

A Comparative Assessment of Civil-Military Relations in South America,  
with a Special Emphasis on Colombia

by

Gabriela Pérez Ordóñez

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University of Manitoba

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## Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the question: how healthy, relatively speaking, are civil-military relations in South America? To answer this, key variables from three of the touchstone works in civil-military literature, namely, Samuel Huntington's *"The Soldier and the State,"* Morris Janowitz's *"The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,"* and Samuel Finer's *"The Man On Horseback."* and journal articles were gleaned.

A total of twenty-two variables were identified and divided into three categories: State Comparative, Civilian and Military variables that are connected to "healthy" civil-military relations in the literature. These variables were then applied to all twelve South American states. The results were then compared to the United States, which the literature suggests is the closest to having "ideal" civil-military relations.

To ensure that the paper comparison matches practice, this thesis reviewed Colombia in-depth. Its military is not only the second largest in the region, but also one that plays a vital role in society.

The overall results from this comparative assessment indicate that there is a bimodal distribution among South American states in terms of the variables indicating healthy civil-military relations. Although it is clear that all States still need major improvements, half have healthier civil-military relations than the other half.

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## **Dedication**

Con todo mi amor, dedico esta tesis a los pilares de mi vida, mis papás, Armando y Lila, quienes han hecho lo imposible para lograr que yo pueda cumplir mis sueños.

Muchas gracias por siempre darme su apoyo incondicional - por darme ánimos en mis peores momentos y sabios consejos en los mejores. Asimismo, gracias por enseñarme, a través de su ejemplo y dedicación, a soñar en grande, a no dudar de mis capacidades y a entender que con paciencia y perseverancia puedo afrontar cualquier desafío y cumplir todas las metas que me proponga. Merecen esto y muchísimo más. Los amo de aquí a la luna.

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## Chapter One

### Setting the Research Programme

Civil-military relations are the study of civil society and the military it employs to defend it. In theory, a state's military defends the nation from foreign foes and assists the state in times of crisis; for example, in the evacuation of citizens due to a massive flood. The civil-military relationship is a delicate balance. If the military, with a monopoly on the ability to use force, is too strong and does not respect civilian oversight (considered ideal), the military can take over and the state in question faces a military coup. Too weak a military (in terms of numbers, pay, resources, training or education) and the military will be unable to defend a country from foreign invaders. A healthy civil-military relationship, therefore, has many variables, but the most important and most often referenced in the literature is firm civilian control over a professional military that is both reflective of its civilian society but also highly trained and educated. The model state of comparison has always been the United States (US). Indeed, it is home to two of the fathers of the study of civil-military relations – Dr. Samuel Huntington and Dr. Morris Janowitz - and hosts the most journals on the subject, especially *Armed Forces and Society*, which studies such relations.

Relatively little has been written about the health of civil-military relations in South America, however. The chequered history of its twelve states<sup>1</sup> with military coups suggests civil-military relations are not ideal. This thesis, therefore, seeks to answer the question: **how healthy are civil-military relations in South America relative to the ideal variables established in the civil-military relations' literature?** Given that South American states suffer from a myriad

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<sup>1</sup> The 12 states are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

of problems, but especially corrupt governments and weak civil institutions that would oversee a state's military, my hypothesis and null hypothesis are as follows:

$H_1$  – South American states do not have many of the ideal civil-military relations variables.

$H_0$  – South American states do have many of the ideal civil-military relations variables.

I expect to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, I expect to find that many of the twelve South American states have relatively unhealthy civil-military relations compared with the ideal variables established in the literature.

However, a comparison of a state to hypothetical ideals based on the literature may provide a skewed picture that is not replicated in practice. To ensure the picture analyses of the states match reality, this thesis will also analyse Colombia's civil-military relations in depth because it seems to have relatively healthy-civil military relations, given that it has had no military coups of late and, anecdotally, the military seems to enjoy wide, public support. Colombia's Armed Forces are ranked among the top five strongest and largest armed forces in the region, second only to Brazil. According to the World Bank, in 2011, Brazil ranked first in total number of Armed Forces Personnel, with a total of 713,480; Colombia ranked second with a total of 440,224.<sup>2</sup> In addition, in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) 2012 study, Colombia's military expenditure share of its GDP was 3.3% and Brazil's was 1.5% suggesting that, based on amount of resources expended, Colombia's military is reasonably well-funded.<sup>3</sup> Anecdotally, the relationship between the military and the civilian government has been more stable in Colombia than many of its South American counterparts. A

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<sup>2</sup> World Bank Database - <http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=armed%20forces&language=EN> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014)

<sup>3</sup> SIPRI Database - [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database) (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014)

seemingly unwavering yet rare obedience to civilian rule is what makes Colombian civil-military relations contrast so clearly from other countries in contemporary South America. **Therefore, the second research question of this thesis focuses on Colombia, specifically, as a test of the actual health of civil-military relations in South America more generally.** Therefore:

H<sub>2</sub> – Since Colombia, on paper, has more of the ideal civil-military relations variables than the other South American states, its civil-military relations should be relatively healthier in practice.

H<sub>0</sub> – Colombia either does not have more of the ideal variables than the other South American states or there are other variables at play damaging Colombia’s civil-military relations not captured by the variables gleaned from the literature.

In this case, I actually expect to accept both hypotheses. Numerous scholars have designated Colombia as a “...modern society ripe for every manner of major political disorder – from military coup to social revolution.”<sup>4</sup> However, despite the war against insurgencies, massive corruption, increasing poverty, socio-political upheaval, and a volatile economy, the fact that neither a military coup nor a significant social revolution have emerged since 1957 in Colombia is central to understanding why, and most importantly how, Colombian civil-military relations differ from all others in South America. The relationship is not irregular from the perspective of Colombia’s own history; civilian control of the military has been the norm since the early years of independence.<sup>5</sup> However, despite the fact that Colombia is relatively healthier in terms of civil-military relations compared to other South American states, domestic instability and insurgencies WITHIN Colombia mean that it has had to use its military increasingly in

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<sup>4</sup> Mark J. Ruhl. “Civil-military Relations in Colombia: A Societal Explanation,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies*, Vol. 23 No. 1. The University of Miami, 1981 p. 125.

<sup>5</sup> Ruhl, p., 133.

domestic security operations. The use of militaries for prolonged periods of time to counter attacks on the state from within the state can be potentially dangerous for civil-military relations long-term.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the increased use of the military inside Colombia with the training and skills to overthrow successive governments,<sup>7</sup> the Colombian military has remained subordinate to the state, in the sense that it has not attempted to overstep or overtake control of the state, but rather, it has worked in conjunction with civilian governments in power to deal with particular issues that have emerged at given times. This research study will highlight what the reasons are for Colombia's seemingly successful civil-military relations, in comparison with the other, eleven South American states. This is not to suggest that Colombia has not had issues with civil-military relations. Rather, the intention is to highlight the fact that constitutional and other controls (both civilian and military), have helped maintain order to date. The use of the military in domestic scenarios (i.e. to counter domestic insurgencies and to fight a war on drugs), however, remains of serious concern, which may do irreparable damage to Colombia's civil-military relations if not watched very carefully.

The policy implications of this research study are that the literature links greater state stability with healthy civil-military relations characterized by the lack of proneness to military

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<sup>6</sup> Although there is a debate on whether the lines separating military and police exist or not (see Marleen Easten, et al, "Blurring Military and Police Roles," Eleven International Publishing, 2010) the fact that some governments have proposed giving their military permanent policing powers to address their internal security concerns is problematic from the point of view of classic civil-military relations' theory.. For example, in November 2011, Honduran President Porfirio Lobo proposed a constitutional reform that would give the military permanent policing powers, plans which have been carried over by the current President, Mr. Juan Orlando Hernandez. For more information see Tatiana Faramarzi, "*Desperate Measures? Honduras Considers Blurring Military-Police Role,*" Insight Crime Organized Crime in the Americas, March 27, 2012. URL: <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/desperate-measures-honduras-considers-blurring-military-police-role> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> For example, there were rumours about a potential military coup to oust President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala in 1979, due to the high levels of violence and the increasing size of the insurgencies, M-19 and FARC at the time. For more information see: Angel Luis de la Calle, "*Rumores sobre un posible golpe militar en Colombia,*" El Pais, 6 Abril 1979. URL: [http://elpais.com/diario/1979/04/26/internacional/293925616\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/diario/1979/04/26/internacional/293925616_850215.html) (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

coups, clearly defined roles for civilians and military - in which the civilian government controls an obedient and professionally trained military, little to no military interventions in political affairs and a balance of power in social and military institutions. The lack of these factors indicates poor health in a country's civil-military relations. Sadly, this is often the case in South America. Therefore, this study will be a contribution to the literature by establishing the health of civil-military relations generally in South America and specifically in Colombia, which then opens the door for future, more in-depth studies including policy prescriptions to improve such relations.

The time frame chosen for this study is the period marked by the end of the Cold War to the present day i.e., 1990-2013. The reasons are three-fold. First, the end of the Cold War is a significant marker for International Relations and other political events. Second, it allows a generation of officers a full cycle of training from Lieutenant to General (in theory) and third, it includes a few cycles of government in all of the states compared in this study. In addition, this study will focus on the twelve South American states as opposed to Latin America as a region. Given the nature of this study, South America is a more manageable sample size, the countries share similar historic and cultural backgrounds and it is highly likely that the data for the majority of these twelve countries will be equally up-to-date and more accessible. The same cannot be said for Latin America.

The health of the twelve states will be compared against the theoretical ideal of civil-military relations as presented in the literature. The main sources of literature that will be emphasized in this study are: Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1956), Morris Janowitz's, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960) and Samuel Finer's *The Man on Horseback* (1962), all of which are key sources in the literature because they outline

and define the theory of civil-military relations and the roles both civilian and military are supposed to take. They are, therefore, widely cited and referenced. In addition, a compilation of essays edited by David Pion-Berlin's *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*<sup>8</sup> and Manuel Jose Santos Pico's *Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia – (Military History of the Colombian Army)*,<sup>9</sup> will be the main sources used to emphasize civil-military relations in South America and Colombia respectively, in addition to other peer-reviewed sources and interviews.

The methodology that is used in this research study involves the coding of variables most often cited in the literature as being important to “healthy” civil-military relations to the twelve South American states. These twenty-two variables are divided into three groups. Group one includes seven variables that are not particular to the civil-military relations’ literature but are general comparative variables (such as size of population) used to contrast the twelve states. Group 2 includes civil variables. The eight ‘Civil’ variables include factors that highlight the overall health and relationship between the civilian government and the military such as: constitutional controls over the military, right to vote by military in state elections, ministers of defence, popularity of the military, popularity of the civilian bureaucracy, size of civilian bureaucracy, public expenditures (on health and education - % of GDP) and military expenditure (% of GDP).

Group 3 variables include those unique to the military. The seven ‘Military’ variables include: size of the military, size of the military in comparison with the general population, military professionalism (education and training), military recruitment, military coups since 1990, martial courts and military acting as police for the military (military police or MPs).

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<sup>8</sup> David Pion-Berlin “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives,” The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Manuel José Santos Pico. “*Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia*,” Departamento E-3, Centro de Estudios Históricos del Ejército, Biblioteca Histórica Militar Colombiana, 2007.

A codebook of the twenty-two variables is found in Annex 5 to describe, in detail, what each of the variables assesses. Variables are coded '1' to indicate an affirmative (or that the variable in question is present in the country), '0' will indicate negative/absence of a variable and '-99' will indicate not applicable or data not available. Pivot tables show the results graphically. States having a larger number of '1s' are closer to the ideal, healthy civil-military relationship. Contrary-wise, states with a larger number of '0' or '-99' scores are further from the ideal. By comparing and contrasting the scores of the variables for each of the South American states to the literature variables, a picture of the relative, rather than absolute, civil-military health is established. These twenty-two variables are compared in the years 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2013 to ensure uniform comparisons over the time frame chosen.

Hypothesis 2 posits that Colombia will have a score closer to the ideal than the other South American states on paper, but that a closer look at Colombia's civil-military relations in practice will suggest new roles for the military now exist (for example, the requirement to take on domestic security duties because Colombia has a corrupt/inept police force) that were not considered in the literature reviewed, which was established during the Cold War when foreign infiltration was the main security threat. The literature suggests that military and police should be separate because the former provides a defence role and the latter, a constabulary role. The fact that many of the South American states, especially Colombia, are using their military in domestic security contexts suggests that this is an area for future study because there seems to be a unique conflation of the defence and constabulary roles that is particular to South America and may be complicating/changing civil-military relations. The overall purpose of the thesis is not to discover how much more healthy one state is over another, but to establish whether or not there



are some states, like Colombia, that possess more of the “ideal” civil-military variables than other South American states.

This methodology has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, this method allows the criteria being evaluated to be unified into pivot tables, using quantitative data, to formulate unbiased, objective evaluations – states either possess or not a particular variable. The variables used are identified in the main sources of literature. Using this method, I, as the investigator, can “define and standardize the data requirements of the case study by formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case.”<sup>10</sup> Moreover, this analysis will pinpoint the factors that states with low scores need to consider in order to improve their civil-military relations. This is especially the case for Colombia as a more in-depth study is made that considers factors beyond the twenty-two variables identified in the literature.

On the other hand, in the likely case that the information gathered for all of the countries is not equally updated, the results will represent an approximation and are not sensitive to nuance. For example, constitutional oversight either exists or not – not the quality of that oversight. As well, some states have more and better information available. Data for Brazil, for instance, is readily available but Suriname is often hit and miss.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the coding method is rather inflexible when it comes to evaluating numbers; the method used to assess statistical values is bimodal (the variable is either present or not) and could presumably overlook more nuanced cases. However, as the purpose of this study is to understand broadly the general health of civil-military relations, especially Colombia’s, this method of analysis is sufficient. Future studies can then focus on particular variables or comparisons. Despite the disadvantages

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<sup>10</sup> Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton University Press, 1994 p. 45.

<sup>11</sup> In cases where there are any statistical inconsistencies for a particular state (for example, missing data), a note highlighting any discrepancy will be included in the final assessment.

described above, this research study assumes the benefits will outweigh these minor, methodological weaknesses.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. This first chapter has outlined the states compared in this research, the methodology and the organization of the study. Chapter 2 reveals the literature's understanding of the importance of having a healthy civil-military relationship and it outlines the fifteen civilian-military variables and outlines how these variables are measured. Chapter 3 evaluates the health status of civil-military relations in South America by analyzing the coding in the pivot tables for the twenty-two variables. Chapter 4 focuses particularly on Colombia. Data gathered during interviews with government and military personnel during the primary research trip to Bogota, Colombia in August 2013 is highlighted in this chapter. Chapter 5 discusses the findings that result from this comparison and will outline potential policy consequences and implications. The Annexes include the raw data, the codebook created to interpret the data, the Tri-Council Panel on Research Ethics: Certificate of Completion, the questionnaire used during interviews with government and military personnel, and a list of all the interviewees who agreed to participate during the research trip to Bogota, Colombia.

## Chapter Two

### An Analysis of Civil-Military Literature

Many have written about the importance of healthy civil-military relations. This chapter reviews this literature, especially three of the key thinkers: namely, Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Samuel Finer. These three authors set the foundation for this academic discipline with their books, *The Soldier and the State* (1957),<sup>12</sup> *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960)<sup>13</sup> and *The Man On Horseback* (1962)<sup>14</sup>, not only within the walls of military academies but also, importantly, within the walls of civilian bureaucracies. In addition, entire journals, such as the US' *Armed Forces and Society* (housed at Loyola University Chicago), also tackle the issues and variables that are thought to be key indicators of good civil-military relations.

Since the end of World War II (WWII), the dynamics of war have changed; technological advances mean civilians remain at the margins of war, societies, in general, are no longer required to engage in the war effort because mass mobilization is unnecessary and in most countries, a professional army replaced conscription. These changes had a profound effect on civil-military relations as wars no longer engulfed entire societies and interaction between civilians and military was limited – especially in times of peace.

The post-WWII era, therefore, marks the emergence of what is now known as “civil-military relations,” which is essentially the interaction between the armed forces and the rest of society. Samuel Huntington defines it as, “... one aspect of national security policy the aim [of

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<sup>12</sup> Samuel Huntington *The Soldier and the State*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England. 1957..

<sup>13</sup> Morris Janowitz. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. The Free Press, NY, 1960.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel Finer. *The Man on Horseback*. Transaction Publishers New Brunswick, USA; London, UK. Originally published in 1962 by Pall Mall Press.

which] is to enhance the safety of the nation's social, economic and political institutions against threats arising from other independent states.”<sup>15</sup> This was entirely logical given that the authors were writing during the Cold War, when the main threat was a Soviet invasion or a nuclear attack against the US (the assumed model of civil-military relations). The military's role, according to Huntington, Janowitz and Finer, is to defend against cunning, well-armed, foreign (assumed state-backed) invaders. Therefore, the soldiers need to belong to a profession of arms that, while reflective of society, is separate and apart. Soldiers need to be the best of the best so that normal citizens do not need to worry about the safety of the state, and more importantly, are not under the threat of conscription. Instead, a professional band of men<sup>16</sup> are “on guard” for the state. Soldiers, therefore, are expected to be better trained, better educated – in fact, military officers, especially, were described as “soldier statesmen,”<sup>17</sup> - a combination of military and non-military near perfection in the same person, reflecting their special status in society. However, they were always expected to be voluntarily subordinate to civilian authority.<sup>18</sup>

Most of the literature that shines a spotlight on civil-military relations was written in the late 1950s and early 1960s using the Cold War as contextual background. The main books reviewed in this chapter were written between 1950-1960. The main journal consulted, *Armed Forces & Society* was established in 1974.<sup>19</sup> This chapter reviews this literature to set the context of this academic discipline as well as to glean the variables referred to in the literature that are

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<sup>15</sup> Huntington (1957), p 1.

<sup>16</sup> Women, of course, play an important role in the military as well, but in the 1950s, their roles were limited.

<sup>17</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 135

<sup>18</sup> Janowitz, Morris, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control”, *Armed Forces & Society* (Winter 1996):, 23: pp 149-176. It is important to point out that these books, which are still the most widely read and cited in civil-military relations studies, were written during the Cold War. Although they are still highly relevant, they do not cover the new developments that have occurred or increased in significance since the end of the Cold War. For example, cybersecurity, asymmetrical threats, use of drones, smaller militaries, post-traumatic stress disorder or sexual misconduct.

<sup>19</sup> Morris Janowitz is credited with creating and launching the journal.

considered important to “healthy civil-military relations.” Ultimately, I discuss fifteen variables<sup>20</sup> that are broken into two broad categories – those pertaining to the civilians (8) and those pertaining to the military (7). The remaining seven variables are not discussed here as they represent the usual, comparative variables used to contrast states in any country-comparative study. They are not, therefore, specific to civil-military relations.

*The Soldier and the State, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* and *The Man On Horseback* were published within only a few years of each other and the experience all three authors had with war is reflected in their works. Samuel Huntington was an American writer and political scientist who began his academic career at a young age. He briefly served in the US Army, and in 1957, he published *The Soldier and the State*, which continues to be among the most influential books relating to civil-military relations. His inspiration for this book was the United States’ involvement in the Korean War in the 1950s, particularly US General MacArthur’s disagreement with US President Harry S. Truman’s policies. Taking this context into consideration, it is evident that Huntington’s book was written from a civilian perspective; it emphasizes the limited role of the military in politics and most importantly, civilian control over the military which is essential in order to ensure the military knows its place.

Morris Janowitz, an American sociologist, was drafted as a soldier during World War II (WWII). He was tasked with analyzing German documents and German prisoner of war communications.<sup>21</sup> This experience convinced him that, after completing his PhD at the University of Chicago, he had to study the sociology of military organizations. He is credited

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<sup>20</sup>The Civil Variables are eight in total and include: Constitutional controls over the military, military vote, ministers of defence, popularity of the military, popularity of civilian bureaucracy, size of civilian bureaucracy, military expenditure, public expenditures. The military variables are seven in total and include: size of military forces, size of military in comparison to population, military professionalism, recruitment methods, coups d’état, martial court, military taking on police roles.

<sup>21</sup> Maslan, John. (1960) "Book Review", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.54, No.4. pp.995-997.

with founding the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, which now publishes the journal of the same name. Reminiscent of the ancient Roman societies, Janowitz was convinced that the profession of arms had to include engaged citizens who were militarily aware. Janowitz fretted about the growing politicization of the military. While civilians, he noted, control the military in three ways: via the budget, via allocation of roles and missions and advice to the President on foreign policy that involves the military, the military have found work around solutions that could undermine civilian control.<sup>22</sup> (He would point to the increasing number of serving military in key positions in the National Security Council at the Pentagon and in other policy shops assumed to be civilian-driven, as examples).

Samuel Finer was a British writer and political scientist who also began his academic career at a young age. He served in the British armed forces rising to the rank of Captain during WWII.<sup>23</sup> However, contrary to Huntington and Janowitz, who tended to focus more on the American military, Finer's *The Man on Horseback* specifically looked at military interventions that were happening around the world at the time he was writing. Finer was among the first writers to identify the peculiarities of civil-military relations, particularly military interventions in the developing world during the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>24</sup> These differences are evident in their book titles: Huntington makes reference to the separation that should exist between the "soldiers" and the "state." Janowitz focuses a great deal of attention on the professionalism and ethics of soldiers, while Finer's *The Man on Horseback* refers to the idea that lies behind men of power; namely, military figures on the move into battle.

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<sup>22</sup> Janowitz, (1960), p. 435.

<sup>23</sup> Papers of Samuel Finer, The University of Manchester Library. URL: <http://archiveshub.ac.uk/data/gb133-fin> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> Dennis Kavanagh. "Obituary: Professor Samuel Finer." *The Independent*. Friday 11 June 1993. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-samuel-finer-1490939.html> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

Although all three analyzed the relationship between civilians and the military, and even though they indicate civilian control of the military is necessary, the reasons why differ. Huntington and Janowitz put more faith in the ability of the military to voluntarily control their actions because of its professionalism, ethics, training and education. Finer, on the other hand, focuses on the responsibility of civilians to have control over the military. It is important to note that, despite there being several books and articles dedicated to this subject, a perfect healthy civil-military relations example has arguably never existed even in the assumed model of civil-military relations, the US.<sup>25</sup> The ideal would have perfect and complete civilian control of the best trained and educated military in the world that does not suffer from any of the personnel issues that can plague any military to varying degrees (like post-traumatic stress disorder, sexual misconduct, criminal behaviour, etc.) As the ideal is not possible to achieve, the three authors, nevertheless, consistently point to a combination of variables that should allow for “healthy” civil-military relations to exist. The United States (US) is the military that is often said to come closest to this ideal. It, therefore, is used to contrast the health of civil-military relations in South America, if only to provide a context for discussions and basis for comparison. This is not to suggest that the United States is *the* ideal model or that it has perfect healthy civil-military relations. There are, however, several factors that indicate that the United States is closest to an ideal.

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<sup>25</sup> There were many articles written, for example, on the desperate state of relations during the Clinton administration when Generals were accused of openly and publicly defying their Commander-in-Chief including an article written by Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See the *NY Times*. “Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia,” September 28, 1992. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/28/world/powell-delivers-a-resounding-no-on-using-limited-force-in-bosnia.html> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

Considering the time-frame chosen for this research project i.e., 1990 to present day,<sup>26</sup> in terms of experience, it is fair to assume that no other country in the world can surpass the United States in terms of the training and expertise in so many of the branches of its military,<sup>27</sup> with regards to resources expended and military involvement abroad. In terms of the relationship the military has with the civilian bureaucracy, the United States' military is undoubtedly the best educated, equipped, trained and supported military in the world. At the very least, its military is probably the most studied.

Lastly, in terms of the relationship the military has with civilians, the United States ranks among the top five countries in the world with the highest level of popularity of its military by its citizens. Several campaigns, such as the *Yellow Ribbon Campaign* and the *Yellow Ribbon Program*<sup>28</sup> are evidence of this outspoken, public support and amity for the military. Furthermore, as indicated by Samuel Finer, “at the highest political culture levels [i.e., robust liberal democracies] will be countries like [the United States], where attachment to civilian institutions is very strong.”<sup>29</sup> As will be explained in this chapter, strong civilian institutions are crucial factors in maintaining healthy civil-military relations.

The variables discussed below gleaned from the literature constitute Group Two or the eight “Civil” variable group, which include: 1) constitutional control over the military; 2) voting

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<sup>26</sup> This time frame was chosen because the end of the Cold War is a significant marker for International Relations and other political events, it allows a generation of officers a full cycle of training from Lieutenant to General and it also includes a few cycles of government in all the states compared in this study as mentioned in Chapter 1.

<sup>27</sup> Israeli forces would come closest. The US Armed Forces has 4 branches: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. (The US Coast Guard is the fifth branch in times of war. In times of peace, it falls under the Department of Homeland Security). The National Guard and Reservists are considered part-time force multipliers but they fall under the Governor of their home state and the President. Most, including the South American states and Israel, have only the first three branches – Army, Navy and Air Force.

<sup>28</sup> The yellow ribbon campaign and programs include wearing, posting and displaying yellow ribbons that raise money for the military for rehabilitation and for the families of military and show general support for the military. For additional information about the Yellow Ribbon Program visit: <http://www.military.com/education/gi-bill/the-yellow-ribbon-program-explained.html> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>29</sup> Finer, p. 21.



privileges for the military; 3) civilian ministers of defence; 4) popularity of the military, 5) popularity of civilian institutions; 6) public expenditures (on education and health esp.); 7) military expenditures and 8) professionalism of the civilian bureaucracy. These variables help determine how well governed the military is by civilians. They indicate how well established civilian control is over the military, whether or not military personnel have the same rights as civilians and lastly, how the general population perceives the military and civilian institutions.

### **Civilian Variables**

#### **1. Civilian Control Over the Military**

For the three authors, civilian control of a subordinate military was one of the most important variables for healthy civil-military relations. As indicated by Huntington, “Civilian control [is] maximized if the military [is] limited in scope and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head.”<sup>30</sup> Ideally, every state should define what these civilian controls are, and what the military’s obligations are in their constitution, so that the controls are enshrined in domestic law.<sup>31</sup> This protects the controls from the predilections of changing governments.

In his seventh chapter, Huntington argues that the United States has failed to accomplish this. In his own words, “The United States Constitution, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, does not provide for civilian control. That is, it does not permit the objective civilian control compatible with a high level of military professionalism.”<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, Huntington explains that, “[The military clauses of the Constitution] divide civilian responsibility for

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<sup>30</sup> Huntington, (1957), p 163.

<sup>31</sup> Peter Feaver laments that while Huntington and Janowitz insist on the civilian control, neither outlines clearly what those controls should be. See “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control”, *Armed Forces & Society* (Winter 1996), 23: pp. 149-178.

<sup>32</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 163.

military affairs and foster the direct access of the military authorities to the highest levels of government.”<sup>33</sup> This direct access, according to Janowitz, was potentially dangerous if military used the access to manipulate civilian control. In theory, this access could be addressed and possibly changed in law, but would require a constitutional change or the addition of an amendment to the Constitution and this has not occurred since the eighteenth century. (The United States carries of changes to their Constitution.) Instead, various acts of law, such as the Possé Comitatus Act,<sup>34</sup> ensure that the controls are not subject to change on a whim or for convenience.

Despite the lack of details in the *US Constitution*, there has been no need for a constitutional change that outlines what the civilian controls of the military include, largely because the US has managed to do precisely what Huntington argues any state should do, which is to invest and develop a professional military that accepts voluntary subordination to the civilian government. Committees of Congress, think tanks, the media and the general public watch this professional military very closely. Furthermore, the military budget cannot be spent without Congressional approval – a Congress that is civilian.<sup>35</sup> As we will see in the next chapter, many South American states have clearly defined civilian controls in their constitutions, but their military’s lack of subordination to governments and lack of oversight committees, think tanks etc. have proven detrimental to civil-military relations.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid

<sup>34</sup> Possé Comitatus Act (June 18, 1878). It was updated in 1981. The Act limits the ability of the US Federal Government to use the military to enforce state laws. (Note: the National Guard and the Coast Guard are not considered part of the Armed Forces for the purpose of the Possé Comitatus Act) Found at [https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Posse\\_Comitatus\\_Act.html](https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Posse_Comitatus_Act.html) (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>35</sup> A few in the House of Representatives or Senate may have been active military in the past, but there are no serving, active members of the US military in Congress. (This creates another potential problem, which is a lack of understanding of what the military can and does do, but this is minor in comparison to the need for civilian control).

Even though Samuel Finer is not as explicit about constitutional controls of the military as Huntington and Janowitz, he does expand on this subject and recognizes that to rely solely on an obedient military to respect the civilian control is a bit naive. He argues:

There is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief, that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey the civil power. Therefore, instances that show civilian control to have broken down are regarded, if at all, as isolated disturbances, after which matters will again return to ‘normal’. But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in fact, ‘natural.’ Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possesses vastly superior organization. And they possess arms.<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, at first sight it is unusual to assume that civilians, who are, in most cases, less organized than the military and most importantly, as Finer indicates, unarmed, can actually control an institution that seems, on paper, to be superior. Indeed, Janowitz recognizes this fact and counsels for more civilian control (but without outlining what that would entail).<sup>37</sup> However, when comparing civilian-controlled states to military-controlled states, historically, there has been a tendency for military-controlled states to fail over time. This is not to suggest that all military states have failed or that all civilian states have succeeded. There have been cases when having had a state under military control has been beneficial to segments of society.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, there are numerous examples of states that have rarely, if ever, had an active military in power and which have remained exceedingly successful, such as the United States.<sup>39</sup> On balance, however, the preference in the literature has been very explicit: legislative controls (which are

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<sup>36</sup> Finer, p 5

<sup>37</sup> Janowitz, (1960), p 420.

<sup>38</sup> Case in point: Chile. A country that underwent a dramatic change in its political economy under General Augusto Pinochet in 1973, whose policies resulted in a significant and positive change in the economy – making Chile one of the most economically stable and developed countries in Latin America, second only to Brazil. As stated in the *Economist* (‘The Tragedy of Argentina,’ February 15, 2014, p. 22), “Chile’s military dictatorship was a catastrophic fracture with democracy but it introduced long-lasting reforms.” However, it is important to keep in mind that these successes were accomplished in a background of terror and human rights abuses.

<sup>39</sup> Of course the US has used its military govern many other states including occupied Germany during WWII. South Korea from 195-1948, Iraq in the 2000s etc.

best achieved in a democratic state) that limit the mandate and scope of the military. The variable that I will use as evidence of civilian control mechanisms over the military is the national constitution of the states as it is concrete evidence of such control.

## **2. A Military That Can Vote**

Given that not all states have clarified exactly what the role of the military is, this research project looks at two variables that assist in determining the level of involvement of the military in politics; namely, the military's right to vote and whether or not the military is allowed to run for public office in government. Ideally, military members should be able to vote for their elected, civilian governments but should be not be able to hold any office other than within the military ranks. The ability to vote is discussed, below. The role of the military in politics is discussed in as the third variable.

In Huntington's words, "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values."<sup>40</sup> Janowitz is more practical. He readily acknowledges that politics is bound to infiltrate the military. However, the military self-regulates to limit the impact of politics because of its professionalism.<sup>41</sup> Guarding against the military's participation in politics, however, does not justify a government's decision to deprive their military of the right to vote in federal, state or other elections. All citizens should have the right to vote; military, in theory, may be better trained and more skilled than the average citizen, but they should have the right to choose the civilian bureaucracy that determines their fate.

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<sup>40</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic," reprinted in Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), 37.

<sup>41</sup> Janowitz, (1960), p. 435.

For Janowitz, participating in civilian-like activities is essential to ensuring that the separate civilian and military worlds converge so that the military are imbued with the norms and expectations of the society it is defending.<sup>42</sup> In the case of the United States, therefore, programs, such as the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), were created to ensure military and other civilians deployed/living overseas are able to vote. The right to vote remains one of the most concrete and enduring signs of a liberal democracy and liberal democracies are best at promoting healthy civil-military relations.

Although democratic countries, like the United States, have governments that have, historically, remained adamant about the military's right to vote, and which have implemented policies that help ensure their military's participation in votes, there are also countries that have advocated for the military's segregation from politics (for example, Colombia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Kuwait, Oman and Tunisia)<sup>43</sup>. Arguably, the fact that men and women in uniform are not allowed to openly participate in voting is contrary to the democratic ideals countries are supposed to try and instil in their societies. Democracy, by definition, is directly linked to equality, an idea that is inconsistent with the reality that exists in societies and militaries around the world. Therefore, whether or not military members can vote is an important variable to track.

### **3. Ministers of Defence**

Similar to the issue of the military vote, neither Huntington nor Finer explicitly address the issue of who may serve as a Minister of Defence – in many developed states – the political head of the armed forces and civilian defence employees. It is assumed that such a position

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<sup>42</sup> Janowitz, (1960), p. 196.

<sup>43</sup> CIA 2007 Factbook listed these in 2007. The Ace Electoral project lists 17 states that do not allow their military members to vote. See <http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/questions/replies/204229904> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014). Many are South American. Some limit the voting to just senior officers.

should be reserved exclusively for elected civilians and not serving military members. David Pion-Berlin argues why:

[...] military officers, either on active duty or retired, [who] occupy top positions within the defence sector, inevitably exhibit divided loyalties. While they are sworn to serve the constitutionally elected government, they are too easily tempted to betray that oath by obliging the institution they had been a part of for so many years. Civilianized institutions and leaders must be in place to ensure that policy preferences get translated into defence actions and to stand vigilant against military efforts to evade their duties. All this implies having a critical mass of well-trained civilian personnel within defence institutions.<sup>44</sup>

Although Pion-Berlin's argument falls in-line with Huntington's main argument of civilian control, it also reflects the gulf between the civilian and military worlds described by Janowitz. Segregating the military from politics entirely (to exclude even retired military) to the extent described by Pion-Berlin above is, arguably, contradictory to the idea of democratic representation in government. This fear of military involvement in anything relating to politics is arguably rooted in the fact that the question of how and why the military becomes "political" remains unanswered.<sup>45</sup> As Finer argues, "We know little or nothing about the mechanism by which rival political ideologies are transmitted into and throughout the armed forces. On the whole, the military are effectively prevented from participating in civilian party activities, and it is not through such participation that political ideologies are usually transmitted to and through them."<sup>46</sup> Regardless, the fear remains that if active military (and there is even debate if retired military) are allowed to run for positions in public office, they will favour the military and lose objectivity and the necessary critical oversight.

