

Nayarit and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920

by

Wayne A. Sabeski

A thesis  
presented to the University of Manitoba  
in fulfillment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  
PhD  
in  
History

Winnipeg, Manitoba

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WAYNE A. SABESKI

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of  
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on the relationship between Nayarit and the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920. It combines a local history of Nayarit during this period with an analysis of the effects of the Revolution on the region, including a review of the granting of statehood to the Territory of Tepic in 1917.

The research resulted in the finding that the experience in Nayarit is consistent with the thesis that the Mexican Revolution was an interrupted social revolution. Moreover, the Revolution in Nayarit was less a struggle of the lower classes versus the upper classes, than a bourgeois civil war led by frustrated members of the upper and middle classes. Nevertheless, the campesinos and working class made important subjective gains which eventually led to social change in the 1930s. The initiative to grant statehood to the Territory of Tepic, however, appears to have been an arbitrary political decision that proved to have been untimely for the region.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

At the outset of the Mexican Revolution, Nayarit—which was at that time still the Territory of Tepic—was one of Mexico's more remote regions. Isolated from the rest of the country by a formidable mountain barrier, Nayarit was then, and remains today, a relatively underdeveloped area of low population density. Despite repeated attempts by the authorities in Mexico City to bring this region under central control that date back to the sixteenth century, the western range of the Sierra Madre Mountains which not only traverses Nayarit but constitutes the greater part of it, effectively prevented the region from becoming fully integrated with central Mexico.

The history of the Mexican Revolution in Nayarit has generally been neglected by historians because the region is of minor importance when viewed from a national perspective, and because it was never a major arena of battle in the struggles of the Revolution. Nayarit was, however, militarily a strategically important area of the country, linking the northwestern states of Sonora and Sinaloa to Guadalajara and the center of the country. The revolutionary armies swept through Nayarit on a number of occasions, leaving new


authorities in command in Tepic, in reaction to the frequently changing military and political currents of the day. The region was also the seat of a number of battles and local insurrections that contributed to the larger national experience of the Revolution. Furthermore, Nayarit underwent a change in status during the Revolution, as it incidentally was elevated from the Territory of Tepic to the State of Nayarit by Articles 43 and 47 of the Constitution of 1917.

The main concern of this dissertation will be to focus on the relationship between Nayarit and the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920. It is not exactly a regional study of Nayarit during the Revolution, nor is it limited to analyzing the effects of the Revolution on Nayarit. It is rather a combination of these two tasks in an attempt to capture a sense of the movement of history in this region during the Revolutionary period, as well as to add yet one more dimension to the already complex study of the Mexican Revolution.

The periodization of the Revolution of 1910 to 1920 is based on much more than the symmetry of one decade: it is at the very heart of this treatment, and, indeed, at the very heart of the meaning of the Mexican Revolution. This period covers the national experience of the insurrectionary phase of the Mexican Revolution, and it is the first phase of a larger period of the Revolution from 1910 to 1940. The local experience within the Nayarit region generally was

shaped by external events. While events within the region ran their particular course, the influence of national and international affairs tended to dominate what was occurring locally.

Following the background to the topic provided in this introductory chapter, Chapters II to VI will each present one of the five phases of the Revolutionary period of 1910 to 1920 in Nayarit. The first phase extends from the outbreak of Madero's rebellion against the Díaz regime in November 1910 to the overthrow of the Madero government in February 1913. The second phase covers the Constitutionalist Revolution in Tepic from its origins in the growing opposition to Victoriano Huerta's usurpation of power until the defeat of the Huerta regime in July 1914. The third phase develops with the struggle for power between the revolutionaries, leading to the Revolutionary Convention of Aguascalientes and the eventual decline of the Conventionist governments, and ending with Pancho Villa's defeat in June 1915 by the forces loyal to Venustiano Carranza. The fourth phase extends from Carranza's assumption of power in 1915 and culminates in the Constitutional Convention in Querétaro. The fifth phase covers the Carranza regime from March 1917 until its overthrow in the Agua Prieta rebellion in April 1920, which paved the way for Alvaro Obregón's election to the presidency later that year, marking the end of the insurrectionary period of the Mexican Revolution.



Map 1: Mexico

An examination of Nayarit and the Mexican Revolution in the 1910 to 1920 period draws forth a number of themes worthy of attention. Understandably, the treatment afforded these themes often is limited by the availability, accessibility, and reliability of the research material on the topic. Considering the difficulties in obtaining documentary material on many aspects of the 1910 to 1920 Revolutionary period in Nayarit, and given the scant research done previously on the topic, it is to be anticipated that gaps in the narrative will appear, and not all the questions that arise will be answered satisfactorily.

The central theme to be explored here is that of revolution—specifically, as it occurred in Mexico. The contribution of the Nayarit region to the larger national experience of the Revolution, as well as the effects of the Revolution on the region, are the main focuses of the narrative to follow. The military campaigns of the Federal Army and the various revolutionary armies, rebellions, revolts, protests, petitions, labor unionization, strikes, work stoppages, banditry, prison uprisings, land disputes, conventions, reform legislation, elections: they all were part and parcel of what came to be known as the Mexican Revolution. What happened in Nayarit during the Revolutionary period? How do local events in Nayarit during the Revolution compare with national events? What happened in other areas of the country that affected Nayarit? What were the social condi-

tions in Nayarit before, during, and after the Revolution? What was the ultimate significance of the Revolution to Nayarit?

The period under study was tumultuous for the regional government of Nayarit. The average term in office for jefes políticos (the federally appointed political chief) in the Territory of Tepic, and governors in the State of Nayarit, between 1910 and 1920 (not counting a number of temporary interim replacements who only occupied the position for a few days or weeks), was less than a year. Even establishing who governed in Nayarit during this decade has been difficult. Tracing the formation and dissolution of governments in Nayarit during the Revolution, then, will be another theme to follow. Who was in power, and how did they govern?

A theme that clearly must be considered is the nature of the Porfirio Díaz regime in the Territory of Tepic prior to and during the Revolution. The government of Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz is of particular interest, because he was in charge from 1905 to the fall of the Díaz government in May 1911. Evidence of opposition to the Díaz government or civil disobedience in general before 1911 is worthy of attention; but so too is evidence of support and respect for the regime. What were the prevailing attitudes toward the regime following Díaz's downfall and death? What happened to Porfirian officials in Nayarit during the course of the Revolution?

Fundamental to the research and commentary alike is the analysis of the socio-economic class structure in Nayarit before, during, and after the Revolution of 1910 to 1920. The dominance of the hacendados and the relationship of dependency that defined the rural and urban working classes are basic to the discussion. While there were challenges to the hegemony of the latifundistas, the survival of the haciendas following a decade of Revolution in Nayarit until the agrarian reform of the Lazaro Cárdenas administration in the mid-1930s is an important feature of the Revolution there. Who owned the land, and how did the Revolution affect their interests? What gains were made in agrarian reform? Who controlled industry and commerce, and how were those sectors affected? What gains were made in labor reform and organization?

The arrival of the Revolution in the Territory of Tepic coincided with the arrival of the Southern Pacific Railroad. The hacendados saw great promise in the railroad for economic gain, and this optimism was shared by the Territory's population in general. The operation and disruptions in service, as well as progress on the Tepic to Guadalajara line, are traced through the period. What role did the railroad play in the Revolution in Nayarit? How did the Revolution affect the railroad?

Before the railroad in Nayarit, the only alternative to overland transportation by foot or by animal through the



treacherous mountains was by sea—usually from the port of San Blas. Who controlled trade through the port? What was the role of the port in the Revolution, and how did the Revolution affect San Blas? What effect did the railroad have on the port of San Blas? Was there a rivalry between the railroad and the port, and if so, to what extent were foreign powers involved in a rivalry?

The Territory of Tepic became the State of Nayarit during the Revolution. What caused this change in status? Was there evidence of a political movement or interests that advocated statehood, or was the decision made for political expediency? How did this change affect Nayarit? Did the role of the jefe político in the Territorial government differ from the role of the governor in the State of Nayarit? Had a regional identity developed in Nayarit?

Other levels of government were affected by the Revolution, too, including the various secretariats of the national government, municipal government, and the judiciary. What did the experience in Nayarit reflect about central government policy throughout the various phases of the Revolution? To what extent was the desire for local, municipal autonomy a driving force for Revolution in the Territory of Tepic? What role did the judiciary play in the Revolution? Was there evidence of competition between the various branches of government? What role did federal and State legislative bodies play with regard to Nayarit?

Many of the revolutionaries were anti-clerical, and this had an effect on Church-State relations. How was the Church in Nayarit affected by the Revolution? What was the attitude of the general population of Nayarit toward the Church? What was the popular reaction to anti-clerical measures taken by the revolutionaries?

These various themes will be developed by the narrative to follow, and they will be given further consideration in the concluding chapter. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, and to help focus the discussion, it is appropriate here to elaborate briefly on the basic interpretive outlook and findings of this study.

The story that unfolds in Nayarit in the years following 1910, simply does not support the commonly held thesis that the Mexican Revolution was a victorious, social revolution characterized by the successful overthrow of the Porfirian old regime by the lower classes. It was rather an interrupted social revolution that was for the most part directed by frustrated, but ambitious, upper- and middle-class leaders. While a social revolution began to develop, it was eclipsed by the bourgeois politics and civil war that enveloped Mexico. Not only did the Revolution fail to defeat the capitalist economic and social order, but indeed capitalist production was further entrenched in Mexico, as business interests became more dependent on foreign capital, while foreign interests—especially United States compa-

nies—made significant headway within the country. Moreover, even though labor unions and peasant movements emerged as important forces during the Revolution, the fact that they increasingly were subordinated to the state apparatus effectively neutralized their influence, and virtually incapacitated the threat of revolution from below.

The evidence regarding Nayarit also tends to refute the notion that the region benefited economically or developmentally from the decade of Revolution. Generally, it proved to be a period of economic disruption and decline, placing rigorous demands on resources and ravaging the meager infrastructure that existed at the outset. The decade of Revolution also largely failed to serve any redistributive function for the lower classes, and while some limited gains were made in agrarian and labor reform, on balance the period tended to be substantially regressive.

The experience in Nayarit also challenges the assumption that the revolutionary leaders enjoyed widespread popularity. Madero, Carranza, Obregón, and a variety of lesser revolutionary leaders encountered mixed reactions in Nayarit, and the region generally tended to run counter to the flow of the Revolution. The legitimacy of the new revolutionary state was not immediately recognized by all, and Nayarit was one of the regions in which government authority continued to be challenged extensively, at least until 1920. This wariness proved not to be entirely misplaced, however,

because the performance of revolutionary leaders once they were in office was often repressive and self-serving. Various revolutionary authorities and government departments not only failed to uphold the principles of egalitarianism and social justice that they professed, but often brazenly betrayed Nayarit's lower classes and formed lucrative arrangements with the latifundistas.

