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The Foreign Policy Of The New Democratic Party, 1961-1988

By

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A thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements
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Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History
University of Manitoba
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE NDP AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A MIXED RECORD (1975-80)

Human rights is the ultimate internationalist issue. If one accepts the notion that people everywhere have certain basic rights, all barriers, including national ones, are transcended. Each person must be viewed as possessing a common world citizenship with rights guaranteed by the international community. Not surprisingly, therefore, the internationalists who founded the United Nations adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.⁷⁰⁴ This was followed over the years by conventions, protocols and a permanent commission to promote respect for human rights.⁷⁰⁵

Despite Canada's support for these UN actions, for several reasons human rights did not begin to play a significant role in Canadian foreign policy until the mid-Seventies. First, in voting for the Universal Declaration, Lester Pearson, Canada's UN representative in 1948, had made it clear that since primary jurisdiction over human rights lay with the provinces, their approval must be obtained before Canada could sign

⁷⁰⁴ John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Vol.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp.290-5.

⁷⁰⁵ John W. Foster, "The UN Commission on Human Rights," in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), pp.79-100.

international human rights agreements.⁷⁰⁶ The result was that Canada did not officially ratify the international covenants until the late Seventies. The second factor was that Canada, like most nations, had long adhered to the principle that non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries (national sovereignty) must outweigh the international community's right to intervene on human rights grounds (as Canada's Biafran policy had exemplified).

As a result of some major internal and external developments, a shift began to occur in the mid to late Seventies that has had a significant effect on Canadian foreign policy ever since.⁷⁰⁷ Among these developments, five were most important. First, by 1975, there was a growing consensus that the traditional Western definition of human rights needed to be broadened to include not just individual civil and political rights but also collective, social and economic rights.⁷⁰⁸ Second, the new president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, helped raise the profile of human rights considerably by making it a leading consideration in determining American foreign policy to the extent that on occasion Washington cut off aid to countries guilty of massive human rights abuses. Third, the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, supposedly guaranteeing respect for certain basic human rights in the signatory

⁷⁰⁶ Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, "Conclusions and Prospects," in Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, p.295.

⁷⁰⁷ For a fuller discussion of these reasons, see Kim Richard Nossal, "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confined?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights," and Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making," in Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.46-76.

⁷⁰⁸ See Francisco E. Thoumi, "Human Rights Policy: Basic Human Needs and Economic Implications for Lesser Developed Countries," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.23 (May, 1981), p.180. Also see, Rhoda E. Howard, "Civil-Political Rights and Canadian Development Assistance," in Human Rights, Development and Foreign Policy, ed. by Irving Brecher (Halifax: The Insititute for Research on Public Policy, 1989), pp.355-76.

countries and the free movements of people between East and West, was very influential in drawing world-wide attention to the issue. This attention was magnified when the failure of the communist countries to fully implement the agreement led to the formation of human rights groups behind the Iron Curtain and to international condemnation at the first follow-up conference on the Helsinki Accords held in Belgrade in 1978. Fourth, increased media coverage of widespread atrocities in such nations as Idi Amin's Uganda and Pol Pot's Kampuchea and of the escalating repression in South Africa made human rights an issue of general concern in the West. This ensured greater interest by politicians especially in countries like Canada where human rights lobby groups helped keep the issue in the forefront.⁷⁰⁹ Fifth, in Canada, domestic pressure from churches and other non-governmental organizations on human rights was growing.⁷¹⁰

All of these factors working together eventually brought a response from the government. In 1978, Don Jamieson, Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, publicly modified the long-standing Canadian policy of non-interference by stating that no member of the UN could insist any longer that its human rights performance was a purely domestic matter in which the international community had no interest.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁹ Kim Richard Nossal, "Cabin'd, Crib'b, Confin'd?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights," and Victoria Berra Berry and Allan McChesney, "Human rights and Foreign Policy-making," in Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.46-76.

⁷¹⁰ Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, "Conclusion: Questions and Prospects," in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt (Kingston-Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1988), p.295.

⁷¹¹ Kim Nossal, "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confin'd?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights," in Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, p.51.

As a party ostensibly committed to building a world built on the ideals of equality and unity of all mankind and humanitarian internationalism, human rights ought to have formed an integral part of the New Democratic Party's foreign policy. This chapter will assess the human rights policy statements of the NDP and its public performance concentrating on the 1975 to 1980 period. The term "human rights" did not appear in any NDP foreign policy resolution until 1973, although respect for human rights underlay many of the resolutions passed in earlier years such as those advocating increased foreign aid, strong support for political and civil rights and others designed to enhance economic and social conditions.

For example, its 1961 convention international affairs and defence platform stated that an NDP government would review "Canada's domestic policies, particularly with regard to immigration and racial discrimination, to ensure that they conform to the spirit of equality among peoples and nations set out in this program."⁷¹² Similarly, the 1963 convention extended enthusiastic greetings to social democratic and labour forces in Latin America who were struggling against tyranny and for political and economic rights.⁷¹³ Then in 1967, NDP delegates passed a resolution demanding the restoration of constitutional rights for the Greek people,⁷¹⁴ while two years later they condemned the Portuguese dictatorship, although without drawing specific attention to human rights abuses, something the Socialist International had already done in 1968.⁷¹⁵

⁷¹² Anne Scotton, ed., "International Affairs/Defence," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), p.95.

⁷¹³ Ibid., "World Peace," p.96.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid., "Greece," p.98.

⁷¹⁵ Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," pp.102-3; Socialist International Information, Vol.18 (February 26, 1968), NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.485, File SI Circulars

In the preamble to its pivotal 1969 foreign policy statement, the party reaffirmed its commitment to a world without oppression, discrimination, poverty or war and in which all could choose their own way to democratic and equalitarian societies.⁷¹⁶ The next year saw Brewin pressuring Prime Minister Trudeau in Parliament to find a way for Canada to officially ratify the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights despite provincial misgivings.⁷¹⁷

By the early Seventies then, the language of human rights had begun to infiltrate NDP foreign policy thinking. Why and how had the shift occurred? First, while it is not possible to document this precisely, the influence of the Socialist International must have played a part as on other international issues. Second, specific world events and the personal involvement of party members began to affect the way Canadian social democrats viewed the question. As noted in Chapter Ten, Andrew Brewin became so personally involved with the Biafran crisis that he took a dangerous trip to the area to learn first-hand about conditions. On his return, he stated explicitly that human rights must play a much greater role in foreign policy decision-making.⁷¹⁸ Moreover, young NDP activists like Stephen Lewis, Gerald Caplan, John Brewin and Steven Langdon had spent some time in Africa in the late Sixties and had come back with a keen and enduring interest in developments there.⁷¹⁹

Other events in the early Seventies also raised the profile of human rights in NDP circles (and beyond). For example, the Pakistani civil war in 1970-1 once more

1968, p.78.

⁷¹⁶ Scotton, "International Affairs and Defence," p.102.

⁷¹⁷ Debates, June 26, 1970, p.8045.

⁷¹⁸ Debates, Nov.26, 1969.

⁷¹⁹ Steven Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

raised the troubling issue of whether the international community had the right to interfere in a sovereign country when a large identifiable group of people were in grave danger, in this case the Bengalis in what was to become Bangladesh. As with Biafra, the NDP came down in favour of the threatened people. The issue rose again with South Vietnam's harsh treatment of political prisoners. When the Liberal government declined to get involved, Andrew Brewin was angered. In a letter he wrote on April 29, 1974, he complained,

Mr. Sharp [Canada's External Affairs minister] is entirely wrong in suggesting that no country has the right to criticize another country when there is large-scale inhumanity. Indeed, the Human Rights Commission of the UN was set up precisely for this purpose.⁷²⁰

Unfortunately, as with foreign policy in general in this period, Brewin had to carry most of the load himself on the human rights question in the NDP caucus. This he did with considerable courage and energy throughout the Seventies. His archival papers are filled with box after box of files concerning human rights and refugee cases which had been referred to him for help. On January 21, 1975, to cite one example, Brewin sent a letter to External Affairs asking that the Canadian government do everything it could to draw attention to the persecution of Christians in Chad.⁷²¹

The human rights issue that traditionally aroused the most interest in NDP circles was the systematic denial of basic human rights by Whites against Blacks, particularly in Rhodesia, South Africa and to a lesser extent Portugal's African colonies. (Since the NDP's policy on southern Africa in the early Seventies was detailed in

⁷²⁰ Brewin to Irene Shaw, Apr.29, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.90, File 17.

⁷²¹ Brewin to External Affairs, Jan.21, 1975, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.78, File 3.

Chapter Nine, only a few points need to be highlighted here.) The issue was straightforward; the racist policy of apartheid and its accompanying human rights abuses must be condemned. Indeed, the NDP had always argued that Canada's foreign policy ought to reflect fundamental Canadian values such as human dignity and equality. The 1970 Liberal White Paper's statement on apartheid in South Africa helped force the NDP to face the question of how to apply these values in a concrete situation, although it took until 1973 before the NDP incorporated the term "human rights" directly into a foreign policy resolution on southern Africa. "In Africa the struggle for freedom and fundamental human rights is one of the world's most crucial problems...."⁷²² For the first time, the NDP had explicitly identified the struggle for fundamental human rights as equal with other longstanding NDP foreign policy objectives.

In a 1975 public address, Brewin insisted that the NDP had always supported the gradual enhancement of a global system of law for the protection of fundamental human rights.⁷²³ However, as the above analysis has shown, concrete sustained NDP support for a distinctive Canadian foreign policy incorporating human rights had not really developed until the early 1970s. This was not much faster than the Liberal government or any other Western government for that matter. The South African and Biafran issues, where human rights concerns were linked with other significant and longstanding aspects of NDP foreign policy such as commitment to the survival of the Commonwealth and the United Nations, were partial exceptions.

⁷²² Scotton, "Southern Africa," p.107.

⁷²³ Brewin, "The Legacy of J.S. Wordsworth In International Affairs," Text of speech to the Ontario Wordsworth Foundation, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.152, File 10-2-1975, pp.14-5.

What changes, if any, in this pattern happened within the New Democratic Party in the period from 1975 to 1988 when human rights emerged as an integral part of the international affairs agenda in most Western countries? Moreover, what effect did this have on NDP foreign policy in general? In early 1977, after Jimmy Carter, the newly elected president of the United States, told the UN General Assembly that any nation must be prepared to receive the wrath of the international community if it committed gross violations of human rights, Andrew Brewin seized the moment on March 18, 1977 to ask the Canadian government:

Will Canada undertake to co-ordinate with other countries the termination of assistance whether direct or indirect through national or international organizations to countries which have been found consistently to breach human rights?⁷²⁴

The Liberal government's reply was noncommittal.

However, when Black uprisings in Soweto in 1976 led to an intensification of repression by the South African authorities symbolized most graphically by the murder of the Black leader, Steven Biko in 1977, Canada took action. First, it barred the entry of South African athletes into Canada, followed the next year by the introduction of a voluntary code of conduct covering trade union rights and racial equality for Canadian firms operating or owning corporations in South Africa. Also in 1978, Canada withdrew its official trade commissioners and stopped the Export Development Corporation from using government funds to promote exports to South Africa. Moreover, Canada endorsed the mandatory ban on selling arms to the apartheid regime

⁷²⁴ Debates, Mar.18, 1977, p.4119.

imposed by the UN in 1977.⁷²⁵ Of course, the underlying reason the Canadian government moved on this issue in the late Seventies was its desire to remain in step with changing world public opinion and the growing sense among Western governments that their own interests were best served by joining the campaign for moderate sanctions, thus, muting calls for more radical measures.

The NDP had been calling for most of these measures since at least 1970 as Brewin reminded the House on December 19, 1977: "I imagine that it was about ten years ago that we started talking about this first, and it shows that if you keep on talking about something worthwhile, you finally get some results."⁷²⁶ (This statement says a great deal about the NDP's understanding of its role as a minority party in a Parliamentary system.)

A new NDP member of Parliament from British Columbia, Stu Leggatt, was not satisfied with the government's ethics code for Canadian companies dealing with South Africa. The voluntary codes would be largely meaningless, he charged, unless specific penalties were applied against those who violated them.⁷²⁷ Leggatt went even further to argue that based on what a delegation of Black South African visitors to Canada had told him, it was time for this country and all Western states to introduce binding and comprehensive sanctions on South Africa to bring about real and

⁷²⁵ Rhoda E. Howard, "Black Africa and South Africa," in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.276-7.

⁷²⁶ Debates, Dec. 19, 1977, p.2012.

⁷²⁷ Ibid., Dec.20, 1977, p.2045.

long-term change.⁷²⁸ However, the NDP itself waited till 1981 to include this in a resolution.⁷²⁹

The NDP was particularly critical of South Africa's occupation and exploitation of Namibia. In a major June 17, 1975 foreign policy speech, Brewin referred to Namibia as Canada's special responsibility because a Canadian firm, Falconbridge, was conducting mining operations under a licence from South Africa which had no international legal authority there. In addition, Falconbridge was guilty of paying poor wages and providing miserable working conditions. Brewin's question was, "What does the Canadian government propose to do by legal steps or otherwise, to discourage a subsidiary of a Canadian corporation from pursuing its course of illegality and exploitation?"⁷³⁰ Unlike South Africa, the Canadian authorities felt no strong internal or external pressure to modify their Namibian policies and thus easily brushed aside the NDP attacks.

It is hard to say what bothered the NDP most about Canada's Namibian policy, the lack of concern for human rights or South Africa's defiance of the United Nations which had revoked that country's mandate over Namibia in the early Sixties. Nevertheless, as with mandatory sanctions on South Africa, a resolution on the Namibian issue was not passed until 1981, further evidence of the NDP's inertia on international affairs in the Seventies.⁷³¹

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ "Resolution B.1.1," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research, p.47.

⁷³⁰ Debates, June 17, 1975, p.6830.

⁷³¹ "Resolution B.8.1," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.63-4.

The South African issue did not go away in the Eighties but intensified as the decade progressed. In 1981, a NDP foreign policy discussion paper recommended that the party urge the Canadian government to end its diplomatic and economic relations with the apartheid regime, but the resolution passed that year referred only to the breaking of economic ties.⁷³²

It was only after violence and repression in South Africa rose to new heights in the middle 1980s that the NDP caucus paid consistent attention to the matter in Parliament. The party's efforts were greatly aided by the determination of the new Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, and his external affairs minister, Joe Clark, to raise the profile of the South African issue both domestically and internationally. With all Canadian parties supporting a strong stand against apartheid, any disagreements were about how best to achieve that end.

Pauline Jewett, former Liberal member of Parliament in the Sixties and President of Simon Fraser University in the Seventies and also a person with keen internationalist instincts, outlined the basic themes of the NDP's mid-Eighties South African policy on September 13, 1985 in her capacity as NDP external affairs critic. She began by reminding her fellow MPs that it was the New Democratic Party which had been the most active and consistent through the years in demanding an end to the regime through strong coordinated Canadian and international efforts. As a strong social democratic idealist, Jewett pushed the Canadian government to take up the mantle of leadership on behalf of Canadians and the whole world by implementing specific measures immediately. First, mandatory codes of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa ought to replace voluntary ones. Second, a program of

⁷³² "Peace, Security and Justice: Report of the International Affairs Committee: An NDP Discussion Paper," 1981, NDP Research, p.20; "Resolution B.1.1," Resolution Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research, p.47.

staged economic sanctions should be drawn up which would take effect within specific time limits. Third, Canada must provide special support for the "front line" states on South Africa's borders who were especially vulnerable to military attack and dependent on the South African economy.⁷³³

Most of Jewett's proposals were included in a resolution passed by the 1987 NDP convention. This resolution also recognized the African National Congress as the international representative of South African Blacks and urged Canada to send diplomatic, political and humanitarian support to the liberation movement.⁷³⁴ However, knowing that most Canadians had misgivings about the ANC's connections with the South African Communist party, the NDP was careful not to give carte blanche approval to the ANC.

Mulroney's strong anti-apartheid pronouncements created some problems for the NDP. Should the party, in effect, assent to a common front with the government and the Liberals or should it carve out a distinctive position? For the most part, Broadbent and Bill Blaikie, NDP external affairs critic after September, 1987, tended to give the government the benefit of the doubt even to the extent of praising the sincerity, energy and leadership which Mulroney and Clark were providing, especially in keeping the Commonwealth together. As a result, most NDP spokespersons were generally reluctant to criticize, and when they did point out short-comings in government policy, they did so rather gently.⁷³⁵

⁷³³ Debates, Sept.13, 1985, pp.6591-2.

⁷³⁴ "Resolution B.8.3," NDP Convention Directory, June, 1993, NDP Research, p.23.

⁷³⁵ This was obvious on many occasions during Parliamentary debate in these years. See Debates, Oct.28, 1985, p.8072; Oct.3, 1986, p.57; Oct.19, 1987, pp.10156-6; Feb.5, 1988, p.12679.

Jewett and Dan Heap, NDP MP for Trinity-Spadina, were generally more critical than their colleagues, at least during the mid-Eighties, because they were not yet convinced that the Tories intended to move beyond talk to action. For instance, on June 12, 1986, Heap charged that continued Canadian trade with South Africa placed it squarely on the side of the oppressors.⁷³⁶ Later that year, Jewett severely chastised the government for failing to accept the recommendations of a Special Parliamentary Joint Committee on Canadian International Relations with South Africa. Instead of imposing full economic sanctions and seeking their adoption by the rest of the world, the Conservative government was following the "Margaret Thatcher line" of very limited sanctions which had no chance of success.⁷³⁷

With Blaikie as chief NDP external affairs critic, the NDP occasionally found itself advocating a more "realistic" position (as some would see it) than the Liberals on South Africa. For instance, on February 5, 1988, Blaikie publicly disagreed with John Turner and Andre Ouellet who wanted Canada to break all diplomatic relations with South Africa immediately. Instead, Blaikie, echoing the Tory government's stance, urged that Canada postpone such a move until all other avenues had been exhausted. In the same speech, Blaikie also endorsed Clark's admonishment of those countries who, while stridently denouncing South Africa, were themselves guilty of political intolerance and human rights abuses.⁷³⁸ A month later, as evidence of South African intransigence mounted, Blaikie more openly, although still temperately, expressed his growing impatience with the Canadian government's lack of action in imposing

⁷³⁶ Ibid., June 12, 1986, p.14271

⁷³⁷ Ibid., Dec.4, 1986, p.1767.

⁷³⁸ Ibid., Feb.5, 1988, pp.12679-80.

mandatory and comprehensive sanctions. It was also time for Canada to at least downgrade its diplomatic presence in South Africa.⁷³⁹

How can the NDP's failure to formulate an independent policy on South Africa be explained in light of the Mulroney government's extreme reluctance to implement full sanctions if apartheid were not soon dismantled as the Prime Minister had promised almost three years before? Moreover, this was happening in a climate where public opinion seemed increasingly receptive to full-scale sanctions.⁷⁴⁰ The NDP's reticence may partly be explained by the differences in style between Blaikie and Jewett. Blaikie's approach was generally less confrontational. Then, too, on most questions, Blaikie found himself gravitating to a middle position between idealism and realism. In contrast, Jewett, as a strong social democratic idealist was usually harsher in her judgements when government policy decisions fell short of the ideal.

It appears also that the NDP did not wish to attack Mulroney and Clark too zealously because it might undermine their credibility on the South African issue within the Progressive Conservative caucus and constituency, where quite a few Tories felt the government had already gone too far. For example, on May 3, 1988, Dave Nickerson (PC member of Parliament from the Western Arctic) introduced a private member's bill advocating the lifting of most sanctions against South Africa. With Jim Manly, (an NDP MP from British Columbia) and Dan Heap wasting no time in demolishing Nickerson's argument, Mulroney and Clark were saved from expending

⁷³⁹ Ibid., Mar.2, 1988, p.13316.

⁷⁴⁰ Martin Shadwick, "Military and Security Issues," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B.Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p.156.

any political capital in publicly defending official government policy from internal right-wing Tory attacks.⁷⁴¹

Another reason for the NDP's reluctance to attack the government's South Africa policy was suggested by Steven Lee, an NDP advisor and member of its research staff, to members of the NDP Caucus International Affairs Committee. In his judgment, making too much noise could backfire politically "since the government is looking good on the South Africa issue."⁷⁴² Thus in the final analysis, by taking a basically non-partisan position on South Africa during the Conservatives' first term in office, the NDP believed it was best serving the causes of justice and internationalism as well as its own political interests.

This interpretation is endorsed by Howard McCurdy, NDP human rights critic at the time specializing in South Africa affairs. The strategy he designed and which the caucus endorsed, involved applying just enough pressure on the Tories to keep them moving forward on the sanctions question (which McCurdy believes key people in the government welcomed), but not so much that the government would feel obliged to dig in its heels. Allowing the matter to become highly politicized would have been counterproductive in McCurdy's view. The practical result of this strategy was the creation of a unanimous all-party committee report on South Africa issued in the fall of 1986 after months of public hearings which became the benchmark by which government actions could be judged.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴¹ Debates, May 3, 1988, pp.15098-15101.

⁷⁴² Bruce Levy to Caucus International Affairs Committee, Subject: Minutes of Oct.2nd meeting, Oct.3, 1985, NDP Research, p.5.

⁷⁴³ Howard McCurdy interview, June 15, 1993.

A second issue with strong human rights connotations which rose to prominence in the Seventies was Chile. However, here, non-partisanship was the exception rather than the rule largely because of political circumstances. In the early Seventies, the Liberal government of the day was still steadfastly maintaining the position that relations with other countries must not be politicized through "excessive" concern about human rights. Consequently, after the democratically elected socialist and quasi-Marxist government of Salvadore Allende was overthrown on September 11, 1973, in a right-wing coup led by General Pinochet, Canada decided to recognize the new military dictatorship within a few weeks. This upset many Canadians, including some church leaders and trade unionists and virtually the entire Left. David Lewis denounced the government for acting with "indecent haste," especially as reports mounted of gross human rights abuses.⁷⁴⁴

One reason for the immediate and sustained NDP interest in events in Chile was the presence in the caucus of someone with South American roots, John Rodriguez, MP for Nickel Belt. On September 20, 1973, in a passionate speech in Parliament, Rodriguez paid eloquent tribute to Allende for giving Chileans hope. He also accused the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives of hypocrisy. In a recent Canadian rail strike, they had had much to say about upholding the democratic voice of ordinary citizens, but when that voice was so dramatically and violently silenced in Chile, they had turned their backs.⁷⁴⁵ Canada, he argued, should wait as long to recognize the new Chilean regime as it had communist China.⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴⁴ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p.269.

⁷⁴⁵ Debates, Sept. 20, 1973, p.6789.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., Sept.19, 1973, p.6726.

The NDP was particularly upset when the Canadian ambassador to Chile, Andrew Ross, revealed his right-wing sympathies by referring to some elements of the Latin American left as "riff-raff."⁷⁴⁷ John Harney, a Toronto area NDP MP, insisted that the Canadian government recall the ambassador because Ross's views made it virtually impossible for him to carry out Canada's Chilean refugee policy objectively.⁷⁴⁸

Gradually, however, the NDP came to focus almost exclusively on the refugee issue. For example, on November 16, 1973, Brewin demanded the same treatment for left-wing Chilean refugees as Canada had offered to those from communist nations such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia in previous decades. Canada, he insisted, should do at least as much as Sweden.⁷⁴⁹ The NDP also strongly objected to the Canadian authorities accepting Chilean refugees on condition they refrain from future political activity against the Pinochet government. The NDP Federal Council went so far as to pass an emergency resolution in 1974 demanding that the Minister for External Affairs rescind this policy since it was contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights and to Canada's treatment of other immigrant groups.⁷⁵⁰

At its 1975 convention, this motion was reinforced with a specific resolution contrasting the Liberal government's policy on political refugees from Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Chile with its special treatment of refugees from South Vietnam. In NDP eyes, here was clear evidence of bias in favour of military dictatorships and against populist left-wing governments. Canada should admit political

⁷⁴⁷ Canadian Annual Review, 1973, p.270.

⁷⁴⁸ Debates, Nov.5, 1973, p.7504.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid., Nov.16, 1973, pp.7864-5.

⁷⁵⁰ Scotton, "Chilean Refugees," p.108.

refugees solely on humanitarian grounds.⁷⁵¹ The convention also demanded that Pinochet release a certain democratic socialist who had recently disappeared.⁷⁵² All these measures illustrate that human rights was increasingly occupying a higher profile in NDP foreign policy.

However, in the rush to pass human rights resolutions, the convention failed to officially condemn the complicity of the United States in Allende's overthrow or even Canada's "hasty" recognition of the Pinochet regime. The NDP was floundering in the mid-Seventies having experienced serious electoral defeat in 1974 and was looking for new directions. Therefore, it was reluctant to take forceful stands on potentially controversial issues. It also knew that people were preoccupied with internal economic problems, especially inflation and unemployment.

Most importantly, the NDP was still recovering from the decade of economic nationalism (1965-75) which had turned the party's gaze inward and contributed to a very anti-American mood in the party. Consequently, the party leadership seems to have been hesitant to take a strong official stand against American actions in Chile because it might play into the hands of radical idealists who, now that the Vietnam war was over, were looking for new reasons to be suspicious of the United States. This might lead to a revival of anti-American feeling just as it had begun to wane (a development that realists in the party inner circle did not view with equanimity). Not surprisingly then, the NDP leadership had lost any will it otherwise might have had to combat or even condemn American imperialism in places like Chile.⁷⁵³ In addition,

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, "Political Refugees," p.109.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*, "Political Prisoner," p.109.

⁷⁵³ In a special edition of Canadian Dimension on the Waffle, Robert Hackett argued that the notion of "American imperialism" had never been a part of the social democratic Weltanschauung of the New Democratic Party. Interestingly, he blamed

the fact that human rights was now emerging as an issue in NDP thinking, may, paradoxically, have distracted the party from examining the deeper political and economic roots of human rights problems in places such as Chile.

There is evidence of some dissatisfaction within NDP ranks with the way the Chilean matter was being handled. In an October 5th, 1974 letter to then interim leader, Ed Broadbent, the president of the Woodsworth-Irvine Socialist Fellowship of Edmonton, Anthony Mardiros, praised the work of Brewin in promoting the cause of Chilean refugees. But Mardiros was unhappy with the fact that the NDP had not yet exposed the role which the Canadian government was playing in promoting trade with the Chilean junta. He was convinced that support for the NDP would grow if the party would present clearer foreign and domestic policy alternatives.⁷⁵⁴ In effect, Mardiros was asking the party to align itself more fully with social democratic idealism.

The NDP did make a few halting steps in that direction, but it never seriously tried to use the Chilean issue to sell Canadians a radical internationalist vision. In 1976, the NDP asked the Liberal government not to directly or indirectly support investment by Canadian multinational corporations which would bolster the Chilean regime, but it stopped short of insisting that Canada actively discourage such investments through legislative or other means.⁷⁵⁵ At the same time, Brewin continued to do his part in keeping the human rights situation in Chile alive in the public mind. He, along with Louis Ducloux (Liberal) and David Macdonald (P.C) made

this on the party's "hesitant economic nationalism". See Robert Hackett, "Pie in the Sky: A History of the Ontario Waffle," Canadian Dimension, Vol. 15 (Oct.-Nov., 1980), p.5.

⁷⁵⁴ Anthony M. Mardiros to Ed Broadbent, Oct.5, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.78, File 10.

⁷⁵⁵ Debates, Apr.14, 1976, p.12814.

two unsuccessful attempts to travel to Chile on fact-finding missions in late 1976 and early 1977 (although they managed to get into Argentina and Uruguay).⁷⁵⁶

By the later Seventies, as evidence of American (and Western) complicity with Pinochet's actions in Chile mounted, Stewart Leggatt, who appears to have shared a good measure of the radical idealists' outlook, made a strong Commons speech in late December of 1977 on the subject. He demanded that the Canadian authorities employ the same moral arguments that were now being used to justify taking action against South Africa to evaluate the Chilean situation. If they did, Leggatt was certain that at least some sanctions would be imposed on Chile as well.⁷⁵⁷

In the early Eighties, as attention shifted to Central America, interest in Chile weakened considerably in NDP circles. For instance, in its major 1981 convention resolution on Latin America, Chile was not even specifically mentioned.⁷⁵⁸ However, by the middle of the decade, with the re-imposition of a state of emergency by the Pinochet regime in the face of growing internal opposition, the NDP resumed its offensive on the matter. On February 6, 1985, Pauline Jewett wrote an open letter to Joe Clark, Canada's external affairs minister, urging him to instruct Canada's representative at the Inter-American Development Bank to vote against a \$130 million industrial reconstruction loan for Chile. No longer should the granting of loans be based solely on technical criteria, Jewett argued, but must include a human rights yardstick as well.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁶ Andrew Brewin, Louis Duclois and David Macdonald, "'One Gigantic Prison'- The Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Chile, Argentina and Uruguay," Sept.30-Oct.10, 1976, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.40, File 19.

⁷⁵⁷ Debates, Dec.20, 1977, p.2045.

⁷⁵⁸ "Resolution B.10.2," Resolution Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research, pp.67-8.

⁷⁵⁹ Jewett to Clark, Feb.6, 1985, NDP Research.

The NDP also mounted a strong campaign in 1985 against exports to Chile of military equipment that could be used to put down civilian demonstrations or assist in the violation of human rights. Nelson Riis, a BC MP, released a series of three communiques that year demanding that human rights be a determining factor in deciding whether Canadian military exports would be permitted to a particular country.⁷⁶⁰ These efforts were appreciated by the Canadian Chilean community as well as political dissidents still living in Chile. For instance, the Chilean Socialist party sent word to the NDP in 1986 indicating a keen desire to strengthen ties between the two parties.⁷⁶¹ In all its efforts throughout the Seventies and Eighties to keep the Chilean issue before the Canadian public, the NDP had been greatly assisted by the Canadian Labour Congress which despised the Pinochet regime's anti-labour agenda.⁷⁶²

Pressuring countries with poor human rights records by cancelling aid and implementing economic sanctions was not a completely new idea for the NDP. Already in 1970, Brewin had asked the government to ban military exports to South Africa and revoke its Commonwealth trade preferences. Then again in 1977-8, Brewin and David Macdonald (a member of the Progressive Conservatives) had tried on at least three occasions to get the House to pass a private member's bill banning foreign assistance to human rights violators. The NDP was particularly concerned about the selling of CANDU reactors to nations with repressive governments especially South Korea and

⁷⁶⁰ Communiques, June 20, June 21, and Nov.4, 1985, NDP Research.

⁷⁶¹ Jim Manly to Ed Broadbent, Dec.22, 1986, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.71, File 8.

⁷⁶² For example, see a letter from John Radorevis, an organizer for the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union to Andrew Brewin, Aug.11, 1977, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.78, File 17.

Argentina. For this reason, on October 31, 1977, Andy Hogan (Cape Breton-East Richmond) introduced an emergency motion in Parliament demanding,

that Canada stop the shipments of all parts of the Candu reactor to Argentina and refrain from selling any further nuclear reactors to Argentina until all basic human and trade union rights are restored and until Argentina signs the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.⁷⁶³

This motion was reintroduced two and one-half months later by John Gilbert (Broadview), but again failed to receive the required unanimous consent for it to be debated in the Commons.⁷⁶⁴ Increasingly in the Eighties, the NDP would successfully link human rights with a whole range of other foreign policy issues especially in Central America, the main subject of Chapter Sixteen.

A very important question to ask is whether NDP policy on human rights was even-handed. Did left-wing and communist countries merit the same scrutiny and criticism as Chile, South Africa and Argentina? Stu Leggatt, during an important Commons speech, insisted that human rights criteria be applied across the board in every situation. In an obvious attempt to meet opposition charges of NDP left-wing bias, Leggatt drew specific attention to Cuba. "If there are people being tortured in Cuba, we should be on the floor of the House calling out their names, just as we do any other regime around the world."⁷⁶⁵

There is no evidence, however, that the NDP seriously attempted to find out about the state of human rights in Cuba and bring abuses to public attention, probably

⁷⁶³ Debates, Oct.31, 1977, p.417.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid., Feb. 10, 1978, p.2733.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid., Dec.20, 1977, p.2045.

because the victims tended to be right-wing and unabashedly pro-American. Yet even other persecuted internal critics of the Castro regime or homosexuals or those jailed for their religious beliefs, never received any public support from the NDP. (One such person needing help was Armando Valladores who served 22 years in Cuban prisons and concentration camps.⁷⁶⁶) The NDP could have pressured Trudeau to use his good relationship with Castro to promote human rights within Cuba.

The NDP also studiously avoided condemning Cuban military involvement in the Angolan Civil War. Remarkably, the only reference to Angola in the House of Commons by an NDP spokesperson in those years was on February 3rd, 1976, when John Rodriguez attempted to introduce an emergency resolution demanding that the United States stop interfering in Canadian external affairs. In his view, the CIA was trying to undermine Prime Minister Trudeau's recent "successful visit" to Cuba by spreading "false reports" regarding Cuban use of Gander airport in Newfoundland to transport soldiers to and from Angola.⁷⁶⁷

The quintessential test of NDP even-handedness in human rights policy was its treatment of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. NDP interest in the subject gradually increased during the Seventies, but it was left to the other parties to spotlight the issue. Only once during the time when detente was at its peak from 1970 to 1974 did the NDP raise the matter in Parliament. This was on October 4, 1971, when T.C. Douglas urged the government to use the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, to press the Russians for an easing of restrictions on Jewish

⁷⁶⁶ Armando Valladores, Against All Hope: The Prison Memoirs of Armando Valladores (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).

⁷⁶⁷ Debates, Feb.3, 1976, p.10569.

emigration.⁷⁶⁸ Later in the Seventies, Brewin attended the 1977 Belgrade Conference on Security and Cooperation held to monitor the effectiveness of the 1975 Helsinki Accords as an observer.⁷⁶⁹

It was left to the Progressive Conservatives to lead the attack in Parliament when the human rights record of the Soviet Union and its allies fell considerably short of full compliance with the Accords. Finally, in response to a May 31, 1978 motion by Joe Clark, the PC leader, Ed Broadbent, the leader of the NDP since 1975, made a definitive speech on the subject, his only major Commons address on a foreign policy issue in the Seventies.

Broadbent began by affirming that human liberty was a matter of concern for everyone throughout the world. Hence, he would have preferred a motion including a reference to the denial of freedoms in non-Soviet bloc nations such as Chile and Argentina. Nonetheless, he was prepared to address the motion on its own merits, although the NDP leader was not sure what any nation state could do to influence the development of liberty in another nation state beyond setting a good example in the treatment of its own citizens. By specifically ruling out the cutting of trade ties and communication links with delinquent nations, Broadbent took a "conservative" stance on the issue. Thus, the NDP, which advocated the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, refused to even consider them in the case of communist countries.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid., Oct.4, 1971, p.8389.

⁷⁶⁹ News Release, "Belgrade Conference," Oct.25, 1977, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.84, File 14.

⁷⁷⁰ Debates, May 31, 1978, p.5930.

When it came to rhetoric, however, Broadbent did not equivocate. "There is no doubt in my mind that the Helsinki Accord...has been violated in a serious way by countries in the Soviet bloc."⁷⁷¹ He then reviewed some of their more blatant examples of serious human rights abuses ending with a lengthy tribute to the people who had signed the Charter 77 declaration in Czechoslovakia. That statement, Broadbent noted, was neither anti-state nor anti-socialist, but a cry for basic human liberty especially for ordinary working people. He also criticized Prime Minister Trudeau for not making any speeches that would have directed the attention of Canadians to places where basic liberties were being denied. Neither had Trudeau appealed to the international community to bring its moral force to bear on behalf of the victims.⁷⁷² The NDP leader's concern about events in Eastern Europe would be further heightened in early 1980 with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland.

The NDP also left it to the Conservatives to spearhead the attack on human rights abuses in other communist nations. Thus, it was Doug Roche on April 1, 1976, who first drew the attention of the House to a United Nations Commission on Human Rights Report about the mass execution and displacement of people in Kampuchea (Cambodia) by the government of Pol Pot. (Roche denounced Chile's record in the same speech and also became the first MP of any party to call for the creation of a supranational authority to which individuals could make human rights claims under international law.⁷⁷³) It took two more years before the House passed a joint Liberal-Progressive Conservative sponsored motion unanimously condemning the atrocities

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷⁷² Ibid., pp. 5930-2.

⁷⁷³ Ibid., April 1, 1976, p.12397.

occurring in Cambodia. Again, as with Cuba and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, the NDP, a party ostensibly devoted to social democratic internationalism, showed a lack of leadership in directing the attention of Parliament, the Canadian people and the world to South East Asia where massive human rights abuses were happening on a daily basis. Here was clear evidence once more of the party's weak commitment to social democratic international in the Seventies.

One reason for the NDP's reluctance to criticize nations like Kampuchea was undoubtedly because that country had so recently experienced the ravages of war and outside domination by the West. This was certainly the case with Vietnam as well. When refugees from communist Vietnam became a pressing issue in late 1978, the NDP was slow in promoting their cause. Curiously, a year later on October 16, 1979, Margaret Mitchell, elected as an NDP MP from BC in the election that had brought a Progressive Conservative government to power in the Spring of 1979, claimed that her party had helped lead the way in supporting the refugees and prodding the Liberal government to open Canada's door to the boat people. However, her claim is not borne out by Hansard. It was Jake Epp, PC member for Provencher, who, in late 1978, had pressured the Liberal government to increase substantially its quota of government supported refugees and to conclude an agreement with churches and other groups to sponsor thousands more.⁷⁷⁴

By this time, human rights had to some extent become a partisan political "football" in Parliament. In a December 4, 1978 address to the House, Jake Epp could not resist taking shots at the NDP. He contrasted the record of the United States, "that much maligned country," in accepting 25,000 refugees with that of Sweden which

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec.4, 1978, pp.1784-5; Mar.7, 1979, p.3905.

had accepted none from South East Asia. Epp also wondered where the people who had protested against the Vietnam war were now.

Is the suffering of humanity at the hands of a government, be it of the right or of the left, no longer important...? Where are the Berrigans today, where are the Fondas? Is Vietnam setting up a gulag such as was described so well by the Russian writer Solzhenitsyn?⁷⁷⁵

On the same day, Broadbent joined the fray when he introduced an emergency resolution in the House sarcastically urging Tory Premier Lougheed of Alberta to withdraw the preconditions he had recently imposed before Alberta would accept Vietnamese refugees. Lougheed was depriving "the people of his province of the opportunity to be as generous to the refugees as Canadians in other poorer provinces."⁷⁷⁶

What particularly rankled the NDP when the Tories came to power in 1979 was their apparent double standard in making it so easy for the Vietnamese boat people (many of whom were more economic refugees than political) to enter Canada, while imposing an eight month processing period for Argentinians fleeing a very repressive right-wing government and simultaneously deporting Chilean political refugees back to their home country where their lives were in danger. Moreover, while \$117 million was being spent assisting the Vietnamese boat people, the economic needs of Nicaraguan refugees were ignored.⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid., Dec.4, 1978, p.1784.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., p.1733.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid., Oct.10, 1979, p.283; Nov.17, 1979, p.1733.

That political parties should favour refugees from certain nations for political and ideological reasons should probably not surprise. Jake Epp, for example, felt it imperative to respond to the groundswell of support from his conservative and anti-communist Mennonite constituents (many of whose ancestors had been persecuted by the Bolsheviks in Russia) for the taking of refugees from communist Vietnam and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, as Steven Langdon, who was a member of the NDP Policy Review committee (PRC) in the late Seventies wrote in a letter to the author, "the PRC simply didn't have groups bringing these (communist) countries before it as issues in the form of resolutions."⁷⁷⁸ Not surprisingly, therefore, the NDP listened to its supporters who were particularly sensitive to oppression by right-wing authoritarian regimes in places like Chile and South Africa with the latter country guilty of racism as well.

The deplorable human rights situation in Uganda presented the NDP with a most difficult political problem which was never confronted directly. As a party strongly committed to national self-determination for all colonial peoples, it was very reluctant to openly criticize a country's behaviour once it achieved independence. This was particularly true for Commonwealth countries. Hence, there were virtually no questions or criticism's from the NDP inside or outside the House about Idi Amin's widespread abuse of human rights in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 (including when Trudeau cancelled aid in 1973) or from 1980 to 1985 under Milton Obote. Again, it was left to the Conservatives to raise the issue in Parliament. When Asian refugees from Uganda began arriving in Canada in 1973, Brewin's apparent greatest concern was not the poor human rights conditions in Uganda which had produced the refugees, but the

⁷⁷⁸ Steven Langdon to author, June 3, 1993, Author's Collection.

tendency of new immigrants to congregate in one location. Is this evidence of some blind spots in Brewin's thinking on racial matters?⁷⁷⁹

Even when reports about Uganda's worsening human rights situation became widely known in 1977, it was John Diefenbaker and Doug Roche who led the questioning in the House.⁷⁸⁰ Roche pressured the Liberal government to change its Ugandan policy from quiet diplomacy to one of public denunciation of Amin's human rights record as an expression of the moral outrage Canadians were feeling. He also insisted that Amin be excluded from the upcoming Commonwealth Conference and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games.⁷⁸¹ Again, a few months later when Trudeau helped push through a motion at the Commonwealth Conference condemning Uganda's human rights record, there was no official response by the NDP. All three parties had been slow to move on the issue, but the NDP had been the slowest of all.

Steven Langdon's explanation is that in the Seventies, Canadian social democrats were leery of accusing Third World countries of human rights abuses because they believed (wrongly Langdon now thinks) that this was a shorthand way of imposing Western values on them. This changed in the Eighties when the party recognized that "semi-fascist regimes in the Third World could only be challenged (and often their American backers with them) by raising such concerns."⁷⁸² Langdon also excuses the NDP's lack of involvement with the Ugandan issue because, in contrast with South Africa, party members failed to raise the subject at party gatherings.⁷⁸³

⁷⁷⁹ Debates, Sept. 1, 1973, p.3938.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid., Mar.31, 1977, pp.4506-7.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid., May 19, 1977, p.5795.

⁷⁸² Langdon to author, June 3, 1993, Author's Collection.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

Langdon ignores the fact that the leadership of a political party has a responsibility to educate its members on important issues.

The weakness of NDP foreign policy in the Seventies was also apparent in other places where human rights abuses were occurring on a large-scale such as in the Philippines, East Timor and Iran. The Philippines were ruled by Ferdinand Marcos, a semi-fascist, who imprisoned political opponents and trampled on human rights. East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, had been invaded in 1975 by neighbouring Indonesia under President Suharto, a dictator who had used any and all methods to smash the political left in his own country. Within five years of the invasion, almost one-third of the 650,000 native people in East Timor had died, while many others had suffered torture and starvation. Finally ten years later on December 9, 1985, Jim Manly rose in Parliament and publicly acknowledged his own and the NDP's pitiful human rights record on East Timor.

I must confess to a deep sense of shame that I have sat in this House of Commons for over five years and never once have I raised the subject of East Timor. Neither has any other Member of my Party, of the Liberal Party or the Conservative Party.⁷⁸⁴

In the case of Iran, throughout the Sixties and Seventies while the Shah was in power, the NDP ignored his dismal human rights record. This did not change much in the Eighties after the 1979 revolution brought to power a fundamentalist Islamic regime which also violated the human rights of its opponents. Here then were three countries, the Philippines, Indonesia and Iran, whose political and social systems the NDP

⁷⁸⁴ ibid., Dec.9, 1985, p.9286.

supposedly abhorred and who had supported American policy in Vietnam and the NDP said virtually nothing.

Why did human rights and other foreign policy matters not receive the attention from the NDP in the Seventies that would be expected from a party ostensibly committed to social democratic internationalism? First, NDP Members of Parliament were not immune to the indifference and even hostility towards foreign policy issues that traditionally characterized most Canadian members of Parliament, a condition that apparently worsened in the Seventies.

This is evidenced in a memo written by Brewin on April 2, 1975 to his NDP caucus colleagues in which he recommended they read the text of a speech he was about to give on the legacy of J.S. Wordsworth in international affairs because they might find it useful "in case you have any occasion to discuss international affairs."⁷⁸⁵ The tone and contents of the memo reveal that Brewin had no expectation that foreign policy questions would be a priority for his fellow New Democratic members of Parliament or that a coherent and distinct social democratic internationalist agenda would or should be aggressively sold to the electorate. Contributing to this inertia and cynicism, as Brewin explained based on his many years of experience in the Commons, was the secrecy in which a few senior bureaucrats and members of cabinet traditionally formulated foreign policy without meaningful input from Parliament despite the existence of SCEAND. Then too, he noted that the media provided minimal coverage and analysis of foreign policy issues.⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸⁵ "The Legacy of J.S. Wordsworth in International Affairs," April 2, 1975, NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol.152, File 10-2-1975, p.1.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid. pp.10-11.

On the few Commons days designated for debate of international affairs in the middle to late Seventies, a few people such as Brewin and Roche, tried to impress on the few members of Parliament in attendance that a new era was dawning in international affairs. Brewin reminded them that since domestic and foreign policy matters in such areas as food production, the population explosion, energy and the environment were interrelated, it was imperative that all politicians became more involved.⁷⁸⁷ This fact required a new foreign policy which Roche labelled "enlightened internationalism."⁷⁸⁸ Despite their efforts and those of a few more MPs, several throne speeches in the late Seventies by both Liberal and PC governments contained no references to international affairs.⁷⁸⁹

There were other reasons for the NDP's weakness in foreign policy in this period. The party was still suffering from the after-effects of its overindulgence with economic nationalism, which together with the general weakness of the economy, helped to reinforce the particularly strong bias that most members of the NDP caucus in those years had in favour of domestic concerns. Broadbent exemplified this with his almost total preoccupation with the notion of a new industrial strategy for Canada in the late 1970s.⁷⁹⁰

Finally, internal party factors must be considered. As noted earlier, the federal party was still in the doldrums in the late Seventies. Institutionally it was quite weak, while financial constraints were such that there was no money for the party to conduct

⁷⁸⁷ Debates, Jan.17, 1975, p.6836.

⁷⁸⁸ Debates, Dec.19, 1977, p.2014.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.; Also see Debates, Oct.12, 1979, p.140.

⁷⁹⁰ Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

serious research on foreign policy issues.⁷⁹¹ Then too, the interests and abilities of the federal NDP caucus must not be overlooked.

The NDP Policy Review Committee which controlled the Resolutions committee must also shoulder some of the blame because it determined what issues would receive primary attention at conventions. Steven Langdon claims that since only 15% of the resolutions submitted by NDP riding associations in the Seventies dealt with international affairs, the PRC was handicapped in what it could do in this field. Nevertheless, Langdon ignores the fact that this committee had considerable latitude when drawing up composite resolutions. Moreover, throughout the Seventies, the Federal Council had on a number of occasions passed emergency resolutions on pressing domestic matters. The same could have been done for international issues.⁷⁹²

On December 19 and 20, 1977, Stu Leggatt gave an address in the House of Commons which hinted of better days to come for social democratic internationalism. He spoke eloquently and passionately (in words reminiscent of Tommy Douglas) while covering the whole gamut of foreign and defence policy issues, only a few of which will be noted here. His major point was that Canada had not been aggressive enough in dealing with the United States in general, and on such specific cross-border disputes as the Garrison Diversion in particular.⁷⁹³ Leggatt, it almost seemed, revived the independent foreign policy issue as much to remind his party as the government.

On another traditional NDP theme, he accused Canada of abandoning its traditional peacemaker role by selling nuclear technology to unstable regimes such as

⁷⁹¹ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

⁷⁹² Langdon to author, June 3, 1993, Author's Collection.

⁷⁹³ Ibid., Dec.19, 1977, p.2027.

Argentina and South Korea, while simultaneously cutting funds for peace research. Moreover, he challenged the government to provide leadership to the disarmament movement by, for example, unilaterally suspending all arms sales for at least a year and inviting other like-minded nations to follow suit.⁷⁹⁴

Social democratic internationalism would have been in a healthier state within the New Democratic Party during the 1975-80 period if a foreign policy resolution drafted by an unknown member of the Resolutions committee for the 1975 convention had been accepted. The draft resolution made a serious attempt to update NDP foreign policy in a number of key areas. Its fundamental premise was that because the world was changing very rapidly, a new understanding of the relationship between internationalism, socialism and democracy was required:

Today socialists must recognize that a socialist society cannot be achieved except within an international framework because of the increasing interdependence of nations. The so-called play of market forces will not provide solutions that will enable the economic system to satisfy basic human needs and guarantee human rights.⁷⁹⁵

Here was recognition that an updated version of Canadian social democratic internationalism must be formulated in which the interests of internationalism would clearly take precedence over those of nationalism. Herein lay the only hope of resisting the onslaught of international market forces.

