

**Understanding President Bush's New World Order:  
Three Perspectives**

BY

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**Pierre Raymond Joseph Cormier**

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BY

PIERRE RAYMOND JOSEPH CORMIER

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## Abstract

The end of the Cold War and the emerging crisis in the Persian Gulf prompted a reconsideration of American foreign policy. As a result of these changes in international politics, President Bush offered the New World Order as a potential solution to the Gulf crisis. The utilization of three distinct perspectives facilitates the process of understanding the NWO and illuminates the various elements at play in Bush's policy.

The first perspective addresses the affects of American exceptionalism and rhetorical symbolism utilized by Bush to test the waters of American public opinion. The manipulation of rhetoric by Bush served as an important device in his attempt to foster support and understanding from the public for US action. It also served to confirm American leadership and exceptionalism in the eyes of the masses - making foreign policy implementation more easily attainable.

The purpose of the second perspective was to illustrate and delineate the significance of the various traditions associated with American foreign policy since the founding of the republic. The importance of the liberal-democratic tradition, especially the Wilsonian variation, and of realism and idealism serve as intellectual touchstones in the creation and implementation of the NWO.

The third perspective analyzes the influence of external structural determinants upon the development and

implementation of the NWO. Included is a study of the various influences exerted by strategic systemic changes on the conduct of American foreign policy in the post-containment era.

Finally, the notion of isolationism as a feasible policy option in US foreign relations is revealed as a chimera. Whereas isolationism had been essential to the development of the US in the early years of the republic, it now represents an outdated school of thought. Furthermore, the relative success of American-led action in the Gulf alleviated the latent fear of isolationism felt by political elites in the US. This latent fear serves as an explanatory thread within the three perspectives. Pragmatism, as a function of dichotomous schools of thought, is revealed as the only feasible source of foreign policy.



## Foreword

The end of the Cold War and the emerging crisis in the Persian Gulf prompted the Bush Administration to reconsider the basis of American foreign policy. The relatively stable and predictable behavior of the Superpowers and their respective spheres of influence had been replaced by a potentially less stable international environment. In response to the Gulf crisis, President Bush began to make use of the phrase "New World Order" (NWO). The purpose of the thesis is to come to a better understanding of Bush's NWO using three perspectives.

Each of the chapters in this thesis examines one of three perspectives which provides us with an understanding of the meaning and significance of the phrase New World Order. The first perspective addresses American exceptionalism and rhetorical symbolism<sup>1</sup> as used by President Bush to lead the American public into the Gulf War. The second perspective discusses the liberal-democratic tradition in American foreign policy, especially its Wilsonian variation. The third perspective incorporates the external structural changes occurring within the international system which provided the catalysts for Bush's rhetoric and actions.

This study will be undertaken on two political levels. First, the narrow focus concentrates on the domestic

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<sup>1</sup>Symbolism is defined as the practice of representing things by symbols, or of investing things with a symbolic meaning or character. A metaphor is described as an implied comparison between two different things; figure of speech in which a word or phrase that ordinarily means one thing is used of another thing in order to suggest a likeness between the two.

political setting. The first two perspectives are identified and their significance examined. Chapter One introduces President Bush's use of the phrase "New World Order" as a slogan to rationalize American involvement in the Gulf War. As a part of this evaluation, the key elements of Bush's NWO are identified as well as the American role in the Gulf War. Chapter Two focuses on the importance of rhetorical symbolism and American exceptionalism. In Chapter Three, the relevance of the Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy will be assessed.

Chapter 4 introduces the broader context and the second level of analysis which assesses American foreign policy and the NWO concept in terms of changes in the international system. Chapter 4 includes an analysis of the myriad changes in the system and the impact they have had and will continue to exert on the conduct of US foreign policy. These changes include: the end of the Cold War and containment, strategic systemic changes, American declinism, US-Russian relations, as well as polarity and the balance of power.

The relationship among these perspectives forms an explanatory link for Bush's NWO. Changes in the international system (i.e. the end of the Cold War and the crisis in the Persian Gulf) prompted a reaction by foreign policy-makers in the US. They sought to elicit support amongst the public for policy initiatives regarding Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. The domestic political source of Bush's NWO (i.e. the appeal to American public

opinion) evolved as a result of the changes in US foreign policy engendered by changes in the international system. In this context, the liberal-democratic tradition in American politics became an important catalyst for domestic political support.

In other words, Bush's NWO in part developed as a response to the external structural changes in the international system. This created the need for him to employ rhetorical symbolism regarding American exceptionalism in order to ascertain the level of domestic support for intervention in the Gulf. His use of the NWO was rooted in the liberal-democratic tradition of US foreign policy. The origins of Bush's policy can be traced back to early periods of American diplomacy. Thus, this approach to understanding the NWO encompasses both the domestic and external political determinants of US foreign policy and hence integrates all three perspectives.

Not only do these perspectives provide a better understanding of the NWO, but they also reveal an underlying problem facing US foreign policy at the end of the Cold War. This problem consists of the dormant fear of isolationism. Political elites in the US, arguably, fear a return to isolationism as a result of the changes in the international system. The study of American isolationism, both historical and contemporary, as a latent fear of political elites, reveals the importance of continued US commitment to an active role in international politics. The relatively

prudent nature of the intervention in the Gulf served to rationalize continued US leadership and interventionism despite the end of the Cold War.

The changing nature of the international system has prompted the US to adapt its foreign policy to these changes. Certain elements of tradition and change in American foreign policy need to be wedded in order to maintain some semblance of stability in the broader context of international relations. Bush's NWO provides a potential starting point for such an assimilation.

The NWO served as a prudentially implemented policy designed to reconfirm America's ability to intervene successfully in the Persian Gulf crisis. Unlike the indeterminate nature of the Bosnian crisis, the Gulf War provided a clear-cut test of American power at manageable cost opposing a clearly definable aggressor. The Gulf crisis served as an ideal opportunity for Bush to establish a NWO, hence laying the groundwork for policy-makers in the post-containment era.

Furthermore, Bush's policy enabled the US to pursue its national interest in terms of its stake in the maintenance of stability in international politics. The maintenance of US commitments remains essential to domestic political stability and international order. America's continued world leadership also serves the purpose of suppressing the fears of isolationism. The assertive nature of US actions in

the Gulf served to combat the latent fear of isolationism  
felt by political elites in the US.

## Chapter 1: Bush's NWO :An Introduction

The events that dominated international politics during the Bush administration signaled the conclusion of an era in US foreign policy. Correspondingly, Robert J. Lieber argues that " the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have triggered a fundamental reexamination of world politics and the future of American foreign policy."<sup>2</sup> The correlation between the future of world politics and that of US foreign policy is one of symbiosis. The US has retained its role as the dominant actor in the system. As a function of its role, the US must continue to provide foreign policy leadership in the international system. In order to do so, Jonathan Clarke points out that:

A successful foreign policy requires an intellectual underpinning or mooring <sup>3</sup> in a *vision* of the country's mission in the world.

As a result of this conviction, the Bush administration sought a slogan it could champion as a new *vision* of US foreign policy. Doyle McManus recounts the inception of the catch-phrase:

One August(1990) morning in Kennebunkport, Maine, Bush took his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, for a ride on his presidential speedboat, Fidelity. Four hours later, the president came ashore with a ringing slogan that Scowcroft had offered: "The new world order."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Robert J. Lieber "Existential Realism After the Cold War" The Washington Quarterly VOL. 16, NO. 1, Winter 1993 p. 155.

<sup>3</sup>Jonathan Clarke "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy" The Atlantic Monthly September 1993 p. 55. Emphasis added.

<sup>4</sup>Doyle McManus "A new world order: Bush's vision still fuzzy" Milwaukee Journal February 24, 1991 p. 2.

The New World Order (NWO) would become synonymous with American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. The future of US foreign policy found temporary roots in the sloganeering of the Bush administration:

Our objectives remain clear: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately, and without condition. Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored, the security and stability of the Persian Gulf assured, and American citizens abroad must be protected. *And finally, a fifth objective can emerge from these: a new world order in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live together.*<sup>5</sup>

Bush's remarks to Arab-American Groups in Washington, DC, on September 24, 1990 represents one speech in many in which the NWO was utilized as a policy catch-phrase. From August, 1990 until his departure from office in January, 1993, Bush frequently cited the NWO in his addresses and speeches. As Edelman argues, the constant repetition of rhetoric serves a specific function:

Chronic repetition of clichés and stale phrases that serve only to evoke a conditional uncritical response is a time-honored habit among politicians and a mentally restful one for their audiences...Once a term becomes a vehicle for expressing a group interest it goes without saying that it is in no sense descriptive, but only evocative.<sup>6</sup>

In terms of its rhetorical value, the NWO as a slogan was relatively effective in US Gulf War policy. The end of the Cold War and the tensions and dilemmas which accompanied

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<sup>5</sup>George Bush "US Action in the Gulf: A Matter of Principle" US Department of State Dispatch 1, NO.5, October 1, 1990G p. 130. President Bush's remarks to Arab-American Groups in Washington, DC, September 24, 1990. Emphasis added.

<sup>6</sup>Murray Edelman The Symbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press, Chicago) 1974 pp. 124-125.

it allowed Bush to propose an alternative vision for US foreign policy.

Bush's NWO slogan in part emerged in response to the American domestic political reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As a result of the transitional nature of the international system, changes in the conduct of interstate relations became inevitable. The sources of behavior during the Cold War were invariably linked to Superpower tension and the threat of nuclear confrontation. The conclusion of the Cold War brought a system of diplomacy to an end. The US would now be capable of pursuing its foreign policy objectives without the interference of a communist Superpower. As part of this new era in international relations, a new slogan or catch-phrase would temporarily describe US foreign policy. The choice of the NWO catch-phrase was quickly precipitated by the events leading to the Gulf War. William Safire commented that:

As the phrase caught on, Mr. Bush gave it a context of cooperative action to stop aggression. In his 1991 State of the Union Message, he called upon the world "to fulfill" the long-held promise of a *new world order* - where brutality will go unrewarded,<sup>7</sup> and aggression will meet collective resistance.

The use of rhetorical symbolism and metaphor by Bush was not novel. However, the NWO did signify the end of an era. Both the language of politics and the conduct of foreign relations changed during the Bush administration.

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<sup>7</sup>William Safire "The New New World Order" The New York Times Magazine February 17, 1991 p. 14.



The most important changes in US foreign policy concerned the end of the bipolar conflict. New avenues of diplomacy would have to be adopted while others were abandoned as part of a foregone era.

As Laurence Martin states, the end of the Cold War enabled US policy-makers to contemplate a new era in foreign policy:

All the great wars of the past two centuries have been followed by a blueprint for maintaining peace and order. This was so in 1815, 1919, 1945 and again in 1991, at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, President Bush quoted Winston Churchill's hope, expressed at the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter, of a world order in which 'the principles of justice and fair play, protect the weak against the strong'. The President envisaged this as a world in which the United Nations at last fulfilled its own Charter.<sup>8</sup>

The events leading to the successful execution of Operation Desert Storm were of a specific and fundamentally unique nature. The political conditions in the international system allowed Bush to indulge his notion of a NWO in a specific and unique foreign policy situation. Any assumption of the NWO as a "blueprint" for US foreign policy in the post-containment era, however, would be faulty. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to assume that the NWO was meant to serve as a potential basis from which foreign policy in the post-Cold War era could be derived. Bush described the NWO as the implementation of principles which always had a place in American diplomacy. The end of the

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<sup>8</sup>Laurence Martin "National Security in a New World Order" The World Today February, 1992 p. 21.

Cold War allowed the US to pursue more easily these principles without the interference of the Soviet Union:

[W]e and our European allies have moved beyond containment to a policy of active engagement in a world no longer driven by Cold War tensions and animosities. You see, as the Cold War drew to an end we saw the possibilities of a new order in which nations worked together to promote peace and prosperity. I'm not talking here of blueprint that will govern the conduct of nations or some supranational structure or institution. The new world order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It really describes a responsibility imposed by our successes. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace. This order, this ability to work together, got its first real test in the Gulf war. For the first time, a regional conflict - the aggression against Kuwait - did not serve as a proxy for superpower confrontation. For the first time, the United Nations Security Council, free from the clash of Cold War ideologies, functioned as its designers intended - a force<sup>9</sup> for conflict resolution in collective security.

Despite the NWO's departure from the norm of Cold War rhetoric which focused almost exclusively on the Soviet Union, the general guiding principles of US foreign policy remained intact. The transitional nature of the international system did not alter the objectives the US would pursue in international relations. The same values and interests which had dominated US foreign policy since the founding of the republic had remained intact. The maintenance of territorial integrity, national security, as

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<sup>9</sup>George Bush "The New World Order: Relations with Europe and the Soviet Union" Foreign Policy Bulletin - The Documentary Record of United States Foreign Policy VOL. 1, NO. 6, May/June 1991 p.32. Address by President Bush at Maxwell Air Force Base War College, Montgomery, Alabama, April 13, 1990.

well as the maintenance and promotion of a political-economic system all remained essential policy objectives.<sup>10</sup> The values and interests which had allowed the US to rise to a hegemonic position would not be displaced. The end of the communist threat allowed the US to focus on US-Russian cooperation as well as the further promotion of democratic values and market trade on a global scale.<sup>11</sup>

The same values which have dominated American foreign policy for over two hundred years remain relevant today. The epistemology of foreign policy from one era to another may vary, only in degree, rather than in kind. A certain element of continuity continues to exist in the creation of American foreign policy based on the desire to fulfill the national interest. The same sources of policy which had guided policy in the past would continue to exercise their influence on the NWO. The paramount interests of security and survival, of prosperity and stability remains inextricably linked to the national interest.

### **Rhetorical Symbolism**

During the Bush administration, various epistemological sources emerged to provide cogency for a potentially new era

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<sup>10</sup>Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a nation. In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements. Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations. Hans J. Morgenthau "Another "Great Debate": The National Interest Of The United States" The American Political Science Review VOL. 46, NO. 4, December, 1952 p. 972.

<sup>11</sup>Stanley R. Sloan "The US Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush's Global Vision" CRS Report for Congress March 28, 1991 pp. 1-2 & William Schneider " 'Rambo' and Reality: Having It Both Ways" in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild eds. Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy (Little, Brown and Company, Boston) 1987 p. 53.

in foreign policy. Domestically, internal political forces as well as the liberal-democratic tradition provided two valuable perspectives from which to study the NWO.

The nature of rhetorical symbolism employed by President Bush manifested itself in an appeal to American patriotism. Catch-phrases remained an important instrument of presidential public relations. Similar uses of language, such as *containment* during the Cold War, served important roles in defining the American purpose. This tradition in American foreign policy continued with President Bush.

Numerous comparisons have been made with former President Woodrow Wilson as a result of Bush's use of the NWO. Wilson also used catch-phrases as exemplified in his desire "to make the world safe for democracy" as part of his Fourteen Points. Joseph Nye argues that Bush's vision was not novel in American foreign policy:

Like Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points or Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms, George Bush's rhetoric expressed goals designed to rally public support when a liberal democracy goes to war. But after the war, when reality intruded, people were led to compare the imperfect outcome of the war with an impossible ideal.<sup>12</sup>

Unlike Wilson, however, Bush sought to achieve his policy ends by different means. Ideologically, Bush's foreign policy had elements of both the idealist and realist traditions of American foreign policy. The goals and objectives of Bush's foreign policy were often communicated

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<sup>12</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (Harper Collins College Publishers, New York) 1993 p. 189.

in utopian-like rhetoric surrounding the NWO, but their achievement was pursued by the exercise of force and other realist techniques. Thus, his conduct of foreign policy incorporated elements of both ideological traditions.

As a result of this ideological assimilation, the Bush administration was successful in its conduct of policy during the Gulf crisis. The rhetoric used by Bush helped to rationalize multilateralism in the Gulf as well as promoting American patriotism by linking the military response to the NWO. According to Lawrence Freedman, one can detect two versions of the NWO:

The first and most optimistic and positive version of the concept offers the vision of an international community achieving its most cherished values of peace, stability, justice and prosperity. The second, and more moderate, version simply suggests that the international community is now better able to cope with challenges to its basic norms.<sup>13</sup>

Rhetorically, Bush appeared to embrace the first version, as delineated by Freedman, but in terms of US actions the second version is more likely the reality. The NWO proposed a novel approach to the undertaking of foreign relations. The Bush administration was successful in its conduct of policy in the Gulf crisis and the rhetoric associated with the situation promoted public support. The administration's policy was not, however, without fault. It was through a systematic study of the aforementioned topics

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<sup>13</sup>Lawrence Freedman "The Gulf War and the new world order" Survival VOL. 33, NO. 3, May/June 1991 p. 196.

that the validity of the president's NWO can be fairly understood. The future of such policy in American foreign relations may be contingent on the ability of policy-makers to adapt to the changing international environment as President Bush did during the Gulf crisis.

### Key elements of the NWO vision

The Gulf Crisis in 1990-91 provided the source from which President Bush could institute his vision of a New World Order:

When President George Bush declared war from the Oval Office Jan. 16 [1991], there was one phrase that resonated amid the rest of the rhetoric: 'We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a New World Order, a world where the rule of law, not the rule of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.'<sup>14</sup>

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Bush made numerous statements regarding the crisis in the Persian Gulf. During this period of time, he sought to clarify America's position concerning the Gulf crisis as to the potential future of international politics:

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective - a new world order - can emerge; a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Rod McQueen "Bush calls the world to order" Financial Post January 19, 1991 p. 7.

<sup>15</sup>George Bush "Toward a New World Order" United States Department of State Dispatch VOL. 1, NO. 3, 1990E p. 91. Address before a joint session of Congress, Washington, DC, September 11, 1990.

Prompted by this crisis in the Middle East, the President sought to propose a new catch-phrase in American foreign policy. Regardless of criticism, Bush attempted to outline his new policy objectives in order to correspond to the changing nature of the international system. Bush's *vision* was mainly focused on the events in the Gulf rather than on the international system as a whole. He recognized the opportunity for the US to maintain its leadership role in international politics at a time when its influence and power were desperately needed:

We are in a new era - one full of promise. But events in the past two weeks remind us that there is no substitute for American leadership, and American leadership cannot be effective in the absence of American strength.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, the example of American action in the Gulf would hopefully provide a basis for future US actions in the post-Cold War era. The US would now be able to focus its capabilities more effectively on a specific crisis without the overarching presence of a communist Superpower or competitor.

The NWO became an apparent building block for the future of American foreign policy. The actions of the US and Bush's rhetoric provided a basis for the selling of policy in the Gulf. The objectives outlined in Bush's speech<sup>17</sup> reflected the conduct of American foreign policy in the Gulf

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<sup>16</sup>George Bush "Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf" United States Department of State Dispatch VOL. 1, NO. 1, September 3, 1990B p. 54. Address to employees at the Pentagon, Washington, DC, August 15, 1990.

<sup>17</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1990 G

but did not necessarily reflect the general changes in international politics.

The successful prosecution of Operation Desert Storm validated President Bush's rhetoric, but left the issues of change in the international system unaddressed. The NWO of the Gulf lacked the foresight of how it could be extrapolated to a global context despite the strength of its rhetorical fervor. The means utilized against Iraq by the US and its coalition partners were not representative of how all future conflicts could be managed. Furthermore, the utilization of the UN in the Gulf represented an anomaly in that the organization would have to recognize some of the inherent problems within its structure such as the make-up of the Security Council in a changing international environment. The Security Council no longer represents the distribution of power in the international system but rather the powers of the Cold War status quo:

The United Nations can do great things. No, the United Nations is not perfect. Its not a panacea for world problems. But it is a vital forum where the nations of the world seek to replace conflict with consensus, and it must remain a forum for peace.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>George Bush "Outlines of a New World of Freedom" Department of State Bulletin VOL. 89, NO. 2152, November 1989D p. 28. (President Bush's address to the 44 th session of the UN General Assembly on September 25, 1989). It is interesting to note, however, as Larry Berman and Bruce W. Jentleson argue, that in building the international coalition, Bush proved to be a skillful bargainer by trading advantages in return for support for international sanctions against Iraq. The administration canceled Egypt's \$7 billion debt, convinced Saudi Arabia to give \$1 billion in aid to Moscow, allowed Turkey to ship 50 percent more textiles to US markets, ended China's eighteen-month diplomatic isolation (by agreeing to welcome the Chinese foreign minister in Washington), shipped new weapons to Israel, and brought Hafez Assad of Syria into the anti-Iraq coalition (with a visit from President Bush). And, for the first time, the Soviet Union joined the United States as an ally in Middle East policy formulation. See "Bush and the Post-Cold



President Bush's vision of global peace and stability are inherently utopian and represent a future system which cannot be achieved via the means used during the course of the Gulf crisis. The goals and objectives of the NWO are reflective of a *short-sighted* foreign policy. As Michael D. Wallace et al. point out, in crisis situations, leaders begin to focus on short-term "quick-fixes" rather than on medium or long-term lasting solutions.<sup>19</sup>

The short-term successes and benefits accrued from the coalition effort do not properly represent the future of international relations. President Bush's goals of peace and security, "to stand up with other nations against aggression and to preserve the sovereignty of nations"<sup>20</sup> are not without merit but require a clearer definition of the means of achieving these ends. As Clarke points out, US behavior in the Gulf appeared to represent an initiation of policy which could only be pursued with great difficulty:

Foreign policy can no longer be formulated in a resource vacuum. In his inaugural address in 1989 President Bush said that America had 'more will than wallet'...the time has come to align policy aspirations with resource realities.<sup>21</sup>

His skillful coalition-building may not be feasible under different conditions in the future where energy

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War World: New Challenges for American Leadership" in Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds. The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham House Publishers Inc., Chatham, New Jersey) 1991 p. 115.

