

THE HAIDA STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY  
ON THE HAIDA GWAIL,  
1966-1990.

BY

NORMAN L. KLIPPENSTEIN

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Anthropology  
University of Manitoba  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

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ISBN 0-315-76785-5

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## ABSTRACT

Using historical and anthropological sources including news media and personal interviews, this study combines political anthropology's process approach with that of political economy's structural analysis in order to analyze the Haida struggle for autonomy on the Haida Gwaii. This thesis traces the historic development of political and economic dependency among the Haida and then, beginning with 1966, examines the process by which they mobilized to challenge government and industry activities on Lyell Island in 1985. The blockade on Lyell Island marked the reassertion by the Haida of their right and responsibility to play a central role in the management of the Islands, a role which they later agreed to share with Parks Canada for the South Moresby/Gwaii Haanas area, in spite of the unresolved dispute between the Haida and Canada over land ownership. The question is asked whether the Haida gain in autonomy (i.e., their increasing ability to determine or influence Island business and politics) has resulted from structural (i.e., political, economic and legal) change or, rather, from reluctant government tolerance of the extra-legal Haida initiatives because of the extent of their alliances, support base and legitimacy. The conclusion reached is that little or no structural change has taken place on the Islands, but, in spite of concerted strategies by government and industry to perpetuate their domination of the Haida and Island resources, the Haida have managed to increase their autonomy by means of extensive political activism including the discriminating and effective use of illegal confrontational strategies. Not only has autonomy been gained by these strategies, but, in the absence of meaningful structural change, it is also being maintained by them.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis began with three people, or rather, two individuals and one people. In 1985, in my first anthropology course, instructor Menno Wiebe invited Native poets, artists, and friends to speak to us about their work and lives. Their stories -- or was it their way of telling stories -- drew my admiration and curiosity. In early 1986, I was introduced to the Haida when their "Save South Moresby Caravan" came through Winnipeg (and our classroom) with stories of struggle, despair and yet hope. The strength and vision of the Haida inspired me to learn more about their struggle with Canadian society. Then, in 1987, in Dr. Raymond Wiest's class on "Ethnological Theory of Migration and Development", I first became fascinated by the potency of theoretical formulations while reading about models of the workings of a world economic system. Dr. Wiest became my advisor, and the theoretical content of this thesis is, to use a variation of that oft used phrase, "a dialog with the theory of Wiest." Reluctant follower that I am, in the end I found myself turning to a political economy analysis in order to best characterize the nation-state within which the Haida are working to realize their goals. Thank you Ray for your contribution, encouragement and friendship throughout this effort.

I have also drawn from the theoretical and applied perspectives of others at the University of Manitoba. For helping me build on my applied interests and encouraging me to see the positive changes being made by native people despite our imperfect society, I thank my second internal reader, Dr. John Matthiasson. For his command of history, the courage to write an unfaltering history of Canada's relationship with native people, and his very helpful suggestions at important points during my thesis effort, I thank external reader, Dr. Douglas Sprague. For facilitating my exploration of anthropological theory and providing very helpful comments on my thesis proposal, I also thank Dr. David Stymeist and Dr. Jean-Luc Chodkiewicz. For sharing a similar research interest, his energy and conversation, I thank visiting professor, Dr. Yngve Lithman. A special thanks also to doctoral

candidate Fred Shore for first introducing me to the anthropological literature on indigenous peoples and the Canadian nation-state.

I remain indebted to many Haida for allowing me the opportunity to take this study outside the university walls in order to learn from those willing to sit and talk in homes, coffee shops, the street, or wherever else we happened to meet. Learning was rarely sweeter. Thank you to the kind people in the Skidegate Band Council for first making me feel welcome in the village by asking me to work for them as a part-time computer consultant. I owe special thanks to Ada Yovanovich for taking two strangers into her home during the summer of 1989 and for so openly sharing her family and friends with my wife and me. A special thanks also to those Haida who made an exploratory trip of Gwaii Haanas possible for me and for a group of ten other participants in a cross-cultural seminar: thanks to the Haida Gwaii Watchmen personnel, especially Colin Richardson and Ted Bellis for providing the means and enthusiasm to make this learning experience possible; thanks to Ernie Gladstone for his refreshing spirit and countless practical talents to which we owed our safety and comfort; and finally, thanks to John Williams for always being the elder. Wise, patient and kind, he proved the most interested and best of teachers during both Island visits. His knowledge and hospitality -- shared by his wife, Elizabeth -- were central to making this research, writing and cultural bridge-building effort a success.

Thank you to MCC Canada for a financial contribution toward the initial visit to the Islands. A further thank-you to MCC staff members Anna Dueck, Menno Wiebe and Darryl Klassen -- for providing the organizational assistance and funding necessary which made it possible for me to plan the cross-cultural seminar on the Islands. Thank you also to the Anthropology Department for their contribution toward the research trip. A special thank-you also to Dr. Richard Stuart (Chief Historian for Canadian Parks Service, Prairie and Northern Region) for his timely efforts in providing access to helpful information, especially the 1989 Haida literature review by Parks.

Finally, a very special thank you to my wife and co-explorer Frieda who shared my 1989 research experience and also provided many helpful suggestions which contributed to greater clarity and refinement in this thesis.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMB	Archipelago Management Board
CHN	Council of the Haida Nation
DIA	Department of Indian Affairs
DFO	Department of Fisheries and Oceans
ELUC	Environment and Land Use Committee
IPS	Islands Protection Society
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
PAC	Public Advisory Committee
PSYU	Public Sustained Yield Units
QCC	Queen Charlotte City
SMRPT	South Moresby Resource Planning Team
TFL	Tree Farm Licence
UFAWU	United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
WAC	Wilderness Advisory Committee
WFP	Western Forest Products

## CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Long after the fur trade had been established across what is now known as Canada, politicians were confronted with the issue of making treaties in order to make room for European settlement on native lands. In the province of British Columbia this point was reached during the mid- and late-nineteenth century. At this time, smallpox and other fatal diseases were rapidly destroying native populations. The prevailing belief on the northwest coast was that native people were a dying race -- those who did not succumb to European diseases would certainly soon be assimilated into the larger Canadian population.

Reflecting this belief, the government of British Columbia stopped negotiating treaties, as had been the practice under the colonial administration of Governor James Douglas, and even reneged on previously made agreements by pressuring the federal government into unilaterally reducing the size of reserve lands.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the Canadian government's Department of Indian Affairs (DIA)<sup>2</sup> embarked on a policy of westernization and assimilation which was designed to eventually integrate the surviving native people into the mainstream of Canadian society. What had begun as the economic relationship of the fur trade had rapidly grown into the economic and political problem of how natives, settlers, business interests and the colonial government were going to share the land. No mutual solution was negotiated. The government acted unilaterally, and native lands were quietly annexed and progressively alienated from native peoples through the establishment of small reserves, the designation of non-reserve lands as crown lands, and the subsequent sale and/or lease of these crown lands to settlers and business interests. When, as inevitably happened, natives resisted the presence of speculators on their coastal lands, gun boats were sent from Victoria to suppress the resistance. The result was that, for

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<sup>1</sup> See Ware (1974) and Titley (1986: 141-148). Native protest finally resulted in individual bands receiving compensation for and/or restoration of "cutoff" lands starting in 1982.

<sup>2</sup> Although the official name of the department changed from time to time, I will refer to it as the Department of Indian Affairs throughout this paper.

most native groups in B.C., although no treaties were signed and no decisive war was fought, their land was simply annexed by the Crown for the province.

Despite the dire predictions of the time, native peoples did not die off. Their populations stabilized and, by the end of the first quarter of this century, began growing in numbers. Nevertheless, the government continued with its policy of assimilation and non-negotiation even while it was becoming increasingly obvious that the policy was not working. Their isolation on small reserves only reinforced native peoples' identity and solidarity and encouraged activism on the land question. Organizations such as the Allied Tribes of B.C. and, later, the Indian Brotherhood of B.C. arose and came to play a central role in these efforts. This activism continued through the early and mid century despite the fact that it was repressed by various legal and administrative means until the late 1960s. Then, in 1969, native reaction to the "White Paper" focussed native disgust and opposition so strongly nationwide that it could no longer be ignored. Calling for a termination of special status for native people, for the closing of the Department of Indian Affairs, and for a complete transfer of federal responsibility for natives to the provinces, the White Paper proposed that native peoples were to have the rights and privileges of other Canadian citizens -- no more, no less. It was the blatant public announcement of the logical result of the near-century-old governmental assimilation policy.

Much to the surprise of the government, native people spoke with a strong and substantially unified voice whereas previously their resistance had taken the form of relatively ineffective isolated initiatives. In what became known as the "Red Paper" they argued that, contrary to the proposed government policy, native peoples were Canadian citizens *plus* people with special status due to their aboriginal past as first nations. Having no interest in losing their identities and becoming assimilated, native people across Canada insisted that the Canadian government must fulfil its obligations to them.

Though the government withdrew the paper, it did not move to formally acknowledge, much less fulfil its obligations to native peoples. This

lack of movement resulted in an increase in native activism against the established political and economic structures. Activism occurred on a national, provincial and local level around such issues as the patriation of the Canadian constitution, the B.C. government's continued unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of aboriginal title in the province, and the logging activities which threatened a complete alienation from the land for some bands. Organized efforts challenging government and industry actions to curb development, or at least to allow natives a say in the nature of developments in their areas, were successful in some cases. Groups such as the James Bay Cree and the Dene of the Mackenzie Valley have made some substantial gains in the course of comprehensive land claim negotiations. In contrast, others such as the Nishga have spent decades mobilizing and preparing their case for court action with no resolution as of yet. To date, many native groups such as the Lubicon Lake Cree, prairie bands with outstanding treaty land entitlements, the Innu of Labrador, the James Bay Cree and the Mohawk in southern Quebec remain embroiled in disputes with government and business without promise of a resolution.

Against this historic backdrop, some scholars have recently argued that in their relationship with native peoples, the Canadian nation-state has not focussed on protecting the interests of native people, in spite of the DIA's official mandate of guardianship. Quite to the contrary, DIA, often in consultation with the Justice Department, has effectively worked to protect the nation-state against claims by native people (Tobias 1976; Sprague 1980, 1988; Tanner 1983; Carter 1990). If this was the case historically, then one might wonder if the same may be true of contemporary native/government relations, especially in light of the fact that the competition for resources between native peoples and government is even more intense today than earlier in this century (Cassidy and Dale 1988).


The purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate the last quarter century of conflict between a native group and the government and industry interests operating in the area claimed by that native group. The lands in

question are the Haida Gwaii<sup>3</sup> (see Figure 1) which, scholars agree, have been the exclusive homeland of the Haida for at least the past ten thousand years until the annexation of the land within the last century. In examining the question of whether existing political and economic structures have changed or merely been perpetuated in some form over the past twenty five years, this study finds that government policy has not changed significantly and that the structures of political and economic dependency have been perpetuated by government and industry. However, in spite of the perpetuation of dependency, I will argue that the Haida have increased their autonomy by means of their extensive political mobilization and their discriminating use of illegal political action, most effectively illustrated during the 1985 Lyell Island blockade.

An examination of the economic and political structures might lead one to argue, from a Marxist or a world system perspective, that economic structures perpetuated by world capitalist interests ultimately determine the political structures, and thus should form the focus of any analysis. This perspective is compelling primarily because of the pervasive impact of multinationals on the governmental policies of nation-states, especially in peripheral areas such as the Haida Gwaii. However, according to David A. Muga (1988: 31-32), there is a dearth of Marxist literature addressing the problem of the aspirations of native populations for greater autonomy within nation-states (known, in Marxist terms, as "the nationalities question"). My own enquiries have confirmed the scarcity of this literature, although there is a more general theoretical literature of importance to an analysis of existing dynamics (e.g., Eric Wolf 1982). Following Harvey Feit (1982) I would argue that, while capital may be the compelling force in the determination of government policy and hence the exploitation of peripheral resource areas, the nation-state plays an undeniably central role in inhibiting, regulating or facilitating these developments. In fact, the nation-state is an increasingly direct player in hydro, mining and other development initiatives affecting

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<sup>3</sup>Haida Gwaii is the name given to the Islands by the Haida. The Islands are more commonly known as the Queen Charlotte Islands, derived from the name "Queen Charlotte's Islands" given by an early explorer Captain George Dixon in 1778 in honour of the wife of Britain's George III (Johnston 1987: 108).



# Haida Gwaii

WARMED by a Pacific current, the archipelago's two large islands and 150 smaller ones enjoy a mild, moist climate much like Vancouver's, 650 kilometers to the south. Named by Capt. George Dixon in 1778 after his ship—and the wife of Britain's George III—the Queen Charlottes are known as Haida Gwaii—"homeland."

**Haida Ancestral Village Sites**  
 ● MASSET BAND  
 ■ SKIDEGATE BAND

0 30 km  
 0 30 mi

NGS CARTOGRAPHIC DIVISION  
 DESIGN: JOHN W. LOTHERS  
 RESEARCH: MICHAEL NICOLLS, MARGUERITE B. HUNSIKER  
 PRODUCTION: ISKANDAR BADAY, RAMSEY MURRAY

FIGURE 1: THE HAIDA GWAII.  
 Adapted from Johnston (1987: 108).

native peoples in northern Canada. Equally important, the political field in a nation-state makes possible the evolutionary -- as opposed to revolutionary -- change being sought by many native societies. Thus it is considered essential to place the greater emphasis on Canadian nation-state's political structures and processes in the following analysis.

"Autonomy" in this thesis is a technical term defined as being independence within certain constraints rather than complete independence or self-government. As the term is used here, for a group of people to be said to have some autonomy with respect to a certain issue or problem means for them to be choosing their own strategy and defining their own goals and not allowing (or being forced to accept) decisions to be imposed on them from nation-state. Decisions of interest both to the group and to outside parties must be arrived at through the process of negotiation. Implicit in the use of this term is the question of, "autonomy from whom or what?" As used in this thesis, it is autonomy from control by governmental and business interests. For instance, co-management by consensus can be seen as a form of autonomy, in that the Haida effectively have a veto on any management decision with which they disagree. However, this autonomy is limited, as the other party has a veto on Haida action as well. Therefore, autonomy is limited to the right to take action only on that to which both sides agree through the process of negotiation.

An "illegal" action is simply any action which is not authorized or defined as legal by the nation-state. Illegal action may be morally defensible, and, in fact, may be understood as being "just" by most members of the society.

### *The Setting*

The Haida live on the Haida Gwaii, an archipelago of the west coast of what is now Canada. It is an archipelago made up of two large islands and many much smaller ones making up a total land mass of approximately 3,500 square miles. The backbone of the Islands is a mountain range rising progressively from the flat land on the east coast to over 3,000 feet on the west coast. According to 1981 figures, the total island population was 5,621 spread



across nine villages, with New Masset and Queen Charlotte City being the largest. The two main Haida reserves, (Old) Masset<sup>4</sup> and Skidegate, had 580 and 322 residents respectively.

Post-contact Haida history is similar to the basic pattern of other northwest coast native groups. After their population -- estimated variously as being between 6,000 and over 10,000 island wide -- was drastically reduced by successive strikes of smallpox and other epidemics in the mid-nineteenth century, the surviving Haida progressively consolidated into the two villages of Skidegate and Masset (now called Haida). By 1915 the Haida population on the Haida Gwaii had reached its lowest level of 588 (Van den Brink 1974: 77). As with most other native groups in B.C., no war was fought nor were treaties signed, but small reserves were designated by the government after a visit by a government commission in 1882, and the remaining land was claimed by the Crown. The establishment of these reserves began the progressive alienation of the remaining land and marine resources from the Haida.

### *Justification*

There are several reasons for my choice of subject, focus and approach. The Haida are a particularly interesting native group, as they were one of the most prominent to successfully mobilize extra-legal and illegal political action at a national level in an attempt to bring about meaningful change to their relationship with the Canadian nation-state. Also unique is the fact that they are well known not only within Canadian native communities, but, largely due to their artistic accomplishments, also in the larger Canadian and world contexts.

Surprisingly little anthropological work has been done on Haida contemporary life and their relationship to the Canadian nation-state. In

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<sup>4</sup> While the Haida of the village of Masset has recently changed the name of their village to "Haida," I will adopt the convention of using the previous name of Masset or Old Masset throughout this thesis due to the ambiguity inherent in the use of "Haida" for referring both to the Haida people and the village of Haida. The non-Haida town of Masset will be referred to as New Masset.

spite of the catastrophic changes progressively brought into their life during the post-contact period, and in spite of on-going resistance and increasingly pronounced Haida activism in the past two decades, the extensive ethnographic work on the Haida has remained focussed on what the traditional culture was like or on how much continuity with the past can be found in contemporary culture. These kinds of studies began with the Boasians<sup>5</sup> and were continued by the proponents of the British structural-functional tradition<sup>6</sup> of anthropology. The studies had in common their focus on the micro or on local level to the neglect of all or important aspects of the wider connections to the macro level (the encompassing state societies) they were a part of. These kinds of studies persist to the present day in mainstream Haida ethnographic work, for example Mary Lee Stearns (1981) and Marianne Boelscher (1988).

While some attention to contemporary Haida activism has been given by anthropologist/sociologist Evelyn Pinkerton (1983, 1989), there remains a need to clearly identify the political and economic structures in which the Haida live and within which they are working for change. These corresponding changes, affecting not only the local but feeding back into the provincial and national levels, require attention as well. Anthropological studies of the bureaucracies affecting -- and to great extent shaping -- the behaviour of small-scale societies are needed in order to understand these changes. (Matthiasson 1972, 1974: 324; Lithman 1983; and Keesing 1981, among others, have called for or provided such studies).

In spite of the fact that anthropologists have been slow to change their focus from a preoccupation with the micro-society, a new literature dealing with the politics of indigenous peoples and the nation-state has been developing. Anthropologists such as Michael Asch, Noel Dyck, Harvey Feit, Yngve G. Lithman, Douglas Sanders, Adrian Tanner and Sally Weaver are among those who have entered this discussion and have generated a

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<sup>5</sup> These are proponents of Franz Boas (1858 - 1942) who is associated with a theoretical approach to ethnography known as historical particularism.

<sup>6</sup> British structural-functionalism was established by the combined contributions of Radcliffe-Brown (1881 - 1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884 - 1942).

substantial body of literature. This kind of analysis has yet to find its way into Haida ethnography.

There is also a moral reason for anthropologists to address topics which are of importance to native peoples today. Without a clear understanding of the worth of a study, many native groups today are no more willing to tolerate research in their community than a researcher would tolerate such an imposition in his or her family and community context. The obsession in the anthropological literature with "the traditional" seems to suggest that the culture of the Haida is valuable only to the degree that it retains elements of the traditional or exotic. The present challenges, aspirations and interests of the Haida in developing a productive relationship with the larger Canadian society and the world appear to be of less anthropological interest. Much as traditional culture should be recognized as important and even central to the Haida identity, the Haida today are primarily concerned with a redefinition of their relationship to the governments and the people of Canada and with how this relationship has fostered their alienation from the resources of the land and waters of the Haida Gwaii. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that this has been the primary concern of Haida leadership since the Islands' annexation by the nation-state at the turn of the century (see Orchard 1969). Indeed, it is this struggle which is now serving to motivate the increasing interest of many Haida in their cultural past. An anthropologist's work should address the needs of a people in some significant way, or at least investigate questions for which they too are seeking answers. This study seeks to be relevant both to the academic and the native world by using anthropological method and theory to address issues of concern to Haida and many Canadians today.

### *Review of the Literature*

While analyses of the general process of colonization and the alienation of the natives from their land in the province of British Columbia and in Canada are abundant (George E. Shankel 1945; Forrest E. La Violette 1973[1961]; John L. Tobias 1976; Ruben Ware 1974; Eric R. Wolf 1982; James S.

Frideres 1983; J. Rick Ponting 1986; E. Brian Titley 1986), there are few sources in the anthropological literature carefully analysing the impact of first the colonial and then the Canadian nation-state on contemporary Haida culture. Nor does one find sources which readily integrate the findings of these mostly historical studies with a presentation of contemporary Haida life.

John R. Swanton was the first anthropologist to conduct extensive field research among the Haida. Although he did research in Skidegate in the winter of 1900, he is surprisingly silent on the issue of the population's decimation, even though most of the village's population was a result of migrations caused by that decimation. His silence can be understood if one considers that, at the time, the belief that the native population was going to die off was still commonplace. It was this belief in the impending extinction, or, at best, cultural assimilation of native peoples, that made documenting whatever could be saved of the traditional culture so urgent and the groups' adaptation at the time of study of no anthropological interest. At this time the historical particularist approach of the American Boasians was becoming established as mainstream American anthropology. This approach was later complemented by British structural-functionalism. Both historical-particularists and structural-functionalists tend to study cultural groups solely at the micro or local level to the neglect of the wider or macro connections. Their view of societies as isolated mosaics, or as museums of human cultural diversity, became the predominant form of ethnography and has become characterized as "salvage" anthropology for their goal of documenting the fast disappearing traditional cultures. From these studies we learn little or nothing about the actual lives of the people but, using ethno-historical and oral history techniques, the authors detail aspects of *traditional* life such as hunting and gathering practices, ritual, myths and legends, material adaptation and art, economic system, leadership and succession to office, and marriage and family patterns.

Swanton (1905), Theresa M. Durlach (1928), George P. Murdock (1934a, 1934b, and 1936), and Daniel E. Anker (1975) are classic examples of this preoccupation with the traditional. All focus on a Haida past already gone a quarter century before Swanton first conducted his research. While Durlach's

and Anker's work was primarily linguistic, the fact that Anker, working as late as the 1970s, was undaunted by the reality that only a handful of Haida were still using the traditional Haida terms he was working so hard to determine Haida kinship semantics from, attests to the extent of the discipline's preoccupation with the traditional. Clearly the representative Haida kinship semantics and kinship system had become something very different from the unobservable (and unverifiable) traditional Haida kinship system Anker was attempting to document.

With the influence of the structural-functional approach and the post World War II interest in acculturation studies, came increasing focus on studying change and continuity in living cultures. Mary L. Stearn's (1973) Ph.D. dissertation is a classic example of this approach. Within a basic structural-functional analytical framework, Stearns demonstrates how acculturation results not in the complete disintegration of the traditional culture of matrilineal societies, but changes in a way so as to preserve continuity with that traditional culture, particularly in its ceremonial life. Margaret B. Blackman's (1973), Stearns' (1981), and Marianne Boelscher's (1988) works maintain the basic change and continuity theme but elaborate it further with more recent theoretical interests. Despite these recent interests, this body of ethnography remains dominated by a preoccupation with salvaging the traditional at the micro level.

For our purposes Mary L. Stearn's work merits closer examination. In her Ph.D. dissertation (1973), Stearns points out that the federal government's presence, represented by the Indian Affairs department and the Indian Agent in Masset from 1910 to 1966, had the impact of leaving a power vacuum in Haida society. While Stearns discusses the effects of this federal government intervention in Haida society with some profound insight into how significantly it has affected local power structures, she stops short of any analysis of the larger political and economic context. This omission has been largely corrected in the 1981 book version of her dissertation where she dedicates a whole chapter to a discussion of the political context. Upon closer examination, however, the reader cannot help but notice that this discussion is not well integrated with the rest of her work which is, to a large extent,

taken unchanged from her dissertation. This strong micro bias is further revealed in her severe criticism of J. H. Van den Brink's (1974) ethno-historical work on contemporary Haida culture. Stearns (1981: 8-9) criticises him for doing too little field work and drawing too heavily on governmental and Indian Affairs documentation. While the criticism concerning Van den Brink's limited two-month field work experience is understandable, she has missed the point of his study, which was not to ferret out yet another volume of exotic traditional culture, but to identify systemic (macro) colonial, national and provincial actions in concert with elements of (micro) Haida cultural organization in order to meaningfully discuss a century of change in Haida society. Indeed, for all her field work, Stearns clearly missed observing the extent to which the Masset and Skidegate Haida had become politically cooperative under the Council of the Haida Nation by the mid 1970s. She states that,

[w]hile members of the other surviving village of Skidegate are considered Haidas, social interaction between the groups is very limited . . . . [I]t is largely in the context of their own village, then, that their identity as Haidas has any meaning or cultural content [1981: 8-9].

Ironically, it was during the very year of her book's publication, 1981, that the Masset and Skidegate Haida collectively registered a land claim with the federal government, the culmination of almost a decade of cooperative effort.<sup>7</sup>

Van den Brink's (1974) ethno-historical work *The Haida Indians: Cultural Change mainly between 1876-1970* is clearly an exception to the preoccupation with the traditional and micro in that it provides an analysis of the impact of the colonial activity and the political and economic activities of the nation-state. Van den Brink is the first to address the issue of cultural change in Haida society from the perspective of government policy decisions. Drawing on voluminous documentation of the federal, provincial and regional governments and the Indian Affairs department, he presents

<sup>7</sup> Indeed, Van den Brink (1974: 197) documents an earlier point when Skidegate and Masset Haida attempted to establish a pan-Haida government. While the reason Stearns missed such seemingly obvious developments may be due to the fact that she was not able to continue her research unobstructed (as alluded to in a footnote [Stearns 1981: 9]), it is more likely that she missed many of these realities because of the preoccupation with the micro analysis of Masset.

information that suggests that the government systematically worked to dominate the Haida population between 1875 and 1910. The study is a unique contribution to the analysis of the Haida and the governmental relationship and could serve as an example of the kinds of issues that could be addressed in subsequent analyses. While the study is very useful in offering a macro analysis, it falls short in its examination of the micro level as Stearns (1981: 8-9) emphasized. For example, Van den Brink's emphasis on the differences between Skidegate and Masset Haida are made primarily on the basis of governmental documentation and are not supported by intensive comparative field work.

