Toward a More Complete Welfare State Regimes Typology: 
The Class Stratification Implications of Family Policy

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Toward a more Complete Welfare State Regimes Typology:  
The Class Stratification Implications of Family Policy

BY

Curt J. Pankratz

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University  
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree  
of  

MASTER OF ARTS

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Toward a More Complete Welfare State Regimes Typology: The Class Stratification Implications of Family Policy

Curt J. Pankratz

Abstract

This thesis argues that a more complete welfare state regimes typology can be achieved through the consideration of the implications of policy for gender and class stratification. I illustrate that family policy has not been fully contextualized within the welfare state regimes discourse. On the one hand, comparative analysts of family policies have not viewed welfare state regime histories and characteristics as underlying key differences between national approaches to the welfare of families. On the other hand, welfare state regimes models have not included family policies in their process of regime delineation. It is argued here that recent attempts to “gender” welfare state regimes discourse rightly illustrate that the impact of welfare states on class stratification must be supplemented by a consideration of their effect on gender stratification. It is shown here that this work has relied heavily on the impact of family policy on gender stratification, and has in this way brought family policy into the welfare state regimes discourse. I argue, however, that the class stratification implications of family policy have been largely neglected. Using a method similar to that used by Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990) to define three types of welfare states based on the class stratification implications of labour market policies (sickness, unemployment, and pensions), I develop a family policy typology. This typology is then combined with Walter Korpi’s (2000) gender policy typology, which is based on family policies’ implications for gender stratification. The result is a family policy gender/class stratification typology. Among the countries in this analysis, welfare state regime clusters based on family policy are consistent with those identified by Esping-Andersen (1990) in labour market policies. This family policy typology is a step towards a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state model since it considers the class stratification implications of family policy alongside their gender stratification implications. This typology lays the groundwork for a welfare state model that will include family policy in its process of regime delineation, and will be useful to comparative analysts of family policy in working towards an understanding of welfare state regime histories and characteristics as underlying key differences between national approaches to the welfare of families.

While “welfare state regimes” models have greatly increased our understanding of the social, political, and historical factors that influence the development of divergent forms of social provision, comparative analyses of family policies have not been contextualized within this framework.¹ For this reason, comparative analyses of family

¹ "Family Policy" here refers to policy programs, benefits and legislation that reflect the implications of government for family life. Family policy has been divided into three categories (McDaniel, 1990). First are laws relating to family issues, for example, marriage, adoption, divorce, and child support. Second are policies that support families’ economic well being, like tax concessions, child allowances, and maternity/paternal leave and benefits. Finally, there is the provision of family services such as childcare,
policies have lacked the ability to benefit from established research on welfare state policy histories and characteristics when explaining family policy development. While comparative family policy theorists have not contextualized their work within the existing discourse on welfare state development, welfare state regime typologies, in turn, have primarily focused on pensions, unemployment, and sickness benefits, largely excluding family policies.

Recently, feminist analyses of welfare states have proposed gender-sensitive accounts of social provision. These are significant and crucial contributions to a more complete portrayal of welfare state policy development. As will be shown, however, much of this analysis focuses solely on the gender implications of policy, and does not present the gender and class implications of welfare state policies. While much of the feminist work clearly shows the need to consider the gender implications of all welfare state policies, it has often been the case that family policies have become "gender policies". That is, family policies have been analyzed for their gender stratification implications. Therefore, while feminist work has argued the gender implications of welfare state policies and mainstream welfare state development theory has focused on the class stratification implications of pension, unemployment, sickness, and overall child protection services, and subsidized housing. Following Baker (1995), family policy will be defined as including these three major areas. That is, family policy can be seen as the policy and legal embodiment of a coherent set of principles that make up the state's role in family life.

2 By "gender implications" I mean the impact that policy has on gender outcomes (i.e. gender stratification, women's labourforce participation, etc). Welfare state typologies have been more concerned with class-based outcomes.

3 This is because of the important effects family policies have on the household gender division of labour, which has been known to interact considerably with women's economic power and labourforce participation, (Luxton and Livingstone, 1991; Lynn and Todoroff, 1995; Hochschild and Machung, 1992; Russell, 1983; Scanzoni, 1972; Wilson, 1986), and which is reinforced by women's economic dependence (England and Kilbourne, 1990; England and Farkas, 1986; Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983).
labour market policies, the class stratification implications of family policies have been largely neglected.

I will argue that welfare state regime typologies should attempt to integrate both class and gender in the analysis of welfare state policies. Simultaneously, from the perspective of the comparative family policy discourse, including family policy within the context of welfare state development more generally will allow the explanations of divergent family policy development across countries to benefit from well-established explanations of divergent welfare state histories, politics and structures, as well as from established theory regarding different national approaches to social welfare.

The intent of this thesis is, therefore, to take a step toward a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state model by considering the class stratification implications of family policies alongside the gender stratification implications of these policies. I will apply a method similar to that used by Esping-Andersen (1990) to define three types of welfare states based on the class stratification implications of labour market policies to family policy in 12 countries. This will result in a class stratification typology of family policies. I will then combine this with Korpi's (2000) gender stratification family policy typology to produce a gender/class stratification family policy typology.

A second, and related, goal of this thesis is to argue that the emerging family policy gender/class stratification typology lays the groundwork for a welfare state model that will be useful to family policy theorists in working towards a better understanding of

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4 In fact, class and gender are not the only areas of concern within the study of welfare state policy implications, and other factors have been argued to be important (for example, race – see Conley, 2000; Marmor, 2000; Quadagno, 2000), and should eventually be considered in welfare state typology construction. That is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
the political and historical factors influencing the development of divergent family policies across countries.

In the first section, I will review the central aspects of the welfare state regimes discourse to illustrate their usefulness in explaining diverse national approaches to social welfare. In section II I will suggest that welfare state regimes typologies should be useful to theorists other than welfare state regimes theorists. I will show that comparative family policy analysts do not contextualize their work within the welfare state regimes discourse largely because current welfare state regimes typologies exclude family policy. I will further argue that cross-national comparisons of family policy could benefit from consideration of the different welfare state regimes in which family policy develops, and that family policies are influenced by regime-specific political/historical factors. The family policy gender/class stratification typology developed here lays the groundwork for an understanding of family policies as components of the different approaches to social welfare taken by countries in different welfare state regimes by examining different national approaches to the welfare of families in the terms used by welfare state regimes theorists to examine different national approaches to welfare.

Attempts from the welfare state theory perspective to consider family policy development have suggested an empirical connection between the historical, political and social factors used by welfare state theorists to explain welfare state development and the structure of family policy benefits (income security programs) and tax deductions, as well as family allowance expenditures. In section III I show, however, that this work does not

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For example, welfare state regimes typologies have been useful for within-nation analyses of policy development as well as for the cross-national comparison of welfare states. A key consideration in developing a family policy typology that is grounded in the welfare state regimes method is, therefore, a consideration of those outside of the welfare state regimes discourse that may also benefit from it.
present a complete analysis of the character and structure of specific family policies, nor does it consider the services aspect of family policies.  

In section IV I will argue that attempts to "gender the welfare state" have illustrated the importance of understanding the implications of welfare state policies for gender stratification as well as for class stratification. It will be suggested that the eventual goal should be to recognize the importance of traditionally class stratifying policies (for example, pensions, unemployment, and sickness) for stratifying gender as well. However, systematic attempts to create a welfare state regime typology that accounts for gender as well as class stratification tend to "gender" the welfare state by conceptualizing family policies as exclusively "gender policies". In the example used here, labour market policies represent the influence of the welfare state on class stratification. The structure of this typology reinforces the view of pensions and unemployment policies as class stratifiers while similarly upholding the view that family policies are gender stratifiers. The typology structure thus derives from the precise assumption that the inclusion of gender outcomes in welfare state analysis challenges: The idea that the position of women and men relative to one another is chiefly a family-related concern. Further, it reinforces the dominant view among comparative family policy theorists that there is a fundamental difference between the outcomes of labour market policies on the one hand and family policies on the other. It is important to note, then, that while feminist analysts argue for the consideration of the gender stratification

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6 Indeed, social services have often been neglected in theory regarding every welfare state policy domain.
7 The typology used illustratively in this paper is that developed by Korpi (2000).
8 As presented by Korpi and Palme (1998).
outcomes of labour market aspects of the welfare state, the class stratification implications of family policies must be considered as well.9

Analyzing the class stratification implications of family policies is thus productive in working towards a more complete gender and class stratification welfare state typology. Further, the family policy gender/class stratification typology developed here takes a step towards understanding family policies as illustrative of different welfare state types in conjunction with the different approaches to social welfare reflected in the analysis of other areas of the welfare state. Overall, this will provide a family policy typology that allows cross-national comparisons based on implications for class and gender stratification and further investigation of the full connection between family policies and different approaches to social welfare. Indeed, from the perspective of welfare state theory, family policies are relevant for class as well as gender stratification, and from the perspective of comparative family policy theory, the assumed basis of welfare state regimes typologies can be expanded to include different approaches to the welfare of families.

In section V, I introduce the countries to be used in this study as well as the reasons for their inclusion. I will outline the specific family policies to be examined in each country, and an operational definition of family policies is developed. I present the specific method by which the class stratification implications of family policies will be

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9 This is not to say that feminist analysts of welfare states have not considered the class stratification implications of the welfare state. It is simply that while family policies have been considered in order to better understand the role of the state in shaping gender stratification (in conjunction with the existing understanding of the role of the welfare state in stratifying class, as is illustrated through analyses of welfare state areas other than family policies), the ways in which family policies stratify class have been largely neglected.
identified and measured. Finally, I discuss how these implications will be combined with the gender implications of family policies.

In Section VI, a typology of the class stratification implications of family policies will be developed. I then parallel the class stratification typology developed here with Korpi’s (2000) gender stratification typology to create a gender and class stratification typology for family policy. Finally, I discuss the implications of this family policy gender/class stratification typology for the welfare state regimes discourse and for the comparison of national family policies.
I

Welfare State Regimes Discourse

Until fairly recently, comparative analyses of welfare states have evaluated and ranked national levels of social provision using a simple leader-laggard continuum (Olsen, 1998:184). The “welfare effort”, measured by expenditures on social provision as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), would be used to measure the size and scope of a country’s welfare state and to rank that country on the leader-laggard continuum (see also Olsen and O’Connor, 1998: 11-12).

The exclusive reliance on social security spending to measure welfare states, however, does not capture the character of social policy instruments and their impact. For example, the creation of proactive and preventive social services and policies allowed the Scandinavian countries to achieve their policy goals while spending less on reactive and redistributive social transfer payments (Olsen, 1998). When such factors are considered, Canada and the U.S, both laggards, appear less similar than when only income security measures are considered (O’Connor, 1998).

As a method for explaining the welfare state, the focus on spending can create a misleading picture. The focus on spending by the first-generation comparativists, including Wilensky (1975) and Cutright (1965) (logic of industrialism), Hewitt (1977), Stephens (1979), Korpi (1983), Myles (1984), and Esping-Andersen (1985b) (working class mobilization thesis), Schmidt (1982; 1983) (neo-corporatist), and Cameron (1978) (economic openness), neglects the importance of the character of welfare states for influencing expenditure levels (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Further, the linear comparison undermines the sociological notion of the constructed, related, and structured aspects of power, democracy, and welfare. Indeed, scoring welfare states based on spending assumes that all spending counts equally (Esping-Andersen, 1990:19). Moreover, nations might have high social spending because they have allowed poverty and inequality rates to rise dramatically, as occurred, for example, in Britain under Thatcher.

Such work ignored earlier insights. Much earlier, Titmuss (1958) distinguished between states that assume responsibility only when the family or market resources fail (residual welfare states) and states that universally addressed the entire population in an institutionalized commitment to societal welfare (institutional welfare states), forcing analysts to consider not only expenditures but also the content of welfare states. Taking up this insight, the most influential account has been that of Esping-Andersen (1990) in *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Pierson, 1998). Here, there is no simple continuum from “low spenders” to “big spenders”. Looking beyond expenditure levels to consider the terms and conditions upon which resources and opportunities are (re)distributed requires the analysis of different welfare state types, or *regimes*. Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes have become the essential starting point for contemporary research on welfare state development (Pierson, 2000).

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10 More specifically, Titmuss distinguished between a *residual welfare* model (minimal state relief of destitution), an *industrial achievement-performance* model (in which welfare status reflects employment status), and an *institutional redistributive* model (in which universalist services are provided across the population in relation to need) (1974, p.30-31).
Esping-Andersen’s Welfare state Regimes

Esping-Andersen (1990) argues for a reconceptualization of the welfare state. Indeed,

[i]f what we care about is the strength of social rights, equality, universalism, and the institutional division between market and politics, social-spending levels may camouflage more than they reveal (106).

The existence of a social program and the amount of money spent on it, Esping-Andersen argues, may be less important than what the policy does (1990:2).

In establishing and identifying different welfare state types, Esping-Andersen argues the importance of two key axes. First is the extent to which they decommodify wage labour. Following Karl Polanyi (1944), social rights are viewed in terms of their capacity for decommodification. That is, the outstanding criterion for social rights must be the degree to which they permit people to make their living standards independently of pure market forces. In this sense, social rights, which come from the state’s role in managing and organizing the economy, diminish citizens’ status as “commodities” (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

The second key axis for the identification of different welfare state regimes is the extent to which they stratify the status of welfare recipients.11 While it has often been taken for granted that social benefits diminish inequalities and that the welfare state creates a more egalitarian society, the idea of the welfare state as a system of stratification in its own right has been neglected (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Within Esping-Andersen’s argument, each welfare state regime represents a qualitatively

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11 Although, strictly speaking, welfare states do not stratify the status of individuals. What is crucial is the effect welfare states have on existing stratification patterns. How welfare states affect this is, in a sense, how they “stratify”, or influence the stratification of, individuals.
different trajectory that produces its own stratification outcome and which results, therefore, in very different conflict scenarios.

In understanding the development of welfare states and their divergent forms, Esping-Andersen stresses the importance of thinking in terms of social relations, not simple social categories (such as class categories). Thus in the development of a welfare state social class is viewed as a political agent in taking a "coalition approach", which directs attention to distinct welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990:18). \(^\text{12}\)

Three central factors are of importance for the historical development of a particular welfare state type in a particular country: 1) the nature of class mobilization (especially of the working class), 2) class-political coalition structures, and 3) the historical legacy of regime institutionalization. Workers will not automatically and naturally forge a socialist class identity, Esping-Andersen argues, and their mobilization may not look Swedish. \(^\text{13}\) The actual formation of working-class collectivities will diverge, and so will their aims, ideology, and political capacities from country to country (1990). The structures of these class coalitions are, for Esping-Andersen, the major cause of the different welfare state trajectories, and "the class coalitions in which the (different) welfare-state regime-types were founded explain not only (the welfare states') past evolution, but also their future prospects" (1990:33).

Esping-Andersen identifies three "typical" clusters of welfare states in his analysis of sickness, unemployment, and pension benefits. *Liberal* welfare states are

\(^{12}\) That is, for example, strong working-class movements forming a political alliance with farmer organizations or the formation of a "new-working-class-white-collar" coalition.

