'Rise up - make haste - our people need us!' : 
Pan-Indigenous Activism in Canada and the United States, 1950 to 1975

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
The University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the period of pan-Indigenous activism in Canada and in the United States between 1950 and 1975. The rights era in both countries presented important challenges for both legislators and for minority groups. In a post-war context increasingly concerned with equality and global justice, minority groups were uniquely positioned to exact from the government perhaps greater concessions than ever before. For Indigenous groups, however, the potential of this period delivered only in part due to initiatives like the Great Society and the Just Society which, while claiming to offer justice for Indigenous people, threatened them as perhaps never before, by homogenizing Indigenous people and their demands with those of other minority groups. As such, I argue that the broader political and social context of the rights era served to inform, but not to dictate, the shape and content of the Indigenous rights movement. The relationship of Indigenous activism to other forms of activism during the rights era was both complicated and contentious, with Indigenous activists conceiving of their struggle in markedly different terms than other marginalized groups. Within this context, I examine the formation of both mainstream and alternative organizations, as well as their responses to the challenges of radicalism, of youth culture and of gender. I argue that the failure of mainstream organizations to properly address the grassroots contributed to a crisis of legitimacy within an increasingly crowded organizational milieu. As both the documentary record and oral accounts demonstrate, what many have demarcated as a new period of “pan-Indian” unity, therefore, was also marked by important division and protest that has often been overlooked in laudatory accounts of the activism of the period. These internal critiques also serve to explain why the mid-1970s signaled an important change in organizational tactics in both countries, at least in the way they had been practiced previously. In addition, the proliferation of rights-seeking groups demonstrated an important echo pattern whereby both policy and protest was replicated and reinvented in a Canadian context slightly later than in an American one.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable help, support, and constant reassurance of my talented advisor, Dr. Jarvis Brownlie who provided academic and emotional support all the way through, and who believed in this project from the start. In addition, this research would not have been possible without the ongoing support and advice of my committee members, including Dr. David Churchill, Dr. Jean Friesen and Dr. Peter Kulchyski, all of whom contributed to the project in various ways. To all of those in the Department of History at the University of Manitoba, for your many years of encouragement and support, I am eternally grateful. In addition, to all those who shared of their lives and experience with me, either publicly or off the record, I am grateful for your trust. A special thank you to Dr. Robert Allan Warrior of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana who gave an unknown doctoral student access to his personal collection of interviews, manuscripts and notes, without reservation. Finally, this thesis would not have been realized without the financial support of both the University of Manitoba's Faculty of Graduate Studies as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Dedication

To Collin, thank you for believing in my crazy dream. To my beautiful girls, Claire and Anabelle, who I hope one day will also contribute to a greater understanding in their own unique way.

And to my maman and my papa, who taught me by example that of those to whom much is given, much is required. Your excellence inspires me to always try harder.
## Timeline of key protests and events, 1944-1975

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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>- Jules Sioui, Aboriginal activist, holds a conference in Ottawa and founds the North American Indian Brotherhood. - The Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons meets to consider changes to the Indian Act.</td>
<td>- Founding of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) in Denver, Colorado.</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>- Status Indians receive the federal franchise.</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>- The Navajo/Hopi Rehabilitation Act provides $500,000 in emergency funding and $88 million in long-range funding to expand employment and services.</td>
<td>- House of Commons passes revisions to the Indian Act which make several important changes including section 87, which places Aboriginal people under the jurisdiction of provincial law.</td>
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<td>1951</td>
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<td>- House Concurrent Resolution 108, also known as Termination, is approved in Congress. It is followed only a few days later by Public Law 280 which extends states' jurisdiction over Native American people.</td>
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<td>1953</td>
<td>- The Klamath Termination Act is passed, despite significant opposition within the tribe.</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>- The Canadian Bill of Rights is enacted by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker providing some guarantee of individual rights including freedom of speech and equality as well as limited equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>The American Indian Chicago Conference takes place.</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>The National Indian Youth Council is born.</td>
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<td>1964-1966</td>
<td>The Economic Opportunity Act launches the war on poverty, providing monies directly to tribal governments for community programs. First Indigenous attempt to occupy Alcatraz Island takes place with very little media attention or concrete success. A series of fish-in protests organized by activist groups and by tribal governments highlights the increasing tensions regarding the abrogation of Indian resources by non-Indigenous people.</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>CBC presents a radio show devoted to Aboriginal people entitled <em>Our Native Land</em>. The show, which runs for over twenty years, provides a national forum and voice for Indigenous people to communicate on issues of importance nation-wide.</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>The first Canadian Aboriginal youth workshop is held in Winnipeg, Manitoba, and organized in large part by the Canadian Indian Youth Council.</td>
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Modeled on the American workshops held in Boulder, Colorado, as of 1956, the workshop aims to help young Aboriginal Canadians learn about Indigenous issues and foster emerging leadership.

1966-1967
- The Hawthorne report is published highlighting the difficult conditions and the abject poverty facing many of Canada's Indigenous people.

1967
- Indigenous groups including the National Indian Council work to have a voice in crafting the Indian Pavillion for Expo '67, with little success. Still, the Pavillion does make a statement and invites further attention to the problems facing Aboriginal people.

1968
- The National Indian Council splits into two groups; the National Indian Brotherhood, to represent status Indian people, and the Canadian Metis Association to represent non-status and Metis.

1969
- The White Paper proposal galvanizes Aboriginal people to unite against termination by other means. The White Paper, proposed by the government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, declares the government's intent to end the special relationship between the federal

- “The Forgotten American” address by President Lyndon B. Johnson highlights a growing awareness in legislative circles that significant restructuring is needed. The American Indian Civil Rights Act provides several new protections for American Indian individuals in the areas of judicial and governance rights, as well as provides a measure of protection from states assuming jurisdiction over Indian lands.

- The Poor People's campaign allows Indian activists to participate in wider protest action as well as convinces some of the uniqueness of the Indigenous cause.

- The American Indian Movement (AIM) is founded.

- Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto, by Vine Deloria Jr., is published, becoming the de facto manifesto of many organizations and activists during this period.

- The Indians of All Tribes occupy Alcatraz Island in one of the most well-publicized and
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<td>1970</td>
<td>The so-called “Powwow Trail” encourages both young and old Aboriginal people to travel across Canada, rediscover Indigenous culture and to interact with others whom they might not ordinarily encounter. The movement as a whole encourages a sense of unity among the people and a broader awareness of Indigenous issues. - The Red Paper, an important Aboriginal response to the White Paper proposal, counters with its own proposal advocating the retention of the Indian Act, the protection of Indigenous culture, and the reaffirmation of a special relationship between the federal government and Aboriginal people including a series of special rights and protections afforded to Aboriginal Canadians. - The Canadian Metis Association become the Native Council of Canada and establishes itself as a national lobbying organization in Ottawa.</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>The first national Native Women's Conference is held in Edmonton, Alberta. - President Richard Nixon claims to support self-determination in an address to Congress and announces an end to Termination.</td>
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<td>Successful pan-Indian protests of the rights era. - Coinciding with the growing popularity of American Indians in the media, a series of Hollywood films are released centering on the history and experience of Indigenous Americans. - The National Tribal Chairman's Association is founded in the face of growing frustration due to a perceived urban bias in the National</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>- The death of Fred Quilt while in RCMP custody prompts two inquiries into the matter after which the RCMP is found not to be at fault for his death.</td>
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<td>- The National Indian Brotherhood publishes <em>Indian Control of Indian Education</em>, a comprehensive document highlighting the way in which Canada's educational system has failed First Nations people.</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>- In a historic and unprecedented judgement, the Supreme Court of Canada's Calder decision denies the Nisga'a's land claim, but affirms the existence of Aboriginal title to land existing outside of colonial law, providing a basis for the Aboriginal insistence on existing title.</td>
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<td>- The Supreme Court of Canada's Lavell decision holds that the Indian Act's section 12(1)(b) concerning Aboriginal status did not violate the right to equality before the law and the protection of the law as guaranteed by the Canadian Bill of rights.</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>- The Office of Native Claims is established within the Department of Indian Affairs to start reviewing and settling all outstanding Aboriginal land claims in Canada.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The Occupation of Anicinabe Park in Congress of American Indians. Detractors claim that the NTCA diverts funds from the NCAI, but supporters assert that the organization is an important and powerful addition to the chorus of American Indian people advocating for significant change.</td>
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<td>- The murder of Raymond Yellow Thunder in Gordon, Nebraska, calls national attention to the plight of Native Americans seeking justice within the established justice system, when the perpetrators are convicted for manslaughter and sentenced lightly.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The Trail of Broken Treaties marches on Washington, occupying the BIA building in a show of protest for the continued apathy of federal administrators. The National Congress of American Indians maintains its own assertion that “Indians don't demonstrate,” and rejects the tactics of the marchers.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- A group of activists take over Wounded Knee in a symbolic protest intended to highlight both their quest for historic justice, as well as the continued abuses of the tribal government of Chairman Dick Wilson on the Pine Ridge Reservation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Menominee Restoration Act repeals termination of federal trust responsibilities for the Menominee people and provides a model for other groups seeking reinstatement.</td>
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<td>- United States <em>v. Washington</em> affirms the treaty fishing rights of the Washington Indians and upholds co-management of the resources by the state and the tribes.</td>
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<td>- The American Indian Policy Review Committee is established by Congress.</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Kenora, Ontario, by members of the Ojibwa Warriors Society, highlights the existence of militant groups with American contacts working in Canada.</td>
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<td>- The historic James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) ushers in a new era of treaty federalism in Canada and the Cree of Northern Quebec enter into an agreement intended to allow the development of hydroelectric dams on their ceded lands by the province of Quebec.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act allows tribes to contract with the federal government in the administration of federal Indian programs.</td>
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Introduction
Speaking at the Academic Week of the Arts Students' Association in 1973, Don Whiteside also known as Sin A Paw, addressed the topic of Indigenous nationalism. Speaking to students and faculty of Sir George Williams University in Montreal, Sin A Paw outlined some key aspects of a subject that had captured public and Indigenous attention over the last decade in North America. As he asserted, “Nevertheless, despite the attempts to commit physical and cultural genocide of our people, we still remain as Indians. We continue to survive... The struggle for self-determination will continue until we regain our freedom and dignity.” What Sin A Paw was saying was not new; it was in essence a summary of an ongoing struggle on behalf of Indigenous people on the North American continent for centuries. But the timing and the content of his address acknowledged the way in which, for as much as was old in Indigenous nationalism during the decades of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, there was also a great deal that was new.

This study is a critical examination of the content and character of pan-Indigenous nationalism between 1950 and 1975 in Canada and in the United States. While the path of Indigenous activism was certainly not the same in both countries, a wider North American context served to animate the ongoing discussion among activists and between activists, legislators and the general public during this era. National policies concerning Indigenous people did differ in their content and application in the United States and Canada, but Indigenous people on both sides of the border shared in a remarkably similar conversation, both amongst themselves and with the public during this period. As such, the similarities of experience and of problems facing Indigenous communities, similarities that persist largely to this day, demand a wider lens through which to view this experience.

I have chosen 1950 as a starting point largely due to the acceleration and greater publicization, in the 1950s, of discussion by Indigenous people concerning their own futures. New organizations demonstrated the growing popularity of the pan-Indigenous message in the 1950s, and by the 1960s, as many Indigenous activists could attest, a new renaissance was well underway. By 1961, the National
Indian Youth Council (NIYC) in the United States emerged, an organization whose work signaled a new direction in Indigenous activism oriented towards direct action. While the NIYC was never the whole of the movement, its growing popularity in early 1960s Native America was indicative of several changes in the ideological and political landscape of the country. Likewise, in Canada, Indigenous organizations also engaged in an important post-war discussion. Although high profile national organizations, in general, emerged later in Canada, activists engaged in the early 1960s with the same sort of rhetoric that made the proliferation of groups like the NIYC of the United States possible. As such, the beginning date of 1950 provides an apt moment to begin to discuss how Indigenous groups engaged with other emerging rights era organizations in a way that the movement had not done before.

Likewise, I have chosen 1975 as an end date for this study due to a series of policy developments in North America which, at least for a time, made it seem as though self-determination in a meaningful sense would indeed be possible. In 1975, the United States Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination Act which recognized the duty of the federal government to provide for maximum participation by Native Americans in federal services and in programs administered in Native American communities. The act formally and legislatively asserted an ongoing obligation and trust between the federal government and Native American people. At the same time, it also helped to re-articulate the activist project from one with national and even international aspirations to one based much more in tribal activism, a phenomenon highlighted in greater detail in Charles Wilkinson's *Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations*. 1975 also saw the creation, in the United States, of the Council of Energy Resource Tribes, a group of over twenty Native American leaders seeking better terms from corporations seeking to exploit minerals on Indian lands. This, alongside the arrest and conviction of Leonard Peltier, a key activist at Wounded Knee. In the aftermath of Peltier's arrest, many remaining activists – at least those who had not yet gone underground – chose to do so, for fear of prosecution or even death. As such, the American Indian movement as a whole changed its orientation rather
significantly after 1975 and deserves its own monograph. While critics have argued that it lost some of
its popular appeal, it also proved itself as dynamic as it always had been when circumstances and the
public mood dictated it change its form and content to reflect new legislative priorities and at least a
tacit recognition of the Indigenous right to self-determination after this time.

In Canada, 1975 is also a significant date. While there was no policy enacted like the American
Indian Self-Determination Act, 1975 signaled a new era as well, or so it seemed. It was in this year that
the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was signed between the government of Canada and the
Inuit and Cree of Northern Quebec. It followed the general example of the 1971 Alaska Native Land
Settlement. Importantly, the agreement provided a significant sum of money as well as confirmed
hunting and fishing rights in return for the surrender of large tracts of land to the provincial government
for the purposes of building hydroelectric dams. Since 1975, the James Bay and Northern Quebec
Agreement has also been the forerunner to subsequent settlements and agreements and, I argue, has
fundamentally changed the role and structure of large pan-Indigenous organizations. As in the United
States then, 1975 signaled an important reassessment of the agenda and of the possibilities for pan-
Indian organization, as well as all but ended the possibility of a broader North American struggle due to
the vastly different approaches taken by national governments at that time.

A. WHAT IS PAN-INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM?

Theories of nationalism as an essentially modern process engaging the socioeconomic,
sociocultural, ideological and political instruments of modernity seemed inadequate in terms of
describing the way in which Indigenous communities not products of the European reorganization
following the French Revolution were nevertheless engaging in expressions of nationalism and pan-
Indianism long before. Cultural nationalists, who perceive the state as an accidental and the nation as a distinctive civilization which is the product of its unique historical culture and geographical profile, do not provide an adequate framework either, for to say that the state is accidental seems to me an insult to Indigenous people: it diminishes the importance of the totalizing state as a force not only in structuring Indigenous life, but in crafting both Indigenous identities and resistance within the settler colonial state.

In various ways and in various degrees, all groups engaged with some form of Indigenous nationalism. I define Indigenous nationalism, for the purposes of this study, as an organized expression of protest planned and carried out by Indigenous people protesting the structures and policies of an imposed colonial state structure. These were subversive protests carried out within the context of a totalizing state, but subversive protests and organizations were sometimes co-opted by the nation state through the practices of incorporation, negotiation and repression.

Engaging with two broad national contexts in addition to two and a half decades of organization necessarily entails placing limits on the types of groups with which I will engage. Therefore, I define pan-Indigenous groups featured in this study as those which are not local or regional, and as groups who looked to advance a national or in some cases an international agenda. I use the term pan-Indigenous to indicate the way in which these organizations employed an approach which implied that all Aboriginal people had something in common, and that this commonality could be mobilized for political gain. In the highly charged rights contexts of this period, this included many organizations, and I have further limited the parameters of this study to include groups whose organizing structure was either large enough or mobile enough to achieve this broader mobilization. Examples of the former include organizations like the National Congress of American Indians and the National Tribal Chairman’s Association in the United States, and the National Indian Council and National Indian Brotherhood in Canada. The latter include mobile groups such as the American Indian Movement, as well as event-based organizations such as the Aboriginal rights caravan active in Canada in the 1970s.
This is not a work of oral history, though every effort has been made to incorporate it where possible. In this case, my work has included interviews conducted by myself with individuals who worked in different organizations and in various roles, and whose politics shifted during their careers and lifetimes. As their words revealed, organizers active during this period often participated in more than one dimension of the Indigenous rights movement at once, and have generally seen their efforts as netting important success. In addition, I have used a series of over thirty interviews conducted by other researchers for different projects, including interviews conducted by those who participated in the famed occupation of Alcatraz Island in a protest that has long been viewed as a key moment in this era of Indigenous organizing. The National Film Board of Canada’s Challenge for Change series provided useful firsthand commentary on this period, as did the Canadian Broadcasting Corporations digital archives of the Our Native Land program, written and produced by Indigenous people, which ran for over twenty years weekly on CBC Radio. Finally, a series of archival collections including personal diaries, personal and organizational correspondence and various research reports were consulted, both at the University of Manitoba and at the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois.

B. SETTING THE STAGE

Indigenous resistance was, during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, of a decidedly modern character. It engaged with the rhetoric of other groups of rights-seekers, sought new opportunities to publicize its message, and engaged with the public in ways that it had not been able to before. Though before the post-World War II era, earlier movements laid important roots and foundations for post-war organizations, they were not of the same scope or breadth – of the same nature – as those with which this study is concerned. Early organizations were primarily based on military or strategic trade alliances
and limited on a practical and on an ideological level. Though many were also religiously based, or blended both religious and political rhetoric, they were also largely regional, limited by geography and limited communication.

Key events did serve to animate Indigenous resistance – and Indigenous unity – early on. Historian David Dixon argues that it was in fact the Seven Years War which largely reinvigorated Aboriginal resistance and gave birth to new spiritual movements focused on urging European powers to recognize Indigenous distinctiveness. In this context, these groups had all sought to regain control of lives and livelihoods increasingly threatened by non-Aboriginal incursion into their lands, and believed that some form of cultural preservation was necessary. Settlers within this region had disregarded land claimed by Indians either by treaty or by ancestral right, and Indigenous residents frequently warned of the dire consequences to befall the settlers if their land-grabbing was not curtailed. Teedyuscung, a Delaware chief, warned English forces that the land belonged to the Indians and that “they will not suffer it to be settled.”

As Gregory Evans Dowd maintains, “the times saw the invention of a new Indian identity in the face of the encounter with domineering new peoples.” While a common geography may loosely have held the tribes together, it was an appeal to the broader pan-Indian land agenda that often spurred the uprising’s base of support.

One of the most significant movements to emerge out of this era was the one that has frequently been credited to Chief Pontiac but that was, according to Richard White, an amalgam of three separate conspiracies involving the Iroquois, the Algonquian and the French. It called upon the work of a young Delaware prophet named Neolin, whose teachings Pontiac would later use to drum up support for the uprising. Neolin insisted that the Master of Life had admonished him for allowing Whites upon the land. As Dowd explains, “What Indians did say, in a succinct expression of territorial sovereignty – and they said it often – was that God had made their country for them; God had given it to them.”

Followers of Neolin also fervently believed that the suffering, covetousness and drunkenness among
them was the result of British influence, and wanted a complete separation, by any means necessary, from the English – and their land-grabbing agenda.

In 1763, Richard White reports, Neolin’s nativism “began to create the wider Algonquian unity that had so far excluded those discontented with British rule.”

Where Pontiac capitalized on the vision was in bringing together both those nostalgic for the days of French rule, as well as those that opposed the particular formulations, deemed by many patriarchal, of the alliance. Despite reports of an impending uprising among the Indians as of the early 1760s and intensifying by 1763, British General Jeffrey Amherst remained smugly convinced that the Indians did not constitute any real threat. He maintained that the power of the Indians was altogether insufficient to curb British forces. Amherst may not have underestimated the logistical organizing capabilities of the early prophets or leaders, but he did underestimate the salience and resonance of their message: within only one year, Neolin's message had spread far beyond the original Delawares to reach tribes “as far west as the Illinois country.”

Though Pontiac and his warriors failed to expel British forces from Fort Detroit, Fort Pittsburgh and Fort Niagara, they had considerable successes as well, destroying “all of the other trans-Allegheny posts as well as numerous isolated white settlements.” Among their victories, they took Fort St. Joseph, Fort Miami, and Fort Ouiatenon, former French possessions now occupied by the British. The group also killed over 2,000 whites during the course of their efforts, which had a significant impact on Pontiac's image in the popular imagination. They were never conclusively defeated on the battlefield, although Pontiac and his warriors sought peace in the end through a series of treaties in 1764 and 1765 that essentially restored the pre-war status quo. For Indians, this meant regaining some possessions lost in the imperial contest, as well as holding back more eager settlers.

This coalition, as other coalitions during this period often were, was extremely contentious and fragile. Pontiac, for example, was not universally respected: as Gordon M. Sayre explains, historical
accounts have presented conflicting images of Pontiac’s leadership: “He was variously seen as a despotic king with grand imperial designs, as the sovereign of all native peoples of the region, and as a self-made upstart, a radical republican with the audacious courage to challenge the empires of England and France.”\textsuperscript{11} Even among his own people, Pontiac’s leadership could be somewhat tenuous. In his siege of Fort Detroit, Pontiac had compelled the participation of some neutral Hurons with threats of annihilation and death.\textsuperscript{12} David Dixon reports that several Potawatomi chiefs had approached officials at Fort Detroit secretly to sue for peace, arguing that they had been compelled to fight by Pontiac.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, Pontiac's own conduct in war had been rebuked by several warriors and followers, including young Kinonchamek, one of the young warriors responsible for the takeover of Fort Michilimackinac. At a council convened by Pontiac, Kinonchamek chastised the leader for allegedly partaking in cannibalism, for ruining and desecrating French property, and for general savagery during his attacks.\textsuperscript{14} As Peckham points out, “What Pontiac was as a symbol exceeded the actual results he achieved.”\textsuperscript{15}

This alliance was primarily military, and cannot therefore be compared with those groups who emerged in the post- World War II world. Yet despite the limitations of this early alliance, Pontiac's militancy and that of his followers did help to strengthen ties between the Delaware and the Ottawa, ties that would be crucial in the early nineteenth century struggles of Shawnee Tecumseh and his prophet brother, Tenskwatawa. Tecumseh's movement, lasting roughly from 1805 to 1813, drew from the example of Pontiac in its emphasis on spirituality and militarism. John Sugden maintains that Tecumseh used religion to strengthen his arguments, building on the pronouncements of his brother Tenskwatawa.\textsuperscript{16}

Like the earlier prophet Neolin, Tenskwatawa claimed that he had experienced his visions among different peoples, not merely his own, and argued that Indian unity alone could address the problems of poverty and could reclaim the land. As Alfred Cave explains, “In keeping with the pan-Indian tradition established by Neolin and other nativist prophets, Tenskwatawa called for the
unification of all Indian peoples.”17 As a united whole, he spoke of the need for the people to change their ways, as well as expressed his faith in a nativist conception that would see Indian people remain separate from the Whites. His teachings sat well with the people, desperately seeking an answer as to why their way of life was declining so quickly. As Sugden reports, Tenskawatawa and Tecumseh's people had lost the majority of their land within their lifetime, particularly in the 1890s, and had been driven west and broken up into scattered villages.18 His message, with its strongly anti-White and pro-Indian message, also helped to foster a new sense of shared identity, as had Neolin's message several decades earlier.

Tenskawatawa's brother, Tecumseh, was at the time a successful war chief who had always been viewed as a man of promise. By 1795, Tecumseh had built a considerable reputation. By this time, he was both a war and civil chief in his group and an exemplar of Shawnee manhood.19 The Treaty of Fort Wayne was a key event in building Tecumseh's alliance, “a transforming event that took a religious movement and made it political.”20 The treaty gained, for the United States, over two million acres of land at the cost of less than two cents per acre from the federally recognized leaders of the Delaware, “Eel River”, Miami and Potawatomi Indians. It was from this point that Tecumseh took charge of the movement and furthered his aims for a pan-Indian coalition. As Sugden explains, the treaty was, for Tecumseh, “an act of robbery in which he United States had exploited the Indians' poverty and once again found willing coadjutors among the established civil chiefs.”21 His anger was directed both at the purveyors of the treaty and at the chiefs, but the event convinced him that a broader coalition was both necessary and urgent.

According to his brother the prophet, Tecumseh was planning for a mighty Indian alliance that would span from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. “His message was clear.”, argues Sugden,”The Indians must stand together to save their lands, their cultures, and their independence, as they had done twenty years before.”22 In other words, the great confederacy for which Tecumseh had fought and for
which his father had died needed to be revived on a national scale. Tecumseh largely ignored the established chiefs, whom he believed to be against him anyway, and focused upon the young warriors. In his quest, Tecumseh faced many obstacles, including vast geographical distances separating the groups, local and regional jealousies among leaders, and the problem of communication between different language groups. His geographical span began from New York and stretched across the frontier to reach even Florida. Though many groups had traded with one another and had cooperated in the past, his was no easy task. Many ideas advocated by Tecumseh, including common land ownership, had been circulated much earlier, but the current and very real threats facing Indian nations meant that many of these obstacles could be – had to be – overcome.

When talk began to spread of war between Great Britain and the Americans, Tecumseh saw an opportunity. He was no mere pawn, but rather, controlled his own participation and those of his followers in the way he saw as most beneficial to Indian futures. In June of 1812, the same month that Congress received a message from the President itemizing his grievances with Great Britain and urging a call for war, Tecumseh was traveling to the Western tribes in order to gain even more support.

Tecumseh proved to be an apt military strategist, and his tactics contributed greatly to British victories during the War of 1812. He focused on attacking supply chains, understanding the a poorly supplied army was easier to defeat than a well-organized and outfitted one. The surrender of Detroit in August of 1815 by American General William Hull was a significant victory, but the outcome of the War of 1812, the Treaty of Ghent, did little to ensure Indigenous survival on the continent. For all of his efforts, including his success at building a tenable pan-Indigenous confederacy, Tecumseh's death fractured his own confederacy, which would not survive his absence. His alliance, like Pontiac's, was primarily military and reflected the struggles of his own context, much as more modern pan-Indigenous activism reflected its own context.

As Indigenous fortunes declined even further throughout the nineteenth century, Indigenous
people continued to organize in a way that combined a preoccupation with spirituality and with culture, but that did so in a more limited way than would arise in the post-World War II period. As Patrick Wolfe has demonstrated, the logic of settler colonialism as a structure meant that state apparatus would quite literally attempt to crush Indigenous edifices. Cultural touchstones centered on a relationship to the land became a primary target for the totalizing state, and Indigenous people reacted. As Gregory E. Smoak explains, the Ghost Dance became the religion of resistance among the Lakota before it became a genuine movement. While the Ghost Dance may have been old for the Newe people, including the Bannocks and the Shoshones, it became, from the 1870s to the 1890s, a “bridge to other people” and the basis for a new statement of shared pan-Indian identity. Smoak maintains that the Ghost Dance, like the movements of the prophets Neolin and Tenskwatawa, was a prophetic expression of Indian identity that countered American attempts to impose national identity on Native American land. Like the movements that came before it, the Ghost Dance was also an attempt to cope with and to understand the host of material changes that Indian people had experiences in the struggles of colonization. Both in 1870 and in 1890, Ghost Dancers believed that the ceremonies could transform the present, restore the old ways and reunite all Indian people, now disunited, living or dead. While the 1870 movement fizzled by 1873, its manifestations spread from the Great Basin into California and Oregon who marked converts among the Washo, the Pyramid Lake Paiutes, the Surprise Valley Paiutes, and the Indians of the Klamath Reservation. It further spread around Tule Lake to the Shastas and Karoks from the Modocs, and reached other California groups like the Maidu and the Patwin.

The Ghost Dance once again gained in popularity in the late 1880s. The movement's leader, prophet Wovoka, was a Northern Paiute who had experienced his first vision on New Year's Day, 1889. His vision occurred during a solar eclipse that had completely darkened the sky and wherein he had traveled to heaven and seen all of the people who had passed living there, all happy and in a perpetual state of youth. As Smoak explains, “God told him to go back to earth and tell all the people to be good
and love one another,” promising that if they faithfully carried out his instructions, they could also be reunited with their friends and relatives in this alternate world in happiness, in health and in youth. In his teachings, Wovoka strove to locate and to make disappear the causes of internal discord so that Indian people could be united. In 1889 and 1890, Wovoka received delegations from many different groups, including the Utes of Utah, Shoshones, Northern Cheyenne, Lakota, Bannocks, Mohaves and Kiowas, among others.

The importance of the Ghost Dance was both reflected and amplified in the popular press. The late 19th century popular press often “talked up” the violence and subversiveness of the Ghost Dance religion. Eager to uncover an “Indian conspiracy”, Whites soon found one. In the Smith and Mason Valleys, for example, the newspapers frequently warned of an impending Indian attack. The Lyon County Times, on September 10, 1890, put it clearly: “...something... [must] be done with the Indians in Mason and Smith Valleys. They are becoming impudent and treacherous, and we think it would be a good idea to confine them on the Reservations for a time.”

In a report to the commanding general of the Pacific Division, investigating agent A.I. Chapman reported that Whites of the area surrounding the Walker Lake Reservations did believe that the Indians were becoming “more exacting every day.” As an illustration, a White farmer reported that an Indian had recently moved his cattle into a White man’s field and refused to leave. When threatened, the Indian explained that the Whites had better “bring a big crowd” in order to evict him. The agent further reported that the Paiutes were very healthy and numerous, though offered no further comment on the matter. These reports contributed both to the banning of the practice in December of 1890, as well as the tragedy of the Wounded Knee massacre, where American troops, led by General Nelson Miles, open fire on a camp which included not only 120 men but over 200 women and children. In the aftermath of the massacre and after less than one hour, over 150 Indians were dead and 50 wounded. Many of the dead were the women and children camped there who had not been among the dancers in the first place. While the massacre did cause the Sioux to
unite against their aggressors, the Sioux eventually laid down their arms on January 15, 1891, surrounded by a force of over 8,000 troops.

The Ghost Dance movement had several parallels, including the Sun Dance movement which became popular, in particular, among Plains people in the late nineteenth century. Joseph Jorgensen has argued that while the Ghost Dance movement was a transformative one, the Sun Dance represents a redemptive movement that sought a new individual state rather than total change to the total social and natural order. Nevertheless, it is clear, through the perspective of participants, the Sun Dance, like the Ghost Dance, was often used as a way of demonstrating resistance in a group setting. Born as early as 1700 as a way to ensure a good buffalo hunt, the Sun Dance eventually became a way of coping with illness, misery and the legacies of colonial occupation. Sun dances were held both in Canada and in the United States, despite government prohibitions against them.

The early twentieth century also witnessed the birth of several new organizations that assumed more bureaucratic structures – a reflection of a modernizing state apparatus as well as the new brand of leadership emerging out of the context of residential schools. In the United States, the Brotherhood of North American Indians (BNAI), founded in 1911, represents one of these new groups. Founded by Richard C. Adams, a member of the Delaware tribe of Oklahoma, the BNAI's earliest constitution expressed its goal to be the promotion of friendship, brotherhood and good citizenship among the tribes. In addition, its mandate included the perpetuation of the “ancient traditions” of the tribes and the retaining of records and tribal histories. It cultivated the favor of a few members of Congress, though their actions on behalf of the BNAI were largely ineffectual. Both its proposals, as well as its plan for a national headquarters in Washington, D.C., remained unrealized and the organization floundered under criticism from the other prominent pan-Indian organization of the time, the Society of American Indians. It collapsed in 1913 amid charges of corruption and unscrupulous associations, never having realized any part of its expansive mandate.
The other group founded in 1911, the Society of American Indians (SAI), looked only to organize Indigenous residents of the United States. It had three main operational divisions including membership, education and legislation. The group emphasized what its members felt supratribalism could have in common, namely education for all Indian people and legislation that improved the lot of all Indian people. Its leaders represented the 'best' of acculturated Indians of the time, integrated individuals imbued with the ideas of the Progressive Era. These ideas were not so different from those of White reform groups who had tried to save the Indian, and included an insistence on self-reliance and self-help. As D. Anthony Tyeeme Clark argues, the SAI provided an Indigenous 'talented tenth' model, much like that proposed by W.E.B. DuBois within the African American community. One of its early leaders, Carlos Montezuma, a Yavapai from the Arizona territory, advocated for a national organization of so-called 'educated' Indians. Arthur C. Parker, a Seneca, was a key member, an Indian anthropologist who served as one-time president of the association as well as, before that, its secretary and editor of its magazine. Though Parker was an important contributor to the ideas and policies of the SAI, he was not a “full blooded” Indian: his mother was White, but he had grown up close to and on the Reservation throughout his childhood. Parker was a strong admirer of Tecumseh's organizational efforts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and he believed strongly in the project of a unified American Indian identity. As Hertzberg explains, Parker “believed that the Society of American Indians should provide an Indian common ground, a vehicle for the expression of a Pan-Indian identity through an organizational format like that of non-Indian reform and academic organizations.” Hence, like these models which Parker held dear, the SAI published its own journal, held its own conferences and deliberations and met in academic milieus, not on reservations. In a sense, the history of the SAI is marked by a continuing yet underlying tension about how much “Indian” should be retained, and how much should be left behind.

The SAI grew throughout the early twentieth century and by January of 1912, had set up its
national headquarters in Washington, DC. Its first two years were marked by events and statements that promoted further education to advance “backward” reservation Indians, an emphasis on self-reliance and self-help characteristic of non-Aboriginal reform groups, as well as the creation and perpetuation of an American Indian identity that would make differences between tribes and individuals irrelevant in the quest for Progress.\textsuperscript{42} It established a forum for its opinions in the form of its Journal, as well as helped to intervene on behalf of reservation Indians with the government. In addition, the SAI provided legal aid to Indians at little to no cost, which had been a goal of its original mandate.

Despite its position as one of the only large-scale and nationally-based reform groups for Indians and by Indians, interest in the SAI waned by 1914. After the war, its existence was marred by a lack of interest as well as a focus on organizational questions rather than frank and productive discussion about the future of Indian affairs. It had also gained its share of critics who alleged that the organization was too far removed from its constituency to make any real difference in the lives of Indians on reservations.\textsuperscript{43} And, as were other organizations, the SAI was often crippled by lack of resources and funding. In the words of Hertzberg, “It was a reform organization which could not achieve reforms.”\textsuperscript{44} As a result, its members became even more distant from each other, engaging in factionalism that would spell the end of the organization by the early 1920s. Despite new themes introduced in the 1920s, including increasing anti-immigrant and anti-African American rhetoric, the shift was towards increasing emphasis on the tribal unit and the decreasing viability of national pan-Indianism as a strategy. Even the organizations magazine suffered: it began as a magazine for Indian reformers and became, increasingly, a magazine about Indians and by Whites.\textsuperscript{45}

As in the United States, Canadian organizers also worked throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to forge organizations that could both be effective and survive. British Columbia, in particular, was a focal point of Indigenous organizing. From 1850 to 1854, James Douglas, previously a chief factor for the Hudson’s Bay Company, and governor of the colony of Vancouver Island for most
of the 1850s and part of the 1860s, made fourteen land 'purchases' from Indigenous people to open up land for agricultural settlement. The terms of conveyance for such purposes were rather unclear, comprised of only about 200 words, and surrendered tracts of territory “entirely and forever.” They preserved Native 'villages' and the right to hunt on unoccupied land and to fish as they had previously.

In other areas, including British Columbia's mainland, no treaties were negotiated due to various reasons which included the expense, the difficulty of the treaty process, and, as both Paul Tennant and Cole Harris have argued, because Douglas came to believe that the treaties “provided scant justice for Native people.” As such, it was no surprise that early Indigenous leaders rallied together to rectify the parsimonious grants that Douglas and later colonial personnel had imposed. In 1872, the Coast Salish people rallied outside the provincial land registry office in New Westminster and in 1874, 56 chiefs signed a petition demanding the implementation of a federal proposal recommending that reserves contain 80 acres per family. As Paul Tennant explains, “It was in the 1880s that a new level of political awareness and organization began to emerge and with it a very specific set of Indian political demands for recognition and aboriginal title, for treaties and for self-government.”

While some may have agitated for resolution, no such resolution was immediately forthcoming. Still, times were changing, and in British Columbia, where tribal and traditional identities remained very central to Indigenous lives, late nineteenth century pan-Indigenous activism built upon them and focused on political, rather than cultural or religious, goals. Furthermore, by the early twentieth century, there were in every community those Indigenous people who had attended mission schools and who knew how to speak and/or to write in English, thus forming the basis of new “neo-traditional” organizations. In 1907, the Nisga'a formed the Nisga'a Land Committee which initiated a meeting with the Port Simpson Tsimshian which resulted, in 1909, in the formation of the Indian Rights Association. As Tennant argues, what was most significant about the IRA, was that “it brought together for the first time north cast and south coast tribal groups and included groups, notably the Haida, who
had not previously taken part in intertribal action.” Thus though pan-Indigeneity had begun to take root in British Columbia, it was not effective in achieving its goal; preventing the further reduction of reserves. And, in early twentieth century Canada eagerly looking to attract European immigrants, land was an important currency.

Organizers realized that the land issue was unlikely to be easily resolved – nor was it the only issue around which activists rallied. Elsewhere in Canada, reformers focused on the Indian Act as a focal point of resistance. The Grand General Indian Council of Ontario was a council of autonomous Anishinabek First Nations in the Ontario region that convened between 1870 and 1936 to discuss and to promote changes in federal legislation regarding Indigenous people. Conceived in a period of relative crisis amidst unrest regarding treaties and new pieces of legislation, the Grand Council was first convened in 1858, to discuss the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857. Norman Shields has examined the emergence and work of the Council in detail, and argues that for the Anishinabek who formed the Grand Council, inter-village alliance had always been “an integral component to the pursuit of pimadaziwin – of the good life.” Though Shields emphasizes the continuity of the Council with practices of the past, it is clear that the Grand Council formed in this period was both an event and an organization that was different than what had come before. It generated a great deal of excitement among the Anishinabek people as it now included the Six Nations, who had not traditionally partaken in Anishinabek Grand Councils. Eighty-nine delegates representing twenty-one different communities thus met together, focusing initially on the concept of strength in unity to place this, the first council, on a good, solid footing for discussion. As Shields admits, most of the membership and particularly the leadership was a literate, educated group, many of whom had diplomatic or cross-cultural experience as well as some exposure to or even career in the Church. Its approach was thus consultative and often conciliatory. In the opening remarks of its 1870 inaugural conference, elected Chairman Chief Kerr remarked that “intelligent deliberations at the general council would help convince the government of
the wisdom of such consultation." Other speakers echoed this mood: Reverend John Sunday added, for example, that he had always been treated with courtesy and respect by the government, and that the 1869 legislation should not be rejected as a whole, but reviewed in parts. Carefully drafted resolutions resulting from years of discussion often emerged from the Grand Council, dealing most frequently with government legislation section by section and statute by statute. For some, the Grand Council simply did not push hard enough: while the year 1882 featured 109 delegates from 21 nations, by 1900 it had 40 delegates from only 15 communities.

The Grand General Council eventually lost its effectiveness, and a factor that it believed affected its popularity was, however, the emergence of a new organization run by Frederick Olgivie Loft, someone whom the Department of Indian Affairs decidedly deemed an agitator. Though the Grand Council had initially envisaged a working relationship with the League of Indians, Loft did not send a representative to the 1920 convention. By 1922, the Grand Council was complaining that the League of Indians was in fact taken away some of its own talent and energies, “to the detriment of the Grand Council’s business being attended to.”

In the League of Indians, Loft envisaged a broad agenda and membership spanning across the country. His vision of unity called upon the basic principle of strength in numbers, drawing on the examples of worker's organizations so prominent during this time. As he noted, in his first circular of 26th November 1919, “Union... is the only way by which the individual and collective elements of society can wield a force and power to be heard and their demands recognized.” His efforts to politicize even the smallest and most isolated of Aboriginal bands was indicative of his belief that Indigenous people needed to be made more aware to awaken their desire to join organizations such as the League. Their problems, he argued, were common from coast to coast, and as such, unity was indeed possible.

The emergence and rising popularity of the League of Indians coincided with the Department's
efforts to seek a more aggressive strategy against Indigenous organizing. Though it argued that the purpose of its new law was to forbid “outside agitators” from making trouble, the new amendment to the Indian Act all but halted all effective organizing in Canada until the 1950s. The new section, titled Section 141, stated: “Every person who, without the consent of the Superintendent General expresses in writing, receives, obtains, solicits, or requests from any Indian any payment or contribution or promise of any payment or contribution for the purpose of raising a fun or providing money for the prosecution of any claim which the tribe or band of Indians to which such Indian belongs, or of which he is a member, has or is represented to have for the recovery of any claim or money for the benefit of the said tribe or band, shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction for each such offence.”62 As Peter Kulchyski explains, the 1927 amendment was not a ban as such, but rather, a prohibition to collect money from any Indian for the purposes of legal representation without the written consent of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs.63 Though it blamed “lawyers” and “agitators” for the need for such a measure, it was clear that the government hoped to stem a rising tide of discontent demonstrated throughout Indigenous communities. It also served as a lesson for future organizations about the limitations imposed on those deemed unrepresentative, and the need to work within a conciliatory framework to have access to the levers of power within the state.

Apart from its role in helping to inspire the administrators who drafted the 1927 amendment, the League of Indians remains significant as an important precursor to later, modern pan-Indigenous organizations. As Peter Kulchyski argues, the League of Indians helped to lay the conceptual and issue-based framework pursued by organized activists in the 1960s and 1970s in particular. Loft's primary areas of focus included Aboriginal rights, self-determination and the protection of a land base, which Kulchyski maintains became the basis of the demands of modern pan-Indian political organizations.64 Nevertheless, like the Grand General Council and organizations before it, the League was primarily a defensive organization, reacting to government policy as it was made.
The League enjoyed considerable success during the 1920s, drawing approximately 1500 delegates to its 1922 annual conference. Though its popularity subsided in Ontario in the mid-1920s, the League became particularly successful in the west and, in 1933, broke into separate provincial chapters for Saskatchewan and Alberta. Indeed, the League of Indians was a key figure in emerging First Nations Prairie organizations, and conventions of the League were held in Manitoba, in Saskatchewan and in Alberta in the three years following its founding. Loft and the League of Indians did generate, as Kulchyski’s title suggests, “a considerable unrest,” but it also suffered from important setbacks, including the eventual loss of Loft’s own charismatic brand of leadership. In this case, its decline in popularity in the post-Loft era demonstrates to what extent Loft’s organization was dependent on leadership from a single individual – himself.

A sense of what was to come also emerged in British Columbia in the early twentieth century. The Brotherhood model for British Columbia was, in part, inspired by the Alaska Native Brotherhood, an organization founded in 1912 by a group of former training school pupils who had highly acculturated themselves in the town of Sitka, Alaska. The organization was part fraternal order and part assimilationist force. In its first decade of existence, its members worked to quell traditional Aboriginal customs, promote full citizenship, and achieve better education. While early British Columbian advocacy groups and the ANB were not at all of the same mind, the ANB model and structure seemed promising to some. In particular, Alfred Adams, a commercial fisherman and a lay minister with the Anglican church, decided that the ANB model might work in the B.C. Context.

Part of the ANB structure included “camps”, which were essentially village branches that, altogether, formed the ANB. In 1931, Adams invited leading Tsimshian chiefs to Port Simpson to discuss the formation of a new organization to fill the vacuum left by the other departed groups. They came together to form the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, “which was seen by its founders as a vehicle for continuing the ideas of the Allied Tribes while avoiding any explicit pursuit of the now-
prohibited land claim.” Early goals included schooling, protection of commercial fishing resources as well as trapping and timber resources in off-reserve traditional lands. In addition, it supported legalizing the potlatch, outlawed as of 1885, and replacing residential schools with in-village day schools. As Tennant explains, the issue of aboriginal title remained an important subtext to the movement which underlied all of its actions, and unlike the ANB, it remained committed to the protection and preservation of Aboriginal lifestyles, rather than their acculturation.

Within this struggle, vibrant new leadership emerged. Andrew Paull used his own popularity among the coastal Salish, with whom he had been involved in an earlier organization called the Allied Tribes of British Columbia, to organize several branches on the coast. Frank Calder, adopted son of Arthur Calder, also joined the Brotherhood in 1942, when a branch was established at Greenville. Peter Kelly also joined the Brotherhood in the mid-1940s as Chairman of the Legislative Committee. With such strong leadership, throughout the 1940s, the organization flourished and became a stable cornerstone of protest, even publishing its opinions and issues in the monthly *Native Voice*.

Within the same period, Jules Sioui also emerged as an important pan-Indigenous activist. Leader of the *Comite de Protection des Droits Indiens* and a member of the Huron-Wendat nation, Sioui issued, in the early-1940s, an invitation to Canada's band chiefs to attend a meeting funded by the delegates themselves. John Tootoosis of Saskatchewan and Andrew Paull were also key forces behind the invitation, which announced a meeting in Ottawa planned for October 19th, 1943, to discuss the current direction of Indian policy. As the invitation read, “The impact of these perilous moments compels us to draw-up serious reforms. We have to establish such reforms in order to put a betterment in the Indian situation, and this, without delay, if we want the maintenance of our rights in our proper country.” Predictably, Sioui’s invitation was denounced by then-Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Major Harold Wigmore McGill, as an agitator and a troublemaker who did not represent the concerns of Aboriginal people. In other words, Sioui was a “bad” sort of Indian who acted in his own
self-interest rather than for that of his people. He was also deemed unpatriotic, having refused to register for military service on the grounds of both law and principle.\textsuperscript{67}

The 1943 conference drew only selected Aboriginal leaders, many of them having been bullied into not attending by Indian agents stationed on the reserves who used threats of suspended federal monies and services to discourage participation. Only fifty-five delegates attended, representing half of what the organizers had planned. Still, the event was significant in its avowal of a pan-Indigenous Canadian agenda, as well as in its partial success in drawing Indian leaders from coast to coast.\textsuperscript{68}

Though conventioneers did not receive any firm commitment from the government, another conference was planned for June of 1944 with the express purpose of forming a Canadian pan-Indian group that could effectively speak for Aboriginal people on a national level. As Sioui announced of the 1944 gathering, “The principal object of the Convention is to reorganize the direction of our nation; we shall have to elect a Supreme Chief, establish direct rules. Then we will be in a position to approach the puppet Government and submit our contentions.”\textsuperscript{69} Sioui, who clung to the notion of unreserved Indian sovereignty, expressed his belief in Indian national independence, including the administration of Indian resources and a proper Aboriginal currency.

As Shewell argues, Sioui’s radicalism was often “too great for many of his own contemporaries.”\textsuperscript{70} In the run-up to the 1944 event, Ottawa issued a circular warning Aboriginal people against travelling to the capital “at the beck and call of any agitator” and advised Aboriginal people to stay at home and assist in the war effort, trusting only “loyal and respectable members of the community.”\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, at the 1944 Convention, Minister Thomas Crerar agreed to meet with only six of the delegates providing Sioui was excluded. The 1944 convention did produce the National American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB), which aimed to represent Aboriginal concerns on both sides of the border and survived for six full years. Still, it never went as far as activists like Sioui would have liked and in the aftermath, Sioui along with thirty three others formed the more radical Indian Nation of
North America, which never came to enjoy the prominence of the NAIB and dissolved soon after. According to Shewell, “the ostracism of Sioui resulted in a more favourable, conservative, national organization free of radical goals and other strident rhetoric.” In the developing context of the Cold War, such an organization was both a safe and a more effective choice. Like the NCAI in the United States, the NAIB represented the “good Indians” with whom Ottawa preferred to negotiate, an organization whose methods excluded a rhetoric that placed Indian people outside of the preserve of the federal state. As of 1944, the NAIB, had elected British Columbia's Andy Paull, a relative veteran of political organization, to a five year term beginning in 1944, to represent non-treaty Indigenous people interested in changes to the Indian Act.

C. A MODERN MOVEMENT IS BORN

As this discussion has demonstrated, early movements did share some characteristics with later ones, including the inclusion of spirituality, culture and activism, but the limited geographical span, as well as the insular discourse of early activism, meant that it differed significantly than the Indigenous activism that emerged in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Therefore, this dissertation will explore the reasons behind the formation of a new generation of pan-Indigenous movements in both Canada and the United States in the postwar era. The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s saw a much greater emphasis on collective identity, as expressed through the idea of the 'Indian', than did earlier movements. The post-war context, including its emphasis on human rights and on a new liberalism, did engender an invigorated discussion about the rights of minority groups in both Canada and in the United States. The rights climate was further enriched by a global context that included many instances of decolonization abroad which served to demonstrate the limitations of the contemporary North American colonial state.
for Indigenous people and others. Though this made later movements less vulnerable, in some ways, to regional or local concerns, it could also make them seem unresponsive at times, to the everyday concerns and realities of Indigenous people.

Though the rich rights climate provided ample opportunities for the discussion of Indigenous rights, Indigenous organizations more commonly defined their agenda against each other. Though all of these groups and individuals were working towards a general improvement of Indigenous lives, they all did so in distinctive ways, and emerged through a discussion of what current organizations had failed to deliver. Though Indigenous organizers were inspired by and drew from the rhetoric, symbolic language, and emphasis on humanity of other groups such as the Black Power movement, they crafted a distinctive agenda that united culture, spirituality and politics, combined with an emphasis on customary, versus human, rights. As Peter Kulchyski has recently argued, Aboriginal rights do not belong to the broader category of universal human rights because they are grounded in the particular practices of Indigenous people. As Winona Wheeler has recounted, when her mother spoke of Martin Luther King as a man who was going to change the world, she also added that the Aboriginal people were different. As Wheeler recalls of her mother’s words: “You are not an ethnic, my girl. Ethnic people come from somewhere else. You are of this land, you are Indigenous, and that’s what makes you different than everybody else.” In essence, this was also the argument of activists during this period who, as a whole, worked to form a thoroughly modern movement within a new and more receptive context. I examine activist groups who participated in this broader movement through the lenses of geography, gender and of the youth generation. These boundaries are not imposed without reflection by the author, but do reflect the way that organizations defined themselves.

The Indigenous rights movement blended both highly formalized organizations and more loosely-based coalitions, and participants often participated in both simultaneously, or at different times as their own personal politics evolved. All organizations and groups reflected many aspects of an
imposed colonial structure, but the bureaucratization of mainstream organizations alienated many people who felt as that such centralized and structured groups represented an assumption of the apparatus of the state. Though more radical activists often charged mainstream organizers with having bowed to the state, I maintain that the assumption of a pan-Indigenous orientation was an attempt at a subversion of the organizing grammar of race that quickly revealed its practical limitations in the face of rigid colonial structures.

D. A CONSPICUOUS SILENCE: EXISTING HISTORIOGRAPHY ON INDIGENOUS ACTIVISM

This work represents an innovation in the field. Many scholars working in the field have been reluctant to engage in a truly critical examination of such movements, largely due to the ongoing political dimension of the struggle. As such, pan-Indigenous organization is not a topic that has been exhausted by historians, social scientists or historians. While there are what some have considered to be 'pioneering' works on the topic, their temporal scope and regional limitations mean that pan-Indianism in its truest sense, conceived as the national or even transnational political organization of Aboriginal people on their own behalf, remains relatively unexplored scholarly territory. Nevertheless, monographic flagship studies include, in the American context, Hazel Hertzberg's *The Search for an American Indian Identity: Modern Pan-Indian Movements*, James Treat's *Around the Sacred Fire: Native Religious Activism in the Red Power Era*, and the much more recent *Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth Council and the Origins of Native Activism* by Bradley Shreve. In the Canadian context, Paul Tennant's *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989* remains the most comprehensive regional Canadian study on the issue.

In 1971, social scientist Hazel Hertzberg published her study of what she deemed “modern Pan-
Indian” movements, both secular and religious, that arose in the first third of the twentieth century. She defined Religious pan-Indianism as an aggregation of local groups, while Reform Pan-Indianism sprang into being as national body in the form of the Society of American Indians. Organizations conceived on secular terms, however, had few tribal institutions to work through, and their project relied heavily on non-Indian sources.

The pan-Indian movement in its initial period was one of accommodation, she argued, one that chose not to focus on past injustices for fear of polarization and factionalism. Hertzberg correctly predicted that pan-Indianism in the future would involve the reemergence of “once-vanished” Indians, individuals whose ancestry was so far removed that it would inspire skepticism by those who considered themselves “real” Indians. Nevertheless, writing from the vantage point of 1971, Hertzberg fails to comment on the way in which pan-Indianism in a truly contemporary sense was not a mere continuation of what had come before, but rather a significant reinvention that stressed history and rejected accommodationist or integrationist models. While some organizations of the older type persisted, including the National Congress of American Indians, the pan-Indianism of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States was of a truly different character.

The religious character of pan-Indian organization is the subject of James Treat's 2003 examination of the annual Indian Ecumenical Conferences beginning in 1970. Around the Sacred Fire analyzes religious activism, though Treat's examination of the Red Power period clearly demonstrates the interconnectedness of religious and political organizing. He characterizes the conference as a grassroots effort designed by Native spiritual leaders to transcend antagonisms between tribal and Christian traditions. He characterizes the development of the conference as post-national and transnational, but points out that the inter-religious conversation was sometimes overshadowed by an inter-generational encounter. His account, however, is largely uncritical, and as such, fails to document fully the dialogue between groups and factions through a focus on the organizational aspects of the conferences.
Most recently, Bradley Shreve has offered his own contribution to the field in his monograph, *Red Power Rising*. In it, he chronicles the rise of the National Indian Youth Council within the emerging activist context of 1960s America. In particular, he locates the origins of the National Council not in 1969 within the occupation of Alcatraz Island, but much earlier, in 1961, when a group of students dedicated to forming “A Greater Indian America” met to form the South West Regional Indian Youth Council. While his work does much to clarify the important context in which activists emerged, as well as provides an important corrective for those who would place too much emphasis on the events of the late 1960s, his focus on the NIYC as an organization belies the very crowded organizational and activist landscape in which it emerged. Moreover, despite his apt description of the various people involved in the NIYC as well as the organization's struggle with internal dissent in the latter part of the 1960s, Shreve fails to fully extract the way in which the NIYC interacted with other movements of the era including students' movement and the New Left. While these movements were in fact distinct from the agenda advanced by the NIYC, there was an important and ongoing dialogue between the various movements of the rights era. In addition, due to Shreve's characterization of the NIYC as a distinctly youth-based Indigenous movement, which it was, he fails to fully appreciate the complicated relationship it had with its elders. Though its leadership frequently lauded the concept of wisdom drawn from elders, its members were also highly critical of those whom it deemed to have betrayed the Native American cause. Finally, though Shreve mentions, in passing, other organizations, his primary focus remains a celebratory account of the modern Indigenous youth movement as it developed during this period and he continues to underemphasize the work conducted by other strands of the pan-Indigenous element during this period.

Overall, there is a lack of information and analysis related to the historical development of a modern pan-Indigenous movement in the United Stated. Much like Shreve's account, many studies try to convey a notion of pan-Indigenous activism as an unbroken strand. There is a rather extensive
literature on the American Indian Movement and on the events of the 1960s and 1970s, especially the occupation of Alcatraz and the Wounded Knee stand-off. Authors like Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, as well as Troy Johnson, Joanne Nagel, Duane Champagne and Adam Fortunate Eagle point to these events as dramatic turning points that signaled the rebirth of Indigeneity as organized within pan-Indian lines. While valuable for the insight they bring to these important events, these approaches tend to underemphasize the particular context and development of the movement before these events in a wider lens. Troy Johnson has declared the occupation of 1969 to be the most symbolic, the most significant and the most formative Indian protest action of the modern era.

Furthermore, most of these authors focus on AIM or other high-profile organizations like the Indians of All Tribes, the group who claimed responsibility for Alcatraz, to the exclusion of the broader pan-Indian movement, and almost none attempt to highlight the way in which different groupings of Indigenous people including those based in a rural or a reserve setting, those considered youths or traditionalists, or women and men structured and defined the shape of the organizations emerging in this period. For these reasons, the field of inquiry into pan-Indigenous movements as they are conceived by this study, of both a political and a cultural nature, remains relatively impoverished and underdeveloped, especially from a historical point of view.

In a Canadian context, most scholars have focused on organizations at a tribal or provincial level. Any sense of national pan-Indigenous organization as it developed in Canada's own historic context remains shadowy and opaque. Notable regional studies include Paul Tennant's *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1869-1989*. His focus is clearly on territorial politics, and while his study contains useful broader references, it fails to critically engage the idea of pan-Indianism in terms of a social movement rather than directed political action. A broader analysis of the question of pan-Indianism could offer a perspective that highlights pan-Indianism in both political AND cultural terms. In addition, Tennant's focus on Aboriginal leadership tends to
obscure the importance of the community they intended to serve. While the land question was undoubtedly important, it was certainly not the only question or the most important question for many people whose concern for rights was eclipsed by the very basic needs of survival.

The limitations and silences of current scholarship, therefore, have led to this project, which takes a more comprehensive and, I argue, more accurate view of the many shades and degrees of organizing that together, formed what many participants have characterized as a genuine “Indian renaissance.” This was a period in which so much seemed possible, and through which the structure of Indigenous politics in Canada and in the United States as it exists today was forged. As such, it deserves our attention, both as a historical community, as well as citizens concerned with the direction, scope, and effectiveness of current Indigenous organizations.

E. THE STORY

Chapter 1 engages the concepts of post-war liberalism and the new ethos of citizenship integration as a rearticulation of assimilation that emerged in the post-Second World War. This chapter focuses on the development of new organizations and groups in the 1940s and 1950s demonstrating the way in which questions of rights and responsibility were phrased increasingly in the language of citizenship and nationalism. The effect on pan-Indigenous organizers was important, for it forced emerging activists to attempt to reconcile Indigenous identity with national citizenship with extremely varied responses. Furthermore, the first chapter necessarily outlines the legislative and political context of the 1960s in Canada and the United States highlighting the similarities and differences in the approaches of both countries towards the Indigenous question. While the emergence of civil rights seemed to engender a discourse more amenable to the settlement of the Indigenous question, the
opposite was true, as Indigenous organizers were increasingly forced to articulate the many ways in which their work differed from those of other ethnic rights-seeking groups.

Chapter 2 focuses on the organizations themselves: how they were created and why, as well as by whom. Their structure and character contributed a great deal to their acceptance, rejection or overall popularity within the Indigenous community, but also, and in a related sense, crucially defined their relationship with the state. The way in which what I have characterized as mainstream pan-Indigenous organizations negotiated these muddied waters and defined their agenda in concert with the structures of the nation-state sometimes served to create perhaps as much opposition to their organizations as support. Nevertheless, the continuing relevance of national organizations founded and fostered during this era is a testament to their adaptiveness and strength born out of necessity.

Chapter 3 engages the urban experience of Indigenous North Americans arguing that Canadian and American Indigenous people experienced much of the same context in the cities across national borders. Chapter 4 and 5 turn to examine the context of Canadian reserve and American reservation life, respectively, to demonstrate how the differences between urban and reservation people were vast indeed. Though many Indigenous people simultaneously lived in both worlds or transitioned from one to the other, the emergence of a rift between more urban and more reserve-based groups signaled the increasingly complicated relationship between more established groups striving for continuing relevance and new groups who seemed, at least for a time, to be listening to the real needs of the people. Chapter 6 highlights the generational nature of the many branches of the movement demonstrating the important youth component to the broader pan-Indigenous movement which drew from other youth organizations often more so than it did from other Indigenous organizations. While youth organizers consistently lauded the values of tradition and of elders, they also forged a distinctive and in many cases more democratic path to resistance. Finally, Chapter 7 critically engages the gender issue, speaking to women's own understandings of Indigenous nationalism and their place within the
struggle both as Indigenous people and as women.

F. THE MOVEMENT... AS IT WAS, AND IS, LIVED

This study seeks to capture pan-Indianism both as it was lived, and as it continues to be remembered. At the outset of this project, I had intended to interview several people about their experience during this time. The reluctance of many to speak out on the subject of events over three decades past is a continuing testament to the challenges that First Nations people still face and the trust that researchers still need to earn from these communities. Nevertheless, I am grateful to those who did choose to trust me with their experiences. The idea of how activists recast pan-Indianism in a new era and embraced the concept of race, albeit often described as cultural identity, is one that continues to have important ramifications for the present. By embracing a cultural identity cast upon them by the colonizers, modern pan-Indianism's goal to be all-inclusive only exacerbated existing divisions between young and old, between reserve and urban Aboriginal people, and between the different classes of Indigenous peoples. An approach that negated tribal or group divisions in favor of a nebulous and hard-to-define cultural identity would appear at first to be completely inclusive, yet the continuing fissures between pan-Indian organizations as they evolved in this era and their broadly conceived constituencies prove that the concept itself, at least in its current articulation, is limited. Of equal importance then, are those who failed to engage in organizing in any significant way during this period. For those who struggled to survive, and who continue to struggle, the project of activism seemed in many cases far removed from their everyday lives.

Speaking in 1973, Sin A Paw argued that First Nations fought to protect their treaties, the Indian Act and even the Department of Indian Affairs. As he maintained, “We do this not because the treaties
were fair and just, they weren't; not because the Department recognizes our hopes and aspirations, it
doesn't; not because the Indian Act protects our land, our people, and our welfare, it doesn't. We
struggle to maintain them because they formally recognize our differences from the dominant society.”
Later, he added, “We want to remain as Indians.”
Difference – a concept which was, during the evolution of the rights era and beyond, cast as out of date, politically incorrect, and even bigoted – continues to animate the rhetoric of Indigenous activism. While preserving or reviving a special relationship between the nation-state and Indigenous people in North America has become a matter of political course in many ways, much work remains to be done. Activists today, as those in the 1960s and 1970s, would argue that difference must be real to be meaningful. It is time that society listened.


7 White, *The Middle Ground*, 283-284.

8 Ibid., 284.


10 Ibid., 42.


19 Sugden, *Tecumseh*, 94.


22 Ibid., 179.

23 Ibid., 9.

24 Ibid., 203.

25 Ibid., 271.


28 Ibid., 10.

29 Ibid., 114.

30 Ibid., 115-116.

31 Ibid., 165.


33 Cited in Hittman, 99.

34 Cited in Hittman, 236.


36 Ibid., 27.


41 Ibid., 56.
42 Ibid., 109.
43 Ibid., 133.
44 Ibid., 134.
47 Ibid., 33.
49 Ibid., 68.
50 Ibid., 84.
51 Ibid., 87.
53 Ibid., Chapter 1.
54 Ibid., 32.
55 Ibid., 10 and 31.
56 Ibid., 36.
57 Ibid., 36.
58 Ibid., 100.
59 Ibid., 125.
60 Cited in Kulchyski, “‘A Considerable Unrest,’” 101.
63 Kulchyski, “‘A Considerable Unrest’”, 98.
64 Ibid., 101.
67 Ibid., 222.
68 Ibid., 225.
69 Ibid., 227.
70 Ibid., 227.
71 Ibid., 229.
72 Ibid., 234.
74 Hertzberg, *The Search*, 301.
75 Ibid., 332.
78 Whiteside, “‘Indian Nationalism,’” 6.
79 Ibid., 9.
Chapter 1:

*Formulating a pan-Indigenous Agenda: Citizenship and Liberalism after World War II*
INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of the post-war era, legislators in Canada and the United States faced an ethical dilemma of sorts. A massive output of both capital and manpower had been put forward by both countries in an effort to aid Europe and defend it from its German aggressors. Yet increasingly, activists at home questioned how governments so focused on European liberation could ignore the very real calls for liberation at home on the part of ethnic groups such as African Americans and African Canadians, Latino Americans and Aboriginal people on both sides of the border. Alongside the quandary facing legislators, there existed a new context of liberalism and decolonization that activists to which activists were committed to taking advantage. The post-war saw the increasing incidence and intensity of decolonization in formerly colonized states in Africa and on the Asian continent, and the new imperatives of global liberalism meant that liberation was increasingly phrased in the context of citizenship. While the notion of full citizenship was not entirely new in the post-war, its rhetoric enjoyed a new virulence both in legislative, and in public circles. Reconciling the specific claims of oppressed minorities with these newly revived ideas thus became an important component of public discourse in the post-war. Similarities in the policy approaches of both countries indicated that legislators were paying attention and facing many of the same challenges and pressures from Indigenous groups.

The discourse of rights included a liberal vision which was, at its very core, universalist; a vision in which 'races' were understood to be equal in natural capabilities and deserving of the same rights. This assertion was demonstrated in several key post-war moments, including the passage of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the emergence of Nuremburg's Crimes against Humanity division, and Edward Steichen's Family of Man, to name a few. But, by the 1960s, the new universalism was also increasingly under fire, challenged by groups and activists who now pledged
cultural particularism, which insisted on the preservation of cultural difference through political self-determination. Malcolm X, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aime Cesaire and Franz Fanon called public attention to the importance of cultural difference while the state, both in Canada and in the United States, continued to act as a universalizing force.

Within the context of these discussions of citizenship and of the so-called “new liberalism”, new Indigenous organizations emerged grappling with the implications both practical and ideological of the new global context with which they were now faced. The postwar development of Indigenous organizations similar in terms of composition, membership and tactical approaches in Canada and in the United States suggests, therefore, a broader North American context of Indigenous reality. Though policies did differ in some ways, their primary impetus – settling the Indigenous question for good and resolving, with an air of finality, the claims and aspirations of Indigenous nations – were common benchmarks of post-war federal Indian policy. And, though legislators may have attempted to paint Indigenous rights seekers' demands with those of other civil rights era groups, Indigenous people continued to insist, in very important ways, that their reality and demands were very separate from the rights rhetoric of other minority groups. For First Nations people, liberalism and integration threatened to annihilate Indigenous people perhaps as much as had all out war or enfranchisement.

This chapter will outline the development of a new rhetoric and of new organizations in the United States, then in Canada, during the latter part of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s, demonstrating the way in which questions of rights and responsibility were, in the post-Second World War world, phrased increasingly in the language of citizenship and nationalism. This context spurred on the development of new organizations which grappled with how to define Indigenous rights in the face of a growing clamor for civil rights. The 1960s presented new challenges in the form of the Great Society in the United States, and the Just Society in Canada. It was therefore in the highly charged legislative context of this environment that Indigenous groups articulated how their philosophy differed
from other rights seekers but, in doing so, also paved the way for the emergence of more diverse voices and groups and a true Indigenous cultural and political renaissance.

A. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: INDIGENOUS ORGANIZING IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD

The Second World War provided an important international arena for the United States to promote its stated vision of democracy and justice. As James Patterson explains, World War II was seen as a “good war”, and in its aftermath, the American people generally felt that the future would be full of harmonious prosperity as a result of their fight for a truly just cause. But, as R. F. Holland explains, the emphasis on freedom touted by planners and policy-makers sat rather uneasily with the realities of post-war America: “Before 1941 anti-imperialism had come easily to an official America whose responsibility for stability in other continents was minimal; by 1944/5 US prestige and interests had become closely bound up with the wider world, such that in administration circles European empires (for all their faults) began to be seen as a means of keeping the lid on Asian and African volatilities, at least until the post-war order had been decided upon and its construction set in motion.” In other words, “if America could not hide from the rest of the world, it must control it.” The new attraction of empire, along with new and renewed calls for change on the home front, placed American administrators in an awkward catch 22 situation that would require new strategies to deal with its increasingly vocal minorities at home. More often than not, however, legislative changes were delayed at home due to preoccupation abroad as well as a reticence to implement meaningful change on the issue.

After Franklin Delano Roosevelt died in office in 1945, vice-president Harry Truman assumed
the role of president. The issue of civil rights became an important policy venture for President Truman, who actively sought counsel but was much more hesitant in implementing change during the 1940s. Like other politicians, Truman saw the civil rights issue as one largely of African American rights. In 1946, Truman established the President's Committee on Civil Rights to examine race relations in the United States and to make recommendations on policy based on these findings. The Committee reported in 1947 with the document entitled *To Secure These Rights*, which described systemic and pervasive racism confronting American minority groups at nearly every level. It suggested measures such as federal protection of African American voting rights, enforcement of anti-lynching laws, an end to segregation in schools, housing and other public places, as well as police professionalization. Overall, it advocated a much stronger and more active role for the federal government as a guarantor of rights. Though its tone was promising, *To Secure These Rights*, like many other initiatives of the era, had little to offer Native Americans. President Truman encouraged Congress to make the committee's recommendations American law, but was ignored. Thus Truman proceeded by executive order, banning racial discrimination in federal hiring and desegregating the armed forces in 1948. Mark Newman argues that Truman's overtures to civil rights were, in part, an attempt to secure African American votes “without alienating either congressional southern Democrats whose support he needed in foreign affairs, or southern white voters in the forthcoming presidential election.”

Reelected in 1948, Truman refocused on what he viewed as the legacy of FDR, extending Social Security benefits, increasing minimum wage, and passing more civil rights legislation the did not represent, for American Indians, the kind of justice that they were expecting.

Though he attempted some action on civil rights at home, Truman was also often too preoccupied with larger issues abroad to pay much attention to the country's smaller minority populations. The United States' post-war aid package for Europe, the Marshall Plan, as well as the new Point Four program which sought to secure allies in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa by
funding the growth of underdeveloped area, were major post-War policy undertakings. They were not ignored by Native American activists, who used the plans designed for an international arena to argue for the same kind of support of Native Americans at home. D'Arcy McNickle, founding member of the National Congress of American Indians and official within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, argued that the solution to America's persistent abuse of the American Indian layed in the development of reservations along the lines of the Point Four program which aimed to share American expertise in the areas of agriculture, industry and health. Though an attempt was made in 1957 to institute such a program, the Resolution was defeated quickly.\(^7\) In 1950, Truman and the American Congress passed the Navajo Hopi Rehabilitation Act which included $500,000 of emergency funding and over $88 million in long-range funding to expand employment and services.\(^8\) Despite this overture however, Truman and his administration disappointed those Native Americans who had hoped that the post-war climate would net important yields for them. In 1953 Truman was replaced by a new president, Dwight Eisenhower, who also focused on international affairs. He passed very little significant domestic legislation in his first term but his popularity was bolstered by continuing peace for America.

Within a context that had largely ignored Indigenous concerns for those of an international nature, or those of other civil rights groups, Indigenous Americans needed to make their case. In the post-war, there was peace for America – but not necessarily peace within. The experience of Indigenous veterans was therefore significant in demonstrating the way in which America's post-war preoccupations had failed to include Indigenous people. Indeed, minority group veterans – including Native Americans -- returned home from the war to find a society largely unchanged, and the old prejudices still very much in effect: for those who had risked so much defending the stated ideals of America, this seemed the ultimate betrayal. Native soldiers served in high proportion to their demographic. Roughly 25,000 Native Americans had served in World War II including 800 women,
and American Indians had contributed land for wartime use as gunnery ranges, airfields and Japanese internment camps. The most famous Native American contribution was also the use of Navajo code-talkers who created a signal code system that the Japanese were never able to crack, as well as the flag-raising at Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima by Ira Hayes, a Pima Indian from Arizona and marine paramilitary celebrated for his bravery. After the Ex Parte Green decision rejected the idea of Indian exemption from the draft, Native Americans were integrated into all branches of the military in large numbers. By and large, Alison Bernstein argues that American Indians were welcomed into the military: “Few whites questioned the Indians’ capabilities as fighters. On the contrary, all Indians were stereotyped as warriors!”

Despite this relatively rosy perspective, Indigenous Americans did face discrimination in the armed forces; for as much as the warrior image may have glorified Indigenous men and women to a certain extent, the prevalent attitude towards them as somehow simple, primitive and unsophisticated permeated the stereotypes applied to them.

Bernstein's contention that American Indians were welcomed into the forces is bolstered, however, from their voluntary enrollment figures. Far from being compelled, American Indians were by and large enthusiastic recruits. The Navajo even requested a special all-Indian training unit be established so that men who failed the prerequisite English literacy tests might also have a chance to serve. While the units were not numerous and were largely temporary – less than 10 percent of all Indian soldiers who later integrated into non-Indian units, they were a testament to the way in which many Native Americans in fact fought to get into the military, rather than fighting to be exempt from its duty. A 1945 pamphlet by the Office of Indian Affairs also celebrated Native American participation and achievement, featuring depictions of assimilation alongside those of cultural distinctiveness.

Despite many instances of exemplary service, Native American service people were often disappointed when they returned home. Though written in 1968, N. Scott Momaday's *House Made of Dawn* illustrated both the expectation and the disappointment that Native American soldiers faced. In
this novel, the character Abel discovers that although he is valued as a soldier, he is still rejected as a citizen. As Lucy Maddox puts it, he becomes “nearly invisible in the American political and cultural landscape.”

As William A. Riegert, Chippewa, published in 1946 of the wartime experience, “How many war then, by your side must we fight,/How long must you ponder to see our right,/ When will your handclasp be firm and secure,/ When will your voice call, to reassure/ The right to live, the same freedom for all/ The RIGHT of our BIRTHPLACE, When-Will-You-Call?”

According to Bernstein, Indian soldiers had become accustomed to equal treatment and regular paychecks, learning to take care of themselves in the White world without any government interference. Yet back on the reservation, veterans enjoyed a new visibility: they often used their experience to become involved in reservation politics after their return, and most enjoyed heroes' welcomes.

In 1944, Ruth Muskrat Bronson published Indians are People, Too, a text designed for a progressive White audience. In it, she argued that like other Americans, Indians should determine their own lives within the bounds of Christian morality and unselfish American citizenship. Bronson was an earlier member of the Indian Rights Association and later, participated enthusiastically in the actions of the National Congress of American Indians, founded in 1944, when eighty Indigenous people, members of more than 50 tribes, met in Denver, Colorado, to establish what would become one of the most important post-war activist groups for American Indian issues. The following year its membership roster would include nearly all Native American tribes.

Though emerging in 1944, the NCAI was in large part a result of the New Deal era, and the organization pursued a broad mandate to secure rights and benefits for American Indian people and to educate the non-Indian public about Indian civil and tribal rights. In part, the broad mandate reflected a desire on the part of the NCAI to avoid divisions that had plagued earlier organizations and to appeal to the largest possible Indian and non-Indian constituency possible. As Thomas Cowger has argued, “[T]he organization was an innovative vehicle of resistance to changes in federal Indian policy and ...
served as an important instrument for the preservation of Indian culture and identity.”\textsuperscript{16} Its innovation was largely represented by its attempt to gather Indigenous people from coast to coast in a broad pan-Indigenous alliance. According to Cowger, “the NCAI converted ethnicity into a pan-Indian identity or intertribal organization that became a permanent force in national politics.”\textsuperscript{17}

The NCAI included a variety of notable Indian intellectuals. Like some early organizations, the early NCAI boasted a distinguished leadership which included Indigenous intellectuals, policy-makers and public figures. Most notable among them, in 1944, was D'Arcy McNickle. Born in 1904, McNickle was of Canadian Cree, French and Irish ancestry, but had spent his life in the United States. He was the author of several novels including \textit{The Surrounded} (1936), \textit{Runner in the Sun: A Story of Indian Maize} (1954) and \textit{Wind from an Enemy Sky} (1978). In both his anthropological work and his writing, McNickle strove to document the Indian encounter with Whites from an Indian point of view and worked actively within the Bureau of Indian Affairs administration alongside John Collier in the 1930s. Apart from McNickle, and as Cowger maintains, the NCAI “always included important tribal leaders who sought to promote common Indian interests and identities on a national level.”\textsuperscript{18} From the outset, these individuals included the Nez Perce Superintendent of the Northern Idaho Agency, Dr. Archie Phinney. Phinney, who had studied at the noted Haskell College and done some graduate work at Columbia University, had studied the history of the earlier Society of American Indians, concluding that “the new Indian coalition needed a more aggressive and militant agenda than previous Indian intertribal organizations.”\textsuperscript{19}

The NCAI was a unique innovation: despite the association of many leaders with non-Indigenous people, the NCAI was not a white-Indian alliance- its membership was exclusively Indian, while non-Indian people could be “associates”.\textsuperscript{20} A departure from what had come before, its ambitions, however, were also limited by its structure: the new organization was modelled largely upon BIA meetings and conferences; its ability to be militant and aggressive largely stifled by the
forum, if not the membership. Planners met with the Association of American Indian Affairs, a predominantly White reform group that McNickle deemed less coercive than others, which advised him to remain free of the BIA, to avoid factional reservation politics and to remain an Indian-only organization.  

Deciding what the new organization should look and sound like revealed a great deal about its possibilities in the post-war era. By this time, many Native American leaders had learned to live within, and in some cases to personally and professionally profit from, existing leadership structures. For some, these existing structures, themselves often a product of colonial intervention, were a problem. Phinney, for example, wished to exclude existing councils from the structure of the NCAI arguing that independent representatives should be chosen, while McNickle argued that councils were the heart and soul of the organizations. As for the issue of urban and non-urban Indigenous people, which was in relative infancy at the time, McNickle further posited that the NCAI should strive to be inclusive, and that individual memberships could be offered to off-reservation Indians who would nevertheless not have the right to vote.

Leadership also grappled with the new organization within a newly emerging rights context. At its founding, the NCAI also decided not to align with other groups: though sympathetic to their cause, the NCAI insisted that the position of Indigenous people was unique. For example, ideologically, the early NCAI advocated a concept of dual citizenship that could both preserve Native American distinctiveness while simultaneously affirming and securing the rights and benefits of full citizenship. For example, those in attendance in Denver in 1944 pledged to make voting rights one of the organization’s goals while also indicating that the post-war context provided an important opportunity for Indigenous people to stress their right to defend the trust doctrine and tribal sovereignty. Its provisional constitution, drafted in May of 1944, also stressed both civil and tribal rights. Denver's conference produced resolutions on three broad themes including sovereignty, civil rights and political
recognition, with the establishment of an Indian Claims Commission and voting rights for Native Americans in New Mexico and Arizona set as the priorities. As Cowger argues, this political strategy was meant to appeal to all Indian people, though it is clear that they were applicable only to the lives of some.24 Land remained the top priority for the NCAI in its early years; it was involved in the battle over the Tongass Timber Act of 1947 which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell land and timber to corporate interests, as well as in stopping dam projects on the upper Missouri River affecting over twenty reservations. In addition, it intervened sporadically in local politics such as on the Mescalero Apache Reservation in New Mexico, where Old Crow was charged with the misuse of funds. The NCAI investigated, found him guilty and demanded his removal, though their demand was ignored by then Commissioner Dillon Myer.25

During this era, the NCAI also learned to tread carefully. Though the climate had opened up to the notion of human rights and expanded civil rights, the NCAI remained a careful exercise in compromise. Leaders recognized that it had to tread carefully, for within the ethos of hypernationalism and of citizenship of post-War America, a concerted and renewed effort to control the ballooning costs of Indian administration and to finalize the terms of the relationship between Indigenous nations and the American state had led to a series of initiatives led by those who claimed to promote justice but whose policies represented an increasingly threatening climate for Indigenous futures.

In 1946, the American Congress founded the Indian Claims Commission, a three-person body charged with resolving Indian claims once and for all. Though groups had until 1951 to file, the complicated work of the commission lasted until 1978, and Indian groups met relatively little success. Of almost 850 separate claims, only 285 were actually settled resulting in an expense of $818 million.26 Because the claim itself had a two-stage burden on the claimants, groups often faced difficulty documenting their claims. In the first stage, each group had to prove that they had occupied the land
since time immemorial- because of the many attempts to dispossess American Indians of their lands, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this claim was often difficult to document. In the second stage, Indian groups were required to put a value upon the land and resources lost, which could sometimes lead to disagreements among group members, as well as between Commissioners and claimants. According to some commentators, the ICC “extinguished existing and potential Indian land claims by monetary settlement before the tenuous or illegal nature of many of the white man's titles could be challenged.”

