

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

THE CHINESE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION
OF VANCOUVER 1885 - 1923,
A RESPONSE TO LOCAL CONDITIONS

by

Chee Chiu Clement Ng

A THESIS
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THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

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THE CHINESE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF VANCOUVER: 1885-1923,
A RESPONSE TO LOCAL CONDITIONS

BY

CHEE CHIU CLEMENT NG

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to study the nature of mutual aid and philanthropic activities within the Chinese community of Vancouver with particular focus on the activities and development of services of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver (CBA Vancouver) from 1885 to 1923. 1885 was the first year of this study because the Canadian government levied a \$50 head tax on all Chinese immigrants in 1885. Particular emphasis is placed on the period between 1914 to 1923 because the City of Vancouver and the British Columbia government attempted to implement policies that restricted the employment of the Chinese. Many of these events were recorded in a Chinese newspaper, the Chinese Times. 1923 is the last year of the study because it was the year that the Canadian government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which excluded Chinese migration to Canada.

The author uses oral history of Chinese old timers, The Chinese Times (Vancouver) and monographs as sources of investigation.

The findings of this investigations are as follows:

1. The Chinese peasants migrated to Canada since 1850's because of unemployment, lack of land for farming and high taxation. They were attracted to Canada because British Columbia needed a lot of cheap labourers to develop its industries such as mining, cannery, construction and railways.
2. Merchant philanthropy, clan philanthropy and rotating credit association were three forms of relief carried over from China to Canada, although their activities changed in Canada due to racism

and discrimination.

3. The CBA Vancouver was established because the Chinese needed a central authority to fight racism and to provide relief to its members. The majority of the services of the CBA Vancouver such as advocacy service, legal aid, mediation, hospital and criminal compensation and information service resembled services provided by the state while other services such as soup kitchens and food bank, bone and burial services resembled merchant philanthropy in China.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is to study the nature of mutual aid and philanthropy within the Chinese community of Vancouver with particular focus on the activities and development of services of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver (CBA Vancouver) from 1885 to 1923. Particular emphasis will be placed on the period between 1914 and 1923.

The Vancouver community is chosen because it became the largest Chinese community beginning in 1885 and onwards, and it had the oldest recorded history.

The Chinese migrated to Canada from the "four counties" called Sze-Yap in southern Quangdong in southern China. They migrated in organized fashion from 1858 onwards because of unemployment, lack of land for farming as well as high taxation. Also there was a demand for labourers to develop the mining, cannery, forestry, construction and railways in British Columbia.

Most of the Chinese who migrated were male labourers whom we call "bachelors". Not unlike other immigrant groups, they did not bring their families because they could not afford to do so. Employment in the new land could be transient and uncertain.

Especially between 1858 and 1875, but also during the building of the Canadian Pacific railway through British Columbia 1880-1885, Chinese immigration was welcome. However, by 1875, the British Columbia legislature prohibited the granting of the

franchise to any Chinese and all Chinese names were to be deleted from the voter's lists. In the following year the same legislature prohibited the hiring of Chinese in provincial public works. The same legislature had been urging the federal government to restrict Chinese immigration for years. Since the federal government needed cheap Chinese workers to build the British Columbia section of the Canadian Pacific Railway, this was never approved until 1885 when the railway was completed.

The Canadian federal government passed the Chinese Immigration Act in 1885 which levied a \$50 head tax for every Chinese who entered Canada. This was increased to \$500 in 1903. This is why 1885 is chosen as the first year of our study because it was the beginning of the new era of Chinese-Canadian history. Up to this point Chinese labour was part of the regular Canadian labour market along with Irish, Slavic and other ethnic groups.

Depression set in in 1885 after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. As a result thousands of Chinese railway construction labourers lost their jobs. In order to deal with the needs of the Chinese labourers and to fight growing racism and discrimination, the Chinese mobilized to form the Chinese Benevolent Association in Vancouver (CBA Vancouver) in 1889. Although the response to racism and discrimination was the principal cause of the emergence of the CBAs' across Canada, in this thesis we are interested in the development of the relief, mutual aid and philanthropic services through the CBA Vancouver both directly and indirectly.

The Importance of 1914 to 1923

Particular emphasis is placed on the period between 1914 and 1923 for several reasons. First, the CBA Vancouver fought against several proposals by the City of Vancouver to discriminate against Orientals in the area of employment. This includes Japanese and East-Indians as well as Chinese. These included proposals (1) to dismiss all Orientals working in hotels in 1914; (2) to limit Chinese hawkers working hours from 9.a.m. to 6.p.m.; (3) to close all Chinese stores at 6.p.m. in 1915; (4) to restrict non-white employers in hiring female white workers in 1919.

Second, it is at this time that the political voice of the Chinese in Canada, in the form of the Chinese Times, a Chinese daily was first published in Vancouver. The Chinese Times informed the Chinese communities in Canada on issues such as racism, discrimination, immigration laws and unemployment that affected their lives, as well as informing them about their homeland and rallying them around various causes.

Third, the Chinese Times provides a valuable resource to study the relief activities of the CBA Vancouver since her activities were frequently reported in the newspaper.

1923 is the last year of our study because it was the year that the federal government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which excluded Chinese immigration to Canada.

Research Questions to be Examined

There are several research questions which we seek to address. First, to what extent did the mutual aid and philanthropic activities of the home land and the home region determine the nature, the extent and models of relief in the Chinese communities in Vancouver and by extension, in other parts of Canada as well? Second, the extent to which local conditions determine the nature, extent and models of relief in the Chinese communities in Vancouver and whether they have modified traditional (home country) means of relief provisions. Third, what was the model of relief provisions in the Chinese community of Vancouver and what was the purpose and nature of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver? Fourthly, what was the range of services provided by the CBA Vancouver that covered the social and other needs in the Chinese communities? Fifthly, what activities did the community engage in that were outside of, predated, or went beyond the frame of reference of the CBA Vancouver? Sixthly, was there a "class" nature to relief in the Chinese community.

Sources of Information

The author uses three sources of information on the Chinese mutual aid and philanthropic activities for this period including oral histories, The Chinese Times and monographs. The oral histories consist of interviews conducted in western Canada with Chinese old timers who immigrated to Canada at the beginning of the twentieth century. Their oral histories provide

information on mutual aid, business among the Chinese bachelors and their lives in general.

An English translation of the Chinese Times, a Chinese newspaper published in Vancouver, Canada, located in Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library is used to examine the activities of the CBA Vancouver. The original newspaper published in Chinese, available at the National Library, Ottawa is consulted periodically to examine the accuracy of the English translation. The Chinese Times is a newspaper published by the Chinese Freemasons which was a secret society.

Monographs are used to provide background information on the conditions of the Chinese peasants in Sze-Yap, the four counties southwest of Canton, the different models of relief activities in China and theoretical models that deal with labour markets, racism and social welfare of self-help groups.

This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter includes theories that deal with racism, immigration, labour market as well as social welfare of self help groups that are pertinent in the study of CBA Vancouver. The third chapter deals with the "push" and "pull" factors of Chinese immigration to Canada from 1840 onwards. In addition, it deals with the emergence of the CBA Vancouver. The fourth chapter deals with the formal and informal forms of mutual aid, state and philanthropic practice which existed in the home country. There is also an examination of other relief activities, groups and activities which predated and were external or

peripheral to the CBA Vancouver extant in the Chinese community. Oral histories of persons outside of the Vancouver area indicate that the pattern identified in the CBA Vancouver and the mutual aid in British Columbia was also similar to what was happening elsewhere in Western Canada. The fifth chapter evaluates the programs and services offered by the CBA Vancouver. This includes discussions and analyses of the nature of the services provided by the CBA Vancouver population, the power structure of the organization and its relationship with other organizations. The sixth chapter is the conclusion which summarizes the research findings to questions originally raised. The appendixes include a history of the CBA Vancouver from 1914 to 1923 based on the summaries of Chinese Times, some notes, an afterward, a glossary followed by a bibliography.

CHAPTER II

Theories of Racism, Labour Market, Immigration and Social Welfare of Self-help Groups

There are many theories that are essential in the understanding of social welfare services offered by the CBA in Vancouver. These theories are concerned with racism, labour markets and the social welfare of self-help groups.¹

(1) Theories of Racism

Banton's Concept of Racism

Racism, according to Ruth Benedict, is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority. According to Banton, social scientists have followed this lead in viewing racism as essentially a doctrine. He states:

The kernel of this doctrine is found in the assertions:

(a) that people's cultural and psychological characteristics are genetically determined; and (b) that the genetic determinants are grouped in patterns that can be identified with human races in the old morphological sense that envisaged the existence of pure races (1970, 17).

Following this logic, Banton defines racism as the doctrine that a man's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characteristics deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand in

relations of superiority and inferiority (Banton 1970, 17).

The origins of racism started from the publication of Knox's The Races of Men in 1850, which was followed by Gobineau's Essai in Paris in 1853, Nott and Gliddon's Types of Mankind in 1854 respectively. The coincidence of their publications and the demise of slavery is notable because one may argue that those in power sought for new justification to maintain the subordination of former slaves (Banton 1970, 19).

From a historical standpoint, racism was an outgrowth of the morphological approach to human biology associated with the study of comparative anatomy. This static non-evolutionary view of human characteristics made no allowance for natural selection. It was only through the rediscovery of Mendel's work that the limit of this view was brought to the surface. Between 1850 to 1900, racism was supported by Darwin's work and other work dealing with genetics. Furthermore racism was used as an ideology to explain superiority. In those days the idea that Europeans were superior to blacks was seized upon and magnified because it was convenient to those who held power in Europe. The success of racism as an ideology was based on the possibility of biological explanation of cultural differences, its political utility and the inability of some of its exponents to assess the evidence in an objective manner. Banton distinguishes three types of explanations for racist theories. The first kind appears as a scientific response to the ideological needs of contemporary capitalism. The second kind originates in the

racial prejudice of their authors and the third kind originates in scientific mistakes. Authors usually advanced their arguments by using two or three of these explanations (Banton 1970, 19-20).

The first kind of explanation, utilized by Marxist writers, employs a functional model of the social system. An example is Oliver Cromwell Cox who defined "race prejudice" as a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior, so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may be justified. Banton considers Cox's definition of racism narrow because it was only concerned with functions. Banton argues that racial hostility had other aspects which are psychological, geographical and historical (Banton 1970, 21).

The second explanation of racism is the inductivist explanation chiefly found in the writings of American sociologists who are acquainted with racism in its modern form and worked backwards viewing earlier statements about race from a modern standpoint instead of setting them in the intellectual context of the time in which they were made. They are aware that statements of racial superiority were not justified and they wondered why the earlier writers did not notice this (Banton 1970, 22-24).

Banton also rejects this view by using the following examples. David Home in his book of National Characters (1748) claims that since the blacks had never developed any major civilization, therefore, they could be naturally inferior to the

whites. An American critic claims that Home's view of the blacks reflects the notion of white supremacy of the time. Banton comments that White supremacy was a modern theory which could not be used to interpret historical events without providing a false impression (Banton 1970, 22).

The third kind of explanation of racism pictures racist theories as conjectural explanation of problems as they appear to scientists and scholars of contemporary age (Banton 1970, 24-28).

Levi-Strauss considers that Gobineau's identification of race with culture was an honest intellectual error. Banton feels that if people persist in clinging to hypotheses in the face of overwhelmingly contrary evidence they may then be suspected of being biased or prejudiced. This approach locates the origin of racism within the history of science (Banton 1970, 24).

Banton claims that the first racist was Robert Knox, the Edinburgh anatomist who lived from 1791 to 1862. He developed a theory that linked biological variation to cultural differences known as transcendental anatomy. In Knox's hierarchy the Slav and Gothic were ranked above the Saxon and Celt but notions of superiority were not important to Knox. He considers that each race was suited to one habitat. Hence Europeans would not be able to acclimatize themselves in North America since it was designed for the Indians. Banton feels that Knox had made a mistake by failing to adopt a judicious approach to the mass of conflicting and often unreliable evidence about race available to a scientist of his generation (Banton 1970, 25).

Banton also examines Langdon Down's notion that a certain type of mental defect, known as Down's syndrome reverted to Mongoloid racial type. In the nineteenth century, Europeans believed that racial attributes could be subject to speedy degeneration. According to a theory in contemporary embryology, ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny. A human being becomes a human being only by passing through transitional stages of organizations in which he was similar to the embryonic forms of fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals before attaining human forms. In the highly influential book Vestiges of Creation published in 1843 it was asserted that Europeans or Caucasians, as a race, represented the most advanced stage of development of all races. The Mongolian is an arrested infant newly born. The Chinese were said to be a child race (Banton 1970, 27).

Banton does not consider Down as a racist despite of his classification of races as different stages of human development. He concedes that the notion of Down's syndrome was derogatory to non Europeans and that Down's syndrome was caused by triploidy of the twenty first chromosome. He feels the inductivist explanation of scientific error is not only wrong but dangerous because it implies that people like White, Knox and Down made mistakes because they were not in the right place. Therefore, in order to avoid or combat racism today what we need is a pure heart. Banton believes people also need a clear head (Banton 1970, 27).

Lastly Banton considers that racism as a scientific mistake developed when anthropology as a recognizable discipline was

bound up with the theory of racial determinism and no major figure in the social sciences between 1860 and 1890 escaped the influence of evolutionary racism. Banton recognizes that scientists make mistakes all the time, but it is up to the scientific community to sort the grain from the chaff (Banton 1970, 28).

Chase's Notion of Scientific Racism

Chase also writes about scientific racism. He claims that scientific racism essentially was the perversion of scientific and historical facts to create the myth of two distinct races of humankind. The first of these "races", is in all countries, a small elite whose members are healthy, wealthy generally by inheritance and educable. The other "race" consists of the far larger populations of the world who are vulnerable, poor or non-wealthy and allegedly uneducable by virtue of hereditarily inferior brains. Eugenics, Malthusianism, Spencer's Social Darwinism and Teutonism, later rechristened Nordicism were the four major cults of scientific racism that developed for historical reasons, in the wake of the contiguous Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Chase 1975 xix).

Thomas Malthus (1766 - 1834), the founder of scientific racism, advocated that social welfare for the poor was not necessary. In the sixth edition (1826) of his famous Essay on the Principle of Population:

We are bound in justice and honour formally to disclaim

the right of the poor to support.

To this end, I should propose a regulation to be made, declaring no child born from any marriage, taking place after the expiration of a year from the date of the law, and no illegitimate child born two years from the same date, should ever be entitled to parish assistance...

The infant, is, comparatively speaking, of little value to society, as others will immediately be in its place.

In Chapter 5 of the same book he writes :

All children born, beyond what would be required to keep up the population of this (desired) level, must necessarily perish, unless room be made for them by the death of a grown person.

Therefore, Malthus concludes:

... we should facilitate, instead of foolishly and vainly endeavouring to impede, the operations of nature in producing this mortality: and we dread the too frequent visitation of the horrid form of famine, we should sedulously encourage the other forms of destruction, which we compel nature to use. Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contrary habits. In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the house, and court the return of the plague. In the country, we should build our villages near stagnant

pools, and particularly encourage settlements in all marshy and unwholesome situations. But above all, we should reprobate specific remedies for ravaging diseases, and those benevolent, but much mistaken men, who have thought they were doing a service to mankind by projecting schemes for the total extirpation of particular disorders (Chase 1975, 6).

It appears to Malthus that any measures that improved the social conditions of the poor such as parish assistance, sanitary reform, medical care were not only immoral and unpatriotic but also against the law of god and nature. According to Malthus, all such social measures that improved the general well being of the public shared the common and fatal "tendency to remove a necessary stimulus to industry."

Malthus published the first edition of An Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798. The functions of scientific racism had been maintained. The functions were as follows:-

1. To preserve poverty or in Malthus term "a necessary stimulus to industry" so that child labourers, who were no longer eligible for parish assistance would flow to the landed gentry and the new class of mine and factory owners whose interest was represented by Malthus.
2. To prevent the passage of all social legislation which included social assistance to the sick and the aged, housing and hygienic standards. These measures enabled the poor to achieve improved standards of living and quality of life (Chase

1975, 7).

Malthus and his followers were able to prevent the passage of some social legislation that was intended to improve the social conditions of the poor. According to Chase, Malthus's supporters perverted the Poor Law passed in 1834 which was intended to bring relief to the victims of poverty into an instrument that imposed virtual serfdom upon them. The well-intended British Act to Exterminate and Make Compulsory the Practice of Vaccination, passed in 1853, was turned into a dead letter by the failure to vote any funds for the production and administration of the small pox vaccine. It was only in 1871, that 20,000 pounds sterling were appropriated for vaccines in England while 400 pounds were allocated for Ireland. This proved to be deadly during the smallpox epidemics of 1871, 1872 and 1873 (Chase 1975, 7).

Apart from Malthus, we should note the views of Herbert Spencer and Sir Francis Galton. The former created the intellectual aberration called Social Darwinism while the latter invented Eugenics. They both:

Institutionalized scientific racism by the since common techniques of counterfeiting biological laws and by misinterpreting and misusing legitimate scientific discoveries and methods to serve ends that, in reality, bore no relationship whatsoever to the sciences (Chase 1975, 8).

According to Spencer, Social Darwinism advocated the

survival of the fittest as the inevitable and biologically ordained fulfillment of evolutionary destinies. Therefore, in his view, improvements of general social condition of the population by enacting laws for safety standards for human housing, clean-water systems, effective sewage systems, mines and factory safety regulations, minimum-wage and working hours regulations in the view of Spencer, acted against the Darwinian laws of natural selection by "the artificial preservation of those least able to take care of themselves." (Chase 1975, 8).

Spencer's nineteenth-century American admirers included the railroad tycoon James J. Hill, and John D. Rockefeller Sr. The former wrote that the fortunes of railroad companies were determined by the law of the survival of the fittest. The latter told a Sunday-school class the growth of a large business was merely a survival of the fittest, a law of god and nature being worked out. Spencer's twentieth-century American followers included ultra liberal sociologist Edward A. Ross, President Herbert Hoover, an advocate of rugged individualism (Chase 1975, 8).

Eugenics was defined by Chase "as a pseudoscientific cult started in nineteenth-century England by Francis Galton "to give the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable." Galton saw all human physical and mental traits as due to either superior (eugenic) or inferior dysgenic blood and preached that the "race" was in peril because most people were by biological

inheritance, "ineffectives" and "mediocrities." (Chase 1975, 13)

According to Chase three classic eugenic "scholars" had influenced legislation and social practice in America and England. Two of these "scholars" are discussed here. Apparently the United States Congress had a staff member who was an expert eugenics agent. His army intelligence tests of World War I, he claimed, proved that Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Spaniards and other non-Anglo-Saxon Protestant racial and ethnic groups were inferior mentally. As a result the Americans restricted immigration by the Immigration Act of 1924. Less than a decade later, millions of Jews and non Jews were barred from sanctuary in the United States. As a result many were trapped in Nazi-occupied Europe and exterminated in race hygiene camps from Auschwitz and Buchenwald to Dachau and Treblinka (Chase 1975, 9).

In England, Karl Pearson, an heir to Galton, urged the British Parliament to enact similar legislation to restrict Jewish settlement in England. Pearson's book called Annals of Eugenics, published in October 1925 contained a study called The Problem of Alien Immigration into Great Britain. Illustrated by An Examination of Russian and Polish Jewish Children. In his investigation, Pearson found in the I.Q. test scores and the anthropometric measurement of the relative roundness or longness of the heads of the children of Jewish immigrants residing in London, all the mathematical and scientific proof he required to validate Galton's 1884 judgement that the Jews were a national parasite and, therefore, unfit to reside in England (Chase 1975, 9).

(II) Theories of Labour Market

The Historical Development of Labour Markets in Canada

Pentland's idea of a "capitalistic labour market" deserves discussion because it raises the question as to who would look after the social welfare needs of labour in a capitalistic labour market which was so impersonal.

Pentland's thesis was about the relationship between labour and capital in Canadian history which went through three stages. The first stage was called slavery which was practiced by the forefathers from 1600 to 1800. The slaves included the blacks, the Indian "panis" slaves, white indentured servants and convicts. In 1761 Indian slaves provided ten percent of the register of burials at Montreal. Black slavery flourished in 1688 and 1721, Most of the early immigrants to North Americans from France and Britain were probably indentured servants. Also Canada received substantial convicts from France in the 1730's, who were convicted because of evading salt tax (Pentland 1959, 451-452).

According to Pentland slavery was not a solution to Canada's labour problems because it was too costly to the employers. Whether the slaves were producing or not, the owners still had to maintain them. It was only in plantation agriculture where continuous, low-grade routinized labour was used, that slaves could pay. But due to the climatic conditions in Canada, the pursuit of most occupations was limited to a few

months in a year. Also nearly every employer demanded employees with skills, adaptation and mobility. The slaves were not able to meet these conditions required by the employers. Hence slavery as a solution to the Canadian labour problem failed (Pentland 1959 451-452).

Feudal System of Labour

From 1800 to 1850 there developed a feudal system of labour. During this period "Canada lacked a labor market and labor reserve, especially of skilled men, and lacked also the dependable demand that could justify and encourage a labour reserve." The employer, in the feudal system of labor, took more or less permanent responsibility for the employees overhead costs despite limited capital. Although he might not be able to use the employee continuously, the employee was sometimes indispensable and there was no dependable source of short run supply. In exchange the employee gave up the chance of a monetary advantage with another employer. The relationship was characterized by leadership and loyalty. The employer provided employment, care in old age and rewards to his employees. On the other hand the employee made himself agreeable. A good example of this relationship was the St. Maurice Forges at Three River which operated from 1732 to 1883. The permanent workforce numbered one hundred and twenty, and generation after generation served the company faithfully. The company in return provided long term employment, fuel, housing and recreation for their employees (Pentland 1959, 453).

The Capitalistic Labour Market

From 1850 onwards, Canada developed a capitalistic labour market. The rise of a capitalistic labour market depended on the development of a regular demand for labourers, regular sources of labour supply and the erection of barriers to workers' escape from the market (Pentland 1959, 455).

The development of transportation facilities that linked the cities in Eastern Canada as well as the growth of manufacturers and the availability of a home market in the early 1860's gave rise to a regular demand for labourers such as printers, bakers, construction workers, and railway tradesmen (Pentland 1959, 456).

As far as the source of Canadian labour was concerned, the obvious one was French Canadians who numbered half a million about 1842. But they showed little interest in wage employment except on a short term basis. It was the Irish who took all the unskilled labour and casual work of Quebec and Montreal. The Irish came from two sources; the Roman Catholic peasants and the Protestants mostly from Ulster. The first wave was the Ulstermen who immigrated in the 1820's and until about 1835. They were aggressive, ambitious, thrifty and poor. They were ready to accept any employment but they had no plan of spending the rest of their life as wage earners. They worked for a few years, saved carefully, then returned home and purchased a farm. New immigrants would replace them (Pentland 1959, 459).

According to Pentland:

By 1850's three events combined to protect the reserves of the Canadian labor market. The first was the fading into the far interior of the frontier of readily available land. The second was an influx of Irish peasants who were prepared to remain permanently in the unskilled labour market. The third was the coming of a substantial body of British artisans who were similiarly prepared, to remain in wage employment (1959, 459).

The second wave of migration from Ireland was the Irish Roman Catholic peasants, mostly from Munster and Connaught. These peasants were to provide the main constituent of Canada's capitalistic labour market. They first came in the 1830's to construct the Rideau Canal. The majority migrated in 1840's and reached its peak in 1847 due to Irish famine. Around 1830, they occupied all casual, heavy and ill-paid work for Quebec, Montreal and Kingston. In the 1840's they were employed in public works up the St. Lawrence. In 1850 they were employed in railway construction in Western Ontario. Unlike the Ulsterman, these Irish Roman Catholic peasants stayed in Canada as unskilled labourers permanently.

The second wave of Irish immigrants were particularly important in the development of a capitalistic labour market because of their preference for wage employment in spite of every hazard of low pay, uncertain employment and abominable

conditions.

Another group who immigrated in the 1850's to Canada were the English and Scottish artisans. They had preference of wage employment, and 4,000, mostly skilled labourers, were brought in by the Grand Trunk Railway in 1850's. They belonged to a settled generation that eschewed the radicalism of their fathers, and accepted the industrial society in which they had been raised. When an artisan left the labor market, it was usually to seek higher wages in another one. With the arrival of the English and Scottish artisans, a capitalistic labour market was developed in Canada.

According to Pentland:

A capitalistic labour market is defined as one in which the actions of workers and employees are governed and linked by impersonal considerations of immediate pecuniary advantage. In this market the employer is confident that workers will be available whenever he wants them; so he feels free to hire them on a short-term basis, and to dismiss them whenever there is monetary advantage in doing so. Hence, the employer takes no responsibility for the worker's overhead costs. Labour, to the employer is a variable cost. From a broader viewpoint, the capitalistic labour market represents pooling of labour supplies and labour needs of many employers, so that all of them may benefit by economizing on labor reserves (1959,

459).

Pentland's ideas deserve discussion because the Chinese who migrated to Canada after 1852 were certainly subject to the impact of the capitalistic labour market. They came to Canada because they were willing, like the Irish peasants, to work for lower wages. This was clearly demonstrated by the two Royal Commissions on Chinese Immigration in the early 1900s. But when they were no longer needed by their employers, especially their main one, - the Canadian Pacific Railway, it was the CBA and its affiliated clan associations which provided relief services to them.

(C) Bonacich's "Split Labour Market"

Bonacich's notion of a "Split Labour Market" also deserves some consideration. A "Split Labour Market" is one which contains at least two groups of workers whose price for performing the same job is different. The price refers to labor's total cost to the employer, which includes not only wages but the cost of recruitment, health care and the cost of labour unrest. There are two types of price determinants, the initial one and the latter one. The initial factors can be divided into two broad categories; resources and motives (Bonacich 1972, 549).

The first type is economic resource or level of living. In general workers move from a lower level of living to an area of higher level of living. After they have immigrated to the new land, they do not need to accept the original wage settlement for long because other opportunities, such as land for individual

farming, may be available. In order to keep wages low for new workers for a while, very often they were brought in as "contract" labourers for a period of them. (Bonacich 1972, 549).

Another resource is information pertaining to the cost of living in the new land. Workers may be enticed into signing contracts out of ignorance since they are not aware of the prevailing wage in the new land. An example of this was the Chinese who were brought to Australia to work under false and suspicious pretenses. In general, the more people that know about the conditions of the new lands, the better they can protect themselves from unfair wage contracts (Bonacich 1972, 550).

Political resources is the third type of resource that affects the initial price demand for their labour. The home government of the immigrants have influenced their wage settlements in the past. For example the British colonial government in India attempted to guard against abuses of the indenture system by refusing to permit Natal to import Indian workers for their sugar plantations until satisfactory terms could be reached. In contrast, Mexican migrant workers who worked in the United States were subject to low wages since the Mexican government did not protect them from low wage settlements. "In general the weaker a group politically, the more vulnerable it is to the use of force, hence to an unfavourable wage bargain" (Bonacich 1972, 550).

Two motives that affect the price of labour are both

related to the worker's intention of not remaining permanently in the labour force. The first one is that temporary workers tend to cost less because they are able to put up with the undesirable conditions for a short time. Also they avoid involvement in labour disputes because their immediate goal is current employment. They are also ideal strike-breakers because they are willing to take lower wages. Temporary workers tend not to join labour organizations because they have no interest in their long-term struggles. Examples of temporary workers are laborers with a fixed income goal and "sojourners" (Bonacich 1972, 550-551).

In a split labour market there existed three different groups: business, higher paid skilled labour and cheaper unskilled labour. Business is interested in lowering its cost of production so that its products can be more competitive. If labour costs are too high, business tends to recruit cheaper labour from abroad so that they can maintain their competitive positions. Business also tends to import cheap labour as strike breakers or replacements to undercut a labour force trying to improve its bargaining position with business (Bonacich 1972, 553).

Another group is higher paid labour which is threatened by the introduction of cheap labour in the labour market because it will either force them to leave the territory or reduce them to its level. This group may consist of current employees demanding a greater share of the profits or trying to maintain their positions in the face of possible cuts; also small businessmen

such as small farmers and private independent miners fall into this category (Bonacich 1972, 553).

According to Bonacich:

The following sequences occur in many colonies: settlement by farmers who work their own land, the introduction of intensive farming using cheaper labour, a rise in land value and a consequent displacement of independent farmers. This displaced class may move on (as occurred in many of the West Indies when African slaves were introduced to raise sugar), but if it remains, it comes to play the role of higher paid labour (1972, 553).

The third group, cheaper labour, has been used by employers to break strikes and also as a bargaining point to undermine the position of higher paid labour. In general cheaper labour does not intentionally undermine more expensive labour. Because of its weakness in terms of organization, it is vulnerable to the control of employers. A split labor market is not necessarily based on ethnic divisions but very often it turns out to be. Thus for example, Europeans may represent higher priced labor and Asians or Africans or other visible minorities may represent cheaper labour (Bonacich 1972, 554).

If high priced labourers are strong enough to resist any replacement by cheap labour, two consequences may follow. The first is the development of "exclusion" and the second is caste. An example of exclusion is the white Australian policy between

1896 - 1923. The capitalists attempted to import cheaper workers from India, China, Japan and the Pacific islands. But they were met with strikes, boycotts and petitions and deputations. The Labour party in Australia developed a "White Australia" policy during this period which was racially exclusionary (Bonacich 1972, 554-555).

A caste system is a system consisting of two groups of labour. The higher paid group which controls the jobs, that are higher paid while the cheaper paid group is paid at a lower scale (Bonacich 1972, 555).

According to Bonacich:

The higher paid group tries to ensure its power in relation to business by monopolizing the acquisition of certain essential skills thereby ensuring the effectiveness of strike action, or by controlling such important resources as purchasing power. Second it tries to prevent the immediate use of cheaper labour as undercutters and strike-breakers by denying them access to general education thereby making their training as quick replacements more difficult....Third, it tries to weaken the cheaper group politically, to prevent their pushing for those resources that would make them useful as under-cutters. In other words, the solution to the devastating potential of weak, cheap labour is, paradoxically, to weaken them further, until it is no longer in business' immediate interest to use them as

replacements (1972, 555-557).

(III) Theories of "Immigration" and "Colonization"

In Racial Oppression in America , Blauner writes about the relationship of the third world people outside of the United States and inside. In order to understand the social relations between different immigrant groups in the United States, it is important to examine how these groups first entered the United States.

People of the third world, according to Blauner, have never been an integral part of the Anglo-American political community and culture because they did not enter the United States in the same manners as other Europeans. The former were subjected to a process of colonization while the latter represents immigrants. Immigrating groups in general enter a new territory or society voluntarily, though they may be forced to leave the mother country due to economic and political oppression. The colonized people entered or became part of the United States through oppression, force and enslavement. As the United States emerged as a nation, the native Indians and black slaves and later Mexicans were treated as conquered people.

The people of the third world did not share the same type of experience with European ethnics as they entered the U.S. because of other conditions. First , they had been forced into the larger society or metropolitan domain. The second is that they had been subject to various unfree labour forms that greatly restricted the physical and social mobility of the group and its

participation in the political area. The third is that cultural policy of the colonizer restricted and destroyed their original values, orientations and ways of life. They experienced a cultural devaluation (Blauner 1972, 53).

Blauner makes a distinction between peoples of the third world and ethnic Europeans with respect to group entry and freedom of movement when they arrived in the United States. Blauner terms the first form colonization and the second immigration. However there are groups that fall in between colonization and immigration (Blauner 1972, 54).

Blacks, native Americans and Chicanos were, according to Blauner, groups whose entry was unequivocally forced and whose subsequent histories best fit the colonial model. The blacks were first captured in West Africa, transported and enslaved in the Southern United States and other regions of the Western hemisphere. The native Americans were conquered and virtually exterminated by the Americans in the last three hundred years. The conquest of the Mexican Southwest and the annexation of its Spanish-speaking population were other prime examples of such colonization. Blauner used the term "internal colonization" to label these processes in the United States (Blauner 1972, 54).

Other third world groups whose experiences were partly a mixture of both colonialism and immigration were the Puerto Ricans and the Filipinos. Puerto Rico was exploited by the U. S. A. but its population had relative freedom to move back to work and settle in the States. The Philippines were first Spanish and

later American colonies. The male populations were recruited for agricultural serfdom both in Hawaii and in the States. In more recent years, their movement to the United States was largely voluntary (Blauner 1972, 54).

Blauner claims that he did not have adequate historical evidence to assess whether the Chinese fit into this third world group. The majority came to work in the mines and the fields for an extended period of debt servitude in the nineteenth century. The Japanese who came to America in the latter part of the nineteenth century followed the experience of the Chinese. The Chinese and the Japanese experience were labelled as semi-colonial in the nineteenth century and their immigration in the twentieth century can be labelled as voluntary immigration. But the Chinese and the Japanese experiences were not similar to those of ethnic Europeans because of restrictive laws, which in fact restricted their numbers, power and influence (Blauner 1972, 54)

The "Immigrant" Model

The Europeans who came to America, provided essentially free labour, responding to a free capitalistic market. They were able to move to different parts of the Americas. According to Blauner, they expected to move freely within the society to the extent that they acquired the economic and cultural means. They certainly faced prejudice and discrimination. But since they enjoyed a degree of choice and self-direction that was for the most part denied to the coloured and visible minorities, it was

possible for individual Europeans and cultural groups to identify with America and see the host culture as a positive opportunity rather than an alien and dominating value system. Blauner considers that choice was essential in influencing careers and perspectives of immigrants and colonized people in America because choice is a necessary condition for commitment to any group from a social club to national society (Blauner 1972, 55).

The "Colonial" Model

The colonial labour principle in the United States is essential in understanding the difference between the histories of the third world people and ethnic Europeans. The labour forces that built up the Western hemisphere were structured on the principle of race and colour. The European conquest of native Americans and the introduction of plantation slavery were crucial beginning points for emergence of a worldwide colonial order. The white Europeans were associated with free labour while unfree labour were associated with non-Western people of colour. South of the Rio Grande, native American faced drastic losses in numbers through European conquest, massacre and disease. Ultimately they were forced into agriculture peonage and their entire communities were subjugated economically and politically (Blauner 1972, 57-58).

(IV) Theory of Self-Help

Katz's article "Self-help Organization and Volunteer Participation in Social Welfare" provides a helpful theoretical

analysis of the structural and functional features of self-help groups as well as the dimension of volunteer activities. There are several structural features of self-help groups. First, self-help organizations share the properties of small groups. This is because the organization attempts to satisfy certain needs of the individual. By belonging to the group, an individual achieves certain satisfactions which would not be available otherwise. Second, self-help groups are problem centered, organized with reference to a specific problem. Third, the members of such groups tend to be peers. This means that the members share a commonality or mutuality of problems with others. Of course a professional may be admitted as a member of the self-help group on a basis of quasi-equality after demonstrating the depth of his concern, sympathy and knowledge of the problem. Fourth, self-help groups is that they share common goals which are perceived and accepted by the group as a central problem or problems. Fifth, self-help groups are action oriented. The individual usually acts in line with the goals and sanctions of the group and with the expressed intent of the groups benefit. Sixth, helping others is an expressed norm of the group. Seventh, the "professional" usually does not play an important role in self-help groups. The professional may be accepted as an observer, but unless he shares the common problem, he is not considered to be a member, nor does he generally participate in the decision-making process. The last characteristic of a self-help group is that power and leadership in self-help groups

occurs on a peer or horizontal basis (Katz 1970, 53-55).

There are a number of functional attributes of self-help groups. The first is that communication is on a horizontal level and not vertical compared with conventional social agencies. The second attribute is that personal involvement becomes a prerequisite of all self-help groups. Each member is expected to involve himself in and to work for the good of the group to his best capacity at the time. While the primary motivation for the individual member may be self-improvement, it is generally understood that group goals and group welfare must come first and self-improvement as a by-product of working for group welfare. The third attribute is personal responsibility which means that the member is expected to give, produce and act to the best of his ability in accordance with group definitions and standards of what is acceptable or unacceptable. The fourth attribute is action orientation. This means that experiential fulfillment, rather than didactic instruction is frequently an explicit aim of certain self-help groups, and it is sometimes achieved. Katz's article on the function of self-help group helps us to understand the structure and function of the CBA Vancouver (Katz 1970, 55).

Conclusion and Discussion

Although Blauner did not write about Canada, his ideas on immigration and colonization are useful in understanding the situation of the Chinese who migrated to Canada after 1850.

Originally the Chinese migrated to British Columbia because several pioneer industries such as salmon fishing, coal mining and railway construction needed cheap labour. Like the Irish and Slavic immigrants, the Chinese were free labour which could move in and out of different labour markets. Their movement resembled the "Immigration" model discussed by Blauner. However this changed in 1875 when the British Columbia legislature prohibited the granting of the franchise to the Chinese and required that all Chinese names be deleted from the voters' lists. This restricted the social mobility of the Chinese immigrants. In the following year, the same legislature prohibited the hiring of Chinese on provincial public works. This legislation restricted the movement of Chinese labour in the free labour market. This was the beginning of a quasi-colonization period. The first head tax legislation was passed in 1885 by the Canadian federal government which levied \$50 on every Chinese immigrant. This was increased to \$500 in 1923. Because of racism and discrimination, the Chinese were confined to several occupations such as laundries and restaurants, which did not compete with the white labourers. Because of racist laws, the Chinese would not be able to enter professions which could provide them with influence and power. Therefore, the majority of them remained as labourers.

