
BY

BRIAN MASSCHAELE

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History (Archival Studies) University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba

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MEMOS AND MINUTES:
ARNOLD HEENEY, THE CABINET WAR COMMITTEE
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CANADIAN CABINET
SECRETARIAT DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

BY

BRIAN MASSCHAELE

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

In March 1940, the duties of the Clerk of the Privy Council were amended to include a secretarial function for cabinet. In the context of cabinet's tradition of in camera proceedings, this was a significant development which was only accepted, at least initially, because of the peculiar circumstances brought on by the Second World War. Simply put, cabinet needed a more efficient system of making and communicating its decisions because of the urgent nature of those decisions. The secretariat was thus established to acquire supporting documentation, create an agenda, maintain minutes and follow up on decisions for the Cabinet War Committee, which for all intents and purposes replaced the cabinet during the war. Arnold Heeney was the first person to occupy this post. Despite initial reservations by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Heeney successfully established a non-partisan secretariat which was based upon a British precedent. Historians have ultimately been the beneficiaries of the decision to record the proceedings of Canada's highest policy-making body. They have been left an invaluable record of committee proceedings which are today available to researchers at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa. Unfortunately, a comprehensive study of the provenance of these records has not yet been done by archivists. It is the archival responsibility to relay provenance information about records to researchers. This ensures their integrity as
evidence for historical research. With these research purposes in mind, this thesis examines one of the most important records creating and controlling institutions in the Canadian government at a formative point in its history: the Cabinet Secretariat, 1940-45.
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I would like to thank Tom Nesmith for his guidance and patience in the editing of this thesis. Credit for conceiving this topic is his. I would also like to thank the staffs at both the Regional Collection at the University of Western Ontario and the Simcoe County Archives for listening to my concerns in the course of this text. Finally, I want to extend my appreciation to the staff of the Government Archives Division of the National Archives of Canada.
INTRODUCTION

When Prime Minister Mackenzie King appointed Arnold Heeney Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet in March 1940, he made a decision that permanently changed the way the federal cabinet conducted its business. Although Canada had had a Clerk of the Privy Council since Confederation, he performed very few secretarial functions for the cabinet. After March 1940, the Privy Council Office (PCO) was not only responsible for drafting and implementing Orders-in-Council, which it had always done, but it was also responsible for drafting an agenda, providing supporting documentation and taking minutes of Cabinet War Committee (CWC) meetings. (For all intents and purposes the CWC performed the decision-making duties on behalf of the full cabinet during the Second World War.) The maintenance of records for both council and cabinet thus became the responsibility of the same office.

Although today it shocks us to think that the highest policy-making body in the land kept few official records of its actions until 1940, in many respects the introduction of cabinet record keeping was a major departure from tradition. It was only accepted, at least initially, because of the peculiar circumstances of war. Simply put, the CWC needed a more efficient system of communicating and implementing its
decisions because of the urgent nature of those decisions. Members of cabinet needed as much information as possible before a meeting so that they could contribute more effectively and make decisions more quickly. They also needed a record of discussions after a meeting to ensure that those decisions were properly implemented.

Historians and other researchers have ultimately been the beneficiaries of the decision to improve cabinet record keeping. CWC records have been used extensively already in a variety of publications and will most likely form the basis of many more. Not only do they record topics of discussion during CWC meetings, but they also contain supporting documentation which helps to provide contextual information on major decisions. In short, they are a rich source of information for anyone attempting to study the Canadian government's wartime policies. When coupled with the fact that they are well organized and thus easy to use, it is no wonder that historians have turned to these documents so often.

Unfortunately, a comprehensive study of how these documents were created has not yet been done. Both Heeney and J. L. Granatstein have outlined the general rationale for the creation of a formal record keeping system for CWC meetings, but they do not examine the procedures behind drafting an agenda, minute or supporting document.¹ A study of this type is especially needed for CWC records for the Second World War,
and indeed cabinet records up to today, because the rationale and procedures behind creating these records had a profound impact on their final form, so much so that one can only fully understand their contents by examining how and why they were created. Each type of document was created to serve a particular administrative purpose within the context of improving committee efficiency during a very difficult time. Consequently, the information in each was crafted to serve a specific purpose. By examining the evolution of the secretariat within the context of cabinet's need for better record keeping, and the duties the new office performed, one is able to gain insights into the types of information contained, and not contained, in its records. This ultimately reinforces their integrity as evidence for historical research, and makes it easier to determine the types of information to expect in each type of document.

Underlying the development of the Canadian Secretariat is a clash of visions between Arnold Heeney and Prime Minister Mackenzie King over the role of the new office. King felt it should be a partisan body which acted as an agent to enhance his power. Heeney felt it should be a non-partisan body which existed to improve the decision-making process of cabinet through better records keeping. Concerns for cabinet solidarity and secrecy coloured much of the debate on the issue. Heeney was ultimately successful in creating a non-partisan secretariat, although the prime minister still
exercised a fair degree of control over the records it produced. Nevertheless, the triumph of Heeney's vision is ultimately manifested in the records that he and his staff produced which, despite being influenced by the prime minister, retain their status as evidence of committee proceedings.

The intellectual foundation of archival administration is rooted in provenance information. In archival terms, provenance is the totality of information about the origins of records. This includes an examination into the originating agency's establishment, its mandate, structure and functions, the uses of its records, the form and structure of these records, and the type of filing system imposed on them. In short, it includes any and all information which helps to establish the context in which a record was created and used. Knowledge of the origins of archived records protects their integrity as evidence for research. It also provides a powerful tool for the retrieval of information for researchers, thereby enabling records to be better utilized. For instance, thorough knowledge of the filing system for a series of records makes it easier to gain access to them. It also helps both archivists and researchers to reconstruct the broader context in which the record exists. After all, records are simply products of the environment that created them. It only makes sense that a fuller understanding of this environment will lead to better archival administration of
The North American archival profession has generally been slow to realize the potential benefits of studies based on provenance. A respect for provenance is, however, an established part of the European tradition of archival scholarship and training. Diplomatics, the study of the properties of records in order to ensure their authenticity, which is a large part of provenance information, has been a refined practice in Europe since the seventeenth century. Leading European and British archivists such as Max Lehmann and Sir Hilary Jenkinson developed guidelines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which stressed the importance of administrative history based on provenance information as a means of bringing evidential integrity to records, guidelines which incidentally are still a key component of European archival education.

In North America, a lot of work has been done to examine changes in structure within organizations and the impact that these changes have had on general administration, but few scholars have extended their studies to include how organizations actually produce records. However, if records are the lifeblood of administration, and ultimately historical research, then more studies of this type are clearly needed. The relatively few examples of provenance-based administrative histories which have appeared in Canada in recent years have all shed important light on records from their respective
organizations. The most notable examples in this regard have been studies of the federal Departments of the Interior and Indian Affairs by archivists Terry Cook and Bill Russell respectively. Their studies use "the power of the principle of provenance" to convey information about a specific group of records which helps to bring a fuller understanding of the information in those records. As Russell points out, the archivist must know the relationship between the structure and organization of an agency and the records that it creates because this is essential in understanding the records themselves. This information gives archivists the ability to direct researchers to records of interest to them and to provide them with a deeper understanding of the meaning of the evidence. A renewed respect for provenance should come as good news to historians, who are increasingly being scrutinized for the reliability of their sources as evidence.

In light of these archival and historical research purposes, then, this thesis examines one of the most important records creating and controlling institutions in the Canadian government at a formative point in its history: the Cabinet Secretariat, 1940-45.

This study has a total of four chapters. The first three deal largely with the evolution and establishment of the Canadian Secretariat. Chapter one examines cabinet record keeping in Britain from 1902 to 1918, and the success the British Secretariat had in improving cabinet administration
during World War I. Chapter two then investigates calls for a similar system in Canada based upon the success of the British model. It also examines the broader context of Canadian cabinet development and how the notion of a secretariat was conceived as a means of improving cabinet administration, which was under mounting criticism. It furthermore provides biographical information on Heeney, who, after much searching, was brought to Ottawa to serve in a secretarial capacity for both the prime minister and the cabinet. Chapter three then examines the reorganization of the cabinet at the outbreak of the Second World War and the structure and mandate of the CWC, which the secretariat was specifically set up to serve. The common thread in the first three chapters, then, is that each helps to establish the context in which the secretariat was created, thus helping to explain many of the duties it eventually performed.

The last chapter engages in a diplomatic analysis of the physical and intellectual properties of committee records. Using contextual information gathered in the first three chapters, it looks into records administration broadly within the Cabinet Secretariat. It looks at how the office received and handled documents of all kinds, how it drafted agenda, and how it drafted, revised and filed minutes and other supporting documentation. The chapter furthermore examines the form and structure of important cabinet documents, such as minutes, and how the procedure behind drafting these documents ultimately
shaped their contents. Examples of documents are analyzed as part of a study of the office's daily administrative functions. This reinforces the archival dimension of this study by demonstrating insights that can be gained into a document's contents by examining its type and use.

This study is limited to the records of the CWC. It was one of a number of cabinet committees established at the outbreak of the war. It was, however, the most prominent committee and its members were the most influential members of the King government. It is nonetheless important to keep this distinction in mind when reading this thesis. Although occasionally the word "cabinet" may be used in place of "Cabinet War Committee", something which Heeney himself often did when discussing his duties, all members of the cabinet rarely met together at the same time during the war. Therefore, although this thesis is about the establishment and functions of the Cabinet Secretariat, the title which was formally assigned to the office, in fact it performed secretarial functions for the CWC during the Second World War and not the cabinet itself. Only towards the end of the war, when the full cabinet began to meet more frequently, did the secretariat's role change.

Ultimately, this study hopes to leave the reader with a keen sense of the importance of administrative history based on provenance information in the care and control of archival records. Although its immediate goal is to relay provenance
information about archival records of the Cabinet War Committee, it can also be used as an example of the importance of conducting a similar study for records of all types. Researching and writing about the history of records, or why, how and by whom they were created, their form and structure, and how they were used must remain a fundamental archival task. Behind every archival record lies the story of its provenance. By telling this story and conveying this information to researchers through devices such as archival descriptions, archivists are able to assure researchers of the integrity of their records. This thesis, then, has both specific and generic applications, which is how the author intended it to be written.
ENDNOTES

1. I refer here specifically to Heeney's *The Things That Are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972) which has a complete chapter on his days as Secretary to the Cabinet and Granatstein's *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982) which examines the office in the chapter entitled "Organization and Politics."


7. This term is taken from David Bearman and Richard Lytle's article "The Power of the Principle of Provenance". This article, and others like it, helped to spark renewed interest in the concept of provenance in North America.


9. Kooyman, Susan, "RAD and the Researcher," *Archivaria* 37 (Spring 1994), p. 105. Kooyman points out that historians' "... writings and conclusions are judged on the quality of
their sources, and thus knowledge of the creation and circumstances of creation is vital - in other words, provenance is vital."
Despite a gap of twenty-four years between the establishment of the British and Canadian Cabinet Secretariats, both were conceived under the same circumstances. Both nations were at war, and both were re-examining the procedures they used to make and implement cabinet decisions in conducting these wars. Neither the British government in 1916 nor the Canadian government in 1940 had firm policies in place to prepare their respective cabinets for deliberations and to ensure that their decisions were communicated to relevant departments after those deliberations. As a result, each nation experienced serious communication problems between cabinet and departments, problems which both could ill afford under the circumstances. To remedy this, both set up a cabinet secretariat with the same core functions of acquiring, drafting and distributing cabinet documents of all kinds, documents which were then used to enhance the decision-making process among cabinet members and other high-ranking officials. Both secretariats were thus established as gate-keepers of information in their respective governments. They became essential links in the creation, care and control of key, and often sensitive, documents.
The Canadian government, of course, benefitted from the British precedent. Many of the duties assigned to the Canadian Cabinet Secretariat were taken from its British counterpart. Indeed, Arnold Heeney engaged in a thorough study of the British secretariat before coming to Ottawa, a study which enabled him to make several demands for the establishment of a similar office in Canada. Given the importance of the British precedent, this thesis too engages in an examination of the British secretariat. It is here that much of the groundwork for the Canadian Cabinet Secretariat was laid.

The idea of a British Cabinet Secretariat has its origins in the record keeping problems of the British military at the beginning of the twentieth century. By 1900, Britain's military was under heavy criticism for its conduct of the Boer War, primarily because it lacked a plan to make better use of its resources during the conflict. Planners defended themselves by pointing out that they were not able to make defence policy adequately because it had been difficult to coordinate the contributions of the various departments of government. While the military established one priority, another department (usually the Treasury) established another. Some in the military pointed to the relationship between a lack of minutes at Defence Committee meetings (made up of the Chiefs of Staff) and the failure of other departments to comprehend their decisions.
In 1902 the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was established in an attempt to bring defence policies into line with those of the government in general. It comprised the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and four additional advisors. It also invited representatives from the Dominions to attend its meetings when matters relating to their defence were discussed. It was the first body to make a concerted effort to keep a record of its proceedings for the benefit of other departments. In 1903 it was assigned a part-time clerk from the Foreign Office who was charged with drafting conclusions from meetings which were then passed on to the King. This duty was strengthened in December of that year when the highly publicized report on military reorganization was tabled by the Esher Committee. This report called for the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the CID. Its proponents argued that such a body would provide continuity in defence planning, especially during periods of government turnover. These recommendations were implemented in May of 1904 with the formal establishment of "The Secretariat" for the CID under the direction of Sir George Clarke.

The CID failed to become a powerful influence within the government. It was viewed as an intrusion on the power of other government departments and it lacked any executive authority. It nonetheless established an important administrative precedent. It demonstrated the importance of
orderly record keeping to the efficient administration of affairs. The Secretariat of the CID was charged with documenting all defence problems brought up in committee discussions from a non-departmental (i.e. non-partisan) angle. It registered the decisions of the committee and its many subcommittees and maintained a personal liaison with departments. It also kept in constant contact with the prime minister and cabinet in order to provide them with pertinent information from the committee. It may not have always received the cooperation of departments, but according to one estimate, at least ninety-five per cent of the CID's business was transacted directly with departments without passing through the cabinet. This can be taken as a sign that the secretariat had a definite impact in breaking the stalemate that had once existed between the military and other departments.

The secretariat carried out its duties in the following manner. Notes for each CID meeting were taken by the secretary and from these notes a set of conclusions was produced. The conclusions were then circulated to all CID members within a 24 hour period. A copy of the conclusions was also maintained in the secretariat's filing system for future reference. Supporting documents and memos exchanged by the committee and departments were kept in five main series. Each series was kept in binders with the titles and dates of each written on the spine in gold lettering for easy reference.
In March 1912, Maurice Hankey took over as Chief Secretary to the CID. His appointment proved to be a watershed in the development of a permanent secretariat for the cabinet. Hankey not only had acquired a reputation for being a worthy administrator in his four years as an Assistant Secretary to the CID (1908-1912), he had also risen to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the British Army which meant that he was well connected, and thus well trusted, in military circles. He promoted the committee's use of the secretariat to achieve more in-depth planning of Britain's defences. These efforts culminated with the creation of a "War Book" which specified actions to be taken by each department and Dominion in the event of war. This task involved an immense amount of cooperation between the committee and departments and demonstrated the importance of having a secretariat to keep track of communications between different parts of the government. In later years, Hankey would call the preparation of this book his greatest achievement.8

The CID continued to function when war broke out in August 1914. However, its influence declined when it became evident that Britain was not going to achieve a quick victory in Europe, despite all of the CID's prewar planning. It was thus relegated to discussing mainly logistical matters. In November 1914, Prime Minister Asquith delegated the job of planning military strategy to the War Council, consisting of thirteen of the most influential members of the military and
senior government departments. It too lacked any executive authority (it was technically a subcommittee of the CID), but due to the stature of its members, any decisions it took were all but assured cabinet approval. Hankey was allowed to take minutes at these meetings. These were kept in the form of a precis of debates, with each speaker's opinion noted. The main record, handwritten by Hankey or an assistant, was not circulated. Instead, "conclusions" were extracted and sent to departments concerned. Oral reports of these meetings were also given to the cabinet. In addition, supporting documents were circulated according to CID practice.

The first two years of the war were tumultuous ones for cabinet members. The war in Europe reached a bloody stalemate and Asquith's government was under mounting criticism. In May 1915, a new coalition cabinet was formed by Asquith's Liberals and the opposition Conservatives. The Dardanelles Committee, set up at the beginning of the war to consider British strategy in the eastern Mediterranean, now occupied centre stage in determining the government's new general strategy. This body was different from the War Council in that it was a formal cabinet committee. Hankey was asked to become secretary for this committee, in addition to continuing his work with the CID. By 1915, he had established a staff to handle relations with other committees. Among his entourage was Colonel E.D. Swinton, who became his understudy for a time. Swinton helped Hankey take minutes, which were drafted
according to the same procedure used by the War Council. He also took care of the administration of the CID. Two other assistants dealt with the general business of the committee and kept Hankey abreast of naval, military and political communications.12

By this point, Hankey had gained the confidence of his peers. He was frequently called upon to comment on policy matters for the Dardanelles Committee. Asquith valued Hankey's opinion highly, primarily because both were in agreement on matters in the eastern Mediterranean13. Thus, when the War Committee was set up to replace the Dardanelles Committee in November 1915, Hankey continued his role as both a trusted advisor and secretary. He was quick to point out, however, that his advice was given on a personal level and was not part of his official duties as committee secretary.14

Although Hankey and his office rose in stature under Asquith's tenure, in many respects the prime minister stood as the biggest impediment to the kind of change that Hankey really wanted. The secretariat had taken several steps closer to serving cabinet by being allowed to serve one of its committees, but it was still a long way from serving cabinet itself. Asquith opposed a secretariat for cabinet. He considered this in conflict with "established constitutional doctrine and practice".15 He argued that a record of cabinet discussions undermined the principle of cabinet solidarity, which held that members of cabinet were to remain united in
their support of decisions being taken by the cabinet, regardless of the divisions that had occurred among members behind closed doors. Anything less than complete support of decisions would be seen as a sign of no confidence in the government, thereby causing its demise. A record of deliberations, he felt, would compromise this solidarity if viewed by the wrong people. It would also jeopardize any state secrets, which by this point in the war were of prime concern.\(^\text{16}\) As it turned out, the solidarity of Asquith's government broke apart anyway. In December 1916, with the British war effort stalled in the mud of the Somme, David Lloyd George formed a new coalition government and assumed the Prime Minister's office. This also proved to be a turning point in the history of the Cabinet Secretariat.

Lloyd George was a pragmatist. Winston Churchill later referred to him as "the greatest master of getting things done and putting things through that I ever knew."\(^\text{17}\) As a result, he was not as concerned with the traditions of cabinet practice as his predecessor. One of his first actions was to abolish the War Committee in favour of the War Cabinet. This was an unprecedented move that involved much constitutional debate. Essentially, the full cabinet was replaced by a five member, non-departmental panel consisting of Lloyd George, Andrew Bonar Law (Conservative party leader), Arthur Henderson (Labour party leader), Lord Milner and Lord Curzon.\(^\text{18}\) This institution had full executive authority, but was free from
the entanglements of inter-departmental competition which impeded previous cabinets. It also enabled other cabinet ministers to focus on administrative matters within their own departments, rather than have to worry about the total war effort.19

Lloyd George appointed Hankey Secretary to the War Cabinet upon becoming prime minister. This move was in keeping with his concern about administrative efficiency. One of the most serious criticisms he had of Asquith's cabinet was that it kept no record of its discussions. As he later commented, "the result was that now and again there was a good deal of doubt as to what Cabinet had actually determined on some particular issue."20 By instituting a formal record keeping system for the War Cabinet, he could compensate for the lack of departmental representation at meetings by sending them a record of proceedings. He could also ensure that there was little confusion over decisions taken at cabinet meetings. Considering the enormous pressure that would be put on a relatively few individuals, the last thing the War Cabinet could afford was to have to reconsider business or re-explain its decisions to departments. Hankey was appointed Secretary to the War Cabinet to avoid all of this.

This appointment must be viewed as a key element in Lloyd George's overall governing strategy. He was trying to bring about a change in the direction of the war at a time when it seemed the conflict was unwinnable. He felt that Britain's
problems lay not with the soldiers on the battlefield, but with an ineffective government that could not properly organize its affairs on the home front. He thus advocated a strong, centralized executive with almost authoritarian power. Hankey as cabinet secretary helped Lloyd George achieve these goals by putting at his disposal information that he and his colleagues needed to make fast and efficient decisions, decisions which could then be quickly executed. The creation of a secretariat was therefore a major achievement which had as much to do with a change in governing philosophy as it did with orderly record keeping.

Hankey's first formal meeting as secretary was on 9 December 1916. A few days later he drafted a set of guidelines, entitled "Rules of Procedure", which established the mandate of the new office. Its duties were:

(1) to record the proceedings of the War Cabinet;

(2) to transmit relevant extracts from the meetings to departments concerned with implementing them or otherwise interested;

(3) to prepare the agenda paper, and to arrange the attendance of ministers not in the War Cabinet and others required to be present for discussion of particular items on the agenda;

(4) to receive papers from departments and circulate them to the War Cabinet and others necessary;

(5) to attend to the correspondence and general secretarial work of the office.