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<sup>44</sup> David Pion-Berlin, "Defence Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," *Armed Forces & Society* Volume 35 Number 3 April 2009, p 567.

<sup>45</sup> Mind you, US, Canadian and other governments don't mind using their militaries to provide security and aid running elections abroad.

<sup>46</sup> Finer, p. 34

Some military experience in parliament would likely improve the quality of decision-making of civilian parliamentarians and bureaucrats given the general lack of knowledge regarding the profession of arms among civilians. However, the norm for developed worlds is to be very suspect of any military uniforms among bureaucrats. For example, the President of the US and the Governor General of Canada tend not to wear military uniforms, especially at public events, despite their roles as Commander-in-Chief.<sup>47</sup> At a minimum, the Minister of Defence, representing the civilian head of the military, should not be a serving military member.

#### **4. Civilian Bureaucracy: Size and Scope of Mandate**

While Huntington seems to suggest that the military will not seize power even with poor civilian control, Finer openly questions why this does not happen all the time, "... because of their centralization, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication and *esprit de corps*, armies are much more highly organized than any civilian bodies."<sup>48</sup> (Janowitz says this problem is compounded when dealing with states that possess nuclear weapons because militaries have the power to hold numerous states hostage). Arguably, both civilian control and the lack thereof could be explained by taking a closer look at the civilian bureaucracy; how organized, efficient and trustworthy a civilian bureaucracy is, the better control it is likely to have over the military, at least in theory.

In order for civilian control to endure, it must be institutionalized.<sup>49</sup> In terms of civilian control over the military, it is vital for the civilian bureaucracy to be larger in scope of mandate.

The larger a civilian bureaucracy is, however, the more responsibilities it has to the general

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<sup>47</sup> The US President does not have a uniform (although they will wear one if only to protect their clothing during inspections). The Honourable David Johnston, and his Canadian Governor General predecessors do/did wear a military uniform when in the presence of primarily military members, especially in the role of review officer, but rarely to address a primarily civilian audience.

<sup>48</sup> Finer, p 10.

<sup>49</sup> David Pion-Berlin, "Defence Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," *Armed Forces & Society*, Volume 35 Number 3 April 2009, p 563.

public. Civilian bureaucracies must be held accountable and this, therefore, requires a high level of transparency that should exist between the civilian government to its citizenry. The success of which is most evident in the level of trust citizens have towards these institutions; these results directly relate to civil-military relations. As Finer indicates, "...Where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak. By the same token, where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will be wide in scope – both in manner and in substance."<sup>50</sup> In other words, strong liberal democracies have checks and balances that hold civilian institutions and the military accountable.

In the developed world, notorious for less robust and less democratic forms of machinery of government, many military interventions and coups can be traced, in part, to the civilian bureaucracy's inability to exercise control over the military either because of lack of ability, resources, power or means. These are factors that Huntington and Janowitz do not consider in-depth, principally because the US was their starting point for discussions about civilian control. Their assumption was that the civilian bureaucracy would not only be superior to the military (in terms of numbers and resources), but also capable of fulfilling its responsibilities. This, however, is usually the exception, not the rule in developing states.

From an institutional perspective, it makes sense to have civilian control of the fiscal budget and government spending (also known as having the "power of the purse"<sup>51</sup>). Determining where the funding comes from, where it will be allocated and how it will be spent is vital for all institutions – military and civilian. Due to the fact that there is more than one

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<sup>50</sup> Finer, p 21.

<sup>51</sup> The power of the purse is usually vested in Parliament or Congress. Elected, civilian representatives of the population decide what resources (public money) can be spent on what priorities.



“civilian” area that needs funding (infrastructure, foreign aid, education, health, etc.; the latter two being the most important and costly, arguably), it is logical to have budgetary control concentrated in civilian institutions to set rules on spending against a single budget. Defining which entity is entitled to take on which task is therefore important, and it has been determined a civilian entity is best. As indicated by Huntington,

The administrative-fiscal function includes representing the interests of the economy and efficiency, advising on fiscal, budgetary, and management matters, and administering ‘civilian’ activities such as supply, procurement, construction, non-military personnel, and the budget.<sup>52</sup>

Due to the fact that this function includes the overall government spending, civilians should oversee this task. In addition, it is important to note that military spending can be quite costly, especially during times of war, but that the ability to raise money via taxes and its spending are controlled by civilians who are elected by the people, for the people.

Having defined the military as a separate institution from its civilian counterparts, it is important to note that it is an institution nonetheless, and therefore, should not be larger in size than the total civilian bureaucracy. As Huntington describes it, departmental organization of civil-military relations must provide for the performance of two distinct functions, in addition to the administrative-fiscal function mentioned above:

The professional military function includes representing the nation’s military requirements, advising on the military implications of proposed courses of action and of the military needs necessary to carry out adopted policies and directing the military forces in the implementation of national policy.<sup>53</sup>

As Huntington stated, the military acts in an advisory capacity only for decisions about the military (including its size, resourcing, equipment etc.). The military’s input should be taken

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<sup>52</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 428.

<sup>53</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 428.

into consideration (especially concerning tactical matters – for example, what equipment is best to match a government’s foreign policy objectives<sup>54</sup>), but that the final decision as to how big the military should be, what resources they should have (or more accurately, what budget they should have to fund equipment, training, etc.), what wars they should fight, rests with the civilian government.

Huntington’s other function is:

The policy-strategy function, which includes balancing the professional military and administrative-fiscal viewpoints, formulating the departmental recommendations on force levels and the military budget, and defending departmental views before outside groups.<sup>55</sup>

Huntington argues that the policy-strategy function should be a shared task between the civilian secretary and the military chief, because states, as a whole, determine when to go to war and use their military. However, given that the military has certain, specialized knowledge about the use of force, they should advise the civilians on the tactical use of force more so than the strategic decision to use force. Janowitz notes, however, that the military is adept at accessing and influencing the top civilian echelons of government – a strategy to watch with concern. It is clear that in order to ensure that there is civilian control of the military, the civilian bureaucracy must be larger, both in size and power, than the military. The problem is that, whereas in the past, many civilians had direct experience with war, the gulf between a soldier’s knowledge and experience and a civilian’s is a veritable chasm. Too often, civilians, because of lack of knowledge, defer to the military to make decisions about the use of force (especially strategically) that should be made by the government. A disinterested citizenry (because they are

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<sup>54</sup> A recent Canadian example is the foot dragging and bureaucratic red tape regarding what plane should replace the Canadian Armed Forces aged CF-18 fighter jet. The military is quite clear they think the F-35 is the best option but the government is leaning toward any plane BUT the F-35 for political reasons.

<sup>55</sup> Huntington (1957), p. 428.

too focused on middle class interests in the case of the developed world, or surviving in the case of the developing world) only facilitates the dereliction of duty on the part of the government. Therefore, the size of the civilian bureaucracy compared to the military is an important variable to track.

## **5. Trust in the Military and 6. Trust in the Civilian Bureaucracy<sup>56</sup>**

A common method used to assess the overall level of contentment of the population toward its institutions is done through surveys and polls. Third parties often carry out these polls to measure the level of trust citizens have with governmental institutions, including the military.

Although Huntington, Janowitz and Finer do not explicitly mention popularity of the military and civilian bureaucracy, they do note that the military, because of its professionalism, should be regarded highly by the general public. Samuel Finer does point out, “At most times and in most countries, traits like courage and discipline and self-sacrifice and patriotism, traits which seem almost characteristically to inhere in ‘the soldier,’ are esteemed and cherished. From this there arises, at the lowest, a sympathy for the armed forces; at its highest a veritable mystique.<sup>57</sup> He further argues that, “the popularity or prestige of the armed forces is a second objective factor which may help them to intervene. Such popularity is very erratic and it fluctuates with time and circumstance.”<sup>58</sup> Andrew Bacevich and Andrea Charron noted, however, that too much amity for the military is not helpful either – the civilian government and its citizens need to hold the military to account in the same manner as it would any government institution.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, this is a second reason why keeping a close eye on the results from these

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<sup>56</sup> See Civilian Variables 5 and 6 in the Variable Codebook.

<sup>57</sup> Finer, p. 11.

<sup>58</sup> Finer, p. 80.

<sup>59</sup> Andrew Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2004). Andrea Charron, “The Iraqi Prison Scandal: Beware the Amity of Public Opinion”, *Analysis for New and Emerging Societal Conflicts*, (Halifax: Cornwallis Group, 2006): pp. 333-349.

surveys is important for civil-military relations. Therefore, knowing how popular the military is vis-à-vis other government institution is an important variable to consider. Ideally, the civilian bureaucracy should be as popular, if not more, than the military.

Finer makes several salient points that are consistent with what has historically tended to happen in states where the popularity of the military has been greater than popularity of the civilian bureaucracy. The military can often be perceived as more popular than other civilian institutions when the economy is very weak which has, in turn, had a damaging effect on society overall. These situations have not only allowed the military to intervene, but the military becomes more willing to do so. In Finer's words:

Inefficiency, corruption, and political intrigue appear to be the very reverse of that austerity, brisk authoritarianism, political neutrality and patriotism which pristine publics, unaccustomed to military rule, tend to attribute to the military. It is not surprising, therefore, that the military find in civilian mismanagement the opportunity, the motive and subsequently the pretext for their intervention.<sup>60</sup>

Finer's argument resonates throughout the next chapter, which takes a closer look at South America. Overall, military interventions of this sort tend to occur in states that do not possess professional militaries or states that have corrupt or inadequate civilian governments.

## **7. Military Expenditures and 8. Public Expenditures<sup>61</sup>**

Huntington, Janowitz and Finer recognize the importance of civilian supremacy over the military including over the budget. Arguably, the control of the military budget is key to where and how long the military is deployed and to what end. If the military had carte blanche to spend funds, there is very little stopping them from waging war at home and abroad. However, the ability to wage war is tightly tied to the funding available – indeed whole campaigns and

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<sup>60</sup> Finer, p. 81

<sup>61</sup> See Civilian Variables 7 and 8 in the Variable Codebook.

strategies are arguably based more on the resources available rather than solely military strategy and tactics. Furthermore, the military tends to be expensive, whether at war or not; to maintain fighting capability, soldiers must train and be paid even in times of peace. Therefore, the military can be a sinkhole for government expenditures unless the civilian bureaucracy has firm control over the funding of other, important state priorities like education and health.

Military institutions must compete with other interests in frequently complex budget games in which all actors presumably attempt to increase their share of the budgetary pie. Characteristic patterns of civil-military relations therefore influence relative bargaining positions, shape the strategies, and establish the norms for competition over public resources between military and non-military interests.<sup>62</sup>

Indeed, in the case of South America, "...the percentage of central government expenditure allocated to defence was significantly higher than allocations to education, health and other social services in most countries from 1965-1985."<sup>63</sup> Although this has changed in recent years for most South American countries, specifically during the time frame selected for this thesis, the fact that military expenditures have increased, especially in times of peace absent imminent foreign threats, is still concerning and may suggest that the military is being wasteful and/or civilians are employing them for other, non-defence roles. Most importantly, governments must ensure military expenditures do not surpass social expenditures like health and education unless, perhaps, during an all-out war (but even then it is ill advised). Conversely, badly funded and paid militaries are equally taxing on civil-military relations.

The 'Military Expenditure' and 'Public Expenditure' variables are therefore important for two reasons. Firstly, ensuring there is a balance in the funds allocated to social issues versus the

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<sup>62</sup> Merilee S. Grindle, "Civil-Military Relations and Budgetary Politics in Latin America" *Armed Forces & Society* . Vol. 13 No 2, Winter 1987 p 260.

<sup>63</sup> Francis O. Adeola. "Military Expenditures, Health, and Education: Bedfellows or Antagonists in Third World Development?" *Armed Forces & Society*, 1996 p 441.

military and proper oversight of the funds spent is important; if anything, the balance is a proxy indicator for the competence of the civilian bureaucracy. Secondly, civilian control of military expenditures is one of the most obvious and tangible methods for civilians to control the military for better or worse. Ideally, budgets should preference happy, healthy (democratic states) with sufficient funds for an efficient, lean military to keep the state safe and aid civilian government departments in times of crisis. The people should determine where to set this budget balance. Of course, the option to do away with the military all together (as in the case of Iceland) is also possible, but renders mute concerns about civil-military relations.

Taking all of the variables discussed up to this point into consideration, it is still unclear what defines a healthy civil-military relation, how it is maintained and, in Finer's words "why is military intervention in politics, or military government, the exception rather than the rule? Why and how do civilian forms of rule persist?"<sup>64</sup> The answers to these questions are outlined mostly by Huntington, who discusses professionalism and the military in great length in his book. Rather than relying on civilians, who can be of varying quality, Huntington argues the military should be able to control itself.

In conclusion, the civilian variables gathered from the main sources of literature consulted in this study are the following:

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<sup>64</sup> Finer, p. 12.

**Table 2.1: Group 2 - Civilian Variables and their Coding**

Civilian Variables	Ideal	Coding
1. Civilian controls on the Military	Preferably written into the Constitution or other bodies of law.	1 = Affirmative
2. Military Vote	Serving military should be allowed to vote in all elections.	1 = Affirmative
3. Ministers of Defence	Should be civilian. There is debate whether or not a retired military member should serve.	1 = (if only civilian)
4. Civilian Bureaucracy	Should be larger in size and scope of mandate than the military.	1 = Affirmative
5. Popularity of the Military	Should be as popular as the civilian bureaucracy. Too much popularity is not helpful for the military	1 = Affirmative
6. Popularity of the Civilian Bureaucracy	Should be as popular as the military.	1 = Affirmative
7. Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	Should be less than all of the other state expenditures (except perhaps during a world war)	1 = Affirmative
8. Public Expenditures (Health and Education) (% of GDP)	Should be more than military expenditure.	1 = Affirmative

Table 2.1 outlines the civilian variables that are often highlighted in the literature (especially by Huntington, Janowitz and Finer) that are essential for healthy civil-military relations. Arguably, civilian control of the military is an especially important variable. The most objective evidence of such control is a body of law or reference in a state's constitution. The

other variables are also important, but are meaningless without robust civilian control of decision made as to when and where to engage the military.

The next set of variables fall under the “Military” group of variables (Group 3). These variables focus on the level of professionalism and preparedness a military should have. A higher level of professionalism will undeniably result in better, healthier civil-military relations. These seven variables include: the size of the military, size of the military compared to the general population, military professionalism (education and training), military recruitment, military coups since 1990, martial courts, military acting as police (military police).

### **Military Variables**

#### **1. Size of Military and 2. Size of Military Compared to Population<sup>65</sup>**

Large, standing armies have played important historical roles in South America and elsewhere. Although there is not a standardized number or an optimal military size, it is clear that there should be a balance; arguably, militaries should be big enough to defend the state in times of need, but small enough that they cannot dominate state and drain the workforce of potential employees. This balance is different for every state and a host of variables. For the purposes of this variable, however, we are only concerned with the relative size of the military compared to the general population using the US figures as a foil for comparison.

#### **3. Military Professionalism**

According to Huntington, military professionalism is the cornerstone of civil-military relations. As he indicates, “the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man. This is perhaps, the fundamental thesis of [*The Soldier and the State*]...The existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives a unique cast to the

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<sup>65</sup> See Military Variables 1 and 2 in Variable Codebook.



modern problem of civil-military relations.”<sup>66</sup> Considering the responsibility that has been bestowed on the military to undertake war with the financial support of civilian institutions, it is imperative that the military institution be prepared to take on this responsibility.<sup>67</sup> The fact that the military is not only needed in times of war but also during a wide range of domestic emergencies, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and other aid to the civil power scenarios, there is little argument against the need to have a well-educated, prepared and professional military at a country’s disposal.

Huntington identifies three characteristics that constitute the “professional” man: 1. Expertise 2. Responsibility, and 3. Corporateness. These three characteristics are also included in Janowitz’s idea of military ethics and ethos. It is expected that, since officer commissions are no longer purchased but earned, the military member (especially officer class) is better trained, better behaved, and a constant role model for the rest of society. Indeed, nothing shocks quite like a military officer behaving badly.<sup>68</sup>

According to Huntington:

The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour. His expertise is acquired only by prolonged education and experience. Institutions of research and education are required for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill. Contact is maintained between the academic and practical sides of a profession through journals, conferences and the circulation of personnel between practice and teaching.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 7.

<sup>67</sup> Especially as they have access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which undeniably require cautious and capable hands to control them.

<sup>68</sup> For example, witness the media frenzy over US General McChrystal’s affair or Canadian (former) Colonel William’s murders and rapes. By any standard committed by any individual, they are illegal acts (although not at all comparable in severity), but that they are committed by officers makes the violations seem that much more egregious.

<sup>69</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 8.

It is worth emphasizing that what is expected from the military is a high level of training. Officers in the Canadian military, for example, must have the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree above and beyond the military training needed for their particular trade, which includes appropriate national designations. For example, if, as a soldier, one's job is as an engineer, the member is expected to have the professional and national designation in addition to military training.<sup>70</sup> To ensure such standards are maintained, there are degree-granting military institutions in nearly all states with militaries. Secondly, the curricula used by these military institutions are updated and include courses in civil-military relations to ensure, at a minimum, soldiers understand their role in society. Lastly, there are opportunities for military students to interact with other militaries either through educational exchange programs, international conferences or training to learn best practices and, especially for developing states, to expose their military to the best training standards (mostly in developed states). Therefore, evidence of "expertise" is an important variable.

According to Huntington, the second characteristic that should be present in professionals is responsibility. He argues,

The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society [...] financial remuneration, cannot be the primary aim of the professional man *qua* professional man.<sup>71</sup>

Huntington emphasizes the fact that salary should not be the professional soldier's main motivation. Considering joining the armed forces is voluntary in most countries, the motivation to join should, ideally, be based on an interest in serving the state and the skills acquired

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<sup>70</sup> There are programs like the commissioned from the ranks programme that may waive this requirement for a university degree. However, the general expectation is that post-secondary education has been completed. Indeed for the General class in the US, Canada and other developed countries, a graduate degree (even PhDs) are preferred.

<sup>71</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 9.

throughout a military career. However, this is not to assume that the military career should not be properly rewarded by economic means; after all, in the case of officers, higher education goes hand-in-hand with more responsibilities, which should be properly rewarded. Further, remuneration can be used as an incentive to increase recruits. The military should be rewarded appropriately for the service that they provide to the state and society just as civilian professional careers are rewarded financially for the services they provide, especially given that the military assumes unlimited liability. It is the state's responsibility to ensure that the military is well provided for – not only in terms of salary, but also ensuring that training and proper equipment are provided. Otherwise, neglect of the military could be potentially problematic for civil-military relations.

The third and last characteristic identified by Huntington is corporateness.<sup>72</sup> He argues,

The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of unique social responsibility.<sup>73</sup>

Janowitz would refer to the military ethics<sup>74</sup> that binds members of the armed forces and the need for: “[a] democratic society [to] accord the professional soldier a position based on his skill and on his special code of honour.”<sup>75</sup> Members of the military are special, not only in terms of the hierarchical command structure, but also in the camaraderie that is embedded in the institution itself. Despite the fact that the professional soldier should be reflective of the

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<sup>72</sup> Indeed, this is an important characteristic to consider, particularly in the case of Latin America, where this military-bureaucratic tendency has prevailed for decades. The emergence of long-term military rule is often tied to corruption and the idea of the military as being an “All Boys Club,” where its members do not rise in rank based on merit, but rather, who they know. For more information see George Philips’ “The Military Institution Revisited: Some Notes on Corporatism and Military Rule in Latin America,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Nov, 1980) pp, 421-436.

<sup>73</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 10.

<sup>74</sup> Janowitz, Morris. "Military Elites and the Study of War", *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Mar., 1957), pp. 9-18.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*: 18.

demographics and characteristics of society, unlimited liability is what undeniably differentiates the military from civilians. Willingly choosing to put their lives on the line, is a characteristic shared by men and women who take up the profession of arms, one which is arguably strengthened during wars and missions abroad.

There are several factors that are highlighted by Huntington's definition of professionalism and Janowitz's idea of a military ethic. It is clear that professionalism is necessary in order to ensure that the military remains obedient, organized and capable. As Huntington mentioned at the very beginning of his book, military professionalism is crucial for control. Although he acknowledges the importance of professionalism, Samuel Finer presents several important additional factors. He argues,

There are three tendencies that push the military towards collision with the civilian authorities; and each one grows out of professionalism. Professionalism is not, therefore, what Huntington says it is – the sole or even the principle force inhibiting the military's desire to intervene. To inhibit such a desire, the military must also have absorbed the principle of the supremacy of the civil power. For this is not part of the definition of 'professionalism'. It is a separate and distinct matter.<sup>76</sup>

Just as Huntington's argument might not always apply to countries other than the United States, Finer's argument might not always apply to countries like the United States. Overall, it is clear the majority of civil-military relations literature is skewed to the United States and the liberal democratic philosophy of world order. Again, the difference lies in the area on which the author focuses – developing versus developed nations. Finer's argument can be directly linked to various historic examples in South America, where the military has used their professionalism (that ability that affords them skill, organization and capabilities beyond that of civilians) to

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<sup>76</sup> Finer, p. 28.

intervene in politics. It is precisely because of this threat of a military coup that Janowitz pushes civilians to remain sharp, vigilante and in control of their personnel.

#### **4. Martial Courts**

Although neither Samuel Huntington nor Samuel Finer address the martial court system directly (it is more implied), it is important to include martial courts (i.e. courts that try soldiers for misconduct and violations of the defence act – i.e. violations of military law) as part of the variables for two main reasons. Firstly, soldiers follow a military code of conduct in addition to the civil code (criminal code, basic traffic rules etc.) A breach in a military code of conduct (for example failing to show up to work or sick parade or not following proper protocol on a ballistics range) falls under a different jurisdiction.

In the UK, for example, “...the differences between the Service and civilian systems of justice exist only to reinforce and support the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces, and are necessary because of the link between the maintenance of discipline and the administration of justice and the need to be able to hold trials anywhere in the world.”<sup>77</sup> In other words, martial courts are necessary to ensure that the military is held accountable because of the nature of their job and the importance of discipline. Therefore, the existence of a martial court is an important military variable. As the thesis is focusing on the relative healthiness of civil-military relations, an in-depth study of the quality of the martial courts is not required. Rather, evidence that such courts exist is important to civil-military relations so that, in theory, violations of military law (which cannot be tried in civilian courts) can take place. It is recognized, however, that the South American military courts are often used to try situations that extend beyond the scope of

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<sup>77</sup> UK Ministry of Justice - Judge Advocate General (JAG) “*Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial*” Version 4, October 2013. Issued by JAG, Published by MCS. Version 4 – October 2013 p, 3.

the military code of conduct and should be tried in civilian courts either because they are better, run, hidden from the public, or because they can skirt jurisdictional protocols.<sup>78</sup>

## 5. Military Recruitment

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the end of World War II resulted in significant changes to society and also to what we have come to know as civil-military relations. The post-World War II era marks the period in which military recruitment methods began to change; countries like the United States, which were able to invest in nuclear weapons development, were the first to change from conscription to voluntary recruitment. Countries that did not have the ability to acquire nuclear weapons still relied on a large, standing army and therefore, the change from mandatory to voluntary service took longer or has yet to happen. The end of the Cold War was arguably the definitive marker of what should have been the end of conscription altogether. It is therefore surprising to find countries that still have mandatory service in place.<sup>79</sup> A volunteer force, in theory, is happier with their choice of profession, which suggests healthier civil-military relations. Therefore, the South American states' recruitment policies are important to consider.

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<sup>78</sup> See Brett J. Kyle and Andrew G. Reiter, "Dictating Justice: Human Rights and Military Courts in Latin America", *Armed Forces & Society* 2012. pp. 27-48 - Kyle and Reiter argue that the martial courts are often used to try human rights issues that are not normally within the jurisdiction of these courts.

<sup>79</sup> Germany, for example, is a country that could have made the change earlier, but change became effective in 2011. For more information read The Guardian "Germany to Abolish Compulsory Military Service" November 2010, URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/22/germany-abolish-compulsory-military-service>. (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014). For more information on European countries see: Deutsche Welle "EU Nations continue to phase out military conscription." January, 2010. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/europe/01germany.html?pagewanted=all& r=0> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

## 6. Military Coups

Although for Huntington the idea of military intervention would be incompatible with military professionalism, Finer recognizes there have been cases in which professionalism has facilitated interventions. According to Finer,

In the first place, there is a distinct class of countries where governments have been repeatedly subjected to the interference of their armed forces. They are certainly not liberal democracies of the British or American kind wherein the military are strictly subordinated to the civilians. Nor are they despotisms or autocracies of a totalitarian type, where, we must empathize, the military are subordinated to the civilians as much as or even more than in the liberal-democratic regimes. These regimes of military provenance or military rule are *sui generis*. They constitute a large proportion of those sovereign states, which are neither communist nor liberal-democratic, and will soon comprise most of them. The regimes where the military are the decisive political factor form a distinct class, which we may call the empirical autocracies and oligarchies. 'Empirical' distinguishes them from the ideological autocracies and oligarchies of the Soviet type; 'autocracies and oligarchies' distinguishes them from the democracies.<sup>80</sup>

Janowitz notes that the level of control civilians have is related to the type of government in power. Liberal democracies are best for a variety of reasons, but not necessarily guaranteed to maintain control of the military.<sup>81</sup> In the developed world, the assumption is that the civilian controls are robust enough (and the state is economically sound enough) that professionalism of the military and the oath that the military takes to protect the state are sufficient guards against a coup. In developing countries, however, civilian controls, resources and state organization can be of varying quality (from dictatorships to failed states). Finer notes that the connection between military coups and developing states has less to do with the military professionalism and more to do with social inequality.

The seismic zones of military intervention [i.e., military coup], the areas where it is or has been endemic, tend by and large to be regions where social stratification is marked, and where, by consequence, the army provides one of the few avenues for social

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<sup>80</sup> Finer, p. 3.

<sup>81</sup> Janowitz, Morris. "Military Elites and the Study of War", *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Mar., 1957), pp. 9-18.

advancement. It is so in most of the Latin American states, in the Middle East, and in contemporary Southeast Asia, and was so in pre-war Eastern Europe.<sup>82</sup>

Indeed, there is a correlation between military intervention and socioeconomic development, which is not taken into consideration by most authors. From this perspective, the military's awareness of the country's overall situation, that is either given or enhanced by 'professionalism', might be one of the contributing factors that allows for intervention (either because they are highly capable and/or because, as citizens, they too are fed up with social conditions). "The moment the military draws this distinction between nation and the government in power, they begin to invent their own private notion of the national interest, and from this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of this view for that of the civilian government."<sup>83</sup> Considering these differences, it is fair to assume that the factors deterring the military from intervention will differ, depending on a country's history, culture and background. However, military coups are an indication of distinctly unhealthy civil-military relations – regardless of the underlying reasons for the coup.

## **7. Military Acting as Police INSIDE the state**

Finer explains that, "...the government depends on the military because this is indispensable to its foreign policy. Domestic circumstances may also produce this effect. The government may have to rely on the military as a police force."<sup>84</sup> The idea of a Military Police (literally police for the military to protect military bases and arrest and detain soldiers who violate military law outside of civilian jurisdiction) is not something new. What is new and what has been noted by Janowitz is a shift toward a constabulary role for the military, i.e., soldiers

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<sup>82</sup> Finer, p. 56.

<sup>83</sup> Finer, p. 26.

<sup>84</sup> Finer, p.75.



acting as police, especially **outside** of the state.<sup>85</sup> For example, soldiers are used to protect food supplies in conflict areas or run prisoner of war detention centres or riot squads in theatres of operation – all of which are normally performed by police.<sup>86</sup> This is a potentially worrying trend witnessed especially in Afghanistan and Iraq by NATO and coalition forces. However, as this is happening outside of the home state, it can be justified as militarily necessary.

The US specifically prevents their armed forces from serving as police officers in the streets of the US. That being said, the police are starting to employ more military like tactics, especially in the “war on drugs.” Evolving militarization has taken the form of a rapid proliferation of PPU (Police Paramilitary Units) or SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams modeled on military special operations’ groups. The expanding use of these PPU in mainstream police work is a major alteration in crime-fighting orientation and arguably represents a role “revolution” in policing.<sup>87</sup> It is concerning, but only tangentially related to civil-military relations.

Nevertheless, in many developing states, both because the police are corrupt/inept or law and order is so comprised, extra reinforcements are needed. There is an alarming trend toward using military as police in the streets **INSIDE** the state, rather than in the traditional defence role against foreign invaders. Indeed, whether military are becoming more police-like or police more military-like, the blurring of roles of both groups with the ability to use force is concerning. Therefore, this thesis points to this variable (the use of military in domestic police roles) as a new contribution to the civil-military relations literature. Ideally, the military should defend against

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<sup>85</sup> Peter Feaver, The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control”, *Armed Forces & Society* (Winter 1996), 23: pp. 149-178.

<sup>86</sup> Canada, for example, is deploying more RCMP officers on overseas missions in recognition of these police roles.

<sup>87</sup> Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell “Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States” *Armed Forces & Society* 36(2) 327–350 p. 329.

foreign invaders and police should deal with internal security.

The fact that additional roles have been bestowed on many South American militaries is a substantial change from what is prescribed in the literature. In the United States, there has been a long tradition of extreme caution toward using the armed forces for internal security or domestic policing purposes<sup>88</sup> and yet, the military is adopting new responsibilities, which, in theory, correspond to the police (for example surveillance of domestic air and water space). The same could be said about countries in South America, which are also using their armed forces to address internal issues that would have normally been delegated to the police.

The fact that there has been a change in the roles the police and the military play is already significant in the study of civil-military relations. Furthermore, in regions, such as South America, these changes have been drastic, to the extent that special task forces, namely, Military Police Programs, have been created to address specific issues related to domestic security by military personnel. In other words, whereas Military Police (MPs), who watch for violations of military law, is needed and accepted by the literature, soldiers acting as police inside their states are counter to their code of ethics. (The question of using military as police outside of the state is also concerning but is not discussed as it is tangentially related to civil-military relations). Chapters Three and Four will discuss this confusion of soldiers as police in the context of South America and then Colombia, specifically.

In conclusion, the military variables gathered from the main sources of literature consulted in this study are the following:

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<sup>88</sup> Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell “Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States” *Armed Forces & Society* 36(2) 327–350 p. 336 “This hostility dates back at least to the American Revolution, when the British Crown used military troops against its own subjects in the colonies. The hostility eventually took concrete form in the U.S. Constitution, which specifically limits the military’s role in civilian affairs. In 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act reinforced these limitations by criminalizing any use of the armed forces to execute laws, except as specifically authorized by Congress. In effect, the act bars officials from using military personnel for domestic police work”.

**Table 2.2 – Group 3 – Military Variables and their Coding**

<b>Military Variables</b>	<b>Ideal</b>	<b>Coding</b>
1. Size of Military	Smaller than the civilian bureaucracy	1 = Affirmative
2. Size of Military Compared to Population	General adult population should be bigger than the military	1 = Affirmative
3. Military Professionalism	Educated, trained.	1 = Affirmative
4. Martial Courts	Should be in place	1 = Affirmative
5. Military Recruitment	Should be voluntary	1 = Affirmative
6. Coups D'état	None	1 = Affirmative
7. Military Police	As police for the military not police of the state	1 = Affirmative

**Conclusion**

The variables identified in the main sources of literature reviewed in this thesis, namely, Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, Morris Janowitz's, *The Professional Soldier*, Samuel Finer's *The Man On Horseback*, and several articles from *Armed Forces & Society* which related to civil-military relations are the following:

**Table 2.3 Group 2 and 3 Variables – Civil and Military**

CIVILIAN VARIABLES	MILITARY VARIABLES
Constitutional Controls on the Military	Size of Military
Military Vote	Size of Military Compared to Population
Ministers of Defence	Military Professionalism
Popularity of the Military	Martial Courts
Popularity of the Civilian Bureaucracy	Military Recruitment
Public Expenditures - Health and Education (% of GDP)	Coups D'état
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	Military Police (new variable)
Size of Civilian Bureaucracy	

This is not to suggest that these are the only variables related to civil-military relations. However, these fifteen variables were chosen because they were referenced by the key civil-military relations' authors and are consistently pointed to in articles as being of importance to good civil–military relations. The only exception is the military police variable, which represents my contribution to the literature.

In the next chapter, I apply these variables to South America, using the United States as an ideal model for the sake of contrast and because the literature is heavily skewed toward the US as a model of sorts. However, as mentioned throughout this chapter, caution must be taken in applying examples from developed countries, such as the United States, to other, less developed, regions in the world. The suggestions explained in detail by Huntington specifically, might not apply to South America, because unlike the United States, South American countries do not have

strong traditions of democracy. In addition, South American militaries are not as “professional” as the United States’ and they have, historically, been more involved in politics of running the states and the history of military coups.

