UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

A STUDY OF GLOBAL TERRORISM AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

BY

PARAMBIR KAUR SIDHU

WINNIPEG, MANITOBA

OCTOBER 2005

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
*****
COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE

A Study of Global Terrorism and its Implications for International Relations

BY

Parambir Kaur Sidhu

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University

of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

PARAMBIR KAUR SIDHU©2005

To Rana

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

              Definition of Concepts
              International Relations

      Part One
              Theory of Terrorism
                      Definition of Terrorism
                      Root Causes of Terrorism
                      Psychology of Terrorism
              Religiously Motivated Terrorism
              Global Terrorism
              Summary
      Part Two
              Literature Review
                      Globalization and Terrorism
                      Implications of Global Terrorism on IR
                      Analysis

      Part One
              The Al-Qaeda Movement: Its Historical and Religious Roots
      Part Two
              The Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization
      Part Three
              The Global Network
                      Leadership
                      Operations

ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank several people who have significantly contributed to the success of this thesis: first and foremost, my advisor, Dr. George Maclean, for his guidance and support; my editor, Colette Stoeber, for her efficiency and attention to detail as this thesis progressed through several revisions; my friends Maninderjit Kaur Bains and Dr. Jagdeep Singh Bachher, for being loyal readers—without their support the journey would have been long and hard; and, last but not least, my husband, Ranjodh Singh Sidhu, for his love and support throughout this entire project.

ABSTRACT

In the past ten to fifteen years, international relations has witnessed dramatic changes in the geopolitical structure of the international system. The changes in the geopolitical structure have contributed to many forms of violence, terrorism being one of them. At the same time, the process of globalization has intensified the conditions of interdependence in the world. The evolving nature of terrorism and globalization, along with their significant effects on world politics, necessitates a closer examination of their impact on international relations. From the realist school of thought, Kenneth Waltz's neorealism is one effective tool that can assist in exploring the concepts of globalization and terrorism within international relations. The organizing principles of Waltz's neorealism provide the opportunity to explore the relationship between global terrorism and states in a parsimonious, rigorous, and testable manner. Through neorealism the implications of global terrorism on the international political system as a whole will become apparent.

Changes in the international political system also include the end of the Cold War. The international balance of powers has gone through a tremendous shift: a bipolar (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) system has been replaced by a unipolar system and a number of unsettled conflicts in the world. Many of these conflicts are rooted in religion and have contributed to the steady rise in terrorist activities worldwide. Although terrorism is an ancient phenomenon, it has recently evolved to a much grander scale, transcending all physical boundaries in the international system.

Terrorist organizations have incorporated the processes of globalization into their strategic and operational planning, enhancing their abilities to strike with

efficiency and hence meet their organizational goals more effectively. With recent world events it has become increasingly clear that changes in terrorist activities are of significant consequence in the study of international relations.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. are a testament to the evolution of terrorism: it is not simply a global phenomenon but a serious threat to international security. This thesis will bring several evolving concepts together in an exploration of the dynamic relationship between terrorism and globalization using a neorealist theoretical framework.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis poses two questions: What is the relationship between globalization and terrorism, and what are the implications of that relationship on international relations (IR), specifically within the theory of Kenneth Waltz's neorealism? This thesis has two objectives. The first is to explore the relationship between globalization and terrorism and argue that post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), IR is witnessing the evolution of terrorism into a new phenomenon this thesis calls "global terrorism." The second objective is to explore global terrorism within the theoretical framework of Waltz's neorealism and determine if the theory can adequately explore the phenomenon by providing sound implications of global terrorism on IR.

The concepts of globalization and terrorism are well known and well analyzed in their respective fields; however, their relationship to each other has not been widely examined within IR theory. Two reasons exist for this gap. First, global terrorism is a *recent* phenomenon—proceeding through a normal academic process of research and analysis—and, as a result, literature on the aspects of the subject matter that this thesis addresses is still scarce. Second, despite the fact that this relationship has serious implications for the international political system, it is not a traditional subject of examination for theorists in IR.

The key purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications of global terrorism on IR within a neorealist theoretical framework. Neorealism is a dominant theory of IR with a rigorous and testable theoretical framework. Neorealism's

organizing principles provide a suitable conceptual framework through which to explore the phenomenon of global terrorism with the objective of identifying implications for IR. In setting out to accomplish a task that has not been attempted within neorealism, this thesis will contribute significantly to the study of IR as well as to terrorism studies. It will identify strengths and weaknesses in neorealism, allowing an evaluation of Waltz's neorealism as a tool for determining implications for IR.

It is important here to note the boundaries of this thesis. Its focus will not be on the structure of the international system but on the usefulness of Waltz's neorealism. Concentrating exclusively on the implications of global terrorism on IR and the usefulness of neorealism—not the implications of global terrorism on the theory of neorealism—this approach will accomplish this thesis' primary task. It is imperative for this thesis to remain within the boundaries of its own research questions as well as within the boundaries of Waltz's neorealism. By adhering to such rigorous limits, not only will this thesis be able to conclude that it examined Waltz's neorealism as a theory when confronted with global terrorism, but it will also determine the relationship between globalization, terrorism, and IR.

This task will be accomplished in four chapters. Chapter One will introduce the reader to the key concepts of globalization and terrorism and explain the importance of studying their relationship. The chapter will then introduce the reader to Kenneth Waltz's concept of neorealism, which will provide the theoretical structure within which the research questions will be explored. The main focus here will be to inform the reader of the theoretical boundaries of this study. Chapter One will set the stage for the conceptual overview and literature review of Chapter Two,

the empirical case study of Chapter Three, and the final chapter's exploration of the implications of global terrorism on IR.

Chapter Two will provide a conceptual overview of terrorism by first introducing the reader to the current literature on terrorism, and then reviewing the literature on globalization and terrorism and analyzing its implications for IR. Chapter Two has two important roles in this thesis. First, because it cannot be assumed that "global terrorism" has a set definition within the study of terrorism or IR, this chapter will first establish a working definition of global terrorism. After this, the definition will be explored within Waltz's neorealism. The purpose of this review is to evaluate existing academic literature on neorealism and global terrorism, and literature that shows an association or correlation between globalization and terrorism, in this way distinguishing global terrorism as an evolution of international terrorism. The chapter will also identify any limitations or unexplored areas in relation to the research questions within the current literature.

Chapter Three will provide empirical evidence through case studies, demonstrating the extent to which terrorism has become a global phenomenon. Since this thesis is exploratory in nature and focuses on the relationship between the two concepts, the current nature of case study research provides the perfect opportunity to investigate this new phenomenon with a real life example. To this end, the Al-Qaeda terrorist movement will be the case for analysis. The case study will apply a logical sequence in exploring Al-Qaeda's organizational attributes related to globalization. Due to the clandestine nature of terrorist group operations, the case study will rely on academic research and open source material available through well-known

government and journalistic sources. Although it may seem problematic to make generalizations about global terrorism within IR based on one specific terrorist organization, this problem will be circumvented through the design of this case study, which will draw upon on the phenomenon of global terrorism as a whole by focusing on the global and transnational nature of the movement. A consideration of the evolution of terrorism through globalization will allow an exploration of analytical generalizations within a neorealist theoretical framework.

Chapter Four will examine the empirical evidence from Chapters One, Two, and Three to explore the research questions. An analysis of all three chapters will reveal the aftermath of 9/11 as a watershed in the history of terrorism, with the emergence of a newly evolved phenomenon: globalized terrorism. Using Waltz's neorealism, the chapter will analyze globalized terrorism with reference to his three defining characteristics of the international system. Each characteristic will be considered in order to determine the influence and implications of global terrorism on IR. The concluding chapter will raise some questions that identify the limitations of Waltz's neorealism and this research and, more importantly, set the stage for future research.

This thesis topic is very timely. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States announced that it was going to wage a "war" against terrorism and that its prime focus was to eliminate the Al-Qaeda terrorist network globally. There is some history in the making with these unprecedented decisions. Never has a superpower waged a "war" against a terrorist group. Indeed, conventional wars have

never been fought against terrorist groups.[1] A terrorist organization's actions have never before created such a serious global threat to human security that the immediate reaction was the spending of billions of dollars in the security industry. Since 9/11, terrorism has not only been discussed and debated extensively in the popular press, it has been on the agenda of all major world leaders, global organizations (UN, WEF, WTO, and IMF), as well as on the international and domestic agendas of all states. Considering the attention given to terrorism since 9/11 and the current focus on globalization, an exploration of the relationship between these two concepts is vital.

Definition of Concepts

Globalization is a social, political, and economic phenomenon of which each discipline of study has its own definition (see Table 1.1). It is not the intention of this thesis, however, to incorporate the definition of globalization from every discipline in order to examine its relationship to terrorism and IR. The main feature of globalization adopted by this thesis is that it is a process that takes place in the world at large without any attachment to territorial space. For the purposes of this study, then, the most appropriate definition of globalization is that it is "a process of removing officially imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an 'open' and 'integrated' world."[2] Although admittedly too broad, this definition is useful for describing the interconnection among states when examining the relationship between globalization and terrorism. This definition of globalization captures its most important aspect: that it is a *process* by which "open" and

---

[1] International terrorism was a priority during the Reagan administration. However, global terrorism presents a different set of challenges than those experienced during the Reagan administration.
[2] Jan Aart Scholte, "Globalization: Prospects for a Paradigm Shift," in *Politics and Globalization: Knowledge, Ethics and Agency*, ed., Martin Shaw (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1999), 11.

"integrated" markets have created an interconnectedness among organizations, cities, states, and countries in different parts of the world using effective and efficient technology. It is the globalizing process that has allowed the administrators of terrorist organizations to function outside of traditional practices of terrorist activity and attain a more global approach to terrorism.

Table 1.1

Definitions of Globalization

Definition	Author
The process of spreading various objects and experiences worldwide.	Scholte
The process of removing officially imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an "open" and "integrated" world.	Scholte
A complex and multi-layered concept and social phenomenon.	Kalb
A process whereby state-centric agencies and terms of reference are dissolved in favor of a structure of relations between different actors operating in a context which is truly global rather than merely international.	Evans

Sources: Jan Aart Scholte, "Globalization: Prospects for a Paradigm Shift," in *Politics and Globalization: Knowledge, Ethics and Agency*, ed. Martin Shaw (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1999), 11; Don Kalb and Marco van der Land, ed., *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 1; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Group, 1998), 201.

Within this study, terrorism is "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological."[3] A

---

[3] David J. Whittaker, ed., *The Terrorism Reader*, 2d ed. (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2003), 3.

multitude of definitions of terrorism exist, each with its own emphasis on various key aspects or elements (see Table 1.2). However, it is not the intention of this thesis to address the relationship between globalization and terrorism from these various perspectives, but instead to use a well-rounded definition that will aid in the exploration of this relationship. The above definition allows terrorism to be explored from different perspectives without losing sight of the fact that it is an ideology. It is important to note that when this thesis refers to "terrorism" or any of its associated terms (such as "terrorist" and "terrorist activity"), it is in the context of the definition provided and as an activity that is internationally condemned.

Table 1.2

Definitions of Terrorism

Definition	Author
A conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behavior of multiple audiences.	Crenshaw
The deliberate and systemic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.	Harmon
The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.	Whittaker
Fundamentally and inherently political . . . also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change.	Hoffman

Sources: Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 4; Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 1; David J. Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 3; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 15.

International Relations

International relations is a heterogeneous and interdisciplinary study of interactions between states-based actors across state boundaries.[4] IR theory entails the development of conceptual frameworks and theories that facilitate the understanding and explanation of events and phenomena in world politics. It also helps analyze state policies and practices. Theoretical debates within IR take various positions on the political status of the international system.[5] Within IR, the three classical theoretical frameworks are realism, liberalism, and Marxism. Each of these provides a different perspective on how to explore and explain the state of the international system. In this thesis, the implications of global terrorism will be explored within a neorealist theoretical framework. Although neorealism provides a suitable framework for addressing the questions raised by this thesis, its usefulness will be determined in this paper. The neorealist theoretical framework was chosen for two reasons.

First, realism is the dominant theory of IR and it provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war, which is considered to be the regular condition of life in the international system.[6] This means that the international system is a continual anarchy within which each state constantly positions itself strategically in relation to other states in the system in order to maintain its place. According to neorealism, states have only one interest given the conditions of international anarchy: self-preservation. A natural correlation exists between an anarchical international system and terrorism. In an anarchical system, the fear of war is constant; with the presence

---

[4] Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Group, 1998), 274.
[5] This term will be used to describe the state-system as defined in IR.
[6] Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism," in *The Globalization of World Politics*, 2d ed., ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 141.

of terrorism, the fear of domestic and international security for governments is a constant. And in the case of global terrorism, international security's fear of a counterterrorist response occurs each time a terrorist attack engages more than one state. The newly evolved phenomenon of global terrorism is collectively costing states billions of dollars each year in their efforts to lower the threat of terrorism. This correlation allows terrorism to be explored as a phenomenon that can cause states to alter their behavior—in response to this transnational phenomenon—in the international system. The core characteristics of neorealism provide a suitable framework for exploring security issues that arise from international global terrorism.

Second, neorealism provides an opportunity to explore the concept of global terrorism in a systemic, deductive, and rigorous theoretical framework with an exclusive focus on states. The realist school of thought has had a great impact on U.S. foreign policy, and considering the significant role that the U.S. plays in world politics, it is important to explore the concept of global terrorism within the theoretical framework of the state that is dominating world politics. The prime target of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was the U.S., and the responding "War on Terrorism" was also led by the U.S. In a unipolar system, the U.S. has taken an international leadership role in highlighting terrorism as a global phenomenon and leading the world to take the appropriate steps to its eradication. In all of this, the U.S. response to terrorism has been rooted in a realist and neorealist school of thought. Given the significant role realism and neorealism have played in U.S. foreign policy decisions, then, it is appropriate for this thesis to use neorealist theory to explore the concept of globalized terrorism and determine the usefulness of the theory.

The focus of this thesis is not to examine the implications of global terrorism on the U.S.; however, if there are implications for the U.S., then there will be implications for IR, especially with regard to neorealism. Waltz's neorealism is a balance of power theory. Any reference in the literature to the impact of global terrorism on the U.S. is an added advantage for this study, even though the U.S. is not the direct focus of this thesis.

In order to establish the theoretical boundaries of this framework, however, it is important to understand the differences between neorealism and realism. Neorealism has its roots in the theory of realism and was introduced by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979.[7] The theory of realism became dominant in world politics after World War Two. The realist tradition can be divided into two schools: classical and modern. Classical realists include Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The core assumptions of modern realism rest on classical realism. It is important to note that both classical and modern realism occur in many forms: historical, structural I, structural II, and liberal (see Table 1.3). Despite these differences, however, all realists share some of the following core assumptions: the state is the main actor in international politics; sovereignty gives the state supreme authority to make and enforce laws; the international system is always an anarchical one; the main goal in international politics is survival; security of the state can only be obtained through self-help principles; and power is the dominant means of achieving survival. Neorealism has emerged from within these core assumptions of the realist tradition,

---

[7] Robert Keohane, ed. *Neo-realism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 14.

and Waltz's theory is only one version of neorealism.[8] It is not the intention of this thesis to test Waltz's theory of neorealism. Instead, it will determine if his theory can lead us to some adequate conclusions about the impact of global terrorism on IR; his theory is simply one way of exploring the research questions posed by thesis.

For Waltz, the realist position was too vague and needed to be more structural, parsimonious, explanatory, and testable. He argued that realism was unable to conceptualize the international system because it was limited by explaining political outcomes through examination of the constituent parts of political systems. This, he says, was a reductionist approach to understanding the international system.[9] Using a very structured approach, Waltz refined realism into a testable theory by rejecting unit-level theories (reductionist theories) and attempting to explain the global system as a whole. Waltz's intention was to develop a more rigorous theory of international politics, one that examined international politics as a system with a precisely defined structure that included an economic perspective and broke the realist theoretical framework down to a testable scientific theory[10] (see Table 1.4). Waltz's inclusion of economics in the theory of IR follows from the idea that economic capabilities cannot be separated from other capabilities of states because states use economic means for military and political ends, which ultimately determines their position in the international system.[11] According to Waltz, a theory of IR must explain why an

---

[8] Steven L. Lamy, "Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism," in *The Globalization of World Politics*, 2d ed., ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 185.
[9] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," in Keohane, ed., 47-48.
[10] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Laws and Theories," in Keohane, ed., 27-46.
[11] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in Keohane, ed., 81-86.

anarchical system continues to reproduce itself: in other words, why the international

system is constantly in anarchy.

Waltz's neorealism is organized using a three-tier definition of political

structure, suggesting that all political systems vary along three dimensions: the

system's ordering principle; the functional differentiation of units; and the

distribution of capabilities.[12] The three-tier definition of political structure can be

applied to both domestic and international politics.

---

[12] Ibid., 81.

Table 1.3
A Taxonomy of Realisms

Type of Realism	Key Thinkers (Classical and Modern)	Key Texts	"Big Idea"
Structural Realism I (Human Nature)	Thucydides (c. 430-400 B.C.) Morgenthau (1948)	The Peloponnesian War Politics Among Nations	International politics are driven by an endless struggle for power, which is rooted in human nature. Justice, law, and society have either no place or are circumscribed.
Historical or Practical Realism	Machiavelli (1532) Carr (1939)	The Prince The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939	Political realism recognizes that principles are subordinate to policies; the ultimate skill of the state leader is to accept and adapt to the changing power configuration in world politics.
Structural Realism II (International System)	Rousseau (c. 1750) Waltz (1979)	The State of War Theory of International Politics	The anarchical system, not human nature, fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity. Conflicts can emerge even if the actors have benign intent towards each other.
Liberal Realism	Hobbes (1651) Bull (1977)	Leviathan The Anarchical Society	International anarchy can be cushioned by states who have the capability to deter other states from aggression, and who can construct elementary rules for their coexistence.

The first core characteristic is the system's ordering principle. In the international system, the ordering principle is anarchy.[13] Anarchy is the lack of order and organization in the international system. The lack of an overarching authority that regulates the behavior of states causes states to socialize into behavior that focuses on self-preservation and self-help in a pursuit for survival.[14] According to Waltz, the anarchical nature of the international system causes states to form spontaneous order by strategically positioning themselves through self-interested acts and interactions.[15] Other international actors such as international organizations and nonstate actors, he says, exist; however, in order for them to play an important role in the international system, they require some attributes and capabilities of states. Hence, states remain the only units that determine the political outcomes of the international system.[16]

The second core characteristic of the political system refers to the functions performed by the differentiated units. Waltz suggests that in an international political system, states are differentiated through the functions they perform. But because the conditions of anarchy dictate that all states strive for the same goal—which is survival—they remain alike in their functions.[17] Put simply, units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated; they are all the same. The reason that states remain alike in an international political system has to do with the system one chooses to analyze. For Waltz, states set the rules of engagement in the international political system and others play within those rules, therefore states remain the main

---

[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 81-84.
[16] Ibid., 81.
[17] Ibid., 87-92.

players.[18] States, Waltz says, are alike in the tasks that they face and not in their ability to perform them.[19] For the most part, states perform tasks that are common to all other states; for example, all states have agencies that interpret and execute the law, and all have related laws for raising revenue. Hence, this function alone is duplicated by most states. Therefore, according to Waltz, the functions performed by the differentiated units remains the same.