In addition, the office was charged with reporting on the duties of cabinet committees which were set up to look into specific issues. The secretariat had a comprehensive
mandate, especially considering that the British cabinet had never before allowed a secretariat to be involved directly in its affairs. The secretariat was given an immense amount of responsibility for the administration of all aspects of cabinet affairs. As Hankey later pointed out: "It was essential that the War Cabinet was provided regularly with the information on which it could base its deliberations." The duties of the secretariat were drafted with this overriding goal in mind.

Hankey's office was located in 2 Whitehall Gardens, where it remained until 1938. His assistants, initially numbering four, were recruited mainly from liaison officers within the Admiralty, War Office, India Office and Colonial Office. Obtaining officers from senior departments, he felt, enhanced the secretariat's relations with these departments in its quest to obtain information for the cabinet. The most senior of these officers was Thomas Jones, who subsequently became Hankey's Deputy Secretary, a post he held until 1930. By 1917, the number of assistants had risen to ten, each of whom was given the responsibility of maintaining close relations with a specific group of departments. This necessitated the creation of two divisions within the secretariat, the "Civil" and "Military" divisions. Each cabinet or cabinet committee meeting was attended by at least two secretaries from one of the divisions. They recorded deliberations and decisions and indexed them for retrieval in the secretariat's office.
number of clerks, typists and messengers rounded out Hankey's staff.

Each day, Hankey appointed an "officer of the day." On that day, this individual was responsible for all of the record creation and record keeping arrangements for the War Cabinet. Any subsequent changes to documents created that day were also carried out by these individuals. Hankey felt that this system worked better than one which had each officer carry out a specific function. As he later pointed out in his memoirs, it "ensured that all the assistant secretaries were thoroughly conversant with the whole machine,...." Hankey felt confident that business would continue smoothly should he be absent for any particular reason.

The War Cabinet usually met two or three times a day, with the exception of Saturday or Sunday when meetings were rarely held. In preparing for a meeting, the first duty of the secretariat was the agenda. Prior to placing any item on the agenda, Hankey and his staff corresponded with departments to ensure that they had amply discussed and researched each matter before forwarding it to the cabinet for discussion. They also wrote separate letters to ministers asking them if they thought certain items deserved consideration by the cabinet. From these suggestions Hankey compiled a "waiting list" of topics for discussion, which was then forwarded to the prime minister who chose items for the final agenda. Hankey certainly had a lot of influence in
determining the agenda, but Lloyd George decided which issues would be discussed.

The final copy of the agenda was drafted one day prior to the meeting. Two or three of these documents could therefore be drafted on any given day. The agenda contained the time and place of the meeting and the headings of the subjects which were to be discussed. Under each heading was also inserted a list of supporting documents to be circulated on that subject. In issuing the agenda, Hankey and his staff appended to each item an estimate of the time at which each subject would arise. This information was for the benefit of invited officials. Given that there were only five members of the cabinet, ministers and departmental representatives would often be invited to attend in order to comment on specific issues. They would be allowed to stay only for that portion of the meeting in which they were needed. According to Lloyd George, an average of six invited officials would be in attendance, and on controversial issues as many as twenty might appear. Hankey kept a close eye on the rate at which business proceeded during meetings. Moments before an invited official was finished at the meeting, he called a clerk who then notified the next individual to get ready to enter the room. In this way, he ensured that matters were expedited as efficiently as possible while still controlling the overall secrecy of the proceedings.

The agenda was circulated to all members of the War
Cabinet, and to all ministers except in matters of extreme secrecy.\textsuperscript{32} For the benefit of departments, a weekly or bi-weekly list of those items yet to be considered was compiled and forwarded to ministers. This helped them to determine when items were likely to make it to the cabinet table. A log of the memoranda already circulated on that subject was also kept on this list.\textsuperscript{33} Hankey and his staff were very thorough in documenting all correspondence between the secretariat and other parts of the government. This not only made departments more accountable, but it also reassured them that the secretariat was still promoting their items with the cabinet.

Hankey and his staff also ensured that all of the documents pertinent to deliberations had been selected and distributed to those attending the meeting. These documents were usually memoranda or telegrams of one type or another, primarily from the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, India Office and Colonial Office. In most instances, these records would be distributed before the agenda was drafted. With the exception of matters of extreme urgency, a day or two would be allowed to pass before it was placed on the agenda. This ensured that all members and invited officials had time to consider the new information. It also provided ample opportunity for other departments or War Cabinet members to circulate additional information, suggestions or criticisms on the subject.\textsuperscript{34} Normally the distribution of papers took place twice a day. A copy of every document was numbered and kept
at 2 Whitehall Gardens according to the practice used previously by the CID.\textsuperscript{35}

Most of the secretariat's time was taken up with drafting, circulating and editing minutes. An examination of the provenance of these records is especially enlightening. When Lloyd George initially approached Hankey about keeping minutes at cabinet meetings, he did so under the impression that they would be used to communicate decisions to the departments, not to provide a transcript of the meetings.\textsuperscript{36} Although Lloyd George had ushered in a new style of governing, he was not about to undermine such basic parliamentary traditions as cabinet solidarity, particularly when he presided over a coalition government which needed to demonstrate its solidarity as much as possible. Lloyd George felt he could gain administrative efficiency by recording decisions, yet avoid dissention by not recording opinions in the minutes.

Initially, Hankey was the only member of the secretariat allowed to attend War Cabinet meetings. By early 1917, however, he was allowed to have an assistant present with him during discussions, except during top secret meetings. This assistant was changed frequently throughout the meeting, with as many as four different secretaries being present for a time. As each left, Hankey handed him a rough pencil draft of the decisions taken during that time. The exiting secretary then dictated the draft for his portion of the meeting to a
typist. After a meeting ended, Hankey returned to the office to approve the compilation of minutes, following which they were "ronoed" (a contemporary printing method) on a wax sheet and distributed to members of the War Cabinet. Members could request revisions to this draft but it had to be returned to the secretariat within twenty-four hours. Once the revisions had been made, the final copy was printed and given prime ministerial approval. Only the King, the War Cabinet, senior ministers, chiefs of staff and high officials received the full minutes. Others received excerpts of the portions that affected them. These were delivered in locked boxes by the "officer of the day". A copy of the minutes was also maintained in the secretariat's office.

According to Hankey, minutes were to provide a complete record of decisions, plus an indication as to the reasons for those decisions. These comments, however, were to remain strictly anonymous. As one assistant later pointed out: "The one injunction that Hankey burned upon our souls was that a minute must always end with a definite decision.” Maintaining a record of decisions was the main reason behind setting up a secretariat. On one occasion, however, Hankey was criticized for the generic nature of the minutes. Lord Curzon wanted credit for his views on the establishment of an Imperial War Museum. Hankey pointed out to him that this was not possible because his goal in drafting the minutes was to "aim not at giving an accurate account of what everyone said,
but a general synopsis of the expert evidence upon which the Conclusion was based...." In dealing with Curzon, Hankey underscored his desire to keep the minutes useful for the execution of policy only, not to laud the efforts of any particular person. This was in keeping with the secretariat's mandate and in no way threatened the principle of collective responsibility."

The secretariat's duties ended after it communicated decisions to ministers and other government officials. It was then the duty of ministers to instruct their departments in the action to be taken. As will be seen later, this was one area that set the Canadian Cabinet Secretariat apart from its British counterpart. The Canadian office was extremely active in following up decisions. However, Hankey and his staff provided departments with a regular report on the general policy of the government and the progress of the war. Biweekly, they compiled an "Eastern Report" and a "Western Report" which outlined the principal developments in each of these theatres of war. The reports were also sent to the Dominions and received wide circulation within government departments. In this way, the secretariat could maintain the secrecy of key cabinet documents, yet ensure that all parts of the government were aware of the general direction of the government in conducting the war.

An important feature of the secretariat was its non-partisanship. Hankey was responsible for assuring that his
office remained neutral in political debates. The cabinet secretariat was more concerned with the "machinery" of government, or the acquisition, creation and distribution of information which could aid the government in carrying out its decisions. From the outset, Hankey indicated that the secretariat was "neither an Intelligence Department nor a General Staff" and that "Assistant Secretaries are particularly enjoined to bear in mind that it is no part of their duties to do work which pertains to the Departments." Hankey did occasionally engage in policy matters on Lloyd George's behalf, but he did not actively court this duty.

The development of political and policy "ideas" for Lloyd George's benefit was the domain of his own personal secretariat. This body, commonly known as Lloyd George's "Garden Suburb" in reference to its location in the garden of 10 and 11 Downing Street, was given responsibility for providing information and opinions on pressing issues to the War Cabinet. Its chief was W.G.S. Adams, an Oxford professor with a noted reputation in public policy. Ideally, its members were to complement the work of Hankey's staff. They would provide the information and the Cabinet Secretariat would disseminate it. Its affiliations, however, were too closely aligned with the prime minister for Hankey's liking. He thus tried to distance himself from this group. Given that the "Garden Suburb" was disbanded shortly after the war while his office lived on, one can assume that he was fairly
successful at this.47

The Cabinet Secretariat remains a permanent British institution to this day. This status was assured in 1922 when, after a bitter controversy involving Warren Fisher of the Treasury (he accused the secretariat of being a costly agent of prime ministerial power), it was agreed that the secretariat would continue to keep cabinet records, but neither it nor any other secretarial body would be allowed to engage in policy making of any kind for the cabinet.48 Hankey viewed this as a personal triumph because it assured the secretariat's place as a vital cog in the machinery of government, independent from other departments. The decision also assured it political immunity from future accusations of the type levelled by Fisher. Although subtle changes have naturally occurred in the office over the years, its essential functions have remained the same as those established in 1916.49 It is also these early years which were most instrumental in influencing the Canadian decision to establish a similar office.

John Naylor, who has written the definitive history of the British Cabinet Secretariat, convincingly argues that the secretariat was successful in improving the administration of Britain's war effort. The lack of records keeping prior to the establishment of a secretariat had essentially paralyzed the British war effort. Hankey rectified this situation by improving the links of communication between the cabinet and
departments in charge of implementing its decisions. King George V echoed these sentiments shortly after the war, saying that Hankey had contributed more than any other individual in the government to the success of the war effort. It is due to this success that the Canadian government later chose to emulate it under similar circumstances. The story of the genesis of the British Cabinet Secretariat sheds light on its Canadian counterpart because the core functions of the Canadian office were derived from the procedures laid down by Hankey in 1916. Heeney's later insistence that his office remain non-partisan was also borrowed from the British model.

Hankey successfully maintained the integrity of the records under his care by not allowing his own personal biases to filter into them. Lloyd George recognized as much, stating that: "He discharged his very delicate and difficult function with such care, tact, and fairness that I cannot recall any dispute ever arising as to the accuracy of his Minutes or his reports on the actions taken." This was the greatest precedent that Hankey set for Arnold Heeney. Hankey knew that if he allowed his own view points to filter into the records he controlled, he would eventually alienate himself from those he served and destroy the office. His job was to report the facts, not to interpret them. In the final analysis, it was this attribute that protected the office from the winds of political change and assured it its longevity. "The creator of the modern cabinet", as Prime Minister Chamberlain called
Hankey upon his retirement in 1938, had set quite a precedent for Heeney to follow.\textsuperscript{53}
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

4. Ibid., p. 24. Naylor makes the point that departmentalism was an inherent part of government when the CID was established. Consequently, the CID failed because departments viewed the sharing of information as a threat to their ability to make decisions. Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918 (London: Collins, 1978), p. 30. Roskill points out that because the CID was not a committee of cabinet, it lacked the executive power to act unilaterally.


6. Ibid.

7. Roskill, Hankey: Volume I, p. 91. These series were classified as Home Defence, Miscellaneous Subjects, Colonial Defence, Indian Defence and "Very Secret File". In 1912 a "War Book" series was also added.


10. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

11. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, p. 33.


15. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, p. 49.

17. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, p. 49.


19. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, pp. 46-48. The separation between cabinet and departments actually made it easier to establish new departments, which helped to facilitate the growth of departments such as Munitions and Supply.


23. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, p. 49.


26. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, p. 49.


29. NAC, Records of the Privy Council Office, RG 2, series B2 (Central Registry Files), vol. 2, file C-20, part II, J.B. Bickersteth to Arnold Heeney, 26 September 1939. Bickersteth forwarded a memo to Heeney on the British Cabinet Secretariat which he compiled in 1925 at the request of Mackenzie King. This memo contains an excellent description of the duties of the British secretariat. The context in which this memo was compiled will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

30. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, p. 53. Daalder is quoting Lloyd George.
31. Hankey, *Supreme Command: Volume Two*, pp. 582-583. Hankey gives an excellent description of the procedure used to draft an agenda. I have summarized it in this paragraph.

32. Ibid., pp. 583-584.


34. Ibid., p. 584.

35. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 2, file C-20 (part II), Bickersteth to Heeney, 26 September 1939.


38. Ibid., pp. 585-586.

39. Ibid., p. 587. Hankey points out that locking the boxes was the duty of the "officer of the day".

40. Daalder, *Cabinet Reform in Britain*, p. 49. Quoted from L.S. Amery, a former assistant.


42. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol.3, PRO handbook, p. 11. In July 1918, Hankey described the goal of the minutes as "giving a general synopsis of the expert advice on which the conclusion was based, and a general summary of the arguments for and against the decisions taken, preserving so far as possible the principle of collective responsibility."

43. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 2, file C-20 (part II), Bickersteth to Heeney, 26 September 1939.


45. Turner, "Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats," p. 73. Turner is quoting Hankey but is not able to date his source. One must assume that it was uttered after 1916 as Hankey makes reference to the Cabinet Secretariat.


47. Ibid., p. 197.


CHAPTER 2

CANADIAN ORIGINS: THE GENESIS OF A CANADIAN CABINET SECRETARIAT, 1919 - 1938

The establishment of a Canadian Cabinet Secretariat was an evolutionary process, with years often passing between developments. The success of the British model provided much of the impetus for these developments. This is not to say, however, that the Canadian government accepted the British precedent without an examination of its merits and weaknesses. Calls were made for a Canadian Cabinet Secretariat periodically between 1919 and 1938, often as part of a larger debate on improving overall government administration. At no time were damning criticisms levelled against the creation of such an office. Yet agreement on the merits of a secretariat did not immediately translate into action. It was not until Prime Minister Mackenzie King took up the matter in the late 1930s that the office finally took shape. By 1938 King committed himself to creating a secretariat. It was established in 1940.

In 1919 the first concrete proposal for a Cabinet Secretariat was put forth in Canada, fuelled largely by Hankey's success in Britain. The Special Senate Committee on the Machinery of Government, chaired by Senator John Stewart McLennan, was established to look into a variety of matters, the most important of which were methods of administration in
the government. This committee followed up on many of the themes raised in 1912 by the "Report on the Organization of the Public Service of Canada" by Sir George Murray, which also looked at ways of improving the transaction of government business.¹ It was also significantly influenced by the findings of the Haldane Committee on the machinery of government in Great Britain, which re-affirmed the need for the Cabinet Secretariat to supervise the execution of cabinet decisions in that country.² In its report, the committee agreed with assertions raised in the Murray report that members of cabinet in Canada were overburdened with matters of routine administration. Part of the solution, members felt, was to decrease the number of cabinet members. This would create a body which would be able to deliberate much more efficiently, and it would also free up other ministers to take care of less important matters.³

On the topic of a secretariat, McLennan and his colleagues stated that "it seems desirable that the administration abandon, as has been abandoned in the United Kingdom the long established practice of keeping no record of Cabinet proceedings." The report went on to say that "the proper carrying on of business demands a proper organization which would include a staff to prepare for council meetings, expedite business at them, and promptly communicate the decisions in council to those concerned."¹ They proposed a secretariat with the following duties:
(a) The keeping of such notes of Cabinet meetings as seemed desirable to its members.

(b) The preparation of the agenda of meetings for the approval of the Prime Minister.

(c) The preparation and submission to the members of Cabinet, in advance, of such information as may be necessary to the formation of opinion.

(d) The communication to Ministers concerned of decisions of the Cabinet.

(e) The acting as a liaison officer between the Cabinet and Ministerial Committees of the Privy Council, as well as between departments.

(f) The arrangement of, and presence at, interdepartmental conferences.5

The committee also said that this individual should have the standing of a deputy minister and should even be made a member of the Privy Council.6

It is no coincidence that these recommendations closely resembled the duties of the British Cabinet Secretariat. By 1919 Hankey's system had proven its worth as a means of improving government administration and the committee was well aware of that. It is interesting to note, however, that in one key aspect their proposal was very different from the British model. Under their scheme, the secretary would not be a non-partisan individual, but would be active in the formation of policy by sitting on the Privy Council. This divergence from the British model would set the tone for later debates on the office.

Central to the argument of McLennan and his colleagues was the need to differentiate between the affairs of the Privy
Council and the Cabinet. This distinction between these two bodies is worth examining because it underlies many of the subsequent developments towards a Cabinet Secretariat. W.E.D. Halliday, a former Registrar to the Cabinet and noted constitutional expert, summed up the difference between the two bodies in the following manner:

Council is the body established by statute for the purpose of tendering advice to the Crown which, when approved, emerges as a formal instrument, the Order or Minute of Council, having full force and effect in law. Cabinet on the other hand is a body having no legal standing but deriving its authority and functions from unwritten conventions and practice. It is concerned with making policy decisions, which may require submission to Council to implement and the issue of a formal instrument.

The Privy Council therefore has formal authority to recommend the implementation of decisions to the Governor General through Orders in Council. The cabinet, on the other hand, acts as a forum for debate on government policy. Many of its discussions provide context for orders approved by the council, but in and of itself it has no formal executive authority. Indeed, the British North America Act makes no reference to the power of the cabinet. Sections 9 and 11 do, however, spell out the power and duties of the Queen's Privy Council.

This distinction between the council and the cabinet is often confused because both bodies share a common membership, at least among active members. Thus, council and cabinet business can take place during the course of the same meeting. Members of council, however, are appointed for life whereas
cabinet members hold their office only during the governing tenure of their party, or in some cases shorter if the prime minister asks them to step down. In recent times, the full Privy Council has never met and, in fact, has no need to meet. For an order to be approved, it simply needs the approval of a quorum of at least four privy councillors, a number easily obtained from existing cabinet members.

The dual nature of the central executive in Canada has a direct bearing on the establishment of a secretariat. There has always been a secretariat for council in the person of the Clerk of the Privy Council. This individual organized its affairs and was able to gauge its proceedings by those orders which had been deferred or approved during deliberations. Orders served as minutes in a sense because they provided a record of council decisions. The clerk, however, served no function for the cabinet. Before ministers assembled for a meeting in the Privy Council Chambers (located in the East Block of the Parliament Buildings), the clerk placed at the prime minister's chair a set of draft orders which had been prepared for consideration. The clerk withdrew once deliberations began. After the meeting he returned to find the orders divided between the two compartments of a large wooden box at the prime minister's place. Those in the right-hand side had been approved and were to be formally drafted and transmitted to Rideau Hall for the Governor General's signature; those in the left-hand side had been deferred or
rejected. The clerk thus had nothing more than remote contact with the cabinet.

By 1920 there was agreement within the government on the existing defects of the Canadian cabinet system. Two comprehensive reports had already argued convincingly for a change in the status quo. However, no firm steps were immediately taken to put the recommendations of the Murray and McLennan reports into practice. It is known that Prime Minister Mackenzie King experimented with a Parliamentary Under-Secretary for a year in 1921-22, but nothing seems to have come of this experiment. The effects of World War I were finally over, at least from an administrative point of view, and cabinet members did not seem to be in any hurry to reform their procedure in times of peace.

Mackenzie King reintroduced the issue in the House of Commons in April 1927. At that time, he had an item placed in the estimates of the Department of External Affairs to provide for a salary for a Secretary to the Prime Minister at $8,000 annually. In giving his rationale for such an office, King told the House that the work of the prime minister had grown to such an extent that he needed "a business manager to coordinate and supervise the work..., someone who can relieve him to some extent of the work incidental to his office, and who will be in a position to deal, at least in part, with individuals on the Prime Minister's behalf." He pointed out that the appointment he actually had in mind was more for an
"executive assistant" than a secretary. He wanted a personal assistant who would help organize his affairs.14

Members of the Opposition agreed that the work of the prime minister had increased to the point that an assistant of some kind was needed. They did inquire, however, into the nature of the appointment. The estimates stated that the hiring of such an individual would be outside of the purview of the Civil Service Act, which implied that the appointment would be partisan in nature. Did this mean, then, that the individual was to retire when the prime minister left office? To this King replied that it was completely within the prime minister's power to appoint a new assistant upon taking office, although there were obviously advantages to be had in keeping one individual in office for as long as possible.15 At the end of the day, there was general agreement that an appointment for a secretary to the prime minister should be made.16

A month later, King approached Burgon Bickersteth, Warden of Hart House at the University of Toronto, about the possibility of "building up a Cabinet office."17 Bickersteth took several months to consider the offer, including time to discuss the matter in detail with both Hankey and his assistant, Tom Jones. After being told that under King's plan the new "executive assistant" would work in the prime minister's office as both a liaison officer and advisor, Hankey "became very doubtful over the whole proposal."18 He
clearly objected to the fact that this appointment would be partisan in nature. After conducting further research into the issue, the result of which was a memo forwarded to the prime minister on the functions of the British Cabinet Secretariat (perhaps in hopes of educating the prime minister for future changes), Bickersteth declined King's offer.\textsuperscript{19}

It is clear that King initially misunderstood the functions of the British office. This became obvious during the course of his Commons speech. He explained that a post similar to Hankey's was "more or less the position that [was] required here [in Canada]." He went on to reaffirm, however, "that whoever is appointed will retire with the Prime Minister unless his successor wishes to retain him."\textsuperscript{20} These remarks reveal a significant contradiction in his thinking about a secretariat. King believed he was proposing an office similar to Hankey's. His proposal clearly differed in one crucial aspect -- the issue of partisanship. After the crisis of 1922, Hankey was reassured that his office would be a permanent institution above partisan politics. This was not the case in King's proposal. If it is true that King patterned his proposal on the British model, then it seems that he had some misconceptions about Hankey's duties. Hankey served cabinet and as an extension of this the prime minister. King's appointee would serve the prime minister and as an extension of this cabinet. This misconception demonstrates the lack of progress that had been made towards a secretariat
up to 1927, even though the idea itself had been discussed in Canada for almost eight years, and had been successful in Britain for an even longer period.