## **Chapter Three**

### **A Comparative Assessment of Civil-Military Relations in South America**

This chapter evaluates the health of civil-military relations in South America generally based on a comparative analysis of the twenty-two variables outlined by the main sources of civil-military relations literature along with the general state comparative variables (representing Group 2, 3 and 1 variables, respectively). These variables, especially as they relate to the control of the military and its relationship to government, are consistently cited in the literature as important for healthy civil-military relations, i.e., a military that is controlled constitutionally by a civilian government, that is well trained and that does not exceed its mandate.

The first seven variables relate to general information about each country. These variables provide a basis for comparison among the countries. For example, is one more densely populated or poorer than another? These factors are important as they may contribute to or exacerbate the health of civil-military relations. While this thesis is not searching for causality, such basic facts about a country are a natural starting place for any comparative study. For the purpose of consistency and accuracy, the main source used to gather information on six of the seven variables i.e., population size, size of state, population density, literacy rates, GDP and GDP per capita is the World Bank Database.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> The World Bank. "World Development Indicators" URL: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

## **State Comparative Variables**<sup>90</sup>

### **1. Population Size, 2. Size of State and 3. Population Density**<sup>91</sup>

Population size is normally the first comparative variable reviewed. For this study, it can indicate the number of military-aged individuals in the country and is important for the calculation of population density.

With the exception of Suriname and Guyana, which have experienced a growth rate of less than 1% between 1990 and 2012, there has been a steady growth in population size in all of the South American countries. In 2012, Brazil ranked first with a population of over 198.7 million. Following in second place was Colombia with a population of 47.7 million, Argentina ranked third with a population of 41.1 million, both, Venezuela and Peru, had a population of 30 million each, and Chile ranked fifth with a population of 17.5 million.

The bottom six, in terms of population, were Ecuador with a population of 15.5 million, Bolivia with a population of 10.5 million, Paraguay with a population of 6.7 million, Uruguay with a population of 3.4 million, Guyana with a population of 0.8 million and Suriname with a population of 0.5 million. Compared to the United States, which had a population of 313.9 million in 2012, the population sizes in South America, even those ranking in the top six, are less than half as large.

Similarly, in terms of the size of the state, with the exception of Brazil, all South American countries are much smaller in comparison to the United States, which has an area of 9,161,920.00 km.<sup>2</sup> In South America, Brazil ranks first as the largest state in South America with a state size of 8,459,420.00 km<sup>2</sup>, followed by Argentina as the second largest, with a size of 2,736,690.00 km<sup>2</sup>, Peru with a size of 1,280,000.00 km<sup>2</sup>, Colombia with a size of 1,109,500.00

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<sup>90</sup> Note: This subheading refers to variables 1-7 of the Variable Codebook.

<sup>91</sup> Note: Refer to variables 1-3 of the Variable Codebook.

km<sup>2</sup> and lastly, Bolivia with 1,083,300.00 km<sup>2</sup>. The three smallest states in the region are Guyana with a size of 196,850.00 km<sup>2</sup>, Chile with a size of 175,020.00 km<sup>2</sup> and Suriname with a size of 156,000.00 km<sup>2</sup>. The size of the state is sometimes related to the size of the military – traditionally, bigger states needed larger militaries to defend their borders. Today this is less of an issue as technology can now play a surveillance role; a state’s “security” is now usually the domain of police and international laws about sovereignty are mature enough that states no longer need every inch of their coasts lined with military stations or posts.

In terms of population density, the top five countries with a high population density (as measured in 2011) were Ecuador with 61 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, Colombia with 42 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, Venezuela with 33 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, Brazil, Chile and Peru all with a population density of 23 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, and lastly Uruguay with 19 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. The countries with the lowest population density were Paraguay with 16 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, Argentina with 15 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, Bolivia with 10 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, Guyana with 4 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> and Suriname with 3 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. Compared to the United States’ population density of 34.6 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, the only country that stands out is Ecuador, which is almost twice as densely populated as the United States.

The inference often drawn from these results is that smaller states with a high population density are more likely to have more pressure on infrastructure and potentially more social problems; these problems will be reflected in the health of their society, economy and military.<sup>92</sup> This is not to suggest that these three factors alone define the overall health of a state, as it will be explained later in this chapter, there are several factors that need to be taken into account. Rather, the variables provide a basis for comparisons.

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<sup>92</sup> Of course this is not always the case. For example The Netherlands has a high population density and small state but is robust economically and socially-speaking.



#### 4. Type of Government<sup>93</sup>

The type of government in power is an important variable for civil-military relations. The ideal is a democratic, republican government in which the civilian head of government (who provides strong, transparent oversight of its military) can be removed via a vote of the people.

Robust oversights and checks and balances of military and civilian institutions are most likely in democratic states. Huntington states, “Civilian control is identified with democratic government, military control with absolute or totalitarian government. In democratic countries, it is argued, policy is determined by persuasion and compromise; in absolutist countries it is determined by force and coercion. Hence, the military, who control the most powerful instrument of violence, will be more powerful in totalitarian countries than in democratic ones.”<sup>94</sup> Janowitz concurs but suggests democracies may have to work harder given that democracies tend to produce expectations and demanding publics. (Authoritarian regimes, in contrast, aren’t particularly concerned about impressing their public or have other, more coercive means to get their way). The main source consulted for this variable was the Political Database of the Americas, produced in conjunction with Georgetown University and the Organization of American States (OAS).<sup>95</sup>

Upon reviewing all twelve South American Constitutions, it was concluded that, with the exception of Venezuela, all States describe their State as “republican.” In addition, with the exception of Argentina, all States describe their State as “democratic”; six<sup>96</sup> out of the twelve

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<sup>93</sup> Note: See State Comparative Variable 4 in the Variable Codebook.

<sup>94</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 82.

<sup>95</sup> Political Database of the Americas. “*Comparación de Constituciones: Nombre, Forma de Estado y Forma de Gobierno.*” URL: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Comp/Estado/nombre.html> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>96</sup> These six countries are Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname.

describe their State as sovereign, and less than six<sup>97</sup> describe their State as representative, united, pluralist, a State of Law, independent and/or decentralized. Less than four states<sup>98</sup> describe their State as indivisible, solidary,<sup>99</sup> free, respectful of human dignity and participative. Only Argentina and Brazil describe their form of government as federal. It is clear that, although the phrasing and wording might differ, all countries incorporate key democratic descriptors in their Constitutions.

Special attention should be paid to Chile, whose description is by far, the simplest. Article 4 of the Chilean Constitution states: “Chile is a democratic republic.” Contrary-wise, the countries that stand out as being unique, in the sense that they use very specific descriptors, are Venezuela, Ecuador, Guyana and Peru.

Article 2 of the Venezuelan Constitution states: “Venezuela is constituted in a democratic and social State of Law and Justice, which advocates as higher values of its legal system and its performance, life, liberty, justice, equality, solidarity, democracy, social responsibility and, in general, the pre-eminence of human rights, ethics and political pluralism.”<sup>100</sup> Even though this description reads well on paper, it is unclear what is meant by a ‘democratic and social State of Law and Justice.’ In addition, it is interesting to note that it is the only country that emphasized

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<sup>97</sup> “Representative”: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru; “United”: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru; “Pluralist”: Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela; “State of Law”: Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela; “Independent”: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru; “Decentralized”: Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru.

<sup>98</sup> “Indivisible”: Guyana, Paraguay and Peru; “Solidary”: Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela; “Free”: Bolivia, Paraguay and Suriname; “Respectful of Human Dignity”: Brazil, Colombia and Paraguay; “Participative”: Colombia and Paraguay.

<sup>99</sup> The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines Solidary as, “characterized by or manifesting community of interests and responsibilities.”

<sup>100</sup> Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (Publicada en Gaceta Oficial del jueves 30 de diciembre de 1999, Número 36.860. Incluye reformas aprobadas por Enmienda N°1, del 15 de Febrero del 2009) Original Spanish Text: “Artículo 2. Venezuela se constituye en un Estado democrático y social de Derecho y de Justicia, que propugna como valores superiores de su ordenamiento jurídico y de su actuación, la vida, la libertad, la justicia, la igualdad, la solidaridad, la democracia, la responsabilidad social y en general, la preeminencia de los derechos humanos, la ética y el pluralismo político.”

the importance of ‘liberty, justice, democracy, human rights, ethics and political pluralism’ but is the same country that has been heavily criticized by the international community for being a violator of human rights, specifically, freedom of speech and assembly. It is clear that the real Venezuela does not match the Venezuela described on paper; the most recent examples of this contradiction between what is on paper and what is practised have been the events that took place in February 2014 and which have, once again, stirred public opinion worldwide regarding the violation of human rights in Venezuela.<sup>101</sup>

Article 1 of the Ecuadorian Constitution states: “Ecuador is a social state of law, sovereign, unitary, independent, democratic, multicultural and multiethnic. Its government is republican, presidential, elective, representative, responsible, alternative, participative and with a decentralized administration.”<sup>102</sup> Similar to the Venezuelan description, the description of the Ecuadorian state suggests this is an all-inclusive, democratic government. However, whether this description matches Ecuador’s social reality is arguable, particularly whether or not the State in fact possesses “multicultural and multiethnic” qualities, which are reflected in their government.

Article 1 of the Guyanese Constitution describes Guyana as “The state in transition to socialism – Guyana is an indivisible, secular, democratic, sovereign state in the course of transition from capitalism to socialism and shall be known as the Co-operative Republic of Guyana.”<sup>103</sup> Guyana is the only country in South America that stresses the importance of their socioeconomic system, i.e., socialism, in their constitution.

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<sup>101</sup> For additional information about Human Rights Violations in Venezuela refer to Human Rights Watch (2010 Article) URL: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/22/venezuela-legislative-assault-free-speech-civil-society>(Date Accessed: June 12, 2014) and Amnesty International (2014 Article) - <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/venezuela-trial-opposition-leader-affront-justice-and-free-assembly-2014-02-19> (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>102</sup> Constitución de la República del Ecuador (2008). Original Spanish Text: “Art. 1:El Ecuador es un Estado constitucional de derechos y justicia, social, democrático, soberano, independiente, unitario, intercultural, plurinacional y laico. Se organiza en forma de república y se gobierna de manera descentralizada.”

<sup>103</sup> Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Act 1980.

Article 43 of the Peruvian Constitution states: “The Republic of Peru is democratic, social, independent and sovereign. The State is one and indivisible. Its government is unitary, representative, decentralized and is organized according to the principle of separation of powers.”<sup>104</sup> Interesting to note is the fact that Peru is the only country that makes reference to the importance of the *trias politica* in their Constitution.

Although all of the South American Constitutions, on paper at least, clearly outline the rights, interests, values and identities of the people and also suggest they are all democratic, this may not be the case in practice. As a proxy test and among the primary indicators used to gauge the health of a society in relation to their government and their government’s policies is education and the degree to which it is valued financially. Literacy rates, therefore, are an important indicator of education.

### **5. Literacy Rates, 6. GDP and 7. GDP per capita<sup>105</sup>**

Article 26 of the *United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights* states, “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”<sup>106</sup> According to the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Although these [South American] countries are close to reaching the target [i.e., UN Millennium Development Goal of primary schooling by 2015], they should

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<sup>104</sup> Constitución Política del Peru de 1993. Original Spanish Text: “Artículo 43.- Estado democrático de derecho. Forma de Gobierno La República del Perú es democrática, social, independiente y soberana. El Estado es uno e indivisible. Su gobierno es unitario, representativo y descentralizado, y se organiza según el principio de la separación de poderes.”

<sup>105</sup> Note: See State Comparative Variables 5 and 6 in the Variable Codebook.

<sup>106</sup> United Nations. (1948, December 10). *The United Declaration of Human Rights*. UN General Assembly. URL: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

nonetheless seek to identify those households in which children are at risk of failing to complete their primary education.”<sup>107</sup> As a whole, South American countries have made significant progress in improving their education systems. As it will be shown below, in general, all governments have increased spending on education; the funding they receive from international donors, of course, facilitates this.

According to the World Bank, in 2011, the literacy rate of the world was 84.08%. The five highest literacy rates in South America were the following: Chile ranked first with a literacy rate of 98.55% (2009 estimate), followed by Uruguay with a rate of 98.07% (2010 estimate), Argentina with a rate of 97.8% (2010 estimate), Venezuela with a rate of 95.51% (2009 estimate) and Suriname with a rate of 94.62% (2008 estimate). The lowest three are Brazil with a rate of 90.30% (2009 estimate), Peru with a rate of 89.59% (2007 estimate) and lastly, Ecuador with a rate of 84.21% (2009 estimate). There is no information available for Guyana. Compared to the United States, which, based on a CIA 2003<sup>108</sup> assessment, had a 99% literacy rate, and a World Bank 2011 assessment had 84.07% literacy rate, the rates for all of the South American states are relatively good. In addition to the general literacy rate, the education of their military is particularly relevant to civil-military relations.

Having a well-educated military is vital, in Sir William Francis Butler words, “The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, in Samuel Huntington words, “...Professional knowledge is intellectual in nature

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<sup>107</sup> Chapter III: The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective, p. 86.

<sup>108</sup> CIA 2003 World Factbook found at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

<sup>109</sup> Colonel Sir William Francis Butler, *Charles George Gordon* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1889), p. 85. As cited by Brent Griffin on his article titled: “Educating the New National Security Professional: A Review of the National Security Programme at the Canadian Forces College” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 12 No.4, Autumn 2012, p. 24.

and capable of preservation in writing. It has a history, and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional competence. Institutions of research and education are required for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill.”<sup>110</sup> According to Huntington, the modern officer corps should not only reflect the educational level of the country they represent, but they should also exceed them. If the Armed Forces are a direct reflection of the population, examining the overall literacy rates of the entire population is essential. Huntington believed that, while the military should be reflective of the population in terms of its diversity, the “soldier statesmen” was to be better educated, better trained and more worldly than the average citizen, given the enormous responsibility afforded them by virtue of being a member of the profession of arms. The better educated the general population, the better educated the military.

Although the literacy rates for all of South America are seemingly acceptable on paper, by no means does this translate into this being the only definitive factor that is used to determine the overall health of a society. Due to the fact that the economy is directly linked to society, so much so that most of the social disparities in South America are rooted in economic and financial turmoil, it is vital to determine how healthy a State’s economy is. The Gross Domestic Product or GDP is still one of the main indicators used to determine the economic health of a state.

Compared to the United States, which had a GDP of \$16,244,600,000,000.00 (or \$16 trillion) in 2012, the GDP for all of South America is relatively low. However, according to the World Bank, there was a persistent and steady growth in the total GDP for all countries between 1990 and 2012, which is positive. Based on a 2012 estimate, ranking the top five were Brazil

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<sup>110</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* pp.7-18.

with a GDP of USD just over \$2 trillion (\$2,252,664,120,777) followed by Argentina just shy of \$1 trillion (\$475,501,675,473), The other South American states had GDP's under \$1 trillion.<sup>111</sup>

Based on these figures, the 6 states with the highest GDP per capita were Chile with \$15,452, Uruguay with \$14,702, Venezuela with \$12,728, Argentina with \$11,573, Brazil with \$11,339 and Suriname with \$9,376. This compares to a US GDP per capita of \$51,700/per capita. The bottom 6 with the lowest GDP per capita were Colombia with \$7,747, Peru with \$6,795, Ecuador with \$5,424, Paraguay with \$3,813, Guyana with \$3,583 and Bolivia with \$2,575. Compared to the United States then, not even the top three seem adequate enough to properly sustain a sizeable middleclass. These figures are reflected in the economic problems these countries are burdened with; a persistent lack of funds results in social expenditure cuts, which undeniably have a detrimental effect on society as a whole.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of the first six variables outlined above, as indicated in the table below.

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<sup>111</sup> Venezuela with USD \$ \$381,286,237,848.00, Colombia with USD \$369,789,365,899 and Chile with a GDP of USD \$268,187,780,226. The five lowest GDP, listed from highest to lowest were Uruguay with USD \$49,059,705,180, Bolivia with USD \$27,035,110,130, Paraguay with USD \$25,502,060,502, Suriname with USD \$4,738,181,820 and Guyana with USD \$2,850,572,407.

**Table 3.1 – Summary of State Comparative Variables for South America**

	Population	Size of State	Population Density	Democratic State	Literacy Rate	GDP	GDP per capita
USA	313.9 Million	916.19 km <sup>2</sup>	34.06 per km <sup>2</sup>	Yes	84.07% (2011 est)	\$16.3 trillion	\$51.7 thousand
TOP 6	<b>Between 198.4 Million and 17.6 Million</b>	<b>Bigger than 882 thousand km<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Between 61 per km<sup>2</sup> and 23.13 per km<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>Between 98.55% and 93.75%</b>	<b>Between 2 trillion and \$470.5 billion</b>	<b>Between \$15.5 thousand and \$9.3 thousand</b>
	Argentina Brazil Colombia Chile Peru Venezuela	Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Peru Venezuela	Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela	All are Democratic on paper	Argentina Chile Paraguay Suriname Uruguay Venezuela	Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Peru Venezuela	Chile Uruguay Venezuela Argentina Brazil Suriname
BOTTOM 6	<b>17.5 Million and less</b>	<b>Smaller than 882 Thousand km<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>23.13 per km<sup>2</sup> and smaller</b>		<b>Lower than 93.75%</b>	<b>Lower than \$27 billion</b>	<b>Lower than \$7.7 thousand</b>
	Bolivia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Suriname Uruguay	Chile Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Suriname Uruguay	Argentina Bolivia Guyana Paraguay Suriname Uruguay	All are Democratic on paper.	Brazil Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Guyana Peru	Bolivia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Suriname Uruguay	Colombia Peru Ecuador Paraguay Guyana Bolivia

It is understood that the states that ranked among the top six have a larger population, a larger state, lower population density, high literacy rates and a sizeable GDP. Despite some fluctuations between one variable and the next, some countries were consistently present among the top six in all variables; Venezuela was among the top six in six out of six variables;



Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru were among the top six in four out of six variables; Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Suriname and Uruguay were among the top six in one out of six and Guyana was not among the top six in any variable.

Similarly, countries that ranked among the lowest six have smaller populations, smaller states, higher population density, lower literacy rates and lower GDPs. Guyana was among the lowest of the six variables; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru were among the lowest six in one out of six variables; Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Suriname and Uruguay were among the lowest six in four out of the six variables. Therefore, there seems to be a bimodal distribution of assets among the South American states where 6 states are clearly bigger in terms of population and size and are more prosperous than the other 6 South American states.

Secondly it is clear that, although all South American countries are democratic states, some have emphasized the importance of particular underlying factors that have presumably been an issue in the past, and therefore they have included these in their constitutions. Factors such as “multi-ethnic and multicultural” in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian constitutions suggest these are not just cultural components in these countries but also issues which governments and policy makers must pay close attention to.

### **Civilian Variables**<sup>112</sup>

The next eight variables assessed were gleaned from the civil-military literature and were described in Chapter Two. They assess whether or not robust civilian control of the military exists, whether or not civilians trust the military at least as much as other civilian bureaucratic institutions, and the extent to which both military and civilians interact with one another.

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<sup>112</sup> Note: This subheading refers to variables 8-15 of the Variable Codebook. There are 8.

## 1. Constitutional Controls of the Military<sup>113</sup>

Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Samuel Finer all argue that the role of the military should be that of a professional and obedient institution whose primary purpose is to defend the state. More specifically, “The army is a purposive instrument. It is not a creesive institution like the church; it comes into being by fiat. It is rationally conceived to fulfil certain objects. One may be to assist the civil power, but the principal object is to fight and win wars.”<sup>114</sup> In addition, all authors agree that civilian control of the military is paramount and therefore, any defying action against the civilian power is a sign of trouble. Finer argues, “...in countries where attachment to civilian institutions is strong and pervasive, the attempts of the military to coerce the lawful government, let alone supplant it, would be universally regarded as usurpation. This, the moral barrier, is what has prevented the military, for all its organization, prestige and power, from establishing its rule throughout the globe.”<sup>115</sup> In other words, concrete legislative tools that ensure military obedience by a democratic, civilian government are the ideal in terms of healthy civil-military relations.

The best way States can outline the relationship between civilians and the military is by including these in their constitutions and national laws. Despite the fact that there are some underlying differences in the wording and phrasing among the constitutions of all the South American states, they all include articles, which specify the roles of the military, the hierarchy that must be followed by this institution and, in some cases, the services that constitute the Armed Forces.

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<sup>113</sup> Note: See Civilian Variable 1 in the Variable Codebook.

<sup>114</sup> Finer, p. 7.

<sup>115</sup> Finer, p. 22.

Although the phrasing and wording used differs slightly among all the constitutions reviewed, there are some interesting similarities among all. Six<sup>116</sup> out of the twelve South American states outline the purpose of the Armed Forces, namely, their mission, which is to defend the state. Five<sup>117</sup> out of the twelve South American states specifically indicate that the President is in control of the Armed Forces, the services that constitute their Armed Forces<sup>118</sup> and describe the Armed Forces as obedient<sup>119</sup>, non-deliberative<sup>120</sup> and subordinate.<sup>121</sup> Three<sup>122</sup> out of the twelve see their Armed Forces as non-political, disciplined,<sup>123</sup> hierarchical,<sup>124</sup> professional<sup>125</sup> and in charge of safeguarding national security<sup>126</sup> whilst maintaining institutional order.<sup>127</sup> Lastly, fewer than three states indicated their Armed Forces are trained,<sup>128</sup> held accountable by the law,<sup>129</sup> have equal citizenship rights<sup>130</sup> and function in compliance with civilian power and the constitution.<sup>131</sup>

Special emphasis should be placed on the Ecuadorian, Surinamese and Venezuelan descriptions:

Article 159 of the Ecuadorian Constitution states:

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<sup>116</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

<sup>117</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Suriname, Uruguay and Chile.

<sup>118</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela.

<sup>119</sup> Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela.

<sup>120</sup> Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru.

<sup>121</sup> Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela.

<sup>122</sup> Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela.

<sup>123</sup> Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.

<sup>124</sup> Brazil and Chile.

<sup>125</sup> Chile, Paraguay and Venezuela.

<sup>126</sup> Chile, Colombia and Paraguay.

<sup>127</sup> Chile, Colombia and Paraguay.

<sup>128</sup> Uruguay.

<sup>129</sup> Bolivia and Colombia.

<sup>130</sup> Bolivia.

<sup>131</sup> Ecuador and Guyana.

The Armed Forces and the National Police will be obedient and non-deliberative and they will accomplish their mission with strict compliance to the civil power and the Constitution. The authorities of the Armed Forces and the national Police will be responsible for the orders they dictate. Obedience to superior orders will not exempt responsibility from those who execute them.<sup>132</sup>

Although the description clearly outlines the role of the military and the command structure it must follow, it is interesting to note that this Article emphasizes individual responsibility. The fact that this is included in the Ecuadorian National Constitution as opposed to the overall rules and regulations the military must uphold indicates they may have had problems of this nature in the past and by referencing it, specifically, in their Constitution, it serves as a constant reminder.

Article 177 of Surinamese Constitution states:

1. The National Army shall have as its task the defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Suriname against foreign, military, armed aggression. 2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the previous paragraph, the army can be charged with special tasks to be defined by law. 3. The army shall carry out its task under the responsibility of and in subordination to the competent authority and in accordance with the prevailing legislation. 4. The organisation of the National Army and the legal status of the servicemen shall be defined by law.<sup>133</sup>

Interesting to note is the emphasis placed on “foreign military aggression.” Firstly, foreign military invasions are undeniably frowned upon; in recent years, whenever there have been foreign invasions, the price invading countries have had to pay is extraordinary – not only financially-wise but also in terms of the detrimental effect it has had in their foreign policy. These two reasons alone make this an illogical endeavour which most countries, particularly

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<sup>132</sup> Constitución de la República del Ecuador (2008). Original Spanish Text: “Art. 159. Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional serán obedientes y no deliberantes, y cumplirán su misión con estricta sujeción al poder civil y a la Constitución. Las autoridades de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional serán responsables por las órdenes que impartan. La obediencia a las órdenes superiores no eximirá de responsabilidad a quienes las ejecuten.”

<sup>133</sup> 1987 Constitution of Suriname with Reforms of 1992.

underdeveloped or developing states, will unlikely take on.<sup>134</sup> Secondly, the mention of “special tasks to be defined by law” is unexpected. A lack of description or examples of these special tasks is truly concerning, because the description, as it currently stands, might be interpreted as a wide umbrella of opportunities the military could use to justify any breach of their internal laws or conversely, for the government to abuse.

Article 328 of the Venezuelan Constitution states:

The National Armed Force constitutes an institution essentially professional, without political militancy, organized by the State to guarantee independence and sovereignty of the Nation and assure the integrity of the geographical space, through military defence, in cooperation with the safeguarding of internal order and active participation in national development, in accordance with this Constitution and with the law. Within the fulfillment of its functions, it is at the exclusive service of the State and in no exception under service of any person or political bias. Its fundamental pillars are discipline, obedience and subordination. The National Armed Force is integrated by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and National Guard, which function in an integral manner within their competency’s framework to the fulfillment of their mission, with an integral social security regime, as established by the respective organic law.<sup>135</sup>

Again, comparing this lengthy and all-encompassing description to the numerous events that have been taking place since 1999 in Venezuela,<sup>136</sup> provide the perfect example of a case in which words do not match actions.

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<sup>134</sup> Of course the US coalition intervention in Iraq in 2003 absent UN Security Council authorization comes readily to mind.

<sup>135</sup> Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (Publicada en Gaceta Oficial del jueves 30 de diciembre de 1999, Número 36.860. Incluye reformas aprobadas por Enmienda N°1, del 15 de Febrero del 2009) Original Spanish Text: Artículo 328. La Fuerza Armada Nacional constituye una institución esencialmente profesional, sin militancia política, organizada por el Estado para garantizar la independencia y soberanía de la Nación y asegurar la integridad del espacio geográfico, mediante la defensa militar, la cooperación en el mantenimiento del orden interno y la participación activa en el desarrollo nacional, de acuerdo con esta Constitución y la ley. En el cumplimiento de sus funciones, está al servicio exclusivo de la Nación y en ningún caso al de persona o parcialidad política alguna. Sus pilares fundamentales son la disciplina, la obediencia y la subordinación. La Fuerza Armada Nacional está integrada por el Ejército, la Armada, la Aviación y la Guardia Nacional, que funcionan de manera integral dentro del marco de su competencia para el cumplimiento de su misión, con un régimen de seguridad social integral propio, según lo establezca su respectiva ley orgánica.

<sup>136</sup> Throughout former President Hugo Chavez’s regime and even moreso during President Nicolas Maduro’s presidency (i.e. 1999-2014), Venezuela has been renowned for violent protesting and human rights abuses. For more details see: Human Rights Watch. “Venezuela: Chavez;s Authoritarian Legacy; Dramatic Concentration of Power

## 2. Military Can Vote<sup>137</sup>

Voting is both a right and responsibility of all citizens living in a democracy; depriving citizens of their right to vote is the very definition of an undemocratic state. Most democracies, such as Canada and the United States, allow their active military members to vote. Indeed, if deployed on a mission while a federal election is taking place, the military ensures ballots reach their service members, that proper voting protocols are followed and that every opportunity is made for members to vote even if deployed. What is curious about South America is that, while all of their constitutions cite democratic principles, not all of them allow their military members to vote.

Since the military is supposed to be reflective of society, the same democratic privileges should be afforded them; voting is a prime example, otherwise, the military may feel they have no say in their government, which could potentially encourage them to undermine their civilian authorities.

Although Argentina Chile and Paraguay are not as explicit in their wording regarding the military's right to vote, based on the eligibility described in the constitutions, and the fact that there were no clauses indicating otherwise, it can be assumed that, constitutionally, their Armed Forces can vote. In the case of Colombia, however, it is clear that their Armed Forces can neither vote nor participate in politics at all. Art. 219 of the *Colombian Electoral Law* states, "The members of the Public Force may not exercise the function of the vote while they remain in

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and Open Disregard for Basic Human Rights." March 5, 2013. URL: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/05/venezuela-chavez-s-authoritarian-legacy> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014) and The Guardian. "Venezuela committing systematic human rights abuses," May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2014. URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/05/venezuela-committing-systematic-human-rights-abuses> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>137</sup> Note: See Civilian Variable 2 in the Variable Codebook.

active service, nor intervene in activities or discussions of political parties or movements.”<sup>138</sup> However, it is important to note that since 2012, several Colombian newspapers<sup>139</sup> reported that there have been discussions about reinstating their right to vote; it is a hopeful sign for Colombia’s civil-military relations, but no change has been made official yet.

Other countries, like Ecuador, have made recent changes,<sup>140</sup> and South American countries in general have historically made numerous changes to their constitutions, which further emphasizes the constitution’s importance as a means to demonstrate civilian control over the military.

### **3. Civilian Ministers of Defence<sup>141</sup>**

Further to the constraints outlined by each respective constitution, whether or not an active member of the Armed Forces can occupy the position of Minister of Defence, or if only civilians can occupy the position, is important. Ideally, the literature indicates that civilians should occupy the position of Minister of Defence and Head of Government rather than active military personnel, because the government representative of the military should be civilian to reinforce the civilian oversight. Retired military are still not a preferred choice to occupy the position because of the loyalties they may still have to the military, which could skew their

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<sup>138</sup> Constitución Política de la República de Colombia de 1991. Incluye las reformas de 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 y 2005. Actualizada hasta el Decreto 2576 del 27 de Julio de 2005. Original Spanish Text: “ARTICULO 219. La Fuerza Pública no es deliberante; no podrá reunirse sino por orden de autoridad legítima, ni dirigir peticiones, excepto sobre asuntos que se relacionen con el servicio y la moralidad del respectivo cuerpo y con arreglo a la ley. Los miembros de la Fuerza Pública no podrán ejercer la función del sufragio mientras permanezcan en servicio activo, ni intervenir en actividades o debates de partidos o movimientos políticos.”

<sup>139</sup> El Espectador “Fuerzas Militares Quedarian Facultadas para Votar,” October 24, 2012. URL: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-382958-fuerzas-militares-querarian-facultadas-votar> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014); and El Nuevo Día. “El Voto Militar, Necesario y Legítimo,” August 23, 2013. URL: - <http://www.elnuevodia.com.co/nuevodia/opinion/columnistas/192318-el-voto-militar-necesario-y-legitimo> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>140</sup> In Ecuador, military vote was reinstated in 2008. For more information about reinstating the military vote in Latin America see: Revista Perspectiva. “Llego la hora del voto militar latinoamericano,” January 1, 2014. URL: <http://www.revistaperspectiva.com/analisis/llego-la-hora-del-voto-militar-latinoamericano> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>141</sup> Note: See Civilian Variable 3 in the Variable Codebook.

judgement and oversight. Although this information is not clarified in all of the constitutions reviewed, based on a review of the Ministers of Defence who have occupied the position since 1990 until 2013 for each South American country, it can be concluded that only a few have managed **not** to have a military head of state or Minister of Defence. Specifically, only Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina have not had a military Minister of Defence since 1990; Chile had one military Minister of Defence between 1990-2000; Colombia had one military Minister of Defence in 1990-1991 and one *ad interim* (in office for less than 4 months) in 2009.<sup>142</sup> Since then, all have been civilian. Since 2000, Paraguay<sup>143</sup> and Peru<sup>144</sup> have had one military Minister of Defence and Suriname<sup>145</sup> has had two. Venezuela<sup>146</sup> has had over fifteen military Ministers of Defence since 1990. Information for Bolivia, Ecuador and Guyana is not readily available.

Clearly, this is a variable for which South America does not approach the ideal. That being said, the US allowed George C. Marshall in 1950 to remain on an active duty list while Secretary of Defence because US Army regulations keep all five-star generals on active duty for life. However, Congress warned:

It is hereby expressed as the intent of the Congress that the authority granted by [the National Security Act of 1947] is not to be construed as approval by the Congress of continuing appointments of military men to the office of Secretary of Defence in the future. It is hereby expressed as the sense of the Congress that after General Marshall leaves the office of Secretary of Defence, no additional appointments of military men to that office shall be approved.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> General Freddy José Padilla de León *ad interim* (May 23, 2009 – August 7, 2009).

<sup>143</sup> Current Minister of Defence, Bernardino Soto Estigarribia.

<sup>144</sup> 2011 Minister of Defence, Daniel Mora Zevallos.

<sup>145</sup> Rupert Christopher (1991) and Lamure Carlo Adolf Latur (2011-2013).

<sup>146</sup> Moises Orozco (1995-1996), Raul Salazar (1999-2000), Ismael Hurtado (2000-2001), Lucas Rincon Romero (2002), Jose Luis Prieto (2002-2004), Jorge Garcia Carneiro (2004-2005), Raul Baduel (2006-2008), Gustavo Rangel Briceño (2008-2009), Ramon Carrizales (2009-2010), Carlos Mata Figueroa (2010-2012), Henry Rangel Silva (2012), Diego Alfredo Molero Bellavia (2012-2013), Carmen Teresa Melendez Rivas (2013 – Present).

<sup>147</sup> Congress passed special legislation (Pub. Law 81-788) in 1950. Marshall Papers Pentagon Office Selected Correspondence Box 69 Folder 18 George C. Marshall Foundation <http://www.marshallfoundation.org>



Marshall was one of the most famous and revered Secretaries of Defence and author of the famous Marshall Plan to rebuild post-WWII Europe when he served as Secretary of State. Clearly “ideals” can be broken.

#### **4. Civilian Bureaucracy<sup>148</sup>**

Due to the fact that there were no consistent sources of information for all of the countries regarding the size of civilian bureaucracies, for the purpose of consistency, the main source consulted was the World Bank’s 2012 ‘Doing Business’ Assessment.<sup>149</sup> The ease of doing business is a substitute for the size of the bureaucracy, in that it gives us a measure of how flexible, efficient and fair the bureaucracy is for businesses. The easier it is to do business is an approximate proxy for the professionalism of the bureaucracy.