In the second core characteristic, Waltz also addresses a feature of the international system that is central to this thesis. He suggests that "it is important to consider the nature of transnational movements, the extent of their penetration, and the conditions that make it harder or easier for states to control them."[20] He acknowledges transnational phenomena as having an impact on the international system and suggests that if they and nonstate actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing great powers, not just minor ones, then it would be important to develop theories to explain them.[21]

This thesis focuses on global terrorism as a transnational phenomenon, not on terrorist groups as nonstate actors. But it must take into account Waltz's warnings about the overwhelming influence that transnational phenomena could have in the international system. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications of global terrorism as a transnational phenomenon to determine its implications for the international political system.

---

[18] Ibid., 89.
[19] Ibid., 90-91.
[20] Ibid., 89.
[21] Ibid.

The third core characteristic of Waltz's international system is the distribution

of capabilities of the units in the system. The capability of units to pursue their

interests is relative to power, and power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of

the units.[22] Therefore, units are distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser

capabilities for performing similar tasks, and the structure of a system changes with

changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units. For example,

given U.S. military superiority, it is safe to assume that because no other state could

match U.S. military capabilities, the world will accept its role as a leader in the fight

against terrorism. Waltz suggests that the ideology and form of government are unit

attributes that cannot be assessed as capabilities because relations that are defined as

interactions must be eliminated from the structural definition.[23] However, he says that

relations defined in terms of the grouping of states do reveal how states are placed in

the system. Waltz also indicates that just as a market place's success or failure

depends on its number of firms, the stability of the international political system

depends on the number of units (states) in the international system. A multipolar

system is far more stable than a bipolar system, and a bipolar system is more stable

than a unipolar system.[24]

The ordering principle of the system, the differentiation of functions, and the

distribution of capabilities form the core characteristics of Waltz's neorealist

theoretical framework. Waltz's theory of international political systems deduces a

number of things: the international system is anarchical; states are the only players in

the international political system; states are constantly in anarchy; the structure of the

---

[22] Ibid., 92-94.
[23] Ibid., 93.
[24] Ibid., 93-97.

system will determine the behavior of the states; states select strategies to maximize benefits and minimize their losses; states are self-interested and are pushed by competitive systems towards self-help; states are motivated by distrust and fear because no state can be sure of another state's intentions; the most critical problem in an anarchical system is survival; and the system must be aware of transnational phenomena, especially if their development begins surpassing great powers.[25] The fundamental differences between Waltz's neorealism and classical realism are demonstrated below (see Table 1.4).

Neorealism is in essence a structural theory. Within neorealism, structural realism and neorealism are considered by some IR theorists to be synonymous, whereas others indicate a clear distinction between them. It is important to note the difference between structural realism and neorealism, the former of which was an attempt to refine neorealism by rethinking the concept of structure in a broader sense. For example, structural realism emphasizes relative capabilities to determine a state's ability to pursue goals in an anarchic system. Structural realism focuses on deep structure—which includes power, institutions, rules, and norms—to view the international system.

As mentioned earlier, Waltz does not undermine the importance of international organizations in the international system, nor does he undermine the importance of structure. He states that the role they play in the international system requires some attributes from states, therefore states remain the only players in the

---

[25] Ibid., 89.

international system that determine the political outcomes of the international

system.[26]

Table 1.4

Differences Between Classical Realism and Neorealism

Classical/Modern Realism	Neorealism
Roots of conflict are derived from human nature.	Roots of conflict are derived from logic of system anarchy.
Nation-states are the most important actors.	Units (states) are the only actors in global politics.
Focus is on power maximization as the dominant interest of states.	Units (states) have only one interest—self preservation/state-survival (rather than maximizing power).
Domestic politics and leaders can influence international politics	Sole focus is on the international level of analysis. Domestic factors are irrelevant to international politics.
Realism is the "art" of global politics.	Realism is the "science" of global politics.

Source: Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism" in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 2d. ed., eds. John Baylis and Steven Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 141-199.

Also, maximizing power is not a core characteristic of Waltz's neorealism. Although

power is important in determining how states strategically place themselves in the

international system, Waltz argues that in an anarchical system states are more

concerned with maximizing their security than they are their power. Power for Waltz

is measured by the distribution of capabilities; it is not the highest priority for a state

---

[26] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in Keohane, ed., 81.

to achieve power in a system where self-preservation is a priority.[27] This thesis does not focus on structural neorealism. It explores the research questions within a very basic framework of Waltz's neorealism and its organizing principles. Given that structural neorealism and Waltz's neorealism are closely associated, incorporating structural neorealism into the framework of this thesis would limit the exploration of the broader implications of the transnational phenomenon on IR.

Although this thesis uses neorealism as its theoretical framework, it also acknowledges that neorealism has certain limitations. Any analytical generalizations drawn from exploring the research question within a neorealist theoretical framework intend to shed light on the broader problem of global terrorism. The limitations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* have been pointed out by IR theorists. Robert Keohane, a liberal institutionalist, published *Neo-realism and Its Critics* in 1986, in which Keohane along with John Gerard Ruggie, Robert W. Cox, Richard K. Ashley, and Robert G. Gilpin analytically critiqued Waltz's neorealism, identifying its limitations and providing alternative solutions.

Ruggie argues that Waltz's neorealism fails to explain the changes of the international system over time; for example, neorealist theory could not predict the end of the Cold War, nor why the system changed from bipolar to unipolar.[28] Keohane stresses that Waltz needs to integrate economics and international institutions to account for cooperation in the system.[29] Cox labels neorealism as both ahistorical and a problem-solving theory, flawed because it lacks the ability to

---

[27] Ibid., 81-96.
[28] Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane ed., 17.
[29] Ibid.

comprehend changes in the world.[30] Ashley sees neorealism as statist, positivist, and uncritical of scientific progress.[31] Despite this combined criticism, however, Keohane acknowledges Waltz's neorealism as a widely recognized, important, and major statement of neorealist doctrine, as well as a major contribution to the realist school of thought.[32]

The limitations of neorealist theory that deal directly with the core characteristics — such as the role of nonstate actors, international institutions, and the maximization of power — have already been addressed earlier in this chapter. This thesis recognizes that there are several important players in the international system whose influence on global terrorism and IR is very valuable to the overall understanding of this transnational phenomenon. However, in order to explore the implications of global terrorism on IR using neorealism or any other theoretical framework, certain limitations are bound to occur in the process of determining the set of variables that would allow a researcher to conduct thorough and concise research.

Neorealism's limitations and critics notwithstanding, this thesis will explore the relationship between globalization and terrorism within a neorealist theoretical framework for the reasons earlier outlined. It will analyze the implications of global terrorism on IR using Waltz's three-part definition of structure: the ordering principle, the differentiation of units, and the distribution of capabilities. Within this definition, the relationship between globalization and terrorism will be explored in order to understand the implications of this transnational phenomenon on the international

---

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 16.

political system. The process itself will not only address the main research questions, but help determine the adequacy of Waltz's neorealism. To begin this process, Chapter Two will provide a conceptual overview of terrorism and then turn to a literature review of globalization and terrorism.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW

To explore the implications of global terrorism on IR using a neorealist

theoretical framework, it is important to first develop a working definition of global

terrorism. Keeping this objective in mind, Chapter Two will be divided into two parts.

Part One will focus on developing the working definition of global terrorism by first

conducting a conceptual overview of terrorism; then providing a brief historical

overview of religiously motivated terrorism; and finally suggesting a definition of the

newly evolved phenomenon of global terrorism. Since this chapter deals with two

distinct disciplines — terrorism studies and IR — it is important to understand the

correlation between globalization and terrorism outside of neorealism. Only after a

definition has been established will this thesis be able to provide clear implications of

global terrorism on IR using a neorealist theoretical framework.

Part Two of this chapter will review the literature on globalization and

terrorism and consider its implications on IR. The review in Part Two plays a very

important role in revealing academic analysis of the evolution of globalized terrorism

and its implications for IR. The exploration of current literature in Part Two will be

built upon using Waltz's neorealism later in Chapter Four to gain a greater

understanding of the implications of globalized terrorism on IR.

Part One

The Theory of Terrorism

In order to grasp the concept of global terrorism, a theoretical framework first

needs to be established to understand terrorism in a general context. Terrorism is a

multi-layered, complex phenomenon that can be examined from several different disciplines and perspectives.[33] Terrorism does not have a testable theoretical framework, nor does it have a set of variables that allows broad comparisons between groups, types of violence, or ideologies.[34] In fact, the lack of a structural and conceptual theoretical framework is the greatest limitation in the theory of terrorism. In order to carry out research in the field, one must work out the appropriate set of parameters for the intended research. For the purposes of this thesis, a general theoretical framework will be organized around three key elements: the definition of terrorism; the root causes of terrorism; and the psychology of terrorism. The literature used in developing this framework has been drawn from academics in terrorism studies.[35]

Definition of Terrorism

The definition of terrorism this thesis employs is "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological."[36] Defining terrorism is problematic because there is no universally agreed upon or precise definition.[37] The term is under constant debate among academics, politicians, security experts, and journalists, all of whom use a variety of definitions focusing on elements that serve their own purposes. In their

---

[33] Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988), 5-32.

[34] Martha Crenshaw, "The Cause of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.

[35] While the work of several leading academics in terrorism studies were drawn upon during the course of research for this thesis, David Rapoport, Martha Crenshaw, and Bruce Hoffman stand out as those whose work was consistently referred to by other academics.

[36] Whittaker, ed., 3.

[37] Schmid and Jongman et al., 1-38.

book *Political Terrorism*, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman conduct research on the

contributions of academics in terrorism studies to the field itself.[38] They cite 109

different definitions of terrorism, which they obtained in a survey from leading

academics in the field. The authors isolated the following recurring elements in these

definitions, in order of their statistical appearance: violence, force (appeared in 83.5%

of the definitions); politics (65%); fear, emphasis on terror (51%); threats (47%);

psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%); discrepancy between the

targets and the victims (37.5%); intentional, planned, systematic, and organized

action (32%); and methods of combat, strategy, or tactics (30.5%).[39] Schmid and

Jongman's research emphasizes that there is no comprehensive and universally

accepted definition of terrorism. The definitional problem in the theoretical

framework reinforces that terrorism cannot be limited to a single definition (see Table

2.1), resulting in the many perspectives of the definition of terrorism.

Equally important in the definition of terrorism is understanding what

terrorism is not. Within the classifications of nonconventional warfare, guerilla

warfare and terrorism are often viewed as being a part of the same phenomenon.[40]

Terrorism however, has far more negative connotations than guerrilla warfare.[41] The

distinction between the two concepts is best explained by Schmid, who states that

while guerrillas fight with small numbers and often with inadequate weaponry, they

can and often do fight according to conventions of war, taking and exchanging

prisoners and respecting the rights of noncombatants. Terrorists, on the other hand,

---

[38] Ibid., 177-202.
[39] Ibid., 5-6.
[40] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 41.
[41] Ibid., 41.

place no limits on means employed and frequently resort to widespread assassination: terrorizing the indigenous civilian population.[42]

Table 2.1

Key Elements in the Definitions of Terrorism

Definition	Analyst	Elements of the Definition
A conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behavior of multiple audiences.	Crenshaw	Violence, force, political, intimidation, purposive, planned, systematic, organized action.
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.	U.S. State Department	Violence, political, influence of audience, clandestine, covert nature, criminal.
The unlawful use of—or threatened use of—force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives.	U.S. Department of Defense	Violence, force, political, damage to person/property, intimidation, criminal, coercion, civilians, noncombatants.
Fundamentally and inherently political . . . also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change.	Hoffman	Power, political.

Sources: Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 4; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 15.; Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Defined," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guildford: McGraw Hill, 2004), 19.

---

[42] Schmid and Jongman et al., 42.

Root Causes of Terrorism

The root causes of terrorism are important factors to consider when identifying the political objectives of a terrorist organization. These vary depending on the ideology of the terrorist group. Several ideologies appear in the general literature of terrorism. The common denominator in the different types of terrorism is the fact that terrorism is rooted in ideology, this being the doctrines, beliefs, and opinions of an individual, class, and/or political party.[43] In other words, root causes of terrorism are centered around a set of beliefs that are social, economic, religious, or political in nature. In the literature on terrorism, ideologies have been arranged categorically according to social, economic, religious, and political grievances. Each type of terrorist organization has its own defining characteristics, although some characteristics or elements overlap. This thesis has identified only the ideologies used by most academics in terrorism studies (see Table 2.2).

Once a group of people with a common belief system (ideology) establishes itself both internally and externally with the support of various internal and external stimuli, its next step is to seek out political participation and resolution of grievances. The lack of resolution for their grievances leads to a fundamental belief within the group that the central authority (government) needs to be challenged using violence, which is the only way for political change to occur. Particular types of terrorism may be more prevalent during certain periods in history, depending on the varying social, political, and economic climates of the world. The main threat of

---

[43] *Webster's New Dictionary and Thesaurus* (1990) s.v. "ideology."

26

Table 2.2

Taxonomy of Terrorism

Type	Ideology
Nationalist Terrorists	These are groups seeking political self-determination. They may wage a combined struggle in the territory they seek to liberate and from bases abroad.
Ideological Terrorists	These groups profess to want to change the whole nature of the existing political, social, and economic system, either to an extreme Left or extreme Right model.
Religious Fanatics	Certain religious groups employ international terrorism to undermine and ultimately overthrow what they regard as a corrupt and evil prevailing religious order.
Single Issue Fanatics	These groups are obsessed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within the target society, rather than with the aim of political revolution.
State-sponsored International Terrorism	This is used as a tool of domestic policy and as a tool of foreign policy. State sponsors may use their own directly recruited and controlled terror squads, or may choose to work through proxies and client movements. They almost invariable work covertly in such support, so that they are able to plausibly deny any involvement.

Source: Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, ed., *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987)

terrorism in the twenty-first century comes from religiously motivated terrorism, specifically Islamic fundamentalism.[44]

The challenge to central authority comes in the form of carefully orchestrated violent attack(s). The *modus operandi* for the terrorist attack depends on a number of issues: the political goals of the organization, the tactics and targets of various terrorist movements, the weapons they favor (shaped by the group's ideology), the internal organizational dynamics, the personalities of its key members, and a variety of internal and external stimuli.[45] Examples of some of these stimuli are ideology, political goals, organizational structure, leadership, resources, funds, technology, intelligence, and social and political environments. Modes of operation vary in type and complexity and may include kidnappings, assassinations, bombings of vehicles and buildings, hijackings, chemical and biological weapons, and weapons of mass destruction (from the simplest to the most complex) with mass casualties. A review of the U.S. State Department's annual report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, reveals that from the 1980s to the present the most popular method of attack has been the bomb and the most popular targets for terrorist attacks are businesses.[46] This demonstrates that weapons are accessible and that the main aim of terrorist organizations is to cause maximum economic damage.

Among the vast array of terrorist ideologies and modes of operations there are some common characteristics that point to similarities between groups, allowing for a

---

[44] Bruce Hoffman, *Testimony: Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Non-Governmental Organizations.* Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, 3 April 2001. (Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001)
[45] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 157.
[46] U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1995-2003, www.state.gov/ (Accessed on April 2, 2004)

few broad generalizations (see Table 2.3). One of the key modes of operation is the use of cellular structures, also known as terrorist cells. In *The Terrorism Reader*, David Whittaker states that because terrorists operate in a hostile environment, security is their primary concern, therefore cellular structure serves them the best.[47] The use of clandestine cells is not a new strategy, although it is a vital part of a terrorist organization.[48] Cell structure is very small and effective, each cell is part of a hierarchy and is responsible to a single point of contact above it. Within each cell, there are typically three to ten persons: a member may not even know all his or her compatriots.[49] When an action is in preparation and execution, a person, or cell, or a group of cells may be called to act together. Inactive cell members are called "sleepers." It is not necessary for all the participants to know the strategic purpose of the action, or even about the full dimension of the operations; everything is on a need-to-know basis. As a result, an organization can act quickly and effectively. In the event authorities catch a member of a cell, secrets are protected because the member have very limited knowledge and can only attest to what he or she knows. A major study estimates that there were one hundred to two hundred Euzkadi ta Askatasuma (ETA) cells operating in northern Spain fifteen years ago.[50]

---

[47] Whittaker, ed., 32-37.
[48] David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 666.
[49] Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (Frank Cass Publications: London, 2000), 98.
[50] Ibid.

Table 2.3

Common Elements of Terrorist Organizations

Ideology	Group	Use of Violence	Target of Political Message	Use of Media	Attacks against Innocent Civilians
Religious Extremism	Aum Shinrikyo (Japan)	Yes	Central Authority	Yes	Yes
State-sponsored	Mujhadeen Fighters (Afghanistan)	Yes	Government (Russians)	No direct use	Not necessarily
Left-wing	Red Army (Germany)	Yes	Central Authority	Yes	Yes
Right-wing	Red Brigades (Italy)	Yes	Government Personnel	Yes	Yes
Nationalist	Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Yes	Ireland – Security Service; Britain – public	Yes	Yes
Single-Issue	Earth First!	Yes	Governments or organizations that are causing any kind of environmental degradation	Yes	Yes

Sources: Cindy Combs and Martin Slann, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2003), 99-100. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott, ed., *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, vol. 1. (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1997), 187-253. David J. Whittaker, ed., *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge Publishing, 2001), 89-107.

Some other common characteristics among terrorist organizations are that all forms of terrorism use violence to make a political statement about their cause; that they use the media to relay their message; that the message is usually intended for governments; and that their prime target for attack is usually innocent people (although in some cases government personnel are also intended targets). The characteristic that most frequently recurs among terrorist organizations, however, is that terrorists attack innocent civilians to inspire fear in the general public. By generating such fear, terrorists are able to use psychological impact as leverage to justify their violent actions. At its roots, terrorism is about justice.[51] Perpetrating violence against the innocent in the name of justice is how terrorists acquire validation and power for their actions.[52]

The correlation between the different players (terrorists, government, civilians, media) is best explained visually using the "Process of Terrorist Communication Model" as shown below (see Figure 2.1).

---

[51] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, No.3 (Winter 2002-2003): 33.
[52] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 15.

Figure 2.1

The Process of Terrorist Communication

Source: Peter St. John, *Air Piracy, Airport Security and International Terrorism: Winning the War Against Hijackers* (West Port: Greenwood Publishing Inc., 1991), 110.

Psychology of Terrorism

The psychology of terrorism plays a vital role in deciphering the decision-making process of a terrorist's mind. Similarly, an internal stimulus affects the cohesiveness of the terrorist group. Due to the lack of available subjects for clinical interviewing and psychological testing, social scientists are limited to understanding the decision-making process, and the violent and clandestine nature of terrorist organizations.[53] Basic research on the psychology of terrorism points to three main conclusions: first, terrorist psychology is inductive rather than deductive; second, there is no unique terrorist psychology; and third, no single personality pattern or common trait exists among terrorists.[54]

There are two aspects of the terrorist's psychology that have come to the attention of social scientists: individual psychology and group dynamics. Research on individual psychologies mainly includes information obtained through individual anecdotes, memoirs, or biographic accounts. Results indicate that instead of any unique terrorist psychology, a wide range of psychologies exists from normal to severe personality disorders.[55] For example, just as an unstable individual would pose a security threat to any level of military operation, the same individual would also pose a threat to a terrorist organization. Studies do not provide conclusive answers as to why individuals become terrorists, but they do explain to what degree individuals become captive to group rhetoric and group psychology.