Socially most Chinese did not bring their families to Canada because employment for the Chinese labourers was transient and uncertain. Also their income was limited. This created a large Chinese "bachelor" society. Since there was a lack of women, the

bachelors had to return home to get married. After staying in China for one year, they had to return home to Canada because immigration law only allowed them to stay there for one year. It was not uncommon that many "bachelors" were only able to see their wives once in five years when they saved up money to return to China. Therefore, we can argue that Canadian policies towards the Chinese from 1885 to 1923 resembled what Blauner refers to as quasi-colonization. Because of this the Chinese immigrants found themselves in voluntary servitude.

Bonacich's notion of a split labour market is useful in understanding the situation of the Chinese labourers from 1885 to 1923 in Vancouver and other parts of British Columbia.

As Wickberg and Chan point out, the Chinese labourers who worked in various industries in British Columbia were often paid less than half of the white workers. In this sense the Chinese labourers represented the lower wage group while the white labourers represented the higher wage group in a split labour market. The employers used the Chinese labourers because they could keep the cost of their business down and remain competitive in the market place. At the same time they could control the demands of the white workers. Should the white workers demand excessive wages and other benefits, the employers could always threaten to hire Chinese workers (Wickberg 1982, 81, Chan 1983, 60-61).

The CBA Vancouver as a self-help group had most of the structural and functional attributes of a self-help group as

discussed by Katz.

The CBA Vancouver was a problem-centered, action-oriented organization whose members tried to help each other by contributing money and time to the organization. All the members shared the same goal, i.e. to fight racism and to look after the needy Chinese in Canada. In some respects, the CBA did not fit the definition of a self-help group as defined by Katz. For example, the power and the leadership of the CBA Vancouver was organized as a hierarchy and not on a peer or horizontal basis.

CHAPTER III

The Emergence of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver

Part A: Source and Reasons of Migration to Canada

Introduction

The interactions of two factors are essential in producing the influx of Chinese immigrants to Canada; first, the conditions in the home country were so intolerable that many Chinese were "forced" abroad. These we call the "push" factors; second, employment opportunities were available in other countries of the world, among them, Canada. These we call the "pull" factors.

(I) The Origins of the Chinese Immigrants

Before discussing the "push" factors that forced the Chinese to migrate abroad, it is important to identify the origins of the Chinese peasants who began to migrate to Canada from the 1850's onwards.

The overall population density in China in the late nineteenth century was about six hundred persons per square kilometre. The typical peasant household cultivated less than one-third of a hectare of land. The economy was based on agriculture. The holdings of the peasants were very small.

The Chinese peasants who migrated abroad originated from an area in the southwest of Canton called the "four counties" or Sze-Yap, which included Sun Wui, Toi Shan, Hoi Ping and Yin Ping. Cantonese was a commonly understood language, although the population spoke different local dialects (Wickberg 1982, 5-12).

The clan played an important role in the lives of the people in Sze-Yap. A clan is defined as all those people who are members of a extended family whose lineage can be traced to a common ancestor. The clan was the source of mutual aid in Sze-Yap. This system was transplanted to Canada with the arrival of the the first immigrants. When the Chinese bachelors came to Canada, it was the clan who financed their journeys. Furthermore the clan provided information for employment. It was not uncommon for Chinese bachelors to work in their relative's business such as laundries, restaurants, and grocery stores. In case of emergencies such as sickness, death, famines and floods, the clan would be approached for help. However not every clan provided assistance to their clan members in a equitable manner.

The people who migrated to Canada were not the poorest from the region. They originated from families who had some income, good credit ratings and some land, otherwise they would not have been able to finance their journeys.

(A) Factors that pushed the Chinese to migrate

Two major factors that contributed to the migration of the Chinese to Canada were the exploitation of peasants by landlords and the collapse of the Canton economy. These factors acted concurrently to facilitate the migration.

(1) Exploitation of the peasants by landlords

In order to understand why the peasants in Quangdong province were exploited by their landlords, it is important to examine the

relationship between social class and land ownership, government policy towards the peasants, the "feudal" relationship between the landlords and the peasants and the changes that altered the "feudal" relationship in the late nineteenth century.

Relationship between Social Class and Land Ownership

In the late nineteenth century the majority of land in China was owned by the gentry, followed by the merchants and small farmers. Although no statistics were published for Quangdong province during this period, it is safe to assume that land ownership in Quangdong province followed this pattern (Hsiao 1967, 384).

The Gentry

The gentry originated from families whose ancestors owned a lot of land. They acquired these lands in several ways. First, this was awarded to them when they had provided valuable service to the emperor. Second, these lands were passed to them by their ancestors. Third, they would purchase lands from the salaries they received by working as officials of the imperial government.

The majority of the gentry's income was derived from renting the land to peasants. Most of the profit from the rent was invested in purchasing more land or commercial enterprises in towns and cities or purchasing official titles. Little was returned to the land to improve its productivity. The gentry also used their income to hire teachers to teach their children so that they could become an educated gentry too (Hsiao 1967, 383-

384).

The gentry, as a class, was composed of scholars and officials. In order to belong to this group, the scholars needed to pass some provincial or national examinations in Confucian classics. After they had passed their examinations, very often they were appointed by the imperial government as officials. In the late Q'ing (1644-1911) period, the imperial government also sold honorary titles to the common people so that they would belong to the gentry class (Hsiao 1967, 574).

The gentry enjoyed a high social position in the Q'ing society because of their scholarly achievements. Because of their high social positions, they were able to influence the decisions of local officials. It was through this relationship that the gentry could accumulate wealth and protect their properties (Hsiao 1967, 382).

The gentry usually resided on their land. They developed a "feudal" relationship with the landless peasants and small farmers who rented their land for farming purposes.

The Merchants

The merchants also owned land in southern Quangdong along the coast. Their income was derived from small business and rent from the land. Some of them worked for foreign firms that operated in Hong Kong and Canton. It was not uncommon for merchants who originated from Sze-Yap to return home to purchase land after they had made money from their businesses. They were the absentee landlords who did not develop a "feudal"

relationship with the peasants (Hsiao 1967, 384).

The Small Farmers

The small farmers were a small group of people who owned some land in Quangdong. Since they did not own enough land to make a living, they rented more land from the gentry and the merchants. The major part of their incomes was derived from the sale of rice. Their income fluctuated because of the uncertainties of the harvests.

The Peasants

The peasants were the largest group of people in southern Quangdong. They did not own any land. Usually they rented land from the gentry and the merchants. Like the small farmers, their livelihood depended on the harvests. As a result their income fluctuated.

Government Policy on Land Ownership

The policy of the Q'ing government favoured the landlords because it considered property owners a stabilizing element in the country. Property owners included the gentry, the merchants and small farmers. The Q'ing government felt that by providing property owners legal protection for their property, it would indirectly strengthen their positions in society. Also it would win them over as supporters (Hsiao 1967, 386).

By examining several characteristics of the land policy, we observe out that it tipped in favour of the landlords.

First, the Q'ing government allowed its citizens the right

to own land. Also it allowed them to inherit land from their ancestors. The government was aware that land ownership was concentrated in a few hands. No attempts were made to control the amount of land owned by individuals because the Q'ing government felt that land redistribution was out of its jurisdiction (Hsiao 1967, 378-388).

Second, the government's view of poverty was that it was created by ancestral and personal shiftlessness. This meant that poverty was a result of personal failure and had nothing to do with the social conditions. Therefore, government intervention was unnecessary unwarranted (Hsiao 1967, 387).

Third, although the Q'ing government was aware of the hardship suffered by the peasants, only limited reform was implemented to remedy this problem. For example, in an edict of 1851 (Tao-Kuang 11), the emperor ordered the provincial government of Quangdong to encourage reclamation of uncultivated land in Kuang-Chou, Chao-Ching, Shao-Chou and other locations. The Q'ing government also warned the local officials in Quangdong that they should not be indifferent to the poor people otherwise they would not receive any real benefits from this reclamation program (Hsiao 1967, 388-389).

Fourth, the Q'ing government's taxation was biased towards the gentry who happened to own the majority of the land.

Since the Song (960-1279) dynasty, Chinese citizens were liable to labour conscription. However in lieu of actual service, the citizens were able to pay a sum of money to the government.

During the Q'ing dynasty the gentry was exempted from this tax because the government needed their support. This meant that the burden of this tax had to be collected from the peasants who were least able to pay. This policy contributed to the social and economic inequality among the peasants (Hsiao 1967, 124-126).

Periodically, the landlords were exempted by the Q'ing government from paying land tax because of famines and other catastrophes in their localities. The large farmers, such as the gentry, were able to take advantage of this situation. However small land owners often were not notified. Therefore they had to pay the taxes (Hsiao 1967, 390).

Fifth, the Q'ing government asserted the right of the landlords to collect their rent from the peasants. It also considered that the peasants who did not pay rent were equivalent to those not paying taxes to the government. This implied that it would be enforced by the government (Hsiao 1967, 391).

Since the Q'ing government did not act in the interest of the peasants, they had to depend on the landlords to make a living. Therefore it is important to discuss the "feudal" relationship between the landlords and peasants.

The Feudal Relationship Between the Landlords and the Peasants

A "feudal" relationship is defined as a relationship that bound the landlords and the peasants together. This involved responsibilities and obligations on both parties. In general, the obligations of the peasants were to pay rent and to look after the landlords' properties. The obligations of the landlords were

to protect the peasants from calamities and natural catastrophies by exercising their social responsibilities.

Payment of Rent

Two types of rental arrangement need to be discussed here. The first was in the form of crops. The landlords would make agreements with the peasants that they would be paid a portion of the harvest. Sometimes the rent was up to fifty percent of the harvest. The advantage of this type of agreement was that both the landlords and the peasants shared the risk of farming. If there were good harvests, the landlords would receive more rent. However, if the harvests were disastrous, the landlords would receive less rent (Hsiao 1967, 385).

Although the obligation of the peasants was to pay rent to their landlords, there were cases whereby full or partial rent were exempted due to famines and other catastrophes (Bastid-Bruguierre 1980, 593).

The second type of rent was payment in silver. In this form of arrangement, the landlords would demand silver from the peasants before they could start working on the land. The amount of rent was usually high. Since the landlords had already received the rent months prior to the harvests, the peasants had to face the risks and uncertainties of farming alone (Hsiao 1967, 385).

Landlords' Obligations and Responsibilities towards the Peasants

Some of the obligations of the landlords were to provide

small houses to the peasants so that their families could live there. Sometimes the landlords would provide seeds and tools to the peasants as well.

In addition to the obligations the landlords had to honour, they also had to exercise social responsibilities towards the peasants.

Most landlords were either gentry or merchants. The majority of them were trained in Confucian classics which stated that it was up to the elites in Chinese society to take care of the disadvantaged. Therefore in case of emergencies such as famines, floods and other catastrophes, it was up to the landlords to take care of the peasants. This involved provision of food, lodging and clothing to the peasants on a short term basis. This method of providing relief services was later adopted by the merchants in the Chinese cities and towns. Later they were transplanted by the Chinese Benevolent Associations in North America (Bastid-Bruguiere 1980, 592-593).

In addition to this social responsibility, the landlords also played a leading role in the areas of road construction, irrigation, flood control, and crop protection in rural society. These projects involved the participation of the peasants who contributed their labour in these projects. There were several reasons why the landlords undertook these projects.

First, the landlords were usually local elites who had high social status in rural society. The local officials would approach them if they wanted to initiate these community projects because

the landlords had developed good rapport with the community. Second, the landlords were wealthy individuals who would contribute financially to these projects. For example, a self-made merchant-official of Hua Hsien in Quangdong province contributed more than 3000 taels of silver to construct a stone-paved road from his village to the nearest market in 1893. Third, the landlords were able to recruit the peasants who resided on their land to work for free as part of the feudal obligation to work on the lords land or public works on these projects. Fourth, the landlords felt that involvement in these projects would be advantageous to their land; these would provide water to irrigate their land, to facilitate the transportation of goods to the nearby markets. Also it would make life easier for the peasants (Hsiao 1967, 281-290).

The "feudal" relationship between the landlords and the peasants could be characterized as non-antagonistic. Although the peasants paid high rent, they also received some protection from their landlords. Since they did not possess other skills, they had to work on the land like their forefathers. As long as they could tolerate the hardship, they would continue to work as peasants.

Changes in the "Feudal" Relationship

In the last fifty years of the Q'ing dynasty, the "feudal" relationship was altered so that the peasants were increasingly exploited.

First, after 1875, there was an increase in population. This

meant that despite their poverty, the poor peasants had to feed more people. Also there was a higher demand because more "privileged" classes wanted to purchase land. This included the gentry, retired officials, heads of large commercial concerns and banks, wealthy land owners and merchants. As a result land prices rose. The new landlords had to charge more rent to the peasants since they paid a lot of money for their land (Bastid-Bruguierre 1980, 536).

Second, the new landlords were not interested in developing a "feudal" relationship with the peasants. Many of them were absentee landlords. Their main interest was to obtain a good and fast return on their investment. This meant that they would no longer provide seeds and tools. They began to prefer fixed rents of grain or money instead of overseeing personally the harvest-time crop division. Furthermore they requested the peasants to post farmers bonds to prevent them from defaulting. Very often this amounted to ten years of rent in advance (Bastid-Bruguierre 1980, 591-593).

Third, there was an increase in taxation due to military expenditure, modernization and surtaxes charged by local officials. Between 1840 and 1911, the fiscal burden on the peasants doubled if not tripled. The land taxes increased by as much as 60 to 80 percent during the same period. The increase in taxation was not equally imposed on the big land owners such as the gentry or the merchants who used their influence to avoid taxes but was shouldered unequally by the small peasants because

the former used their influence to avoid taxes (Bastid-Bruguierre 1980, 592).

Fourth, there were changes in the personal relationship between the landlords and the peasants. It was rare for the landlords to forgive full or partial rent due to bad harvests. This meant that the new landlords did not exercise the traditional social responsibilities towards the peasants.

Due to the collapse of the "feudal" relationship, the peasants and small farmers were placed in an intolerable situation. One of the solutions was to migrate abroad in search of land and employment opportunities.

(2) The Treaty of Nanjing and the Collapse of the Canton Economy

An event which precipitated the large scale migration of Chinese to North America in 1840 was the collapse of Canton as the sole trading port in China. In 1830 Canton was a city of a half million people. Because it was located along the coast, it was accessible from many parts of China. Chan claims that:

Salt, fish, rice and sugar arrived from the northern seaport on Fuzhon junks travelling down the Quangdong coast. Rice and cassia merchants used the West River to move their goods to Canton; these traders might meet junks from Yunnan carrying copper, lead, precious stones and gold along the same route. On the east coast, earthenware, grass cloth, sugar, camphor, black tea, and umbrella moved in from Amoy and Fuzhon (Chan 1983, 24).

At the heart of Canton trade, there developed a group of Chinese firms known as "Cohong" which monopolized import and export trade. The "Cohong" regulated the price and the quantity of tea, silk and other export goods. In return it regulated the activities of all foreigners on behalf of the Chinese government.

Because Canton was the sole trade and commercial centre for foreigners, it generated considerable employment activities in the City. The best artisans hand-crafted fine toys for thousands of gentry children. They also manufactured furniture for the population. Fire crackers, paper, mat-sails and cotton were also produced in Canton. However this all changed after 1842.

The Treaty of Nanjing, signed in 1842, had a devastating effect on the local economy and individual industries of Canton and its surrounding countryside. One of the conditions of the Treaty resulted in the opening of four other ports for western trade. This included Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen, and Fuzhou. As a result the "Cohong" lost its monopoly of trade with the foreigners and this had a negative effect on the local economy. This resulted in the decline in tea trade, textile industry and peasant employment (Chan 1983, 28-29).

Tea Trade

As far as tea transport was concerned, the northern tea exporters from Chekiang and Bohea moved to Shanghai because it was more convenient and cheaper to travel by sea than on land. The southern tea exporters still moved through Canton. Because of the change in the movement of northern tea, the boatmen and

coolies along the upper stretch of the North River and at the Mei-ling pass suddenly found themselves out of work. One hundred thousand porters at Mei-ling and ten thousand impoverished boatmen in the North River became unemployed. By 1858 tea exports from Canton dropped to 24 million pounds from a high of 76 million in 1845 (Chan 1983, 29).

Textile Industry

The textile industry in Canton which flourished in 1830 came to a halt because the industry could not compete with machine-made British textile. Many Cantonese textile merchants were driven out of business. Their cotton textiles rotted in warehouses in Canton. Hence it appears that unemployment in Canton was a direct result of the Treaty of Nanjing (Chan 1983, 30).

Peasant Employment

The peasants who resided in the surrounding area found themselves competing with the porters and boatmen when they sought employment in Canton. Hence an opportunity to migrate abroad seemed to present the only hope to resolve their unemployment problems (Chan 1983, 30).

It is important to note that some of the "push" factors that forced the peasants from Sze-Yap abroad were always present; these included (a) exploitation by landlords, (b) unemployment, (c) lack of land or prices for land beyond their reach. Thus there developed a tendency for the peasants to be "lured" abroad whenever opportunities arose in foreign countries. Numerous "pull"

factors that attracted them to North America.

(B) Factors that attracted Chinese to migrate to Canada

Many of these same factors influenced the Chinese to migrate to Canada. First, the discovery of gold in California attracted miners, skilled craftsmen, merchants and prospectors. Second, the discovery of gold in British Columbia, Canada attracted prospectors, miners and merchants and unskilled workers to migrate to Canada. Third, there was a demand for construction workers in building the Canadian Pacific Railway. Fourth, the dream of the "Gold Mountain" also attracted numerous immigrants. Fifth, kinship played an important role in attracting immigrants. Sixth, the tradition of "migration" in China also played an important role.

(1) The Attraction of Gold discoveries in the Rockies

It is important to discuss the first Chinese who migrated to California because it was the beginning of large scale Chinese migration to North America.

The discovery of gold at the John Sutter's Mills along the Sacramento River in 1848 attracted a large number of Chinese to California (Chan 1983, 32).

Chen (1981, 11) claims a Chinese merchant named Chum Ming, who struck it rich, sent word to Chang Yum, a fellow villager of Sam Yap (Three District) area which included Nanhai, Panyu and Shunde counties. Chang in turn spread the exciting news further before sailing for the "Gold Mountain" as America was called by

the Chinese. It was synonymous with prosperity, hope and stability (Chan 1983, 32).

Three Chinese arrived in San Francisco in 1848. They were followed by another 323 in 1849 and 450 in 1850. During the first two years most Chinese who migrated to California were merchants and skilled craftsmen. The rest were cooks and servants. It is not known why so many merchants and craftsmen migrated. One possible reason was that the merchants and the skilled craftsmen thought that their skills might be useful to the new settlement. They were able to afford the trip and most likely profit from the move. As far as the cooks and servants were concerned, there was probably a demand for cooks in the goldfields and for Chinese servants in Chinese and white households.

From 1848 to 1852, it was estimated that 2500 Chinese from the Sze-Yap area worked in the gold fields in California. Most of these Chinese prospectors worked claims already abandoned by whites. Some gold miners became rich but most did not make it (Chan 1983, 32; Lyman 1974, 59).

(2) The Attraction of Gold Discoveries in British Columbia

In 1858 gold was discovered in the Fraser River in British Columbia, Canada. This attracted the Chinese to migrate to Canada. First, the Chinese miners who used to work in the Californian gold fields moved to British Columbia because the work there was limited. In order to migrate to British Columbia, they either travelled by boat to Fort Victoria or trekked north through Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington to enter the

goldfields overland. Between 1858 and 1859, it was estimated that two thousand came overland from Portland, Oregon to New Westminster, British Columbia. It is not known how many Chinese prospectors travelled by sea from California to Victoria during the same period (Wickberg 1982, 13-14).

The Chinese from Sze-Yap migrated to British Columbia via Hong Kong to work in the goldfields. Apparently the first group arrived in 1859 in Fort Victoria. However it is not known how many arrived prior to 1860. In 1860, the Victoria daily Colonist estimated 4000 arrived (Wickberg 1982, 13).

(3) The Need for Construction Workers in building the Canadian Pacific Railway

Another important factor that attracted the Chinese to migrate to Canada was the need for Chinese workers to build the British Columbia section of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the 1880's.

Onderdonk, the American contractor of the railway hired Chinese workers for several reasons. He was aware that Chinese workers were reliable and had proven themselves in railway construction work in the United States. He was unable to retain the white workers he recruited from the San Francisco area because they deserted their work site at the Fraser Canyon as soon as they arrived. He found these workers totally unreliable. He was unable to recruit white workers from eastern Canada.

The first group of Chinese railway construction workers numbering 1500, came to British Columbia between 1880 and 1881

via the United States. The second group numbering 8000 arrived in Canada via Hong Kong in 1882. These people were unskilled labourers who would build part of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia in the next few years (Wickberg 1982, 20-24).

(4) The Dream of the Gold Mountain

"Gold Mountain" meant the realization of dreams of potential emigrants from Sze-Yap. They dreamed about becoming rich in North America by striking gold, literally, a gold mountain by making a fortune through business. With the money they made, they could fulfil their dreams. Two of their most important dreams are listed here.

First, with the money they made, they could send funds to their parents to purchase some land which would be rented out to peasants thus making them landlords. They would become powerful clan members. The rent they collected from the land could support them for their old age. Should the immigrants choose to retire in the old country, they could live on the rent. Second, they could send money home so that their family members, such as their sons and nephews, could come to join them. Thus the "dream of the gold mountain" if realized meant that their economic security in old age or illness would be secure and poverty for them and their families would be abolished.

(5) The Role of Kinship in Attracting Immigrants

Kinship played an important role in attracting immigrants to Canada. It was not unusual for Chinese from Sze-Yap to travel to

North America because their relatives resided there. These could be fathers, uncles, nephews or distant relatives. It was quite common for immigrants to write to their relatives about the prospects of employment and encourage them to migrate to North America. Information on jobs and wages were essential to lure the potential immigrants to North America.

Typical places of employment were laundries and restaurants. Most of these jobs did not require special skills. It was not uncommon for the owners of restaurants and laundries to encourage their relatives to work for them in their business. Some of the newcomers became owners by working for shares instead of wages. This meant that instead of being paid in cash, they would be credited with shares equivalent to a certain amount of work. Joint ownership of small businesses was common among Chinese immigrants (Lai 1982).

Potential immigrants had three ways to pay for their journeys to North America. First, they worked and saved the money for the journeys in the home country. Second, they approached their parents to pay for their journeys if they had savings. Third, if their parents had some properties, they could mortgage their properties for the journeys. It was not unusual for Chinese immigrants to remit money home to pay for the debts they incurred for the journey to North America.

There was a moral obligation for the immigrants to repay the debts they incurred for their journeys. Usually there was no written agreement between the lenders and the immigrants about

the conditions under which the loans could be paid. Also there was no way of enforcing the loans. However there was an understanding between the two parties that the recipients of the loans would pay them in their life time.

(6) The Tradition of "Migration" in China

It is important to point out that it has been a tradition for the Chinese who lived along the coasts of Fukien and Quandong provinces to migrate abroad. It was not unusual for them to go abroad to search for jobs. Once they were settled, they would be joined by relatives and clans. Therefore, migration as a solution for unemployment was an acceptable practice.

Historically, Chinese migration to other parts of the world occurred in three waves. According to Lyman, the first wave occurred in the seventh century with the establishment of settlements in Taiwan and the Pescadores. This was a seasonal agricultural movement to and from the mainland. The second wave began in the Ming era (1368-1644) which sent Chinese explorers as far as eastern Africa and produced settlements in Malacca, the East Indies and the Philippines, following the trade route first established by the Arabs and then taken over by the British, Dutch and Spanish seaborne empires. The Imperial Edict of 1712 of China prohibited the return of Chinese under the penalty of death. But with the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 which concluded the Opium War, Chinese resumed migration to other parts of the world where their labour was needed (Lyman 1974, 3-4).

Therefore, gold, money, jobs, kinship and tradition were the main attractions that "pulled" the Chinese immigrants in North America. Family and clans were reliable sources to finance their journeys. It was a form of self-help.

(II) The Emergence of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver in 1889

(A) Introduction

There are four factors that prompted the emergence of the Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA Vancouver). First, the nature of Chinese migration must be considered. Second, discrimination must be considered as a contributing factor for the establishing of the CBA Vancouver. There was a need to establish an ethnic defense organization to fight racism which appeared in three forms; (a) official legislation which discriminated against Chinese immigrants in Canada; (b) the economics of racism; (c) actions taken by the white population to deny the rights of the Chinese as citizens. These included discrimination in employment and education situations.

Third, traditional patriarchal responsibility must be considered as a factor. It is important to observe that the Chinese merchants in Vancouver followed the Chinese tradition of the gentry in providing relief to the needy on the Chinese community.

Fourth, in the absence of any federal, provincial or municipal relief system, there was a need of establishing a

central authority in the Chinese community to administer relief services. These included assessing the needs of this community, co-ordinating and expanding relief services.

(B) The Nature of Chinese Immigrations from 1858 onwards

The first issue to be explored is the nature of Chinese immigration from 1858 to 1923, the pattern of Chinese immigration to Canada can be described as a response to a capitalistic labour market.

Pentland writes about the capitalistic labour market as follows:

A capitalistic labour market is defined as one in which the actions of workers and employees are governed and linked by impersonal considerations of immediate pecuniary advantage. In this market the employer is confident that workers will be available whenever he wants them; so he feels free to hire them on a short term basis, and to dismiss them whenever there is monetary advantage in doing so. Hence, the employer takes no responsibility for the worker's overhead costs. Labour, to the employer is a variable cost. From a broader viewpoint, the capitalistic labour market represents pooling of labour supplies and labour needs of many employers, so that all of them may benefit by economizing on labour service (1959, 150).

The first Chinese arrived in Canada in 1858. By 1860 approximately 4,000 arrived according to the Victoria Daily

Colonist. Most of these were men who travelled from California in response to the gold rush in the B.C. interior. Few men brought their families because it was not feasible economically (Wickberg 1982, 13).

Li comments on Chinese migration as follows:

Massive importation of Chinese labour, however, did not begin until the early 1880's when the Canadian Pacific Railway was constructed between 1881 and 1885. The number of Chinese arriving by ship to Canada between 1876 and 1880, for example, was about 2,326, but the number rose to 2,939 in 1881, 8,083 in 1882, and dropped to 2,223 in 1883. As a result the Chinese population in Canada increased from 2,500 in 1860 to 4,383 in 1881 and to 9,126 in 1891 (1979, 320-332).

Onderdonk was the contractor of the B. C. section of the C.P.R. Although Onderdonk had good experiences with Chinese construction workers in the U.S., he made it clear that he would prefer white labour and would only engage Indians and Chinese if he could find no other workers in eastern Canada or elsewhere. In the late 1870's Onderdonk recruited white labour from San Francisco. Many of these were later found unsuitable for construction work in the Fraser Canyon. Hence Onderdonk started hiring Chinese labour from San Francisco and Portland, Oregon one month after he commenced construction at Yale (Wickberg 1982, 20).

Apart from the construction of the B. C. section of the

railway, the Chinese were used to fill a vacuum created by a shortage of white labour at a time when the province of British Columbia was engaged in several pioneer industries.

Li's investigation indicates that:

The shortage was created in part by a large volume of out-migration over in-migration in Canada for every census period after 1851-61, as well as the existence of legal barriers in many European countries that restricted the growth of immigration from Europe (1979, 323).

Therefore Chinese workers were imported by employers not to replace white workers but to fill a vacuum.

According to the Royal Commission of 1885, the salmon and coal mining industry besides railway construction could not be developed without the aid of the Chinese. The development of these industries brought enormous wealth to the province of British Columbia.

(C) Racism against Chinese Immigrants prior to the establishment of the CBA Vancouver in 1889

(1) Anti-Sino Legislation prior to the establishment of the CBA Vancouver in 1889

The first legislation that discriminated against Chinese immigrants was passed in the British Columbia legislature in 1875. The Act known as Qualifications and Registration of Voters Act prohibited the granting of the franchise to any Chinese and

all Chinese names were to be deleted from the voters' lists. Any person who failed to comply with the provisions of this act was subject to a \$50 fine or one month's imprisonment. The Chinese in British Columbia did not protest against this act at that time probably because they were not aware of its significance (Wickberg 1982, 46).

This act was very important for two reasons. First, since the Chinese were deleted from the provincial voters' list, they would not be allowed to vote in federal elections, because the federal voters' lists were based on the provincial ones. Second, Chinese students in British Columbia were not allowed into professions such as pharmacy, law and chartered accountancy since they were not listed on the voters' lists. Therefore, this provincial legislation deprived the Chinese of the right to vote in provincial and federal elections and as well restrict or prohibited their entry into a variety of professions and skilled jobs, the first restriction of a socio-economic nature.

The second piece of legislation that discriminated against the Chinese was also passed in 1876 in the British Columbia Legislature. This act prohibited the hiring of Chinese in provincial public works in British Columbia. The effect of this legislation was to restrict Chinese employment opportunities so that public work would be reserved for white labour. It can be argued that Chinese labour in British Columbia was no longer part of the free labour market because they could no longer compete for jobs in the labour market. Their choice of employment was

restricted by law, which in turn reduced their social mobility and magnified the degree of oppression. This emphasized the need for some body to represent them collectively and fight for their right to freedom in a labour market. It also created increased dependency of needy and high risk upon the more affluent Chinese in the community as well as prompting new methods of meeting collective needs.

The first federal Anti-Sino legislation in the form of a \$50 head tax was enacted by the federal government in 1885, after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Macdonald, the prime minister of Canada, being a calculating man, felt that no further Chinese labour was needed since the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed (Wickberg 1982, 57).

The purpose of the legislation was to discourage Chinese immigration to Canada. This legislation meant that the Canadian government did not appreciate the important contributions of the Chinese railway workers who constructed the B.C. section of the C.P.R. But the enactment of \$50 head tax did not affect the number of Chinese immigrants. This was probably because unemployment was still a major problem in Sze-Yap in Quangdong province and because the Chinese immigrants were able to raise the extra \$50 head tax. By immigrating to Canada the Chinese still hoped to find employment. The situation in Canada, it seems, bad as it was, was still better than at home.

(2) The Economics of Racism

Li interprets the anti-Chinese legislation as a product of economic racism rather than a psychological or cultural reaction. His comments are follows:

From a larger historical perspective, it becomes apparent that the Chinese question, from the outset, was closely related to labour demand of the uneven economic expansion of the Canadian West. While Chinese labour was essential to the pioneer industries in British Columbia, the continuous exploitation of such labour required the maintenance of a reserve labour pool, the fluidity of which enabled labour power to be transferred from one industry to another. The basic dilemma then, was how to maintain the marginal status of a group whose labour was necessary for economic expansion. Legal exclusion from participation in social institutions provided a solution. It rendered a group passive, and hence vulnerable to exploitation. This was accomplished by defining a racial group inferior and nonassimilable, thereby justifying the removal of citizenship rights of the group. It is in this context that institutional racism that the Chinese has to be understood (1979, 324).

(3) Racial Violence Against the Chinese in 1887

Apart from the anti-Sino legislation, the Chinese in Vancouver had to face racial violence from the local white

population. One of the reasons for this hostility of the white population was that Chinese workers were perceived to be taking the jobs from white workers by undercutting their wages. Therefore, it was not unusual for gangs of white men in British Columbia in the late 1800's to attack the Chinese and force them out of town. The following is believed to be an example of the first violent incident that took place in Vancouver.

The violent incident against the Chinese took place on February 24, 1887 in Vancouver. On that day twenty-four Chinese sailed from Victoria to Vancouver to work at the Brighthouse Estate. The local white labourers responded by carrying a placard through the streets of Vancouver. The placard stated that the Chinese had arrived and that there would be a mass meeting at the City Hall in the evening. Several speeches were made at the City Hall which argued for the unity of white labourers and businessmen. After the formal adjournment of the meeting, some one at the meeting called for a show of hands of : "[t]hose in favour of running out the Chinese tonight." There was a strong response from the audience. A crowd of three to four hundred people marched through the snow towards the Chinese camp at the western end of the Coal Harbour Bridge. The crowd chased the Chinese out from the camp. Then they destroyed the shack. Later they lit bonfires into which they threw their belongings. The Chinese were kicked and some were manhandled. Some fled to the water to avoid injury. Part of the mob returned to Vancouver and set fire to some of the Chinese buildings on Carrall Street.

Others also attacked the Chinese shanties on False Creek (Wickberg 1982, 62-63).

According to one historical account, the Vancouver chief of police and superintendent apparently arrived on the scene of the riot very early. Accounts of the time state they were able to protect the Chinese from the attack of the crowd but they were not able to protect their property. Since only three arrests were made after the riot, the provincial Attorney General in Victoria considered this an inadequate response to lawlessness and riot. As a result, in 1887 he introduced a piece of legislation in the B.C. legislature entitled An Act for the Preservation of Peace within the Municipal Limits of the City of Vancouver. The effect of the act was to place municipal police under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Superintendent of Police. It is not known whether this could have prevented the riot. (Wickberg 1982, 63).

After the riot, the provincial police also brought thirty-six police constables from Victoria to Vancouver. Some Vancouver businesses filed claims for damages. For example, Thornton Fell filed claims for damages on behalf of some Chinese who worked for him. He also asked the Vancouver City Council to provide police protection to the Chinese who later cleared the Brighthouse Estate (Wickberg 1982, 63).

(4) Discrimination against the Chinese in employment

The Chinese workers who were employed in Canada in the late 1800's were usually paid less than their white counterparts, although they both performed the same jobs. Sometimes they were

paid less than half the wage of the white workers (Wickberg 1982, 49).

An example which illustrated this was the wages paid to the Chinese railway construction workers by Onderdonk, the American contractor who built the B.C. section of the Canadian Pacific Railways in the 1880's. As stated earlier, Chinese workers were hired because they were available and reliable and white workers were neither reliable nor available.

Onderdonk apparently paid unskilled white labourers \$1.50 to \$1.75 a day and skilled white labourers between \$2 to \$2.50 a day. In addition, he provided cooks, cooks' helpers and other amenities to the white workers. Because of their salary, the white workers were able to live on fresh vegetables and meat (Chan 1983, 61).

In contrast, the Chinese workers regardless of skills were paid \$1 per day. As far as provisions were concerned, the Chinese workers were given a choice between inflated prices at the company stores and competitive prices at local trading houses if they were available. Because of their limited wages, the Chinese lived on rice and stale ground salmon. Due to malnutrition, some Chinese became victims of scurvy. Since no cooks were provided to the Chinese labourers, they had to purchase their own cooking utensils (Chan 1983, 61).

This comparison is important because it not only demonstrated the unequal treatment of the two groups in wages, but also showed the social consequences of such inequality. Discrimination in

wages along "racial" lines was also a consequence of the racist federal and provincial legislation.

Racism, therefore, promoted social and economic inequality between the Chinese immigrants and other Canadians in Canada. It made them second class citizens. The conditions were so intolerable that the Chinese had to establish a defense organization. CBA Vancouver was such an organization designed to fight for citizenship rights, social, political and economic equality.

(D) The "Personal Relationship" between the Chinese Merchants and the Chinese Bachelor Labourers in Vancouver

There existed what Chinese refer to as a "personal relationship" between the Chinese merchants and the Chinese bachelor labourers that resembled the pre-capitalistic labour market model as discussed by Pentland (1981, 25).

In this model, the employers offered continuous employment to the employees because there was a shortage of workers. In the case of the Chinese merchants, it was likely they began to experience growing problems due to white labourers not wanting to work for them due to racism and discrimination. However the passage of new anti-Chinese legislation by both federal and provincial governments, the Chinese bachelor labourers found themselves progressively restricted from the free labour market and increasingly became part of a captive labour market of their own merchants and kinsmen.

In this restricted labour market, the employers were

deprived of the sanctions of dismissal, they substituted positive incentive to induce conscientious work. The employers developed positive attitudes towards their employees by showing an abundance of personal (superior-inferior) contacts, by expressing and demonstrating their paternal interest in the welfare of their workers by offering life long employment and care in old age. Because of the employers offered life long employment, usually they made the employees submissive and agreeable (Fentland 1981, 25).

(E) The Need to Establish a Centralized Social Welfare Agency in Vancouver

In order to understand the need for establishing a centralized social welfare agency, it is important to examine the nature of the Chinese community, the Chinese " bachelor society", the Chinese merchant group, the services provided by the clans of the Chinese immigrants and the Chinese merchants in the Vancouver area between 1840 and 1889.

There are no official statistics to indicate how many Chinese were living in Vancouver between 1840 and 1911. The first official statistic, the 1911 census, stated that there were 3559 Chinese living in Vancouver (Wickberg 1982, 303).

The Chinese community in Vancouver during this period was composed mainly of two groups, the bachelor society and the merchant group. This was typical of Chinese communities in major urban centres in British Columbia prior to 1890 as it was of California. Due to migration this pattern also spread to other

major urban centres in western Canada after 1890.

(1) The Bachelor Society

The bachelor society was so called because it was almost exclusively composed of Chinese males as young as 14 years old. This group came from peasant families from Sze-Yap, the four counties southwest of Canton to look for wage labour jobs in B. C. and these had become the working class (Chan 1983, 47-74).

The bachelors did not possess any marketable skills being primarily of peasant stock. Most of them did not know, speak or write the English language and therefore, were illiterate in both Chinese and English. Many of them never completed their primary school in China. They worked in different industries in the Vancouver area. This included logging, canneries, domestic service, cooking, laundry. The majority worked for white employers while a small number worked for their relatives in small business such as laundries and restaurants. Since the bachelors faced a lot of difficulties in Canada, they always developed loose knit mutual aid associations to assist themselves in meeting crises.

