

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

A POST-PLURALIST THEORY OF PLANNING

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MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING

BY

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SURREY, BRITISH COLUMBIA

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WILLIAM DAVID LINTON

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

A general theory of planning does not yet exist. There are instead a large number of competing theories in a body of literature which may be loosely defined as planning thought. Most of the competing theories center on a particular normative, technical, procedural, or doctrinaire aspect of planning, which has generated a wide discussion of theoretical issues, but little advancement toward a general theory.

Political conflict is a universal characteristic of planning. The widely accepted importance of politics in planning suggests that by exploring its political qualities, it may be possible to develop a theory of planning which is generally accepted by planners and planning theorists, as well as being readily applicable to planning practice.

An emerging approach to the study of politics, post-pluralism, represents an ideal theoretical framework for exploring the political qualities of planning. The emergence of post-pluralism has paralleled the growing interest in politics among planning theorists, and evidence pointing to the utility and legitimacy of the post-pluralist approach is found in abundance in the recent literature on planning practice, urban government, and policy analysis.

As expressed in the open-system, organizational model developed in this thesis, post-pluralism offers planners an intellectual tool for understanding and managing the planning process. The model successfully addresses various political interests within the planning process, accounts for both the managerial and partisan political tensions experienced by planners, and offers a practical means of organizing and understanding almost any planning problem.

As the post-pluralist model proposed in this thesis is capable of addressing various interests with a particular planning situation, it may also be isomorphically extended to address the variety of normative, technical, and doctrinaire positions in planning theory. Applied in this fashion, the model becomes a means to organize and understand the existing body of planning theory, as well as the introduction of future theoretical viewpoints. This application may provide the necessary first step toward the development of a general theory of planning.

To Judy

The sage has no mind of his own. He takes as his
own the mind of the people.

Lao Tzu
"Tao Te Ching"

1.0 INTRODUCTION

There has been widespread recognition among planning theorists that planning thought is in a state of "crisis", and has been for some time. The ongoing disarray originated with a series of criticisms against what has become known as the rational comprehensive model. Since the sustained attack on the rational comprehensive model began, planning thought has become increasingly fragmented. Many approaches have emerged, with each trying to grasp what planning is, where it came from, and where it is going. A number of modifications and alternatives to the rational comprehensive model have been suggested, some of them by the model's critics, and others by its defendants. Some planning theorists have proposed alternative normative theories based on aesthetics, design principles, efficiency, or ideology. The most recent of these normative propositions include the "healthy city", and "sustainable city" movements.

The attack on the rational comprehensive model has effectively resulted in a wider range of literature pertaining to planning thought, with many different writers arguing and counter-arguing each other's positions. Planning thought is comprised of competing ideas, each vying

for the crown of "new paradigm" in the wake of "paradigm breakdown" [Alexander, 1984]. With every new perspective, and every new interpretation on an old paper, planning searches for a path to lead it out of the theoretical woods. While Kuhn's [1962, 1970] paradigm theory of scientific revolutions has proven to be an irresistible metaphor for some planning theorists, few writers have attempted to suggest a planning paradigm, or planning axioms, which may be embraced by the widest range of planners. Alexander [1984], Gunton [1984], and Hoch, [1984b] have suggested that planning theorists ought to work toward such a synthesis, and following this intention, Friedmann [1987] has attempted to chart the terrain of planning thought.

Given the widening range of planning thought, the competitive search for a new paradigm has been overtaken by the pressing need for theoretical order. This need is based on the failure of planning thought to recognize its mission: the creation of a general theory of planning which is widely accepted, systematic, readily applicable to real-world planning situations, and representative of planning practice. Without such a mission, planning thought will remain indefinitely mired in normative, doctrinaire arguments. While planning theorists may assume the mission of building a general theory of planning, the vast range of arguments within planning thought are not going to disappear, and new viewpoints will inevitably arise.

Therefore, in addition to being widely accepted, systematic, readily applicable to real-world planning situations, and representative of planning practice, a general theory of planning will have to accommodate these different arguments, rather than aim to replace them completely.

The first contention of this thesis is that the only possible basis for a general theory of planning is a meta-structure which systematically incorporates the continued expansion of planning thought. Unlike scientific theories, which expand at the expense of falsifying or modifying existing ideas, a satisfactory structure for planning theory will have to accommodate new as well as old ideas, popular as well as unpopular positions, doctrinaire and technical concerns. This requirement exists because planning is an activity rooted in human behaviour and human interests, and planning thought therefore cannot be falsified.

Within the intellectual movement toward a new model, many writers have emphasized issues such as the role of planners, the relationship between process and substance, and nature of politics in planning. Hoch [1984a] and Baum [1988] in particular have pointed to the inherently political nature of planning as the possible basis for building a new planning theory. While Forester [1989] and Benveniste [1989] have underlined the importance of politics in planning practice, a political theory of planning remains

to be written.

The second contention of this thesis is that a political theory of planning would provide the best alternative to the intellectual stalemate in planning thought. Such a theory would rest on the assumptions that all planning is political, and that the politics of planning can be based on ideological, personal, organizational, theoretical, substantive, or any other form of human interest. Since politics incorporates as many views as there are human interests, a political theory of planning also offers the flexibility required to meet the first contention.

In addition to being flexible, a political theory would also have to provide consistency in order to be eligible as a general planning theory. As a wide variety of planning issues continues to surface, a political theory of planning must treat those issues in a consistent fashion. The political theory would have to be taxonomically rigorous, readily applicable to real-world planning situations, and representative of planning practice.

The latter two conditions are especially important, for while it may be assumed that all planning is political, planning is not simply politics. To have any potential as a general theory of planning, the new theoretical approach would have to both prescribe and describe the behaviour of planners within the planning

process. A new political theory would have to be accurate in its description, and widely accepted in its prescription, in order to be successful. In addition, a political theory would still have to address the presence of substantive and technical issues within the planning process. Acknowledging the presence of substantive and technical considerations requires the recognition that any possible field of substantive or technical expertise may have some degree of relevance to a given planning process.

The simplest and most powerful method of incorporating the flexible yet systematic treatment of politics, the behaviour of planners, and substantive expertise is through the development of a model. It is a relatively easy task to specify areas of expertise, and the steps of a planning process, and they therefore lend themselves well to model-building. The key questions are: 1) how political interests could be systematically expressed within such a model; 2) how would the model function; and 3) what school of thought would form the intellectual basis for a systematic definition of politics?

This thesis proposes a political model of planning. To address the three questions of form, function, and intellectual basis, the model is structurally based on organization theory [Hall, 1972; for example], functionally based on general system theory, [Bertalanffy, 1928; 1950a; 1950b; 1951; 1955; 1962; 1968], and intellectually based on

the emerging body of thought called post-pluralism [Schattschneider, 1960; Pross, 1986] and its related cousin, regime theory [Elkin, 1980; 1985; 1987; Stone and Sanders, 1987].

While most accurately described as a post-pluralist, open-system, organizational model, the model will be referred to as simply a post-pluralist model for the remainder of this thesis. In addition to brevity, the main reason for this abbreviation is to emphasize the conception of politics which lies at the centre of the model's plausibility. In the post-pluralist model, general system theory and organization theory serve a vital, yet subordinate role, as the modular devices by which post-pluralism is expressed and explained. While the post-pluralist model may illustrate or perhaps even enhance the utility of general systems theory and organization theory as model-building tools, the primary purpose of the post-pluralist model is to explain the dynamics of the planning process through the consistent expression of its politics, particularly the politics of power.

Within the post-pluralist model, the planning process is fundamentally political, regardless of the importance given to any matter of substantive, technical, or aesthetic expertise. Within the post-pluralist model, areas of expertise are subordinate to the politics of the planning process, and may either serve as sources of political

conflict, or as points of political interest within the planning process. With expertise in a secondary role, it is the political interaction of interests and the exercise of political power which ultimately determines planning outcomes.

The role of planners within the process varies according to the political interests they serve, their area of expertise, and their level of participation within the process. By understanding of the politics of management within their client's organized interest, and understanding the politics of power between various organized interests, planners not only become better players within the process, but are also better able to apply their particular area of expertise. The politics of planning are not only defined by the politics of expertise, but also by the politics of power. In this context, the post-pluralist model serves as a prescription for planning practice as well as a description of the planning process. By attempting to meet both of these tasks, and while metaphorically providing a sense of order to planning theory, the post-pluralist model offers some further direction toward a general theory of planning.

1.1 SUMMARY

The search for a new planning paradigm has been overtaken by the pressing need for theoretical order. It

may be possible to accomplish both tasks within the requirements of a general theory of planning. Those requirements are wide acceptance, systematic rigour, and an internally consistent description and prescription of planning practice. Since the wide range of views on planning will not disappear, a general theory will also have to accommodate these different arguments, rather than aim to replace them completely.

This thesis suggests that since all planning is political, and that since the politics of planning can be based on any type of human interest, a political approach may offer the best hope for a general theory of planning. In addition to meeting the requirement of flexibility to accommodate various planning viewpoints, a political approach would also have to meet the more specific requirements of a general theory. This thesis proposes a post-pluralist model in an effort to meet both requirements.

1.2 THESIS ORGANIZATION

The thesis is divided into three major parts. Following this introduction and preceding the Part One is Chapter 2.0, which discusses the terminology and logical foundations for the thesis.

Part One examines the consideration of politics in the literature on planning theory, using a three stage model. Its purpose is first, to demonstrate the evolving

consideration and integration of politics as a crucial independent variable in planning thought, and second, to demonstrate the introduction and criticism of pluralist ideas in the planning literature. Chapter 3.0 explains the three stage model and describes the first stage, the attack on the rational comprehensive model. Particular emphasis is placed on Lindblom [1959] and Davidoff [1965] who were largely responsible for introducing pluralist ideas to planning. Chapter 4.0 briefly reviews the various schools of planning thought which emerged in the wake of the attacks on the rational comprehensive model, and discusses two residual issues which emerged during this period: the role of theory in planning, and the relationship between planning and policy analysis. Chapter 5.0 discusses the gravitation toward a political theory of planning, primarily through the searches by planning theorists, and through the incorporation of political considerations into planning thought.

Chapter 6.0 provides a conclusion to Part One and an introduction to Part Two by addressing the underlying pluralist theme which has dominated the consideration of politics in planning thought. The corporatist and elitist criticisms of pluralism are outlined, and post-pluralism is introduced as the emerging response.

Part Two of the thesis develops and introduces a post-pluralist, political model of the policy process. In

Chapter 7.0, the structural principles of post-pluralism are introduced, as first developed by Schattschneider [1960]. Chapter 8.0 discusses the basic taxonomy of the post-pluralist arena, and the critical role of pressure groups in shaping the policy process. The work of Pross [1986] is quoted extensively. Chapter 9.0 examines the post-pluralist taxonomy in an urban context, as developed in the urban regime literature especially by Stone [1976], and Stone and Sanders [1987]. Chapter 10.0 draws attention to the underlying theoretical context of the post-pluralist taxonomy: the open-system branch of organization theory. The importance of information and uncertainty in the policy process is explained within the context of the post-pluralist literature.

In Part Three, the post-pluralist model and its implications are discussed. Chapter 11.0 introduces a post-pluralist model of the policy process, based on the post-pluralist material presented in Part Two, the importance of politics in planning thought developed in Part One, and the terminology of reference in Chapter 2.0. Chapter 12.0 explores the implications for planning practice, particularly for planners working in official public agencies. Chapter 13.0 explores the implications for planning theory, particularly the challenge of creating theoretical order from the many influences in planning thought. Chapter 14.0 summarizes and concludes the thesis.

2.0 TERMINOLOGY OF REFERENCE

This chapter explains the terminological and theoretical references of the thesis. In planning thought, writers have often assumed that the meanings of words like "planning", "politics", "region", or even "city" are understood by the reader. But these deceptively simple words mean many different things to different people in different situations, and as a result, they are often misunderstood. The meaning of words is critical to theory-building, and extended attacks and counter-attacks in journal articles due to poor or misunderstood definitions has slowed intellectual progress.

This chapter is an effort to avoid such semantic problems, by qualifying and explaining the terminological context of some of the key words used in this thesis. By investing in such a discussion, it is hoped that this thesis may be judged on the basis of its intellectual merit, and not on semantic technicalities. This chapter also introduces the reasoning behind the primary contentions of the thesis, as they were defined in Chapter One, and lays the logical framework for the remaining chapters.

2.1 PLANNING

In its most basic definition, planning is a conscious effort to affect a future situation. Planning is a generic activity, applicable to any human action in the real-world [Branch, 1990]. One may plan a meal, a career, a vacation, or a day of work. Planning is not an accidental or chance event, but a deliberate attempt to organize events or decisions which will take place in the future. "Planning is the guidance of future action" [Forester, 1989, p.3].

2.1.1 CONTINGENCY PLANNING

A special variation of this generic activity is contingency planning, which attempts to affect the outcome of particular events which may or may not take place in the future. Planning for hurricanes, flat tires, or hostage-takings, are examples of contingency planning. Some forms of contingency planning such as air traffic control or fire prevention have become so entrenched in our society that we call them 'safety measures' or 'preventative maintenance', which we often do not consider as 'planning'.

2.1.2 SPECIALIZED PLANNING

Planning has been applied so frequently to some areas of human activity that such applications have become specialized subjects in their own right. Examples here include financial planning, military planning, and family planning. In each of these disciplines, substantive

considerations have strongly defined the techniques to be used and the variables to be studied to such a high degree, that planning in these fields has developed into distinct forms of expertise.

Planners in these respective fields have extensive expertise in the unique substantive considerations, special techniques, and pertinent variables involved. For example, financial planners must be well-versed in economics, accounting, budgeting, interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices, stocks, and bonds. Some financial planners may even become specialized within one particular area. While both financial planners and military planners try to shape the future, they each possess particular areas of substantive expertise, and are hardly qualified to trade jobs.

2.1.3 LAND-BASED PLANNING

City planning, regional planning, community planning, neighbourhood planning, and district planning each suggest a specialized area of substantive expertise, but they all describe a common characteristic, the delineation of land. Land-based planning has a special problem, since any delineation of land can incorporate a potentially limitless number of planning considerations and areas of substantive expertise. The details of transportation, energy, housing, sewers, parks, water supply, employment,

social services, recreational facilities, and so-on are often too numerous for even a large land-based planning department to manage. This result makes it impossible to conduct land-based planning with the same assurance of success in relatively narrow specialties such as military or financial planning.

However, there remains an additional problem, the political question of how goals are defined and who defines them. While it may be possible to define narrow financial or military goals and reach them through a well-defined series of steps, defining goals for a city, region, or community is far more difficult. Land-based planners, unlike financial or military planners, do not always serve a specific client, and are not always asked to consider a specific objective. Their techniques are not nearly as well-defined, and it is sometimes more difficult to tell 'what works'. Land-based planners must consider not only a wide variety of substantive matters but a wide variety of political interests, both of which derive from the focus on land. Land-based planning may therefore be defined as the effort to guide future decisions, events, or conditions pertaining to formally defined land-based entities such as cities, regions, or districts.

2.1.4 COMMUNITY and NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING

The notions of community or neighbourhood planning

pose a special problem, because 'neighbourhood' and 'community' are rarely defined in a formal manner. For example, planners often fail to distinguish whether a community means a group of people, the area where they live, or both. Like the word neighbourhood, a community implies conditions of shared social or cultural experience or cohesiveness. Such conditions are continually changing, and are in themselves difficult to define. Social or community problems are not necessarily land-based but are typically described by land-based boundaries, and social or community planning typically faces similar challenges as land-based planning: multiple interests, and multiple areas of substantive expertise. Both of these challenges, in one context or another, have occupied the center of attention in land-based planning thought since the 1950s. We now turn to the problem of defining theory, planning theory and planning thought.

2.2 THEORY

As discussed in Chapter One, there is no single theory of planning. Although it is typical to refer to 'planning theory' as the body of planning's theoretical knowledge, it is more accurate to consider this body of knowledge 'planning thought'. Planning theorists often fail to make this distinction, and the result is sometimes confusing. Beginning with definitions of theory, this

section is an effort to emphasize the distinction between schools of planning thought, and the elusive general theory of planning.

2.2.1 DEFINITIONS of THEORY

Virtually every academic discipline has some body of thought which its proponents call theory. The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary offers a number of definitions of the word "theory", each of which will be considered separately.

"1) the analysis of a set of facts in their relations to one another" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

A proposed general theory of planning must somehow account for all viewpoints within the range of planning thought. Many planning theorists have tried to do this, but there is much disagreement among them on which facts ought to be included. There are at least two sources of this disagreement. First there are tangible arguments, pertaining to technical and substantive matters, and second, there are doctrinaire arguments, pertaining to ideological and aesthetic matters. As a result of these many arguments, planning thought embodies a wide spectrum of viewpoints. Friedmann [1987] has tried to treat these viewpoints as a set of facts and chart their relations to one another, for the purpose of supporting his own social learning model, but this model does not account for every viewpoint in planning

thought.

The major theme of Webster's definitions 2a, 2b, and 3 is that theory is prescriptive, instructing a particular form or order of action.

"2a) a belief, policy or procedure proposed or followed as the basis for action" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

Many viewpoints in planning thought have offered proposals as the basis for action. The most obvious of these is the rational comprehensive model, but throughout the sustained attack on this viewpoint, there has been little or no agreement among planners on what ought to take its place. This disagreement on 'how to plan' is closely related to the disagreement on 'what to plan', discussed above.

"2b) an ideal or hypothetical set of facts, principles or circumstances-- often used in the phrase 'in theory'" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

Again, the problem with this definition is its propositional status. If one planner says 'in theory, planning ought to...', he/she is apt to be refuted by another planner, who has some other preference. Planning thought contains many arguments of what 'in theory' planning is, and how planners ought to do their work. These viewpoints may all have some merit and logical consistency, but because none of them dominate the domain of planning thought, none can claim to be THE theory of planning. This

tentative condition of prescription also addresses the third definition cited by Webster's:

"3) the general or abstract principles of a body of fact, a science or an art" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

In Webster's fourth definition,

"4) a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain phenomena" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

theory is essentially predictive, explaining why something happens. Planning theories have never pretended to know or explain what planners are going to do, and have had little success in predicting the behaviour of substantive phenomena, such as changes in the economy or patterns of urban growth. Prediction is clearly a higher order function of theory, and planning theorists must first resolve the disparity between the descriptions of planning behaviour and the prescriptions of what planners ought to do. This disparity has been a major reason for the downfall of the rational comprehensive model.

"5a) a hypothesis assumed for the sake of argument or investigation" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

Webster's definition 5a) is analogous to all of the various stances in planning thought which argue particular viewpoints of how planning ought to be done and why it occurs. This definition of theory is closely related to 5b), "an unproven assumption". In planning thought there

are many assumptions, some of which are ideologically based and cannot be proven. The variety and non-falsifiability of many planning viewpoints also renders impossible Webster's definition

"5c) a body of theorems presenting a concise systematic view of a subject" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

There is no systematic or concise view of planning, and the diversity of various planning arguments is almost beyond systematization.

The final definition of theory from Webster's is almost colloquial, and not relevant to the current discussion: "6) an abstract thought: speculation" [Webster's, 1977, p.1209].

2.2.2 FUNCTIONS of THEORY

From these definitions, it is apparent that theory serves four major functions: description of what is happening, prescription of what should be done, prediction about what will happen, and explanation of why it happens. Although less apparent, it is also evident that a general theory requires two conditions which pertain to the four functions: consistency and rigour.

Consistency is the logical agreement between the predictive and descriptive elements of theory, such that they are logically self-referencing. Newton's laws of classical mechanics are an example. Newton's laws describe,

predict, and explain the mechanical behaviour of physical objects at a human scale. Rooted in logical positivism, scientific theories such as Newton's demand logical consistency, because in science, theory is intended to be applied without the interference of the observer. Prediction must be confirmed by experience in every case in order for the theory to be valid, and this empirical testing must be free from observer interference. If a discrepancy from the expected experience occurs, then the theory must be modified within the logical consistency of experience. Even if it may be shown that the observer cannot be separated from the observed [Capra, 1975; 1983], the criteria of consistency demands that the observer make the greatest possible efforts to avoid biasing the results of experimentation.

A distinction between prescription and prediction becomes more important in the social sciences, where human behaviour is the subject of inquiry. In physical science, prediction and prescription are virtually synonymous. It makes no difference what the observer thinks ought to take place, only what the theory says will take place and what actually occurs in the experiment. In some social sciences, such as economics, theories prescribe as well as predict. As a result, it is possible to distinguish between two kinds of logical consistency in social science theory: internal consistency, where prescription and description are

logically coherent, and external consistency, where prediction and description are logically coherent.

Rigour may be demonstrated in two forms. Taxonomic rigour refers to the ability of a theory to incorporate the widest possible range of positions or classifications within a given discipline, and experimental rigour, the ability of the theory to withstand the test of verification under a wide variety of conditions. The latter is closely related to the aspect of external consistency and is regarded as a formal prerequisite in order for a theory to be widely accepted. The taxonomic notion of rigour is closely related to degree of substantive self-containment, or closure, allowed by the theory. This idea of closure represents the exclusivity of the body of theory to the subject. A highly self-contained or very closed theory has little substantive relevance to other disciplines, while a highly open theory is hardly self-contained, and shares a large commonality of content with other disciplines.

A theory may therefore be minimally defined as a body of knowledge which describes and prescribes a specified form of observable behaviour in a verifiably consistent and rigorous manner.

2.3 PLANNING THEORY

At the minimum, a general planning theory must be prescriptive and descriptive. It may not be possible to

consistently and accurately predict or explain the behaviour of planners or the planning process, but there are many prescriptions and descriptions of planners and the planning process. The observations about existing planning thought and the discussion on the definition of theory suggest that it is possible to create a taxonomically rigorous, internally consistent theory of planning.

In the substantive sense, planning thought is defined as all theoretical discussions pertaining to planning. Within the ever-expanding scope of this subject, there are many arguments, which are typically referred to as 'planning theories' or 'planning models'. These would include the rational comprehensive model, incrementalism, advocacy planning, transactive planning, and any other description of what planning is, or prescription of how it should be done. Planning thought is very difficult to self-contain, because there is a wide range of views within the discipline. However, the problem of self-containment also exists in the theoretical literature of other disciplines, such as geography [James and Martin, 1972; 1981]. Even physics has been subject to explorations of theoretical commonality with other disciplines [Capra, 1975, 1983].

While a high degree of self-containment is a formal characteristic of theory, the diversity of views within planning thought are not beyond taxonomic classification, as Friedmann [1987, p.74-75] has shown.

Much of planning thought has been borrowed from other disciplines, and as it continues to expand into new areas of substantive expertise, it is unlikely that a high degree of containment is possible within a rigid theoretical structure. However, it may be possible to create a taxonomically rigorous theory of planning by using a flexible meta-structure which allows for an ever-expanding number of viewpoints within planning thought.

Given the discussion so far, planning is generically defined as a deliberate attempt to organize events or decisions which will take place in the future, while land-based planning is defined as the deliberate attempt to organize events or decisions which will take place in the future pertaining to formally defined land-based entities such as cities, regions, or districts. A general planning theory would be defined as a body of knowledge which describes and prescribes planning in an internally consistent and taxonomically rigorous manner, and which is widely applied, endorsed, and accepted by planners. This raises the question: on what axioms can an internally consistent and taxonomically rigorous theory of planning be structured?

2.3.1 PLANNING THEORY AXIOMS

An axiom is defined by Webster's as "a maxim widely accepted on its intrinsic merit, a proposition

regarded as a self-evident truth" [Webster's, 1977, p.79]. Any effort at building a general planning theory should therefore begin by proposing axioms which will bear the demands of internal consistency and rigorous taxonomy.

The first axiom is that planning is inherently political. A planning matter becomes a potential political issue when the plan affects more than one person. No two people hold identical sets of values and therefore no planning matter will affect any two people the same way. If two people are going on the same shopping trip, there may be disagreement on the order of stores to be visited. Any discussion or series of decisions which lead to the resolution of a planning issue is a political process. This is as true for planning a two-person shopping trip or a car pool as it is for planning a lunar landing or a military invasion. Any planning issue, even between two people, has the potential to shift from the private domain to the public domain. For example, this is what occurred in the widely publicized case of Chantal Daigle. In 1989, Daigle planned on having an abortion, to the dismay of her male partner. Unable to resolve the issue privately, Daigle eventually needed a ruling from the Supreme Court of Canada in order to proceed with her plan.

When a planning issue shifts from the private to the public domain, the politics of a private conflict become the politics of a public conflict. In this context, any

planning issue is inherently political, and potentially a matter of public politics. This is the first axiom of a general theory of planning. Bolan [1983] has raised the theoretical question of whether any theory of planning can ever be completely value-free if planning is inherently political [Bolan, 1983]. Given the contention that any ideological or other values may be symbolically represented in the discussion of any planning process, this thesis is primarily interested in the methodological route toward a political theory of planning, which embraces the notion of competing values in the planning process.

Because public action requires public agreement, such actions require the formation of organizations. It is only through organizations that publicly sanctioned action can be achieved. In the public domain, planning is also inherently organizational. This is the second axiom. In addition, there is the third axiom of process. Planning takes place over a measurable period of time, and typically involves many decisions. A fourth axiom is that planning is communicative, inevitably involving exchanges of information. Without communication among interests, no political process exists. Land-based planning, such as city planning is always defined by some areal location on the earth. For land-based planning then, a fifth axiom, spatial location is also an inherent attribute. It is from these self-evident attributes, (politics, organization, process,

communication, and spatiality) that a generalized planning theory could be formed in order to satisfy the requirements of taxonomic rigour and internal consistency between description and prescription.

2.3.2 TAXONOMIC RIGOUR AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY

Given the self-evident characteristics of planning, let us suspend for the moment the apparent need to gear "how to plan" according to a particular substantive area of "what is planned". Whatever is going to be planned, the planning will occur in a process over time, involving organizations, communications, spatial location and politics. While all of these axioms offer clues as to how an internally consistent and taxonomically rigorous flexible meta-structure might be approached, the axiom of politics presents more subtle considerations.

As discussed earlier using the shopping trip example, the planning process holds the potential for political conflict, over who benefits or suffers from the plan. However, the planning process involves more than the resolution of issues, it also includes the struggle to include or exclude those issues from the planning process itself. The basic issues of "for what to plan" and "how to plan" are actually the primary source of political conflict within the planning process. The struggle over the planning agenda is perhaps the most important reason why planning is

political, and suggests a way out of the theoretical problem of the expanding realm of planning knowledge.

If we consider areas of substantive or technical expertise, and aesthetic or ideological viewpoints, as simply sources of argument within the planning process, we may include any substantive, technical, and doctrinaire viewpoints as 'sources of argument' in our theoretical discussion without actually having to name them. A flexible meta-structure may therefore be defined by simplifying arguments of 'what to plan' or 'how to plan' as sources of argument, potentially connected by lines of political conflict. This flexible meta-structure permits a rigorous taxonomy, based on whatever political conflicts, organizations, and communications, the planning process includes at a given moment. Any prescription on how to plan, can therefore be simplified as a potential point of argument in the planning process, just as easily as a substantive concern. Both substantive and prescriptive arguments can exist within political conflicts over who benefits or suffers from a planning decision, as well as within political conflicts over the planning agenda itself. Within the flexible meta-structure, planning is not viewed as a fundamentally technical, substantive, aesthetic, or ideological field, but as a fundamentally political process, incorporating any or all of these potential sources of conflict. Political conflict in planning can in fact be

based on any form of interest.

While the flexible meta-structure addresses the theoretical issue of taxonomic rigour required for a general theory of planning, there remains the issue of internal consistency-- the extent to which the description of planning practice is logically consistent with the manner in which it is prescribed by a general theory of planning. It has been shown that prescriptive arguments may be considered as points of political conflict within the flexible meta-structure. This does not eliminate the need for planning prescription within a general theory, but redefines the parameters of how planning should be prescribed.

In the proposed meta-structure, planners are not required to act according to any particular rationale or set of values, but must participate in the politics of the planning process according to the organizational or individual interests they represent. Planners may subscribe to any prescriptive view, or serve any interest within the planning process, but the politics of whether these viewpoints win or lose an agreed-upon planning issue is subservient to the politics of controlling the scope of political conflict, setting the planning agenda, and influencing the course of the planning process itself. These political struggles define the parameters of prescription for planning practice within a political theory of planning. As a fundamentally political activity,

planning is about the politics of management and the politics of power, and it is under these circumstances that planners must act, regardless of what political (organizational, substantive, technical, aesthetic, or ideological) interest they serve.

2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Planning is a generic activity, a deliberate attempt to organize events or decisions which will take place in the future. When applied to specialized areas such as financial and military planning, or contingencies such as emergency measures, planning is closely associated with the particular expertise for those areas. Planners expert in contingencies and specialties are specialists in their field and cannot easily exchange jobs. Land-based planning is defined as the effort to guide future decisions, events, or conditions pertaining to formally defined land-based entities such as cities, regions, or districts. Because defined areas of land potentially involve an enormous range of substantive matters to be planned, land-based planners face two important problems, 1) the potentially vast amount of expertise applicable to planning, and 2) the increased potential for political conflict among various interests. Planners have tried to avoid these problems by focussing on the methodology and procedure of planning as their legitimate form of expertise. This emphasis on procedure in

turn has raised two recurring problems in planning thought, 1) procedure is invariably linked to the substance of what is planned, and 2) it is difficult to distinguish planning procedures from other methods of decision-making.

There is no single theory of planning. Although it is typical to refer to 'planning theory' as the body of planning's theoretical knowledge, it is more accurate to consider this body of knowledge 'planning thought'. Based on a review of prevailing definitions, a theory serves four major functions: taxonomic description, prescription, prediction and explanation. It is also evident that a general theory requires two conditions which pertain to the four functions: consistency and rigour. Consistency is the logical agreement between the predictive, and descriptive elements of theory, such that the predictive and explanatory functions are logically self-referencing. In social science theory, it is possible to distinguish between two kinds of logical consistency in : internal consistency, where prescription and description are logically coherent, and external consistency, where prediction and behaviour are logically coherent. Rigour may be demonstrated in two forms. Taxonomic rigour refers to the ability of a theory to incorporate the widest possible range of positions within a given discipline, and experimental rigour, the ability of the theory to withstand the test of verification under a wide variety of conditions.

A theory may be minimally defined as a body of knowledge which describes and prescribes a specified form of observable behaviour in a verifiably consistent and rigorous manner. Because planning is essentially prescriptive, and embodies a very wide range of substantive and procedural concerns, a general planning theory would be defined as a body of knowledge which describes and prescribes planning in an internally consistent and taxonomically rigorous manner, and which is widely applied, endorsed, and accepted by planners.

It is axiomatically proposed that land-based planning is inherently political, organizational, professional, communicative, and always defined by some areal location on the earth. It is also proposed that a taxonomically rigorous and internally consistent theory of planning could be developed using a flexible meta-structure. Using a morphology of point sources of argument and lines of potential conflict, the flexible meta-structure would represent planning's expanding taxonomy and the fundamentally political nature of the planning process. It is through the latter characteristic that internal consistency could be provided.

The flexible meta-structure fundamentally defines land-based planning as a political process, in which organizations and individuals communicate among one another and make deliberate efforts to affect future decisions,

events, or conditions pertaining to a formally defined portion of the earth's surface. In this process, primary political struggles occur over setting the planning agenda, controlling the scope of political conflict, and guiding the course of the planning process itself. Secondary political struggles occur over the outcome of specific planning decisions. Official positions taken by individuals or groups within the planning process are defined by their political interest in substantive, technical, aesthetic, ideological, or any other aspects of planning.

As a description based on the minimum axioms defining the planning process, the flexible meta-structure also defines the parameters of planning prescription according to the primary political struggles of the planning process: setting the planning agenda, controlling the scope of political conflict, and guiding the course of the planning process itself. At this degree of refinement, the theoretical description of the planning process by the politically defined, flexible meta-structure, is internally consistent with the political parameters defining the prescription of planning practice. The fundamental requirements of a general theory of planning also appear to have been potentially satisfied. The additional qualification of widespread acceptance and application would depend on the empirical validity and practical utility of the potential theory, which has only been roughly outlined

so far. What remains to be discussed are the details of description and prescription within the structural, functional, and intellectual basis of the politically defined, flexible meta-structure.

PART ONE

POLITICS IN PLANNING THOUGHT

looking down on empty streets, all she can see
all the dreams all made solid
all the dreams all made real

all of the buildings, all of those cars
were once just a dream
in somebody's head

Peter Gabriel
"Mercy Street"

3.0 POLITICS in PLANNING THOUGHT 1: ATTACK on the RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL

This chapter introduces the notion of a three-stage movement toward a political theory of planning, and discusses the first stage of this movement, the initial wave of attacks on the rational comprehensive model.

3.1 THE THREE-STAGE MOVEMENT

The discussion of political conflict has grown in the planning literature over three stages. The first stage was the initial series of attacks on the rational comprehensive model, which included Meyerson and Banfield [1955], Simon [1957], Lindblom [1959], Altshuler [1965], and Davidoff [1965]. These writers realized that politics was an important part of planning.

The second stage was a mixed response to this affirmation, which brought further attacks on the rational comprehensive model, discussions of greater public participation in planning practice [for example, Sewell and Coppock, 1977], and a wide range of new theoretical proposals for planning theory. Ideological efforts grew during this aftermath, including the refinements of "radical planners" such as Harvey [1978], Castells [1983], and Bookchin [1986]. More recently there has been renewed

general interest in normative concepts such as social equity and sustainable development as a basis for planning.

The third stage, of which this thesis is a part, has been the effort to formally integrate political considerations within planning thought and planning practice. This methodologically-centered work began in the early 1970s, with Benveniste [1972] and Catanese [1974] who began to detail the implications of politics for planning practice. These efforts have been continued by Forester, [1989] and Benveniste [1989].

The three temporal stages of literature are not cleanly divided, and there is considerable overlap between one period and the next. Each stage also marks a major enlargement in the scope of planning literature, and one result has been a widening of the range of debate in planning theory. Another result of the continued debate among different theoretical camps has been the emergence of a politics of planning thought, which roughly parallels the general politics of planning practice. In the spectrum of planning theory, each school of thought "perceives the public interest in its own way, reflecting its particular assessment of human nature and its own sense of the legitimate range of interventions in social, economic, and political processes" [Hudson, 1979, p.388]. This theme has been included in recent work on the politics of planning by Forester [1989], Benveniste, [1989] and Baum [1988].