\(^{13}\) The point here is simply that class identity formation depends on its social, political, and historical context. Sweden is used as a point of reference because of its history of strong working-class mobilization.
dominated by the logic of the market. Benefits are modest, often means-tested and stigmatizing. These welfare states tend to be low spenders. National examples of liberal welfare states are the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.\(^1\) \(^5\) Conservative/Corporatist welfare states are less controlled by markets but their benefits tend to be stratified, and therefore their overall redistributive effects are minimal. These regimes are generally shaped by historical church traditions, and this tends to determine their conservative attitudes towards the family and gender, as well as their endorsement in social policy of "the principle of subsidiarity" (C. Pierson, 1998:779). Thus, conservative welfare states would be less redistributive than liberal welfare states except in the fact that their social benefit expenditures are considerably greater than those of liberal welfare states. The significantly greater level of expenditure leads to greater redistribution. Typical examples of conservative welfare states are Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. The third welfare state type is the Social Democratic. This type is based on universalism and "usurpation" of the market (Pierson, 1998:779).\(^1\)\(^6\) It is committed to the principle of full employment, and social spending

\(^{14}\) Ideologically, this regime type descends from ideas associated with Adam Smith and the belief in free-market capitalism with a minimum of state "interference" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 9-10).\(^1\)\(^5\) Although, the United Kingdom does not actually come out as clearly liberal in Esping-Andersen's analysis. It does not rank highly for any particular system of stratification (1990:74), and its decumodification index is closer to that of conservative welfare states than to most liberal welfare states (92). However, the U.K. has generally been classified with the liberal regimes (see, for example, O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, 1999; Shaver, 1993-94; Street, 2001; Kangas and Palme, 1998).\(^1\)\(^6\) Conservative welfare states have ideological roots in conservative political economy, which emerged in reaction to the French Revolution. It feared social leveling, and favoured a society that retained both hierarchy and class; for class, status and rank were seen as natural and given. It was class conflict that was not seen as natural (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Chancellor Bismarck, in pushing towards a social insurance system designed to be income-related in order to maintain hierarchy and prevent class solidarity in Germany was also crucial in the development of a conservative welfare state.\(^1\)\(^7\) This welfare state regime has its ideological roots in Marxist political economy. This perspective abhorred the market's atomizing effects, and also attacked the liberal claim that markets guarantee equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
tends to be high, while spending on transfers is comparatively low. Typical examples of such welfare states occur in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.

The most crucial contribution made by Esping-Andersen (1990) to welfare state development theory is the ability to explain welfare state variation as an outcome of particular political histories. For, "it is when we begin to identify the structural differences in welfare states that political power relations gain explanatory momentum" (Esping-Andersen, 1990:137). The interplay of working-class power mobilization, Catholicism, and state tradition comes into play in explaining the degree of decommodification, commitment to full employment, and residualism in a particular welfare state. Esping-Andersen can, through his regimes model, conclude that left-party power is decisive for decommodification, full-employment efforts, and general social democratization.

Finally, Esping-Andersen is able to identify a fairly clear correspondence between welfare state regimes and political forces. Conservative stratification principles are explained by the presence of Catholic party strength and a history of absolutism; socialist stratification is dependent upon strong social democracy. Strong labour movements "appear to be a good guarantee against liberalist welfare state stratification" (1990:138).

The usefulness of typologies of welfare states lies in their heuristic value for the comparative analysis of causes and consequences of divergent welfare state development (Korpi. 2000:172). Further, expansion of the areas under study for each regime (for

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18 In order to operate, this form of welfare state must be committed to full employment because the cost of running a universalistic and decommodifying welfare state can only be achieved with as many people as possible working and the fewest possible number of people relying on social transfers.
19 This is an idea derived from Power Resources Theory, which is built upon the work of Walter Korpi.
20 Indeed, all welfare state regimes are ideal types and no nation is a perfect fit. Generally, the best approximation of each regime is the United States (liberal), Sweden (social democratic), and Germany (conservative).
example, the consideration of additional welfare state policies) can benefit both in terms of a starting point for explanatory factors, and in terms of selecting areas for key comparisons. To use the example of family policy, Esping-Andersen’s work makes it possible to compare, for example, family policy in liberal countries. The work thus begins from the understanding that the countries under examination share crucial historical and political characteristics and therefore that minor differences in the design of policies can be very important. Alternatively, one could compare family policies in countries representing each regime. The focus is not on more or less spending on family policy, but rather on differences between the policy characteristics and outcomes in countries with different historical-political characteristics. If liberal countries share certain aspects of family policy, then the historical-political causes of liberal welfare state structure are likely to influence family policy. Thus, Esping-Andersen’s regime perspective provides a comparative framework as well as a developed set of factors specific to each regime, that have influenced welfare state development.

The comparative literature on welfare states has largely been a “settling of accounts” with Esping-Andersen (C. Pierson, 1998:779). There has been a concerted effort to modify his typology or develop alternative welfare state typologies. Castles and Mitchell (1992) question Esping-Andersen’s classification of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada together as liberal welfare states. They propose, instead, that there exists a “4th world” of welfare capitalism, which has characteristics that depart at least slightly from the expenditure-based “orthodoxy” (2) that more social spending is the only route to greater income redistribution (Castles and Mitchell, 1992).

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21 Castles and Mitchell also criticize Esping-Andersen (1990) for not moving away from a focus on expenditures as much as he claims. It is this continued heavy reliance on expenditures to classify welfare states that, in Castles and Mitchell’s argument, contributes to the misclassification of the United Kingdom.
In this welfare state type, the goals of poverty amelioration and income equality are pursued through redistributive instruments rather than by high expenditure levels. Castles and Mitchell point out that progressive taxation, whether as a principle of directing the provision of tax benefits, as a means of “clawing back” benefits given to the better-off, or more generally, as a principle that higher income earners should contribute a greater proportion of their income to social purposes will, in various ways, reduce poverty and increase income equality.\textsuperscript{22}

The welfare state regimes approach represents a framework for understanding the parallel development of divergent welfare state types, and is conducive to a deeper analysis of policy structures (guided by the heuristic organization provided by the typology), and to the inclusion of previously excluded policy areas and/or countries as well. Further examples are provided by Liebfried (1993), who identifies a distinctive type of welfare state in what he characterizes as the “Latin Rim”; that is, the southern countries of the European Union – Portugal, Spain, and Greece, and by Ferrera (1996), who details distinctive features that define a “Southern Model” of welfare.

Finally, the welfare state regimes perspective has been applied to the study of specific outcomes deriving from regime-based welfare state policy strategies. The work of Korpi and Palme (1998) is a clear example of this. They argue that social insurance institutions are of central importance for redistributive outcomes. Specifically, Korpi and Palme illustrate what they call the “paradox of redistribution”: The more a country

\textsuperscript{22} Since income and profit taxes in most countries are based on the principle of progressivity, Castles and Mitchell take income and profit taxes as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a very crude proxy of the redistributive potential of a nation’s tax system (12). They thus argue that the combination of low expenditures with still high levels of redistribution existing in, particularly, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom warrant their reclassification as members of the fourth, that is, the \textit{Radical}, world of welfare capitalism.
targets benefits at the poor, and tries to create equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely that country is to reduce poverty and inequality (1998:681-682).\textsuperscript{23}

It is important to note that while there is some variation, regime clusters in these studies are essentially similar, and thus the same countries tend to be grouped together.\textsuperscript{24} This points to the validity of the regimes approach for heuristically organizing and understanding different approaches to social welfare.

\textsuperscript{23} Korpi and Palme develop a typology based on the redistribution strategies of two social insurance programs, pension and sickness benefits. The outcome (income inequality and poverty) is analyzed across five social insurance models: The Targeted (Australia), State-Corporatist (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Japan), the Basic Security (Eligibility based on citizenship: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland; eligibility based on contributions: The United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland), the Encompassing (Finland, Norway, Sweden), and the Voluntary State Subsidized (Although, none of the countries in Korpi and Palme’s analysis are deemed to have this type of social insurance structure any more). The emphasis is not on the historical and political factors that may have caused the different welfare state policy strategies, but rather on a comparison of the different “ideal” strategies and their relative effects on inequality.

\textsuperscript{24} With the exception that Australia is classified separately because of its heavy reliance on means-testing. But Australia’s extensive use of means-testing was a key point in Castles and Mitchell’s (1992) criticism of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification of the country, and for Korpi and Palme (1998), the fact that their goal was to evaluate the outcomes of the degree of means-testing within each welfare state’s approach to social insurance, separating Australia was crucial as well. The point is that, in general, regime clusters are similar across the different studies that have attempted to differentiate between them.
II

Comparative Family Policy Theory and Welfare State Regimes

This section will show that comparative family policy analysts do not contextualize their work within the welfare state regimes discourse largely because current welfare state regimes typologies generally do not have a family policy component. It will further be argued that cross-national comparisons of family policy can benefit from considering the different welfare state regimes in which family policy develops, and that family policies are influenced by regime-specific political and historical factors. The main purpose of this section, therefore, is to argue that the family policy gender/class stratification typology developed in this study will lay the groundwork for an understanding of family policies as components of the different national approaches to social welfare evidenced within welfare state regimes typologies. This is because it examines different national approaches to the welfare of families in the terms used by welfare state regimes theorists to examine different national approaches to social welfare. This typology will thus be of use for comparative analyses of family policy.

One of the most influential and comprehensive examinations of cross-national family policy structures and development is Maureen Baker's (1995) analysis of family policies in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In discussing the potential for explaining family policy characteristics and development through welfare state regime divisions, she concludes that broad theories of 'the welfare state' are too general for a specific discussion of family policies, even though there may be many lessons to learn from attempts to classify the different approaches to social welfare (1995:25)
Baker argues that welfare state regime typologies are designed for employment-related benefits, and that countries may fall into a different category for labour market policies than for family-related benefits. Baker also argues that Esping-Andersen’s regime categories are male-oriented in emphasizing class to the neglect of gender, and that they fail to consider how social programs have tended to perpetuate a strict division between men as breadwinners and women as wives and mothers, thus disadvantaging women (1995:24). However, these points show why the inclusion of family policies in welfare state regime typologies is important. They do not, as Baker concludes, make a case for the continuing theoretical dichotomy between comparative family policy analysis and welfare state development theory.

First, we cannot say that because countries may fall into different regime categories for family-related policies than for labour market policies that work shouldn’t be done to verify this claim, and further, to examine potential patterns in the “regime-crossing” that may occur. For example, if there are indeed different national classifications for family policies than for labour market policies, do countries with liberal pension regimes tend to have conservative family policies? A welfare state

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25 Her examples of welfare state regimes typologies are Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ware and Goodwin (1990). The issue of different policy areas within a given country fitting the characteristics of different welfare state regimes has been dealt with in the welfare state literature (see, for example, Olsen, 1998).
26 For the purposes of my argument, the feminist criticism of welfare state regime typologies will be discussed in section IV, in light of the role family policies have played in the “gendering the welfare state” discourse. Here, the point is purely Baker’s conclusions regarding the applicability of welfare state regimes to family policy development.
27 Indeed, that a particular welfare state may have policy domains that exhibit the key characteristics of different welfare state types has been well illustrated. For example, Canada’s health care approach is more Social Democratic while its labour market policies are more Liberal (Olsen, 1998; 2002).
28 This also raises questions about classifying definitions. If a “liberal” welfare state has a family policy structure that is not evidently “liberal”, does that mean that the family policy is fundamentally incompatible with labour market policies, or does that particular structure of family policy become labeled “liberal family policy” because it occurs in liberal countries? Or further, could it mean that the country isn’t really “liberal”?

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typology that considers family policies can answer these questions and bridge the very gap that Baker argues is the reason against the inclusion of family policy in welfare state regime theories.

Baker notes that family policies in liberal countries seem more “conservative” than those under conservative regimes (1995:24). But Baker also points out that Esping-Andersen’s categories of liberal, conservative and social democratic are confusing to a Canadian audience because these are the terms used to represent political parties. Her assertion that liberal family policies tend to be more conservative than those in conservative regimes seems to stem from those exact confusions (namely, the idea in Canada that higher social benefits are not associated with conservatism). Just because a political party that is strongly associated with liberal political economy is labeled “conservative” in Canada does not mean that family policies cannot be studied for their connection with the political and historical development of labour market policies, even if attention must be drawn to political, regime, and ultimately ideological labeling.

Finally, it is within her discussion of the incompatibility of comparative family policy analysis and welfare state regime typologies that Baker points to the neglect of gender by class-based welfare state typologies. The implication is that because social benefit programs have “benefited working class men”, and have “perpetuated a strict division between men as breadwinners and women as wives and mothers” (1995:24), comparisons of family policies cross-nationally cannot be viewed in light of welfare state types. But if the regime typologies neglect the gender implications of policies, the response by theorists should not be to maintain the separation between the class-based analysis of employment related policies on the one hand and the gender-sensitive analysis
of family-related policy on the other.\textsuperscript{29} In this instance it is the very mutual exclusion of theory regarding family policy and theory regarding labour market policy that is the reason why comparative family policy analysis should exclude the consideration of potentially related employment-based policies and their developmental characteristics. In short, it is the dichotomy between the two theoretical constructs that validates and legitimates the analysis of each area in isolation from the other. This is largely a practical issue: There are currently few theoretically connective tools available for the cross-national analysis and comparison of family policies within the context of the development of other, traditionally class-stratifying areas of the welfare state.

Gauthier (1996), in a study of family policies in industrialized countries, presents a typology of family policy models. Gauthier does not, however, connect these models to cross-national approaches to social provision in general. Furthermore, her models are identified purely from a qualitative comparison of family policy characteristics, and are separated not only from the historical developmental characteristics of corresponding welfare states more generally, but also from the analysis of historical family policy development presented within her own study. Gauthier's reason for this is that

models tend to ignore the dynamics of policies, and their continuities or discontinuities over time, as well as non-negligible differences among countries sharing a same model. On the other hand, such an exercise may be useful in further highlighting and summarizing the major similarities and dissimilarities observed across countries (1996:203).

Gauthier is correct that a typology is useful primarily as an heuristic device, guiding the organization of understandings resulting from comparisons. However, she is wrong to argue that a typology must be seen as purely ahistorical in nature. Social, political, and historical factors underlie the development of each policy type, and are crucial to the

\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, theorists have also recently analyzed “employment-related” policies for their implications on gender stratification. This will be discussed in section IV.
understanding of how the different types come to be defined as fundamentally separate. That regimes are dynamic is central to Esping-Andersen (1990). This is evidenced by his conception of regime types as “trajectories” – a notion that implies the crucial change over time that gives each regime its identity.

The ahistorical conception of policy typologies condemns Gauthier’s family policy groupings to a relative inability to explain the reasons for divergent family policy development. Gauthier’s explanations are largely based on a logical connection between demographic change, and to a lesser extent historical circumstances and political ideologies, and inter-country variations in family policies. But Gauthier’s attempts at explanation are devoid of the empirical analyses of historical and political factors associated with policy development that characterize welfare state regimes discourse, and they have been criticized for being “superficial and weak” (Glenn, 1997:730), and in general unsupported (Stacheli, 1997).

Gauthier points out that there is overlap between her family policy groupings and the welfare state typologies put forth by Esping-Andersen (1990), and in some ways Liebfried’s (1992) as well. But Gauthier downplays the potential connection between

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30 Although, welfare state typologies might be viewed as ahistorical in the sense that the label/model that applies today may not (and usually does not) apply for all time. Sweden, for example, was more liberal in the 1920s, and some would argue is becoming more so again in the age of globalization. However, this does not mean that a typology cannot typify different historical changes and characteristics between different groups.

31 Gauthier’s family policy typology consists of four general models (1996:203-204). First, the Pro-Family/Pro-Natalist Model, where the issue of a low fertility level is a main concern. It is seen as the responsibility of government to encourage childbirth. The best examples of this model are found in France and Quebec. Second is the Pro-Traditional Model, where the key concern is the preservation of the family. Government partly endorses the responsibility of supporting families, but at the same time the traditional male-breadwinner family is encouraged. This model is characteristic of Germany. Third is the Pro-Egalitarian Model, where the promotion of greater equality between men and women is the main goal. Government here takes full responsibility for supporting families, especially working parents. Prime examples of this are found in Denmark and Sweden. Finally, there is the Pro-Family but Non-Interventionist Model, where the responsibility to support families is taken by government only for families in need. Women’s labourforce participation is not discouraged (and indeed, is actively enforced through
her types of family policy and the historical/political development of the corresponding welfare states. She argues that the welfare state regimes models “do not reflect the government’s attitude towards the population and family question nor the objective behind its support for families” (1996:205). This is similar to Baker’s (1995) conclusions; namely, that it is because welfare state regime typologies do not include family policies that divergent family policy development cannot be viewed in light of the parallel development of corresponding welfare states more generally.