Most of these bachelors were not married when they first came to Canada. A few years after they arrived, a large number of them returned home to get married with the intention of returning to Canada. Usually by the time they returned home, they would have saved a few hundred Canadian dollars. The marriage was usually arranged by the parents. As a rule the bachelors would stay for a year before returning to Canada. Due to Canadian

immigration regulation, the bachelors would not be able to return to Canada if they stayed more than one year.

The bachelors usually did not bring their wives to Canada for several reasons. First, they had no money to support their families. Second, they did not qualify under Canadian immigration law since they did not own any property. Third, there was an uncertainty about employment. The wives, therefore, never joined their husbands in Canada. They could only see their husbands whenever they returned to China. Usually the bachelors sent money home to support their families. This is referred to as remittance (Louie 1983).

(2) The Merchant Group

The merchant group was a small elite in the Chinese community in Vancouver. The merchants were different from the bachelors in many ways (Chan 1983, 98-119).

In terms of occupations, the merchants operated manpower agencies, export and import stores, emporiums, restaurants and laundries. Most of their businesses were small and employed a few people. Some of their ancestors were businessmen from Canton, Hong Kong and the United States. Traditionally their families were involved in business. Most of their businesses were to cater to the local Chinese population. As their businesses grew, they also provided services to the local white population. Unlike the bachelors, the merchants lived on a higher and more reliable source of income.

Most of the merchants were married. They were able to bring

their families to Canada for several reasons. First, many of them owned properties and, therefore, they were able to meet the requirements under Canadian Immigration law. Second, they had reliable income from their business from which they could support their families. Third, they developed good contacts with white officials because of their business connections and high status as representatives of Chinese society.

The relationship between the Chinese merchants and the Chinese bachelors had several dimensions. First, the merchants provided needed goods and services to the bachelors. These included rental accomodation, food and laundry. Second, the merchants acted as voluntary welfare service providers to the bachelors when they were in need. This will be elaborated on later. Chinese bachelors were frequently employed by the Chinese merchants, manufacturers and businesses and because of the restricted labour market for Chinese bachelors, these wealthier Chinese therefore, had a captive and ready source of Chinese labour to meet their own needs. The Chinese bachelors in turn required these jobs as employment opportunities became more and more restricted for them.

(3) Mutual Aid and Voluntary Relief Services in Vancouver prior to the establishment of the Chinese Benevolent Association to Vancouver in 1889

(a) Mutual Aid Among the Bachelor Labourers

Traditionally, mutual aid among the bachelor labourers and

voluntary relief services provided by the merchants played important roles in providing relief services to the Chinese immigrants in Vancouver and other Chinese settlements.

According to Lai (1982), the bachelors approached their relatives for assistance in time of crisis such as unemployment and sickness. For example, they stayed with their relatives for free room and board until they found new jobs or recovered from their illness. The clan members contributed small sums of money to unemployed bachelors so that they could sustain themselves until they found employment again. If any bachelors died, their clan members collected money for their burials. Periodically they also sent their bones back to China (Chan 1983).

A form of mutual aid known as "hui" or "rotating credit association" was practised by the Chinese bachelors in Vancouver. The "hui" was used by peasants in Quandong immigrants in the United States to raise money for numerous purposes in the nineteenth century. The "hui" is still used in Hong Kong to raise money. The Chinese bachelors in Vancouver used the "hui" to raise money which was used to pay off a debt, to start a small business or to send a relative abroad. The amount of money raised by one "hui" was a few hundred dollars at one time.

Usually up to twenty bachelors agreed to join a "hui" to raise money. Quite often they came from the same village or bore the same last name. An outsider who wanted to join might need a sponsor who would be held responsible if the new member failed to

repay the "hui". Every Sunday they would meet at a bachelor's home. Each bachelor would agree to contribute \$5 per meeting until a total of \$100 was contributed. At every meeting some bachelors would bid on the pot of \$100. The highest bidder would receive \$100. In return he agreed to pay back \$100 to the "hui" plus the interest. The interest was used for a feast at the meeting. The "hui" would continue until every member had his turn. Bachelors could participate in several of these associations if they wanted. Quite often the bachelors found new friends and new partners in business in these associations.

There were several characteristics in mutual aid among the bachelors. The principle that governed the services provided by the clan was "reciprocity". Recipients of such services were expected to reciprocate when their fellow clan members experienced the same problems. The contact between the service provider and the recipients was personal in nature. The service was usually short term and crisis oriented. There was no long term program. Goodwill among the bachelors was essential in maintaining this service (Lai 1982).

(b) Philanthropy in Vancouver

Philanthropy is defined as voluntary social service provided by the Chinese merchants to the Chinese bachelors. This was across class lines; the merchants owned properties and wealth while the bachelors did not. They could therefore afford this. They benefited from it. And it was their traditional responsibility in a highly tradition dominated society, going

back to the teaching of Confucious who urged the wealthy to assist the poor.

When the Chinese bachelors first arrived in Canada, they were quite likely met by some Chinese merchants at the Canadian Immigration office who would put them up in their homes or in their boarding homes for a few days before they continued on their journeys. For example, Yip Chin Tin, a prominent Chinese merchant in Vancouver used to perform this function. Apparently he used to act as an interpreter for the Canadian Immigration office (Lai 1982).

Some of the bachelors who were looking for employment in Vancouver were very often referred to work by Chinese merchants. When the bachelors needed medical attention, the merchants would be approached because they had developed good contacts in white society. Therefore, they would be aware of good physicians. When the bachelors got into disputes with white officials, the merchants were contacted to find lawyers.

(c) Problems of mutual aid by clan members and philanthropy by the merchants

There were numerous problems associated with the mutual aid and the voluntary social service network in the Chinese community in Vancouver. First, there was a lack of long term programs to deal with problems such as old age and long term illness. As the Chinese bachelors became older, there was a need to develop such programs. Second, the voluntary nature of the social service network depended on the goodwill and resources of the service

providers. It was not so unusual, therefore, that some people in need were left unattended because there was neither goodwill nor resources. Third, there was no central authority to identify the needs of the Chinese community, act as a spokesman, to collect contributions from the community and to enforce social programs and fight for their rights and against discrimination. This pointed in the direction of the creation of just such a central authority the Chinese Benevolent Association. Thus, just as the state takes over this responsibility in societies (e.g. England 1531-1536, the Elizabeth Poor Laws etc). The Chinese community in Canada saw the need for some central authority to take over this role rather than continuing to operate on a voluntary and good will basis alone.

(d) The role played by the merchants in establishing the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver in 1889

It is important to observe the role played by the Chinese merchants in establishing the CBA Vancouver in 1889. The Chinese merchants in Vancouver were the elite of the Chinese community. They had wealth, prestige and power in the Chinese community. They also had developed good contacts with white society because of their business dealings. They were recognized by white officials as representatives of Chinese society.

The Chinese merchants in turn were very concerned about the well being of the Chinese bachelors. The first Chinese merchant who was interested in establishing a CBA in Vancouver was Wong Yok San. He was later joined by Yip Chin Tin and Lee Ching Sai.

They felt that it was their responsibility to establish a Chinese organization based on the model of the CBA Victoria, which became the prototype of CBA's in Canada.

The purpose of the association was to fight (1) discrimination in all its forms; (2) to provide social welfare services to the less fortunate in the Chinese Community; (3) to protect members of the Chinese community from attacks by white population and authorities and (4) to assist colonies in other parts of the world when they were in need. They were able to borrow \$2000 from a white Canadian and raised \$1,500 from twenty-five Chinese merchants. They were able to erect a building in Vancouver in 1889 with the second floor as a conference room and the ground floor as a hospital (Chinese Times 4 Feb 1918).

It is important to mention that by playing an important role in establishing the CBA Vancouver, the Chinese merchants were able to integrate the bachelors and themselves in the Chinese community. This created solidarity as an ethnic group to fight discrimination. Also this meant that the Chinese wanted to look after their less fortunate without resorting to different forms of charities from white Canadians. These included approaching the churches and the city authorities.

(F) Conclusion and Discussion

Therefore, it can be argued that the emergence of the CBA Vancouver depended on three factors. First, political, legal, economic and social discrimination including white racism, played an important role in forcing the Chinese to establish an

ethnic defense organization to fight for their citizenship rights and equality. Second, there was a need to provide long term social services to the Chinese bachelors. Third, the Chinese merchants were instrumental in providing the resources in establishing such an organization. Fourthly, an international relief system for Chinese colonies was also established.

CHAPTER IV

History and Philosophy of Relief in China and Practices of Relief in Sze-Yap

(I) State Form of Relief in Chinese History 2255 B.C.- 1870 A.D.

The origin of state relief can be traced to ancient political thought in China. Ethnics and politics were considered to be closely allied concepts in ancient Chinese ethico-political thinkers. The state was regarded as existing solely for the promotion of human happiness. Therefore the best government was the one that promotes the welfare of the people. "Benevolent government" as a term occurs frequently in the Chinese classics (Tse 1921, 16).

The goal of state benevolent office was the elimination of material destitution among the people and to realize economic sufficiency.

(A) Period of the Five Rulers: Emergence of the Chinese Poor Laws 2255-2205 B.C.

The development of state form of relief can be traced back to the Five rulers (2255-2205 B.C.) who were the pioneers in providing old age pensions for the population. According to Li Ki:

The lord of Yu nourished the aged, who retired from the service of the state in the school called the higher hsiang, and the aged of the common people and officers who had not obtained rank in the school called the

lower hsiang. The sovereigns of Hsia nourished the former in the school called the hsu in the east, and the latter that called the hsu in the west (1885, 242 466).

This can be considered the earliest instance of an old age pension system sanctioned by the state.

(B) Chow and Han Dynasties- Development of Poor Laws 1122 B.C.-25 A.D.

During the Chow dynasty (1122-255 B.C.), the state periodically provided relief to orphans in spring and summer. During the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-25 A.D.), an emperor ordered state support of neglected children and children of poor families by the public granaries. During the Song dynasty (960-1260 A.D.) public lands were set aside for the cultivation of grains for public purposes. Buildings were erected for the care of neglected children. An emperor of the Yuan dynasty, (1260-1368 A.D.) in 1271 ordered alms houses to be constructed to shelter the poor. In 1659 Emperor Sun Chi issued an edict in which desertion of children and infanticide were severely condemned. He questioned why rational human beings wanted to destroy their daughters while the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air cherished their young. He felt that the destruction of infant lives was a blacker crime than robbery. In 1711, Emperor Kang Hsi ordered the establishment of foundling hospitals throughout the empire. In 1724, a government almhouse was opened in Canton; and in 1739 Emperor Kien Lung ordered it to feed 4,676 destitute

persons. In 1783, the same Emperor reissued the edict of 1659, condemning people committing infanticide to be punished with 100 blows and exile for a year and a half. In 1873, a proclamation encouraging care and preservation of infant life was issued by the provincial authorities of Hupeh (Tsu 1921, 24-26).

(C) Classification of the Poor

As early as the Five rulers (2225 - 2205 B.C.), poor laws existed in China. The poor were classified into four classes according to Li Ki:

One who while quite young, lost his father was called an orphan; an old man who lost his sons was called a solitary. An old man who had lost his wife was called a pitiable widower; an old woman who had lost her husband was a poor widow. These four classes were the most forlorn of Heaven's people, and had none to whom to tell their wants; they all received regular allowance. The dumb, the lame such as have lost a member, midgets and mechanics, were all fed according to what work they were able to do (1885, 243-244).

Furthermore the law of China recognized the right for relief by those dependent persons, who may be classified as "deserving poor". Tsu outlines the following law from Ia Ising Leu Lee but fails to specify the period when this law was enacted:

All poor destitute widowers and widows, the fatherless and children, the helpless and the infirm, shall

receive sufficient maintenance and protection from the magistrates of their native city or district, wherever they have neither relations nor connections upon whom they can depend for support. Any magistrate refusing such maintenance and protection, shall be punished with sixty blows.

Also when any such persons are maintained and protected by government, the superintending magistrate and his sub-ordinates, if failing to afford them in proportion to the amount of the deficiency, according to the law against an embezzlement of government stores (1810, 93).

Although poor laws existed in China, their administration had serious defects. Tsu offers three reasons. First, there was no machinery to enforce poor laws because there was no provision to establish such an organization. Therefore its provision merely imposed additional duties upon magistrates already burdened with other functions. Second, there was no funding provided by the government. If the local magistrate wanted to enforce the poor laws, he had to find his own fund from revenues derived from the land tax. Since there were other priorities to use the revenue such as paying government employees in his district, furnishing fixed revenue for the provincial and imperial administration, there was hardly any revenue allocated for poor relief. Third, since land tax was fixed by Imperial edicts, the magistrates could not increase taxation to implement

poor law administration.

Due to the defects in the administrations, the poor laws designed to protect the "deserving poor" were not implemented (Tsu 1921, 27).

(D) Philanthropy in Chinese Thought

Although state form of relief was first recorded under the Five rulers (2255 - 2205 B.C.), it was the writings of Confucius and his disciple Mencius in the first century that influenced the development of philanthropy in Chinese thought.

According to Confucius, the feeling of commiseration which implied the principle of benevolence, belonged to all human beings. These feelings were within them. Also the development of philanthropy could be achieved through exercise. Thus Mencius wrote the following in Classics:

The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men, so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the principle of knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge, are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them ... Hence it is said "Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them." Men

differ from one another;- some as much again as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount:- it is because they cannot carry out fully their natural powers (1895, 402-403).

Mencius also stated that:

Men have these four principles just as they have their limbs. When men, having these four principles, yet say of themselves that they cannot develop them, they play the thief with themselves, and he who says of his prince that he cannot develop them, plays the thief with his prince. Since all men have these four principles in themselves, let them know to give them all their development and completion, and the issue will be like that of fire which has begun to burn, or that of a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to love and protect all within the four seas. Let them be denied that development, and they will not suffice for a man to serve his parents with (1895, 203).

(E) Practice of the State Form of Relief in the Canton Area in 1870's

It is important to discuss the nature of state relief and institutions in the Canton area in the 1870's for several reasons. First, the institutions in Canton provide a good representative sample of state relief institutions in China.

Second, most Chinese who immigrated to Canada originated from Canton and the four counties southwest of Canton known as Sze-Yap. Therefore it is important to examine the services provided by the state and in the mother country.

There were five major government relief institutions in the Canton area in 1870's. These were the Foundling hospital, the Home for Old Men, the Home for Old Women, the Home for the Blind, the Home for Lepers.

The Foundling Hospital

The Foundling Hospital was established in 1798 during the reign of Kia King emperor. It was located in the eastern suburbs of Canton. There were three hundred rooms in the building which was surrounded by a wall. The rooms were in a good state of repair. The salt commissioner was responsible for the control of the hospital but a petty officer who reported to the deputy commissioner actually managed the hospital (Kerr 1873, 89-91).

According to the Records of Canton, there was a list of expenses for the hospital. For example the monthly allowance for each infant was \$0.84, a wet nurse \$1.68, a female servant \$0.84, a physician \$14 in Chinese currency.

There were two departments of the hospital. In the first department, infants were received and looked after for a period of six weeks. The health of the infants was very poor, in the sense that they were brought into the hospital because the parents wanted to avoid the trouble and the expense of the funeral for infants who were already very ill. Each wet nurse

was in charge of caring for three infants. The infants' diets were supplemented by rice, flour and sugar. Milk was not available to feed the infants. Most died due to malnourishment. Kerr feels that proper management of the hospital, with introduction of milk in the diet, would have greatly decreased the mortality rate. When the infants survived the first six weeks in the first department, they were then passed to the second department where each infant was cared for by another wet nurse. There were 980 wet nurses who were employed by the hospital, 200 of them occupied rooms in the hospital. Some of them took their infant charges home with them. The wages paid for each nurse were \$2.52 per month.

The number of infants admitted per day ranged between ten to twenty daily. Eight to ten died daily. Most of the admissions were female infants. This was probably because of sex discrimination against female infants. Chinese society in the past was one dominated by the male. Families preferred male children because they carried on the family name and their lineage. Therefore it was not unusual to give up female infants. Most families who sent their female infants originated in Canton as well as the Fatshan countryside.

The children who survived were adopted prior to the age of five. They were daily exhibited in the reception room. A fee of two cents was charged for each inspection. Should the infants be adopted, \$7 were paid for their purchase, of which \$3 went to the wet nurse and \$4 went to the servants. The infants were

purchased by wealthy families who would later use them as servants in their homes. They would let them be married to the sons of poor families. But eight out of ten infants were purchased by women who marketed them; when they grew up, they would be sold as prostitutes. Kerr explains that since Chinese society practised female infanticide, hence the foundling hospital was used as an alternative. He lamented that the foundling hospital was used as "a slave depot and market of the most horrible kind."

The Home for Old Men and Women

The Home for Old men and Women were similar organizations located a short distance from the East Gate in the eastern suburb of Canton. The Home for Old Men was established in 1724, the second year of Emperor Yung Ching. An Imperial edict issued on 1739 i.e. the third year of Emperor Kien-lung, ordered that 4,676 destitute poor should be provided for, each of whom was to receive 42 cents per month. No deduction was to be made when the month had less than 30 days. This decree was repeated in 1745. The Home was repaired and enlarged in 1815, the 19th year of Emperor Kia King (Kerr 1873, 91-93).

According to Kerr:

The regulations established by Imperial decree and recorded on a stone tablet in the grounds, bearing the latter date, required that each resident should receive every five days, five catties, (three catties is equivalent to four pounds) of white rice and 5.5

cents for the purpose of purchasing meat, vegetables, salt, utensils and wood. Servants are to be provided to carry water and prepare medicines. A wadded jacket worth \$1.07 is to be given every year. A physician also is employed, but medicines are not supplied (1874, 92).

As far as admission requirement was concerned, persons must be 60 years old with no close relatives and no means of support. Since only 988 could be admitted, applicants would be placed on a waiting list. Also male blind children who attained the age of 16 would be transferred from the Foundling Hospital to the Home.

The person who was in charge of the Home for Old Men was the Prefect of Canton, but the actual manager who admitted applicants was his deputy, who in turn contracted the local management to a petty officer in the Home. The funding for the operation came from the Commissioner of land tax. The money was placed in the hands of two country magistrates of Nanhai and Panyu, who would issue supplies to the residents on alternative months. The former issued to each resident, every five days, five catties of rice and 32 cents each. The latter issued to each resident every five days, 65 cents. The Prefect of Canton gave an extra donation of 40 cents to each resident on the sixth of each month of the lunar calendar (Kerr 1873, 92).

An evaluation of the administration of the institution revealed several inadequacies. Apparently the institution required applicants to pay \$4 each per year before they were admitted. It was found out that this was the fee the Deputy

pocketed as a kind of Imperial bounty. Also the residents would not commence receiving rations until after two to three years. It was quite likely that the residents' families had to supply food to the residents. However should the residents pay \$14, their rations would commence at once. As far as the rice ration was concerned, the rice issued by Nanhai county was of a low quality and was mixed with husks and broken grain. Furthermore the rice was always mixed with water so that when it was dried, it actually weighed less than the specified amount. Instead of receiving 5.5 cents for meat and vegetables, they received only 3.2 cents for five days. The same reduction was made in the money rations issued by Panyu county. The padded jacket issued every three years was worth \$1.07, however instead of the jacket, 45 cents was issued. When one of the residents died, a coffin worth \$1.29 should have been furnished, but the actual expenditure on the same was less than one dollar. The Prefect's deputy apparently sold the management of the Home for \$440 for a period of five years. Also the physician paid \$100 for his office for life and thereby became the contractor who supplied water. Since the residents were treated inadequately by the administrator it was not unusual to see old men begging near the home to supplement their rations (Kerr 1973, 93).

The Home for Aged Women

The Home for aged women was administered in the same manner as that for Old Men. There were 220 unfurnished rooms which were in good condition. The building was located half a mile from the

Home for Old Men. The number of residents was limited to 1,062, but only 340 resided at the home. Kerr does not mention where the rest resided. Those who did not reside in the residence received their allowance by an arrangement made with the resident officer. Since the women residents were exploited by their administrators, it was not unusual to see aged women also begging side by side with aged men in the eastern suburb of Canton to supplement their rations (Kerr 1873, 93-94).

Home for Lepers

The Home for Lepers was another institution administered in the same manner. The two administrators were lepers themselves. The admission fee was in accordance with the financial situation of the potential residents; it was recorded that as much as \$100 was paid to enter. There were several hundred rooms in a one storey building, built in ranges, on two sides of a principal street in the eastern suburb of Canton. Although the institution was constructed to house only the lepers, it became occupied by families of lepers. The institution received rent from the non-lepers, thus depriving the active lepers in Canton of a place to stay while suffering from the disease (Keer 1873, 94).

Home for the Blind

There was a Home for the Blind which was also located in the eastern suburb of Canton. It is not known how big the building was. Kerr claims that more than half of the rooms were destroyed but he does not specify how and when it was destroyed.

Apparently each resident received 42 cents near a place called Emperor's temple in Canton. Again Kerr fails to mention how the residents travelled to Emperor's temple to receive their allowance (Kerr 1873, 94).

Kerr's study of the state institutions provides some insights into their operations. But there are several inadequacies in his assessment. The first is that he examines all these benevolent organizations from a Christian point of view. Whenever he was disappointed with the administration of the organizations or the social conditions of Chinese society, he attributed this to their heathen existence. According to Kerr, the solution was to convert Chinese society into a Christian one and to replace the administration of the benevolent institution by foreign missions. By so doing, Kerr feels that there would not have been paupers dying on the streets of Canton and the clients' needs would have been better served. There was no doubt that Kerr conveyed a sense of Christian superiority.

His description of the Home for the Lepers was also inadequate. He failed to mention who would provide medical services to the lepers. He also neglected to mention the number of lepers residing at the Home for Lepers. This criticism also applies to his description of the institution for the Blind. It is not known whether he could have compared the living condition of the aged population in the Home for Old Men and Old Women with the aged in Canton in general. However it was possible to compare the annual wages of a Chinese worker and the admission

fees charged by different institutions. This would provide information as to whether an ordinary person could afford to be admitted into these institutions from a sense of paternalistic responsibility.

(II) Philanthropic Thought and Practice in Chinese History

(A) Guild Philanthropy

(1) Philosophy of Chinese Guilds

Burgess's study of Peking guilds and guilds of other cities provides a descriptive summation of the Chinese guilds. Although primarily descriptive in content, it nevertheless provides some insights into the ideology of welfare of Chinese merchants. In general it was a conservative and non-interventionist type of ideology. The needs of the individual members were supposed to be met by themselves and their family members and therefore is residual in its nature. There was a heavy emphasis on self-help. The problems faced by the members of society must be solved by the individuals themselves. It was only when they were not able to resolve these problems, that the associations would use the funds from the treasury to provide relief services to their members. The funds were basically membership fees collected by the individuals as well as donations by members. The services were administered by the leaders of the associations and were crisis oriented because they were related to the life cycle of their members. Examples were burial expenses, medicine for the ill and travel expenses for the ill or aged members. The services provided could be

considered as selective. Membership in the guilds was an eligibility requirement although relief services were also provided to other members in the general population in times of crisis. Typical examples of crises were floods, droughts, fire, famines and wars. The service in these cases would be short term. As soon as the crisis was averted, the service would stop. Examples of these services were donations of food and clothing to a large refugee population affected by floods, droughts and other major calamities. Again the services were selective in nature.

(2) The Origins of Guilds

The guild association was another type of organization where welfare benefits were provided to their members in China. The origin of the guild can be traced back to early Chinese history. Morse finds that the origin of the Banker's guild of Ningpo can be traced back to the establishment of the Bureau of the Treasury of the Chow dynasty (1129 - 249 B.C.) and also to the institution of different standards of currency in the Han dynasty (B.C.206 - A.D.25) (Burgess 1966, 68).

During the reign of Kubla Khan (1260 - 1294 A.D.), Marco Polo observed that there were twelve guilds of different crafts in the city of Hangchow. Each guild had 12,000 houses occupied by its members. During the Ming dynasty (1368 - 1628 A.D.), guilds for tailors, leather box makers and confectionery makers existed (Burgess 1966, 74).

(3) Theories of Guild Genesis

There are numerous theories that explain the origin of the guild. The first theory advocated by Morse claims that the Chinese guild should be classified as a fraternity society or "hui" where groups of men banded together to worship a supposed founder of a trade or craft. Also the various economic functions of the guild were a later development. Morse claims that the prominence of religious practice in the Peking guilds in the early 1900 clearly showed the great importance of this element in guild life (Burgess 1966, 70).

The second theory suggested by Kulp claims that the guilds could have developed from the clan associations. Apparently the clan elders not only dominated the towns in southern China but also their industries. This theory could have taken two forms. First, these towns could have been originally dominated by those families. They took in members of other clans as they expanded but left the monopoly of their particular trade or traders in the hands of the original clan which formed the guilds. Second, the clan could have gone to another town to form a monopolistic association to protect their clan members in certain trades (Burgess 1966, 71).

The third theory, advocated by Douglas claims that guilds were developed from provincial and district associations. Apparently provincial mandarins who visited the capital found they were insulted by local officials and local people because they spoke poor mandarin and were not dressed in the same fashion

as the people in the capital. The provincial mandarins developed centres where they could meet and protect themselves from outside interference. The merchants who travelled to other urban centres began to develop their own centres since they encountered the same kind of problems faced by the provincial mandarins. In these centres, the merchants displayed their goods. Also vendors would visit them to display their goods.

There was a lot of social intercourse among the guild merchants and their trading partners. As a result, a spirit of fraternity was developed. This resulted in the provision of lodging as a service to guild members. According to Douglas, members of the tailor guild who visited Peking found it difficult to find lodging. Hence they called a meeting to discuss this difficulty. It was proposed that one percent of each member's salary should be donated towards a guild association and construction of a headquarter in Peking. Later due to insufficient foundation fund, customers were requested to donate. With these funds the Guild House was established during the Ming dynasty (1368 - 1644) (Burgess 1966, 71-73).

A fourth theory that attempts to explain the origin of guild concerns excessive taxation. It was a custom for officials to levy tax on commercial transactions. Sometimes the tax was excessive. Therefore, craftsmen and merchants felt it necessary to unite into guilds so that they might be able to present a solid front against excessive taxation. Writers such as Confucius and Mencius commented on the exploitation of craftsmen

and merchants by the unjust practices of officials. Unfortunately Burgess does not elaborate on how the front formed by craftsmen and merchants operated to fight against excessive taxation (Burgess 1966, 73-74).

(4) Mutual Aid Among Guild Members

Golas discusses the mutual aid of early Ching guilds. He feels that both the craft guilds and merchant guilds placed equal emphasis on mutual aid, however they differed in the nature of their activities. The craftsmen and workers who belonged to the craft guild lived close to subsistence level and were concerned about survival should they become ill and unemployed. Therefore services were developed to meet these needs. For example members of a craft guild might be provided money to travel home when they became destitute so that they would not become drifters. Also it was common for guilds to purchase land for cemeteries to bury their members.

With regard to merchant guilds in early Q'ing dynasty, the services provided to their members were different because their needs were different from that of the craft guild members. The merchant guilds were more prosperous than the craft guilds. Therefore it was less likely for them to provide money for destitute members to return home. However it was quite common for merchant guilds to provide legal services to members in case members got involved in disputes with officials.

Although mutual aid activities were mentioned in guild inscriptions, it is difficult to assess how effective it was in

practice. Many references had a seemingly perfunctory character. Penalties were not outlined for those who failed to render aid when they should. But in some cases, the rules were more explicit in outlining precisely what members were required to do in given circumstances and fixing penalties for those who failed to do so. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the agreement by the members to institute such specific provisions must have lead to at least some action (Golas 1977, 574-575).

Burgess's study of the Peking guilds also discussed mutual aid activities among the guild members in the early 1900's. The assumption was that the guild members and their families were supposed to be self-sufficient. It was only in the case of the lack of resources that the guild association would intervene in terms of meeting these needs. This represents a traditional approach in dealing with needs. Very often the services were selective in nature and not comprehensive (Burgess 1966, 169-173).

Common type of assistance included burials, traveling expenses, employment and medical expenses. In the record of the Peking guilds, Burgess finds specifically that apprentices who died without funds were to be provided with coffins. Also funds for Chinese herbal medicine were issued to members who were ill. Burgess provides descriptions of the charitable work provided by some guilds. The Cloisonne Designers reported that they provided a cemetery, funeral expenses, medicine and job referrals for their members. The Cloisonne Designers was the sole guild that

assisted their members to locate jobs. Unfortunately Burgess does not expand on this interesting point. The Actors' guild would perform special plays to raise funds for the medical care of the sick and for the burial of the dead.

(5) Charity by Guild Associations

According to Burgess, the commercial guilds provided goods and services to non-members. The nature of the service was selective. It was meant to meet emergency needs of the community. Generally guilds did not offer the same type of goods and services to the community. There are several examples. The Coal Stores guild provided free coal to the poor while the Rice and Flour Merchants contributed grain for famine relief. The Hotel Keepers provided congee in their soup kitchens. Congee is a porridge made by boiling rice and water until a thick soup is formed. Generally congee was consumed by the general public as breakfast in China. However it was also used as a diet for the poor who could not afford to purchase meat and vegetables. In addition to congee, the Hotel Keepers provided a famine relief fund and general outdoor relief in the cities. The Nanking Flowered Satin Stores Guild provided services to members and non members alike. Their services included the use of a cemetery for the burial of paupers, general charitable relief for war refugees and victims of floods and droughts. They also supplied medical relief coffins for paupers, padded clothes for the poor and distributed free tea, presumably to beggars. They indicated that they would only supply these services upon request. In

other words they did not actively promote philanthropy.

Philanthropy was not confined to commercial guilds. The Actors' guilds performed charity plays to raise funds on new years eve for general poor relief.

(B) Clan Philanthropy

Another form of assistance available to members of the community in rural areas in South China was clan philanthropy. This form of assistance was provided to people who belonged to kinship groups. The clans they belonged to were reasonably prosperous otherwise they could not afford to provide assistance.

(1) Philosophy of Clan Philanthropy

The ideology of clan philanthropy was similar of that of merchant philanthropy. Individuals were responsible to look after themselves in crisis. It was only when they could not look after themselves, then the clan would assist them. The programs offered by the clan were selective and residual in nature. It was also paternalistic.

(2) Land and Granaries as Resources for Relief

A system of "ritual" land and granaries were established by the clan administrators for the purpose of performing rituals as well as providing relief to the local population. The ritual land owned by the clans was usually rented to the peasants. The rent paid by the peasants was used to support the relief programs. Granaries were usually established so that relief programs could be funded from the sale of grain.

(3) Program Administrators

The administrators of clan philanthropic programs were limited to the gentry because of the following reasons. First, they contributed money and land to purchase "ritual" land and granaries because they were rich land owners. Second, they had considerable influence in their kinship groups because they were considered to be "successful" and well educated. Third, by acting as voluntary administrators, they maintained their "feudal" relationship with the peasants. Fourth, by acting as voluntary administrators, they were looked upon as virtuous and caring individuals by community members.

(4) Programs offered by Clan Philanthropy

Different forms of assistance, services and programs offered by clan philanthropy:

Education

Students who were members of the clan were issued allowance to participate in the district, provincial and national examinations. The allowance issued for district examinations was for payment of fees. The allowance issued for provincial and national examinations were for the purpose of fees and travelling expenses. In addition to an allowance, the students who succeeded in these examinations were awarded scholarships (Hsiao 1960, 337-342).

In addition to providing scholarships and allowance to students, some clans operated schools in the ancestral halls

located on "ritual" land. They also hired teachers to teach Chinese classics to children who belonged to families of modest means.

Services to the Aged

A food and clothing allowance was issued to any clan members who were over sixty years of age. Sometimes instead of the allowance they would receive meat and rice subsidy annually (Hsiao 1960, 337).

Services to the widowed

Services to the widowed were confined to those who did not remarry. A food and clothing allowance was usually issued to widows by the clan welfare administrators (Hsiao 1960, 339).

Services to the desititue, sick and disabled

The clan welfare administors also issued grain to the desitute, sick or disabled. The amount varied with the size of their respective families. Those who lacked money to finance weddings or funerals were given suitable assistance (Hsiao 1960, 337).

Emergency Assistance

In time of crisis, the clan also issued rice certificates to the needy population so that they could obtain rice from the clan granaries.

It is not known how these programs were administered. For example, we are not aware of its eligibility requirements and

budgets.

People who were in need in the rural areas also approached their extended families for assistance instead of approaching the clan welfare administrators.

(3) Merchant Philanthropy

We have discussed merchant philanthropy between the Chinese merchants and the Chinese bachelor labourers in the previous chapter. Here we will confine our discussion to the Hall of the Sustaining Love in the Canton area. This example is chosen because it was a charitable organization supported by merchants. Also the Chinese emmigrated from the vicinity of Canton.

Hall of Sustaining Love

Another local organization which Kerr studied in the 1870's in Canton was Oi Yuk Shin Tong, or Hall of Sustaining Love. It was a charitable organization supported and organized by Canton merchants.

Five types of programs were offered to the general public in Canton. These were; education, burial service, dispensary, food and clothing. Merchants donated money to the organization which was invested in real estate so that the charity could maintain itself from rental income (Kerr 1874, 108-113).

Public Education

With regard to public education, the Hall of Sustaining Love provided education to the masses. The program included the

Sacred Edict and doctrines of the Chinese classics. Under Emperor Kien Lung, local Chinese officials were instructed to explain the Sacred Edict for the edification of the people. This took place on the first and the fifteenth date of the month. The Association felt that it was the duty of every government to place the means of elementary education within the reach of all people under its control. Should the government fail to do so, it would be up to the better classes in society to provide such education. The Association hired teachers in Canton and in parts of Quangdong province to provide such instruction. For example in 1872, out of a budget of \$2,834.77 (Chinese currency), 564 scholars and 20 teachers were hired to teach in 19 schools. The wages of teachers alone were \$2,043.51. In 1873, the total budget was \$2,061.48 for free schools. Out of this 16 teachers and 391 scholars were hired to teach in 15 schools (Kerr 1874, 109-110).

Burial Service

Burial service was another program offered by the Hall of Sustaining Love. The burial service included provision of coffins, wages for the carriers and cost of tomb stones, worship of tombs and payment for the graves. Kerr feels that the provision of coffins to people was related to the living and to the dead. He feels that it was good to provide coffins to the poor at the time of distress and bereavement. However, this service was related to the superstitions of Chinese society which worshiped their deceased ancestors, their tombs, and celebrated

the repose of the dead annually. In Kerr's investigation, there were three types of coffins. The best one cost \$3.62 each, the medium cost \$2.41 each and the common coffin cost \$1.40 each. The better coffins were provided for the aged and those who had done some good deeds in society. However the common coffins were provided to the paupers who died in the street.

In 1872, the budget of the Association for burial service was \$2,490.80. Out of this, \$1,848.49 was for coffins; 25 best quality coffins at \$3.62 each; 584 medium quality coffins at \$2.41 each and 227 pauper coffins at \$1.40 each. \$307.47 was spent on wages of carriers and the cost of tomb stones. \$318.30 was used to pay for graves, while \$16.81 was used for worship of tombs. In 1873 the total budget for the burial service was \$1,540.38. Out of this \$1,228.98 was used for coffins; 22 best quality coffins at \$3.62 each was paid; 409 medium quality coffins at \$2.41 each was paid; 116 common coffins at \$1.40 each was paid. \$293.14 was used in the 1873 budget for graves and graves stones while \$18.26 was used for the worship of tombs. It was unusual that wages for the carriers were not included for this year. Also it is not known why the 1872 budget exceeded the 1873 budget by more than 900 dollars (Kerr 1874, 110-111).

Dispensary

The dispensary was the third program offered by the same charity. It was reported that the Association hired four physicians to provide 37,758 prescriptions which were filled by drug stores gratuitously. In 1873 three physicians apparently

were hired by the Association to provide 22,589 prescriptions.

The working hours of the dispensary was from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. daily. A door-keeper issued tickets to patients as they arrived. The tickets were in 3 sets which represented different physicians. After the patients were examined, prescriptions would be written out, which the patients took to the drug stores engaged by the Association for gratuitous filling. They could have these filled at any shops by paying for them themselves.

Apart from prescriptions, the Association also provided rice porridge and jackets to poor people. In 1872, rice porridge was issued for six days. Also 100 jackets worth a total of \$16.73 were distributed. In 1873, it was reported that 526 jackets were donated to the association, but it is not known whether any of these jackets were distributed to poor people.

After examining the general expenditures of the Hall of Sustaining Love, Kerr finds that the secretaries of the Association were well paid in terms of salaries and other benefits. For example in 1872, the budget was \$1,905.53 for general expenditure. Out of this \$405.46 was paid to six secretaries. In addition \$849.75 was paid for their cost of food, oil, coal and tobacco. Kerr compares the salary and other benefits of the secretaries and rice porridge given in 5 days and 100 padded jackets issued in 1872. The total cost was \$33.02. He feels that the Association could have made use of the money in a better way. He states that 200 poor people might enjoy each for two months, the benefit of good living (Kerr 1874, 111-112).

(III) Mutual Aid

(A) Rotating Credit Association (RCA)

The rotating Credit Association was a common form of mutual aid in the Chinese countryside and cities. It was also practised by Chinese communities in Canada.