Finally there was the issue of statehood for Nayarit. The evidence indicates that statehood was granted to Nayarit not as the result of any regional movement or clamor for this status, but by the whim of the Revolution's First Chief, Venustiano Carranza. The idea of granting statehood to Nayarit had been proposed a number of times before, but it always met with loud opposition from within the Territory of Tepic, as many of its inhabitants recognized the financial burden this would place upon the region's fragile economy. While the inherent virtue of the idea of statehood is undeniable, and the status was likely to have been granted eventually anyway given the emerging regional identity, to have imposed this responsibility on an area whose economy was devastated by civil war and in which pacification had yet to be accomplished, was imprudent of Carranza, and deplorable for the people of Nayarit.

## 1.1 INTERPRETING THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

A brief sketch of the causes and results of the Mexican Revolution, as well as the major movements and classes involved, will lend a setting for events in Nayarit. The Mexican Revolution is open to a wide array of interpretations. Indeed, there are those who deny that the use of the term "revolution" to portray the events in Mexico between 1910 and 1920 is accurate, preferring instead to describe the series of upheavals as a "great rebellion."<sup>1</sup> The prevailing historiography, however, maintains that there was more to the 1910 to 1920 period in Mexico than just disorder and violence. Although interpretations differ widely in their conclusions about the nature and significance of the Revolution, they also tend to concur in revising the so-called 'official' version expounded by succeeding Mexican regimes since, which portrays the Revolution as a victorious, popular struggle in repudiation of a decrepit Porfirian plutocracy.

An appropriate starting point for analysis of the Mexican Revolution is a view of what preceded it—the period of the personal dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, also known as the Porfiriato. The Porfiriato and the Revolution are best viewed as two phases or periods of one historical epoch. Mexico had undergone accelerated capitalist development

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see Ramón Eduardo Ruíz, The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905-1924 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1980).

since the beginning of the Porfiriato in 1876, and indeed since 1867, when the Republicans triumphed over Maximilian, putting an end to the Second Empire. The Díaz regime rigorously implemented a policy of export-led growth stimulated by foreign investment. In order to attract foreign investment and provide a suitable climate for dynamic capital growth, Díaz complimented his economic strategy with policies designed to encourage political stability and centralization. This political process also had its origins in the presidency of Benito Juárez, although the policies of political centralization and pacification were intensified under Díaz. The insurrectionary period of the Revolution (1910 to 1920) disrupted this growth and stability, but the revolutionary regimes that emerged reestablished the commitment to capitalist growth based on political centralization and stability that had preceded the Revolution. While the differences between the Porfiriato (1876 to 1911) and the Revolutionary period (1910 to 1940) are significant, so too are the fundamental similarities between the two periods. As such, the Revolution was not a repudiation of the Porfiriato, but a revised continuation of the same pattern of capitalist development and political centralization that had begun during the Juárez period, and which flourished under Díaz.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Arnaldo Córdova, La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana: La formación del nuevo régimen (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1973), pp. 15-16.

An important development of the latter part of the nineteenth- and early part of the twentieth-centuries was the accelerated expropriation of the peasantry by the hacendados. The hacienda flourished as a result of the laws of the Reforma period, which—in the hope of creating a new class of small landholding farmers—divided the communally held lands of the Indians into small parcels. The latifundios soon absorbed these lands, however, converting the campesinos into peons. Whereas 40 per cent of land suitable for agriculture in the central and southern parts of Mexico belonged to the communal villages following independence, by the end of the Porfiriato peasants owned only 5 per cent of this agricultural land; less than 10 per cent of the peasantry were left owning any land at all.<sup>3</sup>

During the Porfiriato, the colonization laws created the so-called compañías deslindadoras (land development companies), which were supposed to develop uncultivated lands and settle them with foreign colonists who were to retain a third of the lands cultivated as payment for their work. The compañías deslindadoras were owned by a small oligarchy with government connections, and by 1906 they had "developed" one-quarter of the national territory. In fact, this was much more land than had originally existed as unculti-

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<sup>3</sup> Friedrich Katz, "Mexico: Restored Republic and Porfiriato, 1867-1910," in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 5, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 3-78; and Katz, "Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends and Tendencies," Hispanic American Historical Review 54, no. 1 (February 1974), pp. 1-47.

vated land, and the reality was that the companies had used organized violence to despoil Indian communities of their lands. The displaced campesinos were forced to work as peons on the newly formed haciendas.

Another major feature of the Mexican economy during the Porfiriato was the expansion of the railroad. Railroad construction in Mexico dates back to 1842, although only a few kilometers of tracks were laid in the following three decades. The development of the railroads became central to national policy under the presidency of Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada (1872-1876). Lerdo tended to favor English investors over Americans, because of the widespread fear of economic penetration from the United States. Lerdo came under heavy criticism for the advantages that had been granted to the British investors, and on January 1, 1876, Porfirio Díaz's Plan of Tuxtepec deplored Lerdo's railroad policy for having delivered Mexico to foreign investors. Ironically, Díaz, who had criticized Lerdo's policy of allowing foreign concessions to rapidly develop the railroads in Mexico, encouraged foreign investors—especially Americans—by offering subsidies to expand the nation's railroad network. By 1892, railroads connected all of Mexico's important centers, except for the Pacific coast, while similar gains had been made in telegraph communications, which had been developed in conjunction with the railroads.



The man who challenged Porfirio Díaz and forced him from power, Francisco Madero, had no intention of overthrowing the socio-economic system that sustained the wealth of the hacendado class from which Madero himself originated. The Madero rebellion was the result of a political dispute over the vice-presidency. In other words, Madero wanted to succeed Díaz, not overthrow him. When the Díaz regime blocked Madero's electoral campaign for the presidency in 1910 by imprisoning the challenging candidate and repressing his political movement, Madero proclaimed his Plan of San Luis Potosí in which he called for an armed revolt against the dictatorship. The Plan of San Luis Potosí also signalled an important change in Madero's approach to resolving Mexico's social and economic problems. Whereas his platform had previously been limited to political reform as the basis for social and economic development, he now advocated a program for the restitution of those lands that had been unjustly expropriated from the peasantry. While this represented a distinct contrast to the Díaz approach, Madero's agrarian policy was never more than moderate reformism, and he steadfastly defended what he called the "principle of proprietorship."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> On the Madero Revolution, see Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969); William H. Beezley, "Madero: The 'Unknown' President and His Political Failure to Organize Rural Mexico," in Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist Views of the Leaders, ed. George Wolfskill and Douglas W. Richmond (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 1-24; and Alfonso Taracena, Francisco I. Madero, 2nd ed.

The coup that toppled the Madero government was again a political affair, this time orchestrated by the head of the army, Victoriano Huerta. The overthrow of the Madero regime was initiated by General Bernardo Reyes and General Félix Díaz—nephew of the deposed dictator. Their movement represented a conservative reaction to the languishing Madero government. Reyes was killed while leading his troops as they approached the National Palace to arrest Madero. The president commissioned Huerta to quell the rebellion, but Huerta struck a deal with Félix Díaz—with the approval of United States Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson—and betrayed Madero. President Madero and Vice President Pino Suárez were arrested and murdered, and Huerta became interim-president. The civil war that ensued mobilized the campesino and working classes, and resulted in the erosion of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie to the extent that the Villistas and Zapatistas were able to seize power in December 1914. The Villistas and the Zapatistas, however, were two very different movements.

The Villistas were led by Francisco (Pancho) Villa, a former bandit who became a revolutionary leader during the Madero uprising. The Villistas were northerners, many of them originating from La Laguna, an area of Durango which had attracted people of mixed classes and occupations from all parts of the country. They included artisans, laborers, small businessmen, employees, ranchers, miners, peons, cow-

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(Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1973).

boys, muleteers, hired hands, pedlars, unemployed, and bandits. While agrarian reform was one of their goals, the Villistas were less concerned with the dismantling of the haciendas and land distribution than they were with some nebulous concept of social justice for the lower classes.<sup>5</sup>

The Zapatistas, on the other hand, were a south central movement whose center of operations was in Cuautla, Morelos. They were led by Emiliano Zapata, a small landowner who came from a respected family which had in previous generations been leaders of the campesinos in their struggle to regain their lands. The Zapatistas consisted of commonage joint-landholders, peons, muleteers, cobblers, and small farmers. They had a common goal of agrarian reform which was based on collective precapitalist organization. The Zapatistas—unlike the Villistas—had a basic statement of their principles around which to rally, and this was contained in the Plan of Ayala which was issued on November 25, 1911. The Zapatistas also differed generally from the Villistas in that they were consciously opposed to capitalist production.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> On the Villistas, see Córdova, pp. 155-65; El Colegio de México, ed., Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 23 vols. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1977-19—), vol. 4 (1979): La Revolución escindida, by Berta Ulloa, pp. 5-9; Friedrich Katz, "Villa: Reform Governor of Chihuahua," in Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist Views of the Leaders, ed. George Wolfskill and Douglas W. Richmond (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 25-45; and Katz, "Pancho Villa, Peasant Movements and Agrarian Reform in Northern Mexico," in Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution, ed. D.A. Brading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 59-75.

