

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

ANTHROPOLOGY AND TEACHER EDUCATION

by

Peter van de Vyvere

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This thesis is dedicated to

D. B. SEALEY

for his wisdom, patience,
inspiration and deep love
for humanity

ABSTRACT

"Anthropology and Teacher Education" demonstrates the relevance of certain anthropological concepts to those persons involved with the teaching profession. It is borne out of a need to re-evaluate pedagogical technique in light of culture change. Conceptually, evolution both biological and cultural is overriding. It is intertwined with the concepts of culture, enculturation, and culture change. The significance of these concepts is discussed at some length. Although largely theoretical, practical implications are demonstrated in relation to an analysis of Canadian Indian education in both an historical and contemporary context. Furthermore, this is broadened to the notion of multiculturalism in general. The major contribution of this thesis will be one of inspiring the reader to develop critical cultural awareness.

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CHAPTER I

Anthropology in Education has become a growing concern in recent years. Although early concerns are evident (see Hewett, 1904, for example), for the most part anthropologists have been concerned with education in a descriptively ethnographic sense rather than in an "active" sense. As such, education was, and still is for that matter, regarded as that process through which cultural phenomena were transmitted. Education did not assume recognition a priori. It became part of a systemic analysis of the phenomenon of humankind including such elements as man's relation to man (i.e., social structure, kinship), man's relation to his environment (i.e., ecology), and man's relation to other members of the animal kingdom (i.e., non-human primates, evolution).

Granted, the process of education was not belittled; it was part of the holistic endeavour to substantiate the human phenomenon in a total environment. In a human population that is relatively stable and geographically isolated (i.e., so-called "primitive" societies), this holistic endeavour seemed more realistic and attainable. Indeed, numerous ethnographies exist. A great enterprise was undertaken post World War II whereby the colonial drive made some sensitive humanists aware of the fact that "pristine" examples of humankind were soon to disappear. An effort was made on their part to record "this past" while it yet existed in the present. This is still a crucial issue with some recent scholars (Taylor, 1981).

The problem today, however, is that such dynamic factors as voluntary and forced migration, colonialism, and general human expansion have created a complex milieu, one which does not lend itself to simplified analysis. As such, even though the holistic endeavour must continue to be a pervasive

force, the complex society in which we exist and the seemingly "compartmentalization" of the sociocultural phenomena thereof, render it more difficult to attain.

As a result, studies have become more specialized; "Anthropology and Education" is an example. It is a concern of the writer, however, that we may have become overly-specialized, and have lost sight of our humanity. Living in a society that is apparently mechanistic and atomistic, we have become myopic towards the reality of cultural dynamics and processes within a total environment.

THE NEED AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The need for this study is based upon two major premises. The first is largely theoretical, borne out of a perceived need to establish a pedagogy that is integrated rather than compartmentalized. In this writer's opinion, such an approach is largely attained through a knowledge of biological and cultural evolutionary concepts. Recognizing that evolution is a theory, it will nonetheless be the overriding integrative factor of this thesis and, in fact, its *raison d'être*.

The second major premise is practical, based on the observation that Canada is a racially and ethnically diverse nation. In recent years the thrust has been one of attempting to appreciate and to maintain this diversity (i.e., the rise of "multiculturalism"). According to the Canada Yearbook, 1980-81 (117):

The ethnic composition of Canada has changed considerably because of many factors, including differences in the flow and source of immigrants. Trends have been characterized by a decline in the proportions of British Isles groups and have a corresponding increase in European ethnic groups other than French.

As well, when the demographic table re population by ethnic group 1951, 1961 and 1971, is examined (*ibid*: 137), a marked increase is observed with

respect to Asiatics. For example, there is roughly a 400% increase (1951 - 72,827; 1971 - 285,540) in population vis-à-vis Asiatics as a group. In this particular table "Asiatics" is broken down into "Chinese, Japanese and Other". The "Other" reveals a sizeable increase of roughly 700% (1951 - 18,636; 1971 - 129,460). Although not defined one may assume that this category contains clearly visible racial groups such as Philipinos and East Indians. Within more recent years we are witnessing an influx of Vietnamese as well.

Consequently, Canada's racial/ethnic milieu is becoming more diverse and visible. Furthermore, this sort of milieu is normally accompanied with an increase in social malaise relating to problems of prejudice, discrimination and racism. A means of dealing with these problems is by tackling them through the schooling process. This thesis will deal mainly with creating a pedagogical technique through the incorporation of certain anthropological concepts, evolution overriding, and their utilization within the schooling process.

The purpose of this thesis is threefold.

I. It is an attempt to demonstrate how Anthropology in Education might link separate realities into some uniform process (characterized anthropologically as "holism"). In fact, this will be done with an explicit orientation that anthropological concepts form a vital learning component in today's classrooms.

It is the opinion of some anthropologists (Kimball, 1974; Gearing, 1973) that industrial societies (e.g., Canada) operate within a context whereby "reality" is perceived as a series of "stages" or "levels". This may imply alienation. The home becomes a certain reality, the school another, for example, how often do we not refer to "reality" as being "out there" (i.e., outside the school setting).

It can be argued that the human organism undergoes various stages of physical and social maturation. For example, we categorize in terms of child, adolescent, and adult. As well, we categorize in terms of pre-schooling, schooling, and post schooling (i.e., securing a position in the work force). Quite often, unfortunately, these are perceived as "pockets" of reality, and are thus perceived without any integral interconnectedness, or, continuity. This automatically creates a milieu whereby various stages are juxtaposed one against the other, each regarded as an isolated entity. On the contrary, they are not isolated entities; rather, they are subtle transformations (i.e., evolution) shaped by continuous natural and social forces.

II. This thesis will attempt to demonstrate how the use of anthropological concepts within the teaching profession might correct the myopic tendency towards societal atomism (see Wax and Wax, 1971). This is not meant to epitomize the anthropological endeavour as the ultimate cure for social malaise; rather, it will act as a premise whereby both the teacher and the student may gain some insight into cultural processes. It will be a formula for critical awareness with the understanding that society and culture are much more than an aggregate of individuals operating in a random way.

III. This thesis will attempt to generate ideas for further and more elaborate investigation. Being aware of processes means becoming aware of those forces shaping human lives. Specialization and "compartmentalization" within our society have helped to produce an educational system based on the institution of schooling (see Cohen, 1971).

The social mechanism referred to as "schooling" will be regarded as part of a socio-cultural process. And it should be the aim of every teacher to regard it in this light. The school becomes an integral part of the social

system, and although it cannot effect change sui generis, it can be more than a mimicry of bureaucratic demands.

The school could become a catalyst for individual development and creativity. It would involve a process of "unfolding". This is perhaps comparable to primitive initiation rites whereby the individual "unfolds" as an expression of individual human growth within the reality of his total society (see van Gennep, 1908; Kimball, op.cit: 153).

A basic assumption of this study is that education is a process through which the individual develops the capacity to recognize and solve problems. Its purpose is not merely to acquire facts. As such, learning can be viewed as a causal sequence of the rewarded response to stimuli, a theory "that requires of the learner no greater cerebral capacity than that of a dog learning tricks". (Kimball, op.cit: 23).

Within biological science there is a theory that over-specialization can lead to extinction. The organism becomes so adapted to the immediate environment in such a "perfect" way that a major change in that environment will suddenly make that same organism become maladaptive, and consequently extinct. Of course, it could be argued whether biological adaptation can be discussed at the same level as cultural adaptation. But if it is realized that the two are actually interrelated, that they form part of a system, then it is realized that humankind is at the mercy of ecological forces.

The major point here is that human beings, culturally and biologically, constitute a system of social and physical interrelationships (Kimball, ibid: 22). Too often this point is overlooked; too often the individual is regarded as being a system unto itself, with no responsibility toward a greater cause. As such, the emphasis on the individual belittles, if not negates, the holistic notion.

METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Anthropology in education at the post-secondary level should not necessarily be part of an effort to graduate teachers who will introduce anthropology as a subject in the schools. Although this is a favourable idea, the overriding concern is one to provide certain conceptual tools that could be utilized in all aspects of teaching. This pervasiveness is an attempt to reduce categorization, being concerned with education in the broadest sense. Indeed, the reality of systemics has been undermined. Too many courses operate on self-righteous principles, setting up psychic barriers to the holistic notion.

This fragmented approach to human knowledge should be replaced by one that seeks the integration of social and physical realities. Of course, this would require a major transformation of the attitudes upon which schools operate. Even if this approach were unattainable, schools should at least attempt to represent within our educational system a thematic orientation of the human condition. This thesis will attempt to provide a philosophical orientation congruent with certain anthropological concepts.

Major holistic concepts and how they relate to the teaching field will provide the core of the thesis. In essence, these concepts will represent an "outline for action". They will involve an analytical discussion vis-à-vis the necessity of instilling teachers with a certain degree of cultural insight. Not only are teachers to be concerned with the capacity for critical assessment, but also for some integral restoration of human dignity. It could be argued that through the evolutionary process we are losing sight of our humanity (for a counter argument see Teilhard de Chardin, 1955). A reinvestigation of ourselves through historico-cross-cultural analysis may provide a fruitful reorientation.

LIMITATIONS

Although the writer believes that anthropological concepts would provide some insight to "cultural understanding", limitations need to be discussed. In fact, by virtue of the holistic endeavour, the approach must be interdisciplinary. This is the axiom upon which anthropology claims to operate.

One danger is that the 'study of man' can sometimes seem so total that it becomes the study of man. One ethnocentrism is substituted for another. The anthropologist's comments seem to glitter like gold - to him at least - because for a time they are new and fresh. He becomes a kind of cultural oracle. But when his stock of illuminating asides on the Upper Pukapuka or the Lower Zambesi runs low he will be forced to take another stance. Then he may be reduced to making broad, conjectural statements that he may confuse as final judgements or substantial generalizations rather than a potential source of hypotheses. He may fool some of the educators some of the time, but he can't fool them all. (Spindler, 1955: 112).

In the classical sense, anthropologists have been concerned mainly with cultural activities of non-industrialized societies. Although this is still the case, it is no longer a priority. The simple reason is that these societies have evolved and have necessarily changed as a result of contact. In terms of cultural analysis on an historico-comparative level, however, non-industrial societies cannot be ignored, for they represent cultural systems that are rather unique and only by investigating these systems can we better come to appreciate in a relativistic way that very system in which we function. (Taylor, op.cit: 55).

It will not be the intention of the writer to make a plea for the critical awareness necessarily with the implication of assessing whether one society is either good or bad as compared with another. For example, the argument will not be for the "goodness" or "badness" of the capitalist regime as opposed to a non-capitalist one. This quite necessarily leads into a

moral discussion which will be beyond the scope of the thesis. This is not to imply, however, that amorality is in order here; rather, the concern will be one of processes in a relativist frame of reference. The question would be framed, "How does this come to be?" as opposed to "How ought this come to be?"

The overriding concept is the holistic endeavour. Indeed, the subsequent concepts that the writer intends to integrate into this overriding one are selective. Yet, they are not random selections, but a consequence of what the writer feels to be important as a result of general reading in the area of Anthropology and Education. Prejudice, discrimination and racism, for example, are realities that citizens must contend with in their daily lives. The media report numerous instances of group confrontation. The "West" versus the "East" represents some form of ideological confrontation. In short, the world is becoming more aware of systemic confrontations, and the educator cannot turn a blind eye to this situation.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

"Anthropological research may be justified on the grounds of gathering more data, examining a problem, or for purely exploratory purposes".

(Kimball, op.cit: 1974: 56-57; also see Lofland, 1971). The theoretical orientation of this thesis assumes an approach as described by Kimball.

Thus:

We (certain anthropologists) are not opposed to quantification, but we use it very little, and, as a consequence, we do not rely upon statistical analysis. Instead, we seek to work out cultural patterns or social systems by examining traits or components and relationships which unite these.

Anthropology's scientific tradition comes from biology rather than from physical science. Hence, it emphasizes the inductive approach and utilizes the natural history method in examining systems as events in a time span which stretches from origin to infinity. Its analytical techniques organize data in two ways:

(1) by grouping them as types or classes in taxonomic schemes; and (2) by describing them as whole systems. (Kimball, op.cit: 1963: 217, and see op cit: 1974: 41).

It should be noted, of course, that not all anthropologists might adhere to the approach as described above. It does not represent anthropology in toto. It is not intended, for example, to belittle an approach that is quantitative in analysis of human data; in fact, reference will be made to a number of these studies.

ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

Chapter II will provide a review of the literature concerning "Anthropology and Education" per se (see Burnett, 1974). Certain common themes will be discerned throughout the readings. The review, therefore, will provide a critique of these themes as well as the authors' viewpoints. The readings, however, must go beyond this defined area into the fields of Anthropology and Education, in general. Of course, this could be a task ad infinitum. As a result, the readings will represent a select group of material deemed relevant by the writer, to be introduced in following chapters in relation to various arguments.

Chapter III will provide a discussion of anthropological concepts important to prospective teachers. These concepts were selected by this writer on the grounds that they are the most outstanding and the most fundamentally important to the area of Anthropology and Education.

These concepts are:

- a) Evolution, race and ethnicity;
- b) culture;
- c) the enculturative process;
- d) cultural dynamics and cultural change.

An investigation of evolution, race and ethnicity will emphasize that humankind is to be placed within some cosmological perspective, with an approach that is historico-biological. Humans are to be regarded as a rather unique sort of species, and yet not so unique, as they, along with other members of the animal kingdom have struggled, and still must, with the immediate physical environment.

The discussion of race is a crucial issue. Both the biological and social aspects will be revealed, eventually leading into a discussion of prejudice, discrimination, and racism (see Montagu, ed.1964).

Culture appears to be unique to humankind; it is culture that makes us human. Aptly defined by Tylor in 1871, "Culture or Civilization is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society". (in Brameld, 1957: 7). Intertwined with the culture concept are values and goals which are incorporated within a society's ideology.

A discussion of the enculturative process will necessitate a distinction between "education" and "schooling". As well, a distinction must be drawn between these two and "socialization". (see Cohen, op.cit.). From a cross-cultural perspective the notions of "generalist" and "specialist" - (Sealey, 1980) - will be discussed. One of the most striking differences between education in "generalist" and "specialist" societies is the shift from the need of an individual to learn something that everyone agrees he wishes to know to what Margaret Mead has called "the will of some individual to teach something which it is not agreed that anyone has any desire to know". (Mead in Spindler, ed., 1963: 316).

The study of cultural dynamics and culture change makes evident that no system is static. A major issue will surround group confrontation. Such

aspects as acculturation, diffusion, and assimilation are essential components for the analysis of group conflict at a cross-cultural level (see Herskovits, 1967). Vital as well will be a discussion of the evolution of social stratification and the value premise upon which it thrives. (see Fried, 1967).

Chapter IV will place these concepts within a Canadian context in an attempt to reduce the theoretical component to a more practical level. The cultural diversity existing within Canada makes it a prime candidate for analysis. It is hoped that this chapter will provide a "mental catalyst" for the teacher. Important components will include cultural diversity in Canada, historical educational policies based on assimilation, cultural pluralism, and multiculturalism (theory and practice).

It becomes imperative that the Canadian teacher be made aware of the reality and determination of prejudice, discrimination, and the perpetuation of stereotyping, racism and ethnocentrism. These are processes to be reckoned with and placed within a critically oriented matrix.

Chapter V will suggest that the teacher/learner dichotomy be replaced with a notion indicating mutual symbiosis, actually involving a two-way process. The conceptual framework that anthropology provides might instill a critical cultural awareness based on the notion of variability. In essence, in the Montessorian way (see Gearing, 1973: 1227), the teacher becomes a sort of ethnographer. Once the teacher ceases to investigate, the quality of education, in this writer's opinion, stands in question.

DEFINITIONS

Social phenomena deny absolute definition. As such, definitions are always subject to revision. Basically, a definition must provide some means for explanation. In the social sciences these become numerous, based upon the researcher's idiosyncratic preferences. In this study the following constitutes this writer's preferences. The following definitions are my own, based on preferred criteria, except those that have been extracted from references (indicated).

Acculturation - "the process by which a society undergoes profound cultural change as a result of prolonged contact with another culture". (Salzmann, 1973: 253).

Anthropology - the study of man.

Assimilation - in a social group sense, "the disappearance of a minority through the loss of special identifying physical or cultural characteristics". (Harris, 1971: 624).

Compartmentalization - categorization of cognitive information into discrete packages.

Concept - a general notion guiding a system of classification.

Cultural Pluralism - a model for society based on controlled assimilation for the maintenance of ethnic integrity. It requires some degree of integration of constituent groupings necessary within the public sphere of secondary, societal institutions. At the same time, the model requires some degree of social segregation on the part of the ethnic groupings, necessary for the maintenance and growth of the distinctive culture, identity and integrity of the various ethnic groups. (Hughes and Kallen, 1974: 185-186).

Cultural Relativism - "the belief that all sociocultural systems are inherently

of equal value and that sociocultural traits must be evaluated in the context of the system in which they occur rather than in relation to some other system". (Harris, op.cit: 629).

Cultural Trait - "any single characteristic of a culture such as pattern of behavior or a typical artifact". (Salzmann, op.cit: 255).

Diffusion - "the migration and borrowing of cultural traits". (Salzmann, ibid: 255).

Discrimination - the acting out of prejudice.

Education - the acquisition of knowledge through living and experiencing.

Enculturation - "the transmission of sociocultural traits from one generation to the next by means of learning". (Harris, op.cit: 632).

Ethnocentrism - "a belief that one's own sociocultural practices and values are invariably better and more natural than the practices and values found in other societies". (Harris, ibid: 633).

Evolution - "change of an earlier form or entity into a later form or entity by means of cumulative modification". (Harris, ibid: 633).

Goal - a predetermined end to which any individual or group of individuals strive.

Holistic - an approach whereby an observation is regarded as part of the total interacting system of events.

Ideology - a set of doctrines relating to fundamental beliefs about the world.

Multiculturalism - a policy set forth to the peoples of Canada by the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre E. Trudeau, in 1971. It is a policy based on the model of cultural pluralism.

Prejudice - an opinion formed without taking all the possibilities for fairly forming the opinion into account. An attitude.

Race - "a human population whose members breed among themselves and have become distinct from other populations by sharing a number of inherited physical traits". (Salzmann, op.cit: 261).

Racism - a doctrine that incorporates the notion that some races are innately inferior/superior to other races.

Schooling - an institutionalized means for inculcating of standardized knowledge and skills by standardized and stereotyped means.

Socialization - the inculcation of basic patterns of behaviour through the interaction with parents, siblings, and others.

Stereotype - classification of a group according to criteria based on a prejudged premise.

Social Stratification - "refers to the evaluation and ranking of social categories (i.e., categories of people rather than individuals). The three fundamental dimensions for ranking found within all systems of social stratification are power, privilege and prestige". (Hughes and Kallen, op.cit: 99).

System - a set of relationships forming a whole.

Thematic - overriding orientation incorporated into a meaning.

Value - anything to which importance is attributed.

CHAPTER II

This chapter will survey some of the material dealing with Anthropology and Education. Because of the all-encompassing nature of the two fields only material dealing with "Anthropology and Education" per se will be referred to. As stated previously, information is not at all that scarce.

Undoubtedly, in a holistic sense, education has always been a concern among cultural anthropologists. As a component of culture, it represents that process through which members of a given society acquire their idiosyncratic cultural traits, incorporated within a rather unique world-view. In primitive societies, education can be visualized in the broadest sense. As such, early ethnographies refer to it congruently with cultural transmission and socialization practices. (see, for examples, Firth, 1936; Fortes, 1938). Through contact with other cultural forms, however, the uniqueness of studying these "cultural wholes" has become a rare enterprise.

Nonetheless, these early ethnographies prove invaluable when comparing and contrasting primitive education with the formalized system (schooling) representative of Western-type societies. Mead (1931) provides a good example of this. As well, Boas (1928), who apparently deplored nationalism, by contrasting Eskimo and American cultures demonstrated that the individual freedom presumed to be fundamental to democracy was hardly the case in the actual schooling of American children. Implicit throughout Boas' thinking is the assumption that only knowledge of cultural alternatives makes freedom possible and that education must incorporate such knowledge if cultural determinism is to be avoided. (in Roberts, 1976a: 6).

However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide an historical outline on the evolution of Anthropology and Education. For a concise overview of this aspect the reader is referred to Roberts, ibid; Burnett, 1978; Comitas and Dolgin, 1978.

The distinct possibility of uniting Anthropology and Education as a field of study unto itself was introduced by Hewett (op.cit.). In light of the fact that anthropology is a relatively new area of human endeavour, this early mention seems quite impressive. However, the possibility never transformed into a probability until the mid-1950's. One can only speculate as to why this was the case. Culture-contact via colonialism and trade had been present for quite some time. Perhaps the traumatic experience of two world wars, coupled with a continued threatening experience with a large influx of immigrants transporting their cultural differences, created a need to unite the two. Undoubtedly, the schooling system must have suffered from numerous cultural headaches arising from racial and cultural differences in general, and language problems in particular.

Consequently, Anthropology and Education acquired a degree of legitimacy when, in 1954, George Spindler organized a conference at Stanford, California, which dealt specifically with topics in this area. The substance of this conference was published in book form (1955). In his overview (ibid: 5-37), Spindler calls a need for cultural awareness and critical thinking in light of studying non-western societies. Kimball and his "natural history method" to educational research is also present (ibid: 82-87; to be later incorporated into his comprehensive book, op.cit: 1974, on culture and the educative process). In light of the trauma of war and a shrinking world, Cora DuBois expresses a need for intercultural understanding (ibid: 89-123). There are other contributions as well.

Since that time there has been an increasing amount of literature in the area. In 1968 the American Anthropological Association formed a Council on Anthropology and Education which set out to produce a quarterly publication. In fact, most of the literature is found in journal form, mainly in education journals, and a good number of them are written by anthropologists rather than educators.

As in any newly established field of inquiry, the reader is faced with problems of taxonomy and definition. Consequently, this area of research has taken on a number of guises based upon the perspective of the researcher. They appear as follows:

ANTHROPOLOGY AND EDUCATION - (General)

(for examples, see Vandewalker, 1898; Hewett, 1904; Boas, 1928; Ehrich, 1947; Spindler, 1955; Kimball, 1956a; Brameld, 1957; Eggan, 1957; Spindler, 1959a; Brameld and Sullivan, 1961; Paulsen, 1961; Brown, 1963; Kimball, 1963; Spindler, 1963; Shunk and Goldstein, 1964; Brameld, 1965b; Wolcott, 1967a; Burton, 1972; Gearing, 1973; Ianni, 1973; Burnett, 1974; Kimball, 1974; Roberts, 1976a; Burnett, 1978; Comitas, 1978; Comitas and Dolgin, 1978; Singleton and Textor, 1978).

a) Anthropology of Education

(for examples, see Spindler, G., and Louise, eds. (1965, a continuing series of case studies in Education and Culture, e.g., King, 1967; Wolcott, 1967b; and others); Brameld, 1957; Sindell, 1969; La Belle, 1972a; Spindler, 1974; Roberts, 1976b).

b) Anthropology in Education

(for examples, see Redfield, 1945; Brameld and Sullivan, 1961; Eddy, 1968; Bohannan, et al., 1969; Ianni, 1973; Kimball, 1974; Littleford, 1974; Chilcott, 1976).

c) Educational Anthropology

(for examples, see Rosenstiel, 1954; Kneller, 1965).

d) Cross-Cultural Education

(for examples, see Henry, 1960; Zintz, 1963; Ianni, 1973).

In this writer's opinion, these constitute the major areas within Anthropology and Education. The listing of examples is by no means complete; they constitute a representative sample of material with which this writer has familiarized himself. For a complete listing, general bibliographies in the area do exist (see Burnett, op.cit.: 1974; Roberts, op.cit.: 1976a).

The apparent divisiveness and increased compartmentalization as demonstrated by the categories above rest uneasy with this writer. Reminiscent of Henry's cross-cultural outline of education (op.cit.), they reveal a pre-occupation with categorizing research traits rather than organizing concepts and discerning processes (see Roberts, op.cit.: 1976a; 11). In light of this pre-occupation with labelling, one is left with the impression that the relationship between anthropology and education is rather "tenuous" (Brameld and Sullivan, op.cit.).

In fact, to further enhance this dilemma, Comitas (op.cit.: 11), states that at present there exists no dominant theoretical position within American Anthropology, only various "schools of inquiry". In 1961, for example, a student interested in presenting a paper entitled, "educanthropology" was told by colleagues to "lay off the idea". (Brameld and Sullivan, op.cit.: 71). This writer has suffered the same type of "encouragement" in 1981.

Nonetheless, there is a need to try and make some sense out of the controversy. The approach this writer wishes to pursue is one of discerning common themes running throughout the literature. In a general sense, this assumes some difficulty in that one must take into account the perspective and focus of the writing involved. Consequently, any themes evident in the writings of Anthropology of Education may not occur in those dealing with Anthropology in Education. The former is concerned with anthropological

approaches to the study of education and/or schooling via ethnography, for example; the latter with anthropological concepts that may be utilized within the schooling process. It is the purpose of this thesis to be pre-occupied with the latter.

Many of the writings that have been referred to under "Anthropology and Education" are of a general sort. They tend to be reviews, or, synopses in chronological order, of works that demonstrate some relationship between the two fields. As such, and this is probably due to the infancy of the area, there exists a potpourri of writings based upon idiosyncratic research.

At this point the major conclusion would seem to be that there is no theme.

Though perhaps more often implicit rather than explicit, one can detect an emphasis upon "area of concern". Undoubtedly, there are many, and this writer has selected those which appear to be most outstanding. For the purpose of this thesis, "area of concern", "theme", and "concept" will be synonymous.

An overriding concern, and in a sense a *raison d'être*, in much of the literature is one of the holistic perspective. Perhaps selfishly, this is deemed to be anthropology's unique contribution to education. Philosophically debatable, holism is concerned with viewing cultures as integrated wholes, regulated by certain socio-physico processes. And it becomes the endeavour of the social scientist to determine these processes. Of course, limitations are outstanding. At one time, anthropologists had the unique opportunity of investigating rather isolated societies and "global villages". Although intrinsically complex, they had not yet fallen victim to dominant acculturative forces. As units unto themselves they could be perceived holistically. Through time, general human expansion (i.e., imperialism, colonialism,

migration), however, generally transformed these unique entities into marginal dilemmas. Boas, for example, was quite aware of this, stressing the importance of ethnographic research.

Societies of today do not lend themselves easily to the sort of holistic "objectification" that seemed apparent in earlier times; conversely, reductionism seems in order, studying society microscopically rather than macroscopically. Yet this does not necessarily deny the holistic endeavour. Although perhaps overly simplified, it can be stated that holism implies an awareness of the integratedness of cultural activity. As such, for example, schooling becomes an institutionalized process dependent upon other social processes. Comparable to archaeological investigation, the school as a social "artifact" must be studied in situ; it cannot be divorced from the total cultural context. This is the point that anthropologists are emphasizing to educators, and it is a most important one.

Another overriding concern is one of critical thinking. Certainly, this is an essential criterion for any sort of academic pursuit. Unfortunately, critical thinking is sacredly perceived by many as only possible within the confines of the intelligentsia. This is a totalitarian view that fragments society into "those who know and those who are known". (Hymes, 1980: 7). In a communicative sense this "client relationship" (Kimball, op.cit: 1974: 109) becomes strictly unilateral, and no true learning occurs. This provides a major thesis in the work of Freire (1970). Regardless of academic achievement, the emphasis becomes one of instilling a critical consciousness in all members of society. This becomes a major task of the educator. This orientation is also particularly strong in the writing of Burton. (op.cit; see also Brameld and Sullivan, op.cit: 74; Shunk and Goldstein, op.cit: 74; Kimball, op.cit: 1974: throughout).

No one will deny the importance of the concept of culture (see Spindler, op.cit: 1955; 101, 103; Kneller, op.cit: 17-42, 115-134; Burton, op.cit.; La Belle, op.cit: 528; Kimball, op.cit: 1974; Roberts op.cit: 1976a: 2, 3, 14; Chilcott, op.cit: 326). In the light of holism, culture is viewed as a total way of life. And, in the light of critical thinking culture means much more than elitist materialism. It becomes manifest as a dynamic milieu of interacting systems and processes. As such, culture itself becomes a process, not amenable to static definition.

In the broadest sense, what distinguishes man from other members of the animal kingdom is that he is a cultural being. Moreover, he has the unique capacity to translate culture via abstract symbols. In a more specific sense, he does so differentially; that is, culture (generally) has become manifest in various expressions (specifically) vis-à-vis adaptation and evolutionary development.