The vision that inspired the draft resolution encompassed and embraced the whole world. As such, it strongly affirmed an activist role for the UN calling special attention to the fact that all the contemporary international conferences seeking to

⁷⁹⁴ ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ "New Democratic Party Federal Convention 1975 Draft Resolution on A Foreign Policy for Canada," NAC, MG 32, C28, Vol. 109, File 1-14-1975, p.1.

solve the major questions of the day were being held under UN auspices including the Stockholm Conference on World Pollution, the Bucharest Conference on World Population, the Law of the Sea and many more. The draft resolution also served to remind New Democrats who had been infected by the growing cynicism regarding peace-keeping that they must continue to support it. A section on trade and technology showed why transfers of technology to the Third World were so imperative.⁷⁹⁶ The author of the draft resolution also recognized new developments in the human rights field.⁷⁹⁷

Not surprisingly, given the preeminence of inward-looking nationalism in the NDP at the time, this draft resolution was not incorporated into the international affairs composite resolution passed at the 1975 convention, except for sections on the world food crisis and a proposal for an updated foreign aid program.⁷⁹⁸ Hence, New Democrats had to wait until 1981 for a comprehensive statement on human rights and official party affirmation of the new advances occurring in many areas of international law.

Preoccupied with nationalist economic concerns, weak in commitment to international affairs and short of practical resources, the NDP record on the human rights issue during the Seventies was decidedly mixed, especially judged by the standards of social democratic internationalism.

⁷⁹⁶ "1975 Draft Resolution," pp.1-2.

⁷⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.2.

⁷⁹⁸ Scotton, "World Food Problems," pp.108-9.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE MIDDLE EAST - A SPECIAL TEST FOR NDP HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

Canada's interest in the Middle East began in the late 1940s when Lester Pearson, Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, helped persuade the United Nations to partition Palestine in the interests of creating the state of Israel.⁷⁹⁹ Since then, Canada's primary role in the Middle East has been that of peacekeeper, with the high point being Pearson's key role in the establishment of a United Nations emergency force to patrol the Israeli-Egyptian border after the 1956 war. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the Arab oil boycott, Canada's interest in the region expanded into the economic field. While Canada has consistently supported the right of Israel to exist behind secure borders, since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Canadian government has sought to be more even-handed in its Middle East policy. At its core, the Arab-Israeli issue is a conflict of rights; both have legitimate historical, religious and psychological claims to Palestine. The 1948 UN partitioning of Palestine led immediately to war creating problems that are still unresolved.

⁷⁹⁹ For the history of Canada's involvement in the Middle East and its relation to Canadian politics see the following works: Tareq Y. Ismael, "Canada and the Middle East," in Canada and the Third World ed. by Peyton Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1976), pp.240-73; David Taras and David H. Goldberg, ed(s). The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989); Tareq Y, Ismael, ed., Canada and the Arab World (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1985).

On the one side were hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs who lost their homes and lands and became refugees. The Arabs who remained became Israeli citizens with full civil rights but politically they were marginalized. With victory in the 1967 war, Israel imposed its rule over the Palestinians living on the West Bank of the Jordan and Gaza where Israel felt it necessary to restrict their human rights, especially as Palestinian resistance to the occupation grew over the decades.

On the other side were the Jews, persecuted for millennia, victims of Hitler's "final solution," and now determined to take destiny into their own hands by the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The Arab refusal to recognize Israel, the subsequent wars and unrelenting terrorist attacks designed to undermine the Jewish state, produced a deep sense of insecurity. Hence, Israelis have always felt that their right to exist as a people is threatened.

This conflict of "rights," presented a difficult challenge for Canadian social democratic internationalism. Until the mid-Seventies at least, the NDP had no difficulty deciding which side it was on. After some early hesitation by CCF leaders, including David Lewis (himself a Jew) about Zionism, the CCF had supported the 1948 partitioning of Palestine while warning Arab states that if they attacked Israel, the Security Council must take appropriate action.⁸⁰⁰ Indeed, the CCF was the first Canadian political party to call for the recognition of Israel. There was no discussion of the Middle East question at the NDP's 1961 founding convention and no reference to it in the comprehensive international affairs and defence platform approved by the delegates. The assumption clearly was that the CCF's pro-Israel position would

⁸⁰⁰ David Lewis, The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1981), pp.339-341.

characterize NDP Middle East policy as well. At the same time, there was no attempt even to understand the Arab position.

Of the various factors underlying the CCF/NDP's very favourable attitude toward Israel, two were paramount. First, it shared the widespread view among Canadians that the Jews deserved a homeland of their own given the Nazi attempt to exterminate them during World War II. Thus the NDP became part of the strong domestic political support base for the nation of Israel that lasted until the 1980s. Second, through mutual membership in the Socialist International, most members of the CCF/NDP inner circle developed a strong admiration for the socialist accomplishments of Israel's Labour Party government. This also led some of them to establish quite close personal ties with Israel's leaders such as David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir. With this came a good relationship with Canadian Jews, especially those of similar political persuasion. For example in 1953, H.W. Herridge wrote a letter to A. Shurem, National Executive Director of the Canadian Association for Labour Israel in which he stated, "With a long-time interest in the development towards and foundation of the State of Israel, I have read many of the articles in your paper with great interest in view of our kindred approach to social development."⁸⁰¹ This NDP admiration for Israel's social democratic institutions has continued largely unabated.⁸⁰² In assessing the factors which contributed to the NDP's consistent support for Israel, Broadbent gives the most weight to Canadian domestic considerations.⁸⁰³

⁸⁰¹ H.W. Herridge, to A. Shurem, April 10, 1953, NAC, MG 32, C13, Vol.34.

⁸⁰² Text, Ed Broadbent speech to the Canada-Israel Committee's Annual Policy Conference, March 12, 1985, NDP Research.

⁸⁰³ Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

From the outset, Israel's Labour party used its prominent status in the SI deliberately and very successfully to build support for its interpretation of Middle East events amongst Western social democratic political parties. Most importantly, it convinced them that the fate of Israel was integral to the survival of the West. How successfully can be judged by an excerpt from a speech by Tommy Douglas at the 1963 SI convention. We think two of the great trouble spots that must be defended are Israel and Berlin, that if we give way here we give way at two points which may well determine whether or not liberty and freedom are to survive or to perish.⁸⁰⁴

Throughout the Sixties and at least till the middle of the Seventies, support for Israel was very strong in all sectors of the NDP including among radical left-wing idealists like Cy Gonick who wrote an article in 1967 arguing that Israel's treatment of the Arabs was totally different from America's actions in Vietnam.⁸⁰⁵

Not surprisingly, the NDP's first resolution on the Middle East in 1967 repeated arguments contained in a statement issued by the SI Council in the same year. The first prerequisite for peace, the resolution argued, was acceptance by its neighbours of Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries. When achieved, a UN conference should follow immediately in order to negotiate a permanent settlement. In addition, Israel and all nations must have guaranteed access to international waters in the area.⁸⁰⁶

The NDP resolution's treatment of the Palestinian issue was most revealing:

⁸⁰⁴ T.C. Douglas, "Address to the SI Convention," Socialist International Information, Vol.14, (January 4, 1964), p.12.

⁸⁰⁵ Cy Gonick, "Israel is Not Vietnam," Canadian Dimension, Vol.4 (Sept.-Oct., 1967), pp.4-5.

⁸⁰⁶ "Resolution on the International Situation," Socialist International Circular (October 23, 1967), pp.3-4.

A just solution must be found for the problem of the Arab refugees. The neglect of this problem for almost twenty years by all states in the Middle East and by the members of the United Nations has been morally wrong and politically dangerous. A program of land acquisition, resettlement of and financial assistance to the refugees must be launched immediately. Israel, the Arab states and other members of the United Nations must make a fair and appropriate contribution.⁸⁰⁷

Obviously, the authors of the resolution shared the government of Israel's supposition that the Palestinians had rights as Arab refugees but not as a distinct people with a historical claim to Palestine. The NDP also assumed that the problem could be solved by resettling the Palestinians in other Arab countries and by providing large doses of economic aid for the entire Middle East region. Moreover, the resolution went on to make clear that the NDP's primary concern was not the provision of a measure of justice for the Palestinians, but fear that if something was not done, the next Middle East war could easily escalate into a world-wide conflagration. With that in mind, the resolution (sensibly) called for an immediate end to the Middle East arms race.⁸⁰⁸

The pro-Israel stance of the NDP intensified in the six or seven years following the 1967 war as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), used any and all methods to attack Israel and establish itself as the effective and legitimate spokesmen for the Palestinian people in the eyes of the world. In response, on February 4, 1970, the NDP Federal Council issued a statement very favourable towards Israel.⁸⁰⁹ Again, when the PLO used its bases in Lebanon to launch a series of lethal attacks on Israel in May of 1970, Andrew Brewin asked the Canadian government to demand that Lebanese

⁸⁰⁷ Anne Scotton, ed., "Middle East," New Democratic Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party), pp.101-2.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁹ Gerry Richardson to Brewin, Aug. 17, 1970, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.85, File 10.

authorities control terrorist activity initiated from its territory.⁸¹⁰ When civilians were indiscriminately massacred at Lod airport in Tel Aviv at the end of May, 1972, the NDP led the condemnation in Parliament.⁸¹¹ In most of these cases, as in his reaction to reports about Soviet personnel manning anti-aircraft weapons in Egypt, Andrew Brewin's overriding concern was the danger to world peace.⁸¹² The NDP did not seriously attempt to examine the root causes of the Palestinian and Arab rage that drove them to perpetrate these acts and to seek assistance from the Soviet Union.

Israel's shooting down of a Libyan airliner in February of 1973 killing all civilians aboard created an obvious dilemma for the NDP. Its initial response was to call for an international inquiry to ascertain the facts. When Israel rejected this, Brewin expressed the hope that the government of Israel would ensure its own inquiry was impartial.⁸¹³ The NDP's pro-Israel bias was obvious; they trusted the Israelis but not the Arabs. Arab terrorism was condemned; Israel's shooting down of a civilian airliner was not.

However, for the first time, there were indications that some NDPers were becoming disenchanted with the party's unequivocal and virtually unconditional support for Israel. In August of 1970, Gerry Richardson, a BC party member, wrote to Brewin on behalf of himself and some friends asking why the people who had created the Palestinian refugee problem in the first place had not been condemned.⁸¹⁴ Brewin was not moved. Indeed, after a visit to Israel the following year, he declared in a letter

⁸¹⁰ Debates, May 25, 1970, p.7269,

⁸¹¹ Ibid., June 1, 1972, p.2751.

⁸¹² Ibid., p.7267.

⁸¹³ Ibid., Feb. 22, 1973, p.1544.

⁸¹⁴ Gerry Richardson to Brewin, Aug.17, 1970, NAC, MG 32 C26, Vol.85, File 10.

to Israel's ambassador to Canada that his pro-Israeli position had been strengthened. "We went with much sympathy and admiration for Israel and our experiences have deepened and confirmed our feelings."⁸¹⁵

At the 1973 NDP convention, Local 1967 of the United Auto Workers submitted a resolution stating that Israel's refusal to return the occupied territories was escalating hostilities. There was no condemnation of Israel; just a call for the NDP to officially endorse the 1969 United Nations Security Council Resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal in return for Arab recognition of Israel.⁸¹⁶ Yet, despite the party's normally almost automatic support for any UN resolution, Local 1967's resolution failed to win convention approval demonstrating again the unquestioning support for Israel's position within the NDP at the time.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) war did not bring any immediate change in the NDP's Middle East policy. David Lewis and Andrew Brewin repeated all their old pro-Israel arguments while placing most of the blame for the lack of peace on the Arabs.⁸¹⁷ The CLC, in turn, issued a press release echoing the NDP's position.⁸¹⁸

In response, Gerry Richardson drafted another letter, this time to Terry Grier, NDP MP for Toronto Lakeshore, expressing dismay at the "totally distorted and biased presentations" made by Andrew Brewin and David Lewis, which in the case of the former also displayed "blatant callousness and racism regarding the Palestinians." As for Lewis, his pompous dismissal of the Arab cause reminded the author of President

⁸¹⁵ Brewin to Israel's ambassador, Nov.25, 1971, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.85, File 11.

⁸¹⁶ Resolution on the Middle East submitted to the 1973 NDP convention by Local 1967 of the United Auto Workers, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.81.

⁸¹⁷ Debates, Oct.15, 1973, p.6857; Oct.22, 1973, p.7075.

⁸¹⁸ CLC Press Release, undated, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.94, File 18.

Nixon's arrogant abuse of power in the Watergate cover-up. He was particularly worried that favouritism towards Israel would earn the animosity of most non-Westerners around the world. In other words, he interpreted the attitude of Lewis and Brewin as an attack on social democratic internationalism.⁸¹⁹

The question the NDP should have been asking was the same one it usually asked about international affairs: "What policy should the party adopt that would best contribute to the building of a world community based on justice, equality and respect for human rights?" It seems that the Middle East issue was seldom approached in this manner in NDP circles, at least until the 1980s. It is suggestive, however, that of the three examples cited earlier of people or groups demanding a more "even-handed" NDP Middle East policy, most came from British Columbia, the centre of radical idealist opinion within the party. Nevertheless, it appears that most idealists, many of whom put so much energy and thought into the battle against realist positions on NATO and relations with the United States, made relatively little effort to understand both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Interestingly, by the mid-Seventies, Canadian Dimension, which no longer supported the NDP, had moved from its earlier distinctly pro-Israel stance to endorsing the two-state solution.⁸²⁰

It is equally significant that the same idealists, who in the early Seventies were so busy promoting economic nationalism and an independent foreign policy agenda for Canada, adopted a Middle East position that was virtually identical to the Americans. Thus, many of the same people who denounced Nixon's Vietnam policy had no objection to his pro-Israel stance. The reason for this discrepancy is undoubtedly the

⁸¹⁹ Gerry Richardson to Terry Grier, Oct. 26, 1973, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.94, File 19.

⁸²⁰ Cy Gonick, "The Palestine Question," Canadian Dimension. Vol.11 (June, 1976), pp.33-9.

fact that the creation of the state of Israel and its socialist institutions still represented for many Canadian social democratic idealists the partial fulfilment of their ideals.

Part of the pro-Israeli bias was also due to the NDP's lack of information about the Arab position and absence of contact with Arab people. For example, on May 29, 1974, in reply to a letter from the Canadian Vice-President of Information of the Federation of Arab Canadian Societies, Brewin acknowledged his past bias on the issue, but blamed it on the fact that he had had few opportunities to become familiar with the Arab point of view. "But I wish to be informed and fair in my judgement."⁸²¹

As the Middle East question continued to command the headlines in 1974 and the effects of the Arab oil boycott reverberated through the Canadian economy, the NDP showed signs of altering its pro-Israeli posture to a small degree. This came about partly because by late 1974, pressure was mounting on the NDP to decide what to do about the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After careful consideration, the NDP Caucus Committee on External Affairs issued a statement on December 3 expressing a willingness to recognize the PLO in a limited fashion if it renounced terrorism and revoked the clause in its charter that demanded the destruction of the state of Israel.⁸²² A minority in the caucus, including Derek Blackburn, wanted to go even further towards full PLO recognition by endorsing immediate Israeli-PLO negotiations without preconditions but this was rejected.⁸²³

⁸²¹ A. Brewin to Louis M. Azzaria, May 29, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.81.

⁸²² Statement of the NDP Caucus Committee on External Affairs and the PLO, Dec.3, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.88, File 6.

⁸²³ Brewin to Mr. Herberman, Dec.11, 1974, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.94, File 19; Derek Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

Nevertheless, a significant shift in NDP foreign policy was indicated when the caucus committee declared that the people of Palestine were entitled to form a separate, independent and secure state. Furthermore, the statement conceded that a peaceful solution to the problem must at some stage involve negotiations in which the Palestinians could have separate representation. For the first time, the NDP was prepared to admit officially that the Palestinians had rights not only as refugees but as a nation.⁸²⁴ This shift was probably aided by the NDP's growing acceptance in the mid-Seventies of an expanded definition of human rights which included group rights, as noted in the previous chapter.

Events in 1975, however, revealed the limits beyond which the NDP was not yet prepared to go in modifying its pro-Israel stand. With the PLO still unwilling to meet the NDP's minimum criteria for complete recognition, the party vigorously opposed any moves to enhance the PLO's prestige and influence on the world scene. In fact, federal New Democrats joined with the Conservatives in supporting the Liberal government's decision to cancel a UN conference on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders scheduled for Toronto in September of 1975, because it would mean attendance by the PLO which had recently been granted observer status at all UN sponsored conferences. It was left to Canadian newspaper editorialists to condemn the government for giving into strong pressure from the Canadian Jewish community and in the words of the Toronto Star, "copping out of its responsibility to the world community."⁸²⁵ The NDP decision showed there were limits to its internationalism; the PLO was not a legitimate member of the world community. The party also joined

⁸²⁴ Statement of the NDP Caucus Committee on External Affairs and the PLO, Dec.3, 1974.

⁸²⁵ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p.293.

in the widespread Canadian condemnation of the UN General Assembly's November, 1975 vote equating Zionism with racism.⁸²⁶

The campaign by the new majority of Third World and Arab nations in the United Nations to isolate and condemn Israel combined with Canada's unhappy experiences serving in the UN's International Joint Commission in South-East Asia to erode support for the world organization amongst the Canadian public, and left a particularly sour taste in NDP circles. Egypt's unilateral dismissal of the UNEF in the Sinai just before the 1967 war and the lasting stalemate in Cyprus had begun the process. In fact, these doubts about the UN had spread to include the questioning of future Canadian participation in peacekeeping endeavours, both in the general public and amongst some foreign policy analysts.⁸²⁷

In August of 1974, J.L. Granatstein (a liberal-left historian normally inclined to favour Canadian involvement) wrote an article for Canadian Forum arguing that peacekeeping no longer served the international community or fulfilled Canada's political and idealistic goals. At one time, Granatstein maintained, it had been a middle power's perfect middle-sized responsibility. Indeed, its hold on the public imagination had been so strong that the Canadian government had been propelled against its will into participating in the UN's 1960 Congo operation.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁶ Ibid., p.284.

⁸²⁷ The Canadian attitude towards peacekeeping and the United Nations in the Seventies is analyzed in Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), pp.107-126. Also see Garth Stevenson, "Canada in the United Nations," in Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, ed. by Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), pp.150-77.

⁸²⁸ J.L. Granatstein, "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality," Canadian Forum, Vol.54 (August, 1974), pp.14-19.

The roots of the Canadian infatuation with peacekeeping, in Granatstein's view, lay in the missionary impulse that had been so prominent in English and French Canada before World War II. This impulse found new expression after the war amongst the officers of the Department of External Affairs, many of whom were sons of missionaries or the manse. A prime example was Lester Pearson who had acquired his idealism by way of the Methodist social gospel. According to Granatstein, the result had been a Canadian foreign policy combining idealism (the desire to bring peace to a divided world) and realism (the goal of bringing law and order to troubled parts of the globe in the tradition of the Mounties taming the West.) "This is uplift, of course, but committed uplift. It resembles nothing so much as J.S. Woodsworth establishing his All Peoples' Mission among the immigrant poor of North Winnipeg."⁸²⁹ (Granatstein is doubtless correct in seeing the similarity in motives for peacekeeping and helping the poor. It also illustrates the close connection between liberal and social democratic internationalism on some points. However, social democratic internationalism wanted to do more than create a world of peace and equality of opportunity. It desired to build a world characterized by socio-economic equality and justice within the context of a planned economy.)

At this stage, NDPers would not admit to any lack of faith in UN peacekeeping. Support for the UN at this crucial time in the mid-Seventies also came from certain Liberal and Conservative members of Parliament such as Doug Roche, Heath Macquarrie, David Macdonald, and Warren Allmand, who along with Brewin, formed an informal coalition to promote internationalist causes.⁸³⁰ As long ago as 1970, a few MPs with similar concerns had recognized the need to reform the United Nations

⁸²⁹ ibid., p.17.

⁸³⁰ Garth Stevenson, "Canada in the United Nations," p.175.

if it was to become more effective and meet the criticisms of its detractors which were then just beginning.⁸³¹ Meanwhile, UN authority was further undermined when the United States, Israel and Egypt virtually ignored the world organization in their pursuit of a peaceful Middle East settlement in the late 1970s.

In terms of the NDP, the party's Middle East policy gradually began to display more even-handedness in the period from 1975 to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, although its attitude to the PLO did not change officially. A sign of this shift occurred on December 5, 1975, when the NDP joined with the other parties in condemning the loss of civilian life in a major Israeli air strike on PLO bases in Lebanon.⁸³² Furthermore, a few months later, in his annual speech to the Canada-Israel Committee, Broadbent asserted that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians must be resolved, which might entail Israeli withdrawal from some territory in return for iron-clad guarantees of its security from both Superpowers and recognition by its Arab neighbours.⁸³³

The primary NDP Middle East policy objective in the latter Seventies was to rally Canadian support for the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations and their extension to all the belligerents in the region. As part of this approach, the party urged the Canadian government to promise increased aid to any country or group who would make peace.⁸³⁴ Moreover, when Joe Clark embarked on his ill-fated campaign to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem in 1979, the NDP denounced it as a threat to the

⁸³¹ Debates, Nov.6, 1970, p.979.

⁸³² Ibid., Dec.5, 1975.

⁸³³ Text, Broadbent speech to the Canada-Israel Committee, April 28, 1976, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.29, File 9.

⁸³⁴ Debates., May 7, 1979, pp.3903-4.

peace process. In a brief House of Commons address on the subject, Broadbent went further than any NDP leader before in publicly recognizing Arab claims, especially in Jerusalem. "I want to underscore that the Arabs have a religious, political and historical claim that is as profound as the Jews; it has to be recognized as legitimate."⁸³⁵

At the same time, throughout the years from 1975 to 1982, the NDP continued to defend Israel's fundamental interests vigorously. In his addresses to the Canada-Israel Committee, Broadbent invariably began with a forceful endorsement of Israel's right to exist. Differences within the NDP, he assured his Canadian Jewish audience on one occasion, arose not in the least from a weakening of the party's commitment to Israel's existence and prosperity but from an occasional divergence of view on how those goals could best be achieved. In the opinion of the NDP leader, there existed a three-fold basis for his party's commitment to Israel. First, Israel had been founded in 1948 on principles of justice and humanity. Second, the Jewish people had made numerous contributions to Canada. Third, Canadian social democrats felt strong affinity for Israel's democratic socialist achievements.⁸³⁶ In 1977, when most Arab countries attempted to extend their economic boycott of Israel by forcing Canadian companies wishing to do business with the Arabs to declare whether any person in their ownership or management was Jewish, Broadbent denounced these moves strongly. He also castigated the Canadian government's alleged "feeble response."⁸³⁷

⁸³⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct.29, 1979, p.696.

⁸³⁶ Text, Broadbent speech to the Canada-Israel Committee, April 30, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.29, File 9.

⁸³⁷ "Notes For a Speech by Ed Broadbent to the Canada-Israel Committee," April 28, 1977, NDP Research.

It took Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 to force a fundamental re-assessment of Middle East policy in NDP circles. What particularly disturbed them was that the killing and massacre of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians by the Israeli armed forces and their Lebanese allies was not required to satisfy Israel's legitimate security interests. The result was that for the first time Canadian social democrats and general Western public opinion identified Israel as the prime aggressor in a Middle East war. As such, the NDP found it relatively easy to join with the Liberals and Conservatives in passing a resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli military forces from Lebanon.⁸³⁸ The NDP also proposed a Parliamentary fact-finding trip to Beirut and introduced an emergency resolution in the Commons demanding that Israel cease its bombardment of the city.⁸³⁹

Still, even though the crisis was intensifying, the NDP muted its public criticisms of Israel. In a memo to her caucus (a few of whom apparently wanted sanctions imposed on the Jewish state), Pauline Jewett, NDP External Affairs critic stated her intention of following the NDP's traditional policy of giving Israel the benefit of the doubt as much as possible for at least two reasons. First, Israel's security had so often been threatened. Second, the West still owed the Jews a lot for its longstanding anti-Semitism.⁸⁴⁰

However, as the killing of civilians in Lebanon mounted, the NDP, on September 23, 1982, finally publicly censured Israel's human rights record in the war, another

⁸³⁸ Debates, July 29, 1982, p.19815.

⁸³⁹ Ibid.; Aug.4, 1982, p.20004.

⁸⁴⁰ Jewett to NDP caucus, July 7, 1983, Subject: CTV Question Period, June 20, 1982, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.29, File 9.

first for the party.⁸⁴¹ In a March 16, 1983 speech address to the Canada-Israel committee Broadbent accused Israel's Likud government of betraying Israel's democratic tradition in its West Bank and Lebanese policies.⁸⁴²

Similarly, Bill Blaikie expressed his deep concern with other aspects of Israel's foreign policy which were undermining its international moral standing, in particular, its technological, military and commercial collaboration with South Africa and the stationing of military advisors in Honduras.⁸⁴³ A turning point had been reached; Israel was losing its superior moral standing in NDP eyes, a key element in the party's historic and unequivocal support for Israel.

Behind the scenes, the party's IAC had begun a review of the party's Middle East policy which culminated in the release of a discussion paper in March of 1983. Part of the stimulus for this exercise was the fact that the party had not passed any resolutions on the Middle East situation since 1967 which recognized the Palestinian issue exclusively as a "refugee" problem.⁸⁴⁴ The IAC had some difficulty in reaching consensus especially on the degree of recognition that should be granted the PLO. Some members criticized the draft approved by the majority of the committee for advocating that Israel and the PLO grant each other mutual recognition. This minority contended that democratic socialists should not yield to pressure and grant the PLO

⁸⁴¹ NDP News Release, "NDP Calls for Beirut Inquiry: Canada too Silent-Jewett" Sept.23, 1982, NDP Research.

⁸⁴² "Notes for a speech by Ed Broadbent to the Canada-Israel Committee, Mar.16, 1983, NDP Research.

⁸⁴³ Debates, Mar.16, 1983, p.23853.

⁸⁴⁴ Miriam Taylor, "The Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Search for a Mideast Peace," June 29, 1982, NDP Research, See also Bill Blaikie's contribution to a House of Commons debate. Debates, Mar.16, 1983, p.23853.

political legitimacy until it had demonstrated conclusively over a period of time that it no longer aspired to Israel's destruction.⁸⁴⁵

Majority opinion in the IAC prevailed, however, and their proposals were adopted virtually unchanged by the 1983 convention. The Palestinian right to a national homeland was officially recognized, although its exact location was not specified. Further, the resolution sought to balance its criticism of Israel's West Bank settlement policy with a strong reaffirmation of the NDP's longstanding conviction that the Arabs and the PLO must accept Israel's right to exist before peace negotiations could begin.⁸⁴⁶

Broadbent continued to take every opportunity to reassure Canadian Jews that the 1983 resolution did not represent any weakening of the NDP's commitment to the state of Israel.⁸⁴⁷ Despite these efforts, some members of the Canada-Israel Committee concluded that the NDP was tilting towards the PLO.⁸⁴⁸

The outbreak of the Intafada (the Palestinian uprising) in 1987, provoked new tensions in the relationship between the NDP and the Canadian Jewish community. Compelled by the 1983 convention resolution and his own convictions to display a more even-handed Middle East policy, Broadbent had little choice but to categorize Israel's use of often brutal methods in controlling the uprising as human rights violations in his 1988 address to the Canada-Israel Committee. The reaction of many

⁸⁴⁵ "Notes on the Draft Statement and Proposed Resolutions on Israel-Palestine," Mar.31, 1983, NDP Research.

⁸⁴⁶ "Resolution B.7.1.," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research, pp.62-3.

⁸⁴⁷ Texts of Broadbent speeches to the Combined Jewish Appeal, Feb.27, 1985 and the Canada-Israel Committee Annual Policy Conferences, Mar.11, 1985 and Nov.26, 1986, NDP Research.

⁸⁴⁸ Hilarie, NDP research assistant, to Broadbent, Nov.26, 1986, NDP Research.

in the audience to this, as well as to Broadbent's call for an international peace conference as a prelude to direct negotiations between the Middle East parties, was hostile since they contradicted official Israeli policy.⁸⁴⁹ The relationship between the NDP and the Jewish community had already been poisoned somewhat two months earlier when NDP MP, Howard McCurdy, had strongly criticized Israel's recent human rights performance in a Commons speech in which he labelled the Jewish state, "the oppressive conqueror."⁸⁵⁰

In modifying its Arab-Israeli policy during the 1980s, the NDP was mostly following shifting public opinion. The existence of a right-wing Israeli government had made it much easier for the NDP to shift its policy than if the Labour Party had been in power. However, in 1988 the NDP had still not passed a resolution specifically endorsing the minimum demands of Palestinian moderates for an independent state encompassing Gaza and the West Bank. It had also not officially condemned Israel's occupation policies or the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

There were party members who throughout the Eighties felt that the NDP was too soft on Israel especially its human rights violations and support for oppressive regimes.⁸⁵¹ The NDP could have followed the lead of Bettino Craxi, the Italian Socialist leader, who at a May 11, 1988, meeting of the SI Council took Israel to task for allegedly breaking international law with its occupation policies. Craxi added that

⁸⁴⁹ Speech, Broadbent to the Canada-Israel Committee Annual Conference, Mar. 10, 1988, NDP Research.

⁸⁵⁰ Debates, Jan. 19, 1988, p. 12050.

⁸⁵¹ Donna McDuff to Dan Heap, April 11, 1986, NAC, MG 32 C83, Vol. 71, File 8 Caucus-1986.

the presence of the Labour Party in Israel's coalition government should not spare it from the SI's judgement.⁸⁵²

Most NDP members of Parliament, nonetheless, seemed to have believed its Middle East policy throughout much of the Eighties was balanced. Indeed, compared with the previous decade, NDP policy had moved away from American policy to a considerable extent. For this reason on April 15, 1986, Derek Blackburn could single out Washington's pro-Israeli bias as a major cause of Middle East terrorism.⁸⁵³ The occasion was the Commons debate on the American raid on Libya for its leader, Colonel Gaddafi's alleged sponsorship of terrorism against Westerners. Svend Robinson, in turn, labelled the American attack an "act of state terrorism."⁸⁵⁴ Robinson saw a link between "Rambo Reagan's" actions in Libya and those in Nicaragua, while Jim Manly castigated the Americans for "a breach of international law." Instead of unilateral actions against terrorism, an international anti-terrorist police force should be created, along with the imposition of tough economic sanctions against a country harbouring terrorists.⁸⁵⁵ (Of interest is the fact that the NDP's suggested use of sanctions instead of air raids is the method now being employed against Libya by the West for harbouring the alleged terrorists who killed over 270 passengers in a flight over Scotland a few years ago.)

When the United States downed an Iranian airliner killing hundreds of people in July of 1988, the NDP again called for international action, specifically, a UN inquiry

⁸⁵² Text, Bettino Craxi address to the SI Council, Madrid, May 11, 1988, NDP Research.

⁸⁵³ Debates, April 15, 1986, pp.12285-6.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid., pp.12294-5.

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.12289-90.

to establish the truth about what had happened.⁸⁵⁶ Here, as with the NDP reaction to Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, the emphasis was on the special role Canada could play in calling the world, especially the major powers, to account for selling the means to produce such weapons to Iraq. Unlike the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Libyan and Iranian airliner incidents gave the NDP no difficulty in formulating a policy. The culprit was clear, the United States. The solution was also clear, namely, coordinated, concerted international action with Canada taking the lead in accordance with social democratic internationalism. Of course, lurking behind the NDP's Middle East policy was the overriding concern that sooner or later the Arab-Israeli conflict would blow up into an East-West nuclear confrontation.⁸⁵⁷

The Middle East was a major test of NDP human rights policy. Based on the ideals of social democratic internationalism, the party should have exhibited equal concern for the human rights of both Arabs and Jews. However, historical circumstances and connections with Israel's Labour Party made the NDP's pro-Israeli stance for most of its history almost inevitable. Nevertheless, if the NDP had made a determined effort to understand the Arab position and had established ties with left-wing Palestinians, some of this imbalance could have been overcome.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid., July 5, 1988, p.17096.

⁸⁵⁷ "The Middle East: An NDP Discussion Paper," March, 1983. NDP Research.

PART III

In contrast with the Seventies, the Eighties would be the most exciting time in the history of the NDP's involvement with international affairs. Indeed, so dramatic was the change that in foreign policy terms, at least, it could almost be said a new party had arisen. A key element was the NDP's rediscovery of social democratic internationalism and its relevance to the world problems that emerged simultaneously at the beginning of the decade. Many of these problems also affected Canada-United States relations in such a way as to stimulate a new outburst of anti-Americanism in NDP circles.

After an introductory chapter, which sets the stage for the period, five topics constitute the themes of the succeeding six chapters. The first two themes are: new challenges for NDP Third World policy and Central America, a fresh area of NDP concern. The third topic is cruise missile testing and the strategic defense initiative which represented great opportunities for NDP internationalism. Fourth, is the revival of the idealist/realist debate over NATO which became the biggest test for NDP foreign policy in the Eighties. Two chapters document the various attempts to finally resolve this issue culminating with the development of a new defence policy. Finally, a chapter focuses on American-Canadian economic relations, most particularly free trade.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE NDP REDISCOVERY OF INTERNATIONALISM:

THE 1981 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REPORT

The main catalyst in the NDP rediscovery of social democratic internationalism in the 1980s was the party's decision to establish an International Affairs Committee in 1980. This committee immediately began the process of reviewing NDP international affairs policy and issued its report the following year. Since that report had a major effect on the party's foreign policy for the rest of the decade, it will be the principal subject of this chapter.

What were the underlying factors that made this outburst of internationalism possible? Whereas for much of the earlier decade, Andrew Brewin was virtually alone in holding up the foreign policy torch in the party, the elections of 1979, 1980 and 1984 produced more than fifteen New Democratic MPs with a keen interest in and sustained commitment to the field. The key figure, as many of her colleagues attest, was Pauline Jewett, who began her parliamentary career in the 1960s as a Liberal and disciple of Pearsonian internationalism.⁸⁵⁸ Then there were Bob Ogle, a Roman

⁸⁵⁸ Bill Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993; Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993; John Brewin interview, June 15, 1993.

Catholic priest with overseas experience in development work, and Terry Sargeant, an intelligent observer of the international scene. Derek Blackburn, an open supporter of NATO, would serve as the party's controversial defence critic from 1984 to 1988.

With interest in international affairs so strong in the NDP caucus, Ed Broadbent found it hard to satisfy all the members of Parliament who wished to get involved in the foreign policy arena, especially since many had some expertise in the field. Bill Blaikie brought his prophetic yet pragmatic vision to bear on many facets of foreign policy particularly Canadian-American relations. Dan Heap, an Anglican priest with a passionate commitment to justice, became heavily involved with any matters relating to immigration, refugees and Central America with assistance from Jim Manly from time to time. After his election in 1984, Steven Langdon, a former professor of political science at Carleton University, contributed his considerable knowledge of and experience with trade and international financial institutions and their effect on the Third World. Howard McCurdy provided leadership to human rights concerns especially in relation to South Africa. In fact, almost all NDP caucus members got involved with international affairs from time to time, especially on such issues as Star Wars, Central America, and free trade. Most importantly, Ed Broadbent began to show an attentiveness to international affairs that contrasted sharply with his pre-1980 attitude and actions.

Some important conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the occupational and regional breakdown of the people who were chiefly responsible for NDP foreign policy in the 1980 to 1988 time frame. In terms of occupation, three of them were clergymen including Blaikie, Ogle and Heap while another three, Langdon, Jewett and Broadbent, were professors. The fact that so many clergymen were involved in international affairs is not surprising given that the social gospel had been a chief

source of Canadian social democratic internationalism from the beginning, especially its idealist vision of a coming world community in which justice and peace would reign. The presence of three professors lent a greater air of intellectual respectability to social democratic internationalism than it may have had before.

Regionally, Jewett and Manly were from British Columbia and Blaikie, Sargeant and Ogle from the Prairies while the other five, Heap, Blackburn, Langdon, McCurdy and Broadbent represented Ontario ridings. Obviously, NDP interest in international affairs during the Eighties was broadly based. This is particularly true when the names of other NDP MPs who, while never occupying official foreign policy critic positions in these years, nonetheless, displayed keen interest in the field are included: Svend Robinson, Ray Skelly and Nelson Riis (British Columbia), Vic Althouse, Les Benjamin, Doug Anguish (the Prairies) and Ian Deans and Lynn Macdonald (Ontario).

Of course, without the important global events that occurred in the Eighties, the interest displayed by the NDP MPs would not have been sustained. The decade began on an ominous note with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, followed soon thereafter by the election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States whose primary foreign policy objective was to confront the "evil" Soviet empire by all means and at every opportunity. These events ushered in the Second Cold War which, in some degree, became intertwined with the escalation of the nuclear arms race, the American intervention in Central America and Washington's undermining of the New International Economic Order.

Each of these developments provoked controversy in Canada and revived anti-American feeling which had been in relative decline since the middle Seventies. Adding to the tension would be a long list of American-Canadian bilateral disputes and concerns over matters such as acid rain, ocean fishing boundaries, foreign investment,

the National Energy Program and free trade. This meant that bilateral relations with the United States would once again dominate the Canadian foreign policy agenda.

However, the anti-Americanism of the Eighties was somewhat different from that of the Seventies. Traditionally, anti-Americanism within the NDP has had three main sources. In the first place, most Canadian social democrats react viscerally to a greater or lesser extent to American values as epitomized by the phrase, "the American way of life". This is due to the widespread belief in NDP circles that these values are both fundamentally inferior and a threat to Canadian values, the best of which are supposedly embodied in Canadian social democracy. This type of anti-Americanism is almost always there to some extent as an undercurrent in NDP thinking (especially among idealists) and colours its perception of everything the United States does or says. The second source of anti-Americanism within the NDP has been its generally negative reaction towards much of American foreign policy since World War II. This was particularly true during the decades of the Sixties and Eighties. The third main fountain-head of NDP anti-Americanism has, of course, been economic nationalism which viewed the United States domination of the Canadian economy as a serious threat to Canada's long-term viability as an independent nation with its own way of life.

In the early Seventies, economic nationalism had clearly emerged as the chief driving force behind NDP anti-Americanism, what with the defeat of the United States in Vietnam and the subsequent growth of isolationist sentiment in America. The result was that by the mid point of the decade, "American imperialism" had lost much of its ability to inflame anti-American feeling in Canada.

During the Eighties, disputes with the United States on economic issues, particularly free trade, led to a revival of social democratic economic nationalism.

However, the principal difference between the Seventies and Eighties was that world events and developments became so intrusive that economic nationalism had to share the Canadian stage with international affairs, thus diluting its isolationist propensities. Indeed the anti-Americanism of the 1980s, unlike that of the 1970s, actually strengthened internationalism within the NDP in certain ways.

First, in order to fight the American arms build-up and especially its Central American policy, the NDP had to look for allies on the world stage. This led to a more active involvement in the Socialist International. Related to this phenomenon was the slowly increasing sense that since the nature of the problems were international, the solutions would have to be international. This fact encouraged Canadian social democrats who wanted to make a positive contribution to peace and justice to reconsider the inward-looking mentality of the Seventies and think more globally.

Second, specific American foreign policies in the early Eighties, such as the proposal to develop a strategic defense initiative, the testing of the cruise missile and intervention in Central America, were so offensive to Canadian social democrats that they stimulated enormous interest and healthy debate about how best to respond to this new wave of American imperialism much as the nuclear weapons, Vietnam and NATO issues had done in the Sixties. This contrasted with the Seventies when economic nationalism with its quasi-isolationist focus had dominated the ideological debate so completely that debate on broader foreign policy matters had largely atrophied.

Anti-Americanism third contribution to Canadian social democratic internationalism in the 1980s was that it sparked a renewal of the fundamental internal NDP debate between social democratic idealism and liberal internationalist realism on general defence and NATO policy matters. The effect was to spur renewed interest

and involvement in international affairs amongst both the party leadership and the rank and file. In summary then, controversy, whether over bilateral Canadian-American relations (with its accompanying anti-Americanism) or foreign and defence policy was to a considerable extent a healthy development for the future course of social democratic internationalism in the New Democratic Party.

All these events and intellectual cross-currents converged in the early Eighties in such a way as to stimulate the NDP to update its foreign policy. Ironically, there had been no sign of this at the November, 1979 convention. No foreign policy resolutions were passed (partly, according to Steven Langdon, because there had been little time after the '79 federal election to prepare⁸⁵⁹), while Broadbent's speech to the delegates contained not a single reference to international affairs.⁸⁶⁰ Yet five weeks later, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in the midst of the 1980 Federal election campaign, the subject emerged onto the scene. The occasion was Broadbent's announcement of support for sanctions against the USSR and a reappraisal of the NDP's opposition to NATO and NORAD.⁸⁶¹ His probable motive was to deflect charges that the NDP was anti-American and soft on defence issues in general and the Soviet threat in particular. Electoral considerations also help explain Broadbent's defence of the Americans if they chose to use force to end the Iranian hostage crisis.⁸⁶² Apart from these references, however, Broadbent stuck to his pre-election

⁸⁵⁹ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁸⁶⁰ Text, Broadbent speech to the 10th NDP biennial convention, Nov.23, 1979, NAC, MG 32, C83, Broadbent Speaker's Series, Vol.8, File 4.

⁸⁶¹ William P. Irvine, "Epilogue: The 1980 Election," Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980: A Study of the General Elections, ed. by Howard R. Peniman (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p.368.

⁸⁶² Jim Turk, "Left Debates," Canadian Dimension, Vol.14 (June, 1980), p.25.

strategy and avoided foreign policy matters whenever possible during the campaign unless asked a direct question, and even then he sought to downplay the particular issue's significance.⁸⁶³

Nevertheless, the NDP leader could not escape some of the negative internal party fall-out from his pro-NATO declaration which contradicted NDP policy. Reopening the NATO issue after a decade of relative calm on the topic was potentially dangerous. Indeed, Pauline Jewett's immediate and forceful denunciation of Broadbent's statement had forced him to retract it at least for the moment.⁸⁶⁴

Given the internal controversy engendered during the election about foreign policy and the rapidly changing world situation, the NDP Federal Council established a special committee in the fall of 1980 to review the whole range of NDP international affairs policy. The committee, called the International Affairs Committee (IAC) was chaired by Pauline Jewett and Bob White, leader of the Canadian Auto Workers Union. However, White was soon replaced by John Brewin largely because he missed too many meetings.⁸⁶⁵ A significant aspect of the IAC's assignment was to hear from party members by way of cross-country hearings or the mail on the direction NDP foreign policy should take in the Eighties. In response, the IAC received over 100 letters and written submissions from party and union members as well as peace and development organizations.⁸⁶⁶

⁸⁶³ Text of "Question Period," CTV, Feb.3, 1980, Interviewer, Richard Gwyn, NAC, MG 32, C83, Broadbent Speaker's Series, Vol.102, File 11.

⁸⁶⁴ Jewett to Broadbent, Sept.8, 1980, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.44, File 9.

⁸⁶⁵ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

⁸⁶⁶ "Peace, Security and Justice," Report of the International Affairs Committee, 1981, NDP Research, p.1.

John Brewin is convinced that Broadbent and Robin Sears, party secretary at the time, assumed that reassessment of NDP NATO policy would be the primary task of the committee which would ultimately lead to a reversal of that policy. For that reason, Broadbent wanted Brewin as co-chair of the committee to balance Jewett with her anti-NATO bias.⁸⁶⁷ As the IAC began its work, Broadbent continued to drop hints both publicly and privately that he fully expected the party's NATO (and probably NORAD) policies would be modified. Jewett was not amused and wrote a letter to her leader reminding him that nothing must be done or said which would prejudice the work of the committee.⁸⁶⁸

Broadbent's pro-NATO position had hardened further after a visit to Poland in the summer of 1980. In his view, the rise of Solidarity illustrated the need for a strong and united stand by the West against possible Soviet intervention and in support of free trade unions, a point of considerable significance to a man with very close ties to the Canadian labour movement.⁸⁶⁹ So important were developments in Poland to Broadbent that he had agreed to do an interview for the Toronto Star immediately upon his return from that country despite having to help prepare for the funeral of his brother-in-law.⁸⁷⁰ Party insiders also hoped to use Broadbent's visit for political advantage in an upcoming Hamilton byelection in a riding with many "ethnic" voters.⁸⁷¹

⁸⁶⁷ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

⁸⁶⁸ Jewett to Broadbent, Sept.8, 1980, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.44, File 9.

⁸⁶⁹ Communique, "Visit to Poland, Aug.22-30, 1980," CLC Press Release, Aug.21, 1980, NAC, MG 32, C83, Broadbent Speaker's Series, Vol.8, File 4.

⁸⁷⁰ "Broadbent sees Opportunity in Poland," Toronto Star, Sept. 5, 1980, pp.14-5.

⁸⁷¹ Angus Richer and Gerry Scott for the special attention of Ed Broadbent, Subject: Ed's trip to Poland, Aug.28, 1980, NAC, MG 32, C83, Broadbent Speaker's Series,

Despite the strong desire of Broadbent and much of the party's inner circle to rid the NDP of its anti-NATO policy, these efforts would prove fruitless. Rank and file party activists who participated in the IAC hearings were virtually unanimous in voicing their opposition to any revision of the 1969 resolution. After a well-attended and ultimately decisive meeting in BC, even Robin Sears realized that a change was not forthcoming. According to John Brewin, the overwhelming sense in the party was that even to consider changing NDP NATO policy at that time would amount to a de facto endorsement of Ronald Reagan's massive military build-up.⁸⁷² As a result, the most that pro-NATO IAC members could achieve was the inclusion of a section in the committee's final report outlining the chief arguments of both sides on the issue.⁸⁷³ Thus, it would remain for successive conventions in the Eighties to wrestle with the question of NATO membership, a repeat of what had taken place in the Sixties.

Resolution of the contentious NATO question having been postponed until another day, the IAC, with strong impetus from Jewett, turned its attention to the broad sweep of foreign policy.⁸⁷⁴ The completed IAC report was submitted to the Federal Council in early 1981. The authors labelled it a "discussion paper", but the form in which it was presented (a 32 page typescript/ published volume) and the fact that virtually all of its major recommendations were incorporated into the 1981 convention international affairs resolution gave it much more authority and status than that.

Vol.9, File 4.

⁸⁷² John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

⁸⁷³ "Peace, Security and Justice," Report of the International Affairs Committee, 1981 Convention, NDP Research, pp.25-6.

⁸⁷⁴ Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

The document began with a specific call to the New Democratic Party to turn its full attention to the urgent issues of international peace, security and justice. In the authors' view, the problem was not primarily a military one but economic, social and environmental. Since all the elements making up the crisis were now affecting or had the potential to affect Canada, this country was part and parcel of the global emergency. The most important of these elements were the threat of nuclear war, the global recession, the increasing power of the multinationals and the declining purchasing power of the poorer nations.⁸⁷⁵

The authors of the report rejected the approaches favoured by the superpowers to achieve peace, security and justice. Washington seemed to believe that peace could be obtained by increased military spending, greater extension of NATO's military presence around the world, deployment of new weapons in Europe and strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR. The Americans had assumed the role of world policeman and with its right-wing allies in South Africa, Chile, South Korea and El Salvador was attempting to impose a law and order agenda on the rest of the globe even at the expense of social reform and democracy.

According to the report, the Kremlin also appeared to believe that security could be achieved through military expansionism and repression of dissent. Both superpower approaches must be denounced, the authors concluded, because they greatly exacerbated the world's problems. Moreover, Washington's rejection of all liberation forces would only help extend Soviet influence in the Third World and defeat long-term American interests. The report also reproached past Canadian governments for failing to challenge either the United States or the Soviet Union on these points.⁸⁷⁶

⁸⁷⁵ "Peace, Security and Justice," pp.1-3.

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.3-5.

Instead of such policies which had failed, the Jewett/Brewin report proposed a social democratic internationalist alternative which, it argued, was particularly well suited to Canadian capabilities and which offered some hope for a world order based on freedom and justice. To this end, Canada must without reservation pursue three objectives: the reversal of the arms race, the reduction of tension between the nuclear powers and an assault on world-wide poverty and inequality, the three basic causes of war. Since the authors of the report believed that Canada's most effective international contribution lay in promoting the third objective, almost two-thirds of the report was devoted to outlining policies and programs that would, it was believed, bring social and economic justice and equality to the world community.⁸⁷⁷

With respect to the first goal, the reversal of the arms race and reduction of tensions, the NDP foreign policy statement insisted that Canada's general strategy should be to reassert its traditional Middle Power role which had fallen on hard times in the past decade. As such, Canada must take the initiative in promoting the process of confidence building between East and West begun in 1963 with the Test Ban Treaty and continued by Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and the Helsinki Accords. As a close friend and neighbour of the United States, Canada had a special obligation to encourage the United States Congress and the American people to pursue a different course of action from that outlined by President Reagan.