This study reviews and compares a set of very specific variables in order to determine the ease of doing business in 189 countries. The 11 variables it covers are: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and employing workers. If it is very difficult to do business in a particular country, this may be an indication that the civilian bureaucracy is either inflexible, or disorganized or corrupt or a combination of all three. In terms of civil-military relations, this fact alone could be extended to the civilian bureaucracy’s (in) ability to oversee the military.

The countries ranking highest (1 being ideal) have bureaucracies that are either organized or flexible and therefore facilitate doing business; similarly, countries in the lower ranks are either too disorganized or inflexible or corrupt and therefore complicate doing business. The countries ranking among the highest six out of 189 countries reviewed were Chile #34, Peru #42,

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<sup>148</sup> Note: See Civilian Variable 4 in the Variable Codebook.

<sup>149</sup> “Doing Business” 2012 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.

Colombia #43, Uruguay #88, Paraguay #109, and Guyana #115. Ranking in the lowest six, from highest to lowest, were Brazil #116, Argentina #126, Ecuador #135, Suriname #161, Bolivia #162 and Venezuela #181. Compared to the United States, which ranked #4 (behind Singapore #1, Hong Kong #2 and New Zealand #3), it can be concluded that civilian bureaucracies in Chile, Peru and Colombia are the best organized and therefore, arguably, have the better odds at control of the military. The opposite applies to Suriname, Bolivia and Venezuela who were below #150 out of the total 189 countries reviewed.

In addition to size and organization, how efficient these civilian bureaucracies are is also quite important. Although civilian institutions in South America can be effective in advocating and creating change within their societies, the way they are perceived by the general population is sometimes contradictory of this fact. Arguably, this is due to the high levels of corruption that have rocked the region for decades. “From children denied an education, to elections decided by money not votes, public sector corruption comes in many forms. Bribes and backroom deals don’t just steal resources from the most vulnerable – they undermine justice and economic development, and destroy public trust in leaders.”<sup>150</sup>

According to *Transparency International*, in 2013, the only South American countries which scored higher than 60%<sup>151</sup> - in itself a figure that indicates a significant level of corruption - were Uruguay and Chile, scoring 73% and 71%, respectively. Compared to the United States, which scored 73%, neither Chile nor Uruguay have extremely concerning scores. The scores of the remaining 10 South American states, however, are really disturbing; Following Uruguay and Chile are Brazil with 42%, Peru with 38%, Colombia and Suriname both with 36%. The bottom

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<sup>150</sup> Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/> (Accessed My 27, 2013).

<sup>151</sup> The higher the score, the better.

six were Ecuador with 35%, Argentina and Bolivia both scored 34%, Guyana with 27%, Paraguay with 24% and lastly, Venezuela with 20%. Although corruption will not be discussed in detail throughout this research paper, it is worth mentioning that the problem persists and has an effect on popular opinion, as is reflected below.

## **5. Popularity and Levels of Trust in the Armed Forces and 6. Popularity and Levels of Trust in Civilian Bureaucracy**<sup>152</sup>

In 2011, the Ibero-American Consortium for Market Research and Consultancy (CIMA) led a survey in 19 countries, including 10 out of the 12 South American countries. When asked whether they trusted their Armed Forces, the top five countries with the highest percentages were Ecuador with 79%, Chile with 73%, Colombia with 63%, Venezuela with 49% and Argentina with 45%. The five countries with the lowest percentages were Bolivia with 44%, Peru with 39%, Uruguay with 31%, Paraguay with 31% and Brazil with 26%.<sup>153</sup> No information was available for Guyana and Suriname. When compared to the United States, which, according to a Gallup survey led in June 2011, had an approval rating of 78% indicating “a great deal/quite a lot of confidence”<sup>154</sup> in the military, one can conclude that all countries ranking above 50% in South America enjoy a significant level of confidence from the general population.

In terms of civilian institutions, the same CIMA survey looked at the level of trust citizens had in their Congress, Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Justice. The top five countries with the highest percentages of trust in Congress were Brazil with 51%, Venezuela with 38%, Uruguay with 34%, Ecuador with 33% and Argentina with 32%. The five countries

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<sup>152</sup> Note: See Civilian Variables 5 and 6 in the Variable Codebook.

<sup>153</sup> Consorcio Iberoamericano de Investigacion de Mercados y Asesoramientos (CIMA). “Barometro Iberoamericano de Gobernabilidad,” 2011, pp. 36-44.

<sup>154</sup> Gallop Poll (2011) found at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx#1>. (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

with the lowest percentages were Chile with 25%, Bolivia with 23%, Colombia with 18%, Paraguay and Peru with 9%. No information was available for Guyana and Suriname. Compared to the United States which, according to the same Gallup 2011 survey, only 12% trusted “a great deal/quite a lot” in Congress, a staggering difference can be seen between the United States and the highest scores in South America.

The five countries with the highest percentage of trust in their Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Justice were Brazil with 49%, Uruguay with 43%, Chile with 40% and Argentina with 39%. The five countries with the lowest percentage of trust in their Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Justice were Ecuador and Venezuela both with 33%, Colombia with 26%, Bolivia with 23%, Peru with 22% and Paraguay with 13%. The highest five percentages do not differ greatly from the United States, which, according to the same 2011 Gallup survey, only 37% trusted “a great deal/quite a lot” in the US Supreme Court.

The only country to rank among the top five on levels of trust for Armed Forces, Congress and Supreme Court of Justice was Argentina. The opposite applies to Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru, which ranked among the bottom five in levels of trust in Armed Forces, Congress and Supreme Court. Moreover, this survey indicated Brazilians and Uruguayans trust their civilian institutions more than they trust their Armed Forces; Chile and Colombia trust their Armed Forces and Court of Justice more than they do their Congress. Lastly, Ecuador and Venezuela trust their Armed Forces and Congress more than they do their Court of Justice.

Regardless of the position each country fell into in each ranking, when comparing percentages only, with the exception of Brazil and Uruguay, all South American states indicated their level of trust in the Armed Forces is higher than it is in their Congress and Supreme Court of Justice. Interestingly, the same can be said for the United States, which, according the 2011

Gallup survey, indicated the level of trust was higher for the military than for Congress and for the Supreme Court. Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn from CIMA's 2011 survey is that Brazilians and Uruguayans place a higher level of trust in Congress and Supreme Court of Justice and a low level of trust in their Armed Forces whereas the exact opposite happens in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. No information is available for Guyana and Suriname.

### **7. Military Expenditure and 8. Public Expenditures (Health and Education)<sup>155</sup>**

The main source used to determine the military expenditure share of the GDP for each country was the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Database. The theoretical ideal, in this case the United States, shows a steady decrease in its share from 5.3% in 1990 to 4.4% in 2013. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela followed this trend. Argentina's share decreased from 1.4% in 1990 to 0.9% in 2013, Bolivia's from 2.8% in 1990 to 1.5% in 2013, Brazil's from 6.3% in 1990 to 1.5% in 2013, Chile's from 3.4% in 1990 to 2.1% in 2013, Uruguay's from 3.5% in 1990 to 1.9% in 2013 and lastly, Venezuela from 1.5% in 2000 (Data for 1990 is not available) to 1.0% in 2013.<sup>156</sup>

In the cases of Colombia, Ecuador and Guyana, there was a steady increase in the share of GDP; Colombia's went from 1.6% in 1990 to 3.3% in 2013, Ecuador's from 1.9% in 1990 to 3.4% in 2013 and Guyana from 0.9% in 1990 to 1.8% in 2013. However, since 1990, both Ecuador and Colombia have been struggling with several internal security issues, which require the assistance and involvement of larger Armed Forces; examples of Colombia's case will be discussed in the next chapter.

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<sup>155</sup> Note: See Civilian Variables 7 and 8 in Variable Codebook.

<sup>156</sup> "Military Expenditure Database," (2013). *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*. URL: [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database) (Date Accessed: June 12, 2014). Note that for Venezuela, 1990 data was not available.

In the cases of Paraguay and Peru, there were some fluctuations between 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 2010-2013. Peru's share increased from 0.1% in 1990 to 1.8% in 2000 and then decreased to 1.3% in 2010 and remains at this share until 2013. Similarly, Paraguay's share decreased from 1.7% in 1990 to 1.6% in 2000; it continued to decrease to 1.2% in 2010 and then increased to 1.8% in 2013. There is no information available for Suriname in any of the years.

In sum, these figures show that, with the exception of Ecuador, Colombia and Guyana, the decreases in expenditures for the military for the rest of South America coincides with that of the United States' and that the overall, global trend of reducing military costs. The main reason for the decrease is attributed to the economic global recession of 2008, which has had a significant impact on every country in the world. Moreover, if a country is not involved in any international activity that requires the involvement of their military, a decrease in spending is expected, so long as, despite the decrease, the State continues to support the military in the sense that the cuts will not affect the readiness of the active military and continuing care of veterans.

In addition, when comparing the military expenditure share to the health and education shares of the GDP, all South American countries indicate that they spend more on health and education than on their Armed Forces. The main source consulted for the health and education shares of the GDP was the United Nations' Human Development Index. The table below summarizes the comparison between all shares. For accuracy purposes, the base year used for this comparison is 2010, unless specified otherwise.

**Table 3.2 - Public and Military Expenditures**

	<b>Public Expenditure on Military (% of GDP)</b>	<b>Public Expenditure on Health (% of GDP)</b>	<b>Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP)</b>
United States	4.8%	9.5%	5.4% (2009 est.)
Argentina	0.9%	4.4%	6.0% (2009 est.)
Bolivia	1.7%	3.0%	6.3% (2006 est.)
Brazil	1.6%	4.2%	5.7% (2009 est.)
Chile	2.2%	3.8%	4.5% (2009 est.)
Colombia	3.6%	5.5%	4.8%
Ecuador	3.6%	3.0%	1.3% (2000 est.)
Guyana	2.1%	5.1%	3.7%
Paraguay	1.2%	2.1%	4.0% (2007 est.)
Peru	1.3%	2.7%	2.7%
Suriname	N/A	3.4%	N/A
Uruguay	2.0%	5.6%	2.9% (2006 est.)
Venezuela	0.9%	1.7%	3.7% (2007 est.)

In all cases except for Ecuador, the percentage of GDP spent on public expenditures for health and education is higher than on military expenditures. This suggests that there is a balance of expenditures in South America in favour (at least in theory) of the health and education of the population as a whole. What this analysis does not reveal is how well the money is spent to achieve particular health, education or military goals.

A summary of the “Civilian” variables is shown in the table below.

**Table 3.3 - Summary of Civilian Variables for South America**

	Constitutional Controls	Military Vote	Ministers of Defence	Civilian Bureaucracy	Popularity of the Military	Popularity of Civilian Bureaucracy	Military and public expenditures
USA	Yes	Yes	Civilian Only except Marshall in the 1950s	#4 out of 189	78% of trust	37% of trust	Health and education spending higher
TOP 6	Clearly Outlined	Military Can Vote	Only Civilians since 1990	Lower than #90 (out of 189)	45% or higher	45% or higher	Health and education spending is higher
	All have controls on paper	All except Colombia	Argentina Brazil Uruguay  *No information available for Guyana, Ecuador and Bolivia	Chile Peru Colombia Uruguay	Ecuador Chile Colombia Venezuela Argentina	Brazil	All except Ecuador and incomplete information available for Suriname
BOTTOM 6	Less clearly Outlined	Military Cannot Vote	Have had/ Have Military MOD since 1990	Higher than #90 (Out of 189)	Lower than 45%	Lower than 45%	Military spending is higher
	All have controls on paper	Only Colombia	Colombia Chile Paraguay Peru Suriname Venezuela  *No information available for Guyana, Ecuador and Bolivia	Paraguay Guyana Brazil Argentina Ecuador Suriname Bolivia Venezuela	Bolivia Peru Uruguay Paraguay Brazil  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Uruguay Chile Argentina Ecuador Venezuela Colombia Bolivia Peru Paraguay	<b>Ecuador</b>

In terms of civilian variables, Argentina, Chile and Colombia fall within the “top 6” more often than the other nine South American states.



## **Military Variables**<sup>157</sup>

### **1. Size of Military and 2. Military Size Compared to Population**<sup>158</sup>

The main source consulted for active military size was the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) *Military Balance 2013*. According to this annual publication, the top six countries with the largest active military were Brazil with 318.5 thousand active personnel, followed by Colombia with 281.4 thousand, Peru and Venezuela with 115 thousand, Argentina with 73.1 thousand and Chile with 59 thousand. The bottom six were Ecuador with 58 thousand, Bolivia with 46 thousand, Uruguay with 24.6 thousand, Paraguay with 10.6 thousand, Suriname with 1.8 thousand and Guyana with 1.1 thousand.<sup>159</sup>

Compared to the United States, whose active military was over 1.5 million (1,520,100)<sup>160</sup> in 2013, all South American militaries are considerably smaller. However, contrary to the United States, South American countries are not waging wars abroad nor are they involved in any military activity, other than a select few peace missions headed by the UN.

Moreover, in terms of the size of the military in comparison to the total population, the top six largest militaries in comparison to the overall populations in 2013 were Uruguay with its military representing 0.74% of the population, Colombia 0.62%, Bolivia 0.45%, Venezuela 0.41%, Peru 0.39% and Ecuador 0.38%. The lowest six were Chile 0.34%, Suriname 0.33%, Argentina 0.17%, Brazil and Paraguay with 0.16% and Guyana 0.15%. Compared to the United States, whose size of military in comparison with total population was 0.49%, with the exception of Uruguay and Colombia, South American countries militaries are modest in terms of numbers.

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<sup>157</sup> Note: This subheading refers to variables 16-22 of the Variable Codebook.

<sup>158</sup> Note: See Military Variables 1 and 2 in Variable Codebook.

<sup>159</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 2013," Routledge Journals, imprint of Taylor and Francis, March 2013, pp, 432-471.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p. 71.

### 3. Military Education, Professionalism and Preparedness<sup>161</sup>

Financial figures aside, the variables that are specifically emphasized by Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Samuel Finer relate to military preparedness. Huntington stated, “The direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the management of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer.”<sup>162</sup> The frequency and intensity that soldiers train and study defines how professional they are.

With the exception of Guyana and Suriname, whose information is unavailable, all South American countries offer their officers opportunities for higher education. These institutions offer a wide range of courses in the field of defence and security. Although the curricula varies among all South American states, in general terms, all programmes emphasize the importance of regular and strict physical training as well as an in-depth study of military history, military doctrine and civil-military relations.<sup>163</sup> The only, universally accepted way to move up the ranks is through education and by completing special, military training.

Additional opportunities were developed after the first Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) in 1995. Organized by the Organization of American States (OAS), the CDMA, “was created to provide a valuable forum of debate for the countries of the Hemisphere with the purpose of increasing cooperation in the areas of Defence and Security as outlined in the Williamsburg Principles. Created in 1995, it was designed to provide the Ministers of Defence with a venue to discuss topics such as confidence and security building measures, peace support operations, civil-military relations, and emerging threats such as transnational organized crime

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<sup>161</sup> Note: See Military Variable 3 in Variable Codebook.

<sup>162</sup> Huntington, (1957), p. 72.

<sup>163</sup> For more information about the military institutions, courses offered and overall education and training programs in South America, particularly UNASUR (Union de Naciones Suramericanas – Union of South American Nations) countries, see Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) website: <http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

and terrorism.”<sup>164</sup> This exchange of ideas between Ministers has been very beneficial to militaries in the entire region.

In addition, the founding of the South American Defence Council (CDS – Consejo de Defensa Suramericano) by the twelve countries in 2009 facilitated these academic opportunities. To this day, “...training in issues related to security and defence is carried out in 133 institutions throughout the region. These education centres are opened to civilians and military. There are 23 [military education] organizations in Argentina, 17 in Bolivia, 10 in Brazil, 17 in Chile, 14 in Colombia, 14 in Ecuador, 7 in Paraguay, 11 in Peru and Uruguay and 9 in Venezuela.”<sup>165</sup> Prior to 2009, education centres for the military were strictly for the military; the fact that 133 institutions throughout South America are open to both civilians and military personnel is a good sign of the intent to improve civil-military relations by all of the participating countries.

#### **4. Martial Courts<sup>166</sup>**

Further to the constitutional constraints that should be in place and the civilian oversight of the military, it is of equal importance to ensure an appropriate legal system is in place to address any issues that may arise from within the military given they are mandated to use deadly force. Given the nature of their work and the importance of safety and obedience in their job, the military has adopted a separate legal system to deal with infractions that are particular to the military. For example, going “AWOL” or absent without leave or insubordination. These are offences, which normally, in a civilian context, are not grounds for a trial. For example, if an accountant does not come to work, no lives are at stake, or if a bus driver talks back to his

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<sup>164</sup>Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) Website: <http://www.cdmamericas.org/home/who> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>165</sup> UNASUR - [http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=107&Itemid=3](http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=107&Itemid=3) (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>166</sup> Note: See Military Variable 4 in the Variable Codebook.

supervisor, again, safety is not compromised necessarily. However, in the case of the military, cases of AWOL or not following legal orders can mean the difference between life and death.

Discipline throughout the armed forces is paramount. Therefore, a legal court that can address military issues is the ideal, "...In the criminal law system, some basic objectives are to discover the truth, acquit the innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, punish the guilty proportionately with their crimes, and prevent and deter further crime, thereby providing for the public order."<sup>167</sup> Military justice shares these objectives in part, but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the Armed Forces, serving the overall objective of providing an effective national defence."<sup>168</sup> With the exception of Guyana and Suriname, whose information is unavailable, all South American countries have their own martial courts, in which the military are tried whenever they have violated any military or civilian laws. This is not a commentary on how effective or fair the courts are. Rather, the purpose is to confirm whether or not a court exists for the possibility of prosecution of discipline-like infractions.

## **5. Military Recruitment<sup>169</sup>**

The need for large standing armies that mobilize the majority of the adult population is no longer needed. Technology and robust ideas about sovereignty and the illegality of state-on-state aggression have helped. Therefore, large, conscript militaries are neither needed nor desirable. Recruitment methods, as a result, have changed. Absent another world war, few states have defence or security concerns to justify compulsory recruitment, even fewer reasons to have conscription in place. Rebecca Schiff, a defence analyst, distinguishes between a voluntary military created via coercive and persuasive (the preferred) recruitment methods:

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<sup>167</sup> R.Chuck Mason. "Military Justice: Courts-Martial, An Overview," Congressional Research Service. August 12, 2013 p. 1.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup> Note: See Military Variable 5 in Variable Codebook.

...recruitment method[s], which may be coercive, or persuasive, a distinction borrowed from Samuel Finer's "extraction-coercion-persuasion cycle." Coercive recruitment refers to the forcible conscription or extraction of people and supplies for military purposes. Demands are made upon the citizenry, through conscription and taxation, to supply the needs and obligations of the military. Such demands are often harsh because citizens are forced to cooperate against their will. Consequently, this form of recruitment usually does not allow concordance between the military and the citizenry. Persuasive recruitment can take the form of voluntary or involuntary and is based on beliefs; it implies and agreement among the political leadership, the military, and the citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed forces.<sup>170</sup>

Currently, according to the CIA Factbook,<sup>171</sup> recruitment in Argentina, Chile, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay is voluntary, although some do specify their State has the right to reinstate conscription if deemed necessary. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay request a 12-month compulsory service obligation while Venezuela requests a 30-month compulsory service obligation from its citizens more in response to a high unemployment rate than a need for a larger Armed Forces. Hopefully, in time, the need to have compulsory recruitment methods in place will be eradicated from all countries and instead, better training and apprenticeship programs will be available to provide jobs, especially for youths.

## **6. Coups d'état<sup>172</sup>**

A professionally trained military, which abides by the constitution, is less likely to intervene in matters of the State other than those required of them by the governing civilian power and because they understand their role within the constitution. It can therefore be assumed that, whenever the military intervenes, particularly in cases when the purpose of intervention is to remove a civilian from power, the action itself is illegitimate and unconstitutional.

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<sup>170</sup> Rebecca L. Schiff. "The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Chapter 3: Concordance theory. 2009. Routledge, p. 47.

<sup>171</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). "The World Factbook" URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>172</sup> Note: See Military Variable 6 in Variable Codebook.

Unfortunately, South American militaries have a history of acting ‘unconstitutionally,’ which is why it is said that military coups are a “regular, recurrent, normal part of the Latin American political process.”<sup>173</sup>

However, during the time frame selected for this research project i.e. 1990-2012, only five out of the twelve South American countries have experienced a coup. These countries are Bolivia (2008), Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005 and 2010), Paraguay (2012), Peru (1992) and Venezuela (2002). The fact that there have been any coups post-Cold War is not only concerning, but it also speaks to the health of these countries’ civil-military relations.

## **7. Military Police<sup>174</sup>**

This variable represents my original contribution to the literature. Huntington, Janowitz or Finer do not discuss it as an indicator of healthy civil-military relations, primarily because military police in the Cold War were exactly that – police for the military. It is clear in 21<sup>st</sup> century, however, that the line separating defence from security issues seems to be blurring across the world. In South America, the product of this change in defence and security has been the Military Police. With the exception of Guyana and Suriname, whose information is unavailable, the remaining ten South American states currently have military police programs in place. There are several reasons that demand this variable be explored further. Firstly, these programs have begun to act as a separate environment within the Armed Forces and/or National Police despite the fact that they are neither included nor defined in the constitutions. Secondly, it is unclear whether they are police forces that have been militarized or if they are military acting as police within the state. Thirdly, in addition to the blurred lines between police and military

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<sup>173</sup> Arturo L Valenzuela. ‘*Latin American Presidencies Interrupted.*’ Journal of Democracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Volume 15, Number 4, October 2004, p.2.

<sup>174</sup> Note: See Military Variable 7 in Variable Codebook.

roles these groups play, both the hierarchical command structure and the laws of conduct they follow (whether civilian, military or both) is also unclear causing potential confusion on the ground, especially for civilians, and damaging civil-military relations.

Before addressing these issues, however, it is important to note the differences between Military Police (MP) in North America (US and Canada) and South America, which are stark. In the United States, it is clear that the MPs are quite literally, police for the military, which seldom take on roles outside their jurisdiction. As described by the U.S. Army, “Military police protect the lives and property on Army installations by enforcing military laws and regulations. They also control traffic, prevent crime and respond to all emergencies”<sup>175</sup> but on military bases or at US embassies’ abroad.<sup>176</sup> Although MPs might have, initially, begun under the same context in South America, throughout the years, these groups have been delegated new “special tasks” that deflect from the original idea. As explained in a recent article from the *New York Times* writing about Brazil:

There are two main kinds of police in Brazil. The civilian police concentrate on criminal investigations, while the military police have the duty of maintaining public order and working to prevent crimes [within Brazil]. The military police are not part of the armed forces, and yet they operate according to military principles of rank and discipline. They cannot strike or unionize, and are subject to a military-style penal code (meaning transgressions at work can be treated as mutiny or treason, and officers are tried in a special court). They are prohibited from “revealing facts or documents that can discredit the police or disrupt hierarchy or discipline.”<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> U.S. Army Website – Military Police - <http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/legal-and-law-enforcement/military-police.html> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

<sup>176</sup> MPs can be called upon to aid civil powers within a country, but usually, it is because a major world event, like the Olympics, G8 or World Cup Soccer, is being hosted in the state in question. In the ideal case, the MPs are formally requested for a specified amount of time to aid civilian police. Civilian police take the lead. MPs are “extra bodies” and are still not empowered to enforce federal/provincial or municipal laws unless given special arresting powers.

<sup>177</sup> “Pity Brazil’s Military Police” The New York Times. February 19, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/opinion/barbara-reform-brazils-military-police.html?ref=americas> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

The “special” tasks that these Military Police groups have had to undertake are arguably the result of a serious deterioration of internal security, which have forced the State to adopt new measures; such is the case of Brazil’s BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais - Special Police Operations Battalion), “an intervention force of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ), responsible for acting in critical situations, being the tactical reserve, ready for engagement by the Corporation. Recruitment is voluntary, formed by police officers of high technical, tactical and psychological preparation.”<sup>178</sup> Comparing the US’ MP description to Brazil’s MP already highlights a number differences especially the latter’s deployment in the streets of Brazil. Furthermore, the fact that there is more than one Military Police active in some countries, such as in Brazil, where there are a total of 24 Military Police groups<sup>179</sup> currently in place, is also significant.

These Military Police groups seem to be growing in size and influence, not only in South America, but also throughout the entire region and the world (in the US, they tend to be private military firms). The fact that they have adopted roles, which are virtually unheard of in the original civil-military literature, and most importantly, the fact that it is unclear whether their roles are predominantly security or defence related, make this topic an important issue to track.

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<sup>178</sup>Website: BOPE <http://www.bopeoficial.com/o-batalhao/batalhao/> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

<sup>179</sup> Website: Governo do Estado de Rondonia - Policia Militar no Brasil <http://www.pm.ro.gov.br/index.php/intra/pm.html> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).



**Table 3.4 - Summary of Military Variables for South America**

	<b>Military Size</b>	<b>Military Size Compared to Population</b>	<b>Military Professionalism (Education and Training)</b>	<b>Coups d'état</b>	<b>Martial Courts</b>	<b>Recruitment</b>	<b>Military Police</b>
<b>USA</b>	2.28 Million	0.49%	Yes	None	Yes	Voluntary	Yes
<b>TOP 6</b>	<b>Between 2.21 Million and 175 Thousand d</b>	<b>Between 0.15%-0.34%</b>	<b>Have Military Colleges</b>	<b>Have not had one since 1990</b>	<b>Existing</b>	<b>Voluntary</b>	<b>Existing</b>
	Brazil Venezuela Colombia Peru Paraguay  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Chile Suriname Argentina Brazil Paraguay Guyana	All countries have Military Colleges  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Uruguay  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	All countries have a martial court.  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Argentina Chile Guyana Peru Suriname Uruguay	All countries have  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname
<b>BOTTOM 6</b>	<b>Between 156 Thousand and 25 Thousand d</b>	<b>Between 0.38%-0.74%</b>	<b>Do not have Military Colleges</b>	<b>Have had one since 1990</b>	<b>Non-existing</b>	<b>Compulsory</b>	<b>Non-Existing</b>
	Ecuador Chile Argentina Bolivia Uruguay  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Uruguay Colombia Bolivia Venezuela Peru Ecuador	All countries have Military Colleges  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Bolivia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	All countries have a martial court.  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname	Bolivia Brazil Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Venezuela	All countries have  *No information available for Guyana and Suriname

Again, Argentina and Chile followed by Colombia seem to have more of the military variables than do the other South American states. In sum, therefore, the results stemming from the state comparative, civil and military variables indicate South America could be divided into two groups; on the one hand, there are a group of six countries, which seem to be improving civil-military relations. These six countries, ranking from highest to lowest, are Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. On the other hand, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Uruguay, Guyana and Suriname show little to no substantial signs of improvement for the time being. However, it is clear that there is definitely room for improvement for all South American states in terms of civil-military relations.

The top six countries excel in different areas, but fail miserably in others. It is clear Brazil must consider changing its recruitment methods, increase investment in public areas, such as health and education and consider working on improving the interaction between military (especially military police) and civilians, with the hope that this change might be reflected in the levels of trust placed in the military. Similarly, the levels of trust placed on both the military and civilian bureaucracy are deeply concerning for Argentina. This might be due to the frighteningly high levels of corruption in all state institutions. Argentina must work on regaining this trust from their citizens without neglecting their economy, to avoid another financial misstep.

In the case of Chile, these results seem to indicate the country has seen significant improvement in all levels. However, a caveat is in order in terms of the policies taken against the armed forces; it is understandable that, due to past experiences with military so deeply entrenched in politics, the immediate reaction in the post-Pinochet era would be to reinforce civilian controls and decrease the number of active military. However, neglecting the military for

too long or disabling their development could be potentially problematic for civil-military relations in the future.

Peru and Venezuela are at the bottom of the list for reasons, which are readily apparent in the evening news.<sup>180</sup> Arguably, perhaps the most comprehensive way to assess their score is to consider the fact that there is a disconnection between what they indicate on paper and their actions. There is no doubt that all South American countries are in need of improvement in all areas of the civil-military variable categories e.g., comparative, civilian and military. Similar to its neighbour to the south, the social problems in Peru are among the most troubling in the region; a lot of this has been due to the ethnic problems that have emerged between the different social, cultural and ethnic classes.<sup>181</sup> Unless these problems are properly addressed and resolved by the government, they will continue to trickle down and spread out to all segments of society, including the military.

Venezuela is arguably the best example of a country whose policies directly contradict its own Constitution. In recent years, Venezuela has become synonymous with defiance of the Western norms of democracy and good government. Their dependence on state-owned oil, a corrupt government and a general lack of democracy has created the conditions for rioting in the streets. And because the military runs the country, all semblances of healthy civil-military relations are facades. Despite these shortcomings, Venezuela is a country with a lot of potential

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<sup>180</sup> There are numerous reports indicating the rise in crime and violence in Latin America, Venezuela especially. Initially rooted in socioeconomic disparity and discontent but increasingly related to political discontent, Venezuela has suffered countless and severe human rights abuses, rising to the top of the list in the world's most dangerous places to live in. For more information see: Insight Crime Organization. URL: <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/latin-america-dominates-worlds-most-dangerous-cities-list> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>181</sup> Organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have consistently reported crimes against indigenous communities in Peru, mostly rooted in land disputes. For more information see: Amnesty International. "Se debe investigar la violencia ejercida contra la poblacion indigena en Peru," June 2010. URL: <http://www.amnesty.org/es/appeals-for-action/investigacion-violencia-contra-poblacion-indigena-peru> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

and numerous possibilities, which could, if permitted, turn the current situation around to benefit the population as a whole.

The next chapter focuses specifically on Colombia. Despite ranking fourth among the top six South American states in this chapter for healthy civil-military relations, there are other indicators, which suggest that, despite promising variables on paper, reality is different. Indeed, there are some worrying practices in Colombia, which suggest civil-military relations are in potential decline or in need of immediate improvement. Anecdotal accounts gathered from different government, military and academic representatives in Bogota present a different picture of Colombia's civil-military relations.

## **Chapter Four**

### **An Analytical Review of Civil-Military Relations in Colombia**

Having reviewed the variables that define civil-military relations in the literature and comparing them to South America, it is clear that some of the South American states have “healthier” civil-military relations than others, at least on paper. However, “ticks in boxes” may not reveal what is truly going on with in the state and it disregards country-specific situations that may be affecting civil-military relations. On paper, Colombia was in the top six of the South American countries for most of the civil and military variables; however, it is important to check whether or not paper matches practice. This chapter, therefore, focuses specifically on Colombia. This chapter pinpoints the areas in which Colombia has scored well and the areas that still need improvement. Additionally, this chapter outlines situations that are unique to Colombia but that are not mentioned in the civil-military literature and which might be impacting civil-military relations.

The new, Colombia-specific variables introduced in this chapter are rooted in two main situations. The first situation relates to the social and economic problems that have crippled the entire region. Although this research project is not searching for causality, some of the literature suggests that, due to the lack of professionalism within the military,<sup>182</sup> whenever socioeconomic disparities worsen, the military may be tempted to intervene. As mentioned in Chapter Two, this is a factor that authors, such as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, have downplayed because their focus was mostly on the developed world, not the developing world, where cases like the one being described are less likely to happen.

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<sup>182</sup> More specifically, in the developing world, or in this case, South America.

The second situation applies directly to Colombia as it relates to internal domestic problems that have broadened the military's scope of responsibility. These can be broken down into three main issues:

- (1) Domestic insurgencies e.g., FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army),
- (2) The war on drugs and,
- (3) Military taking on police roles for extended periods of time due to the instability, which both insurgencies and the war on drugs exacerbate.

First, I will outline Colombia's results of the comparative assessment described in Chapter Three. Next, I will outline the specific situations that apply to Colombia that may change the paper picture of Colombia's civil-military relations. As the literature does not consider these situations, one may continue to have a flawed understanding of the state of civil-military relations in Colombia (and by extension, other South American states) absent these specific scenarios. Therefore, this chapter is divided into two sections: Part 1 reviews the comparative, civil and military variables and Part 2 considers how insurgencies, the war on drugs and state insecurity (related to the first two issues but also others) are taxing civil-military relations in ways the literature had not considered.

## Part 1 – Colombia vs. the State Comparative and Civil-Military Relations’

### Variables Identified in the Literature

#### A. State Comparative Variables

In the “State Comparative” variables, Colombia ranks as the fourth largest democratic country in South America with the second largest population and population density in the region. Its GDP is the fourth largest in South America, but it ranks seventh in GDP per capita, suggesting there is a large disparity of wealth or a bimodal distribution between the have and have nots. Lastly, it ranks sixth in literacy rates. Table 4.1 below provides a summary of this assessment:

**Table 4.1 – State Comparative Variables Summary**

State Comparative Variables for Colombia				
	Variable	Ranking in South America	Colombia’s Data	US’ Data
1	Population	2 <sup>nd</sup>	45.2 Million (2013)	313.9 Million (2013)
2	Size of State	4 <sup>th</sup>	1,109,500.00 km <sup>2</sup>	9,161,920.00 km <sup>2</sup>
3	Population Density	2 <sup>nd</sup>	42.43 per km <sup>2</sup> (2011)	34.06 per km <sup>2</sup> (2011)
4	Type of Government	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic
5	Literacy Rate	6 <sup>th</sup>	93.24 (2009)	84.07 (2011)
6	GDP	4 <sup>th</sup>	\$369,789,365,899.00 (2012)	\$16,244,600,000,000.00 (2012)
7	GDP per Capita	7 <sup>th</sup>	\$7,747.84 per capita (2012)	\$51,748.56 per capita (2012)

Therefore, on paper, Colombia has the benefit of a decent GDP, a democratic

government and large state and population although economic disparity and lower literacy rates remain a concern. The next variables to consider are civilian ones.