There are many different ways of living, and this realization is intrinsic to the theme of cultural relativism (see Redfield op.cit: 204-205; Ehrlich, op.cit.; Rosenstiel, op.cit: 32-33; Spindler, op.cit: 1955: 100; Kimball, op.cit: 1974: 235; Chilcott, op.cit: 326). These authors emphasize that one needs to look at one's own culture through an understanding of another. Anthropology becomes important to education in that it is comparative. It recognizes the reality of a plurality of lifestyles. In such a framework does one speak of cross-cultural studies. From a practical viewpoint, this has outstanding implications. As Kimball states:

One of the errors that those who work in cross-cultural situations are likely to make has been based on the bland assumption that underneath the obvious differences, which are often viewed as superficial, the people of diverse cultures are basically alike . . . Those who hold such a view, . . . , often experience a rude shock when their most artful attempts to bring new wisdom . . . to others of

different cultures find their efforts either have little effect or produce unintended consequences (235).

Culture is learned and shared by members of a society. This process, known as enculturation, constitutes another area of concern for anthropologists and educators (see Kimball, op.cit.: 1956a: 483; Kneller, op.cit.: 12, 18; Wolcott, op.cit.: 1967a: 86; Sindell, op.cit.: 594; La Belle, op.cit.: 519; Kimball, op.cit.: 1974: 125-161; Littleford, op.cit.: 285; Mead, 1970). Enculturation involves the transmission of socio-cultural values. In primitive-type societies (non-stratified) this was a non-formalized process (excepting rites of passage ceremonies) accomplished by observing and imitating others. It is in such a milieu where any individual gains knowledge of a total culture (Mead, op.cit.: 1943).

Undoubtedly, in societies that are highly stratified (i.e., industrial, one is hard pressed to find pristine examples of the former), this is not the case. Although education can be spoken of in general terms, the total cultural knowledge becomes segmented and selectively packaged. The package is then delivered C.O.D., per taxes, in institutionalized form, the school. It is the school, in essence, which becomes the subject of scrutinous inquiry by those concerned with the anthropology of education. Indeed, and more anthropologists are aware of this than educators, a firm distinction must be drawn between education and schooling (La Belle, op.cit., 519).

Sindell (op.cit., 594), in a review of the literature in this area, discerns three foci of research. These are:

1. schools and their relations with socio-cultural milieux in which they exist;
2. description and analysis of classroom procedures;
3. the study of individual pupils and educators.

Wolcott (op.cit.: 1967a: 86), in a broader sense, lists the foci of

research in Anthropology and Education as being:

1. the formal educational institution itself is the object of the inquiry;
2. the school as an enculturator;
3. the school as an acculturative agent representing domination of one group by another.

The orientation of this thesis relates most specifically to the schema outlined by Wolcott above.

As the school becomes the focus for inquiry among anthropologists and educators, the transmission of cultural knowledge via this institution becomes a major concern. What kind of knowledge is being transmitted, and in what form? Consequently, the areas of investigation surround content, context, and process (see Ehrich, op.cit., 60; Rosenthal, op.cit., 30; Burton, op.cit.; Gearing, op.cit., 1230; Kimball, op.cit., 1974: 47, 70, 131, 132, 137). According to Ehrich, "the student too often loses the consciousness that all the activities of a group are interrelated, and he frequently finishes a course with little or no sense of the fundamental unity of his own culture in particular or mankind in general" (op.cit.: 60). This area of concern becomes one of compartmentalization.

The act of categorizing is intrinsic to the world-view of Western man. When the objects-to-be-categorized possess rather concretely observable physical properties they lend themselves to the Linnaean formula of classification. However, with "objects" that are highly transmutable (i.e., social phenomena) categorization becomes a highly prejudicial one. Moreover, social phenomena cannot be regarded as isolated entities; they constitute dynamic systems of interaction, and are observed as processes. It is the argument of these authors that the schooling process has unrealistically compartmentalized social phenomena, and physical phenomena as well, belittling the universal

interrelatedness of existence.

Culture is characterized as dynamic. The whole aspect of change is what apparently makes the theory of evolution an observable process. Change is inevitable, and it is perhaps the utopic endeavour of many a social scientist to not only discern what causes change, but to be able to control and direct it. The significance of studying socio-cultural conflict is that it has immediate concerns (see Spindler, op.cit., 1959a: 396; Kneller, op.cit., 80-94; Kimball, op.cit., 1974; Chilcott, op.cit., 328; Comitas, op.cit., 31).

Spindler sees change as a value in itself. Basically, change may be perceived at two levels. Firstly, the change and conflict that occurs within a given cultural system. Secondly, that which occurs between cultural systems. The former confirms that no society is static; the latter, however, is more pronounced and directly observable, becoming the subject matter of anthropological studies dealing with acculturation (for example, see Herskovits, op.cit.)

Then there is the case of a North Australian tribe whose men used the stone axe to kill animals and cut firewood. The axe was their treasured possession and the symbol of their masculinity. Missionaries, however, introduced steel choppers and gave them to both men and women. Quite unintentionally they disturbed the pattern of sex and age relationships, destroying the reasons that led children and adolescents to obey their male elders and depriving the men of their self-respect. Now women could chop! The tribe was almost ruined by an act of kindness. (Kneller, op.cit., 9).

Once again, the school becomes the subject for analysis vis-à-vis transmission of cultural values and socio-cultural conflict. It must be underlined, however, that the school cannot instigate change sui generis. Nonetheless, it is regarded as part of the cultural process. The question becomes one of how should society best convey cultural knowledge within an institutionalized setting that best reflects the reality of socio-cultural conflict?

Kimball (op.cit., 1974: 23), emphasizes that schooling should develop the capacity to recognize and solve problems. Comitas (op.cit., 31) writes in terms of discerning, analyzing, and resolving "events of crisis".

In the light of viewing schooling as a cultural process, and the educator as a contributor to this process, it seems reasonable to assume that the educator become critically reflective of his/her part in the process. Thus, another area of concern becomes one of the educator as social scientist (see Vandewalker, op.cit.; Eggan, op.cit., 254; Burton, op.cit., 1; Gearing, op.cit., 1227).

The act of going through the institutionalized "ritual" of becoming a teacher should not be an end in itself. Without this recognition one can easily fall into the trap of those who know telling those who do not know. The educator is forever in a process of becoming; to believe otherwise is to negate cultural dynamics. As an active participant within the cultural matrix, the educator must visualize the student community as an active participant as well. A concept that emphasizes an I-you relationship instigates alienation and produces social fragmentation.

In terms of methodological orientation, most of the readings in this area favour a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one (see Paulsen, op.cit., 296; Brown, op.cit., 252; Kimball, op.cit., 1974: 59-74; Roberts, op.cit., 1976a: 14; Comitas, op.cit., 35-36). The emphasis is upon "getting to know the people", which is most effectively accomplished through participant observation as opposed to the questionnaire technique. Being a matter for philosophical debate, this writer does not wish to belabour the matter here. In the final analysis, it becomes one of personal preference (see Polanyi, 1974). This writer's preference has been established in the initial chapter. To settle this concern, a remark made by Comitas (35-36) is in order:

Were people chess pieces and were social orders chess boards, the task of understanding would be simpler. It would be enough . . . to describe the color pattern and the relation of the pieces to each other and to the board in order to comprehend the game. But they are not; people recapitulate and reinterpret the past as they anticipate the future. They combine vast sets of variously interrelated and effective influences in becoming who they are.

An area of concern that received no sizeable recognition was that of evolution. Congruent with the reality of change one could surmise that the concept lies implicit in most of the writing. However, the word per se is infrequently referred to. The mentioning of evolution in a biological sense is a rare occurrence indeed (albeit Brameld, 1965b; Kimball, op.cit., 1974: 59-74; Chilcott, op.cit., 328).

Perhaps this can be explained away by stating that the writers involved are more preoccupied with the cultural aspect of existence as a result of being untrained as physical anthropologists. Nonetheless, the whole issue of evolution (biological and cultural) is a crucial one, and this writer will elaborate upon its significance in the following chapter.

As well, there has been a lack of emphasis upon utilizing anthropological concepts within the schooling system. There are instances of instigating anthropology-type courses in institutions other than at the university level (Bohannon et al: 1969; and see Ianni, op.cit.). Yet, there is hardly a mention of the necessity of utilizing anthropological concepts in a pervasively interdisciplinary sense.

It would seem logical, therefore, that the initial recipients of this enlightening endeavour should be the prospective teachers themselves. And it is primarily to them that this thesis addresses itself. This chapter has provided an overview of some of the major themes within the area of Anthropology and Education.

CHAPTER III

The title of this thesis is "Anthropology and Teacher Education". The purpose of this thesis is to discern and to discuss certain anthropological concepts relative to teacher education, and their import to education in general. These concepts and their import would become a pervasive characteristic of education in general. As such, these concepts might be incorporated within some sort of pedagogical constitution to which all members of a faculty of education might abide.

A limitation to this seemingly utopic endeavour, however, is simply one of characterising these concepts as "anthropological". This immediately assumes an anthropological priority to which scholars in other disciplines might take, and rightfully so, offense. A scholar in psychology, for example, might be either partially or fully in disagreement with the concepts this writer has deemed significant. Consequently, this scholar has the right to issue remarks concerning academic imperialism! And indeed, this writer appears hypocritical in that in his campaign against compartmentalization, he, himself, has fallen victim to categorizing concepts as "anthropological".

Too often we refer to scholars as anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, et cetera. Perhaps a more appropriate title to this thesis would have been "The Human Condition and Teacher Education". This might give the impression of unclaimed territory. But there are two sides to the coin here.

On the one side we might have a tendency to utter that all anthropologists are alike; much in the same way Anglo-Saxons might utter that all

Indians are alike. As such, we run into the problem of stereotyping and exaggerating upon perceived differences of certain individuals. Unfortunately, these exaggerated perceptions become a typification of all members belonging to the group (discipline). Anthropologists are so and so, sociologists are so and so, et cetera. And most certainly there is an emotional committment attached to these generalities. To solve this dilemma one might suggest the elimination of "ists", providing qualifications such as "one who studies anthropology", for example.

On the other side, however, we realize that, regardless of individual variation and stereotyping based upon exaggerated differences, these disciplines follow theoretical tenets unique unto themselves. This aspect becomes detrimental when any given discipline assumes self-righteousness and academic arrogance. Yet, it also proves fruitful in understanding that all disciplines are concerned with the human condition in some form. A diversity of outlooks (disciplines, theoretical orientations) is probably essential in determining any truths.

Necessarily pleading ignorance to the knowledge of absolute truth, a plurality of orientations seems a logical path to proceed upon. Anthropology, therefore, must be regarded as a legitimate and meaningful field of inquiry. If we look at its development in historical perspective we can readily discern theoretical approaches unique to the field. These approaches will be outlined in the following pages. Before doing so, however, let us first examine the current status of anthropology (type) courses within teacher training institutions across Canada.

Drewe (1980) has provided a report on the state of Educational Foundations in Canada. The need for such a study was based upon an observation of the decline of the field in the United States during the last decade (ibid: 1).

A questionnaire was sent out to the chairmen, or corresponding representatives, of all 48 teacher training institutions in Canada. The return of these was a gratifying 45 of 48, or 93.7 percent (ibid: 3).

Without going into great detail of this study, the general impression was that the state of Educational Foundations in Canada is stable, definitely not declining in general, and that some areas were experiencing growth. There was a particular mention of a growing need for cross-cultural education (ibid: 11, 13). As well, anthropology has been a recent addition in some institutions (ibid: 5). For example, the number of anthropology-type courses offered in one calendar year to undergraduate students during teacher training across Canada is eight (five in the Western provinces, one in Quebec, and two in the Atlantic provinces, institutions unspecified).

At the graduate level six courses were offered (ibid: 24). In terms of enrollment in the last five years, anthropology-type courses reveal a decrease of 25 per cent in two, an increase of 25 per cent in three, and five have remained stable (ibid: 25). Finally, a slight growth was predicted in that two institutions reported an additional course to be added in the area of Anthropology and Education (ibid: 28).

In no way do these figures indicate an overwhelming need for anthropology in education, nor that the state of Educational Foundations is witnessing a renaissance. In fact, across Canada, of the 44 responding institutions, 15 listed two or less instructors in Foundations (ibid: 16)! Other than arguing tokenism on the part of Faculties of Education in Canada for allowing foundation areas not to become extinct, we may surmise that their demise is not yet ascertainable.

Congruent with the above, this thesis is catering to a perceived need, although apparently minimal. Furthermore, this writer boldly declares that

the need is probably greater than it is perceived to be. The courses offered tend to be electives for those either keenly or mildly interested in Anthropology and Education. It is this writer's belief that exposure to concepts as defined through anthropology become mandatory to all students within education.

Of course, this statement reeks of unwarranted monopolization.

Drewe states "with the exception of the Atlantic region there is a general move to offering a foundations course, often entitled Issues in Education or the like, which combines several foundations subjects in a general look at the role of education in society . . ." (ibid: 11). Why could not anthropology be incorporated in this enthusiastic endeavour? The material presented under such an enterprise will undoubtedly lack detailed analysis, but the important issue is that all students will be exposed to it.

The necessity for the incorporation of these concepts becomes even more evident in terms of the very make-up of our society. In a country that portends to understand and perpetuate cultural pluralism, and where words such as "race", "ethnicity", "discrimination" and "racism" are part of our everyday language, how can we still deny the relevance of anthropology? It is this writer's belief that after an initial exposure to these concepts, a full course should be maintained in all teacher training institutions and become mandatory for those involved in designing and implementing programmes relating to the teaching and developing (i.e., curriculum) of the social sciences.

In this manner may anthropology gain a rightful place within the institution without becoming capitalistic. As well, there should be no extensive outcries of territorial imperialism from those members of a department of anthropology outside of the teacher training institution, for

the latter maintains a professional role vis-à-vis schooling, and anthropology offered therein would focus upon education and schooling.

As stated in Chapter II of this thesis, this writer has not come across much literature dealing with Anthropology and Teacher Education per se (see Redfield, op.cit., 1945; Eddy, op.cit.; Kimball, op.cit., 1974; Littleford, op.cit.. Note: one might argue that any number of works relating to either anthropology and/or education will indirectly relate to teacher education. Indeed, this is true, as the following chapters will indicate. In this instance, however, this writer is referring specifically to those writings whose purpose is directly and explicitly involved with the relevance of anthropology to teacher education). Unfortunately, the few writings that do exist are neither extensive nor totally convincing; but rather brief assertions that anthropology has significance to the education of teachers. This is a tenuous statement that needs greater elaboration and qualification.

In a review of the relevant literature as presented in the previous chapter, it was this writer's intention of discerning what he felt were common areas of concern, or themes, running throughout. To refresh the reader's memory of these they are listed below as they appear sequentially in Chapter II.

1. Holistic Perspective
2. Critical Thinking
3. Culture
4. Cultural Relativism
5. Enculturation
6. Compartmentalization
7. Socio-cultural Conflict
8. Educator as Social Scientist
9. Evolution.

Of course, this listing represents a select group. Furthermore, we might be able to make a distinction here between themes and what seem to be qualifiers of themes. Consequently, this writer has taken the liberty of reducing this list to what he perceives as being four major themes. These four themes are:

1. Evolution, Race and Ethnicity
2. Culture
3. Enculturative Process
4. Cultural Dynamics and Culture Change.

The reasons for this reduction are as follows. The holistic perspective and critical thinking (awareness) are perceived as all-encompassing; that is, these are qualifiers that are essential to all the four categories above. They represent, more or less, a thread running throughout. Cultural relativism is an aspect that is implicit to an understanding of culture and is discussed simultaneously with it. The problem of compartmentalization is perhaps the antithesis to holism. It could be dealt with in a number of ways, the most grandiose being its relationship to reality itself. As well, it can be regarded as a means by which knowledge is transmitted among certain human populations. In this sense it becomes associated with the enculturative process, and therein will it be discussed. For the purpose of this thesis, socio-cultural conflict is synonymous to cultural dynamics and culture change. The educator as social scientist will provide the basis for discussion in the last chapter of this thesis.

The order in which these four themes appear is not random. Bohannon et al., (op.cit., 410) argue that they hesitate to discuss human evolution prior to cultural issues. In their opinion, this assumes a chronological approach with teleological implications. Rather, their approach is one of

going from ethnographic fact to the abstract, from the local to the universal. Indeed, their argument may be well founded; however, from a conceptual viewpoint (and this does not imply ahistorical) this writer is more concerned with perspective rather than historical progression. As outlined in Chapter I, humans are to be regarded in some cosmological perspective, with an approach that is historico-biological.

Consequently, when we regard evolution as transformation operating upon principles of chance, direction need not be implied. Chronology, therefore, becomes a research technique that is misleading when regarded in terms of direction. With this in mind, Bohannan's argument is not all that convincing.

The themes will be discussed in a general way, hopefully not too general. Indeed, theses could be written on any one of these themes. But the nature of this thesis can be justified on the grounds that it is exploratory (see Kimball, op.cit., 1974: 57), and hopefully it will lead others to investigate the relevance of these themes, utilizing any number of methodological approaches, within the context of education and schooling.

EVOLUTION, RACE AND ETHNICITY

Evolution and race are discussed simultaneously for a couple of reasons. Firstly, and more generally, both words evoke stereotyped images within the minds of men. Secondly, it is impossible to relate to race in a historico-biological sense without making reference to evolutionary principles.

Without being naive, it can safely be stated that to many, the word "evolution" brings to mind notions of monkeys and men. Moreover, the association between the two is usually regarded in direct relational terms. Although fallacious, the notion seems both intriguing and appalling when we wander off to the zoo, for example, and find ourselves face to face with these furry creatures.

Unfortunately, to many this fantasy has been transformed into a social myth which seems more often real than unreal, and the mere thought of inter-primal relatedness becomes both defacing and bestial. This is a prejudice based upon hearsay and ignorance of the facts, coupled with the sanctification of humanness as the apex of achievement. A very obvious question, for example, is that if humans have directly descended from the ape then why are there apes with us today? The problem is basically one of not questioning; the general populace seems more content with sensational evidence based on social gossip.

It becomes the task of the educator and the educational system (e.g., schooling) to correct this myopic tendency. This might be achieved with the implementation of anthropological data.

Before this writer attempts to reveal the importance of the evolutionary perspective to educational practice, it is important to mention that in some circles and to some scholars there is much debate concerning the relation of

evolution to truth. There have been, and there are today, court cases being conducted whereby members of the opposing camp question its authenticity and a priori relevance in the schooling system. Although arguments against evolution tend to be of a "religious" nature, there should be enough opposition to make the serious scientist aware that we are dealing primarily with a theory. Evolution, therefore, is a theory that requires constant testing.

In reference to his Primitive Social Organization, Service writes (1962: 10):

This book is rife with speculation and conjecture . . . The error, however, lay in the non-scientific, clannish antagonisms which turned speculations into convictions. But the way to cope with such human frailties is not to foreswear or outlaw theory, speculations, and conjectures, for they are an important part of scientific thought. Rather, there must be an effort to be wary of the emotional states and social or political circumstances that transform mere speculations such as the Kon Tiki notions into vehemently held beliefs, for then they resemble religion rather than science.

Nonetheless, the theory of evolution has gained wide acceptance in anthropological circles and by many is regarded as a truism (Brameld, op.cit., 1965b: 213). Based upon accumulated anthropological data this writer as well believes in its existence; indeed, the conceptual framework of this thesis is based upon it. In this writer's opinion, the fundamentalist view of paralleling evolutionism with atheism is quite prejudicial and misleading as well.

Père Teilhard de Chardin, in his book, The Phenomenon of Man (op.cit.), attempts to unify evolution and Christianity. He, himself, was a Jesuit missionary working in the caves at Choukoutien (China), meticulously sorting out the remains of Homo erectus. Although regarded by the hard-core scientist as a mystic, his approach of synthesis rather than antithesis is, in this

writer's opinion, to be highly respected. Undoubtedly, the religious debate will continue until the ultimate truth (if ever) is revealed.

The primary pedagogical postulate here is that evolution is a process of change that affects all aspects of nature. This is holistic of course, but carrying the important concept that humankind is actually a part of nature. How often do we not look at the gorilla in the cage as being not from our world (i.e., the world of human constructs)? Our efforts will be meaningless unless we begin to admire the fact, and suffer self-humiliation, that we are a part of the process, that we are conditioned by ecological forces. As such, evolution is still occurring; it affects all aspects of nature (see Scientific American, September, 1978, Special Issue on Evolution).

Harris (1975: 6) states that "the feature that distinguishes evolutionary change from nonevolutionary change is transformation: change of an earlier form or entity into a later form or entity by means of cumulative modifications". The essence of bioevolution, however, is its opportunism and pragmatism (chance), and there is no basis for attributing any single or irreversible direction of change to this process (ibid: 18). Harris, of course, offers no room for teleology here, judgementally so, albeit inconclusively so.

In a discussion of biological evolution it is inevitable that genetics enter into it. This is a complex area of study which this writer is not well versed in, and a detailed analysis of it is not essential to the substance of this thesis (for a good introduction see Harris, ibid: chapter 2).

In a more general sense the educator should become aware of the evolutionary process in terms of environment, adaptation, and natural selection. A relevant question becomes - why are there so many forms of life on this Earth? In terms of geography we notice that certain areas contain certain types of species unique to that area. We might be able to explain this

variation in terms of evolutionary processes. It becomes a question of special adaptation to a unique environment with the guidance of natural selection.

In essence, the notion of "natural selection" is quite abstract. It is that "force" (perhaps it might best be perceived as a process) of "genetic intervention"; that is, it acts upon the genetic endowment of an organism so as to best make it adaptable to its surrounding environment. In a specific sense, it is purely pragmatically functional and opportunistic, operating within the context of the immediate physical environment. According to Ginsburg and Laughlin (1966: 201) "the genetic endowment of any organism, which includes its behavioral capacities, represents a potential, the actualization of which involves a series of interactions with environmental factors that restrict the degrees of freedom of this potential". As such, a dramatic environmental change can lead to extinction of the organism (e.g., speculation as to the demise of the dinosaur population). In this sense, evolution can be regarded specifically as organismic adaptation to a specific physical environment (ecological niche) guided by natural selection.

It is important here to bring in the notion of the "survival of the fittest" and certain misconceptions about it. Indeed, in a genetic sense, certain species appear more fit within a given environment under certain conditions. "Fit" is congruent with adaptability. Those that are the least adaptable die out. But we are faced with a problem when speaking in the superlative. We might conclude that the "fittest" are representative of some intrinsic preferential treatment on the part of natural selection. This contradicts the notion of opportunism and assumes a value judgement whereby the "fittest" represent some divine manifest destiny. This notion has disastrous implications when transferred to a social level (i.e., Social

Darwinism). In light of this principle we might assume an ethnocentric bias whereby some cultures are more fit than others, and in terms of adaptation they might be, under certain conditions, utilizing it as an excuse for exploitation (e.g., competition, imperialism, colonialism, difference in intelligence, et cetera).

We may also speak of evolution in more general terms as well as specific (see Sahlins and Service, eds. 1960). General evolution as an area of inquiry becomes a philosopher's paradise. This approach assumes a cosmological perspective, incorporating the entire life history of the Earth, and no less, the universe. Brameld (op.cit., 1965b) argues that this approach become an integral part of educational inquiry. From a philosophical perspective the student visualizes the process of evolution as an unfolding one, a becoming, a progression of increased complexity. For example, the history of the Earth might be seen at various stages of evolutionary development such as:

preorganic _____ organic _____ postorganic _____

Or, in reference to Teilhard de Chardin (op.cit.):

geosphere _____ biosphere _____ noosphere (increased
hominization)

From a "less" grandiose and more historical perspective Brameld (op.cit., 1965b: 168) suggests the following orientations:

anthropocentrism - man as centre of everything

geocentrism - Earth as fulcrum of the solar system with Sun and Planets revolving about (i.e., Ptolemaic)

heliocentrism - Sun as centre of universe (i.e., Copernican)

galactocentrism - Sun as at the periphery of the Milky Way Galaxy

In assuming this approach we once again may fall into the trap of directional implications. Consequently, these categories can only act as a frame of reference. The more important realization is the need to shift

away from self-righteous egocentrism into a perspective that is "cosmo-centric".

The evolution of humankind, therefore, is only a part of the evolutionary process; humans are not necessarily the final expression, or the raison d'être, of evolution. Pedagogically speaking, Chilcott (op.cit., 1976: 327) states that students find the study of man exciting. Moreover, according to Chilcott, it challenges the interest of students in all levels of capacity - not merely the bright! (cf. Bohannon et al., op.cit., 1969: 409 - the students exposed to anthropology in this report were a "select" group whose capacities ran from "average" up. In this writer's opinion, there is no room for such academic elitism in our schooling system).

Quite recently, this writer offered a course in anthropology at a rural high school in Manitoba. The students in this group were heterogeneous in "intellectual capacities", but all students were eagerly enthusiastic when it came to discussing human evolution. The concept was the most important element; technological jargon was undermined.

Perhaps this statement warrants blasphemous outcries from the academic intelligentsia, but this writer wishes to underline that especially at this level of schooling, learning should be an exciting and cooperative affair. "Exciting" does not imply sensationalism, rather a milieu in which students can share their ideas where no one has the final answer. So much schooling involves a process whereby one verifies an answer from those listed at the back of the book. In a situation where there is no final answer education becomes a search, not a solution, and it becomes the task of the educator to lead the search by instilling critical awareness.

For the educator there are many good books dealing with human evolution. In this writer's opinion Dobzhansky's (1962) Mankind Evolving: The Evolution

of the Human Species is a goldmine of information. Hughes and Kallen (op.cit.) provide good introductory chapters on the "spectrum of man and his diversity". Hunter and Whitten, eds. (1979) offer a collection of anthropological articles in which human evolution is included. Recently, Richard Leakey (1978) has published a book, intended for the layman, on his work in East Africa entitled People of the Lake: Mankind and Its Beginnings.

It is to be remembered that much of this sort of writing is speculative and controversial. Palaeoanthropology is based upon fossil evidence, much of which is fragmentary. Consequently, there is no conclusive proof of what actually belongs to the human phylogeny. Leakey, for example, will argue that australopithecines do not contribute directly to the hominid lineage. Rather, he has found evidence of another creature, namely *Homo habilis*, that does, he claims, have a direct relationship. Yet another palaeoanthropologist, Don Johanson (1981), has recently unearthed skeletal evidence in another African location claiming that his find, *australopithecus afarensis* ("Lucy"), is a true progenitor of humankind, and consequently sympathizes neither with Leakey nor his evidence. Packed into one volume all of this controversy could probably provide the greatest mystery story of all time.

But it is not the object of this writing to expound upon these technicalities; rather, its intention has been to surmise the import of the general concept of evolution to education in general and schooling in particular. What this writer is concerned with is the concept, or the idea.


Anthropological data have revealed, for example, that the origin of humankind is probably to be found in Africa; that from this area did humankind proliferate and migrate to other parts of Europe and Asia; that the migration to North America is a relatively recent occurrence; that evolution is an ongoing process as demonstrated by fossil evidence; that environment

is a key variable in determining the evolutionary process; and that, consequently, change is inevitable and we are all amidst the process. Of course, these are but a few of the ideas that have great educational significance in developing a perspective that is "cosmocentric" rather than "egocentric".

There is much speculation as to the origin of humankind and with each new fossil discovery there seems to be yet more. And, indeed there are many gaps in the fossil record. Instead of referring to a "missing link" it would probably be more appropriate to speak of "missing links". Nonetheless, palaeoanthropologists have painstakingly amassed enough data in order for us to make some general conclusions.

It would appear that our origin is to be found somewhere in East Africa, with true hominid-like creatures appearing some 5 million years ago. Evolution as an ongoing process would continue to modify the physical appearance of the hominid line congruent with environmental adaptation (specifically) and lifestyle (generally). As well, these early hominids would radiate from the African continent unto other parts of the world.

As yet, no hominid fossil evidence has been found anywhere in the world that is older than that found in Africa. This is not to conclude that it is not possible. For example, ramapithecine remains (the earliest known linkage to the hominid line, circa 11-14 million years ago) have been located in northern India, China, and Spain. Certain authorities are disputing this linkage, however (see Harris, op.cit., 1975: 46). The remains of a later form of hominid, Homo erectus (circa 500 thousand years ago) have been unearthed in Europe and as far away as China and Java. The whole point of this is that there might be some type of argument pro multi-origin or parallel evolution. But as it now stands, there is but one origin, and this is to be found in Africa.



If the latter statement is true, then it becomes necessary to think in terms of migration. Why did human populations move from one area to another? More than likely in search of sustenance. But as soon as populations start moving they may introduce themselves to varying environments and other populations; and these in turn will affect evolutionary development of the population adapting to them.