Kamerman (1995), in analyzing social policy responses to gender role and family structure changes, proposes a typology of the approaches used by various industrialized countries. Kamerman’s focus is on the approaches developed to address the problems of ensuring lone mothers and their children adequate financial support, and of insuring that working parents have adequate time for child rearing. For Kamerman, these are “the two most important problems facing families with children” (1995:243). Her typology is intended to highlight some common patterns of policy responses to changing gender roles and family structure. With these typological groupings of policy approaches, there is once again significant overlap with welfare state regime country groupings.32 But

workfare in some instances, but only limited benefits exist to support it. This model is embedded within a completely different attitude towards the role of government as a welfare provider. Examples are the United States and Britain. The overlap with Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes is fairly clear – the Pro-Family but Non-Interventionist Model tends to occur in liberal welfare states, the Pro-Egalitarian Model in social democratic welfare states, and the Pro-Family/Pro-Natalist and Pro-Traditional Models occur in conservative welfare states, with the key difference between them being a theoretically instilled intention (namely, dealing with low fertility rates on the one hand, and the preservation of the family on the other).

32 In Kamerman’s typology (1995:243-252), Britain, Canada, and the United States fall under the Targeted Focus on ‘Poor Families’ Strategy, a residual-based system of family support. Germany, France, Austria, and Finland fall under the strategy of Universal Support for Young Children, which aims to provide financial support (and job-protected leaves) to parents with very young children, based on the assumption that most mothers of very young children prefer to remain at home if they can, and that children are better off if parents who want to remain at home can do so. Swedish family policy is classified as attempting to combine Labour Market and Family Policies. Here, a variety of cash benefits, services, and other policy supports for working families with children are provided. The intent is to allow parents to enter and remain
Kamerman’s theoretical approach, which is precisely that the patterns represent policy responses to changing gender roles and family structures, precludes any attempt to further analyze reasons for the development of the divergent policy approaches. Kamerman does not analyze in any detail the possible factors and processes by which the divergent policy approaches may have formed, whether instead of or in addition to the impact of family structure change. This is understandable given that Kamerman’s goal is to illustrate that all of the countries in her study have favorable direct income transfers, family benefits, child allowances, as well as paid maternity and parental leaves, except the United States (1995:253). Still, it is indeed interesting that given this goal, Kamerman’s own typology of policy approaches puts the United States within the same grouping as Canada and Britain. Thus, while the uniqueness of the United States’ extremely limited family policy is an important point for investigation, the evident commonalities between the family policy approach of the United States and the approaches of other liberal welfare countries suggests that factors associated with liberal welfare state development within Esping-Andersen’s analysis should be analyzed in conjunction with family policy approaches to strengthen the understanding of how and why these family policy approaches were adopted in the United States and elsewhere.\(^{33}\) Looking for minute differences in these political/historical factors between liberal welfare states to explain the United States’

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\(^{33}\) “Liberal” in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state typology. The United States, Canada, and Britain are all included.
more extreme family policy deficiencies can also be informed by its contextualization within overall welfare state development.\(^3^4\)

Thus, the family policy gender/class stratification typology developed here will take a step towards developing a family policy component to welfare state regimes typologies, facilitating the consideration of different welfare state regimes in the comparative analysis of family policy. And indeed, the cross-national comparison of family policy can benefit from consideration of the different welfare state regimes in which family policy develops. Recent case studies of the development of particular family policies in the United States and Canada, for example, are saturated with their context in a liberal welfare state. In an analysis of the failure of the Child Labor Amendment to be passed in the mid 1920s in the United States, Aldous (1997) shows the context within which this policy was debated to be one where “[P]eople appear to be afraid of new governmental programs that would increase the federal government’s power”, and where political figures appeal to the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism (87).\(^3^5\) Further, a smaller percentage of the workforce are union members than in the past, and the well-financed, well-organized groups primarily represent big business (Aldous, 1997:87). Similarly, in addressing the role of childcare advocates, White (1997) explores the expansion and reduction of childcare programs in Ontario and Alberta from 1980 to 1996. While White argues that the major catalysts of policy change in childcare have been economic or structural factors rather than partisanship, she points out that “partisanship does matter, even in the face of fiscal constraints” (1997:26). Further, the underlying concern for cutting government spending is intimately connected to the goals

\(^3^4\) That is, for example, the United States could be meaningfully compared to other liberal welfare state countries, not simply to other countries in general.

\(^3^5\) For examples of this, Aldous (1997) points to Dionne (1996) and Dole (1996).
of liberal classical political economy; it is not a factor independent of political ideology that "constrains" the political agenda. Finally, Marks (1997) analyzed the development of the United States' Family and Medical Leave Act. In explaining why the act that eventually passed included a leave of only 12 weeks (as opposed to the originally proposed 18), covered only an elite minority of the workforce in higher-paying, higher-status jobs (rather than the originally intended universal coverage), and included no wage replacement, Marks argues that powerful business interests and weak labour groups are a major reason for the watered-down bill.\textsuperscript{36}

Indeed, it is difficult to agree with the conclusion that welfare state regime typologies cannot explain family policy development because they somehow do not address the issue of "family". It appears, rather, that factors related to Canada's and the United States' liberal political economy play important roles in forming family policy outcomes. Moreover, there is an evident continuity of task between cross-national and single-nation (case study) family policy analyses.\textsuperscript{37} For example, in Marks' (1997) discussion of the watered-down Family and Medical Leave Act that passed in the United States, her point that maternity leave wage replacement is "a major bulwark of family leave provisions for most other countries" (64) could profit from the consideration of different welfare state regimes. Specifically, it is not simply that "most other countries" have wage replacement as a key to maternity leave, but that different political economies and different political histories impact upon policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{38} Thus, it is not simply that

\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, for Marks (1997), powerful business interests and weak labour groups are major factors underlying a weak women's movement.

\textsuperscript{37} "Single-nation" here meaning the analyses of one country rather than comparing policy across countries.

\textsuperscript{38} Although, it is difficult to make a conclusive point regarding the regime-based differences in family policy until family policy development is actually included completely within a welfare state typology. Here, since it is Marks' contention that labour group strength and partisan conflict shaped the family policy
the United States has no policy enforcing wage replacement during maternity leave while other countries do have maternity leave salary replacement. Rather, the United States can be seen to occupy a position relative to other industrialized countries based on its characteristics of liberal political economy and laissez-faire capitalism; its policy outcomes are therefore more similar to those of some countries than to others. If countries with relatively similar histories of dominant liberal political economy have policies more similar to those in the United States than, say, countries with histories of social democratic political economy, then the argument that related political factors impact upon family policy development is strengthened.

At the same time, such in-depth analyses of the development of particular policies within a specific country can lend deeper understanding to the more general, heuristic, and regime-based categories. For example, differences between countries of the same group, that is, countries of the same general political history, can be fully examined. To keep with the current example, Marks (1997) would be right to point out that other liberal countries have maternity leave policies that include wage replacement, unlike the U.S. Detailed analyses of family policy development can highlight important differences in the political structures of generally similar countries, and illuminate the ways in which those factors shape family policy outcomes.

Elison’s (1997) analysis of the development in the United States of the Family and Medical Leave Act argues that interest group cohesion and strategic alliances can allow policy attainment even within a “hostile political climate”. She explains the development of the bill with a theoretical framework that derives from three major

\under{study, her argument can potentially be strengthened by the consideration of differing family policy outcomes in countries with different (regime-based) political histories.}
perspectives of social policy development. First, there is the “economics matters” perspective of welfare state development. Second, is the “politics matters” perspective, where Elison expects a connection between the parties in power, their ideological content, and policy outcomes. And finally, from the area of family studies, Elison considers the strategy and organization of interest groups. In combining these approaches Elison argues the importance of underlying structural change, interest group activity, and class-coalitional alliances for shaping family policy outcomes.

This section has suggested that cross-national comparisons of family policy can benefit from consideration of the different welfare state regimes in which family policy develops, and that family policies are influenced by regime-specific political and historical factors. The family policy gender/class stratification typology developed in this study, because it examines different national approaches to the welfare of families in the terms used by welfare state regimes theorists to examine different national approaches to social welfare, will lay the groundwork for an understanding of family policies as components of the different national approaches to social welfare evidenced within welfare state regimes typologies. This can facilitate the cross-national comparison of family policy in light of welfare state regimes, and takes a step towards the development of a welfare state typology that, to respond to the conclusions of some comparative family policy analysts, does indeed consider different national approaches to the welfare of families.

39 And Elison adopts insights from Hagen and Jenson (1988) regarding the feminization of the labour force (30).
40 Elison hypothesizes these connections using Esping-Andersen (1990) and Sainsbury (1994).
41 That is, whether women’s groups would pursue a strategy of alliance with labour, and whether women’s groups were unified or fragmented (30). These issues have been widely addressed in Family Studies literature, and Elison points to, for example, Lovenduski and Norris (1993), Thomas (1994), and Gelb (1989).
III

Family Policies in the Welfare State Discourse

While conventional welfare state regimes typologies do not include an analysis of family policies within their process of regime delineation (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Castles and Mitchell, 1992; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Leibfried, 1993; Ware and Goodwin, 1990), recent work from the welfare state perspective has not assumed a fundamental break between family policy development and welfare state development. This work has linked particular family policy expenditure characteristics to developmental characteristics that are similar to those used to explain divergent welfare state regimes. The purpose of this section is to illustrate that, while the findings of this work suggest that there is an important connection between factors influencing the development of welfare state regimes and factors underlying family policy development, these analyses are based on expenditure-type indicators of family policy rather than on a consideration of more detailed forms and structures of family policies. Further, family services (for example, formal daycare) are excluded entirely from the analyses. It will be argued that these shortcomings lead to an incomplete analysis of family policy, and that there arises from these omissions a systematic failure to fully understand family policies as developing within the context of welfare state regimes. Indeed, a more detailed analysis of family policies, including the structure and character of specific family policies as well as including family services in the analysis, and thereby going beyond the use of expenditure levels alone to quantify family policy, can improve the scope of welfare state

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42 “Welfare state perspective” is meant as opposed to the family policy perspective, which consists of the theoretical position of major comparative family policy analysts such as Maureen Baker and Anne-Helene Gauthier.

43 For example, left party power, Catholicism, corporatism, etc.
regime typologies and deepen the understanding of family policy development across welfare state types.

Pampel and Adams (1992) examined the impact of political and demographic structures on “family-related intergenerational transfer spending” (540) in industrialized countries. They argue that the most important factors influencing variation in family allowance spending are a large aged population, corporatist structures, and Catholicism. Their overall argument, that “both demographic and political perspectives appear necessary to understand family-related policies” (540), along with their overall analysis, is imbedded within the understanding of distinct welfare state regimes. And indeed, regime-based distinctions are evident. For example, they note that the size of the aged population has greater influence on spending in corporatist nations, but less clear influence in nations with strong leftist rule (540). Further, Pampel and Adams distinguish between the pressures for social equalization in Nordic, social democratic countries and the different aims of family allowances in countries with a strong history of Catholicism, namely, to strengthen traditional family institutions.\footnote{The point here is that Pampel and Adams consider the different welfare state types to have potentially distinct influences on the development of family-related policies (specifically family allowance transfers).}

There is, then, a clear conceptualization of family policy structure as developing within the context of welfare states in general, and Pampel and Adams (1992) point to the “aims” of expenditure. Esping-Andersen (1990) made this point, stating that “[t]he existence of a social program and the amount of money spent on it may be less important than what it does” (2), and an attempt to get beyond using expenditure as the sole indicator of social policies has become a central tenet of the regimes approach. Indeed, the exclusion of an analysis of family policies themselves and family services in general
can be misleading (Olsen, 1998). There are examples of this problem in Pampel and Adams’ work. The most obvious way in which this problem manifests itself is that family allowance expenditures are unable to indicate clearly the responses of various welfare state types to the demographic and political changes under study. In general, the “aim” and character of the policies that are supported by the expenditures are not captured. And the omission of family services, even in the form of expenditures, misrepresents countries’ family policies with regards to the approaches by different welfare state types. This can be illustrated by comparing Pampel and Adams’ values for family allowance expenditures, which they use to show patterns and trends across countries, to values that include expenditures on family services as well.

Table 1 gives the expenditure levels on family allowances measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 16 countries, as given by Pampel and Adams (1992:531). 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Allowance Expenditure (% GDP)</th>
<th>Welfare state Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Liberal³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45 Pampel and Adams (1992) give information for 18 countries, but New Zealand is omitted here because it is not clearly classified in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) analysis, and the goal is to relate expenditure levels to the welfare state type in which they occur. Switzerland is omitted because data were not included in the OECD expenditure database for the country, and this database is the source of service-inclusive family policy expenditure used for the purposes of the current comparison.
Canada 0.83  Liberal
Finland 0.72  Social Democratic
Germany 0.71  Conservative
Australia 0.65  Liberal
Italy 0.61  Conservative
Denmark 0.40  Social Democratic
Japan 0.05  Liberal
United States 0.00  Liberal

* The United Kingdom is classified as liberal because, while it scores around the mean for both liberal and socialist types of stratification (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.74), it scores relatively low for decommodification—right between liberal and conservative countries. The United Kingdom is thus a combination of liberal and socialist stratification and liberal/conservative decommodification. Liberalism is, then, the most dominant trait.


Figure 1 plots the expenditures on family allowances for each country (as given by Pampel and Adams, 1992, as % of GDP) against the welfare state type assigned by Esping-Andersen (1990) to each country. Calculating Eta can assess the association between Pampel and Adams’ (1992) expenditures on family allowances and Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state types. Essentially, Eta is the same type of measure as r, except that the mean within categories of the independent variable, rather than a regression equation, is used to form the predicted Y (dependent) score (Loether and McTavish, 1976:250). Here, Eta = .563.

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46 *Eta* is a correlation ratio used to measure association for non-linear relationships (Loether and McTavish, 1976:248). The technique is based upon the idea of predicting the mean of the dependent variable (in this case, family allowance expenditures) within categories of the independent variable (welfare state type). This is in contrast to parametric measures of association, which predict values for the dependent variable from a linear equation involving a given value for the independent variable. Eta is therefore suitable for analyzing the association between a nominal variable (welfare state type) and an interval/ratio level variable (expenditures).
Figure 1

Pampel and Adams' Family Allowance Expenditure By Welfare State Type

\[ \text{Eta}^2 \] indicates the proportionate reduction in error in predicting the Y scores (here, expenditures on family allowances) if category (here, welfare state type) expenditure means, rather than the grand mean expenditure for all countries, are predicted (Loether and McTavish, 1976: 251).\(^{47}\) In other words, the key question concerns the degree to which separating the countries into welfare state regimes helps in accurately predicting the countries' expenditures on family allowances. Here, using Pampel and Adams' numbers for family allowance expenditures, \( \text{Eta}^2 = .32 \). We can expect to reduce prediction error by 32% when using welfare state group averages, rather than the overall expenditure average, to predict expenditures on family allowances.

However, Table 2 illustrates that where expenditures on family services are added to expenditures on family benefits, the importance of different approaches to social

\[^{47}\] That is, the procedure essentially compares prediction errors when using the mean expenditure for all countries to predict each country’s expenditure on the one hand to the errors when using the mean expenditure of each country’s welfare state type to predict each county’s expenditure on the other. The central question is whether the probability of correctly predicting each county’s expenditure is increased (and, conversely, whether the probability of incorrectly predicting each county’s expenditure is decreased) when using a country’s welfare state type group average to predict rather than using the grand average for all countries.
welfare becomes more apparent. Because Pampel and Adams use 1986 data, the table here draws its data from 1985, the nearest year for which all of the data for comparison is available, so that differences cannot be attributed to change over time.