### **B. Civilian Variables**

As indicated in Table 4.2 below, in terms of the “Civil” Variables, Colombia has some characteristics representing good civil-military relations, but it also lacks certain critical factors which may require attention.

**Table 4.2 – Civilian Variables Summary**

<b>Civilian Variables for Colombia</b>				
	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Ranking in South America</b>	<b>Colombia’s Data</b>	<b>US’ Data</b>
<b>1</b>	Constitutional Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>2</b>	Military May Vote	No	No	Yes
<b>3</b>	Ministers of Defence	Civilians/ Retired Military	No	No
<b>4</b>	Size of Civilian Bureaucracy	5 <sup>th</sup>	#43/189	#4/189
<b>5</b>	Popularity of Military	3 <sup>rd</sup>	63% (2011)	78% (2011)
<b>6</b>	Popularity of Civilian Bureaucracy	6 <sup>th</sup>	18% Congress, 26% Courts (2011)	12% Congress, 37% Courts (2011)
<b>7</b>	Military Expenditure	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3.6% (2010)	4.8% (2010)
<b>8</b>	Public Expenditures	2 <sup>nd</sup> in Health; 4 <sup>th</sup> in Education	5.5% (Health, 2010), 4.8% (Education, 2010)	9.5% (Health, 2010); 5.4% (Education, 2009)

On the plus side, Colombia has clearly outlined civilian control over the military in its Constitution. Despite ranking second in terms of highest military expenditures, Colombia ranks second in health expenditures and fourth in education expenditures. Both



health and education expenditures are higher percentages of the GDP compared to its military expenditure. This means that, despite the seemingly high military expenditures, Colombia has not neglected (at least spending in) other pressing social expenditures, such as health and education (with no comment on how well, fairly or transparently the money is spent). The fact that social expenditures represent a larger share of the GDP in comparison to military expenditures is, therefore, a positive sign of balance between civilian and military spending.

In terms of trust of its government agencies, the main survey consulted shows that Colombians place a higher degree of trust in their military than in their civilian institutions, specifically in their Congress and Supreme Courts. The public, therefore, seems to have a high level of amity for their military. As mentioned in the previous chapter, corruption is a serious problem, not only in Colombia but also in South America. Indeed, corruption is often the explanation behind the poor ranking of trust for civilian institutions.<sup>183</sup>

Colombia has some of the lowest scores in levels of trust in civilian institutions among all the South American states and it ranks fifth worst (in terms of all of South America) in the Transparency International Corruption Index.<sup>184</sup> All of South America's scores tend to be low. As a lack of transparency is tied to corruption, these scores indicate that corruption is an issue that demands critical attention and likely explains, in part, the public opinion of Colombia's Congress and Supreme Court. The military, by contrast,

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<sup>183</sup> Armen Hakhverdian and Quinton Mayne, "Institutional Trust, Education and Corruption: a Micro-Macro Interactive Approach," *Journal of Politics*, 73:3, July 2012, p.5.

<sup>184</sup> The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are perceived to be by the public. Transparency International – need to reference this and give Colombia's score and 1 – not at all transparent out of 10).

fairs better because the public does not “see” the spending done by the military - especially as parts of its budget would be kept secret for national security reasons. (This is not to suggest that the Colombian military either is or is not corrupt but underlines the importance of civilian review and oversight) For instance, on February 18, 2014, Colombian President Santos had to restructure the military’s command structure after a corruption scandal that leaked earlier in February. Although Commander General Leonardo Barrero’s (General Commander of the Armed Forces) cause for dismissal was not due to corruption but rather, for being “disrespectful and offensive” to the judicial power, the cause for dismissal for Major General Manuel Guzman, Brigadier Generals Fabricio Cabrera, Diego Sanchez and Jaime Reyes (all of who were high officials within the military) were linked to corruption.<sup>185</sup>

In addition, despite the military’s popularity, Colombia is the only country in South America where the military does not have the right to vote. This is deeply concerning, not only in terms of civil-military relations, but also because it contradicts the democratic ideals this country claims to follow, at least on paper. Although there have been news circulating since 2011<sup>186</sup> that indicate this issue will be addressed and the right to vote will be reinstated for the military,<sup>187</sup> there has not been a change to date. Moreover, constitutions and laws are notoriously slow to change. As well, Colombia does

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<sup>185</sup> BBC World. “Colombia: Cambios en la Cúpula Militar Tras Escandalo de Corrupción.” Tuesday, February 18, 2014. URL:

[http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas\\_noticias/2014/02/140218\\_ultnot\\_colombia\\_renuncia\\_ejercito\\_ar.sht](http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2014/02/140218_ultnot_colombia_renuncia_ejercito_ar.sht) ml (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>186</sup> El Espectador “Fuerzas Militares Quedarian Facultadas para Votar,” October 24, 2012. URL: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-382958-fuerzas-militares-quedarian-facultadas-votar> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014); and El Nuevo Día. “El Voto Militar, Necesario y Legítimo,” August 23, 2013. URL: - <http://www.elnuevodia.com.co/nuevodia/opinion/columnistas/192318-el-voto-militar-necesario-y-legitimo> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>187</sup> The right to vote was revoked from the Colombian military in 1992.

allow retired military to occupy the position of Minister of Defence, which can create conflict of interest scenarios.

Most concerning, therefore, is the lack of trust that the population has for the government generally and the fact that the military cannot vote. On the civilian front, therefore, control of the military by civilians seems to be in place, which, for Huntington, Janowitz and Finer, was extremely important. We now turn to military variables.

### **C. Military Variables**

Table 4.3 below illustrates a summary of the “Military” variables.

**Table 4.3 – Military Variables Summary**

<b>Military Variables for Colombia</b>				
	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Ranking</b>	<b>Colombia’s Data</b>	<b>US’ Data</b>
1	Size of Military Forces	2 <sup>nd</sup>	281.4 thousand (2013)	1.5 million (2013)
2	Size of Military (% of Population)	2 <sup>nd</sup>	0.62% (2013)	0.49% (2013)
3	Professionalism (Trained and Educated)	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	Martial Court	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	Mandatory Service	Yes	Yes	No
6	Coup D’état (since 1990)	No	No	No
7	Military Taking on Police Roles	Yes	Yes	No

Despite not ranking first for any of the variables, Colombia does rank among the top five of all the South American states for its military variables which suggests it seems

to have a reasonably well-trained, professional military. Its military is the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest in the region, and compared to the total population, the military size is 0.62%,<sup>188</sup> which indicates the number of military deployed overseas is relatively small.

### **1. Size of Military**

Colombia has one of the largest military in the region, second only to Brazil's. In addition, "Colombia enjoys considerable support from the US, both in terms of training and equipment provision, to try to bolster its counter-narcotics effort."<sup>189</sup> According to the *Military Balance 2013*, in terms of equipment by environment, the Navy currently has 4 submarines, 4 frigates, 56 coastal and patrol combatants, over 200 small assault rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs). The Air Force has 6-fighters/ground attack/ISR, 6 helicopters, 82 combat capable aircrafts and 1 maritime patrol/search and rescue aircraft. The Army (Marines) has 4 manoeuvre (Amphibious) and 8 armoured personnel carriers (APC)s. Of course, the equipment doesn't come close to comparing to US resources but compared to other South American states, Colombia has more platforms than the majority of states.<sup>190</sup>

### **2. Size of Military Compared to Population**

Similar to its military size, Colombia also ranks second in terms of size of military compared to population, second only to Uruguay, whose military represents 0.74% of its population. Colombia's military represents 0.62% of its population; in terms of ranking in South America, it also places Colombia 0.17% ahead of Bolivia, which is the third largest military compared to population and 0.47% from the last place, Guyana.

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<sup>188</sup> This does not include paramilitary or military police.

<sup>189</sup> Military Balance "Latin America and the Caribbean," p. 445.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

The reason why Colombia's military is so large compared to the country's total population is explained by military officials as owing to the instability in the state, specifically, the insurgencies and the war on drugs, both of which have plagued the country for decades.<sup>191</sup> However, more important than size is determining how professional the military is – a large, unprofessional military is a serious cause for concern in terms of civil-military relations. The next variable looks at where Colombia stands.

### **3. Military Professionalism**

In terms of professionalism, Colombia has several military institutions to train both undergraduate and graduate student military cadets. These military institutions offer exchange programs and also host/send cadets to international conferences<sup>192</sup> giving them exposure to other militaries, especially to the US. The majority of these institutions offer courses that focus on civil-military relations, or civil society. Furthermore, civilians are invited to attend these courses, and there is a mix of civilian and military professors, meaning military students are inculcated with both military and civilian dogma. Even though the cadets go to military institutions, civilians are incorporated into the staff/faculty and cadets are allowed to leave and integrate with society, which is important for healthy civil-military relations.

Colombia has over 33 military colleges<sup>193</sup> all of which are members of the *Asociación Nacional de Colegios Militares (National Association of Military Colleges)*.

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<sup>191</sup> For more information regarding the Colombian military's growth see Coronel Santos Pico's (2007). *Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia*. Departamento E-3, Centro de Estudios Históricos del Ejército, Biblioteca Histórica Militar Colombiana.

<sup>192</sup> Some examples are the "Escuela Militar de Cadetes (Military Cadets School), Escuela Militar de Suboficiales (Military School of Sub-Officials),

<sup>193</sup> For a complete list of the military schools, visit ACOMIL's website at: <http://www.acomil.edu.co/>. (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

In addition, there are over six graduate-level military institutions, such as Escuela Militar de Cadetes (Military Cadet School), Escuela Militar de Aviación (Military School of Aviation), Escuela de Suboficiales (School for Sub-Officers), Escuela de Soldados Profesionales (School of Professional Soldiers) and Escuela Superior de Guerra (Superior School of War).

The Superior School of War offers,

... national security and defence [courses and training] to various sectors of the state. The Information Course of National Defence (CIDENAL) was created in 1969. Senior government officials, private sector and Colonels of the National Police, who are close to being promoted to Brigadier General, attend. Furthermore, the school offers academic programs within the Masters and Specialization in Security and National Defence, Masters in Human Rights (DDHH – Derechos Humanos), International Law and Armed Conflict (DICA - Derecho Internacional de los Conflictos Armados) and Specialization on Command and Staff.<sup>194</sup>

Not only is it important for States to ensure that proper educational facilities are in place for their military, but also they must ensure that the curriculums offer courses that relate to civil-military relations, such as the description outlined above. In addition, international exposure is also an undeniably positive training opportunity (learning both good and bad practices) that military schools should implement. In the case of Colombia,

The Superior School of War organized the First International Symposium on Studies in Military Ethics in 2012, gathering recognized scholars from Canada, USA, France, Germany, Chile and the UK, to complement the research processes the school is advancing with other civilian institutions in different countries, such as the Santo Tomás de Aquino University, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada and La Gran Colombia University.

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<sup>194</sup> Escuela Superior de Guerra Original Spanish Text: “Con el interés de abrir la academia de seguridad y defensa nacionales a diversos sectores del Estado, en 1969 se crea el Curso de Información de Defensa Nacional, CIDENAL, al cual concurren altos funcionarios del Estado, del sector privado y los coroneles de la Policía Nacional que están próximos a ascender a Brigadier General. Siguiendo el rumbo de su evolución, actualmente, la Escuela ofrece dentro de sus programas académicos la Maestría y Especialización en Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, la Maestría en DDHH y DICA y la Especialización en Comando y Estado Mayor.” URL: <http://www.esdegue.edu.co/node/920> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

Additionally, in partnership with the Sergio Arboleda University, St. Thomas and the Andes, the school developed the International Seminar on Human Rights and International Law of Armed Conflict 'A Constitutional Look'; a scenario in which the legal elements involved were analyzed in the armed conflict and how the state and its armed forces must act in this context.<sup>195</sup>

Clearly, The Superior School of War is making attempts to expose its cadets to new and different learning opportunities, which can be of value to their training as military personnel. Participation abroad, in the form of conferences, exchange programs, education or training in countries that have good civil-military relations also helps broaden the scope of understanding of civil-military relations for the military.

#### **4. Martial Court**

As mentioned before, this thesis is not measuring the quality of the South American countries' military justice systems, but rather, determining whether or not South American countries have such a system in place. In the case of Colombia, the Military Penal System is constitutionally established. Article 221 of the Constitutional Charter defines the following:

The crimes committed by the members of the Armed Forces on active duty and in relation to the same service [are referred to] the Courts Martial or military courts in accordance with the provisions of the Military Penal Code. Such courts or tribunals shall be composed of members of the Armed Forces on active duty or retired.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Escuela Superior de Guerra. Original Spanish Text: "En el Primer Simposio Internacional sobre Estudios en Ética Militar, logramos reunir reconocidos estudiosos del tema, procedentes de Canadá, Estados Unidos, Francia, Alemania, Chile y Reino Unido, para complementar los procesos de investigación que estamos adelantando con otras instituciones de Educación Superior del país, como la Universidad Santo Tomas de Aquino, la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, la Universidad Militar Nueva Granada y la Universidad La Gran Colombia. Adicionalmente, en alianza con las Universidades Sergio Arboleda, Santo Tomas y los Andes, desarrollamos el Seminario Internacional Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional en los Conflictos Armados "Una Mirada Constitucional," escenario en el cual se analizaron los elementos de orden jurídico que intervienen en el conflicto armado y como el Estado y sus Fuerzas Militares deben actuar en este contexto." URL: <http://www.esdegue.edu.co/node/920> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>196</sup> Colombian Ministry of Defence. "El ABC de la Justicia Penal Militar". Original Spanish Text: "El artículo 221 de la Carta Constitucional define lo siguiente: "De los delitos cometidos por los miembros de la Fuerza Pública en servicio activo y en relación con el mismo servicio conocerán las Cortes Marciales o

Furthermore, in terms of the Military Criminal Justice System's jurisdictions and the crimes judged therein, the Ministry of Defence outlines the following:

According to the new military penal code, Article 2 states, "all crimes fall under the Military Criminal Justice System's jurisdiction with the exception of genocide, torture and forced disappearance, which are considered crimes against humanity and [are beyond the codes of conducts], and whose judgment must be made by the ordinary [civilian] justice system."<sup>197</sup>

In conclusion, in theory, Colombia has the capacity to ensure military discipline is maintained.

## **5. Military Recruitment**

According to the CIA World Factbook, Colombia still has compulsory service in place. "18-24 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; service obligation is 18 months."<sup>198</sup> Since the end of the Vietnam War, conscription has been widely perceived as politically non-viable. Indeed, new technological developments in warfare have reduced the need for boots on the ground, making conscription irrelevant. Conscription and temporary mandatory service are perceived to be a negative quality in terms of civil-military relations. As shown in this thesis, however, this is not a problem that is strictly related to developing countries. Some developed countries, like Germany, have also taken a long time to change their recruitment methods.

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tribunales Militares con arreglo a las prescripciones del Código Penal Militar. Tales Cortes o Tribunales estarán integrados por miembros de la Fuerza Pública en servicio activo o en retiro". URL: [http://www.gsed.gov.co/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/pcd!3aportal\\_content!2fcom.pcc.pcc!2fPORTALMDN!2froles!2fcom.pcc.PortalJPM!2fInformacionInstitucional!2fcom.pcc.Glosario!2fGlosarioJPM](http://www.gsed.gov.co/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/pcd!3aportal_content!2fcom.pcc.pcc!2fPORTALMDN!2froles!2fcom.pcc.PortalJPM!2fInformacionInstitucional!2fcom.pcc.Glosario!2fGlosarioJPM)

(Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

<sup>197</sup> Ibid. Original Spanish Text: "De acuerdo con la nueva normatividad penal militar, en su artículo 2, todos los delitos pueden ser conocidos por la Justicia Penal Militar siempre y cuando la conducta se haya desarrollado en actos propios del servicio y con relación al mismo servicio. Se exceptúan el Genocidio, Tortura y la Desaparición Forzada, por ser delitos considerados de Lesa Humanidad que hacen perder la relación del servicio con la conducta y cuyo juzgamiento lo debe efectuar la justicia ordinaria."

<sup>198</sup> CIA, "The World Factbook 2012," URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html#co> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).



## 6. Coups d'état

When compared to the governments in South America, such as Juan Peron's (Argentina) in the 1970s, Augusto Pinochet's (Chile) in the 1970s, the military dictatorships in Brazil between 1964-1985, Hugo Banzer (Bolivia) in the 1970s, and numerous military dictatorships throughout Venezuela's history, Colombia has the least experience with military governments. This trend to leave the military out of office is a projection of the respect that the soldiers have for the state and their role. The lack of military dictatorships and military coups d'état in Colombia are likely the products of a well-established Constitution, in which the role of the Armed Forces play are clearly outlined and described, and also, in the Armed Forces' lack of desire or need to overstep and take control of the State. Colombian Colonel Manuel Jose Santos Pico (Colombian Army) outlines his explanation for the lack of military coups:

Considering that a military coup d'état is led by the military, the role civil-military relations play within a democratic state is absolutely imperative and definitive. This opportunity, which usually emerges during periods of political instability, has seldom presented itself in Colombia; if the existing civil-military relation is not based on clearly democratic principles and mutual trust between the constitutional institutions, a coup is likely to result. In Colombia, this is known as 'Santanderismo,' a position that describes a law-abiding attitude, which is contrary to 'Bolivarismo,' a position that describes the control of power under a dictatorship, which as the name indicates, is what Simon Bolivar accomplished.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> Coronel Manuel Santos Pico, Interview Excerpt. Original Spanish Text: "Por considerar que un golpe de Estado es conducido por militares, es absolutamente indispensable que el papel que juegan las relaciones cívico-militares dentro de cualquier estado democrático es definitivo. Es el caso típico de Colombia frente a esta alternativa que poco se ha presentado en el pasado, pero que cuando un país atraviesa por un período de inestabilidad política, si no existe una relación cívico-militar basada en principios claramente democráticos y de confianza mutua en las instituciones constitucionales, si se puede presentar. La historia política del país, desde su nacimiento, así lo confirma. En Colombia se le conoce como la posición "santanderista," posición que describe una actitud apegada a las leyes, contraria a la posición "bolivariana," que busco y mantuvo el poder bajo el control de Simón Bolívar, bajo el esquema de la dictadura

In the case of Colombia, this lack of desire on the part of the Armed Forces to take over the State can be explained by three factors:

The first is the respect for constitutional laws as a fundamental principle described in the functions the military has within a democratic State, which extends to all the military ranks (i.e., from the highest rank to the lowest). The second is the influence the United States has in Colombia's internal politics; the US has always been seen as a model to follow. Lastly, political neutrality within the Armed Forces, which emanates from Article 219 of the Colombian Constitution, which imposes that "Public Force is not deliberating," a principle that can be found in Colombia's first constitution and which remained untouched in the constitutional changes that occurred in 1886 and in 1991.<sup>200</sup>

Military coups are the most evident proof of unhealthy or poor civil-military relations. In terms of its history with coups d'état, the Colombian military has been unique in the South American context. Rather than a military intervention, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's coup in 1953 can best be described as an imposition by the civilian elites on the military:

The coup d'état was announced, consented and favoured on the part of the civil elite. Nevertheless, once in power, Rojas moved away from the traditional leadership and parties, and turned his government into a dictatorship of a more personal character, different even from the military style. His purpose eventually crumbled against the elite's attacks. Rojas Pinilla's regime was short-lived and in 1957, General Gabriel Paris Gordillo, Gral. Rafael Navas, Gral Luis Ordonez and Gral. Deogracias Fonseca led the military junta that took over after Rojas' fall. This came without the total resignation on the part of the army men who, sometimes divided, tried to stay in power or restore Rojas.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Coronel Manuel Santos Pico, Interview Excerpt. Original Text: "En Colombia han existido varios factores en las relaciones cívico-militares que han sido definitivos frente al tema de los 'Golpes de Estado,' de los cuales identifiqué tres con absoluta claridad: 1. El apego a las leyes constitucionales como principio fundamental de la función militar dentro de un Estado democrático por parte del liderazgo militar (Oficiales y suboficiales); 2. La influencia norteamericana en la política interna. Los Estados Unidos siempre han sido un referente; 3. La neutralidad política emanada del Artículo No. 219 de la Constitución que impone que "la Fuerza Pública no es deliberante," principio que viene desde la primera constitución y se mantuvo en la Constitución de 1886 y de 1991."

<sup>201</sup> Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz. 'El golpe de Rojas y el poder de los militares.' Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, folio n. 31, p 33. Original Spanish Text: "El ascenso paulatino de los militares en la política, luego del 9 de abril de 1948, llevó finalmente al poder a Gustavo Rojas Pinilla en 1953. El golpe de estado

Colombia has managed to avoid an unconstitutional change of government for the last 57 years.

## **7. Military acting as Police INSIDE the State**

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there are situations specific to Colombia, i.e., insurgencies and the war on drugs that have required the military to act as police INSIDE Colombia. The complexities behind the different roles the military plays in internal security affairs will be discussed in detail in the section below.

### **Part 2: Colombia - Specific Situations**

So far, based on paper and using the classic civil-military variables from the literature, Colombia is in the top six of South American states. Additionally, compared to the US' "on paper" variables, Colombia has fairly healthy civil-military relations. However, if we look more closely at practice, especially considering Colombia-specific situations that involve the military, (via insurgencies, the war on drugs and general instability in the state) Colombia's civil-military relations results are less clear. On the one hand, the Colombian military's involvement inside the state can be credited with keeping relative calm. On the other hand, using the military in domestic security situations is generally considered a sign of failure for civil-military relations.

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fue anunciado, consentido y propiciado por parte de la élite civil. No obstante, una vez en el poder, Rojas empezó a alejarse de la dirigencia tradicional y de los partidos, y convirtió a su gobierno en una dictadura de carácter más personal que incluso militar. Su propósito no resistió la arremetida de la élite. Gómez y Lleras lideraron el pacto que finalmente condujo a la caída de Rojas, en 1957, sin una resignación total por parte de los militares que, fraccionados por momentos, intentaron proseguir en el poder o restaurar a Rojas.”

## Colombia Under the Microscope

As mentioned before, there are three issues which are particular to Colombia that call into question the “paper” version of Colombia’s relatively healthy civil-military relations. They are (a) the ongoing domestic insurgencies, (b) the war on drugs and general instability in the state, which require (c) the involvement of the military in internal affairs – especially in police-like roles – something that contradicts civil-military relations’ theory.

Similar to other countries in the region, Colombia’s wealth disparity creates instability, especially in the poor regions of Colombia. During the 1950s and 1960s, this led to the development of domestic insurgency groups,<sup>202</sup> which have grown in size and influence throughout the years, overwhelming police forces and requiring military intervention. Secondly, the US’ involvement in Colombia via the war on drugs has pushed for the better-trained military to be involved, more so than the police.

As the police are generally not trusted in Colombia,<sup>203</sup> mostly because they are not well-trained and have benefitted often from condoning/aiding illegal activity, the military has, increasingly, been deployed inside Colombia. In fact, the professionalism

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<sup>202</sup> For example, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) and EPL (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion). For more information about the insurgencies see Alfredo Rangel ‘Guerreros y Politicos: Dialogo y Conflicto en Colombia 1992-2002’, Intermedio Editores (2003) pp. 217-291.

<sup>203</sup> A survey led in 2013 indicated that the level of trust stood at 33.6%, which was 9% less than 2008 and 20% less than 2003. For more information see, Juan Camilo Maldonado, “*Confianza de los bogotanos en la Policia es la más baja en 10 años*,” El Espectador, Septiembre 22, 2013. URL: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/confianza-de-los-bogotanos-policia-mas-baja-10-anos-articulo-447919> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014). Original Spanish Text: “Según los resultados de la encuesta, en los últimos cinco años la confianza de los bogotanos en la Policía se redujo en un 9%, alcanzando mínimos sin precedentes. En 2008, el porcentaje de personas encuestadas que confiaban mucho o muchísimo en la Mebog era de 42,5%; cinco años después este porcentaje cayó a 33,6%. La cifra es aún más diciente si se analizan los últimos diez años. Según Henry Murraín, director de proyectos de Corpovisionarios, en 2003, durante la segunda administración Mockus, la confianza en la institución estaba en el 55%, más de 20 puntos porcentuales de la situación actual.”

and competence of Colombia's military means it is deployed often, for long (indefinite) periods of time inside Colombia. The three situations do interconnect; often insurgency groups will recruit from disadvantaged areas and become involved in illegal drug activity, problems that have tended to demand military assistance as opposed to police, especially when foreigners are kidnapped.<sup>204</sup> Therefore, it is difficult to parse the situations into separate and distinct events. However, in order to get at the military's involvement, they will be treated as artificially separate situations fully recognizing the methodological problems with such a treatment of these situations.

#### **a) Insurgencies**

The fact that the FARC are not only one of the oldest insurgencies in the world,<sup>205</sup> but their influence and world-wide notoriety has increased over the years, explains why Colombia has, increasingly, called on its military to intervene in a domestic security issue. Overwhelmed by the insurgency and given the poor reputation of the police, the Colombian government has had to call on the military. According to the civil-military theory, using the military for such purposes will, undeniably, have a negative impact on civil-military relations in the long-term, because military are to be deployed to protect the state against foreign insurgents, not for long-term domestic insurgencies. In practice, it may be that Colombia has no choice. However, the use of the military in a domestic context for long periods of time and with ambiguous mandates is concerning from the point of view of healthy civil-military relations.

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<sup>204</sup> Due to the international attention this draws, the Colombian government wants the more capable military deployed. As well, given the "foreign" element, often military are the appropriate forces to use.

<sup>205</sup> Wiharta S. and Anthony I. indicate in their report 'Major armed conflicts,' SIPRI Yearbook 2003" Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003) pp.91-93.

Rather than developing and training additional police forces, like they did in 1948,<sup>206</sup> the default solution to the insurgency problem in Colombia has been to use the military. The danger, according to the literature, is that the military can become too influential in what should be civilian decision-making vis-à-vis the safety of the state. As explained by Alfredo Rangel,

The theory of democracy says that civil power must guide military power; it must have the last word and settle conflicts. However, in practice, military chiefs have always tried to influence civil power, and they sometimes end up contradicting it. If this is common during times of peace, it is even more common during wartime or during an internal armed conflict. In these conditions, the military forces obviously become more relevant and influential [in the decision-making process].<sup>207</sup>

Whether or not this is, in fact, happening in Colombia, is not certain. The fact that the government has consistently<sup>208</sup> made it clear that it not only relies, but also depends on the military to maintain order, opens the door for military intervention in domestic decision-making. The fact that, notwithstanding the government's actions, the Colombian military has not over-stepped and taken over, is interesting. This could be a positive

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<sup>206</sup> Historia de las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia “*Historia de la Policia Nacional de Colombia*,” Planeta Colombiana Editorial S.A., Tomo VI, 1993, p.210. In 1949, as an attempt to restructure and improve their National Police Force, the Colombian Government led the “Mision Inglesa” (English Mission), which was integrated by Sir. Douglas Gordon (head of mission) as an adjunct force. Original Spanish Text: “Se contrató una misión integrada por Sir Douglas Gordon como jefe, el Coronel Eric M. Rogers y doce funcionarios más. Los dos primeros llegaron al país el 28 de agosto de 1948 y los restantes, en los primeros meses de 1949.”

<sup>207</sup> Alfredo Rangel. “*Guerreros y Politicos: Dialogo y Conflicto en Colombia, 1998-2002.*” Intermedio Editores, 2003. p, 201. Original Spanish Text: “La teoria de la democracia dice que el poder civil debe dirigir el poder military, decir la ultima palabra y dirimir en ultima instancia los conflictos. Sin embargo, en la practica, los jefes militares siempre han intentado influir sobre el poder civil, y a fuerza de hacerlo muchas veces acaban por contradecirlo.”

<sup>208</sup>For example, the importance given to the military in the ongoing peace discussions between the FARC and the Colombian government. For more information see: America Economia, “Santos agradece contribucion de las Fuerzas Armadas Colombianas a proceso de paz,” Mayo 13, 2014. URL: <http://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/santos-agradece-contribucion-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-colombianas-proceso-de-paz> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014) and El Espectador “ Militares, proceso de paz y política, ” 23 de Abril 2014, URL: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/militares-proceso-de-paz-y-politica-articulo-488521> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

example of the Colombian military's professionalism and their submissiveness to the State, or it could be interpreted as a sign that the Colombian military has not intervened, not out of desire or motive but rather, because they do not have a need to do so – they already have enough influence over the state.

Although the reasons used to explain the government's actions have been widely accepted, the long-term effects this may have on their civil-military relations is a concern that requires further investigation. Rather than working on highlighting the lines separating military (deal with foreign threats) and police (who should remain in charge of the situation) - which have increasingly been blurred, the government continues to mandate additional responsibilities to the military. An example of an acceptable use of the military within the state, for a limited time, with clearly defined roles, is the case of the Oka Crisis in Quebec<sup>209</sup> in 1990.

The Oka crisis was a 78-day standoff between Mohawk protestors (and outside aboriginal supporters) and police/military authorities which began July 11, 1990 because of a new proposed golf course and condominium project which was to be built on disputed land. The Sûreté du Québec (SQ - the provincial police authorities) were sent to remove the barricades and protestors but ran into opposition. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada's federal police force) were first called in to assist in mid-August. The federal government requested assistance by the Canadian Forces when an SQ police officer, Cpl. Marcel Lemay, was shot and killed by protestors, major road ways were blocked to the island of Montreal (the Mercier bridge) and the RCMP were

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<sup>209</sup> For an excellent history of the Oka crisis, see Whitney Lackenbauer, "Carrying the Burden of Peace: The Mohawks, the Canadian Forces, and the Oka Crisis." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 10/2 (Winter 2008). Online.

overwhelmed by the number of protestors and angry citizens living in the area. On August 8, 1990, the Québec government formally requested of the Minister of Defence aid to the civil powers by the Canadian Forces for a limited time directly related to the crisis. The Van Doos (The Royal 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment) arrived in Oka on August 20, 1990. Once the fear of armed conflict had ended, the military were released and the police continued to monitor the situation, press charges and make arrests. This is not to suggest the Oka crisis is similar in terms of scale of the domestic insurgency in Colombia, rather, it is an example of how military can be used to aid the police in a domestic context that is consistent with civil-military relations theory: the military are formally requested to act for a specified period of time with a clear mandate and all arrests are made by police, not the military.

In contrast, there are not the same divisions of labour between the police and the military in the case of the FARC. First, although there arguably have been formal requests for military support via the Colombian Minister of Defence, most of the time the military is deployed for undefined times. Second, the military, rather than being a support to local police forces, have assumed control including arresting, detaining and questioning FARC members. Note, in the Oka crisis, it was the SQ and RCMP that did the arresting, not the military because the police have arresting powers, not the Canadian military.

Some explanations given by sociologists for the insurgencies by the FARC<sup>210</sup> and ELN identified two main causes. The first is related to a concentration of landownership

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<sup>210</sup> A main difference between the FARC insurgency and its Central American counterparts (e.g. the Shining Path) is the link the latter had to other insurgencies in the region, or at times even the former USSR. In addition, in the case of the FARC, despite being leftist, this group has never been under the direct



during the 1960s, when 66% of arable land in the country was controlled and owned by 3.5% of the population; the remaining 96.5% of the population had to share the remaining 34% of usable land.<sup>211</sup> Indeed, land disputes have historically thwarted development and prolonged socioeconomic disparities, virtually everywhere in the world.<sup>212</sup>

The second cause was the State's structural marginalization based on the different levels of income distribution during the 1960s. There were essentially three income groups in Colombia. The first comprised 13.2% of the population, and this group had a share of 60% of the total income (GDP); the second comprised 54.2% of the population and benefitted from 17% of total GDP; the third group represented 32.6% of the population and received 22% in total.<sup>213</sup> This is not to suggest that this situation is strictly unique to Colombia; traces of the same problem can be found all over the developing world. However, although the socioeconomic disparities often led to a similar effect (social discontent in the form of protests, coups, or the development of insurgencies) what is original to Colombia is the insurgencies' endurance.

Therefore, Colombia has been an anomaly in the South American region, in the sense that, despite the overflow of economic and other social problems, the military has

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influence of or depended on the aid of a foreign power to survive. Contrary to its Central American counterparts, who relied on each other or the USSR, the FARC have been self-sufficient in acquiring their own manpower (recruiting from rural areas) and funding their war (mainly through drug-trafficking and kidnapping).

<sup>211</sup> Colonel Santos, p. 272 Original Spanish Text: "Algunas explicaciones del conflicto armado dado por sociólogos han identificados como causas de este, la forma de tenencia de la tierra, tesis apoyada en datos estadísticos que muestran una concentración latifundista que revela que un 3.5 % de propietarios disponían del 66% de la tierra cultivable en 1960 mientras el 96.5% de propietarios se repartía un 34%."

<sup>212</sup> For more information see Henry Bernstein's "*Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change*."

<sup>213</sup> Colonel Santos, p. 272. Original Spanish Text: "Una segunda causa es identificada como la injusta marginación estructural del estado que se muestra en los niveles de ingreso percibidos en la década del setenta: 60% de los ingresos totales del país eran recibidos por un 13.2% de beneficiarios, un 17% de ingresos se repartían entre un 54.2% de beneficiarios y un 32.6% recibía un 22% de ingresos."

remained subservient to the state unlike other South American states.<sup>214</sup> This curious difference, in fact, served as the impetus for this thesis.

The Cold War provided an ideological foundation for the different armed groups (at the time not yet insurgents) that began to develop in the 1960s due to the socioeconomic disparities, most evident in land and income distribution. However, after the Cold War, this ideological reasoning no longer applied, but instead of diminishing and dispersing like its Latin American counterparts, something different happened within Colombia's insurgency groups.