The beneficiaries of the Claims Commission, rather than being Native American people, ended up being those firms who represented them, often at great expense and with little relative gain for Native Americans.

Despite the stated intention of the Claims Commission process to administer some brand of historical justice for Native American people, the process had many critics. Apart from being prohibitively expensive in terms of garnering legal advice and technical expertise, it was also extraordinarily slow: when the Commission dissolved in 1978, it did so with 68 cases still pending. In addition, the structure of the ICC garnered some critique: according to prominent activist Ward Churchill, the United States assigned itself the role of neutral third party in a process where its own interests were at stake. As a party with a vested interest in the process, it was in fact the United States that decided which claims were meritorious. In addition, it decided what was in fact a fair value for land, deducted “costs” for police and schools from settlement claims, placed monies into BIA-administered accounts and could only pay out money, never to return the hue tracts of land claimants argued they had never ceded in the first place. It was at best, according to activist Ward Churchill, a clean-up measure as ineffective as it often was inaccessible to more impoverished groups.

In addition to the principle of efficiency and cost-saving, the contextual pressures of the Cold War left American policy makers particularly sensitive to any hint of Communist activity, a category that became a sort of catch-all for dissent. For example, throughout the 1950s, criticism from the
Soviets was directed at American Indian reservations, which soviets compared to “huge concentration camps.” According to some Soviet commentators, First Nations were imprisoned in the camps against their will. This sympathy was enough to cast suspicion on organizers, and as such, the National Congress of American Indians dutifully reported on “communist” groups who pledged their support, such as the pan-German Interressengemeinschaft Deutschsprechender Indianerfreunde, German-speaking “friends of the Indian.” The NCAI desperately wanted to avoid being painted by the same brush as other so-called “subversive” organizations within Cold War America and thus reinforced its association with hyper-patriotic groups and tempered its critiques within the international context. As Paul Rosier explains, “The NCAI remained active in fighting for Native sovereignty, but in ways circumscribed by Cold War pressures.” Both before and after the war, many insisted that its encouragement of tribalism was a communistic and subversive endeavor. In 1947, the Senate Civil Services Committee asked Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Zimmerman to start planning for an end to federal services for certain groups, and the same year the Hoover Commission also recommended and end to all “special benefits” for Indians in the name of “efficiency.”

In 1950, Dillon S. Meyer became the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs. A staunch advocate of the idea of termination, there was little doubt among American Indians where his tenure would lead. Meyer's initial actions towards American Indians included the selling of lands without tribal consent, the removal of a BIA superintendent sympathetic to Indian rights, and the support of a bill claiming the right of Indian Service employees to arrest Native Americans without a warrant. Furthermore, Meyer had been the official responsible for running internment camps for American Japanese during the Second World War as head of the War Relocation Authority. His Draconian measures made the ensuing Termination policy unsurprising, to say the least. Termination stemmed, in part, from the spirit that had inspired the 1946 Indian Claims Commission, couched in terms of liberating the American Indian from the dehumanizing 'tribalism' and 'wardship' of the Collier years. The main proponent of the
policy, Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, insisted that this would in fact 'free' in Indian from the federal
government. He compared the Termination Act to the Emancipation Proclamation.\textsuperscript{36} The statement of
policy appeared in the form of House Concurrent Resolution 108 in August of 1953. The resolution
declared Congress's intention to free Native Americans from their condition as wards by making them
subject to the same privileges and responsibilities as other citizens of the United States. American
Indians would thus become 'citizens, free from all Federal supervision and control.'\textsuperscript{37} What this meant,
in practice, varied slightly from region to region, but essentially Termination Act's terminated the
federal government's trusteeship over reservations, the exclusion of Native American people from
state's laws, and the exemption from taxes. On a more theoretical level, it also amounted to an end of
federal recognition of sovereignty, or at least, the right to remain distinct, of these tribal nations.

The advent of Termination in the early 1950s placed the NCAI in a difficult position. The new
legislation presented a quandary: on the one hand, Termination could be seen as a means to end federal
paternalism and promote self-determination in Indian communities. Yet, by 1954, the organization was
holding emergency meetings on the subject, and it remained at the top of its agenda in the years to
come.\textsuperscript{38} Opinions on Termination varied. As Cowger concedes, “Obviously, it was impossible to create
a workable policy that incorporated all Indians' views. What remained for the NCAI was to help design
or maintain a policy that best suited the needs of individual tribes. Exactly how to accomplish this
objective was a different matter.”\textsuperscript{39} As such, the NCAI focused on the process; it alleged the
Termination bill drafting process was too hasty and short-sighted to produce meaningful policy, and
president J.R. Garry in 1958 argued that Termination was “the most dangerous and unwarranted piece
of legislation since the enactment of the General Allotment Act.”\textsuperscript{40} At the same time as they were
criticizing the policy, pan-Indigenous groups were also grappling internally with the complexities of
such a diverse constituency whose tribe members did not represent only one type of person. For
example, the NCAI's battle against Termination was complicated by its anxiety over respecting the

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sovereignty of tribes, some of whom, they felt, were actually for the policy of Termination. The congressional hearings on the matter included specially selected tribe members who gave the impression that most members were in favour.  

Concerted protest, especially by the NCAI, eventually coincided with the nightmares of implementation and administration, so that termination was eventually abandoned by the federal government, though not in so many words as to avoid alienating the substantial pro-Termination lobby that existed in government. John F. Kennedy, for example, held fast to the policy's rationale, and declared in 1960 his intention to help American Indians 'prepare' for withdrawal. Still, in 1961, Kennedy appointed Philleo Nash, a sympathetic liberal with a great deal of experience with Native American people, to the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Apart from the Act itself, various other measures, in concert with Termination, created a definite clear and present danger for Indigenous people. For even though federal supervision and control could be limiting, it still provided some measure of protection from the doctrine of state's rights. In fact, a few days after HCR 108, Congress passed Public Law 280 extending state control of Indians in five states, and empowered other states to enact similar legislation. The law brought Native Americans under the criminal and civil jurisdiction of those states. This move made Native Americans nervous-- if the federal government had been parsimonious and cruel in the past, the experience they would have with the individual states was even less certain. These fears were further reinforced with the 1953 repeal of a law prohibiting the sale of liquors to American Indians, as well as the 1954 transfer of Indian health programs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the United States Public Health Service.

In practice, the effects of Termination were devastating. From 1954 to 1960, fourteen recognized tribes with reservations were terminated. The case of the Klamath Termination Act of August, 1954, provides a good example of what Termination could mean for Indigenous people in practice. The Klamath, an Oregon tribe that enjoyed a resource-rich 1.3.million acre reservation, were
one of the most prosperous Indian groups in the United States. Their commercial endeavors and resource exploitation produced a moderate annual income for all members, as well as funded the entire cost of the service they received from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, including a local hospital. Public Law 587, as it was also known, severed all federal supervision of Klamath lands, alongside all and any aid provided to the Klamath due to their status as Indian people. Public Law 587 which provided for their termination demanded each enrolled tribal member to choose between retaining their tribal identity or withdrawing from the rolls and receiving a monetary sum for their share of the value of Klamath land.

The Klamath were chosen in large part due to the perception of their members largely having “shed the blanket”, as was stated in the hearings of 1954. Klamath self-sufficiency as had been garnered from preliminary hearings, however, was somewhat illusory as the aftermath of Termination would prove. An earlier Bureau of Indian Affairs estimate in the 1940s posited that only 35% of the tribe's members would be able to survive without per capita payments. Yet, a letter written by Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary of the Interior in 1954, stated the opposite. As he argued, “[T]hese people have been largely integrated into all phases of the economic and social life of the area.” He maintained that since most Klamath lived in modern homes and enjoyed a standard of living comparable to their non-Indigenous neighbours, they were ready. He called them among the “advanced Indian groups in the United States.” As he reported, “Their dress is modern, and there remains little vestige of religious or their traditional Indian customs.”

Thus, despite the fact that at the hearing in 1954, tribal representatives appealed for a stay, arguing that their community was not ready for Termination, it proceeded nonetheless. As they argued, the complete removal of federal support and services after over a century of paternalist control could not be administered so suddenly, before the people were properly prepared. After realizing that the two representatives, Jesse Kirk and Boyd Jackson, could not be convinced that Termination was in their best interests, the hearing committee turned to threats, arguing
that if Jackson and Kirk did not affix their signatures on the bill, a large portion of the money awarded to the tribe by the Indian Claims Commission would be withheld. Kirk and Jackson reluctantly signed, and the disaster than ensued in the Klamath community proved that their anxieties had been on-point.

The vote to withdraw from the Klamath tribe or to remain divided the group, which separated into two factions where a vast majority of 77% elected to withdraw while a full quarter of eligible voters did not vote and only a little more than 3% elected to remain in the tribe.\(^\text{45}\) For those who did choose to take the payout, in the mid-1960s, “dream time now turned to nightmare.”\(^\text{46}\) Far from encouraging the further integration of the Klamath, who before Termination had already been sending their children to public schools and intermarrying with local whites, the policy impoverished and ruined the once prosperous community. A survey in 1965 demonstrated how many had tried to spend their money wisely or move to the cities, but their attempts had mostly failed. The hospital that they had payed for from the profits of their resource exploitation closed, and discrimination towards them hardened alongside their worsening situation. To add insult to injury, portions of tribal forest were to be sold off to pay withdrawing members. Under an amendment, 11 units of forest were to be sold to pay, but were reappraised to a lesser value than had been estimated prior to the amendment which reduced the cash payout for each individual member. In short, Termination had been imposed onto a community completely unprepared to move away from a system of collective land ownership, and the ensuing result was chaos.

The impact of Termination of the Klamath was also echoed in other groups. The Western Oregon Indian Termination Act terminated 61 separate tribes of Western Oregon in terms similar to those of the Klamath Act. In the case of California, the California Rancheria Termination Act of 1958 called for the dispersal of over forty rancheria lands and assets to tribal members. Termination was eventually abandoned by the federal government, though not in so many words as to avoid alienating the substantial pro-Termination lobby that existed in government. John F. Kennedy, for example,
declared in 1960 his intention to help American Indians 'prepare' for withdrawal. In 1961, Kennedy appointed Philleo Nash, a sympathetic liberal with a great deal of experience with Native American people, to the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

The Kennedy era represented new hope for American Indian organizers, though their efforts remained circumscribed by both Cold War tensions and, increasingly, tensions among their own members, as Daniel M. Cobb's analysis of the 1961 American Indian Chicago Conference reveals. He argues that one of the most untold and underdeveloped stories of the historic event was the way in which the discussions were “plagued by the politics of anticommunism.” Designed as a meeting to finalize the historic “Declaration of Indian Purpose” to be presented to the then-newly elected president John F. Kennedy, many detractors also used it as a way to scare and harass Indian leaders into taking a much more tepid stance on rights in general. Early Boyd Pierce, for example, was general counsel of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma who, though invested in pursuing land claims against the federal government, was highly suspicious of new protest tactics including rallies and demonstration. Cherokee principal chief W.W. Keeler, then an executive for a petroleum company, reminded conference participants that Indians were no longer sovereign nations but must remain loyal to the United States, and in the months following the conference opponents of the conference circulated a rumour that Sol Tax, a notable anthropologist instrumental in developing educational workshops for American Indian students, was actually a secret communist. The result of all of these anticommunist fears and overtures was the inclusion, within the Declaration of Indian purpose, of an American Indian Pledge that became the eventual focus of the President's attention. When the pledge was finally presented to Kennedy, it gave the impression, at least in some ways, that good American citizenship was in fact a primary preoccupation of the Chicago Conference group rather than its actual concern, Indigenous rights.

In addition to the anti-communist rhetoric, the Indian Conference also demonstrated the perception of the NCAI from its own people. As Lurie, assistant coordinator of the conference project
wrote, “We have, however, had a problem in regard to NCAI. It is the best organized and in many ways most reputable intertribal organization, but it does have enemies among Indians.” As Cowger points out, critics were highly suspicious of its acculturated leadership and of its Western-focus. The limits of the NCAI thus, were also its strengths. In cultivating the leadership of the most educated and most worldly, it had also alienated a vast majority of the traditionalists, as well as of the young and emerging activists. By virtue of its strong leadership from the Western tribes, it had alienated the East. These issues would continue to plague the organization which nevertheless persisted through this period and beyond, a testament to its dynamism and adaptivity within a highly volatile and difficult period.

By the 1960s, Indigenous organizers had learned to be wary of the civil rights era – though it could represent possibility, it could also represent limitations. In the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination, then-vice president Lyndon B. Johnson had 11 months to prove to the electorate that he was indeed, a worthy successor. During this period, he passed both the Civil Rights Bill, promised by Kennedy, which banned discrimination based on race and gender in terms of employment, as well as ended segregation in public facilities. A more significant piece of legislation which had a greater impact on Native Americans was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, creating the Office of Economic Opportunity. This office strove to attack the roots of poverty through the creation of new training and employment opportunities in some of America's poorest communities, including on reservations. The Office of Economic Opportunity provided direct funds to tribes to improve and create programs to attack poverty on reservations. The program was endorsed by the National Congress of American Indians and featured a series of Community Action Plans that did have an important impact in a reservation setting. One of the program's most impressive and successful project was the establishment of the Red Rock Demonstration School in Navajo country, which eventually became, later in the 1960s, the Navajo Community College, the first wholly Indian-controlled school since the late nineteenth century. Head Start programs, which aimed to prepare children so that they would be ready to learn
when they entered the school system, were also put into place on reservations. Perhaps most significantly, what the OEO provided was the opportunity for Indigenous people to take on large projects and to manage them, providing important leadership training that would be of invaluable assistance as former OEO workers moved into leadership positions in regional and national organizations. Though the programs were not without their critiques, the legacies of leadership and management that the OEO left behind was a significant factor in the perpetuation of new Indian leadership.

Both the Civil Rights Bill and the Economic Opportunity Act initiatives were part of Johnson's grander vision: a Great Society which both promised and delivered opportunity and prosperity for all. Johnson's desire to continue the work of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as well as his belief that the government could and should actively intervene to help its citizens, drove his anti-poverty agenda. In addition to the Civil Rights Act and the Economic Opportunity Act, the Great Society included new funding for public education, new environmental protection policies, the creation of MediCare, funding for artists and galleries, monies for the construction of new low-income housing, and new standards for consumer safety. In addition, the Voting Rights Act banned literacy testing and other discriminatory obstacles to the full voting participation of ethnic Americans, and the Immigration Act removed restrictive quotas based on ethnicity. While the various initiatives did, to some degree, improve the lives of some Native Americans, the Great Society package also demonstrated forcefully to them that the agenda of civil rights, though sympathetic to their cause, did not fully represent their concerns or their goals. Upon signing the newly passed Civil Rights Bill in 1964, President Johnson's address contained for many, what was to be the crux of their problems with Johnson reforms. As he stated, “The purpose of the law is simple. It does not restrict the freedom of any American, so long as he respects the rights of others. It does not give special treatment to any citizen.” Thus for American Indians, the Great Society offered little hope, because it seemed to lump them in with other minorities.
by emphasizing equality of treatment over special rights, individual self-reliance over government facilitation of community success, and, finally, relied largely upon the largesse of States which had long proven themselves rather miserly when it came to the issue of Indigenous resource and land rights.

Though the overall mandate of the War on Poverty was generally sympathetic to the goals of many American Indian activists who insisted that poverty was in fact the greatest obstacle to Indian success in a non-Indian world, it did not comprehensively address their concerns. Still, a good number of Indigenous activists actively participated and promoted the war against poverty and related protest, as in the case of the 1968 Poor People's Campaign, a six-week protest in the heart of Washington D.C. that included marchers, picketers, testimony before congress, sit-ins and a variety of different demonstration activities as well as some rising stars within Indigenous activism. While the National Congress of American Indians refused to endorse the Poor People's Campaign, the Campaign featured the participation of prominent younger activists who saw the value in aligning with other groups to produce results on the ground that would affect the everyday lives of Indian people. These included Mel Thom, founding member of the National Indian Youth Congress, who argued that it was the system of internal colonialism that had to be disbanded to end the legacy of underdevelopment and poverty for Indian people. Despite its concrete goals, Vine Deloria Jr., who was also a member of the NCAI, argued that “the march floundered when participants spent their time harassing members of the cabinet about problems that had no immediate solution and demanding sympathy and understanding from federal officials who cold not translate these concerns into programmatic responses.” The press echoed these ideas: one article, published in the Washington Post on July 13th, 1968, was titled 'Too Many Factions Sap Poor Peoples' Unity.' Reporter Paul Valentine pointed out that the protest had degenerated into accusations of self-interest from each group directed at the others. He further described some Indigenous protesters as saying that the reforms to help African Americans would not
help Indigenous people. He concluded by saying that calls for unity were like “talking to the wind,” and that “The Campaign was divided geographically and ethnically.” This critique on the part of mainstream organizers was in fact a description of their objection to many of the protest actions of the era, particularly those that emphasized unity with other ethnic groups. Mainstream organizers, particularly those interested in working within the legislative system, consistently stressed the need for education, knowledge, and access in advancing a pan-Indigenous agenda.

As a partial result of pressure on government from such organizations, as well as the general climate of legislation of the 1960s, there were other victories during the Johnson era. Though these did not address the plethora of Native American concerns, particularly those relating to land loss and the preservation of Indigenous culture, they were at least partial steps in the right direction. Groups like the NCAI, for example, lauded such efforts and though they admitted that none went far enough, it seemed at least that the 1960s might provide some measure of justice that had thus far eluded them. In 1965, the National Advisory Council on Indian Education was formed. It was tasked with advising the President on matters of Indian education, as well as making recommendations for filling the position of Director of Indian Education when a vacancy would arise. Though presidentially appointed, a council devoted to the improvement of Indian education was an important step. In addition to the NACIE, President Johnson appointed American Indian Robert LaFollette Bennett as Indian Commissioner in 1966, a move that generated a great deal of excitement, discussion and debate among Native American people for whom the importance of a Commissioner as “one of their own” was not lost. In 1968, an executive presidential order also established a National Council on Indian Opportunity, intended to facilitate Indigenous participation in government decisions affecting Indian policy and Indigenous lives. Finally, in 1969, the Kennedy Report admitted what Indigenous Americans had been saying for quite some time: that the “coercive assimilation” of the federal government had had “a disastrous effect on the education of Indian children.”

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On March 6th, 1968, Johnson delivered a special message to Congress regarding the American Indian. In it, he pledged a “new goal” for Indian programs based on self-determination and self-help. It would be a long road for the “Forgotten American,” he stated: “The American Indian, once proud and free, is torn now between White and tribal values; between the politics and language of the White man and his own historic culture. His problems, sharpened by years of defeat and exploitation, neglect and inadequate effort, will take many years to overcome.” Still, he pledged that his goals were to improve the standard of living of Indigenous Americans to match those in the rest of the country, to provide freedom of choice with respect to mobility and opportunity, and to equip American Indians with the skills and tools required for “full participation in the life of modern America.”

In addition to his general statements, Johnson's address included many more specific proposals related to standards of living, economic opportunity and self-determination. Of particular note was Johnson's discussion and promotion of a Bill of Rights for Indians, which he argued the protection of basic individual rights of individual Indians in relation to their tribe. As he argued, “The basic individual rights which most Americans enjoy... are not safeguarded for Indians in relation to their tribes.” The bill provided tribal members a mechanism through which to redress grievances against their governments. It provided for freedom of speech, religion, press and the right to protest, as well as Fifth Amendment rights and several other rights related to unjust prosecution and punishment. Though it is arguable as to whether this guarantee of rights within the tribe was a priority for American Indians, the other prong of the bill, which would mean that Native Americans on affected lands have a voice in deciding whether a state could assume legal jurisdiction over them, was of particular concern to Indigenous activists and organizers. The extension of state jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters had begun in the 1950s under Public Law 280, and had been vociferously protested since that time. In closing, Johnson maintained that the “First Americans” deserved self-determination and self-development and that the special relationship between the government and the First Americans should
grow and flourish, rather than be terminated.\textsuperscript{57} Though the Act did provide some guarantees, there was no enforcement mechanism delineated. The protections contained therein were further limited in a 1978 Supreme Court case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, which involved a request to stop denying tribal membership to children born of women who married outside the tribe. In its judgement, the Supreme Court ruled that “tribal common-law sovereign immunity” prevented suit against the tribe, further reinforcing the perception that though the rights were guaranteed constitutionally it was up to the tribes themselves to ensure that they were enforced.\textsuperscript{58}

As legislative efforts during this period demonstrated, those in power often failed to understand what Indigenous people wanted. Civil rights were important to Indigenous people, particularly to those who had been unjustly treated by their tribes; but civil rights without enforcement meant very little in practice, and the benefits of other programs like the NCIO and the National Council on Indian Education were sporadic, poorly distributed and not necessarily well-understood. What organizers stressed – and what Indigenous people needed – were programs that addressed the legacies of colonialism as they had impacted Native American education, economic life, infrastructure on reservations and social and community life. Self-determination, they insisted, was simply not possible without the proper structural supports to develop communities. This was, for organizers, their conception of historical justice, and quite simply what was due Native American people and their communities, the demand for which was growing due to a renewal and recovery of Indigenous identity.

B. THE NEW 'INDIAN RENAISSANCE' IN THE UNITED STATES

Sociologist Joane Nagel has characterized the phenomenon of reclaiming Indigenous identity as one of ethnic renewal, taking place at both the individual and at the collective level. This process was
one by which new identities, cultures and communities were created or recreated out of perceived historical and symbolic items.\textsuperscript{59} In the 1960s, Indigenous ethnic renewal included the self-identification of Indian identity, as well as a renewed discussion of what Indigenous identity meant through a proliferation of new media and artistic work that struggled with questions of culture and rights within the ethos of citizenship integration. The process of ethnic reclaiming resulted, oftentimes, in an undifferentiated “Indian” identity forged through the symbols of popular Indigenous culture. As anthropologist Robert K. Thomas pointed out in 1968, pan-Indianism was the expression of a new ethnic identity, the attempt to create a new ethnic group defined as the American Indian.\textsuperscript{60}

These instances of reclaiming or rediscovering identity were facilitated, at least in part, by a proliferation of cultural expression that validated a new sense of belonging. This included the realm of music, were Indigenous artists and those who supported or admired them expressed a new identity and sense of unity borne of an acute sense of historical injustice. Songs like the famous Ballad of Ira Hayes, written by Peter LaFarge and most famously covered by Johnny Cash, told the tale of Native American disillusionment. Ira Hayes was the Pima Indian and Marine who, with five other men, had raised the flag on Iwo Jima on February 23, 1945. Despite accolades upon his return, Hayes' life quickly degenerated to one of alcoholism and a series of prison sentences. As the lyrics aptly pointed out, “Ira returned a hero/ Celebrated through the land/ He was wined and speeched and honored/ Everybody shook his hand/ But he was just a Pima Indian / No water, no crops, no chance / At home nobody cared what Ira’d done...”. LaFarge claimed to be a distant descendant of the Narrangansett Indian tribe though based in New York. His claim to Indigenous identity further reinforced what many were now doing in attempting to 'rediscover' their Indigenous roots.

The 1960s also featured a series of new films about Native Americans, often in a historical context- though their roles were consistently played by non-Indigenous people. In \textit{Tell Them Willie Boy is Here} (1969), the Paiutes were symbols of the oppressed. In \textit{Little Big Man} (1970), the Cheyenne
people were actually depicted as people, made real both by their screams and their laughter-- by their humanity-- in a depiction of the 1868 massacre at the Washita River in Oklahoma. The film *Soldier Blue* (1970) told a similar story, of the massacre of Cheyenne Indians at Sand Creek in 1864. *A Man Called Horse* (1970) told the story of an English aristocrat who, in 1825, was captured by a tribe of Indian people and who eventually came to accept and understand the Indian lifestyle, as well as to become their leader. Finally, *Billy Jack* (1971) told the story of a part-Cherokee Vietnam war veteran who was forced to defend the Freedom School, an allusion to the many counterculture colleges at the time. The film chronicled the abuse and discrimination that many Native Americans faced at the time. As the highest grossing feature in the series of films featuring the character of Billy Jack, the movie helped to raise awareness of Native American issues at the time both in Native American circles as well as in the wider public.

In fictional literature, authors chronicling the experiences of American Indian people enjoyed a new and invigorated audience. N. Scott Momaday's *House Made of Dawn* won the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for fiction and told the story of an Indian protagonist desperately seeking an identity within his Native American community. Unlike other works, Momaday's protagonist was neither fixed in the past nor completely severed from his culture: “For Native audiences, especially, Momaday’s writing affirmed a vital and contemporary indigenous identity that is both multi-tribal – in Momaday’s case, drawing predominantly from Kiowa, Pueblo, and Jemez Pueblo traditions – and multicultural – drawing not only from Native sources but also from European and Euro-American sources.” Momaday's mother had herself reappropriated her Indigenous identity after being raised squarely within the non-Indian culture and had, during Momaday's childhood, spent much of his own formative years within the reservation setting as a teacher. Momaday's father was also deeply connected to his Kiowa roots as a renowned visual artist. Moreover, the protagonist in the novel, searching for an identity and place, mirrored the journey of many young Native Americans during this period.
In other works of non-fiction, contemporary authors featured virulent critiques of government policy and action. The most famous Native American contribution is undoubtedly Vine Deloria Jr.’s *Custer Died for Your Sins*. Published in 1969, *Custer Died for Your Sins* carried the subtitle of “An Indian Manifesto.” Written by the man who, from 1964 to 1967, had led the NCAI from bankruptcy to solvency and who remained an important figure in Native American activism during that decade and beyond, *Custer* was a seminal text for Native American activists and a rallying point for those still trying to find their place within the struggle. *Custer* repudiated Termination policy wholesale, as well as engaged the broader civil rights context by arguing that solutions advanced by African American activists were inappropriate for Indigenous futures. In it, Deloria also encouraged Native Americans to speak for themselves, rejecting the perceived hypocrisy of those well-meaning intellectuals—anthropologists in particular--, as well as churches and bureaucrats who implemented ill-suited programs with the intention to help. A prolific intellectual, Deloria's later publications included *We Talk, You Listen: New Tribes, New Turf* (1970), *God is Red* (1973) and *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence* (1974). All reinforced the notion of Indigenous self-determination, and of the need for historic justice particularly tailored to Native American concerns in an era that increasingly sought to apply a once-size-fits-all solution to the problems of inequality and racial discrimination. Deloria enjoyed an important audience in both the United States as well as in Canada, where students, in particular, found inspiration and call to action in his exposition of injustice.

As this discussion of Native American cultural output during the 1960s and early 1970s demonstrates, artists and intellectuals worked sometimes unwittingly in concert with organizations to develop new constituencies, as well as to ensure that Indigenous opinion could be heard by legislators. Though artists and intellectuals always seemed to have their own opinions and ideas about the most important priority for activism, all stressed the need for Indigenous people and particularly for the youth to do something. While these newly mobilized individuals may not have been attracted to
mainstream organizations like the NCAI, their inclusion in the broader discussion of rights, as well as their engagement within the discussion of Indigenous futures, had important mobilizing tendencies and helped to ensure that new organizations would emerge throughout this period.

C. CANADA’S OWN: CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL POLICY, AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE PRESERVATION OF INDIGENITY

Canada's post-war experience shared much in common with that of the United States. In Canada, assimilation became integration and a variety of new policies and initiatives drawing from the American experience but adapted to a Canadian context became the modus operandi of branches of government concerned with the welfare of Canada's First Nations. Unlike the United States, Canada entered the Second World War much earlier. As such, it played a major role in World War II on the battlefield and in providing support from abroad. But while the War enhanced Canada's reputation on the world stage, it also created new tensions between Canada's stated policies aimed at postwar justice and its neglect of domestic rights at home.

An issue in Canada as well as in the United States, demobilized Aboriginal soldiers represented but one area where the realities of demobilization prompted uncomfortable questions regarding Canadian democracy to the foreground. As one August 1945 article in the Canadian Forum argued, returning men were first and foremost concerned with finding adequate employment, suitable housing and readjusting to life at home. And the returning serviceman's most important question would be why so little was done in preparation for his return. As the anonymous author of “The Boys Come Back” put it, “What good is democracy, for which one has been fighting, if it can’t provide the things its citizen-
soldiers need, even when the country concerned is far removed from the devastation of war?"  

In Canada, 3,090 of Canada’s Aboriginal population of 126,000 volunteered their service – and this statistic fails to include the enfranchised, northern or those who had missed the National Registration of 1940. Like their American counterparts, these soldiers fought for home and country as well as an ideal of freedom promulgated by recruiters – a freedom that would not be found when they returned home. As chronicled in Loretta Todd's 1997 film, Forgotten Warriors, Aboriginal veterans often returned to find that their reserve lands had been given away and that the ideal of freedom that they had fought so hard to defend had failed to materialize in post-war Canada. Though the Re-establishment order of 1941 had promised benefits to all returning veterans, benefits which included gratuities to all volunteers and conscripts, educational and training benefits, special loans, and hiring preference. Aboriginal veterans were placed under the jurisdiction of a special Indian Veterans Land Act, whereby they would receive Certificates of Possession granting occupational rights – but not ownership – to locations within the Reserve, supported by Band Council Resolution. Some band councils distrusted the measure as it was not standard practice. In addition, veterans complained of the poor quality of land in comparison to the grants available on private and Crown land. Aboriginal veterans also complained that unscrupulous agents mismanaged their loans or outright stole them, as well as failed to pass on necessary information for on-Reserve veterans to receive full benefits. 

Aboriginal veterans enjoyed greater visibility once arrived home, however. As R. Scott Sheffield has argued, the Canadian press demonstrated remarkable sympathy for Aboriginal veterans. Though a prohibition had existed on Indigenous organizing as of 1927, it was also clear that legislators were now reconsidering. As J. Allison Glen, Minister of Indian Affairs, indicated in a 1945 letter to agents, the branch would no longer actively oppose Native political organization, and that activism should still be guided but not outright banned. Within a new organizational context, new leadership emerged: Walter Dieter played a key role as president of the National Indian Brotherhood in the late
1960s, while Omer Peters, who served in the Air Force, became chief of his band and later, helped to organize the Union of Ontario Indians, as well as vice-president of the National Indian Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{66}

In the immediate post-war, however, Canadian legislators seemed at a loss to understand how Indigenous people saw their place in Canadian society. Legislators emphasized the Indigenous desire for full and equal citizenship, failing to understand its contested nature in Aboriginal communities. In 1944, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Consider and Examine the Indian Act met, considering submissions from a variety of groups, both Indigenous and non, who seemed to have a stake in the future of the Indian Act. As the hearings quickly revealed, Canadian legislators were most interested in cutting costs though they couched these austerity measures within the ethos of citizenship integration whereby Indigenous people would abandon their alleged “backwardness” and enthusiastically join modern Canada, leaving their Indigeneity relegated to an earlier and simpler time. Robert A. Hoey, director of the Indian Affairs Branch as of 1944, testified for much of 1946. A great admirer of American Indian policy, Hoey argued that Aboriginal people in Canada needed to be further inculcated into the ideology of modern capitalism and made to ‘want things’, including material possessions and a (nuclear) family life.\textsuperscript{67} Here, Hoey drew on the American examples of policy, including the Dawes Allotment Act rationale of 1877 and, to a lesser extent, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Brooke Claxton, Health and Welfare Minister under the Mackenzie King government, appeared to address Indian Health Services which had come under his department in 1945. In his brief, Claxton compared the situation of Aboriginal people to other Canadian poor, and argued that all social services available to Canadians in their provinces should be available to Indians on reserves.\textsuperscript{68} While the principle of comparability was an important one, it also signalled a re-conception of the relationship between the government and an individual. According to Shewell, “In the rush to social justice, postwar Indian policy was about to negate that difference and effectively obfuscate the historical status of First Nations.”\textsuperscript{69}
In addition to government representatives, other interested parties also weighed in. The 
Canadian Civil Liberties Union argued that to truly be made Canadian, Aboriginal people would have 
to give up any 'special' markers of identity, at least in a legal sense.\textsuperscript{70} This was the theme the CCLU 
also presented in Committee in 1947, an argument it maintained will into the 1960s. The social 
sciences of anthropology and sociology also contributed to the CCLU’s perspective by arguing that 
Aboriginal people had failed rather hopelessly in the project of modernization. Their emphasis on 
economic modernity and civil society set Native people against progress: “The goal was to transform 
First Nations into a new level of civil society, one from which they would see that participation in the 
exploitation of their lands was in their own interests.”\textsuperscript{71} They argued, as did the CCLU, that what 
prevented Indian people from becoming successful citizens was the legal designation of 'special' itself 
that restricted their participation in the economy and in modernity.

First Nations vociferously rejected the stereotypes of backwardness to characterize both their 
communities and themselves. Indigenous contributors included organizations, band chiefs and non-
status people. In rejecting the idea of the obliteration of ’special status,’ they insisted that the position 
of Indigenous people was a unique one built upon a unique tradition, history and relationship with the 
government. In reference to the discussion on the issue of poverty, they insisted that to be lumped in 
with other Canadians ignored the special historical circumstances that had produced their poverty and 
allowed it to perpetuate since the very founding of the reservation system. In addition, the Aboriginal 
submissions reflected the continuing ambivalence of Aboriginal people towards Canadian citizenship, 
particularly if it was based largely on the existing conditions of enfranchisement. Aboriginal people felt 
that enfranchisement included the cessation of any special relationship between the government and 
Aboriginal people.\textsuperscript{72} Their submissions articulated a “we-you” theme of parallelism and a rejection of 
being Canadian if its cost was too great and included sacrificing status, rights and heritage. The brief of 
the Mohawk Nation of the St-Regis Reserve, for example, actually rejected the basis of Canadian
governance over their person and territory, claiming that “We occupy our territory, not by your grace, but by a right beyond your control.” Specific issues such as the right to vote met a mixed response. Participation in the Canadian state seemed to imply an acceptance of its legitimacy, and many First Nations remained unsure as to the best way to apply their power to the Canadian system of governance. Some bands argued that an alternative system of Indian representation in Ottawa was required, while others rejected voting and asked for paid lobbyists in Ottawa to further their causes.

Revisions proceeded to the Act, despite the lack of consensus from Aboriginal groups. The new Act of 1951 contained a few basic changes but left intact the overarching federal power structure that would continue to govern Aboriginal lives. Despite their insistence on a direct relationship with the federal government, derived in part from the direct relationship Aboriginal groups perceived as enshrined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the 1951 revisions included most significantly section 87 which made Aboriginal people subjects of provincial law. According to Shewell, this section enshrined the principles of termination that would later be reflected in the White Paper, including the tool of assimilation as a transfer to provincial responsibility and the reduction of costs associated with Indian administration. As Martha Champion Randle, contributor to the Canadian Forum aptly argued, “Though the Act was publicized as a New Deal for the Indians, examination shows that the means by which democracy and full citizenship are to be attained are in essence authoritarian. The end envisioned is full citizenship for the Indians if they become Canadian... It shows no democratic tolerance, which allows cultural differences and ethnic diversity.”

If both the focus on devolving federal responsibility as well as the push towards equal citizenship were not enough to convince First Nations that their place within the nation was again in jeopardy, their tenuous position was also reflected by a series of other measures in the 1940s and 1950s including the transfer of the Indian Affairs Branch, in 1949, from the Department of Mines and Resources to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Tellingly, Aboriginal people in Canada
were now to be dealt with by the same agency that was responsible for integrating newly arrived immigrants. In addition, they seemed, at least symbolically, no longer to control any resources that required for them to be administered by the Department of Mines and Resources. Then-Prime Minister Louis St Laurent explained that the move was motivated by his desire to make Canadian citizens of those who immigrated here, as well as “as many as possible of the descendants of the original inhabitants of this country.”

The Citizenship Branch, within the new Department, actively worked to promote Aboriginal and immigrant integration through a variety of programs within wartime and post-war Canada. But, as Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta explain, “the programs aimed at Aboriginal peoples were far less respectful of Indigenous cultural traditions and political autonomy than were the immigrant campaigns of European customs.” Programs and initiatives included a suggested gradual devolution of programs to the provinces in an effort “to develop Indian initiative and self-determination.” As in the United States, Canadian officials also tried to urge migration off the reserve and into Canadian cities. Programs developed for Aboriginal people by the branch focused on training, settling, modernizing and otherwise “Canadianizing” them. Still mired in expectations of backwardness and the perceived desire of Aboriginal people to withdraw from, rather than participate in, the Canadian project, programs for Aboriginal people focused less on cultural pluralism and more on assimilation than those for immigrants. It concentrated on formal schooling for children and vocational and leadership training for adults, as well as published its own periodical, Indian News, which began free distribution in 1954 among status Indian people across Canada. Indian News celebrated those who demonstrated successful markers of integration, such as education and achievement in non-Aboriginal society, as well as those who had moved off the reserve to live in Canadian towns and cities. The publication also covered favourably non-departmental initiatives that supported their own goals, including voluntary groups in urban settings and Homemakers Clubs in reserve communities which promoted a particular vision of
white, middle-class bourgeois domesticity that could be imported onto the reserve.\textsuperscript{79} The department also funded its own immigration and urbanization programs by providing short courses in several low-skilled occupations that might be popular in urban environments.\textsuperscript{80} But although the branch actively sought Aboriginal integration, its officials also acknowledged that full integration might never be possible because of the continuing separate status of Aboriginal people in Canadian policy and law.

Canada’s “civil rights era” was different than the American one, not the least of which was due to Canada's lack of numerically significant minority group large enough to challenge the nation-state in the way that African Americans had in the United States. As the \textit{Washington Post} reported, on May 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1965, there was a Canadian civil rights movement manifested in the actions of Canadian and American students who, on this occasion, were gathering more than 300 strong in Toronto to discuss how civil rights movements related to Canadian Indigenous people.\textsuperscript{81} While students did engage, and often did so together, the same push towards legislation and a civil rights focused on individual equality was not present in the discourse of Aboriginal people on post-war rights.

Aboriginal people conceived of their rights differently, and a significant amount of activists' time often seemed to be spent explaining these differences to non-Indigenous people. As the National Film Board documentary \textit{Encounter with Saul Alinsky Part 2: Rama Indian Reserve} demonstrates, both the rhetoric and the tactics of Indigneous rights were distinct from those of other rights-seeking groups. Filmed in 1967, this documentary captures a heated conversation between Indigenous people of the Rama Reserve and American activist Saul Alinsky. While Alinsky insisted that Aboriginal people should start a campaign to repeal the Indian Act, residents counter with the notion of the reserve as a sanctuary, and the idea of being a part of the world, yet separate from it. As one resident put it, “The cost is too great for freedom.” Alinsky also maintained that there was no place left to hide; the reserve was a womb, and white people would not come halfway. Still, those of the Rama reserve articulated their belief in democracy as “an Indian idea” which would be rendered useless if corrupted by the
language and structures of non-Indigenous society.  

In addition, Canada's 1960s provided a struggle nonetheless, which engaged several different versions of nationalism in the heated federal battle with the province of Quebec. This was highlighted in 1973, when Don Whiteside also known as Sin a Paw, addressed a group of students and interested members of the public on the topic of “Indian Nationalism” in Montreal. As he began, “Speaking to a Quebec audience about Indian nationalism has certain advantages. Quebec is the only Province in Canada where the topic of nationalism is discussed in very pragmatic terms by the general public... Unfortunately... the preoccupation with the prospects of Quebec nationalism makes it difficult for people to consider the existence of Indians in the Province who have a prior claim to most of Quebec.” He argued that the people of Quebec so animated and excited by the topic of nationalism had failed to consider the discussion to be applicable to First Nations people residing in the province.

Indeed, the prospect of Quebec nationalism was exciting during the 1960s and early 1970s. On the 24th of July 1967, French General Charles DeGaulle stood on the balcony of Montreal's city hall and passionately shouted at the enthusiastic crowd below: “Vive le Quebec! Vive le Quebec libre!” His reception by thousands of excited Montrealers had reminded DeGaulle of the liberation of Paris, and among those gathered to watch him on that day were several members of the radical Front de liberation de Quebec (FLQ). The FLQ became the most prominent group for Quebec’s “liberation”, but its policies more generally reflected a somewhat tempered view, among less radical French-Canadian nationalists, that Quebec had, as a province and as a people, been unfairly treated both in a historic and contemporary sense by Ottawa and by the English. Its people and resources had been exploited by capitalism and greed, to its detriment, and some sort of justice was required.

Partially because Canadian legislators dealt with the province of Quebec as a block, it also took on the same approach in its dealings with Indigenous people. A catch-all solution, rather than one open to recognizing the distinctiveness of various Indigenous groups and nations, was promoted in both
public studies and in policy. The early 1960s produced a great deal of discussion while the mid-1960s
drew new research that sought to understand why Indigenous Canadians were in the situation they
were, living as third or fourth world populations in a first-world country. As such, the new official
approach was to see Indigenous people as people with problems, but who had not necessarily caused
them. This was the view articulated in the seminal Hawthorn Report of 1966, edited by noted
anthropologist H.B. Hawthorn of British Columbia, which advocated a new approach to the state's
relationship with Indigenous citizens, an approach that many Indigenous organizers could embrace. In
1964, the Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration commissioned a comprehensive
study designed to review the situation of the Indigenous people in Canada. Its mandate was broad, and
included economic, political, social and administrative issues. Its over 3,500 page report promoted
asymmetrical citizen status on Aboriginal people, suggested that they would be citizens like other
Canadians, but plus in bearing additional rights exclusive to them. This solution, commission
members argued, reflected two realities. First, that Aboriginal people and Canadians were different, and
secondly, that these differences were not total. The Hawthorn Commission rejected the nation-to-
nation model advocated by some Aboriginal groups because, they claimed, it weakened the idea of
common citizenship and reinforced the cleavage between Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginals. The
commission stressed the fact that "Citizens Plus" did not represent assimilation, but was the only
paradigm that offered some sort of commonality while accepting the inescapable existence of Canada.
At the same time, the Commission was very much a product of a century of White colonialism, as it
also suggested an Indian Progress Agency be established to monitor all developments in rectifying the
Indian problems of poverty, underemployment, and unemployment.

The chief architect of Canada's parallel to the Great Society, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, saw justice
in distinctive terms and as a product of his own experience in the province of Quebec, and in terms
rather distinct than those promoted by the Hawthorn principle of asymmetrical citizenship. As a part of
the volatile environment of Quebec politics in the 1950s, Trudeau had experienced nationalism as divisive. Thus in his view, nationalism, either on the part of Quebec or in terms of ethnic nationalism, was hostile to liberal values. During the 1950s, Trudeau had been a central figure in the group Cité libre, a group that lamented and wrote about the lack of democracy in Québec under the Union Nationale. As he articulated himself, in his formative years, “Society is a given fact for every man. What we do see is that wherever men live they in fact live in society and depend on the social order. The human being, then, lives in a framework of society; and life in society cannot be pictured without subjection to an established order – that is, government.”

In describing the Just Society model, Trudeau emphasized the individual's rights and responsibilities as citizens. As he stated,

The Just Society will be one in which all of our people will have the means and the motivation to participate. The Just Society will be one in which personal and political freedom will be more securely ensured than it has ever been in the past. The Just Society will be one in which the rights of minorities will be safe from the whims of intolerant majorities... The Just Society will be one in which our Indian and Inuit populations will be encouraged to assume the full rights of citizenship through policies which give them both greater responsibility for their own future and more meaningful equality of opportunity.

As this statement demonstrates, Trudeau's approach to politics and rights emphasized the individual's relationship to the state as a rights bearer and eschewed the idea of collective rights based on ethnic or cultural nationalism. He believed that through an emphasis on individual citizenship and an individual relationship between state and citizen, the roots of Quebec nationalism – and of all harmful nationalisms -- could be undermined. As Sally Weaver explains, “His philosophy was ahistorical, and his emphasis on reason rather than emotion as the basis of government allowed him to dispense with the past as a significant consideration.” He was a cultural Darwinian, convinced that cultures burdened with over-protection would remain insular and be unable to survive. If culture was to survive, it should do so in the spirit of competition, and of its own accord. For Indigenous people, Trudeau's
failure to recognize the justice owed to them by virtue of their history was a significant problem towards forging a common understanding or direction because, as Trudeau's model related to Indigenous people, it precluded any notion of special status or of a treaty relationship. As Trudeau explained to a Vancouver audience in 1969, “It is inconceivable that in a given society one section of the society have a treaty with the other section.” Although the equal enjoyment of rights based on the primary bond of citizenship may have appealed to the heterogeneous society outside of Quebec and outside of Aboriginal communities, but it could also be 'invested with the passion and intolerance he so feared in nationalist movements."

Despite his pervasive fear of nationalism, Trudeau mandated a series of consultation meetings in 1968, during which Indigenous people had the opportunity to voice their opinions on the future of Aboriginal policy in Canada. The first consultation meeting took place in Yellowknife on the 25th of July, 1968. Walter Rudnicki, serving as senior policy adviser to Minister without Portfolio Robert K. Andras, recorded his observations on the process first, in Yellowknife where he acknowledged, “that the formal agenda of the meeting – revisions to the Indian Act – was not necessarily the only of perhaps even the major concern of those speaking for the Indians of the North West Territories.” Instead, he explained, the people were more concerned with the fulfilment of treaty obligations. As he explained, “This was my first lesson—that agendas drawn up in Ottawa sometimes may not reflect the real interest of those attending a meeting... Dialogue – real dialogue – requires an exchange of ideas, a willingness to discuss one’s values and attitudes.” Rudnicki's statements on the Yellowknife meetings, in fact, summed up the entire consultation process – or, more concisely, what so many Indigenous participants, many of whom had been given little or no time to prepare, had experienced. Aboriginal people had expressed a wide range of opinions in the consultation meetings from July 1968 to May 1969, but the consensus that had emerged was a desire for the recognition of special rights and the rectifying of historical grievances. Yet for Trudeau, the status of First Nations people was quite clear: the White
Paper approach encapsulated his fear of nationalism, borne of his life and experience in Quebec, as well as a general disregard for the concept of historical justice so sought by Aboriginal people. As he argued, “We can’t recognize Aboriginal rights because no society can be built on historical might-have-beens.”

Though he pledged to create a new relationship, Trudeau's new policy proposal perpetuated old models. On the 13th of February, 1969, Cabinet approved it in principle, advocating a policy objective of “full non-discriminatory participation” for Aboriginal people in Canadian society. In its statement, it stressed the notion of both positive and negative discrimination as impediments to solving the 'Indian Problem', as it came to be called, referring both the special rights, and to the disadvantages that Aboriginal people faced. A policy memorandum released shortly thereafter outlined the steps to take to achieve this objective, the first of which was the repeal of the Indian Act and the substitution of legislation to secure title for bands and protect their lands from the provinces. The department would be stripped down to retain only those parts that the provinces were unlikely to offer, such as treaties, and all services would be transferred to provincial administration. Though it gave the impression of recognizing prior treaties and claims in good faith, the proposal was in fact meant to disavow them. Intending to avoid the complicated issue of settling land claims, the White Paper also asserted they were mostly so vague as to render them impossible to redress. Though a commissioner was appointed for the purpose of investigating claims, he remained powerless to adjudicate them.

When it was announced on the 25th of June, 1969, Aboriginal leaders sitting in the gallery were shocked at what they had heard. In the end, the White Paper's principal recommendations included the complete repeal of the Indian Act which, for Trudeau, would serve the purpose of removing the legislative and constitutional bases of discrimination. The paper proposed the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs. Further, the White Paper proposed the positive recognition of the unique contribution of Indian culture to Canadian society, though it was framed in such a way as to be
meaningless – and even contrary – to Aboriginal goals. Third, the paper proposed the transfer of Aboriginal people from federal responsibility to provincial jurisdiction so that the services provided for them would come through the same channels as all other Canadians. The policy asserted that those furthest lagging behind the Canadian population should have access to job training, additional funds, and the transfer of Aboriginal lands to Aboriginal control. The government asserted that land claims were too vague and too general as to mean anything, and proposed re-examining the treaties to see how they could be “equitably ended.” Finally, the paper addressed the land question in three parts including the concept of individual, private Indian land ownership, the introduction of taxation and the definition of the word Indian.98 In sum, it represented assimilation in one fell swoop; in practice, it would render a blow that would make Indigenous identity in any meaningful legislative sense obsolete, and it would absolve the federal government of any responsibility or ongoing obligation to the people it had long ago pledged to protect.

D. ABORIGINAL NATIONALISM AND THE ARTS IN POST-WAR CANADA

As it had in the United States, this perceived act of aggression on the part of government spurred on a new round of ethnic renewal, expressed frequently in writing and in the arts. For Indigenous youth and those newly aware, the central question of this period was one of identity. A renewed pride in one's identity was in fact the hallmark of Indigenous activism during this period. As Bryan D. Palmer has argued, “Native peoples, wrongly and lately 'discovered' by their paternalist superiors, 'discovered,' with the help of national and international currents of dissent, a new and vibrant sense of themselves as something more, something other, than what they had been constructed as by the state and white colonial authority.”99
This rediscovery was manifest on several levels, included the Powwow Trail. In a radio program devoted to it, attendees expressed their desire to learn more about their own people and about other tribes, as well as a desire to look for the “old ways” to escape the often overwhelmingly modern and materialistic society they now faced. As Bryan Palmer has argued about Red Power more generally, “what was new in the Red Power movement was always dialectically related, indeed inseparable from, what was old in Native experience ... young Aboriginal militants, relatively innocent of Indigenous spirituality, often came to situate their challenges to the colonizing white state within a return to traditional customs, such as dance, that were religious confirmations of a Native identity and its superiority to that of the rapacious market-driven fetishes of late capitalism.”

While the youth were often perceived to be searching for something 'just over the hill', as one 40-year old interviewee cited, there were also many from the older generation who participated in the movement. Because chasing the Powwow trail was often about living on the road, the movement was also one of mobility that helped to inspire pan-Indigenous unity among Aboriginal Canadians. As some youth interviewed saw it, there was alot to learn from the road that one could not learn in an urban setting. The exposure to a perceived feeling of unity and togetherness was an important component of the Powwow experience and many felt that across North America, Indigenous philosophies and beliefs were “basically the same.”

In 1969 in Canada, over 50,000 travellers hit the road as part of a broader movement, so significant that by 1971, Gerald Pelletier announced the “transient youth phenomenon” had reached epic proportions, prompting an expansion of a hostel program partially funded by the federal government.

In 1965, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's (CBC) radio division also began airing a new program entitled Our Native Land. It ran for 21 years every Saturday afternoon, touted as the only national radio program focused on Native cultural rejuvenation. Intended as a program by Indian people for Indian people, the hosts frequently stressed Our Native Land's interest in Aboriginal, rather
than White, contributions. As early host Johnny Yesno put it, White people had many different ways to speak out and to be heard: *Our Native Land* should therefore be reserved as a forum for Indian people and by Indian people, not for so-called “Indian experts.”* Our Native Land* grappled with issues such as treaty rights, women's rights, new organizations, rural and urban issues, as well as government policy. It frequently invited Indigenous leaders to be interviewed on the program, as well as urban activists, Aboriginal workers employed by the federal government, and popular Aboriginal artists. Demonstrating the importance of Native American activism to Canadian Aboriginal audiences, *Our Native Land* also featured discussion of developments and movements on the other side of the border, as well as interviews with American activists.

Those who participated in this rediscovery also looked to artists and leaders for inspiration. In music, perhaps one of the most famous Native artists of this period was Buffy Sainte Marie, born in Saskatchewan and adopted by American parents. A passionate advocate for awareness of the Indian situation and for Aboriginal rights, many of Buffy Sainte Marie's songs told difficult stories that could reach a broad audience. Named Best New Artist by Billboard Magazine in 1964, Sainte-Marie also sang songs of protest within the broader rights struggle such as the song Universal Soldier, which became a well-known peace anthem. The song *My Country 'Tis of Thy People You're Dying* was featured on CBC television on 28th October 1966. When the host pointed out that the song was a powerful statement that might offend some because it had so much hate in it, Buffy Sainte Marie responded “There’s only as much brutality in the song as there is in the facts. The words in the song aren’t made up.”* She felt her role as an artist was to inform the White community and called for a new understanding of Indigenous history that honoured Aboriginal ancestors. She argued that the historical mistakes of the nation state had to be corrected, not ignored.

In addition to artists speaking out, Aboriginal writers in Canada also had a significant voice. Writing was an important venue for the articulation of the aspirations and hopes of Indigenous
Canadians, and many attempted to write stories and novels that would be both compelling for non-Indigenous people as well as reflect the reality of Indigenous experience. As a part-biographical work, Maria Campbell's *Halfbreed* (1973) related the experience of a Metis woman in Canadian society, putting in new terms issues that had been the focal point of organizing throughout the 1960s. Campbell's work spoke to her discrimination on several fronts, including as an Indigenous person, as a woman, and as a “half breed” or Metis. Campbell herself, interviewed in 1976, argued that Native people and the Metis in particular needed to find their roots in the stories that “old people” told, and Beth Paul, a commentator on CBC Radio's *Our Native Land*, argued that *Halfbreed* “changed the direction of our words,” making Native people’s issues, though still political, more accessible to non-Native audiences as well as more universal to many Native people rather than polarizing Indigenous opinion.

Campbell's own life experience as a transplanted Indigenous person in the city of Vancouver was emblematic of what happened to many: after moving to the city and being deserted by her then-husband, Campbell turned to a life of alcohol and prostitution, attempting suicide on at least two separate occasions. It was her attempt to deal with the anger and frustration of her life that inspired her to write *Halfbreed*, a novel that has been called by many one of the most significant pieces of Aboriginal writing in Canada ever produced.

Howard Adams, prominent Saskatchewan Metis intellectual, also produced his own work, a so-called reinterpretation of Canadian history from an Indigenous perspective. He did not differentiate his situation from that of Canada's status and non-status Aboriginal people and offered a unique perspective that referenced his own involvement in the American civil rights movement as a university student. He called upon Malcolm X, who had under his own banner united the red, black and yellow people, as a model of action in the quest for civil rights. He connected the 'Red awakening' and 'Indian nationalism' to third world liberation, a struggle he also saw in terms of class liberation. Adams' rejection of pan-Indian organizations on the national scale in Canada was directly related to his own
position as both a Métis and a veteran of American civil rights, which he judged as superior for the way in which it united several communities. An international awareness was also evident in the work of activist Waubegeshig, who engaged the work of Franz Fanon, an anti-colonial author from Martinique who focused on the concept of racial alienation in Algeria. In his essay, Waubegeshig drew upon the images of Fanon in tracing the “Indian-white” relationship. At the end of his essay, Waubegeshig indicated the newness of pan-Indianism in Canada by arguing that changes in the Indian Act as to the definition of who was an Indian were not likely to engender unity. Rather, it remained for Indians themselves “to discover if they desire recognition as a nation and then to construct an ideology, linguistics notwithstanding.”

Waubegeshig's theories, though culturally unifying, never specified how this pan-Indianism could be achieved, nor did he point out the dichotomy between his vision and that of many of the mainstream groups publicizing their agenda.

Non-fiction authors also produced important pieces. Harold Cardinal's *The Unjust Society* was published in 1969. Cardinal, then-leader of the Indian Association of Alberta and an instrumental figure in the formation of the National Indian Brotherhood, was incensed with Trudeau's perversion of “the just society.” He argued that the White Paper, was “a white paper for white people created by the white elephant.” His impression of Trudeau’s concept of the just society was of a cultural genocide or “extermination through assimilation.” His writing indicated a desire for inclusion in the Canadian mosaic, but on terms that did not deny Aboriginality. As he stated, “It we are to be part of the Canadian mosaic, then we want to be colourful red tiles, taking our place where red is both needed and appreciated.” The best way to assert this Aboriginality, Cardinal posited, was strength in numbers. As he stated, “Nationwide unity represents a dream long held by Indian leaders well aware of the divisive influence of the emphasis upon individual bands and tribes.”

Cardinal was an up and coming star in Alberta Indigenous politics, and his ideas were
influential in the drafting of another important document by the Association of Alberta Chiefs. The Red Paper was presented to the government one year later in June of 1970. The Paper was also titled "Citizens Plus", indicating some congruity with the Hawthorn Commission's 1967 recommendations. While it emerged from a provincial-territorial organization, or PTO, the Red Paper also asserted the existence of a pan-Indian identity. In response to the White Paper's insistence that the legislative and constitutional basis of discrimination be removed, the Red Paper asserted that these should be maintained until Aboriginal people were prepared and willing to renegotiate them. To the White Paper point that there should be a positive recognition of the unique contribution of culture to Canadian life, the Red Paper asserted that these misleading words were insufficient- what was needed to maintain Aboriginal culture was “to remain as Indians.”

In addition, the Red Paper rejected differential treatment for different tribes, arguing that helping the poorest was in fact a ploy by the Federal Government and yet another example of the divide and conquer strategy. As the chiefs asserted, “All reserves and tribes need help in economic, social, recreational and cultural development.”

Thus, though the White Paper generated discussions that differed on the course of action, it remained a galvanizing experience for Canada's own First Nations and one that reaffirmed the need to act within a national arena to address specific legislative policies. Indeed, anthropologist Sally Weaver argues that the White Paper “became the single most powerful catalyst of the Indian nationalism movement, launching it into a determined force for nativism – a reaffirmation of a unique cultural heritage and identity.” At the same time, while historians have emphasized the way in which the White Paper was an important rallying point for Canadian Aboriginal people, there remained many who, like in the United States, were unaware of the larger developments in Ottawa. As one interviewee noted, those on her reserve knew nothing of the White Paper, or of the Red Paper for that matter: they were simply struggling to survive.
CONCLUSION:

As these contributions demonstrated, there was a great deal of material for Aboriginal Canadians and Americans to engage with and to relate to during this period. While the NCAI quickly emerged in the 1940s in the United States, Indigenous Canadians' efforts at organizing on a national level emerged more slowly and spasmodically. While federal legislation played an important role in both Canada and in the United States in uniting Indigenous people, cultural production was also a significant factor in both countries Canada where increasingly, during the course of the 1960s, youth and those who had never been active before became convinced that the time was indeed, now. In the face of intractable government parsimony and menace, activists engaging with the broader civil rights context saw an opportunity for change that had not existed before.

Thus, the 1960s was an important time for the articulation of a new pan-Indigenous agenda within a reinvigorated context for the discussion of human and collective rights. While the general modus operandi of Indigenous rights had worked to bring people together when the nation was preoccupied with other issues, the spotlight placed upon Indian people in the 1960s through various pieces of legislation, through engagement with other movements, and through cultural production made it important for individual activists and existing groups to clarify exactly what they wanted from legislators, and from the Canadian and American public. As a result of these many factors then, the 1960s perpetuated a climate that would bear much fruit for new organizations, as will be featured in the following chapter.

While American legislators like Lyndon B. Johnson worked hard to try to serve the Native American constituency, critics alleged that he and others continued to lump them in, largely, with other rights-seeking ethnic groups. Indigenous activists insisted that their problems were unique, as the
solution should also be. Initiatives like those of the Great Society package, as well as particular addresses on Native American people, could not mask the fact that no solution had yet been found that could address the historic aspect of the injustice that Indigenous Americans insisted must be addressed.

In Canada, this chapter has articulated a unique context that included the attention accorded to Quebec nationalism, as well as the way in which the experiences of Pierre Elliott Trudeau inspired a version of the Just Society that did not at all address Indigenous concerns. This resulted in the White Paper, an event which did generate a new chorus of voices demanding change, though not all agreed on what the next step should be.

The next chapter will address the new organizations and activists that found a public voice in the 1960s amid a context perhaps more amenable to their needs and goals than ever before. For those who had placed their faith and been disappointed in what they characterized as the tepid efforts of the NCAI, it was clear that there was a need for new and more militant organizations. In Canada, the failure to produce a national organization that could last and withstand the climate of citizenship integration and neo-liberalism of post-war world would eventually produce the first truly national organization of Indigenous Canadians, the National Indian Council. But, while the 1960s and 1970s were decades that drew out some of the most successful Indigenous activism in North American history, they also featured new fissures and divisions that stemmed from the articulation of a particular agenda, as well as a realization that the identity of Indianess could not, in itself, provide a viable basis for lasting and effective organizational representation.
5 Woods, Quest for Identity, 19.
8 Ibid., 1311.
9 Ibid., 1308.
11 Ibid., 43.
14 Allen, Blood Narrative, 81.
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Chapter 2:

'A Tough Horse to Ride':

The Challenge of Organizational Politics

in the Rights Era
INTRODUCTION:

During the 1960s, an era that some termed one of rebirth for Indian people across the North American continent, Aboriginal organizers put all that they had learned from centuries of struggle into a new agenda for pan-Indian organization. Though organizations and organizers agreed that the time was ripe for change and that Indigenous people were owed a great measure of justice from their respective states, not all organizers and activists spoke with one voice. While the decades preceding had been marked by the mobilization of a more general pan-Indian agenda, the 1960s would see that agenda rearticulated, redefined and narrowed in response to a myriad of pressures, both internal and external. Thus, while there were many divisions among groups at the time, one of the most formative and important concerned fissures of a tactical nature. In other words, while activists all agreed that change was needed, organizations differed significantly in terms of the methods put into practice to achieve greater justice for Indian people. The differences of method went beyond purely logistical differences to embrace important ideological positions as well.

If pan-Indigenous organization can be described as a spectrum encompassing conservative and more liberal views, then it must also be viewed as an intricate web with various tendrils all expanding in different directions. To categorize some organizations as mainstream and others as radical paints a much oversimplified portrait of the diversity of these groups in the 1960s and 1970s. As Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior have asserted of the period, “The cast of characters [...] was much more complicated than the media-projected young, city-based militants versus passive reservation residents ... American Indian educators, health professionals, journalists, artists, lawyers, actors, scholars, and others formed organizations and emerged onto the scene with a suddenness that was difficult even to keep track of, much less make sense of.”¹ There were, on the one hand, mainstream groups operating within the 1960s and 1970s climate in Canada and in the United States with
remarkably similar orientations. These were more often than not a result of several interrelated points including a broader rights agenda operating alongside pan-Indian demands, a reliance on inorganic and imported administrative and legal operational structures, a similar type and substance of leadership, an at least tenuous acceptance by mainstream media of their position as legitimate spokespeople for Indian people and a parallel promotion by Canadian and American legislators of the same. At the same time, a dissatisfaction with such groups – with their tactics, their leadership, and the structure – also prompted the emergence of new forms of protest vociferously rejected by mainstream groups as too militant and too radical, which reflected both their increasing place of importance as the 'legitimate' spokespeople for Indigenous issues, as well as the apprehension of losing ground so hard fought in the first place.

This chapter will argue that Indigenous organizations emerging within this era were more dynamic and adaptive than ever, yet more vulnerable to critique, both external and internal, than ever before. Peter Kulchyski maintains that in Aboriginal self-government – and, I would argue, within Indigenous organizations – the politics of form are of considerable important, as “form not only reflects the cultural values of those who deploy it, but embodies, enacts, and perpetuates these cultural values.” They were expressions both of the cultural forms of the state, as well as important cases of subversion whereby the organizers consciously employed a strategy of redeployment of colonial structures as a mechanism of expressing cultural resistance. The vulnerability to critique of large organizations was in part, intimately linked to the greater media profile extended to these groups within a public arena, as well as to their ambitious mandate of securing a seat at the governmental table and the size of the constituencies they hoped to serve.

This chapter will begin by examining theories of Indigenous nationalisms and their manifestation in the orientation of new organizations of the era. It will then chronicle the emergence of citizenship era integration rhetoric and the evolution of tribal politics in an American context. Then, the emergence and work of the National Congress of American Indians, or NCAI, will be addressed
alongside the work of its rival, emerging in the early 1970s, under the name of the National Tribal Chairmens’ Association. The chapter will then shift to a Canadian context, exploring the way in which the National Indian Council, founded in 1961, taught organizers new lessons about the challenges of pan-Indigenous organizing that bore fruit in the emergence of the National Indian Brotherhood and of the Native Council of Canada as two separate organizations in the late 1960s. Finally, the chapter will examine the work of the foundational blocks of the NIB and the NCC, the provincial and territorial organizations, as further examples of the internal dynamics of Indigenous politics.

A. INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA

Indigenous nationalism was an important discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, because it raised key questions as to the legitimacy of the colonizing state itself, not only for Indigenous people who had questioned it since contact, but for others – academics, philanthropists and even interested members of the public – who, until now, had not given the issue much thought. It also had important implications for the mainstream organizations that would develop as a result of the system of tribal governance and intergovernmental relationships that had evolved since American colonization. Leaders of Indigenous-led organizations engaged in these discussions, increasingly seeking to define the place of Indigenous people within the modern nation-state, as well as provide a firm basis for the realization of organizational goals. Concessions from the nation-state, as Aboriginal groups in Canada and in the US had learned, were difficult to negotiate, and so theorizing Indigenous nationalism became an ideological project with important pragmatic considerations. Within the discussion as well as within the work of organizations, participants engaged both concepts of the individual and of the group,
illustrating to what extent the individual and collective dimensions of Indigenous rights during this time and beyond were inextricable from each other. Who were American Indians and what was their place in the modern state? Unlike in Canada, where the Indian Act legislated, on a very basic level, who was or was not considered an Indian person, the question was still very much a point of discussion in the American political culture and in Indigenous political circles during this period. In addition, the complicated history and relationship of tribal governments with the nation-state increasingly came under fire during this period of activism due to critiques that the imposed system, inorganic and ill-suited to Indigenous realities, bred corruption and mismanagement. Therefore, the discussion of these ideas as well as the tendency for mainstream groups to rely on the imposed structures, were important dimensions of the struggle that contributed greatly to both the orientation and composition of large pan-Indigenous groups during this period.

The question of Indigenous nationalism, or at least what sort of political entity Indigenous groups represented, had been hotly debated in legal and legislative circles since the early to mid-nineteenth century. Legislators and Indigenous people had engaged the concepts of nationhood and of the nation-to-nation model as early as 1823, where in *Johnson v. McIntosh*, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that Indigenous people enjoyed a “right of occupancy.” As such, ownership of land did not reside with Indigenous people, nor did they exercise what may be deemed complete sovereignty within their lands. In response, many tribes had eloquently fought attempts by the United States to define them unilaterally, as demonstrated by the declarations of the Cherokee and Choctaw nations in 1824 and 1825. The Cherokees insisted that they wished to remain in the East, that the tribe was collectively now focused on the pursuits of “civilized man”, that it had embraced the precepts of Christianity and, further, that it adhered by the famous declaration that all men were indeed created equal. For their part, the Choctaws extolled the values of American democracy as values that could and should protect them and other, weaker tribes. In other words and as Frederick Hoxie explains, “The leaders of one of the
largest tribes in the nation were staking their future on the proposition that there was a place for their group to exist within the 'civilized' institutions of the United States. They were calling for the creation of a substitute for Jefferson’s and Jackson’s formulations... They sought a new political culture.”

This new political culture, as Hoxie called it, was encompassed in 1832’s seminal *Worcester v. Georgia*, a case in which Justice Marshall declared that the Cherokee nation possessed a right to self-government despite its dependence on the United States. As such, the term “domestic dependent nation” came into being to describe what Justice McLean described as a “peculiar relation.” McLean argued that “At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have been always admitted to possess many of the attributes of sovereignty,” but further indicated that should their numbers be reduced or should the tribe become “degraded”, the powers of self-government could be lost, and the “protection of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over them.”

In 1886, the whole concept of tribal sovereignty was one again diminished in *United States v. Kagama*, where the court ruled that since Indigenous Americans were to be found within the geographical limits of the United States, “The soil and the people within these limits are under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.” The Court insisted that the right of sovereignty existed only within the state, by necessity, as well as asserted that such jurisdiction was now desirable due to the degradation and reduction in number of Indigenous Americans. Then, in 1871, federal allotment policy reinforced the opinion rendered in *United States v. Kagama* within the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, which stated that “hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided, further, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.” Thus, by the late nineteenth century, the political acceptance of
Indigenous sovereignty by non-Indigenous legislators seemed to be at a nadir, with no real restoration in sight.

The courts also offered, during the nineteenth century, important judgements relating to the individuals' place within the American nation-state. Rather than stressing their dependence, as the courts often had in relation to the group, courts speaking on the individual frequently cited American Indians' ability to participate in the body politic. In 1857, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney argued that Natives were free and independent people who could be naturalized and who were capable of joining America’s political community. As he explained, “[Native Americans are], without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States.” He continued to compare Native Americans to a population not unlike emigrates who became American citizens: “...and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.” Nevertheless, Taney maintained that Indian tribes were not in fact independent governments with the power to invite or accept new members and that they did not operate outside of the jurisdiction of the United States, as indicated in his 1846 opinion in *United States v. Rogers*.

Policy regarding Indigenous self-determination and governance had been largely shaped by these legal opinions as well as in the legislative context of the late nineteenth century. To expedite the process of establishing Indigenous governance among Native Americans early on, the United States had applied a formulaic policy under the principle of legislative efficiency that ignored a long history of governance that had shaped a truly heterogeneous Indigenous population. As Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle explain, traditional forms of government had varied among Indigenous groups and included loose confederations built on pragmatic concerns, theocracies, councils, and other administrative bodies. Despite these different forms, however, what remained constant was the primary
duty of the governing body as a mediating and adjudicating force. Indeed, the Chief of any Indigenous group was most often admired for his personal qualities; his job was to lead, not to rule. Through the intervention of the nation-state, the traditional judicial thrust of tribal government was undermined by an increasing need for ruling bodies that could also perform legislative and executive tasks with the onslaught of settler colonialism. As Morton H. Fried, noted anthropologist proposed in 1972, the tribe was a “secondary sociopolitical phenomenon, brought about by the intercession of more complexly ordered societies, states in particular... The ‘pristine tribe,’... is a creation of myth and legend.”

Tribes, like those people who composed the group, had proven adaptive and dynamic, particularly during the period between the Allotment era of the late nineteenth century and the New Deal era of the 1930s. This period was an important one for the evolution of Indigenous governance systems demonstrated by the formation of new allegiances and separate entities. As the case of the Red Lake Chippewa band illustrates, Indigenous Americans were very active in engineering the birth of the modern council system. An 1889 law had established a General Council system for the upper Minnesota Chippewa reservations whose duty it was to hold annual meetings and to allocate annuity funds and per capita payments. The Chippewas had agreed to the allotment of their reservation lands, but the Red Lake band had refused. As a result of the allotment process among Leech Lake, White Earth, Mille Lacs, Fond du Lac and Grand Portage Chippewas, many were, by the early twentieth century, landless because they had decided to sell their lands to timber interests. When a proposal was made, in 1916, to allot the Red Lake lands, still held in common, to provide allotment for the now landless Chippewas, the Red Lake band argued that it had preserved its heritage responsibly and should not have to provide for those who had wasted theirs. In 1918, the Red Lake band seceded from the Chippewa General Council and formed its own government under seven chiefs. Though the fight over Red Lake lands lingered in the courts until the 1930s, the band’s establishment of its independence in light of the pressures facing them represents one example of the issues faced by the modern tribal
council system which began to emerge during this period.

For some tribes, the introduction of a more formal justice system in fact provided groups with an introduction to the Anglo-American structures of legislative, executive and judiciary power that would take on an increasingly sophisticated form. In 1878, Congress officially approved funding for a BIA sponsored Indian police force, though it would not go as far as terminating all tribal sovereignty by extending the whole of the federal legal system into Indian country. The Court of Indian Offences was established in 1883 to police practices such as “heathenish dances,” polygamy, traditional healing, and to promote respect for private property. The Court was staffed by local Native people chosen by the Indian agent and the model was imposed in roughly two thirds of all Indian agencies.

Thus in both justice and in politics, the early nineteenth century was a particularly politically important time, as Indian Agents now sought to transform Indigenous forms of governance for expediency and for compliance. In addition to those duties of the Indian police force and of the Court of Indian Offences, Indian Agents would gather those who they deemed most influential from the bands or communities of any given reservation to form an informal and ongoing council to perform whatever obligations the agent chose to delegate. As Deloria Jr. and Lytle explain, “Generally this council reflected the original political subdivisions of the tribal past but also incorporated the democratic principles in which the agent believed, which usually meant one person/one vote in contrast to the traditional method of choosing leaders.” Significantly, these informal councils could make major changes, as illustrated in the account of the agent for the Blackfoot Reservation in Montana in 1875, where he reported that the council elected three head-chiefs and passed a code of laws which included abolishing polygamy and imposing punishments for various crimes. These sorts of tasks fit in well with the traditional role of governing bodies, but did not necessarily reflect the selection process of representatives that Indigenous people saw as foundational to good governance. There were many reports that alluded to such dissatisfaction, noting jealousy, opposition and heathenism on the part of
political rivals not chosen by the Agent. In some cases, agents deliberately sought to supercede the authority of powerful and prestigious chiefs. Among the Oglala Sioux on the Pine Ridge Reservation, where the agent reported that the board of councilmen, “composed, as it is, of about one hundred delegates from our more progressive Indians... does not meet the approval of many of our superannuated chiefs, but is, nevertheless, doing good work.”

New governments were therefore sometimes imposed as a tool of the state and while it is difficult to know how Indigenous people saw these bodies and their role on the reservation, the continuing popularity of traditional chiefs and the determination to preserve many pre-colonization governing customs demonstrate the extent to which Indigenous people did in fact engage in politics in this earlier period. In general, the beginning to mid-twentieth century featured governments acting on a smaller scale whose reservation council therefore represented, for many, a national rather than a local government. These governments, though donned in “Whites’ institutional clothes.” continued to feature chiefs concerned primarily with community care and with the task of mediation and adjudication. Though there were associated legislative and executive tasks, the separation of these spheres was, in this period, never accomplished.

However, in 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act discussed in a previous chapter also made provision for increased local self-government. The federal government also sought to more clearly define who was considered an Indian through the IRA’s three criteria of membership which included tribal membership, ancestral descent, or blood quantum. The IRA further resurrected “tribal sovereignty” as an organizing principle. It also provided for the formation of new tribal governments as the appropriate vehicle for Indigenous self-determination of some measure. As Morton H. Fried also argued, maintaining the tribes was a matter of governmental expedience. Tribes who accepted the provisions of the act could issue charters of incorporation as well as draw from a special loans fund intended for the purposes of economic development. Tribes had two years to accept or to reject the IRA, but could not reconsider their decision after the fact. Within two years, one hundred and eighty-nine...
one groups decided to accept, while seventy-seven others voted to reject it.\textsuperscript{14} Where more than one group of Indigenous people lived on a single reservation and voted to accept the IRA, they were constituted as new “consolidated” or “confederated” tribal entities. One example can be found on the Fort Berthold Reservation, henceforth known as the Three Affiliated Tribes which included the Mandans, Gros Ventres, and Arickaras, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai of the Flathead Reservation, among others.

While the prospect of drafting their own constitutions and charters seemed full of promise, nevertheless, like the provisions contained within Canada's own Indian Act, the IRA model based governance on democratic principles and corporate structures that were often at odds with traditional models of governance. The IRA model also limited the authority of these governments both through jurisdiction and through funding. As Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle argued, “The political damage that had been inflicted upon tribal governments for so many decades in the past could not be undone overnight. The traditional forms of tribal government had been dormant for too long and much of the religious undergirding of the informal customs had been badly eroded.”\textsuperscript{15} As such, the format for governance emerging out of the IRA and out of the period “was almost a carbon copy of the structured, legalistic European form of government.” It was the BIA which provided the model constitutions for the tribes to work with, and the requirement upon the tribes to submit their constitutions to the Secretary of the Interior for approval before becoming operational meant that, ipso facto, there was a virtual federal veto on any aspect of the new constitutions. It also ensured that most would assume the same form, thus making the task of the Secretary's final approval easier, and encouraging tribes to conform to the already-established model. As a brief survey of tribal constitutions enacted in this period reveals, constitutions and incorporations provided for membership rules and exclusions, elected tribal councils assuming separate legislative and executive duties and branches with fixed terms of office, enumerated powers for councils and officers, and rules regarding land use.\textsuperscript{16} All of course, were subject
to federal supervision and regulation. In sum and as Peter d'Errico argues, “The fact that the New Deal abandoned some of the grosser exercises of federal authority typical of the allotment era that preceded it made it appear attractive to native peoples; but the contradictions embodied in a concept of “dependent sovereignty” would continue to produce conflict and confusion in federal Indian law.”

The promise of the IRA’s self-determination provisions began to wane almost immediately, both in Indigenous communities and in the legislative one. Efforts to revitalize traditional tribal structures emerged with varying rates of success, and tribal governments increasingly took on more executive and legislative duties that were not a part of their traditional form. Within the 1940s and as the tone of public discussion and of legislation regarding the issue shifted to a more individually-based model, new discussion now focused on citizenship. Felix Cohen, teacher of law and scholar as well as activist on behalf of Indigenous people, published “Indians are Citizens!” in *The American Indian* in 1944. In this tract, Cohen articulated what would in fact become part of the basis of the citizenship-based justification for termination policy in the 1950s, that Indians were not perceived as citizens as much as twenty years after the Indian Citizenship Act because of all the persistent signs of their alleged inferiority, including federal trusteeship, their exemption from state property taxes and their use of federal services. Yet Cohen included an important qualification, that exploiters would strip the Indian of their protections but that the law actually promoted a certain type of 'citizens plus' model, articulated more clearly later in in 1960s Canada with the report of the Hawthorn Commission. In Cohen's estimation, “the peculiar status of the Indian today under federal law is not a diminution of full citizenship but an addition to full citizenship.” In other words, the peculiar legal status of Indian people was a matter of contract or consent, much like those of homesteaders, veterans or government contractors. He further insisted that the rights most important to Indian people were not rights of citizenship, but human and/or tribal rights.
B. INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE IN THE 1960S

Cohen's insistence on the importance of human and tribal rights was indeed correct and increasingly, American legislators were realizing the extent to which tribal governance as it had been established could contravene these rights. As such, it insisted on both individual and tribal rights though failed to clearly articulate how these might be realized, as well as ask Native Americans how they saw justice. In its Summary Report of the Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian, issued in January 1961, still-paternalistic commissioners nevertheless insisted that Indians had a right to be different, and that their difference should in fact influence the development of Indian programs and policies. The report rejected Termination without consent and recommended, in principle, letting Indian people initiate and design, as well as administer, their own programs. Citizenship was still an important theme, as articulated in the report, but it was no longer seen as incompatible with American citizenship: “To encourage pride in Indianness is not to turn back the clock. On the contrary, it is to recognize that the United States policy has hitherto failed to use this vital factor effectively as a force for assimilation and for enriching American culture... Only men who have a foot in each way of life and an appreciation of both can effectively lessen the gap which divides the two and thus cross-fertilize both.”

Though the individual was welcome to place a foot in both worlds, as the Commission maintained, federal legislation including Termination policy, discussed at length in the previous chapter, suggested that tribal politics and governance were of a much lower priority.

Indeed they had been; by the mid-1970s, it was clear that implementing a general policy with regards to Native American groups had failed to create tribal governments that operated in the same way across the country. In some communities, tribal councils enacted decidedly positive changes for
the community. Among the Choctaw Tribe, for instance, the Tribal Council, recognizing the difficulties that Choctaws consistently faced in their dealings with the law, passed an ordinance authorizing the establishment of a Legal Services Program beginning in late 1972. The program was funded by outside sources and encompassed a legal education component, as well as representation in the courts and assistance to the tribal council in the formulation of resolutions and ordinances. The Mississippi band of Choctaw Indians also focused on improvements in the areas of education, health and economic development. While the Choctaw example demonstrates that the process was full of promise, its results were mixed. In the referendum held on the Choctaw constitution approved in December of 1974, the Certificate of Results of Election listed 325 for and 237 against, based on a thirty percent quorum for the vote. In addition, the certificate showed the word “rejected” struck out and the word “adopted” added to the document, casting some doubt as to the original statement of results contained therein. Even if the corrections were in fact based on the result of the vote, the ratio of 325 for and 237 against demonstrates the extent to which the formulation of written constitution was a process rife with debate.