Table 2
1985 Expenditures on Family Cash Benefits and Family Services, and Welfare State Type for 16 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Expenditure (% GDP)</th>
<th>Welfare state Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 2 plots countries' 1985 expenditures on family cash benefits and family services (OECD, 1998) against the welfare state type assigned by Esping-Andersen (1990) to each country. Using this data, which includes expenditures on family services alongside expenditure on family benefits, $Eta = .678$. Thus, the association between welfare state type and expenditure is considerably stronger when expenditures on services are included. Squaring this, we get $Eta^2 = .46$. Thus, we can expect to reduce prediction error by 46% when using welfare state group averages, rather than the overall expenditure average, to predict expenditures on family benefits and services.
Looking at the two bivariate models, then, we can say that welfare state type is a considerably better tool for predicting family-related expenditure when family services expenditures are included in the analysis.

**Figure 2**

OECD Family Expenditure (Including Services) By Welfare State Type

This is partly because of the systematic use of family services within particular approaches to social provision and partly because of the intimate relation between family cash benefit/allowance expenditure and spending on family services. First, countries that offer comprehensive family services tend to be those that are interested in offering universal and more decommodifying family provision. Therefore, it is the social democratic countries that rise the most in the ranking when services are included, and liberal welfare states that gain the least. In Pampel and Adams’ (1992) values for family allowance spending (Table 1), Denmark, a social democratic state, ranks third to last.

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48 For the purposes of the current analysis, “family services” means any service categorized in the OECD Expenditure Database (1998) under section 8.0 *Family Services*. This includes, among other services, formal daycare, household services, Homes for Children, Child Nutrition, At-risk child care, School Meals, etc. Although the names and specific nature of these programs differ from country to country, the working definition of “family services” is all programs funded at the federal level that are in section 8.0 of the database for each country.
well behind liberal United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. This presents a gross misrepresentation of the relative social provision for families Denmark provides, as is evident in Table 2, where the inclusion of family services spending moves Denmark up to the fourth highest spending level, only marginally behind second ranked Austria and third ranked France. A similarly drastic increase in relative spending occurs for Finland and Sweden. For liberal welfare states, no country gains from the inclusion of services, and Canada drops from 9th to 14th. With such an important systematic connection between welfare state type and family services spending, it can be misleading to use only family allowance expenditures as a gauge for the effects of political structure on family policies. Moreover, the intimate connection between spending on family allowances, benefits, and services is crucial. It is possible, and indeed quite likely, that a country that spends large amounts on family services will spend less on family allowances precisely because the existing services mediate the need for allowances.\(^{49}\) On the other hand, liberal countries, which stress a strong connection to the market and commodified labour, spend moderate amounts on allowances specifically to strengthen ties to the market, and exactly because of an aversion to creating and funding large-scale family services.\(^{50}\)

Thus, while using expenditures alone to examine the development of family policies fails to consider the aims and structures of specific family policies, the omission of family services from the analysis can present a systematic inability to evaluate family

\(^{49}\) Although, this is not to say that these countries necessarily spend less on family allowances than countries with low services expenditures. Only that in social democratic states, for example, the relatively large amounts of overall family policy spending is divided over allowance, benefit, and services areas rather than being concentrated in only the allowance and benefits area.

\(^{50}\) Thus, in liberal states, the mere idea of providing support to families is paradigmatically connected to allowances, and overall family policy expenditure is therefore not divided across allowances, benefits, and services.
policy trends within the context of distinct, regime-based approaches to social welfare as well.

Wennemo (1998) analyzes the impact of economic, demographic, and political factors on the structure of family policies in OECD countries. Family policies are operationalized as the proportion of family benefits (income security), tax reductions, and tax allowances in the average industrial wage.\(^{51}\) Her analysis shows that left participation in government, religious parties' participation in government, left votes, votes for religious parties, whether a country has an employment-based family benefit system,\(^{52}\) and whether a country has a system of family cash benefits at all have significant influence on the amount of family benefits in the average industrial wage.\(^{53}\)

Further, Wennemo shows that level of economic development (measured as GDP per Capita), fertility (measured by the gross reproduction rate; that is, the average number of girls born to a woman during her entire fertile period), and the absence of a universal family benefit system influence the proportion of tax allowances in the average industrial wage.\(^{54}\) Specifically, family cash benefits are higher in countries with histories of left participation in government, religious parties' participation in government, high amounts of left votes and religious parties' votes, and in countries that have an employment-based system of family benefits. Tax allowances and deductions, on the other hand, make up a higher proportion of the average industrial wage in countries with higher GDP per capita, higher fertility rates, and where there is no universal system of family benefits.

\(^{51}\) The benefits and tax reductions have been calculated for a family with two (2) pre-school aged children and one parent employed full-time and receiving an average industrial worker's wage. Only economic support that is given on the basis of children being present in the family is included (Wennemo, 1998, p.81).

\(^{52}\) Versus having a universal family benefit system.

\(^{53}\) See p. 87 in Wennemo (1998) for regression coefficients indicating these effects.

\(^{54}\) See p. 88 in Wennemo (1998) for regression coefficients.
Wennemo, 1998:87-90). Wennemo thus concludes that her results support approaches that emphasize the importance of partisan politics in determining the course of social policy development, and that “the level of family support is best predicted by the indicators reflecting the domestic political situation” (1998:91).  

Wennemo’s work, like the work of Pampel and Adams (1992) reflects the connection and relatedness between factors that influence the development of welfare states generally and factors that shape family policy development. There is no conceptual division between explaining family policies and explaining the development of pension, unemployment, and healthcare policy. But while this approach contextualizes family policy development within the formation of welfare states and welfare state regimes, there is a lack of depth in the analysis of actual family policies across the countries. Wennemo (1998) effectively measures the structure of family policies in each country by the proportion of family income that is made up of family cash benefits, tax allowances, and tax deductions (details of her criteria were given above). This is a creative, useful measure that Wennemo argues allows the study of families’ rights to economic support rather than state expenditure. Further, this measure “makes it possible to discriminate between…universal support and different types of means-tested support. It also allows us to study the effect of different types of family tax reductions” (Wennemo, 1998:80-81). However, this measure is, in terms of the analysis it produces, similar to using expenditures. Where using expenditures to represent family policy does not facilitate an understanding of the aims and structures of the actual policies supported by the spending,

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35 Although, Wennemo does state that while this is true, the introduction of family support is also influenced by the rising cost of having children (which is related to industrialization and level of economic development) and issues with decreasing fertility during the 20th century, even if the final form of the emerging support structure is determined by partisan politics (1998, p.91).
using the proportion of family income that comes from various forms of economic support programs does not tell us exactly which family policies have paid the money and why. For example, we cannot know whether the benefit cash received by a family is a benefit paid out after the birth of their second child, maternity leave benefits, parental leave benefits, or a combination of these and other possible policies. It therefore becomes problematic to identify specific differences in the approaches taken by different countries and indeed different welfare state types in dealing with and supporting families with children. For example, the United Kingdom and Sweden are both shown by Wennemo to have given no tax reductions to families in 1985, and to have given out very similar levels of family cash benefits: These benefits made up about 11% of the average wage in the United Kingdom and about 12% of the average wage in Sweden (1998:83). Yet, the very connection between the development of welfare states in general and factors that influence the development of family policies that is the basis for Wennemo’s investigation suggests that the United Kingdom (as a liberal welfare state) and Sweden (as a social democratic welfare state) will have important differences in the way they each support their families with children. Wennemo’s measure does not identify these differences.

Further, like Pampel and Adams (1992), Wennemo (1998) excludes family services from the analysis. Her framework therefore cannot fully explain the influence of her causes on welfare states’ approaches to the welfare of families in general because, as illustrated in the discussion of Pampel and Adams’ (1992) work, family services can mediate the use of cash benefits and tax reductions. Not only may Sweden’s cash benefit payments to families be given under vastly different conditions and with different goals
in mind than the benefits paid to families in the United Kingdom, but the support is also given with an assumption regarding the existence of accessible services which work in conjunction with the benefits. For example, if a well funded, universal daycare service exists, the cash benefits given to a family with preschool-aged children means different things than it would to a family that had to pay for child care out of the cash benefit. Indeed, the levels of cash benefits and tax reductions given to families is related to and affected by the available family services in a particular country.

Partly because of the absence of detailed consideration of the aims and character of specific family policies, and because of the exclusion of family services from the analysis, the different welfare state regimes are not clearly reflected in Wennemo’s depiction of family policy variation across countries. This illustrates the importance of a more full consideration of these aspects for the purpose of usefully contextualizing family policy development within general welfare state discourse. As mentioned earlier, Wennemo’s measure (1998:83, Figure 2) shows the United Kingdom and Sweden to be similar – they both give no tax reductions and their benefits levels are almost identical. Other than the United Kingdom, the liberal welfare states tend to give the lowest levels of cash benefits, but Switzerland, which is a liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990:74), gives family benefit levels similar to those in France, Germany, Italy (all conservative) and Finland (social democratic). Denmark’s heavy reliance on family

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56 Wennemo’s analysis deals with the benefits and tax reduction received by families where one parent stays at home with the children; where services like daycare aren’t of prime importance anyway. But it is important to point out that the consideration of services affects the meaning of cash benefits and tax deductions, and the way countries compare to one another.

57 This is not to say that Wennemo’s work is flawed. Her measure of family benefits and tax reductions from the side of the income of the average family does uniquely allow for comparisons of different types of universal and means-tested family support systems, and she clearly acknowledges the importance of varying family service-based support across countries (see footnote 7, 1998, p.93). Indeed, her measurement approach does not allow for an inclusion of services (how much of a family’s income comes from daycare?).
services (as was illustrated earlier in the discussion of Pampel and Adams' (1992) omission of family service expenditures) is likely the reason for its low level of family benefits as reflected in Wennemo’s measure of family policy. If the example of family service expenditure done earlier is any indication, the consideration of family services would significantly improve Denmark’s family support ranking relative to the other countries.

Overall, then, it is clear that while Pampel and Adams (1992) and Wennemo (1998) view family policy as developing as a part of, and not as fundamentally separated from, other aspects of the welfare state, their analyses exclude crucial aspects of how countries approach the welfare of families. Indeed, the exclusion of family services from the analyses and the use of a primarily expenditure-based operationalization lead to an incomplete analysis of family policy. Further, there arises from this a systematic failure to fully understand family policies as developing within the context of welfare state regimes. An analysis that includes the structure and character of specific family policies, and which includes family services in the analysis, will go beyond the use of expenditure levels alone to quantify family policy and can improve the scope of welfare state regime typologies, deepening the understanding of family policy development across welfare state types.
IV

Gendering Welfare State Discourse: Family Policies as "Gender" Policies

A crucial area of recent development in welfare state regimes theory debates the ability of traditional welfare state research to expose gender-related outcomes. Indeed, feminist scholars have revealed the impact of gender relations on welfare state development, and have argued for a reconceptualization and expansion of the outcomes traditionally examined by welfare state theorists. What has become clear is that gender-relevant social outcomes, such as female labour force participation rates, occupational gender segregation, gender wage gap, the gender division of labour in the home, and poverty rates for male- and female-headed single-parent families, show relevant cross-national variation. Further, these gender-related outcomes appear to be related to the particular systems of social provision espoused by traditional welfare state research (Pierson, 2000).

This work has indeed been a significant and crucial contribution to a more complete portrayal of welfare state policy development. This section illustrates that such work has analyzed or included family policy within the welfare state regimes discourse primarily for its gender stratifying effects. That is, it has often been the case that family policies are narrowly seen as “gender policies”, analyzed from the perspective that they impact primarily upon the gender stratification outcomes of the welfare state. It will be illustrated that family policies have thus been central to work that analyzes the gender stratification implications of the welfare state. Further, it will be shown that systematic attempts to create a welfare state regime typology that accounts for gender as well as class stratification have combined family policy (for its gender implications) with labour
market policies (for their class implications). I maintain that the class stratification implications of family policies have been largely neglected, and a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state typology requires that the class stratification implications of family policy be considered alongside the gender stratification implications of these policies.

Conventional welfare state modeling (that is, the welfare state regimes models) highlights the division and interaction between state and market. But it has been well illustrated that a more complete conceptualization of the division of labour in advanced industrial societies includes the state, the market, and the household (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor, 1993; 1996; Orloff, 1993; 1996; Sainsbury, 1994). By excluding the household as an important part of the labour structure, welfare state development theory has “distorted the ways in which state-market interactions depend on, are shaped by, and in turn reconstitute relationships within households, between household and market, and between household and state” (P. Pierson, 2000:10).

Among others, Ann Orloff has argued that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) concept of decommodification is actually based upon the dependence of paid labourers on familial care giving (which is usually performed by women), and needs to be supplemented with an accounting for the ways in which countries vary with regards to the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household (Orloff, 1993). Indeed, we must pay attention to potential gender differences in access to paid employment, and on women’s need to combine paid work and child care work if we are to analyze systems of social provision, which shape the distribution of life-chances.
The focus on gender issues in welfare state structure and development has, interestingly, not broken down the standard liberal, conservative, and social democratic trichotomy (Esping-Andersen, 1999; P. Pierson, 2000), but has, rather, highlighted important regime-based differences that have been unnoticed in traditional welfare state research.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, the goal has become a broader range of welfare state features (for example, support for caring activities, policies that encourage/discourage wives from engaging in paid work, and increase or decrease such opportunities) and a wider range of social outcomes.

What is crucial here is that attempts to gender the welfare state have almost always stressed the consideration of family policies.\textsuperscript{59} In most cases there is an overall attempt to reconceptualize welfare states to include the underlying effects of gender in welfare state construction as well as the implications of welfare states for women specifically. This has involved analyses of most areas of welfare states. But because of the important influence family policies have on the gender division of labour in the home and overall family structure, which is crucial in shaping the position of women with regards to paid employment and overall economic and social power, family policies have been central to the task of gendering welfare state discourse.

Lewis (1992) proposes an alternative welfare state typology that is based on each country’s adherence to the “male-breadwinner model”. Social policy is seen to be built around the gendered division of household labour, where men are primarily

\textsuperscript{58} Although it should be noted that when attention is paid to a new and different set of criteria for the evaluation and comparison of welfare states, as is the case with gender-centered analyses, important “within regime” differences are bound to become apparent. Indeed, such instances have been illustrated (for example, O’Connor, 1999; Sainsbury, 1999; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, 1999; Orloff, 1993, p.312), and alternative regimes have been proposed (for example, Lewis, 1992; Killkey and Bradshaw, 1999). The point here is that there are significant differences between welfare state regimes with regards to gender implications even if all countries in a given regime are not identical.

\textsuperscript{59} Here, to “gender the welfare state” means to make the welfare state discourse gender-sensitive.
breadwinners, attached to the market, and women perform the caring/homemaking work. Lewis characterizes Britain as a strong male-breadwinner state: "While no effort is now made to stop women working, the assumption is that women will be secondary wage earners and, despite the large numbers of women in paid employment, they tend to be in short part-time, low status work" (1992:165). Indeed, as is also noted by Pierson (1998:781), a key reason for why Lewis sees Britain as a strong male-breadwinner states because of its failure to provide adequate childcare. Thus family policies play a key role in differentiating welfare states’ implications for gender stratification. France is seen by Lewis (1992) as a modified male-breadwinner state, having used family policy to affect the gender division of labour, and Sweden is classified as the weakest male-breadwinner oriented state.

