

**Civilianization and National Defence Headquarters:
The Cause of All Evil?**

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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University of Manitoba
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List of Acronyms

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CCSC	Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CCDS	Chairman Chiefs of Defence Staffs
CF	Canadian Forces
CFHQ	Canadian Forces
CLS	Chief of Land Staff
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
DCDS	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
DGSP	Director General Strategic Planning
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
MND	Minister of National Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA	National Defence Act
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence
UN	United Nations
PCO	Privy Council Office
PM	Prime Minister
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PWGSC	Public Works and Government Services Canada
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
TBS	Treasury Board Secretariat
VCDS	Vice Chief of Defence Staff

Civilianization and National Defence Headquarters: The Cause of All Evil?

The international system gives sovereign states a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force. This is usually represented by war as a sovereign right.¹ This basic precept is generally dated back to the Treaties of Westphalia and the beginnings of the western state system.² This monopoly and right created the requirement for managing and organizing armed force as an arm of the government or the state. The result has been the development of complex military organizations that are heavily armed and highly trained for war. While these may or may not be effective at ensuring the state's survival from outside threats, there is often the difficulty in developing means for the state to control this armed group. This is particularly true in liberal-democratic states that pride themselves on free and open societies. In simple terms, how does government control a military that has the means to take power from the government through violence?

Within any state, the relationship, and the issues contained therein, have two components. First, the central question is to exercise civilian control over the armed forces of the state. Douglas Bland states that "in liberal democratic states, civil control of the military means control of armed forces by civilians elected to Parliament."³ In

¹Chapter VII, Article 51, of the United Nations Charter states that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence." Found on the United Nations web site at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

²The Treaties of Westphalia are a series of treaties that are also called the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. These treaties, signed on October 24, 1648 officially recognized the United Provinces and Switzerland and ended the conflict between Catholic and Protestants. This established the nation-state as the highest level of government and independent of others.

³Bland, D. *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*, A Report to the Commission on the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Minister of Public Works: Ottawa, 1997) p. 7

addition, there is also a need for the specialized administration of the military but there remains a question on how to arrange this administration. In addition, while there has no history in Canada of the military seeking to wrest control of the government from civilian political elites, there has been a very vigorous debate over this administration in Canada from confederation onward.

The second is how to ensure that there is an efficient allocations of resources for defence, while developing forces that will be effective in carrying out the duties assigned to the military. This debate is the central argument of military organizations in peacetime. It is vital that a state maintains effective fighting forces while at the same time not breaking the back of the economy. In Canada, this is also done through the establishment of civilian control of the resources that the military uses to build its establishment.

More generally, Samuel Huntington is has been recognized as an expert on the concept of civil control of the military and he defines modern civil control of the military as separating the military from political power within the state. This separation is accomplished by parliamentary bodies through the increase in professionalism of the officer corps and making the military a “tool of the state.”⁴ The increase in isolation of the military from political power renders the military “politically sterile and neutral.”⁵

Huntington also states that “a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out

⁴Huntington, S.P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1957)P. 83-84.

⁵Ibid

the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”⁶

The concept of the professional soldier is central to Huntington’s theories of civil-military relations. In this case, the professional officer is specially trained over many years in the direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence.”⁷ He goes on to state that these officers have three main duties that include: “(1)the organizing, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.⁸ This results in a military largely separate from politics and therefore firmly under the control of the legitimate civilian authority of the state. As noted earlier, the concept of civil control of the military is central to the administration of militaries in liberal democratic states.

While military and its administration are in many ways similar to other government institutions, they are also unique because the institution of defence consists of two distinct parts. In Canada the current structure through which civilian control of the military is expressed is through the Department of National Defence (DND). It includes two elements. The first is a civilian organization that is tasked with “the allocation and management of financial and human resources(not including military personnel and forces), the procurement of equipment and material, as well as infrastructure and the

⁶Ibid. p. 84

⁷Ibid. p. 11

⁸Ibid. p. 11-12.

protection of the environment”⁹ for the entire organization. The other element is the Canadian Forces (CF) as the military component of DND. The CF is “a multi purpose, combat-capable military force with a primary mission to protect Canada from a direct military threat. The CF also helps Canada during times of domestic crises; assists various levels of government that request help in handling civil emergencies; and provides Canadians with a variety of vital survival services, including search and rescue.”¹⁰

While these two elements of the single department have very distinct roles, it is imperative to recognise that the government sees them simply as part of the same organization, DND. The organization is represented by a single minister in cabinet¹¹ and has a single national headquarters in Ottawa for national command and administration. The government largely treats the Department as any other department at the national level. As a result the Department reflects many characteristics that are common among any or all government bureaucracies and institutions. This characteristic, it is argued, has led to the civilianization of the Canadian Forces, largely as a product of the structural changes that surrounded the formation of the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in 1972. In particular, the creation of NDHQ reduced the effectiveness of the CF by replacing military leadership practices and principles with civilian management techniques.

⁹Canada, Department of National Defence, *Information Kit on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*, ‘Role of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces’ p. 1

¹⁰*Ibid*

¹¹As of 12 Dec 03 there is a “Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence with special emphasis on the Role of the Reserves.” His role has not been formalised to any great extent and it is not apparent how much clout, if any, he brings to the cabinet table.

Importantly, civilianization is distinct from the notion of civilian control of the military. Civilian control entails government control of the actions and duties of the military. Civilianization, in contrast, relates to organizational culture and concerns the shift in military culture and decision making processes away from leadership towards a bureaucratic or civilian process. David Bercuson summed up the problem of civilianization as a process that “placed administrative acumen above military insight on the list of qualities required of CF officers.”¹² Allan English also argues that “the general consensus among most writers is that too many civilian values have been assimilated by the CF, and that these values are debasing the fundamental war-fighting ethos of the CF.”¹³ In essence, civilianization has resulted in the decline of the professionalism of the military officer by moving them away from the core attributes of the professional officer.

One of the most vocal critics of the structure of NDHQ has been Dr. Douglas Bland. He is a former military officer, Chair of the Defence Management Studies program at Queen’s University. While the majority of his criticism of NDHQ is directed at the unclear reporting procedures that existed within the headquarters, he does link the problem of the civilianization to the amalgamation of CFHQ and DND in 1972.¹⁴ In his report to the Somalia Inquiry, he outlined the problem of civilianization using an internal DND report on the problems resulting from the unification of the military in 1967. The author of this report, Major General Vance stated that “Civilian standards and values are

¹²Bercuson, D., *Significant Incident* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996), p. 70

¹³English, A.D. *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), p. 154.

¹⁴Bland, D. *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*, (Ottawa: DND, 1997) p. 48-49.

displacing their proven military counterparts, and in the process, are eroding the basic fibre of the Canadian military society.”¹⁵ Bland refers to this report in most of his discussions of NDHQ across numerous published works.

Civilianization has been seen as the key factor in the problems faced by the CF. In particular, the management model has been blamed as a root cause of the Somalia debacle as evidence of a crisis of leadership.¹⁶ Huntington also alludes to the problem of replacing military values in a discussion of civil-military relations. In particular, he argues that when military officers move away from the values of a professional military that their “satisfactions of professional performance and adherence to the professional code are replaced by the satisfactions of power, office, wealth, popularity, and the approbation of non military groups.”¹⁷ This change has very negative consequences. In particular, the change in attitudes towards more self serving goals results in a lack of trust of senior officers by their subordinates. This was exposed for all to see in the proceedings of the Somalia Inquiry and in surveys done during the early 1990's.¹⁸

The civilianization problem is largely blamed on the close proximity of large numbers of civilian personnel within NDHQ. Bercuson states that the influence of large numbers of civilians within NDHQ has confused the chain of command and resulted in

¹⁵DND, Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces, Ottawa, 1980. p. 18.

¹⁶Somalia Inquiry Record 3285/13628

¹⁷Huntington, *Op. Cit.*, p. 95

¹⁸English, A.D. *Op. Cit.* p. 155-156.

officers that espoused civilian and bureaucratic values that conflicted with military leadership values and that these people confused the chain of command.¹⁹

Critics such as Bercuson and Bland suggest that the problem is a function of the structural merger of the civilian and military establishments. This merger was completed in 1972 with the amalgamation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and the office of the Minister of Defence. As will be explained in detail later, this was done largely as an efficiency exercise designed to reduce the problems that were discovered during the Cuban Missile Crisis. These problems led to what some have called a crisis in Canadian civil-military relations.²⁰

The nature of the merger would seem to place the phenomenon of civilianization under the purview of neo-structural theory. This body of theory posits that institutional behaviour is the product of the interaction of culture and structure. In addition, it suggests that organizational history, its structural evolution, culture, and goals, are essential to understand the effectiveness of an institution.

In the context of the explanation for civilianization, Chapter One looks directly at neo-institutional theory and the Chapter Two lays out the roles and responsibilities of the major actors within the Department. In addition, the external influences on the Department and how they have contributed to the problems with civilianization are explored. This includes a discussion of the influence that the Central Agencies of the

¹⁹Bercuson, *Op Cit.* p. 69-73.

²⁰Haydon, P., *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* p. 202.

Canadian Government has upon the department. Combined, these chapters provide the basis to understand the structural evolution that led to the creation of NDHQ.

This evolution is examined in the third chapter, and focuses upon the reasons behind the decision to unify and integrate the Canadian military and create NDHQ. The problems facing the military at the time, such as difficulties in coordination of policy between the Ministers office and the military, were addressed in the creation of NDHQ. As part of this discussion, a brief description of the Canadian military after World War Two is followed by the problems identified by the war, the emergence of a large professional standing armed force for the first time during the Korean War and the Cold War build up. In addition, this chapter looks at the critiques of NDHQ as these are directly related to the problems that faced the Canadian military including problems that resulted in the crisis of civil military affairs during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This crisis had Canadian units participating in actions that were not strictly authorized by the Prime Minister of Canada. Finally the reasons for changing the structure in the past, and how well these problems were addressed by the changes are explored. This historical background looks at the political and military decisions that were being made and looks at the reasons these were deemed necessary at the time.

The fourth chapter explores the leadership versus management debate by studying the cultural changes that are attributed to the interactions that were outlined in the first chapter. In particular, the changes described in chapter three coincide with the emergence of the problem of civilianization. As such, this chapter looks at civilianization, the debate

surrounding leadership versus management, and the differences in military and civil service cultures.

The conclusions that can be drawn from the discussions chapters three and four will be presented within the final portion of the thesis. By using the key characteristics introduced in neo-institutional theory, this chapter evaluates the success of NDHQ. In particular, it shows that NDHQ does the job for which it was intended and is not the main cause of civilianization of the Canadian military. Factors such as changing values in society and the influence of the Central Agencies of Government and their role of fiscal and policy management have a larger impact on the difficulties facing the CF and DND than simply blaming the structure of the organization.

Chapter One

Neo-Institutionalism and DND

Institutions established by governments have a very important role in society. Theoretically they represent Canadian values and concerns and are representative of the social structure of the Canadian people. This opening chapter explores key elements of neo-structural theory. This examination opens by defining an institution and its role within the state. Next, it explores core common characteristics of organizations. Finally, this chapter identifies specific elements of institutions, especially how the organizational structure, culture, and evolution of an organization affects it in carrying out its mandate.

Larry D. Terry differentiates between the term organization and institution. He states, an organization

“is a rational, means-orientated instrument guided by the ‘cult’ of efficiency. In contrast, the institution is considered a creation of social needs and aspirations; it is an adaptive, responsive, cooperative system that embodies cultural values. The cultural values and moral commitments of a society are implanted in its institutions. In short, institutions represent the ‘ethos’ of the culture, its particular way of self fulfilment”²¹

In effect, the institution of national defence is carried out by an government organisation or department; in the case of Canada DND. In effect institutions are the ideas that represent the needs and wishes of society. Government establishes organizations to administer and control programs that are designed to meet the goals and ideals of the institution.

Some authors argue that the state is a collection of institutions and their organizations and these make up a system that has the final power and authority to make

²¹Terry, L.D. *Leadership of Public Bureaucracies: the Administrator as Conservator*,

decisions within a certain territory.²² These institutions very often are determined by the characteristics of the state. The state, in holding supreme power within its territory, sets out policies and guidelines to maintain, inter alia, order, provide services, administer the government, and defend the state and society from internal and external threats.

Institutions such as the legislative process, legal system, and electoral system play a significant role in determining how these functions are carried out, and from these policies and guidelines, the state creates organizations to administer and implement government decisions.²³

There are many characteristics of organizations which make them important in any society. First, any government organization plays a specific role in the government, society and the state itself. This role, as delineated by the government, defines what the organization does and plays a large part in determining the procedures that it will use to accomplish the role assigned to it. A clear role for an organization is vital to ensure that all efforts of the organization are directed toward society's common goals.

Governments determine what kind of organizations provide the services that are required. Once these areas have been identified, a bureaucratic organization begins to take shape in order to administer and execute the role assigned to it. James March and Johan Olsen argue that organizations "are constructed around clusters of appropriate activities, around procedures for assuring their maintenance in the face of threats from turnover and

²²M. Atkinson, *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1993), p. 7.

²³*Ibid.* p. 34-35.

self-interest, and around procedures for modifying them.”²⁴ The establishment of organizations by government also provides the public with an identifiable point of contact.²⁵ By creating role and function specific organizations, the government creates a natural point of contact for the parts of society that require its services.

Institutional theory organizes individual organizations around two principles. First an organization is an independent identity that has a degree of autonomy to act. Second, an organization is based upon collective tasks and functions that are based upon assigned roles. It is important to note that the CF and DND are organized upon a set of tasks and missions and the character of the organization is largely defined by those missions. The CF and DND also have some autonomy to act within their assigned tasks and missions, but are limited by government policy and decisions.

Proponents of neo-institutional theory further define and expand the role institutions and the organizations that represent them play in society and government. This role can be summed up as representing the wishes, needs, and values of the society in a particular issue area. March and Olsen believe that

“the processes internal to political institutions (organizations set up to administer institutions²⁶), although possibly triggered by external events, affect the flow of history. Programs adopted as a simple political compromise by a legislature become endowed with separate meaning and force by having an agency established to deal with them. The establishment of public policies, or competitions among bureaucrats or legislators, activates and organizes otherwise quiescent identities and social cleavages. Polity experts within the political system develop and shape the understanding of policy issues and

²⁴J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, (New York: The Free Press, 1989) p. 24

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶March and Olsen use the term political institution to describe an organization that is established to control and administer the ideas of the institution.

alternatives. Thus, political institutions define the framework within which politics takes place."²⁷

These autonomous and policy enacting organizations have a great deal of effect upon the policies of a state and they reflect the characteristics and composition of the institution they represents.

One of the most important effects of the formal structure of an organization is the efficiencies that result. With each person assigned a certain task, each individual can specialize and accomplish a task at more proficient levels than if the individual was not an expert at that task.²⁸ The quest for efficiency however, must be balanced with the effectiveness of the organization. If efficiency is measured by inputs and outputs, the greater the output from a given input, the more efficient the organization is. However, regardless of output, an organization must still effectively do the task for which it was created.²⁹ A very efficient organization that does not do the task for which it was created is not an effective organization.³⁰ The terms efficiency and effectiveness are the primary tool with which one can evaluate an organization. Regardless, this same organization would be seen to be adequate if it was only partly efficient yet still accomplishes its tasks

²⁷March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p. 21.

²⁸March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p 26- 28, Immergut, *Op. Cit.*, p. 20-21

²⁹An example of this would be a military organization that is very efficient at turning out cavalry regiments with properly trained troops horses and officers, would not be effective at carrying out the defence of a state against a modern and mechanized combined arms army. This efficiency is obviously not effective.

³⁰Robbins, S., and Stuart-Kotze, R. *Management: Concepts and Applications 2nd Ed.* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc, 1990) p. 20 -22.

effectively. Thus, even the most efficient organization that does not effectively accomplish its tasks and vice versa is not a good organization.

March and Olson argue that one of the first efficiencies of organizations are the order that is brought by rules.³¹ The rules of the organization form the relationships that are vital to formulate policy. However, this efficiency does come at some cost. The quest for efficiency and the adherence to rules results in some options being eliminated from contention before they are fully investigated. This is due to limits on who reports to whom within a formal structure, which reduces the options available and lowers the effectiveness of the organisation.

In the context of the drive for efficiency and effectiveness within an organization, the historical development and evolution of an organization become useful in understanding any current organization. History is the foundation upon which one can begin to understand an organization.³² By understanding the source of the institution and how it has developed over time, one can have a better appreciation of how the current formal and informal rules developed. Also, the past evolution of an institution determines the characteristics it currently possesses.

Formal and Informal Rules

As part of this evolution and in order to carry out its assigned goals, an organization develops rules and guidelines. An organization is essentially an assembly of

³¹March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p. 39

³²E. M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism' in *Politics and Society*, Vol 26, No. 1, March 1998

procedures that use a series of rules and criteria to choose the appropriate procedure in a given situation or action which are known as standard operating procedures (SOPs). Much of its behaviour is the result of these procedures. These procedures are the rules that the members of the organization follow to deal with the issues that come before them, as rule based activity is a vital characteristic of organizations.³³

March and Olsen elaborate upon this point in *Democratic Governance*. They state that organizations “follow rules most of the time.”³⁴ These rules are divided into two areas. First are the formal procedures and guidelines or SOPs that an organization follows to carry out the tasks assigned to it. The second is the informal rules reflecting the cultural norms that guide the individuals within the organization in their decision making on a day to day basis.

Formal rules are published and enforced by the hierarchy of an organization. These rules form the basis of the major activities that the organization carries out in the completion of the tasks for which it was formed. More case specific formal rules include the processes that govern the day to day business carried out within and by an organization. These rules consist of the “routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is constructed”³⁵

³³B. G. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science* (London: Pinter, 1999) p. 28

³⁴March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p 22

³⁵*Ibid.* p 22- 23

One of the most important of these formal rules is the organizational structure of the organization.³⁶ This structure is established when the organization is created as the result of legislation or law, and then evolves after years of practice. Structure largely determines communication flows within an organization. It acts as a road map for the routes of communication and delineates responsibility within an organization. The direction and nature of communication plays a large role in how a body deals with inputs from outside an organization and how it deals with ideas and decisions that originate within an organization. How various parts of an organization communicate and trade information are vital to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of its decision making process.