In other instances, tribal governance had transformed, it seemed, into outright abuse of the system. The famed case of Tribal Chairman Dick Wilson on Pine Ridge, which eventually led to the Wounded Knee standoff, is but one example among many of the kinds of abuses that tribal leaders could sometimes carry out. In Wilson's case, he was able to carry on with his questionable activities even after the end of the occupation, as James Parsons reported in the Minneapolis Tribune on July 1, 1973. As Parsons pointed out, though the FBI was claiming to investigate, Wilson's misuse of funds, his usurping of the powers of the council, and his nepotism and the actions of his own “goon squad” continued in Pine Ridge long after the occupiers had left. Still, as one Wilson critic pointed out, it was the system that was flawed, even above those who abused it. When interviewed for the story, Bill Janklow, a non-Indian who had spent five years as a legal aide attorney working in South Dakota reservations, explained: “Some idiot white man sat down in Washington and typed a constitution for
every Indian tribe in this country. It doesn't talk about obligations, duties, powers. It doesn't talk about anything.” What Janklow was pointing out was in fact a strident and common critique of the IRA self-government system, wherein there was no significant separation of legislative and executive power: at Pine Ridge, the executive council composed of Dick Wilson, a tribal secretary and the tribal treasurer frequently met on its own. As Parsons aptly pointed out, “[T]he procedure of having an executive board with ill-defined authority is an easy way to sidestep the council. If that happens, the board has almost complete authority over tribal affairs and some 350 jobs.”

In this case, as in many others, the system had evolved in such a way as to make tribal governments, at times, oppressors of their own people. Tribal governments were unaffected by the Bill of Rights as it related to Indigenous people and populations who already felt alienated or even abused by their leaders were not inclined to see new and emerging organizations based on these existing models as particularly helpful to their cause.

In 1974, the National American Indian Court Judges Association outlined four categories of existing tribal governments which included representative, representative/traditional combination, general council and theocracy. Their categories reflected the way in which modern tribal entities were both a reflection of older established governing traditions, as well as a reaction to and an acceptance of some aspects of Anglo-American governing structures. Representative governments were tribes who elected a governing body acting upon the principles set forth in the constitution. Representative/traditional combination entities were those whereby governmental officials were both elected by tribal members while some positions were reserved for traditional leaders, but which still acted based upon a written constitution approved by members. General Council bodies were structures whereby tribe members adopted by-laws governing and controlling tribal officers who enjoyed limited authority beyond that delegated specifically to them. Finally, theocracies were more rare. In this case, both civil leaders and officers were selected by religious leaders. This was the form of government guaranteed the Pueblos by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo but that was not commonly practiced
across the United States. Clearly, the events of the past several decades had deeply influenced the
development of a diverse political community, and so the task facing organizers, at the dawn of the
1960s, was how possibly to bring all of these threads together. And, despite the existence of these
entities, it was clear by the early 1960s that the question of the role of the individual and of the tribe
had not yet been resolved and that organizers would have to grapple with and make a decision on the
issue before being able to proceed.

C. MAINSTREAM ORGANIZING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960 TO 1975

The various articulations of the Native American position within the American state, as well as
the evolution and transformation of Indigenous governance, generated several different organizational
models all purporting to support the goals of Indigenous nationalism. Since its founding in 1944, no
national group had emerged whose reputation would rival that of the National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI). As in Canada, however, the emergence and popularity of mainstream groups suffered
in large part due to the structure that they assumed. The NCAI, as well as the National Tribal
Chairman's Association, an organization that emerged in the 1970s, both reflected the structures of
governance imposed on Indigenous people by the colonial state. And as much as members insisted that
their's was an exercise that blended Indigenous and colonial traditions of governance, the elite status of
their leadership within the Indigenous community as well as in the non-Indigenous world often served
to create animosity rather than unity, thus creating a void that more radical groups were all to eager to
fill.

The NCAI, whose founding and general principles were discussed in the previous chapter, was
an organization that seemed to invoke particular ire among more radical thinkers. A product of the post-
war, its structure was based on tribes rather than on individuals, and membership of the NCAI was contingent upon being a recognized federal tribe. After the Civil War, tribes had been officially federally recognized according to several factors including the presence of treaties, executive orders and presidential proclamations. The 1934 IRA made group recognition a possibility for some previously unrecognized groups. Furthermore, certain states particularly those in the East established an independent process for tribal recognition, thus placing certain groups in the uncertain territory of enjoying state recognition while not being acknowledged to exist by the federal authority. These included several groups from Alabama, as well as from Delaware, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri and others. Though it later made gaining federal recognition for new groups a part of its mandate, the early NCAI was based upon the boundaries of membership erected in large part by the colonial state. As Charles Wilkinson explains of the 1944 founding convention, “Cries went up that the new congress was dominated by the bureau and its membership was both too professional and too Oklahoma.” And, though it could claim to be the largest and most recognized of Indigenous advocacy groups, it represented only a small minority of tribes: 80 delegates from 50 tribes were present at its founding convention, and though the fortunes of the NCAI would ebb and flow and, in its bleakest moment, the NCAI would represent fewer than 20 tribes. In addition to the prohibitions against unrecognized tribes, the NCAI’s structure also served to alienate some, particularly those of the younger generation who envisioned the reinvigoration of Indigenous values through the restoration of traditional governance structures. Its structure included a General Assembly, an Executive Council and several different committees.

By the 1950s, the NCAI had carved out a broad mandate, and its orientation towards issues reflected its belief that the best way to enact change within Indigenous communities was to cultivate good relationships with the federal government. As such, many of the NCAI's pursuits were orientated towards altering legislation, but did not involve any significant restructuring of the structures that more
radical activists insisted kept Indigenous people within a perpetual cycle of self-loathing and poverty. Though it was not always supportive of the federal government – in 1949 for example, the NCAI charged the federal government with employment bias against Indigenous people – it sought to solve problems, rather than undermine the authority under which legislation was created. On July 8, 1954, the NCAI also triumphed in defeating legislation that would have allowed states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indigenous people residing within their borders. Generally though, and despite these successes, critics charged NCAI leadership of being too acculturated and out of touch with the priorities of everyday people and of bowing to the federal government on important issues.

The efficacy of the NCAI's leadership, at times aided the organization and at times, hampered its success and acceptance in the Indigenous community. As Charles Wilkinson reports, the NCAI's membership had declined precipitously in number after the departure of the charismatic Joe Garry and Helen Peterson, who served as President and as Executive Director respectively during the Termination era. After failing to capitalize on the Williams v. Lee opinion delivered in the United States Supreme Court in 1959 where the court maintained that the exercise of state jurisdiction would undermine tribal sovereignty, it was clear that the NCAI needed a new kind of leadership. In 1964, it received a boost when Vine Deloria Jr. was elected executive director of the organization. Under his leadership, the NCAI once again became solvent, and the ranks of its membership swelled from a mere 19 tribes to 156.24

Vine Deloria Jr. was a godsend for the fledgling organization. The product of a decidedly intellectual family that included his father, Vine Deloria Sr., an Episcopalian minister and his aunt, noted anthropologist Ella Deloria, Vine had been educated at the Kent School in Connecticut and had served in the United States Marine Corps. He had attended university at both Iowa State and the Lutheran School of Theology but was unsure of what to do with his life and his talents. A young man in the 1950s and 1960s, Deloria Jr. was “appalled” at the state of Indian advocacy. As he explained,
“What you could see was that the tribes just had to be more aggressive. The government was so terrified by civil rights that if we just threatened to act, we could prevail.”

Despite Deloria's strong words, the outlook and tactical orientation of the NCAI, throughout its existence, was unapologetically moderate; leadership and membership believed that to be a truly effective force in national politics, Indigenous interest groups needed first to establish a firm relationship with those agencies who were responsible for administering relevant federal programs. Even in the case of the Termination hearings where the very existence of Indigenous political entities seemed to be in question, the NCAI offered only a tepid resolution. When questioned, then-president Joe Garry, chairman of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, admitted that the tribes had in fact been properly consulted and that the NCAI had no alternative proposals to offer. In the end, the only objection Garry offered was whether the tribes properly understood the scope and content of the legislation. His critique encapsulated the difficulties of pan-Indigenous organizing. As Helen Peterson, a Lakota who served as executive director under Garry, explained, Termination placed the organization in a difficult position where to respect the sovereignty of individual tribes was, in a sense, to respect their right to opt in to Termination. As she explained, “The NCAI was in a tough spot... Did the NCAI want to oppose termination even when the people involved wanted it? We never really came to a final answer on that question.” It struggled with similar issues during the occupation of Wounded Knee, where then-executive director Charles Trimble expressed a negative reaction to the occupation. As he expressed, while attending an Economic Development conference in Albuquerque the weekend following the start of the occupation, “It seems to be a tribal fight, a fight against the tribe’s sovereignty.” Leon Cook, NCAI president, expressed a similar opinion, arguing that the tactic was “counterproductive. It seems every time we move two steps back. I don’t know what it will solve for the Indian community.” Opinions on the action at the conference were, admittedly, mixed, and though both Cook and Trimble expressed some sympathy for the goals and the demands of AIM, they refused to condone their actions.
As Cook stated, “The difference between AIM and our congress is becoming clear, but we do want the same things.”

Though both Termination in the 1950s, as well as the challenge of radical groups were both difficult issues, they were not the only ones that prompted an increasing tide of critiques of the organization. For some, the problem with the NCAI was its lack of connection to the grassroots. As Dick LaGarde, AIM activist explains of his early exposure to the Indian movement and to existing groups like the NCAI, “We didn't see them as answering to the needs of all Indian people. In fact, we didn't see them answering the needs of hardly any Indian people at that time.”

Suzette Mills added that the officers of the NCAI were often the same people elected to power at home who were simply not vocal enough. As she argues, “I think one of the things that was real for us was that the same people that were on all of the councils weren't saying anything were the same people who were the officers in these organizations.”

In addition to the critiques levelled at the organization, its issues were often compounded by its lack of stable funding. The organization was constantly, it seemed, cash-strapped: in its Bulletin of October 1960, it wrote that NCAI bulletins had not been published throughout 1960 due to “limitations of funds and staff”. It had not been able to print its 1959 convention report due to limited funds. It only received monies for its Indian voting and registration program late in 1960, despite having sought such funding since early January, from the AFL-CIO Non-Partisan Registration Fund. Encouraging its members to send thank you letters to the AFL-CIO Fund, the newsletter argued that `Perhaps this will serve to encourage them to make additional funds available in the future, on a broader basis and earlier in the year.``

Funding shortages continued to plague the organization throughout the 1960s, though it seemed to find new sources. In 1968, the NCAI received $310,000 from the Ford Foundation, which it pledged to use to strengthen its Washington office as well as to develop a field office in Denver, CO, where staff would focus on `small, generally overlooked tribes,` as well as those now federally
recognized including state tribes and those already terminated tribes. As this demonstrates, funding was an ongoing concern for the NCAI, who operated for much of its early life on a grant-by-grant, or year by year basis. The persistent funding issues hampered the organization’s total effectiveness: as Rose Robinson, American Indian BIA employee at the time reports, she had not heard much about the NCAI even in the mid-1960s. Leo Vasu, who led the Congress as executive director in the early 1960s, had invited Robinson to become involved. As she recalls, "(W)hen Leo Vasu came on, there was no money and he asked for our help." Robinson volunteered in the office whenever she could recognizing that the organization, which could most of the time barely afford to pay for its own office space, desperately needed the help.

Overall, the orientation of the NCAI, and of much of its membership, was towards measured discussion and resolution-making. As such, it operated largely within a convention-based structure. As it asserted through both its actions, as well as its direct statements, the NCAI firmly believed, at least in this era, that American Indians should not demonstrate. It also frequently took a stand in the arena of federal politics, backing certain candidates while rejecting others. In 1960, Clarence Wesley, then-president of the NCAI, spoke at the National Conference on Constitutional Rights and American Freedoms in New York City, where he argued that a Democratic administration was what was best of Indigenous people. He argued that the NCAI supported Democratic nominee Robert Kennedy for president, and that it had confidence in Kennedy's ability to tackle the issues facing Indigenous Americans. As he stated, “We also have confidence in the platform of the Democratic Party. American Indians are symbolic of almost all of the problems of our country which the Democratic Party will try to tackle.” Though Wesley insisted that complete absorption of the American Indian into the American mainstream via total “equality,” as understood in the civil rights context, would indeed mean a great loss to the country rather than salvation, he nevertheless maintained that Indigenous Americans should have the freedom to remain so, along with the rights, duties and responsibilities of American
citizenship. The NCAI had in fact spent a great deal of its energy throughout 1959 and 1960 following up on the theme of its 1959 conference which stressed the importance of Indigenous political participation in mainstream politics. The idea of “Indian planks” within policy platforms were presented to both the Democratic and Republican parties at their annual conventions, and its information letter of October 1960 reassured members that “At all times, effort has been made to approach both political parties equally, and to cooperate by attendance at meetings.”

Towards the late 1960s, the NCAI’s fortunes had once again began to turn as the organization now faced a new challenge- a potential rival organization – who seemed to be currying favor among government officials and perhaps within the Indigenous community itself. Chuck Trimble, elected executive director of the NCAI during this period, reports that at its 1971 conference, it was clear that “the organization was in terrible disarray.” According to Trimble, as well as to other sources, there was a plan underway for the organization to take a more active role in representing urban Indigenous people, as well as in representing non-recognized tribes within the NCAI. The plans, which had been drawn up by Vine Deloria Jr., had been circulated among some members with plans to hand them out at the 1971 Reno conference. It signified major changes to both the constitution and to the structure of the NCAI, and for some, the proposed new orientation was a true threat, though it did reflect what the organization had largely become throughout the 1960s.

The new group that emerged in response to the proposal and the NCAI’s reorientation was called the National Tribal Chairman's Association, or NTCA. The NTCA had the support of Commissioner Louie Bruce as well as several other key figures in federal departments, including within the National Council on Indian Opportunity. The NCIO, established in 1968 by Executive Order, was tasked with encouraging the full use of Federal Indian programs to benefit the Indigenous population and encouraging inter-agency cooperation in federal Indian programs. It was also tasked with appraising federal programs offered to Indigenous people in cities and on reservations, and with
suggesting improvement to such programs where needed. As Robert Robertson, an NCIO official at the time, reports, the idea of the NTCA was embraced by BIA area directors who felt that the NTCA would be a way to create a “really sophisticated, educated tribal council situation on the reservations.” According to Robertson, the NTCA was partially a reaction to a growing demand for services by urban, non-reservation people who the NTCA membership saw as a threat to its appropriations base. Increasingly, non-reservation Indigenous people were employed within the BIA, and saw non-reservation demands on federal funds earmarked for reservation programs were perceived as a threat.

Robert Robertson explains that the NCTA was a potentially powerful force: “[I]t was an aggregation of respected tribal leaders who, if they got their act together, could accomplish big things in a lobbying sense now with the specific parts of the Congress and the administration.” Speaking at the Tribal Chairmen’s Conference in 1971, Commissioner Robert Bennett said as much: “It has always been my hope that in addition to an Indian organization like the National Congress of American Indians, which would be an Indian membership organization, there should be a National Association of Tribal Chairman. A unified position by such an organization would have more impact than all of the loud mouths going about the country trying to curse their way into positions of Indian leadership.”

Robertson maintains that the NTCA enjoyed legitimacy because it was composed of tribal chairpeople who had power at home and within their own states, particularly in Oklahoma. For the NCAI, the NTCA was perceived largely as a threat to its own mandate though it had, by this time, become much more strongly oriented to the urban Indian environment. According to Chuck Trimble, the NCAI was also, by this time, persona non gratta within the powerful NCIO secretariat. As he reported, “NCIO didn't want NCAI in the picture, I think, at the time.... [In the White House,] they had their mind pretty well fixed at the time on NTCA.” In addition, the NCAI was, by the early 1970s, largely discredited “as an establishment organization or as a hang-around-the-fort Indians organization. It was in financial trouble..... And NCAI was really trying not to be thrown out of its offices.”
A press release by the Indian Press Association in February of 1971 chronicled the emergence of the NTCA at the Reservation Tribal Chairmen's Conference held in Billings, Montana, attended by leaders of over thirty tribes representing fourteen different states. As the release stated, “Although no direct attacks were made against the NCAI, many delegates argued that, without substantial change, the National Congress did not fully serve the needs of reservation Indian people. Many of these delegates assured the assembly that a separate organization of tribal chairmen would serve to complement the NCAI, however.” These representatives also suggested that forming another organization immediately would divert necessary tribal support from the NCAI and therefore ensure its demise. William Youpee, Chairman of the Fort Peck Reservation where the conference was being hosted, argued that Indian leaders wanted the decision-making ability to remain at the reservation level. As he argued, “We want to talk about the Indian problems in Indian country. We do not want Indian programs evolving out of meetings held in Washington, D.C., by people who have been away from the reservations for years and who think they know what is good for Indians.”

The appropriation of federal funding also served to deepen the wedge between the NCAI and the emerging NTCA. As Robert Robertson explains, he encouraged the disbursement of some monies to the newly-formed NTCA because “Every other legitimate Indian organization was getting money out of the BIA and some other locations within government...I had no idea that what was going to happen was that it was going to be taken away from Peter to pay Paul.” Robertson maintains that the decision was made by BIA area directors who may also have felt that the best way to maintain control over the leadership of this new group was to play a role in its formation and maintenance, particularly on a financial level. Regardless of the motivations, the diversion of monies intended for the NCAI to the NTCA helped to exacerbate the division between the two groups.

Though the NTCA did become an important force in many ways, it never fully realized the potential that so many saw in it. Robertson argues that the NTCA never got off the ground because its
leadership was composed of tribal leaders who were largely successful in their own areas and who were working hard there and who were therefore unable to pour all of their talents into this nascent organization. Leaders who were very successful for their own tribes didn’t accomplish what they did “by becoming a missionary for other reservations around the country.”

As with the NCAI, the NTCA was a largely conservative organization firmly invested of the structure of Indian politics as they were. It was reportedly hostile to women at the time, as Ramona Bennett has reported of her experience within the group. Their conservatism extended in a tactical sense as well: as an organization, the NTCA was firmly set against the kinds of public demonstrations of the early 1970s, included the Trail of Broken Treaties and the occupation of Wounded Knee. As Robertson maintains, NTCA members were against many of the events of the time “for obvious reasons... They saw it as a direct threat to their appropriations and everything else, and to the stirring unrest among the reservations, and there certainly was a lot of that.” Young people in particular, were creating problems for the established leadership: “[T]hey had tasted, if you will, constitutional rights, democracy. They observed it in action on the outside and got home and didn’t see it there.” Tribal leaders often spoke out against emerging organizations like the American Indian Movement: Dick Wilson maintained that AIM was illegitimate because it did not represent any elected tribal leaders: “They’re a bunch of renegade opportunists looking out for their own skins, who don’t care much about the rest of their people.” Wilson was not alone: Bruce Townsend, president of the powerful Oklahoma Tribal Council, challenged the activists to seek change within established channels: “If the militants feel tribal leaders aren't properly representing them, they should run against them for office.”

Both the NCAI and the NTCA represented a particular brand of organization within the spectrum of 1960s and 1970s Indigenous activism and nationalism. These were not radical groups; both leadership and membership were, in both cases, drawn from the ranks of local elites who nevertheless had a vested interest in the structure of politics as they were. As such, both the NCAI and the NTCA,
provided a great deal of fodder for new and more radical groups who claimed that neither was particularly representative of true Indigenous concerns in a way that could make a difference in Indigenous lives and within Native American communities. In many ways, the development and structure of organizations like the NCAI and the NTCA mirrored those present and emerging in a Canadian context during this time, but within a slightly different cultural and political context than in the United States.

D. 'COMPELLED TO CONFORM': THE CANADIAN CONTEXT

In Canada, the discussion of the relationship of Aboriginal people to the Canadian state also had important dimensions for organizations seeking to realize broadly-based policy changes during this period. In Canada it was the Indian Act which broadly governed the relationships of Indigenous people, as well as their band governments, to the state. While some organizations and the National Indian Council in particular attempted, in the early 1960s, to move beyond this model, the stark realities of dealing with the Canadian state would, in the latter part of the decade, force the movement to divide between organizations representing status Indigenous people and non-status or Metis. Treaties, as discussed at length in chapter 1, formed one prong of this equation. Treaties had been negotiated in succession in the late nineteenth century with Aboriginal groups in various parts of the country, though not evenly. In the prairies, treaties had been an important tool of settlement while in other provinces, most notably large parts of Ontario, in the Maritimes and Quebec, no treaties had been negotiated at all. Still, for those who had treated with the state, they represented an important and enduring commitment. For many Aboriginal activists in the 1960s, these treaties remained the “Indian Magna Carta.” Indeed, in 1876, Lord Earl of Dufferin, Governor General of Canada, had summarized the position of the Crown as follows: “No government whether provincial or central has failed to acknowledge that the original title to the land existed in the Indian tribes and communities which have hunted... and before
we touch an acre we make a treaty ... with the chiefs representing the band.” According to George Manuel, this was the last positive statement of the British government in terms of Aboriginal rights. As he admitted, “Since then, policies have substantially changed.”

The foundational policy of the government, however, had changed only in increments and not in form or in function. The Indian Act, assented to on the 12th of April 1876, was at once a consolidation of previous acts regarding Indigenous people within Canada as well as a comprehensive piece of legislation that would come to control most aspects of the Aboriginal lives. First and foremost, it defined an “Indian” as “any male person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular band,” “any child of such person”, and “any woman who is or was lawfully married to such person.” Illegitimate children, those who had resided in a foreign country for more than five years, women who had married non-Indians according to the definition of the Act, and Metis who had accepted scrip were not accorded status as Indian people. In addition, the act defined a band as “any tribe, band or body of Indians who own or are interested in a reserve or in Indian lands in common, of which the legal title is vested in the Crown...” and an “irregular band” as “any tribe, band or body of persons of Indian blood who own no interest in any reserve or land of which the legal title is vested in the Crown,” The Act also vested the Superintendent General to authorize surveys and reports on the land, as well as could authorize that the reserve be subdivided into lots. In addition, it allowed the government to sell timber licences on the lands and set rules for governance by band councils.

Band councils were established by the Indian Act and elected by those entitled to vote, male members of the band who were at least 21 years of age. Women were finally allowed to vote and to stand for office only in 1951. Furthermore, according to the 1876 act, chiefs were to be elected every three years “unless deposed by the Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, immorality, or incompetency.” Obviously, the Act granted agents a great deal of power over the political process and
encouraged those who would support the government more generally to remain in power. Councils were entitled to create rules and regulations that were nevertheless subject to the confirmation of the Governor in Council in areas of public health, order and decorum in council, “the repression of intemperance and profligacy,” the trespass of cattle, road and general maintenance, the repair and maintenance of public buildings and other relatively minor matters. The Act forbade Aboriginal people convicted of crimes from receiving any payments or moneys from band accounts as well as forbade the presence of liquor on reserves. In 1880, the Act was amended to allow the Governor in Council to make regulations prohibiting or regulating the sale of produce by Indigenous people, as well as to prohibit the cutting of trees.\textsuperscript{52}

The Indian Act regulated nearly every aspect of Indigenous life; economy, social life and even religion were influenced by its provisions. Governance, imposed on a European model by the colonizing state, had replaced Indigenous models of decision-making and in some cases, lent itself to abuse and corruption. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 which granted Canada a certain measure of constitutional autonomy did little to help First Nations along in the negotiating process and a 1927 amendment to the Indian Act made the situation even more restrictive: it banned all soliciting of funds to press claims against government whether by Indigenous or non-Indigenous people and was a key prong of the often over-zealous Duncan Campbell Scott to suppress Indigenous organizing. Then, in 1947 and within the context of post-war citizenship and integration, a plan for “liquidating the Indian problem within 25 years” was presented to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Indian Affairs by the Hawthorne-Belshaw report. The plan proposed to “abolish gradually but rapidly the separate political and cultural status of the Indians and Eskimos.” In practical terms, this meant enfranchising them and placing them on “equal footing” with the rest of the Canadian public. The realization of such a plan would mean an improvement, researchers insisted, to the Aboriginal social and economic position that had worked “as to create leper spots in many parts of the country” in the form of Aboriginal reserves as
well as abolish a drain on the federal treasury that amounted to millions of dollars annually.\textsuperscript{53}

The Indian Act was revised in 1951 to reflect a grudging acceptance of some practices previously outlawed by the Act, including potlatch ceremonies and pow-wows. It also allowed for the possession and consumption of alcohol on reserves with certain conditions. Then, in 1960, non-enfranchised Aboriginal people were granted the right to vote in federal elections. Meanwhile, some new court cases also prompted a reconsideration and a reflection on government policy by new and emerging organizations. In 1969, Joseph Drybones had been arrested for drunkenness in a Yellowknife hotel lobby. While the 1951 revisions to the Indian Act allowed for the consumption of alcohol, it did so only on the reserve. Since the Northwest Territories had no reserves delineated at the time, Drybones was found to be in violation of the law. The case made it to the Supreme Court of Canada where the justices decided that the police had in fact discriminated against Drybones on the basis of race when they charged him with drunkenness. The case had the effect of largely invalidating or making unenforceable the offending provision of the Act.

Then, in 1973, the Calder judgement was delivered. The case did not net Aboriginal people what they wanted, but represented a key moment in redefining the parameters of the federal-Indigenous relationship. Frank Calder, acting on behalf of himself and the Nishga Tribal Council, had sued the federal government arguing the Aboriginal title to a vast tract of British Columbia land had never been surrendered. In a split judgement, three justices with another consenting had confirmed the decision in the St. Catharine's Milling case of the late nineteenth century which stated that Aboriginal people had the right only to occupy and use the land on an individual basis at the pleasure of the Crown. The Court remained split as to whether the Nisga'a claim to the lands was valid; while three judges rules that the claim had been extinguished, three dissenting judges affirmed their title while the seventh judge dismissed the case on a technicality. Despite this judgement, however, the Court's opinion prompted a major reconsideration by the federal government of its policy on settling Aboriginal claims because it
stated for the first time in Canadian jurisprudence that Aboriginal title existed, and that it might still exist, unextinguished, in Nisga'a lands and by extension, in the lands of other Indigenous nations in Canada.

Such was the legislative climate that organizations faced during this period. Years of inorganic structures of governance imposed in unwilling communities had in many cases lent itself to abuse. At the very least, comments made by various leaders and band members indicated the extent to which there was a disconnection between those in positions of leadership and those simply living within communities. As one interviewee noted, those in charge seemed far removed from her own situation on the reserve and she was not aware of the kind of work they were doing, if they were doing any at all. While they attended meetings, representatives often failed to communicate with the larger reserve community, lending credence to the idea that they were somehow separated and removed.

In addition, the limited authority of band councils was well recognized by the leadership. As George Manuel admitted, “We have band councils... but they haven’t got the authority to provide the kind of services all their band members require so they can become economically independent, so they can become semi-politically independent.” While he acknowledged that the Department of Indian Affairs was at fault in its administration, he maintained that Aboriginal people were “still governed by policy,... by regulations... You can blame Indian Affairs all you want, but it's still the policy of government as a whole that we have to live with.” Thus, it was not enough to change leaders or elect new members; laws and regulations must change to develop self-reliant communities. 54 At the same time, many, including Manuel, were jealously protective of the Indian Act. Though a flawed piece of legislation, it was, for many, the only safeguard against outright Termination from a government who had long proven itself as incapable or unwilling to fulfil even in part the aspirations of its First citizens. As such, for mainstream organizations emerging out of this context, including Manuel's own, the amendment of the Indian Act, or else the protection of it until a better solution could be found, became
an important feature of organizational politics during this time.

E. THE CHALLENGE OF ORGANIZING LEGAL AND 'ILLEGAL' INDIANS

Part of the challenge of the Indian Act had always been its legislation, on an individual basis, of who was and was not considered an Indian. Yet, within the early 1960s, a new pan-Indigenous organization aimed to move beyond its strict codes and definitions to support all Indigenous people in Canada more generally. Though its efforts were relatively short-lived, the growth and subsequent demise of the National Indian Council demonstrated to potential organizers the important limitations of organizing Indigenous people more broadly regardless of legal definition, in this country.

The first truly national pan-Indigenous organization in Canada emerged with the formation of the National Indian Council, born in 1961 to represent all Indigenous people, both status and non as well as Metis. Established in August at Saskatchewan House in Regina, its stated purpose was “to promote unity among Indian people, the betterment of people of Indian ancestry in Canada, and to create a better understanding of [the] Indian and non-Indian relationship.” Comparatively little has been written about the NIC, and most scholars have characterized the organization as a precursor to the important political activities of the National Indian Brotherhood founded later in the decade. In fact, J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins argue that the NIC's activities focused primarily on cultural promotion, such as planning the Indian Pavilion at the 1967 Montreal Expo, promoting Indian Princess Pageants and Aboriginal art exhibitions, and organizing exchange visits between between eastern and western Aboriginal youth. Nevertheless, the NIC was a deeply political and, at times, deeply troubled organization whose attempt to unite Indigenous people from coast to coast provided much of the blueprint for later organizations, as well as cautioned would-be leaders as to important consideration in
the formation and in the administration of a complex pan-Indigenous association.

The NIC was also built upon the conference model, and engaged annually in the discussion of topics of importance for Indigenous people in Canada. Its arrival was heralded, by some, as a new kind of innovation in Indigenous politics. As the New York Times reported on August 20, 1963, “The fact that there is a national Indian organization and that it has held three annual conferences is a reflection of the change and ferment among Canadian Indians. Until recently there was no Indian community in Canada.” While the article had perhaps over-dramatized the lack of communication between communities who had since vastly increased their networks, it did successfully assert the way in which the NIC was a particularly innovative and new idea, one that proposed to go beyond the confines of legal definition to promote real unity. The article continued on to argue that a sense of identity and purpose were emerging, mostly from Ontario Mohawks and British Columbian bands whose history of organizing, as highlighted in earlier chapters, had set the stage for the emergence of an organization like the NIC. 57

While the article overemphasized the newness of identity among Canada's Indigenous people, it did aptly point out the way in which the NIC represented a new concept wherein scattered groups with little or no previous association would now join to demand retribution from the government in a way that had the potential to be much more effective than attempts on a local or regional level. Still, though intended to represent all First Nations people, its membership remained primarily nonstatus Indians. Because of this, most of its efforts focused on Aboriginal versus treaty rights, as the Metis and nonstatus people who participated in its activities had no stake in the treaties, not ever having signed one. In addition, its membership was heavily middle class and urban, lending to its near-invisibility on many Canadian reserves and its perceived unrepresentativeness of reserve people. Its approach was less militant than many would have liked, and it suffered because of this. As Edward Lavallee recalled, “[Y]ou were invited to the council. You had to pay membership then.” 58 The election of executives was
conducted at the Council's annual meetings which were, for some, simply too expensive to attend.

Because it emerged before the 1969 White Paper, the NIC defined its mandate more generally, as an organization for Indigenous rights. As such it was often involved in what J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins call cultural politics. At the same time, its actions also clearly highlight the way in which the NIC was profoundly political, struggling to determine the best and most effective way to represent such a vast constituency and effect real and significant change. In the arena of cultural politics, some of the NIC's projects included attempting to control or at least have input into the Indian Pavillion at Expo 67 albeit with limited effectiveness. Though it attempted on several occasions to convince the government to let it plan the centennial celebrations and the high-profile pavilion featuring Indigenous people on its own, its attempts were consistently rebuked. In the end, the government established, without consultation, a nine-member Indian Advisory Committee which operated in addition to its own Expo Task Force, an internal committee of department officials. Its control of the planning process was also bolstered, Myra Rutherford and Jim Miller argue, by deep-seated internal problems within the NIC which took its attention away from the Expo process.59

The reports of annual meetings provide ample information as to the composition and focus of the early National Indian Council. It the report of proceedings for the third annual conference, held at Assiniboia School in Winnipeg from August 14th to the 16th, 1963, many presenters stressed the theme of unity. Chief William Wuttunee, President, spoke about his hope that the Conference, and the work of the NIC, “would result in unity and brotherhood for all Indians across Canada.” He rejected outright the notion of tribalism, emphasizing that the Council would not stress tribal difference, regardless of the issue. Jean Cuthand, Executive Director of the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg, also stressed the importance of putting aside localized difference, “keeping in mind that this was a national group for all Indians.”60 The executive also emphasized the need for the NIC to branch out and to strengthen itself by ensuring that it was perceived as a national organization. One suggestion involved
continuing to move the annual conference from western to eastern Canada, then back again, to ensure that the theme of unity was one expressed in the organization's practice and not only in its rhetoric.

The conferenciers also discussed the role of the NIC, continuing to define and to refine its mandate. In his presentation, Wuttunee expressed the main purposes of the NIC being to promote Indigenous culture, to unite people of Aboriginal descent, to liaise with existing Indigenous groups as well as “To stand on our own two feet and not to be dependent.” On this point, Wuttunee was emphatic. As he discussed the role of non-Indigenous support groups, Wuttunee stressed that “The philosophy of the National Indian Council of Canada was that no pressures should be allowed... He said that he thought it reasonable that Indians should want an organization of their own, confined to Indian membership.”  

Participants also engaged in a discussion of how far the organization should go in attempting to retain its 'independence.' The discussion revealed the very real concerns that many had with attempting to completely eject non-Indigenous members. Wuttunee proposed amending the constitution, which had denied delegate status and voting privilege to any person employed by the federal or provincial governments, to provide Associate membership to retain the interest of government employees. In addition, Wuttunee also proposed opening up Associate membership “to people who are or have been married to people of Indian descent.”  

In addition to these items, Wuttunee’s report exposed the diversity of the roles that the NIC hoped to fulfil. He reported his attendance at several regional conferences in Alberta and in British Columbia, as well as expressed his wish for the establishment of a travelling Indian Art Exhibition. On a more political side, Wuttunee defended the need for an Indian Claims Commission, as well as defended the Department of Indian Affairs’ Community Development Program. He also insisted that “insulting plaques” be removed from historical landmarks and “that history is no longer distorted in regard to the Indian.”  

Overall, the discussions reflected an ongoing discussion on what the actual role of the Council should be, a question without resolution in the short lifetime of the NIC.
The open discussion period reported for the same conference was also revealing, indicating the critiques that the NIC faced internally. Some participants deplored the lack of communication, something that Wuttunee declared was regrettable but that was a result of unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances, including shifting membership on the Council and relocation of several members. Delegate Isaac Beaulieu argued that the organization should work harder to build and strengthen the provincial-territorial organizations. As he stated, “A house does not grow from the roof down.” He further argued that the basis of unity must begin with the community, then the province, and then and only then, on a national level. Finally, some contributors noted the enduring presence of non-Indigenous people which included several non-Indigenous observers, a priest from Assiniboia Residential School, several Community Development Officers and members of the non-Indigenous press, as well as the notable absence of many chiefs at the conference. While the concerns were noted briefly in the report, they were indicative of the sorts of constant pressures that the NIC faced within its membership and within its leadership structure.

The same conference also featured an extended discussion panel on the question of “Indians and Civil Rights in Canada.” Wuttunee opened the panel by defining civil rights in Canada as “those rights which all free persons are entitled to in common with all men in all spheres of our national life.” He also urged panellists to consider the question of civil rights within a broader, North American framework, to wit many rejected any kind of grouping or comparison with African Americans. As Clive Linklater argued, though the problems of illiteracy and poverty were common among both groups, the comparison itself was otherwise invalid. As he stated, “The Indians were here; they were not brought here. They have not been slaves.” Wilfred Bellegarde concurred, arguing that “The Negro was imported, but the Indians belong here, this is their home.”

In addition to its engagement in broader rights rhetoric, the third conference of the National Indian Council also featured some discussion about financial security, prompted in part by a
presentation by Ralph Staples, President of the Co-operative Union of Canada, which aimed to help “farmers and fishermen to help themselves.” Though the project intrigued many participants, they cited the very real restrictions on their land and resource use imposed by the federal government: Harry Bird, for example, recalled an attempt to start a community farm in his home reserve, a project that the federal government had been against. The farm had therefore failed, and he worried about the legal problems that might result from the foundation of any new kind of cooperative.  

The keynote speaker for the conference was Guy Favreau, then-Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. In his address, Favreau extolled the virtues of integration while celebrating the retention of an Indigenous cultural heritage. For Favreau, as for many Indian Affairs administrators during this period, Indigeneity had its place, but it should not negate necessary integration. As he stated, “It is most gratifying that an increasing number of Indians, particularly in recent years, have succeeded through their determination and perseverance, [...] in adapting themselves to a new life which holds the promise of a bright future.” He also celebrated the work of the Council but argued that a true national council or federation “ought to consist of all the Indian associations and brotherhoods throughout the country... It is now up to all Indian leaders to accept the challenge to bring about this highly desirable unity as soon as possible if the dialogue between the Indians, the various levels of government and the public is to be fully effective.” Though Favreau’s words were undoubtedly encouraging to the organizers who had worked so hard to make the National Indian Council gain legitimacy and thus, standing, amongst government officials, they were also indicative of a governmental agenda to dissuade would-be dissenters by legitimizing a single organization as the decisive voice of Aboriginal people in Canada. Though the problems inherent in this solution would become clear in a few short years, the philosophy that motivated this speech did not change, and the National Indian Brotherhood formed in the ashes of the NIC to represent legally defined “Indians” in Canada would take up this mantle itself.

A key obstacle facing the National Indian Council remained financial in nature. It was clear by
both its words and its actions that the NIC was struggling financially: when asked by participants if they would be either partially or fully reimbursed for the cost of attending the conference, Chief Wuttunee explained that the organization simply did not have the finances to assist attendees in this manner. The question of financing placed organizers in a difficult position: while funding was necessary and desirable, many, including Chief Wuttunee, worried that accepting large government grants would compromise the independence of the organization. On this point, attendees disagreed: while Wuttunee argued that “there were always strings attached to money and that any monies the National Indian Council accepted must be without strings,” Chief Alfred Cook argued that the White man should indeed be helping Indigenous people in their organizing efforts. Wuttunee insisted that the Council should devote a committee of people to the purpose of raising funds, but that such funds should be solicited from “prominent people” within each province or territory. Wuttunee also proposed raising money through the sale of NIC pins. During the discussion period, others suggested approaching service clubs, big oil companies, and even Indigenous people themselves who might be convinced to donate a small percentage of their treaty money to the cause. In addition, other activities such Indigenous dance performances and bingo fundraisers were also proposed. In the era before the core funding policy had been completed, organizations like the NIC struggled to stay afloat financially and were therefore caught in the difficult situation of having to solicit money from non-Indigenous groups or individuals, all while insisting that they retain their independence.

Despite the debates involving various issues presented at the conference, the NIC, in 1963, was relatively united. This would not be the case in 1964, when a feud between President William Wuttunee and 1963 Indian Princess Kahn Tineta-Horn threatened the conference and drew vital attention away from the work of the organization and towards their internal problems. The 1964 conference, held on the Garden River Reserve in Ontario, began routinely enough. Early discussions included the role the NIC should play in calling the public's attention to problems on individual reserves and some minor
constitutional review items including a proposal to replace the wording “Indians, Metis and Eskimos” by “People of Indian ancestry” wherever such wording occurred in the constitution. Pursuant to its membership discussion from the previous year, it was also decided that the NIC would offer three types of membership: individual Indigenous people over the age of 17 were to pay $1 in dues, while Native organizations and interested non-Indigenous organizations, such as the Indian-Eskimo Association profiled in the previous chapter, were to pay $25 for membership. Native organizations would be associate members which, it was proposed, would be granted two votes, while non-Indigenous organizations affiliated with the NIC would not have the right to vote.

Any real progress was halted, however, with the eruption of the bitter and public feud between Wuttunee and Kahn Tineta-Horn, a Mohawk activist and fashion model who had been stripped of her title of Indian Princess in 1964 after she began criticizing the governing council of the NIC as well as the presidency of Wuttunee himself. At the meeting, Horn had stood amid catcalls and jeers declaring the executive of the NIC to be composed of "cowards, liars and non-Indians, which is the worst insult I can give them." She insisted that "Wuttunee and his non-Indian stooges control this organization and deliver Indian lands." As Myra Rutherdale and Jim Miller argue, “The differences were both ideological and personal in nature: Horn, an assertive Mohawk sovereigntist, and Wuttunee, a lawyer inclined to be accommodating to the government, could not have been more different in their approach. In addition, the two clearly did not like each other.” At the 1964 conference, Horn advanced “A Proposal for the Native People of Canada, 1964-1999,” in which she proposed a new agenda for the National Indian Council based on creating a “great Native movement for welfare.” She proposed the establishment of a new corporation to receive all Indigenous, Eskimo and Metis funds for Native use, as well as a Native conference to be held every three years to include all organizations, but not individuals. She also proposed a Chiefs Assembly to deal with “Indian real estate claims, not the council, which has no persons experienced in this matter,” as well as a new Indian Council which
would not include Metis or Eskimo people. It was intended as a more effective NIC. As she admitted, “The Constitution would be strong, clear, with complete change in the present set up which is conflicting.” She presented attendees with a choice: “Are we to move ahead with power and strength, knowing where we are going and what we are doing, or are we to flounder in confusion with only a few persons controlling everything and doing the work they choose?” Horn alleged that the NIC had become dominated by Wuttunee and a few hand-picked executives and that it had lost its legitimacy and representativeness among Indigenous people. While Horn's comments were undoubtedly partially motivated by her personal dislike for Wuttunee and her loss of the Indian Princess title, her critique also articulated what many had stated, in much milder terms, on other occasions.

In addition to her proposal, Horn also rose on a point of order, arguing that “in view of the apparent illegal activities being carried on, and other serious aspects of our Council activities, I do hereby move that the present Constitution be rejected, cancelled and suspended and a new constitution be accepted.” She then proceeded to offer a point by point rejection of each article of the NIC's constitution. On the aims of the organization set forth in its constitution “To serve nationally all existing Indian organizations whose object is advancement of their people,” Horn alleged that it had provided very little service to other organizations and had, therefore, failed. She argued that the NIC's goal of promoting the culture of Indigenous people was “relatively unimportant compared with promoting the welfare of Indian people which is opposite to culture and much more important.” She accused the NIC of doing little for either the Eskimo or for the Metis, of mismanaging funds, and of putting forth policy statements that had not been discussed within the Annual National Conference. She put forth her own Constitution for a new Indian Council of Canada which proposed to obtain a charter as a non-profit Foundation who worked towards the “protection of all Indian rights through full enforcement of past and present laws, encouragement of favourable future legislation, improvement of Indian welfare, [...] to increase communication and cooperation between all Indians in Canada and
elsewhere in North and South America.” As she concluded, she argued that the purpose of the new Constitution was “to create and maintain a balance of influence over Indian matters between the treaty and non-treaty Indians; to establish a basis of cooperation with organizations and government, other native peoples of Canada, to describe the exact objective and machinery for an effective program for all Indians to follow for many years to come.”

While Horn may have been articulating in stark terms some general ideas held by critical members of the NIC, her presence at the 1964 conference, and her submissions, were not well-received. In attempting to speak, Horn was insulted and yelled at, before finally being removed from the meeting altogether. In the mid 1960s, Horn became an even greater threat to the organization, prompting an investigation into the NIC’s spending of government grants which had been offered by both the Department of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of State. As Edward Lavellee, an active organizer at the provincial and national levels during the 1960s reported, “The executive director for the organization and the council were just learning how to proper spend these kind of monies. And certainly, at that time, they may have been misspending small amount of money.” Lavallee insisted, however, that this was due to carelessness, and not corruption as Horn had often charged.

While the money question was in part an issue of inexperience, it also had a great deal to do with the leadership. As with later organizations, the composition and the embodiment of the leadership of the NIC did much to position it within the activist spectrum. For much of its effective organizational life, the NIC’s leadership largely reflected the characteristics of a middle-class and relatively privileged orientation: William Wuttunee was a non-status Aboriginal of mixed Cree ancestry from the Red Pheasant reserve in Saskatchewan who studied philosophy at McGill before becoming a lawyer. Wuttunee was also a founder of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, a powerful provincial organization noted by the Department of Indian Affairs, in the 1970s, as being highly influential within the future NIB. Leaders like Wuttunee were necessary; as he reported in an interview conducted in the
late 1970s, travel was extensive and expensive and was usually conducted as one's own expense. Despite his impressive education, Wuttunee was, at least in the beginning, no assimilationist. As Ponting and Gibbins argue, “in his early career Wuttunee was a staunch Indian nationalist who advocated the establishment of a separate Indian state.”\textsuperscript{79} By 1972, however, Wuttunee had begun espousing a new philosophy, as expressed in his book \textit{Ruffled Feathers}, which proposed an ideology promoting assimilation and rejecting special status. Wuttunee was eventually banned from thirteen separate Saskatchewan reserves including his own due to its rejection of the treaties and his self-described “get off your butt and stop complaining” philosophy. As he wrote, “So long as the treaties are held in solemn reverence and so long as Indians continue to lick their wounds in the memories of the past, Canada will have the problem of a people unable to stand on their feet in a new society.”\textsuperscript{80} He viewed the treaties as acts of humility and supplication on the part of Indian people rather than what many Indigenous activists insisted they were: documents negotiated between nations whose promises had not been kept. Wuttunee advocated abandoning the treaties altogether in order to build a new, and successful, future, a view that was out of touch with the current of pan-Indianism sweeping across North America during this period.

Though it recovered from the challenge by Horn, by 1968, it became clear that the NIC could not effectively represent all Indigenous people in Canada. Its pursuit of a pan-Indigenous agenda was complicated by the very real boundaries erected by the status provisions in the Indian act since Status Aboriginal people fell under federal jurisdiction, while Metis and non-status were under provincial jurisdiction. In sum, they were simply not bound or governed by the same rules; organizing in a unified sense, therefore, was complicated by the very real legal boundaries of the state. As the recollections of its own members demonstrate, the choice to split was highly strategic. As Walter Dieter reported in an interview in 1977, the Metis realized that as long as Indigenous people advocated as one large group, no one would receive funding from the federal government. Dieter went even further, explaining that
the federal government used funding as a wedge to divide the people, but that the worst wedge was
driven by the people themselves. As he recalled, “We had a meeting, a real emotional meeting... the
government made it plain that they weren't going to give us money as long as we were with the
Metis.” In addition, the aforementioned division between those seeking Aboriginal rights and those
seeking treaty rights was yet another consideration. As a result, the NIC, in 1968, dissolved to be
reborn in two separate organizations, the National Indian |Brotherhood representing status Indian
people and the Canadian Metis Society for non-status and Metis. The Canadian Metis Society became
the Native Council of Canada two years later.

F. THE INDIAN-ESKIMO ASSOCIATION: ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRID

The NIC, as an Indigenous organization, took root around the same time as another important
group. Though not in the same category as the NIC due to its mixed membership, the Indian-Eskimo
Association nevertheless provided an example that would be important in the formation of new
mandates and priorities. It also inspired the development of new organizations whose priority areas
very much came to resemble its own. The IEA traced its origins to the Canadian Association for Adult
Education (CAAE) which had appointed a committee to examine the problems of Aboriginal people
living off the reserve. In 1960, the National Commission on the Indian Canadian, as it became known,
withdrew from CAAE and was incorporated as the Indian-Eskimo Association with a broad mandate to
serve all people of native origin either on or off the reserve, as well as northern Aboriginal peoples.
Headquartered in Toronto, the IEA was a national citizen's organization whose membership was 25%
Aboriginal and which included Aboriginal people on its Board of Directors. Though it asserted itself a
national organization, however, the large bulk of its membership was from Ontario, and in particular,
The Association held annual conferences and hosted workshops intended to discuss the problems of Indigenous housing, as well as community and economic development. It was both a fundraising and a lobbying agency that included a large number of women working alongside men.

Despite its inclusiveness, the members of the IEA were of a certain demographic, and the IEA celebrated Indigenous people who were perceived to have “made it” in some way. Its bulletin titled Canadian Indians and Eskimos of Today, featured, among other things, profiles of prominent Indigenous people. It explained that the purpose of the bulletin was “to introduce the many Indians and Eskimos who have made important contributions to Canadian life and culture.” The illustration of the bulletin, which features a quarter moon set against a striped, vertical background, “stands for the great Indian and Eskimo culture built up over many years... But that is only the beginning. The rest of the symbol suggests the great future ahead for the Indian and Eskimo when, along with all the other citizens of Canada, they can develop their full potential.” In sum, the Bulletin conveyed an ideal of acculturation; a tempering of the more “savage” trappings of Indianess in favour of integration into non-Indigenous society and life.

In September 1966, the IEA's Bulletin featured Rev. Ahab Spence, “The first Indian in Canada to receive the honorary degree of doctor of laws.” A Cree from Manitoba, Spence had served as both an Anglican priest and a teacher and was, at the time, on staff as a member of the Indian Affairs Branch. It celebrated his achievement both as an outstanding Indigenous person, as well as within the white community. As the Bishop of Keewatin, reported, while Spence had initially been hesitant as to how he might be received as rector in a non-Indigenous community, “Mr.Spence’s attractive personality” ensured that “Wherever he has gone, Dr. Spence has won the admiration and friendship of the white community round about him.”

Spence was active in the IEA as Chairman of its Fourth Annual Conference, and then-Executive Director Ernest McEwan noted that “His greatest strength lies in the fact that he has been successful in making the transfer from reserve life to the larger society. He
thoroughly understands the kind of adjustments that have to be made, and the feelings and tensions that these adjustments generate.”

Thus, while Spence was admired for his “Indianess”, he was also set apart from it as an exceptional man who had spent a great deal of his educational and professional life apart from Indigenous people, cultivating the desired friendship and respect of non-Indigenous Canadians.

The portrait of Spence depicted by the statements about him in the Bulletin also prized Indigenous initiative. Though Spence had been aided in his career by a combination of knowing the right people and good luck, he was simultaneously portrayed as a self-made man, a concept that also formed an important column upon which the actions and rhetoric of the IEA were based. In 1967, the IEA held its annual conference in Calgary Alberta to discuss the “Role of Voluntary Initiative in Native Development.” Panellists for Sunday's discussion included representatives from several Provincial and Territorial organizations, as well as the National Indian Council and the Canadian Indian Youth Council. Collectively, panellists demonstrated a keen awareness of other ethnic advocacy groups and spoke at length about how the situation of Indigenous people differed from that of others, as well as how the problems of Indigenous people in the United States and in Canada were very similar. In a summary of the discussion, the conference report noted, “The Black Power group in the States is entirely different from native groups in Canada... If the only way for the native people to get anywhere is by threats, then we have a long way to go. This is a civilized country and there should be no need for demonstrations... The Indian put down his arms 100 years ago and has kept his part of the bargain.”

The observations of difference continued. As the summary states, “There seems to be a tendency among professors of sociology and anthropology to draw a parallel between negro civil rights movements in the U.S.A. and Indians in Canada. No parallel is seen. It is believed that Indians are fighting for the right to share in the rich resources of their own country, while the negro is also an immigrant fighting against white racial supremacy.” On the general issue of human rights, one
panelists stated that he considered himself as a human being, neither better or worse than anyone else, and that he “felt very strongly that Indian people must be considered as human beings who happen to be born with Indian blood.” Comments presented regarding the panel's discussion are even more revealing. One representative from the Confederacy of Six Nations in Quebec, for example, commented that “his chiefs would have been insulted to have been compared with the negroes and civil rights movements.”

While the IEA contained many Indigenous people, it also struggled with its non-Indigenous roots. During its 1967 conference, it emphasized that the IEA “does not attempt to impose any policy on native people, but rather supports all Indians in their efforts to gain recognition and to achieve those things which they consider to be worthwhile.” In addition, the IEA maintained that “We must look at the problem in the light of what Indians are today; not tell the Indians what they are going to be, but asking what they want to be.” Despite its overtures to the choice of Indigenous people to direct their own lives, the IEA faced some problems dealing with members who felt that its stated goals, and its actions, did not always match. The policies of the IEA thus provided yet another reason for Indigenous people to strengthen their own burgeoning organizations.

A second of contention concerned funding. As J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins demonstrate, the IEA did, in many instances, compete with Indigenous organizations for funding, and was often on the verge of financial collapse. The Indian Association of Alberta, whose relationship with the IEA was uniquely contentious, complained that the IEA had sought a $151,000 grant from the Social Planning Council of Edmonton in order to pursue a study on Indigenous people living in the city. A 1968 meeting with the boards of the National Indian Brotherhood and the Canadian Metis Society also revealed some suspicion on the part of Native organizations that those Indigenous people on the IEA's board were “window-dressing” intended to solicit funds. They further argued that the Aboriginal appointees were arbitrarily chosen, and that local branches could be formed by any twenty interested
people, which precluded Indigenous participation on every level. Though the IEA strove to address these concerns, for example implementing a policy that certain number of positions on its Board would be filled by appointees delegated by the national associations, the IEA continued to flounder, at least in asserting its usefulness, legitimacy, and representativeness among Indigenous people. It eventually changed its name to the Canadian Association in Support of Native Peoples (CASNP), reflecting its new and much-diminished mandate and capacity, but did succeed in one of its original goals, which was to foster the developing strength of new Native organizations.

F. BUILDING THE BROTHERHOOD: THE NIB AND THE NCC

Developing new organizations was indeed a slow process. While the National Indian Council had pledged to assist in developing provincial and territorial Indigenous organizations, there were, by the late 1960s, relatively few who were well-developed, well-funded, or in a position of power. The strengthening of the provincial and territorial organizations thus became an important organizational focus in the new National Indian Brotherhood which emerged during this period as an Aboriginal-only organization whose structure depended on the strength of its member organizations. As one participant had pointed out in 1963, NIB organizers recognized and affirmed that a national organization required a solid foundation, and such a foundation was to be found in the strength of the various threads that connected it. Though some strong PTOs had existed within the life span of the NIC, it was the Brotherhood and not the NIC which put the most effort into their development and which explicitly laid out in its mandate its intention to represent a coalition of provincial-territorial organizations, rather than a broad assemblage of Indigenous people more generally.
When interested parties first met in Regina on May 23rd, 1968, the name of their group was to be the Canadian Indian Brotherhood. Representatives in attendance included Presidents of major provincial organizations including the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, the Indian Association of Alberta, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, the Union of Ontario Indians, and the Union of New Brunswick Indians. Andrew Delisle, President of the Indian Association of Quebec, was scheduled to attend but had been delayed by an emergency. Walter Dieter, president of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, was appointed provisional chairperson, and participants discussed the formation of a new national organization in three parts including its suggested structure, constitution, and program.

The Presidency was decided when Walter Dieter was voted in by acclamation, and the Vice-Presidency was to be occupied by Dave Courchene, also by acclamation. Delia Opekokew, executive secretary of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, became the organization's Secretary-Treasurer. The elections reflected both ambition and pragmatism. The report noted that the Vice-President and Secretary-Treasurer were chosen due to their living proximity to President Walter Dieter. The meeting also featured the formation of a Board of Governors, which consisted of the leaders of provincial organizations. The structure of the NIB was important in its development and signalled its position vis-à-vis the federal government, as an organization committed to gaining both legitimacy and a seat at the table in matters of Indian Affairs.

In defining their aims and objectives, those present recommended a variety of measures that both individually and collectively signalled its intention to differ from the NIC model. It stressed the importance of provincial organizations by referencing them as the vehicle through which to unite all Indigenous people, as well as by deciding that the Canadian Indian Brotherhood (which would be renamed the NIB) would “deal with matters or problems as submitted to them by the provincial organizations with the provincial leaders involved to be present when dealing with problems they have
submitted to the C.I.B.” Clearly then, this organization was intended to be one comprised of leaders defining issues important their people on a provincial scale; its structure left little room for other organizers or different visions of leadership. The group was then renamed the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), and the meeting ended with a pledge for a meeting in Winnipeg in December of the same year whereby a delegation from each organization would be invited for further discussion.

Under Dieter, the NIB had accomplished the establishment of a constitution agreed upon by all the provincial-territorial organizations, the uniting of status Indians and the establishment of a presence on the federal scene. But Walter Dieter's easygoing nature made many believe that a stronger and more forceful personality was needed. Thus, in 1970, George Manuel took the helm of the NIB, an organization that The Native People newspaper described at the time as 'fledgling.' In an interview with Allen Jacob, the then-49 year old George Manuel outlined his vision. An experienced organizer, Manuel had served as special consultant to the Indian Association of Alberta. He described the NIB of 1970 as an organization “in a state of flux.” As he argued, “[T]here’s a national organization in my opinion in name only and I intend to change the negative image of the organization to a positive image and to involve the people at all levels.” He recognized the need to build a strong provincial base, expressing his view that the organization would “have to be effective in mending a strong national image which the Federal Government and other agencies can relate to.” He maintained that the problem with the NIC earlier on was that it had tried to represent both Metis and registered Indians, and that the NIB would rectify that problem by representing those Registered Indians who had more in common. This was in fact a prevailing theme within the NIB, as reported by Tony Belcourt, who became president of the Native Council of Canada representing Metis and Non-status people. According to Belcourt, Metis and Non-status people placed the NIB in a difficult position, and discrimination against them was prevalent. Belcourt maintains that George Manuel was counselled not to talk to the Native Council of Canada because if the Metis did gain recognition, according to Indian Affairs and the chiefs,
everyone's share would get smaller.

Manuel's leadership of the Brotherhood was largely successful: while Dieter had pledged to keep the NIB in as small a capacity as possible, so as not to overshadow the provincial organizations, Manuel envisioned a larger mandate. He eventually was responsible for the creation of a joint NIB-Cabinet Committee, a move rejected by some provincial leaders who feared that too great a centralization of power implied in such a manoeuvre. His parallel insistence on having powerful White contacts in Ottawa was also an issue of contention among more radical activists who argued that the NIB was simply too close to the government to be a representative organization. For its part, the NIB used the relationship to press for conciliation on the government’s behalf, arguing that “if it does not deal seriously with 'reasonable' men from NIB, it will have to deal with 'hot-headed radicals' from AIM.” Apart from establishing consistent contact with Cabinet Ministers and other powerful officials in Ottawa, the NIB, under George Manuel, accomplished a great deal, including helping to bring about the foundational Calder decision, which reversed the federal government's refusal to recognize Aboriginal rights. Manuel was often criticized for what some critics considered a far-too-cozy relationship with the federal government. In December of 1971, Willard Ahenakew, cartoonist, drew a cartoon which featured a very small George Manuel and David Ahenakew sitting on the lap of a much larger Pierre Claus, meant to depict Pierre Elliott Trudeau. In the cartoon, Manuel and Ahenakew, both leaders who enjoyed cordial relationships with legislators, explain to Harold Cardinal, “The Dennis the Menace of Indian politicians because of his strong attacks on Indian Affairs,” that he could have sat on Pierre Claus’ knee to if he had been a “good little boy like Georgie and Davie.”

Manuel also built several affiliations which included, but were not limited to, the Canadian Labour Congress, the United Steel Workers of America, various other labour organizations, the American Environmental Protection Agency, scientific research departments at various North American universities, and public interest research groups. He also sought international allies: as he admitted in
a speech on the importance of unity, “There are alot of countries willing to support us.... The one question that everyone is scared of is the division among Indians themselves... That is why I think it's necessary for only Indians who have the same conviction ... to stick together and move ahead with it through the legal process and develop a political arm of the legal process.” By and large, the NIB did not build strong coalitions with other activists for the purposes of agitation but sought, in its quest to best represent the concerns of Canada's Aboriginal people, to benefit from outside expertise when available. Despite his growing radicalism, Manuel and the NIB that he helped to create never engaged in a close relationship with more radical movements, including the American Indian Movement who was, throughout the 1970s, active in Canada to some extent. As Ponting and Gibbins explain, part of the NIB’s hostility towards AIM had to do with its frustration at competing for the same constituency: both AIM and the NIB sought to represent status Indian people. On another level, AIM's aggressive tactics also permitted government officials to work slowly on some issues, citing a potential non-Indian backlash towards Aboriginal people in the wake of such intensive-- and largely negative – press coverage of Indian activism in Canada.

Manuel was never the whole of the NIB, and various staff helped to make the organization what it was. Still, Manuel's own leadership style heavily influenced those who he chose to serve with him. These were often Aboriginal people – mostly men – of similar background and orientation. For example, Omer Peters, vice president from 1970 to 1974, had been chief of his own band for seventeen years then president and executive director of the Union of Ontario Indians before joining the NIB's administration. Peters, like Manuel, was known as a consensus-builder which was of great value to the NIB during the organization's bid to build legitimacy among bands. In 1974, Clive Linklater took over the position. A teacher by profession, Linklater had also served as a Community Development officer, like George Manuel. Linklater was an internationalist as well and worked, with Manuel, in building the World Council of Indigenous people.
Manuel advocated positive change but often found himself on the defensive. In one address at an 'open-door meeting' on one B.C. Reserve, he addressed several of the critiques leveled at the NIB, including its lack of connection to the grassroots as well as the critiques of youth. Manuel passionately spoke of the need for band members to get involved so that band councils would be properly supported. As he asserted to those in attendance, “We should be here to learn from the community,” which in his estimation included both band members and band councillors. He urged them to work on strategies together to resolve problems facing the community. When describing his interactions with community members at another meeting earlier in the year, he admitted that most people named their problems as “a leaky roof,” or what to feed their children the next day: “That’s what our band members are interested in.” Manuel also acknowledged the air of elitism that often accompanied gatherings of mainstream organizations, stating that he was very impressed that the meeting was being held on a reserve, acknowledging that “Even though we are poor, we still choose to have our meetings in a fancy environment.”

And, if the people could not be involved, Manuel called for more effective leadership to bring the resources to the people. Though he often spoke of reaching out, he was not always altogether successful. At the 1971 meeting of the Brotherhood in Regina, Harold Cardinal, who was at the time president of the Indian Association of Alberta and who had enjoyed a great deal of press for his writings on Indigenous nationalism, walked out after a motion calling for the distribution of funds for research into Treaty and Aboriginal rights. As he stated, on his way out, “a change from a white bureaucracy to a brown bureaucracy is no change.”

Cardinal was an example of those who sometimes became frustrated with the red tape surrounding organizational politics. These individuals were often youth. At his open-door meeting, Manuel that there needed to be a greater effort by the band council to get people to participate, particularly among the youth. As he stated, while 2/3 of the people were under the age of 28, they were not major participants in mainstream organizations. As he lamented, “Where are they at this
conference?... We are making decisions that will affect their lives... They should be involved in these decisions.” It was therefore necessary to carry meetings to reserves in order to connect better with the people. In the same meeting, Manuel criticized the government trend of diverting more money to urban areas to urge greater assimilation and therefore allowing less development on reserves. As he argued, “The government has initiated programs which were far superior in urban areas ... to attract people to urban areas.” These included better welfare for those Aboriginal parents who sent their children non-Aboriginal schools. He also admitted that he feared that governments would attempt to end the reserve system the way they closed “Indian” schools once 50% of the Aboriginal population had relocated to urban areas.

The White Paper was described in detail in the previous chapter, but its importance to the drive behind truly national organized Indigenous politics cannot be denied. As many pointed out, in the aftermath of its announcement, the White Paper, like no policy before, had inspired Indigenous leadership that it needed to create a larger and concerted movement speaking of one voice. Though the idea was much more workable than the reality so it turned out, the White Paper provided the NIB at least, as well as emerging provincial and territorial organizations, enough of a threat to make Indigenous organizations appear, both in the press and in the community, increasingly important to the survival of the people.

By 1971 though, the storm of the now-shelved White Paper had largely cleared, and the NIB once again looked for its next big battle. It found new areas of focus which included education and the economy. While its tactics included consultation and negotiation with governments, it also sometimes backed some peaceful forms of public protest in these areas, such as during the school strike on the Saddle Lake Reserve in Alberta, in the fall of 1971, where many parents kept their children home from school in protest of the poor facilities available for Indian children. In 1972 and in the area of education, the NIB also proposed a National Indian Educational Authority to allow bands to found their
own schools or negotiate condition of their participation in provincial schools. It released its study of economic development the same year, arguing that what Aboriginal people needed was the capital required to establish their own businesses and corporations.\textsuperscript{106}

Education and economy were concerns for all Indian people, yet the NIB and George Manuel conceived of the struggle in terms of nationhood and historic attachment to land. Economy was important in the sense of local development, and education was a tool that could enable the people to enjoy a better quality of life in their own communities as well as to advocate on behalf of the people. Thus, for the majority of its lifetime, the NIB focused on reserve issues including land and treaty disputes, often weighing in on dealing between the government and Indigenous groups, including the James Bay struggle in the Province of Quebec. The James Bay hydroelectric project had been under review since 1965. The project, planned on lands given to the provinces by the federal government under the condition that the Aboriginal title to said lands be settled, was touted by Premier Bourassa as an important economic development project for the province that would generate over 100,000 jobs in the province. More importantly, Bourrassa was convinced that it would proceed without any regard for the First Nations living on it. For a province struggling with its own internal issues at the time, the excitement and the possibility of such a project put the Indians' claims in an unfavourable position, and the province of Quebec made its plans on a completely unilateral basis until a 1973 injunction obtained by the Cree forced Hydro Quebec to halt proceeding and, eventually, led to the signing of the first modern treaty. Predictably, Manuel and the NIB weighed in, arguing that the province had been trying to starve the Indians into submission for decades.\textsuperscript{107} Negotiations with the Cree and Inuit of Northern Quebec proceeded, often under duress, and the Cree and Inuit, in 1974, finally signed the agreement extinguishing title to much of their homelands in exchange for a $150 million cash settlement, a small land base, a larger area for land use and a role in the regional government. For Manuel, it was still not enough: he was angry at the settlement, arguing that the only people to benefit were the lawyers, and
worried about the precedent that it would set.\textsuperscript{108}

Later on in life, Manuel became more radical still. As McFarlane reports, the James Bay experience had shifted Manuel's thinking away from a national philosophy and towards a movement of the people. As he explains, “He was beginning to believe that only if the mass of people were politicized and energized and put in the forefront of the movement could they take on the powerful government and private-sector interests that were blocking the political, social and cultural rebirth of Canada’s First Nations.”\textsuperscript{109} Manuel's son, Arthur, was in fact the president of the National Youth Association which preached the unity of all Indians of all the Americas and which encouraged Indigenous people to have more children in order to increase the available population to fight in the armed struggle. The rhetoric of the NYA, Power to the People, called on a much different philosophy than had the NIB, yet Manuel respected it still. As his son recalled, Manuel wanted to see a people emerge, and recognized that more radical movements served an important purpose through their marches, demonstrations and other protest actions. They were what forced the government to listen and to negotiate.\textsuperscript{110}

In the realm of non-status and Metis organizing, the late 1960s also saw the emergence of an organization, out of the ashes of the NIC, that pledged to better serve the Metis and non-status community. In 1970, regional leaders held a national meeting in Ottawa that included organizations from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, as well as several smaller organizations including the Northwest Ontario Metis Association led by Paddy McGuire. Plans were discussed for the thrust and composition of a new national organization and, like the NIB’s structure, the structure of the NCC was to be founded on its provincial organizations. Tony Belcourt, who had previously acted as Vice-President of the Metis Association of Alberta, was installed as president to his own surprise. Belcourt reports that the appointment itself was an exercise in politics, whereby Stan Daniels, president of the Metis Association of Alberta, wanted Belcourt out of the province and so seconded his
nomination to the post of president, as first nominated by Angus Spence of Manitoba.

As an organization, the NCC used its national clout to lobby for new programs within the provinces and local communities. One of its most important project was the Urban Housing Initiative which sought to address poor living standards in Metis and non-status homes. This led, by 1974, to the achievement of a Rural and Native Housing Policy which aimed to provide suitable housing to low-income families, both native and non-native. According to Tony Belcourt, this was perhaps the most important achievement of his own mandate whereby non-status and Metis people were served across the country based on the lobbying and activism of the NCC and its affiliates, which included not only provincial associations but Friendship Centres, Communications Societies, and other regional groups.

Though it enjoyed eventual success, the NCC, like other organizations, was faced early on with the issue of funding. Once established, for example, the Metis Association of Alberta lent the newly-founded Native Council of Canada $10,000 and a national office was founded in June of 1971. Later on the same summer, the NCC was able to secure core funding. The issue of funding of national native organizations is an important one. As the case of the NCC illustrates, what was involved was often intricate politicking and personal relationships. In the case of the NCC, President Tony Belcourt received a leaked cabinet document which indicated that though Pierre Trudeau planned on giving money to Indigenous organizations, the NCC had not been included. Belcourt then demanded a meeting with Robert Stanbury, Minister of the Citizenship Branch, who argued that the policy had already been made; the exclusion was in fact a fait accompli. Belcourt did not relent- he threatened to use the media, and employed his connections with influential senior public servants, to secure core funding for the NCC. According to Belcourt, Ottawa was a bakery, not a loaf of bread, and there was enough for everyone.111

Enough for everyone, Belcourt insisted, including government funding. Government funding was however a source of friction at times for these two competing organizations. As Noel Dyck and
James B. Waldram explain, the government in that time and beyond wanted to be seen as able to address all of Canada's various constituencies and since Aboriginal people had not been well-served by traditional political parties, the government's funding could provide a stop-gap for those advocating for change. As Dyck and Waldram assert, “The Canadian government needs the Native political organizations to exist almost as much as the Native people do.” At the same time, and as many argued in the 1960s, federal funding to Native organizations also structured the way in which these organizations were able to address the government and legitimize their quest for justice. They also pitted status and non-status organizations as competitors in the fight for a piece of the federal pie. The National Indian Brotherhood, became the most “legitimate” vehicle between Aboriginal people and the federal government in Canada and was by 1978 receiving 98% of its operating funds from the government. But, speaking on the issue, one-time president George Manuel admitted that an organization existed before government funding did and that, in his opinion, the organization was in a sense more legitimate that way: “Everyone was committed more at that time when we were contributing funds directly to the cause.” Still, as early as 1971, it drew much of its core operating budget from the Department of Indian Affairs, $181,000 as compared to only $14,900 from donations and “miscellaneous.” The case of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood was no different. In a Budgetary Statement issued shortly after the planning meetings of 1967, it indicated an estimated $5,000 of income to be drawn from the bands, $10,000 from the Province of Manitoba, and an additional $5,000 in grants from the citizenship branch. It indicated a request for the remaining estimated expenses totalling nearly $50,000 for its first year from the federal government. As many alleged, by controlling the purse-strings, the federal government could be seen to be directing funds to organizations it deemed legitimate and appropriate according to its own standards, rather than those of Native people.
G. THE BACKBONE OF THE BROTHERHOOD: PTO'S AND PROVINCIAL POLITICS

Both the NIB and the NCC were organizations firmly based upon their relationships and affiliations with provincial and territorial organizations. They had learned, from previous attempts at organizing, that without these, it was difficult to coordinate national projects, to maintain group solidarity or membership, or to secure adequate funding. Without their strong relationships with PTS therefore, it is unlikely that the national groups would have survived, as they drew both new leadership and political strength from them. As feeders into the national organizations, the prairies represented particularly successful organizations, drawing from the history of organizing in the interwar years, as discussed in previous chapters. The Manitoba Indian Brotherhood and the Manitoba Metis Federation represent two of these important groups. They emerged in late 1967 when a conference of eighty-four Indigenous and Metis people met in Winnipeg to establish two separate organizations, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood and the Manitoba Metis Federation.

The trajectory leading to the birth of the MIB and the MMF is illustrative of the kinds of pressures that organizations faced during this period, both internally and externally. In a Report published by the Manitoba Metis Federation ten years after its founding, the development of the provincial-territorial organizations serving Indigenous people is documented at length in an examination of subsequent conferences on Aboriginal affairs beginning in 1954. The initial conference, sponsored by the Welfare Council of Greater Winnipeg, attracted few actual Indigenous people and discussed the problems of Aboriginal people as perceived by the government officials and students in attendance. The next year's conference focused on economic problems, noting that the Metis were more afflicted by economic dependency that any other group in the province of Manitoba. It resolved that new studies of the Metis be conducted by the provincial and federal governments, including
comparisons with reserve communities, toward the goals of policy and development planning. Conferences held in subsequent years continued to highlight both differences and similarities among Manitoba's reserve Aboriginal people and non-reserve or Metis people, and emerged with an ever-growing list of resolutions, initiatives and concerns that often enjoyed little progress after their initial proclamation.

In 1968, the fourteenth of such conferences sponsored by the Community Welfare Planning Council took place at the Marlborough Hotel, where the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood and the Manitoba Metis Federation were established as separate organizations. The process had begun in late 1967, where a Communications Conference had lent itself to such a discussion. The resolution to form the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood acknowledged “no effective organization at the present time” and resolved to form an executive or committee to start building the structure of the organization, as it was “generally felt that a strong organization of Manitoba Indians is desirable.” Thus, for conferenciers, strength meant representing a similar agenda, and it was felt by the division of Manitoba's Aboriginal people into two separate organization that organizers could work with greater efficiency and focus on issues affecting their particular membership.

The MIB's structure was similar to that of the NIB wherein democratic vote determined who would be present within the Board on behalf of each of Manitoba's then-51 bands. The Board of Directors, comprised of a President and four regional Vice-Presidents, alongside a Secretary-Treasurer, would be elected either from the ranks of the MIB or nominated from the general population. As organizers saw it, “In this manner we believe the Executive of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood is truly an elected body of the general Indian population.” As within other similar organizations, the lion's share of power rested with the Executive, whose function it was, in the case of the MIB, to coordinate all efforts of the organization more generally, to recommend programs to the Board, to administer approved programs, to set up committees, to fundraiser and to train and hire staff. Committees would
communicate with the bands through Communications Officers whose job it was to “make available Resource personnel to Bands, as well as the Brotherhood.” They were further charged with providing information to the Brotherhood and bands on issues such as education, housing, welfare and economic development, as well as encouraging the development of appropriate structures for band administration of new self-government responsibilities. Finally, they were to assist with the communication between the Government, the bands and the Brotherhood, as well as provide news and information to both Indigenous people and to the media on salient and important issues.\textsuperscript{121} Part of the reason that the Communication Officers were so important was the relative newness of such an organization. As its own report noted, “Communication workers are not to go into bands and organize locals of MIB, or promote it. The MIB will work effectively in improving this structure. It is the understanding of the MIB that only when we have effective Band Councils can the organization be really effective on provincial matters.”\textsuperscript{122}

Setting up the structure of an organization was a contentious task, but no more contentious than establishing its goals and directives, as well as the limits of its scope. As the initial report explains, “A Great deal of discussion went into the drafting of the objectives... A great deal of effort went into assuring that no area was overlooked.” Part of the discussion centred on the MIB’s involvement at the local level, whereby the Brotherhood pledged not to interfere with or infringe upon the authority of the Band Councils. It would do so by not promoting its own locals, relying instead on the already existing band council, a fact that belied much of the critique of band councils emerging during this time.\textsuperscript{123} In this aspect, the MIB was insistent: though it did, by extension, represent Indigenous people, “the MIB is an organization of Indians Bands in Manitoba.” It did not represent individuals, but their designated representatives within a system that had been the source of much critique from more radically-minded organizers. Because it was based on the band structure, the MIB worked hard to garner the support of the bands, resolving at the 1968 conference to write to all Chiefs emphasizing the importance of the
meetings with the government as well as the importance of their input into such meetings. The MIB also worked on many social issues, including housing improvements, education, and care of the elderly on reserves. It made resolutions on both a provincial and a national scale, for example demanding that the Indian Health Service and the Prime Minister act upon inadequate medical services and complaints by Indigenous people, while also demanding that the Health Minister for the province clarify that no cuts in existing services would be made. Verna Kirkness, who was invited by the MIB in 1971 to become its Education Director, describes her experience within the organization. She was charged with writing a paper on Education for the MIB’s comprehensive statement, issued in 1971, called *Wahbun*: *Our Tomorrows*. As she describes, the MIB itself had very little communication with the other provinces; researchers within the MIB were “doing their own thing.” Kirkness had a small budget and was paid very little considering her level of expertise and education, but describes the experience as valuable nonetheless. Though she left the MIB to finish her university education, Kirkness was eventually also hired by the national NIB to be its Education Director. 124

As for the Metis, whose own organization emerged in the same time, it adopted a similar structure with a President, four regional Vice-Presidents, and a Secretary Treasurer. It operated on a delegate system whereby locals sent their own President, Vice-President and Secretary-Treasurers to regional meetings where there, they voted for delegates to attend the annual general meeting. According to former Southwest region director for the MMF, Fred Shore, the delegate system lent itself to manipulation, and internal squabbles were very much apart of the internal dynamic of the MMF. 125 Like status organizations, the Manitoba Metis Federation sought similar gains for the Metis and non-status people, including improvements in housing, in infrastructure, and in health services. First president, Reverend Adam Cuthand, established the priority of organizing locals: for the Metis, there was no existing structure from which they could draw. Priority areas of Housing, Education, Employment, Fishing and Land Grants were also established. The MMF also pledged to continue its
research into the Metis land question, regarding the unlawful seizure of Metis land through the late nineteenth century scrip process, as well as to establish a separate youth organization under the name, Manitoba Association of Native Youth. Significantly, both the MIB and the MMF met together the following year in March of 1969. As the MMF's report notes, however, “Significantly no major resolutions were introduced at this conference... A great deal of discussion on Red Power and the differences between Indian and Metis people took place with no resolution of difficulties these brought about.”

Thus, from 1970 on, each organization held its own conference.

As described by Fred Shore, the Metis Federation's priority during the 1970s was services. Though it was based on a lobbying concept, the MMF of the 1970s got hung up in the areas of service delivery. Nevertheless, the organization was responding to what it felt that Metis and non-status people needed, which has help on a practical level. Programs instituted during this period included, during Shore's tenure, an attempt at local economic development via the municipality of Biscarth sheep farm, a project intended to employ local Metis people in a commercial agricultural project. It was to contain 500 to 600 sheep and house two families working on site. Though the MMF pushed for additional monies including the hiring of eighteen part-time workers, the farm floundered and was eventually bought out by non-Metis. Other projects included the Turtle Mountain Loggers project which aimed at job creation. The plan was to cut ripe poplars for use as utility lumber. The program was allotted $150,000 to hire three people, but was boycotted by locals who resented being seen as cheap labour.