Unemployment began to be mentioned as a cause for the conflict during the 1990s, when unemployment levels reached an explosive figure and only 20.4% of the population was economically active. These conditions create a very vulnerable population, considering the fact that the socioeconomic disparities were already a concern. However, quite surprisingly, the mention of revolutionary slogans, whether of communist orientation, nationalistic, or simply leftist were left aside and were replaced by the Marxist theory of class struggle, calling for the taking of arms - a much more evident display of the part of the Colombian population, who [continue to believe and have faith they will] attain power through an armed struggle; [this] was the main cause of armed conflict that is lived in Colombia today.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> Colombia is comparable to its counterparts in Central America, namely, the URNG (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca – Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit*) in Guatemala, which emerged as “a mass organization of the peasants; drawing Indians for the first time into politics,” the FSLN (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional – Sandinista National Liberation Front*) in Nicaragua, and the FMLN (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional - Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front*) in El Salvador. Although all these movements shared the same Communist ideal, rebellions and man-on-man confrontations, which resulted in blood spill for decades, they eventually withered and died in Central America. Out of all these, only the FARC has endured.

<sup>215</sup> Colonel Santos, p. 272. Original Spanish Text: “El desempleo solo ha sido mencionado como causa de conflicto en la década de los 90, cuando los índices alcanzaron la explosiva cifra de un 20,4% de la población económicamente activa. Estas condiciones crean la percepción de la existencia de una población vulnerable, causa que recoge las anteriores. Sin embargo, con extrañeza se deja de lado la mención de la consigna revolucionaria, sea de orientación comunista, nacionalista, o simplemente izquierdista, de la toma del poder por las armas y la aplicación de la teoría marxista de la lucha de clases, razón mucho más evidente por la que una parte de la población mantiene viva la fe en alcanzar el poder mediante la lucha armada, principal causa del conflicto armado que hoy se vive en Colombia.”

Needless to say, the armed conflict in Colombia is very complex; arguably, these groups not only grew in size but also in influence. Since the 1960s, governmental policies have been implemented to address the insurgency problem, but instead of successfully dissolving all groups, once one group was dissolved, another one emerged. The 1990s marked a period of growth in size and expansion throughout the rural areas. With the exception of the EPL (*Ejército Popular de Liberación – Popular Liberation Army*)<sup>216</sup>, the insurgencies, in particular the FARC and ELN grew exponentially during the 1990s, the former reaching a total of 16,492 in 2011.<sup>217</sup>

Even at the peak of the insurgencies' growth, the National Police could have (arguably) outnumbered the insurgencies and yet, as the insurgencies grew, the total number of Armed Forces was growing in greater numbers than those of the National Police. There were other, special circumstances that demanded the military's involvement; in addition to the increasing number of insurgents, drug trafficking, kidnapping and overall criminal activities were exacerbating factors. One can therefore appreciate how the National Police were overwhelmed by the situation especially as they are generally considered to be less prepared and capable than the military. Additionally, corruption levels are higher in the police than the military. Therefore, given that Colombia has a trained military (representing a significant portion of Colombia's GDP expenditures) they have been dispatched to establish security in the state.

In addition to the leftist insurgencies, the most popular being the FARC and ELN, Colombia is also plagued with right-wing paramilitaries, which have also had a negative

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<sup>216</sup> A smaller insurgency group, active since 1967.

<sup>217</sup> Approximated data registered in the General Command of the Military Forces in August 1999 and modified in 2002 – as outlines in Colonel Santos Pico's "Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia," p. 279.

impact on the stability and security in Colombia. There is no doubt that the FARC and ELN are responsible for human rights abuses in Colombia. There is no argument against the fact that they partake in kidnapping, drug trafficking and other criminal activities to fund their cause; they have even admitted to these crimes on several occasions. However, the right-wing paramilitary group AUC (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia*), is seldom included in these assessments. Several reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, credit the paramilitaries with over 75% of such abuses.<sup>218</sup> In addition, there have been several arguments linking drug trafficking to **both** left and right groups.

In terms of civil-military relations, these right-wing paramilitary groups have further prolonged the internal civil war and the war on drugs, both of which have required the government to deploy the military inside Colombia. In addition, the belief that these groups were once linked to the Armed Forces<sup>219</sup> also poses a major threat to civil-military relations because it results in distrust of civilians in their military, which in turn, more often than not, results in fear and distrust – negative qualities, especially during social turmoil. In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported:

In a new report, “The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links”, Human Rights Watch accused specific brigades and commanding officers in the Colombian military of collaborating with paramilitaries who are committing atrocities against civilians. The Human Rights Watch report links three prominent Army brigades based in Colombia's largest cities to paramilitary activity and attacks on civilians. Together with previous reports, Human Rights Watch has so

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<sup>218</sup> Justin Delacour. ‘*Plan Colombia: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Press.*’ Social Justice, Vol. 27, No. 4 (82), Neoliberalism, Militarism, And Armed Conflict (Winter 2000), p. 72.

<sup>219</sup> In its World Report 2012: Colombia Chapter, Human Rights Watch reported: “paramilitary successor groups continue to grow, maintain extensive ties with public security force members and local officials, and commit widespread atrocities.” For more detailed information about the link between Colombian military and paramilitaries see: Human Rights Watch, “*The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links,*” February 2000, Vol. 12, No.1 (B) URL: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/colombia/> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

far documented ties between half of Colombia's eighteen Army brigades and paramilitaries.<sup>220</sup>

In sum, regarding the insurgency problem, on a social level, what can be concluded is that, unless the original root of the problem is addressed, and socioeconomic conditions are improved, particularly in rural areas, which are prone to guerrilla recruitment, the struggle to dissolve insurgencies will be long-standing. From a civil-military relations perspective, it is imperative that the government enforces its control over its military to prevent them from joining or assisting illegal paramilitary forces. In addition, a proper transfer of power and responsibilities should be made from the military to the police, which would require immense efforts on the part of the Colombian government to recruit and train more police.

We now turn to the second issue which is specific to Colombia, and which is directly linked to insurgencies: the war on drugs.

### **b) War on Drugs**

The second issue that is not discussed widely in the civil-military relations literature is the war on drugs, which is related to the insurgencies and domestic security issues generally. For instance, having underlined the link between the insurgents (guerrillas) and drug-traffickers, the US Ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs, coined the term '*narcoguerrilla*' in 1985.<sup>221</sup> Since then, Colombia has earned a reputation as one

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<sup>220</sup> Human Rights Watch. "Colombia's Military Linked to Paramilitary Atrocities." February 23, 2000. URL: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/22/colombias-military-linked-paramilitary-atrocities> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

<sup>221</sup> Cesar Torres del Rio. "Colombia Siglo XX: Desde la Guerra de los Mil Dias hasta la Eleccion de Alvaro Uribe" Bogota, Grupo Editorial Norma, 2010. P. 380. Original Spanish Text: "Por lo que consideraba un estrecho y evidente vinculo entre la guerrilla y los narcotraficantes, el embajador norteamericano de la epoca, Lewis Tambs, acuño la categoria de narcoguerrilla."

of the largest cocaine suppliers in the world,<sup>222</sup> and the US-led war on drugs is responsible for placing Colombia on the map. Although there have been major improvements and several battles have been won, the war on drugs is far from over. As Alfredo Rangel explains:

Although drug trafficking no longer has the power it once had in the 1980s and 1990s, which managed to reach and affect high levels of the State, Armed Forces and National Police, National Congress and the Justice System, its corrupting power remains active. Currently, its capacity to corrupt and threaten has decreased but continues to affect local powers, lower echelons of the public force including judges and lower ranks in the justice department.<sup>223</sup>

Due to its direct tie to corruption, the drug problem continues to be a big concern not only for civil-military relations but also for overall social and economic development. The war on drugs and the insurgency problem are essentially two sides of the same coin. The insurgents have used drug trafficking to finance the war. The issue escalated further once the Colombian military started to close in on the insurgents with assistance from the United States and the means to sustain war through drug trafficking became limited. Shortly after, foreigners began to be kidnapped by the insurgents. “While FARC held most of its hostages for ransom, a few political hostages, including some high-profile figures, remain an important strategic asset for the rebels.”<sup>224</sup> Arguably, the most renowned FARC hostage was Ingrid Betancourt,<sup>225</sup> who was held in captivity for six years (2002-2008) and whose rescue, along with fifteen other hostages (including 3

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<sup>222</sup> Peru and Bolivia are other source countries.

<sup>223</sup> Alfredo Rangel and Pedro Medellin. “Politica de Seguridad Democratica” Bogota, Grupo Editorial Norma 2010 p. 52.

<sup>224</sup> McDermott, Jeremy. ‘Colombia’s FARC back in limelight’, BBC News, 28 Feb. 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7268257.stm> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>225</sup> Ingrid Betancourt is a Franco-Colombian politician, anti-corruption activist and former senator. At the time of her kidnapping in 2002, she was a presidential candidate. For more information see, Ingrid Betancourt, “*Even Silence Has An End: My Six Years Of Captivity in the Colombian Jungle*,” Penguin Press, New York, 2010.

American military contractors) is one of the successes of the Colombian Army.<sup>226</sup> Kidnapping of foreigners was arguably the straw that broke the camel's back, especially for the United States, demanding Colombia declares "war" on drugs and fight the drug cartels as a defence situation rather than a constabulary one.

Drug trafficking escalated and reached higher echelons in government during President Virgilio Barco's term in office (1986-1990); corruption within the government allowed drug traffickers to acquire higher levels of influence over the Colombian economy and politics. This was the time when drug cartels controlled the state, the most renowned drug lord being Pablo Escobar.<sup>227</sup> The government was increasingly losing control over the drug cartels and drugs began to reach the United States. While on the one hand, the connection to the US was beneficial for the Colombian government; fighting a common cause not only ensured this bilateral relationship to solidify for an undefined period of time, but it also provided the financial resources Colombia lacked to address this issue. On the other hand, as argued throughout this chapter, the consequences resulting from this relationship have had a major impact on civil-military relations because the Colombian government has had to deploy the Colombian military for long periods of time to aid in the war on drugs given the link between drugs, terrorism and the impact of drugs on both the producing and consuming countries and the need for a better, more robust reaction to the war on drugs by Colombia.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> For more information about "Operación Jaque" see Colonel Luis Alberto Villa Marín Pulido "Operación Jaque," (2009) or watch 2010 film/mini-series "Operación Jaque."

<sup>227</sup> For more information about Pablo Escobar read Mark Bowden's "*Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw*" Grovel Atlantic, Inc. 2001.

<sup>228</sup> Cesar Torres del Rio p. 380. Original Spanish Text: "En el campo internacional el presidente Barco denunciaba el problema ante las Naciones Unidas y otras instancias diplomaticas, hacienda hincapie en los vinculos entre narcotraficantes y el terrorismo y precisando que la lucha contra el fenomeno no era

The Colombian government's inability to fight the war on different fronts, i.e., drug trafficking, insurgencies and overall violence allowed foreign governments, like the United States, to intervene.<sup>229</sup> The most renowned and aggressive US-led initiative in Colombia was "Plan Colombia" – a strategy to commit war against drugs. As part of Plan Colombia, the US included an initiative called 'Alternative Development,' whereby the Colombian government (backed financially by the US government) convinced the Colombian coca farmers to farm legal crops as opposed to coca in exchange for financial assistance.

Although several reports mention joint "Public Forces," there is no doubt the focus both in training and mandate has been on the Colombian military rather than on the police. This is not to suggest that the police have not been involved but rather, their role has been inadequate. As indicated by Alfredo Rangel, the State's military offensive has had a substantive impact, particularly during Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's term in office from 2002 to 2010. As Alfredo Rangel explains,

The most significant development is [the fact that] for the first time in recent history, [the insurgencies] ceased to grow and their strength diminished very quickly and in a short period of time. The majority has deserted and become involved in governmental programs. Simultaneously, as a product of their weakness and dishonour, their recruiting capabilities within the rural population has also diminished; this has prevented them from replacing the combatants they have lost by incorporating new recruits.<sup>230</sup>

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unicamente responsabilidad de los países productores, sino que los países consumidores tendrían que actuar para reprimir el tráfico, el lavado de dinero y la adicción de sus nacionales."

<sup>229</sup> On December 1988, the United States' Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operation drafted a report titled "Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy." The Subcommittee's President at the time was senator John Kerry, who stated that Colombia was a "narcodemocracy"<sup>229</sup> and argued "the United States has not devoted the necessary resources to law enforcement intelligence gathering" and proposed to help Colombia fight the drug cartels via "increasing specialized assistance in communication and training for anti-narcotics police [and] work with the elements of the Colombian military and the police who have shown that are willing to take on the drug traffickers." This assistance remains active, to a lesser degree, to this day.

<sup>230</sup> Rangel, *Política de Seguridad y Democracia* p. 12. Original Spanish Text: "Lo más significativo es que por primera vez en su historia reciente dejaron de crecer y disminuyó su pie de fuerza de manera



However, there is still a long road ahead to end the insurgencies and the war on drugs; in spite of the foreign assistance the country has been receiving since the 1980s, not only financially but also in terms of training, the war on drugs, and the struggle against insurgencies are still ongoing. Additionally, as the military's involvement to tackle all of these issues has increased over the years, a new development has emerged in Colombia. Increasingly, the military are not only engaged in domestic security but they are acting as police.

### **c) Domestic Security: Military Acting As Police**

Chapters Two and Three briefly mention the emergence of “Military Police” programs and groups throughout South America. Previous chapters have differentiated “Military Police,” (MPs) in the traditional, US/Western sense (i.e. police for the military) from “Military Police” in South America (i.e. military acting as police in the streets). In addition to having the traditional MPs, Colombia also has a “Military Police” group in the South American context and it also stands out as being the only country in South America using its military as police within the state.

The majority of the South American states reviewed in this thesis currently have MP Programs in place. These MP groups tackle specific domestic issues that relate to security.<sup>231</sup> However, rather than functioning solely as police for the military (as is the case in the United States and the Western World in general), Colombia deploys its armed

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vertiginosa en muy corto tiempo. La mayoría ha desertado y se ha acogido a programas gubernamentales. En forma simultanea, producto de su debilidad y su desprestigio, entre la población campesina, ha caído su capacidad de reclutamiento con lo cual se le ha vuelto imposible recuperar las perdidas de combatientes antiguos con la incorporación de nuevos militantes.”

<sup>231</sup> For more information see the Mayor General Oscar Adolfo Naranjo Trujillo, Director General Policia Nacional de Colombia. “Manual de Operaciones Especiales de la Policia de Colombia,” November 2009.

forces to address the domestic insurgency issue.<sup>232</sup> David Mares argues,

Although most Latin American constitutions retain provisions that facilitate suspension of constitutional liberties in times of internal disorder, the use of the military for domestic control has become unpopular, except in Colombia and Peru for idiosyncratic reasons.<sup>233</sup>

David Mares refers to the ongoing-armed conflict as the ‘idiosyncratic reason’ for Colombia’s use of their military in domestic affairs. Notwithstanding, this is an uncommon use of the military for such operations, which is why there are two opposing pictures of the health of civil-military relations in Colombia: the one on paper and the one in practice.

Establishing what is meant by “Military Police” in the Latin American context proved to be a challenge for this thesis. I will continue to use MP to mean the traditional military police and Military Police to mean the new, Colombian form. For clarification purposes, in regard to Colombia, this research identified three different types of “military police” groups, and one particular issue with Colombia, which is using the Armed Forces in security matters, instead of using the police:

- i. MP in the traditional Western context. Literally “police for the military”
- ii. Military Police – Members of the military, in charge of special operations and task forces.
- iii. Militarized Police Forces – Similar to Brazil’s BOPE, these are police which have received military training.
- iv. Military taking on Police roles.

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<sup>232</sup> An example is the renowned case of the “Operacion Jaque” (Operation Checkmate) in 2008, which was planned, organized and successfully executed by the Colombian military and which resulted in the rescue of fifteen individuals held hostage by the FARC.

<sup>233</sup> David R. Mares “Chapter 9: Latin American Economic Integration and Democratic Control of the Military – Is There a Symbiotic Relationship?” *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. The University of North Carolina Press, 2001. p,223.

## **i. Military Police**

The *Escuela de Policia Militar* (Military Police School) is a branch within the Colombian National Army. As described on their website,<sup>234</sup> their academic profile offers three different courses: a bodyguard course, a course on manoeuvres in urban settings and a course on military police procedures. Although part of their description fits the standard US/Western version of MPs i.e., they are police for the military, the description of the course on manoeuvres in urban settings indicates there is an additional role the MPs play in Colombia, different from that of the US'. The description of the course states,

Upon completion of this course, officers and sub-officers will have the ability to rescue hostages in urban areas, develop special operations with snipers, capture and/or destroy terrorist [groups], provide protection to foreign dignitaries, carry-out hostage rescue operations in airplanes, buses, vehicles or trains, carry out special operations to capture heads of terrorist groups, drug-traffickers, and also develop and plan security studies regarding critical points considered to be potential targets for terrorist attacks in the most important cities of the country, [lastly] being members of a special task force.<sup>235</sup>

## **ii. Special Task Forces Within the Military Police**

When comparing descriptions like the one outlined above, to the US/Canada context, what stands out is the fact that in the Western world, these responsibilities would fall under special task forces, not MPs. Based on this comparison, Colombian military police seem to have responsibilities that are beyond the scope of the role military police have in the developed world and are somewhat in-line with other military special task

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<sup>234</sup> Escuela Policia Militar Official Website: <http://www.espom.mil.co/> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

<sup>235</sup> Escuela Policia Militar URL: <http://www.espom.mil.co> Original Soanish Text: “Al termino del curso los Oficiales y Suboficiales deberán de estar en la capacidad de Rescatar rehenes en áreas urbanas, desarrollar Operaciones especiales con francotiradores, Capturar y/o destruir núcleos terroristas, brindar protección a dignatarios, efectuar rescate rehenes en aeronaves, buses, vehículos o trenes, llevar a cabo operaciones especiales para la captura de cabecillas ya sean terroristas, subversivos o narcotraficantes, así mismo desarrollar y planear estudios de seguridad sobre los puntos críticos considerados blancos potenciales de ataques terroristas en las ciudades mas importantes del país; siendo miembro de una unidad especial.”

forces such as, Canada's JTF2 (Joint Task Force 2). As described on the Government of Canada's National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces' website:

Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) is a specialized unit within the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command that functions best when working jointly with every branch of the Canadian Armed Forces to support the Government of Canada. [They are] subject to exactly the same code of conduct, military discipline and overriding Criminal Code statutes as any other military unit. [Their main objective is to] protect the Canadian National Interest and combats terrorism at home and abroad.<sup>236</sup>

This is not to suggest that the Colombian military police in charge of these types of special operations are inconsistent with civil-military relations; rather, perhaps a new term should be in place to differentiate traditional MPs, in charge of policing the military, and the special operation groups.

### **iii. Militarized Police Forces**

In addition to the description from the Military Police School described above, there are groups within the police that have become "militarized" such as the Unidad de Comandos en Operaciones Especiales y Antiterrorismo, Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (Command Unit of Special Operations and Anti-terrorism) and Escuadrones Móviles de Carabineros (Mobile Carabineer Squads). In theory, these groups do not necessarily stray from the standard role of the police. The fact that their training has been enhanced and they have complemented military practices in their system for the purpose of efficacy is actually a positive feature. Again, the problem is the fact that it is unclear whether these groups were initially police who were militarized, or whether these are

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<sup>236</sup> Government of Canada, "National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2) URL: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-special-forces/jtf2.page> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014)

former military who have taken on police roles which has direct implications for civil-military relations.

There is confusion in determining whether these groups consist of military, (such as Canada's JTF2) or if they are police with military training, (similar to Brazil's BOPE.) Additionally, the purpose and the amount of time they are deployed for is also unclear at times.

Lastly, there are cases in which the military has full-fledged taken on police roles, or in other words, "security" roles (that including arresting Colombians) rather than defence roles.

#### **iv. Military Adopting Constabulary Roles**

The war on drugs and the insurgencies have demanded the Colombian military's involvement in internal security issues. In addition to the role of police for the military described above, there are special task units gathered from the military, which take on the role of police. Among the National Army, these groups are Brigada Contra el Narcotráfico (Counter-Narcotics Brigade), Agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales Antiterroristas Urbanas (Group of Special Urban Anti-Terrorist Forces), Agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales Antiterroristas Urbanas y Rurales (Group of Special Urban and Rural Anti-Terrorist Forces), Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales (Special Forces Brigade), Grupos Autónomos y Unificados por la Libertad y la Anti-extorsión (Anonymous and Unified Groups for Liberty and Anti-Extortion).

These groups have been trained by larger, more developed militaries, such as by the United States and Israel. Although the war on drugs and the insurgency problem remain a concern, the Colombian military has had some successes capturing key

insurgency leaders and drug lords. Arguably their four most successful stories are Operación Sodoma, Operación Camaleón, Operación Jaque and Operación Fénix. Whether or not the military were in charge of arresting, detaining and questioning civilians is unclear. However, it is important to note that the military was involved in the rescue of hostages and detainment of insurgents in these operations. In addition, when it comes to fighting the insurgencies, the government has essentially given the military *carte blanche*.

Colombia's president ordered the army "not to stop shooting" until the conflict with the FARC rebels is over, after 15 soldiers died in an ambush.<sup>237</sup>

The concern is that military laws do not apply and/or are not sufficient to constrain the tactics of military deployed in a domestic context.

In terms of civil-military relations a bigger problem is the fact that Colombians are killing Colombians which is why this function of the military overseeing national security is perhaps the most concerning in terms of civil-military relations. Civil-military relations theory states that armed forces' responsibilities lay in the "defence" of the state and police forces deal with "security" or domestic affairs. Interchanging roles is detrimental for both the military and the police and causes confusion on the ground for civilians. For the former, it is essentially sending mixed messages and for the latter, the fact that so much emphasis has been placed on the military might be interpreted as utter neglect of the police. This is equally concerning as it may allow corruption within the police to escalate, a problem that is very common in the region.

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<sup>237</sup> BBC. "Colombian President Vows to fight FARC After Killings." July 21, 2013. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23399636> (Date accessed: June 12, 2014).

If ever the insurgencies are eradicated and the war on drugs proves successful, Colombia could have problems reinstating the military back in its place within the “defence” boundaries, and a neglected police force that is not equipped with the tools and know-how to deal with “security” issues. Given that Colombia, as the rest of the South American states, are plagued with corruption and insecurity, these problems could arguably destroy any success and progress, the aftermath of which could last longer than the current civil war.

As indicated in a Colombian newspaper in 2013, Colombia’s biggest challenges after resolving the insurgency problem is to “de-militarize the police” and “reinstate the right to vote for both military and police,”<sup>238</sup> both of which have been key issues identified in this thesis as being detrimental to Colombia’s civil-military relations.

## **Conclusion**

There are numerous issues with civil-military relations in Colombia. First, Colombia seems to be aware of the goals of civil-military relations (firm civilian control over a professional military) and have taken some steps to improve relations. Second, despite having the appropriate laws and procedures on paper, at times enshrined in their Constitution, there are still some issues of concern. The most obvious are the ban on voting for military members and the continued mandatory service required of young adults. Third, the paper analysis of Colombia is at odds with practice in Colombia, especially if domestic insurgencies, the war on drugs and general instability are

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<sup>238</sup> “Desmilitar' a la Policía, una de las tareas para el posconflicto,” (24 de Mayo de 2013) *Vanguardia*. URL: <http://www.vanguardia.com/actualidad/colombia/209551-desmilitar-a-la-policia-una-de-las-tareas-para-el-posconflicto> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014).

considered; increasingly, the government is resorting to deploying the military in the streets of Colombia which is counter to the ideal of civil-military relations.

There is no doubt that three specific situations relating to Colombia, i.e., insurgencies, war on drugs have taken a toll on every aspect of society, including civil-military relations. Although these situations are more symptomatic of a deeper, far more complex problem, the fact remains that the use of the military to address these three issues will arguably deteriorate Colombia's civil-military relations. Once the armed conflict is resolved and the war on drugs is under control, it could be much harder to reinstate the military to a strictly defence role. The more immediate concern, however, is the confusion the deployment of police and military can have for the ordinary citizen. Police begin to look like military and vice-versa, but only police have the power to arrest and detain. Oversight and accountability, therefore, become more difficult to monitor.

Chapter Five outlines the conclusions of this research study noting, in particular, the major challenges South American states are facing in terms of civil-military relations and expands on the lessons learned from the Colombian case.



## Chapter Five

### Conclusions and Recommendations

The first four chapters of this thesis outlined what have been considered by the literature to be the most important variables used to define healthy civil-military relations. These variables were gathered from three main sources i.e., Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* and Samuel Finer's *The Man on Horseback*. These books form the foundation of civil-military relations theory and emphasize the importance of strong civilian control over a professional, voluntary and compliant military. These iconic texts were written during the Cold War and are, for the most part, Western-focused. Therefore, their applicability to developing, South American states has always been problematic. In the main, however, as they represent the core texts for civil-military relations and they remain touchstone documents that must be consulted.

The next step was to glean the important variables (15 in total) that indicate “healthy” civil-military relations and see if they are present in the twelve states of South America. To make sure the paper study matched practice, a case study of Colombia was made as it fell in the middle of the states that had “healthy” relations according to the 15 variables.

The main research question posed was: **how healthy are civil-military relations in South America relative to the ideal variables established in the civil-military relations' literature?** The hypotheses were

H<sub>1</sub> – South American states do not have many of the ideal civil-military relations variables.

H<sub>0</sub> – South American states do have many of the ideal civil-military relations variables.

Upon a review of the 15 civil-military relations variables and the twelve South American states, we can reject the null hypothesis, but with a qualification. The results suggest that some of the South American states have more of the healthy civil-military relations variables in place than others. Indeed, there is a bimodal distribution in which roughly half of the states could qualify as having “good” relations and the other half do not. To ensure that the paper evaluation matches practice, a review of Colombia was made.

H<sub>2</sub> – Since Colombia, on paper, has more of the ideal civil-military relations variables than the other South American states, its civil-military relations should be relatively healthier in practice.

H<sub>0</sub> – Colombia either does not have more of the ideal variables than the other South American states or there are other variables at play damaging Colombia’s civil-military relations.

Upon reviewing specific situations in Colombia (especially the internal insurgencies led by the FARC and ELN) and the war on drugs, I cannot reject the null hypothesis. Indeed, civil-military relations in Colombia are quite complicated. Colombia has not suffered from military coups and does have a reasonably well-trained and professional military, which suggests relations are healthy, as shown by the paper evaluation. However, the military is not allowed to vote, mandatory service is still required and the military are deployed for longer periods of time with fuzzy mandates inside the state to help deal with the insurgency and drug trafficking problems. These

factors, not discussed in the traditional civil-military relations literature, are, potentially, very damaging to civil-military relations given that the Colombian military, increasingly, is asked to take on constabulary-like roles rather than concentrate solely on defence against a foreign enemy.

Several conclusions can be drawn from each of the chapters in this thesis. Chapter Two revealed what the literature suggests are the most important variables used to determine whether or not a country has healthy civil-military relations. The analysis of Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* and Samuel Finer's *The Man on Horseback*, and several articles from *Armed Forces & Society* (the leading civil-military relations journal), pinpointed fifteen variables which were then separated into two groups; the "Civil" variables (eight in total) and the "Military" variables (seven in total). This is not to suggest that these are the only variables mentioned in the literature, but rather, these were chosen because they are considered to be the most relevant.

In addition, Chapter Two concluded that despite the fact that the touchstone works are still important in this field, they were written in a different time in history and in a different context<sup>239</sup> and therefore, they might not be as relevant as they once were – even more so when applied to the developing world. Since the 1960s, new variables have developed that are not accounted for in these works, and which have had a strong impact on civil-military relations. Issues such as terrorism, cyber warfare, changes in technology and other asymmetric threats have impacted virtually every country in the world and have

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<sup>239</sup> This refers to the works that are often used as blueprints such as by Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and by Samuel Finer. This does not refer to the numerous journal articles or less known and read books. These books were written roughly five decades ago, despite still being relevant to discussions on civil-military relations, the background Cold War context has now changed for a new, post-9/11 context.

resulted in changes to governments and to militaries around the world. In terms of civil-military relations, these new threats have blurred the roles of civilians, military and police – although this change has been more drastic in some countries, it is clear that the difference in mandates between military and police, especially in developing states, with competing budgetary and other pressures are either overlooked, ignored or blended. Police are looking like and acting more like military and vice versa. The result is confusion for citizens and a potential threat for civil-military relations.

These new developments indicate an update to the literature would be advisable. Although numerous articles relating to civil-military relations continue to be published, the impact these have on the study of civil-military relations is not comparable to the impact Samuel Huntington's, Morris Janowitz's and Samuel Finer's works have had and continue to have in this field. The underlying assumptions of civil-military relations, therefore, continue to be coloured and shaped with a Western and particularly, US model in mind. This means that non-Western and especially developing states may not match the "ideal" outlined by the literature via the 15 variables. However, I cannot ascertain definitively, based on this study, whether or not the ideal needs to be changed for developing countries and/or changed to reflect new threats and technologies generally.

Chapter Three evaluated the health status of civil-military relations in the twelve South American states, by applying the fifteen variables gathered from the main sources of literature reviewed in Chapter Two, and comparing the results to the 'ideal' civil-military relations, namely, the United States. In addition, seven more "State Comparative" variables were included in the assessment. These "general" variables provided the contextual background necessary for the comparison of all the South

American states. This chapter provided two main conclusions; first, although there seems to be evidence that South American states have taken an interest in improving their civil-military relations,<sup>240</sup> at least half of these countries are still far away from having ‘ideal’ civil-military relations. The fact that even the highest scoring countries still scored poorly in some variables e.g., the level of trust Brazilians have in their military is surprisingly low, Venezuela continues to allow active military to participate in politics and Colombia is the only country in the region where the military is not allowed to vote – all suggest that, in spite of the improvements these countries have made since the 1980s (the end of the coups d’état era in Latin America), they are still far from the ideal and most importantly, these results questioned whether practice actually matched paper. Nevertheless, there seems to exist two different versions of South America – the first group is comprised of the highest scoring/ranking countries in terms of civil-military relations and the second group, by the lowest scoring/ranking countries.

The second conclusion is that, lurking behind these results are other, state-specific variables that may be influencing the civil-military relations variables. The range of results of this study shown by the bimodal distribution of ideal variables, suggests, at a minimum, future studies should consider additional variables (such as socioeconomic status, government/military history, relationship to the US military and internal stability issues) that need to be considered in conjunction with the strictly civil-military variables.

Chapter Four included a case study of Colombia. While ranking in the middle of the states with better civil-military relations, there are state-specific contexts that

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<sup>240</sup> Evidence of this fact is found in the increasing number of military colleges, and the curricula these colleges follow. In addition, there has been an increase in international exposure, by means of international conferences, congresses and training abroad.

complicate the picture. The domestic insurgencies (FARC and ELN), the war on drugs and the military taking on police roles for extended periods of time due to high levels of insecurity, are not captured in the ideal model of civil-military relations but they can impact the results. The expanding role and scope of the insurgents and drug traffickers are the main reasons why the Colombian military has been deployed inside the state for longer periods of time beyond what can be classified as simply occasional “aid to the civil powers.” Deployment of the military inside the state except in times of acute crises, for very specific time frames and to aid other agencies (to help during an earthquake or flood, for example) is expressly discouraged in the literature; the military is in the business of defence, not internal security. Even if there is a “foreign factor”<sup>241</sup> present in the insurgency issue and the war on drugs, the length of time the military is deployed internally and the range of mandates given (to include the arrest and detention of Colombians – normally a police role) is worrying for civil-military relations.

How will the government ensure that the military returns to or does not neglect its defence role? How will they strip their military from the constabulary roles they have been playing for decades? Are civilians sure who is protecting them? Are the military trained, equipped and/or given officer powers to do the job of a police officer and wider implications for the continued need for both police and military? These are questions this thesis is not seeking to answer, but merely to highlight as future policy considerations for Colombia and South America.

Arguably, if the same in-depth review was made for the remaining eleven South American states, new variables, specific to these countries might also be revealed. Given

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<sup>241</sup> The involvement of foreign states in the insurgency problem and the war on drugs due to the kidnapping of foreigners and the drug connection that exists between countries.

the vast differences that exist between countries, particularly between developed and developing states, the need to find more authors that can write about civil-military relations with these differences in mind is imperative. The lack of authors or studies on this subject further stresses the caution developing countries must take when exporting literature and lessons learned from developed countries into their own. For instance, as discussed briefly in Chapters Three and Four, in the case of South America and Colombia, respectively, despite the fact that all of the States reviewed in this thesis have controls over the Armed Forces embedded in their constitutions, there have been times when proper civilian control has been lacking. This has arguably been due to weak civilian institutions, inefficient and unprepared civilian bureaucracies and most importantly, high levels of corruption in both civil and military institutions. If the civilian power is weak, little to no control can be enforced over a military – including ensuring their military is professional – this weakness on the part of civilians is not contemplated in the literature, because it was written with the US in mind, a country which is far more developed, democratic and with stronger civil institutions, and many more oversight mechanisms in place (Senate and House committees, think tanks, universities, NGOs, lobby groups etc.) than those in South America.

Therefore, with the developing world in mind and given that it is clear that civil-military relations are a delicate balance, one which relies mostly on the ability of civilians to properly organize themselves and their institutions (including the military), this thesis has identified two variables to consider in future literature about civil-military, particularly in the South American context. These are corruption and socioeconomic instability. This thesis acknowledges that correlation does not imply causation; this

research is simply inferring an association but not a definitive cause between these factors.