No further developments occurred after Bickersteth's rejection of the offer. In fact, the issue again faded into political obscurity as the Depression took hold. The next development did not take place until 1933, and even then its impact was not immediate. Norman Rogers wrote a series of articles for The Canadian Bar Review on the introduction and subsequent reform of cabinet government in Canada. The significance of these articles arises as much from the author as the text. In 1933 Rogers was a professor of political economy at Queen's University. He had served as an aide to the prime minister from 1926 to 1930 and would later be elected to Parliament, eventually becoming a powerful member of King's wartime cabinet as both minister of labour and minister of national defence until his death in June 1940.

In one of the articles, Rogers endorsed the idea of having a cabinet secretariat with the same basic functions as those laid out by the Senate Committee on the Machinery of Government. He too agreed that cabinet was overburdened with the routine of administration. While he offered no strategies to help establish a secretariat (he simply repeated much of what had already been known on the subject), his very support for the idea nonetheless has to be seen as significant. Rogers was an important member of what Doug Owram has called
"the government generation" - an elite group of scholars who introduced major reforms in the federal government on virtually all fronts, especially during the Depression. Out of the efforts of men such as Rogers, W.C. Clark and O.D. Skelton came the Bank of Canada, unemployment insurance and a system of transfer payments to the provinces. Rogers' endorsement of a cabinet secretariat can be seen as a sign that the idea of a secretariat had gained intellectual clout among those who would subsequently wield power.24

Prime Minister Bennett was approached by Bickersteth about the idea of a non-partisan secretariat in 1934. Bennett rejected it outright, however, telling Bickersteth that the time was not right for such an experiment.25 In 1935 King returned to power and once again took up the cause of appointing a personal assistant of some kind to alleviate the everyday strains of office. Late in the year, he became extremely distressed about his workload, almost to the point of needing to see his doctor. "I can no more face Parliament," he said, "with the little thought that has been possible thus far in the way of preparation of its work, plus the great burden that is still on my shoulders in the way of arrears, than I can fly. I shall be entirely crushed if help does not come very soon.... I can only pray that, with the New Year, will come from some unseen source the help of which I am in so great need."26 Governor-General Tweedsmuir made several suggestions to ease King's concerns, the most notable of which
was an endorsement of the plan for an executive assistant who
would act as both a liaison with government departments and
intelligence officer.\textsuperscript{27}

In 1936 King met Arnold Heeney and immediately expressed
an interest in bringing the young lawyer into government
service.\textsuperscript{28} King was a close friend of Heeney's father and
through this relationship King heard of Heeney's already
impressive achievements. Heeney initially attended the
University of Manitoba. In 1922 he was awarded a Rhodes
Scholarship to Oxford where he studied modern history. While
at Oxford, he forged close relationships with such notable men
as Norman Robertson and Graham Spry.\textsuperscript{29} He took an interest in
the affairs of British government and had an occasion to hear
Hankey speak on "Cabinet procedure", a lecture which he
described as "extraordinarily good and first hand."\textsuperscript{30} He
returned to Canada to study law at McGill. Upon his graduation
in 1931, he joined a prestigious Montreal law firm where he
had a successful practice. He was very active in the Montreal
Board of Trade, and for a time was counsel and secretary to
the Quebec Protestant Education Survey, which was set up to
look into the province's minority educational system.\textsuperscript{31} Heeney
was just thirty-four years old when he met King.\textsuperscript{32}

Over the next two summers, King frequently socialized
with both Heeney and his father. On one occasion in 1937,
King invited Heeney to dine alone with him at Laurier House.
During the course of their conversation, Heeney responded
positively when asked if he had ever considered a career in the public service. From this point on, inspired by the close relationship with Heeney's father, King actively sought him out for the new position of "Principal Secretary". In July 1938 the two Heeneys spent an afternoon with the prime minister at Kingsmere. After dinner, King mentioned to them that he wished to find someone who could perform in Canada a role similar to that of Maurice Hankey. Arnold Heeney initially did not realize the significance of King's overtures. As he later stated, "at that time Hankey was to me little more than a name, his place in the British scheme of things almost totally unknown." This situation quickly changed.

Heeney received a letter dated 13 July 1938 from King asking him if he would be interested in the position of Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. He later observed: "It was this letter that was to effect a dramatic change on my life." King outlined the basic duties of the position as general supervision of the work of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) with a view to acting as a liaison between the office and other departments. The office would have powers similar to those of a deputy head of a government department. In outlining the prestige of such a position, King compared it to that of Hankey's, saying that "where work is really important, it is the man who makes the position, not the position which makes the man."
Heeney was flattered with the offer, but did not immediately accept it. He instead decided to study the proposal in comparison with the British model. He also consulted his father. On July 26, he drafted a memorandum for the prime minister entitled "The Nature of the Position and its Functions" in which he asked a series of questions about the post. The first of these simply asked: "Would the post be political?" He went on to say that in his opinion the post should be non-partisan: "If the occupant can, after a brief apprenticeship, perform the function of a secretary to the Cabinet, divorced from party politics, his office will tend in time to be regarded as an integral part of the permanent public service.... He should therefore have no association with party whips, caucuses or officials of national or local party organizations." Most of the other questions in the memo asked for clarification of duties, all of which seemed to be aimed at finding out the extent to which the prime minister wanted to emulate the British model.

Heeney detected very early on that there were major differences between King's proposal and the duties performed by Hankey in Britain. As he later observed, King's notion of the British secretariat was "vague and pretty far from the facts". He went on to say that King "had little abiding interest in the administrative process, in the machinery of government as such... his primary, if unacknowledged, objective [in finding a secretary] was to enhance his
authority as Prime Minister by strengthening the means of its exercise." Heeney therefore immediately sought assurances that at some point, after a grace period in which he would prove his worth to the prime minister, he would become a full, non-partisan cabinet secretary like Hankey, or at least would obtain a position of similar prestige in the government. He did not want to align himself too closely with the Liberal party so early in his career in the public service. These concerns were laid to rest in August when, during a meeting with King and O.D. Skelton, Heeney was told that he would be made part of the permanent civil service prior to the calling of the next general election, either as Clerk of the Privy Council or First Secretary in the Department of External Affairs.

In late August, Heeney finally accepted the post of Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. In many ways, he accepted it on the condition that it would lead to much bigger things. His foot was in the door and he could now hope to effect change from within. Although he sought nothing short of what Hankey had established in Britain, a permanent Cabinet Secretariat, he was willing to work with the prime minister to convince him of the value of such a body. His acceptance letter boldly stated his ambitions in terms befitting his legal experience:

It will be the intention to develop in Canada the kind of post formerly held in the United Kingdom by Sir Maurice Hankey namely that of Secretary to the Cabinet. While it is understood that such a position could not
be brought into being all at once, this objective will be kept in mind and in the event of my proving suitable, the post will be created and I will be appointed. 41

Although King agreed to the terms of the acceptance letter, he reminded Heeney that the creation of a secretariat would also have to have the full support of the cabinet, which had not yet even discussed the matter, let alone voiced its approval. 42 After nearly two months of negotiations, Heeney was formally appointed to the post of Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister in early September. He began his duties on 1 October 1938 at a salary of $7,000 per year. News of his appointment was praised by several Canadian newspapers, including The Winnipeg Free Press and The Ottawa Citizen. 43

Heeney's basic duties were to supervise the work of the PMO, prepare the prime minister for cabinet meetings by briefing him on subjects for discussion, and ensure that decisions were carried out by departments on the prime minister's behalf. 44 He was not allowed, however, to attend cabinet meetings at first, nor was he responsible for ensuring that there was a record of its proceedings. Nevertheless, his appointment has to be seen as an impressive start, especially considering that King had acquired a reputation for being averse to schedules and formal organization. 45 From this point on, there would be no turning back on the road towards the establishment of a secretariat. Heeney quickly proved his value to both the prime minister and cabinet. As war
approached, they could not afford to do without him.

The pace of developments between 1919 and 1938 towards a secretariat could hardly be described as torrid. Yet this in itself can be seen as an indication of the importance of the issue. What was being proposed could not be taken lightly and, indeed, needed time to evolve. As the British precedent demonstrated, establishing a secretariat involved more than just simply preparing agenda and taking minutes of cabinet meetings. It involved traditions such as cabinet solidarity and secrecy which, when tampered with, usually evoked a considerable amount of debate. The McLennan Report in 1919 started the ball rolling towards some kind of reform of cabinet procedure. Subsequent developments throughout the 1920s and 1930s kept the issue alive. The most significant step, however, was taken when Arnold Heeney was brought to Ottawa as Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1938. Heeney led a successful charge over the next two years towards the establishment of a full Cabinet Secretariat.
ENDNOTES

1. Canada. Parliament. Sessional Papers, Vol. XLVII (1913), Sessional Paper No. 57a, "Report on the Organization of the Public Service of Canada". The first section of this report, entitled "The Methods Employed in the Transaction of Public Business" (pp. 7-10), made several recommendations to improve the administration of cabinet which, in the opinion of Murray, was being burdened by too much "routine business". This report did not, however, make specific recommendations for a secretariat which is why it does not receive more attention here.


4. Ibid. p. 344.

5. Ibid., pp. 344-345.

6. Ibid., p. 345.


9. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol. 3, file "Cabinet Government in Canada - Clippings and Miscellaneous Articles." This information is taken from rough notes prepared by Heeney for his 1946 article "Cabinet Government in Canada."

10. Ibid.

11. Arnold Heeney, The Things that Are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 75. Heeney outlines the complete procedure
before he was appointed Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet. In his description, he uses both the terms "minutes" and "orders" to describe documents drafted and compiled by the clerk. In his 1946 article "Cabinet Government in Canada" he maintains on page 285 that the difference between these two is one of form rather than substance. For simplicity sake, then, I have used only the term "order" to avoid any confusion with what will be discussed later as "minutes".


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 2458-2459.

16. William Lyon Mackenzie King, The Mackenzie King Diaries [microfiche]: The Complete Manuscript with Accompanying Typewritten Transcription and Other Typewritten Journals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973-82), 13 April 1927. In commenting on this particular item, King expressed relief and surprise that he got through everything in the estimates smoothly, especially the $8,000 he requested for an executive assistant.

17. Queens University Archives (hereafter QUA), John Buchan Papers (First Baron Tweedsmuir), Collection 2110, vol. 7, General Correspondence, Bickersteth to Tweedsmuir, 4 January 1936. Bickersteth tells Tweedsmuir of the offer King made to him in May 1927.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


22. Heeney, The Things that are Caesar's, pp. 43, 59.


25. QUA, Buchan Papers, vol.7, Bickersteth to Tweedsmuir, 4 January 1936. No explanation is given as to why Bennett rejected the idea. Perhaps he felt the implications for cabinet solidarity were too severe.


27. QUA, Buchan Papers, vol. 7, Tweedsmuir to King, 31 December 1935.

28. King, Diary, 10 December 1936. After having dinner with Heeney, King said that he had "a great mind to bring him into [his] own office."


30. Ibid., p. 193.


32. Heeney was born on 5 April 1902.

33. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 42.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol.1, King to Heeney, 13 July 1938.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., Heeney to King, 26 July 1938.


40. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 46.

41. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol. 1, memo, Heeney to King, 24 August 1938.

42. Ibid., memo, King to Heeney, 25 August 1938.

44. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, pp. 198-199.

45. The editorial in The Ottawa Citizen of 6 September 1938 said of King; "Former secretaries say he is hopeless. The Prime Minister's day cannot be organized either to begin or end at any set hour."
CHAPTER 3

THE OFFICE TAKES SHAPE: THE CABINET SECRETARIAT AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

By 1938 the mood in Ottawa was changing from peace-time complacency to preparation for war. Although many remained optimistic that conflict in Europe could be averted, the government began to prepare the nation and its defences for the strains of war. Part of this preparation involved an examination, and ultimately a reorganization, of the way cabinet conducted its business in order to deal with the increased urgency and volume of its work. Administrative reforms were put into place to ensure that decisions were made as quickly and as efficiently as possible. A key part of these reforms was the establishment of a cabinet secretariat. The pressures of war made such an office necessary, just as World War I had made a secretariat necessary in Britain.

When Arnold Heeney arrived in Ottawa in October 1938, he immediately found himself at the centre of many important policy discussions. Despite shouldering tremendous responsibility as principal secretary, he was quite pleased with his new post. In addition to his main duty of preparing the prime minister for cabinet meetings, he was also involved in making statements to the press and drafting correspondence to departments and provincial governments on behalf of the prime minister. He even prepared many of King's public
addresses and arranged personal meetings.¹ In carrying out these duties, he worked closely with J.W. Pickersgill. Pickersgill had taken a position as an assistant secretary in the PMO several months earlier and had quickly gained the confidence of the prime minister.² Both would subsequently use their experience in the PMO to launch long and successful careers in the public service. They would also forge a friendship that would last the rest of Heeney's life.³

Although Heeney's position as principal secretary required him to play an active role in King's daily affairs, he was nevertheless quick to remind the prime minister that this role extended only to official government business, not to the affairs of the Liberal party. He remained steadfast in his refusal to take part in any of the party's functions. King was unwilling to accept this and frequently pressured Heeney to attend various Liberal gatherings, all the while forgetting his promise to respect Heeney's wish to be non-partisan, a wish which was implicitly agreed upon when the post was created. This grew to be a source of tension between the two. On one occasion during the summer of 1939, Heeney was asked to attend a dinner in Toronto to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of King's leadership of the Liberal party. He promptly declined the invitation, which deeply disappointed the prime minister.⁴ Heeney's rationale was simple. His main goal was to establish a secretariat like Hankey's. He therefore did not want to be seen at a high-
profile Liberal event that was sure to attract the notice of non-Liberals. He did not want to rest his hopes for a secretariat upon the fortunes of one particular party. He thus stayed away from political socializing.

This evasion of political activity became an impediment to Heeney's ambitions. King's enthusiasm for a secretariat waned when he realized that it could not be used for political advantage. Heeney took King's change of heart as a cause for great concern. He thus launched a campaign early that summer to remind the prime minister of his promise to appoint him to the permanent civil service, ideally as Clerk of the Privy Council, before the next general election. In June 1939 King discussed the issue with Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice and his most influential colleague. Despite failing to garner his full support -- Lapointe seems to have objected to Heeney's appointment because he wished to see a francophone in the post -- King nonetheless made it clear that he was going to honour his commitment to Heeney and appoint him clerk.5

King did not take any concrete steps to establish a secretariat after his meeting with Lapointe. The prime minister was still having reservations about Heeney's reluctance to partake in party affairs. King was particularly frustrated with Heeney's refusal to take part in the next election campaign as an advisor, which King was planning to call the next spring.6 Heeney too was growing frustrated with the situation. He wanted more than assurances that he would
be appointed to the senior civil service at some point. He wanted tangible proof that the prime minister was also willing to work with him to establish a secretariat like Hankey's. This issue came to a head in late August 1939 in a memo from Heeney and subsequent meeting between the two at Kingsmere. Pickersgill later described the meeting in the following manner:

Heeney "invoked the written exchange between them, [the exchange that took place in August 1938] which clearly showed (to Heeney but not to Mackenzie King) that his position as principal secretary was to be official and non-partisan and was to lead eventually to appointment as secretary to the cabinet if such a position was established. The prime minister left no doubt that he resented Heeney's attitude but he realized he had to accept his decision or lose him altogether."

This was certainly the low point of their relationship and was by no means typical of an otherwise strong friendship. Disagreements such as these do demonstrate, however, that King still had a long way to go to recognize the potential value of a non-partisan cabinet secretariat. Fortunately for Heeney, King's attitude quickly changed when war broke out in September 1939. The need for more formal cabinet records creation and records keeping procedures became clearer amid the increased urgency of much of its business.

As early as August 1936, there were signs that the very structure of cabinet was beginning to change. In response to calls for a review of Canada's defence policies, which were felt by some to be inadequate in the face of growing international tension, King established a sub-committee of the
Privy Council called the Canadian Defence Committee. This committee was very much a product of earlier recommendations, such as those put forward by the McLennan Report, to shift some of the burden of investigating specific issues away from the full executive and on to functional committees which could devote their full attention to them. King told the House of Commons that the purpose of the Canadian Defence Committee was to provide the cabinet with the regular reports on the state of Canada's defence. It was thus established as an information gathering body to help expedite discussions of the full cabinet. It comprised the prime minister as chair, with the ministers of justice, finance and national defence as its other members. Although it did not have any other permanent members, it did frequently call upon defence officials for their recommendations.

The rationale for establishing this committee was similar to that used to create the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) in Britain prior to World War I. It was thought that a closer alliance between cabinet and the military would yield beneficial results. These committees were also similar because both kept a record of their discussions. In the case of the CID, full minutes were kept and presented to the cabinet. The Canadian Defence Committee did not go quite that far, but it did maintain notes taken by a secretary for future reference. This duty fell to Arnold Heeney when he assumed the position of principal secretary. Unfortunately, very few
records survive from this committee, outside of the occasional memo between King and Heeney outlining a meeting's basic proceedings. Nevertheless, Heeney's experience whetted his appetite for a full records keeping system under the guidance of a cabinet secretariat.

The affairs of cabinet underwent a drastic reorganization with the passing of P.C. 2474 in August 1939. With war inevitable, the Privy Council (and, as a result, cabinet) essentially dissolved into six functional sub-committees to ensure "a proper distribution of work and an effective allocation of duties...." These committees looked into the issues of supplies, legislation, public information, finance and internal security. The overall structure was governed by the Emergency Council, which was constituted "to consider all questions of general policy; to receive reports from all other committees; and, generally speaking, to co-ordinate all aspects of Government." It replaced the defence committee and had the following ministers as members: Mackenzie King (Prime Minister and chair), Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice), J.L Ilsley (Minister of Finance), Ian Mackenzie (Minister of Defence), R. Dandurand (Leader of the Government in the Senate), and T.A. Crerar (Minister of Mines and Resources).

This structure remained in place until December 1939 when a further reorganization took place. Order-in-Council P.C. 4017 1/2 replaced the aforementioned sub-committees of council with nine new committees of cabinet. The change from council
committees to cabinet committees provided for a more accurate description of their role. Although each had at least a quorum of ministers as members, which technically gave them real executive authority to pass council business, their main role was to discuss the issues at hand, which was the role essentially played by cabinet, not council. The change from council to cabinet committees may seem incidental, or at least this is the way that it is treated in many of the sources on the period.\textsuperscript{15} However, in light of the subsequent creation of a cabinet secretariat, it was a very significant development. It recognized that recorded information to facilitate discussion was a crucial element in making swift, accurate decisions. Switching to cabinet committees thus paved the way for a cabinet secretariat to be established during the war, even though cabinet as a whole rarely met during this time.