In light of the evolutionary process there comes a point in our analyses whereby we must make a distinction between what is human and what is not human? More than likely the "transitional" phase is more a process of "becoming" rather than one of definite delineation. But associated with some of the early hominid finds are crude stone tools. Indeed, they are crude, and early examples (Australopithecine-Oldowan) are no more than a few flakes chopped from a stone. Yet, in a rudimentary way, this may be indicative of a mental process that involves preconception. Consequently, through modification, these implements demonstrate a finer fabricating technique over time (e.g., Acheulian).

It is at this point, the capacity to mould an idea, and to reflect upon one's inventiveness that we refer to humans as having a culture.

Although culture becomes the focus of attention in the following section, it is to be stated here that as we may speak of evolution in biological terms, we may also speak of it in cultural terms. Recalling the definition given by Harris re evolution and transformation (op.cit., 1975: 6), cultural development as well may be regarded in terms of cumulative modification. Yet, we must recall that we are dealing at two levels here, and that perhaps a one to one correspondence is not in order. Whereas one is necessarily and immediately functional (biology), the other is primarily abstract and possibly biologically dysfunctional (cultural). We might be able to witness cultural evolution vis-à-vis technological achievement, but how do we detect cultural evolution

as cumulative modification in a social sense?

The problem once again is one of directionality. If "cumulative modification" becomes associated with the notion of "progress" misconceptions will arise. "Progress" may be interpreted in several ways, but common knowledge may align it with "betterment" or "improving". Should "cumulative modification" mean "improving" then we might accept the illusion that evolution is improving, and our civilization as it now stands is an improvement over previous forms.

As such, progress should be regarded only in the light of non-directional movement. Now, this is to be regarded only in gross evolutionary terms. Progress as improvement can exist. For example, if we could increase levels of employment, or increase the standard of living among many poor peoples, this could be deemed as progress.

On a cross-culturally comparative level, however, we might assume that to increase industrialization, for example, is to progress (improve), and those that enforce the industrial imperative are qualitatively "further ahead" than those who are not at this level. This is cultural imperialism and its ethnocentrically destructive mode must be exposed in the educational process.

More will be said on this topic further on in this thesis. The general orientation has been one of generally introducing the concept of evolution. The immediate task is to demonstrate its relatedness to Race.

Race, like evolution, has fallen victim to various social misconceptions. The word automatically evokes images of social conflict. Montagu (1962; ed. op.cit., 1964) argues that "race" closes the mind (op.cit., 1962: 920) and that the word should be abandoned for a more appropriate one (ibid: 919).

He utilizes the word "genogroup", referring to "a breeding population which differs from the other breeding populations of the species in the frequency of one or more genes" (ibid: 925). Hiernaux (1968: 193-194) refers

to race as "a group of populations" whose individuals in turn are "characterized by a gene pool". Hughes and Kallen (op.cit., 42) regard race as "an endogamous or inbreeding population, large or small, that has come through time to be characterized by gene frequencies that are different from those of other populations".

Basically, race must be examined at two levels, biological and social. It must not be forgotten that humans are biological organisms susceptible to certain uncontrollable external forces. We must take for granted that evolution has been an ongoing process. As demonstrated earlier, biological evolution involves three factors - the environment, adaptation, and natural selection.

Obviously, the world is made up of various sorts of environments (i.e., tropical, arctic, and so on), and somehow the organism must function in such a way whereby it best suits (adapts to) the particular environment in which it exists. This is where the process of natural selection comes in. It is that random (chance) process whereby certain genes are accorded "preference" in determining the biological make-up of the organism. The "preferred" combination of genes is known as a genotype. What we actually see is the phenotype (see Harris, op.cit., chapter 2).

The phenotype, therefore, is determined by the genotype, which in turn is determined by adaptation to a given environment. Human beings are all of one species, however, in that inter-breeding is possible. Consequently, "races", or "local populations" of individuals have evolved in an idiosyncratic way relative to a given environment (recall the earlier discussion on evolution and migration).

Men are black, for example, because their environment has determined a need for it. Blackness is no more than the degree of melanin (pigment) in

one's skin. We all have melanin, but certain groups of people phenotypically express more because the environment demands that the organism be more protected against solar radiation.

The important aspect here is "groups of people". Variation will exist within any group [an aspect that palaeoanthropologists might tend to ignore - i.e., discovering a new species which, in essence, might be a variation of a known one; cf. Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 79 - "Variation within a group . . . is almost invariably found to be greater than variation between human groups"; however, re evolution and natural selection Leakey op.cit., 1978: 192 -

The revolution in biological science that has been stirring quietly for some years but which has only very recently gathered any real momentum concerns the focus of evolutionary pressures; biologists are now beginning to realize that, because of the laws of natural selection, it is not just different species that arise in competition, but individuals within a species compete with each other too. Natural selection works at the level of individuals, not on population⁷.

We can, and have the tendency to want to, identify groups of people based on external expression (phenotype). In the past, physical anthropologists have measured such physical differences and categorized them according to certain traits (e.g., shape of the skull, type of hair, body stature, and so on). Such categorizations are often arbitrary. As such, scholars have always been at odds as to how many races exist. In light of migration and racial exogamy, it becomes more and more difficult to categorize racial traits on physical appearance alone. Consequently, distinctions are now based on aspects of genetic endowment and blood types (see Dobzhansky, op.cit.).

Although we may feel a bit comfortable interpreting race in a physical sense, that is, we can scientifically investigate seemingly tangible elements, we are not at all comfortable when dealing with the social definition of race. Herein the very arbitrary nature of defining race comes to the fore. In a social sense race has come to mean "groups of people who look and live

differently from other groups of people". As such, we might be inclined to visualize our French population as one race, and our Anglo-Saxon population as another. According to our biological definition of race (Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 42), however, this belief does not hold true. Even though the differences may be quite real, erroneous assumptions and value judgements (expressed as a stereotype) are too often applied to them.

It is an unfortunate thing (i.e., not in a morally sympathetic sense but in one as how differences are perceived) that those people who do look different physically usually have a way of life (traditional culture) which is also quite different structurally. It is also an unfortunate thing that a certain group of people may have become technologically so advanced as it would appear that this attribute could establish itself as a criterion for cultural advancement and even superiority.

Ethnicity, as well, seems to defy absolute definition (see Isajiw, 1974). Its interpretation, therefore, becomes arbitrary and often leads to erroneous misconceptions. One of these is to confuse the term "ethnicity" with "race". As stated earlier, to refer to a "French race" or an "English race", for example, is both incorrect and socially dangerous. The English and the French are of the same racial stock. To regard them as separate and distinct races is to incorrectly devise a social mechanism for attaining some divine sort of segregation.

When speaking in terms of cultural differences between French and English peoples we must make reference in terms of ethnic groups. Ethnic distinction can be based upon racial distinction, but more importantly, it must be based on socio-cultural distinction. Accordingly, "ethnicity. . . refers to any arbitrary classification of human populations utilizing the bio-cultural criterion of actual or assumed ancestry in conjunction with such

socio-cultural criteria as actual or assumed nationality and religion" (Hughes and Kallen op.cit., 83, underlining mine). Coupled with this is the important aspect of peoplehood or belongingness to a particular group (Hughes and Kallen, ibid., 83, 119, 121-122). In this sense, is being Canadian, for example, belonging to a particular ethnic group, or can the country itself be defined as a single ethnic unit?

We must never lose sight of the fact that culture is a dynamic and fluid reality. Ethnic groups are not static entities; rather, they are amoeba-like and changing. Such processes as intermarriage and shifting residential patterns make it difficult to demarcate an ethnic group (i.e., ethnic boundary).

Taking into account that social relationships are changing and difficult to define absolutely, another problem is faced. This deals with subjective and/or objective analysis of social phenomena. In this light a distinction must be drawn between ethnic group and ethnic category.

When we look at the Canadian Indian, for example, we might well agree that all members belong to a given race. Consequently, we might also wish to agree that all Indians belong to the same ethnic group, which is Indian. This is similar to uttering that the French and English belong to the same ethnic group because they look the same. On the contrary, ask an Indian with whom he wishes to identify himself and he may likely reply that he is Chippewa, or Blackfoot, or Sioux, and so on. The important point here is that Indians themselves make a distinction as to what group they wish to belong.

Ethnic category, therefore, is an "objective" term, based on subjective criteria, created by the researcher for means of analysis. It "refers to a conceptual or statistical category which may or may not correspond with an actual (empirical) group" (Hughes and Kallen, ibid., 87). "Indian", there-

fore is an ethnocentric perception. It is much like putting apples and oranges into the same basket and naming them collectively as fruit. Yet, as stated by Bleibtreu and Meaney (1973: 186) - ". . . our culture finds it difficult or mentally uncomfortable to deal with categories that are not clearly distinct from one another and that do not remain stable".

An ethnic category is more ideal than real. An ethnic group involves subjective criteria (Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 119-122); that is, a member of a particular group is asked as to what group (s)he wishes to make reference. The important question becomes, what criteria does s(he) use for purposes of identification? At present this area is begging for research. Some may say that to maintain one's identity is to perpetuate the language of that given group (see Lupul, 1977, for example). Yet what of the third generation Canadian or Ukrainian background who no longer speaks Ukrainian but wishes to be identified with "Ukrainianness"? In other words, can a distinct ethnic identity be maintained with no knowledge of the ethnic language? Undoubtedly, other ethnic traits must be considered - religion, folklore, feeling of likeness, et cetera.

From an educational standpoint it becomes crucial to observe and to internalize the differences that exist among various terms, and realize that to utilize them interchangeably as has occurred in the past and is still occurring today, not only produces erroneous conclusions but reprehensibly implants false knowledge in the minds of members of a society. This writer has attempted to demonstrate in the preceding passages the significance of acquiring a perspective that is evolutionary (biological and cultural) and retrospective. In order to understand the biological diversity of humankind, and begin to break down some of the erroneous beliefs about racial differences, the kinds of knowledge that anthropology can provide are truly valuable.

CULTURE

Most people have little difficulty defining culture. To many, culture is simply the material baggage of the upper crust of society. Culture is the symphony; culture is fine art, and so on. Of course, this is a very naive interpretation of it. Once again, this type of definition indicates the tendency to want to define reality in an immediate and categorical way.

What of societies that have no symphony, no affinity toward "fine art"? Do they have a culture? The answer is quite obvious.

The idea of culture is in itself so abstract, apparently so holistic as to be unrealistically observable, that definitions of it arise from a myriad of perspectives. Lawson (1964, 450), in a survey of standard English dictionary definitions of culture, discerned three areas where culture was expressed by idiosyncratic definitions. These were:

1. the agricultural-biological;
2. the sociological-anthropological;
3. the artistic-literary-moral.

As stated previously, it is with the artistic-literary-moral that most people identify culture. Culture in an agricultural sense entails the preparation of land to raise crops (i.e., cultivation). In a biological sense it entails a colony of bacteria that has been prepared for experimental purposes. It is with the sociological-anthropological sense that this thesis concerns itself.

In their quest for "true" meaning, many social scientists like to steer away from the common folk-type definitions. Consequently, new definitions are formulated to fit jargonistic needs. As stated previously, any definition within social science seems hardly ever convincing or conclusive. This makes much sense when we realize that culture itself is constantly changing

and we are all part of it. Of course, this undoubtedly begs for a grand philosophical debate as to objectivity in social science and human potential to discern absolute truth within it.

Definitions are an essential element in discerning reality; however, devoting much time in developing a truly specific, and perhaps static, definition, (and we have no way of knowing which is the true one), we unqualifyingly spend more energy concerned with the categorization of a concept rather than with processes within it. Fortunately, according to Turner (1977:61) anthropology is shifting away from structure to process. In his opinion, it is a debate of phenomenology versus positivism (ibid:63). Very simply, the former assumes a premise that reality is a human construct and in many instances indeterminate. The latter assumes a premise that laws observed in the physical universe can be applied to the social universe as well (i.e., Durkheim - social phenomena as "things").

Indeed, cultural anthropologists are never at rest as to what culture means. This is a good sign (albeit physical scientists might become dismayed at their [anthropologists] inability to formulate "conclusive" statements) in that they are yet involved in searching. Is it not more realistic to admit that we have yet not found the truth, rather than assume that we have and then continue to develop from a false premise?

Rightfully so, the concept of culture requires constant scrutiny. Within the anthropological circle alone a myriad of definitions exists (see, for examples, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952; Hoyt, 1961; Schneider and Bonjean, eds., 1973). In reference to Tylor's definition of 1871 (see Chapter I; Note - it is interesting to observe here that certain anthropologists might conclude that in the final analysis, although much has been said and debated vis-à-vis culture, not much can be deemed as new knowledge. Consequently,

certain definitions formulated a number of years ago have yet to be improved upon, and are therefore, substantially relevant today). Harris (op.cit., 1975, 144) concludes that "a culture is the total socially acquired life-way or life-style of a group of people. It consists of the patterned, repetitive ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that are characteristic of the members of a particular society or a segment of a society". He defines society as "a group of people who share a common habitat and who are dependent on each other for their survival and well being" (ibid., 145).

If this writer's interpretation of Harris is correct, he assumes an orientation of cultural materialism (akin to Marxian philosophy) that underlines culture as an expression of humankind's bio-functional interrelationship with a given ecological niche. A key component of cultural analysis, therefore, is human economy. How does humankind relate to the environment via technology in procuring sustenance, and what effect does this relationship have as to total cultural expression?

Harris' approach would appear to be holistic in that he is concerned with the total environment (albeit economic determinism). His approach has profound moral implications as well. An example of this is his celebrated analysis of the functionality of maintaining the cow as sacred in India. As the rest of the world ponders over the stupidity of Indians in allowing platefuls of protein to roam amidst starving bodies, Harris demonstrates that even more would starve should cowmeat become part of one's diet.

They [certain experts] don't realize that the farmer would rather eat his cow than starve, but that he will starve if he does eat it. . . What I am saying is that cow love is an active element in a complex, finely articulated material and cultural order. Cow love mobilizes the latent capacity of human beings to persevere in a low energy ecosystem in which there is little room for waste or indolence. Cow love contributes to the adaptive resilience of the human population by preserving temporarily dry or barren but still

useable animals; by discouraging the growth of an energy-expensive beef industry; by protecting cattle that fatten in public domain or at landlord's expense; and by preserving the recovery potential of the cattle population during droughts and famines. (Harris, 1974: 21,30).

What Harris is implying here is that the religious expression of the Indian population (i.e., maintainance of the cow's sacredness) is manifest as a result of evolutionary principles maintaining equilibrium within a given population. The insistance on the cow's sacredness as a moral issue (i.e., cows live - thousands die) becomes dysfunctional and profoundly ethnocentric in light of population maintenance. Cultural expressions, therefore, are a result of intrinsic regulatory processes (recall environment, adaptation, and natural selection) striving to maintain humankind's biological adaptability to its ecological niche (for further examples of this approach to cultural analysis see Harris, 1972; op.cit., 1974, 1977; and Rappaport, 1968, for a "classic" ethnography utilizing this approach).

As such, however, the critical social scientist may not find this analysis as conclusively definitive, leaving much room for debate. Harris (op.cit., 1977, xiv) states, for example, that "free will and moral choice have had virtually no significant effect upon the directions taken thus far by evolving systems of social life". As well -

Consciousness had little to do with the processes by which infanticide and warfare became the means of regulating band and village populations . . . to change the world in a conscious way one must first have a conscious understanding of what the world is like. (Harris, ibid, 289).

It would appear from these remarks that humankind has no conscious input into its own destiny, that ecological force is the ultimate prime mover. The existential (Sartrian) and/or phenomenological mind would have to struggle with these conclusions. As well, even though Harris is akin to Marxian ethics via economy and dialectical materialism, and that they are both concerned with

the ontology of matter, the latter sees a conscious effort on the part of humankind (i.e., class struggle) to produce an ultimate expression (i.e., classless society) (see Brameld, op.cit., 1965b: 99-117).

Consequently, there are numerous other perspectives of culture as well. There are those who have viewed culture as superorganic" (e.g., Kroeber; White; in Brameld, ibid, 51); that is, culture is seen as having a "life of its own"; as being something greater than the sum of its parts. Then there is Bohannan (1973), for example, who states that culture is the same as its parts (ibid: 359). Furthermore, he visualizes cultural traits as being analogous to genetic traits (i.e., gene pool/cultural pool) (ibid: 360) and that culture is encoded twice, once within the human being via electrical-chemical processes, and once outside the human being via shared learning (ibid: 357). Brameld states (op.cit., 1957 and 1965b) that there is greater room for philosophy within the anthropological network. It becomes obvious, therefore, that a meaning for culture becomes one of idiosyncratic perception, and that some form of collective agreement has not yet reached the bargaining table.

From a pedagogical standpoint it becomes important to realize that the meaning of culture itself has evolved and has not yet realized final expression. As such, the meaning of culture has adapted and adapts to the social niche of the times. Its interpretation is affected by socio-political climate, which in turn may affect the research techniques operating within it. An analysis of historical milieux becomes important here.

It is perhaps more than coincidental that Darwin published his Origin of Species in 1859; that Marx and Engels published their Communist Manifesto in 1848; and that Tylor published his Primitive Culture in 1871. Did this result from some sort of divine intervention, or was there something about the

way the world was organized (socially, politically, economically) that produced these literary consequences? It becomes very worthwhile to speculate as to whether the theory of evolution developed out of a neutral observation of the surrounding circumstances produced by the Industrial Revolution, or whether the theory evolved as a rationale for it (i.e., competition, struggle, Social Darwinism).

The educator cannot avoid investigating the historical aspects of evolution and culture. For a rather extensive presentation of the history of anthropological theory see Harris (1968). For a more concise, yet perhaps dated, essay on anthropological interpretation, see Voget (1960).

Regardless of what the true meaning of culture might be, the primary concern of anthropologists in the past has been one of observing and studying various cultural settings. Not only has this been done with the intent of discerning cultural differences, but cultural similarities as well. In spite of the obvious perceived differences that exist among cultures, what might we observe in order to substantiate the fundamental unity of humankind? When operating within a research paradigm what are the basic elements of the universal pattern? Harris (op.cit., 1975: 156-158) outlines three basic elements - ecology, social structure, and ideology.

Ecology - is a matter of the flow of energy among human and infrahuman populations in a habitat. The ecological adaptation of a particular culture depends upon the technology it has for obtaining, transforming, and distributing energy.

Social structure - consists of the orderly transfer and distribution of energy and labour power among the various production and reproduction units. The emphasis is on economy and importance of economic transactions.

Ideology - consists of the development of semantic universality as the adaptive response of a ground-dwelling, hunting, and food gathering hominid to the problem of facilitating increasingly complex levels of social and ecological activities. Language fulfills the function of fitting the thoughts and feelings of individuals and groups to the ecological and structural conditions of their cultural life.

Although we could speak of a "human culture", it is more realistic to admit that culture is a relative matter (i.e., cultural relativism). Consequently, through a multiplicity of variables such as environment, isolation, et cetera, cultures, through time, have become manifest in unique ways. Here it is important to conclude that all cultures are dynamic, that they constitute an integrated system of social and physical interrelationships. Left in isolation these cultures all develop along certain lines (resulting in an evolutionary pattern that is either divergent, convergent, or parallel, on a comparative level; see Harris, ibid, 163).

As stated previously, it is unwarranted to remark that one culture is evolving faster than another. This indicates that we are evolving toward something, and this has not been proven to be true. The dangerous implication is that some people may regard those societies that have "evolved" technological capacities as being innately superior to those who have not yet arrived at such a level. This qualitative assessment, gained through quantitative observation, is socially maladaptive.

From a phenomenological perspective, upon which this writer places great emphasis, humankind's various unique adaptations to various local environments and its interaction with them, have provided a number of world views. This is going beyond the realm of cultural materialism into what the "pure" scientist might describe as cultural mysticism. Indeed, this involves an emphasis upon the religious and spiritual nature of human beings as a direct-

ional force, one which Harris, for example, undermines. It involves the ethos of a people and recognized conceptions of the "ought".

In a straightforward and unjargonistic text by Redfield (1953), the author devotes a chapter to "Primitive World View and Civilization" (IV: 84-110). His ideas, in this writer's opinion are worthy of investigation. World view is regarded by the author as "an arrangement of things looked out upon, things in first instance conceived of as existing" (*ibid*: 87). This entails the importance of cosmology, and Redfield visualizes ethnology as a building of world views into cosmologies (*ibid*: 88). Utilizing cross-cultural observations of primitive societies, he lists what are, in his opinion, world view universals (*ibid*: 91-93).

1. Among groupings of people in every society are always some that distinguish people who are my people, or are more my people, from people who are not so much my people (recall discussion re ethnicity in previous section).
2. There is a basic recognition of difference between Man and Not-Man. Note - Redfield does not delineate specifically Man from Nature; rather Man and Not-Man are bound together in one moral order. The universe is not an indifferent system. It is a system of moral consequence (106); cf., Kneller, op.cit., 71:

Among modern beliefs one of the most fundamental, and one of the most far-reaching in its effects, is the belief in progress. For modern man the future is, with few limitations, open. He believes that through the application of science to nature and human relations the condition of mankind, both physical and spiritual, can be improved almost immeasurably. For primitive man, on the other hand, the scheme of things is immutable. Man and his environment form an indivisible whole. Nature is to be served, not exploited. The American Indians, for example, believed that in hunting certain animals both the hunter and his prey cooperated with nature in a sacred activity, man furnishing the ceremonial, the animal offering his flesh.
3. Every world view includes some spatial and temporal dimension (cf. Brameld, op.cit., 1957 and 1965b).

4. All primitive societies witness a transition from Birth --- Death, Maturation --- Senescence (i.e., initiation rites); as well, all individual members experience menstruation, menopause and sexual intercourse. And . . . "for those who do not experience these latter common experiences there is the experience of knowing that others do" (93: underlining mine).

This last statement becomes very integral to a later discussion on socio-cultural conflict. In general, primitive peoples see order, and explain the order as put there by intention. If they have a philosophy of man-in-the-world, this would be it [cf., Maquet, 1964; this writer has used the word "if" on the grounds of "philosophy" being an ethnocentric construct; that is, according to Maquet, if the peoples themselves do not see themselves as having a philosophy, do they indeed have one? They simply live it out and do not rationalize upon it. This introduces more than a minor dilemma vis-à-vis cultural objectivity/subjectivity. Harris, op.cit., 1975: 160-161, relates to this in terms of emic and etic. (i.e., emic - description or judgement concerning behavior, customs, beliefs, values, and so on, held by members of a societal group as culturally appropriate and valid; etic - the technique and result of making generalizations about cultural events, behavior patterns, artifacts, thought, and ideology that aim to be verifiable objectively and valid cross-culturally)].

Briefly tracing the evolutionary development of world view in association with civilizational states, Redfield is intrigued as to what led the Hebrews, for example, to put God entirely outside of the physical universe and simultaneously attaching all value to God. To the Greeks, order was imminent without any reference to God (ibid: 101-102). And ultimately, in light of the present, the paramount transformation is that by which the primitive world view has been overturned (ibid: 108). Or, has it?

Naturally, experience is mediated through some sort of value orientation.

Values, as such, become ingrained within a given culture; they become intrinsic to that culture. As Dorothy Lee states (1976: 5) - "We can speak of human values, but we cannot know them directly. We infer them through their expression in behavior".

A number of pertinent questions arises:

What are values?

Are values absolute?

What is an extrinsic value?

What is an intrinsic value?

It is a very difficult thing to talk about values? What are social values? What are my values? Are the two, or should they be, congruous? In a society where the two are congruous, we would hope for social harmony. In our society, however, not only are they incongruous, we do not really know what our social values are. Indeed, we speak in vague terms of freedom and democracy, and make reference to these ideals in ill-defined ways. It seems that in our society a preoccupation with the individual and its immediate wants (as opposed to needs) contradicts the notion of social value (recall Boas, op.cit., 1928).

World views are ideologically represented by symbols. According to Beattie (1964: 70, 71) -

A symbol provides people with a means of representing abstract ideas, often ideas of great practical importance to themselves indirectly, ideas which it would be difficult or even impossible for them to represent to themselves directly . . . what is symbolized is an object of value.

Values may be regarded as being either extrinsic or intrinsic. Very simply, an intrinsic value is one of "inherent worth". For example, writers speak of love, pleasure, and so on, in an intrinsic way. Extrinsic values are those of "superimposed worth". For example, a piece of paper may have an extrinsic worth of one dollar. That which is intrinsic is simply the paper upon which

the value is placed.

It stands to reason, therefore, that extrinsic values are numerous by virtue of the definition of cultural relativism. What is intrinsic to all cultures on a comparative basis is quite the question. This writer would venture to conclude that what is truly universally intrinsic to any culture (as a value) is solely the act of experience, and being able to relate experience with other members of the same group via symbols.

It can be said that we all experience. The experience, however, is comparative also in that it relates to a given cultural paradigm (world view). But the way we interact within the paradigm constitutes experience, and to this extent it is intrinsic to the system within which it operates.

The way we relate to one another as members of a society indicates the intrinsic nature of our paradigm. The type of social interaction is the expression of the intrinsic qualities of the system. It follows, therefore, that we cannot rationalize objectively that which is intrinsic (cf., Harris op.cit., 1977: xiv); we can only act it out. What we do rationalize upon are the arbitrary values (extrinsic).

Sealey (op.cit., 1980: 56-57) has drawn up a list of comparative values re "Specialist" and "Generalist" societies. "Specialist" societies are those characterized by a high degree of technological complexity, resulting in the monopolization over natural resources and the manifestation of social stratification (e.g., Euro-Canadian, cf., Harris re process of intensification op.cit., 1977:5). "Generalist" societies are those characterized by a minimal degree of technological complexity, resulting in an egalitarian adaptation to natural resources and a great degree of social equality (e.g., traditional Indian hunter-gatherers, cf., Leakey, op.cit., 1978 - "gatherer-hunters", Inuit).

The following list is a selection of the comparative characteristics, as

outlined by Sealey, of these two types of societies.

EURO-CANADIAN OR SPECIALIST SOCIETY	INDIAN, INUIT OF GENERALIST SOCIETY
1. Specialist urban, multi-ethnic and industrialized society	1. Generalist, undiversified, societies
2. Mastery over nature (Intensive resource use)	2. Harmony with nature (Extensive resource use)
3. Future orientation	3. Present orientation
4. Scientific explanations	4. Non-scientific explanation such as by mythology and the supernatural
5. Competition for survival	5. Cooperation for survival
6. Work to get ahead	6. Work to satisfy present need
7. Talk out conflicts	7. Repress conflicts
8. Societal enforcement of formal rules of conduct	8. Ethic of non-interference
9. Children kept dependent and carefully controlled	9. Children made independent and few controls
10. Nuclear family	10. Extended family.

Obviously, these values are diametrically opposed and represent "pure" values. We could question the reality and the worth of setting them up in such a manner. With respect to dichotomous values La Belle (op.cit., 522-523) describes the "tousled-head" phenomenon as:

. . . evidence of an adult-centred world and is partly a result of the contradictory values which are set in front of a young person attempting to cope with his environment through adherence to an established orientation. . . The conflicts of cooperation versus competition, equality versus segregation, success in work versus social consciousness and sociability, . . . are only a few of the values which confront the American youngster as he attempts to learn appropriate culturally sanctioned behavior.

Although La Belle is referring to the process of schooling here, the same observation might be made with respect to members of a society in general,

attempting to determine their cultural affiliations. Of course, the generalist system as portrayed above is quite traditional. Does anyone really adhere to these types of values today? We have to be careful not to fall into the trap of portraying Native peoples, for example, in the Rousseauian sense (i.e., Noble Savages). This is dangerously sentimental. Indeed, some will argue that Native values are not so different from White values (Clifton, 1975).

Kneller (op.cit., 117) emphasizes three aspects of the relation of values to culture that are particularly relevant to the study of anthropology and education:

1. discrepancy between a culture's value and its actual practices - (ideal and manifest);
2. conflict in values generated by culture change;
3. disparity between the dominant values of the culture and the values of the minorities.

These three aspects will be discussed in greater detail during the discussion on socio-cultural conflict. The preceding material, however, should have demonstrated to the educator that the concept of culture is far from being a simple one, which is perhaps contrary to popular opinion. We speak so readily in terms of this culture and that culture, and our culture. But culture, in essence, is largely an abstraction, an analytical tool to aid in description. Furthermore, culture is an expression of internally dynamic processes, and perhaps it is with these processes themselves that we should become more concerned, not only the expressed result. Schooling is such a process, and this forms the substance for the following discussion.

THE ENCULTURATIVE PROCESS

In the most general sense, the enculturative process involves the acquisition of cultural knowledge by members of a given society. It involves the learning of this cultural knowledge and the means by which it is transmitted both inter and intragenerationally. To the educator and the social scientist, it involves actions and goals, causes and effects, and the processes involved between them. Congruently, even though not often explicitly, it involves teaching and learning theory. What are the underlying theoretical orientations upon which systems of education and schooling (claim to) operate?