The report went on to delineate many of the specific elements in the party's overall international affairs plan of action as well as the major policies it would seek to implement in the Eighties. Not surprisingly, the development and strengthening of international institutions ranked high on the list. Moreover, Canada, the document maintained, should aid humanity's drive for freedom and social justice by restructuring

⁸⁷⁷ ibid., p.9. See Chapter Fourteen for a full discussion of these proposals.

its economy, reducing its reliance on multinationals, and shifting production from defence industries and from those which could be more efficiently developed in the Third World.⁸⁷⁸

The authors of the report were encouraged by events in Zimbabwe (the achievement of majority rule after many years of war) and Poland (the emergence of Solidarity) and the existence of strong political allies around the world especially in the Socialist International. The SI, particularly under Willy Brandt's strong leadership, was helping social democratic internationalism gain prestige and acceptance around the world through the widely acclaimed Brandt Commission's work on international development issues.⁸⁷⁹ The global emergency, the IAC report concluded, left Canada no choice but to pursue an active and cooperative international role working with like-minded nations, organizations and peoples.

One of the most significant aspects of "Peace, Security and Justice," was the authors' challenge to the New Democratic Party to take a much more activist role in international affairs. They candidly acknowledged that compared to its sister parties in Europe, the NDP had invested little time or resources in international affairs. To rectify the problem, the committee proposed that the Federal Executive raise the party's external affairs budget significantly in order to increase research and program development capability. This, in turn, would facilitate more debate and discussion of international issues in the party across Canada as well as the implementation of specific foreign policy initiatives. Even the provincial parties ought to contribute time, money and action programs. The international affairs committee was convinced that

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.5-7.

⁸⁷⁹ David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p.212.

Canadians were ready to respond positively to a call for a larger and more progressive Canadian involvement in world affairs. The NDP had a unique opportunity to lead in the building of a new consensus for a dynamic internationalist role for Canada.⁸⁸⁰

Here finally, it appeared, was a total NDP commitment to internationalism from a Canadian social democratic perspective. For the first time since the 1962-3 nuclear weapons debate, the NDP appeared to be seriously interested in giving foreign policy equal status with domestic concerns. Evidently, the authors of the report believed that the global emergency was intruding so forcibly into the daily lives of the Canadian electorate that foreign policy could well influence their voting habits significantly in the coming decade. In such a scenario, the NDP would be in an excellent position to provide voters with solutions to the problems of peace, security and justice which were both idealistic and practical. This required, however, that instead of just the occasional question or comment in Parliament, a comprehensive strategy would have to be designed to systematically and unremittingly build public support for NDP foreign policy positions and then make them a central focus at election time.

On another front, the Jewett/Brewin report included the NDP's first comprehensive statement on human rights and their relation to foreign policy. It noted that economic development without freedom was of little value. Hence, events in Poland, Afghanistan and the persecution of dissidents in the Soviet Union weighed heavily on the authors's minds. They unequivocally condemned the "corruption" of the socialist ideal and the abuse of human rights in these countries labelling it "systematic, deep-rooted and awesome in its effect." Washington's coddling of repressive regimes

⁸⁸⁰ "Peace, Security and Justice," pp.7-8.

also earned condemnation along with the international community's lack of attention to the plight of refugees.⁸⁸¹

In its analysis of the specific ways Canada could promote arms control and disarmament, the discussion paper mostly restated old NDP themes although it did provide some guidance on how to meet future challenges. On defence policy, the report promised that an NDP government would immediately commission a detailed study of Canada's defence needs and the role of the armed forces in the context of NDP foreign policy goals. Particular areas of concern included the need to assert northern sovereignty, to patrol the 200 mile offshore economic zone and to maintain Canadian involvement in peace-keeping.⁸⁸²

The Jewett/Brewin report also challenged the NDP to make the development and articulation of specific responses to bilateral and regional issues (including trade) a top priority with special reference to the Middle East, the Far East, the Pacific, Africa, Latin America and the United States. As a beginning, some aspects of a new plan of action in Canada's political relationship with the United States were outlined. While the report revealed that, so far at least, the NDP had done little new thinking on the nature of this relationship or its specific elements, the effort was still significant in that it attempted to bring coherence to all aspects of NDP foreign policy as they affected bilateral Canadian-American relations.

In the authors' opinion, there were two key questions. First, how much did Canadians wish to share in American values, interests and concerns? Second, how much independence did we wish to exercise? The discussion paper presumed that Canadians still had the wherewithal to make real choices on these matters. The NDP's

⁸⁸¹ Ibid., pp.18-9.

⁸⁸² Ibid., pp.20-6.

role was to clarify the alternatives. In addition, it was taken for granted that Canada still had considerable leverage in Washington and could use its influence to pursue distinctly Canadian interests as well as social democratic internationalism's objectives of universal peace and economic and social justice. The authors' belief was that in serving Canadian goals, the interests of the globe were being served, a longstanding idealist tenet of Canadian social democratic internationalism.

The IAC report criticized past Canadian governments for typically viewing American-Canadian relations as a series of trade-offs. The result had been a rather immature Canadian approach to the relationship for many years. Instead, Ottawa ought to conduct its affairs with Washington on a sophisticated state-to-state basis with all aspects of Canadian foreign policy linked by a comprehensive strategy as they were in its dealings with other countries. In the report's words, "The issue of fisheries is not independent, and should not be debated independent of acid rain, United States involvement in El Salvador, or the question of cultural dominance."⁸⁸³

In effect, these spokespersons for NDP foreign policy assumed that Canada should and could conduct business with America as an equal. The result would be greater respect and influence in Washington. The way to obtain this equality was for Canadians to employ their economic muscle. From economic independence other salutary things such as a strengthened Canadian culture and distinct world view would follow, in addition to an independent foreign policy. For the authors of the report, then, an independent foreign policy was a major element in ensuring Canada's destiny and survival.

The Jewett/Brewin report also dealt with several foreign policy topics which had been almost completely ignored in past official NDP foreign policy statements or

⁸⁸³ Ibid., p.27.

resolutions such as the environment, space and the oceans. For example, the document asserted that, "efforts to preserve and enhance the essential elements of a healthy natural environment must become part of Canada's international policy."⁸⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, they supported multilateral efforts to conclude a Law of the Sea Agreement which the United States was trying to delay. They also urged Canada to act unilaterally to preserve and protect its fishery and regulate coastal waters and the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.⁸⁸⁵

In 1975, when the Trudeau government had first hinted that Canada might well impose a 200 mile economic zone on its own, several NDP MPs, including Andrew Brewin and Stewart Leggatt had initially opposed the move on grounds that this was a matter to be decided by the international community. However, after many of their NDP colleagues from coastal regions wanted Canada to act quickly to stop foreign overfishing, they changed their opinion. Leggatt, in fact, sponsored an amendment to a government bill to include the west coast as well as the east.⁸⁸⁶ Obviously, as the 1981 IAC report makes plain, the NDP was now even more willing to go the unilateral route rather than wait for international agreements on this question. On another important matter, however, the report argued that the militarization of space must be

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid., p.27.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid., p.28. All the points mentioned in this paragraph formed the basis of a party pledge on the environment which was incorporated into the composite international affairs resolution approved by the 1981 convention. See "Resolution B.11.E," NDP Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research.

⁸⁸⁶ Debates, June 19, 1975, pp.6927-9.

halted and the present activities controlled through multilateral and international agreement.⁸⁸⁷

With the exception of the NATO discussion, almost all of "Peace, Security and Justice," was incorporated into the 1981 comprehensive international affairs resolution which established the tone, broad parameters and specific themes that would guide NDP foreign policy in the Eighties. While the authors' advice that the party conduct reviews of virtually all major foreign policy arenas was implemented only partially in coming years, the Jewett/Brewin report was successful in setting the stage for a much greater NDP involvement in international issues than ever before. As Jewett matter-of-factly stated in a letter to Broadbent, she was convinced that "the level of activity and political relevance of external affairs has been heightened by the work of the party's IAC and my role as chair of that committee."⁸⁸⁸

The newly constituted NDP International Affairs Committee became like a standing committee of Parliament, tackling a whole series of issues and releasing reports on defence (1983, 1985, and 1988) as well as the Middle East (1983). Strong leadership was the key to its success in John Brewin's opinion. Brewin and Jewett, along with the latter's legislative assistant, Steven Lee, were strongly committed to international affairs and worked well together. When Brewin stepped down as co-chair of the IAC in 1986 in the interests of having someone from Quebec take the post, IAC's effectiveness declined, at least in Brewin's view.⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁸⁷ ibid., p.29.

⁸⁸⁸ Jewett to Broadbent, Mar.12, 1981, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.72, File 1. While Jewett's words may sound self-congratulatory, the key leadership role she played on the committee and in Parliament was confirmed by Bill Blaikie and John Brewin. Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993; Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

⁸⁸⁹ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

One key recommendation of the 1981 report which would have greatly enhanced the profile of international affairs in the NDP was not implemented. On many occasions throughout the Eighties, people such as Jewett, Brewin and Heap lobbied the Federal Council to appoint a full-time party international affairs secretary like most European social democratic parties had. A few times the Council actually passed motions to that effect but the executive and officers of the NDP failed to implement the decision. The administration of the party, in effect, sabotaged the appointment of an international secretary. They did so, as Brewin sees it, because to them it was an expensive "frill" which the party could not afford when compared to urgent immediate domestic concerns such as finding money for the next election.⁸⁹⁰

This points to another problem that hindered the party's ability to project a strong profile on international affairs. The 1961 founding convention had given most of the institutional and financial power to the provincial NDP parties. The federal party had no direct access to funding except through the provinces until it discovered direct mail in the early Eighties.⁸⁹¹ Thus, as Cliff Scotton, NDP federal secretary from 1966 to 1976, wrote in a letter to the author, without assured long-term funding in place, the federal party felt it could not take on the added expense of hiring an international affairs secretary.⁸⁹²

Yet, despite these handicaps, foreign affairs achieved a higher status in the NDP in the early Eighties than at any time since the 1962 election. Indeed, this is what Broadbent had promised the NDP would do in a speech he made to Brown University

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁹¹ Ibid.

⁸⁹² Cliff Scotton, to the author, April 5, 1993, Author's Papers.

on February 20th, 1981.⁸⁹³ Given the fact that members of Parliament generally like to be associated with high profile critic areas, it is not surprising then, in the light of Broadbent's statement, that NDP MPs were soon lining up to be appointed to positions dealing with international affairs. Actually, most of the proliferation occurred in the fall of 1985 after Jewett asked Broadbent for three "deputy" critics to help her with CIDA, South Africa and general foreign policy matters.⁸⁹⁴ There was some disagreement within the Caucus External Affairs Committee, however, over whether critics should be given official "deputy" titles for narrowly focused areas. Howard McCurdy, for one, wanted to be involved with human rights in general, not just South Africa. Jewett agreed that flexibility had to prevail, especially since so many members wanted to comment on human rights issues in the House, but this demanded coordination and consultation so that people would not undercut or try to outdo each other.⁸⁹⁵ Another reason a greater number of foreign policy critic posts were created was because Tory ministers were making more foreign policy statements than previous governments. However, in the view of Jewett and the rest of the Caucus External Affairs Committee, the overriding reason for appointing deputy critics was the fact that if the NDP truly believed external affairs and defense questions were important, more NDP MPs should be encouraged to ask questions in Parliament and thus raise the profile of the issues.⁸⁹⁶

⁸⁹³ Broadbent, address to Brown University, Feb.20, 1981, NAC, MG 32, C83, Broadbent Speaker's Series, Vol.9, File 6.

⁸⁹⁴ Bruce Levy to Caucus External Affairs Committee, Oct.3, 1985, Subject: Minutes of the Oct.2nd, 1985 meeting, NDP Research.

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

Behind these discussions and maneuvers was the feeling of quite a few NDP MPs that international affairs could become a political winner for the party. It was worthwhile, therefore, to spend more time and energy devising elaborate day-to-day political strategies around particular foreign policy themes. For instance, on December 4, 1984, the Caucus External affairs Committee decided to use their next Opposition Day to introduce a nuclear freeze motion. It would embarrass Tories who had supported the freeze during the 1984 election campaign, split the Liberals and also present the NDP as allied with majority public opinion on the issue in both Canada and at the United Nations.⁸⁹⁷

On March 1st of the following year, Hania Fedorowicz, NDP caucus international affairs researcher, wrote a memo to the Caucus External Affairs Committee indicating a further elaboration in the party's political strategy. Now, she maintained, was the ideal time to go after the soft Liberal vote especially in the disarmament, immigration, Third World development and human rights constituencies by emphasizing Liberal party responsibility for the Tories' present foreign policy problems. After all, it was the Liberals who had tied Canada into Washington's defence strategies such as the Strategic Defence Initiative. Simultaneously, the NDP should call attention to existing and potential contradictions in Conservative policy as well as divisions within the Conservative caucus (for example, "liberal" Joe Clark against "reactionary" Erik Neilson) to undermine Tory credibility in the foreign policy arena.⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁷ Caucus External Affairs Committee Notes, Dec.4, 1984, NDP Research.

⁸⁹⁸ Hania Fedorowicz to Caucus External Affairs Committee, Subject: Question Period/Long Term, Mar.1, 1985, NDP Research.

In the Eighties, the NDP also paid more attention to the advantage the party could gain from developing long-term foreign policy action plans. For example, at its December 4, 1984 meeting, the Caucus External Affairs Committee decided to issue a "gag rule" to all NDP MPs concerning defence policy until the committee could develop a comprehensive response to the Conservative White Paper on Defence which was expected in 1985. At the same meeting, the participants agreed that a more integrated critique of Conservative foreign policy was needed going beyond specific issues, such as cruise missile testing or the nuclear freeze, to focus on general themes such as regional conflicts, arms sales and defence production.⁸⁹⁹

Moreover, the NDP placed much greater emphasis on communicating its foreign policy message to the public. Steven Lee recommended at least one international affairs mailing be sent to all voters in target ridings where the party thought it could win in the next federal election. In addition, Lee wanted regular foreign affairs material prepared for party newspapers.⁹⁰⁰ Simultaneously, the NDP began flooding the media with news releases on foreign policy matters. As part of this campaign, Broadbent also wrote a few articles for newspapers on specific themes such as American intervention in Nicaragua.⁹⁰¹ All of these measures demonstrate the improved commitment the NDP made to foreign policy during the Eighties.

NDP attempts to implement its new and aggressive foreign policy strategy centred around five major issues which will each form the basis of a subsequent chapter or chapters in this dissertation. These were: North-South relations, Central

⁸⁹⁹ Caucus External Affairs Notes, Dec.4, 1984, NDP Research.

⁹⁰⁰ Steve Lee to IAC, Feb.28, 1985, NDP Research.

⁹⁰¹ Ed Broadbent, "US Harassment of Nicaragua: A Choice Denied," Globe and Mail, Sept.15, 1986.

America, disarmament and new weapons systems, a new NDP defence policy and Canadian-American environmental and economic relations. The common denominator in all five was the continuing saga of United States-Canada relations. Indeed, immediately following the 1984 election, the Caucus External Relations Committee had seriously considered the possibility of establishing a task force on Canadian-American relations which would travel across the country inviting public comment on the question. Steven Langdon had strongly supported the concept of a task force on this topic because it would integrate various critic areas. This he had argued might be useful since he suspected that the Mulroney government would be focusing on Canadian-American relations. While several other members of the Caucus External Affairs Committee agreed with Langdon, they were worried that it might arouse anti-Americanism. As far as can be determined, the idea was not implemented.⁹⁰²

Both realists and idealists agreed that the primary question NDP international affairs policy had to wrestle with in the Eighties was the same as in previous decades, namely, how best to create an independent foreign policy. Canada must disengage itself from American foreign policy which interpreted everything through the lens of Reagan's anti-communist crusade. American foreign policy must not only be rejected, but confronted as a whole and in its various incarnations.⁹⁰³ To this end, the NDP launched what amounted to a crusade of its own against the Reagan administration and the Canadian government for its alleged complicity with Washington's Central American, Star Wars and cruise missile testing policies. In NDP minds these issues

⁹⁰² Hania Fedorowicz to Caucus External Affairs Committee, Nov.28, 1984, Subject: Minutes of the Nov.15, 1984 Meeting, NDP Research.

⁹⁰³ Dan Heap to the Caucus External Affairs Committee, Feb.28, 1985, NDP Research.

were inextricably linked. As Pauline Jewett stated when evaluating Prime Minister Trudeau's 1983 global peace mission,

We wait anxiously for changes in the government's nuclear arms policies (i.e. cruise missile testing) and we wait anxiously for Canada's efforts to prevent a United States inspired war in our hemisphere (i.e. Central America).⁹⁰⁴

Bob Ogle made the same point when he placed the El Salvadoran situation within the broader North-South question.⁹⁰⁵

Without doubt, the IAC Report played a crucial role in setting the stage for a period of heavy NDP involvement with international affairs which would lead to a strengthened Canadian social democratic internationalism.

⁹⁰⁴ Ottawa Report, Dec.9, 1983, NDP Research.

⁹⁰⁵ Debates, Mar.9, 1981. Clyde Sanger did a similar thing in a book he published in the early Eighties showing the relationship between the Third World Development and disarmament issues. Clyde Sanger, Safe and Sound: Disarmament and Development in the Eighties (Ottawa: Deneau Pub. and Co., 1982).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

DEFENDING INTERNATIONALISM - NDP THIRD WORLD POLICY (1975-88)

In order to evaluate the NDP's response to the North-South issue, it is necessary to go back to the mid-Seventies when the process of reexamining its Third World policy began. Thus, the work of the International Affairs Committee in 1981 on this subject was, in an important sense, the culmination of changes that had been initiated a few years before. (As noted in an earlier chapter, Third World policy was to a large extent an exception to the general decline in NDP involvement with international affairs in the Seventies.)

The catalyst for this NDP reappraisal was provided by a series of global developments in the years between 1973 and 1975 whose major consequence was an increase in the real or perceived power of the non-Western, non-Communist nations of the world. The turning point was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War which led to the Arab oil embargo against most Western industrialized countries.⁹⁰⁶ The resultant oil crisis seemed to indicate to Third World nations that through coordinated action they could

⁹⁰⁶ Ivan L. Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p.19.

seemed to indicate to Third World nations that through coordinated action they could use their possession of important raw materials to enhance their economic clout in relation to the industrialized world.⁹⁰⁷

Other changes played an important part as well. In a shift that had been gaining momentum for some time but climaxed in the mid-Seventies, the West lost its traditional control over the General Assembly of the United Nations. Third World and non-aligned countries increasingly found ways to use this world forum to advance their agenda, exercising what the West interpreted as, "the tyranny of the new majority." A prime example was the passing of the resolution in 1975 equating Zionism with racism and extending virtual government-in-exile status to the PLO.⁹⁰⁸ A third happening was the onset of what became a severe and lengthy famine in the sub-Saharan region of Africa which increased demands for a world food policy.

In these changing conditions, the NDP had to adapt its Third World policies to the new reality. However, there were new realities at home that the party had to consider as well, in particular the strong nationalist current sweeping the party in the early Seventies. In such an atmosphere, the challenge was to find common ground between social democratic internationalism and Canadian nationalism. Fortunately for the future of internationalism within the NDP some common ground did exist. Left wing nationalism has tended to believe that in many respects the United States has

North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p.19.

⁹⁰⁷ Willy Brandt, World Armament and World Hunger: A Call for Action (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1986), p.89.

⁹⁰⁸ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p.283; Also see, J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp.296-9.

treated Canada like a Third World country to be exploited.⁹⁰⁹ This made for a certain natural affinity between Canadian nationalists and Third World peoples, although, as noted previously, this affinity has been constrained considerably by the strong inward-looking tendencies inherent in nationalism.

Therefore, Canadian left-wing nationalists/idealists had both domestic and foreign policy reasons to find satisfaction in the reduction of United States influence at the United Nations. Similarly, it must have been gratifying to them to see the NDP pass a resolution in 1973 on Southern Africa urging the Canadian government to increase non-military aid to countries such as Tanzania and Zambia which were assisting the movements that were fighting for freedom from White oppression in South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and South West Africa.⁹¹⁰ This was at a time when the United States considered most liberation movements to be communist inspired. Hence, nationalists/idealists could, to some extent at least, view NDP efforts to help the underdeveloped world as a part of the broader struggle against American imperialism. While realists in the NDP were not motivated by anti-Americanism, they could still work with idealists on Third World issues, because they both shared in social democratic internationalism's long-term goal of a world community built on the principles of social, political and economic equality and justice for all. Consequently, in general, social democratic idealists and realists did not clash dramatically on Third World policy.

⁹⁰⁹ See James Laxer, The Energy Poker Game: The Politics of the Continental Resources Deal (Toronto: New Press, 1970), p.46 and William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983), p.215.

⁹¹⁰ Anne Scotton, ed., "Southern Africa," New Democratic Party Policies 1961-1976 (Ottawa: The New Democratic Party, 1976), p.107.

When Third World countries decided to take advantage of the changes occurring on the world stage and demand a "New International Economic Order (NIEO)," the NDP was ready to respond. The term was first used at a summit conference of non-aligned nations held at Algiers in 1973 whose closing statement called for an "action program for a new international economic order".⁹¹¹ This was followed over the next ten years by a series of UN sponsored conferences which attempted to get Western industrialized and Third World countries (the Group of 77) to agree on a series of reforms to the world economic system. The Group of 77's objective was to attain greater economic justice by increasing their control over their economic development and transferring wealth from the rich to the poor nations.⁹¹²

The major specific demands of the Group of 77 fell under three main categories. The first category emphasized the transfer of resources from the rich First World (the Western industrialized powers) to the poor Third World through preferential and non-reciprocal trading arrangements, full implementation of the .7% aid target and expansion of the resources of the International Development Association (IDA) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The second category featured measures that would enhance the sovereignty and self reliance of Third World countries. The most important ones were the recognition of each state's sovereignty over its national resources and economic activities, international regulation of transnational corporations and acceptance by the developed nations of the right of less developed nations (LDC's) to form commodity cartels.

⁹¹¹ Brandt, World Armament and World Hunger, p.89.

⁹¹² Ivan Head, On a Hinge of History, pp.19-20.

Finally, the third category highlighted reforms to international organizations designed to enlarge Third World influence in these institutions. Three improvements were viewed as crucial. The first would see an increase in the authority, resources, and power of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In the second, major new international economic institutions would be created, most particularly a Common Fund governed by a board with significant Third World representation. The goal would be to provide funds to stabilize the prices of Third World export commodities and finance the production, processing and marketing of these commodities. The third reform would see an enlarging of Third World representation in existing world economic organizations, in particular, the World Bank, IMF, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).⁹¹³

While the resource demands were not new, those concerning sovereignty and international institutions, if implemented, would have led to a significant shift of economic power from the developed to the underdeveloped world.

Canada's Liberal government cautiously endorsed the basic concept of a new economic order. External Affairs minister, Allan MacEachen, said as much in testimony before SCEAND on April 10th, 1975 and repeated it later that year at the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations held to consider the NIEO.⁹¹⁴ The government then released a report on September 2, 1975, called, "Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980," which made three

⁹¹³ Asbjorn Lovbraek, "International Reform and the Like-Minded Countries in the North-South Dialogue, 1975-1985," in Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension, ed. by Cranford Pratt (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, pp. 25-9. See also Peter Stephenson, Handbook of World Development: The Guide to the Brandt Report (New York: Holmes and Meier Pub, 1981), pp.12-5.

⁹¹⁴ Allan MacEachen, testimony before SCEAND in Canadian Annual Review, 1975, pp.277-8; Also referred to by Andrew Brewin in a speech to the World Federalists, "The New Economic Order," Oct.7, 1975, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.71, File 2.

commitments. First, Canada's external and domestic policies which impacted in any way on the lesser developed countries (LDCs) would be harmonized. Second, a greater variety of Canadian policy instruments in the trade and international monetary fields would be employed to benefit the underdeveloped world. Third, Canada committed itself to support the UN plan for a comprehensive new Third World commodities agreement.⁹¹⁵ In a related move, MacEachen put his stamp of approval on the 1975-76 hearings held by SCEAND's subcommittee on International Development under the chairmanship of Liberal Maurice Dupras into all aspects of Canada's assistance programs.⁹¹⁶

A small group of MPs from the three major parties formed an informal working group to promote the New International Economic Order in Parliament and to educate the general public on the matter. As Alberta Conservative, Doug Roche, argued before the SCEAND subcommittee on development issues, the Canadian people were not ready for the changes that the NIEC would bring to Canada if implemented.⁹¹⁷ To this end, Roche, Irene Pelletier (a Liberal MP from Quebec), and Andrew Brewin (an Ontario NDPer), toured the country in December of 1975 trying to raise the consciousness of Canadians about the role Canada must play in international development in general and the NIEC in particular.⁹¹⁸

⁹¹⁵ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, 1975, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p.278. More details of the Liberal government's involvement with Third World issues, particularly the NIEO, are given in J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp.286-307.

⁹¹⁶ SCEAND hearings, No.4:25, Nov.6, 1975, First Session, 30th Parliament.

⁹¹⁷ Testimony before SCEAND subcommittee on International Development, Nov 6, 1975, No.4:14.

⁹¹⁸ "MPs Tour to Push World Development," Globe and Mail, Dec. 10, 1975.

While the Liberal and Progressive Conservative members of this tour acted largely as individuals, Brewin had the support of his caucus and party, although the level of their enthusiasm was hard to judge. At its 1975 convention, the NDP had officially endorsed the NIEC in principle with special attention paid to the notion of an international commodity agreement.⁹¹⁹ Two years earlier, the party had passed a resolution calling for restructuring of the international monetary institutions.⁹²⁰

In thus supporting the NIEC, the NDP was endorsing what Cranford Pratt, a prominent Canadian scholar specializing in Third World issues, calls "humane internationalism" which in Pratt's definition has three distinguishing features. First, people or countries who endorse humane internationalism believe they have an ethical obligation to alleviate global poverty and promote development. Second, they have faith that a more equitable world is in the real long-term interests of rich and poor alike. Third, they are convinced that the basic approach of the social welfare state, as it developed in the Sixties and Seventies in countries like Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands (where it formed a significant part of the dominant political culture), could be extended to solve the problems of the Third World.⁹²¹

Pratt argues that by 1975 three distinct expressions of humane internationalism had developed within these 5 societies to which he gives the labels: liberal, radical and reform. The first, liberal internationalism, combined a commitment to a more open multilateral trading system with the belief that increased development assistance could

⁹¹⁹ Scotton, "Foreign Aid Programme," p.109.

⁹²⁰ *Ibid.*, "Canada and the Third World Development," p.106.

⁹²¹ Cranford Pratt, Internationalism Under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp.13-16. This philosophy ran counter to realism in most respects as defined in the introductory chapter of this dissertation.

meet the challenge of world poverty and thus contribute to the stability and prosperity of the international capitalist economic order.⁹²² Most of the NIEO demands for resource transfers, unlike those for enhanced Third World sovereignty and increased influence in international institutions, could probably have been accommodated by liberal internationalism. Until the early Seventies, NDP Third World development thinking as well as the party's specific aid policies fell almost completely into the liberal internationalist camp. However, with the growing awareness of the outright failures and limitations of this approach, as documented in Chapter Ten, NDPers were open to alternatives.

A few turned to radical internationalism because of its strong emphasis on solidarity with the poor and complete rejection of the international capitalist system with its institutions such as the GATT and the World Bank. However, this view never gained much influence amongst the upper echelons of the party.⁹²³ Dan Heap sympathized with this view, but he was never a member of this inner circle.⁹²⁴ The nearest the NDP came to officially incorporating elements of radical internationalism into its platform was a 1975 resolution condemning Canadian participation in international economic structures that were designed to force economic and social policies on the Third World at their expense and for the benefit of international corporations.⁹²⁵ Nevertheless, the wording was vague and it became clear

⁹²² Ibid., pp.17-9.

⁹²³ This was attested to by Barbara Angel, a graduate of the University of Manitoba and NDP member, who with her husband served overseas under CUSO in the Seventies. Barbara Angel interview, May 10, 1992.

⁹²⁴ Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹²⁵ Scotton, "Foreign Aid Programme," p.109.

subsequently that the NDP had no intention of advocating Canadian withdrawal from specific international institutions.

The NDP found in reform internationalism the new philosophy of development it was looking for. Unlike liberal internationalism, reform internationalism believed that an open international economic system with its reliance on unguided market forces operated to the disadvantage of the LDCs and was therefore fundamentally immoral. Just as at the national level, justice required intervention by a powerful governmental authority to bring about a fairer distribution of power within international financial, monetary, trade and development institutions, along with measures to alleviate the poverty that capitalism inherently created and perpetuated. Adherents of reform internationalism (mostly social democrats) stated their willingness to implement these reforms even if it meant short term sacrifices for their own countries.⁹²⁶

The NDP, with its traditional critique of the market, adherence to a state interventionist philosophy on domestic issues and commitment to building a world community, found it relatively easy to endorse the basic concepts of reform internationalism as exemplified by the NIEO. Hence, the 1975 convention passed the following resolution:

Whereas it has become clear that the development of the Third World lies not in aid programmes, however helpful in the short run, but rather in the adoption of the new international order recently demanded by the United Nations.... Therefore Be it resolved that a NDP government would exercise all the pressure it could at world forums such as GATT and UNCTAD 4 to help bring about a just and equitable international order.⁹²⁷

⁹²⁶ Pratt, Internationalism Under Strain, p.19. Also see Lovbraek, "International Reform and the Like-Minded Countries in the North-South Dialogue, 1975-1985," pp.33-7.

⁹²⁷ Scotton, "Foreign Aid Programme, p.109.

Not surprisingly, then, the NDP began to see in the NIEO at least a partial fulfilment of social democratic internationalism's vision for the world. Andrew Brewin made this clear in a major address on the New Economic Order to the World Federalists at a meeting in Toronto on October 7, 1975. Brewin was ecstatic because he was certain that the Seventh Special Session of the UN's General Assembly which had finished its deliberations just a month before, had "achieved a new turning point in world history". He was particularly pleased that the developed and underdeveloped (the Group of 77) countries had chosen cooperation and dialogue over chaos and confrontation. Furthermore, he saw hopeful signs that a global strategy was being created to deal with all the major challenges facing humankind in the areas of food, population, health, education, housing and the environment. Brewin also thought he saw a willingness to attack the structural roots of these problems even on the part of the United States. In conclusion, Brewin's took some of the fundamental idealist principles of social democratic philosophy and applied them to the issue at hand. Morality, he stated, demanded that whatever was technically possible must be done to meet human need. All that was required was political will and social imagination.⁹²⁸

The Canadian Labour Congress also got caught up in the spirit of the NIEO for a time in the mid-Seventies. For example, on February 12, 1976, Joe Morris, President of the CLC at the time, in testimony before SCEAND's Sub-committee on International Development, expressed the view that if the world was to survive, there must be a sharing of wealth, resources, technology and the mechanisms of job creation. Thus, he called for abolition of all tariff barriers on finished and semi-finished products from

⁹²⁸ Brewin, "New Economic Order," address to the World Federalists, Toronto, Oct.7, 1975, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.71, File 2.

Third World countries even if it led to considerable Canadian job losses in such areas as textiles.⁹²⁹

Steven Langdon, after working in Africa in the early Seventies, advised Broadbent on the NIEO and served on the NDP Policy Review committee. He remembers that some trade unions, especially the steel workers, worked enthusiastically with his committee during these years in producing detailed papers on how Canada could interconnect with Third World countries in creating cartels for such raw materials as copper, lead, zinc and iron ore.⁹³⁰ However, it is not clear how solid that worker support for the NIEO really had been since it began to recede with the 1980-2 recession.

Indeed, the motives of Canadians who jumped on the NIEO bandwagon in the middle Seventies need to be challenged to some extent. With the demonstration by OPEC that coordinated actions by a few nations with control over an important resource could create severe difficulties for the Western industrialized countries, the feeling began to grow (NDPers were not immune) that matters were slipping out of the West's control. Specifically, fears grew that the Third World might duplicate OPEC's success in other commodities. It was necessary, therefore, to provide a forum in which their grievances could be aired and ameliorated somewhat, but without doing real damage to Western interests particularly those of Canada.⁹³¹

⁹²⁹ Joe Morris, SCEAND Sub-committee on International Development, Feb. 12, 1976, No. 14, pp. 11-30.

⁹³⁰ Steven Langdon interview, June 15, 1993. Langdon elaborated on how Canada could contribute to these cartels as well as to the NIEO general in an article he wrote at the time. See Steven Langdon, "Canada's Role in Africa," in Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, ed. by Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), pp. 178-201.

⁹³¹ Cranford Pratt describes the limits to Canada's internationalism in the 1975-82 period. He notes how at practically every step, Canadian economic self-interest

That this was a genuine concern is demonstrated in testimony on November 6, 1975 by Doug Roche and Andrew Brewin before the SCEAND Subcommittee on International Development. In stating their reasons for supporting the NIEO, they argued that humanitarian considerations and moral commitment to the Third World were no longer enough. Political necessity and the need for stability demanded a Western response.⁹³² Brewin kept returning to this theme of the link between acceptance of the NIEO and world stability. For example, in the text for a speech in February of 1976, he noted that the NIEO was based on humanitarian considerations, "but it is also based on hard facts and enlightened self interest. Unless we solve these problems, we can not have a stable world in Canada or anywhere else."⁹³³ As Asbjorn Lovbraek, a European authority on reform internationalism documents, reform internationalists often voiced concerns that unresolved antagonistic contradictions between rich and poor nations might become a basic security threat to the rich.⁹³⁴ However, stability meant more than a lack of war. It was also a codeword for protection of long-term Western and Canadian economic interests. At the very least,

dominated its policy towards the NIEO. See Cranford Pratt, Internationalism Under Strain: North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp.26-36.

⁹³² SCEAND Subcommittee on International Development, Nov.6, 1975, No.4, p.11. Also see Brewin, "New Economic Order," address to the World Federalists.

⁹³³ Brewin, "New International Economic Order," February, 1976, NAC MG 32, C26, Vol.81, File 13.

In a letter to Ed Broadbent, Sept.2, 1975, Robert Martin, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Western Ontario, London who had served with CUSO in Africa for five years, made much the same point when he stated, "It is my belief that to an increasing extent our lives will be affected by events in the Third World. I suspect that we are in the midst of a profound international realignment and that continued political stability in Canada will come to depend on our ability to adjust ourselves to this realignment." NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.390.

⁹³⁴ Lovbraek, "International Reform," p.34.

if power shifted dramatically to the poor countries, Canada's historic middle power role as a bridge between the developed and underdeveloped worlds might be threatened.

On the question of motives, Langdon believes that a key reason for the NDP's enthusiastic support of the NIEO was that it appeared to provide mechanisms by which the monolithic power of the United States could be broken and divided amongst many more countries of which Canada would be one. Indeed, according to Langdon, he and a number of other NDP thinkers viewed their backing of the NIEO in part as an expression of anti-Americanism.⁹³⁵ In a similar vein, Langdon argued in an article he wrote in the mid-Seventies that the influence of Canadian corporations, especially those with American ties, was much too strong in setting Canada's Third World policy. Therefore, those social forces which were seeking to reduce American corporate influence in Canada and enhance social justice at home should be encouraged because they, in turn, would help Canada make a more serious commitment to promoting social justice in its dealings with Africa and the rest of the Third World.⁹³⁶ In other words, there was a direct connection for Langdon between pursuing nationalist economic policies in relation to the United States and justice for the Third World. This helps explain why NDP involvement in Third World issues expanded in the middle Seventies at the same time as the party's commitment to international affairs in general was in marked decline.

The basic tensions in the relationship between internationalism and nationalism were still unresolved. For example, what would the NDP have done if it had had to choose between them in a concrete situation? Specifically, what if a combination of underdeveloped and East Bloc nations had gained control of the Security Council, as

⁹³⁵ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹³⁶ Steven Langdon, "Canada's Role in Africa," p.198.

they had the General Assembly, and imposed economic sanctions (or worse) on countries who refused to accept the NIEO in its entirety or even liberalize their trade policies sufficiently?

In any case and probably not surprisingly, negotiations for a New International Economic Order bogged down in 1977-78, largely because the western industrialized countries were ultimately unwilling to implement the sweeping structural economic reforms demanded by the Group of 77.⁹³⁷ Then, too, the second wave of oil price increases in 1979-80 split the Group between oil producers and oil consumers. Moreover, creating a powerful cartel in such a vital commodity as oil was one thing. Realizing it with other commodities was another, as Africa discovered.⁹³⁸

By the late Seventies, the NDP's active support for the NIEO had become decidedly muted. It still passed its usual Third World development resolution at the 1977 convention which dutifully reaffirmed support for most of the major tenets of the NIEO.⁹³⁹ But there was little attempt on the part of the NDP leadership both at the convention and in the House to invest much "political capital" in the matter. This came at a time when the NIEO, under growing attack in the West, desperately needed vigorous support and while the Canadian foreign aid budget was declining. Langdon excuses this, as well as the lack of a comprehensive foreign policy resolution at the '77 convention, by claiming that the party was in a rebuilding stage and needed to

⁹³⁷ E. Hugh Roach, "The Commodities Question: Towards a Common Fund-Rhetoric or Reality?" Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol.26 (June, 1978), pp. 19-27. Also see Cranford Pratt, "Middle Power Internationalism and Global Poverty, in Middle Power Internationalism, pp.16-7.

⁹³⁸ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹³⁹ "Resolutions B.2.4," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.51-3.

emphasize those issues which would help promote consensus.⁹⁴⁰ Why had the NDP's enthusiasm for Third World issues weakened at this time?

First, Andrew Brewin, who had backed the NIEO strongly was ill and nearing retirement. Thus, he did not have the energy to raise the profile of Third World issues as much as in the past.⁹⁴¹ One error the NDP had made in the Seventies was allowing most foreign policy questions to be handled by one person. Hence, until Pauline Jewett's election in 1979, there was no one of stature to take on Brewin's internationalist "mantle".

Second, by working on a bipartisan basis with Liberal and Tory MPs who shared his concern for development issues, Brewin depoliticized the question to a considerable extent. This made it more difficult for the NDP to criticize the Liberal government effectively when the latter began losing interest in the NIEO in the late Seventies.

Third, the growing public cynicism about the effectiveness of foreign aid affected the NDP as well. In a June 17, 1975 speech to the House of Commons issue, Brewin had noted that aid was often being used by repressive structures in Third World countries to reinforce their power rather than reaching those in need.⁹⁴² A CUSO volunteer, Robert Martin, who had taught law in Botswana and Kenya for 5 years in the early Seventies, made much the same point upon his return to Canada in a conversation with Professor J.L. Granatstein who then conveyed Martin's observations to Broadbent.⁹⁴³

⁹⁴⁰ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹⁴¹ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

⁹⁴² Debates, June 17, 1975, p.6836.

⁹⁴³ J.L. Granatstein to Ed Broadbent, June 23, 1975, NAC, MG.28, IVI, Vol.390.

Fourth, apart from an address to the 1978 Socialist International convention in Vancouver on the threat posed by multinationals to Third World development, Broadbent did very little to call attention to Third World issues (or any other foreign policy topic for that matter) in the Seventies.⁹⁴⁴ To help Broadbent prepare for this talk, Brewin had sent him background material and advice. Since the conference theme was peace and development, Brewin suggested that Broadbent speak to the issue within the broad context of detente and disarmament. However, the NDP leader largely ignored this counsel and instead, as mentioned, focused exclusively on multinationals, perhaps because he did not feel competent to speak on such a comprehensive theme in the company of such world leaders as Willy Brandt and Olof Palme.⁹⁴⁵ At the same time, Broadbent hoped to use the SI conference to enhance his own status and prestige within Canada as he made clear in a letter he sent to all world leaders planning to attend the conference. He requested that if they decided to meet personally with Prime Minister Trudeau while in Canada, they also meet with him in the same fashion.⁹⁴⁶

It should be recalled that the NDP leader had very little background in the foreign policy field. This may also help explain the focus on multinationals in his SI address because this was a Canadian domestic issue he knew a lot about and one the NDP was emphasizing in the Seventies.⁹⁴⁷ Broadbent's concern about the power of

⁹⁴⁴ Broadbent, text of opening address to the Socialist International Conference, Nov.3, 1978, Vancouver, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.70, File 9.

⁹⁴⁵ Brewin to Broadbent, Subject: Socialist International Conference, Oct.25, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.70, File 7.

⁹⁴⁶ Broadbent to Comrades, Sept.11, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.70, File 8.

⁹⁴⁷ In 1976, Langdon had made the point about the relationship of the domestic role of multinationals to their function on the international scene in testimony before SCEAND's Sub-committee on International development. SCEAND Sub-committee on

multinationals was genuine. For instance, at the 1980 SI convention he introduced a resolution on economic democracy calling for the subordination of corporate decision-making to the needs of the nation and the international community. Only through the exercise of economic rights by ordinary people, could a just and humane world be built.⁹⁴⁸

His initial lack of experience in international affairs further clarifies why, even more than David Lewis, Broadbent focused on "bread and butter" issues in the 1975-79 period. Not surprisingly then, he made no mention of foreign policy in his '77 and '78 official reports to the NDP Federal Council.⁹⁴⁹

Another reason for Broadbent's neglect of foreign policy was that he was preoccupied in those years with rebuilding the party after the disaster of the 1974 election. Quite a few trade unionists had been turned off by the Waffle and the whole nationalist controversy that had so occupied the NDP during the early Seventies. Broadbent believed that the key to a strong Canadian social democratic movement and party was ensuring that union people felt at home in the NDP.⁹⁵⁰

The fifth reason why NDP enthusiasm for international affairs declined was the role of the NDP Federal Council. Since it exercised ultimate authority over the Policy Review committee, it must shoulder some of the blame in that it determined what issues would receive primary attention at conventions. Langdon claims that the Policy

International Development, Jan.29, 1976, No.10, First Session, 30th Parliament.

⁹⁴⁸ Broadbent, "Draft Resolution on Economic Democracy for the SI Convention," Nov.13-6, 1980, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.9, File 19.

⁹⁴⁹ Broadbent, "Report to Federal Council," 1977, NAC, MG 32, C83, Broadbent Speaker's Series, Vol.4, File 39; "Report to Federal Council," 1978, NAC, MG 32, Broadbent Speaker's Series, Vol.47, File 25.

⁹⁵⁰ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

Review committee had planned to have a general foreign policy debate at the 1979 convention but the spring federal election meant there had been no time for policy development.⁹⁵¹ However, the NDP knew an election had to be called sometime in 1979 and could have prepared background material beforehand on the subject.

Sixth, the decision by the government's Export Development Corporation to lend money to Canadian companies to expand their operations in Third World countries like Guatemala and Indonesia upset some NDP members of Parliament. This was especially true for NDP MPs from resource dependent ridings such as John Rodriguez and Arnold Peters who were worried about job losses for their constituents. Instead, Rodriguez argued, the Canadian authorities ought to use the money to help INCO, for example, to diversify its metal, copper and related industries in Sudbury (which just happened to be in his riding). To deflect charges that this was purely a selfish argument, he appealed to nationalist and anti-American sentiment. Canada, he tried to argue, was also a Third World country in terms of its exploitation by American based multinational corporations.⁹⁵²

Arnold Peters's (Temiskaming) reasoning was cruder, albeit, more honest. It was okay for Canada to give loans to countries developing their own agricultural potential because "we know that we are able to out-compete those countries." However, Canada should not help overseas nations develop resource-based industries. This approach, Peters claimed, would give them a competitive advantage. Almost as an afterthought he added that, in any case, supporting tyrannical regimes like Guatemala and Indonesia was wrong because they were serving the interests of the

⁹⁵¹ Ibid.

⁹⁵² Debates, June 28, 1978, pp.6843-6.

CIA.⁹⁵³ The economic concerns of Peters and Rodriguez reflected a growing unease amongst Canadians in the late Seventies about a Canadian economy characterized by rising inflation and unemployment.⁹⁵⁴

Given these uncertainties, the rebirth of Canadian interest in the Third World and its problems in the early 1980s is quite surprising. A key factor was the new interest of Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister once more after defeating Joe Clark's short-lived Progressive Conservative government. For example, from October 21 to 23 of that year, Trudeau co-chaired an important summit on North-South issues held at Cancun, Mexico.⁹⁵⁵

At first, the NDP were somewhat taken aback by the leadership of the reincarnated and rejuvenated Prime Minister in a field they had always considered their special preserve. Consequently, they were not amused when, not long after the Cancun summit, Trudeau publicly chided the NDP for seemingly not sharing his enthusiasm for the subject. Broadbent, visibly upset, responded that if Trudeau would commit Canada to do as much as the Scandinavian countries were doing for the Third World, the Prime Minister would have the NDP's full support.⁹⁵⁶

What lay behind Trudeau's recommitment to the underdeveloped world? First, he knew that this would be his last term as Prime Minister and, therefore, wished to

⁹⁵³ Ibid., pp.6846-7.

⁹⁵⁴ Already in 1974, just after Canada had begun experiencing the first effects of the OPEC oil price increases, Desmond Morton had written an article speculating on what democratic socialism meant now that its adherents could no longer assume that the economy would continue to expand indefinitely. See Desmond Morton, "Democratic Socialism in a World of Scarcity," Canadian Forum, Vol.53 (January, 1974), pp.24-5.

⁹⁵⁵ David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p.331.

⁹⁵⁶ Debates, Dec.9, 1980, p.5534.

leave a positive international legacy.⁹⁵⁷ Second, the Prime Minister was convinced that a complete breakdown of the NIEO process would be mutually disastrous for all nations, rich and poor alike.⁹⁵⁸ Third, general interest in the subject had been revived with the publishing of a 1979 report, North-South: A Programme for Survival, by the Commission on International Development under the chairmanship of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The report convinced many in all political camps that interdependence and mutual interest demanded at least some changes in economic relations between North and South. Trudeau, for one, was so impressed by Brandt's analysis and recommendations that he wrote the Foreword to a subsequent book written by Brandt based on his 1981 CBC Massey Lectures, Dangers and Options: The Matter of World Survival. In it, Trudeau asserted that, "it will be difficult for anyone to escape the conclusion, after reading these pages, that interdependence is the dominant fact of life in our era."⁹⁵⁹

As the Progressive Conservative critic for development, Doug Roche declared that the Brandt Report was "the single best exposition of the global condition that we face today."⁹⁶⁰ Indeed, so close were Roche's views to the NDP's on certain Third World matters during the early Eighties, that some of his speeches would have been received favourably at an NDP convention.

The Brandt Commission had proposed a program which was, in essence, an attempt to fulfil the main objectives of the NIEO, albeit by employing means which

⁹⁵⁷ Cranford Pratt, Internationalism Under Strain, p.36.

⁹⁵⁸ David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p.325.

⁹⁵⁹ Willy Brandt, Dangers and Options: The Matter of World Survival (Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1982), p.7.

⁹⁶⁰ Debates, June 27, 1980, p.2469.

were on balance less radical than the demands of the Group of 77, and therefore, hopefully, more palatable to Western industrial countries. Hence, the report placed less emphasis than the NIEC on transferring substantial economic authority to international institutions such as UNCTAD. In addition, Brandt's notion of a common fund was considerably weaker than the original concept. Reform of the international economic and monetary systems was still an important objective but expectations for a large increase in Third World influence was reduced. The most radical idea was for a type of international income tax to be levied on developed nations and the funds transferred to the underdeveloped. Brandt also proposed two items particularly relevant to the world-wide economic problems of the early Eighties. They were, first, an international energy agreement to help stabilize prices and supply to the benefit of Third World countries and second, a special fund to promote agricultural development.⁹⁶¹

The broad revival of NDP interest in external affairs during the early Eighties, as discussed at the beginning of Chapter Thirteen, also affected its Third World development policy. Like Trudeau and Roche, Broadbent and his caucus had endorsed the Brandt Report. Accordingly, as soon as Parliament opened in the spring of 1980, the NDP took the lead in calling for a new Canadian world development strategy based on Brandt's proposals. On April 22, 1980, Bob Ogle, a new NDP member of Parliament and Roman Catholic priest, who had considerable personal experience in the Third World, went even further when he declared that such a strategy ought to be pursued within the context of a complete revision of Canada's role in the international community, something successive Canadian governments had avoided since the 1970 White Paper.⁹⁶²

⁹⁶¹ Canadian Annual Review, pp.211-2.

