous effects which it is thought the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America would have on the peoples of that Continent.

There is as yet no firm evidence of any investments by the Latin American states in nuclear technology intended for warlike purposes.[14] Moreover, Latin America has not been prone to conflicts and warfare of the sort which has characterised other regions since the middle of the present century.[15] This is not to suggest that the region is without conflict. In fact, there have been frequent coup d'etats, guerilla insurgencies (some of which are still going on), and the rise of authoritarian regimes which have used with increasing salience national means of violence to put down opposition. Yet, at the risk of appearing to be offering an apologia, many of these regimes have often pursued coherent and assertive policies designed to maintain internal order and some degree of economic progress while they were in office. Thus, one could argue that Latin America has not suffered unbearably from any conflict in the latter half of this century.

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[14] George Quester, "Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America," Current History, Vol. 81, No. 472, Feb. 1982:p. 53. There is nevertheless a significant investment in dual-purpose technology, since none of the Latin American states with a nuclear programme has reactors that have purely civilian uses.

[15] The Chaco War of 1932 was the last major war in Latin America. Since that time, there have been less disastrous conflicts between Peru and Ecuador (1941) and between Honduras and El Salvador (1969).

In addition, there are at present few outstanding border disputes in the region. No state can be said to pose a real threat to its neighbours (despite suggestions to the contrary insofar as Central America is concerned), and none is quickly moving to acquire a nuclear weapons capability out of fear for the signals it is receiving from neighbouring states.[16] These facts lead to the conclusion that tensions between Latin American states are not likely to precipitate war in the near future; hence there are no pressing incentives for any state on the Continent to actively pursue the nuclear option at this point in time. As John Redick has explained,

> ---most Latin American policy makers continue to oppose the presence of nuclear weapons in the region and to support the goals of the Tlatelolco Treaty (although...there are differences of view regarding certain aspects of the Treaty). The fact that at present every publicly known nuclear facility in the region [Latin America] is under IAEA safeguards (or under negotiations pursuant to their implementation) stands in significant contrast to other more troubled areas of the world.[17]

One of the purposes for which the Tlatelolco Treaty was founded is to ensure that regional inter-state conflicts do not manifest themselves in acts of war. It means that the Latin American states understood the importance of according regional security priority over their individual ideological and political tendencies. On this basis, it is justifiable to argue that the structuralist generalisation about the inherent centrality of force in international relations tend not to apply to the

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[16] Ibid. According to Quester, Brazil and Argentina indpendently acquired aircraft carriers but have made no move to complement them with the requisite aircraft. See Quester, ed.; Proliferation in Latin America, p. 53.

[17] John R. Redick, "The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-Proliferation," in Idem, Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981:p. 126.

recent experience of Latin America, and is not one of the foundation principles upon which the Treaty of Tlatelolco finds expression. Latin America has witnessed a long history of shared legal traditions and respect for international legal norms and principles. This reinforces the argument that there is a strong desire on the part of most regional states to prevent the instability that would likely ensue from the introduction of nuclear weapons in the region. The result of this prevailing norm has been a defensive attitude on the part of most Latin American states for the nuclear-free zone Treaty.

Finally, the principle outlined above points to a correlation between nuclear weapons on the one hand and international legal norms on the other. The evidence indicates that the Tlatelolco treaty was realised in part because certain Latin American states wanted to achieve a law-oriented foreign policy in their region with respect to nuclear proliferation. The Latin Americans also wished that the nuclear-free zone treaty would in time serve as a pattern for application in other parts of the world; in other words, they hoped it would "constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament.[18]

The second principle on which the Treaty of Tlatelolco rests is the conviction that regional nuclear arms control has an important part to play in minimising the role of nuclear weapons in conflict behaviour, and in promoting the norm of settling disputes through negotiations in good faith. This principle draws its inspiration from the U.N. Charter and a number of resolutions adopted over the years by the U.N. General

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[18] Ibid., p. 70.

Assembly to the effect that the member states will "refrain from the threat or use of force," a commitment which Latin American actors have taken to include the use of nuclear weapons against another state.

A third principle of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that regional arms control initiatives aimed at preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons should originate with the states or parties which will be directly affected by it. Most experts writing on the subject acknowledge that this principle is a sine qua non for the creation of a nuclear-free zone. A study of the origins of the denuclearisation movement in Latin America reveals that the nuclear-free zone initiative was entirely endogenous. It grew out of a genuinely practical concern by a few democratic governments which wanted to exercise some political leverage over the nuclear landscape in their Continent. It is worth remembering that the first recorded reference to the possibility of a Latin American nuclear-free zone was raised by Costa Rica in a draft resolution introduced before the Council of the Organisation of American States in 1958.[19] In 1962, the civilian government of Brazil introduced the idea to the First Committee of the General Assembly. Later in the same year Brazil was joined by three other democratic states (Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador) in presenting a draft nuclear-free zone resolution before the above Committee; and in spring 1963 the Mexican government became the driving force behind the denuclearisation proposal for Latin America.

Not only did the initiative for the NWFZ originate in Latin America, but the specific measures pertaining to norms, rules and decision-making procedures were all decided by chief Latin American policy makers

[19] Ibid., p. 110.

without overt external pressure. The obligations of the signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty, the provisions for safeguards involving the novel process of "verification by challenge," the management and supervisory machinery via the establishment of a permanent body, the procedure for entry into force of the treaty, and the guarantee provisions under the system of protocols applicable to the nuclear weapon powers were the result of arduous months of negotiations among a small group of Latin American statesmen.

The fourth principle of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that all states have the legitimate right to security of the state and its citizens. This precept underscores the tradition embodied in the U.N. Charter, viz. that regional collaboration for the purpose of establishing treaties and regimes cannot annul the right of sovereign states to take steps on their own or in collaboration with others to safeguard their interests. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, therefore, does not restrict the freedom of its adherents to prima facie become involved in security arrangements (such as those represented by some alliances), for purposes of collective security. The only specifications, of course, are that such agreements accord with the conditions and procedures of the Charter of the U.N. and not involve the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons.

The fifth principle inherent in the Tlatelolco Treaty is that international organisations (like the UN and the OAS), have a valuable role to play in the establishment of regional denuclearisation regimes and in achieving "common security" on the basis of cooperation between nations. The assistance that the founding fathers received from the U.N. in drafting and setting-up the Latin American nuclear-free zone has been

long recognised. Throughout the entire negotiating process, the world body's encouragement and stimulation was found to be indispensable. The Treaty was submitted to the U.N. in October 1967, and was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. In Resolution 2865 of 11 December 1967, the U.N. lauded the Treaty of Tlatelolco and expressed the hope that it would make a significant contribution to the Non-Proliferation regime. The U.N. also urged the Latin American states to sign and ratify the Treaty, and exhorted the relevant external powers to do likewise insofar as Additional Protocols 1 and 2 were concerned.

It is also important to note that the Treaty of Tlatelolco embodies procedures whereby collaboration with international organisations (the UN, OAS, IAEA among others) may take place. Article 19(2) states that

> The Agency [OPANAL] may enter into relations with any international organisations or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.[20]

The sixth principle of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that, in the final analysis, regional arms control will depend on an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. This does not mean that the people who drafted the Treaty deliberately constructed a link between it and the East-West arms control process. What it suggests is that the drafters recognised that significant progress towards disengaging Latin America from the dynamics of nuclear weapons would proceed only with extreme difficulty in the absence of political and security guarantees from the Great Powers. The link between this principle and the reality is inescapable. As one

[20] ACDA, Documents, 1967, p. 78.

writer has explained, "most (sub)regional security regimes cannot be established without the consent and contribution of the Great Powers".[21] Just as regional arms control is likely to fail in the absence of political concessions from the Great Powers, so too will the movement (the NWFZ Treaty) to remove the raison d'etre for the introduction and use of nuclear weapons in Latin America fail unless the superpowers agree not to introduce these weapons into the region or to assist any Latin American state in acquiring a nuclear weapon capability.

A reading of the Tlatelolco Treaty indicates that its chief architects were aware of, and took into account, the new developments in the international security climate, since the Treaty was made possible in part with the strong stimulus it received from the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. This fact is inescapable not only because a consensus on the meaning of that event from the standpoint of Latin America has been reached, but more importantly because the nuclear-free zone proposal followed so closely on the heels of the October Crisis.

Furthermore, the enthusiasm for a nuclear weapon-free Latin America was also generated by a recognition on the part of a group of regional actors that their region was caught up in events which were the sole purview of the superpowers and in which they were mere onlookers. The abrupt withdrawal of the missiles by the USSR from Cuba, Havana's protestations notwithstanding, served to remind the Latin American states that their capacity to influence certain events in their own area

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[21] Raimo Vayrynen, "Military Alliances, Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," in Kari Mottola, ed., Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983:p. 52.

was tenuous at best.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco attempted to give expression to this sixth principle via the concept known as "negative security guarantees." By this process, the nuclear weapon states were requested to enter into firm commitments that they would not violate the denuclearised status of Latin America by transiting or transporting nuclear weapons through it. They were also requested not to transfer ownership of such weapons to any zonal state, and not to stockpile nuclear weapons or similar devices in the nuclear-free zone.

The above commitments which the nuclear weapon states were asked to undertake, stemmed from a variety of international legal sources. One is the U.N. Charter which binds its signatories to the principle of non-use of force in the settlement of inter-state disputes. This promise can be taken to include a proscription against the use of nuclear weapons. A second source arises out of the assumption that a deuclearisation regime should reflect a balance of responsibilities and obligations on the part of both the Great Powers on the one hand, and on the other the parties to the nuclear-free zone agreement.[22] The third important source from which the guarantee principle is derived lies in the (qualified) support which the superpowers have given to the the nuclear weapon-free zone concept, and the criteria which they have both outlined for support of such measures. These three components appear to have been the primary operating factors in the drafting of the Tlatelolco Treaty provisions which relate to guarantees. The necessity of incorporating into a NWFZ

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[22] See United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolution 2028 (XX), 19 November 1965 (CCD/PV.682).

agreement commitments from the nuclear weapon states that they will not use their weapons against the participants in the zonal agreement, underscores the salience of the argument that nuclear-free zones are not workable unless they receive adequate support from the Great Powers.

The seventh principle which can be found in the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that regional denuclearisation cannot come about without the establishment of a credible system of verification. Aware that the efficacy of a denuclearisation regime would depend on its ability to ensure that the signatories are fulfilling their obligations, the organisers of the Tlatelolco Treaty incorporated the necessary principle of verification through an impartial international body (the IAEA), in conjunction with OPANAL, its regional counterpart.

Verification and control structures will vary from one place to the next; that is to say, the pattern adopted will depend on long term political objectives. The drafters of the Latin American NWFZ Treaty were concerned about the political ramifications of their region becoming a factor in the military and strategic calculus of the superpowers. It was therefore decided to establish a regional body which would monitor and co-ordinate the operations of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the peaceful nuclear activities of the Zone states. This body (OPANAL), has been a strong force in getting most of the Treaty states to sign individual safeguard agreements with the IAEA, its regional parallel. While the precise forms of safegaurds will differ from region to region, it is nevertheless vital to have one to confirm that signatories are not engaging in activities inimical to the objectives of the agreement. In the case in point, the long term goal is to remove the

possibility of nuclear weapons ever becoming an instrument of policy in Latin America, either as a result of external stimuli or internal developments.

Consistent with the definition of a paradigm employed in this study, a nuclear-free zone must comprise explicit and/or tacit goals and objectives. Furthermore, these goals and objectives must inhere in the principles of the arms control agreement, and should be clear to those that are expected to abide by it. The first general goal of of the Treaty of Tlatelolco may be seen as that of enhancing the Non-Proliferation regime and international security. It attempts to do the first by prohibiting its signatories from producing, obtaining or testing nuclear weapons, and by disallowing others from deploying such weapons in the territories of member nations. It tries to accomplish the second by appealing to the nuclear weapon states to respect the nuclear-free status of the zone and to enter negative security pledges to the Treaty parties. . In short, the Tlatelolco Treaty attempts to disuade its adherents from basing their military postures, doctrines or defence programmes on nuclear weapons through a series of prohibitions; and it tries to make these prohibitions justifiable by seeking insurance from the nuclear states that they will not attempt to use their nuclear power against the signatories. In this way, the latter would presumably be more prepared to abjure the nuclear option; and Latin America would remain a stable region contributing its share to the maintenance of international security.

The second goal of the Tlatelolco Treaty is to buttress the threshold separating conventional and nuclear weaponry. By subjugating the place of nuclear weapons in military postures, the Latin American NWFZ

drafters hope to allay the potentially destabilising geo-political interactions which are thought to accompany the acquisition of these weapons. The Tlatelolco Treaty gains a further raison d'etre from the part it is perceived to play in moderating the so-called "arms race." It aims at giving political assurance to other nations that the foreign policies and national security plans of the signatories to the Treaty are based on an unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons as acceptable, legal instruments of conflict resolution. In suggesting that Latin American states will not seek to gain political advantages by elevating the utility of nuclear weapons as instruments of policy, nor allow third parties to do so with their collaboration, the rules governing the prohibitions of the Treaty are thought to gain increasing credibility in the eyes of the world.[23]

The Treaty of Tlatelolco naturally consists of a number of prescriptions and proscriptions. In brief, these are that signatories must pledge to keep their territories free of nuclear weapons, neither develop, test, or import such weapons, or allow foreign nuclear bases to be erected in their territories. Further, treaty parties undertake to negotiate agreements with the IAEA for application of its safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities and to permit the monitoring agency, OPANAL, to carry out special inspections if necessary. The zone states also agree to submit semi-annual reports on their nuclear programmes to

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[23] The significance of this point must be measured against the backdrop of the argument that few, if any, states would stand by and watch the destruction of their societies and not succumb to the temptation to use nuclear weapons, if they calculated that doing so would alter drastically the outcome of a war in their favour. This would depend on their having nuclear weapons, naturally, no matter what might be their legal status.

the Agency, and to allow IAEA inspectors free access to their nuclear facilities for audit and inspection purposes.

Two Additional Protocols call on non-Latin American states to apply the rules of the Treaty to their respective dependencies in the Continent (Protocol 1), and upon the nuclear weapon powers to respect the Treaty and provide security guarantees to the NWFZ signatories (Protocol 2). These rules imply that the Tlatelolco Treaty entails comprehensive, verifiable commitments on the part of its adherents to non-nuclear defence; while the requests directed at the Great Powers centre on the their role in making a nuclear-free zone operable.

As an arms control instrument, recognisable as such in international law, the Tlatelolco Treaty cannot provide unconditional assurances against nuclear proliferation in Latin America (especially since the likely proliferators are not signatories to it). It is nevertheless a bold attempt to increase the incentives for states not to resort to the nuclear option, which is their sovereign right, by establishing certain normative rules.[24]

In view of this precursory discussion, it seems logical to conclude that the Treay of Tlatelolco possesses regime characteristics even though it is best seen as a partial regime. This conclusion is reached

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[24] Normative includes legal, moral, cultural and biological standards which help to establish distinctions between what is appropriate and justifiable in relations between states and what is not. Arms control incorporates norms about what is appropriate at the level of warfare and conflict or war and peace. See Richard Falk's "Toward a Legal Regime for Nuclear Weapons," in R. Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil & Saul H. Mendelovitz, eds., International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, Studies on a Just World Order, No. 2, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985:pp. 435-72.

because the Treaty has created "principles, norms, rules and procedures to regulate an issue area.[25] Norms give an indication of the reasons states collaborate; rules describe the nature of this collaboration; and procedures set forth the way in which this collaboration is to take place. As Stephen Krasner explained,

> Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-Making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.[26]

It has already been demonstrated that the Tlatelolco Treaty grew out of a concern on the part of a group of statesmen for what appeared to be growing prospects for nuclear weapons proliferation in the South Atlantic. The underlying operative norm was the conviction that nuclear weapons were unacceptable as instruments of policy.[27] The Tlatelolco Treaty is the product of the norm of self-determination in terms of the shape of the Latin American nuclear future. It represents an attempt to disentangle Latin America from involvement in superpower intrigues at the level of nuclear weapons. The quest for greater independence from the developed nations thus becomes a salient norm of the Latin American denuclearisation Treaty. The Tlatelolco Treaty gives the Latin American

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[25] See Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, April 1980:p. 357.

[26] Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983:p. 2.

[27] A useful discussion of the analytical molds of different regime postulates for nuclear proliferation and their implications for disarmament can be found in Ashok Kapur's International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979:pp. 139-59.

states an opportunity to act collectively in their perceived self-interest. Through this channel, they can make their own decisions decisions, analyse and respond to issues of nuclear proliferation in Latin America, and adjust or change the the nature of the regional non-proliferation regime as circumstances dictate.

Procedures take into account the administrative arrangements by which the regime will be regulated. In the Latin American NWFZ Treaty, this task is undertaken by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) which was established in 1969. It is considered to be a thorough monitoring body comprised of three main institutions: a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat. The NWFZ signatories are obligated to submit semi-annual reports of their activities in the nuclear field to OPANAL. The Secretary-General of this body may request special compliance reports and may also administer exceptional audits if a violation is suspected to have taken place by any of the signatories. Treaty parties are obliged further to complete full-scope safeguard agreements with the IAEA.[28] In this way, a link is established between the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the international Non-Proliferation regime which is symbolised by, among other things, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system.[29]

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[28] "Full-scope" safeguards means that all the nuclear facilities (the original imports plus any subsequent nuclear products) are subject to the inspections of the IAEA. The 1978 Non-Proliferation Act, enacted by the Carter administration, demands that states which purchase U.S. nuclear technology submit to the safeguards of the IAEA.

[29] Although most analysts agree that the safeguards of the IAEA are quite thorough, evidence has come to light recently which may indicate that the IAEA's monitoring equipment is defective, so that violating the Agency's safeguards undetected might be possible afterall. See James N. Miller's popular analysis of the IAEA's safeguards machinery : "The Peaceful Atom Bares its Teeth," Readers

The Tlatelolco Treaty is thus the regional counterpart of the NPT: each delineates rules which bind states in the international system to similar obligations, and each has a centralised organisation to manage and control its affairs. Seen in this light, the Tlatelolco Treaty may be described as a regional non-proliferation regime within the broader framework of the global Non-Proliferation regime headed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

Rules are directives to the membership of a regime committed to some identifiable common purposes, and to some consensus about the character of the nuclear future they would like to see and the value of controlling the direction in which that future goes. Rules stand at the juncture between the objectives of a regime and the procedures set up to implement them. They serve to channel and/or foreclose action, make available more information to members, and increase the level of (technical) knowledge available to the parties comprising the regime.[30] The rules that are embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco have been outlined before and do not need repeating. What should be pointed out, though, is that these rules facilitate the pooling, standardising and allocating of information and other resources in order to achieve certain political and social objectives. Chief among them is the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation in Latin America through indigenous means or with the aid of external nuclear states. It may be taken as a given that the framers of the Tlatelolco regime saw the Treaty as contributing ultimately to world order and international

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Digest, June 1983:pp. 93-98.

[30] Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate?" p. 400.

security. In sum, therefore, the Tlatelolco regime can be conceptualised as a social institution with political objectives, founded by a group of determined and highly normatively oriented actors. The regime depends upon "the maintenance of convergent expectations" amongst its adherents for its continuing legitimacy.[31]

Regimes not only include norms, rules, objectives and decision making channels but also inculcate functional scope, geographic boundaries and membership. These elements interact with each other to give rise to a series of outcomes. The preceeding examination has confirmed the view that the Treaty of Tlatelolco falls short in some of these essential areas: for example, the scope of the monitoring Agency is still limited to that of control. OPANAL has not yet been able to incorporate as part of its mandate the maximisation of peaceful nuclear activity as a "collective good." In addition, the geographic boundaries of the Treaty are still undefined; their apparent extension to the high seas and to reaches as far as the southern and northern coastal regions of the United States represents a clearly unrealistic goal. The Treaty lacks the support in one form or another of key states, viz., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and one nuclear weapon state France. Thus, the full potential of the Tlatelolco Treaty as an arms control regime is not yet apparent. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Tlatelolco Treaty is at best a "quasi-regime," that is, an expression of an incomplete collaborative effort. In Young's terms, its coverage is sub-optimal under prevailing conditions.[32]

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[31] See Oran Young's "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, April 1980:p. 355.

[32] Ibid.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco's potential to become a more effective arms control instrument (that is to fulfil its stated objective of keeping Latin America free of nuclear weapons) will depend on its capacity to harness further indigenous opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly where Latin America's chief actors are concerned.[33] Should this be achieved, and if the Treaty gains further support from the nuclear weapon states, then it is likely to ensure that Latin America remains a nuclear weapon-free and stable region. These will be the criteria against which to evaluate the success of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a regional arms control regime by the mid-1990's. Inasmuch as the Treaty possesses an institutional character, defines its jurisdictional boundaries, outlines the conditions under which it will operate, points to desirable political outcomes, and contains an internal dynamic which opens the way for its transformation over time, then it is justifiable to call it a regime.

This section has been an attempt to delineate and examine the paradigmatic characteristics inherent in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and to assess the extent to which one might be justified in calling the Treaty a regime. The evidence shows that the Tlatelolco Treaty underscores some basic assumptions about a desirable world order in the nuclear age. It is also based on certain normative patterns and

[33] Both Brazilia and Buenos Aires have at different times shown relatively accommodating attitudes towards the Treaty. This has depended though on the prevailing regional and international political currents. The election of civilian governments in both countries is thought to bode well for the denuclearisation regime in the South Atlantic. For very good analyses of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear futures see Daniel Poneman's "Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina," Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 1984:pp. 853-80; and David J. Myers' "Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option," supra., pp. 881-911.

incorporates rules, procedures and decision-making channels.

4.2 THE SECURITY (NUCLEAR) POLICIES OF THE NORDIC STATES

The objective of this section of the study is to trace and analyse the fundamental elements of the security policy of each Nordic state. The rationale for this strategy stems from the the author's perception that, in order to grasp the way in which the paradigmatic framework of the Treaty of Tlatelolco might be applicable to the Nordic region, it is necessary to understand the security motivations and priorities of the states in that region in terms of their influence on, and implications for, the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposition. The empirical evidence should demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between calls for a denuclearisation regime in the area and themes of detente, promoting international peace and security, and enhancing a stable world order among others. The degree of support for these broad security ideals run throughout the foreign and security policies of each Nordic state, although threat perceptions account for the participation of some of the Scandinavian states in an alliance system that does not preclude the use of nuclear weapons in the defence of its members.

Before one can embark on a more elaborate exposition of the security policies of the Nordic states, however, an overview of the chief characteristics of the region will be given. This should show that the nature of the coherency and diversity evident in Nordic Europe is in fact the outcome of different international conditions, largely beyond the control of regional nations. These external forces have together played a vital role in the national security policies of the Nordic countries.

The Nordic area is geographically a part of Europe but is situated at some distance from the continent's heartland.[34] Nordic Europe differs from the other outlying regions of Europe in significant respects. First, apart from Finland, the Nordic states were never part of a foreign empire and hence were able to develop along consciously chosen political routes. Second, the Nordic nations never experienced feudalism to any significant degree: peasants were able to retain their rights in all the Nordic states except Denmark, but it too had granted them extensive rights by the middle of the nineteenth century. The absence of feudalism paved the way for democracy to take hold. Third, the Nordic states have a tradition of strong protestant ethic, a high rate of literacy and efficient bureaucracies. As a result, they were able to industrialise very early in this century, to become prosperous democracies, and to feel relatively confident in dealing with the big powers. Fourth, the Nordic countries are roughly equal in size and power. This has augured well for inter-Nordic harmony and cooperation, as has the fact that there have been no major territiorial disputes between them.

This is not to suggest that relations have always been smoothe between the Nordic countries. For one thing, bad memories still linger over Danish rule of Norway between 1380 and 1814. Norway also entered into a forced union with Sweden that lasted until 1905. Finland was part of Swedish territory from the thirteenth century until the Russian conquest of 1809, after which it became a grand duchy under tzarist

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[34] Much of the information for this subsection was gleaned from a special issue of Daedalus (Vol. 113, No. 2, Spring 1984), entitled "Nordic Voices."

rule. Iceland came under Danish control in the fourteenth century and did not gain full independence until 1944. Denmark and Sweden have been traditionally the preponderant regional powers. Centuries of conflict led to the signing of a treaty in 1814 under which Sweden acquired Norway. Close Scandinavian bonds emerged in the mid-nineteenth century due to German pressure upon Norway. Thus, traces of national pride and jealousy still exist.