Orloff (1993) points out that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) use of decommodification (that is, the potential for a worker who, normally in a capitalist system is “commodified” in the sense that he/she is dependent on employers and owners of capital for an adequate standard of living, to achieve a decent standard of living independently of market forces) does not account for the fact that for many women excluded from paid labour, becoming commodified (obtaining a position in the paid labourforce) is "potentially emancipatory" (318). Although Orloff points out that this may constitute the exchange of one form of dependence (familial, on the wages of a husband) for another (dependence on an employer), she is admittedly more concerned with “the potential of paid work to provide women with some autonomy vis-à-vis marriage” (1993:318). This brings up several crucial implications for family policies. First, as Orloff notes, the initiative to increase women’s access to paid employment is connected to the development of services such as
daycare and other policies that make the combination of paid employment and family responsibilities easier for women. A further and related implication is that movements designed to create policy to grant women better access to paid labour have focused not on women’s economic independence, but rather on helping women be secondary earners while “continuing to service their husbands” (Orloff, 1993:319). Finally, Esping-Andersen’s notion of decommodification is somewhat inverted with regard to family policy. If maternity leave and benefits in a given country, for example, are relatively lengthy in terms of leave and include relatively high wage replacement rates, then an application of a method similar to Esping-Andersen’s method for calculating decommodification in unemployment benefits (1990:54) would show the country to have a relatively high level of decommodification. However, such policy may actually reflect a national goal of high female labourforce participation – that significant numbers of women in that country are exercising what Orloff (1993) refers to as “the right to be commodified” (318). Clearly, consideration of family policies is central to Orloff’s welfare state dimension of access to paid work. The other main axis for the evaluation of welfare states’ gender stratification implications proposed by Orloff is the capacity for women to form and maintain an autonomous household. Where Esping-Andersen’s (1990) concept of decommodification refers to the freedom of wage earners from compulsion of participating in the market, Orloff’s concept indicates “the ability of those who do most of the domestic and caring work – almost all women – to form and maintain autonomous households, that is, to survive and support their children without having to marry to gain access to breadwinners’ income (1993:319). Family policies, which may

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60 Unemployment benefits as appropriate – in some countries maternity leave is handled under employment insurance policies. The point here would also mathematically hold if the very similar method used for calculating decommodification in pensions (also p.54) were used.
or may not support the traditional gender division of labour, and which provide varying types and levels of support for single-parent families, can again be seen to be a crucial concern for analyses concerned with gender stratification.

O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver (1999) assess the gender stratification implications of welfare states, primarily analyzing policies relating to three major areas. First, the labour market; this includes the terms upon which women and men can gain access to paid work and the services that make such work possible for those with care giving responsibilities, as well as patterns of men’s and women’s employment. Second is policy regarding reproduction; the key here is the regulation of women’s bodies (“body rights”) and the major indicator is abortion legislation. Finally, they analyze state social provision; specifically, the way state provision affects the gender division of labour, marriage and household formation, and child-rearing, as well as how it reflects relations between states, markets, and families. Family policies, specifically, childcare services and maternity and parental leave policies, are key influences facilitating female labourforce participation (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, 1999). Since access to paid employment is a crucial axis for welfare state assessment in the analysis, family policies are a major consideration in O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver’s comparison of welfare states based on gender stratification implications.

Family policy analysis is central to other efforts to recognize the gender stratification implications of various forms of social provision (Meyers, Gornick and Ross, 1999; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 1999). Indeed, family policies are argued to have profound impact on women’s labourforce participation and social and familial
power, and are therefore analyzed for their influence on gender stratification in the context of welfare state regimes.

This does not, however, constitute a complete contextualization of family policies within welfare state regimes theory. Family policies are crucial influences on gender stratification, but the class stratification implications of these policies are not considered in this burgeoning feminist literature. Often, “gender” regimes have been argued to be necessarily separate from class-based welfare regimes (see, for example, Sainsbury, 1994; 1996). But even the work that argues for the necessity of analyzing gender stratification in the context of other social relations such as class and race (for example, Orloff, 1993; O’Connor, 1993; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver, 1999) uses family policy as a part of gender-sensitive dimensions of welfare states to supplement existing indicators of class stratification in welfare states. The class-based implications of family policies are largely neglected.

Walter Korpi argues for, and indeed proposes, a welfare state typology that will “integrate gender and class into a macro-level analysis of different dimensions of inequality and [allow for the examination of] the ways in which these two factors interact with different types of welfare states in the distributive processes” (2000:128). For the consideration of welfare states’ implications for class inequalities, Korpi argues for the use of “ideal types of welfare state institutions as a heuristic tool in attempts to explain and to understand the patterning of income inequalities” (2000:161). Specifically, Korpi uses a typology of social insurance institutions developed earlier (Korpi and Palme, 1998).61

61 This typology was discussed earlier in this paper. When Korpi and Palme (1998) talk about “social insurance institutions”, they use labour market policies (not family policies).
To this, Korpi adds indicators of gender stratification. He argues that “in contemporary Western societies, gender differences in terms of labor force participation constitute a crucial area of gendered agency inequality” (2000:140). He points to the concept of the male breadwinner model, which has been central to gender-based welfare state analysis since the work of Lewis (1992) and which “recognizes the central role of differences in labor force participation for gender inequality” (Korpi, 2000:142).

Thus, Korpi (2000) analyzes social benefits policies based on whether they provide dual-earner support, general family support, or whether they are market-oriented policies. The dual-earner support are policies that support women’s continuous labour force participation, enable men as well as women to combine parenthood with paid work, and attempt to redistribute caring work within the family. General family support are policies that support the nuclear family while having institutional characteristics based on the assumption that, or being neutral to whether or not, wives have the primary responsibility for caring work done within the family and enter the paid workforce only as secondary earners. Finally, market-oriented policies are defined by Korpi (2000) as occurring where none of the above two policy dimensions are well developed. Citizens are provided relatively few claim rights in this area, and these countries are therefore assumed to have chosen to allow market forces to dominate the shaping of gender relations, meaning that individuals must pursue private solutions to the extent that their market resources and family relations allow.

Korpi (2000) operationalizes his measures using three indicators for general family support and four indicators for dual-earner support. For general family support

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62 For his detailed measurement units, justification of their use, and general discussion of the operationalization, see p.139-148 of his paper.)
he uses cash child allowances, family tax benefits, and public day care services for “somewhat older” children (from age 3 to school age).  

For dual-earner support, he uses public daycare services for the youngest children (aged 0-2), paid maternity leave, paid paternity leave, and public home help to the elderly.  

Market oriented policies are defined to occur in countries that score lowest for the other two types of support.

Table 3 shows the ranking of countries on the two measures of policy support orientation. On both dimensions, the lowest scores go to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland, New Zealand, and the United States. These seven countries are therefore classified by Korpi as having a market oriented gender policy model. Sweden, Finland, Denmark; and Norway have the highest measures for dual-earner support. For General family support, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria score highly. Norway scores highly (4th) on both measures, while France and Belgium seem to combine general family support with at least some characteristics of dual-earner support.

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63 Countries are thus defined by Korpi to have higher levels of General Family Support as their levels of cash child allowances (because they are neutral with respect to the labour force participation of the spouses in the family), family tax benefits (because family tax benefits directed to housewives can be expected to encourage homemaking), and public daycare services for somewhat older children (because having daycare services directed mostly at children over the age of two indicates an intention only to complement caring work within the family) rise.

64 For Korpi, the basic question with respect to Dual-Earner Support is “to what extent public policies attempt to shift care work from the unpaid to the paid sector...as well as within the family, thereby making it possible for wives to maintain a major and continuous occupational commitment” (2000:146). Countries are thus defined to have higher levels of Dual-Earner Support as their levels of public daycare services for the youngest children (because having daycare services for children under the age of two indicates an intention to support the continued labourforce participation of mothers), paid maternity leave (because these policies encourage young women to start and to maintain an occupational career while enabling them to have an interlude for the care of infants), paid paternity leave (because such programs are the only available comparable indicators of direct relevance for policies to change caring roles within the nuclear family), and public home help to the elderly (because such programs enable the elderly to maintain their own independent households, thereby decreasing their reliance on care by daughters and daughters-in-law) rise.
Table 3

Countries Ranked According to Levels of General Family Support and Dual-Earner Support 1985-1990 (Korpi, 2000, Table 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Family Support</th>
<th>Dual-Earner Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>United States</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Korpi (2000) then combines these measures with Korpi and Palme’s (1998) social insurance models typology (which is based on pension and unemployment policies). The result is a welfare state model capable of typologizing social inequality based on gender and class across countries (Korpi, 2000, Table 8). In general, most of the market-oriented countries in terms of gender policies are those classified as basic security by Korpi and Palme (1998). Countries scoring highly for measures of general family support tend to be those that are categorized as state corporatist by Korpi and Palme.
(1998). Finally, countries with policies embodying *dual-earner support* tended to be those with *encompassing* class-stratifying social provision.\(^6^5\)

Because Korpi (2000) sets out to use indicators of gender equality that are based on policy support for combining family caring work and labourforce participation, his analysis introduces family policy into welfare state discourse. However, the *class* stratification implications of family policies are not considered, as his measures of class stratification in social provision institutions are based on Korpi and Palme (1998); class stratification is therefore determined by analysis of old-age pensions and sickness cash benefits (Korpi and Palme, 1998:666). For the purpose of more fully contextualizing family policy analysis within welfare state development discourse, it will be important to analyze both the class and the gender stratification implications of family policies.

Just as pensions, unemployment, and sickness policies stratify by gender as well as class, family policies stratify by class as well as gender. Indeed, family policies are not purely influential for gender stratification. They are also important factors influencing the class-based stratification of those who use them; this reflects the class-related heterogeneity of the women whose social power is affected by these policies relative to the power of men, and also the general class-based elements of the welfare state of which family policies are a part. Thus, in order to work towards a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state typology, the class stratification implications of family policy must be considered alongside the gender stratification implications of these policies.

\(^{65}\) For Korpi’s (2000) analysis of exceptions, as well as of instances where national levels of class or gender inequality are not predicted by a country’s social insurance model on either dimension, see p167-171 of his paper.
V

Determining the Class Stratification Implications of Family Policies Within the Context of Welfare State Regimes Discourse

As noted in the previous chapters, there are several key goals underlying the consideration of the class stratification implications of family policies. The first goal here is to take a step towards a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state model. The task is to build upon Korpi’s (2000) operationalization of family policy by considering the class stratification effects of family policies alongside the gender stratification implications illustrated in his work. This will contribute to the overall goal of working towards the eventual consideration of both class and gender stratification for every welfare state policy area.

The second key goal is to provide a family policy model that will be useful to comparative family policy analysts in working towards a better understanding of factors influencing the development of divergent family policy forms, services, and structures. The intent is to create a theoretical connection between family policy forms and structures on the one hand and the development of the welfare state more generally on the other by developing, within the welfare state discourse, a family policy typology that is based on both gender and class stratification. Further work will need to examine more fully the connections between different family policy structures and different welfare state regime histories. The family policy gender/class stratification typology developed here will lay the groundwork for this work and for the contextualization of the study of family policy development within the overall study of welfare states. Further, this allows for an assessment of the conclusion among comparative family policy analysts that family policies are fundamentally different from other areas of the welfare state, and that

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they therefore cannot be analyzed within the theoretical framework of welfare state regimes. If, for example, family policies, based on their implications for class and gender stratification, tend to differ in important ways along welfare state regime lines, then the groundwork is laid for the conceptualization of family policies as developing within the context of welfare state development more generally. Welfare state regimes theory could, in this instance, contextualize countries' approaches to the welfare of families within the framework of national approaches to social welfare in other areas. This will allow for the understanding of the social, political, cultural, institutional, and historical factors underlying the development of family policies to benefit from the understanding of factors underlying the development of divergent welfare state regimes and vice-versa.

In short, a welfare state regimes model could eventually be developed that not only considers social stratification on various axes, but that also incorporates welfare states' responses to family welfare in its analysis of these extant axes of social stratification.

Finally, it will be important to include family policy services as well as cash benefits and tax deductions in the analysis. This is for two main reasons. First, the services aspect of welfare state policy is often excluded from the analysis from the welfare state perspective. Second, the more qualitative nature of comparative family policy theory usually does include services in the analysis. In order for the family policy gender/class stratification model to be relevant to these theorists, services must be considered in the classification process. Moreover, social services are probably the definitive aspect of the Swedish welfare model (Olsen, 1998; 1999). Excluding services

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66 In this case, class and gender.
67 As was illustrated with regard to Pampel and Adams (1992) and Wennemo (1998).
68 Baker (1995), Gauthier (1996), and Kamerman (1995), discussed earlier, are examples of this.
from the analysis thus creates a systematic bias that problematizes the contextualization of national differences within the welfare state regimes framework.69

The Countries

Because Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state regimes typology has been the most influential account of the divergent development of the content and structure of welfare states (Pierson, 1998:778), and has largely become the starting point for research on welfare state development (Pierson, 2000), it will be used here as the welfare state regime typology within which family policy’s stratification implications will be contextualized. Therefore, the countries analyzed should represent each of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state types. According to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) measures for conservative, liberal, and social democratic regime attributes, four of the strongest conservative welfare states exist in Germany, France, Belgium, and Austria. These countries will therefore be included in the analysis. For the same reason, four of the strongest social democratic welfare states, existing in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland, will be analyzed. Finally, Canada, the United States, and Australia, all of which are among the highest scoring for liberal welfare state attributes, will be analyzed. The United Kingdom, which scores moderately for liberal attributes in Esping-Andersen’s analysis, but which is considered an important liberal welfare state in most subsequent analyses of welfare states (for example, O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, 1999; Shaver, 1993-94; Street, 2001; Kangas and Palme, 1998), will also be included. These twelve

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69 This was illustrated earlier with regard to family allowance expenditures across countries.
countries will allow for an analysis of the class stratification implications of family policies across welfare state regimes.\footnote{While having at least four representative countries for each regime type is necessary for examining the potential clustering of family policy types across the regimes, having more countries in the analysis is difficult for an M.A. thesis because of the limited availability of comparable data regarding very specific indicators (characteristics) of family policies.}

**Family Policies and Services**

It would not be realistic to maintain the general definition of family policies used in previous sections throughout an analysis and comparison of 12 nations. The goal here is to develop several indicators of liberal, conservative, and social democratic class stratification using specific aspects of family policies in each country. This is similar to Korpi’s (2000) analysis of the gender stratification implications of family policies, and the class stratification measures developed here will follow the template for measuring class stratification used by Esping-Andersen in his analysis of pension, unemployment, and sickness aspects of the welfare state.

The key areas of family policy that will come under study are maternity and parental leave policies, tax deductions directed at families, and benefit payments directed at the families of government employees and civil servants. The extent of public daycare provision will also be analyzed as a key representative dimension of the social service component of the welfare state. In addition, expenditures on services and benefits for families will be analyzed.

**Developing Indicators of Class Stratification in Family Policies**

The class stratification implications of family policies should be determined in a way that is directly meaningful within the context of existing welfare state class stratification frameworks, and that therefore also responds to the need for a welfare state
typology that includes family policies as more than stratifiers of gender. The indicators will therefore be modeled after the indicators used by Esping-Andersen (1990) to determine the class stratification implications of pension, unemployment, and sickness policies. As in Esping-Andersen’s analysis, specific indicators will be used to determine the degree of liberal, conservative, and social democratic class stratification apparent in each welfare state. In this analysis, indicators will be based on the underlying principles of Esping-Andersen’s conceptualizations of liberal, conservative, and social democratic stratification, but will be built upon relevant aspects of the family policies discussed in the previous section.

Below is a general discussion of the indicators of class stratification that will be applied to family policies and their bases in Esping-Andersen’s measures of class stratification in pension, unemployment, and sickness policy areas. A more detailed description of the indicators, including specific measurement, calculation, and weighting methods, will be developed in the Method section below.

**Indicators of Conservative Class Stratification in Family Policies**

In order to gauge the level of conservative class stratification in pension, unemployment, and sickness policies, Esping-Andersen employs the concepts of corporatism and etatism. He measures corporatism as the number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes, counting only the major schemes (1990:70-71). Etatism is measured as expenditure on pensions to government employees as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For the purpose of determining the level of conservative class stratification in family policies, a measure of corporatism will be the number of
occupationally distinct maternity leave schemes. The greater the number, the higher the degree of corporatism. Etatism can be measured as the level of family benefit expenditures (i.e. family allowances) directed to civil servants and public (government) employees as a percent of GDP. The higher the expenditures directed to government employees, the greater the level of etatism. Finally, considered will be whether there is a special maternity leave scheme for public employees. If there is a special scheme for public employees, this can be seen as a further indicator of etatism. Thus, higher scores for each of these three measures indicates a higher degree of conservative class stratification in family policies.