According to Kulp, the RCA was organized by poor people who needed cash and also were refused by rich families because they lacked security. When a poor person needed money, he would locate people who were in similiar situtations to organize an association. If the organizer needed fifty dollars, he would approach ten people to join a RCA whose members would be willing to lend five dollars to the organizer. The members would arrange to meet, usually once a month. The organizer would arrange a feast which cost him five dollars and which would be his first repayment on the instalment plan. He did not repay in cash but in the feast which he provided at a cost equal to the amount paid to him by each member. In an association of ten members in which fifty dollars was borrowed, therefore in addition to the organizer, it would take ten months until the association ceased to exist. The organizer would host ten feasts which was worth five dollars each. By the end of the tenth feast, he would repay his fifty dollars (1925, 189-196).

At the first feast each member would cast dice once. The member who threw the highest score would be paid five dollars by every member of the club with the exception of the organizer. He could receive a total of forty five dollars. The difference

between the total he paid into the association during its existence and the amount paid to him by other members when he won his turn would be his contribution to the cost of the feasts. At the following feasts the procedure was repeated until each member had been paid his forty five dollars. Thus each member contributed fifty dollars and received forty five in cash as a lump sum. Furthermore he did a favour to the organizer and enjoyed the feasts with the food, companionship and conviviality.

RCAs can be viewed as a vehicle used by poor people to generate cash for a particular purpose such as paying off a debt or sending a relative abroad. It was a democratically administered organization where each member participated in the decision making. Members who wanted to join had to pledge that they would not run away with the money after they won their turn. Sometimes members who sponsored the delinquent member to the association might have to cover the money themselves. RCAs were subsequently transferred by Chinese in Canada to raise capital to open small business such as laundries and restaurants.

(B) Parental Burial Association (PBA)

Another type of mutual aid association that existed in the Chinese countryside was the Parental Burial Association, which was joined by both rich and poor people. As far as the poor people were concerned, it was important for them to pay cash for the funeral expenses of their parents because filial piety was regarded as an important virtue of Chinese society. The more elaborate the funeral, the greater the filial piety. However rich

people joined the FBA for a different reason. Since they had no problem raising cash to bury their parents, they still needed hands to assist in the performance of the humble but necessary duties of laying out the corpse and mourning (Kulp 1925, 196-203).

People who joined the FBA were usually those with aged parents. It was rather amorphous and rested simply on a general agreement to co-operate. The FBA members might meet once a year, usually at the Chinese New Year when they would hold a feast and drink wine to the health and long life of their parents. When one or more parents of a member died, they also conducted religious worship in honour of the deceased on this occasion.

The PBAs usually consisted of a membership of between ten to thirty people. In order to become a member, each had to pay two dollars as a membership fee. The money accumulated from the membership fees was usually lent to other people at the best interest rates available and constituted the capital of this co-operative society. When one of the parents died, each member would contribute two dollars to the bereaved son. If this money proved to be inadequate, he would then borrow money from the capital fund of the PBA. The use of these funds, however, was not limited to the needs of the death crisis; he might secure a loan from these funds whenever there was a real financial need. In addition to the money contributed towards the burial expenses, when one of the parents passed away, each member would send two persons to render assistance in any capacity, as if they were

performing the last rites for their own parents. This assistance was available until the parent was finally laid to rest in the graveyard. The PBA would continue until the last parent of all the members was properly buried.

The RCA and the PBA were similar mutual aid organizations. Both organizations were made up of voluntary members who participated in a savings society. The membership for both organizations was small. Both organizations were financed by their members. Compared with the RCA, the PBA was a more permanent association because the parents of the members might live for a long time. The former was organized by poor people because they were unable to borrow money from rich families, however the PBA was also joined by rich people because they could count on manpower to work in the funerals. Membership in both organizations would dissolve as soon as the organizations served their purpose. Both organizations served economic as well as social functions. The existence of these organizations could be viewed as due to the lack of social services by the state in these areas.

Summary and Discussion

By examining the philosophy, the organization, services and the clients, it is possible to examine the role played by the state form of relief, charities organized by merchants, the clan and guilds as well as rotating credit associations.

With regard to philosophy, the different forms of relief share a conservative philosophy. Individuals were expected to

resolve problems such as education, burials and health by themselves. Self-reliance was an essential element of this thinking. It was only when the individuals were unable to resolve these problems that they would turn to their families and clans for assistance. If their relatives were not able to resolve these problems, they were expected to approach the state, the guilds or the rotating credit associations to meet their needs. Generally services provided were selective and short term in nature. They were crisis oriented and not comprehensive.

As far as the organization was concerned, generally the state form of relief was elaborate. First, the state form of relief originated from the decrees of emperors. Second, it was administered by local officials. Third, its services were funded by taxation. Fourth, there was a permanent organization that continued to provide services from generation to generation.

With regard to merchant or guild associations, they were generally smaller than the state form of relief. They derived their power to provide assistance from their charters. Sometimes they assumed the role of the government in the absence of state programs. The funding was donated by the members. This could be affected by the business cycle. During time of prosperity, the coffers would be full. Hence more services could be provided. In time of depressions, there would hardly be any funds to disburse. Generally merchant associations offered different services. Unlike the state form of relief, merchant associations were not

as permanent since services were determined by fluctuating funding. Therefore it was possible to see merchants close their relief service due to lack of funding.

As far as clan philanthropy is concerned, the clan took over the responsibility of the local government in rural China in providing relief. The funding of the programs depended on the treasury of the clan.

The rotating credit associations (RCA) and parental burial associations (PBA) were similar organizations. The organization was democratic and voluntary in nature. The funding was provided by members. Individuals who participated in these organizations generally needed a small sum of money which could be used for burials, travelling and other expenses. Also it was possible to participate in many of these organizations simultaneously. The life cycle of the organization usually lasted for a year.

The services provided by the state form of relief was of a long duration. For example services offered by the five major government relief institutions in Canton in the 1870's can be labelled as long term institutional services.

They were targeted at the "deserving poor". These were the people who were not able to assist themselves. Therefore the state felt obligated to assist them. These included the aged, the blind, the infants, and the lepers. The number of clients was sizable since the operation was a large one.

The services offered by merchant or guild associations were of short term nature. An example was the services provided by the

Hall of Sustaining Love in Canton. They included education, burial services, dispensary food and clothing. These were short term and crisis oriented. Quite often these services were provided because they were not provided by the state.

Generally the merchants and guild associations served two types of clients. First, members were in need of assistance. This can be called mutual aid. Second, public relief was also provided to non members in time of crises such as famines and floods. This can be called charity.

The number of clients affected was generally smaller compared with the state form of relief because the funding of merchant and guild associations was generally smaller and fluctuated due to business cycle.

The service provided by the RCA was to generate a small sum of money which could be used for travel, burial and other purposes. The money might not be used for emergency purposes.

The number of clients affected by the RCAs was generally small because it was organized by a small primary group. However as soon as one rotating credit association was terminated, another one could be initiated by the same people for another purpose.

Therefore we can conclude that the state form of relief was most important because of its elaborate organization which offered several permanent programs to a large number of clients. The second in importance was the services provided by merchants and guilds. They were less elaborate in terms of organization

and services compared with the state form of relief. The least importance was the RCAs who provided only small cash to a few people.

CHAPTER V

Evaluating the Services of CBA Vancouver

(I) Issues that are important in understanding the services developed by the CBA Vancouver

Three other issues besides the economics of racism and the nature of Chinese labour market discussed in the previous chapter need to be addressed before we can evaluate the services provided by the CBA Vancouver. This includes the philanthropy of Chinese merchants in Vancouver and the funding of CBA Vancouver.

(A) Philanthropy by Chinese Merchants in Vancouver

An issue which is important in understanding welfare services provided by CBA Vancouver is the ideology of and the role played by the Chinese merchants in the CBA Vancouver.

The role of the merchants resembled that of the gentry in the Q'ing dynasty who took on themselves civic functions such as road building, local registration, police work, and educational programs for the peasants. They raised money for floods and natural disasters. They considered themselves to be an elite in Chinese society. Therefore, they assumed social responsibility to look after the less fortunate in society. Paternalism was an essential element in their thinking and derives from Confucian thought. The merchants also were conservative and non-interventionist in welfare matters. People were expected to deal with their own crises relative to their life cycles. These included sickness, old age and death. However if they could not

deal with these crises, they were expected to approach their families or clans for assistance. The nature of assistance was usually short term and crisis oriented. Once the crisis was averted, the assistance would be terminated. Services were selective in nature. No preventive services being offered.

The CBA Vancouver was an association made up mostly by clan associations from Sze-Yap, the four counties, origin for most Chinese in Canada. The association was originally controlled by a core of merchants who contributed to the foundation fees. Later this was changed at the urging of some clan associations that wanted to follow the example of the CBA San Francisco which used to elect their executives. Sources indicate that each Chinese association would send two representatives so that they would be given the opportunity to be elected as executives.

There were several reasons why the Chinese merchants played an important role in CBA Vancouver. First, the merchants represented the elite in the local Chinese community on which they drew support. Second, being the elite of Chinese community, the merchants could communicate effectively with other elites in Vancouver and British Columbia. These included civic officials and Chinese official representatives in Canada who respected their importance. Third, the merchants had monetary and non monetary resources. Since the merchants usually were better off financially than other Chinese workers, they would be able to contribute financially to any fund raising events. As far as non-monetary resources were concerned, the merchants were well known

figures in the Chinese community in Vancouver and would be able to use their resources to assist people in finding jobs or locating suitable lawyers, doctors etc. Fourth, the Chinese workers who needed assistance would not approach white Canadian agencies for assistance, mainly, because there were strong anti-Chinese feelings in Vancouver between 1885 and 1923. Therefore, it was quite logical for the Chinese merchants to assume a leading role in providing social services in the Chinese community. The relationship between the CBA Vancouver and Chinese workers was a feudal relationship where the employer assumed the social responsibility for the employees. It was also personal and paternalistic in nature.

(B) The Funding of the CBA Vancouver

Another issue worth exploring was the funding of the CBA Vancouver. It relied on two sources. First, regular contributions were made up of exit fees and hospital foundation fees. Exit fees were paid by Chinese residents who returned to China. The amount was \$2 per person. The hospital foundation fee was collected regularly by CBA Vancouver. Chinese stores were expected to contribute \$2 while a Chinese resident was expected to contribute \$1. Second, irregular contributions were made in response to natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes in other countries. The executive of the CBA was responsible for collecting these contributions. For example they would divide the city of Vancouver into four divisions. A group of people would collect money door to door in each division. Sometimes an

audit of the CBA Vancouver would be posted outside its building which showed revenues and expenditures. Should there be money left over from any collections, it would either be converted for general welfare purposes or be used to meet other crises.

Summary and Discussion

As discussed earlier, the breakdown of the feudal relationship between the landlords and peasants in China was greatly responsible for "pushing" the Chinese peasants abroad from 1850's. The demand for cheap labour to construct the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia and to develop forestry, mining and cannery industries in British Columbia attracted many Chinese peasants to migrate to British Columbia.

Unfavourable social and economic conditions in British Columbia in the 1880's, gave rise to economics of racism. This forced the Chinese labourers increasingly to turn to the Chinese merchants for help. Since it was traditional for the merchant-gentry class to assist the poor in China, a relationship was re-established between the Chinese merchants and the Chinese labourers. This relationship resembled Pentland's personal relationship between the employer and the employee in the pre-capitalist era, in which the employer assumed total responsibility for the employee by providing employment and care in old age. In turn the employee submitted to the employer. The establishment of the Chinese Benevolent Association in Vancouver and elsewhere in Canada in a sense was the expression of such a personal relationship between the Chinese merchants and Chinese

bachelor workers. (Pentland 1981, 25).

(II) Types and Effectiveness of Services provided by CBA Vancouver

There were numerous services provided by the CBA Vancouver. These included advocacy service, the Chinese hospital, the Chinese school, the soup kitchen, emergency assistance to other Chinese communities, assistance to Canadian organizations, burial and bone service, legal aid, mediation service and information service. Most services can be classified as a response to local conditions of discrimination and local hardship while some can be classified as a response to national and international situations.

(A) The Advocacy Service

The advocacy service initiated by the CBA Vancouver was a response to social, legal, political and economic discrimination in Canada. By 1914, every Chinese was expected to pay \$500 head tax in order to immigrate to Canada. On August 3, 1914, the CBA Vancouver proposed Canadian Chinese immigration laws should be changed. These proposals included abolition of the head tax and the treatment of Chinese like other immigrants. The Chinese Consul-General, Yeung, in Vancouver urged the CBA Vancouver to discuss the matter with the Chinese representatives in Ottawa. Although two meetings were held in July and August 1914 in the CBA, nothing was accomplished (Chinese Times 3, 4, Aug 1914).

On November 1914, it was revealed that the CBA Vancouver had protested to the City of Vancouver because the City's Licence

Committee proposed that all hotels dismiss their oriental employees. The CBA Vancouver was successful in persuading the City of Vancouver to withdraw this proposed order.

In January 1915, the CBA Vancouver invited all Chinese hawkers to attend a meeting. It was held in response to a proposal by the City of Vancouver which intended to limit the working hours of Chinese hawkers from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. The proposal would have driven the Chinese hawkers out of business since their customers were at work during that time. The CBA Vancouver collaborated with Chinese Consul-General, Lim, to protest against this proposal. They gathered signatures from Chinese residents and hired a lawyer to prepare a petition. Since no record can be found indicating that the City of Vancouver carried out this measure it is presumed the actions of the CBA Vancouver were effective (Chinese Times 16 Jan 1915).

In January 1918, the CBA Vancouver protested against another City proposal that Chinese-run stores in Vancouver should be closed at 6 p.m. This would have made it impossible for Chinese labourers to purchase provisions in them. The CBA Vancouver wrote to the Chinese Consul-General, Wong, so that he would protest this move by the Vancouver City Council. The CBA Vancouver requested that operating hours should be extended. It is not known whether Vancouver City Council changed its mind on this matter (Chinese Times 19 Jan 1918).

In April 1919, the CBA Vancouver collaborated with Consul-General, Yeung, from Ottawa to protest against a regulation that

would restrict Chinese employers in hiring female white workers. This was brought to the attention of the Vancouver City Council at the end of April 1919. Only five female whites were employed by the Chinese employers. This issue was not clarified until December 1923 when the B.C. legislature proposed that persons of any nationality whose characters were evil or doubtful were prohibited from employing female whites. It appeared that the Chinese won this round of protest (Chinese Times 8, 28 Apr 1919; 21 Dec 1923).

The CBA Vancouver protested against the Vancouver Sun in March 1920 when an editor blamed the Chinese for the drug traffic in Vancouver. It was suggested that Chinatown should be removed to save the youngsters. The CBA Vancouver confronted the issue by indicating that the Chinese in China were the first victims of opium imposed by Britain (Chinese Times 27 Mar 1920).

Consul-General, Yip, protested to the mayor of Vancouver requesting the Sun be held responsible for any future mistakes of this type. Furthermore, the mayor was asked to stop the Sun attack on the Chinese. The mayor replied that there would be no more mishaps in the future because the Sun would stick to the facts. Since most of the drug offenders were Chinese, the mayor was concerned about the removal of the drug market. On April 1921, the Vancouver Sun again commented that Vancouver's Chinatown was full of the cocaine and morphine business, and agreed that it should be torn down. A local self-improvement association headed by Yip Chung Tin, a prominent Chinese

merchant, and Consul-General, Yip, of Vancouver was established after a meeting attended by representatives of Chinese business and locality associations. The aim of the committee was to remove these bad habits in Chinatown and restore morality and its good reputation to the Vancouver Chinese community. It is not known what bad habits were referred to but we may assume that there were a number of Chinese smoking opium. Also some were involved in the drug trade. It appears that the Vancouver Sun was unfair in blaming the Chinese alone since many Chinese were also the victims of the drug traffickers (Chinese Times 27, 31, Mar 1920).

Around November 1922, the CBA Vancouver was involved in establishing the Anti-school Segregation Association headed by Rev. Yeung Kai Jong. The CBA Vancouver was concerned about the school board in Victoria which attempted to segregate Chinese from white students. The excuse was that the scholarly standard of the Chinese students was inferior to the white students. The school board failed to segregate the Chinese from white students because Chinese parents withdrew their children from school. The policy of the Association was to raise money to support the comrades in Victoria and to work against the tide of discrimination. No school segregation proposal was initiated in Vancouver by the local school board.

In February 1923, the CBA Vancouver denounced the Canadian government's plan to obtain finger prints from all Chinese immigrants because they were being treated like

criminals. Later Consul-General, Chau, notified the CBA Vancouver that he too had protested this action of the Immigration Department. Also he was notified that the law concerning finger prints was primarily designed to deal with the Chinese passengers in the third class section of ocean liners. Furthermore, the members of parliament from British Columbia were in favour of such a law. The CBA Vancouver failed to change this law (Chinese Times 3 Nov 1922; 24 Feb 1923).

The most important legislation that the CBA Vancouver failed to change was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923 which in effect closed the door to Chinese immigration. According to Wickberg, the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act contained three major provisions. First, the \$500 head tax was abolished. Second, students below university age were no longer admitted. Third, only four classes of people could immigrate. These included university students, merchants, native-borns returning from several years of education in China, and diplomatic personnel. Of these categories, only merchants were numerous in the Chinese community. Their admission was limited to those with substantial capital. Those involved in laundries, restaurants and retail outlets were excluded by this category (Wickberg 1982, 141).

Like other CBA's across Canada, the CBA Vancouver raised money to establish a committee to protest the passing of the Act. A committee called the Chinese Association was established in Toronto to protest this bill. However, the Chinese were unable to prevent the proclamation of this Act. Wickberg offers several

reasons for this. First, China's international weakness and national disunity and the divisions of the Chinese in Canada offered little influence behind efforts to change the bill. Second, the act separated the issue of Chinese immigration and trade between China and Canada. This meant that, despite the fact that immigration was terminated, trade still flourished between Canada and China and the merchant class itself still continued to benefit. Third, there was a lack of major support from white society. The missionaries were sympathetic but ambivalent. The B.C. members of parliaments were anti-oriental. They were able to assure the passage of the bill with the support of indifferent members of parliament in eastern Canada (Wickberg 1982, 144-145).

The impact of the Chinese Immigration Act had several consequences on the Chinese population in Canada. First, the Chinese would not be able to unite their families in Canada by bringing their wives and children here. As a result, "married bachelors" emerged as a unique cultural form among the Chinese. Second, Chinese had to return home to visit their wives and children. They were only allowed to stay home for one year otherwise they would not be allowed to return to Canada. Some Chinese would never be able to see their families because they were not able to save adequate money. It cost about \$75 (Canadian) to travel from Winnipeg to Canton one way. This included a train ticket and a third class ticket on a ship owned by the Canadian Pacific Company. Third, the family as a resource

for welfare purposes declined because "normal" family was absent. The clan and district associations became the dominant resources for welfare purposes.

The CBA Vancouver as an advocacy agency appeared to be able to persuade the authorities in B.C. to allow the Chinese to maintain some of their employment rights but they were unable to resist the Immigration Act of 1923.

(B) The Chinese Hospital

Another service provided by the CBA Vancouver was the Chinese hospital. The CBA Vancouver followed Articles 22 and 25 of "The Rules and By-laws of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Victoria" and establish a hospital. The Victoria CBA was the headquarters of all CBA's in Canada.

Eligibility requirements to be admitted to the hospital were unclear. It appeared that only those who were poor and homeless were admitted. Also should they pass away, the hospital would raise money for their burials. For example on March 9, 1918, \$44.25 was raised to bury a deceased patient who had stayed in the hospital for three years. The hospital was financed by regular exit fees collected when Chinese immigrants returned home. Also money was collected from Chinese in Vancouver periodically (Lai 1972, 53-67; Chinese Times 19 Mar 1918).

Publication of an audit of the January 1918 accounts of the hospital of the CBA Vancouver provides some insights into the operation. A man called Leung Lung was hired to administer both the CBA hospital and its conference room. The hospital was

located on the main floor. Leung Lung was paid \$25 to administer the hospital and \$20 for the conference room. There were eight male patients in the hospital. The hospital paid an average of \$6.20 a month for food for each patient. It also paid \$8.55 for laundry for the 8 patients, \$6.40 for western medicine, \$1.25 for Chinese medicine respectively. \$17 was paid for coal in January 1918 to heat the hospital, while \$1.50 was paid to deliver firewood. The total expenditure for the hospital was \$89.05 out of the total expenditure of \$414.60. Also a friendly visitor was hired to visit patients from August 1916 on (Chinese Times 8 Feb 1918; 7 Aug 1916).

It is difficult to assess whether the CBA Vancouver hospital met the needs of the local community. The Chinese population in 1914 numbered 3,559 and grew to 6,484 in 1921. This meant that less than one percent of the population was admitted into the CBA Vancouver hospital. However, Chinese patients were also admitted into Vancouver General Hospital. In concluding this, it appeared that the CBA Vancouver hospital was an attempt to look after old and poor men who were not supported by relatives or friends. It was a response to a crisis situation in the local Chinese community. It reflects a poor law approach to welfare where hospital care is the responsibility of kin and only where a person was totally destitute would the state step in. However, here the role of the state is played by the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 24 Dec 1923).

(C) The Chinese School

Another service provided by the CBA Vancouver was the operation of a Chinese school at the CBA premises. Education on a selective basis was a traditional service offered by a merchant association in Canton. The ideology was that if the government was not able to teach Confucius classics, it would be up to the elite class in society to provide education to the local population on a selective basis. In Canada the Chinese merchants, being the elites, continued the tradition of providing education to the local Chinese community. The establishment of a Chinese school was first proposed in September 23, 1916 by the president of CBA Vancouver, Tsang Shek Chun. The second floor was the location of the school and no rent would be collected. Tsang and four other members were elected to draw up the constitution for the school (Chinese Times 28 Sep 1916).

The Chinese school was officially opened on May 7, 1917. The school offered courses in Chinese literature, English, mathematics, history and geography. Canadian born Chinese or illiterate immigrants were eligible to be enrolled. The school was divided into junior and senior classes. Chan Shan Yan, Yip Soo Chee and Chiu Yum Po were hired as teachers. Chan apparently received post graduate training in Japan after he worked as a teacher in Canton. Yip was a graduate from the Teachers' College of the University of British Columbia. In June 1917, the fourth floor of CBA Vancouver was added as an additional classroom due to an increase in enrolment. Also no

rent was charged for the school. The funding of the school was by donations. In January 1922, the school was short of funds, Hence fund-raising by a drama performance was initiated. A Chinese named Wong Gay Kiu purchased a honorary ticket for thirty dollars while another man named Yip Mow purchased a honorary ticket for twenty dollars. A lot of people donated money to the event.

It is difficult to assess whether the Chinese school met the needs of the local Chinese community, since there was no data on budget and enrolment. However it can be argued that the school represented an attempt by the CBA Vancouver to preserve the culture of the Chinese community. It fostered the maintenance of the Chinese community in a hostile environment and obviously students enrolled in the program were taught to read and write, and received some education. (Chinese Times 7, 17 Apr 1917; 22 Jan 1922).

(D) The Soup Kitchen and Food Bank

Another type of service sponsored by the CBA Vancouver was the provision of meals to needy individuals in Vancouver. Historically the merchant association provided congee to needy Chinese in Canton. The provision of meals was not part of the regulations of the CBA Vancouver. On January 30, 1915 a man named Wong Wing Kwong initiated a project to feed needy Chinese because some of them were unemployed. He collected \$385.60, 26 sacks of rice and a large amount of other groceries. With fifteen others, he established a committee called Vancouver

Salvation and Welfare Committee. Two of the members were Wong Chee Din and Lau Yu Kun who were very active in the CBA Vancouver. Wong later became the treasurer of the Committee. The Committee was able to use the main floor of CBA Vancouver to distribute meals (Chinese Times 30 Jan 1915).

The Committee provided meals to needy Chinese twice a day between 10 a.m. and 11.30 a.m., 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. respectively. All food and utensils were provided by the Committee. The Committee was staffed by volunteers, however the cook was paid a weekly salary of not more than two dollars. The funding continued to be supported solely by donations. It was stipulated that all funds and material collected would be posted in the newspaper, the Chinese Times. In addition, a report of the weekly account would be posted on the notice board in front of the CBA Vancouver. The Committee commenced operation in February 2, 1915 (Chinese Times 1 Feb 1915).

In response to the Committee's activities, a dramatic society called Kok Tai Ping Dramatic Club organized a play and donated \$166.75 to the Committee. The money was kept in the Chinese consulate.

Consul-General, Lim, was involved in the Committee's work. First, he expressed interest in donating the \$166.75 to the Committee. Second, he was concerned the Committee was poorly financed. Therefore, it might not be able to feed the needy Chinese. Third, he suggested a type of relief (workfare) instead of welfare be provided by recommending that rich Chinese in

Vancouver, Victoria and New Westminster should form a charitable organization. The aim of the organization was to hire unemployed Chinese workers as farm workers at half of the current rate operating on the lines of less eligibility, and other relief and boon-doggling. Instead of paying their wages, they should be issued vouchers to purchase provision in the stores operated by members of the charitable organization. Lim was concerned that greedy recipients would receive duplicate meals. Hence he suggested a meal ticket for seven days be issued. If the person was still unemployed, his meal ticket would be renewed. Also every person who received meals should be investigated to ensure that they were needy. However the Committee was disbanded on May 2, 1915 due to a lack of support in the Chinese community in Vancouver (Chinese Times 1, 6 Feb 1915; 24 Jun 1915).

The Committee was re-opened for business on January 27, 1916 due to rising unemployment among the Chinese during the winter months. The source of the new fund was the remaining money of the Committee in the bank and the rice stored away which the committee did not distribute previously. Rice was distributed instead of meals (Chinese Times 26 Jan 1916).

There were seven regulations that governed the operation. First, all needy overseas Chinese were welcome. Second, a referral from a Chinese company or an organization was needed to obtain a pass from the Committee. Third, eligible recipients could obtain rice for seven days. After seven days, another referral was required. Fourth, a pass was offered between 11 a.m.

and 12 noon. Fifth, the pass was only valid once a day. One pound of rice was issued upon the presentation of the pass. Sixth, daily distribution of rice took place from 12 noon to 1.30 p.m. Seventh, the recipient was expected to bring a container for his rice (Chinese Times 26 Jan 1916).

The Chinese Times criticized the regulations of the Committee. First, it was difficult for poor people to obtain referrals. Second, poor people did not have utensils to cook rice. Therefore it was suggested that meals should be provided instead. However, there was no response from the Committee members.

A new organization called the United Chinese Association set up free meals for the needy Chinese at the CBA Vancouver building. The time was 10 a.m. to 12 noon in the morning and between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. in the afternoon (Chinese Times 28 Jan 1916).

The committee continued to distribute rice to the needy Chinese. In February 1916, the Committee distributed 84 sacks of rice to 283 poor and needy Chinese, 7% of 3,559 Chinese in Vancouver as reported in 1910 census. On May 7, 1916, the Committee stopped distributing rice. It is not known if the termination had anything to do with public demand. It reported that from January 29 to May 7, 1916, the total expense was \$308.40. The total credit from 1915 was \$487.50 so that remaining \$178.90 would be stored in a bank for future use (Chinese Times 26 Feb 1916).

The activities by the Vancouver Chinese Salvation and Welfare Committee were a response to local condition. It was relief measure led by some active members of CBA Vancouver. It was crisis oriented. It appears that they did not meet the needs of needy Chinese because it was not a comprehensive program. For example the poor were not provided with nutrititional food, clothing and shelter.

(E) Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance to other Chinese communities

Another service provided by the CBA Vancouver was public assistance to other communities. First, this involved collecting money from the Vancouver Chinese community and remitting it either to Chinese communities in China or to other overseas Chinese colonies. Second, this involved donating money to Canadian associations in Canada in response to natural and other catastrophies.

Traditionally Chinese merchant associations donated money to communities for flood relief, fires or other natural disasters. The drama club and theatre performance was used to raise money. Between 1914 and 1923, the CBA Vancouver continued this tradition.

The following is a discussion of the efforts made by the CBA Vancouver to provide disaster relief in other colonies and the homeland. The first type involved the Chinese communities abroad. In July 1915, CBA Vancouver donated \$234.08 after a flood in Canton. A drama performance was held at Kok Tai Ping Theatre in

Vancouver to raise the money. In March 1922, the CBA Vancouver donated \$718.90 to the flood victims in the provinces of Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangu. There was a lot of involvement by the Chinese merchants. Again, a dramatic performance was used to generate revenue by selling honorary tickets. In September 1923 the CBA remitted \$1,000 Japanese dollars to the CBA in Kobe so that the Chinese earthquake victims could be assisted there (Chinese Times 24, 28 Jul 1915; 11, 20, 24-27, 29 Mar 1922; 3 Sep 1923).

The assistance provided by the CBA Vancouver to overseas Chinese communities was a response to emergency situations. It was fraternal in nature. It was also a traditional service led by Chinese merchant associations. As soon as the crisis was over, the assistance would stop. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of such service because there are no adequate data.

(F) Assistance to Canadian organizations

The CBA Vancouver also sent donations to Canadian service organizations. In September 1914, CBA Vancouver donated \$100 to the Canadian Red Cross. The money was collected by the executive of the CBA. In November 1916, the CBA Vancouver donated \$50 to the Canadian National Salvation fund. In September 1919, \$5,000 was donated by the CBA Vancouver to the Vancouver General Hospital. Apparently six executive members collected the donations. In October 1919, the CBA Vancouver also assisted in selling \$48,300 Canadian saving bonds to the Chinese community. These bonds were to raise money to help the Canadian war effort

in 1914-1918 (Chinese Times 4 Sep 1914; 13 Nov 1916; 18 Sep 1919; 6 Nov 1919).

The assistance by the CBA Vancouver to various Canadian organizations was a good indication that the Chinese merchants wanted to participate in the national life of Canada despite the anti-Chinese feelings between 1914 to 1923, and as a counter measure to these negative feelings.

(G) Burial and Bone Service

Burial service was a traditional service offered by merchant associations in China. This service included payments for coffins and procuring of pallbearers. The CBA Vancouver offered similiar services which included payment of burial and shipment charges for bones.²

According to the City of Vancouver archives, the Park Rangers' complained about the ceremonial fires at Chinese burials in Stanley Park. In 1890, the same City government at the request of their lawyer granted the local Chinese one acre of land to build a Chinese cemetery. Apparently cemeteries in Vancouver were racially segregated! The Chinese, Japanese and Jews were requested to arrange for their own caretaking or they would be billed for grass cutting (Yee 1977, 29-30).

The City of Vancouver would specify a time the year when the bones could be exhumed and dried. Also a canvas enclosure was set up somewhere in Vancouver so that the bones could be dried and not contaminate the population of the vicinity. The City of Vancouver levied a tax for exhumation of Chinese

ancestral bones. Despite an appeal by CBA Vancouver in 1910, the tax remained in effect but was reduced to \$2.50 per person (Chinese Times 20 Apr 1918; Yee 1977, 30).

The CBA Vancouver had a policy of paying for a funeral only if the deceased's local association, clan association, or relatives were unable to collect donations for the deceased. In case of emergency the CBA Vancouver would advance money first and collect it back from the local association (Chinese Times 28 Aug 1916).

The CBA Vancouver co-ordinated activities with local associations to ship bones back to China every ten years. The bones had to be clearly marked, otherwise the CBA Vancouver would ship them to the Canton Charity Station for identification purposes before burial (Chinese Times 31 Jul 1919).

The burial service and shipment of bones provided by the CBA Vancouver represented a traditional approach to meet needs in the Chinese community. It was selective and crisis oriented. It is impossible to evaluate whether this service met the needs of the Chinese community because of lack of data. However the service was provided for many years and it can be presumed to have fulfilled a need for the Chinese community in Vancouver.

(H) Legal Aid Service

Legal aid service provided by the CBA Vancouver represented a new service in the adopted country as a response to discrimination. The CBA Victoria was the first CBA that provided a legal aid service upon which the CBA Vancouver was modelled.

This involved the hiring of a lawyer to take cases to court or to arbitrate between plaintiffs and defendants out of court. This was mainly confined to cases between the Chinese and the whites. An example was the case of Mr. Sum Chiu Hin. In February 1916, Mr. Sum, who was employed as a cook in Vernon, was dismissed, probably because of discrimination against East Asians. Later his former employer was sued for putting drugs in his customer's coffee. Mr. Sum was then arrested for poisoning the food. The Chinese community in Vernon and Kamloops sent two representatives to the CBA Vancouver for assistance. The CBA Vancouver in turn approached the Consul-General, Lim, for assistance. Since Mr. Sum was a member of the Freemasons in Victoria, they were able to raise money to hire a lawyer to defend him. In March 1916, Consul-General, Lim, sent a delegate to Kamloops to defend Mr. Sum. Sum was later released. This case illustrated the fact that the CBA co-ordinated the efforts of legal defense by involving a Chinese representative. Furthermore it was the Freemasons Association, a member of the CBA associations, that collected the money. The approach was traditional in nature. Philanthropy and mutual aid were used as a method to accumulate resources to defend Chinese in these situations. (Chinese Times 28 Feb 1916).

(I) Mediation Service

Another type of service provided by the CBA Vancouver was mediation between two parties who were Chinese. It is the internal equivalent of the legal aid and advocacy services

discussed earlier. This was a traditional service provided by the gentry-merchant class in China. The case of Wu Sai Lung was an example. Wu apparently approached Chinese Consul-General, Lim to retrieve his head tax certificate from the Canadian government. He waited for two years without success, so he approached the CBA Vancouver in January 1917 for assistance. The CBA Vancouver was very concerned about this. The executives of CBA Vancouver demanded Consul-General, Lim's resignation because he was very inefficient. A lot of support was received from the Chinese community. A lot of pressure was exerted on Consul-General, Lim. Within ten days, Mr. Wu was able to retrieve his head tax certificate (Chinese Times 10 Jan 1917).

(J) Victims of Crime Compensation and Posting of Rewards

Another type of service included awards and crime compensation. Awards included payments to persons who contributed to the arrest of criminals. Crime compensation meant making payments to victims of crime. The former was a service provided by local governments in China.

The case of Soo Yai Sum was an example of the former. In August 1922, Soo apparently was murdered by a Japanese gambler who had lost a considerable sum of money in a gambling quarter in Chinatown. Apparently the Japanese fled afterwards. The district association to which Mr. Soo formerly belonged approached the CBA Vancouver and Consul-General, Lim, for assistance. In response to this, the CBA Vancouver announced that a reward of \$200 would be paid to anyone who could locate

the murderer. Also the police were notified by the CBA Vancouver of the murderer and assailant (Chinese Times 29 Aug 1922; 2, 5 Sep 1922).

(K) Information Service

Another type of service provided by the CBA Vancouver was dissemination of information on immigration laws, discrimination practices and major events in China. Quite often announcements were posted outside the door of the CBA Vancouver building. Some of them were published by the Chinese Times. Again it is difficult to assess whether it was successful in disseminating information.

Summary and Discussion

The services provided by the CBA Vancouver represented a mixture of new programs reflecting Canadian conditions and those offered by the state and merchant associations in China. Advocacy service and legal aid service were new services developed specifically to deal with discrimination. All other services were carried over from the mother country; although some of them such as the hospital and the rewards and compensation to victims of crime services were not always provided by the merchants in China but by local government. It made sense that the CBA Vancouver provided these two services. The CBA Vancouver was the de facto government of the Chinese community in Vancouver combining, in its role and service both traditional merchant activities and filling in for the absent Chinese state relief (Chan 1983, 90).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

In this study of the philanthropic and mutual aid activities of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver during the period from 1885 to 1923, we notice that the CBA Vancouver resembled some forms of relief organizations in the Canton area in terms of its ideology, organization and activities. Therefore, it is important to compare and contrast them. We select the relief organizations in the Canton area because most Chinese immigrants originated from Canton and the four counties southwest of Canton known as Sze-Yap during the period 1885 to 1923.

(I) Forms of Relief in the Canton Area

In the Canton area, there existed (A) state form of relief, (B) merchant philanthropy, (C) rotating credit association and (D) clan philanthropy.

(A) State Form of Relief

Programs under the State Form of Relief

(1) Foundling Hospital

Basically the foundling hospital in Canton was funded by a salt tax. The deputy salt commissioner was responsible for the administration of the hospital but a petty officer actually managed the hospital. The target population was sick babies given up by families in the Canton area. These babies were nursed by wet nurses and later adopted at the age of five by wealthy families. They later became servants of wealthy

families. Due to sex discrimination, most of the babies given up by their parents were female because Chinese families preferred male children who carried on the family name and their lineage. Wet nurses, servants and physicians were the staff who provided services in this hospital (Kerr 1873, 89-91).

(2) The Home for Old Men

This institution was funded by a land tax. The Prefect of Canton was responsible for the administration but a petty officer was actually the manager of the operation. The target population was any male over 60 years of age without close relatives. The institution charged each individual \$4 administration fee yearly. Admission depended on the availability of rooms. When the home was full, the potential clients were placed on a waiting list. Services included provision of rice and cash allowance daily. Once a year each client would receive a padded jacket. Medicine was also supplied when the clients were sick. When they died, coffins were provided (Kerr 1873, 93).

(3) The Home for Old Women

The Home for the Old Women was funded by land tax. The Prefect of Canton was responsible for the administration, but the petty officer actually managed the home. In order to be eligible for admission, the women must be 60 years or old and have no close relatives. The residents usually received an allowance and rice each day. They were each issued a padded jacket once a year. Medication was provided on a regular basis. Coffins were

also provided when they died (Kerr 1874, 93-94).

(4) Home for the Lepers

The Home for Lepers was funded by a land tax. The administrators were lepers themselves. The target population was the lepers, but it is not known at what stage in the development of their illness they were admitted to the colony. An admission fee was levied on the patient's ability to pay. It was recorded that as much as \$100 was paid by a patient in order to be admitted. The families of the lepers also resided with them. Those who were not lepers had to pay rent in order to stay there. There is not much information on the administration of the hospital as well as the services provided to the patients (Kerr 1873, 94).