The MMF also faced many difficulties not shared by status Aboriginal organizations as well however. Because it represented non-status people, federal funding, as reported by Fred Shore, was incredibly difficult to secure. The province insisted that since the Metis were Aboriginal people, they were a federal responsibility. Core funding obtained through the office of the Secretary of State came with an onerous reporting system which was often confusing and difficult to manage. In addition, Shore cites a lack of basic research regarding Metis people which complicated the process of designing
and implementing programs.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, the organization featured an important separation between small town, poorly educated Metis and urban, educated Metis. For those coming from impoverished beginnings in small communities, the salaries offered by the organization represented an important enticement to getting involved. As Shore admits, the system “lends itself to turkeys.”\textsuperscript{130} Finally, the grassroots had very little connection to the national organization. According to Shore, there was simply too much to do provincially to cultivate a genuine national interest and the battle over which issues to prioritize was constant.\textsuperscript{131}

By 1977, the MMF was under pressure. Though it had amassed, by this time, an impressive 118 locals throughout the province,\textsuperscript{132} it noted that “The Manitoba Metis Federation after ten years of operation, is seriously deliberating on its present and future position as a viable buffer between the Metis people and the Government's, Provincial and Federal and as a conduit for the aspirations and goals of local communities.”\textsuperscript{133} While it is unclear what brought about this crisis of existence for the organization, it proposed a revision of its mandate to reinvigorate the cause. The MMF acknowledged, as many noted, “a lot of misunderstanding and fierce opposition from every quarter toward the advancement of the Metis cause.” This included misunderstanding and opposition on the part of treaty Aboriginal people, such as those represented by the MIB, as evidenced in the workings of the national organization, as well.\textsuperscript{134} Further difficulties included unifying a diverse Metis population towards “brotherly and harmonious action,” as well as too great a focus on the actions of governments absent a focus on what Metis communities could do for themselves. As it asserted, “Proscribed actions have always been too limited in scope and too dependant on government and public reaction... The time has come when the Metis people must adopt a new approach and a new attitude toward the Governments and their agents the bureaucrats, the general public, and themselves.”\textsuperscript{135}

The emergence of PTO's in nearly every province and territory mirrored much of the experience of the Manitoba groups profiled. Yet, some organizations were more successful than others. One new
organization to emerge out of the late 1960s was the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs (UBCIC), which was formed out of a Chiefs’ Conference in Kamloops in November of 1969. The Union strove first and foremost for unity, arguing that speaking with one voice to the government was more effective than a disorganized chorus. Its overall objectives, apart from uniting Indigenous people and their organizations in the pursuit of common goals, included settling the B.C. Land question, improving educational opportunities and social conditions, promoting and facilitating local self-sufficiency and self-administration wherever possible, and gaining the support and cooperation not only of Indigenous people but of the public and of the government in the interests of their cause. Significantly, the UBCIC also strove to “Represent the Indian people of British Columbia as the officially recognized Indian organization in the province,”136 reflecting the province’s earlier experience with competing provincial organizations. The UBCIC aimed to settle the question, once and for all, and in doing so, to promote real and significant change in the legislative and political structures that had oppressed B.C.’s Indigenous population since the late nineteenth century.

The governing structure of the UBCIC was a curious mixture of traditional rhetoric combined with colonial practice. While it insisted that its organization was based upon the “structure that existed for thousands of years before the white man arrived – the Chiefs and their local governments,” it was indeed an election system based upon the imposed Band Council system, whereby each Band elected a Chief who then automatically became a member of the District Chiefs’ Council. Each district – there were fifteen of them in British Columbia – would then elect a representative to the provincial Chief’s Council which would comprise the governing body of the Union. The executive committee was elected by the Chiefs’ Council from its own membership and included a President, Vice-President and Secretary, who were collectively responsible for carrying out the policies as decided upon by the Chiefs’ Council. The Executive Committee would then appoint an administrator responsible for the coordination of the activities of all Union employees. A second administrator was added when the
Union began to focus more on the land claims question.

In his report on the UBCIC, Gene Joseph argued that “the Union’s organization and management style is based upon the Indian people's distrust of bureaucracy and its traditionally rigid form.” As such, the UBCIC strove to create a more corporate structure in which employees were guided toward the organization's goals by the management of the UBCIC. In practice, this meant that the UBCIC could hire inexperienced employees, “with the understanding that these employees will develop and educate themselves according to the job needs.” While this could and did have an impact on the Union’s “effectiveness and output,” the benefits of guiding new employees towards organizational goals was seen as a fair trade-off by leaders. Thought his policy, as well as the management that went along with it, could result in division, confusion and high turnover, an additional benefit was to retain and all-Indigenous work force – or at least mostly Indigenous – that did not have to defer or rely on non-Indigenous experts, in keeping with the organization's modus operandi of self-sufficiency.

As within other organizations, leadership within the UBCIC was often contentious and difficult. As Joseph argued, “As the Indian leaders become more and more political they have lost sight of the grassroots people's needs and replaced it with a struggle for personal power and the land claims issue.” In addition, negotiating one's place within the organizational structure of Indigenous politics was often a delicate balancing act wherein strong personalities often disagreed, sometimes publicly. Interviewed by the Indian Voice in 1975, Bill Wilson, UBCIC representative, recalled one unsuccessful attempt in Terrace B.C. designed to work through interpersonal differences affecting leadership during which factions refused to compromise and no real progress was made. The struggles of the UBCIC were similar to those of other organizations: as Joe Sawchuk has reported of the Metis Association of Alberta, where he worked for several years, interpersonal relationships often dominated day-to-day operations, and cultivating good relationships with powerful leaders was an important part of the
smooth functioning of the group. Tony Belcourt, first president of the Native Council of Canada, also said as much, reporting that interpersonal rivalries and jealousies often dictated the path of many organizations.

Both the broadly-based nature of the goals envisaged by organizers, as well as staffing and leadership issues, made headway often difficult to achieve. On the land claims file, the UBCIC faced obstacles resulting from the impasse of the federal government's willingness to enter into negotiations compared to outright refusal from the province. The land claims file growing prominence and focus also made other goals in the areas of education, social welfare and community development, move down the priority list. In a sense, the organization had two competing priorities. Though these goals could work together – and UBCIC leaders frequently insisted that they were indeed inseparable – they also could serve to divide resources and expertise so that progress on one file meant no progress on another. As Joseph maintained, “With settlement of the Land claims the majority of the Indian people will still have social and educational problems.”

While competing priorities did hamper the progress of the UBCIC in certain areas, it could not explain why an organization with such worthy goals might be ignored by Indigenous people themselves. In examining the reasons for lack of progress, Gene Joseph cited a lack of involvement by Indigenous people whom, he argued, had the immediate priority of survival to worry about. As he explained, “Poverty stricken people place higher priorities on food and other immediate needs rather than on politics, education or community development.” His commentary also pointed towards a class issue whereby those worried about politics, education and community development were among the more successful members of the Executive and Chiefs Council rather than by any kind of grassroots people. This lack of involvement by the grassroots could also contribute to the organization being seen as out-of-touch with local concerns, and ignorant of the lives of those simply trying to make it.
CONCLUSION: A REAL PEOPLES’ MOVEMENT?

For some observers, organizations did not represent the movement. For critics, it was the nature of the organizations, as well as their failure to address grievances, which represented the real problem within the organizational spectrum. As Emma Larocque described of her work in another organization, the Alberta Native Communications Society, under-educated people came into positions that they were totally unprepared for. Organizations did not develop protocols to deal properly with management issues, and they became nests of discontent and injustice. According to Larocque, the Canadian government, by funding these organizations, “abandoned the oppressed to the oppressed.” Larocque's comments were echoed by many others, and yet organizations continued to receive funding and in doing so, to legitimate themselves as the proper voice of the people. In addition, many organizations, both at the PTO and national level, became hotbeds of corruption. As Larocque has argued, the structure and nature of organizations lent itself to abuse, whereby leaders were “given enough rope to hang themselves.” Larocque blames the government; as she points out, the government knew how to ghettoize and employ people at the same time. The movements, despite their intentions, thus ceased to be people's movements, much less effective political movements. She cites a lack of vision, even worse in Metis organizations which were even more insecure than their status Aboriginal counterparts.

According to Larocque, 1969 and 1970 represented the height of a true people's movement in Canada. She cites the publication of Harold Cardinal's *Unjust Society* as a key point in the start of a massive people's movement. The Lac La Biche Powwow, which Larocque attended in the early 1970s, was one such representation. Though Larocque maintains that she got a sense of a people's movement through her extensive travels throughout Canada, the people's movement, according to Larocque, never really caught fire. According to her, the organizational part never really got off the ground due to the
division between status and Metis people and the media's neglect of Metis issues.\textsuperscript{143} In the United States and without the status issues codified into the American constitution, the situation was somewhat different. But organizations remained charged with the same critiques in both countries, suggesting that the problem was not in any specific organization, but in the nature of the organizations themselves. Although there was likely no structure that could have been devised that could counter all critiques, colonization had built in division between the educated elite and the grassroots, between Indigenous nations in various parts of the country, and between members of communities themselves suffering under an oppressive system of legislative and structural impediments.

This chapter has argued that organizational Indigenous politics, as they emerged in the 1940s in the United States and in the 1960s in Canada, displayed remarkably similar outlooks, orientations, as well as challenges. In both cases, organizations were praised for their ingenuity, yet struggled with issues of unity, of financial security, and of stable leadership. This chapter has argued that organizational politics were never easy in this era. The very nature of the organizations created within the context of the times, combined with leadership and financial struggles, often gave the impression to Aboriginal people that their leadership was out of touch with their priorities, or at least more concerned with their own ambitions to provide any real relief. Nevertheless, as the work of these organizations demonstrates, they performed important activist functions for the Indigenous community, both in the United States and in Canada, drawing from the rhetoric of other groups yet creating an agenda that was uniquely Indigenous in its orientation and approach. The “rebirth” of the 1960s, therefore, was one that occurred simultaneously on a personal and on an organizational level; drawing from centuries of struggle, the 1940s in the United States and the 1960s in Canada witnessed the emergence of distinctly modern pan-Indigenous models of activism. These organizations were not in any sense static groups: both in terms of priorities and leadership, they were constantly adapting and reformulating organizational goals to respond to the retrenchment of Indigenous rights. Yet, for all of their
adaptiveness and dynamism, these groups were also more contentious and more divisive than ever before. As such, they opened the door for a new type and phase of Indigenous activism that captured public attention and that will be discussed in the following chapter. More radical than the structure of organizational politics would allow, these new groups were formed both as permanent movements and in response to specific events, and came to dominate the perceptions and public imagination of Indigenous activism in a way that no group had been able to before.
36 Robert Robertson, interview by Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, 1 December 1993. See also Reaves Nahwooks, interview by Robert Allen Warrior.
37 Robert Robertson, interview.
39 Chuck Trimble, interview.
40 Chuck Trimble, interview.
42 Ibid., 2.
43 Robert Robertson, interview.
44 Robert Robertson, interview.
46 Robert Robertson, interview.
51 Ibid., section 62.
56 Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 198.
61 Ibid., 2.
62 Ibid., 13.
63 Ibid., 3.
64 Ibid., 4-5.
65 Ibid., 6.
66 Ibid., 8.
67 Ibid., 15.
68 Ibid., 18-19.
71 Rutherdale and Miller, “It’s Our Country,” 156.

Ibid., 2.


Ibid., 3.

Edward Lavallee, interview.

Edward Lavallee, interview.

Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 197.


Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 300.

Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, Canadian Indians and Eskimos of Today September 1966 (No. 5), 1. Box 124 Folder 5. Walter Rudnicki Fonds (University of Manitoba Archives, Winnipeg, Manitoba).

Ibid., 2.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 302.


Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 274.

Peter McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993), 123.

McFarlane, Brotherhood, 126.

Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 273.

Willard Ahenakew, Cartoons of Indian Politics and Indian Humor (Saskatoon, SK: Heese House of Printing, 1974), 23.

Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 271.


Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 272.

Ibid., 235-236.


Ahenakew, Cartoons of Indian Politics, 15.

McFarlane, Brotherhood, 140.

Ibid., 143.

Ibid., 177.

Ibid., 181.

Ibid., 190.

Ibid., 190.

Tony Belcourt, interview by author, Ottawa, ON, 28 February 2012.


For more data, including figures from 1971 to 1979, see J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 228-229.


Ponting and Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance, 228.


119 Ibid., 5.

120 Ibid., 5-6.

121 Ibid., 6-7.

122 Ibid., 7.

123 Ibid., 9.

124 Verna Kirkness, interview by author, May 2012.

125 Fred Shore, interview by author, 15 May 2012.


127 Fred Shore, interview.

128 Fred Shore, interview.

129 Fred Shore, interview.

130 Fred Shore, interview.

131 Fred Shore, interview.


133 Ibid., 2.

134 Tony Belcourt, interview.


137 Joseph, “United We Stand.”


139 Joe Sawchuk, interview.

140 “Bill Wilson.”

141 “Bill Wilson.”

142 Emma Larocque, interview by author, 24 May 2012.

143 Emma Larocque, interview.
Chapter 3:

'Indians in the City':

Indigenous Responses to the Challenges of Urbanization
INTRODUCTION

Of all of the divisions that could characterize Indigenous activism in the 1960s and 1970s in Canada and in the United States, an important aspect of the dialogue was the growing discrepancy between the problems and issues faced by urban and reservation Aboriginal people on both sides of the border. Indeed, urban Indigenous people in Canada often found that they had more in common with their American counterparts than those living on reservations. The opposite was also true. The struggles of urban Indigenous activists often assumed different terms, were expressed in different forums, and focused on different issues than those organizations based on reservation or reserve politics. In addition, the concerns of urban activists often melded with local concerns to forge distinctly local patterns that defy generalization. The important geographical aspect of the division among organizations, movements and individual activists has been under-examined within this context, largely due to the difficulty of tracing the reasons behind individual choices of affiliation as well as the fluidity of identities often assumed by urban Indigenous activists. Nevertheless, their work is important because of all of its diversity, fluidity and dynamism, as well as the way in which urban activists often represented the public face of the Indigenous rights movement. Perhaps more than in any other aspect, the lives of urban Indigenous organizers intersected in numerous ways on both sides of the border. As such, it is of particular note that this chapter, unlike previous chapters, does not separate the Canadian and American Indigenous experiences, arguing that a central feature of this geographical aspect of political organizing was in fact the commonalities faced by Indigenous urban dwellers in both countries.

This chapter will first, contextualize the urban experience through the lens of Indigenous experience, highlighting the particular challenges faced by the influx of new urban emigres in the 1960s and 1970s. In doing so, it will critically evaluate the numerous studies of the urban Indigenous
experience that so captivated social scientists during this period as well as interrogate the degree to which these studies, and others like them, pathologized Indigenous people as somehow exceptionally un-adaptive in an urban milieu. Alongside these stereotypes, this chapter will engage the notion of “skid row” as both a figurative and literal place wherein, scholars insisted, Indigenous bodies and minds remained somehow trapped, unable or unwilling to get out. Next, this chapter will survey both government and charity-sponsored, as well as Indigenous responses to the realities of urbanity including self-help programs, pilot projects and most notably the emergence of Friendship Centres in Canadian and American urban milieus. Finally, this chapter will critically examine responses to Indigenous urban leadership, noting the particular difficulties and challenges faced by those who took to the task to reveal the extent to which the uniqueness and the transience of the urban experience crafted a distinctive urban pattern of Indigenous organization and leadership from 1960 to 1975.

A. CONTEXTUALIZING THE URBAN EXPERIENCE

The divisions between what Robert Allen Warrior has termed diaspora and residential movements formed the crux of one of the major challenges faced by Indigenous activists during this period. As Warrior points out, the differences between these two types of movements-- diasporic and reservation-- mirrored in many ways the geographical divisions among African American activists from the South and from the Northern United States. As Warrior explains, “Growing up on a reservation was in many ways parallel to the insulated life of African-American leaders who emerged from the segregated South, whereas the Native experience in the cities was like the situation that produced Malcolm X and other radical militant African-American leaders and activists.” This was true of Indigenous activism both in Canada and in the United States, though Canada had not experienced the
same North/South dynamic, nor the same history with slavery, as had the United States. Nevertheless, the segregation engendered by the reserve system in Canada promoted a type of political insularity that was often shattered when confronted with a much broader political landscape in an urban setting. As such, urban Indigenous activism took on a particular diasporic character and promoted the creation of a new identity important in shaping the content of Indigenous activism.

Indeed, much of what made Red Power possible in an urban context in the 1960s and 1970s was an almost wholesale exodus of Indigenous youth from the reservation to the city within the context of a variety of relocation programs, both in Canada and in the United States, during the 1950s and 60s. In addition, factors such as wartime demobilization and the increased enrolment of Indigenous youth at institutions of higher education made particular cities in both Canada and the United States virtual hotbeds for Red Power organizing. Of particular note, in Canada, were centres such as Vancouver, Toronto and Winnipeg, while in the United States, Minneapolis-Saint Paul and San Francisco were important sites of urban Indigenous organizing.

Part of the growing significance of the “problem” of urban Indians, as it developed in the 1950s and 1960s, was a result of the increasing number of migrants located there. One 1964 study estimated the number of Indians in the San Francisco Bay areas at around 10,000, representing over one hundred tribal groups. In 1970, the census enumerated over 8,000 Indian residents in Seattle, though Indian leaders claimed the number was closer to 12,000. Between 1950 and 1960, California's Indian population nearly doubled, with many new residents opting to test their fates in its largest cities like Los Angeles, with 32 percent of California American Indians, San Francisco-Okland, with 10 percent, and San Diego, with 9 percent. The relocation of Indigenous Americans to major centres was no mere coincidence, but rather the result of extensive government-sponsored relocation programs mounted during this era designed to achieve what Termination could not; the full and complete integration of
Indigenous Americans into American civil life. As such, relocation programs mounted during this era were extensive. In San Francisco, various programs included school placements, railroad contracts and the Bureau of Indian Affairs Employment Assistance Program, which also had offices in other centres such as Oakland, San Jose, and others. First implemented in 1952, the program first relocated 442 persons and quickly grew. In 1971, for example, over 10,000 Indian individuals received assistance from the program from relocation services to vocational training. Like similar Canadian programs, the BIA provided transportation and establishment costs, though many relocatees complained of never having received all of the services promised to them. Yet despite their promise, programs were often unsuccessful due in part to the large number of returnees who decided to go back to the reservation after having tried to make a living in the city. A 1971 study, for example, found that fifty percent of Indians relocating to Denver, Colorado, had returned to their reservation within three months. Still, many relocatees argued that the program was, on the whole, a good one but that the agents responsible could have screened people more thoroughly to weed out those unsuited for city life. Other programs such as the Adult Vocational Training Program, passed in 1956, offered participants a monthly stipend to cover food and shelter, vocational training, medical assistance and subsequent job placement services. In the case of the AVT, many participants failed to complete the training and either moved on to other opportunities, or went back to whence they came. In its early years, the Voluntary Relocation Program estimated that over three quarters of those relocated had returned home, while the rate of return for 1964 was also high, at 35 percent.

In Canada, Aboriginal people also migrated to cities in relatively high rates throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s aided in part by similar governmental programs. The Indian Eskimo Association noted that by the mid-1960s, the demographic portrait of Canada's First Nations had changed considerably, particularly as it pertained to urban residence. Sixty percent of Indigenous people now lived in an urban setting, a reversal from the portrait only 25 years earlier. Furthermore,
Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics as of December 1964 demonstrated that of a total Indigenous population of 211,000, fifteen percent lived off the reserve. In some provinces, such as Ontario, nearly thirty percent of registered Indigenous people lived off the reserve. As the IEA noted, “One can only guess how many other people who are of Native descent live in our cities.”

As in the United States, the Canadian government launched a series of programs designed to facilitate or encourage this migration. The Canadian Department of Indian Affairs launched its urban relocation program in 1957, though it emphasized careful selection in its migrants. In other words, the young and relatively well-educated, those with a high school education, were those targeted for relocation early on. Relocation programs included transportation from the community to the place of employment, room, board and food for a period of two months, a personal allowance for up to two months, some tools, some clothing and on-the-job-training. Families were supposedly allotted more according to program guidelines, but of the thirty-six relocation grants awarded to Aboriginal families intending to move to Saskatoon, the average grant was less than one thousand dollars.

Another federal program from which some Aboriginal people in Canada derived benefits was the Federal Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act. But, unlike the relocation program, this program was designated for all Canadians. Urban Indians usually qualified under Program 5 of the Act's 10 designated programs, Training of the Unemployed. Aboriginal peoples' retraining was, however, sponsored by the Department of Indian Affairs for qualified applicants, whose qualifications included a minimum level of education, being registered as a status Indian, and being of the minimum age of 16. Interviewees in Toronto, however, expressed some doubts about the value of the program. As Nagler explained, many had never been in any formal training institution and felt alienated in the classroom environment which was designed for a more multicultural group. In addition, many reported that officials pressured them to engage in trade training for which they had no interest, and that time and facilities were often lacking. As this program demonstrated, the problem often lay with the
perceived irrelevance of federal programs and the frustration of Aboriginal people within a framework of training ill-suited to their particular interests.

These programs, despite their limitations, often proved popular for many Aboriginal people whose opportunities on reserves were extremely limited, particularly in more isolated settings. In northern Saskatchewan, for example, the James Smith Reserve had experienced a rapid out-migration of its population: in 1965, only 26 of 830 Indigenous people lived off the reserve compared to 250 people by 1968. As Edgar J. Dosman noted in 1972, “The majority of the Indian population will inexorably shift to the cities... The Native people form the hard core of the urban dispossessed: almost the entire minority lies outside the socio-economic structure of the city. The Indian subculture is not merely low in status and income; it is not merely at the bottom of the pile; its situation is becoming increasingly worse.”

The 1951 and 1961 censuses also provided important comparisons of the rate at which Indigenous people were migrating to Canadian cities. For example, whereas the 1951 census had enumerated 116 Indians living in Saskatoon, the number had jumped to almost one thousand by 1961. Winnipeg saw a similar increase, from 210 in 1951 to 1,082 in 1961 while Toronto's numbers also jumped, from 85 in 1951 to 1,196 in 1961. In Regina, Aboriginal people comprised over twenty five percent of the city's population and in other prairie cities such as Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary and Saskatoon, Aboriginal residence rates fluctuated in and around the 10% range. Between 1965 and 1975, the native population of Winnipeg had increased by over five hundred percent, while the city's own non-Indigenous population had increased only 15 percent as a whole. And while these statistics did show some important trends, they could not account for a large number of unenumerated transients who temporarily lived in cities and who failed to identify themselves as Aboriginal people. For example, 45 of 150 Indigenous people canvassed in Toronto reported that they never had any plan to relocate permanently to the city, only for short term economic and social reasons.

Edgar Dosman's 1972 study of Saskatoon cited several factors contributing to the urban exodus
of Indigenous people in the area, including an industrial and housing boom in the city providing increased employment opportunity, greater access to transportation, a new culture of adventure and discovery among Indigenous people and the breakdown of control previously exercised by the Indian Affairs Branch. In addition, the realities of Aboriginal population growth, which in Saskatchewan included a birth rate three times that of other Canadians, made Indigenous people in major cities an increasingly important fact. In a study of Toronto, similar factors were cited included the influence of mass communication, “and potential, or real educational, economic, political, and social benefits.”

Toronto, as a hub of industry, transportation and manufacturing, offered many incentives for Aboriginal people to relocate. Educational incentives also figured in the process: as one Toronto teacher recalled, “I came to Toronto for two reasons. Everybody was going, and number two, I wanted to obtain an education and work. It seems that all the people my age were leaving home.” Another added, “Life on the reserve is too quiet, and there is not enough to do ... if I went to a small town where the rent is cheap I would not work as well, because in a small town you are really an Indian.”

Education opportunity outside of small communities was also an important pull factor. Research had shown that schools serving Indigenous communities were often subpar both in the quality of instruction and in the facilities. A lifelong resident of the Sioux Valley Dakota Nation location in Southwestern Manitoba, Doris Pratt pursued the opportunities for higher education because, as she herself stated, “There as nothing on the reserve.” People on the reserve, she maintains, were simply trying to survive, while the city afforded new opportunities not available in the underdeveloped reservation from which she had come.

In January 1965, the Indian Affairs Branch reported that Canadian Indigenous people, 32,000 of which were enrolled in schools across Canada, only 1,277 were in grade nine or higher. As cited by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood in their 1971 study, Wahlung: Our Tomorrows, Aboriginal enrolment in federal and provincial schools declined by over fifty percent every year, so that the number of students
in grade 9 was roughly double than the number in grade 10, and the number in grade 10 was double the number in grade 11. These statistics were generally consistent to grade 12. Though the total number of graduating students had increased since the first year in the study, 1950, the overall trend continued; Aboriginal students rarely finished high school.\textsuperscript{22} As the MIB argued, “This is a shocking illustration of monumental failure. The gap is as great as if we had never entered the field of academic education... The gap is of major significance as we are striving for social and economic equality.”\textsuperscript{23} As Theresa Stevenson of Regina pointed out, she knew very few Aboriginal high school graduates; they were, in her own words, “ rare.”\textsuperscript{24}

For those who did manage to make it to high school and into post-secondary education, the pressures of adjusting to integrated education in larger towns or cities often jeopardized their ability to learn and to achieve as much as was possible. Both Emma Larocque and Verna Kirkness, Indigenous women who had pursued high school educations and beyond, describe the undercurrents of racism they both experienced in a high school setting. Emma LaRocque, whose early education had been in a one room schoolhouse composed primarily of Metis children, experienced what she termed “brutal psychological and physical abuse” when she moved to a “huge” school in Lac La Biche, Alberta. At the same time, Larocque also pointed out some instances of kindness such as in grade 7, when she left Lac La Biche for Fort McMurray, where a Metis dormitory was to be set up for children who lived along the railway line. As she explains, “For the first time, I met kind White people.” Larocque cites the principal's kindness as a stabilizing factor. He helped her be admitted into a high school program at the Prairie Bible Institute in Three Hills, Alberta. There, she admits, “I call it the deep South.” She was the only Native student in a bible school concerned primarily with discipline, regulation, and surveillance. The system there, she recalls, was “Like nothing I have ever seen”.\textsuperscript{25} Verna Kirkness of the Fisher River Cree Nation, attended high school in Teulon, Manitoba, which represented a much bigger school than the one she had attended on the reserve. She describes acute homesickness due to poor road conditions
that prevented her from travelling home but rarely as well as a sense of alienation as a result of the separation.\textsuperscript{26}

For Indigenous students, options beyond the high school setting were limited and so it was an important achievement to get there. Between 1960 and 1970, an increased number of Indigenous students did. In her examination of education levels among Metis and Aboriginal people, Verna Kirkness demonstrated that there had been a significant increase in high school and university attendance. In Canada, university attendance had increased by 300\% between 1960 and 1970.\textsuperscript{27} An increasing number of Indigenous students were entering the professions of nursing and teaching, reflecting the need to serve their communities in some capacity with education that would be both useful and relevant in fostering change. Another alternative for Indigenous students wishing to enhance their education was also trade school which is where a majority of students ended up.\textsuperscript{28}

The prospect of higher education was exciting. For those attending traditional universities, it was also often an opportunity to learn about themselves and their own politics. As Doris Pratt explains, it was within her new context at university and in the city that she was first exposed to many activists of whom she had never heard, including the noted Harold Cardinal. At Camrose Lutheran College near Edmonton, Emma Larocque began to write about Native issues that she saw in the world at large, and in the one around her. When she attended Goshen College in Indiana from 1971 to 1972, Larocque describes a huge proliferation of organizations “popping up everywhere, about everything.”

Despite the excitement of new opportunity in the city, both for students and employees, migrants often maintained primary ties to their reserves and reservations. For example, though Doris Pratt has worked, studied and lived in other places, she maintains her reservation as her true home and describes herself as never having left. In the 1970s, there were very few Aboriginal students enrolled in her university and she recalls often feeling a sense of homesickness for her reserve despite the challenges she had faced there. Emma Larocque, who also left her home to pursue a post-secondary
education, described the Prairie Bible Institute in Three Hills, Alberta, where she was the only Native student, as the 'deep South'. Still, the challenges of city life and this sense of alienation did not necessarily make it into the stories shared with those from home. As Stanley McKay, director of the United Church’s Indian Metis Reception Lodge in Winnipeg, explained, “Most people don’t want to go home and tell about the problems they encounter; you go home and paint a good picture. You tell the people back home that you get a good salary in the city but you fail to tell them that most of it goes for rent.” He believed that the urban experience was unwittingly misrepresented by returnees to Northern communities, whose stories then encouraged even more Indigenous migration to urban cores.

B. THE LITERAL AND FIGURATIVE SPACE OF SKID ROW

Education could draw people to the city, but for most, it was the prospect of stable employment. For some, their search culminated successfully, and many Indigenous people adapted successfully to their new home and work environments in larger urban centres. For others, however, the uncertainty of constant employment at a fair rate of pay contributed to the creation of a geographical space which the press, researchers and many Indigenous people themselves characterized during this period as “skid row”. Due to the greater ethnic plurality in American cities than in Canadian ones, skid row as a distinctively Indigenous place became a much stronger paradigm in Canada, while Indigenous skid row inhabitants in the United States often found themselves both nameless and faceless, more dispossessed than ever before in urban melting pots ill-suited to the perpetuation of a distinctly Indigenous persona.

Despite the much stronger Indigenization of skid row in Canada, the concept of skid row was very much an American one that had evolved, according to some scholars, out of the very earliest American cities where masses of poor and dispossessed formed new communities that became known,
simply, as “Skid rows”. A 1965 study conducted by Samuel Wallace, sociologist, examined New York’s Bowery as a modern Skid Row. In it, he characterized Skid Row as a “way of life” which referred not only to the behaviours of individual residents or transients, but to the social mores, traditions, and subcultures that made up an albeit tenuous community. As he argued, “Skid row is a community if for no other reason than life must go on even if one is on skid row... Life on skid row may be nasty, brutish and short but this does not make it any less of a life.” Indeed, skid row as both a literal and a figurative place captivated both scholarly and public attention during the 1960s and 1970s.

In many Canadian cities, skid row was chiefly comprised of Indigenous people. As Larry Krotz, journalist, pointed out, “That is where Indians in cities are most visible – so visible in fact that in western cities the Indian, with only scattered exceptions, possesses skid row.” As such, the notion of skid row formed an important component within the spectre of urban-based activism, as well as received a great deal of attention from non-Indigenous researchers seeking to understand the rates of return and the persistent problems plaguing relocated individuals and families. Part of the attention the social sciences paid to problems like skid row was it abject poverty, a fixation with which was a product of the times; in both Canada and in the United States, major policy initiatives designed to combat the problem of poverty were underway. Within these campaigns, the living and working conditions of minority groups were themes of increasing concern.

The seminal book by Michael Harrington, *The Other America*, was published in 1962 and noted the important relationship between socio-economic status and political power, or lack thereof. In *The Other America*, Harrington argued, the causes of instability and poverty were structural and society's new course in terms of its segregation of the middle classes in fact generated a new blindness that was even more dangerous in realizing the extent of American poverty. As he explained,

Now the American city has been transformed. The poor still inhabit the miserable
This stark portrait could have as easily been applied to new trends in development in Canadian cities, where immigrant populations continued to increase, though a more general awareness of their plight did not. There existed, according to many Canadian academics, another Canada as well, one in which ethnic minorities also survived in similar low-living standards. And, as many argued, people of Aboriginal descent were often hit the hardest. As Jim Harding noted, “The Indian and Metis are but one part of the The Other Canada. However, the striking fact is that poverty hits people of Indian ancestry far harder.”

At the same time, the attention garnered on the problem of Aboriginal poverty, particularly within the urban context, was also a result of the legislative and societal push towards racial integration. Believing that full economic and social integration were the best ways that Indigenous people could survive, researchers consistently focused on ways to improve such integration through a series of studies published both as monographs and as academic articles, as well as in newspapers and popular magazines. The phenomenon of “skid row”, described by many social scientists both as an actual place wherein Aboriginal people socialized, worked and sometimes lived, as well as a figurative place whose character included shiftlessness, vagrancy and hopelessness, was a chief component of these studies. As understood by researchers, the problems of Indigenous poverty and, by extension, of skid row, in an urban context, were both endemic and largely self-perpetuating, as lack of opportunity
due to racism and stereotyping compounded issues of poverty, substandard housing and employment, and rampant crime. In research, it appeared as both a term that was generally accepted and used, but which also served to denote a very real distance between researchers and the population they studied. In many studies, Indigenous people appeared haplessly bound to the life of skid row, and though many were critical of the factors that ensured they would remain there, they also seemed to suggest that Indigenous people sometimes wanted it that way, a statement that did not reflect what many urban dwellers interviewed during the period had expressed. As such, though useful glimpses into the conditions of the lives of many Indigenous people in urban hubs during the period of 1960 to 1975, these studies must also be viewed critically, as expressions of colonial ideas as expressed in various shades of sympathy.

Despite keeping a critical lens on the statements contained therein, the studies commissioned and conducted during this period do offer important insights into the culture of Indigenous urban experience in a variety of urban centres. Hugh Brody whose study was commissioned by the government of Canada and who spent eighteen weeks during the summer and fall of 1969 as a resident of one such “skid row” in an unnamed Prairie city and in a geographical area spanning approximately twenty blocks, maintained that the arguments for studying such a small segment of the Canadian population were considerable: “The arguments are thus not bound to any band or even culture area, but quite possibly apply to the vast majority of the Canadian Indians... I should be surprised if the majority of the remarks made in the course of this report about the socio-economic plight of the skid row Indians specifically discussed are not broadly applicable to all Indians in a similar situation, whatever their band.” He described skid row as a geographical area, and as a figurative place which stood “between the limitations and constraints of a rural reserve and the rejection and alienation of a white-dominated city life.” He argued that it was a constant attraction to Indigenous migrants, who now faced the prospect of forming Canada’s newest “squalid urban ghettos.” As Walter Currie of the Indian Eskimo
Association noted in 1966, “Indian people can easily be found in the city – merely go to the slum area, the cheaper beverage rooms or bars – in Toronto go to the Keystone on Jarvis Street; in Winnipeg the hotels along Main Street, in Vancouver’s skid-row.” And, as he so perceptively noted, “The very economic reasons which pushed them to the city now dictate the place they will live – only here can accommodation be found; only here do they feel socially acceptable – their clothing, their speech, their money, their colour, their Indianness may not be a target of discrimination.”

Poverty was a chief characteristic of skid row, and represented an important point of focus in numerous studies and discussion groups. The 1961 Canadian Census reported that Indian and Metis people were the least employed of the employable labour force in Canada, employed at a rate of only 15.9% compared to 35.7% for the rest of the Canadian population. The same was true in an American context; in an Oklahoma study, a full one quarter of those surveyed returned to their reservations due to their failure to find employment in Oklahoma City, site of their relocation. In Seattle, the unemployment rate for American Indians was 26 percent compared to 8 percent for those listed as White, while the average income of White workers was nearly double that of American Indians.

In addition to the difficulty of finding employment in the first place, much employment offered to those of Indigenous ancestry was of a short-term nature and most jobs were of the unskilled variety and payed comparatively low wages. Education, or lack thereof, played a major role in setting up Indigenous people for failure in an urban setting. Though the history of Aboriginal education is a story far too complex to be reduced to simply a paragraph or two, the bottom line remained that in most cases, Indigenous people found themselves poorly educated compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts. The problem was related, at least in part, to the increased mechanization of manual labour and the perpetual low level of education among Indigenous urban migrants. As Currie noted, “Today the password to a job is – how much education do you have?” Training programs offered by Canadian government agencies often required a minimum grade 8 education which made them inaccessible to
many Indigenous people, and government placement agencies were largely impersonal and bureaucratic.\textsuperscript{41} Federal programs such as the Basic Training for Skill Development program, which offered upgrading classes, as well as the University Mature Student Program aimed to encourage Indigenous education, provided some opportunity but lacked sufficient counselling programs to prepare potential students for what lay ahead.

Lack of academic readiness in addition to the attitudes of many urban employers made a difficult situation even more so: as Ablon explained of the San Francisco area, employers were “gatekeepers” in the Indian migration process which often sought to exclude Indian workers: “Most Indians... come to the city as unskilled or semi-skilled workers, and encounter a shifting job market that requires more and more skilled persons each year. Lay-offs are common, and hit the unskilled worker particularly hard.”\textsuperscript{42} In Canada, Verna Kirkness argues that employers tended to generalize and paint all Aboriginal employees with the same broad brush: “The employer may have previously employed a native person who did not prove to be a reliable employee. He therefore tends to brand all Indians as unreliable. Visibility, in this case, is against the Indian.”\textsuperscript{43} The same was true in American cities, where both underemployment and discrimination on the job were factors. In New York, reporter Judy Klemesrub described the “typical” occupations of American Indian men as artists, musicians and steelworkers.\textsuperscript{44} According to Theodore Graves’ and Charles Lave’s work, Navajo men were praised by employers for their dexterity and willingness to learn but criticized for a perceived lack of initiative among them, as well as their so called lack of ability to communicate and the prevalence of drinking problems. For Denver employers, at least, these assumed stereotypes often explained why they preferred to hire White, rather than American Indian, workers.\textsuperscript{45} In Denver, Navajos received a lower starting wage than Anglos due to their perception of the quality of Navajo workers, and their wages tended to stay lower even when Anglos had less vocational training than Indian employees.\textsuperscript{46} In Chicago, some respondents reported discrimination at work. One woman described being very good at
her job and moving up the ladder – until her boss found out she was of American Indian descent. As she explained, “She found out that I was an Indian and she really gave me a hard time. Every time I’d make a mistake, she’d always make a remark about me being an Indian. She’d say ‘Why don’t you go back to the Indian reservation where you belong,’ and things like that.” Minority group prejudice was cited as a factor in this and many other studies depending on prior experience with Indian workers and satisfaction with such workers.

The realities of unemployment were not only the subject of academic discussion, but were a key point of discussion in Indigenous publications. *The Native People* ran a three page expose on city life, examining the factors influencing chronic poverty and unemployment. A cartoon featured prominently in it shows a non-Indigenous manager seated behind a desk, while an Indigenous family complete with features, a bow and arrow, and a child in a papoose, stands before him. The Aboriginal man says, in broken English, “We look for job, she can tan hides and I can chop wood!” Though intended to be a lighthearted observation on the unpreparedness of many Indigenous people for the realities of city life, it also demonstrated the extent to which Indigenous people were themselves aware that all that glittered in the city was not gold. The same expose noted that 68% of employable native people in the city of Edmonton were unemployed compared to an average of 6% unemployment nation-wide. Of those who were employed, only 20% were employed full-time, 5% were students, and 7% worked only part-time. Females represented 81% of those unemployed; this, combined with the 32% incidence of one-parent families, prompted one writer to argue that what was needed, among other initiatives, was a dramatic expansion in day care facilities.

As one Canadian researcher noted in 1966, “The poverty of the Indian staggers the imagination of the white man...The most sympathetic and imaginative Canadian cannot fathom the depths of human suffering through the medium of bland statistics.” The underlying generalizations and stereotypes underlying non-Indigenous research on Indigenous people during this period led many to conclude that
the situation was nearly hopeless. According to Brody's observations, Indigenous people on skid row had four possible sources of income: savings, welfare, begging and theft. Holding a regular job was simply not a part of the lifestyle, and was extremely rare. In addition, the transition from the skid row lifestyle to urban industrial employment “is neither particularly desired nor very easy: subjective pressures on the migrant, keeping him in skid row, are very strong ... objectively, the industrial employers do not welcome Indians.”

Similarly, according to Dosman's Saskatoon study, the logic of skid row included the Indigenous embrace of welfare programs, either state-sponsored or private. Unmarried Aboriginal women with children, for example, had a far better chance of qualifying for welfare than did women with no children or men. Nagler reported that thirty-five of the Aboriginal people interviewed in his study of Toronto received social assistance from municipal and private authorities, while many more were enrolled in government training programs and received federal assistance. In addition, in the Saskatoon example, most Indians and Metis on skid row congregated socially on the city's West Side, populated as it was with bars and saloon :that the solid citizens of Saskatoon associate with the less desirable.”

Brody added that, in his study, Aboriginal people from different regions tended to stick together during the day and speak in their own languages.

For as much as researchers characterized skid row as a community, it was also true that in many cases, Aboriginal people did not live in skid row: many resided in the poorest of dwellings, though not in any specific concentration. This was true of urban centres such as Toronto: in 1970 study, sociologist Mark Nagler pointed out that the Indians of Toronto did not live primarily in any one section of the city, but were scattered throughout. In the foreword, ethnologist Edward Rogers added that Aboriginal people in Toronto “do not communicate frequently with other Indians in the city and often do not know where their fellow Indians live.” A study completed by the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation with the Indian Association of Alberta found that there was no native ghetto in the city of Edmonton. As Larry Krotz pointed out, “There is no native ghetto in Regina, although the more
cynical will call the entire city a ghetto. When you ask where the Indians live, people name
neighbourhoods ... mixed older neighbourhoods – not slums – rows of neat framed houses on small
lots.”57 Ablon's study of the San Francisco Bay area noted the same phenomenon, whereby Indian
residents lived in typical working class housing or in low-rent housing projects though not necessarily
with other Indian people. Instead, much of the social interaction between Indian residents of cities took
place in informal settings, such as “Indian bars” and home visits.58 Rather than a mere stroke of chance,
this was in fact an important policy of the American Bureau of Indian Affairs, to disperse Indian
relocatees in the hopes that this might expedite their ultimate assimilation.59 The scattering of Indian
residents was also an issue for unity in New York60 and Seattle.61 In Los Angeles, American Indians
were scattered to a much greater degree than both African Americans and Latin Americans, but
primarily lived in the low rental district of central L.A.62

In some cases, Indigenous people responded to the challenges of the city by creating communal
living scenarios in some major centres. In an interview with Our Native Land, Leigh Carter described
her experience in a communal living group in Vancouver, where members of eight different tribes
shared a home. Carter admitted that this type of conglomeration “could have posed a problem a few
years back, but not anymore,” indicating perhaps to what extent the urban living environment had
affected or dislodged particular regional or tribal identities.63 The members of the group included
Shuswap, Salish, Cree, Micmac, Mohawk, and Bella Coola Indians who had decided to live together
for mostly financial reasons. Most were unemployed and not receiving any form of social assistance.
Due to problems early on, the group had instituted a no drinking and no drug policy within the living
space. Interestingly though, the communal living situation also extended beyond the everyday, as the
residents belonged to several different activist groups and published its own newsletter, according to
Carter, distributed in British Columbia, in parts of the United States and even in Europe. Carter spoke
of her desire for a sense of community among reserve and urban Indian people and expressed her belief
in direct action tactics. She admitted that the group would work with anyone, both organizations and individuals, in the objective of exposing to the public at large the conditions in Indian communities, both urban and rural. Thus, though the group may not have been in proximity to a large community of Indigenous people living in the same neighbourhood, they had created and engineered their own microcosm of community within one of the nation's largest, and perhaps most alienating, big cities.

C. CRIMINALIZING THE INDIAN

Skid row residents were often associated with crime and therefore, apart from poverty, crime remained a major focus area for researchers and activists during this period. For those unable to find employment or to survive on whatever meagre benefits they could derive from relocation programs, crime often represented one way to survive. Indeed, as Christopher Hauch pointed out, in his study of Winnipeg’s Skid Row, “Many of the aptitude requisite for survival on Skid Row involve a class of strategies normally referred to as ‘criminal.’” In academic studies, this propensity for crime was linked both to the persistent problems of poverty as well as to the characterization of Indigenous men as shiftless, lazy and prone to crime. As Brody reported, “It is generally assumed by the regular drinkers on skid row that any Indian will be quite happy to participate in petty crime, and this expectation is on the whole just: most of the Indians who come to skid row are preoccupied with participation in its mores, are in search of its benefits and gratifications.” For women, the participation in crime was often linked both to necessity, as well as to a lack of character. Without skills and unemployed, some Indigenous women turned to prostitution. As Mark Nagler noted, “They apparently became prostitutes as a reaction to their economic situation, as they were unskilled and could obtain only very low-paying jobs in domestic service and other similar pursuits.” These women were often the brunt of violence.
and worked in so-called “rough” areas because, as one explained, those who sought prostitutes in upper-class hotels and bars were simply “not interested in Indian girls.” Many Indigenous women also engaged in prostitution on a temporary basis only, trying to raise enough money to simply return to their home reserves. Others were what Brody described as “hustlers”, attempting to secure money without engaging in sexual relations. As he explained, “Money is thus taken under false pretences, by sheer begging, or by some form of theft.”

Though Indigenous people represented but a small proportion of city-dwellers, they appeared overwhelmingly in statistics on crime. In a study comparing the frequency of Indian arrest rates per 100,000 population, Omer Steward found that the incidence of American Indian criminality for America as a whole was about seven times the national average. Moreover, for all types of arrests the rate of American Indian arrest was three times that of African Americans and about eight times that of Whites. In an urban setting, the problem was compounded, and the arrest rate on a national level for Indian people was twenty-four times the rural rate. In Denver, police records indicated that the arrest rate for Indians was twenty times that of Anglos. Canadian centres revealed similar statistics; a 1969 study estimated that though the Indigenous population represented only between 1.2% and 1.5% of Winnipeg's population and 3.5% of Manitoba's population, Indigenous people represented 1,250 of the 5,472 or 23% of all people involved in crimes in the city of Winnipeg. Of those incarcerated in 1969, Aboriginal people made up 19%. Statistics were comparable in centres such as Saskatoon and Regina, as well as in Alberta's largest cities.

Within the context of the social science research of the 1960s, some researchers sought possible explanations as to why Aboriginal arrest rates were so high – and climbing. In a Sisseton, South Dakota study that revealed that Aboriginal arrest rates far exceeded the population rate of Native American people, possible contributing factors given included that Indian offenders were generally younger and less educated, were more likely to re-offend, did not avoid imprisonment to the same degree as non-
Indian counterparts, and were discriminated against by court officers. In addition, they were more likely to be arrested for intoxication or while intoxicated: as Stewart explained, “drunkenness alone accounted for 71 percent of all Indian arrests reported in 1960.”

There were many reasons provided by the police, of course, for such statistics. Chief among them was the failure for the two groups to properly communicate. As one Regina Police Superintendent stated, “The native doesn’t understand us at all, and we don’t understand the native.” Undoubtedly, it was more than ‘misunderstanding’ that contributed to Indigenous fears about police officers. In October 1975, the Institute of Urban Studies at the University of Winnipeg presented a report of the Winnipeg Police Commission entitled Winnipeg's Core Area; An Assessment of Conditions Affecting Law Enforcement. It examined housing, employment, school, playgrounds, social services in attempting to document why problems continued to persist between Winnipeg Police and residents of the core area. Though it devoted a chapter on Native people in the city, the presence of Indigenous people was apparent in nearly all 140 pages of the report, though as one Winnipeg judge pointed out, “Native people in fact were involved in a low percentage of violent crimes and crimes against the person.”

Run-ins between Native people and the law were most frequent in the area of liquor charges, Child Welfare charges, and juvenile delinquency. In Winnipeg's 1969 statistics, 64.8% of all Native offences were violations of the Liquor Control Act and Aboriginal people accounted for 77.8% of all fines given out under its provisions. These findings echoed those made by studies of other Canadian centres: in Saskatoon, for example, the vast majority of charges for Aboriginal people stemmed from incidents involving “alcohol, petty theft (in order to buy more liquor), disturbance of the peace and vagrancy.” It is noteworthy that though vagrancy as such was not a crime, the vagrancy provisions in the criminal code enumerated a series of offences which would, upon conviction, result in the labelling of a person a “vagrant.” These included, as of 1954 when the vagrancy section was significantly amended, the crimes of wandering and trespassing, begging, supporting oneself with gaming or crime, and being a 'common
prostitute or night walker.” Prashan Ranasinghe argues that though the law was significantly amended and reworded in 1953 and in 1954, much of the revisions, which now included vagrancy offences conducted in virtually any private or public place, had the effect of making many aspects of this law more restrictive than ever. For Indigenous people trying to survive in urban streets, the “crime” of vagrancy could be used by the police in almost any circumstance and often was.

Aboriginal people also offered potential explanations for their frequency in dealing with the law, chief among them police prejudice, as well as accompanying discrimination from the legal system itself. The Manitoba Indian Brotherhood's study of the matter offered several reasons including poor education, endemic poverty, lack of legal aid services, and unfamiliarity with the law. As its report explained, “The problem we have with the legal system exists because we must live with White Man’s law – a law that was imposed on us from outside, a law often alien to our way of living and thinking, a law we often do not understand, a law that seems to us to protect White men but not Indian people, and consequently a system of law which builds Indian resentment instead of active co-operation.” While the MIB focused primarily on reserve policing, the factors cited for the high rates of arrest and conviction were also true of the urban environment, where Aboriginal people regarded the police with fear and apprehension, as well as, in many cases, with resignation. Quite simply, Aboriginal people had learned that, with the police as with other agencies, it simply did not pay to complain. When complaints against officers were made, Indigenous people often found themselves simply brushed aside and feared later retribution from the same patrolmen still on the street. In May of 1970, an Aboriginal youth's complaint against two Minneapolis police officers was overruled by a municipal judge even though the Minneapolis Human Relations Commission had found the two officers guilty of racial discrimination at a hearing only two months before. The youth, who had found his runaway sister walking down a city street and was holding her to the ground to prevent her from running away when the squad car pulled up, was subsequently beaten, he reported. He testified that even though his sister was holding on to him
for fear of the officers, they were forcefully separated and he was hit on the shoulder with a nightstick before being taken to the police station. In his ruling, the judge argued that because nothing had been said to Graves about the fact that he was an Indian on the night in question, no evidence of discrimination could be found even though the officers' conduct may not have been appropriate for the situation. Thus, even support groups such as the Minneapolis Human Relations Commission were often ineffective in combating the injustices of justice on behalf of Indigenous people.

If Aboriginal people in both Canadian and American cities were more often arrested, they were also much more often convicted of their crimes, receiving more jail time and harsher sentences for the same offences. In a 1976 study, Williams found that Native Americans constituted 12 percent of Seattle arrests for 1971 but accounted for only 3 percent of cases dismissed and 5 percent found non-guilty. In a different American study, statistical analysis demonstrated that while Indian people constituted only half of one percent of America's population, they accounted for over 2 percent of inmates in state institutions. In the Canadian setting, the findings varied by provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Native offenders did receive a lower percentage of initial jail sentencing while the defaulting on fine payments accounted for 57.4% of admissions to Saskatchewan correctional institutions in 1970-1971. Native people also received the highest proportion of sentences stemming from provincial and municipal charges and were, on average, incarcerated for shorter periods of time than non-Native offenders proportionate to their presence in the jails. An explanation for the shorter sentences offered by Douglas A. Schmeiser, a then-Dean of Law at the University of Saskatchewan, proposed that this was due largely to the nature of charges of a less serious nature. Overall then, it could be concluded that Native people were arrested more for less serious crimes than non-Native offenders, at least in the province of Saskatchewan but in a pattern replicated elsewhere in Canada.

For those confronting the legal system for the first time in a largely impersonal urban environment without the support of family and friends, the process could be daunting. As Jim Harding
reported of the Canadian example, Aboriginal people were often unaware of their legal rights and privileges, pleading guilty “without making any attempt to defend themselves.” ⁸⁶ As the Aboriginal publication, The Native People noted, “There is a definite need by the native people of our country to know their rights and powers as citizens. It is evident that far too many native people, when confronted by the law, go along with the law enforcement agencies just to get it over with. These poor souls generally end up looking out from behind bars, not knowing why or how they got there.”⁸⁷ The Native People thus ran a monthly column entitled “Civil Rights and Police Powers” intended to educate Indigenous people of their rights. It began with an explanation of the reasons for arrest with or without a warrant under Canada's Criminal Code, as well as explained that potential arrestees should ask for the reason of their arrest if no warrant was produced, as well as note his number or his badge, contact a lawyer. It urged Indigenous people to cooperate and to retain legal services so as not to provoke the ire of officers, and promised that the next month's column would explain what to do if the officer asked you to go with him. In the United States, researchers Stauss, Chadwick, Bahr and Halverson conducted a series of interviews that established that “The arrested Native American is generally convinced that he will be convicted and punished regardless of his guilt or innocence. He thus makes little, if any, effort to defend himself before the court.” Furthermore, Indians were largely unaware of possible avenues of support within the community, including legal aid programs.⁸⁸

Once arrested, charged and prosecuted, studies also demonstrated that Indigenous people often received more than their share of prison geography. In Saskatchewan, people of Indian or Metis origin accounted for 48.7% of admissions in the year 1969-1970 even though they represented no more than thirty percent of the province's population. This percentage rose to 58.3% for 1971 and 1972, and for the Prince Albert Correctional Centre's fiscal year 1970-1971, Aboriginal admissions were a shocking 63.0%. For women, the statistics were even more shocking, as they accounted for 87.2% of admissions to Saskatchewan's Pine Grove facility for women inmates in 1970-1971.⁸⁹ In Manitoba, the percentage
of Native admissions to provincial correctional facilities rose steadily each year, from 39.4% in 1966 to 50.9% in 1971. The Winnipeg Core Area report found that “Manitoba, which has a provincial population that is twelve percent native, has a jail population that is thirty-seven percent native at the federal Stoney Mountain Institution, fifty-six percent at the provincial Headingley Jail, and an astonishing eighty percent at the Portage La Prairie Correctional Centre for Women.” In Alberta, Native people who consisted of only approximately 5% of the province's population but numbered between 25 and 35% of admissions to provincial correctional institutions between 1965 and 1972.

While provinces with fewer Aboriginal residents had fewer Aboriginal admissions, the prevalence of an Aboriginal population within the jailhouse setting, particularly in the Western provinces, could not be denied, often leading to the establishment of a new consciousness that could breed activism both behind bars, and once released. In short, jails became excellent recruiting grounds for new and more radical organizations. As Bruce D'Arcus reports, many of the key leaders of the early American Indian Movement met in Stillwater State Penitentiary, including Dennis Banks and Clyde Bellecourt who were imprisoned for the crime of burglary. In jail and just like those who reported of their time in universities, budding activists could also be inspired by other movements and by news of the wider world. As an AIM founder reported, it was while imprisoned in 1967 that “I began to understand there was a hell of a goddamn movement going on that I wasn't a part of, the antiwar movement, the Black Panther movement, the civil rights movement, the Students for a Democratic Society.”

Jails were places for radicalization: Aboriginal inmates had very little patience for slow and incremental change. Thus, the work of mainstream organizations was not always appealing to them. As one editorial by Donnie Yellowfly, incarcerated president of the Native Brotherhood of Indian and Metis, an organization formed in jail, pointed out, Native inmates were the “forgotten people,” abandoned by their organizations to the system. He accused Native organizations of not giving a voice
to Indigenous inmates and argued that, as a result, incarcerated Native people required their organization to engender possibilities for rehabilitation. As he stated, “Prisons can do their part to realize rehabilitation; inmates DO their part; but without public participation there can be NO rehabilitation! How many of you so-called leaders have ever taken the time out to visit the institutions where your brothers and sisters are?” The fact that Yellowfly was working to form a Brotherhood that would teach responsibility and cultural pride, as well as work to establish new halfway houses in cities where the ex-con population was significant.

In response to both the criminalization of Indigenous identity as well as persistent police harassment, the monitoring of the treatment of Aboriginal people arrested for various crimes became a focal point for urban activists. In Minneapolis, the emerging movement of the 1960s featured mostly urban Ojibwas who initially formed the American Indian Movement group as a police force `to police the police`. Given rising incidents of police brutality among Indigenous people in the area, local Indian people decided that even law enforcement needed to become accountable to a larger public. AIM, for example, focused initially on publicizing the ill treatment and abuse of Indian people arrested, and grew into a larger organization focusing on a wider variety of issues from there.

D. 'THE OLD DAYS ARE GONE': CITY STORIES

Skid row never represented the whole of urban Indigenous existence, though the prevalence of research on the subject may have given that impression. For many, a life in the city did not lead directly or even ever to skid row, though it represented many pitfalls and challenges, not the least of which was in many cases an acute sense of social alienation within an enlarged urban context. In 1966, the Indian Eskimo Association, or IEA, held a national conference with the theme of “Indians in the City.” In his
conference address, Mr. Walter Currie noted that a committee titled “Indians in Transition” had been formed in January of the same year with a stated purpose “to do all possible to lessen the difficulties faced by the Native people when they come into the City.”

City stories, which often contained some element of education, of oppression, of alienation – a combination of several factors that made up the Indigenous experience – thus provided, both for legislators, activists and for the public, a better sense of the Indigenous urban experience that any statistic or number.

What city stories demonstrated went beyond the statistic. For example, young people, in particular, who formed the lion's share of new emigrants, faced particular challenges in adjusting to city life. While life on the reserve, for many, seemed to offer nothing, they quickly found out that life in an urban context could be as difficult, for different reasons. Tony Mason, speaking of the “Think Indian” project in East Vancouver, a program designed to orient young Indians to the realities of city life, stated in an October 3, 1970 interview with CBC's Our Native Land radio program, that there were big differences between the urban and rural experience. In his capacity as a leader for the program, Mason characterized the city itself as apathetic, which led to alienated and isolated Indians who had trouble adjusting to their new realities. He described, in particular, the so-called ignorance of reserve newcomers who knew only to work and to drink within the urban environment. He argued that Indian people wanted to live in the community among Whites as equal members, but that they needed to be shown where opportunities existed and how to access them. He added that many Indians saw the city as a kind of utopian reality that was more often than not, disappointing.

As Joan Starr Takahara, Sioux, explained, her first reaction to city life was utter loneliness. After being given instructions to call the relocation office when she arrived, Joan found no one at the office so made her way to the YMCA. Dale Solace, a Maliseet from the Tobique reserve in New Brunswick, also spoke to the values of the city, arguing that the city was far-removed from the reserve and that despite many good intentions, Whites could simply not understand the dislocation felt by young Indians making the transition. As
one Toronto study reported, “the value system under which [Indigenous people] have been living is at variance with the value system and expectations of urban society.”¹⁰⁰ Even the president of the National Indian Brotherhood, George Manuel, argued that the acceptance of Indian people in cities was at best, superficial.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, and as the stories of those living in cities demonstrated, city life was often a necessity. Anthony Apakark Thrasher, whose autobiography published in 1976 chronicled his journey from far-North Eskimo to a man accused of murder and eventually convicted of manslaughter, heard as much. “The old days are gone”: this is what Thrasher reported hearing from the government agent who came to his northern community looking to recruit workers. And so Thrasher’s journey began, from a traditional far-Northern Aboriginal lifestyle based on fishing and trapping to one mired in tragedy and nostalgia in Edmonton, Alberta.

Born in 1937, Thrasher came from a large family of 21 children. His family slept in a traditional tent and spent his childhood learning, observing and preparing for the life his ancestors had also lived. As he recounted, “Early in the morning the men would go off with their dog teams to tend the traplines and we would stay behind with the women and the old people... Later, we would gather around the old men to watch them care tools and little scenes from their own hunting days.”¹⁰² When Thrasher was approximately 5 years old, he was send to mission school in Aklavik, a schooner ride away from Tuktoyaktuk, with several of his brothers and sisters. He describes a mixed experience at school but fondly recalls the summers spent at home in Tuktoyaktuk with his family. Thrasher was discharged after grade six at the age of 12, when his father had a stroke and he had to become a full-time caregiver. At the age of seventeen, he moved to Aklavik and began working on a Hudson's Bay Company freight ship until the following spring when he thought, at least initially, that opportunity knocked.

Insisting that the old days were gone, a government agent asked Thrasher if he was interested in taking a six-week course on driving machinery. Urging him to abandon trapping altogether, the agent
reflected what was nevertheless a new Northern reality: as Thrasher reported, “By 1957, it was no longer possible to live by trapping alone. Half the population of Aklavik was relying on government handouts. It was either that, or join the white construction gangs, or starve.”

Thrasher's initial impressions of Edmonton, the city to which he was sent for training, were of amazement. He explained being thrilled by the millions of beautiful lights visible from the transport plane flying his group in. When they reached the ground, their wonder continued; “Riding into the city, our heads were turning right and left as huge, high buildings flashed by and people with fancy clothes strolled along wide concrete sidewalks.” Their hotel, a rundown establishment, was a stark contrast to the luxury they had experienced from the taxi, but there was too much to learn to worry about it. After one night of apprehension and fear, “curiosity won out,” and several of the relocatees ventured into the streets to explore their new habitat. As Thrasher reports, the simple social mores of city life were challenging- the group was chastised for jaywalking and for taking up the whole sidewalk when walking as a group. Though most steered clear of them, they did meet some who would help. These were, as Thrasher later found out, “Skid Row bums,” but “they were the only ones who would talk to us.”

To cope with the anxiety of this new environment, Thrasher began to drink. As he explained, “The more I drank, the freer I felt,” and drinking became a regular occurrence. Despite an attempt at rehabilitation in 1964 and 1965, Thrasher returned to the streets and continued to drink and live on Skid Row, homeless and penniless. As he argued, “I never met anybody on Skid Row who wanted to get off it. You always want to run out and find another drink.” He made carvings to sustain his drinking habit and spent much of his time getting to know other residents on Skid Row, many of whom he reported were not Indian or Eskimo people.

In addition to the drink, Thrasher struggled to come to terms with both the misery, the violence and the chaotic nature of life on Skid Row. He eventually hitchhiked to Calgary where, during a
particularly severe drinking binge, he was alleged to have beaten to death a man named Charles Ratkovitch, also of Skid Row. Send to the Prince Albert Penitentiary, Thrasher only felt safe there when locked alone in his cell at night. Prince Albert Prison, an institution with a relatively high population of First Nations and Metis prisoners, was nevertheless a dangerous place, and Thrasher joined the Native Brotherhood in the hopes of staying safe.  

Prison life did offer some advantages—removed from alcohol, Anthony was able to move beyond his addiction and begin some classes in the Prison school. He enjoyed algebra and psychology, played hockey and joined the prison Alcoholics Anonymous group. He also joined the Toastmasters Club because, as he explains, “I tried keeping to myself as much as I could to avoid trouble with the other inmates.” Still, trouble followed and, after much campaigning, Thrasher was eventually transferred to William Head, a minimum security camp at Swartz Bay, near Victoria, B.C., but a fight got him transferred to the British Columbia Penitentiary, the “Big House”, as he called it, to serve the rest of his sentence as of November of 1971.

Thrasher's story did not have a happy ending: Thrasher was eventually sent to a hospital for the criminally insane, rather than returning home to the North. So was the case with many stories of the city, which blended an acute sense of dislocation and alienation with a determination to overcome the difficulties faced. In 1980, reporter Larry Krotz published an expose of the life of Indigenous people in Canada’s cities. As he pointed out in his introduction to the book, “It could be, it ought to be, a dynamic moment in the history of the world, a moment filed with all sorts of welcomed possibilities. But it is more often a disturbing, paralysing time.” He called the story of Canada’s Indigenous dwellers “one of the most important stories of this decade in the tides that create Canadian life. Few stories and few human movements so confront our history; so confront our private fears and stereotypes; so confront our myths; and so leave us confused and paralysed.”

Though Krotz offered his perspective and commentary, he also did what many researchers had
failed to do in their own examination of Aboriginal lives by reproducing Indigenous stories in full, from a first-person perspective. Bev Desnomie was a relocated mother from the Peepeekisis reserve one hundred kilometres northeast of Regina. She had moved to the city initially to do some secretarial work at the Lebreque residential school on a temporary basis. She had left her reserve due to an overcrowded housing situation and to contribute money to the family income by finding a job.

Her first rental in Regina, she recalls, was both overpriced and undermaintained. As she recounts, “It was a two-bedroom house and it was very small. It was very small. The bathroom was downstairs and it had this real rickety stairs... All we had was one mattress, a sleeping bag and our clothes.” Bev had brought her two children to the city with her and hired a babysitter to watch them while she worked. Though she did receive some assistance from Indian Affairs as well as the local Friendship Centre to find work, though she eked out a living at first, in part, with the help she received from her family back home including fresh meat and vegetables grown on the reserve. With a grade 12 education, Bev was also more employable than many Aboriginal relocatees to cities. Though the job was minimum wage, Bev was happy to be working. As she asserted, “Since I had grade twelve I guess they thought here’s someone who will at least do her job.” 111 Bev explained that she faced prejudice in Regina but that she had been prepared for it due to her coming there for grade 10. Still, she said, “It really hits you in the face... when you go into a store, the detectives follow you around.” She also explained the many incidents of sexual solicitation when simply walking to work. Of this, she simply stated, “I don’t think that happens to white girls.” 112 Within her narrative, Bev offered some sense of how the city could alter Indigenous values, as well as maintained the importance of a cultural connection for urban Aboriginal people. As she insisted, “An Indian is an Indian anywhere as long as you remember that you are an Indian, and what you are supposed to be doing with your culture ... But I’m just learning all these things too.” 113

Learning to navigate between the Indigenous and the non-Indigenous world was a process of
transformation, and many Indigenous relocatees struggled with maintaining a connection to both. For Indigenous children raised in the urban environment, the connection could be even more tenuous. Doreen Wyatt of Regina had been raised in the city and lamented her lack of knowledge about her traditional culture. As she recalled, her father had wanted to be white, and had therefore avoided teaching his thirteen children anything about their Metis heritage.

Doreen had learned of her Indigenous heritage in the fifth grade but had only, as a young adult, begun to seek out connections with others. She reported that she had encountered various types of discrimination including being ignored, insulted, and snubbed in social situations and in stores. As she explained, “Regina is really bad about that sort of thing, prejudice. Real subtle.” Doreen became involved in the Friendship Centre hoping to learn more about her Cree and Saulteaux background: “The things that are important to achieving identity in the city have to do with the way you are brought up... Since I missed that, I've now got to make my identity, so to speak... I won't say I have got it yet, maybe I never will have it. But you have to keep trying.”

Trying to find Indigeneity was one point of intersection for many displaced Aboriginal people, and contributed largely to the development of a pan-Indian character. As Bruce D'Arcus explains, the “red ghetto” phenomenon existing in cities such as San Francisco and Minneapolis created melting pot spaces where people once tied to tribal or regional identities could find a common sense of Indianness, partly as a result of the poor treatment that urban Indigenous people suffered at the hands of authorities, aid societies and law enforcement. This was true in Canadian centres featuring a large concentration of Aboriginal people, as well. This common sense was manifested, among other things, in cultural celebration and in powwows, which American Indian Movement leader Russell Means characterized as experiences in camaraderie and fellowship. Though this could dilute reservation roots and tribal traditions-- Means would later reflect that participants had become “caricatures of their own traditions, unrecognizable as communities, as nations, almost unrecognizable as Indians” -- they served to
create for some a sense of community long lost, or which had never existed.

At the same time as the city could generate new Indigenous identity, many younger Aboriginal people in particular expressed some appreciation for the anonymity of the city. In other words, they embraced such alienation, believing that their existence in cities, though often anonymous, was much easier than it would be in smaller urban centres or on their home reserves and reservations. As one Aboriginal person living in Toronto explained, Aboriginal people had a much harder time obtaining employment in smaller communities, where ingrained assumptions were often difficult to dislodge. In the city, on the other hand, “Employment is more impersonal. The fact that you are, or are not something from a racial point of view, is not important ... [I]n these smaller places the feelings of prejudice are much closer to the surface.”117 On the other hand, many successful Indigenous people also rejected their progression through the ranks of employment as so-called successful “token” Indians. Those not as successful in procuring steady employment in the city often displayed an “internalization of the non-Indian’s hostility towards the Indian” as a significant factor in their own Indigenous identity, or lack thereof.118 As Means pointed out in the 1990s, “Urban assimilation over the last three decades threatens to accomplish the destruction of Indian culture as efficiently as cavalry raids and massacres.”119

The words and reflections of Indigenous people were also largely reflected in the plethora of studies regarding American Indian adaptation at the time. Researcher Joan Ablon asserted that American Indians in the Bay Area associated mostly with other American Indians, but did so largely ignorant of tribal affiliation. As she explained, “The fact of self-conscious Indianness appears to determine the choice of Indian relationships – a choice that usually precludes intermingling with non-Indians either in social groups or on an individual intimate friendship basis.”120 She further characterized this type of identity as a “neo-Indian social identity which is pan-Indian in its orientation.”121 A 1968 New York Times article captured the reality of Indian identity well in its very
“The American Indian: Part of the City, and Yet...”. The article went on to detail a new American Indian group formed in New York as a way to promote “a new Indianness,” as defined by the renaissance in Indian culture at the time. The need for the group “had become apparent to them when they noticed that city Indians were wearing Indian braids and jewelry, giving their children Indian names, and passionately relearning their tribal language, history, dances.” In Seattle, Washington, which also attracted a large number of American Indian relocatees, researchers Bruce Chadwick and Joseph H. Stauss found that the level of assimilation of urban Indian people remained relatively low regardless of time lived in the city, suggesting that many Indigenous people retained “a strong sense of peoplehood” that was an important deterrent to the realization of assimilation.

In a separate article, Stauss and Chadwick also maintained that Indian people both desired to make a life in the city while maintaining ties to and identifying with their “Indian way of life.” Thus, urban activism often took on a particular character that stressed the existence of an essentialized Indian identity forged within the pressures of a city melting pot. As Price argued, “Pan-Indianism thus seems to emerge as a stabilizing element -- and perhaps a permanent part -- of the adaptation of the Indian migrant to the metropolitan areas, and a significant facet of the ethnic diversity of the American city.”

Though members of any given urban group may have a majority of members from a certain linguistic or tribal affiliation, most focused on creating new communities.

E. NEW COMMUNITIES, SAME OLD SOLUTIONS

In both Canada and the United States, the absence of relevant programming formed a major impetus for Indigenous people to organize their own urban programs. “Official” programs administered by different levels of government were often more notable in their absence than in their
effectiveness. In Saskatoon for example, there were no services directed exclusively to Indians and Metis with the exception of the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre. The reason, according to Dosman, was the cities like Saskatoon simply felt that Indians should be none of their business and their care, the responsibility of provincial or federal administrators and politicians.\textsuperscript{126}

In Canadian cities, limited federal programs were available to some urban Aboriginal people, including assistance in housing and in employment apart from the relocation program. Since 1967 the Indian Affairs Branch had administered a housing program designed, according to then-Minister Arthur Laing, “to ease the transition from the reserve to the materialistic urban society.”\textsuperscript{127} The program allowed the Branch to aid Aboriginal people regularly employed off of the reserve in finding and maintaining off-reserve accommodation. The grant could amount to $10,000 but was conditional upon good behaviour and the ability of the individual to contribute at the outset-- and to keep contributing--to meet mortgage obligations. As Dosman explained, however, “Of all the programs, this is the most sought after; it is also by far and away the most difficult to obtain.”\textsuperscript{128}

In addition to these federal programs, urban Indigenous people could also receive some provincial benefits. Unlike federal programs, the Metis were eligible under provincial programming, which mirrored the objectives of federal programs and funds. The province of Saskatchewan set up a Task Force on Indian Opportunity to examine programs of education, training, housing and employment, though the task force included many more non-Aboriginal than Aboriginal panellists. Provincial programming relied on employment relocation as the primary way to reduce welfare dependency and also featured counselling services to assist newly relocated individuals. In addition, the department could provide one month’s rent plus clothing and food to eligible applicants.\textsuperscript{129} Both programs functioned similarly but the federal program relocated far more than the provincial one.

On a more personal level, social workers often also provided services to Aboriginal people within Canadian cities. But, as Brody pointed out, there existed an “enormous gulf ... between the
helpers and the helped: not only do they come from opposite social classes, different life-styles, and different races in a race-conscious society, the helpers do not seem to be able to grasp that there exists in skid row a way of life which is gratifying... Skid row life... accommodates the marginal people far more completely than any of the institutions.” While this statement may have seemed surprising given the difficult realities of the skid row setting, social workers often displayed the same paternalistic disdain as did government workers, agencies and programs, as well as private charities.

In Canada and in the United States, private donors and charities also played an important role in urban centres. In Saskatoon, the Salvation Army offered clean lodging to clients, though not uplifting by any means. As Dosman explained, “Life in the Salvation Army symbolizes failure in the larger society; it is a depressed, although not necessarily brutal, home for male outsiders.” He further described the attitude of Salvation Army workers, based on his own observations, as one of “paternalism mingled with contempt.” Aboriginal people who sought shelter there were frequently lectured on the importance of work and thrift, not unlike the Indian agents that many migrants from the reserve had become accustomed to in their earlier days. In addition, the Salvation Army developed a relationship with the Saskatoon police, mistrusted by Aboriginal people, whereby a Salvation Army worker dropped by the Police Station daily to discuss incidents from the previous night. As Dosman asserted, “[The Deputy Police Chief] maintained close relations with the Salvation Army, the agency which he felt was in closest touch with the native population.”

In addition to the Salvation Army, other church-affiliated agencies also operated in Saskatoon. The Friendship Inn was run by an interdenominational group and its clientele, approximately fifty percent Aboriginal. It offered lodging, meals, a clothing bank and a barber, as well as free counselling and legal aid, though not to those who had been drinking or were accused of other “bad behaviours.” The problem with these programs, as with similar initiatives in other cities, was that they did not fundamentally affect Indigenous reality within the cities; at the end of the day, Aboriginal people were
still under-paid, under-employed, alienated, and ill-served by the institutions designed to help alleviate their plight. As Dosman usefully pointed out, “The conclusion, therefore, concerning the effects of the poverty programs... is that they do not foster upward mobility; in the immediate future little impact on the native social structure can be anticipated.”

As in Canada, governments and charities in the United States worked to find solutions to a growing problem as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, accustomed to dealing with a relatively stationary reservation population, struggled to adjust to a changing demographic. In the early 1970s, a review had been conducted of BIA services by then-former Interior Secretary Hickel. He proposed to reorganize the bureau and to transfer authority from area directors to field administrators. For those Aboriginal people living on closed reservations, the recommendations exacerbated fears that they would receive less support from area directors whose power would be curtailed. In addition, they feared a diversion of both services and monies from the reservations in favour of urban Indian people. Not surprisingly, those in the cities insisted that they had long been cast aside by the bureau as urban Indigenous people, and therefore deserved extra aid and attention. They also maintained that “a redirection of BIA efforts would not mean a cutback in per-capita reservation aid, but would mean that the allocations would follow the Indians when they move, as so many are dong.” For its part, the BIA argued that since it was in part responsible for relocating American Indians to cities, it had a responsibility to serve them in urban centres.

Though the Bureau of Indian Affairs professed to want to help, it is clear that non-Indigenous and Indigenous service organizations provided much of the aid administered for Indigenous people in cities at the time. The Christian church, for example, often worked within the Indigenous community. As one Chicago resident explained, the church had been instrument in helping her “spiritually, financially, and lots of problems I’ve had now.” St. Augustine’s Church also helped her to find suitable housing so that she could adopt the foster children living with her.
As these programs demonstrated, Indigenous people could find help in the city if only they were willing to conform to a set of standards and rules meant to curb what many workers and so-called helpers was their “natural” inclination to disorder and maladjustment. As such, the need for new programming in the urban environment was relatively urgent for Indigenous people facing a new life in Canadian and American urban centres.

F. INDIGENOUS RESPONSES, INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS

As a result of the many assumptions that social workers, government workers and some religious authorities brought to their charitable efforts, there began, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a new movement to provide help to Indigenous people in the cities. Though they cannot be exclusively placed as an Indigenous solution, Friendship Centres gradually became more independent and increasingly, administered by Aboriginal people, reflecting the desire for Indigenous programming that was relevant and appropriate to the people. Thus, though these centres were occasionally founded by non-Indigenous activists, there evolution suggests that there was something particularly relevant in the way that Aboriginal people used and developed them. On the whole, Friendship Centres provided important relief to many relocating from their reserves and rural areas, as well as new cultural and employment opportunities that were often directed by Indigenous people who had “made it.” As such, the phenomenon of Friendship Centres became the central locust of Indigenous activism in an urban context.

In Canada, the model for the Friendship Centre was provided by the city of Winnipeg whose own centre was fully operational and functioning by 1960, inspiring the creation of a similar centre in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. Other Centres were also located in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton,
Regina, Winnipeg, Kenora and Toronto. The Centres provided counselling and referral services, but more importantly, according to one observer, the Friendship Centre was the only place “providing the Indian with a place where he is accepted socially and where he can find advice and direction, with understanding.”¹³⁷ The last two words of this were significant, for at the time, many agencies supposedly in the service of Indigenous issues did not display such understanding.

In the United States, Chicago provided an early model for Friendship Centres nationwide. According to interviews conducted with several Chicago residents, the Friendship Centre, though not without its issues, clearly provided an important service to the Indigenous community. Begun in 1953, the Indian Centre provided transportation for elders, a food pantry, and an essential means of communicating with other Indigenous people living in different areas of the city. For some, it also provided cultural education and a sense of pride. As one woman noted, “I just seemed to be a different person then, hold my head up high and feel good about myself.”¹³⁸ Another expressed appreciation for the closeness of the relationships at the Centre, as well as the sense of belonging it provided: “That was the one place where I could really go and be with other people and meet other people... If it wasn't for that Indian Centre I wouldn't have gone anywhere. I would have just stayed at home.”¹³⁹ Yet another woman praised the Centre for its activities for children including sports teams and day camps, as well as noted: “People were so nice. They would welcome you to everything. They made you feel at home. Everybody was so close, too, at the time. I'd ... I never felt that anywhere since, that closeness that all people had over there.”¹⁴⁰

Friendship Centres offered services which reflected the desires and needs of their respective constituents, and new programs were frequently added. But, as the 1966 conference of the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada pointed out, “The question continually recurring was whether the Centre should be social and cultural or a service agency, thereby duplicating many existing services.”¹⁴¹ In 1970, the Edmonton Native Friendship Centre expanded its programming to move beyond simply
providing social services such as providing bus tickets and used clothing, to one more focused on celebrating Native culture. According to the Native People, the Centre aimed to add sports activities such as basketball, broomball and hockey, as well as host a pow-wow club, old time dances, beadworking workshops and Cree language classes.\footnote{Cree classes in particular were in significant demand, according to a separate article in January 1971.} As the 1966 conference of the Indian Eskimo Association of Canada pointed out, “the Centre has the most important role to play for the Indians coming into the city. It is the place where psychological problems, such as loneliness, the need for acceptance, and the need for friendship, can be met. It serves as a buffer against the impersonal atmosphere of the city.”\footnote{As much as many lauded the benefits of Friendship Centres, they were not easy organizations to manage. A major disadvantage of the centres was their constant search for funding. Friendship Centres were also often crippled by lack of funds. As one Toronto respondent noted, “I think more resources should be contracted to the Centre as unfortunately a great deal of, especially, government funds are given to the Indian-Eskimo Association who employ people who give stupid talks and who organize expensive conventions for themselves to go to.”}  

As much as many lauded the benefits of Friendship Centres, they were not easy organizations to manage. A major disadvantage of the centres was their constant search for funding. Friendship Centres were also often crippled by lack of funds. As one Toronto respondent noted, “I think more resources should be contracted to the Centre as unfortunately a great deal of, especially, government funds are given to the Indian-Eskimo Association who employ people who give stupid talks and who organize expensive conventions for themselves to go to.”\footnote{Brody echoed this sentiment, arguing that the Centre in his city of study required massive expansion including more office space for staff and a residence, but that the funds were simply not forthcoming.} In March of 1971, \textit{The Native People} ran a story on Alberta's six native friendship centres who, the article reported, would be faced with a financial crisis in as early as ten months. Jeff Choy-Hee, Executive Director of the Edmonton Centre, noted that they may even be forced to close or to truncate several programs. Friendship centres could and did receive government monies- for the fiscal years 1967 to 1970, Alberta's centres, operating under the umbrella of the Alberta Association of Friendship Centres, received a combined $60,000 – but governments often failed to realize the increasing costs facing the centres as well as the increase in cost of living which increased each centre's budgetary requirements. In addition, Centres operated on community
funding which varied from location to location. Church groups provided the lion's share, but Choy-Hee argued that “the governments should bear more of the responsibility. If centres are to continue assisting native people in the transition from rural to city life we need more funds.” In 1970, community funding amounted to nearly half of the Friendship Centres' budgets in Alberta and by 1970, it represented fifty percent of the Edmonton budget. The crisis facing Alberta's centres was in fact manufactured so that all six centres would reach a crisis point at the same time and seek further funding. As Choy-Hee pointed out, “We want to approach the government as an association with a common problem,” rather than simply as one or two isolated centres in peril.