Obviously, this has been an area of concern among many disciplines, especially among educational theorists and psychologists. This writer, however, would conclude that the orientation of the educational theorist has primarily been one of educational inquiry related to the development and maintenance of civilizational states. How many of these theorists might contemplate the significant contribution that a study of education among Bushmen, for example, might have toward modern systems of schooling?

Of course, we could argue that a comparison of the two is on different levels, and that our facts would be erroneous. But when we ignore the possible significance of this sort of analysis, we are culturally naive and ethnocentric; and, furthermore, we are culturally arrogant, supporting the notion that evolution has been lineally directional, and that civilization constitutes an advanced checkpoint along the path to an increasingly enlightening truth.

We might produce a counter-argument in claiming that, due to civilizational encroachment, "primitive" societies are ceasing to exist in a pristine state. This is true, but it does not warrant conclusively an orientation that their demise is a "natural process" and their former lifestyles merely an ethnographic artifact. On the contrary, it may be of great benefit to undertake an

"armchair analysis" of past ethnographic accounts, assessing and re-assessing educational patterns of former non-civilizational societies, and entertaining the possibility that they may have much to offer, even if only putting our contemporary practices into some perspective, to today's society.

The psychologists have tended to perceive culture and learning in terms of biology and cognitive development. Of course, anthropologists have done so as well; but the former, in this writer's opinion, have become preoccupied with the ego, with the development of the biological organism within a physical and social context. Undoubtedly, there are many exceptions to this. But once again, how often have we seen psychological references made in a cross-cultural context, albeit the ethnocentric application of tests (for example, I.Q., see Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 50-64); Harris, op.cit., 1975: 499-513) as constructed by those members of a "specialist" society?

It is obvious that this writer will be attacked on grounds of categorizing psychologists as being such and such, pointing the evil finger at their ethnocentric ways, and prescribing a large dose of anthropology as a cure. Before the academic jury finds this accused guilty to the charge of academic imperialism, allow the accused to qualify his statement by interjecting that its intent is to demonstrate the need for an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing natural and social phenomena (Vogt, op.cit., 959 - "surrender something of their self-images"; Turner, op.cit., 78, 79 - "achieve a relationship of *communitas* . . . consisting of a blend of humility and comradeship"), and that the combined efforts of various disciplines, who carry with them various perspectives, might begin to fulfill this need. This is with the understanding that the anthropologist can all too readily become selfish about his discipline as well, portending to be some sort of divine cultural oracle (recall quote by Spindler, op.cit., 1955: 122 in Chapter I of this thesis under "Limitations"; see also Harrington, 1978,

for a discussion re the need for more psychology in education).

Much has been discussed and written about the enculturative process from an anthropological perspective (recall Chapter II of this thesis). In 1972, for example, a Symposium was held by the American Ethnological Society re perspectives on learning and culture. Some of the presentations were compiled and published in a single volume by Kimball and Burnett, eds., (1973). The editors delineated three areas of concern (ibid., xiii) with regards to culture and learning. These are:

1. Learning in biologic, linguistic, and cognitive dimensions
2. Socialization in context of institutions and rituals
3. Social change.

This thesis directs itself to socialization in the context of institutions and rituals, and social change. The latter will be dealt with in the following section. First of all, a distinction must be drawn between socialization and enculturation.

According to Mead (1963: 187), socialization is "a set of species-wide requirements and exactions made on human beings by human societies". Mead refers specifically to human beings here, but socialization exists among non-humans as well [i.e., there have been a great number of studies done vis-à-vis socialization among non-human primates; see for example, Poirier, 1972.

(Note: of course, we could argue once again that we are dealing with research not on the same level, and that comparisons re human and non-human socialization patterns are qualitatively incomparable; i.e., humans are culturally conditioned)]. Cohen (op.cit., 1971: 22) defines socialization as "the activities that are devoted to the inculcation and elicitation of basic motivational and cognitive patterns through ongoing and spontaneous interaction with parents, siblings, kinsmen, and other members of the community".

Mead (op.cit., 1963: 187) refers to enculturation as "a process of learning a culture in all its uniqueness and particularity". Basically, the distinction between the two is that socialization is learning in its universal form (general), and that enculturation is the acquisition (learning) of cultural knowledge with respect to the individual culture in concern (specific). According to Mead (ibid., 186) this involves two levels of abstraction and underlines the importance of cultural relativism.

Consequently, learning is culturally specific and theories of learning are many (cf. Rosenthal, op.cit., 29 - "there cannot be more than one philosophy of education"). As well, she adheres to the Freudian notion that cultural learning is hard and painful instinctual behavior that is fundamentally antagonistic to culture (ibid., 185). In a more recent writing (op.cit., 1970), she describes the enculturative process as being characterized three ways. "Postfigurative" involves children learning primarily from their forebears. "Cofigurative" involves both children and adults learning from their peers. "Prefigurative" involves adults learning from their children. All of these operate simultaneously, but from a historico-evolutionary viewpoint Mead argues that contemporary societies are becoming progressively more "prefigurative". If so, what implications would this observation have for discerning and formulating learning theory?

Shimahara (1970) offers a reconsideration of enculturation. He insists that too much emphasis has been placed upon it as a process of passive acquiring. Rather, it is to be viewed as a creative process of inquiry and innovation as well (ibid., 148). In light of this, he offers, in his opinion, a definition that demonstrates the dynamic two-way process of enculturation. Thus;

It is proposed that enculturation be defined as a construct, ✓ and a process in a behavioral sense, that delineates transmission and transmutation of culture throughout human growth. Cultural transmission is a process of acquiring the existing culture; culture mutation, on the other hand, is a process of psychosocial mutation through deliberate, reflective, functional, yet occasionally incidental processes of teaching and learning. Enculturation, thus, involves innovation and inquiry which is a particular type of epistemological sensitivity to culture. It is a bi-polar process and a universal function of education in culture (ibid., 149).

This definition has been included not so much in that it possesses any heuristic value; rather, it demonstrates how meaning can become ambiguous when overladen with jargon (see reader's "Comments" ibid., 149-152). Obviously, there is much room for debate here. Yet, Shimahara must be commended in that, underneath the flamboyant verbiage, he is attempting to create a definition that is process-oriented. He sees the enculturative process as give-and-take. Harris (op.cit., 1975: 145) states that enculturation is a "partially conscious and partially unconscious learning experience whereby the older generation invites, induces, and compels the younger generation to adopt traditional ways of thinking and behaving (cf. Mead -"postfigurative"). In this sense, enculturation accounts for cultural continuity, not cultural evolution (Harris, ibid., 151).

Furthermore, according to Harris (ibid., 164), "enculturation can be regarded as the analogue of genetic replication, . . . like genetic reproduction, (it) is imperfect, and hence innovations, the analogues of mutations, arise in a cultural system". The crux of the problem becomes, how and why (i.e., under what circumstances) do these mutations arise? Perhaps Mead and her concept of "prefigurative" and Shimahara with his emphasis upon two-way process of enculturation are not so far apart; the former stating her views less jargonistically.

As well, a distinction needs to be drawn between education and schooling.

La Belle (op.cit., 519-520) states:

Many individuals, including educators, are guilty of a somewhat narrow conception of education. We have been accustomed to viewing education as an institutional outcome, something which results from attending a school. Thus, experiences which occur outside of school become, in terms of sociocultural expectations, nonsanctioned learnings. These out-of-school learning experiences occur most often without credit or recognition even though educators know them to have tremendous impact on in-school and out-of-school behavior.

A further manifestation of this "somewhat narrow conception" is one of many teacher training institutions carrying the pseudonym of "Faculty of Education". Within our society we have somewhere failed to make a real distinction between the two. Cohen (op.cit., 1971: 22) defines education as "the inculcation of standardized and stereotyped knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes by means of standardized and stereotyped procedures". The institution referred to as the school is one means of inculcating such knowledge (actually, Cohen's definition of education resembles much what could also be referred to as the enculturative process. Consequently, this writer would like to refer to education in the broadest sense; that is, the acquisition of knowledge through living and experiencing).

For the most part, people would agree that to go to school is to acquire an education. Of course, the school is an institution providing certain types of education. Attending school, therefore, is part of becoming educated. Once again, looking at culture in a holistic and systemic way, we cannot help but arrive at such an observation.

It is much easier, if at all possible, to look at a society holistically when it is relatively isolated and relatively homogeneous (recall discussion in Chapter II). From a cross-cultural perspective, it is particularly worthwhile to study the educative process vis-à-vis "generalist" and "specialist" societies. These notions were introduced in the previous section re culture

and values, and from that discussion it would follow that, given the two types of societies and the intrinsic experiential component to each one, the process of education within either would also have to be unique.

As members of a given society, we are enculturated within that society. That is, our experience within our society is mediated by those extrinsic cultural values we learn from other members of that society. Naturally, a generalist world view differs from a specialist one, and education differs accordingly. Education involves the transmission of cultural knowledge, allowing for a certain amount of cultural security, or stability, as well as the perpetuation of "established" norms.

It would follow that as knowledge increases in any culture, ignorance tends to increase in individuals, for these come to know less and less of the total available information, which in turn seemingly necessitates and fosters specialization and compartmentalization (Henry in Kneller, op.cit., 70). In a generalist society, therefore, all of the available cultural knowledge is embodied within each individual; where within a specialist society only a part of the total knowledge can be embodied by any one individual.

Thus, a generalist society is relatively stable (not to imply static) because its members' needs are relatively finite, but a specialist society is necessarily more restless and dynamic, since it assumes that the needs of its members are infinite. Perhaps one of the most striking differences between education in generalist and specialist societies is the shift from the need of an individual to learn something that everyone agrees he wishes to know to what Margaret Mead has called "the will of some individual to teach something which it is not agreed that anyone has any desire to know". (Mead in Spindler, op.cit., 1963: 316, also quoted in Chapter I). This has become

one of the primary functions of the school within modern day society.

It is obviously next to impossible to discern the origin of things (recall discussion on human evolution). We can trace human biological evolution through fossil evidence, for example. As well, we can trace the material aspect of cultural evolution (e.g., technology, subsistence, et cetera) through archaeological investigation. But many of our notions on social and behavioral evolution are based upon speculation. For example, how do we determine when not-human became human through self-awareness? How do we determine when humans effectively utilized language as a form of communication? How, indeed, do we correctly interpret intelligence? The answers to such questions remain hidden within the artifacts we unearth.

Research is being done with non-human primates (e.g., chimpanzee) re the origin of culture, self-awareness, language development, and social behavior (see Poirier, op.cit.: Fleming 1974; Harris, op.cit., 1975: 58-74, 126-128; Wilson, 1975). Although research into these areas via non-human primates is performed with sincere intentions, (albeit the works of Lorenz, On Aggression; Morris, The Naked Ape; Ardrey, The Hunting Hypothesis; basically proposing that war and violence are in our genes, have been un-sympathetically attacked by such anthropologists as Leakey, 1977: 42 - "This essentially pessimistic view of human nature was assimilated with unseemly haste into a popular conventional wisdom. . . "and op.cit., 1978), we must remain skeptical on theoretical grounds of drawing inferences from this type of research and applying them on a one-to-one basis to our (proto) hominid ancestors (see Fried, op.cit., 38-49). This same dilemma applies when perceiving primitive peoples as our "contemporary ancestors". Perhaps it is appropriate to state that ". . . men can teach only what they know, and they have known so little about human nature" (Paulsen, op.cit., 298).

Although all human societies and cultures have educative and enculturative processes within them, the same conclusion cannot be established with respect to schooling. The institutionalization of education via the school is particularly, although not exclusively (e.g., African Bush School), characteristic of specialist societies and state systems. The origin of the school as we have come to know it, therefore, would be found within the origin and the evolution of the state, and the evolution of political society. As with the evolution of the hominid line and subsequent behavioral patterns, the true origin of the state and the institutions within it are difficult to discern as well (Cohen, 1970: 57).

The purpose of this writing, however, is not to attempt to trace the rise and evolution of the state (for such analyses, see Adams, 1966; Fried, op.cit.; Carneiro, 1970); rather its focus is upon the school as an institution within it.

Fried (op.cit., 235) defines the state as:

. . . a collection of specialized institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal, that maintains an order of stratification. Usually its point of concentration is on the basic principles of organization: hierarchy, differential degrees of access to basic resources, obedience to officials, and defense of the area. The state must maintain itself externally as well as internally, and it attempts this by both physical and ideological means, by supporting military forces and by establishing an identity among similar units.

From an ethnographic perspective, this is what the state is perceived as being vis-à-vis the results of social interaction (i.e., cultural expression - the acting-out reveals the state). From an evolutionary perspective, it is worthwhile to note that the evolution of pristine states was an unconscious process; humankind did not sit down and methodically plot out the rise of the state. According to Harris (op.cit., 1977: 122):

The participants in this enormous transformation seem not to have known what they were creating. By imperceptible shifts in the redistributive balance from one generation to the next, the human species bound itself into a form of social life in which the many debased themselves on behalf of the exaltation of the few.

From a sociological perspective, this draws worthwhile implications. According to Cohen (op.cit., 1970:57), "Institutions are to be regarded as having lives of their own, quite independently of the people who fill them" (cf., "a social system can survive and perpetuate itself even though it does not serve to support individual members"; Roberts, op.cit., 1976b: 12). This is a perspective, of course, that is superorganic, and this writer is uncertain of its validity. Nonetheless, in a broader sense, we could conjecture that the state system has a life of its own, and that processes within it that are acted out by its members are intrinsic to system maintenance. As such, much of the internal disarray that members of a given society so readily characterize as social conspiracy on the parts of politicians, bureaucrats, and so on, is actually intrinsic (unconscious) to system maintenance. But enough here; this becomes part of the discussion in the following section.

With the rise of the state, various conditions have summoned the school into existence. According to Kneller (op.cit., 74), these are:

1. the development of institutional religion and the need for a priesthood;
2. internal growth or conquest abroad, requiring the preparation of civil and military administrators;
3. the division of labor, calling for instruction in special techniques and, in industrial societies, necessitating a basic literacy as the prerequisite of vocational skills;
4. conflicts within society, which threaten traditional beliefs and values and lead to the use of education [sic. schooling] to reinforce acceptance of the heritage.

Schools evolved as adaptations to the pressures of civilizations.

"It is clear that the first schools served to implant national political symbols and to serve centralized political control" (Cohen, op.cit., 1970: 87). The Sumerians, for example, established schools on the basis of teaching how to write language. "No school system was ever established with egalitarian aims in mind, with the hope of freeing the mind, or of serving the quest for unfettered truth" (Cohen, ibid., 91).

In fact, our reference to the university as an institution of higher learning is just as erroneous as referring to a teacher training institution as a "Faculty of Education". The etymological root of "university" is "universitas vestras - the whole of you" (Cohen, ibid., 100). Our society, for example, does not stress wholeness of being; rather, it seeks out and moulds that part of one's being best suited for a consumer-oriented society. But this moulding of character is endemic to state societies. In medieval times, for example, "new ideas and intellectual horizons were regarded as constant threats and worries" (Cohen, ibid., 104).

Within our society, therefore, the primary function of the school is state system maintenance. Through both conscious and unconscious means it perpetuates the ideological force crucial to maintaining an order of stratification (recall Fried, definition of state). It would seem rational to conclude that within a state system the school could not possibly perform any function contrary to this. Its purpose could only be redefined congruent with a total systemic revolution.

Although, in evolutionary terms, this can be regarded as a natural process, it is not to be assumed that it is inherently good. Those processes supporting system maintenance should be critically assessed vis-à-vis social outcome and distribution of social rewards. This inevitably could lead to

the "chicken and egg" syndrome. As well, how do we know what is inherently good? It also raises the question such as "institutions having lives of their own" (Cohen, op.cit., 1970:57) and free will and moral choice having virtually no significant effect upon the directions taken thus far by evolving systems of social life (Harris, op.cit., 1977: xiv). These views seem rather fatalistic, however; we would hope that we might consciously be able to induce social change.

Nonetheless, assuming that the latter is possible, it becomes essential for the educator to investigate what impact the schooling process has upon social outcome and system maintenance. It must be remembered that, holistically, the school is integrated within a cultural system. It is ✓ conditioned by various other forms of cultural activity, and does not function sui generis (see La Belle, op.cit., 530).

Kimball states (op.cit., 1974: 19):

The fact is, before an individual can hope to reach any of his promised rewards, he must prepare himself, and the magnitude of his effort is believed to be roughly commensurate with the magnitude of his achievement. Each forward step, however, engenders new efforts for reaching succeeding goals; thus, preparation becomes a never-ending requirement. Those whose original preparation was inadequate, or those who have withdrawn and been defeated, may be counted as the casualties. That they are not now involved does not invalidate the manner in which the system works. Their failure may be due to an inadequate internalization of the psychic base necessary for commitment.

This observation reveals the notion of "blaming the victim". Not only can it be applied to society in general, it has much applicability to schooling in particular. Rather than questioning the integrity of systemic processes, based upon such observations, it is assumed that perceived social expressions are a natural consequence of the system; it is assumed that the "casualties" are undergoing some form of "natural selection"; it is assumed that we are operating on a principle of "survival of the fittest", and those "casualties"

are obviously not fit; it is assumed that competition is a natural phenomenon; it is assumed that the physical and social universe are involved in some form of linear progression; it is assumed that progress involves quantitatively struggling from point A to point B; in essence, it is assumed that humankind's *raison d'être* is exemplified in the way specialist societies operate.

In a thought provoking article by Dorothy Lee (1950), linguistic analysis of the Trobriand Islanders indicates that "they do not describe their activity lineally; they do no dynamic relating of acts. . . . (*ibid.*, 276). To Lee's mind this suggests an absence of axiomatic lineal connection between events or objects in the Trobriand apprehension of reality. On the contrary, "in our own culture, the line is so basic, that we take it for granted, as given in reality . . . In our thinking about personality and character, we have assumed the line as axiomatic" (*ibid.*, 275). She cites an example whereby experience only is of intrinsic worth:

If I walk along a path because I like the country, or if it is not important to get to a particular point at a particular time, then the insuperable puddle from the morning's shower is not frustrating; I throw stones into it and watch the ripples, and then choose another path. If the undertaking is of value in itself, a point good in itself, and not because it leads to something, then failure has no symbolic meaning . . . But failure is devastating in our culture, because it is not failure of the undertaking alone; it is the moving, becoming, lineally conceived self which has failed. (*ibid.*, 281-282, underlining mine).

The schooling process as we know it must accept responsibility for advocating an ethnocentric ideology that equates success with linear progression. ✓ Yet our culture demands that we maintain this euphoric facade in our own perception of the world and our place in it. The school, as such, becomes an appendage of the state, a mechanism concealing the realities of a broader culture (Roberts, *op.cit.*, 1976b: 11). Comparable to a prison, it protects

students from their own appetities for knowledge and exploration (Roberts, ibid., 11).

Kimball argues (op.cit., 1974: 92) that we have deluded ourselves into a false state of perpetual optimism. Preoccupied with the shadows cast upon the wall, the schools, and many educators within them, insist upon maintaining an "innocence of realities" (Kimball, ibid., 88). Only after departing from many years of schooling do students catch a glimpse of who is running the projector.

Is it at all possible for the school to take on a reconstructionist mode and alter the attitudinal premise upon which our culture operates? Should the school seek primarily to influence the culture's development, or should it inculcate the culture's heritage? Should the child learn this heritage as his teachers present it, or should he explore it on his own initiative, creating his personal picture of culture? (Kneller, op.cit., 17-18).

Change is an ongoing process, and a gradual one (albeit historical revolution). Violent revolution is not the answer. In most cases this produces no more than a temporary shift in power, where the "haves" become the "have-nots", and vice versa. The structure of the society itself has not changed, only the relative roles of the members within it. Revolution, as such, is no more than a social orgasm, offering only temporary relief from built-up frustrations.

Realizing that the school is an institution integrated within a given cultural matrix and influenced by social forces, it would seem highly unlikely that the school itself in toto could function as a major instigator for change. At best, this might possibly only be accomplished with the efforts of certain educators. Perhaps charismatic types are needed to incorporate the possibility of attitudinal shift within school curricula and classrooms. If any meaningful

change is to come about, it more than likely will commence at a micro-cosmic level. To the revolutionary activist wanting change now, this would be difficult to swallow; but only through a slow process of cumulative modification will meaningful change occur.

The task of the dedicated educator in this meaningful attitudinal shift is to instill critical awareness among students. In this writer's opinion, most high school students are quite receptive to this approach. It is the school and the technique employed by many an educator that stultifies their inherent search, maintaining an "innocence of realities".

Schools, as they have also done in the past, still implant false ideology within students. The social milieu in which they operate has not drastically altered; only now, through technological innovation can we dangle the prospect of becoming a computer operator in front of mystified noses. Has this increased the quality of life? ". . . schools are designed to train individuals in the skills which make it possible to man the modern equivalents of the plow and the market stall" (Cohen, op.cit., 1970:97).

We have become trapped in materialist quagmires, where access to computer technology puts us no further ahead socially than the peasant and his plow. The basic structure is the same; we are only dressed in different costumes;

. . . they [elite] are being quite self-serving by bringing the commoners' level of technical knowledge slightly closer to the elites' so that the former can carry out the economic and political activities required by those in decision-making capacities. The computer technologist, . . . , it is in the interests of the elite that he be trained in this technological procedure so that the elite can better make and carry out their decisions and maintain their standard of living. (Cohen, ibid.,97).

Technological innovation such as expressed by computer technology has increased a need for compartmentalization; data are categorically filed away in electronic gadgetry. We are blindly placing faith in a technology that

creates social alienation. As such, landing a man on the moon is hailed as humankind's greatest achievement, while millions starve every day for lack of proper nourishment.

Nonetheless, computers are becoming more and more popular. Terminals are being set up in schools, and courses are offered with them. Computer prophets are being sent to isolated communities in northern Manitoba, for example, attempting to convert the Natives, who have barely crawled out of the woods, proselytizing how computer technology will enhance their existence. Is this really much different from an earlier period of our country's history, when white trappers were proselytizing the merits of alcohol? The effects of the computer may be just as intoxicating.

Perhaps this little scenario resembles science fiction more than fact, but should we not sit back and think about what we are doing? Computer technology, for example, assumes the line as axiomatic to reality. How does Lee's analysis (op.cit., 1950) fit into this? This raises the question of not what people think but how they think (Roberts, 1976b:16).

Kimball (op.cit., 1974:278) has referred to the school as a warehouse, stocking components for the industrial machine. The educator, like a keypunch operator, impresses data upon the students. They, in turn, begin to resemble computer cards, their only intrinsic value being the data impressed upon them.

Learning has become a one way downward flow of predetermined knowledge. Ultimately, we are entrenched in a system that emphasizes teaching rather than learning (La Belle, op.cit., 530); the answers can all be found in the back of a book (recall previous discussion re evolution).

I do not have the answer for what is happening in the school situation, but I can relate what studies in industry show to be the effect of increasing the quantity of the downward flow of initiation when no compensating mechanisms for reverse communications are supplied. When increased pressure. . .

is exerted from above upon a supervisory level. . . ., there is an increase in action from the supervisory level upon the workers. These workers, in turn, have no place to direct their responses except inward on themselves or outward against each other, except to the extent that they vent their responses through organized protest in strikes, slow-downs, or other forms of resistance (Kimball, op.cit., 1974:83).

What pedagogical alternatives do we have? Of course, there are many propositions. Kimball (ibid., 47, 158) states that the materials be presented as "comprehensions of mankind", and that "the individual must learn the criteria that make identification possible and permit classification of the item of experience in the larger whole". Brown (op.cit., 1963a:257) feels the school should emphasize the "increasingly human use of human beings". Goslin (1965, 40) sees the function of the school in modern society as a catalyst for discerning the nature of the intellectual process itself. Kneller (op.cit., 137) states that "the school must educate its pupils so that they can adapt to the unforeseeable events that are bound to occur in their lifetimes" (i.e., cultural resilience).

As a comprehension of mankind, for example, Marxian theory should be taught in the schools (see Brameld, op.cit., 1965b: 99-117). Unfortunately, this may be done with a predetermined value judgement that Marxian philosophy is inherently wrong. This is an ethnocentric bias that avoids any positive influence this philosophy has contributed to peoples of the world. Evidence of class struggle, for example, exists long before the appearance of either Marx or Engels (see Brameld, ibid., 99 re Plato and Aristotle).

Stressing the unconscious aspect of learning La Belle (op.cit., 525) quotes from Henry (1963, 289):

But - and mark this well - it is not primarily the message (let us say, the arithmetic or the spelling) that constitutes the most important subject matter to be learned, but the noise!

The most significant cultural learnings - primarily the cultural drives - are communicated as 'noise'.

La Belle himself adds (ibid., 525):

Such observations suggest that what students really learn in schools is not the recognized curriculum; instead they learn to be dependent, competitive, and obedient - goals which few curriculum specialists would sanction, yet goals which would be recognized by anyone who has thought about his school career as essential to survival.

It was stated in the initial chapter of this thesis that education has evolved into some 'bastardized form of rite de passage', overburdened with an environment conditioned by the rule of stimulus-response. Emphasizing the teaching (i.e., one way communication) aspect of schooling Norton (1970: 13,33) comments that too much education is done for the student:

Such efforts derive from learning theory of behaviorist psychology which dominates our colleges of education and presently gains momentum from the industrial complex in virtue of the prospective market for teaching machines and other mechanical accoutrements of programmed learning. For behaviorism restricts learning to the mode of dependence, which underlies alike the stimulus-response model, the atomistic (as against the wholistic) conception of human behavior, the external direction of learning which is implicit in programming, and the reliance on extrinsic inducements to learning which constitutes the process of 'conditioning' and 'extinction'. Nor is dependence alleviated in the least by behaviorism's recent shift from 'respondent' to 'operant' behaviors, for while these latter originate with the subject, their control remains externally determined.

In light of this observation it becomes quite worthwhile for the educator to consider anthropological perspectives vis-à-vis cross cultural analyses of education (recall previous discussion of education in generalist and specialist societies). As stated earlier, education in generalist societies is primarily one of living, observing, and experiencing. Within specialist societies the process necessarily becomes compartmentalized and institutionalized in the form of a school. The former involves an internalization of total cultural experience, whereby the latter involves an

internalization of only a part of it.

In generalist societies the growing individual was recognized by the total group as in a state of becoming. Accompanying the unfolding (transition) of the individual into various levels of cultural reality was a milieu of social recognition, characterized by symbolic ritualistic practices. This type of cultural activity has been characterized by a theory known as "rites de passage" (van Gennep, 1908). These rites included the universal crises of birth, puberty, marriage, and death, but also included other situations in which changes in behavior or group identification were involved. In many of these ceremonies there was a ritually enacted simulation of death and of a subsequent rebirth into the new condition. The structural arrangement of the sequences has been described in three phases (see van Gennep, *ibid*; Kimball, *op.cit.*, 1974:153; and "Introduction" by Kimball in van Gennep, *op.cit.*).

The initial phase, in which the connections with a current way of life were severed, was called separation. The individuals then found themselves in an intermediate stage in which they were neither of one group or another; they were not-beings. This liminal condition was labelled transition (cf., Turner, *op.cit.*). In the final stage of incorporation, the individual returned to the group, but into a different social niche and with altered behavior. This activity was sacred in that the person who entered a status at variance with the one previously held became "sacred" to the others who remained in a profane state. It was this new condition that called for rites eventually incorporating the individual into the group and returning him to the customary routines of group life (Kimball, *ibid.*, viii - ix).

Attempts have been made by anthropologists to utilize this model vis-à-vis specialist societies and schooling. In a sociological analysis, Burnett (1969)

applied this concept to a small midwestern high school. She states (ibid., 287), for example, that the "pep rally" is a:

. . . ritual means of quickly carrying the students through a transition in interaction from work activity and the everyday relations of daily school life to the characteristically different relationships of extramural athletic events, when students relate to large numbers of the community and relate to one another in somewhat different ways.

In a study of the effects of white schooling upon the American Indian, Fisher (1969) defines the "school" as "all formal education from kindergarten to grade twelve or thirteen, as a rite of passage, or rather a series of rites signifying separation from, transition through, and incorporation into culturally recognized statuses and roles" (ibid., 291). This writer, however, is suspicious of the idiosyncratic and loose manner in which the concept is utilized in these examples.