Structure also represents a division of labour within an organization. This impacts upon the types of responsibilities that members of the institution hold, the roles they play, and the access they have to other decision makers.³⁷ Structure serves to designate clearly who can contact who in an official manner. It is clear to all who is in charge and what the reporting pattern should be.

Less obvious than the formal rules but arguably just as, if not more, important are social or cultural factors or the informal rules within an organization. Hall and Taylor note:

“that many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with some transcendent “rationality”, instead they argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.* p 26-27

ceremonies devised by many societies , and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally. Thus, they argued, even the most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms.”³⁸

The importance of the social basis of informal rules is echoed by March and Olsen. These authors see the informal rules of organizations as a “set of beliefs, cultures, paradigms, and codes that surround, support, elaborate, and (may) contradict the formal roles, rules, and routines.”³⁹ These rules are a product social interaction, and the day to day relationships and interactions of individuals lead to a sense of belonging. These informal rules are simply rules of appropriateness as opposed to directives of efficiency. These rules are implicit, rather than contractual in nature, but they are still recognised by most of the other actors in the organization. In effect, the expectations of the individuals are socially directed and enforced as a result of them. This is contrasted to the formal structures which are enforced by formal contracts or agreements within the organization. Above all else, the consequences of ignoring these informal rules may be just as important as if formal directions or rules are ignored.

Trust is also a critical aspect of the informal contract of appropriate action among individuals within an organization.⁴⁰ When trust is lost between individuals or groups, it becomes very difficult to enforce the implied contracts that are so vital for efficiency and effectiveness. The lack of trust will result in the individuals adopting a ‘me first’ attitude

³⁸P. Hall, R.C.R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’ in *Political Studies* (1996) 44, p. 936-937

³⁹March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p 10

⁴⁰March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p. 33

in decision making instead of thinking of what is best for an organization. In time this shift in thinking would have dramatic effects on the efficiency of the organization and greatly degrade its effectiveness.

A product of the combination of informal and formal rules, norms, and procedures is the prioritization of determining factors in decision making. Individuals within a structure and culture of an organization will have a different decision making process than individuals who make decisions as individuals and are not part of an organization. March and Olsen argue that the expectations of the organization will have a very important effect on how the individual will make choices, particularly if the choices involved may not be in the individual actor's best interest. They describe this as a 'logic of appropriateness' as opposed to the individual 'logic of consequentiality'.⁴¹

The difference is illustrated through a series of question sets for any problem. Individuals faced with a situation will likely follow certain problem solving steps; What are my alternatives? What are my values? What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values? Finally, the individual will choose the alternative that has the best consequences for his or her self. On the other hand, an individual within an organizational setting will attack the same problem from a very different perspective. This individual will ask what kind of a situation is this? Who am I? How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation? This results in an action that is most appropriate for the organization, not necessarily the best solution for the individual.⁴²

⁴¹March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989 p. 23 -24

⁴²*Ibid*

These result in very different answers depending on the circumstances of the individual. An individual will most likely seek to maximize the benefit of the decision. Individuals will take the actions that he or she perceives will result in either the most benefit or the least damage to his or her own position. Conversely, the decision maker in an organizational setting will make the decision with the added variables of formal and informal/cultural rules and procedures attached to the decision making process. The decision will take into account where the individual falls within the organization, the culture and the role the individual plays within them. This will likely result in a decision that is far more likely to benefit the organisation, and be acceptable to the culture of the organization, but may not be in the best interest of the individual making the decision.⁴³

Choices that are in opposition to the prevailing culture or 'logic of appropriateness' in the organization will tend to be eliminated. These options are seen to be too radical for the organization or they may not even be considered or thought of. These choices are therefore eliminated from consideration before the actual decision process even really begins. Any decision made will be a result of all the rules that are present within the organization, whether these are formal or informal/cultural in nature, and reflect these factors.

The influence of culture in restricting the number of options presented within a decision process also lowers the possibility of conflicts arising within an organization. This lowers the possibility of dissension among the members of the organization, lowers the number of dissatisfied people, and strengthens the sense of belonging that is fostered

⁴³More info on this in the first section of Chapter Three of March and Olsen *Op. Cit.* 1989

by the organizational culture. This reinforcement of the cultural rules for the participants in the organization also reinforces the perception of the organization as the rightful place for policy discussions on the subject at hand. The informal education and formal training of new recruits into the organization, which is executed by the existing members, plays a large role in conveying this institutional logic to new generations of members.

Stability and Change in Organisations

Another very important effect of the culture of organizations is its stability. A stable organization normally is illustrated by a slow evolutionary process, rather than dynamic and abrupt change.⁴⁴ Massive change can jeopardise the standing of an institution and the individuals that identify themselves as members of the organization. Defending the status quo is equivalent to defending itself. Large change will be seen as threats, while smaller, incremental changes are less threatening to members of an organization. Thus, internal decisions will tend to lead towards smaller, more incremental steps resulting in a slow evolution of the organization.

Another evolutionary force is applied with the intake of new personnel to the organization. While an organization will tend to change the decision making process of an individual, the introduction of new members to the organization only slightly alters the culture of an organization. Slow evolution discourages forces that are seeking to change the organization for short term reasons or events.

⁴⁴*Ibid.* p. 54-55.

March and Olsen recognise that organizations “preserve themselves, partly by being resistant to many forms of change, partly by developing their own criteria of appropriateness and success, resource distribution, and constitutional rules. Routines are sustained by being embedded in a structure of routines, by socialisation, and by the way they organize attention.”⁴⁵ These built in tendencies against dramatic change produce highly effective mechanisms for defending against radical change. The unique characteristics of an organization is “sustained by social pressure and education.”⁴⁶ The formal and informal education and training given to new recruits makes social change within an organization a very slow and often a very difficult process.

The ability of an organization to defend itself against short term events is a positive aspect of the slow nature of change within it. This prevents the government from using the organization in ways that it was not intended. However, if the society that the organization grew out of evolves into something different, then the organization is likely to adjust to this new arrangement. While some changes may have taken place in the organization through the process of recruiting from society, the pace of change from within the organization may prove to be slower than the pace of change within general society. This is due to the influence of organizational forces, rules, culture, and history combined with a strong internal indoctrination and career advancement of members of the organization. These forces will prevent the organizational culture from evolving at the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

same pace as society. However, if an organization is too slow to change, its legitimacy and validity in the eyes of the society may come into question.

Since organizations are inherently slow to change, a difficult problem is how to create change. According to some writers, there are three methods to change an organization.⁴⁷ The first is by taking advantage of the stable process of change that already exists within the structure of the organization. This can be accomplished through variation in, and the selection of, routines, duties, and roles.⁴⁸ Leaders within the organization can attempt to use the embedded characteristics of the institution to try to change it. This most likely takes a great deal of time and change will not be immediately obvious. However, while not constituting rapid change, it will very likely be effective as such change will not tend to upset the inherent characteristics of the organization. As such, individuals already present in the organization will continue to identify themselves with the organization as it evolves. However, if change is massive or fundamental, individuals may no longer identify themselves with the new organization. As a result, they may identify themselves with the old organization and the new body will not benefit from their loyalty.

The second method is to take advantage of the divided attention of the organization. A large organization can not concentrate on all issues that affect it at one time. This preoccupation gives actors advocating change an opportunity to attempt change in areas that the organization has placed a lower priority upon.⁴⁹ This allows the actors

⁴⁷Schien, E. *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide: Sense and Nonsense About Culture Change*, (Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco, 1999) p. 8 - 9.

⁴⁸*Ibid*, p 58-59.

⁴⁹March and Olson, *Op. Cit.* 1989, p 61-62.

seeking change to move 'under the radar', of the organization and its components that may resist change. This would be particularly effective at changing areas that the organizational culture does not deem vital to its survival.

The final method of change is massive shock. This method involves major changes that are imposed by the leadership, or an outside force. While very effective at bringing change, there is a great deal of risk involved,⁵⁰ because it involves replacing one set of rules in an organization with another set of formal and most importantly informal/cultural rules. This in turn, has a massive effect on the entire life of the organization. While changing the organization may have been seen by all actors as necessary, the new rules, norms, and procedures may cause significant problems. Once again, there are problems of individuals within the organization. They may no longer identify themselves or agree with the new body. Many will likely continue to identify themselves with the older organization and may actively work to move the new one back to the older structure.

Problems with Two Cultures

As discussed above there are several ways to change an organization. However, often change results from the combining of two or more organizations for whatever reason. This mixing of organizations and their corresponding cultures can result in the presence of multiple cultures within an organization and poses additional challenges to that organization. This is particularly true for defence organizations due to the presence

⁵⁰March and Olson, *Op. Cit.* 1989, p 64-65, Goodin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 24-25.

of a military and civil service culture. While this relationship is fairly unique among government organizations and departments, other large organizations such as multinational corporations face similar problems.⁵¹ A noted expert on the culture of organizations, Edgar H. Schein, argues that there are three directions that the culture of an organization can follow when two or more cultures come together within a single organization.⁵²

The first possible outcome is continued separation. Each culture more or less continues as before. The two cultures simply coexist. This has advantages as long as there are no fundamental differences that prevent coexistence.⁵³ However, the lack of changes to either culture would result in the least amount of resentment or dissatisfaction of members who closely identified with the culture of their original organization. The state of coexistence is most common when the two separate cultures are not fully integrated within a cohesive organization and exist more or less as separate entities but are working towards the goals of the combined organization.

The second result is the domination by the stronger culture and the eventual disappearance of the other. According Schein, this happens most often when the leadership of the new organization force a single culture upon the organization. While this may be very traumatic for the members of the displaced culture, it can result in greater

⁵¹One example in business includes the take over of ESPN by ABC in American television. Two similar organizations with vastly different cultures forced to coexist within one management structure. Later both of these were absorbed into the Disney Corporation.

⁵²Schien, E. *Op. Cit.* p. 8 - 9

⁵³*Ibid.*

efficiencies for the organization as a whole.⁵⁴ It is particularly efficient for senior managers as the single culture has less impact upon decision making process and, after some likely resistance, a single culture will result in a more unified organization.

The third possible result is the blending phenomenon where characteristics from each culture create a new blended or integrated culture.⁵⁵ This is a very difficult option due to the large amount of cultural change for all members of the organization. However, it also results in a very strong, new culture as all have gone through the blending process and these shared experiences will become part of the newly blended culture.

Organizational Theory and the DND

This chapter has examined institutions and has made several important points that will be used the following chapters to examine DND as an organization. This chapter also demonstrated that organizations are rule based structures and that these rule are divided into two basic groups. The first being the formal rules of the organization. These would include the formal reporting lines, structures and legislation that the organizations use to outline its activities. These formal rules also extend outside the organization. DND does not exist within a vacuum. It is part of a system that makes up a state.⁵⁶ It has to operate within the system of the federal government and must work in concert with other departments and central agencies in order to carry out the wishes of the government. The

⁵⁴*Ibid*, p.9 - 10.

⁵⁵*Ibid*, p.10 - 11.

⁵⁶Atkinson, Op Cit. p. 34-35.

other kinds of rules that the DND works within are informal rules. These are made up of the culture and traditions of the organization. These rules are just as important as the formal rules in looking at how the organizations carry out tasks from day to day and how the individuals within the organization work towards achieving the goals of the group. The formal rules of DND will be examined in Chapter three of this thesis while the informal rules will be examined in chapter four.

This first chapter also outlined the importance of knowing the history of an organization as a guide to where it has gone in the past and changes it has made in order to overcome challenges it has faced. These changes are part of the evolution into the organizations that currently exists and has a large effect upon both the structure and the culture of the DND.

The quest for efficiency has resulted in the vast majority of changes to the organization and culture of DND and the CF. This quest for efficiency has arguably affected the ability of the Department to effectively carry out its tasks. This first chapter also pointed out that the quest to increase the efficiency the Department has been opposed by the inherent stability of organizations. Organizations such as DND have inertia that must be broken or at minimum directed in order to accomplish change of the organization.

The remaining chapters of this thesis will discuss the history, formal structure, informal rules and culture, and finally the efficiency and effectiveness of the DND. All of this shows that the loss of effectiveness through civilianization has not been caused

specifically by the attempts at increasing the efficiency of the department through the creation of NDHQ.

Chapter Two

Who's Who in the Zoo

The formal and informal rules of an organization are the basis of its operations. In order to examine this basis, this chapter examines the formal structures of the Department and the actors that have a role in designing, administering, and enacting defence policy in Canada. The roles and responsibilities of the primary actors within the department play a critical role in how the department functions. This examination begins with a look at the legislation that establishes DND and describes the legal roles of the primary actors within the Department. This is followed by a more detailed look at the highest levels of management and command within DND and the CF, through which the flow of information within the structure of the organization has a direct impact upon the efficiency of the organization.⁵⁷ The chapter concludes with a look at the role of outside influences upon the actions of the Department. In particular the role the central agencies of the government and how they interact with DND as they have a major impact on the day to day activities of many decision makers within the Department. The relationships between the major actors inside and outside the Department will result in further influences of the Department.

The Legal Foundation of DND

The National Defence Act (NDA) provides the authority to the government to establish the Department of National Defence. While the Department is subject to several

⁵⁷As shown in Chapter 1 p. 12

different acts of Parliament the NDA specifically states: "There is hereby established a department of the Government of Canada called the Department of National Defence over which the Minister of National Defence appointed by commission under the Great Seal shall preside."⁵⁸ While this seems very clear, Douglas Bland argues that confusion is created by Part II, Section 4 of the Act which states that "the Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces."⁵⁹ However, the relationship between the CF and the DND is not clearly specified in the text of the Act. The vagueness in the relationship has been left to the day to day managers of the Department and this has led to much of the criticism from critics such as Bland.⁶⁰

DND is also affected by other statutes in addition to the NDA. Like any other department, DND is subject to many of the laws that guide all parts of Canadian society. Of primary importance is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that guarantees a set of primary rights for all Canadian citizens. DND is also responsible for following guidelines set out in the Employment Equity Act, Access to Information Act, Privacy Act, and the Criminal Code. In addition, DND is responsible for carrying out the provisions of several other acts of Parliament. These include the Emergency Preparedness Act, the Emergencies Act, the Aeronautics Act, and the Fisheries Act. These acts contain specific references to the CF, and give certain powers to the CF depending on the situation.

⁵⁸Part 1, section 3, NDA

⁵⁹Part 2, Section 4, NDA.

⁶⁰Bland, D. *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision, A Report to the Commission on the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* (Minister of Public Works: Ottawa, 1997) p. 47.

Other acts are directed directly to the administration of government departments and these include the Financial Administration Act which created Treasury Board. The Treasury Board plays a large role in the DND as it is charged with the organization and general administration of the Public Service, financial management including disbursement of budget funds, and human resources management.⁶¹ While most of the powers of Treasury Board are directly applicable to the civilian employees of the Department, the financial powers of Treasury Board are a very important consideration for DND and the CF.

The Department is also subject to provisions of the Public Works and Government Services Act, Federal Real Property Act, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, Auditor General Act, Public Service Employment Act, Public Service Staff Relations Act, and the Official Languages Act. DND is also responsible for some parts of several international treaties that have been ratified by government and these include the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Geneva Convention.⁶²

Overall, DND is tasked with protecting the social, economic, and environmental structure of Canada, as well as defending its borders and protecting Canadian citizens.

According to the mission statement contained in *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*: “The

⁶¹Canada, Department of National Defence, *Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence: Second Edition*. Annex B, September 1999

⁶²*Ibid*

mission of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.”⁶³ This mission statement is a simplification of the defence policy laid out by the Government in the 1994 Defence White Paper. In its Introduction, the MND at the time, David Collenette, states that Canada and the interests of Canadians are to be defended by Canadians. He goes on to declare that the “primary obligation of the Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security.”⁶⁴

Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 expands upon these missions.⁶⁵ This document identifies the specific tasks that the Department is expected to carry out.

- “provide strategic defence and security advice to the Government of Canada;
- conduct surveillance and control of Canada’s territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction;
- respond to requests from provincial authorities for *Aid of the Civil Power*;⁶⁶
- participate in bilateral and multilateral operations with Canada’s allies;
- assist Other Government Departments and other levels of government in achieving national goals;
- provide support to broad federal government programs; and
- provide emergency humanitarian relief.”⁶⁷

⁶³Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001* p. 2-2.

⁶⁴Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 2.

⁶⁵This document is a departmental planning document that lays out long term plans to link the guidance from the Government to specific long range goals for the Department.

⁶⁶

Italics from original. Aid to the Civil Power is described in NDA and is described in more detail later in this chapter.

⁶⁷Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, p. 2.

Arguably, any task that the Department undertakes should fall within one of these responsibilities that grow directly from its overall mission. One notices immediately that any language mentioning the war-fighting tasks of the Canadian Forces is omitted in favour of more business-like language and description.


A Strategy for 2020 also goes on to identify the core values of Canadians. These are democracy and the rule of law, individual rights and freedom as indicated in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the maintenance of peace, order and good government as spelled out in the Constitution, and sustaining the economic well-being of Canadians.⁶⁸ In so doing, the Department essentially recognises the measure that society will use to judge the DND. This is also a recognition that society will frame decisions about the Department by these values.

The Major Actors

The NDA is not only important as the legal foundation for the formation of the Department, but it also serves to establish the legal basis of high ranking officials within the Department, including the Minister of National Defence (MND). The most recent organization chart of DND is listed below in Chart 1.

⁶⁸*Ibid*

Chart 1 - DND Organization Chart⁶⁹



As stated above, the NDA describes the role of the Minister and states that “The minister holds office during pleasure, has the management and direction of the Canadian

⁶⁹This organization chart is the most recent available from the Department. These do not reflect the changes made in the Cabinet shuffle of 12 Dec 03 or the elevation of the DGPA to Deputy Minister status.