Even though Sweden is by far the most powerful of the five Nordic states, its capabilities are not sufficient to enable it to exercise dominance over its neighbours. This possibility has declined even further since important petroleum finds in Norway elevated its economic power and thrust it into the limelight. Furthermore, as NATO's most northerly situated member, Norway's strategic significance has grown tremendously. Rapid economic development in the other Nordic states has also created a perception of power equilibrium.

In sum, the prospects for further cooperation amongst the Nordic states are very good. A certain power equivalency, absence of divisive territiorial disputes, and strong cultural affinity combine to make the Nordic region a prime case for comparative arms control study. A common historical background has given rise to a legacy of shared cultural experiences.[35] This has in turn influenced Nordic foreign and security policy perceptions to a large degree.

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[35] See Information, Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UDA/085/ENG.), October 1984.

The Nordic states' view of the world is symbolised by a strong belief in international law and institutions and in a world order in which both large and small states can play a vital role. Public debates and policy declarations emanating from the Nordic area are infused with a strong sense of commitment to creating a more just and equitable system of international relations. This overt moralistic tendency is given expression through the strong involvement of the Nordic states in the disarmament and arms control arena; in their generous assistance to the developing countries; and in their pursuit of a foreign policy designed to put an end to Great Power hegemony. Nordic states project their experience of rational, peaceful change onto the international scene. As this section should demonstrate, much of this orientation is reflected in the security policies of the Nordic states. The tenor of the public debates in Nordic Europe is thus a logical outcome of historical experiences.

Few would question, perhaps, the dictum that the search for survival and security is the hallmark of any nation's foreign policy. The Nordic countries are no different in this regard. As Holst has pointed out, the Nordic states have chosen different routes to security: three (Denmark, Iceland and Norway) are founder members of NATO and remain fully committed to the Organisation's overall security; Sweden has chosen non-alignment tending towards neutrality in wartime; and Finland has entered into a treaty relationship with the USSR.[36] This security equilibrium, which emerged in Northern Europe after the Second World

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[36] J.J. Holst, "The Pattern of Nordic Security," Prepared for Publication in a special Issue of Daedalus (Vol. 113, No. 2, Spring 1984), NUPI/Notat, No. 273 (A), June 1983:p. 1.

War, has crystallised over time and has influenced to a great extent the security policy of each Nordic state. Another influential factor was the aborted attempt to form a Nordic defence community in 1948-49. It failed mainly because Norway insisted that the proposed community develop close ties with the West.[37]

The Nordic area does not constitute therefore a cohesive security system. The policies each Nordic state arrived at were conditioned by and became part of the general security order which developed in post-war Europe. In short, wartime arrangements dictated the security pattern which emerged later in the Nordic region. Nordic Europe has never occupied a central place in the balance of power system because of geography. Yet, as indicated above, the dynamics of that balance have helped shape the security calculations of the northern states. Thus, Norway, Denmark and Iceland chose partnership in the Western Alliance. Finland found its post-war options severely constrained, and in order to preserve its political independence and democratic way of life, it sought close relations with the Soviet Union. Sweden was the only Nordic country which managed to stay out of World War II. It has continued its policy of non-alignment cum neutrality which Stockholm had earlier followed for a century and a half.

The Nordic region finds itself enmeshed in the strategic competition between the superpowers. The Norwegian Sea, for example, is an important sea-lane for Soviet ballistic missile-carrying submarines. Some sixty percent of the USSR's strategic naval forces are located in the Murmansk

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[37] Olofur Egilsson, "An Unarmed Nation Joins a Defence Alliance," NATO Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1983:p. 29.

area of the Kola Peninsula.[38] The latter contains vital components of the Soviet Union's early warning and forward defence apparatus. The Soviet military presence in the Baltic Sea is also very great. From this point of view Denmark (together with Schleswig-Holstein) make up a strategic entity, as it is from this area that passage through the Straits and access to the high seas can be controlled. Consequently, the Nordic region as a whole has been contoured by the technological and strategic developments underlining superpower activity in the North.

All the Nordic states, with the exception of Iceland, are technically capable of developing nuclear weapons. Yet, they have all signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. None of the Scandinavian members of NATO permits the deployment or storage of nuclear weapons on its territory during peacetime. Therefore the Nordic region is a de facto nuclear-free zone. This status has gained permanence with time, although only Sweden is unconditionally nuclear weapon-free. The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) does not entirely rule out the transfer of nuclear arms from the the USSR to Finland in a crisis or war. At the same time, the two nations do not conduct joint military exercises, and Helsinki has not signed any agreement committing itself to the possible use of nuclear weapons.

The three Nordic states which belong to NATO have made no reservations with respect to the general defence concept on which the alliance operates: they draw upon the positive nuclear guarantee extended to them as members of NATO. In short, "nuclear abstinence" is

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[38] The Balance of Strength in Northern Europe, Excerpts from the Norwegian version of The Military Balance, 1984-1985, Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1985:pp. 14-21.

not theoretically an option for either Denmark, Iceland or Norway. While the peacetime non-deployment policies of NATO-Scandinavia have never come under serious questioning from the Organisation, a nuclear restraint policy in wartime would impose restrictions on NATO planning that it might be unwilling to tolerate. Thus, while the Nordic states are essentially non-nuclear, they are not entirely unaffected by nuclear weapons and doctrines. Notwithstanding, the Nordic members of NATO have been able to command a certain amount of leverage over their security policies vis-a-vis nuclear weapons, hence the self-imposed restraints which they follow. These restraints have served to re-assure the Soviet Union that the Nordic region is not hostile towards it. They are a central part of what has been termed the "Nordic balance."

In general, therefore, the Nordic states have shown a great deal of reluctance to become "pawns" in the strategic postures of either the United States or the USSR. This is why their security policies are shaped in such a way as to respond to the need for stability in Northern Europe. Fulfilling this need depends on their ability to increase the nuclear threshold in the North, by lowering the role that nuclear weapons play in their peacetime international relations. The Nordic states therefore see their relatively benign security policies as contributing to a broader circle of arms limitation in Europe and in the world at large.

The reasons why the Nordic region is such a popular focus of the nuclear-free zone literature is due to the fact that the Nordic population has been traditionally at the forefront of the calls for disengagement in Europe and for putting an end to the so-called arms

race. Nordic peoples have evinced little confidence in the leadership of the Great Powers. They appear worried about the vulnerability of their "corner" of Europe to East-West tensions, especially that aspect having to do with nuclear doctrine and strategy. This concern has naturally filtered into the democratic process in Nordic Europe, and has influenced the thoughts of Nordic politicians. The Nordic nuclear-free zone proposition is a direct result of this general Nordic disposition.

4.2.1 Danish Security Policy

When the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone was first voiced by Finnish President Kekkonen in 1963, the Scandinavian states had already established firm policies with respect to nuclear weapons. The Danish perspective has emphasised invariably the peaceful, as opposed to the warlike, character of nuclear power.[39] The idea that Denmark is a "nuclear threshold" state is not something that Danish policy makers or citizens are fond of hearing. Nowhere in Danish security policy is there any evidence that acquiring nuclear weapons has ever been seriously considered. In short, Denmark is a small, non-nuclear power with no pretensions about ever becoming a nuclear weapons power.

Danish foreign policy is typically normative and emphasises motifs of peace and security.[40] This accounts for Copenhagen's high profile in U.N. peacekeeping efforts in many parts of the globe, its participation

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[39] Neils J. Haagerup, "Danish Security Policy," in J.J. Holst, ed., Security, Order and the Bomb, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972:p. 34.

[40] Foreign policy is used from time to time to refer to security policy, inasmuch as the latter is normally one important aspect of foreign policy.

in the CSCE process and in cooperative institutions such as the European Economic Community (EEC). There are two important aspects to Denmark's security policy. The first is its refusal to allow nuclear weapons on Danish territory "under present conditions." In 1964, for example, the then Foreign Minister, Per Haekkerup, stated that Denmark would continue its policy of not allowing nuclear weapons on its territory. He went on to say, however, that Denmark could not commit itself to an indefinite future which it did not know".[41] This policy remained until 1980 when it was given further clarification and predictability by Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen. He stated categorically that Denmark will not accept nuclear weapons or foreign troops on its territory in peacetime.[42] Among other things, Olesen's remark made it clear that a war or crisis would cause Denmark to review its nuclear restraint policy.

The second important element of Danish security policy is preservation of the Nordic balance. This balance refers to the "pattern of mutual restraints with respect to the national defence policies which are pursued by the Nordic states individually," in cognisance of the strategic penetration of their region by the superpowers.[43] As Holst has suggested, the Nordic states have pursued different "roads" to security but they are each conscious of not overstepping the boundaries that might precipitate inadvertent tensions involving the interests of the

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[41] Cited Ibid., p. 37.

[42] "Statement by the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kjeld Olesen, 1980," DUPI, 1981:p. 329.

[43] J.J. Holst, 'The "Nordic Balance" and the Northern Flank - A Norwegian Perspective," a lecture to the American-Scandinavian Foundation, New York, N.Y., 23 May 1984, NUPI/Notat, No. 287 (B), 1983:p. 1.

superpowers. The Nordic balance operates in such a way as to limit the direct engagement of Nordic Europe by the Great Powers. Restraint with respect to one Great Power may however be perceived as a threat by another. There is no symmetrical balance as such, but instead a situation in which Denmark (together with Norway and Iceland) is more closely aligned with the Western powers than Finland is to the Soviet Union. Sweden lies somewhere in the centre because of its neutralist policy. Thus, as Holst summed it up,

> There is not so much a balance as [there is] a pattern of a decreasing degree of inclusion into the connecting tissue of the Western system of security as we move through the Nordic area from the West to the East.[44]

From the standpoint of arms control and nuclear-free zones, this pattern helps Denmark to pursue its preferred security policy of restraint to avoid exacerbating potentially destabilising situations.

The above analysis indicates that the core of Danish foreign policy is marked unambiguously by a fundamental commitment to Western democratic values and to integration into the Western security framework. This enables it to place its military posture in a context of continuity which shifts between the opposite poles of detente and tension.[45]

Denmark has witnessed shifts in its foreign policy as a result of having to make certain choices. These choices have been prompted mainly by the attempts of the superpowers to reassert their global influence,

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[44] J.J. Holst, Norway and NATO in the 1980's," A Lecture to the American-Scandinavian Foundation, New York, N.Y.: May 23, 1984, NUPI/Notat, p. 7.

[45] Ibid.

especially in the European theatre. The drift towards another era of tight bi-polarity has been operationalised in part by a tendency by both the U.S. and the USSR to militarise a number of issue areas which were dealt with hitherto through political means. Denmark, as well as the other Nordic states, perceives that this pattern is detrimental to its vital interests, since the further militarisation of international affairs will likely have destabilising consequences for Europe's "quiet corner" over the long term.

It is true that Danish security is partly dependent on the stability of deterrence between the superpowers. Yet, as one author pointed out, a more aggressive superpower global policy expressed by a new spiral of vertical nuclear proliferation can only be perceived as a dangerous trend insofar as Denmark is concerned.[46] That this process has been occurring indeed, is evidenced by the increasing level of tension between the superpowers over nuclear strategy and weapons deployment. From a political point of view, heightening tension is borne out by the lack of any real progress in strategic or intermediate nuclear arms talks, by direct military interventions in the affairs of other states, and by a disposition to give military aid to insurgency groups fighting their central governments. In short, the decade of the 1980's has witnessed a sharp shift from detente to tension.

Implicit in Danish foreign policy are efforts to extend the low conflict environment of the Nordic area to other parts of the Continent. Denmark has been vocal in its criticisms of the "arms race" and of the

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[46] See Bertel Huerlin's "Nuclear-Free Zones," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1966:p. 242.

offensive military doctrines of the superpowers. At the same time, though, Copenhagen has been careful not to take any action that might undermine or call into question the American security insurance it enjoys by being a NATO member. The government appears to recognise that to challenge U.S. military policy too far could lead to even more undesirable changes in the European security picture. Denmark would rather see the status quo maintained than have the Federal Republic, France or Great Britain exercise continental hegemony. Copenhagen perceives that such a happenstance could set in motion a vigorous nuclear competition between the above three powers to the detriment of Nordic Europe.

Notwithstanding the degree of adaptation that Danish security policy has witnessed in recent times, the changes have occurred mostly at the level of conventional weaponry. Denmark's policy on nuclear weapons has shown a good deal of consistency since the 1960's. The two outstanding adjustments which have occurred have been in the areas of support for the NATO idea of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and full membership in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, culminating in support for the dual-track decision in 1983 after months of opposition to the plan.

In summary, the declaratory policy of Denmark has been characterised by notions of continuity; whatever changes have occurred have been cloaked in the guise of continuity. Some of the more salient changes have been a stepping-up of the criticism against the nuclear policies and strategies of the superpowers. The Soviet Union has often borne the brunt of such criticism, particulary since the process of detente

started to unravel at the onset of the present decade.[47] However, the United States has also come under strong Danish disapprobation since the Reagan administration assumed office in 1980. Copenhagen has expressed its dispraise for the American plans to start a new programme of strategic arms production to counteract what it perceives as a lag in the superpower strategic balance in favour of the USSR. Danish statements have criticised the "hypocritical double standard of U.S. foreign policy". Moreover, both the U.S. and the USSR have been condemned by Denmark for their arms control stances. Copenhagen was very disappointed in Washington's decision not to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II). It has pointed to the nuclear arms programme of the superpowers as being an alarming and gigantic build-up in weapons of mass destruction. Denmark has been sceptical of the American claim that the U.S. was seriously lagging behind the Soviet Union in strategic weapons, and thus needed to upgrade its stockpiles so as to be able to conduct negotiations from a position of strength. In short, Denmark has opposed a strategic balance at a higher level than that which existed in 1984.[48]

In terms of the nuclear-free zone proposition, Denmark has participated in the discussions on the subject at meetings of the Nordic foreign ministers, and in 1982, the Danish Security Council Commission on Disarmament Affairs (SNU) completed a study on nuclear-free zones.

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[47] See "Address by the Prime Minister of Denmark at the Conference on the Nordic Area as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,...held at Christiansborg Palace on November 24, 1984," especially p.5.

[48] Huerlin, "Nuclear-Free Zones," p. 246. Despite Copenhagen's disapproval of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, it tends to fall in line with it eventually, although, as pointed out above, there are limits to Denmarks willingness to bend.

Danish policy on the Nordic NWFZ idea has changed very little since the 1963. It has maintained consistently that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would have to include the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic Sea and be conceived within a broader European framework. This does not necessarily mean that Denmark opposes the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ under any circumstances. Its attitude reflects a wish to see the Nordic region treated as a separate entity, but balanced against the long term political stability and military balance in Europe.

Danish security policy suggests that Copenhagen is resistant to any agreement that would in effect limit its freedom of manoeuvre. It wishes to continue as a full NATO partner, and thus will not further restrict its present policy of non-stationing of nuclear weapons during peacetime. Evidence of this can be seen in its cooperation with West Germany inside the so-called Baltic Joint Command (BALTAP). Collaboration between the two states has improved Denmark's command and defence posture and accounts for the support it later gave to the NATO-INF decision of late 1979. The fundamental objective of Danish support for the Western Alliance is to see that the credibility of the allied nuclear guarantee does not dwindle. This is why the new Defence Bill of 1982 stated that:

> The prevention of war has to be found in the membership of and the cooperation inside the Atlantic Treaty, where Danish defence is part of the integrated defence.[49]

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[49] Quoted Ibid., p. 249.

4.2.2 Norwegian Security Policy

Norway is strategically located in Northern Europe because of post-war developments in military technology and the meaning these have had for the Nordic area in terms of the military postures of the superpowers. Norway's importance therefore is a direct consequence of "the deployment, configuration and operation of strategic forces by the superpowers".[50] A large deployment of nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and long-range ballistic missiles on the Northern cap have combined to push Norway into the maelstrom of the central balance. Northern Europe has the largest concentration of strategic forces in Europe: the Soviet Union alone has some sixty percent of its submarine launched ballistic missiles (SSBN's) stationed at the Kola Peninsula. A new generation of SSBN's has enabled the USSR to target North America without venturing through the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (GIUK gap). This has prompted the U.S. to increase significantly the northern element of its forward defence in Europe.

In light of the impact superpower northern strategy has had on the status of Norway, Oslo has developed a strong interest in strategic arms limitation or reduction negotiations. Like Denmark, Norway was disappointed in the U.S. decision not to ratify SALT II. In 1979, Oslo issued the following statement:

> The significance of the SALT II Treaty must above all be considered by comparing the situation which is established by the Treay with the expected situation in the event that it is not completed. A rejection of the SALT-II Treaty would constitute a very serious and regrettable set-back for the detente effort, the arms control negotiations in Europe and

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[50] J.J. Holst, "Norwegian Security Policies for the 1980's," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1982:pp. 208-09.

the efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation treaty.[51]

Norwegian security policy therefore has been framed in such a way as to contain tensions and thereby increase the outlook for stability in the Northern region. Oslo perceives that growing tension in its area will only lead to further superpower presence and a decline in its ability to manoeuvre. This accounts for Norwegian efforts in the area of detente and its impact on the political order in Europe. At the opening of the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid in 1980, the foreign minister of Norway noted that

> Current disillusions should not conceal the very real results of this process [detente]. The quality of political relations is different from that of the cold war years. The intensity and scope of diplomatic relations have grown. The stakes in continued cooperation and expanded relations have increased. Detente has brought tangible results in the daily life of our people. Although the military confrontation remains, the political pattern has become more flexible.[52]

Norway has been a potential nuclear weapon power since the early post-war years, but it has never thought of pursuing a nuclear bomb programme. In 1965, a former director of the Institute for Atomic Energy (IFA), Gunnar Randers, stated that Norway had the capability to manufacture a bomb of the same type which was dropped on Nagasaki in the space of a few years, given the necessary financial resources.[53] However, the production of atomic weapons has never been a serious item

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[51] Cited Ibid., p. 210.

[52] "Statement by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund, at the opening of the CSCE Meeting in Madrid, 13 November 1980." Quoted Ibid.

[53] Cited in J.J. Holst, "The Nuclear Genie: Norwegian Policies and Perspectives," in J.J. Holst, ed., Security, Order and the Bomb, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973:p. 46.

of consideration by Norwegian governments.

In 1957, Norway decided to formalise its policy on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil. Its immediate antecedent was the 1949 policy which prohibited military bases on Norwegian territory. At a NATO heads of government meeting, the Norwegian Prime Minister mounted a political coup by announcing that his country had no plans "to let stores of nuclear weapons be established on Norwegian territory or to install launching bases for medium range missiles".[54]

In 1960, the Military Chiefs' Committee recommended that Norwegian forces be equipped with theatre nuclear arms. It was the Committee's view that these weapons could serve to place tactical restraints on a putative aggressor, not unlike those faced by the Norwegian armed forces. The government did not accept the Committee's findings, however, and so the policy of no nuclear weapons "during peacetime" remained. This decision was similar to the one used by Norway to justify its "no-bases" policy: the need to balance deterrence with reassurance in order to maintain the basic elements of Nordic stability. Oslo added that it was hoping to forestall further nuclear weapons proliferation, meaning vertical and geographical proliferation.[55] The government was careful to point out that its decision was a unilateral one and carried no international connotations. It therefore left open the option of reviewing its policy should circumstances change. In line with its

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[54] Quoted in Holst, "Norwegian Security Policies," p. 48. The Prime Minister apparently felt he had to act quickly as there was media rumor that Norway was being considered as a possible nuclear basing site. His action was intended to put an end to this speculation.

[55] Ibid., p. 49.

policy of "nuclear abstinence," Norway has not taken any steps on its own or in conjuction with NATO which would indicate that it anticipated a serious threat to its security or some other crisis. Thus, as Jorgen Holst has observed, "The policy [of no-nuclear weapons] has become close to an absolute unconditional commitment".[56]

The Norwegian Defence Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, outlined in the Storting in December 1980 that the storage and deployment of nuclear weapons in Norway were not permitted. Norwegian troops do not get training in the use of nuclear weapons, there are no special sites for storing nuclear weapons, and no communication facilities which are associated with the use of such weapons. Finally, Norway has not concluded the Programme of Cooperation, under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which could lead to the transfer of information from Washington to Oslo about nuclear operations in both peacetime and wartime. These facts confirm what the Norwegian Defence Minister had said previously about Norway's defence being based on conventional forces.[57]

Although Norway's declaratory policy and actions point to a strong non-nuclear attitude, it is nevertheless a fact that it does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence. The conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used in Norway's defence would require that such weapons originate and are used from outside of Norwegian territory. This residual ambiguity was reflected in a 1982 government statement which read in part:

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[56] Ibid., p. 223.

[57] Ibid.

> The formulation of the Norwegian nuclear weapons policy does not prevent the Norwegian Defence in the event of war from being supported by external forces which may have at their disposal nuclear weapons for tactical use by their own units. As distinguished from conventional reinforcements, no preparations have been made in peacetime, however, for receiving possible allied nuclear weapons during crisis or war. But the insertion of such reinforcements and the use of their nuclear weapons require Norwegian consent.[58]

Opinion polls conducted in Norway recently, indicated that Norwegians support the government's stance on nuclear weapons.[59] The 1980 survey, in which nearly 80 percent of the people polled expressed support for the government's "no-nuclear" policy, demonstrated that there is no significant pro-nuclear weapons constituency in Norway. There is no evidence that the situation is different today. In the discussions leading to the dual-track decision of 12 December 1979, Norway was the one which focused attention on the need to offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union (track II). Norway said also that the decision to deploy new theatre forces in Europe should be taken at the highest political level, and in reference to the results of the negotiations with the USSR. Further, Oslo was of the opinion that part of the West' negotiating strategy should include an offer to forestall deployment (of Pershing II's and Cruise Missiles) in return for a Soviet promise to withdraw its newly deployed SS-20 missiles (a zero option).

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[58] Ibid., p. 224.

[59] A 1980 opinion survey found that 79% of Norwegians concurred with government policy on nuclear weapons; only 10% of the respondents were in favour of changing it. See U.D. Informasjon, No. 16, 13 May 1982. Cited Ibid., p. 235.

In order to uphold the credibility of its own nuclear policy and prevent the deployment of theatre nuclear forces on its territory, Norway argued at the the NATO foreign ministers meeting, that its security policy had become a crucial element in the Nordic security pattern and by extension in the overall strategic balance on the Continent.[60] Norway asserted that any change in this situation might have far-reaching consequences for the Nordic balance. The INF decision of 1979 was very controversial among the Norwegian public, but despite public opposition, the governmment lent its support to the decision anyway. The opposition parties, led by Labour, were especially concerned about ensuring that the U.S. did follow-up on the second "track" of that decision, that is to open negotiations with the USSR.

Notwithstanding its nuclear weapons policy, Norway, like Denmark, has never been too keen on the proposals for a Nordic NWFZ. It has laid down several criteria on which it would be prepared to entertain the suggestion. First, no agreement regarding arms control in Northern Europe should upset the strategic equilibrium on the Continent. Second, a nuclear-free zone should be cast in a broader and more comprehensive arms control system, which would be applicable to all of Europe and aimed at reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the strategies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[61] Third, Nordic arms control should help to achieve the objectives of global arms control and disarmament. Fourth, Norway will not enter into any agreement which might undermine its link to NATO, or affect the allied strategy of flexible response as well as the

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[60] Ibid., p. 17.

[61] Ibid., p. 15.

overall strategy of NATO for allied defence. As far as Norway is concerned, the purpose of a nuclear-free zone would be to contribute towards de-ligitimising the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and to reinforce the nuclear-free status of Nordic Europe. These objectives would in turn help to contain tension on the Continent and create new opportunities for a renewal of detente.

To conclude, the security policy of Norway reflects its geo-strategic position as a NATO frontline state in an area of the globe that bears specific relevance to the East-West strategic balance. This has called for a certain fine-tuning of security policy to reflect a symmetry between the apposite goals of deterrence and re-assurance. That is to say, Norway must define its security policy in a manner that avoids the danger of exaggeration vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, or the appearance of laxity which might be perceived as appeasement or, worse yet, weakness.