<sup>19</sup>Michael D. Wallace et. al. "Political Rhetoric of Leaders Under Stress in the Gulf Crisis" Journal of Conflict Resolution VOL. 37, NO. 1, March 1993 p. 95.

<sup>20</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1990 G

<sup>21</sup>Jonathan Clarke op. cit., 1993 p. 62.

resources such as oil are not at risk. Tucker and Hendrickson point out that:

The new world order also rested on the likelihood of the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council. Without that cooperation, the United States would be deprived of the legitimacy it had enjoyed in the gulf crisis. Despite alliance support of the American-led action against Iraq, it was by no means apparent that future actions could be assured comparable support.<sup>22</sup>

### The American role: leadership

The role of the US in Bush's NWO is one of leadership among the actors in the global system. Stanley R. Sloan states that:

The President has been quite explicit in outlining a leading role for the United States both in creating and maintaining a new world order. Even though Administration rhetoric has occasionally hedged by arguing that the United States must 'help' establish or play a 'major role' (versus the leading role) in a new world order, the model of the Persian Gulf crisis is<sup>23</sup> one of strong and effective American leadership.

The role of the US as leader in a new order is representative of that of first among equals in pursuit of collective objectives. US leadership in the international system is based on its dominant position within the hierarchy of states. Sloan adds that "George Bush's new world order vision appears to depend heavily on international support, if not complete consensus".<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose (Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York) 1992 p. 68.

<sup>23</sup>Stanley R. Sloan op. cit., 1991 pp. 22-23.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

The leadership exhibited by the President as well as by the US are similar in that the ability to lead is contingent upon the response of the US public and the international community respectively:

Leadership, then, is not to be understood as something an individual does or does not have, at all times and places. It is always defined by a *specific situation* and is recognized in the response of followers to individual *acts and speeches*. If they respond favorably and follow, there is leadership; if they do not, there is not.<sup>25</sup>

The importance of this notion rests on the assumption that the US may have difficulty building another *Persian Gulf-like* consensus. Furthermore, other leading powers may challenge the US for the leadership and forfeit any opportunity for future collective multilateral actions.

America's role in the NWO according to Bush is much more than leadership. Rather, it is a dutifully exercised obligation to itself and the international community:

We must engage ourselves if a new world order, one more compatible with our values and congenial with our interest, is to emerge...we must lead. Leadership takes many forms; it can be political or diplomatic; it can be economic or military; it can be moral or spiritual. Leadership can take any one of these forms or it can be a combination of them.<sup>26</sup>

The leadership, the power, and, yes, the conscience of the United States of America - all are essential for a peaceful, prosperous

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<sup>25</sup>Murray Edelman op. cit., 1974 p. 75. Emphasis added.

<sup>26</sup>George Bush "America's Role in the World" United States Department of State Dispatch VOL. 4, NO. 2, January 11, 1993 p. 13. Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., January 5, 1993.

international order, just as such an order is essential for us.<sup>27</sup>

As Tucker and Hendrickson point out, Bush was correct in his assessment of the importance of US leadership in international politics:

Even if the Cold War had come to an end, the need for international order had not. Whether [the US] welcomed it or not, the task of providing order to the world was the nation's inescapable lot, given its position as the world's greatest and most trusted power. To shoulder this task was not only a matter of duty but of vital interest as well, given the nation's stake in the effective functioning of the global economy and the spillover effects of instability elsewhere in the world on the nation's security.<sup>28</sup>

Bush suggested that the US would be the principal leader toward, and defender of, a new world order, stating:

[T]oday, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable...Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort. *Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has both the moral standing and the means to back it up.* We're the only nation on this Earth that could assemble the forces of peace.<sup>29</sup>

The US role with regard to the Gulf War was one of undeniable leadership. However the environmental conditions of the international system are still plagued with conflict and crises. The US may not be able to muster the necessary support required for legitimate multilateral foreign interventions. The leadership of the US in the Gulf was

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<sup>27</sup>George Bush "America Must Remained Engaged" Unites States Department of State Dispatch VOL. 3, NO. 51, December 21, 1992C p. 893. Address at Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, December 15, 1992.

<sup>28</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit., 1992 p. 25.

<sup>29</sup>Stanley R. Sloan op. cit., 1991 p. 18. Emphasis added.

mainly based on three factors. First, the moral standing of the US elicited respect as result of its strong democratic values. Second, the military capabilities of the US demonstrated its ability to lead by force, if necessary. Finally, the coalition-building capacity of the US cemented its role as leader.<sup>30</sup>

The combination of these three factors may not easily be achieved in the future. As Rubinstein argues, success in the Gulf was not simply a function of US leadership, but a combination of several factors:

Five circumstances made for success in the gulf crisis: US leadership; US-Soviet cooperation; US military capability; the role of the United Nations; and the willingness of nations to share the burden.<sup>31</sup>

The changing nature of the international system may not allow the confluence of such circumstances in the foreseeable future. A shift from the Cold War oriented ideological conflict to one based on economic globalism and regional nationalism may force the US to reevaluate its leadership role.

The US can no longer afford to maintain the same foreign policy posture as it had during the Cold War. Hendrickson and Tucker point out that:

The US was no longer the defender of freedom against the threat of Soviet totalitarianism. If the endemic dangers of the old world nevertheless remained, it was necessary to acknowledge that the dangers were not the same as those that had

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>31</sup>Alvin Z. Rubinstein "New World Order or Hollow Victory?" Foreign Affairs VOL. 70, NO. 4, Fall 1991 p. 54.

dominated the period of the cold war. Being different in character, they required a different vision of the nation's role. To maintain a peace that remained fragile and subject to instability called more for a *policeman* than the leader of a coalition confronted by a hostile and identifiable adversary. In the *new world* the adversary was no longer identifiable in advance; the adversary was now instability and could materialize in a variety of concrete guises.<sup>32</sup>

The threat of conflict and instability associated with the bipolar balance of power is being quickly replaced by many new potential sources of crises. The influence exercised by the former Soviet Union over its sphere of influence has all but disappeared and has been replaced by a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in all other regions where the USSR had previously chosen to exercise its influence. The former Soviet Union remains as one of the main sources of potential crisis, not because of its direct threat to the West, but because of the threat to itself and all states associated with it caused by the fragile nature of inter-republic relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The inherent instability and uneasiness in the CIS makes it a primary focus of US foreign policy.

In light of the declinist view of American economic capabilities and the increasing relative importance of economic issues, the US may be forced to share its hegemonic position in the international arena. The intervention in the Persian Gulf was as much motivated by access to natural resources as it was by moral principles of intervention in

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<sup>32</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit., 1992 pp. 26-27. Emphasis added.

an attempt to alleviate a further decline of American economic power. On a number of occasions, the Bush administration voiced the importance of natural resources and their impact on the American economy:

We are also talking about maintaining access to energy resources that are key - not just to the functioning of this country but to the entire world. Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's greatest oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.<sup>33</sup>

We cannot allow a situation in which an aggressive dictator has a million-man army, thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, hundreds of jets, and access to billions of petro-dollars.<sup>34</sup>

Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence.<sup>35</sup>

Economics and access to essential resources were influential factors in the proposal of a NWO. Despite the pleas of advocates of "no blood for oil", a military solution was eventually used to answer Iraq's aggression. The US leadership role in this endeavor would signal to some that access to natural resources, rather than principle, has become the decisive factor in Middle East politics. Luttwak offers an interesting argument regarding the moral aspect of intervention and access to natural resources. The dilemma

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<sup>33</sup>George Bush "Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf" United States Department of State Dispatch 1, NO. 1, September 3, 1990B p. 54. Emphasis added.

<sup>34</sup>Dan Quayle "The Gulf: In Defense of Moral Principle" United States Department of State Dispatch 1, NO. 17, December 24, 1990 p. 350.

<sup>35</sup>George Bush "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles" United States Department of State Dispatch 1, NO. 1, September 3, 1990A p. 52.

of weighing the cost of restricted or limited access to supplies immediately essential for survival and the use of force is difficult to resolve. The economic impact of restricted supplies of natural resources has a tendency of affecting all members of the international community, with the poor and weak actors being the most susceptible. The use of force by the US-led coalition in the Persian Gulf should not be interpreted in strict economic terms, but rather in terms of a variety of issues. One of these issues was the maintenance of the relative status quo in the Middle East and in international politics. Inevitably, access to natural resources and regional stability in the Persian Gulf are areas in which the US has an enormous stake.<sup>36</sup>

Regardless of this apparent conflict of interest, the US role as leader has been reaffirmed by the Gulf War victory. This begs the question of whether the US will be able to maintain its supremacy in the international hierarchy despite the relative decline of the use of force in favor of economic capabilities. America will inevitably retain its Great Power status but will have to share the leadership role with other powers in a multipolar setting. Not unlike the fervor of his NWO rhetoric, Bush strongly reasserted America's position among the other actors of the international system. Secretary of State Baker addressed this question on behalf of the administration:

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<sup>36</sup>Edward N. Luttwak "Intervention and Access to Natural Resources" Hedley Bull ed. Intervention in World Politics (Clarendon Press, Oxford) 1984 pp. 83-84.



And let no one believe that because the Cold War is over, the United States will abdicate its international leadership.<sup>37</sup>

The role the US would play in the NWO was very important to Bush. He constantly sought to reaffirm America's multifaceted strengths which would continue to provide the US with the influence it required to lead the international system:

The qualities which enabled us to triumph in that struggle [the Cold War] - faith, strength, unity, and above all American leadership - are those we call upon now to win the peace.<sup>38</sup>

The dramatic changes which had taken place since the end of the Cold War could, in part, be attributed to the role the US had played in international politics. Bush sought to reassert this leadership role in the post-Cold War era. He enumerated the various facets of the American character which had allowed the US to triumph in the Cold War and would enable the US to continue its leadership role:

[T]he patient and judicious application of American leadership, American power, and American - perhaps most of all - American moral force.<sup>39</sup>

These elements of the 'American character' along with military, economic, diplomatic, cultural and other sources of influence enabled the US to maintain its Superpower status for decades during the Cold War. Bush did not wish

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<sup>37</sup>James Baker III "Why America is in the Gulf" United States Department of State Dispatch 1, NO. 10, November 5, 1990B p. 237.

<sup>38</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1992C p. 893.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 894.

to see this status eroded, along with the associated prestige, either by the changing nature of the international system or by the apparent changing nature of power. A radical change from the status quo of American leadership in the NWO would be potentially hazardous and disadvantageous to both the US and the international system. On numerous occasions, Bush stressed this argument. Despite the differences of his audiences, his message remained consistent:

A retreat from American leadership - from American involvement - would be a mistake for which future generations, indeed, our own children, would pay dearly.<sup>40</sup> ...Recent events [the Gulf Crisis] have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power.<sup>41</sup>

As for Bush's view of America's role within the framework of a NWO, the maintenance of status quo US leadership was essential. The emergence and development of US power and influence from the formative years of the Republic to Superpower status was impressive. The maintenance of US power and influence in the NWO could be a formidable challenge. The bipolar status quo has been replaced by a far less predictable and controllable environment:

As old threats recede, new threats emerge. The quest for the new world order is, in part, a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 895.

<sup>41</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1990E p. 92.

<sup>42</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1991 p. 32.

The symbolic value of the NWO as a catch-phrase for Bush was very important. The issue of US leadership was often promoted and defended as an essential variable in a stable post-Cold War world. The symbolism associated with the NWO played a significant role in maintaining public support for the US-led intervention in the Persian Gulf. The notion of American exceptionalism also served as an invaluable rationalization for an interventionist policy.

## Chapter 2- First Perspective: American Exceptionalism and Rhetorical symbolism

The Orwellian nature of the NWO proposal achieved one significant victory for Bush other than that in the Gulf; it galvanized public opinion in the US with his purpose. The overriding intention of the President's choice of words was to create support for his administration in order to avoid domestic political *malaise*. In order to do so Bush imbued his statements before, during, and after the Gulf crisis with notions of American *exceptionalism*. By promoting a *romantic* conception of America's obligation as the "champion of justice", the administration was more easily able to fulfill its objectives in the Persian Gulf. US leadership in the intervention also aided its cause by reinforcing the mass belief in American hegemony:

In the US there has always been a strong belief in American exceptionalism. From the start, Americans have believed that destiny has marked their country as different from all others - that the United States is, in Lincoln's marvelous phrase, 'an almost chosen nation.' American greatness seemed like a magnetic field that would shape the nations contours from sea to sea, and the expansion across a vast continent seemed to confirm that manifest destiny.<sup>43</sup>

Bush's NWO represented his vision of the potential post-Cold War world in the context of the Gulf crisis. He made American leadership, international conflict resolution, and peace the major themes of his foreign policy. The post-Cold War setting of the NWO identified the role the US would

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<sup>43</sup>Daniel Bell "American 'Exceptionalism' Revisited: The Role of a Civil Society" The Public Interest Spring 1989 p. 9.

play, or ought to play in order assure the successful maintenance of international stability.<sup>44</sup> The symbolism associated with the NWO and the desire for continued American hegemony did more than simply rally public support for the Persian Gulf endeavor. It also rekindled the glory of past greatness in American history. Despite the fears associated with American declinism and the emergence of neo-isolationism, the grandeur of the American character was reaffirmed as a result of the Gulf experience.

Through the symbolism of the NWO the pervasive themes of American messianism and mission continued. The notions of exceptionalism and greatness were also part of Bush's Gulf War-NWO rhetoric. Shoring up the confidence and self-assurance of the American masses provided Bush with the public mandate to pursue his foreign policy objectives in the Gulf. American policy became associated with the American *mission* in the world which had developed as a result of the historical experiences of the settlers of America. Stupak argues that:

[T]he Americans started the formulation of their ideas in foreign relations under the impact of the political notion of a mission. Reformation of less fortunate people was to be at the forefront of this mission of America.<sup>45</sup>

Bush attempted to rekindle a sense of exceptionalism in US foreign policy which had been diminished by the Vietnam

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<sup>44</sup>Stability is defined as the absence of war and crisis in the international system.

<sup>45</sup>Ronald J. Stupak American Foreign-Policy: Assumptions, Processes, and Projections (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York) 1976 p. 11.

experience. The purpose of his strongly patriotic and nationalistic rhetoric in association with the NWO was meant to rationalize American involvement in the Gulf:

Our action in the gulf is about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of nations. It is about keeping our word and standing by our old friends. It is about our national security interests, and ensuring the peace and stability of the world.<sup>46</sup>

The leadership of the US in the Gulf was also of paramount importance. Often, as has been cited in Chapter One, Bush sought to promote the significance of the American role in international politics. The apparent mass acceptance of a US-lead multilateral intervention in the Persian Gulf helped to replenish the patriotism and chauvinism which had served as a motivation for US actions in the past. Christopher Thorne notes that President Bush stated himself that 'America rediscovered itself during Desert Storm'.<sup>47</sup>

Bush also promoted the notion of American resolve as well as America's position in international politics as sources of inspiration and enlightenment:

You know how America remains the hope of "liberty-loving people everywhere." Half a century ago, the world had a chance to stop a ruthless dictator and missed it. I pledge to you: We will not make that mistake again.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1990B p. 54.

<sup>47</sup>Christopher Thorne "American Political Culture and the End of the Cold War" Journal of American Studies VOL. 26, NO 3, 1992 p. 330.

<sup>48</sup>George Bush "America's Stand Against Aggression" United States Department of State Dispatch VOL 1, NO 1, September 3, 1990C Address to the ninety-first national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, August 20, 1990 p. 57.

Coupled with his rhetoric regarding the leadership role of the US, Bush's *missionary* references promoted self-confidence and acceptance of US involvement in the Gulf. The process of rationalization included both the reification of American leadership and mission in the world despite the end of the Cold War. Even in the context of contemporary policy such as that associated with the NWO, exceptionalism continued to retain its relevance and importance in the conduct of American foreign policy.

### American Exceptionalism

The origins of exceptionalism in American society find their roots in the early colonial settlements even before the founding of the Republic. Rupert Wilkinson delineates several phases of development in the growth of exceptionalism:

Early American society developed its concern with social character in three stages. First, in colonial New England, the *Puritan task*, the idea of a "special commission" from God to build a Christian commonwealth, required a people to reassess constantly their spiritual and social progress, or lack of it. Second, the assertion of *republicanism* contained the belief that democracy depended on the virtue of the people and their resistance to foreign corruptions - all the more as their nation was founded on a set of moral and political principles. Third, the anxieties of *cultural nationalism* before the Civil War impelled Americans to find qualities in themselves that bound them together while distinguishing them from their parent civilizations.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>Rupert Wilkinson The Pursuit of American Character (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York) 1988 pp. 8-9.

In the context of the NWO, exceptionalism remained a paramount motivational aspect of US foreign policy. The significant challenge of "standing up to the Iraqi aggression" necessitated an elevation of American patriotism and jingoism in order to rationalize action. In an address before a joint session of Congress on September 11, 1990, President Bush reiterated the very principles described by Wilkinson. Similar with many of his other speeches and addresses, Bush's "Toward a New World Order" provides significant harmony with the roots of American exceptionalism:

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt<sup>50</sup> our staying power. We will stand by our friends.

In the final analysis, our ability to meet our responsibilities abroad depends upon our political will and consensus at home. This is never easy in democracies, for we govern only with the consent of the governed. Although free people in a free society are bound to have their differences, Americans traditionally come together in times of adversity and challenge.<sup>51</sup>

For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital. Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing; a woven piece, strongly bound as Old Glory.<sup>52</sup>

The sense of moral and political superiority associated with exceptionalism pervades the rhetoric of Bush's NWO-Gulf War campaign. The perception of America as special, virtuous, and unique; these connotations of a *sui generis*

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<sup>50</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1990E p. 92.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 93.



exceptionalism find themselves interwoven in Bush's NWO rhetoric. The importance and strength of American leadership in the context of the NWO revealed the significance of America's moral strength as a vital component of US leadership. As Davis and Lynn-Jones argue, American exceptionalism is a profoundly diverse doctrine:

American exceptionalism not only celebrates the uniqueness and special virtues of the United States, but also elevates America to a higher moral plane than other countries. Exceptionalism lies at the heart of the persistent moralism prevalent in American foreign policy. Exceptionalist ideas have influenced American foreign policy throughout US history, but the consequences have varied greatly. Ironically, exceptionalism can stimulate both crusading interventionism and complacent withdrawal from world affairs. The sense of moral superiority on which exceptionalism is based and the attendant American determination to spread American ideals around the world have justified all manner of US involvement in foreign affairs. But this same sense of superiority has also sometimes given Americans an excuse to remain smug and content in an isolationist cocoon, well protected from "corrupt" and "inferior" foreigners.<sup>53</sup>

In the context of the NWO, Bush choose to champion American exceptionalism as a rationale for *crusading interventionism* in the Persian Gulf. The apparent elasticity of exceptionalism in foreign relations - from isolationism to interventionism - would appear to provide a sound rationalization for a wide spectrum of US foreign policy behavior. Bush was able to capitalize on the wide range of interpretations associated with exceptionalism and utilize the doctrine to further US foreign policy

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<sup>53</sup>Tami R. Davis & Sean M. Lynn-Jones "Citty Upon a Hill" Foreign Policy NO 66, Spring 1987 pp. 20-21.

objectives. Both before and after the Gulf War, he continued to reiterate America's unique status and role in international politics:

[T]here is no nation on earth with greater resolve or stronger steadiness of purpose.<sup>54</sup>

Amid the triumph and tumult of the recent past[Gulf War], one truth rings out more clearly than ever. America remains today what Lincoln said it was more than a century ago: the last best hope of man on earth.<sup>55</sup>

The notion of exceptionalism as it was espoused by President Bush played an important role in the formulation of the NWO. The notion of exceptionalism present in the NWO-Gulf War sloganeering was consistent with the traditional American interpretation of the *sui generis* nature of the American situation. Jack P. Greene describes exceptionalism as an integral aspect of the American character:

The concept of American exceptionalism with its positive connotations was present at the very creation of America. Rooted in the earliest efforts by Europeans to come to terms with the newfound continents on the western side of the Atlantic and the new societies they were creating there, this concept, already by the end of the sixteenth century and well before the English had succeeded in establishing permanent settlements anywhere in the Americas, had become one of the principal components in the identification of America.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>George Bush "Taped Address To the Iraqi People" United States Department of State Dispatch September 24, 1990F Remarks in a videotape to the people of Iraq from the Oval Office, September 12, 1990, and broadcast in Iraq, September 17, 1990 p. 114.