Forces and all matters relating to national defence.”⁷⁰ The words ‘management and direction’ have very important limits placed upon them. The MND is responsible for all matters of defence policy and management of the Department and the CF. The Minister is not in command of the Canadian Forces.⁷¹ According to the act, the Commander-in-Chief is the Governor General of Canada.

While the legal basis for the MND is found within the NDA, a very thorough description of the responsibilities of the Minister can be found in Annex A, Part II of the *Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence*. This document describes the responsibilities of the Minister as being derived from “legislation and from government policies and regulations.”⁷² The legal powers given to the Minister by the NDA are simply a foundation for his day to day responsibilities. The Minister is also responsible to Parliament for the administration of the Emergencies Act, the Emergency Preparedness Act, the Visiting Forces Act, the portions of the Aeronautics Act that relate to Defence, the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, the Garnishment Attachment and Pension Diversion Act. Through these acts the MND also acts as Minister for the National Search and Rescue Secretariat, and advances civil preparedness in Canada in order to deal with

⁷⁰Part I, Section 4, NDA

⁷¹A chart showing the relationships between the major actors in the DND is shown at Annex A.

⁷²Canada, Department of National Defence, *Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence*, Second Edition, (Ottawa, 1999), Part II.

all types of emergency situations.⁷³ While these are the statutory responsibilities of the Minister, the day to day management of the department is the job of the Deputy Minister (DM) and the CDS.⁷⁴

As is shown in the Chart 1, the DM and the CDS share the level directly below the Minister. The role of the DM is outlined in the NDA in Part I, Section 7 of the Act. The DM is appointed by the Governor-in-Council and can be replaced at anytime by the government.⁷⁵ The responsibilities of the DM are not spelled out in the NDA and are largely derived from the Financial Administration Act and the Interpretation Act.⁷⁶ The majority of the responsibilities of the DM fall in the areas of policy formulation, monetary oversight, coordination with other government department managers, and human resources policy pertaining to the civilian employees of DND.⁷⁷ The DM also has some power over the CF, but it is limited to areas involving procurement, defence properties, civilian personnel or other issues that have large financial ramification. for the department. The DM is responsible to the Minister for assistance in those areas that are not expressly assigned to the Chief of Defence Staff(CDS), and involve the administration

⁷³*Ibid.* Emergency Preparedness was removed from the MND's portfolio on 12 Dec 03 as part of the new Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. (www.psepc.gc.ca) This is not yet reflected in documentation from DND or in the DND website. Clarification of the role of the new Ministry and its relationship with DND will have to be outlined by the new government after the election of 28 June 04.

⁷⁴Savoie, *Op Cit*, p. 248.

⁷⁵Part I, Section 7, NDA.

⁷⁶Bland, D. *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*, A Report to the Commission on the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Minister of Public Works: Ottawa, 1997) p. 24.

⁷⁷Canada, Department of National Defence, *Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence*, Part III.

of regulations promulgated by TBS or other central agencies of government. The DM also serves as the primary point of contact for the leading officials of the Central Agencies.⁷⁸

Overall the DM's position in DND, as in other departments, is not well defined and often depends upon the individual relationships between the Minister and the DM.⁷⁹

The position of the DM within DND is unique within government due to the presence of the CDS.⁸⁰ While the DM is given sweeping powers by the Interpretation Act, in practice and tradition within the Department, the DM only exercises legal power if "the matter is in relation to procurement, defence property, civilian personnel or had serious financial implications."⁸¹ In addition while the DM does act as an assistant to the Minister, the relationship does not mean a direct assignment as the "second in command," so to speak. The DM's role is complicated by the legal responsibilities assigned to the CDS by the NDA.

The CDS is the head of the military component of the department and highest ranking officer. The CDS is appointed in a manner similar to the DM by the Governor-in-Council on the advice of the Prime Minister. The role and responsibilities of the CDS are established in Part II, Section 18(1) and Section 18(2) of the NDA. These sections state that:

⁷⁸Savoie, *Op Cit*, p. 278-27.9

⁷⁹Bland *National Defence Headquarters*, p. 24 -25

⁸⁰In particular, the DM must share power within the department with the CDS. This relationship is unique among Federal Government departments.

⁸¹Bland *National Defence Headquarters*, p. 24-26.

“18(1) The Governor in council may appoint an officer to be the Chief of the Defence Staff, Who shall hold such rank as the Governor in Council may prescribe and who shall, subject to the regulations and under the direction of the Minister, be charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.

18(2) Unless the Governor in council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions the Canadian Forces that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister shall be issued by or through the Chief of the Defence Staff.”⁸²

The role of the CDS is further clarified within the Department also, by *Organization and Accountability*. It states that the CDS is responsible for the administration and control of military requirements, capabilities, and planning for the CF.⁸³ In other words, the CDS is the primary source of advice on military questions to the Minister and the Government.⁸⁴

As the senior military officer in the CF, the CDS is the source of all commands and orders within the CF. This provides the legal and constitutional basis for the chain of command from the highest to the lowest levels of the CF. The CDS is responsible to the government for ensuring that the CF is ready to carry out any tasks the government calls upon it to carry out.⁸⁵ The CDS is also called upon by the NDA to provide “aid to the civil power.” This power is exercised when an Attorney General of a Province or Territory ask for help in stopping a disturbance of the peace or some other situation beyond the

⁸²Part II, Section 18, NDA.

⁸³Canada, *Organization and Accountability*, Section 3.

⁸⁴The most comprehensive review of the appointment of CDS, why it was created, role it was to perform and the men who have held the post can be found in Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Brown Book Co.: Toronto, 1995)

⁸⁵Canada, *Organization and Accountability*, section 3, and National Defence Act, Part 6.

capability of the province or territory to deal with.⁸⁶ Part 6, Section 277 of the NDA states;

“Where a riot or disturbance occurs or is considered as likely to occur, the attorney general of the province in which the place where the riot or disturbance occurs or is considered as likely to occur is situated, on the initiative of the attorney general or on the receipt of notification from a judge of a superior, county or district court having jurisdiction in the place that the services of the Canadian Forces are required in aid of the civil power, may, by requisition in writing addressed to the Chief of the Defence Staff, require the Canadian Forces, or such part thereof as the Chief of the Defence Staff or such officer as the Chief of the Defence Staff may designate considers necessary, to be called out on service in aid of the civil power.”

The NDA specifically states the CDS is to deploy “such part of the Canadian Forces as he considers necessary.”⁸⁷ While there is no doubt that consultations with the Minister would take place, the final decision legally remains in the hands of the CDS. Finally, the CDS has responsibility for carrying out military operations in support of the policies of the Government.⁸⁸

Below the Minister, DM, and CDS are a number of other high level managers that head up major divisions of the DND. These positions are described as the ‘Level One Managers’ in *Defence Planning Guidance 2001* (DPG 2001). This DND document provides “a framework for translating Government direction as established in the 1994 Defence White Paper into a capable and efficient Defence Services Program that delivers affordable, multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces for Canada.”⁸⁹ This document is

⁸⁶National Defence Act, Part 6. Section 277.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*

⁸⁸Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision* p. 23.

⁸⁹Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001* p. i.

the also most current description of the roles and responsibilities of the highest level managers and leaders in the DND.⁹⁰ DPG 2001 outlines twenty separate Level One Managers. These managers serve as the first step in the chain of command and are assigned specific responsibilities for capabilities or planning within the DND and CF. The level one managers report to the Minister, CDS, DM, or DM and CDS. As shown in Chart 1, they are the heads of the major internal groups or directorates, with military managers reporting to the CDS and civilian managers reporting to the DM. Linking the two is the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), whose role will be expanded upon later. Overall, these managers provide advice and expertise on their areas to the DM and CDS largely on a basis of civilians to the DM and military personnel to the CDS. These level one managers also have very extensive budgetary powers as they are “provided an operating budget to generate, support or maintain the forces required for operations.”⁹¹ This indicates that these managers have a great deal to say as to how their budgets are allocated.

The civilian portion of the Department under the DM is made up of a number of Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM) and their offices. The ADMs are career civil servants and deal mostly with the allocation of resources and budgets to the department. These civil servants are not entitled to command military operations. One of the most important of these is the Assistant Deputy Minister Policy (ADM (POL)). The ADM (POL) Group is the primary source of policy advice to the Department and is responsible for advice and

⁹⁰As pointed out earlier, the changes to DND after 12 Dec 03 are not yet reflected in this document or in any DND published document.

⁹¹*Ibid.* p. 3-1, 4-1

support in the formulation of defence policy, department dealings with Cabinet and Parliament, international defence relations, advice on managing issues bearing on national unity and relations with provincial governments, coordination with Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council, and assistance in creating a national pool of expertise and interest in defence and national security issues.⁹² The ADM (POL) plays a vital role in the development of Canadian defence policy. The ADM (POL) Group coordinates the ideas and plans of the entire department and collates this information into policy options for the government, the Minister, the DM, and CDS.

Another powerful position is the ADM for Financial and Corporate Services, ADM (FIN CS), which is responsible for the financial management of the department. This position ensures that the department follows all legislation and directives with regard to funding allocation, procurement, and provides advice on budget and spending priorities.⁹³

Also supporting the DM and the CDS are Assistant Deputy Ministers for Information Management (IM), Human Resources for the Military (HR MIL) and for Civilian employees (HR CIV), Infrastructure and Environment (IE), Science and Technology (S&T), and Materiel (MAT). Each of these ADM positions have a set of responsibilities for coordinating the various functions of these offices in support of the DM and the CDS.

⁹²Canada, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001* p. 3-36.

⁹³*Ibid*, p. 3-34

The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) is the second-in-command of the Canadian Forces. The VCDS has several roles to play and primary among them is to act as the CDS when the he/she is absent,⁹⁴ as spelled out in the NDA. The VCDS is the Chief of Staff for NDHQ, and plays a very important coordination role in the headquarters as a bridge between the civilian component and the CF, and is first among equals as the coordinator of the military and civilian parts of NDHQ. On top of this very important coordination responsibility, the VCDS is the senior resource manager at NDHQ.

The primary CF function of the VCDS is Strategic Planning, led by the Director General Strategic Plans (DGSP). While the ADM (POL), ensures the department is meeting current governmental defence objectives and recommends future policy options the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, with his strategic military planners, “develops and oversees the Department’s strategic management and planning process and generates planning options and guidance to meet overall defence objectives.”⁹⁵ Strategic Planning in the VCDS office is largely conducted by CF officers who are looking at developing operational plans and guidelines and often comes into conflict with the activities of the bureaucracy within the ADM (POL) group that concentrates on government policy and direction.

⁹⁴National Defence Act Part 2, Sections 18.1 and 18.2

⁹⁵Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*, p. 3-38. The role of the VCDS is developing into the main coordinating cell within the DND. The VCDS group also includes for the CF Provost Marshal, Director General Strategic Planning, GD Strategic Change and Chief of Reserve and Cadets. In addition, VCDS group may gain responsibility for CF Headquarters, Northern Region, depending on the decision of Armed Forces Council in May 04.

Also below the CDS is the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS), which is also a military position. The DCDS exercises command and control of CF formations and units deployed on operations on behalf of the CDS. The gathering and distribution of all kinds of operational and strategic intelligence is also the responsibility of the DCDS. The DCDS is required to “plan, direct and support the conduct of Departmental and CF operations and to generate specified globally deployable national command and control and specialist forces.”⁹⁶ Simply stated, the DCDS is the focal point for the operational planning processes, is effectively responsible for all non routine taskings carried out by the CF and above all else, the DCDS is the highest operational commander within the CF.

The other Military level one managers are the respective environmental or elemental Chief of Staffs: the Chief of Maritime Staff (CMS); the Chief of Land Staff (CLS); and the Chief of Air Staff (CAS). Combined, they are all responsible for the generation and maintenance of “combat-capable, multi-purpose” sea, land, and air forces to “meet Canada’s defence tasks.” They are to also provide specific advice on the elemental matters concerning national security, defence and the CF.⁹⁷ The elemental Chiefs of Staff are also assigned as commanders to any forces that may be assigned to them on behalf of the CDS.

⁹⁶Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*, p. 3-13

⁹⁷*Ibid*, p 3-5, 3-7 - 3-8.

Outside Influences on DND

DND, like any Department, does not operate in a vacuum. External influences include the relationship that the Department has with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. In addition to these political relationships, there is the relationship between the Department and the Central Agencies of Government such as Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and the Privy Council Office (PCO).

The Minister and DND are constrained by the fact the Department must represent the government and must follow the decisions of Cabinet and general directives of the Prime Minister. This situation leaves the Minister with the task of ensuring that military and defence policy falls within the guidelines set out by the cabinet, and remains consistent with overall government policy, largely set down in the current case in the 1994 White Paper. This task can be one of the most challenging requirements of a Minister. Beyond the administrative functions as MND, the Minister also has responsibilities that come from the role of a Minister of Cabinet.

It is also the responsibility of the MND to act as the primary spokesperson for defence issues in Canada. "It is the Minister's responsibility to explain and to garner support for defence priorities, positions, and policies and indeed for the activities of the Canadian Forces, for which he or she is responsible under law."⁹⁸ Any official announcement or communication that originates from within the Department is promulgated on behalf of the Defence Minister. This is directly related to the tradition of ministerial responsibility in the Canadian parliamentary system.

⁹⁸Savoie, *Op Cit.* p.318 -319.

Ministers of Cabinet are also responsible for developing and communicating policy for the Canadian government. This is one of the most important responsibilities of a MND and can be the most difficult. Not only must the policies promulgated by the Minister fit with overall government direction, but they must also take into account the current strategic situation in the world, the perceived defence requirements for Canada, and arguably the most important factor to most governments, cost. These policies are released to the public through speeches, announcements, statements in Question Period, or more formally, can be expressed in a government White Paper.⁹⁹

These responsibilities would lead one to think that the Minister is a very powerful figure in the Canadian cabinet. This is not the case however. The office of the MND is not a prestigious cabinet appointment and the Minister is not traditionally one of the central decision makers in the cabinet. The Minister often has a very difficult time in establishing defence policy as an important issue. Defence discussions in cabinet are most often either a reaction to unexpected situations or controversy.¹⁰⁰ Serious discussion often revolves around how to ensure military issues do not become controversial and damaging to the government. However, even with these limits on the influence of the Minister outside of the department, the Minister can wield a great deal of power inside the department and can have a dramatic effect upon the conduct of defence policy in Canada. This was shown by the actions of Paul Hellyer during his time as Minister. By

⁹⁹Savoie, *Op Cit.* p.318 -319.

¹⁰⁰D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Harcourt, Brace, Hovanovich Canada Inc: Toronto, 1989) p. 64 - 65.

approaching the Department with a plan and the determination to carry it out, the MND has the ability to dramatically affect the Department and how it makes decisions.

The problems facing CF and DND have not always been internal per se. In the ministerial system, all decisions made by the department are made on behalf of the Minister. This traditionally means that the Minister is responsible for everything said by members of the department. As a result of this, if the department deviates from government policy, or is critical of the minister, this theoretically requires the resignation of the Minister. This is particularly disastrous if the resignation of the Minister results in the fall of the government.¹⁰¹ In addition to the pressure brought on the department by the Minister, the Prime Minister also has a role to play in defence discussions.

While ministerial responsibility does help in providing a shield behind which civil servants can remain largely bipartisan and anonymous, it is also harmful in that it provides a shield for the organization to try to solve problems internally and attempt to limit public knowledge of problems or incidents within the department.¹⁰² Civil servants would argue that they must let the Minister release information to the outside world as it is the Minister's responsibility to take the blame or credit.

The Prime Minister has also created problems for the Department. His office has often made significant changes in defence policy without direct consultation with DND. This creates a sense of being blind sided and has led to difficulties in the implementation

¹⁰¹Schafer, A., *The Buck Stops Here: Reflections on Moral Responsibility, Democratic Accountability and Military Values*, A Study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada: Ottawa, 1997) p. 24-25 This tradition, largely inherited from Britain, is recognised in Canada, but to a lesser extent.

¹⁰²*Ibid*, p 26,27

of these “surprises.” An example is the reaction of the department to a statement by Prime Minister Trudeau, declaring that Canadian defence policy was to be changed to better reflect more Canadian ideas and priorities. The change was to include an examination of the Canadian level of commitment to NATO and an examination of the relations with the United States in order to “have the activities within Canada which are essential to North American defence performed by the Canadian Forces.” This statement caused a great deal of confusion as the Department largely saw the commitments to NATO and NORAD as the foundation of Canadian defence policy.¹⁰³ It also implied that the Government had concerns about the degree to which the Department was following government direction and producing an effective response. This concern was in fact, also evident in the defiance that Minister MacDonald perceived from several senior officers questioning the 1971 White Paper;¹⁰⁴ a major factor in the reforms that were to follow, as discussed below.

Donald Savoie argues that the Prime Ministers that followed Trudeau have carried on with the practice of “governing by bolts of electricity.” He argues that it is far simpler for the Prime Minister to declare policy as a “fait accompli”¹⁰⁵ rather than risk having the

¹⁰³Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2, Defence Organization*, p. 160.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid*

¹⁰⁵Savoie, *Op Cit.* p.318 -319.

department or cabinet make changes to policy that the PM wants enacted. This method of policy enactment, however has often caught even the minister responsible without warning.¹⁰⁶

In addition to the impact of the Cabinet and the PM on the Department, other government agencies have a large impact upon the DND. It is very important that all departments, including DND, have a good working relationship with the central agencies of the government. They set government wide policies that affect all. No department can function independently of the central bureaucracy as policies controlling civilian employees, accounting practices, and procurement all originate from central government agencies. This is particularly apparent in DND dealings with the Department of External Affairs and the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS).¹⁰⁷

Donald Savoie has written extensively on the increase in influence and power of the central agencies of government. He describes the central agencies as playing a vital role in the mechanisms of government. In particular they exist in "the grey zone in government that links politicians to the bureaucracy."¹⁰⁸ He also states that "central agencies usually have a hand directly in all key policy decisions and play a crucial role in budget making. Indeed, it is to them the head of government should turn for help in

¹⁰⁶Some of the more recent examples of this include the purchase of the new Challenger VIP business jets for the CF 31 Mar 03. This was done against the advice of the CF and when the decision was made there was little or no notice to the department that the government was going ahead with the purchase. Another example includes the premature shutting down of the Commission of Inquiry in to Somalia.