Though the Alberta association did have a representative in Ottawa, the job was a part-time one that often failed to net results. In addition, the constituency of Friendship Centres was growing, reflecting more and more Indigenous immigrants into urban centres—under consideration, as of 1971, was the opening of yet another centre in either Calgary, Grande Prairie and Peace River. Monthly operating costs were often high—the Winnipeg Native Club for example, was owned by the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg Inc. (IMFC), and cost approximately $2,500 per month to operate. Governments often fell short of budgetary request; the IMFC petitioned the federal government for $57,750 for the fiscal year ending March 31st, 1975, but received $2,000 less. It asked the provincial government for $83,000 but received only $77,000. The United Way was the only contributor which matched its requested amount, funding a staff of drop-in councillors for the Centre. As one editorial pointed out, “It would appear that we have been courted, betrothed and then left standing at the church door. Friendship Centres should be a rallying point for the urban Indian ... Government should take a good look at the role of the Friendship centres and their definite necessity within the community.”

Friendship Centres also had their share of critics from mainstream and reserve-based organizations. In an interview with Our Native Land, Andrew Delisle, then-chair of the National Indian
Brotherhood’s Committee on Indian Rights and Treaties, spoke frankly of the so-called `problem the urban Friendship Centres, at least from his organization’s perspective. According to Delisle, Friendship Centres did have an important role to play, but should not create reservations in cities. In his opinion, Indians in cities should strive to return to the reserve environment, rather than remain within the urban environment. Fostering too great a sense of community would encourage urban Indians to forge stronger roots in their new communities and thus weaken reservations.150

In addition to the critics who rejected the Friendship Centre movement based on its perceived weakening of tribal affiliation, many urban Indians simply did not use the facilities. As Nagler explained, “The Centre experiences difficulties in solving all the needs of Indians ... The Friendship Centre cannot contact all of the Indians who are in the city, or who enter the city, but only those who choose to take advantage of its facilities.” Thus, many Toronto Indians had no knowledge of the Centre's resources. In addition, respondents in the Toronto survey also cited their responsibilities within the urban world-- work, family, and the like – as reasons for their lack of frequenting the Centre.151 When they did frequent Aboriginal Centres, many often did so for social purposes only; as the seventeenth annual report of the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg Inc., pointed out of the Winnipeg Native Club, “We are constantly promoting the place and yet the only time Native people really use the building is when there is a dance and liquor is being sold.”152 Many argued that the difficulties many Indigenous people faced in finding a satisfactory social life could be eased with greater access: “If the community recreation agencies... made themselves more readily available, and publicized their availability this difficulty could be eased. After all, beverage rooms and bars advertise, are readily available, and draw more than their quota of Indians.”153

There also seemed to exist, depending on whose opinion was solicited, an important class dimension defining those who often used the Friendship Centre and those who worked there- as Nagler pointed out, many white-collar Aboriginal people in cities participated in other organizations such as
service clubs, political parties and religious and social organizations while blue-collar workers often failed to participate in any.\textsuperscript{154} Leadership in Friendship Centres was sometimes considered too “White”, such as in the case of the Saskatoon Friendship Centre established by joint native-white board. Though meant to be transitional, Dosman argued that the limits of White control had, in this instance, been overreached.\textsuperscript{155} This critique was also expressed by Stanley McKay Sr. of Winnipeg who began going to the Friendship Centre early on when its board of directors were all non-Indigenous people.\textsuperscript{156} Indigenous people had long been campaigning for Indigenous control of the Centres, with non-Indians acting in an advisory capacity only.\textsuperscript{157}

In other cases, the perception of the organizations as middle class often centred on the way in which clients felt that they were treated. Of the Regina Friendship Centre, an interviewee named Rose was frank: “I don’t go to the Friendship Centre anymore... a lotta times I’d go into the centre thinking I’d get some advice... but they were no help... they don’t care what goes on as long as they are taking their money. And they were supposed to be doing good for the people.” In addition, Rose described a relatively hostile environment that she argued had embittered many other people in the community: “Every time I went in there it was as if I wasn’t wanted; I had to stand against the wall so that I wouldn’t get kicked from behind. There’s a feeling in there that makes you feel that you’re not wanted without your being told.”\textsuperscript{158} Lloyd Caibaiosai, an Ojibwa who had served as executive director of the London, Ontario Friendship Centre, reported that “The workers were insular in their thinking... In other words, workers were saying, ‘we are masters of our centres to clients.’ This is the kind of cold feeling one gets in welfare offices.”\textsuperscript{159} He argued that Friendship Centres, by the early 1970s had changed; whereas they had been, in the early 1960s, friendly places where people could find real camaraderie and assistance, Caibaiosai maintained that in the last several years, highly acculturated Indigenous people had been hired who were not genuine in their desire to truly help. In terms of some Centres' new focus on cultural awareness, Caibaiosai stated: “Let me say this, they are in no position to promote
cultural awareness because of their more middle-class way of thinking.” In citing evidence of this middle-class thought process, Caibaosai pointed out Centres' limited hours of operation- though open from 8:30 am to 9:30 pm, he argued that those most in need of help needed assistance between the hours of 5:30 and 9:30 am, as well as between 10:30 pm and 1:30 am. He also felt that the social activities offered by the Centres were restrictive and that they should play more of an educational role, as well as continue to provide frontline services to those most in need.

Caibaosai was correct in pointing out the way in which Friendship Centres had changed; as a whole, they had become more bureaucratized and structured than from the outset, and regional associations had been formed. These eventually coalesced into a National Association of Friendship Centres which met in Winnipeg in October of 1971, the same year in which the Manitoba Association of Friendship Centres was also incorporated. Manitoba had, at the time, a whopping seven operational Friendship Centres in the province, and so it seemed an ideal location to host a national gathering. For its part, the national association initially represented 35 separate centres. Its executive consisted of ten board members, two from each of the Western provinces where Friendship Centres were established. The Native People, which reported on the proceedings, was extremely flattering in its description of the work of the Manitoba government and of the efforts of then-Premier Ed Schreyer. As it reported, “The Manitoba Government assisted the national board in numerous ways... It was established, in principle at least, that the national board can look forward to assistance from Manitoba in building a solid foundation for its work.” It further reported the importance of a national organization in securing core funding. As it reported, “[I]t is the concept of Core funding that must become a reality to assure that we shall stay in existence.” The task of Friendship Centres in this era, the report continued, was to closely examine the work being done and to provide even greater services, upgrading all of their activities without forgetting the individual ; in other words, “they must not be merely another agency.” This was not, in fact, a new opinion – it had been voiced as early as 1966, when the IEA conference report
asserted that “Centres trying to take over the job of the Indian Affairs Office should remind themselves of their policy... The most important factor is that the Indian people feel they are a part of the Centre.”

Aside from the Friendship Centres, there existed several different outlets for Indigenous identity to be shared, manifest and recreated, though participation in these was often limited. In her study of the urban Indigenous population residing in the San Francisco Bay area, Joan Ablon estimated that less than one sixth of the adult Indian population of the San Francisco Bay area were touched by the activities of communal organizations and that it was the employees themselves who most often represented the most devoted of their membership rosters. This was not due to a lack of opportunity: in this area, no fewer than sixteen specific organizations were organized for Indian participation in addition to a number of baseball and basketball teams that consisted, Ablon argued, of “focal points for social interaction.” She maintained that the most influential of these were the Intertribal Friendship House, the San Francisco American Indian Centre, the Four Winds Club, and Oakland American Indian Baptist Church, the San Jose Dance Club and the American Indian Council of the Bay Area. The same pattern was observed in Los Angeles, where despite extensive mailing lists of nominal members, only about 20 percent of Indigenous people were truly active in formal organizations such as athletic leagues, churches, clubs and various kinds of centres. Many families were active in other social settings, such as important gatherings and pow-wows, but declined to become involved in other, more formal groupings. As in the case of Friendship Centres moreover, economic status and achievement often affected membership: in one case, it was found that rural manual labourers and the lowest educated entered community groups at the very lowest rates. None of these organizations were tribe-specific and almost all appealed to the growing sense of undifferentiated Indianness fostered by large urban centres. Some were Indian-run and some were not. Collectively, however, they shared the same goal: they aimed to create a much-needed social space for Indigenous interaction.
In addition to programs seeking to create social space, many aimed to create opportunity and education for new Aboriginal urban dwellers. These included a pilot legal aid program instituted in the city of Seattle, Washington because of the findings from a related study that demonstrated that Indian offenders had very little awareness of their rights within the legal system. The program was instituted in September, 1972 and operated for a period of 18 months. It was staffed by five American Indians trained as paraprofessionals supervised by a team of attorneys. The program's administration was overseen more generally by an advisory board of American Indian community leaders. Though slow to start up, the program eventually reached over 700 people from 57 different tribes. Their problems were often of a legal nature, but sometimes also related to consumer issues, social services, and so-called typical “Indian problems” such as Enrolment, Trust Land, Educational Grants, and Per Capita payments. Paraprofessionals also provided community service which accounted for nearly one quarter of their time.

One of the most innovative would-be programs emerging from urban-based activism in this period was in fact one originating in Winnipeg, Canada, where the idea for Neeginan Village, “the village that never was,” took root. Early in 1973, a corporation called Neeginan Manitoba Inc. was chartered. By late 1973, the corporation had entered into agreements with the federal government to undertake research into the idea of creating an urban village. Neeginan, a Cree word meaning “our place,” was envisioned as a place for landed urban Aboriginal immigrants to call their own. Encompassing between two and three renovated city blocks along the river and near the Winnipeg Concert Hall and the Museum of Man and Nature, it was supported by then-director of Winnipeg's Indian and Metis Friendship Centre, George Munroe, and then-Director of planning for the city of Winnipeg. As Krotz maintains, “Depending on who one talks to, Neeginan would have been either the boldest attempt ever made by a city, certainly in Canada, to encompass the needs and aspirations of a portion of its populace, of it would have been a monstrous failure, a monument built to segregation and
the solidifying of the status quo at the expense of anything human and volatile and changing."\textsuperscript{167}

The Neeginan proposal was indeed a bold one; the Aboriginal village in the heart of Winnipeg was to include schools, cultural centres, shopping, and organizational headquarters as well as health and social services. The goals of the Neeginan Corporation included “to provide a decent place for the urban Indian to live in the city where he can be with his own people, speak his own language, follow his own customs, and enjoy the supports and strengths inherent in this type of ethnic community, much as he does on the reserve but in an urban context.”\textsuperscript{168} It also had a transitional and educational role for newcomers to provide a greater change of success in the city. A feasibility study was conducted by the federal government on the Neeginan proposal, and in April 1975 the investigation netted a seventy-two page report. As Krotz concluded, what killed the Neeginan project varies depending on who is asked, but in general, two reasons emerged for its demise including the cost to governments, who balked at the expense, as well as a loss of initiative and desire on the part of Indigenous leadership in Winnipeg.\textsuperscript{169}

G. THE CHALLENGES OF URBAN LEADERSHIP

The Neeginan project might have been saved, as could have several Indigenous initiated projects in the urban environment. But, as leaders had realized, leading in an urban environment could be even more challenging than doing so on the reserve or reservation. Throughout this era, urban Indigenous leaders were often self-made men and women whose authority depended on effectiveness, relevance and perception among the Aboriginal community. When their effectiveness or integrity was challenged by Indigenous people, they struggled to preserve an often uncertain and shifting base.

While many studies concerning Indigenous leadership were produced by non-Indigenous sources and must therefore be regarded critically, they nevertheless offer some important observations
as to the challenges of leading urban organizations unique to such a context. In Dosman's study of Saskatoon, he argued that urban Indian organizations in the area were composed of “leaders without followers”, due largely to the lack of coherence within them, as well as a general lack of interest in membership.\(^{170}\) As Nagler explained in the case of Toronto, “The failure to acknowledge commonality prevents the creation of Indian communities within the urban place.”\(^{171}\) The bringing together of people of many different communities and origins was not always an easy task and tribal or reserve identification was an important component of Indigenous identity that people often clung to in the uncertain atmosphere of the city: “Indians are invariably precise about their tribal and reserve origins. Throughout most of their life as an administered people, they have identified themselves with parochial units at the expense of any strong feelings of national identity or thoughts about collective action.”\(^{172}\) Nagler added that, in the case of the Friendship Centres, many felt they could not easily establish social contact with other Indians there.\(^{173}\) As one Toronto merchant noted, “I don’t like Indian groups ... We Indians have enough trouble without creating more, besides no organization knows all the Indians. I want to speak for myself and I don’t want anyone to speak for me.”\(^{174}\) This respondent’s comments pointed to an important aspect of urban organization in the disjunction between leaders and followers. The ensuing lack of contact between them led many to claim that they, non-Indigenous people by birth, were far more concerned and effective advocates for Indigenous people than their own people could ever be.\(^{175}\) In the Toronto study, Nagler observed that Aboriginal people seldom recognized leader who represented them on a community level, regardless of group affiliation.\(^{176}\)

Other problems cited, particularly within the context of urban organizations, included different strategies for change. As one respondent in the Chicago Oral History Project noted, “We could have better leadership. We could have alot better leadership... I think our trouble is still unity among our leadership.”\(^{177}\) In his study, Dosman noted three separate factions within the cadre of Indigenous leadership. The first, he explained, was a highly acculturated group that endorsed practical reform and
rational discussion. The members of this group were often co-opted, as were other leaders, by various levels of government who hired them as consultants with relatively large salaries.\textsuperscript{178} The second group represented organizations like the American Indian Movement, for example, whose radical “fight” tactics could quickly generate publicity but not always net results. While these leaders were not often hired by the government, Dosman argued that the university fulfilled an important need in this regard. As he explained, “It flatters Native radicals to have an audience so sympathetic and so utterly uncritical.”\textsuperscript{179} Howard Adams, noted Metis radical for example, was described by Dosman as too intellectual for Native people. His primary audience was, rather, students and White leftist groups, and the university was but one aspect of the very society that radicals sought to condemn. The third variety of leadership described by Dosman was a compromise between the two latter types, which “accepts the premise that the native population forms an unassimilable group inside the larger society. On the other hand, it also believes that, given pragmatic adjustments, “radical incrementalism” so to speak, the values and goals of both sides can contribute to a mutually enriched society.”\textsuperscript{180} While Dosman believed that this type of organization was undoubtedly superior to the first two, its practical operation posed a variety of problems. He cited the Saskatoon Indian Committee, formed in 1967 in the pursuit of treaty rights, as a case in point. While it was an organization composed exclusively of Native people, its agenda was also taken over, later, by the need to heighten its media profile by using controversial figures as the SIC’s mouthpieces. While this contributed to the broadening of its power-base and its prestige, the heightened politicized message represented by the man jeopardized SIC’s ability to apply effective pressure.\textsuperscript{181}

Finally, unlike the larger, national organizations, urban Indigenous activists often had no access to additional funding, official or otherwise, unless affiliated with a powerful group which was unlikely in the case of most red power organizations. As Dosman explained, autonomy in this case was but illusory.\textsuperscript{182} Added to this lack of funds was also a lack of resources or information on the Aboriginal
residents of urban centres, collected but not shared by both government and charitable agencies. Government organizations also often convinced local activists that certain programs and projects were “in the works”, without offering any concrete timeline to implementation. Such projects often died on the planning floor, leaving Indigenous organizations without the information needed to develop their own programs or the funds needed to operate them. Urban organizations were thus often left without any real practical objectives.

In some cases, these practical objectives were found to be consistent with wider concerns, and other causes. A notable case example is the famed occupation of Alcatraz Island, designed in large part by the Intertribal Friendship House in the area. In the San Francisco area, local concerns merged with an Indigenous agenda. As Adam (Nordwall) Fortunate Eagle argues, the locally-based Bay Area Indian community's United Council, meeting at the Intertribal Friendship House, was largely responsible for the content and strategic planning of the occupation. In addition, the occupation of Alcatraz was also inspired by local concerns, like the fire that completely ruined the Indian Centre. As such, the United Council desperately needed new headquarters. The occupation was further prompted by an announcement by the San Francisco board of supervisors in favour of preliminary development plans by Lamar Hunt for the Island's commercial development. Hunt, a billionaire, certainly had the capital to fulfil his plans to develop an apartment and restaurant complex on the grounds. The confluence of the need for headquarters thus merged with a broader concern in the Bay area, namely the development of Alcatraz island. Here, the American Indian cause merged with those Bay Area activists committed to keeping the Island free of commercial development. According to organizer Adam Fortunate Eagle, “the anti-Hunt forces ran a big ad in the local newspapers, complete with a coupon to be filled out by readers who were opposed to the project.” Thousands sent in the coupons, and provided even further encouragement for the organizers to follow through with their occupation plans.
Public and Indigenous support of Alcatraz was, however, exception not replicated in other communities. While the potential for realizing such action could exist, it was often a problem of mobilizing urban Indigenous people under effective and vocal leadership that was the problem. This is where many urban organizations fell short and so, though they provided a great many support services to urban people, they were more often than not service-oriented, rather than true lobbyists in the traditional sense of the word. Though they did lobby for change for urban Indigenous people, particularly within organizations changing their orientation in the early part of the 1970s to reflect an increasingly shifting demographic, reserve and reservation people, by and large, had better organized and more effective leadership to represent their issues.

CONCLUSION

As this chapter has revealed, the unique character of urban experience formed an important nexus for organizations to emerge in Canadian and American cities. The pressures of city life, both for those who were more successful and those still struggling to survive, made fostering an Indigenous cultural identity all the more important. Though many maintained important ties to the reserves and reservation communities, as well as to the rural towns from which they had emerged, city life undoubtedly complicated, enriched and challenged ingrained Indigenous identities. To resist the melting pot, Indigenous people had to find innovative solutions practically suited to their needs.

These needs, as both the social science research and the words of Indigenous people themselves suggest, were enormous: making one's way in the city required financial, social and emotional support not always readily available to all those who dared to take the chance. Expectations of city life, often aggrandized by returnees to the reserve, did not necessarily materialize. For some, making a living in
the city was difficult. For others, it was indeed impossible. For the latter, skid row emerged as a quasi-community, and in Canadian cities, an urban, largely Indigenous community whose pitfalls included alcohol, petty crime, and joblessness or underemployment. Due to the prominent place that skid row enjoyed in the media, “Indians on skid row” became a popular perception of the lives of Indigenous people in the cities. It exacerbated tensions between Aboriginal residents and their non-Aboriginal neighbours, as well as between Indigenous people and the municipal police.

Due to the paucity of effective programming designed to address the needs of this transient population, both on skid row and off of it, Indigenous people engendered their own solutions. Friendship Centres, for example, became an important nexus of pan-Indigenous identity and organization during this period. Though faced with critiques from inside and out, Friendship Centres remain perhaps the most visible and effective legacy of urban pan-Indigenous organizations from 1960 to 1975. At the same time and despite their relative visibility and success, not all Indigenous people used or appreciated them suggesting that these only partially fulfilled the needs and aspirations of the Indigenous urban community during this period.

Aboriginal people living in the cities frequently spoke of or reminisced about their lives on reserves in often nostalgic and wistful tones. For as much as the city could promise, it could also take away. Thus, the reserves, reservations and rural communities around which Indigenous lives had centred since the dawn of colonization remained an important element in the story of Aboriginal organizing at this time, and it is to these places that we shall now turn.
43 Verna Kirkness, “Education of Indian and Metis,” 160.
48 “The Big Move- Is It Really Worth It?”, The Native People, June 1971, 10.
50 Brody, Indians on Skid Row, 16.
51 Ibid., 24.
52 Nagler, Indians in the City, 69.
53 Dosman, Indians: The Urban Dilemma, 69-70.
54 Brody, Indians on Skid Row, 48.
55 Nagler, Indians in the City, xiii.
56 “The Big Move,” 11.
57 Krotz, Urban Indians, 41.
59 Ibid.
60 Klemesrud, “The American Indian: Part of the City, and Yet...”
64 “Indian Magazine’ becomes Our Native Land.”
65 Christopher Hauch, Coping Strategies and Street Life: The Ethnography of Winnipeg’s Skid Row Region (University of Winnipeg- Institute of Urban Studies, 1985), 53.
66 Brody, Indians on Skid Row, 15.
67 Nagler, Indians in the City, 79.
68 Ibid., 80.
69 Brody, Indians on Skid Row, 18.
71 Ibid., 62.
73 Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, Wahbung, 142.
75 Krotz, Urban Indians, 129.
76 Cited in Krotz, Urban Indians, 130.
78 Dosman, Indians, 100.
80 MIB, Wahbung, 141.
82 Stauss, Chadwick, Bahr and Halverson, “An Experimental Outreach Legal Aid Program,” 386.
132 Ibid., 100.
133 Ibid., 114.
134 Ibid., 137.
136 Chicago Oral History Project, 211. Box 1 Folder 3.
138 Chicago Oral History Project, 194. Box 1 Folder 3.
139 Chicago Oral History Project, 195. Box 1 Folder 3.
140 Chicago Oral History Project, 197. Box 1 Folder 3.
143 “From the Edmonton Native Friendship Centre,” *The Native People*, January 1971, 11.
145 Nagler, *Indians in the City*, 73.
146 Brody, *Indians on Skid Row*, 55.
150 “Happy Birthday Hudson’s Bay.”
151 Nagler, *Indians in the City*, 73.
152 Indian and Metis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg, Inc., *Seventeenth Annual Report*.
154 Nagler, *Indians in the City*, 76.
163 Ibid., 299.
165 Ablon, “Relocated American Indians,” 301.
166 Stauss, Chadwick, Bahr and Halverson, “An Experimental Outreach Legal Aid Program,” 386-394.
168 Ibid., 59.
169 Ibid., 60.
172 Dosman, *Indians: The Urban Dilemma*, 159.
174 Ibid., 76.
176 Nagler, *Indians in the City*, 76.
177 Chicago Oral History Project, 212. Box 1 Folder 3.
179 Ibid., 162.
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181 Ibid., 164.
182 Ibid., 159.
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186Ibid.
'We were just trying to survive':

The Challenges of Indigenous Politics on Canadian Reserves
INTRODUCTION

In *Reservations are for Indians*, a book first published in 1970, author Heather Robertson expressed her shock, as a non-Aboriginal person, at experiencing the world of a Canadian reserve for the first time. As she described, “I was shocked by the reserves and Metis communities, shocked by the destitution, the squalor, the chaos, the brutality, the apathy.” Indeed, few outsiders in an era of relative wealth and apathy could have understood, let alone imagined, the kinds of conditions that Indigenous people living on reserves and reservations across North America faced on an everyday basis. From a lack of basic infrastructure to a near-complete absence of opportunity and, in many cases, hope, reserves and reservations had not, as originally intended, prepared Indigenous people for total absorption into the non-Indigenous world. They had remained much as they had been set out; poor tracts of land, often unsuitable for farming and unable to support a healthy population, examples of state ignorance, neglect, and state-sponsored cultural genocide. From a political or activist standpoint, therefore, reserves and reservations provided both the best and the worst context for Indigenous organizing. Though they graphically illustrated the kinds of third world conditions faced by one segment of the population segregated by race, they were also, in many examples, isolated inlets whose people, beaten down by years of simply trying to survive, were either too weak, too discouraged, or too resigned to look beyond reserve and reservation borders. Complicating the situation was in fact the long colonial gaze which had, as of the nineteenth century, instituted controls of local governance that often lent themselves to abuse or corruption for people who sought some way to get by in incredibly difficult circumstances.

This chapter will outline the very difficult conditions faced by reserve residents in Canada between 1960 and 1975. It will then examine the political context that greatly impacted the emergence of reserve-based organizers and activists in a distinctly Canadian setting, as well as highlight the way in
which pan-Indigenous organizers often used reserve-based struggles as a platform for media attention. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the overall impact of the reserve system on political organizing, drawing particular attention to the way in which a strong attachment to one's own nation complicated the pan-Indigenous agenda and reduced the impact of large organizations on a grassroots level. It will argue that although Indigenous people in this context faced underemployment, unemployment, poor health and staggering poverty as much or more so than their urban counterparts, the cultural security of living amongst one's own people contributed to an overall more insular activist proclivity than that found in Canadian urban centres, ultimately leading, in the latter part of the 1970s, to a renewed tribalism within the reserve context as the era of Comprehensive Agreements dawned in Canada.

A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF RESERVE EXPERIENCE

Like skid row to urban Indigenous people, reserves in Canada or reservations in the United States – the 'Rez', as residents often deemed them—could be viewed as both physical and a figurative places. From their inception in the nineteenth century, the notion of keeping Indian people somehow separated from the rest of the population had deep implications for future development. Legislators throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries constantly cited the need for reservations as a preparation stage for Indian people's full integration into the colonizing society, a full integration that never really came. Despite their claims to helping the people, Canadian and American legislators constantly sought to truncate the physical space of these places as well as consistently failed to provide services and support that might help Indigenous people to function successfully in the non-Indigenous world, thus guaranteeing their inability to be self-sufficient.

While the geography and physical space of reserves were important aspects of the experience
for Indigenous people across Canada and the United States, so too was the reservation as a figurative space with cultural, spiritual and political implications. For while reserves were indeed a sort of cultural enclave offering some solace from the discrimination of the non-Indigenous world as well as some sense of community and/or nation, state regulations limiting or even outlawing spiritual, cultural and healing practices also ensured that they were places of simultaneous freedom and control, of oppression and of liberation.

Before Canada was ever Canada, the colonial office in London managed nearly all of its affairs, including its treatment of Aboriginal people. It assumed a somewhat protective role, however, when the colonies demonstrated a complete lack of respect for Aboriginal people as their thirst for development increased. This teleological quest for progress conflicted with the notion of the White Man's Burden that the British Empire had so vigorously used as ideological defence of its expansionist ways in several colonial arenas. The protection of Aboriginal people in what would become Canada, therefore, was very much ensconced in the liberal humanitarianism of the mid to late nineteenth century alongside the impetus for protection that the White Man's Burden implied.

Though it paid lip service to the notion of protection, the Colonial Office demonstrated early on that it preferred a more hands-off approach, leaving most aspects of the civilizing mission in the hands of missionaries. The Office erroneously assumed that Aboriginal were interested in European notions of progress, and in 1857, introduced the Act for the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in the Canadas. This initiative, which offered Canadian Aboriginal people citizenship on an individual basis, was met by disinterest or outright rejection on the part of Aboriginal people who had long believed in their special relationship with the government, established as early as the Royal Proclamation of 1763. In 1860, responsibility for Aboriginal people was officially transferred to colonial control, and the Confederation settlement of 1867 delineated a special branch designed specifically to deal with Aboriginal matters. Confederation did not reinvent the wheel; rather, officials chose to build upon the
established traditions of the time, including the goal of assimilation.

To ensure consistency in dealing with Aboriginal people amid diverse provinces, the Indian Act of 1876 enshrined certain legislative principles on the part of the Department. In terms of what would later become relevant to the struggle of the 1960s, it essentially codified a different, though unequal, relationship between the state and Aboriginal people. The Indian Act also placed Aboriginal people in a special legal category, as wards of the state. Based in part of the previous relationship with the imperial power, which included the Queen as the 'Great Mother', this relationship was intended to evolve from one of wardship to gradual civilization. Its provisions controlled almost every aspect of Indian life, including politics, gender relations, and the procedures for gradual civilization. As E. Brian Titley concludes, “The act was amended over the years, but in its general thrust and intent, it changed little. It was designed to protect the Indians until they acquired the trappings of white civilization.”

Reserves were an important component of this so-called preparation and protection, set aside for the purposes both of assimilation as well as land development. They were intended to be temporary arrangements that would gradually be dissolved through the process of enfranchisement, as Indigenous people learned to “properly” use the land. Thus, reserves that were initially set aside for Aboriginal people were gradually truncated over the years, leaving them with rather small and largely agriculturally untenable tracts of land held for them by the Crown. The Crown's insistence on the fact that Aboriginal people could not own this land was important, for it allowed it to control all the facets of Indian life upon them with nefarious consequences. It did so through the work of the Indian agent. As R.J. Brownlie has demonstrated, the work of Indian agents varied from reserve to reserve and agents held different views of Aboriginal people which affected their administrative styles. Nevertheless and in every instance, the Department granted their agents an incommensurate amount of power over Aboriginal lives.

Though reserve lands were meant to be protected spaces, many scholars have demonstrated the
way in which the government acted against its own promises throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to reduce both the amount and the quality of reserve lands, ensuring that these places could never become self-sustainable or profitable communities. Property was eroded in large part through the rationale that if Indigenous people were not using their lands 'properly,' then the government could act to pre-empt them in many cases without consent. In 1905, Frank Oliver explained to the House of Commons that Aboriginal rights ought to be protected, but not at the expense of the rights of non-Aboriginal settlers. He also assured MPs that the Department was doing everything in its power “to secure the surrender of ‘surplus’ Indian land.”

To this end, an amendment was introduced. Bill 194 proposed to facilitate the process of securing the surrender of land, since the Indian Act had guaranteed the need to secure Aboriginal consent by majority from the male members of the band over the age of 21. The new bill proposed to entice Aboriginal people to surrender lands by ensuring that they could receive 50% of the purchase price immediately rather than the 10% they had been able to obtain before. The rest, as usual, would be held 'in trust', but the Department reasoned that Indigenous greed would win out. It found, however, that it had greatly miscalculated, and Indigenous people were not going to give up on their lands so easily.

In 1911, further amendments were introduced to the Indian Act by Oliver which allowed outright coercion, since Indigenous people did not seem willing to give up their lands without a fight. The first allowed municipalities and companies to take portions of reserve lands for public purposes including roads and railways without securing the proper surrender except for the approval of the Governor-in-Council. The second amendment allowed the removal of Aboriginal people from any reserve adjacent or connected to a town of eight thousand inhabitants or more if the Exchequer Court of Canada ruled it so. Oliver proudly declared that the surrender of reserve land was accelerating, announcing that, between 1896 and 1909, 725,517 acres of land had been surrendered for better use.
Under Duncan Campbell Scott, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs for the better part of two decades, from 1913 to 1932, land rights were further curtailed. In April of 1918, another amendment authorized the government to spend band funds on public works on reserve lands without band consent, as well as for the lease of 'non-productive lands' by the Superintendent General for cultivation and grazing purposes without formal surrender. For populations whose reserves were already insufficient to sustain agricultural production, and traditional hunting and gathering practices, state incursion of this kind was not only an inconvenience, but a clear and present danger to their survival.

As the Indian Act ensured, reserves were tightly controlled places, but not only in the realm of economic activity. They also remained heavily policed in terms of spirituality, education, and governance, leaving little doubt as to why reserves failed to develop, by the 1960s, into flourishing, self-sustaining communities. In the realm of spirituality, missionaries were in fact the first colonizers of Indigenous people. The chronicles of early missionaries working in seventeenth and eighteenth century Canada have been chronicled at some length. Roman Catholics including Jesuits, as well as Anglicans, Methodists and Presbyterians; all had carried out their ecclesiastical project with the blessing and often, the financial backing, of the state. But it was in the late nineteenth century, when the missionary project became officially embroiled in the colonial one through religious regulation and through education, that the lives of Indigenous Canadians became ever more regulated and surveilled.

Missionaries had long worked to eliminate many of the practices they deemed most objectionable in the realm of Indigenous spirituality. In 1884, however, their mission was bolstered by amendments to the Indian Act largely brought about by their complaints and concerns. The 1884 amendments to the Indian Act banned both the potlatch and “Tamanawas,” which were practices associated with shamanic healing. These were further restricted by more amendments in 1895 which prohibited travel by Indigenous people for the purposes of religious gatherings or dances. The penalties for transgressors could be serious, and included fines and the possibility of jail time. Though the
Department and the police sometimes disagreed on who exactly should be prosecuted, several individuals were including Wanduta, a member of the Oak River Sioux band in Manitoba, who was sentenced to four months in prison as a signal to those who would dare to disobey the law.\textsuperscript{8} Later on, and in concert with the rise in popularity of Fred Loft's League of Indians, police presence became more pronounced at “dance camps” set up by Indigenous groups attempting to hold on to their traditions despite department interference.\textsuperscript{9}

In many cases, missionaries also interfered in traditional gender roles. As Sarah Carter has documented in her excellent work, \textit{The Importance of Being Monogamous}, the state working in concert with missionary groups frequently interfered in marriage and courting practices among various Aboriginal groups. They favoured the European concept of separate spheres with the woman being relegated to the domestic sphere, a belief that fit uncomfortably with the actual realities of many Aboriginal groups whose female members had important economic and public roles to play. Within the Catholic order, Catholic womanhood was celebrated through the depiction of Mary as the ideal woman: “chaste, modest, wise, delicate and young, Mary was Jesus’s mother and she fulfilled her roles as Saint Joseph's wife to the best of her abilities. She placed Joseph before her own desires, and she did nothing to displease him.”\textsuperscript{10} Indigenous women, through both religious instruction and education in residential or day schools, were constantly reminded of their ‘proper’ place in 'civilized' society.

In concert with the regulation of Indigenous spirituality and gender roles was the missionaries’ efforts to amend the healing practices of Indigenous groups. As James Waldrum, D. Ann Herring and T. Kue Young assert, for Indigenous people, healing was inextricable from the realm of religion: “Hence, 'medicine' was fully within the realm of what we would call the religious, and many healers were also involved in religious activities.”\textsuperscript{11} Healers included herbalists, medicine men and women, and shamans who worked either independently or in concert to ensure a healthy community. Healing practices included among some groups, shaking tents and sweat lodges, as well as minor surgery, blood letting,
bone setting and scarification. Missionaries worked hard to supplant Indigenous medicine with mixed results due to the general derision with which Aboriginal people's own spirituality was handled by the various denominations. Working alongside the missionaries were medical doctors, who often expressed the opinion that Indigenous healers were “very injurious to the Indians.” Their medical system, as one doctor put it, was rife with “murmurings and superstitions,” and doctors who did attract Indigenous clients often boasted of their ability to wrest Aboriginal minds away from “Indian quackery.”

For both missionaries and legislators, part of the problem with First Nations health was there perceived unwillingness to contribute to their own well-being by inculcating the 'proper' values of domesticity and civilization. Frank Pedley, superintendent for Indian Affairs in 1910, argued that it was Aboriginal peoples' general disregard for hygiene as well as their unwillingness to properly learn to use sanitation facilities that contributed to their ill-health. Dr. Peter Bryce, the man responsible for the scathing indictment of conditions in residential schools, argued that Native women had failed to properly institute the skills of 'housewifery' that could improve community health. As Mary-Ellen Kelm has argued, the pathologizing of Aboriginal bodies was an important feature in early to mid-twentieth century legislative rhetoric, and contributed largely to the persistent perception of Aboriginal people as both unable and unwilling to adopt the ways of civilization in health practices.

Despite these official perceptions, the actions of Indigenous people looking to improve the conditions on their reserves make it clear that they did want change, but that the lack of investment into proper facilities on the reserves made enforcing proper hygiene difficult. On the Squamish reserve, only four of seventy homes had toilets. These conditions were replicated throughout British Columbia's interior. As Kelm illustrates, Indigenous groups in British Columbia repeatedly petitioned government officials for access to clean water and proper sanitation facilities but were largely ignored, except when the ill health of the reserve community seemed to threaten nearby White communities. Thus, even though the government consistently failed to implement proper conditions conducive to
good health on the reserve, Indigenous people continued to be blamed for the ill health of their own communities.

Though it still blamed Aboriginal people, the government did make some effort to implement health services on reserves, though it did so in the spirit of cost-saving and thrift which did not often provide for good service. In 1927, Colonel E.L. Stone was appointed the first Medical Superintendent of Indian Affairs. He had been a Department physician previously and was enlisted, in part, to fight the emerging tuberculosis epidemic that now threatened even the most remote of Indigenous communities. Though the government feared the cost of providing comprehensive health services to Indigenous people, the provision of such services was yet another tool for colonization and surveillance. By 1935, the Medical Branch employed eleven full-time medical officers and had eight Indian Agents with medical training. 250 additional doctors were employed part time or as needed and eleven field nurses working in concert with those from religious orders provided some measure of health service to Indigenous communities. As ever, the concern of the Department was cost, and Stone worked hard to control them. In 1934, the per capita cost of health services for Indigenous people was $6.90 compared to $31.00 for the rest of the Canadian population.16

In terms of the services provided, there were many complaints. In reference to doctors, Indigenous people often complained of the high turnover rate. Though many doctors worked diligently to help their clients, the difficult conditions of practising medicine in this environment could be discouraging, as was the salary associated with the position. Many Aboriginal people on reserves also complained that doctors refused to help them when travelling was required, or that they ignored their First Nations clients in favour of White clients who might be paying for their services directly. Nurses also received their share of complaints: residents of God's Lake Narrows complained that the nurses working there were “inaccessible” while nurses stationed there, for their part, maintained that there was no ambulance service and that the people needed to make their way to the nursing station on the “white
side of the narrows.\textsuperscript{17} In 1945, the care of Indian people was transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare. Its service delivery often suffered from a lack of available doctors which reached a crisis level in the late 1960s. In addition, practitioners often came to the job with little knowledge about Aboriginal people, or their values. Missionary or layperson, many of those entrusted with improving Aboriginal health were thwarted by their own per-existing attitudes towards the people.

Part of the mandate of delivering health services was the hope that Indigenous people would become somehow better at managing their own health. Indeed, the perception of Indigenous people as responsible for their own health problems persisted well after 1950, the period covered by Mary-Ellen Kelm's work. Missionaries who worked with doctors or who provided health services through denominational hospitals also made their presence felt in the realm of education where they played the all-important role of teacher and manager of services. Though the British North America Act that created Canada as a nation-state had declared education to be in the realm of the provinces, the federal responsibility for Aboriginal people as constitutionally laid out made education of Aboriginal people a federal issue. Indigenous people, as Brian Titley points out, were thus to attend schools established by the federal government thereby reinforcing segregated schooling in concert with the clauses in the numbered treaties which had guaranteed the establishment and operation of schools on reserves.\textsuperscript{18} According to legislators, education was a useful tool in the transmission of new economic habits, as well as “key to their cultural transformation.”\textsuperscript{19} In providing this schooling, the federal government first looked to missionaries who had, for some time, been working among Indigenous people. The logic was twofold; first, in using missionaries, the federal government posited that Indigenous people might more readily conform. Secondly though, and most importantly during this period, the idea of 'contracting out' Indigenous education fit well the government's efforts to rein in the cost of Indian administration. In short, the measures were largely pragmatic and reflected the desire of federal officials to fund, but not to manage, the education program.
Canada's educational model for Indigenous people had been heavily influenced by the 1879 Davin Report. Written by Nicholas Flood Davin, who had been commissioned to travel the United States and to report on its industrial school system, the report had important ramifications for Aboriginal education in a Canadian context. Davin proposed new industrial schools modelled on the American ones. As he reasoned, the first step to assimilation was “to take a way their simple Indian mythology.” Davin's report proposed the building of four new industrial schools which were allocated to different denominations in 1883-1884.

By 1900, there were 226 federally funded day schools on Aboriginal reserves as well as a series of residential schools that forced children away from their home communities. As noted Canadian activist Harold Cardinal wrote, in his seminal 1969 work, “[t]he white man apparently believes that education is a tool for the implementation of his design of assimilation.” Missionaries, he argued, “regarded the Indians as savages, heathens or something even worse. They made no attempt to understand Indian religious beliefs, virtually no attempt to appreciate Indian cultural values and paid little heed to Indian ways.” This was absolutely the case, as missionaries came to their work with a zeal to save the Indian from him or herself through the values of 'civilization' and Christianity.

Industrial schools operated alongside residential schools. Industrial schools proposed by Davin were to cater to an older student body than boarding schools. They were also to be located further away from the reserve and closer to White settlements. While boarding schools catered to those between the ages of eight and fourteen, industrial schools were intended to operate much like high schools. Both, however, were intended to educate and inculcate Indigenous students into the ways of “civilization,” including the speaking of the English language, Euro-Christian religion and an emphasis on discipline, order and self-help. Boys were to be taught useful trades such as farming and general repair, while girls educated in these institutions were to receive an education focused on the domestic sphere of home-making and mothering. Although industrial schools eventually fell into disrepute by the end of the
1890s, not least of all for their poor records in producing graduates and filling attendance rosters, the residential and day school system persisted.

Though education was not compulsory for Aboriginal students when the schools were first established, the government increasingly took on a more coercive role in securing Aboriginal attendance. Aware that many Indigenous parents resented the schools' rejection of the traditional ways as well as were genuinely concerned for the health and care of their children while in attendance, the government legislated compulsory attendance as of 1894, when the Indian Act was amended to allow the Governor-in-Council to make regulations regarding attendance.23

Once compelled to attend, the condition of education in the schools and the challenges which students faced were numerous. Overcrowding, poor food, deplorable sanitary conditions and systemic abuse were rampant. As Dr. Peter Bryce's controversial report noted in 1907, schools were in a deplorable state. The poor ventilation, lack of physical exercise and poor nutrition placed even healthy students in jeopardy. Infectious diseases were common, and measles, mumps, tuberculosis, pneumonia, influenza, whooping cough and chicken pox were all a part of the arsenal of disease that assaulted new arrivals.24 Part of the problem was the per capita grant system which provided an allowance for each child from which all costs of education, including maintenance, were to be borne.25 As Kelm argues, “The bodies of Aboriginal children were indeed transformed by the residential school experience. But the residential schools did not produce robust workers, as they had promised, but rather weakened children and adolescents.”26

In most cases, therefore, the scheme to promote civilization through economic redirection, religion, medicine and education had failed miserably. These measures had affected every aspect of the community, including the issue of band governance, which was explained in some detail in Chapter 4. To summarize, the Indian Act had created a system of elected representation in the form of band councils who served to help administer their communities but in a way severely curtailed by the limited
powers assigned to them, the supervision of the Indian agent and from their inability to control their own budget. Council members often governed very carefully, understanding that their term could be circumvented by overzealous agents who felt the need to depose them for perceived irresponsibility and immorality, as laid out by the Indian Act’s provisions on the matter. It also set the rules about the conduct of band meetings, who should preside over the meeting, and the number of persons in attendance that would constitute a quorum. As Robertson remarked, “The [Indian] agent can, and frequently does, rule that a quorum consists of himself and the chief.” All bylaws passed by the council (though already in existence) had to be forwarded to Ottawa for approval by the Minister of Indian Affairs, who could invalidate any bylaw he wished.

Ottawa had an important finger in the local pie, and one that could not be ignored and often served to divide and conquer the people. As Heather Robertson observed in her anthropological evaluation of the culture and politics on Canadian reserve, “On reserves, the strong ‘gorillas’ rule, while the weak are ridiculed and persecuted.” Though Robertson was indeed a non-Indigenous outsider, her words echoed what many others had said, either publicly or more often secretly, as to avoid any fallout associated with critiquing those in power. During the 1969 occupation of the bridge on the St. Regis reserve, the band council chief refused to get out of his car to speak to protesters and, in fear, even requested a permit for a sidearm when asked to speak to the protesters by local police. As one demonstrator explained, many people felt that the chief did not represent them: “The Band Council does not carry our wishes to Ottawa, but brings Ottawa’s wishes to us.” Another woman added that the Band Council members were simply puppets who did not understand or care about the will of the people. Due in part to the tremendous influx of money and new programming in the 1960s and 1970s, reserve politicians and ambitious locals, conditioned as they had been by colonialism to jealously guard whatever benefit and power still remained, were often accused of political corruption and abuse of office. As the comments of many respondents indicated, when dealing with “life on the ‘rez”, making it
in this setting often depended on who you knew. Though many officials worked diligently for their people, a job as a reserve or reservation politician was often the best possible option for survival of their own family. This, combined with a lack of training and experience, made politics in these settings contentious to say the least and provided a great deal of fodder for outside pan-Indian activists looking for a way to prove their connection to reservation life.

B. CRISIS POINT: CANADIAN RESERVES IN THE 1960S

By the 1960s, a concerted effort over the last half century to decrease the size of Canadian reserves as well to limit economic development on them had resulted in pockets of severe economic depression in an era of relative prosperity for the rest of the Canadian population. Though many older residents fondly recalled a time when food and resources were plentiful, reserve dwellers of a younger demographic in the 1950s and 1960s remembered them as places of hunger and of uncertainty, though not to the crisis point reached in the 1960s. Though there are many idyllic aspects of James Sewid's childhood in Canada, he also recalls many times of difficulty, including poverty. When he went, as a seven year old, to attend school in Alert Bay and live with his grandmother, Sewid recalled selling eggs to people in the village and busily gathering supplies for the upcoming winter. As Doris Pratt, lifelong resident of the Sioux Valley Dakota Nation maintained, life on the reserve was simple; it was simply about trying to survive. The Paul family, interviewed by reporter Larry Krotz in the 1970s, told a similar tale. For the Paul family, making a living on the reserve was complicated- thus, some members shared time between the city and the reserve. Wallace, the male head of the family, worked as caretaker of the new school, as well as ice fishing in the winter and hunting in the spring, summer and fall. In addition, many there worked for the band or “on near-by farms owned by white farmers, or is on
welfare.” Verna Johnston, of Cape Croker Ontario on the shores of Georgian Bay, maintains that no one ever really felt national economic upheavals on her reserve because on the reserve, life was always hard. On the God's Lake Narrows reserve, home to over 1,200 Woodland Cree, over half of the residents were on welfare. As Krotz observed, the band was also the largest employer, which ensured that critiques of local governance were kept at a minimum. As he explained, “It pays to be in good with the chief or a powerful councillor if you want any of this work.” As numerous Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people pointed out, on reserves, poverty was the rule, more than the exception, and as both statistical and anecdotal research pointed out, Aboriginal Canadians fell far short of the average living conditions faced by most. The Hawthorn Report demonstrated that Aboriginal people earned, on average, just over $300 annually while the average Canadian earned $1,400.

As these wages might indicate, unemployment or underemployment was rampant due to lack of training and discrimination in the outside world while opportunities on reserve were few and far between. As the report noted, “The great majority of reserves absorb relatively little of their own available manpower, because of their under-developed economy and their pitifully inadequate adjustment to an economy of supply and demand. This means that the vast majority of the workers have to seek employment off the reserve or be unemployed most of the year... General underemployment and a rather low standard of living place Indians living on the reserves in a permanent state of poverty and indigence.” And though Aboriginal people might prefer to work on-reserve, prospects were bleak. The Hawthorn report states that “they are too small a proportion of the population, and most of the communities in which they reside are too small, scattered, and limited in resources, to provide viable economies that could support anything like independent societies.”

For some reserves adjacent to non-Indigenous settlements, employment could sometimes be found within towns, but the racist environment of many such settings was an impediment to working there. In a study of Crow Lake, Ontario, conducted in 1972, David Stymeist found that despite the
mixed ethnic composition of Crow Lake which included Italian, Chinese, French and English, Aboriginal people were seen as “different” from the lot. As Stymeist explained, “it was seldom the case that Indians and whites worked together at the same job. In addition, when jokes about Indians were aired they were accepted as jokes, but were told with a certain edge, a hardness of the voice, and were answered by an aggressive laughter that was not present when jokes about Ukrainians, Finns, or Italians were told. And when an insult was made, either in the presence of Native people or in their absence, it was often made in earnest. There were comparatively few Indians living in town, and fewer still who were able to obtain steady jobs.” Of those who were able to find employment there, most were in non-managerial positions such as clerical assistants, nurses aides, or cooks, cleaners, maintenance people or orderlies. For those employed seasonally, pay was often withheld until they had returned home in an efforts, as Stymeist reported, “to keep them out of town as much as possible.”

The unwillingness of non-Aboriginal businesses to employ and to serve Indigenous people also contributed to the poor condition of living on the reserve, conditions which had existed from the early twentieth century but that seemed, in the 1960s, even worse due to the improvement in housing standards for the Canadian population at large. Indeed, few of the people living in emerging suburbia could have imagined the extent of poverty and the conditions that Indigenous people faced in their daily lives, particularly as it related to the issue of housing. The lack of employment income on Canadian reservations only exacerbated this already difficult issue. For example, on the Lake Manitoba Reserve, the Paul family complained of the condition of their home. Wallace Paul bitterly pointed out the rotten wood under the linoleum, while his wife complained that their house was always cold in the winter. In addition, supplies were often very expensive on the reserve. As Krotz pointed out, “[Grace] is dreading winter, another winter where they spend five hundred dollars for sixteen loads of wood for their header and still have to leave the electric oven on with the door open on frigid nights.” At God's Lake Narrows, housing was also subpar; homes built with inferior materials tended to fall apart within
just a few years, and the lack of proper insulation made them difficult to heat.\textsuperscript{40}

Low income, poor nutrition and substandard housing contributed to increasing health issues on reserves as well. Contagious diseases still threatened the children and the elderly at an alarming rate, yet Aboriginal people frequently failed to see doctors and health practitioners. By 1956, National Health and Welfare, the department responsible for the healthcare of Canada's Aboriginal and Inuit peoples, operated eighteen hospitals, thirty-three nursing stations, fifty-two health centres which contained dispensaries, and thirteen other health centres. These numbers had increased to twenty-two hospitals, thirty-seven nursing stations, and eighty-three health centres in 1960.\textsuperscript{41} The number of medical staff employed by the Department had grown exponentially, and yet, poor health in Indigenous communities persisted. Part of the reason was indeed the legacy of ill-health and abuse imparted by the residential school experience, but perhaps more importantly was the disillusionment of Indigenous people in the system. The 1969 Booz-Allen report, a major review of Indian health services, demonstrated the paternalistic tone that service delivery could take, when it stated that: “Many Indians have little understanding of the meaning of good health because of cultural difference and education deficiencies.”\textsuperscript{42} While this statement was intended to shed light upon the over and under utilization of Aboriginal health services, an alternative explanation also pointed to the fact that Aboriginal people continued to rely on their own methods of treatment, demonstrating a lack of faith in the non-Indigenous system.

Run-ins with the law for Aboriginal people on many Canadian reserves also led many to disillusionment with the Canadian legal system. The 1960s saw an increasing incidence of arrest and accusations of police harassment particularly among Indigenous youth. Reserve residents often feared the presence of the RCMP, a police force originally created in 1873 largely in response to alleged cross-border incursions of American whisky traders and the 1873 Cypress Hills Massacre committed by whisky traders against a group of Assiniboine people, who remained by mid-century the primary
method of law enforcement there. The RCMP officers stationed on reserves were decidedly 'outsiders.' As respondents to one survey revealed, RCMP officers on the reserves “said that their contact with juveniles is so slight that they hardly get to know the young people. Even with the adults, it is only during periods of 'homecoming' when migrant workers are returning from pulp-cutting, berry-picking or potato-harvesting that that police have reason to become active among the Indians.” The RCMP presence on reserves across Canada was uneven and depended often on the presence of provincial police forces. In the Prairies, in British Columbia and in the two northern territories, the RCMP were the only police force maintaining law and order except where municipal police also operated. As the report Indians and the Law explained, relationships between the police and Indian people in many areas “are less amicable and, in many areas, have reached a stage where bitterness prevails on both sides... The constant surveillance sometimes required by the Indian and Metis people can ... harden into open dislike on the part of the police. Where this occurs the Indian people, in turn, may respond by being withdrawn and uncommunicative when sober and highly belligerent and aggressive when drunk.” As Willard Ahenakew, cartoonist, depicted in 1971, many regular RCMP members simply did not understand why Indigenous people should not be grateful for the RCMP’s devotion to them. In his cartoon, two officers stand together, discussing a newspaper headline that reads, “Indian People Request Own Police Force.” In response, one officer complains, “Imagine, those Indians wanting their own police force. Can't they see what a good job we're doing in preventing crime? Just look at our jails, they're full of Indian people we've arrested.” Though some areas did employ Aboriginal constables, these positions were few: in 1966, 46 Indian Constables were employed by band councils. There were none in British Columbia, in Prince Edward Island, in the North West Territories or in the Yukon. Saskatchewan had only 2, Nova Scotia had 3, Quebec had 4 and New Brunswick had 5. The majority of Indian constables were located in Ontario, with 14, followed by Manitoba with 10 and Alberta with 8. Given the size of Indigenous populations in these provinces however, the distribution of Indian
constables was highly uneven and did not apply to all areas under the jurisdiction of the RCMP.

Aggravating tensions between RCMP and reserve residents were incidents that often made national news and that convinced Aboriginal people even more so that the RCMP was not on their side and that there was little protection from the law or through the law for those living on reserves. On 30 November 1971, Fred Quilt, a Chilcotin Indian, died in Williams Lake, British Columbia, after suffering what witnesses alleged was a vicious kick to the abdomen on the 28th of November which split Fred’s bowel in two and led to his death. In the aftermath of Quilt’s death, British Columbia’s Attorney General ordered the British Columbia Supreme Court to conduct an inquest into the death of Quilt and in its report, issued on the 4th of August, 1972, no one was blamed. There were a series of issues around which Indigenous people protested, including the exclusion of all Indigenous people in the jury and the cultural intimidation faced within the court setting by Indigenous witnesses. Interviewed for Our Native Land, Jack Ramsay, former RCMP corporal, pointed out that the RCMP had become an alien force in Indigenous communities. While they had previously enjoyed a good relationship with their host reservation communities, RCMP officers in the late 1960s and early 1970s seemed to show up on reserves only when there was trouble. Many Indigenous people, as well as Ramsay himself, argued that Indian people were not getting the police services that they needed and that a greater Native presence was a dire need within the mostly-Caucasian police force.47

In 1973, an evaluation on policing within the reserve environment was conducted by a federal task force. In summary, the task force argued that Indigenous people had as much right as anyone to expect good policing and that they had not necessarily received it. It advocated the training of additional band constables, adequate working conditions and clear jurisdictional terms of reference. Though advocates in both New Brunswick and Saskatchewan had advocated setting up an autonomous Indigenous police force, the federal task force concluded that such a proposition lacked provincial support as well as support from Indigenous people themselves, as well as ignored “the present lack of
police experience among Indians to administer and operate such a force." It also recommended that bands be allowed to choose the type of policing they wanted, between indigenizing the current force or municipal policing whereby services would be purchased from existing police forces such as the RCMP though such a choice was to be contingent upon the decision of the provincial Attorney General.

Despite the many problems presented herein, reserves remained, for many, a special place. The story of James Sewid, Kwakiutl, as told to James Spradley, for example, begins with an account of Sewid's “traditional” childhood as a Kwakiutl in Alert Bay. There, he participated in a naming ceremony where he received several names to reflect his ancestors' venerable status within the community. For the first several years of his life, Sewid resided with his mother in a large community house. As a child among his people, Sewid observed the way in which fishing and canning was a central part of both the social and economic life of the people. As he recounted, “I really liked to go up there and catch some fish with my grandfather... When I wasn't helping the older people I would make little boats to play with.” Sewid also experienced the important story-telling aspect of community life on many reserves, and he recounted several in his memoirs including the story of how Mink and Raven worked together to produce many features of his homeland. He also recalls attending many potlatches and dances even though, during his childhood, they were illegal.

The sense of community conveyed by James Sewid's story seems a central feature to most account of reserve experiences. As Krotz observed, during his visit to a variety of Canadian reserves, “I keep feeling like I am part of a scene that I remember from Alabama. I feel like I am on a back road where the Negros' houses stand, at intervals, between the dust of the road in front and the ferocious threat of the creeping undergrowth in back.” As he explained, “In the heat and the haze we savour the easy sociability of the beer and the callers who pull in off the road in dusty beaten vehicles and pause for twenty minutes or an hour and leave again.” Of the atmosphere, Krotz continued: “[I]t is also a family without bounds. A family where there is always room for an extra, where another body is
welcomes without fuss or formality, where every other body moves over one space with a motion that is automatic and the new person is absorbed and accepted as if he or she had always been there.”

As the crisis point reached in the 1960s demonstrated, Canadian reserves faced many challenges that came to a head during this period. As such, it would seem as though Canadian reserves were an ideal place to organize a mass political movement. Yet, for all of the challenges faced by residents, Aboriginal people who remained on the reserve – a mere 60% by the mid 1960s – insisted that their homelands were still entirely special to them, and that they wished to stay. For this reason, a continuing fondness and attachment for reserve life in addition to the pressing preoccupations of mere survival, pan-Indigenous political organizations often had difficulty promoting interest in this setting. It was thus left to their representatives, who were often seen as out of touch with the people, to advocate on their behalf for issues that could be regarded as nationally relevant.

C. REAWAKENING: CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT ON RESERVES IN THE 1960s

The 1960s were changing times on Canadian reserves, despite the enduring image of stagnation that was often conveyed by researchers, bureaucrats and by the media. As the Hawthorn Report noted of Canadian reserves in 1966, “It is unnecessary to visit more than one Indian reserve to be immediately struck by the new self-awareness prevalent in Indian communities. This new attitude, a turning point in Indian history, finds expression in an ambiguous ethnic identification and stems from inferior living conditions reflected in a host of factors such as employment, living standards, social organizations and intercultural relations with Whites.”

New self-awareness often manifest itself in new local initiatives that was both Indigenous in its inception and non-Indigenous in its implementation. In Canada, the focus on the idea and the principles
of community development was a focal point of legislative efforts in this era. In 1961, the Annual Report of Community Development Services in its first fully operational year indicated that some progress had been made. It called the Community Development “a new approach to the Indian and Metis question” which had included the appointment of a field officer appointed in September of 1960. It drew from an approach it argued was “one of the most efficient and, at the same time, most democratic methods of helping a nation or a community co-ordinate all its resources to achieve social and economic improvements.” It was a system whereby “the more privileged nations”, in this case, the Canadian state, would offer its technical and financial know-how to help the people achieve their goals. Less privileged nations would therefore design their own programs based on community needs within a more “sophisticated” model.

In its first year, the Community Development program had added new field officers in Berens River, Norway House, Grand Rapids, Camperville and The Pas, as well as a liaison officer based out of Winnipeg. The training for the program included six weeks spent in the Winnipeg office where new field officers would peruse both studies of Aboriginal people as well as those pertaining to community development. As the report noted, Community Development Officers were to act in an advisory capacity only, though the effect of their work might be greater still: “He must not substitute his goals for theirs. However, he cannot escape some responsibility for the effects of his recommendations. He must not maintain that he is merely a technician unconcerned with the ends towards which his skills are directed.” As such, a large part of the responsibility of the CDO included building a relationship of “confidence and respect” with the local people, developing an “intimate partnership” with them. Duties also included acting “as catalyst in stimulating the local people to action,” as well as to coordinate governmental and non-governmental services within the community. For the first three months of their appointment, however, CDOs were advised simply to be observant: “They should rather observe the way the community lives, its aspirations and frustrations and its problems and achievements.”
In Norway House, Manitoba, where a community development officer was dispatched as of February 1961, the CDO first aimed for “the creation of strong community-spirited organizations which could later provide a framework within which the community could study its economic and social problems and take whatever action it deemed necessary.” As such, the Norway House Residents’ Association was formed, with the initial mandate to look into how it might be helpful in areas of community cooperation, the possibility of building an airstrip, a discussion with the telephone company about the need for more telephone lines, and the possibility of establishing public hydro services.56

In addition to communities surrounding or attached to reserves, and reserves themselves, CDO's were also active in the Metis settlements such as Camperville, where 675 Metis lived alongside 325 Aboriginal people on the Pine Creek Reserve. As the report noted, “Other than for the legal differentiations arising from the Indian Act, the two place names represent only one community with everyone shopping at the same stores and patronizing the same recreational facilities.” In Camperville, the committee noted twenty-five areas where improvements were needed, including in the development of stable employment, better schools, clean drinking water, adequate housing, and health care facilities and services.

In Berens River, the people themselves prompted the appointment of a CDO. As the report noted, “The people of Berens River have become quite concerned about their future. They made their anxieties known to the government and in May of the year under review, Community Development Services was urged to extend its help to that community."57 In other regions, it was the tense relationships between Indigenous people and the nearby non-Indigenous community that made the program so important. “Life on the fringe usually creates several community problems such as: [...] different standards of housing, [...] different standards of law enforcement, [...] different standards of community services and public utilities, [...] absence of social pressures, [...] creation of a slum mentality, [...] racial differentiation.” These “fringe” settlements, as they were called, “usually feel
unhappy and often uneasy about their apparent inability to integrate people of Indian ancestry.” This was true in MacGregor, MB, where Indigenous residents suffered from low income, poor housing, and were noted as chronic begging. An “improvement program” devised, therefore, included the provision of adequate food, clothing and shelter, as well as education, social relationships and employment, in chronological order. It is interesting to note how employment was deemed the last priority on this list, but the report concluded that “There are still many problems to be solved, but the way of life of these people will never return to the low ebb they knew before the year under review.”

The CDO program certainly had some benefits, but it also insisted that the best chance that Indigenous people had for a better standard of living was to try to make it “off the Rez.” As the Report indicated, transmitting information about job opportunities was a key feature of the work, as was encouraging employers “to offer remunerations which are sufficiently high to make it worthwhile for an Indian or a Metis to leave his remote community, incur the expense of transportation and maintain himself separately from his family.” If the remuneration was insufficient, then the individual would no longer have the desire to find work outside the community, or to work at all. If he “made it”, his good fortune would be transmitted to friends and/or relatives, who might then also be encourage to do the same. What was critically lacking in the CDS program, therefore, was any real possibility or vision to make these communities viable, all on their own. In addition, the Community Development Services Program saw itself as helping Indigenous people, but within the expertise of the federal Department of Indian Affairs. As the Report noted, in closing, “Entering this field in the eleventh hour as Community Development Services did, it is quite reassuring to have the guidance of the Indian Affairs Branch who have had close to a century of experience in dealing with these problems.”

As many residents and participants found out, however, the ethos of community control could be as limiting as it could be empowering. By focusing on community control, federal legislators in both countries continued to steer the direction of federal policy-- and control the funding arrangements. As
the Hawthorn Report had concluded, maintaining and encouraging the development of Indian communities had become rather secondary to the massive efforts to relocate Indigenous people in the cities. As Fidler explained, many government funds earmarked for development remained unused because the government refused to disburse the money, and of the Indian Affairs Department's over $60 million dollar budget in the late 1960s, less then $2 million had been spent on economic development.61

D. A NEW BREED: SAME OLD PROBLEMS

In addition to government programs devoted to improving economic and prospects of reserve life, there was also the emergence, in the 1960s, of talented new administrators on Canadian reserves. As The Native People reported in 1971, “The New Breed” had arrived in both federal and Aboriginal politics in Canada. For critics, this new brand of leadership only served to exacerbate the problems of communities. As radical Howard Adams pointed out, leadership training, when it was offered, co-opted leaders and local elites and placed them in charge of community action. Those chosen were in fact those who best “reflect and express the aspirations of the colonizer’s community.”62 These were often individuals educated within and comfortable in the non-Indigenous world who arrived in their new posts as Band Administrators with a great deal of enthusiasm but not alot of training. As Ed Fox, the 32-year old Band Administrator for the Blood Reserve, then- the largest in Canada, noted, administrators required more training and education in manoeuvring the mass of bureaucratic red tape, particularly when it came to grants. Fox's comments, however, also indicated the degree to which administrators such as he often struggled to connect with the populations they purported to serve, despite being Indigenous themselves. As he explained, “We would be able to solve more of our problems faster if it were not for the lack of communications that exist in the reserve, between the
people and the Administration. Attendance at Band meetings is not what it should be.”

Fox, who was a high school graduate and a land surveyor, as well as vice-president of Kainai Industries, a company which assembled mobile homes, was certainly set apart from many of his contemporaries. Other Band Administrators had a similarly impressive combination of education and work experience, though not necessarily in the field of politics or of administration. Joe Dion, Tribal Administrator for the Kehewin Band Council at Kehewin, Alberta, was a 22 year old who had briefly reported for The Native People as well as completed his first year of the pre-med program at the University of Alberta. Phil Thompson, who served as Band Administrator at Assumption, in Northern Alberta, was a former Air Force pilot who had completed his Bachelor of Science degree. For all of the education that this group help, however, virtually none dealt with the administration of monies, projects and people inherent in positions on Band Councils.

James Sewid, Kwakiutl elected as chief of the Nimpkish band council in 1950, recounted some of his political experiences in his memoirs. The Kwakiutl tribes, in the late 1940s, were still primarily operating on the hereditary chiefs system, and Sewid pushed vociferously to have it changed to the elected one. As he explained, he believed it was both more democratic and more efficient. In his mind, more people elected would mean more work could be accomplished. He faced a great deal of opposition: “Of course some of the people would not go along with me and they thought I was crazy to talk like that.”

Finally, when the hereditary chief of the Nimpkish band died in 1950, the band switched to the elected system thanks to a pen stroke from Ottawa. In his band of 300 members at the time, only 70 were eligible to vote. Sewid was elected chief and was nervous about his ability to do the job. In his acceptance speech, he simply said “I'll do my best.” Almost immediately, Sewid reports that he faced some opposition. Not being originally from the Nimpkish band, some community members gossiped that Sewid was an outsider with no right to lead the band. Though Sewid was not intimidated, he did tread carefully at times. He describes frequently consulting village elders on
important issues though the decisions he made were always his own. His council was much younger: as he recalls, “Herbert Cook, Dan Hanuse, George Alfred and myself were four young men that were very young and very active. That was the best council I ever had because those men really worked.”  Though he enjoyed harmonious relationships with his council members, his relationship with local residents was not always the best; one of his first measures was to begin charging members of the Nimpkish band using the water system on the reserve $1 a month for its use. Though Sewid was looking to make a long range plan to further develop the water system, locals simply failed to see why they should pay for this resource.

During his tenure, Sewid and his council also voted to allow limited logging on the reserve. Monies received from any such sales were distributed in the following manner: half to the band members and half to the band's capital account in Ottawa. Because Sewid disagreed with the distribution of monies to all individual band members including children and the elderly, the council passed a measure that monies should henceforth be put into a band account and used for band business. As he recalls, “Of course I had a lot of opposition and there were a lot of people who didn’t like it. They had been doing it the other way all those years and they couldn’t see why we should change it.”  Sewid stressed community self-sufficiency in the sense that if the community itself paid for improvements like parks, recreational property and upgrades to existing council and infrastructure facilities, then it would foster community pride as well as prevent Ottawa from interfering in the band's affairs.

As his recollections indicate, the job of band administrator could be difficult and often led to strained relations with the people, particularly where monies were involved. As Sewid explains, there were many meetings where he and his council were questioned on their use of band monies. He based his justification to the people on the Indian Act and explained that, just like a municipality, the band council was the governing body of the village. He continued to say that the council had to check with the Indian Agent about whether the Indian Act gave the council power to do all of the things it wanted
to do. As might be expected, the explanation provided by Sewid only served to frustrate many of the people more. His efforts to promote new membership in the band by allowing new members to transfer in was also highly contentious: he maintained that new members had as much right as the original Nimpkish members “according to the laws of the white man and what they call democracy.”

A staunch advocate of both democracy and integration, Sewid also reports that when he asked when new elections would be called, he was told by Mr. Todd, the Indian Agent at the time, that the band had come under the section of the Indian Act which provided that Sewid would be chief for an indefinite period of time. Sewid and Todd subsequently petitioned Ottawa to have the system changed and the band was once again reordered under section 73 of the Indian Act whereby elections would be held every two years with the chief councillor elected by majority vote, the first of which was held in 1953. Sewid’s involvement in local politics did not end at the point, but he ceased to be chief or a member of council.

E. A ONE-MAN ARMY: THE FAILURE TO CONNECT THE NATIONAL TO THE LOCAL

Though individuals like James Sewid often worked hard for their people, many of the things they did, such as attending large meetings in major centres as well as negotiating with governments behind the scenes, failed to impress the residents. For their part, residents not involved in local politics often failed to see the point. As Doris Pratt pointed out, “We were just trying to survive.” As she explained, there was in fact a marked perceived difference between reserve politicians and reserve residents, a difference which was often exacerbated by the conduct of politicians themselves. In a cartoon by Willard Ahenakew which was never published due to fears of public reaction, Ahenakew illustrated a chief, lying in the lobby of a grand hotel’s front desk while a maid explained to the front
desk clerk that she had “found him under the bed in room 237.” The clerk’s newspaper showed a bold headline which read, “Indian Chief missing for 10th day after attending chiefs’ conference in Saskatoon.”

Ahenakew, who had worked with the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, explained the disjuncture between the expectations of young new employees and the realities as such: “Because most of us had more education than the average Indian person and had experienced similar circumstances, we thought we knew all there was to know about our people and that we had to just line up our marbles and everything would turn up rosy, but most of us found the contrary eventually.”

Fred Shore, southwest regional director of the Manitoba Metis Federation during this era, describes the “new politicians” of this generation: “The system lends itself to turkeys,” he explained. Metis from very small towns with poor levels of education were often placed in charge of large expense accounts, paid large salaries and charged with administering complex programs for which they had no preparation or training.

An unequal relationship of power, whether actual or perceived, between politicians and reserve residents also served to complicate pan-Indian efforts on Canadian reserves during this era. As Robertson observed in 1970, “I found there was no civil rights movement among the Indians, certainly not the coherent mass uprising my imagination anticipated. Only a handful of chiefs have ever seen a text of the Indian Act, and few of them have been able to interpret its jargon... Old people are obsessed with treaties they have never read; and they stridently proclaim rights they have never been granted. Circumscribed by isolation, poor education and a language barrier, with pathetically scanty knowledge of Canada's political system, their blunders amuse the bureaucrats who keep them in ignorance and confuse them with half-truths. Most Indian are, like all people, too preoccupied with the daily chore of getting food to care much about examining their position.”

Though an outsider, Robertson had aptly pointed out the way in which Indigenous choices about getting involved in politics were often circumscribed by the daily chore of living. In his personal notes, John Conway, student activist, noted
the extent to which the reserve seemed divided and void of any sense of community action. He was travelling through Saskatchewan in 1967, attempting to register. As he noted, “I dreamt mainly of a political consciousness and solidarity such as occurs only in the nursery rhymes of the utopian revolutionary.” These comments echoed what Indigenous people insisted themselves; that they were simply too busy attempting to survive to engage in any larger or grand political agenda.

On another level, many reserve residents did not see the need for a larger pan-Indigenous agenda. While the term “tribalism” was certainly more popular in American rhetoric, there was an important element of tribalism, or nationalism, which ensured that particular nations might band together, for cultural or for pragmatic reasons. For some, local concerns were simply much more important, as they had a significant impact on local economies, families and day-to-day life. In Canada for example, recent changes to several laws had threatened the survival of many Indigenous people who made their living trapping. This was not the case coast to coast. As Father Leopold Morin described them, changes included the imposition of a registration system for trap lines and trapping time limits, as well as quotas for pelts. The Hawthorn Report demonstrated as much: in its analysis of the economic situation of Canadian bands, it pointed out that “While all communities ... share some common characteristics and experiences, at the same time it is true to say that each Indian band is unique.” The report cited size of population, dependence on relief, religion, education, proximity to Whites, size of the reserve area, quality of leadership and loans or grants of capital as important factors that led to differences among reserves. In this way, these differences could also contribute to an unwillingness on the part of certain communities to participate in an activist project, as well as apathy on the part of those suffering most. Finally, for some, the focus on one's own nation was simply a matter of cultural pride. As Doris Pratt asserted, the Dakota people were not like other Canadian Indigenous groups in that they were not treaty people; as such, the lack of a Dakota treaty significantly affected the relevance of the issues that national organizations were attempting to advance, as well as
served to foster an antagonistic relationship between her people and those she termed “treaty people.”

The issue of local concern was indeed a significant factor in the failure to mobilize, at least in any real sense, a larger pan-Indigenous agenda across Canada that was both known and relevant to local people. As noted American scholar Frederick Hoxie explains, “reserves”, as they were designated in Canada and “reservations” as they were called in the United States were more than mere tracts of real estate: “They encompassed religious and historic sites, community resources, and Native institutions. For their inhabitants and others who traced their origins there, reservations were cultural homelands. As a consequence, the borders between reserves and the nations which surrounded them ... were cultural and political frontiers.”

These cultural and political frontiers often had jealously guarded borders, and many who had lived their lives as members of these communities saw little purpose for a broader agenda that might not make any concrete progress for years to come. Local concern, according to some activists, was simply a manifestation of the age-old divide and rule principle. As Howard Adams, Metis activist and scholar of note during this period pointed out, “The more a region or area is broken down into local projects, the more alienation and powerlessness is intensified. The more isolated and individualized people are, the easier it is to keep them divided.”

In Canada, the relationship of large pan-Indigenous organizations to individual bands also varied. As Ponting and Gibbins aptly pointed out, the relations between the NIB and individual bands could be most effectively characterized as uneven. As they explained, “The majority of the 573 bands in this country do not have any direct dealings with the NIB... Some bands, however, do use NIB in a 'trouble-shooting' or expediting capacity when they encounter a problem... A handful of bands receive direct and intensive assistance from NIB.” This assistance was usually granted in the form of lobbying or facilitating for a certain project, as well as providing technical expertise and research for the development of particular programs. The choice of who to help was important, and assistance was not granted on a first-come first-serve basis; rather, the NIB selected where and when it would become
involved “with a keen eye directed towards both their national ramifications and the political leverage that they can provide NIB in its relations with government.”

In 1972, the National Indian Brotherhood developed its own policy statement on Indian education. It argued that the basis of Indian education should be pride in one’s own heritage and that it was time for a “radical change in Indian education. Our aim is to make education relevant to the philosophy and needs of the Indian people.” It proposed that educational agreements be reached between bands, provinces and the federal government to allow bands to administer local control over curriculum, facilities and teaching. While this was a project that the NIB, as a pan-Indian organization, could effectively advocate – after all, Indian education was a concern across the country – it was sensitive to the differences among bands and reserves. As it articulated in its concluding statement, “There is difficulty and danger in taking a position on Indian education because of the great diversity of problems encountered across the country.”

As these comments indicated, the NIB was a “big-issue” organization- issues of treaties, education, healthcare, economic development; these were the bread and butter of the NIB, but were often inaccessible to local people. As such, the lack of a localized or effective NIB presence in many communities made some more apt to radicalism than others. As Menno Boldt argued, in 1980, two identities, pan-Indian and tribal, existed together, but “There is a reluctance on the part of local tribal councils... to form a united front.” He maintained that organizations were often mass-based in the sense that the majority of Indigenous people were attitudinally supportive, but that their actual ability to mobilize people politically was still in its emergent stages. As Doris Pratt pointed out, her local leaders were involved in the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood but they did not understand, nor did they share with the people, what was going on. For the most part, she expressed her view that they merely wanted to attend meetings for a trip to Winnipeg. For Menno Boldt, organizations like the MIB as well as the NIB demonstrated what his study deemed pragmatic and adaptive nationalism characteristic
of both the group itself and of their respective leaders.

F. LOCAL ACTIVISM, LOCAL ISSUES

Rather than engage in the national question, activists often focused on the local level believing that meaningful change could more readily be achieved at home. The work of Alanis Obamsawin is a case in point of the way in which local activism was often seen as more relevant than the national question, but not completely separate. Born in New Hampshire but raised primarily in Quebec, Obamsawin lived on the Odanak reserve in Quebec until the age of nine when her family moved to Trois-Rivieres. There, she recounts, her family faced much discrimination from other families. As a teenager, Obamsawin recalls living in a “frightening world” and of being chased and insulted in the street on a regular basis. Of Abenaki descent, Alanis Obamsawin was, by the 1960s, a notable singer and songwriter. Throughout the 1960s, Obamsawin engaged in community activism centering on the building of a swimming pool for Aboriginal children.

Her efforts began in earnest in 1961, when the St. Francis river, a popular swimming spot for both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal children, was deemed too polluted and swimming was no longer allowed. The town of Pierreville built a pool for its children, but Obamsawin argued that Aboriginal children were made to feel unwelcome and decided that the children of Odanak should also have a swimming pool. Using her talents as an entertainer, as well as various other fundraising methods including fashion shows, lectures and other public presentations, Obamsawin raised $12,000 to finance the construction.

As she recalls, the effort was difficult. She faced some opposition from non-Aboriginal people who argued that a swimming pool for Aboriginal children was a luxury, as if to say they should not
have it. Still, Obamsawin persisted, and the pool was built within only a few years. Profiling the project, CBC’s *Telescope* explained that the name Obamsawin means “pathfinder”, and that Obamsawin was an important advocate for the Odanak community. As Obamsawin herself explained, when interviewed on her success, “In one way it’s only a swimming pool. In another way, it’s so much more.”

Obamsawin's work was reflective of many community-based activists who, for a myriad of reasons, felt that acting at the local level was just as important and symbolic as working on a national level in big-issue organizations. Often, however, local activists conceived of their struggle in much larger terms as significant to the larger Indigenous struggle. Such was also the case in the 1968 occupation of the Sea-Way International Bridge. The bridge links Cornwall, Ontario to Massena, New York, and runs through the Mohawk territory known as Akwesasne. Akwesasne includes several borders including the one between Canada and the United States, as well as the border of Ontario, Quebec and the state of New York. Though the people of Akwesasne in many ways conceive of themselves as a unified nation, the bureaucratic barriers erected over the last several centuries have meant that this unity has frequently been challenged both externally and internally.

The building of the bridge in the 1950s engendered fear and resistance in the community. Residents rights protested the destruction of their local fisheries as well as the encroachment on their land and the increased traffic into the community. In December of 1968, a group of Mohawk residents accompanied by the press erected a blockade on the South Channel bridge protesting the imposition of custom duties by the Canadian government they claimed violated the Jay Treaty of 1794. The treaty guaranteed the Mohawk free passage as well as freedom from any duties imposed by the government. Residents called both upon the treaty, as well as on other elements of administrative and legal history pertaining to their people. The 1927 Supreme Court decision of United States ex. Rel Diablo v. McCandless had ruled that Paul Diablo, an Canadian iron worker charged with being in the United
States illegally, was protected by prosecution by the Jay Treaty and that as such, the immigration laws that would apply to other citizens did not apply to the Akwesasne people.\textsuperscript{88} Canadian precedents, however, dismissed this argument: the Supreme Court of Canada had dismissed an appeal of Louis Francis, an Akwesasne man forced to pay customs duties on appliances he had bought on the American side to take back to his home in Canada. In its decision, the court ruled that the Jay Treaty did not exempt Francis first, because exemptions were to be legislated and second, because section 87 of the Indian Act had made customs laws applicable to First Nations people as well.\textsuperscript{89}

Ernest Benedict was a key planner in the blockade. Born in New York in 1918, Benedict had served in the American military and upon discharge, had relocated to the land left to him by his parents on Cornwall Island in Ontario. Benedict had become a staunch advocate for the improvement of Aboriginal education in the community as well as an opponent of the Seaway Bridge project. A member of the Company of Young Canadians, Benedict had been instrumental in the creation of the Native North American Travelling College in 1968. Though he and other concerned residents had first travelled to Ottawa to protest the bridge, threatening to block it if their concerns were not met, the government failed to act. As such, the blockade of the Seaway International Bridge began December 18, 1968, when a group of approximately one hundred women and teenagers from Akwesasne and Kahnawake blocked the bridge using cars and their own bodies.

The event was captured on the film \textit{You Are on Indian Land}, produced by the National Film Board of Canada and directed by Noel Starblanket, the man who would, in 1974, become the new president of the National Indian Brotherhood. Cornwall police tried to convince the protesters to remove their blockade, but those gathered insisted that it was indeed the police who were trespassing on Indian land. Tempers flared and several arrests were made until Benedict eventually convinced those who remained into a meeting at the community hall. Police arrested forty-seven people in all on charges of obstruction while seven protesters faced additional weapons charges.\textsuperscript{90} These included Kahn
Tineta Horn, who had also played a prominent role in the National Indian Council before she was disavowed by the organization and its leader. Charges were eventually dropped against 35 of the protesters due to the argument that they could not be identified with certainty as protesters from two months prior to the court date.

Though the protest was initially marked by unity, a developing chasm between Horn and Benedict resulted in a split between the traditional longhouse and the elected council, responsible for the people in Canada and in the United States respectively. Traditional chiefs rejected a mass demonstration planned by Horn at the bridge in the months after the protest. For its part, the Canadian government refused to honour the duty-free clause of the Jay Treaty arguing that its implementation had lapsed in 1813.