The various revolutionary factions gathered at the convention that was held in October 1914, in the city of Aguascalientes. Lacking strong national leadership and without a revolutionary agenda in place, the Conventionist government which emerged from the Revolutionary Convention of Aguascalientes disintegrated within a few weeks, and the country again was plunged into a civil war from which the Constitutionalists—led by Venustiano Carranza—emerged victorious. Carranza was the Maderista governor of Coahuila, who had previously served as a municipal president during the Porfirian epoch. Carranza's style of leadership was authoritarian, and his policies had a distinctly nationalist character. Indeed, it was probably Carranza's strongly nationalist policies in opposition to the United States incursions into Mexico that allowed him to outmaneuver Villa politically in 1915 and 1916 and gain control of the leadership of the Revolution. Many of Carranza's generals had working-class backgrounds and had served as labor leaders—like Pablo González, Heriberto Jara, Domingo and Mariano Arrieta, Manuel Diéguez, Pablo Quiroga, Juan José Ríos, and Esteban Baca Calderón (the latter born in the Territory of Tepic). Two of Carranza's most important generals, Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles (both of whom were to succeed him in the presidency) had worked as teachers and in minor adminis-

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<sup>6</sup> On the Zapatistas, see Córdova, pp. 144-45; Ulloa, vol. 4, pp. 9-13; John Womack, Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); and Robert P. Millon, Zapata: The Ideology of a Peasant Revolutionary (New York: International Publishers, 1969).

trative jobs before becoming officers in the revolutionary army. Those closest to Carranza, however, were civilians. They tended to be intellectuals and former active members of the radical wing of the Madero Revolution. While the class composition of the rank and file of the Constitutionalists was not much different from that of the Villistas, the leadership was clearly supportive of the bourgeoisie. The Carranza administration, as well as subsequent administrations, restored more and more power to the bourgeoisie, and continued down the path of capitalist development.<sup>7</sup>

When Carranza attempted to thwart the electoral process that was to choose his successor and proceeded to impose a hand picked candidate, a rebellion erupted that drove the president from power, resulting in his assassination. The movement that deposed Carranza was led by a troika from Sonora, which included Alvaro Obregón, Adolfo de la Huerta, and Plutarco Elías Calles. De la Huerta became interim-president, but the prestige that came from Obregón's military victories over Villa helped Obregón emerge as the dominant leader, and he was elected president in 1920. Obregón was an astute politician, and he managed to forge a bonapartist regime that embraced the Zapatistas, labor unionists,

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<sup>7</sup> On the Constitutionalists, see Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 131-32; Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972); and Douglas W. Richmond, Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle, 1893-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

radical liberal reformers, and the bourgeoisie. Revolutionary caudillos were enticed into remaining subordinate to the regime with lucrative business concessions, bureaucratic positions, or even outright bribes. The old bourgeoisie had been critically weakened by the Revolution, and they were unable to challenge Obregón's power. Instead they generally assimilated with the new bourgeoisie of revolutionary caudillos turned businessmen, throwing their support behind the revolutionary government, which in turn benefited business interests by promoting and facilitating capital accumulation.<sup>8</sup>

A seminal work by Adolfo Gilly appeared in 1971, which gave new perspective to the Mexican Revolution. In La revolución interrumpida, Gilly maintained that a revolution occurred in Mexico between 1910 and 1920, but that it was an "interrupted revolution," which failed largely because of the lack of adequate leadership. Despite the eventual collapse of the movement, it cannot be denied that the Villistas and Zapatistas seized power in December 1914, in the name of the campesinos and working class. While the revolution was repressed by the bourgeoisie, who appropriated the

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<sup>8</sup> For a treatment of Obregón's rise to power as a revolutionary general and politician, see Linda B. Hall, Alvaro Obregón: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981).

On the relationship between the revolutionary state and the new bourgeoisie that emerged during the Obregón presidency, see Hector Aguilar Camín, "The Relevant Tradition: Sonoran Leaders in the Revolution," in Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution, ed., D.A. Brading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 92-123.

Mexican Revolution for themselves—capitalizing the "R" in Revolution and deflecting the meaning of the word so that it became synonymous with nationalism—the campesinos and the working class remained strong in 1920, lacking only the right leadership to carry out a socialist revolution. Such leadership eventually emerged with Lazaro Cárdenas in the 1930s, and this resulted in further gains for the campesinos and working class, although the revolution was once again interrupted and remains to be completed. Gilly's objective in writing La revolución interrumpida, however, was not academic, historical research. His objective in writing the book—which was written while he was a political prisoner in Lecumberri Prison—was political; as Gilly, himself, stated: "to explain and understand in order to be able to organize the revolutionary intervention."<sup>9</sup> As perceptive as his work is, however, Gilly's contribution is in the area of the conceptual, not the particular. As such, his interpretive framework may not always serve to explain fully the concrete, specific experience of the Revolution in all regions of Mexico.

According to another influential historian, John Womack, Jr., a more historical conclusion would afford "greater respect" to the bourgeoisie, which clearly was the victorious class in the Revolution of 1910 to 1920, and which has, to date, maintained control. As Womack has pointed out, the

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<sup>9</sup> Adolfo Gilly, La revolución interrumpida: México, 1910-1920: Una guerra campesina por la tierra y el poder, (Mexico City: El Caballito, 1971), p. 410.

Mexican Revolution "amounted to the defeat of the first massive popular struggle against capitalism in Mexico." The Revolution, therefore, resulted not in radical social transformation, but simply in reform. Indeed, as Womack has indicated, far from withdrawing from the international capitalist system, Mexico became even more integrated with foreign capital during the Revolution, especially United States capital. In part, it is this inconclusive result of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920 that has led to the great variety of historical interpretations.<sup>10</sup>

Many of the current revisions of the Mexican Revolution have emphasized the importance of the role of the caudillo. The social forces that struggled in the Russian Revolution were not identical to those of the Mexican Revolution. Analysis of the Mexican Revolution using only the terms of reference that apply to Russia, therefore, leads to confusion. In the case of Mexico, as D.A. Brading has pointed out, "the essential social force which dominated the Revolution was the armed band and its caudillo."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> John Womack, Jr., "The Mexican Economy During the Revolution, 1910-20," in Twentieth-Century Mexico, ed., W. Dirk Raat and William H. Beezley (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), pp. 73-83; and Womack, "The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920," in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 5, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 79-153.

<sup>11</sup> D.A. Brading, "Introduction: National Politics and the Populist Tradition," in Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution, ed., D.A. Brading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 1-16.



Alan Knight has distinguished between the peasants of the Zapatista movement of the South and the serranos (mountain men) of the North, who were a peripheral peasantry. The serranos who followed Pascual Orozco and Pancho Villa were less concerned with land reform than the political autonomy of their communities which increasingly had been threatened by the central government. According to Knight, "vertical (geographical) divisions took priority over horizontal (class) divisions."<sup>12</sup> This explains the blurring of class lines, and the apparent inadequacy of standard Marxian terms of reference to interpret the Mexican Revolution. The Zapatistas were a traditional peasantry with a well defined program for agrarian reform to guide their leadership. The northern revolutionary caudillos, however, had less class consciousness, which led them to political alliances that—upon analysis—appear to have failed the class interests of their rank and file members.

Another reason for the complexity of the Mexican Revolution is that the experience of the Revolution was not the same throughout the country. Different regions had quite different experiences during the decade of 1910 to 1920, and to rely only on a national perspective ignores the complexity of the country and its history. As Luis González y González has pointed out, the development of local history con-

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<sup>12</sup> Alan Knight, "Peasant and Caudillo in Revolutionary Mexico, 1910-17," in Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution, ed., D.A. Brading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 17-58.

tributes to an appreciation of the richness and depth of Mexican history.<sup>13</sup>

While the literature on the Mexican Revolution is quite abundant, and some regions, themes, and personalities have been well researched, study of the Revolution of 1910 to 1920 in Nayarit has generally been neglected. Tracing some of the major themes of the history of the Revolution in Nayarit will add to our understanding of the Mexican Revolution, and, one hopes, will lead to further research into some of the more interesting aspects of Nayarit's history.

## 1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLUTION IN NAYARIT


One of the more important factors that determined Nayarit's role in the history of the Mexican Revolution was its geography. Located on the Pacific coast, and isolated from central Mexico by the western range of the Sierra Madre Mountains, Nayarit's development was retarded by the lack of transportation and communications links. The economic development that modernized the central regions of the country in the nineteenth century did not begin to arrive extensively in the Territory of Tepic until 1910, when the extension of the Southern Pacific Railroad from Sonora and Sinaloa first crossed over the northern boundary of the Ter-

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<sup>13</sup> Luis González y González, Invitación a la microhistoria, SEP-Setentas, vol. 72 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1973); and Nueva invitación a la microhistoria, SEP-Ochentas, vol. 11 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982).

ritory. The disruptions of the Revolution, however, further delayed the completion of the railroad between Tepic and Guadalajara, and this link with central Mexico was not completed until 1923.

The boundaries of Nayarit contain an area of 26,961 square kilometers, and there are three distinct types of geographic regions in the State. The most spectacular of these regions is the western range of the Sierra Madre Mountains which runs from north to south, and which serves as a formidable barrier isolating the west coast region of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nayarit from the central regions of the country. This mountain region is generally barren and inaccessible, and except for its forest products and pockets of mineral wealth, it contributes little to the economy of the State. Crossing the mountains are a number of river valleys running from east to west, which make up Nayarit's second type of region. Many of these valleys are abundantly fertile, and the rivers that cut through them provide irrigation for a wide range of agricultural products. Nevertheless, these valleys are scattered throughout the State, and the mountains isolate them and make their access to markets difficult, thereby reducing their economic potential. Nayarit's third region is the Pacific coastal plain, which runs along the coast from north to south from the Sinaloa border to San Blas. It is an extension of the Pacific coastal plain that runs along the coasts of Sonora and Sinaloa. The



Map 2: The State of Nayarit

coastal plain in Nayarit reaches a maximum width in the Santiago River Valley. Parts of the plain are very rich in tropical agriculture, while the many lagoons along the coast provide good fishing and shrimp cultivation. In addition to these three regions, Nayarit has a few islands off its coast, the most important of which are the constellation of three islands called the Islas Mariás which lie about 160 kilometers off the coast from San Blas. The islands are rugged and lack a water supply. They have been used as a penal colony by the Mexican government, and exploited for the guano deposits found on some of the islands.

Nayarit's indigenous population, which consists of two main cultures—the Coras and the Huicholes—has successfully resisted the "civilizing" efforts of European culture since the epoch of the Conquest, and to this day they remain distinct and separate cultures within the Mexican nation. The Coras and Huicholes, greatly aided by the rugged terrain of their habitat, managed to prevent any widespread settlement of their region until the end of the eighteenth century. The pattern of settlement that developed in the region led to a bitter enmity between the mestizo class—or mixed race, which consisted of people who were predominantly racially Indian, but who had adopted the Catholic religion and the Spanish language and cultural heritage—and the Coras and Huicholes, as the indigenous populations were pushed out of the fertile valleys and into the higher and more barren

mountain regions.<sup>14</sup>

The Nayarit region opened up considerably at the beginning of the nineteenth century during the War of Independence with the expansion of trade through the port of San Blas. Guadalajara had become the principal distributor for Mexico's North West by the latter part of the eighteenth century, and San Blas was its most important port. Moreover, the independence revolution followed by an earthquake in 1820 had either killed or driven away more than half of Acapulco's population, and this further contributed to San Blas's importance.<sup>15</sup> The San Blas-Tepic-Guadalajara trade axis greatly stimulated the economy of western Mexico, and the establishment of a mule train route through the mountains provided the vital transportation and communications links that led to increased settlement in the region. A number of foreigners began to arrive in Tepic from Spain, Germany, Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, and Italy, dedicated to enriching themselves through the exploitation of this newly opened region. The area soon came to be dominated by Barrón, Forbes and Company, which grew to be one of the richest companies in Mexico. High levels of import-export taxes led to the proliferation of smuggling in

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<sup>14</sup> The most comprehensive treatment of the Conquest and Colonial periods in Nayarit is found in Evarardo Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico del Estado de Nayarit, 2 vols., vol. 1: De la Conquista a la Independencia (Tepic: n.p., 1946).