¹⁰⁷MRG, p. 188, Bland, *The Administration*, p. 23-24

¹⁰⁸

Savoie, Donald J. *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics*, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 1999) p 4.

articulating broad policy direction or an overarching strategy for government. Central agencies are also involved in many administrative issues - in formulating personnel and procurement policies, and in establishing financial management practices.”¹⁰⁹ These central agencies are different from line departments that are formed around specific policies or functions. Instead, the central agencies exist to support all areas of government and serve as coordinators of policy across all government policies and departments.¹¹⁰ They are the conductors of the government that ensure that all departments are more or less “singing the same tune.”

PCO has a mandate that includes support for the Prime Minister, Cabinet, individual ministers, Parliament, other central agencies, line departments and even the media. PCO is headed by the Clerk of the Privy Council Office, who is also the Secretary to the Cabinet and the most senior civil servant.¹¹¹ The purview of PCO is very wide as it has a great deal of influence on the Government agenda. In addition, PCO plays a significant role in ensuring that government policy is reflected by the various parts of the Government. Savoie argues that “it is hard to overstate the importance of the office to the government’s policy and decision-making processes.”¹¹² More specifically, PCO “briefs the Prime Minister on any issue it wishes, controls the flow of papers to Cabinet, reports back to departments on the decisions taken, or not taken, by Cabinet, reports back to the

¹⁰⁹Savoie, *Op Cit*, p.5

¹¹⁰Thomas, Paul, “Central Agencies: Making a Mesh of Things” in Bickerton, J.P. and Gagnon, A., *Canadian Politics*, (Broadview Press, Peterborough: 1994) p. 289.

¹¹¹Savoie, *Op Cit*, p 109

¹¹²*Ibid.*

departments on the selection of deputy ministers and briefs chairs of Cabinet committees (with the exception of the TBS), supports the operation of the Cabinet and Cabinet committees, advises the Prime Minister on federal-provincial relations and on all issues of government organization and ministerial mandates, and prepares summaries of strategic memoranda.”¹¹³ These activities give PCO a great deal of influence over the line departments. PCO has a great deal of influence on how departments and their proposals are represented to Cabinet and has a tendency to “micro manage” major projects.¹¹⁴ Without the support of PCO, it is almost impossible for any line department to enact new policies.

In addition to PCO, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) plays an important role in the coordination of government policy. Thomas describes the PMO as a “partisan, politically-orientated body,”¹¹⁵ and is “staffed largely by political friends of the governing party and confidants to the Prime Minister.”¹¹⁶ The PMO is largely tasked as serving as a link between the caucus, the party, interest groups and other groups of interest to the Prime Minister.

The Department of Finance is another central agency that has a large influence upon line departments. “The Minister and the Department of Finance cover the entire

¹¹³Savoie, *Op Cit*, p. 109

¹¹⁴*Ibid*, p. 282-283.

¹¹⁵Thomas, *Op Cit*. 1994 p. 299

¹¹⁶*Ibid*.

range of government activity. In short they are the guardians of the public purse.”¹¹⁷

Without the support from the Minister of Finance and the Department, all government departments will have a difficult time maintaining their current budget let alone receive increased funding for new programs. While superficially appearing similar to a line department, the functions of the Department of Finance are aimed at coordinating government policy between the departments and it does not provide direct services to Canadian citizens.

Closely related to the financial and monetary roles of the Finance Department, the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) has three main divisions and roles. The first is to supervise department expenditure allocations. Secondly, TBS is charged with human resources issues within the civil service. This includes collective bargaining, job classifications and other human resources policy including requirements for bilingualism and employment equity. Finally, the TBS is charged with improving administrative efficiency for the government,¹¹⁸ and ensuring that the public service carries out the task assigned to it in as efficient and effective manner as possible.

By looking at the roles of the central agencies it is readily apparent that their power over policy formulation and implementation is considerable. Without the cooperation of the central agencies line departments would find it almost impossible to propose new policy and have it accepted, have the resources to pay for programs, or even have proper staff with which to administer and carry out their mandates. The relationship

¹¹⁷Savoie, *Op Cit*, p 156

¹¹⁸Thomas, *Op Cit*, 1994 p. 301.

between the departments and the central agencies can be strained and even adversarial in nature.¹¹⁹ In particular, DND has to take into consideration what the position of the central agencies is before beginning the process of proposing policy through the central agencies to cabinet.¹²⁰

The influence of the central agencies upon DND cannot be understated. It affects every area of defence administration and regulations emanating from three agencies have forced the military to take on many business management regulations designed for the civil service as a whole. In particular, the imposition of these practices have forced even mid-level managers within the Department to adjust to civilian budgeting and planning processes. It has become obvious to the Captains and Majors in the CF, who are looking to advance, that these management skills must take precedence over related military skills, which are generally defined as leadership. This is made particularly clear to officers that work within the “civilian” side of the organization under the DM. This has directly led to the arguments that management has taken precedence over leadership. The structure of the headquarters does not have as large of an effect as the imposition of business management rules by the Central Agencies of the Canadian Government on all aspects of the administration of DND.

¹¹⁹Savoie, *Op Cit*, p 291

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P. Kenis and V. Schneider ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox’ in *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations*, ed. B. Marin and R. Mayntz (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) p. 39, and W. D. Coleman and G. Skogstad, “Introduction” in *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach*, ed. W. D. Coleman and G. Skogstad, (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd. 1990

Chapter 3

The Quest for Efficiency

As stated in the introduction, the critics of NDHQ point as civilianization be largely due to the structure of NDHQ. This chapter explores the evolution of the administration of the Canadian military as the civilian leaders of the country sought to ensure adequate civilian control of the military while ensuring that resources allocated to defence were utilized in as efficient a manner as possible. As noted earlier, Huntington states that in order to ensure that civilian control is maintained, the officer must be as professional as possible in order to maintain their distance from politics and to ensure a highly trained military ready to carry out the wishes of the legitimate civilian authority.¹²¹ This chapter examines how this relationship and the structure of it has evolved in Canada.

The structure of DND changed significantly after the end of WWII. After the war, the Department was headed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which grew out of the pre-war Joint Staff Committee, that did not include the Chief of Staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). After the establishment of the RCAF as a distinct entity, each service was separate and each of three Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, and Air Force, had direct access to the MND.¹²² The Chiefs of Staff Committee served as the forum where the three services were expected to develop common policy and coordinate actions. At this time there was no head of this committee, even though the Army Chief of the General

¹²¹Huntington, *Op. Cit.* p. 84 -86.

¹²²Bland, D., *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1945 to 1985*, (Ronald P. Frye & Co. Kingston: 1987) p. 15.

Staff was considered the senior member of the Committee. It was not until 1951, that a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCSC) was appointed as the Senior member of the Committee, and tasked to coordinate the actions of the committee. ¹²³

In 1946, Brooke Claxton was appointed MND. This appointment replaced a system of one Minister and two junior Ministers, used during WWII: the latter responsible for the Air Force and Navy. At the time, the senior minister retained responsibility for the Department as a whole, overall policy formulation, and the Army. At the end of the war this was changed to a senior minister and an associate minister who was then replaced by a single minister in 1946. ¹²⁴

In 1947 Claxton established the three roles for the Canadian Military. These were;

1. To defend Canada against aggression;
2. To assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country;
3. To carry out any undertaking which by our own voluntary act we may assume in co-operation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations. ¹²⁵

With these roles in mind, Claxton wanted to ensure that there was sufficient resources to support the military, with the expectation that military spending would return to prewar spending levels, with demobilization resulting in significant expenditure reductions. ¹²⁶ As a result, discussions were held regarding the possibility of integrating some portions of the three services. These discussions built upon the first legislative attempt at unification

¹²³Kronenberg, V., *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972*, Wellesley Paper 3/1973, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. p.10-11.

¹²⁴*Ibid*, p.11-12.

¹²⁵Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy*, p. 3.

¹²⁶*Ibid*.

taken in 1939. At that time, a bill was drafted to end the three separate services and create a unified armed forces. However, with the outbreak of war in September of 1939, the legislation was never introduced in Parliament. It was felt that time was not right to introduce major changes to the structure of the military.¹²⁷

The discussions around unification produced opposition within the military. In fact, several issues were raised by those opposed to unification. The first of which was the changing nature of the relationship between Canada and the United States.¹²⁸ It was felt that during the immediate post WWII period, coordination of defence with the US would be very difficult if it was undertaken at the same time as massive organizational changes to the structure of the military within Canada. Further arguments against unification included the differences between seemingly similar services such as medicine, cooking, and photography from all of the Service Chiefs. In the face of heavy opposition Claxton abandoned the drive for unification. In 1946 he then turned to the integration of support services as a resource saving measure.¹²⁹

Defence managers were still seeking to save as much of the capability of the military as possible while reducing the budget. To further this goal, the integration of support services was carried out in a series of small steps from 1947 to 1951. These included the integration of medical, dental, and legal services. In addition, the Royal

¹²⁷Kronenberg, V. *Op. Cit* p. 11-12

¹²⁸*Ibid.* p. 12. This relationship was growing steadily closer as both sides of the border looked for ways to expand upon the Ogdensburg Agreement and the establishment of NATO and NORAD.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*

Military College and Royal Roads Military College were linked so that members of any service could attend either institution.¹³⁰

At this time, there was a very small number of civil servants in the Department. Although the Deputy Minister possessed a staff, they played almost no role in policy formulation. They were largely limited to bookkeeping. Almost all policy formulation came from the Services or the Chiefs of Staff Committee.¹³¹

The 1952 Royal Commission on Government Organization, known as the Glassco Commission, examined the entire administration of government and departments.¹³² In so doing, the commissioners specifically looked at the DND and released a separate study as a 'Special Area of Administration' in Part 4 of the Report. The object of the report was "not to examine Canadian defence policy, but to appraise the role of the Department of National Defence in the formulation and application of policy and the suitability of its present organization in these roles. Attention was therefore focussed on the headquarters organization and on the broad aspects of administration."¹³³

The *Glassco Report* produced several important recommendations. The first concerned the powers of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCSC). It recommended that a provision be made for the exercise by the CCSC of the power of

¹³⁰*Ibid.* p. 13.

¹³¹*Ibid.* p. 14-15

¹³²This report is commonly known as the *Glassco Report* after J.G. Glassco, one of the drafters of the report.

¹³³Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization, *Volume 4 Special Areas of Administration* (Queen's Printer: Ottawa, 1960), p. 64.

direction over the Armed Forces, within such limits as the Minister might define. In addition, the CCSC should be given control and administration of such elements common to two or more Services as the Minister designated. In recognition of the change of status implicit in these proposals, the title of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff was also to be altered to Chief of Canadian Defence Staffs.” (CCDS)¹³⁴ The report also recommended that the Deputy Minister “be given greater responsibility for keeping under review the organization and administrative methods of the Canadian defence establishment, and assisting and advising the Minister in the discharge of his responsibility for the control and management of the Armed Forces.”¹³⁵

The Report also produced several options related to integration and unification. In this context, integration meant the amalgamation of units or functions of the CF while maintaining separate services (RCN, RCAF, Canadian Army) and unification concerned the elimination of the services as separate organizations, with all forces being organized into separate, but joint, commands. While the Report did not make any concrete recommendations towards unification, it did state that there were “strong reasons for seeking a greater integration of those functions common to the three Services.”¹³⁶ In addition to the recommendations that the role and responsibilities of the DM be expanded, the report also suggested that the levels of coordination between CFHQ and the DM be increased and comprehensive changes in allocations of military and civilian

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 74.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 77.

¹³⁶ Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization, *Volume 4 Special Areas of Administration* (Queen’s Printer: Ottawa, 1960) p. 69

staff within the Department. In the end, the Report would provide the future Defence Minister, Paul Hellyer, with the ammunition required to attempt a massive reorganization of the Canadian military in 1964.

Notwithstanding Glassco, the real motive to reorganize the Department was largely supplied by incidents surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.¹³⁷ The crisis led the government and others to realize that there was a serious problem within the Department in its relationship with the government. While the Canadian military responded in a manner that supported its core ally, the situation surrounding its actions and the wishes of the Canadian Government was recognised as a crisis in civil-military relations. In essence, the Canadian military and the Minister took actions that the Prime Minister was neither prepared for, nor expecting the military to do.

The crisis was primarily due to the difference between how the Canadian military, including the Minister of the day, saw itself in situations involving bilateral operations with the US and how the government saw its responsibilities in times of crisis. The core of Canadian defence policy was the commitments to NATO and NORAD, under which Canadian units were relied upon by both alliances to be part of a unified command during time of emergency. In addition, Canadian units were assigned to commands that were, more often than not, commanded by Americans. The problem arose when this reality was not fully understood by the Canadian government. Prime Minister Diefenbaker believed that there was to be direct consultation among the allies of NATO and between the

¹³⁷The Cuban missile crisis happened in the fall of 1962 as the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had been secretly deploying medium range ballistic missiles to the island of Cuba. This resulted in arguably the most dangerous time during the Cold War as United States, British and Canadian naval and air units took part in a blockade of Cuba in order to force the USSR to withdraw their weapons.

United States and Canada within the terms of reference of NORAD before any forces were to be used in operations. In both cases, the Americans saw notification of action as the largest part of consultation.¹³⁸ In effect, there was a significant difference of opinion between the United States and Canada on the meaning and practice of consultation.

Within the military, however, there were no such differences. According to Haydon, "the structure for joint continental defence was a highly efficient, well coordinated organization dedicated to countering a well defined Soviet threat to North America."¹³⁹ The lack of recognition within the military that there was a problem was further compounded by the decision that Defence Minister Harkness was forced to make in order to ensure that Canada was keeping its defence commitments with the United States. In particular, Harkness increased the readiness levels of the Armed Forces after the Prime Minister hesitated in making the decision to support the United States.¹⁴⁰

Several factors contributed to the crisis. Hayden argues that the problem with civil-military relations was essentially due to political apathy towards the everyday activities of the Canadian military in its relationship with the allies and the United States, and the military assumption that this apathy was consent for their activities. Also, the unclear nature of the civil/military relationship in combination with the crisis that faced the United States and Canada led to a very disjointed Canadian response. While the Prime Minister was largely worried about the political images around consultation, the Defence

¹³⁸Haydon, P., *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, p. 202.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰Smith, D. *Rogue Tory: the Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker*, (Macfarlane Walter & Ross, Toronto: 1995) p. 458.

Minister and the military went forward with Canadian military commitments alongside the US Navy and Air Force in operations during the crisis.¹⁴¹ The actions of the military were in accordance with their interpretation of the agreements that had been made with the United States, and had been developed by the close relationship that had developed between the militaries on both sides of the border. The integrated nature of the commands led to the condition where the military was taking steps that the government was not yet ready to make. Thus the military was, consciously or not, wielding power that was in the purview of the legitimate civilian authority, thus constituting a breakdown of civilian control of the military as defined by Huntington.

The Cuban Missile Crisis also revealed another problem within the Canadian military. Inter-service rivalry was further compounded by a serious disconnect between the services and national headquarters. The CCSC had very little power to carry out the coordination role that the position was created for. He was further weakened by the access that each of the Service Chiefs had to the Minister when dealing with service unique operational issues.¹⁴² This access also seriously compromised the ability of the Minister to present a comprehensive or complete picture to cabinet and government.

Compounding this problem was that operational level commanders possessed a great deal of autonomy from their Service Chiefs and worked in very close step with their American counterparts in an environment far away from the political centre in Ottawa. This arrangement resulted in the lack of a single commitment by all elements of the

¹⁴¹Haydon, *Op Cit.*, p.203-204, Smith, *Op Cit.* p.458 - 459.

¹⁴²Haydon, *Op Cit.* p. 89-90

Department, which played a large role in denying it an effective voice inside of the government. This also played a role in sowing the distrust that the Prime Minister developed for the senior military officers of the day.¹⁴³

Subsequently, the combination of government apathy, Department assumptions drawn from this apathy, inter-service infighting, and lack of trust in senior military officers by the Prime Minister robbed the military of effective representation within the government and severely diminished the amount of faith that the government had in any advice coming from the department. While the coordination of actual planning and operations between operational level commands of the United States and Canada were highly effective and efficient, the CF operated without effective political guidance from Ottawa.

The situation between the military and the government was a major contributor to the collapse of the Diefenbaker government in 1963.¹⁴⁴ This led in part to the defeat of the Conservatives in the General election of that year and the election of a Liberal Government seeking to ensure that these problems did not result in the collapse of their new government. They wanted to re-establish firm civilian control of the military and more firmly entrench the existence of a single legitimate civil authority over the military. This is vital in order to maintain the professional nature of the military and further strengthen the civilian control of the military.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³*Ibid.* p. 210.

¹⁴⁴Smith, D. *Op Cit*, p. 457 Smith argues that the Missile Crisis led directly to the cabinet confrontation between Diefenbaker and Harkness over nuclear warheads which resulted in the defeat of Diefenbaker.

¹⁴⁵Huntington, *Op. Cit.* p. 35.

Unification to NDHQ

Paul Hellyer, appointed MND in 1963, began the next set of major reforms.¹⁴⁶

Over the next few years he was to enact the most far reaching restructuring or reforms to the Department and the CF. Armed with the recommendations of the *Glassco Report* and motivated by the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis, Hellyer was prepared to make massive changes within his portfolio.¹⁴⁷

The Minister was also convinced that it was not possible to maintain the level of international commitment without increasing the defence budget substantially. As the option of dramatic increases in defence spending was not likely to get through Cabinet, Hellyer was forced to look for other areas where savings could be realized in order to maintain the level of Canadian military commitments. To Hellyer, the unification of the three services would be the answer.¹⁴⁸ In effect, a primary reason for unification was fiscal.