Norway will continue to occupy the key position in Nordic Europe, and its standing in the Western Alliance will likely continue to grow. NATO will also continue to be the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. At the same time, more stress is possible insofar as Oslo's non-nuclear stand is concerned. Public opinion will likely sway the government into calling for a reduced role for nuclear weapons in alliance strategy, particulary in respect to the early use of these weapons. It should be noted, however, that Norway has usually supported the Alliance's nuclear policy, while it engages in quiet diplomacy. The Norwegians, evidently, are cognisant of the political utility of nuclear weapons. However, the unilateral restraint policy which Norway follows with respect to nuclear weapons, allied manoeuvres and exercises involving the use of nuclear

weapons, will in all likelihood remain as integral aspects of its security policy.

4.2.3 Swedish Security Policy

The role that nuclear weapons should play in defence policy has been debated periodically in Sweden since the end of World War II. The debate reached a climax during the period 1954-1962 but later faded. The main focus of the discussion has been whether or not Sweden, a small nation caught between two opposing power blocs, should actively pursue the nuclear option in the event a crisis threatened to undermine its integrity and neutrality.[62]

It should be noted that Sweden has had the technical capability to pursue an independent nuclear weapons programme for some time now. The fact that its neutrality prevents it from enjoying protection under an alliance umbrella makes it even more imperative for it to have a strong defence. Both factors have combined to make the case for going the nuclear route a sensible option for Sweden. However, there were other factors which came up for consideration at the time Sweden was seriously thinking of starting a nuclear bomb programme. The major ones had to do with economics, politics, and ethics.[63] No consensus emerged, but a compromise position was reached whereby Sweden would not try to manufacture nuclear weapons but would continue its scientific and

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[62] See Nils Andren's "Sweden's Security Policy," in Holst, ed., Five Roads, p. 138.

[63] For a more detailed discussion of the Swedish nuclear weapons debate see Jan Prawitz' "Sweden - A Non-Nuclear Weapon State," in Holst, ed., Security, Order and the Bomb, pp. 61-73.

technological research programme in the nuclear field until such time as a clearer direction could be found. Up until the end of 1959, most of the Swedish military elite felt that it was necessary to make nuclear weapons a part of Sweden's defence posture. They said it would not be a financial burden on the country, and in any event Sweden's neutrality closed off any opportunity of getting these weapons from a foreign power.[64]

Despite strong lobbying from the military hierarchy the Swedish people remained opposed to the concept of a "Swedish bomb," not simply on the grounds stated above, but more importantly because it was thought that a policy of restraint would bode well for peace and detente in Europe and would in the long run be of advantage to the nation. Swedish decision-makers were apparently convinced: both the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 were signed and ratified soon after they were opened for signature. These actions, coupled with the 1959 resolution not to produce weapon-grade fissionable material or continue research to design and test a nuclear warhead, effectively foreclosed the nuclear option insofar as Sweden was concerned.[65]

Sweden embarked on a careful nuclear threat analysis in 1968 and came to the following conclusions: nuclear deterrence had preserved the peace since 1945; the agreements on strategic arms limitation signed by the

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[64] Ibid., p. 62.

[65] Sweden signed the PTBT and the NPT on the understanding that it reserved the right to review its adherence if international developments resulted in nuclear arms becoming a normal aspect of the security posture of small states. Nils Andren, "Sweden's Security Policy," p. 139.

superpowers and the measures they had agreed upon to avoid a nuclear confrontation had reduced the possibility of a nuclear war; and, finally, all wars since 1945 had been conventional. Having arrived at this assessment, Sweden then began a massive programme of conventional defence, convinced that a conventional war, not a nuclear, was more likely in the future.[66]

This is not to say that Swedish policy makers chose to ignore the nuclear strategies and doctrines of the Great Powers. However, being convinced that the theory of deterrence had worked, the inference was drawn that the role of nuclear weapons is more in keeping with political than military objectives. As one governement bill to the Swedish Parliament asserted:

> ---nuclear weapons are primarily political instruments and to a lesser and lesser degree a military fighting device. According to this idea, the use of nuclear weapons is primarily a political act in order to convey signals to the adversary of a very strong resolution. At the deliberations preceding a decision on the possible use of nuclear weapons, the political estimate of the consequences is likely to dominate over the military profitability of eliminating various targets. This idea may be expected to be increasingly dominating, the longer the period without using nuclear weapons.[67]

Thus, on 8 March 1968 the government officially declared that "it is at present not a security interest of Sweden to acquire nuclear weapons." This policy was confirmed on 27 May 1968, about a month before the Non-Proliferation Treaty became open for signature. It has been repeated several times as an accurate impression of Swedish nuclear doctrine.

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[66] Ibid.

[67] Governmental Bill to the Riksdag, No. 1968:p. 110.

Sweden has pursued a policy which has been described as "active neutrality." As a result, it has been very articulate at international fora (such as the ENDC which began its deliberations in Geneva in 1962), where arms control and disarmament issues invariably are discussed. Stockholm sees its role as that of contributing to peaceful change and development, to a reduction in conflict, and to an enhancement of the prospects for better understanding between nations. It wants to structure the international environment so that small states can also play a meaningful role. Finally, Sweden would like to disengage the small powers from the superpower "web" so that a conflict between them will not pull them in as well.[68] In short, Swedish security policy is characterised on the one hand by a wish to create a less anarchic international system, and on the other a desire to safeguard Swedish integrity through a strong defence posture. Underpinning its security policy, however, is the norm that Swedish security will benefit from a peaceful world order and from the erection of arms control regimes to limit and manage the strategic competition between the superpowers.

Although Sweden recognises that there are limits to its foreign policy of activism, it has nevertheless used its significant economic and technological resources in an attempt to clarify and influence global political developments. Stockholm's interpretation of "neutrality" means action and cooperation. This is why it has played such an active role in U.N. peacekeeping efforts, in arms control endeavours since the early 1960's, and in serving as a mediator between other states. Active neutrality has been practised by Sweden for over a

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[68] Ibid., p. 141.

century and a half; this policy accounts in no small measure for its international profile which is somewhat out of proportion to its power. At the same time, Stockholm has been accused of being excessively moralistic and even hypocritical on occasions.

The concept of neutrality, non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime - has also made its mark in the area of international law. Two perspectives stand out in Swedish desire to strengthen and further develop international law. In the short run, Stockholm wishes to participate actively in keeping global conflicts and international violence in check; in the long term Sweden's aim is to work for a new security order based on respect for the norms and principles of international law and collective security.[69] This orientation accounts for the support given to the U.N. and other similar international institutions. It is Stockholm's view that although imperfect, the U.N. system offers the best framework through which it can pursue its particular brand of foreign policy.

In 1962, U.N. Secretary General, U Thant, asked the non-nuclear member states to indicate on what grounds they might be prepared to renounce formally the option to possess nuclear weapons or to allow others to station them on their territories. This inquiry actually grew out of a proposal by Swedish Foreign Minister Oster Unden, in 1962, to form a "non-nuclear club".[70] Sweden replied that it was prepared to

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[69] "Speech by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Torsten Nilsson, at the Social Democratic Party Conference, 1969," Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1970:p. 53.

[70] United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly, Documents A/4980/Add. 1 (A/C.1/L297 and Add. 1-2), A/C.1/PV.1196, A/Res./1664 (XVI), A/PV.1070; and Disarmament Commission (DC/201 and Add. 1-3).

participate in a nuclear-free zone of the widest extent, to include non-nuclear states in Central and Northern Europe. The reply went on to state that the NWFZ should run for an initial period of five years and should be respected and guaranteed by the nuclear weapon states, which should also agree simultaneously to a test ban on nuclear weapons. Lastly, it was pointed out that a verification system would be desirable.[71] Nothing came of the U.N. feasibility study on the nuclear club idea or of the Unden proposition.[72]

Stockholm has been active nevertheless in the Geneva negotiations on multilateral disarmament which was discussed formerly in the ENDC (later renamed the Committee on Disarmament). Soon after the Test-Ban and Non-Proliferation treaties came into force, however, Sweden's interest in multilateral arms control fora waned. It began to take a much more European perspective on arms control issues, apparently because its interests and that of the non-aligned states no longer seemed to coincide at either Geneva or the U.N. Moreover, Stockholm realised that the arms control focus had shifted significantly from multilateral to bilateral negotiations between the superpowers on strategic and theatre nuclear weapons. The government in Stockholm also became very interested in the MBFR talks which had been going on in Vienna intermittently since 1973. As Sweden shifted its attention inwards, its security agenda began to reflect a much more European orientation with respect to arms control. (This may account for the fact it has offered

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[71] Prawitz, "Sweden - Non-Nuclear State," p. 63.

[72] The Unden proposal of 1961 was launched without the prior knowledge of his government or the Swedish Defence Staff. See Ingemar Dorfer's, "Nordic Security: Sweden," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1982:p. 282.

to host an European security conference during the present decade.) As the arms control agenda has drawn closer home for Sweden, the issue of a Nordic nuclear-free zone has also injected itself more into the political debate. Sweden has often brushed aside calls for such a zone, saying only that the matter was deserving of further study.[73]

In response to President Kekkonen's Stockholm speech in 1978, Foreign Minister Karim Soder maintained that Sweden had always been ready to discuss the Kekkonen proposal with other pertinent states. He said also that his country's main concern was the areas to be included in the zone. Continuing, Soder indicated that

> It is our view that such a plan must take into consideration those tactical nuclear weapons in the vicinity of Scandinavia that can be used against targets in the area.[74]

Aside from raising the customary call for inclusion of the Kola Peninsula in the Nordic nuclear-free zone, Soder also wanted the Soviet Union to remove all of its weapons stationed in areas near to Nordic Europe, except Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). His reasoning was that all other weaponry could be directed against the zone and therefore should be removed as a collateral measure.

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[73] See the article written by former Under-Secreatry of State, Anders Thunborg, entitled "Nuclear-Weapons and the Nordic Countries Today - A Swedish Commentary," in Mottola, ed., A Nuclear-Free Zone and Nordic Security, condensed English edition of Ulkopolitiikka, Helsinki:Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1975:pp. 34-38.

[74] International Studies, No. 3, 1978:p. 130. Quoted in Kalevi Ruhala and Pauli Jarvenpaa, "A Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone: Prospects for Arms Control in Europe," in Idem, Yearbook on Finnish Foreign Policy, 1978, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1978:p. 21.

Similar sentiments were expressed by Hans Blix, Soder's successor, in a speech in Helsinki in November 1978. According to Blix, a Nordic NWFZ would have to cover the entire Baltic Sea, viz., the northern parts of the two Germanies and the Baltic Sea itself, in addition to the Nordic area and the Kola Peninsula.[75] Another concern of the Swedish government is that a NWFZ in the Nordic region should not disturb the Nordic balance. Hans Blix said in his Helsinki speech that a nuclear-free zone had to be discussed against this backdrop.

Under pressure from the very vocal and influential Swedish peace movement, Parliament decided in 1982 to ask the government to study the nuclear-free zone issue jointly with its Nordic counterparts.[76] The Swedish Foreign Ministry was also urged to study the matter.[77]

The well publicised outcry against the incursion by a Soviet "nuclear carrying" submarine led to a call from all the political parties in Sweden for a nuclear-free zone in the Baltic region. The proposal did not specify if this would constitute a separate arragement or if it would be a part of the Nordic plan.[78] In a speech in 1982, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Leif Leifland, added a list of further conditions to the already growing list of Swedish criteria for a Nordic NWFZ. Among them, was that the USSR should open its nuclear

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ingemar Dorfer, "Nordic Security - Sweden," p. 282.

[77] Ibid.

[78] It shoul be pointed out that between 60-70% of Soviet naval repairs take place on the Baltic coast. It would be difficult to imagine an arrangement which would prohibit Soviet nuclear-equipped warships from transiting the Baltic Sea, not to mention finding an effective way of verifying compliance.

stockpiles to inspection, so that it could be verified that no medium-range nuclear weapons were in fact stationed near the proposed nuclear-free zone.[79] Quite obviously, the Soviet Union is not likely to entertain such a suggestion. From the point of view of the USA, any denuclearisation plan that would limit the status of Denmark and Norway in NATO is unlikely to be welcome news. Indeed, both the former Secretary of State Alexander Haig and British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington pointed out in 1981 to Knut Frydenlund, the Norwegian foreign minister, that they were not interested in any proposal which would transform Denmark and Norway into a protective shield for the Soviet Union.[80] Both statesmen effectively destroyed any possibility of progress towards a Nordic nuclear-free zone in which Sweden could participate. There is no evidence to suggest that Sweden has retreated from its 1981 position on the Nordic nuclear-free zone issue.

This review has demonstrated that while Sweden continues to believe in a strong defence as the cornerstone of its neutral foreign policy, it has chosen nevertheless to seek this outside the context of nuclear weapons. Stockholm effectively gave up the option, ceteris paribus, to possess its own nuclear weapons by having been one of the first to sign the Non-Proliferation and Partial Test-Ban Treaties.

Sweden has played a significant role in disarmament negotiations held under U.N. auspices and has often called for a total ban on nuclear testing, asserting that this would check considerably the qualitative

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[79] Ibid., p. 283.

[80] See Erling Bjol's Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers No. 181, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983:p. 29.

development of nuclear weapons. Stockholm's policy has emphasised measures to safeguard international peace and security, and the need to re-construct the international system to give more weight to international law. It is partly on this premise that Sweden anchors its participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions worldwide.

Finally, Stockholm has been an ardent supporter of the NPT and of bilateral arms talks between the superpowers. In sharp contrast, its reaction to the Kekkonen and other proposals for a Nordic NWFZ has been half-hearted at best. Sweden tends to support models of a Nordic nuclear-free zone that would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

In concluding, however, it must be stressed that Swedish foreign policy has overtly normative (Grotian) overtones. This is borne out by the speeches of its diplomats, in the General Assembly and at other fora, on the danger that nuclear weapons pose to mankind. Swedish policy makers and the public alike fervently believe that measures to ban these weapons should be explored. Undoubtedly this conviction underlies Stockholm's international role as a mediator, arms control advocate and supporter of UN peacekeeping efforts throughout the globe.

4.2.4 Finnish Security Policy

Finnish security policy has remained basically the same since its main precepts and constraints were laid out by Presidents J.K. Paasikivi (1946-56) and Urho Kekkonen (1956-82). There are two primary themes to this policy: the first is to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, and the second is to pursue a policy of "active neutrality." In

Finnish terms this means "staying outside the Great Power conflicts of interest" while providing the superpowers, the U.N. and other international organisations with diplomatic support and services in the interest of arms control and disarmament.[81]

Finland has operationalised the first theme via the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which is as it were the permanent reference point for decision-making having to do with security matters.[82] The neutrality element manifests itself through the activities of Finland in the CSCE and in multilateral and bilateral arms control negotiations.

The "Eastern policy" is designed to convey the permanency of Helsinki's behaviour vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It is independent of fluctuations in other aspects of Finnish international relations, but the security benefits gained by this contract change from time to time. Moreover, the Eastern policy sets parameters for Finnish neutrality, in that it portends a range of options from which the Finnish government may choose. Given the close interrelationship between these twin elements of Finnish foreign policy, many analysts have concluded (rightly or wrongly) that Finnish international interactions are wholly conditioned by its "friendship" with the USSR and by its geographical position in relation to it. Finnish policy makers have gone to lengths to deny this allegation. They say that

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[81] Kari Mottola, "The Politics of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since the Early 1970's," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1982:p. 289.

[82] The text of the FCMA can be found in Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1973, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1974:pp. 60-61.

> ---a policy of neutrality can only be pursued in practice if it is accorded the recognition and trust of those foreign states which influence the country's destiny. This recognition and trust must be gained and constantly regained, through unflagging work and care.[83]

Finland has argued further that its relations with Moscow symbolises the concept of "national realism." This means Finland knows that the Soviet Union has legitimate security concerns about what takes place on its western border. Thus President Passikivi once said that Finland's foreign and security policy must never threaten or seem to threaten the Soviet Union. This conviction is actually written into Article 4 of the FCMA, viz., Finland shall "not conclude any alliance or join any coalition directed against the Soviet Union".[84]

Having realised the constraints which geography and politics have placed upon it, Finland has gone ahead nevertheless and pursued its policy of neutrality, referred to by President Kekkonen as his life's mission.[85] From the quiet diplomacy of Paasikivi to the active diplomacy of Kekkonen, Finland has come to play a central role in issue areas relating to war and peace. Finnish neutrality relies little on classical notions of neutrality (as practised say by Switzerland), or on neutrality through military strength (as pursued in Sweden). Instead, it relies on the twin concepts of credibility and acceptability. The first underlines the political and military means at the disposal of the Finnish nation as it tries to pursue its neutralism, while the second connotes the influence that policy exercises over the environment.

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[83] Mottola, "Politics of Neutrality," p. 291.

[84] "Treaty Text," p. 61.

[85] Mottola, "Politics of Neutrality," p. 291.

This analytical framework may be used to assess the foreign policy initiatives taken by the Finnish government insofar as security issues are concerned.[86] Finnish security policy may be seen mainly as a means of wielding political influence. A lot of energy goes into trying to convince the international community that Finland is steering a course which remains faithful to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen dictates, namely, close bilateral relations with the USSR and the pursuit of a policy of neutrality and non-aggressive defence. Understanding how these three goals interact to give rise to a unique blend of foreign policy is to grasp the roots of Finnish behaviour.

In terms of Nordic security, two objectives stand out in Finnish security policy. First, is to strengthen the security of Northern Europe and the Baltic region: these two areas impinge directly on Finnish integrity and vital interests. Second, is to participate in the wider European and international systems where Finland can define a role for itself in accordance with its ideology. Finnish declaratory policy is clearly bent on the need to disengage the Nordic area from the nuclear strategy of the superpowers. In short, it aims at preserving the post-war non-nuclear status of the Nordic region. As Mottola put it,

> The objective [of Finland's Nordic policy is] to keep the region outside nuclear weapons strategy speculations by confirming the non-nuclear status against all eventualities in the dynamics of doctrines of use and plans for deployment of nuclear weapons as well as the effects of new weapons technology on both of these aspects.[87]

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[86] For an insightful analysis of the development of Finnish security policy during the critical period of the 1970's see Aimo Pajunen's "Finland's Security Policy in the 1970's: Background and Perspectives," in Holst, ed., Five Roads, pp. 39-60.

[87] Ibid., p. 47.

The above perspective sums up the reason why Finland has been the foremost exponent of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The original idea was intended to be a regional security measure, but by 1978 the proposal had broadened in scope. It now explicitly recognised the link between arms control in Northern Europe, on the Continent in general, and with the nuclear powers in particular. Kekkonen was convinced that a Nordic arms control regime would benefit the Nordic region and the rest of Europe as well. In making his case for the non-deployment in Europe of so-called 'grey area' weapons, Kekkonen alluded to the notion that the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ would be only one stage in a much broader European arms control process. Despite the fact that the Finnish nuclear-free zone proposal has achieved little in terms of its ostensible objective, Finland takes pride nevertheless in the fact that it was able to get the Nordic Foreign Ministers to agree to put the item on the agenda of their annual meeting in 1981.

Curiously enough, Finland has been noticeably silent on the nuclear-free zone issue which came up for renewed discussion in Scandinavia beginning in 1980. Helsinki has declined to comment on the conditions that the Scandinavians have laid down for the NWFZ to be realised. These pertain to the geographical reach of the zone and the concrete measures expected from the Great Powers. One can only guess that Finland considers that to comment on these crucial yet sensitive issues would be detrimental to its status as a neutral power and damaging to its long term interests.

The protracted goal, as Finland sees it, is to protect its borders. The security agreement with the Soviet Union, and its neutrality, might

be enhanced if it could persuade the Norwegians to conclude an agreement to protect the exposed Lapland region from becoming an object of superpower military calculations. Norway has rejected Helsinki's overtures in this matter, thus adding to the latter's fears that Norway's growing strategic importance will channel even further East-West nuclear competition in its direction. The dilemma that Finland faces in security terms is that it must try and prevent an attack or threat of an attack upon the Soviet Union through its territory. An alliance of neutral Nordic states "would go a far way in removing even the theoretical threat of an attack on the USSR via Finland's territory.[88] On the other hand, it must try and strengthen its links to the West in order to gain greater acceptability among its Nordic neighbours and to be in a position to exercise greater influence over how the security landscape of the North develops. Pursuing one goal without appearing to jeopardise the other has been difficult indeed. It is fair to say, then, that the remarkable consistency which one finds in Finnish foreign policy is due mainly to the dilemma that Finland has been faced with since the end of the Second World War.

To conclude, Finland has played a vital role in attempts to ameliorate tensions between East and West. It has served as host for the meetings held to prepare for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and in the Geneva and Helsinki stages of the CSCE, not only was it the host but it tried to get the participants to arrive at consensus positions on certain key issues. Helsinki was also

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[88] This formulation is actually President Kekkonen's. See T. Vilkuna, ed., Neutrality: The Finnish Position, speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, London: Heinemann, 1970:pp. 55-56.

instrumental in getting the two sides to agree to have follow-up meetings.[89] Furthermore, in the Belgrade and Madrid Review Conferences Finland worked with a loose coalition of non-aligned states to try and improve the CSCE process as well as to support calls for nuclear disengagement and further confidence-building measures in Europe. Finland is one of the main voices in the call for a European disarmament conference.

There is a sense in which neutrality (the Finnish version) has become accepted by foreign powers as a foreign policy per se. This has given more weight to Finnish lobby efforts in the fields of arms control and disarmament. As President Kekkonen put it in 1972,

> By practising a policy based on peaceful neutrality and good neighbour relations the people of Finland many years ago found their place in Europe and in the world. Finland's neutrality, built through systematic efforts, has become a positive and lasting part of the balance in Europe.[90]

In line with its Nordic and European arms control outlook, Helsinki has been particularly active in trying to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is evidenced by its prominence in NWFZ activism and its readiness to support both horizontal and vertical arms control negotiations. Finland's performance at the U.N. and elsewhere has also kept pace with trends in the East-West nuclear arms control process.

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[89] See Jaako Iloniemi's "Finland's Role in the CSCE," in Kari Mottola, ed., Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1975, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1975:pp. 33-35.

[90] "Speech by the President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, at the Opening of the Helsinki Consultations, 22 November 1972," in Idem, Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1972, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1972:pp. 82-83.

4.2.5 Icelandic Security Policy

The first thing one notices about Iceland is that it does not have an army. This fact has had an inevitable bearing on its security perceptions and underlines Iceland's relationship to NATO, which it joined reluctantly in 1949. Iceland became a party to the North Atlantic Treaty only after much assurances that it would neither have to raise a defence force or absorb allied troops on its territory.[91]

In the aftermath of the Korean War, NATO requested the Icelandic government to upgrade its security. This led to the signing of a 1951 defence agreement with the United States under NATO auspices.[92] The purpose of the U.S. armed forces in Iceland is mainly to secure the vital sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) bordering the country.[93]

Being a small nation, Icelandic security policy tends to be inward looking. There is a definite tendency to focus on narrow domestic interests rather than on those of the alliance to which it belongs. This tendency undoubtedly accounts for its no-stationing and no-bases policy with respect to foreign troops. In 1971, for example, a new centre-left coalition government was elected. It began a major review of Icelandic security policy, hitherto based upon the 1951 Defence Agreement and membership in the NATO Alliance. The government asserted that it

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[91] See Bjorn Bjarnasson's "The Security of Iceland," in Holst, ed., Security, Order, and the Bomb, p. 61.

[92] North Atlantic Assembly, Security in the Northern Region, n.p.: North Atlantic Assembly, 1979:pp. 40-45. The United States-Icelandic Defence Agreement was revised in 1974 to allow for a reduction of the American military presence in Iceland.

[93] Ibid., p. 41.

> ---considers that efforts should be made for the relaxation of tensions in the world and the strengthening of peace by closer contacts between nations and by general disarmament....[P]eaceful relations would best be preserved without military alliances....The government agrees to the convening of a special conference on European security.[94]

The security of Iceland and that of its Nordic partners are closely intertwined. Furthermore, the Keflavik base is vital to NATO for peacetime surveillance of sensitive ocean lanes. In a war or crisis, when it would be essential for NATO to defend effectively the GIUK gap against Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic, Iceland's military posture would be crucial to the defence of the West. If it were to cancel the Defence Agreement with the USA, thus necessitating the closure of the Keflavik base and the radar station near Hofn, then NATO would definitely have to find an alternative location in order to maintain the Nordic equilibrium popularly known as the Nordic balance.[95] The geo-strategic position of Iceland is therefore of great importance to the Western Alliance as a whole, and to the maintenance of stability in conformity with the Nordic post-war security pattern.