Corruption is a factor which has undeniably become an obstacle for proper civilian governance in South America; one which has made it nearly impossible for states to enforce Huntington's and Janowitz's principle i.e., absolute civilian control. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, "scoring less than 50 out of 100, almost 70% of countries is perceived to have a serious [corruption] problem."<sup>242</sup> Among the South American states reviewed in this thesis, only Uruguay and Chile scored higher than 50%,<sup>243</sup> the remaining ten states scored lower than 42, the lowest being Venezuela with a score of 20%. In terms of civil-military relations, the fact that corruption has infiltrated all levels of civil and military institutions, including the judicial system, is very concerning. In addition to having under qualified, inefficient and (more often than not, corrupt) police forces, the high rates of impunity are a major setback and a pressing concern.

Additionally, in terms of socioeconomic instability, in the past, whenever inequality worsened and development was stalled, rates in violence and insecurity spiked. Indeed, according to United Nations Development Programme's "Regional Development Report 2014", 8% of the world's population is in Latin America, and 42% of homicides worldwide occur in this region.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> Transparency International, "Corruptions Perception Index 2013," p. 1.

<sup>243</sup> Uruguay scored 73% and Chile 70%, compared to the US which scored 73% and Canada which had the highest score in the Americas (80%) – these two South American countries are not too far off the "ideal" in terms of corruption.

<sup>244</sup> America Economia "La violencia nuestra de todos los dias" April 2014. Original Spanish Text: "Con el 8% de la poblacion mundial, America Latina es escenario del 42% de los homicidios que ocurren en el planeta, segun el Informe Regional de Desarrollo Humano 2014, elaborado por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)."



Citizen security, as defined [by] the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), is a sensitive issue, which preoccupies many political decision-makers, and reverberates in the heat of electoral campaigns. It is not surprising that the issue has escalated in Latin America to become the number one public concern in many countries. The level of insecurity many experience impedes human development.<sup>245</sup>

Given the high levels of corruption, impunity and socioeconomic instability that currently exist in the region, one can appreciate why governments have come to rely more on their militaries. Militaries are better trained, prepared, and arguably, better educated than the police (and some credit must go to the civil-military relations theory for encouraging this), which is why they are the default solution for most South American states. They can be deployed immediately (and the state is already paying their salaries) rather than wait to train/improve/hire more police.

Previous chapters emphasized the growing concern that exists in South America regarding the increasing numbers of the military assuming police roles. “Military Police Programs” might be the short-term solution to some of these countries, but they pose a potential problem in the long-term. If these social conditions are not improved or resolved, the military’s involvement can be expected to increase, and the effect this would have on civil-military relations can be speculated to be unfavourable at best.

Secondly, if the status quo remains unchanged, and the military continues to be the default solution to address security issues, the military’s relationship with society might also deteriorate. This assumption is based on the friction that has existed between civilians and the military. Alfredo Rangel explains, “...there is a long and widespread tradition of distrust that exists between the civil power and the military. This situation has

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<sup>245</sup> UNDP ‘Citizen Security,’ Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014 p.III.

affected both developed and developing countries, from the north and the south, even when such tensions and conflicts have been expressed in different ways and have had different outcomes and consequences in some cases.”<sup>246</sup> Increasingly, the military’s level of involvement in society might have a negative impact on the existing amity for the military this thesis revealed exists in most South American countries.

In sum, although this thesis does not attempt to provide an answer to these two issues that relate to South America i.e., corruption and socioeconomic instability, it does recognize that there are two “routes” South American countries could explore in an attempt to improve their civil-military relations. This is not to suggest these are the only options; there could be many more, all of which will have pros and cons that need to be weighed and studied further.

First, countries that consistently ranked among the lowest six could consider eliminating their military altogether and essentially, take the Iceland route. Iceland has no military. Rather, it depends on allies to provide it with defence, if required. While seemingly an easy solution, there are several problems. A) It is clear that in politics, where you sit determines where you stand; South American countries do not have the geographic advantage Iceland has – an island in the Arctic Ocean. In this respect, foreign threats to South America are not only considered imminent, but hours away from borders and likely from a neighbouring state. South America has a history of continental,

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<sup>246</sup> Rangel, p. 201. Original Spanish Text: “Existe una larga y difundida tradicion de desconfianza entre el poder civil y los militares. Esta situacion ha afectado tanto a paises desarrollados como a los mas atrasados, del norte y del sur, aun cuando esas tensiones y conflictos se hayan expresado de diferente forma y hayan sido distintos los desenlaces y las consecuencias en unos y en otros casos.”

interstate wars.<sup>247</sup> B), South American states are not as financially, politically and socially developed as Iceland. More economic prosperity seems to help encourage stability. C), the United States and NATO (the main guarantor of defence for Iceland) cannot afford to take all these countries under its wing, as the US has done with Costa Rica and Panama. D), these countries do not have strong civilian institutions or strong police forces. Indeed, some civilian governments have come to depend on the military so much to do all sorts of work for the state beyond defence that their removal may create more instability and create the conditions for an armed attack by a foreign element. Therefore, the “Iceland” option seems a remote possibility.

A second option would be to invest more on police forces, similar to what the UK has done with the “New Scotland Yard.”<sup>248</sup> As mentioned before, the main reason why South American states have come to rely on the military so much is largely due to underfunded/undertrained/corrupt police. The focus of this research study was not on police forces but military and therefore the evidence related to proper police training is limited to military police programs only. However, based on the evidence related to corruption and security, it is clear that police forces in South America generally are not keeping pace with growing insecurity in many states. Indeed, no police force in the region can afford to claim, as UK police do that their objectives are “...to cut crime, cut costs, and continue to develop the culture of the organization. We will achieve this with; humility, integrity and transparency. We will develop making [this] the best police

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<sup>247</sup> For a detailed account of interstate conflicts and disputes in Latin America see: Jorge I. Dominguez et al., “*Boundary Disputes in Latin America*,” United States Institute of Peace (USIP), September 2003, No. 50.

<sup>248</sup> The Metropolitan Police or New Scotland Yard polices the various boroughs of London. One of the key principles of modern policing in Britain is that the police seek to work with the community and as part of the community.

service in the world.”<sup>249</sup> Indeed, most South American police are more concerned with surviving a day’s work. This may require reducing the number of military so that funds can be redirected to the police.

Arguably, the biggest takeaway from this research project is that civil-military relations’ literature needs new injects that start with the contexts of developing states. Similar to Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*, Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* and Finer’s *The Man on Horseback*, the new literature would introduce different/additional/state-specific civil-military variables. Similarly, in terms of South American and Colombian civil-military relations, perhaps what is needed is not more military involvement, but better trained, paid and educated public forces. What is needed is not to build larger bureaucracies, but improve the existing institutions by specifically targeting and eradicating corruption and impunity. In order to determine how viable these solutions are and most importantly, how they can be implemented successfully, a more in-depth investigation and analysis is required.

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<sup>249</sup> Metropolitan Police London, “Objectives” URL: <http://content.met.police.uk/Site/totalpolicing> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

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
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**Annex 1 - Panel on Research Ethics Certificate of Completion**

Figure 1.1 – TCPS 2: Core – Certificate of Completion



## Figure 1.2 – Research Ethics and Compliance: Approval Certificate



Human Ethics  
208-194 Dafoe Road  
Winnipeg, MB  
Canada R3T 2N2  
Phone +204-474-7122  
Fax +204-269-7173

### APPROVAL CERTIFICATE

August 22, 2013

**TO:** Gabriela Perez (Advisor J. Fergusson)  
Principal Investigator [REDACTED]

**FROM:** Susan Frohlick, Chair  
Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB)

**Re:** Protocol #J2013:113  
"Latin American Coups D'états and the Special Case of Colombia"

Please be advised that your above-referenced protocol has received human ethics approval by the **Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board**, which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement (2). **This approval is valid for one year only.**

Any significant changes of the protocol and/or informed consent form should be reported to the Human Ethics Secretariat in advance of implementation of such changes.

**Please note:**

- If you have funds pending human ethics approval, please mail/e-mail/fax (261-0325) a copy of this Approval (identifying the related UM Project Number) to the Research Grants Officer in ORS in order to initiate fund setup. (How to find your UM Project Number: <http://umanitoba.ca/research/ors/mrt-faq.html#pr0>)
- if you have received multi-year funding for this research, responsibility lies with you to apply for and obtain Renewal Approval at the expiry of the initial one-year approval; otherwise the account will be locked.

The Research Quality Management Office may request to review research documentation from this project to demonstrate compliance with this approved protocol and the University of Manitoba *Ethics of Research Involving Humans*.

**The Research Ethics Board requests a final report for your study (available at: [http://umanitoba.ca/research/orec/ethics/human\\_ethics\\_REB\\_forms\\_guidelines.html](http://umanitoba.ca/research/orec/ethics/human_ethics_REB_forms_guidelines.html)) in order to be in compliance with Tri-Council Guidelines.**

**Annex 2 - Questionnaire for Interviewees in Colombia**



### Questionnaire

Thesis Title: “*Latin American Coups D’état and the Special Case of Colombia*”

1. In your professional opinion, how would you describe civil-military relations in Colombia today generally speaking?
2. The literature often describes Colombia as being among the strongest democracies in Latin America; what role do you think civil-military relations have played in this regard?
3. What do you consider to be distinct about civil-military relations in Colombia relative to other Latin American states?
4. Which civil-military factors do you consider have been historically present in Latin American countries that have experienced military coups?
5. Which of the factors above would you say have been present in Colombia?
6. How would you describe General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s government in terms of civil-military relations relative to other Latin American military governments between the 1950s-1980s?
7. In your professional opinion, what factors or events led Latin American countries to shift from military to democratic governments in the 1980s? Which of these factors apply to Colombia?
8. Colombia has largely avoided military governments. Why do you think that has been the case, in your professional opinion?
9. What role has civil-military relations in Colombia made either to improve or exacerbate political and military tensions?
10. What factors would you consider have influenced civil-military relations in Colombia?

If you have any questions or would like more details about this questionnaire, please feel free to contact the researchers:

Gabriela Perez  
M.A. Student  
University of Manitoba

████████████████████  
████████████████████

Dr. James Fergusson, PhD  
Professor of Political Studies  
351 University College  
University of Manitoba  
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2M8

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████████████████████

**Annex 3 – List of Interviewees in Colombia**

### List of Interviewees

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Location</b>
<b>1</b>	Tuesday, August 6, 2013	Director at the Centre of Security and Democracy	Bogota, Colombia
<b>2</b>	Tuesday, August 6, 2013	Director at a Non-Profit Organization	Bogota, Colombia
<b>3</b>	Thursday, August 8, 2013	Professor at Universidad de los Andes	Bogota, Colombia
<b>4</b>	Thursday, August 8, 2013	Director at a Non Governmental Organization (NGO)	Bogota, Colombia
<b>5</b>	Friday, August 9, 2013	Retired Colonel of the Colombian Army	Bogota, Colombia
<b>6</b>	Friday, August 9, 2013	Lieutenant Colonel of the Colombian Army	Bogota, Colombia
<b>7</b>	Monday, August 12, 2013	Professor at Universidad Nacional de Colombia	Bogota, Colombia

**Annex 4 - Map of South America**

**Figure 1.3 – Map of South America**



**Annex 5 - Variable Codebook**

GENERAL STATE SPECIFIC		
V1	Population Size	Data is in the Millions
		Source: World Bank Database - <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V2	Size of State	Land Area (squared km)
		Source: World Bank Database - <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?page=2">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?page=2</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V3	Population Density	People per squared km of land area
		Source: World Bank Database <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST/countries?display=default">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST/countries?display=default</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V4	Type of Government	Democratic = 1
		Non-Democratic = 0
		Not Available/Applicable = -99
		Source: <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Comp/Estado/nombre.html">http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Comp/Estado/nombre.html</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V5	Literacy Rates	Adult Total (% of people ages 15 and above)
		Data for all the years assessed (1990, 2000, 2010, 2012) is not available for all countries. 2009 is used as the comparative year, considering most countries had data available for that year. However, there is no data for Argentina, Peru and Suriname have in 2009, so year closest to 2009 is used for comparison, as will be indicated in the pivot table.
		Source: World Bank Database - <a href="http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=literacy+rates&amp;topic_exact%5B%5D=Education">http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=literacy+rates&amp;topic_exact%5B%5D=Education</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		There was no information available for the United States for any of the years assessed. A different source was used.
		US Source: <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html</a> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

V6	GDP	Data is in US Dollars Source: <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=4">World Bank Database - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=4</a> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V7	GDP per Capita	GDP divided by midyear population. Source: <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD</a> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>CIVIL-MILITARY</b>		
V1	Constitutional Control Over the Military	<p><b>Argentina</b> –“ ARTÍCULO 10.- Compete al Presidente de la Nación en su carácter de jefe supremo de la misma y comandante en jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas, la dirección de la defensa nacional y la conducción de las fuerzas Armadas, en los términos establecidos por la Constitución Nacional.”</p> <p>Source: Ley No. 23544 - Ley de la Defensa Nacional. URL: <a href="http://www.ara.mil.ar/pag.asp?idItem=91">http://www.ara.mil.ar/pag.asp?idItem=91</a> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p> <p><b>Bolivia</b> – “Art 245 – La organización de las Fuerzas Armadas descansa en su jerarquía y disciplina. Es esencialmente obediente, no delibera y esta sujeta a las leyes y a los reglamentos militares. Como organismo institucional, no realiza acción política; individualmente, sus miembros gozan y ejercen los derechos de ciudadanía en las condiciones establecidas por la ley.”</p> <p>“Art. 246 – Las Fuerzas Armadas dependen del Presidente del Estado y reciben sus órdenes, en lo administrativo, por intermedio del Ministro de Defensa y en lo técnico, del Comandante en Jefe. En caso de guerra, el Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas dirigirá las operaciones.”</p> <p>Source: Ley Organica de las Fuerzas Armadas, Ministerio de Defensa del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia URL: <a href="http://www.mindef.gob.bo/mindef/node/29">http://www.mindef.gob.bo/mindef/node/29</a> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p>



**Brazil** – “Art. 142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na hierarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem.

§ 1º - Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, no preparo e no emprego das Forças Armadas.

§ 2º - Não caberá "habeas-corpus" em relação a punições disciplinares militares.

§ 3º Os membros das Forças Armadas são denominados militares, aplicando-se-lhes, além das que vierem a ser fixadas em lei, as seguintes disposições: (Incluído pela Emenda Constitucional nº 18, de 1998)”

Source: CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988

URL:

[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/constituicao/ConstituicaoCompilado.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/ConstituicaoCompilado.htm)

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

“Art. 142. Las Fuerzas Armadas, constituidas por la Marina, por el Ejército y por la Fuerza Aérea son instituciones nacionales permanentes y regulares, organizadas con base en la jerarquía y la disciplina, bajo la autoridad suprema del Presidente de la República, y que tienen como misión la defensa de la Patria, la garantía de los poderes constitucionales y, por iniciativa de cualquiera de estos, de la ley y del orden.”

Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitution of Brazil (1988)

URL:

<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/esp88.html#mozTocId639299>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Chile** – “Artículo 101. Las Fuerzas dependientes del Ministerio encargado de la Defensa Nacional están constituidas única y exclusivamente por las Fuerzas Armadas y por las Fuerzas de Orden y Seguridad Pública. Las Fuerzas Armadas están integradas sólo por el Ejército, la Armada y la Fuerza Aérea, existen para la defensa de la patria, son esenciales para la seguridad nacional y garantizan el orden institucional de la República. Las Fuerzas de Orden y Seguridad Pública están integradas sólo por Carabineros e Investigaciones, constituyen la fuerza pública y existen para dar eficacia al derecho, garantizar el orden público y la seguridad pública interior, en la forma que lo determinen sus respectivas leyes orgánicas. Carabineros se integrará, además, con las Fuerzas Armadas en la misión de garantizar el orden institucional de la República. Las Fuerzas Armadas y Carabineros, como cuerpos armados, son esencialmente obedientes y no deliberantes. Las fuerzas dependientes del Ministerio encargado de la Defensa Nacional son además profesionales, jerarquizadas y disciplinadas.”

Source: Constitucion Politica de la Republic de Chile (Septiembre 2005)

URL: [http://www.camara.cl/camara/media/docs/constitucion\\_politica.pdf](http://www.camara.cl/camara/media/docs/constitucion_politica.pdf)

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Colombia**

“ARTICULO 217. La Nación tendrá para su defensa unas Fuerzas Militares permanentes constituidas por el Ejército, la Armada y la Fuerza Aérea. Las Fuerzas Militares tendrán como finalidad primordial la defensa de la soberanía, la independencia, la integridad del territorio nacional y del orden constitucional. La Ley determinará el sistema de reemplazos en las Fuerzas Militares, así como los ascensos, derechos y obligaciones de sus miembros y el régimen especial de carrera, prestacional y disciplinario, que les es propio.”

“ARTICULO 219. La Fuerza Pública no es deliberante; no podrá reunirse sino por orden de autoridad legítima, ni dirigir peticiones, excepto sobre asuntos que se relacionen con el servicio y la moralidad del respectivo cuerpo y con arreglo a la ley.”

Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitución de 1991 con reformas hasta 2005

URL: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/colombia/col91.html>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Ecuador** – “Art. 158.- Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional son instituciones de protección de los derechos, libertades y garantías de los ciudadanos. Las Fuerzas Armadas tienen como misión fundamental la defensa de la soberanía y la integridad territorial. La protección interna y el mantenimiento del orden público son funciones privativas del Estado y responsabilidad de la Policía Nacional. Las servidoras y servidores de las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional se formarán bajo los fundamentos de la democracia y de los derechos humanos, y respetarán la dignidad y los derechos de las personas sin discriminación alguna y con apego irrestricto al ordenamiento jurídico.”

“Art. 159.- Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional serán obedientes y no deliberantes, y cumplirán su misión con estricta sujeción al poder civil y a la Constitución. Las autoridades de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional serán responsables por las órdenes que impartan. La obediencia a las órdenes superiores no eximirá de responsabilidad a quienes las ejecuten.”

Source: Constitución del Ecuador 2008

[http://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/noticia/constituciones\\_del\\_ecuador](http://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/noticia/constituciones_del_ecuador)

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

-

**Guyana** - “197A (2) The Defence and Security Forces shall subordinate to national defence and security policy and owe allegiance to the Constitution and to the Nation. The oath taken by members of the Defence and Security Forces shall establish their duty to respect the Constitution.”

Source:

URL: [http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/guy/en\\_guy-int-text-const.pdf](http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/guy/en_guy-int-text-const.pdf)

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

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**Paraguay** – “Artículo 173 - DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación constituye una institución nacional que será organizada con carácter permanente, profesional, no deliberante, obediente, subordinada a los poderes del Estado y sujeta a las disposiciones de esta constitución y de las leyes. Su misión es la de custodiar la integridad territorial y la de defender a las autoridades legítimamente constituidas, conformes con esta Constitución y las leyes. Su organización y sus efectivos serán determinados por la ley. Los militares en servicio activo ajustarán su desempeño a las leyes y reglamentos, y no podrán afiliarse a partido o a movimiento político alguno, ni realizar ningún tipo de actividad política.”

Source: Constitucion Nacional de Paraguay, Junio 1992.

URL: [http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/par\\_res3.htm](http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/par_res3.htm)

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Peru** – “Artículo 168.- Organización y funciones de las Fuerzas Armadas y Policía Nacional Las leyes y los reglamentos respectivos determinan la organización, las funciones, las especialidades, la preparación y el empleo; y norman la disciplina de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional. Las Fuerzas Armadas organizan sus reservas y disponen de ellas según las necesidades de la Defensa Nacional, de acuerdo a ley.

“Artículo 169.- Carácter no deliberante de las Fuerzas Armadas y Policía Nacional Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional no son deliberantes. Están subordinadas al poder constitucional.”

Source: Constitucion Politica del Peru

URL: <http://www.tc.gob.pe/legconperu/constitucion.html>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Suriname** – “Article 177:

1. The National Army shall have as its task the defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Suriname against foreign, military, armed aggression.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the previous paragraph, the army can be charged with special tasks to be defined by law.

3. The army shall carry out its task under the responsibility of and in subordination to the competent authority and in accordance with the prevailing legislation.

4. The organisation of the National Army and the legal status of the servicemen shall be defined by law.”

		<p>Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitution of Suriname, 1987 with Reforms of 1992</p> <p><a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Suriname/english.html">URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Suriname/english.html</a></p> <p>(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p>
		<p><b>Uruguay</b> – “Artículo 18 - Las Fuerzas Armadas están integradas por la Armada Nacional, el Ejército Nacional y la Fuerza Aérea Uruguaya. Se constituyen como la rama organizada, equipada, instruida y entrenada para ejecutar los actos militares que imponga la Defensa Nacional. Su cometido fundamental es la defensa de la soberanía, la independencia e integridad territorial, la salvaguarda de los recursos estratégicos del país que determine el Poder Ejecutivo y contribuir a preservar la paz de la República en el marco de la Constitución y las leyes.”</p>
		<p>Source: Ley Marco de Defensa Nacional Ley No. 18.650 - Ministerio de Defensa Nacional</p> <p><a href="http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=ley-18650">URL: http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=ley-18650</a></p> <p>(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p>
		<p><b>Venezuela</b> – “Artículo 328. La Fuerza Armada Nacional constituye una institución esencialmente profesional, sin militancia política, organizada por el Estado para garantizar la independencia y soberanía de la Nación y asegurar la integridad del espacio geográfico, mediante la defensa militar, la cooperación en el mantenimiento del orden interno y la participación activa en el desarrollo nacional, de acuerdo con esta Constitución y con la ley. En el cumplimiento de sus funciones, está al servicio exclusivo de la Nación y en ningún caso al de persona o parcialidad política alguna. Sus pilares fundamentales son la disciplina, la obediencia y la subordinación. La Fuerza Armada Nacional está integrada por el Ejército, la Armada, la Aviación y la Guardia Nacional, que funcionan de manera integral dentro del marco de su competencia para el cumplimiento de su misión, con un régimen de seguridad social integral propio, según lo establezca su respectiva ley orgánica.”</p>
		<p>Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitucion de 1999 con reformas hasta 2009</p> <p><a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html">URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html</a></p> <p>(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p>
V2	Military Vote	<p><b>Coding:</b></p> <p>Yes = 1</p> <p>No = 0</p>

Not available/applicable = -99
<b>Argentina</b> – Artículo 1.- Electores. Son electores nacionales los ciudadanos de ambos sexos nativos, por opción y naturalizados, desde los dieciocho años cumplidos de edad, que no tengan ninguna de las inhabilitaciones previstas en esta ley
Artículo 3. - Quiénes están excluidos. Están excluidos del padrón electoral:
a) Los dementes declarados tales en juicio; (Inciso sustituido por art. 72 de la Ley N° 26.571 B.O. 14/12/2009)
b) (Inciso derogado por art. 73 de la Ley N° 26.571 B.O. 14/12/2009)
c) (Inciso derogado por art. 1° de la Ley N° 24.904, B.O.18/12/1997. Vigencia: a partir de su sanción. );
d) (Inciso derogado por art. 3° de la Ley N° 25.858 B.O. 6/1/2004);
e) Los condenados por delitos dolosos a pena privativa de la libertad, y, por sentencia ejecutoriada, por el término de la condena;
f) Los condenados por faltas previstas en las leyes nacionales y provinciales de juegos prohibidos, por el término de tres años; en el caso de reincidencia, por seis;
g) Los sancionados por la infracción de deserción calificada, por el doble término de la duración de la sanción;
h) (Inciso derogado por art. 3° de la Ley N° 25.858 B.O. 6/1/2004);
i) Los declarados rebeldes en causa penal, hasta que cese la rebeldía o se opere la prescripción:
j) (Inciso derogado por art. 3° de la Ley N° 25.858 B.O. 6/1/2004);
k) (Inciso derogado por art. 3° de la Ley N° 25.858 B.O. 6/1/2004);
l) Los inhabilitados según disposiciones de la Ley Orgánica de los Partidos Políticos;
m) Los que en virtud de otras prescripciones legales y reglamentarias quedaren inhabilitados para el ejercicio de los derechos políticos.
Artículo 3° bis.- Los procesados que se encuentren cumpliendo prisión preventiva, tendrán derecho a emitir su voto en todos los actos eleccionarios que se celebren durante el lapso en que se encuentren detenidos.
Source: Código Electoral Nacional Ley No. 19.945- Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas
<a href="http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/19442/texact.htm">http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/19442/texact.htm</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Bolivia** – Artículo 141°.- (NORMAS PARA LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y POLICIALES). Durante el período electoral, las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación y la Policía Nacional observarán las siguientes normas: a) Un mes antes y hasta ocho días después de las elecciones, no se llamará a períodos extraordinarios de instrucción o maniobras a ciudadanos que no estén en servicio activo. Con anticipación de ocho días a cada elección, ningún ciudadano podrá ser perseguido como omiso al servicio militar. b) Queda prohibida la concentración de tropas o cualquier ostentación de fuerza pública armada en los lugares y día de elección. c) Durante el día de las elecciones, toda la fuerza pública será puesta a disposición y mando de las Cortes, Jueces y Jurados Electorales. d) Excepto las fuerzas de Policía necesarias para mantener el orden, las demás fuerzas públicas permanecerán acuarteladas hasta que concluya el escrutinio y cómputo de las mesas. e) Los ciudadanos que estén en servicio activo podrán sufragar uniformados, pero sin armas, siéndoles prohibido permanecer en el recinto electoral más del tiempo estrictamente necesario. f) Las Fuerzas Armadas no podrán trasladar grupos de conscriptos una vez cerrado el período de inscripciones.

Source: Codigo Electoral de Bolivia Ley No. 1984

URL: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/bolivia.html>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Brazil** – Art. 5o Não podem alistar-se eleitores:

CF/88, art. 14, - 2o: alistamento vedado

aos estrangeiros e aos conscritos.

I – os analfabetos;

9 CF/88, art. 14, § 1o, II, a: alistamento e voto facultativos aos analfabetos. Ac.-TSE no 23.291/2004: este dispositivo não foi recepcionado pela Constituição.

II – os que não saibam exprimir-se na língua nacional;

III – os que estejam privados, temporária ou definitivamente, dos direitos políticos.

f CF/88, art. 15: casos de perda ou de suspensão de direitos políticos.

Parágrafo único. Os militares são alis- táveis desde que oficiais, aspirantes a ofi- ciais, guardas-marinha, subtenentes ou su- boficiais, sargentos ou alunos das escolas militares de ensino superior para formação de oficiais.

f CF/88, art. 14, § 2o: alistamento vedado apenas aos conscritos, durante o serviço militar obrigatório; e § 8o: condições de elegibilidade do militar. Res.-TSE no 15.850/89: a palavra “conscritos” alcança também aqueles matriculados nos órgãos de formação de reserva e os médicos, dentistas, farmacêuticos e veterinários que prestam serviço militar inicial obrigatório.

Source: Brasil Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Código eleitoral anotado e legislação complementar. – 9. ed. – Brasília : Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Secretaria de Gestão da Informação, 2010. p. 25

**Chile** – Artículo 15. En las votaciones populares, el sufragio será personal, igualitario y secreto. Para los ciudadanos será, además, obligatorio. Sólo podrá convocarse a votación popular para las elecciones y plebiscitos expresamente previstos en esta Constitución.

Artículo 16. El derecho de sufragio se suspende:

1º Por interdicción en caso de demencia;

2º Por hallarse la persona procesada por delito que merezca pena aflictiva o por delito que la ley califique como conducta terrorista, y

3º Por haber sido sancionado por el Tribunal Constitucional en conformidad al inciso séptimo del número 15.º del artículo 19 de esta Constitución. Los que por esta causa se hallaren privados del ejercicio del derecho de sufragio lo recuperarán al término de cinco años, contado desde la declaración del Tribunal. Esta suspensión no producirá otro efecto legal, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el inciso séptimo del número 15.º del artículo 19.

Source: Constitucion Política de la Republica de Chile - Exto actualizado a octubre de 2010.

**Colombia** – Ley 72 de 1930 - Los militares no tienen derecho al voto y no pueden ejercer cargos públicos. “La Ley 72 de 1930, tal como esta redactada, no priva a los miembros de aquella institucion del carácter de ciudadanos, como se sostiene en la demanda que contradigo, sino simplemente del ejercicio temporal de uno de los atributos de la ciudadanía: el derecho del sufragio mientras permanezcan en servicio activo.”derecho

Art. 219 “Los miembros de la Fuerza Pública no podrán ejercer la función del sufragio mientras permanezcan en servicio activo, ni intervenir en actividades o debates de partidos o movimientos políticos.”



Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitución de 1991 con reformas hasta 2005
<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html">URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
Cambio Constitucional, 2012 – SI podran votar
<a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-382958-fuerzas-militares-querarian-facultadas-votar">URL: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-382958-fuerzas-militares-querarian-facultadas-votar</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Ecuador</b> – Art. 62 (2) El voto será facultativo para las personas entre dieciséis y dieciocho años de edad, las mayores de sesenta y cinco años, las ecuatorianas y ecuatorianos que habitan en el exterior, los integrantes de las Fuerzas Armadas y Policía Nacional, y las personas con discapacidad.
Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitucion del Ecuador 2008
<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html">URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Guyana</b> – N/A
<b>Paraguay</b> – Artículo 91.- No podrán ser electores: los interdictos declarados tales en juicio; los sordomudos que no sepan hacerse entender por escrito o por otros medios; los soldados conscriptos y clases de las Fuerzas Armadas y Policiales y los alumnos de institutos de enseñanza militares y policiales; los detenidos o privados de su libertad por orden de juez competente; los condenados a penas privativas de libertad o de inhabilitación electoral; y, los declarados rebeldes en causa penal común o militar.
Source: Political Database of the Americas - Paraguay: Ley N. 834, del 17 de Abril de 1996
<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Paraguay/ley834.html">URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Paraguay/ley834.html</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

	<p><b>Peru:</b> La ley 284830 ARTÍCULO 34.- los miembros de la Fuerza Armadas y de Policía Nacional tiene derecho al voto y a la participación ciudadana, regulados por la ley. No pueden postular a cargos de elección popular, participar en actividades partidarias o manifestaciones ni realizar actos de proselitismo, mientras no haya pasado a la situación de retiro, de acuerdo a ley."</p>
	Comuníquese al señor presidente de la República para su promulgación.
	En lima, a los diez días del mes de marzo de dos mil cinco.
	Source: LEY DE REFORMA DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 31° Y 34° DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ LEY N° 28.480
	URL: <a href="http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/peru-voto-militar.htm">http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/peru-voto-militar.htm</a>
	(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
	<b>Suriname</b> – N/A
	<p><b>Uruguay</b> – *ARTICULO 179.- Queda igualmente prohibida la aglomeración de tropas y toda ostentación de fuerza pública armada durante el día de la recepción del sufragio. Dichas fuerzas, con excepción de las de policía indispensables para mantener el orden, deberán permanecer acuarteladas durante el acto eleccionario, sin perjuicio de concederse a sus integrantes el tiempo necesario para que concurran a sufragar.</p> <p>NOTA: El agregado procuró asegurar que el cumplimiento de esta norma no impida emitir su voto a los integrantes de las Fuerzas Armadas o de la Policía.</p>
	<p>*ARTICULO 181.- Queda prohibido a los jefes y oficiales de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía permanecer en el local de las comisiones receptoras de votos más tiempo del necesario para sufragar, encabezar grupos de electores, emplear los locales, útiles y elementos de sus reparticiones en actos electorales de cualquier especie y hacer valer, en forma alguna, la influencia de sus cargos para coartar, impedir o alterar la libertad del sufragio</p>
	Source: Political Database of the Americas - LEY núm. 7.812 DEL 16 DE ENERO DE 1925, MODIFICADA POR LEY núm.17.113, DE 9 DE JUNIO DE 1999
	URL: <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Uruguay/uruguay.html">http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Uruguay/uruguay.html</a>
	(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

		<b>Venezuela</b> - Artículo 330, que "los o las integrantes de las Fuerzas Armadas Venezolanas en situación de actividad tienen el derecho al sufragio de conformidad con la ley, sin que les esté permitido optar a cargo de elección popular, sin participar en actos de propaganda, militancia o proselitismo político".
		Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitución Venezolana de 1999 con reformas hasta 2009.
		<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html">URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V3	Ministers of Defence	
		Minister of defence are they military or civilian? Note some of the majority of these countries did not have this information readily available.
		-
		<b>Coding:</b>
		Yes = 1
		No = 0
		Not available/applicable = -99
		-
		<b>Argentina - 0</b>
		All Civilian
		Source: "Presidentes y Ministros de Argentina 1776-2014," (n.d.), <i>El Historiador</i>
		<a href="http://www.elhistoriador.com.ar/datos/presidentes_de_argentina.php">http://www.elhistoriador.com.ar/datos/presidentes_de_argentina.php</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Bolivia – -99</b>		
Artículo 21°.- (OTRAS INCOMPATIBILIDADES). No podrán ser elegidos miembros de los órganos electorales definidos en el artículo 225 de la C.P.E.: a) El Presidente y Vicepresidente de la República, los Ministros de Estado, Viceministros, Directores Nacionales, Magistrados del Poder Judicial, Fiscales, Prefectos, Subprefectos, Corregidores, militares y policías en servicio activo.		
Art 247. "Para desempeñar los cargos de Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas, Jefe del Estado Mayor General, Comandantes y		

Jefes de Estado Mayor del Ejercito, Fuerza Aere, Armada Boliviana y de grandes unidades, sera indispensable ser boliviana o boliviano por nacimiento y reunir los requisitos que senale la ley, igual condiciones seran necesarias para ser Viceministra o Viceministro del Ministerio de Defensa.

Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitucion de Bolivia de 2009

<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia.html>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

-

**Brazil – 0**

All Civilian since the Ministry's creation in 1999.

Source: Ministério da Defesa

<http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/ministros-anteriores>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Chile – 0**

All Civilian since 1990.

Artículo 91.-La incorporación a las plantas y dotaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas y de Carabineros sólo podrá hacerse a través de sus propias Escuelas, con excepción de los escalafones profesionales y de empleados civiles que determine la ley.