The unification of the three services would free up resources by eliminating overlap among them. For example, it would be cheaper to have only one supply system instead of three. Maintenance, administration, communications, and other areas could be streamlined to support a larger organization while taking up a smaller portion of available resources. Efficiency would also result as the competition between the services would be

¹⁴⁶He had been Associate Minister of Defence for a couple months in 1957 so he was somewhat familiar with the portfolio.

¹⁴⁷Smith, D. *Op Cit*, p. 457.

¹⁴⁸Hellyer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 111-112, Bland, 'Introduction to the Hellyer Reforms' in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Vol 2*, p. 94

eliminated and procurement could concentrate on what was needed for the CF as a whole, and not on the basis of procurement rotations negotiated by the services. Procurement would no longer be based upon which service was perceived to be next in line to receive new equipment.¹⁴⁹ The net result supposedly would be a more effective and better equipped armed forces for the country.

Armed with Glassco, and with the Missile crisis and the drive to maximise resources the Hellyer reforms went forward. These took place over several years but can be broken down into two major components; Bill 243 in 1966, and the organizational changes that led to the creation of NDHQ in 1972. Bill 243 merged the three separate services (RCN,RCAF, and the Canadian Army) into a single service called the Canadian Armed Forces. The amended NDA thus read; “the Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.”¹⁵⁰ The bill also described how the new Canadian Armed Forces were to be organized at the administrative and individual command levels.¹⁵¹

Bill 243 also introduced the position of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to reform the organisational structure at the highest levels of the armed forces as well.

¹⁴⁹Hellyer, *Op. Cit.* p. 111-112

¹⁵⁰National Defence Act (R.S. 1985, c. N-5) Part 2, Para 14.I believe this statement to be the source of confusion between the use ‘Canadian Forces’ or the CF versus the use of Canadian Armed Forces. If one looks at the wording of the Act, one could think of these terms as interchangeable. However, the most common use within the Department is Canadian Forces or CF. I have not identified when or where a decision on this common usage was made or promulgated.

¹⁵¹There was a great deal of debate surrounding the actions of the government towards unification. Hellyer’s responses to the criticisms he faced are summarized by a speech to Parliament on 7 December 1966. The text of this address is reprinted in Paul Hellyer, ‘Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganisation Act: 7 December 1966’ in Bland, *Canada’s National Defence Vol 2*, (School of Policy Studies, Kingston: 1998).

Hellyer had become quite frustrated with what he perceived as inefficiencies at the highest levels. He perceived that the various services were in constant competition for resources and that the Chiefs of Staff for the various services were locked in a constant competition for resources. In addition, with no single head of the military, he found it very difficult to get a consensus from the Chiefs of Staff Committee on almost any issue.¹⁵² The position of the CDS was created to address these difficulties.

The CDS would combine the roles of the CCSC and the roles of the Chiefs of Staff for the three separate services. This new role was said to be more in line with reporting to a single minister and resulted in "military command and management" that was properly configured to handle a unified armed force.¹⁵³ Unification and the new office of the CDS would result in a management of the Canadian military that was more efficient and better equipped to make decisions that were best for the armed forces as a whole.

Command changes were also to go beyond simply the creation of the position of CDS. Hellyer introduced a single command system for the newly established Canadian Armed Forces. Unification eliminated the separate services and replaced them with a system made up of various task specific or functional commands, including task based commands which he felt would result in a more diversified and flexible workforce within the Armed Forces as a whole.¹⁵⁴ In so doing, this was to allow for more variable missions

¹⁵²Canada, DND, 'White Paper on Defence: 1964' reprinted in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Vol 1*, (School of Policy Studies, Kingston: 1997), p. 90-94.

¹⁵³Hellyer, *Op. Cit.* p 116

¹⁵⁴Hellyer, *Op. Cit.* p. 132

to be undertaken and result in a more flexible and useful military for the country. These included Mobile Command (Army), Air Defence Command (Air Force), Maritime Command (Navy), Air Transport Command (Air Force), Training Command, and Material Command. It also established separate commands for the Air Division committed to NATO, and the Brigade Group deployed in Europe. These commands were not specifically Air Force, Army, or Navy. Above all else, the new commands were to encompass all of the resources necessary to carry out their assigned tasks, regardless of service.

Hellyer felt that a unified Canadian Armed Forces would be better able to handle new operations that required forces from all three services: joint operations. All three services would have to cooperate in order to accomplish the new missions that were becoming apparent at that time.¹⁵⁵ A single organization would eliminate many problems with the coordination of three different services within a single mission. By having only one service, Hellyer argued that many of the problems of conducting joint operations would disappear because all elements would be members of the same organization.¹⁵⁶

The Hellyer reforms also expanded the authority of the civilian component. He essentially created a Department made up of two distinct organizations; the Canadian Armed Forces headed up by the CDS; and a civilian organization headed by the DM. The task of the civilian organization was to act as a check and balance on the advice coming

¹⁵⁵For example, it was becoming apparent that air, army, and naval units were having to work closely together on the same battlefield. It is much easier to communicate and coordinate efforts within a single command structure, rather than having three separate command structures on a battlefield at the same time.

¹⁵⁶Hellyer, *Op. Cit.* p. 111-112.

from the military to the Minister by providing another source of advice. The DM and his staff would do so by providing separate policy options and administering the budgeting and auditing functions of the Department.¹⁵⁷

Unification was not universally hailed as the answer to the funding or any other problem. There was a great deal of opposition to the elimination of the three services as separate entities. Each of the services in Canada had been in existence for many years. While many of the traditions of each service were adopted from their British parents, there was also a distinctly Canadian flavour to the culture of each of them. Moreover, the cultures of each service were treasured by the members of each service and were seen as part of the identity of each person serving within them. These cultures were built into the organizations and played a role in everything from promotion to social activities. The elimination of the separate services was seen by many within the military community as a direct threat to these traditions.¹⁵⁸ The elimination of the distinctive uniforms of the three services was seen as a particularly harsh blow to many in the military community, and particularly to the large numbers of veterans that had fought in the uniforms of these now defunct services.

However, not all of the opposition was due to the loss of tradition or identity of each service. Many senior officers in CFHQ argued that the unification plans of Hellyer were unworkable. They felt that the difference in roles and expertise were too great to be

¹⁵⁷Management Review Group, 'The Management of Defence in Canada' in Bland *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2: Defence Organization* p. 178 (hereafter footnoted as MRG Report).

¹⁵⁸Bland, D., *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985*. (Ronald P. Frye & Company, Kingston: 1987), p. 50.

overcome and there was no clear plan to overcome these difficulties. Also, the rush to implement the changes led to some feeling that the CF “was moving on an uncharted course at a very, very high speed towards a very, very dim destination.”¹⁵⁹ Finally, many recognised that there was a desperate need for reorganization within the DND.

Nonetheless, for many years after unification, there was a great deal of resentment and bitterness towards the Hellyer reforms.

Hellyer’s answers to the problems of culture and tradition was to pretend that they were not significant. He stated that while the traditions of the former services were very valuable to the former services, they would not all be destroyed, but would be modified into new traditions of a single service. A single uniform would bring on savings from economies of scale and would bring the entire Canadian Armed Forces together by providing a single look for all.¹⁶⁰

After the creation of the entity legally known as the Canadian Armed Forces in 1966, the next major change in the administration of defence in Canada occurred with the report of the Management Review Group (MRG) and the subsequent creation of NDHQ in 1972. While inter-service rivalry and the lack of the CF speaking with a single voice were dealt with in the issues surrounding the unification of the CF, Prime Minister Trudeau and Defence Minister MacDonald set about to reform the management of the defence question in Canada. This was fuelled by their perception that Canadian defence

¹⁵⁹Statement by General Moncel, VCDS, Quoted in Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1945 to 1985*, (Ronald P. Frye & Co. Kingston: 1987) p. 51

¹⁶⁰Hellyer, *Op. Cit.* p. 143 (Bland points out in his introduction to Hellyer’s Address, that the argument that culture was insignificant was hollow and were eventually dropped by Hellyer in favour of placing the fiscal savings as being the main benefits to his reforms. Bland, ‘Introduction to the Hellyer Reforms’ p. 97-98)

policy was too dependent on NATO and that a truly Canadian defence policy was now possible while eliminating Canada's deployments in Europe and substantially reducing the defence budget.¹⁶¹ The Minister appointed the MRG to "examine all aspects of the management and operation of the Department of National Defence."¹⁶²

The MRG was to identify the problems with the execution of the defence policy, and make recommendations to the Government on how to establish a more efficient and effective system in the face of changing needs for defence policy in Canada.¹⁶³ The problem of inflexibility was identified earlier as being a result of "the internal bureaucratic inertia in the Department, similar to that possible in any large organization," and needed to be addressed before progress could be made towards adapting the Department of National Defence to its environment in Canada.¹⁶⁴ The Review Group went on to state that the problems of bureaucratic inertia within the Department was strengthened by four factors:

"First, the apparent ambiguity concerning the position and authority of the Deputy Minister; second, the continued preservation of individual service loyalties and traditions seem by their nature to have engendered resistance to change; Third, the continued adherence to a rigid hierarchy of command has made any organizational change difficult without the appearance of disrupting the effectiveness or morale of those directly involved; and fourth, the long tradition in the Canadian Armed Forces of attempting to remain a self-contained and self-sufficient fighting force largely independent of local

¹⁶¹Bland, 'Introduction to the Management Review Group' in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2, Defence Organization* p. 160

¹⁶²

Management Review Group, Found in Bland *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2, Defence Organization*, p. 167.

¹⁶³*Ibid*

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.* p. 175-176.

resources and facilities, has , to a certain extent, detached them from the main stream of Canadian society.”¹⁶⁵

Of primary importance was the recognition that there were large problems with the management of defence issues and policy by the Department including the relationship between the CDS and the DM.¹⁶⁶

Above all else, the MRG suggested that the dual structure of Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) under the CDS and the Department of Defence under the DM, which had not been affected by earlier reforms, was the primary cause of inefficiency within the department. It suggested the creation of a single organization to correct perceived inefficiencies that were created by having two parallel control structures,¹⁶⁷ not least of all because the two organizations were working in competition against each other on some issues.¹⁶⁸ In order to correct these perceived difficulties, the creation of a unified National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was carried out between 1972 and 1973. This process can be understood as the elimination of CFHQ under the CDS and its merger with the Department of National Defence under the Deputy Minister, to form NDHQ.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶The MRG did an effective job of critiquing defence policy formulation at the time, however, there were serious problems with many of the recommendations made by the board. These are very thoroughly described by D. Bland in his introduction to the MRG report in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization..*

¹⁶⁷

Some felt that the existence of a separate civilian organization paralleling the military structure was wasteful.

¹⁶⁸P.D. Manson, 'The Restructuring of National Defence Headquarters - 1972-73: An Assessment', in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol 3, #3, Winter 1973/74 p. 9. An example of the conflict between the DM's office and CFHQ was the scrapping of HMCS Bonaventure shortly after completion of a hugely expensive refit.

The MRG identified several other areas that needed improvement within the Department. They declared that the CF were adequately led in the field and any difficulties faced by the operational end of the Department were due to “basic management problems within the civilian and military components of Headquarters.” The report then went on to state that “these problems were, in the main, a direct result of the Department not having adapted its basic management and organization to accommodate adequately the implications of unification, changing defence roles and priorities, and changing public attitudes.”¹⁶⁹

The MRG made a vast number of recommendations that would have affected all aspects of managing the department and the resources allocated to it. However, very few were enacted, due to the lack of will of the new Minister to push through fundamental changes to how the Department was managed, which would have required numerous amendments and changes to the NDA in order to be enacted.¹⁷⁰ However, the most important recommendation that was enacted was the creation of NDHQ.

The creation of NDHQ had the effect of creating a single department made up of both the CF and the civilian DND. While they were still legally separate entities, they were now organizationally and spatially a single entity. The relationship between the Minister, the DM and the CDS were redefined with the establishment of a reporting system where everyone reported to the DM and the CDS.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰Bland, *The Administration of Canadian Defence Policy*, p. 23-24

It was expected that the creation of NDHQ would result in the DM and the CDS becoming more cooperative in their everyday activities. The integration of the headquarters was expected to turn the relationship from an adversarial to a more cooperative one, and to bring a common position within the newly reorganized structure. However, while they may have shared control according to the organization chart, they were still separated. The CDS remained responsible for military operations and was the top of the military chain of command. The DM remained responsible for administration of the budget. Nevertheless, the new arrangement at the top of the Department arguably made policy formulation easier and allowed for closer cooperation between the CF and the civilian administrators within the Department. This was especially important when dealing with other government departments such as Treasury Board, as now a unified front could now be presented instead of the sometimes contradictory wishes of two separate entities dealing with Canadian defence issues.¹⁷¹

Conclusion

The elimination of the Canadian Forces Headquarters and the reorganization of a civilian and military into NDHQ remains in place. The years that have followed since the amalgamation of the headquarters has been an evolutionary process that has left the organization of the Department much the same as it first appeared in 1973. NDHQ has become the centre for defence policy discussions and at the same time acts as the operational headquarters for deployment of the CF.

¹⁷¹*Ibid.* p. 12

The main arguments in favour of maintaining a single integrated NDHQ as the leadership organization DND and the CF are effective civil control of the military, fiscal efficiency, and effective military advice for the government. All of these issues have been the core to the majority of reforms that have faced the Department over the last 50 years. Each of these issues has been identified as specific problems facing the government in its relations with the Department. Re-structuring was enacted as an attempt to improve the organization and to ensure that the Department could carry out the tasks assigned to it by the government. By ensuring that the Department was effectively administered, the government and the proponents of change expected that more efficient allocation of resources would result, or at minimum, the Department would be a better source of policy, advice, and military options for the government.

At the beginning, the goal was efficiency. Integration and unification were attempts to ensure the most efficient use of resources in order to protect the capital budget in light of declining budgets. By finding greater efficiencies, particularly by eliminating duplications among services, there would be more money available for 'sharp end' operations.

The Unification experiment was part of this integration movement. It ultimately failed as an attempt to turn each of the three services into one identity, but it did succeed in making common trades available to the entire CF. Later changes, including the return to distinctive uniforms in 1984, ensured that the positive aspects of service traditions were restored. This went some way towards restoring the pride and moral of a demoralized military.

Attempts were also made to ensure that the events surrounding the Cuban Missile crisis were not repeated. It was apparent that there was a disconnect between the Prime Minister and the Department and it resulted in actions being taken that were not specifically approved by the Prime Minister. The crisis of civilian control of the military that resulted from the actions of the Minister and the military at the time needed to be addressed. The lack of trust that resulted between the government and the military in particular resulted in increased roles for civilian administrators in policy decisions. In addition serious problems with procurement were addressed through further increases in departmental accountability to Treasury Board and the more specific assignment of financial oversight to civilian personnel.

The creation of NDHQ was the culmination of these efforts. It placed the civilian staff assigned with administrative and financial responsibilities side by side with the command and administrative structure of the CF. This change in particular made DND appear more like an average government department, and also placed the relationship with the central agencies and the rest of government more in line with other departments. By being a better fit within the system, DND could now be expected to develop closer relationships with the central agencies that were growing in power at the same time as NDHQ was taking form.

As discussed in the first chapter, one of the most important effects of a formal, defined organizational structure is greater efficiency. The creation of NDHQ generated many efficiencies where inefficiency had reigned previously. The previous existence of the DM's office and CFHQ provided the government with defence policy, administration,

and provide military forces in a environment of competition, not cooperation.¹⁷² The creation of NDHQ eliminated the open and harmful competition that existed between the administrators and the operators. While there will always be a tension between groups that have separate tasks within the institution, this competition was now at least buried within a single entity and removed from the eyes of other government departments and the government itself. In this sense, this competition became much easier to deal with as a clash between groups within a single institution. This point is a vital one given the current difficulties facing all departments in dealing with the tremendous power of the central agencies, while still effectively providing necessary policy advice and proposals to Cabinet. A single voice from the Department gives the central agencies and cabinet more confidence in defence proposals.

Another benefit outlined by March and Olsen is the advantages of efficiency that are brought to the decision making process.¹⁷³ Under the former system DND and each individual service were in competition with each other for the attention of the government. Each one believed that the other was not qualified to make decisions outside of its jurisdiction. The administrative arm argued that the military was not fiscally responsible while the CF argued that civilians were making operational decisions that they had no expertise to make. This competitive relationship was in large part eliminated or restructured with the integration of the Department. The closer cooperation of the

¹⁷²MRG Report, p.188 - 189 of Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*. 1998

¹⁷³March and Olsen, *Op. Cit.* 1989 p. 39

civilian and military parts of the Department ensured that the department largely has a better grounding on what is militarily possible with what is politically viable.

NDHQ can be called a success if you consider the increased efficiency in the organizations ability to promulgate a single vision of defence policy and respond to government direction. In addition, civil control of the military needed to be reasserted and strengthened. However, other problems have appeared as older problems have receded. In particular, the cultures of the CF and the civil service were not considered in unification and the creation of NDHQ. This has resulted in many of the critics of NDHQ attacking the structure of the new headquarters as the source of the civilianization problem as the professional nature of the military began to erode. These issues became more important as DND moved way from the 1972 creation of NDHQ.

Chapter 4

Leadership Versus Management

The attempts to address the problems outlined in the previous chapter were the basis of many of the changes to DND. However, these changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the department coincided with the rise of the issue of civilianization.¹⁷⁴ The primary argument against a single department or NDHQ is the belief that the merger of two separate and distinct cultures into one organization has led to the civilianization of the CF.¹⁷⁵ Civilianization is a process where military values, traditions, and culture are slowly replaced with those more closely identified as being civilian or bureaucratic in nature.¹⁷⁶ Huntington states that when “satisfactions of professional performance and adherence to the professional code are replaced by the satisfactions of power, office, wealth, popularity, and the approbation of non military groups,”¹⁷⁷ it results in a lack of trust of senior officers by their subordinates. This was exposed for all to see in the proceedings of the Somalia Inquiry and in surveys done during the early 1990's.¹⁷⁸ This loss of military professionalism is a threat to the maintenance of civilian control of the military. In essence the response to important efficiency problems has had a direct influence on the rise of the problems within the

¹⁷⁴Problems with two or more cultures within an organizations were discussed in Chapter 1, in the section on multiple cultures resulting from joining two organizations.