---

[53] Jerrold M. Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 271-289.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid., 272

Social scientists tend to focus more on group dynamics, because research indicates that the principle reason for becoming a terrorist is to belong to a group.[56] Studies suggest that terrorist groups are like surrogate families for alienated, disaffected, and lonely individuals who have a fragmented sense of self and a history of professional and personal failure.[57] Their need to belong to a group is fulfilled once they join a terrorist organization, and their need to feel important is fulfilled by carrying out significant operations that are justified through the group's ideological goals. Group psychology then has been found by researchers to be the primary determinant of terrorist behavior.[58] The individual psychology combined with group dynamics help the group to become self-sustaining regardless of the political consequences, which, according to Martha Crenshaw, is the fundamental purpose of any political organization.[59]

Having considered the three key elements of the conceptual overview, one can conclude that that terrorism does not fit easily into a clearly defined theoretical framework. Each element of terrorism addressed in this chapter — definition, ideologies, and psychology — will allow a further understanding of religiously motivated terrorism and global terrorism.

---

[56] Jerrold M. Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy," in *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 307-317.

[57] Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors," 272.

[58] Ibid., 273.

[59] Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass Publications, 2001), 13-31.

Religiously Motivated Terrorism

In order to understand the phenomenon of global terrorism, one has to

understand how religiously motivated terrorism made its appearance in the

international system. This section aims to provide such an understanding using the

academic works of David Rapoport[60] and Bruce Hoffman,[61] academics internationally

renowned for their work on religiously motivated terrorism.

Terrorism's ancient lineage can be traced back to preliterate and primitive

societies in all major religious traditions of the world.[62] Within "modern international

terrorism," Islam is at the heart of religiously motivated terrorism.[63] Islamic

fundamentalism and religiously motivated terrorism are as old as human history. The

Assassin (also known as *Ismaili-Nizari*), an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group

from 1090 to1275, is comparable to modern-day Islamic fundamentalists involved in

international terrorism.[64] The Assassin's main political objective was to purify Islam

and to establish inseparable religious and political institutions. Like today's global

terrorists, they moved across state boundaries, raising funds and establishing complex

networks of supporting cells.[65] Although Islamic fundamentalism today is said to

have its roots in the Iranian revolution, this revolution itself has roots in the same

---

[60] David C. Rapoport is a professor of Political Science at UCLA and the founding and current co-editor of the *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*. He is currently working on a book entitled *The Four Waves of Modern Terror* (Columbia).

[61] Bruce Hoffman is the V.P. of External Affairs and Director of RAND Corporation (Washington, D.C. office), where he heads the terrorism research unit and is an internationally recognized expert on terrorism. He has been published extensively in both academic and popular journals and has testified at length on terrorism before the U.S. Congress.

[62] David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism," in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Lester Kurtz (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), 497.

[63] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004) 61.

[64] Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling," 658-677.

[65] Ibid., 666.

philosophy as the Assassins. A review of the motives and political goals of the

Assassins compared to those of Islamic fundamentalists today indicates that they

remain the same.[66]

Religiously motivated terrorism fueled by Islamic fundamentalism today is

inspired by the desire to establish a secular state.[67] The renewed inspiration is

attributed to the year 1979, which marked the beginning of a new Islamic century,

and to two main events that occurred during that year; the Iranian revolution and the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[68] Before elaborating on these, however, it is worth

noting that the process of secularism has its roots in anticolonialist/nationalist

liberation movements arising after the World War Two to challenge continued

Western rule in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.[69] For the purposes of placing

modern international terrorism (religiously motivated terrorism) in the context of the

broader evolution of terrorism, it is appropriate to briefly introduce the "Four Waves

of Modern Terrorism" as presented by Rapoport.[70]

Rapoport indicates that, prior to 1979, terrorism went through three waves,

each of them overlapping and contributing to the overall evolution of terrorism (see

Table 2.4). The first three waves are tied to the break-up of empires, de-colonization,

---

[66] Ibid., 658-677.
[67] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 90-91.
[68] Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," 46-73; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 89.
[69] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 90.
[70] It is important to note that the general evolution of terrorism can be presented in several different ways. This thesis is not suggesting that Rapoport's analysis is the only analysis in terrorist studies. However, an examination of the literature indicates that Rapoport's historical analysis is well-respected by leading academics in the field of terrorism, hence the most useful in understanding modern international terrorism within the broader context of terrorism.

and leftist anti-Westernism, and are labeled "anarchist," "anti-colonial," and "New Left." The final wave is labeled "religious."[71]

The first event of 1979 sparking the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism was the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian revolutionist who inspired, assisted, and encouraged *Shiite*[72] terror movements outside of Iran, particularly in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lebanon.[73] With the rise and spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, a similar mix of "faith, fanaticism, and violence" also spread to other major religions of the world.[74] Khomeini's most significant contributions to Islamic fundamentalism were the use of radical interpretations of the *Quran* to provide the ideological foundation for the Iranian revolution and his message that Muslims, both *Sunni*[75] and *Shiite* could unite and fight for a common cause.[76] *Sunni* terrorism simultaneously appeared in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, and Indonesia.[77] *Sunnis* and *Shiites* shared anti-American sentiments, the roots of which lay in American support for regimes cynical of Islamic values. The desperate social and political conditions resulting from this U.S. support led to the rise of militant Islamic movements.[78]

---

[71] Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," 47.

[72] The largest single sect of Islam next to *Sunnis*, constituting approximately 14% of the total Muslim population. Caesar E. Farah, *Islam*, 4th ed. (New York: Barron's Publishing, 1987), 177.

[73] Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," 60.

[74] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 90-91.

[75] The followers of the main body of Islam known as *Ahl al-Sunnah wa 'lHadith* are *Sunni's*. The majority of the world's Muslims are *Sunni*. Farah, 190.

[76] Ibid., 87-129.

[77] Rapoport, "Terrorism," 503.

[78] Martha Crenshaw, "Why America? The Globalization of Civil War," *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 429.

Table 2.4

The Four Waves of Terror

Wave	Time Period	Results	Inspiration
Anarchist (First Wave)	1880	Propaganda by Deed[79]	Universal suffrage, popular empowerment through Western world.
Anti-colonial (Second Wave)	1920s-1960s	Freedom Fighters	National self-determination, related to struggle for power to win political independence or autonomy.
New Left (Third Wave)	1975-1990s	International Terrorism	U.S. intervention in Vietnam, U.S. defeat by Viet Cong inspired the next wave.
Religious (Fourth Wave)	1979-present	Secularism	Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Source: David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy,* ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-73.

The second 1979 event that inspired religiously motivated Islamic fundamentalism was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The two key players in the fight against the Soviet Union were the *Sunni* Muslims, who came from all over the world to train and fight in Afghanistan, and the U.S., who subsidized the resistance.[80] By 1989, the Soviet Union was forced out. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was seen as a victory of religion over a secular superpower. Muslim populations that were formerly a part of the Soviet Union (Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,

---

[79] This refers to the need to be heard in order to command respect because the rebel was taking action that involved serious personal risks that signified a deep commitment to the cause (Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," 50).

[80] Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," 62.

Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan) along with Afghanistan became important new fields for Islamic rebels.[81]

The events of 1979 sparked a renewed sense of purpose for Islamic fundamentalists, who began to focus on the U.S. and its economic interests and involvement in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, areas considered "holy" by Islamic religious standards. As a result of this narrow focus on U.S. interests in the Middle East, as Hoffman states, "terrorism came to be regarded as a calculated means to destabilize the West as a part of vast global conspiracy."[82] Uniting Muslim countries to oust Americans from the Holy Land was the ultimate goal of religiously motivated terrorists (Islamic fundamentalists) after 1979.

A competing view of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism suggests instead that terrorism breeds where a vast difference exists between the rich and poor. Audrey Kurth Cronin[83] points out that modern terrorism is a "power struggle along a continuum: central power versus local power, big power versus small power, modern power versus traditional power."[84] Two forces were at play during the 1980s: U.S. economic interest in the Middle East was beginning to draw the attention of Muslim fanatics, and globalization was starting to gain momentum. For Islamic fundamentalists, the U.S. became the most obvious target because of its close association with the forces of globalization, which were also seen as an expansion of American imperialism.

---

[81] Ibid.
[82] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 27.
[83] Audrey Kurth Cronin is a specialist in international terrorism at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
[84] Cronin, 35.

Globalization was seen as an intrusion of Western values upon Islamic states, and many Islamic fundamentalists would have preferred to see their states governed by Islamic law instead of the Western values of democracy and capitalism.[85] Therefore, U.S. presence in the Middle East fueled anxiety and resentment. Although economic globalization and Americanization are in fact considered to be two different phenomena, fundamentalists see them as the same because they are both driven by U.S. companies involved with trade, financing, and information technology.[86] Modern international, or religiously motivated, terrorism is seen as a part of the larger phenomena of antiglobalization and tension between the elite (U.S.) and underprivileged (Muslim countries).[87] According to the total number of terrorist incidents between 1995 and 2002, the percentage of attacks against the U.S. increased steadily, a trend that indicates a growing resentment against the U.S. (see Table 2.5).

Table 2.5

Terrorist Attacks Against U.S.

Year	Total # of Attacks	# of Attacks Against U.S.	% Attacks Against U.S.
1995	440	Unknown	-
1996	296	73	24.6
1997	304	101	33.2
1998	274	111	40.5
1999	395	169	42.8
2000	426	200	46.9
2001	355	219	61.7

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (1995-2001), http://www.state.gov/

[85] Michael T. Klare, "Waging Postindustrial Warfare on the Global Battlefield" *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 433-437.
[86] Ibid., 437.
[87] Cronin, 35.

As mentioned earlier, one of the common elements of religiously motivated terrorism is the use of religious theology to justify terrorist-orchestrated violence.[88] In the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism, the Assassins, Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden were notorious for misusing the concept of *jihad* (holy war) in declaring war upon its enemy.[89] The general characteristics of individual and group psychology cited earlier explain why terrorists willingly engage in a *jihad*. Rapoport explains that the terrorist act is seen as a sacrament of duty or God's will, and fulfillment of God's will guarantees them a place in paradise.[90] The high moral ground preached by terrorist leaders, through either religious clergy or their own words, has led terrorists to believe that their lives are worthwhile if martyred in the course of executing God's will. This powerful psychology has been a common element in all religiously motivated terrorism.

Statistics show that 1995 saw an explosion of religiously motivated terrorism. During the 1990s, the most serious terrorist attacks had a significant religious dimension or motivation.[91] Although the total number of religiously motivated terrorist organizations rose, the total number of terrorist attacks declined between 1987 and 2001 (Figure 2.2 and Table 2.6). The decrease in terrorist attacks can be attributed to an increase in the lethality of the attacks. Hoffman indicates that some of the most significant terrorist acts of recent years have some religious element present,

---

[88] Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 2 (1988): 195-213.
[89] Ibid.; Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling," 658-677.
[90] Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," 195-213.
[91] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 92.

which in some instances goes beyond their religious theocracy but has a mystical,

transcendental, and divinely inspired imperative.[92]

Figure 2.2

Religious Versus Other Terrorist Groups

Source: Ian O. Lesser et al., *Countering The New Terrorism* (Washington
D.C.: RAND Publications, 1999), 16.

Table 2.6

Increase in Religiously Motivated Terrorist Organizations (1968-1995)

Year	% Increase of Religiously Motivated Terrorist Organizations
1968	0%
1980	3.1%
1994	32.7%
1995	215%

Source: Ian O. Lesser et al., *Countering The New Terrorism* (Washington
D.C.: RAND Publications, 1999), 16.

---

[92] Hoffman, *Testimony: Lessons of 9/11*. Submitted for the Committee Record to the United States
Joint September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 8
October 2002 (Washington D.C.: RAND Publications, 2002)

This conceptual overview of terrorism and religiously motivated terrorism indicates that the latter is not a new phenomenon. It would be safe to say that among the different types of terrorist ideologies, religiously motivated terrorism is more lethal because it uses religious texts to justify the use of violence. The rise of this type of terrorism in a globalized age presents a new series of challenges for the international political system, given the increase in anti-Western sentiments among Islamic fundamentalists.

Global Terrorism

This section will address global terrorism as an evolved form of terrorism in which religiously motivated terrorists are using the process of globalization to promote their political ideologies. The definition of globalization adopted by this thesis is that it is "a process of removing officially imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an 'open' and 'integrated' world."[93] Removing restrictions at border crossings between nations has allowed a much freer flow of trade and investments between countries. But the benefits of globalization are also seen to serve terrorist organizations, which are able to exploit the ability to transcend boundaries in planning and executing their political agendas effectively and efficiently through a vast and complex network of supporters. The planning, funding, and execution of the 9/11 attacks are a prime example of terrorism reaping the benefits of a globalized world.

Globalization has caused a shift in how terrorist organizations conduct themselves. Their strategies have changed with the ability to function in a globalized

---

[93] Scholte, 11.

43

world, but their motives and rationale remain the same.[94] In his book *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Howard Russell states that there is a shift from localized terrorist groups to loosely organized global networks of terrorist groups.[95] For example, Al-Qaeda's global network consists of permanent or independently operating semi-permanent cells of trained militants that have been established in more than seventy-six countries.[96] For a terrorist organization to sustain itself globally, it has to build a self-sustaining infrastructure that includes being well financed through global financial networks and having well-trained operatives in different parts of the world.[97]

As mentioned earlier, cell structure is the most effective design to serve terrorist organizations. As the environment has become more global, the cellular structure has also become more global. Traditionally, international terrorist organizations primarily functioned in a centralized, hierarchical organizational structure. With the new tools globalization has provided, the hierarchical structure is slowly being replaced with a flatter network of cells dispersed all around the globe with decentralized operations. This change is referred to as "information-age network designs."[98] The difference between international terrorism versus global terrorism is best demonstrated by explaining the differences between the three different types of cell structure: chain network, star or hub network, and all-channel network[99] (see Figure 2.3). In a chain network, people, goods and information move along a line of

---

[94] Russell D. Howard, "The New Terrorism Model," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment,* rev. ed., ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw Hill Companies, 2004), 74-85.
[95] Ibid., 77.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid., 74-85.
[98] John Arquilla, David Rodfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman et. al. (Washington D.C.: RAND Publications, 1999), 40-42.
[99] Ibid., 49.

separated contacts where end-to-end communication travels through the intermediate nodes. The star or hub network is a cartel structure in which a set of actors is tied to a central node or actor and they must go through that node to communicate and coordinate. The all-channel network is a collaborative network of small groups where every group is connected to every other group.[100]

International terrorism has for the most part been composed of terrorist organizations with a chain network or star/hub design. Even though some of the terrorist organizations were managing their operations outside the country of origins, decision-making remained central. The new trend in terrorism has changed the structure by spreading out the organization and decentralizing decision-making. The shift from hierarchical and star/hub networks to all-channel networks comes from the influence of current information and communications technology, such as cellular telephones, fax machines, electronic mail, World Wide Web (WWW) sites, and computer conferencing.[101] In order to remain effective in its operations, the all-channel network design requires dense communication.[102] Information technology, through these various forms of communication, now permits all-channel networks to function effectively. As terrorist organizations have become more global in their reach, adopting all-channel networks, statistics show that the overall number of religiously motivated terrorist group has increased and the overall number of terrorist incidents has decreased. (Figure 2.4)

---

[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid., 52.
[102] Ibid.

Figure 2.3

Cell Structures

Chain Network

Star or Hub Network

All-Channel Network

Source: John Arquilla, David Rodfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism" in *Countering the New Terrorism*, eds. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman et. al. (Washington D.C.: RAND Publications, 1999), 50.

Figure 2.4

Total International Terrorist Attacks (1977-2001)

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (1996, 1999, 2001), www.state.gov/

Once again, the interesting connection between global terrorism and its ability to function effectively is seen in the rise of the number of deaths of U.S. citizens. Between 1968 and 1999, a total of 778 Americans were killed by terrorist attacks overseas, and 83 percent of Americans that died as a result of terrorist attacks between 1968 and 1999 were specifically targeted.[103] It is also notable that as the number of attacks decreased, the lethality of the attacks increased.[104] An examination of all the attacks against the U.S. alone in the 1990s reveals that each attack was carefully orchestrated — the choice of target and weapon were both strategic and symbolic — which is another indication of the global evolution of terrorism (see Table 2.7).

---

[103] Hoffman, *Testimony: Protecting American Interests Abroad*, 10.
[104] Hoffman, "Terrorism, Trends, and Prospects," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al (Washington D.C.: RAND Publications, 1999), 12-13.

Table 2.7

Major U.S. Attacks 1997-2003[105]

Date	Location of Attack	Country	Estimated Casualties (U.S.)
1996	U.S. Military's Khubar Towers housing facility	Dharan, Saudi Arabia	19
1997	Union Texas Petroleum	Karachi, Pakistan	4
1998	U.S. Embassy	Nairobi, Kenya	18
1998	U.S. Embassy	Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	12
2000	USS Cole	Yemen, Port of Aden	17
2001	Murdered of Daniel Pearl	Karachi, Pakistan	1
2001	Twin Towers, Pentagon, Pennsylvania	New York and Washington D.C., United States	3000+
2003	Jadewal and Al-Hamra housing compounds	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	9
2003	U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv motorcade	Gaza Strip, Israel	3
2003	Ambush by Armed Militants	Shkin, Afghanistan	2

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (1997- 2003), http://www.state.gov/

Each of the attacks received a great deal of media attention, and the majority

of them were executed with weapons that had the potential to cause mass casualties.

A great deal of ingenuity and planning went into the attacks, especially those against

---

[105] The number of U.S. attacks published by the U.S. Department of State far exceeds the number of attacks listed in Table 2.7. Some of the attacks and U.S. citizens killed listed in the publication were those where the U.S. was not the direct target for the attack. These incidents were eliminated and only those where U.S. citizens were the direct target were included in Table 2.7.

the U.S. Embassies, USS Cole, and the September 11 attacks. The most important

aspect of the attacks listed in Table 2.7 is that only the four attacks of September 11

actually took place in the U.S. and the rest were aimed at U.S. interests overseas. The

transnational evolution of terrorism in the engagement of states and their interests

outside of state boundaries is what makes this transnational phenomenon dangerous

to the international system.

The increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks can be attributed to the forces

of globalization as well as to the rise of anti-American sentiment. Hoffman suggests

that there are seven factors contributing to the increase in lethality. First, there

appears to be a pattern that suggests that the public and media have become

desensitized to terrorist violence, therefore terrorist attacks have become more

dramatic and destructive to achieve the same psychological affects. Second, terrorists

have become more adept in killing, so not only have their weapons become more

sophisticated and deadlier, they are more easily accessible through terrorist alliances

with various rogue states. Third, the active role played by states sponsoring terrorism

enhances the striking power and capabilities of ordinary terrorist organizations.

Fourth, the overall increase in religiously motivated terrorism is bringing new

adversaries, motivations, and tactics together, which in return are affecting terrorist

patterns. Fifth, the proliferation of amateurs in terrorist organizations is increasing the

lethality due to the training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge. Sixth,

there is an increase in innovation, sophistication, and operational competence of

professional terrorists, who are becoming more adept in the tradecraft of death and

destruction. Finally, terrorists today tend to claim credit less frequently for their lethal attacks. [106]

One important aspect of global terrorism and religiously motivated terrorism that has drawn significant attention is the acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups. In his book, *Toxic Terror: Assessing the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Jonathan Tucker analyzes the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by terrorist groups.[107] He states that WMD are a cause for great concern for two reasons: because of the accessibility of the weapons, and because religious fanaticism has attained a ruthless agenda that suits the use of such weapons.[108] In the case studies conducted, Tucker concluded that the majority of terrorist groups would engage in mass-casualty attacks with conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. However, the only group to use catastrophic mass-casualty attacks using conventional, chemical and biological weapons would be religiously motivated terrorist organizations.[109] The use of WMD is a growing threat along with the evolution of global terrorism.