Though not focussed specifically on the Haida, a study which contributes to an analysis of both macro and micro factors affecting native peoples in B.C. is Rolf Knight's (1978) work, *Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Indian Labour in British Columbia 1858-1930*. Knight argues that, far from being isolated people relegated to their reserves while the province was developing around them, native people -- including the Haida -- were an integral part of that development, both in the form of skilled and unskilled labour. The author argues that their marginalization from the Canadian economy is a relatively recent development. This study demonstrates the utility of the analysis of the economic and political realities of Indian (and, to some extent, other) labour within the province. What is missing from the analysis, however, is a discussion of the specific federal and provincial policies impacting native people specifically. If Rolf Knight is right in arguing that native people were very much a part of the larger B.C. economy before and after the turn of the nineteenth century, then it is surely an omission that anthropologists prior to Van den Brink have not documented that connection with the larger society.

Evelyn Pinkerton's recent work comes closest to a contemporary analysis of Haida activism. With the background gained from her three-year fieldwork in Queen Charlotte City for her Ph.D. dissertation (1981) investigating the history and the economic and cultural life of Queen Charlotte City, the "sister" village of Skidegate on the Haida Gwaii (see Figure 1), she turned her research focus more directly toward Haida activism

(Pinkerton 1983). A collection of articles on native co-management edited by Pinkerton (1989) includes an article co-authored by Haida Nation president Miles Richardson (Richardson and Green 1989). These works are an important source of detail on recent Haida Gwaii and Haida history, but they would have benefited from more systematic examination of the political and economic relationship of the Haida to the nation-state.

Looking beyond these sources, there is a promising, growing body of literature on indigenous societies and the nation-state informing anthropological studies of other native groups in Canada and similar nation-states. A few important examples are Michael Asch's articles, "The Dene Economy" (1977) and "Dene Self-Determination and the Study of Hunter-Gatherers in the Modern World" (1982); Noel Dyck's (1985) edited volume, *Aboriginal Peoples and the Nation State: An Introduction to the Analytical Issues*; Harvey A. Feit's articles, "The Future of Hunters within Nation-States: Anthropology and the James Bay Cree" (1982) and "Legitimation and Autonomy in James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro Electric Development" (1985); Yngve G. Lithman's (1983) book, *The Practise of Underdevelopment and the Theory of Development: the Canadian Indian Case*; Robert Paine's (1985) article "Ethnodrama and the 'Fourth World': The Saami Action Group in Norway, 1979-1981"; Adrian Tanner's (1983) article, "Introduction: Canadian Indians and the Politics of Dependency" and Sally Weaver's (1985) article, "Political Representivity and Indigenous Minorities in Canada and Australia."

These recent anthropological studies draw on a diverse and eclectic body of theory, incorporating elements of dependency theory and elements of the process approach to analysing political activity. These theories are tailored primarily for an analysis of the Canadian nation-state's relationship (primarily through the bureaucracy of DIA) with natives. While inspired by them, I would argue that many of these works could be significantly improved by a fuller development of the theoretical models and key concepts they employ, such as "dependency," "legitimacy," "autonomy," "ethnodrama," "support," and "consensus". Not all studies are equally negligent in their development of the theoretical dimension of their work.



Lithman's (1983) study serves as a model of how the concept of "dependency" (or "underdevelopment") might be constructed. Lithman traces the concept's development back to the Latin American dependency school, elaborating and clarifying in the process. By tracing the development of this concept, Lithman's discussion stands in contrast to Tanner's (1983), which simply adopts the use of the term without critical discussion of its meaning, utility or historical development. Asch (1977) provides us with an excellent analysis of how, in the case of the Dene, economic dependency was first developed before the turn of the century by the fur trade and then was maintained by government interventions (e.g., the introduction of southern institutions such as day schools and individualized welfare programs). Asch (1982) then goes on to argue for the workability of the Dene proposal to establish themselves as a self-governing region within Canada (an argument he refines later with specific reference to the Canadian Constitution [Asch 1984]). He concludes that the major problem is getting national governments, who are opposed to the plan, to accept the Dene proposals and suggests that this might best be accomplished by developing widespread public support in Canada and the world community (Asch 1982: 366-367). It is, however, precisely the examination of this problem -- the process by which public support could be mobilized for a native agenda -- which is missing from Asch's work.

In fact, all the above studies would benefit by developing more systematically their analysis of the process by which natives mobilize or might mobilize to achieve their political goals. Here Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden's (1966) seminal article on the process approach to the analysis of political anthropology still stands out for its courageous attempt to not only provide a detailed discussion of the various processes activated in political conflict, but also provide an overall (predictive) framework within which a political conflict within the nation-state can be analysed. While concepts from the process approach are widely utilized as analytical concepts, they are generally used outside of any interpretive framework and often inadequately defined. As they stand, many of these new studies are better works of native advocacy than significant contributions to anthropological analysis and understanding (a point also made by Marxist

theorist David A. Muga 1988). This new literature could be even more convincing advocacy if it were grounded more firmly in anthropological theory. For this reason this study is an effort to find a way of synthesizing a body of more coherent and productive anthropological theory for the analysis of issues related to the activism of native peoples within nation-states generally and the Haida specifically.

### *Theoretical Perspective*

Such a synthesis requires a theoretical perspective which will reveal the political and economic structure of the relationship between the Haida and the encompassing Canadian nation-state as well as facilitate the analysis of the process by which changes are being made (or attempting to be made) to these structures.

A promising theoretical perspective for analysis of the economic structures in place on the Haida Gwaii comes from Latin American dependency theory as articulated by Andre G. Frank. Frank (1966) argues that there are no dual societies with a traditional economy and a modernizing economy but that both are integrated into a world economy through a series of satellite-metropolis market relationships in which the metropolis extracts surplus value from the satellite regions. Historically the capitalist penetration of a continent or region converts its settlements into a "series of minor economic constellations each with its own minor metropolis and satellites, these in turn being composed of still more metropolises and their satellites, all of them directly or indirectly dependent at that time on the European metropolitan centre (Frank 1969: 15). Each level of the market chain appropriates the surplus of the next lower one. Since capital flows to the top, development of the metropolis creates underdevelopment of the satellite as argued in "Development of underdevelopment" (Frank 1966). On the Haida Gwaii this would mean that the Islands and its settlements form a satellite for Vancouver and Victoria (in this case the metropolis), since a wealth of lumber and other resources are extracted from the Islands with little more than wages for labour being returned. Vancouver itself forms a satellite

for American and other world market centres because, for the most part, it directly exports the raw lumber to out-of-province (and country) processing centres only to buy back the finished products at a much higher cost (cf. Patricia Marchak 1983).

The framework provided by Frank's model is largely adequate for our analysis of the economic structure in place on the Haida Gwaii, but, as Roger Keesing (1981: 446-447) points out, there are inadequacies at both 'ends' of dependency theory: both the macro and the micro end. At the macro level, Frank has been criticized for his conceptualization of how the world capitalist system developed and, at the micro level, for his inadequate analysis of the internal structures of colonial societies and economies. Keesing goes on to argue that Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) "builds on the work of economic historians creating a brilliant synthesis" which fills in what is lacking at the macro level of Frank's analysis. Known as world-systems theory, Wallerstein, drawing on work by economic historians, begins with concepts similar to Frank's and applies it to his analysis of the development of capitalism in Europe or the world-system. He referred to the developed regions as the "core" (Frank's "metropolis") and the underdeveloped regions as the "periphery" (Frank's "satellite"). The relationship between these two poles are similar to those described by Frank. The basic concepts developed by Frank and Wallerstein will be used to provide the macro analysis of the economic structure operant on the Haida Gwaii.

In his introduction, Eric Wolf (1982) has pointed out that an adequate theory must take into consideration both political and economic factors. Much recent work is available examining the political structures operating on native peoples in Canada and within other nation-states. To examine the specific (political) role played by the Department of Indian Affairs, the recent theoretical discussions of Adrian Tanner (1983: 1-35) and Noel Dyck (1985: 1-26) on the "politics of Dependency" and "Encapsulation" will be used as points of departure. According to Tanner (1983: 1-2, 10), the use of the term "politics of dependency" refers to the administrative policy adopted by Canada and by the Indian Affairs bureaucracy which first created and maintained a relationship of perpetual dependency among Haida. This policy of

dependency building had its beginning with the paternal "wardship principle," which had as its (highly moralistic) rationale the protection of the natives from the colonizing settlers. In effect, though, it worked to isolate Indian groups onto reserves where close control over them could be maintained while their homelands were being settled by Europeans. Wardship also ensured that all policy control concerning Indian life remained in the hands of outside bureaucrats (1983: 2-3, 16-17). "Encapsulation" as used by Tanner (1983: 19-22) is one result of the politics of dependency. It refers to the extent to which native populations, when they are discontented with government action do not, or did not, have the recourse for protest which most non-natives had within the Canadian state system. Natives, for most of this century, have remained encapsulated within a single governmental bureaucracy, the Department of Indian Affairs, and have been subject to its policy and agents.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, most Canadians have access to the provincial and municipal political structures as well as "parapolitical subsystems" such as businesses, school boards, universities, trade unions, and churches. These institutions, which serve as alternative avenues for political lobby of the federal or provincial governments, are much less accessible to native peoples within Canada, and indeed are often the very institutions implementing the suppressive government policies of assimilation and acculturation among natives.<sup>9</sup>

Taken together the above concepts contribute a political economy perspective to this analysis. According to Wolf (1982: 7-8), political economy is a field of inquiry "concerned with 'the wealth of Nations,' the production and distribution of wealth within and between political entities and the classes composing them." In this study, however, the emphasis will be on the production and distribution of wealth between geographical regions (though

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<sup>8</sup> The lack of influence by native people on the governmental system is most plainly underscored by the fact that, with the exception of Nova Scotia, natives did not receive the right to vote in provincial elections until World War II and in federal elections until 1960 (Frideres 1983: 297).

<sup>9</sup> The term "containment" used by Ponting (1986: 103-104) has essentially the same meaning as the term encapsulation used by Tanner. Similar to the use of encapsulation in this thesis, Ponting uses containment in combination with a political economy perspective.

the core/periphery divisions largely coincide with the class divisions of the people composing the competing political entities).

The political economy approach has been variously criticized for being too economic in its analysis (Ortner 1984: 142) and for dealing only with the macro level. Keesing (1981) has argued neither Frank nor Wallerstein offered an analysis of the internal structures (or processes) of the small scale societies referred to by the concept of "periphery." Consequently Frank's model is of little or no help in describing and analyzing the political activism of the Haida and how it can change the extent to which the overarching structure of dependency limits their autonomy. The process approach, considered to be an influential approach in political anthropology (Nicholas 1968; Kurtz 1979: 38-45), complements the political economy analysis by bringing a strong political analysis and micro dimension to it. Concepts such as process (as opposed to structure), public goals, political field, political arena, support, power, force or coercion, and legitimacy will be the conceptual tools used to describe and analyse the micro processes set in motion by the mobilization of the Haida around certain political goals. These concepts will be used to document the expansion of their political field and the formation of political arenas as the Haida contend with the agents of the macro political and economic structures on the Haida Gwaii. By avoiding the language of structural analyses, this model allows one to describe and analyse conflict and change while momentarily suspending judgement on what exactly is the structure at any given point in time.

Following Swartz, Turner and Tuden (1966: 7), the study of politics is defined as the "*processes* involved in determining and implementing public goals and in the differential achievement and use of power by the members of the group concerned with those goals." The success of political activity is largely dependent on the extent to which the group has mobilized political capital (i.e., maximized "support of all types" (1966: 32). Support refers to "anything that contributes to the formation and/or implementation of political ends [i.e., political goals]" (1966: 23). According to the above authors, support can be based either on force or on legitimacy and can be gained either by means of persuasion or through the coercive use of power (or some

combination of the two). If support for political goals is based on force, then persuasion takes the form of threats and bribes, and power is maintained by coercion. This kind of support is often characteristic of military governments but can characterize a democratic regime's response to an internal crisis (as used unsuccessfully by the Canadian state in the case of the Haida in 1985 and successfully in the case of the Mohawks at Oka, Quebec in 1990). On the other hand, if support is based on the legitimacy of the leadership, it must rely on their influence in efforts to persuade their public toward a certain kind of consensus position. The consensus developed, then, becomes the power base of their support during a confrontation with another political group (or "entity"). Both means for building support can be used by a political group. Clearly, this is the case for the nation-state, but it is also true of smaller native political groups when they use widespread support on an issue to coerce the non-conforming groups or individuals to fall in line with their policies.

Much of the mobilization effort exerted by a political group is focussed on building support by means of the expansion and/or restructuring of the "political field." The political field refers to the groups within which processes such as marshalling support, undermining rivals, attaining goals and achieving settlements take place (Swartz, Turner, Tuden 1966: 8). Or, as Claessen (1979: 12) puts it, "the totality of actors involved in one specific political event [or issue]." A part or all of a political field may become transformed into a political arena (Paine's [1985] "ethnodrama") as a result of power crises or a "momentous juncture or turning point" in the relationships between components of a political field at which an apparently peaceful process becomes one of overt conflict and the contenders become arrayed into two camps or two factions (Swartz, Turner, and Tuden 1966: 33-34).

The process approach also facilitates description of micro-level processes by providing the organizational framework of this thesis, albeit with one significant modification. The "still" (or structural analysis) called for at the beginning and end of a process analysis will not be of the classic micro-based structural-functional type that the authors assumed as a starting point for their analysis. Rather the structural analysis presented seeks to

define the political and economic context of the Haida in 1965 and then identify the significant changes to that structure in 1990. Therefore, in contrast to the articles included in the Swartz, Turner, and Tuden (1966) volume, the context is not only examined in terms of narrow political realities but also in terms of the economic realities operating on the Islands, since the two are here considered to be intricately connected. To accomplish such an analysis this study draws in theoretical contributions never intended by the process anthropologists but which can be integrated with the basic framework of the process approach to significant analytical advantage.

### *Methodology*

My interest in working on a topic of concern to the Haida led me to investigate the possibility of developing an "applied" dimension to the research by cooperating with the Native Concerns Department of the Mennonite Central Committee Canada (MCC Canada).<sup>10</sup> Operating from its head offices in Winnipeg, this department's mandate includes advocacy on behalf of native peoples in Canada. Its director, Mr. Menno Wiebe, has had previous contact with the Haida during the 1985 Lyell Island blockade. As I had a previous working relationship with Wiebe and MCC Canada, he asked if I would be interested in investigating the possibility of conducting an on-island seminar on Haida culture and issues for the summer of 1990. It was with the acceptance of this request that my research effort took on a "dual mandate," a duality which, it turned out, served to ease my entry and facilitate my research activities in Skidegate.

The planned seminar<sup>11</sup> helped me to justify my imposition on the

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<sup>10</sup>MCC Canada is an organization founded to coordinate the relief, peace and service efforts of provincial and other Mennonite organizations across Canada. Of particular interest to me was the Native Concerns Department whose mandate included four areas of involvement: constituency education, resource development, justice concerns and special programming and support (Funk 1987: 12, 20-40). The proposed Haida initiative was related to constituency education and justice concerns areas.

<sup>11</sup>Highly instrumental in making this "planned seminar" a reality in the summer of 1990 was a course I took in applied anthropology in the fall of 1989. The course proved the opportunity to plan the seminar in partial fulfilment of the course requirements and with the added benefit and encouragement of fellow students and the instructor, Dr. John S. Matthiasson.

Haida in Skidegate. My research and the subsequent seminar focussed on similar issues. I explained to the Haida that, as the person working to organize and provide the orientation for such a seminar, I needed to carefully research the themes set out and that I was doing so as a part of my thesis effort at the University of Manitoba (see Appendix A). The dual mandate also provided me with an explicit ethnic (Mennonite) identity as opposed to simply an individual or university department identity. In so doing it created an opportunity for mutual benefit since I, as a representative of the Mennonite people, was there to meet, get to know, and be an advocate for the interests of the Haida people. The encounter took on a dimension of a meeting between two peoples. I soon came to be seen as being aligned with a constituency to which I could communicate my learning rather than merely being there with a research interest.

MCC Canada provided my wife, Frieda Esau Klippenstein, and me with a letter of introduction and names of people to contact. When we arrived in Skidegate, we began by contacting a Haida woman who had previously been interviewed by MCC Canada staff during the Lyell Island crisis. She suggested we negotiate arranging to stay with her mother, which we did for four weeks. We used our letter of introduction to seek the approval for our project from the Council of the Haida Nation. The letter made a significant difference in the willingness of some Haida to trust us with their stories and insights. Equally important to acceptance by my Haida consultants<sup>12</sup> was the fact that I felt comfortable with my reasons for being in Skidegate and on the Haida Gwaii and could appeal for their cooperation in an open and "up front" way (see Appendix A for how we presented ourselves in the community). One significant disadvantage with the Mennonite identity surfaced almost immediately on arrival in Skidegate -- the implicit association of "Mennonite" with the Christian church. Among most young and middle

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<sup>12</sup> Contrary to anthropological convention I will be referring to the people I obtained information and expertise from as consultants instead of informants. I view the distinction between informant and consultant as unnecessary, and perhaps even elitist. As the terms are normally used, consultant refers to a person offering "professional" expertise (i.e., "western" or scientific) whereas informant refers to someone offering information or "cultural" knowledge (i.e., "folk" or common). Such a distinction is arbitrary and necessarily based in one's operative paradigm or world-views.



aged Haida, the Christian church has fallen into disrepute. We had to clarify on a number of occasions that we had no interest in proselytization of any sort, but were there simply to learn from them, not to offer our advice or opinions on any matters relating to them.<sup>13</sup>

A factor which also had the effect of greatly easing our entry was the Band Council's interest in gaining more computer expertise.<sup>14</sup> This unexpected factor served to rapidly create an interest in our continued presence in Skidegate. The assistant manager of the Skidegate Band Council office offered to hire me as a computer consultant for the purpose of training staff on the more advanced uses of their newly purchased computers. This part-time work opportunity quickly brought me into a rich context of interaction. These people proved very helpful in making us feel welcome in the community, providing me with information about the community, and in helping me make further contacts. Once situated in the community by means of this working relationship, it was possible to enter into numerous casual conversations which allowed me to gain more background and to test some of the perspectives I encountered for representativeness.

Throughout the summer, I used various interview techniques such as the schedule-based interview (Appendix B), life history interviews, as well as making notes on informal conversations. Most often I used an informal interview style in which I sought to have a series of conversations with a range of individuals throughout our six-week stay on the islands. This approach was much like the "long conversation" technique advocated by Kemp and Ellen (1984: 236). As part of this effort I also interviewed some people in a more formal fashion, covering the scope of the interview schedule in one sitting. To encourage good communication and to build trust, I did not attempt to tape record most interviews and took only minimal notes so as not to interrupt the flow of conversation. I found that while consultants did not mind sharing their views, being asked to do so on tape

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<sup>13</sup> Ironically, on my second visit to the islands in the context of the summer of 1990 Haida/Mennonite Seminar this implicit church connection came to be seen in a rather positive light primarily due to the beliefs of one of the key Haida resource people for the seminar.

<sup>14</sup> I hold a B.Sc. (Honours) in Computer Science and have specialized in the particular computer system used in the Skidegate Band Council, the Apple Macintosh.

immediately built up their defences. Given the politically sensitive situation the Haida were in with ongoing negotiations with Parks Canada, most consultants were concerned that their words might be used against them at some point.

As I progressed in my research, I found that people tended to open up more. In a number of cases, the early interviews were quite superficial compared to later conversations. In my judgement, to have tape recorded and then done detailed transcriptions of these early interviews would not have been a good use of time. The interview technique I developed was to focus on building rapport, to work at gaining a clear understanding of each issue as it was discussed during the interview, to make only brief notes on the topic discussed and then, from recall, to type out the content of the interview immediately afterwards.

Other research techniques I employed included map sketching, photography and the use of a computer to store my research notes. Chart making and photography required detailed exploration of the community and the Islands and, when combined with the interviews, contributed to gaining what Crane and Angrosino (1984: 191) refer to as "depth of view". Exploration was conducted on water, by air and on land (by hiking or driving the logging roads). Exploration by air proved especially useful for getting a perspective on the settlement patterns and on the extent of the logging activities on the Islands.

I used a computer-based hypertext program to store my field notes and to make associations between notes taken from different interviews, conversations, observations, or even supplementary research. Hypertext technology allowed me to freely annotate the notes and even superimpose my interpretations on them, without ending up confusing the original notes with my analysis. Such a system has many of the basic capabilities that Burgess (1984: 174-183) suggests for a research note organizing system, but provides greater flexibility and access speed with ease of use.

Finding consultants who were both interested in speaking to me and representative of the Skidegate Haida was the most significant challenge. Selecting consultants by means of a random sampling technique would have

been the most desirable way to address the problem of representativeness, at least statistically. However, I saw a statistically defensible strategy limiting, in that it would not allow me the flexibility to respond to those people interested in speaking to me, as did a less formal strategy of pursuing contacts made through the band council employees and through family members of the Haida family with whom we stayed. Given the time limitations on my research, a random sampling would not have worked. It would have been very hard to motivate people to participate or to tolerate such an imposition. Even when following up on contacts, there was always an element of suspicion which had to be overcome. Given these constraints, it was readily apparent that representativeness would have to be achieved in a qualitative way. J. H. Kemp and R. F. Ellen suggest that "where the emphasis is on qualitative research, problems of sampling are not prominent, yet it remains important to contact consultants who are in some way representative of their society and the cleavages within it" (1984: 232-233). To this end I made it my goal to seek representativeness by interviewing people from different segments of the community: the young and the old, people from different matrilineages, people involved in the administration of the village (i.e., band council members), and leaders within the Skidegate Band Council and the Council of the Haida Nation. Kemp and Ellen further suggest being cautious about the views of those people who are most open and helpful initially -- since they are often marginal people -- and to patiently wait for those not so readily available. In order to meet the latter type of consultant they suggest introduction through intermediaries. I found this kind of approach productive in gaining access to the community. It allowed me to spontaneously follow up on introductions and in this way pursue opportunities for interviews as they developed through my ongoing presence in the community. In order to be sensitive to the representativeness of the consultant's views within the community, I compared their views with other consultants and was careful to identify the segment of the community from which each came.

Other important sources of information were found outside the community; speaking with non-native residents in the nearby town of Queen

Charlotte City, speaking with people in government offices such as the provincial forestry and Parks Canada offices, and scanning local newspapers and other media, all proved useful in gathering more information.

The interview schedule (Appendix B) is more general and much shorter than initially planned. The schedule was shortened as I became more attuned to the issues central to my consultants, as certain questions became self evident, and as I realized that the schedule was simply too long and the questions ranging across too many issues to hold the consultants' attention and interest (see Crane and Angrosino 1984: 58-61). As it was, a typical interview took two hours and was, in a number of cases, followed by subsequent interviews or discussions for further clarification. I did not follow the interview schedule in any strict sense; rather, like Burgess (1984: 107), I considered the schedule to be a topic list -- a list of topics and/or questions to be covered with the consultant in whatever order they chose. During the interview I allowed the consultant to establish the flow of the conversation (i.e., much like the open-ended nature of the life history interview), and only redirected the interview when I considered it to be moving in an unproductive direction. I found that allowing consultants to speak without interruption was one of the best ways to find out what was important to them. Thus, I never considered the schedule to be rigidly fixed, but wanted to remain open and exploratory during these interviews in order to be assured I was focusing on the right kind of questions.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the commitment to organize a follow-up seminar worked to encourage higher ethical standards in my research activities. The commitment to follow-up allowed me to see more clearly the importance of maintaining relationship-building as a central goal, so that I would be welcome on return to the village. Consultants needed to be respected and not pushed beyond their threshold of interest, patience, and confidence in me during interviews. The opportunity to return to the islands during the summer of 1990 along with ten other people interested in investigating the very same questions was most productive. Within the framework of this

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<sup>15</sup> As my research progressed (and especially during the summer of 1990) this interview schedule was increasingly supplemented by additional and more pointed questions.

seminar we were provided with three Haida resource people for a seven-day exploratory trip into the proposed park area including Sedgwick Bay, the site of the blockade. We were not limited to these three resource people for our information; each of the four Haida village or fish camp sites we visited had two or more Haida people known as "watchmen" looking after the site. Most of the watchmen were Haida elders with keen interest in sharing their perspectives and stories. Certain places like Hot Springs Island served as meeting places for Island people and tourists wanting to bathe in the hot springs pools. This site provided an opportunity for meeting other Haida people, some of whom were at the forefront of Haida political activism.