The emergence of a politics of planning thought underlines the inherently political nature of planning, pointing to politics as a way to build an internally consistent, and taxonomically rigorous, general theory of planning. In this context, the third stage may be viewed as the sum of previous stages, and identified as the gravitation toward a political theory of planning.

3.2 The RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL

The rational comprehensive model is a phrase used to describe a general method of planning which rests on two major assumptions: 1) that planning matters are selected and actions implemented on a purely rational basis, and 2) that planning takes every major aspect into account, in order to coordinate urban development. There are many variations and conditions attached to these assumptions, but they remain as the most fundamental aspects of the rational comprehensive model. In theory and in practice, planning was held to be a rational, comprehensive exercise. Also referred to as master planning, synoptic planning, or more simply as rational planning or comprehensive planning, this "mainstream theory" [Baum, 1988] or "dominant paradigm" [Alexander, 1984] has been predominantly concerned with the physical development of land. More recently, social, environmental, and health concerns have been added to the mixture, but physical development has remained at the center

of urban planning.

A superb representative of the rational comprehensive school in the literature is Kent [1964]. Tracing the history of "the general plan" in the United States from 1930 to 1950, Kent firmly placed urban planning in the hands of local government, and detailed the substantive matters of physical planning and how they ought to be presented in formal planning documents. In this model, planners acted as technical servants, providing expertise and documenting changes in urban conditions for civic politicians. Political problems were not the planners' responsibility. Kent [1964] offered a broad introduction and historical snapshot of planning from the rational comprehensive viewpoint just at the moment when the attacks against it were mounting significantly.

The attack on the rational comprehensive model occurred simultaneously on two fronts, first on its theoretical premises [especially Simon, 1957; Lindblom, 1959], and secondly on its effectiveness in planning practice [for example, Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Altshuler, 1965]. The recognition of political variables in planning by writers such as Lindblom [1959] and Altshuler [1965] set the stage for Davidoff [1965], and the flood of debate which was to follow. These first attacks will be considered here in greater detail, followed by a brief discussion of Kravitz [1970]. By exploring the historical

development of the rational comprehensive model, Kravitz [1970] offers some insight into the criticisms against it, and the politics of planning thought.

3.3 LINDBLOM [1959]: PLURAL INCREMENTALISM

Like Simon [1957], Lindblom [1959] attacked the rational comprehensive model on the unfounded basis of its assumptions of rational action and comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors. However, rather than supporting Simon's compromise of "bounded rationality", Lindblom embarked on an analysis of planning in practice to challenge the rational comprehensive model. In addition, Lindblom raised three major issues in planning thought: 1) the internal consistency between theory in use, and theory on paper, 2) the relationship between planning and policy analysis, and 3) the uncertain nature of the planning process. All three issues have been the subject of considerable debate within planning thought, and all point to the major issue of politics in planning thought. In this context, Lindblom [1959] represents the first major blow to the rational comprehensive model.

3.3.1 RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE vs. INCREMENTALISM

In contrast to what he called the "rational comprehensive method", Lindblom pointed out that public administrators and agencies had to practice a method called "successive limited comparisons" [Lindblom, 1959, p.80].

This was because planners' "functions and constraints-- the politically or legally possible-- restrict their attention to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among the countless alternatives that might be imagined" [Lindblom, 1959, p.80]. Because the assumptions of the rational comprehensive method contradicted these real conditions, planners were left "in the position of practicing what few preach" [Lindblom, 1959, p.80]. Lindblom upheld his contentions by defining and critically comparing the principles of both methods. For the record, Lindblom's defining principles are fully quoted below:

"RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE

1a. Clarification of values or objectives distinct from and usually prerequisite to empirical analysis of alternative policies.

2a. Policy-formulation is therefore approached through means-end analysis: First the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them are sought.

3a. The test of a 'good' policy is that it can be shown to be the most appropriate means to desired ends.

4a. Analysis is comprehensive; every important relevant factor is taken into account.

5a. Theory is often heavily relied upon.

SUCCESSIVE LIMITED COMPARISONS

1b. Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from one another but are closely intertwined.

2b. Since means and ends are not distinct, means-end analysis is often inappropriate or limited.

3b. The test of a 'good' policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective).

4b. Analysis is drastically limited:

- i) Important possible outcomes are neglected.
- ii) Important alternative potential policies are neglected.
- iii) Important affected values are neglected.

5b. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory" [Lindblom, 1959, p.81].

Lindblom generally characterized the rational comprehensive method as "starting from the fundamentals anew each time, building on the past only as experience is embodied in theory, and always prepared to start completely from the ground up", in contrast to the successive limited comparisons, characterized as "continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees" [Lindblom, 1959, p.81]. In comparing the two methods' general character and specific features, and arguing in favour of the successive limited comparisons approach, Lindblom focussed on the process of planning, and how different values and interests are involved in that process. Lindblom's analysis of the two methods' features will be considered here at length.

3.3.2 VALUES and OBJECTIVES

In the comparison of 1a versus 1b, the matter of selecting values and objectives, planners face pressure from interests whose values are continually in conflict with one

another. Citing the case example of Meyerson and Banfield [1955], Lindblom pointed out that even if there is a clear objective of providing a given number of housing units, there are conflicts over the details and logistics of how those units are provided. Even if the details of a planning objective can be defined, the planner may have no guidelines to prioritize them: "is it worth sacrificing a little speed to for a happier clientele, or is it better to risk offending the clientele so that we can get on with our work?" [Lindblom, 1959, p.82]. "Unable consequently to formulate the relevant values first and then choose among policies to achieve them, administrators must choose directly among alternative policies that offer different marginal combinations of values" [Lindblom, 1959, p.82].

In this sense it is practically impossible to disentangle policies from objectives, or evaluation from analysis. There is no such thing as objective planning as long as there are planning objectives. Since a planner must infer values and objectives simultaneously, Lindblom proposed that "whether he is aware of it or not", the planner "does not find general formulations of objectives very helpful and in fact makes specific marginal or incremental comparisons" [Lindblom, 1959, p.82].

Conflicting interests, managerial problems and latent value judgments demand both marginal policy comparisons and incremental policy changes. Incrementalism is therefore the

product of the need for political expediency in the planning process.

3.3.3 MEANS, ENDS, and GOOD POLICY

Lindblom's comparisons of 2a-2b and 3a-3b further emphasized the importance of process, interests and values in shaping planning decisions. He argued that in the case of 2a, "means are conceived to be evaluated and chosen in the light of ends finally selected independently of and prior to the choice of means", but that "such a means-ends relationship is possible only to the extent that values are agreed upon" [Lindblom, 1959, p.83]. Given that the planning process is riddled with conflicting interests and values, Lindblom argued that means and ends are chosen simultaneously in the case of 2b.

In the comparison of 3a-3b, Lindblom noted the problem of testing for "good policy" when goals and programs are blended, and defined by incremental steps. Unlike the rational means-ends method, the successive limited comparisons method cannot show whether objectives have been met, only whether one policy is preferred over another. Lindblom argued that since "objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than that they are agreed upon", the agreed preference of one policy is an acceptable measure of its goodness [Lindblom, 1959, p.84].

The agreement of values, and the preference for a

particular policy expressed as a series of incremental steps, point to the politics of the process as the basis for planned action. The method of successive limited comparisons implies that rational decision-making is subservient to the political struggles by which plans are created. Without being specific, Lindblom implied that planning, like any other political process, is about power.

3.3.4 COMPREHENSIVENESS

In the comparison of 4a-4b, Lindblom attacked the assumption of comprehensiveness in planning, as did Simon [1957]. Lindblom noted that it was impossible for planners to be competent in every possible area of responsibility, and that "democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds" [Lindblom, 1959, p.84]. Lindblom suggested that any degree of comprehensiveness which does exist, is due to the multitude of interests involved in any planning process. Limited comprehensiveness is achieved through the "mutual adjustment" of political positions among interest groups. "For all the imperfections and latent dangers in this ubiquitous process of mutual adjustment, it will often accomplish an adaptation of policies to a wider range of interests than could be done by one group centrally" [Lindblom, 1959, p.85-6]. In this context, the degree of comprehensiveness is the by-product of an

incremental, multiple-interest planning process, not a prerequisite condition of the planning process. The degree to which a plan is comprehensive is a function of the number of interests accommodated by each increment in the planning process.

3.3.5 THEORY and PRACTICE

In his final comparison of 5a-5b, Lindblom pointed directly to one of the major themes in planning thought, and in his paper: the lack of internal consistency between planning theory and planning practice. The rational comprehensive model assumes "that theory is the most systematic and economical way to bring relevant knowledge to bear on a specific problem" [Lindblom, 1959, p.86-7]. In contrast, Lindblom's incremental model of successive limited comparisons suggests that planners are far more interested in what works for a given situation. In comparing alternative policies "that differ only incrementally from each other and from the present policy", for the explicit purpose of making policy, the planner need know "only the consequences of each of those aspects of the policies in which they differed from one another" [Lindblom, 1959, p.87]. Planners tended to ignore the rational comprehensive approach, because it had little relevance to planning practice. Given this discrepancy, Lindblom advocated his descriptive, incremental model of successive limited

comparisons as a prescription for planning practice.

3.3.6 LINDBLOM and POLITICS in PLANNING

As mentioned earlier, Lindblom raised two other major issues in planning thought, the relationship between planning and policy analysis, and the uncertain nature of the planning process. These issues deserve extended attention, and will be discussed in later chapters, but both underline the essence of Lindblom's paper, his recognition that planning is political. Comprehensiveness and rationality are limited by values, interests, and technical shortcomings, which are the mainstay of the planning process. Rational arguments and comprehensive guidelines are limited by political efficacy. Accordingly, the rational comprehensive model, as a planning theory, bears little resemblance to planning practice. In the political process of planning, planners take incremental measures when it is the only reasonable alternative.

3.4 ALTSHULER [1965]: TEST CASES OF PLANNING PRACTICE

Altshuler [1965] represents the last of the early critical works which focussed on detailed case studies of the rational comprehensive model in action, and presented theoretical implications. Another early study in this genre was Meyerson and Banfield [1955] on housing in Chicago, while a later example is Harris Stone's [1973] study on New Haven.

Altshuler compared the prescriptions of the rational comprehensive model with the realities of planning practice in four case studies. As summarized by Breheny [1982], Altshuler found "that the realities of planning practice, particularly as influenced by politics" were "simply not consistent with the principles of the model" [Breheny, 1982, p.241]. Altshuler pointed out that the rational comprehensive model "tends to be conservative, that it relegates politics, that it neglects conflict, that it emphasizes technical judgments", and "that it is excessively optimistic about the scope of planning" [Breheny, 1982, p.242]. "That planning is inevitably political, that it deals with great uncertainties, that it is limited in scope, that it involves internal conflicts and so on, were also clearly demonstrated by Altshuler" [Breheny, 1982, p.242]. Altshuler concluded that the influence of politics affected planning practice in ways which were "simply not consistent with the principles" of the rational comprehensive model [Breheny, 1982, p.242].

3.5 DAVIDOFF [1965]: PLURAL PLANNING

With the rational comprehensive model already weakened, the publication of Davidoff [1965] left the model in an uncertain condition, which has prevailed to the present. Since Davidoff, there has been no scholarly consensus on the legitimacy of the rational comprehensive

model, and a continuous debate on the future of planning thought. Following the initiatives of Lindblom and other early critics of the rational comprehensive model, Davidoff [1965] set the tone for considering politics as a fundamental characteristic of planning. In this context, Davidoff [1965] marks the end of the first stage of political development in planning theory, and the beginning of the second stage, which brought demands for greater public participation and the renewal of planning as an instrument of urban social reform.

Davidoff openly rejected "planning which would have the planner act solely as a technician", and proposed a future practice "which openly invites political and social values to be examined and debated" [Davidoff, 1965, p.331]. "Appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a position of value neutrality, for prescriptions are based on desired objectives" [Davidoff, 1965, p.331]. Like Lindblom [1959], Davidoff recognized the fallacy of objectivity surrounding the rational comprehensive model, given the imperfect knowledge available to planners. Planning cannot be purely rational or perfectly comprehensive, because it does not occur in a political vacuum. "Values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-making process", even if such a process was possible [Davidoff, 1965, p.331].

Davidoff also recognized the variety of values

competing as interests in the planning process. He attacked the notion of a common public interest, assumed by proponents of the rational comprehensive model, and proposed an openly political role for planners, who were to act as advocates for various interests in the planning process:

"Determinations of what serves the public interest, in a society containing many diverse interest groups, are almost always of a highly contentious nature. In performing its role of prescribing course of action leading to future desired states, the planning profession must engage itself thoroughly and openly in the contention surrounding political determination. Moreover, planners should be able to engage in the political process as advocates of the interests both of government and of such other groups, organizations, or individuals who are concerned with proposing policies for the future development of the community" [Davidoff, 1965, p.332].

Davidoff suggested that planning was an empowering process which could be used "to encourage democratic urban government", and as such, "it must operate so as to include rather than exclude citizens from participating in the process" [Davidoff, 1965, p.332]. In this vision, planners were to serve as advocates for individuals, groups, or organizations, and in so doing, democratize the planning process. Davidoff felt that unitary, comprehensive plans prepared by a single public agency discouraged public participation by excluding alternative opinions and proposals. These two interlocking ideas, the planner as

advocate and the pluralistic planning "structure", formed the basis of Davidoff's discussion.

"Where plural planning is practiced, advocacy becomes the means of professional support for competing claims about how the community should develop. Pluralism in support of political contention describes the process; advocacy describes the role performed by the professional in the process" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333].

Together advocacy and pluralism stirred an interest in public participation in planning, and galvanized the normative view of planning as an activity with a social mission; a mission which was subject to political debate.

3.5.1 The PLANNER as ADVOCATE

Davidoff borrowed his notion of the planner as advocate from the legal profession, arguing that planners in support of different views would act as if in an adversarial proceeding. "The planner as advocate would plead for his own and his client's view of the good society. The advocate planner would be more than a provider of information, an analyst of current trends, a simulator of future conditions, and a detailer of means. In addition to carrying out these necessary parts of planning, he would be a proponent of specific substantive solutions" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333].

Davidoff felt that the advocacy role would have several benefits for planners and planning. First, it would allow planners to seek employment with organizations having

similar values to their own. Second, planners "would have to prepare plans that take account of the arguments made in other plans" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333]. Third, because planners would be "performing a task similar to the legal technique of cross-examination... the net effect of confrontation between advocates of alternative plans would be more careful and precise research" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333].

Unfortunately, some of Davidoff's conclusions are based on assumptions concerning legal practice. While the notion of planner as advocate is useful and valid, the analogy with legal practice is not. Instead of using empirical examples to support the idea of planner as advocate, Davidoff extends the legal analogy, and precipitates some false conclusions.

First, Davidoff assumes that lawyers' personal positions are the same as their professional position in a given case: "The legal advocate must plead for his own and his client's sense of legal propriety or justice" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333]. While both Crown and defense attorneys may have personal views on a case, their professional responsibility is to the law itself. For example, whether a defense lawyer is repulsed by the behaviour of his or her client, he or she is obliged to serve the client to greatest degree provided by the law. The law serves a medium for lawyers much as money does for accountants.

Under the rational comprehensive model, planners have been told to rely on their expertise, and often attempt to hide behind it. While Davidoff argues that planners must go beyond the role of expert and become proponents of "specific substantive solutions", substantive expertise in planning is less rigid, less codified, and less durable than substantive expertise in law. Furthermore, by acting as proponents for competing interests, planners give up some of the prestige and influence held by experts, and act less like lawyers than Davidoff would presume. If planners are to act as advocates for particular interests, as they often do, they are much more likely to behave like politicians. This would be especially true where "the advocate planner would devote much attention to assisting the client organization to clarify its ideas and to give expression to them", and "to carry out the planning process for the organization and to argue persuasively in favor of its planning proposals" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333].

Not only does advocacy require some form of bias, but the planning process is a political process to a much greater extent than a legal one. This is the second problem of Davidoff's extended analogy: in the planning process there is no judge or jury attempting to weigh evidence in an unbiased manner, and no just solution. The lead agency or planning commission has its own planning agenda as well as an obligation to hear arguments from various interests.

However persuasive the arguments of advocate planners may appear, the greatest allegiance of the lead agency is to its own political power.

A third problem with Davidoff's extended legal analogy relates to the previous two. Davidoff's suggestions that advocates may cross-examine each other during public hearings and take account for the arguments in each others' plans are misleading and exaggerated. Because the planning process is primarily political, there is no obligation for the mutual availability of evidence which exists in legal proceedings. While Crown attorneys must allow defence lawyers access to all evidence they intend to present, there is no obligation for developers to disclose all of their "evidence" to neighbourhood residents.

3.5.2 The STRUCTURE and SCOPE of PLANNING

Davidoff considered two major forms of organization in the "structure" of planning, interest groups and the public planning agency. Through a widened scope of planning issues and political debate, Davidoff felt that the behaviour of these organizations would change, and planning would be improved.

Davidoff's major criticism of interest group behaviour was that they tended to react to official planning proposals rather than propose plans of their own. He blamed this condition on "the enlarged role in society played by

government bureaucracies and the historic weakness of municipal party politics" [Davidoff, 1965, p.334]. In his vision of a pluralistic planning process with advocacy planners, Davidoff proposed institutionalizing the influence of interest groups through the public support of alternative plan-making. In particular, Davidoff saw political parties, special organized interests, and ad hoc citizen groups as being interested in the avenue of alternative plan-making.

While Davidoff had high hopes for institutionalizing "grassroots" plan-making, his criticisms of public planning agencies were largely directed at a specific form of agency, the public planning commission. Structurally detached from elected city councils in most instances, planning commissions were ostensibly created to conduct planning in an independent and unbiased manner, as prescribed by the rational comprehensive model. Davidoff ridiculed the very notion of separating planning from politics, and planning commissions became an obvious target:

"Aside from important questions regarding the propriety of independent agencies which are far removed from public control determining public policy, the failure to place planning decision choices in the hands of elected officials has weakened the ability of professional planners to have their proposals effected. Separating planning from local politics has made it difficult for independent commissions to garner influential political support. The commissions are not responsible directly to the electorate and in turn the electorate is, at best, often indifferent to the planning commission" [Davidoff, 1965, p.335].

Davidoff disliked planning commissions primarily because they served the interests of dominant political powers. On one hand, Davidoff felt that commissions were powerless to influence elected politicians, while on the other, commissions were handmaidens to elected officials. In both cases, the planning commission was used to control the scope of political conflict on planning issues. In the first case, the planning commission served as a means to channel outside interests into a process which had an official appearance but no real power; a political dead-end. In the second case the planning commission simply served to implement decisions from above. In both instances, the planning commission blocked the access to power by either diverting or restricting political debate.

While Davidoff only indirectly addressed the political scope of planning, he directly addressed the substantive scope of planning. In this case, Davidoff opposed the restriction of planning to physical aspects of urban development and saw the expansion of planning into socio-economic areas as a means of politicizing the planning process:

"'Who gets what, when, where, why, and how' are the basic political questions which need to be raised about every allocation of public resources. The questions cannot be answered adequately if land use criteria are the sole or major standards for judgement" [Davidoff, 1965, p.336].

The implication for city planners, in Davidoff's view, was that they had to become more than land-use experts, and had to understand and manage the social, cultural and economic aspects of city life. As a result the scope of a city planner's work would be "no wider than that presently demanded of a mayor or city councilman" [Davidoff, 1965, p.336]. Simultaneously, planning was to be more political and more comprehensive, and advocate planners were to be more like politicians.

3.5.3 DAVIDOFF and POLITICS in PLANNING

"In presenting a plea for plural planning", Davidoff held that "the advocacy of alternative plans by interest groups outside government would stimulate city planning" in at least three ways, including 1) "better informing the public of the alternative choices open, alternatives strongly supported by their proponents" [Davidoff, 1965, p.332], 2) "forcing the public agency to compete with other planning groups to win political support" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333], and 3) "to force those who have been critical of 'establishment' plans to produce superior plans, rather than only to carry out the very essential obligation of criticizing plans deemed improper" [Davidoff, 1965, p.333].

These suggestions, and the very idea of advocacy planning were based on some questionable assumptions about

pluralism, democracy, planning, and politics which Davidoff did not make clear. For example, Davidoff did not address how the costs of producing competing plans would be paid, including the salaries of various advocate planners. As for support or opposition, the presentation of arguments to the unitary agency has minimal political effect compared to gaining the direct attention of politicians. Furthermore, Davidoff neglected to mention that the 'establishment' agency is an instrument of municipal government, and does not usually have to compete with outside groups for politicians' attention.

Davidoff [1965] failed to recognize that while the planning process involves political struggles for power, the power to plan is ultimately subservient to the power to govern. Opposition to 'establishment' plans may achieve some desired changes, but organizations and groups outside of government do not wield the ultimate power: control of the planning process. Davidoff incorrectly assumed that various groups and advocacy planners could gain control of the planning process by presenting alternative plans, but in fact such alternatives can only be fully implemented through the control of municipal government itself.

3.6 KRAVITZ [1970]: RATIONAL PLANNING AS AN OUTCOME OF POLITICS

Although most planning theorists give the impression that planning became "political" during the

intensified attack on the rational comprehensive model, Kravitz [1970] has argued that the rational comprehensive model was itself thrust upon the planning profession by a political agenda, implying that the role of politics in planning has a much longer history. As "a basic element in the reactionary efforts of the 'political reform movement' to establish corporate or welfare liberalism", the rational comprehensive model was proposed as an alternative to the City Beautiful movement [Kravitz, 1970, p.243]. Kravitz claimed that during the period 1893 - 1910, "planning was discovered by the establishment and subordinated to their developing ideology of corporate liberalism with its ultimately conservative ends" [Kravitz, 1970, p.245]. This establishment co-opted planning as a new policy instrument through their "early interest of the civic improvement groups", and "as they came to recognize that government intervention could be made to serve their interests, planning came to be a major component of this elitist effort to maintain power" [Kravitz, 1970, p.245].

Kravitz maintained that most of the original civic reformers were over-shadowed by their establishment counterparts by 1910, with an accompanying shift in priorities. "Amenity and order, which has been its explicit objectives, were replaced by efficiency, and what had been viewed as an 'Art' quickly became a 'Science'" [Kravitz, 1970, p.248]. The classical rational model which emerged

after World War One conceived planning as a government function whose ultimate objective "was to facilitate policy-making that would be rational (comprehensive in scope, scientific in method) and in the public interest" [Kravitz, 1970, p.251]. "What was a ostensibly a liberal, reform-minded approach to planning was, in reality, part of a conservative movement to maintain the political status quo and to serve the interests of the powerful and propertied" [Kravitz, 1970, p.252].

Kravitz's historical analysis can be clearly labelled as part of elitist political theory, yet it also shows how rational comprehensive planning cannot be completely separated from the political conditions which occurred during the period of its origin. In his historical analysis, Kravitz suggested that the attacks on the rational comprehensive model by behavioural scientists were focussed too sharply on the model itself and not on "the latent function it served" [p.253], or "the basic problems of elitism and one-dimensional culture" [Kravitz, 1970, p.262]. Although Kravitz's arguments had an Elitist bias, his analysis demonstrated the important point, that the political arguments in planning practice have been directly paralleled by political arguments in planning thought, at least throughout the rise and decline of the rational comprehensive model. Any planning theory, tentative as it may be, has political implications for planning practice.

3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The rational comprehensive model was seriously weakened by the early attacks, which boosted the recognition of planning as a politically volatile undertaking. Lindblom [1959] pointed out that the model was almost irrelevant in an incremental planning process where many interests and values held stakes in the outcome. Altshuler [1965] and others demonstrated the importance of politics in case studies of planning practice. The underlying problem of politics in planning remained latent, however, as theorists wrestled with the seemingly mechanical problems of the rational comprehensive model. The latency of politics and the flavour of the theoretical debate was changed forever with the publication of Davidoff [1965].

Unlike incrementalism, Davidoff outlined a broad, visionary departure from the rational comprehensive model. In fairness, Lindblom [1959] intended to criticize rather than sweep aside the rational comprehensive model, but what began as a simple critique has often been presented as a whole school of thought. Davidoff [1965], in contrast, detailed his views for changes to planners roles, planning content, and the political context of the planning process. What both Davidoff and Lindblom pointed to, but did not answer specifically, was that the planning process involves questions of political power. With the benefit of hindsight, Kravitz [1970] showed that the rational

comprehensive model was itself the successor of a political struggle for the control of urban reform.

The early attacks, particularly Lindblom [1959] and Davidoff [1965], also spun off a number of theoretical questions which only pointed indirectly to the politics of planning, but proved to be more interesting to planning theorists. These questions included the rift between planning in theory and planning in practice; the likenesses and differences between planners, policy analysts, administrators and other roles; the issue of technical expertise; normativism in planning thought; and the condition of uncertainty in planning-- a problem which has only recently been given serious attention. Debates over these and other questions have endured throughout the second stage in the growth of political considerations in planning thought.

4.0 POLITICS in PLANNING THOUGHT 2: The EXPANDING RANGE of PLANNING THOUGHT

Where the first stage of development raised the notion of politics in planning thought, the second stage marked the beginning of a politics of planning thought. In the wake of the initial attacks on the rational comprehensive model, planning thought was fractured into a myriad of views and debates. There were suddenly many models of planning, what it was supposed to do, and how it was supposed to work, as planning theorists drew from a wider range of methodological, ideological, and empirical literature. The splitting of planning thought into several schools, and the persistence of residual issues, directly contributed to a politics of planning thought during the aftermath of the attack on the rational comprehensive model. This chapter outlines the basic spectrum of these various schools of thought, and examines two residual issues which most clearly demonstrated the growth of politics in planning and the creation of a politics of planning thought.

4.1 MAJOR SCHOOLS of PLANNING THOUGHT

Despite the criticism from Lindblom [1959], Davidoff [1965], and others, the rational comprehensive model persisted as a "dominant paradigm" [Alexander, 1984]

in planning thought. But with the expansion of planning thought, the extent of this dominance remained uncertain. The model was modified and revived by Chadwick [1971] and Faludi [1978] under the labels of "systems" and "procedural planning", while others such as Breheny and Hooper [1985] studied the role of rationality itself.

Incrementalism developed from Lindblom [1959] into a school of thought, evolving through a series of challenges, particularly from Dror's "normative optimum" model [1964], and to a lesser extent Etzioni's "mixed scanning" [1967], who both sought a middle-ground alternative between incrementalism and the rational comprehensive model. Lindblom remained actively involved through this long and sometimes semantically confusing process, which is superbly documented by Ham and Hill [1984, pp. 79-94]. Also in the wake of both incrementalism and the rational comprehensive model are the noteworthy contributions of Friedmann, including "transactive planning" [1973] and "social learning" [1987].

Advocacy planning, as launched by Davidoff [1965], spawned a wide interest in public participation in the planning process, and opened a whole range of ideological arguments from the political left. The latter movement, sometimes called radical planning, criticized the rational comprehensive model and planning in general as an instrument for political suppression and the preservation of class

structure in capitalist societies [See for example, Harvey, 1978; Castells, 1983]. A cousin of the radical planning school is critical planning theory, based largely on the writings of Habermas [1974]. Critical planning theory, by abandoning power relations and ideology altogether, proposes that a new power based on pure truth would result [See for example, Paris, 1982].

The corresponding friction between these divisions marks the politics of planning thought. The politics of theoretical positioning are not immune from political ideology, as clearly demonstrated by the radical planners. However, ideology has played a more ambiguous role among other schools of thought, and political positioning has occurred primarily on the grounds of methodology, disciplinary unity and underlying assumptions.

4.2 RESIDUAL ISSUES

From numerous articles arguing 'whose theory is better and why', residual issues emerged during the second stage of politics in planning thought. Residual issues include the role of expertise, the definition of interests, the functions of the planner, and the domain of planning. While those issues are discussed in greater detail in other chapters, this section will address two persistent issues which point to the legitimacy of a political theory of planning: 1) the problem of normativism and internal

consistency, and 2) the relationship between planning and policy analysis.

4.2.1 THEORY of PLANNING, THEORY in PLANNING, and NORMATIVISM

The issue of normativism in planning was raised indirectly during the first attacks on the rational comprehensive model, when competing sets of values and planning interests were described by Lindblom, Davidoff, and others. A direct consideration of normativism was made by Bolan [1983], in response to Faludi's [1973] distinction between theory in planning and theory of planning. Faludi and others were attempting to resurrect the rational comprehensive model by separating it from the problems of planning practice. Faludi [1973] called theories about planning which arose during practice "theory in planning", and designated hypothetical, ideal theories such as the rational comprehensive model as "theory of planning". This separation was simply the blurred recognition that planning theories in general suffered from a lack of internal consistency [Chapter 2, *infra.*]. By not addressing the internal consistency problem itself, Faludi's terminology served only to separate planning postulation from planning technique. Faludi [1978] later proposed that the 'in/of' distinction provided "an emphasis on 'substantive' theory and 'procedural' theory with the latter involving the 'procedural knowledge for going about tackling the problem'"

[Bolan, 1983, p.3; quoting Faludi, 1978, p.162].

In response to Faludi's dichotomous terminology, Bolan [1983] did not address the internal consistency question either, but used another dichotomous argument, the issues of prescription and description. Bolan argued that before it was possible to outline a procedural theory of planning, it was necessary to define a normative theory of planning. Bolan defined normative theories as being prescriptive,

"expressly concerned with what ought to be; they are explicitly in search of beauty, justice, goodness. A normative theory is an expression of a goal, of value, of meaning. In the end, normative theories do not make predictions explicitly about the future-- they make prescriptions about how people ought to act" [Bolan, 1983, p.4].

In contrast, Bolan defined descriptive theory as "theory which attempts to describe, explain, and predict the world's phenomena without making any judgement about the worth or virtue of that phenomena" [Bolan, 1983, p.4]. For Bolan, the chief danger of descriptive theory was "committing the logical fallacy of reification-- affirming that which exists is what ought to exist" [Bolan, 1983, p.4]. In order to build a procedural or prescriptive theory of planning then, it was necessary to decide what ought to be described. Planning could not be objective and unbiased; it had to have a normative base.

While Bolan [1983] distinguished between the

normative basis of procedure, and the normative basis of goals, whether ideological, aesthetic, technical, or otherwise, he also felt that goals and the procedures for obtaining them ultimately had to be unified by a normative base. Bolan went on to argue that a normative base for planning had to be rooted in a contextual, pragmatic, and phenomenological view of the world, a position echoed from an earlier paper [Bolan, 1980]. Bolan called for a number of "shifts" in planning thought in order to reach a satisfactory normative theory, but did not actually propose a normative theory. However, by raising the issue of normativism and questioning the philosophical basis of debates in planning theory, Bolan pointed to the need for planning theorists to explain the normative and philosophical basis of their arguments.

Klosterman [1978] also attacked the view that planning was free from normative values, because planning was intrinsically political, and recognized the disparity between planning in theory and planning in practice (again 'theory of planning' and 'theory in planning'):

"To the extent that planners are successful in influencing the policies and actions of governments, they are acting politically in the most fundamental sense of the word because their actions help determine 'who gets what, when, how' and thus affect the members of society, positively and negatively" [Klosterman, 1978, p.39].

Unlike Bolan's phenomenological approach, Klosterman suggested a different foundation for a normative theory of planning, based on the rational justification of ethical decisions. Using principles of justice outlined by Rawls [1971], both the means and ends of public policy could be rationally evaluated, and:

"planners ethical positions would not reflect mere preference or taste but would be supported in a way similar to that of their scientific positions (which are likewise based on principles which must be rationally defended). Other groups could of course pursue other objectives, but under this approach to normative planning, would have to justify THEIR perspectives, allowing the bases for the conflicting positions to be rationally evaluated" [Klosterman, 1978, p.43 original emphasis].

Klosterman tried to present a normative basis for planning, but like Bolan [1983], failed to consider the most important implication of planning's intrinsically political nature, the prevalence of power. Normative, ethical positions, whether based on phenomenological or any other system of values or philosophy, are subservient to the pursuit and exercise of political power. Planning decisions are political, and are based on the persuasion and pursuit of power by any number of normative interests, who may resort to any form of argument, whether rational, emotional, ethical, aesthetic, or ideological. The means of planning and the ends of planning are inherently normative just as planning is inherently political.

4.2.2 PLANNING and POLICY ANALYSIS

While the issue of normativism has derived from the problem of internal consistency and rationality, the argument about planning and policy analysis is derived from the problem of professional identity. Through the expanded debate in planning thought, interest was aroused in any field which could provide greater insight into planning's theoretical problems. As planners drew from the works of Lindblom and others on policy analysis and public administration, the unhappy question arose as to whether planning was really a unique field. This issue was sparked off by Wildavsky [1973], who seized the opportunity to write a nasty, polemic attack on planning, just when it was in a state of theoretical shreds.

Wildavsky [1973] attacked planning primarily for its reliance on the rational comprehensive model, and its extended references to coordination, efficiency, systematicity, and consistency. Beginning with a synopsis of planning failures, Wildavsky asked whether it was unreasonable to consider those failures as an integral part of its practice. Noting the inconsistency between prescribed theory and described practice, Wildavsky postulated:

"Suppose planning as presently constituted cannot work in the environment in which it is supposed to function. Is it irrational to entertain this hypothesis?..."

"If planning designed to make goals consistent on

paper, one would judge it quite differently than if its purpose is actually to achieve social goals in the future" [Wildavsky, 1973, p.128].

For Wildavsky, planning's emphasis on the rational comprehensive model focussed "attention on adherence to universal norms rather than on the consequences of acting one way instead of another", making failures an inevitable outcome at least some of the time [Wildavsky, 1973, p.130]. The matter of weighing alternative actions was key to Wildavsky's contention that planning was a way to cause something to happen, and ultimately involved politics and power:

"Planning takes place when people in a society are able to cause consequences they desire to occur. Planning is, therefore, a form of social causation. It requires causal knowledge and the ability to wield that knowledge effectively in society. Power and planning are different ways of looking at the same events" [Wildavsky, 1973, p.132].