Summary

The conceptual overview of terrorism, religiously motivated terrorism, and globalized terrorism provides a basic understanding of global terrorism as a newly evolved transnational phenomenon in the international system. The conceptual and theoretical framework of terrorism established in this chapter is somewhat limited because it only examines terrorism from one perspective: that is, from the field of

---

[106] Hoffman, "Terrorism, Trends, and Prospects," 13, 14, 15, 20, 25, 27.
[107] Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorism Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 249-271.
[108] Ibid., 12.
[109] Ibid., 288.

terrorism studies. However, the conceptual overview of terrorism and its evolution to

the present sets the parameters for the next stage of this thesis: the literature review.

Part Two

Literature Review

Part two of this chapter will provide an account of the published research on

the relationship between globalization and terrorism and its implications for IR. This

review will convey the knowledge and ideas of respected scholars, and it will also

identify the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments as they pertain to IR.

Limitations in the current research identified through the analysis will enable further

exploration of these findings in this thesis using Waltz's neorealism.

The literature addresses the relationship of globalization, terrorism, and IR

from several different perspectives, introducing the reader to different themes and

concepts that not only aid in an understanding global terrorism as a transnational

phenomenon, but address its implications for IR. The literature review will be divided

into two sections: the first will explore the relationship between globalization and

terrorism; and the second will review the literature that addresses the implications of

global terrorism on IR. The final analysis will sum up the relationship between

globalization and terrorism and then attempt to bring the evolving concepts and key

arguments from section two together, identifying the key points in the competing

argument that address the research question: what are the implications of global

terrorism on IR.

Globalization and Terrorism

Research indicates that several aspects of globalization contribute to the rise

of terrorism. Within the literature two aspects of globalization demonstrate a

relationship with terrorism: globalization as a process and globalization as an

economic phenomenon. The former is a direct relationship between globalization and

terrorism, whereby terrorists utilize globalization as a tool to enhance the process of

their capabilities to function by accessing various global systems.[110] The second is an

indirect relationship, where the negative impact and drawbacks of economic

globalization have created an environment that promotes terrorism.[111]

For this thesis, both aspects of globalization contribute to providing a deeper

understanding of the relationship between the two concepts. The setbacks of

globalization provide an understanding of the foundation on which grievances and

motivations of terrorist movements are based, whereas the process of globalization

provides a practical understanding of how terrorists are able to establish themselves

within a global infrastructure. Because the focus of this thesis is the transnational

nature of terrorism, more emphasis is placed on understanding globalization as a

process. The importance of globalization as an economic phenomenon will be used to

establish the broader understanding of how it contributes to the rise of terrorism.

In "Globalization's First War?" Kurt Campbell states that the relationship

between globalization and terrorism arises from economic inequalities. Increased

economic disparities produce terrorist violence, and counterterrorism efforts

demonstrate governments lack a deeper understanding of the threat of global

---

[110] Cronin, 30-58.
[111] Walter LaFeber, "The Post-September 11 Debate over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation," *Political Science Quarterly: The Journal of Public and International Affairs* 117, no. 1 (2002): 1-17.

terrorism. To demonstrate the global nature and evolution of terrorism, Campbell

compares the Al-Qaeda terrorist movement to globalization (see Table 2.8). This

comparison demonstrates the similarities in the evolution of both phenomena globally

over a ten-year period: a rapidly developing complex of interconnections involving

countries throughout the world.

Table 2.8

Connections and Comparisons: Globalization and Terrorism

Globalization	Al-Qaeda Terrorist Movement
Spread to many countries throughout the world.	Followers and cells in more than 60 countries.
Advanced in the 1990s.	Advanced in the 1990s.
True power and influence was first overlooked and later underestimated.	True power and influence (religiously motivated terrorism) was first overlooked and later underestimated.
Functions as a network of complex connections, linked between and across societies.	Functions as a network of complex connections, linked between and across the Islamic regions.
World leaders misunderstand the depth to which its activities could disrupt their countries.	World leaders misunderstand the depth to which its activities could disrupt their countries (especially the U.S.).
Gave early warnings of its growing power through the Asian economic crisis of 1997.	Gave early warning of its growing power through the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
Movement has attracted followers prepared to accept innocent casualties (displaced workers).	Movement has attracted devoted disciples and murdered innocent people along the way.

Source: Kurt M. Campbell, "Globalization's First War?" *The Washington Quarterly*
25. no. 1 (Winter 2002): 10.

Campbell states that globalization has added to the complex interdependent

nature of economic, political, and social conditions in the world. Globalization has

expanded the market force, sped up the movement of capital around the globe,

created greater economic efficiencies, and had a significant influence on culture,

environment, productivity, economy, and various other aspects of social and political

life.[112] Campbell explains that in the midst of the complex social, economic, and

political transnational relations, globalization has created inequalities that have had an

impact on the nature of global conflict, and at present very less is understood about

the relationship between globalization and global conflict.[113] The practical application

of globalization has allowed terrorism to evolve into a transnational phenomenon, an

issue that Campbell does not address adequately but that will be discussed later in this

section. Without an understanding of how the processes of globalization benefit

terrorism, it is difficult to understand global terrorism as a transnational phenomenon.

Campbell compares the national campaign waged against terrorism after 9/11

to the national campaign waged against communism by the U.S. during the Cold War,

suggesting that very little was understood about communism during the Cold War,

and similarly very little is understood about the complex connection between

globalization and terrorism.[114] He implies that the international system does not know

how to deal with transnational phenomena that threaten the system because they do

not know how to achieve balance in maintaining security in order to eliminate the

threat. He bases this assessment on the counterterrorism response initiated by the U.S.

government after 9/11. Campbell suggests that new security measures can sustain

---

[112] Kurt M. Campbell, "Globalization's First War?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2002): 7-9.
[113] Ibid., 9.
[114] Ibid., 10.

globalization need to be established, which will require balance between enhanced security and the motivation to attain greater prosperity.[115]

In the comparison between terrorism and communism, Campbell suggests that terrorism is simply another "ism" and topic of the day for the international system to deal with. He downplays terrorism as representing a serious threat. This is surprising given the comparison he makes with it to communism, a phenomenon that caused a shift in the balance of powers: if terrorism is analogous to communism, then certainly the potential for a similar shift in the balance of powers exists in present times if the threat is not dealt with.

Campbell's suggestion that terrorism is another "ism" of the day implies that the threat of terrorism can be eliminated. To suggest that it can be eliminated by governments that lack an understanding of its very nature implies that globalization as a process and economic force can also be eliminated, because globalization is one root cause of terrorism. The direct link between globalization and terrorism in Campbell's description indicates that terrorism grows out of economic inequalities and uses the various aspects of globalization that support economic growth and infrastructure. Reviewing Campbell's arguments, it seems his suggestion that terrorism is just another flavor of the day is misplaced: it would be difficult to eliminate the threat of terrorism unless one could eliminate globalization and/or the conditions it produces. Even if Campbell were accurate and the threat of terrorism were eliminated, then according to his own assessment only one of two methods could achieve this: first, because globalization continues to exist and evolve, the threat of terrorism would only be replaced by another "ism"; and second, a shift in the

---

[115] Ibid., 13.

balance of powers caused by global terrorism could result in decreasing the threat of terrorism.[116]

Campbell's correlation between globalization and terrorism provides a very broad and basic understanding of global terrorism. One suggestion central to this thesis is that globalization has created economic inequalities that have contributed to global conflict. Although Campbell does not specify the type of global conflict he is referring to, his statement does apply to terrorist violence. It is important to note that not all terrorists come from poverty stricken and economically poor states;[117] similarly not all economically poor states produce terrorist movements.[118] This, of course, does not mean that the economically poor are not targeted, nor that all terrorists come from the middle or upper social economic classes. However, economic inequalities do provide a basic ingredient for the type of environment that can produce terrorism.[119]

Building on Campbell's correlation between globalization and terrorism, Walter LaFeber, in "The Post-September 11 Debate over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation," identifies two additional elements that have contributed to the rise of global terrorism and that are directly related to globalization: fragmentation and the strategic use of U.S foreign policy.[120] Fragmentation is also a diverse process that embraces political, social, economic, technological, and cultural change. Where globalization is related to integration, interdependence, openness, and

---

[116] Ibid., 7-14.
[117] Hoffman, *Lessons of 9/11*, 10.
[118] Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002): 29.
[119] Ibid.
[120] LaFeber, 1-17.

interpenetration, fragmentation is the shorthand for the opposite: disintegration, autarchy, unilateralism, closure, and isolation, all leading to nationalism, regionalism, separatism, and heterogeneity.[121]

Fragmentation in the international system is a by-product of globalization, where social, economic and political systems become fragmented because of increased global interaction. In other words, these systems are heavily influenced by external systems, causing them to break down into smaller fractions and become part of a global system. One of the effects of globalization and fragmentation is the widening of the economic gap between rich and poor nations, causing poverty, frustration, and disparity at all levels of social, economic, and political life, which in turn provides the breeding grounds for frustration and violence leading to terrorism.

In the international political system, the U.S is a key strategic player. U.S. foreign policy plays an important role in protecting its own international interests through its political, economic, and military decisions. LaFeber states that U.S. foreign policy is motivated by capitalism and imperialism and that fragmentation is a consequence of globalization supported by U.S. foreign policy.[122]

LaFeber suggests that although globalization was a great strategy to mobilize the global economy to generate wealth in abundance, the greatest limitation of globalization is its inability to distribute the wealth across the globe equally.[123] Instead, globalization has led to economic inequalities in key regions in the world, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, fragmenting societies and causing them to lose

---

[121] Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-2.
[122] LaFeber, 1-4.
[123] Ibid., 11.

57

their power over their social, economic and cultural identities.[124] LaFeber suggests

that it was through the pursuit of capitalism and imperialism that "globalization

created a mirror image of fragmentation, and out of fragmentation came the evil of

terrorism."[125] Better communication has also allowed the world to witness the

economic inequalities arising out of globalization and fragmentation.[126] As parts of

the world witness poverty and directly relate it to conditions promoted by the U.S.,

there has been a rise of anti-American sentiments. According to LaFeber, the

evolution of globalization will continue shaping and reshaping societies around the

world.[127] So long as economic inequalities continue to be glaringly visible, terrorism

will continue to flourish.

LaFeber sees global terrorism as a direct implication of foreign policy that

only manages its execution, not the consequences of its actions. Foreign policy is an

important tool for states in the management of their international and domestic

affairs, according to LaFeber: how it is executed therefore does have serious

consequences for other states. The problem is not the ambitious nature of states that

want to pursue their ideological and economic interest through foreign policies, it is

the management of outcomes — such as the distribution of wealth in this case — that

is key to determining how the pursuit of a state's interests helps balance (or not) the

international system as a whole. The emphasis is not on foreign policy; the important

factor is the outcome of economic inequalities. Following LaFeber's statement about

---

[124] Ibid., 10.
[125] Ibid., 17.
[126] Ibid., 2.
[127] Ibid., 1-2.

the importance of U.S. foreign policy, one could easily argue that foreign policy is a significant variable in determining international affairs of states.

However, this argument would not apply to the international political system in a neorealist examination of the behavior of states. Foreign policy is a vital and intricate part of a state: it is a part of the internal structure of a state and not a part of the international system. Foreign policy is significant to this thesis, therefore, only insofar as it provides an understanding of the various other components of the international system, especially understanding economic inequalities arising out of globalization. Economic capabilities are important factors in determining where states fall along the spectrum of power (greater to lesser) in the international system. The balance of numbers of great powers and lesser power determines the degree of stability in the international system. A step-by-step consideration of how foreign policy affects the stability of the international system, therefore, is important in terms of the distribution of capabilities.

In her article "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," Audrey Kurth Cronin extensively discusses the correlation between globalization and terrorism. Cronin agrees with Campbell and LaFeber that terrorism is the by-product of historical shifts in the international distribution of power. Cronin refers to social, political, economic, ideological, and cultural power as all being the same forms of power that characterize the forces of Western-led globalization.[128] She calls global terrorism a "complicated, eclectic, phenomenon," and she provides three practical examples of globalization that has given terrorism a transnational dimension.[129]

---

[128] Cronin, 53.
[129] Ibid., 30.

Cronin states that terrorism as a phenomenon is not new, but what has changed is the

means (external stimuli) by which terrorism is functioning: the external environment

that allows terrorists to choose the most effective way to carry out their operations.

The three examples of this change are the use of information technologies; the ability

to cross international borders to conduct commercial and business interests; and

access to global financing networks to build resources.[130]

First, the use of information technologies has been revolutionized through

three major trends in global communication: the Web, e-commerce, and wireless

telephones[131] (see Table 2.9). The increased growth of data transmission has far

outdistanced the growth of international voice traffic.[132]

In the 1990s, the overall number of phone users and internet users has grown

at a remarkable rate (see Table 2.9). Overall increase in Web communication

indicates that terrorists, like regular citizens, can easily access information

technologies globally. The increase in data transmissions and instant navigation using

the Web has fundamentally changed the nature of communication, allowing anyone at

any given time to communicate instantaneously. Practical use of this technology has

allowed terrorists to become more efficient in managing their administrative tasks,

coordinating operations, recruiting, and expanding their range of operations.[133]

---

[130] Ibid., 46-51.
[131] Jonathan Aronson, "The Communication and Internet Revolution," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction of World Politics*, 2d. ed., ed. John Baylis and Steven Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 544-556.
[132] Ibid., 545.
[133] Cronin, 47.

Table 2.9

Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service Sector

Year	Main telephone lines (millions)	Mobile subscribers (millions)	International phone traffic by minutes (billions)	Personal computers (millions)	Internet users (millions)
1991	546	16	38	130	4.4
1992	572	23	43	155	7.0
1993	604	34	49	175	10
1994	643	56	57	200	21
1995	689	91	63	235	40
1996	738	145	71	275	74
1997	792	215	79	325	117
1998	846	318	89	375	183
1999	905	490	100	435	277
2000	983	740	118	580	399
2001	1053	955	127	555	502
2002	1129	1155	135	615	580
2003	1210	1329	140	650	665

Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2001.
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom99.html (Accessed October 21, 2004)

Table 2.10

Increase in Communication 1991-2003

Communication	% Increase 1991-2003
Main telephone lines	222
Mobile subscribers	8306
International phone traffic	368
Personal computers	500
Internet users	15113

Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2001.
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom99.html (Accessed October 21, 2004)

Cronin's second example of change is the removal of economic barriers

between nations, which has made crossing international borders and raising funds

through commercial and business interests much easier. International trade

agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and

European Union (EU), have facilitated not only the flow of business transactions and

economic goods, but the flow of illegitimate funds for terrorist operations, under the

guise of legitimate businesses. The opening up of borders to the flow of goods,

combined with easy and instant access to communications technology, has increased

the number of business-to-business e-commerce transactions. Within an open and

integrated economy this type of business-to-business e-commerce is continuing to

grow at a much faster rate than business-to-consumer e-commerce[134] (see Table

2.11).

Table 2.11

Growth of Business-to-Business E-Commerce

Year	Business-to-Business	Business-to-Consumer
1997	1^{a}	1
1999	2	1
2001	10	1

Source: Jonathan Aronson, "The Communication and Internet Revolution," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction of World Politics*, 2d. ed., John Baylis and Steven Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 545.

[a] The value "1" denotes "x" number of business transactions and is presented as a ratio for comparison between columns 2 and 3 to indicate growth.

---

[134] Aronson, 545.

In addition to cross-border trading, sources of financing include legal businesses, nonprofit organizations, and charities — all of which provide good cover for terrorist organizations to covertly raise funds through globally accessible markets.[135] States also welcome foreign direct investment (FDI) in their jurisdiction.[136] The ability to start a business in the global market place provides terrorist organizations with an easier avenue through which to conduct business anonymously outside their own states' jurisdiction.

The third change is the easy access to financial institutions around the globe. Clients are now provided with around-the-clock financial services without ever having to be physical present. Global financial markets are a fundamental and successful part of the global economy. Globalization has also revolutionized banking in the numbers of transborder deposits, expansion of transborder branch networks, and instantaneous transworld interbanking fund transfers.[137] One example is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). SWIFT exemplifies the complex nature of financial institutions in a globalized world. It was launched in 1977, and by 2004 was interconnected to over 7,654 financial institutions worldwide in two hundred countries, carrying payments with a daily average of more than $5 trillion.[138] SWIFT's financial institutions comprise members (financial institutions that own shares), sub-members (financial institutions that are directly or indirectly owned by a member), and participants (financial institutions that have chosen not to or do not qualify to become shareholders). Since 9/11, SWIFT has

---

[135] Cronin, 47-51.
[136] Jan Aart Scholte, "Global Trade and Finance," in Aronson, 520-525.
[137] Ibid., 528-531.
[138] http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=42732 (Accessed on October 20, 2004)

continued to grow, indicating an increase in the number of members, trade messages, payment messages, securities messages, and treasury messages.[139] The sheer magnitude of SWIFT's financial responsibility indicates that there is plenty of room for illegitimate participants in this massive financial institution: network traffic runs into millions of transactions on a daily basis, creating opportunities for terrorists to conduct their transactions under the disguise of legitimate clients.

The external stimuli identified by Cronin support the all-channel networks described earlier. In *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, Ian Clark states that the highest level of globalization is currently occurring in the world of finance along with instant world communications.[140] Using global communications and financial institutions has increased their ability gather and disseminate intelligence at a faster rate with the ability to concentrate their efforts over larger areas. It also helps groups and members remain in constant contact with each other making the distance between them disappear. Globalization as a process has given terrorism the ability to transcend state boundaries, making terrorism transnational and truly global in its operations. This provision has also allowed terrorism to target states outside their homeland, expanding their goals by targeting overseas economic interests.

Globalization and terrorism then have a complex and intertwined relationship, one that is evident not just through the literature review but through the statistical evidence provided in conceptual overview. Since the 1990s, terrorism and globalization have had remarkable evolutions. It is not just their individual growth

---

[139] Ibid.
[140] Clark, 17.

that is a cause for concern, but the manner in which terrorism is feeding off of the growth of globalization: more specifically, how the global development of the various external stimuli has allowed terrorism to function more effectively and efficiently.

In a review of section one, it is important to briefly state aspects of the literature review that contribute to this thesis. First, economic globalization and fragmentation contribute to understanding the basic social and economic conditions that promote terrorism. They provide an understanding of how terrorism has evolved into a transnational phenomenon. Second, foreign policy, although important in understanding certain domestic and international political issues, does not directly provide an understanding of the neorealist implications of global terrorism on IR. However, the implications of global terrorism on the U.S. do play an important part in determining the implications of global terrorism in the international system. The U.S. is a dominant power, and how it strategically deals with the threat of terrorism has an impact on how other states will respond to the threat, which will determine the stability of the international system overall.

The literature provides evidence that there is a significant relationship between globalization and terrorism, where terrorism is evolving with the help of globalization. Terrorism is transnational in nature; and by using the tools provided by globalization, it can establish a global infrastructure. The next section will determine the implications of global terrorism on IR.

Implications of Global Terrorism on IR

To address the implications of global terrorism on IR, six papers have been selected to provide the different perspectives of academic scholars. Because of the

unique nature of this thesis topic, the consideration of a broad range of academic perspectives is important in order to understand how the academic community perceives the threat of terrorism. The key points of all six perspectives will be first stated. The different perspectives will then be analyzed within Waltz's concept of neorealism to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments. This process will help to determine which concepts and themes from the academic works studied apply to the understanding of the impact of global terrorism on the international system as a whole, and which ones are reductionist in nature and do not apply. The distinction between deductive and reductionist variables is important, because reductionist variables can lead to an assessment of the international system that is limited by behaviorist methodologies if political outcomes are determined using the constituent parts of political systems. The different academic perspectives evolve around the following themes: balance of powers, multilateral cooperation, state rivalries, WMD, shift in conflict, and democracy.