<sup>55</sup>George Bush "America Must Remain Engaged" United States Department of State Dispatch VOL. 3, NO. 51, December 21, 1992C Address at Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas, December 15, 1992 p. 893.

<sup>56</sup>Jack P. Greene The Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity From 1492 To 1800 (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London) 1993 p. 6.

Exceptionalism therefore became an indispensable component of the very fabric of American society, even before the founding of the Republic. The notion often served as a means of unifying diverse individuals into a collective and homogeneous body exclusive from the imperialistic and autocratic nature of European politics and society. Exceptionalism played an important role in the definition of the American ethos.

The development of exceptionalism coincided with the growth and development of American society. As America progressed and expanded, exploring the frontier and establishing roots on the North American continent, the American character also expanded, reconfirming the collective belief in exceptionalism. Greene argues that:

During the [sixteenth and seventeenth] centuries, moreover, the English experience in North America and the eventual establishment of the independent and extended republic of the United States during the last quarter of the eighteenth century only served to enhance [exceptionalism's] explanatory authority for those many contemporaries who sought- through their words and their behavior - to articulate or to realize the meaning of America. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the idea of America as an exceptional entity had long been an integral component in the identification of America.<sup>57</sup>

The association of exceptionalism with America continued into the twentieth century. The traditions which had been born out of the growth of a nation remained essential components of the American social and political structure. As the US emerged, first as a Great Power and

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<sup>57</sup>Jack P. Greene op. cit., 1993 pp. 6-7.

then as a Superpower, exceptionalism provided much of the traditional rationale which had guided the conduct of US foreign policy since the first colonial settlement. Exceptionalism in American political culture served an important role in the conduct of foreign policy throughout the history of the Republic. As Reinhold Niebuhr states, even the American sense of mission is different and unique from other states:

Most of the nations, in Western culture at least, have acquired a sense of national mission at some time in their history. Our nation was born with it. England acquired it after the Revolution of 1688 and viewed the Magna Carta retrospectively in the light of its newly developed democratic mission. Russian messianism was derived from its consciousness of being the "third Rome". Like Israel of old, we were a messianistic nation from our birth. The Declaration of Independence and our Constitution defined the mission. We were born to exemplify the virtues of democracy and to extend the frontiers of the principles of self-government throughout the world.<sup>58</sup>

America's manifest destiny has had a significant impact on the conduct of its foreign policy, including that of President Bush. In the context of the NWO, exceptionalism served an important role in the conduct of policy as it has since the founding of the Republic. Exceptionalism has provided a basis from which the American *national style*<sup>59</sup> of foreign policy could be carried out in a consistent manner.

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<sup>58</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr & Alan Heimert A Nation So Conceived: Reflections on the History of America from Its Early Visions to Its Present Power (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York) 1962 p. 123.

<sup>59</sup>National style in foreign policy or diplomacy may be understood as a nation's basic assumptions and beliefs about the world and its own role or place in it. National style conditions the nation's perceptions and judgments, the kinds of claims it advances to the world, as well as its manner of formulating, presenting, and executing them. It affects perception, judgment, and modes of behavior on the international plane. Knud Krakau "American Foreign Relations: A National Style?" Diplomatic History VOL. 8, NO. 3, Summer 1984 p. 255.

President Bush's NWO and the rhetoric associated with it would appear to confirm the importance of the notion of exceptionalism in American politics. Exceptionalism and the rhetoric devoted to its continuation reinforce an integral component of the American character and provide a homogeneous foundation from which to conduct policy:

The new world order really is a tool for addressing a new world of possibilities. This order gains its mission and shape not just from shared interests but from shared ideals. And the ideals which have spawned new freedoms throughout the world have received their boldest and clearest expressions in our great country, the United States. Never has the world looked more to the American example. Never before have so many millions drawn hope from the American ideas. And the reason is simple: Unlike any other nation in the world, as Americans we enjoy profound and mysterious bounds of affection and idealism. We feel our deep connections to communities, to families, to our faiths. But what defines this nation? What makes us America is not our ties to a piece of territory or bonds of blood; what makes us American is our allegiance to an idea that all people everywhere must be free. This idea is an old and enduring as this nation itself - as deeply rooted, and what we are as a promise implicit to all the world in the words of our own Declaration of Independence.<sup>60</sup>

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which led the US into the Middle Eastern conflict served as the catalytic event in the formulation of the NWO. US behavior in the Persian Gulf and Bush's rhetoric reestablished the confidence of public opinion which remembered the failure of the Vietnam experience. The President's words served as positive reinforcement for a nation hesitant to become embroiled in foreign entanglements despite its jingoistic foreign policy

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<sup>60</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1991 p. 34.

tradition. The mass public was once again allowed to reassert its patriotism and its pride in America. Reminiscent ideas of glory once again became an active part of American culture:

[Bush] repeatedly promised that, should war come to the Persian Gulf, it would be "no Vietnam". The President explained, "If there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs, and I pledge to you there will not be any murky ending. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win and then get out as soon as possible...In our country I know that there are fears of another Vietnam. Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war."<sup>61</sup>

The rhetoric and actions associated with the Gulf War in the context of the NWO served the invaluable purpose of dispelling the fear of the Vietnam syndrome.<sup>62</sup> As Tucker and Hendrickson argue:

The specter that had presumably been buried forever was the pervasive doubt that America could and would again effectively employ its military power in the world...The specter of Vietnam - indeed, the Vietnam syndrome itself was first and foremost the fear of another defeat. By contrast, the promise of the gulf is that of a future in which the nation will never again be frustrated, let alone experience defeat, in war.<sup>63</sup>

The positive outcome of the Gulf War signaled the end of an era in American foreign policy which had been plagued by the fear of another Vietnam-like situation. The prospect

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<sup>61</sup>George Bush as cited in Larry Berman and Bruce W. Jentelson eds., op. cit., 1991 p. 116.

<sup>62</sup>The relative success of the Gulf War in quelling public anxieties regarding the Vietnam syndrome is well developed in Chapter 13, The Redemption of Vietnam, in Tucker and Hendrickson's The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose (Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York) 1992

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp. 154-155.

of the uncertain use of force in the future would have potentially continued to impair the implementation of policy in the US. The success of the US-led coalition in the Gulf enabled President Bush to exorcise the infamous legacy of Vietnam.

The ability of the US to exercise power successfully in the Gulf on such a grand scale at a relatively low cost invariably reaffirmed public confidence in American interventionism. In the context of the NWO and the Gulf War, public support for Bush and his policy decisions was relatively high. As part of the rhetoric associated with the NWO, he addressed the issue of America's apparent inability to purge itself of the Vietnam syndrome:

In a radio address on the morrow of victory President Bush declared that "The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula." In a similar though less formal vein he confided to a smaller group: "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."<sup>64</sup>

The strength and resolve of the US-led coalition effort in the Gulf not only dispelled the fear of another Vietnam but confirmed America's preeminent position in international politics. Furthermore, as the cost and casualty levels remained relatively low for the coalition forces, public support for American interventionism in the Gulf increased.

As the American public began to approve of foreign policy *en masse*, Bush acquired significantly more power to pursue foreign policy objectives by whatever means he

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<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 154.

deemed necessary. Murray Edelman described this phenomenon as a symbiotic relationship between the leader and masses. Edelman stated that:

Governmental leaders have tremendous potential capacity for evoking strong emotional response in large populations. When an individual is recognized as a legitimate leading official of the state, he becomes a symbol of some or all the aspects of the state: its capacity for benefiting and hurting, for threatening and reassuring. His acts, for this reason, are public in character. They are perceived as having significant, strong, enduring, indirect consequences for large numbers of people.<sup>65</sup>

### Rhetorical Symbolism

Political symbols developed by Bush in order to secure support include reference to the victory of democracy as well as order and stability in the international system. The concept of a "New World Order" holds important symbolic significance. The symbol of a NWO and America's leadership reiterate the common belief that "America is a providential nation, the one whose dedication to liberty and to the dignity of the individual lays the foundation for a *new and better world*."<sup>66</sup> David Gergen points out that Bush's rhetoric and use of symbolism, such as personifying Saddam Hussein as the "Butcher of Baghdad" promoted public support. Bush's forceful leadership and strong actions were also instrumental in renewing American public confidence:

Not since the end of WW II had so many Americans, some 90 percent, given their president such heartfelt approval. Far more than the collapse of

<sup>65</sup>Murray Edelman op. cit., 1974 pp. 73-74.

<sup>66</sup>Daniel Bell op. cit., 1989 p. 10. (emphasis added)



the Berlin Wall, which stirred only modest hurrahs, the Gulf War seemed to mean a magical restoration of America's greatness. That Saddam remained in power and that the US at first stayed on the sidelines as his troops smothered Kurdish and Shiite uprisings did little to take the sheen off the war for the public. Six months after the conflict some 75 percent of those polled continued to think that the war had been worth it and that the US had scored a big win.<sup>67</sup>

Bush's symbolism serves a very important role in that regard:

Condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness: some one of these or all of them.<sup>68</sup>

Symbolism also manifested itself in the creation of an enemy for the American people. Bush compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler and sought to magnify the negative characteristics of the opponent in the Middle East. The rhetoric appealed to the emotions and values of American citizens. By personifying the conflict, Bush demonstrated the Manicheanistic dichotomy between the US and Saddam Hussein. Hussein became associated with the Manichean or Gnostic notion of the "other" - the antithesis of the US. Barbara Kellerman points out that:

The enemy, the fiend, the "other", is identified and labeled, and becomes in time an object to be obliterated at all costs. Nazis, Hitler, swastika; Commies, Stalin, hammer and sickle; red Chinese, North Koreans, Viet Cong; and recently a new nemesis, the swaggering, suddenly familiar figure of Saddam Hussein. Presidents become persuaded that their antagonists are genuinely

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<sup>67</sup>David Gergen "America's Missed Opportunities" Foreign Affairs VOL. 71, NO. 1, 1992 pp. 10-11.

<sup>68</sup>Murray Edelman op. cit., 1974 p. 6.

evil, and thereby justify the violence of their campaign against them to the American people.<sup>69</sup>

This view is reflected by both Bush and vice-president Quayle:

Saddam has claimed that this is a holy war of Arab against infidel - this from the man who has used poison gas against the men, women, and children of his own country, who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Muslims, and who now plunders Kuwait. The reports out of Kuwait tell a sordid tale of brutality.<sup>70</sup>

The American people understand that Saddam Hussein's Iraq poses a long-term threat not just to its neighbors but to us ... and that unless he is stopped today, a nuclear-armed Iraq will control the bulk of the world's energy supply tomorrow, thereby holding a gun to all our heads.<sup>71</sup>

By creating a symbolic enemy, Bush was able to justify intervention in Kuwait by means of force. The administration was able to further its goal of promoting the NWO by linking it to the military response in Kuwait. Edelman goes further by pointing out that the *misintelligence* of the masses is highly receptive to political rhetoric which serve as symbols for the public to absorb or "drink up". These symbols, he argues, "have to be dramatic in outline and empty of realistic detail"<sup>72</sup> if they wish to have mass appeal. As Voss et. al. argue, "metaphor has long been regarded as a rhetorical device that can

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<sup>69</sup>Barbara Kellerman "How Presidents Take The Nation Into War" The New York Times January 20, 1991 Section 4, p. 2.

<sup>70</sup>George Bush op. cit., 1990B p. 54.

<sup>71</sup>Dan Quayle op. cit., 1990 p. 350.

<sup>72</sup>Murray Edelman op. cit., 1974 pp. 8-9.

facilitate persuasion."<sup>73</sup> On this point, President Bush attempted to provoke greater consensus in public opinion by using language which evoked strong emotional responses in order to expedite the intervention in Kuwait:

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities - and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.<sup>74</sup>

The very language in which developments such as these are discussed make it difficult to react to them except as threats. Symbols like "Saddam Hussein", "Iraq" and the "Butcher of Baghdad" can come to stand so repeatedly for danger, according to Edelman, that adaptive thinking becomes unlikely, and political actions that accept Saddam Hussein or Iraq as reasonable or as potential associates are met with hostility.<sup>75</sup> As Voss et. al. demonstrate, the use of metaphor such as '*Hussein is another Hitler*' serves to justify the argument against Hussein and Iraq.<sup>76</sup> The public perception in this case is clarified regarding Hussein, making the images associated with him more understandable to the masses. Furthermore, not only the Bush administration but both sides of Congress employed similar metaphors to connote their perception of Hussein:

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<sup>73</sup>James F. Voss, Joel Kennet, Jennifer Wiley, and Tonya Y. E. Schooler " Experts at Debate: The Use of Metaphor in the US Senate Debate on the Gulf Debate" Metaphor and Symbolic Activity VOL. 7, NO. 3+4, 1992 p. 199.

<sup>74</sup>George Bush as cited in Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson op. cit., 1992 p. 92.

<sup>75</sup>Murray Edelman op. cit., 1974 p. 15.

<sup>76</sup>James F. Voss, Joel Kennet, Jennifer Wiley, and Tonya Y. E. Schooler op. cit., 1992 p. 199.

Both sides referred to a 'Saddam Hussein machine'. Hussein was seen as a violent criminal: Both sides called him a 'rapist', 'thief', and 'villain'; Republicans added 'robber', 'plunderer', 'murderer', 'cutthroat', 'blackmailer', and 'thug'. Several psychological disorders were attributed to Hussein: 'fanatic', 'madman', 'power addict', 'egomaniac',<sup>77</sup> 'megalomaniac', and 'geopolitical glutton'.

In Hussein, President Bush and the American people found the perfect enemy, and with his invasion of Kuwait a clear-cut legal and moral issue.<sup>78</sup>

The political capital of public support often determines the conduct of foreign policy. What is required is a perpetuation of an image of the enemy which narrows the focus of policy to direct threats to the interests of the public.<sup>79</sup> A common enemy, according to Norman J. Ornstein, provides the glue that binds society together and reason to overcome doubts and resentments about other forces and decision-makers.<sup>80</sup>

Under certain conditions, such as those surrounding the Persian Gulf crisis, power over public opinion is no less essential for political purposes than military and economic power.<sup>81</sup> E. H. Carr adds that:

The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader. Rhetoric has a long and honored record in the annals of statesmanship.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., pp. 204-205.

<sup>78</sup>Carla Anne Robbins "Is There a New World Order?" US News & World Report March 11, 1991 p. 50.

<sup>79</sup>James Schlesinger "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs VOL. 72, NO. 1, 1993 p. 19.

<sup>80</sup>Norman J. Ornstein "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election" Foreign Affairs VOL. 71, NO. 3, Summer 1992 p. 7.

<sup>81</sup>E. H. Carr The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (MacMillan, London) 1962 p. 132.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

Persuasion and showmanship became part of Bush's foreign policy campaign. Edelman argues that decision-making at the highest levels is not as much literal policy-making as it is dramaturgy.<sup>83</sup>

President Bush's leadership during the course of the Gulf campaign was without reproach on the domestic scene. The Gulf War rhetoric was timely in that it reinforced a sense of *exceptionalism* in the American public which may have been lacking since the *quiet* conclusion of the bipolar conflict. Edelman proposed that:

[L]eaders and the led provide essential psychological benefits for each other. The leader's dramaturgical jousts with public problems make the world understandable and convey the promise of collective accomplishment to masses who are bewildered, uncertain, and alone.<sup>84</sup>

The acquiescence of public opinion provides a necessary element of justification for the leader which he may consciously or unconsciously require or desire.

The manipulation of rhetoric by President Bush in the context of the NWO served as an important device in his attempt to foster support and understanding for US interventionism in the Persian Gulf. The reification of American leadership and continued exceptionalism provided justification for Bush's *foray* into the Gulf. As a result of the apparently heightened jingoism in US foreign policy, American objectives were more easily attained.

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<sup>83</sup>Murray Edelman op. cit., 1974 p. 78.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

The substance of Bush's rhetoric associated with the NWO-Gulf War situation remained highly consistent with the ideological traditions of American foreign policy. The cogency of Bush's rhetoric was reflected in the support his policies garnered both domestically and abroad. The symbolism associated with the NWO provided reinforcement and reification of the fragile notions of leadership and exceptionalism in American politics.

The NWO reflected both traditions in American politics. Idealism or utopianism was reflected in Bush's rhetoric while realism was demonstrated via the use of force in the Gulf. These traditions in American foreign policy enabled Bush to pursue the US-led coalition's objectives in the Gulf crisis. Elements of both idealistic messianism and power politics were implemented simultaneously in the context of the NWO. The implementation of a multilateral collective security-like approach to the crisis provided a suitable framework for successful intervention. In the context of the NWO, both idealism and realism played important roles in the development of the NWO-Gulf War policy.

### Chapter 3- Second Perspective: The NWO and the Liberal-Democratic Tradition

In the context of the NWO, many comparisons have been articulated regarding the similarity of Bush's vision and that of Woodrow Wilson. Bush's goals were not novel and found their roots in the traditions of twentieth-century American diplomacy. The reemergence of Wilsonianism, however, may provide an opportunity to adapt foreign policy to the changing nature of the system.

The Wilsonian approach to foreign policy encouraged a collective multilateral approach rather than the old politics of the balance of power. The Wilsonian tradition which has been associated with Bush's NWO, emerged as a result of the similarities of the proposals undertaken by these two individuals in two different times of international political transition. The conclusion of WW I marked the end of the balance of power system as it had previously been known much in the same manner as the end of the Cold War ended the bipolar system which had persisted for over four decades. Wilson sought to adjust American foreign policy to the changing international environment:

[A]t the end of World War I, Wilson proposed the end of the [balance of power] system in favor of one which he believed more promising as a means of regulating power relations.<sup>85</sup>

Bush's NWO was not dissimilar in that it represented a relative shift away from the 'old politics' of the bipolar

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<sup>85</sup>Inis L. Claude Jr. Power and International Relations (Random House, New York) 1962 p.78.

balance of power in favor of a collective security-like approach.<sup>86</sup> Unlike Wilson, however, Bush sought to maintain the status quo despite the transitional nature of the system. The maintenance of the status quo in a NWO would presumably mitigate crises during this period of upheaval.<sup>87</sup>

Richard Falk stated that:

[T]he Persian Gulf War appeared as a watershed between past and future, a test of whether the possibilities of peace and justice in international relations that had been created by the end of the cold war could be realized and institutionalized. It now seemed feasible to establish a global security system of the sort envisaged by President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I: a system based on norms, administered by international institutions, and resting on the commitment of leading states to the maintenance of peaceful international relations.<sup>88</sup>

The desire of both Wilson and Bush to promote the US as an agent of change as well as their collective approach to security represent their strongest similarities. Both presidents sought to employ available institutional structures, the League and the UN, to meet their policy objectives. In 1917, Wilson stated that:

We shall fight for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>Bush's collective security approach was implemented directly in correlation with the Persian Gulf crisis with an emphasis on short-term results. Conversely, Wilson's vision more universal in scope compared to Bush's crisis specific policy.

<sup>87</sup>Bush's NWO included the maintenance of America's hegemonic position in international politics rather than an isolationist position as advocated by Wilson.

<sup>88</sup>Richard Falk "In Search of a New World Order" Current History VOL. 92, NO. 573, April 1993 p.145.

<sup>89</sup>Richard W. Leopold The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1962 p. 78.



Wilson's rhetoric and its utopian<sup>90</sup> tone provided a primary historical source for Bush's NWO. In many ways, the Gulf War-NWO rhetoric was reminiscent of Wilsonian sloganeering. Furthermore, the creation of a Gulf War coalition rekindled memories of a failed League. The significant difference between Bush's coalition and Wilson's League lay in the American ability and willingness to exercise power as a function of foreign policy interests:

The effectiveness of the system of collective security Wilson had championed depended on a community of interest and power which did not exist and which could not be called into existence by incantation. In the absence of such a community, Wilson was faced with the choice between attempting to change the international system or adapting to it. Changing the international system, that is, attempting directly to create what did not exist, required a degree of power well beyond America's capabilities at the time and a commitment<sup>91</sup> to the use of power well beyond America's will.

The similarities between Bush and Wilson which have been proposed are generally based upon Bush's method of dealing with the Gulf crisis in the form of Wilson's example. Before a fair and accurate assessment may be made regarding these similarities in foreign policy style, an exposition of Wilson's political philosophy regarding international politics is necessary. From this basis a clearer juxtaposition may be possible.

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<sup>90</sup>It may be inappropriate to consider Wilson as a utopian although the language of his discourse and the goals of his foreign policy may appear to be. Seeking as he did to employ the League of Nations as an instrument of collective power would seem to indicate that the ends he sought were similar to those of American heads of state before and since him although the means he chose for achieving these ends were different. Wilson incorporated elements of both realism and idealism in his conduct of foreign policy.

<sup>91</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit., 1992 p. 59.

## Wilsonianism

Wilson's vision/philosophy concerning international politics was unusual in that it called for an end to the balance of power system which, arguably, had successfully regulated international politics for centuries. The maintenance of the *old* system of politics, the balance of power, would not provide the necessary infrastructural elements of influence to deal with crises in his view.