Since "to plan, is therefore to govern", the question remained as to how goals are formulated and how plans were implemented to achieve them [Wildavsky, 1973, p.133]. Goals are often subject to change, and implementation measures do not always work. As Lindblom [1959] pointed out, planned changes often occur over a series of incremental steps. Since "planning objectives and the means for implementing them are no longer fixed but have become subject to modification", typically through the political process, and "planning is placed in the context of

continuous adjustment, it becomes hard to distinguish planning from any other process of decision" [Wildavsky, 1973, p.135]. In other words, planning was no different than any other form of public policy-making, and planners hardly deserved to command special attention. While raising a number of questions already familiar to planning theorists, Wildavsky also pointed to policy analysis as a discipline from which planners could learn a great deal. It was several years before Alexander [1981] responded to this polemic, in which he defined planning as:

"the deliberate social or organizational activity of developing an optimal strategy of future action to achieve a desired set of goals, for solving novel problems in complex contexts, and attended by the power and intention to commit resources and to act as necessary to implement the chosen strategy" [Alexander, 1981, p.137].

Alexander [1981] was in turn criticized by Reade [1982] for not addressing Wildavsky's major point, that planning was no different than any other decision-making process. Reviewing both Alexander [1981] and Wildavsky [1973], Reade concluded:

"It is very doubtful, and has certainly not been established, that there does or could exist an analytically distinct method of decision-making, 'planning', which can be applied to any one of a vast range of substantive policy areas. This being so, those who are concerned with policy in any specific subject area (such as 'town and country planning') would seem best advised to concentrate their efforts upon improving their substantive knowledge of the particular phenomena with which policies in that area

are intended to deal" [Reade, 1982, p.71].

Reade's article was immediately followed by a rejoinder by Alexander [1982]. Alexander felt that Reade had confused "planning as an analytically distinct mode of decision-making, and planning as a field of specialized expertise" [Alexander, 1982, p.73]. Given that planning is "an analytically distinct type of decision behaviour", the issue of whether planning was a field of specialized expertise depended on how one answered the following questions:

"1. Does the existence of a specific type of generic activity admit the possibility of specialized expertise in that area?

2. If it does, is such expertise feasible and useful? This question can be answered affirmatively if the specialization... can claim (i) a sound basis in theory; and (ii) a clear relation between theory and substantive action" [Alexander, 1982, p.74].

With those remarks, Alexander returned the debate to the problem of internal consistencies, but like Klosterman [1978] and Bolan [1983], did not provide a conclusive answer. Reade continued to pursue his contention that "If Planning was Anything Maybe it Can be Identified" [1983]. The question of planning's professional and theoretical distinctiveness continued, as Alterman and MacRae [1983] presented a comparative analysis of planning with the field of policy analysis. They concluded that while the two fields had commonalities and differences,

their separate identities would persist, due to the strong social content in planning thought and the persistence of a rationalist perspective in policy analysis [Alterman and McRae, 1983, p.211].

More recently, Forester [1989] avoided the distinctiveness question altogether by combining the roles from both policy analysis and planning. "Planning analysts", as he put it, referred to "a family of roles that involve deliberation about proper courses of action: evaluators, policy analysts, planners, administrators and managers" [Forester, 1989, p.14]. Emphasizing the managerial nature of planning, Benveniste [1989] noted that while no intrinsic differences existed between planning and policy analysis, each developed under different circumstances and from different intellectual traditions [Benveniste, 1989, p.20].

Whether planners like it or not, they have been learning from the field of policy analysis at least since Lindblom [1959], and clearly both professions benefit by learning from each other. What is far more important than job titles or specialization is how planning thought can be improved through closer examination of the public policy and public administration literature. This literature is highly relevant given the intrinsically political nature of planning, and the close academic ties between policy analysis and political studies.

4.3. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Following the attack on the rational comprehensive model, planning was fractured into several schools of thought, none of which was particularly dominant. Efforts were made to revise and improve the model, resting on the notion that a theory of planning practice could be separated from normative prescription. This idea attempted to avoid the problem of internal consistency between description and prescription, without success. At the same time, planning was challenged on the grounds that it was no different than any other form of public policy decision-making process, and planning theorists once again were asked to address the fundamental question of "what is planning?".

The disputes raised by normative and polemic questions, and the variety of ideas vying to replace the rational comprehensive model, created a politics of planning theory, with many arguments competing for the lofty crown of "new paradigm". Included in this turbulence of ideas, were the observations made by Lindblom [1959], Davidoff [1965], and others that planning practice was riddled with political problems. The recognition of political considerations in planning, and the political squabbles among planning theorists, together resulted in a new interest in the politics of planning, both in theory and in practice. This new interest constituted the gravitation toward a

politically-oriented theory of planning, the third stage in the consideration of politics.

5.0 POLITICS in PLANNING THOUGHT 3: GRAVITATION TOWARD a POLITICAL MODEL of PLANNING

From the variety of issues and arguments in the wake of the attack on the rational comprehensive model, there emerged a gravitation toward a political theory of planning, which has continued to the present. This third stage in the consideration of politics in planning thought does not have a sharply defined beginning, but has gradually precipitated from the theoretical chaos. This chapter reviews the major literary sources which highlight stage three.

Political considerations emerged as an important part of planning theory as early as Lindblom [1959], or even Tugwell [1935], who later recognized planning as a "fourth power". But it was particularly after the attack on the rational comprehensive model that planning theorists began to consider how political conditions could be formally introduced into a theory of planning. This work was encouraged by writers such as Beyle and Lathrop [1970], Gunton [1984], Hoch [1984a], and Alexander [1984]. This group of writers outlined the theoretical points which a political model of planning would have to address, largely by surveying the expanse of planning literature. A second

group of writers including Catanese [1974], Baum [1988], Benveniste [1972; 1989], and Forester [1989] explored ways of integrating political considerations into planning theory and planning practice. Representatives of the two groups will be considered here in two sections.

5.1 GRAVITATION by SEARCH and DISCOVERY

5.1.1 BEYLE and LATHROP [1970]: IMPOSSIBLE PLANNING

In the introductory chapter to their collection of edited essays, Beyle and Lathrop [1970] lamented the future of planning due to its inherently political nature, and especially the problems of planning as a function of government. Beyle and Lathrop pointed to the fundamental division between the political and administrative functions of government, the financial and political weakness of local governments, and the uncertainty created by short-term political leadership. While these structural conditions have been formalized in the American system of government, they are also present in the Canadian system.

Beyle and Lathrop [1970] lamented the fate of planners who work in government. "Planning is impossible because we have thrust the planner into the untenable middle. We have asked him to straddle the fence between the administrator and the decision-maker politician, telling him that he must be concerned with comprehensiveness and the long view, but that, at the same time, he must be responsive

to the decision-maker, and in fact, must concern himself with shorter range policy issues and decisions which are the bread and butter of the elected official" [Beyle and Lathrop, 1970, p.3].

Given this situation faced by planners in government, Beyle and Lathrop pointed to a common criticism of their work: "planning is too often the captive of bureaucracy, with its reports and data reflecting the biases of past decisions and protection for the agency and the program in the future" [Beyle and Lathrop, 1970, p.9]. In order for planning to break from its bureaucratic trap, Beyle and Lathrop felt that planning had to become "politicized as a function" and planners had to become "more political", where planning had to "shake off the shackles of its past and of specialized professionalism, and become, as it should, continually critical, brooding, and involved" [Beyle and Lathrop, 1970, p.9].

In addition to the political conditions of planning, Beyle and Lathrop [1970] also stressed the organizational and communicative conditions of the planning process, how they influence planning outcomes, and the perception of planning by those within the process. Beyle and Lathrop also raised the issue of the role of planners, and what source of authority they brought to the planning process. Although they did not explicitly address the issue, at the center of all Beyle and Lathrop's observations

was the recognition that planning is about power, not only over 'who gets what' but over what issues matter enough to become part of the planning process, and how the planning process is controlled.

5.1.2 GUNTON [1984] and HOCH [1984a]: ROLES and THEORIES

Gunton [1984] stated that while "none of the alternative theories on the role of planners offers a valid description of how planning works or a normative prescription of how it should work", planners should not worry [Gunton, 1984, p.417]. Instead of arguing over the superiority of one role or theory over another, Gunton suggested that "planners should learn how to adapt their roles to various planning environments in the same way they employ alternative techniques of analysis" [Gunton, 1984: 417].

Hoch [1984a], like other writers, recognized the normative dilemma of "mainstream" planning theories in their attempt to link public interest, or "doing good", and rational action, or "being right", in a single theory. For Hoch, mainstream theories suffered "from a naturalistic bias that overemphasizes the significance of instrumental problem-solving as the most effective model of human action and underemphasizes the uneven distribution of power that frustrates democratic the participation necessary to make such action possible" [Hoch 1984a, p.335].

Hoch pressed for the development of a pragmatic theory of planning which did not artificially separate planning process from planning substance, and was "based on human experience, practical activity, and democratic community participation, but without the naturalistic bias and liberal pluralism incorporated in mainstream planning theories" [Hoch, 1984a, p.343]. Hoch's vision of an ideal planning theory focussed on "defining problems in relation to particular histories and attachments of different people in different locales [Friedmann, 1982; Marris, 1982a; 1982b]" [Hoch, 1984a, p.343]. The central feature of an ideal new planning theory would be the exploration of uncertainty affecting those in the planning process, and "how those people learn to collaborate in overcoming this uncertainty" [Hoch, 1984a, p.343].

5.1.3 ALEXANDER [1984]: SEARCH, RITUAL, AVOIDANCE, and ABANDONMENT

Acknowledging the break-down of the rational comprehensive model, Alexander claimed its demise was "not being addressed by any fundamental restructuring of professional planning practice or roles and will continue to be an unresolved problem for planning until a new model emerges to take its place" [Alexander, 1984, p.64]. This argument was based on his taxonomy of "responses to paradigm breakdown", which included categories of "ritual", "avoidance", "abandonment", and "search" responses

[Alexander, 1984, p.64].

For Alexander, ritual respondents to paradigm break-down responded by simply "clinging to the old paradigm and ignoring its revealed anomalies, in almost ritual repetition and elaboration of the old verities in theory and practice" [Alexander, 1984, p.64]. Avoidance respondents, by contrast, accepted the limitations of the rational comprehensive model, but avoided the implications of these limitations. Alexander included Lindblom [1959] "and his followers" in this category because while they advocated the normative value of "disjointed incrementalism", their position was "just as consistently opposed by others for its ideological implications in terms of social equity and change" [Alexander, 1984, p.64]. This rather weak argument deserves further attention, before considering the "abandonment" and "search" categories.

In his reasoning for classifying the incrementalist view as avoidance, Alexander failed on two counts. First, by hiding behind the verbal false limb "in terms of", Alexander did not specify pluralism as the actual target of Lindblom's critics. Flawed as it may be, pluralism explicitly recognizes politics in planning, which the rational comprehensive model fails to do. Secondly, while not citing references of Lindblom's "followers" or critics, Alexander also failed to explain how the mere criticism of incrementalism qualified it as an avoidance

response. Despite these flaws, Alexander insisted that "the avoidance response is dominant among the social scientists", and that "their descriptive orientation relieves them of the obligation to repair or replace the normative model their research has exposed as flawed" [Alexander, 1984, p.64-5].

Alexander's third category, the abandonment response, suggested that the rational comprehensive model and any other general or abstract models should be discarded completely. Planners should instead "adopt the intuitive wisdom of the practitioner, the pragmatic responses of professionals in a structured institutional context, or the faith of a substantive social ideology to direct decisions" [Alexander, 1984, p.65]. In this category, Alexander grouped together the "theory in practice" of Schon [1982], the legal managerialism of Baer [1977], and the neo-Marxism of Castells [1977].

Alexander's favoured category was the search response, because such efforts "are not attempts to amend or reconstruct the undermined paradigm, but efforts to develop a radically different model as the paradigm of the future" [Alexander, 1984, p.65]. Alexander included under this category a number of examples closely related to the rational comprehensive model, such as Meier [1980], Mason and Mitroff [1981], and Nadler [1981], as well as the social learning and transactive models of Schon [1971] and Friedmann [1973]. Alexander admitted that cybernetic

approaches resembled too closely the rational comprehensive model, but he also felt that "social learning models offer too little as prescriptions" while transactive and strategic modifications to the rational comprehensive model are "too specific in important respects" [Alexander, 1984, p.67].

Given his categories of responses to "paradigm breakdown", his criticisms of those responses, and his contention that others were obligated to repair or replace the rational comprehensive model, Alexander did not propose an alternative model of his own. However, he did describe three components of a contingency model "that can become the new paradigm for planning and related decision disciplines" [Alexander, 1984, p.67]. These components include:

- "1. A meta-theoretical framework that commands respect as a true account of social and individual relationships and interactions in the process of transforming ideas into reality;
2. Derived from this framework, a set of contingencies identified and described in such a manner that they will be useful for both exploration and prescription;
3. For each of these contingencies, a normative decision-making model that would be sufficiently concrete for it to be made operational and used in real-life problem-solving and decision-making, situations, yet abstract enough to be applicable over a range of substantive contexts" [Alexander, 1984, p.67].

Alexander's suggestions point directly to the structural and functional plausibility of a political model of planning, and support the notion of a meta-structure, as

discussed in Chapter 2.0. Whether a set of contingencies should precede a corresponding set of normative decision-making models is not clear, nor is it apparent how such a correspondence would work. The need for flexibility in application and abstraction described in the third component also seems out of place, especially if normative solutions are to be geared for specific contingencies. It may be recalled that in Chapter 2.0, the need for flexibility was placed on the meta-structure itself.

While Alexander, Gunton, and Hoch offered few specifics on how planning theorists should proceed, all three provided insight on what an improved planning theory would look like, and hinted at the commonality of politics as the key to building new theory. Other writers also chose to survey the terrain of planning thought as a step toward theory-building, but unlike Alexander, Gunton, or Hoch, they did so with the purpose of integrating politics into a planning theory.

5.2 GRAVITATION by INCORPORATING POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

5.2.1 BAUM [1988]: INHERENTLY POLITICAL PLANNING

Baum [1988] considered planning to be political in two ways. First, planning involves the recommended allocation of valued resources for which there is competition among interested parties. In this respect, planning is "intrinsically political", because of the

political domain in which it operated [Baum, 1988, p.35]. In the second respect, planning is political because of the activities it undertakes. By "collecting information and formulating recommendations, as well as in promoting proposals", planners intentionally take action which will "influence the distribution of resources serving various interests" [Baum, 1988, p.35].

Despite the inherent condition that planning is political, and that planning theory "seems to say little about politics", Baum noted that in fact "theorists' writings convey a strongly felt message about politics and its dangers" [Baum, 1988, p.35]. Baum felt that this characteristic of planning thought occurred in two ways, first through the apolitical conceptualization of planning issues, and second through the apolitical conceptualization of planners.

To illustrate the first, Baum stated that "mainstream planning theory focusses on the elaboration and critique of a model of rationality that emphasizes the formal logical characteristics of issues and information concerning them" [Baum, 1988, p.36]. In this context, both the critics and the proponents of the rational comprehensive model overlooked the "specific interests implicated in the political domain" [Baum, 1988, p.36]. This point is similar to one made by Kravitz [1970], who suggested that the attacks on the rational comprehensive model by behavioural

scientists were focussed too sharply on the model itself and not on "the latent function it served" [Kravitz, 1970, p.253], or "the basic problems of elitism and one-dimensional culture" [Kravitz, 1970, p.262]. While Baum was less concerned with particular political biases, he recognized that mainstream planning theory had generally excluded the notion of politics.

The second source of this exclusion was the apolitical conceptualization of planners. By ignoring planners' emotional lives and emphasizing their cognitive skills, Baum felt that mainstream theory "denies both the reality and the legitimacy of planners emotional lives and political concerns" [Baum, 1988, p.36]. "Because traditional planning theory excludes politics in these two ways", debates about politics in planning, and the political roles of planners in particular, "have suffered from theoretical poverty" [Baum, 1988, p.36]. Baum therefore described planning theorists as "political practitioners" who "say nothing directly about their own politics and practice" [Baum, 1988, p.38].

5.2.2 FORESTER [1989] and BENVENISTE [1989]: PLANNING, POLITICS, and POWER

While Baum's challenges were essentially directed at planning in theory, they were followed by Forester and Benveniste in their quest to integrate political considerations in planning practice. While Forester [1989]

attempted to integrate political considerations and planning by focussing on the political relationships between organizations, Benveniste [1989] was primarily concerned with political relationships within organizations, and the role of planners as professional managers. In this context, Benveniste's work is closely related to the study of politics in management, which began with the bureaucratic studies of Max Weber, and has evolved into more recent works such as Yates [1985]. Forester's work points to a whole body of literature on public dispute resolution which has largely been overlooked by planning theorists. Examples of general works in this field include Susskind and Cruikshank [1987], and Carpenter and Kennedy [1988].

Taking up Simon's [1957] concept of bounded rationality, and the incrementalist ideas of Lindblom [1959], Forester [1989] used political considerations to shed light on some of the practical problems of planning. Like Benveniste [1989], Forester viewed planners as active, interested participants in the planning process who could not remain neutral:

"As they formulate problems, analysts preempt decision-makers; they define and select the feedback as well as process it. They watch for new opportunities. They face uncertainties that are anything but well-defined and that cannot be monitored" [Forester, 1989, p.15].

In this context, planners perform an inherently political role, not only by managing information, but by

influencing the scope and character of the planning process. Planners serve this function "not by technically calculating means to ends or error signals, but by organizing attention carefully to project possibilities, organizing for practical political purposes and organizational ends" [Forester, 1989, p.18]. To this task, Forester viewed planners and policy analysts as doing the same type of work, and outlined strategies of "mediated negotiation" for them to use in day-to-day practice. These involved slightly different roles, depending on the planner's status within his/her organization, and the political relationships pursued by that organization in the planning process. Organizational behaviour, and the planner's role in guiding that behaviour, was therefore critical to understanding the planning process, which is riddled with questions of power.

Benveniste [1989] was also interested in the ways political power affected the planning process, but his emphasis was placed on the power struggles within organizations rather than between them, and how these struggles affected the role of planners. Benveniste felt that planners acquired and exercised power in their own right, by serving a managerial or "line function" in the planning process, rather than an advisory or "staff function". This larger, political role directly contradicted orthodox planning theories according to Benveniste, thereby presenting planners with a dilemma.

"Planners or policy analysts are criticized when they do not pay sufficient attention to stakeholders, and they are often considered arrogant and isolated. And yet, if they play the role that they have defined for themselves-- namely, a staff role --they have to remain aloof from stakeholders" [p.151]. Benveniste pointed to the recurring problem within planning thought, the lack of consistency between description and prescription. If the prescribed theoretical role did not reflect the described reality, then planners suffered and planning theory grew obsolete.

Benveniste [1989] critically reviewed the major schools of planning thought, but did not offer an alternative theory. Instead, he explained a number of practical managerial strategies that planners could use on the job to better fulfill their politically active role. The centerpiece of his presentation was the "multiplier effect" in which planners built consensual support for planning proposals. Throughout his tactical lessons, Benveniste emphasized the political relationships between planners and other individuals in the process, and how these relationships affect planning outcomes. In this context, Benveniste's work draws attention to managerial studies as a source of insight for planners, particularly the literature on the politics of management [see for example, Yates, 1985].

5.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

From the viewpoints of theory and practice, and from the exercises of search and discovery, a movement has emerged to directly incorporate political considerations in planning thought. While lamenting the state of planning thought, Beyle and Lathrop [1970], Gunton [1984], and Hoch [1984a] encouraged the politicization of planning as a way out of the jungles of theory and application. Alexander [1984] reviewed planning thought in the wake of attacks on the rational comprehensive model, and offered a plausible sketch of how a new, unifying theory could be constructed. His notion of a meta-theoretical structure [Alexander, 1984, p.67], has been adopted for discussion in this thesis. Baum [1988] recognized the intrinsically political nature of planning, founded in the allocative tasks undertaken by planners and the political domain in which they work. Forester [1989] and Benveniste [1989] explored the implications for planners' roles in a politically charged planning process, and offered political guidelines for planning practice.

While progress has been made, there remains the need to bridge the gap of internal consistency between theory and practice in a political model of planning. What makes this next step possible is the long history of intellectual support for political considerations in the planning literature, which began during the initial attacks

on the rational comprehensive model. The rational comprehensive model was largely attacked for its ignorance of political considerations. In the aftermath of those attacks, planning thought broke into several schools, splitting along the fracture lines of political flaws in the rational comprehensive model. The political criticisms of planning thought which marked the various theories in the aftermath, resulted in a politics among those various theories. The commonality and pervasiveness of politics has in turn sparked the slow, synthetic response toward a political model of planning, to account for political differences in planning thought and planning practice.

As discussed by Baum [1988], Wildavsky [1973], and Forester [1989], and hinted by Lindblom [1959] and Davidoff [1965], the exploration of political content of planning thought has been primarily driven by a pluralist vision of politics. It is therefore important to question whether pluralism represents the most appropriate intellectual foundation for a political model of planning, given the potentially unifying role of such a model.

6.0 PLURALISM, POST-PLURALISM, and PLANNING THOUGHT

Throughout the three-stage process described in chapters three, four, and five, there has been an evolving debate over the pluralist vision of politics in planning thought. While planning theorists considered, modified, and criticized pluralist ideas, other critiques of pluralist thought began to emerge within the discipline of political studies from the corporatist, and elitist schools of thought. From the criticism of pluralism outside of planning, a new approach to politics, post-pluralism, has begun to emerge. This chapter serves two purposes: 1), to provide further background for the pluralist theme underlying the consideration of politics in planning; and 2), to introduce the notion of post-pluralism as the intellectual basis for a political model of planning.

6.1 PLURALISM

Pluralism was formulated primarily in the United States, during the 1950s and early 1960s. The pluralist view originated with Dahl and Lindblom [1953] and Dahl [1956]. Although pluralism has been most frequently applied to national and regional politics, perhaps its most representative work was the case study of New Haven's local

politics made by Dahl [1961], who continued to espouse pluralist views [1982].

The core of pluralism focusses on the influence of interest groups in the formation of public policy. In the pluralist framework, groups represent "an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state, and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective groups" [Schmitter, 1979, p.15; by Pross, 1986, p.227]. As a result, pluralists argue "that power in western industrialized societies is widely distributed among different groups", and while "no group is without power to influence decision-making, ...no group is dominant" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.27].

In addition to assuming the fragmentation and diffusion of political power, "the sources of power-- like money, information, expertise, and so-on," are also assumed to be widely dispersed [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.28]. Where pluralists recognize "the substantial existing inequalities in wealth, income, organizational capacity, and other resources", they assume "that the rule of law, free and open elections, free speech and media, and the right to form relatively independent organizations creates the potential

as well as the reality for broad participation" [Pal, 1986, p.217]. The condition of universal suffrage therefore acts as an "equalizing force", giving elected officials "a strong incentive to maximize their popular appeal" [Stone, 1976, p.10]. Popularity is viewed by pluralists as "a base of influence independent of other factors such as wealth and social standing. Therefore no group is without some strength and inequalities are non-cumulative" [Stone, 1976, p.10]. In the pluralist context, "electoral competition is thus the central force in shaping the representative role of public officials", and "electoral competition makes public officials broadly representative of the people they govern" [Stone, 1976, p.10].

6.2 CORPORATISM

Corporatist critics rejected the pluralist assumption that power is extensively fragmented in western societies, and argued instead that some groups are very powerful, while others are relatively powerless. Corporatists emphasized "the state's role in determining group participation in policy formation and execution", in contrast to "the voluntary, competitive and unorchestrated quality of group involvement in the policy process" outlined by pluralists [Pross, 1986, p.212]. Both Pross [1986] and Ham and Hill [1984] recognized Schmitter's [1974] definition of corporatism as the most widely accepted:

"... a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" [Schmitter, 1974, p.93-94, in Ham and Hill, 1984, p.38].

Schmitter also defined two forms of corporatism:

1) state corporatism, such as the governments of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany; and 2) societal corporatism, which corporatists claimed had risen in the wake of pluralism's decline in the post-war western world. Schmitter's hypothesis argued that corporatism was promoted by the growing concentration of capitalist ownership and international competition among nation-states, where "the need to secure the conditions for capital accumulation forced the state to intervene more directly and to bargain with political associations" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.38]. In this context, government "moved from a position of supporting the process of capital accumulation to directing that process" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.41].

The economic focus of Schmitter's hypothesis has stirred some debate among corporatist scholars as to whether corporatism is particularly an economically oriented development, or a politically oriented development. To breach this dichotomy, Pross [1986] has used the term

corporatism primarily in a structural sense, to describe "the totality of relations between the state and interest communities", and uses his own term of "tripartism" [signifying labour, business, and government] "to designate those forms of corporatism concerned exclusively with the development of economic policy" [Pross, 1986, p.215]. For Pross, corporatism particularly "expresses the will of both government officials and interest representatives in all fields to avoid conflict in the development of and implementation of policy, and to do so by creating monopolistic representative groups working through formal structures for collaboration" [Pross, 1986, p.215].

6.3 ELITISM

Elite theory, or neo-pluralism, "stresses the power exercised by a small number of well-organized societal interests and notes the ability of these interests to achieve their goals" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.25]. Elitist literature is found in two forms, the classical works of Pareto [1897] and Mosca [1939], and the modern works of writers such as Mills [1956; 1963]. In the classical version, political elites gained and maintained power "through revolutionary overthrow, military conquest, the control of water power..., or the command of economic resources" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.29]. In the modern version, "the position of elites is related to the

development of large-scale organizations in many areas of life, with the result that there are different kinds of elites" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.29]. Mills [1956] drew attention to institutional sources of power in the United States, particularly the key leadership positions in government, the military, and business corporations.

In urban politics, the most important elitist study was conducted on the reputed power of local leaders in Atlanta by Hunter [1953]. This approach contrasted the pluralist work of Dahl [1961], who focussed on issue-centered conflict rather than power relations. Dahl [1961] and other pluralists were in turn criticized by Bacharach and Baratz [1970], and other "neo-elitists", "for ignoring the possibility that power may be exercised other than on key issues", and that "power may be used to control the political agenda and confine discussion to safe issues" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.31]. The basic conclusion from these elitist arguments is:

"The fact that different elites operate in different issue areas is a protection against dominance by one group. According to this interpretation, the structure of power in western industrialized countries can be described as democratic elitism, involving not only competition between elites but also their circulation and replacement" [Ham and Hill, 1984, p.31-2].

6.4 POST-PLURALISM

The term "post-pluralism" originates with Pross [1986], who used it to describe an emerging view of public

policy development and the role of the state, which draws ideas from pluralism, elitism, and corporatism. Post-pluralism, like pluralism, focusses on organized interest groups as the primary actors in the political arena, but like corporatism, recognizes that some groups are more powerful than others, and like elitism, notes that the most powerful of these closely influence the behaviour of the state. In the post-pluralist view, politics is not "a competitive market-place for policy options", but provides interest groups with "a vehicle for limiting competition and for securing a tranquil environment for themselves and their enterprises" [Pross, 1986, p.234-5]. Organized interests enhance their influence on the state by seeking consensus among each other and limiting the scope of conflict. The most effective way for interests to avoid conflict and achieve consensus is "to control the instruments that define which issues will appear on the public agenda, and -- just as important -- which alternatives will be chosen to resolve them" [Pross, 1986, p.235].

Primarily applied by Pross [1986] to the federal and provincial policy arenas in Canada, post-pluralism is still in an early stage of development and is not yet a common term in political studies. In the urban context, the theory of urban regimes developed by Elkin [1980, 1985, 1987] and explored extensively in Stone and Sanders [1987], as well as the notion of revisionism [Stone, 1976] both

contain strong parallels to the post-pluralist ideas outlined by Pross [1986]. While the revisionist and regime theory labels are appropriate references for certain authors, the term 'post-pluralism' will be used throughout this thesis. The term 'urban regime' will be used to describe the prevailing coalition of interests which control a municipal government.

6.5 PLURALISM, POST-PLURALISM and PLANNING THOUGHT

Planning theorists became gradually interested in the question of how government responded to political pressure from a wide range of groups through the work of the early critics of the the rational comprehensive model. Pluralist ideas first introduced by Lindblom [1959] suggested that because power interests were so fragmented, the most politically acceptable policies were those that resulted in the least change to the status quo. Lindblom felt that conflicting interests, managerial problems and latent value judgments demanded both marginal policy comparisons and incremental policy changes. For this reason, policy changes occurred in small increments which were easiest to implement, and stood the greatest chance of widespread political acceptance. Like any other policy process, planning was seen as being highly sensitive to political expediency.

Following Lindblom [1959], as pluralist ideas

continued to be introduced to the planning literature, they were modified and questioned by various writers. Unlike Lindblom, Wildavsky [1964] felt that because interests were specialized, politicians would support policies which served those groups who were most intensely vocal about an issue. Because those groups did not necessarily comprise the majority of the public, Wildavsky called this tendency "the rule of minority satisfaction", in which specialized influence served "the public interest in contributing to a political system which comes closer than others to meeting the widest range of preferences" [Wildavsky, 1964, p.360, by Stone, 1976, p.11].

Davidoff [1965] also recognized the variety of interests in the planning process, and used pluralist ideas to attack the notion of a unified public interest, commonly assumed by proponents of the rational comprehensive model. However, Davidoff did not assume that all interest groups had equal power, and he entertained the idea of the planning agency being an interest group itself. These were the primary reasons for his contention that planning required an institutionalized system of advocacy for relatively weak interests, particularly the urban poor. After Davidoff [1965] effectively launched advocacy planning as a school of planning thought, his modified version of pluralism and group interests brought further discussion of pluralist assumptions from Peattie [1978] and Mazziotti [1982].

Forester [1989] considered pluralist conflict among interest groups as the third in a set of four considerations of the "boundedness of rationality" [Simon, 1957]. The first consideration was that even a single policy decision-maker was fallible, due to the incompleteness of available information, time limits, and the limits of human cognition. The second consideration was that policy involves more than one decision-maker, and requires the sharing of information through the maintenance of social networks within the decision-making organization.

As the third consideration, pluralist conflict involves competition among organizations, further complicating the decision-making process. The definition of problems multiplies with the entry of each additional interest group into the policy process.

"Information, similarly, becomes a political resource. It will be contested, withheld, manipulated, and distorted. The problem of gaining access to pristine information now gives way to a set of problems about knowing what and whom to trust, what can be done in the face of misrepresentation, and so-on" [Forester, 1989, p.57].

Under pluralist assumptions, Forester agreed with Lindblom [1959] that "short-term political compromise becomes a practical incremental strategy, one that is all the more defensible if, indeed, there are 'watchdogs' for all affected interests" [Forester, 1989, p.58].

The fourth level in Forester's taxonomy of the

boundedness of rationality points directly to post-pluralist ideas about the policy process. Forester notes the weak role of political power in pluralism, because of "the assumption that power is diffused so widely in society that all important affected interests have an effective voice or 'watchdog'" [Forester, 1989, p.58]. Given the unequal distribution of power in society, Forester dismissed the pluralist view of the policy process, since "inequalities provide and shape the context in which planners and public administrators, and decision-makers more generally, work and act" [Forester, 1989, p.59]. Furthermore,

"if the pluralist assumption of significant, effective political equality of power is recognized as a political ideal rather than as an accurate description..., then the incremental strategies that seemed appropriate under those assumptions are no longer so obviously sensible. Instead, strategies that anticipate and counteract structural inequalities of power must be devised and put into practice" [Forester, 1989, p.61-2].

Forester clearly agrees with some of the criticisms of pluralism raised by elitist and corporatist thought. While he offers some direction for the professional conduct of planners in the face of political power struggles, Forester is not clear on what the role of the state is, or ought to be, in an unstable political environment. It should also be noted here that Forester is cautious in referring to incrementalism in its prescriptive, rather than descriptive context. The separation of these

two contexts is important for further discussions of post-pluralism.

6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The consideration of politics in planning thought has been largely made within a pluralist context. In addition, as planning theorists have directly or indirectly considered pluralist assumptions within the limited context of planning thought, corporatist and elitist writers in the discipline of political studies have also considered pluralist views. The dominant criticism of pluralism from all sources has been its unrealistic assumption of the equal distribution of political power in society.

Post-pluralism, which has emerged in the wake of such criticism, assumes the unequal distribution of power in society, and draws from pluralist, elitist, and corporatist ideas. Post-pluralism focusses on organized interest groups as the primary actors in the political arena, recognizes that some groups are more powerful than others, and notes that the most powerful of these closely influence the behaviour of the state.

As a specialized form of public policy, planning is rooted in the power of the state, its institutions and its functions. Defining the role of the state, and how the state responds to the political influence of interest groups, is therefore the first step to be taken in

developing a political theory of planning. The position of this thesis is that post-pluralism is the most advanced theory of how the state responds to political interests. Post-pluralism therefore serves as the most appropriate intellectual foundation for a political theory of planning.

PART TWO
POST-PLURALISM

All warfare is based on deception.
Therefore when capable, feign incapacity; when active,
inactivity.
When near make it appear that you are far away; when
far away, that you are near.
Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; Feign disorder and
strike him.
When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is
strong, avoid him.
Anger his general and confuse him.
Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.
Keep him under a strain and wear him down.
When he is united, divide him.
Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does
not expect you.
These are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not
possible to discuss them beforehand.

Sun Tzu
"The Art of War"

7.0 POST-PLURALISM 1: STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES

This chapter describes the structural principles of post-pluralism. This description serves two inter-linked purposes: 1) to enlarge the background of post-pluralism as a view of politics in democratic societies, and 2) to begin laying the intellectual foundation for a post-pluralist model of the planning process.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the term "post-pluralism" originated with Pross [1986], but the structural principles of post-pluralism can be traced to Schattschneider [1960], which pre-dates the labels of corporatism, elitism, and pluralism. Schattschneider [1960, p.21] did not mention pluralism by name, referring simply to "the group theory of politics", but he greatly influenced the post-pluralist writings of Pross [1986] as well as Stone [1976]. His work also echoes to a lesser extent in corporatist and elitist theory, but Schattschneider was essentially interested in the unequal influence of interest groups. Where Schattschneider stood furthest apart from his pluralist contemporaries, was in his conception of organizational power imbalances and the scope of conflict as the fundamental conditions of democratic politics in the modern western state.