The first argument is that global terrorism will cause a shift in the balance of powers from a unipolar to multipolar system because counterterrorism requires multilateral cooperation among states. In "A Multipolar World is Inevitable," E. Bazhanov indicates that the threat of global terrorism will specifically require the U.S. (a unipolar power) to cooperate and act with states in all parts of the world despite its interests to remain a hegemon, and that ultimately unipolarity can only be sustained through multilateralism[141] Bazhanov states that U.S. engagement in the War in Iraq can be seen as a strategy to engage in military conflict with rogue and failed states to eliminate the threat they present to the superpower, and further providing the

---

[141] E. Bazhanov, "A Multipolar World is Inevitable," *International Affair* 49, no. 5 (2003): 22.

superpower with an opportunity to establish military bases and pursue economic

interests in new markets and access sustainable energy sources for the future.[142]

The second argument is that a superpower cannot effectively eliminate the

threat of global terrorism without addressing the underlying conditions of

globalization and fragmentation. In his article "An Interim Assessment of 9/11: What

Has Changed and What Has Not?" Robert Jervis agrees with Bazhanov that

multilateralism is the most effective stance against terrorism.[143] Like Campbell,

LaFeber, and Cronin, Jervis is of the opinion that the conditions that contribute to

global terrorism are poverty in the Third World; inequality among nations; and

corrupt and unresponsive governments.[144] He states that not all poor societies breed

terrorists and that poverty alone is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of

terrorism. However, as long as these conditions prevail, so will the threat of

terrorism.[145]

The third argument is that democracy is an important criteria in managing the

security of the international system and that great powers understand that one of the

root causes of terrorism is the lack of representation by rogue states in the

international community. In "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," John Lewis

Gaddis points out that the cause of terrorist recruitment is not poverty: it is the

resentment growing out of the absence of representative institutions, as well the lack

of representation in the international community.[146] However, to have a voice in the

---

[142] Ibid., 17-19.
[143] Robert Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?"
Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (2002): 53.
[144] Ibid., 41.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid., 52-54.

international political system, states must adopt democracy as a political ideology, especially in the Middle East.[147] The "grand strategy," Gaddis states, is the U.S. plan to transform the entire Muslim Middle East into a democratic world, a strategy driven by the fact that authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East support terrorism indirectly by continuing to produce generations of underemployed, underrepresented, radicalized young people who make ideal targets for recruitment into terrorist organizations.[148]

The fourth argument is that new realities such as competition between great powers, religious extremism, and economic inequalities may be leading the world into a power vacuum, causing a shift in the balance of powers from unipolarity to apolarity.[149] In "A World Without Power," Niall Ferguson says that apolarity is the absence of a hegemon.[150] Ferguson predicts an apolar world based on some key shortcomings of the U.S. in its leadership role. He states that there are three structural deficits that will limit the U.S. in its effectiveness as a hegemon. First, the U.S. is growing dependent on foreign capital to finance excessive private and public consumption. Second, the U.S. is a net importer of people and therefore cannot afford to underpin its hegemonic aspirations with true colonization. Finally, the U.S. army is already spread very thin as a result of major ongoing military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.[151] In addition to these structural problems, Ferguson states that the challenges that lay ahead for the U.S. are rooted in the fragmentation of Islamic

---

[147] The Bush administration refers to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the "axil of evil," and states that there is a need to transform autocratic regimes to democracies. President George W. Bush, "State of Union Address" (January 29, 2002) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (Accessed on August 7, 2004).

[148] Ibid., 55.

[149] Niall Ferguson, "A World Without Power," *Foreign Policy* (July-August 2004): 32.

[150] Ibid., 34.

[151] Ibid., 32-34.

civilization, which is causing high levels of anti-American sentiment without any unanimity.[152] For Ferguson, political fragmentation will cause a downward shift in power, ending U.S. monopoly and control[153] He does not believe that power will shift to supranational institutions.

The fifth argument is that global terrorism does present a number of challenges to realists in IR. In "Clash of Globalizations," Stanley Hoffman argues that despite the "bloody link" terrorism represents between interstate relations and global security, nothing has changed in IR theory because it does not account for globalization and NSAs, in particular their role in international politics.[154] However, a globally insecure world presents a number of challenges for realists in IR. First, more rivalries can be expected among great powers as the number of states acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increases. Second, as wars between states are becoming less common, wars within them are on the rise, as seen in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Africa, and Sri Lanka. Third, foreign politics are shaped not only by realist geopolitical factors such as economics and military power but also by domestic politics.[155] According to Hoffman, any of these challenges calls into question the notion of sovereignty.

The sixth argument is that global terrorism does not present a significant challenge to neorealism, nor has it changed anything in IR. In "The Implications of September 11 for the Study of International Relations," Barry Buzan states that terrorism has only highlighted areas of IR that require attention. He states that from a

---

[152] Ibid., 35.
[153] Ibid., 38.
[154] Hoffman, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 104-115.
[155] Ibid.

neorealist perspective, the terrorist attacks can be interpreted as a consequence of

unipolarity and the response as an example of the unipolar power structure in

operation.[156] For neorealists, he states, 9/11 can be seen as an opportunity to realign

relationships among great powers and strengthen state and territorial politics through

various security measures, such as increased border checks, surveillance, inspection,

and monitoring of all kinds of activities. Buzan also states that two items of the realist

agenda are likely to get attention as a result of the terrorist attacks. First, the problem

of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the international

system, with a key focus on nuclear, aerospace, chemical, and biotechnology

industries. While the monitoring of WMD was previously aimed at rogue states, it

will now expand to transnational terrorism. A second item to receive attention is the

fact that U.S. military superiority, along with its ability to use precise force with low

risk of casualties, is widening the gap between the U.S. and other actors in the

international system with respect to military power.[157] Buzan concludes that despite

the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. response, global terrorism did not lead to much change

in the debates about IR theory or the agenda of IR generally.[158]

Analysis

The six implications suggested by the various academics are all significant in

addressing the threat of terrorism from different perspectives. An analysis of the

different perspectives within a neorealist theoretical framework provides the

opportunity to explore terrorism as a transnational phenomenon in a systemic,

---

[156] Barry Buzan, "The Implications of September 11 for the Study of International Relations," Paper presented on April 10-11, 2002 in Stockholm for Conference on the Research Agenda in International Politics in the Aftermath of September 11, 9-10.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid., 14.

deductive, and rigorous theoretical framework with an exclusive focus on states. This method of analysis will allow the limitations within the literature to be identified by removing reductionist arguments and allowing further exploration of the implications of global terrorism on IR as a whole. According to Waltz, the international system has three organizing principles: the system's ordering principle; the functional differentiation of units; and the distribution of capabilities. This analysis will address the key issues raised in the literature using Waltz's theory. The format will be issue oriented, addressing the implications as they appear in the literature.

In brief, the different perspectives in the literature state the following: global terrorism has the ability to cause a shift in the balance of powers, from a unipolar system to a multipolar or apolar system; global terrorism will cause interaction between states either in the form of multilateral cooperation or increased rivalries; rivalries will be based on the proliferation of WMD, downward shift in conflict from international to internal, and increased awareness of military superiority; and finally, democracy needs to be established as the dominant political ideology to ensure a secure international system.

The first implication of global terrorism on IR is the potential shift in the balance of powers. Bazhanov and Ferguson imply that global terrorism has the ability to cause a shift in the balance of powers, changing the system from a unipolar power to either a multipolar or apolar one. To support their arguments, Bazhanov suggests that the threat of global terrorism requires multilateral cooperation by the U.S. and the failure to achieve this would cause a shift in the balance of powers, but Ferguson

implies that the U.S. will not be able to strategically manage the threat because its military capabilities are running thin.

There are two key points in their arguments that require attention. First, cooperation and multilateralism in the international system is not a new strategy among states to effectively deal with threats. States align and realign themselves constantly depending on the challenge at hand and their own interests. Second, cooperation and multilateralism alone cannot determine the polarity of the system: additional factors such as economic, political, and military capabilities all play a role in determining the stability and polarity of the system.

Ferguson does state that U.S. military capabilities are running thin as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and there may come a time when the superpower is incapable of dealing with global terrorism which will cause the loss of credibility and its unipolar position in the international system. Military capabilities are an intrinsic part of the international system's ordering principles. If the U.S. is unable to demonstrate its continued military superiority, then that set of conditions would open the international system to competition, forcing other states to adjust their relations with the declining superpower and other states to protect their own interests.

Whether the balance of powers will shift from unipolar to apolar or to multipolar is difficult to determine through an examination of the military capabilities and multilateral efforts in fighting terrorism. The shift from unipolarity to apolarity in a system would be equivalent to a stock market crash. Does global terrorism have the potential to cause such a degree of anarchy that a unipolar power with military superiority would find it impossible to tackle the threat? It is difficult to answer this

question for two reasons. First, the literature provides only broad generalizations of the impact of global terrorism on IR. Second, to truly measure the threat of global terrorism, a true life example would have to be explored within the parameters of this research to determine if such implications exist, and at present, the data and research presented are insufficient to do this. Chapter Three will use Al-Qaeda as a case study on global terrorism to determine to what degree global terrorism is capable of causing serious consequences in the international system.

Another condition strongly emphasized by Ferguson and Gaddis, as well as in the literature at large, is the growing concern over economic inequalities arising out of globalization and fragmentation. The literature in section one indicates that both economic globalization and globalization as a process have had a significant impact on the evolution of terrorism. It has also been noted that globalization is continuing to evolve at a remarkable rate, causing it to become more open and integrated. In order to pursue their economic interests in an integrated economy, states will want to engage in the international decision-making process and make their interests known. Great powers do not encounter any difficulties in making their interests known, because they are well recognized and respected in the international system. The lack of representation of lesser powers in the international political system can heighten their fear for survival, causing them to resort to other means — such as violence and the acquisition of WMD — to ensure their security in the international system. Should economic globalization and fragmentation continue to widen the gap between rich and poor nations, the system will continue to produce two problems: an increase in the number of rogue and failed states, and frustrations within the states that will

provide breeding grounds for terrorist movements. In order for rogue and failed states

to survive in the international system, they will require economic and military

capabilities. As pointed out in section two, the transnational nature of terrorism has

the potential of serving rogue and failed states as state-sponsored terrorism. A system

divided along the lines of severe economic inequalities will support global terrorism,

as is evident through modern international terrorism, specifically in the Middle East.

This brings us to the next important variable in the implications of global

terrorism: the proliferation of WMD. WMD in the hands of terrorists is probable and

problematic due to their accessibility in a globalized world.[159] However, the

proliferation of WMD as a problem of its own fueled by global terrorism presents

different challenges for IR. Both Hoffman and Buzan identify WMD as a challenge

that global terrorism brings to the international system. The connection between

global terrorism and WMD stems from the increased economic gap between greater

and lesser powers. Because of the magnitude of damage and destruction that they can

cause, WMD are considered a significant threat to the international system as a

whole. WMD are valued as a part of a state's distribution of capabilities. The

increased number of states with WMD also increases concerns for security of the

system, producing state rivalries. If global terrorism causes global insecurity as the

result of severe economic inequalities, then the acquisition of WMD in the hands of

terrorists or rogue and failed states will present significant challenges for maintaining

---

[159] Russell D. Howard, "Understanding Al-Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism—The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, rev. and upd., ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 81.

security of the system as a whole. Both Hoffman and Buzan are accurate in addressing this threat as a significant challenge to IR.

Hoffman suggests that three additional problems within IR theory need attention: first, wars among states have declined and wars within states are on the rise; second, foreign politics are shaped not only by economic and military power but also by domestic politics; and third, realism does not account for globalization and nonstate actors (NSA). Although Hoffman's argument is well placed, neorealism has not completely disregarded Hoffman's points of contention. Neorealism acknowledges that state's internal conflicts, domestic politics, and the role of NSAs and transnational phenomenon such as globalization are important to international politics.[160] Individually, the variables Hoffman identifies are not able to provide an understanding of how the system functions as a whole, therefore each of the problems raised are reductionist and limited in their contributions to this thesis.

This can best be explained using Waltz's political structure diagram.[161] In Figure 2.5, N (1,2,3) are states generating their external effects. X (1,2,3) are states interacting with one another.

[160] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in Keohane, ed., 88-89.
[161] Ibid., 95.

Figure 2.5

To address Hoffman's concern, N represents issues that occur within a hierarchical

structure (domestic politics). N represents variables such as internal conflicts,

domestic politics, non-state actors, and political ideology. The variables N represents

are important in determining the external capabilities of X, which determine how X^1

will interact with X^2 and vice versa. N cannot simply replace X no matter how

significant the N variable may be in the international system, because X is the most

significant player in the international system.[162]

In the example of global terrorism, the literature review demonstrates that

only states have taken legitimate steps to counter the threat of terrorism. This

indicates two things: first, that terrorism does threaten the international system, and

second, that states are the major players in the international political system, who

through their counterterrorism actions have demonstrated their significant role in

managing the affairs of the international system. Therefore, despite the transnational

---

[162] Ibid., 88.

and independent nature of NSAs, they along with any other nonstate bodies are not the most significant actors in the international system.[163]

One issue that remains unexplained within the N variable is political ideology. Gaddis makes two significant statements on this issue: in order for lesser powers to have a voice in the international system, they must adopt democracy as their political ideology; and in order for the U.S. to maintain its position as hegemon, it is vital for the world to adopt democracy. Democracy is a political ideology. The world has seen several ideological changes among nations. A general opinion is that democracy provides a safer environment for a state to conduct its domestic affairs because it allows its citizens to contribute to the various political processes without fear of reprisal. However, within Waltz's neorealism, the political ideology of a state does not determine how capably a state is functioning in the international system. Since states are self-regarding units, they are capable of deciding how they need to cope with their environment to make their ends meet.[164] Waltz also states that grouping of states indicates how states are placed in the system.[165] In the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, 208 countries and jurisdictions expressed support for the campaign against terrorism and its objectives.[166] Among the 208 countries, there were several Islamic states.

One key point stems from the impact of political ideology in the international system. It could be argued that if a democracy is seen to provide economic benefits to a state, then other states would naturally gravitate to adopt similar practices. This idea

---

[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid., 93.
[165] Ibid.
[166] The White House Website. http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/financialresponse.html (Accessed October 17, 2004).

comes from Waltz's second organizing principle, the differentiation of units. All states in the international political system are the same, which means that "states are alike in the tasks they face, though not in their abilities to perform them."[167] Technically, if democracy has contributed to U.S. economic growth and military strength, then nations, such as China and those in the Middle East would naturally gravitate to adopting practices similar to the U.S.: they too would want to build their economic and military capabilities to secure their position in the system. However, this has not happened. The rise of global terrorism has shown the opposite: China remains communist, and Islamic nations have rejected the idea of democracy and shown a strong preference for Islamic law in governing their states. Political ideology as stated by Gaddis does not play a significant role in determining the success or failure of a state within the international system. However, if in the international system there appears to be a greater degree of cooperation among democratic states in dealing with global terrorism, then ideology would serve a purpose that required further attention within this thesis.

Another key issue that requires analysis is Hoffman's statement that realism does not account for globalization. While this is true to some degree, Waltz does state that "it is important to consider the nature of transnational movements, the extent of their penetration, and the conditions that make it harder or easier for states to control them."[168] To accurately address Hoffman's concern, the impact of globalization on its own would have to be examined closely to determine its effects on the international system, and to see if it directly challenges state sovereignty as Hoffman suggests.

---

[167] Waltz, "Political Structures," 91.
[168] Ibid., 89.

Since this thesis is only exploring two aspects of globalization in relation to terrorism, it is limited in its ability to determine the validity of Hoffman's concerns.

In summing up the literature review on the implications of global terrorism on IR, it is important to highlight a few key points. The key research questions posed by this thesis — what is the relationship between globalization and terrorism, and what are the implications of global terrorism on IR?— are adequately addressed by the literature reviewed in both parts of this chapter. However, a few areas of concern require further attention in the exploration of the implications of global terrorism on IR. The most important issue is to determine the degree to which global terrorism is a transnational phenomenon. By identifying the strengths and weaknesses of global terrorism, its implications on IR will become clearer when examined within a neorealist theoretical framework. A number of issues raised in section two of the literature review that this thesis was not able to address require further exploration including: whether global terrorism can cause a shift in the balance of powers; whether the possession of WMD by terrorists causes problems for IR; and whether global terrorism can challenge the military superiority of a unipolar power.

Chapter Three will present a case study of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization as an example of global terrorism. The findings will help answer the questions raised in the literature review and allow a further exploration of the implications of global terrorism on IR.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: GLOBAL TERRORISM—

THE AL-QAEDA TERRORIST MOVEMENT

This chapter will present a detailed case study of global terrorism to demonstrate how it has evolved into a transnational phenomenon and how it is interconnected with the major players in the international political system. Waltz's neorealism acknowledges the importance of transnational phenomena, and the significant impact these would have if they developed to the point of effecting change in the international political system. The case study research will provide collected data on various aspects of global terrorism as a transnational phenomenon. Among the several global terrorist movements, only one — Al-Qaeda — has been chosen to examine its global characteristics.

Al-Qaeda has since the 1990s been identified as a major threat to the international system; however, it is important to note that Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist organization to use the advantages of globalization to further its political objective.[169] Al-Qaeda has been described by leading academics such as Paul Wilkinson as a new form of movement that is genuinely transnational, with multinational membership, finances, and support networks.[170] The 9/11 attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda raised its profile as a significant transnational movement, making it an ideal case study to determine the implications of global terrorism on IR.

To examine global terrorism as a transnational phenomenon, this chapter will be divided into three parts: the first will introduce the Al-Qaeda terrorist movement

---

[169] Cronin, 48-49.
[170] Paul Wilkinson, in Whittaker, ed., 45.

with a description of its historical and religious roots; part two will examine Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization; and part three will examine its global network, with special attention paid to its leadership and operations.

Part One

The Al-Qaeda Movement: Its Historical and Religious Roots

In an address to the United Nations (U.N.) sanctions committee, Ambassador Heraldo Munoz of Chile said, "the nature of the threat is constantly evolving, just as Al-Qaeda itself has evolved from an organization with a structure and hierarchy into a global network of groups unbound by organizational structure but held together by a set of overlapping ideological goals."[171]

Al-Qaeda's ideological roots originate from an Islamic religious movement called the *Salafiyya*, derived from *al-Salaf al-Salih*, which translates into "the venerable forefathers," referring to the generation of the Prophet Mohammad and his companions.[172] In the book *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*, Michael Scott Doran, describes the *Salafiyya* movement. As a political movement, the *Salafiyya* compels *Sunni*[173] Muslim states and their governments to adopt the *shari'a*, the Islamic law, as the dominant governing constitutional body. Within Islam, *shari'a* law is a guide to religious, political, social, and domestic life. It also regulates all public and private behavior. Extreme *Salafis*[174] believe that the strict application of the *shari'a* is God's commandment to Muslims, and therefore it must be adopted to

---

[171] Council, Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz of Chile, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee (September 13, 2004) http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11904&Cr=terror&Cr1 (Accessed on October 1, 2004)

[172] Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War: Ideology, Rage, and the Assault on America," in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and The New War*, ed. James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 34.

[173] A sect of Islam.