(5) Home for the Blind

There is not much information on this institution, however we know that each blind resident received forty two cents each day. Information on the administration of the institution as well as benefits granted to the residents was not available. Therefore, the relief services provided by the state in the Canton area were targeted at clients who were least able to assist themselves. There was no preventive program (Kerr 1873, 94).

Conclusions on the Ideology, model and services of state form of Relief in the Sze-Yao Area

In ideological terms, the state form of relief was

conservative and non-interventionist. The individuals were supposed to meet their own needs as much as they could. If they were unable to do so, they were expected to approach their families and clans. This was a residual approach to relief. The state was the last resort to provide assistance to the individuals. Services were crisis-oriented. For example, only when there were famines would the state open the granaries to feed the affected population. Apart from crisis oriented programs, the state also provided long term care homes for infants, the aged, the blind and the lepers because these people could not take care of themselves in their daily lives.

(B) Merchant Philanthropy

An example of merchant philanthropy was the Hall of Sustaining Love in Canton which provided (1) educational services, (2) burial services, (3) dispensary service, (4) food and (5) clothing to the needy on a selective basis.

Services of the Hall of Sustaining Love

(1) Education

The funding of all the services of the Hall of Sustaining Love was by contribution of Canton merchants. The education services included the teaching of the Sacret Edict as well as Chinese classics. The target of the program was to provide elementary education to the local population (probably mainly children) when the national or the local government failed to do so. This involved the hiring of teachers so that they could

teach in Canton and other parts of Guangdong province. Administration of this program is not clear. We do not know what were the qualifications of the teachers and how the allocations of the teachers were made (Kerr 1874, 109-110).

(2) Burial Services

The same agency provided burial services to the deceased whose family could not pay for their funeral in the Canton area. These included payment for coffins, wages for the carriers, tomb stones, worship of tombs and graves. More expensive coffins were purchased for people who had done some good deeds in the community. However plain, cheap, pine box coffins were provided to the paupers who died in the street. It is not known whether the families of the deceased had to be investigated before coffins were provided (Kerr 1874 110-111).

(3) Dispensary

The Hall of Sustaining Love also operated a dispensary where poor people who were ill were examined and medications were provided. We do not know what the agency's definition of poor people was and whether referrals were needed (Kerr 1874, 111-112).

(4) Porridge

The provision of rice porridge to poor people was also a service provided by the Hall of Sustaining Love but there is a lack of detailed information on how this program operated (Kerr 1874, 111-112).

(5) Clothing

The same agency provided jackets to poor people. Eligibility requirements are not clear. We are aware that in 1872 100 jackets were distributed, while 526 were distributed in 1873.

The services provided by the Hall of Sustaining Love were long term in nature. These services were not provided by the State.

Conclusions on the Ideology, model and services of Merchant Philanthropy in Sze-Yap

The ideology of the merchant philanthropy was similar to the state form of relief in the sense that they were conservative and non-interventionist. The individuals were supposed to meet their own needs and therefore, it was residual in nature. If the individuals were unable to meet their own needs, they were expected to approach their families and clans. The merchants intervened only when the individuals were not able to assist themselves through their families and when there was a lack of state intervention.

The Chinese merchants provided services to the public probably because there existed a paternalistic relationship between the Chinese merchants and their employees. As Pentland points out that, such a relationship resembled that of a feudal relationship between the employer and the employee which had mutual obligations. Such relationship existed prior to the development of the capitalistic labour market. This paternalistic model characterizes the rise of merchantilism

(Pentland 1981, 24-26).

The merchants considered themselves to be a better class of people. Therefore, they saw it as their responsibility to help the less fortunate in society.

(C) Mutual Aid

There were three forms of mutual aid associations reported in the area of South China, namely the (1) Rotating Credit Association (RCA), (2) Parental Burial Association (PBA) and (3) Clan Philanthropy.

(1) Rotating Credit Association (RCA)

The RCAs were formed by poor people who were unable to obtain credit from rich people. Hence poor people joined RCAs' to raise small sum of money. The ideology of RCA's was self-help. It meant the pooling of resources among poor people. Some of these people were related and some were just friends or from the same village. The RCA's were administered by members themselves who contributed money to a pool from which members borrowed money. The interest on the principal was paid in the form of feasts provided by the individuals. Also the individual borrower promised to repay a sum of money on a regular basis until the money was paid off. In this way a type of cooperative users bank was created and was based upon mutual trust and assistance. Sometimes a sponsor was needed in order to join the RCA's. In the event one of the members absconded with the money, it was up to the sponsor to cover the losses sustained by the

association (Kulp 1925, 189-196).

(2) The Parental Burial Association (PBA)

The Parental Burial Associations (PBAs') were formed by both rich and poor people. The reason poor people joined the associations was because they needed money to bury their parents when they passed away. The reason rich people joined these associations was because they needed manpower to participate in funerals. People joined PBA's when their parents were still alive.

Members paid two dollars in membership fees when they joined the association. This money formed the capital which was lent to other people at the best interest rate. When one of the parents died, each member would contribute to the bereaved son. If this money proved to be inadequate, money could be borrowed from the capital. Also each member would send people to assist in the funeral of the deceased person. The members of the PBAs' could borrow money from the capital when they faced crisis (Kulp 1925, 196-203).

Conclusions on the Ideology, services of mutual forms of relief and assistance in Sze-Yap

The ideology of mutual aid organizations was self-help. It was the ancestor of the universalistic or institutional welfare model. It involved the participation and co-operation of people who wanted to join a loan society. The members of mutual aid organizations usually came from the same class. The assistance

occurred within the same class and not across class lines. Intensive interactions occurred among the members because mutual aid usually operated within a small group of people. Quite often mutual aid organizations were the last resort from which a particular group of people borrowed money because they were excluded from other sources. The reasons they were not able to borrow money were as follows. First, they did not have credit. Second, they belonged to the same social class. Third, they were discriminated because they belonged to a different racial group.

(3) Clan Philanthropy

Clan philanthropy was a mixture of merchant philanthropy, a paternalistic model and mutual aid. In southern China, when people were in need, they would approach their families and clans for assistance. This involved borrowing money from one's family or clans for journeys or schooling. They might seek advice as to whether they would undertake some major projects in their lives such as starting a business or moving abroad. People also approached their families for support whenever they were in distress such as when grieving for the passing of a relative.

The assistance provided to the individuals in need depended on the monetary and non monetary resources of the providers. If the providers were wealthy and resourceful, the assistance would be more generous.

When money was borrowed from a clan member, the individuals in need might have to reciprocate in several ways. First, the individual might have to repay the money with interest. Second

the individual might have to repay the money without interest. Third, the individual might not have to repay the money but would pledge that he would assist the lender when he faced the same crisis in the future.

The assistance between members of the clan, with the exception of immediate family, usually was short-term and temporary in nature. The provider would usually expect reciprocity in return when he or she faced the same crisis.

In conclusion, the state form of relief resembled the English Poor Laws which reluctantly recognized the state's responsibility to provide for the destitute dependents. It resembled all conservative models. The merchants and some forms of clan philanthropy resembled a paternalistic model necessitated in the first instance by the limited development of free labour market, which, as Pentland points out, requires a paternalistic attitude and responsibility on the part of the merchant groups towards labourers and others such as tradesmen (Pentland 1981, 25).

Mutual aid and other forms of clan philanthropy were forms of self-help which operated within a class. It was institutionalized in a Chinese community or in the clan.

(II) The Importance of "Class" in the CBA Vancouver

It has been pointed out that the CBA Vancouver consisted of two social classes of people; the big merchant and the "bachelors". In addition there was a section of small businessmen and small commodity producers like restaurateurs,

laundry operators and independent trades people in business for themselves.

(A) The Merchant Group

As pointed out earlier, the merchants in China followed the gentry tradition of providing relief to the local population when the state failed to do so. Therefore, it was not unusual that the Chinese merchants in Vancouver fulfilled this role in Canada.

The merchants owned businesses. These ranged from emporiums to manpower agencies. They usually owned the properties where their business was conducted. Their income was steady and secure and less subject to market forces.

Socially the Chinese merchant class was well respected within the Vancouver Chinese community because they represented power and success. They were looked upon by white Canadians as the leaders of the Chinese community. This means that they could represent the Chinese communities as their representatives, as mediators between white officials and the local Chinese. Since they represented the Chinese community, they consulted with Chinese officials in Canada about matters concerning Chinese communities.

The merchants were able to bring their families into Canada because they were not as restricted by exclusionary immigration laws and because they owned properties. Also they had developed good relationships with immigration officials who made decisions in this regard.

The Chinese "merchants" shared some social and regional

characteristics with the Chinese "bachelors". They originated from the same region in Quangdong province. Both belonged to the same kinship group or district association. They spoke the same dialect, had similar cultures, experienced similar racism and discrimination from white racists.

(B) The Chinese "Bachelors"

This group of people were labourers in the main who worked in different occupations in Vancouver. Some were employed by white employers while others were employed by Chinese employers. Some of them were the relatives of merchants. Their income was greatly affected by market forces. They usually did not own any properties. It was common for them to shift from one occupation to another when opportunities arose. From 1850 to 1875 they were a transient labour force which moved in and out of different job markets like the Europeans workers in Blauner's "immigrant" model. But from 1875 onwards, the Chinese bachelor labourers became what Blauner calls "quasi-colonized" people because they were not allowed to vote and worked on provincial public works by the British Columbia government. By 1885, more restrictions were placed on the "bachelors" who entered Canada because they had to pay a \$50 head tax. This was increased to \$500 by 1903 (Blauner 1972, 51-81).

Socially the "bachelors" depended on their kinship group as well as their district associations for assistance when they were in any kind of crisis. They usually left their families in China since it was unrealistic to bring them to Canada because they had

to move from job to job and due to the head-tax and restrictive immigration laws. Although no as such rules were written in immigration law, we learn from oral history that one of the reasons their families could not join them was because they did not own any property (Louie 1983).

The CBA Vancouver provided an example of co-operation between two distinct classes rather than antagonism. Their sharing of kinship and national origin was more important than their class distinction. This was because they both faced discrimination and racism. Therefore, it can be argued that national ties or what is today referred to as ethnic or ethnicity, was more important than class distinctions.

(III) Models, extent and nature of relief in Vancouver and other Chinese Communities in Canada Prior to the Establishment of the CBA Vancouver in 1889

There is no question that there was a strong influence from models of relief in the Canton area in China that affected the nature, the extent of services and models of relief among the Chinese in Vancouver and other Chinese communities in Canada prior the establishment of the CBA Vancouver. The philosophies and practices of merchant philanthropy, rotating credit associations and clan philanthropy were carry overs to Canada from China.

(A) Influence of Merchant Philanthropy

First, as far as merchant philanthropy was concerned, the

Chinese merchants were powerful and influential , commanded monetary and non-monetary resources and, therefore, were able to provide assistance to their fellow men in Vancouver and other Chinese communities. Second, the Chinese merchants felt that it was their role to provide assistance to the less fortunate in Chinese communities in the absence of government assistance from the home country. As such, through formal and informal mechanisms they continued to provide assistance to needy Chinese in the Vancouver area along lines similar to the Chinese paternalistic model. Examples were referrals to jobs and lawyers.

(B) Influence of Rotating Credit Association

The second form of assistance influenced by practises in China was the rotating credit associations (RCA's) which also emerged in Canada. The Chinese "bachelors" joined the rotating association because they wanted to raise money to start small businesses or for trips. These were for non-emergency purposes. The RCA's were either operated formally within a clan or district association or operated informally among friends. As such, through formal and informal mechanisms they continued to provide assistance to needy Chinese in the Vancouver area along lines similar to their Chinese paternalistic model. Examples were raising money for small businesses and trips.

(C) Influence of Clan Philanthropy

The third influence was the practice of clan philanthropy. When the Chinese found themselves in emergency situations such as

unemployment and illness, they would approach their clans. Most of these were "bachelors" as their families were at home. As such, through formal and informal mechanisms, they continued to provide assistance to needy Chinese in the Vancouver area along lines similar to their Chinese paternalistic model. Examples were the provision of room and board, and referrals to jobs.

Therefore, the practices of merchant philanthropy, rotating credit associations and clan philanthropy were carry overs from China. All three of these were vehicles to generate assistance to the needy bachelors in various parts of Canada. All three of these forms were to be found in the Canadian Chinese community prior to the emergence at the CBA Vancouver.

(IV) The Influence of the Social and Economic Climate that Affected the nature, extent and models of Relief in the Chinese communities in Vancouver

The social and economic climate that affected the Chinese from 1885 onwards included immigration, employment and educational policies that discriminated against Chinese immigrants in Vancouver and other Chinese communities in Canada.

Due to discrimination and racism, the Chinese were themselves rejected by white society. As a result they turned inwards and looked for solutions for their problems such as unemployment and ill health within their own community and resource base.

The nature of the services was different from the homeland because there was no racism experienced in China. Therefore,

services had to be developed that could be directed at the economic and social policies and practices that discriminated against the Chinese. For example, Chinese merchants would assist Chinese "bachelors" to look for jobs since they encountered discrimination in the job market. They would assist the "bachelors" to seek legal advice if they got into disputes with the white community. The businesses established through rotating credit associations were accepted by the white society as they did not compete with the white workers for jobs. The "bachelors" also approached their relatives for shelter and food in case they were unemployed. And the clans, through their philanthropic actions, also assisted their clan members to set up businesses and to send money home.

Merchant philanthropy, clan philanthropy and rotating credit associations were not able to provide adequate services to the Chinese communities because they did not have the strength to deal with racism and discrimination. By banding together to form a central authority, the Chinese would gather more power to deal with racism and discrimination. Chinese Benevolent Associations were established to co-ordinate services to fight racism and discrimination and to provide assistance to the needy in the Chinese community.

(V) The Emergence of the CBA Vancouver in 1889 as a response to the Social and Economic Climate

The social and economic climate included (a) national legislation that affected Chinese immigration; (b) provincial

legislation that restricted Chinese in the labour market; (c) discrimination in the job market and (d) white racism against Chinese.

(A) National Legislation

The first federal anti-Sino legislation in the form of a \$50 head tax was enacted by the federal government in 1885, after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The amount of the head tax was increased to \$500 in 1903. The impact of this legislation was that it discouraged the migration of Chinese to Canada (Wickberg 1982, 57).

(B) Provincial Legislation

As far as provincial legislation was concerned, two pieces of legislation were already passed by the British Columbia legislature by 1889. In 1875 the B.C. legislature prohibited the granting of franchise to any Chinese and all Chinese names were to be deleted from the voters' lists. In 1876 the same legislature prohibited the hiring of Chinese on provincial public works (Wickberg 1982, 45-46).

(C) Discrimination in the Job Market

The Chinese workers who were employed in Canada in the late 1800's were usually paid less than their white counterparts, although they both performed the same jobs. Sometimes they were paid less than half the wage of the white workers. An example of this was the Chinese railway construction workers who were employed by Onderdonk to build the Canadian Pacific Railway.

They were paid half of the wages of the white workers (Wickberg 1982, 49).

(D) Social Climate of White Racism

Apart from the anti-Sino legislation, the Chinese in Vancouver and other parts of Canada had to face violence from the local white population. The Chinese labourers resembled the lower paid workers in Bonacich's "split labour market", while white labourers resembled the higher paid workers. Usually the higher paid workers were better organized than the lower paid workers. Hostility existed between the white labourers and Chinese labourers because the Chinese labourers were perceived to have taken the jobs from white workers by undercutting their wages. Therefore, it was not unusual for gangs of white men in British Columbia in the late 1880's to attack the Chinese and force them out of town. The Vancouver riot of 1887 was a good example (Bonacich 1972, 547-559, Wickberg 1982, 62-63).

The social and economic climate restricted the Chinese bachelor labourers in the labour market. This encouraged them to increasingly rely on the Chinese merchants in Vancouver for assistance. Like the labourers, the Chinese merchants also faced racism and discrimination. Therefore, it was in their interest to form a Chinese Benevolent Association with the Chinese bachelor labourers in Vancouver to fight racism and discrimination.

The CBA Vancouver was an improvement over the merchant philanthropy, clan philanthropy and mutual aid for several

reasons. First, the CBA Vancouver represented a bond between different classes in Chinese society. This meant strength and power. Second, because of its strength and resources, it could deal with white authorities in a unified manner and act as a spokesman of the Chinese community. Third, it could utilize its resources to provide more programs to the needy population.

(VI) Unique Features of the CBA Vancouver

(A) Goals of the CBA Vancouver

The goals of the CBA Vancouver resembled those of CBA Victoria. These goals included (1) fighting racism and discrimination; (2) providing relief in Chinese communities; (3) resolving disputes within Chinese communities.

(B) Ideology

The ideology of the CBA Vancouver resembled the merchant philanthropy in the Canton area. The merchants were conservative and non-interventionist. Their belief was that it was up to the individuals to look after themselves. It was only when they could not resolve their problems that they should approach their relatives or clans for help. Thus they became what Vic George and Paul Wilding refer to as reluctant collectivists (George 1976, 42-61).

In China there developed a "feudal" relationship between the landlord and tenant with responsibilities on the part of both parties. In Canada the CBA Vancouver represented the maintenance of such a relationship between the labourers and the merchants.

The merchants provided jobs to the Chinese bachelor labourers who were increasingly restricted in the labour market due to racism and discrimination. In return the Chinese bachelor labourers submitted themselves to the merchants. It was in this manner that the CBA Vancouver can be understood.

(C) Funding of the CBA Vancouver

The funding of the CBA Vancouver was unique too because it was the Chinese merchants in Vancouver who originally donated money for purchasing the property of the CBA Vancouver. After its establishment it collected two dollars from every Chinese who returned to China. This money was used for the operation of the Chinese hospital. The CBA Vancouver also collected money regularly from individuals for operating the hospital as well as other charity events. Although CBA Vancouver was led by Chinese merchants, unlike the Hall of Sustaining Love, it was not the merchants who solely contributed to the funding of the CBA Vancouver. Therefore, it can be argued that the funding itself was a combination of merchant philanthropy and mutual aid or institutional welfare model (Chinese Times 4 Feb 1918).

(D) The Structure of the CBA Vancouver

The CBA Vancouver was made up of two forms of membership; (a) individual and (b) organizational. Originally individuals who paid the foundation and the hospital fees were allowed to be elected as executives of the CBA Vancouver. This meant that the original founders controlled the organization. Later the

constitution was changed so that major Chinese district associations sent two representatives to the CBA Vancouver. These representatives would select the executives of the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 23 Jul 1919).

As far as leadership was concerned, the CBA Vancouver was led by Chinese merchants because they had monetary and non-monetary power and resources. As well, these merchants felt that it was their social responsibility to fight racism and discrimination and to provide assistance to the needy. By so doing, they followed the tradition of the merchant-gentry class in China. Therefore, we can argue that the CBA Vancouver was a democratic organization which represented all segments of the Chinese communities in Vancouver.

(E) CBA Vancouver as a Government Body

In a sense it could be argued that the CBA Vancouver was the de facto government of the Chinese in Vancouver and elsewhere from 1889 to 1923. There are several reasons for this. First, the agency represented all sectors of the Chinese community especially in later years after its structure was reformed. Second, the leaders of the CBA Vancouver acted as the internal mediator when Chinese themselves were involved in disputes. They had a role similar, in theory, to the liberal concept of Hobbes and Locke of the state as the impartial arbiter among conflicting equals. By so doing they followed the tradition of the local Chinese officials who used to collaborate with the merchant-gentry class to resolve disputes in China. Third, some of the programs

were national in character as they affected the interests of all Chinese in Canada (Chan 1983, 90).

(F) The Programs of the CBA Vancouver

The programs of the CBA Vancouver were of two types. First, programs were targeted at racism and discrimination. The role of the CBA Vancouver was to make petitions to various white government bodies to protest against policies associated with included advocacy service and legal aid service. These services were absent in China. They were not carried over from China. These services affected the Chinese in Vancouver as well as Chinese in other parts of Canada.

Second, there were programs offered by CBA Vancouver which were carried over from China. Most of them originated from the government which included mediation service, (both internal and external), information service, hospital service and education service. The rest originated from merchant philanthropy. These included soup kitchens and food banks, burial and bone service.

Since the CBA Vancouver was composed of many organizations such as clan and district associations, rotating credit associations, some were formed among the members of these organizations to raise money for trips and small business. Members contributed money to the funerals of a deceased member.

(1) Government Form of Services of CBA Vancouver

Advocacy Service

This service was developed by the CBA Vancouver to fight racism and discrimination. This involved external mediation or making representations to Canadian authorities to protest against discriminatory policies that affected the Chinese immigrants in areas such as employment and immigration. This service was important because the issues involved affected the whole Chinese community in Canada not just the Chinese in Vancouver alone. For example if the CBA Vancouver was successful in reducing head tax, it certainly would have affected all Chinese communities in Canada .

Legal Aid Service

Legal aid service was also a new service developed in Canada in response to racism and discrimination in Canada. This service was absent in China. Therefore, it was not transported to Canada. It involved the hiring of a lawyer for a Chinese when he was involved in a dispute with a white Canadian. The difference between the advocacy service and the legal aid service was that the former involved a group of people while the latter involved individual cases.

Mediation Service

Internal mediation was another service provided by the CBA Vancouver and was an old service carried over from China. In China it was a tradition for the gentry-merchant class to work

with local officials to mediate disputes among the local population because the government played the role as an impartial arbiter. By providing a mediation service, the CBA Vancouver took on another function of the government as discussed earlier.

Criminal Compensation

Criminal compensation provided by the CBA Vancouver meant rewards to persons for information leading to the arrests of criminals as well as criminal compensation to the victims of crime, a service well ahead of its time in Canada. The former was a function provided by local government in China. By providing this service, the CBA Vancouver took on the function of the government. Also this service involved individuals rather than the group work.

As far as payments made to victims of crimes was concerned, it is not clear whether this was a new service or not.

Information Service

The CBA Vancouver always posted news of major events that affected the Chinese population in Vancouver and Canada outside on its building in a manner similar to wall newspapers in modern China. In addition it made announcements in the Chinese Times. By providing an information service and disseminating information to the local population, the CBA Vancouver fulfilled another role of a centralized government body.

The Chinese Hospital

In China, the government, the merchants as well as religious

orders provided hospital service. The merchants in the CBA Vancouver took on the traditions of the government in China in providing hospital service to the needy Chinese in the absence of the state. The hospital provided room and board, Chinese medicine as well as Western medicine to the needy Chinese. The hospital was a service carried over from China.

The Chinese School

In China, education was usually financed by the government. In the absence of a government sympathetic to their needs, the merchants took on this responsibility by providing education to the needy population. An example was the Hall of Sustaining Love. It can be argued that the Chinese school in CBA Vancouver followed this tradition.

The Chinese school was established by CBA Vancouver targeted at those Chinese "bachelors" who were illiterate in English and Chinese. They could not be enrolled in the English schools in Vancouver since they did not know English. Although it is not known what the working hours of the school were, it is quite possible it operated on the weekends or in the evenings, i.e. a night school enabling the "bachelors" to come to school.

(2) Charitable Activities of the CBA Vancouver

The Soup Kitchen and Food Bank

The provision of food for the needy was a tradition of the merchants in China. An example was the Hall of the Sustaining Love.

The provision of food at the CBA premises by Chinese merchants and the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee was a form of merchant philanthropy. These merchants were executives of the CBA Vancouver. They had monetary and non monetary resources. Being wealthy they were able to contribute money to purchase food. Since they were members of the CBA executive, they were able to utilize the CBA facilities to provide meals to the needy "Chinese bachelors" (Chinese Times 30 Jan; 1 Feb 1915).

Bone and Burial Service

The shipments of the body of the deceased and burial services were provided by the merchants to their guild members as well as to the needy population back in China. Like the Hall of Sustaining Love, the CBA Vancouver took on the tradition of the merchants in China by providing this service to the needy population. Normally a local association would raise money to bury a deceased person. In emergency situations the CBA Vancouver would advance money to the local association first and collect the money back from the local association later (Chinese Times 28 Aug 1916).

Every ten years bones were shipped back to China under the co-ordination of the CBA Vancouver. Usually the bones were exhumed and dried. Each individual paid \$2.50 to the City of Vancouver agency that exhumed his ancestors' bones. The bones were clearly identified and shipped back to the Canton Charity Station (Chinese Times 31 Jul 1919).

This service was an example of the co-operation between the

CBA Vancouver and its affiliated members. It was also an example of mutual aid among the Chinese in Canada because the members of the local associations raised money for burying and shipping the deceased. This service was a combination of mutual aid and merchant philanthropy. This service was selective in nature as it was only available to those who could not afford it.

In concluding, it can be argued that the CBA Vancouver performed the functions of a government form of relief and of merchant philanthropy. Also the rotating credit associations took place in the clan and district associations which formed part of the CBA Vancouver.

The CBA Vancouver was a comprehensive organization because it incorporated different forms of relief functions. It was also a national organization because it represented the interest of the Chinese in Canada. Since the late 1800's the CBA Vancouver was the headquarters of all CBAs in Canada. It also acted as the spokesperson of all Chinese in Canada for many years.

APPENDIXES

History of the Chinese Benevolent Association of Vancouver
1914-1923

Before discussing the history of CBA in Vancouver between 1914 and 1923, it is important to examine the Chinese Benevolent Association in Victoria (CBA Victoria) because it was the first CBA in Canada. Later it became the headquarters of all CBA's in Canada. By examining its constitution, functions and activities, an insight will be acquired into the history of CBA Vancouver because they were similiar organizations. According to Lee, he claimed the administration and regulations of the CBA Vancouver were all copied from those of the CBA Victoria (Lee 1967, 16).

In March 1884, the Chinese merchants in Victoria sent a letter to Huang Tsim Him, the Chinese Consul-general in San Francisco requesting the establishment of a Chinese Association. In the letter the association stated that the British Columbia legislature had passed a law compelling every Chinese in British Columbia over 14 years of age to pay \$10 annually for a license to reside in the province. It also stated that fellow Chinese were bullied by gangs and that the old and the sick had nobody to care for them, hence some perished on the streets. Prostitution, gambling, intimidation, fighting and extortion prevailed in the Chinese community. Therefore the establishment of a Chinese association was essential to fight racism, to eradicate prostitution and resolve the problems in Chinese communities in Canada (Lai 1972, 55).

A public appeal for the establishment of the CBA in Victoria was issued in 1884. It ordered all Chinese to remit a \$2 contribubtion to Victoria before October 3, 1884. If anyone

failed, they would be obliged to pay \$10 to the Association before they returned to China. A fund of nearly \$30,000 was raised for the construction of the Association offices and the hospital. The building was completed in July 1885 at 558 Fisgard Street. The ground floor of the building was rented out, the first floor was used as the Association's office, the second floor as a temple and a school. The Association known as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association was registered with the provincial government on August 9, 1884. In 1909, the Association moved to its present location at 636 Fisgard Street (Lai 1972, 56).

An English copy of 'The Rules and By-laws of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association' was submitted on August 18, 1884 to the Registrar of Companies, Victoria. The Chinese version was far more detailed. It outlined clearly the organization, authority and functions of the Association. The first section consisted of four clauses which defined the objectives and functions of the Association. The third clause stated the objectives of the Association; they included promoting inter-relationships among the Chinese in Canada, carrying out social welfare functions by assisting the sick and the poor, to eliminating internal troubles and fighting against foreign oppression. The second section was concerned with the election and appointment of officers, accounts and audits; twelve articles dealt with the conditions under which the Association would arbitrate among the Chinese and assist them in their disputes

with whites and nine articles were concerned with social welfare (Lai 1972, 56-57).

The bylaws numbered Articles 10 , 14 and 15 resembled regulations in current legal aid programs. Article 10 stated that if a white assaulted, robbed or refused to pay his debt to a Chinese, and if that Chinese made a complaint to the Association, the Association would assist him to appeal to the law. Article 14 stated if a Chinese was wrongly accused by a white and jailed, the Association would put up bail for him and employ a lawyer to appeal against the sentence. Article 15 stated if a Chinese was wrongly sued by a Chinese and was imprisoned, the Association would attempt to settle the case by arbitration. If the arbitration failed, the Association would provide bail for the wrongly accused and would assist him to appeal the law. In order to be eligible for legal aid service, a Chinese must have sent his \$2 contribution to the foundation fund by October 3rd, 1884 (Lai 1972, 57-58).

Some articles in the constitution resembled fragments of a program of criminal compensation. Article 11 stated that if a Chinese was killed by a white who was still at large, the Association would give a subsidy of \$25 to the victim's family in order to institute a suit against the killer, and the Association would also offer a reward of \$200 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the killer. Article 13 stated that if a Chinese was killed or murdered by another Chinese who was still at large, the Association would give the victim's family a sum of

\$25, and would offer a reward of \$200 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the murderer (Lai 1972, 57).

Articles 22 to 25 stated that the Association would raise money to pay the homeward fare for those Chinese over 60 years old who were poor and unable to work. The Association would build a hospital to accommodate the poor and homeless patients and raise money to pay for their funeral if they died in hospital. Article 27 stated that if a Chinese girl was kidnapped and sold in Victoria, she must be returned to the Association, who would pay her passage back to Hong Kong and place her in the custody of the Tung Wah Hospital. If she did not have any relatives, the hospital authority would arrange her marriage. Although many Chinese were eligible for services provided by the Association, it was not known how many indeed benefited from such services. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the services (Lai 1972, 58).

The Chinese Benevolent Association in Vancouver was founded in 1889. Originally the Chinese community in Vancouver was under the jurisdiction of CBA in Victoria. When a merchant called Wong Yok San came to Vancouver in the late 1880's, he joined other merchants such as Yip Chun Tin, Lee Ching Sai and Ho Chung Cheung who intended to purchase a piece of land for an independent Chinese agency based in Vancouver. In November 1899, a piece of land was purchased as a Chinese public property which eventually became the home of CBA in Vancouver (Chinese Times 4 Feb 1918).

The following is a description of how the financing was arranged. In the late 1800's all donations from Chinese returning to China were collected by the headquarters of CBA in Victoria. Therefore no revenues reached the CBA Vancouver. As a result, Wong Yok San approached 25 Chinese stores and set up 30 shares. He was able to collect \$1,500. He borrowed a further \$2,000 from unspecified whites. The \$3,500 was used to purchase the land. A building was established with the second floor as a conference room and the ground floor as a hospital (Chinese Times 4 Feb 1918).

Wong Yok San was chosen as the president, Yip Chun Tin, the vice president and Ma Sing Lam as Secretary. In 1900, they again set up 21 shares and raised \$1,260 for the development of the Association. Wong Yok San was president until he resigned in 1904. He was succeeded by Yip Chun Tin (Chinese Times 4 Feb 1918).

When the CBA Vancouver was first established, the constitution of the Association required that all members and voters contribute \$2 as a foundation fee. The executives were elected by members in good standing, in other words by members who had regularly contributed money to the Association: After the executives were elected, they would invite other members of the Chinese community to be board members. For example the Chinese Times sent two of their staff to sit on the board of the CBA Vancouver as did the United Chinese Association and the Freemasons Association. Hence the CBA Vancouver was not a

monolithic organization. However, the power rested in the hands of the executive members (Chinese Times 14 Aug 1915, 22 Nov 1915).

The history of the CBA Vancouver can be divided into two directions. Firstly, the Association reacted to local conditions that affected the Chinese population. A good example was the problem of the exclusion of Chinese hawkers working in Vancouver. The CBA Vancouver protested this to the City Council. Secondly, the CBA Vancouver reacted to events in China or other Chinese communities outside Canada. For example, CBA Vancouver would remit money to China to assist refugees. Also the CBA Vancouver would collaborate with other agencies, committees' and Chinese government representatives to provide services to Chinese in China and other overseas Chinese communities.

The first news concerning the CBA Vancouver which appeared in the Chinese Times in 1914 concerned their protest against restrictions on Chinese immigration to Canada. At that time the most recent legislation which discriminated against Chinese immigration was the 1903 Dominion statute which established a head tax of \$500 on each Chinese immigrant. There were six classes of persons who were exempt: established merchants and their families (the definition of which was not clearly made, leading to abuses), diplomats, clergymen, tourists, students and men of science (Wickberg 1982, 82-83).

The CBA Vancouver was very concerned about the restrictions on Chinese immigration. Hence they made six proposals to the

Chinese Consul-General, Yeung, in Ottawa in the summer of 1914. The outline of the proposal was as follows:

1. They demanded that the Canadian government cancel all restrictive immigration laws against the Chinese;
2. They demanded equality in immigration laws with European and U.S. immigrants;
3. They demanded the abolition of the head tax, but recommended that the Chinese government establish a quota for Chinese emigration to Canada (the quota for workers should be similar to that of Japan, but the number of entrants should be proportional to that of Japan). In addition, after three years of residency, Chinese immigrants should have the freedom of entry and exit. All taxes collected from students should be returned.
4. They demanded total equality with other Canadians.
5. They demanded a five years clause for returning Chinese. That is, Chinese immigrants would have no trouble in gaining re-entry after five years of absence from Canada. Moreover, those who had licenses could have freedom of entry and exit.
6. They demanded that the law concerning limited quota should be enforced only within a certain time limit and should only be a temporary law (Chinese Times 3 Aug 1914).

In early August 1914, both CBA Vancouver and the headquarters of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce received a letter from Consul-General, Yeung, indicating that the CBA Vancouver should send representatives to Ottawa to discuss the issue of

Chinese immigration with the representatives from China.

Apparently a meeting was held on July 3rd, 1914 to discuss the matter of restriction on Chinese immigration, but nothing was decided at that meeting. Another meeting was to be held on August 10, 1914, but no record was published in the Chinese Times of such a meeting (Chinese Times 4 Aug 1914).

CBA Vancouver published a letter in the Chinese Times on August 1, 1914 sent by a white minister of Presbyterian Church in Seattle to the corresponding Secretary, Kwong Man Kong, of CBA Vancouver about welcoming Chinese to the U.S. The minister indicated that he had established a church in Chinatown in Seattle. In 1912, he sponsored 70 Chinese students to go to the U.S. and in 1913, another 30 later came to Canada or to eastern U.S. for study. He further suggested building a Chinese community house in Seattle for the convenience of incoming Chinese. The letter was an informal appeal for support from the CBA Vancouver. There is no record indicating that CBA responded to the minister's request (Chinese Times 1 Aug 1914).

The CBAs in Vancouver and Victoria were involved with an Anti-Russian Fund Raising Committee which hoped to raise funds to resist Russian intervention in Mongolia. By August 1914, the Mongolian question was settled, hence there was a meeting regarding the disposition of funds raised through drama performances. The un-used funds were retained in the offices of the CBA Vancouver and Victoria for future welfare purposes. Later when the CBA Victoria suggested remitting the funds for

flood relief in China, there was a split between the CBA Victoria and the Committee. The Committee insisted that the money should be returned. They further suggested the CBA Victoria should withdraw from the Committee. However the CBA Victoria insisted that they should have sole responsibility for the money, as it was stored in their treasury. They complained that the Anti-Russian Committee should not have stored the money in the CBA Victoria in the first place if they did not trust them. After a long debate, it was agreed that the donations raised solely by the Anti-Russian Committee should be re-distributed to the original donors, who could claim their share of donations from the CBA Vancouver until December 20, 1914. After that date the remaining unclaimed donations would be given to CBA Vancouver for welfare purposes. It was also agreed that the Anti-Russian Committee would be disbanded on December 20, 1914 (Chinese Times 18, 24 Aug 1914).

The CBA Vancouver elected their new executive members for the year 1914 (September 1914 to September 1915) on August 28, 1914. There were twenty executive members. The president elected was Wong Chee Din, the vice president, Lee Ying, the treasurer, Lee Sai Cheung, The English secretary, Chu Cheung and the Chinese secretary, Lau Yee Kwan. The term of office of the executive commenced on September 7, 1914 (Chinese Times 29 Aug 1914).

Just before the new executive was to commence its duties on September 7, 1914, a man named Ho Check King wrote a letter to

the CBA Vancouver concerning reforming the Association. The letter was addressed to the executive of the CBA Vancouver and published in the Chinese Times on September 4, 1914. He commented that due to the instability and disorganisation inside the Chinese community, there was increasing external humiliation and pressure on the general Chinese population. He had already suggested reform of the CBA Vancouver two months before, thinking that after the reform, the Chinese community would have better direction. He further condemned the old structure of the Association which placed most of the responsibility on the presidents and secretaries, while the members at large were just symbols. He asserted that the reform had been seconded by the last executive. However, due to the disability of a few members, it had not been carried out. This letter was a formal appeal to the new staff to reconsider the case and to reorganize the Association so that it might be helpful to the Chinese community. There was no immediate comment from the CBA Vancouver executive. The structure of CBA did change in the next few years, but it is not known whether Ho's letter precipitated the change (Chinese Times 4 Sep 1914).

On September 12, 1914, the new executive of the CBA Vancouver had its first meeting. Two announcements were made. Firstly, the CBA would continue to employ Mr. Chu as a visitor to a Vancouver hospital three times a week. He would continue to act as an interpreter for the patients. He would be paid a small salary of \$8. each month. Secondly, in order to initiate a fund raising drive for the Red Cross War Fund, the CBA Vancouver would

donate \$100 from the funds raised by the drama performance to the Vancouver Red Cross War Fund. In addition the executive members of CBA Vancouver would visit from door to door to ask for donations. The Association hoped that all Chinese would be willing to donate generously. No record was published by the Chinese Times regarding the amount of donations to the Vancouver Red Cross War Fund (Chinese Times 14, 17 Sep 1914).