When Iceland laid down its conditions for membership in NATO, in 1949, the Atlantic states had a virtual monopoly in sea power. The USSR commenced an impressive naval expansion in the Atlantic in the early 1960's, so that the Alliance now faces a much more formidable threat. The areas east and south-east of Iceland have become regular locations

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[94] Quoted in Bjarnasson, p. 66.

[95] Ibid., esp. pp. 30-33 for a discussion of possible alternatives open to NATO. See also Krister Wahlback's "The Nordic Region in Twentieth Century European Politics," in Bengt Sundelius, ed., Foreign Policies of Northern Europe, Westview Special Studies in International Relations, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982:pp. 9-32.

for Soviet naval exercises. There is every reason to point to increasing attempts by the Soviet Union to exercise dominace over the region. In the event of a central war, Iceland could be quickly occupied by the USSR before NATO could send in re-inforcements. The danger of this actually occurring becomes greater the more the government of Iceland is pressured into closing the Keflavik military base. This is not likely to happen, however, as Norway, Denmark, the U.K., Canada and naturally the USA would be bound to put pressure on Reykjavik to keep the base open. Iceland has very close ties to these countries and is likely to be swayed by them in the interest of preserving the special relationship.

Fortunately the guarantees that Iceland gets from being a member of NATO, and the defence agreement with the United States, now enjoy substantial political support from Icelanders.[96] This is because there has been an increasing awareness of the continuing threat posed to their isolated and sparsely populated state by the Soviet Union. It is safe to conclude then that membership in NATO and maintenance of military relations with the United States will continue to be the cornerstones of Icelandic security policy.[97]

There is, nevertheless, some convergence between the nuclear policies of Iceland and those of its Nordic neighbours. Of all the security issues, none is more sensitive in Iceland than that of nuclear weapons. Reykjavik maintains the ultimate responsibility for the deployment of

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[96] Bjorn Bjarnasson, "Defence of Iceland," NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 30. No. 7, December 1985:p. 39.

[97] The USA has maintained maritime air patrols operating out of Keflavik since 1951. Since 1969, this role has been performed by a squadron of P3Cs.

such weapons on its territory. From the discussions which have occurred since the beginning of the 1980's, it becomes obvious that no such deployment will be entertained by the Icelandic government in the forseeable future. The non-nuclear weapons policy of Iceland also applies to vessels within its territorial waters and to those making port calls.[98] Although Iceland has shown little enthusiasm for the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone in the past, preferring to take the Danish-Norwegian line on the issue. The Parliament has called unanimously for a

> study of possibilities and basis for agreements on a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, on land, in the air, as well as on or in the ocean, as an element in an agreement to decrease the arms build-up and to lessen tensions.[99]

As this short review of Icelandic security policy indicates, that country is in a sharply different situation from the rest of Nordic Europe by virtue of its total reliance on the United States and NATO for its protection. This set of circumstances, coupled with a small size, relative isolation from the rest of Europe, and few resources, have limited severely Iceland's ability to manoeuvre and to pursue either an active foreign or security policy. Despite these constraints, it can be said that Icelanders - policy makers and the public alike - are weary about the role of nuclear weapons in the strategic contours of their region. This has given rise to a decidedly normative approach in

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[98] There is some doubt as to the credibility of Iceland's nuclear abstention policy in view of U.S. decision never to comment on whether or not its vessels are carrying nuclear warheads. Also, Iceland made no attempt to inspect a convoy of eleven NATO warships which visited its ports en route from Boston to northern Norway in 1985, to take part in NATO's "Ocean Safari" exercises. See Bjarnasson's "Defence of Island."

[99] Ibid., p.39.

security policy discussions, similar in some degree to what can be observed in the other Nordic states. The renewed interest in 1985 in the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone may well become a turning point in Iceland's security policy agenda.

4.3 EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF A NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

The idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone originated with the then Soviet Premier, Bulganin, in letters to both the Danish and Norwegian heads of government during the period 1957-58. In his January 1958 letter, Bulganin drew attention to the fact that both Sweden and Finland had rejected the nuclear option. He went on to say that if Denmark and Norway were to do the same, the pre-requisite for a nuclear-free zone would have been secured and the basis for stability and peace in the Nordic area achieved. Both the Norwegian and Danish leaders replied by reminding Premier Bulganin that a significant part of the Soviet Union lay in Northern Europe, meaning that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would be possible only if the USSR agreed to include its Northern territories in the proposed NWFZ.

The above exchange seemed to have laid the matter to rest until May 11963 when the late President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, became the first Nordic statesman to introduce the iddea of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region. He raised the issue again in 1972 and 1978. The first proposal for a denuclearised Nordic zone to come from the region itself originated with the late President His successor, Moino Koivisto, and the late Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, were both instrumental in resurrecting the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposition in the 1980's. In addition, three other 'plans' for a NWFZ in Northern Europe have

emerged, but none has managed to replace the Kekkonen proposals which have survived a quarter of a century of critical analysis and appraisal.

The Kekkonen plan developed in three distinct but overlapping phases: 1962-65, 1972-75, and 1978 onwards.[100] The initial phase coincided with a period of high tension between the superpowers and with the nuclear disengagement proposals (the Rapacki and Gomulka plans) which were being discussed for Central Europe. The second phase occurred against the backdrop of the detente process between the U.S. and the USSR, as well as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which was underway in Helsinki. The third phase began in 1978, just prior to the first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. It was raised in an atmosphere of increasing tension between the superpowers and lack of tangible progress in the CSCE Belgrade Review Conference.

The first phase of the Kekkonen plan was inspired by previous calls for arms control arrangements to curb the East-West nuclear arms competition in Europe. These calls were made by Frank Aiken and Oster Unden, foreign ministers of Eire and Sweden respectively. Similarly, the NWFZ proposal of Adam Rapacki and Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland, concerning Central Europe, provided the setting in which President Kekkonen introduced his ideas for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

In a speech to the Paasikivi Society in May 1963, President Kekkonen proposed that the Nordic states agree not to procure nuclear weapons.[101]

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[100] Osmo Apunen has referred to these phases as "waves." See his "Three 'Waves' of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980's," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1980:pp. 16-31.

[101] None of the Nordic states had actually expressed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, although, aside from Finland, none had

He reiterated the fact that none of the Nordic states had shown an interest in acquiring nuclear arms, and that the Nordic region was already a de facto nuclear weapon-free zone. Kekkonen suggested that the Nordic states enter into an undertaking, in accordance with the Unden Plan, to declare their region a "nuclear-free zone." He held that such an action would "ensure that this area [Nordic Europe] will remain outside international tension.[102] The features of the NWFZ proposal put forward by Kekkonen were first, that the Nordic states not procure nuclear weapons, that they not allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories; and that there be no change in the existing security policies of the Scandinavian states.

The Unden Plan referred to above called for an end to nuclear weapons testing.[103] President Kekkonen stuck firmly to this requirement, while Denmark and Norway declined to become involved in any arrangement which would limit their freedom to alter their nuclear restraint policies in the event of a crisis or war. Thus, the first phase of the Kekkonen proposal was not supported by Finland's Nordic neighbours.

The 1963 proposal took shape in the context of great polarisation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: about six months before Kekkonen made his speech to the Paasikivi Society, the Cuban Crisis had threatened to bring the superpowers into direct nuclear confrontation over the stationing of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union in Cuba.

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rejected that possibility outright.

[102] Vilkuna, ed., Neutrality: The Finnish Position," p. 145.

[103] The Unden plan is discussed in Katarina Brodin, "The Unden Proposal," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1966.

Furthermore, there was a movement ahead in Europe which sought to disengage the superpowers militarily and politically from the the Europen theatre. The Finnish initiative was therefore a product of these developments, and underscored Finnish attempts to break out of the strictures of the tight bloc framework within which Finland perceived the Nordic states. The possibility of a nuclear-free Nordic region appeared to open up an important channel through which small powers could take independent foreign policy initiatives and stances. Finland saw this as the best way to bring about a a relaxation of political and military tensions in an area of increasing strategic importance to the superpowers.

Discussions regarding a multilateral nuclear force for the North Atlantic Alliance were taking place at the time of the first phase of the Finnish proposition. These talks served to remind the Europeans that their role in a future war might not be limited to conventional warfare but could also include nuclear weapons. The Kekkonen plan was aimed at banning nuclear arms in Northern Europe by a multilateral treaty between the five Nordic states. The idea did not get very far because of the gloomy political and security climate of the 1960's, the overarching antagonistic relationship between the superpowers and between their respective blocs in Europe, and the lack of support from the United States and the other Nordic countries. It also failed because, apart from the demilitarised zone created by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, there was very little else to serve as reference for states which were being asked to formulate coherent policies concerning the nuclear-free zone

approach to arms control.[104]

Phase two of the Kekkonen proposal was introduced in 1972 by Ambassador Aarno Karhilo at the United Nations. The features were the same as those which characterised phase one except in one important respect: the Nordic NWFZ was now to be linked with a broader plan for nuclear disengagement in Europe. As Kekkonen stated,

> To envisage any disarmament and arms control aspects of the Nordic countries separately from the developments in Europe as a whole is just as inconceivable as it would be to deal with problems of European disarmament divorced from the disarmament process in a global sense.[105]

Further, the superpowers were being called upon to extend negative security guarantees to the Nordic states in return for their decision to abjure the nuclear option. This was seen as a move to link Nordic security directly with the central balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Finland also took a more hardlined stance with respect to the stationing of nuclear weapons on Nordic soil. In a speech to the United Nations, Karhilo said that "the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free Nordic region would strengthen the established policy of the Nordic countries".[106] This reference was clearly intended to reiterate the fact that the Nordic states neither owned nuclear weapons or possessed them on behalf of anyone else. It was Finnish hope that this situation would not only remain as it was but be given further credence via a formal

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[104] Clive Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance in Northern Europe: Plans for a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," Centrepieces, No. 6, Winter 1984:p. 19.

[105] Quoted in Apunen's, "Three 'Waves,'" p. 21.

[106] Ibid., pp. 304-05.

nucler-free zone treaty.

The second phase of the Kekkonen proposal took place under a completely different set of circumstances from that of the first. East-West relations were on a better footing; and Finland was playing a pivotal role as host to the Conference on Security and Confidence Building in Europe. Moreover, a number of arms control agreements were signed to limit both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Among them were the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Seabed Treaty (1971), and the Outer Space, Tlatelolco and Non-Proliferation Treaties (1968).

Finally, despite a build-up in Soviet strategic forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Norwegian Sea, there was no overwhelming pressure on Denmark and Norway, NATO members, to re-assess their long-standing policy of self-imposed, unilateral restraints pertaining to the stationing of nuclear weapons. This activity is prohibited by both states. In addition, Norway disallows the construction of military facilities on its soil, with the exception of those which are necessary for receiving and supporting allied troops assigned to defend Norwegian territory. Allied exercises in Finnmark, the northernmost county, Allied overflight of Norwegian territory east of the 24 meridian (i.e., 200 kms. west of the Soviet border), and Allied naval visits to territorial waters lying in Finnmark are also not permitted.[107]

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[107] See J.J. Holst, "Norway and NATO in the 1980s." A Lecture to the American-Scandinavian Foundation, New York, N.Y., 23 May 1984, NUPI/Notat, No. 301(B), May 1984:p. 5.

Similar restriction are applied by Denmark: it will not receive nuclear weapons or allow the stationing of allied troops "under existing circumstances," which is taken to mean during peacetime. Copenhagen will also not allow foreign troops on its Baltic island of Bornholm, in conformity with a promise to the USSR which liberated the Island in 1945. The ostensive purpose of these restraints by Denmark and Norway is to try and remove any pretext the Soviet Union might find to build and deploy nuclear forces for use against the Nordic region, and to ease the threat of nuclear conflict in Europe as a whole.[108] Sweden's decision to ratify the NPT in 1969, a year after it had signed, completed and re-affirmed the Nordic state's declared disavowal of nuclear weapons during peacetime.

It is not entirely clear why Finland initiated another phase of the 1963 proposal. It would appear that President Kekkonen realised that a common Nordic approach was essential if the nuclear-free zone idea was to take hold. This is apparently the reason for his tying a Nordic NWFZ arrangement to security developments on the European continent in general. In more precise terms, Helsinki's objective was to bring about an European equilibrium whereby Finnish neutrality could be preserved. If a NWFZ treaty could be realised, the nuclear weapon powers could become associated with it in the form of guarantees to the Nordic states to renounce the use of nuclear weapons or their threat of use against them.[109] In raising the nuclear-free zone idea before the U.N. General Assembly in 1972, Ambassador Karhilo emphasised the need to bolster the

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[108] See Apunen's "Three "Waves",", pp. 23-24.

[109] In fact, Soviet President Podgorny had made such a promise to the Nordic states in a speech in Helsinki in 1974. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

existing status quo in Nordic Europe. And in a speech - three years later, Ambassador I. Pastinen pointed out that there was a necessity to prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons by third parties in Nordic territory.[110]

The outcome of the second phase of the Kekkonen plan was no more successful than the first. The Swedish government's response was guarded: Foreign Minister Anders Thunborg pointed out that the suggested nuclear-free zone would lie in close proximity to the Kola Peninsula where the bulk of the USSR's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were stationed.[111] He called for the removal of intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons pointed at the Nordic states; and drew a link between the Nordic arms control process and those of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations. Clearly, what Thunborg seemed to have been saying was that the Nordic NWFZ issue was much more complex than Finland made it appear.[112]

For its part, Norway said that Kekkonen's proposal was unbalanced, because it did not place an obligation on the Soviet Union to provide adequate compensation to the Scandinavian states, which would likely see

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[110] This remark was in response to a planned study by the CCD of nuclear weapon-free zones; the proposal was sponsored by Finland. See Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 21.

[111] SLBMs are actually strategic forces and are not aimed at the Nordic area. Removing them would probably upset the strategic balance between the superpowers.

[112] See Anders Thunborg's "Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Countries Today - A Swedish Commentary," in Kari Mottola, ed., A Nuclear-Free Zone and Nordic Security, a special issue of Ulkopolitiikka, English edition, No. 1, 1975:p. 37.

their security as NATO members weakened under a nuclear-free zone arrangement. Oslo asseerted also that a NWFZ could lead to undue outside interference in the internal policies of NATO countries and could weaken the security ties between Scandinavia and the Western Alliance. Moreover, it was pointed out that a Nordic nuclear-free zone might even give the Soviet Union a droit de regard in terms of the character of Nordic security arrangements. Lastly, phase II of President Kekkonen's proposal came at a time when Norway and Moscow were engaged in delicate discussions regarding the legal regime in the Barents Sea. Oslo perceived that a favourable response to the Finnish proposition could weaken Sweden's bargaining position, if the Soviets took their position to be a willingness to offer concessions under pressure.[113] All these elements, plus the fact that Finland became pre-occupied with the drafting of the Final Act of the CSCE, combined to put the second Kekkonen nuclear-free zone initiative on the backburner.[114]

It should be pointed out, however, that phase II of the Finnish nuclear-free zone plan was not entirely without success: the U.N. accepted the seven principles which an expert group, under Finland's chairmanship, had prepared on nuclear weapon-free zones. Of particular note was the principle requiring the Great Powers to provide security guarantees to any nuclear-free zone. It is also of some relevance to note that Soviet President Podgorny, in his 1974 speech in Helsinki, gave some weight to the Finnish argument that a Nordic nuclear-free zone

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[113] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p.22.

[114] Finland tried unsuccessfully to introduce the subject of a Nordic NWFZ in the agenda of the 2nd. stage of the CSCE. Helsinki argued that this would be one way of building confidence in Europe. See Apunen's, "Three 'Waves,'" p. 20.

should receive adequate security pledges from the nuclear weapon powers; and that this could follow the pattern establihed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968.[115] Furthermore, in Sweden and elsewhere, the Finnish nuclear weapon-free zone plan was beginning to be discussed by politicians and the general public alike.

The third phase of the Kekkonen proposal was introduced by Kekokonen himself in a speech in Helsinki in 1968.[116] This was the first time that his proposal really took concrete shape. It was presented as a plan consisting of three parts: first, an arms control treaty for Nordic Europe; second, a treaty to strengthen the existing non-nuclear status of the Nordic region; and third, negative security guarantees from the nuclear powers.[117]

President Kekkonen reiterated his 1963 statement in which he had pointed to the de facto nuclear-free status of the Nordic region. He went on to say that the security landscape of the Nordic area had not changed since 1963, and that it need not change with a commitment to an internationally binding NWFZ treaty. In other words, as he had said in

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[115] According to Apunen, the Finnish government sought a guarantee from the nuclear weapon states that would not only prohibit them from stationing, transferring or transiting nuclear weapons in the Nordic area, but which would also contain a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Nordic states. This would presumably protect Finnish neutrality as well. See Ibid.

[116] "Address by the President of Finland, Dr. Urho Kekkonen, at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 8 May 1978," Helsinki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mimeograph), p. 7; cited in Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 24.

[117] Steve Lindberg, "Towards a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone," in Mottola, ed., Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1980, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs:p. 29.

1963, a Nordic nuclear-free zone need not affect prior security arrangements under which the Nordic states were operating. Kekkonen stressed the importance of obtaining adequate guarantees from the nuclear weapon states by nations which had pledged to forgo the nuclear option. Thus, phase III of the Kekkonen plan now emphasised the notion of "negative security guarantees," whereas before the stress was on simply "respect" for the denuclearised status of the zone.[118]

Kekkonen proposed that the Nordic states should "in their own interest enter into negotiations among themselves and together with the great powers concerned about arms control".[119] The objective would be to agree to a separate treaty which would insulate the Nordic nations as completely as possible from the effects of the nuclear weapons strategy of the Great Powers as well as from the technology used to produce nuclear weapons.[120] He delineated the following: that negotiations should involve the Nordic states as the main actors, with the superpowers being asked to participate at some later stage; that the talks should focus on finding better means of managing existing and future weaponry; and that the Great Powers should provide negative security guarantees.

The third phase emphasised political control over nuclear weapon systems, that is, their role in the defence of Nordic states and their location relative to the Nordic region. Kekkonen envisaged that, in addition to providing adequate guarantees, the superpowers would enter

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[118] Apunen, "Three 'Waves,'" p. 23.

[119] Quoted in Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 24.

[120] Ibid.

into serious arms talks themselves about placing limitations on weapons systems like mini-nukes, precision-guided missiles, neutron bombs (enhanced radiation missiles) and cruise missiles deployed in neighbouring NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. Thus, it was no longer enough to have political guarantees from the superpowers concerning the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Nordic region. As one analyst put it,

> There has been a move away from marginal treaties typical of detente and services rendered by a mediating small power to the leading great powers, towards the rough and tumble of disarmament policy.[121]

Phase III of President Kekkonen's proposal occurred against the background of the unfruitful Belgrade Review Conference. The latter failed to arrive at a consensus about arms limitation in Europe and on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology which Finland perceived as a threat to the Nordic states. Kekkonen pointed to the cruise missile as a weapon which made "the use of third countries and neutral airspace a routine matter," and called for a ban or freeze on their production.[122]

The attitude of Scandanavia to phase III was consistent with past responses. Denmark, Norway and Sweden repeated the need for the proposition to take into account the deployment of nuclear weapons by the USSR in the Kola Peninsula and Baltic Sea. Further, they expressed concern about the presence of Soviet nuclear forces in the vicinity of the Nordic region. The Scandinavian countries said that these posed a

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[121] Apunen, "Three 'Waves,'" p. 25.

[122] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 24.

threat to their vital interests.[123] Lastly, both Denmark and Norway said they were unprepared to place a total ban on nuclear weapons in view of their Allied commitments.

The Kekkonen plan began as an amorphous proposition for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone designed to formalise and stabilise the status quo. It was transformed into a reasonably coherent proposal over a fifteen year period. Many hope President Kekkonen's plan will form the basis of a denuclearisation regime for Northern Europe. Despite its apparent crystallisation over time, however, the reaction of the Scandinavian countries remained lukewarm at the close of the 1970's. Up until then, none of Finland's Scandinavian neighbours was willing to discuss a Nordic NWFZ without coupling it to the future of Soviet forces stationed on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic Sea. This proclivity made it impossible to achieve progress in the Finnish proposal. Denmark's and Norway's insistence on retaining the right to station NATO nuclear forces in their territories in the event of a war or crisis had a similar effect.

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[123] At the 1978 Special session on Disarmament, the Soviet union repeated it's earlier pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons aganst non-nuclear powers. Evidently, the Scandinavian countries were not re-assured by that promise. Also, the Soviet Union has recently said it would consider new arrangements for its nuclear forces deployed in the Kola and Baltic Sea should the Nordic states agree upon a nuclear-free zone treaty. See "Excerpts from the Speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov made at a Kremlin dinner held in honour of the President of Finland Mauno Koivisto, June 6, 1983, in Kari Mottola, ed., Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe - Problems and Prospects of Arms Control, (Documentary), Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983, p. 86.

Another major stumbling block was the attitude of the superpowers: successive U.S. administrations responded to Kekkonen's plan with stolid indifference. Washington had never really warmed to the concept of nuclear-free zones and apparently did not intend to make an exception in the case of Northern Europe, an area which is vital to U.S. global political and security interests. The USSR, on the other hand, showed some support for the proposal even though it did not respond favourably to the Scandinavian suggestion that it include the Northern parts of its territory in the proposed nuclear-free zone.[124] Notwithstanding the seeming support of the Soviet Union for the Finnish proposal, it is widely believed that Moscow's intentions are to de-couple the Nordic region from the rest of the Western Alliance. This argument accounts in part for Scandinavian and U.S. scepticism about the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal as advanced by Finland.

The Kekkonen initiative has therefore met with little real success. It has nevertheless shown remarkable tenacity in having remained for twenty three years on the Nordic security agenda. During this time, has focused attention on the general question of nuclear disengagement in Northern Europe and in the European theatre in general.

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[124] For a succinct analysis of the attitudes taken by various states concerned with the Nordic NWFZ idea, see Steve Lindberg's "Towards," esp. pp. 33-34.

4.3.1 - Other Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone Proposals

Although the Kekkonen proposal is the most well known and closely analysed proposition for a Nordic NWFZ, there have been other discussions and proposals for a denuclearisation regime in Northern Europe. Some have shown recognisable continuity with their Finnish predecessor, but have also demonstrated important differences. As a result, they merit individual treatment as part of the overall framework for Nordic arms control. They also deserve attention because the renewed discussion about a Nordic nuclear-free zone began in Norway which traditionally has been the most vocal critic of the Kekkonen plan.

Intensive talks got underway amongst members of the Norwegian governing coalition in 1980. These resulted in a government policy declaration which stated that Norway would work for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone within the wider European context.[125] Also, the Swedish Parliament approved for the first time a resolution calling upon the Nordic states to begin discussions, with a view to assessing the feasibility of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. In their joint Congress in May 1981, the Nordic Social Democratic Parties passed their first decision to study the basis on which a Nordic NWFZ might materialise in the broader European framework.[126] And in September 1981, the Nordic Foreign Ministers decided to place the matter of a Nordic nuclear-free zone on the agenda of their annual meeting.[127]

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[125] For a good review of this debate, see Robert K. German's, "Nuclear-Free Zones: Norwegian Interest, Soviet Encouragement," Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1982:pp. 451-76.

[126] "Resolution by the Joint Congress of the Nordic Social Democratic Parties, 17 may 1981."

The debate emanating from Norway led also to discussions in Denmark. The Social Democratic government in Copenhagen said it supported the idea of a Nordic NWFZ by means of a treaty-writing formula, but repeated its long-standing view that a nuclear-free zone in Nordic Europe must be seen in a wider European setting. In addition, Foreign Minister Olesen said that a nuclear-free zone must include the Soviet Union's Baltic territories as well as the Kola Peninsula - thus effectively reversing the positive stance which Denmark had taken earlier on the NWFZ issue. Olesen's view also underscored the extent to which Denmark was prepared to go in supporting the NWFZ proposition.[128] It is quite possible, of course, that the Foreign Minister's remarks were merely a reflection of the NATO stance on a Nordic nuclear-free zone in relation to Denmark and Norway, which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. A study conducted by the Committee on Security and Disarmament Affairs of NATO stated that,

> politically it would be against the general concept of alliance membership if two NATO countries, Denmark and Norway, were to embark upon such a major security policy venture as the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone without consulting their allies in order to obtain a common understanding.