Wilson's goals were rooted in the desire to establish a system representative of current trends in international relations. The collapse of the balance of power and the onset of World War I prompted him to suggest a new interpretation of international politics. Essentially, he sought to alter the manner in which international relations were conducted, especially concerning the apparent indiscriminate use of power. The Wilsonian critique of balance of power, according to Claude is straightforward:

It identifies the balance of power as a system which failed to prevent World War I and which, even in its classical period, functioned unreliably; moreover, it [the Wilsonian critique] associates the operation of the system with unacceptably low standards of morality. Wilsonianism gives up on the balance of power. It summons mankind to devise a system for the management of power in international relations which can work more effectively for the maintenance of peace than the balance system did, with fewer evils and abuses than the balance system involved, under the altered conditions of the twentieth century which make the balance of power obsolete.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>Inis L. Claude Jr. op. cit., 1962 p. 87.

The semantic association between Wilsonianism and morality is not a specious one. Although Wilson's paramount motivation, according to Arthur S. Link, "was the ambition to do justly, to advance the cause of international peace, and to give to other peoples the blessings of democracy and Christianity"<sup>93</sup> he also approved of the exercise of power:

Wilson was in many ways "realistic", even by conventional standards, in his thinking about and methods in the conduct of foreign relations. For example, he used armed force in the classic way to achieve certain diplomatic objectives in Mexico and the Caribbean. He understood the meaning of the term "balance of power". He was keenly aware of the relevance of material interests and had few illusions about the fundamental bases of international behavior. It is, one must say, the sheerest nonsense to talk about him as an impractical idealist and visionary.<sup>94</sup>

Wilson sought to establish a system within which state behavior would be balanced in its actions by both morality and power. The two intellectual schools of thought which dominated his political philosophy had also been part of the traditions in American foreign policy since the founding of the Republic.<sup>95</sup> The significant difference with Wilson's

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<sup>93</sup> Arthur S. Link Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 1910-1917 (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York) 1954 p. 82.

<sup>94</sup> Arthur S. Link "The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson" The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in American History H-436 reprinted from Journal of Presbyterian History VOL. 41, NO. 1, March 1963 p.9.

<sup>95</sup> Those traditions were idealism and realism in the conduct of foreign policy. Idealists are considered as those who see such values or human preferences as justice or a desire for world peace as potentially decisive and capable of overcoming obstacles to the realization. Ethics and morality play a significant role in idealist thought as opposed to the notion of power. An idealist considers ideas as having important causal effects as opposed to realists who see power and material factors as being the determinants of political outcomes. Realism refers to a perception of international relations that focuses on the state as a unitary and rational actor and on the actions and interactions of states. Realists attempt to understand patterns of conflict and collaboration under conditions of anarchy or lack of common government. Security issues are usually the most important for realists. National interest, power, and balance of power are key concepts in the realist school. Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (MacMillan Publishing Company, New York) 1987 pp. 592 & 602.

approach lay in the reification of morality in a system which had often fallen prey to the perils of power politics.<sup>96</sup>

The association of morality with the policies and actions of Wilson is an often made comparison. His view on the importance of morality in collaboration with the elements of power politics is clearly distinguishable and unique. Wilson's messianistic vision is more universal perhaps as a result of the unprecedented bloodiness of WW I. In Bush's case, the Cold War ended relatively peacefully while having avoided major war - a significant success in international relations.

Morality for Bush appears to be contingent upon the maintenance of the status quo, and the preservation of the Westphalian state system<sup>97</sup> in order to avoid potential chaos and anarchy in international relations. The state system had enabled the US to exist and prosper from the founding of the Republic to the end of the Cold War. Any significant destabilizing element such as crisis in the Persian Gulf would constitute a threat to the status quo of the state system and the American position within that system.

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<sup>96</sup>The absence of an overarching institutional system designed to enforce and promote international morality made Wilson's objectives difficult to attain. Unlike the nation-state, with its laws and values, the international system does not hold sway over its citizens. Particularly when each state attempts to fulfill its national interest, sometimes at the expense of other states.

<sup>97</sup>A core of rules of international law laying down the rights and duties of states in relation to each other developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These rules of international law were securely established in 1648, when the treaty of Westphalia brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system. Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th Edition (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1973 p. 172.

Perhaps the greatest source of apprehension regarding the similarities between Bush and Wilson concerns the relative utility of their respective policies. Despite the fact that Bush's vision is both messianistic and utopian, the NWO emerged as a response to a specific crisis in the Gulf. The NWO provided a sound policy basis from which Bush could attempt to manage the Persian Gulf crisis while maintaining American power in the international system. Morgenthau argues that all political phenomena can be reduced to three basic types of behavior. Within these three types, one should be able to identify the motivation for American action in the Gulf. In all probability a combination of two or more of Morgenthau's types should explain the motivation(s) which fueled the NWO:

A nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and toward changing the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations - whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status - pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose foreign policy seeks to demonstrate the power it has, either for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it, pursues a policy of prestige.<sup>98</sup>

The Wilsonian creed proposed that idealism and realism could be wed in order to create a basis from which foreign

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<sup>98</sup>Following this passage, Morgenthau added the accompanying footnote: It must especially be pointed out that these different patterns of international policies do not of necessity correspond to conscious motivations in the minds of statesmen or supporters of the respective foreign policies. Statesmen and supporters may not even be aware of the actual character of the policies they pursue and support. More particularly, a nation may intend to pursue a policy of the status quo, while actually, without being aware of it, it is embarking upon a policy of imperialism. Hans J. Morgenthau op. cit. 1973 pp. 40-41.

policy could be derived. Each of the two schools of thought were equally important. The danger lay in favoring one or the other in times of crisis, the results of which in either case would prove to be ineffective in the long-term. The necessity of establishing such a marriage between realism and idealism lay in the inadequacies of either fully to provide a framework for foreign policy. As E.H. Carr states:

Coercion and conscience, enmity and good-will, self-assertion and self-subordination, are present in every political society. The state is built up out of these two conflicting aspects of human nature. Utopia and reality, the ideal and the institution, morality and power, are from the outset inextricably blended in it. In the making of the United States, as a modern American writer has said, "Hamilton stood for strength, wealth and power, Jefferson for the American dream"; and both the power<sup>99</sup> and the dream were necessary ingredients.

### The Founding Fathers

The Jeffersonian style<sup>100</sup> of foreign relations is most appropriately associated with idealism and morality. Conversely, Alexander Hamilton preferred a different approach to foreign relations. His views on foreign policy were defined by a realist interpretation of the world and an acceptance of the realities of power politics:

Whereas Hamilton was distinguished by a tough-minded realism, by prudence, by a disciplining of the national spirit, and by a sober calculation of available power, Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison exhibited an assertiveness, a keen sensitivity to presumed slights, and a full confidence in the nation's capacity to defend its interests and uphold justice. Hamilton and the Federalists started their formulations with a recognition of the existing system of

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<sup>99</sup>E. H. Carr op. cit., 1962 p. 96.

<sup>100</sup>James Madison was also closely associated with Jefferson's approach to foreign policy.

international relations and were willing to work within the framework of current practice. Jefferson and Madison began by rejecting existing realities and sought to implement an ideal.<sup>101</sup>

In his juxtaposition of these traditions and their respective exponents, Paul A. Varg exposes the latent traditional aspects of both schools of thought. The political environment of eighteenth century America enabled two dichotomous schools of thought to grow and flourish. These same traditions continue to dominate US foreign policy in contemporary times:

Hamilton was above all a realist who fatalistically accepted the existing framework, and dedicated himself to obtaining the best bargain possible. He did not object to the *realpolitik* of balance of power diplomacy, chose to regard treaties as convenient arrangements binding on the parties until they no longer served the purposes of one or the other, accepted British dominance as a simple fact of life, and dismissed as dangerous embarking on goals that the limited power of the country could scarcely hope to achieve. His own limited aim in foreign relations was to guarantee access to what he considered the prime need of a nation that desperately needed capital for the development of its tremendous resources, so that it might one day emerge as a major power.<sup>102</sup>

Conversely, the foreign policy of Jefferson and Madison reflected their faith in the ideals they believed were most important for the successful execution of US policy. Varg states that:

Jefferson and Madison gave expression to widely held views and their approach to foreign policy became the American approach that found its culmination in the moralizing of Woodrow Wilson at Versailles and Cordell Hull's moral and legalistic

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<sup>101</sup>Paul A. Varg Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (Michigan State University Press) 1963 pp. 145-146.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

expositions on behalf of an ideal international order based on law rather than force.<sup>103</sup>

The presence of two opposing views on foreign relations in the US eventually led to a partial, yet significant, synthesis of both schools of thought. The advantages of the marriage of intellectual traditions has, arguably, enabled the US to act more effectively in international politics. Inevitably, there are exceptions and anomalies associated with any such merger. During certain periods of American history, one school of thought became temporarily preponderant while the other lost some of its relative utility. The counteractive forces between the realist and idealist traditions has created many fluctuations in the manner in which American foreign policy has been conducted. The preference of one view over another in a particular political environment has enabled the US to exercise a great degree of latitude regarding its policies during its history.

As Reinhold Niebuhr states, despite the apparent irreconcilability of morality and power, both forces are necessary in order to achieve balanced action and balanced thought:

Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>104</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York) 1932 p. 4.



## Bush's Synthesis

The NWO seemed to represent these two traditions in foreign policy. Tucker and Hendrickson enumerate the essential principles of American foreign policy which constitute Bush's vision:

An emphasis on the rule of law and the maintenance of order has been as pronounced as the emphasis on promoting freedom. The freedom of nations (self-determination) has been seen to be quite as important as the freedom in nations (democratic institutions). In the American view, the two have been viewed as mutually supportive, even symbiotic. If experience has shown that this is not always so, the point remains that we have persisted in believing that it is so. Certainly, Woodrow Wilson believed that it was so. It was largely what he meant by a world made 'safe for democracy.'<sup>105</sup>

Both Bush and Wilson proposed to address the same concerns which had been plaguing the international system. The fact that their language and use of imagery was similar is not the only similarity that they shared. The vision of a more manageable and peaceful system was undeniably a part of their interpretation of the future international system:

For both, the states of the world, great and small, are to be guaranteed the same right of respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For both, the peace of the world is to be maintained, and democratic societies are to be made safe against the threat of arbitrary power, by a universal system of collective security that substitutes a community of power for a balance of power. And for both, the US is destined to play a role of leadership in the new order, a role that falls to this nation not only because of the magnitude of its power but also because it alone has 'sufficient moral force' (Wilson) or 'moral

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<sup>105</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit. 1992 p. 56.

standing' (Bush) to lead the other nations of the world.<sup>106</sup>

Despite the obvious philosophical compatibilities between Bush and Wilson concerning the ends and objectives of American foreign policy, a fundamental division arose concerning the means for achieving those ends. Although Bush has been correctly compared with Wilson and the Wilsonian tradition, he also pursued the objectives of American foreign policy by means other than those supported by Wilson<sup>107</sup>. Bush's foreign policy, inherently conditioned by a strong sense of pragmatism, became a marriage of two opposing views of American tradition. The references to Wilson regarding Bush remained valid although they were often made with respect to the similarity of their rhetoric and vision. Bush's ends had come of age in a time more willing to accept them and in a nation more willing to fulfill them:

The circumstances attending the present vision appear far more favorable than those that marked the past vision. It is not only that democratic ideals have triumphed today to a degree far beyond

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<sup>106</sup>Robert W. Tucker "Brave New World Orders" The New Republic February 24, 1992 p. 24. & Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit. 1992 pp. 56-57.

<sup>107</sup>It may be unfair to stigmatize Wilson as one who abhorred war more than any other, whose sole occupation consisted of remaining aloof from the temptations of power politics. As Arthur S. Link states, Wilson was perhaps more morally inclined and ethically motivated than any other American President:

While admitting that there were times when a nation had no recourse but to use armed force in international disputes, and while using force himself on behalf of the American government on certain occasions, President Wilson never permitted war's neuroses and fascinations either to derange his reason or to obscure the political objectives for which force was being used. Hence he was never the victim of that great twentieth-century delusion, that it is necessary to win wars even at the risk of losing everything for which wars are fought. From Arthur S. Link op. cit., 1963 p. 9.

any earlier period; equally important, the position of America's leadership that Wilson's vision of world order assumed, (but did really possess) has also been realized.<sup>108</sup>

The ability of the US and its apparent willingness to fulfill its leadership role in the context of the NWO is more credible today than during Wilson's tenure as president. The rise of the UN and the American role in its activities have given new hope for Wilson's vision:

In this world, the UN, under American leadership, was once again found to express the community of power that Wilson had aspired in vain to find in the League. This was also because American leadership was virtually unchallenged by any other Great Power.<sup>109</sup>

American leadership in the UN enabled it to create a coalition of states for action in the Persian Gulf therefore setting a possible precedent for multilateral action in the future. Wilson's experience with the League of Nations was not as successful:

The League had failed to keep the peace, the familiar argument ran, because the Great Powers had not been given a sufficiently dominant role and, of course, because one Great Power, the United States, had played no role at all.<sup>110</sup>

In order to avoid the inherent problems associated with Wilsonianism, a symbiotic relationship between theory and practice was adopted by the Bush Administration. Arguably, the NWO formed a synthesis of policy, taking into

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<sup>108</sup>Robert W. Tucker op. cit. 1992 p. 24.

<sup>109</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit. 1992 p. 63.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 62. And also see Arthur S. Link American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890's (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1963 pp. 228-230.

consideration the positive elements of both the realist and idealist schools of thought. Furthermore, Bush's policy was responsive to the demands of the international political environment:

The tradition represented by Jefferson and Wilson entertained grand ambitions in the world but was equally insistent on achieving these ambitions through measures short of war. The tradition represented by Alexander Hamilton and Henry Cabot Lodge eschewed grand ambitions and insisted that foreign policy be tied to the pursuit of limited national interests; at the same time it saw the need for military preparedness and believed that military force would remain the great arbiter of conflicts among nations.<sup>111</sup>

The Bush administration returned to the vision of Woodrow Wilson but added to it the willingness to use means which Wilson himself had disavowed.<sup>112</sup> Bush's vision of foreign policy embraced both traditions:

It is an authentic offspring of both traditions, but one from which each parent would have recoiled. It offends the Hamilton-Lodge tradition by virtue of its universalism; it offends the Jefferson-Wilson tradition by virtue of its reliance on force. A product of the past half-century, it combines the outlook and institutions that a global challenge to the nation's security and purpose necessitated with circumstances that are altogether different from those that justified the initial response.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>David C. Hendrickson "The Renovation of American Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs VOL. 71, NO. 2 Spring 1992 p. 55.

<sup>112</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit. 1992 pp. 68-69.

<sup>113</sup>David C. Hendrickson op. cit. 1992 pp. 55-56.

In more contemporary terms, Joseph Nye Jr. compares the Bush administration's flexibility between realism and idealism as a dichotomous relationship and difficult to manage:

The problem for the Bush administration was that it thought and acted like Nixon, but borrowed the rhetoric of Wilson and Carter.<sup>114</sup>

The successful execution of the American-led coalition intervention in the Persian Gulf represented both traditions in American foreign policy. The conduct and policy of the US was a reaction to a situation in the Middle East which it could not ignore. Bush successfully defended the utopian nature of his policy by virtue of the fulfillment of the American objectives in the Gulf. The rhetoric of the NWO had been very effective in rallying public support in the US as well as cementing the resolve of the coalition states within the UN. Domestic political support for his vision demonstrated widespread support throughout the nation. As the international system and its actors returned to the *comfort* of the status quo that the Gulf War had helped to preserve, the rhetoric of the NWO began to lose its utility and appeal.

As a result of a crisis which affected the interests of many states, including those of the UN coalition, a rallying-cry for action was required in order to mobilize support for multilateral intervention. Although stating that the US was the leader is a truism, it is important to

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<sup>114</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs VOL. 71, NO. 2, Spring 1992 p. 84.

recognize that as leader, the US dealt with the crisis situation as an opportunity to alter the conduct of power relations among states.

War with Iraq was a representation of how a NWO-system could operate: shared responsibilities, shared costs, and shared benefits. The conduct of American foreign policy during the Gulf crisis was, arguably, well motivated and implemented. The combination of aspects of both idealist and realist traditions created policy highly responsive to a specific situation.

Perhaps this is where the similarities between Bush and Wilson truly diverge. Wilson's foreign policy objectives and actions were rooted in a long-term vision of the management of power relations. Not unlike Bush, he sought to make use of institutions in order to further his policy objectives. As Inis L. Claude Jr. argues:

Wilson spoke of the League as "a combination of moral and physical strength of nations", and as for an arrangement based on the conviction that "if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall." He was as clear as a man can be in acknowledging the role of *both* moral and physical force in the system of world order which he envisaged. While he may have believed in the primacy of moral force, he explicitly recognized the ultimate validity of physical power in international relations.<sup>115</sup>

Wilson's objectives were not of an evanescent nature. They persisted after his tenure as President to influence US foreign policy for decades. Perhaps, most notably, Wilson's

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<sup>115</sup>Inis L. Claude Jr. op. cit. 1962 pp. 105-106.

influence may be seen in Bush's NWO. A significant difference between the two, however, lies in the fact that the Bush's policy was both short-term and crisis specific while the Wilson's was designed as a universal solution to political crises. Arthur S. Link describes Wilson as something other than a realist or an idealist. He singles out Wilson's philosophy as specific and unique:

A realist, I take it, is one who faces life and its situations without illusions, in short, one who can see realities or truth through the fog of delusion that normally shrouds the earthbound individual. If the European and American critics of President Wilson who thought mainly in strategic and material terms, who measured national power by army divisions and naval bases, and the like, if they were realists, then President Wilson was a realist of a different sort. Sheerly for purposes of convenience, let us call his view of the national and international situation with which he had to cope a "higher realism", higher because more perceptive, more in accord with ultimate reality, more likely to win the long-run moral approval of societies professing allegiance to the common western, humane, Christian traditions.<sup>116</sup>

Pragmatism, rather than any rigid ideological stance, arguably remains an effective approach to foreign policy. In the Gulf War context, the NWO provided such an approach. The US reaction to developments demanded changes in policy equal to the changing international political environment. The key elements of the vision were ill defined, but successfully served the purpose of bringing a nation together in support of Bush's policy.

The dominant role of the US remained the same one it had been during the Cold War. The main difference, however,

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<sup>116</sup>Arthur S. Link op. cit., 1963 p. 4.

manifested itself in the breadth of that role. The military, economic, and political preponderance of the US necessitated an equally preponderant role in the Gulf. The reality of the changes in the international system may force the US to accept a diminished role as the focus of power makes a relative shift toward economic capabilities rather than military capabilities.

The NWO and the use of force in the Gulf may have been a manifestation of a dying tradition in American foreign policy. The declinist argument would argue that the US must continue to reorient its foreign policy and reevaluate its priorities. In order for the US to function at its highest potential level in foreign relations, the domestic political problems of the nation need to be addressed. Therefore forcing the US to be more selective in its choice of future actions and intervention in order to avoid stretching its relatively diminished capabilities beyond effectiveness.

The vision of a NWO expressed by President Bush may not be as unrealistic as it appears although the actors in the international system must be willing to adapt their behavior to the changing circumstances in the international system. The American role in a new order should remain that of leader. However, leadership may have to be shared in some version of multipolarity in the changing international system.

Bush's NWO, as a consequence of long-standing traditions, served its purpose in the Gulf but was soon



thereafter dropped when it no longer served the President's rhetorical purposes. As a catch-phrase, the NWO served an important role in American foreign policy. It was not, however, as significant as the symbols associated with Saddam Hussein. The NWO encouraged and promoted multilateralism and internationalism as a continuing part of US foreign policy. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for the US to act without having to worry about the Soviet menace.

Essentially, Bush's NWO represented three key issues. First, as a result of the end of the Cold War, the NWO was guided by pragmatism rather than being exclusively ideological. Next, as a result of this pragmatism, Bush's policy reflected the effect of the long-standing traditions of realism and idealism in US foreign policy. Finally, the multilateral interventionist nature of the NWO rebutted the neo-isolationist sentiment in the US. In doing so, Bush's policy quieted the alarmist view that the US would adopt an isolationist position in international politics and withdraw its commitments overseas.

#### Chapter 4- Third Perspective: External Structural Determinants and the NWO

The end of the Cold War has caused the United States to reconsider carefully its foreign policy. Changes in the nature and structure of the international system left a policy vacuum which had previously been filled by the containment doctrine. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-containment security developments forced the US to search for a new approach to securing American interests and maintaining international stability.

The end of the bipolar balance of power has also created uneasiness in the US. The strictly defined antagonism of the former East-West relationship may now be replaced by a less stable and inherently less predictable environment. The Persian Gulf crisis provides an excellent example of the potential volatility of the post-Cold War system.

During the Cold War, American actions and initiatives in the Middle East were essentially conditioned by Soviet behavior. The collapse of the bipolar system changed that. US intervention in the Persian Gulf was more easily realizable without the potential Soviet counter-threat. As William B. Quandt argues:

From the end of WW II until 1990 - a full forty-fives years - American foreign policy in the Middle East had only one steady point of reference: curbing the expansion of Soviet influence in an area judged to be of vital interest to the United States and its allies. Each president, from Harry S. Truman to George Bush, and each Secretary of State, from George Marshall to James A. Baker III, viewed the Middle

East through a lens at least partly colored, if not distorted, by Cold War rivalry.<sup>117</sup>

The structure of the post-containment system will inevitably be created and formed as a function of the newly emerging sources of power as well as the changing nature of power in the international system.