¹⁷⁵Dr. Bland in interview for *Dishonoured Legacy*.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷Huntington, *Op. Cit.*, p. 95

¹⁷⁸English, A.D. *Op. Cit.* p. 155-156.

military. The critics directly attribute civilianization and the resultant damage to civilian control of the military to these changes.

The civilianization critique has coincided with the recognition that the culture of an organization is vital to its success. It has also become a particularly important consideration for organizations that are trying to evolve or change, because "it is far less likely that an organizational 'turn around' will begin with a change in the structure of the organization or its patterns of authority and control. Progressive public managers are much more likely to focus on values which are the underlying basis for the organizational culture. In so doing, these managers are seeking a basic transformation of their organizations; one far beyond what a change in structure could bring about."¹⁷⁹ The issue of culture has become particularly important as a result of the creation of NDHQ in 1972. The efforts to make the department a more efficient administrative tool was done without the knowledge that the culture of the department would become an issue.

Management Versus Leadership

The Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on the Unification of the Canadian Forces (1980) was the first official recognition that civilianization was becoming a problem. While problems between management and leadership were identified as early as 1972 by Brigadier General (Retired) E. Leslie,¹⁸⁰ it was the Review

¹⁷⁹Denhardt, R. *The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations*, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993), p. 22

¹⁸⁰Leslie, E. 'Too much management, too little command' in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Winter 72/73, p. 30-32.

Group officially acknowledged the perception that at senior levels of the department, civilians were making decisions of a military nature.¹⁸¹ In particular, in the Final Report of the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, “it has been held that at the ADM level, civilians were making or were contributing to the making of decisions of a military nature and that control by the civil power should not mean control by the Public Service.”¹⁸² The principle of the CDS having command and control of the CF was ‘seen to be eroded by the staff of the DM making decisions on the deployment of military forces.

In addition, there was a growing perception that some military officers were abandoning the culture of the military and replacing those values with ones more closely associated with the business world; the dominance of management over leadership.¹⁸³ This perception became particularly prevalent among military members that felt that the military had been ‘betrayed’ by the senior officers in NDHQ. Officers who have spent too much time in NDHQ were seen as particularly susceptible to this ‘condition.’

While this effect was, and is arguable, the perception that it exists is very important and in the end destructive. The trust that subordinates place in their leaders is a very important tenet of military culture. This was recognised in the report of the Somalia Inquiry when it pointed out that, “a managerial model that focuses on managerial

¹⁸¹Canada, Department of National Defence, *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces*, Report 31 Aug 80, p. 14.

¹⁸²Canada, Department of National Defence, *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report*, 15 March 1980, p. 40

¹⁸³Somalia inquiry, Record 3256/13628

efficiency and individual self-interest will erode the traditional military ethic and undermine the cohesiveness of the military unit.”¹⁸⁴ In effect, the common soldier had come to believe that they can no longer trust the officers to look after the welfare of subordinates.

Civilianization was further recognised in the Somalia Inquiry as one of the key elements that contributed to the failure of the mission. As noted by the Inquiry, the efficient allocation of resources is important, but it does not matter how efficiently resources are allocated if the CF cannot perform missions in the field for which it was created. “Without strong leadership, the concerted effort that characterizes a properly functioning armed force is unlikely to take shape, and the force’s individual members are unlikely to achieve the unity of purpose that is essential to success in military operations.”¹⁸⁵

The Somalia Inquiry recommended that;

“The Canadian Forces make a concerted effort to improve the quality of leadership at all levels by ensuring adoption of and adherence to the principles embodied in the findings and recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry regarding the selection, screening, promotion and supervision of personnel; the provision of appropriate basic and continuing training; the demonstration of self-discipline and enforcement of discipline for all ranks; the chain of command, operational readiness, and mission planning; and the principles and methods of accountability expressed throughout this Report.”¹⁸⁶

However, in recognising civilianization as a problem there is far less agreement on the cause. The primary cause of civilianization according to many is the mixing of two cultures a function of the merger of cultures within NDHQ. Many believe that the mixing

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Executive summary of the Somalia Enquiry, p. ES 12

¹⁸⁶ Somalia Enquiry Record 3360 / 13629 recommendations from ch 15

of the military and civil service cultures has led to a problem of leadership versus management, and leadership is losing the competition. Bland is one of the proponents of the leadership-management argument and sums up the problem:

“Until 1972 the administration of defence policy in Canada was considered to have two aspects; that is it was viewed as a command problem to be addressed by military concepts, and as a public administration problem to be addressed by theories of public management. Two power centres, the CDS and the DM, approached these problems with organizations and processes particular to their aspects of the problem. In this context it was a political responsibility to reconcile differences and risks. After 1972, the administration of defence policy became defined as a managerial problem *alone*, with the expectation that better management practices could make the “sharp end sharper.” This new definition of the defence problem promoted managerial skills over command experience and allowed officials to restructure DND and the CF as though they were a single entity.”¹⁸⁷

Leadership within the military is generally defined as “the art of motivating human behaviour in order to accomplish a mission in a manner desired by the leader.”¹⁸⁸

The institutional biases towards leadership by the military are contained within this definition. The first of these is that leadership is an “art,” rather than an exact science and requires repeated practice. It is also not always perfect and it takes time and nurturing in order for a person to become an effective leader. Second, motivating ‘followers’ is a basic tenant of leadership. The leader must motivate his or her followers to carry out the mission, even if it goes against the followers best interest (ie. could result in harm to the follower). The next bias is “mission,” which is goal orientated in nature. These goals are vital to the group and have a much larger meaning to military personnel than civilian workers. This is ingrained during the basic training and socialization process in the

¹⁸⁷Bland, D., ‘Institutionalizing Ambiguity’, in *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol 30, #4, 1987, p. 549. This also builds on what B Gen Leslie said in Leslie, E. *Op Cit.* p 30-32.

¹⁸⁸Canada, Department of National Defence, *Royal Canadian Air Cadets Level Two Handbook* A-CR-CCP-267/PT-002, p. 6-1.

military. Finally there is a definite hierarchical foundation of leadership in the definition. While teamwork may be emphasised, a definite hierarchy exists with defined roles for members of the team. The beliefs in motivation, training, mission, goals, and obedience are fundamental to the military.¹⁸⁹

Within management literature, management has many different definitions. *The One Minute Manager* by Blanchard and Johnson simply states that management “is simply working with people to accomplish results.”¹⁹⁰ Robins and Stuart-Kotze define management as “the process of completing activities efficiently, through others.”¹⁹¹ Regardless of definition, the main difference between most definitions of management and leadership is the emphasis on motivation. Motivation is crucial to good leadership. However, motivation is not as necessary to ensure good management. This is a fine line but it is a large difference to men who are going into combat. They need to be led effectively in order to accomplish the mission through the sacrifice of their lives if necessary, and this extends far beyond just ensuring that they are provided for.

¹⁸⁹The debate surrounding the exact definition of leadership is an extensive one. There are many arguments for individual styles of leadership. There are thousands of books on various arguments around leadership. However, for the arguments that are pertinent to this thesis, I will concentrate on the definitions of leadership that are used by the critics of DND. In particular, the CF definition of leadership is the one most often used by the critics as many of them are former military officers. For a discussion on other definitions and arguments surrounding leadership, see Robert W. Terry’s book called *Authentic Leadership: Courage in Action* or Patricia Pitcher’s *The Drama of Leadership*.

¹⁹⁰Blanchard, K. and Johnson, S., *The One Minute Manager*, (La Jolla: Blanchard-Johnson Publishers, 1981) P. 21.

¹⁹¹Robbins, S., and Stuart-Kotze, R. *Management: Concepts and Applications 2nd Ed.* (Prentice-Hall Canada Inc : Scarborough, 1990) p. 20 - 21. Boone, L., and Kurtz, D. *Management 3rd Ed.* (Random House: New York, 1987) p. 3. Once again, there are numerous definitions of management, but for the purposes of this thesis we will look at the definitions within this very popular Commerce textbook and *The One Minute Manager*, a book with many millions of copies sold and a part of the management programs within many large corporations.

Just saying that leadership is good and management is evil is an oversimplification. Many of the hardest critics in the leadership versus management debate are former military officers or closely identify themselves with the military.¹⁹² In order to better understand if civilianization is the result of having two cultures within a single organization, it is useful to have a closer look at the cultures in question. The scrutiny of the two cultures allows for an understanding of the influences that the two cultures may have upon each other. Subsequently, a comparison between the effect of the mixing cultures in NDHQ and the influence of the central agencies of government through fiscal, personnel, and policy guidelines will partially demonstrate the extent to which the structure of NDHQ truly is the cause of civilianization.

CF Culture

The differences between the civilian culture of the civil service and the military is obvious at first glance. The uniform, traditions, and symbols of military members serve as an obvious separation from the civilians working within DND. However, beyond the obvious, there are many similarities between the cultures. Service, integrity and loyalty are the primary drivers in both cultures. When one looks at these core values within each culture and their similarities, it is not obvious where blending of the two cultures could

¹⁹²These high profile former military members include Jack Granastein, Lewis McKenzie, and Douglas Bland.

have a detrimental effect. The other aspects of military culture, such as uniform, are not likely to be affected by the presence of civilians.¹⁹³

As shown in the introduction of this thesis, one of the fundamental tenets of military culture is the professionalism of the military. The concept of the professional soldier is central to Huntington's theories of civil-military relations. In this case, the professional officer is specially trained over many years in the direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence."¹⁹⁴ This long training over many years and the sense of belonging to a select profession has an important impact on the development of a unique military culture.

The culture of any organization consists of "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."¹⁹⁵ The culture of the CF is very much based upon the history of the military in Canada. Canada has always depended on alliances throughout its existence. First it relied upon the British as part of a larger Empire for protection. In the Twentieth Century, this reliance shifted to the United States.¹⁹⁶ In both cases, it was recognised that

¹⁹³ Although there is a policy in the National Capital Region that Fridays are a no uniform day, this is usually attached to a charitable campaign where military members pay to have to right not to wear a uniform on Fridays.

¹⁹⁴ Huntington, *Op. Cit.* p. 11

¹⁹⁵ Schein, E. H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd Edition, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), p. 12.

¹⁹⁶ Milner, M., *Canada's Navy: The First Century*, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 1999) p. x.

the relatively small population of Canada would not be able to defend its landmass. This led to the Canadian military always considering its role in conjunction with others within an alliance structure.¹⁹⁷ The impact of alliances thus played a significant role in the development of Canadian military culture. Large portions of Canadian military culture have been borrowed, consciously or not, from exposure to the armed forces of its core ally. These borrowed traditions, in turn, have been moulded into the Canadian organization.

An important study of the CF established the effect that its unique culture had on the events that were investigated by the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. In this report, Winslow stated;

“The military in Canada sees itself as a corporate body distinct from lay men and women. Although an integral part of Canadian society, the military perceives itself as ‘a distinct sub-set of the Canadian fabric.’ This separateness is underlined through the military’s distinctive dress (distinctive badges, buttons, colours, uniform, haircut, headgear, etc.) language, (unique terminology and use of acronyms) and an emphasis on ceremony and tradition (Parades, mess dinners, troopings, etc.). The distinct corporate nature of the military is also established by its distinct culture, which includes its hierarchical system, the army’s regimental organization and the navy’s divisional system, formal and informal associations, customs, and traditions.”¹⁹⁸

As Winslow argues, the theme of separateness and distinctness run throughout discussions of the culture of the military in Canadian society.

¹⁹⁷Morton, D. *A Military History of Canada*, Third Edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), p. x-xii.

¹⁹⁸

Winslow, D., *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry*, A Study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada: Ottawa, 1997) p . 6

The Canadian Forces has also been labelled a 'total institution'.¹⁹⁹ The characteristics of a total institution are;

- "All aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority;
- each phase of the member's daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together;
- All phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials;
- The various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfil the official aim of the institution;
- There is a sharp split between the supervisors and the members, with social mobility between the two groups highly restricted;
- Information concerning the member is often withheld from him;
- The work structure in a total institution, geared as it is to a 24-hour day, demands different motives for work than exist in the society at large.
- There are usually real or symbolic barriers indicating a break with the society 'out there'²⁰⁰

While all of these characteristics do not apply to all members of the CF at any one time,²⁰¹ it is an accurate description of the experience that all military members go through during their basic training and during most military qualification courses. During training and courses, the individual member is fully socialized into the military culture and is given a set of beliefs and standards that the military wishes its members to possess.

The basic training and indoctrination that each member of the military receives is done in a manner that results in a member now being part of a war-fighter society or

¹⁹⁹In this case, Winslow is describing the organization of National Defence. A 'total institution' is best understood in this context as an organization as it is described in Chapter one of this thesis.

²⁰⁰Winslow, *Op. Cit.*, p. 12.

²⁰¹Many Canadian Forces occupation categories do not fit all of the characteristics of a 'total institution.' For instance, trades such as clerk, firefighter, air-traffic controller, military police, and others closely resemble the job requirements and lifestyle of their civilian equivalent positions. Also, members are no longer required to live 'on base' and often live in the communities that surround most military bases in Canada. However, all trades can be deployed overseas and at these times, almost all aspects of the 'total institution' apply.

culture. In so doing, each member realizes that he/she may be called upon to take the life of another human being, and if necessary, sacrifice their own life. In military culture, this is the notion of unlimited liability.

“Under this unwritten clause of the military contract, Canadian Forces’ members are obliged to carry out duties and tasks without regard to fear or danger, and ultimately, to be willing to risk their lives if the situation requires. This obligation is not often invoked in peacetime. It is worth recalling, however, that Canadian servicemen and women have been on operational service on more than fifty occasions since the end of the Korean War, most often as United Nations peacekeepers. While unlimited liability is generally associated with service in war, it is *always* present in military service, and its existence lends a dignity to the military profession which is difficult to deny or denigrate. This liability is what most distinguishes the Canadian Forces institutionally and its members individually from the rest of Canadian society.”²⁰²

Unlimited liability is central to military culture and separates the military from society at large.²⁰³ Thus, the requirement to kill and unlimited liability combine to create the belief of each individual as charged with the protection of the country; a duty that requires each to surrender certain rights that all citizens possess.

Rigorous training is very important to the socialisation process. Through training, the military instills a set of values and traits essential to maintain discipline and accomplish its primary mission; war-fighting. These include duty, courage, discipline, dedication, teamwork and honour.²⁰⁴ These values are instilled in such a manner that they take precedence over values that might have previously possessed as a civilian.²⁰⁵ A key

²⁰²Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee*, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, 1 April 1998. p. 33.

²⁰³*Ibid*, Winslow, *Op. Cit.* p. 15

²⁰⁴Young, M. D., *Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces*, Report to the Prime Minister, March 25, 1997, p. 7.

²⁰⁵Schafer, A. *The Buck Stops Here: Reflections on Moral Responsibility, Democratic Accountability, and Military Values*, A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Minister of Public Works, Ottawa: 1997), p. 33

trait is integrity as it is the basis for all the other traits. Without integrity, the concepts of obedience and loyalty that make up discipline could not exist.²⁰⁶ Without integrity there can be no honour, discipline, or duty.

Loyalty is vital to all aspects of military culture. As part of a mentality that becomes second nature, a new member develops various loyalties. These loyalties are directed towards one's unit, trade, and service.²⁰⁷ These loyalties are very effective at maintaining morale and endow a feeling of belonging, especially as members may be separated from their families for long periods of time in very arduous conditions. The net result is individuals identifying themselves as belonging to a military sub-group.²⁰⁸ Loyalty to ones' superiors, the sub-group, and the organization is a very important part of any organization. But it is even more important in the military as the members rely on the three levels for much more support than a civilian does, up to and including their very lives.

The hierarchical nature of the Canadian Forces also impacts its culture. Each member of the military knows exactly where they stand in the organization. The chain of command is clearly demarcated. Decisions made in or outside of combat are delegated to the proper units and tasks passed down within the units to the individual. Each individual

²⁰⁶Schafer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 32.

²⁰⁷There does exist the loyalty to country of course, but the loyalty to the unit and attachment to their friends is largely what individuals are fighting for when they engage in battle.

²⁰⁸While this seems to be a very admirable and functional, it does have some drawbacks for organizational effectiveness, particularly if individuals place sub-unit loyalties ahead of their responsibilities to the organization or the country as a whole. "Problems arise only when this loyalty is misplaced or lacking." Gen(ret'd) L. MacKenzie Interview in *Dishonoured Legacy*.

knows one's superiors and subordinates. Furthermore, the chain of command clearly indicates that all are a part of a larger group and all are dependent upon everyone also doing their assigned task.²⁰⁹

In military life symbols are also important. Illustrative is the impact of unification on the CF. One of the largest outcries after unification was the loss of distinctive uniforms of the Army, Air Force, and the Navy. The loss of these symbols, and thus identity, was key in some ways to the failure of unification.²¹⁰ Individual soldiers, sailors and airmen become very attached to these symbols. These include the distinctive colours of their uniforms, trade and qualification badges, or other means of identifying them as having a distinct set of skills.²¹¹ In addition, symbols also identify the individual as a specialist who is a trained expert in a particular field.

Another aspect of military culture is an expectation of non-participation in politics. While individual members are not restricted from voting, active participation in partisan politics is discouraged. The expectation stems from the belief that the military should not attempt to affect the formation of government, and the need to maintain the independence of the military and that political parties do not exert a partisan influence upon the military. However, this also can lead to the average soldier not understanding political issues as they relate to defence. In addition, this can be identified as one of the rights that a military member gives up when they join the CF. While the non-participation

²⁰⁹Winslow, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17 -19.