The combination of the 1989 summer research effort and the intensive time spent with the Haida resource people during the 1990 Haida/Mennonite Seminar made it possible to build friendship and trust to the extent that I could leave an early draft of my thesis with one of our resource people without great concern of being misunderstood and possibly banned from further research on the Islands (as has been the experience for a number of anthropologists). While the response I received on the draft was not as detailed or as critical as I might have hoped, the response included answers to questions I had posed and assured me that the draft had been carefully read and that the reader understood the project's content and direction. I was offered little criticism, but I was extended good wishes in my presentation of the material. While such a reading might have been more productive, the ethical importance of making this work available for scrutiny by a suitable Haida individual prior to formal completion should not be underestimated.

### *Organization of Thesis*

My argument requires demonstration that: 1) political and economic structures of dependency existed in 1965; 2) extensive and concentrated political effort by the Haida has taken place; 3) illegal action was necessary due to the lack of a suitable legal forum for addressing their grievances; 4) political activism has resulted in increased autonomy for the Haida; and, finally, 5) the government and industry interests worked against the

development of this autonomy and worked to perpetuate the structures of dependency.

Inasmuch as the analysis is primarily that of a process of change, the organizational framework recommended by Swartz, Turner and Tuden (1966: 1-41) is adopted. Chapter Two begins with a structural analysis or a "still" where the political and economic structure of dependency within which the Haida found themselves in 1965 is presented. In order to facilitate greater ease of analysis, these beginning and end points should ideally be periods of relative peace (or, in structural-functional terminology, equilibrium). For this reason the choice of the decade is most deliberate (since it was during the 1960s that recent Haida activism first became increasingly militant and effective) the choice of this particular year is somewhat arbitrary since the process approach requires finding a beginning and end point in order to provide appropriate periods for comparison. The year 1965 is chosen as a starting point because it was the last year during which the Indian Agent, the symbol of an especially intense kind of political domination of the Haida, was resident in the Haida village of Masset. Change came more rapidly after the agent's departure. Similarly, in Chapter Six, the year 1990 is taken as an end point, because it is not until the spring of that year that the Haida obtain any substantive type of redress for their prolonged activism on Gwaii Haanas. While in Chapter Two the argument is that these structures of dependency were progressively established and in place by 1965, in Chapter Six I argue that the government has perpetuated the structures of dependency into the 1990s by avoiding the central concerns of the Haida and has granted autonomy only to mitigate against the risk of further political action by the Haida.

In Chapters Three through Five, I describe the phases by which the Haida mobilize politically, enter into a showdown with industry and government generating a national crisis, and go on to use their political capital to press for meaningful change on the Islands. Chapter Three is focussed upon the Haida mobilization against government and industry activities, especially as these activities related to the Islands' forestry industry. Here I argue that the extensive political mobilization was preparation for the confrontation of government and industry on Lyell Island in 1985. In Chapter

Four I argue that once legal means failed, illegal political action in the form of a blockade of industry activities created a national crisis forcing the government to address the Haida grievance. Chapter Five consists of the argument that the political capital gained both from the broad support base and further activism forced the government to deploy adjustive and redressive measures resulting eventually in a mutually satisfactory interim solution through which that Haida won greater autonomy.

CHAPTER II  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HAIDA IN THE MID 1960s

“And the white man is . . . siphoning our land dry.  
They are taking away billions and billions of the finest feet of timber from our Island and we’re  
demanding compensation.  
No. We can’t get it . . . .  
now we are groping around in the dark.”  
*Chief William Matthews, aged 84 (Orchard 1969).*

Before investigating the process by which the Haida have attempted to increase their autonomy during the last quarter century, it is necessary to examine the context in which the Haida found themselves in order to establish a base line from which any change can be assessed. The evidence presented here is used to argue that, in 1965, the context of the Haida was one of political and economic dependency on the Canadian nation-state. This dependency, rooted in the mid-nineteenth century, was developed through both political and economic means and was firmly in place in 1965.

When European explorers and traders first reached the Haida Gwaii in the eighteenth century, its population numbered at least 8,000.<sup>16</sup> The Haida were the exclusive inhabitants of the Haida Gwaii and were a powerful and feared people on the northwest coast. Highly mobile, they interacted in trade, politics and warfare with other native groups up and down the coast. They were the sovereign rulers of the archipelago.

Prior to and well into the post-contact period, their subsistence was based solely on the abundantly rich food resources of the land and waters of the Haida Gwaii. The environment was so rich that it could support a relatively dense sedentary population using “sophisticated fishing and collecting technology” (Stearns 1973: 35). The people lived in villages strategically situated near major food sources, such as streams or halibut banks along the coastline. Each village formed an autonomous, self-governing unit, but villages were not corporate units under the headship of a single chief, rather they were composed of one or more autonomous lineages. Each lineage was a social, political, and economic unit. Village political

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<sup>16</sup> See Van den Brink (1974: 21-26) for a discussion of the various population estimates.



relations involved hereditary succession to the chieftainship of a lineage. There was competition in a village for the highest rank among lineage chiefs, in order to become "town master" (Stearns 1973: 36), although the town master could not enforce his will upon the other chiefs. The local village and inter-village politics, the hierarchical ranking, and the extensive relations with non-Haida groups, characterized a complex political, economic and social structure.

The European diseases accompanying the fur trade in the early and mid-nineteenth century were a source of catastrophic change. These diseases, particularly the smallpox epidemic of 1862, and the associated population loss were the most important factor making the Haida vulnerable to European intrusion. In fact, the smallpox epidemic of 1862 seriously threatened Haida sovereignty. Prior to 1862, R. Brown, a visitor to the region, reported that large groups of Haida on the west coast of the Haida Gwaii made it difficult for mining prospectors to do their work. But by 1866, due to the epidemic and subsequent relocation of many Haida into urban centres on the mainland, Brown said that Haida in the west-coast area had become "wholly extinct and the coast is common ground" (Van den Brink 1974: 23-24). Disease and emigration continued to reduce the Haida population through the latter part of the nineteenth century. By 1885 their numbers were estimated to be 800. Ten years later the count was 690. By 1905 they were reduced to 599, and, by 1915 they had reached a low of 588 before the population began to increase again (Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson 1958: 23).

### *Dismantling the Political Structures of the Haida*

Vulnerable because of the extensive population loss, the autonomous political structures of the Haida were dismantled by Canada and replaced by dependency on the Canadian government acting through the DIA bureaucracy. This process began with the disregard for Haida ownership laws and the application of European laws of ownership. Such disregard in the

late nineteenth century facilitated the annexation of 99.82%<sup>17</sup> of the Haida Gwaii land mass for the Canadian Crown. The groundwork for the political incorporation of the Islands was laid when Governor James Douglas established colonial power over increasing numbers of Indians on the north-west coast. In 1849, he became Governor of Vancouver Island, in 1853 he also became Governor of the Haida Gwaii, and in 1866, he became Governor of the rest of the territory which was to be called British Columbia. By 1861, Douglas had given orders for the establishment of reserves throughout the colony, but this was not to take place on the Haida Gwaii until 1882, eleven years after British Columbia became a province in Canada (Van den Brink 1974: 53).

As Van den Brink (1974: 53) and La Violette (1973: 109) point out, the reserve establishment process was to make a considerable change for the worse after Governor James Douglas retired in 1867. Douglas had followed British Imperial policy with respect to the Indian land title question in British Columbia. La Violette (1973: 104) states that Imperial policy, embodied in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, was "based upon a conception of the Indians as the owners of the land; tribal groups were considered to be independent nations." Procedurally the Proclamation required that purchases of land from Indians could be made only on consent of the natives, and then only by the Governor on behalf of the British Crown (Asch 1984: 112-114). Douglas also maintained that Indians were to fix the boundaries to their reserves even if it meant granting rather extensive land areas for the object of securing title, or, in Douglas' words, "securing their natural or acquired rights." (La Violette 1973: 105). Douglas made generous land grants ranging from 50 to 200 acres (20 to 80 hectares) for each adult man in southern B.C., but these grants were reversed by Governor Seymour in 1867. Describing this reversal of policy, La Violette (1973: 109) argues that the new colonial administration had a fixed conception of Indian's limited land use and needs, which was to determine quantity and locations of the reserves in relation to expanding settlements. He adds that

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<sup>17</sup> Van den Brink (1974: 91-97, 130) indicates that the combined total reserve area for the Masset and Skidegate bands by 1913 was 3,998.7 acres (1,599.48 hectares). Given that the Haida Gwaii have a land mass of 2,268,800 acres (907,520 hectares) (Stearns 1981: 26), this reserve land allocation amounts to .18 percent of the Islands total land mass.

the new policy was developed prior to the entrance of British Columbia into Confederation, and it led to a complete denial of the Indian title, even before the Terms of the Union had been ratified by British Columbia.

With this shift in policy the groundwork had been laid for the non-negotiated annexation of native lands and a government-determined allocation of small parcels of reserve land.

The annexation of the Haida Gwaii was completed when Canadian law was imposed, small reserves were allocated and the rest of the Islands were claimed by the Crown. In 1882, a government commission visited both Masset and Skidegate for the purpose of designating the reserve sites. That the commission visited the Haida in order to take their advice concerning the location of reserve boundaries is interpreted by Van den Brink (1974: 85) as a sign that "the Haida were submissive to authority in this period." A Haida elder recalls a different story. When the commissioner arrived in Skidegate to announce that the Queen was going to grant them reserve lands, the Chief of Skidegate reportedly protested that the Queen had no right to give them anything on these Islands because it was not her land. At this the commissioners were reportedly quite incensed (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1990/08).<sup>18</sup>

Sixteen sites, together making up an area of 1,866 acres (746.4 hectares), were allocated for the Masset Haida on Graham Island, and nine sites, forming an area of 1,775 acres (710 hectares), were allocated to the Skidegate Haida, totalling 3,641 acres (1456.4 hectares) (Van den Brink 1974: 91-97). With the estimated population of 900 at this time (Hawthorn et al. 1958: 23), this allocation amounted to only four acres (1.6 hectares) for each member of the Haida population. In 1913, in response to bitter protests by the Haida as more and more of their land was going to settlers, 330 more acres (132 hectares) were added to the Masset group's territory and 27.7 (11.08 hectares) to that of Skidegate group (Van den Brink 1974: 129-130). These additions amounted to

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<sup>18</sup> See Appendix C for a list of consultants/oral sources and a description of reference conventions.

a total of 3,998.7 acres (1599.48 hectares), making the final allocation amount to .18% of the total land mass of the Haida Gwaii.

From the description of the reserve allocations as given by the Commissioner (Van den Brink 1974: 91-97) it is apparent that the reserve allocations reflected the new policy -- what government thought the Haida needed -- and that the commission did not consider the extensive resource ownership and management laws of groups like the Haida for both land and water resources<sup>19</sup> (Richardson 1982). It is also apparent, judging from the protests and the oral tradition of the Haida objection, that the exchange between the Haida and the government commission was less than cordial.

It was no coincidence that shortly after these small reserves were defined, the provincial authorities made large parcels of "crown land" available to Europeans on very favourable terms. After 1905 the province sold land for two to five dollars an acre. As well, a settler could, by living on a parcel of land for two years, buy 160 acres (64 hectares) for a dollar an acre. For these paltry prices, the settlers would purchase lands containing ancient burial grounds, old houses, Haida gardens, and other areas used by Haida for various purposes such as fishing or food gathering (Van den Brink 1974: 130). Massive tracts of land were also leased to logging operations at this time. While no treaty had been made with the Haida, the act of establishing the reserves was intended by government to open the way for the sale or lease of the non-reserve land, a process which began in earnest at the turn of the century.

The next step in the subjugation of the Haida was to dismantle their political and judicial structures and replace them with Canadian political and judicial systems as implemented by the Department of Indian Affairs. Once reserves had been set aside, the Haida came increasingly under the administration and control of the Indian Agent. This was the period in which political dependency was gradually implemented by introducing the Haida to western institutions and by making it increasingly difficult for the

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<sup>19</sup> My conversations with older Haida during the summers of 1989 and 1990 about any parts of the Islands would often include some mention of which lineage the area under discussion belonged to.

Haida to make their own policy. The most important step toward destroying Haida political autonomy was taken in 1899, when the Indian Agent dissolved their political and judicial body, the Council of Chiefs, and replaced it with the Canadian political and judicial structure of the Department of Indian Affairs. The Council of Chiefs was made up of the chiefs taken from each of the lineages represented when the Haida amalgamated into the villages of Masset and Skidegate during the late nineteenth century (Van den Brink 1974: 84-85; Orchard 1969). The council was based on traditional Haida social structure, where a hereditary chiefdom system operated in each of the major lineages. What was new was having so many lineage chiefs in one town. Most pre-contact villages had had only one lineage chief, or, at most, a few in which case one would become town master. The Haida had always looked up to and followed their hereditary chiefs. It is not surprising, then, that their influence as a council was considerable. In 1969, at the age of 84, Chief William Matthews, long-time councillor in the village of Masset recalled:

When I was a boy, all chiefs of these eight different villages were councillors in here. And arch-deacon . . . Collison's son, William Collison, was minister up here. And he was the chairman of Council. Nine members of all people. Chief of each tribe. And we had a nice little village. You can't [could not] even go on the street after 10 o'clock (pm). They had a bugler go around. They learned that bugle call from the army someplace. And they sound that bugle on the street. Ten o'clock everybody must be in their home. And even Sunday there's a bylaw. Nobody is to cut wood on Sunday. They took this religion very seriously. . . . No, they enforced a lot of good things in my young days [Orchard 1969].

While the above village life may sound somewhat rigid, evidence from Chief Matthews, missionaries who worked with the Haida (Freeman 1904), and Van den Brink (1974: 83-85) suggests that this Council of Chiefs was very effective in maintaining village law and order. Yet, on the pretence of resolving a conflict among the Skidegate Haida concerning the location for the construction of a new building, the Indian Agent dissolved this council in both villages. One government authority described the Council of Chiefs as being "judicial tribunals summoning lawbreakers before themselves, hearing

evidence and awarding punishment, following principally their own interpretations of the laws of Moses . . ." (1888 Annual Report Department of Indian Affairs, quoted in Van den Brink 1974: 85). To the extent that "their own interpretations of the laws of Moses" reflected Haida values, this "tribunal" was enforcing native law, albeit native law with western influences. This Council was, in effect, the court for the Haida people, suggesting the Haida still exercised judicial control over their own affairs up until this point.

That the conflict in Skidegate was simply used as a pretext for disbanding a highly autonomous and hence undesirable political and judicial body, becomes clear when one examines the internal communications of DIA at this time. As expressed in the annual Report to the Department of Indian Affairs (1897), the government saw this hereditary system as a regressive force among the Haida, a force against the expressed assimilation efforts of the Department of Indian Affairs:

The Department has for a long time past kept before it as an ultimate end the transformation of the Indians from the status of wards into that of citizens. The hereditary system tends to retard the inculcation of that spirit of individuality without which no substantial progress is possible. The Department's Policy has, therefore, been gradually to do away with the hereditary and introduce an elective system . . . [Van den Brink 1974: 84-85].

It seems that the government was unable to see that the "hereditary system" was to the Haida political structure what the "elective system" was to the Canadians of English and European descent. The hereditary system provided an orderly process for succession to office in Haida political structure which could not be replaced without far-reaching implications for the social and political structure of the Haida. Or perhaps the Indian Agency understood all too well that taking over control of policy ultimately required the dismantling of this traditional power structure.

Certainly the hereditary chiefs understood the implications of this dissolution of their Council. They appealed to a higher level of authority by protesting to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs emphasizing the danger of the resulting vacuum in local authority. In a letter of protest from

Skidegate, the chiefs argued that the influence they had exercised *before* the establishment of the council was now discredited in the eyes of the people by the extreme action of the Agent's withdrawal of authority from the council (Van den Brink 1974: 84-85). The Council of Chiefs saw the move for what it was -- a direct assault on the traditional Haida political structure which centred around the institution of hereditary chieftdom. Further, the chiefs were right in alluding to the resulting power vacuum which was to have repercussions for generations to come.

The plea brought no reversal of the Indian Agent's decision. This exchange between the Haida and the government of Canada serves as a good example of what Tanner (1983: 20-21) calls the direct encapsulation of native people. The Department of Indian Affairs was the only desk to which the Haida could bring their plea. Unlike other Canadians, who have more channels to political power, the decision by the Department to disregard the appeal was made within this single bureaucracy. No attempt was made to provide the Haida with alternative avenues for appeal. Indian politics, like the classic colonial form, was managed by a single state department. An appeal by the Haida to a member of parliament, for instance, was simply not an alternative at this time. Native peoples had no vote, no other forum. Their political field was strictly limited to the local band and DIA.

After the dissolution of the Council of Chiefs, Canadian political and judicial structures were introduced with increasing force from the mainland resulting, within 11 years, in the installation of DIA's Indian Agent in Masset. The agent became overseer of local Haida affairs creating increasing dependency in all aspects of Haida life. Van den Brink (1974: 100-101) argues that during the period from 1900 to 1940, "the most important factor in the lives of the Indians . . . was the governmental system."

The Indian Agent had control of the Band Council's operation. The agent was responsible for the education, medical care, social assistance, settlement of conflicts -- especially between the Haida and the new settlers -- and supervised the observance of fishing, hunting and trap-line regulations. The Indian Agent even recruited the Haida for military service. Stearns (1981: 53) argues that this paternalistic system remained in place until the

early 'sixties, even though the growing discontent and resistance to it became increasingly apparent during the late 1950's.

The Indian Agent also had control of the bands' judicial functions: local law and order. Once Indian Affairs had dismantled the traditional power structure of the Haida political system, they not only held onto policy-making power but offered the local Haida leadership no structural power within the new political structure. Stearns, who did thirty months of fieldwork among the Masset Haida during the 1960s and early 1970s, agrees that the local leadership or power structure had been dismantled by the Canadian government and replaced by the hierarchical structure of ranked officials in the Department of Indian Affairs. When necessary, this department enforced its agent's power by the use of coercion (1981: 51,236).

Theoretically this power, vested primarily in the Indian Agency and its local agent, was to extend to the band councillors, but in practice it did not. Stearns (1981: 53) suggests that the system did not work because the Haida perceived their local leadership as having no real power, but viewed them as "yes-men," and "tools of the government." As a result, the Haida would not accept the exercise of power from their local leadership -- though they would tolerate it from the Indian Agent. Stearns (1981: 52) argues that the "ineffectiveness of band councillors is due largely to the ambiguity of their role as powerless local participants in the Indian Branch Hierarchy," and that, in fact, the Haida's perception of their leaders as powerless was correct, since no real power was attached to Haida leadership roles by the Indian Agency. The Band Council did not have the power to "enforce its decisions or act in a judicial capacity" and "all proposed by-laws [were] subject to review by the minister" (1981: 52). Stearns (1981: 294) concludes that "by the time the agency had closed in 1966, it appeared that federal administration had rendered the Indian people incapable of managing their own affairs."<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Note however that, although the Haida had no formal power, they were not powerless. Rather, they had to achieve power informally by rallying the support of the people around specific issues. These informal leadership roles were by their nature quite temporary and subject to backlashes when the sentiments of the people changed, as has historically been the case (see Stearns 1981: 237-238).



A comparison of the Masset and Skidegate case suggests that the Indian Agent's presence in the village may have been a major factor contributing to this continued power vacuum. In contrast to Masset, the Skidegate Haida, who had no resident Indian Agent, had long had an effective Band Council. Van den Brink (1974: 200), drawing from Indian Agent reports, points out that Skidegate Haida had always paid more attention to the advice of their councillors, they had a much higher degree of participation in village decision making, and they had little trouble enforcing their by-laws. He, along with Stearns (1973: 345) and DIA (Van den Brink 1974: 200-201) suggest that the Indian Agent may have been a key factor contributing to the undermining of the local leadership in Masset. It seems reasonable to conclude that greater political and economic dependency in Masset was developed as a result of the agent's constant intervention in that village, whereas the agent was often not able to visit Skidegate for months at a time, especially in winter (Van den Brink 1974: 126). Without the Indian Agent present in the village, the local Skidegate Band Council seems to have had greater autonomy, some formal power, and likely more continuity with their traditional leadership under the Council of Chiefs.

The power vacuum anticipated by the Council of Chiefs when it was dissolved in 1899 became a very problematic reality and, as discussed above, was still evident to Stearns during her work among the Haida in the early 1960s. Chief Matthews supports this linkage between the dissolution of the Council and the power vacuum in Masset during the 1960s:

Then the Department spoiled that thing [the Council of Chiefs]. They do away with the chiefs and get them to elect councillors. And the result is that the people elected young people who have got no experience -- who are not interested in the progress and the welfare of their people. You see, today this village is wide open. No law and order. All kinds of things are going on [Orchard 1969].

#### *Alienation from Economic use of the Haida Gwaii*

After political dependency was established, the economic policies of concentration pursued by the federal and provincial governments

progressively alienated the Haida from the land and waters of the Haida Gwaii. While the Haida fell victim to general economic policies as well as some directly discriminatory ones, all these policies rested on the political and ultimately military annexation of the Haida Gwaii and its surrounding waters, first by the colonial government and later by Canada and the province of B.C. This annexation was a prelude to the granting of lands for settlement and the incorporation of the fishing and forestry of the Haida Gwaii into the provincial and national economy.

### *Alienation From the Island Fishery*

With the exception of the fur trade, the first major Canadian industry in which the Haida participated was the fishery. The industry was particularly suited to a maritime people like the Haida. In fact, native expertise and seasonal work habits made fishing the clear employment preference of native peoples throughout the province (Hawthorn et al. 1958; Hawthorn 1966). Rolf Knight (1978: 78) has documented this central importance of native fishermen and cannery workers to the development of the B.C. commercial fishery. Although the fish canning and processing industry drew on Euro-American innovations, at the turn of the century the fishery on the Haida Gwaii relied almost exclusively on Haida fishermen and Haida fishing technologies. Between 1900 and into the 1920s, the Haida dominated the commercial fishery on the Haida Gwaii. Yet by the mid-1960s the federal government had alienated the commercial canning and fishing industries from them by pursuing a policy of centralized fish extraction and processing.

The fishing industry was heavily regulated between 1900 and the 1920s. Until 1917 restrictions were placed on the number of canneries allowed to operate in the province. Licences were allocated to canneries<sup>21</sup> instead of fishermen until 1923, possibly as a conservation measure to protect against overfishing (Hawthorn et al. 1958: 108). Gas-powered gillnetters were not

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<sup>21</sup> While the general policy was that of giving licences to canneries only, individual licences were granted after 1912 in order to encourage white settlement in the north. These licences were not made available to the Haida (Pinkerton 1981: 95, 148).

allowed in the north until 1924.<sup>22</sup> Masset and Skidegate Haida used rowboats to travel between fishing areas and the cannery from which they had been granted a licence. Without gas-powered gillnetters, canneries had to be located near each major salmon run to accommodate the limited range of sail and row boats.

The combined effect of this licensing policy, the unavailability of gas-powered gillnetters, and decentralized locations of the canneries worked to protect the position of local small-scale operators in the fishing industry, effectively ensuring Haida domination of the fishery. Local fishermen had the strong advantage of residing near the cannery for the duration of the fishing season. Given that there were only about forty non-Haida residents on the Islands in 1901, the Haida, even though numbering only 600 at the time, had a clear advantage. In the years that followed, the number of white residents increased rapidly, reaching almost 3000 during the height of WW I, and dropping back to less than 1000 after the war. Most of these people did not compete with the Haida fishery during this period, however, being loggers or homesteaders hoping to establish farms (Van den Brink 1974: 110).

The labour provided by Haida women and their daughters in the canneries further contributed to Haida domination of the local fishery. Female members of families would work in the cannery while the men fished. As a result, the Haida had a strong advantage both in fishing and cannery labour, which worked to increase their status and bargaining power within the fishery.<sup>23</sup> Such bargaining power was useful in a context where canneries had the monopoly on fish sales -- in each major fishing area there often was only one cannery to sell to within range of row boats.

Starting in 1917 a period of deregulation in the fishery brought significant change. Rapid centralization in the cannery industry destroyed local Haida labour opportunities and seriously undermined Haida viability in commercial fishing by the mid-1950s. Ironically, pressure for federal

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<sup>22</sup> Initially, at the turn of the century, gas-powered engines were not reliable nor were they generally available at affordable prices. When they became more generally available they were outlawed on gillnetters in the north until 1924, thus making them effectively unavailable in the north until 1924.

<sup>23</sup> Stearns (1981: 114) makes this point for the Masset Cannery as well.

deregulation of the number of canneries came both from B.C. Packers, which maintained that the federal government was discriminating against them by showing preference to smaller operators in the granting of licences, and from independent B.C. fishermen who saw the canneries as having an "outrageous monopoly . . . under government protection" and demanded the right to establish independent canneries (Pinkerton 1981: 97-98). In response to these kinds of pressures, conditions favouring local cannery labour were removed by the mid 1920s when the federal government stopped regulating the number of canneries, fishing licences, and gas-powered gillnetters in the north.