The alarming pace and scope of change have also had significant ramifications in trying to assess adequately the changing distribution of power in the system. The absence of an overarching Soviet threat and the survival of the US at the conclusion of the Cold War requires that the bipolar system be replaced by a representative structural interpretation of current developments in world politics. The concepts of unipolarity and multipolarity have emerged. In an attempt to comprehend the changing nature of the system, historical precedents may serve as important determinants of the eventual label used to describe the system.

The end of the Cold War meant the end of an era in American foreign policy. No longer would the Soviet Union and communist bloc serve as the most clearly defined source of American antagonism. Foreign policy as defined by the policy of containment no longer reflects the changing realities of the emerging international system. In order to adapt successfully to these changes, the US needs to modify

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<sup>117</sup>William B. Quandt "US Policy Toward the Middle East" in Robert J. Art & Seyom Brown eds. US Foreign Policy: The Search for a New Role (Macmillan Publishing Company, New York) 1993 p. 315. Art and Brown argue that the Cold War era imposed a clarity of purpose and relative ease of choice on US foreign policy that is no longer available. "US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World: Introduction and Overview" in Art & Brown eds. op. cit., pp. 1-2.

its policy in order to suit the changing circumstances of international relations.

Since the dramatic, revolutionary upheavals began in Central and Eastern Europe and, to some extent, within the Soviet Union in 1989, the American foreign policy establishment has been searching for a new "Mr. X" - a new foreign policy guide who, emulating the original Mr. X, George Kennan, will set down on paper the broad outlines of a national security doctrine designed to guide American statesmen in the next decade and beyond.<sup>118</sup>

The US needs to reevaluate its former foreign policy guidelines while incorporating elements of change associated with the transitional nature of the system. American foreign policy will not simply be "recreated", but, rather it must undergo significant modifications taking into consideration historical lessons and transitional changes. The ability of the US to adapt, to adopt a new "Mr. X", will allow it to maintain its hegemonic position. The problem remains constant, as Nye states, and is contingent upon the fact that the Cold War is over and Americans are trying to understand their place in a world without a defining Soviet threat.<sup>119</sup>

For the first time in decades, the US may be entering a period of world politics in which none of the most powerful

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<sup>118</sup>Francis P. Sempa "The Geopolitics of the Post-Cold War World" Strategic Review VOL. 20, NO. 1, Winter 1992 p. 9.

<sup>119</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. "American strategy after bipolarity" International Affairs VOL. 66, NO. 3, July 1990 B p. 153.

states harbors aggressive intent, and all are thereby freed of critical threats to their physical security. The Great Powers will continue to compete; for political influence over issues that concern their interests, for market share and technological leadership, as well as setting the rules for cooperative endeavors (such as that in the Persian Gulf). The post-Cold War world will not be free of violence despite the end of Superpower confrontation and antagonism: many signs in former communist and Third World states indicate something different, and some of these conflicts (such as that in the Gulf) may well threaten the West's vital interests.<sup>120</sup>

The emergence of a different distribution of power among the Great Powers has changed the manner in which one looks at international politics. A new system of powers balancing one another is required to replace the relatively successful bipolar regime:

The fear of forceful domination on a global scale does seem to have ended for the foreseeable future, and with it the distinguishing feature of international politics in the twentieth century.<sup>121</sup>

The changing international environment has made the containment policy of the Cold War outdated. Formerly, the conduct of the Soviet Union was thoroughly analyzed and evaluated by Kennan in order to formulate an adequate and

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<sup>120</sup>Terry L. Diebel "Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the future" International Security VOL. 16, NO. 4, 1992 p. 80.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

effective foreign policy doctrine. "The attempt," Kennan stated, "must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered."<sup>122</sup> Understanding the implications of the international systemic changes, as Kennan did, should permit decision-makers and leaders in the US to reevaluate American foreign policy. The containment policies of the Cold War, in their multitudinous manifestations, were all products of Kennan's initial evaluations:

[T]he Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be *contained* by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.<sup>123</sup>

The basis for post-Cold War foreign policy, however, still originates from the same sources as those consulted by Kennan. Francis Sempa argues that the search for a new Mr. X, unquestionably, has fostered an important debate on the future national security strategy of the US.<sup>124</sup> The policy proposed by the Bush administration, especially during the Gulf Crisis, was not necessarily reflective of a long-term approach to American foreign policy.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>122</sup>George F. Kennan American Diplomacy (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 1984 p. 107.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 120. Emphasis added.

<sup>124</sup>Francis P. Sempa op. cit., 1992 p. 10.

<sup>125</sup>In its search for a new "Mr. X", the US has found in the NWO a sound basis from which post-containment policy can be derived. As a foundation for future foreign policy, the NWO is similar to Kennan's policy of containment in the sense that it may be utilized in subsequent times of crisis. The NWO, as a fallout of long-standing traditions of American diplomacy and its consideration of the national interest, arguably, makes it the groundwork for post-containment policy.

As a policy response to a specific crisis in the Gulf, the NWO demonstrated the ability of the US to act decisively. During the Cold War, the Middle East had been a very volatile region where competition between the Superpowers was both constant and vigilant. "In this highly charged zone", J.C. Hurewitz states, "the Superpowers were engaged after the mid-1950s in rivalry for prestige, position, and influence."<sup>126</sup>

The competition fostered by Cold War antagonism was aimed at achieving various goals. The Superpowers sought to reinforce their strategic and economic interests in the region at the expense of each other. Often the behavior of the US and Soviet Union led to near confrontation. Under such conditions, the US could not act freely in the Middle East. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the ability of the US to act in the Middle East has been facilitated.

In the context of the NWO, the importance of the Middle East has remained an integral component of US foreign policy. Bush's policy appears to have been rooted in the American desire to keep the Persian Gulf and its vast oil reserves open to all states as well as ensure that no single state dominated these reserves. The relevance of the analogy between Bush's NWO and the Carter Doctrine is important to the understanding of US policy in the region. Carter stated clearly and definitively that the US had, and

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<sup>126</sup>J. C. Hurewitz ed. Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (Frederick A. Praeger, New York) 1969 p. 1.

continues to have, great interest in the Persian Gulf. The message of the Carter Doctrine is arguably reiterated in Bush's NWO. Carter's 1980 State of the Union address appears to identify a pattern of rhetoric and policy for Bush:

We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region. Let our position be absolutely clear: Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.<sup>127</sup>

The principles enunciated by Carter remain relevant in the context of the NWO. The potential danger however, no longer originates from the former Soviet Union but as William Quandt argues, from other sources:

[T]he Carter Doctrine, modified to deal with threats from within the region and as amended by the Bush preference for multilateralism, is likely to remain the framework for American thinking about Gulf security throughout the 1990s.<sup>128</sup>

As a part of the establishment of his NWO, Bush sought to address the issue of Iraqi aggression without attempting to resolve all of the long-standing dilemmas associated with the region. His was a policy of pragmatism which focused on, among other things, American security interests. Arguably, his policy was based on a desire for short-term benefits and domestic political acquiescence.

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<sup>127</sup>Jimmy Carter "The State of the Union" Address delivered before a joint session of the Congress. January 23, 1980. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1980-81 Book I - January 1 to May 23, 1980. (United States Government Printing Office, Washington) 1981 p. 197.

<sup>128</sup>William B. Quandt op. cit., 1993 p. 321.



According to David Gergen, Bush's policy objectives in the Gulf have been both practical and effective in the context of the Iraqi invasion:

President Bush shies away from grand schemes, preferring to solve problems and seize opportunities as they ripen. He underestimates his own capacity as a communicator, so that he rarely seeks to mobilize a public march. Yet with an intimate knowledge of other leaders and the world's largest Rolodex, he happily assembles fraternities of nations to achieve concrete short-term goals.<sup>129</sup>

Conversely, George Kennan's containment proposal, according to Francis Sempa, was based not on the temporary circumstances of the post-World War II order, but on geopolitical realities which have been recognized since the founding of the Republic.<sup>130</sup>

It would have been presumptuous of Bush to assume that the NWO would replace the doctrine of containment in such a dramatic fashion as that associated with the US-led intervention in the Gulf. Rather, it would perhaps be more appropriate to assume that American actions in the Gulf would themselves speak loudly to the validity of a potential NWO. As Gergen argues, a significant degree of support for the NWO emerged as a result of Bush's direct approach to the crisis:

Bush managed to rally a reluctant nation to a successful war not with inspiring words or soaring visions, but with a series of shrewd and forcing actions. The clear lesson is that strong, clear-cut and well-conceived presidential initiatives,

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<sup>129</sup>David Gergen "America's Missed Opportunities" Foreign Affairs VOL. 71, NO. 1, 1992 p. 3.

<sup>130</sup>Francis P. Sempa op. cit., 1992 p. 10. Invariably, these geopolitical realities consisted of the maintenance of a balance of power in both Europe and Asia as part of a stable international environment.

especially those taken in partnership with other nations, can transform public opinion in favor of the White House.<sup>131</sup>

The relative success of the Gulf War policy was contingent upon both decisive action and firm rhetoric. Elements of both power politics and idealistic messianism were necessary. Bush's vision and actions represented a means of achieving desired ends in the Gulf. Furthermore, the NWO initiated debate on the future of US foreign policy. The NWO represented an opportunity to implement a proactive foreign policy with significantly greater freedom of choice without having to compete with Soviet threats. Containment was designed to counter Soviet adventurism and imperialism while the NWO has attempted to deal with the myriad new dangers emerging as a result of the end of the Cold War.

#### Kennan and containment

Kennan's advocacy of containment stemmed from the recognition that America's security was greatly affected by the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass.<sup>132</sup> The focus of US policy was on the communist bloc and the aggressive, expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. American policy would have to be one of "long term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment".<sup>133</sup> According to Francis Sempa, Kennan

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<sup>131</sup>David Gergen op. cit. 1992 p. 9.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.

<sup>133</sup>John W. Spanier American Foreign Policy Since World War II (Frederick A. Praeger, New York) 1968 p. 36. Kennan's exact citation described US foreign policy in the post-WW II period in the following words: "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence." As cited in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" op. cit.. 1984 p. 120.

was among the first Americans to realize that WW II resulted in a grave imbalance on the Eurasian continent which could only be rectified by a strong US commitment to the devastated nations within easy reach of Soviet power. The stationing in peacetime of large numbers of American troops in Europe and Asia was a great departure for US foreign policy. This development and the whole containment policy resulted from the imbalance created by the war and not from a sudden realization that the Eurasian balance of power affected America's security interests.<sup>134</sup>

The stability of the Eurasian balance of power continues to affect American security interests despite the end of the Cold War. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union has lessened the threat of Superpower conflict but has not eliminated the possibility of future crises. Russian military capabilities remain potentially formidable, and despite democratic reforms, political instability and economic hardship, Russia still fosters a sense of unpredictability in the former Soviet republics. Sempa argues that:

The Russian-led Commonwealth's military can still field the most powerful land army on the globe. It still possesses thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Moreover, the Commonwealth

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<sup>134</sup>Francis P. Sempa op. cit. 1992 p. 10. The containment of Soviet intentions and actions as a result of American interests in Europe and Asia also helped stem the isolationist sentiment present in the US. The latent fear of isolationism felt by political elites would appear to have been quelled as security interests concerning the Soviet Union emerged as the primary focus of American policy. Arguably, the potential Soviet threat to the West allowed American political elites to rationalize the pursuit of interventionist and internationalist policies consistent with containment. The isolationist school of thought lost a great deal of its appeal and influence as the Cold War entered its preliminary stages.

continues to have interests which diverge from [American] interests in Cuba, Angola, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. The ideological aspect of the Cold War may in fact have been terminated but the geopolitical aspect remains.<sup>135</sup>

Europe and Asia remain as primary regions of interest in the formulation of a post-containment foreign policy. The US must endeavor to implement a new policy doctrine conducive to American interests in the changing systemic context.<sup>136</sup> Following WW II the strategy of containment was relatively quickly released:

A period of eighteen months passed before the United States undertook that reassessment - from the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, until the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. Perhaps such a reevaluation could not have been done more quickly.<sup>137</sup>

The urgency associated with the creation of the containment strategy should be reflected in contemporary policy formulation. Despite the relative decline in importance of military capabilities, US-Russian relations still remain paramount to the security and stability of the international system. The inherent stability of the bipolar system has vanished only to be replaced by a more ambiguous and uncertain balance of power. In order to foster

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<sup>135</sup>Francis P. Sempa op. cit. 1992 p. 10.

<sup>136</sup>Certain similarities exist concerning the beginning and the end of the Cold War in that each period marked a significant change in the conduct of international relations among the major powers. The US and Russia were most effected by both of these periods. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the US was and is once again faced with the dilemma of implementing policy conducive to avoiding crises (i.e.: major war). In the context of the Persian Gulf, the Bush administration was successful in defusing the crisis but the NWO has not been equated with a policy as successful as containment. The emergence of containment in 1947 was both timely and propitious.

<sup>137</sup>John W. Spanier op. cit. 1968 p. 31.

stability the US needs to orient its efforts in order to establish a new foreign policy doctrine - a post-containment strategy reflective of the changing nature of the system.

The policy of containment came into being not only as a result of the growing antagonism between the US and Soviet Union but also as a function of specific issues in international politics. The main catalytic event which fostered the need for containment lay in the Greece-Turkey crisis of 1947. Arguably, Greece and Turkey served as a potential first trial of containment policy. The social and political dilemmas in these states increased the potential for surging Soviet influence in the region. Louis Halle explains the serious nature of the Greece-Turkey situation and refers to the following points:

[T]he deteriorating situation in Greece, where the government was at the brink of economic and military perdition, where it appeared that the communist rebels might be about to capture the country for Stalin's rapidly expanding empire - which would thereby emerge, at last, upon the shores of the Mediterranean. Until now Britain, pursuing the policy set by Churchill in 1944, had been providing the economic and military assistance that the Greek government needed to stave off this disaster.<sup>138</sup>

Correspondingly, the situation in Turkey was as critical as that in Greece. Unable to continue its support and maintenance of these states, Britain was forced to withdraw its assistance as a result of its own economic quandary. These events, the relinquishment of British

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<sup>138</sup>Louis J. Halle The Cold War as History (Harper & Row, New York) 1967 pp. 110-111.

commitment to Greece and Turkey, represented a significant moment in post-WW II history:

[T]he final end of *Pax Britannica*. Now, after two World Wars, Britain had exhausted the last of the means with which, for almost a century and a half, it had maintained its power and discharged its responsibilities over the wide world.<sup>139</sup>

In response to the crises in the Mediterranean as well as in Britain, the US was prompted to act in order to avoid a further increase of Soviet influence in the region. The series of events associated with the Greece-Turkey crisis of 1947 provided the catalytic element necessary to the implementation of the policy of containment.<sup>140</sup> As Hugh Ross argues, the importance of American involvement in the region became increasingly paramount:

Truman and his principal advisers on foreign policy argued that the imminent British withdrawal from Greece would leave a power vacuum into which the Soviets would swiftly rush. Secretary of State George Marshall stressed that the fall of Greece would leave Turkey in a dangerously exposed position. And if both Greece and Turkey became satellite states held firmly in a prescribed orbit by gravitational pull from Moscow, the way for rapid Soviet penetration of the Middle East would lie open.<sup>141</sup>

The association between the situation in Greece and Turkey and the potential consequences in the Middle East is

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<sup>139</sup>Ibid., pp. 111-112.

<sup>140</sup>In Kennan's view, the militarization of containment was inconsistent with the means he had ascribed to the policy. The drafting of NSC-68 and the Korean War arguably necessitated a more liberal interpretation of containment in order to counter communist intentions in the Far East. As Gaddis states: "The result [NSC-68], like that more prominent product of a broadly contrived mandate, the United States Constitution, was a document more sweeping in content and implications than its originators had intended." From John Lewis Gaddis Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford University Press, New York) 1982 p. 90.

<sup>141</sup>Hugh Ross ed. The Cold War: Containment and Its Critics (Rand McNally & Company, Chicago) 1963 p. 4.

not a specious one. The significance of the Middle East to the US remains as relevant now as it was in the early Cold War era. Herein lies the catalytic analogy between the emergence of containment and Bush's NWO. As part of his March 12, 1947, address to a joint session of Congress, President Truman outlined what became known as the Truman Doctrine:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way...It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.<sup>142</sup>

The association between relative stability and the status quo in both the Middle East and Greece and Turkey is, arguably, self-evident. Similarly, crisis management in the Persian Gulf represents an opportunity for Bush to mitigate potential for further chaos in the region. The importance of the Middle East in the Truman Doctrine and the NWO represents a parallel interest in US foreign policy.

The Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment were quickly operationalized in 1950 with the creation of NSC-68. This highly secret document, brought into existence by the National Security Council, "proved to be the blueprint for

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<sup>142</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-7.

waging the Cold War during the next twenty years."<sup>143</sup> In turn, NSC-68 was implemented *en vigueur* and hence legitimized by the outbreak of the Korean War. The opportunity to test American policy in the post-WW II era had come at a most opportune time when America needed to demonstrate the validity of its policy orientation regarding the Soviet Union. John Lewis Gaddis suggests that the North Korean invasion could hardly have come at a better time to ensure the implementation of NSC-68:

Indeed this latter outcome was so serendipitous that some students of the subject have implied complicity on the part of American officials, either in Washington and Tokyo, in bringing it about...it is true that President Truman had not formally approved NSC-68 at the time the fighting broke out in Korea, that his advisers had foreseen difficulties in getting Congress to fund it, and that the attack across the 38th parallel greatly simplified the task...This happened in large part because of the remarkable manner in which the Korean War appeared to validate several of NSC-68's most important conclusions. One of these was the argument that all interests had become equally vital; that any further shift in the balance of power, no matter how small, could upset the entire structure of postwar international relations.<sup>144</sup>

Herein lies the similarity between the Truman Doctrine and the NWO. Much in the same manner that Truman's policy was conditioned by a specific incident, the NWO also arose under analogous circumstances. Both visions of world order emerged at the end of a period of crisis and war - one hot, the other cold - with the intention of forging a more stable

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<sup>143</sup>Miroslav Nincic Anatomy of Hostility: The US-Soviet Rivalry in Perspective (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, Orlando, Florida) 1989 p.133.

<sup>144</sup>John Lewis Gaddis op. cit. 1982 p. 109.



and secure international environment. Tucker and Hendrickson address this issue specifically:

While the Truman Doctrine responded to a specific threat, it did so within the framework of a sweeping vision of world order and of an equally sweeping view of the American commitment to, and role in, securing that order. The vision was nothing less than a world free from aggression, a world in which free people might work out their own destinies in their own way, a world that made possible the lasting freedom and independence of all nations...Containment formed the eventual policy expression of the vision of world order and the conception of role held out in the Truman Doctrine.<sup>145</sup>

The similarities in both vision and role are significant. Perhaps the main difference between Truman and Bush lay in the fact that the NWO was not followed by a concrete proposal or strategy such as containment and NSC-68. Rather, the NWO provided a sound basis from which policy could be derived in the post-Cold War era without a formal and specific agenda such as containment. The American reaction to crisis in the Gulf reflected both the pragmatic approach of the NWO as well as the operationalization of Bush's vision.

The absorption of American interest in the Middle East has been consistent. Numerous political, strategic, and economic implications have had direct influence on US behavior in the region. In the context of the NWO, these implications remain. A significant difference in the conduct of US policy has emerged, however, as a result of the end of the Cold War. The paradoxical nature of the

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<sup>145</sup>Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson op. cit. 1992 p. 31.

bipolar conflict arguably created a consensus between the Superpowers and the Great Powers regarding the imperative of avoiding total war.

The Cold War's multidimensional dyadic conflict between Marxism-Leninism and liberal-democracy had given way to the apparent triumph of democracy and/or the proliferation of new *ideologies*. The bipolar system and the potential dangers associated therein however, have, not been supplanted by a more stable environment. The NWO, as a policy for a specific crisis during an era of transition, has arguably not established a viable method of interpreting international politics in the post-containment era. The desire for the promotion of global consensus may invariably cause the collapse of the system as a result of the end of bipolar antagonism.

Essentially, the predictability and stability of the bipolar system has been replaced by something less easily fathomable. Whereas the focus of attention during the Cold War lay in the problem of avoiding large-scale catastrophic war between the Superpowers, the post-Cold War world may encounter even more formidable crises. The uncertainty and unpredictability of actors in the context of the NWO may prove problematic. The intentions of US foreign policy during the Cold War were focused, whereas in the post-Cold War world, these same intentions may be dispersed or diffused. Such a diffusion of American intentions may lead to misperception or miscalculation. Arguably, the Cold War

limited the problem of misperception as a function of the close scrutiny of the other actor's (i.e. Soviet) behavior.