<sup>15</sup> Stanley C. Green, The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823-1832 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), p. 134.

the area, and Barrón, Forbes and Company was apparently the most successful at bribing government officials, thereby reducing its business costs greatly. The repressive tax structure stifled the growth of small businesses, and Barrón, Forbes and Company enjoyed what amounted to a monopoly of the region's economy for much of the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup>

Between 1856 and 1873, Nayarit—which at that time was the Seventh Canton of the State of Jalisco—was controlled by a cacique (local political boss) who had originated from the pueblo of San Luis, Manuel Lozada.<sup>17</sup> Lozada was an outlaw who had been commissioned by Barrón, Forbes and Company to protect the company's contraband trade in silver ingots that left the country through the port of San Blas. Lozada soon began to lead an agrarian revolt in the region, taking

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<sup>16</sup> For a treatment of the history of Nayarit during the nineteenth century, see Evarardo Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico del Estado de Nayarit, vol. 2: De la Independencia a la erección en Estado (Tepic: n.p., 1956).

On Barrón, Forbes and Company, see Jean Meyer, Esperando a Lozada (Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, 1984), pp. 197-218.

<sup>17</sup> On Lozada, see Meyer, Esperando a Lozada, especially pp. 219-56; Meyer, Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias (1821-1910), Sep-Setentas 80, (Mexico City:Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1973), especially Chapter 5, "El agrarismo en acción," pp. 103-15; Meyer, "El ocaso de Manuel Lozada," Historia Mexicana 72, vol. XVIII, no. 4 (April-June 1969), pp. 535-68; Mario Alfonso Aldana Rendón, La rebelión agraria de Manuel Lozada: 1873 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1983); Mariano Azuela, Los precursores, in Mariano Azuela, Obras completas, vol. III (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1964), pp. 636-84; Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol 2, pp. 49-338; and Silvano Barba González, La lucha por la tierra, vol 1: Manuel Lozada (Mexico City: n.p., 1956).

over haciendas controlled by rivals of Barrón, Forbes and Company, and distributing the land to the Coras. In 1857, Lozada's patrons persuaded him to adopt the Conservative slogan "Religión y Fueros" (Religion and Privileges), and he rallied the Coras and Huicholes in the struggle against the Liberals during the Three Years War.

Lozada's domination of the region led to the de facto separation of Jalisco's Seventh Canton from the State. In 1867, President Benito Juárez declared Tepic a Military District, directly dependent on the central government. Although the Lozada revolt was defeated and its leader killed in 1873, the political rivalry between the central government and the government of the State of Jalisco led to President Lerdo's decision not to reintegrate the Seventh Canton with Jalisco despite repeated demands from political leaders in Guadalajara, and in 1884, the Military District of Tepic became the Territory of Tepic.<sup>18</sup>

With the favorable Lerdo administration in power, Barrón, Forbes and Company obtained a concession on December 5, 1874, for a railroad from Mexico to Leon, Guanajuato, to be known as the Central Railroad. When Díaz came to power, however, he nullified the concession for the Central Rail-

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<sup>18</sup> On this and other administrative changes regarding the territory that now comprises the State of Nayarit, see Salvador Gutiérrez Contreras, El territorio del Estado de Nayarit a través de la historia, (Compostela, Nay.: n.p., 1979); and Edmundo O'Gorman, Historia de las divisiones territoriales de México, 5th ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1979).



road's line to León, a line that eventually could very well have been extended to Tepic, considering the extensive investments Barrón, Forbes and Company had in the region.

The first railroad project in the Nayarit region was promoted by Edward Lee Plumb, who represented the International Railroad of Texas. Plumb proposed a line to run from Laredo, Texas, to the port of San Blas, but the project failed to get off the ground. In 1884, the Mexican Central Railway Company began a railroad from San Blas to Tepic, but construction of the line came to a sudden halt at the hacienda of Navarrete, and the project was never completed.

In 1882, the Sonoran Railroad was completed from Nogales to Guaymas. In 1905, the Southern Pacific Railroad, which was owned by the American tycoon Edward H. Harriman, obtained a ninety-nine year concession from the Mexican government to operate a line from Guaymas to Guadalajara. The railroad was placed under the management of Colonel Epes Randolph, a former Confederate soldier who had persuaded Harriman of the economic potential of a railroad line down the Mexican Pacific coast. They were particularly interested in the mineral wealth of Sonora, and the 1,100 kilometer coastal plain that appeared to hold great potential for large agricultural industry. Construction began immediately, and by 1910, construction crews had entered the Territory of Tepic.<sup>19</sup>

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
<sup>19</sup> John H. McNeely, "The Railways of Mexico: A Study in Nationalization," Southwestern Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring

Barrón and Forbes accumulated huge estates through their very successful partnership, and in the 1880s and 1890s the businesses were liquidated and distributed to the heirs. The haciendas and factories that once belonged to Barrón, Forbes and Company were acquired by Domingo Aguirre, and by the turn of the century the Aguirre firm had become the new de facto "owner" of the Territory of Tepic. After having built a financial empire in Tepic, Domingo Aguirre died in 1909, and the company was reestablished as D.G. Aguirre Sucesores.

On the eve of the Mexican Revolution, the Territory of Tepic was dominated by a small group of latifundistas and their managers and lawyers who carried out the day to day operations. The Territory contained 45 large haciendas and 24 small haciendas. There were also 591 ranchos (large farms). D.G. Aguirre Sucesores was the most powerful company in the region, owning most of the haciendas in the Territory's central municipality of Tepic, as well as many large and important haciendas in other municipalities. The family of a former jefe político of the Territory, Leopoldo Romano,

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1964), pp. 1-56; David M. Pletcher, Rails, Mines and Progress: Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 1867-1911 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Robert A. Trennert, "The Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico," Pacific Historical Review 35, no. 3 (August 1966), p. 265-84; Leo E. Zonn, "The Railroads of Sonora and Sinaloa, Mexico: A Historical Geography," Social Science Journal 15, no. 2 (April 1978), pp. 1-15; P.L. Bell and H. Bentley Mackenzie, Mexican West Coast and Lower California: A Commercial and Industrial Survey (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1923); and Mexico, Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, Sonora, Sinaloa y Nayarit (Mexico City: Imprenta Mundial, 1928).



Map 3: Municipalities of Nayarit

**Key to Map 3:**  
**Municipalities of Nayarit**

1. Acaponeta
2. Ahuacatlán
3. Amatlán de Cañas
4. Compostela
5. Huajicori
6. Ixtlán
7. Jala
8. Jalisco
9. Nayar
10. Rosamorada
11. Ruíz
12. San Blas
13. San Pedro Lagunillas
14. Santa María del Oro
15. Santiago Ixcuintla
16. Tecuala
17. Tepic
18. Tuxpan
19. Yesca, La

owned most of the haciendas in the municipality of San Blas, as well as lands in other municipalities. The German firm, Delius and Company, owned haciendas in San Blas and other municipalities. Other hacendados included Manuel Fernández del Valle, Constancio González, Francisco Rivas Gómez, the Menchacas, the Espinozas, and the Romeros.<sup>20</sup>

In 1910, six per cent of heads of family in the Territory of Tepic were landholders. While this is a relatively low figure, the percentage of heads of family who owned land was considerably better in the Territory of Tepic than in States like Oaxaca, Mexico, Puebla, and Tlaxcala where less than one per cent of heads of family owned land.<sup>21</sup> The Territory of Tepic had only begun to open up to large scale land development in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this would explain the higher proportion of landowners in the Territory as compared to those States that had been developed for centuries. Nevertheless, the latifundistas had already begun to absorb the small landholders in the Territory, and by the outset of the Revolution the pattern of land tenure was a growing social problem.

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<sup>20</sup> Territorio de Tepic, Adelantos y mejoras materiales realizados durante la administración del Señor General Mariano Ruiz, Jefe Político y de las Armas del Territorio de Tepic (Tepic: Imprenta del Gobierno [Tepic], 1909), p. 61; and for a list of the owners of the haciendas in the Territory of Tepic, see Tomás Velázquez Galván, Directorio general del Territorio de Tepic, (Tepic: Herminio Torres, 1908), pp. 65-70, reprinted in Pedro López González, Recorrido por la historia de Nayarit, (Tepic: INEA, 1986), pp. 174-75.

<sup>21</sup> Wilfred Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), p. 188.

While various social classes contributed to the struggle, the popular movement for the most part was sustained by the rural, working classes. One must distinguish, however, between the various rural working classes and the distinct roles they played in the conflict.

The peón acasillado, or resident peon, was a comparatively privileged worker, who was permanently employed by the hacienda to work the land and care for the cattle. They tended to remain loyal to the hacendados during the upheavals, and their duties included defending the hacienda from attacks by bandits or revolutionary gangs.<sup>22</sup>

The largest and poorest class on the haciendas were the jornaleros, or day-laborers, who worked temporarily during peak work seasons. They were often residents of neighboring Indian villages who worked on the hacienda for a few weeks at a time, and returned to their native communities when they were laid off. In 1920 there were over 45,000 day-laborers in Nayarit (See Appendix A).

The arrendatario, or lessee, rented land from the hacienda. The lessee often had arrived at this status as a favor from the hacendado in payment for some valued service. The lessees tended to remain allied to the hacendado class, except in some cases where the hacendado rescinded the leasing arrangement, forcing the lessee to accept an inferior arrangement. The lessees aspired to own their own land, and

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<sup>22</sup> Katz, "Labor Conditions," pp. 18-21.

occasionally they did manage to become small land owners.<sup>23</sup>

The medieros, or sharecroppers, were an industrious class who worked hacienda lands for a share of the crop. Their position was very insecure, however, and they were vulnerable to severe exploitation by the hacienda. Advances of corn or money extended to the sharecroppers by the hacienda during the planting season had to be repaid with a 100 percent surcharge. If an animal rented from the hacienda died, the sharecropper was forced to pay full compensation. While their dependent relationship on the hacienda tended to keep them loyal to the hacendado, disputes or abusive treatment at the hands of the hacendados made them a source of recruitment for the revolutionary armies.<sup>24</sup>

The exploitive class structure of Porfirian Mexico was maintained with the help of organized violence. Paul J. Vanderwood's monograph on Mexico's Rural Police Force led him to conclude that the police and the bandits they were hired to pursue both belonged to one and the same group of "highly motivated opportunists."<sup>25</sup> According to Vanderwood, the lines between the rurales and the bandits were blurred from the very inception of the Rural Police Force during the Benito Juárez administration, when the government deliber-

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 24-27.