7.1 The SCOPE of POLITICAL CONFLICT

For Schattschneider, "the nature of political organization depends on the conflicts exploited in the political system, which is what politics is ultimately all about" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.viii]. Conflict forms the root of all politics, and in free societies, conflict is highly contagious. This point has important implications, for as we shall see later, the ability for conflicts to become contagious is directly proportional to the level of freedom in society. "Every fight consists of two parts: (1) the few individuals who are actively engaged at the center and (2) the audience that is irresistably attracted to the scene... the excitement of the conflict communicates itself to the crowd. This is the basic pattern of all politics" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.2]. Given this axiom, Schattschneider proposed that "the outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it. That is, the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.2]. To paraphrase his analogy of a fist-fight, it is not the combatants but the onlookers who play the decisive role.

"At the nub of politics, are, first, the way in which the public participates in the spread of conflict, and, second, the processes by which the unstable relation of the public to the conflict is controlled. The second proposition is a consequence of the first. The most important strategy of politics is concerned with the scope of conflict" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.3].

For this reason, retaining control over the scope of conflict is paramount to controlling the political agenda, and serves as the ultimate source of political power. The desire to control the scope of conflict is built upon the desire for political stability by those who hold power. Changes in the scope of conflict bring further political uncertainty, and a loss of control of the political agenda.

"Every change in the scope of conflict has a bias; it is partisan in its nature. That is, it must be assumed that every change in the number of participants is about something, that the newcomers have sympathies or antipathies that make it possible to involve them. By definition, the intervening bystanders are not neutral. Thus in political conflict every change in scope changes the equation" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.4].

Given this brief examination of the scope of conflict, Schattschneider began to consider the level of theoretical and empirical support for his hypothesis. He described a fundamental philosophical tension between the desire to "privatize" or contain the scope of conflict, and the desire to "socialize" or expand the scope of conflict [Schattschneider, 1960, p.7]. The sanctity of the individual, the freedom of private enterprise, local political power, and an economized government were seen by Schattschneider as "designed to privatize conflict or to restrict its scope or to limit the use of public authority to enlarge the scope of conflict" [Schattschneider, 1960,

p.71). In contrast, the scope of political conflict was socialized by "ideas concerning equality, consistency, equal protection of the laws, justice, liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and association and civil rights" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.71].

For Schattschneider, the tension between the socialization and privatization of political conflict was laid within the most fundamental of political questions, such as the constitutional rights of individuals, and the role and responsibilities of the state. In order for individuals and groups to raise a political opposition to the dominant groups in a community, they must feel self-confident and secure. "The civil rights of severely repressed minorities and all measures for public or private intervention in disputes about the status of these minorities become meaningful when we relate them to the attempt to make conflict visible. Scope is at stake in these discussions" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.91].

Because the constitutional nature of the democratic state greatly affects civil rights and the character of political opposition, "the whole discussion of the role of government in modern society is at root a question of the scale [of] conflict. Democratic government is the greatest single instrument for the socialization of conflict in the American community" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.13]. While democratic states are born out of the

socialization of conflict, they also survive by allowing for the socialization of conflict through participation and representation. "The universalization of the franchise, the creation of a national electorate and the development of the plebiscitary Presidency elected by a national constituency have facilitated the socialization of conflict" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.14].

Just as the tension between the socialization and privatization of the scope of conflict lies at the center of democratic society, "the question of scope is intrinsic in all concepts of political organization "[Schattschneider, 1960, p.12].

"The controversy about the nature and role of political parties and pressure groups, the relative merits of sectional and national party alignments, national party discipline, the locus of power in party organizations, the competitiveness of the party system, the way in which parties develop issues and all attempts to democratize the internal processes of the parties are related to the scope of the political system" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.12].

In other words, the organizational structures through which political battles are fought are themselves the product of the tension between the need to privatize or socialize the scope of political conflict. Furthermore, while the organizational structure of politics is produced out of the scope of conflict, so are the tactical strategies by which political battles are fought. "While the language of all politics is often oblique and sometimes devious, it

is not difficult to show that the opposing tendencies toward the privatization and socialization of conflict underlie all strategy" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.17-18]. Although the outward purpose of political organizations is to socialize the scope of external political conflicts which threaten their interests, they also seek to privatize the scope of internal conflicts within their own ranks. From the internal perspective, "the best point at which to manage conflict is before it starts. Once a conflict starts it is not easy to control because it is difficult to be exclusive about a fight" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.15]. From the external perspective, "competitiveness is the mechanism for the expansion of the scope of conflict. It is the loser who calls in outside help... On the other hand, any attempt to monopolize politics is almost by definition an attempt to limit the scope of conflict" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.16].

While the scope of conflict hypothesis has implications for various ideologies, especially conservatism and liberalism, Schattschneider was careful not to inject his hypothesis with normative arguments. He was far more interested in the dynamics of political struggle among various interests, which spring from the tension between the socialization and privatization of the scope of conflict.

"There is nothing intrinsically good or bad about any given scope of conflict. Whether a large conflict is better than a small conflict depends on what the conflict is about and what people want to accomplish.

A change of scope makes possible a new pattern of competition, a new balance of forces and a new result, but it also makes impossible a lot of other things" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.17-18].

Change in the scope of conflict, and control over that change, lies at the heart of political power; how it is organized, and how it is exercised.

7.2 The DYNAMICS of CONFLICT

As suggested in an earlier chapter, every private conflict has the potential to become a public conflict. Of the limitless number of potential conflicts in society, relatively few become public knowledge, and fewer still earn a place on the public political agenda. Therefore, "the reduction of the number of conflicts is an essential part of politics. Politics deals with the domination and subordination of conflicts. A democratic society is able to survive because it manages conflict by establishing priorities among a multitude of potential conflicts" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.66].

In order for a conflict to become part of the public political agenda, the issue in question must attract supporters and detractors. "It follows that conflicts divide people and unite them at the same time, and the process of consolidation is as integral to conflict as the process of division. The more fully the conflict is developed, the more intense it becomes, the more complete is the consolidation of the opposing camps" [Schattschneider,

1960, p.64]. The result of escalation and consolidation of the conflict is displacement of attention from other potential conflicts.

As people are attracted from one conflict to another, "every combination involves the dominance of some conflicts and the subordination of others" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.66]. In this process, a "new conflict can become dominant only if the old one is subordinated, or obscured, or forgotten, or loses its capacity to excite the contestants or becomes irrelevant. Since it is impossible to keep the old and cultivate the new at the same time, people must choose among conflicts. In other words, conflicts compete with each other" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.65]. Through this competition of conflicts, some conflicts remain latent because stronger sources of antagonism dominate the public political agenda. In this capacity, "the unequal intensity of conflicts determines the shape of the political system" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.68]. While some conflicts overshadow others, there is always the potential for changes in the public political agenda.

"In the competition of conflicts there is nothing sacred about our preference for big or little conflicts. All depends on what we want most. The outcome is not determined merely by what people want but by their priorities. What they want more becomes the enemy of what they want less" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.68].

The competition among conflicts is what drives the public political agenda, and has two enormous implications for explaining the structure and behaviour of political organizations. First, since competition among conflicts "is not like an intercollegiate debate in which opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues", then "the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.68]. Secondly, since there is competition to control the political agenda as well as to be on the political agenda, "what happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, classes, etc" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.62]. In all of these divisions, their "political strategy deals with the exploitation, use and suppression of conflict" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.67].

In the competition among potential and existing conflicts, organization serves as the primary vehicle for gaining a foothold on the political agenda. Because political organization "is the mobilization of bias", each organization has an additional, inherent bias "in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.71]. It is through the differential strength of organizations that some issues become organized on to the political agenda, while

other issues are organized off of the political agenda.

As conflicts over some issues become dominant, marked by the success of political movement and the currency of ideas, conflicts over other issues decline and fall. "Dominance is related to intensity and visibility, the capacity to blot out other issues. It is related also to the fact that some issues are able to relate themselves easily to clusters of parallel cleavages in the same general dimension" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.74]. The bias that a political organization has in supporting or suppressing conflicts involving other organizations, therefore leads to the formation of political alignments.

Through the alignment of political organizations around issues, political majorities are formed and held together. Once in place, majorities have a vested interest in maintaining their political alignments, and they perform this maintenance by continuing to organize conflicts on or off the public political agenda. Majorities prefer to confront

"familiar antagonists already well-identified in old contests. A new alignment is likely to confuse the majority; new alignments are usually designed to exploit tensions within the majority. Hence the fight is apt to be between the interests that benefit by the maintenance of the old alignments and those demanding a new deal. The very fact that no alignment can satisfy all interests makes the political system dynamic" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.75].

Whether within organized groups, among organized

groups, or as a means of maintaining power by the dominant regime, controlling the scope of conflict through such means as consensus-building, serves as the primary means of articulating a particular issue, or set of issues, or setting the public agenda. Within the available range of political strategy, the most devastating effects are made through the substitution of conflicts [Schattschneider, 1960, p.74]. In this circumstance, some organizations may effectively wield power over others. In other circumstances, the winds of political change may be come about from unforeseen events. In both instances, "the most catastrophic force in the world is the power of irrelevance which transmutes one conflict into another and turns all existing alignments inside out" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.74].

In the conflict of conflicts, the political stakes are high, especially for well-established alignments of power. Conflicts in the early stages of development, where bias is beginning to be mobilized, may immediately quashed, or may potentially cause major shifts in political alignment, depending on the status of other conflicts and other organizations. Ultimately, "what people can do and what they cannot do depends on how they are divided. Every shift of the line of cleavage affects the nature of the conflict, produces a new set of winners and losers and a new kind of result" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.63]. Since a

shifting in the alignment of conflicts "is the process by which majorities and minorities are made, it may be said that every change in the direction and location of the line of cleavage produces a new majority and a new allocation of power" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.63].

Alignments may become particularly stressed when member organizations become torn between the political needs of the alignment and the need to control the scope of conflict on their own issue. For example, "every political party consists of discordant elements which are restrained by the fact that unity is the price of victory. The question always is: which battle do we want most to win?" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.66-67]. During periods of significant political turbulence, "the fog of political conflict is as impenetrable as the fog of war. Political conflicts are waged by coalitions of inferior interests held together by a dominant interest. The effort in all political struggle is to exploit cracks in the opposition while attempting to consolidate one's own side. Inevitably this results in many people saying many different things simultaneously" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.69-70]. While large alignments and political parties must manage the scope of conflict in order to maintain their size and strength, small organizations seeking a place on the public agenda face a different set of stakes. The greatest fear of an organization struggling to gain or maintain exposure "is not

a frontal attack by the opposition but a flank attack by bigger, collateral, inconsistent and irrelevant competitors for the attention and loyalty of the public" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.68].

The way in which political interests rise, organize, align, divide, and fall with the changing scope of conflict characterizes the dynamic of politics in democratic societies. The challenge for organized interests to survive is to maintain a public profile, but in order gain and wield political power, they must forge competitive alignments through the inclusion and exclusion of conflicts. At stake is the influence over public policy, and ultimately the biggest prize of all: control of the state.

7.3 CONFLICT and the STATE

While Schattschneider tends to use the words 'state' and 'government' interchangeably, there is a useful distinction between the two when considering control over the scope of conflict. The state is the institutionalized, authoritative mechanism of legal and military power over the people within its jurisdiction. Governments are simply those political forces which have won control of the state, through democratic means. Governments come and go, but in democratic societies, the institutions of the state remain intact.

In this context, the state serves as the most

important instrument for the socialization of conflict in democratic society. But while "visibility is a factor in the expanding scope of conflict" and "a democratic government lives by publicity", a democratic government may also die by publicity [Schattschneider, 1960, p.16]. It is not necessarily a government which survives by public visibility, but the power of the state to socialize conflict and the democratic process itself. As the warden of the state, government may in theory be a socializing force for political conflict, but political conflict does not make for lasting government in the short term. Since government also operates as a politically motivated organization, it is also interested in controlling the scope of conflict. "The grand strategy of politics deals with public policy concerning conflict. This is the ultimate policy", and this is also why there is no substitute for electoral victory [Schattschneider, 1960, p.67]. In assuming the power of the state, the primary concern of any government is to retain that power, a matter which is regularly tested in the short-term.

Government is the lead agency of the policy process, setting the rules for public policy concerning conflict, and ultimately managing the scope of conflict on a day-to-day basis. "Conflict is so powerful an instrument of politics that all regimes are of necessity concerned with its management, with its use in governing, and with its

effectiveness as an instrument of change, growth and unity" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.67]. It follows that those political parties who are best able to manage the scope of conflict and form majorities of political alignment at the time of elections are most able to attain power, and retain it once in office. "He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.68]. While the role of political parties is primarily to win elections, the role of interest groups is primarily to influence and gain power within the policy process.

7.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

All politics is based on conflict, and every conflict has two parts, the active combatants and the audience. The outcome of conflict is determined by the way in which the audience is able to join the fight. The extent to which the fight is enlarged is called the scope of conflict. The way the scope of conflict is enlarged, and the way it is controlled, forms the crux of political strategy. Because changes in the scope of conflict affect the outcome of conflict, controlling the scope of conflict is the most valuable source of political power. In politics, there is therefore a fundamental tension between the desire to privatize conflicts among those most likely to

win the fight, and the desire to socialize conflicts by those combatants most likely to lose. Laws about controlling the scope of conflict are therefore central to questions about how interests are organized, how political battles evolve, and how society is governed through the power of the state.

Change in the scope of conflict, and control over that change, lies at the heart of political power; how it is organized, and how it is exercised. The dynamic of politics brings some conflicts to public attention, and removes others away from public view. Conflicts reach the public agenda by attracting supporters and detractors. This division of opinion over an issue also serves to unify public attention, displacing other conflicts from the public agenda. From this competition, some political conflicts remain dominant for long periods, shaping the character of the political system, while others remain latent until socio-economic and/or technological shifts bring them to light.

The competition among political conflicts, be they large or small, has two major implications. First, defining the public agenda becomes the most important instrument of political power; and second, the dynamic of politics depends on how people unite and divide into organizations, alignments, and parties. As the mobilization of bias, political organization is the primary vehicle to recognition

and power. Political bias, through public exposure and attention, propels some issues and suppresses others, and creates political alignments or cleavages. Once in place, alignments continue to seek power by organizing some issues and dispelling others. An alignment may eventually form a majority and dominate the political agenda. Alignments are attacked most effectively through the substitution of conflicts, and by exploiting the fractures created by disgruntled minority members. Whether brought about directly or by the winds of political change, the shifting of alignments marks the dynamics of politics in democratic societies.

Control of the state through electoral victory is the ultimate prize in politics because the institutions of the state determine the rules about controlling the scope of conflict. As wardens of the state, governments gain and retain power by managing the scope of conflict. While in the long term, the state serves as the most important instrument for the socialization of conflict, governments do not always prefer a high level of public visibility. Because there is no political substitute for electoral victory, and because elections tend to be fought in the short term, "the crucial problem in politics is the management of conflict. No regime could endure which did not cope with this problem. All politics, all leadership and all organization involves the management of conflict.

All conflict allocates space in the political universe. The consequences of conflict are so important that it is inconceivable that any regime could survive without making an attempt to shape the system" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.701.

8.0 POST-PLURALISM 2: PRESSURE GROUP POLITICS and the POLITICAL ARENA

To briefly review some of the post-pluralist ideas presented so far, we have seen that post-pluralism considers organized interest groups as the primary actors in the political arena, recognizes that some groups are more powerful than others, and that the most powerful of these greatly influence the development of policy. Because the outcome of political conflict is determined by the way in which people are able to join the fight, controlling the scope of political conflict is the most important political strategy. In the political arena, the strongest organized interests enhance their influence on the state by seeking consensus among each other and limiting the scope of conflict. This chapter defines and explores the political roles of organized interest groups in further detail, particularly the way in which they influence the state in policy development.

8.1 The POLITICAL ARENA

As we have seen, "the scope of conflict is an aspect of the scale of political organization and the extent of political competition" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.201]. This also yields two kinds of politics and political

organizations: pressure politics, involving interest groups; and party politics involving political power. Where party politics is largely about the scope of conflict around political alignments and winning elections, the pressure politics of interest groups is largely about controlling the scope of conflict over policy development. "The basic issue between the two patterns of organization is one of size and scope of conflict; pressure groups are small scale organizations while political parties are very large scale organizations" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.20].

The increase in the number of organized interest groups is "rooted broadly in the changing relationship between government and the economy in the modern state, and more specifically in the expansion of bureaucratic influence and in the declining policy role of political parties" [Pross, 1986, p.46]. Because of the enormous competition of conflicts for public attention and the increasing complexity of expertise involved with each issue, political parties and the public at large have minimal influence on the development of policy. Government bureaucracies have expanded to address the variety and complexity of policy concerns, thereby diffusing some of the power of the state and shifting it to public service officials.

8.1.1 POLICY COMMUNITIES

Because of the specialization of policy matters in

virtually every field, "special publics" have emerged to politically engage each policy arm of the state. These special publics are permitted by political society "to dominate decision-making in fields of policy where they have competence", and it is "only when larger concerns must take precedence, or when conflict within the special public spills over into the larger political arena" that political society interferes [Pross, 1986, p.97]. "In a sense any special public can be seen as the narrow end of a funnel, bringing issues from the general public to the decision-making apparatus of the state" [Pross, 1986, p.97].

Special publics are also known as "policy communities", a term which will be retained for the remainder of this thesis. Through its vested interests, specialized expertise, and functional responsibilities, a policy community is a segment of political society which "acquires a dominant voice in determining government decisions in a specific field of public activity, and is generally permitted by society at large and the public authorities in particular to determine public policy in that field" [Pross, 1986, p.98]. The policy community [Figure 1] "is populated by government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including academics, who have an interest a particular policy field and attempt to influence it" [Pross, 1986, p.98]. Policy communities have grown to the extent that they often challenge the credibility of




Figure 1. The Post-Pluralist Political Taxonomy

Based on Pross [1986].

bureaucratic power in the development of policy. As a result, "public officials must generate support in the policy community, winning the approval of the other government agencies, the pressure groups, corporations, institutions, and individuals with a vested interest or an explicit concern in the policy field" in order to achieve policy goals [Pross, 1986, p.132].

8.1.2 The SUB-GOVERNMENT

As a result of the relationships among these various policy actors, particularly the state, "most policy communities consist of two segments: the sub-government and the attentive public" [Pross, 1986, p.98]. The sub-government forms the core of the policy community, and in effect serves as the policy-making body. Composed of one or more government agencies, representatives of the line department, and institutionalized interest groups, the sub-government "processes most routine policy issues and is seldom successfully challenged by dissident members of the policy community" [Pross, 1986, p.98]. While many groups and individuals may hope to become part of the sub-government, "only institutionalized groups and agencies with substantial resources and the incentive to dedicate them to sub-government work can manage day-to-day communication between agency officials and representatives of companies or groups" [Pross, 1986, p.98]. Groups which belong to the

sub-government are members by invitation, and are regularly asked to participate in policy-making through any number of privileged functions. These include sitting on advisory committees and expert panels, commenting on draft policy, "participation on committees or commissions charged with long-range policy review; and continual formal and informal access to agency officials" [Pross, 1986, p.98]. Since the policy-making process is often limited by available time and resources, the sub-government is usually a small group of people. In a federal or provincial context, the sub-government would include "the minister in charge of the agency that is primarily responsible for formulating policy and carrying out programs in a field", their senior officials in that field, and "representatives of the few interest groups whose opinions are vital and whose support is essential" [Pross, 1986, p.98].

As the most prominent part of the policy community, members of the sub-government are not primarily concerned with re-making or reformulating policy. "For them the policy community is a protective device, limiting rather than expanding opportunities for the public at large to achieve major policy changes. The goal of the sub-government is to keep policy-making at the routine or technical level, thereby minimizing interference" [Pross, 1986, p.107]. In order to achieve this goal, members of the sub-government must concentrate on maintaining a political

consensus, that is, controlling the scope of conflict. However, the maintenance of consensus and control of the scope of conflict cannot be sustained indefinitely. Structural changes in the socio-economic, technological, and political fabric of society will eventually "overwhelm the sub-government's system of formal communications and informal networks. Controversy develops, new issues emerge, and more and more interests want to take part in policy-making" [Pross, 1986, p.107]. These other interests make up the second part of the policy community, the attentive public.

8.1.3 The ATTENTIVE PUBLIC

In contrast to the sub-government, the attentive public "is neither tightly knit nor clearly defined. It includes any government agencies, private institutions, pressure groups, specific interests, and individuals-- including academics, consultants and journalists-- who are affected by, or interested in, the policies of specific agencies, and who follow, and attempt to influence, those policies, but do not participate in policy-making on a regular basis" [Pross, 1986, p.99]. Members of the attentive public may have a high level of interest in the policy area, even a high level of expertise and a history of political experience, but these alone do not qualify for membership in the sub-government. The attentive public is

therefore

"the lively part of the policy community. It does not share the privileges of access and does not necessarily have a vested interest in keeping issues out of politics. In fact, many of its members are excluded from power and influence and see public debate as one way of obtaining them. They are therefore prepared to challenge the status quo and are less inclined to accept the norms with which sub-government members are comfortable. As a result, relations within the attentive public are more volatile than those within the sub-government" [Pross, 1986, p.149].

These characteristics point to the primary function of the attentive public, "to maintain a perpetual policy-review process" [Pross, 1986, p.99]. "Without the policy community's special capabilities for studying alternative courses of action, for debating their rival merits, and for securing administrative arrangements for implementation, governments would have great difficulty discerning and choosing between policy options" [Pross, 1986, p.107].

8.1.4 INTEREST GROUPS

While the attentive public is made up of both individual and group interests, it is the latter which are of greatest concern in the post-pluralist view. By their organizational character, groups are able to control at least some of the scope of conflict within their own ranks, and as explained, may act within or outside the sub-government. Among the attentive public, groups represent the greatest potential source of political support and

opposition to the sub-government. The first step in understanding post-pluralist politics is to "stop talking about interests as if they were free and equal. We need to discover the hierarchies of unequal interests, of dominant and subordinate interests" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.70].

Pross distinguished between three categories of interest groups: "latent interests", "solidarity groups", and "formal interest groups" or "pressure groups" [Pross, 1986, p.5]. Acknowledging that they were difficult to define both in theory and in practice, Pross described latent interests as those "not yet been mobilized to recognize shared interests, much less act upon them" [Pross, 1986, p.6]. Despite the amorphous nature of latent interests, "such interests are potentially able to achieve self-consciousness and eventual mobilization, and that once those processes are set in motion their political impact may be incalculable. Consequently politicians and civil servants are often anxious to identify the attitudes of those they judge to be latent interests" [Pross, 1986, p.6]. This factor partly explains the close attention and scarce resources paid by interest groups and political parties to opinion polls and media reports. The inability of major policy players to read the mood of latent interests may also have contributed to the rejection of the 1992 constitutional agreement in the national referendum.

When latent interests begin to coalesce, they form

solidarity groups. "A solidarity group is 'made up of individuals with common characteristics who also share some sense of identity'" [Pross, 1986, p.5; quoting Schwartz, 1981, p.14]. Despite the desire of its members to witness policy changes, "in a solidarity group the recognition of interest does not extend far enough to bring about a formal organization that can consciously mobilize group effort to achieve policy goals. Thus the composition of the groups remains vaguely defined and its political power and influence indeterminate" [Pross, 1986, p.5].

Formal interest groups, or pressure groups, have advanced themselves beyond simple solidarity through greater organization and by making efforts to affect the development of policy. As noted by Pross, "the terms 'pressure groups' and 'interest groups' are often used interchangeably", but may have different connotations [Pross, 1986, p.4]. "The term 'interest groups' conveys a sense of the general, non-political activities of these groups. It, more than the term 'pressure groups', helps us remember that for most of these organizations political activity... is often a minor and unwelcome addition to the concerns that have brought the group together" [Pross, 1986, p.4-5]. In this context, the primary interest of the group is not political, but substantive. In contrast, pressure groups "are organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest. The chief

characteristic of the pressure group is that it tries to persuade governments to pursue policies it advocates. Persuasion takes many forms, nearly all of them intended to exert political pressure on government" [Pross, 1986, p.3].

Unlike 'interest groups', in Pross's terminology, pressure groups exist primarily to act in the political arena. In this context, the substantive interest of a group plays an important role, but is subservient to its political interest. For example, an urban historical society may primarily be a club for those interested in urban history, with political activism as a secondary concern. In contrast, an urban historical preservation society may be primarily concerned with lobbying government for the protection and preservation of historic sites. However, there is nothing to stop the first group from also becoming politically active, particularly if a highly contentious historic preservation issue arises. It can be expected that the terms 'pressure groups' and 'interest groups' will continue to be used interchangeably, since both may contribute to policy development and affect the outcome of the policy process. Since this thesis focusses on political conflict and political interest, the term 'pressure group' will be used for the remainder of the discussion.

8.2 PRESSURE GROUPS

The first characteristic of pressure groups is

their primary reason for organizing: to exert political pressure. The second characteristic is organization itself, defined as "the association of individuals within a formal structure" [Pross, 1986, p.4]. "It is the quality of organization that distinguishes the pressure group from the mob on the one hand and the movement on the other" [Pross, 1986, p.3-4]. The degree of organizational quality yields the third characteristic of pressure groups, their ability to articulate and aggregate common interests [Pross, 1986, p.4]. "The fourth characteristic of pressure groups-- the desire to influence those who hold power rather than to exercise the responsibility of government-- distinguishes" pressure groups from political parties [Pross, 1986, p.4]. Pressure groups focus on the special interests of a few and avoid trying to engage the support of the mass public, a restricted role that permits them to compliment rather than to rival political parties in the process of political communication [Pross, 1986, p.4].

Having removed themselves from the desire to exercise the responsibilities of government, pressure groups are free to pursue access to power without accountability to the public at large. Abandoning the quest for electoral victory, pressure groups use the narrow focus of policy to its greatest advantage in promoting the interests of their members, communicating with the state, legitimating members' demands, advocating policies, regulating members, and

assisting the state to administer policies and programs [Pross, 1986, p.84]. At the core of pressure group influence is the conviction "in the minds of both group representatives and policy-makers that pressure groups speak for a significant part of the public, a part that can be mobilized into political action should its interests not be reasonably accommodated in public policy" [Pross, 1986, p.8]. While pressure groups continually work to maintain or improve their political credibility, governments continually assess "the legitimacy of specific pressure groups and the strength of their mandates. Such assessments are not only useful in group-government bargaining, but also serve to protect governments from adopting policies that lack real public support" [Pross, 1986, p.8]. In this context, the mobilization of political bias around a policy interest performs a dual role, by promoting at least one segment of the policy community, and granting governments an avenue for testing political resolve. To maintain or improve its political credibility to government, a pressure group "must be able to show that it speaks for an entire interest community or that it can elicit the support of a significant part of that community" [Pross, 1986, p.9].

The leadership of a pressure group must therefore perform a delicate balancing act while gaining access and credibility with government. They must nurture a degree of organizational and political autonomy for the group in order

to choose tactics and promote a position without interference from other policy actors. At the same time, the group leadership must maintain credibility with the rank and file group members in order to remain politically potent. Achieving this delicate balance may be particularly difficult for group leaders as they sense that membership in the sub-government is within their grasp. Where support for group leaders by their membership is soft, groups must "ration the energies they devote to policy causes. Their role in policy formation is consequently diminished and that of groups single-mindedly concerned with policy issues is enhanced" [Pross, 1986, p.15]. It is therefore on the outcome of this delicate balance that pressure groups differ from interest groups, and successful pressure groups are invited to participate in the sub-government.

8.3 PRESSURE GROUPS and ELITE BIAS

Writing twenty-five years earlier, Schattschneider [1960] developed a slightly different taxonomy of interest groups by focussing on what he saw as an upper-class bias in the politics of group pressure. While the historical context of his taxonomy is different than Pross [1986], Schattschneider's explanation of power structures in the policy process bears important similarities to Pross's model of the policy community, the attentive public, and the sub-government. These similarities will be briefly discussed

here, and will become further evident in the next section.

Schattschneider proposed two distinctions, first, between "public interest" and "special interest" groups; and second, between organized and unorganized interest groups. He defined public interests as "general or common interests shared by all or by substantially all members of the community. Presumably no community exists unless there is some kind of community of interests, just as there is no nation without some notion of national interests" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.23]. In contrast, special interests "are shared by only a few people or a fraction of the community; they exclude others and may be adverse to them" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.23-4]. The notion of exclusiveness is important in understanding the political positions of special interests, especially whether the distributional benefits they seek from the policy process are exclusive or non-exclusive. While "all public discussion is addressed to the general community", special interests begin from a narrow, internally directed focus [Schattschneider, 1960, p.27]. When special interests collide with one another, the conflict becomes public, such that "a political conflict among special interests is never restricted to the groups most immediately interested" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.20]. Schattschneider's second distinction between organized and unorganized interests is almost self-evident, addressing the difference between the

latency and mobilization of bias. "By the time a group has developed the kind of interest that leads it to organize it may be assumed that it has also developed some kind of political bias because organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.30].

After reviewing various published lists of organized interests, Schattschneider concluded that most of them, including non-business organizations, reflected "an upper-class tendency", supporting an elitist argument. "The class bias of associational activity gives meaning to the limited scope of the pressure system, because scope and bias are aspects of the same tendency" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.34]. This finding gave Schattschneider reason to question the pluralist assumption that organized groups effectively represented all interests equally. "The pressure system makes sense only as the political instrument of a segment of the community. It gets results by being selective and biased; if everybody got into the act, the unique advantages of this form of organization would be destroyed, for it is possible that if all interests could be mobilized the result would be a stalemate" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.35]. As a result, "pressure politics is a selective process, ill designed to serve diffuse interests. The system is skewed, loaded and unbalanced in favour of a fraction of a minority" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.35].

8.4 PRESSURE GROUP TACTICS and the POLITICAL ARENA

Given the post-pluralist taxonomy of the political arena, we may now turn to its political dynamics, particularly the behaviour of pressure groups and their relationships within the policy community. In pursuing their political goals, "groups seize on the policy system where and how they can, struggling to insert their claims in hopes of satisfying their demands and interests" [Pross, 1986, p.131]. Pressure groups carefully use all available means to further their cause. "Persistence; extensive knowledge of substantive issues and policy processes; and the financial resources necessary to communicate with the public as well as with government, are all essential ingredients in a lobbying campaign" [Pross, 1986, p.3]. The political tactics of interest groups also vary directly with their relationships within the policy community, particularly to government. Effective persuasion relies heavily on the organizational capacities of the group, and "modern governments are not easily convinced" [Pross, 1986, p.3]. The most important avenues for pressure group influence are through the sub-government, and its central member, the lead agency.

8.4.1 PRESSURE GROUPS and the LEAD AGENCY

The term 'lead agency' also originates from Pross [1986] and describes the arm of government which is directly

responsible for the particular policy field. The lead agency may be a ministry branch, or an appointed commission, and may coexist with other agencies in the sub-government. While a commissioner or cabinet minister usually sits at the center of the lead agency, he or she will not necessarily attend every meeting with other members of the sub-government.

The strong presence of lead agencies tends to "reinforce the bureaucratic nature of the policy communities", although "agencies may not dominate their relations with groups as easily as they once did", and "their capacity to dictate terms has diminished" [Pross, 1986, p.137]. Especially when working with the lead agency, pressure groups "must organize themselves in similar fashion and, to some extent, must abide by the norms of consultation preferred by them" [Pross, 1986, p.137]. When a group decides to enter the fray of pressure politics in a serious manner, it adapts its organization to 'shadow' the structure of the lead agency. Conceptualizing the "bureaucratic rationality" is the minimum requirement for accomplishing more detailed shadowing tasks. The pressure group must be routinely familiar with the institutional structure of the lead agency:

"it must know who in the organization deals with what issues; how much weight their advice carries; who their rivals are and how likely they are to attack. The group must also have an intimate knowledge of the

programs administered by the agency: a thorough understanding of how they work in practice; how they affect the public; what their shortcomings and benefits are; and whether or not they come close to meeting the objectives set out for them" [Pross, 1986, p.138].

The relationship a pressure group has with the lead agency will depend not only on how well it is able to accomplish these shadowing tasks, but also on whether it is a member of the sub-government. To borrow from a recent advertising slogan, membership indeed has its privileges. Pressure groups must consider a different set of political circumstances from within the sub-government, than as members of the attentive public. Membership marks the difference between struggling to influence power and managing the scope of conflict. The tactical considerations from each of these two vantage points will be considered here in turn.

8.4.2 PRESSURE GROUPS WITHIN the ATTENTIVE PUBLIC

Within the attentive public, pressure groups act primarily as policy advocates or lobbyists. While there are attentive publics for most policy fields competing in the conflict of conflicts, sometimes pressure groups compete among one another within a single attentive public, to become the strongest voice. At stake are the distributional benefits of public policy and influence on the state.

The success of the organized interest group in gaining distributional benefits depends on its internal

cohesion, its ability to obtain information and to mobilize political support. "The capacity of an association both to generate the information and to mobilize the support needed for successful advocacy will rest to a significant extent on how well it maintains the cohesion of its members" [Coleman, 1985, p.417; with reference to Truman, 1952, p.112].

Internal cohesion among group members is most easily achieved by narrowing the policy interest of the pressure group, which in turn, improves political effectiveness. In order to maintain internal cohesion and rigorously define its political objectives, the pressure group must retain a high degree of autonomy. Unlike politicians and officials, who must demonstrate consistency across policy fields, organized interests are "under less pressure to discipline their demands", and therefore "are free to make alliances with other organizations on an ad hoc basis and to dissolve them once a given political objective has been achieved" [Coleman, 1985, p.418]. This is particularly true for groups who are not well-organized, or who do not care to become part of the sub-government, preferring to review and criticize rather than initiate policy.