Turner (op.cit., 77) makes a distinction between ritual and ceremony, the former being associated with social transitions while the latter is associated with social states and statuses. Burnett (op.cit.) fails to make a distinction between the two in her study. As such, this writer feels that what she describes is ceremonial rather than ritual. Fisher, as well, although he qualifies his analysis (op.cit., 291) by stating that "not all ritual must be magico-religious", seems to be using the concept inappropriately here. With respect to the final stage (incorporation), in a culturally holistic and socially recognized sense this writer questions the Indians' attainment of this as a group. On the contrary, the rite de passage is ritualistically incomplete; Indians as a cultural group have been culturally alienated and left in limbo (marginal) at the intermediate stage (i.e., not-beings). Their "incorporation" is yet to be recognized.

We must be careful of such analyses, for they tend to manipulate and

obfuscate the essence of the concept as originally defined. This is exactly why this writer has referred to the schooling process as a "bastardized form of rite de passage". Its function has become purely ceremonial (i.e., involved with social states and statuses) and hardly ritual (i.e., involved with social transitions as described by van Gennep). Turner (op.cit., 72) states that "when ritual loses its capacity to play with ideas, symbols, and meanings, when it loses its cultural evolutionary resilience, ritual ceases to be an effective metalanguage or an agency of collective reflexivity".

Our schools have no ritual. Our students sense no transitional phase of becoming. Our society has no such "rite de passage" comparable to those of a generalist society, whereby the individual was guided through his life crises by social recognition and total group involvement.

It might be wise to reassess our evolutionary "progress" in terms of studying generalist systems. This is where anthropology can be of use to educators. Now let us see what problems arise when varying cultural systems meet face to face.

CULTURAL DYNAMICS AND CULTURE CHANGE

Congruent with Wolcott's list for foci of research in Anthropology and Education (op.cit., 1967a:86, quoted in Chapter II of this thesis) this writer, up to this point, has attempted to incorporate the first two of these into his analysis; that is, the formal educational institution itself as the object of inquiry, and the school as an enculturator. The final focus is one of the school as an acculturative agent representing domination of one group by another.

Before we can discern the effects of schooling as an acculturative agent, we must first have a broad look at the element of cultural dynamics itself. We cannot deny the inevitability that all living things change (recall discussion re evolution). As well, we cannot deny the inevitability that all societies change, along with the culture they express (see Herskovits, op.cit., for example). Culture, therefore, must inevitably be qualified as dynamic. Any culture left in isolation will automatically come under the effect of evolutionary forces. Consequently, change can be studied as a phenomenon that occurs within any given culture, as a result of its internal dynamics and evolutionary consequences.

The kind of change, however, that we are interested in here is that which results in the meeting and prolonged intense contact of rather diverse cultural expressions. In anthropological terms this is known as acculturation. This is a two way process whereby either culture in concern acquires cultural traits (material and ideological) from the other. Such traits may be diffused from one to the other (albeit cultural diffusion exists without prolonged intense contact; e.g., trade), and if they become integral to either cultural matrix, and if they come to have meaning within it, assimilation occurs. Undoubtedly, the process is much more sophisticated than outlined here, but the

following discussion intends to clarify it.

In relation to diverse cultural systems, this writer will make reference to them as cultural paradigms. As such, a specialist society represents one cultural paradigm, while a generalist society yet another.

Kuhn (1969: 175) writes of paradigms in two senses:

1. it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community;
2. it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.

According to Kuhn, it would appear that paradigm is both general and specific, postulate and hypothesis. In a general sense it might be equated with world view (recall discussion of culture in previous section, re Redfield, op.cit., 1953). In a specific sense it might be equated with model for inquiry. In a scientific sense the paradigm would be that frame of reference within which the scientist develops his theoretical orientations. For example, the Ptolemaic scientist envisioned the Earth as the fulcrum of the solar system, with the Sun and planets revolving about (recall Brameld, op.cit., 1965b:168). The Copernican scientist envisioned the Sun as the centre of the universe. Either case is representative of a scientific paradigm (part of the total cultural one) which sets a premise for further research. The transition from one paradigm to the next is rather abrupt, resulting from scientific discovery, and is referred to by Kuhn (op.cit., 92) as a scientific revolution; "scientific revolutions are here taken to be those non-cumulative" (this distinguishes revolution from evolution) "developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced by an incompatible new one".

In a reassessment of Kuhn's analysis, Wallace (1972) stresses more the "paradigmatic process" rather than the "paradigmatic revolution". Translating this process in anthropological terms, he cites the following example:

In the history of American anthropology, for instance, one can find a convenient illustration in the origin of the 'field work' paradigm. Whether accurately or not one thinks of Franz Boas stepping off the boat in an Eskimo village with his suitcase in hand . . . This image is the paradigm . . . (ibid., 469)

This example is cited in contradistinction to one that involves, for example, an approach utilizing solely library research and the use of the comparative method to derive models for cultural evolution (e.g., "armchair anthropology", "butterfly collecting"). Wallace cites the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain as a paradigmatic process (ibid., 474-476), and in "Wallacian" fashion concludes that:

The paradigmatic model is obviously closely related to the revitalization movement model; indeed, one could conceive of revitalization movements as being a special case of paradigm development. In both cases one is dealing with deliberate efforts to innovate continuously over a substantial period of time (ibid., 476).

For the purpose of this thesis "paradigm" will be both general and specific; general in that it will represent a unique world view, specific in that this writer will offer a model for inquiry re acculturative change.

With all this in mind we are now interested in relating the conflict that arises upon prolonged contact of cultural paradigms of divergent value orientations (recall previous discussion re extrinsic and intrinsic values). Prolonged contact is important here. For example, an explorer travelling in an unknown region who comes into contact with peoples of a different cultural background will have little effect on these people (cf., Service, op.cit.,9; "the historical situation that led to the discovery of primitive peoples and made them scientifically observable is the very situation that began to alter

them"). In some rational way these people will accommodate this new element within their world view.

Of course, the "rational way" may not be in accordance with Western philosophy. Accommodation may be through some magico-religious principle. Nonetheless, in a relativistic perspective, this rational way is justifiable (see Jarvie, 1967; what is rational to a person pursuing a generalist orientation may not be rational to a person pursuing a specialist orientation. But within the paradigm it operates it is rational).

All cultures are dynamic; all observe some degree of internal conflict. Yet, any culture of and by itself has the means to resolve this conflict (e.g., generalist-social ostracism and social ridicule; specialist - maintenance of a police force). A true problem arises when cultures of quite divergent value orientation come into prolonged intense contact.

History stands witness to the fact that the immediate reaction to contact may be one of physical conflict. But more importantly, and more significantly from a cultural-processual perspective, the conflict may be an ideological one (see Pearce, 1953; Jaenen, 1976, for examples).

According to Lifton (1974: 84-85):

One such measure is 'ideological totalism', in which a system of ideas is held with absolute conviction, regardless of how well or badly these ideas fit the complexity of reality. Totalism is an all-or-none proposition in which some political, religious, or philosophical [or cultural] creed is raised to the level of an all encompassing claim to truth.

furthermore (ibid., 85):

A totalistic view allows for no such process [ideological assimilation] or allows it only if the strangers are exactly like oneself. The space which one inhabits ['space' here including ideas a group of people hold and the people it accepts, as well as geographical area] becomes sacred. Those outside the sacred space are conceived as ghosts, demons, foreigners, or, simply, the enemy.

and, according to Otto Rank (1958: 40-41; published posthumously), a well

known Austrian psychologist:

. . . a competitive struggle not merely for biological survival but for eternal survival. The question of who is the 'chosen people' to survive all others, accounts for the perpetual struggle between the striving for likeness - in order to be included in the privilege of an eternal life of the group - and the emphasis on individualistic difference, be it personal or racial, in order to exclude the different ones from the blessings of eternity.

In this writer's opinion, observations such as the above have intense and realistic implications within our present society. Why does inter-cultural conflict exist and persist? Why do racist tendencies persist? Why can we not simply recognize one another as human beings, and work from such a premise? Perhaps we should agree to a "psychology of difference" (re: Rank) and educate accordingly.

According to Brown (1963b: v):

The notion that if people would just get to know one another they would be friends and everything would be alright is as dangerous as it is sentimental. Nor does a common race, religion, language, nationality, or culture insure friendliness or good will as numerous civil wars and rebellions testify. The sober fact is that we have to learn to get along with people who are different and are likely to stay that way.

Through time, the interaction of the two paradigms (generalist and specialist), undergoing acculturative processes, will manifest a process similar to, in this writer's opinion, that expressed via Hegelian philosophy (see Kojève, 1969). Thus:

thesis _____ antithesis _____ synthesis _____ thesis _____

Although represented here in a linear fashion, it must be recalled that the process is, in essence, circular; that is, the attainment of a new thesis is not an ultimate conclusion, rather a new premise for a consequent anti-thesis. This philosophy is essentially spiritual (idealistic ontology; see Brameld, op.cit., 1965b, 102-103). Marx was to transcribe this process

in terms of materialistic ontology.

With this model in mind we can now more effectively discuss value conflict as a result of inter-paradigm conflict (see Diagram). Given Society A (Generalist) and Society B (Specialist), all individuals relate within their paradigm through experience. This is what is intrinsic to the system, the pattern of experiential interaction. Society A differs from Society B in fundamental ways. Each Society also represents a thesis. An antithesis develops as a result of prolonged intense contact, producing a conflict of interests (i.e., a conflict through an awareness of alternatives; recall Redfield, op.cit., 1953:93, quoted in previous section re culture). This is where we are at today, for example, with the Canadian Indian situation and others like it. A synthesis resulting in a new thesis should be attained by resolving the conflict through all channels of the cultural matrix. Undoubtedly, this has not yet been achieved; we are in limbo (cf., van Gennep, op.cit., marge) at the antithetical level.

We could possibly arrive at a hundred reasons as to why we have not achieved synthesis (e.g., political conspiracy, economic exploitation, et cetera). But, in this writer's opinion, the problem is fundamentally a result of divergent paradigms being unable to resolve conflict due to a basic difference in value orientation intrinsic to each paradigm. Contrary to assuming the role of a cynic, this writer feels that this analysis fortifies a premise based on a psychology of difference (i.e., based upon the postulate of inter-paradigm variability).

One way of appreciating the conflict arising from prolonged intense contact between divergent cultural paradigms is through an analysis of cultural imperialism and colonialism. This inevitably assumes an historical perspective in discerning cause-effect relationships. As well, it entails


A Model For Cross-cultural Conflict

Society A Generalist

Society B Specialist

Thesis₁

Thesis₂



Antithesis

Conflict through awareness of alternatives
Conflict of Interests

Synthesis

Resolving of the conflict through all networks
of the cultural matrix

Thesis₃

A new social order

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an assessment of what has been recently referred to as "development" in "Third World" countries. First, we will briefly consider the notion of development within a socio-historical context. Then we will consider the role of the school within this context.

It might safely be said that "development" is often no more than a notion. Because of cultural variation, the term necessarily becomes relative. What determines development in one cultural milieu may not be the same in another. This is where a major problem lies. Peoples seek development in a number of ways; political, economic, educational, technological, et cetera. Unfortunately, these various social facets are ill-defined in terms of a total frame of reference.

This "total frame of reference" may be interpreted in two ways. First, what does development mean in terms of unique cultural make-up of the peoples involved? At this level it is important to analyze the "psychological constellation" of the cultural group in terms of social structure, values, and historical development. Second, what does development mean in terms of total global affairs? This assumes an international perspective, tackling such an issue as international conformity versus international differentiation within a global community.

"Global community" is an important concept here, and an increasingly ongoing concern. Yet this concept is a relatively recent "development" and it becomes necessary to view it in an historico-evolutionary perspective. The catalyst towards its realization undoubtedly lies within the rise of Capitalism.

This is not the place to trace the rise of the capitalist spirit (for an excellent account of this see Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism: 1947). But it is crucial to realize that, in a phenomenological

sense, it established a philosophical premise on how humankind was to view the world (i.e., specialist). Basically, it involved a world of exploitation and oppression, in both a physical and an ideological sense. Its rapid development and proliferation can undoubtedly be attributed to the late eighteenth century phenomenon in England, the Industrial Revolution.

So decisive was it for the whole future of capitalist economy, so radical a transformation of the structure and organization of industry did it represent, as to have caused some to regard it as the birth pangs of modern Capitalism, and hence as the most decisive moment in economic and social development since the Middle Ages. (Dobb, ibid., 19; and see Wallace, op.cit., 474-476).

A consequence of the Industrial Revolution was the need for raw materials. These would have to be found elsewhere; thus the blossoming of imperialism and colonial expansion. And so it came to pass, in making a long story short, that new lands needed to be conquered and controlled. Unfortunately, these lands were not free from indigenous human populations. Indeed, a few squabbles ensued, but the "might of progress" (which to some would mean "survival of the fittest") prevailed and soon the "inferior primitives" would become absorbed into the Empire Machine. Or would they?

Not all members of the conquering "tribe", however, found these indigenae to be that inferior. Consequently, a number of sensitive humanists, some of whom fondly labeled themselves as anthropologists, sought to observe and record the daily events of these peoples. It soon became evident, although not by the masses unfortunately, that these peoples and their lifestyles were not necessarily inferior but merely different. Moreover, it seemed that they had been and were developing along their own lines. It is at this point where the notion of "development" becomes synonymous with "evolution". This is, perhaps, development in the broadest sense. Societies in Africa, for example, represented worlds unto themselves. A noted anthropologist,

Jacques Maquet (1971), speaks of "global villages" and "global societies".

Inevitably, in all areas of the globe where contact has been established, and where the capitalist spirit prevailed, a system of colonial stratification followed. The original inhabitants, unfortunately, were to benefit little from the endeavour (see, for examples, D'Aeth, 1975; Gustafson, 1978). An apparently insoluble dichotomy was established between the "haves" and the "have nots", with the latter represented by the original inhabitants.

In most instances this dichotomy developed into fixations of cultural inequality, whereby the only escape seemed to lie within total assimilation with the dominant group. Some would assimilate, some would try with no success, and many would not try. Even those that tried often could not assimilate for the basic reason that the opposing regime seemed automatically to contain a mechanism known as institutional and/or structural racism. (Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 105-106).

In the name of "freedom and self-respect" (D'Aeth op.cit., 5), and conscious of past inequities, many of the colonially oppressed sought to cut loose the shackles of exploitation. These peoples were to become representatives of the "Third World". Politically, perhaps, this was to be a landmark for freedom; culturally and economically, this was to realize certain negative repercussions. According to D'Aeth (ibid, 28):

Countries of the Third World are characterized in varying degrees by having low standards of living, rapidly increasing populations and incomplete educational systems with many children having no schooling and with widespread illiteracy.

Consequently, in a global perspective, the term "under-developed" has been used by writers to describe these areas (Hoffman, 1966; Illich, 1969; Adams and Bjork, 1972). Illich (ibid., 4) equates underdevelopment with the blind faith acceptance of consumerism; "Underdevelopment as a state of mind

occurs when mass needs are converted to the demand for new brands of packaged solutions which are forever beyond the reach of the majority". The spirit of Capitalism has left an indelible blemish on all peoples affected by it.

Those who assume a Marxist-Leninist interpretation ultimately envision some sort of class struggle against the burden of exploitation and materialism. Even though the peoples have achieved (psuedo) independence vis-à-vis colonial rule, the created social structure has remained intact (neo-colonialism), providing a situation described as "Internal colonialism" (Gustafson, op.cit., 19; Chapter One has a lengthy discussion on the effects of capitalism via imperialism/exploitation upon conquered peoples; Chapter Four characterizes Jamaica as a country suffering from internal colonialism). According to Gustafson the argument also holds true with respect to Canada's indigenous population (specifically "Status Indians"). Although this is a matter for debate, it is quite noteworthy to speculate that, in light of present developments (i.e., "local control", a tendency towards cultural pluralism) we in Canada do have a situation of "internal colonialism" (cf. Porter, 1965), and that the struggle of the Canadian Indian is comparable to those of a Third World situation.

With regards to cultural dynamics and change, it must be remembered that in a systemic sense no one variable necessarily deserves a priori consideration as a prime mover. Within any given culture, economic, political, educational, familial, and religious factors are so inextricably intertwined that we cannot view any single variable as the sole engine of development (Adams and Bjork, op.cit., 10).

Nonetheless, education has been a major factor in shaping the notion of development. In assessing its significance, it is essential that we first

make a strong distinction between "education" and "schooling". This has already been done in the previous section of this thesis. It is important, however, to underline the distinction, and so a brief review is in order here.

In traditional non-industrial societies (i.e., generalist), exactly those encountered by colonial expansionists, there was no such device as schooling. Education, however, played a major role. Very basically, to live and to experience was to learn; cultural norms were transmitted through group behavior, via socialization practices and oral traditions. This procedure generally characterized most of the Indians of North America.

Congruently, this life style both determined and was determined by a communal world view, or cultural paradigm. Left in isolation, this paradigm would nonetheless evolve in its own right. Certain cultural expressions, however, would make the paradigm rather unique, with certain intrinsic qualitative properties. This is what this writer has referred to as the "psychological constellation" of a people.

Undoubtedly, societies that have an Industrial orientation (i.e., specialist) also are characterized by a world view. It could be argued, however, that the existential premise upon which they operate differs markedly from their non-Industrial counterpart (cf., Sealey, op.cit., 1980). Rather than communal, the emphasis is upon specialization and stratification.

An increase in technological innovation coupled with specialization produces a situation whereby no one individual can possibly acquire the total knowledge of his culture. To accommodate for cultural ignorance and social atomism, the system justifies its existence in the form of providing certain skills that will allow the individuals' respective role in the social machine. In essence, knowledge becomes selective, and the means of procuring selective knowledge is through the institutional transmission of selective knowledge.

Thus the rationale for the existence of schools (recall Cohen, op.cit., 1970 re schools and civilizational states).

"To each his own" is quite a fashionable social dictum until we attempt to analyze the consequences of two markedly different cultural systems experiencing prolonged and forced contact. Although the physical struggle may appear to have certain peak moments, the ideological struggle seems to be a pervasive and ongoing force.

Realizing that the physical presence of the intruder will not go away, an initial attempt is made at some sort of cultural accommodation. "To learn the ways of the white man", for example, was an attempt at achieving cultural understanding. Obviously, to accomplish this was to go to school - the snare! Indeed, to the Indian, for example, and to many other oppressed colonials as well, the school functioned like a snare. Baited with the promise of becoming successful, gaining the material delights of a "utopic" society, the Indian was lured away from traditionalism, indoctrinated with social myths (cf., Freire, op.cit., 135-316). Material desires, however, bring unforeseen internal changes affecting social structures.

Equality of opportunity did not seem to provide equality of outcome, especially if one was culturally and/or racially different. It seemed inevitable that the school would pave the way to cultural genocide. Consequently, total cultural assimilation, or some sort of "melting pot" philosophy, has backfired.

Peoples within politically defined territories have sought and achieved independence, creating political enclaves. Canada's Indians, however, have not met with such success. They might be likened more to the situation in South Africa, with one major exception - they are ruled by a dominant majority. Yet they share similar beliefs with Third World developing nations in that

they wish to control and regulate their own destiny (see Gustafson, op.cit., Chapter Six).

In an attempt to develop their own respective personalities within a competing world, the newly "liberated" nation may automatically seek to function within and perpetuate the already existing structure as imposed by the former colonial regime. This sort of blind faith acceptance of an Industrial-type frame of reference can be quite misleading and socially maladaptive (Spindler, op.cit., 1973).

The Industrial-type system automatically assumes social stratification and corporate elitism. It automatically assumes a tendency toward urban migration and a resultant "poverty syndrome" (see Lewis, 1966). It operates on a rather shaky existential premise that an increase in technological knowledge will lead to material gain with a higher standard of living. By some mystical formula all this is transformed into progress (D'Aeth, op.cit., 59; cf. Harris, op.cit., 1977: 271, 291--

Regardless of which mode of production is involved, there is only one means of avoiding the catastrophic consequences of declining efficiencies: to shift to more efficient technologies. . . While the course of cultural evolution is never free of systemic influence, some moments are probably more 'open' than others. The most open moments, it appears to me, are those at which a mode of production reaches its limits of growth and a new mode of production must soon be adopted. We are rapidly moving toward such an opening).

All this seems to imply the fallacy of "catching up". To what? In most instances, an emulation of the Industrial-type model. There arises a faith in factories, a faith in consumerism, and a faith in the school that will transform outdated traditions into new modes of progress. "School has become the world religion of a modernized proletariat, and makes futile promises of salvation to the poor of the technological age" (Illich, 1970:15).

Perhaps the peoples of developing areas may be likened to some sort of

lumpen proletariat, and the school as its redeemer. Illich (ibid., 65)

perceives that:

School combines the expectations of the consumer expressed in its claims with the beliefs of the producer expressed in its ritual. It is a liturgical expression of a world wide 'cargo cult', reminiscent of the cults which swept Melanesia in the forties, which injected cultists with the belief that if they but put on a black tie over their naked torsos, Jesus would arrive in a steamer bearing an icebox, a pair of trousers and a sewing machine for each believer (for more detailed accounts of the phenomenon of the cargo cult see Jarvie, op.cit., Lawrence, 1964; Worsley, 1968).

Comparably, if developing countries were to adopt Industrial-type ideals, they should also receive material gain. This has not proven to be the case in most instances. Ironically, even the "advanced" countries are criticizing their own system (D'Aeth, op.cit., 13).

The hopes that primary schools would equalize opportunities, and help social development, have proven to be false. It does not seem as if any amount of improvement of the curriculum or teaching methods could remedy the situation, for what is needed is a new form of education much closer to a community life, and to its improvement (D'Aeth, ibid., 62, underlining mine; see Sealey, 1973, re Native Curriculum Development in Canada).

Ironically, once again, a "form of education much closer to community life" can often be found to be associated with primitive traditionalism, or the way many societies lived prior to Industrial intervention, where a great emphasis was placed on socialization and kinship ties, and a total education.

Comparative educators realize the potential danger of imposing one modus operandi of a cultural system upon another. This relates back to our previous discussion of development and cultural relativism. Cultural assimilation is a formidable task. We must take into account the unique historical developments and the "psychological constellations" of the cultures involved.

There can be no simple model for development in the Third World, and the position of each country has to be analyzed in terms of the economic, political, social, educational and other complexities; and these must include such aspects as race, religion, language and other cultural differences (D'Aeth, op.cit., 59).

In essence, "the whole process abroad", and with Canada's Indians, "is like an attempt to transplant cut flowers" (Dart, 1966:96). The outcome seems to result in the perpetuation of social alienation and social poverty, producing a situation of marginality (Adams and Bjork, op.cit., 126).

Consequently, much is being written on the function of the school within a social system, and how it relates to the "quality of education" (recall Chapter II of this thesis with reference to Anthropology of Education). D'Aeth (op.cit.), for example, does not make a distinction between "education" and "schooling". He distinguishes the theoretical and the praxis of education.

Theoretically, the aims of education are -

1. overcome ignorance;
2. contribute to economic growth;
3. improve quality of rural life;
4. improve training in skills for industrial development;
5. develop a more equitable society;
6. contribute to nation building.

(D'Aeth, ibid., 9-10).

Translated into practical terms the contribution of education becomes -

1. give sufficient literacy and a basic education;
2. provide a continuing flow of information in practical learning situations (agriculture, nutrition, health, et cetera);
3. provide 'modern learning systems' for higher education;

4. develop some sort of political ideology congruent with the aims.

(D'Aeth, ibid., 77-78, 110-111).

In reference to developing countries the emphasis is upon some sort of rural-urban symbiosis. D'Aeth's analysis is insightful, yet rather nebulous in terms of immediate social action.

Beeby (1966: 10-13) provides a three-tier concept in his discussion of the quality of education. Thus, quality of education is to be defined three ways:

1. classroom conception as seen by school inspectors (i.e., ability in three R's, rote learning, atmosphere, et cetera);
2. productivity in terms of input/output market and jobs available;
3. social goals of education - theories of educating.

The emphasis seems to be upon the type of schooling within an Industrially oriented system. This assumes that the school is a recognized form of transmitting cultural knowledge. It also assumes the selection and compartmentalization of certain cultural values, and somehow implies a restriction in individual members of a society to attain total cultural knowledge. In essence, it implies a form of cultural totalitarianism. As such, schools provide the fuel for the Industrial machine, maintaining polarization "by hardening the perception of real needs into the demand for mass manufactured products" (i.e., notion of Verdinglichung, Illich, op.cit., 1969:4).

It would seem that the ultimate conclusion would reckon a need for some sort of socio-cultural reconstructionism (see Brameld, op.cit., 1965b; Kneller, op.cit., 36: definition; Adams and Bjork, op.cit., 18: "The whole structure of society must be changed.") This seems to be a critical phase

congruent with Beeby's (op.cit.) third stage of theories of educating.

Of course, we could all have a heyday with this, each of us providing the key to social utopia. Serious attempts are being made, however, and one rather enlightening attempt has been made by Paulo Freire. Unlike Illich, Freire does not emphasize an aspect of deschooling society. Like the former, however, he does recognize the school and what it stands for in an Industrial-type system as a perpetrator of social myths (cf. Kimball, op.cit., 88, re "innocence of realities"), maintaining a system of oppression:

It is necessary for the oppressors to approach the people in order, via subjugation, to keep them passive. This approximation, however, does not involve being with the people, or require true communication. It is accomplished by the oppressors depositing myths indispensable to the preservation of the status quo. . . .

(Freire, op.cit., 135-316).

Freire continues by listing a whole series of "social myths". An interesting point, however, is that all societies seem to perpetuate social myths.

According to Max Gluckman, all societies have procedures to hide such dissonances from their members. He suggests that this is the purpose of the ritual. Rituals can hide from their participants even discrepancies and conflicts between social principle and social organization. As long as an individual is not explicitly conscious of the ritual character of the process through which he was initiated to the forces which shape his cosmos, he cannot break the spell and shape a new cosmos.

(Illich, op.cit., 1970: 74, underlining mine).

Freire develops an argument whereby true liberation lies within becoming conscious of these social myths and transcending them in order to become "more fully human" (op.cit., 42, 72, 157, 160). This is not liberation in the Marxian sense of class struggle leading to some sort of polar reversal. Rather, it implies a "rebirth" (cf., van Genneep, op.cit.,

re "incorporation", and Cardinal 1977: The Rebirth of Canada's Indians) through the attainment of "conscientização" - "learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality", (ibid., 19; cf., Redfield, op.cit., 1953: 93: "for those who do not experience . . . there is the experience of knowing that others do").

By taking action against the oppressive elements of reality, Freire does not imply violent revolution. Rather, he implies a cultural revolution, emphasizing the importance of education in becoming an instrument whereby human beings realize their total potential. "The oppressed must cease to be things, rather subjects". (ibid., 55).

As such, he introduces the "banking concept" of Industrial-type schooling, characterizing it as a "paternalistic social action apparatus" with the sole function of maintaining oppression (ibid., 60). Oppression is maintained by a system of stratification and vertical dialogue (cf., Kimball, op.cit., 1974: 83). Consequently, a system is proposed whereby dialogue is horizontal, thereby reducing verticality and social inequity. (Freire, op.cit., 80). This implies the need for cultural revolution, and in a practical sense this seems not at all that impossible (see, for examples, Hinton, 1966, 1971 and Gustafson, op.cit., on Cuba, Chapter Four). Ultimately, time will stand as a variable in determining the long range success of these revolutions.

Freire's argument seems to stem from a phenomenological premise of being "with" the world rather than merely being "in" it (op.cit., 62, 100). This has interesting implications, for it supposes that we have the intrinsic ability to change our lives. Schooling, as a function of the Industrial-

type system, numbs, if not negates, the attainment of conscientização, emphasizing being "in" the world and victim of social forces. It assumes that an Industrial-type orientation is a natural existence.

Undoubtedly, this blind acceptance has had, and is still having, profound effects upon developing countries. Indeed, in adopting this sort of Industrial orientation is true liberation being achieved? On the contrary, the only achievement has been the independence to make the same social blunders.

With respect to Canada and the United States, a Freirian-type analysis has been applied to Indians. Chance (1972: 180-181) envisions white society as a depositor of social myths vis-à-vis Native education (cf., Fisher, op.cit.). This has inevitably produced cultural alienation, whereby Native peoples in general have become both marginal to society and exploited within it (ibid., 175). According to Chance (op.cit., 176) increased "conscientização" is a process constituting three levels:

1. 'culture of silence' - minority members are seen as an object by others - dependency;
2. transitional level - people become aware of the dichotomy between themselves as object and subject;
3. people denounce dehumanizing social institutions and cultural practices, and undertake to formulate new humanizing institutions and values - i.e., role of the educator.

Although Freire tends to be jargonistic, he raises a major philosophical awareness that is worthy of consideration. In a Platonic sense, he is wanting to get at the real image. Industrial-type schooling merely projects false images on the wall.