<sup>25</sup> Paul J. Vanderwood, Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police, and Mexican Development (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981).

ately recruited bandits to fill the ranks of the corps. This phenomenon of police and bandits switching from one side of the fence to the other continued through the Porfiriato and the Revolutionary period of 1910 to 1920, and it was echoed in state, municipal, and private police forces throughout Mexico.

In the Territory of Tepic there was a long history of collusion between the Aguirre company's forerunner, Barrón, Forbes, and Company, and gangs of rebel bandits like that of the legendary Manuel Lozada. These gangs by and large controlled the outlying mountain regions, often in defiance of the national government in Mexico City. Such gangs not only assisted in the smuggling activities, but also were hired by hacendados to serve in the notorious guardias blancas (paramilitary guards; literally, white guards). The guardia blanca, along with the support of the Porfirian regime, allowed the hacendado class to maintain tight control over land holdings despite numerous disputes with campesinos and Indian communities.

There was little industry in the Territory of Tepic in 1910, and much of what there was belonged to the Aguirre company. The two major factories in the Territory were the Aguirre textile factories in Jauja and Bellavista. Together these factories employed approximately 500 people. The company also owned sugar mills at Puga, La Escondida, and La Labor. The Menchaca family operated a panocha factory which



was located about fifteen kilometers south of Tepic. There were two soap factories in the Territory: one owned by Delius and Company in La Palma; and another which had been established in Tepic in 1910 by Manuel F. López.

There was somewhat more diversification in the tobacco industry, where eight small cigar and cigarette manufacturers operated factories employing from one to twenty people in shops located in Tepic, Compostela, Santiago Ixcuintla, and Acaponeta.<sup>26</sup> Tobacco production in the Territory increased substantially around the turn of the century, and it resulted in a corresponding wave of immigration from the neighboring State of Jalisco, between 1895 and 1910, as workers arrived to work in the tobacco fields. Once the railroad linking Tepic to Guadalajara was completed in 1923, Nayarit's share of the national production of tobacco jumped suddenly to over 40 per cent, surpassed 52 per cent by 1930, and is currently over 80 per cent of national tobacco production. This shift in production from Vera Cruz to Nayarit was also caused by the changing tobacco market in the 1920s, with golden tobacco replacing dark tobacco as cigarettes replaced cigars. The introduction of such strains of golden tobacco as Virginia, Carolina, Maryland, and Burley by James

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<sup>26</sup> Bell and McKenzie, pp. 140-41 and 198-202; Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nayarit, pp. 281-83; José González Sierra, Monopolio del humo: Elementos para la historia del tabaco en México y algunos conflictos de tabaqueros veracruzanos, 1915-1930 (Xalapa: Universidad Veracruzana, 1987), pp. 25-26; and Carlos Aguirre Anaya, "The Geographic Displacement of Population 1895-1910: Perspectives in the Study of Urban Systems," Latin American Research Review 10, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 123-24.

Duke's British American Tobacco Company met with great success in Nayarit. Nevertheless, the Territory's lack of transportation facilities before the Revolution—especially the railroad—depressed the tobacco industry.

Given the lack of industrial development, the industrial working class in the Territory of Tepic was relatively small and not very influential. Nevertheless, there was a background of labor unrest in the decades leading up to the Revolution. Workers at the Bellavista and Jauja textile factories worked fourteen to sixteen hours daily. During the peak season, workers were forced to work from 5:00 A.M. to midnight, and they had to eat their meals at their machines in five-minute meal breaks. Workers were regularly kicked and beaten for breaking the rules, and workers who angered the boss were sent to prison, exiled along with their families, or forced into military service. This harsh treatment led to a work stoppage in 1894 in the preparation department of the Bellavista factory, led by Francisca and Maclovia Quintero. Their protest failed to produce any improvement in labor conditions. In 1896, the workers at the Jauja textile factory, opposed to their sixteen-hour work day, asked for a raise in pay. Their request was denied, however, and they were forced to return to their jobs under threat by government authorities.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Enciclopedia Mexicana, 2nd ed., s.v. "Nayarit, Estado de," by Eugenio Noriega Robles; and Miguel García Rodríguez, Bellavista, monumento histórico de Nayarit: Un pueblo obrero en pie de lucha (Tepic: Centro de Estudios Históricos del movimiento obrero de Nayarit, 1986), pp.

On March 20, 1905, the workers at the Bellavista textile factory went on strike. They were led by Enrique and Pedro Elías, Pedro Beltrán, and Quirino Huerta, who professed socialist ideas and had close links with the anarcho-syndicalist Flores Magón brothers. On the morning of the strike, the factory whistle blew at 4:30 as usual to beckon the workers to their jobs. The workers assembled in front of the factory, but they did not enter. Instead they defiantly marched the seven kilometers to Tepic to present a petition to Jefe Político Mariano Ruíz protesting their low wages, abusive treatment, high prices in the company store, and long work day. The workers arrived on the outskirts of Tepic, where they were met by the army. Enrique and Pedro Elías explained the peaceful nature of their march and their intention to continue to Government Palace to present their grievances, but the soldiers forced the workers to disperse and return to their jobs. While it was short lived and resulted only in defeat, the Bellavista strike of 1905 was a clear indication of worker discontent in the Aguirre factories, and it was a prelude to the more tragic strikes to follow in Cananea and Rio Blanco.<sup>28</sup>

As a result of the initiative by the Porfirian regime to create a counterweight to United States influence by encouraging trade with Great Britain, France, and Germany, the foreign sector of the business community grew in Tepic,

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80, 89-90.

<sup>28</sup> García, pp. 94-100.

as it did throughout the nation. The German firm Delius and Company owned coffee plantations and a soap factory in La Palma, as well as the barges and cargo warehouses in San Blas, which gave the company practical control of the port. The German firm also carried out an extensive private banking business, and various large landowners in the Territory were indebted to Delius and Company. At the outset of the Revolution, Maximiliano Delius was an influential member of Tepic's business elite, while Eugenio Hildebrand, who was also associated with the firm and was the German Consul in the Territory, was president of the Tepic Chamber of Commerce.<sup>29</sup>

Foreign investment in the Territory continued to arrive mainly from the United States. Americans had been investing in land along the Mexican west coast in response to plans to build the Southern Pacific Railroad. The Mexican west coast was important to the United States not principally as a market, but as a field of investment, especially in mining and lands. Being contiguous with the rapidly developing American southwest, the Mexican west coast was viewed by American investors in the years leading up to 1910 as a frontier. Wealthy Americans purchased large tracts of good land at relatively cheap prices in the hope of turning a profit eventually when land prices rose. As a consequence of the Revolution, these investments largely proved to be less suc-

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<sup>29</sup> Katz, Secret War, pp. 50-91; Bell and McKenzie, p. 255; and Lucifer, Tepic, May 5 and 10, 1911.

cessful than anticipated.<sup>30</sup>

A plan for Japanese colonization to develop the Compañía Agrícola Tepiqueña in the Santiago Valley was begun in 1910. This project was scuttled by the Japanese government with the arrival of the Revolution, when that government refused to grant visas to its citizens because of the chaotic conditions in Mexico.<sup>31</sup>

According to the census of 1910, the population of the Territory of Tepic was 171,173 (See Table 1). This population was reduced to 146,093 by 1921, largely as a result of out migration to other parts of the country. Most of the population was concentrated in or near the larger towns like Tepic, Santiago Ixcuintla, Ahuacatlán, Ixtlán, and Compostela.<sup>32</sup>

According to a poverty index compiled by James W. Wilkie, Nayarit was a relatively poor region during the revolutionary period. In 1910 the percentage of the population living in communities of less than 2,500 was 76.1 percent. By 1921 this percentage had changed somewhat, to 68.8 percent, but the predominantly rural character of Nayarit still prevailed. The percentage of the population speaking only

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<sup>30</sup> Bell and McKenzie, pp. 166-67; and John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

<sup>31</sup> Bell and McKenzie, p. 167.

<sup>32</sup> Gutiérrez, p. 96.

TABLE 1  
TERRITORY OF TEPIC: POPULATION BY DISTRICT, 1910

District	Male	Female	Total
Tepic	21,811	20,525	42,336
San Blas	3,090	2,870	5,960
Islas Mariás	1,287	297	1,584
Santiago Ixc.	11,891	11,416	23,307
Acaponeta	16,577	15,624	32,201
Ahuacatlán	10,352	10,794	21,146
Ixtlán	10,487	10,127	20,614
Compostela	8,595	7,179	15,774
La Sierra	4,722	4,193	8,915
TOTAL	88,812	83,025	171,837

SOURCE: Salvador Gutiérrez Contreras, El Territorio del Estado de Nayarit a través de la historia, (Compostela: n.p., 1979).

an Indian language was 7.5 percent in 1910. In 1921, this percentage had decreased to 3.5, indicating perhaps that closer links with the Indian communities had been forged when the revolutionary bands were forced into the mountains by the Revolution. In 1910 the rate of illiteracy in Nayarit was 74.5 percent. By 1921 it had changed to 65.2 percent of the population.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910, 2nd ed., rev. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 208-19, 234-36, and 296.

Data published by the Mexican Department of Vital Statistics indicates that almost three-quarters of the population were "raza mezclada" (mixed race) by the end of the Revolution (See Table 2). Those classified as "raza indígena" (Indian) made up about one-fifth of the population, while those classified as "raza blanca" (white) constituted less than six percent of the population. These statistics are more a reflection of the lifestyles of the groups referred to than a measure of the biological racial characteristics. For example, many of those classified as mixed race may well have been genetically Indian, but their integration with mestizo society caused them to be included in that group. Likewise, some of those classified as white may in fact have been of mixed race, but their caucasian features allowed them to pass as white; or, conversely, some of those classified as Indian may have had some race mixture, but their lifestyle and membership in an Indian community led to their classification as Indian.<sup>34</sup>

According to a list compiled in 1916, there were a total of 236 foreigners residing in the Territory of Tepic (See Table 3). All but two of these foreign residents were males. The majority of the reported foreign residents were listed as being Chinese (43.2 percent); Spaniards were second (19.9 percent); Arabs third (11.9 percent); Germans fourth (7.6 percent); Japanese fifth (5.9 percent); and Americans were surprisingly—considering that the United

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<sup>34</sup> Mexico, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nayarit, pp. 69-70.