Sharp [1981] distinguished between two forms of advocacy, which mark a progression in pressure group influence on the sub-government. The first, "adversarial advocacy", simply focusses on increasing public attention to issues, "often using controversial tactics. In short,

adversarial advocacy is a goal of inviting acrimony in order to force policy change" [Sharp, 1981, p.417]. Promoting adversity is the simplest form of expanding the scope of conflict. Creating a stir brings media attention, draws new supporters and detractors, and invites comments from government officials and other actors within the policy community. The second form of advocacy is "advisory advocacy", "involves reliance upon formal contacts and/or regularized meetings with officials, a focus upon service oversights rather than a questioning of the overall quality or legitimacy of government services, and a style of informing and advising or requesting, rather than demanding or agitating for change [Sharp, 1981, p.416-7]. This quieter, advisory role clearly occurs when the pressure group is closer to the sub-government, through better organization, resources, and political credibility.

The Sharp [1981] distinction between adversarial and advisory advocacy is respectively paralleled by the petition and co-optation models of group influence outlined by Galaskiewicz [1981]. In the co-optation model, informal contacts between interest groups and government officials are used "to foster the political ends of the interest groups" [Galaskiewicz, 1981, p.260]. This practice has three advantages for the interest group, in that they can present their arguments directly, reduce the uncertainty of their cause, and expend less energy in building coalitions

with other interest groups [Galaskiewicz, 1981, p.260]. The petition model "assumes greater social distance between interest groups and political decision makers", where "interest groups interact with public officials only in the public arena" [Galaskiewicz, 1981, p.260]. Under these circumstances, interest groups must garner support from the public and build political alignments with other organizations.

In a sense, pressure groups within the attentive public play a more pluralistic than post-pluralistic role in the policy process. It is within the sub-government that differences in pressure group power become most evident, where the primary role of the pressure group shifts from advocating policy, to making policy.

8.4.3 PRESSURE GROUPS WITHIN the SUB-GOVERNMENT

Policy participation by pressure groups "refers to the active participation of associations in the formulation of policy, in the implementation of policy, or in both" [Coleman, 1985, p.418]. In the post-pluralist setting, such participation occurs within the sub-government.

Participation by the pressure group in the sub-government "taps it into the information flow; guarantees consultation on issues of real concern to the group; and provides for links with civil servants, leaders of other groups and sometimes senior politicians" [Pross, 1986, p.146]. In

order to become even a potential participant in the sub-government, the pressure group must have two major characteristics. "First, it will be able to order and coordinate the complex range of information and activity that it is asked to assume by its members and by other organizations, particularly the state. Without such a capacity the organization will not be tolerated for long by others seated around the policy table" [Coleman, 1985, p.419]. Second, the pressure group must have a special degree of autonomy from its membership as well as the state. As a participant in the sub-government, the pressure group must be "more than the sum of the interests of one or the other. It takes on a life of its own and is able to rise above the short-term particularistic interests of its members. It can not only see in the medium and longer term, it can define for its members what their interests are within this broader perspective" [Coleman, 1985, p.419]. These two characteristics, information-processing capacity and organizational autonomy, depend on the depth and range of internal resources available to the pressure group. Internal resources include money, "the relative professional expertise of association staff, the degree of committment or support the association receives from its members, the capacity to generate unique information and the privileges the association receives from other actors, particularly the state. Following Schmitter and Streeck [1981], what is

central to organizational autonomy is resource diversity" [Coleman, 1985, p.425].

Information-processing capacity and organizational autonomy are the minimum requirements in assuring political credibility for the pressure group. Political credibility is vital to participation in the sub-government, where negotiation occurs "'within and among a limited and fixed set of interest organizations that mutually recognize each other's status and entitlements and that are capable of reaching and implementing relatively stable compromises in pursuit of their interests'" [Streeck and Schmitter, 1984, p.12; by Coleman, 1985, p.420]. This is the working environment of the sub-government, and "securing a recognized position in the sub-government is a first priority for any group intending to exert continuing influence on policy" [Pross, 1986, p.145]. Once having attained membership within the sub-government, and "apart from its concern for promoting its influence with the lead agency, two factors are paramount in a group's relations with other members of the sub-government. The first is position. The second co-operation" [Pross, 1986, p.145].

Position entails the status, prestige, recognition, and visibility of the pressure group to other members of the sub-government, especially the lead agency. Position enables pressure groups to be invited into the sub-government, and to secure their credibility among other

members. Once its positional credibility has been achieved, the political tone of the pressure group's voice is forced to change.

"Instead of clamouring to be consulted, they are hounded for advice. When governments and their agencies decide that specific groups speak for a significant part of the population and that their views are legitimate, they turn to them frequently, inviting them to sit on advisory committees and consulting them on issues far afield from the immediate concerns of the groups themselves. Responding to these overtures takes considerable effort" [Pross, 1986, p.146].

Position and participation are therefore interdependent qualities, which in reinforcing each other, improve and maintain the membership of a pressure group within the sub-government. Position and participation also have the effect of reconciling "group members of the sub-government to the norms preferred by bureaucratic members" [Pross, 1986, p.146]. The reconciliation to such norms is even more important to the internal life of sub-governments because it forms the basis for controlling the scope of conflict. The need for consensus within the sub-government, "as much as the predilections of officials, imposes norms and sanctions on group behaviour-- particularly norms and sanctions of discretion and confidentiality" [Pross, 1986, p.147]. Therefore, while most sub-government members are most concerned with influencing the lead agency, they are also concerned with co-operating among each other in order to preserve their mutual privileges of position and

participation.

It is through the second critical factor, co-operation, that the scope of conflict is controlled. Co-operation promotes stable relationships between members, strengthens individual group credibility, broadens the base of political support, and increases "the resources available to specific groups" [Pross, 1986, p.147]. Co-operation reflects the "communal nature of policy-making" within the sub-government, and underlines the reality that most of its members "will have to live with one another in the future" [Pross, 1986, p.147].

Although members of the sub-government co-operate to maintain their privileges, the relations of pressure groups to other members are rarely defined in a formal manner. Furthermore, just as a group can gain admittance to the sub-government by the virtue of its political clout, "it can use the same levers to obtain concessions from officials, politicians-- and other members-- that other key groups and agencies can use. It is in a position to regulate the flow of information to government and the public; to secure the success or failure of government programs, and to secure legitimacy on public policies" [Pross, 1986, p.148]. With greater access to information, a pressure group may also exploit its privileges within the sub-government to promote its own hidden agenda, "to form alliances, win support, oppose rivals, and crush the

pretensions of groups that would like to supplant it" [Pross, 1986, p.148]. However, the gains made through such activities are usually short-lived.

Long-term influence by the pressure group is maintained more subtly, through the sharing of power relationships with the lead agency and controlling the scope of conflict within the sub-government. "Over time, recognition of mutual interests, and the habit of working together, lead to the evolution of a more-or-less cohesive social organization that is maintained through a network of mores, norms, and sanctions that, like many of the bonds between agencies and groups, are entirely informal" [Pross, 1986, p.148-9]. Membership in the sub-government implicitly extends to the pressure group a system of reciprocity, "in which the privileges of membership are conferred and the leaders of the newly accepted group 'become susceptible to socialization into the mores and modes of behaviour appropriate to interest group leaders'" [Pross, 1986, p.148-9; with reference to Kwavnick, 1972, p.16].

While the motives for consensus and stability are strong, and the norms of participation and co-operation are prevalent, political tension within the sub-government can also rise quickly, especially if the mood of the larger policy community is volatile. Under these circumstances, "the threat of publicity becomes the ultimate weapon and a powerful incentive for securing accommodation within the

sub-government" [Pross, 1986, p.149]. The seeds of political turmoil may remain latent for a long period, but they also point back to an integral aspect of pressure politics: the way in which conflict is structured. To a degree, the sub-government serves to privatize the policy process and the political conflicts associated with it. The overhanging threat of publicity exists when "someone wants to make certain that the power ratio among the private interests most immediately involved shall not prevail" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.38]. As discussed earlier, it is typically the least powerful interest, perhaps a pressure group who will want to expand the scope of conflict and raise the uncertainty of the outcome. Given the unequal strength of members in the sub-government, "it follows that the most powerful special interests want private settlements because they are able to dictate the outcome as long as the conflict remains private" [Schattschneider, 1960, p.40]. Therefore in the long run, the primary motive for consensus tends to be held by the lead agency and its closest allies. A weaker pressure group admitted to the sub-government may initially want to yield to prevailing norms, but later threaten to 'go public', even at the risk of expulsion from the circle of privilege. In this situation, it may become easier to distinguish 'the government' from 'the state'. It may be the function of the state "to modify private power relations by enlarging the scope of conflict", but there may

also be no motive for the government, through the lead agency, to enlarge the scope of conflict and endanger the concentration of power relations in the sub-government [Schattschneider, 1960, p.40].

For pressure groups, the transition from policy advocacy within the attentive public to policy-making within the sub-government, may itself become a source of conflict due to the inherent contradictions of the two roles. Where participation in the sub-government "favours the widening of domains and the formalization of hierarchical relationships with other associations", policy advocacy is more successful "when domains are narrow and the association can develop strategy and act independently of other associations" [Coleman, 1985, p.431-2]. Participation with other members of the sub-government "is more successful when ideology is suppressed in favour of a techno-pragmatism and when issue are not politicized. However, the policy advocacy role will often involve ideological grandstanding to galvanize the support of members, deliberate politicization of issues, and open, independent politicking by association members. Each of these behaviours, however, promises to undermine the atmosphere of trust and secrecy that associations and the state nurture for the staging of the policy participation role" [Coleman, 1985, p.432-3].

It is difficult to assess whether political advantage rests with the lead agency and the sub-government

in the long run. The sub-government, particularly the lead agency, is very cautious in admitting new members in the short run due to the fear of disrupting the existing consensus, but in the long run it may be perilous to practice political exclusion. This is because underlying changes in the social, economic, and technological structure of society will inevitably overtake the ability of the sub-government to politically respond to new problems. The only way for sub-governments to maintain their circle of privilege is to adjust to such underlying changes, and co-opt the political interests of growing pressure groups.

In this chapter the features of the post-pluralist political taxonomy have been presented in the context of federal and provincial governments. This is because most of the material pertaining to the subject was developed with these levels in mind. Post-pluralism is also especially conducive to the study of local government, where most public policy-making on the planning of cities is conducted. This is the subject of the next chapter.

8.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY

In the post-pluralist political arena, politics is organized out of the desire to control the scope of conflict. Where political parties are organized out of the desire to win elections and exercise the apparatus of the state, group politics is organized out of the desire to

influence the development of policy. With the expansion of the bureaucratic state, political power in policy development has been distributed among the administrative branches, encouraging the formation of policy communities in every policy field.

Policy communities are composed of groups, government agencies, journalists, and academics, who are interested in a particular field, and attempt to influence the development of public policy pertaining to it. As segments of political society, policy communities have become the predominant sources of expertise and authority in their fields. Most policy communities are composed of two major parts, the attentive public and the sub-government. The sub-government effectively serves as the policy-making body in the field, and is composed of representatives from the most important and influential groups in the policy community. At the center of the sub-government is the lead agency, which is the official arm of the government responsible for the policy field. The attentive public surrounds the sub-government, and contains all other members of the policy community. Acting primarily as a body for policy review, the attentive public is home to those interests excluded from the policy-making process, and those who wish to join the ranks of the sub-government.

Interests in the policy community may be classified into three basic categories: latent, solidarity

groups, and organized interest groups. By remaining unorganized, latent interests are the least powerful of the three, yet are important to deciding the outcome of policy issues if they should rise near the top of the public agenda. Solidarity groups are formed by individuals who have realized their common interest and identity, but do not have the desire or organization necessary to greatly influence the policy process. Organized interest groups, also called pressure groups, are varied in their political strength and credibility but have organized themselves specifically to affect the development of policy. While most pressure groups exist within the attentive public, the most powerful hold positions of representation within the sub-government.

In their desire to gain status within the sub-government, the leaders of pressure groups must strike a delicate political balance between garnering the support of its membership, building organizational autonomy, obtaining political resources, and establishing credibility with the lead agency. As membership in the sub-government becomes imminent, the pressure group must retreat somewhat from a competitive, antagonistic strategy and adopt a co-operative position. This transition is often difficult, but is necessary for obtaining a participatory position among the other powers at the policy-making table.

Within the sub-government, pressure group

representatives sit in a privileged position alongside the policy-making elite, and are obliged to participate within established protocol. Consensus-building through negotiation, shared information, and mutual trust is the norm of policy-making within the sub-government. While the threat to distort the certainty of the process by enlarging the scope of conflict may be a great temptation to the pressure group in the short term, its long-term survival within the sub-government depends on its willingness to support the other members in controlling the scope of conflict. The need to control scope of conflict is the very reason why the interests of powerful pressure groups are co-opted by the sub-government, and their representatives are invited to become policy-makers rather than policy critics.

9.0 POST-PLURALISM 3: URBAN REGIMES and PRESSURE POLITICS at the LOCAL LEVEL

The power to control the agenda and the scope of conflict is equally vital to pressure politics at local levels of government, where most city planning occurs. In local post-pluralist politics, policy communities develop, with sub-governments, attentive publics, and an array of organized and unorganized interests. The key difference in the post-pluralist taxonomy at the local level is that the sub-government is more closely linked to public officials and elected politicians. These closer links are manifested in more powerful lead agencies, and less diffusion of power from politicians than at provincial or federal levels. The predominance of power at the top, and its persistence over time is described as the urban regime [Elkin, 1980].

While numerous case studies of urban regimes are found in Stone and Sanders [1987], this chapter explores the concept of the urban regime and how it prevails in local politics by using the ultimate political weapon, control of the scope of conflict. The main proponents of urban regime theory [Elkin, 1980, 1985, 1987; Stone, 1976; Stone and Sanders, 1987], have drawn from the writings of Schattschneider [1960], and present a revisionist

alternative to elitist, corporatist, and Marxist criticisms of pluralism. Urban regime theory is a significant branch of post-pluralist thought, with direct parallels to Pross [1986]. Unlike Pross, however, the urban regime school addresses post-pluralism specifically to local politics.

The chapter begins with a look at the economic context of city politics, particularly the tension between business interests and the urban state. This is followed by an explanation of how dominant urban interests form governing coalitions, and by controlling the scope of conflict, maintain their position of power as an urban regime. The tendency of urban regimes to preserve the dominance of certain interests through system bias is then examined.

9.1 POLITICS and the CITY

Conceptions of urban politics are usually based on underlying assumptions about the answers to two basic questions, 'What are cities?', and 'What are cities for?'. Urban geographers often distinguish two approaches to the study of places, site and situation. Site focusses on the particular attributes of a place and how they influence its behaviour. Situation examines the relationships between the place of interest, and other places. This approach also includes the study of "relative location" and "comparative advantage". The separation of both site and situation as

approaches to the study of places is purely artificial, because one concept cannot logically exist without the other. The distinction of "site" is only relative to the existence of other "sites", or some amorphous "hinterland". Equally, a "relationship" cannot exist without the definition of the individual entities involved therein. Sites are defined by situations, but situations are also defined by sites.

Logan and Molotch [1987], describe another dichotomy, primarily within the context of "site". They "offer the basic hypothesis that all capitalist places are the creation of activists who push hard to alter how markets function, how prices are set, and how lives are affected" [Logan and Molotch, 1987, p.3]. The underlying assumption here is that places are "created" on exclusively on the basis of their site, not their situation. Logan and Molotch also assume that urban inhabitants are divided between two groups, "residents, who use place to satisfy essential needs of life, and entrepreneurs, who strive for financial return, ordinarily achieved by intensifying the use to which their property is put" [Logan and Molotch, 1987, p.2]. Like Logan and Molotch [1987], Peterson [1981] considered the city as a unitary interest, whose overriding concern is economic productivity in competition with other cities. In this framework, urban government primarily serves to further economic productivity, and is concerned with pursuing

economic development goals with the greatest efficiency.

While trying to draw attention to the political and competitive nature of cities, Logan and Molotch [1987] neglect some key points. First, cities are not merely created by capitalists as investments, but evolve historically as locations for a wide range of human activities, including religion and education, as social meeting places, and as military fortresses [Mumford, 1961]. Cities are not exclusively the product of economic or commercial activity, although such activities are central to city development. Natural features such as drinking water, harbours and arable land also contribute to concentrations of permanent human settlement. Second, entrepreneurs also seek out cities as pleasurable places to live, to satisfy the essentials of life, as well as to do business. Furthermore, workers also seek the city to achieve maximum financial gain. There is no class bias in the reasons people migrate to cities. Third, while business boosters from different cities compete in attracting economic development, economic development does not depend exclusively on their success. The historical economic base of local resources and skills is as important to each city as the success of boosters in attracting external investments.

In sharpest contrast to the outlook of Logan and Molotch [1987] and Peterson [1981], is the view that

politics matters to urban government, since "the development-policy actions of cities are rooted in the political arrangements by which coalitions of actors are brought together and achieve cooperation" [Stone, 1987a, p.101]. While economic competition is of primary importance, it clearly does not displace urban politics, and political behaviour is no less influential in the development of cities than other variables. The wealth of any city may rise and fall over time, as changes occur in the relative demand for local commodities, in the technology of production, in the position of competitors, as well as in many other factors [Jacobs, 1970; 1985], but equally influential is the political responses to those factors, including the behaviour of local boosters [Artibise, 1975]. It is not enough to ask 'what are the major economic variables which determine the development of a city, and how are they likely to change over time?', without also asking 'what political forces influence the development of a city, and how are those forces likely to change over time?'.

Regime theory begins with discussion of the city as a basis for political power, noting that it is much narrower and more specific than provincial or national jurisdictions. The most significant factor in a city's survival is its economic interest, but equally important is the manner in which city politics acts upon that interest. The economic base of the city is therefore its most

important source of political power.

9.2 URBAN POLITICS and the STATE-MARKET TENSION

Beginning with the view that politics matters, and "cities are not mere economic units in a competitive market" [Stone, 1987a, p.17], the narrower focus of urban politics places greater emphasis on the relationship between local government and local business interests. This relationship is centered on what Stone [1987a] calls, "the division of labor between state and market", where "labor" means the business work conducted in the city as well as the infrastructure, amenities, and services of the city itself. The relationship between state and market is marked by (1) the common interest of economic success, and (2) the tension between the socialization and privatization of conflict Schattschneider [1960].

The economic success of the city is valued by both urban business and urban government, because both are dependent upon it. This dependency often blurs the distinction between the 'public sector' and the 'private sector'. Private investment decisions by urban business have an enormous social and public impact on urban life. These decisions may create or eliminate jobs, change the city's physical landscape, influence decisions by other businesses, and urban government. In turn, decisions by urban government affect the behaviour of businesses,

especially in such areas as policing, transportation services, and taxation. The area where business and local government interests merge most closely is in development policy. Government therefore "does not ignore business, and business is an integral part of life in urban communities. Politics takes place within these circumstances" [Stone, 1987a, p.18].

Opposing the commonality of interests between urban business and urban government is the second major factor in the state-market relationship, the tension between the desires to socialize and privatize conflicts [Schattschneider, 1960]. Business interests and city government interests do not always agree, since their responsibilities are different. While business must occasionally attend to public relations, governments are driven by them. As the institution primarily able to socialize local conflicts, urban governments sometimes must challenge the interests of business, even though they hold other interests in common.

Together, the tension of conflict and the commonality of interests create a continually shifting relationship between state and market, and an open form of political autonomy for urban government. The morphology of urban politics "is a matter of putting together arrangements that can hold in check the tension between what Charles Lindblom called the 'privileged position of business', which

is characteristic of capitalism, and the equality of citizens in voting rights and civil liberties, which is the foundation of popular control. The position of business can clash with the principle of popular control" [Stone, 1987a, p.15 referring to Lindblom, 1977]. Urban politics is therefore "not a free-floating activity, shaped only by the creative ingenuity and personal preferences of its major actors" [Stone, 1987a, p.17]. City politicians and other political stakeholders behave within the boundaries of political arrangements developed over time with the influence of local cultural norms and the relationship between state and market. Political arrangements are shaped and reshaped by the need for city officials to "retain the confidence of the capital markets as well as the support of a majority of their city's voters'" [Stone, 1987a, p.15, quoting Shefter, 1985, p.235].

The political arrangements created in cities, while attempting to reconcile the tension between common interest and common conflict, involve uncertainties, trade-offs, and continuing variation. "Neither the issue of how best to satisfy the principle of popular control nor the issue of how to induce private business to serve community well-being is itself the kind of question to which there is a technical answer" [Stone, 1987b, p.269]. As a result, there is always "room for differences of judgement and for variations in practice" in the creation of urban political

economies [Stone, 1987b, p.270].

9.3 INTERESTS, COALITIONS, and the URBAN REGIME

The political arrangements described above evolve from a variety of urban interests, including latent interests, solidarity organizations, pressure groups, and some individuals [Figure 2]. Because interests are unequal in their power, and also because the basis of urban politics is relatively narrow, those interests involved in creating and maintaining urban political arrangements tend to be few and powerful. They form what Stone calls a "governing coalition" [1987a], and if they are able to retain power for an extended period, the governing coalition may be called an urban regime [Elkin, 1980].

9.3.1 INTERESTS

While both urban business interests and the urban state have a common interest in the economic success of the city, there is often disagreement on the specifics of what entails economic success and what policy measures are most appropriate in its achievement. The commonality of interest dissolves even further as other less-powerful interests are considered. The result is that in political debates, policies "are almost always defended as being in the public interest, and opposition is often stated in the same terms" [Stone, 1987a, p.15]. But as reflected upon by Davidoff [1965] and others, a unitary public interest cannot be




Figure 2. The Urban Regime Taxonomy
Based on Stone and Sanders [1987]

defined objectively. Political actors, be they individuals or groups, generally "pursue what is most immediate and real to themselves" when participating in policy debates [Stone, 1987a, p.15]. Furthermore, since "policy decisions involve making an ongoing series of value judgments with which both particular and general interests are intermingled", no interest group or individual "is likely to promote the good of the whole community in a way that commands universal agreement [Stone, 1987b, p.271]. Among the latent, solidarity, and organized interests, "a law of indeterminacy prevails: a community cannot know in concrete terms what the public interest is, independent of political activity" [Stone, 1987a, p.15]. The only sense of public interest or common good which is relevant to policy debate is that which is "brought into being, albeit imperfectly, by a set of political actors. However defined, the common good is mediated through the agency of political leadership" [Stone, 1987a, p.10]. Even when acting on an imperfect or partial view of the common good, political leadership cannot ignore that "the common good is not a fixed program to which all agree. It changes over time and may be perceived differently by different constituencies" [Stone, 1987a, p.11].

Political leadership therefore advances a view of common good which by definition is only partial, but it is through gaining the power to exercise urban government that

such leadership is "endowed with a capacity to act on behalf of that aim" [Stone, 1987a, p.11]. While the governing coalition is not subject to an objectively defined common good and cannot "simply ask how they can efficiently serve the interest of the community", the partial or imperfect sense of common good which they are able to convey "entails a set of operational procedures and arrangements that are themselves very powerful shapers of policy" [Stone, 1987a, p.51].

This is why ordinary coalitions of interests strive to become the governing coalition, for it is not only "the agent through which conceptions of the interest of the whole community are mediated", but the agent with the greatest potential for of controlling the scope of conflict [Stone, 1987a, p.6]. The governing coalition shapes the scope of policy debate and the continuum of policy decisions. In fashioning the political arrangements by which policy is decided and implemented, the governing coalition creates a view of the public interest and how it will be served [Stone, 1987b, p.271].

Regime theory, presented here so far, argues that the diversity of urban interests seeks a common public good which is mediated through politics, and expressed by the governing coalition. "In concrete and specific terms, there is no interest of the whole community that the governing coalition knows about and pursues apart from the governing

coalition's own character and composition", and policy grows out of governing coalition through "its relationship to the populace and to the controllers of private investment" [Stone, 1987a, p.20].

9.3.2 BUILDING the GOVERNING COALITION

As we have seen, urban policy decisions are not made by cities, but by the people who live in them, who "have neither uniform material interests in the decisions that are made nor a common understanding of the risks involved in and the probable consequences of those decisions" [Stone, 1987a, p.8]. Urban politics, like other politics, is therefore riddled with conflict, and controlling the scope of that conflict is the most important means of gaining and maintaining power.

Coalition building "is a complicated task of bringing together the people whose particular interests are served, allaying the concerns or isolating those whose particular interests are threatened, and presenting one's actions as being consistent with the good of at least a majority" [Stone, 1987a, p.8]. The scope of conflict is managed through coalition building, where "politics is about the substance of policies, political arrangements, and connections between the two" [Stone, 1987a, p.16]. Forming a governing coalition is not about winning mere elections, "it entails a capacity to guide and reshape various forms of

interaction, to modify goals, and to alter rules of decision making" [Stone, 1987b, p.273]. The governing coalition does not have to control all activity in the city, it only has to "be able to recast the terms on which key social transactions occur" [Stone, 1987b, p.273]. A governing coalition does not simply govern in the legal sense, it also acts like a sub-government [Pross, 1986], in which "private actors are able to act collectively and bring concerted influence to bear", particularly on those matters which directly affect a city's economic survival [Stone, 1987b, p.273].

Governing coalitions may differ from one urban area to another, both in their composition and policy strategies, but regardless of their particular platform, governing coalitions "are the architects of their own responses to the structural constraints and changing conditions in which city politics is embedded" [Stone, 1987a, p.14]. In facing both expected and unexpected challenges, the responses of the political leadership of the governing coalition are "shaped by the composition of the political coalitions they depend on for support and the structure of the political organizations and institutions in their city" [Shefter, 1985, p.220, by Stone, 1987a, p.14]. When governing coalitions are unable to respond adequately or quickly enough to political challenges, a crisis may ensue, where interests realign themselves along a new

dominant political cleavage. The governing coalition may be modified, and may even remain in power, but the result is a shift in the governing arrangements and vision of public interest. However, governing coalitions tend to remain stable in the long run, and may even "come together as arrangements for coping with enduring constraints [Stone, 1987a, p.15]. If a governing coalition can endure the winds of political change, it effectively becomes an urban regime.

9.3.3 The URBAN REGIME

As expressed by Elkin [1980], the urban regime "represents an accommodation between the potentially conflicting principles of the popular control of government and the private ownership of business enterprises", that is, an accommodation made between the opposite desires to privatize and socialize the scope conflict in order to further urban economic interests [Stone, 1987b, p.269]. Urban regimes serve as 'mediators' "between the goal of economic well-being and the particular development policies pursued" [Stone, 1987b, p.269]. Urban regimes remain in power by controlling the scope of conflict, and as such become the targets of competing coalitions. As a branch of post-pluralism, regime theory "invites us to ask how a governing coalition is held together and what difference that makes in a city's development agenda" [Stone, 1987a, p.17].

9.4 DEVELOPMENT POLITICS and the URBAN REGIME

Development politics under the urban regime is characterized by the positional advantages and disadvantages of groups relative to the regime. This condition is analogous to the importance of group positions in the sub-government, discussed in the previous chapter. Positional advantage, particularly through access and influence on public officials, is a major source of "system bias" [Stone, 1976]. Development policies tend to reflect this system bias, and typically occur in an incremental fashion.

9.4.1 POSITIONAL ADVANTAGES and DISADVANTAGES

When public officials of the urban regime are predisposed "to favour the interests of a given group more strongly and actively than the interests of other groups", then those favoured groups are said to enjoy a positional advantage [Stone, 1976, p.18]. Although such predispositions are sometimes countered by the external pressure of a strong opposition campaign, such efforts are very difficult to sustain in the long run. Since it is much easier to manage political resources from a position of power, "policy in the long run is likely to reflect the predispositions of public officials about group interests" [Stone, 1976, p.18]. As a result of these tendencies, pressure groups generally "prefer to have friends and allies in public office", in addition to a capacity to mobilize

external opposition campaigns [Stone, 1976, p.16].

The unequal accessibility of public officials and politicians creates differences in political advantage for those in the policy community, as "positional advantages may be cumulative for some interests, and, similarly, disadvantages may be cumulative for other interests" [Stone, 1976, p.16]. Given the degree of potential political influence at stake, pressure groups actively try to gain positional advantage, using at least three techniques. First, a pressure group will try to select public officials to promote its interest in strategically important offices, boards, and committees. Second, the a pressure group will try to identify important public officials who "share the group's perspective on leading policy questions" [Stone, 1976, p.18]. Third, pressure group leaders will cultivate informal ties and gain the respect of major officials. By creating a relationship of mutual trust [Covey, 1992], group leaders can improve their chances of accommodation. "A positional advantage thus might be structured into process whereby public officials are selected, it might be a matter of 'ideological' congruence, or it might rest on an informal basis" [Stone, 1976, p.19]. Using one or all of these methods, or by using any other means, it is clear that:

"a positional advantage substantial enough to enable a group to gain cumulative policy benefits at the expense of competing groups does not come about easily. Only those groups with substantial, multiple, and expendable

political resources are likely to be able to devote their resources to gaining and maintaining a positional advantage. Even then, political success depends on favourable circumstances" [Stone, 1976, p.205].

Consistent positional advantage does not occur by chance, and can be both "the result of the exercise of influence as well as a means by which influence can be exerted" [Stone, 1976, p.19]. The first task of pressure groups who wish to influence the urban regime is to gain a positional advantage. It is through positional advantage such influence is exercised, since it is within the regime's controlled scope of conflict that influence is most important. Where "technical complexity and low public visibility reduce the scope of external constituency pressures on public officials", influence by positional advantage can be very effective [Stone, 1976, p.205]. The attempt to set priorities, build alliances, and learn technical details "is exercised more readily through public officials than on them" [Stone, 1976, p.207].

The influence gained from positional advantage is a rare and stable political commodity, since "group influence over policy is less costly to the group that holds a positional advantage than to the group that lacks such an advantage" [Stone, 1976, p.207]. While the influence of positional advantage may be challenged from time to time by rival pressure groups, the cost of mounting such a challenge is usually much greater than the "expenditure of resources

may be necessary to meet or circumvent the challenge"

[Stone, 1976, p.207]. Furthermore,

"incumbent leaders have acquired skills, and they have abundant opportunities to use these skills in the timing, shaping, and presenting of proposals in such a way as to build support and disaggregate opposition. It is not an easy task to coalesce dissatisfied groups into a substantial and stable opposition force when the competing group has the command of the public domain. In other words, conflict is easier to manage from inside the governmental system than from the outside" [Stone, 1976, p.211].

As previously outlined by Schattschneider [1960], political discontent and protest activities "rarely bring about change unless accompanied by fundamental alterations in community structure and composition" [Stone, 1976, p.205]. Under any political circumstances, it is the power and influence of public officials within the urban regime which are the prize in the quest for positional advantage.

9.4.2 PUBLIC OFFICIALS and the SCOPE of CONFLICT

Under the urban regime, it is implicit that public officials do not necessarily participate in the policy process from a neutral position. Given the importance of positional advantage and the influence it may bestow, "officials may be strong partisans of one group or another" depending on political conditions [Stone, 1976, p.14]. Where public officials consistently advocate for some interests instead of others, and where the allegiances of

public officials are sharply divided, the character of the policy process within the urban regime may change. Bargaining, negotiation, and mutual adjustment may be replaced by "a process in which the not-so-fine arts of deception and manipulation are practiced in order to manage conflict on behalf of certain favoured groups and objectives" [Stone, 1976, p.15]. In extreme cases, controlling the scope of conflict may ultimately be a higher priority for public officials than whether the means or methods of control are diplomatic.

Of anyone involved in the policy process, public officials are in the best position to control the scope of conflict. "They, more than any other group, can manipulate the timing and the scope of issues and give direction to conflict" [Stone, 1976, p.15]. The scope of conflict does not control officials, "it is something that leaders shape, confine, and divert as they go about their business of policy formation" [Stone, 1976, p.15]. It is not always clear whether the scope of conflict or the substance of policy is foremost in the minds of public officials. In the policy-making ring of the urban regime, political conflict and policy substance often become synonymous in the politics of power. The outcome of a single dispute may be "no more than a tactical point from which skilled leaders resume their efforts to achieve desired policy goals" [Stone, 1976, p.15]. Generally speaking though, "conflict does not chart

the path that policy will follow", and appears as a by-product of policy formation [Stone, 1976, p.212]. The outcome of a given issue may be less important to officials than the by-product, the scope of conflict, but policy outcomes also serve as indicators of the struggle for influence within the urban regime.

9.4.3 SYSTEM BIAS

As public officials within the urban regime take concrete actions "to build coalitions, orchestrate proposals, and isolate opposition forces in order to move a policy forward in the face of resistance", they help to create a systematic bias in the policy-making process [Stone, 1976, p.212]. Urban pressure groups "exert influence to establish and maintain relationships that give rise to positional advantages", which yield "favorable preferences and predispositions among public officials", who in turn "are able to choose a policy direction and manage conflict" [Stone, 1976, p.213]. Policy outcomes are therefore "the outward manifestation of an underlying set of system characteristics" [Stone, 1976, p.213]. This set of characteristics is called system bias, and it is through system bias that "group influence both shapes and is shaped by the political structures and practices of the community" [Stone, 1976, p.213].

Under an urban regime, "policy is made and power

is exercised within a structured set of relationships", which "confer advantages and disadvantages on various groups in the local community in the form of the preferences and predispositions of leading local officials" [Stone, 1976, p.17]. The urban regime may be said exhibit system bias to the degree that it consistently favours "the selection of top level officials with predilections to facilitate actions on some policy measures and impede actions on others" [Stone, 1976, p.17]. As channels of power which create strategic advantages for some interests at the expense of others, the structured relationships among policy actors "are themselves elements in any community power equation" [Stone, 1976, p.17].

The persistent disregard of the 'rule of minority satisfaction' by public officials also represents "a departure from the 'neutral' workings of democratic politics", since "a city's governmental machinery may be influenced to operate consistently in favour of some interests at the expense of others-- even if the other interests are a sizeable and active political force" [Stone, 1976, p.18]. System bias is the manifestation of a post-pluralist policy process, where unequal interests struggle to control the scope of conflict, and the most powerful pressure groups manage consensus within the urban sub-government. "The type of system bias described here is not simply a bias in policy direction; it is a bias in policy

direction that derives from the conduct of political leaders faced with competing demands from active and interested groups at the community level" [Stone, 1976, p.212].