*Indicators of Social Democratic Class Stratification in Family Policies*

Esping-Andersen measures social democratic class stratification as the average universalism of sickness, unemployment, and pension policies. The underlying principle here is the provision of full rights to benefits based on residency. Social democratic class stratification is further measured as the average benefit equality of pension, sickness, and unemployment policies. For each policy type, benefit equality is measured as the ratio of the guaranteed basic social benefit to the legal maximum benefit possible in the system (1990). For determining the degree of social democratic class stratification in family policies, the comprehensiveness of maternity and parental leave policies will be a crucial indicator. Specifically, the total length of the leaves with pay and the rate of wage replacement will be combined to form one indicator. More comprehensive maternity and parental leave policies indicate social democratic class stratification in that, in similar fashion to pension, sickness and unemployment policies examined by Esping-Andersen
(1990), such leaves serve to decommodify employees. The case of maternity leaves is somewhat unique, as they can be conceived as the opposite (that is, as "commodifiers") in that they encourage and facilitate the employment of women. This has been pointed out in feminist work (for example, Orloff, 1993). While this is true, however, maternity leave policies actually encourage labourforce participation by ensuring that female employees will be decommodified enough that they will be able to maintain an acceptable standard of living independently of market forces during pregnancy and early infant care. It is the decommodifying effect of maternity leave policies, which is similar to the decommodifying effects of sickness, unemployment and pension policies, that allows women to maintain careers and related standards of living even when they become pregnant and are temporarily unable to work. In short, it is the decommodifying impact of maternity leave policies that encourages and allows women, whose life choices are more likely to require a certain degree of decommodification, to join the paid labourforce in larger numbers.

Therefore, the wage replacement rate and length of maternity leaves are good indicators of decommodification, and thus social democratic class stratification in family policies. For the purposes of identifying class stratification, parental leaves can be added to maternity leaves within the same indicator. Korpi (2000) made the crucial distinction between leaves that are specifically for women and leaves such as parental leaves, which are for either a mother or a father, in identifying gender stratification orientation. However, for class stratification the question will be to what degree policy enables parents to take leave to care for children without having to rely solely on private resources. The length of maternity and parental leaves will therefore be added together to
represent the total leave that can be taken to care for new-born children, and the wage replacement rate of these leaves will also be considered.

In addition to the length and wage replacement rate, the length of the waiting period before receiving pay for maternity leave will be examined. Indeed, the decommodifying prowess of a maternity leave policy is enhanced if there is little or no waiting period before receiving the wage replacement that facilitates the relative standard of living independently of pure market forces.

A further indicator will be the degree to which public daycare is universal, as evidenced by the proportion of pre-school aged children (that is, children younger than school age) that are in public daycare. The greater the proportion of eligible children (where “eligible” means all those children of pre-school age) that are in publicly funded daycare, the more universal public daycare is.

Another indicator of social democratic class stratification in family policies will be the degree to which tax deductions are directed to families. Since tax deductions are not as redistributive in nature as benefits (because those who earn more pay more taxes – thus these higher earners have the greatest amount of tax payments and taxable income to deduct). Social democratic class stratification, however, stresses public support for, rather than private responsibility for, expenses associated with child raising. It is an indication of social democratic class stratification when tax dollars are used to ensure the existence of more universally accessible services and longer child-care-related leaves with wage replacement rather than given back to families, especially since it is those with higher incomes that will get the most back, and private resources thus become crucial.

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71 This does assume that taxation is progressive. Although there are regressive characteristics at more extreme levels of income, the taxation structure in each of the countries in this study are generally progressive, especially with regard to the majority of salary-wage earners.
Therefore, less reliance on and use of tax deductions for families will indicate social democratic class stratification.

Finally, expenditures on certain types of family policy areas can exemplify a social democratic approach. Therefore two major types of spending will also be examined and measured. First, since family services (and services in general) are the most universal form of support, expenditure on family services as a percent of GDP will be measured.\(^2\) The higher the expenditure on family services, the higher is the degree of social democratic class stratification in the corresponding family policy. Second, expenditures on family benefits (which include expenditures on family allowances) will be considered. Although, as argued earlier, the use of family services mediates the need for and use of family benefits, it is the case that greater use of benefits is a social democratic characteristic. Therefore even though countries spending greater amounts on services for families may tend to spend slightly less on benefits than they would otherwise need to, it is the use of services and benefit transfers rather than relying more on tax deductions that makes social democratic welfare states distinct from, for example, liberal welfare states. Benefit expenditure must therefore be seen to be an indicator of social democratic class stratification.

\textit{Indicators of Liberal Class Stratification in Family Policies}

Esping-Andersen measures liberal class stratification using three main indicators. First, as the percent of total public expenditure that is used for means-tested poor relief,

\(^2\) Some liberal countries do temper the universality of services by developing a means-tested qualification system. However the service itself is not what is inherently tied to wealth and income. Moreover, spending on any service will be greater when uptake is greater. Therefore higher spending on services is tied to more universal services.
second, as the percent of total pensions that are private, and third, as the percent of total health spending that is private (1990:70). In a sense, then, liberal welfare state orientation can be seen as a polaric opposite to social democratic orientation. Where social democratic orientation stresses public funding and universal access, liberal ideology favours private resources and means-tested access to benefits and services. In this analysis indicators of liberal stratification will be identified as opposing social democratic characteristics. Indeed, the six indicators of social democratic class stratification orientation described above can be inverted to derive indicators of liberal class stratification.

To determine the liberal class stratification in family policies, then, one indicator will be the degree to which daycare is private rather than public. Where a larger proportion of eligible children being in publicly funded daycare is an indicator of social democratic orientation, the opposite (that is, a lower proportion of eligible children being in public daycare) indicates liberal stratification. This addresses both the hypothesized lack of universal family services in liberal welfare states as well as the expectation in liberal regimes that citizens rely on private means to care for their children.

A second indicator of liberal class stratification will be a greater reliance on tax deductions. The greater the reliance on tax deductions, the greater the liberal class stratification. When taxes are given back to families rather than used to ensure the existence of universally accessible family services and lengthier child-care leaves with wage replacement, this emphasizes private resources for caring for children. Moreover, those with higher income (and thus greater amounts of taxable income) benefit the most. A greater use of tax deductions for families, which are less redistributive and which
emphasize the use of private resources to care for children, indicates liberal class stratification.

Third, a lower wage replacement rate and shorter length of maternity and parental leaves indicate liberal class stratification. Indeed, the fewer the total weeks of leave and the lower the pay during the leaves, the less de commodified labour is, and the more families must rely on private resources to care for their families. A fourth indicator of liberal class stratification is related to maternity leave as well. The longer one must wait before receiving wage replacement while on maternity leave, the more one relies on private resources. Therefore, where a shorter waiting period can be associated with social democratic class stratification, a longer waiting period indicates liberal class stratification.

Fifth, while a greater commitment to family services is a social democratic trait, funding fewer services is a liberal characteristic. The more services there are for families, the more family care work is shifted from private to public responsibility. Expenditure on family services is a relatively accurate proxy for the existence of services and of the degree to which the services are universally accessible or, as would be more likely in liberal welfare states, means-tested for eligibility.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, the lower the expenditure on family services, the more liberal the stratification.

Finally, despite the fact that the use of services can mediate the need for (and thus, use of) benefits (such as family allowances), it is nonetheless an indicator of liberal class stratification when benefit payments are low. Although a welfare state that uses universal services extensively is not required to use equally high levels of benefits, liberal

\textsuperscript{73} For, service expenditure will be lower where services are means-tested and therefore are taken up by only a limited part of the population.
welfare states that support few services do not attempt to "fill the void" with higher benefit supports. Benefits are more directly redistributive than tax deductions, and they represent public support for family care. Liberal ideology stresses private resources and therefore lower levels of family benefits indicate liberal stratification. This is, as are all of the above indicators of liberal class stratification in family policy, a polaric opposite to high levels of benefits for families, which indicate social democratic class stratification. Expenditures on family benefits will serve as a proxy for family benefit levels.

Figure 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Class Stratification in Family Policy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Stratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The number of occupationally distinct maternity leave schemes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Family benefit expenditure directed to civil servants and public (government) employees (% GDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Whether there is a special maternity leave scheme for public (government) employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic – Liberal Stratification (Polarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The proportion of pre-school-aged children in publicly-funded daycare (higher = S.D., lower = Liberal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Use of tax allowances/deductions for families (higher = liberal, lower = S.D.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Maternity and parental leave wage replacement rate (as % of regular earning) and length of maternity and parental leaves (in weeks) (higher = S.D., lower = liberal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Length of waiting period (in days) before receiving maternity leave wage replacement pay (higher = liberal, lower = S.D.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Expenditure on family services (as % of GDP) (higher = S.D., lower = liberal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Expenditure on family benefits (as % of GDP) (higher = S.D., lower = liberal).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conceptualizing the Three Types of Class Stratification Relative to One Another

Thus, liberal and social democratic class stratification can be seen as polaric opposites in certain fundamental ways. Within the measurement framework employed in this study, the countries that have higher degrees of social democratic stratification in their family policies will be defined as having lower degrees of liberal stratification and
vice versa. Countries with the highest levels of conservative class stratification in their family policies can be expected not to lead at either end of the liberal – social democratic polarity but rather to tend to locate between strongly liberal and social democratic welfare states. Moreover, it can be expected that the type of class stratification most evident in a welfare state’s family policies will correspond with the type of class stratification identified by Esping-Andersen (1990) for that welfare state’s pension, unemployment, and sickness policies. That is, welfare states identified by Esping-Andersen (1990) as social democratic, for example, are most likely to have relatively strong social democratic class stratification evident in their family policies.

Measuring the Indicators of Class Stratification in Family Policy

With three key indicators of conservative orientation in family policies and six key indicators constructed as liberal – social democratic polarities, there are in total nine key measurements. This section will outline the actual measurement units of each variable, and where applicable, will detail how multiple measurements are combined to create a variable. Following this, the weighting of the measures relative to one another will be discussed, and the method by which they will be combined to generate measurements of the three types of class stratification orientation will be given.

Measuring Indicators of Conservative Class Stratification in Family Policy

The number of occupationally distinct maternity leave schemes will be measured directly. That is, the number of occupationally distinct maternity leave schemes in each country, as given by the Social Security Administration (1999), will be compared across countries. The amount of family-related expenditure directed at civil servants and public
(government) employees will be measured as any expenditure within the *Family Benefits* section (7.0) of the *OECD Expenditure Database* (1998) that is specifically directed to government employees. The spending will be expressed as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each country. Finally, whether or not there is a distinct maternity leave scheme for government employees will be measured as either “yes” or “no”, with “yes” treated as the greater indicator of conservative class stratification. Any distinct maternity leave scheme identified by the Social Security Administration (1999) as being directed to government employees at any level of government will be considered an indication of conservative class stratification.

**Measuring Indicators of Liberal/Social Democratic Class Stratification in Family Policy**

Expenditure on family benefits will be measured as all expenditure in the *Family Benefits* section (7.0) of the *OECD Expenditure Database* (1998) for each country. Expenditure will be expressed as a percentage of the GDP for each country. Expenditure on family services will be measured as all expenditure in the *Family Services* section (8.0) of the *OECD Expenditure Database* (1998). This will also be expressed as a percentage of GDP for each country.

The use of tax deductions for families will be measured as the difference between the after-tax (net) income of an average production worker that is single (as a % of pre-tax (gross) income) and the after-tax income of an average production worker that has a spouse and two children (also as a % of pre-tax income).\(^74\) This will be expressed as a

\(^74\) Assumes a one-earner, two-parent family with two children. This introduces some bias, as single-earner families are rewarded by conservative countries (Korpi, 2000). The results may be different if dual-earner families were examined, but that data is not available for comparison across the countries in this thesis.
percentage of the average production worker's gross income. The higher the net income of the worker with a family is relative to the net income of the worker that is single, the greater is the use of tax allowances and deductions for families.

Maternity and parental leaves will be measured in the form of an index combining wage replacement rate with the length of the leaves. The total length of maternity and parental leaves combined, measured in weeks, will be multiplied by the wage replacement rate for the leaves, which is measured as a percent of regular salary. The product of this will represent the length and payment of maternity and parental leaves for each country. The length of the waiting period before receiving maternity leave wage replacement will be measured as the number of working days (week days) that one must wait before receiving maternity leave pay once leave has begun. Only federal maternity and parental leave policies will be analyzed.

Finally, the proportion of eligible children in publicly funded daycare will be measured as the percent of all pre-school-aged children that are in publicly funded daycare of some kind. Although most research makes a distinction between the daycare attendance of children aged less than three years on the one hand and children aged three to school age on the other (see, for example, Gauthier, 1996; OECD, 1990), these will be combined to create one overall measure for the proportion of children in publicly-funded daycare in each country. Specifically, the proportions of children in each of these two age groups that are in public daycare will be compared across the countries separately.

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75 For example, an average production worker in a given country may have an after-tax income equaling 80% of pre-tax income when they are single, and an after-tax income of 87% of pre-tax income when that worker has a spouse and two children. This would be a difference of 7% of gross income gained in tax relief and allowances for workers with families as opposed to workers who are single.
76 "Average production worker" is not specifically defined (see OECD, 2001:38-39).
77 To be in "publicly funded" daycare is defined as to be enrolled in publicly funded childcare institutions (see Gauthier, 1996:180).
The values for each age group within each country will then be averaged to give a final score for each country that represents the overall proportion of eligible children that are in publicly funded daycare. Averaging the proportion of children aged 0-2 and 3-school age that are in publicly funded daycare to get an overall value for the proportion of all children aged 0-school age that are in daycare assumes that there is roughly the same number of children in each age group in each country. Overall, however, the average of the two proportions gives a good proxy for the degree to which daycare for pre-school-aged children is a public, or conversely a private, responsibility.

_Achieving Measures of Liberal, Social Democratic, and Conservative Class Stratification in Family Policy_

To create meaningful measurements of class stratification orientation in welfare states, the indicators of each stratification type must be responsibly combined. In this study, the nine indicators will be given equal weight. That is, each variable will be given equal influence. This standardization will be achieved by expressing scores as standard z-scores.⁷⁸ Thus, the basis for comparison in each case will be the average score achieved by the 12 countries on any given indicator. Scores for each indicator will be expressed as a number of standard deviations above or below the mean. The result of this is that each country’s values across the indicators can be directly compared, and can be

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⁷⁸ A standard-z score is simply a particular score expressed as standard deviation units (de Vaus, 1996:148). Standard deviation is, in a sense, the average distance between any one score and the overall average score for a variable. Specifically here, then, the idea is to determine for each indicator the mean score for the countries as well as the average distance between that mean and each country’s score. This average distance from the mean, or standard deviation, becomes the unit of measurement. For example, if the mean score on an indicator is 50 and the standard deviation from that mean is 5, then each country’s score can be expressed as how many “5s” above or below the mean (50) a country’s actual score is. A score of 45 would be expressed as −1 (one standard deviation, that is, one “5” below the overall mean). Standard-z scores are calculated by taking a country’s raw score on an indicator, subtracting the average score for that indicator, and dividing the quotient by that indicator’s standard deviation.
added together with equal weight. The three indicators of conservative class stratification, once standardized in this way, will be added up to achieve a final measure of conservative class stratification for each country. The countries will then be ranked based on their levels of conservative class stratification within family policy.

For the six polaric indicators of liberal/social democratic stratification, measurement will also be based on standard-z scores. In four of the six indicators (spending on family benefits and family services, the length/wage replacement rate of maternity and parental leaves, and public provision of daycare), higher scores indicate social democratic class stratification. For these, then, it is easy to total up each country's standard scores to achieve a combined indication of liberal/social democratic class stratification. For the other two indicators (reliance on tax benefits/deductions and length of waiting period for maternity leave wage replacement) however, higher scores indicate liberal class stratification. Therefore it will be necessary to invert each country's scores on these indicators.

This is easily achieved with standard-z scores by reversing the polarity of each score. For example, if a country is one standard deviation below the mean on an indicator (scores -1), then this country’s score will become +1 (that is, one standard deviation above the mean. This works because each indicator is a polarity: if a country is one standard deviation below the mean for social democratic stratification, then that country is by definition one standard deviation above the mean for liberal stratification. In other words, this country is one standard deviation from the mean, on the liberal side of the polarity. Once measures for all indicators are unidirectional (higher is always an indication of social democratic class stratification, and lower is always an indication of
liberal stratification), the standard scores can be added together to achieve overall measures of social democratic/liberal stratification for each country.