The study continued by stating that the problems of Nordic security with respect to nuclear weapons must be seen in a broader context.[129]

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[127] "Communique from the Nordic Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Copenhagen, September 1981," Finnish Features, No. 10, 7 Sept. 1981.

[128] Lindberg, "Towards," p.36.

[129] Cited by Robert E. Hunter, "Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe: The Global Setting," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 57.

For its part, Iceland, which had never before participated in the discussions on the Nordic nuclear-free zone issue, concurred with Norway and Denmark. It asserted that such a zone could not be considered separately from arms control in Europe generally.[130]

The Norwegian Conservative coalition government, headed by Kaare Willoch, rejected catagorically the notion that a Nordic nuclear-free zone could be realised outside a wider arms control regime for the European continent. In May 1982, Prime Minister Willoch stressed that a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region would create divisions within the NATO alliance and undermine Norway's position with respect to the talks on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF Talks) in Europe.[131]

The Social Democratic Party which came to power in Sweden in 1982 showed considerable interest in the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. This concern was expressed by Foreign Minister Lennart Brodstrom in a speeech he made in autumn 1982.[132] Moreover, then Prime Minister Olof Palme, in a June 1983 speech made in Helsinki, said that

> We are convinced that a Nordic [nuclear-free] zone arrangement...can make a real contribution to, and be an important element in, the efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in Europe as a whole. A reduced nuclear threat and a reduced presence of nuclear weapons in our vicinity can contribute towards reducing tension between the great power blocs. A nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area can thereby promote detente and strengthen the security of the Nordic area and of Europe.[133]

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[130] "Speech by the Icelandic Foreign Minister, Olofur Johannesson," Arbeiderbladet, July 21, 1981.

[131] Tapani Vaahtoranta, "Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Countries: Nuclear Status and Policies," in Mottola, Problems and Prospects, p. 56.

[132] Ibid.

Olof Palme delineated certain pre-conditions for a Nordic NWFZ. Among them were a total ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons, unconditional negative security guarantees from the Great Powers, the removal of land-based and sea-based nuclear weapons from the vicinity of the Nordic region, and a nuclear -free Baltic Sea. These demands were essentially a re-stating of the traditional Swedish stand on the subject of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe

Since President Kekkonnen's speech in 1978, ushering in phase III of his proposal for a nuclear-free Nordic Europe, Finland has been noticeably reticent on the matter. Helsinki has not commented officially on the new proposals advanced in the 1980-81 debates in Scandinavia. However, President Koivisto has time and again indicated his determination to continue the work of his predecessor (Kekkonen). In a speech commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Kekkonen proposal, he said

> the Nordic region has been a nuclear weapon-free zone in practice. This has contributed to its political stability. The area has remained free of nuclear weapons, however, due to unilateral declarations, which in the case of Norway and Denmark are valid only in time of peace. Important as the factual nuclear-free status is, it would be valuable to consolidate it permanently and to provide it with acceptance and assurances by nuclear States ....
>
> It is primarily the task of the Nordic countries themselves to strengthen the non-nuclear status of the region. But cooperation by nuclear weapon states is also required....
>
> President Kekkonen's idea of the nuclear weapon-free status of Nordic countries is deeply anchored in the Finnish security policy. We shall continue to work consistently for its

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[133] "Security and Stability in the Nordic Area," speech by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on June 1, 1983, in Mottola, ed., "Documentary," Problems and Prospects, p. 85.

realisation.[134]

The revival of the debate in the Nordic environment concerning the nuclear-free zone idea is attributable to a number of factors. In Norway, where the debate began, it was prompted by a decision of the Storting (Parliament) to allow the U.S. to pre-stock in Norway heavy equipment, ammunition, fuel, infrastructure to receive and supplement NATO forces; and installations for command, control, and intelligence (C^3I) purposes under the allied guarantee plan for Nordic security.[135] This decision as such was not the real catalyst behind the Nordic nuclear-free zone debate; rather, it was the meaning of this decision when viewed against the background of Norway's role as NATO's most northern frontline state and the existing security system in the region, that is to say the "Nordic balance." Thus, the new proposals were connected to the Kekkonen plan in that they reflected

> an awareness of changes in the bipolar environment as a result of technological development in both strategic and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons, combined with a threat to both regional and international security, the discontinuation of detente and heightened tension between the superpowers.[136]

Several factors, which may be viewed as links in the bipolar balance, thus combined to create a sense that the Nordic environment was becoming increasingly tense. Some of the more central changes in the East-West

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[134] "Statement by the President of the Republic of Finland, Dr. Mauno Koivisto [sic] on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Plan for a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, given on May 28, 1983," Ibid., p. 82.

[135] Holst, 'The "Nordic Balance" and the Northern Flank,' prepared for a Conference on "Europe's Northern Flank," organised by Deutsches Marine Institute, Bonn, 24-25 November 1983, NUPI/Notat, No. 287(B):pp. 2-3.

[136] Lindberg, "Towards," p.36.

security environment which impinged upon Nordic security concerns were the continuing build-up of Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula, the heavy deployment of Soviet conventional forces in Northern Europe, the stationing of electronic surveillance equipment in Iceland and the decision by Norway to store NATO equipment on its soil. Furthermore, NATO had embarked on plans to modernise theatre nuclear forces in Europe by deploying the cruise missile in several allied nations. The Nordic states were increasingly worried that the introduction of the cruise missile would make it more likely that their airspace would be violated, since cruise missiles are by their very nature difficult to detect during overflights.

Apart from purely military and strategic developments, there were political causes as well: the Soviet Union decided to intervene in Afghanistan on the last day of 1979. This action elicited a sharp protest from Washington and prompted Norway to increase its defence preparedness. At the same time the United States, under the new Reagan administration, began a rearmament programme which included the manufacture of the neutron bomb. Finally, the U.S. unveiled its new "counterforce" doctrine which to many seemed to make the prospects of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union more attractive. It also created fear amongst the Finnish disarmament community; it warned of the danger that a limited nuclear war in Northern Europe, inspired by this new doctrine, might bring.[137]

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[137] Ibid., p. 35. The "counterforce" doctrine refers to a nuclear attack directed against military targets.

The growing tension which resulted from these developments in turn exacerbated the military and political rivalry between the USA and the USSR on a global scale. One area in which this rivalry became acutely manifested was Northern Europe, especially in the Barents Sea and neighbouring Arctic waters. In terms of both nuclear and conventional postures, the northern Seas became central to the strategic doctrines of both superpowers.[138] Rival interests in the area has meant that Nordic Europe has become not simply an European flank, but one that plays an integral role in the strategic developments in the northern region as a whole. Technological factors having to do with the build-up of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles (SSBN's), coupled with the area's geographical location, have placed Nordic Europe at the "intersection of opposing strategic nuclear forces."[139]

The massive Soviet strategic build-up on the Kola Peninsula has posed real security problems for NATO.[140] Many commentators inside and outside NATO contend that the military balance in the North has shifted in favour of the USSR as a result. If this is the case, then it suggests that Norwegian territory might no longer be easily reached by NATO

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[138] For a good analysis of the importance of the northern seas in superpower strategic competition see S.Miller's "The Northern Seas in Soviet and U.S. Starategy," in Idem., Disengagement, pp. 117-37. See also C.Jacobsen's "The Barents and Arctic Seas in Power Calculations; Implications for Norway and the Countries," pp. 137-47 of the same volume.

[139] Sverre Lodgaard, "Nuclear Disengagement in Europe," in Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee, eds., Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, London: Taylor and Frances for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1983:p. 20.

[140] For a cryptic analysis of strategic developments in the Northern region see Marian Leighton, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan," Survey, Vol. 27, No. 118/119, Winter 1983:pp. 111-51.

forces, which have as found themselves increasingly hardpressed to counter the Soviet strategic challenge in the northern seas. The basis of Norwegian security policy, that is, the expectation that NATO forces will come to Norway's defence if attacked or threatened with attack, thus seems to have become tenuous[141]

On another level, economic issues affected the security outlook of the Nordic region in the early part of the present decade. Chief among them were the friction which developed between the USSR and Norway over fishing rights in the Northern seas, that is, on the continental shelf.[142] The other was the start of test drilling for oil by Oslo beyond the 62nd. parallel. This activity was perceived to pose a threat to the status quo in times of crisis or war, since oil could conceivably appear to Moscow as a strategic and economic necessity for the Western Allies, particularly if the flow of Middle East oil was cut-off. Lastly, there was the marked decline in the growth rate of the Swedish economy which precipitated a decision by Stockholm to reduce its defence expenditures. This brought inevitable changes in Sweden's defence posture.[143] Some commentators believe this could threaten the so-called Nordic balance, create a strategic vacuum in Sweden and damage the latter's ability to defend its airspace, territory and the Baltic area.[144]

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[141] Lindberg, "Towards," p. 35.

[142] The Murmansk fishing fleet is the largest maintained by the Soviet Union.

[143] Sweden has abandoned its state-of-the-art naval and air offence systems in favour of cheaper defence systems.

[144] Steven L. Canby is just one of a number of analysts who think that this process has already taken place. See his "Swedish Defence,"

The above changes, coupled with the concomitant elevation of the status of the area in the global strategy of the superpowers, mean that the regional states (Norway and Finland especially) may be forced by circumstances to take a much more definitive stance on East-West security issues. Were this to take place, it could lead to the dissolution of the stable Nordic security pattern that has evolved since the end of the Second World War.

It was against this strategic, political and economic setting that Ambassador Jens Evensen, a former Norwegian cabinet minister and high official of the the Norwegian Foreign Office, outlined his proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. This was done through an address which he gave to the Chemical Workers' Union in October 1980. Evensen drew attention to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles in Europe and to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as "serious psychological blunders." He referred to the theatre modernisation programme by NATO, involving the deployment in Europe of Cruise and Pershing II missiles, as being "shocking" and "psychologically ill-timed".[145] Evensen also made reference to the Final Act of the Tenth Special Session of the U.N., the first devoted entirely to disarmament issues, in particular to Article 62 which read:

Survival, May-June 1981:pp. 116-23.

[145] Jens Evensen, "The Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Proposal on a Treaty Text," in Lodgaard & Thee, eds., Disengagement, pp. 167-79. The NATO decision of 12 December 1979 was to follow a "Dual-Track" policy, viz., the deployment of 964 land-based cruise missiles and 104 Pershing II missiles in Europe in 1983, and the simultaneous pursuit of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

> The process of establishing such zones [NWFZ] in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The states participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreement or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.[146]

Evensen called for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone via the treaty-writing method. He said that the NWFZ should rest on four basic pillars. First, the Nordic states should enter into a legal obligation not to produce, deploy or allow third parties to place nuclear weapons on their territories. He suggested that this obligation be upheld in both peacetime and wartime. Second, the nuclear powers would make firm promises not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the NWFZ.[147] Third, an international control system should be set up to monitor compliance with the nuclear-free zone treaty. Fourth, the zone would be organised in such a manner as to encourage a dialogue on disarmament issues by all the parties concerned, with the objective of reducing tension and preserving peace.

Although Evensen referred to Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in his draft treaty as the likely initiators of the nuclear-free zone, the proposition was in fact aimed at both Eastern and Western Europe, whether neutrals or members of alliances. It was his view that the nuclear weapon powers should be included as direct participants in the

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[146] Ibid., p. 171.

[147] Evensen noted (Ibid., p. 172) that the nuclear weapon states had already made such a promise under Articles 59 & 62 of the 1978 Helsinki Final Act. He said also that they had signed Protocol 2 of the Tlatelolco Treaty, but that these guarantees "contained deplorable reservations...."

negotiations and organisations which would establish a nuclear-free zone.[148]

There has been a fair amount of discussion about the proposal introduced by Ambassador Evensen some four years ago. Peace groups have come on side; as have members of the Nordic opposition and various leaders of thought who have tended to see the proposition as particularly Nordic in perspective.[149] Many emphasise that, if implemented in the Nordic region, the plan would have a positive effect on arms control in Europe.[150]

On the other side have been those who support a continuation of the existing security pattern in Nordic Europe, one that has been given expression in the term "Nordic Balance." This is supposed to describe the balance of power between the Great Power blocs (the bi-polar balance) vis-a-vis Northern Europe; and the interplay between the various models of security policy in Fenno-Scandinavia (the Nordic Balance).[151] Supporters of the status quo have mostly come from the

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[148] The Tlatelolco process was carried out without direct participation by any of the Great Powers. It was only later that they were asked to sign the two Protocols and thus became formally associated with it. Evensen's proposal would, it seems, involve the Great Powers to be involved at a much earlier stage.

[149] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 32.

[150] See, for example, Erik Alfsen's "A Plea for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the North," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 12, No. 3:pp. 239-42.

[151] For an outline of the theory of the Nordic Balance see A.O. Brundtland,"The Nordic Balance - Past and Present," Remarks before the Swiss Institute of International Affairs at Zurich University, Meeting of 24 November 1981, NUPI/Notat, No. 229, December 1981. For a convincing refutation of Brundtland's theoretical model, see Erik Noreen's, "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1983:pp.

centre right parties of Denmark and Norway as well as from the more conservative wings of the Labour and Social Democratic parties. These spokesmen have argued forcibly for a continuation of "the careful mixture of insurance and re-assurance in favour of the latter".[152]

A third group has been working for a synthesis of the above two main strands of opinion. It has proposed a Nordic NWFZ locked intimately into the wider European security fabric; and would like the Scandinavian partners in NATO to consult with the allies before entering into a nuclear-free zone arrangement. This middle view has been articulated mainly by the leadership of the Labour and Social Democratic parties in Scandinavia.[153]

In a series of newspaper articles published in the Swedish press during 1980-81, Swedish Ambassador Alva Myrdal proposed a moderate plan for a NWFZ in the Nordic area. She propounded that such a zone be comprised of Finland and Sweden in the first instance, since both were neutral and/or non-aligned powers, both had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and neither one was a nuclear threshold power. It was Ambassador Myrdal's view that these factors removed the difficulties that a Nordic NWFZ arrangement would pose if Norway and Denmark (NATO aliies) were to be included.

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[152] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p.32.

[153] See J.J. Holst's, "The Challenge from Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1981:pp. 239-45.

Myrdal unequivocally ruled out the inclusion of Soviet territory in the NWFS, but said that it was her hope that if the nuclear-free zone did materialise, it would spread to other unnamed parts of Europe. Finally, Myrdal spelled out the necessity of Finland and Sweden gaining adequate security assurances from the the Great Powers.

The Myrdal proposal was made at a time when the USSR had just intervened in Afghanistan and when President Carter decided to withdraw the SALT II agreement which his administration had submitted to the U.S. Senate on June 22, 1979, for its advice and consent to ratify. The proposition was also voiced at a time when the debate concerning the NATO decision to deploy INF forces in several Allied states was at its peak.

As is evident, Ambassador Myrdal's initiative was very limited in scope; and was apparently aimed at overcoming U.S. and other Western Allies' resistance to the whole idea of a Nordic NWFZ. It is commonly believed that the U.S. and other Allied states hold that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would upset the bi-polar balance and give the Soviet Union a decided advantage in an area of the world (Northern Europe) which is central to NATO doctrine and U.S. global commitments. Needless to say, then, Myrdal's proposition was given little attention in Scandinavia or the Allied capitals. Many commentators came to the inevitable conclusion that a NWFZ involving only Finland and Sweden would be meaningless in terms of building confidence in that part of the world and in raising the nuclear threshold - objectives which appear to be at the forefront of the rationale for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. As Leitenberg has asserted:

> A restricted nuclear weapon-free zone in an area surrounded on all sides by nuclear weapons meant quite a different thing than a nuclear weapon-free zone on an entire continent, such as America.[154]

The Myrdal plan was partial in scope, presumably because it was seen as the only option available at the time. However, precisely because it was only partially conceived, it was open to the criticism which normally accompanies such peripheral propositions for arms control in Europe, namely, that they are myopic and ignore the wider aspects which would entail placing limits on nuclear weapons on the continent at large.[155] In the final analysis, the Myrdal plan received little support, and is therefore unlikely to re-surface on the Nordic security agenda for some time.

The most recent proposal for a Nordic NWFS was put forward by Olof Palme, late Prime Minister of Sweden, in an address to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on June 1, 1983. Palme proposed an arrangement which would prohibit nuclear weapons from the Nordic area in both peacetime and wartime. He also called for a "thinning-out" zone in the vicinity of Nordic Europe, which would include a nuclear-free Baltic Sea. The latter would come about by removing land-based and sea-based nuclear weapons, suitable for employment against the Nordic region, from the vicinity of the littoral states. Palme held that under a nuclear-free regime such instruments would be superflous. Next, Palme suggested that the negotiations to establish the NWFZ should proceed in

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[154] Milton Leitenberg, "The Stranded USSR Submarine in Sweden, and the Question of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1981:p. 21.

[155] See Holst's letter.

tandem with those concerning theatre nuclear forces in Europe, especially battlefield nuclear weapons. The fourth suggestion was that it would be absolutely essential that the Nordic states obtain negative assurances from the nuclear weapon powers. Fifthly, Palme proposed that the zone be comprised of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden with Iceland being invited to participate.[156]

Insofar as objectives are concerned, Palme stated that his NWFZ model would help reduce the role of nuclear weapons in Europe. He said moreover that the negative commitments obtained fron the nuclear powers and the reduction of nuclear weapons in the vicinity of the Nordic area would contribute to lessening tensions between East and West. Lastly, he asserted that "a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area can thereby promote detente and strengthen the security of the Nordic area and of Europe".[157]

Although the Prime Minister felt that work on the Nordic NWFZ would benefit from talks on limiting nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe, he nevertheless held to the belief that such work should not await or be made dependent on arms control talks in the broader European context. Palme stressed the need for cooperation amongst the Nordic states, on the understanding that each reserved the right "to make its own decisions concerning the policy which best served its national interests".[158] Finally, Palme pointed to what he described as the

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[156] "Speech by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on June 1, 1983," (Documentary), in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 85.

[157] Ibid., p. 85.

[158] Ibid.

"deterioration of East-West relations in Europe" and suggested that the Nordic states were compelled to contribute to the formation of an arms control regime in Northern Europe. He felt that this would serve to bolster confidence and alter the political climate of hostility and mistrust between the superpowers.

Prime Minister Palme's address to the Finnish Institute of International Affairs was given at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were embarked on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) on limiting strategic nuclear arsenals, as well as the INF negotiations. The latter, the third round of talks which began in November 1981, were designed to limit intermediate range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. The debate in the arms control community in 1983 concerned the Soviet Union's decision to deploy new Backfire bombers and SS-20 missiles. Together, these weapons would enable the USSR to hit targets in Western Europe and parts of Asia from its territory, utilising sophisticated multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). SS-20's, in particular, pose major strategic problems due to their mobility. It was this concern that led to the NATO decision to deploy a new generation of US ground-launched Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, while simultaneously agreeing to negotiate with Moscow on limiting those very weapon systems. This strategy became known as the 1983 "Dual-Track" decision, and was designed to counteract the perceivwed military imbalance in Europe which the SS-20's were supposed to create.[159]

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[159] See the well researched and balanced presentation by Jed. C. Snyder titled, "European Security, East-West Policy, and the INF Debate," Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 1984:pp. 913-70.

Palme's proposal was also set against the background of the CSCE Review Conference underway in Madrid. Interestingly, the Conference was also expressing concern over the "new round" of arms competition which some felt the latest security moves by the superpowers would entail. In the Nordic region itself, a debate was going on about the INF decision. It centred on the future of U.S. security policy with respect to the likelihood of Northern Europe becoming the locus of a future American-Soviet confrontation.

To complicate matters, a controversy errupted between the conservative governments and their respective oppositions in Denmark and Norway. The row concerned three items: the seeming contradiction in NATO strategy of preparing to deploy new INF forces while at the same time preparing to negotiate; the wisdom of merging the talks on INF and strategic forces; and whether or not NATO should bend to Soviet demands to rescind the plans for deploying new Cruise and Pershing missiles before negotiations could resume. The governing coalition in Oslo for one, favoured a mutual moratorium on deployment, contingent upon progress being made in the arms negotiations, while the Labour Party opposition came down in favour of a moratorium as a form of confidence-building measure to spur on the negotiations.[160]

The decisions of the superpowers to deploy new generations of nuclear weapons in Europe brought with it deep reservations among Nordic statesmen about the utility of a NWFZ. The Conservative coalition administrations in Denmark and Norway were not only profoundly sceptical about the proposal, but expressed uncertainty about the frame of

[160] See Holst's, "Norway and NATO," pp. 1-18.

reference of such a NWFZ and the method by which it might be accomplished.

Using as his starting point the October submarine affair and the subsequent Report of the Submarine Defence Commission set up to investigate the incident, Olof Palme issued a plea for states to respect

> --- the fundamental principles of international law,....the observation and preservation of which are vital to a peaceful development in the Nordic area and in Europe.[161]

He stated further that the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone should be conditional upon the firm support of the superpowers and on progress in the INF negotiations on arms limitation in Europe. Palme's proposal was welcomed by the peace movement and the liberal wings of the Nordic opposition parties. However, insofar as the real policy makers in the Nordic arena were concerned, the proposal left a lot to be desired. The Palme proposition for a denuclearised Nordic Europe has thus produced little, if any, tangible results. Now that Olof Palme has died, it is possible that his proposal will be discarded because it is unlikely to be any more attractive to the United States and the Western allies than were the others before it.

This review of various Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone proposals should demonstrate that, with the possible exception of Iceland, such plans have become deeply embedded in the political and security landscape of Northern Europe. There are now a variety of conceptually different but overlapping propositions. However, they fall into two basic categories: there are those which are underpinned by the principle that keeping the existing security pattern of the Nordic region intact

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[161] Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, (Documentary), p. 44.

is the best possible option; while in the second category are those which aim at altering that pattern which Archer amply described as the "delicate balance between deterrence and reassurance".[162]

The Kekkonen proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone, introduced in 1963 and revised in 1972 and 1978, has been seen to have caused some consternation amongst Scandinavian statesmen and opinion molders alike. However, the decision by the Soviet Union to deploy significant numbers of new SS-20 missiles in Europe, followed by the NATO dual-track decision of 1979 to deploy a new generation of medium range Eurostrategic missiles, managed to spark-off significant interest in Scandinavia about the NWFZ proposition of President Kekkonen. This in turn caused a great deal of concern in NATO circles. It was felt that any move in the direction of formalising the nuclear-free status in Northern Europe would only de-couple the Alliance partners in the Nordic region from overall NATO strategy, and give the Soviet Union military and political advantages over the West.

The conclusion that must be drawn from the foregoing analysis concerning the nuclear-free zone history of the Nordic area is that for a formal denuclearisation regime to materialise in Nordic Europe, it has to be compatible with the obligations imposed upon the NATO members of the region by virtue of their membership in the Western Alliance. This means as a consequence that a NWFZ can only come about as part of a broader European arms control process. The politics of the Nordic nuclear-free zone debates underline nevertheless the proposition that the Nordic balance is not a static concept, but a "continuous balancing

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[162] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 45.

act between different interests".[163]

President Kekkonen's NWFZ "plan" represented an integral part of the perceived role of Finland in the Nordic security pattern. If a nuclear-free zone is accomplished, it could well have adverse effects on the foundation upon which the balance rests. Concomitantly, it might also alter the requisites for a stable strategic balance between the superpowers in Northern Europe, thus confirming a part of the NATO fear.

The polite rejection of, or the cautious approach which Scandinavian states - particularly Norway and Denmark - have taken towards, the idea of a Nordic NWFZ are central aspects of the dynamic regional pattern mentioned above. While Finland's Nordic neighbours continue to put forward impossible criteria for the nuclear-free zone to come into being, Helsinki can, without undercutting the so-called Nordic balance or its own geostrategic situation, use the NWFZ plan along with other confidence-building measures in its relations with the Soviet Union. This would not only provide political benefits to Finland, but to the other Nordic states as well. As President Kekkonen has often been heard to say: a good relationship between Finland and the USSR is a crucial, positive asset to all states in the area.[164]

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[163] Nils Andren, "Changing Strategic Perspectives in Northern Europe," in Sundelius, ed., Foreign Policies, p. 90.