²¹⁰Task Force on Unification., p. 78

²¹¹*Ibid.*

in politics is in itself not overly important, Legault suggests that this has led to a disconnect of public officials from the military and vice versa.²¹² In particular, officials that are elected to represent all areas of Canadian society have little affiliation with, or knowledge of the military in Canada.

Finally, as any culture will, military culture reacts in a very positive manner to good leadership. As one is indoctrinated to the rest of the culture of the military, it becomes obvious to every individual if their immediate supervisors are practising good leadership. Everyone is expected to follow the principles of leadership. This contrasts remarkably with the culture of the civil service where each person is largely responsible for their own work and leadership is not stressed in the same manner as within the military.

Civil Service Culture

Civil service culture, the other important influence on the Department, differs from the military culture in some aspects and is similar in others. Superficially, of course, they do not wear a uniform. Most importantly, they view leadership in a different manner than military personnel. According to the Auditor General, the public service should not use authoritarian leadership or management techniques that are too rigid and do not encourage collaboration.²¹³ This may result in a better working environment for the civil servants, but it does not fit well with the members of the CF who have adapted to a more

²¹²Legault, A, *Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-First Century: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence* (Canada, DND: March 25, 1997), p. 17.

²¹³Lewis, I., 'Public Service 2000 and Cultural change in the Department of National Defence' in *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol 37, No. 2, Summer, p. 252.

direct form of leadership and expect immediate compliance by subordinates and provide it to superiors.

At the federal level most civil servants are managers, policy experts, or administrators. These are often specialized but many are also trained, in a generic sense, as managers or administrators. In the current structure of the public service at the federal level, theoretically at least, any civil servant can compete for postings in other departments and the person most qualified will be hired for the position. In this way, members of the civil service can change jobs and even departments. No one is necessarily tied to the department that first hired them. This is readily apparent by looking at the biographies of the current group of ADMs at DND. The ADM (FinCS), ADM (Mat), and ADM (IE) all have no previous experience in dealing with the military, yet all hold very senior positions within NDHQ.²¹⁴ Their experience comes from the PCO, Western Canadian Diversification, Public Works and Government Services Canada, Industry and Canadian Heritage, to name a few.²¹⁵

The public service plays a vital role in the administration of government. In this role, the civil service “has unrivalled knowledge of the detailed organizational framework and capacities of the policy, as well as a unique perspective on the characteristics of various clienteles and policy communities. This knowledge of the administrative...makes

²¹⁴www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/mat_office/bio_e.asp, www.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/bio.intro_e.asp, www.forces.gc.ca/admie/bio_admie_e.htm, Downloaded 14 Apr 04.

²¹⁵Notable exceptions to this is the current ADM(Pol) and ADM (IM). The ADM (Pol) has worked almost his entire career in the Policy Group while the ADM (IM) is a former military officer.

officials indispensable players in a second role.”²¹⁶ This second role is continuous policy development. The members of the public service, particularly in policy positions, constantly advise the government as to available policy options and this has an impact upon how the culture of the civil service has developed. While military officers are posted in and out of policy positions, civilian members spend many years developing policy experience at NDHQ. A prime example of this is the current ADM (Pol) who has been in the Policy Group almost continuously since 1971 and has been ADM(Pol) since 1991.²¹⁷

Civilian members of DND are also likely to share many values with public service members in other government departments. However, in contrast to the military, there is no common training period to instill the culture of the public service. This results from a lack of a need to instill values that are contrary to society in general. There is no need to instill absolute discipline in order to ensure that the member will harm others in order to carry out the will of the organization.

Civil servants are similar to military personnel in that they operate within a very structured environment. A civil servant tends to see things as being within or outside of his/her power. Very specific job descriptions and defined limits of power can lead to some inflexibility. The civil service is very rule and procedure orientated in order to ensure the unbiased delivery of services and to ensure that procedures are common throughout the large bureaucracy.

²¹⁶Sutherland, S., ‘The Public Service and Policy Development’ in *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, Atkinson, M. Ed. (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Canada Inc: Toronto, 1993) p.85

²¹⁷www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/about/adm_e.htm , Downloaded 15 Apr 04.

The values of the public service as defined by the federal government are “service to Canada and Canadians, loyalty to the duly elected government, honesty, integrity, non-partisanship, prudence in the use of taxpayers money, faithfulness to the principles of fairness and impartiality, professionalism in carrying out their duties, respect for Ministers, other parliamentarians, members of the public and other members of the public service.”²¹⁸

Integrity, as in military culture, has always been recognised as a necessary characteristic of any civil servant. Without the integrity to make sound decisions based on what is right, the other components of civil service culture fall apart. Integrity in combination with accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, representativeness, neutrality, fairness, and equality all make up traits that the institution attempts to instill in its members.²¹⁹ Recent criticism of the civil service²²⁰ has resulted in a move towards increasing the importance of integrity as a value to show that the civil service can be trusted with taxpayers resources and to make important decisions.²²¹ It is vital to show that the integrity of the civil service is being maintained or improved in order to ensure that the public trusts the public service. This trust must be reinforced in order for the country to be administered efficiently and with the support of the public.

²¹⁸Kernaghan, K., ‘The Emerging Public Service Culture: Values, Ethics and Reforms’ in *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol 34, #4, Winter, p. 623.

²¹⁹Kernaghan, K., *Op. Cit.* p. 615.

²²⁰*Ibid.* p. 629.

²²¹This has become particularly important as recent events surrounding the current “sponsorship scandal” in Ottawa has shown.

One reason for the decline in trust of the general public can be attributed to a perceived decline in the neutrality of the members of the public service. This is particularly true at higher levels of the bureaucracy. Decline of perceived neutrality has resulted from an increase in the number of partisan political appointments at the highest levels of the public service.²²² Recent governments have increased the number of political appointments and this has been noticed by the media and the public and has led to an increase of scepticism towards senior levels of the bureaucracy.

The Structural Basis of the Anti-NDHQ Argument

As shown in the introduction of this thesis, critics such as Bercuson and Bland argue that the primary contention against the current structure of NDHQ is that the close proximity of civilians within the structure of NDHQ has caused the civilianization problem within the military. Civilianization is largely a problem where the use of management techniques have led to degradation in the leadership. As shown in the discussion above there is little chance that the culture of the civil service has blended with the military culture to an extent that there would be a detrimental effect upon the military. It is difficult to say that civilianization is a disease that creeps over the tops of cubicles in NDHQ to infect unsuspecting military officers.

²²²Kernaghan, K., *Op. Cit.* p. 628. As mentioned in the last paragraph the recent "sponsorship scandal" in Ottawa has directed a great deal of criticism upon senior civil servants. This is particularly damaging when this criticism is from former the Minister of PWGSC and politically appointed heads of various heads of crown corporations. For further information see the many news paper articles including "Sponsorship panel nowhere near report: Williams" at www.theglobeandmail.com 15 Apr 04 and the proceedings and evidence of the Standing Committee of Public Accounts 17-19 Mar 04 at www.parl.gc.ca for the testimony of Alphonso Gagliano blaming the civil servants and heads of crown corporations for the scandal.

However, the presence of directives from the central agencies of government play a large role in causing civilianization. Given the current power of the central agencies of government, no matter how civilian and military personnel were combined, the policies that the central agencies set will have a huge effect upon the personnel administering the military. TBS financial and personnel policies affect every financial transaction no matter if the purchase order is filed by a civilian or military member of DND. In addition, PCO and PMO must approve any policy submissions to cabinet. These financial and policy oversights would directly affect the thinking of military policy makers and administrators even if they were not 'exposed' to civilian staff within the headquarters.

In addition, the shifting culture of society at large has also played a role in the civilianization of the military. As the military is made up of members drawn from society at large, changes in this society will be reflected in the military itself. While this change is gradual and subtle, it is appreciable over time. Modern recruits are less open to authoritarian leadership and more highly educated.²²³ The more educated and skilled recruits are used in trades that are far more technical in nature than in years past. These trades take years of training and result in highly educated and professional members that are not necessarily officers. These skilled professionals do not respond to inflexible leadership as well as infantry or combat arms soldiers. In addition, even combat arms troops spend years acquiring the skills necessary to carry out their jobs. This forces military leadership to use a more flexible leadership style. This adaptation in combination

²²³Tasseron, J. 'Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs' in *The Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 2. No. 3, Autumn 2001 p. 57.

with the influence of the central agencies likely has a larger influence on civilianization than the mere presence of civilians within NDHQ.

As pointed out in the first chapter civilianization has been identified as a problem in the CF. Civilianization, in these arguments, is the replacement of military values, traditions and culture are replaced with values, traditions and culture that are more closely identified as being civilian or bureaucratic in nature. This problem has been recognised by many official groups that have looked at the problems of the CF from as early as the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, The Review Group of the Task Force on Unification, and the Somalia Inquiry. In addition, unofficial critics such as Bercuson, Bland, and others, have been arguing that management has been replacing leadership since 1973, shortly after the creation of NDHQ.²²⁴

The contention that NDHQ is the cause of the civilianization is based upon the argument that the presence of civilians within the structure has had a negative influence upon the military culture. On the surface, this would seem to closely match the predictions of neo-structural theory as described in chapter one. In particular, after the combining of CFHQ and the Office of the Minister in 1973, that the two cultures present underwent a transformation that resulted in the domination of the civilian culture over the military. The critics that propose that this is the cause of civilianization may be missing several important factors that may have a larger impact upon the military than simple bending of cultures within the structure of NDHQ. These other factors include the possibility that the cultures really are not that different to begin with and perhaps that the

²²⁴Other critics include Neelin and Pederson (CDQ Vol 4#2, 1974) among others.

society from which the military is recruited has changed as well. In addition, the fact that modern war has changed and that the military has evolved to meet these changes is another factor. Finally, the Canadian government has changed how it manages itself and its departments. Each of these factors, when examined individually, are potentially more influential upon the civilianization of the military.

The first argument against the proponents of NDHQ as the cause of civilianization is that the civilian culture has not had as large an effect upon the military as previously supposed. Schein proposed that there were three different outcomes if two or more organizational cultures were forced to come together within a single structure. These outcomes included coexistence, domination, and blending.²²⁵ Proponents of the anti-NDHQ theory would propose that there has been evidence of the civilian culture dominating the culture of the military within the headquarters. However this would ignore that military culture has been reasserting itself in the last 15 years with the re-emergence of the separate services within the CF and a re-emphasis upon effective leadership at all levels since the Somalia Inquiry.

It seems more likely, after examining the two cultures earlier in this chapter, that a kind of coexistence has developed between the two cultures within the headquarters itself. The core values of integrity and service have always been present in both cultures. In addition, it is obvious that the separate and distinct symbols of military culture have not been altered to any great degree. While the differences between the emphasis on leadership and management are legitimate, there is no solid evidence that this has been

²²⁵Schein, *Op. Cit.* p. 8 - 11. A more thorough description can be found on p. 20 of this thesis.

caused by the influence of the civilian culture within the headquarters. In fact, it is more likely that the management influence comes from outside of the department through the influence of the government itself.

The government influences the Department through the actions of the Central Agencies. This impact is considerable and their influence upon the military and its administration is ongoing. As shown by the report of the Management Review Group, the military must be responsible and responsive to the government. This responsibility to the government is controlled by the government through the Central Agencies and includes areas of policy development, procurement, accounting, and human resources. These Central Agencies include TBS, PCO, PMO, and Finance. They are used to control line departments and to ensure that the government of the day has complete control over them. This is particularly important for DND considering the problems that resulted during the Cuban Missile crisis and the ensuing controversies surrounding civil control of the military. This incident was one of the major factors leading to the creation of NDHQ and this fact must be kept in mind while considering criticisms of the current structure.

As shown in the second chapter, the influence of the central agencies of government have been increasing to the point where they wield almost supreme power over most areas of funding and policy.²²⁶ This is true across government and would be true even if the structure of the organization was different. The source of the civilianising influence on the CF comes from the directives of these central agencies. As shown in the previous chapter, the central agencies influence reaches into the decision making process

²²⁶Savoie, *Op Cit*, p.5

with all departments considering policy proposals to cabinet. This influence is further strengthened when one considers that policies established by central agencies must be considered during almost every administrative action taken by the military. This influence would exist whether or not civilians or military personnel share the same building, regardless of organizational structure.

While the influence of the Central Agencies has been increasing, Canadian society itself has been changing at the same time. As mentioned in chapter one, an organization is influenced by the society from which it has been drawn.²²⁷ These societal changes include a change from “outward directedness, tradition, communalism and morality to inward directedness, individualism and hedonism.”²²⁸ The society as a whole may not fit as well with any military due to the shift in values of society while the military is striving to reinforce its values of duty, integrity, discipline, and honour.²²⁹

These societal challenges are affecting all militaries around the world and Canada is not immune to this. The CF is adapting to societies that are more educated, quicker to question authority, and encouraged to think independently.²³⁰ Because society is providing better educated recruits to the military, the same old authoritarian leadership techniques are not being as effective with these people. New recruits show an “increased rejection of

²²⁷March and Olson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 54 - 59.

²²⁸Winslow, D. ‘Canadian Society and its Army’ in *Canadian Military Journal* Winter 2003-2004, p. 19-20.

²²⁹*Ibid.* p. 20 - 21.

²³⁰This is even reflected in the recruiting techniques of the US Army. This largest of Western combat forces has began to recruit on the basis of individual skills that can be learned rather than emphasising teamwork or patriotism. The “Army of One” campaign has had its critics, but it shows how even the largest combat force in the West is recognising that society has changed, and they must adapt to it.

order, pursuit of happiness to the detriment of duty, de-emphasis of social and family connections, and diminished concern over financial and future outlook.²³¹ This is particularly true in Western Democracies that rely on a professional military, staffed by volunteers, do not use conscription to fill the ranks. These new and better recruits require more subtle, informed, and motivational leadership than was required in the past. Also, the society itself may not recognise older, more traditional military techniques as being acceptable. Leadership is still needed in order to lead soldiers. However, this leadership must be more flexible and not rely on cultural deference to authority that may have worked in the past.

The shifts of society towards the individual could have been having an effect upon the civilianization of the military. The recruits from this changing society may better relate to values connected to management over leadership as they are more attuned to individual actions over team leadership. Respect must be earned and not freely given. In addition to military members being recruited from this changing society, they are more exposed to civilian society than in the past. This due to the increased numbers of military members living 'off base.' They are also more likely to be married than in the past and their spouse are very likely to have a job outside the military. Increased exposure to the society increases the affect that changes in society have upon the military.²³² This is a challenge for the highly structured culture and working environment in the military.²³³

²³¹Tasseron, J. *Op. Cit.* p. 57

²³²English, A.D. *Op. Cit.* p. 155-156.

²³³Winslow, 'Canadian Society and its Army,' p. 21

While this impact is subtle, it is a factor that has not been widely discussed by the majority of critics of NDHQ.

Finally, the nature of modern war has had an affect upon the culture of the military. Modern war is far more technical in nature and requires far more technical and support staff to allow front line operators to have the full advantages of modern technology on the battlefield. These highly trained technicians take many years to train and are very highly educated. They are not as willing to bend to the every wish of the military. This means that the leadership cannot take for granted the automatic respect and obedience of these people. The technicians often have trades that are highly sought after by civilian companies so they often have an 'out' if they feel that they are not appreciated, or are asked to do something that they may not want to do. This could include continuous and demanding deployments or even a transfer to another unit that may include a move to a remote area of Canada. These technicians are not as reliant upon the military for employment and therefore must be treated differently than soldiers traditionally have been.

A closer look at the changing attitudes of soldiers was conducted by the CF Personnel Applied Research Unit in 1978. Charles Cotton conducted this survey and it showed how attitudes in the army have changed as the number of support troops began to outnumber the number of 'combat arms' soldiers within the army of the time. In particular, the support troops were more likely to identify with regular 9-5 work days

where they could apply their trades.²³⁴ This attitude was also shared by many of the officers employed in the support occupations. This is particularly alarming as it is evidence of a move away from the professional officer described by Huntington. Particularly as the professional officer is vital to the civil-military relationship required for effective civil control of the military.²³⁵

Cotton also noted that these army support specialists preferred to be posted to a joint or airforce establishment as they felt that they were more valued as part of the team in these environments.²³⁶ This more accepting attitude may be due to the more technical nature of airforce operations and the attitudes noted in the paragraphs above. With the increase in the number of support specialist increasing in relationship to the 'combat arms' soldier, the overall influence of the support trades on the military will increase. In particular, this will lower the perception that they are professional military officers, and increase the closer identification of these military members with their civilian counterparts. This "has led to reduced standards of accountability among senior officers, who are now unwilling to accept responsibility when things go wrong in their command."²³⁷

²³⁴Cotton, C.A. *Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada* (Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, 1979) cited in Kasurak, P. 'Civilianization and the military ethos: Civil -military relations in Canada' in *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol 25 #1, Spring 1982, p. 114.

²³⁵Huntington, S.P. *Op. Cit.* p. 83-84.

²³⁶Cotton. *Op. Cit.* p. 115

²³⁷English, A.D. *Op. Cit.* p. 34.

Cotton also mentions specifically mentions civilianization in an article published soon after his survey. In this article, Cotton reflects that civilianization is largely perceived by members of the military who showed higher recognition of the military as a profession and not just a job. In particular, these “beleaguered warriors” are “characterized by a dominant focus on battle and a sense of alienation from a military that is perceived as having become too civilianized to perform its essential function of combat.”²³⁸ He was particularly intrigued by the issues raised by officers that felt that operations were no longer the focus of the administrators in Headquarters. This is directly related to the increase in importance of efficient administration to the civil authorities at that time.

Modern war is also less ‘human’ than was formerly the case. The use of smart bombs, missiles, and other long range but accurate weapons has made the need for direct, traditional authoritarian leadership seem less relevant. Large numbers of men no longer ‘go over the top’ to face the enemy with fixed bayonets. More subtle methods of leadership are more relevant in the modern military than the brutal discipline of the past.