The Freirian analysis is not without criticism, however. During the years 1973-1974, Anthony Burton, an educational anthropologist, became

directly involved with Freirian pedagogy. Burton was consultant to a national literacy program, known as ALFIN (Alfabetizacion Integral), organized by the Peruvian Ministry of Education. Initially excited about Freire's theoretical stance, this provided Burton with an opportunity to become involved in its praxis.

The program was a failure and its downfall is outlined in an article by Burton (1980):

ALFIN theory is not merely defective social science; it is also offensive, in that it unmistakably posits two levels of human consciousness, the liberated and the oppressed, the 'seer' and the 'submerged'. What is offensive about this is that it is the seers who define themselves and the submerged. (ibid., 248).

In light of Burton's personal observations, Freire has offered no more than a modern version of Plato's Republic, and the concept of a philosopher-king as ruler.

Nonetheless, how might Freirian-type analysis relate to Canada's Indians and education, for example? Gustafson (op.cit.) and others have rightfully argued the systematic oppression of Indians. Furthermore, a reaction to "internal colonialism" is a necessary step. Local control of education is such a reaction.

The crucial issue, of course, and one to be observed over the next few years, is the effectiveness of local control type education. If its direction is to emulate an Industrial-type pedagogy one could easily question the effectiveness of local control and "true liberation". To the extent that Canada's Indians are fighting for self-respect and self-control parallels their efforts with developing nations.

The problem, however, as Gustafson alludes to (ibid., Chapter Four) is not comparable on a one to one basis with the Cuban situation. The

latter portrays a total systemic change, whereas the former portrays an ethnic adjustment within a system that is existentially oppressive. In a Freirian sense, for Canada's Indians to have become truly liberated would mean that all Canadians would have reached the level of conscientizaçãõ. Of course, this is at present not the case.

For all intents and purposes of this thesis, "conscientizaçãõ" is comparable to critical cultural awareness. It is argued by this writer that the internalization of the previously discussed concepts by the educator and society as a whole is a necessary step in attaining a level of conscientizaçãõ. Evolution reveals the important facts of adaptation and variability, and those ecological forces that very much affect our survival. Culture is that milieu of bio-cultural interrelationships within which we interact. It is also a manifestation of adaptation and variability (i.e., cultural evolution). Enculturation has a particular significance for educators, for it is that process through which cultural knowledge is perpetuated. Schooling is one means of achieving this. Cultural dynamics reveals that culture is continuously going through a process of modification (conscious and unconscious), conditioned by responses to our bio-cultural environment. It is with these basic concepts that the educator might best portray the "human condition", exploring with students the realm of its potential.

The following chapter will focus upon the Canadian situation, utilizing some of the previously discussed concepts and relating them specifically to the Canadian Indian in both an historical and contemporary context. Before this is done, however, we must consider such operant forces as stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination and racism, and their *raison d'être* within an Industrial paradigm.

CHAPTER IV

The previous chapter provided a discussion, from an anthropological perspective of four major concepts deemed relevant by this writer to prospective teachers. This was done in a general way, the major intent being to demonstrate the significance of such a perspective to those unfamiliar with it. This chapter will continue this trend, Its focus, however, will become more specific in that it will be concerned with how stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination and racism operate within a specialist paradigm. These "operant forces" will be discussed within a context that is primarily Canadian, what this writer refers to as "situational". The manifestation of these forces will be revealed vis-à-vis the schooling process both historically and contemporaneously, and the major emphasis will be upon what has become known as "multicultural education".

STEREOTYPE, PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM

Undoubtedly, stereotyping has existed for a long time. Although Lippman (1922) has been attributed with the coining of the term, the processes involved in producing stereotypes have been around for as long as groups of people have been in contact with other groups that are racially/culturally different. Research in the area of attitude and stereotype has been of major concern to many scholars within the United States. This is no doubt a result of the ongoing racial strife that continues to plague that nation. Up until quite recently Canadians have assumed an arrogant pride in believing that racism was hardly a major issue in this country, that somehow the territorial border that delineates the two countries is an ideological one as well, confining all social malaise south of it. Canadians have been referred to as "polite racists" (Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 214); "They

politely move slightly away from a Black co-passenger on the subway; they politely refuse to rent to or hire a Black, . . .". A review of many Canadian city newspapers, however, will reveal what appears to be the transformation of covert racism (i.e., polite racism) to overt racism, and Canadians can hardly now blame Americans for pointing at our arrogant folly.

Returning to stereotyping, Brigham (1971) provides an excellent review of the literature (re United States) up until that time. As discussed in the previous chapter, a key problem in social science is one of definition. Consequently, the concept of "stereotype" has taken on a variety of different meanings.

Many writers have attempted to refute "established" definitions only to contrive another just as fallacious. This is not to say that we are wasting our time; rather, many definitions tend to be arbitrary and idiosyncratic, based upon the particular orientation of the researcher involved. Indeed, this thesis is indicative of this as well, revealing a particular orientation based upon the idiosyncratic research of the writer. Nonetheless, a frame of reference must be provided, if only to be refined at a future time.

The easiest orientation would be one of affirming that stereotyping is intrinsic to the nature of humankind. Another orientation may be classified as phenomenological. Vinacke (1957) has some worthwhile ideas on this issue. Pursuing the notion that stereotypes are social constructs, he states that they "should properly be regarded as concept-systems, with positive as well as negative functions, having the same general kinds of properties as other concepts, and serving to organize experience as do other concepts" (ibid., 229). He defines concepts as (ibid., 232-233) "cognitive

organizing systems which serve to bring pertinent features of past experience to bear upon a present stimulus-object".

Although these definitions may lend themselves to criticism, there are key issues here when we consider research in this area. A stereotype can have either a negative or a positive function, depending upon the situational context and the groups involved. As such, what we are concerned with are the properties of stereotypes and how they are employed in a person's thinking. Stereotyping must be perceived systemically as a two-way process (recall discussion in previous chapter re enculturative process; Mead op.cit., 1970; Shimahara, op.cit.).

In this sense, stereotyping, borne out of ethnocentrism, becomes functional within a given social reality, a means for classifying social groups. Furthermore, the process itself need not necessarily be noted as negative; it can be quite positive in a functional sense (i.e., promoting cultural stability and solidarity). They are the criteria for classification (traits) that we are interested in (recall previous discussion on criteria for classification of racial/ethnic groups). "The fact is that traits represented in stereotypes depend solely upon properties which a group of people agree are typical of a class, just as is the case, in practice, for classes of other objects" (Vinacke, op.cit., 239, underlining mine). Now, what are the groups and how do these groups of people come to agree on traits for classification? Can we assume that these may be both described and measured by certain testing techniques? How are Canadian Indians, for example, socially objectified by members of an outgroup?

In a statistical sense, stereotype has been defined as a "collection of trait-names upon which a large percentage of people agree as appropriate for describing some class of individuals" (ibid., 230). According to Brigham

(op.cit., 29) this tells us very little about stereotyping:

Findings as to the extent that a given generalization is widespread among a group of people (subjects), even if methodological problems are ignored, do not prove of any value in elucidating what a stereotype is, how it is developed, or even how many people hold a stereotype. For example, how many subjects actually endorse (agree with) or use the generalization in behavior, and how many subjects are just reporting on their knowledge of the traits that persons in one's culture most commonly attribute to the given ethnic group?

It would appear that a stereotype is only as significant as it is manifest in actual behavior. Consequently, it would appear as well that any definition of stereotype that is purely descriptive is non-explanatory. It must include an active dimension accounting for the processes involved in classificatory behavior.

Mackie (1973:435; 1974) argues a need to make a distinction between the scientist and the layman; she perceives stereotype as referring "to those folk beliefs about the attributes characterizing a social category on which there is substantial agreement" (underlining mine). How do we know when an agreement is substantial?

Perhaps we are becoming too detail-conscious at this point. According to Campbell, (1967: 827), "the most ubiquitous aspect of stereotypes is not so much the falsity of the descriptive content as it is in the several causal misperceptions that accompany them". Once again, stereotyping as a process is emphasized (cf., Turner, op.cit.), and we would assume that this be made explicit in any definition.

Campbell (op.cit., 824-825) relates certain problems in defining the process. It would seem that attitudes leading toward stereotype have a number of intervening variables to be taken into account. These problems are worth quoting here:

1. Phenomenological absolutism of the normal ingroup member's imagery of the outgroup or minority group member. Naively one assumes without question that the outgroup is as one perceives it, or as the ingroup informs one about it.
2. The degree of difference perceived, the exaggeration of the homogeneity with which either ingroup or outgroup members have the trait in question, and the underestimation of the amount of overlap between the two groups.
3. The naive ingrouper's stereotypes of outgroups as an erroneous causal perception. This is the tendency to perceive racial rather than environmental causes for group differences.
4. Causal misperception - the most important although the most difficult to explicate. It has to do with the relationship between the content of the stereotype and the hostility felt toward the outgroup.

In essence, the problems here are of an epistemological variety.

Yet, it is important to realize that our concern is not with content (descriptive element) of a stereotype per se; rather, with the processes involved that promote certain attitudes which in turn may project a stereotype.

Aside from the basic problem of epistemology, it is left for the researcher to investigate and determine causal factors. This has gone beyond the purely ethnographic approach to one of validation/refutation of hypotheses via various testing mechanisms. What causes certain groups of people to have certain attitudes that in turn become "attitudinal fixations", or, stereotypes?

Once again, Brigham (op.cit.) provides an excellent review of the research that has been done in this area within the United States. Causal explanations are numerous. The most obvious one has been race. "Skin color and racial membership appear to be perceived as possessing both racial and social significance by children by the time they reach age 4 or 5" (ibid., 21, in reference to others). Some studies indicate that class has

more of a function than race (ibid., 20, in reference to others).

Bogardus (1925) attempted to equate attitude with "social distance".

Other causal factors could be mentioned; ethnic affiliation, religious affiliation, socio-economic status, language, years of schooling, and so on. The most frustrating aspect is that not any one of these could be a prime mover; rather, it is likely that they are all involved in the stereotyping process.

In Canada, research has been just as varied. Porter (op.cit.), for example, claims that ethnicity is a major factor in controlling the status of various groups. More recently Darroch (1979) explores the possibility that there is a greater social mobility between ethnic groups than once predicted, and that ethnic groups have not become as "fixed" as Porter indicated. Darroch's analysis will be looked at in greater detail further on in this writing. Frideres, however (1975; 1976; 1978), supports that ethnicity and racism are major causal factors for type of stereotype maintained.

Specific to social class, the results show that for Indians and Blacks social class is not an important mediating factor in determining students' attitudes toward them [student sample drawn from Western Canadian University] . . . it does suggest that a portion of the hostility of the larger society directed towards them may be due to other factors such as 'racial characteristics'.

(Frideres, op.cit., 1975:40).

Congruently, in a more recent study (Frideres, op.cit., 1976: 136), he concludes that racism in Western Canada has not decreased over the past twenty years and that "individual racism has been transferred from Great Britain to Canada". His study of 1975 also reveals "that language has an impact upon attitudes towards French Canadians and Ukrainians but little impact towards other groups" (ibid., 40).

In a social distance study by Driedger and Peters (1977: 168) it is concluded that "Manitoba students indicated a desire for more distance from non-Europeans, but there was little evidence for negative attitudes towards them". Goldstein (1978) presents a study based on prestige and socio-economic status vis-à-vis ethnic name labelling.

Two earlier studies, Gardner and Taylor (1969), and Gardner, Taylor and Feenstra (1970), discuss the phenomenological aspect of stereotyping and a "common knowledge model", seemingly in accord with a later writing by Mackie (op.cit., 1974).

The model suggested here, however is that the ethnic-group label, French Canadians, evokes a relatively common image of the Quebec scene, of Expo and hockey, of Catholicism, and separatism, and on the basis of this 'common knowledge', subjects hypothesize about what personality attributes from a list presented are congruent with this 'information'. Such a model would support the "Kernel of truth" hypothesis in that a common image might conceivably be based on common factual information, but at the same time it would account for the inclusion of erroneous, or conflicting personality attributes in the 'stereotype' since these could be reasonable deductions based on partial information suggested by the image. (Gardner and Taylor, op.cit., 190-191).

To substantiate this type of analysis Gibbins and Ponting (1976), in relation to Canadian Indians, incorporated a "knowledge index of Indian Affairs". Their subsequent results concluded that among their respondents, knowledge about Indians and their situation had little impact upon sympathy or approval. If this holds true, we could seriously question the validity of "cultural awareness" programmes within the school curricula, or the content of these programmes.

This writer as well (van de Vyvere, 1980) conducted a study of the attitudes of prospective school teachers towards selected ethnic/racial groups. The research was also done at a Western Canadian university. The testing instrument used in this study was the semantic differential,

consisting of 13 bipolar adjectives covering a three dimensional space - EPA (i.e., Evaluative - e.g., good/bad; Potency - e.g., powerful/powerless; Activity - e.g., fast/slow).

There is no need, however, to go into any great detail re semantic differential here (see Osgood, 1964; Heise, 1970). A mean distribution (profile) was plotted, revealing the respondents' (n=80) general attitude vis-à-vis the selected ethnic groups and the selected bi-polar adjectives. On a mean range from one to five, with five being the most positive, the average mean for most groups with respect to the total EPA dimension centred about the three-point-five range. There were two noticeable exceptions, however, being the East Indians and the Canadian Indians. Especially in the evaluative dimension, the Canadian Indian fared no better than a mean of two-point-five. That is, according to the respondents of this study, Canadian Indians were dirty, lazy, dishonest and drunk.

Of course, there are many limitations to such an analysis and those like it. We may look at them from two levels. The first relates to the method of testing. Although cooperative, a few respondents raised doubts concerning the validity of such testing (see Heise, *ibid.*, 246-247). Some believed the concepts to be dogmatic, forcing a prescribed response, working within a prescribed mind set. According to Heise (*ibid.*, 247), ". . . for the present one perhaps should be cautious in using the SD with highly salient topics since there is some evidence that the measures may be confounded by social desirability effects in such instances".

The second level relates to the kind of sample utilized in this study. A sample of university students may be regarded as a "closed system" sample. The university may be regarded as a subsystem of a larger system, and although

it is part of this larger system, the ideas it perpetuates may be sui generis (i.e., academic liberalism) and not necessarily characteristic of the members of society at large.

As such, we must speculate as to whether the test results were either "real" or "ideal". Although, for example, the questionnaire may ask whether the respondents had any close relationships with the members of ethnic groups other than their own, we have no way of actually knowing how intimate the relationships are, or under what circumstances they are maintained (cf., Campbell, op.cit.).

Furthermore, we do not know how well members of other groups are perceived in "real" situations; that is, those situations outside of the university. Consequently, respondents may rely upon certain folk beliefs (Mackie, op.cit., 1973), or "common knowledge" (Gardner and Taylor, op.cit.).

An interesting aspect of van de Vyvere's study (op.cit.), is that a goodly number of respondents (30) were enrolled in a course on cross-cultural education. This would lead us to speculate on the content of the course being offered and its effects on prospective teachers. Are the attitudes as represented by this study influenced at all by course content, or would they exist regardless? On the other hand, is it not possible that schooling may have little effect upon attitude or changing it?

Nonetheless, cognizant of such limitations, research of this type is significant in discerning whether certain groups of people perceive other groups of people as being different? Research of this type is beneficial in either supporting or refuting such conjectured models on cross-cultural conflict as presented in the previous chapter of this thesis, for example. This type of research, therefore, becomes quite necessary when much is being

said and questioned about issues relating to multiculturalism and cultural pluralism.

A stereotype is the "stuff" upon which prejudices are formulated. We all have prejudices in that we all have preferences as to what we like or dislike. The stereotype that "blondes have more fun" may cause male members of a society to be prejudiced in favour of females with blonde hair, while female members of the same society who do not have blonde hair to be prejudiced against them (i.e., female blondes). This is a hypothetical case, of course, but it reflects how prejudices are often formulated on selective subjective criteria.

We are interested, however, in studying ethnic and racial prejudice, and these automatically have come to assume a negative stereotype.

According to Allport (1954: 10):

Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group . . . The net effect of prejudice, thus defined, is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his own conduct.

According to Hughes and Kallen (op.cit., 105):

Racial prejudice refers to a set of attitudes or beliefs towards members of particular ethnic categories or groups on the basis of their assumed physical, cultural, and/or behavioural characteristics.

Prejudice is a belief, or attitude, usually based upon erroneous information (per stereotype) of the individual/group in concern. The belief, however, is of no major consequence until it becomes manifest in actual public behaviour. A bar-tender, for example, might relate to intimate friends his belief of white racial superiority. Nonetheless, he will serve non-whites at the bar. On the other hand, should his belief be

demonstrated in actual public behaviour (i.e., refusing to serve non-whites at the bar), this is an act of discrimination and racism. According to Hughes and Kallen (ibid., 105):

Racial discrimination refers to the act or practice or granting or denying members of particular ethnic categories or groups access to life chances (opportunities or rewards) because of their assumed physical, cultural and/or behavioural characteristics.

Prejudice, therefore, refers to attitudes or beliefs. Discrimination refers to behaviour or the act of inclusion/exclusion according to personal beliefs. Racism refers to a belief that one race is superior/inferior to another.

As is the case with biological evolution, so it is with social evolution as well in that the interaction becomes significant mainly at the group level. Discrimination towards the individual may be seen as individual variation. Towards the group, however, it assumes greater significance. As such, people belonging to a certain race are excluded from certain group activities (cf., Walker, 1978: 76,78 - a greater emphasis needs to be placed upon research that discerns the processes of maintenance of institutional racism. In terms of social stratification, we should be "studying up rather than down"). A threshold is crossed when racism becomes structural. A real problem has been created, one that is systemic and pervasive. (see Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 105-106; "Structural racism refers to inequalities rooted in the system-wide operation of a society which exclude substantial numbers of particular ethnic categories from significant participation in its major social institutions").

Being ingrained within the moral and social fabric of a society, structural racism becomes an unconscious determining force. Governmental

policies have been constructed with the intent of excluding certain groups of people according to ethnic/racial affiliation. Australia is one example; South Africa another. Although Canadians in their humanitarian endeavour may neglect the fact that racism exists in our present society, it would be wise to look at the problem historically vis-à-vis government policies and immigration laws (see Palmer, ed. 1975).

It would seem that prejudice does not simply exist in and of itself. Although prejudice can be related as a causal factor for discrimination, there must be causal factors involved in producing prejudice in the first place. These causal factors take on a number of forms relative to the researcher's particular emphasis.

Early theoretical orientations have been attacked on grounds of over-generalization and over simplification. This is a nebulous realm, of course, but justifiable in that it realizes a difference of kind (cf. previous discussion re generalist and specialist systems, Sealey, op.cit., 1980; see Vinacke, op.cit.). Prejudices exist within a given societal context on an individual level. More importantly, however, they exist at a group level as well. These prejudices are innate in that they are unconsciously founded upon ethnocentric values (cf. Mead, op.cit., 1970: 29-30):

The unanalyzed belief that other people, who look very different physically, or live at a very different social level from oneself, are somehow different in deeply hereditary ways, is a very persistent one however strongly people may declare their allegiance to the scientific statement that beliefs associated with race and class are learned, not carried in their genes).

Individual prejudices are hardly influential, "you go your way and I'll go mine". At a group level, it has a more profound impact. Cultures

that are isolated maintain a "latent" prejudice. This latency becomes outwardly real as a result of prolonged inter-cultural contact. On a cross-cultural level, therefore, in a very general way, we may speculate as to the causes of prejudice with regards to cultural differences and ethnocentrism. Although generalized, this idea should not be undermined, for the possibility arises that this benign process is a factor involved in the perpetuation of the "psychological constellation" held in common by a particular group.

With societies that are more complex and stratified, another dimension must be added. This dimension is a vertical one and related to degree of social mobility. Inevitable with this type of social structure is the degree of power held by its members and differential access to it. Obviously, the more complex the social system the more complex must be the variables involved in determining the causes of prejudice.

Within highly stratified societies, a differential access towards the availability of consumable resources and the power to acquire the access leads to differential treatment of the members of society as a whole. Unfortunately, this goes beyond the individual level to the group. Differential access becomes significant in terms of groups of people. Consequently, certain groups of people have access to certain resources denied to other groups of people. Congruently, as a matter of reference, we speak in terms of a majority or dominant group, and a minority or sub-ordinate group.

The concept, majority or dominant group, refers to the category or categories of people who occupy the highest ranking or super-ordinate position within the society in terms of power, privilege and prestige. The concept minority or subordinate group, refers to the category or categories of people who occupy a lower ranking or subordinate position vis-à-vis the majority group. The crucial

characteristic of minority group ranking is not numerical strength [take South Africa, for example] but its inferior social position because of which its interests are not equally or effectively represented in the major, public and private social institutions of society. The concept, minority, is a relative term and thus has no social meaning apart from its relation to the concept, majority.

(Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 101).

Porter's analysis (op.cit.) gives evidence that this model of majority group conformity is implicit in the Canadian system of ethnic stratification. Represented in the greatest numbers at the top of this hierarchy are those ethnic categories most clearly resembling the dominant "W.A.S.P." (White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) elite, physically, linguistically, culturally and behaviourally.

Represented in the greatest numbers at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy are those "highly visible" ethnic categories most dissimilar to the majority, the indigenous peoples: Indians, Inuit and Metis. In the middle ranks are a wide range of ethnic minorities including Ukrainians, Chinese, et cetera, most of whom have experienced considerable upward or downward mobility over time, depending upon the willingness of the majority to allow them effective participation in its major social institutions, and on their own members' desire to emulate the majority model.

This pattern of ethnic stratification bears a great resemblance to van de Vyvere's study (op.cit.) re ethnic stereotyping. It would appear that there is a tendency for the hierarchical ethnic structure to persist because, despite mobility in the middle ranks, the ethnic composition of the top and bottom ranks remains relatively stable.

More recently, the purpose of an analysis by Darroch (op.cit.) was primarily one of re-evaluating the commonly accepted thesis of Porter that

one's ethnicity was the most important variable in determining entrance status and social mobility within a stratified society. Darroch does not deny that the premise may be true to some extent. Observed social phenomena over the past decade, however, seem to indicate that the problem of ethnic stratification is obviously quite complex, and that one's ethnic affiliation is not necessarily an impediment to social mobility. "There is no sound evidence to sustain the quite common assumption that ethnic affiliations operate as a significant block to educational and occupational mobility in Canada" (ibid, 2).

In this light, the significance of Darroch's analysis is one of making explicit and fundamental that one's ethnic affiliation is not the sole variable in determining social outcome. "I am concerned with the gross effects of ethnicity and immigrant status in stratification and mobility . . . (ibid, 4). In terms of research, this has significant implications, calling a need in re-establishing an axiomatic premise that moves away from the "ethnic variable" and the "vertical mosaic".

Darroch proceeds to support his argument by making reference to more recent research. Quoting Blishen (1970), Forcese (1975), Tepperman (1975), and Pineo (1976), he seeks to weaken Porter's position by stating that interethnic social mobility does exist. In accordance with Pineo (op.cit.), he suggests that Porter's thesis was, in fact, largely commenting on the relative status of ethnic groups and not on the life chances of individual (Darroch, op.cit., 5). This observation has meaningful implications as well, for it attempts to view social systems as dynamic entities. Porter's analysis with its "locked-in" orientation could be viewed as an unrealistically static representation of society.

As such, Darroch argues (ibid, 10):

One major conclusion which a reconsideration of the original data makes imperative is that ethnic occupational differentiation has systematically reduced in thirty years. Certainly, this adds weight to the growing reluctance to accept the idea that Canada has experienced a hardening of initial levels of ethnic entrance statuses into a permanent class system.

Indeed, when we look at the various Tables (ibid., 9,11,14,16), we might conclude that there appears to be a greater "ethnic fluidity"; yet this appears to be primarily with the "middle" groups (e.g., German, Dutch, Scandinavian, et cetera). Unfortunately, proportionately Canada's indigenae (Native Peoples) reveal a considerable disparity. Congruently, might we not conclude that we are moving from an apparent multi-caste system to an obvious dual-caste system (i.e., Native Peoples versus the Others)?

Why would this be the case? Could this be at all related to the previous discussion re specialist and generalist cultural paradigms, each representing a unique psychological constellation, now revealing an antithetical situation of ideological conflict? Nonetheless, with Darroch's analysis we might have to conclude that ethnicity alone is not the factor in determining social position, and to this extent a re-evaluation of Porter's thesis is quite justified.

In a stratified society, prejudice and discrimination must be perceived in terms of dominant/subordinate relationships. As such, they are non-causal variables; rather, they are mechanistic and intervening. With reference to the majority, they may be used as a device in the maintenance of the status quo.

The overriding consequence, however, is that this functional aspect with regards to the majority group becomes institutionalized and intrinsic to the operating social structure. Indeed, their function becomes

profitable as a means of societal maintenance and power centralization. On a competitive level, one group can only be at the top at the expense of another.

Interplaying with these operant forces is the process of stereotyping. At an observable level, groups of people are seen as possessing group characteristics (physical and cultural), inhibiting them from becoming "successful" human beings. Somehow, these become idiosyncratic cultural traits that are identifiably maladaptive (recall previous discussion re "survival of the fittest"); "Indians are lazy", for example.

Thus, an excuse exists in order to make this group an object of discrimination (i.e., maintaining a group's "sacredness", cf., Lifton, op.cit., quoted in previous chapter). On the level of economics, some have postulated an observable "culture of poverty", particularly characteristic of certain ethnic groups (see Lewis, op.cit.). It might be surmised that people are poor because they desire to perpetuate this ethic. This is a misleading notion, for it excludes external social forces which contribute to the maintenance of poverty.

With reference to the minority group, prejudice and discrimination are functional intervening variables in the maintenance of ethnic identity and the promotion of social living conditions. For the minority group prejudice and discrimination become "weapons" for social control. Historical incidents have revealed that policies based on assimilation for the most part have been destructive towards maintenance of ethnic identity and supportive of the ruling class (cf., Gustafson, op.cit.).

Conversely, from the perspective of the ethnic minority, a policy of segregation may be beneficial toward its cause. What the minority group is

doing, in essence, is setting up a conflict model congruent with a social system based on competition. Ultimately, to forge ahead is to compete. Although apparently contradictory, the end result would be one of a reduction of competition based on maintenance of ethnic solidarity. An example of this would be an Indian Reservation school operating on a policy of local control. An active policy would be to hire (only) instructors of Indian background. Thereby the job market would be more open to Indians.

Prejudice and discrimination as a function of the majority/minority group is discussed in some detail by Levin (1975). Below is a diagrammatic representation of their relationship.




FIGURE 2 - Prejudice as an Intervening Variable

from Levin (1975, 104).

In that prejudice and discrimination are ongoing forces within our society, teachers, as practitioners, contribute in a direct way to this perpetuation. This is not to declare that we, as individuals, are consciously contributing to the demise of ethnic integrity. But in a socio-

cultural context, it is groups of people with whom we are concerned and it should be our duty to discern our actions and responsibilities vis-à-vis our reference groups.

As practitioners, we contribute to our society in ways that are both conscious and unconscious. Consciously, the teacher maintains cultural traits and social patterns. As discussed previously, this involves the process of enculturation and socialization. Parents tell their children how they should behave; teachers tell their pupils what they should learn. Cultural traits become identified and categorized.

The unconscious aspect is, however, probably a more crucial element. In other words, why do we do what we do? We simply do it. This mode of operation can have grave consequences. In a cross-cultural perspective, patterns of behaviour, or, the reasons for doing things, may well be dissimilar (cf., Jarvie, op.cit.).

Dissimilarity does not necessarily imply differential outcome. Indeed, a number of theoretical orientations may conclude a similar outcome (i.e., justification for various modes of research). They are the means of attaining a similar outcome that differs. It becomes obvious, therefore, that prejudice and discrimination become functional means. To the majority they become a function of maintaining the status quo; to the minority they become a function of social progress.

We would have to assume that Canadian society and the very premise upon which it operates is conflict oriented. The reality of prejudice, discrimination and racial strife is difficult to deny. But the reality must be tested in terms of exaggeration. Prejudice and discrimination are not necessarily traits peculiar to the ruling class wanting to create an

ethnic barrier to upward social mobility. Although this may be partially true, it simply cannot be the truth. The two are utilized as well by the subordinates. Their functions become mutual and two-way.

It should be our endeavour to critically analyze the functions of the two with a minimal degree of emotional attachment. The point is, therefore, as it is with cultural relativism, not whether prejudice and discrimination are either good or bad; rather, why and how do they operate within the context of the total society?

Operant forces such as these can basically be analyzed from two perspectives. They may be studied synchronically; that is, we might analyze these forces in terms of the present, and many sociological studies are doing just this vis-à-vis quantified analysis. As well, they may be studied diachronically; that is, what might have been the historical circumstances leading up to the present situation? Ideally, a proper study would involve both perspectives. Unfortunately, however, one is often sacrificed by the other.