TABLE 2  
NAYARIT: POPULATION BY RACE, 1921

Classification by Race	Population	Percentage of Total
Mixed Race	107,312	73.45
Indian	29,773	20.38
White	8,518	5.83
Other or Unknown	100	.07
Foreigners	390	.27
TOTAL	146,093	100.00

SOURCE: Mexico, Departamento de Estadística Nacional, Sonora, Sinaloa y Nayarit (Mexico City: Imprenta Mundial, 1928).

States is a neighboring country—sixth, with only 3.8 per cent, or nine residents.<sup>35</sup>

Thus stood the Territory of Tepic on the eve of the Mexican Revolution. While the Nayarit region held great potential for investors, expanded economic development of the region could not occur until the basic transportation links with the rest of the country were in place. The Territory of Tepic in 1910 was imbued with a sense of anticipation, and the arrival of the railroad epitomized this sense of hope and progress. It is not likely, though, that anyone

<sup>35</sup> Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, November 30, 1916, with attached document, "Lista nominal de los extranjeros residentes en el Territorio de Tepic," Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Gobernación, Período Revolucionario, (cited hereafter as AGN-GPR), 220/90.



TABLE 3  
FOREIGN RESIDENTS BY NATIONALITY, 1916

Nationality	Number of Residents	Percentage of Total
Chinese	102	43.2
Spanish	47	19.9
Arab	28	11.9
German	18	7.6
Japanese	14	5.9
American	9	3.8
Turkish	8	3.4
English	3	1.3
French	3	1.3
Colombian	1	0.4
Italian	1	0.4
Chilean	1	0.4
Syrian	1	0.4
TOTAL	236	99.9

SOURCE: "Lista nominal de los extranjeros residentes en el Territorio de Tepic," November 30, 1916, AGN-GPR, 220/90.

imagined that another, even greater force followed so close behind those first Southern Pacific Railroad locomotives—the dawning Revolution.

## Chapter II

### THE TERRITORY OF TEPIC AND THE MADERO REVOLUTION, 1910-1913

#### 2.1 THE DAWN OF REVOLUTION

As the year 1910 got underway, there was little to indicate that a political and social upheaval was in store for the Territory of Tepic. There were great expectations for change in the Territory, but those hopes revolved around the Southern Pacific Railroad which was being extended south from Sinaloa, through Tepic, and eventually on to Guadalajara. Tepic's latifundistas and commercial classes awaited the prosperity that they expected would arrive with the railroad link to central Mexico and the United States.

In January 1910, more than 20,000 spectators attended the inauguration of the Territory's first train station located in the northern town of Acaponeta. Railroad officials promised that the Territory's capital, Tepic, would have rail service by the end of the year.<sup>1</sup> Land prices in the Territory began to rise as a result of speculation, and within the previous two years, at least three major land transactions involving American purchasers had been negotiated.<sup>2</sup> The giant D.G. Aguirre Sucesores company, which obvi-

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<sup>1</sup> Lucifer, January 8, 1910.

ously stood to gain the most from the development of the Territory, had already donated the materials and manpower for the construction of an electric light system in the city of Tepic, and in June 1909, the company proposed the construction of a \$20,000 waterworks system for the city, at the company's expense.<sup>3</sup> This largesse was probably motivated less by a sense of noblesse oblige, however, than by the fact that the company's plans for expansion surpassed the government's means to finance such projects.<sup>4</sup>

Amid the excitement that had been unleashed by the arrival of the railroad in the Territory, however, came a sobering voice. In November 1910, the Tepic newspaper Lucifer published a series of articles that had appeared in El Progreso Latino, criticizing the attitude that had been taken by a number of foreign newspapers, in particular Vossische Zeitung from Berlin, regarding the enviable development and prosperity that these foreign newspapers speculated would arrive in the Territory with the construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad. The German newspaper had allegedly reported that the railroad would make the "extraordi-

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<sup>2</sup> Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Tepic, Memorial elevado por la Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Tepic al H. Congreso del Estado de Nayarit, pidiendo sea reconsiderada la Ley Hacendaria de Marzo 1 de 1918, (Tepic: Imprenta Ruiz, 1918), located in AGN-GPR, 266/22.

<sup>3</sup> All references to monetary values using the "\$" sign are in Mexican pesos, unless otherwise noted. Monetary values expressed in United States dollars will be followed with "(U.S.)" to specify the currency.

<sup>4</sup> Lucifer, July 9, 1910.

narily costly" improvements to the port of San Blas less of a necessity. The articles from El Progreso Latino, however, questioned the assumption that the railroad automatically would be beneficial to the Territory of Tepic, and alleged that the Southern Pacific Railroad carefully had avoided San Blas in order to make the distance between the railroad and the port considerably longer in order to squeeze more money out of producers by obliging them to turn to the more costly railroad freight service.

The author of the articles in El Progreso Latino referred to an article that had been written by Willis J. Abbot, published in the American monthly magazine Cosmopolitan in October of that year, which had provided a detailed account of the tactics and practices of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company in southern California. According to Abbot, the citrus fruit producers of southern California were being forced to pay freight rates that were six times higher than before for the transport of their fruit to New York and other eastern markets, resulting in an annual rail freight cost of four million dollars. The Pacific Mail Steam Ship Company, which belonged to the same company as the Southern Pacific Railroad, no longer stopped in the California ports of San Pedro and San Diego, in order to prevent having to load citrus fruit products, thereby obliging producers to turn to the more expensive rail freight service. Under such combinations, the railroads were allegedly

obliging producers to pay freight rates that were 250 percent higher than they would have paid in an open competitive market.

The articles from El Progreso Latino agreed that the port of San Blas was in poor condition, but denied that the improvements would be costly. Reference was made to an estimate that had been prepared three years earlier at the government's request by navy engineer Alejandro Cerizola, that included the dredging of the port to remove sand and sediment, the revetment of the beach with loose stones, and the construction of a 300 meter long jetty. According to the estimate, the total cost, "including a handsome profit for the contractor," came to \$1 million, and it would turn San Blas into a first class port. This was compared to the \$15 million that had been invested in the port of Manzanillo, and \$48 million that had been invested in the port of Salina Cruz, Oaxaca. Mention was also made of the generous federal government subsidies that had been extended for the construction of the railroad. Nevertheless, while the improvements to the port of San Blas were deemed to be relatively inexpensive, the author of the article argued that the funds would have to be supplied by the federal government because the Territory of Tepic was in no position to finance such a project. The articles concluded by describing the port of San Blas and the railroad as "questions of life and death" for the Territory, and it was stated that

Tepic had been waiting since it had become a federal territory in 1884, for the federal government to attend to the Territory's most urgent needs.<sup>5</sup>

In November 1910, Tepic was introduced to another new means of transportation, and while this mode of transportation did not at that time hold the promise of economic development that the train did, it no doubt added to the excitement of the day. C.E. Johnson, a wealthy American businessman from Nevada, arrived in Tepic from San Blas in what was described by the local press as a "beautiful" automobile. In February 1911, Johnson, accompanied by his chauffeur, made the first trip from San Blas to Mexico City by automobile.<sup>6</sup>

Despite this ambience of change, however, there was little to suggest that politically this was also a time of the end of an epoch, and the beginning of a period of Revolution. There was scant evidence in Tepic of political opposition to the Porfirio Díaz regime. In July 1910, for example, the delegates to the Territory's electoral college gave overwhelming victories to the candidacies of President Porfirio Díaz and his vice-presidential running mate Ramón Corral.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Lucifer, November 12, 16, 19, and 23, 1910.

<sup>6</sup> Lucifer, November 26, 1910; and Evarardo Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico del Estado de Nayarit, vol. 2, pp. 488-89.

<sup>7</sup> Lucifer, July 13, 1910.

Labor leaders Enrique and Pedro Elías, who represented Bellavista as electoral delegates, threw their support behind Madero for the presidency and Francisco Vázquez Gómez for the vice-presidency. The Elías brothers were persecuted for their dissidence, and reportedly almost became victims of the notorious ley fuga (an execution legally justified by a sham escape attempt by a prisoner). The Elías brothers had been associated for several years with the anarchosyndicalist Flores Magón brothers and their Mexican Liberal Party, as well as the Gran Círculo de Obreros Libres (Great Circle of Free Workers) that had been formed in 1906 by radical textile workers in Río Blanco, Veracruz. The fact that they had longstanding links with such anarchosyndicalist organizations does not mean necessarily that the Elías brothers were as radical, for unlike the anarchists and socialists who tended to be anti-Maderista, they actively supported Madero.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile elsewhere in the country Madero's campaign for the vice-presidency began to gain momentum, and his slogan "Effective Suffrage—No Reelection" was received enthusiastically by the crowds who turned out to see the diminutive candidate. Díaz had Madero thrown in jail in San Luis Potosí, however, and Díaz and Corral went on to triumph at the polls. Madero escaped to the United States, and upon his arrival in San Antonio, Texas, he issued his Plan of San

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<sup>8</sup> García, p. 131; Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 125; and Hart, Revolutionary.

Luis Potosí.<sup>9</sup> The Madero rebellion, however, had little success initially, and Madero left for Europe. Nevertheless, in Chihuahua, Pascual Orozco and Francisco Villa began to rebel, and Madero returned from Europe in February 1911. Madero succeeded in convincing Orozco and Villa to adopt the Plan of San Luis Potosí, and the Madero Revolution began in earnest.

One of the first indications in the Territory that an armed revolt had erupted appeared on February 25, when the Tepic newspaper Lucifer, a dedicated supporter of the status quo, reported that the frequent rumors of "imaginary uprisings" that recently had been running through the Territory, were caused by alarmists whose ends were pure sensationalism. The newspaper admitted that peace had been ruptured in other States of the Republic, but insisted that tranquillity still reigned in the Territory of Tepic.