⁹⁶² Debates, April 22, 1980, p.306.

Similarly, Pauline Jewett pressured the government to shift Canada's emphasis from traditional development assistance to a restructuring of international economic institutions in line with the NIEO and the Brandt Report.⁹⁶³ Jewett had been a Liberal MP in the Sixties and later chancellor of Simon Fraser University for a time, but had broken with that party largely because it had, in her words, "turned its back on Pearsonian internationalism."⁹⁶⁴

At the same time that the NDP was asking the government for a reassessment of Canada's Third World policy, the party's Federal Council established the International Affairs Committee consisting of members of caucus and representatives from the party at large to review its own Third World policy as part of a general review of the NDP's entire foreign policy. Out of this emerged the discussion paper, "Peace, Security and Justice," whose general approach and contents were analyzed in Chapter Thirteen. In terms of Third World issues, the committee concluded that the economic and social disparities between North and South were just as much to blame for the emergency confronting the whole world as excessive military spending, multinational activity and environmental pollution.⁹⁶⁵

So large did the North-South question loom in the minds of the authors that they devoted over one-third of their 32 page report to the topic. According to Dan Heap, Ed Broadbent's growing interest in Central America evidenced by his peace-

⁹⁶³ *Ibid.*, Nov.25, 1980, p.5038.

⁹⁶⁴ Pauline Jewett interview, May 2, 1991.

⁹⁶⁵ "Peace, Security and Justice," Report of the International Affairs Committee: An NDP discussion paper, published by the New Democratic Party, 1981, pp.1-2.

making trip to that country in the late spring of 1981 also encouraged the committee's focus on Third World issues.⁹⁶⁶

The North-South emphasis clearly demonstrated the authors' conviction that Canada's most effective future international contribution would come in the development of policies that would bring social and economic equality to the world community.⁹⁶⁷ The NDP had always preached that Canada should play an intermediary role between the Western industrialized countries and the Third World. The 1981 discussion paper recommended that Canada now go even further and identify completely with the Third World cause. Partly, they based this on the notion that as a country with many development problems relating to its relationship to the United States, Canada could make common cause with the developing world on many fronts.⁹⁶⁸ This idea had, of course, been first propounded by idealists/nationalists in the Sixties.

The report began by defining the term, "North-South," and acknowledging its debt to the Brandt Commission whose influence was visible throughout the document. The authors also drew on the work being done by the Socialist International. For example, at the very moment the IAC was beginning its deliberations in November of 1980, the SI's Madrid conference was passing a resolution ensuring that the North-South question would be an integral element of its overall strategy for promoting global peace and security.⁹⁶⁹ Indeed, Third World matters dominated SI discussions during

⁹⁶⁶ Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹⁶⁷ "Peace, Security and Justice," p.8.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid., p.10.

⁹⁶⁹ "Resolution Draft, 1980 Socialist International Conference, Madrid" in Socialist International Circular (September 19, 1980), PAM, P489Z, F.13.

1979, 1980 and 1981 as the organization made a determined effort to broaden its appeal to democratic socialists around the world.⁹⁷⁰

The International Affairs Committee paper went on to castigate the Trudeau government's failure to fulfil the commitments of its own highly touted 1975 document, "Strategy for International Development Cooperation - 1975-80." First, the Liberals had allowed Canada's aid budget to fall to 0.37% of GNP by 1980-1. Second, most of Canada's assistance was still tied aid which forced recipient nations to use Canadian aid money to purchase Canadian goods. Third, CIDA was being pressured to act more like an export promotion agency for Canadian industry instead of concentrating on the basic human needs of the destitute people in the poorest countries as the government's strategic development plan had pledged. Fourth, Canada persisted in aiding and trading with "politically reprehensible" regimes such as Chile, Argentina and Namibia.⁹⁷¹

The authors of "Peace, Security and Justice," outlined three main elements that should characterize a Canadian democratic socialist North-South platform. First, Canada ought to provide leadership and support for a new international economic development framework that responded to the needs of the most underdeveloped nations including fundamental structural change as outlined by the NIEO and Brandt report. Within the context of the 1980-2 world-wide recession, the policy paper argued that Canada must promote international governmental intervention to prevent a catastrophic depression since Canada could not afford to see a collapse in world

⁹⁷⁰ See speech by Felipe Gonzalez, "New Declaration of Principles," Socialist International Circular (November 15, 1980), PAM, P489Z, F.14.

⁹⁷¹ "Peace, Security, and Justice," pp.9-10.

demand. A "Fortress Canada" approach or a reduction in foreign aid was short-sighted, because this country could not survive in a world that could not buy its products.

Second, for this reason, Canadian economic aid priorities needed restructuring and its trade policies loosened to meet the challenge of its new relationship with the Third World. Of course, this was contingent on compensation being provided to affected Canadian workers and communities for any resultant hardships. As well, the authors wanted a "social clause" added to GATT outlawing unfair competition based on exploitation of workers.

Third, Canada's direct development aid should be focused on those poor nations which were building local democratic economic and political institutions and following sound long-term development policies.⁹⁷²

Of the many other aspects of Canada's Third World policy dealt with in the document, only one more will be mentioned. In a move reflecting the growing influence of the women's movement within the NDP, the paper committed the party to

unequivocally affirm the right of women to equal participation in the development process and to equality in the distribution of social and economic benefits, especially in rural areas. A concrete recognition of these rights must be a prerequisite to any Canadian development assistance.⁹⁷³

The IAC's work proved to be extremely influential. Most of its recommendations were incorporated in one way or another into the NDP's major resolution on North-South issues that was adopted at the 1981 convention and guided party thinking and policy-making for the rest of the decade. In terms of the long history

⁹⁷² *Ibid.*, pp.10-12.

⁹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.17.

of Canadian social democracy, "Peace, Security and Justice," represented social democratic internationalism at its peak. It both reflected and enhanced a feeling of optimism that the party's long-standing idealistic Third World development goals were coming closer to fruition, especially given the seeming widespread support in Canada for Willy Brandt's proposals.

Having officially embraced what Cranford Pratt would later call "reform internationalism" at the '81 convention, the next challenge for the NDP was to incorporate the new thinking into all aspects of its work whether in Parliament or out on the campaign hustings. How well did the NDP succeed in this task in the years from 1981 to 1988? Certainly, the NDP had many opportunities to promote and defend its foreign development assistance policies, especially during the early Eighties with the public and parliamentarians somewhat more attuned to Third World concerns.

For instance, on May 23, 1980, External Affairs minister, Mark MacGuigan, asked Parliament to form an all-party task force to review Canada's relations with the South, which brought an immediate and enthusiastic response from the NDP. The task force under the chairmanship of Liberal Herb Breau worked hard and quickly, hearing many witnesses, issuing interim reports and achieving a consensus. This was possible because many of the key members of the task force from all three parties had worked together on development issues in the Seventies. Most importantly, they shared the basic assumption championed by the Brandt Commission, namely, the interdependence of all people and countries. David Macdonald, Gordon Fairweather and Doug Roche of the Conservatives and Warren Allmand and Herb Breau of the Liberals joined their NDP colleagues in a willingness to go beyond traditional liberal internationalism to embrace at least some aspects of reform internationalism's analysis and prescriptions.

Not surprisingly, then, in its final report tabled on December 1, 1980, the task force recommended that Canada study how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could increase special drawing rights for Third World countries. It also endorsed Canadian ratification of the modified Common Fund Agreement and argued that commercial objectives should not take precedence over traditional development assistance objectives in setting Canadian policy. Moreover, the Canadian economy needed to be restructured to accommodate Third World economic development. The other key recommendations of the report were more in keeping with historic liberal internationalist thinking. These included a recommitment to reach the .7% of GNP assistance target by 1990, a reduction in tied aid, the subsidizing of international sales and loans to poor countries and a decrease in Canada's protective tariffs and quotas.⁹⁷⁴

In endorsing the all-party task force report, the NDP showed its willingness to accept half a loaf on Third World policy if necessary. As NDP caucus critic for North/South issues, Bob Ogle stated, "I feel that the report although still inadequate was a good step forward,"⁹⁷⁵ Indeed, while the report's recommendations were more radical than official government policy, the suggestions fell well short of the demands of the 1981 NDP convention resolution. This resolution had called for (among other things) a fundamental restructuring of economic institutions to transfer a significant amount of wealth and power to the poorer nations while bringing multinationals under public control at the community and international level.⁹⁷⁶ By

⁹⁷⁴ Canadian Annual Review, 1980, pp. 213-5.

⁹⁷⁵ Bob Ogle to Broadbent, Subject: Caucus Critic Responsibilities, Mar 11, 1981, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.72, File 1980-1984.

⁹⁷⁶ "Resolution B.1.1.," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, p.45.

signing the all-party report, the NDP restricted its ability somewhat to defend the NIEO and the Brandt Commission when they came under sustained attack from both within and outside Canada as the Eighties progressed.

Why, then, did the NDP make this decision? First, without doubt, by participating in the task force it was able to make an important contribution, even if only to bolster the courage of Conservative and Liberal committee members who came under considerable suspicion from certain quarters of their respective parties for their willingness to even consider the merits of the Brandt proposals.

Second, the nature of the Canadian political and parliamentary systems was such that the only way a political party such as the NDP, which appeared locked in its third party status indefinitely, could have any significant influence was by working on all-party task forces and committees all the while cognizant of the fact that their complete program would never be accepted.

A third factor was the personality and beliefs of Bob Ogle, the NDP's chief spokesman on Third World matters during these years. Ogle was committed to bridging the gap between North and South, particularly along lines advocated by the Brandt Report. He was convinced that the issue would become increasingly important and, therefore, one the NDP should embrace wholeheartedly, not only to benefit the poor, but because it harmonized so completely with the NDP's commitment to a new domestic industrial strategy. Thus both Canada and the Third World would benefit.⁹⁷⁷

Ogle preferred to work on a consensual rather than confrontational basis, which is not surprising given his status as a Roman Catholic priest. For him, progress on the

⁹⁷⁷ Ogle to Broadbent, Subject: Caucus Critic Responsibilities, March 11, 1981.

North-South question was too important to make into a crass political debate.⁹⁷⁸ Hence, instead of criticizing the other political parties for not adopting the more radical policies approved by the 1981 NDP convention, Ogle kept encouraging them by reiterating how thrilled he was by the unanimity achieved by all members of the 1980 Parliamentary task force.⁹⁷⁹

In keeping with his Christian beliefs, personality, and social democratic idealism, Ogle was most comfortable making moralistic appeals to the Canadian government and people to help Third World peoples. Like a prophet or preacher, he kept reminding his "flock" of Parliamentarians that in approving the task force report, they had approved the international development strategy and objectives adopted by the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations which included (among other things) the elimination of hunger and the provision of universal primary education and health care by the year 2000.⁹⁸⁰

As appealing as arguments based on moral concern can be, they often lack staying power in the face of sustained opposition rooted in economic concerns, especially if those concerns are of an immediate nature. For example, on July 22, 1982 in the House, Progressive Conservative MP, Gordon Taylor, attacked the whole notion of transferring resources to the Third World and especially Brandt's proposal for an international body to levy a form of income tax on the rich nations. Yet the NDP failed to jump to the immediate defence of the Brandt Report. Perhaps it dared not defend resource transfers to the underdeveloped world in the midst of the worst recession to affect Canada since the Great Depression. In his speech, Taylor

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁹ Debates, July 21, 1982, p.19601.

⁹⁸⁰ Debates, July 22, 1982, p.19606.

inadvertently called attention to another point that may also help explain the NDP's reticence, at least on this occasion.

If we ever get to the point where we provide taxing authority to the UN or to any other international body, the next step will be an international police force which will be able to pound unwilling nations into submission.⁹⁸¹

The NDP had always tried to avoid being forced to resolve potential conflicts between its notions of internationalism and nationalism. If the NDP was primarily a movement, it could get away this. If it was a party seriously bent on taking power in Canada, it would sooner or later have to face the fact that one of the main tenets of its foreign policy, a strong United Nations, could under certain conditions ride rough-shod over Canadian sovereignty.⁹⁸²

The opponent that counted most in the struggle to create a more just international order was not a right-wing Canadian politician like Gordon Taylor, but the American administration under President Reagan. Very soon after assuming office, Reagan indicated his strong opposition to outright transfers of wealth to the Third World beyond traditional aid programs. Instead, as Washington made clear in October, 1980, at the Cancun Conference, the United States was convinced that the best hope for Third World countries lay in their adoption of unfettered free enterprise.⁹⁸³ Under

⁹⁸¹ Ibid., July 22, 1982, p.19610.

⁹⁸² Langdon maintains, however, that the NDP did not view it this way. Implementing the new economic order through strengthened UN agencies was not a matter of Canada giving up sovereignty but a pragmatic tool to control "those damned multinational companies." This would be achieved by joint control of the sources of raw materials. Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹⁸³ Canadian Annual Review, 1981, p.331.

this assault by Reagan, aided by Britain's Margaret Thatcher, and by growing indifference in the other Western industrialized nations, the concept of a new economic order along the lines proposed by the NIEO/Brandt Report began to fade quickly. In fact, Cranford Pratt maintains that for all intents and purposes, the movement towards the NIEO had collapsed by 1982.⁹⁸⁴ Langdon agrees, although he notes that Africa and Europe did subsequently establish a modified common fund on a regional basis.⁹⁸⁵

In this changing atmosphere, the NDP soon found itself largely abandoning the fight for fundamental economic structural reform and instead, turning its attention to defending those structures that were already in place and which provided some measure of stability for and assistance to underdeveloped nations. These included, ironically, institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the Bretton Woods Agreements which the NDP had often chastised in the past, but which were now under direct attack by the United States administration or suffering from its growing indifference. For example, in 1981, the USA unilaterally reduced its hitherto agreed share of contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) by a significant amount. In response, during a major Commons speech on a bill to amend the Bretton Woods Agreement and International Development Acts, Pauline Jewett urged the government to publicly rebuke Washington for these cutbacks.⁹⁸⁶

There were other aspects of American Third World policy that disturbed the NDP. For example, Jewett was very concerned about the way the United States was

⁹⁸⁴ Cranford Pratt, "Middle Power Internationalism and Global Poverty," in Middle Power Internationalism, p.16.

⁹⁸⁵ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

⁹⁸⁶ Debates, Nov.9, 1982, p.20573.

seemingly politicizing international institutions by pressuring them to take a hard line with countries whose political persuasion was deemed unacceptable to the Reagan administration. Washington also was using its influence in the IMF to limit new drawing rights while imposing tougher conditions on developing countries seeking assistance. Deeply troubling, as well, was the threatened withdrawal by the United States (with Canada possibly following suit) from multilateral institutions such as UNESCO.⁹⁸⁷ This came at the same time that the Americans were refusing to sign the Law of the Sea treaty, the culmination of a major eight year UN sponsored effort to negotiate an extension of international law to the oceans.⁹⁸⁸ Since, this could negatively affect not only the poorer countries but Canada with its long coast line as well, Jewett introduced a motion in the House on July 13, 1982, expressing her dismay at Washington's decision.⁹⁸⁹

Besides growing opposition to the NIEC and Brandt proposals led by the United States, there were other major changes on the world scene which affected NDP development assistance policy and contributed at least indirectly to a weakening of interest in reform internationalism. For example, the deep recession of the early Eighties convinced the Liberal government that it was expedient to postpone the date by which Canada would reach the .7% foreign aid target. When this pattern was repeated several times in the Eighties under both Liberal and Conservative administrations, the NDP felt compelled to spend inordinate amounts of time and

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid., Mar.12, 1985, pp.2944-6.

⁹⁸⁸ In 1986, Clyde Sanger wrote a book describing the history of the Law of the Sea and Canada's involvement with the issue. See Sanger, Ordering the Oceans: The Making of the Law of the Sea (London: Zed Books, 1986).

⁹⁸⁹ Debates, July 13, 1982, p.19255.

energy upholding the .7% standard.⁹⁹⁰ Idealism seemed to need a number by which to measure faithfulness to the social democratic internationalist creed. Then again, if a political party hopes to be a movement as well as a party, it cannot afford to abandon its statement of faith, a point alluded to by Jewett on one occasion.⁹⁹¹

Another major circumstance on the world scene that captured the NDP's attention in the Eighties was the Third World debt crisis. In the Seventies, commercial banks had strongly encouraged poor countries to take out huge loans to finance more rapid development in the expectation that commodity prices would remain high enabling them to repay the loans. With the world-wide economic downturn in 1980-2, demand for minerals and other raw materials almost collapsed leaving Third World nations with external debts totalling around 800 billion dollars. Again the NDP found it necessary to expend time and effort reacting to a crisis rather than vigorously promoting a new economic order.

In June of 1985 the member parties of the Socialist International worked out a common set of proposals that attempted to ameliorate the Third World debt problem. These included debt forgiveness for the poorest countries, stretching out debt repayment timetables for others, putting ceilings on interest rates and tying rates of annual debt service payments to a maximum level of 20% of export earnings.⁹⁹² Accordingly, the NDP reacted positively for the most part when during that same month, the Conservative government announced a moratorium on debt owed by sub-

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid., Nov.9, 1982, pp.20573-4; Nov.19, 1985, p.8464; Oct.28, 1987, p.10493. This was also reiterated in an article Pauline Jewett wrote for CUSO. See Pauline Jewett, "Canadian Development Assistance: The NDP View," CUSO FORUM, Vol.3 (March, 1985), p.13.

⁹⁹¹ Debates, Nov.9, 1982, pp.20573-4.

⁹⁹² NDP Communique following the Socialist International meeting of June 21, 1985, NDP Research.

Saharan nations to Canada. However, BC New Democratic MP, Jim Manly, was not satisfied. He argued that the government's action only looked good when compared with the programs of "bush league countries" like the United States and Albania!⁹⁹³

The Ethiopian famine of 1984-5 united all Canadian political parties behind a massive effort to move grain as quickly as possible to the starving people. At the same time, the NDP, in keeping with the main thrust of its 1981 International Affairs resolution, emphasized that a shift needed to occur from short-term to long-term solutions and from a bilateral approach to a multilateral one. In particular, the resolution had outlined four changes Canada ought to promote: basic agricultural reform in the Third World to increase productivity for local needs, an international wheat agreement, larger international grain reserves and a buffer stock of essential food commodities. All this in turn was to be part of an overall reformed foreign assistance program designed to better meet all the basic human needs of the poor majorities in Third World countries.⁹⁹⁴

Socio-political developments within Canada also greatly affected NDP Third World assistance policy. The two most significant were the rise of the feminist and human rights movements. Here again the 1981 resolution set the tone and established the guidelines. Canada, it stated, must take at least five criteria into account when deciding where and how to spend its foreign aid dollars. These were: enhancement of the role of women, strengthening of trade union and human rights, promotion of democratic traditions and economic growth, consideration of local needs and

⁹⁹³ Debates, June 2, 1986, p.13853.

⁹⁹⁴ "Resolution B.1.1," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.46-7. The concept of basic human needs had entered the development vocabulary in the Seventies through the work of such people as Francisco E. Thoumi. See his article, "Human Rights Policy: Basic Needs and Economic Implications for L.D.C.'s," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 23 (May, 1981), pp.177-201.

aspirations and finally the willingness of the recipient nation to engage in long term planning.⁹⁹⁵

During the Eighties, the NDP emphasized these criteria in its Parliamentary pronouncements and activities related to development issues. For example, on March 13, 1986, Jim Manly criticized the government for cutting aid to a program that would have provided safe, potable water to African women who were the back bone of agriculture in that continent.⁹⁹⁶ NDP efforts may have been influential in persuading the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade to take the matter more seriously. Thus, in its report, "For Whose Benefit," which was based on more than a year's study of Canada's official development assistance program, the committee declared that from now on CIDA should be expected to reflect Canadian values by moving towards greater equity for women in its programs.⁹⁹⁷

While the role of women in development came to occupy a higher profile in NDP policy, it was non-gendered human rights that gradually rose to the top of the party's Third World assistance list of criteria by the late Eighties. This should not surprise since, as noted in Chapter Eleven, the NDP had slowly come to see the enhancement of human rights as an integral part of social democratic internationalism. However, it had not been until the Eighties when the rampant human rights abuses in Central America grabbed the attention of the NDP and the public in general that the party had passed a resolution linking human rights and foreign aid.

Throughout that decade, the NDP attempted to apply this policy in a systematic fashion to issues as they arose. Consequently, on November 9, 1982, during a debate

⁹⁹⁵ "Resolution B.1.1," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, p.47.

⁹⁹⁶ Debates, Mar.13, 1986, p.11490.

⁹⁹⁷ Debates, Oct.28, 1987, p.10491.

on world financial institutions, Jewett asked the government to work for more accountability in the granting of loans by the World Bank and IDA. They ought not to lend funds to repressive regimes like Guatemala and South Africa.⁹⁹⁸ For this reason, the Canadian government should be required to provide Parliament and the public with more complete information about which countries had received loans from multilateral institutions.⁹⁹⁹

By the mid-Eighties, the NDP had adopted an even more aggressive posture on the relationship of human rights and development assistance. For instance, when in late 1984, the newly elected Conservative government restored bilateral aid to El Salvador whose human rights record had improved only marginally, the NDP responded with a vigorous and sustained attack.¹⁰⁰⁰ Then in May of that year in response to a government bill on the Bretton Woods Agreement Jewett introduced an amendment that would, among other things, have forced the Canadian government to promote respect for human rights as a major criterion in the lending activities of the World Bank and the IMF. In answer to the charge that this would politicize these financial institutions, the NDP External Affairs critic argued that by signing the UN universal covenant on human rights, all nations had agreed that protection of human rights was beyond politics and partisanship.¹⁰⁰¹

⁹⁹⁸ Debates, Nov.9, 1982, p.20593.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.20595.

¹⁰⁰⁰ See for example Jewett's speech in the House on March 12, 1985. Debates, p.2946. For the story of Canada's assistance programs and economic relations with Central America see, Lisa North and CAPA eds., Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990), pp.94-130.

¹⁰⁰¹ Debates, May 7, 1985, pp.4465-6.

The NDP could act more assertively on human rights because its sources of information were much more extensive and credible compared to the Seventies. In particular, non-governmental organizations and church groups had become active in supplying information on human rights issues to the NDP, partly because many of the key people in these organizations were either connected with the NDP or at least liberal-left in their political sympathies. Not surprisingly then, NDP Parliamentary spokespersons often made specific reference to these groups and their proposals, especially the Inter-church Task force on Corporate Responsibility which had representatives from most mainline Canadian churches.¹⁰⁰² Moreover, from time to time NDP members of Parliament made direct reference to the churches' support for the NDP position on human rights and development.¹⁰⁰³ While some have argued that the churches have had a minimal effect on official Canadian foreign policy, this was certainly not true for NDP Third World policy.¹⁰⁰⁴

The vigorous NDP campaign in Parliament on human rights was somewhat successful. It certainly played an important role in making human rights an integral part of the continuing debate on development questions in Canada, so much so that it probably helped convince the Conservative government to establish a Standing Committee on Human Rights in February of 1986.¹⁰⁰⁵ Equally important, the NDP managed to persuade the all-party Committee on External Affairs and International

¹⁰⁰² Ibid., April 16, 1985, p.4464 and March 3, 1988, p.13346. A full discussion by various authors of the work done by the Inter-Church Task force on the human rights issue, can be found in Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy ed. by Bonnie Greene (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1990), pp.101-161.

¹⁰⁰³ Debates, April 16, 1985, pp.4464, 4469.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Robert O. Matthews, "The Christian Churches and Foreign Policy: An Assessment," in Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy, pp. 161-179.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid., p.174.

Trade to recommend in its report, "For Whose Benefit," that the human rights situation in recipient nations ought to be a major factor in determining whether and how much aid should be provided by Canada. In moving concurrence on this report, Jim Manly, added that the members of the committee believed it important for Canadians to broaden their understanding of human rights. To civil, political and individual rights should be added socio-economic and cultural rights along with minimum subsistence and security rights.¹⁰⁰⁶

First, the all-party committee called on the government to develop a human rights grid for recipient countries to help Canadian authorities determine whether assistance should be granted and under what conditions. Second, it endorsed the 1985 NDP proposal for integrating human rights concerns into the deliberations of international financial institutions. Third, military exports should be prohibited to any country deemed ineligible for development aid on human rights grounds. Fourth, Canada ought to establish an international institute of human rights and democratic development that would offer advice and help to nations trying to create human rights institutions of their own. Despite all-party support in the committee, the Conservative government accepted only the last recommendation.¹⁰⁰⁷

The NDP was particularly upset that the government had rejected the committee's third recommendation. The spending of billions of dollars on arms while millions of people starved was immoral, the party argued. Pauline Jewett had made this same point six years earlier in reply to a June 15, 1981 Commons speech by then Prime Minister Trudeau on North-South matters:

¹⁰⁰⁶ Debates, Oct.28, 1987, pp.10490-1.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid.

I do not think the rest of the world and I include many democratic-socialist parties in the Third World and elsewhere, is going to take Canada very seriously when the Prime Minister goes on...about the arms race continuing while billions are suffering, while we are so involved and so complicit in that very arms race.¹⁰⁰⁸

She specifically mentioned the guidance system for the cruise missile which was being produced by Litton Industries in Toronto and the failure of Tory and Liberal governments to protest NATO's possible deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles as examples of Canadian complicity.¹⁰⁰⁹ Worse even than this in NDP eyes, was the selling of arms to human rights abusers which weakened Canada's moral standing immeasurably. Therefore, in April of 1984, Jewett had condemned Canadian aid to Honduras which the NDP accused of allowing contra attacks on Nicaragua from its soil.¹⁰¹⁰

On the issue of trade with Third World countries, the NDP record in the Eighties was mixed. The 1981 convention resolution had endorsed most of the NIEC and Brandt Report proposals on trade between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, albeit with some qualifications. For example, the resolution had stated that an NDP government would eliminate "special" protectionist measures that Canada had always employed against Third World imports. This, nevertheless, left the door open for Canada to maintain trade barriers at "normal" levels. The 1981 platform supported the inclusion of a "social clause" in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade outlawing

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid, June 15, 1981, p.10602.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid., April 16, 1984, p.3083.

unfair competition based on child labour, workplace hazards and exploitation of women.¹⁰¹¹

While sounding magnanimous, the clause was open to various interpretations and could have been used to keep out virtually any product from poor countries. In political terms, however, it performed a dual function. On the one hand, it appealed the NDP's powerful labour constituency who were naturally always concerned about job security. On the other hand, the "social clause" appealed to those for whom social justice for the poor was paramount. In any case, everyone must have known it was unenforceable, an expression of "safe" moralistic social democratic idealism.

In the mid-Eighties, with the issue of international trade liberalization assuming a higher profile in all Western countries, the NDP was forced to respond. Notwithstanding its longstanding commitment to trade liberalization, the NDP began to have serious reservations especially about the growth in low-cost imports from underdeveloped countries. One sign of this was a resolution introduced at the 1983 Regina convention from Ernie Epp's Thunder Bay Nipigon riding which resolved that the NDP reconsider its support for the "simplistic policy of trade liberalization" which was leading to the industrialization of the Third world at the cost of inhumanity for workers in both underdeveloped and developed countries.¹⁰¹² As Steven Langdon observed, many workers were coming to the conclusion that the only ones to benefit from the internationalization of business were the multinationals who were shifting production

¹⁰¹¹ "Resolution B.1.1," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.45-6.

¹⁰¹² Resolutions to the 12th Federal NDP Convention, June 30-July 3, 1983, NDP Research, p.31.

to poor countries where labour was cheap, trade unions often prohibited and workers repressed.¹⁰¹³

Another matter that had come to the fore by the mid-Eighties was the attempt to link aid and trade policies more closely. Part of the Canadian development budget was being redirected to promote Canadian exports to Third World countries. NDP MP, Lynn Macdonald, (Broadview-Greenwood) denounced the Liberal move in a speech to the House on February 23, 1984. "Aid should be aid. It should go where it is needed.... Incentives to export should be frank incentives to export. They should not be couched in the form of aid."¹⁰¹⁴

The Tories moved further in this direction when they came to power by adding a trade component to CIDA's mandate. Jewett noted on January 17, 1988 that, according to government projections, this new section in CIDA would receive one-half of all foreign aid budget increases for the next decade. CIDA, she charged, was being turned into a Canadian Export Development Agency to provide subsidies to "uncompetitive and inefficient Canadian businesses. Moreover, this had been done without consulting the Canadian people or Parliament, a recurrent theme in NDP criticism of government Third World policy during the Eighties.¹⁰¹⁵ Here again the NDP drew on support from the churches in its fight against the actions of the Tory government.¹⁰¹⁶

As a party with a long standing commitment to the creation of a world community of justice and equality for all peoples, the NDP believed instinctively that

¹⁰¹³ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

¹⁰¹⁴ Debates, Feb. 23, 1984, p.1689.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid., Jan.17, 1988, p.5858.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid., May 7, 1988, p.4464.

if the huge gap between rich and poor was not reduced, this dream could never be fulfilled. Thus, inspired by social democratic idealism, the NDP had, since its founding, expended considerable effort in trying to keep the needs of the Third World before Parliament and the general public. At times, most particularly in 1981, this had led the party to adopt resolutions that, if implemented, would probably have meant a major shift in the real balance of economic and political power between rich and poor countries. Indeed, the party's 1981 IAC report and convention resolution represented social democratic idealism in full bloom. However, a few years later, growing opposition to trade liberalization within party ranks put a damper on the NDP's ability to champion Third World issues.

The NDP never seriously challenged the whole concept of development that had arisen in the West after World War II. It assumed that what had apparently worked in Canada would work in Third World countries. Perhaps this view of development was just another form of the imperialism NDPers so resented in its American form. Nationalism contributed to the myopia to some extent because it encouraged social democrats to view the world through a narrow lens. Throughout the 1961 to 1988 period, the NDP's Third World assistance policy was sustained by the idealist vision of a better world, but the overpowering light emanating from this vision also blinded the NDP to the fact that some of its policies may not have been in the best interests of the recipient countries.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

CENTRAL AMERICA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR NDP INTERNATIONALISM (1980-8)

In several respects, the NDP's preoccupation with Central America in the Eighties seems odd. Historically, the party, like most Canadians, had displayed almost no interest in the region despite extensive Canadian business involvement in Central and South America throughout the Twentieth century.¹⁰¹⁷ In fact, it had taken until 1967 for the NDP to pass a resolution with even an oblique reference to Central America. That resolution, which rejected Canadian membership in the Organization of American States (OAS), did little to encourage NDP interest in the region.¹⁰¹⁸

All this changed almost overnight in the early 1980's. A significant factor was the Third World emphasis of the 1981 NDP International Affairs Committee Report. But the key element was the conversion of Ed Broadbent into a passionate student of Central American affairs and crusader for human rights in that part of the world. Much

¹⁰¹⁷ The story of Canadian business activities in Latin America is told in two recently published books. Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, *Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters in Latin America and the Caribbean 1896 - 1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Duncan McDowall, *The Light: Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company Limited* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

¹⁰¹⁸ Anne Scotton, ed., "OAS," *New Democratic Policies 1961-1976* (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), pp.98-9.

of the impetus for this probably lay with the Socialist International. In 1978 in Vancouver, Broadbent had hosted the SI's first ever Congress held outside of Europe. With representatives from almost every non-communist country, the Congress brought Third World concerns home to Broadbent (and the NDP) in an unprecedented fashion.¹⁰¹⁹ Then too, Broadbent developed good friendships with many Latin American social democrats. This personal factor must not be underestimated when accounting for his persistent efforts in the early Eighties to keep the region's problems before Parliament and the Canadian people.¹⁰²⁰

The 1979 Nicaraguan revolution that replaced the corrupt American-supported Somoza regime with a broadly based moderate and left-of-centre government further opened the eyes of Canadians and the NDP to Central America. Only a few months after Somoza's overthrow Pauline Jewett, the NDP's recently appointed new External Affairs critic, was calling on the Canadian government to increase emergency reconstruction aid to Nicaragua.¹⁰²¹

However, it was the vicious war that broke out in El Salvador in 1980 between another American sponsored right-wing government and the liberation movement called the FDR (its military wing was named the FMLN), that galvanized left-wing public opinion in Canada. The attempt by this coalition of liberal, social democratic and Marxist groups to promote land reform and social justice was being thwarted by a relatively few powerful El Salvadoran families with their allies in the military. Thousands of civilian opponents of the regime were brutally killed by right-wing death

¹⁰¹⁹ Keith Spicer, "A Chance for Broadbent on a World Stage," *Montreal Gazette*, Nov. 1, 1978, PAM, MG 14, D4892, F.15.

¹⁰²⁰ Jerry Caplan to Steve Lee, Feb. 16, 1984, NDP Research.

¹⁰²¹ NDP Press Release, Aug 21, 1979, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol. 70, File 3.

squads with the seeming acquiescence of the El Salvadoran government. Reports of these activities and the thousands of refugees trying to escape appeared in Canadian newspapers almost daily. Moreover, a number of popular films such as "Salvador," "Under Fire," and "Romero," were produced drawing attention to the area's social and political conditions.¹⁰²²

Broadbent immersed himself in the historical background of Central American's problems to the extent that he was able on March 9, 1981, to provide the House with a detailed and captivating history lesson of the region.¹⁰²³ Everyone seemed to be impressed except Mark MacGuigan, the External Affairs minister, who accused Broadbent and the NDP of having an obsession with black and white. The United States was always black; the fighting left was always white.¹⁰²⁴

Broadbent's interest and knowledge of the area made him the logical choice when the Socialist International was looking to send a representative on a peace mission to El Salvador.¹⁰²⁵ An internal NDP memo shows, however, that prior to Broadbent's trip, some members of the NDP's inner circle had had strong doubts about the wisdom of Broadbent agreeing to the mission. Concern was expressed that the European social democrats were foisting a thankless task onto the NDP. Even if Broadbent's efforts were successful in achieving a negotiated settlement, this might

¹⁰²² Two books describing the involvement of Canadians in Central America from a left-wing point of view have recently been published. Peter McFarlane, Canadians and Central America (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1989); Lisa North and CAPA eds., Between War and Peace: Choices for Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990).

¹⁰²³ Debates, Mar.9, 1981, pp.8027-9.

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid., Mar.9, 1981, p.8032.

¹⁰²⁵ Bill Roberts, Socialist International Research Secretary to Broadbent, May 7, 1981, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.31, File 6.

have the unfortunate effect of helping the American State Department create another so-called "moderate reformist" regime in the area.¹⁰²⁶

In keeping with the mission's objectives, the NDP leader spent a week at the end of May, 1981, meeting with all the disputing parties and important leaders in the area to gather information, gauge attitudes and make some tentative proposals for peace.¹⁰²⁷ Broadbent's efforts failed because the President of El Salvador, Jose Napoleon Duarte, rejected the Socialist International's offer of mediation on the grounds that it would constitute an act of interference in his country's internal affairs.¹⁰²⁸

The mission did enhance Broadbent's stature both domestically and internationally. In reflecting on it a decade later, the NDP leader stated his conviction that the trip helped shape the Canadian government's Central American policy and paved the way for the SI's growing involvement in Nicaragua.¹⁰²⁹ Indeed, for several years thereafter, the NDP took the lead in ensuring that the region remained high on the Socialist International's list of priorities.¹⁰³⁰

The visit also sparked controversy. While Broadbent was in Mexico meeting with the FDR representative, the Mexican news media reported the international

¹⁰²⁶ Steve Lee to all Research Staff, April 28, 1981, NAC, MG 32, Vol.31, File 7.

¹⁰²⁷ "Broadbent Meets El Salvadoran Government and Rebel Leaders," Montreal Star, May 25, 1981, p.58.

¹⁰²⁸ "Broadbent's Offer of Mediation Rejected," Globe and Mail, May 29, 1981, p.10.

¹⁰²⁹ Ed Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

¹⁰³⁰ John Brewin to Broadbent, Nov. 30, 1982. See also Gerry Caplan, Federal Secretary of the NDP to Robin Sears, Jan. 28, 1983, Re: Central American Resolution floor submission to the April, 19, 1983 SI Congress in Sydney, Australia. NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.70, File 3.

secretary of Sweden's Social Democratic party as stating that the SI believed "the negative attitude" of the United States was the only obstacle to a negotiated settlement.¹⁰³¹ In the interests of his mission, Broadbent and the general secretary of the Socialist International quickly disavowed these sentiments. Nonetheless, there is no doubt, based on subsequent statements which he repeated several times on the floor of the House of Commons throughout 1981, that the NDP leader largely agreed with those who blamed Washington's policy of sending vast amounts of military aid and advisors to El Salvador for prolonging the war.¹⁰³² In an interview with the author, Broadbent had no hesitation in labelling American action "a classic case of imperialism," while challenging Washington's version of the root causes of the problems in Central America.¹⁰³³

In several respects, it was Vietnam all over again with the United States playing the part of the bully against Third World peoples. Just as it had in Vietnam, Washington was propping up a corrupt oligarchy in El Salvador. In Nicaragua's case, the Americans found themselves allied with a variety of right-wing forces including former members of Somoza's National Guard, while the Sandinistas they were trying to overthrow represented for most social democrats, a government of progressive social and economic reform. This paralleled to a remarkable degree Washington's support for the South Vietnam government in the Sixties in their struggle with the National Liberation Front who stood for fundamental land reform (among other things).

¹⁰³¹ "Socialist International Official Blames US," Regina Leader-Post, May 27, 1981.

¹⁰³² Statement by Ed Broadbent, leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada and Vice-President of the Socialist International, June, 1981, NDP Research.

¹⁰³³ Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

In both cases, the NDP's major theme was that the people of Vietnam and Central America must be left alone to solve their problems in their own way.¹⁰³⁴

As with Vietnam, the United States' bullying of Central America reminded NDPers of Washington's long history of attempting to do the same to Canada. Indeed, both periods, 1965-74 and 1980-84, were times when concern about too much American economic power and interference in Canada were high. For example, the early Eighties saw very strong pressure exerted by Washington against this country over the National Energy Policy, the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), and several fishing boundary disputes. (This will be discussed more fully in Chapter Nineteen.)

The NDP's political strategy on the Central American question in the Eighties was to manipulate first the Liberal and then the Conservative governments into publicly denouncing American policy and instituting a more independent Canadian policy for the region. However, the NDP's strategy was only partially successful. For example, from 1980 to 1983, with help from some Conservatives, the NDP kept the Liberal government, and especially its External Affairs secretary, Mark MacGuigan, on the defensive embarrassing him on more than one occasion. Notwithstanding, the government usually managed to walk the line between outright denunciation of Washington's Central American policy and tacit assent.

An exception, at least in the view of the NDP, occurred in early March of 1981 during a series of exchanges in the House between the External Affairs minister, Ed Broadbent and Flora Macdonald, the Conservative critic, over MacGuigan's recent alleged use of the phrase "quiet acquiescence" to describe the Liberal government's attitude towards Washington's continued shipment of offensive arms to El Salvador.

¹⁰³⁴ Broadbent made this point on many occasions. See for example Debates, Jan.28, 1981, p.6641.

Worse still for MacGuigan, in his reply to a question from Broadbent about what Canada was prepared to do to help bring peace to a region so close to home, he stated, "I am not aware that we have any serious obligation in that part of the world...which is not an area of traditional Canadian interest."¹⁰³⁵ This is an astonishing statement based on ignorance of Canada's history of economic involvement in the area. When interest in Central America grew in Canada over the coming years, the NDP repeatedly reminded MacGuigan about his ill-chosen comments. The NDP knew that many Liberal and even some Progressive Conservative MPs were uncomfortable with his ignorance of the historical facts as well as his laissez faire attitude that smacked of too much subservience to the United States.

This unhappiness came to the fore during the 15 member all-party sub-committee hearings on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Both its interim (late 1981) and final report (spring 1983) were critical of government policy while endorsing several aspects of the NDP position. In particular, the report urged the postponement of elections in El Salvador until all parties felt safe to participate. Second, it declared that Canada ought to make the region an area of concentration in Canada's foreign policy and take the lead in promoting peace. Third, trade should be employed as a lever to promote human rights.¹⁰³⁶ (This unanimity was achieved, according to Jewett, because the committee had attracted mostly progressive MPs from all parties.¹⁰³⁷) MacGuigan was clearly upset by the criticism coming even from members of his own party. In his response to the interim report on December 16,

¹⁰³⁵ Debates, March 2, 1981, p.7767.

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid., Dec. 16, 1981, p.14124. Also see "The Liberal Government's Response To Recommendations of the Final Report of the Sub-committee on Canada's Relation with Latin America and the Caribbean," undated, NDP Research.

¹⁰³⁷ Jewett interview, May 2, 1991.

1981, MacGuigan tried to cover up his embarrassment by expressing admiration for the idealism of the committee members, but this did not stop him from rejecting most of their major recommendations, as he would those of the final report.¹⁰³⁸

Sensing political opportunity, the NDP stepped up its attack on the government's alleged complicity with American "crimes" in Central America. To be successful, the NDP had to paint as dark a picture as possible of life in El Salvador under the Washington-backed regime (which given the actual situation was not hard to do). If the Liberals refused to dissociate themselves unequivocally from Washington's policy, they would be deemed guilty by association, which would leave the NDP in the public's mind with the most credible Central American policy.

Accordingly, on several occasions in 1981, Broadbent introduced resolutions in the House demanding that Canada develop its own Central American policy. He bolstered his argument with dramatic stories of El Salvadoran government-sponsored terrorism against its own people. Ottawa ought to take bold and imaginative action to promote a peaceful and just settlement, he said, offering its services as a mediator and supporting all regional, bilateral and multilateral efforts to that end.¹⁰³⁹

In these speeches, the NDP leader showed that he had caught the spirit of moral indignation so often exhibited by Tommy Douglas during that other prolonged and controversial American intervention, Vietnam. Broadbent's anger sprang from a deep sense of outrage at the United States for supporting a regime that was violating human rights with impunity. Broadbent also wrote a memo urging his fellow caucus members to attend a demonstration outside the American embassy.¹⁰⁴⁰

¹⁰³⁸ Debates, Dec.16, 1981, p.14124.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid., Mar.9, 1981, pp.8027; June 16, 1981, pp.1050-4.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Broadbent to NDP caucus members and staff, Feb.26, 1981, Subject:

By the early Eighties, therefore, NDP human rights policy had clearly moved to the forefront in NDP thinking about international affairs. In the case of Central America, it combined with the traditional NDP desire for an independent foreign policy to produce a strong opposition towards United States policy in the region. While for realists like Broadbent, this did not develop into full-fledged anti-Americanism, it probably encouraged many idealists to adopt an anti-American stand.

For them, Central America, added to the strategic defence initiative Star Wars, cruise missile testing and the general American arms build-up was proof positive that the American system, as epitomized by Ronald Reagan, was fundamentally antithetical to Canadian social democratic values. The result was renewed anger and even hatred of things American, sentiments reminiscent of the feelings at the height of the Vietnam War. While anti-Americanism had its dark side, it also supplied much of the energy for the campaign for an independent Canadian policy in Central America. Thus, whether Broadbent liked it or not, anti-Americanism was a useful element (perhaps a necessary one) in building public support for the NDP's political strategy on this issue and others involving the United States in the 1980's.

Central America had so captured the attention of the NDP by 1981 that the party invited Guillermo Ungo, leader of the MNR, one of the major groups fighting the El Salvadoran government, to be its keynote speaker at that year's convention. The convention responded by passing two strong resolutions incorporating the thrust of Ungo's charges and demands which echoed many of Broadbent's thoughts as well. The resolutions also pledged that the New Democratic Party would sponsor internal and fraternal education and solidarity activity such as people exchanges and most

importantly, campaigns for material support among Canadian social democrats to help defeat repression and construct democratic socialist states in the region.

In so doing, the NDP, was committing itself to an activist international role in the Third World that went well beyond its traditional support for increased foreign aid and the work of international organizations. This was in sharp contrast to the non-involvement of the Seventies, when even its seeming strong commitment to the NIEO had not really affected the party's grass-roots. Now, it appeared as though the NDP was prepared to launch a large-scale effort to get the grass-roots involved in the concrete lives of oppressed peoples. Indeed, the resolutions appeared to stop just short of asking for volunteers to fight on the side of their Central American compatriots. At a minimum, the NDP was ready to join with other Western social democratic parties in building a world-wide network of support for the struggle.¹⁰⁴¹

In his 1981 convention speech, Broadbent showed the extent to which he had caught the crusading spirit of idealist social democratic internationalism.

I say, if we have an interest in humanity, we must get involved. For us, as socialists, there is no other choice. We must remember that the history of our movement is the history of a world-wide struggle for social justice and equality. At home, we have fought for real solutions to real problems.... We are fighting for the same approach to meet the need for justice and freedom around the world.¹⁰⁴²

Equally revealing was the fact that for the first time since becoming leader, Broadbent devoted a major portion of his address to foreign affairs. Moreover, this was a

¹⁰⁴¹ "Resolutions B.10.1 and B.10.2," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research, pp.66-8.

¹⁰⁴² Broadbent, Text of Convention Address, 1981, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.75, File 6, p.16.

convention where he was preoccupied with defending himself from strong attacks from internal critics who opposed his support for Trudeau's 1981 constitutional initiative.

Efforts to promote practical expressions of solidarity with Central American democratic were somewhat successful. For example, telegrams were sent to the El Salvadoran authorities demanding the release of persons kidnapped by the death squads. However, in an interview with the author, Dan Heap complained that most members of caucus never demonstrated wholehearted support for the party's Central American policy.¹⁰⁴³ In fact, only two years later at the 1983 convention, there were signs that the party was already backtracking from its earlier demand for total social and political change in El Salvador. Specifically, while the 1981 resolution had recognized the El Salvadoran rebel movement (the FDR) as the only legitimate representative of the people, the 1983 convention emphasized an all-party settlement which implicitly recognized the ruling junta's right to have a significant say in determining El Salvador's future.¹⁰⁴⁴

Gradually NDP attention expanded beyond El Salvador to include other countries in the region, a point recognized by the party's IAC which responded by identifying three aspects of the party's Latin American and Caribbean policy that needed revision. First, Canada ought to promote its middle power role in the entire hemisphere in cooperation with other Middle Powers such as Mexico and Venezuela as a counterweight to the United States. Second, more heed should be given to the growing refugee and human rights problems of Guatemala. Third, forceful action

¹⁰⁴³ Dan Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹⁰⁴⁴ "Resolution B.10.3," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.68-9.

needed to be taken on the Haitian situation.¹⁰⁴⁵ In terms of specifics, the NDP demanded that Canada cut off bilateral aid to the countries with the worst human rights records, in particular, El Salvador and Guatemala. Honduras must be accorded the same treatment for permitting the contras to use its soil as a base against Nicaragua.¹⁰⁴⁶

On the home front, the NDP continued its campaign to keep the issue alive publicly as much as possible. Each time President Reagan or Vice President Bush visited Ottawa and the Prime Minister or his external affairs minister journeyed to Washington, the NDP pressured the Canadian authorities to challenge American policy in Central America.¹⁰⁴⁷ To ensure that Central America and similar places with major human rights problems would receive the regular notice of Canadian Parliamentarians, the NDP made three specific proposals: the creation of a Standing Committee on Human Rights, the establishment of a permanent Standing Committee on North-South affairs and the prompt renewal of the Latin American sub-committee's mandate.¹⁰⁴⁸

Of considerable assistance to the NDP's Central American crusade were its close contacts with church groups and non-governmental organizations. For example, Bob Ogle's connections with the Latin American Roman Catholic church provided him with continual updates on regional conditions.¹⁰⁴⁹ Jewett credits Ogle for helping to arouse and sustain interest amongst NDP MPs in Central America after the

¹⁰⁴⁵ Randell Potts to IAC, Subject: Latin America and the Caribbean, June 30, 1982, NDP Research.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Debates, Mar. 11, 1983, p.23688; Mar. 22, 1983, p.24417.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid., Mar 9, 1981, p.8044; Mar 22, 1983, p.29017.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid., Feb.9, 1983, p.22629; April 20, 1983, p.24674.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ogle made reference to this on several occasions. See for example, Debates, May 3, 1983, p.25099.

assassination of El Salvadoran Archbishop, Oscar Romero in 1980. In addition, NGOs, such as Oxfam and certain Protestant churches, especially the United Church through John Foster its Secretary of Mission, had ties with the NDP and provided a constant stream of information.¹⁰⁵⁰

To the NDP, the American invasion of Grenada in October of 1983 encapsulated much of what was wrong with Washington's Central American policy. In introducing an emergency resolution into Parliament, Broadbent isolated the core issue succinctly and powerfully:

The invasion of Grenada...is an act which should be condemned by every person in all lands representing all ideologies who believe that negotiations, not violence, should be what conducts the affairs of mankind...and who believe that no state has the right to impose its particular system of government upon any other.¹⁰⁵¹

By violating international law and the UN Charter, the United States was acting like a renegade power in Broadbent's opinion. It was a country out of control, a threat to internationalism. Any left-of-centre country, whether Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic or others had better beware. The Grenadan invasion was just the latest example of Reagan's personal crusade against any deviation from Pax Americana in the Americas. The invasion was simply an event waiting for an excuse to happen.¹⁰⁵²

Furthermore, according to Broadbent, just as Parliament had unanimously condemned the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner two months earlier, also

¹⁰⁵⁰ John Foster to Broadbent, Dec.12, 1982, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.32 File 2.