Artículo 92.-Ninguna persona, grupo u organización podrá poseer o tener armas u otros elementos similares que señale una ley aprobada con quórum calificado, sin autorización otorgada en conformidad a ésta. El Ministerio encargado de la Defensa Nacional o un organismo de su dependencia ejercerá la supervigilancia y control de las armas en la forma que determine la ley.

Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitución 1980 con reformas hasta 2005

<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Chile/chile05.html>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

Source: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional

<http://www.defensa.cl/>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

<b>Colombia - 1</b>
General Oscar Botero Restrepo (1989-1991); General Freddy Padilla de Leon (interim in 2009)
Source: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia
<a href="http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/portal/Mindefensa?NavigationTarget=navurl://6e3a98d57e9f90eaed26a183b51b5697">http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/portal/Mindefensa?NavigationTarget=navurl://6e3a98d57e9f90eaed26a183b51b5697</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Ecuador - -99</b>
Source: Ministerio de Defensa de Ecuador
<a href="http://www.defensa.gob.ec/">http://www.defensa.gob.ec/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Guyana - -99</b>
<b>Paraguay - 1</b>
Current Minister of Defence, Daniel Mora Zevallos (Since 2011)
Source: Ministerio de Defensa de Paraguay
<a href="http://www.mdn.gov.py/elministro.php">http://www.mdn.gov.py/elministro.php</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Peru - 1</b>
“Artículo 124.- Requisitos para ser Ministro de Estado. Para ser Ministro de Estado, se requiere ser peruano por nacimiento, ciudadano en ejercicio y haber cumplido veinticinco años de edad. Los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional pueden ser ministros.”
Source: Political Database of the Americas - Constitución Política del Perú 1993 con reformas hasta 2005
<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Peru/per93reforms05.html">http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Peru/per93reforms05.html</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Suriname - 1</b>
Rupert Christopher (1991) and Lamure Carlo Adolf Latur (2011-2013)
Source: Ministerie Van Defensie - Republiek Suriname
<a href="http://www.gov.sr/sr/ministerie-van-defensie/minister-en-staf/john-achong.aspx">http://www.gov.sr/sr/ministerie-van-defensie/minister-en-staf/john-achong.aspx</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

		<p><b>Uruguay - 0</b></p> <p>All Civilian since 1990.</p> <p>Source: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional - Republica Oriental del Uruguay  <a href="http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=autoridades">http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=autoridades</a>  (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p>
		<p><b>Venezuela - 1</b></p> <p>Moises Orozco (1995-1996), Raul Salazar (1999-2000), Ismael Hurtado (2000-2001), Lucas Rincon Romero (2002), Jose Luis Prieto (2002-2004), Jorge Garcia Carneiro (2004-2005). Raul Baduel (2006-2008), Gustavo Rangel Briceño ( 2008-2009), Ramon Carrizales (2009-2010), Carlos Mata Figueroa (2010-2012), Henry Rangel Silva (2012), Diego Alfredo Molero Bellavia (2012-2013), Carmen Teresa Melendez Rivas (2013 – Present).</p> <p>Source: Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa  <a href="http://www.mindefensa.gob.ve/index.php/organizacion/ministro-de-la-defensa">http://www.mindefensa.gob.ve/index.php/organizacion/ministro-de-la-defensa</a>  (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p>
V4	Civilian Bureaucracy	<p>Note: Considering there were no consistent sources of information available to determine how large the civilian bureaucracies are in all 12 South American states, this thesis is using the World Bank's "Doing Business" assesment, which emphasizes how flexible countries are in terms of the ease of doing business.</p> <p>Source: World Bank. (2013). Doing Business: Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.</p> <p><b>United States - 4/189</b></p> <p><b>Argentina – 126/189</b></p> <p><b>Bolivia – 162/189</b></p> <p><b>Brazil – 116/189</b></p> <p><b>Chile –34/189</b></p>

		<b>Colombia – 43/189</b>
		<b>Ecuador – 135/189</b>
		<b>Guyana – 115/189</b>
		<b>Paraguay – 109/189</b>
		<b>Peru – 42/189</b>
		<b>Suriname – 161/189</b>
		<b>Uruguay – 88/189</b>
		<b>Venezuela – 181/189</b>
V5	Popularity of the Military	Usted tiene o no tiene confianza en las Fuerzas Armadas?
		(% Si Confian)
		Source: Centro Nacional de Consultoria – Barometro Iberoamericano
		<a href="http://www.cimaiberoamerica.com/">URL: http://www.cimaiberoamerica.com/</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Argentina – 45%</b>
		<b>Bolivia – 44%</b>
		<b>Brazil – 26%</b>
		<b>Chile – 73%</b>
<b>Colombia – 63%</b>		
<b>Ecuador – 79%</b>		
<b>Guyana – N/A</b>		

		<b>Paraguay – 31%</b>
		<b>Peru – 39%</b>
		<b>Suriname – N/A</b>
		<b>Uruguay – 31%</b>
		<b>Venezuela – 49%</b>
<b>V6</b>	<b>Popularity of Civilian Institutions (Congress and Supreme Court of Justice)</b>	Source: Centro Nacional de Consultoria – Barometro Iberoamericano 2011
		<a href="http://www.cimaiberoamerica.com/">URL: http://www.cimaiberoamerica.com/</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		Usted tiene o no tiene confianza en el Congreso? Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema de Justicia?
		(% Si Confian)
		<b>Argentina – 32% (Congreso)</b>
		39% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Bolivia – 23% (Congreso)</b>
		23% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Brazil – 51% (Congreso)</b>
		49% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Chile – 25% (Congreso)</b>
		40% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Colombia – 18% (Congreso)</b>
		46% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Ecuador – 33% (Congreso)</b>
33% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)		
<b>Guyana – N/A</b>		



		<b>Paraguay</b> – 9% (Congreso)
		13% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Peru</b> – 9% (Congreso)
		22% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Suriname</b> – N/A
		<b>Uruguay</b> – 34% (Congreso)
		43% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		<b>Venezuela</b> – 38% (Congreso)
		33% (Corte Constitucional y Corte Suprema)
		Source: SIPRI Database (2012 Estimates)
		<a href="http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx">URL: http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>United States</b> - 4.4%
		<b>Argentina</b> - 0.9%
		<b>Bolivia</b> - 1.5%
		<b>Brazil</b> - 1.5%
		<b>Chile</b> - 2.1%
		<b>Colombia</b> - 3.3%
		<b>Ecuador</b> - 3.4%
		<b>Guyana</b> - 1.8%
		<b>Paraguay</b> - 1.8%
<b>V7</b>	<b>Military Expenditure Share of GDP</b>	

		<b>Peru</b> - 1.3%
		<b>Suriname</b> - N/A
		<b>Uruguay</b> - 1.9%
		<b>Venezuela</b> - 1.0%
<b>V8</b>	<b>Public Expenditures (Health and Education % of GDP)</b>	Source: United Nations' Human Development Index
		<a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi">URL: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		Health (2010 Estimates)
		Education (No consistent year for all countries)
		<b>Argentina</b> – 4.4% (Health)
		6% (Education - 2009)
		<b>Bolivia</b> – 3% (Health)
		6.3% (Education - 2006)
		<b>Brazil</b> – 4.2% (Health)
		5.7% (Education - 2009)
		<b>Chile</b> – 3.8% (Health)
		4.5% (Education - 2009)
		<b>Colombia</b> – 5.5%
		4.8% (Education - 2010)
		<b>Ecuador</b> – 3% (Health)
		1.3% (Education - 2000)
		<b>Guyana</b> – 5.1% (Health)
3.7% (Education - 2010)		
<b>Paraguay</b> – 2.1% (Health)		
4% (Education - 2007)		

		<b>Peru</b> – 2.7% (Health)
		2.7% (Education - 2010)
		<b>Suriname</b> – 3.4% (Health)
		N/A (Education)
		<b>Uruguay</b> – 5.6% (Health)
		2.9% (Education - 2006)
		<b>Venezuela</b> – 1.7% (Health)
		3.7% (Education - 2007)
		<b>United States</b> – 9.5% (Health)
		5.4% (Education - 2009)
<b>MILITARY</b>		
		Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (March 2013). “The Military Balance 2013,” Routledge Journals, imprint of Taylor and Francis, pp, 432-471.
		<b>Argentina</b> – 73,100 Active. p. 423
		<b>Bolivia:</b> 46,100 Active. p. 437
		<b>Brazil:</b> 318,500 Active. p. 439
		<b>Chile:</b> 59,050 Active. p. 442
		<b>Colombia:</b> 281,400 Active. p. 446
		<b>Ecuador:</b> 58,000 Active. p. 452
		<b>Guyana:</b> 1,100 Active. p. 457
		<b>Paraguay:</b> 10,650 Active. p. 464
V1	Size of the Military	

		<b>Peru:</b> 115,000 Active. p. 465
		<b>Suriname:</b> 1840 Active. p. 468
		<b>Uruguay:</b> 24,650 Active. p. 469
		<b>Venezuela:</b> 115,00 Active. p. 471
		<b>United States:</b> 1,520,100 Active. p. 71
<b>V2</b>	<b>Size of Military in Comparison to Population Size</b>	Percentage was taken by dividing total number of active military by the total population of 2013.
<b>V3</b>	<b>Military Professionalism</b>	<p>Note: This thesis does not seek to measure how efficient these militaries' level of professionalism are but rather, determine whether they have education systems in place, that are in-line with what the civil-military relations literature outlines as "ideal." In addition to the institutions mentioned below, all South American countries (except Guyana and Suriname) are members of the CDS (Consejo de DEFensa Suramericano) in UNASUR and therefore, have exchange programs for their militaries, as outlined in UNASUR's website:  <a href="http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=107&amp;Itemid=3">http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=107&amp;Itemid=3</a> (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p> <p>Coding:  Yes = 1  No = 0  Not available/applicable = -99</p> <p><b>Argentina - 1</b>  Source: Colegio Militar de la Nacion  <a href="http://www.colegiomilitar.mil.ar/2008/index.html">URL: http://www.colegiomilitar.mil.ar/2008/index.html</a>  (Last accessed on June 12, 2014)</p> <p>Source: Instituto Universitario del Ejercito  <a href="http://www.iese.edu.ar/">URL: http://www.iese.edu.ar/</a></p>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Bolivia - 1</b>
Source: Colegio Militar del Ejército Coronel Gualberto Villarroel
<u>URL:</u> <a href="http://bo.geoview.info/colegio_militar_del_ejercito_coronel_gualberto_villarroel,44312929w">http://bo.geoview.info/colegio_militar_del_ejercito_coronel_gualberto_villarroel,44312929w</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Brazil - 1</b>
Source: Sistema Colégio Militar do Brasil
<a href="http://www.eb.mil.br/web/ingresso/colegios-militares">http://www.eb.mil.br/web/ingresso/colegios-militares</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Chile - 1</b>
Source: Escuela Militar Chilena
<u>URL:</u> <a href="http://www.escuelamilitar.cl/">http://www.escuelamilitar.cl/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
-
Chile “Artículo 90. Las Fuerzas Armadas y Carabineros, como cuerpos armados, son esencialmente obedientes y no deliberantes. Las fuerzas dependientes del Ministerio encargado de la Defensa Nacional son además profesionales, jerarquizadas y disciplinadas.”
<u>Source:</u> <a href="http://www.camara.cl/camara/media/docs/constitucion_politica.pdf">http://www.camara.cl/camara/media/docs/constitucion_politica.pdf</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Colombia - 1</b>
Source: Escuela Militar de Cadetes
<a href="http://www.esmic.edu.co/esmic/">http://www.esmic.edu.co/esmic/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
Source: Escuela Militar de Suboficiales
<a href="http://www.emsub.mil.co/">http://www.emsub.mil.co/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
Source: Escuela Superior de Guerra
<a href="http://www.esdegue.mil.co/">http://www.esdegue.mil.co/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Ecuador - 1**

Source: Escuela Superior Militar Eloy Alfaro

URL: <http://www.esmil.mil.ec/>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Guyana – -99****Paraguay - 1**

Source: Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura de Paraguay

<http://www.mec.gov.py/cms/recursos/6015-la-escuela-militar-pasa-a-denominarse-colegio-militar-mariscal-francisco-solano-lopez>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Peru - 1**

Source: Escuela Naval del Peru

<https://escuelanaval.edu.pe/>

Source: Escuela Militar Pedro Luis Gallo

<http://www.colegiomilitarprg.edu.pe/>

Source: Escuela Militar de Chorrillos "Coronel Francisco Bolognesí"

<http://www.escuelamilitar.edu.pe/inicio.html>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Suriname – -99****Uruguay -1**

Source: Escuela Militar de Uruguay

<http://www.escuelamilitar.edu.uy/>

Source: Escuela Militar de Aeronautica

<http://www.ema.edu.uy/EMA/index.asp>

Source: Instituto Militar de Estudios Superiores

<http://www.imes.edu.uy/>

(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Venezuela - 1**

Source: Universidad Militar Bolivariana de Venezuela

<http://www.umbv.edu.ve/>

Source: Academia Militar de la Armada Bolivariana

<http://200.109.228.11/amarb/>

		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		Coding:
		Yes = 1
		No = 0
		Not available/applicable = -99
		<b>Argentina - 1</b>
		Source: Codigo de Justicia Militar - Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Publicas
		<a href="http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/105000-109999/105438/texact.htm">http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/105000-109999/105438/texact.htm</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Bolivia - 1</b>
		Source: Tribunal Permanente de Justicia Militar
		<a href="http://www.mindef.gob.bo/mindef/node/613">http://www.mindef.gob.bo/mindef/node/613</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Brazil - 1</b>
		Source: Superior Tribunal Militar
		<a href="http://www.stm.jus.br">http://www.stm.jus.br</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Chile - 1</b>
		Source: Codigo de Justicia Militar
		<a href="http://www.leychile.cl/Consulta/m/norma_plana?idNorma=18914&amp;org=cd">http://www.leychile.cl/Consulta/m/norma_plana?idNorma=18914&amp;org=cd</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Colombia - 1</b>
		Source: Corte Constitucional de Colombia
		<a href="http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2001/c-676-01.htm">http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2001/c-676-01.htm</a>
		Source: Justicia Penal Militar
		<a href="http://www.policia.gov.co/portal/page/portal/UNIDADES_POLICIALES/Direcciones_Apoyo_servicio/InspeccionGeneral/Organizacion/Areas/JUSTICIA_PENAL_MILITAR/Corte_marcial">http://www.policia.gov.co/portal/page/portal/UNIDADES_POLICIALES/Direcciones_Apoyo_servicio/InspeccionGeneral/Organizacion/Areas/JUSTICIA_PENAL_MILITAR/Corte_marcial</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

V4

Martial Courts

		<b>Ecuador - 1</b>
		Source:Codigo de Procedimiento Penal Militar No. S-356 (Noviembre 6, 1961)
		<a href="http://docs.ecuador.justia.com/nacionales/codigos/codigo-de-procedimiento-penal-de-la-policia-nacional.pdf">http://docs.ecuador.justia.com/nacionales/codigos/codigo-de-procedimiento-penal-de-la-policia-nacional.pdf</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Guyana – N/A</b>
		<b>Paraguay - 1</b>
		Source: Ley No. 840 Organica de los Tribunales Militares, Ley No. 843 Codigo Penal Militar y Ley No. 844 Codigo de Procedimiento Penal Militar en tiempos de paz y guerra (Diciembre 19, 1980)
		<a href="http://www.cej.org.py/games/Leyes_por_Materia_juridica/JUDICIAL/LEY%20%20840.pdf">http://www.cej.org.py/games/Leyes_por_Materia_juridica/JUDICIAL/LEY%20%20840.pdf</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Peru – 1</b>
		Source:Codigo Penal Militar Policial D. Leg. No. 1094
		<a href="http://www.fmp.gob.pe/FMP/Html/2013-05-03/que_es_el_fuero_militar_policial.html">http://www.fmp.gob.pe/FMP/Html/2013-05-03/que_es_el_fuero_militar_policial.html</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Suriname – N/A</b>
		<b>Uruguay - 1</b>
		Source:Supremo Tribunal Militar
		<a href="http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=stm">http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=stm</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Venezuela – 1</b>
		Source:Circuito Judicial Penal Militar
		<a href="http://www.cjpm.mil.ve/">http://www.cjpm.mil.ve/</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
V5	Military Recruitment (Conscripti	Coding: Compulsory = 1 Conscription = 2



on or Voluntary Enlistment )	Voluntary = 0
	Not available/applicable = -99
	Source: CIA World Factbook
	URLs are included individually for each country
	(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
	<b><u>Argentina:</u></b> ‘18-24 years of age for voluntary military service (18-21 requires parental consent); no conscription; if the number of volunteers fails to meet the quota of recruits for a particular year, Congress can authorize the conscription of citizens turning 18 that year for a period not exceeding one year (2012)’ <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html</a>
	<b><u>Bolivia:</u></b> 18-49 years of age for 12-month compulsory male and female military service; Bolivian citizenship required; 17 years of age for voluntary service; when annual number of volunteers falls short of goal, compulsory recruitment is effected, including conscription of boys as young as 14; 15-19 years of age for voluntary premilitary service, provides exemption from further military service (2013)
	<a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html</a>
	<b><u>Brazil:</u></b> 18-45 years of age for compulsory military service; conscript service obligation is 9-12 months; 17-45 years of age for voluntary service; an increasing percentage of the ranks are "long-service" volunteer professionals; women were allowed to serve in the armed forces beginning in early 1980s when the Brazilian Army became the first army in South America to accept women into career ranks; women serve in Navy and Air Force only in Women's Reserve Corps (2012) <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html</a>
<b><u>Chile:</u></b> 18-45 years of age for voluntary male and female military service, although the right to compulsory recruitment of males 18-45 is retained; service obligation is 12 months for Army and 22 months for Navy and Air Force (2012) <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html</a>	
<b><u>Colombia:</u></b> 18-24 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; service obligation is 18 months (2012) <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html</a>	

	<p><b><u>Ecuador:</u></b> 18 years of age for selective conscript military service; conscription has been suspended; 18 years of age for voluntary military service; Air Force 18-22 years of age, Ecuadorian birth requirement; 1-year service obligation (2012)  <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html</a></p>
	<p><b><u>Guyana:</u></b> 16 years of age or younger for voluntary military service; no conscription (2013) <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html</a></p>
	<p><b><u>Paraguay:</u></b> 18 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscript service obligation is 12 months for Army, 24 months for Navy; volunteers for the Air Force must be younger than 22 years of age with a secondary school diploma (2012)  <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pa.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pa.html</a></p>
	<p><b><u>Peru:</u></b> 18-50 years of age for male and 18-45 years of age for female voluntary military service; no conscription (2012)  <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html</a></p>
	<p><b><u>Suriname:</u></b> 18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription; personnel drawn almost exclusively from the Creole community (2012) <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ns.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ns.html</a></p>
	<p><b><u>Uruguay:</u></b> 18-30 years of age (18-22 years of age for navy) for male or female voluntary military service; up to 40 years of age for specialists; enlistment is voluntary in peacetime, but the government has the authority to conscript in emergencies; minimum 6-year education (2013)  <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uy.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uy.html</a></p>
	<p><b><u>Venezuela:</u></b> 18-30 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; 30-month conscript service obligation; Navy requires 6th-grade education for enlisted personnel; all citizens of military service age (18-60 years old) are obligated to register for military service (2012)  <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html</a></p>

		<p><b>USA (Theoretical Ideal):</b> 18 years of age (17 years of age with parental consent) for male and female voluntary service; no conscription; maximum enlistment age 42 (Army), 27 (Air Force), 34 (Navy), 28 (Marines); service obligation 8 years, including 2-5 years active duty (Army), 2 years active (Navy), 4 years active (Air Force, Marines); DoD is eliminating prohibitions restricting women from assignments in units smaller than brigades or near combat units (2013)  <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html</a></p>
V6	Number of Coups d'état Since 1990	Coding:
		Yes = 1
		No = 0
		Not available/applicable = -99
		Source: Individual search for each country, no consistent source of information for this thesis' timeframe (1990-2013)
		Argentina - 0
		Bolivia – 1 (2008)
		Brazil - 0
		Chile - 0
		Colombia - 0
		Ecuador – 4 (1997, 2000, 2005, 2010)
		Guyana – N/A
		Paraguay – 1 (2012)
		Peru – 1 (1992)
		Suriname – N/A
		Uruguay - 0

		<b>Venezuela – 1 (2002)</b>
		Coding:
		Yes = 1
		No = 0
		Not available/applicable = -99
		<b>Argentina – 1</b>
		“ Una Fuerza de Seguridad, de naturaleza Militar con características de Fuerza Intermedia, que cumple su misión y sus funciones en el marco de la Seguridad Interior, Defensa Nacional y apoyo a la Política Exterior.”
		Source: Gendarmeria Nacional Argentina - Ministerio de Seguridad
		<a href="http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/">http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Bolivia – 1</b>
		Source: Policia Militar - Ejercito de Bolivia
		<a href="http://www.ejercito.mil.bo/ejercito/index.php/cursos/policia-militar">http://www.ejercito.mil.bo/ejercito/index.php/cursos/policia-militar</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Brazil – 1</b>
		"O Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) é uma força de intervenção da Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ), responsável por atuar em situações críticas, sendo a reserva tática de pronto emprego da Corporação. Seu efetivo é voluntário, formado por policiais de elevado preparo técnico, tático e psicológico."
		<a href="http://www.pm.rio.gov.br/index.php/intra/pm.html">http://www.pm.rio.gov.br/index.php/intra/pm.html</a>
		<a href="http://www.bopeoficial.com/">http://www.bopeoficial.com/</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Chile – 1</b>
		Source: Carabineros de Chile
		<a href="http://www.carabineros.cl/">http://www.carabineros.cl/</a>
		(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
		<b>Colombia - 1</b>
		Source: Historia de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia ‘ Policia’ pp 207, 384.
V7	Military Police Programs	

Source: Escuela de Policia Militar - Ejercito Nacional de Colombia
<a href="http://www.espom.mil.co/">http://www.espom.mil.co/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Ecuador - 1</b>
Source: "Primera mujer graduada de Policía Militar Ministerial," (22 de Noviembre de 2013) Ministerio de Defensa Nacional Ecuador
<a href="http://www.defensa.gob.ec/primera-mujer-graduada-de-policia-militar-ministerial/">http://www.defensa.gob.ec/primera-mujer-graduada-de-policia-militar-ministerial/</a>
Source: BATALLÓN ESCUELA DE POLICIA MILITAR No. 1 "CAP. LUIS SAAVEDRA" - UNASUR, Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS)
<a href="http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=179&amp;Itemid=11">http://unasur.midena.gob.ec/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=179&amp;Itemid=11</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Guyana – N/A</b>
<b>Paraguay - 1</b>
Source: "Operativo policial-militar, pero para boda," (Octubre 5, 2012), ABC Color
<a href="http://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/megaoperativo-policial-militar-para-boda-459708.html">http://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/megaoperativo-policial-militar-para-boda-459708.html</a>
Source: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Paraguay "- Comandante de Pelotón Policía Militar del Regimiento Escolta Presidencial."
<a href="http://www.mdn.gov.py/elministro.php">http://www.mdn.gov.py/elministro.php</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Peru - 1</b>
Source: Sociedad Mutualista Militar Policial del Peru
<a href="http://www.smmpp.org/">http://www.smmpp.org/</a>
(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
<b>Suriname – N/A</b>
<b>Uruguay – -99</b>
Source: "Larrañaga propone policía militar," (Noviembre 5, 2013) <i>El Pais</i>

	<a href="http://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/larranaga-propone-policia-militar.html">http://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/larranaga-propone-policia-militar.html</a>
	(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
	Source: "El Ejército reactivará la Policía Militar con el objetivo de cumplir una función de disuasión," (20 de Mayo de 2010) <i>Espectador</i> .
	<a href="http://www.espectador.com/politica/182499/el-ejercito-reactivara-la-policia-militar-con-el-objetivo-de-cumplir-una-funcion-de-disuasion">http://www.espectador.com/politica/182499/el-ejercito-reactivara-la-policia-militar-con-el-objetivo-de-cumplir-una-funcion-de-disuasion</a>
	(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)
	<b>Venezuela - 1</b>
	Source: "El Ejército de Venezuela activa un nuevo batallón de Policía Militar," (Noviembre 11, 2013) <i>Infodefensa</i>
	<a href="http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2013/11/11/noticia-el-ejercito-de-venezuela-activa-un-nuevo-batallon-de-policia-militar.html">http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2013/11/11/noticia-el-ejercito-de-venezuela-activa-un-nuevo-batallon-de-policia-militar.html</a>
	Source:
	<a href="http://deej.ejercito.mil.ve/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=43&amp;Itemid=2">http://deej.ejercito.mil.ve/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=43&amp;Itemid=2</a>
	(Last accessed on June 12, 2014)

**Annex 6 - Pivot Table and Variable Database**

## Annex 6 - Pivot Table and Variable Database

STATE COMPARATIVE													
	V1					V2		V3				V4	V5
	1990	2000	2010	2012	2013	1990-2013	1990	2000	2010	2011	1990-2013	2009	
South American Countries													
1	Theoretical Ideal	249.6	282.1	309.3	313.9	313.9	916	1920.00	217.25	30.79	33.81	34.06	84.07 (2011)
2	Argentina	32.6	36.9	40.3	41.1	42.2	2,736,690.00	11.92	13.48	14.75	14.88	1	97.8 (2011)
3	Bolivia	6.7	8.5	10.1	10.5	10.3	1,083,300.00	6.27	7.84	9.38	9.53	1	91.17 (2009)
4	Brazil	149.6	174.5	195.2	198.7	199.3	8,459,420.00	17.69	20.62	23.07	23.27	1	90.30 (2009)
5	Chile	11.3	15.5	17.1	17.5	17.1	743,532.00	17.77	20.78	23.06	23.27	1	98.55 (2009)
6	Colombia	33.3	39.9	46.4	47.2	45.2	1,109,500.00	30.01	35.96	41.86	42.43	1	93.24 (2009)
7	Ecuador	10.1	12.5	15	15.5	15.2	276,840.00	36.56	50.46	60.40	61.38	1	84.21 (2009)
8	Guyana	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	196,890.00	3.68	3.78	3.99	4.01	1	84.99 (2009)
9	Paraguay	4.2	5.4	6.4	6.7	6.5	397,300.00	10.69	13.46	16.25	16.54	1	93.75 (2009)
10	Peru	21.7	26	29.2	30	29.5	1,280,000.00	17.01	20.31	22.86	23.13	1	89.59 (2007)
11	Suriname	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	156,000.00	2.60	2.99	3.36	3.39	1	94.62 (2008)
12	Uruguay	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.3	175,020.00	17.77	18.97	19.26	19.33	1	98.27 (2009)
13	Venezuela	19.7	24.4	29	30	28	882,050.00	22.38	27.67	32.92	33.44	1	95.51 (2009)

Note: Whenever possible, data for all the years reviewed in this thesis (1990, 2000, 2010, 2013) were included for each variable above. However, data for V2 and V4 below remained unchanged during the chosen time frame. Data for V5 was not available and thereby, 2009 is indicated in parentheses.

CIVIL-MILITARY													
	V1					V2		V3				V4	V5
	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990	2000	2010	2011	2013	2011	
South American Countries													
1	Theoretical Ideal	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	78	12
2	Argentina	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	126	45	32
3	Bolivia	1	1	1	1	1	-99	-99	-99	-99	162	44	23
4	Brazil	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	116	26	51
5	Chile	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	34	73	25
6	Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	43	63	18
7	Ecuador	1	1	1	1	1	-99	-99	-99	-99	135	79	33
8	Guyana	1	1	1	1	1	-99	-99	-99	-99	115	99	99
9	Paraguay	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	109	31	9
10	Peru	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	42	39	9
11	Suriname	1	1	1	1	1	-99	-99	-99	-99	161	99	99
12	Uruguay	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	88	31	34
13	Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	181	49	38

Note: Whenever possible, data for all the years reviewed in this thesis (1990, 2000, 2010, 2013) were included for each variable above. However, whenever data remained unchanged or information for all these years was not available, such as in V1, available and thereby, allowing country could be coded.

MILITARY													
	V1					V2		V3				V4	V5
	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990-2013	1990	2000	2010	2011	2013	2011	
South American Countries													
1	Theoretical Ideal	1,320,100.00	0.5%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
2	Argentina	73,100.00	0.2%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
3	Bolivia	46,100.00	0.5%	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
4	Brazil	318,500.00	0.2%	1	1	1.2	0	0	0	0	0	1	
5	Chile	59,050.00	0.3%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
6	Colombia	281,400.00	0.6%	1	1	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
7	Ecuador	58,000.00	0.4%	1	1	2.0	4	4	4	4	4	1	
8	Guyana	1,100.00	0.2%	-99	-99	0	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99	1	
9	Paraguay	10,650.00	0.2%	1	1	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
10	Peru	115,000.00	0.4%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
11	Suriname	1,840.00	0.3%	-99	-99	0	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99	1	
12	Uruguay	24,650.00	0.7%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
13	Venezuela	115,000.00	0.4%	1	1	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	1	

Note: Whenever possible, data for all the years reviewed in this thesis (1990, 2000, 2010, 2013) were included for each variable above. V1 and V2 indicate the most up-to-date data for 2013 only. Variables V3-V7 do not show data for all the base years but rather, show the time frame (1990-2013) - this indicates the information was not gathered from a particular base year but rather, the information was available throughout the chosen time frame and remains unchanged.



V6											
	1990	2000	2010	2012	1990	2000	2010	2012	1990	2000	2010
\$	5,979,600,000,000.00	\$	10,289,700,000,000.00	\$	14,958,300,000,000.00	\$	16,244,600,000,000.00	23,954.52	36,467.30	48,357.68	51,748.56
\$	141,332,368,715.00	\$	284,203,750,000.00	\$	368,736,093,174.00	\$	475,501,675,473.00	4,333.66	7,701.36	9,132.96	11,573.06
\$	4,867,582,765.00	\$	8,397,888,206.00	\$	19,649,724,656.00	\$	27,035,110,130.00	716.45	988.53	1,934.68	2,575.68
\$	461,951,782,000.00	\$	644,701,831,101.00	\$	2,143,035,333,358.00	\$	2,257,664,120,777.00	3,086.92	3,694.46	10,978.09	11,339.52
\$	31,538,927,517.00	\$	79,328,640,264.00	\$	217,311,678,771.00	\$	2,69,869,337,788.19	2,388.31	5,133.08	12,684.93	15,452.17
\$	40,274,204,595.00	\$	99,886,572,576.00	\$	287,018,129,194.00	\$	3,69,789,365,899.00	1,209.18	2,503.55	6,129.40	7,747.84
\$	15,239,278,100.00	\$	18,327,386,416.00	\$	67,513,698,000.00	\$	84,039,856,000.00	1,505.32	1,462.32	4,500.59	5,424.63
\$	396,582,264.00	\$	712,667,925.00	\$	2,259,288,026.00	\$	2,850,572,407.00	546.98	957.28	2,873.95	3,583.96
\$	5,695,201,563.00	\$	8,195,993,191.00	\$	20,028,375,554.00	\$	25,502,060,502.00	1,340.13	1,531.89	3,100.50	3,813.47
\$	26,294,371,425.00	\$	53,290,390,318.00	\$	153,544,876,325.00	\$	196,961,048,699.00	1,207.71	2,049.62	5,386.01	6,795.77
\$	388,300,000.00	\$	892,164,364.00	\$	4,366,914,555.00	\$	5,012,121,214.25	954.61	1,911.78	8,520.65	9,376.50
\$	9,298,839,655.00	\$	22,823,255,806.00	\$	38,846,151,818.00	\$	49,059,705,180.00	2,900.04	6,872.73	11,520.29	14,702.80
\$	47,027,508,385.00	\$	117,147,614,566.00	\$	393,807,492,847.00	\$	381,286,237,848.00	2,382.25	4,799.65	13,559.33	12,728.73

Table for all these years - for consistency and accuracy purposes, the year 2009 was chosen as the base year for comparison. For countries where this data was unavailable for 2009, the

V6											
	1990	2000	2010	2010	2013	1990	2005	2010	2000	2005	2010
Courts	37	5.3	3.0	4.8	4.4	5.0	5.3	5.4 (2009)	5.8	6.7	9.5
	39	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.1	-99.0	6 (2009)	5.0	4.6	4.4
	23	2.8	2.1	1.7	1.5	-99.0	6.3 (2006)	-99.0	3.7	3.7	3.0
	49	6.3	1.8	1.6	1.5	-99.0	4.5	5.7 (2009)	2.9	3.3	4.2
	40	3.4	2.8	2.2	2.1	2.4	3.4	4.5 (2009)	3.4	2.8	3.8
	46	1.6	3.0	3.6	3.3	4.0	4.8	4.8	5.5	5.3	3.5
	33	1.9	1.6	3.6	3.4	-99.0	1.3 (2000)	-99.0	1.3	2.1	3.0
	-99	0.9	1.5	2.1	1.8	-99.0	8.1	3.7	4.6	6.0	5.1
	13	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	5.3 (2000)	4 (2007)	3.7	2.8	2.1
	22	0.1	1.8	1.3	1.3	-99.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.7
	-99	-99.0	-99.0	-99.0	-99.0	-99.0	-99.0	-99.0	3.9	3.5	3.4
	43	3.5	2.5	2.0	1.9	-99.0	2.7	2.9 (2006)	6.1	4.1	5.6
	33	-99.0	1.5	0.9	1.0	2.5	2.7 (2006)	3.7 (2007)	2.4	2.3	1.7

V2 and V3, the focus was not placed on the base years (i.e., 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2013) but rather, information for these variables is gathered from different years within this time frame (1990-2013) to ensure data was