Often in these highly technical units, discipline is much more relaxed than the average unit 20 years ago. Everyone is an expert at his/her job and supervisors rely on the expertise of the technicians who may be more experienced and better trained than the officer in charge. This has led to a decline in the stressing of leadership in these units and an increase in supervisors becoming facilitators or managers for their expert staff.²³⁹ At

²³⁸Cotton, C.A. ‘Institutional and Occupational Values in Canada’s Army’ in *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 8 #1, Fall 1981, p. 108.

²³⁹Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment*, p. 12-14

this point, supervisors must recognise this phenomenon and adjust their leadership style to maintain positive control while allowing for the flexibility that technical experts feel they deserve in their day to day activities. Leadership is the key to guarding against civilianization while maintaining a high level of operational effectiveness and flexibility.

Conclusion

In order to better understand the arguments around civilianization, this chapter examined the clash of leadership and management and then examined at the nature of the cultures of the military and the civil service in Canada. This examination and the Somalia Inquiry showed that there are substantial differences in how military personnel perceive leadership and management and that a shift away from leadership has had a negative impact upon the effectiveness of the common soldier through a loss of trust in their leadership.²⁴⁰ In addition, the discussion around culture showed that shifting values in society have had an effect upon the recruits that are available to the military, and this, in turn, has affected the way the CF approaches leadership.

Civilianization is a problem and does exist. However, from the examination of the cultures presented here, one can see that there are causes of the civilianization of the military beyond the interactions between military and civilians within the structure of NDHQ. The civilian culture has not dominated within NDHQ as much as some have argued. Their core values of integrity and service are shared by both the civil service and military, but the military traditions and symbols have been re-emerging over the last 15

²⁴⁰English, A.D. *Op. Cit.* p. 155-156.

years and flexible leadership has been stressed as a result of the findings of the Somalia Inquiry.

In addition, the actions of PCO, PMO, TBS, and Finance have a daily impact on the operations and administration of the military. These affect all areas of procurement, finance, human resources, and policy development. This impact is large and constant and comes from outside the structure of NDHQ. One could see that even if there was not a single civilian employee in NDHQ that the impact of the Central Agencies would still be felt upon all areas of defence operations and administration.

Further changes around the department have also had an impact. The first of these is the changing society. Canadians have changed. They are more individualistic and less traditional. They do not identify with service, deference to authority, and duty as much as their forefathers. In addition, current military members are more exposed to the society as a whole as they are far more likely to live off base than in the past and are also more likely to have a spouse who is employed outside the military. This has forced military leaders to adapt more flexible leadership methods. In addition to shifting society, the increase in the influence of technology in warfare has had an effect. New weapons require many years of training to maintain and operate. The military personnel required to operate these weapons are technological experts in various fields and are not as dependant on the military as soldiers in the past. These technicians have skills that are in demand in civilian industry so military leaders are forced to consider their needs and requirements far more than in years past as they do not want to drive them out of the military as a whole.

All of these challenges facing the military have one cure. Civilianization must be recognised and each military member in a supervisory position must use the leadership style that is appropriate for their situation. All must remember that military effectiveness is the order of the day but at the same time, all instructions from the government must be followed and implemented. This is a challenge to balance civil control with military effectiveness, but it is a challenge that all militaries must confront.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Civilianization has been and remains a challenge for DND. However, there is no clear evidence that the structure of NDHQ is the principle source of these difficulties. The controls used by modern government and the outside influences of society have had a greater influence upon the civilianization of the military.

The reforms that were imposed upon the defence administration in Canada developed largely from the problems that were identified after the Cuban Missile Crisis. These resulted from the actions of the Canadian military during this crisis. While the problems existed before this time, it was the crisis and the interactions between the government and the military that made it clear to all in Government and Opposition that there were serious problems with the DND and the Canadian military.

The new Liberal government in 1963 faced opposition from the military when integration and unification were introduced. They felt that the elimination of the independent services was destructive and would have a detrimental effect upon the morale and culture of the military. The cultural arguments being made against the integration were seen by the Minister as attempts by the military to derail his reforms, and were therefore dismissed. The next MND completed the integration of all portions of the Canadian defence apparatus into a single organization. However, over the next twenty years, many of the major tenets of unification were reversed. Policy changes included the

return to distinctive environmental uniforms and separate service staffs, while the benefits of a single supply and administration system remain.

The current structure of the DND is a response to problems that have faced the department over the last 50 years. NDHQ was created in 1972 when the office of the Deputy Minister and CFHQ were combined. This created the organization that largely still exists today with the CDS and the DM sharing the top of the organization. This has resulted in a single organization with a single outlook and goals.

The integrated nature of the current department in practice, while not in law, has resulted in a mix of civilian management of defence policy and military control of operations. With the effective implementation of the elements of integration that make sense, such as; support and jointness, and the re-emergence of some service cultures the military is once again moving towards providing an effective military option to the government. At the same time the civilian portion of DND was moved in order to make operate more efficiently in the centralized structure of the government while providing a professional fiscal and policy administration that is in line with the civil service as a whole.

However, the creation of NDHQ has not resolved all problems. Over the years there has been criticism that NDHQ was not clearly set up with all of the roles of the leaders clearly explained.²⁴¹ While this may have been true at the time the department was integrated, there have been attempts over time to more effectively define roles and

²⁴¹Bland, D. *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*, A Report to the Commission on the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Minister of Public Works: Ottawa, 1997) p. 26- 29

boundaries for the primary officials within the department, particularly since the issue was brought up by the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. As a result, there has been an effort to clearly show that there are distinct roles for each primary actor within the department. One way this has been accomplished was the publishing of *Organization and Accountability* by the Department. This document attempted to define what the role of each primary actor was within the department, and show who they are accountable to in the chain of command within the Department.²⁴²

In this light, the most successful result of the changes to DND is the internalization of disagreements between the civilian administration and the military. Open disagreements were detrimental to the department when going to the government with policy and funding proposals. The internalization of the debate within the structure of NDHQ resulted in a single voice for DND with the government bureaucracy. This raised the confidence in the other agencies of the government that a consistent message was being communicated by DND. Internalizing the debate has also been beneficial to the governments seeking to down play the role of the military in order to concentrate on other social issues.

While these dramatic changes were being made to the structure of the organization the culture of the military was largely ignored. In particular, the unification of the three services and the creation of NDHQ were carried out without thought of how this would

²⁴²Canada, *Organization and Accountability*. However, this debate is still not complete. Recent cabinet shuffles (12 Dec 03) resulting in changes to the role of the MND and questions surrounding the chain of command in the case of shoot downs of civilian airliners show that there must be constant revision and updating of the roles and responsibilities of leaders within the organization .

affect the cultures within the new organization. While culture was not acknowledged at the time, the recognition of the civilianisation problem by numerous sources, including the MRG and the Somalia Inquiry, show that the problem does exist.

There are four arguments against the belief that the mixing of civilian and military members within NDHQ has led to civilianization. First, there is no reason to believe that the creation of an integrated headquarters was the primary cause of the problem. The core values of service and integrity are found within both cultures within NDHQ. It is difficult to say that the civilian culture has dominated the civilian culture particularly as the military is re-embracing the symbols and traditions of the past, including distinctive uniforms.

Secondly, Western democratic society is changing and this is effecting militaries around the world. They are all adapting to societies that are more educated, quicker to question authority, and encouraged to think independently. Society is providing better quality recruits to the military and the old authoritarian leadership techniques are not being as effective with these people. They require more subtle and motivational leadership than was required in the past. Also, the society itself may not recognise older, more traditional military leadership techniques as being valid. The problems of civilianization may be coming from a society that shows an "increased rejection of order, pursuit of happiness to the detriment of duty, de-emphasis of social and family connections, and diminished concern over financial and future outlook."²⁴³ In addition to

²⁴³Tasseron, J. 'Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs' in *The Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 2. No. 3, Autumn 2001 p. 57.

the changes in society, military members now are far more likely to live and have spouses that work off the base itself. This exposes them to society in a way that was not prevalent in the past as most military members were single and lived on base.

Also, changes from within the military are bringing changes to the military culture. The increase in education required to fight a modern war has resulted in a large number of technological experts. These experts expect to be well treated and expect that they will be consulted before decisions affecting their area of expertise are considered. These experts are also not as dependent on the military for their livelihoods as in the past. Their skills are in high demand in the civilian workplace and this provides them with an opportunity to leave the military if they feel that it is no longer in their interest to stay. This requires the supervisors of these experts to use a very subtle and consultative method of leadership as authoritarian leadership would quickly alienate these experts. This would result in them leaving the military and wasting the resources needed to train them.

The final argument against the charge that civilianization is caused by NDHQ is the increase in the importance of the Central Agencies of the Canadian government that coincided with the structural changes within DND. The evolution of the Central Agencies in Canada has led to an increase in control by the civilian bureaucracy and a decrease in control by the military leadership. The slow increase of civilians within NDHQ in order to deal with directives from the Central Agencies combined with the downsizing of the military has resulted in the increase of administrative power by civilians in the Department. PCO, TBS, PMO, and Finance directives involving language, environment, equity, access to information, fiscal, and privacy policies are all areas that affect the

department. The influence of the Central Agencies and affect all departments in the government and would impact DND regardless of the organizational structure of the Department.

Problems that have resulted from the creation of NDHQ are directly related to the problems it solved. While having a single voice for defence within the government makes for a better relationship and less confusion within the bureaucracy of government, it does not guarantee good defence policy for the Government of Canada. By burying the debate within the organization, there is a reduction in the checks and balances with regards to policy. The policy options available to the government have become limited in the eyes of some observers. The lack of outside policy experience, combined with lack of attention from Parliament²⁴⁴ has resulted in the temptation within the department to provide three options to cabinet. The first is impossible, the second requires the doubling of the budget, and the third option is the option that DND feels they can get away with.²⁴⁵ The outside policy coordination of PCO may not be as effective as hoped due to the fact that the majority of the staff in the defence cell of PCO are seconded to PCO from DND itself.²⁴⁶ It is difficult to say that this is a truly independent check upon policy options coming out of the DND.

However, it can be argued that the quality of the defence policy being proposed from within the department does not really matter in the real world. In reality, defence

²⁴⁴Bland, 'Parliament's Duty to Defend Canada' in *Canadian Military Journal* Winter 200-2001, p. 35-43

²⁴⁵Interview with former PCO staffer, name withheld by request, Nov 01

²⁴⁶*Ibid.*

policy is determined on an ad hoc basis in response to stimulus that the government cannot ignore. These stimulus can be split into two categories. The first would be a crisis. An example of this would be the attacks of 11 September 2001. The Canadian government was forced to make changes to how it approached security and made very small additions to the base budget of the Canadian military. The second stimulus would be an opportunity for political advancement. One has to look no further than the decision to purchase 100 Griffon helicopters from Bell in Montreal. The government directed the DND to purchase these helicopters without a tender process and without regard to the military utility of these helicopters.²⁴⁷

In addition doubts about the effectiveness of defence policy formulation as a whole, it is doubtful how much of an impact integration has had upon the individual cultures even within NDHQ. While the organization is completely integrated below the DM/CDS diarchy, individual ADMs and Service Chiefs have very separate staffs. Under the DM it is very common to find the vast majority of positions occupied by civilian civil servants while under the CDS the staffs are primarily military officers.²⁴⁸ While there may be a degree of cooperation that was not there before the integration, it seems likely that the actual cause of any culture shifts may have been evolutionary responses to other factors including shifts that are common to all armed forces around the world. Armed forces around the world are recognising that there is a natural shift towards a more

²⁴⁷Other examples include the Iltis 'Jeep', the Challenger CC-144, and the Airbus CC-150 aircraft purchases.

²⁴⁸*Dishonoured Legacy*

bureaucratic or business management style when managing a large organization in a peace time environment.²⁴⁹ With other armed forces around the world dealing with similar problems as the CF it is difficult to blame the integrated headquarters structure for all the perceived ailments and problems within DND.

Another problem that remains for the Department is the Minister. The power of the Minister within the cabinet has always been an issue. In recent years successive ministers have not had the ability within the cabinet to represent successfully the needs of the department. This results in funding levels that are recognised as inadequate by most of the population in the country, except the cabinet. DND is then required to carry out multiple taskings that are beyond the organization to sustain, and to do this with no additional resources.

It is obvious that the creation of NDHQ did not solve all the problems present in the system. While the creation of NDHQ solved problems of policy coordination and relations with the government structure, many of the same problems are cropping up again. For instance, the difficulties that faced the government during the Cuban Missile crisis with the lack of civil control of the military is still a challenge faced by the government. This problem is caused by the necessity of cooperation with the United States in the defence of North America. By participating in bilateral agreements with the United States, certain actions are devolved down to the field commanders. Therefore, there is a danger of the military taking action without the express permission of the government. This issue was discussed at length as new rules of engagement were being

²⁴⁹Horner, C and Clancy, T. *Every Man a Tiger*, (Putnam Publishing Group, New York: 1999)p. 116-117

discussed by NORAD in light of the new possibilities surrounding the possible interception of civilian aircraft after 11 September 2001.²⁵⁰

The methods used to change the department have varied but have followed the pattern of organizational change explored in the first chapter. The changes during the Hellyer era and the creation of NDHQ could be termed as massive shocks that changed the Department in very fundamental ways. However, after this massive shock to the Department there has been a continuing evolution. This evolution was in response to, and acted in concert with, the extensive reforms that preceded them. Almost all changes made within the Department since the Hellyer era have been made to either strengthen the reforms made or to address shortcomings that were exposed over time.

The arguments against the single integrated Department are not as strong as their proponents wish them to be. According to institutional theory, a single institution is an effective tool for a government to use to be a single point of contact for any policy area.²⁵¹ The current structure of the Department of National Defence follows this reasoning. As an organization it serves as a single institution that the government can rely on to provide policy advice and administrative expertise. By having a single organization that combines the civilian and military elements of the DND the government also ensures that there is an effective pool of expertise from which the government can draw. It also provides link

²⁵⁰This discussion is not complete, as there is still disagreement on how the Canadian elements of NORAD will act if a shoot down of a civilian airliner is necessary. US commanders have had shoot down authority granted to them while Canadian generals have not. Koring, P, *Globe and Mail*, 'Canadian air defence lags behind U.S. after Sept. 11' Friday, 18 Jun 04.

²⁵¹Goodin, *Op. Cit.* p. 22

between the military and the legitimate civilian authority that is necessary for effective civilian control of the military.

Is the argument that the civilianization of the CF is due to the structure of NDHQ valid? It is simply not the case. The problems of the DF and the DND are not unique to Canada. Military forces around the world have had to face similar problems as their societies and governments have evolved. In turn, these other states have adapted their systems in order to address the various challenges they faced.²⁵² The changes that led to the establishment of NDHQ were necessary. The problems of the lack of cooperation and lack of policy coordination were all addressed with the establishment of NDHQ. While there is debate over the effectiveness of these changes, changes needed to be made and the establishment of NDHQ did go a long way towards solving major problems.

It is obvious that the creation of NDHQ was not a perfect solution to every problem. However, the creation of NDHQ did address many of the problems it was created to solve. It is also obvious that the creators of the new organization did not take the organizational culture into mind when they created NDHQ. At that time, any cultural arguments against NDHQ were ignored as perceived opposition to the proposed changes. The creation of NDHQ did play a role in the increase of civilianisation of the military

²⁵²In Great Britain, the government faced similar problems. The inter-service rivalries were perceived to be advancing to the point of destructiveness, the procurement process was not proceeding in a controlled manner, projects were over budget, and serious questions were being raised on the effectiveness and necessity of the equipment being purchased. The independent and separate Service Departments were eliminated in 1964 and control for all three services were brought under the control of a single Ministry of Defence (MOD) after several reports by Parliamentary Committees through the early 1960's clearly indicated the triplication of policy development and resource allocations was wasteful in a time when it was obvious that Britain could no longer justify huge defence outlays. For further information on the British experience see Cox, A., and Kirby, S., *Congress, Parliament and Defence* (MacMillan Press Ltd, London: 1986).

administration, it cannot be blamed for the civilianization of the military as a whole. Too many other countries faced similar problems for NDHQ to be the problem. Changes to the societies of Western Democracies have had a much larger impact. In addition, the extremely tight financial situation the militaries have found themselves facing has led to the adoption of civilian business models in most areas of administration.

The change of roles from leader to administrator was heavily blamed in the Somalia Inquiry for the problems of civilianisation. It is clearly linked to the loss of professionalism that Huntington feels is vital for effective civilian control of the military. Since the Somalia Inquiry a new emphasis on leadership has been started. However, the difficulty now lies in finding the correct balance in classic leadership and new management techniques in order not to make the mistakes of the past.

Annex A - Canadian Officer Commission Scroll

Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada
and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth,
Defender of the Faith

To

(Name)

Hereby appointed an Officer In Her Majesty's Canadian Armed Forces

With Seniority of the (Date)

We, reposing especial Trust and Confidence in you Loyalty, Courage and
Integrity, do by these Presents Constitute and Appoint you to be an
Officer in our Canadian Armed Forces. You are therefore carefully and
diligently to discharge your Duty as such in the rank of Second
Lieutenant Or in such other Rank as We may from time to time hereafter
be pleased to promote of appoint you to, and you are in such manner and
on such occasions as may be prescribed by Us to exercise and well
discipline both the Inferior Officers and Men serving under you and use
your best endeavour to keep them in good Order and Discipline. And We
do hereby Command them to Obey you as their Superior Officer, and you
to observe and follow such Orders and Directions as from time to time
you shall receive from Us, or any your Superior Officer according to
Law, in Pursuance of the Trust hereby reposed in you.

In witness Whereof our Governor General of Canada hath hereunto set his
hand and Seal at Our Government House in the City of Ottawa this 15th
day of September in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and
Ninety Five and in the Forty Fourth of Our Reign.

By Command of His Excellency the Governor General
(Signature)

Minister of National
Defence

(Signature)

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