It can be expected that countries found to have the greatest degree of conservative class stratification in family policy will tend to position between countries with more strongly liberal and strongly social democratic stratification in their family policy. Moreover, it will be interesting to see the degree to which regime-based differences across countries in pension, unemployment and sickness benefits parallel cross-national differences in the class stratification implications of family policy.

**Multifaceted Implications for Stratification: The Implications of Family Policies for Class and Gender Stratification**

Just as it is insufficient to conceptualize family policies as primarily gender stratifiers, a complete family policy typology, that is, the complete consideration of family policies within the context of welfare state development, should not deal only with the class stratification implications of family policies. As shown earlier, Korpi (2000) defines three types of “gender policy models”, each of which denote a particular format of gender stratification, using criteria based on characteristics of existing family policies in industrialized countries.\(^79\)

Korpi (2000) theoretically connects the gender stratification of family policies in each country to the corresponding class stratification in labour market policies as outlined by Korpi and Palme (1998). Korpi (2000) thus uses the gender stratification of *family policy* to represent the gender implications of the *welfare state* in conjunction with the

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\(^79\) Korpi (2000) used, as indicators of gender stratification, certain characteristics relating to family allowances, family tax benefits, public daycare services, paid maternity leave, paid paternity leave, and public home help to the elderly. In short, these are family-related policies, and are for the most part the same policies that will be examined for their class stratification implications in this thesis.
class stratification of pension and unemployment policies, which represent the class stratification of the welfare state. Table 4 gives the gender stratification type assigned by Korpi (2000) to each of the countries examined in this thesis.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender Stratification Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Market Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Market Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Market Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Market Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Dual Earner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Dual Earner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Dual Earner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Dual Earner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since Korpi’s indicators of gender stratification are all based on family policies, this part of his typology will be used here to represent the gender stratification of family policy rather than, as Korpi used it, to represent the gender stratification of the welfare state. To contextualize within the welfare state discourse a family policy model that reflects both the class and gender stratification implications of family policies, the class stratification implications of family policies determined in this analysis for 12 countries, that is, the type of class stratification most evident in the family policies of each country in this
analysis, will be aligned with the gender stratification types assigned by Korpi (2000). 80 The goal is to achieve a family policy model that is rooted in the discourse of welfare state development and that considers the implications that these policies have for both class and gender stratification.

80 Though future work should not only explore more fully the connections between the development of family policies and the development of other aspects of the welfare state, but also should seek to consider other axes along which family policies (and other policies) stratify and “order” (i.e. race).
VI

The Class and Gender Stratification Implications of Family Policy

The intent of this section is to examine family policy in the 12 countries based on the indicators of conservative, liberal, and social democratic class stratification and to parallel the outcomes of this with the gender stratification implications of these policies. First, I will give the results for each indicator for each country. Following this, I will present the standardized scores\(^1\) and will make an argument regarding which form of class stratification seems most dominant within family policy in each country. In this way, a typology of the class stratification implications of family policies will be developed. I will then parallel the class stratification typology developed here with Korpi’s (2000) gender stratification typology to create a gender and class stratification typology for family policy. Finally, I will discuss the implications of this family policy gender/class stratification typology for the welfare state regimes discourse and for the comparison of national family policies.

National Family Policies Across the Indicators

Tables 5 and 6 give the raw scores for each country on each indicator (for a detailed summary of sources as well as descriptions of how each score was derived, see Appendix A). Because each indicator is scored on a vastly different scale (for example, the number of occupationally distinct maternity leave schemes can be as high as 10, while anything measured as a percent of GDP cannot be higher than 1.00), these scores will be converted into standard z scores.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) That is, the results on each indicator for each country transformed into standard z scores and then added together to derive rankings on each type of stratification, as outlined in the method section.

\(^2\) Details of how each indicator is conceptualized, as well as the method for and necessity of standardizing the final scores, was given in Chapter V.
### Table 5
Raw Scores for Indicators of Conservative Class Stratification in Family Policy for 12 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes</th>
<th>Family Expenditure Directed Exclusively To Gov’t Employees (as % of GDP)</th>
<th>Special Maternity Scheme for Government Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Numerically, “Yes” is scored as 1, while “No” is scored as 0.

### Table 6
Raw Scores for Indicators of Social Democratic and Liberal Class Stratification In Family Policy for 12 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Expenditure on Family Benefits</th>
<th>Expenditure on Family Services</th>
<th>Use of Tax Deductions for Families</th>
<th>Leaves Index</th>
<th>Waiting Days for Leaves Pay</th>
<th>Daycare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>47.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>36.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - This is measured as the difference between the after-tax income of the average production worker that is single and the average production worker that has a spouse and two children, as a proportion of pre-tax income (see previous chapter).

b - The length of maternity and parental leaves combined (in weeks) multiplied by wage replacement rate.

c - The average between the proportion of children aged 0-2 and the proportion of children aged 3-school age that are in public daycare.
A Typology of Class Stratification in Family Policy

If we convert the above figures for each indicator for each country to standard z scores, we can get an indication of each country’s relative position on each measure. Moreover, we can total the values across the indicators to derive final scores for each country for the three types of stratification. Table 7 gives each country’s welfare state type, as designated by Esping-Andersen (1990), as well as the standard scores achieved on each indicator of conservative class stratification. Finally, the countries are ranked by total Conservative (corporatist) class stratification. Without question, France appears to have the strongest levels of Conservative class stratification evident in family policies. It scores well above the mean on each indicator and totals 5.78 standard deviations above the means of the three indicators (thus averaging almost 2 standard deviations above the mean for each indicator). Germany is close behind, totaling 4.37 standard deviations above the means. Austria and Belgium are the only two other countries that are, overall, above the means for the indicators. It is interesting that the four clear leaders in terms of Conservative class stratification in family policy are those that were classified by Esping-Andersen (1990) as Conservative.
## Table 7
Conservative Class Stratification in Family Policies (Standard z Scores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of country</th>
<th>Welfare State Type</th>
<th>Number of Maternity Schemes</th>
<th>Family Exp to Gov't Employees</th>
<th>Maternity Scheme for Gov't Employees</th>
<th>Corporatist class stratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>- .55</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning to the indicators of Liberal/Social Democratic class stratification, we can see again fairly strong reflections of the classifications identified by Esping-Andersen (Table 8, next page). Here, six countries are, overall, above the means of the indicators while six are below. Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, which are all classified as Social Democratic by Esping-Andersen, have the greatest overall indication of Social Democratic class stratification in family policies. France is not too far behind, after which there is a considerable drop. As hypothesized, countries classified as conservative by Esping-Andersen, and which also appear at the top with regard to conservative class stratification in family policy, tend to locate near the middle of the Liberal/Social
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of country</th>
<th>Welfare State Type</th>
<th>Family Benefit Expenditure</th>
<th>Family Services Expenditure</th>
<th>Family Tax Deductions</th>
<th>Mat/Fam Leaves</th>
<th>Waiting Period</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Social Liberal Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Democratic polarity. This is true in terms of ranking as well as overall proximity to the mean scores across the indicators. Finally, the United States and Canada clearly have the greatest indication of Liberal class stratification in family policy. Next is Australia, which, like Canada and the U.S., is classified as Liberal by Esping-Andersen (1990).

Determining Classifications for National Family Policies

While no country is ever a perfect fit for any particular type of stratification in welfare state regime typologies, the goal in creating an heuristic tool for organizing and understanding different national approaches to social welfare is to identify the most apparent type of stratification in each country’s policies. The goal here is, therefore, to identify the most dominant type of class stratification apparent in the family policies of each country. For Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, the case is quite clear. These countries are the clear leaders at the Social Democratic end of the Social Democratic/Liberal polarity (Table 8). Furthermore, these countries are among those countries having the lowest amounts of Conservative class stratification in family policies (Table 7). The dominant type of class stratification in the family policies of these countries is thus Social Democratic. Norway ranks only marginally behind these countries in terms of apparent Social Democratic stratification, and it is only after Norway that there is a more considerable drop. Interestingly, Norway ranks closest to the four clear leaders when it comes to Conservative class stratification. Indeed, outside of those four, Norway is the only country that scores above the mean on an indicator of Conservative stratification. Overall, however, Norway tends to be below the mean on

---

83 That is, of the four countries that total closest to the mean (Belgium, a total of .07 s.d. away from the means; Austria, .31 s.d.; United Kingdom, .34; and France, 1.46 s.d.), three are Conservative. The next (fifth) closest to the mean (Germany) is also Conservative.
indicators of Conservative stratification (a total of 0.69 standard deviations below the means of these indicators) and this, coupled with its relatively high ranking for Social Democratic stratification, suggests that its most apparent type of class stratification in family policy is Social Democratic.

At the other end of the Social Democratic/Liberal polarity, that is, for Liberal stratification, the United States is clearly a leader. The U.S. is well towards the Liberal end of the polarity on each indicator, and in total is 7.38 standard deviations away from the means of these indicators, towards the Liberal end. At the same time, the U.S. shows little in the way of Conservative class stratification in family policy (Table 7), and can therefore be confidently classified as overwhelmingly Liberal in its approach to the welfare of families. Canada is in a similar position, with much evidence of Liberal stratification in family policy. Similarly, Canada shows little evidence of Conservative stratification, and so Liberal stratification is the most apparent in Canada’s family policies. Though its evidence of Liberal class stratification is slightly less than that of the U.S. and Canada, Australia is still clearly at the Liberal end of the polarity. Moreover, there is relatively no evidence of Conservative stratification in Australia’s family policies. The United States, Canada, and Australia, then, can be classified as predominantly Liberal in their approach to the welfare of families.

Looking again at Table 7, it can be seen that France and Germany have by far the most evidence of Conservative stratification in family policies. In the case of France, there is also some evidence of Social Democratic stratification (Table 8). However, France’s total score for Social Democratic stratification is still a good distance behind that of Norway, and Conservative stratification can therefore be seen as the most apparent
in France’s family policy. Germany, on the other hand, shows some evidence of Liberal stratification in its family policies (Table 8). However, across the six indicators of Social Democratic/Liberal stratification, Germany’s total score of 3.47 (on the Liberal side) indicates an average of only 0.58 standard deviations from the mean score for each indicator. Across the three indicators of Conservative stratification, by contrast, Germany’s total score of 4.37 indicates that Germany is an average of 1.46 standard deviations above the mean score for each indicator of Conservative stratification. Though there are some characteristics of Liberal stratification, then, it appears that the most dominant type of class stratification in Germany’s family policies is Conservative.

The only other two countries that are, on average, above the mean for indicators of Conservative stratification are Austria and Belgium (Table 7). Being ranked third and fourth, respectively, these countries show fairly strong evidence of Conservative stratification in family policy. Further, there is a considerable drop to fifth-ranked Norway (1.75 cumulative standard units). Moreover, there is, in a sense, a lack of an alternative classification. Both countries rank near the middle of the Social Democratic/Liberal polarity, and their cumulative standard scores are not far from the mean (centre). With no strong evidence of decisively Liberal or Social Democratic stratification, and with fairly strong relative evidence of Conservative stratification, Austria and Belgium can be classified as predominantly Conservative within family policy.

Finally, the United Kingdom seems to be the most difficult case when it comes to identifying a dominant stratification type. For Conservative stratification (Table 7), the U.K. is tied for the lowest possible score. The question, therefore, is whether the U.K.
should be classified as predominantly Liberal or Social Democratic (Table 8). Overall, the U.K. is 0.34 cumulative standard units from the mean scores for indicators of Social Democratic/Liberal stratification. This is on the Liberal side of the spectrum, but it is relatively distant from the scores characterizing either end of the polarity.\footnote{It is interesting that the U.K. is the only country in this study that was not clearly identified by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) method as being strongly of any particular type of stratification in labour market policies. With regard to both labour market policies and family policies, then, the U.K. has been more difficult to categorize as distinctly Conservative, Liberal, or Social Democratic than the other countries analyzed in this thesis.}

Two things are most noteworthy here. First, the U.K.’s total standard score is on the Liberal side of the polarity; that is, the U.K. can be seen as being below the mean for indicators of Social Democratic stratification, and just above the mean for Liberal ones. In terms of ranking, the U.K. ranks eighth for characteristics of Social Democratic stratification and conversely, fifth for characteristics of Liberal stratification.

Second, it is crucial to note that the strongest indications of Social Democratic stratification in the U.K.’s family policies occur within two indicators. The U.K. ranks between seventh and tenth on the other four indicators. There is evidence of Social Democratic stratification in that there is no waiting period to receive payment while on maternity leave. However, it should be kept in mind that the maternity (and parental) leave to which this applies in the U.K. ranks tenth among these countries, ahead of only the U.S. and Australia, both of which have no wage replacement for these leaves at all. In other words, the lack of a waiting period for receiving maternity leave wage replacement is an indication of Social Democratic class stratification, but when the leave is relatively short and the wage replacement rate is relatively low, the Social Democratic impact of not having to wait is lessened. The other main indication of Social Democratic class stratification in the U.K.’s family policies is that there is relatively little use of tax
deductions for families. Although greater use of tax deductions is a characteristic of Liberal stratification, it is interesting that in the U.K., a lack of tax deductions for families does not seem to indicate a preference for more redistributive forms of family support like benefits and services, as is the case for Sweden and Finland. In other words, while the U.K. does not tend to use tax deductions to support families, it also ranks relatively low (eighth and seventh, respectively – see Table 8) for expenditures on benefits and services for families. Thus, in the case of the U.K., a lack of tax deductions and allowances for families seems to indicate a more Liberal theme – an overall lack of spending on families.

Nonetheless, on the indicators of class stratification in family policies developed here, the U.K. does not appear to be as strongly Liberal in its approach to the welfare of families as other countries; at the same time, however, there is no suggestion that Conservative or Social Democratic stratification outweigh Liberal characteristics. I will therefore classify the United Kingdom as having weak evidence of Liberal stratification in its family policies.

Although future research should include other countries, it appears here that there is strong overall congruence with class stratification classifications given by Esping-Andersen (1990) based on labour market policies (see Table 9).
Table 9

Typology of Class Stratification in Family Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Democratic</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>United Kingdom (weak)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Typology of Class and Gender Stratification in Family Policy

In order to account for how family policy in each country impacts upon the stratification of gender as well as class, the gender stratification portion of Walter Korpi’s (2000) welfare state typology, which is based on family policy, should be laid alongside the class stratification typology developed here.\textsuperscript{85}

Table 10

Class and Gender Stratification in Family Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class Stratification Type</th>
<th>Gender Stratification Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>Dual Earner Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>Dual Earner Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>Dual Earner Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>Dual Earner Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>General Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Market Oriented Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Market Oriented Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Liberal (weak)</td>
<td>Market Oriented Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Market Oriented Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{85} Korpi’s typology has been discussed earlier, in chapters IV and V.
The Implications of Family Policy for Class and Gender Stratification Within the Welfare State Regimes Context

Looking at Table 10, it is quite clear that particular types of class stratification are related to specific types of gender stratification. Indeed, countries with Social Democratic class stratification in their family policies exhibit a *dual-earner support* model for stratifying gender. In the same way, in countries where Conservative and Liberal class stratification are the most apparent in family policies, *general family support* and *market oriented support* models, respectively, are most evident for gender stratification. Moreover, among the countries in this analysis specific gender/class stratification family policy models are characteristic of the different welfare state regime types as identified by Esping-Andersen (1990).