On March 8, Lucifer reported that the mobilization of small detachments of troops in the Territory had led to popular speculation that the revolt had spread to Tepic. The newspaper as much as admitted that the speculation was well founded, for it commented that the rebels were nothing more than "bad patriots" led by ambitious people who were intent on destroying the order and peace that had been established by the "glorious" President Díaz. According to Lucifer,

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<sup>9</sup> For a copy of the Plan of San Luis Potosí, see Jesús Silva Herzog, Breve historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 2 vols., vol. 1, Los antecedentes y la etapa maderista, (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960), pp. 157-68.



these agitators were arming "hosts of ignorant men" to attack the army, which the newspaper insisted deserved respect because it was the "guardian of our democratic institutions." Nevertheless, Lucifer reported that Tepic was demonstrating its great love for the Fatherland because its inhabitants were still engaged in "fruitful and honorable work."<sup>10</sup>

The first major insurrectionary incident of the Revolution in the Territory of Tepic occurred in Ixtlán del Río on March 18, 1911. Historian Evarardo Peña Navarro, resident of Ixtlán and participant in the uprising, claimed that the Revolution in the Territory of Tepic began "not with a group, but that the community in mass rose up to the cry of 'Viva Madero!'" Since that day, the Porfirian authorities were no longer recognized by the residents of Ixtlán, who instead organized to defend themselves from attacks by government forces. Peña Navarro maintained that Ixtlán was noted for the complete unity that there had always been between all of its social classes, but that in March 1911, "the ties were tightened more and everyone considered themselves to be members of one family." Peña Navarro has overstated the unanimity of the Madero Revolution in Ixtlán, because there were elements of the population who were repulsed by these events and who clearly supported the Díaz regime. Nevertheless, within the historian's statement about the complete unity of all the social classes is con-

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<sup>10</sup> Lucifer, February 25 and March 8, 1911.

tained an important and accurate characterization of the Madero Revolution as being a political rebellion rather than a social revolution typified by class warfare.<sup>11</sup>

From the government's perspective, the situation continued to deteriorate. On April 11, Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz, who was also military commander of the Territory, advertised for volunteers to join the army. The term of duty was to be six months in duration, and the soldiers were to be paid a wage of \$1 per day. Another response by the Ruiz government was an initiative to have the pavement tax in the Territory rescinded. The tax had been an unpopular one in Tepic, and moreover it had been a difficult tax for the revenue department to collect. Ruiz also resorted to the censorship of Tepic's newspapers, which resulted in the suspension of publication of El Tepiqueño, a newspaper which had refused to follow the dictates of the jefe político.

Meanwhile, because the Southern Pacific Railroad ran the risk of having to pay penalties according to the terms of their concession contract with the Mexican government, construction on the railroad continued as though everything were normal. Moreover, Madero and his family had longstanding connections with major United States business interests including E.H. Harriman and the National City Bank, owners of the Southern Pacific Railroad. There was no sense that the Madero Revolution was necessarily a threat to the South-

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<sup>11</sup> Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 489.

ern Pacific Railroad, and the company apparently was content to remain aloof from the civil war in Mexico. On April 16, 1911, the first crew of workers who were to begin construction of the railroad from Magdalena, Jalisco, to Tepic, which would link Tepic with Guadalajara and the center of the country, were sent from Guadalajara. The workers reportedly were being paid a minimum wage of \$1.25 per day. The formidable Barranca region which consisted of a 28 kilometer stretch of treacherous ravines, would require a series of tunnels and bridges, and a reported \$8 million had been budgeted to span this natural barrier. Nevertheless, during the month of April, the revolt resulted in the destruction of two bridges in Sinaloa, between Mazatlán and El Rosario, located near the Tepic border. The railroad company immediately set out to repair the bridges in order to keep the line in service.<sup>12</sup>

In the latter part of April, the Sinaloan port city of Mazatlán was placed under seige by a force of more than 1,500 Maderista rebels. Rather than risk casualties by attempting to seize Mazatlán, the Maderistas were satisfied with isolating the port city, cutting its electric power lines, telegraph lines, and water supply. The rebels captured El Rosario and La Bayona, located on the border of Sinaloa and Tepic, and they began to extend their control over the northern part of the Territory. Violent distur-

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<sup>12</sup> Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, p. 245; and Lucifer, April 19 and 22.

bances had also been reported in the area around the communities of Tecuala, San Felipe, and Palos Blancos. In Santiago Ixcuintla, there were also signs of discontent, and the residents there demanded the removal of the political prefect.<sup>13</sup>

The Maderista rebellion also advanced in the eastern part of the Territory. Ixtlán del Río remained under the control of residents sympathetic to the Madero Revolution. In early May, a squad of about fifty rural police approached the town in an attempt to reestablish government authority. A militia of four hundred residents rallied to defend their town, however, and the rurales were forced to retire without having attacked.<sup>14</sup>

Because he had been compelled to send much of his scarce manpower to the outlying areas of the Territory, Ruiz was left with few men to guard installations in the capital city, and on May 1, an uprising took place at the penitentiary in Tepic. A group of inmates attacked a guard during the regular inspection, stabbing him to death and taking his rifle and ammunition. The inmates then attacked the interior sentinel, killing him and taking his rifle. They began to shoot at the other guards, but the guards succeeded in overcoming the inmates, and order was restored. Eighteen inmates were killed and twenty-five injured, while casual-

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<sup>13</sup> Lucifer, April 26, 29, and May 3, 1911.

<sup>14</sup> Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 489.

ties to the soldiers and penitentiary employees included three killed and five injured. Rumors immediately arose that the jefe político had ordered the execution of the leaders of the prison uprising, and Ruiz responded with assurances that the prisoners involved would be tried in the courts in accordance with the law. On May 4, Ruiz issued a statement to the prisoners advising them that he had been informed that the inmates were planning another uprising. The jefe político warned the prisoners against repeating their attempted escape, insisting that he had sufficient forces to put down any uprising. Nevertheless, the incident demonstrated that Ruiz's forces in the Territory were being spread thin.<sup>15</sup>

On May 2, Amatlán de Cañas was occupied by rebel forces under the command of Ramón Romero, who originated from San Marcos, Jalisco. The archive in Amatlán de Cañas was thrown into the street and set on fire. The rebels forced the sub-prefect to dance on a portrait of Vicepresident Ramón Corral, while shouting vivas to Madero. When Romero and his men ventured onto one of the principal haciendas of Compostela, however, they were pursued by the rural police and forced back to the State of Jalisco.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Lucifer, May 3 and 6, 1911; El Regional, Guadalajara, May 9, 1911.

<sup>16</sup> Lucifer, May 20, 1911; El Regional, May 9, 1911.

On the evening of May 4, the news spread across Tepic that the Maderistas had been sighted on the outskirts of the city. Soldiers manned the rooftops of public buildings and the towers of the cathedral, and they passed the night waiting for the enemy which did not arrive. The local newspaper Lucifer attributed the sightings to "alarmists" and assured the residents of the city that there was nothing that should lead them to believe that the city was threatened by any uprising. The next day, Ruiz issued a public manifesto declaring that he had received word from Mexico City assuring him that the negotiators from the opposite sides of the national conflict had arrived at an accord that would end the civil war. The jefe político asked for calm from the citizens of Tepic, and he assured them that the garrison was alertly guarding the security of the area.<sup>17</sup>

In early May 1911, amid the ambience of insecurity provoked by the Maderista rebels and the prison uprising, a group of influential Tepic citizens began to promote the idea of forming an urban police force for the city of Tepic. The proposed police force was intended as an organization of civil defense, and it was supposed to remain completely apolitical. Tepic Chamber of Commerce President Eugenio Hildebrand convoked a public assembly on May 6 in the meeting hall of the Miguel Hidalgo Mutual Society, for the purpose of forming the city police force. The meeting was well attended by the Tepic public. Hildebrand presided over the

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<sup>17</sup> Lucifer, May 6, 1911.

meeting, and lawyer Roberto Valadez, attorney for the Aguirre company, read the proposal to the audience. A number of questions arose over the nature of this police force, and they were fielded by Valadez. An organizing directive council was elected at the meeting, although a number of objections to the form of this election had been raised. The ten man council elected at the meeting was heavily weighted in favor of the latifundistas and the business community, who had propelled the hasty implementation of the city police force in order to ensure their control over the organizing directive council.

Significantly, the resolution that spelled out the general bases of the police force not only stipulated that the force was to remain "independent of all political questions or content,"—a regular feature of the general bases proposed for such municipal police organizations—but went to great length to specify the duties of the city police in the event that Tepic was placed under seige by a rebel group. Clearly Tepic's latifundistas and businessmen could sense the demise of the Díaz regime, and were making contingency plans to deal with the Maderistas. In case of such a state of seige, it would be the duty of the city police force to venture outside the city to engage the rebel group in negotiations in order to prevent bloodshed. In the event that the government decided to resist, the city police corporation would be restricted to "defending the life, honor, and

interests of Commerce and the families within the city from vandalism." While the police force was ostensibly apolitical, the class affiliation of the corporation was fixed in favor of the latifundista and business classes that had proposed it. While an element of loyalty to the Díaz regime was still evident, the upper classes were plainly leaving the door open in the event of change.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, the Maderistas continued to strengthen their positions in the northern part of the Territory. On May 8, rebel forces under the command of Martín Espinosa engaged in battle with federal soldiers at La Bayona, on the south side of the Cañas River. On May 9, Tecuala was taken by the rebels. The following day, Acaponeta was placed in a state of panic by rumors that the rebels had arrived. The rumors proved to be premature, however, and tranquillity was restored in the town.

On the evening of May 16, a number of residents of Santiago Ixcuintla, discovering that the garrison and the federal employees had abandoned the city, spontaneously began to seize power. In the process, however, the doors to the

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<sup>18</sup> See Lucifer, May 10, 1911.

The group responsible for proposing the police force consisted of Municipal President Carlos Castilla, Maximiliano Delius, Esteban Gangoiti, Domingo Hormaechea, Eugenio Hildebrand, Agustín Menchaca, Fermín Maisterrena, Roberto Valadez, Manuel Varela, and José Vargas. The ten man organizing directive council consisted of the following people: Eugenio Hildebrand, Roberto Valadez, Fermín Maisterrena, Agustín Menchaca, Vicente Rosales, Marcos Ibarra, Trinidad García, Eutimio Arreola, Pedro Patrón, and Atilano Uribe.



city jail were opened, and this led to a spree of vandalism and the looting of pawn shops and other businesses. One of Santiago's latifundistas and leading businessmen, José O. MENCHACA, attempted to quell the disorder, but realizing that his words were having no effect, he sent for help to reestablish order in the city. At about 10:00 P.M. a group of Maderistas arrived and took charge of the situation, closing the city's saloons. The instigators of the anarchy were about to be shot immediately, but pleas from women and influential people of the community succeeded in having the punishment reduced to incarceration, until the rioters could be tried formally. The Maderistas proceeded to appoint new local authorities for the city.<sup>19</sup>

Anticipating the arrival of the Maderista rebels, and obviously worried by the news of the outbreak of anarchy in Santiago Ixcuintla, many of Tepic's most affluent families suddenly left the Territory's capital city.<sup>20</sup> Another sign

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<sup>19</sup> Lucifer, May 10 and 20, 1911; El Regional, May 24, 1911.

<sup>20</sup> Lucifer, May 17 and 20, 1911.