The recalibration of American intentions in a less certain world would appear to be a necessary component of successful policy. An effective policy would perhaps be characterized as one which assessed crisis situations and limited the potential repercussions of crises. The ability of the US to modify its policy approach to suit a radically changing system is in large part contingent upon its ability to adapt policy to the changing nature of power. In order for the US to meet its objectives, its intentions must correlate with the realities of its diverse capabilities.

#### Strategic systemic changes

According to Samuel P. Huntington, three significant changes in the international system have taken place which ultimately affect America's changing strategic interest. These modifications include systemic changes, changes in the distribution of power, and changes in the relations among states. In correlation with these three changes, the notion of power, American declinism, and US-Russian relations deserve particular consideration in the context of the NWO.

The first of these modifications is *systemic change*, which includes changes in the structures of domestic and international politics. These include the emergence of a truly global economy (economic globalism) and of powerful transnational organizations; the electronic revolution in communications; the global movement towards democratic

political systems and market economies; the declining importance and power of the nation-state *for some purposes* and the intensification of national and ethnic identities for others; and the use of international organizations and procedures (regimes) to deal with almost every conceivable international issue.<sup>146</sup>

These systemic changes are closely linked to the changing nature of power in the international system. The relative decline in military or command power coupled with the increasing importance of economic capabilities has caused some speculation concerning the future of US-Japanese relations. According to Joseph Nye, the nature of power is changing and some of the changes will undoubtedly favor Japan, but some of them may favor the US even more. In command power, Japan's economic strength is increasing, but it remains vulnerable in terms of raw materials and relatively weak in terms of military force. And in co-optive soft power, Japan's culture is highly insular and it has yet to develop a major voice in international institutions. On the contrary, the US has a universalistic popular culture and a major role in international institutions.<sup>147</sup> American military capabilities, and the ability of these forces to be used in order to achieve desired outcomes, arguably, provide the US with undeniable

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<sup>146</sup>Samuel P. Huntington "America's changing strategic interests" Survival VOL. 33, NO. 1, January/February 1991 p. 5.

<sup>147</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. "The Changing Nature of World Power" Political Science Quarterly VOL. 105, Summer 1990 A pp. 182-183.

command power hegemony. *Ergo*, the diversity of American power capabilities allows it to compensate for changes within the system as well as those accompanying a changing nature of power:

The "governance" of the international system is in part maintained by the prestige and moral leadership of the hegemonic power. While the authority of the hegemonic power is ultimately established by military and economic supremacy, "the position of the dominant power may be supported by ideological, religious, or other values common to a set of states." Such arguments suggest the importance of non-material resources in the creation and maintenance of hegemonic order.<sup>148</sup>

Second, according to Huntington, there are *changes in the distribution of power*. These include the relative decline in American economic power after WW II; the rise of Japanese economic power; the unification of Germany and the consolidation of its position as the preeminent Western European power; the rise of locally dominant powers in many Third World regions; the general diffusion of economic and military capabilities in the Third World; and the social mobilization of publics in the Third World. Most significant and dramatic of the power changes, however, is the decline and perhaps collapse of Soviet power, now manifest in its economic weakness and its withdrawal from Eastern Europe.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup>G. John Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan "Socialization and hegemonic power" International Organization VOL. 44, NO. 3, Summer 1990 p. 288.

<sup>149</sup>Samuel P. Huntington op. cit. 1991 pp. 5-6.

During the Cold War, US-Soviet relations were paramount to the stability and security of the international system. The same assumption remains in the post-Cold War era. The importance of the changes in the US and the former Soviet Union is that the dominant nature of these two states has not vanished with the end of the Cold War, but remains essential to the system.

The declinist school which has been advocating the end of American hegemony has raised some concerns regarding Huntington's characterization of changes in the distribution of power. One of the main issues of debate remains as to how the cost of victory in the Cold War, the victory of liberal-democratic capitalism, will have an impact on American power in the post-Cold War era. The answer would appear to be that the changing nature of power has caused the US to experience a relative decline in its ability to exercise power.<sup>150</sup> The cost of the Cold War, as Walter Russell Mead argues, has been misleading and is only now becoming apparent:

[The US has] won the Cold War the way Britain won World War I; the Soviet Union has been defeated, but in the struggle the United States *lost*

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<sup>150</sup>The relative ability of the US to exercise its various means of influence has declined since the early stages of the Cold War. This phenomenon however, that of undisputed American hegemony, emerged as a result of its ability to benefit from the unique circumstances attending the end of WW II. The *absolute* decline of the capabilities of American allies as well as that of the defeated Axis powers enabled the US to experience an artificially magnified increase in its own influence in the system. In many aspects, most notably - economic, military, and political - the US enjoyed a level of influence never achieved in its history. However, from the onset of the Cold War, the reconstruction and redevelopment of the war-torn economies of Europe and Asia resulted in a relative decline of American influence. In the context of these developments, the US has been in a state of relative decline - but only from an artificially elevated position - occasioned by the devastation of WW II.

*economic ground to its allies.* [The US] had a larger role in the world in 1950 than in 1990. After the Second World War, [the US] was in a position to establish a new world order and it did. But the post-WW II era is over; the post-Cold War era is beginning. And while the post-WWII era was designed by the United States and served its interests, the new order is being created by others, and it *threatens* to lock the US into long-term economic decline.<sup>151</sup>

The nature of change in the international system provides declinists with ample opportunity to promote their agenda. However, with the system in such a state of transformation the validity of their arguments loses its cogency. The alarmist nature of decline theory is accurately rebuffed by Nye:

Even conservative estimates show that the US share of global products has declined from more than a third of the total after WWII to a little more than a fifth in the 1980s. *That change, however, reflects the artificial effect of WW II: Unlike other Great Powers, the US was strengthened by the war. But that economic preponderance was bound to erode as other countries regained their economic health.*<sup>152</sup>

A great deal of American capabilities during the Cold War was consumed by the bipolar rivalry. The *diffusion of power*<sup>153</sup> in the post-Cold War system may cause the appearance of US decline but the actual power capabilities of the US have, in general, not depreciated. American declinism would appear to provide an adequate rationale for what Seyom Brown calls "a time compressed transformation of

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<sup>151</sup>Walter Russell Mead "On the Road to Ruin: Winning the Cold War, losing the economic peace" Harper's March 1990 p. 59.

<sup>152</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. "American strategy after bipolarity" International Affairs VOL. 66, NO. 3, July 1990B p. 153. Emphasis added.

<sup>153</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. op. cit. 1990 A p. 170.

seemingly stable relationships in world politics".<sup>154</sup>  
Coupled with the apparent American decline, the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the most significant manifestation of change in the international system.

The disabling of the former Cold War opponent's political, economic, and to a certain degree, military capabilities is likely to create significant repercussions throughout the system:

The dramatic events of the past few years in the Soviet empire have weakened the power that threatened Eurasian hegemony for the last 45 years. But the balance of power on Eurasia has not altered to such an extent that America's weight can safely be removed from the scales.<sup>155</sup>

In order to avert increased instability in an already precarious environment, policies addressing the crises in the CIS, and most importantly Russia, need to be developed. The collapse of the former Soviet Union has created a dangerous power vacuum where liberal-democratic capitalism may replace the fallen communist ideology. The failure of such reforms in Russia is especially menacing in light of the increasing influence of ultra-nationalist gains. Former President Richard Nixon argues that:

Peace and US security are inextricably linked to the fate of Russia's political and economic reforms. If Yeltsin succeeds, a democratic Russia will integrate itself, into the West. It will bolster European stability, cooperate with Western

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<sup>154</sup>Seyom Brown "Explaining the transformation of world politics" International Journal VOL. 46, Spring 1991 p. 207.

<sup>155</sup>Francis P. Sempa op. cit. 1992 p. 17.



powers in far-flung crises and enhance prosperity through trade. If he fails, a new despotism will arise based on extremist Russian nationalism. This could trigger war among the former Soviet republics, force the West to rearm, threaten Eastern Europe's security, relieve pressures in China for political reform, and lead to sales of Russian arms and military technology to rogue states such as Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya and North Korea.<sup>156</sup>

An inwardly-turned Russia, attempting to integrate democratic aspects of politics as well as adjusting to the effects of a market-based economy, should become a more stable participant in international politics. In particular, the Soviet abandonment of the military occupation of Central and Eastern Europe has profoundly stabilized international relations.<sup>157</sup> Russian reforms are essential, in both economic and political spheres, for the maintenance of domestic stability can no longer be managed as it was during the Cold War. Russia is not alone. The US also needs to address the myriad social and economic problems of its society in order to participate more adequately and successfully on the international scene. A strong American economy can better aid in the rebuilding process of Russia which does require significant assistance from the West:

While the communists have lost, we have not won until we prove that the ideas of freedom can provide the peoples of the former Soviet Union with a better life. We must enlist the same spirit that won the defensive battle against communism to win

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<sup>156</sup>Richard M. Nixon "We Are Ignoring Our World Role" Time March 26, 1992B p. 72.

<sup>157</sup>Walter B. Slocombe "Strategic stability in a restructured world" Survival VOL. 32, NO. 4, July-August 1990 p. 300.

the offensive battle to ensure the victory of freedom. We must mobilize the West to commit the billions of dollars needed to give Russia's reforms a fighting chance to succeed.<sup>158</sup>

Helping the former Soviet republics to join the family of liberal democratic nations is not only in accordance with the highest principles of the US, it is also in its national interest. Although the US has much to offer the new republics in the way of political-military incentives, such as arms reduction arrangements, much of the investment capital and economic assistance will have to be provided through multilateral efforts. The US needs to join its resources to those of other actors in the international system in order to enhance both future US security as well as future prospects for a more cooperative international order.<sup>159</sup> The urgency of this task cannot be ignored by the West in favor of a less costly short-term objective. The inherent security and stability of the system may be a function of the US-led Western response to the economic and political crises in Russia. Nixon argues that great dangers may emerge if the US ignores its obligation to Russia:

A new Russian despotism inspired by a vital imperial nationalism and shorn of the baggage of the dying faith of communism could potentially be even more dangerous than the old Soviet totalitarianism.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>158</sup>Richard M. Nixon op. cit. 1992B p. 72.

<sup>159</sup>Alberto R. Coll "Power, Principles, and Prospects for a Cooperative International Order" The Washington Quarterly VOL. 16, NO. 1, Winter 1993 p. 9.

<sup>160</sup>Richard M. Nixon op. cit. 1992B p. 72.

Third, according to Huntington, there are *changes in relations among states*. During the Cold War, relations among key countries were relatively stable and clear. Cold War stability and predictability created by the strict polarity of bloc relationships left little room for misperception or uncertainty. The post-Cold War era will be without an overriding cleavage such as that characterized by bipolarity. The new world will have a welter of ethnic, national, religious, economic and cultural antagonisms.<sup>161</sup> The international system, Huntington argues, will likely include the two following characteristics.

First, relations between nations may be volatile and less predictable than during the Cold War because of fewer commonly perceived threats. Nations will, therefore, more frequently pursue unilateral interests. Second, relations among states are likely to be more ambivalent as the strict differentiation between blocs has disappeared. Relations among Great Powers may be characterized by myriad dangers as states abandon the Cold War bipolar system. Bipolarity did provide an element of certainty and predictability among the actors which may not function in a changing systemic structure.<sup>162</sup>

The reassurance among actors during the Cold War resulted as a function of the fear of defection from one side of the scale to the other on the bipolar balance of

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<sup>161</sup>Samuel P. Huntington op. cit. 1991 p. 6.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-7.

power. Bipolarity, and the multidimensional dyadic conflict which characterized it, prevented global consensus at first. As the Cold War continued, global consensus concerning the dichotomy of the bipolar struggle emerged. The end of the Cold War may have caused the collapse of such a consensus in that states are no longer restricted in their activities by an overarching Superpower's influence. Unilateralism as opposed to collectivism may be associated with adventurism in the post-containment era. In order to maintain stability, some form of balance among the Great Powers needs to be maintained.

#### Polarity and balance of power

Perhaps the oldest method by which nation-states have sought to protect their physical security in a hostile world, according to Deibel, is the balance of power.<sup>163</sup> Based on a label for the international system between the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the end of Cold War, the balance of power has persisted for over three hundred years. It showed remarkable stability in surviving the challenge of such crises as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.<sup>164</sup>

Although condemned in theory since its origin and certainly in America well before Woodrow Wilson's time as immoral and war-prone, balance of power policies have been

<sup>163</sup>Terry L. Diebel "Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the future" International Security VOL. 16, NO. 4, 1992 p. 83.

<sup>164</sup>Joseph Frankel International Relations (Oxford University Press, New York) 1964 p. 156. The balance of power which persisted during the Cold War provided a tenuous though stable political environment - all the while accomplishing the goal of avoiding total war.

honored in practice when a nation has felt weak or vulnerable.<sup>165</sup> The balance of power in Europe has especially been significant to the US since its founding. The pursuit of American interests was best undertaken in a system of Great Power balance where it could operate more freely. Deibel states that in the early days of the republic the US was able to capitalize on the balance of power:

When the new United States was a small nation surrounded by the territorial outposts of hostile and much more powerful countries, the founding fathers used balance of power statecraft to protect and expand American independence.<sup>166</sup>

The balance of power provided the opportunity for the US, at its inception, to pursue its policy objectives within a relatively stable and secure environment. The balance of power did not mean an end to war or other crises, rather, it provided a structural framework within which actors could pursue their objectives. "In international politics," Waltz stated, "there is no authority effectively able to prohibit the use of force." "The balance of power among states," he stated, "becomes a balance of all the capacities, including physical force, that states choose to use in pursuing their goals."<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>165</sup>Terry L. Diebel op. cit. 1992 p. 83.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>167</sup>Kenneth N. Waltz Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Columbia University Press, New York) 1959 p. 205. The balance of power serves as a system of checks and balances in which, as Waltz points out, the freedom of choice (and action) of any one state is contingent upon the actions of all other states. p. 204.

The balance of power established a sense of stability and security. Over a period of nearly three hundred years, from the Peace Treaty of Westphalia to the end of the Cold War, the balance of power system has provided a structure within which states balance the relative capabilities of one another. The collective security system of the inter-war period did not adequately replace the traditional balance of power system, and, as a result of the utopian intentions of the League of Nations, it failed:

The collective security system was ineffective because the Great Powers, both within and outside the League, were insufficiently determined in their support for it... When they look back upon the failure of the League to prevent another war, the adherents of both the balance of power and of collective security agreed on one thing, that a stable order in the inter-war period was precluded by the lack of co-operation among the Great Powers - the recurrent differences between the French and the British, the isolationism of the US, the long exclusion from international society of Germany and Russia, as well as the lack of co-operation between the western powers and Russia in the late thirties.<sup>168</sup>

During the traditional balance of power era (1648-1914) all states, large and small, powerful and weak, became involved in the balance. The balance was, to a great extent, determined and maintained by a few powerful states, a balance of power among the Great Powers, and the system depended on their co-existence.<sup>169</sup> In the contemporary international system, after the end of the Cold War, the system is once again balanced by a few Great Powers. The

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<sup>168</sup>Joseph Frankel op. cit. 1964 pp. 164-165.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

contemporary system differs from the traditional balance of power system in that today, one Superpower remains as an active leader in a "complex" balance of power.<sup>170</sup> The evolution of balance of power theory was strongly linked to on American foreign policy from the inter-war period and throughout the Cold War:

Even that supposed moralist Woodrow Wilson, and after him Franklin D. Roosevelt, considered it a vital interest - over which they led the United States into war - to prevent the landmass of Eurasia from being dominated by a single power which would thereby have sufficient industrial capacity to bring war across the oceans to American shores. After WWII, such thinking was applied beyond Eurasia to the entire world. Indeed, containment was essentially the application of balance of power thinking to the particular configuration of the state system that emerged after 1945.<sup>171</sup>

Balance of power has apparently fulfilled the goals of its proponents in providing the system with a mechanism of preserving the system of states. According to Deibel, the question suggested by balance of power thinking for the post-containment era is whether, with the collapse of Soviet power, any nation is likely in the foreseeable future to pose a similar threat to the US?<sup>172</sup> Among the current Great Power candidates, Japan seems to be anti-military and is deficient in global ideological appeal, Russia lags economically and politically, China remains a less-developed

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<sup>170</sup> Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (MacMillan, London) 1977 p. 102.

<sup>171</sup> Terry L. Diebel op. cit. 1992 p. 84.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

country and is too weak, Germany is too enveloped by Europe, Europe lacks political unity, while Brazil or India are too young.<sup>173</sup>

The probability of one or a group of challengers testing America's hegemonic position in the near future seems unlikely. The exaggeration and misperception of the absolute decline of American capabilities has given false hope to a return to some *romantic* nineteenth century balance of power system. The system is invariably more multipolar now than it was during the Cold War based on the meteoric ascent of Japan and Germany while the US carried the majority of the economic and social burden during the bipolar era:

If economic reforms reverse Russian decline, if Japan develops a full-fledged nuclear and conventional capability, or if Europe becomes dramatically more unified, there may be a return to *classical multipolarity in the twenty-first century*. But barring such changes, the US is likely to retain a broader range of power resources - military, economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological - than other countries, and the former Soviet Union may lose its superpower status.<sup>174</sup>

A new balance of power system, adapted to maintain the nation-state based on the structural changes of the system may sustain the status quo. American superiority in most sources of power will allow it to retain its Superpower status despite the end of the Cold War. In contradiction to

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<sup>173</sup>Ibid., p. 85. & Joseph S. Nye Jr. op. cit. 1990 B p. 155.

<sup>174</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. op. cit. 1990 B p. 155.



the declinist arguments, the US remains the most influential and dominant actor in the international system. Furthermore, a number of other states have made relative gains or simply maintained sufficient power resources to form a strong core of Great Powers. Huntington assesses the new system's structural balance of power:

Some people label the new world multipolar. Others point out that the end of the Cold War world left only one superpower. Both observations are true. The emerging world is perhaps best described as a 'uni-multipolar' world. The US is clearly the only country that could be called a superpower. At least six other countries - the Soviet Union, Japan, China, Germany, the UK and France - are major powers, with particularized strengths, weaknesses and interests.<sup>175</sup>

Kenneth Waltz supported the bipolar balance of power as a mechanism for maintaining stability during the Cold War. He believed that there had been only two international systemic structures in modern history: the multipolar system that had characterized interstate relations from approximately the time of the Treaty of Westphalia through the end of WWII, and the bipolar system that had replaced it. On both theoretical and historical grounds, Waltz believed that bipolar systems were inherently more stable than their multipolar counterparts. From a theoretical perspective, the existence of only two major adversaries minimized the possibilities of misperception, confusion, and unpredictable interaction: as any physicist could explain,

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<sup>175</sup>Samuel P. Huntington op. cit. 1991 p. 6.

two-body problems are far easier to solve than those involving three or more.<sup>176</sup>

The emerging structure of the international system may retain some measure of what Waltz so strongly advocated, the survival of one of the Superpowers. The Cold War's bipolarity did provide a certain sense of stability and security despite all of the Superpower antagonism. Perhaps the US, as a result of its Superpower capabilities, will be able to exercise some kind of mediatory role in the international system in order to manage crises. The multipolar dimension of the post-containment era may provide the other necessary stabilizing factor in the system. The concept of unipolarity has, however, attracted significant attention.

Unipolarity, as manifested in the current Pax Americana, emerged as a result of the end of bipolarity.<sup>177</sup> The US finds itself in a unique position, no longer opposed by the Soviet Union, able to pursue its interests virtually unimpeded. Charles Krauthammer has been a fervent supporter of such a proposition acknowledging that the transitional nature of the system has bestowed a unique status upon the US:

With the fall of the Soviet empire, the bipolar world has become unipolar, the one remaining superpower should unashamedly and confidently play

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<sup>176</sup>Kenneth Waltz as cited in John Lewis Gaddis "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War" *International Security* VOL. 17, NO. 3, Winter 1992/93 1992 p. 32.

<sup>177</sup>The US also experienced a sense of Pax Americana during the initial years following the end of WW II as a result of its atomic monopoly.

the part, acting unilaterally if necessary, to defend its friends, its interests and its values abroad.<sup>178</sup>

The immediate post-containment era allowed the US to reign in a unipolar setting. However, the realities of the systemic changes may be more conducive to referring to Huntington's uni-multipolar conception. Deibel's structural interpretation of the balance of power is based upon two characteristics:

First, because the emerging multipolar system offers as potential allies more states of relatively equal power; and second, because ideological differences that constrain realignments have declined in importance. Although its power may seem less overwhelming than in the early Cold War years, the US remains the indispensable balancer.<sup>179</sup>

The American role of *balancer* is not the same as that of Britain in the past. Rather, the US role - which is welcomed by a surprising array of states across the globe - is seen as:

The "least undesirable" outside power in many regions (especially Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf) by states who fear intra- or extra-regional challengers and are too weak to defend themselves even against local hegemon.<sup>180</sup>

The changing nature of the international system has produced a *sui generis* balance of power. Based upon the relative success of bipolarity in the short-term and of

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<sup>178</sup>Charles Krauthammer "Bless Our Pax Americana" Washington Post March 22, 1991 B p. A25.

<sup>179</sup>Terry L. Diebel op. cit. 1992 pp. 85-86.