Theoretically, it could be predicted that Social Democratic class stratification may go hand-in-hand with the Dual-Earner Support gender stratification model. For example, lengthy maternity, paternity, and parental leaves with high levels of wage replacement can be seen as indicating an effort towards increased female labourforce participation. Indeed, for Korpi (2000), paid maternity and paternity leaves are indicators of Dual-Earner support with regard to gender stratification (15). It is crucial, however, that such leaves encourage female labourforce participation by, in a sense, decommodifying female labour. That is, women are encouraged to enter the labourforce by the promise that they will be decommodified enough that they can maintain a manageable standard of living independently of pure market forces if they become new parents and therefore cannot work for a time. Dual Earner Support is provided by decommodifying women’s labour. Therefore, lengthy leaves with higher wage replacement rates are indicative of Social Democratic class stratification as well. The same could be said about the availability of
public daycare; the greater the public responsibility for child caretaking, the more support there is for dual-earner families. At the same time a great public responsibility for daycare embodies universal access and public support, both central tenets of Social Democratic class stratification. Thus, there is both a theoretical and (from this) a methodological reason to predict that the Dual-Earner support type of gender stratification will tend to occur alongside Social Democratic class stratification in family policy.

In the same way, the Market Oriented gender stratification model should theoretically tend to occur with Liberal class stratification. Indeed, Market Oriented Support occurs theoretically in countries where evidence of both Dual Earner and General Family Support is the lowest. For Korpi (2000), then, this would occur in countries that are most limited in terms of public daycare, leaves and wage replacement, cash child allowances, and tax benefits that reward a “stay-at-home” spouse. With the exception of tax deductions, which are theoretically a Liberal characteristic with regard to class stratification, having relatively low support in each of these areas is indicative of Liberal class stratification as well as Market Oriented gender stratification. These theoretical connections highlight the need to understand how family policies impact upon gender as well as class stratification.

A key finding in this analysis is that countries identified by Korpi (2000) as adhering to the General Family Support type of gender stratification turned out to be the clear leaders in terms of Conservative class stratification in family policy. This suggests that Conservative class stratification, characterized by the maintenance of occupational
distinctions, may go hand-in-hand with key aspects of gender stratification, insofar as gender is related to “familial occupation”.86

There is also an apparent continuity between the most evident type of class stratification in labour market policies on the one hand and family policies on the other. Although it should be remembered that this thesis uses only the strongest representatives of each of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state regimes, it is significant that the match is virtually identical. Moreover, the apparent relation between class and gender stratification types in family policy suggests that each welfare state regime tends to exhibit a particular model for both class and gender stratification in family policy. Indeed, countries classified as Conservative regarding the class stratification implications of sickness, unemployment and pension policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990) can also be classified as Conservative regarding the class stratification in family policies, and the impact of these policies on gender stratification can be classified as General Family Support (Korpi, 2000). In Social Democratic welfare states, this form of class stratification is likewise evident in family policies as well as labour market policies, and the type of gender stratification most evident is Dual Earner Support. Finally, Liberal welfare states are characterized by Liberal class stratification in labour market and family policies, and by Market Oriented implications for gender stratification.

Thus, the typology of gender and class stratification in family policy developed in this thesis highlights the crucial connections between different axes of stratification outcomes that occur across welfare state regimes. Moreover, this typology takes a step toward a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state model by considering the

86 That is, work distinctions within the family are supported by this family policy model, as are work (occupational) distinctions outside the home.
impact of family policy on class stratification, and by doing so alongside the implications these policies have been demonstrated to have on gender stratification.

Implications for Comparing National Family Policy

Insofar as the family policy gender/class stratification typology developed here lays the groundwork for a welfare state typology that has a family policy component, it can be useful to comparative family policy analysts in working towards a better understanding of the political and historical factors underlying the divergent development of national family policies. The compatibility between class stratification characteristics of labour market policies on the one hand and family policies on the other within each country suggests that family policy can, and should, be analyzed in conjunction with the analyses of other areas of the welfare state. Indeed, types of stratification within national family policies do not seem to cluster in radically different ways than in labour market policies (as is argued by Baker, 1995), and welfare state regimes can now begin to address national approaches to the welfare of families (an inability noted by Gauthier, 1996). The results of this analysis indicate two main ways in which the comparison of national family policies can benefit from seeing family policy as one part of the larger welfare state in each country.

First, the political and historical factors that underlie the development of each welfare state regime can come to be seen as underlying the development of family policy. For example, a strong history of politically dominant Catholicism is related to Conservative class stratification in sickness, unemployment and pension policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Since it appears in this analysis that the same countries classified as
Conservative by Esping-Andersen tend to have clear evidence of Conservative class stratification in family policy, the potential connections between dominant Catholicism and family policy structures becomes crucial for investigation. Another example is that strong labour mobilization and unionization historically underlie Social Democratic class stratification in labour market policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The connections between strong labour movements and family policy structure therefore also become the necessary target for analysis when analyzing differences in national family policies.

Second, the family policy gender/class stratification typology developed in this thesis can serve as a heuristic guide that informs the assessment of differences between family policies across different countries. The regime delineations can help to shape the ways in which differences in national family policy are seen. Indeed, differences between the family policies of two Liberal welfare states have different relative meanings than do similar differences between national family policies existing in different regimes. Moreover, analysts can choose to compare national family policies within one specific regime. Conversely, they can choose to compare family policies across representative countries of each regime type. Differences and similarities discovered in the policies could then be assessed depending on the welfare state types wherein the policies exist. The results of this analysis suggest that the comparative analysis of family policies should be done within the welfare state regimes context.

**Conclusion**

This thesis has attempted to respond to several key theoretical issues. First, I have attempted to respond to the fact that welfare state regimes discourse has largely neglected the class stratification implications of family policy. Indeed, welfare state regimes
models have not included family policies in their process of regime delineation. Further, where feminist work has attempted to sensitize welfare state regimes discourse to the impacts of social policy on gender stratification, family policies have been "brought in", but overwhelmingly for their impact on gender stratification. The family policy gender/class stratification typology developed here lays the groundwork for a step toward a more complete gender/class stratification welfare state typology. Building upon Korpi’s (2000) operationalization of family policy, which focused on implications for gender stratification, I have analyzed the class stratification implications of these policies. This will be helpful to welfare state theorists who seek to eventually include both class and gender stratification import for every welfare state policy area.

Secondly, I have attempted to address the theoretical gap that has existed between the analyses of welfare state regimes on the one hand and the cross-national comparisons of family policy on the other. While the welfare state regimes discourse has not included analyses of the forms and structures of family policies with regard to class stratification implications, comparative analysts of family policy have not viewed welfare state regime characteristics as underlying differences in national family policies. This theoretical gap has largely been self-reproducing; that is, comparative analyses of family policies have not used the heuristic potential of welfare state regimes precisely because the regimes have not had an explicit family policy component. The family policy typology developed in this thesis analyzes family policy forms and structures in the method of the welfare state regimes discourse, and so attempts to work towards the development of a family policy component for welfare state regimes typologies. This will facilitate the contextualization of comparative family policy analysis within the welfare state regimes.
discourse, allowing for family policies to become seen as developing in context with other areas of the welfare state. And indeed, the congruence between national clusters with regard to class stratification in labour market policies on the one hand and family policies on the other indicates that family policies are not somehow fundamentally exempt from their position as part of the welfare state.

Thirdly, I have, on a more finite level, attempted to bridge the gap between welfare state regimes theory and more qualitative national comparisons. The overwhelming exclusion of services from the analysis of social policy across welfare states, apart from being a theoretical omission of great importance, has served to theoretically diminish the usefulness of welfare state regimes typologies for heuristically guiding more detailed, qualitative comparisons of national policies. I have illustrated that omitting services from analysis can introduce systematic bias with regard to welfare state regime types. Moreover, since more qualitative analyses of national family policies do, in general, analyze family services, a heuristic guideline that neglects services can only be less confidently referred to in such work. Although considering family services within the traditional welfare state regimes method is at this point a difficult task due to the difficulties associated with “quantifying” the provision of particular services, \(^\text{87}\) this thesis has included family services within the process of identifying types of class stratification in family policy. This contributes to the welfare state regimes discourse, as social services in all areas of the welfare state should eventually be more deeply considered for their impacts on class and gender stratification. As well, this helps to further close the gap between the regime typologies and the typically more qualitative comparative

\(^{87}\text{Indeed, social services are largely understudied from a quantitative perspective, and, other than with regard to expenditure on services, creativity is required in measuring a service as opposed to a level of benefits, which is already in numeric form.}\)
analysis of family policy; the inclusion of services in the process of regime delineation contributes to the meaningfulness of the emerging regime clusters for analysts that compare family services as well as social benefit policies for families.
Appendix A:
Sources of Information on Each Indicator for Each Country

Sweden

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: One general scheme only (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 0 (No difference) (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 59 weeks, wage replacement rate is 80% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, $59 \times 0.8 = 47.2$.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 55% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

Denmark

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: One general scheme only (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 6.9% (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 28 weeks, wage replacement rate is 100% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 28 x 1.0 = 28.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 67.5% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

Finland

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: One general scheme only (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 0 (No difference) (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 52 weeks, wage replacement rate is 70% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 52 x 0.7 = 36.4.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).
Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 35% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

**Norway**

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 4 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 4.2% (No difference) (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 38 weeks, wage replacement rate is 100% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, $38 \times 1.0 = 38$.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 30% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

**Belgium**

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 3 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0.31 in 1994 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP): 0.13 (OECD, 1998).

Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 11% (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 15 weeks, wage replacement rate is 77% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 15 x 0.77 = 11.6.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 58.5% (Gauthier, 1996:181).

France

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 10 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0.29 in 1995 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: Yes (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP): 0.37 (OECD, 1998).

Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 6.7% (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 16 weeks, wage replacement rate is 100% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 16 x 1.0 = 16.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).
Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 58.5% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

Germany

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 5 (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: Yes (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Expenditures on Family Benefits (%GDP): 0.78 (OECD, 1998).

Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP): 0.78 (OECD, 1998).

Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 21.2% (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 14 weeks, wage replacement rate is 100% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 14 x 1.0 = 14.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (no waiting period) (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 35% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

Canada

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 2 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).
Expenditures on Family Benefits (%GDP): 0.80 (OECD, 1998).

Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP): 0.08 (OECD, 1998).

Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 10.6% (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 30 weeks, wage replacement rate is 55% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 30 x 0.55 = 16.5.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 10 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 9% (Gauthier, 1996: 181).

Austria

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 4 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: Yes (Social Security Administration, 1999).


Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP): 0.49 (OECD, 1998).

Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 5.9% (OECD, 2001).

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88 In Canada’s case, it should be noted that daycare is funded at the provincial level, and that Quebec has by far the greatest provision of public care. While this figure can be used to represent the proportion of preschool-aged children in Canada that are in public daycare when the nation is the unit of analysis, it should still be remembered that the vast majority of these children are concentrated in Quebec.
Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 16 weeks, wage replacement rate is 100% (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, 16 x 1.0 = 16.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: 0 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 23% (Österreichischen Statistisches Zentralamt, 1989).89 It was specified that 2% of children aged 0-2 were in Krippen (public care). Of children aged 3 to school age, 60.6% were in Kindergärten (daycare institutions), 73% of which were in publicly-funded Kindergärten. Thus, 73% of 60.6% equals 44%. With 2% of children aged 0-2 in public care, and 44% of children aged 3-school age in public care, the averaged total for all children, as is calculated for every country, is 23%.

United States

Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes: 2 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP): 0 (OECD, 1998).

Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees: No (Social Security Administration, 1999).

Expenditures on Family Benefits (%GDP): 0.33 (OECD, 1998).

Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP): 0.31 (OECD, 1998).

Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 10.8% (OECD, 2001).

Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Total length is 12 weeks, no federal wage replacement (Marks, 1997). Thus, 12 x 0 = 0.

Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay: Since the U.S. has no federal wage replacement rate for maternity leave, the waiting period for pay is technically infinite. For purposes of calculating meaningful z scores, however, the U.S. will be assigned a value for this variable that is equal to the longest waiting

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89 Thanks and appreciation to Gregg M. Olsen and Walter Korpi for helping me locate this data from Austria.
period in the group of countries, even though this actually undermines the actual meaning of having an infinite waiting period for maternity leave wage replacement.

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): The proportion of pre-school-aged children that are in daycare centers is 8% (age 0-2) and 34% (age 3-4) (Olmsted, 1989:381). The proportion of children in daycare centers that are in publicly-funded centers is 37.3% (age 0-2) and 46.6% (age 3-4) (Kamerman and Kahn, 1981:109). Thus, the proportion of children aged 0-2 that are in publicly-funded daycare centers is 3% (37.3% of the 8% in centers). The proportion of children aged 3-4 that are in publicly-funded daycare is 16% (46.6% of the 34% in centers). The values for the two age groups, 3% and 16%, average to give 9.5%.

**United Kingdom**

**Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes:** One general scheme only (Social Security Administration, 1999).

**Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP):** 0 (OECD, 1998).

**Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees:** No (Social Security Administration, 1999).

**Expenditures on Family Benefits (%GDP):** 1.87 (OECD, 1998).

**Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP):** 0.48 (OECD, 1998).

**Family Tax Deductions (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay):** 1.1% (OECD, 2001).

**Maternity and Parental Leaves (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate):** Total length is 18 weeks, wage replacement rate is 90% for 6 weeks, then the last 12 weeks are paid at a flat rate of 60 £ per week (Social Security Administration, 1999). It is necessary to convert this flat rate benefit, which is given to anyone who is taking the leave from work and is therefore intended as a wage replacement, into a rate of wage replacement. The average weekly wage of a female over the age of 18 employed full-time in the U.K. is 367 £ (Office for National Statistics, 2001). The weekly payment of 60 £ is equivalent to 16% of the average weekly wages of women in the U.K. Thus, I will operationalize the wage replacement rate to be 90% for 6 weeks and 16% for 12 weeks. This, averaged out over the 18 weeks of leave, comes to a wage
replacement rate of 41%. While the U.K.’s maternity leave scheme has been this way for a while (see OECD, 1990:144), Gauthier used a similar method to derive a general wage replacement rate of 45% for the U.K. (1996:174). For purposes of measurement here, this works as \((6 \times 0.9) + (12 \times 0.16) = 7.32\).

**Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay:** 0 (Social Security Administration, 1999).

**Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare** (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 19% (Gauthier, 1996:181).

*Australia*

**Number of Occupationally Distinct Maternity Leave Schemes:** One general scheme only (Social Security Administration, 1999).

**Family Expenditures Directed Exclusively to Government Employees (% GDP):** 0 (OECD, 1998).

**Whether there is a special Maternity Leave Scheme for Government Employees:** No (Social Security Administration, 1999).

**Expenditures on Family Benefits (%GDP):** 2.31 (OECD, 1998).

**Expenditures on Family Services (%GDP):** 0.21 (OECD, 1998).

**Family Tax Deductions** (The difference between the after-tax pay of the average production workers who are single and that of those who have a spouse and two children, given as a percent of gross pay): 2.2% (OECD, 2001).

**Maternity and Parental Leaves** (Total Length in Weeks Multiplied by Wage Replacement Rate): Australia gives only a “maternity allowance” that is means-tested, quite low, and is not connected to the idea of replacing lost wages (Social Security Administration, 1999). Thus, there is no actual wage replacement or defined maternity/parental leaves for the general working women population. For this reason, Australia has been classified as not having any wage replacement for maternity or parental leaves (see OECD, 1990:144). Here, the score given will be 0, as is the case with the U.S., which also has no federal wage replacement for maternity or parental leaves.

**Number of Waiting Days for Maternity Leave Pay:** As is the case with the U.S., which also has no wage replacement for leaves, Australia will be given a score equal to that of the longest waiting period existing in this group of countries.

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90 The U.K. has no parental leave to supplement maternity leave.
even though this slightly underestimates the actual impact of an infinite wait for wage replacement.

Proportion of Pre-School-Aged Children in Publicly-Funded Daycare (averaged between children under 3 and children 3 to school age): 5% (Gauthier, 1996: 181). Australia only has data available for children aged 3 to school age. Therefore, this value will be used to represent all pre-school-aged children in public care. While this urges caution, the figure is extremely low, suggesting that on the one hand, the proportion of children aged 0-2 that are in publicly-funded daycare must be extremely low, and on the other that any overestimate cannot be statistically damaging to the overall comparison across these countries.
Bibliography