¹⁰⁵¹ Ibid., Oct. 27, 1983, p.28415.

¹⁰⁵² Ibid., pp.28417-8.

on a motion initiated by the NDP leader, it must apply the same moral standard to the Americans when they acted wrongly.¹⁰⁵³ As Terry Sargeant noted, while there was a difference in scale, there was no difference in kind between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American invasion of Grenada.¹⁰⁵⁴ Indeed, fears were beginning to mount in the NDP caucus that Nicaragua might soon suffer the same fate.¹⁰⁵⁵

Grenada, El Salvador, Afghanistan and the Korean airliner incidents reinforced the long-standing conviction held by social democratic idealists that both Superpowers deserved to be tarred with the same brush, although it was the United States that received the most blame for restarting the Cold War. Thus, while a survey of delegates to the 1983 NDP convention indicated that 65.1% considered the USA and USSR equal threats to world peace, of the remaining 34.9%, respondents selected the United States as the main threat by a margin of almost five to one.¹⁰⁵⁶

By the mid-Eighties, the focus of NDP attention in Central America had shifted noticeably towards Nicaragua as that country came under increasing attack from Washington both directly (mining of harbours and an economic boycott) and indirectly (funding of the counter-revolutionaries called contras). From the outset, many New Democrats had shown a keen interest in the fate of the Sandinista government because, unlike other regimes in the region, it appeared to share many social democratic goals such as social justice and economic equality as well as improved

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid., Oct.27, 1987, p.28438.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibid., Nov.17, 1983, p.28934; Nov.28, 1983 pp.29236-7.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.124.

health care and literacy and a commitment to political pluralism. The main task for Canadian social democrats, as the NDP saw it, was to provide practical aid, thereby encouraging the revolution to remain true to this path.

At the same time and almost from the outset, concerns were raised, at least privately, in NDP circles about the future direction of the revolution. If Canada and the West did not provide sufficient assistance, Nicaragua would be forced, in the words of Jim Fulton, a BC NDP member of Parliament upon his return from a June, 1981 trip to that country, "to explore options that are difficult for some of us to accept."¹⁰⁵⁷ Sixteen months later, Bob Ogle reported to Broadbent after one of his Central American fact-finding trips that the Nicaraguan revolution was being pushed to the East whether it "liked it or not".¹⁰⁵⁸ Moreover, on August 17, 1983, in an otherwise scathing letter to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Ottawa condemning Washington's entire Central American policy, Gerry Caplan, Federal NDP Secretary, acknowledged that the CLC, the International Congress of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Socialist International were all worried about certain undemocratic and anti-trade union trends starting to emerge in Nicaragua.¹⁰⁵⁹

Publicly, at least, the NDP continued its blessing of the Sandinista cause. For example, at the 1983 convention, the party resolved (among other things) that it would make every effort to spread the truth about the revolution in every riding through articles, meetings, slide shows, films, eye-witness accounts and tours like one sponsored the previous year by Dan Heap's Spadina international affairs

¹⁰⁵⁷ Jim Fulton, Report, June, 1981, MG 32, C83, Vol.31, File 5.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Bob Ogle, Report to Broadbent, Dec.15, 1982, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.32, File 2.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Gerry Caplan to William Harbin, Aug.12, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.30, File 21.

committee.¹⁰⁶⁰ This strong support for the Sandinistas was another indication of the growing influence of social democratic idealism in NDP circles during the early Eighties. As idealists saw it, any country trying to assert its independence from the United States and multinational corporations, while pursuing its own socialist agenda, deserved all the help it could get. It probably reminded them of their long-standing desire for Canada to pursue a similar path.

The NDP demonstrated this support in October, 1984, by joining with other members of the Socialist International in sending representatives to observe the first general elections held since the Sandinistas had taken power. Upon their return, Gerry Caplan and Dan Heap reported that the Nicaraguan election won by the Sandinistas met reasonable standards of fairness, especially for a country with no democratic tradition and under armed attack from outside forces. Consequently, in their view, President Reagan's condemnation of the election was totally unjustified. The best thing the newly-elected Canadian Progressive Conservative government could do would be to dissociate itself completely from Washington's Central American policies.¹⁰⁶¹

As American pressure against Nicaragua mounted in 1985, the NDP felt compelled to defend the Sandinista leadership even when some of its decisions turned into public relations disasters. For instance, right in the middle of a strong White House campaign against the alleged communist leanings of the Nicaraguan government in the spring of 1985, the Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, undertook a well publicized trip to Moscow during which he announced a strengthening of relations with the USSR.

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Resolution B.10.4," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, NDP Research, p.69.

¹⁰⁶¹ Gerry Caplan and Dan Heap, Statement on Nicaragua, Nov.8, 1984, NDP Research.

Jewett tried to defend the move by noting that Ortega was doing the same with Sweden and Spain and wished to do so with Canada.¹⁰⁶²

The 1985 convention found the party still affirming Nicaragua as an example to be followed by other Central American nations if they were to meet the basic needs of their people and move towards greater equity and political participation. As in previous resolutions, it urged Canadians to send material support. Moreover, the NDP again identified the United States as the chief source of the problems in Nicaragua and the entire region. As such, the NDP pledged to continue "its support for broad alliances of democratic and revolutionary action against repression and for the construction of democratic socialist societies in Central America."¹⁰⁶³ Further, it promised to promote human rights, send material support to fraternal parties in the region, take a more active part in the Latin American section of the Socialist International and help set up an SI presence in Managua if asked.¹⁰⁶⁴

Meanwhile, privately, concerns about Nicaragua's direction continued to grow in top NDP circles. In late 1984, Meyer Brownstone, an Oxfam representative in Nicaragua and with connections to high ranking NDP officials, wrote a most revealing letter to NDP researcher, Andy Jackson, in response to the latter's request for briefing material in preparation for an upcoming SI meeting. Brownstone warned that, although Socialist International presence and influence in Nicaragua was significant, it was being overshadowed by economic support from the Soviet bloc to which Nicaragua was increasingly turning because of the American trade boycott. Most disturbingly,

¹⁰⁶² Hania Fedorowicz to NDP Caucus International Affairs Committee, May 22, 1985, Minutes of the May 16th meeting of the Caucus International Affairs Committee, NDP Research.

¹⁰⁶³ "Resolution B.10.5," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.69-72.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ibid.

hundreds of the brightest young Nicaraguans were travelling to Cuba, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for training. This fact alone, Brownstone argued, should provide added incentive for social democratic parties to step up their aid.¹⁰⁶⁵ In effect, the NDP found itself in the middle of a battle between the Socialist International and the Communist "international" for influence in Nicaragua.

By 1986, debate about Nicaragua had intensified, although the NDP still managed to keep most of it out of the public eye. The CLC, in particular, was becoming worried that in the present polarized atmosphere, some of the staunchest supporters of the Sandinistas were dismissing democratic socialist values far too easily. Rick Jackson, Research Director of the CLC's International Affairs Department, confided to Broadbent in a letter that labour was growing increasingly disturbed by the violations of human and trade union rights, the denial of press freedom and the apparent emergence of a one-party state in Nicaragua.¹⁰⁶⁶

Part of the reason for the CLC's influence on the NDP's and Broadbent's thinking on foreign policy was the strength of its International Affairs Department whose research capacity was considerably greater than the party's. For example, Broadbent was particularly grateful for Jackson's expertise on Latin American affairs and for this reason took him along on at least one of the NDP leader's trips to Socialist International meetings in South America. Moreover, Shirley Carr, President of the CLC in the mid-Eighties, made an open-ended offer to supply Broadbent with all the help he required on international affairs.¹⁰⁶⁷

¹⁰⁶⁵ Meyer Brownstone to Broadbent C/O Andy Jackson, undated, NDP Research.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Rick Jackson to Broadbent, Sept. 15, 1986, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.79, File 10.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Shirley Carr to Broadbent, Aug.13, 1986, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.79, File 10.

Amidst the growing controversy, the NDP caucus was able to maintain unity on at least one fundamental point. United States interference in Nicaraguan affairs must be denounced categorically. Thus, when the American Congress in the spring of 1986 gave strong indications that it might resume massive direct military funding of the contras, all members of the NDP caucus signed a letter urging American legislators to reject any such action:

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the priorities of the existing government in Nicaragua, it is completely wrong in terms of international law and morality to finance military action against a government that is internationally recognized.¹⁰⁶⁸

This was consistent with NDP statements a year earlier which had condemned Washington's mining of Nicaraguan harbours labelling it "an act of terrorism" made worse by Washington's rejection of the World Court's jurisdiction over the case to which the Sandinista government had appealed for redress.¹⁰⁶⁹ At his first opportunity after Congress had approved \$100 million for the contras despite NDP protests, Broadbent introduced a motion in the Commons asking all MPs to express their strong disapproval of the American action, in light of Parliament's unanimous condemnation of the Soviet Union's 1980 military intervention in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷⁰

Broadbent laid out his moderate policy on Nicaragua most completely in an article that appeared in the September 15, 1986 edition of the Globe and Mail. He

¹⁰⁶⁸ Broadbent to US Congress, Mar.10, 1986, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.32, File 6.

¹⁰⁶⁹ David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp.160-1; Also see, "Resolution B.10.5," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.69-72.

¹⁰⁷⁰ NDP Communique, June 21, 1986, NDP Research.

acknowledged the existence of human rights abuses, but blamed them on the civil war and the presence in the Sandinista government of Marxist-Leninist elements "with no commitment to human rights as seen by social democrats." He also lamented discrimination against independent trade unions and some departures from due process of law and intimidation of political opponents. Broadbent challenged the Sandinista revolutionaries to return to their original stated goals of political pluralism. However, while the Nicaraguans might not choose the social democratic path in the end, Canadians "must oppose the aggression of strong nations against their weaker neighbours even when those neighbours make decisions with which we disagree."¹⁰⁷¹

This was Broadbent and the party's central argument throughout the Eighties not only with respect to Nicaragua, but all of Central America. Thus, when Washington threatened Panama's Noriega or sent troops to Honduras in March of 1988 after attacks by Nicaraguan troops against contra bases there, the NDP demanded that Canada inform the United States of its opposition.¹⁰⁷²

While united on this point, clear differences on Nicaragua were apparent within the NDP caucus by 1986. The key question was, "Did the Nicaraguan revolution deserve the continued support of the NDP, and if so, to what extent?" For strong realists like Orlikow and Blackburn, the Sandinistas had shown themselves to be communists in the Eastern European mold and should be treated as such. However, as with other foreign policy matters, Orlikow remained silent, while Blackburn was too busy fending off internal criticism of his work as NDP defence policy critic to pay much

¹⁰⁷¹ Ed Broadbent, "US Harassment of Nicaragua: A Choice Denied," Globe and Mail, Sept. 15, 1986, p.7.

¹⁰⁷² Debates, Mar.18, 1988, pp.13897-8.

attention to the matter.¹⁰⁷³ The majority of the caucus, while not content to view the Sandinistas as just another communist dictatorship, were now more ready to publicly acknowledge the undemocratic features of the Sandinista regime. Nevertheless, they wished to maintain basic practical and diplomatic support for Nicaragua.¹⁰⁷⁴

Dan Heap, of all the idealists in the NDP caucus the most committed to radical social democratic internationalism, was not happy with the slippage in the party's support for the revolution. Consequently, Heap began a determined campaign to reverse this trend both within the NDP and in the public at large. He had first caught the "Central American bug" on a trip to the area in the early 1980's, and had since returned several times. Now in 1986, in light of the deteriorating situation, Heap and his wife, Alice, decided to visit Nicaragua at their own expense. Their subsequent report, dated March 4th, was directed specifically to Canadian Christians asking them to pray, send material aid and write appeals to Washington. They painted a picture of a small, poor and besieged Christian nation trying to take control of its own land and resources and fighting the government of the richest country in the world, which was doing its best to destroy it.¹⁰⁷⁵

To increase his influence and raise the party's profile on the question, Heap sent a letter to Broadbent on June 30, 1986 asking that he be appointed a special foreign policy critic with particular responsibility for South and Central America.¹⁰⁷⁶ The

¹⁰⁷³ David Orlikow interview, Dec.4, 1991; Derek Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Bill Blaikie Interview, June 7, 1993.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Alice and Dan Heap, Report on Trip to Nicaragua, Mar.4, 1986, NDP Research.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Heap to Broadbent, June 30, 1986, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.72, File 2.

request was granted, partly because Pauline Jewett had recently asked for more caucus assistance to deal with the increased number of foreign policy issues requiring attention.¹⁰⁷⁷

In his new post, Heap wrote a memo to each member of the NDP caucus on December 18, 1986, arguing that it was time for the party to undertake new initiatives in support of the Nicaraguan Revolution. He had a number of suggestions. First, fresh ways must be found to help American opponents of Reagan's war against Nicaragua. Second, caucus members should get involved publicly with groups sending people and materials to Nicaragua such as "Tools for Peace," and "Mission for Peace". Third, the NDP ought to pressure the Canadian government to form a consortium with West European and Latin American countries to replace American non-military aid to Honduras on condition that country closed the contra bases operating on its soil.¹⁰⁷⁸

When relations between the Socialist International, the New Democratic Party and the Sandinistas deteriorated even further in the spring of 1987, Heap was dismayed but remained committed to the cause. He proposed that the NDP attempt to improve matters by sending a special delegation posthaste to Managua for talks, which, if combined with more Canadian aid, could still make a substantive contribution to the evolution of democracy.¹⁰⁷⁹ The 1987 NDP convention resolution on Central America included his call for more aid, but the general tone of the resolution was quite

¹⁰⁷⁷ This was discussed in more detail in Chapter Thirteen.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Heap to NDP Caucus, Re: Central America, Dec.18, 1986, NDP Research.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Heap, Report to Caucus: Nicaragua and El Salvador, May 26, 1987, NDP Research.

subdued compared to the lavish praise poured on the Sandinista revolution earlier in the decade.¹⁰⁸⁰

There is no evidence the NDP caucus took any concrete action on Heap's other proposals. Nevertheless, while Heap's continuing enthusiastic support for the Sandinistas may have embarrassed his colleagues at times, he undoubtedly spoke for many party idealists who never gave up their faith in the Nicaraguan Revolution and wanted the party to spare no effort in assisting it.¹⁰⁸¹

Dan Heap's central American involvements were not confined to Nicaragua. As repression mounted once more in El Salvador during the 1986-8 period and human rights abuses continued in Guatemala, members of all parties often looked to Heap with his many direct Central American connections for information on recent developments. For example, on June 2, 1987, after Heap requested that Joe Clark ask President Duarte of El Salvador to account for recent violent attacks on peaceful demonstrators, the Secretary of State for External Affairs replied, "Once again the Honourable Member has brought to my attention on the floor of the House information I did not previously have."¹⁰⁸² Whenever Heap mentioned a new incident which showed that El Salvador's human rights record was not improving, he coupled this with demands that bilateral Canadian aid to that country be halted.¹⁰⁸³ While NDPers increasingly had difficulty agreeing on all aspects of Nicaraguan policy, this,

¹⁰⁸⁰ "Resolution B.10.6," New Democratic Party International Affairs Resolutions, 1989, pp.26-7.

¹⁰⁸¹ Penny Sanger interview, June 19, 1993. She, along with her husband, Clyde Sanger, a well known journalist, have had long-standing close connections with NDP activists.

¹⁰⁸² Debates, June 2, 1987, p.6640.

¹⁰⁸³ Debates, Nov.17, 1987, p.10910; Mar.15, 1988, p.13792.

not surprisingly, was not the case with El Salvador with its appalling human rights record and a government kept in power by massive quantities of American military aid. Thus, the 1987 convention condemned the regime in terms almost as harsh as those employed in 1981.¹⁰⁸⁴

As the contra war against Nicaragua reached a climax in late 1987 and early 1988, the NDP redoubled its efforts to promote a peace settlement. The party had officially supported the Contadora peace process ever since the 1985 convention. This was the 1983 agreement brokered by Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia and Panama which outlined steps to remove foreign military advisors and bases, reduce levels of arms and armed forces and establish international supervision and verification of arms control measures throughout the region.¹⁰⁸⁵ When the presidents of five Central American states signed a new agreement on August 7, 1987, called the Arias Peace Plan, the NDP supported it also because, like Contadora, it provided for a regional solution to Central America's problems, not one imposed by the United States.

On September 1, 1987, just before he relinquished his Central American critic's job to Bill Blaikie, the new NDP general foreign policy critic who also had a keen interest in Central America, Dan Heap introduced a private member's resolution in the House asking the Canadian government to undertake a major diplomatic initiative in support of the Arias plan. Heap noted that by their vigorous and concrete support of the Central American people throughout the decade, the Canadian people had demonstrated a Canadian initiative for peace. "I challenge this government to show the

¹⁰⁸⁴ "Resolution B.10.6," New Democratic Party International Affairs Resolutions, 1989, pp.26-7.

¹⁰⁸⁵ "Resolution B.10.5," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.69-72.

kind of courage and imagination, the kind of dedication and vision that is shown by so many Canadians."¹⁰⁸⁶

Bill Blaikie's tenure in foreign policy was marked by a change in style, if not in substance, on Central American issues. As with South Africa, he tried to balance criticism of the Conservative government's performance with commendation. This, Blaikie believed, would bring more positive results, while also depriving right-wing Tory MPs of leverage in their caucus on the issue. For example, on December 2, 1987, Blaikie began his address by praising Joe Clark for visiting Central America and reporting to the House immediately on his return. He was not happy, however, with Clark's refusal to condemn Washington's funding of the contras, which was proving a major impediment to the implementation of the Arias peace plan. Blaikie also could not understand why the External Affairs minister demanded of Nicaragua that it meet a higher human rights standard than El Salvador or Guatemala.¹⁰⁸⁷

Blaikie's less confrontational and abrasive style, at least when compared to Heap's, probably played a role in getting the government to agree to the formation of an all-party Special Commons Committee in early 1988 to ascertain what Canada's relationship to the peace process should be.¹⁰⁸⁸ In its initial report on July 5th, the committee unanimously urged Canadian support for the Arias plan, a decision in harmony with the NDP's position.¹⁰⁸⁹

¹⁰⁸⁶ Debates, Sept. 1, 1987, pp.8681-4.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Debates, Dec. 2, 1987, pp. 11415-17.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Blaikie interview, June 14, 1993.

¹⁰⁸⁹ "Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process," The First Report of the House of Commons Special committee on the Peace Process in Central America, July 5, 1987 Blaikie Collection.

The differences within the NDP caucus on Central America should not be overplayed, but were nonetheless real and illustrative of another problem, namely, how high a profile international affairs should have in NDP political strategy. Dan Heap's strong commitment to peace and justice in Central America led him to fight for a much higher one than the central organs of the caucus and party had in the past been prepared to grant. Heap shared Jewett's frustration with the fact that the caucus executive permitted relatively few foreign policy questions to be featured in the daily House of Commons Question Period. In a letter to Ian Angus, Chairman of caucus and other members of the caucus executive on October 29, 1987, Heap chided them for not allowing Blaikie to pose more questions on Central America:

Don't be afraid we'll run out of foreign policy issues. Besides Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras, there is the external debt, Southern Africa, the Philippines, the Persian Gulf and Chile for starters. If we run low, there's always Ireland and the Middle East. Our brothers and sisters are dying for freedom in places like El Salvador and Nicaragua and challenging us to help them in our comfort and safety. We'll not deserve to be the government of Canada if we campaign just for a 'chicken in every pot'.¹⁰⁹⁰

Opposition to Heap's efforts to highlight social democratic internationalism as the NDP approached another election, was probably based on traditional doubts about the electoral appeal of foreign policy in general and fears about what would happen if the party's idealists were given an opportunity to turn the election into a crusade on foreign policy issues. Indeed, as it was, Dan Heap's assessment of his party's Central American performance was not flattering.¹⁰⁹¹ He concluded that it was the

¹⁰⁹⁰ Heap to Ian Angus, Oct. 29, 1987, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.71, File 10.

¹⁰⁹¹ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

Canadian NGO community not the NDP that deserved most of the credit for increased Canadian involvement in Central America during the Eighties. Specifically, the NGO's educational work at the grassroots level had been pivotal. As a result, the External Affairs Department had received more correspondence on Central America than any other issue including arms control.¹⁰⁹² Nevertheless, Heap's Central American efforts demonstrate what one individual imbued with a passion for justice, a deep feeling of solidarity with the oppressed and an indefatigable zeal could accomplish in educating his fellow MPs and citizens about their internationalist duties.

Central America, most particularly the deplorable human rights situations in El Salvador and Guatemala, helped bring to the fore another closely related and important foreign policy issue of the Eighties, namely, Canadian immigration and refugee policy. Political upheaval, famine and economic distress around the world had produced millions of refugees, thousands of whom wished to enter Canada. The Canadian immigration and refugee claims system had become so unwieldy that by 1984 a backlog of thousands of claimants had developed. Another problem was that under the 1976 Immigration Act, a person seeking refugee status was not allowed an oral hearing before the Refugee Status Advisory Committee. This committee would decide her or his fate solely on the basis of the written transcript of an interview she or he had had with an immigration officer.

Armed with evidence of the injustice of the system and bolstered by a 1981 Government Report and a recent Supreme Court ruling demanding changes, along with growing support from many Canadian citizens and organizations working in the field, Dan Heap helped lead the fight for reforms that would make the system both more just

¹⁰⁹² Gene Beuthien, Heap's assistant, Re: Central American Overview and NDP position, Feb.17, 1986, NDP Research.

and efficient. To this end, he introduced amendments to the 1976 Immigration Act on several occasions in the mid-Eighties and endorsed a similar motion introduced by Liberal, Sergio Marchi in 1987.¹⁰⁹³ In essence, these amendments would have changed the system to give the benefit of the doubt to the claimants.

The Mulroney government finally responded with its own bill in 1987 which, as far as the NDP was concerned, made matters worse in two respects. First, it introduced pre-screening methods designed to ensure that most potential refugee claimants were eliminated before they could even arrive in Canada to claim refugee status. Second, it almost completely denied the right of appeal.

In reply, Heap argued strenuously that Canadians and all Westerners had a special obligation to accept refugees from the Third World because the West had been primarily responsible for creating the political and economic conditions which had produced most of the refugees in the first place.¹⁰⁹⁴ Heap also showed how the new rules would discriminate against refugees from right-wing countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile, while favouring those from communist nations. One of the effective weapons employed by the NDP in the debates of 1987 and 1988 on the government's refugee bill was the argument that key provisions violated not only human rights and Canadian law, but UN standards and agreements including its convention on refugees which Canada had signed decades earlier.¹⁰⁹⁵

As with Canada's Central American policy, the NDP succeeded in making itself the chief focus of public opposition to the government's new restrictive refugee policy.

¹⁰⁹³ Debates, Mar.16, 1984, p.2198; April 23, 1985, p.4039; May 11, 1987, pp.5992-5.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid, May 12, 1987, pp.5992-3; June 8, 1988, p.16267.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid., May 12, 1987, pp.5993-4; June 8, 1988, p.16267.

The party capitalized on its many connections with key people in the mainline churches and NGOs who in large measure shared in social democratic internationalism's world view. Not surprisingly then, they developed common policies on defence, peace, Central America and refugees. As Heap observed during a Commons debate in September of 1987,

We are finding that a growing number of Canadians who support peace also generally support refugees. They realize that the refugees...because of the reality of their circumstances and the terrors which they had to flee in countries like El Salvador, are a symbol of the rejection of the life and rule of war, military control and the exploitation of men, women, and children by the men of war and big business.¹⁰⁹⁶

Cranford Pratt had made a related point in an article he wrote for the International Journal a few years earlier. Pratt showed how a counter-consensus cluster of groups had emerged by the Seventies that challenged many components of Canadian foreign policy on humanitarian grounds with particular reference to four themes: nuclear disarmament, human rights, international equity and solidarity with oppressed peoples.¹⁰⁹⁷

As its Central American and Third World policies illustrate, the NDP had to a considerable degree thrown its support behind the counter-consensus in the areas of human rights, solidarity with oppressed peoples and international equity during the 1980s.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Ibid., Sept.10, 1987, p.8849.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Cranford Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus," International Journal, Vol.39 (Winter, 1983-4), pp.99-135.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

NDP POLICY ON CRUISE MISSILE TESTING AND SDI: MISSED POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES (1982-8)

The foreign and defence policy issues of the Eighties were very similar to those of the Sixties in several respects. This, as noted briefly in the previous chapter, had also been true to some degree of the American involvements in Vietnam (1960's) and Central America (1980's). But it was particularly relevant for the issues of American-Soviet relations, disarmament and peace. In both decades, increased superpower tension heightened the fears of nuclear war, which, in turn, fuelled a renewed arms race as each side tried to enhance its strategic military position.

This affected Canadian foreign and defence policy in several ways. In particular, Canada was forced to make major decisions about the nature and extent of its involvement in the nuclear arms race. In the 1960s, the issue had been whether to acquire nuclear warheads for its Bomarc missiles, while twenty years later the question was whether Canada should participate in the research or production of a new generation of weapons, specifically, the cruise missile (a first strike weapon with nuclear capabilities) and the Strategic Defence Initiative (a space-based missile defence system).

In both decades, the NDP answer was essentially the same, an unequivocal rejection of any Canadian participation in the research, testing or acquisition of such weapons and their delivery vehicles or systems of defence against such weapons. As a party committed to disarmament, the NDP had always opposed nuclear proliferation, criticized Canadian involvement in the world arms trade and opposed acquisitions of new offensive weapons for the Canadian armed forces. Idealists were generally more willing than realists to make the peace issue a central part of election campaigns. Nevertheless, both realists and idealists were largely united on this question because without disarmament and peace, social democratic internationalism's goal of a world community could never be realized.

Even in the Seventies when foreign and defence policy matters had occupied a relatively low profile in the NDP, the party had found the wherewithal to raise its voice on these matters periodically. For example, when India exploded a nuclear bomb in 1974 using Canadian technology, T.C Douglas demanded better safeguards on any future Canadian sales.¹⁰⁹⁸ Two years later when Canada was on the verge of selling CANDU reactors to Argentina, South Korea and Pakistan, Douglas insisted that the purchasers be required to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty first.¹⁰⁹⁹ Then in 1978, Brewin attacked the government's decision to purchase the CF-18 fighter primarily because he believed it would contribute to the arms race.¹¹⁰⁰ (However, in a private memo to his fellow caucus members, the NDP external affairs critic noted that this was also the politically astute course of action because it distinguished the NDP from the other parties and saved the taxpayers from spending money on a plane

¹⁰⁹⁸ Debates, Oct.10, 1974, p.292.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibid., July 12, 1976, p.15245.

¹¹⁰⁰ Debates, Nov.23, 1978, pp.1434-6.

which was obsolete in the missile age.¹¹⁰¹) At least, as NDP spokespersons noted several times during 1978 and 1979, a final decision on the fighter should await the release of a Defense White Paper that would fully assess the country's defence equipment needs and develop a comprehensive industrial strategy to maximize benefits for Canadian workers.¹¹⁰²

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 ushered in a new phase in the history of the arms race. Predicated on the belief that the United States had lost its military superiority over the Soviet Union, Reagan launched the largest peace-time arms build-up in American history. The escalation occurred on almost every front: conventional forces and equipment, long and short range missiles, space based weapons, and even chemical and biological warfare. In fact, the first of the major escalations had come just before Reagan had assumed the Presidency. In December, 1979, NATO had decided to deploy cruise and Pershing II intermediate range missiles in Europe to counter a new generation of powerful and accurate Soviet missiles (the SS 20s) that could hit Western Europe in a few minutes. A few days before the fateful meeting of NATO ministers, Pauline Jewett had asked the Canadian government to push for a postponement of this deployment at least until SALT II had been ratified.¹¹⁰³

While, as noted in Chapter Thirteen, the 1981 NDP convention passed a comprehensive international affairs resolution whose main focus was the North/South question, the arms race and disarmament were also major themes. The authors of the

¹¹⁰¹ "Notes for Caucus, Re: Fighter Planes," Nov.8, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.85, File 11.

¹¹⁰² NDP Research to Brewin, Re: Proposed Purchase of the Fighter Plane, Oct.25, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.85, File 11; Terry Sargeant, News Release, "Renews call for Defence White Paper," Oct. 12, 1979, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.37, File 10.

¹¹⁰³ Debates, Dec.7, 1979, p.2131.

resolution were convinced that Canada could make its greatest contribution to world peace and security by helping to close the gap between rich and poor countries. It was not until a groundswell of public opposition against NATO's two-track decision (the simultaneous pursuit of disarmament talks and deployment of new weapons) and Reagan's military spending plans arose in Europe and North America that the NDP jumped completely on the disarmament bandwagon in the spring of 1982. By that time, thousands of people were demonstrating in the streets all around the world and liberal-left journals like the Canadian Forum were full of anti-nuclear rhetoric. Moreover, many Canadians were again taking up the call for a more independent Canadian foreign and defence policy in ways reminiscent of the late Sixties.¹¹⁰⁴

The specific event in Canada that spurred many Canadians into involvement with the disarmament and peace issue was the Liberal government's decision to begin negotiations with Washington on the American request to test a new type of missile in northern Canada. This missile was called the "cruise" since it travelled near the ground to avoid radar. On April 23, 1982, Jewett rose in the House to accuse the Liberals of hypocrisy. They had, she maintained, already concluded a secret agreement with the United States to test the cruise missile contrary to the government's repeated statements. In addition, the government had provided grants to Toronto's Litton industries to help manufacture guidance systems for the missile. None of this should have happened, according to the NDP External Affairs critic, before a full Parliamentary review of Canada's external and defence policies had been

¹¹⁰⁴ For example see, Stephen Saloff, "A Fire to Suffocate," Canadian Forum, Vol.60, (Sept., 1980), pp.14-16; Ernie Regehr, "Cashing in on the Arms Race," Canadian Forum, Vol.61 (Aug., 1981), pp.14-16; Simon Rosenblum, "Canada in the Shadow of the Superpowers," Canadian Forum, Vol.61 (Aug., 1981), pp.17-19; Mark Aby, "From Poland to Portugal: The Disarming of Europe," Canadian Forum, Vol.61 (Aug., 1981), pp.7-13.

conducted concentrating particularly on Canada's role in the world. No such review had taken place since 1970.¹¹⁰⁵

Along with people throughout the world, Canadians were afraid that the resumption of the Cold War and the arms race were making nuclear war more likely. Throughout the many debates on the cruise issue in the ensuing years, the NDP, with Pauline Jewett leading the way, continually reproached the government for its apparently contradictory stance in expressing a strong commitment to disarmament and peace on the one hand, while permitting the Americans to test such a destabilizing weapon as the cruise on the other hand.¹¹⁰⁶ In the NDP's interpretation, this was not just another new weapon, but represented a major technological escalation in terms of first strike capability to which the Soviets would be forced to respond in kind. The NDP also knew that most Canadians did not wish to see Canada's reputation as a peace loving, peace making country devoted to disarmament tarnished. Moreover, testing the cruise appeared to place Canada in the same class as Ronald Reagan and the hawks in the Pentagon and Congress who were anathema to most Canadians of liberal-left persuasion.

In cruise missile testing, the NDP felt it had found a foreign policy issue that simultaneously met all the criteria of social democratic internationalism, and if handled properly, could translate into votes (unlike most international affairs issues). First of all, Canadian refusal to test the cruise could, NDPers believed, help reverse the momentum of the arms race. Here was a great opportunity for Canada to take a

¹¹⁰⁵ Debates, April 23, 1982, pp.16578-80.

¹¹⁰⁶ J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell argue that Prime Minister Trudeau supported cruise testing in Canada against his "every instinct" because he hoped thereby to gain some credit with Ronald Reagan to use on other bilateral Canadian-American issues. See, J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp.363-4.

leadership role internationally. Broadbent summarized NDP feelings about this as follows: "It is rare in political life that the ideal and the possible perfectly coincide."¹¹⁰⁷ Second, it appealed to the basic moralism inherent in social democratic internationalism. Very simply, testing a new generation of weapons was morally wrong. Third, the cruise issue stirred up the latent anti-Americanism most Canadians feel to some degree, which added to its electoral appeal.

Over the next few years, the NDP attempted to implement their anti-cruise and disarmament policy through a concerted and well organized Parliamentary strategy. This effort was assisted greatly when on April 29, 1982, six members of SCEAND, including two Conservatives (Walter Maclean and Doug Roche) and one Liberal (Paul McRea) and all the NDP members (Pauline Jewett, Bob Ogle and Terry Sargeant) issued a minority report which disagreed emphatically with official government security and disarmament policy and, in effect, endorsed several key aspects of NDP policy.

Broadbent seized the opportunity to introduce a motion asking the House to support a worldwide nuclear freeze, a ban on cruise testing and the campaign for a world-wide pledge against first use of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁰⁸ Broadbent and Jewett noted that two American senators had introduced a global freeze resolution into the United States Senate which had garnered some support even amongst conservatives. Indeed, as the NDP spokespersons kept reiterating throughout the debate, most people from all political ideologies seemed to consider political labels on such a crucial matter irrelevant. Therefore, Jewett challenged all members of Parliament to consider the vote on the motion a free vote as the NDP was doing.¹¹⁰⁹

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, April 29, 1982, p.16738.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, April 29, 1982, p.16736.

¹¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, April 29, 1982, pp.16736-9, 16759-62.

When the other parties refused, NDP strategists knew that the opportunity was there for the NDP caucus to present itself as the only group in Parliament battling on the national political stage on behalf of cruise opponents. To this end, Ottawa Report, a regular newsletter published by Broadbent's office and sent to thousands of party members and interested individuals, was filled with foreign policy stories, most of which focused on disarmament in general and the cruise in particular. For example, the December 3, 1982 edition carried a story and picture of Saskatchewan NDP MP, Doug Anguish, (The Battlefords-Meadow Lake) reading a Declaration of Peace to his colleagues at the Centennial Flame on Parliament Hill. The story also quoted Broadbent to the effect that the NDP position on disarmament and peace represented the only alternative that was at once humane, just and reasonable.¹¹¹⁰

Also in keeping with the party's strategy to raise the profile of foreign policy in general and the arms issue in particular, Broadbent, in his address to the 1983 Manitoba NDP convention, gave equal attention to disarmament and domestic issues (a first for him at an NDP convention). In both areas, his primary objective was to show the similarities between Liberal and Conservative policies while contrasting them with the NDP. Canadians, he argued, must face the fact that if the cruise system was developed, balanced and verifiable reduction of nuclear weapons would likely become impossible. Broadbent went on to accuse Prime Minister Trudeau of hypocrisy on the issue, favouring disarmament in the abstract while promoting rearmament in reality.¹¹¹¹

¹¹¹⁰ Ottawa Report, published by Broadbent's office, Dec.3, 1982, p.1.

¹¹¹¹ Broadbent speech to the Manitoba NDP convention, "Disarmament and Economic Recovery," Winnipeg, Mar.5, 1983, NDP Research.

Undermining Liberal credibility on disarmament was obviously a prime NDP objective. Another opportunity arose on February 15, 1983, when Jewett attacked a recent statement by former External Affairs minister, Mark MacGuigan, which seemed to imply that an agreement on cruise testing had been reached with the United States. This contradicted the Prime Minister's assurance that the cruise issue had not yet been finally decided, and that only a general umbrella weapons testing agreement had been signed. Jewett implored, "Can the Prime minister assure the House that Canada can get out of this cruise testing deal with the United States thereby bringing hope to millions of Canadians?"¹¹¹² The NDP also argued that contrary to government statements, Canada was under no obligation to test the cruise as part of its NATO commitments.¹¹¹³

Gerry Caplan, NDP Federal Secretary at the time, claimed the party was "fighting the [cruise] issue because we believe in it not because it will give the NDP any political advantage,"¹¹¹⁴ Caplan's claim is not believable. As a professional political insider, he knew that no party, including one as idealistic as the NDP, invests heavily in an issue without hoping to benefit politically in some fashion.

NDP dreams of capitalizing on the peace and disarmament issue received a blow in September of 1983 when Trudeau launched a major personal peace initiative designed, as the Prime Minister stated, "to break the ominous rhythm of crises" that had brought international arms control negotiations to a halt. For the next six months the Prime Minister conducted high level diplomacy with key leaders on several

¹¹¹² Debates, Feb. 15, 1983, p.22851

¹¹¹³ Global Report, Spring, 1983.

¹¹¹⁴ Gerry Caplan to Jane Ambeau, Aug.2, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.30, File 21.

continents based on a five point arms limitations program.¹¹¹⁵ The NDP endorsed the basic elements and internationalist spirit of the Trudeau initiative, but repeatedly emphasized that its credibility was severely undermined because Canada had agreed to test a vehicle capable of delivering nuclear weapons and was producing some of its components. The NDP made the same argument about Trudeau's campaign to halt the development of anti-satellite weapon systems and his efforts to encourage more nations to sign the non-proliferation treaty.¹¹¹⁶

As the date for the first cruise missile test approached in early 1984, the New Democratic party stepped up the pressure by all Parliamentary means available. For example, on January 17th, Doug Anguish reintroduced a private member's bill declaring Canada "a nuclear weapons free zone" and barring cruise testing, a motion he had first proposed on March 30, 1983.¹¹¹⁷ Then on March 5, 1984, one day before the first scheduled test, Jewett tried to shame the government into at least postponing it as a tribute to women for their work in spearheading the disarmament and peace movements and who were beginning the celebration of International Women's week the same day.¹¹¹⁸

When the test went ahead in spite of these pleas, the NDP painted the event in melodramatic and ominous terms. It was, they declared, a decisive turning point in Canadian history. Jewett pleaded, "Will he [the Prime Minister] not bring Canada back

¹¹¹⁵ The details of Trudeau's plan are described by David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p.194. For an analysis of the entire peace mission, see, J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette, pp.365-76.

¹¹¹⁶ Debates, Dec.9, 1983, p.58.

¹¹¹⁷ News Release, Jan.17, 1984, NDP Research.

¹¹¹⁸ Ibid., Mar.5, 1984, pp.1759-60.

to its traditions, to its honour, and not play a nuclear role in this world?" Canada, she was convinced, was closing the door to the best in its history and entering a new era of almost total dependence on and integration with American foreign and defence policy.¹¹¹⁹ This was social democratic idealism writ large, accompanied by its usual propensity for hyperbole and even paranoia when it came to dealings with the United States.

Nine months earlier, Jewett had expressed similar feelings most vividly while summarizing NDP foreign policy in the House on June 14, 1983:

What it [cruise testing] has to do with...is that we have become more integrated into the economic and military doctrines and values of Washington. We have therefore abandoned...any independent judgment,...and decision-making with regard to alliance weapons policies.... We could untie ourselves without hurt or harm to our economy or to our relationship with the United States. We could untie ourselves from this total dependence, this uncritical acceptance of everything that is done. We could join other smaller nations...in the alliance in developing nuclear weapons free zones.... We could be free to pursue the goals that everyone in the world wants to reach, namely the goals of peace, freedom and security.¹¹²⁰

Opposition to cruise missile testing was therefore an occasion for the NDP to recommit itself to an independent foreign and defence policy and a special role for Canada (in other words, to Canadian social democratic internationalism). As such, Canada should form a new "bloc" of middle and small nations devoted to the creation of nuclear free zones and promotion of disarmament above any other foreign policy objective. As an NDP Fact Sheet stated, "Canadians believe that our country has a special and important role to play in the world to reduce the growing risk of nuclear

¹¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Mar.6, 1984, pp.1812.

¹¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1983, p.23644.

war."¹¹²¹ All this was consistent with the CCF/NDP's repeated calls over the preceding decades for a re-examination of Canada's role in the world, which Tory and Liberal administrations had, in Jewett's opinion, neglected to do. There had been some moves in this direction under Pearson and Trudeau (for example, the latter's 1978 speech to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in which he outlined proposals for nuclear suffocation), but in the end they had all been aborted.¹¹²²

The NDP peace and nuclear disarmament effort, with the anti-cruise campaign as its centerpiece, climaxed in the first half of 1984. On February 15, Jewett released a Ten Point Peace Plan based on the 1983 NDP Federal Convention composite International Affairs Resolution. She called for no cruise testing, superpower approval for a nuclear weapons freeze, Canada to become a nuclear weapons free zone, no Canadian production of nuclear weapon components, increased funding for disarmament research, a global disarmament referendum, a "no first use" pledge by NATO, a merging of stalled arms limitation talks, a denuclearized corridor in Central Europe and greater restrictions on sales of nuclear technology and fuel and on the conventional arms trade.¹¹²³ The NDP also wanted more public and parliamentary involvement in the formation of foreign policy, particularly on disarmament.¹¹²⁴

It is doubtful, however, if more involvement by the public and parliament on controversial issues like the cruise and a nuclear freeze would have effected a change in government policy. As Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon observed in her book, The Domestic

¹¹²¹ NDP Fact Sheet, "Speaking up for Canadians Like You, Working for Nuclear Disarmament," March, 1984, NDP Research.

¹¹²² Debates, April 23, 1982, pp.16578-80.

¹¹²³ News Release, "Jewett Outlines 10 Point NDP Peace Plan," February 15, NDP Research; "Resolution B.5.2," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.58-60.

¹¹²⁴ NDP Fact Sheet, "Speaking up for Canadians Like You...."

Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy, demands which do not mirror government priorities have little chance to become part of its foreign policy.¹¹²⁵ On the other hand, David Taras is not as pessimistic. Writing in the mid-Eighties, he argued that since Biafra in the late Sixties, Parliament's capacity to influence foreign policy had been enhanced and with that had also come a greater interest in the field by members of Parliament.¹¹²⁶

In the spring of 1984, Broadbent tried to influence government policy directly by writing a letter to the Prime Minister submitting the key points of the NDP Peace Plan for possible inclusion in the all-party Commons resolution which Trudeau had proposed to support his peace initiative. When Trudeau rejected Broadbent's ideas outright and questioned his motives, the NDP leader released the text of his reply to the Prime Minister expressing deep disappointment and some indignation at the substance and tone of the PM's response.¹¹²⁷

One area where all the political parties were able to cooperate was in the establishment of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) with a mandate to increase knowledge and understanding of the issues relating to international peace and security from a Canadian perspective.¹¹²⁸ Pauline Jewett

¹¹²⁵ Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), p.71.

¹¹²⁶ David Taras, "From Bystander to Participant," in Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. by David Taras (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), pp.3-19.

¹¹²⁷ Broadbent to Pierre Trudeau, May 18, 1984, NDP Research.

¹¹²⁸ Canadian Annual Review, 1984, p.200.

played a key part, both in writing most of the terms of reference and in helping push the bill through Parliament just prior to the '84 election.¹¹²⁹

The NDP gave considerable support to non-partisan efforts outside Parliament to promote peace such as the Peace Petition and "Operation Dismantle".¹¹³⁰ Indeed, prominent NDPers such as Simon Rosenblum assumed high profile roles in some of these campaigns.¹¹³¹ Broadbent had become especially intrigued by "Operation Dismantle," a concept first developed by James Stark, President of the World Federalists in the late Seventies. Stark's idea was for a United Nations sponsored global referendum on disarmament. When Andrew Brewin had first learned about the concept, he expressed some misgivings about the proposal but in the end had endorsed it, albeit, purely as an educational device.¹¹³² In response to persistent lobbying, the NDP officially adopted Stark's notion at its 1983 convention.¹¹³³ So committed did Broadbent become to the cause that he wrote letters to the most important Vice-Presidents of the Socialist International and to Thorvald Stoltenberg, Secretary of the International committee of the Norwegian Labour Party and Chairman of the SI Resolutions Committee, asking the organization to pass a resolution endorsing the concept of a global referendum on nuclear weapons at its 1983 Congress.¹¹³⁴

¹¹²⁹ Jewett interview, May 2, 1991.

¹¹³⁰ News Releases, "NDP Endorses Peace Petition Caravan," Mar.16, 1984, and "NDP Endorses Freeze Proposals," July 5, 1984. NDP Research.

¹¹³¹ Simon Rosenblum "Agenda for the Peace Movement," Canadian Forum, Vol.64 (April, 1984), pp.18-9.

¹¹³² Brewin to James Stark, Nov 3, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C26, Vol.71, File 2.

¹¹³³ "Resolution B.5.2," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.58-60.

¹¹³⁴ Broadbent to Thorvald Stoltenberg, Feb.1, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.70, File 2.

The Socialist International-New Democratic party connection was greatly enhanced during the early Eighties by the presence in the London Headquarters of the Socialist International of Robin Sears, former NDP Federal Secretary who, according to Steven Langdon, played a vital part in expanding the NDP's internationalist vision.¹¹³⁵ John Brewin, for his part, wrote a report after attending the 1983 SI congress urging even more involvement by all levels of the NDP in the Socialist International including increased financial contributions.¹¹³⁶ In return, as Broadbent's lobbying effort for "Operation Dismantle" indicates, the NDP intended to capitalize on its new-found influence in the international democratic socialist movement.

Given all this NDP activity on the foreign policy scene in the months and years leading up to the 1984 election, many expected the party to make the peace issue a major emphasis in its platform. After all, the NDP was clearly identified in the public mind with the popular anti-cruise and pro-nuclear freeze positions. Now it was time to capitalize on the success of its political strategy. Yet, as in all federal elections since 1963, the NDP chose largely to ignore foreign policy in the campaign, despite the efforts of people such as John Lamb of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control who tried valiantly to initiate debate on arms control and disarmament by all the parties.¹¹³⁷ Thus, for example, the NDP's major election pamphlets, "A New Democratic Future: New Opportunities For Canadians Like You," relegated peace and nuclear disarmament to the last two pages.¹¹³⁸

¹¹³⁵ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

¹¹³⁶ John Brewin, Report to Federal Council et.al. Re: SI Congress, April 7, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.70, File 2.

¹¹³⁷ John Lamb, Arms Control Communique, "Arms control: A Question of Leadership," Aug.18, 1984, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

¹¹³⁸ "A New Democratic Future: New Opportunities for Canadians Like You," 1984,

What had happened? The NDP had previously given every indication that disarmament and cruise missile testing would be important planks in the upcoming election platform. Indeed, it had begun laying the ground work as early as February, 1983, as an internal memo indicates: "We are now taking a much harder line with disarmament, church and other groups and students who see nuclear disarmament as crossing party lines. Paul McRae [a Liberal MP] has been getting too much attention."¹¹³⁹ Evidently, the NDP was upset that, as the only party completely united in its opposition to cruise testing, it was not receiving enough of the credit either from the peace movement or the general public.¹¹⁴⁰

Another sign that the NDP intended to make the peace issue a significant part of its next election campaign was the prominent place it was afforded at the 1983 convention. In his keynote address, Broadbent vowed emphatically to take the nuclear disarmament battle to the "old-line parties".¹¹⁴¹ This was the language of a crusade, a tone that was also reflected in the numerous peace and disarmament resolutions submitted by delegates. For instance, an Ottawa Carleton resolution read: "Be it resolved that every NDP member should personally acknowledge every country as a neighbour and actively support international cooperation by promoting education on

NDP Research.

¹¹³⁹ Steve Lee to All Caucus and Staff, Feb.1, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.34, File 9.

¹¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁴¹ Broadbent, "Text of 1983 NDP Convention Speech," NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.75, File 11.

peace issues."¹¹⁴² Idealism, it appeared, was ready to lead the party to victory under the peace banner.