[164] Ibid.

4.4 APPLICATION OF THE PARADIGM CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO TO THE NORDIC REGION

In this the final section of the study, an attempt is made to test the applicability of the paradigm-induced principles, goals and rules found in the Treaty of Tlatelolco to the Nordic region. By examining the empirical evidence, one should be able to determine more fully the extent to which the Tlatelolco regime contains instructive signposts for those who wish to see the Nordic region formally declared a nuclear-free zone. The proceeding analysis will focus on the security characteristics of Nordic Europe vis-a-vis Latin America, and on the relevance of the latter structure in the context of the European security. It will also examine the stances the superpowers are likely to adopt towards any attempt to formalise the military situation in the Nordic area, given their particular vantage points and strategic interests.

The editorial of a special 1984 issue of the Journal of Peace Research stated that

> ---there seems to be a need for developing some kind of new paradigm(s). That is, a fundamentally new way of thinking (defence philosophy) about security at the level of human beings, local communities, nations and regions as well as in terms of the global system.[165]

This attitude may be said to inform Nordic thinking, both at the level of the policy makers and the informed citizenry, about the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and in the international system in general. There is a definite fear that a nuclear confrontation in Europe is possible unless concrete steps are taken soon to avert it. On the one hand, the Nordic public takes a nuclear weapon-free zone to be a means

[165] Jan Oberg, "Focus On: Three Minutes to a New Day?" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1984:p. 95.

of disengaging the Nordic area from nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in all their aspects. In other words, they want to have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. Evidence for this assertion comes from the fact that the Nordic nations are firmly committed to nuclear non-proliferation. All Nordic states have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and, in the case of Finland, the 1947 Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union prohibits it from possessing, constructing and testing atomic weapons.[166] Moreover, nuclear weapons cannot be stationed in Sweden and to some extent Finland because of their policy of non-alignment and/or neutrality. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are integrated into the military strategy of NATO, but each has made it a permanent aspect of its security policy not to permit stationing of nuclear weapons during peacetime. Even though this stipulation is reviewable in times of crisis or war, the three states have each reserved the right to have nuclear weapons used to defend them.

It should also be remembered that President Kekkonen's call for a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region was based partly on the hope that this would remove the Nordic area from the dynamics of nuclear weapons and from international tensions associated with nuclear weapons. Kekkonen also made note at the time that none of the Nordic states had nuclear weapons or had any intention of acquiring them.

The debate concerning a Nordic nuclear-free zone in the 1980's emphasised the potential danger to the Nordic region of nuclear weapons, and although no consensus was reached on certain crucial issues such as

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[166] See Raimo Vayrynen's "Stability and Change in Finnish Foreign Policy," Research Reports, Series A, Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science, 1982:pp. 69-70.

the precise elements of such a zone, there was general agreement on the desirability of keeping nuclear weapons out of Nordic Europe. Thus, one can safely conclude that the Nordic states are acutely aware of the implications for their wellbeing of nuclear weapons. Like most Latin Americans, the Nordic peoples are convinced that the use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the principles of international law and catastrophic to human welfare.

In the Evensen draft treaty, for example, an attempt was made to tie a Nordic nuclear-free zone very closely to the U.N. Charter, and to relate it to U.N. endeavours in the disarmament field. The draft also attempted to draw attention to the destructive capability of nuclear weapons, and to declare the obvious, viz., that the use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against society in general. The Preamble of Evensen's "Draft Treaty" reads:

> Convinced that the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons makes it imperative to establish a total ban against nuclear weapons and effective and strict observation of the legal prohibition of war if the survival of mankind and our civilisation is to be assured.[167]

Apart from the normative statements emanating from Helsinki and expressed in similar language, none of the other Nordic governments has actually made such emotional statements concerning its attitude to nuclear weapons. However, none has decried the sentiments found in the Evensen proposal either. This leads one to surmise that they are shared by most Nordic statesmen and the public alike.

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[167] "Draft Treaty on the Establishment of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," in Lodgaard and Thee, eds., Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, London: Taylor and Francis for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1983:p. 180.

The other side of the matter has to do with the fact that three of the Nordic states belong to a security alliance and one has a treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. Both agreements may one day lead to involvement in nuclear weapons planning and strategy. Thus, it cannot be said that Nordic decision-makers reject nuclear weapons completely. From time to time grave reservations surface about the possible cataclysmic impact nuclear weapons could have on the Nordic region and Europe in general. At the same time, it is recognised that some Nordic states may be called upon to take part in a nuclear war in the future. This is particularly true in the case of the states belonging to NATO: membership in the Alliance means, unilateral constraints aside, that there exists "an ultimare resort to draw upon the 'nuclear umbrella'.[168]

In view of the situation outlined above, it is logical to conclude that the proscriptions against nuclear weapons expressed in the Tlatelolco paradigm do not fully conform to the present and future circumstances of the Nordic region. If the qualifications attached to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the Nordic region were removed, then the first paradigm-induced principle of the Tlatelolco Treaty could more easily be applied to a future Nordic nuclear-free zone agrement.

Nordic nuclear diplomacy places a great deal of emphasis on the need to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe. In fact, this theme is implicit in the Kekkonen and other propositions for a nuclear-free Nordic area. Obviously, if nuclear weapons can be removed or their

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[168] Ulrich Albrecht, "The Proposals for a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone - A German Perspective," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, pp. 35-37.

deployment in a certain region avoided by some form of arms control measure, then the nuclear weapon states would be forced to place less emphasis on nuclear weapons in their military postures and plans for securing the area in question. There is general agreement, certainly in Nordic Europe, that in the NATO strategic planning for Europe too much stress is put on nuclear weapons.[169] Measures to raise the nuclear threshold are therefore in great demand. The debate which took place in Europe in the early 1980's over the idea of "no-first use" of nuclear weapons gives an indication of how deep the uneasiness is in Europe about some aspects of NATO doctrine.[170]

The peace movement in the Nordic countries is quite active and apparently effective in terms of the degree to which it influences security policy. The question now in Nordic Europe is not whether the "first-use" policy is justifiable or not, but whether the USA or NATO should deploy nuclear weapons in the Nordic states which have, afterall, rejected entirely the nuclear option. This is why the idea of a nuclear-free zone appears so attractive to so many of the Nordic peoples.

Nuclear deterrent may be seen by some Nordic statesmen as a short term expedient for maintaining peace in Europe, but, as Holst asserted, "the Nordic people don't want their sons to fight with nuclear weapons.[171] They take for granted the belief that nuclear weapons are

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[169] See Lodgaard and Thee, eds., Disengagement, p. 6.

[170] See the recent article by a group of academicians and former American statesmen in McGeorge Bundy, et al., "Back From the Brink," The Atlantic Monthly, August 1986:pp. 35-41.

[171] Holst, "The Pattern," pp. 12-13.

not for use. This accounts in part for the fact that all the Nordic members of the Western Alliance have rejected INF deployment on their territories as a security option. The decision to except nuclear weapons of any type was made in the late 1950's and 1960's and was accompanied by a good deal of controversy. In the 1980's, however, all party consensus has been reached in all three Nordic states in NATO. The ostensible objectives of this negative stance are to reduce the role and impact of nuclear weapons on the peacetime conduct of international affairs, to avoid the pressures for early resort to nuclear weapons in an emergency, and to contribute to a wider pattern of arms limitation and confidence-building in Europe.[172]

If the above observations are correct, then it is also accurate to assume that Nordic policy makers and citizens view regional arms control as playing an important part in minimising the status of nuclear weapons in resolving inter-state conflict. Further, insofar as regional arms control measures function as confidence-building tools, they also exercise a beneficial effect on the arms control process in Europe and elsewhere. This attitude stems from a belief in Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter which states that all members of the U.N. agree to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the integrity and political independence of other states." In this sense, therefore, Nordic views correspond with the principle found in the Tlatelolco Treaty, viz., that regional measures designed to curtail the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons are desirable, because they

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[172] J.J. Holst, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area: Conditions and Options - A Norwegian View," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1983:p. 229.

would in turn reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international interactions and encourage the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

This principle does not attain full convergence with the Nordic currents of thought on security issues however. None of the Nordic states, which is a NATO member, has protested against the Alliance's doctrine pertaining to nuclear weapons; nor has any expressed a desire to withdraw from the security insurance it receives by virtue of being a NATO partner. The danger is that, given the strategic importance of the Nordic region, the uncertainty associated with escalation and preemption might cause the Alliance to resort to early use of nuclear weapons in a crisis or war that started out conventionally. Expressed differently, the external implications of the Nordic pattern of security suggest that Nordic Europe will continue to be influenced by the "desposition of the forces of the major powers".[173] The Nordic area is linked closely to the wider security order in Europe, As such, Denmark, Norway and Iceland have to give cognizance to the possible tensions and contradictions which may come into play when they embark on changing their present security structures, particularly with respect to the nuclear-free zone issue. The critical question for Nordic NATO states is whether a NWFZ arrangement will involve the permanent exclusion of nuclear weapons (as most of the proposals seem to imply), and the degree to which this would be compatible with Alliance membership.[174]

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[173] Holst, "The Pattern," p. 13.

[174] Some analyst are of the opinion that a nuclear-free zone implies a permanent ban on nuclear weapons in both peacetime and wartime. This proscription would become an integral aspect of any legal instrument establishing the NWFZ. See Lodgaard's "Nuclear Disengagement," in Lodgaard & Thee, eds., Disengagement, p. 10.

Many feel that it is important that the decision and negotiations to establish a nuclear-free zone be undertaken freely by the states in the pertinent region. This is one of the foundation principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and is thought to be a necessary first step in the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone.

The unilateral approach has its merits, but some significant drawbacks as well. The basic argument is that to be effective a NWFZ has to be initiated by regional states, in this case the Nordic countries. There is little doubt about the desirability of actors in the international system freely arriving at agreements affecting the security of their region and their relationship to the politics of nuclear weapons. However, insofar as the Nordic area is concerned, this attitude cannot be premised on the claim that a separate arms control measure for the area would primarily serve to re-affirm the non-nuclear status of Nordic Europe. Several unilateral approaches to a Nordic nuclear-free zone have been suggested ranging from those which call for a multilateral treaty between the Nordic states but not specifying any relationship to a broader framework; to those which propose a Nordic NWFZ as part of an all-European denuclearised regime; and to those which simply call for an informal re-affirmation by Nordic states of their nuclear-free status without requiring any change in the existing security pattern.[175]

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[175] See Osmo Apunen's "Three 'Waves'", pp. 16-32; and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Countries: Nuclear Status and Policies," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 61.

On the other hand are the proposals which advance the "contextual" approach to a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Their proponents argue that broader measures are essential requisites for the success of a Nordic NWFZ. It should be noted that these proposals do not reflect the same perspective as the all-European approach described above; rather they conceive of

> ---a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone as part of a broader arrangement which involves the regulation and build-down of nuclear weapons in Europe, as distinguished from the constitution of a nuclear-weapon-free zone throughout Europe.[176]

This is the point of departure for a Nordic nuclear-free zone arrangement. Latin America is a continent; it was feasible and logical for the Latin American nuclear-free zone treaty to be decided solely by Latin American statesmen. This is not the case in Nordic Europe, which is one of several European sub-systems caught between competing alliances and superpower nuclear strategy.[177]

From the point of view of the Nordic members of the NATO Alliance, a major concern has to be to ensure that they do not become involved in isolated arrangements like those the unilateral approach embraces. Politically, doing so would cause their allies to express concern and doubts about their commitment to NATO. This is exactly why the security policies of Norway, Denmark and Iceland have been shaped within the context and implications of alliance membership. The United states,

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[176] J.J. Holst, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in Europe: An Option for the Future?" Transcript of a lecture delivered at the NATO Defence College during the information period of NATO Civil Dignitaries, Rome, 12 April 1983, NUPI/Notat, No. 269 (B), April 1983:p. 11; emphasis in the original.

[177] Ibid., p. 13.

Nordic NATO's chief security underwriter, would not support any measure which would in effect weaken the Northern aspect of NATO strategy and force planning. As one writer put it,

> An (sic) NWFZ in one part of Europe could start a chain reaction that would shake the very foundations of NATO's nuclear strategy. Should Norway and Denmark dissociate themselves from NATO on the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ, the Netherlands might do the same and Belgium might follow suite.[178]

In sum, it seems only logical and fitting that the Nordic states should be the ones to initiate talks leading to the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ, but the USA and the USSR would have to be brought into the picture at an early stage, even at the risk of according them a droite de regard over the security affairs of the Nordic states. This is inescapable, since it is the superpowers that ensure that the Nordic area enjoys the security and relative lack of tension which it does at present. The possibility of a Nordic nuclear-free zone would have to be realised ipso facto with the mutual agreement and input of the superpowers. To do otherwise would be to sound the death-knell of such an arms control measure from the outset.

At another level, a Nordic nuclear-free zone regime has to be built in tandem with security developments in the wider European setting. The Nordic region is an important aspect of the overall security balance in Europe (and indeed the world) in a way that Latin America is not. The Nordic nations have special "drawing rights" on the balance of power on the Continent.[179] As part of the European military logic, a Nordic NWFZ

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[178] See Lodgaard's "Nuclear Disengagement," p. 15.

[179] Ibid., p. 15.

cannot come into reality without deference to this logic. The nature of this dialectic means that both Washington and Moscow would be integrally involved as the primary guarantors of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, otherwise it would bear little fruit and may turn out to be detrimental to the stable security pattern which prevails in the area at present. The Latin American denuclearisation process did not carry similar connotations or pose the same complexities for its negotiators.

The third principle found in the Tlatelolco Treaty suggests that all states have a legitimate right to security of the state and its citizens. This means that insofar as the Treaty is concerned, Latin American adherents to the Tlatelolco framework may enter into alliances and other security systems to safeguard their vital interests. The important caveat is that such arrangements cannot violate the rules of the Treaty which proscribe nuclear weapons. The question then is to what extent these strictures could be accommodated in a Nordic nuclear-free zone arrangement?

As this study has shown, the Nordic states are united in their opposition to nuclear weapons. They are convinced that their restrictive policies vis-a-vis these weapons lend a great impetus to the cause of peace and security in Europe. However, three of the Nordic states subscribe to an alliance charter which operates under a doctrine called "flexible response," the implications are inescapable: NATO will consider the first use of nuclear arms in crisis or wartime. Clearly, if one begins from the premise that a nuclear-free zone denotes the permanent eschewing of nuclear weapons, then a Nordic nuclear-free zone would be inimical to the Western Alliance's strategy of flexible response and ultimately to the status of Norway, Denmark and Iceland in

that Alliance. Assuming that these three states opt for participation in a NWFZ which prohibits nuclear weapons under any circumstances, then

> In important respects, Norway, Denmark and Iceland would be decoupled from NATO's nuclear strategy, and their participation in NATO's military planning and organisation might have to be reconsidered in other respects as well.[180]

In other words, the political function that nuclear weapons perform in the NATO Alliance would be restricted significantly.

The above revelation is an important source of the opposition by the USA, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany to the idea of a Nordic NWFZ as variously conceived. To agree to any regime that would remove the Nordic states from participation in a crucial aspect of the Alliance would definitely be contrary to the NATO principle of non-singularity. It could also have a domino effect whereby other members of the Alliance, concerned about the present strategy of flexible response, may use the Nordic example to justify their own wish to withdraw from parts of the overall policy structure of NATO. Finally, the Kremlin may interpret NATO's willingness to bend to the demands of some of its less important actors as an indication of weakness. Such a reading could damage the Alliance's credibility in the eyes of the putative aggressor.

This deduction is not original, of course. Indeed Norwegian and Danish spokesmen have pointed to the political and military difficulties that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would raise in terms of their role in the Western Alliance on several occasions. It is, therefore, unlikely that Oslo and Copenhagen would be willing (or able) to limit further their participation in NATO because of the adverse political and

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[180] Lodgaard, Disengagement, p. 10.

psychological effects this could have on their continued participation in the Alliance.

President Kekkonen was not unaware of the political and military implications of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Consequently, he declared in 1963 that his proposal would not require any changes in the existing security pattern of the Nordic region. Other Nordic voices have recognised that in the nuclear age the purpose of a security system such as NATO is to protect its members against a possible nuclear attack. This goal is pursued not so much in war-fighting terms, but in terms of insuring an adequate deterrent. Engagement and disengagement may be aspects of a deterrent strategy, but they are not substitutes for it. It is against this backdrop that NATO decision-makers view the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. This leads one to infer that the plans for a Nordic nuclear-free zone cannot be separated from the political fact of military alliances into which the USA and the USSR have incorporated the majority of European countries. "From the standpoint of alliance politics, the inclusion of a member state in a nuclear-weapon-free zone would mean the divisibility of obligations.[181]

Thus, while the above Tlatelolco related principle appears relatively unproblematic in the case of Latin America, it acquires complex connotations when an attempt is made to apply it the Nordic area. The Nordic adherents of NATO are unlikely to be supported by their allies even if they were to agree to the formation of a nuclear-free zone on their own. This is because to do so would create a system of duality in

[181] Raimo Vayrynen, "Military Alliances, Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," in Kari Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 47.

NATO, and that would be politically unacceptable to the other allies. Furthermore, Norway's and Denmark's participation in a nuclear-free zone, under existing circumstances, would be read in NATO circles as disloyalty. Deterrence by nuclear weapons is in many ways a collective good. If one party benefits, then all will to some degree or other. To quote Vayrynen again,

> Basically nuclear deterrence is a mixture of collective and private goods, a joint product, in which security derived from nuclear deterrence may vary among the members of the alliance, yet it is impossible to assign fractional shares of the total benefit to individual members.[182]

In short, it is likely that Denmark and Norway would open themselves to the charge that they were pursuing a "free ride" policy with respect to the Alliance. In order therefore for Tlatelolco's third principle to have any relevance to the Nordic setting, it would have to be modified to account for the character of the alliance system, not only from the point of view of the three states belonging to NATO but from Finland's perspective as well. The Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship does hold out the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in Finnish territory to defend against an attack upon the Soviet Union by a third party. Insofar as Finland is concerned, the fundamental principle upon which it must base its participation in a Nordic NWFZ is that the zone should not undercut its security relations with the Soviet Union. For Norway, Denmark and Iceland, the primary consideration is ensuring that a Nordic nuclear-free zone is consistent with their membership in the NATO alliance. That is, it must not undermine the deterrent element in their

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[182] Ibid., p. 47. For further analysis of this theoretical argument see Jeffrey A. Hart's and Peter F. Cowhey's "Theories of Collective Goods Reexamined," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1977:pp. 351-62.

security policies.

The Tlatelolco Treaty was established on the basis that international organisations (such as the U.N.) have a valuable role to play in founding regimes for regional arms control and common security. The Nordic states have made outstanding contributions to the U.N. and associated bodies, especially in the areas of arms control, disarmament and peacekeeping; and they have been very active in the deliberations of the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament from its inception in 1962. The Nordic countries have also been hosts to several U.N. sponsored events related to issues of peace and security. Finland was instrumental in initiating a 1975 U.N. expert study on nuclear-free zones, and has sponsored a resolution for a further study of this subject in 1985-86.

Against this background, it would be natural to expect that the U.N. or any of its pertinent organs would play some kind of role in the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. Its involvement however would be of a general nature. Presumably the negotiators of the nuclear-free zone treaty would find the U.N. useful as a resource in drafting a multilateral arrangement. The U.N. could also offer expert advice on technical matters relating to control mechanisms, delimitation and transit provisions, guarantees, organisation, and other operational modalities. In other words, one envisions the role of the U.N. as explicitly confined to technical and legal parameters. Once a treaty or similar arrangement was decided on, it would benefit from the commendation of the General Assembly which, in any event, is the normal repository of such instruments. However, the U.N. could not be

involved, in political terms, in the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The Nordic area has to be conceptualised as essentially one element in the strategic balance between the superpowers. It is the United States and the Soviet Union which, by their willingness to respect, support and cooperate in the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ, will determine the success or demise of a future regime of this kind in Nordic Europe.

One must also remember that the post-war attempts by the U.N. to bring about collective security regimes all came to naught largely because that body was unable to get the superpowers to agree on key issues essential to the progress of those arrangements. The world body's efforts were further undermined by the fact that the measuress it had recommended could not be implemented unless they were guaranteed by the USA and the USSR. Moreover, the interdictions contained in the U.N. Charter, against the use of force except in self-defence, had binding effect partly because it was sometimes difficult to tell who was the aggressor or the provocateur, and because the Security Council seldom reached consensus on issues vital to the interest of either the Soviet Union or the United States. All this is by way of saying that the U.N. might be helpful in settling disputes which could precipitate war, in reducing the parameters of conflict, in discouraging military operations and in mobilising public opinion against the belligerents. However, the U.N. cannot be counted on to preclude armed conflict or to ensure the vital interests of states in a system that is still largely power-centric. In actuality, in security issues involving the superpowers, the U.N. has played and is likely to continue to play little, if any, substantive role. The question of a Nordic nuclear-free

zone is one issue in which the author sees the world body as having very little to contribute. In a theatre where superpower diplomacy and strategy are very active, there is not much room for the U.N. and its organs to manoeuvre.

It is probably more logical to expect that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would gain support from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Afterall, the thirty five nations which gathered in Helsinki in 1973 declared their intentions to "work for a Europe whose security is guaranteed by detente and disarmament....[183] A proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone might benefit symbolically from being discussed in the CSCE, where the view of the participants can be ascertained and their comments noted. This might facilitate a process leading to more comprehensive arms control measures for the rest of the Continent, and to a reduction in the number and role of nuclear weapons in the European security system. In the final analysis, however, no international institution or body can hope to play more that a moderate to symbolic role in the formalisation of the nuclear-free status of the Nordic area. This is primarily a matter for the Nordic states to decide in close consultation with the superpowers and the NATO Alliance.

The Tlatelolco Treaty is underpinned by the principle that regional arms control should rely on "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers." From the foregoing analysis, it should be clear that a Nordic nuclear-free zone cannot bear fruit without appropriate support and

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[183] "Speech by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on June 1, 1983," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, (Documentary), p. 83.

guarantees from the Great Powers. This is not the only crucial issue, however. As this study has shown, the issue of a Nordic nuclear-free zone matter is very complex. On the one hand, a system would have to be worked out which would ensure that the Nordic states maintain some freedom of action which would remove the probability of any foreign power commanding inordinate leverage over their security affairs.[184]

On the other hand, an arrangement under which the Nordic area is officially denuclearised cannot rest on positive security assurances, since this would pose serious questions for the policy of neutrality followed by Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, a chief consideration must be to avoid an agreement that would weaken the protection now enjoyed by those states which are affiliated with the Western Alliance. In short, a guarantee system for a Nordic NWFZ will have different political implications than one which is focused on a specific area like Latin America.[185]

As observed above, the three Nordic NATO states are protected under the nuclear "umbrella" of the United States. As members of the NATO Alliance, Norway, Denmark and Iceland would understandbly not wish to

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[184] It is for this reason that some analysts, like Holst, disagree with the suggestion that territory owned by the USSR should be included in a Nordic NWFZ, for fear of establishing a basis for a Soviet droit de regard with respect to Nordic security. See Holst's, "Conditions and Options," p. 9.

[185] In the Tlatelolco framework, the question of security guarantees was handled via a separate Protocol attached to the Treaty itself. Many are sceptical about the assurances given by the nucelar weapon states because these are subject to a variety of interpretations. See A. Rosas' "Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and NWFZ's," in Lodgaard & Thee, eds., Disengagement, pp. 221-25, for a legal analysis of the negative security concept. The Tlatelolco aspect is dealt with on pp. 222-23.

participate in an arms control arrangement that would weaken or cancel that assurance, which also performs a deterrent role in their respective security policies. In any case, it is difficult to conceive of a system whereby the Nordic states which belong to NATO could simultaneously opt out of the positive security aspect of the Alliance while remaining inside of it.[186] Since withdrawal from NATO is not a viable option for either Denmark, Norway, or Iceland, one must consider seriously the repercussions that could flow from their relinquishing the right to the positive security guarantee offered by the Alliance. As Lodgaard asserted,

> In important respects, Norway and Denmark [and Iceland] would be decoupled from NATO's nuclear strategy, and their participation in NATO's military organisation might have to be reconsidered.[187]

The delicate issue then becomes one of trying to arrive at a formula that would not undermine the positive element which flows from alignment, and at the same time formulating an approach along the lines of the negative assurances associated with the Tlatelolco Treaty. The aim would be to minimise the risk that the guaranteeing states would feel they had some special right to interfere in the internal policies of the Nordic nations. One cannot imagine that the latter would enter into a security treaty which would limit further their freedom to

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[186] For a thorough treatment of possible nuclear-free zone guarantee options from a legal-technical standpoint see Osmo Apunen's "The Problem of the Guarantee of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," in Mottola, ed., Nordic Security, condensed English edition of Ulkopolitiikka, pp. 13-27.