In 1926, there were eight canneries operating on the Haida Gwaii. Pinkerton (1981: 98) argues that competition steadily increased, first in the form of a rapid increase of cannery sites and, second -- as this competition led to overfishing and a resultant threat to everyone's supply -- in the form of mergers especially with B.C. Packers. By 1928, B.C. Packers, having bought out most of the canneries up and down the coast, was requesting that limits be placed on new canneries. Many Island canneries closed during or before 1930, a few remained into the late 1950s, and by the 1960s only one remained open in Masset. The Islands reflected the province-wide trend which saw ninety-four canneries in 1917 sink to forty-four during the severe depression of the 1930s and then hit a low of twenty by 1954 (Hawthorn et al. 1958: 110; Pinkerton 1981: 98-99).

With limited work opportunities locally, increasing numbers of Haida women began to migrate to Prince Rupert and other locations on the opposite coast for seasonal wage work. The minister of Skidegate reported this as still the case as late as 1956 (Van den Brink 1974: 213). But by the early 1960s, even opportunities for summer employment on the mainland had come to an end, due to post-World War II mechanization and further mergers in the industry (Van den Brink 1974: 159, 213; Hawthorn 1966: 146).

Though the Haida were rapidly losing their prominent role in canning and fish processing as a result of industry centralization, Haida commercial fishing continued to flourish. But, by the mid-1950s, lack of regulation and extreme competition and overfishing by mainland and international

fishermen (allowed to fish outside a three-mile limit at the time) had inflicted serious damage on Haida fishermen. Van den Brink (1974: 161) indicates that "between 1954 and 1957, the average share taken by the various countries in the total salmon catch was: U.S.S.R. 30%, Japan 29%, U.S.A. 28% and Canada 13%."

From the beginnings of the Haida Gwaii fishery at the turn of the century through to the late 1940s the Haida had maintained a very successful fishing fleet. The sailboats and row boats used during the early period when gas-powered boats were unavailable became supplemented in the early 1920s by small gas-powered boats. These boats, built on the reserves by the Haida, measured between thirty to forty feet in length. In 1926, the Skidegate Haida had a fleet of thirty gas-powered fishing boats. By the end of the 1920s this fleet of boats had been replaced by larger boats often financed by the cannery companies. At this time, natives made up a significant part of the province's fishermen. Knight (1978: 83-84) reports that in 1929 from a total of 13,860 fishermen, 7,884 were whites, 3,632 were Indians, and 2,344 were Japanese.

Haida success was maintained though the 1930s despite discrimination against them by other ethnic groups in the fishery. Van den Brink (1974: 131) points out that during the 1930s depression, the Haida were not supported in their strikes by other ethnic groups, and they were excluded from membership in local cooperatives. The Masset and Skidegate Haida responded differently to the economic crisis. The Masset Haida became co-founders of the Indian Brotherhood of B.C. in 1931, which petitioned government with regard to economic matters on behalf of natives in the province.<sup>24</sup> In contrast, the Skidegate Haida established the Skidegate Trollers Association which gave them a say in determining both the price of fish and the location of fishing areas and fishing camps. Van den Brink (1974: 136-137) reports that the Skidegate Haida demonstrated a good understanding of the

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<sup>24</sup>Prior to formation the Indian Brotherhood of B.C., the Allied tribes of B.C. had been the major representative body with a primary focus on activism related to land claims. After 1929 a law was passed making it a criminal offence to meet in groups for the purpose of land claims discussions. Subsequently the Indian Brotherhood of B.C. was organized for conducting negotiations concerning fishing. But, informally, it kept land claims discussions alive until the 1929 law was repealed during the 1951 revision of the Indian Act (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1990/08).

market situation, as "they supplied part of their catches to a cooperative at Vancouver that paid higher prices than could be obtained anywhere else on the northwest coast." To further increase their autonomy, they bought their own large boat suitable for packing fish from their fishing grounds to their chosen market destination (Pineo 1955: 10).

These organizational measures helped to protect Haida fishermen, and by 1940 the Skidegate fleet was reported to comprise "almost exclusively new or as good as new fishing boats" (Van den Brink 1974: 103). Toward the end of the 1940s similar success was reported among the Masset Haida: "one finds one of the largest and finest seine-boat fleets of any community on the coast, valued at \$350,000. The same village boasts a modern boat-building yard, where each year a large seine boat is launched" (Gladstone 1953: 34). With this fleet the Haida could fish locally as well as up and down the coast, following the salmon down to the mouth of the Fraser River (Van den Brink 1974: 150).

Despite this period of relative deregulation in the fishing industry, World War II contributed greatly to maintain the success of the Haida fishery. Hawthorn et al. (1958: 112) states that

Indians made unprecedented gains in numbers, per capita income, and status in the fishing industry during World War II and the immediate post-war years. Shortages in labour and equipment during wartime, coupled with virtually unlimited demand and high prices, greatly increased the fishermen's income. White and Indian fishermen, moreover, benefited by the mass expulsion of Japanese from the coast after December 1941. They gained not only from the elimination of Japanese competition in the industry, but also from acquiring Japanese-owned fishing boats and other equipment, often at knock-down prices.

Hawthorn et al. go on to point out that this demand for labour and higher production initiated a period of technological innovation which greatly increased productivity and income of the fishermen. Innovations came

in gill-netting and later in purse-seining, the application of power-driven mechanical drums for setting and hauling nets; the use of echosounders, and later radar, for locating fish; and the use of radio telephones for improving communication, providing greater safety, increasing mobility, and cutting down wasteful travel on the part of fishing boats [1958: 112].

Such innovations resulted in over-capitalization in the post-war period, and by the mid-1950s there was "every evidence that the industry . . . [was] already badly overcrowded both in terms of capital and labour" (Hawthorn et al. 1958), or as Pinkerton (1981: 108) put it, "too much gear chasing too few fish." Overfishing and destruction of major spawning grounds such as those north of Graham Island by non-Indian Canadians from the mainland with high tonnage boats full of modern gear, combined with international competition outside the then only three-mile zone, made it increasingly difficult for the Haida to support themselves. With profits falling, it became difficult for the Haida to carry the debt owed to the canneries for their seine boats. That the Haida lost these seine boats to the canneries is explained by some writers as careless money management, or, as in the case of Hawthorn et al. (1958: 116-117), difficulty in financing the necessary capital due to decreasing profits during this period. Others (Stearns 1973: 99, Pinkerton 1981: 107) point out that there is little doubt the cannery owners took advantage of the fact that few Haida fishermen kept books in their dealings with the canneries and, thus, were hardly able to defend themselves against unreasonable billings.

In any case, for the Masset Haida such repossessions of their proud fleet of seiners gave way shortly after World War II to a "mosquito" fleet acquired with governmental assistance (Van den Brink 1974: 212). These small boats were highly inferior to the former seining fleet. They were not suitable for open water or even local waters when conditions were less than ideal. The Haida were now limited to fishing locally, whereas previously they had followed the salmon runs down the coast each year. By 1959, the Masset chief councillor was applying to the federal government for assistance, due in significant part to loss of income from seasonal fishing (Van den Brink 1974: 149).

A final blow came in 1968 when the Federal Fisheries Department introduced what became known as the "Davis plan." The plan moved toward a fully centralized commercial fishing industry. As it effectively cut out all smaller-scale fishermen, most of the Masset Haida lost their right to commercial fishing. According to Pinkerton (1981: 107-108), the Davis plan

set up three limited classes of commercial fishing licences, A, B and C, in order to deal with the problems of 1) overfishing, 2) low incomes for fishermen and 3) too much equipment investment for the numbers of fish available. Pinkerton (1981: 108) states that "the result of the Davis plan was to concentrate fishing privileges of many small vessels onto fewer larger vessels." Those fishermen who had delivered less than an average \$1,250 in salmon for the three years prior to 1968 were issued "B" licences which were to expire in ten years. The other qualifying fishermen were given non-expiring "A" licences if they fished salmon and "C" licences if they fished cod and groundfish. In 1965 Stearns (1973: 107) reported that the fishing incomes of the majority of Haida fishermen using mosquito boats averaged less than \$1,000. Taking this as an indication of the seasonal productivity of the thirty-two Mosquito-fleet-based fishermen, the average annual income over three years was too low for most of them to qualify for anything more than the temporary "B" licences.

For the Masset Haida, then, the loss of their seine boats and the introduction of the Mosquito fleet practically ensured their loss of the commercial fishery. The replacement boats were poor competition for the highly sophisticated seine boat and gillnetter fleets of the mainland. In Skidegate, in comparison, a Mosquito fleet was never introduced, but the seine fleet had been reduced substantially. Hawthorn (1966: 89) reports that by the mid-1960's fishing was the primary occupation for only 21.6% of Skidegate Haida. Clearly, a dramatic decline occurred from the time of Hawthorn's first study in 1954 when 710 Haida out of a total 952 (or 74.5%) were supported through work in the fishing industry (1958: 114).

Ten years after the introduction of the Davis plan a follow-up study revealed that concentration of fishing privileges from many small to fewer large boats had taken place. The licence limitation program had resulted in more licensed tonnage being concentrated into larger boats, and the soaring cost of fishing licences. During this period, company ownership had increased to 70% of the fishing capacity of all boats on the coast (Pinkerton 1981: 109-110). This result of the plan was explicitly recognized in the report, but even though fishermen's organizations recommended that



marginal fisherman be allowed to stay in the industry, . . . the report recommended (following the processing company submissions) that the marginal fishermen not be allowed to continue [Pinkerton 1981: 111].

As a result of this followup study, those boats which caught less than \$2,000 worth of fish in 1971 were also not allowed to continue fishing after 1978. This amounted to 34% of the vessels on the coast and, of course, included occupational pluralists such as the Haida (Pinkerton 1981: 111).

During this time, similar centralization policies were put in place in certain specialized fisheries as well. Pinkerton (1981: 346) records a resident Queen Charlotte City fish patrolman angrily lamenting that of the seventeen boats in B.C. licensed specifically to fish abalone on the coast, including the significant concentration in and around the Islands, none of them were local boats. Other specialized fisheries, such as the herring spawn on kelp weed (known locally as "roe on kelp") fishery, were set aside for the Haida (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1989/08/08), although such specialized licences are of limited value since the staple of the Island fishery is salmon.

A Haida consultant confirmed that the number of Haida involved in fishing had declined substantially due to license limitation. A fisherman himself during the 1950s, he indicated that during that time there were fifteen seine boats operating out of Skidegate (although some were not owned but rented). He added that, even up until the 1960s, one could start fishing in a speedboat, buy a commercial license and work one's way up to a fifty-four to sixty-foot seine boat. But now, what used to be a \$1,400 boat sells for a minimum of \$60,000, and more typically \$100,000. He indicated that presently there are only five seine boats left in the village. The licensing situation remains such that fishermen have to deliver a certain number of salmon in order to keep their license.<sup>25</sup> The consultant also stated that fishermen had to fish the whole season just to keep up payments on their boats. He concluded that instead of the fishermen receiving the major profits, now the processing

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<sup>25</sup> Licences had to be purchased at a considerable cost. Pinkerton (1981: 110) recounts how during a period of approximately ten years, a boat sold with a licence changed hands three times, increasing in amount from an initial \$5,000 to the end sale price of \$45,000. Thirty thousand dollars of the end sale price was for the cost of the fishing licence.

plants and banks receive the bulk of the money (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1989/08/08).

As a result of these policies of industry centralization, the Haida Gwaii had become a hinterland, not only shipping its processed fishing resources to the core, as had been the case initially, but having most of the fishing and all of the processing -- with their associated economic benefits -- located in the core and dominated by core-based operators.

### *Alienation from the Islands' Forests*

While the fishing industry on the Haida Gwaii began with policies which preserved the Haida's dominant position, the establishment of the forestry industry went against their interests from the start. At the turn of the century the best valley land was quietly granted to large companies. Combined with a provincial government policy of perpetual renewal, the grants effectively became permanent leases.<sup>26</sup> Before B.C. had passed its first Forestry Act in 1912 and almost a half century before these companies started their operations on the Islands, the potential for a local forestry industry had already been seriously undermined. The grants marked the beginning of the provincial government's pursuit of a centralized resource extraction policy which effectively worked to alienate the Haida from their use of forest lands.

Numerous accounts are available on how enforcement of this alienation was resisted by the Haida. Van den Brink (1974: 130) recounts how the Skidegate Haida were accused of "thefts of lumber" when they would obtain wood for firewood or boat building from land assigned to outsiders. Linking a discussion of firewood with the Haida claim of ownership to the Islands, Chief Williams Mathews recalls a similar incident:

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<sup>26</sup> The major companies presently operating on the Islands, known today as Fletcher Challenge (previously Crown Zellerbach and Pacific Mills) and MacMillan Bloedel (previously Powell River Company), were recipients of these choice land grants for timber and pulp and paper production (Pinkerton 1981: 90).

Today, although our ancestors own the whole Island, it's taken away. All Crown land they call it. Oh, we had a lot of fight over this thing. The provincial forestry man come here, land here on a boat. Got off on the dock because some of my people took down some fine spruce trees for fire wood and he didn't like that. And he called the chief councillor down on the dock, and the Indian Agent and a lot of people gathered down there . . . . And this Forestry man, government man, said "We don't want you to cut firewood on the Crown land. You cut your firewood on the reserve." And the chief Councillor said "Well that's fine, that's very good. We're glad to hear that. But you must understand. This village has been located here for hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of years. Thousands of years. And all the wood that is available for firewood is cleaned out. All scrubby timber you can't use for firewood. And you advise us to get our wood on the reserve. Fine. We've got a reserve way down here. Forty miles away. We got some more reserves on the west coast. Seventy miles away. You advise me to go over there on a canoe and cut a few blocks of firewood!" He [the Chief councillor] said, "That's foolishness, he don't know what he's talking about. We own this land in the first place . . . . We are the absolute owners of this island. And I'm going to advise my people you go out in it and cut down firewood, cut down any tree available. We'll see what this [the Forestry Department's] people are going to do about it." And that [Forestry] man say nothing and he left and never came back again. Oh, we had a lot of fights [Orchard 1969: Tape 3 Side B].

While immediately affected by the Crown land designations, during the early years and up to the 1940s the Haida quite possibly may not have known about these large scale land grants. The predominant form of logging on the Islands during this period was medium-scale logging companies, although many subcontracted for the major lease holders. These operations experienced major booms during the wars, stimulated by the demand for the Islands' high grade Sitka spruce for the manufacture of planes. Three logging companies operated out of Queen Charlotte City at this time and employed many Haida from the nearby reserve town of Skidegate. Knight (1978: 118) reports that the Haida were already involved in the logging industry prior to the World War I logging boom on the Islands. Haida involvement throughout this period came primarily in the form of wage labour, because Haida were not allowed to purchase Island land -- unlike the settlers who

bought up small tracts for hand-logging operations. Haida logging initiatives on private land was limited to their reserve land allocations.

In the late 1940s, when the lease-holding companies moved to begin large scale land-based logging operations on the Islands, a conflict developed between the smaller and larger firms at a province-wide level. These conflicts, combined with concern about overcutting, were the primary reasons given for the 1945 Sloan Report recommendation for the implementation of a sustained yield forest management program in the province (Marchak 1983: 49; Pinkerton 1981: 117). But contrary to the Sloan Report's stated purpose of dividing up the province into equal size private and public sustained yield units, public land designated for smaller, independent operators was increasingly absorbed by large companies.

As initially designed, this program allowed for either "private" or "public" leases of areas designated for logging. Private leases, first called Forest Management licences and later Tree Farm Licences (TFLs), were granted to industry directly by the government. In contrast, public leases, known as Public Sustained Yield Units or (PSYUs), were to be granted only by means of public auction. TFLs were designed for the larger firms and PSYUs for the smaller, independent loggers. The leasable provincial land was to be divided up equally between these two types of sustained yield units (Hodgins 1964: 340, 342; Pinkerton 1981: 131-132).

By the second Sloan Commission in 1956, it was already becoming clear that the system was clearly favouring large companies by allowing them to procure cutting rights in the PSYUs. Despite many submissions to the Commission from smaller operators requesting that this change be abandoned, the government continued on its policy of industry concentration and centralization and further alienated the PSYUs from the smaller operators. Between the years of 1943 and 1958 renewal of large company lease holdings in the province came in the form of twenty-three perpetual TFL agreements. After 1958, thirteen more twenty-one year TFL agreements were made (Pinkerton 1981: 117-118, 149). (See Figure 2 for a map of Island TFL and PSYU allocations by the end of 1962.)

# TREE-FARM LICENCES

## PUBLIC SUSTAINED-YIELD UNITS




FIGURE 2: TFL and PSYU ALLOCATIONS BY 1962.  
 (Adapted from Map 4 in Hodgins 1964)

Despite the competitive advantage of the large companies, independent loggers on the Islands continued to survive in this increasingly hostile environment. The Skidegate Haida were reportedly active as wage workers throughout the 1950s. During 1956 most able-bodied men from Skidegate were reportedly logging, and for many years they held the "loggers' loading record" for the region. During this period, timber sales were made on certain reserve lands of the Skidegate Haida for a profit of \$20,000 in 1956 and \$50,000 in 1957 (Van den Brink 1974: 214). The Masset Haida made no such sales at this time (Van den Brink 1974: 149), and their participation in the logging industry was generally more marginal. Whereas Skidegate is described in 1954 as having both fishing and logging occupations, Masset is described solely as a fishing community (Hawthorn et al. 1958: 83).

It was not until the introduction of the quota system in 1962 that smaller independent operator's opportunities for logging in the PSYUs were all but destroyed in favour of the larger companies (most of which by the 1960s were multinational). The quota system further eroded the small operator opportunities by favouring larger, "established operators" in the public bidding process, based on a three-year average of the past cutting amounts (Pinkerton 1981: 132). Established operators could determine the time bidding was to be done, request secret bidding, and exercise the option of meeting the lowest bidder in order to get logging rights to an area (Hodgins 1964: 342).

The effect of the quota system on a province-wide basis was a rapid reduction in the number of licences operating in the PSYUs, even though the number of productive hectares in the area increased dramatically. Marchak (1983: 51) indicates that in eight years the number of PSYU based licences had dropped from 1,529 in 1960 to 850 in 1968, cutting the number of operating licences nearly in half, even though the number of productive hectares had increased dramatically.<sup>27</sup>

Local operators reported that their annual cuts were reduced to one-third of their average annual cut, which meant they "could not afford to

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<sup>27</sup> The number of hectares increased from 19.8 million hectares in 1960 to 32.4 million in 1974 when the number of licences had dropped even further to 594 (Marchak 1983: 51).

continue operations unless they could buy up enough of the other operators' quotas to make a viable single operation" (Pinkerton 1981: 132). By 1978, only 1% of the allowable annual cut was open to competitive bidding by locals. For the Haida, independent logging on Crown land was never a significant source of logging income (Pinkerton 1981: 133-134). As Hawthorn et al. (1958: 127) point out, in the 1950s logging involved primarily wage work under supervision:

[O]pportunities for [self-employed proprietorship] . . . are limited to a few hand loggers and family or partnership groups on Indian-owned timber reserves, and to a smaller extent on adjoining timber tracts.

To what extent Haida did log "adjoining timber tracts" during this period and into the 1960s is not clear. Pineo (1955: 8) reported that in 1954 there were no independent hand loggers operating on PSYUs. Van den Brink (1958: 149) even suggests that the Skidegate Haida, who had considerable timber on their reserves, leased these stands instead of hand logging them. These accounts imply that independent hand logging by the Haida was not prevalent -- certainly not as prevalent as wage-work in the logging industry

By 1965, Haida wage labour in forestry remained minimal for the Masset Haida while it was more significant for the Skidegate Haida. In 1965, from her census data of Masset Haida, Stearns (1973: 82) observed that, of 122 employed men, only 4% (or five men) were full-time loggers and another mere 5% (six men) did part-time logging in the winter. Van den Brink's (1974: 215) figures for 1965 are similar. His count has eight Masset Haida compared to twenty Skidegate Haida engaged in full-time logging jobs. Hawthorn (1966: 87) states that a majority of workers in Skidegate were employed in logging, but offers no statistics. In fact, Hawthorn et al. (1966: 91) characterize logging as the most important locally available employment opportunity for not only Skidegate but also Masset. Such a characterization makes this study's findings with regard to the Haida communities somewhat suspect, especially if one considers that Stearns' (1973: 82) findings, based on years of research in the community, indicate that in 1966 the majority (68%, or eighty-three employed men) fished as their primary occupation.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> In comparison to Van den Brink (1974) and certainly Stearns work, little or nor research was done in either Masset or Skidegate for the 1966 Hawthorn Report (1966: 1-2).

While there is little or no evidence that the Haida had significant independent logging operations going from the early part of this century until 1965, it is clear that their opportunities to become involved as smaller, independent operators were highly compromised from the beginning when massive land grants were made to companies based in the core areas of North America. From the time that large scale, land-based logging began in earnest in the early 1950s, opportunities were further eroded until, in 1962, the quota system effectively closed down opportunities for small operators to establish viable logging companies. By the 1960s the Haida, as most other long term residents of the Haida Gwaii, had become victims of the provincial government's policies of economic centralization in the forestry industry. After this point the only real option for their involvement was as wage-labours in this now multi-national dominated industry.

The cumulative result of the Canadian and provincial government policies on the Haida Gwaii was that of developing underdevelopment and dependency on the Islands generally and among the Haida specifically. Dependency was built by annexing the Haida Gwaii with flagrant disregard for Haida ownership law and practice, by dismantling their political and judicial structures, and by completing their alienation from the economic potential of the Islands by means of a policy of centralized resource extraction. By not allowing the Haida to benefit substantially from either the Islands' forests or fish, Haida were increasingly forced into wage labour for large multi-nationals with its associated risk of unemployment and, when unemployment benefits expired, welfare.

Clearly the Haida were not passive throughout any of these developments. But, being encapsulated within the DIA bureaucracy, they had limited avenues for redress. When they attempted to break out of this narrow encapsulation through the formation of the Indian Brotherhood of B.C, the Brotherhood too remained largely limited to dealing with the Department of Indian Affairs. The cooperative and trade union movements gave them some redress, especially by means of the Trollers Association in Skidegate, but association with these movements, as with the union affiliations of the Indian Brotherhood, served a function only as long as the



Haida managed to remain viable in the commercial fishery. Ultimately these organizational efforts failed to secure a productive place for the Haida in the larger provincial and Canadian economy.<sup>29</sup>

The question could be raised as to why government did not act in its self-appointed guardian role by getting sea-worthy boats for the Haida or ensuring that their seine fleet not be lost. Clearly the government knew by the early 1950s, from a study it had commissioned, that the native fishery was in trouble (Hawthorn et al. 1958: 127). While documenting the clear native preference for work in the fishery (1958: 128) as well as its primary importance to their livelihood (1958: 72), Hawthorn et al. nevertheless do not recommend ensuring a place for native people in the fishery, but simply expect them to change occupations, specifically to that of logging (1958: 72, 123, 128). This policy recommendation does not change in Hawthorn's later report (1966: 146). Van den Brink (1974: 85-86) recounts a similar policy as early as the 1880s, when the Chinese began to displace Indians in the fishery in the lower mainland. Rolf Knight's (1978) thesis that natives had a crucial role in building the B.C. economy and were subsequently squeezed out and marginalized is substantiated in the Haida case. It was within this context that the Haida began their mobilization to expand their political field in order to challenge their dependence on detrimental governmental policies of resource extraction on the Islands, especially as they relate to the multi-national forestry industry.

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<sup>29</sup> Note also that the unions rarely supported natives in the strikes. Natives, on the other hand, had little choice but to follow them in their strikes because of the amount of control the unions had in the industry. It is also interesting to note that the International Woodworkers of America association did not support the Haida in their 1979 court action against the Forestry Minister (Helmer 1979: 387).

CHAPTER III  
HAIDA MOBILIZATION OF POLITICAL CAPITAL

"One [grandson is] in Vancouver in college and when he's through there he's going to the University.  
We want him to finish education so that he can come back and maybe  
help to change the situation of our village people.  
We get enough young people go through and finish education, I believe it will make a change."  
*Chief William Matthews, aged 84 (Orchard 1969)..*

In the face of their pervasive political and economic dependency in the mid-1960s, the Haida began to mobilize politically in an effort to regain control of their local government and at least some aspects of their economic life. The mobilization was extensive, and prepared the Haida for confronting government and industry activities on the Islands by means of the 1985 Lyell Island blockade.

*Reasserting Haida Leadership*

This mobilization began with the restoration of the central role of the Haida leadership both at a band and inter-band level. In Masset, two factors served as important catalysts in this reestablishment process. One factor was the growing unrest in the village among the young people, most evident in their increasing conflict with the older established leadership of the band council (Stearns 1981: 53-53, 114-115, 294-295; Van den Brink 1974: 199). The second factor was the removal of the Indian Agent from the Haida Gwaii to Prince Rupert, ending the period of direct supervision.