The basic structure established during this re-organization remained in place for the rest of the war (see Figure 1). The Cabinet War Committee (CWC) took the place of the Emergency Council at the top of this structure. It is worthwhile quoting the mandate of the committee in full because of its importance to this study. It was established:

\begin{quote}
To consider questions of general policy, to consider reports from special and other committees; and to coordinate war activities; the said Committee to have power to call before it any official or employee of the government, and any officer of the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada, whose duty it shall be to render the Committee assistance in the discharge of its duties, and, in particular, to accord the Committee information upon any subject concerning which information may be requested.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}
Figure 1:
CABINET COMMITTEES
AND
RELATED AGENCIES,
WORLD WAR II

Committees

- War Supply
  - and Supply
  - War Supply Board (Transport)
  - Foreign Exchange Control (Finance)
  - Bank of Canada
- Food
  - Production and Marketing
  - Agricultural Supplies (Agriculture)
  - Bacon Board (Agriculture)
  - Salt and Fish Board
- Wheat
  - Board of Grain (Trade and Commerce)
  - Canadian Wheat Board (Trade and Commerce)
- Fuel
  - and Power
  - Dominion Fuel Board
  - (Mines and Resources)
- Shipping
  - and Transportation
  - Canadian Shipping Board (Transport)
  - Transport Controller
  - Board of Transport
  - National Harbours Board (Transport)
- Price Control
  - and Labour
  - War Prices and Trade Board (Labour)
  - Combines Investigation Act (Labour)
- Internal Security
  - Administration of War Charities (Sec. of State)
  - Director of Internment Operations (Sec. of State)
  - Custodian of Enemy Property (Sec. of State)
  - Registrar General of Enemy Aliens (Justice)
  - Dependents Allowance Board (Defence)
  - Advisory Committee on Enemy Aliens (Justice)
- Legislation
  - Emergency Legislation (Justice)
- Public Information
  - Volunteer Service Registration Bureau (Sec. of State)
  - Censorship
  - Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
  - Postmaster General
  - National Film Board
  - Public Information Office
Two qualities are particularly noteworthy about this mandate - the stress on information and coordination. This committee had a very broad and ambitious task. In a sense, its mandate was as wide as the war effort itself. Obviously, members could not hope to be informed about every aspect of the war's prosecution. Many decisions were better left with those in a more suitable position to deal with them. However, the committee did have a right to know generally about different facets of the war and had the right to overturn any decisions it deemed not to be in the best interests of the country. For this reason, it was necessary to have a mechanism in place to ensure that information between the committee and other parts of the government was being exchanged as quickly and as accurately as possible. Hence the need for a cabinet secretariat.

The CWC was a very close-knit group of the most senior ministers in King's government. Initially, its membership was the same as that of the Emergency Council. The committee was enlarged in May 1940 to include C.D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, and C.G. Power, the newly appointed Minister of National Defence for Air. In July of the same year, J.G. Gardiner, Minister of National War Services, and Angus Macdonald, Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, were also added. Gardiner, however, never attended a committee meeting, and his successor never became a member. The committee's permanent membership did not exceed these ten
ministerial portfolios, although there a few replacements were made to ministers. J.L.Ralston was added in June 1940 after the death of Norman Rogers and Louis St. Laurent was added in December 1941 after the death of Ernest Lapointe.15

The workload of the CWC was truly immense. This can largely be attributed to the committee's insistence on reviewing all decisions before they were passed as Orders-in-Council. This system certainly enabled the CWC to keep tabs on the decisions of other committees, but it also meant that an overwhelming amount of business was directed towards it. The terms of the War Measure's Act exacerbated the situation. The act granted the Privy Council, and thus the CWC, power to deal with a wide range of issues without the consent of Parliament. This meant that items that normally were discussed in Parliament, or at least were referred to a Parliamentary committee, now only needed the approval of the Privy Council to become law. King rejected calls to consult Parliament on a regular basis regarding measures being taken during the war. Instead, he promised simply to ensure that all orders were promptly published in the Canada Gazette and distributed to all members.20 Considering that approximately 15,000 orders were passed during each year of the war, it was wholly unreasonable to expect the committee to proceed without some sort of secretarial organization.21

King was under considerable pressure throughout the war to change the composition of the committee. He rejected calls
for a "National Government" of the type formed during the First World War. He was adamantly opposed to any Conservative participation in the committee, or at least full participation. In the spring of 1940, at the height of the blitzkrieg and the ensuing media hysteria over events in Europe, he made a gesture of solidarity towards the Opposition by offering them two associate memberships in the committee. This they rejected outright, to King's delight, on the grounds that they wanted nothing short of full membership.\(^22\) This gesture aside, King was unyielding in his desire to keep this a Liberal war with only senior members of the party being allowed to have input into its conduct. He even argued successfully against Canadian participation in an Imperial War Cabinet on the grounds that it threatened Canadian autonomy.\(^23\) King viewed any attempts to share information outside of the CWC with suspicion at the best of times, and outright contempt at others. He therefore demanded that members of the CWC keep cabinet discussions strictly confidential. This is an important characteristic to keep in mind when examining the development of a cabinet secretariat. From this perspective, it is easy to understand why King approached the idea of such an office, which had as its main function the creation, care and control of records, with some caution.

Heeney was very much left in limbo in the early stages of the war, largely because the government itself was going through a period of instability due to all of the
aforementioned changes in its structure. He continued to help prepare the prime minister for committee meetings, just as he had previously helped him to prepare cabinet meetings. He still, however, did not exercise any formal duties on behalf of the various committees, a situation which increased his frustration with his job in the face of an ever-increasing workload. As 1939 drew to a close, he once again argued for a secretariat which would organize committee affairs and help to ensure information was being exchanged quickly, accurately, and confidentially. According to Heeney at the time, cabinet had been divided into specific committees for three main reasons: (i) to allow each committee to devote more time to specific issues; (ii) to compensate for the increased volume of business which the cabinet faced; (iii) to ensure secrecy by reducing the number of ministers privy to the most sensitive information considered by the CWC. He argued that a secretariat could help in all three of these areas because it would not only acquire information, but it would also ensure that it was being communicated only to those intended, thereby maintaining secrecy.²⁴

In this context, then, Heeney's selection as secretary was clearly overdue. He later commented on the situation prior to his appointment in the following way: "I found it quite shattering to discover that the highest committee in the land had neither agenda nor minutes. And the more I learned about Cabinet practice the more difficult it was to understand
how such a regime could function at all. In fact, of course, the Canadian situation before 1940 was the same as that which had existed in Britain prior to 1916."^{25} By the spring of 1940, several pressing issues, such as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, required immense coordination among different parts of the government.^{26} The government could ill-afford delays in implementing such items, especially during a time when the allied war effort seemed to need Canada most.

O.D. Skelton was openly lobbying for a cabinet secretariat by early 1940. This proved to be the final piece of the puzzle. Skelton was King's most trusted political advisor and arguably the most influential civil servant Canada has ever had. Educated at Queen's University with graduate training at the University of Chicago, Skelton was a professor of political economy at Queen's before coming to Ottawa. During his tenure at Ottawa he recruited many of the most influential federal civil servants during an era which has subsequently been dubbed "the government generation."^{27} Jack Granatstein has said "Skelton changed Ottawa; he and his recruits changed Canada."^{28} He was an astute observer of keen intellect, and he thought very highly of Heeney. He devised a plan to revise the duties of the Clerk of the Privy Council to include a secretarial function for cabinet. The clerk already kept minutes (in a sense) of council business through Orders-in-Council. It was only natural, therefore, that these
secretarial duties be extended to cabinet as well. Skelton saw the opportunity to discuss the plan with the prime minister when E.J. Lemaire, the clerk at the time, announced his retirement at the end of 1939.29

There were several benefits to this plan. First of all, changing the duties of the clerk did not require new legislation. This appealed to King in his zealous desire for secrecy because it would not attract much notice from the Opposition, particularly important to him in early 1940 given that an election was about to be called.30 Secondly, it was the most expedient way to bring the office into being during a period when time was of the essence. Heeney later observed that the CWC was already experiencing difficulties in implementing its decisions because of inadequate record keeping.31 Negotiations in the fall of 1939 for the air training plan were a case in point. According to Heeney, the process had been filled with delays, difficulties and misunderstandings.32 Finally, amending the clerk's duties served to reinforce the notion that the job carried with it the highest status in the civil service. (This designation, incidentally, was given to the office at the insistence of D'Arcy McGee's brother, Francis, upon assuming the post in 1882.)33 This was important in order to gain the respect of ministers and other senior officials, especially considering the office was going to need their cooperation to succeed.34
King's decision to call an election for 26 March 1940 forced him to deliver upon his promise to grant Heeney a permanent position in the civil service. Heeney prepared the order appointing him as Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet four days prior to the election. This was subsequently approved by council three days later as P.C. 1121. (See Appendix I for a copy of this order.) In drafting it, Heeney attempted to highlight his background as a lawyer as the rationale for his receiving the post. In King's mind, however, it was his personal service as principal secretary that won him the post. Heeney's insistence on maintaining his non-partisanship in the order still served as a source of irritation for the prime minister: "It [the appointment] bears out a certain conception which he [Heeney] had at the time of his entering the service as secretary, [that] party politics is something with which it is not well to have oneself too closely identified. Quite clearly he is seeking to base his emphasis on his legal qualifications rather than his political ones whereas the latter are certainly, in his position, the most important."35

Heeney, of course, had good reason to maintain his non-partisanship in the wording of the order. He was unbending in his desire to implement a secretariat as close to the British model as possible. He was quite successful at disassociating himself from King during the election campaign in order to avoid any suspicion of partisanship.36 His efforts to become
a "Canadian Hankey" had finally paid off. The Canadian Cabinet Secretariat mirrored its British counterpart in that it played a role in the administration of executive meetings before, during, and after they were held. Its duties before a meeting were to prepare the agenda and distribute supporting documents to all members. Its duties during a meeting were to keep notes of proceedings which would then form minutes. Its duties after a meeting involved communicating decisions to those they affected and following these up to ensure their proper implementation. It also acted as custodian of these records. (Each of these duties will be examined in detail in the next chapter.)

In addition to his secretarial duties, Heeney was also responsible for the traditional duties of the Clerk of the Privy Council. The number of orders passed during the war increased substantially as a result of the War Measures Act, requiring him to establish a Statutory Orders and Regulations Division within the PCO to record and publish the 92,350 Orders-in-Council passed during the war. (A special committee of privy councillors, called the Government Business Committee, existed during the war to pass many of these orders. Its presence allowed other ministers to devote more time to the war effort.) H.W. Lothrop, the Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council, shouldered a good deal of responsibility in this regard, or at least this seems to be the case based upon the amount of correspondence and orders that bear his
signature during the period.\textsuperscript{38}

Heeney's other responsibilities included monitoring the administration and finance of public information as a member of the Wartime Information Board. This brought him into frequent contact with John Grierson of the National Film Board.\textsuperscript{39} His office was also responsible for issuing a statement on the government's legislative agenda before sessions of Parliament.\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, Heeney was a member of the Economic Advisory Committee, which was arguably the most powerful committee in operation during the war, next to the CWC. Its members included Skelton, W.C. Clark, Graham Towers and Norman Robertson.\textsuperscript{41} Heeney's presence on this committee, which was justified considering his status as a deputy minister who technically outranked all other members of the civil service, is proof of his entrenchment within the Ottawa mandarinate, a community in which he forged the right kind of intellectual connections to not only make the secretariat effective, but also to make it flourish.

Heeney's appointment as secretary was generally seen as a positive development. The Montreal Gazette said of his new role with the CWC that "Mr. Heeney will be breaking new ground in the administrative system of this country."\textsuperscript{42} The Financial Post also saw the move as significant, saying that Heeney was appointed "in the hope of achieving an important change in the machinery of government at Ottawa."\textsuperscript{43} His rapid ascent to the top position in the civil service was generally
received as being based on his abilities, rather than his political ties. This must have been very gratifying for him considering that he had tried so hard to distance himself from any political affiliations.  

King was initially less than enthusiastic about the new post. He attempted to downplay its significance, telling Heeney that "he must regard his appointment as simply additional duties to those of the Clerk of the Council, not as a creation of some new post." According to King, committee members were generally opposed to the creation of the office because it was perceived as an intrusion on the ability of members to voice their opinions in confidence. Comments such as these were in keeping with King's earlier views on the office. He was disappointed that it was not a partisan office which he could control, but he would not let this stand in the way of creating an office which would assist the administration of the war effort. Despite his reservations, he acknowledged the necessity of the office.  

After a long, evolutionary process, the cabinet secretariat was finally a reality in March 1940. What began as an appeal to relieve ministers of excessive responsibilities, evolved into the creation of a cabinet secretariat which mirrored its British precedent in almost every way, including the circumstances in which it was born. The appointment was truly a triumph for Heeney and those who had argued before him for an improvement in the administration
of cabinet affairs. Indeed, the establishment of the cabinet secretariat can be seen as the culmination of the McLennan report of 1919. The extension of the duties of the Clerk of the Privy Council to include a non-partisan secretarial function for cabinet, or in this case the CWC, was in effect a recognition of the dual nature of the central federal executive in Canada, a distinction called for on several previous occasions. During a time of war, when so many pressing matters needed to be discussed, cabinet could no longer afford to be without some sort of formal record keeping procedure.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 198.

3. J.W Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole: A Memoir (Markham, On: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1994), p. 156. Pickersgill writes of their first meeting that thereafter "Arnold was to be one of my dearest friends for the rest of my life."

4. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 56.

5. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 200. Also, Mackenzie King Diary, 23 June 1939. When King approached Bickersteth about the idea of establishing a cabinet office in 1927, Bickersteth too noted that Lapointe was against the idea of appointing an English Canadian to the post. This may help to explain why King did not pursue the issue further at that time, considering that he was still trying to solidify his support in Quebec. See QUA, Buchan Papers, vol. 7, Bickersteth to Tweedsmuir, 4 January 1936.


7. Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole, pp. 167-168. See also Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 57 and Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 201. Granatstein points out that Heeney modified his opposition to doing party work after this exchange which helped to bring the two men together. It does not seem, however, that Heeney did much work in this regard and certainly the eventual duties of the secretariat bear out his dedication to Hankey's principle of non-partisanship.


10. Ibid., p. 113. Stacey points out that, for instance, the only surviving record of the meeting of 30 January 1939 is a memo from King to Heeney.

11. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol. 2, "Memoirs, n.d. Chapter 10 draft". Reference to his responsibilities with the defence committee was made in the draft version of chapter 10 of The Things That Are Caesar's. The description of these duties
does not appear as strongly in the printed version of the chapter.


15. Even C.P. Stacey, who is noted for going into great semantical detail in some instances, does not even note the change in Arms, Men and Governments.


17. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 118.


20. House of Commons, Debates, 20 June 1940. King rejected calls to summon Parliament every ninety days to discuss measures being taken during the war.


26. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 20-23. Stacey gives a good indication as the complexity of the plan and the amount of coordination it required.

27. See Doug Owram's The Government Generation.

29. Heeney made a similar proposal to the prime minister in July 1939. At that time, however, there were no plans to replace Lemaire, who had not yet announced his retirement, and King would not consider amending the clerk's duties while Lemaire was in office. Heeney credits Skelton for initially conceiving the plan and for taking the initiative in bringing it up with the prime minister in January 1940 when Lemaire announced his retirement. See, Ibid., pp. 200-201 and Heeney, "Mackenzie King and the Cabinet Secretariat," p. 369.

30. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 77.

31. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol.1, Heeney to L.B. Pearson, 22 April 1940. Heeney makes reference to the lack of minutes and agenda before his appointment as Secretary to the CWC as the reason for many matters having to be deferred.

32. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 62.

33. Ibid., p. 77.


35. King, Diary, 22 March 1940.


38. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 35, file C-20-4 (1942-43). A large portion of the orders and letters in this file, for instance, were signed by Lothrop.

39. Heeney, The Things that Are Caesar's, p. 72.

40. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 7, file P-21 "Parliamentary Work-Legislative Program".


43. Ibid., The Financial Post, 13 April 1940, p. 6.

44. Ibid., Le Devoir, 28 March 1940, p. 1. The paper commented on Heeney's rise and pointed out that it was well deserved.

45. King, Diary, 28 March 1940.
46. Ibid.


CHAPTER 4

THE SECRETARIAT IN ACTION: A DIPLOMATIC ANALYSIS OF CABINET WAR COMMITTEE RECORDS FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The decision to create a Cabinet Secretariat has been most beneficial to historians because they have been left an invaluable record of the actions of Canada's highest policy-making body during the Second World War. Authors of numerous books and articles have already used these records extensively as a basic source of reference. This, of course, is hardly surprising given their subject matter. What is surprising, however, is the lack of attention which has been paid to the records' origins. It is this information, after all, which ultimately lends credibility to their integrity as evidence for historical research. As is the case with most archival records, archivists need to shift the focus away from the information in them to the context in which they were created.

The study of documents, and the procedures used to create them, is called diplomatics. Formally, diplomatics is defined as:

the discipline which studies the genesis, form, and transmission of archival documents in relationship with the facts represented in them, and with their creators, in order to identify, evaluate and communicate their nature.

Although the study and use of diplomatics is a relatively new development in North American archival circles, it has long
been a key component of European archival education. Forms of it have been practiced in Europe since medieval times, often in an attempt to ensure the authenticity of documents. (Forgeries were not uncommon during this time.) By the nineteenth century, French and German archivists were using diplomatics to ensure the authenticity, and thus the integrity, of their holdings.¹

While a major component of diplomatics remains the analysis of individual documents, particularly their form and structure, modern approaches to the discipline also include the wider context of creation of these documents.² A document is therefore analyzed according to both its physical and intellectual properties. Examples of physical properties include the actual content of a document, its medium and its layout. Examples of intellectual properties include why it was created, who created it and how it was ultimately used.³ Diplomatics is the final step in certifying the integrity of documents as evidence of their creator's actions. It is thus a major component of provenance information, although provenance is much more extensive in that it also examines the originating agency's evolution and its relations with other agencies. With these research purposes in mind, this chapter engages in a diplomatic analysis of committee records through both an examination of the procedures the secretariat employed and the records it produced.
Heeney's first official meeting as secretary to the CWC took place on 3 April 1940. Despite being well aware of the large task before him, he did not enter the job with an established set of guidelines on procedure. As he later commented, the development of procedures for the Cabinet Secretariat was essentially a pragmatic process marked by much trial and error, particularly at first. He could not hope to implement a wide range of procedural reforms to committee practice right away. His struggle with the prime minister to establish a secretariat had already taught him many valuable lessons. Chief among them was that King was not immediately receptive to change of any kind, particularly when it came to cabinet procedure. Heeney recalled in his autobiography that "instinctively Mackenzie King recoiled from efforts to formalize the business of cabinet, an institution whose genius, historically and in his own experience, had been its flexibility and informality." Although change was urgently needed to cope with the demands of war, it would have to be introduced cautiously to avoid antagonizing the prime minister.

Among Heeney's first actions was to assemble a staff for the secretariat beyond that already in place for the PCO. Throughout the war, he was assisted by as many as ten senior officers, most of whom were obtained on loan from other senior departments. In choosing these assistants, he looked for what he called "generalists" or men with historical and
economic training rather than technical expertise. Such men, he felt, were better able to adapt to a variety of tasks. These officers were not assigned to a particular committee or duty. Instead, they were assigned to deal with a particular subject-matter regardless of where this took them within the government structure.\textsuperscript{11} This was very much in keeping with the approach Hankey used in Britain. It ensured all officers were in touch with the entire machine, which thus made it easier for someone to take over in Heeney's position should the need arise. These officers worked out of a small map room in the East Block, close to the privy council chamber.\textsuperscript{12}

Heeney also had a permanent staff of between twenty and thirty employees throughout the war.\textsuperscript{13} Included in this number was an assistant secretary (initially James Conacher), several typists, clerks and stenographers, two messengers, a librarian, a translator and a doorkeeper. The office's total budget was approximately $55,000 in 1940-41. Heeney drew a salary of $9,000.\textsuperscript{14} The size of his staff was modest by comparison to the British secretariat. In 1941, it consisted of a staff of 344, among which there were 131 clerks and 109 typists.\textsuperscript{15}

A significant addition to the secretariat was made in September 1944 when Major-General M.A. Pope was appointed as Military Secretary within the secretariat. As Heeney told Lester Pearson at the time, the goal of the appointment was to "bring about a closer day to day relationship with the Chiefs
of Staff, and to avoid the unsatisfactory, left-handed procedure which in the past had to be followed in getting information from the Joint Staff in Washington." (The Joint Chiefs of Staff was comprised of senior Canadian and American military representatives. This body made regular reports to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the CWC on military coordination between the two nations.)

Pope was previously military representative for the CWC in Washington. Earlier, in May 1943, the committee also appointed Brigadier General W.W. Foster as Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in the North-West. He, too, had an affiliation with the secretariat and made regular reports to the committee, largely on the progress of the Alaska Highway. The addition of these powerful military men to the secretariat significantly increased its stature and assured it a virtual monopoly on information being supplied to the CWC.

Many of the procedures which Heeney used for the creation and maintenance of committee documents were established in consultation with the British secretariat. As mentioned earlier, his knowledge of the British office during Hankey's tenure was already quite extensive when he came to Ottawa. By the time the Second World War began, Hankey had retired. In his place were two secretaries, Edward Bridges and Norman Brook. They immediately gave Heeney and other members of the PCO access to a large amount of confidential information about the British office.
Heeney continued to observe and consult with the British secretariat as the war progressed. In September 1941, for instance, when King returned to Ottawa after having attended a meeting of the British War Cabinet in London, Heeney requested from the prime minister a description of the role of the secretariat in those proceedings. King told Heeney that the secretariats in both countries were very similar to each other. He pointed out that British War Cabinet minutes, for instance, were in much the same form as those of the Canadian committee, although the British used a much more formal and strict system for circulating cabinet documents. (In Britain, documents were actually circulated in locked boxes. Such was not the case in Canada.)

Heeney made a further enquiry into British procedure in February 1942. His exchange of correspondence with Bridges at this time helped him to assess the effectiveness of his own procedures, especially with regards to minutes. (This exchange is examined in more detail on pp. 104-106 of this chapter because of its relevance to procedural aspects of creating minutes.) John Baldwin, who later became his assistant, also provided him with a detailed account of War Cabinet procedure in October 1943, a large portion of which dealt with how its documents were prepared and circulated. As a result, although Heeney claimed that the establishment of procedures to serve the committee was largely a pragmatic process, in actual fact he used the British secretariat as his
blueprint.