9.4.4 DEVELOPMENT POLICY

So far, we have seen that cities compete among one another for economic survival, but that politics does have a role in securing urban economic success. Based on the division of labour between the market and the urban state, dominant interests form a governing coalition to strike arrangements by which political decisions are made. Once in power, the governing coalition persists through the positional advantages of dominant interests in the policy process, manifested in the actions of public officials. This creates a condition of system bias, where not all political actors are given equal favour, even though they may be equally affected by a given policy. Nowhere in the urban setting is system bias more evident and more contested than in development policy.

Stone [1987a] defines urban development policy as "those practices fostered by public authority that contribute to the shaping of the local community through control of land use and investments in physical structure" [Stone, 1987a, p.6]. Urban development transforms the character of the city, both quantitatively and qualitatively, "and the beneficiaries and defenders of

established uses may be quite different from the beneficiaries and defenders of new uses" [Stone, 1987a, p.7]. Development always has a different effect on different interests, and because it is the most dominant of urban political issues, development politics inevitably extends into the political arrangements by which policy is made.

Development politics is not only about the substantive issues pertaining to a given project, it is also about the ways in which the urban regime controls the scope of conflict. The question of how to best develop the city cannot be answered by textbooks or formulas alone; it is ultimately answered by the political arrangements which form the governing coalition and persist as the urban regime. Development politics is characterized by a variety of times and places, which limit the "value choices that are implicit in efforts to shape policy by one set of arrangements rather than another" [Stone, 1987a, p.16]. Different policy options and alternatives typically reflect differences in politics more than differences in efficiency, equity, aesthetics, or any other substantive content. "Because the development policy pursued in a community grows out of governing arrangements, policy can be expected to vary with those arrangements and to represent varying slices of what is in the interest of the community", especially the interest of the urban regime [Stone, 1987b, p.273]. The

urban regime is very interested in controlling the scope of conflict, and is most successful in the policy process when issues remain hidden or diluted. Since the general public "is seldom in a position to observe the full scope of official conduct and to weigh the cumulative results of government action", the policy success of the urban regime "is more akin to prevailing in a war of attrition", than to "winning spectacular battles" [Stone, 1976, p.14]. The dilution of policy into "a series of decisions, many of which appear to be unimportant when viewed singly", helps to control the scope of conflict, and ensures the greatest chances of long-term political stability for the regime. [Stone, 1976, p.14]. The over-all effect of the urban regime on development politics is therefore not only a system bias for advantaged interests, but an incremental policy process.

9.4.5 INCREMENTALISM and the URBAN REGIME

We have seen that under the urban regime, "policy decisions are often not mutual accommodations to equally affected groups" [Stone, 1976, p.206]. Furthermore, such equally affected groups often do not have equal means or equal costs attached to influencing policy decisions. The lack of positional advantage among public officials and scarce resources to lay political siege on the urban regime characterizes the imbalance among equally affected groups,

and "moves policy away from the point of mutual accommodation" [Stone, 1976, p.208]. With system bias created by positional advantages, neither public officials or policy would "correspond to the 'rule of minority satisfaction' but would move in the direction favoured by advantaged groups" [Stone, 1976, p.16]. Favoured interests would "prevail consistently, although occasional skirmishes would still be won by competing groups" [Stone, 1976, p.16].

Under these conditions, incremental decision-making favours the maintenance of system bias by assisting in the control of the scope of conflict. Incrementalism "may serve to make system bias less visible at any given time, and it may also serve as a way in which groups lacking a durable political base can be out-maneuvered" [Stone, 1976, p.209]. In this context, there is policy making by consensus, but only a consensus within the urban regime, the urban equivalent of the sub-government. Therefore, in addition to its original, pluralist context [Lindblom, 1959], incrementalism can have a post-pluralist context, "a general pattern of policy making in which some groups consistently gained concessions while others just as consistently failed to do so" [Stone, 1976, p.209]. This was clearly demonstrated in Stone's study of urban renewal in Atlanta, where "incrementalism was part of a strategy for the containment and management of conflict", and policy "did not move in the direction of least public resistance"

[Stone, 1976, p.209]. "Incremental decision making thus need not move in a direction of popular consent. It need not be disjointed, and a policy may evolve incrementally but not come through as series of disconnected decisions"

[Stone, 1976, p.209].

Stone's revisionist version of incrementalism is clearly organizational as well as political, and it illustrates some of the changes in political thought since Lindblom [1959]. Adopted here as a post-pluralist view of incrementalism, it underlines the need to analyse policy processes in an organizational and political context. An organizational and political approach to policy processes is further underlined by the urban regime model, its sub-government cousin, and the fundamental principles surrounding the scope of political conflict. Clearly, "political efforts are not restricted to specific policy questions; they also extend to the arrangements through which policy is made" [Stone, 1987b, p.270]. Stone also readily admits that "the interconnections between development policy and political arrangements and the struggle over these interconnections are little explored territory", but Stone and Sanders [1987] offers no less than a dozen case studies [Stone, 1987b, p.270]. Regime theory offers an urban context to the policy community/sub-government model of Pross [1986] as well as the theoretical writings of Schattschneider [1960]. What remains to be

discussed is the dynamic nature of the post-pluralist policy process, and the influence of information and uncertainty on its behaviour.

9.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Regime theory is an urban variation of post-pluralist political thought, drawing primarily on the empirical experiences of urban development politics in the United States. As an economic competitor among other cities, the political arrangements of each individual city are characterized by what Stone [1987a] calls the division of labour between the state and the market. Economic competition creates overlaps in the interests between the state and the market, as well as a basic tension between the desires to socialize and privatize the scope of conflict. While urban business and urban government need each other to compete effectively among other cities, they also oppose each other over the scope of conflict. These twin factors, which mark the division of labour between the state and the market, shape the form and function of urban politics.

Development initiatives have different ramifications for different people, and while the effects on people may be equitable, their power to deal those effects is not. Organized interests in the urban setting are varied in their political strength and resources. The most powerful urban interests tend to form a governing coalition

which is able to mediate the division of labour between the urban state and the urban market, and it is the governing coalition which seizes control over development policy. Once in power, the governing coalition entrenches and fortifies its political status, becoming an urban regime. The regime maintains its status by securing positional advantages for interests and disadvantages for different interests among public officials. When such positional advantages and disadvantages persist, a condition of system bias exists, because not all groups have equal influence on the policy process. The mobilization of bias found in organized pressure groups effectively becomes entrenched in an urban version of the sub-government.

Within the urban regime, policies are formed on a consensual basis, and policy changes often occur incrementally. Some interests may remain excluded from power, even though they may be directly and equally affected by policy decisions. While they may occasionally gain small victories, the long-term policy direction and the scope of conflict remains in control of the urban regime. Because of system bias, significant political change occurs epochally, as underlying social, economic, and technological forces gradually shift. The balance of political will must shift enough to create a new alignment of conflicts, in order for a modified or new governing coalition to come to power. Throughout the shifts of political change, in every policy

dispute, and at every organizational level, the most common political currency is control over the scope of conflict. In urban settings this is manifested in the urban regime, particularly over the politics of development.

10.0 POST-PLURALISM 4: ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTY,
INFORMATION, and the POLICY PROCESS

In chapter 7.0 it was argued that post-pluralist politics is primarily about controlling the scope of conflict, and political action requires the mobilization of bias. In chapter 8.0, a post-pluralist taxonomy of political bias was presented, featuring the policy community and its two major parts, the sub-government and the attentive public. Pressure groups play a key roles in the attentive public, but also in the sub-government, where policy making occurs. Chapter 9.0 presented the urban regime, an urban variation on the post-pluralist taxonomy.

This chapter explains the underlying organizational context of the post-pluralist policy process. It begins with a review of organization theory, its relationship with general systems theory, and the theoretical role of uncertainty and information in organizations. This is followed by a closer look at how uncertainty and information influence the power of politically motivated organizations. Finally, the policy process is itself examined, with emphasis on the power relations of organized actors within the post-pluralist taxonomy.

10.1 The ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

Hall and Quinn [1983] make three fundamental statements which concern the impact of organizations on planning: "organizations are the means by which public policy is implemented", "public policy is formulated in organizational settings", and "organizations are the object of public policy" [Hall and Quinn, 1983, p.7-8]. Given this comment on the importance of organizations, and the references presented in earlier chapters to such organizations as governments and pressure groups, one can look to organization theory for further insight into post-pluralist politics.

10.1.1 GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY and SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Organization theory is conceptually rooted in both general system theory and in systems analysis, by considering organizations as if they were systems. General system theory has been primarily developed by Bertalanffy [1928, 1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1955, 1962, 1968], over the course of his lifetime career in theoretical biology. The hallmark of general system theory is an open-system approach to organized behaviour, where interest is focussed on the external relations of organizations. Systems analysis draws from cybernetics [Weiner, 1948] and information theory [Shannon and Weaver, 1949], and is largely expressed as a branch of management studies [for example, Beer, 1968;

Churchman, 1968]. Systems analysis predominantly takes a closed-system approach, where interest is focussed almost exclusively on the inner workings of organizations. General system theory and systems analysis are sometimes confused with each other, and share a terminology which has different contexts within the literature. A detailed explanation of general system theory, systems analysis, their concepts and terminology is found in Linton [1990].

Systems analysis has been debated as an approach to public administration [Black, 1968; Hoos, 1972; McKean, 1958], and as a broad perspective on political theory and the policy process [Deutsch, 1963; Easton, 1967, 1985]. While these writings have some overlap with organization theory, most have taken a closed-system approach to policy processes, and are not of primary concern here. This thesis is primarily interested in the open-system approach to organizations and the policy process, originally developed by Bertalanffy [see especially 1950a, 1950b, and 1968], and aptly summarized by Hall and Fagen [1956]. To close this sub-section, the basic terminology of open systems will be briefly reviewed.

A system is defined as "a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes", where the "objects are simply the parts or components of a system", while "attributes are the properties of objects" [Hall and Fagen, 1956, p.81]. The

components of a system are bound together by their relationships to each other, in a condition of interdependence. Through this interdependent condition, a change in one component will affect changes in others, and by logical extension, will change the system itself. A system may also contain subsystems, which have all the characteristics of larger systems but relate to each other within the containing system as if they were individual components themselves.

An open system maintains itself by exchanging energy, matter, or information with its surrounding environment. These exchanges are sometimes described as inputs, outputs, or throughputs, and effectively sustain the system. Processes within the system transform the imported energy, matter, or information, and export byproducts to the environment. Like its component parts or subsystems, a system and its environment exist under a condition of interdependency. A system may also have interdependent or even dependent relationships with other systems in the environment.

Throughout the universe of systems, interdependent relationships are sustained through the process of feedback. In this process, the output of one system affects the behavioural state of a second, and the behavioural state or output of the second system in turn affects the first. Feedback from the second system may reinforce the output of

the first, thereby accelerating the process. This is called positive feedback, and is sometimes described by the term synergy. Feedback may also be negative, in which the output of the second system causes the output of the first system to decrease.

Sustained interdependent relationships among systems, between their internal components, or with their environment, requires combinations of positive and negative feedback loops which have some structure or order. Feedback loops sustain systems, and systems sustain feedback loops. Order is therefore required within systems and between them if interdependent relationships are to be sustained at any scale. In the universe of systems, however, maintaining order always involves uncertainty. Ordered, interdependent relationships continually struggle against entropy, the tendency toward randomness and disorder. Open systems, by maintaining interdependent relationships among their component subsystems, the environment, and other open systems, are able to withstand the entropic tendency to deteriorate towards randomness and disorder.

Closed systems, in contrast, are completely sealed off from their surrounding environment, and in fact cannot exist in reality. Closed systems are in fact pure abstractions, but have been the basic premise of systems analysis. Until recently, the focus of management studies, engineering, and other applications of systems analysis has

been internal, concentrating on the inner workings of systems and the interdependence of their component parts. In fact, systems analysis has been the dominant branch of systems literature, influencing among other disciplines, organization theory. However, the tendency in the universe for things to become disordered has renewed interest in how open systems work and the sustaining tendency of interdependent relationships [see Bertalanffy, 1950a; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984]. This renewed interest has also been felt in organization theory.

10.1.2 ORGANIZATION THEORY

Just as there is a tendency for order to arise in natural systems, the social organization of human relationships tends to arise informally and naturally, without conscious design. In informal human relationships, people "tend to order their relationships and display orderly behaviour" [Carzo and Yanouzas, 1967, p.3]. By contrast, formal organizations are created when people and resources "are deliberately related for some explicit purpose" [Carzo and Yanouzas, 1967, p.6]. In a formal organization, the social positions and relations of individuals "have been explicitly specified and are defined independently of the personal characteristics of the participants occupying these positions" [Scott, 1981, p.15]. The definition of social positions and relations is

therefore a normative prescription for the formal organization, even though the observable behaviour of the organization may also exhibit some informal characteristics. The formal organization cannot be defined, however, without some normative sub-structure. "The formal organization is characterized by rules, regulations, and a status structure that orders the relations among its members... to remove some of the uncertainties of a human situation" [Carzo and Yanouzas, 1967 p.12].

While normatively defined social positions and relations are the first defining characteristic of a formal organization, the second is the element of purpose, which is directly related to the problem of environmental uncertainty. A formal organization is collectively oriented to produce some type of desired outcome, but because of the internal uncertainty of human relations, purposefulness is a matter of degree. "To an observer, members of organizations behave as if the organization had a goal. This is not the same as asserting that organizations do have goals, but only that much of the activity we observe appears directed toward some common purpose" [Aldrich, 1979, p.4]. Organizational purpose makes the normative substructure both possible and necessary, and introduces idea that in addition to a degree of human-based uncertainty, formal organizations are also characterized by a degree of rationality.

The rational component of formal organizations is

exemplified by the notions of effectiveness and efficiency, which are typically expressed in the normative content of the organizational social structure. Rationalists stress the definition of a formal organization as "a collectivity oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting a relatively highly formalized social structure" [Scott, 1981, p.21]. Prominent examples from the rationalist school include Barnard [1938], March and Simon [1958], and Etzioni [1964].

In contrast to the rationalist school is the naturalist branch of organization theory, which stresses the importance of non-normative components and the informal processes occurring within organizations. Naturalists argue that informal, behavioural substructures "grow out of the natural abilities and interests of participants and enable the collectivity to benefit from the human resources of its membership", and that these informal, behavioural substructures are as important to the maintenance and functioning of the formal organization as the normative substructures [Scott, 1981, p.22]. Examples from the naturalist school include Gouldner [1959], and Rothschild-Whitt [1979].

Both rationalists and naturalists have described the formal organization as a system, but have given relatively little attention to the interdependent relations with other systems and the larger environment. Both are

more closely linked to systems analysis than general system theory, and have tended to concentrate "upon principles of internal functioning as if these problems were independent of changes in the environment" [Katz and Kahn, 1966, p.45]. Irregularities in organization behaviour attributable to environmental influences were considered as random errors in the organization's internal workings. Many organization theorists "treated the organization as a 'closed' mechanical system and became preoccupied with principles of internal design" [Morgan, 1986, p.45]. This view resulted "in a failure to develop the intelligence or feedback function of obtaining adequate information about the changes in environmental forces" [Katz and Kahn, 1966, p.46]. The mechanistic emphasis on internal workings was criticized as being "inadequate when one is interested in conceptualizing the actual behaviour patterns of an organization" [Argyris, 1964, p.12], and inaccurate because "in mechanistic systems, the interdependence among parts is such that their behaviour is highly constrained and limited" [Scott, 1981, p.103].

In the wake of these criticisms, the open system model has been advocated as a more appropriate description of organizations [see for example, Harrison, 1987]. In this theoretical framework, "organizations are goal-directed, boundary-maintaining, activity systems" operating within an environment [Aldrich, 1979, p.4], "constantly influencing and being influenced by the environment"

[Argyris, 1964, p.12]. This shared influence occurs through feedback loops, particularly those concerning the input, processing, and output of information and resources. As in general systems theory, feedback loops concerning information and resources are subject to uncertainty. Since this thesis is primarily concerned with politics and the policy process, we shall focus here on how uncertainty affects information as a source of organizational interdependence.

Uncertainty about information feedback loops has been described along three dimensions. First, is the degree of similarity among the "the environmental entities to which the organization must relate" [Scott, 1981, p.168-9]. For example, a municipal planning agency must consider a variety of organized interests in the policy community, each who has different capabilities of receiving, processing, and delivering information. Second, is the degree of environmental stability, which affects different organizations in different ways. Environmental stability among technological, socio-economic, and political variables is of particular concern. Long term changes in the structure of society eventually affect even the most sheltered organizations. A third dimension is the degree of interdependence among organizations. An organization is affected by the number, strength, and influence of its interrelationships. An example here is the interdependence

of actors who participate in policy-making within the sub-government, or who form an urban regime. The concern here is "to what extent the organization confronts a set of environmental entities whose actions are coordinated or structured" [Scott, 1981, p.169]. All three of these dimensions of the impact of uncertainty on information feedback loops affect the interrelationship between the organization and its environment. Organizations will be subject to higher levels of uncertainty with greater degrees of heterogeneity, higher rates of environmental instability, and higher degrees of interdependence among its related entities [Scott, 1981, p.169]. "The central insight emerging from the open system model is that all organizations are incomplete: all depend on exchanges with other systems. All are open to environmental influences as a condition of their survival" [Scott, 1981, p.179]. This deeply contrasts the classical, closed system approach which emphasizes the separation of the organization from its environment.

This section has presented a brief explanation of organization theory, its roots in general systems theory, and the importance of information and uncertainty in organizational life. The next section considers in greater depth, the role of information and uncertainty in shaping relationships both within and among organizations during the policy process.

10.2 UNCERTAINTY and INFORMATION

We have seen that uncertainty and information have tremendous influence on organizations. In policy or planning processes, political uncertainty and politically relevant information is of great interest to the organizations involved. Organizations must consider how politically relevant information and political uncertainty affect their internal stability and external relationships. As the mobilization of bias, we have seen that the primary motive of organizing interests is to reduce political uncertainty by controlling the scope of conflict. Organizations such as political parties, pressure groups, and urban regimes, need and information to survive. Information provides the means by which uncertainty is reduced, bias is mobilized, and the scope of conflict is controlled. Information is a source of political power for organizations, and the use of misinformation may create political uncertainty for their opponents. However, because it is uncertainty which provides the context for understanding what sort of information is politically important, evaluating and re-evaluating the quality of uncertainty is also vital for politically motivated organizations at any stage in their development.

10.2.1 EVALUATING UNCERTAINTY

As a future-oriented discipline, planning is

invariably concerned with uncertainty. Evaluating uncertainty is therefore a primary step in understanding the politics of any given policy process. The quality of the planning process is a function of the degree of its uncertainty, which flavours the politics of the planning process. "Effective planning begins by confronting the problem at hand and assessing conditions of uncertainty, rather than misapplying theories and methods without regard to particular problem conditions" [Christensen, 1985, p.63]. By discovering the characteristics of the political conflict, an accurate picture of the process can be created, indicating the degree of uncertainty at hand. Christensen has developed a two-dimensional matrix to remove some of the guesswork involved in this task [Figure 3].

The vertical dimension of the matrix describes the technology or means by which to address an issue, while the horizontal dimension describes the 'goal' or desired outcome of the policy process. Each dimension is then divided into categories of certainty and uncertainty. "A technology can be known or unknown; that it effective means either have or have not been proven to be effective for achieving a particular goal. A goal can be agreed or not agreed on, since a goal is value-laden and thus cannot be proven known or unknown" [Christensen, 1985, p.63]. In quadrant "A", where the goal is agreed and the means are known, the process is characterized by certainty, and policy actors may

		GOAL	
		agreed	not agreed
TECHNOLOGY	known	<p>A</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - programmer - standardizer - rule-setter - scheduler - optimizer - analyst - administrator 	<p>C</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - advocate - participation promoter - facilitator - mediator - constitution-writer - bargainer
	unknown	<p>B</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - pragmatist - adjuster - researcher - experimenter - innovator 	<p>D</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - charismatic leader - problem finder

Figure 3. Evaluating Uncertainty in the Planning Process
 Reproduced from Christensen [1985, p.69], Original Title:
 "Planning Roles Categorized By Planning Conditions".

concentrate on such aspects of the problem as efficiency and effectiveness. The process in this case is a relatively rational one. In quadrant "B", where the goal is agreed but the means are unknown, the process is marked by the need to search for new methods to overcome technological uncertainty. In quadrant "C", where goals are not agreed but the means are known, policy actors must resolve conflicts with each other if the process is to overcome political uncertainties. Finally, in quadrant "D", where neither means or goals are known, the process is characterized by complete uncertainty.

Christensen readily admits that the matrix and its dichotomies greatly simplify the blurred lines of political reality. Each dimension could in fact be measured in degrees of uncertainty instead of differences of uncertainty, but the four quadrants do provide starting point for evaluating the process. "Different readers may attach different relative importance to different boxes... [and] actual problems may not fit neatly into any single box" [Christensen, 1985, p.66]. Even in quadrant 'A', where technology is known and goals are agreed upon, "is vulnerable to periodic uncertainty as conditions shift" [Christensen, 1985, p.66]. Uncertainty about the issue at hand, its aspects of technology and desired outcome, is further complicated by political uncertainty within organizations themselves.

While Christensen's matrix tends to focus on the substantive aspects of an issue and how they affect the external policy positions of different organizations, Wildavsky [1987] has constructed a matrix with the same morphology to examine the internal political culture of different organizations [Figure 4]. As presented in Benveniste [1989, p.97-8], the vertical dimension of Wildavsky's matrix describes group cohesion, the ability of its members to work together, while the horizontal dimension describes the organization's prescriptions for behaviour, which are labelled as 'routines'. Cohesion is described as either weak or strong, while routines are divided into 'many' or 'few'. In quadrant "A", where group cohesion is strong and prescriptions for behaviour are abundant, there is greater certainty in an organization's political culture, and fertile ground for hierarchical command structures. In quadrant "B", where the group's cohesion is weak and uncertain, but prescriptions for behaviour remain abundant, the political culture will drift toward apathy and fatalism. In quadrant "C", where the prescriptions for group action are less certain, but group cohesion remains strong, an egalitarian political culture emerges within the organization. In quadrant "D", uncertainty prevails in both group cohesion and prescriptions for action, creating a highly competitive political culture. Because of its morphology, the Wildavsky matrix presents the same problems

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ACTION
many few

GROUP COHESION strong weak	A hierarchical	C competitive, individualistic
	B apathetic	D egalitarian

Figure 4. Evaluating Uncertainty in Organizations
Based on Wildavasky [1987] in Benveniste [1989]

as Christensen's, in creating differences of kind out of differences of degree. But the Wildavsky matrix also offers a starting point for evaluating the uncertainty of an organization's internal politics. Planners must clearly contend with uncertainty within organizations, as well as in the policy process as a whole. Wildavsky's matrix provides planners with a tool for roughly evaluating the quality of uncertainty in organizations they may encounter, especially the lead agency.

10.2.2 INFORMATION as a SOURCE of POWER

As we have seen from the matrices, information counteracts uncertainty. Obtaining the information necessary to describe an organization's internal cohesion or prescriptions for action, or the degree of agreement on desired outcomes and the technological capacity among policy actors, immediately reduces the planner's uncertainty about a given situation. In this respect, information is a vital source of power, especially for planners who wish to understand and shape the policy process. "If planners understand how relations of power work to structure the planning process, they can improve the quality of their analyses", and if they so desire, "empower citizen and community action as well" [Forester, 1982, p.67].

As a source of power, information is a commodity which demands time and attention from organized interests

and individual policy actors, including the lead agency. The most valuable information is usually the most scarce, since "only those intimately involved in official decision making are in a position to be well informed" [Stone, 1976, p.141]. Organized interests "fare best which are able to acquire detailed information and to maintain an unrelenting pressure on behalf of their interests" [Stone, 1976, p.14]. Less valuable information is still important to policy actors who, though they may not participate within the sub-government, remain active within the attentive public. Organized interests seek three kinds of information which are critical to their success: 1) "a detailed knowledge of the policy process, particularly within the bureaucracy"; 2) "an assessment of the likely political impact of policy proposals"; and 3) an assessment of any policy proposal to "determine the economic and structural effects it will have on its membership" [Coleman, 1985, p.416]. By seeking such information, organized interests are in effect trying to expand the scope of conflict in their favour. Aware of these efforts, members of the sub-government, especially the lead agency, are often reluctant to share all of their information and may only divulge broad factual information or bland generalities for public consumption.

As a source of power, acquiring, processing and managing information is one of the ways planners gain prestige and credibility [Benveniste, 1989]. Forester

[1982] has suggested that different positions in planning thought offer different perspectives on information as a source of power. For the rational technician, "because information supplies solutions to technical problems, it is a source of power" [Forester, 1982, p.68]. Furthermore, "the technician must adopt a benign role to assume that sound technical work will prevail on its own merits" [Forester, 1982, p.68]. For the incrementalist, "information is a source of power because it satisfies organizational needs.... Knowing the ropes is a source of power, and informal networks and steady contacts and communication keep the planner in the know" [Forester, 1982, p.68]. The incrementalist may not know, however, what impact such information may have outside of organizational politics. For the advocacy planner, information "can be used by under-represented or relatively unorganized groups to enable them to participate more effectively in the planning process" [Forester, 1982, p.68-9]. For what Forester calls the "structuralist", information serves "first, to legitimize and rationalize the maintenance of existing structures of power, control, ownership, and second, to perpetuate public inattention to such fundamental issues as the incompatibility of democratic political processes with a capitalist political-economy" [Forester, 1982, p.69]. In other words, information serves to maintain the status quo, which structuralists view as anti-

democratic.

Forester's fifth position is his own, which he calls "progressive", recognizes that information is a source of power for all of the previous reasons, but also "calls attention to the structural, organizational, and political barriers that may unnecessarily distort the information that citizens have and use to shape their own actions" [Forester, 1982, p.69]. For Forester, the system bias evident in urban government systematically distorts communication, and may be a source of misinformation as much as information. In addressing this manifestation of system bias, "progressive" planners face the same practical tasks "analogous to those that community organizers and political actors have traditionally performed" [Forester, 1982, p.70]. Because of misinformation, whatever its source, "informed planning and citizen action is vulnerable... to the systematic management of comprehension, trust, consent, and knowledge" [Forester, 1982, p.72].

Misinformation as well as information is also important to the exercise of power, but as Forester implies, the notion of misinformation raises a critical problem in politics, the question of who to trust-- especially among those in power. Forester side-steps this question, and all but assumes that power corrupts, by suggesting that systematic or structural sources of misinformation originate from three forms of political power. The first form of

power, is the ability to prevail in decision making, from which "one has the ability to inform or misinform citizens effectively" [Forester, 1982, p.76]. The second form of power, is the ability to set political agendas, which as we have seen, is directly related to the ability to control the scope of conflict [Schattschneider, 1960]. The third form of power, is "the ability of major institutions or actors to shape the felt needs and self-conceptions of citizens" [Forester, 1982, p.76]. Each of these forms of power may be systematically used to either "thwart democratic citizen participation and encourage passivity, or to encourage responsible political action and the realization of a democratic planning process" [Forester, 1982, p.76].

Forester clearly has an axe to grind, but he downplays the possibility that misinformation could originate in non-structural sources. Pressure groups and other members of the policy community may also create misinformation, either accidentally or deliberately. In any case, Forester effectively underlines the importance of information and misinformation to organizations in the policy process.

10.3 THE POLICY PROCESS

Until recently, there has been a tendency in planning and policy studies to view the policy process as a generic, step-by-step procedure by which public demands were

converted into public policy. "As a vehicle for change, policy processes were presented as a form of 'trojan horse'", and academics as well as public officials tended to search for an ideal process mechanism for addressing public issues [Healey, 1990, p.91]. This tendency "had the effect of focussing discussion on process forms and techniques in isolation", dissecting them from the specific political, organizational and socio-economic from which they arose [Healey, 1990, p.91]. Policy processes are not generic vehicles for policy content, but are politically charged struggles over control of the scope of conflict.

Policy processes cannot be discussed in general without addressing the power relations between the various actors: the pressure groups, the attentive public, the sub-government, the lead agency, the public officials. The political relations of organizations and their attempts to maintain power are the underlying sources of conflict which drive the policy process. Since the policy process is driven by the political relationships of organizations, "changes in outcomes cannot be produced by formal plans or proposals for allocating resources alone. These have to be developed in such a way that they affect the institutional processes through which policies are translated into actions" [Healey, 1990, p.91]. The task of policy theory is to identify "the distinctive qualities of the processes by which the power relations among the interests with a stake

in, and/or involved in, collective or public agency operations are mediated and transformed" [Healey, 1990, p.921].

'Policy' is not simply a matter of paper or substantive expertise; it includes the political and administrative arrangements by which it is implemented. To change policy is to change the way power is exercised. The result is that most public policies "bear the marks, even if only faintly, of the process which created them" [Pal, 1987, p.102]. Just as political tensions among powerful groups tend to persist, most "policies are only tentative and limited solutions, so that the policy process for any single policy problem is in continuous motion" [Pal, 1987, p.107]. Inherently political, policy processes seldom have a final end, and are often less orderly than their name implies. Since "the policy process is about the definition of public problems, the forging of means to deal with them, the implementation of a solution, and the monitoring of success or failure", reaching decisions on these matters inevitably involves well-established organized interests [Pal, 1987, p.107]. Therefore, "the first step in understanding the policy process is recognizing who the players are" [Pal, 1987, p.108].

10.3.1 POLICY ACTORS and THEIR POWER RELATIONS

As we have seen, the most important players,

whether organizations such as powerful pressure groups, or individuals such as public officials, work at the center of policy making, the sub-government. The lead agency in particular plays a critical role in balancing various interests and guiding the process forward. "Its permanence, size, and control over information give it a special influence in refining the details of broad policy ideas that may come from elsewhere" [Pal, 1987, p.110]. While Stone [1976] and Pross [1986] have emphasized the role of powerful organizations in shaping the policy process, Healey [1990] takes a more moderate approach. She emphasizes that the character of each particular policy process is not the outcome "of the dominant power groups, but is the outcome of established political and organizational practices, of the range of interests which cluster around particular issues and areas, the choices which groups make as to how to pursue their interests, and the way the relations between these two groups are specifically negotiated" [Healey, 1990, p.92].

At first glance, Healey's view may appear to be more pluralist than post-pluralist, since she down-plays the power of dominant groups, but she does not dispell the role that powerful groups have in shaping political and organizational relationships. She simply points out that different groups are involved in different issues, creating different sets of relationships. Healey's analysis is also fitting to the open system organizational model, because she

takes dynamic factors are taken into account and is careful to allow the independence of many political variables in shaping the policy process. She expects that "the form of the policy processes ('how') to vary with the issues addressed ('what'), and between localities and agencies ('where'), as well as with the groups involved and the interests they hold ('who')" [Healey, 1990, p.92-3].

Like Stone and Sanders [1987], Healey suggests that governing coalitions vary from place to place, and that politics external to the sub-government takes on a higher importance for some cases. Furthermore, she states that "policy processes not only reflect attributes of their context but may redefine that context" [Healey, 1990, p.93]. This means that policy processes have the potential to change the political arrangements which originally defined the roles of policy actors; to shift the control of the scope of conflict and create new political alignments. This is why the choice of doing nothing [Bacharach and Baratz, 1970] is so tempting for governing coalitions, and why uncertainty always remains as a prevailing condition in the policy process.

Given the competing demands on government, in what Schattschneider [1960] called the conflict of conflicts, policy processes emerge from the political interactions of policy actors. As "patterns of interaction between different interest groups and the power relations they

embody, become consolidated", these patterns "enhance or inhibit the opportunities available to individuals and groups to influence and benefit from public agency action. As new pressures arise, existing policy processes may be adapted and transformed, or new ones appear to combine with and take precedence over the old" [Healey, 1990, p.94].

10.3.2 DECISION RULES and the POLICY PROCESS

Healey does not explain fully how new processes appear, and leaves the explanation of policy process dynamics to others, but she does offer a method of defining particular policy processes within their generally amorphous character:

"Following Offe [1977], policy processes may be defined [by] the decision rules embodied within them. These govern the way in which policies are articulated and translated into policy measures, institutional structures and procedures, and put to work. These rules concern who gets access to a decision arena, the criteria which govern debate within an arena, and the criteria by which decisions are validated. The distributional biases of specific policy processes are then realized in the way these criteria are applied in specific contexts. Policy processes are thus the transformations through which political pressures, ideas, and problems are converted into policies and policy measures, competencies for implementing such programmes delineated, and operating practices developed" [Healey, 1990, p.95].

Since there are so many potential forms of policy process, depending upon the specific issues and who is involved, Healey suggests a closer examination of decision rules as "the defining criteria of policy processes" [Figure

51. By classifying decision rules into three categories, "who participates; what is the nature of their discourse; what is judged to be a good decision", Healey clearly points to the importance of the power of decision rules. [Healey, 1990, p.98]. Decision rules reflect the distribution of power within the policy process, which is in turn "shaped but not determined by the structuring forces which both distribute power among the interests involved and lodge decision rules within process forms" [Healey, 1990, p.100].

In essence, decision rules control the scope of conflict, by governing the social and political relations among policy actors. Once in place, decision rules may modify the policy intentions of some actors, and influence change the way policies are actually implemented. The struggle for control over decision rules themselves therefore becomes as important to the policy process as the substantive arguments of interested actors. The policy process and the outcome of issues, "is always a matter of 'invention' by participants. How these [participants] accept, confront and transform structuring forces cannot be predicted in advance" [Healey, 1990, p.101].

Healey's treatment of decision rules as the procedural elements of policy processes raises an important distinction between policies and decisions. Where a "decision refers to a particular act", "policy refers to a course of action, flowing from a series of decisions, which

DECISION RULES IN POLICY MAKING

1. CRITERIA GOVERNING WHO IS INVOLVED
who gets access to the process and on what terms
who controls the process
to whom must the process be legitimated
 2. CRITERIA GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOSE INVOLVED
what style of debate
what procedure of debate
 3. CRITERIA GOVERNING THE JUDGEMENT OF SUCCESSFUL DECISIONS
which values should govern a decision
in what way should decisions be presented to the
relevant constituency
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Reproduced from Healey [1990, p.98], Originally titled "The Defining Criteria of Policy Processes".