Further evidence of the NDP leader's ostensible commitment to a peace campaign was an open letter he wrote to Trudeau in May, 1983 in which he defended the disarmament movement against charges of anti-Americanism.¹¹⁴³ On the other hand, Broadbent's enthusiasm for the issue has been questioned by Dan Heap, who claimed in an interview that it was Jewett who drove the NDP's anti-cruise and disarmament campaign, not Broadbent.¹¹⁴⁴

While this comment minimizes Broadbent's role too much, Jewett's wholehearted dedication to the task of raising the profile of the peace issue within the party and the country can hardly be overemphasized. She was the one who in early 1982 first raised the cruise issue in Parliament.¹¹⁴⁵ About that time, she also urged the NDP Federal Council not to wait for the '83 convention, but, in light of the world situation, make an immediate official statement encouraging the greatest possible involvement by all party members in disarmament activities in the months leading up to the UN Special Session on Disarmament scheduled to begin in June, 1982.¹¹⁴⁶ She also conducted a cross-country disarmament tour in the fall of 1983 to hear from Canadians and to help ensure that the issue received maximum publicity.¹¹⁴⁷

¹¹⁴² Resolutions Submitted to 1983 Regina NDP Convention, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.75, File 16, p.45.

¹¹⁴³ Broadbent to Trudeau, May 12, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.51, File 10.

¹¹⁴⁴ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹¹⁴⁵ Jewett interview, May 1, 1991.

¹¹⁴⁶ Report, "Jewett Proposes Two Resolutions to Federal Council," undated, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.45, File 2.

¹¹⁴⁷ Jim Thompson to Steve Lee, Subject: Disarmament Tour, NAC, MG 32, C83,

Jewett's disarmament efforts largely overshadowed those of Terry Sargeant, the NDP defence critic in the early Eighties who worried that his critic position was hurting his reelection chances just as it supposedly had an earlier NDP defence critic from Selkirk constituency, Doug Rowland. Sargeant complained that he had to spend too much time on matters, as he put it, "of little concern to my constituents".¹¹⁴⁸

Sargeant's perception was probably quite widespread among NDP MPs and helps explain why the party failed to make international affairs a central focus in the election campaign. As an anonymous veteran party MP explained to Dan Heap before the 1984 election, peace and disarmament, while important questions for many people, were usually not vote determining issues. Yet, there were exceptions. Heap, for example, happily acknowledges their decisive role in his 1984 victory over high profile Liberal candidate, Jim Coutts.¹¹⁴⁹ The same was true for John Brewin in Victoria both in 1984 when he lost but trimmed his opponent's victory margin in half, and in 1988 when he won.¹¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, both men defend the general party strategy of minimizing foreign policy questions in elections. Since the leader is limited to an 8-15 second sound bite in the evening news, he or she must speak to issues of immediate and overwhelming burning concern to voters.¹¹⁵¹ Moreover, according to Heap, any decision to turn an election campaign into a crusade on a foreign policy issue would have required the

Vol.45, File 2.

¹¹⁴⁸ Terry Sargeant to Ed Broadbent, Feb.26, 1981, Subject: Caucus Critic Responsibilities, NAC, MG 32 C83, Vol.72, File 1.

¹¹⁴⁹ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹¹⁵⁰ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

¹¹⁵¹ Ibid.; Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

cooperation of at least some of the major media outlets, a doubtful occurrence since all are controlled by corporations generally hostile to the party's philosophy and to the social democratic perspective in external affairs. Finally, in an election like 1984, when the country was polarized around the leadership issue, foreign affairs was likely to receive even less attention.¹¹⁵²

Bill Blaikie's explanation is more straightforward and revealing. Party strategists believed that if the NDP called attention to foreign policy in the '84 campaign, the Tories and Liberals would attack the NDP on NATO mercilessly, while simultaneously exposing the deep rifts within the NDP on the issue. Key members of the NDP had been aware of this problem for some time as indicated by comments made by Blaikie at an NDP caucus retreat in September of 1983. There, Blaikie had argued that the cruise issue was not translating into votes for the party because it was set within the context of a NATO policy that most Canadians would not accept.¹¹⁵³ In those circumstances, foreign policy was a liability not an asset. Accordingly, the dominant sentiment among the largely pro-NATO inner circle of the party was to "let sleeping dogs lie" and hope that the Liberals and Conservatives would ignore the subject as well.¹¹⁵⁴

This feeling was reinforced on the eve of the 1984 election when, with the party running at only 10% in the polls, NDP strategists concluded that its only salvation lay in a spirited campaign based on traditional social democratic "bread and butter" issues. In the end, the tactic was successful in winning back the NDP's

¹¹⁵² Heap interview, June 15.

¹¹⁵³ "Discussion Notes: NDP Caucus Retreat." Sept.8-9, 1983, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.73, File 4.

¹¹⁵⁴ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

traditional support despite early predictions by the prognosticators that the party would suffer severe losses. A poll commissioned by the NDP six months after the election in the spring of 1985 confirmed that any attempt to turn the '84 election into a referendum on peace and disarmament would have been counterproductive. When asked to name the two most important matters facing the country, unemployment/jobs was chosen first by 40.5% of respondents, while nuclear war garnered only 2.6% of the first place votes.¹¹⁵⁵

Although the NDP continued to draw attention to cruise testing in the years following the 1984 election, especially whenever a test date was approaching, interest among Canadians in the issue had begun to decline. However, another opportunity for the NDP to exploit the peace issue arose soon after the election of Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives when the United States invited Canada to participate in the development of the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars).¹¹⁵⁶ However, most members of the party leadership probably shared the view of Allan Blakeney, leader of the Saskatchewan NDP, who in an article in the December, 1984 edition of Canadian Forum, completely ignored foreign policy when outlining the issues and strategy he believed the NDP needed to emphasize in order to win the next election.¹¹⁵⁷

¹¹⁵⁵ NDP Federal Survey by Fingerhert-Grandai Opinion Research Co., May, 1985, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.95, File 16.

¹¹⁵⁶ For a detailed analysis of Canada's involvement with arms control and space weapons, see Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament 1945-1988 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp.406-21.

¹¹⁵⁷ Allan Blakeney, "After 1984: The NDP What Next?", Canadian Forum, Vol.64 (Dec., 1984), pp.5-7.

Even if Blakeney's assessment was correct as far as elections were concerned, the party was aware that international affairs, especially the theme of bilateral relations with the United States, could be useful politically in building support for the NDP between elections. As things would develop in the 1984-88 period, the Progressive Conservative government was most obliging in this respect. From the outset, it was evident Mulroney intended to pursue a closer relationship with the United States than any Prime Minister had since Louis St. Laurent. This link would find expression in both domestic and foreign policy. From the NDP vantage point, Mulroney's pro-American stance had serious implications for Canadian defence and disarmament policies. They particularly feared further integration into the American military-industrial complex with its history of "hare-brained" and "sinister" schemes of which SDI was only the latest example.¹¹⁵⁸

Fundamentally, as Jewett explained in the House, the NDP opposed SDI because it extended the arms race into space and, like the cruise, upset the entire strategic balance, thus introducing a new destabilizing element in East-West relations.¹¹⁵⁹ By the Eighties, most social democrats had accepted the value of deterrence (albeit with considerable reluctance) in discouraging all-out nuclear war between the superpowers. However, new technological breakthroughs like SDI and the cruise might tempt one of the superpowers to launch a pre-emptive strike against the other's ICBMs. Another destabilizing effect of SDI was that it violated the 1972 ABM treaty which forbade Washington and Moscow from building active defences against

¹¹⁵⁸ Hania Fedorowicz to Judy Giroux, Feb.26, 1985, Subject: Theme Day: Mulroney-Reagan visit, Defence Issues, NDP Research.

¹¹⁵⁹ Debates, Mar.19, 1985, p.3186.

each other's nuclear weapons.¹¹⁶⁰ Suspicions were mounting that all these developments signalled a basic shift in American nuclear strategy from deterrence to one of providing the Pentagon with the tools to fight and win a nuclear war with supposedly minimal damage to the United States.

The NDP decided, therefore, to mount a political campaign against SDI employing all the usual means. Hence, on March 19, 1985, they introduced a motion of non-confidence condemning the government for not immediately and categorically declaring that Canada would not participate in the strategic defence initiative in any fashion.¹¹⁶¹ Specifically, as Jewett elaborated in her speech, the NDP was troubled about possible future linkages between the development of the Strategic Defence Initiative and the uses to which the new Early Warning System might be put. The possible stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil as part of any future SDI deployment was also disturbing.¹¹⁶² Fuelling these alarms also, was the threat to Canadian sovereignty and the damage SDI would do to Canada's middle power status, especially Canada's ability to act in its historic role an intermediary between the United States and Europe where most countries officially opposed SDI. All of these concerns were incorporated into a resolution passed by the 1985 NDP convention.¹¹⁶³

Anticipating charges that Canadian rejection of involvement in SDI would lead to United States retaliation, Broadbent travelled to Washington on September 3, 1985,

¹¹⁶⁰ NDP Caucus Memo, "Why Star Wars is Dangerous and Won't Work," undated, NDP Research.

¹¹⁶¹ Debates, Mar. 19, 1985, p.3177.

¹¹⁶² Ibid., Mar. 19, 1985, p.3185.

¹¹⁶³ "Resolution B.5.3," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.60-1.

to hold a news conference on the subject as if to warn the Americans in advance against the impropriety of such a move.¹¹⁶⁴

Over the summer of 1985, a Special Joint Committee of the House and Senate dealing with Canadian International Relations conducted public hearings on whether Canada should participate in SDI research, but the committee's Conservative majority refused to make a recommendation. The NDP representatives were appalled by this move, labelling it a "total abdication of responsibility."¹¹⁶⁵ The NDP's public campaign against SDI included an appeal to the peace movement to make it a central issue in their activities such as peace walks. They also urged all Canadians to write the Prime Minister.¹¹⁶⁶

An August, 1985, Southam news poll showed that Canadians were divided on the issue with 42.3% opposing participation and 40.5% favouring it and the rest having no opinion.¹¹⁶⁷ Mindful of these results, on September 7, 1985, Mulroney announced that the Canadian government would decline the American invitation to participate in SDI research but would allow private firms to bid for contracts.¹¹⁶⁸

¹¹⁶⁴ Canadian Press, Report of Broadbent's Washington News Conference, Sept. 3, 1985, NDP Research.

¹¹⁶⁵ Pauline Jewett and Steven Langdon to people who made submissions to the Special Joint Committee, Aug. 26, 1985, NDP Research.

¹¹⁶⁶ Communique, "Statement by Pauline Jewett on Behalf of the NDP for Peace Walks," Apr. 28, 1985; Communique, "Group Urged to Write PM on Star Wars," Aug. 26, 1985, NDP Research.

¹¹⁶⁷ Douglas A. Ross "SDI and Canadian-American Relations: Managing Strategic Doctrinal Incompatibilities," in America's Alliances and Canadian-American Relations ed. by Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1988), p.150.

¹¹⁶⁸ For a good discussion of the SDI debate in Canada, see Martin Shadwick, "Military and Security Issues," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p.218-25 and Douglas Ross, "SDI and Canadian-American Relations," pp.137-61.

This brought an accusation from the NDP that the government was equivocating and a demand for an emergency Parliamentary debate.¹¹⁶⁹

Throughout 1985, the NDP was also active internationally on disarmament issues especially through the Socialist International. The SI had intensified its efforts in this area in the late Seventies and early Eighties concentrating particularly on keeping the East-West dialogue alive amidst the mounting crisis. In 1985 then, Broadbent served as part of a special SI team which visited Moscow, Washington and Vienna putting forward specific disarmament proposals formulated by the Socialist International Advisory Council of Disarmament and Arms Control (SIDAC). In their discussions with top American and Soviet officials, they urged both sides to consider seriously any measure that might slow down or halt the arms race. As a SIDAC official wrote, "Any offhand rejection of a disarmament offer is detrimental to international understanding, peace and stability."¹¹⁷⁰

In his subsequent report to the NDP Federal Council, Broadbent stated that, in his view, the framework for a workable disarmament agreement had emerged as a result of the SI team's work. Both sides would be required to make substantial cuts in their nuclear forces. In addition, while the Soviet Union must accept on-site verification, the United States, in turn, would have to put the Strategic Defense Initiative on the negotiation table. Furthermore, Canada ought to use its credit with both superpowers to indicate what each must do in going the extra mile to achieve a breakthrough.¹¹⁷¹

¹¹⁶⁹ NDP Communiqué, Sept. 11, 1985, NDP Research.

¹¹⁷⁰ Report, "The Activities of SIDAC," undated, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol. 51, File 10.

¹¹⁷¹ Report, "Broadbent to Federal Council Meeting," Oct. 26, 1985, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol. 15, File 12.

During 1985 and early 1986, the battle against SDI also took place on another front. The NORAD Agreement was up for renewal in 1986 and the NDP believed there were sufficient grounds for Canada to withdraw. Back in 1981, the Liberal government and the American administration had secretly removed a clause from the NORAD Agreement (added in 1968) which forbade any Canadian participation in an anti-ballistic missile defence system (the ABM clause). The NDP now demanded the reinstatement of the clause as insurance against any future attempts to use NORAD to pressure Canada into participating in SDI.¹¹⁷² For the same reason, the NDP had opposed the NORAD Modernization Accord negotiated in March of the previous year.¹¹⁷³ When the Tory majority on SCEAND issued a report on February 14, 1986, recommending NORAD renewal even without reinsertion of the ABM clause, Derek Blackburn and Pauline Jewett condemned the Conservative decision as "irresponsible."¹¹⁷⁴ At minimum, any extension of the NORAD Agreement should be limited to two years to give Canada time to assess the continuing and rapid changes in American defence strategy and policy.¹¹⁷⁵

However, Mulroney's September 7th, 1985, decision to forego any direct Canadian involvement with the strategic defence initiative, combined with general public support for NORAD renewal, made for much less political mileage for the NDP on the SDI issue than had been the case with cruise missile testing. Nevertheless, this

¹¹⁷² Debates, Mar.13, 1985, p.2979.

¹¹⁷³ Martin Shadwick, "Military and Security Issues," p.239.

¹¹⁷⁴ Communiqué, "Committee's Recommendations on NORAD Renewal Irresponsible: Jewett," Feb.14, 1986, NDP Research. Also see Martin Shadwick, "Military and Security Issues," in Canadian Annual Review, ed. by R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp.204-8.

¹¹⁷⁵ "A Statement by the New Democratic Party on the Standing Committee's NORAD Report," Feb.14, 1986, NDP Research.

did not stop the party from trying to keep the matter alive in the House of Commons. Their cause received a boost in 1987 when Washington officially decided to employ a broad interpretation of the ABM treaty, thereby enabling the Americans to launch full-scale testing and possibly even deployment of a multi-billion dollar SDI system.

At her first opportunity following the American announcement, Jewett introduced a private member's bill asking Canada to take the lead in drafting and promoting an international treaty forbidding the development of military and all non-peaceful space and space-based technologies. What particularly concerned the NDP was the real possibility that Canada would become directly implicated in the militarization of space through its participation in building an American space station, which the American Defence Department had hinted could be used for basic research on SDI related technology.¹¹⁷⁶ In fact, MP Michael Cassidy (Ottawa Centre), had expressed NDP apprehension about the space station as long ago as March 21, 1985.¹¹⁷⁷ Instead, as Dan Heap underscored, Canada should promote the establishment of a space station directed and controlled by the United Nations to be employed for both peaceful purposes and surveillance of potential warlike activities anywhere in the globe.¹¹⁷⁸

The year 1987 also saw a modest revival in the New Democratic Party's anti-cruise campaign. On March 6, Jewett charged Washington with breaching the SALT II limits on strategic bomber deployment and Ottawa with complicity, since Canada

¹¹⁷⁶ Debates, Feb.3, 1987, pp.3046-7.

¹¹⁷⁷ Communiqué, "Parliament Should Review Space Plan - Cassidy," Mar.21, 1985, NDP Research.

¹¹⁷⁸ Debates, Feb.3, 1987, p.3052.

was continuing to allow testing of air-launched cruise missiles.¹¹⁷⁹ The cause also received help from a new quarter. The Canadian Centre For Arms Control, which had consistently supported cruise testing but had opposed Canadian participation in SDI, now asked Ottawa to suspend the tests as a way of pressuring Washington to adhere to a strict interpretation of the ABM treaty.¹¹⁸⁰

Another factor that lent renewed vigour to the anti-cruise effort and, indeed, the whole disarmament cause, was the set of initiatives taken by the new President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, shortly after coming to power in 1985. By early 1986, Jewett could hardly contain her excitement about Gorbachev's disarmament proposals, especially his idea of setting a timetable for mutual strategic weapons reductions with the final elimination of all remaining nuclear arms by 1999.¹¹⁸¹

During the next two and one-half years as good progress was made in talks between the Americans and Russians in a number of areas including intermediate range missiles, the NDP continued to pressure the government to take stronger measures to promote arms control and disarmament. On one occasion, Jewett accused the Tories of hypocrisy because a few years earlier the government had implied that cruise missile testing would end once significant progress was made at the Geneva disarmament talks.¹¹⁸² By the spring of 1988, the NDP could refer to polls showing that 54% of

¹¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 1987, p.3901.

¹¹⁸⁰ "The ABM Treaty in Crisis: A Canadian Response," Canadian Centre for Arms Control Communique, Feb.23, 1987.

¹¹⁸¹ Debates, Jan.23, 1986, p.10103.

¹¹⁸² Ibid., Oct. 27, 1987, p.10432.

Canadians wanted Canada to stop cruise testing, up from 45% a few years earlier.¹¹⁸³

Since most social democrats traditionally put disarmament at or near the top of their foreign policy objectives, the party found the cruise missile and SDI debates generally an enlivening and unifying experience. Bill Knight, in commenting on this point, observed that NDPers who, one minute were attacking each other passionately on NATO policy, could unite unreservedly around the peace and disarmament banner the next.¹¹⁸⁴ This is not surprising given that the issue correlated so strongly with many of the defining characteristics of traditional Canadian social democratic internationalism such as idealism, moralism, faith in Canada's special international role and even pragmatism to some degree. In addition, as Jewett pointed out in an article, promoting peace and disarmament were an integral part of an independent foreign policy, something all NDPers supported.¹¹⁸⁵

Derek Blackburn is one of the few dissenters from this positive assessment of the NDP involvement with the peace issue. In his interpretation, the peace movement was a waste of time. What defeated the communists in the end was collective security not peace marches, which had no effect on the Russians or the arms build-up. In other words, the end of the Cold War was a victory of realism over idealism.¹¹⁸⁶

Broadbent also has some reservations. The negative side of the party's heavy focus on peace and disarmament, he maintains, was not only that the complexity of

¹¹⁸³ Ibid., Mar.25, 1988, p.15157.

¹¹⁸⁴ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

¹¹⁸⁵ Pauline Jewett, "Toward an Independent Foreign Policy," International Perspectives (Nov.-Dec., 1985), p.10.

¹¹⁸⁶ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

the issue was minimized, but other vital questions were downplayed. In Broadbent's words, "If you begin with a central focus on peace as opposed to building stable relations with other countries, Canada's practical interests may well be overlooked."¹¹⁸⁷ Transparent here is the frustration of the realist having to contend with idealism in formulating concrete answers to difficult foreign policy questions.

Nowhere was this more evident than on the NATO issue. Indeed, during the Eighties, the old debate re-emerged, forcing the NDP to relive the idealist/realist battles of the Sixties on defence policy. This led to a major reappraisal of NDP foreign and defence policy and the development of a new policy framework.

¹¹⁸⁷ Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

REVIVING THE IDEALIST-REALIST CONFRONTATION - NATO (1980-7)

During the era of detente in the Seventies when tensions between East and West had declined, people in the West tended to take the North Atlantic Treaty Organization somewhat for granted. This all changed in the early Eighties bringing in its wake new internal and external challenges to NATO. Dissension within the organization arose for several reasons. Several members resented America's unilateral action on SDI and its seeming dominance of the alliance. In addition, NATO's deployment of Pershing II missiles and increased defence spending caused major political problems for many European alliance leaders. Yet, the United States kept pressuring them and Canada to spend more. Notwithstanding, throughout the Eighties, none of the NATO partners seriously considered leaving the alliance.¹¹⁸⁸

The New Democratic Party of Canada stood virtually alone, even within the Socialist International, in its official anti-NATO policy. During the era of detente in the Seventies when defence issues assumed a relatively low profile in Canada and within

¹¹⁸⁸ Kim Richard Nossal, "The Dilemmas of Alliances: Cohesion and Disintegration in Western Alliances," in America's Alliances and Canadian-American Relations, ed. by Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1988), pp.32-51.

the NDP, differences within the party on NATO could be overlooked. However, in the Eighties the situation changed drastically leaving Broadbent and much of the NDP leadership determined to reassess this policy within the context of a general review of party defence policy was required. This process culminated in April of 1988, with the unveiling of a new defence policy, the result of four months of intensive work by the party's International Affairs Committee (IAC).

The decision to embark on this exercise in the fall of 1987 was the result of the convergence of four main factors. First, NDP defence (and foreign policy) needed updating because of rapidly changing international circumstances. Second, much of the party leadership believed that a new NDP defence policy was imperative for electoral reasons. Third, party activists had been highly critical of NDP defence critic Derek Blackburn's written reply to the Tory government's 1987 Defence White Paper. Fourth, a concept called "common security" which offered considerable promise as a new defence policy framework more in keeping with social democratic internationalist principles had become available. How these factors combined in the development of a new NDP defence policy is the main subject of this chapter.

For NDPers, the gradual improvement by 1987 in relations between East and West, due mostly to Gorbachev's initiatives, provided the optimum moment for the party to promote its long-standing disarmament and world community objectives. However, the party was handicapped in that most Canadians thought of NDP foreign and defence policy largely in terms of negatives: anti-NATO, anti-NORAD, and anti-American.¹¹⁸⁹ Perhaps, a new foreign and defence policy framework might be able

¹¹⁸⁹ Tessa Hebb interview, May 2, 1991. Hebb attended several Socialist International functions in the Eighties representing the NDP at meetings of SI women. More recently, she served as director of NDP Research and as a special assistant to Audrey Maclaughlin.

to cast these policies in a more favourable light, especially if the new framework helped point the way to a special role for Canada in the new world order that was emerging.

Election considerations were never far from the surface either. Broadbent and several other key people in the NDP leadership were not prepared to enter another election with, in their view, an outdated NATO and general alliance policy which, they believed, was intellectually indefensible and electorally suicidal. By 1987, Broadbent seemed finally ready to tackle the issue, something he had wanted to do for almost a decade.

Almost twenty years earlier as a delegate to the 1969 convention, Broadbent had supported the anti-NATO resolution in keeping with the spirit of the times. However, over the following decade he had gradually changed his mind, in good measure because of his increasing contact through the Socialist International with Western European social democrats who had made their peace with NATO decades before.¹¹⁹⁰ Of special importance was a crucial meeting held in the winter of 1987 between Broadbent and Thorvald Stoltenberg, the foreign minister of Norway and a good friend of Broadbent. Stoltenberg was also, as Judy Steed, the NDP leader's biographer wrote, "a persuasive proponent of belonging to the NATO club." According to Steed, Stoltenberg's pragmatic internationalism had strongly influenced the evolution of Broadbent's thinking on this and other issues since the mid-Seventies.¹¹⁹¹

¹¹⁹⁰ Broadbent interview, Sept.20, 1993. For a full discussion of how the West German social democrats had come to terms with NATO, see, Stephen J. Artner, A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and Nato, 1957-61, (London: Greenwood Press, 1990).

¹¹⁹¹ Judy Steed, Ed Broadbent: The Pursuit of Power (Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books, 1988), pp.334-5.

By 1979, there were signs that the NATO question was high on Broadbent's agenda. In an interview, Pauline Jewett recalled that he had thoroughly quizzed her about her NATO views prior to appointing her external affairs critic after the spring, 1979 election.¹¹⁹² About that time, other party officials had also privately begun to speculate about reopening the NATO question.¹¹⁹³ Moreover, as Bill Knight remembers it, Broadbent had intended to push for a reversal of the 1969 "get out-of-NATO" policy at the 1979 convention, but since the convention already had another difficult and potentially divisive matter to deal with, namely, uranium mining in Saskatchewan, Broadbent had backed off.¹¹⁹⁴ Obviously, even after four years as leader, Broadbent did not yet feel strong enough to risk his reputation in a show-down with the idealists in the NDP.

This pattern was repeated several times in the Eighties most notably in 1981 and 1985. As mentioned in Chapter Thirteen, Broadbent played a key part in the creation in 1981 of the party's International Affairs Committee. Initially, he had expected the IAC's review of NDP foreign policy to lead to a major change in the party's official stand on Canadian membership in the alliance. However, as in 1979, Broadbent abandoned any plans he might have had to force the NATO issue at the 1981 convention when a domestic issue threatened to divide the convention. Broadbent desperately needed the backing of the BC section of the party for a resolution supporting Trudeau's constitutional package which faced serious opposition from many Western Canadian New Democrats. Hence, he could not afford to alienate

¹¹⁹² Pauline Jewett interview, May 2, 1991.

¹¹⁹³ Marc Elieson to Stephen Langdon, Subject: Policy Development for the 1979 Federal Election, Nov.29, 1978, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.75, File 1.

¹¹⁹⁴ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

West Coast delegates, the vast majority of whom were strongly anti-NATO.¹¹⁹⁵ Consequently, Broadbent made sure that a big floor fight on NATO was avoided. Instead, a brief statement in the composite international affairs resolution declared that "an NDP government would not be part of NATO."¹¹⁹⁶ Clearly, the anti-NATO idealists had won a victory, although for Dan Heap, the wording was still too ambiguous.¹¹⁹⁷

The split in the party on the NATO question followed regional lines to a considerable degree. Generally, the further West, the more anti-NATO the NDP became. This was in keeping with the radical idealist legacy of H.W. Herridge and Colin Cameron and before that the Socialist Party of Canada whose strongest support had always been in British Columbia. Further evidence of this regional phenomena was the fact that throughout the Eighties, Broadbent hesitated to push too heavily on the alliance issue because he had to appease Western NDP Premiers who did not want to alienate their party activists, most of whom opposed NATO membership.¹¹⁹⁸

For those in the party who wanted to change official NATO policy, the early to middle Eighties were not propitious. For most New Democrats, an endorsement of Canadian participation in an American dominated alliance at the very time when the United States was supporting oppression in Central America and militaristic policies around the world was virtually unthinkable.¹¹⁹⁹ In fact, during these years, Broadbent, also harshly criticized NATO at times, although he usually balanced this

¹¹⁹⁵ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

¹¹⁹⁶ "Resolution B.1.1," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, p.48.

¹¹⁹⁷ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹¹⁹⁸ David Orlikow interview, Dec. 4, 1991.

¹¹⁹⁹ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1983.

with similar treatment of the Warsaw Pact, since, as he stated on one occasion, both were equally guilty of "bringing humanity closer to a Hobbesian world of uncontrolled violence."¹²⁰⁰

John Brewin, co-chair with Pauline Jewett of the IAC at the time has provided another intriguing explanation of why criticism of official NDP NATO policy by realists was muted in these years. He contended that as a third party in Parliament and low in the polls in the early Eighties, the NDP did not have to concern itself with all the nuances of foreign policy, but instead could fill the role of spokesperson for the many Canadians who wanted a strong and independent Canadian foreign policy. To have changed NATO policy during that time would have confused the issue and possibly negated this role.¹²⁰¹ In effect, Brewin was conceding that the NDP's foreign policy function was similar to its historic domestic role, namely, acting as an advocate for idealistic positions, a good number of which would have to be modified or discarded if the NDP ever attained power.

If John Brewin's interpretation of NDP strategy in this period is correct, it helps to explain why the IAC's 1983 updated defence policy discussion paper, "Peace and Security," found it expedient to outline only anti-NATO arguments, unlike the 1981 report which had summarized the main points of both sides. Clearly, realism was making little progress against idealism on defence matters within the party in the early Eighties.

However, "Peace and Security," left the door open ever so slightly for a future shift in NATO policy. The document hinted that the NDP's rejection of Canadian participation in NATO might be reassessed if two conditions were met. First, the

¹²⁰⁰ Debates, April 29, 1982, p.16736.

¹²⁰¹ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

percentage of Canada's military training effort, equipment procurement and strategic planning devoted to NATO must be heavily curtailed. Second, the alliance ought to abandon its nuclear first-use doctrine.¹²⁰²

The IAC's 1983 report laid the groundwork for a fuller examination of the NATO question two years later. The 1985 discussion paper outlined eleven points (most of which reiterated old arguments) that the authors believed should characterize Canada's defence policy. The most significant aspect was new refinements to the NDP's anti-NATO policy. Instead of withdrawing from NATO automatically, a newly elected NDP government would only pull out if there was no evidence of progress within a first term of office towards fundamental change in alliance policies, particularly on first-use of nuclear weapons, Star Wars, arms sales to the Third World and disengagement of NATO and Warsaw Pact nuclear forces in Europe.¹²⁰³ (In many respects, this reinterpretation of the NDP's anti-NATO policy anticipated the one advanced a few years later by the IAC in its 1988 major policy statement.)

After intense debate in which Broadbent did not personally intervene, delegates to the 1985 convention rejected this proposed change and reaffirmed the 1969 unconditional stance against membership in any military alliance. Contributing to this decision, as a resolution stated, was the firm belief that the credibility of the party's historic commitment to peace and disarmament was on the line.¹²⁰⁴ Realists in the party inner circle seemed to have forgotten that as long as NATO was viewed by party

¹²⁰² "Peace and Security," International Affairs Committee Defence Discussion Paper, March, 1983, NDP Research, p.4.

¹²⁰³ Hugh Thorburn, "The New Democratic Party and National Defence," in Semialignment and Western Security, ed, by Nils Orvik (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.180-1.

¹²⁰⁴ "Resolution, B.4.3.," New Democratic Party International Affairs Resolutions, 1989, p.18.

activists (most of whom were strong idealists) as an obstacle to the achievement of these objectives, attempts to modify the party's alliance policy were doomed. After all, peace and disarmament constituted not only fundamental tenets of social democratic internationalism, but were also an expression of fundamental social democratic values such as solidarity, cooperation and equality.

Of all the people in the upper echelons of the party, Jewett seems to have understood this best. In an interview, Jewett admitted that she had been continually astonished at Broadbent and company's persistent efforts to reopen the alliance issue, given the depth of anti-NATO sentiment amongst the majority of the membership.¹²⁰⁵ When asked to comment on Jewett's observation, Broadbent countered that most people who actually voted for the NDP in federal elections favoured continued Canadian membership in the alliance. The party, he said, had an obligation to consider their views as well.¹²⁰⁶ In any case, back in 1985, Broadbent had affirmed that year's anti-NATO convention decision and had even tried to defend it publicly as best he could, although not strongly enough to satisfy critics like Dan Heap.¹²⁰⁷

According to Bill Knight, however, not long after the convention, Broadbent's strong anxieties about the issue resurfaced. Once more he urged the IAC to begin the process of rethinking NDP foreign and defence policy, but apart from Jewett, the members of the committee were too afraid of the political consequences to pursue the idea seriously.¹²⁰⁸

¹²⁰⁵ Jewett interview, May 2, 1991.

¹²⁰⁶ Broadbent telephone interview, Sept. 20, 1993.

¹²⁰⁷ Heap to friends, Aug. 17, 1986, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol. 71, File 8.

¹²⁰⁸ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

Broadbent did not give up. On instructions from the NDP leader, Desmond Morton, long-time party historian and advisor, wrote a paper outlining a new defence policy which modified the unequivocal anti-NATO stance in a manner designed to appeal to the broader peace movement, many of whom, Morton judged, were not wedded to a strong stance either way on the NATO question.¹²⁰⁹ Since many people in the mainstream peace groups were also active in the NDP, this might tip the balance in the party in favour of the pro-NATO camp.

To this end, Morton devised a double strategy. First, he outlined a general defence policy attractive to all segments of the anti-NATO crowd with a few items from his personal "wish list" included as well, such as increased conventional defence spending and strengthened reserves. Morton called for the redeployment of all the Armed Forces to Canadian soil and the creation of an additional purely defensive alliance of non-nuclear, northern nations such as Norway, Iceland and Japan. Having thus, he hoped, appeased the idealist/nationalist/anti-American sentiments of most NDP peace activists, Morton then basically resuscitated the rejected 1985 resolution, although the choice of words was designed to be as innocuous as possible: "So long as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization... [insists] on a strategy of 'first strike use' of thermonuclear weapons, a New Democratic government will find it impossible to continue Canada's membership in the alliance."¹²¹⁰ What Morton really meant by this convoluted statement was that as long as there was hope that NATO would alter its first strike strategy, an NDP government would be free to remain in the alliance. He concluded with a thinly veiled, yet unmistakable threat to anti-Natoists that the

¹²⁰⁹ Desmond Morton, "A Defence Policy For New Democrats," undated, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.34, File 4.

¹²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

consequences of rejecting the alliance would mean greater militarization of Canadian society and much higher defence costs, a most undesirable prospect to social democratic idealists.¹²¹¹

In late 1986 or early 1987, Broadbent also shared his unhappiness with present NDP defence policy in a private conversation with Larry Pratt, a party member and political science professor at the University of Alberta, who later co-authored a book with Tom Keating entitled, Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis.¹²¹² Shortly after this discussion, Pratt, acting ostensibly on his own initiative, wrote a letter to all members of the NDP federal caucus in which he pleaded with them on practical and logical grounds to throw their weight behind a new effort to revise the party's anti-NATO stand. The bottom line for Pratt, as with most realists, was that present NDP defence policy constituted a major election liability.¹²¹³ There is no evidence Pratt's appeal changed anybody's mind.

Public opinion was also weighing heavily on the minds of Broadbent and the rest of the party leadership. For example, on occasion, he received letters from "ordinary" Canadians who expressed a strong desire to vote for the NDP, but had serious reservations about its NATO policy.¹²¹⁴ By early 1987, with opinion polls

¹²¹¹ ibid., p.2.

¹²¹² Tom Keating and Larry Pratt, Canada, Nato and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis (Edmonton: Hurtig Pub., 1988).

¹²¹³ Larry Pratt to all Members of the NDP federal caucus, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.34, File 4. Philip Resnick, a political scientist from the University of British Columbia and an erstwhile opponent of NATO membership now echoed Pratt's view. He wrote that "a degree of realism is called for if the NDP is to have any success in selling its defence policy." While withdrawal from NORAD was desirable and politically sellable, withdrawal from NATO was not. See Philip Resnick, "NATO, NORAD and the NDP," undated, Clyde Sanger Papers.

¹²¹⁴ See, for example a letter from T.S. Sloan, a free lance journalist, consultant and broadcaster to Broadbent, Aug.13, 1987, Blaikie Papers.

showing the NDP in first place and a clear majority of Canadians still favouring continued membership in NATO, Broadbent and his close advisors were almost desperate to find a way to rid themselves of a policy that could deprive the NDP of its best chance ever at electoral victory. Having inhaled a "whiff of power," in Bill Knight's words, the NDP inner circle naturally wanted the whole thing.¹²¹⁵

As matters stood, Broadbent had had to endure periodic Conservative and Liberal attempts throughout the 1980's to exploit the well-known division in the NDP on the defence question. For example, on June 14, 1983, in a debate on cruise testing, Conservatives David Kilgour and Benno Friesen had mocked the NDP's inability to agree on NATO policy.¹²¹⁶ In 1987, during another Commons debate on the same topic, John Turner made things very uncomfortable, especially for NDP realists when he said, "On the basis of its responses and resolutions that are binding on it, the NDP is a neutralist, isolationist party." Turner went on to challenge the NDP to add the phrase, "in a manner consistent with Canada's NATO and bilateral obligations," to an NDP motion calling for an end to cruise missile testing. After Jewett rejected this as well as the charges of neutralism and isolationism, Turner retorted that if the NDP would adopt a more realistic NATO policy, it would find his amendment perfectly acceptable.¹²¹⁷ Broadbent must have felt most uncomfortable throughout these exchanges.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1987, with the possibility of an NDP government in Ottawa, journalists and defence analysts began to critically examine NDP defence and foreign policy. Even the prestigious British defence periodical, Jane's Defence

¹²¹⁵ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

¹²¹⁶ Debates, June 14, 1983, p.26344.

¹²¹⁷ Ibid., Mar.6, 1987, p.3904.

Weekly, carried an article on the subject. While treating NDP policies quite objectively for the most part, it concluded by speculating about the negative impact an NDP victory would have on Canada and the alliance's defence posture.¹²¹⁸

Another factor also played a significant part in prodding the NDP to conduct a fundamental review of its defence policy. Since the onset of the Eighties, the party had been calling for a serious Parliamentary debate on all aspects of defence policy. But when Perrin Beatty, the Tory defence minister, finally released his long-awaited defence White Paper in the summer of 1987 signalling the opening of that debate, the NDP suddenly realized that it had no up-to-date, comprehensive defence policy it could call its own. More was required than the party's periodic reaffirmations of NDP disarmament and anti-alliance positions.

This became even more obvious after the publication in July of the NDP's response to the government White Paper written by Derek Blackburn, the party's defence critic, entitled, "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the Defence White Paper."¹²¹⁹ (Blackburn has subsequently attempted to distance himself from the paper by claiming that an aide wrote the final draft.¹²²⁰) While response to the paper by most idealists and realists was cool, it was the idealists who reacted most negatively. Blackburn, they argued, appeared to accept the same outdated military strategies and political thinking which dominated the Tory White Paper.¹²²¹ Specifically, the internal party critics lambasted his proposal

¹²¹⁸ "The Left Wing Challenge to Current Defence Policy," Jane's Defence Weekly, November, 1987, p.12.

¹²¹⁹ Derek Blackburn, "Canadian Sovereignty and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the Defence White Paper," July, 1987, NDP Research.

¹²²⁰ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹²²¹ Tessa Hebb interview, May 2, 1991.

that Canada take on the responsibility of protecting the North Atlantic sea lanes as it had in World War II, even though such a task would be irrelevant in a full-scale nuclear war which, they were sure, could last only a few days. As well, they charged Blackburn with sharing Beatty's view that the Soviet threat was still the basic frame of reference within which all defence matters must be weighed.¹²²²

In the words of Robert Penner, the coordinator of the Canadian Peace Pledge Campaign and a party member, this had led the NDP defence critic to place

far too great an emphasis on military answers compared to foreign policy questions. There is little reference to the internationalist perspective contained in other NDP policy documents. Little mention is made of common, as opposed to, collective security, or the role of the United Nations.... The document seems to imply that an impending Soviet attack is likely and even suggests Canadian participation in nuclear war fighting strategies.¹²²³

Two other peace activists, John Bacher and Metta Spencer, responded in a similar vein. They argued that if Blackburn wished to accentuate the defence of Canadian sovereignty, it must be balanced with a strong internationalist emphasis. Otherwise, if Canada eventually left NATO, this could well signal a retreat into isolationism.¹²²⁴ (Bacher and Spencer demonstrated that it was possible to combine fervent idealism with a laissez faire attitude towards NATO.)

For Derek Wilson, a Winnipeg member of the NDP Federal Council, on the other hand, Blackburn's paper could not be salvaged. It represented a complete betrayal of

¹²²² *Ibid.*, Also see Peter Pentz, "NDP Critique of Beatty's White Paper on Defence," Oct., 1987, p.1, NDP Research.

¹²²³ Robert Penner to Ed Broadbent, January 24, 1988, NDP Research.

¹²²⁴ See, John Bacher and Metta Spencer, "Foreseeing the Implications of NDP Defence Policy," undated, NDP Research.

social democratic internationalism as encapsulated in past NDP convention resolutions. Indeed, in the absence of a more convincing national security policy, Wilson advocated the resuscitation of the 1981 IAC report, "Peace, Security and Justice," and the discarding of Blackburn's effort altogether.¹²²⁵ In a similar vein, the NDP Left Caucus denounced Blackburn's paper for betraying the CCF-NDP's longstanding anti-war tradition. Broadbent and Blackburn had run "before the tirades of the...capitalist press and left the party without a credible position at a favourable moment to win public sympathy to the party's anti-war policy."¹²²⁶

Of course, any NDP defence document must ultimately be judged by its handling of the NATO issue. Blackburn's statement on the subject read, "Canada can make a more effective contribution to peace and security outside of NATO.... We should re-work our agreements with the United States and our friends in Western Europe."¹²²⁷ To anti-Nato purists, this was fudging the issue. As Derek Wilson observed, the declaration did not explicitly say that an NDP government would withdraw from NATO or NORAD. In his view, this was an abdication of longstanding policy which would strain the credibility of the party. Instead, the NDP should do a better job of explaining its alliance position and press on regardless, because he was confident that the party's position represented a common sense alternative based on social democratic principles and the realities of the nuclear age.¹²²⁸

¹²²⁵ Derek Wilson, "Federal NDP Defence Policy Paper, Manitoba New Democrat, Vol.4 (December, 1987), p.5.

¹²²⁶ Gord D. Orlikow, "NDP Leaders Retreat From Anti-war Policy," Left Caucus Newsletter, Vol.2 (Feb.-March, 1988), pp.1,5-6.

¹²²⁷ Blackburn, "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence," p.6.

¹²²⁸ Derek B. Wilson to Ed Broadbent, Oct.27, 1987, NDP Research.

As a supporter of Canadian membership in NATO, Blackburn, in turn, was also unhappy. Official party policy had forced him to include references to leaving NATO in his document. Worse, he had to spend the rest of the summer defending a position with which he profoundly disagreed from strong media attacks and censure from defence analysts. In an interview with the author, Blackburn freely acknowledged his agreement with the critics' judgement that the section of his paper calling for NATO withdrawal was inconsistent with the generally pro-alliance tone and substance of his document.¹²²⁹

Blackburn was also perturbed that he had to defer to Canadian nationalism. Consequently, he considered totally nonsensical the statement in his paper arguing that it was time for Canada to assume "its security obligations as a separate but equal partner in the defence of North America."¹²³⁰ The costs would have been astronomical, a point mentioned by both NDP and external critics as well.¹²³¹ Geoffrey Pearson, Executive Director, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, tabulated that the cost of all the equipment purchases and changes in strategy necessary to implement Blackburn's "made in Canada defence policy" would have exceeded the bill for the military build-up proposed by the Tory White Paper.¹²³²

Blackburn maintains that Broadbent put him in the defence critic post after the 1984 election to "clear up the mess" in NDP defence policy. Broadbent, according to

¹²²⁹ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹²³⁰ Blackburn, "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence," p.13.

¹²³¹ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹²³² Geoffrey Pearson, "Comments on the NDP's Response to the Defence White Paper," Jan.26, 1988, Bill Blaikie Papers, pp.1-2.

Blackburn, knew little about the subject except he was sure there was something fundamentally wrong as matters then stood. "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the Defence White Paper," was Blackburn's attempt to start the process of reform. However, it suffered from all the weaknesses inherent in a document embodying a policy in transition and attempting to appeal to people on both sides of a controversial issue. Certainly, as a political statement it failed, managing only to alienate both idealists and realists.¹²³³ It represented, at best, a holding action until the party could overhaul its entire defence policy. All the negative publicity engendered by the response to the Blackburn paper ensured that this would happen sooner rather than later.

Thus, on August 10, 1987, key people in the party's unofficial foreign policy "think tank" met to map out a strategy. The people were Jewett, Blackburn, Steve Lee and Paul Howard (research assistants and advisors), along with Franklin Griffiths of the University of Toronto and David Cox, Research Director for CIIPS. The first overall objective, they agreed, was to lay the ground work for a comprehensive review of NDP defence and foreign policy with particular emphasis on policies compatible with the party's forthcoming election theme of fair and honest government for average Canadians. Second, they decided to ask all party planning committees, who were already meeting to set overall priorities and policy goals for a future NDP government, to make foreign policy considerations an integral part of their thinking. Third, foreign contacts should be expanded so as to enlarge the party's understanding of the "real world" to counter the public's perception of the NDP as the party least likely to maintain Canada's international reputation.¹²³⁴

¹²³³ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹²³⁴ Steve Lee, Confidential Memo, "Evolution of New Democratic Sovereignty,

However, by December of that year, this informal NDP foreign policy group had narrowed its vision to basically one area (defence) and to one overriding objective (resolving the NATO issue.) In a memo dated, December 3rd, Steve Lee advocated a two-track approach to the problem. This would involve detailed analysis of all aspects of the NATO question and simultaneously the development of a strategy on how best to present the results to the electorate in the forthcoming federal election. The key point, in Lee's view, was that while

it may not be necessary to try to convince the public and the media (as we know foreign affairs is not a vote determining issue) - we will have to sound convinced ourselves if we are to maintain our honest, fair, fit to govern positioning.¹²³⁵

Fortunately for the NDP, a new defence policy framework based on social democratic principles was available, namely, the concept of common security. Perhaps a consensus could be built around this idea which would resolve the differences over defence policy that had plagued the party from its birth. The term, "common security" had first emerged on the world scene in 1982 with the publication of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister, Olof Palme.

In brief, common security was based on the theory that security for one nation could only be ensured and enhanced by increasing the confidence and security of all. No nation could gain security by making another feel insecure or by attempting to make itself impregnable. Moreover, common security could work only if an alternative

Defence and Foreign Policy," Aug.25, 1987. NDP Research.

¹²³⁵ Steve Lee, "Evolution of New Democratic Sovereignty, Defence, Foreign Policy - Defence Policy and NATO," Dec.3, 1987. NDP Research.

global psychology of defence based on purely defensive principles was created.¹²³⁶ For the world to achieve that happy state, each nation would have to reduce its offensive military capability in stages until only defensive weapons remained. As each stage was implemented, countries (some of them former adversaries) would increasingly find their security so intertwined that trust would gradually replace fear and eventually even defensive arms might shrink almost to zero.¹²³⁷ The ultimate objective was to resolve conflicts without war, relying instead on cooperation and conflict resolution techniques. It was even suggested that before national leaders took office, they should have to pass a test on conflict resolution. Implementation of common security required, of course, the strengthening of international law and world institutions such as the World Court and the United Nations.¹²³⁸ It is easy to see why common security appealed to Canadian social democratic internationalism with its idealist vision of a united and peaceful world.

The concept of common security, as pioneered by the Palme Commission, was reinforced in social democratic circles by the findings of two other key commissions chaired by prominent social democratic world leaders in the Eighties, Willy Brandt and Gro Brundtland. The Brandt Commission Reports (1980 and 1983) demonstrated that economic security for any of the world's people required the cooperation of all. The World Commission on the Environment and Development, chaired by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro H. Brundtland released its report, Our Common Future, in 1987.

¹²³⁶ Hania Fedorowicz to NDP caucus and staff, Subject: Common Security and Alternative Defence, Oct.5, 1987, NDP Research.

¹²³⁷ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991. Blackburn based his understanding of common security on the work of another German social democratic foreign policy theorist, Egon Bahr.

¹²³⁸ Fedorowicz to Caucus and Staff, Oct.5, 1987.

It further strengthened the notion of interdependence by showing how the growing environmental crisis threatened every person's security and survival. The impact of these three reports (the "holy trinity" of social democratic internationalism in the Eighties) on the NDP 1988 defence policy document would be profound.

By 1984, through their connections with the Socialist International and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), key members of the NDP caucus and International Affairs Committee had been exposed to the new doctrine and were gradually introducing the language of common security into foreign policy debates in Canada. For example, upon her return from the 1984 Stockholm conference of CSCE, Pauline Jewett reported to the House how impressed she had been by the contribution of the neutral countries, Sweden, Austria and Yugoslavia, who talked not about military security, but security for all:

There was a feeling at the conference that if only the US and the USSR were not there or did not exist, agreement could be brought about on disarmament and the concept of a common security instead of many individual states' security could be realized.¹²³⁹

In other words, common security was beginning to emerge in Jewett's mind as an alternative to collective security, dependent as the latter was on the existence of two armed camps each led by a superpower.

Indeed, by 1987, a number of liberal-left Canadians who worked in the international security field had made common security the central principle in their thinking and writing about defence. Among others, this included C.G.Gifford of Veterans Against Nuclear arms, Gwynn Dyer, an independent defence policy expert,

¹²³⁹ Debates, Jan.25, 1984, pp.738-40.

and Roman Catholic bishop, Remi DeRoo, all of whom began to include the common security theme in their writing and lecturing.¹²⁴⁰ As a result, the NDP knew it could count on the support of a growing consensus in these circles for a reappraisal of defence policy based on common security principles.