In preparing for a committee meeting, Heeney's first challenge was to secure its agenda documentation. King allowed Heeney to draft an agenda immediately upon his appointment, but he did not allow agendas to be circulated to ministers in advance of meetings until October 1941. Up to that point he kept it to himself in order to exercise control over the course of a meeting. Heeney's prodding and departmental pressure to have more notice as to when items would be discussed, thereby giving them more time to prepare supporting documents, forced King to approve the agenda for circulation. He still retained the unilateral right, however, to make last minute changes to proposed topics.

A review of agenda records for the CWC points to evidence of four types in use, each of which represents a distinct phase in the preparation process for a meeting. The first type of agenda record was called "Items for Consideration". This was a master list of items which could be discussed at any CWC meeting, or any other committee meeting for that matter. Topics were often added to the list at the suggestion of senior departmental officials or ministerial secretaries. As a general rule, these items were of a less urgent nature and dealt mainly with matters such as routine departmental administration and minor budget appropriations. Most of them were dealt with, it seems, without ever going to committee. The maintenance of this list, however, permitted
the secretariat to keep track of departmental concerns, which helped to build a healthy relationship between the secretariat and departments.

The second type of agenda created by the secretariat for the CWC was the "Provisional Agenda". As the name implies, this document contained proposed items that still needed formal approval before being brought to the CWC. It was drawn up the day before a CWC meeting and was distributed to all members, often with a covering letter stating the exact time and place of the meeting. (Meetings were usually held in the Privy Council Chamber in the early evening.) Ministerial requests for changes or additions to the "Provisional Agenda" were sent back to the secretariat the same day it was circulated. That day the requests were reviewed by both Heeney and the prime minister for final approval or rejection.

The establishment of a provisional agenda was an important element in the systemization of committee meetings. This assertion is supported by the following appeal made by Heeney to CWC members in October 1941:

While clearly it will not always be possible, in cases of urgency, to follow this procedure [of advance notice], I trust that members of the Committee will endeavour to inform me, in writing, as soon as possible beforehand, of any questions which they wish to have considered by the Committee. This practice will, I feel, enable the work of the Committee to be simplified and expedited to a considerable extent, and I shall greatly appreciate your co-operation in this respect.

The response seems to have been immediate. Committee agenda
files beginning in October 1940 are full of correspondence from ministers or their private secretaries giving advance notice of subjects they wished to discuss at the next meeting. Heeney also seems to have been successful in gaining advance notice from ministers of any absences from meetings, thereby enabling his staff to circulate a list of ministers expected at each meeting.

The third agenda document, the actual agenda, was drawn up hours before a CWC meeting, after King had given final approval to all topics. An attempt was made to circulate the final version to ministers beforehand. If time permitted, Heeney seems to have also taken the opportunity to issue a letter reminding ministers to bring any supporting documents needed for the meeting. This was indicative of his overall style. Either he did not have much confidence in ministers' memories or he realized that they were under intense pressure which often made them forgetful of other matters, or a combination of both. In any case, he often went to considerable lengths to ensure that ministers were fully prepared for committee meetings.

A source of continuing frustration for Heeney was King's aversion to sticking to the agenda, even after he had approved it and it had been circulated. Heeney later commented: "I well remember..., in the very early days of the Cabinet War Committee, how difficult it was to keep the Prime Minister to the agenda." His frustration was easy to understand given
the long hours that he and his staff put into preparing the agenda. However, it was ultimately up to King as committee chair to determine how a meeting would proceed. Often, many items on the final agenda were not even discussed.\textsuperscript{34}

The fourth agenda record was called "Items for Decision." It was used to list items which could not be deferred for another meeting. This type of document was used less frequently than the three already mentioned. There are only scattered examples of it in the PCO's central registry files. There are no examples in either the Heeney papers or any of his publications.\textsuperscript{35}

Appendix II contains the agenda for the committee meeting of 2 October 1941. The business at hand during this meeting represented the standard diversity of issues covered during the course of a typical meeting. This agenda is the final version that was distributed to members hours before the meeting. Consequently, the twenty items on it have already received the prime minister's approval for discussion. The word "secret" appears in the top left corner of the document. All committee documents were classified as secret, most secret or confidential.\textsuperscript{36} Occasionally, documents were not classified at all (Such was the case with the minutes for this particular meeting.) The difference between these classifications, and the meaning of their absence, is not immediately apparent given that all committee documents were guarded with a measure of secrecy. However, it does seem that correspondence with
the committee was generally considered confidential, whereas minutes and agenda were seen as secret or most secret. The agenda was a very structured document. Rarely, if ever, did it exceed one page. Items relating to external affairs were usually listed first. These issues were of particular importance to the prime minister as Secretary of State for External Affairs. After the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence in August 1940, its reports were included as a regular part of the agenda. Subsequent items then related to matters of defence. A component was reserved for discussion of general defence, as well as others for each branch of the armed forces. Beginning in June 1942, the Chiefs of Staff were allowed to attend the first and third meetings of each month. Further space was thus reserved to enable them to make personal reports and answer any questions. Major-General Pope's appointment as military secretary in 1944 regimented the agenda even further as he was also called upon to make regular reports to the committee. The same was true of General Foster when he was appointed in 1943. On the whole, then, the agenda for each meeting was drafted within a basic framework. Certain matters had to be discussed at every meeting. There was thus very little latitude left for ministers or the secretariat to suggest other items of business, especially considering that core items expended a large amount of ministers' time, time which was already at a premium.
Another noteworthy characteristic of this agenda is the presence of check-marks down its left margin. These represent items that were actually discussed during the meeting. Out of the twenty original items on the agenda, only fourteen were actually considered by the committee. Within these fourteen items, the order in which they appear on the agenda was not strictly followed for purposes of discussion. The sixth item, "Medical supplies for Russia" (or "Aid to Russia" as it is referred to in the minutes) was actually discussed before the third item, "Canadian Information Office, New York." The failure to discuss certain items, and the disorder of others, helps make understandable Heeney's sense of frustration with King's aversion to sticking to the agenda, especially considering that Heeney tailored the agenda-making process to accommodating changes. His frustration was certainly justified, considering all of the steps that went into drafting the final version of the agenda.

Preparation for a committee meeting also involved acquiring and selecting supporting documents. These documents helped to provide context for discussions. The amount of memos, letters, telegrams, and other types of communications received by committees and government departments during the course of the war was truly staggering, rising to heights inconceivable at any time previous. During 1940 alone, the Department of External Affairs handled over a million telegraphic messages. This "information explosion" played
a large part in the need for a secretariat. It also threatened to overwhelm it unless an organized system could be established to ensure essential information was being selected and brought to the committee's attention.

It was not until November 1941 that supporting documents were systematically kept and filed by the PCO, although they were in use prior to that time.\(^5\) Each selected document, be it a highly sensitive memo from an allied government, an estimate from the Department of Finance, or an update on the country's industrial output, was assigned a number and filed sequentially along with the master file of committee minutes. This document number was often its only means of reference, particularly in the text of minutes. (See Appendix III for an example of a supporting document. This was the first document to be numbered. The document number is stamped on its upper right-hand corner.) In total, 985 supporting documents were filed along with the minutes between November 1941 and the end of the war.\(^6\) Supporting documents were often accompanied by explanatory memoranda prepared by the department responsible for the information, or by PCO staff in consultation with the departments. They were usually distributed with the provisional agenda, thereby giving ministers ample time to study them.\(^7\) This is the case with the document in Appendix III. The words "circ. [circulated] with agenda, Nov. 4" were written by Heeney on its top, indicating that ministers had ample time to consider it before attending the meeting.
Selecting 985 documents from such a mass of material obviously could not be done by Heeney and his assistants alone. He depended upon the cooperation of other departments to do a lot of the selection work for him. In this task, he was particularly aided by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, O.D. Skelton, and his successor, Norman Robertson. Much of the committee's intelligence was being supplied by the Department of External Affairs from its links with the Canadian High Commission in London. Both Skelton and Robertson alerted Heeney to key departmental documents, which were subsequently passed on to the committee. In fact, both men during their respective tenures were allowed to regularly attend committee meetings, thereby enabling them to personally present much of the information.\textsuperscript{48} Heeney's close friendship with J.W. Pickersgill, as previously mentioned, was also useful in bringing to his attention key pieces of information.\textsuperscript{49} Heeney also benefitted from having senior officers on his staff who were actually on loan from other departments. This helped to ensure the co-operation of these departments in forwarding essential information.\textsuperscript{50}

Once supporting documents were acquired and an agenda was created for a meeting, the secretariat then took on the task of drafting, editing and circulating minutes. It is here that the new secretariat had its greatest impact on cabinet procedure. For the first time in Canada's history, the deliberations of the country's highest policy-making body were
being recorded to serve an administrative purpose. In the context of traditional cabinet procedure, with its emphasis on in camera discussions, this was a considerable change indeed. It was a change, however, that was long overdue, especially when one considers that as early as 1919 calls had been made for the maintenance of some sort of record of cabinet discussions.

Committee members were accustomed to Heeney's presence during meetings. He frequently took notes of deliberations as part of his duties as Principal Secretary for the Defence Committee, the Emergency Council and the CWC, notes which were subsequently passed on to the prime minister and occasionally other members. In fact, he created full minutes for the first four meetings of the CWC prior to his appointment as Cabinet Secretary. His appointment, however, allowed him to be much more aggressive in the maintenance and circulation of these documents. From this point forward, he was more assertive in using the text of minutes to communicate decisions to departments to ensure quick implementation. He became an indispensable part of the committee's deliberations and was often able to correct ministers during discussions based on his knowledge of previous minutes.

Heeney outlined his typical routine when creating minutes in a letter to his father in December 1940: "I have been dictating draft minutes... all afternoon. Tomorrow they will be revised, sent to the Prime Minister, and letters written to
ministers and others concerned in decisions taken." He was the only official from the PCO who was allowed to attend meetings. Consequently, it was his job alone to keep a full set of notes on deliberations, a considerable amount of work at the best of times, and an insurmountable task when a particularly contentious issue was being discussed. He fortunately convinced King in 1942 to allow an assistant, John Baldwin, to attend as well. This helped to ease the burden somewhat.

The conclusion of a meeting set off a torrent of activity within the secretariat. When Heeney and/or Baldwin returned from a meeting, draft notes were dictated to a typist who prepared a preliminary minute. The following day, a copy of this minute was circulated to the prime minister, who made initial changes and comments before any other minister had a chance to view them. The procedure used to draft and edit the preliminary minute differs from the one used in Britain during the First World War. Dictation did not start in Ottawa, it seems, until the meeting had formally ended. Hankey, on the other hand, had assistants working on a portion of the minutes while the meeting was still going on.

Heeney used a standard letter to distribute draft minutes to the prime minister. The letter asked, "If the Prime Minister has any directions as to alterations, will he kindly so indicate?" A response usually came the same day. After 1940, ministers were also allowed to make suggestions for
revisions, although their suggestions were considered only after the prime minister had finished editing the draft. Ministerial changes delayed the creation of a final version of minutes about one week. This entire process is significant in that it shows the amount of editing and revising that went on to create an "appropriate" set of minutes. Thorough editing assured the prime minister, and to some extent his ministers, of the right to be the final arbiter of the record, which was important considering the value King placed on maintaining cabinet solidarity. Thus, although King failed to create a partisan secretariat, he was at least able to exercise a measure of control over the records it created, especially when it came to the agenda and minutes for meetings, both of which were subject to his revisions.

Once a final version of minutes was agreed upon, it was then circulated. The guiding concern in this area was always secrecy. Beginning in July 1940, all members of the CWC were given a copy of the minutes. However, each was asked to return the copy immediately upon reading it. In fact, copies sent from the PCO were stamped "on loan from the Privy Council Office", thereby giving the office clear title to the documents. In some instances, requests could be made to the PCO to keep copies for up to three months. The PMO and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs were allowed to keep a file of minutes for the whole war. (This, once again, is an indication of how important these offices were in
helping the secretariat to perform its duties.) Member copies, once returned, were kept for six months and were subsequently destroyed, with the exception of the PCO's master copy which was indexed and maintained in its central registry in the East Block.63

In distributing the minutes, Heeney attempted to point out items of particular interest to each minister.64 In the case of other government officials, relevant excerpts were forwarded to them with the following brief statement: "Since I [Heeney] last wrote you on [date], three meetings of the Cabinet War Committee have been held and the following matters have been recorded in the minutes...."65 The letters to other officials served two purposes. First, they quickly communicated decisions for implementation without jeopardizing the secrecy of other matters in the minutes. Second, they compensated for potential failures on the part of ministers to inform departments of any action to be taken.

Appendix IV contains the final minutes of the committee meeting of 2 October 1941. (Appendix II is the agenda for this meeting.) Minutes of a typical committee meeting usually consisted of a cover page with anywhere from three to twelve pages of text attached to it. Beginning on 3 April 1940 (Heeney's first official meeting as cabinet secretary), each meeting was consecutively numbered until the committee was dissolved. The meeting of 2 October 1941, for instance, was meeting number 110. In total, 342 CWC meetings were
numbered. Four meetings of the committee also took place before Heeney was officially appointed secretary. These were transcribed after the formal numbering system was started. They are identified as meetings A to D.

The meeting number was essential in indexing subjects discussed during each meeting. Heeney had a full time staff member who maintained an index for the minutes covering the entire war period. The index was organized alphabetically by subjects such as countries, provinces, departments, leaders, or specific policies. Beside each subject, the number of the meeting in which it was discussed was listed (with the number underlined), along with another number which directed readers to the specific item in the minutes in which it appeared. Potential cross-references also appeared at the beginning of each subject. The index enabled Heeney to easily retrieve previous decisions on matters being considered by the committee. It permitted him to intervene occasionally in committee meetings when it appeared that a decision was in conflict with one taken previously. Beginning in January 1943, a "subjects discussed" page also appeared at the beginning of each meeting's minutes to ease reference.

Minutes always contained a list of committee members in attendance. The order of this list most likely corresponded to their order of seating at the table. Mackenzie King, as chair, was always listed first. T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, assumed this duty in the prime minister's
absence. A separate section of the list was reserved for officials who were in attendance but were not members of the committee. Here Heeney listed the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (either Skelton or Robertson), any invited officials such as chiefs of staff, and himself. A glance at this section thus gives a good indication of the nature of business being discussed during the meeting. As a general rule, the invited officials only attended the portion of the meeting for which they were needed. Heeney summoned guests into the meeting at the appropriate time and escorted them out after they made their contribution. Note that during the 2 October 1941 meeting outlined in Appendix IV, the Minister of National War Services entered after item 25, and left after item 35. This procedure, which was also used by the British War Cabinet, once again reflects the overwhelming concern about secrecy which guided committee deliberations at all times.

The text of minutes was governed by strict adherence to business relating directly to the committee. This becomes most obvious when the sudden death of a member occurred. O.D. Skelton's death in late January 1941 came as a shock to Mackenzie King, who called it "the most serious loss thus far sustained in my public life and work." There was no reference to this event in the minutes. The minutes simply pointed out that Norman Robertson had been appointed as the new under-secretary without any reason being given. The same
can also be said of the deaths of both Ernest Lapointe and Norman Rogers, both of whom were influential members of the committee.⁷⁷

War committee minutes were generic documents, especially in comparison to minutes kept for other committees during the war. Minutes of the Cabinet Wheat Committee, for instance, were much more explicit with regards to personal viewpoints.⁷⁸ The same could be said of minutes of the Emergency Council, which Heeney unofficially drafted and maintained as part of his duties as principal secretary. Those for the council meeting of 31 October 1939 actually contain an appendix quoting Mackenzie King verbatim on several points throughout the meeting.⁷⁹ Rarely was this allowed for CWC meetings. The emphasis in committee minutes was on reporting decisions, although an attempt was made to at least provide context on those decisions. Generally, the last paragraph of each item reported a decision of some kind.

Although it is difficult to summarize the broad range of items discussed during committee meetings, it is at least possible to identify certain themes in the minutes. Meetings for 1941, for instance, can be categorized in the following manner: 34 per cent of committee time was devoted to military matters, 24 per cent to international affairs, 19 per cent to domestic matters, 16 per cent to economics and finance, 4 per cent to labour, and 3 per cent to joint defence.⁸⁰ Many of these items, of course, overlapped, but these figures at least
give an indication of the purview of the committee. They
support C.P. Stacey's comment that the committee's field of
operation was "as wide as Canada itself."81

Until 23 October 1940, CWC minutes were formally called
memoranda. Thereafter, they were called minutes. There seems
to be little evidence to explain this change. There was no
change at all in form and substance. Perhaps this was a
simple case of semantics. Strictly speaking, a memo leaves
room for personal expression and is much more informal than a
minute. Heeney may therefore have wished to convey the
feeling of finality when it came to the decisions of the
committee as written in the minutes.

The initial draft version of minutes usually only
required minimal editing to bring it to its final form. Such
was the case, for example, with minutes for the committee
meeting of 31 January 1941. C.G. Power, Minister of National
Defence for Air, simply requested that the word "additional"
be added to the statement "600 men a month would be needed"
(in reference to the recruiting of Canadian pilots for the
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan).82 The change was made
to the final version of minutes with no visible sign of a
change of any kind.83 In another instance, J.L. Ralston,
Minister of National Defence, made simple changes to the draft
by writing them on his draft copy. Heeney acknowledged the
changes and made the suggested revisions.84
On occasion, however, changes to the original draft, or lack thereof, could be the topic of heated debate and criticism. Appendix V contains a copy of the minutes for the committee meeting of 11 August 1943. This was by no means a typical meeting of the committee. It was a joint session with the British War Cabinet during the first Quebec Conference. Heeney was designated as secretary on behalf of both the committee and War Cabinet. Preparation for this meeting consumed a lot of time because matters such as the agenda had to be approved by both bodies. Producing the final version of minutes also proved to be an exceptionally difficult process.

Ralston in particular did not completely agree with Heeney's version of events as described in the draft copy of minutes. He wrote to Heeney one week after the meeting to request four changes. The first of these (page 3, line 1) was for the addition of a fourteen line statement regarding Canada's participation in future military operations. This change, he stated, was actually being recommended by Churchill himself. The second change was of a more personal nature. He objected to being singled out in the minutes for his views on the above issue by the statement "in Mr. Ralston's own opinion" (page 3, line 13). These words, he said, "leave an impression that I [Ralston] was only speaking personally which of course is incorrect. I was speaking for and as a member of the committee." He went on to suggest that these words be
replaced with the statement "our view was that for the reasons stated...."\textsuperscript{87} The other two changes were similar to the first one in that they involved the addition of clarifications to already existing statements (page 7, line 7). Ralston's second request was very much in keeping with traditional cabinet views towards recorded discussions of any kind. He resented being singled out in the minutes largely because of the impact this would have on his own credibility and on committee solidarity. He seems justified in his views, especially considering that Heeney's role was not to record differences of opinion.

Heeney nonetheless resisted in making these revisions, arguing that this meeting was unique and that Ralston's contributions to the meeting were significant enough to merit special attention. In a memo to the prime minister the following day, he proposed placing a note at the end of the minutes recording Ralston's suggestions rather than making changes to the original text itself.\textsuperscript{88} Mackenzie King seems to have approved of this idea because, in fact, the changes are noted only at the end of the minutes (page 9a) rather than in the main body of text.

On other occasions, Heeney was required to verify statements made during a meeting after it had ended. If any statements had to be added, Heeney identified them in the amended minutes with an "x" next to the relevant point.\textsuperscript{89} In other instances, revisions were hand written in ink if a minor
clarification was needed after the minutes were formally issued.\textsuperscript{90} The seal of authenticity was Heeney's signature at the end of every copy of minutes. He did not sign minutes until he was sure that no more changes were required to the final copy.\textsuperscript{91} One can assume, then, that changes such as those mentioned above were made after the final copy was drafted. On the whole, Heeney was willing to make changes to a few words in the draft, but for the most part he resisted making any changes which would seriously alter his version of events.

His concern for the authenticity of original minutes was best demonstrated in an exchange of correspondence he had with his British counterpart, Bridges, in February 1942. At this time, he requested information from Bridges on how minutes were brought to their final form. This letter and subsequent response reveal a lot about both British and Canadian practice with respect to minutes. Heeney asked Bridges the following questions:

(i) Are copies of the first draft circulated so that ministers can suggest changes?

(ii) What outward and visible sign, if any, indicates the authenticity of the minutes as finally settled?

(iii) To whom are copies of the minutes sent - in first draft? - in final form?

(iv) Within what delay are copies of cabinet minutes returned to the secretary?

(v) Is direct quotation from the War Cabinet conclusions permitted in passing on decisions for action by appropriate departmental officials?
What is the legal, constitutional and "customary" position regarding access to cabinet minutes by succeeding administrations? Bridges gave the following responses to these questions:

(i) In Britain, cabinet minutes are not circulated in draft. The minutes are regarded as authoritative in the sense that ministers act upon them forthwith.

(ii) There is no outward or visible sign to indicate the authenticity of minutes as finally settled.

(iii) Copies are sent to all members of the War Cabinet and to all members who in peace would be members of the cabinet.