Both historically and contemporaneously, of course, Canadian society has been plagued with prejudice, discrimination, and racism; albeit "politely" as the moral majority might declare. It is important to remember, however, that all ethnic groups, not only those classified as the "minority", are victimized by these forces. Too often we overlook the fact that what is termed as "W.A.S.P." is an ethnic category as well.

As a means of demonstrating the manifestation of these forces, this writer will focus upon one particular ethnic group; the Canadian Indian. This group is selected on the grounds that it represents a rather unique situation vis-à-vis cultural confrontation. Firstly, Indians are the

"original inhabitants" of this country. Secondly, in terms of differential cultural paradigms, we can attempt to analyze the effects of prolonged cultural contact. Consequently, this group is also selected in that it might best explicate the anthropological concepts as discussed in the previous chapter.

CASE STUDY: THE CANADIAN INDIAN AND SCHOOLING

First of all, it needs to be clarified that when we speak in terms of "Indian" we are dealing with a very complex situation. To the casual observer, anyone who looks Indian is Indian (per stereotype). To those with intimate knowledge of the Indian re historical circumstances and legalities, and to Indians themselves, this is hardly a warranted perception. Very briefly, "Indian" taxonomically falls into the category "Native", which includes the Metis and Inuit as well. To be Indian is to be Native, but the converse does not hold true. Furthermore, the term "Indian" may be further divided into:

1. Treaty Indians - those whose ancestors signed treaties with the crown whereby they ceded land in return for specified rights.
2. Registered Indians - those whose ancestors did not sign treaties (Maritimes, Quebec, Yukon, parts of the Northwest Territories, and in most of British Columbia), but who chose under the Indian Act to be regarded as legal Indians.
3. Non-Treaty Indians - those who have "sold" their treaty rights (enfranchised) or lost their legal rights in other ways. As such, treaty and aboriginal rights are sacrificed and individuals are treated (ideally) legally as Canadian citizens.

The Metis, of course, are the result of inter-racial marriages and have no special statutory rights except in the province of Manitoba. Their dilemma is rather unique in that, for the most part, they have been discriminated against by both Indians and non-Indians. The concept of Metis-ness and its expression vis-à-vis ethnic group would provide a valuable study in determining the meaning of ethnicity. As an ethnic category they defy typical stereotyping based on shared physical characteristics. The same

holds true with cultural characteristics. The Metis, however, are not our concern here (for further analysis see Sealey and Kirkness, eds., 1973; Sealey and Lussier, 1975; Sealey and Lussier, eds., Vol. I, II, 1978; Vol. III, 1980, especially Chapter V - "Ethnicity and the Concept of Metisness"; Sealey op.cit., 1980).

In an attempt to maintain conformity and congruency, this section will utilize the term "Indian". More specifically, within the context of Canadian society, this writer will mainly be concerned with the schooling process as it is related to Status Indians. This is contradistinction to what we might refer to as "urban" Indians, or those which the non-Indian is most familiar with. Beyond these complex legal parameters, however, our major concern is to regard Indians as a derivative of a cultural paradigm that has been termed as "generalist", and to analyze the continuous culture clash resulting from an acculturative process involving a paradigm that has been termed as "specialist".

a) A Brief Historical Perspective

It is important to realize that we are all migrants to the North American continent. It has been estimated that early nomadic tribes crossed into North America via the Bering Strait Land Bridge some 40,000 years ago (cf., Comas, 1972). Naturally, these peoples roamed the continent and settled in various parts of it. It is also important to realize that there were probably several migrations, with the Eskimo being perhaps the most recent. But in no way were all these people alike. The word "Indian", of course, is a recent addition, presumably uttered by Columbus while he thought he had reached the Orient. Both prior to and during white contact Indian cultures were numerous.

We see the more advanced societies such as the Maya, Aztec and Inca,

as well as some peoples in the South Eastern United States and the North West Pacific Coast. We see the prairie hunter and gatherer and the Iroquois Confederacy. It becomes quite obvious that there were many kinds of "Indians".

It is also very important to recognize that these various groups practised inter-tribal warfare, that although they may be idealized as cooperative, they were in instances, competitive. It is, therefore, very misleading to conclude that all Indians are alike. Of course, it may appear to be this way today, but only because they have been forced to think this way, and through their own will it has become a defense mechanism for ethnicity. It may be useful to investigate the following questions:

Can we speak in terms of an "Indian Culture?"

Should we rather speak in terms of Indian Cultures?

What was similar and what was different to the various cultures?

Did warfare exist among the Indians prior to white contact?

If so, what were the motivations for warfare?

Were Indians traditionally competitive?

If so, to what degree are they different from competitive white people?

Often we read of how the Indian people were looked at as savages, as uncivilized, or, as children. These observations are often part of the colonial experience. Not so frequently, however, do we read of how the Indian regarded the white person. Many history books would lead us to believe that the white man was revered as god-like. This may be true in instances, but eventually the Indian realized that the white man was as human as everyone else. In fact, some reports indicate that the Indian regarded himself superior to the white man, and indeed, it might be said that many believe this today. But we all believe ourselves to be superior, one to

the other. We all build defenses around our "sacred worlds". The following quote from Walsh (1971, 88, underlining mine) illustrates this point:

The Indians at first did not know what to think of the bearded, light skinned strangers. Some, for a while, thought they were supernatural creatures like those known from ancient traditions. Near Yale the Indians told Simon Fraser that someone like him had once come up the river and left scratch-marks on the rocks, a local story that refers to the mythical Transformer Haylse. The newcomers were strange in many ways. For one thing, they were all males. They owned many wonderful things - "magic sticks" (as the Kwakiutl called muskets), clocks, uniforms with buttons and buckles. Telescopes seemed magical, too: one Haida chief asked Captain Ingraham to look around a point of land to see if enemies were approaching. The Haida called white men "Yetshaida" ("iron men") because they were so rich in that valued metal; the Nootka called them "Mamathni" ("their houses move over water").

Once the novelty wore off, however, the Indians gave further thought to dealing with these new men. They were not relatives, so perhaps should be treated like members of distant tribes, as potential enemies. Then it would be fair to steal from them or even kill them if there was an advantage to be gained.

For economic reasons, or whatever, it seemed that it would be the white man's duty (manifest destiny) to either exterminate or civilize these peoples. Part of the civilization process was the zealous work of the missionary. Devoted to God, these missionaries were performing their religious quest in a non-conspiratory manner. In fact, only the missionary was daring enough to venture into unknown lands.

According to Sealey (op.cit., 1980, 31):

Their [missionaries] commitment to the furtherance of Christ's work, as they viewed it, tends to be judged by modern secular standards and the judgement is usually negative. Their dedicated work, however, was exemplary by the standards of that time and the pejorative comments that roll so easily from the lips of many contemporary Canadians reflect not wisdom of hindsight but ignorance of history. The tendency to judge the past only by using the social insights of modern times results in distorted and limited understanding.

Unfortunately, he carried with him a bias, the need to convert the

savages to Christianity. Although the latter may have had some difficulty in accommodating Christianity per se, somehow there was contained within both religions (Indian and Christian) a suitable degree of overlapping mysticism. The missionaries did provide extensive evidence of their concern for the Indian people (e.g., The Jesuit Relations). But many Indians did take the opportunity to get rid of this educational experience (e.g., martyrdom of Jesuits in Huronia).

We could argue that the missionary may have led the way to more extensive exploitation by the intruding party. This is not the immediate problem, however. The problem is that the intruders are simply not going away. Contact is prolonged and continuous. Undoubtedly, a conflict of interests arises and becomes a matter of whomever is the most powerful will ultimately have the final say. We could cite numerous historical examples of how the intruder pushed his way westward in search of a better economy. We could cite other numerous examples of how the Indians were decimated through either combat or disease.

But our concern here is with the Indians as a conquered people (cf., Gustafson, op.cit.). It is perhaps not too difficult to see why some Indians signed Treaties but it is certainly worth an effort to examine one such Treaty, for its contents and its interpretation is a major issue today.

Concerning the forming of Treaty I, Governor Archibald at Lower Fort Garry stated in a letter of 1871, "Furthermore, the Indians seem to have false ideas of the meaning of a reserve. They have been led to suppose that large tracts of ground were to be set aside for them as hunting grounds, including timber lands, of which they might sell the wood as if they were proprietors of the soil" (Walsh, op.cit., 72).

In essence, what they did receive:

The Chippewa and Swampy Cree Tribes of Indians and all other Indians inhabiting the district hereinafter described and defined do hereby cede, release, surrender, and yield up to Her Majesty the Queen and successors forever all the lands included within the following limits . . .

Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside and reserve for the sole and exclusive use of the Indians . . . as will furnish one hundred and sixty acres for each family of five, or in that proportion for larger or smaller families . . .

And with a view to show the satisfaction of Her Majesty with the behaviour and good conduct of Her Indians parties to this treaty, She hereby, through her Commissioner, makes them a present of three dollars for each Indian man, woman and child belonging to the bands here represented.

And further, Her Majesty agrees to maintain a school on each reserve hereby made whenever the Indians of the reserve should desire it.

(extracted from Treaty I, 1871, underlining mine).

According to Cardinal (op.cit., 148, 149), concerning the signing of the Treaties:

The only thing that we agreed to do was to live in peace with the white man, and to share with him the available land so that he could come into this country, and bring his livestock, and support his families . . .

I don't think that the white people ever thought that religion was any part of the treaty-making process . . .

As far as our elders were concerned, the treaty-making process was three things. First, it was a reaffirmation of the religious aspect of their nationhood. Second, it was a reaffirmation of their belief that they would have to accommodate white man's presence. Finally, it was a formal attempt by them to establish the relationship there ought to be between their people and the other partners to the treaties.

What the treaties say and what they are supposed to mean are two different things. Cardinal would have us believe that the treaties represented an agreement towards the acceptance of each other's presence. This writer cannot help but relate these ideas to the model on cross-cultural conflict discussed earlier (see previous chapter re Cultural Dynamics and Culture Change). A conflict of cultural paradigms has resulted

in this antithetical situation. The Indian has attempted to synthesize the situation within the context of his intrinsic belief system.

Obviously, the white man has tried to do the same. Unfortunately, as Cardinal would have it, there has been a misinterpretation, or probably, a misunderstanding of this spiritual synthesis. Consequently, no real synthesis has taken place and we are still at the level of antithesis.

According to Walsh (op.cit., 82):

The problem now resolves itself into one of mob psychology. It involves fundamentally the spiritual fibre and stamina of the race. There is no doubt that the Indian mind has lost its bearings on a starless sea. The ancient beliefs, notions and myths have been shaken to the roots; the ancestral cosmogony has fallen to the ground.

In a traditional way the Indian child was educated to participate in a total life; living was education. In our society, as previously discussed, although we all become educated in the sense that education is measured by experience, we cannot possibly learn all the aspects of our culture. Consequently, we are schooled in order to accommodate certain segments of the larger society. Schooling is, therefore, a selective device. Under the auspices of the Federal Government, the Indians, as potential citizens of the greater society, were subjected to this imposed process. It was the intention of many to produce "responsible Canadian citizens" out of the Indian children. As is to be seen, this was no easy task. During the centuries, the Indians had established a certain unique relationship to their environment. A culture developed with values unique unto itself.

White society also had developed a system of unique values. Consequently, after hundreds of years of evolution along dissimilar paths how is it now possible for one to understand the evolved world view of the other?

Both systems are at fault.

Indeed, the white people encroached upon Indian territory and administered numerous "raw deals", but was this action an outright conspiracy? Conquest is inevitable. It seems to be a natural outcome of many human endeavours. Do the Indians understand this? Should they understand this? There are numerous instances of slavery, for example, amongst the North American Indians prior to white domination (see, for example, Drucker, 1965, 51-52).

To look at terms in black and white is often misleading. As Cardinal himself admits, "However, the idea of a black and white picture is a myth. Many Indians and many whites would be astounded at the similarity of their behaviour under given conditions" (op.cit.,199). To continually harp, under the guise of romantic nostalgia, on how the Indian got cheated is a waste of time and energy. Cheated or not, initially many Indians quite willingly went to school; of course, many also went unwillingly. But this does not seem so strange. Many children in white society unwillingly go to school; they are forced to go to school.

Indian children went willingly because initially it was the desire to learn white man's ways, to learn his language and his culture, so that they could fit into society. They are those unfortunate consequences of not being able to fit in that we mostly read about. Why has this been the case? Once again, we have a conflict in values. But often it is not so much the conflict per se that creates the problem; it is conflict which has resulted from a belief that one set of values takes priority over the other.

Now we have a real problem, one based on an ethnocentric premise of the "sacredness" of one's culture. This writer feels that this dilemma is so

deeply rooted that he is skeptical as to whether it can ever be dealt with successfully. Even if the Indian desires to be assimilated we might question his ability, though with sincere intentions, to cast away his "sacred world" [i.e., that deep-rooted psychological constellation that distinguishes self (Indian) from the other (non-Indian); cf., Redfield op.cit., 1953, 91; Lifton, op.cit., 84-85, both quoted in the previous chapter].

One area where value conflict becomes evident is matters dealing with curricula, both "overt" and "hidden". Many Indian children have been taught by white instructors who might actually have little or no cultural understanding of the children they teach. Although they might pretend to be understanding, they are not fully aware of their ethnocentric biases. (cf., Kleinfeld, 1972). The textbooks that have been utilized are of little significance to the lives of many Indian children. They are the product of a world view not directly perceived by the children; in other words, they are not relevant (Sealey, op.cit., 1973).

The structure of the school itself is a new concept for the children. A major argument against residential schools has been that, being away from home, being away from the immediate family environment, these have created alienation and "deculturation". According to Sealey (op.cit., 1980, 34):

A major problem, not realized at the time by educators, was that boys and girls growing up in an institution failed to learn normal child-rearing practices which traditionally had been absorbed over time through role modeling.

The Indian child had changed in that by spending ten months out of twelve away from home he/she had been indoctrinated into a value system alien to the traditional life. It is true that many students were not allowed to be Indian. Their language and culture were belittled. It was

probably the naive, innate belief of many an instructor that to assimilate the Indian child one had to make a white man out of him. Unfortunately, the colour of his/her skin could not be changed accordingly (see Hawthorn et al, 1967, Part 2; King, op.cit.; Sealey and Kirkness, op.cit., 1974; Wolcott, op.cit., 1967b).

Relating to this section, the following questions seem worthy of consideration:

Other than government coercion what were some of the motivating factors for Indian children to want to receive an "education"?

What are some of the values intrinsic to either cultural paradigm that would promote conflict?

Moreover, what are those values that would promote a greater internalized conflict?

Did the curriculum as imposed by the white society contribute to any internalized conflict?

What other factors are involved?

Some would state (op.cit.) that value conflict has resulted from an apparent disparity of values amongst Indians and Whites. How realistic and meaningful, in the sense of problem solving, is this observation?

Some would state (for example, Clifton, op.cit., 1975, 1977) that the disparity in values amongst Indians and Whites is actually not that great, that given equal opportunity in an assigned milieu either one would be acting accordingly, in its own best interests. What would such a view indicate about human behaviour in general?

b) A Brief Contemporary Perspective

Past statistics have indicated that, in general, the Indian has not been unanimously enthusiastic about the type of education offered (see Hawthorn, et al, op.cit., 130; Walsh, op.cit., 20-24; Frideres, 1974, 30-48). It would appear that the attempt to incorporate the Indian as an integral part of Canadian society has failed. A more recent survey by the Department of Indian and Inuit Affairs (Siggner, 1979) indicates a more "optimistic" trend re educational attainment (i.e., schooling) of Registered Indian students:

In the ten-year period between 1965 and 1975, the number of Indian children attending school at all levels and those staying through primary and secondary grades have increased markedly. The retention rate from grades 2 to 12 has increased from 11 per cent in 1965-66 to nearly 18 per cent by 1975-76. However, this rate is still far below that for the total population which was at 75 per cent in 1975-76 . . . Since 1972-73, the percentage of registered Indian young people aged 14-18 enrolled in secondary school has declined from a high of 76 per cent to 61 per cent by 1976-77 . . .

(Siggner, ibid., 28).

Although statistics such as these seem encouraging, certain limitations need to be emphasized. Firstly, there could very well be a disparity between "enrollment" figures and the number of students that are actually attending classes on a regular basis. Secondly, do such figures indicate at all the "life chances" of the students enrolled, or their chances at being "successful" in the world as a result of educational attainment? Carlson (1975, 28) warns us that:

. . . we have been lured into a fog of statistical analysis which seeks to establish national norms, national characteristics, and national fortunes and failures . . . thus, drop-out rates, delinquency statistics, and other nationally published data usually tell the teacher little about either the students or the students' community.

It would seem that schooling, as a tool for persuasion, as a mechanism for assimilation, is dysfunctional. But schooling in itself is not so much at fault as are those social forces that implement the ideology into the schooling system. Schooling does not perform in a vacuum; it manifests a social will by perpetuating conformity and the status quo. The reason why the Indian has not "succeeded" is not a result of his innate incapacity to do so; it is rather, a consequence of social humiliation and the formation of an identity crisis (Zentner, 1973).

We are back to looking at culture as a system of interrelationships. The specialist system, in a desire to have the Indian strip off his identity and conform to it, has demanded no less than a rearrangement of a psychological constellation that arose out of a unique evolutionary development, resulting in a clash of paradigms. The Indian does have the potential to become a lawyer, a doctor, or whatever. He can become such if he has the desire to do so. But in most cases that desire is not there, for the greater society does not nourish the desire. On the contrary, through ethnocentric stereotyping the Indian has been awarded little integrity.

Ethnocentric stereotyping develops out of a pre-conceived notion that to be different (racially and culturally) qualitatively implies a situation of inferiority/superiority. It is a social mechanism for maintaining one's own integrity and "sacredness". Our specialist system thrives on such a mechanism for maintaining the social hierarchy. This writer hesitates to admit, however, although historical evidence may contradict him (e.g., Immigration policies), that this is all part of a conscious conspiracy.

The conscious conspiracy may well be a device utilized by the researcher. The situation becomes defined by the device that is uncritically applied to

it. It has been argued, for example, that our bureaucrats consciously formulate racist policies in order that ethnic stratification may be maintained and, as such, those in power will remain so (Porter, op.cit.).

We could argue, for example, that in the past, a preoccupation with Indian schooling vis-à-vis vocational aspects of our society is proof of the device in action. Stress on vocation fortifies the position and the power of the ruling elite (cf., Cohen re "computer technologist", op.cit., 1970, 97, quoted in previous chapter). But there certainly must be more to this than purely political explanations. The problem is deep-rooted; it is intrinsic to the paradigm in which it manifests itself. In this light there is much truth in what Harman has to say (1977, 7), that "These dilemmas are intrinsic, they are built into the paradigm itself and await only the unfolding of the consequences before they become critical".

According to Lane (1972, 358):

We can pretend that it is a brave new world and that the past is or should be dead and buried. Many Indians do not see it that way. Remember, we are speaking of people who lost a continent . . . and who are still losing land and resources today . . . Whether or not any particular child is infected by this hostility it is endemic in their environment. When the time is right, when a teacher speaks brusquely, when a lesson is incomprehensible, when a white child is or appears to be unfriendly, then hatred and . . . frustration may break out.

There is no conspiracy here, but a system of events unconsciously determined by the system of relationships within the paradigm (cf., Harris op.cit., 1977). We would allow the Indian to participate in our society, in our way of life, if he were to become as we. This he could not do for reasons beyond his control. We can maintain our integrity only by destroying the integrity of others.

Discrimination both physical and social have perpetuated this. As well, racism, borne out of ethnic naiveté, is at the root of the problem.

Realizing this, that racial discrimination persists, that cultural assimilation seems impossible, the Indian has gathered defenses in order to maintain racial integrity. Now we speak in terms of integration. The notion that all people are the same seems a myth (recall Rank, op.cit.; Brown, op.cit., 1963b, quoted in previous chapter).

Reacting to a system of schooling that virtually has gotten the Indian nowhere but in a state of anomie and "marginality", he feels that the only way to maintain integrity is to set himself aloof from those social forces that have disinherited him. Unable to cope in a system guided by racist principles, he gropes for a past and its tenuous ideals. Unfortunately, preoccupied with the task of reminding white society how the Indian was cheated in the past, any inherent differences become unrealistically exaggerated. The injustices of the past become part of the propagandistic podium.

Undoubtedly, members of white society do realize these injustices but we cannot solve any problem pondering historical "might-have-beens". With respect to the signing of the Treaties, we are reminded that the Federal Government of Canada has responsibilities towards these people. The Indians have become "citizens plus". The Government has tried to understand the problem, and has tried to promote favourable resolutions. The White Paper of 1969 attempted to deal with some of the injustices.

It contended that if Canadian Indians were to become fully integrated into Canadian society, they, not whites, must change radically. It argued that the separate legal status of Indians has kept them from fully participating in the larger society. Among its proposals was the repealing of the Indian Act to enable Indians to control their lands and acquire title to them. As well, Indians were to become a provincial responsibility phasing

out the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Frideres, op.cit., 1974, 121).

Of course, such a document was suspiciously looked upon as benevolent paternalism, as another conspiracy. Unfortunately, we are presently at a state of affairs that no matter what the Government does (e.g., re constitutional matters 1981), it would be considered as outrageous and criticized with nothing more than a "gut reaction" philosophy. Naturally, the White Paper was attacked on grounds that the Government was conspiring to wipe its hands of the "Indian Problem" and make it a provincial concern. This was regarded as another tactic for assimilation and it was rejected with passion.

For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Thus, the Policy Paper on The Indian Control of Indian Education was introduced in 1972. Basically, the Indians of Canada have called for the right of determining their own educational destiny. According to them, controlling education is a means of controlling destiny through the perpetuation of "Indian" values (see Policy Paper, ibid, 1-2).

Consequently, many have referred to the Indian situation as being an "Indian Problem". From a systemic point of view this is highly unrealistic. In effect, it is our problem. Historical and contemporary evidence seems to indicate that assimilation will not work. This would require a cultural sacrifice that many people simply will not submit to. The other alternatives seem to be either segregation or integration.

Although most would argue that they adhere to some policy of integration, their verbal actions seem to indicate a tendency towards segregation. Cardinal states (op.cit., 80), "Well aware of this, the Brotherhood and its Policy paper devoted a considerable section to the problem." This

considerable section, however, constitutes no more than just over a page within the paper (see Policy Paper, op.cit., 25-26).

Indeed, this is the crux of the matter. We cannot help but become involved in a discussion of values, more specifically, social values within the context of Canadian society. "Essentially then, when we talk about Canada or Canadianism it is even more vital now than ever before that Indians across the country define their terms more precisely" (Cardinal, op.cit., 15).

We cannot even be sure any more what "Indian" means. The "workable" definition has come to be that found within the Indian Act (1978). Section 2, (1) states that "'Indian' means a person who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian". This is a highly impersonal definition.

As previously indicated, the term "Indian" has little value in a traditional sense, for prior to white contact Indians did not regard one another as belonging to the same group. Undoubtedly, what has been looked upon and stereotyped as an "ethnic category" has now transformed into an "ethnic group" (see Hughes and Kallen, op.cit., 87, 119). Logically, the transition has been made and now pretentiously held on to for tactical matters of self-defence. And yet, and this is important, the Indians unanimously keep referring back to this "traditional culture". There was a traditional culture. But evolution and cultural dynamics have it that all things must change. Those values of the past to which so many blindly adhere are nothing more than values of the past.

How can the Indian of today, with a slim '22 rifle and a brand new skidoo, justifiably speak of wanting to adhere to past values? The Indian of today is somebody new, and a new definition of this type is needed. It seems quite evident that our priorities lie in discerning what our values are,

and how they relate to our actions. In our society, values and the way we relate to them become such an abstraction that we are simply building sand castles in the air. We want this, and we want that, without any in-depth regard for the social consequences of our individual actions. In place of what we want, what is it that we need?

There are no immediate solutions to the problem. But perhaps a way of finding a solution is through the reassessment of our social and individual values, and how they relate to the maintenance and perpetuation of the system. It could very well be that the only solution would be to re-educate members of society to a new set of social values which would accommodate cultural differences without segregating the constituents thereof. This is what will be dealt with now.

"MULTICULTURALISM" AND THE RISE OF "MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION"

The previous case study attempted to illustrate the effects of value conflict resulting from a clash of rather unique cultural paradigms. As such, we should be concerned with the consequent evolutionary processes resulting from this clash. A relatively recent study, for example (Havighurst, 1976), demonstrates similarities of the acculturative process among Anglo and Native societies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The interaction between the Anglo and the Native societies has followed a similar course in all three cases. Briefly, this sequence of phases is:

1. Tentative and cautious initial contacts, generally with an emphasis on trade rather than settlement of the land.
2. Settlement and colonization by the Anglo society, which takes land from the native.
3. Resistance from natives to land takeover, physical conflict, and defeat of the natives.
4. Native retreat and withdrawal to reserves, reservations, or isolated strongholds. Native population reduced to its lowest number.
5. Anglo society develops a policy of assimilation of the dwindling native society, which is accepted by a minority of the native people.
6. Assimilation policy is seen as inadequate by Anglos and natives. Problems of socio-economic adjustment arise, with rapid population increase of native people, migration to the cities, and protest movements.
7. Rise of a movement for cultural pluralism - a plurality of cultures with their members seeking to live together in amity and mutual understanding and mutual cooperation, but maintaining separate cultures.

(ibid, 128).

We can easily recongize a similar process of events vis-à-vis the Canadian situation. The policy of assimilation as a postivie force in the

social evolution of Canadian society, consisting of a plurality of races and ethnic groups, has not proven to be functional. Any policy of assimilation operates on a yet-to-be-proven premise that the "other" wishes to be assimilated, and that equality requires some uniformity of experience and training.

This is the major fault of any policy based on assimilation. It identifies equality with conformity, and moreover, conformity with the values of the ruling elite. In a cross-cultural perspective it means that the Indian, for example, simply forget what has made him what he is; that is, ignore thousands of years of experience gotten from unique evolution and assume a role within another cultural paradigm unique in itself.

Systematically, this is both maladaptive and dysfunctional. Consequently, we are faced with a situation as described in "Stage 7" of the acculturative process (Havighurst, ibid). Canadian Indians, as an ethnic group, are presently striving for a means of maintaining racial integrity within the confines of that political entity known as Canada.

This writer has purposefully selected and focussed in upon the Canadian Indian and cross-cultural conflict. Societal interaction with this group seems to exhibit more profoundly the concepts as discussed in the previous chapter. However, this writer might be attacked on grounds that his selection is an example of anthropological exoticism, monopolizing upon a group that represents a "classic example" in terms of cultural and racial distinctions.

Indeed, in this light we are dealing with a unique sample, and we must be careful not to exaggerate upon this type of socio-cultural conflict, transferring its apparent processes to other ethnic/racial groups. As such,

we would belittle the uniqueness of the other groups involved, and their integrity within Canadian society.

Despite ethnic diversity, historically and contemporaneously, similarities are shared in that many have been victimized by prejudice, discrimination, and racism. Past immigration policies have demonstrated this (e.g., treatment of Japanese and German Canadians during World War II). As well, vertical ethnic social mobility has appeared to be rather minimal (Porter, op.cit.; albeit Darroch, op.cit.), producing a situation of ethnic stratification. Of course, the argument has been put forward by Darroch (ibid, 5) that Porter's analysis was commenting on the relative status of ethnic groups and not on the life chances of individuals. This may well be the case; however, in discerning cross-cultural conflict it is probably more realistic to speak in terms of groups of people rather than individuals, and those socio-political processes that have affected the group.

One of these socio-political processes is the school. As stated previously, schooling is part of a larger process involving those social forces that implement the ideology into the educational system. Schooling does not perform in a vacuum; it manifests a social will by perpetuating conformity and the status quo.

Historically, that social will has been one based on a policy of assimilation; moreover, and especially at the turn of the century, assimilation into the way of life of the ruling elite (see Chaiton and McDonald, 1977, especially McDonald, "Canadian Nationalism and North-West Schools, 1884-1905": 59-87). Schooling, therefore, has for the most part been an instrument in perpetuating the ideals of the dominant group.

Unfortunately, the persistence of prejudice, discrimination, and racism (indeed, the idea of assimilation in itself is based upon prejudice

and discriminatory practices) has not allowed Canada to attain cultural homogeneity. Hughes and Kallen (op.cit., 152-153) list three stages to the process of assimilation (structural integration):

1. Secondary assimilation refers to the entrance of members of ethnic minorities into the formal public sphere of secondary, economic, educational, legal and political institutions of the majority society.
2. Primary assimilation refers to the entrance of members of ethnic minorities into the informal, private sphere of social clubs, cliques and primary social relationships of the majority ethnic group.
3. Marital assimilation or amalgamation refers to interethnic marriage. Marital assimilation is the ultimate step in primary assimilation.