[187] Sverre Lodgaard and Per Berg, "Nordic Initiatives for a Nuclear-Free Zone in Europe," in SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1982, London: Taylor and Francis for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1982:p. 78.

manoeuvre between the superpowers and which might upset the Nordic balance.

Yet another dimension of this issue of guarantees for a Nordic nuclear free zone has to do with determining whether to have a Tlatelolco type system or one similar to that associated with the NPT. Here it is necessary to examine the interface between a Nordic NWFZ and the wider European setting. A general negative security pledge, tied to a broader pattern of arms control in Europe, would perhaps be more meaningful and acceptable to the Nordic states from the standpoint of their independence, ability to manoeuvre, existing alliance relationships and neutrality.

One of the assumptions underpinned by the concept of nuclear-free zones is that the nuclear threat against the area in question would be reduced. On this basis, it is argued that negative security assurances should include an obligation on the part of nuclear states to remove nuclear weapons deployed near the proposed zone which are capabale of posing a direct threat to the states in the area. This implies a functional link between a Nordic NWFZ and collateral measures to be undertaken by the Soviet Union. The USSR has a significant number of nuclear forces stationed in the vicinity of Nordic Europe which, because of their range and characteristics, could be used against the Nordic states. Norway and Denmark (and on occasion Sweden) have insisted that the removal of the relevant nuclear weapons stationed on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic Republics is a <u>conditio sine qua non</u> for their participation in a nuclear-free zone arrangement. It is not certain if they mean that the Kola and Baltic regions should become part

of a Nordic NWFZ, or if a separate arms control regime to cover these areas is envisioned as a collateral measure.[188]

The political implications of insisting on some form of collateral action from the Soviet Union, clear to many analysts, do not seem to have revealed themselves to some members of the coalition governments in Norway and Sweden. Evidently, if the Soviet Union decided to relent and remove its tactical nuclear forces from the vicinity of Nordic Europe, it may also conclude that it has special "drawing rights" over matters of security in the Nordic region. Moscow may even go as far as using whichever collateral measures it instituted as "bargaining chips" in negotiations with the United States and with the Nordic states themselves. This could lead to tension, and to the introduction of new uncertainties regarding the future behaviour of the Soviet Union with respect to the Nordic region. Put differently, the Nordic states might find themselves the unwitting hostages of nuclear intimidation by their powerful neighbour. The Kremlin might, for example, threaten to redeploy its tactical nuclear forces in close proximity to the Nordic states if it felt Scandanavia was not cooperating in certain issue areas. It may even argue that such weapons are not intended for use against Nordic countries but are part of the strategic balance between it and the USA. Either alternative could leave the Nordic area with less security than it had before the introduction of a formal nuclear-free zone agreement.

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[188] A "collateral measure" means agreements intended to affect the quantity, location and structure of (nuclear) weapons in a certain area. Such measures are often loosely tied to a more central arms control treaty or regime. For further elucidation see Apunen, "The Problem of the Guarantee," in Mottola, ed., Nordic Security, condensed English edition of Ulkopolitiikka, p. 19.

In summary, there is no question that the responsibility for regional arms control regimes must be borne equally by those which are asked to give up the nuclear option and those which ask that they do so. In the abstract, this principle of the Tlatelolco Treaty is applicable to the Nordic region. Yet, several problems arise when considering how to operationalise the principle in Nordic Europe. The foregoing again points to the desirability of having a guarantee from the nuclear weapon states that is framed within a broader European context. In this way, one avoids the problems which arise in treating the Nordic area as a discrete sub-system.

The Tlatelolco framework is unequivocal in suggesting that a denuclearisation regime necessitates the creation of a credible system of verification. Any arms control measure must be verifiable. This means that the parties involved must find an adequate, mutually satisfactory mechanism to achieve this goal, otherwise arms control can generate more uncertainties and fears than it solves. Having said that, the question insofar as a Nordic NWFZ is concerned is not so much the technicalities of a verification scheme, but the political implications of whatever system is chosen.

In the Nordic area, the primary concern would be "to control the dispositions of the major powers".[189] It is relatively easy to check that states are not acquiring, producing, testing, deploying or stockpiling nuclear weapons, particularly as these prescripts are covered under the comprehensive agreements that the Nordic states have

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[189] J.J. Holst, "The Challenge from Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1981:p. 241.

with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, one cannot envision these activities going unnoticed in open societies like the Nordic states. It is the various other proscriptions and provisions normally associated with nuclear-free zones that pose some acute problems in the Nordic context.[190] Supporters of the Nordic nuclear-free zone suggest that satellites and other technical means of surveillance might be used to verify a Nordic nuclear-free zone. They add that the organisation responsible for managing the NWFZ would work in conjunction with the nuclear weapon states on this matter.[191]

Once again, it is not clear if the proponents of a Nordic NWFZ have considered the implications of this procedure or even if Nordic governments would be prepared to accede to them. In the first instance, the result would be that the superpowers, the chief guarantors of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, would have an especial role to play in the security policies of each Nordic state over and above the role they play now. In the second case, the Nordic states would be reluctant to accept any arrangement for verification which would create the very situation they have insisted on avoiding for so long: the unwarranted interference of the Great Powers in their affairs. Furthermore, if a Nordic NWFZ agreement were to adopt a verification system that was reliant on the Soviet Union for its verification, then undoubtedly the Kremlin would welcome it, since this would provide it with a splendid

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[190] For a theoretical discussion of the operational elements of a draft Nordic NWFZ treaty, see Holst's "Conditions and Options," p. 232; and "Draft Treaty," in Lodgaard and Thee, eds., Disengagement, pp. 167-89.

[191] Norwegian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Countries: A Preliminary Study," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1982:p. 193, and "Draft Treaty."

"window of opportunity" to influence more directly the texture of Nordic security.

Other political consequences are predictable as well: it is possible that the Soviet Union may wish to verify for itself, rather than take the words of Norway and Denmark, that naval ships and submarines owned by the United States do not have nuclear weapons on board when they visit Nordic ports. The USA is unlikely to acquiesce to such a demand unless the Soviet Union were willing to reciprocate. Moreover, to do so would be to contradict Washington's own longstanding policy of neither confirming or denying that its warships carry nuclear weapons. To make an exception (or what would amount to one) in the Nordic context would lead only to calls upon the USA from other nations like New Zealand and possibly Iceland, to make similar declarations before its military vessels can enter their ports.[192] Based on past experience, one cannot conceive of the Soviet Union allowing U.S. (or IAEA) inspectors to examine its submarines passing through the Baltic exits.[193] The above discussion suggests that although there must be appropriate arrangements for verifying a Nordic NWFZ agreement, those measures must take careful note of the distinctive political factors which are at work in the Nordic region. In addition, consideration must be given to the question of what steps the guaranteeing powers are willing and are agreeable to

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[192] On Monday, August 12, 1984 the U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz, was reported to have said that the ANZUS Pact no longer sheltered New Zealand. The latter's expulsion from the Pact was due apparently to its insistence that the USA declares whether or not its vessels have nuclear weapons on board when entering New Zealand ports. Source: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "World Report," 12 August 1986.

[193] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 53.

accept. One thing is clear, however, and that is that the Tlatelolco Treaty guarantee system cannot be easily transferred to the Nordic context.

The goals of the Tlatelolco Treaty regime have been determined as those of enhancing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reinforcing the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons, and contributing to international security by reducing the role that nuclear weapons play in the security policies of states. In addition to these implicit goals, the ostensible aim of the Tlatelolco process is to remove permanently nuclear weapons from Latin America by trying to convince regional states that it is in their long-term interests to abjure the nuclear option, and to refrain from any involvement in the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in any form. The second explicit goal of the Treaty is to disengage Latin America from the nuclear weapons strategy of the Great Powers.

The above aims are a tall order for a budding regime which has to rely on the goodwill of its adherents not simply for its long-term efficacy, but also for its ability to restrain the nuclear ambitions of zone states in an environment that is essentially state-centric. To what extent can these paradigm-induced goals serve as a pattern for a Nordic NWFZ? One has to begin from the premise that a NWFZ is designed to satisfy both political and military objectives; it is not an end in itself.[194] There is a clear symmetry between the objectives that the Tlatelolco Treaty serves and those that a Nordic nuclear-free zone

[194] Lodgaard, "Nuclear Disengagement," p. 38.

agreement might serve. There are also marked dissymmetries. The convergence lies in the area of bolstering the Non-Proliferation regime. Insofar as the Nordic area is concerned a NWFZ would add, albeit only marginally, to the existing constraints on nuclear weapons that the Nordic states have voluntarily accepted under the NPT. There is no Nordic state which has nuclear intentions as perhaps Brazil or Argentina does; and all of them have applied comprehensive IAEA safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. Nevertheless, a Nordic NWFZ would re-affirm the obligations that the Nordic states have entered into under the NPT and thus be of more than symbolic importance. A further dimension lies in the fact that the obligations that are assumed under a NWFZ arrangement, in theory go beyond NPT obligations insofar as the prescripts against deployment and stationing of nuclear arms are concerned.

A Nordic nuclear-free zone is often defended on the grounds that it would help to reduce the impact of nuclear weapons on the political process in Europe and raise the nuclear threshold.[195] A nuclear-free zone in Nordic Europe would have the effect of lessening the impact of nuclear weapons on the peacetime relations, not so much of the Nordic states themselves, but of the other European bloc states. Proponents of a Nordic NWFZ suggest that negating nuclear weapons in the Nordic region will have a positive emulatory impact in other parts of Europe, such as in the Baltic and the Benelux states. Consistent with the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2, this domino outcome, if it materialises, might make European politics and security less dependent on the nuclear

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[195] Holst, ""Option for the Future?" p. 9.

element of defence policies.

In the second instance, a Nordic NWFZ would tend to raise the nuclear threshold in the sensitive Northern region of Europe, by establishing principles and norms of constraint as well as rules of prescription and proscription. The eventual product, a regime, would function as a force in lowering the possibility that states will be tempted to cross the conventional barrier in the event of a war. To quote Lodgaard,

> The disengagement zone represents a hardware approach to raising the nuclear threshold. If nuclear...weapons were removed from specified areas, military doctrines would obviously have to place less emphasis on early use of nuclear weapons.[196]

There is the view that a nuclear-free Nordic region would have a beneficial influence on international security as a result of its confidence-building function. Since the highest concentration of nuclear arms on the planet can be found in Europe, it goes without saying that security in Europe is essential to international stability. As Holst explained, Europe is a region

> ---where the two Alliances are in immediate geographical contact, where the [nuclear] forces arrayed on both sides are considerable, and hence where the pressures for early use of nuclear weapons might also be of an explosive nature, particularly in view of the current structure of some of the deployments.[197]

In view of the fact that the two central wars of this century began and were fought mainly in the European theatre, it is vital that stability and confidence-building be maintained on that Continent. Many believe that the first objective has been served so far by the nuclear

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[196] Lodgaard, "Nuclear Disengagement," p. 7.

[197] Holst, "Option for the Future," p.9.

doctrine of deterrence. On the other hand, confidence-building measures such as nuclear-free zones may help to alleviate strategic uncertainty which can cause the outbreak of conflict. As Adam Rotfeld suggested,

> the object of [confidence-building measures] is to alter perspectives and ensure the perception of partners aims in a more or less correct rather than imaginary light. They are primarily, therefore, measures of a political and psychological nature, although they relate to military activity.[198]

If a Nordic NWFZ could be constructed so as to fulfil these criteria, then perhaps it could have a stabilising effect on the European and international security environments. In terms of the latter arena, a Nordic NWFZ would accomplish more than the Latin American denuclearised regime has and can produce.

The Tlatelolco regime in theory contributes to ameliorating or slowing down vertical proliferation, because its operational procedures prevent the nuclear weapons states from deploying or stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty. A Nordic NWFZ would also accomplish this goal in respect to those states which belong to the NATO Alliance. The extent to which wartime constraints on deployment and stationing would apply will depend on the operational parameters in which a Nordic NWFZ is construed. If one takes the strict position that a NWFZ is a permanent arms control device, then a nuclear-free zone would presumably affect vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons; but, if the more flexible perspective is adopted, it may not.

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[198] "European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims," in Karl Birnbaum, ed., Confidence Building in East-West Relations, Laxenberg, Austria: Austrian Institute of International Affairs, 1982:p. 107. Quoted in Macintosh's Confidence Building Measures, p. 16.

The difficulty with multilateral arms control measures that proscribe one or more categories of weapons under any circumstances is that the nuclear powers might refuse to respect the stricture, when and if their vital interests are at stake. This situation has been encountered in foregoing discussions which pertain to the Nordic environment. If the latter alternative approach is followed in Nordic Europe, it would effectively mean that Denmark, Norway and Iceland would be separated from the strategy of their Alliance in crucial respects. In other words, a Nordic NWFZ which puts a permanent ban on nuclear weapons in Scandanavia under all conditions would contradict that part of NATO's current defence plans which prescribes the use of such weapons in the Nordic region.[199] Some commentators on the Nordic NWFZ proposal recognise this problem, but then say that Norway and Denmark could work to change NATO strategy on nuclear weapons deployment in allied territory in a crisis or wartime. Such a development would require however a whole new strategy for the Alliance. This study has already explored the hazards involved in this line of thinking; suffice it to say that a Nordic nuclear-free zone conceptualised in terms of inducing drastic changes in the status quo in any part of Europe could create more anxieties and uncertainties than it solves. It could disturb the Nordic balance and drastically affect the security pattern on the Continent.

The same could not be said of the Latin American nuclear-free zone proposal when it was introduced in the early 1960's. One must recognise that no Latin American state, with the possible exception of Cuba and

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[199] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 49.

Belize, has a military compact with any nuclear weapon state or has entered into any security alliances outside of the relatively benign Organisation of American States (OAS). Thus, unlike Nordic Europe, the security pattern in Latin America does not carry the same meaning for the East-West military and strategic balance. The role of a Nordic nuclear-free zone in stemming vertical proliferation, therefore, must be measured against the foregoing observations.

An eventual Nordic nuclear-free zone, unlike its Latin American counterpart, might help to diffuse the pressures towards nuclear escalation and preemption.[200] This goal is closely related to, although analytically distinct from, the confidence-building role. A Nordic nuclear-free zone might function as a discrete framework through which the superpowers could gauge their military postures in Northern Europe. Put differently, it would serve as a kind of strategic warning system or indicator: each superpower might be satisfied that it need not include the Nordic area in its nuclear planning strategy, since no nuclear threat exists in, or could emanate from, the region. This assurance may in turn lower the propensity of either side to take pre-emptive action for fear that the Nordic area could be used as a launching pad for a nuclear attack against it. Inasmuch as a NWFZ in Nordic Europe suggests to some the removal of certain types of nuclear weapons from areas in proximity to the Nordic region, it could also serve to eliminate the uncertainties and the pre-emptive urge that is often associated with

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[200] Holst sees this more as a function of a denuclearisation regime or battle-field NWFZ in Central Europe. This author thinks it could also apply in the Nordic context, given the interconnection between the latter and the security contours in the rest of the Continent. See Holst's "Option for the Future," p.8.

nuclear weapons deployment. As Kalela and Vayrynen put it,

> Nuclear-weapon-free zones,...have both regional and global dimensions. They could be used to alleviate strategic confrontation between the Great Powers and to stabilise military and political circumstances in regional contexts.[201]

The establishment of a NWFZ in the Nordic region may provide an opportunity to the United States and the Soviet Union, the main guarantors of such a zone, to engage in further dialogue on the establishment of similar arms control regimes in other parts of Europe. This is assuming that the superpowers perceive that the Nordic arrangement has brought tangible benefits to the strategic environment of Europe and placed their competitive relationship on a more predictable footing. The prognosis is that a Nordic NWFZ could not of itself accomplish these results: it would have to be accompanied by unambiguous collateral measures to cover the large number of tactical and intermediate nuclear forces which the USSR has deployed in the Kola and Baltic regions. Indeed, collateral measures may be a sine qua non if the prospective Nordic nuclear-free zone is to play a meaningful role in allaying inadvertent nuclear confrontation in Europe.

The late Soviet General Secretary, Yuri Andropov, indicated in a speech made in 1983 that the Soviet Union was not averse to consider measures to facilitate a Nordic NWFZ:

> We would not only assume the commitment to respect the status of [a Nordic NWFZ] but also would be ready to study the question of some measures, and substantial ones at that, concerning our own territory adjoining the zone and which would enhance the consolidation of its nuclear-free status. The Soviet Union would also discuss with interested sides the

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[201] Jaakko Kalela and Raimo Vayrynen, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Past Experiences and New Perspectives," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 70.

question of giving the nuclear-free status to the Baltic sea.[202]

These pledges may well have been "meaningless gestures" from Moscow, and one can only evaluate their worth in abstract terms. If the Soviet Union meant what it said, then there is the possibility that a future Nordic nuclear-free zone might be the first step in a wider process of arms control and confidence-building in Europe. One of the strong possibilities, for example, is that a Nordic NWFZ could lead to other regional CBM's comprising the inner sea-lanes of Europe as well as the waters adjacent to the Continent. However, there are many details that would have to be worked out before this type of regime could materialise. The USA for one may insist that such arrangements are dependent upon the achievement of verifiable and equitable arms control at the central level.

Nuclear weapons are principally instruments of deterrence and policy in the modern age. Political changes in the European theatre ipso facto will mean a shift away from the political status quo. The degree to which a Nordic nuclear-free zone could contribute to this trend would depend on exactly how the zone is conceived. More importantly, it would hinge on the impact such a NWFZ had on nuclear disengagement in Central Europe. Given the geo-political profile of the area, it is hard to speculate on how much influence a Nordic NWFZ might bring to bear on the security order in Europe, particularly as a nuclear-free zone would not actually involve the physical removal of nuclear weapons from the Nordic

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[202] "Excerpts From the Speech of the General Secreatry of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov made at a Kremlin Dinner Held in Honour of the President of Finland Mauno Koivisto, June 6, 1983," in Mottola, ed., Problems and Prospects, p. 86.

countries.

Some proponents of the Nordic NWFZ idea feel that it would lead to a reduction in tension and help maintain the peace.[203] The claim is debatable in terms of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. As Archer contended, this objective may result simply in one "putting the cart before the horse".[204] All indications are that rather than a Nordic NWFZ bringing about a reduction of tension in Europe, its realisation will be contingent on the prior reduction of tension on the Continent. Put differently, the greater the atmosphere of detente between the superpowers, the better will be the chances of creating a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

President Kekkonen may in fact have represented the realist stream in the nuclear-free zone debate. One must recall that he envisaged a Nordic arms control agreement in the context of shoring up the re-assurance element in the Nordic balance without undercutting the deterrent portion.[205] The more idealistic and normatively-induced approaches to a nuclear-free zone in Nordic Europe treat the area as an independent variable in the European security system. Their supporters argue that a NWFZ in the region would disengage Nordic Europe from the undesirable aspects of the East-West military rivalry. One has to be sceptical about this claim, however, because it has been amply demonstrated that a nuclear-free zone in Europe's north cannot have any meaning unless the superpowers endow it with such.

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[203] See Evensen's "Draft Treaty," for example.

[204] Archer, "Deterrence and Reassurance," p. 53.

[205] Ibid., p. 54.

There is little that the Nordic states could possibly do for example - other than to protest in diplomatic fora - to prevent the USA and the USSR from moving nuclear weapons through Nordic waters or to deploy them near the borders of Nordic states. The USA and the USSR might be prepared to show restraint in the interest of maintaining good relations with the Nordic countries, but one must not labour under the misguided assumption that the introduction of nuclear weapons by the superpowers in Nordic Europe is unlikely. Moreover, no one can say for sure that the Nordic states have the technology to ensure that the USA or the USSR is not using Nordic terrain for cruise missile overflights or for targeting with weapons like the so-called "grey area" types. Thus, as Archer put it, "The declaration of a nuclear-free status might turn out to be just as hollow as that of Nordic neutrality in 1939".[206]

If the above analysis is correct, the view that a Nordic nucelar-free zone would reduce tension in Europe and thereby promote superpower detente is somewhat tenuous. The Finnish President was well aware in 1963 that a Nordic NWFZ could have far-reaching consequences for the security of the allied Nordic states, hence his stress on a gradualist approach. This is in sharp contrast to the adit recommended by Evensen among others. These plans would eventually remove Denmark and Norway from NATO , since they are protrusively incompatible with their present security policies. In the Kekkonen plan, a NWFZ would be a "buffer zone" between the superpowers, while in some of the later proposals a Nordic NWFZ would seek to disengage the area from the superpowers. The first is intended to ease tension between the USA and the USSR and

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[206] Ibid., p. 55.

thereby accelerate the process of detente; the second set would inadvertently produce drastic changes in the Nordic security pattern. The fundamental premise upon which the latter is based is that deterrence in Europe has become a major source of uncertainty for the Nordic states; remove the Nordic region from the ambit of superpower nuclear speculation and a greater reliance on conventional defence will be the outcome. This will in turn enhance, so the argument runs, the re-assurance element in Nordic security policy.[207] Unfortunately, many are not convinced that the matter is that simple.

In sum, the degree to which a Nordic NWFZ might become an agent of detente is dependent on the type of scheme being contemplated. In the abstract, the nuclear-free zone could exercise a positive influence on the confidence-building process in Europe; in another sense, it could undermine both the deterrent and the re-assurance elements in the Nordic security pattern and result in further tensions between Moscow and Washington. Latin America, being relatively free of tension with potential to spill over into the international arena, does not offer itself as an example to the Nordic area insofar as the goal of detente is concerned.

Under the rules of the Treaty of Tlatelolco nuclear weapons are banned permanently. Before one can determine to what degree this prescript might hold in the case of the Nordic area, it should be pointed out that drawing up a list of a priori rules on which a NWFZ should be based can be a rather unproductive exercise. The reason for

[207] Ibid., p. 57.

this is that the modalities and procedures for such measures will depend on the characteristics of each region. Some of the factors which will have a bearing on the shape of a NWFZ are the presence or not of alliance arrangements, geography, military, political and strategic issues among others. It may be possible to proscribe the manufacture, possession, stationing and transit of nuclear weapons in a NWFZ treaty applicable to an area like Latin America, while it may be unfeasible to prohibit all these activities in another region. Additionally, a NWFZ in one area may be seen primarily as a peacetime arrangement but as a permanent feature in another.

In the Nordic area, not all the rules embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco would apply for reasons which are apparent. The proximity of the area to vital strategic areas of the Soviet Union means that the Nordic countries cannot avoid being included in the nuclear plans of the superpowers concerning the use of such weapons in Europe. One must also bear in mind that the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Nordic states in a crisis or war is part of NATO's flexible response strategy. It is a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union would have made plans to counteract the possible use of nuclear weapons against its territory from the Nordic countries belonging to NATO. Finally, at the purely theoretical level the credibility of a nuclear-free zone in an atmosphere of war or crisis, when command, communication, control and intelligence are in an uncertain state of flux, is questionable.

While no one questions the policy of nuclear abstinence that the Nordic states follow in peacetime, this policy would come under serious pressure if war breaks out. Aside from Sweden, all the other Nordic

states are open to receive nuclear weapons under certain circumstances: Finland under its Treaty compact with the Soviet Union; and Norway, Denmark and Iceland under their treaty obligations in the Western Alliance. If it were a question of survival of the nation-state, it is likely that Nordic NATO states would accept the deployment of nuclear forces on their territories. Finland's neutrality vis-a-vis nuclear weapons would be left up to Soviet threat perceptions and to the two states' interpretation of the FCMA Treaty.