However, common security did not win automatic acceptance in the upper echelons of the New Democratic Party. For example, the NDP's Policy Review Committee initially rejected a resolution for debate that introduced the idea at the 1987 spring convention. In the end, the notion was included, but as a minor part in a resolution on the protection of Canadian sovereignty and without explaining the concept.¹²⁴¹ In the winter of 1986-7, the party's IAC itself had not yet paid much attention to common security. In fact, it had just made a commitment to concentrate its efforts for the next two years on a thorough review of the party's international development assistance policies.¹²⁴²

Even in September of 1987 with the Federal Council poised to authorize the IAC to undertake a comprehensive defence policy review with common security almost certain to be its guiding and integrative principle, researchers at NDP headquarters in Ottawa were still frantically searching for background information on the concept and

¹²⁴⁰ For example, C.G. Gifford wrote an untitled booklet in 1988 analysing the Tory White Paper from the standpoint of common security, NDP Research; Also, Gwynn Dyer and Tina Viljoen, "Neutrality: A Choice Canada Can Make," Compass (June 88), pp.6-10; Remi DeRoo, "Global Forces - Canadian Challenges: Towards the Development of an Alternative Foreign Policy in Canada...", Forum 2000, NDP Research.

¹²⁴¹ "Resolution B.4.5," New Democratic Party International Affairs Resolutions, 1989, pp.20-1. Also see Peggy Hope-Simpson to Pauline Jewett, Oct.17, 1987, Blaikie Papers.

¹²⁴² Steve Lee to Bill Knight, Re: Request to caucus to pre-convention information, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.71, File 9.

its possible applications to the Canadian situation. For example, in a letter Hania Fedorowicz wrote to Professor Dietrich Fischer, a European social democrat teaching at the Centre for International Studies at Princeton and who had published extensively on common security, she stated,

Since the Palme Commission, there seems to be little serious discussion of this idea by politicians and government leaders. This lack of enthusiasm (or perhaps understanding) make it that much more difficult for our party leader to launch this concept as a serious alternative.¹²⁴³

There was confusion about the parameters of common security. Did it apply to all weapons or just conventional ones? Derek Blackburn insists that Egon Bahr told him privately that he never intended for nuclear weapons to be part of the common security equation.¹²⁴⁴

The person most responsible for popularizing common security within the upper echelons of the NDP and later convincing the IAC to use it as the foundational and integrative principle in its 1988 report was Peggy Hope-Simpson, a Nova Scotia member of the IAC's defence policy subgroup. She spent the summer of 1987 on

¹²⁴³ Hania Fedorowicz to Prof. Dietrich Fischer, Sept.29, 1987, NDP Research.

Shortly after this, she was apparently able to attend a lecture given by Fischer on the subject in Ottawa under the auspices of an officially non-partisan organization (although consisting mostly of liberal-left intellectuals) called the Group of 78 which had been formed in the early Eighties to promote the peace agenda. In fact, in 1986, they had organized their general conference around the theme of common security and had established a smaller working group on the subject which also included alternative defence. See, Fedorowicz to NDP Caucus and staff, Subject: Common Security and Alternative Defence, Oct.5, 1987, NDP Research; Hania Fedorowicz, "NATO Policy Affirmed: Common Security Essential," New Democrat, Vol.5 (June, 1988), p.1. Clyde and Penny Sanger were founding members of the Group of 78. Sanger interview, June 19, 1993.

¹²⁴⁴ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

assignment from the NDP studying common security intensely, most particularly through a series of meetings with Scandinavian social democratic leaders who were attempting to integrate the concept into their own nations' defence strategies and programs. Specifically, Hope-Simpson's objective was to explore the applicability of the common security principle to what the NDP had by then come to believe were the two most immediate Canadian security and sovereignty challenges. First, the NDP was very worried about American strategies for Northern Forward defence which must inevitably affect Canada. Second, Canada must find a way to carry out basic surveillance of its airspace, coasts and economic zones so as not to constitute a de facto "threat" to the Americans, while at the same time not contributing to the provocative capacity of the United States military machine.¹²⁴⁵

Everywhere, Hope-Simpson found that European social democrats were taking the NDP much more seriously now that it appeared to be a real contender for power in Ottawa. For example, she was invited to participate in an important foreign policy panel at the British Labour Party's annual Conference in Brighton. In virtually all these encounters, the Europeans urged Simpson to do all she could to persuade the NDP to abandon its traditional "get out of NATO at all costs" policy. Instead, they hoped that Canada under a New Democratic government would take on a "natural leadership" role of the non-superpower nations in NATO and employ its influence to promote common security policies within the alliance.¹²⁴⁶ Needless to say, Hope-Simpson, must have found the notion of a new and special role for Canada most appealing, reinforcing as it did one of the chief tenets of Canadian social democratic internationalism.

¹²⁴⁵ Peggy Hope-Simpson to John J. Holst, Minister of Defence, Norway, Aug. 21, 1987, Bill Blaikie Papers.

¹²⁴⁶ Peggy Hope-Simpson to Steve Lee, Sept. 5, 1987, Blaikie Papers.

Upon her return to Canada in the early fall of 1987, Hope-Simpson wrote several detailed reports in which she demonstrated how common security could serve as a new conceptual framework for NDP defence policy and how its principles could be applied to specific Canadian defence problems.¹²⁴⁷ As Clyde Sanger, who was later hired by the NDP to write the 1988 IAC report freely acknowledges, it was Simpson's preliminary work that was decisive in clarifying the meaning of common security for him and, he believes, for other members of the IAC as well. Indeed, her hope had been to review all of NDP foreign policy with common security as the lodestar. She even talked about eventually creating a culture of peace that would permeate all of Canadian society.¹²⁴⁸ Broadbent and the other realists in the upper echelons of the New Democratic Party were about to see their long-standing desire for a complete review of the party's defence policy fulfilled.

¹²⁴⁷ Peggy Hope-Simpson to George Nakitsas, Oct. 15, 1987, BLaikie Papers.

¹²⁴⁸ Simpson to an anonymous acquaintance, Oct. 18, 1987, Blaikie Papers.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE NEW DEFENCE POLICY - COMMON SECURITY AND THE DEFEAT OF THE REALISTS (1987-8)

The NDP had never conducted a comprehensive review of its defence policy. Bill Knight believes this should have occurred in the late Sixties before any decision about NATO was made at the 1969 convention.¹²⁴⁹ Even the detailed 1980-1 investigation by the International Affairs Committee of virtually all aspects of NDP foreign policy did not attempt an exhaustive analysis of defence policy. This was about to change.

Preparatory organizational work by Tessa Hebb and Bill Blaikie, the co-chairs of the IAC, commenced in late 1987. However, the committee did not meet as a whole until the end of January, 1988, and finished its task in mid-April of the same year. Of the ten active members, three were members of Parliament: Blaikie, Jewett and Blackburn.

In the initial sessions, the committee heard or read submissions by experts in the defence and foreign policy field, quite a few of whom were not NDP members,

¹²⁴⁹ Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

although generally sympathetic to liberal-left perspectives. Among others, the list included: Geoffrey Pearson, executive director, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in Ottawa; George Ignatieff, president, Science for Peace; C.G.Gifford and Raymond A. Criery, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms; Leonard V. Johnson, Canadian Major-General (Ret.); Frank Griffiths, Professor, Stanford University; Michael McGuire, The Brookings Institute; Fergus Watt, World Federalists of Canada; The Canadian Council of Churches; Ernie Regehr, research coordinator, Project Ploughshares; the Canadian Labor Congress; Simon Rosenblum, long-time member of the NDP foreign policy "think tank," and an anonymous Department of National Defence employee.

In the second stage, the substantive work of analyzing the material and creating consensus occurred. Blaikie insisted that deliberations take place behind closed doors to allow committee members to contemplate controversial issues afresh without being immediately accused by radical party idealists of besmirching the purity of NDP doctrine. Blaikie's move annoyed some people, particularly Dan Heap, because he felt that the committee was stacked with pro-NATO people.¹²⁵⁰ Regardless, despite being denied observer status, Heap managed to get his views on the record by means of a lengthy memo he sent to each member of the IAC.¹²⁵¹

Michelle Brown, an NDP youth member of the IAC, largely agrees with Heap's contention that the inner circle of the party went to considerable lengths to control the outcome of the committee's deliberations, especially on a few important but controversial matters. For this reason, Dan Heap and his alleged "softness on the issues" was unwelcome. Moreover, Brown found her own idealism sorely tried by what

¹²⁵⁰ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

¹²⁵¹ Dan Heap to the IAC, January 5, 1988, Blaikie Papers.

she described as the "Stalinist tactics" of Robin Sears, NDP Federal Secretary at the time, who appeared to be serving as Broadbent's point man on the committee.¹²⁵² Sears's main objective appeared to be to achieve rapid consensus on the main issues, hopefully in ways that would satisfy Broadbent in anticipation of an early summer federal election. Clyde Sanger, a left-wing journalist who was hired to write some of the drafts and the final report, agrees with Brown's interpretation of Sear's tactics.¹²⁵³

In Brown's opinion, the process was fundamentally flawed from the start. First, the committee heard mostly from non-party experts. Second, the committee co-chairs allowed few opportunities to cross-examine the presenters. Third, preliminary drafts of the committee's report were not circulated widely among party members for their input as had been done in 1981.¹²⁵⁴ John Brewin maintains, however, that some key party members did read preliminary drafts of the final report.¹²⁵⁵

Tensions naturally surfaced in the course of the committee's work, although Tessa Hebb maintains that apart from the NATO question, consensus was reached with relative ease.¹²⁵⁶ As a more neutral participant, Clyde Sanger's observations carry particular weight.¹²⁵⁷ According to him, Blackburn almost walked out on one occasion when people persisted in questioning his defence spending figures. Blackburn

¹²⁵² Michelle Brown interview, May 3, 1991.

¹²⁵³ Clyde Sanger interview, June 19, 1993.

¹²⁵⁴ Michelle Brown interview, May 3, 1991.

¹²⁵⁵ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

¹²⁵⁶ Tessa Hebb interview, May 2, 1991.

¹²⁵⁷ Blaikie says it was his idea to hire a neutral person to write the final report to avoid charges of bias by either the pro- or anti-NATO camps. Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

also felt that Jewett's views were receiving too much credence. Jewett, in turn, kept pacing the halls in frustration because she could not convince the pro-NATO people that their position was wrong. Blaikie stayed out of most of the verbal jousting and histrionics, content for the most part to provide low-key guidance to the proceedings. Through it all, John Brewin played the role of conciliator working out the specific language of the text as befitted a lawyer.¹²⁵⁸

In writing the various drafts of the NDP common security document, Sanger was particularly conscious of the two audiences the NDP was trying to reach. First, the concept of common security must be introduced and sold to the party rank and file (many of whom had never heard of it) as one in keeping with the party's fundamental beliefs, but also capable of pointing the way to the future for a party supposedly on the verge of taking power. Second, the document must set out the fundamentals of NDP defence policy in such a way that the key points could be easily isolated for use with the general public in the coming election.¹²⁵⁹

Examination of the contents and organization of the finished product, a 57 page document released on April 16th, 1988, entitled, "Canada's Stake in Common Security," (hereafter called "Canada's Stake") reveals that Sanger's objectives were at least partly achieved.¹²⁶⁰ Previous NDP foreign and defence policy statements had been mostly reactive in nature. For example, both "Peace, Security and Justice," (1981) and "Peace and Security," (1983), had begun with a description of the threat posed to international peace and security by contemporary world conditions. In

¹²⁵⁸ Clyde Sanger interview, June 19, 1993.

¹²⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁶⁰ "Canada's Stake in Common Security," published by the New Democratic Party, April 16, 1988.

contrast, "Canada's Stake" took as its initial point of departure the new doctrine of common security before even mentioning the global threat to peace. The authors were saying, in effect, that the authors intended to redefine the terms of the NDP's internal debate about foreign and defence policy as well as the broader one occurring throughout the country. Everything was to be judged by a new criterion, whether it contributed to the building of a global common security system.

Constantly hovering over the proceedings was the coming election, as the document made clear:

For the first time in Canadian history, the NDP is in a position to assert its ability to form a government. So the time has come to set out in some detail the party's policies on security and defence issues.¹²⁶¹

The authors of "Canada's Stake" attempted, therefore, to demonstrate how public opinion in the late Eighties had moved towards acceptance of foreign and defence policy perspectives long championed by the NDP and now increasingly relevant in the Gorbachev era. The NDP was now, they claimed, the party that spoke for the majority of Canadians on foreign and defence policy matters!¹²⁶²

The rest of "Canada's Stake" discussed and case studies. Hence, the second section described how the concept of security had changed over the past decade by examining approaches to common security as discussed by Olof Palme, Cyrus Vance, Gro Brundtland, King Gordon (a founder of the CCF who was still writing) and reports by the United Nations and Veterans Against Nuclear War. Most of the remaining sections of "Canada's Stake" were devoted to reviewing past foreign policy "errors"

¹²⁶¹ Ibid., p.6.

¹²⁶² Ibid., pp.6-7.

by Liberal and Conservative governments and applying common security theory to contemporary defence policy issues in accordance with longstanding NDP principles.

Four major questions must be considered in assessing the success or failure of "Canada's Stake". First, to what extent did it reflect traditional NDP foreign and defence policy principles and objectives? Second, did it meet the immediate need for an updated foreign and defence policy in preparation for the next election? Third, in particular, did it resolve the longstanding conflict within the NDP between anti- and pro-Nato factions? Fourth, did it lay the basis for a Canadian social democratic foreign and defence policy for the Nineties and beyond?

To answer these questions, requires, first of all, an examination of the seven principles outlined in "Canada's Stake" which the authors stated must guide NDP defence policy.¹²⁶³ What is immediately apparent is how well the doctrine of common security dovetailed with and indeed enhanced these fundamental NDP principles which underlay not only foreign policy but domestic policy as well. For example, the first principle's assertion that security is mutual rather than competitive resonated strongly with a party that had long hoped for the day when cooperation would replace competition in all areas of life. The second principle developed this further by noting that common security must be based not on a "fortress attitude," but on common efforts to create a just social order whose origins lay primarily in such non-military initiatives as equitable trade policies, support for human rights and protection of the environment. Of course, the conviction that peace was impossible without specific efforts to promote international justice had a long history in the New Democratic Party as did the third principle, the prohibition of nuclear weapons.¹²⁶⁴

¹²⁶³ Ibid., pp.50-1.

¹²⁶⁴ Ibid.

Common security implied the existence of a stable and just international order which recognized and respected Canadian sovereignty and territory. Hence, Canada's primary responsibility in its own defence was to contribute to the development of such an order under the auspices of the United Nations (Principle 4). Such military capabilities as Canada possessed should be completely defensive in nature designed to defend without threatening or provoking (Principle 7). Canada's special role also extended to responding constructively to global military, economic and other threats to this stable and, hopefully, just international order whether the source be weapons proliferation, East-West tensions or Third World conflicts (Principle 5). In particular, because of its strategic location between the two Superpowers, Canada had the power either to stabilize or disturb the international order. Hence, it should not allow its land, airspace or territorial waters to be used in any way that might be interpreted as threatening to a third country (Principle 6).¹²⁶⁵

As implied in these principles, adoption of common security would force Canada to reassess its role in the world including its membership in NATO and NORAD, something the NDP had long wanted Canada to do. In addition, and happily for NDP idealists, common security held out the promise of hastening the demise of collective security as hitherto understood, dependent as it was on the continued existence of

¹²⁶⁵ ibid. Interestingly, five of these principles were taken virtually word for word from the submission by Ernie Regehr, Research Coordinator of Project Ploughshares, to the IAC hearings. See, Ernie Regehr to Bill Blaikie, Mar. 22, 1988, Blaikie Papers. Moreover, the same principles had earlier appeared in a letter from the Canadian Council of Churches to Prime Minister Mulroney in which they were responding to Beatty's 1987 defence White Paper. See Canadian Council of Churches to Mulroney, Feb, 4, 1988, NDP Research. It is not clear however, whether Regehr borrowed from the Council or vice versa. In fact, it was John W. Foster, a member of the United Church's Division of Mission in Canada and also a member of the NDP's IAC who personally submitted the Council of Churches statement for consideration by the party committee. Such were the close ties between the peace movement, church leaders and the NDP in the Eighties.

military blocs. As for arms control and disarmament, perennial cornerstones of NDP foreign policy, they were also central to the whole common security philosophy.

"Canada's Stake" was a clarion call for a renewed Canadian commitment to social democratic internationalism. It had sweeping implications for another significant NDP foreign policy principle, the struggle for an independent foreign policy and its corollary, the defence of Canadian sovereignty. As noted above, the fourth principle affirmed by "Canada's Stake" emphasized that Canadian security depended primarily on maintenance of a stable international order which the authors assumed would respect Canadian territory and sovereignty. They even stated explicitly that common security must take precedence over sovereignty.¹²⁶⁶ Indeed, the term, "an independent foreign policy" did not appear in the document. According to Blaikie, this was partly because the authors viewed it as a term from a bygone era, while common security pointed to the future.¹²⁶⁷ However, this did not mean that the historic tension within the NDP between nationalism and internationalism had finally been resolved in favour of the latter.

The issue of northern Canadian security and sovereignty, a matter which by 1987 had emerged at or near the top in any discussion of Canadian defence policy concerns both in social democratic circles and beyond, illustrated the continued tension in "Canada's Stake" between the two NDP approaches to foreign policy.¹²⁶⁸ The North was a major focus throughout much of the document, especially in the lengthy

¹²⁶⁶ "Canada's Stake," p.16.

¹²⁶⁷ Blaikie interview, May 7, 1993.

¹²⁶⁸ For example see, Wayne C. Thompson, "Canadian Defence Policy," Current History, Vol.87 (March, 1988), pp.105-8, 127-130; John Honderich, "The Arctic Option: NATO and the Canadian North," The Canadian Forum, Vol.63 (October, 1987), pp.7-19.

analyses of NORAD and maritime defence. It was also an integral part of the text's declaration that Canadians needed to start observing their place in the world from a new perspective. Instead of hovering on the globe's periphery as most maps would have it, Canada was at the centre. After all, Canada, with its vast northern territory stretching almost to the North Pole, was located between the two Superpowers and linked geographically and strategically with the European Nordic nations and with important neighbours across the North Pacific in Asia.¹²⁶⁹

While the security and sovereignty of the North had always been part of NDP thinking and had been briefly noted in the '81 and '83 foreign and defence policy discussion papers, the issue had gained new prominence because of the conjunction of several historical developments in the mid-Eighties. These included the renewed arms race, the subsequent Canada- United States plans to upgrade the DEW line, the 1985 voyage of an American icebreaker without permission in waters claimed by Canada, and finally the high profile the North received in Tory minister Perrin Beatty's White Paper. With the Superpowers investing more in under-ice technology and improved nuclear submarines and missiles, the Arctic Ocean had become even more important strategically. In addition, many of the concerns the NDP had about United States defence and strategic policy touched in one way or another on the Canadian North including first strike capability, Star Wars, forward naval strategy and the apparent integration of NORAD into the American space command.

NDP foreign and defence policy thinkers were naturally very concerned about these developments as many of the submissions to the IAC made clear. Common security was warmly welcomed in this regard because it appeared to provide a workable alternative. In her discussions with Scandinavian social democratic leaders,

¹²⁶⁹ "Canada's Stake," pp.15-7.

Peggy Hope-Simpson discovered that they too were very interested in exploring with Canada the possibility of implementing common security in the North through the negotiation of a cooperative security and scientific regime involving the seven Nordic countries with territory in the Arctic Basin. During the course of the IAC's deliberations, Simpson convinced the other members of the committee of the merits of the Arctic Basin concept, and thus it became the centre piece of the document's defence policy for the North.

A 1987 convention resolution had made brief mention of the Arctic Basin idea, but it was Simpson who was most responsible for popularizing it in NDP circles. Indeed, she envisioned that the Basin agreement would go far beyond foreign and defence policy cooperation to include joint environment and resource management planning and co-operative northern development efforts.¹²⁷⁰

The authors of "Canada's Stake" were particularly pleased that an international Arctic Basin regime for co-operation and security would provide Canada with new allies against cruise missile deployment and for a declaration of an Arctic nuclear weapons free zone. In keeping with this, the IAC document also urged Canada to take the initiative in establishing a permanent council for international discussion of Arctic issues and an international satellite monitoring agency under UN auspices to promote demilitarization of the region.¹²⁷¹

A positive by-product of a common security agreement with Nordic nations would be its usefulness as a counterweight to the historic dominance of Washington

¹²⁷⁰ See Simpson, "Report on the Follow-Up to the March, 1987, Convention Resolution on 'Arctic Sovereignty and Common Security,'" Oct.12, 1987, Blaikie Papers. Another important paper she wrote on this theme was "Common Security Principles for Canada - A discussion Paper prepared for the IAC of the New Democratic Party," Nov.23, 1987, NDP Research.

¹²⁷¹ "Canada's Stake," pp.34-7.

over Canadian foreign and defence policy. No longer would critics of the New Democratic Party's NORAD and NATO policies be able to argue that Canada had no alternative but to tie its security planning irrevocably to that of the United States. Hence, now was the time for NORAD to be replaced by another agreement with the United States whereby Canada would take charge of peacetime surveillance and the northern warning systems. In this way, Canada could avoid any links to ballistic missile defence while also removing any possible threats to a third country originating from Canadian soil.¹²⁷² Canada, in effect, would assume the role of an independent semi-neutral security buffer. (The whole notion is reminiscent of an idea quite popular in NDP circles in the Sixties that Canada should run the DEW line independently and supply military intelligence to both the Soviet Union and the United States thereby deterring surprise attacks by either side.)

Naturally, all this would require considerable financial expenditures on a wide range of military hardware. In addition to sensors and satellites, Canada would have to build or purchase frigates, helicopters, minesweepers and new surveillance and transport aircraft, while replacing its aging fleet of submarines. At the same time, the authors of "Canada's Stake" rejected the nuclear-powered submarine option favoured by the Tories allegedly because of its high cost and offensive naval capacity.¹²⁷³ Many members of the IAC were uncomfortable with the proposed defence spending increases. Nevertheless, they eventually justified it on grounds that expanding the Canadian arms industry for domestic use would be accompanied by tougher restrictions on arms sales to Third World belligerents and increased research funding

¹²⁷² Ibid., p.34.

¹²⁷³ Ibid., pp.41-2.

for economic conversion from military to civilian production for companies reliant on those sales.¹²⁷⁴

Following the release of "Canada's Stake," critics both inside and outside the party drew attention to the apparent reversal of the NDP's historic stance against increased military spending. For example, John Lamb of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control asserted that the NDP's plan to have all of Canada's defence equipment and weapons manufactured domestically would require a greatly expanded indigenous military industrial complex to carry out the basic research, weapons development, testing and production. The result would be levels of defence spending even higher than the Tory program.¹²⁷⁵ In Parliament on May 5, 1988, the Conservatives chided the NDP on this point and demanded clarification. In reply, Jim Manley tried to deflect criticism by maintaining that the NDP had not yet finished putting a price tag on the items they proposed to build or buy. The lack of cost estimates fooled nobody, least of all the party's internal critics.¹²⁷⁶

Blaikie frankly acknowledges the dilemma posed by these suggested expenditures: "An independent foreign policy is expensive.... We [(NDPers)] want to be independent but not pay." However, he maintains that spending money on Arctic surveillance, satellite technology and patrol boats to keep Canada's coasts from becoming an environmental dumping ground was one thing. Expenditures on tanks and

¹²⁷⁴ Ibid., p.38.

¹²⁷⁵ John Lamb, "NDP Defence Policy: A Critical Assessment," Arms Control Communique, April, 19, 1988.

¹²⁷⁶ For example, see the paper, "Comment on 'Canada's Stake in Common Security'" by an anonymous author, undated, NDP Research.

attack aircraft for NATO's central front in Europe (as then proposed by the Tories) was quite another.¹²⁷⁷

Probably one of the most significant contributions of "Canada's Stake" to NDP defence policy was its attempt to apply innovative thinking to the new defence and foreign policy challenges emerging in the late Eighties, of which the North was only one illustration. Another example was the document's redirection of the party's attention to the Far East and Canada's Pacific coast for the first time in NDP history. Specifically, "Canada's Stake" pledged strong support for the efforts of the Pacific people to resist the militarization of their region and lessen the negative impact the United States had had on their independence and integrity. The document also wanted Canada to develop an independent policy for the Pacific region completely disentangled from the Pentagon's. The result would be a more central place in the world for Canada.¹²⁷⁸

Here was another example of NDP foreign and defence policy thinkers attempting to make defence policy serve the broader interests of Canadian social democratic internationalism, one in which Canada would play a starring role. This also explains why in a document devoted to defence issues, the authors made sure that the NDP's traditional strong support for Third World development assistance, a fairer world trading system and debt reduction for poorer nations were reaffirmed.

Despite "Canada's Stake in Common Security's" attempt to cover all aspects of Canadian defence policy, the document had serious omissions. Most seriously, Canada's contribution to peacekeeping and, indeed, the role of the United Nations, which would be vital to the successful implementation of global common security,

¹²⁷⁷ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

¹²⁷⁸ "Canada's Stake," pp.44-5.

received only superficial treatment. In so doing, the NDP missed a great opportunity to make a significant contribution to social democratic internationalism by conducting a detailed analysis of how the UN could be strengthened and adapted to the new task.

Several questions could also be raised about the strictly defence policy aspects of "Canada's Stake." First, its broad-based approach to security meant that defence policy in the narrow sense suffered. As an anonymous critic observed, so much space was devoted to a critique of past and current government policies and to arms control, that the document's analysis of defence policy proper was less focused and detailed than even Blackburn's 1987 paper. In fact, more effort was expended detailing the problems of converting military production to civilian use than in examining what the new material needs of the Canadian Armed Forces would be if they were to implement "Canada's Stake's" wide-ranging and rather daunting objectives.¹²⁷⁹

Still more serious was the charge that the authors of the NDP defence document had failed to demonstrate conclusively how the party's new emphasis on building up Canada's territorial defence capability could help create the stable and peaceful international order envisioned by "Canada's Stake." Indeed, it may have had the opposite effect, even stimulating a small arms race with other middle powers.¹²⁸⁰

Furthermore, as part of the NDP's pledge to work for a new Arctic security regime, "Canada's Stake" called for a re-assigning of troops to Norway in a crisis, a commitment that had recently been cancelled by the Mulroney government. How could an NDP government increase its commitment to peacekeeping, build up coastal defences and, in addition, promise to send troops to Norway if needed? The failure of

¹²⁷⁹ "Comment on Canada's Stake in Common Security," NDP Research, p.1.

¹²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.2.

the authors to work out the detailed costs of their proposals and prioritize commitments sufficiently left "Canada's Stake" vulnerable to criticism.

Clyde Sanger's main criticism is that too much time and effort were devoted to the NATO question, since he believes that the really important and potentially explosive issue was NORAD. The United States would feel much more threatened by a Canadian withdrawal from NORAD than NATO.¹²⁸¹

Despite these deficiencies, "Canada's Stake" would have gone down in NDP annals as an enormous success if it had been able to resolve the longstanding division in the party between realists who favoured Canadian membership in NATO and idealists who opposed it. The authors of the document adopted a three point strategy designed to bridge the gap between the pro and anti-NATO camps. First, they recounted in considerable detail most of the traditional criticisms of NATO that virtually all Canadian social democrats agreed were most important. These included NATO's failure to become more than a military alliance and its willingness to use nuclear weapons first based on the doctrine of "flexible response". The document also noted the negative impact of the 1979 "two track decision" and recent moves to modernize NATO nuclear weapons.¹²⁸² Second, "Canada's Stake" outlined five goals that both anti-and pro-NATO people agreed Canada should promote as long as it remained in NATO. These included troop reductions and disengagement in Europe within the context of CSCE, the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons, promotion through CSCE of the new Arctic security regime, a worldwide chemical weapons ban and adoption by NATO of no first-use and non-offensive declarations.¹²⁸³ The third way

¹²⁸¹ Sanger interview, June 19, 1993.

¹²⁸² "Canada's Stake," pp.25-9.

¹²⁸³ Ibid. pp.29-30.

the document tried to bridge the gap between the realists and idealists was to call attention to their shared conviction that the defence of Canada and the peace of the world depended to a significant extent on the dissolution of military blocs.¹²⁸⁴

However, hopes for a final solution to the party's NATO problem were dealt a severe blow as soon as the committee began meeting. Some anti-NATO party activists, most particularly in Dan Heap's Trinity-Spadina riding, heard a rumour that the IAC might be effecting a unilateral shift in the party's NATO policy. Almost immediately, they, along with some other NDP riding associations, passed resolutions and wrote letters of protest pointing out that constitutionally only party conventions could make substantive changes to party policy, not Federal Council or party committees.¹²⁸⁵ When, despite this outcry, Desmond Morton persisted in calling for a fundamental shift in NDP NATO policy in an article he wrote for the Toronto Star, Dan Heap struck back with an open letter of his own in the same newspaper denouncing Morton's machinations.¹²⁸⁶

Some NDPers came to the defence of the IAC's review of NATO policy, but compared to the critics they were few in number. One of the committee's defenders suggested that if the NDP formed the government after the next election, they should settle the issue by holding a nation-wide plebiscite, which he was sure the neutralists

¹²⁸⁴ Ibid., p.52.

¹²⁸⁵ See "Resolution Passed by the Members of Trinity-Spadina NDP Riding Assoc., Jan. 28, 1988, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.44, File 10; "Resolution Passed By the Ottawa-Vanier NDP Riding Assoc.," Feb. 16, 1988, Blaikie Papers; Dick Myers, President of the Kingston and the Islands NDP Assoc. to Johanna den Hertog, Feb.19, 1988, Blaikie Papers; Martin Cohn, "NDP Forced To Stick With NATO Policy," Toronto Star, Feb.8, 1988.

¹²⁸⁶ Desmond Morton, "NDP Courts Disaster With Its Old Defence Policy," Toronto Star, Feb.15, 1988; Dan Heap, "The NDP and Policy on NATO," Toronto Star, March 16, 1988.

would lose.¹²⁸⁷ Another, while supporting the NDP's official position on NATO, recognized that it could damage the party's electoral chances. Hence, the policy should be defended in the coming campaign in the context of a pledge that, if elected, an NDP government would produce a Green Paper outlining the country's options followed by a nation-wide debate on defence matters. Based on these discussions and the state of the world at the time, the NDP would announce its specific plans before going to the electorate again.¹²⁸⁸

In an attempt to end the controversy, party president, Johanna den Hertog, publicly confirmed what the critics had been saying. The IAC could not unilaterally alter NDP defence policy. Partly in response to this, some of the pro-NATO people on the committee led by Robin Sears proposed a new solution which they believed held out some hope of reaching a compromise given the circumstances. After lengthy and heated debate on the matter, the IAC agreed on the following wording, "Given the magnitude of these initial tasks, notice of Canada's intention to withdraw from NATO will be given in a subsequent term of a New Democratic Party government."¹²⁸⁹ Evidently, members of the committee who favoured Canadian membership in NATO believed this did not contradict past anti-NATO resolutions since these had not specified the exact timing of a NATO withdrawal subsequent to an NDP electoral victory.

Already during the previous fall, this "solution" had been broached in some top NDP circles. For example, in two letters she wrote on the NATO question, researcher Hania Fedorowicz noted that party resolutions did not commit an NDP government to

¹²⁸⁷ R. Macy to the IAC, undated, Blaikie Papers.

¹²⁸⁸ Grant Macdonald to the IAC, Mar.8, 1988, Blaikie Papers.

¹²⁸⁹ "Canada's Stake," p.54.

a specific timetable for NATO withdrawal which left considerable room for interpretation.¹²⁹⁰ Even a committed pro-NATO person like Pauline Jewett admitted that a newly elected NDP government could not pull out of NATO forthwith.¹²⁹¹

Some pro-NATOists on the IAC still hoped to find a way for Canada to stay in NATO long-term as Robin Sears strongly intimated in a February 23, 1988 memo. To that end, he described the following scenario. In the first three years of an NDP government, New Democrats would fight for a revision of NATO policies to transform it from the American war-fighting organization it now was into a true partnership based on common security principles. If successful, Sears and his supporters knew that a future NDP convention would never embarrass an NDP government and force it to withdraw from the alliance. If NATO refused to change, the NDP could campaign for a second mandate on a get-out-of NATO platform with a reasonable chance of winning the election, having, in its first term, been able to influence the Canadian foreign policy climate by engaging in a large-scale public education effort.¹²⁹²

After "Canada's Stake" was released on April 16, 1988, it soon became obvious that most internal party critics were not fooled by the IAC's NATO compromise. Some pointed out that remaining in NATO throughout a term of office without a firm deadline for withdrawal would undermine Canadian efforts to modify the direction of the alliance. Others noted that if Canada's NATO allies knew it was

¹²⁹⁰ Fedorowicz to Rob Leavitt, Oct.14, 1987; Fedorowicz to Gladys Pollack, Nov.23, 1987, NDP Research.

¹²⁹¹ Jewett interview, May 2, 1988.

¹²⁹² Robin Sears, "NATO," Feb.23, 1988, Clyde Sanger Papers.

definitely leaving the alliance in a second term of an NDP government, Canada would immediately lose all influence in the organization.¹²⁹³

The proposed compromise never had much chance of obtaining enthusiastic support. Realists, who believed that Canada belonged in NATO for historical, strategic and practical reasons could not be happy that under an NDP government, Canada would be leaving the alliance sooner or later. Similarly, many NDPers, and not just radical left wing idealists who disdained American and NATO "imperialism" and viewed membership in NATO as an unpardonable "sin," would not be mollified by anything short of a pledge of immediate and unequivocal withdrawal. Heap, for his part, tried to put on a brave front and even attempted to defend the document in public, especially its common security theme, but privately he was most unhappy.¹²⁹⁴

If the truth be known, hardly any IAC members could have been satisfied with the NATO compromise. For example, early in the process, Peggy Hope-Simpson, a strong realist, at least on defence policy, wrote a memo in which she made it clear that, in her view, any version of the "get out of NATO" position was unilateralist, isolationist, and sure to lead to less independence from the United States rather than more. Moreover, it demonstrated

¹²⁹³ Several people and groups wrote detailed and thoughtful critiques of "Canada's Stake" covering not just the NATO issue but a whole gamut of foreign and defence policy themes. See, "A Review of 'Canada's Stake In Common Security,'" undated, NDP Research; "Comments on 'Canada's Stake In Common Security: Report by the International Affairs Committee of the New Democratic Party of Canada (April, 1988)," undated, NDP Research.

¹²⁹⁴ Heap interview, June 15, 1988.

a stronger commitment to ideological purity than to the development of a sound security policy for Canada proving once again that the NDP was as yet unwilling to deal with the reality of power and was therefore unfit to govern.¹²⁹⁵

Blaikie seems to have been the most sanguine about the whole thing and most willing to defend the document publicly, probably to a considerable extent because, as the NDP's international affairs critic, that was part of his job. In a detailed and thoughtful speech on May 29, 1988 to a Greenpeace and Toronto Disarmament Network Forum, Blaikie explained how, by rejecting the old cold war rhetoric and the belief that the planet was dominated by two competing empires, "Canada's Stake," pointed the way to a hopeful future based on a new concept of security, common security. Moreover, he pledged that an NDP government would apply the new principles to areas beyond the traditional purview of security to build a fairer world trading system and grapple with the environmental crisis.¹²⁹⁶

Blaikie is somewhat critical of many of his IAC colleagues who at first strongly advocated a radical shift away from the party's 1969 anti-NATO position, but backed down in the face of mounting internal party opposition. They succumbed to the argument of the critics who maintained that changing the policy just before an election would look opportunistic and unprincipled. One such critic was Jim Manly, a British Columbia MP, who wrote in a letter that to change policy now just before an election would be viewed as "political opportunism of the crassest form."¹²⁹⁷ However, the

¹²⁹⁵ Peggy Simpson, Memo to the IAC, Feb 2, 1988, Clyde Sanger Papers.

¹²⁹⁶ Blaikie, Text of Speech on "Canada's Stake in Common Security," May 29, 1988, Blaikie Papers.

¹²⁹⁷ Jim Manly to Dave Barrett, Mar.4, 1988, NAC, MG 32, C83, Vol.44, File 10.

irony, in Blaikie's view, was that by sticking to a policy they no longer believed in, the pro-Nato members of the IAC were guilty of acting in an even more unprincipled and opportunistic fashion.¹²⁹⁸

The person who was probably most unhappy with the result (at least privately) was NDP party leader, Ed Broadbent. For years he had been quietly working behind the scenes to get rid of the "out of NATO" policy once and for all. Now again he would have to defend a modified version of it in an election. Not surprisingly, therefore, he showed relatively little interest in "Canada's Stake" once it was released and his indifference continued throughout the election campaign.¹²⁹⁹ This, despite the fact that when Broadbent made one of his few speeches on common security in the period leading up to the election, the audience's response was generally very positive.¹³⁰⁰ Notwithstanding his own criticism's of the "watered down" document, Heap was angry with Broadbent for abandoning it in the election.¹³⁰¹

Considering these reactions, it is understandable why the party leadership, outside of Tessa Hebb and Bill Blaikie, made relatively little effort to ensure that "Canada's Stake in Common Security" was circulated rapidly and broadly whether inside or outside the party, a point that upset a few NDP members who were pleased with the document's contents.¹³⁰² As criticism by editorialists and political

¹²⁹⁸ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1988.

¹²⁹⁹ Clyde Sanger observed that when he asked Broadbent to autograph a copy of "Canada's Stake" for him, the NDP leader showed no affection for the document. Sanger interview, June 19, 1993.

¹³⁰⁰ Broadbent, Speech Notes to the Eighth World Conference of Physicians Against Nuclear war, June 3, 1988, Montreal, NDP Research.

¹³⁰¹ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹³⁰² Memo, Peter Pentz to John Brewin, June 3, 1988, Blaikie Papers.

opponents mounted and with the fundamental question of NDP NATO policy still unresolved, most people in the upper echelons of the party were content to put "Canada's Stake" on the shelf. Obviously, it would not be a centrepiece of the party's platform in the coming election.

According to Blaikie, this was not the way it was supposed to be. The party had originally planned to give international affairs a higher profile than in any election since the nuclear weapons debate of 1962.¹³⁰³ On the eve of the election, a poll had shown that by a margin of two to one, Canadians disapproved of the Tory plan to purchase nuclear subs, while another found that 71% of Canadians would be more likely to vote for candidates who supported peace and disarmament measures.¹³⁰⁴ The times seemed propitious for a major NDP election push on peace and disarmament. Indeed, in response to queries from the Canadian Peace Alliance Lobby in June, three months before the election was called, the NDP pledged to give these issues a high profile in the campaign.¹³⁰⁵

Yet, as in previous elections, NDP spokespersons largely failed to initiate discussion on foreign and defence policy questions. When Broadbent mentioned them at all, it was in reply to pointed inquiries on NATO.¹³⁰⁶ Again, as in 1984, John Lamb of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament criticized all the parties for largely ignoring foreign policy.¹³⁰⁷

¹³⁰³ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

¹³⁰⁴ "The Issue is Defence and Arms Control," Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: Defence and Arms Control, Ottawa, Sept., 1988, p.80.

¹³⁰⁵ Hania Fedorowicz/Alex Connelly to Broadbent et.al., June 10, 1988, Re: Canadian Peace Alliance Lobby, NDP Research.

¹³⁰⁶ Paul Howard to Robin Sears, Subject: Defence, Oct.1, 1988, NDP Research.

¹³⁰⁷ John Lamb, Arms Control Communique, Oct.24, 1988.

Many members of the NDP, as well as peace groups, were very disconcerted by the NDP election performance both on peace and defence policy issues and free trade.¹³⁰⁸ For example, following the election, some Spadina New Democrats wrote an evaluation of the campaign which castigated the NDP caucus and Federal Council for treating the common security document and foreign policy in general as matters with only fringe appeal. They accused the NDP's core leadership of being afraid to openly support the party's official foreign policy positions or to link up with the grassroots peace movement.¹³⁰⁹

In their post-mortem on the election, Robert Penner, coordinator of the Canadian Peace Alliance and David Kraft of Greenpeace echoed these criticisms. They also noted that the Tories had been vulnerable to a vigorous attack on their Defence White Paper, particularly their willingness to spend billions on nuclear submarines. The NDP failure to take advantage was evidence, in their view, that despite all the work done by the IAC in reviewing NDP foreign and defence policy, the leadership circle of the party was still unwilling to commit itself to a grass-roots effort to educate Canadians and seriously attempt to win the public debate on defence and peace issues.¹³¹⁰

Some NDP caucus members have responded with some biting criticisms of their own about peace groups. For example, Dan Heap lambasted them for often being confused and contradictory in their objectives and methods. Too often, the peace

¹³⁰⁸ The following chapter will deal with the free trade aspect.

¹³⁰⁹ "Renewing the New Democratic Party: Some Ideas from Trinity Spadina," undated, NDP Research.

¹³¹⁰ Robert Penner and David Kraft, "The NDP, Peace Issues and the Last Federal Election," Sept. 14, 1989, NDP Research.

organizations' biggest concern was not alienating their Tory and Liberal supporters. For example, during the rallies against cruise testing in the early Eighties, peace groups would grant speakers from these parties who spoke only for themselves equal billing with NDP spokespersons who represented a caucus united in opposition to the tests. Heap also accused them of "cosying up to power", and never seriously examining the economic roots of war while hiding behind the rhetoric of idealism.¹³¹¹

Following the 1984 election, Bill Blaikie had made many of the same points. He especially had castigated the peace groups for failing to understand the reality and nature of political parties in Canada. If they were serious about promoting the peace agenda, they should have campaigned wholeheartedly for the NDP in 1984 as the only party which had unequivocally supported the Canadian peace movement's platform of a nuclear freeze, no cruise testing and no first-use of nuclear weapons.¹³¹²

As noted earlier, many prominent NDPers believed that if the party emphasized foreign policy matters in an election, the other parties could hurt the NDP badly on the NATO issue. Therefore, it was best to stay away from international affairs altogether in a campaign. In fact, Julie Mason, an NDP advisor, in her analysis of the 1988 election went much further. She argued it had been a strategic error to conduct a foreign and defence policy review in the year before the election because it had drawn attention away from social issues, where the public has traditionally perceived the NDP to be strong and diverted it to an area (foreign policy) where the party had always

¹³¹¹ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹³¹² Bill Blaikie, "Political Choices and the Canadian Peace Movement, Seeds, Vol.3 (December, 1984), pp.12-5, Author's Collection.

been viewed as weak. Thus, in her opinion, all the work of the IAC in producing the common security document had been worse than useless.¹³¹³

Why was the IAC unable to resolve the NATO question? The question is important because it illuminates the basic conflict within the NDP between realism and idealism, which, in turn, helps to clarify the nature of Canadian social democratic internationalism. As the introductory chapter noted, social democratic internationalism, especially as it had developed after World War II was not inherently pacifist, neutralist, isolationist or even always anti-military. However, because of developments peculiar to Canadian and North American history, the Canadian social democratic version of internationalism had retained a heavy dose of these elements, in addition to anti-Americanism, idealism and for some, liberal internationalism (at least on defence issues).

What united all these strands was the sense that the CCF/NDP had a prophetic call to lead Canada in fulfilling its special historical role of spreading the "gospel" of peace and justice and building a world community (as defined by social democratic internationalism). Bill Blaikie once wrote:

We are the only political party...which can and must tell them [the Canadian people] that international justice is the key to peace, and that what problems we have arise generally not out of sheer unoriginated malice on some nation or people's part, but rather out of some injustice committed in the past.¹³¹⁴

¹³¹³ Julie Mason, "Courting the Ordinary Canadian," Canadian Forum, Vol.72 (October, 1990), pp.17-21.

¹³¹⁴ Blaikie, "A Reflection on Foreign Policy, Oct.28, 1980, Blaikie Papers, p.10..

Derek Blackburn believes that the idealists in the party took this prophetic role much too seriously. They seemed to believe that "somehow the CCF, and more particularly the NDP, was brought into the world by God to save it." This feeling was so strong that the NDP could not accept the world the way it was. The result, in Blackburn's view, was a minimal contribution by the party to the solving of concrete international problems.¹³¹⁵ Of all the realists in the NDP caucus, Blackburn came closest to rejecting social democratic internationalism altogether.

Idealists reacted viscerally to Blackburn and his views. For them, the prophetic vision was central to their understanding of NDP foreign policy. Because, as they saw it, Canadian membership in NATO made the fulfilment of this vision or call impossible, they instinctively and uncompromisingly fought against any shift towards a pro-NATO alliance policy. The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. To them, NATO represented the old militaristic, imperialistic, even racist traditions of Europe (now reincarnated in the United States) which were the antithesis of the universalist and idealist vision of Canadian social democratic internationalism. As Dan Heap put it, NATO was simply a "ganging-up of the same powers that followed Columbus to conquer the rest of the world and were now desperately trying to maintain control." Heap also made reference to an anonymous Canadian general who in the 1960's had admitted that NATO was essentially created as an alternative to conscription. It was better to support American "nukes" than to have to send "our Canadian boys over there."¹³¹⁶

The international affairs committee of the Spadina NDP Riding Association, which was a prime focus of the opposition to weakening the party's official anti-NATO

¹³¹⁵ Derek Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹³¹⁶ Heap Interview, June 15, 1993.

stance throughout the Eighties, emphasized that the real danger spots for world peace were not in Europe but the Third World. The root causes were economic disparity between rich and poor nations compounded by neo-imperialist exploitation and manipulation (especially by the United States) and suppression of human rights and destruction of the environment and non-renewable resources by corrupt local regimes:

Canada could be helping to solve some of these problems. To see the comparatively stable regimes of continental Europe as a major focus of our international and military concern is surely utterly irrational in this context: it represents some sort of childish fixation with the European parentage of our nation.¹³¹⁷

A truly internationalist policy, the authors argued, would see Canada enhancing security primarily by helping to create non-exploitative trading relations with poor nations. For these idealists, Third World and alliance policy were intimately connected. A critical problem with membership in NATO, the Spadina paper maintained, was that it placed Canada in a camp with nations, especially the Americans, who behaved in Third World countries such as Chile, Central America, East Timor and southern Africa in ways they would never dare to do in Europe, thereby contradicted NATO's supposed commitment to democracy.¹³¹⁸

On the other hand, people who favoured NATO membership insisted that the Spadina committee's arguments rested on faulty premises. First, the anti-NATO camp completely underestimated the Soviet threat and what a Russian takeover of Western Europe would mean for their idealistic dreams of a world united by freedom,

¹³¹⁷ "Remarks on Canada and Its Military Alliances," Spadina NDP Riding Association, Dec.21, 1987, NDP Research, p.5.

¹³¹⁸ ibid., pp.5-6.

democracy and justice.¹³¹⁹ Second, and closely related, was the fact that anti-Nato people seemed unwilling to come to terms with Canada's European roots; indeed, some took delight in denigrating them. In both Broadbent's and Blackburn's opinion, the idealists deliberately ignored Canadian history and the identification by most Canadians with a northern world order which included Europe and the United States. Contributing to this, in their view, was the lack of first-hand experience among most NDPers with the ravages of war and their geographic isolation from direct contact with the Soviet threat. Not surprisingly then, the largest and most vociferous group of anti-NATO people lived in BC which gave the division in the party on this issue a distinctly regional flavour.¹³²⁰

In Bill Blaikie and Tessa Hebb's experience, most Canadian social democrats who had prolonged contact with their European political compatriots through the Socialist International, sooner or later adopted the pro-NATO position favoured by the majority of European social democrats.¹³²¹ North American and Canadian physical and ideological separation from Europe were, therefore, significant factors in giving a unique flavour to Canadian social democratic internationalism and its internal disputes.

For both anti-and pro-NATO camps, the issue often boiled down to the question of influence. For people who believed they had a special mission to save the world, the matter of how best to maximize Canada's influence in international affairs was vital. To many on the pro-NATO realist side, the answer was clear. Bill Knight argues adamantly that Canada must be at every international table advancing its peace and justice agenda. To do otherwise was to promote a form of isolationism. For example,

¹³¹⁹ John Brewin interview, April 22, 1991.

¹³²⁰ Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991; Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

¹³²¹ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993; Hebb interview, May 2, 1991.

if Canada had been a member of the Organization of American States in the early 1980s, it could have been the first Western industrial power to speak out on behalf of El Salvador's poor in a forum where the United States was used to getting its way virtually unchallenged.¹³²² Likewise, as Blaikie now sees it, the NDP from the outset should have advocated not withdrawal from NATO, but an independent role for Canada within NATO promoting disarmament, challenging American perceptions and criticizing the actions of any NATO member anywhere in the world if warranted.¹³²³ Simon Rosenblum, a long-time NATO critic, gradually came to the same conclusion over the course of the Eighties.¹³²⁴

The usual response by anti-NATO members of the NDP to these arguments was that no evidence existed that Canada had ever been able to influence any long-term alliance policies or major specific NATO decisions, such as the initial decisions to rely on tactical nuclear weapons and to adopt the "flexible response" doctrine. On the other hand, freed from NATO membership, Canada would have had more influence on the world stage especially with Third World nations who viewed NATO as a rich nations club.¹³²⁵ Moreover, pulling out of NATO was not isolationist but showed a commitment to peace and security for all (whether living in the East or West) which constituted the essence of common security.¹³²⁶

¹³²² Bill Knight interview, May 7, 1991.