[174] Those who believe in the *Salafiyya* doctrine.

ensure that Muslims walk on the path of the Prophet.[175] The *Salafiyya* is not a unified

movement: it is expressed in many forms, most of which are not necessarily related to

extremism.[176] Examples of the Salafiyya include the *Wahhabi* ideology of the Saudi

state and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.[177] Even though the organizations that

have adopted the Salafiyya philosophy are diverse, they do have one common

objective: that Muslims have deviated from God's plan and therefore they must return

to their proper state by emulating the Prophet Mohammad, adopting *shari'a* in every

aspect of private and public life.[178]

Extremist *Salafis* regard modern Western civilization as evil because of its

power in political and economic affairs in Islamic states.[179] In *Salafi* writings, the

U.S. is seen as a senior member of a "Zionist-Crusader alliance" dedicated to killing

Muslims and destroying Islam.[180] Extremists within the *Salafiyya* movement place

great emphasis on *jihad*, or holy war, to fight those supporting the Zionist-Crusaders

alliance.[181]

Part Two

The Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization

Al-Qaeda, which means "the base" in Arabic, took form as an organization in

1989 from the *Mekhtab al Khidemat* (MaK), the Afghan *mujahadeen*[182] service

office. The MaK was actively engaged in a global campaign, with Osama bin Laden

---

[175] Doran, 35.
[176] Ibid., 34.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid., 36.
[180] Ibid., 38.
[181] Ibid., 35.
[182] A person who strives against his self. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. (New York: Berkeley Publishing Company, 2002), 112.

as its principal funder, to ensure a constant supply of *mujahadeen* fighters (*jihadis*)[183]

and funds to the Afghan resistance against the Soviets.[184] The MaK was very

successful in recruiting Muslim fighters from over thirty-five countries into

Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the name of *jihad*,[185] and the recruits for the

Afghan *jihad* came to be known as the Afghan Arabs. The MaK established recruiting

centers under the name of *Al Kifah* throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S.,

and it is estimated that between 1986 and 1989, 25,000 Afghan Arabs participated in

the Soviet-Afghan war.[186] The Afghan Arabs fought alongside 175,000 to 250,000

Afghan *mujahadeens*, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was

considered to be a tremendous moral victory for Osama bin Laden, the *jihadis,* and

Muslims all over the world.[187] The moral victory for Islam over the Soviet Union (a

superpower), an infidel, fueled the situation by providing an opportunity for

extremists to extend the Islamic sentiments of a victory to a struggle beyond

Afghanistan and on to the U.S.

Part Three

The Global Network

Al-Qaeda is a well organized, highly secretive, diffused, and diverse terrorist

organization.[188] Its global network includes salaried operatives worldwide who are

actively involved in the collection of intelligence, the acquisition of false documents,

---

[183] One who engages in a Jihad (See footnote 5).
[184] Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 54-57.
[185] A holy war. Jihad is the exertion of one's utmost effort in order to attain a goal or to repel something detestable. The principle objective of a jihad is to remove oppression and injustice to establish justice, well-being, and prosperity; and to eliminate barriers to spread the truth. Gunaratna, 112.
[186] Bergen, 59.
[187] Ibid., 65-82.
[188] Whittaker, ed., 41-50.

the movement of funds; recruitment; and training around the globe.[189] The intricacies

of Al-Qaeda's global network can be best explained by examining the organization in

two parts: leadership and operations.

Leadership

Osama bin Laden was the son of a Yemenite billionaire who founded the Bin

Laden Group of companies in Saudi Arabia.[190] The Bin Laden Group was primarily a

construction company that built mosques, highways, and palaces, and it took on a

number of government contracts. After bin Laden's father died, he inherited

approximately $30 million from the family business.[191] In addition to the inherited

family fortune, Bin Laden built profitable businesses in construction, manufacturing,

currency trading, import/export, and agriculture in Sudan and Afghanistan, and his

assets included owning approximately eighty companies in Africa, the Far East,

South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.[192]

Bin Laden's doctrines are considered to be identical to those of the Iranian

extremist *Shi'ite* leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[193] Both Khomeini and Bin

Laden wanted to create a fundamentalist theocracy throughout the Islamic world,

where the ruler of the nation would also be the authoritative guide for the religion.[194]

The organization had other influential leaders in addition to Bin Laden: Ayman al-

---

[189] Fouad Ajami, "The Uneasy Imperium: Pax Americana in the Middle East," in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and The New War*, ed. James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 12.

[190] Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001), 4.

[191] Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc, 2002), 33.

[192] *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, 34.

[193] Bergen, 48.

[194] Michael A. Ledeen, *The War Against the Terror Masters* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), 16.

Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor and the head of the Egyptian militant group-Islamic

Jihad; Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the ruler of Sudan; and Abdullah Assam, to name a few.

Bin Laden's vision was not limited to Al-Qaeda. Jane Corbin[195] describes his

aspirations in *The Base: In Search of al-Qaeda – The Terror Network That Shook the*

World. Corbin states that Bin Laden's plan was to create an empire by uniting the

world's one billion Muslims, governed by the *shari'a* and one leader.[196] Corbin also

says that Bin Laden set out to accomplish this goal in the following manner:

> The instrument to accomplish this would be Al-Qaeda. The method they
> would use would be *jihad*, Holy War, drawing inspiration from the works of
> Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian polemicist who had used the judgments of a
> thirteenth-century Islamic purist to justify his call for war against the
> "infidel." Al-Qaeda's enemy would be twofold: first, the Muslim governments
> they accused of being un-Islamic; second, the power which supported them,
> the U.S. of America.[197]

John Gray and Rohan Gunaratna[198] support Corbin's assessment and add that if Al-

Qaeda could destroy the Saudi regime, it would remove the U.S. from Saudi Arabia,

and by gaining control of Saudi oil it could hold the industrialized world to ransom.[199]

With this plan in mind, the first and foremost challenge would be to bring one billion

Muslims together — transcending all national and international boundaries — and

---

[195] Jane Corbin is a BBC correspondence who has spent extensive time investigating the Middle East, in particular the threat of Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda terror network. She has won four journalism awards—in 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1994.

[196] Jane Corbin, *The Base: In Search of al-Qaeda—The Terror Network That Shook the World* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 23.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Rohan Gunaratna is a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrew's, Scotland, and an honorary fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel. He has also served as a consultant on terrorism to several governments and corporations, and has addressed the United Nations, U.S. Congress, and Australian Parliament on terrorism. Information collected on Al-Qaeda in this book has been collected through his own police and intelligence sources, as well as his own interviews with Al-Qaeda associates.

[199] John Gray, *Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2003), 76; Gunaratna, 116-117.

create a pan-Islamic empire.[200] This strategy served Al-Qaeda in two ways: first, it would provide a vast pool of potential terrorists to recruit; and second, due to a vast multicultural membership, it would give Al-Qaeda access to several parts of the world to solicit funding and spread its network. [201] Prior to merging Islamic terrorist organizations together, Al-Qaeda faced the challenge of finding a way to deal with the differences between the two major sects of Muslims in the world, the *Sunni's* and *Shi'ites*.[202] According to Corbin, Western intelligence agencies were aware that *Shi'ite* and *Sunni* terrorist groups had been meeting to work out their doctrinal differences and planning to merge to create a global alliance against the U.S.[203]

The evolution from a single organization to multiple organizations with one ideology transformed Al-Qaeda into a global movement.[204] The first merger between the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and other Islamic groups took place in 1998. Al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) collaborated and then expanded to include the Libyan Fighting Group, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, the Syrian Jihad Group, and the Groupe Islamique Armé of Algeria.[205] Additional terrorists were then recruited from Tajikistan, Tunisia, Comoros Islands off the coast of Africa, Eritrea, Somalia, Chechnya, Egypt, Bosnia, Philippines, Algeria, and Pakistan — all from

---

[200] Corbin, 22; Gunaratna, 116-117.
[201] According to Peter Bergen (30-31), Al-Qaeda members came from the following countries: Jordan, Turkey, Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Tanzania, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, Uighur, Burma, Germany, Sweden, and France, and also included Arab-Americans and African-Americans. The list was prepared by Bergen from the interviews and court testimonies of Al-Qaeda operatives.
[202] Ledeen, 14.
[203] Corbin, 36.
[204] Wilkinson, 45.
[205] Corbin, 54.

third world countries.[206] Al-Qaeda established its network across the globe with

Muslim countries and groups with small or large populations and memberships.

Table 3.1

Groups Affiliated with Al-Qaeda

Group	Country
The Advice and Reform Committee	-
Asbat al Ansar	Lebanon
Harakat ul-Ansar/Mujhadeen	Pakistan
Al-Badar	Pakistan
Armed Islamic Group/GIA	Algeria
Saafi Group for Proselytism and Combat (GSPD)	Algeria
Talaa al Fath (Vangaurds of Conquest)	-
The Groupe Roubaix	Canada/France
Harakat ul Jihad	Pakistan
Jaish Mohammed	Pakistan
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan	Pakistan
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam	JUI/Pakistan
Hezbollah	Lebanon
Hezb ul-Mujahideen	Pakistan
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)	Egypt
Al-Hadith	Pakistan
Hamas	Palestinian Authority
Bayt al-Imam	Jordan
Islamic Jihad	Palestinian Authority
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan
Al-Jihad	Bangladesh
Al-Jihad	Egypt
Al-Jihad Group	Yemen
Laskar e-Toiba	Pakistan
Lebanese Partisans League	Lebanon
Libyan Islamic Group	Libya
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	Philippines
Partisans Movement	(Kashmir) India
Abu Sayyff	Philippines
Al-Ittihad	Somalia
Ulema Union of Afghanistan	Afghanistan

Source: Yohan Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network*. (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001), 30.

---

[206] Bergen, 31.

After establishing Al-Qaeda globally, the next goal was to legitimize Al-Qaeda among Muslims across the world. The use of theological concepts, such as *fatwa* and *jihad* doctrines, is a major feature of Al-Qaeda.[207] In order to legitimize Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden issued several religious edicts (*fatwa*). Rohan Gunaratna analyzed several documents distributed by Osama Bin Laden to his followers and noted constant references to God (*Allah*) in his writings and speeches. Bin Laden's choice of words to address his followers suggested to them that he was carrying out *Allah's* divine wish, legitimizing his message to the degree that questioning his motives would be sacrilegious.[208] The key messages to Muslims and Saudis in Bin Laden's speeches and documents were to boycott American goods and wage economic warfare against the U.S.[209] The most significant document was a *fatwa* issued in 1998 that was perceived as a serious threat to international security, interpreted as a declaration of war by the Clinton administration.[210]

The 1998 *fatwa*, titled "The International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders," was issued by Al-Qaeda in collaboration with five other terrorist organizations: Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Group, North African Islamic movements, Pakistani *Harkut al-Ansar* and the Bangladeshi militant group.[211] The *fatwa* accomplished two goals for Al-Qaeda: it announced the merger between Al-Qaeda and some of the most feared Islamic terrorist groups in the world, and it ordered all Muslims to undertake the killing of all American and their allies,

---

[207] Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," 195-197.
[208] Gunaratna, 117-124.
[209] Ibid., 120.
[210] Alexander and Swetnam, 2.
[211] Ibid., 88.

civilian or military, wherever possible.[212] The *fatwa* openly declared Americans, their

allies, and U.S. civilians and military personnel as targets, and encouraged every

Muslim, even those not terrorists, to kill the enemy. Usually terrorist organizations do

not make such declarations in fear of repercussions from governments.

Operations

Al-Qaeda's internal organizational structure had a director, a governing

council called *Shura* (which is equivalent to a board of directors), line managers, and

employees.[213] The *Shura* controlled the various units that managed the recruitment,

financial, military, communications, and intelligence needs of the organization.[214]

Each of these units were built on a global infrastructure.

Al-Qaeda's global network is supported by its all-channel network structure

and the functions of its business and finance department. In this study, Al-Qaeda's

operations will be divided into the following categories: network structure, global

business networks, global financial networks, and recruitment and training. In his

book, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Gunaratna states that during the

Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda's annual budget was under $50 million, and

since Bin Laden only inherited approximately $25-30 million, the rest of the funds

were obtained through Al-Qaeda's businesses.[215] The businesses and financial

networks established by Bin Laden were designed to raise and move money through

---

[212] Corbin, 66.
[213] Ajami, 12.
[214] Ledeen, 44.
[215] Gunaratna, 81-83.

regulated and deregulated financial institutions, as well as through traditional informal means, which are described as a financial network of "spider webs."[216]

Al-Qaeda's global network structure

Due to globalization and rapid advances in communications technology, Al-Qaeda adopted the network structural model over the hierarchical model.[217] Each cell had approximately two to fifteen members, and the cells were independent of the local groups that Al-Qaeda may have built alliances with while creating its various networks.[218] The cells functioned with a high degree of secrecy and security to avoid detection. Members of one cell did not know members of other cells: they only came together on a need-to-know basis. At the time of this research, it is believed that Al-Qaeda has cells in approximately seventy countries. In response to the 9/11 attacks, more than 3,300 Al-Qaeda operatives from 47 different countries were arrested in 97 countries.[219] Al-Qaeda has maintained a high degree of secrecy through its flat, diffused, cellular network structure.

Al-Qaeda's global business networks

Al-Qaeda's business section started with a company called *Wadi al-Aqiq*, "the mother of other companies," which became its holding company.[220] Al-Qaeda raised funds in four ways: through legal businesses and investments; through petty and serious criminal activity; by soliciting donations from wealthy Muslims around the

---

[216] Ajami, 12.
[217] Howard, "Understanding Al-Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism," 81.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid., 77.
[220] Corbin, 33.

world; and from charitable and nongovernmental organizations from around the world.[221]

In Sudan, Al-Qaeda established a number of holding companies, construction firms, agricultural businesses, investments firms, tanneries, and transportation companies.[222] The Sudanese government permitted Bin Laden to create and support businesses in Sudan, allowing Al-Qaeda to use the legitimate businesses as fronts for raising money. Al-Qaeda was involved in exporting honey in Yemen, and there is also speculation that he had connections in massive short selling of stocks in airlines, insurance, and reinsurance companies in Europe, Japan, and the U.S.[223] As well, trading companies called Laden International and Taba Investments provided a vehicle for currency trading.[224] The *al-Hijra* was a subsidiary for importing explosives, *al-Qadurat* was a trucking venture, and *al-Themar al-Mubaraka* ran fruit and vegetable farms that also doubled as training camps.[225] These are just a few examples of the diverse businesses established by Al-Qaeda to raise funds for terrorist activity. Both the legitimate and illegitimate companies provided Al-Qaeda operatives with logistical and communications support as well as cover to prevent capture or detection.[226]

The second method used by Al-Qaeda to raise money was petty and serious criminal activity. Afghanistan, the world's leading producer of opium, is used for

---

[221] Ibid.
[222] William F. Wechsler, "Strangling the Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda's Finances," in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and The New War*, ed. James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 129-145.
[223] Wechsler, 131.
[224] Corbin, 33-40.
[225] Ibid., 34.
[226] Gunaratna, 81.

drug smuggling by the Taliban, which generated revenue for terrorist activity.[227] Al-Qaeda cells dispersed in various parts of the world were expected to support their operations through petty crimes such as cigarette smuggling, credit card frauds, counterfeiting, and other financial frauds.[228] One Algerian cell in Britain raised $200,000 in six months in 1997.[229] No means of raising funds was perceived as too unorthodox, morally questionable, or illegitimate for Al-Qaeda members.

The third method employed by Al-Qaeda to raise money was by soliciting donations from wealthy Muslims around the world, especially those who share Al-Qaeda's vision. Although the *mujahadeen* fighters themselves were not known to be wealthy, their training was backed by rich supporters, and such financial support was seen first-hand during the Afghan war. A great deal of the financial support has been known to come from Saudi Arabia, but Muslims in different parts of the world contributed as well.[230]

The fourth and most important source of funds for Al-Qaeda are worldwide charitable and nongovernmental organizations.[231] There are several advantages to raising money through these organizations. First, the Muslim community in general believes in donating money for charity as a religious practice, therefore offering billions of dollars a year to charities. People donating to charities are not necessarily sympathizers of Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organizations. Second, funds raised in charities are predominantly in cash, which provides an easy avenue for transactions and makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to follow the money trail. Third,

---

[227] Wechsler, 131.
[228] Ibid., 132.
[229] Gunaratna, 87.
[230] Alexander and Swetnam, 29.
[231] Ibid.

many of these charities were associated with Islam and therefore they did not attract the attention of government regulatory agencies. This setup allowed Al-Qaeda to recruit individuals from within the charities: to steal money from within the charity while using it as a front. Finally, because a vast number of charities were international in scope, they accepted funds from international donors, which provided excellent cover for transnational movement of terrorist personnel, material, and funds.[232]

The members of Al-Qaeda raising the funds were not necessarily the direct beneficiaries of the funds; instead the money was channeled through financial institutions across the globe where funds were needed to support Al-Qaeda's operational needs.[233] Al-Qaeda's funds were spent on religious schools, business enterprises in which Al-Qaeda could derive future operational interests, terrorist training camps, salaried agents network, allied organizations, the Taliban, and terrorist operations.[234]

Al-Qaeda's global financial networks

Research indicates that Al-Qaeda had more than three different financial networks, and it moved money using four different methods.[235] The first method was basic cash smuggling. Most Middle Eastern economies are still more cash intensive than those of the West, and therefore movement of large amounts of cash was not unusual. This allowed Al-Qaeda members to move around with large quantities of money without arousing the suspicion of officials in the Middle East.[236]

---

[232] Wechsler, 132.
[233] Gunaratna, 87.
[234] Ajami, 12.
[235] Wechsler, 129-143.
[236] Ibid., 133-134.

The second method for moving money was to use the global banking system—in particular the under-regulated banking havens—to hold and launder money.[237] The havens offered a number of advantages to Al-Qaeda members: they concealed identities, supported anonymous incorporated businesses, employed strict bank secrecy, did not examine bank transactions or report suspicious activity, and barely cooperated with foreign law enforcement.[238] The financial system was designed to hide the identities and the funds of its clients. However, access to the global banking system was easy because of technological advancements and around-the-clock service in every corner of the world.

The third form of movement of funds took place within the Islamic banking system. This form of banking was set up for those of the Muslim faith who felt that their religion forbade them from being involved in the charging or payment of interest. However, due to the religious affiliation of the Islamic banking system, it was exclusive and less regulatory than that of the Western systems. The Islamic banking system was not very accessible to non-Muslims or governments seeking to gain access to information.[239]

The fourth and final means of moving money was through the *hawala* — or "in trust" — underground banking system. This system allows the movement of money with little or no paper trail, government regulation, or overseeing, and it does not involve the physical movement of cash across borders.[240] In order to use the

---

[237] Ibid., 133.
[238] Ibid., 134.
[239] Ibid., 130-135.
[240] Ibid.

hawala system, the *hawaladar*[241] from the initiating point receives cash from a party

and makes a phone call, faxes, or e-mail's a *hawaladar* at the receiving end to advise

him of the amount that is to be given to the receiving party. The two *hawaladar's* will

ultimately settle their accounts over time. The system does not require wire transfers

or contracts with formal banks. The Pakistani bankers estimate that the *hawala*

system brings between $2.5 and 3 billion into the country each year, compared to

only $1 billion that enters through the formal banking system.[242]

Al-Qaeda adopted different means of raising and moving funds globally. It

demonstrated itself to be a flexible organization. Al-Qaeda is believed to have three

financial networks that cross national boundaries, therefore its financial networks are

not limited to one country but incorporate the legitimate and illegitimate financial

institutions of most states. Bin Laden and his associates were also believed to have

dollar bank accounts in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Dubai and London, with large reserves

of gold, and to have dealt with different currencies, including the U.S. dollar, in case

any one of the currencies collapsed.[243]

Gunaratna states that compared to other terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda's

global financial network is the most robust, complex, sophisticated, and resilient

money-generating and money-moving system.[244] With a vast network and pool of

funds, the organization supported other departments within the organizations —

general administrative functions, recruitment, communication, and training.