It becomes clear, therefore, that the total prohibition of nuclear weapons in a prospective Nordic nuclear-free zone arrangement would pose serious problems to alliance strategy and military planning. It is not certain that the relevant Nordic states would be willing to pay the political and security price of removing entirely the nuclear deterrent aspect of their security postures. And as this study has pointed out earlier, any future NWFZ which embraces a total ban on nuclear weapons from the Nordic region would necessitate major alterations in the existing security pattern in the area. Clearly, this is hardly at issue in the case of Latin America.

A nuclear weapon-free zone normally excludes the possession or use of devices associated with nuclear weapons. It is a fact though that Norway, Denmark and Iceland have components associated with nuclear weapons on their territories. Hence, as Lodgaard explained,

> Hosting important elements of nuclear weapon systems, they cannot be immune to a response in kind if a nuclear attack can be sustained from territory under their jurisdiction.[208]

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[208] Lodgaard, "Nuclear Disengagement," p. 11.

The installations in Norway, for example, may figure in the nuclear targeting of the Soviet Union which, according to the military logic, may render meaningless the guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against Nordic countries from the standpoint of the USSR. Several other categories of multi-purpose systems are deployed in Norway. Their effect might be to create suspicions and uncertainties, they are therefore incompatible with the aims and objectives of a nuclear-free zone like the Latin American example. In the absence of clarity about what systems should or should not be treated as nuclear devices, a denuclearised regime in Nordic Europe would not serve any useful purpose, especially once war has begun. Under such circumstances, the participants in the nuclear-free zone arrangement would hardly know what to expect from the putative adversary. In matters of security, nothing can be more agonising than uncertainty.

The purpose of the above explication, as seen through the prism of the Nordic security character, is to cast doubt on the applicability of some of the rules of the Tlatelolco Treaty to the Nordic region. The need to halt horizontal nuclear proliferation, which the theoretical literature suggests to be the chief function of NWFZ's, may be a politically insufficient condition in practice to govern a denuclearisation regime in Nordic Europe. The Tlatelolco Treaty formula would face formidable security obstacles in the Nordic region. This fact underscores the need to confer a more particular raison d'etre upon a future Nordic nuclear-free zone arrangement, consistent with the findings of this study.

The proscriptions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco relating to testing, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons are partly covered under the rules of the Non-Proliferation and Limited Test-Ban Treaties to which all the Nordic states adhere. The prohibitions against deployment and stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the territories of nuclear-free zone states characterise the de facto situation in the Nordic area at present. As the analysis has shown, any attempt to apply the bulk of these rules to a prospective Nordic NWFZ would pose major problems both from a political and military standpoint. Furthermore, even if some of these rules formed part of an eventual Nordic nuclear-free zone, the military constellations in the area would make the regime difficult to maintain in periods of acute tension or war.

The set of prohibitions relating to transit and/or transport of nuclear weapons through a NWFZ is equally problematic. The Tlatelolco Treaty did not address this issue in explicit terms, preferring to leave it up to each party to deal with it in reference to established principles and norms of international law and national policies. A ban on such activities in the Nordic context would pose serious problems for the freedom of passage of Soviet vessels, which may or may not be carrying nuclear weapons, especially on their way to and from the Baltic region. The United States also may be unwilling to constrain its freedom of passage in the oceans and sea-lanes bordering the Nordic region.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis has been an attempt to demonstrate that in some respects the paradigm-induced principles, objectives and rules embodied in the Tlatelolco treaty bear some relevance and applicability to the Nordic region. It has also been the author's purpose to establish that in important respects some of these principles, goals and rules do not apply at all. In other instances, it should be clear that significant adjustments would be required if the Tlatelolco paradigm is to have a place in the geo-political and security setting into which the Nordic region finds itself. Finally, the foregoing examination has disclosed a number of regime elements that might be incorporated in a future Nordic NWFZ treaty and which do not appear to suit the Latin American situation.

One primary conclusion is that the Latin American area is *sui generis*. In other words, it is a continent zone, while the Nordic area is potentially a tension zone. Thus, a different security paradigm must be found which can form the foundation and justification for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The analysis leaves little doubt that the broad paradigmatic elements of the Tlatelolco regime would find a place in the Nordic security construct. Important provisos apply, however; for example, a Nordic NWFZ cannot be construed as a means of keeping Nordic states away from the nuclear strategy of the Great Powers, since the former are linked integrally to everything else that happens in the security environment of the European theatre. This is the point of departure for any analysis dealing with arms control in Northern Europe.

The Nordic region sits in the shadows of the bi-polar balance. It in fact only appears to be a "quiet corner" of the Continent. The fact that this impression is conveyed has to do with the complex pattern of deterrence and re-assurance that is epitomised in the so-called Nordic balance concept. Yet, Nordic Europe cannot be said to form a separate or coherent security system. A Nordic NWFZ considered from the point of view of the Nordic countries as discrete entities would prove to be too narrow to accommodate the intermingling of the security pattern of these states with others in Europe as a whole. Moreover, it would run contrary to the strategic interests of the main guarantors of a future Nordic NWFZ, viz., the USA and the USSR.

The Nordic region is already a de facto nuclear-free zone. The possibility of achieving an agreement to formalise this status along the lines of the Tlatelolco Treaty is motivated mainly by an attempt to "remove" the nuclear threat hanging over the heads of the Nordic countries and to raise and make less ambiguous the nuclear threshold. However, as has been shown, a nuclear-free Nordic region has to be part of some wider arrangement for arms control in Europe. Any attempt to change unilaterally the current security situation in the Nordic area would be read as a major departure from a model that has proven its durability since the end of World War II. A NWFZ treaty could prove to be extremely destabilising and threatening to the security of Europe if not well conceived and executed.

This is not to say that a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region might not serve a meaningful function under certain conditions. Indeed, one of the aims of this study has been to show under what circumstances a Nordic NWFZ might prove to be useful. What is being suggested,

however, is that any paradigm-related regime designed to try and forestall the nuclearisation of the Nordic region must pay particular atttention to the contradictions, tensions and perceptual framework to which the region gives rise. This would involve an assessment of the political connotations from the point of view of the superpowers and the rest of Europe. The conclusion that has to be drawn is that before a Nordic NWFZ can be realised, it will be necessary to make progress in arms control negotiations between the superpowers. Further, confidence-building measures in Europe would seem to be essential first steps, and not the other way around as some suggest.

East-West divisions will continue to constrain the security pattern existing in Nordic Europe and undermine the establishment of a NWFZ. To be sure, if it does happen that such a zone materialises at some time in the future, it will not be along the lines of the Tlatelolco model. The latter, as a paradigm, is only partially suitable for the Nordic region. It applies in the sense that the foreign policies of the Nordic states tend to carry the same normative strains as do the foreign policies of the Latin American nations. There is also a convergence insofar as states in both regions bear allegiance to the principles of international law and order, show strong support for international organisations, and believe firmly that nuclear weapons pose a great danger to human survival and should therefore be constrained as much as possible. The two regions differ in the sense that the one is part of a strategically sensitive subsystem, while the other is a subsystem in itself. One is caught in the vortex of superpower nuclear strategy, and the other is relatively isolated from it. A Nordic nuclear-free zone

calls therefore for a modified paradigm, one that is congruent with the pressures and strains of the Nordic area. The Latin American paradigm does not meet the full requirements of a future Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

The primary research question of this study has been as follows: to what degree does the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, popularly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, serve as a paradigm for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic region? The subsidiary research questions inherent in this study concern the reasons why the NWFZ concept has come to be seen as a valid route to regional nuclear arms control, despite the fact that the international Non-Proliferation Treaty was set-up principally to make the need for regional mulitlateral arms control alternatives superflous. The other secondary concern of this work has been to explain how and where the nuclear-free zone concept fits into the general literature on arms control.

The study has demonstrated that the popularity of the NWFZ (regional) approach to nuclear non-proliferation grew more or less in proportion to the decline in the currency of the NPT. It has been shown also that in the estimation of many non-nuclear states, the NPT has not met the objectives for which it was established. The non-nuclear weapon powers have criticised the Treaty for its apparent inequality, and have charged the nuclear weapon states with unfairness, hypocrisy and failure to fulfil their commitments to disarm. In sharp contrast, the nuclear-free zone approach has been viewed by many as an initiative among equals. Based on generally accepted NWFZ principles, such arrangements are

thought to enable the countries in a certain region to have the primary input into how the security environment of their area will be shaped, especially with respect to the disposition of nuclear weapons and associated devices.

A plethora of propositions have surfaced for creating nuclear-free zones. Some, like the Rapacki plan, have been around long before thought was ever given to found a global Non-Proliferation regime. Ostensibly, these plans and proposals have been justified on the basis that a NWFZ would help certain states which have agreed to forgo the nuclear discretion to avoid involvement in a nuclear war which could devastate their societies. It is believed, moreover, that a NWFZ would strengthen the non-nuclear weapon status of a specific region and remove it from the ambit of the nuclear strategy of the Great Powers. Some supporters of nuclear-free zones go even further than that; they suggest that this type of arrangement in one area is likely to have a positive impact on the creation of similar zones in other pertinent areas of the world. They add that it could even avert preparations for nuclear warfare by the nuclear states in regions which do not form obvious parts of the nuclear map. The logic of the latter assertion lies in the presumption that once a state has acquired nuclear weapons or the capability to do so, it automatically becomes a target for nuclear attack by one or a combination of all the formal nuclear weapon states.

This study has cast doubt on some of the above objectives on the basis of the empirical record to date. Although the author accepts and argues for a definition of a nuclear weapon-free zone that would embrace accords like the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties, it is recognised that these agreements were desigend principally to remove from the

agenda issues that could unnecessarily aggravate relations between the superpowers. Apart from this, it is difficult to see how they might fulfil some of the major functions that are assigned to nuclear-free zones.

The other side of the picture concerns NWFZ arrangements applicable to populated regions. The foregoing analysis indicates that the Tlatelolco Treaty, being the most sophisticated expression of the nuclear-free zone concept so far, has to be accorded some credit for averting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Latin America. In this sense, it may have moderated the urge of the continental nuclear threshold states, Brazil and Argentina, to pursue the nuclear option. However, as the author has hastened to warn, the willingness of those states to show restraint with respect to their nuclear ambitions may have been influenced more by developments in the international environment rather than by the determent power of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The latter may have enhanced as well the worldwide Non-Proliferation regime: indeed many observers would argue that this is probably the singular role that nuclear-free zone can and do play in the arms control nexus. Insofar as preventing a future nuclear war or furthering the aims of detente between the superpowers is concerned, this study finds no evidence to support such a claim vis-a-vis the Latin American nuclear-free zone Treaty or any similar measures for that matter.

Plans to establish NWFZ's in other parts of the globe have made little progress. Three main reasons were found to account for this. Firstly, the plans tended to focus too much on the legal and military dimensions of nuclear-free zone schemes and too little on the crucial underlying political factors which were found to cause tension and poor

relations between the very states for which the proposals were intended to apply. Secondly, the plans called for too drastic a change in the military and security structures of the prospective nuclear-free zone states. Thirdly, the majority of the suggestions seemed to have been impelled by narrow self interests (or what were perceived as such by the onlookers), and by a failure to pay sufficient atttention to the threat perceptions of the other relevant parties. As a result, the plans were suspect from the beginning. They served only to worsen the already tense and uncertain regional environment, and to exacerbate the mistrusts which existed among competing regional actors. In short, very few of these NWFZ plans, particularly the post-NPT ones, were in fact the outcome of a genuine wish on the part of their proponents to preclude nuclear weapons from their respective regions, and to enhance thereby the Non-proliferation regime.

As the Chapter which examined the theoretical literature should have shown, a nuclear-free zone is seen as a "collective good." Nuclear-free zone supporters contend that such schemes render the military atmosphere more stable and predictable. Put a different way, they assume that a NWFZ has an innate confidence-building quality. If this is true, then one can expect that the nuclear-free zone concept will continue to be articulated as a bona fide avenue through which to stop the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. This is likely to be so particularly when the prevailing international atmosphere is characterised by heightening tension and insecurity between the principal powers.

Notwithstanding the foregoing prognosis, it appears justifiable to argue on the other hand that the world is not likely to witness the establishement of more nucler weapon-free zone regimes in the near

future. The lengthy debates which have followed in the wake of the introduction of most NWFZ proposals not only in the region concerned, but in the U.N. and other forums, are indicative of the very factors which militate against the realisation of further nuclear-free zones. Chief among them are the overt animosities that exist between the very states which are expected to cooperate in the establishment of NWFZ's. Another is the growing, but unconfirmed, reports that certain countries have nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them. Why Egypt or Pakistan would consider it politically acceptable to accede to the status quo ante has not been explained by the supporters of a Middle Eastern or South Asian nuclear-free zone.

Another major stumbling block to the achievement of more far-reaching successes in the NWFZ field is the fact that the principal powers, the USA and the USSR especially, continue to hold differing opinions on the purpose and value of nuclear-free zones. The United States is inclined to believe that NWFZ arrangements merely detract from the NPT which it supports and wants to further; and that such measures could do more harm than good in security terms. The Soviet Union on the other hand has tended to support traditionally the creation of NWFZ's. Not surprisingly, its support has only served to strengthen the hands of the Western states, most of which tend to take the American view in the matter. It is widely believed that Moscow's chief aims in supporting calls for nuclear-free zones around the world are to weaken the military and strategic postures of the United States and undermine its influence on the security environment in certain parts of the world. This fundamental perceptual opposition in points of view between the superpowers has done little to enhance the prestige of nuclear-free

zones as a suitable approach to nuclear non-proliferation. If there is one thing that this study has made unequivocally clear, it is that the future of the NWFZ route to arms control lies in the hands of the superpowers. Without their acceptance of these proposals and their willingness to grant adequate guarantees not to violate a NWFZ agreement or direct their nuclear weapons against the countries which agree to participate in any such arrangement, then obviously one can attach little importance to the ensuing product.

The various nuclear-free zone orthodoxies that have surfaced over the past three decades or so have not produced tangible results for one other crucial reason, namely, that their proponents assumed that all non-nuclear states, would recognise the overriding danger in nuclear weapons would be prepared to renounce them formally and permanently. Here again, the study has pleaded for realism. If anything can be learnt from the refusal of nuclear threshold states like Argentina, India, Israel and Pakistan to become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for either Argentina or Brazil to associate itself fully with the Tlatelolco Treaty, it is that many statesmen are acutely aware that the advantages of nuclear weapons in an era of mutual deterrence lies not so much in their overt military function but rather in their political function. To the above states, the limitations that the nuclear weapon powers have formulated for their nuclear arms have not gone far enough in disguising the political role of these weapons in international relations.

The debate over nuclear weapons possession is therefore seen as one which pits three quarters of the world's actors against a few powerful ones. It has put one set of questions to the majority of these nations

and a different set to a select few. The temper of this discussion suggests that barring a major catastrophe or another serious crisis like the Cuban Missile crisis, the forecast for setting-up NWFZ's in other populated areas of the planet will depend in no small measure on a major reconstruction of the power hierarchy in the international system. The dilemma that faces those who support the NWFZ channel to regional arms control is that in a predominantly state-centric milieu, nuclear weapons cannot but be seen as instruments of power. In other words, the ownership of these devices in fact endows nations with more power and at the same time perpetuate their already elevated status in international affairs.

In a competitive international system as exists at present, other states will always want to share some of the prestige which the principal powers alone have hitherto enjoyed. This may mean reserving the option to pursue policies in certain areas like nuclear weapons. If a NWFZ necessarily means a permanent ban on nuclear weapons possession, then obviously some of the regions often mentioned as possible nuclear-free zone targets in the literature might never become nuclear-free zones afterall. The reason for this is that a few states, usually the middle powers, will invariably decline to go along with such plans. They will not wish to forswear forever the possession of nuclear weapons, especially as those nations which already have them continue to hold on to them. Even where a NWFZ becomes established, as in Latin America, question marks may continue to cloud the regime if important actors in the region decline to participate in it. This is one of the more crucial questions that the Tlatelolco Treaty will have to grapple with in the next decade or so.

Given the fluidity of international affairs and the fact that the international system has undergone far-reaching changes in the recent past, one cannot rule out the possibility that other nuclear-free zones will be established. If so, then the Treaty of Tlatelolco will provide instructive lessons for some of these arrangements. It is equally possible that it will not be very relevant to other areas which might be operating under a different set of constraints.

As the leading example of a nuclear-free zone, the Tlatelolco model has been used in this study as the starting point from which to critically assess the chances of realising a Nordic nuclear-free zone in the future. The evidence leads one to conclude that there are important points of correspondence between Latin America and Nordic Europe, especially in terms of the outlook or worldview of statesmen in both regions vis-a-vis nuclear weapons. It is at this level that an across-systems analysis is possible and justifiable. At another level, however, the study finds that the Tlatelolco Treaty as a paradigm for a Nordic nuclear-free zone does not go far enough in addressing the particular concerns of the Nordic area. Several reasons were found to be responsible for this, among them, the fact that Latin America is a continent and is fairly isolated from the main curents of superpower nuclear planning and strategy. In contrast, the Nordic region is an essential aspect of the nuclear strategy of the USA and the USSR in Europe, a continent which has the highest concentration of nuclear weapons in the the world. In light of this situation, the superpowers are naturally quite sensitive to any changes in the security order on this Continent. The underlying assumption is that it is this prevailing order that has kept the peace in Europe and indeed in the world.

The United States for one, has expressed concerns that a Nordic nuclear-free zone could do more harm than good in terms of security in the wider European context. The Soviet Union, which has traditionally supported a Nordic nuclear-free zone, is suspected by the USA and the Western allies of trying to cut-off the Nordic region from the strategy of the NATO Alliance to its own advantage. Evidently, therefore, unless both sides could come to some mutually satisfactory agreement on the desirability and benefits of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone, then one is not likely to materialise soon. No amount of political manoeuvring from inside or outside of the Nordic region will bring about a NWFZ regime in Northern Europe unless the principal powers involved in the security structure of Europe can agree to it. Ample evidence has been presented to support this claim.

The other crucial issue which was found to mitigate against the early realisation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is the fact that Nordic statesmen and decision-makers cannot seem to agree on the relative merits and demerits of such a measure and the operational modalities which would govern a Nordic NWFZ. On the one side are those who wish to maintain the existing de facto nuclear-free status of the Nordic region, and on the other hand are those who think formalising this situation would enhance the security of the area. Thus, the question insofar as the Nordic states themselves are concerned is one of a fundamental philosophic difference. It is clear from the examination carried out in this study that the Nordic states which are part of the Western Alliance do not seem to think that a formal NWFZ agreement would be compatible with competing alliance interests and commitments. Hence, although many

statesmen in the coalition governments in Norway and Denmark have expressed support for a Nordic NWFZ in principle, they seem hardpressed to find a model which would not be, at the same time, at variance with their countries' existing security arrangements under the NATO accord. In the final analysis, no one knows for sure that establishing a formal Nordic nuclear-free zone would in fact disentangle the Nordic states from the strategy of nuclear weapons and ensure that they end up with more security than they have at present.

This study has suggested that the uncertainty as to where to go from here, in the search for a new security pattern in Nordic Europe, will continue to hamper further progress towards a nuclear-free zone. The evidence unearthed points to the conclusion that a Nordic NWFZ, from the standpoint of the security order on the European continent at the moment, will have a better chance of success if conceptualised within that broader framework. More importantly, however, tangible results will be forthcoming if prior progress can be made in the areas of arms control negotiations between the superpowers at both the strategic and theatre levels. If these come about, then one might expect a new round of confidence-building efforts in Europe. Together these developments would augur well for detente in Europe and for the Nordic nuclear-free zone plans. This is the logical point of departure for a meaningful discussion on a viable and formal arms control regime for the Nordic area.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco has been found to offer some paradigmatic signposts on the basis of which a serious comparative analysis could take place; but it does not go far enough. In the writer's view, this

is no reflection on the Latin American Treaty as such. Its shortcomings as a paradigm for the Nordic region does not mean it might not apply elsewhere. What this study has demonstrated above all, is that proposals for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone have to be viewed against the background of the characteristics of the Nordic area and its place in the overall security pattern in evidence in Europe. Only afterwards can external paradigms be applied. A Nordic nuclear-free zone therefore calls for an appreciably modified paradigm, one that will no doubt embody some of the principles, objectives and rules of the Tlatelolco model which this study has delineated, but one which will also contain elements of a new security paradigm.

APPENDIX 1

STATUS OF THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Country	Signature	Ratification	Entry into force*
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	Oct. 11, 1983	Oct. 11, 1983	Oct. 11, 1983
ARGENTINA	Sept. 27, 1983		
BAHAMAS	Nov. 29, 1976	April 26, 1977	April 26, 1977
BARBADOS	Oct. 18, 1968	April 25, 1969	April 25, 1969
BELIZE**			
BOLIVIA	Feb. 14, 1969	Feb. 18, 1969	Feb. 18, 1969
BRAZIL	May 9, 1967	July 29, 1968	
COLOMBIA	Feb. 14, 1967	Aug. 4, 1972	Sept. 6, 1972
COSTA RICA	Feb. 14, 1967	Aug. 25, 1969	Aug. 25, 1969
CUBA			
CHILE	Feb. 14, 1967	Oct. 9, 1974	
DOMINICA			
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	July 18, 1967	June 14, 1968	June 14, 1968
ECUADOR	Feb. 14, 1967	Feb. 11, 1969	Feb. 11, 1969
EL SALVADOR	Feb. 14, 1967	April 22, 1968	April 22, 1968
GRENADA	April 29, 1975	June 20, 1975	June 20, 1975
GUATEMALA	Feb. 14, 1967	Feb. 6, 1970	Feb. 6, 1970
GUYANA**			
HAITI	Feb. 14, 1967	May 23, 1967	May 23, 1967
HONDURAS	Feb. 14, 1967	Sept. 23, 1968	Sept. 23, 1968
JAMAICA	Oct. 26, 1967	June 26, 1969	June 26, 1969
MEXICO	Feb. 14, 1967	Sept. 20, 1967	Sept. 20, 1967
NICARAGUA	Feb. 15, 1967	Oct. 24, 1968	Oct. 24, 1968
PANAMA	Feb. 14, 1967	June 11, 1971	June 11, 1971
PARAGUAY	April 26, 1967	March 19, 1969	March 19, 1969
PERU	Feb. 14, 1967	March 4, 1969	March 4, 1969
ST. LUCIA			
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES			
ST. KITT'S NEVIS***			
SURINAME	Feb. 13, 1976	June 10, 1977	June 10, 1977
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	June 27, 1967	Dec. 3, 1970	June 27, 1975
URUGUAY	Feb. 14, 1967	Aug. 20, 1968	Aug. 20, 1968
VENEZUELA	Feb. 14, 1967	March 23, 1970	March 23, 1970

* - The date of entry into force is the date of deposit of the Declaration of Waiver of the requirements stipulated in Article 28.1

** - These countries have not been invited to adhere by the General Conference since they are in the situation provided for in Article 25.2 of the Treaty.

*** - This country has not yet been invited because it only recently gained independence.

SOURCE: Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (CG/266).

APPENDIX II

Status of Signatures and Ratifications of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

I

	Signature	Ratification
United States of America	26 May 1977	23 Nov 1981
France	2 Mar 1979	
Great Britain	30 Dec 1967	11 Dec 1969
Netherlands	15 Mar 1968	26 Jul 1971

II

People's Republic of China	21 Aug 1973	12 Jun 1974
United States of America	1 Apr 1968	12 May 1971
France	18 Jul 1973	22 Mar 1974
Great Britain	20 Dec 1967	11 Dec 1969
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	18 May 1978	8 Jan 1979

SOURCE: Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (CG/267).

APPENDIX III



SOURCE: Current History, Vol. 85, No. 507.

APPENDIX IV SOURCE: Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe (pp. 58-59).



A note is in place on the geopolitical terminology used in this publication. The Nordic countries (or region/area) refers to Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. It should be noted, however that "a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone" usually seems to exclude Iceland. Scandinavia means the other Nordic countries except Finland. Northern Europe is a broader and less exact term comprising the Nordic countries plus northwestern parts of the Soviet Union and the Baltic Sea. Northern sea areas or waters refer to the sea areas adjoining Northern Europe, including the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea as well as parts of the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean together with the islands in the area. The Arctic sea areas means more or less the same or then the northernmost parts of the northern sea areas. The North is also a more vague and broader term comprising more or less all the areas listed above. It is close to the term "northern flank" used in the Western strategic discussion.

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