The unrest among the young people led to the replacement of the older generation of councillors with younger Haida. Because of the dependency and powerlessness discussed in the previous chapter, the seeds of discontent were already evident in the 1950s. But, as Stearns (1981: 115) points out, it was only during the 1960's that the orientation of the younger generation become increasingly activist, shifting from "passive withdrawal to rebelliousness." Initially the frustration of the youth was apparent in their agitation outside the village where incidents such as aggressive acts toward white people worked to increase tension between the Haida village and neighbouring New

Masset. Much of this hostility was channelled into the 1964 cannery strike in New Masset (see Stearns 1981: 111-115). The older generation referred to the young people as "hell raisers" and expressed grave concerns about their activities (Stearns 1981: 171-172; Orchard 1969). Despite the initial efforts to trivialise the actions of the young people, by the mid-1960s their activism led to a successful overturn of the established Masset council (which retained the support of only 30 to 40 percent of the band membership). Stearns (1981: 115) reports that at that time

the majority of villagers, disillusioned and embittered . . . swung their support behind the militants. The emergence of an activist mood which mobilized the whole community placed a powerful political weapon in the hands of their leaders.

This change in the makeup of Haida leadership coincided with the removal of the Indian Agent from the Islands in 1966, together bringing about the reassertion of local Haida leadership in the village. While the succession to political office was still based on an electoral system as opposed to the hereditary chieftdom, the council was now based on a new consensus in the village. The message from the Haida was: "we are now in control."

Responsibility for the community's welfare fell upon its elected councilors. The frustration, the anger, the problems of the agency period remained, but the people had found their voice. . . . [T]he new roles of band-manager, legal assistance counselor, home-school coordinator, community health worker, and so on allowed the Haidas to take charge of their own affairs. With little experience or training they grew into their jobs, relishing the opportunity to 'make our own mistakes,' as one woman put it [Stearns 1981: 294-295].

While the political field of the Masset and Skidegate Haida was still limited largely to their respective bands and the corresponding nearby towns of New Masset and Queen Charlotte City, the Haida were now less tightly encapsulated by Indian Affairs due largely to the new, more autonomous leadership. Van den Brink (1974: 201) notes that this change in the Masset council leadership led to more collaboration between band members and resulted in various improvements within the community.

In contrast, the Skidegate council never had the leadership problems of the Masset council. As discussed in the previous chapter, the difference

between the two villages may have been largely due to the Indian Agent's ongoing direct involvement in Masset and relative noninvolvement in Skidegate. To the extent that this was the case, the removal of the Indian Agent from the Islands served to allow Masset to reestablish its own leadership, and in this sense "catch up" to the Skidegate Haida in its local governmental infrastructure. The formal transfer of many of the powers of the Indian Agent to the band council effectively gave this new leadership some real power and legitimacy both in the community and with the Indian Affairs department. By 1969, improvements in Masset prompted a DIA official to comment, "there are certainly more signs of the council speaking out and becoming quite aggressive in some of its demands in these last few months -- a sign of increasing 'red power' as they call it over here" (Van den Brink 1974: 199-200). This description of the Masset council was beginning to resemble longer standing descriptions of the Skidegate council.<sup>30</sup>

When this rebuilding process was well underway at the village level, in 1973 the Haida formed the Council of the Haida Nation (CHN), a pan-Haida "tribal" or "national" government to unite the Masset and Skidegate Haida and to represent the common interests of all Haida people. (Earlier in 1945, the Haida had requested this kind of organization, but the request was turned down by DIA [Van den Brink 1974: 196]). In this initiative the Haida anticipated moves among other native peoples toward tribal (as opposed to individual band level) identities which were increasingly apparent throughout the province by the late 1970s (Paul Tennant 1983). This action established the political structure from which the Haida could extend their political field throughout the Islands.

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<sup>30</sup>The Skidegate Haida, which had no resident Indian Agent, had long been known to have an effective band council. In 1951, the Indian Agent reported that the band as a whole recognized the authority vested in the elected council. In 1965 another Indian Agent reported "Their leadership has always, as long as I can remember, been better [than in Masset]: more initiative and the people pay more attention to the advice and instructions of their councillors" (Van den Brink 1974: 198, 200).

*Defining Political Goals*

Once the role of the Haida leadership had been reestablished, the Haida moved to define their political goals. These goals were initially articulated by the Council of the Haida Nation (CHN) and the Skidegate Band Council. The CHN began with the political goal to “press their land claim to the Islands and the surrounding waters” on behalf of both the Masset and Skidegate Haida (Pinkerton 1983: 74). This initiative was a response to the still unresolved land title question in B.C. and the federal government’s recognition of aboriginal claims in 1973.

While the CHN mandate was only indirectly related to Island forestry activities, the Skidegate Band Council’s political goal of putting a stop to the logging in the Gwaii Haanas/South Moresby<sup>31</sup> area was directly concerned with the forestry industry’s activities in that area. In the early 1970s it became readily apparent that most of the forest of the Haida Gwaii was slated for logging and the development of industrial tree farms (Grzybowski and Brown 1986: 14) (See Figure 2). At this time the Skidegate Band Council came to see logging on Gwaii Haanas as degrading the character of the area and destroying the cultural and spiritual inspiration it held for the Haida (Grzybowski 1985: 58). As already discussed, land-based logging had first begun on a grand scale in the early 1950s. These logging operations, operating throughout the 1950s and 1960s, resulted in clear cutting of much of the northern part of Moresby Island and the southern and central areas of Graham Island. The land-based logging initiative of Rayonier Canada was now poised to begin logging in the southern part of Gwaii Haanas.

That such logging was about to happen on these Islands was of no surprise to the hereditary chief of that region. He recalled that his uncle (i.e., his mother’s brother) had predicted long ago that this would happen: that the loggers would soon come for the magnificent trees in Gwaii Haanas, this “beautiful country” (Skidegate, 1989/08/18). In 1973, the Skidegate Band

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<sup>31</sup> The designations Gwaii Haanas and South Moresby will be used interchangeably and refer to the area included in the wilderness reserve proposal (see Figure 1).

Council, having primary traditional jurisdiction over the southern Islands,<sup>32</sup> passed a resolution to make it their priority to stop the logging in this region. The resolution was made in anticipation of the request by Rayonier for a five-year renewal of its forestry license. To resolve the land claim and to stop logging on Gwaii Haanas by the early 1970s became the two central political goals which were to guide the Haida through the next two decades.

### *Acquiring Local Support*

The next five years of activism became characterized by efforts to broaden the support for the Skidegate Band Council resolution and culminated in court action against the provincial Forestry Minister. When Rayonier presented a five-year logging plan to start logging on Burnaby Island in 1974, the Skidegate Band Council, in line with its resolution, lodged a formal protest with the provincial government. At a feast thrown by the Haida, the B.C. premier responded to the protest by making a verbal promise that the area would see a moratorium on logging. The Haida took this to mean that no logging license would be granted in the area. The logging company did not acknowledge this moratorium publicly, but stated that, for economic reasons, it had decided to log in a more northerly region. This mere transference of logging was unacceptable to the Skidegate Haida who interpreted it as a breach of trust and formally protested (Pinkerton 1983: 75).

Shortly after this, the Islands Protection Society<sup>33</sup> (IPS) was formed by a Haida activist and a young non-Haida Island resident and was joined by other Haida and Islanders (E. May 1990: 19-20; Bolan 1984: B8; Pinkerton 1983: 75). The formation of this society was the first move to formally organize Haida and non-Haida islanders on the Haida Gwaii. The Islands Protection Society submitted a proposal for a wilderness reserve for the Gwaii Haanas region to the provincial government (Grzybowski 1985: 58; Broadhead 1984: 130). The formation of the IPS on the Haida Gwaii (including non-Haida members) and

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<sup>32</sup>The lineage ancestors of people now living in Skidegate used to occupy numerous villages all along the coastal areas of these southern islands (i.e., Gwaii Haanas/South Moresby).

<sup>33</sup>Initially it was called the Islands Protection Committee (Broadhead 1984: 130).

their submission of a proposal to the provincial government (as opposed to DIA) signified a further expansion of the political field of the Haida.

The IPS soon came to provide a forum for monitoring, evaluating, educating and developing support for the Gwaii Haanas/South Moresby Wilderness Proposal. In 1975 the IPS circulated an Island-wide petition calling for a moratorium on logging in the entire Gwaii Haanas area until environmental impact studies could be done. Five hundred Island residents signed the petition delivered to the provincial legislature (Grzybowski 1985: 58; Broadhead 1984: 130). Even though the recommendation of this petition was not followed, it worked to extend into the wider community the joint community involvement already present in the IPS. By getting independent opinions from respected organizations, the IPS built support and established their legitimacy as critics of forestry management practices. In 1976, the IPS nominated Anthony Island to UNESCO as a world cultural heritage site (a nomination which was accepted in 1982). During the same year, largely due to pressure applied by the IPS, the provincial Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC) commissioned its secretariat to perform an overview study of the South Moresby area as a preliminary step to further planning. A number of other federal and provincial studies were also undertaken at this time (Grzybowski 1985: 58). Then, in 1977, the IPS initiated a further public education effort by organizing a local symposium to discuss various positions in the controversy on the forestry issue on the Islands with the result that, with the added media exposure, the debate took on national and international dimensions (Grzybowski 1985: 58).

An important forum used by the IPS in their battle with the forest industry was the local media. Evelyn Pinkerton, arguing on the basis of her analysis of the contents of the the local paper, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Observer*,<sup>34</sup> notes that in the early 1970s there was hardly any public discussion on the activities of the forestry industry. Then came a gradual increase in the number of editorials and articles related to these issues. In 1974, she observes

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<sup>34</sup> Pinkerton's assumption is that this weekly island paper is a good monitor of the issues as people see them locally since, as a matter of policy, all editorials are published. The *Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* continues to be a vital forum for dialogue on issues and developments of interest to Islanders today.

that only local residents were defending the practices of forestry companies, whereas by 1975 the companies began to submit articles to defend their activities. In these early defences the companies did not discuss their actual operations, but rather, they drew attention to their superior know how, their studies and the extent of their investments in the area -- in effect, appealing to their authority as a way of justifying their actions (Pinkerton 1983: 76).

Pinkerton interprets even this initial response by industry as a sign that the companies were beginning to feel a threat, however mild, to their activities on the Islands. From 1976 on, the local debate opened up, increasingly focussing on the actual activities of the companies on the Islands and resulting in open debates between pro-logging and anti-logging people.

The Forestry Service, in responding to this pressure from the IPS, created a Public Advisory Committee (PAC) in 1977 composed of logging company representatives and residents representing a range of local interest groups. The mandate of this committee was to provide local advisory input for the Forestry Department on the Islands. Its members soon learned, however, that the Ministry had no intention of educating the committee into any position of responsibility or of taking its recommendations seriously (Pinkerton 1983: 78). The events surrounding the introduction of the new Forestry Act illustrate this disregard for the PAC most clearly. According to the PAC's chairman, Ric Helmer (1979), one of the first resolutions of the PAC called for public hearings into all Tree Farm Licenses (TFL) renewals. This came out of the realization that all of the Islands' 21-year TFLs were soon due for renewal. When the local forestry service was approached with this resolution, it suggested the PAC wait with forwarding the resolution until the new Forestry Act was drafted, as the PAC "would have plenty of time for input then" (Helmer 1979: 387). Later, when the Forestry Minister was approached, after the first draft of the Act in May 1978, he suggested the same thing and said that the third reading would not occur until fall (Helmer 1979: 387). However, neither the Minister nor the local Forestry Service was willing to provide a copy of the draft, but the PAC managed to obtain a draft from another source after a month of effort. The PAC soon learned that final reading would not be in fall, but on June 29, 1978 -- just three weeks away.



They worked quickly to interpret the significance of the Act. Of great concern was the change in the Act that would allow for the perpetual and automatic renewal of the Tree Farm Licence agreements. In response to this development, the IPS and the Haida immediately called for reforms to the conditions of TFL 24 in order to get their changes in place before the TFL became perpetually renewable. But the bill was pushed through the legislature quickly, allowing no time for the open debate of the changes proposed by the PAC. The Ministry informed them that suggestions of proposed changes could be submitted but these were to be incorporated into the Act at the discretion of the Minister.

The PAC continued to press for a public hearing as, during the Forestry Act debate, the Minister had stated "I don't think anything in the [new] Act precludes us from having public hearings if we feel it necessary" (Helmer 1979: 387). Until mid-December the Ministry indicated that it was still considering conducting a public hearing, but

two weeks later, options were out of the question. Taking refuge in his own legislation, Forest Minister, Waterland now argued that the Forest Act precluded public hearings into TFL renewals and the Act forced him to make a renewal offer to Rayonier [Helmer 1979: 387]<sup>35</sup>.

By refusing the PAC an opportunity to study the Act before it was made law, and by seeming deliberately to mislead the Public Advisory Committee, the Forestry Service and Provincial government exposed the Committee as a body they did not take seriously.

In spite of these counts against it, the PAC continued to critique forestry management on the Islands. They demonstrated that current harvesting rates were far too high, and that sustainable yield was not being practiced outside the TFLs. Later they gathered enough information to demonstrate that the same was true in Rayonier's TFL 24 which was being overharvested by about 30% (Pinkerton 1983: 79). By this time the activists

had made three crucial steps toward changing public opinion. They

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<sup>35</sup> TFL 24, granted in 1959, was the first 21-year TFL granted in the province. "Therefore the question of the conditions and manner of renewability of this TFL . . . was a critical, precedent-setting matter . . . for the other 12 [21-year] TFLs in the province" (Pinkerton 1981: 149). The Minister may have been so reluctant to grant the public hearing because of the precedent setting nature of the handling of TFL 24. To grant a public hearing for this TFL might set a precedent of public hearings, making ineffective the automatic renewal legislation in the new Forestry Act.

had identified the contractual obligations of the companies, produced affidavits swearing that one or more of the companies was in breach of contract, and convinced many local groups and individuals that they had a right to review important forest management decisions Pinkerton (1983: 80).

By communicating and providing forums for the public discussion of their findings, the activists within the PAC gradually built a broad local consensus around their positions. Besides the IPS and the Skidegate Band Council, a call for public hearings was made by the Masset Band Council, the Skidegate local of the UFAWU, the Northern Trollers Association, the Graham Island Advisory Planning Commission, Iona Campagnolo, M.P. for Skeena, Graham Lea, M.L.A. for Prince Rupert, and others making a total of sixteen separate calls for public hearings (Helmer 1979: 387; Pinkerton 1983: 81).

When the request for public hearings was not granted, the decision was made by the petitioners<sup>36</sup> to take the Minister to court. Local support was further demonstrated by money raised by well attended local benefit dances, and by a total of eighteen organizations both on and off the islands submitting supportive affidavits to the court. Pinkerton (1983: 82) states that "all this support indicated that the petitioners and Islands Protection [Society], which financed the case, were in fact champions of a public cause much larger than their own interests."<sup>37</sup>

Under the sponsorship of the IPS and with the public support of the

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<sup>36</sup> Two Haida, Nathan Young and Guujaaw and a non-Native trapper, Glenn Naylor, were the petitioners. Naylor was included to assure "standing," because non-Natives had to register traplines and thus could demonstrate formal evidence of continuous use (Pinkerton 1983: 81).

<sup>37</sup> The strong support for the IPS and the Haida, based as it was in Queen Charlotte City (QCC), is better understood by taking into account Pinkerton's (1981) study of the town's culture. Pinkerton identifies a group of "neo-indigenous" people as dominant in local politics. This group composed of the descendants of the early white settlers on the Islands. Its members are fiercely independent both economically and ideologically, resisting any outside efforts to limit their autonomy, as is seen in their successful resistance of repeated attempts by "mainstreamers" (short term professional or company employees) to incorporate the town from 1964 to 1976 (1981: 355-357) and indeed, to the present day (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/11/22). Much of Pinkerton's discussion focuses on how the neo-indigenous have managed to integrate (and remain politically dominant over) new immigrants over the years and how they deal with the mainstreamers who sometimes make up a considerable part of the population. In Chapter V she argues that the counter-culture immigrants soon became close allies with the neo-indigenous. Given Pinkerton's (1983: 75) reference to the role of the counter-culture in the formation of the IPS, the IPS is likely to have been joined later by the neo-indigenous residents of QCC, effectively giving the Haida the support of the QCC establishment.

Public Advisory Committee (PAC), the court challenge by three individuals requested the "judge order the Minister to hold a full public hearing before deciding whether to renew the TFL" (Pinkerton 1983: 81). However, when it became clear that this intent was too ambitious, the petitioners asked that at least a minimal fair treatment of the interests of trappers and food-gatherers be granted (Pinkerton 1983: 81). After the three-day court hearing, the judge ruled that public hearings before renewing the TFL were not required, but the petitioners ought to be consulted before a renewal was made (Pinkerton 1983: 82). During these hearings, both the effort of the forestry companies to discredit the research done by the IPS and the effort of the Forestry Service to discredit the PAC (which supported the court challenge) failed (Pinkerton 1983: 80, 82).

While the court did not decide in favor of the petitioners, the mobilization for court action constituted a further expansion in the political field of the Haida and thus a further undermining of their encapsulation resulting in some political gains vis-a-vis the provincial forestry ministry.

They were now taken much more seriously by the Ministry and were able to meet directly with senior officials .... Second, the petitioners gained access to Forestry Service files on renewal considerations. And third, the public was now allowed to view and comment upon the Management and Working plans of the companies before they were finalized [Pinkerton 1983: 82].

The activities of the Forestry Service and companies were now open to detailed scrutiny by the local people and the public. Such scrutiny by members of the PAC revealed that there was "little evidence [showing] . . . that the Forestry Service was placing more meaningful constraints upon the companies." In September 1979 the Public Advisory Committee was dissolved by its members out of protest with its members declaring that "public participation was a sham" (Pinkerton 1983: 82). Pinkerton (1983: 77, 80) observes that, after this court case, forestry companies began to back away from the public debate as provincial and forestry officials took on the role of defending Island logging practices to the local people.<sup>38</sup> By this time no local

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<sup>38</sup> The Forestry Service accepting the role of a public defender of the logging companies accounts for the belief often expressed by locals that the Service is "in bed with the logging companies."

people were publicly defending the forestry management policies of the companies. It appeared that the local people of Queen Charlotte City and Skidegate were developing a consensus on these issues.

The TFL renewal was granted to Rayonier following the court challenge, but only for a one year period. As a result of the court action and the dissolution of the PAC, the provincial government set up the South Moresby Resource Planning Team (SMRPT) even while logging activities on Lyell Island were allowed to continue. The SMRPT team had the mandate to come up with a comprehensive plan for the South Moresby area and was made up of representatives from all interested parties including the "B.C. forest service, fish and wildlife branch, parks branch, mines ministry, federal fisheries, ecological reserves, Rayonier, . . . [the Island Protection] Society" as well as one representative of the Skidegate Haida (Farrow 1980: H6; *Haada Laas* 1986: 3).

### *Building the CHN's Legitimacy and Leadership*

From this point on, the mobilization became characterized by building the Council of the Haida Nation's (CHN) legitimacy and leadership in the conflict over Gwaii Haanas. The CHN built its local legitimacy as the primary political body responsible for the Haida Gwaii by taking over the court case of the three petitioners, submitting a formal land claim for the Islands, and adopting responsibility for Island management.

The first act was taking over the court case of the three petitioners. After the judge ruled that public hearings were not required before the renewal of TFL 24, a second petition was made to the court. This second application was also denied and the judge indicated that the Forestry Minister had considered the Haida submission (during the first court proceedings) and had made some changes to the renewal agreement. A few days later the licence was renewed with none of the changes promised in the first court proceedings. From that point on, in order to obtain a court order forcing the Minister to renegotiate the terms of the TFL agreement, the goal of the petitioners was to demonstrate that the Minister had negotiated in bad faith.

Further petitions were presented and dismissed. Then the Council of the Haida Nation sponsored a final appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. This application was also denied on December 20, 1982 on the grounds that it was a provincial matter, but the petitioners and the CHN had made their position clear (*Haada Laas* 1986: 3; Pinkerton 1983: 83; Broadhead 1984: 134-136).

In 1980, Rayonier (by this time called Western Forest Products due to a recent merger) was granted another one-year licence renewal. At the same time, new mineral rights claims were allowed to be staked out on Lyell Island even though numerous earlier requests were made by SMRPT for a moratorium on the making of further claims until the team had completed its report (Broadhead 1984: 136). When in 1981, SMRPT released the ecological reserve proposals for the Windy Bay watershed it defined two options. One option would preserve the entire Windy Bay watershed, and the other preserve the forest alongside the creek running through the watershed but would log the interior areas to industrial use (Grzybowski 1985: 59).

In 1981, the CHN formally registered its land claim for the Haida Gwaii with the federal government. Two years later, the claim was accepted (recognized by the Canadian government as qualifying for the federal land claims process). The Council, now under the new Grand Chief, Percy Williams, also made a number of significant policy statements on the fishery, forestry and the Haida obligations on the Islands. On forestry it stated:

Presently the Forests Ministry, in conjunction with the large companies, has nearly exclusive use over most of the prime lands on the Islands. The management practices are unacceptable to our people. The concept of multiple use has been mocked by the forest industry, making public input useless [In Pinkerton 1983: 84].

Perry Williams further stated "the Haida have a moral obligation to protect their resources from the degeneration which is taking place in the hands of government and the forest companies" (Pinkerton 1983: 84).

With these actions the Council of the Haida Nation began to shift its emphasis from pursuing a "land claim" to pursuing "land management" for the Haida Gwaii. As one Haida stated, "We're not going to wait for Ottawa to

work out our land claims. We've already started doing it!" (In Pinkerton 1983: 85). In keeping with this shift in focus, the CHN began publicly dealing with issues which until then had been dealt with largely by the Skidegate Band Council and the IPS. For example, in 1982 the CHN rejected the terms of reference of an Islands Task Force conducting a study of the county system of local government proposed for the Islands by the provincial government. The Haida persuaded the task force, composed of representatives from each community and area on the Islands, to join them in exploring other forms of local government. Island management initiatives such as these began the process of negotiating the Haida land claim with non-Haida residents of the Islands (Pinkerton 1983: 84-85). In so doing the Haida, through the CHN, came to be seen as the legitimate leadership in the local conflict for control over Islands affairs by not only Haida but also non-Haida residents. Indeed Pinkerton (1981: 83) notes that

long-term residents [her neo-indigenous group in Queen Charlotte City] . . . sense that only the Haidas can keep the islands from being completely transformed by the larger industrial plans for the islands, because they are the only people feared by developers.

In line with this priority of Islands management, a core group of five people began laying the groundwork for the Council of the Haida Nation's new aggressive leadership. They began both by developing future strategy and by grooming a new president. In organizing for and carrying through with the blockade and its aftermath, the knowledge and competence of the Haida were their greatest resource. Here the role of five key younger Haida leaders were fundamental. Their efforts to mastermind the whole process began three years before the 1985 blockade. Typically these individuals were in their late twenties or thirties and had considerable experience in such activism.<sup>39</sup> One of their primary roles was to plan strategy by looking ahead and trying to predict what what kind of reactions particular initiatives would draw from government and/or industry. At the same time they were behind the major policy decisions of the CHN, of which Percy Williams was carefully

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<sup>39</sup> One of the members was a founder of the IPS. Another is known locally as the Haida's own historian and ethnologist.

placed to be the elder spokesperson, the Grand Chief (Haida Man, Haida Leadership, 1990/08/09).

This group also hand picked and groomed the new Haida president. At the time Miles Richardson was at the University of Victoria studying economics. One of his professors, a friend of the Haida who knew of their need for leaders with excellent public speaking skills, drew attention to Richardson's uncommon ability. At that point a member of this group of five approached Richardson, explained what they were planning, and asked him if he would be willing to come to the Islands to play a significant role. Richardson accepted.<sup>40</sup> He started by working in the Skidegate Band Council office.

Miles Richardson soon proved to be a most effective leader. He had several excellent credentials: 1) he had the necessary knowledge and competence to become a most effective spokesperson, one able to articulate the Haida position clearly and consistently throughout the crisis; 2) for a young leader, Richardson had extensive education not only in Haida ways, but also in Euro-Canadian ways with a degree in economics from the University of Victoria; 3) he had also gained local experience having earned his right to leadership in the community by working together with the initial group of five young leaders and other village members, first in the Skidegate Band Council and then as vice-president for the CHN (*Vancouver Sun* 1983/01/26; Baldrey, et al.1985: A14). This kind of training is highly valued in a leader. As one Haida woman from Skidegate related, "Our leaders have a good solid education. They know the white way, they know the Indian way" (Penner and Martens 1986: 5). Noel Dyck (1985: 12) suggests that such understanding is an essential characteristic of native leaders today. While this kind of dual enculturation is not exceptional among the Haida, it is clear that Richardson's leadership strategies, based on a excellent understanding of both systems, allowed him to communicate effectively and gain respect both inside and outside the native community.