Social distance scales have been utilized (Bogardus, op.cit.; Mackie, op.cit., 1974; Driedger and Peters, op.cit.) in an attempt to determine the extent to which primary assimilation exists within our society. Of course, these tests might report "ideal states". Nonetheless, the trend of the results indicates that primary assimilation is more ideal than real. Consequently, inability to reach this stage has created a repercussion in the form of ethnic revitalization.

Canada has always been recognized as a nation that is bicultural and bilingual. This recognition is tantamount to any socio-political action its government assumes. An investigation into the extent of this reality was performed via the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism set up in 1963. Somehow, ironically, a section of its report indicated that Canada was in essence "multicultural", and that the uniqueness of ethnic groups other than French or Anglo-Saxon had to be recognized.

Consequently, a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework was announced by the Prime Minister in October of 1971. The basic tenets of this policy are:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.

Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity.

Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society. (Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1971: 8546, from Burnet, 1975: 205-206).

We could have a real heyday with these policy pledges in terms of determining their practical implementation. Socially, the term has become part of our everyday language, something like culture perhaps. But, like culture, it has eluded absolute definition. The mysticism surrounding the concept is quite apparent.

Unfortunately, the praxis of the policy is often left to the imagination of the practitioner and social researcher. Lacking in practical definition, it has been attacked by such researchers as Porter (1972) and Lupul (1973). In light of a Porter-type thesis, it is argued that the policy represents some sort of benevolent paternalism (i.e., political soother). One of the policy's most staunch supporters is Burnet (op.cit., 1975, 1979). "Ironically, however, some of the criticism made by Rocher, Lupul, and Porter, are the result of a misnaming of the policy which was occasioned by an equalitarian spirit" (Burnet, op.cit., 1975, 208). We are left to ponder, however, the meaning of "equalitarian spirit". More recently, Burnet (op.cit., 1979, 8) pursues her claim that the policy is no "myth", but that it simply has suffered an unwarranted misunderstanding by those proclaiming it as just another government conspiracy.

Regardless of whether this policy is understood as is meant to be or not, its existence has made a profound effect re schooling and the type of education that should be assumed in producing a society that is essentially multicultural. According to Grant (1977, 30), "Education that is multicultural is a concept predicated upon a fundamental belief that all people must be accorded respect, regardless of their social, ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds". He emphasizes the role of anthropology in the schooling system to attain this end, (ibid., 39).

Although the United States does not have an official policy on multiculturalism, multicultural education has been a growing concern in that country. Although historically and politically dissimilar from Canadian society, its "melting pot" philosophy re social reconstructionism is basically assimilationist in approach. It has suffered repercussions as well, due to prejudice, discrimination and racism, and there has arisen much debate re multicultural education as a remedy for social malaise.

In 1975 a number of papers were presented at a Symposium of the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, held in San Francisco. The intent of the gathering was an attempt toward attaining a definition of multicultural education. Selected papers have been published in a special issue of *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* (1976, Vol.VII: 1). Although the writers are American dealing with American issues, their theoretical arguments go beyond political boundaries.

Goodenough (1975, 6), for example, remarks that multiculturalism is present to some degree in every human society. His argument is individualistic in that members of a society are "multicultural" in that any single member learns only an aspect of his/her culture. This obviously attacks the notion that any culture is inherently homogeneous.

When we look at processes, then, we no longer look at societies only as wholes, but at individual people as learners of culture in the context of social interaction, as they pursue their various problems of living - problems that involve the necessity of choosing among conflicting goals, competing wants, and long range as against short range concerns.

(ibid., 4).

Darroch (op.cit.), for example, might favour this approach re individual life chances and social mobility. This writer, however, is skeptical of this sort of atomistic reductionism. Indeed, when we speak in terms of groups of people vis-à-vis cultural paradigms, we must recognize uniqueness resulting from evolutionary processes. How would Goodenough explain the resurgence of ethnic revival and solidarity? We should not characterize societies as merely aggregates of individuals.

The difficulty involved in the practical application of multicultural education is outlined by Gibson (1975, 7-18). She provides and discusses in some detail four different approaches. Very briefly, these approaches and their underlying assumptions are:

1. Education of the Culturally Different or Benevolent Multi-culturalism

- culturally different children face unique learning handicaps in schools dominated by mainstream values; that to remedy this situation, multi-cultural programs must be devised which will increase home/school cultural compatibility; and that these new programs will, in turn, increase students' academic success.

2. Education About Cultural Differences or Cultural Understanding

- schools should be oriented toward the cultural enrichment of all students, that multi-cultural education programs will provide such enrichment by fostering understanding and acceptance of cultural differences, and that these programs will in turn decrease racism and prejudice and increase social justice.

3. Education for Cultural Pluralism

- the purpose of multicultural education is to preserve and extend cultural pluralism in American society . . . It seems to increase reward parity among groups by decreasing the power of the majority.

4. Bicultural Education

- the purpose of multicultural (bicultural) education is to produce learners who have competencies in and can operate successfully in two different cultures (i.e., mainstream and other).

The reader may surmise from the above that the whole notion of multiculturalism in practical terms is no simple matter. As well, all four approaches tend to equate education with schooling and to overlook the educational processes occurring outside of school.

Young (1979) has transposed Gibson's analysis to Canadian society. He argues (ibid., 5), "that issues in multicultural education inevitably pose questions of purpose in the wider society and that different images of Canadian society demand different responses from the school system". He also explores the meaning of ethnicity (ibid., 6), cultural and structural assimilation (ibid., 7-8), and, in general, the meaning of multiculturalism within the greater society.

Consequently, if schools are to implant the social will of the greater society, it becomes a priori to determine the long term goals of that society. Any short term multicultural programs/workshops vis-à-vis "cultural awareness" are intrinsically worthless unless some sort of evolutionary context is taken into account (i.e., what kind of society do we want Canada to become, and how do our present actions relate to these goals?).

In this light, analyses such as those of Gibson and Darroch (op.cit.), although predominantly theoretical, become quite invaluable in terms of actions and goals. For example, we so easily speak in terms of Canada striving towards a state that is culturally pluralistic. What does this mean? Gibson (op.cit., 11) states that "multi-cultural education for cultural pluralism is the hardest approach to depict, even as an abstract, ideal-type construct".

The most obvious remark might resemble one that emphasizes a recognition of cultural diversity in a picturesque sense. This "folkloramish" attitude, in essence, differentiates on grounds of the material aspects of culture and has little heuristic value in terms of discerning socio-cultural evolution. To properly perceive cultural pluralism, therefore, is to recognize it in a context that relates to social structure and power.

Once again, it becomes essential to analyze social processes in terms of groups of people. As discussed in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of ethnicity is intrinsic to our analysis. What defines an ethnic group? What are its social boundaries? Why is there presently a trend towards ethnic revitalization? Which ethnic groups are more fervent in this endeavour? How do these groups relate to other groups in Canadian society vis-à-vis access to power and socio-economic rewards? These are just a few questions that indicate the complexity of the matter.

In reference to Philips (1975, 31), "Is it possible to develop educational programs that meet both the goal of the greater access to power and the goal of maintaining ethnic group culture and identity?" This writer has attempted to demonstrate re Indian schooling how educational policy based on assimilation is socially maladaptive for the entire society. It is based upon a premise whereby a loss of cultural identity would be counter-balanced by a gain in the socio-economic rewards from the host society. As discussed previously, operant forces such as discrimination and racism create a stumbling block towards this utopia. The resultant anomie establishes a premise for cultural/ethnic reaffirmation (revitalization), stressing the unique "psychological constellations" of the groups involved.

Breton (1978, 152) states that "In Canada, communities such as the

French in Quebec, the Acadians, those of British origin in Quebec and in the rest of Canada, and the Native peoples represent fairly high degrees of parallelism - social and institutional - relative to one another". He goes into some detail as to what he means by parallelism (*ibid.*, 149). It refers to a process of socio-cultural "compartmentalization", and the related structure of institutions and organizations to the extent to which each ethnic community has a set of institutions of its own. But this need not necessarily imply pluralism; rather biculturalism. For example (*ibid.*, 149), "parallel educational structures refer to the fact that there are at least two sets of educational organizations serving ethnically different clienteles and under control of ethnically different elites".

In terms of ethnic solidarity and the perpetuation of associated idiosyncratic cultural values, this approach would appear as a panacea for social malaise. In practical terms, however, Breton (*ibid.*, 154) adds:

. . . when ethnic communities have some elements of an institutional system, the very conditions for the existence of such a system, let alone its expansion, are likely to become the object of a power confrontation between them . . . the mutual concern for the relative strength of their institutional systems constitutes the source of the most intense conflicts between ethnic communities and the object of the most severe uses of power.

Consequently, (*ibid.*, 154):

. . . the greater the degree of institutional parallelism, the more conflicts and exercise of power between the communities in contact will involve issues concerning the spheres of jurisdiction, that is the delineation of the respective domains of organizational activity.

Apparently, we have transformed a model initially based upon the maintenance of idiosyncratic cultural values into one of the monopolization of power. In this sense, cultural differences become meaningless, camouflaging the intrinsic desire for any group of people "to be on top"

[cf., Newman, 1977, 49:

The revival of ethnic consciousness was far from a liberal humanitarian movement created in the name of human dignity. Rather it was born of relative deprivation, based in essence on a 'we want ours too perception'.

and cf., Lawrence and Singleton, 1975, 22:

so what is sometimes viewed by educators who are interested in multi-cultural education as cultural pluralism is in reality the result of challenges to structural pluralism by groups seeking upward mobility and who symbolize that quest in cultural terms. (underlining mine).]

As such, cultural differences may be more ideal than real. The subsequent reification of these differences into compartmentalized homogeneous cultural units (i.e., cultural pluralism) is a device created in an attempt to gain greater control of one's life chances within a system that is existentially oppressive. Consequently, overemphasizing cultural/ethnic affiliation by creating such homogeneities will in turn produce fixed stereotypes which, in the long run, will also become socially maladaptive. What we are creating, therefore, is a form of "culturalism", which in terms of socio-cultural processes, is much akin to "racism" (see Philips, op.cit., 31; Burnett, 1975, 38, ". . . the very process of introducing and maintaining that approach in schools reinforces the conditions it is to alleviate").

According to Porter (1975, 299):

When descent groups are the principal carriers of culture there are dangers of new forms of racism. If 'races' have been evaluated as inferior and superior, so can cultures be. Racism and 'culturalism' stem from the fact that both are linked to the maintenance of descent group solidarity and endogamy. After all, if ethnicity is so important, if cultures are so different, then it is easy to extend the argument that those of different ethnic groups and cultures must also be different with respect to qualities which are thought important in different parts of the work world and for entrance to elite status. It may not take very long before that view becomes extended even further, to include the notion that qualitative differences are inborn. When

that point is reached we have come full circle and we begin to realize that those theories of race and ethnic differences which we thought destroyed or at least highly discredited by World War II have reappeared in a new guise with culture replacing race.

(cf., Mead, op.cit., 1970, 29-30).

Consequently, as a reaction towards the danger of romanticizing upon cultural differences Newman stated (op.cit., 50), ". . . that regardless of how much we are able to preserve diverse cultures and languages, the American", and Canadian as well, "educational system should equip minorities to participate in the cultural mainstream where the material rewards are being distributed". Supportive of this approach, Hourihan and Chapin (1975, 24) remark that:

. . . we do not view cultural pluralism as meaning that the large number of ethnic groups in the U.S. are, or should be, internally homogeneous, or that these sub-cultural units are or should be segmented into corporate groups with distinguishable sets of equivalent social institutions . . . we view cultural pluralism in terms of structure wherein some cultural traits may be shared but others may remain intact . . .

As well, it must be added here that what appears to be a countervailing force re cultural differences is being assumed underneath a guise of research aimed at discerning cultural similarities. Clifton (op.cit., 1975) and Bienvenue (1978), for example, ambitiously question the almost folklorish belief that Indians maintain a negative self-image as a result of the acculturative process (cf., Hawthorn et al, op.cit.; King, op.cit., Wolcott, op.cit., 1967b). Clifton states (op.cit., 1975, 578) that certain studies have a methodological fault in that "comparisons have been made implicitly between Indian students and either 1) some ideal affective states the students would have if they were not Indian or, 2) the affective states of some idealized comparison group".

Both researchers administered questionnaires (i.e., semantic

differential, relying on the validity of the evaluative dimension) to specific samples in order to determine the respondents' self-image. A detailed analysis is not in order here. Both these studies, however, support the contention that Indians feel positively about themselves as human beings, but negatively towards what the "out-group"(i.e., non-Indian) has stereotyped them to be as Indians in reference to values held by members of the "out-group".

What are the implications of studies such as these for the Indian in Canadian society? We might conclude that if both groups have rather positive self-concepts, should we agree with Clifton of course, why should we maintain value differentiation at all? But then we might interject, so what if the Indian feels good about himself? During the Second World War in Germany, the Jew may also have felt good about himself. This did not ameliorate his social circumstances, however. Nonetheless, his road to success led to the gas chamber.

As educators, we become annoyingly perplexed when attempting to understand our perspective roles vis-à-vis multicultural education. On the one hand, analyses indicate the need to perpetuate cultural differences; on the other hand, analyses indicate that cultural differences are not really that great. In light of this apparent dichotomy Kimball (op.cit., 1974, 96) remarks that "in spite of our insistence upon cultural pluralism and the tolerance of deviancy, the danger of cultural diversity remains a powerful threat".

As such, cultural diversity per se is not so much an issue as is the fact that its realization and perpetuation automatically assume a power struggle amongst the "haves" and the "have nots". The minority member, dressed in cultural regalia, creates a situation whereby perceived

differences somehow imply that these differences are very real. Whereas, ultimately, according to Wax (1972:176) "being an Indian", for example, "is a social and political identity and not a cultural identity". What is at stake, therefore, is a form of social and political pluralism.

In terms of social progress, the educator cannot help but seriously contemplate the meaning of culture in this context. According to Hourihan and Chapin (op.cit., 24), ". . . we would like to see the principal goal of education become the training of culturally pluralistic individuals. That is, the focus of our educational institutions should not be to create or perpetuate distinct subcultural units but, rather, it should be to acquaint all students with the great range of cultural variations".

This, of course, resembles benevolent multiculturalism (Gibson, op.cit., 7). A major dilemma for the educator becomes one of how to teach cultural variation? If culture is perceived in terms of material differences this would present no formidable task. But as demonstrated in the previous chapter of this thesis, it is fallacious to view culture in such a static dimension. Rather, it must be viewed as the manifestation of interacting processes (social, political, economic, ecological, et cetera) that are constantly creating a new product.

Congruent with the above postulate, the educator must seriously question the relevance of what some ethnic minority members naively refer to as "traditional culture". Part of ethnic revitalization involves an insistence upon adhering to "traditional" values. In this writer's opinion, this is comparable to embracing a museum piece and trying to drag it into the present. As mentioned previously re archaeological research, an artifact must be analyzed in situ; once dragged out of the original context in which it had meaning it can only be perceived as a cultural trait (i.e., material)

belonging to the past.

Transferring this notion to the idea of multiculturalism Burnet states (op.cit., 1975, 209, 212):

. . . since the members of a particular ethnic group are in most cases geographically dispersed and highly differentiated, according to time of arrival and socio-economic states in the homeland and in the receiving country. It is because those members of an ethnic group who wish to preserve their identity in Canada are so diversified that often the symbols of ethnic identity are legendary heroes . . . what the group members have in common is a remote past, real or fictitious.

If it [multiculturalism] is interpreted . . . as enabling various peoples to transfer foreign cultures and languages as living wholes into a new place and time multiculturalism is doomed.

In light of this, it should become obvious to all concerned educators that the concept of evolution and socio-cultural change is a fundamental and vital ingredient in any discussion of culture. Bohannan (1971, 370) insightfully gets right to the heart of the issue by simply stating that "the culture that was adequate for yesterday is inadequate for today and disastrous for tomorrow. If there is a law for culture that is it". Congruent with the thesis of Harris (op.cit., 1977), we must abandon the reverie associated with cultural romanticism.

Anthropology and teacher education involves an attempt at exposing static antiquarian beliefs to the light of systems and processes. The analysis of the four concepts as discussed in this thesis should provide a basis for critical cultural awareness. Consequently, culture is not so much a given as it is an hypothesis, and any attempt at compartmentalizing its constituents is anti-holistic and undermining of continuous change.

As indicated earlier, the theme of the concluding chapter is "educator as social scientist". It is fundamental to realize that theory and practice

are inseparable realms. The difficult task, of course, is attempting to attain a juste milieu vis-à-vis these two. Consequently, one often overpowers the other. The following chapter will attempt to deal with this dichotomy, emphasizing the need for the internalization of the aforementioned concepts in creating a learning situation that is based upon exploration rather than the perpetuation of a predetermined truth.

CHAPTER V

. . . we teach history without a sense of the historian. While mathematics reveals the circle, the square and the graph, the social science analogues of settlement pattern, clique, rites of passage, and the like, are nowhere present. Yet the teacher might perform an appropriate service in allowing the child those tools and insights by which the things he does not know are discerned and made comprehensible. If every man is a record of man's past, every child ought, in kind, be a researcher himself; a participant-observer, as it were, on his own condition . . . Children who are caught up solely in their own life-ways have been rendered no service in our public schools. (Rosenfeld, 1968, 130-131).

In 1898, at a small school in the mid-western United States, Nina van de Walker (op.cit.) recognized the need for educators to become more critically reflective of their classroom activities. In essence, the parochial view of teacher/learner, whereby communication was strictly a one-way process, needed to be replaced by a view which held that the teacher/learner rapport was actually a two-way process; that both were influenced one by the other, and that the categorization of the process into discrete units such as "teacher" and "learner" might not only be misleading but acutally fallacious.

In C. P. Snow's celebrated work The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959), it is stated (ibid, 10) that, "the number 2 is a very dangerous number: that is why the dialectic is a dangerous process. Attempts to divide anything into two ought to be regarded with much suspicion." While actually referring to the apparently infinite debate that continues to divide the "scientist" from the "literary-artist", the notion might well be extended to anything that implies dichotomization. This writer has discussed earlier (cf., Mead, op.cit., 1970 re postfigurative, cofigurative, prefigurative; Shimahara, op.cit., in Chapter III of this thesis) that the enculturative process is actually two-way, and in light of the fact that the

rate of change today is so rapid, the educator of today can hardly be regarded as the ultimate source of knowledge (cf., Mead, op.cit., 1970 re prefigurative society).

This is not to conclude that the role of the educator be undermined and viewed as a "baby-sitting" activity. It does imply, however, that (s)he become critical of pedagogical technique with respect to rapid cultural change. As is the case with culture (cf., Bohannon, op.cit., 1971, 370, quoted in previous chapter), so it might equally be that the pedagogy that was adequate for yesterday is inadequate for today and disastrous for tomorrow. If there is a law for pedagogy that is it.

It is the opinion of this writer that schooling in Western society has become preoccupied with a pedagogical technique that emphasizes a priori the quantity of information possessed by a population. As well, it perpetuates an ethos that is egocentric rather than cosmo/sociocentric (cf., Brameld, op.cit., 1965b). Of course, by forwarding these "accusations" we are on touchy ground, for we immediately assume to have knowledge of what ought to be as something other (and better) than what is (i.e., Platonic cf., Burton's critique re Freire, op.cit., 1980).

Nonetheless, considering the dilemma of absolute knowledge, we must assume an approach that is infinite rather than finite. Consequently, we must instill an awareness in our schools that emphasizes the quest rather than the outcome. Granted, as it is written here it seems all too prosaic, begging accolade from those humanistic educators.

Undoubtedly, the quantity of information possessed and perpetuated by any given society is both necessary and important. Any scientist or medical doctor knows this. But as culture continues to evolve (i.e., has not yet reached a final expression), the quantity of knowledge must evolve

(not merely accumulate) as well. This sort of "evolution of knowledge" is presented in Kuhn's analysis (op.cit., and see Wallace, op.cit.) of scientific paradigms.

La Belle (op.cit., 538) states that ". . . the quantity of information possessed by a population is only one aspect of cultural difference; the other, or conceptual style, is of at least equal importance in terms of designing and planning the curriculum and instructional process". Unfortunately, this statement infers a dialectical relationship (i.e., the one/the other), where in essence the two are inextricably bound. The point is, however, that knowledge only has meaning in terms of a given conceptual framework (see Polanyi, op.cit.; Redfield, op.cit., 1953, re world view). Consequently, congruent with the purpose of this thesis, this writer has attempted to provide arguments that substantiate the relevance of anthropology (not a priori) to the formulation of a conceptual framework that may provide for critical cultural awareness and insight into cultural processes.

It must be underlined that anthropology deals with much more than stones and bones and exotic cultures. To cast it in such a light is terribly misleading. In the past "many a graduate student . . . chose anthropology with the hope of finding in reality--albeit in some distant and exotic tribe - those human virtues and that adventurous sense of life which romanticists of an earlier generation had sought in imagination" (Gillin, 1956, 24-25). It might be argued that this Rousseauian ethos is presently being maintained amongst the cultural traditionalists and revitalizationalists.

Anthropology does, and must, deal with much more than the primitive. As discussed earlier, however, past ethnographies and other such analyses vis-à-vis primitive cultures are both necessary and invaluable in discerning

socio-cultural evolutionary processes. Nonetheless, the emphasis must now be upon contemporary complex societies. In reference to early anthropological studies Gillin states (ibid., 24, 25), ". . . they tended to make common sense assumptions concerning contemporary civilizations in a manner which seemed to indicate that such assumptions were self-evident and a matter of general knowledge . . . they believed that 'someone' knew what modern complex culture was as to content, organization, orientation, value-goals, etc."

Furthermore, in a commentary to Gillin's article by Streib (ibid., 30, 31) it is questioned whether anthropologists really know as much about Hopi, Zuni, and Trobriand culture, for examples, as they would like us to believe. Streib cites a case (ibid., 30) where Truk residence rules had been interpreted differently by two researchers. Such cases must be numerous and lead us to question the capacity of the social scientist to be "objective" (cf., "facts" regulated by conceptual framework).

The true romance of anthropology lies in the fact that it attempts to holistically surmise humankind's relationship to humankind, to the world (biologically and culturally), and no less, to the universe itself. Such an undertaking cannot help but produce the occasional grandiose scheme that seems far removed from immediate reality. Thus, in discerning the "human condition" we might have a tendency to ignore efficiency in a material sense (cf., Harris, op.cit., 1977). The "human condition" should perhaps not be all that mysterious. According to Snow (op.cit., 7):

Most of our fellow human beings, for instance, are underfed and die before their time. In the crudest terms, that is the social condition. There is a moral trap which comes through the insight into man's loneliness: it tempts one to sit back, complacent in one's unique tragedy, and let the others go without a meal.

It is an observation such as this, for example, that leads this writer to conclude that our society values egocentricity (which can be extended to ethnocentricity) over sociocentricity. Relating this notion to kinship analysis, Service states (op.cit., 16-17) that "one of our problems is that part of the ethnocentrism lies in the egocentrism of beginning with the individual and assuming that kinship categories are extended outward". On a broader scale this is a crucial observation in that the concept of wholeness is undermined by placing greater value on the ego. The world, therefore, is regarded as an extension of the ego (cf., Vinacke, op.cit.) and has no intrinsic value in and of itself. Now, this is not to be confused with world view, which involves the extensional property of groups of people (i.e., culture).

If we were to examine this notion conversely, we might hypothesize that the ego is actually an extension of the whole and can only be perceived in reference to it. As such, the ego must be undermined by placing greater significance on the whole. In producing a society that is ecologically fit, we must recall that we are part of Nature and susceptible to bio-evolutionary forces, and if culture is an expression of a population's ecological fitness (cf., Harris, op.cit., 1977), would it not seem feasible to incorporate the latter approach in the conceptualization of curriculum materials? And if such an orientation is perceived as being good (i.e., positively functional), then anthropology can be a valuable tool towards attaining its realization.

Of course, once again we fall into the trap of relativism when attempting to surmise what is positively functional for any given society. At an absolute level what we should be striving for, perhaps, is efficiency vis-à-vis positive biocultural adaptability. Nonetheless, relativity is more than

a notion, for it espouses variability, which is the essence of change. It is variability that allows for biological evolution vis-à-vis natural selection (recall previous discussion in Chapter III). And it is cultural variability that has brought about, for example, a need for the formulation of a policy on multiculturalism in Canada (recall Chapter IV).

With variability as a fundamental postulate, the task of every educator must be one of exploring variability in an attempt to reduce cultural myopia and ethnocentrism. This is not to imply that by dethroning a culture we become lost in a sea of variability; rather, we must be proud of our culture and heritage (i.e., stability), but it must be perceived within a framework that is relative rather than absolute.

Particularly at a young age are students aware of worldly options. More so than the educator, for (s)he has already settled into a cultural niche. Strongly entertaining the notion of variability, such students should be encouraged to explore. They are not empty vessels to be filled; rather, they are filled with ideas, waiting to be poured and probed.

In this case learning becomes one of mutual symbiosis (cf., Freire, op.cit., re dialogue and conscientização). To this extent we all become "anthropologists" by exploring human interaction vis-à-vis conflict and cooperation, attempting to formulate value judgements in light of such analyses (Brameld 1965a fondly labels such a process as "anthropotherapy"). Wagner (1981, 35) states that "it might be helpful to think of all human beings, wherever they may be, as 'fieldworkers' of a sort, controlling the culture shock of daily experience through all kinds of imagined and constructed 'rules', traditions, and facts".

As discussed previously, we are all in the midst of change. Change is inevitable for groups of people who are either in isolation from or in con-

frontation with other groups. Both the educator and the student must be aware of this, assuming the role of "social scientist" and exploring the causes and effects of change. This writer would like to remain optimistic, with the hope that human beings can direct change in a positive manner.

As Muller (1960, 274) states:

. . . many thoughtful people . . . stress the need for making people better prepared to utilize whatever material means may exist, not primarily for conspicuous consumption, status seeking, mechanized vulgarity and intensified whoopee, but for purposes enobling rather than degrading to man.

Although presented in an idyllic manner, this remark is important in that it implies that action, in this case via material means, is guided by a conceptual format. And indeed, all actions are based upon a certain conceptual premise. It is exactly this premise that needs to be explored, and those values and goals that derive from it.

Consequently, as societies change values must change as well, emerging and merging into a new order. This is the dilemma of the traditionalists who might wish to adhere to values that are incongruous with the reality of change and, therefore, systemically maladaptive. As Havighurst (op.cit., 136) has observed with respect to the Aborigine in Australian society, "In their attempt to develop Aboriginal identity, they have sought two things - a satisfactory place within that system, and a satisfactory place outside that system - and here lies the personal dilemma for many Aborigines and the social problem for Australian society". This writer ponders whether such a problem can be paralleled to Canadian society and its "aboriginal" population?

Attempting to counteract a trend toward "cultural speciation" (e.g., structural-cultural pluralism) writers have suggested the need to develop new sets of goals (i.e., social reconstructionism) that are all-encompassing

and lie beyond immediate desires (cf., Breton, op.cit., 156, "mechanisms must exist for the formulation of superordinate goals if any concerted action is to occur"; Wagner, op.cit., 59, "Because we 'use up' our symbols in the course of using them, we must forge new symbolic articulations if we are to retain the orientation that makes meaning itself possible").

This reveals two very important notions. First, "systems are not to be treated as conclusions or results, but as expressive of the internal dynamics that govern stability and change" (Kimball, op.cit., 1974, 56). Second, and as a corollary to this observation, "ecological systems survive in so far as they have evolved tactics to keep the domain of stability, or resilience, broad enough to absorb the consequences of change" (Turner, op.cit., 69). Might the same not be applied to cultural systems as well?

This brings us back to the notion of variability. Consequently, the greater the degree of variability within a cultural system, the greater are its chances for positive adaptation and survival. Overspecialization may lead to extinction. This can be a major contribution of anthropology to teacher education: the holistic, comparative, and evolutionary analysis of the great range of bio-cultural variability and its implication for human-kind's future evolutionary development. This thesis has intended to provide a background for such an orientation.

Ideally, this writer sincerely believes that all teachers should be exposed to the anthropological concepts as discussed in this thesis. Realistically, this writer affirms that those teachers presently teaching in areas related to Social Studies be definitely exposed to them, especially those teachers in training at the various Faculties of Education across Canada. The material provided herein will broaden their outlook on the human condition and will allow them to approach their teaching more

critically. Consequently, their students might attain this critical awareness as well. And that is what education is all about.

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