(iv) The office does not call for the return of minutes within a given period.

(v) Ministers are solely responsible for communicating decisions in any manner they deem appropriate. A "Schedule of Decisions" is also maintained for the benefit of departments.

(vi) When an administration goes out of office, the cabinet minutes and papers of that administration are returned to the Cabinet Secretariat.

This information influenced Heeney to assess the effectiveness of his own procedures. He seems to have used the comparison to institute some changes to his own practices. In another sense, however, the exchange demonstrated his confidence in his own procedures, even if they were somewhat different from those used in Britain. For example, he pointed out that minutes of the CWC were somewhat more detailed than the conclusions of the British War Cabinet, with a paragraph of context preceding any decision in the minutes in Canada. He also commented that in Canada, minutes were occasionally revised and the draft copy was by no means
authoritative, unlike British practice. When significant revisions were made in Canada, they were duly noted on the final copy of minutes.35

In asking these questions, Heeney was attempting to determine the extent to which minutes of British cabinet meetings reflect their actual proceedings. In so doing, he was hoping to compare the success of his own minutes in this regard. This was a sensitive area for Heeney. He knew that the secretariat did not have a mandate to provide a complete transcript of committee meetings. Yet he seemed to value a record which at least had some value in reflecting actual deliberations -- i.e. one with some integrity as evidence of actual committee proceedings. Thus, he sought to put into place as many safeguards as possible in the creation and custody of these records, while still allowing some revisions to be made to appease notions of cabinet solidarity.

King's general views towards the minutes changed as the war progressed. As demonstrated earlier, he was initially very wary of Heeney's presence and the impact that this would have on deliberations. By November 1944, however, he was calling for an even fuller version of events in the minutes then had been customary. He made the following comments in his diary:

I keep feeling resentful more strongly than ever in the minutes of the War Committee where Heeney far too often [is] keeping out the vigour of my protests against courses being taken. I had time and again to point out to them [secretarial staff] that they soft-pedalled anything by way of criticism on my part of the action
of some of the ministers to the lengths to which they were going.96

It is hardly surprising that Heeney resisted quoting King more fully at this, or any, time. The episode with Ralston aside, Heeney did not want to leave the impression that he was taking sides by emphasizing one member's protests over another. This could jeopardize the non-partisan role of the office and make it susceptible to criticism by ministers outside the privy council chamber. The basic text of minutes thus remained largely unchanged between 1939 and 1945 in that they always emphasized decisions.

The extent to which Heeney's personal views are reflected in committee records is difficult to determine. As Austin Cross observed shortly after the war, he had immense power that largely went unnoticed. He compared Heeney to a tollgate which controlled the flow of information between the committee and other parts of the government.97 Tangible proof of this power, however, is hard to acquire. Heeney's memoirs and other publications make no reference to changes which he made to the records. In addition, he did not have to write letters or memos stating his editorial requests to any other body as creator of them. Furthermore, all the rough notes he made and used to form draft minutes were destroyed for security reasons. Consequently, it is a hard to gauge Heeney's personal impact on the records under his care. The best evidence suggests that his personal impact on committee
records was minimal. His concern for the authenticity of minutes, as evidenced by both his exchange of correspondence with the British Cabinet Secretariat in 1942 and his resolve to resist any major changes to the draft version of minutes, suggests that he was impartial in creating these records. Heeney fought long and hard to create a non-partisan secretariat. It is highly unlikely that he would jeopardize this to promote his own viewpoints in any of the committee's records.

In summary, then, there are three significant characteristics to committee minutes. The first is that they are largely a generic record of committee deliberations which have as their focus decisions. The secretariat was, after all, established to aid the committee in its decision making and implementation process, not to provide a record for posterity. The second is that the minutes underwent occasional revisions at the request of the prime minister or one of his ministers. King especially wanted to ensure that his own credibility and the solidarity of his cabinet was not being undermined by the creation of these records. He therefore allowed these records to be created and maintained by a non-partisan body, but only if he at least had a say in their final contents. The third is that Heeney attempted to protect the authenticity of original minutes whenever possible by documenting significant revisions. He was more successful at this when it came to ministerial changes as opposed to
those of the prime minister. Nevertheless, Heeney created a set of minutes which accurately reflect the proceedings of committee deliberations, even if they do not provide a transcript of their deliberations. They thus have the status as evidence of committee proceedings.

Once minutes were created and relevant excerpts containing decisions were forwarded to ministers and/or departments, the secretariat's final duty was to then follow-up on decisions to ensure that implementation had taken place. Initially, procedures in this regard were fairly straightforward. They usually amounted to no more than a simple memo to departments enquiring into the progress of various decisions. This system, however, proved inefficient as the number of decisions grew. As a result, Heeney circulated a new form to departments, the "Schedule of Decisions", to systematically follow up on committee decisions beginning in December 1942. This form listed dates of recent committee meetings, the subjects discussed affecting the department, and the type of action required by it within a certain deadline. Senior departmental officials returned it regularly to the PCO with indications as to the progress of each item. Those items which had been implemented were placed on the PCO's internal "Schedule of Decisions (Consolidated)" which was then filed in the PCO's central registry. (See Appendix VI for a sample of this document.) Any unimplemented items were re-issued on the department's next schedule. The
practice of issuing departmental schedules was discontinued in September 1944, when, as Heeney later observed, departments no longer wished to conform. Unfortunately, he does not give any reason for this occurrence. In any case, committee activity had slowed considerably by late 1944, at least in comparison to two years earlier, which meant that it was possible once again to monitor its decisions without the schedule.

For the contemporary researcher, records of the CWC are relatively easy to use. Formally, committee records consist of minutes and supporting documents only. As mentioned previously, supporting documents consist of only those 985 documents which were selected and numbered by the secretariat. These were originally bounded in books with large red, leather covers along with the minutes. Each of these books comprises a volume. The time frame and number of meetings covered in each volume varies. Volume 1, for instance, contains minutes and supporting documents for the first twenty-two meetings of the committee over a seven month period. Volume II contains minutes and supporting documents for seventeen meetings over a three month period. There are a total of sixteen such volumes (plus the index) for the committee which have been microfilmed on seven reels. Access to these records was restricted for thirty years after their creation. They were formally transferred from the secretariat to the National Archives of Canada between 1970 and 1975.
restrictions on access to the microfilmed records of the committee.

Researchers who want related committee records should use central registry files of the Privy Council Office from 1939 to 1945. These files are known as RG 2, Series B2, in the Government Archives Division of the National Archives of Canada. Heeney filed all of the correspondence related to drafting and editing cabinet documents on this registry. Although there are no restrictions on access to these records, there are difficulties in using them. The National Archives finding aid is less than adequate for this material, especially given that no reference is made to the PCO's filing system, which thus makes it difficult to make sense of it. The whereabouts of the PCO's own original file classification manual seems to be unknown, despite evidence that such a manual was probably created. (File classification manuals set out the main features of the system structure such as file titles and numbers.) Nevertheless, there are ways to gain an overview of the PCO's filing system through a comprehensive examination of its files. As archival and administrative scholars have argued, such as Terry Cook, David Bearman and JoAnne Yates, knowledge of records keeping systems is essential in proper administration of archival records. Records-keeping systems are the most important means by which records creators structure or interrelate their records. Identification and knowledge of the structure of such systems
should be a key element in any archival administrative history of an organization.

The filing system for the PCO's central registry files is based upon a series of codes containing alphabetical and numerical combinations. In all cases, file codes begin with a letter corresponding to the subject and/or agency to which it was related. For instance, codes for material relating to cabinet always begin with C, codes for departmental material always begin with D, and codes for Parliamentary material always began with P.107 This letter is followed by a number corresponding to a further sub-division of the agency type or subject. For example, the number 10 followed by C corresponds to committees of cabinet. The number 12 after the letter D corresponds to the Department of External Affairs. A further number, when needed, then refers to a specific item or agency type.106 The number 3 after C-10, for instance, refers to the Cabinet War Committee. There were obviously clear guidelines for filing PCO material based on this classification system. If a PCO file classification manual was created and still exists, its location and acquisition by the National Archives would facilitate better access to these records. If no manual was created or can be located today, the archives ought to consider creating one as a finding aid.

For information on the Cabinet War Committee, researchers should consult files coded C-10-3 for the war period. Beginning late in 1940, an addition was made to this code to
distinguish between different types of committee records in the possession of the PCO. The following is a breakdown of these codes:

(i) C-10-3-A: items relating to minutes.
(ii) C-10-3-B: items relating to agendas.
(iii) C-10-3-C: items relating to the communication of decisions.
(iv) C-10-3-D: items relating to the circulation of committee documents (especially agendas).
(v) C-10-3-E: items relating to the time and date of committee meetings.
(vi) C-10-3-F: items relating to the "Schedule of Decisions".
(vii) C-10-3-G: items relating to general procedure.
(viii) C-10-3-M: items relating to other committees.
(ix) C-10-3-P: items to be considered by the Privy Council.
(x) C-10-3-R: items relating to the return of committee documents.\textsuperscript{109}

These seem to be the only ten codes in use for committee records in the PCO's central registry.\textsuperscript{110}

The last meeting of the CWC occurred on 16 May 1945. It was not officially abolished, however, until 5 September 1945.\textsuperscript{111} With the end of the war, the status of the secretariat was once again in limbo. Although Heeney could still technically discharge a secretarial function for cabinet, in reality the rationale for his appointment was to improve the administration of a committee of cabinet during a period of crisis. Could he reasonably expect to continue as
cabinet secretary given that the crisis had ended? He was generally praised for his work in improving cabinet administration during the war. He had demonstrated the value of records keeping to the efficient administration of cabinet affairs. The success which Heeney and his staff enjoyed during the war enabled the office to continue its important records administration function after the war.
ENDNOTES


7. NAC, RG 2, 7C, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, vol. 1 (microfilm C-11789). This is the first meeting after the appointment.


9. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 79.


11. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, pp. 204-205. Comments on Heeney's senior staff were made by a team of American researchers who in 1943 were studying the organization of the Canadian government during the war.

13. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 7, file P-50 (vol. II), Privy Council Office Estimates, 1940-41. Estimates list the regular staff of the PCO at twenty for this year. Granatstein makes reference to a staff of forty or fifty, including senior officers (of which, therefore, thirty or forty are regular staff). See Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 204.

14. Ibid.


16. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol. 1, file "Clerk of the Privy Council, 1941-1946: Correspondence, memoranda", Heeney to Pearson, 24 April 1944. Pearson was serving at the Canadian Embassy in Washington at this time.


22. Ibid., memo, Baldwin to Heeney, 27 October 1943.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid. This is my own interpretation of the general theme of topics.

27. Ibid., vol. 1, file C-10-3-B. For instance, Heeney to C.G. Power, 5 May 1941.

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., file C-10-3 (September-October 1940), 28 October 1940, form letter. The same basic statement is made in the minutes of the CWC meeting of 24 October 1940.

30. Ibid. For instance, C.G. Power seems to have listened to Heeney's request immediately, issuing a letter on 29 October 1940 on topics he wanted discussed at the next committee meeting.

31. Ibid., file C-10-3-A (January-June 1941). This file contains letters from ministers acknowledging they will be in attendance. Also Ibid., vol. 24, file C-10-3-E "Cabinet War Committee Meetings, 1942-1945". This file contains lists of ministers expected to attend meetings during this period.

32. Ibid. Samples of such letters are attached to agendas.


34. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 1, file C-10-3-B. This file contains copies of agendas, many of which have check-marks beside each point that was discussed.

35. Ibid., vol. 35, file C-20-2 (vol.1).

36. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 1, (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 5 June 1940, 27 August 1940. Also NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 40, memo, Halliday to Heeney, 19 January 1944. All are examples of official committee documents which use one of these three classifications.

37. Ibid.

38. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 1, file C-10-3-B (May-Dec. 1941). Contains agendas, none of which exceed one page.

39. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 2 (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 27 August 1940. Mechanisms for reports from the board were established during this meeting.


41. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 35, file C-20-2 (vol. 1). File contains agendas from 1944-45, most of which have a component for Pope's reports.

42. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 5 (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 2 October 1941. I have compared the agenda to these minutes and have determined that these items were discussed out of order.


46. Ibid.


49. Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole, p. 192.


52. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 1 (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 8 December 1939, 14 December 1939, 22 January 1940, 12 February 1940. These minutes were added to the central registry in the PCO at a later date.

53. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 35, file C-20-2 (vol. 2). This file is full of excerpts of minutes sent to departments after 1940.


55. Ibid.


57. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 35, file C-20-6. Also RG 2, B2, vol. 21, file C-10-3-A. These files contain rough drafts of minutes with memos distributing them to the prime minister the next morning. One can assume, then, that they were dictated right after the meeting. This was the procedure used, for instance, for the meeting of 11 August 1943.
58. Ibid., vol. 1, file C-10-3-A (January-June, 1941), eg. Heeney to King, 2 May 1941.

59. Ibid. King to Heeney, 2 May 1941.

60. Ibid., vol. 21, file C-10-3-A "Cabinet Committees: War Committee, correspondence re: minutes, etc." Contains ministers requests for changes, 1943.

61. Ibid. I have followed the trail of correspondence and matched it with the creation of minutes to arrive at this average of one week.

62. Ibid., vol. 57, file C-10-3-R "Return of Cabinet War Committee Documents, Minutes." This file contains cover letters with this stamp.

63. NAC, Heeney Papers, vol. 10, "Publication: Mackenzie King and the Cabinet Secretariat - Correspondence, 1953-1967", draft p.10. Also Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 204.

64. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 21, file C-10-3-A "Cabinet Committees: War Committee, correspondence re: minutes, etc. 1943 Aug-Dec."

65. Ibid., vol. 1, file C-10-3-C (1940-41), eg. Heeney to W. Smellie (Clerk of Estimates, Department of Finance), 8 November 1940.

66. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 17A (microfilm C-4873), Index.

67. Ibid., vol. 1 (microfilm C-11789), Meeting A - December 1939, Meeting B - 14 December 1939, Meeting C - 22 January 1940, Meeting D - 12 February 1940. Minutes for these meetings were not actually created until April 1940.

68. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 204.

69. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 17A (microfilm C-4873), Index.

70. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 203.

71. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 12 (microfilm C-4875), minutes, 6 January 1943.


73. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 12 (microfilm C-4875), minutes, 6 January 1943. During this meeting, for instance, the list of officials in attendance also contains information on the points for which they were present during the meeting.
74. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 24, file C-10-3-E. File contains invitations to ministers not in the CWC with instructions to wait until they are notified to enter the meeting.

75. King, Diary, 6 February 1941.

76. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 4 (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 29 January 1941.


80. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 35, file C-10-3-G (1942-45), Halliday to Heeney, 2 December 1943. Heeney requested these figures be compiled for his own personal use.

81. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 118.

82. NAC, RG 2, B2, Vol. 1, file C-10-3-A (Jan-June 1941), memo, Power to Heeney, 5 February 1941.

83. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 4 (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 31 January 1941, p.2.

84. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 35, file C-10-3-A 1942 (July-Dec.), memo, Heeney to Power, 8 July 1942.

85. Ibid., vol. 54, file C-100-10, Conferences - Quebec Conference (August, 1943).

86. Ibid., vol. 21, file C-10-3-A, "Cabinet Committees: War Committee Correspondence re: Minutes, etc. (Aug-Dec 1943)", letter, Ralston to Heeney, 18 August 1943.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., memo, Heeney to King, 19 August 1943.

89. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 3 (microfilm C-11789), minutes, 14 November 1940.

90. Ibid., vol. 16 (microfilm C-4876), minutes, 24 May 1944.

91. NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 40, C-20 (vol. 2) 1942-1945, "Cabinet - Representation, etc.", memo, Heeney to Bridges, 7 February 1942.
92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., Bridges to Heeney, 18 March 1942.

94. For instance, Heeney began using the "Schedule of Decisions" to follow up on cabinet decisions shortly thereafter.

95. Ibid. Heeney to Bridges, 7 February 1942. A good comparison of some of the differences between the two practices is given in an internal report provided for Heeney by Baldwin. See, NAC, RG 2, Vol.40, file C-20 (vol.2), "Memorandum for Mr. Heeney - United Kingdom War Cabinet Procedure", 27 October 1943.

96. King, Diary, 28 November 1944.

97. Granatstein, A Man of Influence, pp. 249-250. The comment was made by Austin Cross in 1951.


101. Mr. Jim Whalen, archivist in charge of RG 2 (Records of the Privy Council Office) in the Government Archives Division of the National Archives of Canada, allowed the author to view one of these original volumes.

102. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vols. I and II (microfilm C-11789).

103. House of Commons, Debates, 1 May 1969, pp.3199-3200. Prime Minister Trudeau announced new guidelines for the transfer of most government records to the National Archives after thirty years. He commented specifically on the release of committee records to the archives and their significance.

104. NAC, Government Archives Division, RG 2, Finding Aids 2-11, 2-12 and 2-13.

105. According to Mr. Whalen, the archives has not acquired such a manual. He has also been in contact with the PCO, which also is not aware of such a manual. It must have existed at one time, however, because of the complexity of the
filing system.


107. NAC, RG 2, B2, vols. 1, 2, 7, 20, 35. Each file fits this pattern.

108. Occasionally, a further number was not needed, as was the case for many files of Parliament. See NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 7, files P-21 (Legislative Program) P-22 (Parliamentary Work) and so on.


110. The author saw evidence of only these ten codes. In addition, Mr. Whalen confirmed in the spring of 1995 that he too saw evidence of only these ten codes.

111. NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 17 (microfilm C-4877), P.C. 5915.
CONCLUSION

In February 1946, King held a dinner at Laurier House to honour both Heeney and Norman Robertson for their efforts during the war. "Never," he told his guests, "would I have been able to endure the heavy burdens of office at a time of war had it not been for Arnold and Norman."¹ Such public acknowledgement was particularly gratifying for Heeney, who knew that King did not give praise easily.² Six years previous, the two men were at odds over the very existence of the secretariat. Heeney, in fact, was close to leaving the civil service because of lack of progress on the issue. By the end of war the prime minister saw the office as an indispensable part of the government machinery. In 1946 the secretariat was still active in cabinet affairs. King chose not to dismantle it when the war ended. Instead, he facilitated its growth by assigning it new responsibilities.

As early as January 1944, when meetings of the full cabinet were once again becoming a regular occurrence, there were strong indications that the secretariat was going to assume some sort of postwar role within the Privy Council Office. At that time, internal suggestions were made to reorganize cabinet meetings along the lines of the CWC. Among the changes recommended was establishment of a weekly meeting of cabinet for which records would be kept. This included
circulating an agenda and supporting documents well in advance of the meeting, maintaining "conclusions", and providing a mechanism for following up on decisions. The proposal described conclusions as a brief outline of the subject matter and the decision reached on each item, as opposed to the several paragraphs of text often found under each item of CWC minutes.

On 15 February 1944 Heeney drafted the conclusions for a meeting of the full cabinet. It was the first time in Canadian history that a formal record of deliberations had been kept for this body. He continued to keep conclusions of cabinet meetings throughout 1944, although not on a regular basis because of his commitments to the CWC. Beginning in the summer of 1945, however, many of the aforementioned changes were in place. Heeney later noted:

> Questions of major policy were reserved for discussion at a regular weekly meeting for which an agenda was drawn up. Notice of such questions, with supporting explanatory documents was required from Ministers, and agenda and relevant papers were circulated prior to the meeting. Conclusions were regularly recorded by the secretary along with a brief minute of the essential features of each subject discussed. Ministers affected received a written note of decisions and follow-ups were sent out from the Privy Council Office after each meeting to the departments concerned with implementing them.

In essence, then, the basic framework established for the CWC was simply transferred to the full cabinet.

Heeney's role in the postwar government was further solidified when King asked him to be part of the Canadian delegation to the Paris peace conference in 1946. He was
assigned as an alternative delegate, with duties relating largely to logistical matters. As he later pointed out, his attendance at the conference seemed only natural: "For hadn't Hankey been at Paris in 1919?" Eight years after coming to Ottawa to develop a British-style secretariat, he was still using it as a benchmark for his own success. Although he did not play a major role in negotiations, especially in comparison to Robertson, his very presence, which was based upon his role as Secretary to the Cabinet rather than Clerk of the Privy Council, nevertheless symbolized the stature which the new office had acquired during this time.

Heeney continued to discharge both the duties of clerk and secretary throughout the rest of King's tenure as prime minister. Unfortunately, no further moves were made during this time to make the secretariat a permanent institution. It still owed its existence to an order-in-council passed nearly a decade earlier, an order which could easily be rescinded. When Louis St. Laurent became prime minister in 1948 the secretariat was largely unaffected. The new prime minister already had first-hand experience with the secretariat as a member of the CWC. He understood its role. Indeed, he relied heavily upon the secretarial staffs within the PCO and PMO, especially during his first few months of power.

After more than eight successful years of establishing and directing the cabinet secretariat within the PCO, Heeney left the position at his own request to become Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs in March 1949. He told the prime minister that it was time for someone else to occupy the position. His replacement was Norman Robertson. Robertson had already held several significant positions in the civil service, including periods as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and Canadian High Commissioner in London. He served in the PCO until 1952, at which time he was succeeded by J.W. Pickersgill, King's former Principal Secretary in the PMO (a job which he also took over from Heeney). Such prominent successors is further testimony to the stature which Heeney had established for the office during his tenure.