Overall, the protest not only engaged the issue of the Jay Treaty specifically but wider issues of self-determination; the issue forced Ottawa to consider removing the Indian Agent on the St. Regis Reserve, of instituting a Native police force, and of protecting treaty rights. More importantly however, and as Carlyn Pinkins has demonstrated, the existence of effective local protest organizations helped prevent some other groups seeking to make their mark on the protest, such as AIM, from gaining a foothold in the community. These included the Mohawk Warrior Society, founded in 1959, an organization which pledged to recreate a traditional, independent government stemming from a revival of the Longhouse in the mid-1920s. The expropriation of 1200 acres of land by the Canadian government for the Seaway project as well as the distrust of the elected band council drew many followers who, on March 5th 1959, marched to the council house at Grand River and seized it from the elected councillors. Though the elected system was eventually re-instituted, this was not to be the end of the Mohawk Warrior Society which re-emerged with the Mohawk Singing Society in Kahnawake, founded by Paul Delaronde who had been arrested at the bridge occupation. The Singing Society was envisioned as a way to rebuild a fighting spirit among the Mohawk, as well as to bring back old pride.
In 1970, the Mohawk Singing Society changed its name to the Mohawk Warrior Society, which assisted the people of Akwasasne in taking over Stanley and Loon Islands in 1970.

The organization grew and inspired the creation of several new, but much more militarized, warrior societies among the Mohawk. In 1973, the Mohawk Warrior Society also assisted protesters in New York State in the Moss Lake occupation. As the actions of the Mohawk people demonstrate, local issues often became national ones, engaging national problems. At the same time, the existence of effective protest on a local level could often serve to limit the involvement of large pan-Indigenous groups, at least on any more of a token level. As such, the importance of localized protest both as a tool for change and as a limiting factor in the growth of pan-Indigenous groups as grassroots organizations is an important dimension in considering the possibilities of pan-Indigenous engagement at the local level.

CONCLUSION

As this chapter has demonstrated, the context of Canadian reserves greatly affected the efficacy of Indigenous organizing during this period. While reserve residents could all agree that a century of bureaucratic bungling, error and outright maliciousness had certainly jeopardized their community health as well as their individual ability to survive, it seemed to many as though national mainstream and big-issue organizations had little to offer in terms of concrete help or services. This led, in many cases, to a disconnection from the grassroots level in a way that, for Aboriginal people, severely compromised the legitimacy of the pan-Indigenous struggle but that, ironically, bolstered its status in national political circles, particularly in the early 1970s as more formal arrangements with governments including the NIB's own Joint Committee began to make important legislative inroads using a more
conciliatory process.

Unlike in the United States, Canadian reserves were not often the sites of radicalism. As Doris Pratt so poignantly pointed out, they were places where people struggled genuinely from day to day and were consumed, for the most part, by this effort. Yet the relative absence of radicalism on the reserve as seen in a Canadian context should urge us to reevaluate the nature and significance of local struggles which, in Canada's 1960s and 1970s, engaged national issues in a national spotlight with a great deal more impact than has been accorded to them traditionally.
3 For more on the way in which individual agents’ administrative styles could affect the everyday lives of those in their care, see R.J. Brownlie, *A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
5 Ibid., 21.
6 Ibid., 22.
7 Ibid., 15.
8 Ibid., 168.
9 Ibid., 177.
12 For numerous examples, see Mary-Ellen Kelm, *Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-1950* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 105-106.
14 Ibid., 50.
15 Ibid., 47.
16 Waldram, Herring and Young, *Aboriginal Health in Canada*, 193-194.
18 Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, 75.
19 Ibid., 15.
22 Ibid., 52.
24 Kelm, *Colonizing Bodies*, 66.
25 Ibid., 69.
26 Ibid., 80.
27 Robertson, *Reservations are for Indians*, 120.
28 Ibid., 33.
29 *This is Indian Land*, directed by Mort Ransen (Montreal: National Film Board, 1969).
31 Doris Pratt, interview by author, 16 January 2012, Winnipeg, MB.
36 Ibid., 23.
38 Ibid., 66.
41 Waldram, Herring and Young, *Aboriginal Health in Canada*, 197.


Willard Ahenakew, *Cartoons of Indian Politics and Humour* (Saskatoon: Heese House of Printing, 1974), 34.


Ibid., 2.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 9.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 12.


Ibid.


Ibid., 149.

Ibid., 155.

Ibid., 156.

Ibid., 170-171.

Ahenakew, *Cartoons of Indian Politics*, 57.

Ibid., 16.

Fred Shore, interview by author, 15 May 2012, Winnipeg, MB.

Robertson, *Reservations are for Indians*, 8.

John F. Conway, “Notes from Carry-the-Kettle,” 1. Walter Rudnicki Fonds, Box 100 Folder 7 (University of Manitoba Archives, Winnipeg, MB).


Ibid., 71.

Doris Pratt, interview.


Ibid., 30-31.


Doris Pratt, interview.

87 Gerald F. Reid, *Kahnawake: Factionalism, Traditionalism and Nationalism in a Mohawk Community* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 12.


90 Cited in Carlyn Pinkins, *One Nation, Separate Spheres: An Examination of Red Power Activism between Two Mohawk Communities* (MA Thesis), Georgia Southern University (2011), 72.

91 Cited in Pinkins, *One Nation*, 77.

92 Pinkins, *One Nation*, 80-81.


94 Ibid., 170-171.
Chapter 5:

'I struggle along anyway':

The American Reservation System and 1960s Revival
INTRODUCTION

If the problems on reservations were any indication, policy orientations concerning Indigenous lands and people had been remarkably congruent in Canada and in the United States since the late nineteenth century. While there had been important variations including the absence, in the United States, of a formal Indian Act, the foundation and therefore the outcome of quality of life for reservation residents was similar in both countries. The reservation system in the United States had been imbued with the same logic as that in Canada, where the emphasis was on clearing available land for settlers and on segregating Indian populations until such time as they might be ready, according to Whites, for full integration. The colonizing government often used its power over Indian lives to consolidate groups, and as Robert K. Berkhofer Jr. explained, “The tribe as a political entity in the area of the United States is in nearly all instances a post-white contact development.” The corollary to this process, establishing reservations, moreover, helped to avoid boundary disputes and made Aboriginal people, grouped together on a federally defined chunk of land, much easier to control. As of 1786, reservation spaces were negotiated when tribes came to agreements with the government whereby they ‘reserved’ from the land cession a specified part held by original occupancy but reserved them, with the consent of the government, to Indigenous people.

As in Canada, a history of reservation living had important consequences for the activism that would develop in the reservation setting. Still, in the United States, radical activists made inroads into reservations that their counterparts could not necessarily reach in Canada. As in Canada, mainstream organizations in the United States often suffered from a lack of connection to the grass roots which only emboldened radical activists seeking a cause that would speak more broadly to Indigenous rights across the country. As such, the 1960s and 1970s were an explosive period of Native American action in the United States that, in the end, helped to reinforce the re-emergence of tribalism after 1975.
A. AMERICAN RESERVATIONS: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As in Canada, Indians in the United States did not 'own' their reservations in fee simple: they carried no power of alienation except to the United States and could not be sold to any other entity. As a general rule, Indigenous people living on American reservations could not lease land, sell standing timber, or enter into any other contract with outsiders except with the express approval of Congress. For its part, the government pledged – though did not always honour its promise – to prevent any intrusion, trespass or settlement on any Indian lands. Despite government promises of protection in exchange for land cessions, Secretary of War Henry Knox in 1789 lamented, "that all the Indian tribes once existing in those States, now the best cultivated and most populous, have become extinct … in a short period, the idea of an Indian on this side of the Mississippi will only be found in the page of the historian." Policy makers in the early republic believed that the attrition of Native Americans and the extinguishing of their reservations was an inevitable consequence of civilization's progress.

Often, the government simply imposed treaty boundaries on Aboriginal people and removed them from their original territories, as it had when it removed Indian populations living east of the Mississippi to a new area west of the river in the mid 1800s. The end of the War of 1812 had generated new pressure to open land for settlement and in 1830, Congress created a policy of Removal that President Andrew Jackson argued would ensure the United States' own progress to the detriment of Indians, who were simply a relic of the past: “Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country,… but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. … What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranges by a few thousand savages to our extensive republic… occupied by more than
12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?"  

The new area was deemed, quite simply, “Indian Territory”, and meant to provide lands for all Indian tribes removed to make way for new settlement or the expansion of existing settlements. Predictably, the removal was vehemently protested by many groups who insisted that their established livelihoods including their trap lines, hunting routes and migratory patterns would be completely disrupted. These elements, the foundation of community and tribal development, were dismissed by the government as the complaining of an irresponsible and nomadic people whose wishes need not be considered. Thus, by 1840, nearly all of the main Eastern tribes had been removed by force to Indian Territory and the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole Indians granted the label of 'Nations.' By 1900, Indian Territory housed approximately 40 recognized tribes who had been forced to relocate. Over 80,000 Indian people had been removed in a series of events that had netted the government over 15 million new acres of land.

As of 1849, the newly created Department of Interior was charged with managing public land and Indian land, a mandate that would undoubtedly favour non-Indigenous people. Luke Lea, Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1851, called for the “concentration, domestication and incorporation” of Indian people into the larger American society. Formal treaty-making was suspended in 1871, reflecting the weakened position of Native American people in the wake of over a century of disruption and dispossession. Thereafter, reservations would be established by executive order or congressional act, reflecting the belief of the government in its own sovereignty and superiority over Indian nations.

As on Canadian reserves, the American reservation system was based on the idea of forced assimilation including a transition to Euro-American labour and educational traditions. The Dawes Act of 1877, touted by its main proponent, Senator Watkins of Utah, divided reservations into individually owned 160-acre tracts of land designed for subsistence farming. Watkins compared this policy to the
emancipation proclamation arguing that by freeing Indian people of the shackles of communal ownership, it would set them on the right path towards full integration. The 1906 Burke Act further granted Indian officials power to transfer land from trust to fee patent status, which authorized the secretary of the interior to decide whether an Indian was “competent” to manage their own lands. If deemed competent, land could be taken out of trust, transferred to fee patent, then made taxable and, by extension, saleable. Over the span of the Dawes Act, Indian lands decreased from 136 million acres to only 48 million by 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act forced the repeal of the Dawes Act.

While the IRA, chronicled in greater detail in previous chapters, offered some solace for Indian people, it could not undo the damage done by the erosion of tradition in their communities. As in Canada, Native American religion had been viewed by legislators and the missionaries who worked among them with fear and contempt in the nineteenth century, and Progressive Era policy makers provided religious groups with monies to assist them in Native American conversions. The establishment of the reservation system had given a boost to missionaries who generally established missions in Indian Agencies. As the Commissioner of Indian Affairs expressed in 1882, “In no other manner and by no other means, in my judgement can our Indian population be so speedily and permanently reclaimed from barbarism, idolatry and savage life, as by the educational and missionary operations of the Christian people of our country.” As Frederick Hoxie has argued, the civilizing mission and the Christianizing mission were viewed by Progressive Era policy-makers as inextricable from each other, and indeed complimentary in their goals.

Section 5 of the Allotment Act of 1887 had provided religious denominations free reservation allotments as a way to secure their presence in perpetuity on American Indian reservations regardless of the will of residents. The Plains Sun Dance was listed as a crime from 1883 in the Courts of Indian Offences. In 1902, Commissioner W.A. Jones advised his agents to prohibit men wearing their hair long, body painting, “give-away” ceremonies, and religious dances. In 1918, the Board of Indian
Commissioners described tribal rituals as a “reversion to paganism.” In 1921, new Indian Commissioner Charles Burke insisted that Indian children be compelled to attend church on Sunday and issued Circular 1665 further restricting gatherings and dances, as well as travel to sites of gatherings and dances, and urging “close cooperation between the Government employees and the missionaries in those matters.” Until 1935 then, the traditional non-Christian religions of the American Indians were banned outright on reservations with the prospect of fines or prison time for those who dared to practice. In the 1920s, however, John Collier who was to become the Commissioner for Indian Affairs in 1935 and institute the Indian Reorganization Act which provided for some restoration of tribal religion, began to agitate for change in this matter. Though his views were largely cast aside by legislators in the 1920s, his work would have an impact in the 1930s. In 1935, Collier issued Circular 2970 which prohibited interference with Indigenous religious life or ceremony. Though the receptive environment for Collier’s ideas was to wane by the 1940s, by that time, much of the traditional religious practices of Indigenous nations had been eroded and would not experience a revival until the 1960s.

Alongside the legal prohibitions of the Progressive Era and as in Canada, a system of Indian education also worked hand in hand with the Christianizing mission to speed up the process of so-called 'civilization.' Congress began to appropriate money for Indian education in 1870, and by 1890, over two and a half million dollars was being spent annually on 148 boarding schools and 225 day schools responsible for educating over 20,000 children. The most effective method for assimilation, of course, according to authorities, was the boarding school where Indian children could be removed from all of the heathen influences of their home life. Isolated and alone, they reasoned, the children would come to embrace Christianity as well as habits of hard work and thrift to encounter the perceived indolence organic to Indigenous communities. As the Meriam Report pointed out, in 1928, the schools were designed “with the idea of eradicating all signs of Indianess... Bureau of Indian Affairs employees
cooperated with zealous Christian missionaries to prohibit the children from practising tribal ceremonies or dances because they considered these pagan rites that had to be ended.” 10 In addition to prohibiting ritual and Native languages, missionaries also insisted that Indigenous children cut their hair and wear 'appropriate' clothing.

Missionaries insisted that their methods were not only educating Native American children in the ways of civilization, but could help in eradicating bad hygiene practices in communities that they insisted contributed to their own issues with health. Congress first appropriated money specifically for Indian health care in 1832, when a smallpox epidemic prompted legislators to secure funds for vaccines and treatments. In addition, some funds were given directly to religious orders for the provision of health services with additional appropriations from tribal treaty funds for the provision of health services.11 Early health services were meagre and by 1880, only 77 physicians served the entire Native American population of the United States. Though the health of reservation residents was frequently reported as abysmal, legislators seemed not to understand how best to address the problem. The BIA created a chief medical supervisor position in 1908, and Congress once again began appropriating funds for the purposes of Indian health in 1910. It was only in 1921, however, that Congress passed the Snyder Act which provided explicit legislative authorization for federal health programs for Indians. Though the federal government had been slow in setting up services for Indigenous people, it nevertheless insisted that they not use their traditional practices. As Brett Shelton reports, the Progressive Era which featured a great deal of religious repression also repressed traditional healing practices associated with religion. The Courts of Indian Offences were empowered to detain indefinitely medicine men who would not stop practising.12 The Indian Health Service was finally established as an agency under the Public Health Service in 1955. Staff hospitals and health centres followed suit, and the services provided for Indian people improved more generally though, as critics maintained, they still fell far short of those provided to non-Indigenous American citizens.
As this overview has demonstrated, many of the factors that determined the quality – or lack thereof – of reservation life in the United States were the same as in Canada. A state insistence on land-grabbing combined with an aggressive civilizing mission for the better part of a century created structures within Indian reservations that were decidedly objectionable to a people who had long enjoyed their own religious, healing and educational practices for centuries. By the 1960s, therefore, life on the reservation had become ever more difficult and the exodus of Indigenous youth, in particular, was a chief point of concern for local leaders. Encouraging people to stay, therefore, became an important focus of the larger pan-Indigenous struggle through a revitalization of reservation life which seemed, at least at the dawn of the 1960s, a project that could be accomplished on a national scale.

B. THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN RESERVATION IN THE 1960s

Thus, by the 1960s many American reservations contained very little tribal land and much had passed on to individual ownership. Given the complexities of reservation definition then, it was no surprise that the BIA itself published different statistics with respect to how many reservations it administered in the period. Nevertheless, the total was approximately 290, according to a 1968 statistic. The size and composition of reservation populations varied from state to state with the most densely populated being the Navajo reservation spanning areas in Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. By some estimates, about 100,000 Navajos lived on this reservation while in smaller settings, reservations could contain less than 100 people, as was the case with 78 of them. American Indian populations were, as in Canada, growing at a fast rate however: in the United States, the median age of Aboriginal people living on or adjacent to reservations was 17, compared with 29 years for the rest of the American
Larger families, but even less money: as Levitan and Hetrick pointed out of American Indians during this period, “The single most salient indicator of their desperate need for assistance is their comparatively low income.” They reported the per capita cash income for Indians on or near reservations at only $900 annually in 1968. One study demonstrated that family income below the $1,000 level was three times as prevalent among rural Indians that among rural non-Indian people. As Russell Means described of his own reservation experience, “There is very little work on the reservation except for that provided by the BIA. Even most of the BIA jobs are dead ends, part-time of ‘temporary’ positions... No one can support a family on those wages, not even on a reservation.” Even when business were established, non-Indian operators did not always hire Indian people. As one report showed, “Of an estimated 10,000 jobs opened up by industries on Indian lands, more than half of them have been filled by whites.” As such, Reservation residents frequently had to look outside of their home community for employment. As Means put it, “[S]o many Indians today are economic refugees, no different than the Vietnamese boat people of the Mexicans who sneak across the border in search of decent jobs – be we are in our own country.” Even those who worked faced impossible odds in getting ahead due to the BIA's consistent deductions from their welfare checks for any income earned from either employment or mineral-lease payments.

Compounding the problems of low wages and unemployment was the unavailability of goods for a fair price on reservations. As Means explained of the Pine Ridge reservation in the early 1970s, the BIA had failed consistently to enforce the law forcing White business owners to trade fairly with Indian people and had encouraged profiteering and price inflation without consequence. At Pine Ridge, nearly all community members owed the White-owned trading post which had extended a vast amount of credit. The same phenomenon was observed in Edward S. Cahn's collection, My Brother's Keeper, which detailed how many White merchants took advantage of Indian people on the reservation despite
the BIA insistence on their holding a licence to do business there.

For those in dire economic straits, housing was also a problem. Poor planning and infrastructure was the norm on both American reservations and on Canadian reserves, and the commonalities of experience were plenty. As Russell Means reported, “Most lived in dilapidated one-room shacks.” Study after study supported these anecdotal observations. In one study of the living conditions at Fort Hall in Southern Idaho in 1960, 2,135 people were living in 368 houses. Homes were mostly very small with a significant number being classified as 'lean-to's' and re-tasked railroad boxcars. While the average Idaho home contained 4.2 rooms, reservations homes contained an average of only 2. As the report continued, “The yards surrounding these houses are filled with refuse and tin cans which accumulate before burial since little or no collection exists on the reservation.” For some, the drinking water was located far away from the residence and proper sewage services were virtually non-existent.

The proliferation of unemployment, the lack of access to resources including healthy food and the poor infrastructure on reservations in the United States made administering health services difficult. In the United States, the most serious and most frequent health problems facing reservation populations included communicable diseases among children, mental health issues, alcoholism, nutritional problems and poor dental health. Malnutrition was cited as an important factor in the proliferation of most diseases on reservations, as were substandard housing, geographic isolation, poverty, lack of communication systems. In 1962, a division of the Public Health Service was renamed the Indian Health service and assumed all responsibility for federal Indian health services on reservations, though rarely helped its clients once they had left the reservation. Its responsibilities included operating hospitals on reservations as well as educational services focused on preventative care. While it did help some residents, critics often accused the IHS of negligence in its delivery of care. As Means reported, “Several people told horrific stories of relatives dying in hospital waiting rooms because they were forced to wait in line. Some went in suffering severe chest pains, had a cardiac arrest, and died
unattended in Indian Health Service waiting rooms.” While the IHS did operate with many of the same paternalist assumptions as its federal masters, it did not seem to inspire the same level of ire as did the area of education. IHS, perhaps more than any other service delivery unit, attempted to provide community training programs to equip Indian people to deliver their own care. As Levitan and Hetrick explained, “the IHS insists that its orientation is to work with and for the Indian population.” Though their programs never equipped Indian people to assume leadership roles within this area of service delivery, many Indigenous people were trained in various areas of healthcare, including healthcare aide and nursing, and provided invaluable services that were more sensitive to cultural values than those provided by non-Indian people.

The insensitivity to cultural values often also extended into the area of education, where poor health and nutrition often compounded the existing structural and administrative problems plaguing Aboriginal education. Education in the reservation environment was also often of poor quality. Beginning in 1879 with the foundation of the Carlisle School, American federal authorities became involved in a variety of schooling initiatives ostensibly designed to “prepare” the Indian for eventual assimilation into society, which in practice guaranteed his or her inability to function in either the Indigenous or the White world. In the aftermath of the 1928 Meriam Report which found that “no government Indian school met the minimum standard requirements” of comparable, non-Indian schools, legislators were forced to revisit their policies. The Johnson-O’Malley Act of 1934 provided reimbursement to state and local authorities for the education of Indian children in public schools. Still, by 1969, a full 41% of Indian children in school attended BIA institutions which included both boarding and day facilities. Within the context of boarding schools, educators were faced with myriad problems which Levitan and Hetrick argued were “compounded by their own lack of sensitivity to the values and culture of their wards... The BIA schools continue to teach Indian children that Columbus discovered America and that history on this continent began with the sixteenth century.” The Head
Start program, announced in May of 1965, was one bright spot: implemented within the context of the War on Poverty, it provided early childhood education for toddlers but with distinct advantage to communities which were generally encouraged to plan and implement their own programs based on their own situations. 29 Few reservation youths continued on to higher education, though attendance statistics steadily increased during the 1930s, 40s and 50s, from only 1 of 15 Indian youths in college in 1936 to 28.8 percent entering in 1968-69. 30

Despite these growing numbers, statistics in the domain of Indian education were still bleak. At Pine Ridge, for example, Rosalie Wax reported that scholastic achievement was exceedingly low and the dropout rate very high. Despite nearly a century of the system, problems persisted: “the children’s primary loyalties go to friends and peers, not schools or educators' and all of them are confronted by teachers who see them as inadequately prepared, uncultured offspring of alien and ignorant folk.” 31 Because the reservation system had been plagued by schooling ranging from outright abusive to culturally inappropriate, activists often focused on gaining “Indian control of Indian education.” In the United States, the BIA had, as of 1951, officially adopted a policy that sought to increase community involvement in the selection of Indian school boards, which served in an advisory-only rather than an administrative capacity. In 1967, the National Indian Education Advisory Committee was established, containing 16 members whose mandate was to coordinate the educational activities of tribes vis-a-vis education with the BIA. Then, in 1968, President Johnson instituted the establishment of Indian school boards for Federal Indian schools. This was manifested through the establishment of a federal program called Project Tribe wherein Indian people themselves would control and direct their own public schools. As in Canada, progress was slow. As Levitan and Hetrick discovered, by the end of 1970 and over two years after the announcement, only four schools had been turned over by the BIA: two in Arizona, one in New Mexico and one in South Dakota, all areas with considerable Indian populations. 32 Though many Indian activists blamed the delays on the BIA’s typical procrastination, the BIA charged
that many Indian groups were reluctant to assume control for fear that any significant move towards Indian control of Indian education might jeopardize federal assistance. In other words, many groups feared that open termination as sought in the 1950s might be replaced with termination by stealth.

Also in the domain of education, the BIA funded what were called demonstration schools including the Institute for American Indian Arts in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1962, and the Rough Rock Demonstration School on the Navajo reservation in Arizona in 1966. Born of the popular Office of Economic Opportunity programs of the 1960s, demonstration schools were intended to be community-controlled, with the express purpose of Indian control of the curriculum. However, because the school retained BIA staff and administrators, the Navajo people founded a private not-for-profit to wrest control from the BIA. It accepted the department's three million dollar school and took control of it on July 1, 1966. The Rough Rock School project was significant for several reasons, not the least of which was its attempt to simulate a home environment in its continuing function as a partial boarding school. Its curriculum included both Navajo content and regular programming in American public schools. The affiliated Navajo Curriculum Centre produced textbooks and other materials for teachers. While the Rough Rock experience was deemed a near-universal success by the community, its successes would not necessarily be duplicated in other milieus. As Levitan and Hetrick pointed out, Rough Rock was an extremely expensive initiative staffed by a series of very talented and highly educated Navajos who were not to be found in all other reservation communities.\(^{33}\)

Equally impressive was an institute of higher education, the Navajo Community College, opening in 1969 with initial enrolment of over 300 students. One of most important mandates of the College was accessibility and it admitted a variety of Indian people whose level of prior education attainment was not always standard. It aimed to prepare students for a “regular” college or university experience reflecting the widespread belief among tribal and pan-Indian leaders that the new generation of activists needed to have the skills to navigate both within the Indian and the non-Indian world.
Unlike other post-secondary institutions, the NCC allowed students to move through their course of study at their own pace and offered English as a second language and a variety of technical and vocational choices for Indian people.\textsuperscript{34}

While these initiatives were important, they were also significant for the way in which their implementation was unlikely across the nation. The Navajos represented one of the most widespread and numerically significant groups of Indian people in the United States. Many much smaller nations whose geographic land base was less vast would face problems with both the logistics of such an operation and the technical expertise needed to implement it. Moreover, bureaucratic inefficiency and the reluctance of many officials to surrender this, one of the bastions of federal control over Indian people, were compounded by an unwillingness to invest in such a pricey project. Despite these limitations, however, pan-Indians continued to insist that Indian control of Indian education was one of the only ways to begin to recover from a colonial legacy that had robbed many communities of their language, their culture and their community health. For example, Janet McCloud remembers her mother as a victim of ethnocide as a result of being taken to a residential school far away from her family. Of the effects, Janet explained: “My mother couldn’t help being a victim. She couldn’t defend herself... She didn’t drink at first; but after being so battered, finally she began to drink too.” When her parents were out drinking, she remembers playing the role of protector for your younger sisters: “The drunks knew we’d be left alone, and they would come to sexually molest us. When I was seven, I started organizing the cousins. We’d find a corner in the house, we’d make beds on the floor and would put all the little kids behind us. We’d get axes and knives, and when the drunks came, we’d go after them and run ’em out.”\textsuperscript{35}

Part of the problem compounding abuse was the lack of effective law enforcement and protection though on American reservations, the tribal law and the tribal court system provided some sanctum from the difficult realities of dealing with non-Indigenous legal authorities. The BIA reported
that crimes had increased at a rate of over 20 percent from 1966 to 1970, as did the incidence of arrest, prosecution and cases that went to trial. As one 1960 study demonstrated, many offences were for misdemeanours instead of felonies and included charges of vagrancy and drunkenness or of the related disorderly conduct. These offences made up nearly fifty percent of the Fort Hall reservation's criminal docket. Many of those arrested, furthermore, were arrested in surrounding towns “in situations where whites would not be arrested.”

Moreover, the lack of infrastructure on many reservations meant that the police were often of little help in more remote communities. The BIA placed little emphasis on rehabilitation and, due to sheer volume, often failed to prosecute many crimes, leading to an ever-increasing distrust on the part of Indian communities of the state's ability to police within the reservation environment. In enforcing and administering Indian law, tribal laws were generally considered supreme in cases involving offences committed in Indian country and among Indian people, as long as these were not considered federal offences. Examples of offences that tribes laid exclusive claims to adjudicating included assault and battery, disorderly conduct, drinking offences, theft, fraud, and trespass. They could also adjudicate in civil matters such as family law, property and wills. Moreover, offences not involving another party were not subject to state law, but only federal or tribal laws.

Where non-Indian police worked, stories of abuse were rampant, as they were in the cities during this period. Mistrust extended to BIA police as well. As Means reported, AIM members were privy to many stories of police abuse including how on the Standing Rock Reservation, one woman had her arms broken by local police for supposedly resisting arrest. Many Indian people alleged that BIA police consistently beat and humiliated those “helpless and harmless drunks,” and that young women and girls reporting rape were in turn raped or abused by outside investigators.

Many agencies had a hand in administering law for Indian people, which led to complicated legal issues of jurisdiction where said jurisdiction was not explicitly defined, as in the offences listed
above. When jurisdiction was unclear, for example, the adjudicating court decided which jurisdiction it should be placed in “with federal legislation prevailing and tribal customs receiving secondary preference.”

Sometimes federal and state jurisdiction also clashed, and tribal justice systems varied a great deal from location to location, as did the spending of tribes to administer these systems. Larger tribes like the Navajos spent a great deal of money on their system, which featured salaried judges, a jail system and a significant police force, while other, smaller and less wealthy groups had no such systems in place. As Levitan and Hetrick explained, other critiques most commonly voiced were levelled at poorly trained judges, insufficient rights of appeal, favouritism, outdated or obsolete detention facilities and the alleged widespread barring of lawyers to represent people on trial.

For all of the teleological justifications for the foundation of reserves and reservations, it was clear to nearly all administrators and to Indigenous people in general that their reserves and reservations, though woefully underdeveloped and ill-served, represented a last stand or territory. Many maintained a strong attachment to the reserve or reservation. Janet McCloud, noted American Indian activist, spoke fondly of her home when interviewed about her work in 1994: “Huckleberries grow on top of the mountains here. It's a real sacred food, beautiful food ... It's real nice to go up in the mountains and pick berries. I have a hard time, sometimes, because I get up in the altitude and it's smoky – but I don't care, I struggle along anyway.”

Whatever the problems, whatever the shortcomings, many spoke fondly of the reservation as a kind of cultural 'safe place' that belonged to Indigenous people regardless of how the government chose to qualify their occupancy. Even lands which had been forced upon them by treaty had now, for many groups, become 'their lands', and so life stories of those on reserves and reservations assume a kind of dual aspect wherein the negative aspects are countered and in some cases even surmounted by an enduring attachment to community and to land.
C. RESERVATIONS AND REVIVALS: THE 1960s IN AN AMERICAN CONTEXT

The American situation was strikingly similar to the Canadian one, despite the often important differences in the national context and legislation surrounding Indigenous people in each country. In the American case, many aspects of reservation life were changing too, as increased development and new government initiatives presented opportunity, as well as peril, for many communities. Increased contact with the outside world, and with non-Indigenous 'experts', had not come without a cost: in the American example, many noted the gradual disappearance of Indian languages and cultural traditions. As John Bushnell described of the Hupa by the mid-1960s, only older people spoke the language, stories were rarely communicated by parents to children, and the number of skilled basket weavers had declined dramatically.\(^42\) Still, as some observed, there were good things happening on many reservations. Peggy DesJarlait, Arkara from the Fort Berthold Reservation, had lived in Chicago for a period of several years and finally returned to visit her home reservation. There, she noted several dramatic changes: “Well, to me the reservation has changed alot. It’s more modern and they fixed up the homes. A lot of homes have electricity...They seem like they have more, in fact, they got better education... I was surprised to see they have a community college there... So I was really impressed.”\(^43\) For many, the improvements of the modern had jeopardized some of the charm of the past: as Vince Catches, Sioux, pointed out, “When I was a kid, you’d see nothing but horses on the reservation... Now, when I go home, I see alot of cars and hardly any horses.”\(^44\)

Part of the recovery and of the modernity that both Peggy and Vince noted had been a result of the new ethos of self-determination both espoused by organizers and a new generation of politicians and bureaucrats. Though Indigenous people themselves had long agitated for changes on the reserve or reservation, for the first time, government rhetoric now seemed to echo their demands. Thus, to some
extent, the 1960s featured a variety of federal efforts purportedly designed to increase Aboriginal self-determination within reserve communities. As in Canada, community development as an organizing ideal enjoyed popularity within legislative circles as well though, as Levitan and Hetrick asserted of community organization programs on American reservations, “The status of community organization ... is reflected in the fact that the agency did not see fit to appoint a community development officer until 1968, and he still does not have the funds or the status in the agency that would allow him to develop local initiative within tribal communities.”

Nevertheless, under the ethos of development, new programs were launched and created including, most notably, the Office of Economic Opportunity which was the first government division to grant funds to reservations for the administration of programs that were primarily designed by tribal people. As Russell Means reported, “I soon discovered that the OEO was the best thing ever to hit Indian reservations. It was overwhelmingly successful where I visited.”

OEO programs included community health representation, legal aid and economic stimulus initiatives. While the Office of Economic Opportunity served more groups than Indian nations, its Indian Division and the Indian Community Action Program (ICAP) aimed towards the “stimulation of local initiative through the organization of community action agencies, the development of remedial programs, the improvement of delivery services to the poor, the utilization of existing resources through the coordination of public and private services, and the improvement of employment capability and general economic well-being.” Through the training of local people, it also aimed to foster the development of local leadership: 67 community action agencies serving 170 reservations and over 300,000 Indian people were established within its first three years. Popular and recurring programs included the Head Start program for early education and the establishment of legal services to serve local populations and to educate them in manoeuvring the American legal system.

Like the community development programs in Canada, ICAP did provide opportunity for local
leadership but could also often frustrate pan-Indian efforts to organize tribal communities. By focusing on the local and tribal level, federally administered programs could also undercut local leadership and refocus attention away from systemic structural issues and ideas of historical justice. It could also co-opt traditional Indigenous leadership and leadership structures. As Levitan and Hetrick asserted, “While ICAP officials have not yet supplied quantitative support for their claims, it is speculated that experience received by the Indians as they serve on ICAP staffs, governing boards, and program teams has led to increased interest and participation in community affairs.” 48 While this indeed seemed to be the case, the bureaucratic structure of such programs could complicate existing arrangements within communities and incite accusations of tribal governments perpetuating “establishment” ideas and practices. Many ICAP project proposals failed to receive funding, and the government's preference for established programs like Head Start and Legal Services often meant that programs tailored to specific communities would not receive funding or attention. According to Levitan and Hetrick, and perhaps most significantly, “The long-range effect of the Indian OEO programs is not yet known, but it is doubtful whether they can lift an appreciable number of Indians out of poverty under existing conditions and levels of federal expenditures.” 49

As in Canada, the legal status and functioning of American tribal governments was more complicated. As Levitan and Hetrick pointed out, tribal governments were supposed to maintain their autonomy over tribal affairs, yet this autonomy could be and was frequently circumscribed by Congress, which reserved the right to veto any laws, codes, and financial arrangements made by individual nations. 50 In the United States, the BIA's expenditures in reservation settings in areas such as education, health, housing, welfare, resource development and manpower programs often provided the motivation for many to enter tribal politics, though not always for the good of their communities: in fact, internal division was also often characteristic of tribal or band governments. In some cases, tribal governments were dominated by traditionalists who jealously guarded the limited power they had
managed to wrest from the state while in other cases, moderates—deemed by some assimilationists—
or even radicals controlled the direction of tribal affairs.

Tribal governments should not be characterized as solely ineffective. In many cases, tribal or band governments fought hard for their rights, with varying levels of success. As Clyde Warrior, charismatic leader of the National Indian Youth Council explained at the time, “The local tribal government forms a buffer zone between the tribe itself and the Federal Government... If this local tribal government doesn't produce goods and services from the Federal Government for the tribe then they get booted out and they lose all the fat per diem and salaries that they have been able to legislate for themselves from tribal funds. Also if they bug the government then they get vetoed or kicked out again.” The result, according to Warrior, was the “ultra American cinch, where in order to perpetuate his present position, he will plead for crumbs from the white bureaucrat and lie and sell-out his own people unbeknownst to them.”

Reaves Nahwooks, American Indian who also worked within government bureaucracy during the 1960s and 1970s, echoed Warrior’s sentiments: “The tribal chairman or the tribal councilman ... basically conforms to that system because if you fight that system you are not going to get what you need.”

Getting what was needed, therefore, became a careful exercise in compromise, often to the sacrifice of the larger idea of Indigenous land rights.

The litany of governmental abuses in terms of development on Indian lands, in the 1950s and 1960s, would seem a ripe environment for the emergence of a strong pan-Indian voice. In the 1950s and as part of the post-war push for more development, the Kinzua Dam project was once again revived. It had been proposed in the early 1900s as a way to protect the city of Pittsburgh from floods but the project had been abandoned because of the Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior's unwillingness to break a 1794 treaty with the Seneca people guaranteeing their lands not be molested. Nevertheless, in 1957 the Army Corps of Engineers obtained a preliminary court order allowing them to begin the project, which would flood over 10,000 acres of tribal land. This represented nearly one-
third of the reservation, including its most productive habitats and farmlands. As Wilkinson explains, the project would mean that over 600 people would have been forced to move. Subsequent tribal leaders attempted to mobilize both the Seneca people and the press in their cause. Chief Cornelius Seneca made national television appearances and speeches, and the cause was equally vociferously fought by his successor, George Heron. The Seneca used all resources available to them, including the support of the Six Nations Confederacy and of the National Congress of American Indians. Other, outside groups including churches and the ACLU also opposed the Dam. To raise money, the Seneca granted highway and pipeline rights-of-way. Despite their efforts, the Army Corps eventually got their way and flooded thousands of acres, including important burial sites, on the Allegany Reservation.

The Seneca's situation was not unique: the Army Corps of Engineers was a powerful entity which successfully lobbied Congress for project approval while “Indian land, water, and minerals offer the path of least resistance. The Tribes lacked the money, ballot box influence, and political know-how to mount effective opposition.” This was equally true of the Northwest people whose salmon runs would be affected by hydroelectric development and in the arid Southwest, where Indian people were denied access to reliable water while developers profited. In terms of mineral leases, “Invariably, the tribes received below-market-value returns and damaging environmental impacts on the land, water and air.” Given this situation, it seemed likely that tribes would welcome pan-Indians into their midst as another tool of protest.

Yet for a variety of reasons, pan-Indians often had difficulty generating support on reservations. This was true of both mainstream and radical groups whose efforts were often frustrated by what they perceived as an apathetic population. This was not necessarily the case, though apathy could indeed be an issue in communities where immediate needs were not well-served. Still, by the dawn of the 1970s the focus in American Indian politics had shifted to the notion of tribalism, based upon the arguments of Felix Cohen in the 1930s that the powers lawfully vested in Indian tribes were not general, delegated
powers but inherent powers of limited sovereignty which had never been extinguished. Tribes, in Cohen's estimation as well as within the operating structure of many organizations like the NCAI and the NTCA, were the political unit that was most important. Thus for many, activism on a tribal level simply made the most sense.

The emphasis on tribal identity had also, in some cases, proven successful, and thus generated other, subsequent attempts for more local self-determination based on a tribal model. In South Dakota, the United Sioux Tribes organization successfully petitioned that a referendum be held on Public Law 280, the piece of federal legislation that had, in 1953, allowed states to assume jurisdiction in Indian country. South Dakota had not taken any action for some time, but in 1963, finally assumed jurisdiction. Though the deed was done, “The Sioux refused to let it lie.” Leaders organized the United Sioux Tribes and, in the referendum held November 3, 1964, had the measure reversed. As Wilkinson reports, it was a moment of great triumph: “The tribal newspaper headline captured the spirit of the moment, unlike any the Sioux had experienced in a great long time: WE SHALL SURVIVE!”56 The success of this type of action was not the norm, yet its effectiveness in selected situations gave many tribally based groups hope that something concrete might be accomplished this way.

In addition, many tribes resented the perceived dilution of cultural identity they saw within the broader pan-Indian agenda. They accused pan-Indigenous activists, particularly those coming out of an urban setting, of changing and amending Indigenous culture in a way that made each tribe's distinctive traditions far too general. As John H. Bushnell reported of the changing identity of the American Hupa, “The growing concern for the fate of the Hupa heritage can be characterized as a largely endogenous development that has proceeded with little, if any, reference to a generalized pan-Indian movement. The Hupa tend to be possessive about their native traditions and insistent that they be kept unadulterated.”57

Distances between the people also added to the challenge, as differences in size, composition
and wealth of individual reservations affected the efficacy of a larger project of unity. Though subject to BIA jurisdiction, the income provided by the over 55 million acres of Indian lands was significant: as Levitan and Hetrick reported, “surface leasing, permitting, and stumpage payments for the use of Indian lands by non-Indians generated $70.4 million in 1969.”  

Timber was also an important resource for many American reservations, yielding more income than leases from any other reservation resources with the exception of oil and gas. Particularly when lumber prices were high, this important resource was a key factor in reservation organization and politics. Oil, gas and other minerals were also important though to very specific groups: according to Levitan and Hetrick’s study, it was members primarily of the small Osage tribe who benefited the most from oil and gas revenues, while most royalties amounted to very little per capita when distributed among the thousands of Indian people entitled to them.

Local politics and local development were also important factors influencing local organizing. As Charles Wilkinson notes, tribal council members tended, on a tactical level, to be conservative and many wanted nothing at all to do with activist strategies. The NCAI attempted to navigate both local and national politics. As Thomas Cowger argues, “The NCAI facilitated both an intertribal identity which emphasized Indians as a single ethnic group and a tribal identity which emphasized the citizenship of Indians in separate nations. In fact, the NCAI strengthened tribal ties by serving as a stabilizing element.” The NCAI, like other more mainstream pan-Indigenous organizations, was also relatively conservative. As such, any association with a more radical activist element was often discouraged. For local politicians, discouraging this kind of participation was often easier by proximity, either through words or in actions, inhibiting dissenters prospects for employment and acceptance in their own communities.

Nevertheless, it was this critique of tribal politics that could represent an important inroad into reservations where residents were indeed dissatisfied but without the power or resources to fight back.
The American Indian Movement's famed occupation of the Pine Ridge reservation was undoubtedly one of the most highly publicized events of the Red Power era, helping to cement AIM's reputation for radicalism among both Indian people and the public. In this case, AIM used the local abuse of political office to make inroads into the reservation setting despite its urban roots. As one AIM member explained, AIM began in the cities; as such, it was not necessarily a well-known organization among those who had spent their lifetime on the reservation. In seeking out opportunities to agitate in this setting, AIM also served to demonstrate the way in which it, like other more radical groups, used reservation politics to advance a pan-Indigenous agenda.

D. PAN-INDIANS AND PINE RIDGE

Suzette Mills, Indigenous activist of the era, has argued that Relations between AIM and Pine Ridge reservation president Dick Wilson were embittered when, in the wake of the Trail of Broken Treaties demonstration, Wilson had spoken out vehemently against AIM and its actions. Wilson was not alone. The Trail of Broken Treaties, a march-turned-sit-in-turned-sacking of the BIA headquarters in Washington, D.C., had been initiated by AIM and helped to foster a tense relationship between moderates and radicals that would not be repaired. It was Bob Burnette, deemed a moderate by non-Indigenous legislators, who helped to initiate the Trail of Broken Treaties when, in 1972, fed up with the lack of progress on this front, began to collaborate with other leaders to organize a march. Burnette, who had joined Martin Luther King’s march to Washington in 1967, believed that a march organized by Indigenous people could produce some needed media attention and place pressure on legislators to act. While Burnette worked in the east, others did so in the West and the Midwest. It was decided that a variety of caravans would begin from major urban centres such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle,
Rapid City and Denver, to converge on the American capital. The result was approximately one thousand five hundred travellers representing over 200 Native American tribes. The trail “landed” in Washington in November of 1972, where organizers insisted that they had been promised food and lodging upon arrival. When none materialized, they were put up in the basement of a church in decidedly poor conditions. The government officials with whom organizers had hoped to meet seemed suddenly unavailable, and commissioner of Indian Affairs Louis Bruce, himself a Native American, was instructed not to help the marchers in any way. The marchers headed to the Bureau of Indian Affairs building and, as Leonard Crow Dog recalls, it was at this point that moderates lost control of the march: “There was alot of anger, especially among the young people, and the AIM leaders took over the leadership of the Trail of Broken Treaties.” Individuals like Bob Burnette became “surplus leaders” who had difficulty understanding why this protest, designed along the lines of the Poor Peoples’ March of 1968 and other important sit-ins, had become an exercise in destruction.

The events that ensued from that point on vary according to the teller. To some, those occupying the building seemed little more than disenchanted and enraged youth whose propensity towards destruction and violence ran its natural course when the building itself was largely vandalized by the occupants. To others, the leadership simply lost control of individual protesters, resulting in mass amount of damage. Finally, to some, it was the threat of police violence that initiated the destruction in the building in an Indigenous effort to defend themselves.

The Trail produced a list of demands called the Twenty Points. These included a variety of demands centered on treaties – both the honouring of old treaties, and the renegotiation of the new, the restoration of land base and other ‘original’ rights stolen by the colonizing state, a revamped justice system, the end of the Bureau of Indian Affairs as it stood, and a variety of other demands related to economic development and education. To placate protesters, government officials agreed to talk, and
after one week, asserted that they would “seriously consider” the twenty-point proposal made by the group. The government also provided sixty thousand dollars to the protesters to get them home and the activists left the building with several confidential documents they claimed proved the government's ill-will and deception as far as American Indians were concerned. According to Reaves Nahwooks, who attended some of the negotiations on the government side, government negotiators didn't understand what the Indian people were about: “All they were trying to do was just to get rid of this headache.”

Bradley Patterson who was a prominent non-Indigenous bureaucrat in the Bureau at the time, indicated as much when he argued that Indigenous occupiers had not come to Washington to work, but rather simply to make a splash. Patterson also felt that the protesters' twenty points simply ignored the realities of the law and of the constitution: as he argued, they wanted treaties, and Congress had stated there would be no more treaties. Period. In addition, Patterson indicated that he, and other who had cooperated and worked with reservation politicians prior to the march, felt “beleaguered and unappreciated and our battles and sweat not helped at all by this stuff.”

Thus, though the Indigenous occupiers claimed some element of victory -- as Crow Dog reported, “it was the greatest gathering of Indians in the nation's capital. AIM had made its mark on the white man's mind. We were a different kind of Indian now. We had won a victory.” -- the net result of the devolution of the march was an embittered relationship with more moderate leaders and groups, several of whom represented total rule on their reservations, and increasingly strained relationships with moderates. This was the case with Dick Wilson, who became a focal point of AIM's activism less than one year later.

AIM also publicly spoke out against Wilson, whom it accused of mismanaging tribal funds, of nepotism and of violently quelling any opposition to his rule on the Pine Ridge Reservation. In addition, Russell Means argued that the tribal election had not represented the wishes of most of the residents but that Wilson's victory had in fact been engineered by the support of the white men. Wilson was alleged to have used monies provided to his police force by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to hire what were known locally as “goon squads.” As Means argued, “With hundreds of armed men, he began to act like Haiti's Duvalier or Nicaragua's Somoza. Wilson became a tin-pot dictator who sought to exterminate all political dissent on the reservation.”

In November of 1972, Wilson issued an executive order prohibiting any AIM activity in 'his' reservation. Critics alleged that Wilson had been paid off by white ranchers who wanted to lease vast areas of the reservation for their cattle and the Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Association at Pine Ridge asked for AIM's assistance. Wilson was also negotiating with the government to grant permanent title to 133,000 acres of reservation land holding valuable uranium deposit in exchange for a cash payment rather than a return of land, as many of the traditionals wanted. In response to these issues, the Association had collected a petition of signatures demanding Wilson's removal but to no avail: one of Wilson's supporters on the council moved to dismiss the charges against him, a vote was held and no further action was taken. Both the FBI and the US Attorney argued that they had no jurisdiction in reservation politics, and the BIA absolved itself of any responsibility in the matter. Then, in February, US paramilitaries surrounded the BIA agency at Pine Ridge and gave Wilson the final say in who was allowed to enter when the Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Association organized a march on the building. For AIM, Wilson's antics simply had to stop, not only for the residents of his own reservation but to send a message to other-would-be “dictators.” As Vern Bellecourt, then-national director of AIM explained, “Revolution is taking place not only in reservations against – you know, there are alot of responsible tribal leaders in this country. I'm not, er, trying to comb all into the same category but we see in some of the reservations the people are being abused,they're getting poorer ... and we realize we have to have some type of revolution to bring about these changes into existence, to survive as a society.” Bellecourt seemed to tread carefully on the issue of reservations for on the one hand, it desperately wanted to take action on them but still needed the support of some locals to make it work. AIM insisted that the tribal form of government in operation in the 1960s and 1970s was not the
original form of government, and that tradition needed to be restored whereby power rested in the traditional chiefs.

On February 28th, several hundred protesters marched to Wounded Knee, taking over the community in a gesture of protest. Wounded Knee, the site of the 1890 massacre prompted by the government's hysteria over a new religious movement sweeping the plains called the Ghost Dance, had always been an important cultural and spiritual guidepost for Indigenous activists. On December 29th, 1890, the Indians were ordered to set up camp and to surrender their weapons. There, American troops opened fire on over 350 Indian people, most of whom were women and children. It was the largest ever military massacre of Indigenous people. Colonel James Forsyth, in charge of the detachment which opened fire on the people, was later exonerated for the deaths. Furthermore, Dee Brown's seminal reinterpretation of traditional American Indian history and of the incidents surrounding the massacre entitled Bury my Heart at Wounded Knee, published in 1971, denoted the way in which the site was of enduring importance since that time. As such, Wounded Knee, which had in 1890 encapsulated Indigenous fears over their own genocide, was indeed a cultural, a spiritual and a strategic choice. Culturally, organizers hoped to choose a site that would have widespread significance for Indigenous people; the site of a massacre of several hundred Indigenous men, women and children by the American military offered a site of extreme historical importance. As Leonard Crow Dog, spiritual leader of AIM asserted, “Wounded Knee gave knowledge to the people. Wounded Knee is the spirit that knows the red man. It is an identity you can stand on.”73 AIM also insisted that it was a spiritual movement; gathering in such an important site where so many ancestors had met their untimely end would provide a spiritual context for the occupation. Finally, strategically, the site was ideal; so many locals, discontented with Wilson and having faced his intimidation, might be emboldened by the site's cultural and spiritual context. As Crow Dog articulated in his own memoirs,”'In March of 1973, I, Leonard Crow Dog, brought the ghost dance back. At the right place, at the right time.”74
AIM organizers were correct. As Bellecourt explained of the larger mission on Pine Ridge, “Now we recognize that in addition to the confrontation that is taking place between the sovereign Oglala people at Wounded Knee, the American Indian Movement and of course other Indian people and other tribes represented; there is not only a confrontation against the bureaucratic oppression of the United States government... Most importantly we see it as a confrontation with the conscience of America and the conscience of the world.” It aimed to call attention to the violation of treaties, the over representation of Indigenous people in the justice system, and many other larger issues facing American Indian people. As Bellecourt tellingly insisted, “We found a case.” AIM was, in this instance and as it hoped to be, a catalytic force: emboldened by its presence, many local residents who had hitherto been intimidated by Wilson and his squads, began to speak out. As one reservation resident explained, the participation of AIM made local people bolder: “We decided that we did need the AIM in here because our men were scared, they hung to the back ... With our brothers and sisters of the AIM, we feel stronger. We’re not scared of them. This is what we needed – a little more push.” Women elders of the newly established Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization (OSCRO) welcomed AIM and urged the people to take action. AIM protesters who included both men and women occupied the Catholic Church, several homes and the trading post.

A chief feature of the standoff that developed at Wounded Knee was the influx of other Indigenous people, non Oglala, who came to support the people. Crow Dog indicated as much, when he explained that many of those gathered there were ignorant of the old ways having been raised in the cities alienated from Indigenous traditions, or were non-Sioux participants unfamiliar with the Ghost Dance. Though they found it difficult, Crow Dog and AIM's calls for solidarity and unity spoke directly to them. Indigenous people gathered at Wounded Knee included participants from Canada, Alaska and Mexico, as well as several Native American groups all brought together by what Crow Dog called the “moccasin telegraph”, indicating the extent to which an important awareness existed among
Indigenous groups as much as the focus sometimes remained on their own nation's affairs.

After a tense thirty days, conditions on the site worsened when a new government negotiator, Kent Frizell, was appointed from the Department of Justice to manage the government response. Under Frizell's orders, water, electricity and food supplies were cut off, as well the media's access to the site. These actions did not help AIM's perception that the government was in fact working in concert with Dick Wilson. Indeed, government officials had met with him to reassure him that their goal was not in fact to overthrow the tribal government but that to ensure that the civil rights of its residents were being protected. As Patterson recounts, the events of the Trail of Broken Treaties also kept government negotiators on their toes in this particular situation: “...having had that meeting with several tribal chairmen after the occupation of the BIA building we knew damn well.... the tribal chairmen were watching this and were peed off with AIM. But we were still trying to do the right thing, but we knew there was this sense of pressure.”

After the death of two Indigenous men as well as several attempts at negotiation, an agreement was finally reached after discussions in both April and May, whereby AIM agreed to terms of surrender intended to preserve the safety of Indigenous demonstrators. The agreement provided for a surrender of all weapons to government officials, as well as the separation of protesters into three groups including a group of those with outstanding warrants who were to be transported to Rapid City, SD, as well as a group of permanent residents to be escorted to their homes, and non-residents to be escorted off of the reservation. The government agreed to mount an investigation into the illegal activities of tribal chairman Dick Wilson, as well as an audit of tribal accounts. And so, the siege of Wounded Knee ended 71 days after it began, though not allegedly in accordance with the agreement made with protesters, who had demanded more than the government was prepared to deliver. In the aftermath, AIM supporters and other protesters there charged the government with destruction of personal property as well as a complete disregard for the terms of the agreement.
Though not particularly successful in upholding nineteenth century treaties, the occupation of Wounded Knee did have important effects on policy and on public opinion. On a political level, the actions and the publicity garnered by AIM in 1973 and in 1974 convinced it more than ever before that AIM was a group whose members needed to be dealt with swiftly and harshly. After Wounded Knee, the Department of Justice sought numerous indictments against its participants though many of the charges were later dropped as well as increased its surveillance and, according to some, its harassment, of more radical Indigenous activists. It had to tread carefully, however, for those organized at Wounded Knee had captured a great deal of media attention. During its over-two months of existence, the Wounded Knee standoff was covered extensively by the mainstream and Indian press. As Wilkinson reports, a Harris poll reported that 93% of all Americans had heard about the takeover and that of those surveyed, 51% sympathized with the Indians and 21% with the government. Part of the support generated was a result of it not only being an AIM event—many traditionals also participated and lent gravity to a cause that could have come across as yet-another AIM debacle, had they not lent their support. Notable American celebrities also helped to increase public awareness: Marlon Brando, nominated and selected as Best Actor for his performance in The Godfather, asked Apache actress Sacheen Littlefeather to appear for him at the 1973 Academy Awards where she declined the award on his behalf due to the poor treatment of American Indians in the film industry, as well as the ongoing conflicts between the American government and Indigenous nations.

The critique of local or tribal government that prompted one of the most highly publicized and talked about Indian protests in American history was indeed not isolated to Pine Ridge. It illustrated the tensions inherent in many reservations in the United States, conditions that were often replicated in Canada as well. Wounded Knee-style takeovers became more frequent in the aftermath of the occupation as a way of standing up against elected tribal officials. In January of 1975, the Menominee Warriors Society occupied the Alexian Brothers Monastery in Gretchen, Wisconsin. Interviewed by
very nervous non-Indigenous reporter Kevin McKiernan, the Menominee Warriors represented by
Melvin Chevalier Jr. insisted that the occupation was a last resort. They had tried elections, councils
and informing and educating their own people, to no avail. They alleged that Ada Deer, elected
chairperson for the Menominee tribe, was in fact abusing the system and was unfairly representing the
Menominee. As Chevalier explained, “The people have lost control of tribal government.”§1

CONCLUSION:

For many, the reserve, however difficult its conditions, was preferable to the city, for it helped
to ensure cultural and linguistic survival as well as foster a continuing and enduring sense of
community and nationhood that could not be found in larger centres. The sense of nation was key to
reserves and reservations. As Frederick Hoxie points out, many reservations were important sites of
cultural survival and pride. But the often distinctive world of the reserve also complicated pan-Indian
attempts to organize. Though mainstream organizations like the NCAI and the NIB prided themselves
on being representative, they claimed, of Indigenous people on Indigenous lands, they often seemed to
locals unconnected, unaware and unable to effect practical, concrete change in very difficult
circumstances. Reservation identities did complicate the pan-Indigenous struggle, but did not wholly
prevent it from taking root there. As this chapter's examples have illustrated, despite this disconnect,
some pan-Indian organizations did make headway in the reservation setting. In many important
instances, more radical groups, like AIM, did enter this world- with a fair amount of legislative and
media success. Reservation struggles helped to promote pan-Indigenous unity that, at least in the
moment, could go beyond established reservation boundaries. Though often fleeting, the moments of
coalescence were real and important, and in some cases, some of the most successful demonstrations of
the Red Power movement of the era.
12 Ibid., 7.
14 Ibid.
18 Means, Where White Men Fear to Tread, 79.
19 Ibid., 203.
20 Ibid., 205.
21 Mhyra S. Minnis, “The Relationship of the Social Structure of an Indian Community to Adult and Juvenile Delinquency,” in Native Americans Today, 328.
22 Levitan and Hetrick, Big Brother's Indian Programs, 66 and 68.
23 Ibid., 77.
24 Means, Where White Men Fear to Tread, 206.
25 Levitan and Hetrick, Big Brother's Indian Programs, 83. Emphasis in original.
27 Levitan and Hetrick, Big Brother's Indian Programs, 37.
28 Ibid., 41.
29 Ibid., 34.
30 Ibid., 46.
32 Levitan and Hetrick, Big Brother's Indian Programs, 53.
33 Ibid., 57.
34 Ibid., 58-59.
37 Levitan and Hetrick, Big Brother's Indian Programs, 102-103.
38 Means, Where White Men Fear to Tread, 206.
39 Levitan and Hetrick, Big Brother's Indian Programs, 100.
40 Ibid., 102.
41 Janet McCloud, interview.
44 Ibid., 246.
45 Levitan and Hetrick, *Big Brother's Indian Programs*, 89.
47 Levitan and Hetrick, *Big Brother's Indian Programs*, 90.
48 Ibid., 93.
49 Ibid., 94.
50 Ibid., 19.
51 Clyde Warrior at Wayne Street (Robert Warrior audio files, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, IL).
52 Reaves Nahwooks, interview by Robert Warrior (Robert Warrior audio files, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, IL.)
54 Ibid., 117.
55 Ibid., 122.
56 Ibid., 125.
58 Levitan and Hetrick, *Big Brother's Indian Programs*, 125.
59 Ibid., 146.
61 Thomas Cowger, *The NCAI- The Founding Years* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 11.
63 Ibid., 176.
64 Ibid., 173.
65 Ibid., 173.
66 Reaves Nahwooks, interview.
67 Bradley Patterson, interview by Paul Chaat Smith, 7/9/1993 (Robert Warrior audio files, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana).
68 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 237.
73 Crow Dog, *Crow Dog*, 129.
75 Vern Bellecourt.
78 Ibid., 130.
79 Bradley Patterson, interview.
Chapter 6:

'Rise up - make haste – our people need us':

Indigenous Organizing and the Baby Boom Generation
INTRODUCTION

One of the most salient features of pan-Indian Red Power movements in the 1960s and 1970s was related to the perception that movements were somehow characterized by dissatisfied youth militants who had largely shunned the lessons of their forefathers and foremothers. To the contrary, North American Indigenous youth movements were polyglot organizations who experienced the same sorts of divisions and issues as mainstream organizations composed of a generally older demographic did. These movements commonly cited the need to learn from the lessons of elders as well as to engage their help and teaching. As Bradley Shreve has recently written of those who founded the National Indian Youth Council, these individuals “had a firm conviction to uphold tradition and the ideals of their elders.” Literature produced to this date has largely failed to engage in a critical examination of the interplay of youth and of tradition that characterized most Aboriginal youth movements, as well as the way in which this aspect of youth movement politics differentiated Indigenous groups from other student protest organizations.

At the same time, youth organizations and groups forming during this period were also products of their time, engaging, accepting and rejecting certain tenets of other youth movements with which members engaged. At times, alliances could be formed on a strategic level but by and large, the experience of Indigenous youth organizers in the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by relative insularity. Like their non-youth counterparts in the Indigenous movements, Aboriginal youth often conceived of their project as Aboriginal people in unique and distinct terms. Their historical struggle with the nation state as earlier residents of the continent made Indigenous youth see their battles differently than other groups.

While youth organizations in both Canada and in the United States were remarkably congruent in some key areas including, most importantly, the way in which they differentiated themselves from
non-Indian youth movements, they were also as varied as the charismatic leaders that often dictated their form and content. Leadership in youth movements, perhaps more than in any other demographic, largely dictated their orientation. In addition, formal organizations were often eclipsed both in the news and in popular opinion by ad hoc groups formed on particular issues, and membership within Indigenous youth movements was often quite varied.

This chapter will begin by offering some context on youth culture more generally during this period. Indigenous youth saw themselves as a part of this culture, yet very much outside of it as the experience of growing up in the reservation or on the street was, for many, a very different upbringing than for non-Indigenous students who also organized during this period. It will then turn to examine the emergence of a new generation of college-educated Indigenous people who were key in forming new youth movements in the United States and in Canada. Yet these students were also joined by those coming from very different contexts such as military service, prison, or the street, and the origin of youth organizers dramatically affected the organizations they would form. Then, key groups such as the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) in the United States and the Canadian Indian Youth Council (CIYC) in Canada will be discussed, as will the student workshops that, for each organization, represented important sites of recruiting and information-sharing. Finally, this chapter will engage the phenomenon of event-based activism that drew a significant number of Indigenous youth on an ad hoc basis to create some of the most salient and memorable protests of the rights era.

A. CONTEXTUALIZING YOUTH CULTURE

Indigenous youth of the 1960s and 1970s were members of the baby boom generation in some ways, but set apart from it in many others. Documented at length in many other studies, the baby boom
generation can be summarized as both a physical phenomenon of a dramatic explosion in births during the 1940s and 1950s as well as a societal phenomenon of a generation raised in relative financial opulence and ease, a factor that contributed, during the 1960s and 1970s, to the perception of spoiled and wasted youth. In the immediate post-war years and through the early 1960s, babies were born at an increased rate to a society whose institutions “weren’t prepared for the needs and demands this shock wave of children would create.” As Doug Owram has argued, part of the rising fear of youth culture in the 1960s was due to the size of the baby boom generation, as well as to the economic power of its members. The explosion of a commercial culture centred on youth included music, dress, and other consumables and the destructive path perceived by many was only complicated by the extension of adolescence made possible in post-war North America. In both Canada and in the United States, youth experience set the stage for the significant movements that would emerge in the 1960s and 1970s.

Youth culture was very much seen, and saw itself, as a counterculture to the conservatism of the previous generation. In this way, the experience of youth, whether overtly or not, was a social movement of the period. Owram argues that what characterized the youth counterculture, at least after 1967, was its existence as “a political movement expressed through non-political means.” The effect on adults, Owram maintains, is that they never knew “where style ended and political revolution began.” In other words, for many adults, personal choices such as dress, music and hobbies were political choices for youth. Thus, the politicization of the personal also provided non-political and non-activist youth “the sense they were part of the generational struggle against adult authority.” The media helped in this perception, emphasizing the idea that to be a student or a youth at the time was to be a radical.

The 1960s counterculture of youth was further bolstered by its transnational appeal. As Owram argues, American issues were key to the early years of campus-based activism in Canada. The Glenboro lunch counter sit ins, the Freedom Ride campaign as well as high-profile figures like Martin Luther King Jr., and later, Malcolm X, ensured media attention in both countries. In Canada, events like
these contributed to the sense of youth as a part of a wider, global project, and urged many to get involved due to the perception that everyone else was doing it. As Howard Adams, Metis, recounts of his exposure to new movements while at university in Berkeley, California, “Through my participation in the black people's civil rights struggle I could see myself struggling beside my people at home for the same freedom... The more I became involved, the clearer colonialism became.”

During this period, many researchers sought to categorize youth activists in an effort to understand just what made them so dissatisfied, or so it seemed. Kenneth Keniston, for example, characterized as two distinct types of dissenters, the “activist” and the “culturally alienated” youth. Activist youth took a stand against perceived injustices, though these injustices were frequently not ones they themselves suffered. Alienated youth, on the other hand, were less likely to demonstrate in an organized, public way due to their pessimism and opposition to “the System”. Rather, they represented a hidden underground of transients whose pursuits included drugs and other forms of escapism, what conservative adults feared as the “hippie” phenomenon. Keniston was in many ways a product of this particular era whose own personal views permeated his own studies of youth, but his observations characterize the way in which many researchers and the public at large failed to appreciate the seriousness and the deliberation with which many youth approached the activist project.

B. THE CONTEXT AND THE LIMITS OF NON-INDIGENOUS YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

Often, those who chose to take part in organized youth politics were a combination of Keniston’s two “types.” For those, there existed a number of organizations who had emerged, by the early 1960s, as important youth activist outlets. The New Left for example emerged and became a dominant force among youth in both Canada and in the United States. Doug Owram describes the
phenomenon as both a movement and a mood, an apt description for the New Left on both sides of the North American border. They consciously rejected many of the beliefs of the “old Left” but specifically, New Lefters promoted greater accessibility to political and social institutions, as well as local control of the political process. In addition, its members urged and encouraged confrontations with the modern capitalist system by those alienated by it included ethnic minorities and the global poor. In the United States, New Leftists gravitated towards and became embroiled in racial issues, as many chose to focus on the still-very much segregated South as an ideal place to organize against the system.

New Leftist organizations were complicated and often volatile, but nevertheless effective in calling for change by drawing attention to the inequalities of modern society. In February of 1960, when lunch service was denied to three African-American youths at a segregated Greensboro, North Carolina, lunch counter, the sit-in movement began and with it, prompted a new host of organizing and organizations claiming to represent the New Left. Media attention and a further rash of student-led sit-ins in the wake of the Greensboro incident prompted leaders of established organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Congress on Racial Equality to urge youth to form a wing within their existing groups, but Ella Baker, whose work focused on inspiring independent leadership, encouraged students to form their own group. By April of 1960, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee had been formed. As David Steigerwald explains, “While they accepted he tutelage of older activists... SNCC became the main organizational vehicle through which this small handful of students... changed American society.” Composed mainly of devout Southern youth with no previous organizing experience, SNCC “relied on collective decision-making and discouraged individual leadership.” The group’s motto encapsulated both the enthusiasm and whimsy of youth: “Do what the spirit say do, go where the spirit say go.” As its name indicated, SNCC remained committed to non-violent protest like sit ins. But, as Steigerwald maintains, SNCC were radical purists in the sense
of their determination “to confront segregation directly and immediately. This combination of religious conviction, generational urgency, and willingness to confront authority”\textsuperscript{10} were what made SNCC a truly radical youth organization, unique and new to its time.

The other prominent youth-based movement occupying the space of the New Left in the early 1960s was the Students for a Democratic Society, a group that drew inspiration from the SNCC. Approximately 100 students met between 1960 and 1962 to establish the parameters of the SDS, delivered in the famous Port Huron Statement by activist Tom Hayden. The Statement captured the concerns as well as the spirit of disaffected youth. It began by acknowledging the privilege of the youth generation, then by expressing its discomfort with the current state of affairs, including namely racial segregation in the South and the oppression of the Cold War. Its demand was simple: “[W]e seek... two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.”\textsuperscript{11}

In Canada, there were branches of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), as well as of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Transnationalism was very much a student phenomenon as ease of travel and communication made this possible, as did the perceived solidarity of the experience of youth. But Canada also had its own organizations that developed on the new Left model. The Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) for example was established in 1964. As Owram explains, “SUPA, as it was known, was explicitly a New Left organization, influenced by the SDS and firm in its belief in direct action, non-violence, and participatory democracy.”\textsuperscript{12} In its broadly defined mandate, it included both peace and social issues but focused principally on grass-roots organizing in disadvantaged communities, on the anti-Vietnam war effort, and the larger project of consciousness-raising among youth across the country.\textsuperscript{13} Described by Peter Gzowski in 1965 as “the heart of the new left,” SUPA was, by the mid-1960s, a force to be reckoned with.
Its rival, the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), a government-sponsored youth program, from 1966 to 1977, was intended to operate loosely in the image of the American Peace Corps. Federally funded and advised at least initially by older respected figures on its board, the CYC took a different route to rid itself of government control and of the bureaucratic structures envisioned by organizers initially. As Owram reports, “Within a year the elder officials at the council had been pushed into subordinate roles by active young councillors and the paid staff.”\(^{14}\) Despite the government's hope that the CYC remain non-political, politicize it did. Thus, from 1964 to 1968, both SUPA and the CYC were the “preeminent national organizations of New Left ideals.”\(^{15}\)

The mood of the New Left encouraged events like the expulsion of the older advisors from the CYC. It unabashedly claimed youth as “the primary agents for the redemption of modern society.”\(^{16}\) It was youth, and not the working class, that were to redeem humanity from its technocratic state. Alienation could be addressed by involvement and participatory democracy was the mantra repeated over and over at meetings, lectures and in pamphlets. An extension of these notions of humanity and participation inevitably centred around minority rights, and Indigenous people were among the subjects New Leftists and student activists hoped to help. They were, studies had shown, more sympathetic to the “Indian cause”: in one 1971 survey regarding Indian militancy for example, it was noted that persons under the age of thirty were more likely to feel that Indians in Minnesota were treated unfairly and that militant action was justified to help the Indian cause.\(^{17}\) In Canada, in 1974, Brenda Dineen, the League for Socialist Action candidate in the race for mayor of Winnipeg, issued a statement of the League's unequivocal support for the Ojibway Warriors Society takeover of Anicinabe Park in Kenora, Ontario. In it, she passionately pledged that “The League for Socialist Action/ Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere will use its election campaigns across Canada and Quebec to speak out firmly on the side of Native people... We fully support their right to set their own goals and to determine their own priorities, to end their subjugation and take full control over all aspects of their lives.”\(^{18}\) This sort of support was
relatively common from socialist-leaning activists and became a mainstay of the era, particularly in event-based protests organized and maintained by a youth presence. Despite these gestures, however, for Indigenous youth in both the United States and Canada, it was clear that what was needed was a movement devoted to their cause exclusively.

C. THE LANGUAGE OF INDIGENOUS YOUTH ORGANIZING

For as much as existing organizations claimed to care about Indigenous issues, there were simply too many injustices in the world for Aboriginal issues to take centre stage. For many Indigenous youth activists, one of the most important lessons of the era was that their cause needed publicity and was unlikely to get the attention it deserved in such a crowded organizational climate. In other words, youth needed to carve out a place of their own: as Harold Cardinal, speaking at a the Duck Lake powwow in 1967 argued, “If we are going to have a future... if we are going to look for a tomorrow, then we ourselves as young people must be prepared to put the services of whatever resources we may have at the disposal of our Indian or Metis community. We feel that the future holds a great challenge for the Indian.”¹⁹ First though, Indigenous youth had to discuss and to decide how best to articulate their cause within the new discourse of human and civil rights. The result was a language and a philosophy that was all their own. In general, youth organizations of this era were most often focused on a renewed nationalism that prioritized historic justice based on the recovery of Indigenous rights including fishing and hunting rights lost or diminished over the years. These were not individual rights in the purest sense, for they were sought on the basis of nationality as Indigenous people, not as individual citizens with special rights. Nor, at the same time, were they altogether collective, for Indigenous activists also sought justice in the language of individual rights and of individual
opportunity. As Melvin Thom, one of the early leaders of the NIYC expressed, “with the surge for greater Civil Rights for American citizens, there is pressure to get rid of privileged groups of people, and Indian people are considered privileged with their federal services.”\textsuperscript{20} In a sense, the rights envisioned by youth activists reconceptualized the perceived dichotomy between the individual and the collective by emphasizing their interdependence and interrelatedness. In other words and as Cindy Holder and Jeff Corntassel have explained in a more modern context, “Indigenous peoples generally recognize that collective and individual rights are mutually \textit{interactive} rather than in competition.”\textsuperscript{21} While many observers could in fact understand the basis of collective rights claims, they nevertheless failed to understand the way in which Indigenous claims sought the realization of both.

The other issue upon which Indigenous activists consistently differentiated their cause from that of civil rights were the stakes of the struggle. As Vine Deloria Jr. explained to one African American leader, Indians were no longer fighting only for physical survival, but for ideological survival. “Our ideas will overcome your ideas. We are going to cut the country’s whole value system to shreds.” In rejecting the centrality of civil rights to the Indian struggle, Deloria continued: “The question is, What is the nature of life? It isn’t what you eat, or whether you eat, or who you vote for, or whether you vote, or not. What is the ultimate value of a man’s life? That is the question.”\textsuperscript{22} These basic questions existential, complicated, and difficult to resolve were, of course, not what organizations advocated for in a pragmatic way, but provide some indication as to why the rhetoric of civil rights fit rather awkwardly with the Indigenous cause. As Bradley Shreve has explained, the NIYC, for example, relied on the four “cornerstone principles” of tribal sovereignty, treaty rights, self-determination and cultural preservation, the same principles that had guided intertribal organization since the founding of the NCAI in 1944. Still, youth organizations and activists tackled the these issues in a way that was all their own, engaging their experience and their sense of responsibility for the survival of their own communities in theirs, a distinctly youth project.
For Indigenous youth, their project was quite simply very different. Though they conceived of their struggle as youth in similar terms of non-Aboriginal young people, they also often felt alienated within their own communities. Their frustration was thus dual, both as Aboriginal men and women as well as young men and women who insisted they were misunderstood and misconceived by wider society as well as often, within their own. As Mel Thom, a founder of the National Indian Youth Council explained, “In the country today we are undergoing some kind of revolution. The young people in the whole country are not satisfied. Being an Indian and being young means you are twice as dissatisfied.”

Thus, “The New Indian”, as termed by Stan Steiner in his own study of the youth struggle, worked hard to cultivate acceptance both as an Indigenous person and as a young person. He or she had grown up in a different context than his parents and his grandparents, a context that produced a generation that was, generally speaking, much more vocal, more demanding and more given to direct action than those who had come before. In his comments at the Tribal Chairman's Conference in February of 1971, Robert Bennett, Indian Commissioner, noted that “since the reservation is no longer isolated from the rest of society, Indian youth is in a turmoil over what they see and hear.” The challenge of Indian youth in the current era, he noted, was learning to live in two worlds “so as not to become victims of both.” He added, “My concern is that Indian young people not become diverted in their quest for meaningful places in society by those elements who are seeking to tear apart the giver of American lifeways... Indian young people should not use their youthful energies to burn themselves out in hate and destruction, as some young people are doing, but rather they should use these energies for the agonizing search for social justice. They need to look forward with goals in mind – and not backward in anger.”

Similar thoughts were also expressed in a Canadian context. Interviewed in 1970, singer Kay Starr, who identified herself as Iroquois, Cherokee, Choctaw and Irish, explained the dilemma of Indian youth as one of being caught between two cultures that she defined as “old versus young.” George
Manuel, president of the National Indian Brotherhood, also defined “young versus old” as the primary struggle of youth in this era.\textsuperscript{27} As Canada's primary Aboriginal lobby, the National Indian Brotherhood often struggled with its relationship to Aboriginal youth. In a December 1970 interview with CBC's \textit{Our Native Land}, George Manuel identified two problematic aspects of the youth generation. The first he defined briefly as extremists resisting the system while the second type, he argued, consisted of right wingers willing to compromise their beliefs and values for recognition and acceptance. Indeed, the NIB recruited youth to work in its own ranks but, as in American mainstream groups, the youth the NIB took in were often far removed from their non-educated peers and often left after a few short years exhausted, discontented, and determined to advocate in a different way.

D. THE POST-SECONDARY EXPERIENCE

As has been discussed in previous chapters, post-secondary education in the 1960s and the 1970s became a new possibility for many Indigenous young people. As such, the exposure to a new student culture as well as to the variety of movements on college and university campuses across North America is what inspired many for form their own organizations. The experience of post-secondary education is both what prepared Indigenous youth for activism, as well as convinced them that the current form of activism was not working.

“Well then, rise up – make haste – our people need us,” argued Herbert Blatchford, a university-educated Navajo and founder of the NIYC when interviewed by Stan Steiner in his book, \textit{The New Indians}.\textsuperscript{28} As Dr. William Burgess, dean of instruction at one of the country's leading Indian post-secondary institutions observed, “For the first time in history it's popular to be an Indian.”\textsuperscript{29} In an American context, Indigenous youth heard the call, entering in never-before seen numbers into
institutions of higher education. Their enrolment was spurred, at least in part, by the foundation of several Indian colleges in the United States. The All-Indian Pueblo Council began advocating in 1960 for a technical vocational school which was built in Albuquerque, New Mexico in 1971. The Navajo nation established its own college in 1968 in the state of Arizona, with several more emerging in the early 1970s. Though enrolment started out as minimal, it grew quickly. For example, Navajo College enrolment increased dramatically, from less than 50 in the immediate postwar to over 400 youth annually by the early 1960s. These facilities were desperately needed: the early to mid-1960s had witnessed a remarkable increase in the number of successful high school graduates. A 1965 report produced by American Indian Development, Inc., an offshoot of the NCAI, noted that the number of Indian students attending college a generation prior could be counted in hundreds while enrolment had increased, by 1964, to approximately 6,000. Moreover, the number of Indian students graduating high school in the same year was twenty-five percent larger than in the previous year with the increased number projected to continue growing. By 1978, there were sixteen tribally-controlled colleges and universities in operation in the United States. The increased availability of scholarship money was one motivating factor influencing the growth of Indian students in post-secondary schools: in 1963, 2.3 million dollars in scholarship money was provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, by private foundations, church groups and by the Tribes themselves.

Though Indian colleges did cultivate a new sense of activism, youth graduates were not always given to radicalism. At Haskell Indian Junior College in Lawrence, Kansas, the American Indian Movement was met with a mixed response. Superintendent Wallace Galluzzi explained that although Haskell students took AIM seriously, they were apprehensive about its tactics, adding that the main source of the apprehension was the reliance on the teachings of elders that stressed the notion that “aggressive social action is not the Indian way.” Some others, however, embraced AIM’s impatience as reflective of their own. As Ken Blackbird, a 24-year-old student added, AIM provided a kind of
...'shock treatment’ that was, in the current context, both necessary and justified. As he argued, “Maybe now the government will deal with the Indians as a sovereign people.”34 Overall, the college experience did expose Indigenous youth to new tribal nations and cultures. As LeNada Boyer recounted of her time working with other Native American students at Berkeley, “As students we all worked together... we had no secrets. It was the only one time in my life I had ever experienced Indian unity.”35

Unity was fostered in college, as well as in additional projects sponsored by youth and other agencies for students. The National Indian Youth Council sponsored the Clyde Warrior Institute in American Indian Studies in 1969. With the assistance of the Upward Bound program, the Institute offered 120 students from three different universities across the United States a six-credit course designed to “rely on the social sciences to examine the complex processed [sic] that operate directly on Indian communities and on the various perspectives with which Indians and their communities are viewed.”36 For many, the opportunity to engage with this perspective, to study those who had for so long studied them, was extremely empowering and led to the development of a cadre of student leadership within the Indigenous community.

Fostering new leadership was an important priority for the older generation of leaders. To this end, foundations and organizations often established workshop programs for Indigenous college students. Begun as a trial run at the Indian Service Summer School in Brigham City, Utah in 1951 and established as a Student Workshop formally in 1956, the Annual Workshop on American Indian Affairs was a six-week seminar summer session offered for Indian college students at the University of Colorado at Boulder. It was sponsored by American Indian Development, itself a creature of the NCAI, and offered approximately 30 students from 25 different tribes the opportunity to meet to discuss the state of Indian affairs, as well as its future. Key in the development of such workshops were Indigenous people who seemed to have 'made it': these included noted social scientists and administrators of Indigenous descent who, having both lived and worked in the Indigenous and non-Indigenous world,
hoped to foster a greater level of understanding and a more effective brand of activism within the student world.