<sup>180</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 86.

multipolarity in the long-term, a unique approach to international politics may be emerging. The combination of US strengths as a leader among a series of Great Powers, in absence of an overarching threat, provides the opportunity for a stable and secure system. Not unlike the bipolar system, the uni-multipolar system *ceteris paribus*, should encompass the reassurance of systemic stability as well as the longevity of the multipolar approach. The US will remain as the dominant actor in the system:

In the post-Cold War world, the United States will continue to have an interest in maintaining itself as the number one power in the world.<sup>181</sup>

The US will maintain its role as *leader* despite the rising challenges from other Great Powers. Its interests in terms of physical security, value projection, and economic prosperity will unabashedly be pursued as they were in the past. As Nicholas Spykman wrote in 1942:

... it will be cheaper in the long run to remain a working member of the Eurasian power zone than to withdraw for short intermissions to our insular domain only to be forced to apply later the whole of our national strength to redress a balance that might have<sup>182</sup> needed but a slight weight at the beginning.

In the context of the NWO, the maintenance of order among states remains a primary objective for US foreign policy. The structure of the system and the relationship

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<sup>181</sup>Samuel P. Huntington op. cit 1991 p. 8.

<sup>182</sup>Nicholas Spykman America's Strategy in World Politics: the United States and the Balance of Power (Harcourt, Brace, and Company, New York) 1942 pp. 467-468.

among states have evolved from a concrete bipolar design to an ambiguous post-Cold War system. The traditional security threat associated with the Cold War has crumbled along with the Soviet system but other dangers persist. The ambitions and interests of nation-states which had previously existed under the yoke of Superpower influence have become more realizable. The threat of a premeditated nuclear attack against the US, for example, has significantly diminished.

The world in which the US must formulate and implement its foreign policy has undoubtedly changed. The ability of the US to act in such an environment in order to successfully avert or limit crises would represent an effective method of crisis management. Bush's NWO seemed to represent such a policy initiative. Rather than returning to the mindset of Cold War policy, the NWO has arguably illustrated the benefits associated with a policy guided by American interests. During the Cold War, American policy was determined not only by what it sought to champion but also by what it sought to oppose. The ability of the US to pursue objectives based on what America personifies would represent a consistent approach to foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

The NWO represents such a policy. Intervention in the Gulf demonstrated America's ability to act, as well as attempt to establish a policy framework conducive to addressing the concerns of the post-Cold War era. As Krauthammer argues, the Persian Gulf crisis served an

important purpose as a part of the potential NWO. However, the implications of Bush's policy are much deeper:

[T]he new structure of the international system...is the direct result of the collapse of the Soviet empire. The end of the Cold War changed the structure of the world. The gulf war simply revealed it.<sup>183</sup>

The American reaction to the Gulf crisis addresses a fundamental issue in US foreign policy. The forceful and direct nature of intervention in correlation with the UN seemed to spell an end to ambiguous causes and inconclusive outcomes characterized by US Cold War policy.

### Summary

The external structural determinants of the NWO encompass an essential component to understanding Bush's Gulf War policy. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the US remains as the dominant actor in international politics. The role, both ascribed and acquired, of Superpower remains an essential component of the American political lexicon. As such, American participation in a uni-multipolar setting seems predetermined. As a function of the responsibilities associated with its hegemonic status, the US will continue to pursue the interests which brought it success. The triad of American foreign policy interests has been and will continue being those of physical security, economic prosperity, and the projection of American values.

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<sup>183</sup>Charles Krauthammer op. cit. 1991 p. A25.

These interests had been successfully promoted and defended during the Cold War. The end of the Soviet-American conflict however does, not signify the cessation of these interests. In the post-Cold War era these interests, and perhaps most notably the projection of American values, may become even more essential to the stability of the system. The maintenance of stability in the Middle East has long been of paramount interest to US foreign policy makers.

The ability of the Bush administration to function effectively in the Gulf under the ambiguous pre-conditions of the post-Cold War world is remarkable. As John Lewis Gaddis explains, the end of the Cold War presented a *sui generis* environment in which to conduct international relations:

The end of the Cold War brought about nothing less than the collapse of an international system, something that has happened in modern history only once before - if one accepts structuralism's emphasis on the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity at the end of WW II.<sup>184</sup>

As during the Cold War, US-Russian relations remain paramount to the maintenance of stability. The abandonment of this relationship could prove hazardous to the future of international politics. The maintenance of stability provided the paramount source of motivation for Bush in the

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<sup>184</sup>John Lewis Gaddis op. cit. 1992 p. 53.

conduct of his NWO policy. George Weigel reveals this ramification of Bush's policy:

Insofar as it has a guiding concept, the Bush administration's instinctive passion seems to be for "stability". It is here that the President and his foreign policy advisers most resemble the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna. Like Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, President Bush, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft are men made profoundly uncomfortable by revolutionary ideas, and indeed by revolutionaries - and yet they are responsible for US foreign policy in an age of revolution.<sup>185</sup>

As a result of Bush's desire for the maintenance of stability lies the need for an active and effective foreign policy. The implementation of policy cannot be expected to produce fruitful results unless, at times, it seeks to stray from convention. Certainly the approach undertaken during the formulation of the NWO was novel. Perhaps as a result of Bush's unique manipulation of variables such as the UN, the coalition states, and America's leadership position, the NWO may represent a manner in which foreign policy may be conducted in an increasingly interdependent world. Backed by selective and proportionate American commitments, an incipient global security structure derived from widening and increasingly self-reliant regional cooperation may, according to Brzezinski, be possible.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>185</sup>George Weigel "On the Road to Isolationism?" Commentary VOL. 93, NO. 1, January 1992 p. 38.

<sup>186</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski "Selective Global Commitment" Foreign Affairs VOL. 70, NO. 4, Fall 1991 p. 20.



The pursuit of stability however, has never easily been achieved. The importance of American leadership in the future remains essential. The relative success of US policy in the Gulf reified America's hegemonic status. The implementation of the NWO and the US role within it did require substantial effort and commitment. Although the costs, both economic and social, were less - the risk remains. As Krauthammer states, withdrawal from the world and its conflicts will only entail greater chaos and disaster. The importance of a continuously sustained focus on international politics is essential and will require active engagement:

If we want relative stability and tranquillity in the world, we are going to have to work for it. It will come neither of itself nor as a gift from the Security Council. It will only come from an American foreign policy of "robust and difficult interventionism".<sup>187</sup>

Interventionism and engagement in international politics remain *sine qua non* to American interests. The alternative, the withdrawal of commitments, invites uncertainty into the international arena. The need to clarify America's changing strategic interests remains essential. Perhaps as a result of the changing nature of the system, this task becomes even more formidable. The maintenance of American security remains quintessential. In order to successfully implement its policy and pursue its objectives, the US needs to establish a tangible security

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<sup>187</sup>Charles Krauthammer op. cit. 1991 p. A25.

doctrine. Kissinger spoke on the same topic in 1957, the significance of which has not been lost on contemporary times:

The basic requirement for American security is a doctrine which will enable us to act purposefully in the face of the challenges which will inevitably confront us. Its task will be to prevent us from being continually surprised. Our doctrine must be clear about the nature of our strategic interests in the world.<sup>188</sup>

Bush's NWO represents an initial attempt to confront the issues which challenge American interests. In a changing world, in a new world order, the establishment of a strategic doctrine may require extensive time and effort. The indispensability of such a doctrine in the post-Cold War era imposes a sense of urgency for this task. The future success of policy remain inextricably linked to interventionism and leadership. But neither of these characteristics of effective foreign policy are likely to endure if isolationist tendencies triumph.

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<sup>188</sup>Henry A. Kissinger Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, Harper Brothers, New York) 1957 p. 405.

## Chapter 5- Conclusion: Neo-isolationism and the NWO

The need to remain actively engaged and committed to foreign undertakings appears to represent a truism of American post-WW II policy.<sup>189</sup> Throughout the Cold War, US interventionism best served American interests abroad. However, even during the bipolar period there existed an interest in pursuing an isolationist path.<sup>190</sup> The political environment of the Cold War precluded a return to any such policy which would have hampered US efforts to defeat communism. The end of hostilities between the Superpowers with the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to represent an opportunity for American policy-makers to refocus their interests on domestic issues. The NWO, however, did not allow for such a change in policy as Bush recognized the genuine need to remain engaged in international politics.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>189</sup>Isolationism in American foreign policy has often been misinterpreted. For reasons of practicality, the US would never be capable of isolating itself from other nations. As the world has become increasingly interdependent in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, the probability of an isolationist policy lost its limited credibility. The notion of a "Fortress America" isolated from the corruption and influence of other states represents an idealistic or literal interpretation of the concept. At its height, during the early years of the republic as well as the inter-war period, isolationism represented a policy derived from the specific political considerations of the period in question. The incompatibilities of the current international environment are not conducive to the implementation of a neo-isolationist revival. Ironically, the maintenance of overseas commitments serves as the most pragmatic approach while dispelling the latent isolationist fears of political elites in the US.

<sup>190</sup>Perhaps the most obvious and relevant example of this phenomena during the Cold War emerged as a result of American involvement in Vietnam. The inconclusive nature of the end of US involvement in Vietnam as well as the high social, political, and economic cost spawned what came to be known as *Vietnam Syndrome*. As a result of the engagement in South East Asia, popular support for US interventionism declined, therefore rekindling the forces of the isolationist school.

<sup>191</sup>Ronald Steel notes that foreign policy elites in the US fear the loss of power and influence they exercised during the Cold War: It is not surprising that there are those, particularly in the foreign policy elite, who actually miss the Cold War. It gave us a cause to defend, allies that paid deference, and a role as undisputed boss of the realm we called the 'free world'...What were we afraid of? Indeed, were our leaders really afraid of the power of the Soviets to seduce and intimidate the entire world? Or did they find it to be a useful enemy that allowed them to build up the military and economic power that created

The debate between interventionist and isolationist foreign policy has existed since the founding of the republic. During the early years of the United States, isolationism provided the most plausible course for its relations with other states, most notably those in Europe. Bernard Fensterwald elaborates:

..."isolationism" was a marked success during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; by adhering to this policy, we expanded across the continent and became the strongest single power in the world. When we departed from it (1798-1812), we got our fingers burned. The success of the policy over a long period of time was its most dangerous element; America was led into the delusion that its success depended not on political circumstances but on geography and natural law - and that the policy could be successfully followed forever. The other salient point is that the *raison d'être* of nineteenth century aloofness toward Europe was the desire to expand in other directions.<sup>192</sup>

By remaining aloof from European power politics the US was able to focus on expanding the American frontier and developing its political, economic, and social infrastructure. Isolationism became the accepted policy in the US as a result of the *sui generis* nature of the colonial settlers. A distinct sense of alienation from Europe encouraged a policy within which Americans could thrive and develop in the new world. The messianistic tendency of

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what has been justly called the American Century?...Arguably, it was about a role of dominance that the foreign policy elite sought to exert, and to which it is still committed even though the old foe has vanquished. See Ronald Steel *Temptations of a Superpower* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts) 1995 pp. 10, 12 & 21.

<sup>192</sup>Bernard Fensterwald Jr. "The anatomy of American 'isolationism' and expansionism. Part I" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* VOL. II, NO. 2, June 1958 p. 112.

America with its notion of exceptionalism had to first develop and expand in North America:

The American colonists also developed a distinct feeling of "separateness" from Europe, which was based on geographical, economic, and social factors. Allied with "separateness" was a feeling of "differentness" from Europe. Although they felt superior to Europeans in some ways, they felt a deep sense of inferiority in others: it was the coonskin cap versus the periwig, the log cabin versus the manor house. During colonial days we find the beginnings of the vague, amorphous, mystical doctrine of "manifest destiny", which was a mixture of predestination, religion, optimism, and egotism. Americans felt - they seemed to know- that they had a great future ahead of them, and it did not involve dependence upon Europe; rather they were to achieve it for themselves and by themselves.<sup>193</sup>

The initial preoccupation in America with the establishment and maintenance of its own individuality among nations represents what Morgenthau characterized as the first purpose of American politics. This purpose, that of establishing equality in freedom in America, was *sine qua non* to the conservation of its unique nature:

To maintain that achievement of equality in freedom within the United States has, then, been the fundamental and minimal purpose of America. This purpose is fundamental, since the distinctiveness of America as a nation among nations is predicated upon it.<sup>194</sup>

The value of isolationism as a means of achieving desired ends during the formative years of the republic was indispensable. In order to pursue successfully its myriad

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<sup>193</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>194</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau op. cit. 1960 p. 33. This first purpose of American politics as described by Morgenthau is followed by two others. The second purpose necessitates the maintenance of equality in freedom in America as an example for other nations to emulate. The third purpose, according to Morgenthau calls for America to expand the area of equality in freedom in order to maintain equality in freedom at home. By establishing, maintaining, and then exporting equality in freedom the threefold purpose of American politics would be fulfilled. Ibid., pp. 34-36.

objectives on the North American continent, the policy of aloofness provided the necessary policy framework from which to operate.<sup>195</sup> During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the US was able to prosper and flourish behind the policy of isolationism. The twentieth century brought many changes in international politics. The US had become a major power and therefore was obligated to abandon the policy which had made its ascent possible. In the context of the Cold War, isolationism would have been inappropriate. The same remains true of contemporary international politics.

Despite the end of the Cold War, isolationism and/or isolationist tendencies do not provide the necessary policy framework for the US. American foreign policy has been implemented in the past with a certain degree of success as a result of its status in the international community. As a result of the accumulation and development of American power and influence, foreign policy objectives have been more accessible. The implementation of Bush's Gulf War policy

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<sup>195</sup>It is noteworthy to add that the issue of territorial security during this era of continental imperialism was not of paramount concern to American policy-makers. The US was able to pursue its interests in the new world as a result of its insulation from the turmoil of European power politics. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine expressed the intent of the US to retain a policy of isolationism from European affairs. However, the European powers would have to refrain from attempting to venture into the Western hemisphere. Only the support of the British gave the Monroe Doctrine any legitimacy. Ronald Steel explains: What gave the Monroe Doctrine its teeth was not official warnings from Washington, but British sea power operating to prevent the Continental nations from re-establishing their colonies. Even if the new states of Latin America were in danger from imperial Europe, the young American republic of 1823 was not in a position to do very much about it. The Monroe Doctrine - which has since become one of the most important, and most misunderstood, declarations of American foreign policy - was not much more than a bold gesture. Ronald Steel *Pax Americana* (The Viking Press, New York) 1967 p. 195. Also see Martin E. Goldstein *America's Foreign Policy: Drift or Decision* (Scholarly Resources Inc., Wilmington, Delaware) 1984 p. 115. & Ruhl Bartlett *Policy and Power: Two Centuries of American Foreign Policy* (Hill & Wang, New York) 1963 pp. 73-76.

serves as an example of continued American hegemony. The significance of hegemonic socialization<sup>196</sup> in American politics remains essential to the conduct of foreign policy.

As a result of hegemonic socialization, a state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in international politics because other states wish to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such affects. In this sense, it is as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power, getting others to want what you want, might be called indirect or soft co-optive power behavior. It is in contrast to the active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want (also defined as structural power). Co-optive soft power can rest on the attraction of one's ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express.<sup>197</sup>

Only a relatively powerful state (i.e. a Superpower) could effectively exercise soft power rather than resorting to military capabilities or other power sources associated with hard command power. The increasing importance of such

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<sup>196</sup>There are two basic ways in which a hegemonic nation can exercise power and secure the acquiescence of other nations. The first is by manipulating *material incentives* [i.e.: command power]. The second basic way in which a hegemonic nation can exercise power is by altering the *substantive beliefs* of leaders in other nations. Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and accept it as their own - that is when they internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system. John G. Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan op. cit., 1990 p. 285.

<sup>197</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr. op. cit., 1990 A p. 181.

power sources as cultural and social appeal appear to be favorable to the US:

Soft power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will be more willing to follow. If it can establish international norms that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other states to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may not need any costly exercises of coercive or hard power in bargaining situations. The universalism of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are crucial sources of power.<sup>198</sup>

In much the same way, the Superpowers maintained their status during the Cold War in part because "of the fact that we conceive of them as such".<sup>199</sup> American hegemony will be maintained by its exercise of soft as well as hard powers. The fact that these soft sources of power are becoming more important indicates the importance of the ability to socialize the beliefs of others. The US is currently the only state capable of exercising these soft powers with any apparent effectiveness on a global scale:

Power is exercised through a process of socialization in which the norms and value orientations of leaders in secondary states change and more closely reflect those of the dominant state. Under these circumstances, acquiescence is achieved by the transmission of norms and

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<sup>198</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>199</sup>Christer Jonsson Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy (Frances Pinter, London) 1984 p. 15.



reshaping of value orientations and not simply by the manipulation of material incentives.<sup>200</sup>

The US exercises both varieties of power and as a result transmits its norms and values throughout the international system. The Cold War victory of liberal-democratic capitalism has emerged as a result of American hegemonic socialization throughout the post-WW II era. During the Cold War, both hard and soft power were exercised by both blocs. However, the victory of the West has allowed the US to continue to disperse its values and beliefs throughout the system.

The hegemonic status ascribed to the US allows for the continuation of American influence in international politics. Interventionism rather than isolationism permits the US to retain its Superpower status. In order to maintain the momentum of the dispersion of Western (i.e.: American) values, it remains necessary for the US to continue its policy of active engagement on the global scene.

Bush's NWO served the purpose of reconfirming America's hegemonic position during a period of transition and reevaluation. The NWO attended to the crisis in the Persian Gulf and reinforced America's commitment to the maintenance of stability in the world. Stability and the absence of total war remained major interests in the conduct of US foreign policy. In order to maintain stability, Bush sought

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<sup>200</sup>John G. Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan op. cit., 1990 pp. 285-286.

to employ methods from both schools of thought, morality and power.

Morgenthau argues that American foreign policy can be categorized, in terms of the duality of human nature, into three classifications. These divisions in the formulation and implementation of policy simplify the understanding of the NWO:

The illusion that a nation can escape, if it wants to, from power politics into a realm where action is guided by moral principles rather than by considerations of power is deeply rooted in the American mind. Yet it took more than a century for that illusion to crowd out the older notion that international politics is an unending struggle for power in which the interests of individual nations must necessarily be defined in terms of power. Out of the struggle between these two opposing conceptions, three types of American foreign policy have emerged: the realistic - thinking and acting in terms of power - represented by Alexander Hamilton; the ideological - thinking in terms of moral principles but acting in terms of power - represented by Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams; and the moralistic - thinking and acting in terms of moral principles - represented by Woodrow Wilson.<sup>201</sup>

As a heuristic device, Morgenthau's triad would appear to stigmatize the NWO as ideological. Bush's policy was in part motivated by moral considerations and did include the exercise of power. It would be erroneous, however, to assume that policy could be so easily categorized. Morgenthau's three types serve to distinguish the differences between policies. Although the NWO does fit the

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<sup>201</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1951 p. 13.

criteria associated with the ideological type, its motivation and implementation are far more complex.

Freedman argues that Bush's aforementioned first version of the NWO, associated with the novel features of the Gulf War, is more vulnerable to charges of exaggerated ambition: soaring rhetoric racing ahead of reality. In the awkward weeks following the successful conclusion of the war, when Saddam Hussein was still in power and international attention focused on some of the more painful and discreditable aspects of the post-war condition of both Iraq, Kuwait, and of American policy, the outcome appeared to fall short of any vision of a better world.<sup>202</sup> The apparent disappointment in attaining the principles associated with a NWO may have caused some observers to reevaluate their expectations raised by Bush's jingoistic rhetoric. According to Adam Roberts, however:

A cynical interpretation of Bush's recycled vision might have been that preparation for a large and risky military operation overseas always involves an *escalation of rhetoric*, and this was no worse than most.<sup>203</sup>

Criticism of Bush's rhetoric and policy emerged as a result of public expectations for the future of American foreign policy as well as the international system. As the war in the Gulf came to a conclusion, the anarchic nature of

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<sup>202</sup>Lawrence Freedman "The Gulf War and the new world order" Survival VOL. 33, NO. 3, May/June 1991 p. 196.

<sup>203</sup>Adam Roberts "A new age in international relations?" International Affairs VOL. 45, 1991 p. 14. Emphasis added.

the international system predictably remained. Bush had described the Gulf War as the first test of this new order, as his initial effort:

He acknowledged that the world was not moving into 'an era of perpetual peace.' Instead, 'The quest for the NWO is in part a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay.'<sup>204</sup>

Despite the success associated with the US-led coalition effort in the Gulf, certain questions regarding the solvency of the NWO as well as the future of US foreign policy remained. Support for Freedman's interpretation of the first version quickly vanished and was replaced by the more pragmatic second version. The notion of coping with challenges and crises as they arise remains as the guiding principle of US foreign policy. The idealistic nature of the first version, that of a vision of peace and harmony served the rhetorical purpose of testing the waters of public opinion.