¹³²³ Bill Blaikie, "A Reflection on Foreign Policy," undated, Blaikie Papers, p.9.

¹³²⁴ Simon Rosenblum, "Reforming the Pacts," International Perspectives Vol.17 (May-June, 1988), pp.13-6.

¹³²⁵ "Remarks on Canada and Its Military Alliances," pp.5-8.

¹³²⁶ Fedorowicz to George Nakitsas, Subject: Arguments Against Getting Out of NATO, May 26, 1987, NDP Research.

Many who held the anti-NATO position also disclaimed the charge of neutralism. They could accept some form of defence partnership with the United States, such as outlined in "Canada's Stake in Common Security," under which Canada would take on the task of surveillance and patrol of its own territory and waters. Indeed, with the exception of pacifists, most NDPers accepted such a role as necessary if Canada was to have an independent foreign policy.¹³²⁷

Clearly what made the NATO issue particularly difficult to resolve was the fact that so many of the arguments involved intangibles. That was especially true for anti-Americanism. To Broadbent, this constituted the most elemental explanation why NDP idealists hated NATO so much. Instead of examining the arguments for and against NATO on their merits, visceral and emotional anti-Americanism distorted the debate and, unfortunately, in Broadbent's interpretation, also negatively affected the general public's perception of a whole range of NDP foreign and domestic policies.¹³²⁸ Blackburn, for his part, identified anti-Americanism along with pacifist-isolationism and the "peculiar" group of people called "West-coasters" as the true sources of opposition within the NDP to playing a responsible, role in the world as they saw it.¹³²⁹ Furthermore, according to another pro-NATO person, because of limits posed by geography, culture and power, Canada could not avoid at least informal alliances with the US. Thus, membership in a multilateral organization such as NATO enhanced

¹³²⁷ For an interesting discussion of the relationship between military questions and the enhancement of Canadian independence, see James Jackson, "Military Minimalism: Canada's Defence Policy," Canadian Forum, Vol.16 (June-July), 1986.

¹³²⁸ Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

¹³²⁹ Blackburn interview, May 7, 1991.

Canadian sovereignty and freedom of action because it provided a counter weight to American influence.¹³³⁰

Blaikie, an unenthusiastic supporter of NATO membership, found the anti-Americanism prevalent in the anti-NATO camp quite understandable given that Canada as a junior partner in an American led NATO, had historically found it next to impossible to have an independent foreign policy. Speaking in 1982 to the North Atlantic Assembly of NATO, Blaikie explained how New Democrats found it exceedingly distasteful to have any official association with a United States that insisted on suppressing indigenous political movements deemed to be inimical to its economic interests anywhere in the world.¹³³¹ Interestingly, eight years later with the implementation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, he had changed his opinion somewhat. Now he argued that Canada needed strong connections like NATO to resist even more continentalism.¹³³²

Most people in the party who opposed NATO insisted they were not anti-American but anti-American foreign policy in the same way that being pro-Canadian did not make one anti-American.¹³³³ However, in practical terms, social democratic idealists, like Canadians in general, found it difficult to distinguish between anti-Americanism and opposition to American policies. The same questions would reappear in the free trade debate when it came to overshadow other issues in bilateral Canada-

¹³³⁰ Dr. C.A. Cannizzo, "NATO Discussion Paper," prepared for the Consultative Group on Arms Control, Sept., 1986, NDP Research.

¹³³¹ Blaikie, text of speech to the North Atlantic Assembly, Funchal, Madeira, May 31, 1982, Blaikie Papers, pp.1-2.

¹³³² Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993. Also see Blaikie, "The Berlin Wall and the NDP," Global Village, (Oct.1990), Author's Collection.

¹³³³ Svend Robinson interview, April 25, 1991.

in the free trade debate when it came to overshadow other issues in bilateral Canada-United States relations by 1988.

While "Canada's Stake in Common Security" did not solve the internal NDP conflict over NATO, the document has historical significance within the party and beyond. First, it represented an attempt to integrate defence policy within the context of an overarching foreign policy theme, common security. Second, it helped inject the concept into foreign and defence policy discourse in Canada. Third, in terms of the broader currents of Canadian foreign policy, "Canada's Stake in Common Security" may well be interpreted as the NDP contribution to the new internationalism which, according to certain scholars, was emerging in the 1985 to 1988 period.¹³³⁴ Fourth, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of communism, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the rise of nationalism, changes in the Middle East and much more, the world is searching for ways to build new forms of "common security." Social democratic internationalism's version of common security may yet make a contribution to this quest.

¹³³⁴ John Holmes and John Kirton, eds. Canada and the New Internationalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

CHAPTER NINETEEN

THE FIGHT TO SAVE CANADA AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISM: CANADIAN-AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1980-8)

Any discussion of the NDP's approach to the major Canadian foreign policy questions of the Eighties could not be complete without devoting attention to two interrelated subjects which often proved contentious in American-Canadian relations, namely, the environment and economic policy. Tensions here added to those generated over Central America and the arms race to make the first four years of the decade, in particular, among the most difficult in the long history of bilateral relations between the two countries. The main fields of dispute were: acid rain, foreign investment, the New Energy Policy, fishing boundaries and finally trade disagreements¹³³⁵

Until 1981, the environment issue had largely been ignored in NDP foreign policy resolutions. Previously, all resolutions relating specifically to that field had been grouped under a section entitled, "Resources and the Environment" in any compilation

¹³³⁵ For useful discussions of these bilateral disputes, see. Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship (Rev. ed.; Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1988); Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Molot, eds. Canada Among Nations, 1984: A Time of Transition (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1985).

of NDP resolutions.¹³³⁶ Nevertheless, as even a cursory study of these resolutions reveals, the party obviously understood the importance of environmental considerations in dealing with cross-border disputes. For example, a 1965 resolution committed an NDP government not to sell water to the United States until Canadian needs could be ascertained "for all time" to prevent any recurrence of a treaty like the 1962 Columbia River Agreement.¹³³⁷

When pollution emerged as a growing public concern, the NDP passed a resolution in 1967 calling for greater cooperation between the two countries on joint pollution problems through the International Joint Commission.¹³³⁸ Five years later, after the American Congress passed legislation authorizing construction of the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline, the 1973 NDP convention demanded that Canada establish a minimum 200 mile pollution-free zone off the west coast and that American oil companies be barred from Arctic waters because "they don't care two cents for Canada's ecology."¹³³⁹

By the early Seventies, internationalist concerns began to manifest themselves strongly in NDP environmental resolutions. For example, in 1971 the convention recognized the need for the UN to establish international agencies to tackle pollution problems on a global scale. Implicit here was a call for an upgraded system of international law on environmental matters. Then two years later, for the first time the NDP officially recognized that the environment imposed certain limits to economic

¹³³⁶ Anne Scotton, ed., "Resources and the Environment," New Democratic Policies, 1961-1976 (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1976), pp.46-8.

¹³³⁷ Ibid., "Water," p.46.

¹³³⁸ Ibid., "Pollution," p.46.

¹³³⁹ Ibid., "Tanker Spillage," pp.48-9.

growth. Inspired by Canadian social democratic idealism, the NDP saw in this a special responsibility for Canadians to save the entire world:

As citizens of one of the few countries which still possesses space and resources beyond our immediate needs, we must act as trustees for all humanity and for coming generations.... As internationalists, we struggle to ensure that Canadians do not settle for selfish or continental solutions at the expense of all mankind.¹³⁴⁰

Given such rhetoric, the NDP might have been expected to be more active in the Seventies than it was in supporting such UN efforts as enhancing international law's jurisdiction over the oceans as well as devoting more attention to bilateral US-Canadian environmental problems and the general education of the public on the issue.

By the early Eighties, matters began to improve as part of the party's general revitalization of NDP foreign policy. In recognition that environmental considerations must be incorporated into NDP thinking on international affairs, the newly constituted IAC devoted a modest section to the subject in its comprehensive 1981 discussion paper, "Peace, Security and Justice," and the composite international affairs resolution at that year's convention. Specifically, the resolution committed an NDP government to: support for a Law of the Sea Agreement, preservation and protection of the world's fishery and endangered wildlife species, strengthened global pollution controls in international waters and bilateral and international agreements covering water, land and air pollution, most particularly acid rain.¹³⁴¹

¹³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, "The Environment," p.48.

¹³⁴¹ "Peace, Security and Justice," NDP Research, pp.27-9; "Resolution B.1.1," Resolution Reference, Oct., 1986, p.49..

As with the other foreign policy questions of the Eighties, the election of Ronald Reagan brought new tensions in United States-Canada relations on several environmental and economic fronts. Not surprisingly, therefore, the NDP quickly found itself differing forcefully with the Americans both philosophically and on specific issues. In the case of the Law of the Sea, the clash was essentially between the social democratic vision that seabed resources beyond the 200 mile limit were part of the common inheritance of all the world's peoples and the Reagan administration's contention that the resources belonged to whichever country could find a way to exploit them first. When the United States refused to sign the 1981 United Nations-brokered Law of the Sea Agreement which enshrined seabed resource and revenue sharing, the NDP denounced Washington's move. To the party, it was a sign that the new administration wanted American interests to reign supreme and did not care about the negative impact such a stance would have on the North-South Dialogue or the internationalist agenda in general.¹³⁴²

The second major bilateral issue during the Eighties, namely, acid rain pollution of Canadian lakes and rivers, caught the attention of NDPers not only because of concern for the environment, but in large measure because it seemed to typify Canada's historic relationship with the Americans. The United States was the exploiter; Canada was the victim. Throughout the Eighties, the pattern was essentially the same. Periodically, the Canadian government would ask Washington to take action to limit sulphur emissions from American factories much of which fell to the ground in Canada as acid rain. Each time, Reagan would stall and the NDP would denounce Washington's "footdragging" and urge the Prime Minister to keep up the pressure.¹³⁴³

¹³⁴² Debates, May 22, 1981, p.9813; Ibid., July 13, 1981, p.19258.

¹³⁴³ For example see Debates, Oct.19, 1983, p.28123.

During the Tory years, acid rain became for New Democrats the major litmus test of Mulroney's much vaunted special relationship with Reagan.¹³⁴⁴ Hence, when Mulroney's March, 1985 Shamrock summit at Quebec City with President Reagan failed to obtain an American commitment to early action on acid rain (and when Mulroney failed to state unequivocally that Canada would not participate in the strategic defence initiative), Broadbent introduced a non-confidence motion condemning the Tory's general conduct of United States-Canada relations.¹³⁴⁵

As important as the acid rain question was, the most serious bilateral economic disputes with the potential for long term damage to the two countries' relationship, at least in the 1980-84 period, involved foreign investment and the National Energy Policy (NEP). The 1981 NDP composite foreign affairs resolution contained a special section on Canadian-American relations recommitting the party to the fight for more Canadian economic and cultural independence which necessitated more public ownership of key economic sectors and cultural institutions.¹³⁴⁶ The NDP was signalling, in effect, that it was ready to resume the nationalist economic battles of the early Seventies although tempered by certain global realities.

In practical political terms, the NDP found itself in a dilemma in these years. It wanted to support the general thrust of such Liberal government policies as tighter controls on foreign investment, government ownership of a major oil company (Petro-Canada) and a national energy policy (NEP). Yet, at the same time, it coveted even stronger government action in all these fields both for ideological and political reasons.

¹³⁴⁴ Debates, Mar.30, 1987, p.4693; Also see Margaret Royal, "External Affairs and Defence," in Canadian Annual Review ed. by R.B Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp.158-160.

¹³⁴⁵ Debates, Mar.19, 1985, p.3177

¹³⁴⁶ "Resolution B.1.1," Resolution Reference, Oct., 1986, p.49.

In general, the NDP decided to adopt an aggressive stance towards the Liberals on specific issues. Consequently, they pushed for even tougher foreign investment regulations, a more spirited commitment to Canadianization of the energy industry, less reliance on mega-projects and a pipeline building timetable that placed Canadian interests first.

Suffice it to say, however, that in the process of attacking Liberal nationalist economic policies, the NDP, on balance, probably helped undermine public support both for the specific government initiatives and the underlying principle of Canadianization. For example, in 1982, under heavy American pressure, the government of Canada backtracked to some extent on implementation of its recently strengthened foreign investment rules. In time-honoured fashion, the NDP could not resist the opportunity to denounce the Liberals for their alleged acquiescence to Washington. The same thing happened, although to a lesser extent, with the NEP.¹³⁴⁷ Inadvertently, to some extent, these NDP actions played into the hands of both the Reagan administration and the Tory government after it was elected in 1984.

Steven Langdon, who was not a member of Parliament at the time, stated in an interview that he had been upset at his party's attack on the NEP because its introduction in 1982 had been a significant move in curtailing the power of the multinationals in Canada. In fact, Langdon had helped a good friend of his in the civil service draft the original NEP legislation. As for FIRA, Langdon agreed with the critique offered by NDP members of Parliament, especially after the new Liberal energy minister, Ed Lumley, allegedly emasculated it.¹³⁴⁸

¹³⁴⁷ Debates, May 4, 1982, p.16908; Ibid., May 13, 1982, p.17537; Ibid., Dec.6, 1982, p.21289.

¹³⁴⁸ Steven Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

When the newly-elected Conservative government moved rapidly to "gut" FIRA completely in late 1984, Langdon (now an MP) described the fight in almost apocalyptic terms during his contribution to the Commons debate on the issue. It was ultimately a confrontation between two visions of the country, a dependent and weakened Canada (the Tory vision) or a strong, independent Canada (the NDP vision). The struggle he predicted would be hard and long.¹³⁴⁹

Langdon proved correct in his prophecy that the first term of a PC government would witness a clash of visions, but he was wrong about the specific issue. Despite his and the rest of the NDP caucus's vigorous defence of the argument that a foreign investment review mechanism was an absolute necessity, most Canadians soon lost interest both in FIRA and the ultimate goal of Canadianization of the economy. Instead, another issue with even more profound implications for bilateral Canadian-American relations began to seize the public imagination, namely, free trade.

The New Democratic Party had historically favoured freer trade, especially multilateral free trade. In a resolution passed at its 1961 founding convention, the party condemned protective tariffs as "out-moded patchwork attempts to protect domestic industry." The resolution went on to enthusiastically endorse active association with the European Common Market and other free trade areas along with the exploration of hemispheric trading arrangements. In addition, as part of planning Canada's trade, an NDP government would try to expand world trade by pressing for the creation of an international trade organization and by cooperating fully with international economic agencies.¹³⁵⁰

¹³⁴⁹ Debates, Dec. 11, 1984, pp.1098-1102.

¹³⁵⁰ "Resolution B.2.1.," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, pp.49-50.

Tommy Douglas and most of the NDP welcomed Britain's 1962 attempt to enter the Common Market. Upon learning of DeGaulle's veto of Britain's application, the NDP leader strongly criticized the French President for allegedly directing the European community inward rather than outward.¹³⁵¹ In other words, De Gaulle's move was a betrayal of the internationalist spirit. Despite the setback, Douglas called on his party to continue the fight against world trade barriers and make Canada a world leader in creating an open trading system.¹³⁵² Douglas saw this as another way for Canada to contribute to an integrated world based on the principle of economic justice. At the same time, Douglas believed there were great practical benefits for Canada in freer trade. In words that echo those of a pro-free trade Conservative Prime Minister twenty-five years later, Brian Mulroney, Douglas declared:

For all these reasons, I think we should act now. If we continue to sit back in timid isolation, we face a rapidly shrinking trade horizon. If we have the courage and enterprise to strike out in new directions, there will be expanding opportunities for trade, production, and income throughout every part of our economy.¹³⁵³

NDP support for smashing world trade barriers was contingent on two suppositions: First, that the Canadian economy would continue to expand and could thus make the necessary adjustments and second, that workers' jobs and rights would be protected. David Lewis had made this clear in a speech about the implications for

¹³⁵¹ "Statement by T.C.Douglas for The United Church Observer," Mar.5, 1963, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol. 489.

¹³⁵² Tommy Douglas, "Implications of the Common Market and Canada's Trade Policy," undated, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.501.

¹³⁵³ Douglas, "Canada and the European Common Market," CBC telecast, Dec.13, 1961, NAC, MG 28, IVI, Vol.501.

Canada if Britain were to join the Common Market.¹³⁵⁴ If and when these favourable conditions no longer existed, the NDP's commitment to an open trading system would face its first real test.

When the bilateral Canadian-American Auto Pact trade agreement was negotiated in 1965, the NDP had serious reservations at first because they believed the Americans had gained the advantage. However, gradually the NDP became enthusiastic supporters of the Auto Pact as a 1974 resolution affirmed.¹³⁵⁵

Through the Seventies, the NDP's support for trade liberalization, especially as it affected the Third World, remained firm, at least, in theory. However, as noted in Chapter Fourteen, during the recession of the early 1980's as working people became more worried about their jobs, this changed.¹³⁵⁶ Thus, at the 1983 NDP convention, textile workers made sure that a section of a resolution calling for the easing of restrictions on Third World imports was deleted.¹³⁵⁷ Thus, by the early Eighties, protectionism was on the rise in the NDP.

In September of 1985, when the Mulroney government first proposed negotiating a comprehensive bilateral free trade arrangement with the United States, the NDP response was overwhelmingly negative, a position it has maintained ever since. While New Democrats were naturally concerned about possible job losses, the central issue without doubt for the NDP throughout the years of debate on the issue was the fear that free trade would irrevocably damage Canadian independence and the

¹³⁵⁴ David Lewis, "Britain's Proposed Entry into the European Common Market," Sept. 24, 1962, NAC, MG.28, 1V1, Vol.486, File Socialist International, NDP papers 1962-6.

¹³⁵⁵ Scotton, "Auto Trade Pact," p.16.

¹³⁵⁶ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

¹³⁵⁷ John Brewin interview, June 14, 1993.

"Canadian Way." A study of the major speeches by NDP spokespersons from 1985 to 1988 makes this abundantly clear.

For example, in his first Commons speech in response to Mulroney's 1985 announcement, Broadbent went to the heart of the matter straightaway: "What we are talking about here is the very future of our nation."¹³⁵⁸ Continentalism, he maintained, must be resisted at all costs. Canadian distinctive arrangements such as the Wheat Board, the social safety net and regional development programs were not negotiable. Moreover, trade was ultimately not about dollars and cents but about cultural sovereignty, the quintessence of nationhood. At minimum, therefore, as a matter of strategy, the government ought first to consult with Canadians about what institutions they wanted preserved before embarking on such negotiations. As in later speeches, Broadbent evoked the memory of past Prime Ministers such as Macdonald and Diefenbaker, Canadian nationalists who had fought continentalism.¹³⁵⁹

In terms of an alternative to a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States, the NDP favoured managed trade involving sectoral agreements between governments analogous to the Auto Pact with its built-in Canadian content rules which protected jobs and posed no threat to Canadian sovereignty.¹³⁶⁰ For example, a 1985 resolution stated "that as an alternative to free trade the NDP support...Canadian content regulations which would require corporations to produce and invest in Canada as a condition of having access to the Canadian market."¹³⁶¹ Moreover, a 1987 resolution warned that Canada should not become even more

¹³⁵⁸ Debates, Sept.26, 1985, pp.7062-4.

¹³⁵⁹ Ibid.; Mar.16, 1987, p.4163.

¹³⁶⁰ See Debates, Oct. 27, 1986, p.741 and Mar.16, 1987, p.4160.

¹³⁶¹ "Resolution B.2.7," Resolutions Reference, Oct., 1986, p.54.

dependent on the American market, but instead concentrate on expansion into other world markets particularly the Pacific Rim, the Third World and Europe. This NDP commitment to multilateral trade was also demonstrated by its support for achieving freer world trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which was viewed as the best forum in which to work for curtailment of the USA countervail system.¹³⁶² As with defence matters, the NDP saw in multilateralism, in the broadest sense, the best shield against American domination in Canada-United States trade relations.¹³⁶³

What made the free trade negotiations even more intolerable in NDP eyes was that they were happening against the backdrop both of Mulroney's seeming unquestioned support for President Reagan's foreign policy initiatives and a series of trade actions launched by Washington against Ottawa. These American initiatives threatened such industries as cedar shakes and shingles, softwood lumber, steel, potash, pork, grain and the East Coast fishery.¹³⁶⁴ Svend Robinson argued this point forcefully on May 27, 1987, in an address to the House of Commons on the shakes and shingles issue. Canada, he contended, had paid a high price to obtain its supposed special relationship with the United States which now appeared to count for nothing. That price had included open endorsement of American actions on SDI, cruise missile testing, the bombing of Libya and even acquiescence to American violations of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic Sea.¹³⁶⁵

¹³⁶² "Resolution B.2.8.," New Democratic Party International Affairs Resolutions, 1989, pp.8-9.

¹³⁶³ Debates, June 3, 1986, p.13898; Mar.16, 1987, pp.4158-61; Apr.14, 1987, p.5154; Sept.23, 1987, p.9233.

¹³⁶⁴ Canadian Annual Review, 1986, pp.128-136.

¹³⁶⁵ Debates, May 17, 1986, p.13698.

Furthermore, the NDP was upset by Washington's invoking of trade sanctions despite the Canadian government's adoption of a whole series of other economic measures favourable to the Americans and unfavourable for Canadian sovereignty. As Broadbent outlined in a March 16, 1987, speech on a Tory motion endorsing the free trade talks:

What we have is a Prime Minister who has abolished FIRA, who has sold out Prentice Hall..., who has given away fishing rights in Atlantic Canada, who has yielded to the United States on acid rain, [and] who has sacrificed our generic drug industry.¹³⁶⁶

NDP fears were heightened even more by recurrent statements by American officials and negotiators seeming to indicate that from Washington's standpoint, Canada's social programs, cultural industries, marketing boards, regional development programs and the Auto Pact were on the negotiating table.¹³⁶⁷

New Democratic Party spokespersons were acutely aware that their opposition to free trade would be construed as another example of NDP anti-Americanism by some political opponents. In his first important address on the free trade issue, Broadbent had tackled the question head-on as did Steven Langdon when he introduced a motion on October 27, 1986, condemning the government for confusion, lack of direction and secrecy in its trade policy. So sensitive was the matter that Langdon found it necessary at the outset of his speech to assure the House, and indeed everyone concerned, that he would not be making an anti-American

¹³⁶⁶ Ibid., Mar.16, 1987, p.4159.

¹³⁶⁷ Ibid., Dec.10, 1985, pp.9368-9; Canadian Annual Review, 1986, pp.129-130.

speech.¹³⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the Conservatives kept accusing the NDP of doing just that. For example, on June 26, 1987, in reply to a query from Langdon about when Canada would stop surrendering to Washington on trade matters, Mulroney struck back accusing the NDP of promoting policies that were anti-trade, anti-business, anti-NATO and anti-American.¹³⁶⁹

For realists in the NDP leadership, the charge of anti-Americanism worried them almost as much as anti-Natoism. Quite naturally, social democrats, who accepted liberal internationalist thinking on defence matters and appreciated American leadership of NATO, tended to be less anti-American on other issues than did idealists who detested the alliance, especially American dominance. This fact, however, did not stop both idealists and realists from standing united against the Mulroney trade deal.

As far as they were concerned, throughout the debate leading up to the fall of 1987 when free trade talks were temporarily suspended, their pointed questions about the possible negative implications of free trade had never been seriously addressed by Tory spokespersons. Consequently, on September 23rd of that year, Broadbent demanded the termination of the free trade negotiations altogether and followed that up a month later with his most passionate speech to date in which he raised the stakes considerably by making the following dire prediction. If Ottawa signed a comprehensive trade deal with Washington, Broadbent asserted, Canada would inevitably be absorbed by the United States.¹³⁷⁰ With that possibility in mind, the NDP decided to spare no effort in rallying Canadians against a free trade deal with the United States. As part of this strategy, party headquarters produced an internal

¹³⁶⁸ Debates, Oct.27, 1986, p.740.

¹³⁶⁹ Ibid., June 26, 1987, p.7678.

¹³⁷⁰ Ibid., Oct.26, 1987, p.10362-5.

document entitled, "Response to Mulroney's Trade Agreement," which detailed plans for a vigorous counterattack if and when a deal was consummated.¹³⁷¹

When negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was finally concluded in the spring of 1988, NDP spokespersons in Parliament employed apocalyptic language to describe the long list of disasters that was sure to befall the country. The central issue, in Broadbent's view, was which historical tradition, which system of values would triumph in Canada. Would it be "the American way," where market values dominated virtually every aspect of life, or would it be "the Canadian way," which put limits on the market? Like Americans, Canadians were committed to life and liberty, but also to a sense of community nurtured by the state, and which had given birth to Canada's extensive network of social programs and many other distinctive arrangements. Broadbent was convinced that based on the evidence, the path chosen by Canada had been remarkably superior in many respects to that of the United States, a point conceded by many Americans and the reason they looked to Canada for continuing leadership in areas such as medicare.¹³⁷²

The argument that Canada must be completely free to maintain its heritage and continue to develop along an independent path, provided the backdrop for NDP MPs in their attack on specific aspects of the deal throughout the almost two months of Commons debate that followed in the summer of 1988. Whether it was the final destruction of foreign investment screening, the alleged infringement of provincial powers by a foreign power, the continentalization of energy, the necessity of amending 27 acts of Parliament to conform to the Free Trade Agreement and much more, the threat to Canadian sovereignty was the bottom line for the NDP.

¹³⁷¹ "Response to Mulroney's Trade Agreement," undated, NDP Research.

¹³⁷² Debates, July 5, 1988, pp.17102-4.

As the debate drew to a close near the end of August, Bill Blaikie put everything into historical perspective from the Canadian social democratic standpoint. The agreement, he maintained, would put an end to the creative debate that had been going on in Canada for fifty years between the Red Tory/Social Democratic tradition, which the United States had never embraced, and the tradition which espoused the sovereignty of market values. Philosophically and practically, the FTA would make the kind of Canada the CCF/NDP had fought for since 1933 impossible, and would entrench the neo-conservative agenda as undisputed master of Canada for at least a generation.¹³⁷³ In Blaikie's interpretation, the NDP was the chief repository of most of what was best in the Canadian tradition and its chief defender against "evil" neo-conservatism whose source of inspiration was the United States.

For Peggy Hope-Simpson the issue was fundamentally a moral one.

It is immoral for the present Canadian government to pretend that through a Free Trade Pact with the US, an unending supply of Canadian energy and other irreplaceable resources should be theirs for the asking in order to fuel an anti-social market oriented economy, and wasteful industrial, environmental and military technologies.¹³⁷⁴

Other key NDP spokespersons, such as Steve Langdon, saw the struggle as part of a long term battle against the multinational corporations. The FTA would extend and entrench their power, a development deleterious for both long-term social democratic domestic and international objectives.¹³⁷⁵ As Dan Heap so graphically put it, "The

¹³⁷³ ibid.; Debates, Aug.30, 1988, p.19088.

¹³⁷⁴ Peggy Hope-Simpson, "Report on Follow-up to the March, 1987 Convention Resolution on 'Arctic Sovereignty and Common Security,'" Oct.12, 1987, Blaikie Papers.

¹³⁷⁵ Langdon interview, June 15, 1993.

FTA, in essence, was a plot to use the American government to place Canada in trusteeship for the multinationals."¹³⁷⁶ Given these sentiments and arguments, it is not surprising that for three years the NDP fought an unrelenting struggle in Parliament against a comprehensive trade agreement with the Americans.

In terms of effectiveness, the NDP (and the Liberals) were ultimately unable to derail either the negotiations or the signing of a free trade agreement. However, sustained opposition from the NDP may have been crucial in keeping certain items off the negotiating table such as the Auto Pact, cultural industries, and regional development programs. Perhaps, it also played a role in ensuring that the Tory government did not accept the American definition of a subsidy which might have left social programs imperilled.

Despite the immense importance NDP spokespersons attached to the free trade question and its overall significance for the social democratic agenda, the NDP initially chose not to make free trade the central issue of its 1988 election campaign. According to Blaikie, the people in charge of the NDP campaign believed that the most effective strategy was to unveil a whole range of progressive policies around the theme of fairness that would appeal to "ordinary" Canadians. Moreover, based on the results of opinion polls taken on the eve of the election, free trade was only one of several important matters people were concerned about. Consequently, when the election developed into what amounted to a referendum on free trade, the NDP election "brain trust" led by Robin Sears was unprepared and seemingly unable to change its approach.¹³⁷⁷

¹³⁷⁶ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹³⁷⁷ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

Broadbent must bear some of the responsibility because he appears to have somewhat misread the electorate on the issue. For example, his initial speech officially launching the NDP campaign contained no reference to free trade. Indeed, Blaikie maintains that, despite his many eloquent speeches on the topic in the Commons over the years, Broadbent never fully understood the watershed nature of the Free Trade Agreement and its political significance.¹³⁷⁸ For instance, on May 18, 1987, when the Conservatives had introduced a motion requesting Parliament to re-affirm the government's mandate to negotiate a free trade deal, Broadbent was prepared to allow the motion to go forward after only one day of debate. It took an emergency NDP caucus meeting convened under pressure from Blaikie to convince their leader to prolong the debate in order to take full advantage of an opportunity to educate the general public on the long-term implications of free trade for Canada.¹³⁷⁹ In Heap's interpretation, part of the problem was that Broadbent was generally more conciliatory towards big business than Douglas and Lewis had been, and therefore less likely to launch an all-out attack on big business and the multinationals who, in the final analysis, "called the shots" for the pro-free trade campaign.¹³⁸⁰

As a realist, Broadbent may also have felt uncomfortable with the, at times, overblown nationalist rhetoric the anti-free trade position tended to generate. He certainly did not want to be labelled anti-American.¹³⁸¹ Then too, he and his strategists knew that NDP credibility on economic questions had always been low

¹³⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁷⁹ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

¹³⁸⁰ Heap interview, June 15, 1993.

¹³⁸¹ As noted earlier, Broadbent was convinced that "knee-jerk" anti-Americanism was all too prevalent in the NDP. Broadbent interview, May 1, 1991.

amongst the electorate. Therefore, drawing strong attention to free trade might be counterproductive.¹³⁸²

After the election, many party activists and trade unionists were very upset that the party had failed to make the free trade issue the centre of NDP campaign strategy. As some New Democrats in Trinity-Spadina wrote in their postmortem:

The greatest disappointment was caused by the NDP's failure to seize the major issue of the campaign, free trade. Here was an issue ready made for us. In it were combined a great debate over the economic future of Canada, tremendous implications for our foreign policy, our culture, and our freedom to plan our future.¹³⁸³

While the criticism is valid in terms of the national NDP campaign, free trade did play a prominent role in the local campaigns of most NDP candidates. Indeed, the NDP became the main focus of opposition to the deal at least in Saskatchewan and BC.¹³⁸⁴

The free trade issue illustrates the fact that foreign and domestic policy are inextricably intertwined, especially in the NDP. Hence, opposition to free trade was a foreign policy matter because it affected Canadian-American bilateral relations. But it was also a domestic issue in that it appeared to call into question Canada's identity and its very existence. The FTA revealed, as no issue before it, that anti-Americanism within the NDP was rooted fundamentally in the conviction that the "American Way" posed a fundamental challenge to the building of - even the survival of - a unique social

¹³⁸² Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.221.

¹³⁸³ "Renewing the New Democratic Party: Some Ideas From Trinity-Spadina," undated, Michelle Brown Papers, pp.1-2.

¹³⁸⁴ Blaikie interview, April 15, 1993.

democratic society in Canada. And for NDPers, a Canada without the "bright light" of the social democratic vision would also be a Canada without the ability to fulfil its mission to build a better world according to the dictates of Canadian social democratic internationalism.

CONCLUSION

Rather than summarize the dissertation, this conclusion will recapitulate its main argument and examine the primary implications of the argument for both NDP and Canadian foreign policy. The chief argument of this dissertation has been that the foreign policy of the New Democratic Party is best understood as a variant of social democratic internationalism. There are five defining characteristics, which taken together, make Canadian social democratic internationalism a distinct phenomenon not only in Canada, but in the global social democratic movement.

The most important of these characteristics was one shared by all social democrats. This was the belief that the main objective of social democratic internationalism was the building of a world community based on the values of solidarity, socio-economic justice and equality and genuine political democracy. It was a world in which capitalism would be superseded by the social democratic version of socialism. For this to occur a second element was needed, namely, the creation of strong international institutions leading eventually to a world government to ensure that these values permeated every level of society throughout the world.

However, owing to its roots in the Western Canadian populist and radical political movements of the Twenties and Thirties and the North American social gospel phenomenon, these values took on a particular form within Canadian social democratic internationalism. For example, the cooperative ideal was viewed through the lens of the Prairie experience with cooperatives and pools. Similarly, the social gospel and its

vision of a future Messianic kingdom of righteousness put a somewhat more quasi-religious and moralistic stamp on the Canadian movement compared to their European compatriots.

Also distinct was a third characteristic of Canadian social democratic internationalism. In the post World War II era, many Canadians increasingly came to believe that the Canadian economy, culture and, indeed, its whole way of life was threatened by the United States. For Canadian social democrats, this was particularly alarming since the United States had no social democratic movement of any consequence. Therefore, the NDP felt it necessary to find a place for Canadian nationalism within the broad parameters of its fundamentally internationalist world view. The reasoning was straightforward. If Canada did not survive, or at least a Canada in which social democracy could thrive, Canadian social democratic internationalism would be unable to fulfil its historic mission.

Here then was the fourth defining characteristic of Canadian social democratic internationalism, namely, that the NDP had a prophetic call to make Canada a special force for peace, justice and the building of a world community in keeping with the values of the international movement. Anything that might undermine this objective, such as membership in military alliances, was suspect.

The fifth constituent element of the Canadian version of social democratic internationalism was its anti-military bias. While very few members of the NDP were pacifists, most were affected in some way by its early pacifist roots. The result was a suspicion of things military and a reluctance to spend money in this field unless for peacemaking or the creation of a world police force which, in Canadian social democratic internationalist thinking, were viewed as uncontaminated by the military ethos.

While NDPers were united in their commitment to the goals of Canadian social democratic internationalism, they often could not agree on the best way to achieve them. This dissertation has demonstrated how the differences between idealism and realism affected NDP foreign policy in many areas, especially defence and attitudes towards the United States. Part of the explanation for the conflict lies in the fact that for idealists, the basic elements of Canadian social democratic internationalism were like the fundamental beliefs and ideals of a religion. The fundamentalist mind-set cannot tolerate deviations from the "faith" or anything that appears to stand in the way of their fulfilment, because this is interpreted as a betrayal of these ideals. Thus, membership in military alliances was not only suspect, it was anathema.

Similarly, close ties with the United States, which idealists believed displayed many of the characteristics of an imperialist power, must studiously be avoided. Anti-Americanism, therefore, was a legitimate weapon in the struggle for Canada to establish and maintain its identity and historic role. Canada was different from the United States and Canada was better than the United States. Canada had a different and superior role in the world than the United States. Thus it was, and thus it should remain as far as idealists were concerned.

Consequently, everything must be done to distinguish Canadian foreign policy from that of the United States, and at the same time to encourage Canada in the fulfilment of its destiny as an ambassador for the values of social democratic internationalism and as a mediator between rich and poor nations. In particular, idealists emphasized Canada's role in providing leadership to a "third force" of neutral countries which were not completely part of either the communist or capitalist camps. Thus, in the final analysis, most social democratic idealists were not isolationists. They believed, to use the words of the scholar, John W. Holmes, that Canada would

"become a more world-minded country after snapping...the umbilical cord [binding Canada to the United States]"¹³⁸⁵

While realists shared the idealists' enthusiasm for a special Canadian role in fulfilling the ultimate objectives of social democratic internationalism, they differed on the means. To realists, it appeared self-evident that, given its history, cultural connections and geographic location, Canada was part of the Atlantic community and a North American nation and must, therefore, be on reasonably good terms with both Europe and the United States. Anti-Americanism should not be allowed to define or unduly influence Canada's bilateral relationship with the United States or its overall foreign policy. It followed also that neutralism was both undesirable and impossible. Moreover, the inevitable practical effect of neutralist thinking in the long term was a form of isolationism which could only have deleterious effects on Canadian social democratic internationalism. Indeed, by attempting to weaken its historic European and American ties, Canada would have less influence with these countries and with the non-aligned and poor nations as well.

That most members of the NDP inner circle favoured realism and most party activists idealism is of some interest. It could well be that people who rise to the top of any party tend to be those who are most adept at compromising or adapting their ideals. This is particularly significant for a party like the NDP that supposedly takes its beliefs seriously, and where the leader must take into account both idealistic resolutions passed by party conventions and the pragmatic daily demands of politics. It also seems clear that over time, the leadership and apparatchnik in any party form a kind of bureaucratic class with a strong interest in preserving their status and power.

¹³⁸⁵ John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), p.17.

This makes them even less willing to take risks, which further widens the gap between the inner circle and the activists. However, this explanation must not be pushed too far since there were important leaders in the NDP such as Pauline Jewett who were idealists, while the realist camp was not devoid of activists.

As for class and regional variations within the NDP, two findings emerge. Since realists and idealists did not generally come from different socio-economic groups or classes, their differences cannot be accounted for on this basis. Regional explanations have more merit, especially the idealism of British Columbia members, but they are not decisive.

While the realist position on NATO membership, like its attitudes towards the United States, was similar to that of liberal internationalism, the main difference was in the objective. To social democratic realists, adoption of such policies were simply pragmatic responses to the threats of communism and nuclear disaster to social democratic internationalism.

It must also be recalled that, except on NATO and to a lesser extent anti-Americanism, realism and idealism did not represent rigidly defined camps within the party. They were more like two ends of a continuum with NDPers situated at various places in between and influenced to at greater or lesser extent by both. Indeed, on some issues, such as Third World policy, the NDP as a whole seemed to move back and forth between realism and idealism depending largely on domestic political circumstances.

Thus, NDP foreign policy was the product of the interplay and conflict between both realism and idealism and took on many of the strengths and weaknesses of both. For example, idealism gave the party's policy a distinctly futuristic orientation and one in which moral considerations played a very prominent role. For idealism, spiritual

forces were ultimately stronger than other powers. Right would prevail over wrong. The world and all of humanity were moving in a positive direction.

Such thinking has had both good and bad effects on NDP foreign policy. A foreign policy rooted in such thinking has had positive as well as negative aspects. Clearly, people who believed that a world based on justice, equality and peace was coming, were willing to work hard to help bring that dream to fruition as soon as possible. Consequently, for NDPers, foreign and domestic policy were inseparable. Building a social democratic Canada was a step towards building a social democratic world. Idealism provided the energy that sustained the CCF/NDP movement and party in Canada for sixty years despite repeated electoral failure at the federal level.

However, by the mid-Nineties, idealism was in trouble in the New Democratic Party. The success of the neo-conservative revolution and the seeming failure of traditional social democratic socio-economic solutions in the past decade has undermined the faith of many social democrats in the future. NDPers were particularly vulnerable to disillusionment, because without the discipline and realism gained from having run the government in Ottawa, idealism had been largely unchallenged in the party with the partial exception of defence policy. Indeed, if the party had managed to win a federal election, some of the more idealistic policies would in all likelihood have had to be reversed or ignored.

Another important result of the NDP's over emphasis on idealism has been the negative effects on Canadian social democratic internationalism. For example, the NDP's faith in the United Nations as a major step towards world government is well-known. However, the party never worked out a concrete plan to improve the UN's effectiveness. If it had, the world organization might have been more successful in bringing peace to such places as the Middle East, Vietnam and Central America.

Perhaps, the NDP could also have helped prepare the United Nations and the world for the new challenges it faced in the mid-Nineties in the former Yugoslavia, Central Africa, Somalia and many more countries. In short, the hopes and optimism of idealism needed to be wedded with realism to show how the United Nations could be transformed in the direction of world government.

This points to some serious deficiencies in Canadian social democratic internationalism as a whole. Because of its institutional, financial and electoral weakness, the NDP has traditionally devoted relatively few resources to international affairs. At the same time, its continuing preoccupation with Canadian nationalism led to an over emphasis on Canadian-American matters. Some of that energy might have been devoted to building much closer ties with other social democratic movements and in educating NDP members about the changes occurring in the world. The globalization of the economy and the growing capitalist hegemony presented challenges to social democratic internationalism that could only have been dealt with on a world-wide basis. Hence, the NDP should have done more to rally international labour and social democratic support for its fight against the free trade agreement with the United States in the 1985 to 1988 period and the North American Free Trade Agreement in the early 1990s. Similarly, in the mid-Nineties, NDP foreign policy should increasingly be directed towards building connections with movements such as the Zapatistas of southern Mexico and ensuring that international institutions are not captured completely by neo-conservative forces. In addition, the NDP ought to work towards the strengthening of international efforts to deal creatively with such problems as environmental, deforestation and technology transfer issues. Traditional NDP concerns about American domination of Canada were valid, but they should have been

understood within a much broader context. All in all, the NDP seems to have been ill-prepared for the global changes that began in the mid-Eighties.

In addition, for Canadian social democratic internationalism to thrive, the NDP needed a leader with an instinctive understanding of and commitment to the field, something the party has not had since T.C. Douglas, with the partial exception of Ed Broadbent. The leader must draw from the best of idealism and then articulate practical policies that will incarnate that vision. The party's floundering on the NATO issue illustrates what happens when leaders fail to exercise strong leadership. What was required was a willingness to stake out a position and educate party members about the issue. All the economic and diplomatic consequences of NATO withdrawal should have been clearly spelled out as well as the advantages and then a binding decision made. Similarly, the leader and party ought to have confronted the Canadian nationalism issue more openly and discussed its positive and negative impact on the party's internationalism. The result would have been fewer knee-jerk reactions to American statements and actions and a more mature NDP discussion of Canadian-American relations. For example, the issues of American investment and free trade would have benefitted.

The same straight-forward and educative approach was required if the NDP hoped to gain electoral advantage from its foreign policy. Canadian social democratic internationalism could very likely have been an electoral asset if it had been presented as a natural and, indeed, necessary part of the NDP's domestic vision and plan for Canada. Moreover, since Canadians distrust visions that are cast in ideological terms, the NDP needed to do a better job of demonstrating how its foreign policy was the most reasonable choice given the circumstances and one from which Canadians would benefit in the short or long-term.

Did NDP international affairs policy effect the conduct of Canada's foreign policy in the 1961 to 1988 period? Since this was not a major concern of this dissertation, only a few observations will be offered. Historians and political scientists have generally agreed that Canadian foreign policy has been the almost exclusive purview of the executive branch of the government with minimal input from Parliament or the general public. Traditionally, even most members of cabinet have had no influence. In practice it was the Prime Minister, his External Affairs minister and top officials in the External Affairs department who made and unmade Canadian foreign policy. The only substantive limitation was the broad parameters of Canadian public opinion.

Thus, a significant NDP impact on foreign policy was in articulating and, at times, manipulating public opinion. The debates on nuclear weapons, Vietnam and cruise missile testing are examples where the NDP's position reflected the views of millions of Canadians, and must therefore have been taken into account by the government of the day to some degree. Evidence of a more direct influence on the government's policy on these and many other issues is weak. At the same, on some questions, such as Central America and South Africa, there is little doubt that the NDP made important contributions to all-party SCEAND reports which sometimes affected government policy. In terms of Third World policy, the NDP strengthened the climate of humanitarian internationalism which undergirded Canada's foreign assistance programs and human rights thrust (weak as it often was). Indeed, it may well be that in encouraging Canadians to think in terms of cosmopolitan values the NDP made its most important and lasting impact on Canadian foreign policy, albeit, indirectly. If Willy Brandt was right that democratic socialism was the "humanitarian ideal" of the

Twentieth century, then social democratic internationalism was a major component of that ideal.¹³⁸⁶

This raises the question of what contribution this dissertation makes to the study of Canadian foreign policy. The introduction noted that NDP international affairs policy had been neglected by both historians and political scientists. A few years ago, Maureen A. Molot wrote an article lamenting the narrow theoretical framework employed by scholars of Canadian foreign policy.¹³⁸⁷ In response, David R. Black and Heather A. Smith criticized Molot for virtually ignoring the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy. By focusing exclusively on the question of Canada's status and role in the world, Molot had imposed false barriers between two "spheres of activity" which were fundamentally interconnected.¹³⁸⁸ Black and Smith went on to argue that domestic factors must be treated as important determinants of Canadian foreign policy.¹³⁸⁹

This dissertation contributes to this discussion in several ways. First, it documents the story of the foreign policy of the New Democratic Party, one of the domestic factors on the Canadian international affairs scene. As such, it lays the foundation for a future analysis of the domestic basis of Canadian foreign policy formation. For example, one area of fruitful work would be a study of the NDP

¹³⁸⁶ This quotation is from an article by Pauline Jewett. See Jewett, "Toward an Independent Foreign Policy," International Perspectives (Nov.-Dec., 1985), p.10.

¹³⁸⁷ Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," International Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol.1-2 (Spring-Fall, 1990), pp.77-96.

¹³⁸⁸ David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.26 (December, 1993), pp.747.

¹³⁸⁹ Ibid., pp.748-74.

relationship to the counter-consensus that Cranford Pratt maintains arose in the mid Seventies to support humanitarian internationalism.¹³⁹⁰ Another area would be a detailed analysis of the contribution of NDP MPs to SCEAND and other Parliamentary committees that dealt with international issues. Second, by showing how NDP foreign policy was often the product of an internal ideological conflict, the dissertation raises the question as to whether this was the case for other Canadian political parties or within the External Affairs department. Third, the NDP's experience in formulating international affairs policy represents a case study of how foreign policy develops fundamentally as an extension of domestic policy and is subject to its constraints.

This comprehensive examination of NDP foreign policy also makes a contribution to the mosaic of Canadian foreign policy studies by introducing a new paradigm, namely, social democratic internationalism. In addition to liberal internationalism, peripheral dependence and complex neo-realism, scholars will have another perspective with which to interpret foreign policy. Moreover, while the Canadian version of social democratic internationalism has never become the official policy of the Canadian government, its tenets have influenced the broad lines of its development. For example, a detailed analysis of the NDP's emphasis on Canada's prophetic role may shed new light on the strong role idealism has played in Canadian foreign policy since World War II. Alternatively, for those historians, such as Dennis Stairs, who lament the general dearth of ideas and purpose and preponderance of administrative considerations in the formation of official Canadian foreign policy, a closer look at Canadian social democratic internationalism is recommended.¹³⁹¹ In

¹³⁹⁰ Cranford Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-consensus," International Journal, Vol.39 (Winter, 1983-4), pp.127-35.

¹³⁹¹ Dennis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.15 (Dec., 1982), p.690. Also see Robert Dallek, The

offering this intellectual perspective, the dissertation contributes to a future analysis of the Canadian culture of foreign policy that seems so lacking at present.

Finally, where does this dissertation fit within the historiography of the New Democratic Party and the Canadian social democratic movement? Since this is the first comprehensive study of NDP foreign policy, it represents a significant step forward in filling this gap in the literature. For example, historians who wish to pursue the movement/party question in the future will need to pay much closer attention to the foreign policy thinking of the New Democratic Party. They will find the movement/party dichotomy reflected quite strongly in the idealist/realist controversy. Idealists were most concerned with preserving the ideals that had spawned the social democratic movement in Canada, while realists considered the pragmatic needs of the party to be paramount. In fact, no longer will it be possible to write a history of the NDP without giving foreign policy a prominent place in the story. This is not only because international affairs played such an important part in the party's history, but because the conflict between idealism and realism that characterized the saga of NDP foreign policy was often repeated in the creation of its domestic policy.

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3. John Brewin, April 15, 1991, June 14, 1993, Ottawa
4. Derek Blackburn, May 7, 1991, Ottawa
5. Ed Broadent, May 1, 1991, Montreal; September 20, 1993 (telephone)
6. Michelle Brown, May 3, 1991, Ottawa
7. Cy Gonick, June 22, 1992, Winnipeg
8. Dan Heap, June 15, 1993, Ottawa
9. Tessa Hebb, May 2, 1991, Ottawa
10. Pauline Jewett, May 2, 1991, Ottawa
11. Bill Knight, May 7, 1991, Ottawa
12. Steven Langdon, June 15, 1993
13. Howard McCurdy, June 15, 1993
14. Bob Ogle, May 13, 1993 (letter), Saskatoon
15. David Orlikow, December 4, 1991, Winnipeg
16. Svend Robinson, April 25, 1991, Ottawa
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