One key organizer of the early workshops was the noted Indigenous scholar D'Arcy McNickle, whose anthropological work was already, by the 1950s, considered an important contribution by an American Indian scholar in the field. McNickle was significant on another level too, for he represented, at least for many within more mainstream organizations like the NCAI, the kind of person who was best able to exact significant change through his involvement in the non-Indigenous world. To capture the thoughts and feelings of a figure like McNickle, or of any lifelong activist for that matter, is a difficult project, for McNickle's views on Indian administration and on activism changed during the course of his life and work. Still, overall he maintained a commitment to self-help conceived as the need for participants to reflect inwardly and to come to the conclusion of the need for change on their own. This was, of course, a part of his own journey; for example, McNickle had, in 1925, sold his allotment on the Flathead Reservation in order to generate enough money to attend university abroad at Oxford and Grenoble. He had spent a number of years working within the Bureau of Indian Affairs under John Collier's administration, as well as continued to produce important works of anthropology regarding Indigenous lives throughout his tenure there. Later on in life, McNickle moved on to the world of academia where he was regarded as something of an expert in nearly all facets of Indigenous administration. McNickle believed in self-help, as well as cultural pride which reflected the way in which he himself lived and worked. It was the combination of these two that he hoped to foster, expecting new leadership to grow out of this new self-awareness.

McNickle's descriptions of workshop participants largely reflected his own experience. They also demonstrated the extent to which McNickle had reached his own conclusions about the Bureau from his experience working there and was not simply a “yes man”; as he pointed out in a report describing the project, “[W]hile the Bureau talks about ‘self-help’ as the way out for Indians, it really
does not promote self-help... Self-help, as some of us have come to use the term, means encouraging a person to use his brains and his hands to do things which satisfy him, however wrong or foolish they may seem to the rest of us at the moment.” In addition, McNickle added the importance of Indigenous people designing their own programs, an example applicable to the summer workshop project. As he asserted, the Bureau was simply “unable to adapt its own clumsy machinery of regulations and procedures so as to invite real Indian participation... [N]o man, or no Bureau made up of many men, however intelligent and well-meaning, could slip inside another man’s skin and think and feel for him.” Thus, “it seemed that the time had come to try, if only in a small way, to stir up in the Indians some concern for the fix in which they find themselves and maybe get them to do something about it, by themselves.”

Encouraging self-initiated self-help was sometimes a challenge given the diverse group of participants that McNickle described as attending the student workshops. Like the divisions that sometimes manifested themselves among youth within pan-Indian organizations, summer workshops included what McNickle defined as Tribal Indians, those who had spent most of their lives inside a closed community with which they strongly identified; Stable Generalized Indians, who were a large bloc of students who conceived of themselves as “Indians” rather than simply members of a tribe; and American of Indian Ancestry, who McNickle described as biologically Indian “but neither characteristically 'Indian' in behaviour nor strongly integrated into the social fabric of their parental community.” Those McNickle identified as Stable Generalized Indians had more of a connection to general society and broader experience within it than those identified as “Tribal.” Factionalism was inherent in the workshop and manifested itself most severely in the ‘folk-urban split.’ In a separate paper published in *Psychiat* in August of 1968, McNickle described the factions as “conservative” and “progressive.”

Whatever descriptors were applied either by McNickle or his staff, the reports generated from
the workshops demonstrated the way in which students could be difficult to organize. Apart from the ideological dimension that McNickle pointed out, there was also a regional dimension to the factionalism expressed by participants which had important corollaries within pan-Indian organizations. As McNickle pointed out, “The ‘angry’ students tended to come from western Oklahoma, which is something of a center for a growing pan-Indianism.” On the other hand, the “Tribals” or conservatives tended to be from more closed societies included the Sioux, the Navajo and the Papago. Moreover, as McNickle reported, in many cases, there were simply too few 'generalized Indians' to provide translations between the Tribal and American of Indian Ancestry groups. As such, McNickle described the workshop as a 'distressing experience’ for many. As he explained, “The course failed to make clear the many ways in which one can legitimately be Indian – to portray, for example, how one can be urban prosperous, fairly individuated, and yet Indian in both function and identity.” This was key for McNickle; how Indigenous youth could function in both the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal world while advocating and realizing change was in fact the story of his own personal journey. His frustration with the small subset identified as 'ideologues’ who “fared worst of all in the workshop” reveal the way in which McNickle, as well as other more mainstream activists, sought a combination of both pragmatism and Indigeneity that did not always exist in the modern generation of youth activists.

Overall, the summer institutes were for many, a transformative and educational experience. As McNickle explained in a report on a different workshop that embodied many of the same principles of the student seminars, “We believe that solving Indian problems is not a matter of bringing together a group of experts to make a study, to report, and then write a program... We are not interested in holding meeting for the purpose of lecturing to the Indians who attend,telling them all the things we think are wrong with the way they live.” His predictions were largely realized. As he reported, “For the first time, many of them were able to look at their own communities and themselves with insight and without abhorrence. They began to think of their own personal problems productively.” They could do
so either negatively or positively, he explained, for either way, the workshops fostered a renewed or completely new sense of nationalism whose benefits outweighed the negative effects. In addition, the workshops helped Indigenous students to gain a broader perspective. As he explained, “The students left the Workshop not only with renewed self-confidence but less angry at the 'villains' in Indian affairs. They began both to understand the conservative Indian and the government administrator.” It was this new “geist”, McNickle reasoned, that would enable those who had been successful in the workshop setting to find a place within the cogs of change.

Colleges were indeed extremely important in generating new activism in the United States. In concert with workshops and other awareness exercises, Native American students came to the experience of activism through engaging with other youth from across the country. In Canada however, the Aboriginal-run college phenomenon did not occur at the same speed or in the same way. Data on Aboriginal post-secondary enrolment in this era is exceedingly difficult to find, as are the stories of the students who did partake. The 1970s in particular saw intensifying efforts from Indigenous communities to seek out opportunities for post-secondary education, as well as to promote the idea of Aboriginal-controlled institutions. The federal government was of little assistance in this regard: though it created, in 1968, a new vocational program providing direct financial assistance to some First Nations and Inuit students attending post-secondary institutions, it failed to support the development of independent colleges. This was not surprising: until the 1940s, any Aboriginal who wished to enrol in higher education was required to surrender their status as “Indian.” It was not until 1977 that the government established the Post-Secondary Educational Assistance program which provided much more generous funding for a far greater number of students.

Amid this relative stagnation, in 1972, the National Indian Brotherhood released its landmark position paper on education entitled Indian Control of Indian Education. In it, the NIB argued that what Indigenous people wanted for their childrens' education was very different from the educational system
they confronted at the time. As the paper noted, “The values which we want to pass on to our children, values which make our people a great race, are not written in any book. They are found in our history, in our legends, and in the culture." The paper continued on to argue that if these values could once again be re-inscribed, then Aboriginal people would have cause to be proud of their culture, once again.

Though aimed at many levels of schooling, Indian Control of Indian Education did address the issue of post-secondary education, urging that recruiting programs be aimed at attracting people to professions like nursing, counselling, teaching, law, medicine and engineering. These sorts of educational paths, the NIB argued, would be of most service to the communities. The paper urged respect for Native Studies programs, which were, at the time, only emerging, as well as argued that entrance requirements should be adjusted to allow for entrance on other bases than simply academic achievement. In addition, the NIB urged more generous support from the government to remove finances as an impediment to attending, and that Aboriginal people seek places within the universities’ and colleges’ executive and administrative apparatus to ensure Indigenous input. Though the paper took a strong stand on the issue of local control, to date, there exists only one Indigenous-run college in Canada. Founded in 1976 as the Saskatchewan Federated Indian College, the college, in partnership with the University of Regina, continues to attract First Nations Students from across the country but has been plagued by allegations of mismanagement and financial crisis. Despite the lack of Indigenous-run institutions, Aboriginal youth in Canada’s 1960s and 1970s did more frequently seek higher education and were, therefore exposed, to many of the same ideas as their American counterparts.

Canadian observers did not fail to notice the American workshop phenomenon, either. A student workshop on Aboriginal affairs, touted as the first, was held at the University of Manitoba in 1966. It was sponsored by the Canadian Indian Youth Council which had only been formed in the fall of 1965 in cooperation with the Departments of Anthropology and Sociology, as well as Adult Education. Three of its primary organizers, also members of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Indian Youth
Council, had attended some of the sessions of the Boulder, Colorado Summer Workshop series. As the CIYC's own report on the workshop explained, “It was the feeling of the Canadian Indian Youth Council that the concept of the Boulder Colorado Workshops, if it should be introduced in Canada, with the necessary Canadian modifications, could play a vital role towards realizing some of the aspirations and needs of Canadian Indians.”

Though the CIYC produced its own report, another was also generated by Robert Rietz, Chief Instructor who was in fact the Executive Director of the American Indian Center in Chicago, IL since 1958. Rietz had worked with the Bureau of Indian Affairs at Fort Berthold, NB, and was both a founder and a participant in the Colorado workshops. The report was also prepared by Harold Huston, an Assistant Professor in the Department of University Extension and Adult Education at the University of Manitoba. It is notable that Rietz was chosen as chief instructor, though details on his appointment are not available. Funding was obtained by the CIYC in part from the Indian Affairs Branch as well as the Citizenship Branch and the Centennial Commission, but most of the funding efforts were carried out by the CIYC of its own accord. The cost of $23,000 estimated to run the workshop was significant, and the CIYC worked tirelessly in promoting the project. For its efforts, it received $6,000 from the Indian Affairs Branch as well as monies from the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. It also received donations from the Centennial Commission and the McLean's Foundation, as well as Eaton's of Canada.

As Rietz's and Huston's foreword explained, the workshop was indeed a six-week program intended to promote reflection among the participants, “to sort out their thinking about Indianness,” who “came with varying degrees of awareness of the social revolution currently at work among their people.” Though a significant experience for many, Rietz and Huston explained that the workshop was by far, not a miracle process. That being reported, many participants left with “a greater awareness,... an improved understanding, ... seeing their parents in the broader perspective of a changing dynamic
culture.” Many also signalled the importance of meeting other Indigenous people and the feeling of unity that the workshop generated, as well as a renewed enthusiasm for their studies and for the social responsibility that the workshop had emphasized.52

Designed around the central locust of “identity,” the stated purposes of the workshop included cultural awareness, an appreciation of the forces in operation within Indigenous communities both rural and urban, as well as an opportunity to meet others also enrolled in university and to promote completion of university. Twenty students were invited to participate, including eleven men and nine women aged between eighteen and twenty-six years old. These were, in a sense, a selection of the most successful youth in their communities. As Rietz and Huston pointed out, the students selected satisfied university entrance requirements and were “good students, hard-working students, students who had survived in an educational system that was not designed for their survival.”53 As such, like the American workshops, these did not always reflect the wide variety of Indigenous youth experience but rather, a particular segment of the Indigenous youth population which had already proven itself exceptional in some way.

Likewise, the instructors for the course, as well as guest lecturers, were drawn from a particular segment of Indigenous society. They included, of course, Rietz, as well as noted anthropologists Dr. Robert Thomas and Dr. Richard Pope. In addition, guest speakers included Jean Legasse of the Citizenship Branch, Reverend Adam Cuthand, a regional Director of Indian Affairs, as well as a lawyer, a representative of the Company of Young Canadians, the president of the Canadian Indian Youth Council, and the Director of the Indian-Metis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg.

Though the central question was identity, instructors also focused on features of identity that they and the students considered most salient in the experiences of Indigenous youth in the 1960s, namely “tribal-to-urban culture change,” as well as Indigenous-white relations. From the outset, Rietz and Huston’s report indicated important difficulties of having students engage in a critical evaluation of
the tribal-urban continuum. As they explained, “[S]ome of the students have learned to survive the urban educational system by rote learning... They tend to see the instructor as a storehouse of explainable facts which he divulges rather than as part of the joint Workshop enterprise which demands both student and instructor contributions.” To promote further engagement, the Workshop students travelled to community development service offices, reserves, friendship centres and organizations.

While reports concerning the Boulder workshops cited factionalism as a main problem, the CIYC’s own report denoted the opposite. In fact, as its own report argued, “Possibly because the Canadian Indian Workshop’s student membership was only 20... and also because the Canadian students themselves were the prime moving force in organizing the Canadian Indian Workshop..., the foremost observance that we made was that the American students were factionalized while the opposite was true in the Canadian Indian Workshop.” Organizers had in fact visited the Boulder workshop to gauge whether some kind of interaction between the two workshops would be favourable, but they concluded that the time may not be right. Canadian delegates who stressed “pan-Indianism irrespective of International boundaries” found themselves, at times, to be resented by their American counterparts. As they reported, these students were “rather guarded against Canadian intrusion into their battlefield.”

Explanations offered included the idea that American Indians felt that Canadians were less sophisticated than them and the perception that Canadian Indigenous people got a great deal more from their government than did Americans. In the end, caution was advised: “Perhaps this trend should be carefully studied before any attempt is made to evolve participation between the two workshops in future sessions.”

Overall, and as was the case in the American workshops, instructors Rietz and Huston reported that the students had been successful on several levels. First, they had learned to see that what was “Indian” was not necessarily that which had been cast by the White man. Rather, Indigeneity was dynamic rather than static and based not on the perceptions of Whites but on the experiences of the
community. As the instructors asserted, “Indians are no less Indian with horses; nor are they necessarily less Indian with the coming of the white man. The coming of the white man simply an aspect of the Indians’ live, viable and changing world, not something which demands his self-rejection.”

Secondly, students began to understand the inextricable connection between freedom and responsibility. Towards the end, instructors reported that the students had expressed some “creative tension” with them concerning the heavy academic basis of the course and their desire to pursue a discussion on the practical implications of such understanding and knowledge. There was also some division as to the role of the CIYC in the actual workshop; though it had put in a tremendous amount of work and energy into planning, they were largely shut out of the workshop itself. As Rietz and Huston described, “The CIYC officers in the city at the time were deeply hurt. That they felt shut out by faculty, administration and students provided a traumatic conclusion of the Workshop. This was far from the intention; the students were immensely grateful... but unless the participants were to be free within the workshop enterprise, they could not be responsible for it.”

Despite these minor problems, the workshops were seen as successful, both by organizers and by students. Final recommendations generated in a debrief several months later included that the Workshop be an annual experience, that it be better planned and that both the educational and residential facilities should be on campus “so that students may experience the full brunt of the urban university setting.”

Most importantly, however, Rietz and Huston insisted that the Workshop “remain a joint enterprise of a university and Indian youth” and that neither dictated the content or the scope of the enterprise.

As the student workshops and the post-secondary experience in both Canada and in the United States demonstrate, higher education was often an important pathway to Indigenous activism. At the same time however, it was not the only, or the first. In many ways and for several reasons, post-secondary education was limited in its ability to recruit new activists, not the least of which was that
despite its greater accessibility, the experience of post-secondary education remained an exceptional achievement in many Indigenous communities. More often than not then, it was the school of life that provided the formative experiences underlying a great deal of Indigenous activism during this period.

'The street', as many disaffected Indigenous youth called it, was a primary catalyst for change among youth and an important feeder into the Indigenous rights movement more generally. For those for whom post-secondary education was not an option, military service also furnished much of the exposure to new ideas and to new rhetoric that post-secondary education provided for students. As one veteran recounted, “The Indian, you see, looked at being in the services a little differently.” Native Americans were well aware of their place in a “white man’s army,” a place defined not only by Euro-American culture but by his own, Navajo ways. As he recalled, “When I went into the service I was told: 'Remember, you represent us, You represent the Dines, you represent the Navajo, you represent the Indian. Not the rest of the country. Not the white man.’”

In practice, for this veteran, it meant defending those most vulnerable--women and elderly people--who were sometimes allegedly abused by non-Indian American troops. Most Indian servicemen were nicknamed 'Chief' within their units, a moniker that marked a dual perception of Indian servicemen as both clowns and heroes. Returning veterans often relocated to large urban centers where the realities of post-war unemployment further compounded the betrayal that many felt upon their return to American soil. Some veterans ended up on the street, alongside many Indigenous youth who had migrated from the reserve or reservation only to find that prospects in the urban landscape were equally dim, as described in detail in a previous chapter. According to Rose Maney of Chicago, young Indians were “all at the Indian bars, every weekend, and most of them take this drug.”

For many of these youths, alienation was rather severe, and the search to recover or to understand their own identity led many youth to the powwow trail, a journey to different gatherings and powwows across Canada and the United States. In Canada, the powwow trail phenomenon reached
its peak in the early 1970s. Those interviewed on the 'powwow trail' cited learning about other people and tribes as well as looking for the old ways and recovering spiritual values as the biggest motives for their participation. As one interviewee noted, young people wanted to be free to see things and to learn from the road. As he explained, “I am not learning to be an Indian – I am one – but the exposure to the Indian way is important.” It cultivated a feeling of unity and togetherness promoting a belief, among these travellers, that across North America Indian philosophies and beliefs were basically the same. In 1969, the government of Canada estimated that 50,000 travellers had hit the road and by 1971, Minister Gerald Pelletier announced that the 'transient youth phenomenon' had reached epic proportions, prompting the government to fund a hostel program across the nation.

Overall then, whether in post-secondary education, military service, street life or communal travel, what provided the catalyst for many Indigenous youth activists was the experience of encountering other Indigenous youth in a variety of contexts and engaging in discussions on the status of Indigenous life at the time. Though they may not all have shared the same background, most could agree that it was time for a new kind of movement, and that Indigenous youth were uniquely positioned to lead it.

E. THE NEED FOR A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

If contextual factors helped to shape young Indigenous activists, then so too did the current state of affairs in pan-Indigenous organizing and in politics in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the United States, Indigenous youth consistently demonstrated a frustration with the perceived stagnation of Indian activism through traditional channels such as the NCAI, whose members they saw as out of touch with the concerns of everyday people, as well as far too assimilated to follow through on the changes
required to transform Indian country. As LeNada Boyer, key leader in the occupation of Alcatraz Island has stated of the period, the national organizations were “just there.” Others tried to institute change on the political level but were often frustrated by the realities of bureaucratic stagnation and the inability to create meaningful change. Nevertheless, it was in this forum that many Indigenous youth sought initially to make a difference, moving on to different projects once their dissatisfaction had reached a certain level.

Youth involvement in older, established organizations did make a difference. In the American context, Indian youth were instrumental in the drafting of the important 1961 Declaration of Indian Purpose that emerged from the 1961 Chicago Indian Conference organized largely by the NCAI. Supported by organizations such as the Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation of Chicago and the University of Chicago, the conference was an important event that served to illustrate the gap that existed between Indian youth activists and more traditional activists. As Steiner reported, “Most of the young Indians who went to Chicago did so on their own. They were not invited. They represented nobody... The youthful ardour that they brought to the conference was dispelled by the routine rhetoric of those they called the ‘Uncle Tomahawks’ – the official Indian leaders.” Mel Thom recalled a sea of resolutions and Indian pageantry. Clyde Warrior called it an “old song and dance to a slightly new anthropological tune.” Though, as Warrior asserted, the final Declaration had taken the shaped of the demands expressed by Indian youth delegates, the entire experience was instrumental in creating a new and separate youth movement, the National Indian Youth Council. The primary achievement of the conference, the Creed of the Declaration, illustrated many components of pan-Indian youth organizations of the 1960s and 1970s, demonstrating both a respect for the Indian past and an orientation towards the future. It stressed the free exercise of cultural and spiritual values, the need for a greater appreciation and understanding of the Indian condition in wider society, and the need for new policies and programs founded on a new relationship of understanding.
Indigenous youth trying to make headway into organizations like the NCAI also faced obstacles engendered largely by the fear and apprehension on the part of the Indigenous establishment that youth were, in fact, a disruptive force. In both the National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NTCA) and in the NCAI, leaders encouraged members to try to make alliances with youth, but to be wary of the result if change in the relationship did not occur soon. Speaking to the National Tribal Chairmen in 1971, Robert Bennett urged members to “appraise our relationship with Indian youth before we find ourselves in treacherous waters, before passion replaces reason, before slogans replace issues, and before carrying of signs replaces carrying of pride and dignity.” Bennett advocated more open and frequent communication and the need to demonstrate mutual respect characterized by a desire for understanding. As he pointed out, “Indian youth are coming on us very strong. They are coming on us in larger numbers, they are coming on us better educated, they are coming on us more sophisticated... These young people as they come on us can be a positive force for good, or a negative force for evil. This is our challenge.” For some, the 'challenge' of Indian youth was welcome. There were those amongst the tribal elders who welcomed the newly educated and worldly Indian youth with optimism and hope. As Wendell Chino, president of the NCAI, articulated in 1959, “We are realizing the emergence of young, educated Indian leadership so that the reins of tribal destinies are being transferred to the college-trained, college-educated young leaders [who are] still availing themselves of the sage advice of the older people.” Indeed, becoming comfortable with the idea of these worldly and educated Indian youths still maintaining their own “Indianness” was a key factor in determining the acceptability of youth organizations into the ranks of the mainstream.

In Canada, many Aboriginal youths attempted and succeeded in working with older, established organizations. There were many younger members of the National Indian Brotherhood, including Marie Smallface Marule, a Blood from Southern Alberta, who was an important though under-acknowledged force in the organization early on. A mere 27 years old when she joined, Marule had
studied at the University of Alberta and spent four years overseas working in Zambia. She became executive director in the early 1970s and assisted president George Manuel in many of his most important tasks including writing and strategic planning. Marule worked tirelessly, leaving the organization within a few years due to sheer exhaustion. Arnold Goodleaf, a 27-year old Caughnawaga Mohawk, was also a key advisor to Manuel's successor, Noel Starblanket. While these were important example of youthful figures seeking to find a place within mainstream organizations, it was equally true that they were most often overshadowed and overworked by the older and more established leadership. Their leadership was in fact underdeveloped in their advisory capacity and very few of these talented young people continued on with the organization for a significant length of time. Though the NIB advocated for youth issues and frequently discussed them, youth were more often the objects of discussion rather than the contributors.

Though organizations represented one forum for motivated youth, so too did the prospect of working in national politics, whether in the Indian bureaucracy or in the policy arena. In Canada, there had occurred in the late 1960s a “mass exodus” of Indian Affairs Department personnel from reserves, to be replaced with Aboriginal people themselves. Many were well-educated, as evidenced by the brief biographies printed in The Native Voice. Band Administrator Ed Fox of the Blood Indians, for example, was 32 and married with three children. He had attended Mount Royal College in Calgary and was also the vice-president of Kainai Industries. Joe Dion of the Kehewin Band at Kehewin Alberta, had attended a pre-med program at the University of Alberta and Phil Thompson, Band Administrator for the Slavy Band in Northern Alberta held a Bachelor of Science Degree and had served as a pilot in the Canadian Air Force. Though they expressed a common frustration with the regulations that bound them, these youthful administrators nevertheless displayed a commitment to working within the system rather than radicalizing against it. According to astute critics however, the Department's appointment of Native people was simply a 'token', designed to placate Aboriginal Canadians while continuing to
control their affairs via their own people. As the article explained, “[Critics] say that the Indians are now perhaps signing, handling and accounting for checks, but nonetheless it is still decided in Ottawa in what areas these monies should be spend, and how they should be spent and accounted for.” The new administrators, many of them in their thirties, were nevertheless more accessible to locals than Indian Agents, often speaking the language and exhibiting genuine sympathy for the needs of the people.

In the United States, several groups of ambitious young adults would try their hand at reform within the existing structures, though with limited success. Louis Bruce became the Commissioner of the Bureau, taking over from Robert Bennett. Bruce, who was accused by some militants of being an “apple” -- “a brother who is red on the outside but white on the inside” -- was nevertheless generally supportive of bringing in some new talent, as well as of the idea of allowing tribes to administer their own affairs by contract with the Bureau. As Frank Wright reported, in a series on the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1970, “the top priority project... has been to realign the top echelons of the bureau and bring in some new blood – supposedly younger, more flexible and more responsive to Indian needs than the old top management.” Though seventeen positions were made available with three-quarters being promised to Indigenous people, the positions proved difficult to fill: as Wright maintained, some concluded that working for the bureau would be a “sell-out”, while others were simply unavailable or already happily employed elsewhere.

Those recruited faced some obstacles to reform, however. Within the Nixon administration, for example, a group of “aggressive youth reformers” within the BIA were stopped in their tracks by the Secretary of the Interior, under Nixon's advice. Appointed by Nixon, Rogers C.B. Morton installed John Crow, a quarter Oklahoma Cherokee with a long history within the Bureau, to oversee internal operations, granting him power equal to then-commissioner Louis Bruce. Crow, a native of Salem, Missouri, had attended the Haskell Institute and had worked for the Bureau since 1934. Presented with
a Career Service Award in 1964, the Department of the Interior glowingly reported on Crow’s sustained careful and sustained service, noting in particular his ability to make “careful explanations” to Indigenous people regarding Public Law 671- a termination act for the Utes of Utah passed by the 83rd Congress, “with the result that the provisions of the law received the greatest possible acceptance, with minimum friction.”

As Lawrence Rosen explains, the Bureau was, at this time, divided into two factions: Old Liners and Insurgents. Though Crow advocated self-determination and respected the talent of those seeking change, he also had learned, in his years of experience with the Bureau, the characteristics necessary for success in such an environment: “in-house statesmanship, personal obscurity and loyalty to bureaucratic efficiency.” In his capacity as overseer, Crow downgraded those deemed too outspoken or controversial including Ernest Stevens, an Oneida from Wisconsin and Leon Cook of the Red Lake Chippewa of Minnesota. Leon Cook, “the most vocal and impatient of the Insurgents,” had been very vocal in defending Indigenous land and water rights, while Stevens had been working on completely revising the Bureau’s urban relocation program. In addition to their efforts, Cook, Stevens and other reform-minded individuals had been establishing direct links between the central office and the reservations, by-passing Area Offices with the intention to funnel more money directly onto the reservations. As journalist Frye Gaillard reported in 1971, “[F]or awhile, things happened around the BIA that had never occurred before.”

But, just as quickly as it began, the innovative approach to Indian Affairs was trumped by staffing changes enacted under the guise of administrative efficiency but meant to curb what many established administrators and legislators regarded as too much change, too quickly. Cook was replaced in his capacity as economic director and demoted to deputy director of economic development under the supervision of a more conservative director. Stevens’ job as Acting Associate Commissioner for Education and Programs was eliminated and placed back into his old role as Director of Community
Services. In addition, Crow ordered that all funds, all directives to field offices, all press releases and virtually all correspondence go through the office of the deputy commissioner. BIA reformers charged the department with returning to a state of “administrative paralysis.” Thus, young administrators, however young and energetic, were nevertheless faced with a difficult job. They were not responsible for crafting policy, only implementation, and when asked what the hardest part of their work was, many expressed frustration at the maze of bureaucratic red tape and of regulations that made responding to those in need a more lengthy and difficult process than need be. The BIA's regulations and procedures occupied a full thirty-three written volumes, and ambitious bureaucrats, alongside the Bureau's resistance to realign its programs to serve both urban and reservation Indians, served to curb their ambition.

F. 'RAISING HELL.... THE INDIAN WAY’: THE NIYC AND THE CIYC

For youth dissatisfied with both existing organizations and the possibility of trying to change the system from within, the only solution seemed to be an entirely new movement built from and based on youth. Indigenous youth saw their project as unique: they were creating a new movement, not an organization. As Mel Thom explained, “The movement grew in the Indian way. We had decided what we needed was a movement. Not an organization, but a movement. Organizations rearrange history. Movements make history.” “Raising hell-- the Indian way” became the unofficial mantra of both the National Indian Youth Council and other emerging groups during this period.

The NIYC emerged through the development of the Regional Indian Youth Council in the 1950s in America's southwest region. Though the RIYC did not fully articulate the goals that the NIYC would a decade later, it offered an annual gathering and an effective sounding board for Indian youth to meet
and to share their ideas. From its outset, the NIYC did not strive to upend the fundamental beliefs of their predecessors. As envisioned by Herb Blatchford, one of the NIYC's founders, the organization negotiated a 'delicate balance' whereby youth could strive for change through their own channels yet avoid being too drastic and dramatic as to upset the elders. Above all, it strove to remain independent rejecting outright the idea of any kind of sponsorship which might compromise its ability to advocate for those causes it saw as most important.

The NIYC advocated for tribal sovereignty, treaty rights, self-determination and cultural preservation. These ideas were hardly new and in fact, were important cornerstones of other, non-youth mainstream organizations. The NIYC was in fact a strong advocate for tribalism and based much of its efforts on the reservation. One of the group's favourite mantras was, in fact, “You can go home again,” and throughout its existence it often seemed to privilege the reservation setting as the appropriate and most useful place from which to base its activism. Though it paid some service to urban youth, most of its programs were built on the premise that Indian would rather return 'home', that is, to the reservation. As Warrior explained, “For many of them the promise of opportunity ends in the gutter on the skid rows of Los Angeles and Chicago. They must grow up in a decent community with a strong sense of personal adequacy and competence.” The preference for the reservation did make the NIYC closer to organizations like the NCAI and in opposition to the largely urban base of radicals.

At the same time as it hung on to several aspects of what was old, the NIYC also struggled to create something new by uniting a greater number of Indian people across tribal and regional lines. Thus, like student organizations such as the SNCC, the NIYC engaged in direct action, trying to prove that it was still a grassroots organization despite its upholding of some of the older traditions of pan-Indian organizing. The participation of the NIYC in the 1964 fish-ins was one way of bridging the perceived divisions among Indians and NIYC proudly declared, in its aftermath, that they had participated in “the first full-scale intertribal action since the Indians defeated General Custer on the
Little Big Horn.” 82 Indeed, the fish-in movement helped to generate the perception of the NIYC as a truly pan-Indian organization on a national scale. As Shreve argues, “The fish-in campaign recast the NIYC from what was essentially an obscure student social club into a nationally recognized and respected intertribal organization.” 83 The fish-ins were indeed an exercise in legitimacy; the NIYC leadership asserted as much when the Yakimas, considered a generally conservative group who had initially refused to join the fish-in movement, later implored youth and other Indians from fifty different tribes to join in on the action. As Steiner recounts, the youths were asked to lead the fish-ins which were named collectively the Washington State Project. As Mel Thom recalled, “In the beginning tribal support was a little difficult to get... Being a conservative people, as they are, the tribal leaders had never had the opportunity to be aggressive... So action, direct action, was something they were not sure about.” 84 Still, as many leaders insisted, the willingness of the Yakima to use the energies of youth to demonstrate meant that youth could in fact speak for Indigenous people just as much, if not more, than those in the older mainstream organizations. As Shreve maintains, though they critiqued elders' goals at times, they “stood on the same sideline.” 85

The NIYC also strove to engage a greater demographic through its distribution of its newsletter, America Before Columbus (ABC). In its inaugural issue in October, 1963, the organization listed Melvin Thom as President with Shirley Witt and Joan Noble as 1st and 2nd Vice-Presidents. Directors included Gerald Brown, Edison Real Bird, Karen Rickard, Clyde Warrior, Bruce Wilkie, John Winchester, and Herb Blatchford as Executive Director. The Board of Directors encompassed many different nations and geographical areas; they identified themselves as Paiute, Mohawks, Flathead-Sioux, Crow, Tuscarora, Ponca, Makah, Pottawatomie, and Navajo respectively. ABC was described as an attempt to keep Indigenous youth current on the state of Indian affairs and news. As one writer expressed, “we were uninformed about the many issues confronting Indian people today... sincere interest is not enough. We will not be effective until we gain thorough knowledge and understanding of
the many problems facing us as Indian people.” In an article entitled “For a Greater Indian America,” a young writer rejected what he described as a “wait and see” attitude prevalent in the Native American community. The attitude of youth, he maintained, was one of impatience: “We are tired of being pushed down and held down. We are tired of experts making decisions for us. Sounds like we just want to be first-class American citizens? Well, not exactly. We just want to be Indians ... a race of whole human beings.” Finally, in an article entitled “After the Convention,” one writer expressed annoyance at the “shiftiness”, “tattle-tailing” and vendetta of personal vengeance that too often characterized the conference process for organizations like the NCAI. He argued that the government's divide and rule strategy could only be countered by true unity rather than pettiness. Subsequent newsletters contained rallying calls, informational articles on rights pursuits, news on scholarship programs and film and book reviews, and all emphasized the need for Indian unity and most importantly, for action.

As Steiner described, it was the rebellion of youth, “but with a difference.” The rebellion was not against their fathers, but against the “Great White Father.” Moreover, for as much as they learned from the elders, in this aspect youth felt sincerely that they, too, had something to teach. Vine Deloria Jr. said as much when he described how his own father, Reverend Vine Deloria Sr., had begun to speak out more vociferously in this highly charged political climate. Andy Abeita, governor of the Pueblo of Isleta in New Mexico, also described his own father's re-awakening, who had spoken out against colonization when asked to speak at a dedication for a statue of Coronado.

Like their forebearers, the leaders of the NIYC were primarily from reservations or from rural tribal communities. Herb Blatchford was the NIYC's first. A college educated veteran of the Regional Indian Youth Council as well as the Workshop on American Indian Affairs, Blatchford was older and more experienced than the other founders, according to Bradley Shreve. Alongside Blatchford was the charismatic Mel Thom who reportedly led the youth caucus at the Chicago Indian Conference. Thom had been a student leader at Brigham Young University and had also participated in the Regional Indian
Youth Council. While Blatchford and Thom were known as more level-headed figures, this was not always the case, and the NIYC leadership featured its share of more sensational figures. Youth leaders could be polarizing figures, as in the case of Clyde Warrior who served as an NIYC director, one of the NIYC’s first, and most vocal, leaders. A Ponca Indian, Warrior was described by Steiner as “one of the angriest of the angry young men in the hills” and “Sitting Bull with a university degree.”

He had worked on the University of Chicago anthropological team as well as a researcher for the University of Kansas. A war dancer, Warrior refused to dance for tourists as had other dancers. As Steiner explained, “He dances to renew his tribal heritage within himself.” Warrior advocated for many groups including the eastern Oklahoma Cherokee in 1966, who were protesting John Chewie’s prosecution for hunting without a licence. Warrior, speaking out against the arrest, staunchly argued that eastern Oklahoma was the Indian's old South. He had in fact spent a summer there working with the students at the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. As he asserted, “The only way you change that structure is to smash it. You turn it over sideways. And stomp on it. It appears to me that's what will happen around here. I think violence will come about. And as far as I am concerned the sooner the better.”

Referencing his broader knowledge of rights struggles around the world, Warrior predicted “an uprising that will make Kenyatta's Mau Mau movement look like a Sunday-school picnic.”

Warrior's words were often-cited by the press, who used his explosive rhetoric to paint a more radical picture of the NIYC than was perhaps the case. Despite Warrior's words, the NIYC was committed to working within the structure, advocating, for example, for Indigenous peoples' inclusion into the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act via a March on Washington. There, Mel Thom delivered a speech to all of the delegates assembled at the American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty. Though not a youth conference specifically, the Paiute's speech clearly indicated the preeminence of youth concerns in any kind of economic agenda as well as the NIYC's commitment to securing tangible gains, within the system, for Indigenous youth and their communities. According to Thom, youth were among
the proudest of Indian people. As a result, “It is especially difficult for young people to say ‘We are poor – please help us.’... the Indian youth fears this poverty.” He continued: “The young people of the Indian tribes are going to be the ones to live with this.” What the Indian youth wanted, according to Thom, was not to be pushed into the American mainstream but to remain Indian – viably. Part of this was the Indians special relationship with the federal government that Thom argued young Indians did not want to see terminated in favour of some nebulous version of 'freedom.' Thom maintained that any work to be done had to be done with the support of older Indian leadership, but that a great deal for the responsibility lay with the young people. Warrior, like other youth leaders, had a somewhat complicated relationship with some of the traditionals. At times, Warrior seemed to see them as impediments towards true and relevant change. As he explained, “Uncle Tomahawks were bought off with government jobs, or jobs of Indian do-gooders.” Yet, according to one commentator, “The old Indians dig him.” Warrior also had some sympathy for the political philosophy of the conservatives and had even campaigned for Goldwater. He believed in fighting in modern ways for the old ways, a sentiment expressed by many within the NIYC cadre.

Though it strove to be a movement that was both pragmatic and relevant to the everyday concerns of Indian youth, the NIYC, like the organizational context from which it sprung, was sometimes perceived by Indian people as more elitist than it was grassroots. This perception sometimes extended into its own leadership. Warrior left the NIYC in the early 1970s arguing that the movement he helped to found had become a political springboard whereby young, educated Indians simply got sucked into the system. He bitterly proclaimed that those who founded and led the organization early on were, within a few years, the new Uncle Tomahawks. He returned later on the same summer, however, angrier and readier than ever for the kind of confrontation he deemed essential to a true revolution. Warrior's change of heart vis-a-vis the organization he had helped to create was not uncharacteristic of Indian youth activism in this era. As Cherokee anthropologist Robert K. Thomas
explained, “Every three years there is a new generation. And every new generation is more Indian than the last. Youth leaders of the National Indian Youth Council, who were hotshots three years ago, are considered by the new new Indians to have cooled it, to be conservatives.”

The NIYC had a corollary in Canada named, not coincidentally, the Canadian Indian Youth Council. Its stated objective was “to build stronger leadership among young people by practising it,” as one founder explained. It strove to provide a meeting ground for youth and to study solutions, as well as to promote youth reserve-based activism. Its membership was between the ages of eighteen and thirty years old. Founded in 1966, it also pledged to maintain its independence from the Indian Affairs Branch as well as the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre, based in Winnipeg.

One of the chief strengths of organizations like the CIYC was its ability to facilitate the meeting of young Indigenous people. As one member put it, when asked by a reporter, “Did you know there are over 300 students in Winnipeg alone? There must be hundred if not thousands of young people in the city!” As F. Kewaquedo, a young Aboriginal person from Point Au Baril, Ontario, put it, “As a young adult Indian vitally concerned with Indians there are many questions I need answered. But there are ... some questions that can be answered only through talking to Indian youth. This then is the main reason I need an Indian youth club.” According to Kewaquedo, in addition to its function as a liaison between youth, the organization could also offer hope to the elders that the future shall have leaders as committed as they are, to parents that there would be a way to address the issues of youth today, and for the very young generation who would become youth in the future, that they have a well-established group to call home. Tellingly, Kewaquedo also expressed the view that advice must only be given to the youth council when sought: “CIYC must not ask unless they need this help for it is better they do as much as possible on their own.” The CIYC was not, in a pure sense, a radical organization; it very self-consciously insisted that it was intended as a “constructive outlet for the eager and enthusiastic energy contained within young people.” Its constitutional preamble asserted that the organization “will work
and strive to gain the human dignity and recognition and equality that are the birthright of every citizen in Canada. As Indian people we have the right to maintain these ideals, at the same time as we retain our identity as Indian people.”

The early CIYC engaged in a number of ambitious projects including the Summer Workshop series, as discussed earlier on in the chapter, centred around the goals of self-initiative and self-directed improvement. Other goals included leadership training, liaising with the public, and the promotion of a “Canada-wide Indian communication.” As the CIYC’s report noted, “The Indians in Canada are governed by the same legal, social and historic forces, whether he be a Micmac from the Maritimes, a Cree from Manitoba, or a Nootka from BC. These forces create and mold the Indian situation irrespective of tribe or location.” It noted isolation as a primary issue preventing effective solutions to Indigenous challenges and strove to promote a purposeful dialogue among youth. Another objective was described as “the promotion of Canadian-Indian Aspirations.” As described, “This objective is the most basic.” It included Indigenous participation in the Canadian economy and in non-segregated schooling.

Specific projects included, of course, the workshop. It also included significant participation during National Indian Week. It aimed to reverse the mass media portrayal it saw of Indigenous people in Canada “as a problem or liability..., as a villain or idiot in movies, T.V.’s or magazines, or as a tourist commodity.” “True” Indigeneity, they argued, included powwows, banquets and other festivities designed “to literally jam the Canadian mass media with Indian news in its positive aspects.” Due to its affiliation to youth, it was also primarily concerned with education, undertaking a study on Aboriginal post-secondary enrolment as well as one of the Indian Act, in conjunction with the Universities of Waterloo and Saskatchewan. It also began a Task Force able to mobilize in Indigenous communities “in whatever capacity designated by the members of the Community, as well as engaged in the promotion of national sports and recreation.”
Like the NIYC, the CIYC also engaged with other activist groups. In Canada, these included the National Indian Council, the Canadian Union of Students, the Canadian Citizenship Council, the Canadian Centenary Council, and the Company of Young Canadians. But despite its relationships with other groups, as well as the important work and function it was fulfilling, the CIYC faced significant challenges as well. Within two years, the CIYC was in difficulty, as a letter to Walter Rudnicki, then of the Special Planning Secretariat, demonstrated. Contacted by Harold Cardinal, then-president of the Canadian Indian Youth Council, Cardinal requested an “emergency meeting”, “with anxiety and great concern.” Cardinal was prepared to offer a full report on its present state including the sources of income and expenses. Cardinal hinted at some accusation of impropriety, when he articulated his hope that this accounting “would clarify some of the question that may exist in the minds of some people.” He ended his letter with the warning that “The future of the Council at this point is uncertain and even doubtful.” What happened to the CIYC after this meeting is unclear; records of the CIYC are largely difficult to find. But its early struggles certainly exemplified the types of challenges that youth organizations faced in both Canada and in the United States, and exemplified the extent to which the youth, though enthusiastic, committed and intelligent, could often be stymied by the structures of organized bureaucracy.

G. YOUTH ON FIRE: AD HOC PROTEST AND EVENT-BASED POLITICS

For those frustrated with organizations, there were of course a series of important events which mobilized Indigenous youth in the 1960s and 1970s. In the United States, these included the 1964 fish-ins, the 1969 occupation of Alcatraz Island, the Trail of Broken Treaties march in 1972 and the stand-off at Pine Ridge in 1973. Many of the youth activists that participated in these events also helped in
many others, and event-based activism for those not affiliated with formal organizations is thus an important component of youth organizing that has been obscured by focus on highly structured organizations. Equally significant is the way in which members of more bureaucratic organizations like the NIYC or the CIYC could often be found at more radical demonstrations. Occupations of major domestic landmarks including historical sites and government buildings generated a great deal of what youth organizers wanted, such as attention from mainstream media, alongside that for which they did not wish: for all of the media attention lavished on the cause, the intense press coverage, as well as the frequency and the tactics used by demonstrators, also served to invoke the ire of more established groups and organizations, both youth-based and non-youth based, as well as served the government in representing Indigenous people as both disorganized and disunited.

Of course, one of the most significant and often-recalled occupations of this period involves the famed occupation of Alcatraz Island, directed and conceived largely by students from the Bay Area. Seventy of the eighty-nine original occupiers were students from University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and other members included students from UC Santa Cruz, San Francisco State College, and UC Berkeley. "We Hold the Rock!" was the jubilant cry of the newly formed pan-Indian group, the Indians of All Nations, who from 1969 to 1971, occupied the famous decommissioned prison of Alcatraz in a show of pan-Indian solidarity. Although the occupation of Alcatraz was eventually marred by a crisis in leadership and degenerating conditions on the Island, the legacy of Alcatraz continues today, as do many of the pan-Indian organizations it inspired in its wake. As Troy Johnson admits, "The 1969 occupation of Alcatraz Island stands out as the most symbolic, the most significant, the most successful Indian protest action of the modern era." In fact, as Shreve reports, in its aftermath, the occupation of Alcatraz Island bolstered membership in the National Indian Youth Council as well as significantly increased the distribution of its newsletter, *America Before Columbus*. Part of the symbolism of the occupation of Alcatraz was indeed, its youthful character. The
young character of the protest was noted by several older participants. As Nordwall points out, “Anger was never far from their hearts. It was anger built of frustration with the way they had been treated by the BIA, but it was also a resentment many of them felt toward their own tribal leadership, dominated as it was by cautious older people who were corrupted, it seemed, by their long dependency on the White man.” The plan for Alcatraz Island, once the land was reclaimed, was to build a college, a spiritual center, an ecological centre, a museum and a training school. Since the occupation was planned as a long-term one, the group set about organizing an elected council and assigning jobs to maintain the island and its temporary residents. The leadership model was a consensual one, yet Richard Oakes emerged as the most visible and most recognized leader.

The principal author of many of the initial documents describing the pan-Indianism of the Alcatraz occupation, Richard Oakes has been the subject of much political and sociological inquiry, romanticized as a handsome and articulate young Mohawk who provided the visionary leadership. After his departure, many claim, the occupation of Alcatraz simply collapsed. Yet this characterization of Oakes neglects the way in which decisions were made on Alcatraz, as well as the way in which his leadership was challenged by the end of 1969 rather significantly by two different groups, both of which shared a different vision of what pan-Indianism should be. While they did not necessarily dispute the theme of cultural or political unity, these groups disagreed with Oakes on the way in which Alcatraz was claimed, as well as did not share his background in terms of education or activism. Johnson, Nagel and Champagne argue that these two factors, the competing claim based on the already-invalidated 1868 Sioux treaty alongside the ‘hi-jacking’ of the occupation by some non-Indians, “many of them from the San Francisco hippie and drug culture,” were what doomed the occupation.

The accidental death on the Island of Oakes' thirteen year old daughter, Yvonne, caused him to leave the Island permanently and with that, Alcatraz lost its most visible and, some argue, respectable, frontman. According to Johnson, “Following Oakes’s resignation from the council and departure from
the island, there was a lack of strong, focused leadership... Once Oakes left Alcatraz,a state of disarray and confusion engulfed the occupiers.” After Oakes’ departure, conditions on the Island worsened, and according to Deloria, it increasingly became a hazard to venture out to Alcatraz. More specifically, the occupation became a struggle for power among the remaining factions. One particularly difficult group, the Thunderbirds, arrived in January 1970. A more militant-leaning organization that were the original occupiers, the group “was allegedly involved in heroin trafficking and was known to be extremely tough.” They did not come from the university setting, but from the tough streets of the Bay Area. They were armed with chains and pipes, and began selling marijuana out of the infirmary.

The original occupying group of students issued a variety of statements during its time on the Island, as well as aired a radio station, Radio Free Alcatraz, broadcasting from the Island to the mainland. These statements provide some context into the kinds of ideas that animated Indigenous youth within the event-based activism. Radio Free Alcatraz was carried by stations in Berkeley, Los Angeles and New York, reaching an estimated audience of 100,000 people. The content of some of the on-air and printed statements also provides some insight into the nature of the occupation, and the type of pan-Indianism it inspired. One of the first statements included a self identification as “the native peoples of North America,” as well as an appeal to “the Great Spirit.” In a later statement, the group appeals to the values of Freedom, Justice and Equality to inspire the support of other brothers and sisters of this earth, without necessarily referencing Indian people. A little later, a new manifesto claims that “From this island we would grow a movement which must surely encompass all the world. All men of this earth must hunger for peace and fellowship.” John Trudell, the voice of “Radio Free Alcatraz,” described the movement as a traditionalist spiritual movement, a nationalist movement, and an internatonalist rights movement, simultaneously. The transnational appeal, and its affinity with the broader rights struggle, was also evident its roots in local universities and student culture.
In addition to this dimension, Alcatraz was also an exercise in what Robert A. Rundstrom calls “American Indian Placemaking.” His analysis posits that the occupation of Alcatraz included all four elements of placemaking, including physical site and situation, a tangible created environment, a social milieu, and a set of personal and shared meanings. This view of place, he argues, can successfully explain why Alcatraz was chosen, but even more importantly, why its legacy and importance persists. As he explains, “The web of symbolic meaning may be of greatest and most lasting importance. The unique twinning of place and human identity that occurred on Alcatraz for so many assured the island lasting significance as the emergence-place of of modern pan-Indian identity and collective protest.”

Tags on concrete bunkers proudly asserting “This is INDIAN land!,” “Welcome to the Home of the Free Indian,” and “This land is my land!” spoke to the way that Alcatraz, a place that many of the occupiers had never visited, was recreated as their own. In answering why they had chosen Alcatraz, the Indians of All Tribes explained that Alcatraz was a symbol of what Indian people have today, bearing a 'remarkable resemblance' to reservation life, as well as the stigma of criminality that a convict must bear, similar to the stigma of Indianness that the Indian carried.

While the occupation may have ignited youth activists across America and in Canada, it was not altogether well-received by members of the older generation. Several tribal politicians spoke out against the occupiers and the absence of support from the older, established organizations was conspicuous. The Ohlone Indians, for example, in a letter from January 20, 1970, expressed their belief that the occupation was simply “wrong”: “Those on Alcatraz say they speak for all Indian people everywhere. They do not. They have no authority whatsoever to speak even for a single tribe...They are destroying what we Indian people have been fighting and dying for these hundred years.” Other thinkers also individually questioned the occupiers, including the hugely influential Vine Deloria, Jr., whose 1969 best-seller, *Custer Died for Your Sins*, had represented a significant inspiration for the students. In an interview conducted around the time of the occupation, Deloria argued that the
occupation itself was useless unless the occupiers had “people in Washington who understood the bureaucracy and could carry the documents from agency to agency.” Some also expressed doubt as to the symbolic value of the occupation. As Howard Yackitonipah, a Los Angeles Comanche pointed out, the occupation was prohibitively expensive, and the money could be spent much more usefully on helping Indian people. John and Lois Knifechief, American Indians from Stanton, California, argued that the students themselves were spoiled, that Alcatraz was nothing but a 'stupid rock' and that the occupiers' ignorance of reservation life damaged their credibility among other Indian people.

Similarly, Deloria Jr. argues that the occupation of Alcatraz and the “bewildering” set of student demands only became more confusing when the various spokespeople began using the media to articulate different philosophies on different occasions. The vision of Alcatraz as a “baffling exercise carried out by privileged, misguided youth” remained the belief of several of those who rejected its basis, its membership and its tactics.

Despite any doubts, the occupation of Alcatraz did promote a trend of takeovers, particularly among youth. Between 1971 and 1978, over 79 property takeovers modelled on its own occupation took place all over the United States. In Canada, the occupation of Alcatraz island also prompted takeovers and sit-ins due to increased media circulation among Indigenous people, as well as increased communication. Canadian Aboriginal youths frequently crossed the border into the United States to provide support for occupations and takeovers, and American agitators – in particular members of AIM – frequently travelled to Canada hoping to recruit new followers, as well as to support in the wider North American struggle. As one protestor, interviewed at the 1969 St. Regis Reserve bridge blockade expressed, “We don’t want to be Canadian citizens – we don’t want to be American citizens.” For many youth, citizenship was Indigenous, and a wider North American reality formed an important component of group identity.

During the 1974 occupation of Anicinabe Park in Kenora, James Burke interviewed Lyle
Ironstand, who addressed the issue of cross-border involvement. As he explained, he had been at Crowdog's camp in South Dakota in 1973 in support of Wounded Knee. In addition, he explained that AIM members had been present at the occupation offering their support. Though the press characterized them as “outside agitators,” Lyle simply stated, “I think we're all fighting the same problem.” Louis Cameron, the 24-year old spokesperson for the Ojibway Warriors’ Society, was also interviewed for the book and explained that the Americans had been invited and had learned a great deal about police repression in a Canadian context. Dennis Banks, on trial at the time for his involvement in Wounded Knee, was the invited keynote speaker and a major supporter of the action, as well as helped to negotiate the settlement that eventually led to the disbanding of the occupation.

As at Alcatraz Island, the media constantly deployed the young warrior image when dealing with the occupation at Anicinabe Park. As Scott Rutherford explains, “[F]or many Canadians the only knowledge, or at least the first representation they saw, of the occupation was often a photograph of a young indigenous man holding a gun with a small caption – such as the one used by the Montreal Gazette: “Armed Pow-wow.” Indeed, the Chronicle Journal of Thunder Bay published a lengthy editorial on the occupation characterizing the Ojibway Warrior Society as a group of publicity-seeking martyrs who were young, naive and unrealistic in their demands.

Their demands were, in fact, varied. As at Alcatraz, the list of 25 points of contention in three categories: local, provincial and national. They ranged from the claim on Anicinabe park, to urging the government to reform the justice system, settle all outstanding land claims and to deal with the issue of mercury poisoning. Though the Anicinabe park demand received the most attention, the broadly-based and broadly-conceived list of demands is reminiscent of those activists who took over Alcatraz in 1969. In his pronouncements to the media, Louis Cameron also deployed the rhetoric of youth movements of the era. As he stated, “…our war is a just war, a people’s war. We are fighting oppression, fighting profiteers, fighting private interests... Our struggle is progressive... It fights for
human rights.” But, this wasn’t simply a case of fighting for human rights – as so many Indigenous groups had demonstrated, Indigenous rights were not only human rights. As protesters insisted, they were something more.

The occupation of Anicinabe Park that had so captured the attention of the nation finally came to a close in the face of the threat of action from the White townspeople as well as the threat of the police coming into the park. The OWS laid down their arms as a gesture of ‘good faith’, and ten days later this good faith seemed to be rewarded when a tentative agreement was reached with municipal, provincial and federal officials on several points of the OWS’ demands.

The Anicinabe Park occupation is illustrative of several such occupations during the period, organized by warrior societies composed primarily of young people and held in conjunction with larger, pan-Indian organizations like AIM. Modern warrior societies emerged in the 1960s with the Mohawk Warrior Society at Akwesasne and Kahnawake, established by group of young people hoping to reestablish traditional teachings, language and structures. These teachings and structures were implicitly tied to the land, which made warrior societies prominent members of the occupations and takeovers of the 1960s and 1970s. While AIM was not, in a technical, what one might define as a traditional warrior society, it claimed the label of international warrior society as of 1973. Its leadership and membership also strove to display the portrait of a warrior in its printed materials and in their rhetoric. In fact, its flag’s image was based upon the likeness of a young Mohawk warrior.

It also inspired new warrior societies. The foundation of the Ojibway Warrior Society was in fact largely credited by spokesperson Louis Cameron to AIM. As he asserted though failed to elaborate, showing allegiance or support for AIM was very unpopular in Kenora, and so they titled it the Ojibway Warriors Society. As he explained, “We looked around and the only organization that we saw that had the kind of feeling that served the people is the feeling that is connected with AIM... It's a human movement... It serves the people, it puts the aims and aspirations of our people together.” This was, in
fact, exactly the purpose of AIM, at least according to Vern Bellecourt who described its primary purpose as a catalyst. Therefore, though they displayed keen differences, with urban-based Red Power organizations allying loosely into chapters whilst warrior societies remained very much a part of their home communities, both phenomena drew in youth. As Taiaiake Alfred and Lana Lowe explain, “Whatever the differences between them, though, warrior societies and Red Power organizations did draw on the same spirit of discontent among young Indigenous people and they did focus on the same fundamental problems; thus, warrior societies and Red Power organizations did ally in conflict situations.”

The series of occupations that accelerated in the early 1970s made their way across North America and provide ample examples of how many Indigenous youth envisioned their future, and their role in it. In a letter to Dennis Banks dated February 17, 1974, Louis Hall described a “big project” being planned by the Warrior Society of Cauhnawaga and Akwesasne. On May 13th, 1974, a relatively small group of people seized an abandoned girls' camp at Moss Lake, New York in the Adirondack Forest Preserve. Many of these were from the Caughnawaga reserve near Montreal though a report on the incident for the government by Michael J. Blair dated the 6th of January 1975 noted between 150 to 200 native Americans and native Canadians now camped at the site. The occupation, though initially peaceful, took a turn for the worst on 28th of October 1974 when two passerbys were hit with gunfire including a 22 year old man and a 9-year old girl.

Tellingly, the manifesto produced during the incident began with the words, “We the young people of the Mohawk Nation, (St. Regis, Cagnawaka, Oka, Desoronto, and Oswugan) want to set up a cultural sanctuary for our interests and our Long House way of life.” Louis Hall's letter to Dennis Banks provided even more detail. As he explained, the occupation had the goal of creating an “Independent North American Indian State” and would “help the AIM trials [to] no end, by focusing national and international attention on more injustice, persecutions, oppressions, racism, prejudice and
In his field notes of the occupation, Arthur Einhorn, an American anthropologist, also noted the prevalence of young Indians on site, as well as the appearance of a young militant he nicknamed 'Che' due to his donning of a Che Guevara beret hat with an eagle feather attached to the top center. According to Einhorn, 'Che' had spent some time in New York City in Greenwich Village. Einhorn also noted, somewhat sarcastically, that 'Che' philosophized about talking with birds and animals likely to get out of chopping wood. As his comments about Che, as well as about a young girl he calls 'May' indicate, many of the participants in the occupation saw themselves as traditionals rather than radicals. This surprised Einhorn who, undoubtedly, held expectations of youth that were more radical than these occupiers seemed.

**CONCLUSION**

In 1967, Ernest Stevens, Oneida, then-director of the Los Angeles Indian Center, issued the following warning to what he perceived as a revolutionary youth movement with the potential to do great harm to the Indigenous community. To the 'hippies,' he said: “We are not ashamed of our country-- so please be careful, 'hippies,' -- that is OUR flag you are burning.” Indeed, the Indigenous youth movement within North America, at least for critics, had every potential to do as much harm as it could do good, not unlike the broader youth movement that had emerged a few years earlier.

This chapter has demonstrated that youth movements were incredibly varied and were influenced by a conglomeration of factors that included increased educational and vocational opportunity, increased mobility and a demoralization both with the rhetoric of civil rights as applied to Indigenous people, as well as by the stagnation within their own organizations. While some Indigenous youth did attempt to carve a place for themselves within older and established mainstream groups, what
was most characteristic of youth movements at this time was their inventiveness and their willingness to try to be different than their predecessors. Though they touted what was new however, they consistently appealed to what was old or traditional. Where they hoped to cultivate a picture of sophistication and adaptiveness, they also hoped gain some support within the non-youth Indigenous community.

These trials were met with varying success: in some instances, leadership was simply too unstable to provide any sort of direction that could be lasting. In other cases, groups formed in response to particular crises or for temporary occupations simply dissolved in their aftermath. But, taken as a whole, the mobilization of Indigenous youth within this era suggests that the youth revolution was not limited to the mainstream. In a sense, Indigenous youth formed a counter to the counter-culture, dissociating them with non-Indigenous youth struggles through their attachment to their own histories and cultural legacies. To be sure, some movements enjoyed more support from the public, and strategically professed more attachment to their cultural roots than others, but overall the rhetoric employed by youth organizations of this era demonstrates the way in which they created a new legacy by mixing what was old and what was new, drawing upon the enthusiasm- and the anger- of a generation still struggling to come to terms with itself.
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4 Ibid., 204.
5 Ibid., 217.
6 Ibid., 219.
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123 Indians of All Tribes, “Untitled,” in Alcatraz: Indian Land Forever, 43.
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125 Ibid., 165.
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Chapter 7:

'Your little girl and mine':

*Gendered Politics and Indigenous Women's Organizing*
INTRODUCTION

The subject of this chapter is phrased as Aboriginal women's activism. I have deliberately chosen not to use the term “Aboriginal feminism” in the title due to the fact that many Aboriginal women activists have rejected the term on a number of grounds. At the same time, the decolonization project of these women engages notions of feminism that do not easily fit into Western paradigms but do, nevertheless, serve as instructive to understanding their motivations, their project, and their successes during the period 1960 to 1975.

Western feminism as a movement, simply defined, is focused on advocating for rights for women. First wave feminists, active as of the late nineteenth century but whose efforts intensified in the early to mid-twentieth century, were focused primarily on securing basic civil rights including the right to the franchise and to private property ownership. Many of these efforts were also centred on reevaluating the role and contribution of women as mothers and care-givers. By the end of the Second World War however, the content of feminism had shifted to equality of opportunity and to equal rights with men more generally. In North America, these struggles focused on affirmative action policies and issues such as reproductive choice. Of course, within the movement, there were different kinds of feminists including liberal feminists focused on policy change, radical feminists seeking the abolition of gender as a category of determination, as well as cultural feminists who sought to establish power structures, traditions and cultural norms within and alongside existing power structures.

For Aboriginal women, the 1960s and 1970s which saw a reinvigorated non-Aboriginal feminist movement, was also an important time for Indigenous women as greater awareness and communication combined with a frustration with existing organizers and organizations spurred the development of a new Indigenous women's outlook distinct from those articulated by Western feminists. While they were, like Western feminists, reacting to sexism and misogyny in their own communities, they were
also engaging in a new discussion centred on Indigenous culture more generally whereby the value of women's work and of women's voices was being touted as a very important component of the solution for improving Indigenous lives. It is therefore, in a sense, misleading to talk about the development of Indigenous feminisms or activism as stemming directly from the non-Indigenous feminist project, as the two were, in fact, quite distinct. Aboriginal women in both Canada and the United States articulated strands of liberal, cultural and radical feminism in the same breath within a distinctly Indigenous world view.

Despite a similar worldview, women organizers mobilized different strategies. Like their male counterparts, many Aboriginal women engaged in the task of building organizations powerful enough to negotiate with and be heard by national governments while others took a more community based approach. Likewise, while many women did successfully engage in a more structured brand of activism which included a myriad of conferences and discussion while others opted for a more ad hoc, though no less effective approach, engaging in direct action alongside men as well as independently from them. Most notably though and as the women profiled in this chapter will demonstrate, many women did both, believing that Indigenous women deserved focused women's organizations that could negotiate with governments while also choosing to participate in more loosely organized demonstrations that would attract much-needed attention to their cause.

As the following exposition of women's groups and of female activists will reveal, Indigenous women were a heterogeneous group. And, as Devon Abbott Mihesuah points out, this is most often one of the faults with current scholarship dealing with the lives of Indigenous women. She argues that heterogeneity among women's experiences has not, for the most part, been addressed in historical works. This heterogeneity includes the feelings and emotions of Native women, the relationships among them, and their observations of non-Natives. Organizations and movements, as well as the women who formed them, were a conglomeration of these three factors. As a result, every effort has
been made to capture the voices of women directly, based on their own words, either through personal interviews, through transcribed interviews or through their own published works, to illustrate the diversity that characterized their experiences.

This chapter will first provide a broad overview of the debates surrounding Indigenous feminism that emerged, at least in part, from the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s. Though the debate has become, in the last three decades, much more sophisticated, understanding its parameters is useful in terms of viewing and evaluating Indigenous women's activism from 1960 to 1975. Following this theoretical grounding, this chapter will profile various women's groups in both Canada and the United States, demonstrating how they learned from men's organizations as well as forged their own direction. In Canada, this direction was largely provided by the Lavell Supreme Court challenge whose judgement was delivered in 1973, whereas in the United States mainstream women's groups remained much more auxiliary style groups. Next, this chapter will address the foundation and composition of more radical groups through profiles of women deemed more militant by both their male counterparts within the radical movement as well as by mainstream male-dominated organizations. Finally, this chapter will assess the impact of women's groups within this period as well as how it shaped the orientation of later emerging groups.

A. FINDING/DEFINING 'INDIGENOUS FEMINISM'

Aboriginal feminism has become the subject of heated debate within the academic community and within activist circles in the last three decades. The pressure to define one's activism has in fact led to the rejection of the term “Aboriginal feminism” by many Indigenous women who insist that its content and emergence is bound too deeply in the issues of White women to be relevant within the
Indigenous community. A useful definition of the term is offered by Joyce Green, who describes Aboriginal feminism as a construct that “brings together the two critiques, feminism and anti-colonialism, to show how Aboriginal people, and in particular Aboriginal women, are affected by colonialism and patriarchy. It takes account of how both racism and sexism fuse when brought to bear on Aboriginal women.”

This space of Aboriginal feminism is one that has had widespread appeal to Aboriginal women in both Canada and the United States. As Renya Ramirez has recently argued, the fight for tribal nationalism and the fight against sexism should not be mutually exclusive. Rather, she argues that “race, tribal nation and gender should be non-hierarchically linked as categories of analysis in order to understand the breadth of our oppression as well as the full potential of our liberation.”

In 1984, Kate Shanley published an essay entitled “Thoughts on Indian Feminism.” Shanley declared herself as an Indigenous feminist in pursuit of tribal sovereignty, which had two important implications. First, Shanley maintained that “on the individual level, the Indian woman struggles to promote the survival of a social structure whose organizational principles represent notions of family different from those of the mainstream.” Secondly, “on the societal level, the People seek sovereignty as a People in order to maintain a vital legal and spiritual connection to the land, in order to survive as a people.” Shanley was one of the first to “come out”, so to speak, as an Indigenous feminist, and her work inspired a whole generation of women working in this field. Like the definition advanced by Joyce Green, Shanley's account recognizes both colonialism and sexism as important factors in the lives of Indigenous women while adding the dimensions of nation and sovereignty to the Indigenous feminist equation.

While some Indigenous women have accepted varying definitions of Aboriginal feminism, as well as their implications, there continue to be women who vociferously reject any element of feminism as implicitly Western and colonial. As Lorelei DeCora Means, one of the founders of Women of All Red Nations, has stated, “We are American Indian women in that order. We are oppressed first
and foremost as American Indians, as peoples colonized by the United States, not as women. As Indians we can never forget that. Our survival ... depends on it.” Moreover, the label “feminist”, some argue, is too laden with the ideas and pursuits of non-Indigenous women to be relevant to the concerns of Indigenous women. Hawaiian activist Haunani-Kay Trask echoes this sentiment, arguing that solidarity has been more natural to come by laterally, “with our own people, including our own men” rather than with other, non-Indigenous feminists. As Barbara Cameron, Lakota, has stated, “I don’t like being put under a magnifying glass and having cute liberal terms describe who I am.” Mihesuah herself, as a Native American academic, maintains that even the most outspoken Native women do not necessarily consider themselves feminist but do consider their project important to the past and to the future of Indigenous women. Pam Colorado, Oneida, maintains that Western feminists share a presumption with the patriarchal society they oppose, “That they have some sort of inalienable right to simply go on occupying our land and exploiting our resources for as long as they like.” For many, the process of feminism, or of rejecting feminism, has been an evolution. Lee Maracle recalls that, in the late 1970s, “it mattered not that I was a Native woman.” For her, at that particular time, lateral solidarity was more important whereas, now, she engages with the concept of feminism as an Indigenous woman.

Joanne Barker has argued that “What holds the contested locations of feminism within Indigenous communities together is that feminism is a hermeneutic and not an object. It is a politic of interpretation and representation, not a thing whose meaning is external, prepackaged, and applicable.” In this way, feminism—whether or not it has been rejected as a label—can be seen operating within the lives of all Indigenous activist women through their prioritizing of women's contributions and work, and through their insistence in the unique value of women's contributions to their communities' overall health. In addition, it was manifest in the relationships built with women across Indigenous nations based on the gendered spaces that colonialism had both created and
perpetuated over time. For most active during the period, it was not enough simply to remain engaged and active in the structures developed by men. Though many continued to work within these structures, they also branched out on their own, revealing the way in which this feminist lens was an important category of both analysis and of action, as well as a powerful means for alliance across Indigenous borders.

While engaging with issues deemed important to the livelihood of the community and those who lived within them was a central feature of Indigenous women's work, it did not always translate well into Western feminist paradigms. In 1963, Betty Friedan most famously and prominently revealed “the problem” of modern women in her seminal work, *The Feminine Mystique*. The “mystique of feminine fulfillment,” she argued, had become the “cherished and self-perpetuating core of contemporary American culture.” In particular, the celebration of the suburban housewife was but an illusion, and women's discontent was reaching a breaking point. But for Indigenous women, the picture windows, the station wagons and the electric waxers over spotless kitchen floors bore little resemblance to the lives and even aspirations of Indigenous women. Furthermore, in the United States, the primary preoccupation for the women's rights movements with the Equal Rights Amendment which was passed in 1972 but never ratified seemed far removed from the concern for basic survival of Indigenous families, communities and nations. In Canada, the women's movement also focused heavily on individual rights including a woman's right to her own body. In 1970, the Abortion Caravan left Vancouver on its way to Ottawa calling for free abortion on demand.

While non-Indigenous women across North America campaigned for issues like the ERA as well as abortion rights, women of colour often rejected the assumptions of White Western feminism. In *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings By Radical Women of Colour* (1981), authors Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa argued that the assumptions of the women's movement explicitly privileged the histories and experiences of White women and ignored the important incongruities of existence in
terms of citizenship, class and race. Similarly, Indigenous women activists during this period often rejected the content and orientation of some aspects of the women's movement. For example, while in a Canadian context, non-Indigenous women insisted on their right to choose motherhood through abortion rights, one of the primary facets animating Indigenous women's activism was, in fact, its strong attachment to and celebration of motherhood. As Shirley Bear has stated, “Women are powerful because they birth the whole world.” Barbra Nahwegahbow echoes this sentiment, arguing that “Whether we eventually give birth or not is not important; it is the power of the symbol of lifegiver that is significant.” The symbolism extended to a lifelong responsibility to protect and nurture communities and Indigenous people. According to Bonita Lawrence, the failure of Western feminism to embrace the empowerment of motherhood in favour of celebrating and prioritizing the individual was then and continues to be one of its primary limitations in terms of retaining or gaining relevance to traditional Indigenous women.

This concern for past traditions and a preoccupation with matriarchal paradigms were important aspects of Indigenous feminist discourse in the rights era. In a sense, the discourse could be liberating, prioritizing the areas of importance that Indigenous activists saw as most important. Yet, and as Emma LaRocque has argued, the framing of women as keepers of tradition and culture, defined as nurturing and healing entities, could also be limiting, for it relegated them to a non-political sphere. Though non-Indigenous maternal feminists, particularly in the first wave of the twentieth century, had long advocated for the elevated status of woman-as-mother, rights era feminism of the non-maternal variety had also rejected its mores as much too limiting to be helpful. Though Larocque's scepticism regarding the centrality of the nurturing paradigm is an important observation, for many Indigenous women, recovering rights they had held before and reclaiming a place of honour and primacy in their own communities was a central concern that was not necessarily shared by non-Indigenous feminist groups who sought equality on an individual basis to claim rights that had not been held before. For
Indigenous women like the Navajo, the affiliations of clan, of kinship and of community enabled collective response. On the other hand, non-Indigenous feminists were not attempting to recover a past position, but to gain a new one. Their failure to understand and to engage with this aspect of Indigenous women activists' belief systems and values did affect the effectiveness of the project, albeit limited, of engaging all women including Aboriginal women in the larger feminist agenda.

As these ideas demonstrate, the discourse of Indigenous feminism or Indigenous women activists, as some prefer to be called, has evolved since the 1970s, but the central question remains as to how to reconcile or prioritize a larger decolonization project with the very important, real, and central concerns of Indigenous women. This debate though in its infancy in the late 1960s and 1970s, helped to shape the organizations that emerged out of the rights era as well as prompted a flurry of discussion centering on whether or not to ally with other, non-Indigenous feminist groups. These questions were foundational and important to Indigenous women activists at the time and engaged varying notions of Aboriginal feminism, though not necessarily in these terms. Indigenous women had been activists since the earliest days of colonization, but the context of the 1960s prompted women to seek their place within both the rights discourse the era and within the larger movement as crucial but controversial cogs in the wheels of change.

B. THE GENDERED CONTEXT OF COLONIALISM

While the context of colonization bore important resemblances for Aboriginal men and women in terms of land dispossession, cultural loss and the legacies of residential schooling, women who engaged in the rights struggle often cited a broader historical context as reason for their participation in the struggle. There are many accounts of women's Indigenous history that stress the primacy of
women's roles, as well as many studies which have usefully outlined the concerted efforts of colonizers across the continent to enforce patriarchal models of governance and of social organization to the detriment of Indigenous women. These changes were imposed early on and produced important disruptions and ruptures in the fabric of these communities and nations. The pre-colonization status of Indigenous societies, and women's places within them, have been discussed and perhaps more importantly debated in great detail and so for the purposes of this chapter, only a brief synopsis of the parameters of these discussions will be offered. As this summary will reveal, the way in which Indigenous women have described and engaged with their own history has been of primary importance in structuring the parameters of their resistance, and of their feminist outlook. Although scholars have debated at length the extent to which claims of matriarchy in early Indigenous communities have been overemphasized, what is most important in this context is the way in which this discourse contributed to the evolution of Indigenous women's activist worldview and how they used this aspect of their histories to advocate for a more significant position within their own communities and organizations.

Prioritizing women's place within early Indigenous communities is one way in which female activists have attempted to counter the learned misogyny of colonialism. As such, there are many scholars who have devoted themselves to exploring the way in which women lived before colonialism reordered their lives. As Devon Abbott Mihesuah points out, before colonialism, most tribes were at the very least, egalitarian, and many were matrilineal. Women and men shared religious, political and economic power, and while early European observers constantly pointed out the plight of the “squaw drudge”, as she was often called, women “received recognition and compensation, often in the form of controlling the economic output; in addition, they were secure knowing they would always have food, shelter and support from their extended families and clans.” The same could be said of the status of affairs in what would become Canada. There, early matrilineal societies also existed and celebrated and respected women in many of the same ways. As Kim Anderson explains, because women's work was
highly valued, women “were given authority over the community’s most precious resource: food.”

Women both produced and distributed food, as well as enjoyed authority over goods coming into the village. In the realm of property, women enjoyed the rights to both the tools and to the product of their own labour, which was considerable.\(^\text{17}\) Thus, though men and women within Indigenous nations may have performed tasks exclusive to their gender, women had a prominent place in the public sphere.

In the area of religion, many traditional religions included a female deity. In Navajo religion, for example, “mother” symbolizes earth, sheep and corn, three elements foundational to Navajo subsistence. Among the Cheyenne, adherents of the traditional religion believe that “their food is supplied by a female who takes the shape of an elder.” Women were also an indispensable part of the spiritual equation. They acted as shamans and medicine people, as well as were essential to the occurrence and functioning of many ceremonies and rituals. Because women were the birthers of children, their spiritual systems also prioritized them as the givers of life and as intermediaries of power between the creator and human beings.\(^\text{18}\) A quick survey of Indigenous religions reveals, therefore, the prominence and respect accorded to women within these societies where men often had to seek out spirit guides, while women, vested with additional powers of giving life, were not seen as lacking in this regard.

In the realm of social relations, in matrilineal societies, it was the men who left their home to join that of their wife, and children automatically belonged to the mother’s clan, deriving their lineage through that line. As Mary Morez, a Navajo woman explains, “In Navajo society, the woman is the dominant figure who becomes the wise one in her old age... But the Navajo woman never demands her status. She achieves, earns, accomplishes it through maturity.”\(^\text{19}\)

In politics, the Iroquois Confederacy employed the wisdom and judgement of women known as Clan Mothers who in turn chose tribal leaders to sit on the Grand Council. These Clan Mothers also played an important role in allotting agricultural production, decided when to go to war and when to
seek peace, and served as religious authorities. Kim Anderson describes the authority of Iroquois women, as well as a Mohawk women’s council “that would bring their issues to the Grand Council or to all of the people.” In addition, Sto:lo women chose their own chiefs.  

Despite these examples and as many have pointed out, it was heterogeneity that characterized the organization of tribal roles in early North America. In the Plains society, for example, “Plains men often stood as authority figures” because of women’s dependence on men for subsistence. Ojibwes, Arapahos, Winnebagos and Menominees were other groups that were traditionally “male-centred,” according to Mihesuah, yet did afford women a great deal of social freedom. As Mihesuah points out, “How much prestige and power women actually had will never be known.” Though women’s stories were recorded in oral histories in the communities in which they lived, European observers who themselves were conditioned to celebrate patriarchy and prioritize male roles, were most commonly the recorders of Indigenous women's place in a historical context. As such, they often failed to capture or to understand the complexity of women's position in early Indigenous societies.

Whatever the early position of women in Indigenous nations, colonialism had a decided impact on their choices and the organization of their tribes and communities. For some, its impact was devastating. In more egalitarian or matrilocal societies, the imposition of European sexism and patriarchy through changes to marriage practices and relationships, to governance arrangements, and to economic activity severely curtailed the choices available to women as well as gradually eroded their position within the community. Essentially, the onslaught of settler colonialism codified patriarchal practices in a way that would ensure that they became the norm. Early on, Christian missionaries deliberately undermined women's roles. Characterizing them as ideally subservient and relegating them to the private sphere undermined women's roles in decision-making in politics and in economic matters, while the Christian religion undermined their role as both actors in their own spirituality as well as female deities in the spiritual world. The imposition of European standards of marriage further
restricted women’s social and economic freedom, a phenomenon that has been usefully documented by Sarah Carter’s *The Importance of Being Monogamous*, which describes the steady and concerted efforts of colonial authorities to impose Western models of courtship and marriage within Indigenous communities. The restriction of movement across space curtailed women’s roles in the economy and the imposition of subsistence agriculture models further prioritized outdoor space as male space. Finally, the residential schools experiences of many generations created a legacy of abuse in Indigenous communities that affects women to this day, as well as contributed to the internalization of the Western domestic ideal of women relegated to the private sphere.

In the realm of federal policy, regulations and practice also undermined women’s roles in governance, in economics and in personal and social choices. In Canada, the Indian Act granted agents an incommensurate amount of power including the power to register births, marriages and those eligible for status. Through these roles the agent became a kind of sexual police whereby he could regulate women deemed acceptable or not acceptable according to Eurocentric standards. While many First Nations societies permitted a kind of divorce, the colonial paradigm did not and women found guilty of cohabitating with a man who was not their legally registered husband could be charged with bigamy and sent away to a reformatory. As Joan Sangster argues, “The fact that the Indian Affairs filing system designated a whole category for Immorality on the Reserves, with almost all the complaints centering on sexual misbehaviour, indicates the importance of the agent’s role as custodian of sexual morality.” As Karen Anderson has explained, some aspects of colonial law and ideals did unwittingly filter into Indigenous communities leading to an internalization of certain ideas. As such, in some cases, Aboriginal communities policed themselves with band members complaining about the behaviours of their fellow women. This internalization of sexual double-standards therefore “involved both direct coercion and the indirect colonization of the soul, with the colonized literally coming to discipline themselves.”
The Indian Act undermined women's place in several different ways. First, it defined who was an Indian. A woman automatically became a member of her husband's community upon marriage. If she married a non-Indian, she also lost her own status as did any children as a result of the marriage. As such, she could not live on the reserve, nor did she have a right to be buried there with her ancestors at the time of her death. At the same time, a non-Indian woman who married an Indian man gained status. Furthermore, the Act placed Indigenous women squarely as dependents of their husbands, rather than seeing their roles as complementary as Rebecca Tsosie has explained they were.\textsuperscript{25} The Act denied women the ability to own property or land, though widows could possess land under the Reserve system. Still, a widow could not inherit her husband's personal property upon his death and all of it went to his children. The ability to inherit personal property was amended in the Indian Act of 1884, but it was still dependent on the Agent's decision on whether the woman was of good moral character or not.

In addition, the restrictions concerning voting as inscribed in the Indian Act, with eligible voters of any band being the male members over the age of 21, also restricted women's roles in decision making. Though women gained the right to vote in 1951 when the Indian Act was amended so as not to specify the sex of the voter, they remained trapped in the legacy of exclusion that had characterized their existence since the passage of the first Indian Act in 1876. As such, any esteem and position they had held before would have to be regained slowly and with difficulty, because men had learned to guard their own power.

In the United States, federal legislation imposed upon Indian nations also restricted women's roles. As Bonita Lawrence explains, “The United States did not begin to codify definitions of Indianness until it had managed to assert control over most of its claimed territories – and those definitions were firmly tied to controlling the captive populations of the newly created Indian reservations.”\textsuperscript{26} Blood quantum was instituted in the Dawes Act of 1887. By 1906 and 1907, the
government had passed legislation providing for the sale of lands for anyone with less than a 50 percent blood quantum. Later, this was changed to 25 percent. Though tribes do have the final say in their membership, most have chosen to adhere to the 25 percent blood quantum regulation, a rule which remains in place today. Many Native American communities essentially codified and internalized colonial rhetoric with respect to the role of women while the further pressures of the church and of federally-regulated schooling further intensified the pressure to accept hierarchically ordered gender roles to take root in Native American communities.