While Richardson's leadership was highly influential from the very beginning of the crisis, the fact that he was just one of a group of leaders

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<sup>40</sup> Based upon information received from various Haida consultants.

suggests that it was not a coercive or solitary leadership, but one based in a broader consensus. With long term goals well defined and with broad support, it was possible to focus on choosing strategies. As Feit (1985: 47) suggests, Indian leaders must be able to both shape and represent the consensus of their community. The Haida leaderships' first strategy had to do with channelling the consensus in the community. Miles Richardson's primary role during the blockade clearly became one of articulating this direction which, as his uncompromising strength during the crisis demonstrated, worked to further solidify the Haida resolve.

### *Mobilization Leads to Haida Consensus for a Blockade*

With growing frustration at the lack of a productive forum for the resolution of the conflict over Gwaii Haanas, the CHN moved the people toward a decision to set up a blockade. By this time it was becoming increasingly obvious to the five activists that available avenues for the resolution had been exhausted. For the past few years this group of five had carefully documented both government and their own actions so that the record would be plainly available. Like the earlier court challenges, the special committees were not bringing about any resolution. The PAC had been stymied. Now SMRPT was also being stymied in its efforts to facilitate meaningful decision making. While its recommendations had been available since 1983, no decisions were being made by the province on the basis of the report. Broadhead, as a co-director of the IPS from its conception and a member of SMRPT, reports that efforts to create and present a meaningful report publicly for the purposes of open discussion were derailed by government.

After members had met for four years, visited the area, examined its various resources and attempted to evaluate them, South Moresby was beginning to grow on the team. It was becoming obvious that the majority favoured conservation, and loud complaints arose from industry that the team had an 'environmentalist bent.' Then the word filtered down through the bureaucracy: there would be no public meetings, the report would contain no consensus (sic) recommendation on the area's allocation and government agency



members were to refrain from expressing their view on this matter in public. For the public members of the planning team, it was the crowning lesson in cynicism.

Broadhead adds that after the SMRPT report, a "predictably bland document," was out:

honourable members were heard to complain about the lack of substance in the report. But it was their own minions who scrupulously ensured that it contains no potentially compromising recommendations, leaving themselves with nothing to react to, nothing to reject and nothing to confirm [1984: 139].

Broadhead concludes that

in the minds of its participants, 'public involvement' degenerated in concept from meaningful democratic exercise to a clever diversion by government of conservationist energies and a measure for avoiding embarrassing (sic) legal confrontation. . . . The five-year term . . . allowed for . . . organizing and gathering support [from] . . . an international audience, [but the five-year term was] . . . not without serious drawbacks . . . such as the sacrificing of the northern quarter of the original wilderness proposal by extensive clearcut logging on Lyell Island [1984: 139-140].

It was becoming apparent to the Haida and their supporters that, if the Gwaii Haanas area was to be saved from logging, time was running out. There was increasing reason to believe that legal means had been exhausted. Court challenges had failed; special committees had had their efforts stymied or had been disbanded; no progress had been made on the Haida land claim since the time it was accepted as qualifying for negotiations by the federal government; and, in the fall of 1985, the government continued to renege on its promises. While logging operations were being shut down due to reaching the annual quota, the Ministry of Forests announced logging would continue on Lyell Island. Seeing radical action as the only alternative, the Haida set a forty-day deadline before which logging must stop. At the same time, a meeting with the ELUC was arranged, in which the ELUC promised to issue no further cutting permits until a formal decision on land allocation for the whole Gwaii Haanas region was made. Despite these promises three new licences were issued, and logging resumed in October (*Haada Laas* 1986: 4). Just prior to issuing the new licences, yet another committee, the Wilderness

Advisory Committee (WAC), was appointed to study the problem (Grzybowski and Brown 1986: 15). There were also some discussions between the federal and provincial governments about creating a park, but no action was taken (Grzybowski 1985: 60). There was little reason for the Haida to place any hope in these new government initiatives.

Feeling the need for high-profile support in order to ensure that their voices would be heard, the Haida and their supporters set up a committee specifically to gain the attention of prominent Canadians. By the time of the blockade, the National Committee to Save South Moresby had signed up celebrities from across the country, including David Suzuki, Robert Bateman, Farley Mowat, nature photographer Freeman Patterson, Pierre Berton and MPs Jim Fulton, Charles Caccia and John Fraser. Prominent people in other organizations were also recruited: Gregg Sheehy, director of the Canadian Nature Federation, was asked to be chair; and Kevin McNamee, executive director of the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada, offered to put more of his resources behind the Save South Moresby cause, as did Peter Hamel, Consultant on National Affairs for the Anglican Church (Grzybowski 1985: 60; May 1990: 79). This support, combined with the knowledge that most of the federal MPs favoured protection of South Moresby (E. May 1990: 60), ensured the blockade would have support from some prominent spokespersons.

Most important for what was to come, the group of five was testing the preparedness of the Haida villages for a blockade confrontation. The idea of such radical action was first tested with elders and community leaders in lengthy discussions and a weighing of the options. Then, when they felt the majority of people were supportive, the five called a general Haida assembly and put it to a vote. The overwhelming consensus in both villages was to go ahead and put up a blockade (Haida Man, Haida Leadership, 1990/08/09). The Haida leadership had its mandate. This consensus, then, was at the heart of the Haida power during the crisis and made possible a mobilization of hundreds of people at the "grass roots" level. Such a mobilization could not easily be isolated and, as a result, was potentially explosive -- a fact which added to the effectiveness of the blockade.

CHAPTER IV  
THE LYELL ISLAND BLOCKADE CONFRONTATION

“We’ve tried as much as we know how to try and find some justice in the political and legal system. That hasn’t come about.”  
*Miles Richardson, President of the CHN (O’Leary 1985: Tape # 33).*

To the Haida, who had a consensus position against further logging on Lyell Island, the decision by the Minister of Forests to allow logging to continue over the annual quota limit was a direct provocation.

We were very close to resolving this. . . . The [logging] . . . on Lyell Island had shut down. And all those people returned to their homes in the lower mainland. And for some reason there was a last minute decision made to proceed with [further logging] [Miles Richardson, President of the CHN, O’Leary 1985: Tape # 33].

I feel that we were provoked into it, I feel that we were led into it. I think that they are doing it intentionally. They probably would like nothing better than to jail us all and criminalize us [Guujaaw, O’Leary 1985: Tape # 35]

With a history of more than a decade of failed attempts to resolve the dispute by committees, lobbies of parliament, the land-claim process and the courts, the Haida chose to breach legal norms by putting up a blockade on Lyell Island. This created a national crisis which forced government to address the Haida grievance. The Haida erected a blockade on Lyell Island on October 30, 1985 near Sedgwick Bay in such a way as to position themselves between the logger’s camp and the cutting area. At this point the long, apparently peaceful negotiation process became one of open conflict. Fundamental to the success of the blockade was the fact that it had to become a national “media event” so that public support could be rallied and pressure could be brought to bear on the government and industry.

*Blockade Develops into National “Media Event”*

As the Haida had hoped, when the blockade began, support came from a number of prominent Canadians. David Suzuki and Robert Bateman were

reported to be willing to face arrest if necessary. Bill Reid told the press "I'll go when I'm recruited," and later appeared in the Vancouver court to argue on behalf of the Haida. Peter Hamel came on site during the crisis to announce the Anglican Church resolution in support of the Haida grievance (O'Leary 1985, Tape #38). Later he tried to appear before the court during a Haida hearing but was refused standing (*Vancouver Sun* 1985/11/29). MP Charles Caccia publicly supported Haida civil disobedience to end the logging.

Another MP, NDP Justice Critic Svend Robinson, joined the blockade stating,

This [blockade] . . . represents the failure of governments to act. . . . I have been here. I have seen the destruction, the rape and the pillage of these lands. And I have seen the lands that they want to destroy. And I understand [why] these people say this must not be allowed to take place [O'Leary 1985: Tape #35].

The support of these individuals contributed greatly to drawing media and public attention to the Haida position. But the media and public support itself came in response to the actions of the Haida leadership, the organization at the blockade site, the show of strength in consensus for and commitment to achieving their political goal of stopping the logging. Miles Richardson, president of the Council of the Haida Nation, used his gift of public speaking to the best advantage. Both on the front lines of the blockade and with the media he clearly, and often dispassionately, articulated the Haida position. During the crisis, his became an almost household name as he appeared on the nightly news, or in the headlines of major papers across Canada. What was even more effective was the consistency with which a range of Haida people spoke. In Teresa O'Leary's interviews for the CBC news, Guujaaw, Arnie Bellis, Gary Russ, and Adolthus Marks all spoke eloquently about the purpose and importance of the blockade. During the court hearings beginning on November 7th concerning the request for an injunction against the Haida, eighteen Haida spokespersons eloquently argued the Haida case. Then, on November 14, 1985, three Haida elders joined the blockade and presented the same message with the authority of their age and experience.

Another factor which demonstrated the commitment of the Haida to the blockade initiative was their well planned, rapid implementation of a base camp to house the Haida joining the blockade. They began constructing the camp on Lyell Island upon their arrival in late October, and within two weeks they had cleared an area and built two twenty-square-foot and one twelve-square-foot (O'Leary 1985: Tape #34).

The commitment to achieve their political goals by means of this blockade, expressed in a show of strength by a broadly held consensus, served to send a clear message to the media. While on the blockade line Miles Richardson stated: "All the Haida people have decided that there is to be no further logging in this area and there will not be. . . . This is Haida land. The Haida people have made a decision" [O'Leary 1985: Tape #33]. This claim of a very broad consensus among the Haida was made again and again. The Haida leadership claimed this consensus on the basis of a decision of the Assembly of the Haida Nation. Two elders, Ada Yovanovich from Skidegate and Ethel Jones from Masset, both indicated that their villages stood behind them. Ethel, when asked if she was prepared to go to jail stated, "Very much so . . . if that's the only way we'll shame the government. If they can handle us all in jail, fine. We can all go. The whole of my village [Masset], if they put us in jail, are ready to come" (O'Leary 1985: Tape #35). The strong Masset support was especially welcome for the Skidegate Haida, since Gwaii Haanas is traditionally owned by the Haida people now residing in Skidegate (Haida Woman, Queen Charlotte City, 1989/08/23; Hereditary Chief, Skidegate, 1989/08/18). Arnie Bellis, Lyell Island base camp coordinator, pointed to even broader Haida support:

This is the very beginning for us, and everybody looks at it that way. . . . We have way more people involved then ever before. We have 100% support from people in both communities [Masset and Skidegate and] the [CHN] Rupert . . . and Vancouver Locals. And the people I know just won't give up until this thing is dealt with in a . . . civilized, proper manner [O'Leary 1985: Tape #34].

Very significant to the argument for a strong Haida consensus was the fact that the first people arrested were Haida elders, each with their own sphere of influence in the community. That the elders were willing to take the first

step and risk being arrested, demonstrated the extent of the objection to the logging and foreshadowed the widespread participation of the Haida community, eventually resulting in seventy-two Haida getting arrested. Harvey Feit (1985: 44-47), in his discussion of the legitimacy of the James Bay Cree leadership, notes that involvement of not only regular members of the community but also of the elders and local leaders is crucial in demonstrating the legitimacy of native leadership. The Haida clearly had the support of both, and, it is well worth noting, the legitimacy (the consensus support) of the Haida leadership's strong stand was never questioned in the media.

With the Haida people committed to the political goal of stopping the logging, Lyell Island rapidly became an arena in which the Haida and their environmentalist allies stood in combat against the logging companies and the provincial government. Swartz, Turner and Tuden (1966: 33-34) suggest that, "power crises sooner or later take on a dichotomous form, and the field as a whole becomes (sic) what . . . has been called an 'arena' in which the contenders are ultimately arrayed in two camps or two factions." This phenomenon could already be observed on the Haida Gwaii during the October 9, 1985 visit of the Federal Environment Minister when he was greeted by an angry group of pro-logging residents in Sandspit (E. May 1990: 17). It became much more pronounced throughout the Haida Gwaii and across Canada after the initial blockade. Consultants from Queen Charlotte City spoke of the polarized relationships that had developed as a result of the blockade. One Haida woman spoke generally about people in Queen Charlotte City (QCC) as being "concerned" about what the Haida were doing and Sandspit as being "all up in the air" because they felt the blockade would destroy the town's economic base (Martens and Penner 1986: 7-8). Another spoke of the "drift" that developed in the easy relationship between Skidegate and logging towns such as Sandspit and Port Clements. Of Sandspit she said, "Haida don't feel comfortable going there anymore." Another Haida woman reported having lost her job of eight years in the Sandspit airport shortly after the blockade, and attributed it to the anti-Haida backlash there. A logger, married to a Haida woman and living in QCC, spoke of feeling the dilemma and the need to take sides when the Lyell Island controversy was in full

swing. He resolved it on the side of the Haida, by deciding that the Haida should get more than just jobs. Someone else was making all that profit (Non-Haida spouse of Haida Woman, Queen Charlotte City, 1989/08/23).

While it is safe to say that all of the towns on the Haida Gwaii were affected by the blockade, it was in Sandspit that opposition become most pronounced. Sandspit, unlike Queen Charlotte City, is a logging town<sup>41</sup> with which the blockade created a serious breach. Often the term "Redneck" was used by my consultants to describe the kinds of people living there. The "arena" created on the Islands is best seen in the direct opposition between the Haida communities and Sandspit. Indeed, as the conflict continued, this arena was carried across the country directly by means of the Haida "Save South Moresby Caravan" and an opposing "counter-caravan" from Sandspit (see Chapter V). But for the most part, their opposition on the Islands was exported via the media onto the national stage.

Accounts of the developments in the conflict were broadcast widely on radio and national television. An analysis of the newspaper coverage serves to underscore the extent to which the conflict was broadcast provincially and nationally. For a period of three weeks -- from the start of the blockade until shortly after the first arrests -- the *Vancouver Sun*, with the exception of one day, ran a minimum of one daily story on the Haida. On nine days, the story appeared on the front page. During the same time, the *Globe and Mail* ran eleven articles. Together with articles carried by four major Canadian newspapers (the *Calgary Herald*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Montreal Gazette*, and the *Toronto Sun*), at least forty-eight articles were written on the crisis during this period. During critical times such as the court ruling on the injunction, the arrests of the Haida elders, and the court trials, the major papers again gave coverage. This level of attention continued into early December, making the blockade and its aftermath a front-page, national media event in Canada for approximately one and a half months (Lemieux and Sucee 1986: 498).

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<sup>41</sup> On a community profile by the Canada Employment Centre, Sandspit is still identified as a logging camp, whereas Queen Charlotte City is identified as a fishing/commercial centre (Collinson 1989: ii).

*Attempts to Criminalize Haida Fail*

In the midst of the Haida appeal for national support for their cause, the most important concern was to keep from being "criminalized". Criminalization, that is to focus on the Haida breach of law to divert attention from the reason for it, was a great danger, as it would justify the use of the courts and the police to deal with the crisis. From the beginning of the crisis both industry and government did attempt to criminalize the Haida and to ignore the underlying political issue of the land dispute. On the first day of the blockade, industry representatives Frank Beban and Harvey Hurd told the Haida blockaders "You're breaking the law . . . We have the legal right to log here, and we intend to log here. . . . We'll let the courts decide" (O'Leary 1985: Tape #33). Later, after the Haida had defied the November 9th injunction, Hurd, the Queen Charlotte Operations manager for Western Forest Products (WFP) (formerly Rayonier), was more direct:

I'm angry that people can break the law, and so far we haven't been able to do too much about it. . . . We have to do something. We can't let the economy of this province go down the tube for lawbreakers. And that's what we have there right now [O'Leary 1985: Tape #40].

Government had taken a strict legal position when the decision was taken to grant more logging permits. On the day after the blockade was constructed, Forestry Minister Tom Waterland repeated that Western Forest Products had the right to cut timber on Lyell, even though the Haida claimed it as aboriginal territory. He added that, "every time someone makes a claim to an area of land, we can't go and turn history back or the forest industry would be dead" (Glavin 1985/10/31: A10). With this statement the Minister claimed ignorance of the twelve years of intense political effort that had gone into trying to resolve the matter, and placed the Haida blockade within a clearly unworkable scenario in order to deny it any credibility. One Haida consultant claimed that the Attorney General of B.C. had at one point instructed the judge, "Get those people! Don't let them get away with this" (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1990/08). The government attempt to simply



criminalize the Haida became most apparent during the second half of November when seventy-two Haida were arrested.

Despite the efforts to criminalize the Haida, the manner in which the Haida conducted the blockade before the media made these efforts increasingly ineffective over time. As already mentioned, the eloquent articulation of the Haida position by numerous spokespeople was of central importance. But the fact that Haida elders were the first to defy the injunction and face arrest most seriously undermined the criminalization effort. The involvement of the elders was crucial, as the conventional position in the forestry industry and forestry service had long been that the environmentalist movement on the Haida Gwaii was instigated by "hippies" who had misled the young Haida. Clearly, the elders who were the first arrested, two women and one man, all over sixty years of age, could not be accused of being pawns of the hippy or even the environmentalist movement. Nor could they be accused of being "young militants," youths who had not yet learned to have respect for Canadian Law. The presence of the elders also affirmed that support in the Haida community was as widespread as the younger leaders had claimed. As had the young leaders, the elders asserted Haida ownership of the Islands, deplored the government's lack of commitment to an honourable negotiation process and indicated their willingness to go to jail if that was how the government decided to deal with it (O'Leary 1985: Tape #35). The arrests of these elders proved to be a public embarrassment to the provincial government, when the event was broadcast live across Canada and reported in all the major Canadian newspapers.

A factor which single-handedly worked to undermine attempts to criminalize the Haida was Judge MacKay's comment during the injunction hearings that this was really a "political" not a legal matter, and should really not have been brought before the courts (*Vancouver Sun* 1985/11/08). As well, during a later hearing another Judge stated that the Haida were not criminals (*Globe and Mail* 1985/11/29).

Two other factors -- the commitment to non-violence and to alliance building -- mitigated the Haida response by helping them avoid extremes and

keep from being easily criminalized. The commitment to non-violent confrontation was demonstrated first by the leadership. Guujaaw, when asked on November 13 if he was angry because the court had granted an injunction against the blockade, stated:

No, we weren't angry. We are not mad at the company, but it did hurt. Our people were confused and hurt when they heard the judge's decision. . . . We haven't heard his reasons for his decision yet. But we moved aside showing our respect to the court [O'Leary 1985: Tape #35].

While the decision to stand aside was reversed the next day, the often dispassionate resolve of the Haida leadership contributed a restraint normally not seen in such situations. One Haida consultant credited Miles Richardson directly for the peaceful way in which the blockade was conducted (Haida Elder, Haida Gwaii Watchmen, 1990/08). Richardson's education at the University of Victoria and his previous political experience on the Islands helped him and the other leaders to understand the kinds of processes at work in such a confrontation. Richardson's personal qualities, combined with the extensive planning by the five young leaders as already discussed, helped to bring a very rational approach to the confrontation, where the responses of the government were largely anticipated and understood. The Haida who joined the blockade on Lyell Island were instructed by the leadership to be non-violent and were not allowed to bring liquor into the camp. During the whole confrontation, only one Haida was found with liquor, and that individual was sent back (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1989/08/08). Throughout, then, it was a nonviolent strategy in which the perspective of what was being sought was never lost in the extended crisis.

Another mitigating factor was the conviction most Haida shared that they were right to do what they were doing, and thus would ultimately win by peaceful means. Miles Richardson spoke of the "justness" of their cause (O'Leary 1985: Tape #33). One of the women arrested stated that "at no time did it [the blockade] ever feel wrong to me" (Martens and Penner 1986: 6). After being arrested, one Haida elder admonished those remaining on Lyell Island, "Anything you do, do it with peace and with dignity." Equating her stand with a spiritual struggle for truth, she read from the Bible before being

escorted away: "I have fought a good fight. I have finished my course. I have kept the faith" (O'Leary 1985: Tape #37). Another elder explained that the Haida could be so peaceful in the midst of the struggle because they knew they were right, and believed that mainstream Canadian society was offering support.

Another factor contributing to non-violence was the genuine respect and fear many Haida had for the law. This was especially the case among the Skidegate Haida who had a long history of being law-abiding and in good relationship with the neighbouring communities. A number of people who joined the blockade stated that it had been a real crisis for them to decide to take illegal action and face almost certain arrest. One woman stated that she "never wanted to come so close to the law again in her life!" (Haida Woman, Skidegate, 1989/07/17). Parents feared they would be separated from their young children. Young people feared that their parents or grandparents would be put in prison. These concerns contributed to producing a peaceful civil disobedience among the Haida participants in the blockade.

Also contributing to a non-violent activism was the commitment of the Haida to alliance-building. Alliances with the prominent members of the larger society through organizations such as "The National Committee to Save South Moresby" and through various environmental groups helped to reduce the danger of the Haida becoming isolated during the crisis. For instance, David Suzuki in his program *The Nature of Things* highlighted issues related to the blockade crisis. The Haida also showed a commitment to their relationships with other residents of the Haida Gwaii. Most significant perhaps was their unwillingness to allow the confrontation to become strictly a logger versus anti-logger issue. As a deliberate effort to ease some of the tensions in the local arena, the Haida hosted a feast in early 1986, sending a clear message that the loggers were not being pegged as the source of the problem.<sup>42</sup> As one Haida youth put it, "both loggers and Haida on Lyell Island were simply actors forced into playing roles in a drama created by the B.C. government's reluctance to negotiate in good faith" (Martens and Penner

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<sup>42</sup>In fact, the RCMP and Frank Beban, long-time resident of the Islands and the subcontractor responsible for the logging on Lyell, were often invited into the Haida camp for informal conversations (Haida Man, Haida leadership, 1990/08).

1986). The idea was communicated that this was part of a larger struggle, and that those in power were allowing the uncontrolled exploitation to continue.<sup>43</sup> For the Haida, the broad base of support and alliances with significant elements of the local and the larger society mitigated a sense of desperation.

The public support the Haida received helped to disallow the government the option of simply criminalizing them. A province-wide poll commissioned by the *Vancouver Sun* indicated that sixty percent of the people polled wanted the premier to negotiate native land claims, fifty percent supported the Haida in their stand, while thirty-one percent were opposed and sixteen percent were undecided (Pynn 1985). These results put pressure on the provincial government and prompted Attorney General Brian Smith to comment, "I guess we'll have to take our case, or at least our concerns [about land claims] (to the public)." The government could no longer hide behind the public in refusing to address the issue. That the federal government also wanted to intervene put more pressure on the B.C. government and eventually contributed to the Attorney General's willingness to meet with the Haida as a first redressive gesture.

The Haida drew support from the local towns and beyond. Most important was the support of the Islands Protection Society. For all practical purposes the local IPS organisation could hardly be separated from the Haida, as many of its members were Haida and, indeed, the organisation was begun by a member of the Haida community. As detailed in the previous chapter, growing Haida and IPS credibility on the Islands corresponded with a decrease in the credibility of industry and government representatives. In addition there was growing concern about the activities of the forestry industry across the province (Farrow 1980: H6; Findley 1982; *Globe and Mail* 1979/01/12; Patricia Marchak 1983). It was this broadly-based support which provided

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<sup>43</sup> The significance of countervailing tendencies may be seen in the greater liberty with which the Masset Haida joined the blockade. According to one Haida consultant, the "young boys from Masset" came to their support and took confident leading roles, unafraid of facing arrest. The Skidegate Haida were generally more cautious about going on the front lines and facing arrest, as relationally they had more at stake with their neighbouring white community in Queen Charlotte City. In fact, many had friends and family members in the logging industry (Hereditary Chief, Skidegate, 1989/08/18).

legitimacy for the Haida generally and Miles Richardson and the other Haida leadership in particular.

Various Haida stated that the public rallying behind their cause, as indicated by the November 1985 Vancouver poll and other signs throughout the crisis, was fundamental to their victory. Several Haida, including those in important leadership positions, stated that if it hadn't been for the public support, the Haida might simply have been crushed by the government.

Given the involvement of the Haida elders, the commitment to non-violence in the blockade arena, the maintenance and development of alliances both locally and nationally, the judicial opinions, and the clear public support for the Haida, the efforts to criminalize the Haida were unsuccessful and, despite threats of significant jail terms by the courts, resulted only in suspended sentences.

*Haida Demonstrate Legitimate Grievance Forcing Government Involvement*

When the effort to criminalize them failed, the Haida were able to publicly demonstrate legitimate grievance, forcing the government to address their issues. The first opportunity for them to present their position to the provincial government came after federal Indian Affairs Minister David Crombie arranged a meeting with B.C. Attorney General Brian Smith on December 10th, 1985. After a two and a half hour meeting, Smith indicated that he was very impressed with the discussion, and that the Haida had put forward their position "with a great deal of passion." Smith added that he had "never heard it in that detail before . . . . Hearing it first hand was very helpful. It impressed me." (Danylchuk and Gory 1985: A8). According to the the Haida, the Attorney General expressed his appreciation upon hearing their side of the story, but maintained that they must have respect for the law. To this the Haida report responding:

We expressed our feelings that the government licensing systems in B.C. favor the unfettered exploitation of our resources, while Haida are being constantly charged with violations of laws -- often for trying to protect these resources.