On October 8, 1914, CBA Vancouver published a letter by Consul-General, Yeung, dated October 6, 1914. The letter discussed a law that prohibited entry of foreign workers into British Columbia effective April 1, 1914 until end of September 1914. Due to the First World War, most of the economy in Canada experienced a slow down. The prospect of economic recovery was not optimistic. As a result the government wished to extend the period of restrictive entry of foreign workers to April 1915. Until that time, Chinese workers were warned not to come to Canada (Chinese Times 8 Oct 1914).

The Chinese Times published a letter written by a man called Hugh Maetier who accused the License Committee of the Vancouver City Council of discriminating against orientals. The letter stated that in a recent meeting of the Council, it was proposed that those Canadians who were holding hotel and restaurant licenses should dismiss all orientals. Maetier felt injustice for the orientals which included East Indians, Chinese and Japanese so he wrote letters to both the English and Chinese newspapers exposing the unreasonable action of the city

government. He also commented on the \$500 head tax by saying that if the Chinese had to pay the head tax, they should be guaranteed equality with other Canadians. He further commented that he was ashamed of his government for such actions (Chinese Times 21 Oct 1914).

On November 3, 1914 an editorial in the Chinese Times commented on the issue of dismissing orientals from the hotel and restaurant business. The editor confirmed to the public that the CBA Vancouver had done its part in appealing to the City of Vancouver aldermen. The appeal accused the License Committee of approaching the hotel managers to demand the dismissal of orientals. In addition, the CBA Vancouver also reminded the aldermen that Chinese were dutiful residents and therefore to deprive them of hotel work was an injustice to them. The CBA Vancouver demanded that the aldermen of the City of Vancouver reconsider the case (Chinese Times 3 Nov 1914).

Another complaint was launched by the United Chinese Association against the CBA Vancouver on November 6, 1914. This complaint condemned the allegedly indifferent attitude of the CBA Vancouver towards the discrimination against the hotel and restaurant workers. The letter also challenged the ability of the CBA Vancouver to protect and direct the Chinese community. Another letter was sent by the United Chinese Association on November 9, 1914, regarding its position on the discrimination against Chinese workers. It requested CBA Vancouver to hold a general meeting for the discussion of the whole affair, hoping

some good suggestions might be raised or that the CBA Vancouver might hire a lawyer to defend the position of the Chinese workers (Chinese Times 7, 9 Nov 1914).

On November 16, 1914, CBA Vancouver replied to the United Chinese Association. The president of CBA Vancouver Wong Chee Din said that the Association should be careful in discriminatory cases. Furthermore there was not adequate evidence that the License Committee at the Vancouver City Council had acted in a discriminatory manner (Chinese Times 16 Nov 1914).

1915

There were a number of discriminatory activities involving the Chinese in Canada in this period. In Toronto, the white-controlled Canadian Laundrymen Association (CLA) held a general meeting in late 1914 demanding that the licenses of the companies that still used hand washing methods be abolished. The Association claimed that this action was in accordance with their constitution and not specifically directed against Chinese laundries which happened to employ manpower instead of machines. The members of the CLA from the Toronto area argued that they were successful in chasing the Chinese out of the laundry business because they had required white laundromats to donate \$5 to the said association and in addition one dollar each week per machine. Thus \$5,000 was raised in the Toronto area. The money was used for propaganda attacking Chinese in the laundry business. Similar action was taken to exclude Chinese from the laundry business in Montreal. Fifty people were elected in the CLA meeting from Montreal with the sole purpose of keeping the monopoly of the laundry business in the hands of white Canadians. Apparently \$7,000 was raised in Montreal and action commenced against the Chinese in December 1914. It was estimated that there were 3,000 Chinese laundrymen in Montreal in January 1915 (Chinese Times 8 Jan 1915).

The Chinese Consul-General, Yeung, in Ottawa was concerned about the exclusion of Chinese from the laundry business in Montreal. He warned the Montreal Chamber of Commerce on December 20, 1914 that the Chinese in Montreal were being

harassed by the CLA. He urged the Chinese laundrymen to form an organization which would fight for their rights. He stressed that union would provide strength and that co-operation was needed by the Chinese laundrymen to struggle against the external pressure.

The Chinese Times announced on January 12, 1915 that it was important to unite Chinese from Eastern and Western Canada to fight against discrimination in the laundry business. It agreed that exclusion meant massive unemployment for the Chinese. The Chinese Times also outlined the following unjust reasons used by the Canadian Laundrymen Association to screen out the Chinese:

The Chinese should be put out of work so that their jobs could be filled by unemployed Whites; it was unhygenic to hand wash laundry; machine washing in the long run saved time or money (Chinese Times 12 Jan 1915).

Discrimination against Chinese workers was not confined to the laundrymen in eastern Canada. The City of Vancouver planned to restrict the work of Chinese hawkers in Vancouver. On January 14, 1914 Consul-General, Lim, of Vancouver announced that the Chinese hawkers were in danger of being thrown out of business. He stated that there were three hundred of them selling vegetables alone or ten percent of the Chinese population. In 1909, the Vancouver City Council attempted to forbid Chinese hawkers selling along the streets before 9 A.M. and after 6 P.M. However the Vancouver City Council found that it did not have the authority which apparently lay in the hands of the government of

British Columbia. Nevertheless Consul-general Lim felt that the hawkers should discuss the restriction of working hours and urged them to send representatives to the consulate regarding possible solutions (Chinese Times 14 Jan 1915).

The restriction on Chinese hawkers could be interpreted as an attempt to legislate them out of business because their customers would normally not be home during the work day. Hence by restricting their activities to the hours between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. the Chinese would be out of work.

The Chinese population was concerned about discrimination against Chinese workers. For example Wong Hint Ying of Ottawa wrote a letter addressed to the CBA of Vancouver, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Consul-General in Vancouver. The letter expressed concern about discrimination against Chinese workers. He felt that injustice was imposed upon Chinese workers. For example the \$500 head tax was useless to safeguard the position of the Chinese. Also he felt that harrassment against Chinese laundryman was a contagious idea which would spread across Canada. Furthermore he criticized the majority of the Chinese who were afraid and unwilling to fight for their rights. He added that it was wrong for them to stay out of the business of fighting discrimination. Lastly he hoped that all overseas Chinese would unite and fight for their rights (Chinese Times 15 Jan 1915).

In addition to Wong Hint Ying's concern, Chow Kar Chiu, president of the CBA Victoria sent a letter to the Victoria

English newspaper protesting against the Comrade Association. Apparently in Victoria, several Canadian associations joined the Comrade Association which intended to ask different employers to dismiss all Chinese workers. Mr. Chow felt that Chinese Canadians were dutiful citizens and should be treated equally as were other Canadians, also that the Chinese workers shared the doom situation of unemployment. He also outlined three of the solutions of the Comrade Association. The first one was to dismiss all Chinese workers and replaced them by Canadian workers. The second one was to ask the Canadian workers in permanent positions to take two months off each year and let the unemployed whites work for them for 2 months. The third solution was to send letters to various organizations and employers, explaining to them the difficulties of the unemployed Canadians and asking them to hire white Canadians instead of Chinese if there were any vacancies (Chinese Times 18 Jan 1915).

On January 16, 1915 CBA Vancouver held a meeting to discuss the issue of limiting working hours for Chinese hawkers. The CBA invited all Chinese in Vancouver to attend the meeting. Although a meeting was held, no resolution was published (Chinese Times 16 Jan 1915).

On January 28, 1915, Consul-General, Lim, made an announcement to all Chinese hawkers. He stated that the hawkers were indifferent about the government action which limited the working hours of the Chinese hawkers. He further stated that the Chinese Consulate in Vancouver would initiate a counter action by

gathering signatures of residents who disagreed with the government action. A lawyer was hired to prepare the petition and copies of the petition were sent out to various hawkers. It was hoped enthusiastic Chinese residents would also voluntarily distribute the petitions for more supporters. All petitions had to be returned by January 31, 1915 for appeal purposes. Although it was not reported whether the CBA Vancouver contacted ambassador Lim, it would be safe to assume the CBA Vancouver collaborated with Chinese officials in the consulates in matters that affected the Chinese community significantly (Chinese Times 28 Jan 1915).

On January 29, 1915, Consul-General, Lim, made an announcement regarding the discrimination case against Chinese hawkers in Vancouver. He indicated that he had sent representatives to Victoria to report daily on developments, as Victoria was the location of the Provincial Legislature. He was informed that the case would not be discussed until February 5, 1915 in the British Columbia Legislature. This meant that the Chinese would have more time to prepare for the appeal. The deadline for returning the petition against discrimination of Chinese hawkers would be extended to February 4, 1915 for the purpose of soliciting more signatures (Chinese Times 30 Jan 1915).

Unemployment was a major concern for the Chinese community. Due to the European War, many Chinese became unemployed, reported the Chinese times on January 30, 1915. A Chinese named Wong Wing

Kwong was concerned about the delimma of the unemployed Chinese workers because they neither had the funds to return home nor to support themselves. Wong Wing Kwong decided to raise money for the unemployed Chinese. In the first fund raising drive, he was able to raise \$385.60, 26 sacks of rice and a large amount of grocery. As of January 28, free meals would be provided for the needy in the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 30 Jan 1915).

In February 1915, an announcement was made in the Chinese Times to encourage the local Chinese population to donate for Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee. There were sixteen initiators in this project. Some of the name were Wong Wing Kwong, Wong Chee Din, Lau Yu Kun, Chu Yan Cheung and Chan Kam Cheung. Both Wong Chee Din and Lau Yu Kun were active members of the CBA Vancouver. The constitution of the Committee was as follows:

1. The canteen for providing free meals would be located in the hospital sponsored by the CBA Vancouver.
2. Time for the meals (twice a day) would be 10 A.M. and 11.30 A.M. - morning meals, 4 P.M. and 5 P.M. - afternoon meals.
3. There was a regulation pertaining to food limit, all food and utensils would be provided by the Vancouver Chinese Salvation and Welfare Committee. Those who came should not bring along their own food in addition to the donated meal. This regulation was established to ensure that only the very needy ones were served. Those who could bring their own food were not regarded

as needy. The patients on the upper floor were exempt from free meals due to hospital regulations.

4. There was a regulation pertaining to the procedure to be followed. Those who came in for the free meal should come in the front door and leave at the back door. This regulation was to prevent conflicts and congestion. Good behavior was also essential.

5. There was a regulation pertaining to the duties of the members of the Committee. The members of the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare committee and their executives were voluntary workers. Hence they would not be paid. The cook, however would be paid a weekly salary of not more than two dollars.

6. There was a regulation pertaining to the funding of the Committee. The funding would be donated solely by concerned residents in Vancouver.

7. As far as the report of the donations was concerned, it was stipulated that all funds and materials collected would be posted in the newspaper. In addition, a report of the weekly balance or account would be posted on the notice board in front of the CBA.

8. As far as memberships were concerned, all Chinese were to be responsible for improving the Committee to provide better service. Suggestions and criticism were welcomed.

9. The opening date of the Committee would be February 2, 1915. The chief executives were listed as follows:

Director - Wong Wing Kwong

Treasurers - Wong Chee Din and Chan Cam Cheung (A) All donations would be kept by the two treasurers)

Secretaries- Lau Yee Kin and Kwong Ming Fu

Social convenor - Chu Yau Cheung

Chef- Cheung Kwong Tau

There were six other members in the Committee who did not hold any executive positions. Also it was stipulated that all voluntary workers and seconders for the Committee had the responsibility to ask for donations from door to door (Chinese Times 1, 2 Feb 1915).

Some comments should be made regarding the relationship between the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee, and CBA Vancouver. It appears that the executives such as Wong Chee Din and Lau Yu Kin of the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee were also executives of the CBA Vancouver. This perhaps explained why the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee was able to utilize the facilities provided by the CBA Vancouver. However, since the CBA Vancouver had the mandate of assisting Chinese in its constitution, it was not known why they did not develop a program of assisting needy Chinese through their own organization, instead they joined the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee.

The Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee was not the only organization who was concerned about the welfare of needy Chinese in Vancouver. A dramatic group called Kok Tai Ping Dramatic Club held a concert to raise funds for the needy and

unemployed Chinese on January 31, 1915. The group had obtained permission from Vancouver City Council to hold a concert. Since no admission fees could be charged, the Chinese Consul-general Lim in Vancouver arranged a sealed box at the entrance of the concert hall. The audience was requested to make donations. The donation box was finally opened in the public by officials. It was recorded that \$54.30 was collected in the afternoon show while \$112.45 was collected from the evening show. The funds were then stored in the consulate in Vancouver (Chinese Times 1 Feb 1915).

Consul-General, Lim, was interested in the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee. He wrote a letter to the Committee on February 4, 1915 indicating he was interested in donating the fund raised by the Kok Tai Ping Dramatic Club to the Committee (Chinese Times 6 Feb 1915).

He wanted to have a better understanding of the function of the Committee and their future plans. Also he was concerned about the revenues and the expenses of the Committee. He felt that the treasury of the Committee was inadequate to support the needy. He suggested that measures should be taken immediately by rich Chinese men in Vancouver, Victoria and even New Westminster to unite together to form a charitable organization. These rich men should offer jobs at half of the current rate for the unemployed workers so that they could develop their farms. If these rich men were unable to provide money as wages, they could provide vouchers so that the unemployed workers could purchase provisions

in the stores operated by members of the charitable organization. At the end of each year, the rich men would sit down together to balance their books (Chinese Times 6 Feb 1915).

Consul-General, Lim, also commented on the inadequacy of the regulations of the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee. He felt regulation No. 4 was inadequate because the greedy clients could return for more food after they had obtained their portion. He suggested a meal ticket for seven days be issued. After seven days, if the person was still unemployed, his meal ticket could be renewed. Furthermore he suggested that an investigation on the meal ticket applicant should be made to ensure he had a desperate need for food. The Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee was closed on May 2, 1915 because the committee members on a vote of the Committee members (Chinese Times 30 Apr 1915).

Another organization called the Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association was formed in February 1915. This organization again used the CBA Vancouver as their temporary address. Executives of the Association was also members of CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 22 Feb 1915).

The purpose of the Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association was to unite all overseas Chinese to raise money for China because China's external relation with Japan was deteriorating. It was a patriotic association. It's duties and activities were listed as follows:

1. To make speeches.

2. To publish pamphlets.
3. To investigate, to negotiate and to import or export merchandise.
4. To raise money.
5. To sell Chinese products.
6. To contribute to the prosperity and development of the Chinese communities.

The objective of the Association was to obtain donations from the founders and the sponsors and utilize funds from the remaining money of the Anti-Russian Committee. A election was held on February 25, 1915. Chan Tao Chee was elected as president. Yip Chun Tin and Lee Sai Cheung were elected as vice presidents. Both Chan Tao Chee and Yip Chun Tin were executives of CBA Vancouver. They were both prominent merchants in the Chinese community in Vancouver at that time (Chinese Times 26 Feb 1915).

The CBA Vancouver was concerned about the deteriorating relationship between China and Japan. On March 1915, they discussed an anti-Japanese action. They decided to establish a fund raising organization to collect money in case of war between China and Japan (Chinese Times 3 Mar 1915).

In July 1915, CBA Vancouver was concerned about floods in Canton. Hence an announcement was made that a drama performance was to be held on July 25 at Kok Tai Ping Theatre in Vancouver. \$234.08 was raised for the purpose (Chinese Times 24, 28 Jul 1915).

On August 11, 1915 CBA Vancouver announced that candidates for the 1915 - 1916 executive members should be registered now. The election would be in September 1915 and qualification for nomination was either:

1. Overseas Chinese who had donated foundation money for the Association or

2. Overseas Chinese who had donated money for the hospital when they returned to China. The deadline for application was the 20th of August and the addresses for remitting the application forms were:

1. Wing Wo Cheung Company

(The contact person was Wong Chee Din)

2. Kai Sun Book Store

(The contact person was Lam Lau Yee)

3. Chinese Benevolent Association

(The contact person was Leung Lung) (Chinese Times 11 Aug 1915).

The United Chinese Provision and Supply Company sent a letter to CBA Vancouver on August 12, 1915 criticizing the regulation for nominating candidates. They stated that CBA Vancouver was unfair to allow just those who had donated foundation fee or hospital funds as candidates. In addition, they prophesied that the CBA Vancouver would gradually become a private association run by a group. They hoped that the Chinese would fight for their rights to be nominated for the executive of CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 13 Aug 1915).

On August 14, 1915 CBA Vancouver stated that the

regulation for nomination was in the constitution of the association. The regulation was used to ensure the responsibility and the enthusiasm of the executive members. When the Association was first established, a \$2 foundation fee was asked from all candidates and voters. Such a regulation was still adopted by the Association to select qualified candidates. CBA Vancouver followed up with another announcement on August 19, 1915. It stated that despite the disapproval of various associations, the regulation for nomination had to be enforced. Those who wanted to be nominated had to give the foundation fee now. The deadline for submitting the application form would be extended to the 22nd of August 1915. The election date would be on August 28, 1915. All Chinese were welcome to vote (Chinese Times 14 Aug 1915).

Further criticism of the CBA Vancouver came from an association called the Bing Ching Association which criticized the CBA Vancouver for not displaying a clear review of the account of the Association and requested the CBA Vancouver to send out a public detailed account of the donations. The letter criticized specifically Mr. Lau Yee Quang, the secretary of CBA Vancouver for letting the third floor of the CBA Vancouver building become a gambling club and for raising the price of rice which was sold to needy Chinese (Chinese Times 10 Sep 1915).

On October 6, 1915, it was reported that the Chinese shipping Company in San Francisco sent a letter and a constitution of the said company to CBA Vancouver on September

13, 1915. The letter indicated that the company would sell shares to Chinese in Canada. Also it was hoped that Chinese would gain back the shipping market of from the Japanese. The agents for the company were Wong Wei Wai and Chow Char Chiu (Chinese Times 16 Oct 1915).

As reported earlier, CBA Vancouver held an election on August 28, 1915. However a re-election was held on November 20, 1915. The Chinese Times reported on November 22, 1915 that the above-mentioned re-election was a failure due to following reasons:

1. The re-election was delayed for three months.
2. The Chinese Times was unreasonably disqualified.
3. Many newly elected members were unwilling to vote due to the above two reasons.

Also the Chinese Times claimed that there were several reasons for the delay of the re-election:

1. The CBA Vancouver knew that it was unreasonable to disqualify the Chinese Times because their representatives might revise the account and the records of the CBA.
2. The presidents and the directors in CBA Vancouver had no confidence of gaining full control. They were afraid that the secretary of CBA Vancouver together with the Revolutionary Party would gain control of CBA Vancouver and caused trouble with the Chinese consulate. They thought that the re-election would strengthen the power of the opponents (i.e. those opposing the current power structure of CBA Vancouver), so the presidents

and the directors would like to delay the re-election.

3. Since the United Chinese Provision and Supply company had a few representatives in the executive posts, the presidents were indifferent to the re-election because they were on unfriendly terms with the United Chinese Provision and Supply Company. The Chinese Times invited all the responsible Chinese residents to attend the second re-election day and gave a just vote. The Chinese Times also urged their sponsors, members of the Freemasons to question why the Chinese Times were expelled by the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 22 Nov 1915).

1916

The Vancouver Chinese Salvation and Welfare Committee was reopened for business on January 27, 1916. The Committee had been closed on May 2, 1915 due to a lack of support from the Chinese community in Vancouver, however, it was reopened for welfare purpose due to the unemployment and severe winter conditions. The source of donations was the remaining fund of the Committee which had been kept in the bank and from stored rice which the Committee did not distribute previously. The Committee distributed rice instead of full meals this time. There were seven regulations governing the Committee. They were as follows:

1. All overseas Chinese who were needy were welcome.
2. A referral with a seal either from a company or an organization was needed to obtain an identification card or a pass from the Committee before relief could be obtained.
3. The card would allow the holder to obtain free rice seven times. After that the person had to renew the card by following regulation No. 2.
4. Applicants for cards could come daily from 11 A.M. to 12 noon.
5. The card was only valid once a day. Each time one pound of rice would be distributed.
6. Daily distribution of rice was from 12 noon to 1:30 P.M.
7. The needy who came for the rice had to bring their own containers (Chinese Times 24 Jun 1915, 26 Jan 1916).

The Chinese Times criticized some of the regulations of the

Vancouver Chinese Salvation and Welfare Committee as impractical. The first criticism was that it was difficult for the poor and needy to obtain good references from a company or an organization. The second criticism was that it was impossible for them to cook the rice due to lack of equipment. Therefore, it was suggested that the Committee should provide free meals instead. There was no response from the Committee themselves. However the United Chinese Association set up free meals for the needy Chinese at CBA Vancouver building. The time was 10 A.M. to 12 noon in the morning and between 5 P.M. to 6 P.M. in the afternoon (Chinese Times 28 Jan 1916).

Legal aid was a form of assistance entrenched in the constitution of the CBAs in Canada. In February 1916, a man called Sum Chiu Hin was dismissed as a chef in a white restaurant in Vernon, British Columbia due to discrimination against East Asians at that time. After he was dismissed, the restaurant was sued for putting drugs in coffee. The police arrested Sum Chiu Hin and accused him of poisoning. The Chinese community in Vernon and Kamloops sent two representatives to CBA Vancouver to ask for assistance. CBA Vancouver then sought help from Consul-general Lim hoping he would take action. Since Mr Sum was a member of the Freemasons, the Freemasons headquarters in Victoria raised money to hire a lawyer. Also in mid March 1916, Consul-General, Lim, sent a delegate to Kamloops to assist and defend Mr Sum. He was released later (Chinese Times 28 Feb 1916, 14 Apr 1916).

Despite the complaint of the Chinese Times on January 28, 1916 about the regulations of the Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee, it continued to operate as an agency which distributed rice to the needy Chinese. In February 1916, the Committee distributed 84 sacks of rice for 283 poor and needy Chinese. The latest contemporary census of Chinese in Vancouver was in 1910 which recorded that there were 3,559. 283 represented about 7% of the total population of 3,559 assuming that there was no increase in population. On May 7, 1916, the Committee stopped distributing rice. It is not known if its termination had anything to do with public demand. It was reported from January 29 to May 7, 1916 that the total expense of the Committee was \$308.40. The total revenue from 1915 was \$487.50 so that remaining \$178.90 would be retained in a bank for future use by two men. They were Wong Wing Kwong, Wong Chee Din. Wong Wing Kwong was the founder of the Committee and Wong Chee Din was the treasurer (Chinese Times 29 Feb 1916).

On July 3, 1916, the executives of the CBA Vancouver was elected and the acceptance ceremony was held on July 11, 1916. On July 17, 1916, CBA Vancouver announced that it depended on Chinese companies and stores for donations. Originally there were two recruitments of donations per year to strengthen the financial situation of the Association. However, due to the inefficiency the previous year's executive members, the Association failed to collect any funds from the Chinese companies and stores. Since there was no donation in 1915, CBA

owed more than \$800.00 in property tax and other unpaid accounts. The Association felt that it should clean up its debt. Therefore, the new executives decided on July 15, 1916 that CBA Vancouver representatives should go from door to door to collect donations. Also those who registered to donate for the hospital should donate prior to July 22, 1916. The fund raising activity was aimed mainly at cleaning the debt, and the remaining money would be used for welfare purposes for the Chinese community (Chinese Times 13, 19 Jul 1916).

CBA Vancouver had been operating a hospital for Chinese in Vancouver. A discussion about the policy of the hospital was held on August 4, 1916. It was decided that representatives would be sent to visit the patients by CBA Vancouver. The purpose of the visit was to study the condition of the patients. Furthermore it was decided that delegates would be sent to Chinese companies and stores to collect hospital funds on every Sunday night. A report on the donations by registered donors revealed that \$16.20 was collected between July 11 and July 31, 1916 (Chinese Times 7 Aug 1916).

On August 28, 1916, the Chinese Time reported that the CBA Vancouver had paid for a funeral fee for a Chinese. The president of CBA Vancouver Tsang Shek Chun promised that he would not collect the fee advanced by the Association until the local association of the victim was able to raise enough money. This announcement revealed the policy of CBA Vancouver towards funeral expenses as a form of relief. It appeared that when

someone died, it would be up to the community or its local association to raise money to bury the deceased, if the deceased's family was unable to pay. The CBA Vancouver's role was to advance the money for payment until the money was raised by the local association or the community themselves which in turn would re-imburse the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 28 Aug 1916).

On September 19, 1916, CBA Vancouver announced that there were villains attempting to use the name of the Association to collect \$2 exit fee for the Chinese Hospital. CBA Vancouver announced that it would give an award of \$100 for the arrest the villains who cheated the overall Chinese community. The award was effective until October 1916 (Chinese Times 19 Sep 1916).

On September 23, 1916, CBA Vancouver held a meeting regarding the establishment of an Overseas Chinese Public School. The president of CBA Tsang Shek Chun suggested that the second floor of the building should be used as the location of the school. Other executives seconded the suggestion and also decided that no rent would be collected from the school. Tsang Shek Chun and four other members were elected to draw up the constitution for the school (Chinese Times 28 Sep 1916).

In November 1916, two meetings were held in CBA Vancouver. The first one was on November 3, 1916. It was decided to donate \$50 to the Canadian National Salvation Fund. It was decided also to establish a temporary staff to prepare for the establishment of the Chinese School in Vancouver. Tsang Shek Chun who was the

president of CBA Vancouver was named the temporary director and principal of the Chinese School. On November 9, 1916, another meeting was held in CBA Vancouver. Three issues were settled. The first was that the CBA Vancouver would like the United Provision Association to pay the hospital fund prior to November 13, 1916. Apparently the United Provision Association was bankrupt, it was decided to sell the remaining assets to pay any debts. The second was that CBA Vancouver would attend a symbolic funeral for a Chinese hero with a wreath not exceeding \$10. The third was that CBA Vancouver, together with two companies would collect donations from door to door for the Canadian National Salvation fund drive (Chinese Times 13 Nov 1916).

1917

Numerous issues arose in CBA Vancouver which affected the Chinese community in 1917. One concern was the inefficiency of Consul-General, Lim, located in Vancouver. He was accused of not being helpful to members of the Chinese community. Another issue was the election system of the CBA Vancouver which was based on contribution to the organization of a foundation fee. Only those who contributed to the foundation fees could hold office but every Chinese had the right to vote. Some organizations felt that the executives of CBA Vancouver should be elected from representatives of different local organizations. Finally the CBA Vancouver decided to establish a Chinese public school in Vancouver.

On January 10, 1917 the CBA Vancouver announced that a man called Wu Sai Lung approached the association to obtain a return of his head tax certificate. He had apparently attempted to get back his head tax certificate for two years without success. The CBA Vancouver approached Consul-General, Lim, in Vancouver and questioned why there was no answer for Mr. Wu. It was hoped that the Chinese consulate would appeal for the head tax certificate from the Canadian government immediately. The executive of the CBA Vancouver felt that Consul-General, Lim, was inefficient, that Lim humiliated China because of his inefficiency, and that he brought destruction to the Chinese community. They asserted that their move was supported by letters from various Chinese organizations (Chinese Times 10 Jan 1917).

On January 12, 1917, the CBA Vancouver announced that a Chinese was molested and arrested by 2 plain-clothes policemen. Fortunately he was released and given \$25 compensation by the City government. The CBA Vancouver hoped that the Chinese community could unite and fight against external harrassment. The CBA Vancouver requested anyone who was being harrassed to come to the CBA Vancouver for assistance. There was no indication of the kind of assistance that would be forth coming from the CBA Vancouver, however quite likely the CBA Vancouver would either appeal to the City of Vancouver government or through the Chinese consulate in Vancouver (Chinese Times 12 Jan 1917).

On the same day, the CBA Vancouver again attacked Consul-General, Lim, and vice Consul-General, Lin. The CBA Vancouver felt that they humiliated the Chinese community. The CBA listed ten "crimes" they had both committed. These were:

1. Giving troubles and obstacles to the Chinese students.
2. Neglecting the legacy of the deceased Chinese.
3. Denying to return the head tax certificate of the Chinese. for example, Mr. Wu Sai Lung.
4. Ignoring correspondence of the CBA Vancouver.
5. Failing to issue receipts after spending offical money.
6. Using external assistance to oppose Chinese in Canada.
7. Demanding passports and threatening Chinese.
8. Raising the registration fee of passports three times within a month.

9. Being a disgrace to China.

10. Taking advantage of the vegetable hawkers (Chinese Times 12 Jan 1917).

On January 13, 1917 the CBA Vancouver attacked vice Consul-General, Lin's inability to master both Cantonese and English. Apparently his ignorance in these two languages caused inconvenience during his official meetings with other Canadian government departments (Chinese Times 13 Jan 1917).

On January 17, 1917 Consul-General, Lim, sent a letter to the Chinese Times in order to defend his position. He asserted that he had been in Vancouver for four years and during this time he had attempted to assist the Chinese here. He claimed that he was ashamed of Tsang Shek Chun, the president of the CBA Vancouver for stirring up trouble. Finally Lim announced that he would resign and asserted that the truth about his devotion to the Chinese community would be revealed soon (Chinese Times 17 Jan 1917).

On January 20, 1917, Tsang Shek Chun, president of the CBA Vancouver sent a letter to counter attack Consul-General, Lim's letter. The letter stated that Tsang was a devoted member of the CBA Vancouver and the Chinese community. He claimed that he participated in the welfare and charity organizations of the community (Chinese Times 20 Jan 1917).

Following the publication of Consul-General, Lim's letter, the Chinese Times reported on January 18, 1917 that Mr. Wu Sai Lung had received his head tax certificate with the assistance of

the CBA Vancouver. He felt that without CBA Vancouver he would not be able to regain his certificate from the Chinese consulate. On the same day the Chinese Times published a letter which was used by the CBA Vancouver as an evidence against Consul-General, Lim. The letter was about a Chinese tailor who claimed that he did not get paid from Lim after he had provided service to him (Chinese Times 18 Jan 1917).

On January 22, 1917, a Chinese tailor wrote to the Chinese Times saying that he had received payment for services from Consul-General, Lim. However the CBA Vancouver had used both letters as evidence of Consul-General, Lim's cowardice and untrustworthy conduct (Chinese Times 22 Jan 1917).

Wong Hung Chiu, an executive of the CBA Vancouver apparently sent a letter to Tsang Shek Chun regarding the date of the telegram that Tsang sent to Peking to complain about Consul-General, Lim. He said that he had heard about rumour that Tsang Shek Chun of the CBA Vancouver had already sent a protest to Peking on the 5th of December, 1916 without the consent of the Vancouver Chinese community. The meeting held on the 9th of January, 1917, in Wong's opinion was only a symbolic meeting to cover the misdeeds on December 1916. Wong Hung Chiu then asserted that he was also against Consul-General, Lim, because of his inefficiency and his loyalty to the dictator Yuen Shik-K'ai. However he would like the CBA Vancouver to hold a general meeting to show that the Association was just and they did not attack Consul-General, Lim, for personal reasons. Wong Hung Chiu

wanted the CBA Vancouver to prove that they only sent out the telegram after the meeting on January 9, 1917. According to the evidence from the Chinese Times in February 19, 1917 it was revealed that indeed the telegram sent to complain about Consul-General, Lim, was actually dated December 1916 (Chinese Times 3 Feb 1917).

On February 10, 1917, the CBA Vancouver announced that there would be an election of advisors on March 18, 1917 in the agricultural and commercial ministry in the Peking government. The CBA Vancouver had already appointed Wong Bock-Yue on December 19, 1916 from San Francisco as their delegate in the election for advisor in Peking. The CBA Vancouver hoped that various Chinese organizations would vote. The organizations included the CBA, the Chamber of Commerce, the reading room and other organizations. Apparently the Advisory board in the Peking government would have one third overseas Chinese advisors. They would be changed every two years (Chinese Times 10 Feb 1917).

In March and April 1917, one event that dominated the agenda of the CBA Vancouver was the establishment of the Chinese Public School. On March 9, 1917 Yiu Cheung Association sent a letter to the CBA Vancouver indicating that they would support the said Association in performing a drama. The fund raised would be used for establishing the Chinese Public School. The drama performance was to be held on the 16th and 17th of March 1917. There were three types of tickets. The first one was an honorary ticket which would be sold for one dollar or more per

ticket. The second one was the first class ticket that sold for fifty cents per ticket. The third type of ticket was the second class ticket that would be sold for twenty five cents each. The last type of ticket was called regular ticket that would be sold for ten cents each. Apparently there were a lot of ticket buyers but no exact number was reported (Chinese Times 10, 14 Mar 1917).

On April 7, 1917, the CBA Vancouver announced that the Chinese school for Canadian born Chinese or illiterate Overseas Chinese would be officially opened on May 7, 1917. The school would provide courses in Chinese literature, English, mathematics, history and geography. The school was divided into junior and senior classes. Three teachers were hired as teachers. Mr. Chan Shee Yan, Mr. Yip Soo Chee and Mr. Chiu Yum Po were teachers. Chan received post graduate training in Japan and was an ex-teacher from Canton. Yip was a graduate from the Teacher's College of the University of British Columbia while Chiu came from Canton. In May 1917 the CBA Vancouver published a list of donors to the Chinese public school (Chinese Times 7 Apr, 17 May 1917).

On April 23, 1917 the CBA Vancouver received a letter from the Chinese consulate saying that all those overseas Chinese who had contributed to the writing of the Book of Education would be given awards. Apparently the Chinese president was concerned with Chinese education. He proposed two books should be written; one on education and the second one on agriculture. However there were not many people who supported the publication of these

two books (Chinese Times 23 Apr 1917).

On June 1, 1917, Yu Shan Association, a local association sent a letter to the CBA Vancouver suggesting that the CBA Vancouver election system should be altered and modeled on that of the CBA in San Francisco, Yu Shan Association felt that the executive of the CBA Vancouver were not good representatives of the community. Therefore it was hoped that each locality or district could have its representatives in the executives. Also the CBA Vancouver should be structured into three divisions; advisors, executives and board members. Yu Shan's proposal was supported by Hoysun, Sun Hui and Hoi Ping associations (Chinese Times 1, 18 Jun 1917).

On June 26, 1917 Yu Shan Association held a meeting to settle two issues. The first was to revive the association. The second was to boycott the CBA Vancouver because they did not reply to their proposal of modifying the election system. Yu Shan Association decided to withhold all the charity donation collected by the members for the CBA Vancouver until the new executive was elected. If the Yu Shan Association approved the new executives of the CBA Vancouver, the charity fund would be turned over to the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 26 Jun 1917).

On July 2, 1917, the CBA Vancouver responded that a discussion would be held regarding modification of the election system. The CBA Vancouver decided to have a second fund raising for the hospital fee and foundation fees because the CBA Vancouver was unable to collect an adequate amount of money. It

was hoped that those who promised to donate, would have the donations ready for the charity collectors (Chinese Times 2 Jul 1917).

On July 7, 1917, the CBA Vancouver announced that the Canadian government had cancelled the six month relaxation for absence from Canada and recalled the Chinese immigrant workers. The Association had already sent out notices and letters to the overseas Chinese who were still in China and asked them to return to Canada for better job opportunities (Chinese Times 14 Jul 1917).

On July 14, 1917 the CBA Vancouver replied to the letters from different local organizations pertaining to the modification of the election system. The CBA Vancouver claimed that there were two trends in the community. One trend was in favour of changing the system supported by the local organizations. The second trend in the Chinese community was to maintain the system, the Chinese Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Youth organizations were organizations in favour of retaining the system. Apparently the CBA Vancouver held a meeting on July 11, 1917. It was decided that the election of the executive by local representatives might be troublesome. But no real reason was given. Therefore the CBA Vancouver insisted on the original system. Through this method all Chinese could vote. Also all those who had donated to the foundation fee and hospital funds were qualified to be elected as executive (Chinese Times 14 Jul 1917).

On July 17, 1917 the Chinese Times reported that Tsang Shek Chun, president of the CBA Vancouver announced on June 22, 1917 that the Chinese Public School was a success. Due to the increase of students, the fourth floor of the CBA Vancouver building would be given to the school as a classroom. Like the second floor of the building, the fourth floor would be exempt from rent payments (Chinese Times 17 Jul 1917).

On July 18, 1917 the Chinese Times revealed that the Consul-General, Yeung, from Ottawa had sent a letter to the CBA Vancouver criticizing its inefficiency. Apparently the CBA Vancouver had misinterpreted his letter of June 28 and made a serious mistake. The CBA Vancouver apparently mistakenly announced that the Canadian government had cancelled the six month relaxation period and had recalled all Chinese immigrant workers. Usually an immigrant worker was allowed to return to Canada after staying in China for one year. The relaxation period was the period of time the Chinese immigrant worker could stay in China in addition to the one year period. Since the mistaken announcement could mean panic among the overseas Chinese who were still in China, Consul-General, Yeung, from Ottawa needed to correct the announcement by the CBA Vancouver. Yeung confirmed that the six month period was still valid for those who left Canada prior to December 31, 1916. Those who left Canada after January 1, 1917 were only allowed to be absent for one year. The CBA Vancouver admitted on July 18, 1917 that they had made a mistake by sending out a wrong notice. However they

assured Yeung that the Association had sent out an alteration and everything would be settled (Chinese Times 18, 19 Jul 1917).