The cabinet secretariat formally gained permanent status after the general election of 1957. St. Laurent and Diefenbaker agreed during the transfer of their administrations that the office should be the permanent custodian of cabinet records, thus ending the practice whereby members of defeated governments removed cabinet papers. "We may count ourselves fortunate", Heeney later stated, "that these two men agreed that the British tradition should be followed and that the secretary to the cabinet should be accepted as the custodian of cabinet papers, responsible for determining what communication should be made thereof to succeeding administrations. With that agreement, the cabinet secretariat became a permanent institution of Canadian government."
Today, the secretariat remains a part of the Canadian civil service. It performs all of the traditional secretarial functions as defined in its original mandate. Naturally, subtle changes have occurred to the office over the years to meet modern demands. However, the very essence established by Heeney remains untouched. He was very humble in his own assessment of the secretariat's success, attributing it largely to King who, he said, "had a sure and subtle instinct for the business of government". Ultimately, however, praise should go to Heeney himself. Upon his death in 1970, Gordon Robertson, who was Secretary to the Cabinet at the time, wrote: "It was he who designed the machine that co-ordinates all the vital decisions of government... the basic design is unchanged because he designed it so well." Of his achievements, historian Jack Granatstein later wrote: "Heeney introduced the systematization without which Canada's war could scarcely have been run or won.... He made his Secretariat the smoothest functioning arm of the Ottawa bureaucracy." J.W. Pickersgill, Heeney's former colleague, recently said of Heeney: "He was a dear friend, whom I count among the greatest public servants of my time."

In the case of the British Cabinet Secretariat, John Naylor argues that one cannot separate Hankey from the institution he created because he shaped the secretariat in his own personal image. The same could be said of Heeney. He had a distinct goal in mind when he came to Ottawa which
was based upon his own preconception of how cabinet should be administered, a preconception which was influenced largely by the British experience. He never wavered in his goal of creating a permanent institution above the affairs of partisan politics. After a long evolutionary process, beginning in Canada as early as 1919 with the release of the McLennan Report, the goal of a permanent secretariat was finally achieved.

It is hoped that this study has accomplished two goals. The first, and most obvious, is to relay provenance information about a very important set of archival records from Canada's highest policy-making body during the Second World War. While these records have enjoyed a relatively high profile in the academic community, they have not been examined from the perspective of provenance in the archival community, at least prior to this study. It is now hoped that the findings of this study can be integrated into the formal description of Privy Council Office records in Record Group 2 of the National Archives in Ottawa. It is this information, in the final analysis, which is most vital to their proper administration. As has been demonstrated, provenance information is essential in explaining the final form and content of these records. It is also vital in helping archivists to determine where key bits of information are likely to lie. What has been presented here, then, is simply the history of the record, not an interpretation of its
contents. It is now up to the researcher to apply this contextual knowledge to acquire a fuller understanding of the information in them.

The second goal of this study is much more broad in application. It hopes to expand that body of North American archival literature which uses provenance to relay contextual information about records, information which then reinforces their integrity as evidence for historical research. A record, after all, is simply a product of the environment that created it. It only makes sense that a comprehensive study of this environment will help archivists to better administer records under their care. Although North American archival scholars have generally been slower than European scholars to recognize the potential benefits of these studies, there is, nonetheless, evidence that a "rediscovery of provenance" is occurring on this continent, especially in Canada.23 It is the hope of the author that more archivists will chose a similar path of provenance to unlock the mysteries that exist in their respective archival collections.
1. Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 91.

2. Ibid.


4. Ibid. These documents, then, provide a minimal amount of information because, as has already been demonstrated, CWC minutes themselves were not extensive.


10. J.W. Pickersgill, My Years With Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 60-64.


12. Pickersgill, My Years With Louis St. Laurent, p. 64.

13. For a complete review of Robertson's career, see Granatstein's A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968 (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1981). For his tenure as Secretary to the Cabinet, see pp. 246-282.


17. The present Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet is Jocelyne Bourgon.


APPENDICES

Sources


Appendix II: NAC, RG 2, B2, vol. 1, file C-10-3-B.

Appendix III: NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 6 (microfilm C-4654).

Appendix IV: NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 5 (microfilm C-4654).

Appendix V: NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 13 (microfilm C-4875).

Appendix VI: NAC, RG 2, 7C, vol. 7 (microfilm C-4874).

N.B.: The author apologizes for the quality of these appendices. In some cases, fading has occurred on the original microfilm.
APPENDIX

P.C. 1121

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 25th March, 1940.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated March 23rd, 1940, from the Right Honourable W. L. MacKenzie King, the Prime Minister and President of the Privy Council, representing:

That the Clerk of the Privy Council is charged with the preparation of Orders and Minutes of Council, the custody of the same, the administering of certain oaths of office and the maintenance of a register thereof, the oversight and direction, as deputy head, subject to the directions of the President of the Privy Council, of the officers, clerks and employees of the Office of the Privy Council, and the general control of the business thereof, and such other powers and duties as by law and custom pertain to the said office;

That the great increase in the work of the Cabinet, of recent years, and particularly since the outbreak of war, has rendered it necessary to make provision for the performance of additional duties of a secretarial nature relating principally to the collecting and putting into shape of agenda of Cabinet meetings, the providing of information and material necessary for the deliberations of the Cabinet and the drawing up of records of the results, for communication to the departments concerned; and

That provision for the performance of the said additional duties, referred to in the preceding paragraph, can most conveniently be made, by providing that they be undertaken by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and that for such purposes it is desirable that he be appointed Secretary to the Cabinet.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and President of the Privy Council, advise:

1—That Arnold Danford Patrick Heeney, Esquire, Advocate, formerly of the City of Montreal, and, since October the First, 1938, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, be appointed Clerk of the Privy Council, (in place of Ernest J. Lemaire, Esquire, C.M.G., retired on superannuation), and Secretary to the Cabinet, at a salary of $3,000 per annum, to take effect on March the 23rd, 1940;

2—That, in his capacity of Clerk of the Privy Council, the said Arnold Danford Patrick Heeney perform the duties heretofore pertaining to the said office and herein above described;

3—That, in his capacity of Secretary to the Cabinet, the said Arnold Danford Patrick Heeney, under the direction of the Prime Minister, perform the
duties herein above described, and more particularly that he be charged with:

(a) the preparation for the approval of the Prime Minister of such agenda of Cabinet meetings, as may be required;
(b) the keeping of such notes of Cabinet meetings and conclusions thereof, as may be required;
(c) the preparation and submission to Members of the Cabinet, in advance, of such information and material as may be necessary for its deliberations;
(d) the communication to Ministers, departments and others concerned, of decisions of the Cabinet;
(e) the maintenance of liaison between the Cabinet and Committees thereof; and
(f) such other duties as may from time to time be assigned to him by the Governor in Council.

All of which is respectfully submitted for approval.

(signed) R. G. Robertson
Clerk of the Privy Council
SECRET

CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

Prime Minister and External Affairs:

2. Canada - U.S. Joint Economic Committees -
   (a) Procedure regarding reports;
   (b) Replacement of Mr. R.A.C. Henry on Canadian Committee;
   (c) Establishment of Joint Committee on defence production.
4. Establishment of short wave radio station.
5. Interment of C. S. Jackson.
6. Medical supplies for Russia.
7. Permanent Joint Board on Defence -
   Journal for meetings of September 9th and 10th.
8. Communications and despatches.

National Defence (General):

9. Honours and decorations.
11. Publication of newspaper for troops overseas.

National Defence (Army):

12. Canadian re-enforcements for Hong Kong garrison.
13. Additional Forestry units.

National Defence (Air):

15. Provision of Catalina aircraft to the United Kingdom.

National Defence (Navy):

17. Maintenance of Naval Base at St. John's, Newfoundland.
19. Improvement of ship channel, Seymour Narrows, B.C.
20. Use of Laurentian Club for Officers.
For the Cabinet War Committee:

Re: Relations with Finland, Hungary and Roumania.

Replies to the U.K. government's circular telegram regarding the Russian request for declarations of war against Finland, Hungary and Roumania were as follows:

**Canada** - as decided by the War Committee, namely, opposed to declarations at present.

**New Zealand** - in favour of declarations against Hungary and Roumania, opposed to a declaration against Finland in present circumstances.

**Australia** - subject to United States reactions, in favour of compliance with Russian wishes.

The government may wish to give further consideration to the question in view of the above messages.

A.D.P.H.
Minutes of the
War Committee of the Cabinet
October 2nd, 1941.
A meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet was held in the Privy Council Chamber on Thursday, October the 2nd, at 3 p.m.

There were present the following members:

The Prime Minister,
The Leader of the Government in the Senate (Senator Pankiw),
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston),
The Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Lesley),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald).

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Robertson),
The Secretary (Mr. Heeney).

Canadian Military Mission, Washington

1. The Prime Minister reported upon the progress of discussions with the U. S. Government regarding the establishment in Washington of a Canadian military mission. Since the question had last been considered by the Committee, the suggestion had been made that the U. S. government's objections might be met if Canadian representatives were to be known as a technical mission. It was now understood, however, from informal conversations, that the United States, in reply, would express the view that a Canadian military mission would be out of place so long as the Permanent Joint Board continued to function.

The Chiefs of Staff had reconsidered the question and decided to re-affirm their earlier recommendation. They contemplated that a mission's principal function would be to ensure that there would be adequate Canadian representation at, and participation in, discussions on questions of policy and joint planning which might take place between the Service representatives of the British and U.S. Governments in Washington. Other less important functions would have to do with the maintenance of close contact between the Service heads of Canada and the United States. It was suggested, too, that a mission might act as technical advisers to the Canadian Minister and Canadian Supply authorities in Washington.

(See memorandum of October 2nd, 1941, to the Prime Minister, on Canadian Military Mission, Washington).

2. The Minister of National Defence for Air observed that a Canadian mission in Washington would have the duty of conferring there with J. K. Service representatives as well as with those of the United States. Indeed,
contact with both British and American officers and participation in their joint discussions were the real reasons for seeking to have a separate Canadian mission.

British officers in the United States had the right to make representations to the U. S. Services upon the "strategic" features of supply questions. This was a function which should be given to members of a Canadian mission.

3. The Minister of Munitions and Supply said that, while the multiplication of missions of various kinds in Washington had led to confusion, he would have no objection to a Canadian military mission whose members would have direct access to U. S. Service departments regarding the strategic aspects of supply.

4. The Minister of National Defence stated that members of a mission should be free to discuss the strategic aspects of supply with the U. S. Services.

5. Mr. King referred to the political importance of separate Canadian Service representation in Washington. Canada, because of her direct participation in the war and her intimate association with the United States, was entitled to separate representation; the most important functions of a Canadian mission would be to participate in discussions with representatives of the U. K. and the U. S. Governments and to follow up with the U. S. authorities, plans made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

6. After further discussion, it was agreed that the government continue to press for the establishment of a Canadian joint staff mission in Washington, and that representations to the United States should emphasize the political importance attached to the proposal by the government.

It was also agreed that members of a Canadian mission should have the function of discussing with the U. S. Service departments the strategic aspects of supply questions.

Canada - U. S. Joint Economic Committees

(a) Procedure regarding reports

7. The Secretary reported that he had discussed with the Acting Chairman of the Canadian Section, procedure to be followed in respect of reports of the Joint Economic Committees.

The practice followed by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence might with advantage be adopted by the Joint Economic Committee. It was suggested that, in future, Mr. McKintosh be requested to submit reports to the Prime Minister, as Chairman of the Cabinet War Committee, in order that reference might immediately be made to the Ministers concerned, and recommendations dealt with promptly by the Cabinet War Committee.
8. The Committee approved this procedure in respect of reports of the Joint Economic Committees; Mr. Heeney was directed to advise Mr. Mackintosh, accordingly.

9. The Secretary reported that the Minister of Munitions and Supply had recommended the appointment of Mr. G. C. Bateman as a member of the Canadian Section of the Joint Economic Committee to succeed Mr. A. O. Henry. He was unable to continue to act. Other names suggested had been those of Mr. Symington and Mr. Berkinshaw.

10. The Minister of Munitions and Supply said that, of the names suggested, he felt that Mr. Bateman would be preferable.

11. The Committee, thereupon, approved Mr. Bateman's appointment as a member of the Canadian Section, and it was agreed that a formal recommendation to that effect be submitted to Council.

12. The Prime Minister read a communication from the Acting Chairman of the Canadian Section, enclosing a resolution adopted by the Joint Economic Committee, on September 19th, proposing the establishment by the United States and Canada of a joint committee on defence production. The purpose of the proposed new joint committee would be to survey the capacity and potential capacity for the production of defence material in each country to the end that, in mobilizing the resources of the two countries, each would provide for the common defence the articles which it was best able to produce.

The Joint Economic Committees felt that these important objects could best be served by setting up a competent joint body specifically charged with this duty. The new joint committee would report to the President and to the Prime Minister and make recommendations for so arranging defence production as to minimize maladjustments in the post-defence period.

(See letter of September 19th, 1941, from the Acting Chairman of the Canadian Committee, to the Prime Minister, and enclosed resolution).

13. The Committee discussed; at some length, the recommendation of the Joint Economic Committees, it being agreed that the Canadian government were in sympathy with the objects of the proposed joint committee on defence production as described in the resolution of September the 19th.

The Committee, however, were of the opinion that, if the functions to be given to the proposed new body
were not being adequately performed through existing machinery, it would be preferable to have the work done under the Joint Economic Committees themselves, possibly by the appointment of a suitable sub-committee rather than to create another new and separate organization.

The Secretary was directed to advise the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Committee's views on the subject.

14. The Prime Minister stated that strong representations had been received by the Canadian Legation in Washington, from James E. Carey, National Secretary of the C.I.O., in connection with the continued detention of C. S. Jackson, under the Defence of Canada Regulations. It appeared that Mr. Carey was a strong supporter of Philip Murray and an opponent of the Lewis and Communist elements in the C.I.O.

It was represented that Jackson interned was more of a nuisance to the general war effort, than Jackson at liberty.

15. The Minister of Justice reported that, in the first instance, the R.C.M. Police had been reluctant to recommend such action, and Jackson had been interned with the approval of Council on the strong recommendation of the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Munitions and Supply. He had now appealed from the order and his appeal had been heard by an Advisory Committee under Mr. Justice O'Connor. The Advisory Committee's report had not yet been received.

16. The Minister of Munitions and Supply expressed the view that Jackson's activities had been deliberately obstructive of war production. Responsible labour leaders were disposed to agree with the necessity of drastic action.

17. The Prime Minister reported that, at the urgent request of Mr. J. E. Atkinson for the Canadian Red Cross Society, he had consented to an announcement that, from the proceeds of the Society's forthcoming campaign, $10,000 would be allotted to medical supplies for Russia. It had been suggested that the government contribute a similar amount, for the same purpose.

(See memorandum of October 1st, 1941, for the Prime Minister, re medical supplies for Russia).

18. Mr. King expressed the view that Canada should do whatever was possible for the U.S.S.R., in the present critical circumstances. Stalin's requests to the U.K. government for the despatch of British expeditionary forces to the Continent had, of necessity, been refused by the U.K. government. This made it all the more important to aid in other ways, and Canada
should adopt all means within her power of assisting and encouraging Russia.

Information as to ways in which Canada could help might be available to the U. K. government as a result of the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission.

19. The Minister of Finance did not favour a direct government contribution of the amount suggested for this purpose. Other organizations would, with reason, contend that they were entitled to similar gifts for equally laudable purposes. The Red Cross were collecting large sums from the Canadian public and should themselves undertake this responsibility.

Further, if aid to Russia were important, a contribution of $10,000 would be paltry. Government assistance should be of a more substantial character.

20. The Minister of Munitions and Supply stated that, in the field of war equipment, assistance to Russia had so far been limited to negotiations between American and private Canadian firms; as yet, no government credit had been extended. The U. K. government were most understanding, dealing on a partial credit basis. Personally, he would favour the extension to the U.S.S.R. of a million dollar credit.

21. The Minister of National Defence remarked that the government had always followed the policy of sending assistance where it was most needed, even if this meant that Canada herself went short.

22. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that to date the only substantial Canadian contracts concluded with the U.S.S.R. were for sole leather which had been sold for cash. The U. K. government had indicated to us their own basis for Russian transactions, but there had been no suggestion that Canada extend credit.

Word had just been received that appeals by the British Red Cross and through the Trades Union Congress, to raise funds for medical supplies for the Soviet Union, would receive backing of the U. K. government.

23. The Minister of Mines and Resources agreed with the Prime Minister that aid to Russia was of the first importance. Possibly the Red Cross might be persuaded to divert a larger part of their budget to this purpose.

As to supplying Canadian wheat, he was sceptical of this proving practicable. The U. K. government had large supplies in Australia which could be much more readily transported.

24. After further discussion, it was agreed that a communication be sent to the United Kingdom stating that the government had under consideration the question of Canadian aid to Russia and enquiring...
whether reports from the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission contained information which might help the government in reaching a decision as to ways in which Canada might be of assistance. Some indication might be given of the categories of assistance which had been under consideration.

25. The Committee also approved the Prime Minister's action in agreeing to the contribution of $10,000 from Red Cross funds, for medical supplies to Russia; the suggestion of a similar government contribution was deferred.

(The Minister of National War Services then entered the meeting.)

Canadian Information Office in the United States

26. The Prime Minister said that he had written personally to the Canadian Minister in Washington expressing his own views as to the desirability of establishing a Canadian Information Office in the United States, as recommended by the Minister of National War Services and approved on a former occasion by the Committee. Mr. McCarthy, however, remained of the opinion that such a step, at this time, would be unwise.

27. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs reported that Mr. McCarthy had set out, in a lengthy despatch, the reasons for his stand on the question. On general grounds, he was doubtful of the wisdom of establishing a separate information office and, further, he was convinced that to do so, at this time, would be other-wise than helpful. He would be available to come to Ottawa next week to discuss the question further.

(See despatch of September 26th, 1941, from the Canadian Minister in Washington, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa).

28. The Minister of National War Services said that he was convinced that the establishment of a Canadian Information Office in the United States would be welcomed by the U.S. Administration. Personal advisers of the President were strongly in favour of the project, and the State Department had indicated that they would have no objection. Mr. McCarthy, himself, had admitted the desirability of a more vigorous publicity policy. For this purpose, the more natural and more effective method would be through the establishment of a bureau.

In this connection, a formal submission for the establishment of a "Canadian Publicity Commission" in the United States, was submitted.

(See submission of October 2nd, 1941, by the Minister of National War Services to His Excellency the Governor-General in Council).

29. Mr. King observed that the Committee had
already approved the principle of an information office in the United States. It should, however, be clearly understood that the function of this office would be the distribution of information, and not propaganda. The name "Canadian Publicity Commission" was open to objection on this score. Canadian "Office" or "Bureau of Information" would be more appropriate. The establishment of an elaborate staff and large organization should be avoided.

In view of the attitude taken in the Minister's communication, it would be preferable to defer final action and announcement of the government's decision until there had been an opportunity of conferring, personally, with Mr. McCarthy, next week.

30. The Committee agreed:

(a) that it was desirable to establish, in New York, a Canadian Information Office;

(b) that the New York Office should operate in association with the Bureau of Public Information, in the Department of National War Services, and

(c) that the establishment of the New York Office and announcement thereof should be deferred until Mr. Thorson had conferred with Mr. McCarthy, in Ottawa, next week.

Canadian Short-wave radio station

31. The Prime Minister reported that the U.K. Minister of Information had communicated to him, personally, urging the importance of establishing a short-wave radio station in Canada.

(See telegram No. 150 of September 17th, 1941, from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs).

32. Mr. King observed that this proposal had been considered by the Committee on previous occasions, but had not been approved. While in the United Kingdom, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs had had the opportunity of going into the question in more detail, and it appeared that there were increasingly strong reasons which would justify the government in undertaking the expenditure involved. In all probability Canada would have to establish such a station at some time, and if it were built now, it might serve war purposes.

(See memorandum of September 18th, 1941, from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Prime Minister).

33. The Minister of Munitions and Supply expressed disapproval of the project. It would not be appropriate for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to finance it, nor would he favour the government doing so. Only by the maintenance of a programme of
very high standard and consequent great expense, could
an audience be obtained. Short-wave audiences were,
in any event, very limited. The substantial capital
and maintenance expenditures involved were not justified.

34. The Minister of National War Services
stated that, if the undertaking were to be approved,
it would have to be financed from the War Appropriation.
The capital cost would be approximately $500,000 or
$750,000 depending upon whether one or two transmitters
were installed. Annual maintenance cost would be from
$100,000 to $200,000, with a minimum of $250,000
additional for programme.

If a station were to be established, it would
provide transmission both to Europe and South America
and could best be located in southern Nova Scotia.
The C.B.C. would construct and operate the station.

Canada was lagging far behind other countries
in the short-wave field. Two Parliamentary Committees
had recommended action in this respect. The C.B.C.
and the public generally were in favour of it.

35. After further discussion it was agreed to
defer decision on this question, it being understood that
Mr. Thorson would, at a later date, submit a formal
recommendation to Council.