Figure 5.

allocates benefits in a definable way" [Stone, 1976, p.22]. Decisions therefore represent one important analytical tool for constructing a model of any given policy process, and understanding "when and under what conditions various groups encounter resistance" [Stone, 1976, p.23]. By noting the conditions of many specific decisions rather than trying to fit a generic "trojan horse" form of policy process over a given situation, planners will be better able to understand and respond to the unique circumstances at hand [Healey, 1990]. Healey suggests that "the impact of context on process" and "the distributional consequences" of policy are most likely to be discovered if analysis is "focused on decision rules as realised in relation to specific issues.... It is the questions about decision rules, not the typology of forms, which planners need in their kitbag of experience" [Healey, 1990, p.101].

10.3.3 The POLICY PROCESS and DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS

The power relationships of policy actors and the decision rules they operate have implications for the democratic responsiveness of government. Constituency pressure in the form of policy demands does not always translate into policy results. "Policy results, not from the mere presence of demands, but from the decisions of public officials who choose variously to alter, reject, or assent to demands.... Demands give rise to counter-demands

and choice making is intertwined with the forces of political struggle" [Stone, 1976, p.6]. In the post-pluralist policy process, the most powerful forces involved in the political struggle attempt to control the scope of conflict by using decision rules and their own power relationships to shape the policy process, and remove some issues from the official agenda in favour of others. The broad electoral constituency, with its many policy communities and attentive publics, "can account for the presence of demands; it cannot account for choices between competing sets of demands" [Stone, 1976, p.6]. Policy demands from the electorate "must in some way be transformed into policy responses, and that transformation involves choices between alternative courses of action" [Stone, 1976, p.6].

Drawing from Schattschneider [1960], Stone [1976] has suggested a four-step "revisionist" version of how government officials respond to constituency pressure. In a post-pluralist democracy,

(1) electoral competition tends to be structured around a single dominant cleavage (or possibly a few major cleavages);

(2) particular controversies, not necessarily related to the dominant cleavage, may occasionally penetrate election campaigns;

(3) however, the outcomes of particular controversies do not necessarily determine policy direction because public knowledge of the decision making process is imperfect, and on many matters constituency pressure is not durable over time;

(4) therefore, public officials may be able to

promote a line of policy that does not have a broad base of public support and may even have substantial opposition" [Stone, 1976, p.14].

No-one has greater access and influence over public officials than the policy actors within the sub-government. Through the control of information, especially the decision rules, the most powerful organized interests reduce political uncertainty for themselves by acting through government officials to shape the policy process. Brought to power as the governing coalition through the dominant cleavage, the personalities and beliefs of "some community groups and institutions are strongly represented in official governmental circles and involved directly in the process of making official decisions" [Stone, 1976, p.23]. Other groups and institutions are not so well-represented in the sub-government, or in the upper echelons of the urban regime, and a condition of system bias is created.

Stone has also suggested that the power of organized interests over the policy process is most evident in three stages:

(1) mobilization-- that stage at which proposals may or may not receive enough support to be brought up for formal consideration by local authorities;

(2) official disposition-- the stage at which officials formally decide to approve, either fully or in substantially modified form, or disapprove proposals; and

(3) implementation-- that stage at which it can be determined whether or not ...[approved] proposals have been put into effect and if so, to what extent" [Stone, 1976, p.21-2].

A policy demand from the general electorate may be diluted, modified, or quashed at any stage, or at any of the sequence of decisions which make up the policy process. A particularly difficult proposal, which has many proponents and proponents in the general electorate, may survive relatively unscathed until it faces formal adoption or implementation. At these points of decision, the proposal may threaten the general consensus within the governing coalition, as "hidden costs rise to the surface, and the stakes of how policy is carried out and by whom come to the forefront. Conflict emerges, and the struggle may center... on which interests compose that coalition and by what rules they play" [Stone, 1987a, p.6]. Where the dominant electoral cleavage is threatened by a proposal over which the scope of conflict cannot be controlled, "the question of what is good... policy cannot be separated from issues about the means by which that policy is made" [Stone, 1987a, p.6].

It is possible to observe when and whether proposals are transformed into policy, and monitor the responsiveness of public officials to groups outside the sub-government. Although it is perhaps more difficult, it is also possible to determine those proposals initiated by public officials themselves. What is most needed, however, is "to know how policy choices are made, whose interests are served by these choices, and why officials come to formulate

and advance some proposals while resisting or neglecting others" [Stone, 1976, p.22].

10.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Organization theory provides a means of describing the policy process, by integrating the structural principles and taxonomy of post-pluralism and accounting for differential power relations based on information and uncertainty. Policy development essentially occurs in an organizational context, where political tensions occur within and among organizations. While a few powerful individuals may have significant influence on public policy, the political dynamics of the policy process are driven by internal and external organizational relationships. Even powerful individuals must exert their influence either on or through organizations. Political interactions within and among pressure groups, the lead agency, the sub-government, the attentive public, and an entire policy community can be described in an organizational context. This context is characterized by the prevalence of information communicated among political actors, and varying uncertainty about how those actors will behave. Such political interactions occur over time and space in the policy process. In the policy process, information is a vital source of power because it is used to retain control over the scope of conflict. Including or excluding pressure groups from participating in

the sub-government, for example, will greatly influence how the policy process unfolds. Interests may be co-opted into or excluded from actual policy-making depending on what is at stake, and the relative level of political uncertainty among policy actors. The rules of decision-making not only influence the course of the policy process, but are also shaped by who participates in the decisions. Control of the decision-rules and the information they precipitate are therefore highly prized among organizations who seek to influence the policy process. The result of organizational dominance of the policy process and the relative differences in power among those organizations, is a varying degree of responsiveness by public officials to policy demands from the general populace. The mobilization of bias is prerequisite to the realization of latent interests, both among the public at large, and within a policy community.

PART THREE
THE POST-PLURALIST MODEL

The important thing about theoretical positions is that they lead you to decisions that you wouldn't have taken otherwise, or that you wouldn't have committed.

I want to be on the edge between improvisation and collaboration.

Brian Eno

11.0 A POST-PLURALIST MODEL of the POLICY PROCESS

In Part One, it was established that if planning is anything, it is political. Planning is a form of policy making, and the planning process is a policy process. In Part Two, the post-pluralist view of politics and policy processes was explained, underpinned by its taxonomy, organizational context and its governing principle, the scope of political conflict. In this chapter, the elements of post-pluralism and its underpinnings are used to create a flexible model of the policy process, where different interests or policy actors have differing degrees of political power based on their organizational character, resources, and relative position to each other. In this sense, the model is "multi-centered" [Rider, 1986], and offers planners a way of taking greater account of power relationships in the policy process [Hoch, 1984b]. This Chapter begins with a brief review of the key elements of post-pluralist policy processes, followed by a presentation of the model itself. It will be shown in Chapter 13.0 that the flexible model also exhibits the required properties of a potential general theory of planning: internal consistency and a vigorous taxonomy.

11.1 POST-PLURALISM and the POLICY PROCESS

As the mobilization of bias, the formation of organized interest groups mirrors the conflicts which occur in the wider relations of society. Policy processes are populated by such groups, and as in the case of the urban political economy, typically reflect the division of labour between the market and the state. As Healey explained, "policy processes are considered as sets of relations among groups, each of which is linked into other sets of relations in the wider society. It is these other relations which define the reasons why groups are involved in, or seek to be involved in, policy processes, and which distribute power among such groups" [Healey, 1990, p.92]. The key questions for the planner, whether acting as a public official, an academic observer, a community advocate, private representative, or ordinary bystander, is who are the actors, what are their relationships, and how do these relationships affect policy. As stakeholders in the policy process, the organized interests are politically as well as substantively motivated, and are influenced by the scope of conflict. Since "policy grows out of a set of political activities, it behooves us to give attention to the arrangements by which policy is made and conflict is managed" [Stone, 1987b, p.282].

As Healey [1990] also pointed out, policy

processes are further defined by decision rules about who participates and how they will be permitted to do so, within a sub-government. In this sense, the policy process is also the transformation of political impetus into political relations by the decision rules. The creation and control of decision rules is therefore a way to control the scope of conflict, and becomes the most valuable prize in any policy process. In the political economy perspective of post-pluralism, the most important decision rules are those "determining who gets access to articulating policies and implementing policies, and how the policy process gets organised, reflecting the emphasis on policy processes as modes of interest mediation" [Healey, 1990, p.95].

The enormous advantage given to government in creating and controlling decision rules is the reason why in democratic societies there is no substitute for electoral victory [Schattshneider, 1960]. Unfortunately, "electoral competition does not necessarily offset imbalances in the distribution of political resources and that some groups are better positioned than others to further their interests through the political system" [Stone, 1976, p.11]. This positioning occurs through the creation of the governing coalition, a workable set of governing arrangements in which not all groups can contribute equally [Stone, 1987b, p.283]. In addition, since "most people most of the time are

indifferent about the particulars of most policy decisions, it becomes clear that putting together and maintaining a governing coalition is a task that greatly favours some groups over others" [Stone, 1987b, p.283]. The result is that "power may be unequally distributed even among those groups who are equally interested and active in a given policy area" [Stone, 1976, p.206]. Unlike pluralism, the essence of post-pluralism is the differential power structure of organized groups, in exerting political pressure during the policy process, and in contributing to the dominant electoral cleavage. "Bargaining and compromise may occur, as pluralists contend, but these activities are subordinate to the larger efforts to manipulate the lines of conflict and the saliency of issues in such a way as to advance the causes of favoured interests" [Stone, 1976, p.206].

The arena for the management of conflict is the sub-government, where organized interests and the lead agency bargain among each other in making policy, largely invisible to the remainder of the policy community or the general public. The degree of cohesiveness within the sub-government affects whether its members will interact as members of a united coalition, most concerned with the power politics of public disputes [Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Forester, 1989], or as antagonistic representatives from the

most powerful pressure groups of the policy community, most concerned with the internal management politics of the sub-government [Yates, 1985; Benveniste, 1989].

11.2 The MODEL

The fundamental unit of the post-pluralist model is the open organization [Figure 6]. Functioning with all the characteristics of an open system, the open organization receives information from the political environment outside its boundaries, processes it internally, and releases new information back into the political environment. In addition to this primary function, the open organization has four other internal characteristics which influence its general behaviour: purposes, culture, technology, and structure.

Purposes include "the strategies, goals, objectives, plans, and interests of the organization's dominant decision makers" [Harrison, 1987, p.24]. Politically, all forms of purpose are part of the organization's interest, which serves as the reason for its existence. The purposes or interest of the organization "are the outcomes of conflict and negotiation among powerful parties within and outside the organization" [Harrison, 1987, p.25].




Figure 6. The Open Organization
Based on Harrison [1987, p.24]

The open organization's internal culture "includes shared norms, beliefs, values, symbols, and rituals relating to key aspects of organizational life, such as the nature and identity of the organization, the way work is done... and relationships between higher and lower ranking members" [Harrison, 1987, p.25]. In the political context, culture embodies the internal cohesion of the organization, exemplified by Wildavsky's matrix [Figure 4, p.202], and also includes political ideology.

In the open organization, technology includes the methods and processes for obtaining, transforming, and releasing information. In this context, technology incorporates both mental capacities such as diplomatic contacts, substantive expertise, and communication skills, as well as physical capacities such as computer technology, publications, and personnel [Harrison, 1987, p.23].

An open organization's structure is comprised of the enduring internal relations among individuals and sub-groups such as role assignments, privileges, standard operating procedures, and actual patterns of internal relations "that may differ from officially mandated ones" [Harrison, 1987, p.25].

In addition to the internal characteristics of purpose, culture, technology, and structure, the open organization behaves according to several major factors

inherited from system theory, and outlined by Harrison [1987]. In brief, they are as follows:

- "(1) External conditions influence the flow of inputs to organizations, affect the reception of outputs, and can directly affect internal operations";
- "(2) Organizations use many of their products, services and ideas as inputs to organizational maintenance or growth";
- "(3) Organizations are influenced by their members as well as their environments";
- "(4) ...system elements and their subcomponents are interrelated and influence one another;
- "(5) Organizations are constantly changing as relationships among their system elements shift";
- "(6) An organization's success depends heavily on its ability to adapt to its environment-- or find a favourable environment in which to operate-- as well as on its ability to tie people into their roles in the organization, conduct its transformative processes, and manage its operations";
- "(7) Any level or unit within an organization can be viewed as a system" [Harrison, 1987, p.25-27].

This last point is particularly relevant to the next step in building the post-pluralist model, expressing the policy community taxonomy as a pattern of open organizations [Figure 7]. In this pattern, the lead agency is an open organization within the sub-government, which in turn is an open system within the policy community. As independent open organizations, pressure groups may occupy positions within the sub-government or within the attentive




Figure 7. The Post-Pluralist Policy Community

public. Other open organizations within the attentive public include solidarity groups which have a lesser degree of system closure, and latent interests which are in effect unorganized. Individuals such as academics and journalists may also be recognized within the sub-government or the attentive public. The policy community as a whole occupies political space within the general population. Where a segment of one policy community finds common political interest with a segment of another policy community, a political alignment may form, such that each segment garners the support of the other during policy disputes. Where political alignments cluster together from among the politically active public, a dominant political cleavage may form, on which elections may be successfully fought. Like the physical universe, the political universe is in continuous flux, where open organizations attempt to control the scope of conflict, information is transmitted, received, processed, and re-transmitted, and the future is never completely certain.

In a specific policy community, such as that concerned with planning and development policy in a major city, the continuous political flux is characterized by changes in the sub-government, and the differential power of pressure groups. Figure 8 represents a sequence of four time slices of a policy community in a post-pluralist policy




Figure 8. Changes in the Policy Community and the Sub-Government

process. In each time slice, the sub-government is represented by the lead agency, labelled 'LA' and its adjacent pressure groups. Other pressure groups are located outside the sub-government in the political space of the attentive public. Each pressure group is numbered for identification.

Quadrant A, (t1) represents the pre-conflict condition of the organized interests, before the hypothetical issue becomes salient. The lead agency shares the sub-government with groups 5 and 6, while groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 operate independently within the attentive public. It should be noted that the condition of pre-saliency depicted in quadrant A is a pure abstraction, used only as a convenient device for introducing the modeling process. In reality, pre-saliency does not exist, because the relations of organized interests and the emergence of issues always have an historical origin with other groups, other issues, and earlier latent interests.

In quadrant B (t2), the issue has surfaced in the form of a policy proposal being floated by the sub-government, originating from public officials in the lead agency. All of open organizations have begun to send and receive information to reduce uncertainty. In the attentive public, group 1, has sent a response to the sub-government expressing some reservations about the policy proposal,

while groups 2, and 4, have denounced the proposal altogether. In the sub-government, groups 5 and 6 have maintained an early solidarity with the lead agency, which is communicating directly with group 3 in the attentive public. Group 3 has some serious reservations about the proposal but is interested in gaining political power, and is considering whether to make a bid to join the sub-government.

In quadrant C (t3), things are beginning to heat up. In the attentive public, group 3 is disappointed with the sub-government's position, and an invitation to sit at the policy making table appears to be unlikely. Group 3 decides to seek an ally in order to build political prestige outside the sub-government, and finds a willing conversant in group 2, who has received no reply to its official denouncement from the sub-government. Group 4 hasn't received a reply to its denouncement either, and promptly sends a second denouncement. Meanwhile, in the sub-government, the lead agency has begun direct talks with group 1, who although has some reservations about the policy proposal, is interested in having the old policy revised.

In quadrant D (t4), the organizations begin to sense an emerging power struggle. In the attentive public, groups 2 and 3 are continuing their dialogue, and agree to look for other allies to fight the sub-government. Group 3

knows that group 1 has had discussions with the sub-government in the recent past, and sends a representative to group 1 to try and divert its attention, and test its opposition to the policy proposal. Group 2 knows that group 4 has not received a reply from the sub-government either, and at group 3's suggestion, agrees to make contact with group 4. Meanwhile, group 1 has not been completely enthralled by the lead agency talks, but is interested in the future potential of a seat in the sub-government. Sensing the hesitancy of group 1, the lead agency asks the other members of the sub-government, groups 5 and 6, to continue talks with group 1 as goodwill ambassadors for the policy-making circle. Through the media, the lead agency has learned of the discontent in the attentive public, and is under growing pressure from elected politicians to control the scope of conflict.

Figure 9 depicts four possible results from t4, which are labelled as versions of t5. The different outcomes are all possible depending on the relative power of each organization, their interests, the availability of information, and their willingness to bargain. Quadrant A (t5-1) represents a quick resolution to the issue based on the established strength and political resources of the sub-government. In the attentive public, groups 2 and 3 have formed a coalition in public opposition to the proposal, and




Figure 9. Organization Alignments and the Scope of Conflict

continue to try and attract the support of group 4. Their efforts, however, are too late. Group 1 has agreed to join the sub-government on this issue, and support the proposal with some small but observable changes which more positively affect its interest.

Quadrant B (t5-2) represents a troubled situation for the sub-government in general and the lead agency in particular. While continuing to try to attract group 1 with a new round of direct talks, group 1 has been approached by the strongly united front of groups 2 and 3, and begun a dialogue on a second front. Group 4 has also begun a dialogue with group 2, who points to the talks with group 1 as a sign of strengthening opposition. Uncertainty prevails in this situation for both the sub-government and the attentive public, as significant political pressures begin to mount on group 1. Group 3 can again smell the prospect greater power, perhaps even a new governing coalition, but it has neither the prestige nor the credibility of group 1. Group 1 is torn between the temptation to head a new challenge to the governing coalition in the next election, and the chance to join its colleagues who already sit at the policy-making table. The sub-government cannot pass the proposal without significant political damage, and is considering whether to create a special committee to study the matter further, or perhaps water down the proposal to

win the public approval of group 1.

Quadrant C (t5-3) represents the emergence of a new political phase, with the creation of two new pressure groups from latent interests and solidarity groups within the policy community. Group 8 is immediately invited to sit at the policy making table by the sub-government, while group 7 begins a dialogue with the new opposition coalition of groups 1, 2, and 3. Group 4 remains isolated and watches from a political distance as a major conflict unfolds, with the strong challenge to the sub-government at hand and the distinct possibility of a new governing coalition being formed.

Quadrant D (t5-4) represents a complete disaster for the sub-government. Group 6 decides to leave the policy table and immediately attracts the full support of group 1. Groups 2 and 3 lend their qualified support, since they are eager to see a change in the sub-government. Group 4 has disbanded, frustrated by the political uncertainty and unable to obtain critical information. With only group 5 as an ally, the lead agency withdraws the proposal at the instruction of elected politicians, who can see the electoral storm approaching. With public support eroding and the policy credibility of the sub-government ruined, the issue has taken a place near the top of the public agenda, and the opposition groups quietly begin to identify

potential candidates for the next election.

The scenarios presented in this example could be varied in any number of ways. Organizations rise and fall, emerge and disappear, and power struggles shift among them in their common search for control of the scope of conflict and influence on the policy making process. The beauty of the post-pluralist model is its empirical flexibility and consistency in representing organized interests in the policy process. Although it has only been presented here in a simple form, the logical detail of the model could be easily enhanced to include the most gradual changes in power, information and uncertainty with the decision of each organization, and the effect of each decision rule. The most important function of the model, however, is to illustrate the possible political ramifications of events in the policy process among the major policy actors, and this requires a degree of simplicity as much as attention to particular details.

The question of what influences the character of the policy community is a matter of continuing intellectual and ideological debate, but Stone [1987c] has suggested four elements which influence the organizational character of the urban policy community. First, is the "socio-economic composition of the community", the extent to which the general population is either homogeneous or fragmented into

heterogenetic groups along lines of class, income, language, culture, employment, spatial location or any other criteria [Stone, 1987c, p.292]. "Second is the extent to which the cityscape is populated by small property holdings versus large organizations and concentrations of economic power" [Stone, 1987c, p.292]. Stone felt that such differences in the structure of the urban economic base would have different impacts on political attitudes toward urban development policy. "Small property-holders seem to be more inclined to take few risks, hold onto what they have, and avoid large-scale reshaping of the development environment. ...they may lack the resources to internalize the particular costs of coalescing around a broad program of action" [Stone, 1987c, p.292]. Stone also felt that small property-holders would be more likely to unite in defense of their position when faced with a political challenge. On the other hand, large and powerful economic organizations would be "more inclined to be assertive in reshaping the development environment so that it will be more favourable for investment opportunities" [Stone, 1987c, p.292].

Third, in addition to the socio-economic heterogeneity or homogeneity of the general population, is the degree of heterogeneity or homogeneity among those who are politically active. "A community might be socially heterogeneous, but for various reasons that heterogeneity

might not be reflected in the community's political activity" [Stone, 1987c, p.293]. Finally, the fourth element influencing the urban policy community are the "institutionalized forms of representation" present in the city [Stone, 1987c, p.293]. Different institutional forms not only influence the character of the lead agency and the sub-government, they also influence the extent to which politically active groups "enjoy a stable and independent channel of representation. Movements to incorporate previously excluded groups are likely to be successful only if representation is institutionalized in some way" [Stone, 1987c, p.293]. In addition to the decision rules of participation and representation created by institutions, "the power of specific groups and the relationships between groups are likely to be shaped by the norms and traditions of the community" [Stone, 1987c, p.293].

The four elements illustrate that there is no single reason for why the urban policy community and the urban regime especially develops a particular character. In any particular city at any given time, the causation of political conditions is "manifold-- no one overriding factor is at work; that causation is sequential-- the present is shaped by the past; and that causation is cumulative-- as various elements combine to contribute to a given pattern, other alternatives are increasingly difficult to realize"

[Stone, 1987c, p.294]. In the urban setting as any other, the conflict of conflicts is shaped in the long term by changes in socio-economic conditions. The manifold, sequential, and cumulative effects of the four elements on urban political character are the reasons why a dominant political cleavage may prevail or weaken, and why the scope of conflict may remain controlled or become enlarged. In post-pluralist urban politics, "power relationships change epochally rather than episodically. Not every outburst of discontent has its impact. Power relationships alter significantly only when dissatisfaction builds up as part of an accumulating change in the basic socio-economic structure of the community" [Stone, 1976, p.211].

11.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The post-pluralist model, which is primarily concerned with the responsiveness of policy makers to organized interests, stresses the varying political influence of organized interests, including the lead agency, within the sub-government, and the various roles assumed by planners in serving those interests. In the model, policy results from the the political interaction among the principle actors, and reflects to at least some degree the political process from which it was produced. Ultimately, the political interaction involved in the process will have

more influence on its outcome than any substantive, technical, aesthetic or other considerations. This is because the policy option of non-action subordinates all other considerations to the power of decision-making. Since the policy process occurs within a political environment, it is impossible to separate arguments over policy matters from struggles for power. The decision to act is in fact a decision on how the scope of conflict will be controlled, since political uncertainty will prevail or worsen unless action is taken.

Each organized interest within the policy process is represented in the post-pluralist model as an open system, an organization with permeable boundaries, exchanging information with other organizations and attempting to reduce political uncertainty in its own interest. In pursuing this aim, organized interests must consider the nature of their own internal politics as well as external political conditions and relationships. Nowhere is the consideration of these dual politics more important than within the lead agency, and among the members of the sub-government. There, it is the public officials, both elected and appointed, who must simultaneously consider both the managerial politics within organizations, and the power politics among organizations. Together, they comprise the political context of policy making. The post-pluralist

model emphasizes the external politics of power occurring among organizations, except in the case of the lead agency and sub-government. In every policy process, the role of the planner will vary according to which organized interest he/she represents, its internal politics, and its political relationships with other organized interests.

12.0 IMPLICATIONS 1: PLANNING PRACTICE

Planners often find themselves in political conflicts as different organized interests seek information and access to the sub-government. Planners also face potential new roles for themselves in the policy process. Post-pluralism, including the post-pluralist model, offers some direction for planners in navigating these issues. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of planners faced with conflict, and the organizational context of those conflicts. This is followed by an exploration of newer roles suggested for planners by post-pluralism and the post-pluralist model, particularly within the context of the political conflicts, the lead agency, and the policy process.

12.1 PLANNERS and POLITICAL CONFLICT

With the scope of conflict playing such a critical role in the policy process, it is no wonder why planners, especially when serving as public officials, are frequently confronted with political conflicts. The literature on planners in conflict is dominated by works pertaining to the range of theoretical approaches in planning, but there is a small body of research that focusses on planners' political

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conflicts without the trappings of a particular planning theory.

Baum [1983] explored the issue of political conflicts in planning practice by reviewing a number of studies on the subject. He found that planners could be divided into three groups: (1) "a substantial minority who think or act politically", (2) a larger group who "consistently act as technicians, avoiding political thinking or action", and (3) "a significant group of planners [who] are ambivalent about politics" [Baum, 1983, p.13]. Richardson [1980] suggested that a planner suffers from conflict because he/she must respond to four "'constituencies': his personal values, his professional standards, his responsibilities to his elected masters, and his obligation to serve the public interest" [Richardson, 1980, p.1]. For example, a planner may have the responsibility "to carry out a political decision which, professionally, he regards as thoroughly bad" [Richardson, 1980, p.5]. These sorts of conflict are described using the traditional concepts of political power, public servant, and the public interest. Despite these flawed assumptions, which have already been discussed in this thesis, it is evident that planner's conflicts are directly related to their roles.

Confusion over roles themselves may in fact be a major source of conflict for planners, especially within

publicly funded planning agencies where political struggles predominate the working environment. In a questionnaire survey of sixty planners in metropolitan Chicago, it was found that one third of the respondents "admitted purposefully avoiding the danger of political disputes altogether" [Hoch and Cibulskis, 1987, p.99]. Furthermore, in attempting "to prevent or cope with political conflict", the respondents revealed "ambivalence about the expectations of their professional role and the uncertainties of political practice" [Hoch and Cibulskis, 1987, p.99]. While the Chicago study confirmed the abundance of conflicts relating to planners roles, it also revealed that planners had a serious lack of political skills to deal with political conflicts. Of those planners who were unsuccessful in dealing with political conflicts, 73% had tried to prepare for the event. Of those planners who were successful in dealing with conflicts, 60% tried to avoid the event completely [Hoch and Cibulskis, 1987, p.105].

Based on the results of the Chicago survey, Hoch [1988] conducted a mail-out questionnaire survey of a 5% random sample of members of the American Planning Association (n=992). With a response rate of 26.7% and a final sample size of n=267, Hoch found that 56% had reported "a seriously threatening political conflict during their career", and working at the director level "significantly increased the probability of risky political conflicts"

[Hoch, 1988, p.27]. Fifty-four percent of the recorded conflicts involved land-use disputes or administrative disagreements, and the most frequent conflicts (40%) were those "in which the political desires of public officials and/or private developers violated established planning principles, regulations, or policies" [Hoch, 1988, p.27]. "Next in frequency were those cases of conflict in which planners were threatened for not maintaining or expressing political loyalty to their supervisor or elected officials (17%)" [Hoch, 1988, p.28].

Using a similar cross-tabulation format as that applied in the Chicago study, Hoch found that 40% of the respondents had tried to prevent a political conflict, but could not avoid being overwhelmed, while another 20% successfully avoided conflict by using the prevention strategy. The remaining 40% of respondents made no attempt to prevent the conflict, and most (24% of total respondents) were insulated from the dispute [Hoch, 1988, p.29]. Based on these and other survey results, Hoch concluded that "when planners prepare for conflict, it is usually because they work in an organizational environment where risky conflicts are likely. Those who seldom prepare for conflict tend to work in organizations and occupations that insulate planners from these dangers" [Hoch, 1988, p.33]. Most planners who actually faced conflicts were only asking other public officials and developers to follow existing rules. By

recognizing their institutional weakness but not sharing with others their acknowledged vulnerability, planners run the risk of "increasing their weakness while intensifying their attachment to the myth of professional autonomy" [Hoch, 1988, p.33]. Faced with the bleak and depressing results of his survey, Hoch pointed out the need "to know more about the relationship between occupational or organizational responsibilities and the risk of threatening conflicts. This means exploring how planning practitioners might organize with others in ways that anticipate and prepare for disputes in occupational settings where they are inevitable, if not predictable" [Hoch, 1988, p.33].

Benveniste [1989] and Forester [1989] have respectively pointed for the need for planners to think and act politically from intra-organizational and inter-organizational perspectives, based on planning roles with the specific aim of reducing and resolving conflict. Given the inherently political character of planning both within and among organizations, and the importance of information, uncertainty, and the scope of conflict in the dynamics of political relationships, these planning roles will be explored in further detail.

12.2 PLANNING ROLES and POST-PLURALISM

Like the conflict literature, the writings on planners' roles are dominated by works pertaining to the

traditional range of theoretical approaches in planning. Most of those approaches focussed on the position of the planner as a public servant or policy advisor, and "all suffer from serious weaknesses" [Gunton, 1984, p.399]. While the present discussion will continue to focus on this position, particularly within the context of the lead agency and the sub-government, the roles examined here begin with the post-pluralist assumptions argued throughout this thesis.

12.2.1 POLITICALLY ACTIVE PLANNING ROLES

In contrast to the conventional image of the planner as a policy advisor, is the view of the planner as an interventionist [Kaufman, 1978]. In this capacity, planners exercise "varying degrees of politicized behaviour" on policy issues and "try to influence the issue outcomes so that they more resemble their agency's policy preferences" [Kaufman, 1978, p.183]. As the representative of an organized interest group, the planner's behaviour is similar to "other self-interest groups who use a variety of tactics of a persuasion, exchange, engagement, and sometimes even pressure and threat nature to try and get their point of view incorporated in decision outcomes" [Kaufman, 1978, p.183]. While Kaufman suggested that as interventionists, planners try to either initiate, modify, or prevent policies from being enacted, he did not fully address the domain of

the intervening planner, political conflict [Kaufman, 1978, p.184]. For Barton [1984] and others, the notion of intervention is tantamount to engaging in conflict resolution in the public policy arena, where power politics reign supreme. In order to engage in conflict resolution, planners must become familiar with the roles they may play, particularly the roles of negotiator and mediator.

12.2.1.1 NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is "a voluntary process involving two or more individuals or groups who seek to attain some or all of their objectives through mutual consent" [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.467]. In some ways, a negotiated agreement is similar to a coalition, in that the bargaining parties "agree to soften or to relinquish certain of their demands in order to act together" [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.467]. Unlike a coalition however, in which agreement is usually a matter of temporary convenience to the parties, negotiation binds parties "to abide by an agreement over a definite period of time" [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.467]. As a negotiator, the planner strives to reach a consensus with other parties to greatest benefit of his or her own party, for whom he/she advocates as an organized interest.

Unassisted negotiation which permits a consensus defined by the stakeholders, usually has a better chance of resolving disputes than a legislated, administrated, or

adjudicated settlement. But negotiated, consensual solutions only work "if all the stakeholding parties are confident that they will get more from a negotiated agreement than they would from unilateral action" or other means [Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.81]. "If a group is not confident of victory, or wants to satisfy more than its minimum objectives, it has an incentive to negotiate" [Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.81]. To arrive at a successful consensus, the parties must not only agree to the defined terms of discussion, they must be willing to integrate their concerns and interests into a shared perspective. As also supported by Covey [1989], "the key to integrative bargaining is to avoid casting the dispute in 'win-lose' or 'yes-no' terms. The negotiators must try to invent alternatives that respond to the interests of all parties involved" [Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.87].

Citing the need for planners to abandon their conventional role as technical advisors, Rabinowitz [1989] raised attention to some of the problems that planners face when they plunge themselves into the deep waters of political debate. First, planners are not elected, and do not face the same tests of electoral support as elected politicians. Secondly, there is the problem that technical advisors do not automatically become skilled negotiators, and, Rabinowitz notes, planning educators "should pay more attention to the central place that conflicts occupy in

planning" [Rabinowitz, 1989, p.92]. As an emerging class of negotiators, planners and planning educators must begin exploring some of the questions raised by Rabinowitz and addressed by Susskind and Cruikshank [1987], and Carpenter and Kennedy [1988]; questions such as:

"What are the limits of the authority to negotiate?

"What kinds of arguments and styles are appropriate when professionals negotiate and what kind are inappropriate?

"What authority to negotiate is required and from whom?

"What responsibility, if any, does the negotiator have for improving the skills (or the positions) of groups whose power or pre-negotiation understanding of its own position is, in his view, limited?

"What happens to the reputation of a technically trained professional when as an expert he is expected simultaneously to be a neutral and an advocate?

"Should the planner... ever negotiate for the solution that is most salable, as opposed to the solution or alternative that is technically best?" [Rabinowitz, 1989, p.93].

12.2.1.2 MEDIATION

Mediation is a specific form of assisted negotiation, in which "a non-partisan intermediary-- a facilitator, mediator, or arbitrator" enters the negotiation process to try and guide the positions of the parties toward a consensus [Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.137]. Of the three forms of non-partisan intermediary, the mediator has a moderate degree of "substantive involvement of the neutral" compared to the relative aloofness of the facilitator and

the binding powers of the arbitrator [Suskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.162]. The mediator does not remove "control over the outcome from the parties", but plays "a transforming role-- helping the parties out of a zero-sum mindset into an integrative bargaining framework" [Suskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.162-3].

The mediator begins by separately holding private meetings with each party to get beyond their bargaining positions and determine their real interests in the dispute. This requires an absolute trust in the mediator's credibility and integrity by the parties in conflict [Covey, 1992]. "With the inside knowledge that comes from these meetings, the mediator is in a position to understand what is tradable and what is not" [Suskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.163]. Armed with this knowledge, the mediator takes "a large responsibility for the agreement that emerges", but in order to retain the trust of the parties, "must submerge his or her sense of what is 'best', and focus instead on the disputing parties' own measures of success" [Suskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.163]. The mediator clearly walks a delicate line in public disputes, since he/she must ensure "that every possible effort was made to meet the interests of all the parties involved" while not dictating terms or representing "specific interests who may be having trouble representing themselves directly" [Suskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.164].