On July 24, 1917 it was reported that a dispute between a newly elected executive called Sum Pui Sang in the CBA Vancouver and the current president Tsang Shek Chun and the secretary Chan Wan Chung. Apparently Tsang and Chan wanted to exclude Sum as an executive of the CBA Vancouver by declaring his election as void because he did not pay the foundation fee for the hospital fund. They also wanted to prohibit Sum from submitting his foundation fee on July 23, 1917. However their policy was known to the Chinese community which became restless. Tsang and Chan had to hire body guards to protect themselves at the CBA Vancouver meeting on July 23, 1917. Consequently they had to qualify Sum as an executive for the final election on July 28, 1917. Chan later made a statement indicating that he should not be blamed for causing any trouble, he was merely acting according to the principle of the constitution of the CBA Vancouver. He felt that there probably was some misunderstanding between him and another executive called Wong Hung Chiu who accused Chan as being irrational. Chan stated that he was a law-bidding citizen and hoped that all Chinese should love each other and stop creating conflicts. Later Sum Pui Sang was elected as the president of the CBA Vancouver on July 28, 1917 (Chinese Times 24, 25, 26, 30, Jul 1917).

On August 15, 1917 Consul-General, Lim, in Vancouver announced that the Chinese government had declared war on Germany

on August 14, 1917. He hoped that overseas Chinese might cooperate in fighting against the enemy. He expected all Chinese organizations to hang the national flag to arouse patriotism. The following day he requested that Vancouver Chinese to organize a combined tea party with the white community so that the White public would understand the Chinese were allies in the European War. Consul-General, Lim, felt that such activity would foster better relationship between the Chinese and the white community. The consulate promised to assist organized the party, but it would not offer any financial assistance (Chinese Times 15, 17 Aug 1917).

In response to Lim's request, the CBA Vancouver held a meeting on August 16, 1917 rejecting Lim's request because the Association was against China joining the European War. Other matters were also discussed; it was decided that the Association would send representatives to the Chinese hospital for visits to collect exit fees; it was also decided to leave out the checking and balancing of old accounts for a future meeting (Chinese Times 18 Aug 1917).

Since the CBA Vancouver had made a mistake by sending a wrong announcement to former overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and China in July 1917, they wrote a letter to the Chinese Times in late August 1917 requesting the Consul-General, Lim, to reserve more space in the Canadian Pacific ships so that they could return to China on time (Chinese Times 22 Aug 1917).

Wong Hung Chiu, an active member of the CBA Vancouver sent a

letter to the CBA Vancouver on August 26, that the Association should take measures to pacify the overseas Chinese. Wong stated that urgent notice should be sent to modify the wrong announcement or to reserve more seats in the Canadian Pacific ships for the returning Chinese. Moreover Wong demanded that the CBA Vancouver should co-operate with the Chinese government to fight against Germany and should attempt to foster good relationship with the white community (Chinese Times 27 Aug 1917).

On the same day it was reported Consul-General, Yeung, from Ottawa that the Canadian government had cancelled the agreement to reserve three hundred spaces at Canadian Pacific for the returning immigrants. The reason was the British government had reserved all the space for transportation of military personnel. Also he confirmed that those Chinese who left Canada prior to December 31, 1916 could still have the privilege of returning freely within six months after the armistice (Chinese Times 22 Aug 1917).

In response to the news stories regarding returning Chinese and issues pertaining to patriotism, the CBA Vancouver announced that a meeting would be held on August 28, 1917 to discuss the issues of raising a national flag, preparing the tea party and sending representation to China.

In early September 1917 it was reported that Consul-General, Yeung, in Ottawa had tried to negotiate with the Canadian government to reserve, in each shipment, three hundred

seats for the returning Chinese. The Canadian government had consented but felt that Canadian Pacific should be responsible for negotiating the terms with the British government which had reserved most of the space from the Canadian Pacific ships for transporting military personnel.

On September 13, 1917, an agency called Wah On Association in Hong Kong demanded more ship tickets for the returning Chinese. It was also revealed that the CBA Vancouver had confirmed to Wah On Association that the six month relaxation period was still valid and thus the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong should not be desperate (Chinese Times 13 Sep 1917).

On September 15, 1917 the Chinese community in Chilliwack was planning to build a Chinese hospital and collect foundation a fee for the project. The CBA Vancouver held a meeting on September 14, 1917 to discuss whether the Association should accept the request. They eventually rejected the request because they felt that the Chinese community in Chilliwack should be responsible for the whole organization. Furthermore they felt that once the CBA Vancouver had accepted the request to collect the fund, other association would ask the same favour (Chinese Times 17 Sep 1917).

On September 25, 1917 it was reported that the students from the Chinese Public School, a school funded by the CBA Vancouver, wanted to set up an Independent Association. The aims of the organization were to unite the students for exchanging knowledge, and to develop a sense of independence. A meeting was

held on September 24, 1917 to set up the association. Executives were to be elected to organize and manage the association. It was proposed that the structure of the organization should consist of investigation, discussion and execution. It was also agreed that all members over fifteen years old had the right to vote and to be elected as officials of the Association (Chinese Times 25 Sep 1917).

On October 24, 1917 the United Chinese organization in Ottawa had appealed to Consul-General, Yeung, and the head office of the Canadian Immigration Department in Ottawa about the time limit for absence from Canada. They asserted that those who left Canada after January 1917 might not be able to return to Canada before January 1918 due to the limited ship space. They hoped that the late returners would be exempt from paying additional head tax. Apparently the cabinet had to discuss this. It was believed that the Chinese could win this issue (Chinese Times 24 Oct 1917).

Consul-General, Yeung, notified the CBA Vancouver on November 12, 1917 that he had tried his best to fight for a longer time limit for absence from Canada for Chinese workers. He hoped that the CBA Vancouver would spread the news to the Chinese community so that they might not be so desperate. A similar letter was sent to the CBA Victoria on November 5, 1917 (Chinese Times 10, 19 Nov 1917).

On November 19, 1917 the Immigration office made an announcement indicating that those Chinese workers who left

Canada after November 15, 1917 had to sign a statement which specified the date they left Canada. The Chinese were refused reentrance to Canada within one year's limit regardless of the availability of ship space. The announcement also claimed that the Chinese workers did not show desperation in returning to Canada since they often ignored the one year regulation. Later the CBA Victoria announced that Consul-General, Yeung, had recently reserved twelve hundred seats for the returning Chinese in two shipments (Chinese Times 21 Nov 1917, 3 Jan 1918).

1918

On January 16, 1918 the president of the CBA Vancouver Sum Pui Sang and the secretary Chan Yew Sung both sent a letter to Consul-General, Wong, who recently replaced Consul-General, Lim. They asked him to appeal for an extension of business hours for Chinese merchants in Vancouver. The CBA Vancouver asserted that the by-law requiring that all stores be closed at 6 p.m. was indeed a drastic measure against Chinese workers because they were unable to purchase provisions. Most Chinese workers were single and they worked from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. Hence they had no time to do their shopping. It was hoped that Consul-General, Wong, appeal to the Vancouver City council for a two hour extension for Chinese stores. There was no immediate response from the Vancouver city council (Chinese Times 19 Jan 1918).

On February 5, 1918 the CBA Vancouver had raised funds for the diaster in Halifax. The total amount of funds raised was \$124.70 of which the CBA Vancouver donated \$50 (Chinese Times 5 Feb 1918).

Consul-General, Yeung, in Ottawa sent a letter on March 6, 1918 requesting the CBA Vancouver to spread the news about Patriotic Donations. Wong would like the Chinese community to donate money for this Patriotic Donation which was set up to assist families of wounded soldiers in Canada. On March 30, 1918, it was reported that \$248.25 was collected for Patriotic Donations due to the enthusiasm of the Vancouver Chinese community (Chinese Times 6, 30 Mar 1918).

On March 9, 1918 the hospital operated by the CBA Vancouver

attempted to raise money for burial expenses of a deceased patient who had stayed in the hospital for the last three years. Chee Kong Tong donated \$3.00. The total fund raised was \$44.25 for the burial of the deceased patient (Chinese Times 9 Mar 1918).

In late March 1918 the CBA Vancouver set up a speech day to discuss topics like "economy" and "enterprise" in China because the Chinese community was interested in these areas. Lam Tim Mok, a representative of the Hong Kong Bank of Merchants was invited to give a speech on the topic. A man named Aun Chiu Yim gave a speech on the relationship between overseas Chinese and banking development. Tsang Shek Chun, an active member of the CBA Vancouver also gave a speech on the same subject. There were more than one hundred people who attended the meeting. Later in early April 1918 Lam Tim Mok was going to set up the Merchant's Bank of Canada in Vancouver. He was able to recruit shareholders with the assistance of the Vancouver CBA and various Chinese organizations in Vancouver (Chinese Times 25 Mar, 3 Apr 1918).

On April 19, 1918 the CBA Vancouver announced that those who had dug up the bones of the ancestors had to dry them between the end of April 1918 and the beginning of May 1918. The bones had to be put into boxes immediately after drying. The Vancouver City Council had already set up a canvas enclosure some where in Vancouver so that the bones would not endanger the hygiene of the population in the vicinity. It was hoped that the various

associations would obey the announcement. In addition, the various associations had to report to the CBA Vancouver the day they commenced working so that the CBA Vancouver could inform the Public Health Department of Vancouver (Chinese Times 20 Apr 1918).

Consul-General, Wong, in Vancouver sent an announcement to the CBA Vancouver on May 11, 1918 requesting all Chinese to register. They were expected to come to the Bank of Commerce at the corner of Pender and Main Street in Vancouver between May 12, 1918 and May 22, 1918. Those who could not go to registration would be visited by an official. There would be an official interpreter in the registration office and the registration would be free (Chinese Times 12 Jun 1918).

Subsequently Consul-General, Yeung, from Ottawa also sent a letter to the CBA Vancouver indicating that all Chinese over the age of 16 had to register with the British Columbia Government prior to June 22, 1918. Those who did not register would be punished by the government when detected. Yeung had sent two copies of the registration booklets for reference, one was the original and the other was a Chinese translation of the original. The CBA Vancouver announced on June 27, 1918 that Chinese residents should not panic or worry about the government registration. In addition, the registration would be extended for thirty more days. Those who wanted to apply for a nationality certificate or Chinese passport could contact directly the Chinese consulate in Vancouver in person or by mail

(Chinese Times 1 Jun 1918).

On July 11, 1918 the CBA Vancouver announced that they had decided to use the old voting method for an election. The date for voting would be July 27, 1918. Those who disagreed with the decision should report to the CBA Vancouver. A similar announcement was made on July 20, 1918. Since there were only a few candidates registered for the July 27, 1918 election and Chee Kong Tong and the Constitutional Party had requested the CBA Vancouver to set a date before the election to decide on the election system, the CBA assigned July 21, 1918 to be the date for discussion. It was hoped the Chinese community in Vancouver could respond enthusiastically (Chinese Times 12, 20 Jul 1918).

On July 21, 1918 a meeting was held at the CBA Vancouver to decide upon the election system. All participants decided to have local representative. On July 22, 1918 the CBA Vancouver announced that they would contact the different local associations so that they could elect and submit names of representatives prior to August 1, 1918. August 4, 1918 was designated as the date for election for posts among the various district members. Later the election was postponed to August 6, 1918. Since there was a large number of executive selected, the administrative structure would be divided into a board of advisors which would discuss, advise and decide on every matter of the association, and the board of directors which was to manage the matters that were handed over to them by the board of advisors. Those representatives who were not appointed specific

posts would become members at large. This election system was not without opposition; forty nine members from Heungsan district, eight from Yu Shan (Pan Yu district) and eleven from Hok Yup district were against it. Apparently some planned to stir up trouble during the final election. Two policemen were present to supervise the final election (Chinese Times 22 Jul, 7, 9 Aug 1918).

The CBA Vancouver held the first executive meeting on August 24, 1918 after the recent election. Four issues were discussed:

1. To collect exit fees for hospital expenses.
2. To inspect the hospital.
3. To invite Consul-General, Wong for a tea party.
4. To divide the members at large to assist the board of directors and the board of advisors.

It was felt that there should be a clear cut line in terms of functions, duties and responsibilities between the two administrative boards. Therefore a constitution was needed. Wong Hung Chiu and Sung Cheug Fun were elected to draw up the constitution (Chinese Times 26 Aug 1918).

The CBA Vancouver announced on August 29, 1918 that the records of exit fees which were previously distributed among various stores and organizations had to be returned to the CBA Vancouver. The executive would go from door to door to collect the books on September 1, 1918 (Chinese Times 29 Aug 1918).

On September 30, 1918 the CBA Vancouver made known a letter

from Consul-General, Yeung, which stated that all Chinese whether they were citizens or not were exempted from enlistment in the Canadian armed force (Chinese Times 30 Sep 1918).

On November 1, 1918 the CBA Vancouver announced that the Association would assist in the selling of Canadian Government war bonds by having executives to undertake a door to door fund drive (Chinese Times 4 Nov 1918).

On November 2, 1918 Consul-General, Wong, from Vancouver sent an announcement to the CBA Vancouver stating that the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in China requested the overseas Chinese to provide a report on their business. The report should provide information on the current business situation as well as those three years immediately before the commencement of the European War. By so doing the Chinese merchants could claim indemnity during the treaty negotiation between the Allied powers and Germany. The report of losses had to be remitted to the CBA Vancouver before November 15, 1918. On December 13, 1918 the new Consul-General, Yip Kwan Leung, located in Vancouver had acknowledged receiving report on the losses of Chinese business through the CBA Vancouver. He reported that the total losses did not exceed \$500,000. Yip hoped that any Chinese who wanted to claim indemnity should report to the Consulate before December 20, 1918 for an assessment (Chinese Times 2 Nov 1918).

1919

On January 31, 1919, the CBA Vancouver announced that Chinese who left Canada before December 15, 1918 would be allowed to return to Canada freely within 6 months of the armistice (Chinese Times 31 Jan 1919).

On February 14, 1919 the CBA Vancouver was very concerned about the conflict between China and Japan in the Paris Peace Conference. Apparently Japan demanded that the Chinese president dismiss the two Chinese delegates to the Conference; Koo Wei Kun and Wong Ching Ting. A telegram was sent by the CBA Vancouver to the Chinese president and the Chinese external affairs minister respectively. The telegram requested the two delegates to be firm with Japan and not to give in. The second telegram requested that the conference make known to the public the secret treaty between China and Japan. Both telegrams were signed by Lee Sai Cheung of the CBA Vancouver. Since the telegrams were sent out in a very urgent manner, the CBA Vancouver did not obtain the consent of the Chinese community in Vancouver. The decision was made solely by the two boards of administrators (Chinese Times 14 Feb 1919).

On March 7, 1919 the CBA Vancouver, the Hoysun association and other local associations decided to send out Fung Wing and Lee Bing Sun to various places to collect ancestor bones for shipment to China. The bone shipment was carried out every ten years. There was still some unfinished work in Vancouver and New Westminster where many graveyards were ruined. It was hoped that the relatives might go to the graveyards and mark their

ancestors' tombs so as to prevent confusion (Chinese Times 7 Mar 1919).

On April 1, 1919 Consul-General, Yeung, sent a notice to the CBA Vancouver about the current immigration law which made the following points:

1. The Chinese consul had negotiated with the Canadian Immigration Department so that Chinese student-workers could be exempt from deportation.
2. Genuine students who had paid the head tax would be allowed to come to Canada.
3. Workers who pretended to be students would have their head tax refunded. They would be refused to gain entry to Canada.
4. Students under 16 who were genuine students would be allowed to obtain visas and pay head tax to the immigration office at any time (Chinese Times 7 Apr 1919).

On April 8, 1919 the CBA Vancouver announced that the Association had consulted with Consul-General, Leung, in Vancouver and various merchants in Vancouver regarding the issue of employing female whites. Apparently the Canadian government did not want the Chinese to hire female whites. The CBA Vancouver hoped that any Chinese who were employing female whites would inform the Association before April 10, 1919 for preparation of anti-restrictive law activities. On April 28, 1919, Consul-General, Yeung, from Ottawa was in Victoria to argue against the law that prohibited Chinese from employing female whites. He even appealed to the Vancouver mayor. It was decided

to bring the case to the Vancouver City Council meeting on April 28, 1919. Yeung asserted during the council meeting that such a restrictive law was discriminatory. Moreover, out of 3,000 to 4,000 Chinese residents in Vancouver, there were only five female whites being employed by the Chinese. Therefore the Vancouver City government should not take the risk of endangering the friendly relationship with the Chinese by enforcing the law. Yeung felt that the law would be abolished in Vancouver (Chinese Times 8, 28 Apr 1919).

On June 14, 1919 the CBA Vancouver announced that a Chinese named Sung Chiu who committed suicide had donated \$200 to the Tai-ping hospital of the CBA Vancouver. Later it was revealed he not only donated \$200 to the hospital but also \$200 to the Chinese Public school sponsored by the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 14, 18 June 1919).

On July 20, 1919 the executives of the CBA Vancouver decided to use the local representation method to choose the new executives. Firstly it was decided that five official representatives from each of the following districts would be represented. These were Heungsan, Hoy San, Sun Hui and Fan Yu. Additionally, five auxiliary representatives from each district would be selected by the district associations. Secondly, four official representatives from each of the following districts would be represented. These were Hoi Ping and Yin Ping. Also, four auxiliary representatives from each district would be selected by the district associations. Thirdly, it was

decided that two official representatives from each of the following districts would be represented. They included Nan Hoi, Soon Duk, Tung Kwun, Hok-san, Jung Shing, Sam Sui, Sun Hon and Far Yuen. Two auxiliary representatives should also be selected from each district association. The total number of official representatives would be forty-four. The individual associations were allowed to choose their means of electing representatives but they had to hand in the names to the CBA Vancouver prior to August 1, 1919. These representatives from different local associations would select the executives of the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 23 Jul 1919).

On July 22, 1919 the CBA Vancouver announced that the election of the new executive was clear. Thus the association would send out six representatives to collect the hospital fee, so that the account would be clear when forwarded to the new executives. The names of the six people were Lee Sai Cheung, Liu Yick Ming, Yeung Kam Ling, Lau Yet Chor, Wong Hung Chiu and Chu Duk Ying (Chinese Times 22 Jul 1919).

On July 29, 1919, the CBA Vancouver announced that Hoysan association had sent in a list of fifty sets of boxes which contained bones of deceased Chinese; these bones were dug in Vancouver. The CBA Vancouver's intention was to ship them to the Canton Charity station if no one would claim them or provide information on them (Chinese Times 31 Jul 1919).

The CBA Vancouver announced on August 14, 1919 that most of the members were in favour of the local representation.

Apparently most clan association had already submitted the names of their representatives except Hoysun Association. The CBA Vancouver asserted that the structure of the Association was a duplication of the Chinese congress, but the Hoysan association wanted the discarded structure and election system. The CBA Vancouver refused to make changes proposed by the Hoysan Association. They also set August 17, 1919 as the deadline for the Hoysun Association to submit the names of the representatives (Chinese Times 15 Aug 1919).

The Chinese consulate in Vancouver announced on September 17, 1919 that the Vancouver General Hospital planned to raise funds for clearing its debt. It was hoped that the Chinese in Vancouver might help by donation since the hospital would benefit the Chinese community by its efficient service. On the same day the CBA Vancouver announced that the Chinese community should help to donate to the Vancouver General Hospital. It was expected that the Chinese community could offer \$10,000. Also six representatives would be sent by the CBA to collect funds. Those who donated more than \$100 would have their names registered at the hospital. By October 16, 1919, it was reported that \$5,000 had been raised for the Vancouver General Hospital (Chinese Times 18 Sept, 16 Oct 1919).

Another fund raising was held by the CBA Vancouver on October 30, 1919. Consul-General, Yip, in Vancouver held a banquet at the Association for both Chinese and Canadian committees. The aim was to promote sales of Canadian Government

bonds. A Chinese Senator called Mr. Yu was also present. The Chinese community purchased more than \$20,000 Canada savings bonds. Lee Kar, a merchant purchased \$10,000 while Lee Yuen purchased \$16,000. The total sale was \$48,300. On November 12, 1919 it was reported that Chinese purchased \$114,350 Canada savings bonds which was the highest among minorities in Vancouver. On December 3, 1919, the CBA Vancouver announced that the Chinese hospital had moved to 1625 Albert St. located in new Chinatown. The seven patients would be moved to the above address on the same day. The hospital had to be moved was due to poor ventilation and lighting in the existing building. Also, it was too damp and dirty for such a purpose. Apparently the Vancouver Health Department demanded that the CBA Vancouver build a new hospital for sanitary reasons. However, due to a shortage of funds, the CBA Vancouver had to rent the premises at 1625 Albert Street instead of building a hospital (Chinese Times 6, 12 Nov, 3 Dec 1919).

The CBA Vancouver announced on November 28, 1919 that Chan Won Chung had replaced Cheung Ching for collecting hospital exit fees at the Vancouver immigration office. It was hoped that overseas Chinese who were returning to China would report to Chan when they were in the immigration office (Chinese Times 17 Jan 1920).

1920

On January 18, 1920 the CBA Vancouver announced that the old Chinese hospital has been condemned by the Vancouver Public Health Department. It was decided that the old buildings that housed the old hospital should be renovated to meet the standard of the Vancouver Public Health Department. The draft plan of the Chinese hospital was designed. It was reported that any Chinese resident who wanted to undertake the renovation should obtain the regulations from the CBA Vancouver and bid for it on January 21, 1920 (Chinese Times 19 Jan 1920).

On March 13, 1920 the CBA Vancouver announced that the old Chinese hospital was for rent. Those who were interested should send in letter to the CBA Vancouver with suggested rent on bidding. Also the CBA Vancouver would like to hire a hospital aid. Those who were interested should contact the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 13 Mar 1920).

On March 22, 1920 the Vancouver Sun reported that Chinatown was the focal point for narcotic drug merchants. It was reported that the "higher class" Chinese could not stop this illegal business. Therefore Canadian citizens would have to act unmercifully in case of emergency. The Vancouver Sun warned the Chinese in Vancouver that if the drug market did not stop operating, Chinatown would be removed in order to save the youngsters (Chinese Times 27 Mar 1920).

The CBA Vancouver attacked the Vancouver Sun's article by stating that the whites might be the backbone of the drug market. The Association would also like to stop the drug operation. The

Association stressed that Chinese were the first victims of opium imposed by England, therefore they would like to fight its distribution (Chinese Times 27 Mar 1920).

Consul-General, Yip, of Vancouver also sent a letter to CBA Vancouver about the counter-attack on the Vancouver Sun. Yip stated that it was good for the CBA Vancouver to represent and defend the Chinese, however he heard that such a letter might lead to trouble. Nevertheless, he had sent an appeal to the British Columbia Government to warn against the outcome of such discrimination by the Vancouver Sun.

Consul-General, Yip, also sent a letter to the mayor of Vancouver about the Vancouver Sun's attack on Chinatown as a focal point of drug market. Since the Vancouver Sun stated that it was necessary to remove Chinatown in order to save youth from evil, Yip would like the mayor to retain the article and hold the Vancouver Sun responsible if there were any future mishappenings. Yip also wanted the mayor to stop the attack of the Chinese by the Vancouver Sun. The mayor replied that there would be no more mishappenings in the future because the Vancouver Sun was not reporting the facts. Since most of the drug offenders were Chinese, the mayor was concerned with the removal of the drug market (Chinese Times 31 Mar 1920).

The Chinese Times reported on April 22, 1920 that Children's Protection Association had held a meeting to discuss the drug issue. The association decided the following:

1. To praise the Vancouver Sun for its attack on the evil drug

sellers in Chinatown.

2. To appeal to Ottawa for more severe punishment on the traffickers, such as deportation.

3. To build a centre for drug addicts.

The Chinese Times would like the Chinese merchants to be aware of the decisions advocated by the Children's Protection Association (Chinese Times 22 Apr 1920).

On August 28, 1920 the CBA Vancouver held a meeting in response to Consul-General, Yip's notice. He announced that overseas Chinese should send representatives to Han Chow to assist the development of a self-governing agricultural community in Sam Moon Wan in Cheskiang province. Won Kum Yau and Chin Yuk Hin made speeches in the meeting. A representative was elected and delegate was elected to discuss the matter in Victoria and New Westminster. On September 3, 1920 the CBA Vancouver announced that a few months ago, the Children's Protection Association suggested school segregation. The CBA Vancouver president Won Kum Yau and Consul-General, Yip, would hold a meeting on September 5 to explain white school regulations to Chinese students so that they would abide by the law and prevent any mishaps. Apparently a meeting was held on September 5, 1920. The Chinese students were told to keep quiet, abide by the law and be hygienic. Also they should make a good impression on the whites (Chinese Times 28 Apr, 3 Sep 1920).

On October 24, 1920 the CBA Vancouver was involved in recruiting shareholders for the Oakland Fruit Company. Kwong

Shiu Lin and Lau Fui Hong were sent to Vancouver to recruit shareholders. Consul-general Yip was asked to give a speech encouraging Chinese in Canada to support the development of the Oakland Fruit Company. Won Kum Yau, president of the CBA Vancouver also gave a speech (Chinese Times 23, 26 Oct 1920).

On November 6, 1920 the CBA Vancouver held a final election based on the local representation system. As a result of the election Lee Sai Cheung was elected president and Chan Won Chung was elected as vice president. Chan was involved in collecting exit fees at the Vancouver immigration office (Chinese Times 8 Oct, 9 Nov 1920).

The CBA Vancouver announced on November 25, 1920 that all furniture in the association was donated by various Chinese during the opening ceremony at its inception. In 1916, during the presidency of Tsang Shek Chun, he had lost quite a bit of furniture such as chairs and tables because it was lent to various clubs and drama societies. Since the premises had been renovated, the Association would still be willing to lend "antique" furniture to various associations. However, the New Republic newspaper spread rumours that the CBA Vancouver was unwilling to lend furniture to a drama society. The CBA Vancouver wanted to clarify this matter and accused the New Republic newspaper of making trouble (Chinese Times 2 Dec 1920).

1921

On January 22, 1921 the Chinese Times reported that Chan Won Chung, vice president of the CBA Vancouver and another executive Chiu Sinn Yee, offered a funeral service for a Chinese who had died without any money. The deceased man was the late Cho Chant Lung who immigrated to Canada from Toyshan district in Quangdong province in China (Chinese Times 22 Jan 1921).

The Vancouver City Council held a meeting recently to discuss plans to beautify Vancouver reported the Chinese Times on February 22, 1921. The council meeting had very poor opinion of Chinatown, they considered Chinatown as untidy and full of opium smokers. Also, the merchants used clothing as sign boards. Although the head of the Vancouver Public Health Department insisted that Chinese as a whole were sanitary and tidy, the other aldermen disbelieved him. They were against Chinese selling vegetables and poultry on sidewalks. The aldermen asked for a more detailed investigation. Furthermore the Public Health Department also informed the Chinese Times that the newspaper should give notice to all Chinese butchers to put clothing or covers on all meats. Also they suggested that Chinese should urinate inside restrooms (Chinese Times 22 Feb 1921).

The same newspaper also reported the investigation of Vancouver restaurants by the Vancouver Public Health Department on the following day. Apparently the Vancouver Public Health Department was asked by the Vancouver Commerce Department and the Vancouver Public Works Department to investigate the conditions

of restaurants in Vancouver. The report showed that half of the restaurant workers were East Asians and most restaurants were hygienic. Out of sixteen restaurants which did not pass the inspection, eleven were served by East Asians. It was not known how many were operated by Chinese (Chinese Times 23 Feb 1921).

On February 28, 1921 the Chinese Times reported that a housing inspector recently notified the Vancouver City Council that houses in Chinatown were in poor condition due to the carelessness of both owners and tenants and many had illegal partitions in order to provide more rooms. On March 8, 1921 the Chinese Times again reported that the Vancouver City housing inspectors had conducted tours around residential district in Chinatown which resulted in demolishing of two houses and rehabilitation of three. The inspectors also indicated that most houses in the residential section in Chinatown needed to be repainted and washrooms cleaned. It was reported that out of 280 Chinese landlords, 278 were asked to repaint their houses or perform some rehabilitation (Chinese Times 28 Feb; 8 Mar, 6 Apr 1921).

On April 14, 1921 the Vancouver Sun commented that Vancouver Chinatown was the root of all cocaine and morphine business. Hence it should be torn down. In response to such criticism Consul-General, Yip, from Vancouver immediately called up the Chinese community to establish a local self-improvement association. Yip asked for the collaboration of CBA Vancouver which agreed to hold a meeting on April 18, to discuss the

feasibility of establishing a local self-improvement association. It was decided that each Chinese association should send two representatives to the organizational meeting. The local self-improvement association would set up its own constitution. A meeting was held on April 15, 1921 at the CBA Vancouver with the result of the establishment of the Self Improvement Committee. Both Consul-General, Yip, of Vancouver and Yip Chung Tin, a prominent member and one of the founder of the CBA Vancouver were made honorable presidents. The meeting was attended by members of local associations and members of the Chinese business community. The aim of the Committee was to remove the bad aspects of Chinatown and restore morality and a good reputation (Chinese Times 15, 19 Apr 1921).

On April 28, 1921 the Chinese Times reported that the Local Improvement Committee decided to send pamphlets to various organizations to send three types of personnel to administer the Committee. They included speech makers, investigators and advisors. Some Chinese organizations had already submitted their names; they included the Chinese Times, Dart Coon Club and Lee Gee Tong (Chinese Times 28 Apr 1921).

On May 5, 1921 the same newspaper commented that Consul-General, Yip, of Vancouver had already received the names submitted by various Chinese organizations. He planned to assign posts for them shortly (Chinese Times 5 May 1921).

The Chinese Times reported on May 6, 1921 that a religious society in British Columbia had written to the CBA Vancouver

regarding the two liquor stores to be established in Chinatown in Victoria and Vancouver respectively. They claimed that liquor could be very dangerous. Moreover, if the white community was so concerned about illegal drugs and gambling, they should not promote drinking in Chinatown. The religious society hoped to appeal to the provincial legislature to abandon the liquor store project. It was hoped that CBA Vancouver would support initiating the appeal. There was nothing published in the Chinese Times regarding the response by the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 6 May 1921).

On May 30, 1921 an alleged discriminatory action by the Vancouver Immigration Department was brought to the attention of CBA Vancouver. Apparently the Vancouver Immigration Department required all new immigrants to submit \$50 as a meal fee in case they had to be detained in the immigration house. The \$50 deposit would be utilized if necessary or returned to the immigrants. This measure was implemented because many immigrants used false identification and had to be detained. The Chinese Times reported on June 25, 1921 that the CBA Vancouver hired a lawyer to look into the matter. The lawyer found that the Immigration Department had the authority to ask for the fee from those who were detained at the Immigration Department. The shipping companies who transported these immigrants were responsible for asking the passengers for the deposit and then paid the amount to the department when necessary. The rate was \$1.25 per day for each individual (Chinese Times 30 May, 25 Jun

1921).

In anticipating the commencement of the new school term in September 1921, the CBA Vancouver made an announcement on August 13, 1921 to the Chinese students. They were advised that they should behave themselves and be presentable when they started the new term. The Association had invited a dentist to check the teeth of the Chinese students. The examination would be free of charge (Chinese Times 13 Aug 1921).

On September 6, 1921, the CBA Vancouver also announced that an orphanage in Vancouver would raise funds by selling pins. The CBA Vancouver urged the Chinese community to support the fund drive (Chinese Times 6 Sep 1921).

On December 16, 1921, the CBA Vancouver announced that there would be an election on December 25, 1921. The pattern of representation was the same as announced on July 20, 1920 (Chinese Times 16 Dec 1921).

On Christmas day 1921, a number of executives from the Vancouver CBA, some Chinese merchants, some students from the Chinese Public School and Consul-General, Yip, visited Chinese patients in a Vancouver hospital. The executives of the CBA Vancouver included Chan Won Chung, Fong Man Lang and Chin Yuk Hin. The merchants present were Lee Sai Fan, Yip Yew Chor and Liu Yuk Peng. The group was accompanied by a hospital visitor from CBA Vancouver called Miss Yip Kwong. Consul-General, Yip made speech in English to thank the hospital's administration for taking care of the Chinese patients. Later he gave a speech in

Chinese advising the patients to follow the rules in the hospital otherwise they would not be welcome. Later Yip read out the names of the Chinese businesses who had donated gifts to the patients. Kum Lai Yuen and Wing Sung both donated flowers. On Hing Lung donated two boxes of Lai Chi nuts. Kwong Yu Lung donated two pounds of ginger candy. A man called Yip Yew Chor donated thirty boxes of cigarettes. Another Chinese business called Canadian business donated one box of apples. A pastor from the Presbyterian Church called Yeung Kai Jong prayed for the patients as well (Chinese Times 25 Dec 1921).

1922

On January 22, 1922, the Chinese Public school sponsored by the CBA Vancouver was short of funds. Hence they decided to raise money by a drama performance. It was revealed that a Chinese called Wong Gay Kui purchased an honorary ticket for thirty dollars. Another person called Yip Mow purchased another honorary ticket for twenty dollars. Also a Chinese called Chu Hui Fai purchased a honorary ticket for fifteen dollars. There were others who purchased honorary tickets for five dollars and ten dollars. The Chinese Times commented that if everybody was willing to contribute like this, there would be no worry about a shortage funds for the school (Chinese Times 22 Jan 1922).

On March 10, 1922 the CBA Vancouver made an announcement about a flood in Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces in China. The CBA received a letter from a charity organization from Shanghai named Wah Yeung Charity Association. The letter indicated that 1,523,000 people were left homeless due to the flood. It was hoped that overseas Chinese would donate money. The CBA Vancouver decided that it would call a meeting at 1 p.m. on March 12, 1922. All Chinese in Vancouver were invited to come to the meeting at the CBA located at 168 Pender Street E., Vancouver to discuss the matter (Chinese Times 11 Mar 1922).

On March 18, 1922, the CBA Vancouver had a meeting regarding the closing time of Chinese businesses. Apparently the Vancouver City Council decided that all businesses should be locked up and that nobody could enter the premises at night. There was a discussion. It was decided that a lawyer would be

hired to look into the matter. Furthermore it was proposed that a Chinese merchants association would be formed to deal with this matter (Chinese Times 20 Mar 1922).

On March 24, 1922, the CBA Vancouver decided to operate a bazaar in the following week to raise money for the Wah Yeung Charity Association in Shanghai. On March 26, 1922 the Chinese Consul-General, Lam Poi Hang decided to give a speech in Lok Man Lien theatre. The purpose was to encourage the local Chinese community to donate to the flood victims in the three provinces. Another meeting was called by CBA Vancouver at 8 p.m. on March 28, 1922 about the flood (Chinese Times 24, 25, 26 Mar 1922).

On March 27, 1922 Chinese Times reported that a man named Chan Po Yin donated one hundred pieces of Chinese antique for sale in the bazaar. Also a drama group called Lok Man Lien was willing to donate their drama performances on April 1, 1922. The owner of Kin Fung a Chinese business would act as the ticket agents for the drama performance on a voluntary basis. Also a Chinese merchant called Wong Lap Fong allowed the bazaar to operate in his new business premises without any rent (Chinese Times 27 Mar 1922).

On March 28, 1922, another meeting was held at the CBA Vancouver to discuss about the donations to the flood in the three Chinese provinces. The president of CBA Vancouver announced a plan for ticket sales for the Lok Man Lien drama performance. There would be three types of tickets. The first type would be honorary tickets which would be sold for at least a

dollar. In other words people could purchase honorary tickets at any price above a dollar. The names of the honorary ticket purchasers would be advertised on the newspaper. The second type of tickets would be for reserved seats. The cost would be fifty cents each. The third type of tickets would be for rush seats which would be sold for twenty five cents each. Another announcement was made during this meeting; four teams would be established to solicit donations from door to door. The east team would be headed by Lee Sai Fan, while the west team would be headed by Chan Wan Chung. The south team would be headed by Go Wing Kun. The north team would be headed by Yeung Kai Jong. The teams would commence their activities on March 29, 1922 and terminated on March 31, 1922. Also during the meeting it was reported that Chan Wok San and Chan Ho Yin each donated two oil paintings. Also Law Shin Hay also donated two golden statues while Wong Kew donated an oil painting (Chinese Times 29 Mar 1922).

On March 30, 1922, the Chinese Times reported the donations for the flood victims in the three Chinese provinces. One Chinese business donated \$100. Another donated \$50. The third donated \$20. Two Chinese business and four Chinese residents each donated \$10. There were numerous persons who donated less than \$10. A Chinese called Ng Chick owner of Dick Taxi lent his automobile for the south team to collect donations. A photographer called Chow Yew Chor, in addition to money, donated a picture of Chan Qing Ming, the governor of Quangdong province

in China. The picture and the frame worth \$25. was donated to the bazaar.

The Chinese Times of April 1, 1922 reported the donations collected by the four teams in a CBA Vancouver meeting on March 30, 1922. The total collection was \$718.90 (East \$82.75, West \$296.50, South \$85.75 North \$112.90) (Chinese Times 1 Apr 1922).

On April 3, 1922 there was more news about the donations for the three provinces. It was decided that anybody who wanted to donate should register their names with Wu Chow Pharmacy. Also it was reported that the Chinese Presbyterian Church turned over \$50 collected on Sunday, April 2, 1922 for the flood victims.

There were a number of restaurants who were willing to turn over their revenues for donation purposes. The Ling Nam restaurant would donate the revenue received for lunch for Monday April 3, 1922. This would be followed by Wah Kew restaurant on Tuesday and Peking restaurant respectively on Wednesday. Later it was reported that Ling Nam donated \$37.15, Wah Kew donated \$24.90 and Peking donated \$26 respectively (Chinese Times 4, 5, 6 Apr 1922).