Crisis management and the maintenance of stability remain primary goals of US foreign policy. The mechanisms and procedures for attaining these goals have been changed as a function of the changing international system. The Gulf Crisis provided a pattern of how crises *could* be addressed on a multilateral level. However, this model of intervention was successful as a result of the pragmatic

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<sup>204</sup>Lawrence Freedman op. cit., 1991 p. 196.

behavior of the US and its coalition partners and obviously not because of the utopian nature of NWO rhetoric.

The cooperative interventionist nature of the Gulf experience has caused some concern on the American political scene. Some observers believe that the US is adopting foreign policy objectives contrary to the well-being of the US and its domestic political problems. Close US involvement with the United Nations and fear of the emergence of a socialistic world government has prompted some observers to adopt an 'America First' ideology.

The "America firsters" argued that the United States should opt out of the international arena<sup>205</sup> and focus on the domestic scene. These isolationists, led by Patrick Buchanan, argued that America should stop "bearing the burdens" of the world and turn inward once again. According to Nathan and Oliver:

[T]he isolationists [traditionally] argue that the real threats to American security are domestic and must be tended to if American influence is to be extended.<sup>206</sup>

Right-wing activists have warned against US involvement elsewhere while the very fabric of American society unravels. The US has been *bearing the burden* of the international system while domestic social problems have not been dealt with adequately. Stanley Hoffman argues that:

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<sup>205</sup>Kenneth T. Walsh et. al. "With Communism Defeated, America can 'Come Home'" US News & World Report February 3, 1992 p. 27.

<sup>206</sup>James A. Nathan & James K. Oliver Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System (Little, Brown and Company, Boston) 1983 pp. 172-173.

Neo-isolationists want the US to deal only with threats to America's physical security, political independence, and domestic liberty. They find no such threats at present, and therefore argue that the US should let other powers, and regional balances of power, take care of all the world's woes.<sup>207</sup>

Furthermore, according to isolationists, the coalition forces working in unison with the UN have set a dangerous precedent in terms of advancing the cause of globalized socialism:

The painful truth remains that American blood has been spilled in the Middle East, not to protect America, but to help build a new world order under the control of the United Nations. Now that President Bush has shown that his NWO can work in the Persian Gulf, the UN, with Bush's help, might work to 'solve' other global crises. In addition to 'resolving' regional conflicts in the Middle East, Central America or Africa, the UN might also declare war on environmental concerns, the international drug trade, or international terrorism. *Brick by brick, the house of world order might be built under the guise of solving problems that supposedly transcend national boundaries - until at last the US becomes a mere province in a socialistic world government.*<sup>208</sup>

The validity of the concerns for the future of the US by the Right are reminiscent of the early years of the American Republic:

The cardinal principle undergirding the foreign policy of the young republic was isolationism. Precisely defined, this set of ideas was, in itself, largely negative - a limitation upon the action of the United States government. It required the avoidance of permanent alliances and of involvement in the domestic affairs of other

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<sup>207</sup> Stanley Hoffman "Bush Abroad" The New York Review VOL. 39, NO. 18, November 5, 1992 p. 59. The reality of complex interdependence necessitates the maintenance of US commitments.

<sup>208</sup> Gary Benoit "American Blood for a New World Order?" The New American March 26, 1991 p. 4. Emphasis added. The UN does not possess the necessary homogeneity necessary to achieve such an end. Only under highly specific conditions could a Gulf-like intervention reoccur.

continents. But taken together with such other major concepts as neutrality and the Monroe Doctrine and such lesser ones as nonintervention, recognition of *de facto* governments, and equality of trade opportunity, it provided a positive and realistic course for a *young and weak nation*.<sup>209</sup>

The policy of isolationism suited the US as a young and weak nation. Through both revolution and evolution the US has grown to Superpower status, a status of power and influence in world politics which a reversion to isolationism would jeopardize. On the contemporary scene, Stanley Hoffman argues that three ideologies dominate the intellectual debate concerning America's role in world politics. These ideologies include the neo-isolationists, the realists, and the internationalists.<sup>210</sup>

Bush's NWO foreign policy incorporated elements of both the realist and internationalist ideologies. Isolationism has played a role throughout American history and has had success in obtaining its goals in the past. In the post-WW II era, isolationism as a reaction to American adventurism has maintained a consistent yet tertiary appeal in the US:

Generally since the late 1940's, two-thirds to three-quarters of the public has favored an active part, whereas only one fourth has wanted the country "to stay out of world affairs." Although there was a slight increase in isolationist sentiment after the Vietnam War, the proportions had nearly returned to their previous levels by

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<sup>209</sup>Richard W. Leopold The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1962 p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>210</sup>Realists such as Kissinger want the US to continue to be the holder of the world balance of power, the arbiter of the main regional power groups, and the watchdog against all imperialistic trouble-makers. Internationalists want a greater role for multilateral institutions and more emphasis in human needs and rights, the environment, and democracy. Stanley Hoffman "Bush Abroad" The New York Review VOL. 39, NO. 18, November 5, 1992 p. 59.

the late 1970's. Indeed, in the spring of 1977, 79 percent of the public agreed that "the United States has a real responsibility to take a very active role in the world."<sup>211</sup>

Historically, isolationism has played a role in the American experience. However, the lessons of the Interwar period and the failure of the League of Nations remind policy-makers of the dangers of remaining aloof. The nature of the isolationist position lends very little credibility to its applicability in policy formulation in the 1990s:

Pat Buchanan's revival of the 1940's slogan 'America First' is, like isolationist slogans of the past, more a cry of despair than a counsel of practical policy ... for the last century, isolationism has been more of a political rallying cry than a policy anyone could put into place ... isolationism will continue to be a mirage, a source of fascination visible only in the distance.<sup>212</sup>

As Walter LaFeber points out, isolationism or neo-isolationism, is in its nature similar to any other foreign policy ideology. Essentially, isolationism emerges and fades as a function of the political environment on both the domestic and international scenes:

Americans tend to become political "isolationists" when they cannot dominate international affairs and "internationalists" politically when they can. Rarely have Americans been prepared to bargain or to compromise their freedom of action. They have joined such organizations as the United Nations when they could control them.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>211</sup>Thomas Brewer American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.)1980 p. 66.

<sup>212</sup>Michael Barone "The American isolationist mirage" US News & World Report February 3, 1992 p. 29.

<sup>213</sup>Walter Lafeber America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1984 Fifth edition (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1985 p. 23.



In the post-Cold War era, isolationism has little utility as it fails to address the multitudinous issues in world politics in which the US has a significant stake.

Writing in 1972, in the midst of the Vietnam War, Robert Tucker illustrated the incompatibilities of isolationism with American foreign policy which remain pertinent today. "The issue", he claims, "is not one of withdrawal from the world but one of redefining America's relationship to the world".<sup>214</sup>

Furthermore, as Wayne S. Cole argues, the isolationist approach to foreign policy in the post-Cold War era is incongruous with the realities of the international system:

It has been years since the United States could properly feel so secure from direct military assault from abroad as it can at this moment. Nonetheless, the shocking capabilities of military science and technology; the spectacular speed of its development, and the growing awareness that countries once thought to be too primitive for such developments are demonstrating surprising potential in those areas make it unlikely that the civilian and military leadership elites of the United States will be persuaded that the country can now relax its multilateral security concerns in ways compatible with traditional isolationism.<sup>215</sup>

Tucker also discusses a variety of other reasons which would avert the emergence of isolationism as a dominant foreign policy ideology:

...economic and strategic realities are considered to preclude the possibility of a return to isolationism as a policy. Our economic commitment abroad, it is argued, compels a course of action

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<sup>214</sup>Robert W. Tucker A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? (Universe Books, New York) 1972 p. 17.

<sup>215</sup>Wayne S. Cole "United States isolationism in the 1990s?" International Journal VOL. 48, Winter 1992/93 1993 pp. 46-47.

that rules out a return to isolationism. Economic interdependence is for the United States an inescapable fact of life, and one that may be disregarded only at the price of national well-being.<sup>216</sup>

Moreover, Cole believes that the American economy as well as its accompanying urban society very nearly mandate an active and positive role for the US in world affairs.<sup>217</sup>

The crux of the argument against isolationism is based on the contemporary determinants and political considerations existing in the international system. Pragmatism, as a function of the realities of power politics, precludes any abandonment of American objectives and goals throughout the world which would jeopardize the national interest. As Tucker aptly states:

...power creates responsibilities...great power must in turn give rise to great responsibility, and that this responsibility is incompatible with isolationism...America's power precludes a return to isolationism.<sup>218</sup>

Isolationism in the post-Cold War era has, arguably, been revealed as a chimera rather than a feasible resolution to the questions being posed regarding the future of American foreign policy. The NWO, having demonstrated the willingness and ability of the US to act decisively in a crisis, has reinforced public confidence in American foreign policy. The US-led coalition victory in the Gulf served as an example of how policy could be implemented

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<sup>216</sup>Robert W. Tucker op. cit., 1972 p. 18.

<sup>217</sup>Wayne S. Cole op. cit., 1993 p.18.

<sup>218</sup>Robert W. Tucker op. cit., 1972 p. 19.

despite the unstable contingencies generally associated with conflict in the Middle East.

First, and perhaps foremost, Bush's policy reaffirmed the notion of exceptionalism as well as the belief in America's hegemonic status. The successful implementation of military operations in the Gulf lent credibility to the continuation of US leadership in world affairs. The significance of these developments in the Gulf is not specious nor is it meant to be tautological. The belief in American messianism, in its manifest destiny, was replenished as a result of Bush's vision and action during a period of turmoil and uncertainty.

The conduct of foreign policy during the Gulf War arguably, served as a catalytic element for the continuation of American influence in the post-Cold War era. Rather than vanquishing its role, and perhaps refocusing its energies on domestic matters, the US fulfilled its obligations as a leader in the international community. The *sui generis* nature of American history in world affairs and its evolution to Superpower status would appear to preclude any other course of action.

US foreign policy finds its epistemological sources in the dichotomous relationship between realism and idealism. Both power and morality have, over the years, served as divergent intellectual touchstones for foreign policy. Bush's NWO exemplifies this tradition. Based on the words and actions of statesmen in US history, the NWO was

fashioned from sources as diverse as Jefferson and Hamilton, and Wilson and Truman. As a result of this correlation of morality and power, Bush's policy evolved as a pragmatic response to the crisis in the Gulf.

The creation and implementation of the NWO also served the purpose of addressing American interests in the Gulf region. National interest, in part defined as a desire to maintain a stable environment in the Middle East, represents a probable justification for American involvement in the Gulf crisis. The rationalization of US interventionism reveals many other sources for involvement which include: access to vital oil supplies, and the redressing of Iraqi actions, as well as the exportation of Western (i.e. American) values. Fortunately, American actions associated with the NWO were not simply motivated by crusading moralism. Bush's policy included the use of force and power to attain his objectives. Both aspects of the NWO find their source, however, in the desire to promote the national interest. Morgenthau acknowledged the significant dichotomy between morality and power in the conduct of foreign policy. However, he also argued that in the course of pursuing the national interest in international relations, that morality and power could be married to form a sound basis for policy:

Political thought and political action moved on different planes, which, however, inclined to merge in the end...The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles *divorced* from political reality, and

another set of moral principles derived from political reality.<sup>219</sup>

Bush's policy exemplifies the ability of the US to maintain its hegemonic leadership while also being conditioned by the messianistic values in American history. The NWO, arguably, is an *a fortiori* representation of the national interest. Its epistemological sources in rhetoric, tradition, and international environment reveal the depth of its origins. The implementation of the policy replenished all of the strengths which had been questioned since the Vietnam era. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War fueled apathy for American commitments and obligations abroad. A revisionist interpretation of US interventionism arguably, prompted the reemergence of the isolationist school. The NWO, however, served to demonstrate that the national interest could only be fulfilled when the US was prepared to demonstrate its leadership in order to maintain stability in international relations.

The intervention in the Persian Gulf aided in the illumination of several significant elements in the conduct of US foreign policy. Not only was American leadership and hegemony salvaged, but also relative stability was returned to the Persian Gulf - hence the maintenance of the status quo. The utilization of both moralism and power enabled Bush to implement policy conducive to the national interest by maintaining stability, asserting the status quo,

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<sup>219</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (Alfred A. Knopf, New York) 1951 pp. 19 & 33.

confirming American leadership, exporting Western (i.e. American) values of democracy and justice - all while operating within the parameters established by the United Nations, including Russia.

America's widely defined national interest - Bush's consideration of multiple variables concerning the interest of the international actors - serves the purposes of US and the community of nations at large. The NWO does not fall prey to Niebuhr's "narrowing of interest" to a point of egoistic self-concern:

It is not easy for a nation to be concerned with any other nation in altruistic terms. The difference between individual and collective morality is immense and is established by the fact that collective self-concern is a compound of individual egoism, collectively expressed, and the spirit of loyalty and self-sacrifice of the individual which the community easily appropriates for its own ends. It was a dictum of George Washington that a nation was not to be trusted beyond its own interests...[A] nation that is too preoccupied with its own interests is bound to define those interests too narrowly. It will do this because it will fail to consider those of its interests which are *bound up in a web of mutual interests* with other nations...In short, the national interest when conceived only from the standpoint of the self-interest of the nation is bound to be defined too narrowly and therefore to be self-defeating.<sup>220</sup>

Bush's NWO satisfies the policy criteria of representing the US national interest both domestically and on the international scene. The implementation of the Gulf War policy reified America's commitments, hence allowing the

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<sup>220</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and Its Application to Our Age Expressed in His Writings Harry R. Davis & Robert C. Good eds. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York) 1960 pp. 332-333.

US to retain its status of leadership. Richard Nixon outlines the necessity for the continuation of US commitments:

The renewal of America at home is necessary for the renewal of our example abroad. When the people of the world look to America for leadership, we want them to see not just the strongest and richest country on earth but also a uniquely good country. The American people are industrious, generous, and devout; they have great character and spirit. They rise to any challenge they are given. We still have the power to move others. Do we have the power to move ourselves? Ultimately, a country that has lost faith in its ideals cannot expect its ideals to appeal to others.<sup>221</sup>

As the foreign policy of a Superpower, isolationism presents itself as an unfeasible solution. The political environment of the international system will not permit it. Rather, a policy conducive to continued US involvement and commitment reinforces American leadership and influence over the global agenda in which it maintains a significant stake. The NWO provided an example - not a blueprint - of how a policy, derived from both idealist and realist schools of thought and based on the national interest, can effect results. Based on the morality of Wilsonian rhetoric and America's diplomatic tradition, the NWO was created out of the climate of the international environment.

Bush possessed both the capabilities (power) and the wisdom (virtue) in the creation and implementation of policy. Isolationism, as it was utilized by realist

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<sup>221</sup>Richard Nixon Beyond Peace (Random House, New York) 1994 p. 23.

American statesmen in the early years of the republic - before it achieved Superpower status - was once a pragmatic policy. During the early years of growth and development, the US needed to isolate, even shelter itself from the entanglements of Eurocentric power politics. However, in the contemporary system isolationist ideas have become extraneous. Nixon illustrates this point with significant clarity:

As we enter the twenty-first century, we must adopt a clear-headed policy based on practical idealism and enlightened realism. For the first time in fifty years, we have the power to set a course for the next century so that all, not just some, nations can experience the victory of freedom over tyranny in the world.<sup>222</sup>

Only in this manner can the US hope to fulfill its national interest. The dilemma however, lies in the fact that the course of international politics and American foreign policy are inextricably linked to one another. Therefore, in order to pursue a policy representative of the national interest, the US needs to remain actively committed to international relations. The US found such a policy in Bush's approach. The NWO, as considered from three perspectives in American politics, fulfilled the criteria of the national interest during the Gulf crisis. Derived from realism, idealism, and American political philosophy, the NWO embodies the national interest. Meinecke's description of the nature of *raison d'état* demystifies the sources and motivations of state behavior:

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<sup>222</sup>Ibid., p. 34.



*Raison d'état* is the fundamental principle of national conduct, the State's first Law of Motion. It tells the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State. The State is an organic structure whose full power can only be maintained by allowing it in some way to continue growing; and *raison d'état* indicates both the path and the goal for such a growth. This path and this goal cannot be chosen at random; but neither can exactly the same ones be prescribed for all States. For the State is also an individual structure with its own characteristic way of life; and the laws general to the species are modified by a particular structural pattern and a particular environment. So the 'intelligence' of the State consists in arriving at a proper understanding both of itself and its environment, and afterwards in using this understanding to decide the principles which are to guide its behavior. These principles are always bound to be at the same time both individual and general, both constant and changeable. They will change subtly as alterations take place in the State itself and the environment. But they must also tally with what is lasting in the structure of the individual State, as well as with that which is permanent in the laws governing the life of all States. Thus from the realm of what is and what will be, there constantly emerges, through the medium of understanding, a notion of what ought to be and what must be. The statesman *must*, if he is convinced of the accuracy of his understanding of the situation, act in accordance with it in order to reach his goal. The choice of path to the goal is restricted by the particular nature of the State and its environment. Strictly speaking, only one path to the goal (i.e. the best possible one at the moment) has to be considered at any time. For each State at each particular moment there exists one ideal course of action, one ideal *raison d'état*.<sup>223</sup>

The fulfillment of the national interest has both domestic and international ramifications for the US.

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<sup>223</sup>Friedrich Meinecke Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'Etat and Its Place in Modern History (Yale University Press, New Haven) 1962 p.1. The history of the concept of 'national interest' goes back to the earliest stages of the evolution of the modern state, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, first in Italy and then in England. After the advent of nationalism, the older terms - the 'will of the prince', 'dynastic interests', or *raison d'état* - were gradually replaced by reference to the nation. The term 'national interest' has been extensively used by American statesmen ever since the establishment of the Constitution. Joseph Frankel National Interest (Praeger Publishers, New York) 1970 p. 20.

Considering America's stake in the international arena, the NWO provided a policy from which desired ends, both at home and abroad, could be realized.<sup>224</sup> The maintenance of Middle East stability as well as the reification of American exceptionalism were two of the motivational factors regarding the Persian Gulf campaign. As a result of the American-led intervention in the Gulf, the American national interest was satisfied in both fora. The restitution of the national interest via the implementation of the NWO-Gulf War policy would have remained unsatisfied had Bush decided to choose another path such as crypto-isolationism. The role the administration chose for the US to reassert in the post-Cold War era was indelibly that of world leadership. Ruggie observes that the US has been a world power throughout the twentieth century and thus has had both worldwide interests and capabilities.<sup>225</sup>

The various commitments the US has undertaken since the end of WW II outlined the role the nation would continue to play in the future if it desired to maintain its multidimensional hegemonic status in international relations. As American involvement in international relations increased, its ability to establish a more stable world order grew. The result was a world order dominated by

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<sup>224</sup>Having tested the waters of public opinion, Bush sought to implement the NWO as a pragmatic interpretation of long-standing traditions in American foreign policy. Furthermore, as a result of the implementation of the NWO, the US was able to continue exporting its values of freedom, equality, and justice for the purpose of fostering a more stable international environment.

<sup>225</sup>John Gerard Ruggie "Third Try at World Order ? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War" Political Science Quarterly VOL. 109, NO. 4 1994 p. 561.

Western democratic-capitalist values. The end of the Cold War seemed to represent an opportunity for the Bush administration to reaffirm America's resolution to strong global leadership and international stability. The three different perspectives examined in this thesis indicate the underlying elements of contemporary American foreign policy. The need for American involvement in global matters remains essential to political stability in the US and abroad. The NWO provided such a policy in the transitional nature of the post-containment era. Based on the beliefs and values of American statesmen dating back to the founding of the republic as well as the unique nature of the international system, the NWO provided a balanced approach to the Gulf crisis. Essentially, the NWO represents the fundamental characteristics associated with American foreign policy for over two centuries. Richard Nixon expresses his views on this point clearly:

As we enter the twenty-first century, we must adopt a clear-headed policy based on practical idealism and enlightened realism. For the first time in fifty years, we have the power to set a course for the next century so that all, not just some, nations can experience the victory of freedom over tyranny in the world...Idealism without realism is naïve and dangerous. Realism without idealism is cynical and meaningless. The key to effective leadership at home and abroad is a realistic idealism that succumbs to neither utopianism nor despair.<sup>226</sup>

The three perspectives herein developed facilitate the understanding of the NWO. By illustrating the significance

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<sup>226</sup>Richard Nixon op. cit., 1994 pp. 34 & 192.

of American exceptionalism and rhetorical symbolism as a means of promoting public opinion, the importance of the liberal-democratic tradition, and the external structural determinants, Bush's policy becomes intelligible. The ability to comprehend his vision finds its sources not only in the immediate political crisis in the Gulf but also in the rich history and tradition which defines American diplomacy.

The rationalizations for intervention run deeper than the simple redressment of Iraqi belligerence but rather, into a nation's past where the answers to its actions may be discovered. The role undertaken by the US remains that of international leadership. Both historical and contemporary events make this choice seemingly obvious. In exercising this leadership, under the influence of power politics and moral values, the US may, arguably, satisfy its national interest in the post-Cold War era. In the context of the NWO, the US sought to confirm its position in world politics via the implementation of policy derived from both idealistic messianism and power politics. The success of the Gulf War campaign seemed to corroborate America's claim to its continued hegemonic status.

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