We reminded him that the previous Forest Minister who had originally issued Tree Farm Licence #24 had ended up in jail for taking bribes; and that our efforts to challenge the renewal of the licenses had been brushed aside by the court. We reminded him of another case involving the proposed Cinola Gold Mine on the Yakoun River, which Judge Allan MacEachern ruled that, although the company had indeed been operating without a valid permit, he was not going to decide anything more than he had to, because he didn't wish to cause any harm to the company. We mentioned the destruction of salmon habitat and the violations that occurred at Landrick Creek and Riley Creek. We reminded him of how a Haida had attempted to bring the Deputy Minister of Forests and the company to court to answer for the destruction of Riley Creek, and how the then Attorney General had blocked those proceedings without good reason. Yes, we said, we are very respectful of law [*Haada Laas* 1986: 4-5].

After the meeting, Miles Richardson spoke with guarded optimism stating, "I think we are making progress . . . . There's a possibility of productive dialogue. It's more than we had before" (*Globe and Mail* 1985/12/10). But, while the Attorney General had made promises for subsequent meetings with the Haida, these meetings never took place (Danylchuk and Gory 1985: A8; *Haada Laas* 1986: 5), suggesting that this initial meeting may simply have been a way of trying to diffuse the pressure on the provincial government without offering any constructive context for a resolution.

Possibly the most important developments forcing government to address the Haida grievances were conflict-of-interest allegations made against some of the key individuals involved in handling the blockade crisis. The chairman of the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) was found to have had shares in Western Forest Products. Apparently he had realised the conflict of interest and quickly placed his shares into a blind trust before they were discovered (E. May 1990: 131). Even though this quick action made it possible for the chairman to hold on to his position, the WAC's mandate to study and submit recommendations for the future of Gwaii Haanas, was a clear conflict of interest for the chairman. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation also revealed that Forestry Minister Mr. Tom Waterland, who had personally granted logging permits to Western Forest Products, held a \$20,000 investment in Western Pulp, a subsidiary of WFP. Shortly thereafter,

the *Vancouver Sun* revealed that Energy Minister Stan Rogers had a \$100,000 holding in the same company. The conflict of interest for Rogers lay in the fact that, "[A]s energy minister, Rogers determined the rates pulp mills paid for electricity" (E. May 1990: 131). Both men also sat on the cabinet's provincial Environment and Land Use Committee, a committee which had long stalled on decision making for Gwaii Haanas. Amid province-wide calls for their resignations (E. May 1990: 131), Waterland resigned his cabinet post, but Rogers did not, the Premier arguing that Rogers really had no direct influence on the decisions concerning South Moresby. In addition, shares in Western Pulp were also owned by the Regional Manager of Forests for the Prince Rupert Forest district, whose responsibilities included making decisions regarding logging on the Haida Gwaii, including Lyell Island (*Haada Laas* 1986: 6; Martens and Penner 1986: 9). In the media, Jack Webster, a television talk show host for BCTV and an aggressive crusader against the Haida and others who would save South Moresby, also had shares in Western Pulp. These conflict of interest charges against governmental officials and others directly involved in the dispute worked to further undermine the credibility of the government in the eyes of not only the Haida, but the B.C. and Canadian public as well, thus effectively working to strengthen the Haida position.

A further embarrassment for the government was the CHN request that the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) press charges against the logging companies for the destruction of Landrick Creek resulting from a land slide on the steeply-sloped, clear cut area bordering the creek. The land slide plugged the creek, making the salmon run for spawning impossible. As a young Haida man explained, on the Haida Gwaii there are no big rivers, so every creek is important for spawning. In order for there to be numerous salmon in the area, every creek has to be healthy and to produce its full capacity. The overall effect is a richness of environment and spawning area for the salmon (Skidegate, 1989/08/22). On February 4, 1986, the DFO laid charges, embarrassing the provincial government which had not wanted to acknowledge that any problems were caused by logging on the Haida Gwaii.

With the conflict of interest scandals highlighted in the media and the DFO charges laid, the province announced a moratorium on all new logging permits on Lyell until the Wilderness Advisory Committee report was released. From its establishment, the WAC had been working very hard to build some credibility, as it was seen as just another in a long list of ineffective committees the government had formed, even while continuing on its logging agenda. This particular announcement gave the WAC at least some short-term credibility. The moratorium remained in effect for almost a month and a half, and constituted the first substantial effort of the provincial government to address the Haida grievance.



CHAPTER V  
THE PRESERVATION AND CO-MANAGEMENT OF GWAI HAANAS:  
THE PARK DEAL

"Although the government . . . favoured economic considerations,  
domestic and international pressures eventually persuaded it to change direction . . . coming  
into line with the Haida position."

*Chairperson for CHN Gwaii Haanas Committee (Guujaaw 1988a: 3).*

After the government began to publicly address their grievances, the Haida continued to insist that logging in the Gwaii Haanas/South Moresby area must stop and that the whole area must be preserved. As support for their position continued to grow, the idea of resolving the crisis by turning the area into a National Park Reserve gained stronger support among the public and government. The federal government first researched the option of establishing a park reserve within the region in the late 1970s and discussed the idea with the province prior to the Lyell Island blockade confrontation. For their part, the Haida never advocated the establishment of a National Park Reserve because a park would not necessarily ensure their management of the area and, more importantly, would not resolve the underlying land dispute with the province. However, as support for the park idea grew, the Haida increasingly focussed their political efforts on the goals of preservation and management of Gwaii Haanas -- while trying not to compromise their longer term goal of resolving the land dispute. During the years leading up to the 1990 co-management agreement with Parks, the Haida's continued widespread support-base and the ongoing threat of further confrontation effectively forced the government toward a resolution the Haida could agree with, at least as a short-term solution.

*Unwavering Haida Commitment to Preservation of the Total Area*

The first step in the Haida effort was to convince government and the public of the necessity for preservation of all of the proposed wilderness area. Here a cross-country train caravan proved to be very effective. Plans for this

caravan were made in late December 1985 by Islands Protection Society members Thom Henley and John Broadhead while in Ottawa during an eastern Canada lobbying and fund raising tour. The caravan was to travel from Newfoundland in March, 1986, and to end up in Vancouver around the time that the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) would be releasing its recommendations (E. May 1990: 130-131). Consisting of the Haida elders who had been arrested and a number of the younger Haida activists, and joined by increasing numbers of supporters, the Save South Moresby Caravan turned out to be very effective at drawing good media coverage in each of the major centres. The caravan precipitated rallies in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg and Vancouver. Media interest was heightened by the additional controversy generated by some pro-logging interests from Sandspit making appearances in the cities just ahead of the caravan. It was initially thought that the caravan's success might be placed in jeopardy by these individuals. Instead, rather unexpectedly, this "counter-caravan" soon worked to facilitate the interests of the Haida. In a number of cases both caravans spoke to the same groups of people. The Haida found people coming "on-side" with them rather than siding with the views of the counter-caravan (E. May 1990: 133-134).

During this highly successful caravan the Wilderness Advisory Committee released its disappointing report. The report recommended that the rest of Lyell Island and the Windy Bay watershed be logged, while more southerly areas be preserved. According to May (1990: 139), this report did not please any of the groups involved. The environmentalists welcomed the report in part, because at least some of the area was to be preserved. But the Haida were definitely not satisfied, as the report did not go far enough in preservation of important areas. In contrast, the forest industries were dissatisfied because the report went too far in favor of preservation. The release of the WAC recommendations served to demonstrate the immediacy of the issues presented by the caravan and generated further controversy, interest and discussion.<sup>44</sup> Although none of the above groups were satisfied

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<sup>44</sup> The Haida had initially hoped that the caravan would reach Vancouver in a show of force before the report was released so as to put on further pressure and make it less politically acceptable to come out with a weak proposal like the one released.

with the recommendations, the provincial government voted on May 28th, 1986 to accept the recommendations in principle.

In early June, the case for preserving all of the proposed wilderness area was presented at the Fate of the Earth Conference in Ottawa. The conference planners' goal was to highlight the Haida issue among the other international issues. Guujaaw made a presentation which captivated the people there and brought many of the people more firmly on side with the Haida position.

Nevertheless, on June 9th, 1986, five new logging permits were issued, and logging resumed on Lyell Island. In protest, nine Haida, including Miles Richardson, president of the CHN, renounced their Canadian citizenship. Richardson stated,

The Haida Nation has had involuntary citizenship imposed on our people by Canada. By this decree we the undersigned hereby renounce all the burdens and benefits of Canadian citizenship . . . . It is obvious that Canada gives the health of these lands and waters a low priority. . . . The integrity of Haida culture is threatened as surely as they rip apart our Island. . . [CHN 1986/07/14].

In December, Western Forest Products was given a five-year logging plan approval, a plan premised on the logging of the Windy Bay Watershed (E. May 1990: 160). This approval further fuelled the crisis. In protest, during the winter of 1987 the Haida built a longhouse at Windy Bay in order to protect the watershed. A Haida elder recalls that when the Council of Haida Nations started building the longhouse at Windy Bay they received a letter from the B.C. Ministry of Lands and Forests demanding that they stop building or the government would take court action. The Haida continued to build. After the longhouse was completed, the CHN received a second letter, this time from the Minister for Lands and Forests stating that the longhouse must be dismantled and removed from the area or it would be removed by bulldozer. The CHN wrote back stating that, if the bulldozer was sent, "We will be there to meet you." The bulldozer never came. Later, an informer in the Department of Lands and Forestry told the Haida that when the prospect of another confrontation was communicated back to Victoria, a "high level

letter" came back saying "don't touch that longhouse!" (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1990/08).

The elder interpreted this response from Victoria to mean that, by this point, the government was not willing to risk another public confrontation over that issue. The construction of the longhouse effectively derailed the government from its five-year logging agenda on Lyell Island. In fact, it contributed to the growing provincial interest in coming to an agreement with Canada regarding converting the area into a National Park. Guujaaw outlined the scenario as one in which the provincial government had a clear economic agenda but backed off due to public pressure to accept the Haida position (Guujaaw 1988a: 3).

*Political Capital in Place for Canada/B.C. Negotiations and Agreement*

Shortly after the confrontation over the longhouse, the federal and provincial governments found the political will for serious negotiations. Some negotiations had already been going on since the first formal talks on the matter in June of 1986. By March 20, 1987, the negotiations around the park idea had gained enough momentum that another six-week moratorium on new logging permits was announced. While this was a significant redressive measure, it was significant in a largely symbolic sense -- logging continued on Lyell Island at a feverish pace on the basis of old permits. Companies were reportedly working double shifts and even three shifts a day, probably, according to the Haida, out of fear that their operations would soon be shut down.

The federal and provincial governments continued to negotiate during this time, and after six weeks the federal government managed to extend this moratorium until an agreement could be reached. On July 11, 1987 the two governments reached an agreement and signed a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of a national park for all but the Skedans site of the original wilderness reserve area proposed by the Haida and the Island Protection Society (see Figure 3). With this agreement, all logging was suspended and the process for signing a final agreement was put in place.




FIGURE 3:  
GWAII HAANAS/SOUTH MORESBY NATIONAL PARK RESERVE.  
(Adapted from Map 1 in Canada/B.C. 1988b)

This memorandum of understanding was the major redressive measure in the conflict; Haida were assured that the area would not be logged -- meeting their short term goal -- and they could look toward negotiations with Canada regarding the creation of a National park Reserve. However, consistent with the political goals defined in the early 1970s, a Haida spokesperson, Jim [Gary] Edenshaw (Guujaaw) was quick to point out that they did not want Canadians to lose sight of the fact that the creation of a park reserve did not resolve the land claim issue, and that the Haida expected to have a say in how the park was developed: "We'd rather have a flock of tourists than a flock of loggers. But I'm worried about this. We'll definitely be keeping a close eye. If anything goes on there [that] we don't like, we'll have to be confrontational again" (Cernetig 1987: B12). Earlier Guujaaw had made clear that "Ottawa must talk to the Haida before any national park is established" (*Calgary Herald* 1987/06/05).

The federal government moved quickly to try to include the Haida, and by September 15, 1987 the first draft of a Canada/Haida agreement was made. This agreement, however, was drafted unilaterally by (Parks) Canada and was unacceptable to the Haida -- primarily because it included a ministerial veto on any decision made in the park. Inadequate as this draft was, it did begin the process of negotiations between Canada and the Haida. The Haida responded to this first draft of the agreement by saying that they were not interested in being put into a marginal, limited position where they were basically "yeh sayers" for Parks Canada. In such a situation, they would have no real power. On March 28, 1988, the Haida presented their own draft of a Canada/Haida agreement in which they included claims to sovereignty, and land ownership. These claims were rejected outright by the Justice Department. As a result, a series of revised drafts were submitted in which the Haida attempted to neutralise language without significantly altering content. The document remained unacceptable, as the Justice Department objected to any kind of land claim mentioned in the agreement, stating that Canada alone had sovereignty.

Negotiations between Parks Canada officials and the Haida continued. One Haida consultant reported that in one of these sessions a Parks

representative remarked that the higher level jobs such as park warden would not be available to Haida, as there were not any Haida who would meet the requirements. Insulted, a Haida negotiator retorted, "The only thing we really need to know from you is how you build those outhouses!" (Haida Woman, Haida Leadership, 1989/08/25). The negotiations broke down at this point.

Another attempt to define the role of the Haida in the proposed park area also failed. Concurrent with the above negotiations, the Haida and Environment Canada Officials were working on another document on the "Purpose and Objectives" of the Park. Although it was completed and reached the publication stage, the Justice Department insisted that instead of being released it must be destroyed because certain objectives outlined in the document, like the perpetuation of Haida culture, were unacceptable (Guujaaw 1988a: 4-5).

Canada/Haida negotiations remained stalled at this point, as their positions were very far apart -- allegedly because of the demands of Canada's Justice Department. The Haida had understood that no final agreement between the province and the federal government would be signed until an agreement with the Haida had been reached. Despite this promise, on July 12, 1988, a final Canada/B.C. agreement was signed without Haida consent. By this agreement a "Proposed National Park Reserve" was effectively announced and the go ahead given to begin creating this Park infrastructure on the Islands.

In keeping with this agreement, the government of Canada, acting through the Economic Initiative Planning Committee, further aggravated the situation in September of 1988 by announcing that a local advisory committee be named, and that it get down to the work of planning how the monies in the agreement's "diversification fund" should be spent. The Haida responded by demanding that no initiative with regard to the Park or the diversification fund should be undertaken on the Islands until a Canada/Haida agreement was reached. The Haida position was respected locally (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1988/09/22, 1988/11/10). Parks did not go along with this in any strict sense, but they worked on those initiatives which could be

undertaken at arms length. For instance, at this time a literature review was undertaken, staff was hired and placed on the Islands, and the process was initiated which would change the status from a *proposed* park reserve to a park reserve. Essentially, Parks began their mobilization while holding back on some of the more visible aspects of the park establishment process.

*Haida Apply Further Pressure for Acceptable Canada/Haida Agreement*

The agreement to preserve Gwaii Haanas as a wilderness area was a significant victory in spite of the Canada/Haida stalemate. But as Miles Richardson had stated, the Haida would not recognize the agreement unless their rights in the area were acknowledged: "It takes two to negotiate. It takes two to come to an agreement. . . . We can't sell out the future of our nation for a national park, and we won't" (*Globe and Mail* 1988/07/13). With the Canada/B.C. agreement in place, the Haida applied pressure to gain suitable agreement for park management.

Since talks were still going nowhere with Parks, the Haida simply continued to manage the area themselves. Guujaaw (1988a: 5) described,

We continued to manage the Archipelago, allowing visitors to Gwaii Haanas by special permits, setting out the ground rules and charging a fee. Our people looked after the key sites on a largely volunteer basis. Parks Canada looked on and desperately called us back to the table, citing higher officials on their side and a renewed will to get an agreement with us.<sup>45</sup>

In the fall of 1988 the Haida agreed to more talks but set a deadline by which an agreement must be reached. At this time the Haida also offered another proposal, a redraft of the original proposal with only minimal changes. By this point government had largely come around to accepting the same Haida proposal they had so perfunctorily rejected in the spring of 1988 (Haida Woman, Haida Leadership, 1989/08/25). But an agreement was not reached by the deadline of October 12, 1988, so the Haida suspended negotiations.

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<sup>45</sup> A Parks official explained that at some point the negotiations went higher level, so it may be that, after these rejections by the Justice Department, a shift to higher level negotiators (the deputy minister level for the environment) was made.



During the summer of 1989 the Haida continued their management of Gwaii Haanas and conducted tours through Haida Gwaii Watchmen Tours (established in 1983). One of their management decisions was to close down Hotsprings Island (a hot spring resort very popular with locals, tourists and fishermen), in spite of the fact that it was not a reserve area. This was a move illegal under Canadian law. While justified on the grounds of high levels of bacteria found in the pools, this shutdown was clearly linked to the lack of a management agreement with Parks and, along with the continued mandatory permit system for park visitors, represented the assertion of management autonomy in the area (Haida Man, Haida Gwaii Watchmen, 1989/08/22). A Parks spokesperson interpreted this action in a similar way -- as an assertion of part of the Haida land claim -- stating that Parks could seek an injunction against the Haida closing of Hotsprings Island, but that it would not accomplish the larger term goals of seeking to establish a park. When asked if Parks thought such an injunction would lead to another major confrontation, he agreed, indicating that the threat of continued Haida confrontation was an ongoing consideration in their dealings with the Haida (Employee, Parks Canada, 1989/08/23). While no further progress was made during most of 1989, for the Haida Gwaii Watchmen organization it was a very successful year in which they reached their highest level of operation, employing thirty five people through the summer (Haida Man, Haida Gwaii Watchmen, 1989/08/22).

Late in August, word came that there would be more negotiations in the fall of 1989. According to a Haida man close to the negotiations, when these negotiations resumed, disagreement arose not on the main points of the earlier draft agreement, but on issues such as allowing the Alaska Haida (on Prince of Wales Island) to have rights within the park. As well as including the Alaska Haida in the benefits of the park area, this point was made as a way of protesting the international borders "arbitrarily imposed" on the Haida (Haida Man, Haida Gwaii Watchmen, 1989/11/30) Clearly the negotiation climate was better than it previously had been, and the basic terms of a co-management agreement were established. The agreement began with parallel statements of sovereignty and then went on to talk about the

establishment of a consensus working group. In the case that consensus decisions could not be reached, negotiations would be moved up to the governmental level where the CHN president would talk directly to the Minister or Deputy Minister and try to resolve matters at that level. Essentially, nothing would happen on a disputed issue until consensus or an agreement was reached (Haida Man, Haida Gwaii Watchmen, 1989/11/30; Guujaaw 1988a).

In the spring of 1990 the Haida assembly approved signing the co-management agreement with Parks. This announcement was made to the media. While Miles Richardson was careful to point out that this agreement in no way compromises or deals with the land claim questions (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/05/24), two members of the original group of five leaders hailed the co-management agreement as a very positive step in the right direction and as a great opportunity for the Haida (Haida Leadership, 1990/08/13, 1990/08/09).

CHAPTER VI  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HAIDA IN 1990

The arguments presented in the previous chapters have shown that the Haida exercised a significant degree of autonomy in choosing their confrontational strategies during the effort to stop logging on Gwaii Haanas and in negotiating an acceptable agreement to co-manage the area. Less conclusive are their gains within the Canadian political and economic system since 1966, for, at the same time that they have exercised greater autonomy, structures of political and economic dependency have also been perpetuated.

*Autonomy Gained and Dependency Perpetuated in Gwaii Haanas/South Moresby*

In the agreements concerning the Gwaii Haanas area, gains in Haida autonomy and the perpetuation of dependency are both evident. To have realized fully one of the political goals set out in 1973 is a clear victory for the Haida. But the political goal of resolving the land claim remains unresolved.<sup>46</sup>

The Canada/Haida co-management agreement allows the Haida to co-manage the Gwaii Haanas area by means of a consensus board with Parks. Called the Archipelago Management Board (AMB), its function is to examine all initiatives and undertakings relating to the planning, operation and management of the area. Because it is a consensus board, the Haida have equal control and a veto option for any policy they are against, and can, if they so decide, terminate the agreement at any time by following due process.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Recently, the Haida have formally rejected the land claims process and reversed the land claims language (*Winnipeg Free Press* 1989/02/01). One Haida consultant explained that the Haida are no longer making a "land claim," rather they are disputing the B.C. and Canadian government's claim to Haida land. He said that the Haida considered the Haida Gwaii to be theirs by inheritance from their foremothers/fathers and that this argument would form the basis of any subsequent negotiations. He added that the Haida were not planning to use lawyers or the courts for these negotiations (*Haida Man, Haida Leadership*, 1989/08/02).

<sup>47</sup> The co-management agreement provides for either party terminating the agreement in one year by following due process of a mandatory six-month review and then giving six months notice (Canada/Haida Agreement 1990: Section 8.4).

The Haida have retained rights to use the area for cultural and traditional resource harvesting activities (Canada/Haida 1990: Section 4.1, 8.0, 6.0). Whereas logging in these areas was seriously compromising Haida land and water resource usage, this agreement provides the Haida with a comparatively great deal of autonomy in the preserved wilderness area.

Several central aspects of the deal, however, perpetuate dependency. First, land is transferred from B.C. to the federal government for the establishment of a "park for all Canadians" instead of being transferred to the Haida in settlement of Haida land claims. Second, in the Canada/B.C. agreement Canada conceded with terms ensuring that, even in the future, the lands of Gwaii Haanas cannot be used to resolve a land claim with the Haida. This was accomplished by means of a "reversion clause" which grants that if the land is used for anything but a national park, title reverts back to B.C. at the province's request (Canada/B.C. 1988a: 71-72). Third, Parks Canada AMB board members, like the Haida, have veto power over any management decision. Fourth, the government of Canada can terminate the agreement with the Haida within a year by following due process. These conditions effectively mean that no land claim settlement can be made without B.C.'s involvement. It also means that, barring effective Haida activism, Parks has the right to absolute legal control of the area, should it choose to exercise that right by terminating the co-management agreement. Such a termination would remove the Haida from the Park management process. The area would not cease to be a park but would continue to be managed by Parks Canada indefinitely or until B.C. and Canada agreed to shift to other uses of the area. The present agreement leaves the Haida structurally dependent on the good will of Parks Canada and the federal government.

The Haida have gained in the sense that there is opportunity for significant economic development in their interests, perhaps on a scale unprecedented except within the fishing industry at the turn of the century (which, as was argued earlier, was alienated from the Haida by federal policies favouring industry concentration). While there is potential for economic development for the Haida, economic dependency has been perpetuated; the Haida have secured no economic base from the Parks deal -- again because of

the unresolved land claim, which has implications for Haida employment in the park. Equal rights legislation and the Canadian Constitution take precedence over any regulations which the Haida might want to make by means of the AMB board. Thus, AMB board decisions cannot contradict any other Canadian laws protecting rights of other Canadians or the provincial government. If the Haida had been able to negotiate a land claim with the Canadian government, the land claim agreement would take precedence over any Canadian law, including the Canadian Constitution (Employee, Parks Canada, 1989/08/23). For example, hiring policies could then explicitly require that applicants for jobs within the park be of Haida ancestry, whereas, under the existing agreement, unless argued and justified in reference to the Canadian Constitution, competitions that do not go to internal Parks staff are open to Haida and others on equal ground.

Without an economic base, the Haida remain dependent on Parks Canada for funding and are accountable to them for any initiatives undertaken in the Park area. Some implications of this dependency for the day-to-day operations are already apparent from the summer of 1990, the first in which the Haida Gwaii Watchmen have been operating under this agreement. A manager for the Watchmen spoke of the "mounds of paper work" they were now being asked to process. As manager of the base camp operations, he also spoke about his struggle to get funding for the usual staff of three. Parks considered two staff members to be adequate. He also spoke of the struggle to get an adequate budget for the summer operations. Instead of the requested \$220,000 budget, Parks had offered them a \$100,000 operating budget for the base camps (even though in the previous year well over \$100,000 had been required). The presence of Parks Canada means that the primary option for Haida involvement is wage labour work. Prior to the agreement with Parks, the Haida were generating their own funds with a visitor permit system and an independent tourist operation, also run out of the Haida Gwaii Watchmen offices. Now, except for the possibilities still available on the small reserve areas within the park, the independent economic possibilities are limited.

Economic possibilities could also be subject to damaging competition from fellow Islanders. In fact, non-Haida competition may effectively be encouraged by money made available as part of the Canada/B.C. agreement's 38 million "diversification fund." As "incentive money" to encourage industry on the Islands, it will not necessarily be of any specific benefit to the Haida, and could create more competition between Islanders, encouraging more settlement and more outside business ventures, eventually changing the Haida/non-Haida population ratio and reducing the influence of Haida on the Islands. The Haida have no direct control over these funds as the money falls outside the management scope of the consensus board.