Unlike Rabinowitz [1989], Susskind and Ozawa [1984] felt that mediation skills are "not so different than the process-management skills that planners have been taught for years", especially since "the now generally shared presumption that planners have a major role to play in the process of implementation" [Susskind and Ozawa, 1984, p.5]. Shared or not, the presumed importance of planners in the implementation phase of policy-making is what shapes Susskind and Ozawa's vision of the planners' mediation environment. Susskind and Ozawa view this conflictual terrain differently than other mediation environments such as labour or international disputes, drawing parallels to community and environmental conflicts due to the "quality of negotiated agreements and their implementability" [Susskind and Ozawa, 1984, p.13]. "Because of the relative unfamiliarity of the parties with the negotiation process and, when technical analyses are essential, mediators in community and environmental disputes often serve as important sources of information. The role of the mediator in these arenas thus more nearly parallels the role of the planner" [Susskind and Ozawa 1984, p.13]. In this context, Susskind and Ozawa grant planning mediators more leverage in sharing information among the concerned parties than perhaps Susskind and Cruikshank [1987] would in other instances. Also unlike Susskind and Cruikshank [1987], who emphasize that "if a proposed settlement appears exploitive or

unworkable, the mediator is obligated to question the validity of such a settlement" [p.164], Susskind and Ozawa [1984] view implementation failures as "a consequence of the planning profession's hesitancy to stress the important role that planners can play during implementation, especially in building and maintaining a durable consensus and in resolving disagreements" [Susskind and Ozawa 1984, p.9].

Even from reputable scholarly authorities, there is no clear standard for how planners should act as mediators, even though the role has enormous potential in post-pluralist political space. Susskind and Ozawa observe that "planners should not worry about their credibility or authority as mediators; rather they should focus on how to best present themselves, handle confidences, and apply the skills of the mediator", but this view seems to contradict the implications of their earlier statements [Susskind and Ozawa, 1984, p.14]. If planners are to take greater responsibility for the successful implementation of policy, why should they accept standards of credibility which are less than any other professional mediator? This question becomes increasingly important if the planner is trying to mediate a consensus within the sub-government, or among other organized interests, while controlling the scope of conflict.

12.2.1.3 MEDIATION, NEGOTIATION, and POWER

A key problem in both mediation and negotiation roles is the ideal of equal power among parties at the table. As it has been argued throughout this thesis, it is a rare if not improbable case where every party invited to the table has equal access to information and equal negotiating skills. Furthermore, it is difficult to bring unequally affected or skilled parties to consensus when they are hesitant to integrate their individual interests and concerns for a common gain. Some parties will usually have more at stake than others, and there may be additional parties who do not even sit at the table.

At the center of conflict resolution is the control of its scope, the exercise of decision rules, and the normative question of how to address imbalances of power. Barton [1984] argues that conflict resolution is most commonly understood as a search for consensus among conflicting interests, "within a context where a decision will be imposed if no agreement is reached" [Barton, 1984, p.98]. The result is that resolution occurs within the context of relative power among those interests at the table, and that "the broadest and most successful use of consensual conflict resolution techniques require [the] relative equality of power" [Barton, 1984, p.99]. In negotiated settlements, participants may use the occasion "to strengthen themselves so that they may be able to impose

more favourable terms some time in the future" [Barton, 1984, p.98]. In mediated disputes, weaker parties "must understand as fully as possible the limits the balance of power places on what is open to negotiation, and what they would have to do in order to shift the balance of power" [Barton, 1984, p.98].

Forester [1987, 1989], like Barton, takes the normative position that mediation and negotiation must address the unequal power and position of affected groups if they are to have positive long-term effects. Planners who adopt these roles "must decide either to perpetuate or to challenge inequalities of information, expertise, political access, and opportunity" [Forester, 1989, p.101]. Unlike Susskind and Cruikshank [1987] however, Forester rejects the idea that mediation and negotiation roles are separate. Forester recognizes the two fundamental sources of conflict between the two roles: "First, the negotiator's interest in the subject threatens the independence and the presumed neutrality of a mediating role. Second, although a negotiating role may allow planners to protect less powerful interests, a mediating role threatens to undercut this possibility and thus to leave the inequalities of power intact" [Forester, 1987, p.303]. However, Forester argues that because planners simultaneously pursue the strategies of both roles, the roles are in fact compatible. He then outlines and explains six "mediated negotiation strategies"

which are mediated "because planners employ them to assure that the interests of the major parties legitimately come into play", and negotiation "because (except for the first) they focus on the informal negotiations that may produce viable agreements even before formal decision-making boards meet" [Forester, 1987, p.303].

Briefly, the six strategies and their characteristics are as follows. The first strategy, "the planner as regulator", notes that even the most routine and technical decisions involve questions of judgement [Forester, 1989, p.88-9]. Forester uses an empirical example to note that simply relying on the rules to make decisions is rarely routine or purely technical. The second strategy, "pre-mediate and negotiate", means that planners anticipate and "articulate others' concerns before they can erupt into overt conflict", a practice that "involves a host of political, strategic, and ethical issues" [Forester, 1989, p.89-90]. The third strategy, "the planner as a resource", simply describes the most basic function of mediation: bringing disputing parties together to find compromise agreements [Forester, 1989, p.90-92]. Forester's major point here is to simply introduce mediation as a planning role. The fourth strategy, "shuttle diplomacy", describes a form of mediation where the disputing parties rarely meet face-to-face, but the planner travels back and forth frequently to meet with each party. In this fashion,

planners can mediate disputes, "if not in ways that mediators are typically thought to act" [Forester, 1989, p.92-93]. The fifth strategy, "active and interested mediation", simply involves presenting "each side's concerns to each other so they can be understood and addressed" in face-to-face meetings [Forester, 1989, p.93-94]. The sixth strategy, "split the job-- you mediate, I'll negotiate", "promotes face-to-face mediation with the planners at the table, but as negotiators or advisors, not mediators" while a more highly skilled communicator performs the mediation role [Forester, 1989, p.95].

For all of Forester's worthy intentions to encourage politically active roles for planners, his six strategies are not well-defined or organized, and are hardly a substitute for the formal conflict resolution literature as instruction for planners. Furthermore, the poor development of the six strategies hardly qualifies them to reconcile the formal differences between mediation and negotiation roles. Still, the six strategies underline Forester's common message, that planners have influence and may actively use it in the policy process to reduce conflict and build consensus. From the normative position of helping less-powerful groups, Forester states that mediation and negotiation cannot change social or political power structures directly, but can "support wider, collective efforts to change such structures" [Forester, 1989, p.102].

Forester [1987] tends to neglect, however, what Benveniste [1989] greatly appreciates: that mediation and negotiation occur within an organizational context which directly influences both the differences in power among the disputing parties, and prospect of a successful agreement [Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987].

12.2.2 The PLANNER in the LEAD AGENCY and SUB-GOVERNMENT

As Gunton [1984] implied, the role of a planner varies with his/her organizational setting, since organizations themselves hold different positions in the political space of the policy process. Furthermore, while planners may embrace politically active roles, they remain answerable to their superiors, as is evident in the conflict literature. Nowhere is this more important for planners than within the lead agency and by extension, the sub-government. This is because the center of the policy community is not only the realm of policy making, but the realm of policy makers who are closest to the governing coalition.

As public officials, planners in the lead agency participate and benefit from the dispersion of power from the legislature to the administration and the accompanying institutionalization of the policy process within the sub-government. Policy ideas may originate within the lead agency, where they "gather supporters and critics, are tried

and refined, and can become part of the routine with little, or any involvement of elected officials or political appointees" [Maynard-Moody, 1989, p.137].

With the institutionalization of policy making, politics and administration are no longer separate functions. The sub-government provides a different sort of arena for policy-making which is less visible than the legislature, and because of the need to accommodate powerful organized interests, becomes "the institutional embodiment of past policy choices" [Maynard-Moody, 1989, p.140]. Policy making within the sub-government becomes "shaped by established definitions of problems and solutions that are enshrined in organizational rules, norms, and habits. These institutionalized norms become part of the architecture of the political structure" [Maynard-Moody, 1989, p.140]. The institutionalization and relative invisibility of the sub-government greatly improves its ability to control the scope of conflict.

Since the institutional setting "has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions" [Maynard-Moody, 1989, p.137], planners within the lead agency must learn to think organizationally [Baum, 1980] and politically [Benveniste, 1989]. This requires that planners further develop themselves in "line functions", where they manage and acquire power in their own right as credible negotiators and mediators, rather than in "staff functions" as rational

technicians and fact-finders [Benveniste, 1989]. These needs have been confirmed by Gondim [1988], who studied the working habits of planners in the lead agency for the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro. In her seven-year study, Gondim found that "both planners who emphasized the technical aspects of their jobs as well as more politically concerned planners were unskilled in dealing with politics at the level of the organization" [Gondim, 1989, p.169], echoing the findings of Hoch [1988]. Gondim concluded that "for staff planners, who make up the majority of practitioners, effectiveness depends largely on [the] ability to mobilize support from top level officials, who control resources necessary for the performance of both 'technical' and 'political' roles. Expertise per se does not guarantee that planners' advice will be called upon by their superiors" [Gondim, 1989, p.171].

12.2.3 PLANNING ROLES and the POLICY PROCESS

Just as there is a relationship between planners' roles and the conflicts they experience within the lead agency, there is also a relationship between planners' roles and the policy process. In order for conflict resolution efforts to have a chance of success, planners must begin with an understanding of the policy process: who is the 'prince'? [Benveniste, 1989], who are the other players? [Pross, 1986] what are the decision rules? [Healey, 1990],

what is the political culture like in each of the organizations involved? [Wildavsky, 1987], and in particular, what are the uncertainties at hand? [Christensen, 1985]. In Christensen's matrix [Figure 3, p.199, infra.], the political environment for conflict resolution methods was most receptive when "means" or technology were reasonably known although "goals" or desired outcomes were not agreed. Barton [1984] has further suggested that ideally there must be an equitable power ratio among participants in order to ensure the greatest chance of success at building consensus.

Perhaps the best analysis of conflict resolution and the policy process is Stephenson and Pops [1989], who examined the importance of specific variables in shaping the the policy process, and the conflict resolution methods and roles suited to given situations. They grouped the variables they considered significant into two categories, structural variables and tactical variables. Independent "structural variables" which are "mediated through the policy process" and "shape the choice of decision mode" [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.464]. Structural variables include the number of interested parties, their varying resources, the intensity of their preferences, the complexity of the issue(s), and the laws or regulations pertaining to the dispute [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.464]. Tactical variables include the level of trust among

the disputing parties, their willingness to use third parties, the outcomes they anticipate, whether they have a competitive or integrative orientation to the issue, and whether they bargain on the basis of their official position or their underlying interest [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.468-69]. Tactical variables are under the control of the parties themselves, and "directly affect only the choice of a resolution method" [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.465]. Decision modes, which include coalition, negotiation, and adjudication, are selected based on the structural variables, while specific decision methods such as voting (legislation, rule making), judicial trial, or arbitration (unassisted bargaining, joint problem solving, mediation) [Stephenson and Pops, 1989, p.464].

In this taxonomy, Stephenson and Pops therefore create a third fundamental distinction between mediation and negotiation roles in addition to the two outlined by Forester [1987, 1989]. Negotiation is a decision mode which depends on structural conditions beyond the control of the parties involved, while mediation is a specific conflict resolution method dependent on tactical conditions which are in control of the parties involved. In assuming the roles of either mediator or negotiator, planners must therefore be respectively knowledgeable of the tactical and structural variables pursuant to those roles.

Bryson, Bromiley, and Yoon [1990] also examined

the importance of particular variables in the policy process, with particular emphasis on the perspective of the lead agency. Loosely based on the 'trojan horse' assumption that "the planning process must be tailored to the particular context within which the changes must be pursued in order to achieve desired outcomes", Bryson, Bromiley, and Yoon tested a multiple regression equation using eleven discrete variables against a sample of fifty-nine recorded case studies of planning processes, including such classics as Meyerson and Banfield [1955], and Altshuler [1965] [Bryson, Bromiley, and Yoon, 1990, p.183]. Despite their grossly incorrect use of this complex quantitative technique, the researchers proclaimed:

"that (1) the greater the potential impact on resource allocation patterns, (2) the greater the extent of problem identification efforts, and (3) the more extensive the use of problem solving as a conflict resolution strategy, the more likely it is that project goals will be achieved and that the organization with prime responsibility for the project will be satisfied" [Bryson, Bromiley, and Yoon, 1990, p.183].

The poor choice of methodology used in this study and its correspondingly questionable results clearly point to the need for planning scholars to undertake further research into policy processes, and pay closer attention to the work of writers such as Stephenson and Pops [1989]. Like Forester [1987], Bryson, Bromiley, and Yoon [1990] have shown that even the most basic understanding of negotiation and mediation roles in the policy process is sadly lacking

in the planning literature.

One area of study which has yielded more promising results has been the negotiation of decision rules [Healey, 1990] among interested parties [Fiorino, 1988]. Although "resolving a specific, clearly bounded dispute over a zoning decision, construction of a highway through a park, or siting of a municipal landfill is fundamentally different from designing a general rule", Fiorino found some advantages to negotiation as a rule-making process [Fiorino, 1988, p.770]. Fiorino examined seven cases of regulatory negotiation which involved the US Environmental Protection Agency. Since they were rule-making processes, not decision-making processes, they also illustrated the tensions and fragilities of making political arrangements within a sub-government setting. Some of the advantages were providing parties with access to technical information for consideration as it was needed, and creating "the opportunity to educate potential opponents and persuade them that adopting a particular provision [would] not harm their own interests [Fiorino, 1988, p.764].

Under conventional rule-making the lead agency "acts as the authoritative, third-party decision maker; the affected and interested parties are the pleaders, bound to whatever conclusions the agency reaches" [Fiorino, 1988, p.769]. By creating a negotiatory environment for rule-making, the lead agency "agrees to act as the theoretical

equal of the other parties by sitting at the table to negotiate and resolve issues. A decision is not made until the affected interests, through their representatives, consent to it" [Fiorino, 1988, p.769]. But the lead agency must be cautious that the stakeholders' interests do not subordinate the real reason for the negotiation, the need to make rules. For this reason the lead agency differs from other organized interests in one important respect: "it is the only party with the authority to withdraw from the negotiations and propose a rule as its own. The equality of the parties around the table is in this sense a fiction, but it can be sustained if the agency and the other parties accept it" [Fiorino, 1988, p.769].

Fiorino notes that while opening the rule making process to negotiation with other parties has advantages, the improvised process has other limitations inherent to the sub-government of any policy community. For example, even "the most well-balanced committee is not competent institutionally to represent unorganized or un-influential groups or broad conceptions of the public interest" [Fiorino, 1988, p.769-70]. The process is also limited by one of the conditions similarly outlined by Susskind and Cruikshank [1987], namely that the parties involved must be willing to participate in the exercise. In addition, the parties must also be willing to retreat from the "potential subordination of decision premises to the instrumental needs

of the parties and the process" [Fiorino, 1988, p.764]. Fiorino also suggests that in addition to the lead agency controlling the scope of conflict, the problem at hand must be primarily based on technical matters, not on questions of social value, to ensure the greatest chance of success. "Within its limits, however, and with procedural safeguards, regulatory negotiation can offer a valuable complement to the conventional rule making process" [Fiorino, 1988, p.764].

12.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The inherently political nature of the policy process and the specific characteristics of the post-pluralist political environment imply that planning practice cannot exist in a political vacuum. Planners cannot retreat into technical or advisory roles and expect to remain sheltered from the clash of organized interests, unaffected by the struggle for power, separated from the scope of conflict, or shielded from the winds of uncertainty. Planners can expect conflicts to arise and to affect them personally, and must be adequately trained to deal with them. Furthermore, planners can expect to assume new roles in the face of politically charged conflicts among various organized interests, including the lead agency. As mediators and negotiators within the policy process, planners must not only rely on their particular area of

substantive expertise, but on their ability to sense the structural and tactical variables involved. Whether attempting to build consensus within the bounds of the lead agency, the sub-government, a community group, or among a number of diverse organized interests, the post-pluralist politics of the policy process demand that planners think and act politically. This means being sensitive to the nature of trust, information, and power.

13.0 IMPLICATIONS for PLANNING THEORY

This chapter asserts the validity of post-pluralism and the post-pluralist model as the intellectual, structural, and normative basis for a potential general theory of planning, by evaluating the theoretical and normative validity of the post-pluralist paradigm.

13.1 POST-PLURALISM as the FOUNDATION for a POTENTIAL GENERAL THEORY of PLANNING

While controlling the scope of conflict is the fundamental issue in the post-pluralist political environment, it has also been the fundamental problem in planning theory. Just as in any given policy process there are a number of interested positions, represented by open organizations in the post-pluralist model, in planning thought, there are any number of theoretical positions which can also be represented using the open organization model. When applied to planning thought, the open organization is a metaphor for a position in planning thought, whether that position is based on an interest in ideology, aesthetics, efficiency, equity, profit, safety, or any other matter [Figure 10]. In this capacity, the post-pluralist model provides a vigorous taxonomy for planning thought. No




Figure 10. The Politics of Planning Thought

particular position in planning thought is completely dominant, although the institutionalization of planning as a function of government has served as a center of gravity for planning theories, particularly the old rational comprehensive approach, incrementalism, and advocacy. The model can therefore be used to describe the terrain of planning thought, including changes in scholarly alignments, in a manner which permits the entry of new schools or theories as they arise.

The scope of conflict in planning thought can be said to center around particular issues and viewpoints, all which have struggled for dominance as the new governing paradigm. The post-pluralist model circumnavigates this struggle by proclaiming that planning is inherently political, and no single paradigm in planning thought should be expected to dominate, not even post-pluralism! As a paradigm, post-pluralism does not claim that planners should subscribe to a particular ideology or substantive preference. It only claims that the self-evident truth of differential power and conflict predominate in planning thought and planning practice. There will always be different viewpoints and there will always be some level of conflict among them.

In addition to taxonomic vigour, it was stated that a potential general theory of planning had to exhibit internal consistency, that is, the description of planning

in thought had to logically agree with the prescription for planning in practice. In chapter 2.0 it was stated that an internally consistent theory had to rely on inherent axioms which were self-evident, and that planning was inherently political, occurred through organizations, required communication among those organizations and took place over space and time. The post-pluralist model incorporates all of those elements, and permits planners to possess any area of substantive expertise and pursue any role they wish in planning practice, noting only that a role may vary according to the relative political position of the organization whose interests they serve. The most potent roles for planners in the post-pluralist environment are as a negotiator for a specific organized interest, or as a mediator among specific organized interests. Especially in the case of the lead agency, or the sub-government, planning is complicated by the need to build consensus among organized interests, and such roles lend themselves favourably to the planning process. The relative power of organizations, the scope of conflict, the transfer and processing of information, and the range of uncertainty all bear weight on the planning process and the planner's role within that process.

The post-pluralist prescription for planning practice is internally consistent with the post-pluralist description of planning thought. The variety of real-world

interests is isomorphic to the various schools and concerns in planning thought. The inherently political character of planning demands inherently political roles for planners. The inherently organizational and communicative character of planning demands organizational and communicative skills in planners. The time and place of the planning process demands that planners sensitize themselves to that time and place. The subjective and technical expertise so often claimed as the planner's domain, is only as relevant to the planner as it is demanded by the organized interest which the planner serves, or the planning process in which that organized is engaged.

The only remaining qualification required for the post-pluralist model to change from a potential general theory to a general theory, is its widespread acceptance and application, based on its empirical validity and practical utility. There are a number of case studies which support aspects of the post-pluralist model and its organizational approach. Simmie [1987] concluded in his study of the San Francisco Downtown Plan that "directions eventually adopted by plans will depend on the outcome of conflict, bargaining and consensus between producers, the polity and the land-use planning system" Simmie, 1987, p.304]. In her study of changes in the organizational structure of Seattle's lead planning agency, Dalton [1985] concluded that the visibility of the agency directly corresponded to its political

accountability. Other studies supporting the post-pluralist view include Freemuth's [1989] study of the US national parks system, and O'Brien, Clarke, and Kamieniecki's [1984] paper on toxic waste management. These studies support elements and ideas within post-pluralism, but further empirical work is needed which tests the specifics of the model and its assumptions, as they have been described in this thesis.

13.2 NORMATIVISM and the POST-PLURALIST MODEL

Stone has argued that "paradigms compete less on the basis of which commands the strongest support in a body of evidence and more on the basis of the issues they raise", and that "paradigmatic debates are not over who has the best evidence; they are over who has the best questions" [Stone, 1987a, p.17]. One question posed to the post-pluralist model is whether it is normative, and if so, what does it mean for planning theory. Normative is defined as "of, relating or conforming to, or prescribing norms" [Webster's p.783], while a norm is defined as "1) and authoritative standard", or more precisely, "2) a principle of the right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behaviour" [Webster's p.782].

In the first sense of 'normative' as defined by Webster, it is somewhat premature to address the post-

pluralist model, because it is not yet an accepted standard. As a proposed standard, however it does stand up to scrutiny. In his discussion of Faludi [1973], Hooper [1982] suggests one possible defence of a normative theory of planning which is applicable to the post-pluralist model. Described as a "methodological defence", if a normative theory "cannot be tested in relation to an 'empirical proof', it nevertheless permits useful hypotheses which can be tested in relation to logical consistency and value premises" [Hooper, 1982, p.245]. This commentary points to the need for further empirical testing of the post-pluralist model's flexible meta-structure, and whether its future potential as a general theory may be fulfilled.

The post-pluralist model is most clearly normative in Webster's second sense, by proposing that planners work according to the political conditions of the planning process. This classification of normative is also relatively 'loose', because the prescriptions of the model are less exacting than prescriptions for other professions, such as engineering or medicine. The normatively prescribed roles of mediation and negotiation offer useful guidelines which are widely applicable, but the broader normative question is how planners ought to fulfill those roles, and in whose interests. Both Healey [1990] and Forester [1989] want planners to take active roles in changing the scope of conflict, in order to help the process become more certain

for disadvantaged groups and less certain for governing coalitions and dominant interests. Like Forester [1989], Healey [1990] promotes a normative role for planners to bring less-powerful groups to the bargaining table, even into the sub-government. Healey does however support the premise of a non-normative model of the policy process, on the grounds that it is the decision rules which challenge or uphold established values, not the policy process itself. "Policy processes can only provide a vehicle for changing established values to the extent that these are challenged by the decision criteria used within a process form" [Healey, 1990, p.101]. Since it is the decision rules, not the policy process per se, which create and extend governing arrangements, Healey concludes that "planning culture should not seek to develop a typology of 'model' process forms, as proposed in the debates on rational planning processes [Hudson, 1979]. The normative debate should instead focus on how to maximize opportunities for realising particular values, or the position of particular interests, or how to negotiate a process out of the needs and demands of many interests" [Healey, 1990, p.92-93]. The post-pluralist model agrees with Healey's view on where the normative debate should focus, but it does not advocate which particular interests or values should be the subject of that debate. In the same context, the post-pluralist model does not advocate 'for what to plan' or 'how to plan', beyond

identifying the interests in a given policy process and emphasizing the planner's role as a mediator or negotiator in that process. In this respect, the model remains true to the standard of internal consistency and taxonomic rigour.

13.3 EVALUATING the POST-PLURALIST MODEL

Boyle [1982] suggested four points to serve as a guide for "exploratory research" in politics and planning, which also serve as benchmarks by which to evaluate the post-pluralist model. First, "the planner has to be extremely cautious of adapting any single theory from applied political science; the literature clearly demonstrates that no one theory or model explains the nature of the political influence acting upon planning" [Boyle, 1982, p.130]. As a school of thought in political studies, post-pluralism draws from many other schools including pluralism, elitism, and corporatism. Pross [1986] has also suggested that post-pluralism has also emerged partially due to Marxist criticisms of pluralism. As political systems continue to evolve, post-pluralism will undoubtedly be eclipsed by some other school of thought. While post-pluralism provides an intellectual underpinning for the post-pluralist model, the model itself does not restrict particular ideological or doctrinaire views. Even if the post-pluralist underpinning were to be replaced by some other body of political thought, it is possible to model the

politics of planning process under any degree of organizational or political closure using the open system methodology. The post-pluralist model does not pretend to explain all sources of political influence or ideology in a given planning process. Rather, it provides a means of understanding the political dynamic of the planning process by including those interests which are most directly involved. The post-pluralist model could potentially include a huge number of interests and ideologies for a given planning process, but then it wouldn't be much of a model.

Boyle's second point was that "the planner must exercise care in differentiating between honest empirical enquiry leading to model building (even theory) and case studies which are used to support one or other of the dominant ideologies" [Boyle, 1982, p.130 original parentheses]. The post pluralist model is not based on a particular case study but has been drawn from the general observation of many case studies by political, organizational, and system scholars. Furthermore, the post-pluralist model is designed to be structurally and functionally flexible enough to be applied to any planning process.

Thirdly, Boyle felt that "to build meaningful theory, it seems unlikely that a purely institutional or organizational analysis is sufficient; to only concentrate

on 'actors' or 'groupings' is too narrow; to embrace the 'locality' of local government-- interest groups, issues, relationships-- may be useful but might suffer from parochialism; to dismiss local government as being irrelevant is to ignore reality" [Boyle, 1982, p.130]. Boyle is suggesting here that both the institution of local government as well as the local organized interests and actors must be included in building political models of the planning process. The post-pluralist model, by specifically referring to the lead agency as well as interest groups, meets this concern. Furthermore, the model does not simply list the number or type of organizations or groups; beyond its organizational taxonomy is the post-pluralist focus on power relations, the exchange of information, and the scope of conflict.

Boyle's final point was that it "appears necessary to develop analysis across a series of environments which ultimately shape local decisions", of which he included the 'local' political environment, the professional environment, the organizational environment, and the national political environment [Boyle, 1982, p.130-1]. Although the post-pluralist model does not specifically address national politics, it is possible to include national interests like any other interests within the realm of the planning process. The post-pluralist model offers guidance for the professional roles of planners as well as the managerial

politics of the lead agency and the politics among local groups and actors. The application of the model beyond planning issues the reason for the continuing use of the phrase 'policy process' instead of 'planning process'. Given these features of the model, the last of Boyle's four points also appears to have been satisfied.

13.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The post-pluralist model provides a theory of planning which is taxonomically rigorous and internally consistent. The model prescribes forms of planning practice and describes the expanding universe of planning thought on the basis of the inherent characteristics of the discipline, using a flexible meta-structure applicable to any planning process, any range of interests, and any range of planning ideas. Underpinning the structural and functional characteristics of the model is the assertion that planning is inherently political, and that both planning thought and planning practice may incorporate any number or variety of interests. This political condition dictates that power, conflict, information, and uncertainty permeate planning practice, therefore prescribing roles for planners that focus on mediation and negotiation skills. The inherent political nature of planning also dictates that planning thought will always be populated by competing ideas, values and interests. While planning thought therefore remains

impossible to unify, it is possible to generalize. In the post-pluralist theory of planning, the flexible meta-structure is a mirror for both thought and practice, reflecting the image of organized bias.

14.0 CONCLUSION

Planning is inherently political; a characteristic which is important to planning theory and planning practice. However, in addition to recognizing this characteristic, the post-pluralist model also recognizes that plans are a form of public policy, and planning is a form of public policy-making. In the latter context, politics matters to the status of planning in public life. The public decision to plan at all is itself a political decision. But to say that politics matters is not the final point, but rather it is the first step in recognizing "a responsibility to identify and work for good political practice" [Stone, 1987a, p.18]. Since politics matters in the larger, public sense, "we need appropriate and realistic criteria by which policies and political practices can be judged" [Stone, 1987a, p.18]. Planners and planning theorists cannot afford to retreat into the shelter of aesthetic or technical expertise in reviewing and refining their work. Even the most drab proposal for sewer lines or boulevard construction has political implications and consequences.

Post-pluralism asks planners to consider how politics is organized. "Attention needs to be given to those elements in a political system that influence the

issue agenda and thereby limit the amount of conflict that occurs or shape the form that it takes" [Stone, 1976, p.20]. The post-pluralist model gives planners a tool for discovering and understanding those elements, particularly the elements of information, uncertainty, and power. Power, especially, is not simply the ability to win favours, or obtain conformity in the behaviour of others. "Power also involves the capacity to affect the context within which decisions are made, that is, the capacity to secure positional advantages; and it involves the ability to exploit the positional advantages that have been secured" [Stone, 1976, p.20]. Post-pluralism argues that the mere presence of conflict is only the public face of power, and that the most important political forces are those which control the scope of conflict, by keeping it hidden and by diluting the mobilization of bias. "The absence of conflict may mean that power has been exercised to suppress opposition or to exclude some issues from being considered" [Stone, 1976, p.20].

The presence of power, conflict, organized interests, and the state implies that while plans may be considered as instruments of policy, the planning process is not simply a means to an end. In the post-pluralist, public context, planning is "a mediating process in which relations of power are continually re-negotiated and reproduced" [Forester, 1984, p.124]. Where the state is the potentially

the most powerful institution capable of socializing conflict from out of the private domain [Schattschneider, 1960], the state may be viewed pluralistically as "the terrain for negotiation, struggle, and conflict between various groups and classes in the society" [Forester, 1984, p.127].

As discussed earlier, however, the role of the state in post-pluralist democracy is not to socialize conflict, but control the scope of those conflicts deemed important by the governing coalition of organized interests. The result is a degree of limitation on the state as a mediating arena for public policy. The degree of mediation is limited by the organized interests invited by the lead agency to sit at the policy making table of the sub-government; invitations that may or may not be made at the request of the governing coalition. As a mediated, negotiated, and future-oriented form of policy process, planning is limited by the power of the state, subject to the "evolving balance or imbalance of social forces, of economic power, of exclusion or participation, of cultural practices and values, of inheritance recognized and cherished or buried or revised" [Forester, 1984, p.127].

Planners mediating and negotiating from within the lead agency are continually tested by the interests of the governing coalition, the sub-government, and the groups and latent interests within the attentive public. The politics

of the lead agency are also affected by its extensive technical resources and expertise, the complexity of its internal organizational structure, and its legal responsibility to government. With many administrative rules and procedures to follow, planners within the lead authority face a far more complicated organizational setting than private or community interests. The power of the lead agency also lends a special character to its relationships with other organized interests. As an effector of public policy, the planning agency must appear to consider all organized interests with an equal degree of respect and courtesy. The effect of legal planning power on the external relationships of the planning authority also raises the issue of how planners must deal with the urban regime. While the elected politicians often, though not always, form part of the prevailing regime, the planner may inadvertently contact other members of the regime through his/her professional relationships with organized interests. The planner may not even be aware of such contacts, since the urban regime may not publicize the identity or relationships of all of its members.

In an era of planning practice dominated by the political struggles of organized interests, the post-pluralist model offers planners a tool for exploring the conditions of the policy process. The flexibility of the model's organizational analysis permits the planner to "look

at all of the relevant demands and see that some are neglected, that others receive quite different treatments as they move from one policy stage to another, and that some issues never become salient to the public at large" [Stone, 1976, p.21]. There are however some cautions which must be considered. The arrangement of the model and the division of time slices is subject to the planner's subjective understanding of the policy process, its actors, their relative power, the exchange of information and the degree of uncertainty. "Planners' personal values and strengths predispose them toward particular ways of interpreting problem situations", and "a planner's perception may also vary with the level of his job" [Christensen, 1985, p.70].

Whether working for the lead agency, acting as a volunteer advocate, or as a hired consultant, the most effective planners in the planning process are those who understand politics and the struggle for power. The importance of understanding politics also remains vital, regardless of the particular substantive expertise held by the planner. The politics of historic preservation, urban design aesthetics, and social equity are as equally political as transportation systems, sub-division development, and hazardous waste treatment. City planning is primarily concerned with development, however defined, and all forms of development are political. It is only through understanding politics that conflict may be

understood, consensus may be achieved, and that effective plans which make a difference ahead of time may be created.

This thesis began with the assertion that planning thought has been characterized by a wide array of ideas and positions, particularly since the attack on the rational comprehensive model. It was then proposed that the first step in the quest for a general theory of planning would be to bring an accepted degree of order to planning thought. After reviewing the semantic and logical conditions involved, a general planning theory was defined as a body of knowledge which describes and prescribes planning in an internally consistent and taxonomically rigorous manner, which is widely applied, endorsed, and accepted by planners. Within such a general planning theory, planning would be generically defined as a deliberate attempt to organize events, decisions, or conditions which will take place in the future. Land-based planning would be defined as planning which pertains to formally defined land-based entities such as cities, regions, or districts.

To achieve the first step of bringing a sense of theoretical order to planning thought, it was first contended that the only possible basis for a general theory of planning would be a flexible meta-structure, capable of encompassing the continuous expansion of planning thought, and including popular as well as unpopular ideas. Secondly, it was contended that a political theory would provide an

ideal basis for a flexible meta-structure, based on the axiom that all planning is inherently political, such that political positions in the planning process could be based on ideology, loyalty, substantive claims, aesthetics, or any other form of interest. While organization theory, with its roots in general systems theory, was suggested as a convenient medium in which to express a flexible meta-structure, post-pluralism was proposed as the intellectual basis for describing the inherently political underpinning of planning, because of its structural rather than ideological approach to politics, and its congruence with the realities of planning practice.

Part One of the thesis then considered in detail the contention that planning is inherently political, and revealed the evolving presence of political considerations in planning thought since the attack on the rational comprehensive model. These political considerations have been characterized for the most part by a pluralist approach to politics, but there has also been a gradual shift toward post-pluralist ideas within the planning literature. Having established the inherently political nature of planning and the importance of politics as a consideration in planning theory, the definitions of pluralism and post-pluralism were formally introduced. Part Two of the thesis then explored post-pluralism, its structural principles, taxonomy, its manifestation in urban regime theory, and its expression in

the behaviour of organizations in the policy process. These discussions provided the background for the post-pluralist model. Part Three presented the post-pluralist model, followed by a discussion of the implications of the post-pluralist approach for planning practice, for planning theory, and for planning as a form of public policy.

While post-pluralism and the post-pluralist model offer new insight for planning theory and planning practice, they also point to the need for planners and planning theorists to examine their own values, interests, and political expectations. As potential mediators and negotiators planners must also examine their own ethics and morals; the principles that govern their own behaviour in the planning process. Post-pluralism explains the importance of information, but it does not instruct planners on when or with whom information should be shared or withheld. Post-pluralism explains the importance of the scope of conflict, but it does not advocate what political convictions or allegiances planners should uphold. Post-pluralism explains the importance of organized interests in the planning process, but it does not recommend which organized interests planners should represent. While planners must make these choices for themselves, post-pluralism and the post-pluralist model offer insight into the meaning of those choices for planning theory and planning practice.

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