---

[241] Person or persons involved in the money transaction within the *hawala* system.
[242] Gunaratna, 84.
[243] Corbin, 57.
[244] Gunaratna, 81.

Recruitment and training

One of Al-Qaeda's main focuses was recruiting and training members. The recruitment of members was not limited to one region or country in the world. Any state with a low or high Muslim population was a potential target for recruitment and financial support. Those who joined Al-Qaeda were fully employed by the organization. Although Al-Qaeda was open to recruiting anyone who was interested in joining the organization, it did pay attention to the academic exposure of new members. Al-Qaeda avoided recruiting anyone educated in the humanities in order to avoid those who had been exposed to Western philosophy and thought.[245] The focus was more on technical skills. In *The Al-Qaeda Training Manual*,[246] the necessary qualifications for membership were listed as follows: that one must be a Muslim; must commit to the organization's ideology; must be mature, patient, intelligent, and insightful; must be willing to sacrifice; must listen and obey; must keep secrets and be willing to conceal information; must be free of illness; and must have a calm personality and be able to endure psychological trauma.[247]

Al-Qaeda's recruitment methods were diverse as well: prerecorded audiovisual material and brochures; indirect recruitment through word-of-mouth; setting up open-houses, known as "guesthouses," in various regions of the world where newcomers could drop in to obtain information; and soliciting new members from a databank of terrorists who had fought during the Afghan war. Propaganda

---

[245] Corbin, 137.

[246] The *Al Qaeda Training Manual* was located by the Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police during the search of an Al Qaeda member's home. The manual was found in a computer file described as "the military series" related to the "Declaration of Jihad." The manual was translated into English and was introduced in court during the embassy bombing trial in New York. Only selected texts from the manual have been released by the U.S. Department of Justice.

[247] *The Al Qaeda Training Manual* obtained from the internet http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm (Accessed February 10, 2004)

videos of the Al-Qaeda training camps were developed with a style that made training attractive, featuring masked men in uniforms engaged in stealth missions and physically challenging exercises.[248] For those who were unable to attend the training camps, Al-Qaeda provided an encyclopedia in the form of books and CD-ROM's called *The Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*. This learning tool had detailed information on explosives, weapons, and strategies for engaging in terrorist and paramilitary attacks.[249]

A great deal of information about Al-Qaeda operations was confirmed in 2001 by Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al-Fadl, a Sudanese defector who provided evidence in court in New York about Al-Qaeda's internal structure and organization.[250] During his trial, Al-Fadl indicated that Al-Qaeda members were required to take an oath of allegiance (*bayat*) to the group's philosophy of *jihad* and sign papers swearing allegiance to Bin Laden.[251] The *jihadi's* that joined Al-Qaeda earned monthly wages — Al-Fadl had earned $200 a month, standard pay for Al-Qaeda members [252]— and members could earn bonuses depending on their trade and degree of specialization. Al-Qaeda also had a medical scheme for its employees, and some workers were offered rations such as sugar, tea, and oil.[253]

---

[248] Corbin, 138.
[249] Ledeen, 23.
[250] Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june04/al-qaida061804.htm (Accessed August 10, 2004)
[251] Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/binladen20701tt.pdf. (Accessed August 10, 2004)
[252]Corbin, 35.
[253] Ibid.

The training of Al-Qaeda members varied from basic military training to highly specialized training.[254] Training camps provided recruits with guesthouses as living quarters.[255] The training facilities offered series of lectures and practical exercises[256] Some of the trades included explosives, poisons, secret acid, forgery, basic engineering, technical skills, farming, deception, forgery, falsifying passports and other legal documents, driving, and maintenance.[257] The courses were designed to make the members self-sufficient: no matter what part of the world they went to, they would be able to establish a network through clandestine cells and train others to do the same.[258] The training methods also focused on cross-cultural training: on socially blending in with societies anywhere in the world to prevent capture or detection.[259] The U.S. Department of States reports that they do not know exactly how many members or cells Al-Qaeda has worldwide.[260] The total number of Al-Qaeda members ranges in the thousands depending on the source of information, and the accuracy of the data is unknown. Al-Qaeda has established areas of operation globally (see Table 3.2).

Another area of focus was the acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents as WMD. Whether Al-Qaeda possesses any WMD is unknown. There are assumptions based on information supplied by the

---

[254]Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/binladen20701tt.pdf. (Accessed August 10, 2004)
[255] Corbin, 39.
[256] Ibid.
[257] *Through Our Enemies' Eyes,* 130; *The Al Qaeda Training Manual.*
[258] *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, 130.
[259] Corbin, 40.
[260] U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10220.htm (Accessed October 23, 2004).

Soviets of theft of their stockpiles of CBRN agents.[261] In his book *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, Russell Howard states that Al-Qaeda is determined to acquire WMD and may potentially have access due to globalization, information technology, and shady suppliers.[262] Information is limited in most of the research on Al-Qaeda and WMD, although a few reports exist indicating that some operatives have been caught with small quantities of chemical agents.

Table 3.2

Al-Qaeda Areas of Operation

Region	Countries
Middle East	Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority Areas, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arabs Emirates, Yemen
Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines
Europe	Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Kosovo, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Former Soviet Union	Azerbaijan, Russia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Africa	Algeria, Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire
North America and South America	Canada, U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay

Source: Yohan Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network.* (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001), 31.

---

[261] Howard, "Understanding Al-Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism," 81-82.
[262] Ibid., 82-83.

This concludes the case study on the Al-Qaeda terrorist movement. Global terrorism as a transnational phenomenon significantly impacts the internal dynamics of a state, as seen in the intricate network design of the Al-Qaeda terrorist movement. The next chapter will take the discussion on the relationship between the two concept, globalization and terrorism, as well their implications on IR further by exploring it exclusively within neorealism.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

What is the relationship between globalization and terrorism? What are the implications of global terrorism on IR? This chapter will consider the two research questions posed by this thesis in light of the research conducted. Part one will address the first question. Part two will address the second, exploring it using Waltz's neorealist theoretical framework. Part three will conclude this research, addressing two important questions: what are the strengths and challenges of Waltz's neorealism with regard to global terrorism, and does Waltz's theory of neorealism adequately describe the phenomenon of global terrorism?

Part One

Globalization and Terrorism

Global terrorism comprises two distinctive parts: "global" and "terrorism." The global aspect of the term indicates an association with the concept of "globalization," and terrorism is an ideology. The conceptual overview of terrorism indicated that terrorism today is ideologically the same as it has been through its history.[263] Although motivations, goals, and modes of operation have evolved, terrorism at its core has not changed. As a result, there are no new definitions of terrorism. What *have* changed are the external stimuli.

Globalization is an external stimulus. The combination of terrorism and globalization has given global terrorism a new dimension, one that has forward momentum and transnational characteristics. Two primary aspects of globalization

---

[263] Ibid., 74-85.

have contributed to the rise of global terrorism: economic globalization and globalization as a process.

Research indicates that both aspects of globalization have been important in the evolution of terrorism. Globalization as an economic phenomenon causes economic inequalities and fragmentation. Therefore, a renewed sense of purpose creates not only an environment ripe for breeding terrorist violence but one that is prone to the exploitation of terrorists and also by terrorists.[264] Globalization as a process provides—through advanced global technologies such as communications, business, and financial institutions—enhanced means for the function and decentralization of terrorist operations.[265]

Economic inequality is one negative condition caused by globalization. This condition produces a hostile environment that encourages the grouping of people with a common ideology seeking radical change in the status quo. Economic inequalities threaten the social, economic, and political well being of a state and its people when they are visibly aware of the below-average conditions they are subjected to compared to other economic environments. The helplessness and anger arising from the harsh economic conditions caused by globalization lead to a sense of grievance. If grievances are not addressed, then the situation requires alternative means of resolution—one of them being terrorism.

In a global economy, the distribution of economic profits is not necessarily in the hands of poor economic nations. Because there are several global actors in the supply and demand chain, certain nations are helpless, unable to improve the social

---

[264] LaFeber, 1-17.
[265] Aronson, 545; International Telecommunication Union, 2001, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom99.html (Accessed October 21, 2004)

and political conditions of its own people. Economic inequalities then lead to further problems, fragmentation being one of them. Where globalization is meant to bring every nation together to create a global market place, fragmentation does the opposite, causing further disintegration and creating more unrest. Fragmentation then causes further problems within nations, resulting in, for example, nationalism and separatism. Economic inequalities born out of globalization set off a chain reaction, with a set of consequences affecting terrorism by creating the conditions that support an environment that causes terrorism.

Globalization as a process works toward better communication. The vast distances between nations and regions are eliminated through advanced communications technology, which allows greater interaction in areas of business and finance. This increase in global communication has had positive and negative results. One of the negative results is that this communications technology is also accessible to terrorists.

The revolution of communications technology has benefited terrorist movements in two key ways. First, it has allowed terrorism to become decentralized, allowing it to spread across the globe: terrorists no longer have to be together, or even physically present, in the country of origin. Second, advancements and increased accessibility to communications technology have allowed terrorists to function more efficiently using enhanced tools. For example, terrorist movement "Z" can have operatives in one or as many as all the nations in the world. Its funds can be moved through a transnational inter-banking system, using a legitimate company as a front and operatives listed as members of the business. The funds can be accessed at any

time of day and in any amount necessary. Furthermore, efforts to plan and coordinate

terrorist acts can be transmitted and received through any data transmission system

(internet or telephone) instantaneously. Indeed, all the above transactions can take

place in minutes.

As the processes of globalization are adapted by terrorist groups, the structure

of these organizations has changed from hierarchical to network models.[266] The

structural change has permitted a greater degree of secrecy and efficiency. The

enhanced covert and clandestine nature of terrorist groups makes counterterrorism

efforts more difficult. Due to the exclusive nature of network cells, detection and

defection are rare.

The relationship between globalization and terrorism is apparent with regard

to the two primary external stimuli: economic globalization and the processes of

globalization. Economic globalization has provided the broader conditions that favor

terrorism, and the process of globalization has had a practical influence on the manner

in which terrorist organizations function. Figure 4.1 demonstrates how terrorism has

edged itself into globalization, making globalization a part of its own structure. As a

result of the two external stimuli, the processes of globalization have given terrorism

a transnational dimension. As these stimuli continue to affect global terrorism, the

types of terrorism that dominate global terrorism will change.

---

[266] Howard, 75-78.

Figure 4.1

Globalization and Terrorism

GT   Global Terrorism
G   Globalization
T   Terrorism

Religiously motivated terrorism is a wave, and like the first three waves—the break-up of empires, decolonization, and leftist anti-Westernism—it will be replaced over a period of time.[267] However, if the processes of globalization that benefit terrorism continue to evolve at high rates, then terrorism will continue to evolve as well. As the means by which terrorism functions become more sophisticated and accessible, terrorists will continue to adapt to the external environment. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization's adaptation to processes of globalization will evidently lead other terrorist organizations to follow suit, wanting to gain momentum and incorporate processes that help further their causes. David Whittaker, Bruce Hoffman,

---

[267] Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," 47.

and Martha Crenshaw all address this evolution of terrorist organizations across the globe: as globalization continues to evolve, so will global terrorism.

The conclusion of the literature review and conceptual overview with regard to global terrorism is that globalization is an external stimulus. A useful metaphor might be that globalization is the freeway for the vehicle of terrorism. Just as a freeway provides the fastest route from points A to B if traveling in a straight line, globalization provides the tools for terrorists to accomplish their goals more efficiently. As the freeway continues to improve its road conditions, the vehicle will continue to improve its delivery time and distance. Terrorism will continue to benefit from improved global services.

Governments have far more power to acquire the necessary tools to detect and eliminate the threat of terrorism. Multilateral cooperation and access to sophisticated and up-to-date intelligence-gathering technology are means that terrorists cannot compete with.

Terrorism, in its evolution into a transnational phenomenon, has penetrated the international political system. The various academic works cited in this research paper provide evidence of this, as does the analysis provided in this part of the discussion. Part two will explore the implications that global terrorism, as a transnational phenomenon, has on IR using Waltz's neorealism.

Part Two

Global Terrorism: Implications for IR

This research concludes that there are two primary implications of global terrorism on IR: the increase in unequal distribution of capabilities, and the

acquisition of WMD. Waltz's ordering principles of an international political system state that anarchy is the organizing principle of the international political system, that units are differentiated in capabilities only and not in their functions, and that the distribution of capabilities determines the survival of a state in the international system. Starting with the first ordering principle, this part of the chapter will logically show the impact of global terrorism on the behavior of states.

In an anarchical international system, the presence of global terrorism causes a heightened sense of insecurity, which leads to suspicion that failed and rogue states are state sponsors of terrorism. The overall increase in the number of fatalities and the economic and political disruption caused by terrorism force states to examine the causes of terrorism beyond the means (globalization) established through which terrorists are able to carry out their attacks. In the interests of international and unit security, states are motivated to examine the players sitting in the shadows that support terrorism. In a self-help system, the survival of the state is the responsibility of the state itself.

A certain degree of suspicion is caused by uncertainty of the motivations and actions of state sponsors and supporters of terrorism. Due to the violent nature of terrorist activity, states are likely to act on their suspicions out of fear for their survival. A good example of this scenario is the War in Iraq. This war was a response to suspicions that Iraq was a sponsor of the 9/11 attacks.[268] Based on the available intelligence and suspicion, the U.S. attacked Iraq pre-emptively. The lack of a direct link between a terrorist movement and a state will not prevent great powers from

---

[268] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Report (21 August 2004) http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch10.htm (Accessed October 27, 2004)

taking direct action in the interest of their security. As the threat from global terrorism increases, so will the degree of anarchy. As seen with the War in Iraq, the distrust of states begins with other rogue and failed states.

States differentiate in capabilities, not in the functions they perform. All states are focused on self-preservation, therefore survival is their main goal. If greater powers have established a system that guarantees a certain degree of security, then other states will follow in their footsteps. Global terrorism is a transnational phenomenon: its presence affects all states to varying degrees. Therefore, it is in the best interest of a state to address the problem of global terrorism through a collaborative international effort. Addressing the problem of global terrorism is a function that all states will engage in, because it guarantees a degree of security and, ultimately, survival.

However, the extent to which states can participate in addressing the problem varies, depending on Waltz's third ordering principle: the distribution of capabilities of the states in the system. To accurately address the problem of global terrorism, states individually have to assess their relative position in the international system. Their actions and responses will be evaluated and judged by other states, increasing or decreasing the level of distrust.

In light of the threat of global terrorism, all states have two choices: to engage or to disengage. The greater and middle powers will assess their ability to engage in conflict depending on their military capabilities, and they may form multilateral alliances to address the situation. Lesser powers will engage by supporting greater powers, or they will disengage and suffer the consequences that follow their lack of

participation. It is not unusual to witness two hundred states support the U.S.-led

coalition in the War on Terror.[269] In the genuine interest of international security,

states do have an interest in seeing the threat of global terrorism eliminated. But states

that do not wish to support the U.S. will jump on the bandwagon simply to prevent

jeopardizing their relationship with great powers.[270]

For lesser powers, multilateral cooperation is an effective strategy to maintain

relations with great powers as well as to provide a front that indicates support for the

greater good of the system. However, because of the existing anarchical nature of the

international system and the additional threat of global terrorism, states that are

suspected supporters of terrorism will need to take extra steps in ensuring their own

survival. After 9/11, seven countries were designated as state sponsors—Cuba, Iran,

Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan.[271] According to the U.S. Department of

Defense, Sudan and Libya have taken measures to show their support by dealing with

terrorism in their states. However, Iran, North Korea, and Syria have taken limited

action to cooperate with the international community's campaign against terrorism.

Iran and Syria appear to have clamped down on certain terrorist groups, such as Al-

Qaeda, but they maintain their support for other terrorist groups.[272]

The situation is difficult, because although lesser powers are in a position to

choose sides, they might demonstrate their support by joining the alliance. Lesser

powers will acknowledge that despite their efforts to join the cause, their security is

---

[269] The White House, "Campaign Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update."
http://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/coalition/ (Accessed October 20, 2004)
[270] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Powers," in Keohane, 126.
[271] U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10249.htm (Accessed October 19, 2004)
[272] U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10249.htm (Accessed on October 19, 2004)

still not guaranteed because of the suspicious and distrustful nature of the anarchical system. Even though lesser powers support great powers in the war against terrorism, self-preservation and self-help will require that they develop other means to establish their security and survival.

Although the relative capacities of a state measure survival, military capabilities and economic conditions are the indicators that determine how successful a state is in the international system. These indicators are relative gains that a state builds to promote its interests and at the same time manage its survival. Lesser powers do not benefit from their economic conditions to the degree that greater powers do. Therefore, states (lesser powers) need to acquire other capabilities to ensure their position in the international system.

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are the most feared and dangerous weapons of mass destruction and disruption by international stability. Global terrorism affects the proliferation of WMD in two ways. First, a system built on distrust will cause rogue and failed states to acquire such weapons to ensure their own survival. All seven countries designated as state sponsors during the War on Terror have WMD.[273] The increase in the number of states with WMD also opens the system to rivalries and competition. Waltz states that the higher the number of players in a system, the more stable the system.

Can global terrorism—opening the doors of competition by increasing the number of states that possess WMD—make the system more stable? The answer is no. Other factors, which will be discussed further on, also play a part in determining

---

[273] Federation of American Scientists Website, "States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction," http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd_state.htm (Accessed October 26, 2004)

the stability of the international system. The rivalries and competition encouraged by global terrorism are fear-based and reactive. Stable states with WMD possess them with the confidence that their deployment is not at risk, even in the worst circumstances; but states experiencing social and political unrest cannot guarantee such security. The chain reaction global terrorism sets off in the international system has serious consequences for state survival in an anarchical system.

Waltz's neorealism is helpful in exploring the implications of a transnational phenomenon like global terrorism on the international system. Since neorealism is a balance of power theory, the ultimate question addressed should be whether global terrorism can cause a shift in the balance of powers. This question was raised in the literature review but not addressed adequately, and so requires some attention.

The polarity of the international system does not rest on the impact of one phenomenon. It is admittedly a bold idea, but can global terrorism change the system from unipolar to multipolar, bipolar, or apolar? It is true that global terrorism has affected the international system in various ways, such as in its social, economic, and political stability. It is also true that global terrorism has raised serious issues with respect to weapons that can cause unimaginable mass destruction. With the number of unsettling consequences caused by global terrorism, any assumptions about the balance of powers depend on the theoretical assumptions of neorealism that explain the results of the actions undertaken by states within the given conditions of global terrorism. In the case of global terrorism, the U.S. is leading the international community to fight the war on terrorism. It has the ability to take on this role because of its unmatched military superiority. The key question determining whether there

111

will be a shift in the balance of powers is not whether the U.S. will continue to maintain an international coalition, but how long the U.S. can maintain its military superiority. This raises questions about the length of the war, the economic means to support the war, and the military and economic support provided by other states.

To adequately address whether the international system will see a shift in the balance of powers due to terrorism would require further exploration of U.S. capabilities as well as those of its allies to determine how long they can remain in the War on Terror. Even after exploring the relative abilities of the U.S. and its allies to endure in the fight against terrorism, other variables would require analysis. This thesis is limited in its ability to provide a clear answer to the question of polarity.