The bazaar, located at 147 Pender Street East, received a lot of news coverage in the Chinese Times in April 1922. On the second day of the bazaar i.e. April 6, 1922, it was revealed that thirty six Chinese business as well as four Chinese individuals donated miscellaneous goods. In addition one person donated \$10 and two people donated \$5. There were numerous people who donated under \$5. The Chinese Times reported 22 volunteers

helping in organizing the bazaar (Chinese Times 1, 7 Apr 1922).

On April 7, 1922 J. Lechie Co. Ltd. in Vancouver, a white business donated leather which was worth \$83.50 at wholesale value. J. Lechie did business with a Chinese leather company called Sing Lien Kee. A bath house known as Kwong Lay Man, located at Pender street West would reduce the price of bathers to ten cents for two weeks effective April 8, 1922 (Chinese Times 8 Apr 1922).

On April 8, 1922, two white business donated miscellenous goods to the bazaar. Ten Chinese business also donated goods to the bazaar. There was one person donated \$10 compared with five people who donated \$5. On April 10, 1922 it was reported six Chinese merchants donated and a white business donated goods. On April 12, 1922, it was reported that the drama performance raised \$200.04 for the flood (Chinese Times 10 Apr 1922).

On April 12th and 13th , 1922 there were numerous people who participated in the bazaar. Twelve Chinese business donated miscellenous goods. Again twenty six volunteers participated in the bazaar. Also it was reported that \$2,000 was remitted to the Shanghai Wah Yeung Charity Association. Also on April 14, 1922, \$63.84 was collected as donations from the bazaar (Chinese Times 15 Apr 1922).

On June 5, 1922 the Chinese Times reported that Consul-general Chau in Ottawa protested against the restrictive laws. According to the news report only those children under 13 were allowed to study in Canada. Also only those merchants with an

amount of Canadian \$2,500 capital and three years of business experience would be allowed to migrate to Canada. The head immigration officer agreed to make further consideration about the Consul-general Chau's appeal. The CBA Vancouver was concerned about this. On June 8, 1922 they called a meeting to discuss the immigration law which restricted Chinese students from coming to Canada (Chinese Times 5 Jun 1922).

On June 22, 1922 there was more news on the immigration laws. Consul-General, Chan, from Vancouver protested against the immigration law pertaining to students. Apart from the fact that only those Chinese under 13 could come to Canada, as students, wives could only come to join their husbands in Canada provided that the husbands had resided in Canada for three years and had \$2,500 in capital. Apparently the Canadian Immigration Department argued that such restrictive laws had to be passed because it was discovered that many Chinese students and their wives were in fact working in Canada. Consul-General, Chan, announced to the Chinese community that he would try his best to improve the immigration law, but he also hoped that fellow Chinese could co-operate with the government (Chinese Times 22 Jun 1922).

On June 29, 1922, Chinese Times reported that Consul-General, Chau, from Ottawa would come to Vancouver in September 1922 to inquire into the public opinion of the Chinese with regard to the commercial agreement and immigration laws that were to be established by the Chinese and Canadian government in the

near future. Apparently it was essential to obtain the opinion and consensus from the overseas Chinese community before the final decision on the content of the agreement was made. The Chinese in Vancouver were concerned about pending commercial and immigration agreement between China and Canada. Hence they urged the CBA Vancouver to hold a meeting to establish an association called the Overseas Chinese External Relations Association. Sixteen people including Wong Hung Chiu and Chan Won Chung were initiators of the association. Both Wong and Chan were executives of the CBA Vancouver and very active in the Chinese community. The Association was established about June, but no exact date was recorded (Chinese Times 29 Jun 1922).

On July 1, 1922 CBA Vancouver held a meeting to discuss the commercial and immigration laws that were to be set up by the Chinese and Canadian governments. As a result, a special committee to investigate the laws was established and to collect opinions. The CBA of Victoria was asked to send representatives to a general meeting held in Vancouver for discussing the commercial and immigration law. However, since CBA Victoria did not respond, another letter was sent. The CBA Vancouver also sent a letter to the Overseas Chinese External Relations Association on June 29, 1922 to ask its members to attend the general meeting.

On August 1, 1922 the CBA Vancouver announced the names of the investigation team to explore the commercial agreement and immigration law between China and Canada. The team was later

known as a supplementary association of CBA Vancouver for dealing with future commercial agreement and immigration law of China and Canada. There were twelve executives headed by Seto Ying Shek and active members of CBA Vancouver such as Wong Hung Chiu and Chan Wong Chung. The Association was interested in collecting briefs from the Chinese community. Three places such as Wing Kee, a Chinese business at 39 East Pender Street, the CBA Vancouver and another Chinese business called Kung Yuen were depositories for briefs for the future commercial and immigration treaty. The CBA Vancouver made a statement on August 1, 1922 indicating that it would be responsible for the action and the expenses of the supplementary association. On August 3, 1922, the supplementary association introduced all representatives. They also discussed how the association should be organized and recommended the able members in the Chinese community who could help. On August 7, 1922 the supplementary association held its second meeting. It was suggested that all proposals were to be written and to be discussed at the next meeting. Consul-General, Chau, in Ottawa was also to be informed of its establishment (Chinese Times 31 Jul, 7 Aug 1922).

On August 10, 1922, the committee that was responsible for donations for the floods in the three provinces met to thank the various associations for giving help. Gifts donated by the Shanghai Wah Yeung Charity Association were distributed to the various associations (Chinese Times 10 Aug 1922).

The following day the CBA Vancouver announced that Chinese

should contribute funds for the library of Peking University, one of the leading universities in China. A committee of raising funds composed of five members was established in Victoria and was headed by Wong Jok Lam .

On August 29, 1922 the Chinese Times reported that a Japanese gambler murdered a Chinese called Soo Yair Sum in a gambling quarter in Chinatown after losing a considerable amount of money. Apparently the Japanese fled afterwards. The district association to which Soo used to be a member sent a letter to Consul-General, Lim, and to the CBA Vancouver respectively hoping they could take action to arrest the Japanese murderer. The CBA Vancouver responded that the association would put out a reward of \$200 to anyone who could locate the murderer. Also the police had been notified by the CBA Vancouver (Chinese Times 29 Aug, 3, 5 Sep 1922).

In Victoria the school board held a meeting on September 13, 1922 to segregate the Chinese from the white students. The representatives had been very sophisticated by avoiding using the word "Chinese" so that they would not be attacked for discriminating against the Chinese. The conclusion was that a special school was to be set up in certain part of town. The criteria for admission to this special school were as follows:

1. Those who might interfere with the education of others because of their poor standard of English.
2. Those who resided in a certain district should attend the special school in order to avoid overcrowding in certain schools.

3. Those who were over 10 years with very limited knowledge.
4. Those who did not know English, no matter how old they were, would be admitted in the special school.
5. Those who failed the admission test for going into regular elementary school could go to the special school.
6. Those elementary school students who were over 16 and those intermediate and high school students who were over 17 could be admitted (Chinese Times 14 Sep 1922).

In response to the proposal of segregating Chinese from the whites, the Chinese withdrew their children from the school in Victoira. The School Board in Victoria urged the Chinese parents to send their children back to school. They pointed that seperating the Chinese students from the white students did not imply discrimination against the Chinese. The purpose of this was to ensure better learning for both groups. Moreover, the law applied to all foreigners who could not master the English language and not to the Chinese only. It was reported that the School Board refused to open some letters written by members of the Chinese Presbyterian Church who protested against this. A letter was sent by a Chinese who argued that his son was Canadian born, therefore he should not be discriminated against (Chinese Times 15 Sep 1922).

An association called the Anti-school Segregation Association was established in Victoria. They urged the Chinese not to attend classes. Also they requested Consul-General, Chan, to take action. Furthermore campaigning by newspaper was used in

mainland China to gain support. The Association also wrote a letter to the CBA Vancouver on September 28, 1922 requesting help and co-operation in stopping the Department of Education in Victoria from re-enforcing the policy of segregation of schools. The CBA Vancouver was asked to inform both the Chinese and English newspapers in Vancouver about the injustice and to arouse all Canadians to help. The Chinese government and the associations in China were to be informed about the discrimination so that people could unite together to protest against such segregation policy.

On October 6, 1922 the Chinese Times reported that the School Board in Victoria announced that if the Chinese students still insisted on not attending school by October 9 1922, the School Board would close down all Chinese schools. All Chinese students had to wait until January 1923 for the next enrollment. On October 9, 1922 the School Board changed their mind by announcing that the special schools for those who did not know English were to be closed down. It was reported that so far five Chinese students had been attending school. But this was disputed by the Victoria Anti-school Segregation Association which insisted that no student actively showed up. Many Chinese associations had submitted letters to protest the School Board in Victoria on October 30, 1922. CBA Vancouver announced that a general meeting for all overseas Chinese was held to discuss school segregation in Victoria. The Association felt that school segregation was surely a step toward discrimination against the

Chinese. The CBA Vancouver later set up an Anti-school Segregation Association primarily for supporting the Chinese students in Victoria as well as protecting the rights of the Chinese students in Vancouver. The Chinese Anti-school Segregation Association was headed by Rev. Yeung Kai Jong, a Chinese Presbyterian minister. The vice-president of the association was Tsang Shek Chun who was a very active member of the CBA Vancouver. The Chinese Anti-school Segregation Association of Vancouver held a meeting in Victoria on November 5, 1922. The representative attacked the various reasons that the Department of Education held for segregating schools. Those reasons were as follows:

1. The Chinese were inferior intellectually inferior to the whites.
2. Most of the Chinese were over 15 and they were older than the white members.
3. Owing to insufficient schools, special schools should be set up for the Chinese.

The Chinese Anti-school Segregation Association of Vancouver decided to continue the struggle against the policy of segregation. Otherwise, the tide of discrimination against Chinese students in school would, in the opinion of the association, lead to the prevalence of discrimination against the Chinese community at large (Chinese Times 6, 11, 30 Oct 1922; 3, 6 Nov 1922; 18 Jan 1923).

On November 7, 1922 Consul-General, Lim, invited the

representatives from Victoria and Vancouver to a banquet to discuss the problem of school segregation. They decided to raise funds so as to support the campaign. Drama performances were apparently discussed as means to raise funds. The Chinese Anti-school Segregation Association of Vancouver sent a letter to Consul-general Lim on November 10, 1922 asking him to make a thorough investigation to see if it was true that a Canadian girl had been stabled by a Chinese boy since the incident could possibly be made up by the English newspaper. The Association sent a letter to various Chinese organizations in Vancouver on the same day, asking for suggestions and plans concerning the protest. Moreover the associations were also asked to raise funds for the project. On November 17, 1922 it was reported that the Vancouver Chinese community was very enthusiastic in donating money for the Anti-school Segregation campaign. But no figure was printed in the Chinese Times (Chinese Times 14 17 Nov 1922).

On December 1, 1922 the Chinese Times reported that Rev. Yeung Kai Jong, president of the Chinese Anti-school Segregation Association of Vancouver was travelling to China for a visit. He was chosen as the delegate for propagating the anti-school segregation campaign in China. He was given two letters; one was from Consul-general Lim and the other from the Association which he could present to the Chinese government. On December 20, 1922 the Association agreed to donate \$2,000. for the anti-school segregation campaign in Victoria (Chinese Times 1, 20 Dec 1922).

1923

On January 9, 1923 the CBA Vancouver announced that the services of the executive for 1922 would terminate on February 15, 1923. New executives would have to be elected before that date according to the constitution. The pattern of local representation had not changed. It followed the July 20, 1919 election which was discussed previously. The final election of executive was to be held on February 24, 1923 (Chinese Times 9 Jan; 19 Feb 1923).

On January 29, 1923 Consul-General, Chau, of Ottawa had returned to Canada after visiting China. He was welcomed by Consul-General, Lim, of Vancouver and representatives of CBA Vancouver. In the banquet, Consul-General, Chau was asked about the pending commercial agreement and the immigration law between Canada and China. He replied that the terms of the agreement would surely be designed for the benefit of the overseas Chinese. The following day he talked of the school segregation question in Victoria. He said that he had already reported the case to the Chinese government. The Chinese people were greatly aroused by such unjust treatment imposed upon the overseas Chinese. They asserted that they would surely boycott Canadian goods if no action was taken to check the school segregation policy. Consul-General, Chau, assured the overseas Chinese that he would talk with the Canadian government at Ottawa. If his protest was disregarded, he would let the Chinese government intervene (Chinese Times 29, 30 Jan 1923).

On January 31, 1923 the Association for Investigating the

Future Commercial Agreement and Immigration Law between Canada and China had sent a letter of proposals to the CBA Vancouver hoping it could discuss the proposal with Consul-General, Chau. After several months of investigation and discussion, the following four proposals were drawn up:

1. To request the Canadian government to abolish the current immigration laws concerning Chinese immigrants.
2. Except for workers who were forbidden to migrate to other countries under international law, all others should be allowed to come to Canada. Moreover, those holding Canadian passport should be given free entry.
3. All overseas Chinese should receive equal treatment with those from other foreign countries. The same kind of priority should be granted to the Chinese immigrants also.
4. All overseas Chinese should have the right to reside in Canada whether or not they had received the receipt for head tax or not. Those who had returned to China and had not yet passed the time limit (usually 1 year) should be allowed to return to Canada (Chinese Times 31 Jan 1923).

On January 31, 1923 the CBA Vancouver held a meeting in order to discuss the future agreements between Canada and China with Consul-General, Chau. Members of the Chinese community were invited to join the discussion. During the meeting Seto Yip Shek, president of the Association for dealing with the future agreements between China and Canada and Tsang Shek Chuen, president of the Vancouver Chinese Anti-school Segregation

Association made speeches. Consul-General, Chau, assured the audience that he would try his best to help in the area of discrimination and immigration. The four proposals drawn up by the Association for dealing with future agreements between Canada and China were sent to Consul-General, Chau, on February 1, 1923. They were published in the Chinese Times for reference (Chinese Times 31 Jan; 1 Feb 1923).

On February 24, 1923 the CBA Vancouver denounced the Canadian government for obtaining finger prints of all Chinese immigrants, since by so doing the Chinese were treated as though they were criminals. Consul-General, Chau, wrote a letter to CBA on February 28, 1923 saying that he had already discussed with the head of the Canadian Immigration Department abolishing the law that demanded the finger prints and registration of all Chinese immigrants. It was reported that the law was primarily designed to deal with the Chinese passengers in the third class section of ocean liners. In addition, the members of parliament of British Columbia were in favour of such a law (Chinese Times 24 Feb 1923).

On March 14, 1923 the Chinese Times published a list of proposals for the new agreement between China and Canada made by Consul-General, Chau, in Ottawa when he met with the Canadian Prime minister on February 4, 1923. The proposals were sent to CBA Vancouver on March 6, 1923 hoping they would have it published. The proposals were as follows:

1. Since Canada and China were on friendly terms, the lives,

rights and properties of the overseas citizens should be protected.

2. The head tax imposed on Chinese immigrants should be abolished.

3. The unfriendly treatment which the detained Chinese immigrants receive should be abolished.

4. All Chinese who were holding official passports should be given free entry.

5. Chinese who hold official passports could also bring their wives.

6. Both the Canadian and the Chinese governments should allow qualified Chinese citizens to migrate to Canada.

7. Overseas Chinese students should be taught in the same school as whites.

8. All Chinese immigrants should have the rights to work in government department or any factories and companies.

9. Chinese immigrants should receive the same kind of physical examination upon arriving in Canada as immigrants from other countries.

10. Canadian born Chinese should also enjoy the same kind of privileges as Canadians, including the right to be elected as Members of Parliament.

11. Chinese goods coming to Canada should be taxed in the same way as goods from other countries.

12. Chinese cargo ships coming to Canada should be treated the same way as ships from other countries. (Chinese Times 14

Mar 1923).

On March 15, 1923 it was reported that the CBA Vancouver had arranged for fund raising primarily for the preparation of setting up the Chinese Canadian agreement. A door to door donation plan was to be set out. A Chinese called Lui Hung Cheung wrote to CBA Vancouver saying that he had received a copy of the new immigration law on March 2, 1923. The law consisted of 43 harsh regulations and if they were being enforced, the overseas Chinese would surely have a hard time. He asked if the CBA Vancouver knew about the terms of those 43 regulations and hoped that action could be taken against them (Chinese Times 15, 22 Mar 1923).

On April 11, 1923 the CBA Vancouver held a meeting to discuss two issues. The first was to protest against the new immigration law. The second issue was to protest against a white Presbyterian minister who denounced Chinese as responsible for evil drug activities. The association had agreed to send Wong Yik Cham, Lee Sai Fang, Fong Cheung Man and Lee Ping Kwong to discuss the issues with Consul-General, Lim, at Vancouver so that a counter-attack could be made (Chinese Times 12 Apr 1923).

On April 12, 1923 the CBA Victoria circulated the draft of the new immigration law, most of which would be implemented at a later date. The essence of the law which affected Chinese immigration would be discussed (Chinese Times 14 Apr 1923).

The Canadian government proposed that four types of Chinese would be allowed to come to Canada. They would include Chinese

government representative and ambassadors, Canadian born Chinese, merchants and university students. The merchants and the university students had to obtain written approval of both the Chinese Government and the Canadian Government officials in China prior to immigration. The students would not be allowed to stay after graduation. Also the new proposal differed from the old immigration law which allowed wives of merchants, teachers, intellectuals and reverends to immigrate. Under the new proposal, these people were no longer allowed to immigrate.

Some of the proposed new regulations drafted by the Immigration Department that affected the Chinese were also listed in the CBA Victoria circular. Regulation B stated that all Chinese who had been deported from Canada or elsewhere were not allowed to come to Canada. Regulation 15 stated that the Director of the Immigration Department had full authority to admit or deport Chinese. If they deserved deportation, no appeal could be made to the court. The immigrant could only retain counsel at the discretion of the Director of the Immigration Department. Under the old law, the Director of the Immigration Department did not have the absolute authority to make decisions according to the CBA Victoria circular. Also appeals could always be made when the hearings were not favourable to the immigrant. Regulation 15 indicated that within 12 months after the new immigration law was passed, all Chinese (including the Canadian born) had to register with the Immigration Office and had to carry the registration certificate with them all the time.

Regulation 20 stated that upon dissatisfaction of a judgement made by the Director of Immigration Department, an appeal could only be made to the headquarters within 38 hours of judgement. The Director of Immigration could, however, disallow the appeal because the judgements could be absolute. Regulation 26 stated that all illegal Chinese immigrants could be arrested without warrant and questioned by an Immigration Officer. If they could not produce proof of their legal status, they would be deported at their own expense. Regulation 32 stated that all Chinese immigrants who filed other citizen's income tax return, as if their own, would be charged a minimum of a \$1,000 fine, be placed in jail for twelve months or face deportation. Regulation 32b indicated that any person who assisted Chinese immigrants to file other citizen's income tax returns, as if their own, would be charged a minimum of \$1,000 or be imprisoned for 12 months. Regulation 34 stated that all unregistered Chinese immigrants would be charged a \$500 fine or face 12 months imprisonment. Regulation 38 stated that the court had no authority to intervene into the judgement made by the Immigration Office. Regulation 43 stated that the law that allowed Chinese immigrants to enter into Canada upon paying head tax would be abolished after the new immigration law came into effect. The CBA in Victoria urged the Chinese people to protest against the enforcement of the above harsh laws. All Chinese associations were asked to defend the rights of the Chinese in Canada. The CBA in Victoria responded to the harsh law by setting up a committee. The president was

Wong Chok Kau and the negotiator was Lau Kwok Cho. Other officials such as a vice president, a secretary and a treasurer were also elected. On April 18, 1923, a meeting was held at the CBA Vancouver because two members of the committee to protest new immigration laws in Victoria. Law Chiu Yin and Lau Kwok Cho came to CBA Vancouver to discuss a plan for protesting against the harsh law. The representatives of the Chinese associations were present. They proposed that a new association to protest the new immigration law be established in Vancouver (Chinese Times 17, 19 Apr 1923).

On April 18, 1923 Lui Hung Cheung, a Chinese immigrant wrote to CBA Vancouver again denouncing the CBA Vancouver for not replying to his earlier letter. He asserted that he had warned of the forthcoming harsh immigration law on March 21, 1923 but he had received no reply.

On April 19, 1923 the Chinese Times reported that CBA Vancouver wrote to the Vancouver City government on April 17, 1923. The letter was to ask the government inspector to investigate the case in which a white minister attacked Chinatown for allowing obscene acts by a white girl to amuse people and to become a prostitute. In the letter the CBA Vancouver stated that the Chinese community was in rage upon hearing such an accusation and hoped that clarification of such a rumour could be made (Chinese Times 19 Apr 1923).

The CBA Vancouver released two letters in the Chinese Times on April 20, 1923. The first was dated April 18, 1923

which indicated that Consul-General, Chau, of Ottawa hoped that Chinese people would send their opinions to him regarding the proposed new immigration law. The second letter dated April 19, 1923 indicated that the Canadian Prime Minister and the Director of the Immigration Department forbade the Chinese associations to send representatives to Ottawa to attend a meeting on immigration. Only the official Chinese representatives had the right to provide proposal to revise the law. As a result he would come to Vancouver on April 27, 1923 to collect opinions from the Chinese community (Chinese Times 20 Apr 1923).

The CBA Vancouver continued its attack on a white minister who claimed that the Chinese allowed a white woman to perform an obscene act. The first comment was reported on the Chinese Times dated April 19, 1923. The CBA Vancouver did not find any evidence to support that a white woman was employed as a prostitute and did not perform an obscene act in Chinatown. The CBA Vancouver also wanted to comment on the trafficking of opium, morphine and cocaine. The CBA Vancouver felt that it was Europeans and North Americans who were addicted to morphine and cocaine. As far as opium was concerned, the number of Chinese who were addicted to opium in Canton and Vancouver was negligible. As far as the source of morphine was concerned, it was manufactured in the United States and Scotland and shipped to Japan. From Japan it was shipped to China and in turn transported to Vancouver. As far as the processing of cocaine was concerned, it was manufactured in Germany and transported to

Japan. From Japan it was shipped to China which in turn was transported to Vancouver. The CBA Vancouver felt that Canadians did not realize the nature of drug trafficking and blamed the Chinese (Chinese Times 20 Apr 1923).

On April 24, 1923 the CBA Vancouver published a letter in the Chinese Times. It was a reply to correspondence from a Chinese called Lui Hung Cheung's dated April 18, 1923. The CBA Vancouver advised Lui that the association had put a lot of effort into fighting the harsh immigration law.

On April 26, 1923 the Chinese Times reported an incidence about Chinese farmers being forced to join the British Columbia Farm Association. The Chinese farmers in Vernon were approached by the British Columbia Farm Association to join as members. Under the constitution of the association, the members had no right to sell their products. These products were to be sent to the association for sale. There was no price guarantee for these products. The Chinese in Vernon refused to sign the contract. The British Columbia Farm Association put the blame on the interpreter named Chan Sou Hin who was later accused of selling liquor. Apparently two empty liquor bottles, retrieved from the back of a restaurant were used as evidence. The Chinese farmers in Vernon and Armstrong were so furious that they went on strike. The CBA Vancouver decided to hold a meeting and hire a lawyer so that they would not be forced to join the British Columbia Farm Association. Later some Chinese merchants in Armstrong and Vernon hired a lawyer to defend Chan Sou Hin

who was acquitted of selling liquor due to insufficient evidence. There was no record by the CBA Vancouver about the outcome of the attempt to force the Chinese farmers into the British Columbia Farm Association (Chinese Times 12 May 1923).

The Chinese Times was very concerned about the new proposal for Chinese immigration. The editor of the Chinese Times Chu Pok Yin wrote an editorial comment on April 27, 1923 regarding two strategies which Chinese associations might use in order that a revision of the proposal could be made by changing the sentiments of Members of Parliament in Ottawa. The first strategy was to negotiate with the opposition party of the Canadian Parliament so that they would support the protest against the harsh law. Additionally, the Chinese should gain support from the English newspaper so that articles in favour of the Chinese would be published. The Association should obtain support from the Canadian merchants, capitalists and manufacturers so that the rights of Chinese workers could be protected. The second strategy for the Chinese association to pursue to protest against the harsh law, should be appeals made to both the Canadian and the British governments at the same time. In this event, the Chinese government should be called upon for assistance. A propaganda campaign should be initiated and maintained in China so as to gain moral support from the fellow Chinese. Chu also suggested that booklets about the discontent among Chinese in Canada should be published and distributed in Canada so that the Canadian community at large could acknowledge

the injustice faced by the Chinese. Finally Chu felt that all Chinese associations over Canada should keep in touch and cooperate and a considerable amount of money should be set aside for this campaign (Chinese Times 27 Apr 1923).

On May 3, 1923 CBA Vancouver held a banquet for Consul-General, Chu, during which he made a speech indicating that the Canadian government was willing to revise the law. Chu suggested that the Chinese should persist in their protest otherwise revision of the law would be impossible. On May 4, 1924 the Chinese immigration law was passed for the third time in the House of Commons.

The Association for Protesting Against the Immigration Law (Vancouver) had arranged for a drama performance in order to raise funds for the protest. The association was supported by the CBA Vancouver and located in the same building. The Association set the date for the drama performance on May 13, 1923. They announced the money collected by drama performance would be kept in the bank for use in the protest. The association was headed by Kwang Yue Lam. Members such as Chan Won Chung and Tsang Shek-Chun were active members of the CBA Vancouver. Similiar associations were established in Edmonton, Calgary and Toronto to protest the unjust immigration law (Chinese Times 9, 10, 17 May 1923).

The Association for Protesting Against the Immigration Law (Vancouver) made an announcement of May 15, 1923 indicating that the protest fee that was presently demanded was not the same as

the fund that the Chinese people had previously donated for investigating the immigration law. The team for collecting funds were not sent out until May 14, 1923. Receipts would be given to all donors. The Association intended to collect \$2 from every Chinese business in Vancouver and \$1 from every Chinese (Chinese Times 15, 17 May 1923).

The Chinese decided to set up a protest headquarters in Toronto to fight against the new immigration law. Despite its protest and Consul-General, Chu's negotiation, the new Chinese Immigration Act was proclaimed on July 1, 1923.

On September 10, 1923 the CBA Vancouver received a message from Consul-General Lim which stated that CBA located at Kobe, Japan had requested relief for victims due to a recent earthquake. Lim hoped that the Chinese in Canada could give a hand to their fellow members in Japan. The CBA Vancouver decided to request Chan Won Chung, the president of the Association for relieving the flood victims in the three Chinese provinces, to send the rest of their donations to relieve the victims in Japan. On September 12, 1923 a meeting was held and it was decided that donations would be sent to the Chinese victims in Kobe. Chan Won Chung, Lee Sai Fang and three other members were responsible for sending the money to Kobe. Apparently \$1,000 Japanese dollars was remitted. Also the CBA Victoria raised money for the earthquake victims in Japan (Chinese Times 10, 13, 14 Sep 1923).

The British Columbia legislature was discussing a proposal

that forbade Chinese to hire white girls and Indian girls in restaurants in late November 1923. Consul-General, Lim, of Vancouver sent a letter to protest to the British Columbia government on November 26, 1923. A meeting was held in CBA Vancouver on November 27, 1923 to discuss the above matter and it was decided to hire a lawyer to appeal to the provincial government. The Premier of the Province then acknowledged Consul-General, Lim's letter, stating consideration of Lim's appeal would be made (Chinese Times 27, 28, 30 Nov 1923).

The CBA Vancouver held another meeting on November 31, 1923 during which the president Liu Yik Pang gave a report on his previous meeting with CBA Victoria concerning the protest against the prohibition of the Chinese from employing Indian and female white workers. Some decisions were made at the meeting. The first decision was that CBA of both Victoria and Vancouver should send a letter of protest to the Provincial government. The second decision was that Liu Yik Pang and Chan Won Chung would join the representatives of CBA Victoria in a meeting with the British Columbia government scheduled on December 5, 1923. The third decision was that a lawyer would be hired to lobby with the members of the British Columbia Legislature with the hope of gaining support for the protest. The last decision was that the executives of CBA in Victoria and Vancouver would take a primary role in a fund raising and protest campaign; all funds were to be raised for this protest only (Chinese Times 1 Dec 1923).

Another meeting was held at the CBA Victoria on December 2,

1923, Liu and Chan of CBA Vancouver attended the meeting with Consul-General, Lim, of Vancouver. In addition to the decision already made by the CBA Vancouver, the following decisions were passed:

1. All funds for use in the protest were to be raised by the two CBAs.
2. The consent of the two CBAs was required for withdrawal of any money exceeding \$50.
3. CBA Victoria should take the lead in this protest.
4. CBA Victoria would assume the expenses for all representatives who travelled to Victoria for meetings (Chinese Times 3 Dec 1923).

Another meeting was held on December 5, 1923 at CBA Vancouver. Only twenty people showed up due to poor advertisement. President Liu Yik Ming gave a speech. This was followed by a discussion on the request of the CBA Victoria to hire a lawyer to appeal to the British Columbia government. It was suggested that CBA Vancouver should remit \$1,000 to the CBA Victoria for protest purposes. The final decision was that the money of the Association should not be used for this protest. Instead revenue should be raised solely for the purpose of this protest (Chinese Times 6 Dec 1923).

On December 7, 1923 the British Columbia government acknowledged receipt of protest briefs against the prohibition of Chinese from employing female white and Indians. On December 10, 1923 Consul-General, Lim, wrote to the British Columbia

legislature about the same concern. He felt that the intent of the member of the legislative assembly who brought up the proposal was to protect women in British Columbia from drugs and evils. However Lim felt the proposal itself was discriminatory. Lim went on to say that Chinese were law-abiding citizens and they would feel offended upon hearing the proposal which forbade them to employ white and Indian women. If the proposals were passed, the friendly relationship between China and Canada would be endangered. It was hoped that the Legislative Assembly would look into such restrictive proposals (Chinese Times 10 Dec 1923).

On December 10, 1923 the Chinese Times reported that a Chinese restaurant in Chicago donated \$50 to fight for Chinese employment rights. Also a drama club turned over \$340 to CBA Vancouver for the same purpose. On December 17, 1923 the CBA in Vancouver and Victoria made an announcement regarding prohibiting Chinese to employ white and Indian women. They felt the proposals were an insult to the Chinese community. If the proposals were passed, the future of the Chinese in British Columbia would be limited. The CBAs had been trying their best to fight for the rights of the Chinese. It was hoped that the Chinese community could help and co-operate by giving generous donations. Money could be remitted to either CBA in Vancouver and Victoria (Chinese Times 3, 10 Dec 1923).

On December 21, 1923 the British Columbia Legislature held a meeting to modify the proposal on the Chinese employment rights. The proposals were modified in such a way that persons

of any nationality whose characters were evil or doubtful were prohibited from employing female whites. The City police and the RCMP would be responsible for enforcing such a law. The above law was passed with the support of the Attorney General of British Columbia (Chinese Times 21 Dec 1923).

On December 24, 1923 CBA Vancouver held a meeting to discuss the new income tax law that demanded English or French bookkeeping. It was hoped that all Chinese merchants would attend the meeting. On December 26, 1923 another announcement by CBA Vancouver was made regarding the appointment of Mrs. Yip Kwong to inspect the condition of the Chinese patients in the public hospital. Seeing that the patients were quite lonely and bored, Mrs. Yip raised funds to purchase a bookshelf for them. Five members of CBA Vancouver donated books; among them were Lui Yip Pang and Wong Hung Chiu. Both of them were active members of the CBA Vancouver. The Chinese community in Vancouver were encouraged to donate books to provide more reading material for the patients (Chinese Times 24 Dec 1923).

On December 28, 1923 the CBA Vancouver made the second announcement about English or French in bookkeeping. The CBA had recently consulted with Consul-General, Lim, who pointed out that all owners of manufacturing companies merchants, hawkers and retail merchants had to prepare their bookkeeping for inspection for the income tax officers, however the records did not have to be written in English or French. Only those big manufacturers such as sawhills or clothing manufacturing who earned more than

\$10,000 annually had to report their bookkeeping in either English or French, otherwise they would be fined \$100 per day (Chinese Times 28 Dec 1923).

NOTES

NOTES

1. We do not discuss the psychological aspects of racism because we want to show that racism had been used to create the myth that one group was more superior than another group. The Chinese in Canada from 1885 to 1923 were labelled as "inferior" compared with the whites. Therefore, removal of their citizenship rights were justified.

2. It was customary for the Chinese to bury the deceased. After a period of time, their bones were exhumed, cleaned and returned to their birth place and buried. In Canada, the Chinese retained this tradition during the period of 1885 and 1923. Every ten years, bones of the deceased Chinese were exhumed, cleaned and shipped to Sze-yap. One of the reasons why this was continued was because the Chinese did not consider Canada as their home.

AFTERWARD

AFTERWARD

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923 was repealed in 1947. Apparently during Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to Canada in 1944, she persuaded the Canadian prime minister Mckenzie King to allow the Chinese to migrate to Canada to join their families, since China and Canada were allies during the Second World War. Concerted efforts by various groups in Canada finally brought about the repeal of the 1923 law in May 1947.

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Anhui 安徽

Anti-Russian Fund Raising Committee 拒俄籌餉團

Aun Chiu Yim 顏志炎

Bing Ching Association 秉正團

Chan Ho Yin 陳浩然

Chan Kam Cheung 陳錦昌

Chan Po Yin 陳寶賢

Chan Qing Ming 陳燦明

Chan Shee Yan 陳樹人

Chan Tao Chi 陳道之

Chan Wan Chung 陳隱宗

Chan Wok San 陳玉珊

Chee Kong Tong 志公堂

Cheskiang 浙江

Chin Yuk Hin 錢玉軒

Chinese Benevolent Association 中華會館

Chinese Times 大漢公報

Chiu Sinn Yee 趙善義

Chiu Yum Po 趙陰甫

Cho Chant Lung 曹瓚龍

Chow Kar Chiu 周加超

Chow Yew Chor 周耀初

Chu Cheung 朱昌

Chu Hui Fai 朱去非

Chu Yau Cheung 朱祐昌

Chui Duk Ying 徐德英

Comrade Association 同志會社協會

Far Yuen 花縣

Fong Man Lang 方文瀾

Fung Wing 馮永

Go Wing Kun 高詠勤

Han Chow 杭州

Heung San 香山

Ho Check King 何卓競

Hoi Ping 開平

Hok San 鶴山

Hok Yup 鶴邑

Hoysun 台山

Hoysun Association 台山寧陽餘慶堂

Jiangsu 江蘇

Jung Shing 增城

Kai Sun Book Store 啟新書店

Kin Fung 乾豐

Kok Tai Ping Dramatic Club 國太平子弟

Koo Wei Kun 顧維鈞

Kum Lai Yuen 金利源

Kung Yuen 公源

Kwong Lay Man 廣利民

Kwong Ming Fu 廣明溥

Kwong Shui Lin 廣瑞年

Kwong Yu Lung 廣裕隆

Lam Lau Yee 林劉儒

Lam Poi Hang 林葆恒

Lam Tim Mok 林天木

Lau Fui Hong 劉煥漢

Lau Yee Kwan 劉儒堃

Lau Yet Chor 劉和初

Law Shiu Hay 羅紹希

Lee Bing Sun 李丙長

Lee Ching Sai 李清西

Lee Kar 李嘉

Lee Sai Cheung 李世璋

Lee Sai Fan 李世潘

Lee Ying 李嶽

Lee Yuen 李緣

Lingnam Restaurant 嶺南餐館

Liu Yick Ming 廖奕明

Liu Yuk Peng 廖翼明

Lok Man Lien 樂萬年

Lui Hung Cheung 廖鴻翔

Ma Sing Lam 馬星林

Nan Hoi 南海

Ng Chick 吳積

On Hing Lung 安興隆

Overseas Chinese External Relations Association 中華國民僑加外交會

Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association 海外救國會

Overseas Chinese Public School 海外中華學校

Pan Yu 潘禺

Sam Moon Wan 三門灣

Sam Sui 三水

Seto Ying Shek 司徒英石

Shanghai Wah Yeung Charity Association 上海華洋義賑會

Sinh Lien Shek 盛連記

Soo Yair Sum 蘇夜森

Sook Duk 順德

Sum Chiu Hin 岑朝軒

Sum Piu Sang 沈培生

Sun Hon 新安

Sun Hui 新會

Sung Cheung Fun 宋卓熏力

Tsang Shek Chun 曾石泉

Tung Kwun 華莞

United Chinese Association 華僑聯合會

United Chinese Provision and Supply Company 華僑聯合公司

Vancouver Salvation and Welfare Committee 溫哥華濟惠團

Wah Kew Restaurant 華僑餐館

Wing Sung 永生

Wing Wo Cheung Company 永和昌號

Won Kum Yau 溫金有

Wong Chee Din 黃子典

Wong Ching Ting 王正廷

Wong Gay Kui 黃紀橋

Wong Hint Ying 黃顯英

Wong Hung Chiu 黃孔昭

Wong Kew 王橋

Wong Lap Fong 黃立晃

Wong Wing Kwong 黃榮光

Wong Yok San 黃玉珊

Wu Chow Pharmacy 五州藥房

Wu Sai Lung 胡世瓊

Yeung Kai Jong 楊啟壯

Yeung Kam Ling 楊錦凌

Yin Ping 恩平

Yip Chun Tin 葉春田

Yip Kwan Leung 葉昆樑

Yip Mow 葉茂

Yip Soo Chee 葉素之

Yip Yew Chor 葉曉初

Yiu Cheung association 愚張會

Yu Shan 禺山

Yu Shan Association 禺山會

Yuen Shik Kai 袁世凱

Zhejiang 浙江

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