*Autonomy Gained and Dependency Perpetuated in Other Island Areas*

During the summer of 1989, the Council of the Haida Nation had three goals identified as priorities in its Island management program. The first goal was to successfully negotiate a co-management agreement with Parks Canada, as discussed above. The second and third were to address the problem of overfishing in the Islands' sports fishery and to ensure that the Cinola Mine on the Yakoun River not be developed (Haida Man and Spouse, Skidegate, 1989/07/25).<sup>48</sup>

As already discussed, the Council of the Haida Nation made a shift from exclusive concern with Haida land claim matters to active involvement with Island management issues. Haida autonomy in areas of the Islands outside of Gwaii Haanas is based on the CHN commitment to Island management, on its specialized committees monitoring different aspects of the Island economy, and on its Haida Gwaii Watchmen program. Committee specializations include fisheries, forestry, Cinola gold mine, offshore [oil], Gwaii Haanas, and land use (Guujaaw 1988b: 8). The mandate of the Haida Gwaii Watchmen is to implement the management policies of the CHN.

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<sup>48</sup>When asked about the large-scale, land-based logging activities continuing their operations on Graham Island and the northern portion of Moresby Island, the Haida acknowledged that this is a problem, but stated that addressing it is not presently a priority, as it would not be prudent to spread themselves too thin by taking on too many issues simultaneously (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1989/08/08).

During the past decade most Haida Gwaii Watchmen activities have been focussed on looking after the traditional village sites in Gwaii Haanas in order to protect them from misuse by visitors. In a strict sense, the Gwaii Haanas Watchmen initiative began in the early 1980s (although, as discussed in Chapter III, Haida monitoring of industry activities began much earlier). During the summer of 1989 six base camps were being managed by the Watchmen. Since the signing of the co-management agreement with Parks in the spring of 1990, the Watchmen program continues, but watchmen have recently focussed their efforts on the CHN's management initiative in the sports fishery.

### *Fisheries Management Initiatives*

The Haida position with regard to the Island fishery has steadily worsened since 1965 even as their commitment to Island management has grown. As Miles Richardson and Bill Green (1989) have pointed out, three factors have worked to increase CHN concern over the fishery: the mismanagement of abalone stocks; failure of government to protect salmon spawning habitat; and fisheries licensing policies (1989: 250-251). Richardson and Green (1989: 251-254) note that while abalone have been an important part of the Haida economy since prehistoric times, and while a large portion of the abalone removed from B.C. waters are taken from the waters of the Haida Gwaii (36 percent between 1978 and 1984), the Haida have been alienated from this fishery since the imposition of licence limitation in the early 1970s. That is, no Haida person is licensed to fish commercially for abalone. The authors also cite data indicating there has been a 75 percent decrease in the abundance of abalone around the Islands generally and 90 percent in some previously very productive areas such as Cumshewa Inlet.<sup>49</sup>

Regarding the question of protecting salmon spawning habitat, Richardson and Green (1989: 252-253) point to a marked increase in the logging of unstable slopes and the unwillingness of the federal or provincial

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<sup>49</sup>This severe depletion has resulted in a recent Fisheries department announcement of a complete freeze in the abalone fishery (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/11/08).

government to take a strong stand to protect streams near these areas from land slides caused by the logging. The authors go on to document how the 1968 licence limitation program's (Davis plan) devastating impact on the Haida fishery (as discussed in Chapter II) has not been reversed. In particular, the commercial halibut fishery has been completely alienated from the Haida even though the waters of the Haida Gwaii are the most productive halibut fishing area in B.C. As well, "very few Haidas" have a licence for the lucrative salmon fisheries around the Islands. The authors conclude that, "the experience of the Haida nation over the past one hundred years has been one of alienation and destruction of the valuable fishery resources of Haida Gwaii, and increasing powerlessness over the management of these resources" (Richardson and Green 1989: 254).

Primarily as a result of these concerns, the CHN prepared a proposal to gain commercial harvesting and management rights for a few selected fish stocks on the Islands, including abalone in specific areas, row herring for additional spawn-on-kelp production and previously unfished small salmon stocks (Richardson and Green 1989: 254-256). The program was unique in that it was designed to be "experimental and [to] generate information on possible approaches to co-management" (Richardson and Green 1989: 258). But the federal government response was that it could not negotiate any agreement with the Haida until province-wide policies regarding native fisheries were established. When, in 1986, the Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans released a proposed policy paper on co-management and development of native community salmon fisheries, it was considered "completely inadequate" by the CHN. The proposed policy placed emphasis on broad public consultation, a process which the CHN thought would likely stymie any developments due to non-native competition for the fishery; it also proposed only non-binding "consultation" with native groups as opposed to well-defined, representative, decision-making committees. The Haida subsequently withdrew their co-management initiative (Richardson and Green 1989: 258-259).

In the spring of 1990, shortly after a report by a Haida Sports Fishing Commission, the CHN embarked on a new fisheries management initiative,



this time for the sports fishery. Unlike the above proposal, this new initiative was undertaken unilaterally by the Haida after it became apparent that the unregulated Islands sports fishery was impacting on the local commercial fishery by overfishing chinook salmon (Richardson 1990/05/06). Under the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the northwest coast has a total allocation for Chinook salmon taken either by commercial or sports fishermen. In 1989 the total Chinook salmon caught on the northwest coast was 298,000, and in 1990 the allocation was reduced to 264,000. This reduced allocation required reductions in both the commercial and sports fisheries in 1990. During 1989 sports fishermen caught 15,000 Chinook salmon more than their 20,000 allocation, with most of the increase occurring in the CHN designated "Duu Guusd Tribal Park" (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/06/14) (See Figure 4). To aggravate the situation, in 1990 the sports fishing quota was increased rather than decreased, even while the more locally based commercial (troll) fishery saw a reduction in quota.

In response, the Haida-initiated program, focussed on the Duu Guusd Park area, successfully registered 60% of the major fishing lodges by May 30, 1990. The sports fishery in this area is of special concern to the Haida because it contributes little or nothing to the local economy; sports fishermen are flown in and out either directly from Alaska or via the Sandspit airport (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1989/08/08). The program requires that each registrant pay \$10,000. or .5% of the lodge's yearly revenues, whichever amount is smaller (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/07/19). Registered operators must agree to reduce their Chinook salmon catches to one half of those currently required by DFO standards: a daily catch limit of two and a possession limit of four (compared to the DFO's daily limit of four and possession limit of eight). With two boats, five Haida Gwaii Watchmen, based in a longhouse at Kiusta (near Langara Island), are the enforcement component of the new program. In part the Haida justify the enforcement component by the fact that the DFO does not have a patrol vessel in the area, and thus does little or no enforcement of its own regulations (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/06/14, 1990/07/12).




FIGURE 4: DUU GUUSD TRIBAL PARK.  
 This park was established by Council of the Haida Nation in 1981.  
 (Hodgins 1964 and *Haada Laas* 1986: 7)

The Haida initiative has not gone without challenge. In early July 1990, the Watchmen attempted unsuccessfully to force a holdout sports fishing operator to join the program. During the confrontation, an aircraft collided with the Haida's 50-foot canoe. On Friday, July 6th, an injunction against further activism in the area was granted to the operator of the sports fishing lodge. But by Sunday, in a show of support for the CHN, seventy trollers had surrounded the lodge's fishing boat, effectively blockading their fishing efforts that day. A spokesman for the trollers stated that while they did not necessarily support all the Haida views, they supported the CHN position on commercial sport fishing charters and their conservation efforts on the Islands (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/07/12).

While the CHN chose to respect the injunction, President Miles Richardson indicated that the program was going very well, with six out of nine operators cooperating. Referring to the nonparticipants in the program, he added, "Our objective is still the same -- to remove them from the area" (*Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/07/19). This stalemate has been maintained throughout the summer, and a consultant indicated that he expects the CHN will take further action during the fall and winter (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1990/08).

### *Stopping the Proposed Cinola Mine*

Another example of the CHN asserting its Island management role is its response to the proposed Cinola (gold) mine development on the Yakoun River. As outlined by the CHN committee member responsible for opposing the mine, Cinola would be a major threat to the integrity of the river and especially to its role as a major salmon spawning river because of the large concentrations of toxic chemicals which would be employed in the mining process. Estimates indicated that 300 tons of arsenic, 2000 tons of nitric acid, 960 tons of ammonia as well as other chemicals would be used annually throughout the operation of the mine (Collison 1988: 6). A consultant indicated that the proposed mining procedure would pulverize forty million tons of ore in fifteen years. He explained that the company is trying to

convince people in the nearby village of Port Clements that this is a natural process by arguing that they are simply speeding up the processes of erosion. The process, this consultant added, is indeed sped up -- by compacting thousands of years of erosion into three years! The CHN has taken the position that it will not allow the mine to be developed and, so far, has managed to discourage investment in the mine (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1989/08/08; *Queen Charlotte Islands Observer* 1990/05/24).

### *Designation of Other Parks Areas*

The area currently included in the CHN's sports fishery management initiative was designated as a tribal park by the CHN in 1981 (*Haada Laas* 1986: 2). While this designation was made unilaterally by the Haida, it was announced in October at an "All Islands Symposium," which included delegates from eight government ministries, a provincial cabinet minister, and various Island individuals and organizations. The Symposium members petitioned the B.C. Forestry Service and Mines Department to "defer all development plans within the Tribal Park" (*Haada Laas* 1986: 2). In 1982 this land designation was supported by the two major fishing organizations of the Native Brotherhood and the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union (UFAWU), with the recognition that it would ensure future salmon stocks. Since that time, a number of initiatives have been undertaken successfully by the CHN in order to stop mining and forestry developments in the area (*Haada Laas* 1986: 2). The Haida sports fishery management program is the latest initiative within the park boundaries.

What these three initiatives have in common is that they have been undertaken unilaterally by the CHN. Since these initiatives do not have the sanction of the provincial or federal government, they are extra-legal or even illegal under Canadian law and, as such, are based ultimately on confrontation and on the political capital with which the Haida can challenge the Canadian political and legal system (by mobilizing local and national support for their initiatives, for instance, as they did on Lyell Island). The media is of fundamental importance for this kind of activism. One

consultant conjectured that if the Haida could get the media to cover the Langara issue as well as they did the Lyell Island confrontation, then there is a good chance they can get the operators on side (Haida Elder, Skidegate, 1990/08). Again, the extent to which the Haida have autonomy in operating in these areas depends on the perception of their legitimacy, the perceived merit of their policies, the support and the consensus behind them, and their ability to successfully use coercion at strategic times to actually bring dissenting groups into line with their policies.

#### *Other Autonomy/Dependency Considerations*

In addition to the specific changes discussed above, there are a number of other general changes which have facilitated the development of greater autonomy among the Haida since 1965. The primary change has come in the Haida relationship to Department of Indian Affairs. Most significant has been the expansion of the political field of the Haida from its tight encapsulation within DIA in 1965 to that of DIA being just one of the government departments the Haida deal with. The Haida now have ready access to the courts and have a working relationship with the Environment Department (Parks Branch) regarding Gwaii Haanas, the provincial Department of Education regarding the education of their children, and, other provincial ministries with whom they frequently discuss Island economic developments. As well, they administrate their own funds on their reserves, and the main political body representing them -- the Council of Haida Nations -- operates independently of DIA.

Both the Skidegate and the Masset Haida groups have assumed their own administrative duties. The Skidegate Band Council employs thirty-two full time people on a regular basis and more than fifty full time during special projects. The Masset Band Council employs between forty-three and fifty people (Collinson 1989: 10; Pyde 1989:14). As a result of the recent introduction of Bill C-31, which reversed the loss of Indian status for native women marrying non-native men, a major housing construction boom has occurred in both Skidegate and Masset. This program is also administered by

the band councils. In Skidegate, 23 houses were funded for construction in 1989. In 1990 the number of houses funded was somewhat larger. While not all these houses were built for Haida returning in response to Bill C31, a large majority of them were (Employees, Skidegate Band Council, 1989/08/13). This construction boom has resulted in a new residential development on the east side of the village and has infused considerable money and employment opportunities into the reserve in recent years.

To increase their political capital, the Haida also have built numerous alliances: with environment groups in their close association with the Islands Protection Society; with locally based trollers; with federal MPs and provincial MLAs; with many prominent Canadians; and with the media. These working relationships and alliances all contribute greatly to Haida autonomy by making it more difficult for any arm of the government to work directly against Haida interests.

Yet, in spite of this relatively loose encapsulation within the Department of Indian Affairs, it is still impossible for the Haida to deal with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans directly. As Richardson and Green (1989: 258-259) point out, DIA had a formative role in the development of the BC-wide native fisheries policy which the Haida rejected as "completely inadequate" for lack of a significant co-management role for native peoples. Here again DIA policy was consistent with the past in allowing the alienation of the fisheries from native people.

Except for the Gwaii Haanas area, the continuing alienation of the forests from the Haida, and indeed other residents of the Haida Gwaii, has continued. Pinkerton (1981: 133-134) documents how in 1978 the last large PSYU (originally intended for small independent operators) was leased to a Japanese company, who won out over several smaller, local firms. Throughout all but the Gwaii Haanas area, logging continues on a massive scale, with the MacMillan Bloedel operations alone accounting for 425 to 450 employees (Collinson 1989: 9) and for annual clear cut area of approximately 2500 hectares of forest annually, primarily on Graham Island (Guide, Fletcher Challenge Canada, 1989/08/26). The next major area slated for clear cut by MacMillan Bloedel is the northern side of Cumshewa Inlet on Moresby

Island. Fletcher Challenge, the next largest logging company on the Islands, operates on Moresby Island and clear cuts approximately 500 hectares annually (Employee, Fletcher Challenge Canada, 1989/08/11).<sup>50</sup> The Canada/B.C. Agreement allows for the establishment of a fifty million dollar Queen Charlotte Island Regional Development Fund, some of which is earmarked for small business developments (Canada/B.C. 1988b: 2). Until these moneys are spent, their effect on the multinational/mainland-dominated economy, still predicated exclusively on resource extraction, will remain unclear (Ministry of Economic Development 1989: 370).

In conclusion then, the political and economic structures on the Island continue to promote dependency. The Haida remain dependent on the federal government through the Department of Indian Affairs. This is not likely to change unless the Haida land claim is resolved. Without the land and economic base likely to come from such a settlement, the Haida remain economically alienated from the Island commercial fishery, they continue to have only wage labour opportunities in the forestry industry, and, at least in the near future, will have only wage labour opportunities in their association with Parks Canada.

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<sup>50</sup> One of the problems with estimating actual cut rates on the Haida Gwaii follows from the way statistics are calculated for a TFL: calculations are made on a province-wide basis and not specifically for the Islands. The IPS and PAC considered this a major obstacle to monitoring logging on the Islands (Pinkerton 1981: 400-401).

## CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION

According to an analysis of the Canadian nation-state from a political economy perspective, the state performs three basic functions in perpetuating dependency and underdevelopment. First, it facilitates the accumulation (and concentration) of wealth; second, it legitimates (and thereby facilitates the perpetuation of) the unequal distribution of wealth; and finally it preserves the above order by maintaining the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Ponting 1986: 103). This thesis has shown that, throughout this last century, the Canadian and provincial governments exercised all these functions in their efforts to dismantle and contain Haida autonomy in political and economic life. The resulting dependency is understood as arising from policies of the nation-state which favoured the dominant economic interests from the core areas at the expense of the interests in the periphery. It also arises from specific pressures of underdevelopment and dependency on the Haida, arising from the historic annexation of the Islands, the political, legal and economic encapsulation of the Haida bands within the Department of Indian Affairs and other discriminatory policies fostering their economic marginalization.

Since 1966 the state has perpetuated these structures of underdevelopment and dependency among the Haida by not offering redress for its annexation of the Haida land base (by addressing the land claims/dispute issue) or reversing its exploitative economic policies in the Islands' fishing and forestry industries. Instead of addressing these central political and economic issues, the state has, at least for the time being, allowed the Haida to play a more autonomous role in local management, a role which is not guaranteed under Canadian law.

This recent gain in autonomy is predicated on the extensive activism of the Haida including the discriminating and effective use of illegal



confrontational strategies.<sup>51</sup> Not only has a measure of autonomy been gained by these strategies, but it is also maintained by them. With the exception of the Canada/Haida co-management agreement, the increase in autonomy achieved by Haida Island management initiatives is based solely on the ability of the Council of the Haida Nation to rally support (political capital) for its goals. Even in the case of the Canada/Haida agreement, the right of either party to terminate the agreement means that it too is ultimately predicated on the ability of the Haida to maintain the consensus, legitimacy and leadership necessary to remain a potent and respected force in Island politics.

It is reasonable to conclude that, had the Haida not adopted the confrontational strategies they did in 1985, the South Moresby/Gwaii Haanas area would not be preserved nor would the Haida have any co-management role in the area today. A important implication then, is that, due to their relative encapsulation or containment within the Canadian nation-state, natives often have no option but to take illegal confrontational action in order to raise their political agenda. With increasingly potent native resistance to existing political and economic realities in Canada, Canadians may well expect these kinds of confrontations to increase in both number and scale unless addressing their (resource ownership and management related) grievances is made a political priority.

To a large extent, the success of these confrontational efforts require a supportive Canadian public. In order to gain this public support, the role of the media becomes of central importance. When, as in the case of the confrontation at Oka during the summer of 1990, government does not allow the public on the scene, when it curtails native access to the media and thereby controls the information the media has access to, the native perspective cannot be presented in the popular press and their cause is

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<sup>51</sup> I am not arguing that all the changes on the Islands are the result of Haida activism, because changes in the larger society -- notably growing concern for the environment -- have contributed to the Canadian public's receptivity to these changes which in turn have influenced government action. Beyond the alliances formed between the Haida and individuals and organizations within the nation-state, the extent to which external factors contributed to these changes is beyond the scope of this study. Of interest here is an analysis of the degree to which the activist forces of the Haida have been successful in affecting the kinds of change they established as political goals.

severely jeopardized. This kind of repression only intensifies native anger. The study of the strategies utilized by the Haida in their stand at the Lyell Island blockade can be seen as a model of what works, and the degree to which it works, in the contemporary political scene.

Most apparent then is the fact that, while there has been little change in government policy during the period examined, the Haida have changed significantly as a result of their mobilization against undesirable developments on the Islands. They have built formal new political structures such as the Council of the Haida Nation and restructured older ones in order to better deal with the nation-state. They have mobilized support by building local and national alliances and become more adept both at dealing with Canada's provincial and federal politicians and in dealing with Canada's courts. But, most importantly perhaps, they have gained new inspiration for continued struggle as a result of their success on Lyell Island. As an elder stated, Lyell remains a model for future confrontation (Skidegate, 1989/08/08).

This study, then, also suggests the importance of formative, central events which become symbols or reference points for mobilizing a native group into effective action, inspiring and directing them in subsequent endeavours. The same elder spoke of significant moments in recent Haida history which contribute to their preparedness for future confrontations. In particular, he highlighted the importance of building the longhouse and raising the totem pole in Skidegate in 1978, the formation of the 1985 blockade, the building of the fifty-foot Haida war canoe for the Vancouver Expo in 1986, the paddling of the canoe from Vancouver to the Islands in 1987, and to the Alaska Haida at Hydaburg on Prince of Wales Island in 1989. These high points, combined with Bill Reid's significant contribution to the revival of Haida art, have helped to build Haida pride and confidence (Skidegate, 1990/08). Another Haida spoke of a three year "mobilization" prior to the blockade and yet saw the blockade as only a phase in a larger effort: "with Lyell we were crawling, with Langara we are walking and with the Park we will run!" (Haida Man, Haida Leadership, 1990/08/09).

**APPENDIX A****Definition of Purpose Regarding Field Research on the Haida Gwaii  
(As presented to the Council of the Haida Nation)**

1. I would like to get to know some Haida people.
2. I want to develop an understanding of the struggle for Haida Gwaii as the Haida see it.
3. I hope to help in that struggle by working to build awareness among my own people, the Mennonite people -- particularly by working toward jointly organizing some kind of "Seminar on current issues for the Haida" to take place possibly next summer. The content for the seminar should be determined by the Haida. (As envisioned, it might provide an opportunity for interested Mennonite people to come to the Haida Gwaii for a period of about ten days in order to see and learn first-hand from the Haida about the major issues/obstacles to the struggle on the Islands.)
4. My thesis, conducted at the University of Manitoba, is focussed on investigating these same questions. I am seeking the CHN's ongoing approval and am inviting its guidance in this project.

## APPENDIX B

### Interview Schedule

#### *Overview Questions*

What are the major long-term goals of the Haida/ the Council of the Haida Nation as you see it?

When did this struggle begin?

What are the successes which have brought you closer to reaching those goals?

What have been the major disappointments so far in the struggle toward reaching these goals?

What approaches/strategies are the Haida committed to in their efforts to reach these goals?

Why is the government not moving to settle with the Haida?

#### *Questions About Economic Activities*

How would you describe the establishment of the South Moresby Park Reserve?

Would you consider it a success?

What is your opinion about the logging/clear cut logging being done on Graham Island?

The effect on the land?

The effect on the streams?

As a source of income for Haidas?

As a source of income for others?

What is your opinion about the logging/clear cut logging being done on Moresby Island?

How is the fishing industry doing here on the Islands?

Is there overfishing?

Pollution as a result of logging and mining?

As a source of income for Haidas?

As a source of income for others?

What about work in the canneries? How important is it to the Haida?

What about mining?

How much of it is going on? or planned?

What are the dangers/risks?

What is it doing (or potentially going to do) to the fishing industry?  
the salmon?

What about tourism?

How do you feel about more tourists coming over to the Islands?

What does this mean for the Haida? Is it good for them?

What kind of change do you see tourism bringing to the Islands over  
time?

In what other industries, or in what other ways do Haida make a living here  
on the Islands?

### *Concluding Questions*

How do you envision all of this changing when the Haida finally win their  
struggle and regain control over the Islands?

How would life become different here?

How would things change for non-Haida living on the Islands?

## APPENDIX C

### Consultants/Oral References

This thesis research draws on oral sources from primarily two categories. The first category consists of Haida consultants (and their spouses, if applicable). The second consists of (mostly non-Haida) employees of certain companies or organizations. For the Haida consultants, the reference convention adopted includes an indication of sex and age (whether adult or elders/hereditary chiefs. Sex is not identified for elders.); place of residence (unless occupation is considered more important);<sup>52</sup> and the date of the interview. For the second category, employee is indicated (with a more specific title indicated when deemed appropriate); the employers name; and the date of the interview.

#### *Haida Consultants*

##### Haida Man, Council of the Haida Nation

1989/08            Personal Conversation in Masset

##### Haida Elder, Haida Gwaii Watchmen

1990/08            Personal Conversation at Windy Bay.

##### Haida Man, Haida Gwaii Watchmen

1989/07/25        Personal Conversation in Skidegate.

1989/08/22        Personal Interview in Skidegate.

1989/11/30        Personal Telephone Conversation from Winnipeg.

##### Haida Man, Haida Gwaii Watchmen

1990/08            Personal Conversations on Haida Gwaii.

##### Haida Man, Haida Leadership

1989/08/02        Personal Conversation in Masset.

1990/08/13        Personal Conversation in Tlell

##### Haida Man, Haida Leadership

1990/08/09        Personal Conversation on Hotsprings Island, Gwaii Haanas.

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<sup>52</sup>The occupational category of "Haida leadership" is attributed to those consultants who both identified themselves and were identified by others as leaders during the Lyell Island confrontation. In this category are individuals identified as part of the group of five leaders discussed in Chapter III.

Haida Woman, Haida Leadership

1989/07/24 Personal Interview in Skidegate.

Haida Woman, Haida Leadership

1989/08/25 Personal Conversation in Skidegate.

Haida Woman, Queen Charlotte City

1989/08/23 Personal Conversation in Queen Charlotte City.

Spouse of Haida Woman, Queen Charlotte City

1989/08/23 Personal Conversation in Queen Charlotte City.

Haida Elder, Skidegate

1989/08/08 Personal Interview in Skidegate in August.

1989/08/25 Personal Conversation in Skidegate in August.

1990/08 Personal Conversations on the Haida Gwaii.

1990/09/15 Personal Conversation in Winnipeg.

Haida Man and Spouse, Skidegate

1989/07/25 Personal Conversation in Skidegate.

Haida Woman, Skidegate

1989/07/17 Personal Conversation in Skidegate.

Hereditary Chief, Skidegate

1989/08/18 Personal Interview in Skidegate.

### *Employees*

Guide, Fletcher Challenge Canada

1989/08/26 Guided tour and Personal Conversation.

Employee, Fletcher Challenge Canada

1989/08/11 Personal Conversation in Fletcher Challenge Canada Office.

Employee, Parks Canada

1989/08/23 Personal Interview in Queen Charlotte City.

Employees, Skidegate Band Council

1989/08/13 Personal Conversations with Staff members.

Clergy, United Church

1989/08/25 Personal Conversation in Skidegate.

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