(Mr. Thorson then left the meeting).

Port Security, Halifax.

36. The Prime Minister reported that he had
received from Mr. Churchill a personal message
regarding the report of the British Naval Security
Mission which had been submitted by Brigadier Craig,
R.C.M.P., to the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
National Defence. Mr. Churchill's cable commended
Brigadier Craig's report to careful attention.

The most immediate of the report's recommenda-
tions had to do with local security in Nova Scotia,
particularly Halifax.

(See memorandum of September 19th, 1941, for
the Prime Minister, from the Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs).

37. The Minister of Justice said that the
Mission's report had been received by the R.C.M. Police,
and been given careful attention.

38. The Minister of National Defence said
that the report, far from being ignored, had been
seen into thoroughly by both Defence and Police author-
ities. As a result of its examination by the Vulnerable
Points Committee, a Port Security Control Officer had
been appointed at Halifax (Superintendent Banes) on
August 1st. Superintendent Banes was to report
at the end of three months on the advisability, or
otherwise, of making Halifax a protected area.

The U. K. government might not be aware of what steps had been taken in respect of security at Halifax.

39. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services confirmed Mr. Halifax's statements that the Security Mission's report had not been neglected and that the matter of point security was receiving careful attention.

40. The Committee agreed that a communication be sent to the U. K. government, in reply to Mr. Churchill's cable, describing the steps which had been and were being taken with regard to security in Nova Scotia.

Newspaper for troops overseas

41. The Prime Minister said that he had received from Captain Leslie A. Mutch, M.P., a copy of a letter sent to the Minister of National Defence, proposing the publication of a newspaper in England for the Canadian forces.

He was inclined to think that to have such a journal published under government sponsorship would be unwise.

42. The Committee referred the proposal to the Minister of National Defence for consideration, and if deemed appropriate, subsequent recommendation.

Canadian Infantry Battalions for Hong Kong

43. The Minister of National Defence reported that the U. K. government's suggestion that two Canadian Infantry Battalions be sent to Hong Kong, to re-enforce the garrison, had been referred to him and approved, after examination by the General Staff. Consideration was now being given to the selection of suitable units from Canada.

44. The Committee confirmed approval of the despatch of two Canadian battalions to Hong Kong; the actual units to be decided upon by the Minister of National Defence, in consultation with the General Staff.

Mobilization and use of manpower.

Canadian Military policy

45. The Prime Minister, in reference to the decision to send Canadians to Hong Kong, observed that it should be clearly understood that the troops were available and that this further commitment would not contribute to the creation of conditions which would make conscription for overseas service necessary in order to meet all of our obligations.
46. The Minister of National Defence said that the two battalions for Hong Kong were already mobilized. In addition there would remain, in that respect, only the provision of reinforcements. As he had said before, however, he felt that the possibility of having to resort to compulsory overseas service was not necessarily the paramount consideration in these matters. He considered that it ought to be considered in the light of the need for the time to time and the man-power available, having regard to the requirements of the Services and of industry.

47. Mr. Ralston stated that on his visit to the United Kingdom in the near future he would be discussing with General McNaughton and with the U.K. government the employment of the Corps of the Armoured Division, and the programme for any further Canadian Army formations or units in 1942. He also wished to discuss the use of the 4th Division and of unbrigaded battalions at present on Coast Defence duties. These discussions would be exploratory; upon them would be based later recommendations to the government. One recommendation might be the conversion of the 4th Division to an Armoured Division for service overseas. United States' views regarding North American defence were undergoing a change, and they might be satisfied that one Canadian division was sufficient for defence here. A number of other subjects would be discussed in England among them the problem of employing trained men under the National Resources Mobilization Act.

48. Mr. King reminded the Committee of the views of the U.K. government with regard to the conduct of the war in 1942. No invasion of the Continent could be attempted next year.

It was often forgotten that Army service overseas was only one of the spheres in which Canadian man-power was participating in the total war effort; in addition there was service in the Air Force, in the Navy, home defence, and employment in the manufacturing and agricultural industries. Compulsion had been adopted for Army service in Canada. There was no reason why the same principle should not be extended to other spheres of war activity in Canada where additional man-power was needed for the maximum war effort so as to obtain the services of those who were not prepared to volunteer. The only exception in principle to the adoption of compulsion was in relation to military service overseas.

49. The Minister of Finance expressed the view that the basis of the conscriptionist feeling in Western Canada was the feeling of inequality of sacrifice under the present system. There existed a serious situation in regard to agricultural labour.

50. The Minister of Mines and Resources felt that it would be difficult to compel agricultural labour; possibly there were not the same difficulties in respect of other industries.
Command of 2nd Division

51. The Minister of National Defence reported that he had received from General McNaughton a message recommending that Major-General Odum be replaced in command of the 2nd Division, and appointed to an Inspector-Generalship in Canada. The grounds for General McNaughton's recommendation were that General Odum was no longer suitable to command in the field, because of advancing years.

It was proposed to defer action in this respect until the Minister could discuss the subject personally with General McNaughton.

Accommodation for R.C.A.F. personnel proceeding overseas

52. The Minister of National Defence for Air reported that full investigation had been made concerning the recent refusal of a considerable number of graduates from the Commonwealth Air Training Plan, to embark for overseas on the S.S. "Empress of Asia". This vessel had previously travelled from the United Kingdom to the Middle East, round the Cape to the United States, and then to Halifax, without fumigation or proper cleaning. She had undoubtedly been in very bad shape. In fact verminous at Halifax when the R.C.A.F. personnel went aboard. While a number of men persisted in their refusal to re-embark, under such conditions, the majority of the contingent had done so.

The Admiralty contended that, in the present extreme shipping shortage, there was no time to have transports properly cleaned and fumigated and that crowded conditions were inevitable. This was true; nevertheless R.C.A.F. personnel were not prepared to accept such conditions.

53. Mr. Power said that, in the circumstances, he had decided to send a strong cable to the U.K. Secretary of State for Air urging him to have the Admiralty take all possible steps to improve conditions.

54. The Committee approved Mr. Power's action in this respect.

Naval Base at St. John's, Newfoundland

55. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services recommended that the Canadian government agree to pay the cost of maintenance of the Naval establishment at St. John's, Newfoundland, the headquarters of the convoy escort base established there by the U.K. and Canadian governments. The Admiralty were paying the capital cost. The Naval forces were Canadian.

56. The Committee approved in principle Mr. Macdonald's recommendation in this respect.

Naval Nursing Service

57. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services reported that nurses were required for the Naval Service. It was recommended that, unless there were
some objection on the part of the R.C.A.M.C.,
authority be given for the establishment of a Naval
Nursing Service.

58. The Committee approved in principle Mr.
Macdonald's recommendation, in this respect, subject
to the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence,
after reference to the Adjutant General.

Improvement of ship channel, Seymour Narrows, B.C.

59. The Minister of National Defence for Naval
Services reported that he had now gone fully into the
recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee for
the removal of Ripple Rock from Seymour Narrows, B.C.
The traffic in the channel was heavy and the only
satisfactory way to make it safe was to remove this
obstruction. It had been concluded, therefore, that
the step recommended should be taken. The cost would
be approximately $300,000.

60. The Committee approved Mr. Macdonald's
recommendation in this respect.

Deputy Minister of National Defence
for Naval Services.

61. The Minister of National Defence for Naval
Services reported that, since the appointment of
Lt. Col. K. S. MacLachlan as Acting Deputy Minister,
without remuneration, Colonel MacLachlan's civil
income had been very much reduced. In the circumstances,
and after consulting with the Minister of Finance,
he recommended that Colonel MacLachlan be appointed
Deputy Minister, at a salary of $10,000.

62. The Committee approved in principle
Mr. Macdonald's recommendation in this respect, it
being agreed that a formal submission to that effect
be made to Council.

The meeting adjourned at 6:30 p.m.

A. D. F. Heeney
Secretary.
Meeting of the
War Committee of the Cabinet
August 11, 1943
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WAR CABINET - UNITED KINGDOM
CABINET WAR COMMITTEE - CANADA

A joint meeting of the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom and the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet was held at the Chateau Frontenac, Quebec, Que., on Wednesday, August 11th, 1943, at 11.30 a.m.

Present:
United Kingdom
The Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (Mr. Churchill),
The Lord President of the Council (Sir John Anderson).

Canada
The Prime Minister (Mr. King),
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Relston),
The Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. McHauld),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Robertson),
The Secretary (Mr. Heeney).

Mr. J. R. Baldwin, Privy Council Office.

Joint session; U.K. War Cabinet - Canadian War Committee; announcement

1. The Canadian Prime Minister welcomed Mr. Churchill and Sir John Anderson. The present meeting had been called for the purpose of discussing matters of mutual concern to the two governments.

2. The United Kingdom Prime Minister expressed appreciation of the action of the Canadian government in making arrangements for the forthcoming conference, at Quebec, with the President
of the United States and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The present meeting had been arranged, in advance, for consideration of questions of common interest to Canada and the United Kingdom. Two of His Majesty's governments were sitting together in formal conference. As a joint session of the British War Cabinet and the Canadian War Committee, the occasion was unique and of major importance and should be marked by the issue of a suitable communiqué to the press.

3. It was agreed that a special communiqué, prepared at the conclusion of the meeting by Mr. Churchill and Mr. King, be approved for immediate release.

Canada's position in relation to conferences
British - Canadian Chiefs of Staff discussions

4. The Canadian Prime Minister referred to the position of the Canadian government and Canadian Chiefs of Staff in relation to the forthcoming discussions with the President and the conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Canadian government had accepted the position that the higher strategic direction of the war was exercised by the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was recognized that the participation of the Canadian military heads, in meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, might give rise to difficulties with other United Nations. It had been agreed that suitable opportunities would be made for consultation between the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff.

5. The United Kingdom Prime Minister observed that arrangements had already been made for a meeting, that afternoon, between the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Further meetings could be held, subsequently, as required, and conclusions reached during these meetings could be reviewed later on by the Canadian Prime Minister and himself.

6. It was agreed that the position as described by Mr. King and Mr. Churchill was satisfactory.

Employment of Canadian Army Overseas

7. The Minister of National Defence pointed out that it had been, and continued to be, the policy of the Canadian government that the Canadian Army overseas should be employed, in whole or in part, wherever, in the judgment of those charged with the strategic direction of the war, it could make
the most effective contribution. (1)

Canada did not demand an equal voice in determining the high strategy of the war, but the military advisers of the Canadian government should, in all cases, have the opportunity of passing upon operations which involved Canadian troops, reserving the right of reference to the Canadian government for final decision.

In view of the long period which most of the Canadian Army had spent in Britain, in a defensive role, and the prospect of further delay before operations would be launched from the British Isles, it was, in Mr. Pearson's own opinion, (2) desirable that additional Canadian formations should be given an opportunity of participating in the Mediterranean area, possibly with the establishment of a Canadian Corps Headquarters there.

8. Mr. Churchill expressed his appreciation of the desirability of employing further Canadian forces in active operations at the earliest possible date. Decision in this respect, however, could not be made until the Combined Chiefs of Staff had, at their coming conference, reached definitive conclusions regarding future strategy. Thereafter, full and sympathetic consideration would be given to the questions raised by the Minister.

9. It was agreed that further consideration would be given to these matters, following the conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Canada's position in relation to direction of the war

10. The Canadian Prime Minister observed that the Canadian government had recognized fully that the higher direction of the war could not be exercised by all of the United Nations, and was satisfied, in this respect, that authority should rest with Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, and their Combined Staffs. While this was so, the Canadian public were increasingly concerned that there should be adequate recognition of the substantial contribution which Canada was making to the total war effort of the United Nations.

It was widely felt that, while Canada had been at war two years before the United States, she was not being accorded, in the council of the United Nations, a role proportionate to her contribution. It was felt that in certain fields in which Canada was playing a major role her right to a more decisive voice might well be recognized.

11. Mr. King stated that the Canadian government appreciated the full information provided from day to day through the Dominions.

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(1) See Note 1, page 9(a)
(2) See Note 2, page 7(a)
Office, the U. K. High Commissioner, and in personal messages from Mr. Churchill to himself. In most cases an opportunity was given for consideration, in advance, by the Canadian government, where Canadian interests were affected.

Nevertheless, in some instances, decisions taken jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States, affecting Canada, had been taken and announced without opportunity for Canadian comment. Such occasionsed serious difficulties for the Canadian government. It was recognized that the necessity for rapid action might compel certain decisions to be taken without there being time for consultation.

He felt sure that the Canadian position in this respect would be appreciated and that Canada would be fully consulted in advance, wherever Canadian interests were affected.

12. The United Kingdom Prime Minister expressed appreciation of the points brought forward by Mr. King.

R.C.A.F. - relations with R.A.F.

13. The Minister of National Defence for Air stated that, while from time to time, difficulties had arisen between the Canadian Department of National Defence for Air and the U.K. Air Ministry, for the most part these had not been of a serious character and had proved capable of satisfactory solution by the two departments, relations between which were excellent.

The matter of adequate mention in public announcements of the operational activities of R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas and of Canadian personnel serving with the R.A.F. was being ironed out, though it had not yet been completely settled. It was not generally appreciated that a large proportion of R.A.F. aircrew consisted of men from the Dominions, particularly from Canada and, further, that separate R.C.A.F. squadrons were playing an important part in the bombing of Germany.

The Canadian public were much concerned in this matter, particularly in view of the publicity given to the activities of U.S. Air Forces.

14. The Canadian Prime Minister observed that Australia and New Zealand were in a similar position to Canada, in this respect. The mention in press releases of "Commonwealth" Air Forces, rather than R.A.F., would help to provide a solution.

15. The United Kingdom Prime Minister expressed appreciation of the difficulty raised
If the Minister would let him have a note on the subject he would be glad to take the matter up in London, with a view to seeing that suitable reference was made to Canadian and other Dominions participation in specific operations which had a marked significance.

16. It was agreed that a note of the matters mentioned by the Minister be communicated to Mr. Churchill for subsequent consideration with the U.K. Air Ministry.

Sicilian operations; Canadian participation; communiques

17. The United Kingdom Prime Minister referred to the difficulties experienced in including reference to Canadian participation in the early announcements of the operations.

The U.K. government had not been less anxious to meet the Canadian request than the U.S. government. It had been possible to obtain earlier agreement from Washington solely because of the greater ease and speed of communication.

Difficulties of this nature were bound to arise in connection with communiques requiring approval of several authorities particularly where, for security reasons, they had to be issued on short-notice. Further misunderstandings of this kind might be avoided if Mr. King were to communicate with him by telephone, wherever he might be.

18. The Canadian Prime Minister reviewed the events leading up to the issue of the initial communiques and explained the importance, from the Canadian viewpoint, of including reference to Canadian participation. Since no assurance had been obtained from London by the preceding Thursday night (when it was thought that the landing might take place) and since the first announcement was to be made by General Eisenhower, he had then communicated direct with President Roosevelt.

Anti-submarine warfare; monthly statements

19. The Canadian Prime Minister referred to the proposal for the issuing of regular An, lo-
American statements on the progress of anti-submarine warfare.

It had been assumed that these statements would refer, in particular, to the North Atlantic, though this did not now appear to be the intention. The R.C.N. were responsible for a substantial proportion of convoying in the North Atlantic area and it appeared to the Canadian government that statements of the kind it was proposed to issue should take account of that fact.

20. The United Kingdom Prime Minister stated that the purpose of the proposal for regular release of information, which had originated with President Roosevelt, was the desire to stop confusion which resulted from frequent fragmentary statements coming from various sources.

The joint statements to be issued would deal with anti-submarine warfare in all theatres of action, and he now intended to propose to the President that they contain reference to the fact that they were issued after consultation with the Canadian Department of National Defence for Naval Services.

21. It was agreed that the reference in the joint statements proposed by Mr. Churchill would meet the situation adequately.

Honours and Awards: 1939-43 Star

22. The United Kingdom Prime Minister referred to previous discussions regarding conditions to attach to the award of the 1939-43 Star.

This award had been intended to recognize the services of those troops who had been in action during the critical early years of the war. Unfortunately the terms of the award did not cover the majority of Canadian Army overseas who, through no fault of their own, had been engaged during the period in the vital defence of Britain.

It was hoped that the Canadian position would be met by a six months' extension of the qualifying period. The U.K. government appreciated the importance of according some appropriate recognition to troops who had served away from home for a long period. Consideration would be given to special further extensions of the qualifying period and he would welcome any action by the Canadian government to provide a special award for its own overseas personnel.

23. The Minister of National Defence pointed out that the Canadian government were not so much concerned with an award which would be available to all Canadians overseas, but rather that the conditions of the first general operational award should not be such as to exclude Canadians who, as
a result of strategic exigencies, were not engaged in operations until after some arbitrary date.

The period 1939-45 was too long to have any special significance, but yet not long enough to meet the special Canadian situation. It would be desirable to extend the period to cover 1946 as well. (3)

(4) It was agreed that the Minister of National Defence review the recent United Kingdom White Paper on the 1939-45 Star to see if there were any modifications which could be made to meet the Canadian position, and in particular whether any discretionary extensions of the qualifying period could be made.

International Civil Aviation

25. The United Kingdom Prime Minister referred to the difference of opinion between the U.K. and Canadian governments with regard to the advisability of special Commonwealth discussions, in advance of a meeting with the United States and other countries.

It was difficult to see how the U.S. government could reasonably take exception to such prior Commonwealth discussions. It would be a natural and proper thing for the nations of the Commonwealth to hold a "family council" in such circumstances.

26. The Minister of Munitions and Supply referred to the position of the United States airlines who were laying plans for large expansion after the war, including extensive developments northward, over Canadian territory.

Under these conditions it would be unwise for Canada to embark upon any formulation of policy with other nations, without some prior opportunity for obtaining the views of the U.S. government.

27. The Canadian Prime Minister said that it was the view of the Canadian government that the institution of prior Commonwealth discussions, on these important questions, would create, in the United States, the impression that the members of the Commonwealth were seeking to achieve a common policy before consulting the U.S. government, and would thereby prejudice the course of any subsequent international conference and the hope of achieving a satisfactory result.

This was true in other fields of post-war policy, as well as in civil aviation.

(3) See Note 3, page 9(a)
(4) See Note 4, page 2(a)
[Text content]
anxious for early settlement of the French position. If definitive agreement was not reached at Hyde Park, the question would be taken up during the coming week, with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. King at Quebec.

33. Mr. Churchill said that he had thought of suggesting to the President that de Gaulle be invited to join them at Quebec. Would this be helpful from the Canadian point of view?

It was hoped that Canada would take no action with regard to recognition of the Committee until agreement on common policy had been clenched with the United States, and that recognition would then be simultaneous and couched on similar terms.

34. The Canadian War Committee were of the opinion that a visit by General de Gaulle, at this time, might have a disturbing effect.

35. It was agreed that no action be taken with regard to recognition of the Committee, pending discussions between Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. King, and that recognition, when agreed upon, should be simultaneous and on similar terms.

Training of French aircrew in Canada

36. The Minister of National Defence for Air said that the Canadian government had been approached with regard to the training of French aircrew in Canada. This raised questions of diversion in the allocation of aircrew quotas under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

37. It was agreed that the Minister confer on this subject with the United Kingdom Chief of the Air Staff.

Further joint session

38. It was agreed that a further joint session of the representatives of the United Kingdom War Cabinet and Canadian War Committee be held at Quebec in the near future, subsequent to the discussions between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt.

The meeting adjourned at 3 p.m.

A. D. P. Heaney
Secretary.
Note 1:

The Minister of National Defence wished to have added to this paragraph the following:

"At the same time we felt that in determining what was best, those responsible would want to know of any considerations which might affect that decision. In that connection the Minister, when in England, had already mentioned to Mr. Churchill that after consultation with our military advisors it seemed to us important that Canadian troops and Canadian Headquarters Staffs should if possible have the benefit of battle experience, to increase their efficiency for participation in the cross-channel operations which are contemplated eventually, and maintain the morale of the Canadian Army as a whole and of the troops overseas in particular. It would also have a beneficial effect on public morale in support of the war effort."

Note 2:

The Minister of National Defence indicated that he was not speaking personally, but for and as a member of the Cabinet War Committee.

Note 3:

The Minister of National Defence wished the following addition to Paragraph 23:

"Although the date was being extended to December 31st, 1943, the six months' requirement might preclude the granting of the 1939-43 Star even to Canadians who participated in the Sicilian Campaign."

Note 4:

The Minister of National Defence wished to have the following addition after Paragraph 23:

"The United Kingdom Prime Minister indicated that he was willing to consider some application of the six months' regulation which would include the Canadians who participated in Sicily, and also sought whether it might not be possible to extend the period 1939-43 for perhaps another year, while the date December 31st, 1943, had been announced, one method might be to insert some regulations to permit the extension of the date at the discretion of the appropriate authority."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Action Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec.2/42</td>
<td>Reserve Army - local transportation costs - approved in principle</td>
<td>Approved indicated by Minister on Headquarters file - file passed to Deputy Minister, December 3, 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.2/42</td>
<td>Military roads, B.C. - financial assistance not granted</td>
<td>No action necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.2/42</td>
<td>Road at Botwood, Newfoundland approved in principle</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff and Military Secretary advised by memo., December 4, 1942.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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