Part Three

Conclusions

This research posed two exploratory questions: what is the relationship between globalization and terrorism, and what are the implications of global terrorism on IR? The exploration was divided into two parts with a logical sequence of discussion, defining each of the concepts of terrorism, globalization, and global terrorism. Since the two research questions posed by this thesis have been addressed, Part three of this conclusion will now turn to the theoretical framework to determine the implications of global terrorism on IR. An analysis of global terrorism through a neorealist lens required a step-by-step approach in exploring global terrorism as a variable using the key organizing principles of the theory. In order to benefit from various perspectives, this thesis examines the phenomenon of global terrorism from the different social, economic, political, and religious angles. Hence, this type of

analysis has provided a more complete understanding of global terrorism. The design

of this thesis permitted a well-rounded analysis of global terrorism and its

manifestation within the international political system by exploring its internal and

external stimuli. However, the three organizing principles of neorealism have

encouraged a much deeper analysis of global terrorism by examining state behavior

through breaking down the functional responses of states to the threat of global

terrorism.

The theoretical framework of neorealist theory provides researchers with the

tools to examine the manner in which a state would respond to global terrorism based

on its abilities and natural desire for self-preservation. Hence, taking the research a

step further, we can draw the following conclusions from exploring global terrorism

using Waltz's neorealism. The first organizing principle reinforces that global

terrorism contributes to the degree of anarchy due to the increased threat of security

and survival via terrorist attacks. Similarly, the second organizing principle identifies

and confirms that the functions performed by the differentiated states remains the

same. This is because the threat of global terrorism targets security and thus in the

interest of survival and self-preservation states will respond despite their political

status in the international political system. Finally, the third organizing principle

shows clearly that a state's response to the threats of global terrorism would depend

on its own political, economic, and military capabilities. All three implications reveal

that neorealism has helped identify some legitimate concerns for the international

political system.

This analysis allows us to address the question of Waltz's neorealism and its usefulness in examining the implications of global terrorism on IR. Each of the above-noted conclusions combined with the analysis of global terrorism in Chapters Two and Three provide evidence of an examination of global terrorism and its implications from various perspectives using a very effective theoretical framework that was both systematic and logical.

Although neorealism was useful in showing the interconnection between global terrorism and the international political system, it was less successful in exploring global terrorism's impact on IR and the two research questions. There are two reasons for this: terrorism is not a discipline and IR is a study of state behavior. Although terrorism may be examined in the context of international relations, terrorism and international relations are, strictly speaking, distinct areas of study. Terrorism therefore is not a perfect match for international relations theory. This does not prevent our analysis, but it does pose challenges. With regard to the second reason, Kenneth Waltz's theoretical analysis is designed for the study of states in the international system, which poses challenges for incorporating nonstate actors and their relationship into global terrorism.

It is less problematic to study the implications of global terrorism on international and domestic politics and foreign policies: this type of analysis, followed by most political scientists in terrorism studies, is evident in the academic works cited in this paper. The difficulty lies in understanding the impact of global terrorism on the international political system as a whole. As a result, some aspects of neorealism do not assist in providing a complete picture of the impact of global

terrorism on IR: for example, the role of nonstate actors and international institutions. In Chapter Two, the progression of religiously motivated terrorism from the grassroots shows that nonstate actors and international institutions play an important role in providing the external stimuli that have perpetuated the growth of this international phenomenon. It is important to narrow the focus of global terrorism and analyze the various players that contribute to its existence even if such an analysis is reductionist in nature. This type of analysis can only strengthen the overall understanding of global terrorism and its impact on international relations.

Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* provides a strong framework for exploring global terrorism in the international political system as a whole. The exclusive design of this thesis is perhaps its greatest limitation, but it is also its greatest strength. By using an exclusive design and theoretical framework, this thesis has been able to explore one aspect of global terrorism—as a transnational phenomenon—in a rigorous manner. The thesis limited reductionist arguments and variables, discussing them only within the realm of domestic politics. By eliminating discussion of them with reference to the international political system, this thesis was able to accomplish its set task.

As mentioned in Chapter One, this thesis was faced with various challenges in bringing the evolving concepts together to provide a more complete and accurate picture of the impact a transnational phenomenon like global terrorism on the international political system. Adhering to the theoretical boundaries of neorealism permitted this thesis to accomplish two important tasks. First, it defined global terrorism from the grassroots, and second, it avoided examining global terrorism

using a reductionist argument to determine its implications on IR. This is a key point in this thesis because terrorism is a not a normal variable used within IR theory. In order for global terrorism to be explored as a variable within neorealism and contribute significantly to neorealist theory and IR, it needed to adhere to the parameters of Waltz's theory.

The overall design of this thesis has accomplished two objectives. First, it has explored the relationship between globalization and terrorism on its own merits, without using any aspect of IR to establish the correlation between the two concepts. Second, using Waltz's neorealism, it has been able to determine the implications of global terrorism on IR. The most important point in the design of this thesis is that global terrorism, even outside of an IR theoretical framework, is a significant threat to the international political system.

The key question remains: does Waltz's neorealism explain global terrorism adequately? The affirmative answer is that Waltz's neorealism does reveal serious implications for the international political system if global terrorism continues to evolve and more dangerous modes of operation continue to be adopted. The more challenging question is whether Waltz's neorealism can predict the future of international relations given the current and future status of global terrorism? The answer is no. The greatest limitation of Waltz's theory is also its strength. In the case of global terrorism, an analysis of reductionist theories needs to be considered in order to determine if neorealism can adequately explain the phenomenon of global terrorism on IR. The need for reductionist arguments means that more work needs to be done to examine global terrorism as a serious threat to the international political

system. However, this thesis has taken the first step and has overcome the first challenge of bringing two distinct areas of study together to explore pressing issues surrounding global terrorism and IR. In doing so, this thesis has successfully contributed to both terrorism studies and IR. It has clearly shown that a rigorous international relations theory, such as neorealism, does adequately address the implications of global terrorism on international relations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, James. *The Financing of Terror*. Great Britain: New English Library, 1986.

Adamson. Fiona. *"International Terrorism, Non-State Actors and the Logic of Transnational Mobilization: A Perspective from International Relations."* Memo written for the conference on Conference on International Law, International Relations and Terrorism at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Stanford: Stanford University, November 2002.

Al Qaeda Training Manual. Internet. Accessed from the U.S. Department of Justice athttp://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.

al-Fadl, Jamal. *Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl in U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, U.S.A. vs. Usama Bin Laden (Defendant)*. New York: February 7, 2001. Internet. Accessed from http://new.findlaw.com/cnn/ and Federal Bureau of Investigation at http://www.fbi.gov.

Alexander, Dean C., and Yonah Alexander. *Terrorism and Business: The Impact of September 11,2001*. New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002.

Alexander, Yonah, and Michael S. Swetnam. *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network*. New York: Transnational Publishers Inc. 2001.

Ananieva, E. "Foreign Policy Debates in the U.S." *A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and IR* 50, no. 1 (2004): 8-15.

Anonymous. *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*. Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002.

A. T. Kearny Inc. "Measuring Globalization." *Foreign Policy: The Magazine of Global Politics, Economics, and Ideas*. Internet. Accessed on October 10, 2003. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_janfeb_2001/atkearney.html

Baylis, John, and Steve Smith, eds. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Bazhanov, E. "A Multipolar World Is Inevitable." *International Affairs* 49, no. 5 (2003): 17-22.

Bergen, Peter L. *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2001.

Betts, Richard K. "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002): 19-37.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. "Borders Beyond Control." *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2003): 99-104.

_____. "Coping with Antiglobalization: A Trilogy of Discontent." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (2002): 2-7.

Burke, Jason. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003.

Bush, George W. State of Union of Address, January 29, 2002. Washington D.C.: The White House, 2002. Internet. Accessed from http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases

Buzan, Barry. "The Implications of September 11 for the Study of International Relations." Paper for Conference on the Research Agenda in International Politics in the Aftermath of September 11. Stockholm, April 10-11, 2002.

Byford, Grenville. "The Wrong War." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002): 34-43.

Calhoun, Martin. "Annual Military Spending from 1945-1996." *Centre for Defense Information*. Washington D.C. (July 9,1996). Internet. Available from http://www.cdi.org/issues/milspend.html

Campbell, Kurt M. "Globalization's First War?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2002): 7-14.

Carothers, Thomas. "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror." *Foreign Policy* 82, no. 1 (2003): 84-97.

Cilluffo, Frank J., Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi. "The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2002): 61-74.

Clark, Ian. *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

_____. *Globalization and International Relations Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999.

Clutterbuck, Richard. *Living With Terrorism*. Great Britain: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1975.

Collins, John, and Ross Glover, eds. *A User's Guide to America's New War: Collateral Language*. New York: New York University Press, 2002.

Combs, Cindy C. *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc.,1997.

Combs, Cindy C., and Martin Slann. *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*. New York: Checkmark Books, 2003.

Corbin, Jane. *The Base: In Search of al-Qaeda—The Terror Network That Shook the World*. London: Simon & Schuster U.K. Ltd., 2002.

Council on Foreign Relations. "Economics: Globalization." Internet. Accessed on October 12,2003. http://www.terrorismanswers.com/policy/globalization2.html

Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.

_____. "How Terrorism Declines." In *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, ed. Clark McCauley, 69-87. London: Frank Cass Co. Ltd., 1991.

_____. "How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism." In *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, ed. Howard Lawrence, 71-80. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992.

_____. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich,7-24. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

_____, ed. *Terrorism in Context*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.

_____. "Why America? The Globalization of Civil War." *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 425-432.

Crenshaw, Martha, and John Pimlott, eds. *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*. Vol. 1. New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1997.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism." *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2002/2003): 30-58.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004.

Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. "Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America's War on Terrorism." *Current History* 100, no. 640 (2001): 403-409.

Dalacoura, Katerina. "Islamist Movements as Non-state Actors and Their Relevance to International Relations." In *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, ed. Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 235-248. London: Palgrave Publishing, 2001.

Delpech, Thérèse. "The Imbalance of Terror." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2002): 31-40.

Doran, Michael. "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 177-190.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. *Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World.* New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Eubank, William L, Leonard B. Weinberg, and Ami Pedahzur. "Terrorism, Globalization and Freedom." A paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18-21, 2004.

Evans, Graham, and Jeffrey Newnham. *Dictionary of International Relations.* London: Penguin Group, 1998.

al-Fadl, Jamal. *Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl in U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, U.S.A. vs. Usama Bin Laden (Defendant).* New York: February 7, 2001. Internet. Accessed from http://new.findlaw.com/cnn/ and Federal Bureau of Investigation at http://www.fbi.gov.

Fandy, Mamoun. "Middle East Terrorists with 'Global Reach'." In *War on Terror: The Middle East Dimension*, ed. Robert B. Satloff, 101-104. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002.

Farah, Caesar E. *Islam*, 4th ed. New York: Barron's Publishing, 1987.

Federation of American Scientists. *States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction.* Internet. Accessed from http://www.fas.org/.

Fedorov, Iu. "A Global Web of Terror." *International Affairs* 49, no. 3 (2003): 93-101.

Ferguson, Niall. "A World Without Power." *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2004): 32-39.

Freedman, Lawrence, ed. *Superterrorism: Policy Responses*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

Freidman, Norman. *Terrorism, Afghanistan and America's New Way of War*, 67-100. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

Fuller, Graham E. "The Future of Political Islam." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002): 48-60.

Gaddis, John Lewis. "A Grand Strategy of Transformation." *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2002): 50-64.

Ganguly, Sumit. "Putting South Asia Back Together Again." *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 410-414.

Gray, John. *Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern*. Kent: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2003.

Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2002.

Gurr, Nadine, and Cole Benjamin. *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000.

Halliday, Fred. "Transnational Paranoia and International Relations: The Case of the 'West versus Islam.'" In *The New Agenda for International Relations*, ed. Stephanie Lawson, 37-53. Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing Inc., 2002.

Harmon, Christopher C. *Terrorism Today*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.

Hennessy, John L., David A. Patterson, and Herbert S. Lin, eds. *Information Technology for Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities*. Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

_____. "*Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment*." Paper presented at the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy and Geneva Center for Security Policy Third Annual Conference, The Middle East After Afghanistan and Iraq, Geneva, Switzerland, May 5, 2003.

_____. "*Testimony: Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy*." Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, March 27, 2001. Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001.

_____. "Testimony: Lessons of 9/11." Submitted for the Committee Record to the United States Joint September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, October 8, 2002. Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001.

_____. "Testimony: Preparing for the War on Terrorism." Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001.

_____. "Testimony: Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, annoy-Governmental Organizations." Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001. Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001.

_____. "Testimony: Re-Thinking Terrorism in Light of the War on Terrorism." Presented to the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, September 26, 2001. Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "Clash of Globalizations." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002): 104-115.

Hoge, James F. Jr., and Gideon Rose, eds. *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.

Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Holms, John Pynchon. *Terrorism: Today's Biggest Threat to Freedom*. New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2001.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. "The Rise of Complex Terrorism. *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2002): 52-62.

Howard, Michael. "What's in a Name?" *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (2002): 8-3.

Howard, Russell D., and Reid L. Sawyer. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Rev. and upd. Connecticut: McGraw Hill Companies, 2004.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Jervis, Robert. "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002): 37-54.

Josselin, Daphné, and William Wallace. "Non-State Actors in World Politics: a Framework." *In Non-State Actors in World Politics*, ed. Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 1-21. London: Palgrave Publishing, 2001.

Kalb, Don and Richard Staring. *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000.

Kaplan, Robert D. *Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.* New York: Random House Inc., 2001.

Kegley, Charles W. Jr., ed. *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls.* New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1990.

Kelleher, Ann, and Laura Klein. *Global Perspectives: A Handbook for Understanding Global Issues.* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1999.

Keohane, Robert O., ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Khor, Martin. *Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices.* Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Ltd., 2001.

Klare, Michael T. "Waging a Postindustrial Warfare on the Global Battlefield." *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 433-437.

Kushner, Harvey W. *Encyclopedia of Terrorism.* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2003.

_____, ed. *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium.* London: Sage Publications, 1998.

LaFeber, Walter. "The Post-September 11 Debate Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002): 1-17.

Lawson, Stephanie. *International Relations.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

Ledeen, Michael A. *The War Against the Terror Masters.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy." *International Affairs* 79, no. 5 (2003): 1045-1063.

Leheny, David. "Terrorism." In *World at Risk: A Global Issues Sourcebook*, 545-565. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2002.

Lessor, Ian O., Bruce Hoffman, and John Arquilla, eds. *Countering The New Terrorism*. Washington D.C.: RAND Publishing, 1999.

Levitt, Matthew. *Targeting Terror: U.S. Policy Towards Middle Eastern States, Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post-September 11*. Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002.

Lukin, A. "Russia, U.S., China and the Iraqi Conflict." *International Affairs* 49, no. 3 (2003): 9-2.

Mahajan, Rahul. *The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002.

Maskaliunaite, Asta. *Terrorism and Globalization: Recent Debates*. Internet. Accessed on October 12, 2003. http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubicon/forum/terrorism.htm

McCgwire, Michael. "Shifting the Paradigm." *International Affairs* 78, no. 1 (2002): 1-8.

McCloud, Kimberley, and Matthew Osborne. *WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden*. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Internet. Accessed on November 27, 2001. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm.

Mohsen, Ashraf. "Challenges of the Terrorist Phenomenon in the Twenty-first Century." In *Meeting the Challenges of Global Terrorism: Prevention, Control, and Recovery*, ed. Dilip K. Das and Peter C. Cratcoski, 117-129. New York: Lexington Books, 2003.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9-11 Commission Report*. August 21, 2004. Internet. Accessed from http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

Neuman, Stephanie G., ed. *International Relations and the Third World*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Nicholson, Michael. "How Novel Is Globalisation?" In *Politics and Globalization: Knowledge, Ethics, and Agency*, ed. Martin Shaw, 23-34. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1999.

Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century*. London: Fernwood Publishing, 2001.

Picco, Giandomenico. "New Entente after September 11? The United States, Russia, China, and India." *Global Governance* 9 (2003): 15-21.

Post, Jerold M. "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces." *In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich, 25-40. Cambridge: University Press, 1992.

Al Qaeda Training Manual. Internet. Accessed from the U.S. Department of Justice at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.

Quarles, Chester L. *Terrorism: Avoidance and Survival.* Lanham: University Press of America,2000.

Rapoport, David C. "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions." *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 658-677.

_____. "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism." *In Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, 46-73. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004.

_____. "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism." *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 419-424.

_____. "Messianic Sanctions for Terror." *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 2 (1988): 195-213.

_____. "Terrorism." *In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict.* Vol. 3. Ed. Lester Kurtz, 497-510. San Diego: Academic Press, 1999.

Robinson, Adam. *Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist.* London: Mainstream Publishing, 2001.

Rosie, George. *The Directory of International Terrorism.* Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd., 1986.

Salmon, Trevor C., ed. *Issues in International Relations.* London: Routledge, 2000.

Satloff, Robert B. *War on Terrorism: The Middle East Dimension.* Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002.

Schmid, Alex P. "Magnitudes of Terrorist Victimization." In *Meeting Challenges of Global Terrorism: Prevention, Control, and Recovery*, ed. Dilip K. Das and Peter C. Cratcoski, 33-39. New York: Lexington Books, 2003.

Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman, Michael Stohl, et. al. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, rev. and expanded. With a foreword by I. L. Horowitz. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988.

Scholte, Jan Aart. "Globalisation: Prospects for a Paradigm Shift." In *Politics and Globalisation: Knowledge, Ethics, and Agency*, ed. Martin Shaw, 9-22. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1999.

Shumilin, A. "The U.S. Vs. Rogue States of the Middle East." *International Affairs* 49, no. 5 (2003): 32-41.

Skidelsky, Robert. "Imbalance of Power." *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2002): 46-55.

Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). Internet. Accessed from http://www.swift.com.

St. John, Peter. *Air Piracy, Airport Security and International Terrorism: Winning the War Against Hijackers*. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 1991.

Stoett, Peter. *Human and Global Security: An Exploration of Terms*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

Taylor, Max, and John Horgan, eds. *The Future of Terrorism*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.

Telhami, Shibley. "It's Not about Faith: A Battle for the Soul of the Middle East." *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 415-418.

_____. "Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy." *Security Studies* 11, no. 3 (2002): 158-170.

Tucker, Jonathan B., ed. *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. London: MIT Press, 2000.

Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th ed. Rev. by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

U.S. Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism*. Published Reports 1982-2003. Internet. Accessed from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Weidenbaum, Murray. "Economic Warriors Against Terrorism." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2002): 43-52.

Weintraub, Sidney. "Disrupting the Financing of Terrorism." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.1 (2002): 53-59.

Whittaker, David J., ed. *The Terrorism Reader*. New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2001.

_____, ed. *The Terrorism Reader*, 2d ed. New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2003.

Wilkinson, Paul. "Pathology and Theory." In *The Terrorism Reader: The Essential Sourcebook on Political Violence Both Past and Present*, ed. Walter Lacquer and Yonah Alexander, 236-245. New York: Nal Penguin Inc., 1987.

_____. *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal Response*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.

Wilkinson, Paul, and A.M. Stewart, eds. *Contemporary Research and Terrorism*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987.

Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Vol. 5. Rev. ed. London: Sage Publications Inc., 1989.

Zanders, Jean Pascal. "Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists." *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall 1999): 17-29.

Zilinskas, Raymond A. "Rethinking Bioterrorism." *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 438-442.