While European practices contributed to a growing sexism manifested in Indigenous communities, so too did the events of the mid-twentieth century, including Indigenous men's service in World War II in particular. As Gloria Emerson has recounted of her own Navajo nation, World War II contributed to a change in attitude on the part of Indigenous men who increasingly took on Western ideas about men as protectors of the community and family and who often used their wartime service as a way to justify male leadership of the community. This, operating in concert with already entrenched government and missionary efforts to reshape Indigenous society according to Euro-American and Euro-Canadian norms, fundamentally altered Indigenous women's place within it. As Lee Maracle recounts, as a 20 year old in 1970, she was shocked at the sexism of Aboriginal men which she argues had greatly increased even since 1960. For Indigenous women, sexism was nothing new, but it was becoming a more readily discussed issue. For example, in April 1970 a cartoon in The Native Voice, the newspaper of the Alberta Native Communications Society, depicted an Aboriginal man demanding of his wife, who was cooking and cleaning in the kitchen, “Ma put may shoes on.” [sic] The woman replied that he should put them on himself; she was too busy, to which he replied “Feminist !! Get out of my house!”
While many of those who took advantage of the increased opportunities in the realm of education and employment during the 1960s were men, women also actively pursued new goals and priorities. Women who had been devastated by the cyclical violence of colonialism that was perpetuated in their homes in the form of emotional, physical and sexual violence, now looked to step outside of the community and to heal some of the hurt. The government's decades of efforts undermining women's roles had all but obliterated their voices in the political forum, as well as entrenched in Indigenous men a near-jealousy of power, as well as a manifest sexism in tribal and band politics. In speaking with one Indigenous family, Stan Steiner, a writer whose personal and working life until his death was the reevaluation of the history of the West from a Western perspective, reported that the daughter complained about tribal politics being the “refuge of yes men. For self-seeking men. For weak men.” She continued: “I think we need women running things once more.”

Steiner's interviewee was not atypical of the young women coming of age during this period. He characterized the women as “changing”, while, in the same account, the men were described as “new.” Yet, in many ways, women of the 1950s and 1960s were new: like men, some sought opportunities in universities and in urban centres to engage with a broader society. As Steiner's interviewee pointed out, engagement was important for the new and modern Indian girls, she believed, who had for too long been too polite. As she argued, “if you are too polite the white men will walk all over you. And the Indian men will never elect you. The young Indian girls are different. We’re modern.” Young women often sought larger centres, believing that these might afford them more freedom than the restrictive geographical and ideological place of the reservation or reserve. Though they faced systemic discrimination in cities as well, in the urban milieu, women's power was more readily recognized. For example, the San Francisco Urban Indian Center included four women and one man on its board of
directors in 1966-1967, and three women were also on the board at the Indian Center of Chicago. Urban centres like Los Angeles, Minneapolis and New York City also embraced female leadership. As Steiner observed, Indigenous women, particularly amongst the younger generation, were resilient and flexible, able to adapt to changing circumstances more readily than the older generation or than the men.\textsuperscript{32}

Women got involved in activism for various reasons and at different times, but the events of the late 1960s certainly helped to spur additional engagement. Borders were thus in this sense superficial within the context of the politicization that occurred for both women and men in this era. Events like the occupation of Alcatraz Island and of Wounded Knee were both well-reported and well-known within the Indigenous community in Canada, and many referred to these events as the impetus behind their own politicization. As Gertie Baucage recalls, Wounded Knee was an important time in the life of the then-Ontario teenager.\textsuperscript{33} As previous chapters have illustrated, the discussion of these events in the highly charged rights climates of both Canada and the United States animated Indigenous communities as well as the women that lived within them.

Though highly publicized events and the women involved in them had an important impact on Indigenous women, there were other factors that encouraged women to become activists. As Janet Stillman points out, there existed a keen knowledge of the problems faced by women as well as a genuine curiosity and desire to get to know others facing the same obstacles.\textsuperscript{34} Madonna Thunderhawk, one of the co-founders of the Indigenous women's group WARN in the United States, explains that the roots of her politicization occurred very early on. Thunder Hawk spoke of her grandmother, an outspoken woman who wrote letters to the president about Indian issues. As Thunder Hawk explained, “I grew up thinking all grandmothers wrote letters to the president. She told us about the stars, about the sacred Black Hills. She was the one who told me about treaty rights. There were no strong, stoic Indian grandfathers in our lives. There were strong grandmothers.”\textsuperscript{35} Women like Thunder Hawk were
often previously involved in male-dominated organizations and maintained their membership within these while advocating within women's organizations.

For those who did not have the same experience, activism sometimes occurred as a result of curiosity or circumstance. At the 1967 conference of the Alberta Native Women's Society, Pearl Stamp described her experience. Invited to a meeting by other women, she explained, “I didn't know what I was going for... I went to the meeting out of curiosity – I didn't think I could offer anything to these women but I wanted to learn what they were talking about and why they were gathering... I had never seen native women organize.” Women had, in fact, long since organized within their own communities to provide support and services for those facing difficulty, but the broader awareness and commitment to a wider cause did occur within the context of the rights era.

The movement also provided, for many women, opportunities to engage with a broader world than they had before. For Leona Blondeau of the Native Women's Community Centre in Regina, Saskatchewan, founded in 1973, the movement had represented an opportunity to gain confidence and to become more vocal. For women like these, the participation in political or organizing activity was often a new concept entirely. Blondeau, for example, had never been involved with male organizations and argued that she agreed with the philosophy of Native women. Her community centre offered classes on culture, on family education, on budgeting, and helped women to go back to school and to find employment, offering a liaison with social services. For many women, including Blondeau, there existed a very real fear of joining any women's movement. As Helen Martin, President of the Nova Scotia Native Women's Organization explained, lots of women did not want to join due to the Aboriginal men’s rejection of “women's libbers.” Many women organizers argued that Native men tended to forget the issues important to women. They resented their poor representation at National Indian Brotherhood and Native Council of Canada conferences, though argued that the most effective route to change would be by working in concert with these larger and higher-profile organizations.
In Canada, an additional issue also animated women's activism. A factor in the politicization of many Indigenous women had been the loss of Indian status as encoded in the Indian Act. Indigenous women's status had been encoded as inferior by the Indian Act's section 12(1)(b), which provided for the loss of status of any Indian woman who married a non-Indian. It removed any sort of matrilocal lineage or identification by placing the status of an Indian woman with the government, whose own legislation prioritized the role of the male. The Indian Act stipulated that, upon marriage to a non-Indian, the woman must leave her home and reserve and could no longer hold any property there. She could no longer participate in band business, and her children would not be deemed Indian according to the Act. Her body could not be buried on the reserve upon her death, nor could she return if infirm, widowed, divorced or separated.\(^{37}\) Though this section had been re-examined in the 1940s by Joint Committee, no real action had been taken. As Robert Hoey, Director of Indian Affairs testified, the case of Indian women in Canada was indeed an “awkward problem,”\(^{38}\) though evidently not awkward or urgent enough to be addressed by the revisions of 1951. Indeed, the memo prepared for the Committee by the Indian Affairs Department contended that the definition of Indian as per the statute had, since 1876, “very substantially reduced the number of people for whose welfare it was responsible and by that action passed the responsibility on to the provinces for thousands of people, who, but for the statute... , would have been a federal responsibility for all time.”\(^{39}\) When the Act was finally revised and passed in 1951, its provisions, in fact, worsened the lot of Indigenous women who married outside of the Indigenous culture, as well as reduced even further any rights of inheritance, however limited, that they may have possessed previously. The male line of descent was further emphasized as the criterion for inclusion in the definition of “Indian,” and children with one-quarter or less of “Indian blood” were to be stripped of status upon reaching the age of 21, blood being defined by this same administrative statute and thus disqualifying those children and grandchildren of women previously disenfranchised by the Act. Women who married outside of the Indigenous community were now automatically
enfranchised as of the date of marriage, as were her children.\textsuperscript{40}

The loss of status was not only a loss of membership in terms of naming, but could lead Indigenous women down a frightening path of economic insecurity as well. Though women who lost status received a one-time payment amounting to their per capita share of the band fund and ten years worth of interest or other annual payments – a sum that, for many women, could be rather substantial -- many women still suffered due to the loss of ongoing support. Due to loss of status, many women ceased to receive assistance under federal programs for Indigenous people. In addition to the monetary loss, women and their children lost support for education which included the provision of school supplies, lunch supplement, sports equipment, art supplies, money for tours and other important supports, as well as free daycare and nursery services in certain areas for women with young children on the reserve. Women who had lost status could not access federal funds earmarked for post-secondary Indigenous education or receive the housing subsidy allowing those with status to purchase their own homes. They became subject to taxation, could not receive free medicines if pledged by treaty and lost some border crossing privileges under the American Immigration and Naturalization Act.\textsuperscript{41} In addition to these pragmatic issues, women and their children, perhaps most importantly, lost their community and, in many cases, their languages, as well as essential sources of cultural and community support and security.

Thus, and as Stan Steiner's interviewee noted, Indigenous women both in Canada and in the United States had, for too long, been polite. Though they had engaged in activism at the community level and even regionally before the 1960s and 1970s, the same factors that contributed to the growth of men’s organizing- education, geographic mobility, greater means of communication – also spurred on the development of a community of women who, like the men, were as different as people could be and who frequently disagreed on how change might best be effected.
D. FOR 'TOMORROW'S WOMAN': THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS IN CANADA

One of the principal venues for women during this period were mainstream organization which often sprang from auxiliaries to men's organizations. Though the women who attended these sorts of meetings were diverse, they agreed that the format of men's organizations, or at least those who seemed to be making headway with the government, was a useful one through which to begin to address the issues felt most important by women. As a study of conference proceedings reveal, the issues addressed were not only those of women, however, and included a broad range of problems held together by the belief that change could be effected by women at the community level with the right tools and knowledge to make it happen.

In Canada as in the United States, the conference format was well established by the time women started gathering on their own in the mid to late 1960s. Still, for Aboriginal women, the conference forum was very new and, for some participants, very alien to their prior experience with other Indigenous women. As Bet-te Paul reports, when first invited, she didn't know what to expect. Moreover, she and a fellow Tobique woman, Eva (Gookum) Saulis were placed on the agenda and asked to speak at their very first meeting, which was a large assembly that included Noel Starblanket, George Manuel's successor as president of the NIB as of 1974. As Bet-te recalls, “I was so scared I almost started crying too, but I just explained what was happening at Tobique with housing and why.” Though frightened, the women received an oral endorsement of support from then-president of the Indian Rights for Indian Women, Jennie Margetts.42

At women's only conferences, the proceedings could be somewhat friendlier. The first Alberta Native Women's conference was held at the Mayfair Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta, from March 12th to
the 15th, 1968. The theme of the conference, “Native Women: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” drew attention to the vast array of issues that the female participants at this, the first conference of its kind in Alberta, wanted to address. Organizers acknowledged the support and assistance of the Indian Affairs Branch in several capacities, including facilitating the participation of both Treaty and Metis women to attend. The Province of Alberta also assisted with transportation and accommodation costs for approximately 125 delegates. With its stated goal to provide “an opportunity for native women to express their concerns and mutual interests and to endeavour to define their goals for a better future in their communities,” the Conference was, first and foremost, an exploratory venture meant to discover what Indigenous women across Alberta had in common, and to help spur on the development of a national conference for the next year.

Comments by the organizers illustrated the possibility, as well as the limitations, that the conference format held. The organizers were first-time conference planners, and admitted that “At many times our meetings were chaotic, our conclusions ill-defined, and our planning somewhat lax.” The Conference's report pointed out that, despite the support and assistance of the Indian Affairs Branch, “The initiative as well as the work involved was totally a native endeavour. The undertaking was ours; the success was also to be determined by us.” Overall, the conference was described by organizers as a great success, most importantly due to the sense of self-confidence and accomplishment it instilled in women with very little training in this area. In pointing out the problems with the conference, organizers cited the lack of communication and understanding “between Native people as a group and the government agencies which were represented there.”

Speakers for the conference represented various communities, age groups and agencies. Rose Yellowfeet and Alice Steinhauer, co-chairwomen of the conference, both spoke. The official Opening also featured a speech by Bill Wacko, Training and Research Officer, of the Provincial Community Development Branch and Don Steward of the Indian Affairs Branch. Sessions also included speakers
who were homemakers, economists, child care workers, youth, and health workers. In addition to sessions, the conference also featured a Native demonstration of Native dress, a homemaking competition and an “Indian Craft” contest.

The issues addressed were varied. One of the speakers was homemaker Mary Ann Lavallee of the Cowessess Reserve in Broadview Saskatchewan. She demonstrated a keen understanding both of current national issues facing Indigenous women as well as a broader international human rights context as factors in framing a new conception of justice for Aboriginal women. She presented a synopsis of what white women in Canada would be asking for in presenting for the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, and argued that Aboriginal women should also come up with suggestions of their own. Though she did not say it, her speech gave the impression that the issues important to white women were not those that were of priority to Aboriginal women. She cited equal job opportunities, equal and amendments to the abortion law as priorities to white women but argued that Aboriginal women should come up with suggestions that resolutions “that will benefit Indian woman and her everyday world.”

It was, in essence, a call to action when Lavallee asked, “will Indian woman maintain her silence, which is the easy way out; or will Indian woman gather her courage, lift her head, and speak out?”

Lavallee also spoke of pride and of the need to inspire pride in the next generation. She described “Yesterday’s Indian Woman” as tough and hardy: “She was bone and sinew; she was stout of heart. In order to survive she had to develop real fortitude and courage.” Of today’s Indian woman, she described the need to blaze a trail, to “prepare the way for Tomorrow’s Woman, not by virtue of birth alone but by blazing a trail of education, reform, of social reform and political reform.” As she argued, “Tomorrow’s Woman is your little girl and mine. Let us as Today’s Women light a torch for her so she will see where she is going, for she is more in danger of being lost and swallowed up in the white man’s jungle that we or grandmother have ever been.”

Women, Lavallee maintained, must fight oppression
in the wider world but also in their own communities, stating that “It seems that for many of us our husbands must first be converted.”

For Lavallee, the noblest calling was motherhood and it was in mothering that the seeds to building a better tomorrow might be sewn. Building community health, in other words, started at home.

In this spirit, various speakers at this conference stressed the need for better education and for better services not only for women but for the community as a whole. On the matter of education, Bill Wacko, Research and Training Officer for the Provincial Community Development Branch, provided these comments: “Never before have I seen such concern and determination in respect to education. It is the first time I have felt it.”

Wacko was also charged with providing an evaluation of the conference, a task he described as tremendously difficult. Overall, he displayed admiration for the women who he argued were themselves “chiefs” due to the influence they had on the chiefs. But, he added, “Maybe you were trying to do too much; you even had people speaking to you when you were eating.” He also cited the problem of communication, as well as divisions between Treaty and Metis, and between Southern Albertan and Northern Albertan bands.

Though the delegates covered an enormous range of issues, an issue not discussed at length was the specific area of women's rights. Delegate's comments offered on the subject were reported very briefly and included statements that indicated women feeling unrepresented on their own band councils, as well as expressed an intent to work on equality and reduce violence in their own homes.

The difficulties experienced at initial women's conferences on a provincial level were indeed growing pains, some of which had also been experienced by men in the development of national conferences for their own organizations in the 1960s. Still, the experience provided motivation and encouragement for women to begin to work on the national level. The first national conference of Indigenous women in Canada was held on March 22 and 23, 1971, in Edmonton Alberta and organized in part by some of the women who had been key organizers for the Alberta Native Women's
Society conferences held previously. The arrangements allowed two voting delegates to represent each group in the province, and provided for non-voting delegates. Organizers explained that this arrangement was necessary due to very tight budgetary constraints. Though the conference attendees addressed and discussed several issues, central to those was the question of forming a national native women’s organization. As Bertha Clark argued, “We have taken the first step. Let’s not stop and die here but go all the way – if this is what the ladies of Canada want.”

Like the provincial conference format, the national conference featured a variety of speakers including several government representatives from the federal, provincial and municipal governments. In the opening address, Robert Stanbury, Minister without Portfolio responsible for Citizenship and Information Canada, stressed the supportive versus directive role of the government of Canada. As he stated, “The Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretatry of State is in Ottawa to serve you – not to tell you what to do.” In keeping with the theme of these types of gatherings, Stanbury also pointed out the special role and responsibility of women as teachers and imparters of Indigenous cultural heritage: “It is from their mothers that children learn their place in society; that they are given their attitude to their culture and, to a large extent, their knowledge of it... When Indian mothers are able to strengthen their children, it is bound to be a better community.”

Though Stanbury rightfully acknowledged the importance of Aboriginal women within their communities, he also seemed to be prioritizing the retention of culture over some of the more concrete structural impediments facing both women and their children in Aboriginal communities.

Stanbury, as well as a variety of women speakers, also stressed the importance of agency on the part of Indigenous women as well as their special place and responsibility as community activists. As Pearl Stamp, conference coordinator argued, “I think Indian women of any community are the backbone of that community, because women see things that are needed more clearly and readily as she is closer to the problems an recognizes them for what they are.” Alice Steinhauer, founder of the
Voice of Alberta Native Women's Society, explained that before organizing on a provincial scale, many women had belonged to different groups like co-ops, women's guilds or women's institutes, but that they felt they were not getting anywhere. As she explained, “We talked to people from government and from women's organizations – we did a lot of talking, but nothing came of it until we talked to people in Indian Affairs and the provincial government in Alberta, and they did not see why we could not have a conference.”

Steinhauer’s comments illustrated both the possibilities and the limitations of this approach that were well understood by the women. By accepting the assistance of government agencies, the meeting had become a possibility. Like those male-led organizations who were receiving government funding, women fought to get their share but had to do so by accepting financial and logistical support from the very colonizers who had oppressed them in the first place.

Of the important issues raised at the national conference, chief among them were education and the problems facing Indigenous youth. Women placed a great deal of emphasis on education and youth, and though men were indeed concerned with improving the educational system, women tended to focus on the holistic betterment of youth through community support. Joe Bylan of the Alberta Native Communications Society discussed youth on skid row, urging the women “If you have any love for your children, and feelings towards native people at all, I encourage you to do everything in your power to assist wherever you can. Maybe it would be in adjust a small way, but even just paying attention to our children, and supporting them, means a lot.”

Though a Native person, Bylan’s somewhat condescending tone suggested that he felt that part of the problem, and hence the solution, was mothering. In addition to youth issues, topics common to discussion groups also included Family Allowance, the improvement of housing, the amelioration of education of both children and adults, as well as instilling cultural pride and awareness in the next generation.

Women in Canada were also distinctly aware of the status issue. The loss of status was one important way in which Indigenous women felt that their experience varied from men’s. The problem
was complex for the government and devastating for the women, many of whom, in attendance at the conference, found common cause with their Indigenous sisters. Women described the alienation and hurt they felt upon being shunned by their former communities after having lost their treaty number through marriage. As a Director on the Board of the Union of Ontario Indians, Monica Turner, who had lost her status, was hurt by the treatment she received. As she explained, “When I speak and voice an opinion, I am told that since I am not treaty I cannot give direction, but rather may be used as a resource person for the non-status people.” Having spent the majority of her youth on the reserve, Turner expressed a continuing attachment to her status: “Although the government says I am not a treaty Indian, I am certainly an Indian; in my heart it doesn't matter whether they take my number away or not, I am still an Indian and I am a part of you.”

Jenna Margetts of Alberta had also lost her status upon marriage, and explained: “I get quite emotional about this, as I am still an Indian and will always be an Indian whether I have a treaty number or not.”

Participants at the national conference demonstrated, almost uniformly, a deep concern with this issue. At this event, there were many non-status women in attendance who had played key organizing roles either in the conference or even within organizations that represented status women, and all of these expressed a concern that any national organization encompass the concerns of non-status women, too. Thus, on the issue of how and when to form a national organization, women expressed various opinions on the potential mandate and scope of such a group. Leona Willier, Northern Vice-President of the Coice of Alberta Native Women's Society, the group that hosted the conference, expressed her opinion that a national women’s organization “should be non-political – that the members should act as wives and mothers.”

Though the majority of the delegates from Quebec agreed that forming a national organization was a good idea, the group also debated whether or not such an organization should be “political.” The persistence of this question among delegates indicates the degree to which Indigenous women's organizing differed from its non-Aboriginal counterparts, both in content and in form. To
question whether an organization committed to studying and addressing the important obstacles to
being an Indigenous person in a colonial state would be, for many non-Indigenous observers, a
confusing issue indeed. But for many Indigenous women who organized themselves in this period, and
still do today, discussion and action could be pursued without necessarily labelling oneself as either
“feminist” or “political.” Other delegates commenting on the prospect of a national organization also
raised interesting questions. Manitoba delegates stipulated that the constitution for such an organization
should ensure that it remain open to all women of native ancestry. B.C. Delegates raised questions as to
the relationship between provincial organizations and the national body, as well as which of these
should be prioritized. The Quebec delegate, Eileen Marquis, explained that on the Caughnawaga
Reserve alone there were nine organizations for women, and stressed the importance of some uniting
force or body.

Thus, as expressed by the delegate from Quebec and by many others, most provincial and
territorial groups were generally supportive of the idea. Alberta women suggested the formation of a
national body in the image of the conference, with one or two representatives from each province and
territory. In general, they felt, as did many women, that the types of problems facing Indigenous
communities were similar enough across the country to merit a national organization. The B.C. Indian
Homemakers' Association, which carried out projects on the reserve and provincial level, also approved
the idea in principle.

In the report on the conference, it was reported that there was “considerable discussion” on the
issue. Evelyn Paul moved that a Constitution Committee of five women should be set up to draft a
constitution which would then be circulated to all Aboriginal women's groups and discussed at the next
national conference. Many rejected this as premature, however, arguing that local groups needed to be
consulted to determine their receptiveness for the idea. Some also suggested that other women's groups
be contacted to discuss how groups might work together, including with the recently formed Native
American Women's Action Council in the United States, as well as with the National Council of Women in Canada.

After breaking into provincially and territorially based discussion groups on this issue, delegates brought forth a number of suggestions on the issue. B.C. Delegates felt that a rough draft of the aims and objectives of a national body should be written and brought back to the provincial organizations for feedback. It also suggested that some of the goals should include “greater home efficiency”, helping the older, infirm and destitute, improving conditions on home reserves, to discover, stimulate and train leadership, and to “develop better, happier and more useful citizens.”  

Saskatchewan delegates felt that the role of the national organization should be to combine the voices of provincial groups to “speak with a mightier voice than would one province alone.”  

Manitoba delegates agreed with those from Saskatchewan on the need for a stronger voice, and argued that the goals should also include providing means of communication between women as well as between women and men at home. As they insisted, “Indian men should accept the fact that Indian women can be involved in much of the work they are doing, and be useful in the community as well as at home.”  

This included representation in band council business as a matter of course. Nova Scotia, Yukon and Alberta agreed that the national organization should provide a stronger voice, but Alberta added that strength must stem from the provincial organizations who would take the lead in the process. As a result of the discussion, a steering committee was formed and most representatives chosen from those in attendance.

In closing the conference, George Manuel, president of the National Indian Brotherhood expressed his delight at the fact that women had finally decided to get together to investigate the possibility of forming a national organization. As he explained, “I am glad that the women have decided to come from behind us 'great' men and become 'great' themselves, because I think that the native women in Canada... have been exposed to the hardships of life to a greater degree than any other people in Canada, including our men.”  

Though his words were encouraging, his tone was, in fact,
condescending and illustrated the view of many men within mainstream organizations about the women. Though Manuel's comments were encouraging, they also pointed to the possibility of relief in that mainstream organizations would no longer have to take a stand or engage with the complicated and polarizing issue of status, or other issues seen to belong exclusively to women.

E. TO BE OR NOT TO BE... INDIAN?: THE STATUS ISSUE AND CANADIAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Of all the issue that women faced in Canada during this period, perhaps the most salient and pressing for Indigenous women was the one of status, an issue which had animated much conference discussion, as well as which helped crystallize and solidify the shape of emerging organizations in the aftermath of the dramatic 1973 Supreme Court decision on the issue. Though Kathleen Jamieson stated, in 1978, that “The development of native militancy in the late sixties and early seventies culminated in the Lavell case,” the case was, in fact, an important step in solidifying the formation of early women’s organizations and, due to the negative judgement, failed to resolve the issue of unity that so many organizers had hoped to bury.

As the conference proceedings demonstrated, status was an important issue for women in the 1970s. Women certainly had opinions on it and discussed it: in “Woman's Viewpoint,” an editorial by Jane Fournier in The Native People newspaper in June 1971, Fournier relayed a resolution by the women of the Saddle Lake Reserve of Alberta to form an organization “for treaty women only”, and were urging Metis women to do the same. Fournier's own view was that though there was much work to be done locally, Native women, both status and non, shared the same problems of inadequate housing and infrastructure, alcoholism and cultural annihilation.64
Nevertheless, the Lavell decision obliterated the possibility for lasting unity between non-status and status women due to its failure to reverse section 12 (1)(b). The case had been prompted in part by a favourable judgement in the Drybones decision of 1970, wherein Drybones successfully appealed his conviction for being intoxicated off reserve on the basis that section 94(b) violated section 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights’ guarantee of equality. The Court agreed with Drybones that the offending section imposed harsher penalties on an Aboriginal person being found intoxicated in a public place than on a non-Indigenous person for the same crime. Encouraged both by this decision, as well as the 1970 Royal Commission on the Status of Women's condemnation of section 12(1)(b), Jeanette Lavell decided to take her loss of status to the Supreme Court.

Ojibwa Jeanette Lavell had lost her status upon marriage, in 1970, to a non-Indian and had subsequently been removed from the band list. Her challenge was based upon the same logic employed in Drybones wherein section 12(1)(b) contravened the Bill of Rights. Her case was heard alongside the case of Yvonne Bedard, a Six Nations woman who had also lost her status and was unable to live, after her divorce, on the reserve with her children in the house willed to her by her mother. Lavell's appeal had initially been denied by Judge Grossberg in 1971, who deemed that inequality within a class of people did not contravene the act. The Federal Court of Appeal reversed the Grossberg decision, and the Attorney-General of Canada then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1971. Bedard's case was subsequently brought to the Supreme Court of Canada, which delivered its decision in 1973.

Jean Chretien, minister of Indian Affairs at the time and persona non gratta in the Indigenous community, particularly after the White Paper of 1969, sought Indigenous people to join him in the fight against Indigenous women. The effort seemed promising: The Association of Iroquois and Allied Indians who represented 20,000 Indian people, primarily men, had in fact asked the government to intervene in the case. Though the National Indian Brotherhood eventually intervened against the women, it struggled with its decision. As George Manuel, president of the NIB at the time of the appeal
recounts, “It proved one hell of a mess to get into, because no matter what we did, everyone got mad at us, and it was difficult to maintain a sane and rational discussion on the issues involved.”

The case proved a difficult one for the NIB who feared the possibility of the Bill of Rights knocking out the legal basis of the Indian Act and with it, the special status of Indigenous people in Canada. The case added to the tense atmosphere on this issue generated by the 1969 White Paper, which though shelved, continued to make Indigenous organizers believe that the government would try any means possible to abrogate their responsibility towards Aboriginal Canadians. In short, mainstream leadership worried that cases like this one could accomplish the same process as the White Paper had suggested, but by stealth. At the 1972 NIB conference in Edmonton, Alberta, no decision was made. The Indian Association of Alberta thus decided to intervene against the women and were later joined by the Indians of Quebec, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians and finally, the NIB.

The Supreme Court eventually ruled against Lavell and Bedard in 1973, despite the *Drybones* precedent, arguing that equality of the law was meant only in reference to the administration and enforcement, and that as such, laws could apply differently to men and women and that the Bill of Rights did not overrule the Indian Act in this case given its constitutional responsibility of Indian Affairs. As Sally Weaver explains, “The NIB, and status Indians in general, heralded the judgement as a victory in defending the Indian Act against possible nullification or further erosion, against a Bill of Rights.”

As Noel Starblanket, Manuel’s successor argued, “The Canadian Government cannot change one section of the Indian Act without looking at the effect those changes will have on the Indian people of our communities. We feel the wrong being done to Indian women and their offspring cannot be undone by imposing further hardship on the rest of the Indian people.”

Because the case failed to create a basis for unity of status and non-status women, it also ensured the continuing division among the national groups. Like NCC/NIB division, the case thus ensured no one national women's organization could speak for all. In 1974, the Native Women's
Association of Canada was incorporated as an aggregate of thirteen Aboriginal women's groups across the country “to deal with all aspects of women’s concerns.” Though it supported the cause of non-status women to regain status as of a resolution in 1975, its membership was formed primarily of status women. In a workshop session held in 1975, members discussed the areas of priority and direction for the NWAC. These included securing more funding, as well as using “international interest and focus on women... to bear pressure upon the federal government to do something this year,” and move beyond tokenism “with respect to attention paid to women to-date.”

The second primary national organization, Indian Rights for Indian Women was also established in the early 1970s to represent non-status and Metis women as an issue group vis-a-vis the Indian Act. It had actually been established as a provincial committee in 1967 by Mary Two-Axe Early as Equal Rights for Indian Women who became the organization's eastern Vice-President when it became national in scope in 1973. Speaking in 1975 of the controversy surrounding the Lavell case, Jenny Margetts reported that since no compromise had been possible with the status women, non-status women formed their own group. Margetts described the goals and objectives of the IRIW as acting to rectify the discrimination in the Indian Act. This would contribute to the larger goal of unity. As she stated, “As a national group, we will continue in our efforts to unify the Indian women and unify ourselves as Native people-- not as non-status people but as Native people... and hopefully one of these days we will come to a conference as a unified people, not as status people, non-status people and Metis people.”

F. ACTING LOCALLY, THINKING NATIONALLY: HOMEMAKERS GROUPS EVOLVE

Both the NWAC and the IRIW were very consciously national groups. The NWAC pledged to
operate to support provincial organizations while the IRIW deliberately worked on the status issue on the national level. Still, there was during this period another type of group which existed, often at the local level, but that also emerged as an important outlet for community-minded women. The often overlooked Indian Homemakers' Association illustrates some of the important tendencies of women's organizations during this era as well as exemplifies how, in many cases, women chose to act locally in the belief that there local work would influence the position and status of women on a much broader level.

The Indian Homemakers' Association was a non-profit organization dedicated to improving living conditions within First Nations communities with clubs across the country. These women gathered to share skills relevant to homemaking and were funded with small grants from the Department of Indian Affairs until 1968. Homemakers' Clubs often met in regional groups, as was the case of the 7th Annual Conference of Northern Ontario Indian Homemakers' Clubs, held at the Lake Helen Reserve in Nipigon in July of 1963. The report of the proceedings clearly illustrates the important role that Homemakers' Clubs saw for themselves. The central question of the conference, “what can women do on reserves?,” made clear that Homemakers Clubs were about much more than handicrafts or housework. The stated object of the clubs, and by extension of the conference, included improving reserves overall as well as equality with the rest of the country.72

Due to their focus on improving reserve conditions in general, questions addressed by the homemakers included economic development. At the Fort William Reserve, for example, Mrs. Cecille MacLauren was credited with organizing a group of dancers under the Fort William Indian Pow Wow Club, which aimed to draw in tourism to the Reserve. The report also cited that local handicrafts were a “wonderful source of income here for those people who manufacture handicrafts and the Indian people on the Fort William Reserve are being reminded of this opportunity. The thousands of tourists who drive up to the Mount McKay Lookout site are always looking for genuine Indian souvenirs.”73 In
addition to promoting economic development through tourism and handicrafts, invited speakers, included Mr. Eklund, a local job placement officer, urged the women to take an active interest in promoting employment prospects for their children and for their husbands. He added that the women “could help by writing cheery letters of encouragement,” as well as seeking more information from teachers, priests and personnel managers, as well as from local agents.74

Homemakers’ Clubs differed somewhat in their areas of local priority. The Hiawatha Club, for example, held bingos, bake sales, and raffles aimed towards helping sick Indigenous people in the hospital, and their families. For one family who did not qualify for welfare assistance, the Hiawatha Homemakers’ Club, composed of twelve active members, raised enough money to provide a bed, table and chairs. In contrast, the Moose Factory Club stated that it raised its money in order to send their delegate to the convention. In Gull Bay, where the Homemakers Club was still in its first year, proceeds from their efforts were donated to the construction of a new hall and to a school Christmas party. In Round Lake, women focused on producing bead work but complained that they had no one to sell it to. The same complaint was echoed by delegates from Big Trout Lake and Sachigo Lake.75

These club were relatively small and their success varied from year to year. In Serpent River, by contrast, the Homemaker’s Club was much more comprehensive in its approach to community change. It had its own church-based youth group, which raised $617.00 “which all goes to the missionary.” It also had a Home and School group which worked closely with local teachers and parents, and which had awarded, in the past year, “forty-three SILVER dollars to students with academic status” with the rest of the money being used to fund a school picnic. In her report, Jean Shanawa, delegate, proudly asserted, “This is how every man, women and child co-operates in our community.”76 Constance Lake, which also had a larger club whose fundraising efforts were considerably more successful than in some other communities: it had donated $150.00 to the building of a new church on the reserve, $30.00 to the hospital to assist with heating costs, as well as $30.00 to the cancer society and $10.00 to a reserve
member in the Ontario Hospital.

Overall, the conference was an opportunity for women to meet and to discuss their efforts. In closing, Mrs. Meawasige, conference chair, reiterated the rules for membership. She maintained that any Indian woman, Treaty or non-Treaty, could belong to the Homemaker's Clubs, but that no non-Treaty women could hold full executive office. Non-Treaty women, furthermore, could attend the convention only if delegated and funded by their local Homemaker's Club. Meawasige also expressed her surprise that more men had not come to the convention as observers. As she argued, “It is quite disappointing we haven't seen more male observers these last two conventions. They are always welcome.”

While Homemakers' Clubs were indeed a worthwhile pursuit according to its members, not all Indigenous observers felt that way. Neither, it seemed, did the federal government: in 1968, the funding from the DIA funding stopped. For small clubs struggling just to stay afloat, this was a major problem and a phenomenon that many former members attribute to their increasingly political actions. In response, many clubs sought to find strength in numbers. In British Columbia, the clubs were incorporated, in 1969, into a single organization representing all of the Homemakers' clubs in the province. The IHA's constitution articulated five important goals for the organization, which became more overtly political after the 1969 White Paper. These included assisting Indian women to improve their home efficiency, helping those in need by improving living conditions on reserves, discovering and stimulating new leadership, promoting Indian Arts and Handicrafts and developing “better, happier, and more useful citizens.”

After becoming the IHA, the organization, now removed from DIA funding, moved ever more in to the arena of activism. It began to publish The Native Voice, a monthly newsletter disseminated and read across British Columbia, as well as helped to shape the emerging structures of the IRIW and the NWAC. Like other organizations, the IHA and The Voice's efforts to secure consistent funding were
always a struggle in part due to their lack of profile outside of British Columbia. Their work was classified as “social welfare work,” requiring funding directly from the federal government as opposed to from special project like the First Citizens’ Fund, which denied the group funding in 1971. The group did appeal directly to the government based on their intimate knowledge and understanding of the day to day lives of Aboriginal citizens on reserves, but was denied. In the particularly crowded landscape of indigenous activism in British Columbia at the time, the BCIHA also struggled in its relationship with male-dominated and led organizations. As Patricia Barkaskas reports, leaders of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) sometimes argued that the IHA should remain an auxiliary organization.

G. RADICAL WOMEN HEAD SOUTH

Radicalism among Canadian Indigenous women has not received a great deal of attention in historical scholarship, partially as a result of the phenomenon being difficult to find. Although there were prominent militant women, including most notably Kahn Tineta-Horn who was an integral part of the internal critique of the early National Indian Council, as well as a noted radical activist in her home territory of Akwesasne during the occupation of the Sea Way International Bridge, radically-oriented Indigenous women in Canada often headed south, to the United States, where more militant groups were much more prominent. Much of the American Indian Movement's success during the period 1960 to 1975 did, in fact, depend on the women whose energies and talents it tapped. For example, women were central in parlaying the takeover of the United States Coast Guard Station in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, into a lasting and viable institution to serve the needs of the community's children. As Susan Applegate Krouse points out, “Their success is not acknowledged by AIM, and the Milwaukee
takeover itself is rarely mentioned in histories of Indian activism.”\textsuperscript{82} Moreover, though at Wounded Knee, at least five of the thirteen key negotiators were traditional women, men took center stage though, as Mihesuah reports, “they did not approve of Native men adopting the European ideology that females are subservient to males.”\textsuperscript{83} The male leaders and membership of AIM strove, during the 1970s in particular, to recreate and represent the Plains warrior role of the past and did so often at the expense of highlighting the important contributions of women. Russell Means argued that women did not need to be the public face of leadership, stating that “Taking the glory was not on their agenda.” As reported in his own autobiography, Means also explained that the sexism demonstrated by AIM as well as by himself was, at least in part, a product of the lessons of colonialism, of being “robbed of our heritage through the brutality experienced by our parents and passed on to us all.”\textsuperscript{84} Nevertheless, Lorelai DeCora Means, AIM member and one of the later founders of Women of All Red Nations, maintained the priority was solidarity. As she explained, “I never felt resentment that they didn’t have women right up there with the men... I spoke at a NOW [National Organization for Women] conference about the role of women in the struggle of American Indians, and I told them that we don’t have the luxury as a people to address issues of equality. If your people are dying and they’re hungry, then you have to address those issues before you have time to address other issues.”\textsuperscript{85}

One of these Canadian women who did head south was Anna Mae Aquash. Born in Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia in 1945 and a member of the Mi'kmaq nation, Anne Mae Aquash came of age within the heady 1960s. Raised in a tribal environment for essentially her entire childhood, Anna Mae spoke her own language and knew her own history. In 1962, she moved to Boston with her future husband Jake Maloney, another Mi'kmaq. In Boston, Aquash became involved in the Boston Indian Council and it was during her involvement with that organization that she was first exposed to AIM through the Thanksgiving occupation of the Mayflower II. Though AIM had a reputation for attracting largely displaced urban Indian people, Anna Mae's strong connection to her tribal roots did not stop her
from seeing the potential that AIM had. As Mihesuah explains, Anna Me Aquash “chose to work with
AIM rather than her own people because she believed that AIM could address a arrange of Native
grievances and serve not only displaced and confused Natives but also people like her, who were secure
in their tribal and ethnic identities.”  

Aquash's involvement with AIM continued after that Thanksgiving Day occupation, and she
was a part of the Trail of Broken treaties. But it was the occupation of Wounded Knee that finally
committed Aquash full-time to the AIM cause, and she travelled there to help with the cause by
cooking, cleaning and assisting with providing supplies, often in secret, to the occupiers. But Anna Mae
was not contented to busy herself in the background, and as Mihesuah recounts, her “aspirations,
emotional strength, and intellect, in addition to her martial arts background, were intimidating to some
males, and she lost support from those who were most insecure.” AIM as a movement had always
contained an important element of male machismo. Due in part to its founders as well as the media's
glorification of AIM's warrior persona, women who were no less active or important in the movement
were often pushed aside, and this process became even more marked during the highly publicized
Wounded Knee takeover.

Following the takeover of Wounded Knee, Aquash, her partner and her daughters eventually
move to Ottawa, but she remained an active supporter and fundraiser for AIM. She was responsible for
establishing AIM's West Coast branch, and travelled extensively for her work prompting the continued
surveillance of the FBI. She also engaged in other militant struggles including the Menominee Warriors
takeover of the Alexian Brothers Monastery in Wisconsin, which was largely a struggle between tribal
chairman Ada Deer and a small but determined Warrior Society dominated largely by men.

The 1975 revelations of Douglas Durham's betrayal of AIM as a government informant led
many to suspect Anna Mae, as well, who had suspected Durham of being less than sincere in his
activism. She was accused by Leonard Crow Dog, the organizations prominent spiritual leader.
Moreover, she became involved, after her separation from her partner, with Dennis Banks who was already married to another woman, prompting the ire of some other Lakota women, who already snubbed Anna Mae due to the fact that she was a Canadian Indigenous woman. Aquash's troubles continued when she was questioned by Dino Butler, Leonard Peltier and Bob Robideau about the possibility of her being an informer, and she was soon on the run from a fugitive warrant issued in the aftermath of a shootout on the Jumping Bull property at Pine Ridge. Though she was released on bail shortly after her capture, she would not be on the run for long.

On 24 February 1976, the body of Anna Mae Aquash was found on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, and it was determined that Aquash had been dead for at least two months. Though the coroner ruled her death came from exposure, family members were suspicious after Pine Ridge physicians noticed blood at the base of her skull, as if from an impact injury. It did not take long after her death had been reported for both the FBI and for AIM members to start laying blame. AIM members publicly accused the FBI of ordering her death, something that director Clarence Kelley vehemently denied, while another agent who had worked closely with AIM accused its leadership of ordering her death. Later enquiries revealed that she was executed as a result of her being suspected as an informant by AIM leadership, and in 1999, Russell Means announced that Vernon Bellecourt had ordered Anna Mae's execution. Still, as Shirley Hill Witt, Akwesasne Mohawk and founding member of the National Indian Youth Council argues, “The executioners of Anna Mae did not snuff out a meddlesome woman. They exalted a Brave-Hearted Woman for all time.”

Though Anna Mae was an important activist of the 1960s and 1970s in particular and was a unique force within AIM, she was also one of several women working within that forum. As her daughter Denise expressed, in an interview with Devon Abbott Mihesuah, “People get lost in the legends and they forget that my mother was a person.” Though her untimely death has contributed to the media's celebration of the life of Anna Mae Aquash, her life was indeed the life of many militant
activist women who fought tirelessly and passionately for Indigenous rights believing that a pan-Indian orientation animated by militant action was the best possible solution to enact essential chance. In the last month of her life, Aquash wrote to her sister, “...I’m not going to stop fighting until I die, and I hope I’m a good example of a human being and my tribe.” Aquash, like many other activist women, did not publicly engage with the idea of feminism, though her daughters, in reflecting on her life, have. As Denise explains, “I know that my mother was progressive. I don’t want to say she was a feminist. She was more of an activist. She knew that she had certain rights as a human being, not necessarily as a woman, but as a human being.”

Aquash worked alongside many American Indian women also advocating within the context of the American Indian Movement. Though it could be a misogynistic organization, it could also be sanctuary for many. Sue Morales, for example, found a family in AIM. Adopted by a non-Indian family, she describes being “raised in the streets” before joining AIM. After being thrown out of her cross-racial adoptive home at the age of 15, Morales found camaraderie and friendship in the streets of Seattle, WA, by befriending other women in her situation including Ramona Bennett, a prominent AIM-er, who she explains raised her there. Working within the Seattle Indian Youth Program for the Northwest Indian News at the age of 16, she describes being shocked at finding out how how deceptive news could be. This bitter realization, she maintains, pushed her even further outside of federal programs and into a more militant stream of Indian activism. Though she stayed with the youth program, she maintains that she did so for monetary reasons. The disillusionment she felt with the program after the program's denunciation of the occupation of Fort Lawton in early 1970 was an important component of her alienation from these more mainstream ideas. She eloquently argues that the streets and the movement were her parents, rather than her adoptive home or any federal program.

At the age of 16, Morales ended up in Fort Lawton in March of 1970. Morales says she went because “everybody else was going”. She adds that she “just sort of ended up in lots of places” because
she felt she had no place of her own. At Fort Lawton, Morales reports many street people in attendance. Though she generally ran with the younger crowd, at Fort Lawton, she explains, the older street people took care of her. During the occupation, Morales helped to carry signs and funnel goods into the site. Though occupations have been described as primarily youth initiatives, Morales describes a diverse crowd that included 'little old women' who were, for her, the ultimate heroes providing much inspiration for her. These women were not afraid to be a part of militant action and, she argues, the thought of getting locked up “was almost like an honor badge.” Like the men, women of more militant orientation often saw prison as a rite of passage to becoming true Indian activist warriors.

Though Morales is reluctant to talk about certain dates and events after 1972, she describes some of the work that she conducted for AIM. Primarily, Morales was a fundraiser based in Seattle though she actively participated in many occupations and demonstrations on the part of her AIM chapter. Morales reports hearing about AIM for the first time in 1971, after the high publicized fish-in demonstrations. These included other ethnic groups lending support, including the Chicano community whom Morales had worked with prior to the fish-ins. She attended the fish-ins with her high school Indian club, of which Morales was president, and was inspired by the unity and solidarity she experienced there.

Like Morales, Janet McCloud was heavily involved in the militant struggles of the 1960s and 1970s revolving around the fish-ins, though she does not label herself a militant. As she explained in one interview, “Once, this man came here and he called me a ‘militant.’ I said, 'I don’t like those labels. They’re like barnacles on a ship. They weigh you down.” McCloud's childhood had been difficult, tainted, as it had been for many women, by the alcoholism of her father and then stepfather, as well as physical and sexual abuse. She describe herself as a lifelong organizer, though: “When I was seven, I started organizing the cousins. We'd find a corner in the house, we'd make beds on the floor and would put all the little kids behind us. We'd get axes and knives, and when the drunks came, we'd go after
them and run 'em out. So that was my first organizing.”93 She described herself as a lifelong warrior and protector. In her own words, “You defend what's sacred to you. Not with guns. I used what the Creator gave me – my voice.”94

McCloud married and divorced at a young age, living and working in the city of Seattle. After one of her daughters was almost killed, McCloud decided to leave the city, and with her second husband purchased 10 acres of land in what they soon discovered was a racist town, which made it difficult for her husband to work.95 Part of McCloud's own politicization also occurred within the context of her own work on the Nisqually waterfront, where she decided to try to organize a kind of co-op just about the time that the state of Washington decided to restrict Indian fishing in favour of developing a sport-fishing industry. McCloud recounts buying a mimeograph at the second-hand store and starting her own newsletter to publicize and record what Native American fishermen were going through at the time. It was during this time that McCloud also founded the Survival of American Indians Association, in 1964, which battled state and federal officials for the retention of Indigenous fishing rights.

Though she was deemed a militant, much of McCloud's experience involved the bureaucratic work of organizing, including publishing her newsletter, writing affidavits and briefs, serving as spokesperson for the Nisqually tribe and participating on a national task force, which included AIM leaders Dennis Banks and Clyde Bellecourt, set up to examine the issues facing contemporary Indian people. As she described, “There were big bets going on at the time that the forty of us who were so diverse could not be in the same room without killing one another.”96

Janet McCloud enjoyed a particularly close relationship with fellow activist Ramona Bennett (Puyallup), who she explains took her in after McCloud left her adopted home. Bennett took care of McCloud in the streets of Seattle, as well as introduced and nurtured her activist side. Speaking in 1970 to Akwesasne Notes, Bennett reflected on her belief in the need for an armed struggled: “We did have
an armed camp in the city of Tacoma ... If we gave up our arms, the government would immediately lose interest in us.” 97 Cited by the Congressional Record as one of the nine most militant Indians in the country, Bennett served in the 1970s as her tribal chairperson though she was pushed out of office after eight years in the position.

Interviewed by (Robert Allen Warrior) in the 1990s, Bennett demonstrated her continuing passion for fighting the Indigenous cause. Though she had, by the 1990s, changed tactics as then-director of the Rainbow Youth and Family Service, she was no less committed in her new role as she had been as a militant activist in the 1970s. Speaking on the issue of Indigenous unity, Bennett explained that “There really is only one Nation of Indians. You can find evidence of this from Alaska down to the tip of South America... We are one people with different dialects.” 98 Her belief in the concept of one nation explains why Bennett, like so many others, found common cause within so many Indigenous struggles during the period. Her own people, the Puyallup, were also among those matrilineal tribes where the woman stayed in the village of her birth. As she recounts, it was the process of colonialism that so dislodged the matrilineal idea and prioritized the decisions of men, throwing her own society into a difficult position. Discussing the mid-1800s, Bennett explains that “the men from Boston” had come to the people and asked to speak to their leaders. When the old women came out, the white men rejected them as leaders. Then, Bennett continues, the people sent out the old men, who were also rejected. Finally, the young men were sent out. As she states, “So right from the beginning, whites imposed on us methods of choosing our representatives, and our traditional way of identifying leaders had to be set aside to accommodate the sexism of white people.” 99 Bennett further describes the way in which women were even further victimized after treaty was signed in 1854 by a series of suspicious “railroad accidents,” wherein white men who had had too much to drink would break into fishermen's cabins, rape their wives and murder their husbands, then place the body on the train tracks where the death would be ruled a “railroad accident.” Bennett had herself found the death certificates
for these incidents, which were usually followed by the kidnapping of the victim's children and an inscription of “no heir” on the death certificate so that these men could take their property.

Despite her history and her knowledge of her past, Bennett describes her own politicization as occurring, as it had for many, after high school. She describes being invited to a cultural program at the Seattle Indian Center where she subsequently became involved in the American Indian Service League. As she explained, “For the first time, I really belonged. The Indian Service League gave me opportunities to socialize and volunteer, and the healing began.” Part of the healing led her to return to the reservation and become a member of the tribal council. Though Bennett was a young mother, she was given the important task of going to Washington to work in the Department of the Interior working on legislation that might help to restore tribal lands and a tribal way of life long since gone, but never forgotten. The position was hectic and often thankless, but for a determined woman like Ramona Bennett, there were ways to get results. As she recounted, “If I couldn’t get an appointment with a congressman, I’d wait outside his door for the bell to ring calling him into chambers to vote. I’d have my papers ready, and when he came out, I’d run with him... lobbying them on the run.” She describes having to sleep on the floor, having to lobby church groups for money and hitchhiking home, all to complete what she considered to be key in restoring pride and livelihood to the tribe.

Though she worked in the capital, Bennett also spent a great deal of time demonstrating with groups like AIM at various occupations during this era. She recalls being present at Fort Lawton, at Cascadia and at the fish-ins, where she served as spokesperson for the tribe. In all of these instances Bennett recalls the company of other women who, like her, were convinced that the government simply would not listen to anything but the staunchest of protests. She also describes women juggling multiple roles as activists, as speakers and as mothers. At the camp in Tacoma, Washington, Bennett describes a mixed group of men, women, teenagers and even children. The women were among the most vocal. As Bennett recalls, one woman threatened to open fire if her 19-year old son were threatened by either
police or vigilantes. As she herself explained, “I am one woman with a gun, and no one is going to touch my son.”

Many of the women profiled as radical women also went on to found their own organization separate from AIM. Women of All Red Nations, or WARN, was established in the 1970s by several of the women who had played key roles in AIM struggles including Lorelai DeCora Means, Madonna Thunder Hawk, Phyllis Young, and Janet McCloud. At its inaugural conference in Rapid City, South Dakota, its more militant orientation combined with a focus on issues deemed important to the health of women and, by extension, to the health of Indian communities. It represented over thirty different communities, and early issues addressed by WARN included women's and community health, linking high rates of death, birth defects and miscarriage to nuclear mining and storage on Indian lands. It also protested against the adoption of Indian children by non-Indian people and advocated for the restoration and securing of treaty rights. In particular, it attempted to publicize the forced sterilization of Indigenous women in public health service hospitals which a 1974 WARN study estimated at between 40 and 50 percent. Like AIM, it sought alliances with other groups, including the National Organization of Women or NOW, a non-Indian feminist group, as well as feminist networks in Guatemala and Nicaragua.

H. 'TELL THAT SKINNY LITTLE BITCH TO SIT DOWN': WOMEN IN NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBAL POLITICS

As was true of many youth activists, women organizers often worked in several different forums. Yet, there existed perhaps no greater challenge to female activists at the time than the difficult to penetrate realm of tribal politics. From 1972 to 1979, Ramona Bennett served as tribal chairwoman,
focusing on regaining title to lands and on reestablishing tribal boundaries and jurisdiction. Though she dealt with her work with determination and good humour, it is clear from her interview that Bennett also faced discrimination from within her own tribal and Indigenous community, particularly working within larger associations such as the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, or NTCA, which she became a member of when she was chair of her own tribe. When travelling to an NTCA conference, Bennett was refused entry as a delegate because, organizers claimed, her tribe had been terminated. Then, organizers suggested that Bennett should have designated her vice-chairman to represent the tribe because he was a man. To add insult to injury, NTCA representatives suggested to Bennett that she should sit in the lobby with the Chairmen's wives.

Though she was finally let into the meeting, the disrespect continued. As she recounts, when she suggested adding children who were being alienated through interracial adoptions to the list of endangered species up for discussion, a list which included a variety of natural resources, one man nearby said, “Somebody tell that skinny little bitch to sit down.” Others rejected the idea that interracial adoption was as large a problem as Bennett alleged. Still, she also found some support from those who knew her, like Joe DeLaCruz of the Quinault Tribe, who insisted that Bennett did her research and knew her material. The result was the addition of the children to the list, but the real victory was Bennett's ability to access the NTCA. As she explains, “It's one thing to have to deal with racism and sexism when you're talking to a senator or governor, a white man, it's another thing when it's your brother.”

On who to blame, Bennett was succinct: “Those Indian men did not learn that sexism from their traditional teachings... So I don't blame the Indian men. I blame every woman who put up with it, and the organizations for not being more responsive.”

Despite any difficulties experienced in larger organizations, Bennett's term as tribal chairwoman was remarkably successful, resulting in the establishment of new services that helped to draw people back to the reservation. These include an elder's center, a mental health facility and a school established under the Indian Self-Determination Act
Like Bennett, Ada Deer also attempted to breach the world of male-dominated tribal politics. Born on the Menominee Reservation in Wisconsin in 1935, Deer lived there for 18 years until she left for college, then entered law school. The Menominee tribe had been officially “terminated” in 1961, under the Termination policy of the 1950s. As she explained, those who opposed termination had been overruled, and only five percent of people voted to make the decision. Others were “lured by the cash payments offered in return for giving up government services. Most of the people were uninformed.”

Hoping to help her people restore the land that had been taken from them, Ada Deer dropped out of law school and entered politics fighting those who argued that she was too young, too inexperienced and too naive to be an effective voice in tribal politics. Dropping out of law school, Deer argued, “was the price I had to pay to get involved. It was worth it.”

After leaving law school, Deer returned to Menominee country in an attempt to wrest control of the tribe from a group who had assented to Termination in the first place. She and others created, in 1970, a new organization called DRUMS: Determination of Rights and Unity for Menominee Shareholders. The organization, assisted by the Native American Rights Fund, fought to restore the Menominee's federal recognition and in 1972 and 1973, Deer worked in the heart of Washington to advance the cause. Deer consistently demonstrated a can-do attitude on the issues, arguing that anything could be changed with enough effort and determination. Indeed, her efforts, as well as those of DRUMS, resulted in national publicity for the Menominee culminating in the Menominee Restoration Act of 1973.

As Chairwoman of her tribe from 1974 to 1976, Ada Deer attended meetings of the NTCA but, unlike Ramona Bennett, was unsuccessful at accessing its inner sanctum. Bennett recalls seeing Deer upset at the NTCA meeting because she had been asked to wait in the lobby with the Chairmen's wives. Deer also encountered opposition within her own community, strongly opposed by the Menominee
Warriors society who claimed that Deer was a puppet of the government and unconcerned, as well as out of touch with, the true desires and needs of the Menominee nation.¹⁰⁷

CONCLUSION

In 1975, CBC's weekly radio program, Our Native Land, profiled women's activism in Canada. It reported the existence of over 15 women's groups in Canada and two national organizations. Grassroots organizing, as well as the formative period of the early 1970s, had prepared women for leadership in larger organizations. As Jean Goodwill of the Department of the Secretary of State stated women had “moved fast at taking on responsibilities on their own... and getting right down to business.” She argued that women's groups, unlike other organizations, were not on salary and thus worked doubly hard. She maintained that women had shown that they could do the job themselves and did not need professional consultants.¹⁰⁸ The native women's movement had changed in a few short years. According to Nora Thibodeau, past president of the Saskatchewan Native women's movement, since 1972, the movement had become much more populated with more young women and older people. She argued that she would have liked to see even more young people get involved to sustain the movement in future years.¹⁰⁹

As this chapter has demonstrated, the work of Aboriginal activist women was varied, difficult and often thankless. From those who participated in the larger organizations to those who chose to engage on a more local level, and from those women who took up arms to those who took up pen and paper, there was a spectrum of activism for Aboriginal women that emerged out of the early 1970s but that bore fruit only in the late 1970s and early 1980s and are thus, outside of the realm of this study. Nevertheless, what early Indigenous women's activism demonstrates is the heterogeneity that
characterized women's experience as well as threads that pulled it together, namely a commitment to the special role of Indigenous women as activists, as well as a dual fight against both colonialism and sexism.

The ideological basis of Indigenous women's movements often affected the substance and content of the activism with which these women engaged. In the first instance, women's groups emerged later than men's. Though women reached a new level of self-awareness and prominence within their communities in the 1960s, it was the period of 1970 to 1975 which witnessed the most organizational activity by women in a way that would come to resemble, but maintain its difference, from Indigenous men's. It was therefore not until later in the decade, as well as in the early 1980s, that women's organizations had gained enough experience, support and effective leadership to truly engage on a national and international level. In terms of the motivations behind activism, many women shared with Indigenous men the legacy of colonization, of residential schooling and of land and cultural dispossession. Yet for many activist women, it was also the experience of working within men's groups that convinced them that women needed their own forums. These women often remained active within broader organizations both mainstream and radical, but stressed the important project that Indigenous women had within the broader struggle, as well as discrimination within the community, as additional motivation to organize. Finally, the rhetoric of Indigenous women's activism exclusively was often of a different stripe than men's. Though both Indigenous women and men engaged with questions of the recovery of land and tradition, women, much more than men, focused on the concept of community health viewed holistically as encompassing spiritual, mental and cultural health. Women's unique place as givers of life, as well as their history within their own nations, were both major contributors to the rhetoric of women's groups, placing them in a different position than men.

The emergence of Indigenous women's activism was often controversial, as seen in the Canadian setting throughout the Supreme Court challenges of Yvonne Bedard and Jeanette Corbiere
Lavell, as well as in the murder of Anna Mae Aquash. Some male activists could often not understand why women had to branch out on their own, and found it sometimes difficult to deal with the assertion of a woman's place within the activist realm while others embraced the emergence of Indigenous women as an activist force all their own.

Though the 1960s and, in particular, the 1970s netted great gains for Indigenous women's organizing, the sexism that prompted its emergence continues to plague Indigenous politics. As Lee Maracle explains, “I have been to hundred of meetings where the male members demand written submissions from female members while giving themselves the benefit of collective discussion and team development prior to any attempt to write it up... Worse, I have watched the chairperson wait and listen to an endless exchange between two male colleagues while a patient woman holds her hand in the air, waiting to be recognized.” In a sense, Indigenous women still wait to be recognized. In both Canada and in the United States, women's organizations do not enjoy the same level of funding or recognition as do their male counterparts, while they continue to endure discrimination on two separate, but interrelated fronts. Indigenous women, within organizations and outside, still struggle with what it means to be Indigenous, feminist, or activist in a modern context, with little prospect for resolve.

As Janet McCloud of WARN and of AIM has stated, “Many Anglo women try, I expect in all sincerity, to tell us that our most pressing problem is male supremacy. To this, I have to say, with all due respect, bullshit. Our problems are what they've been for the past several hundred years: white supremacism and colonialism. And that's a supremacism and a colonialism of which white feminists are still very much a part.” Nevertheless, McCloud still insists on the need for Indigenous women to unite and to fight against the oppression of the colonial world, as well as the oppression present in their own communities. Even today, McCloud continues to embrace the idea of Indigenous women working together and of being central pillars of their community. As she explains, women are “like the low man on the totem pole, yet we’re holding it up.” As McCloud's comments illustrate, most women activists
have found their place within the struggle, and have largely cast aside the labels, debates and detractors they have deemed irrelevant. They do not have the luxury of labels. They are still struggling for survival.
8 Jaimes and Halsey, 332.
13 Ibid., 169.
18 Ibid., 73.
19 Mary Morez (Navajo), “The Woman is the Dominant Figure,” in *I am the Fire of Time: The Voices of Native American Women*, edited by Jane Katz (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977), 126.
23 Cited in Hanson, “A Brief History,” 2.
24 Ibid., 3.
27 Mithlo, “‘A Real Feminine Journey,’” 21.
28 Lee Maracle, *I am Woman*, ix.
31 Ibid., 217.
32 Ibid., 224.
38 Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 58.
40 Ibid., 61-62.
41 Ibid., 71.
42 Stillman, *Enough is Enough*, 174-175.
44 Ibid., 3.
46 Ibid., 6.
47 Ibid., 7.
48 Ibid., 41.
49 Ibid., 37.
50 Ibid., 36.
52 Ibid., 1.
53 Ibid., 3-4.
54 Ibid., 9.
55 Ibid., 21.
56 Ibid., 11.
57 Ibid., 22.
58 Ibid., 23.
59 Ibid., 17.
60 Ibid., 43.
61 Ibid., 44.
62 Ibid., 44.
63 Ibid., Appendix III, i.
70 Native Women's Association of Canada, “Planning Workbook, Meeting of the Board of Directors, National Library, Ottawa, June 7-9 1975.” Walter Rudnicki Fonds, Box 148 Folder 10 (University of Manitoba Archives, Winnipeg, MB).
71 “Native Women Organize.”
73 Ibid., 18.
74 Ibid., 22.
75 Ibid., 25-26.
76 Ibid., 28.
77 Ibid., 29.
78 Ibid., 30.
80 Ibid., 13.
81 Ibid., 18.
87 Ibid., 119.
90 Ibid., 127.
91 Ibid., 137.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ramona Bennet (Puyallup), “We’re Talking About Cultural Genocide,” in *I am the Fire of Time*, 147.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ada Deer (Menominee), “The Power Came from the People,” in *I am the Fire of Time*, 149.
106 Ibid.
107 SMenominee Warriors, interview with Kevin McKiernan, 1st and 2nd of January 1975 (Gretchen, WI).
108 “Taking the Power Back.”
109 Ibid.
Conclusion
This study has taken a broad view of Indigenous nationalism as it was practised in Canada and the United States between 1950 and 1975. This examination of Indigenous activism ends, necessarily, due to developments in the mid-1970s in both Canada and in the United States that effectively strove to curtail and quell Indigenous protest the way it had come to be practised. Though there remained a place for mainstream groups with strong links to governments, the space for practising alternative activism in its more radical forms, such as the takeovers that had so animated the late 1960s and early 1970s, was now receding.

In 1973, the Canadian government faced a quandary of sorts. The Calder decision had represented a historic benchmark in Canadian jurisprudence by affirming the principle that the historic occupation of land by aboriginal peoples gave rise to legal rights that survived European settlement. Though the particular claim in question was not settled at that time, this decision was the primary catalyst for a federal review of how claims were being addressed. In addition to the Calder decision, the Paulette Caveat of the mid-1970s, as it was known, represented a decision by Justice William Morrow of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories who, having held a six week hearing process which included arguments based on allowing oral testimony and travelling to the homes of those unable to travel, found that the Dene chiefs had not understood the meaning of treaties to have relinquished rights to their lands. As such, he maintained that the chiefs, who had filed a caveat at the land titles office to approximately one million square kilometres of land had sufficiently established a case for claiming Aboriginal rights to as to warrant the filing of such a caveat. Though Morrow’s decision was appealed by the federal government and overturned in the Supreme Court of Canada, it, along with Calder, certainly illustrated a pressing need to clarify the scope and contents of both Indigenous land rights and land ownership.

From this political climate, a policy framework for the assessment and negotiation of claims based on aboriginal title, called comprehensive claims, and claims arising from treaties and the
establishment of reserve lands, called specific claims, was developed. In 1974, the Department of Indian Affairs established the Office of Native Claims (ONC). The Specific Claims Branch of the ONC had two roles. First, it was responsible for reviewing claims 'arising from the failure of the government to discharge its lawful obligations to Indigenous people,' as well as to represent the government in new negotiations. If this sounds like a conflict of interest, it is because it was, but the policy was revised only in the early 1980s.

The new claims policy was first put into effect by virtue of a complicated and urgent problem in the province of Quebec. Introducing an “exciting” new hydroelectric development project in 1971, Premier Robert Bourassa insisted that the development was key in breaking the “vicious circle” of poverty, unemployment and lack of investment in Quebec. As he explained, high rates of unemployment meant more money needed to go into social assistance. The extra money required for social assistance thereby thwarted investment and hampered the creation of additional jobs. Speaking to a crowded non-Indigenous audience, Bourassa argued that “...this is a clear example where it will be possible for the province and for this government and for this people to break this vicious circle.”

Bourassa's conviction and belief in the opportunities of the project, as well as the precedent of Quebec history to then, had not prepared him for the opposition he would face when, without any regard or consultation with First Nations people, he decided to forge ahead. It was simply as if the Cree and Inuit did not exist, as if Bourassa expected them simply to stand aside and sacrifice their livelihoods and lands for the benefit of development in Quebec.

As such, the Cree, who stood to lose a significant amount of their traplines as well as other important sites, rallied against the Goliath. Chief Smally Patawabano argued that the development would ruin the traditional Cree way of life. On a CBC News Radio Special airing March 8th, 1972, he estimated that the dam project would destroy almost 40% of working traplines, as well as flood a third of the homes on the reserve and cover burial sites with water. Still, he acknowledged the difficult
position of the Cree in the battle: “I wish this could be stopped but I don’t know how we do it,” he explained simply. He maintained that all that was left to do was to negotiate the best possible outcome in a difficult situation. Members of the band had offered suggestions including compensation for ruined traplines, not only for one year but in perpetuity. Aside from using the media, the Cree also acted in the courts. On November 15th, 1973, the Cree and Inuit won a major victory when they obtained an injunction against further construction. Their hopes were dashed, however, when the injunction was overturned merely a week later. Still, the concerted opposition prompted a revision in the way that the federal government would handle future claims, and demonstrated to the province of Quebec and other would-be developers that the concerns of Canada’s Indigenous people, in a new legislative and legal climate, could not be ignored. Though it was not without difficulty, the new treaty process did net a result as encompassed in the final agreement. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, signed on November 11th, 1975, was the first of the modern treaty agreements negotiated between the government of Canada and the Cree and Inuit people of the region who ceded their right to certain land in Northern Quebec in exchange for $225 million in government compensation. The agreement also pledged the protection of some hunting and fishing rights, as well as devolved further responsibilities in the area of self-government.

In a sense, the agreements did represent a great deal of that which advocates had been fighting for so long; greater self-determination, a position as negotiators rather than victims, and a firmly established relationship of obligation with the government they had so long pledged owed them a great debt. The James Bay treaties, however, had not come without cost. In a retrospective on the agreement, airing ten years later on November 11th, 1985, Tom Kennedy of CBC’s The National argued that though the Northern Cree and Inuit had experienced dramatic change in the form of new housing, schools and health clinics, there were many problems as well. These included a decline in the traditional way of life, polluted drinking water and high levels of mercury in fish stocks. Though an
estimated one third of the Cree had been against the agreement from the beginning, even those who had
initially supported were beginning to see its shortcomings.\textsuperscript{5}

In addition to the surrender of lands, the treaties had the effect, in Canada, of diverting a great
deal of more radical opposition by legitimizing and prioritizing the process by which mainstream
organizations could in fact play a role in securing real gains for Indigenous people. Aboriginal nations
from coast to coast correctly sensed opportunity, however limited, and large mainstream organizations
seemed the most poised to take on the challenge of guiding the people through a complicated
bureaucratic process for which many had not been prepared. As such, the land claims policy effectively
silenced a great deal of alternative opposition and changed the face of Indigenous activism in Canada
from a diverse field of opinions into a more streamlined process increasingly aimed at negotiating with
government. As it would evolve, the modern treaty process also meant that First Nations organizations
with established bureaucracies and relationships would increasingly seek a seat at the constitutional
table in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Having been admitted to this level of negotiation, Aboriginal
organizations would not back down. The NIB, turned the AFN in the 1980s, was bolstered by the
process, and once admitted it would not back down.

In the United States, 1975 saw a new constitutional amendment for Native Americans. It was,
according to Edmund Danziger Jr., a response to three interrelated historical factors including the
proliferation in the late 1960s of carious task forces, committees and congressional investigations into
the state of Native American life, the efforts of Native Americans themselves, as well as a growing
attention to Indian matters emanating from the White House.\textsuperscript{6} Whatever the factors, the Act certainly
signalled an important change. In some ways, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational
Assistance Act represented a quasi-victory for Native American activists. In its preamble, the Act clearly acknowledged both that “the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has
served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities,” and
secondly, that “the Indian people will never surrender their desire to control their relationships both among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations and persons.” It was this latter point that had animated Indigenous activism in the United States for centuries; yet its overt acknowledgement by Federal authorities signalled to all those who had worked so tirelessly that, at least on this point, their message was clear.

The Act aimed to encourage and foster more Native American involvement in service delivery in particular. It recognized “the obligation of the United States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination by ensuring maximum Indian participation in the direction of education as well as other Federal services to Indian communities so as to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.” Education was a key feature of the Act, which allowed Indian communities the ability to establish their own schools and to design, at least in part, the curriculum taught there. In other areas, such as Indian Health services and justice, the Act also designated funds designed to allow tribes to “plan, conduct, consolidate, and administer programs, services, functions, and activities, or portions thereof, administered by the Department of the Interior through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” Other guarantees concerned wages on parity with those paid within the locality, as well as the establishment of joint advisory committees to ensure Native American participation in the implementation of new agreements. President Gerald Ford, speaking on January 4th, 1975, summarized the act as “a milestone for Indian people. It will enable this Administration to work more closely and effectively with the tribes for the betterment of all the Indian people by assisting them in meeting goals they themselves have set.”

Indeed, the Act had generated a great deal of hope-- but mixed results. Testifying before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1977, Joseph De La Cruz, chairman of the Quinault Tribe of Washington as well as head of the now-powerful National Tribal Chairmen's Association, admitted as much. As he argued, “I, along with other tribal chairmen, greeted the passage of the Act in 1975 with
hope that Indian tribes finally would be able to administer their new programs without confusion and conflict. I cannot report to you today that we still have such hope.” Complaints centred primarily on difficulties with implementation: it seemed that the BIA “had tied the new Indian contracts to its own narrow and preexisting priorities.” Areas deemed not a priority by the BIA, including education in Native languages, were simply pushed aside. Tribes were forced to operate pre-existing BIA programs which they had long insisted did not meet their needs or reflect the priorities of their communities. This, combined with the “bureaucracy of the contracting process” including daunting paperwork, delays in reimbursements and inflexible administrators, made the optimism that first greeted the legislation fade rather quickly. Though De La Cruz admitted that the Act had granted Native Americans an unprecedented amount of local control as evidenced in many areas by a reduction in unemployment, the development of new infrastructure and local agencies, as well as a new enthusiasm for learning to navigate the process, he insisted that the reality had fallen far short of the dream. Nevertheless, by January of 1978, the Secretary of the Interior had 537 “contracts” with Native American groups valued at approximately $137 million. Indeed, as Vine Deloria, Jr., admitted, in the late 1970s, “One thing was certain: Indians had broken the back of the termination mentality and had emerged from the shadows of social neglect into a better day.”

Another contributing factor to the repression of radicalism, particularly in an American context, was the prosecution of radical activists. The COINTELPRO, or Counter Intelligence Program, was launched in 1956, purportedly to curtail Communist activity in the United States. Its stated purpose was to “expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize” its targets, and it used a variety of methods to do so. In the 1960s, the program was expanded to include several domestic groups including the Black Panthers as well as the American Indian Movement. It included covert surveillance, the implanting of covert operatives such as Douglas Durham, a secret agent who played a major role in gathering intelligence on American Indian Movement members and activities, as well as intimidation, harassment, and
discrediting important leaders. As Dennis Banks has observed, as a result of the constant surveillance and threat of the FBI served to wear down the people, both at Wounded Knee and in its aftermath: “A kind of fatigue set in... So the traditionalists asked us to disengage, to try and take some of the heaviest pressure off. And, out of respect, we had no choice but to honour those wishes. And that was the end of AIM, at least in the way it had been known up till then... the movement itself kind of disappeared.” In addition, COINTELPRO actively worked to frighten activists or would-be activists through murder and intimidation. Between March 1, 1973, and March 1, 1976, the yearly murder rate on the Pine Ridge Reservation rose to 170 per 100,000, a number almost equivalent to that during the 1973 coup d'etat in Chile which ousted democratically-elected socialist President Salvador Allende. Leonard Peltier was extradited to the United States from Canada based on questionable eye-witness affidavits for his alleged participation in the shooting of two federal agents during a 1975 conflict on the Pine Ridge reservation, and in 1977, convicted and sentenced to two consecutive life terms. Peltier's conviction is listed as one of Amnesty International’s “Unfair Trials” in its 2010 annual report, and the Leonard Peltier Defense Committee continues to agitate for his release. Finally, many former and current AIM members remain terrified and reluctant to detail their involvement in the activism of the early 1970s, suggesting both the severity of the FBI's tactics, as well as their continuing fear as to what may befall them if they speak out.

Therefore, in both Canada and in the United States, the climate of Indigenous activism had changed significantly by 1975. Though there had been, for the most of the twentieth century, a kind of echo effect in Indigenous protest and in legislative policy which meant that Canada seemed to follow the United States, the mid-1970s seemed, at least in some sense, to be the time where both nations faced the same context. For one, the primary goal motivating much of the activism of the rights era – to get the Government’s attention and focus on Native issues – had been realized. Though the solutions were not perfect, they were under discussion and offered, which was for many an important step
forward. Additionally, the process for change had become more formal; no longer were radical groups negotiating with the government, whether successfully or unsuccessfully. A legislative process had been put into place in both countries which recognized existing structures of governance and which prioritized mainstream organizations and local governments who were recognized by Federal authorities as legitimate. This essentially limited the spectre of effective activism possible, as well as served to bolster the claims of Indigenous leadership that they did indeed represent the grassroots themselves.

I have argued that Indigenous nationalism has been over-simplified in the historiography, ignoring the way in which organizers and activists participated on multiple fronts and for multiple reasons in certain types of activism. Moreover, I have maintained that the large pan-Indigenous organizations that emerged during this time never fully realized their project; in advocating for a pan-Indigenous agenda, they in fact alienated much of their potential constituency. The structure that mainstream organizations in particular assumed was far too close to the structure of non-Indigenous government to appear relevant to the every day concerns of the people and though it seemed as though most knew that they existed, it is clear, and has been demonstrated at length in this study, that they were not the primary forum for Indigenous activism that they strove to be.

At the same time, this dissertation has demonstrated the myriad of ways in which Indigenous people did engage. Due in large part to a growing and dynamic context for the pursuit of rights surrounding them, Aboriginal Canadians and Native Americans gained a new awareness and a renewed passion in the post-Second World War period, and the 1960s in particular, that made such high-profile activism possible and, in many cases, effective. The many movements for national liberation on the part of previously colonized groups in other parts of the world urged many to reconsider the way in which Indigenous people lived in their own colonized homelands. While other activist groups and ethnic minorities could and did help the Indigenous cause in several cases, Indigenous activism
remained relatively insular due to its emphasis on the idea of historical justice in a contemporary context, as well as its insistence on the continuing existence of Indian nations rather than Indigenous individuals. Canadian Aboriginal people and Native Americans demonstrated a great deal of congruity in their approaches and responses to legislative during this period, but Canada, as demonstrated in several instances, seemed to follow the American lead in terms of legislation, and Indigenous protest followed suit. As the struggles of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s showed, the question was not in fact individual or collective rights. What Indigenous organizers were pushing was in fact a unique combination of both, wherein Indigenous people, as members of Indigenous nations, were not simply citizens with equal rights or even with extra rights. Rather, they were people deserving collective rights and individual opportunity in a modern context by virtue of a continuing and historic relationship with those who had colonized them. While Aboriginal people had by this time lived under the spectre of colonialism for several centuries, they insisted that they had never given up; that they remained Indians; and that their respective nation-states urgently needed to renegotiate the terms of an agreements made unequally and unfairly so long ago.

While the sense of an Indigenous renewal in North America was a rather general feeling during this period, the specific reasons for which people engaged with activism during this period were all very unique. The multiple perspectives engaged, including those related to degree of militancy, age, gender and geographic residence or upbringing all contributed to the development of diverse organizations that served radically different communities. Activists moved among them and between them depending on their own personal evolution and the development of the dynamic organizations and groups with which they were engaged.

The weighty questions of Indigenous nationalism engaged within the context of this historical study have important implications in a contemporary sense. This is because since the mid 70s, the context for Indigenous nationalism has changed significantly. As Charles Wilkinson has argued, the
assumption of more powers and responsibilities, beginning in the early 1970s but accelerating after 1975, “released a surge of cultural pride; at last it became safe to be an Indian.” This was represented in part, by a resurgence of traditionalism, as well as by the increasingly insular efforts of particular nations to enact change within their own borders through federal programming, redirecting the struggle in some sense to those pursued on behalf of tribal nations. In a way, this reorientation has reduced the visibility of Indigenous activism within the wider society. And while large pan-Indian groups have adapted and changed, much as they always have, they continue to represent an important element in the quest for Indigenous justice within the modern North American nation state. What this shift has meant, for smaller and less powerful Indigenous groups, is a worsening of conditions overall. Large and powerful nations, particularly in an American context, have been able to successfully develop business plans, corporations and sustainable economic development on many reservations. Poorer nations with few or no resources, on the other hand, have continued to be left behind though most have been pursuing what change is possible on a local level.

In a Canadian context, the struggle has also shifted to one based on a more regional or local level. Those interviewed consistently maintained that it has been much easier in a sense to focus on these issues and to achieve piecemeal change than to worry about the larger national goals that are more difficult to achieve. At the same time, the constitutional battles of the 1980s and early 1990s have also provided some encouragement to Indigenous organizations who have managed to prove, in some way, that they too deserve a seat at the constitutional table. For the governments of Canada and the United States, the battle has also shifted from the press and the public to the backrooms. It is the nature of large organizations currently advocating for Indigenous rights to adopt the mannerisms and structures, at least to a certain degree, of those with whom they are negotiating.

A notable exception, and one that should give legislators reason to pause, is the very recent and growing popularity of a new grassroots movement called Idle No More. It is a response to Conservative
Prime Minister Stephen Harper's second omnibus budget bill, Bill C-45, which threatens to further erode Aboriginal treaty rights through changes to the Indian Act, the Navigation Protection Act and the Environmental Assessment Act. It allows for the lease of Indigenous lands without the support of the majority of eligible voters as well as provides the Minister with the power to call the meeting to consider ceding such territory. In addition, the Navigation Protection Act is slated to be amended to remove the onus on major pipeline and power line projects to prove that their project will not destroy or damage a navigable water way unless the water way is on a list prepared by the Minister. Finally, changes to the Environmental Assessment Act further reduces the number of projects requiring environmental assessment. For Indigenous people, who have largely posited themselves in this era as guardians of the land, Idle No More represents a much-needed intervention. Its mission statement is reminiscent of some of the action taking place over three decades ago: “Idle No More calls on all people to join in a revolution which honours and fulfils Indigenous sovereignty which protects land and water.” Its Facebook group boasts over 45,000 members, and the movement itself demonstrates the new possibilities of social media in a global age. Idle No More supporters have posted comments from as far as the United Kingdom, and even those in remote communities have been staging their own protests and demonstrations. Canada's AFN has expressed its public support for the movement. In addition, many supporters have participated in sit-ins, round dances and blockades.

Historians are often reluctant to make predictions. After all, ours is a study of the past, of people and events that once were and that influenced the present. But the question of Indigenous nationalism, much as it the past, is currently being reevaluated today as demonstrated by an increased focus on interdisciplinary work, increased enrolment in Native Studies programs, a renewed discussion on what it means to be Indigenous and what the new nationalist project is for our times. It is my hope that this study can help reveal what has worked, what has not worked, and what might be the best course for the future.
For a copy of Morrow's findings and his landmark decision, visit www.tlichohistory.com/...


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