A number of these affluent families travelled to San Blas for passage by steamship to the United States, including Leopoldo Romano and family, Esteban Gangoiti and family, Mr. and Mrs. Agustín MENCHACA, Francisco Rivas Gómez and family, Doctor Benjamín Wallace, Gervasio Sarría and family, and Domingo Hormaechea and family accompanied by Fermín Maisterrena's small children. The administrator of the Puga hacienda, Julián Sarría, left for Spain via San Blas, as did Fermín Maisterrena, Jr., who reportedly was going to attend one of the principal colleges in that country. Others went to Guadalajara, including Mr. and Mrs. Gonzalo Gangoiti of the D.G. Aguirre Sucesores company, and Doctor Salvador Quiñones. José Somellera Rivas left for San Blas accompanied by his family. The reason given for the move by Somellera was

that the Maderista occupation of Tepic was imminent, was that Baltazar G. Peña, president of the Compañía Guayulera de Torreón and an influential leader of the Maderista movement in the Territory, was admitted as a member of the prestigious Casino Club in mid-May. Moreover, on May 17, the interim secretary of Government in Tepic resigned, and was replaced by Juan Martín del Campo.<sup>21</sup>

Government forces had recaptured Ixtlán del Río, but on the evening of May 14, the town's Maderistas once again revolted. The following evening the doors of the city jail were opened and the prisoners set free. The courthouse was sacked, and its archive and furniture were thrown into the street and set on fire. While businesses were reportedly left untouched, the funds from the Revenue Office were stolen. On May 17, the rural police force arrived and reestablished control, but the following day they were driven out of Ixtlán by the Maderistas under the command of Ramón Romero.<sup>22</sup>

On May 18, a number of young men from Ahuacatlán, apparently encouraged by the success of the revolt in Ixtlán, attacked the rural police force posted in that town. However, the young men were inexperienced and had few weap-

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"to attend to his broken health and by medical prescription."

<sup>21</sup> Lucifer, May 10 and 17, 1911.

<sup>22</sup> Lucifer, May 17 and 20, 1911; El Regional, May 18, 23, and 24, 1911.

ons, and they were easily defeated by the police. Twenty-two died in this futile attempt. When the residents of the neighboring town of Ixtlán heard about this massacre, they rallied to the aid of their allies in Ahuacatlán. Before they arrived, however, the rurales, along with the town's prefect, had fled for safety to Tepic.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile, in the northern part of the Territory, the rebels took control of the Aguirre hacienda of Chilapa. Various residents of nearby Tuxpan reportedly met with the Maderistas, although the results of the conference were unknown in the capital because the telegraph operator had abandoned the town, severing communications between Tuxpan and the rest of the Territory. In response to this insurrectionary activity, Ruiz concentrated the majority of the garrisons of the Territory in the capital to await the expected rebel attack.

Apparently the civil strife in Mexico had not yet dissuaded the Grant Brothers Company, the firm in charge of the construction of the Southern Pacific Railway, from proceeding with its task. Company spokesman S.L. Wakulewicz declared that work would continue on the project to the end. Supplies for the work gangs had entered the Territory through San Blas, and 1,500 construction workers were reportedly toiling without regard to the civil war that was

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<sup>23</sup> Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, pp. 489-90; and Lucifer, May 24, 1911.

taking place throughout the country.<sup>24</sup>

On the night of May 21, thirty men from the rural police force stationed in La Yesca rebelled because of the danger their commander was exposing them to against a numerically superior enemy. This prompted their commander to flee to Hostotipaquillo where he sought shelter in the home of the town's municipal president. The rebellious rural policemen then rode to Plan de Barrancas near the border of Jalisco and Tepic, where they joined Ramón Romero who was waiting there with an army of about 500 men.<sup>25</sup>

In Acaponeta, a group of citizens ventured out of the city to meet with the rebel forces under the command of Martín Espinosa in order to come to an agreement on an orderly evacuation by the federal forces, and occupation by the rebels. They arrived at an arrangement, and the federal forces peacefully left Acaponeta. Espinosa's rebel army, which numbered about 1,000 men, immediately occupied the town. The residents were not harmed in the least, although the principal businessmen of Acaponeta were forced to provide "small loans" to the newly appointed authorities.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile, Díaz and Madero had arrived at an agreement for an orderly exchange of power, and this facilitated a peaceful entry of the Maderistas into Tepic. On May 23,

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<sup>24</sup> Lucifer, May 17 and 20, 1911.

<sup>25</sup> El Regional, May 23, 1911.

<sup>26</sup> Lucifer, May 20, 1911; and El Regional, May 24, 1911.

Mariano Ruiz received a message from the Ministry of Gobernación (Ministry of the Interior) informing him that a peace treaty had been signed, and ordering him to advise all the government dependencies, as well as the revolutionary leaders, about the arrangement. Ruiz was advised that a cease fire was in effect, and he was ordered to fight only in self-defense in the event that a rebel gang should fail to respect the treaty.<sup>27</sup>

The following day, by an arrangement that had been worked out between Jefe Político Ruiz and Maderista commander Martín Espinosa, the Maderistas who had been camped at the haciendas of Puga and La Escondida occupied Tepic. The revolutionary column consisting of over one thousand men on horseback rode up Lerdo Street led by Espinosa and the other commanders, arriving at the city's main square at about 5:00 P.M. They took possession of the government offices, and Maderista spokesman Baltazar Peña delivered a public address from the balcony of the building, advising the residents of the change in power, and assuring them that personal guarantees and political rights would be extended to all citizens. The speech was received with a delirious ovation and shouts of "Viva Madero!"

While the Maderistas were occupying Tepic, the federal troops, the rural mounted police, the territorial police, and other Porfirian authorities were abandoning the city.

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<sup>27</sup> Lucifer, May 24, 1911.

The army formed a column near the public cemetery, while the two police corporations formed a column along Mina Street. When they were joined by the rurales who had been relieved of their guard duty at the penitentiary by the Maderistas, they set out immediately toward Ixtlán and on to San Marcos, Jalisco, where they boarded trains to Guadalajara.<sup>28</sup> It was a rather anticlimactic ending to the Porfirian epoch in Tepic, as in the rest of the country, resembling more a changing of the guard than a revolution, and a telling sign of what was to follow.

## 2.2 JEFE POLÍTICO MARTÍN ESPINOSA

The news about the capitulation of the Díaz regime, and the arrival of the Maderistas in Tepic, signalled a completely new attitude toward Madero by the Tepic newspaper, Lucifer. This change in attitude did not arrive unannounced, for the newspaper commented: "Don Francisco I. Madero, the madman of six months ago, the dreamer, the ridiculed one, is today the prophet, the apostle, the liberator." The newspaper's editorial went on to confess that its staff, like most people, had been too "myopic" to perceive Madero as anything more than a quixotic figure burdened by the weight of his own ideals, and had failed to appreciate that soon he would become the hero and saviour, the David who slew the giant. Nevertheless, Lucifer did not suddenly

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<sup>28</sup> Lucifer, May 28, 1911; Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 490.

begin to malign the fallen giant, Díaz. He was still referred to as "illustrious" and the "great President," and reference was made to the "splendid days of glory" that the newspaper insisted Mexicans would never forget.<sup>29</sup>

Upon arriving in power in Tepic, Martín Espinosa lost no time in setting out to establish his authority in the Territory. On May 25, he issued a proclamation that the revenue offices would only be collecting one-half of the taxes that had previously been levied. The sale of alcoholic beverages was strictly prohibited, and infractions to this rule were deemed punishable by thirty- to ninety-day jail sentences or fines of from \$100 to \$500.<sup>30</sup>

On May 26, a group of Maderistas made a request to the revolutionary leaders to free the prisoners held in the penitentiary. The prisoners were set free and given \$5 each to prevent their having to turn to crime to survive, but they were also warned that if they returned to a life of crime they would be punished by an automatic death sentence, without the possibility of appeal. That same night one of the prisoners who had lost no time in returning to his criminal ways, was apprehended and shot immediately.

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<sup>29</sup> Lucifer, May 24, 1911.

<sup>30</sup> "Aviso," by Martín Espinosa, May 25, 1911, published in Lucifer, May 28, 1911.

The initial reaction to the Maderistas by many of the residents of the city of Tepic was unfavorable. These residents had become nervous because the Maderistas patrolled the streets of the city with weapons in hand. Some residents were obliged to provide the new government with "forced loans," and allegations were made that the Maderista soldiers had appropriated horses and saddles throughout the city. Businesses were presented with government vouchers without having received prior assurances that they would be reimbursed by the new government. One prominent Tepic businessman refused to honor the vouchers, and he was placed under arrest and brought before Espinosa for disobedience. These tensions between the government and the community prompted Espinosa to issue a public proclamation guaranteeing civil and property rights.<sup>31</sup>

In Ixtlán del Río, Martín Espinosa's cousin, Isaac Espinosa, attempted to impose "forced loans" and appropriate weapons, ammunition, and horses, but he was opposed by a group of forty citizens on horseback and sixty others on foot who forced the Maderistas to back down on these demands. In the neighboring town of Ahuacatlán, Isaac Espinosa had reportedly imposed a \$2,800 "loan" on the town's businessmen, but the businessmen organized and sent a telegram to Interim President Francisco León de la Barra complaining about such extortive practices. Apparently the

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<sup>31</sup> El Regional, June 2, 1911; and Lucifer, May 28, 1911, including "Proclamation" by Martín Espinosa, May 27, 1911.



president notified Martín Espinosa, who in turn ordered his cousin to stop collecting such "loans" because the bank had since been ordered to release funds for the sustenance of the troops. In the communities of Compostela, San Pedro Lagunilla, Santa María del Oro, and Tequepexpan, however, the residents who had been obliged to pay "forced loans" to another squad of Maderistas failed to escape the extortion, and those unfortunate residents who had been forced to hand over their horses, saddles, and weapons to the Maderistas apparently were never able to recover their property.<sup>32</sup>

In early June, 101 men from the Territory's police force under the command of José Natividad Alvarez, arrived in Tepic. A few days after their arrival, however, fighting reportedly broke out between the territorial police and the Maderista soldiers as a result of lingering bitterness over past encounters between the two groups. In another incident, the police commander made the mistake of dramatically stepping on a picture of Madero while rebuking one of his troops. Martín Espinosa ordered his arrest, but the police commander managed to escape into the mountains.<sup>33</sup>

Despite the unsteady start, Espinosa established order in the Territory within a matter of weeks, presumably because of the widely recognized legitimacy of the Maderista movement. Many of the Maderista rebel soldiers began

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<sup>32</sup> El Regional, June 4, 1911.

<sup>33</sup> El Regional, June 17, 1911.

returning to their homes and their former occupations within days of their entry into the capital. By mid-June, about 1,500 Maderistas had been retired from service. The soldiers received retirement pay of from \$3 to \$40 each, while officers received between \$100 to \$300. Telephone and telegraph lines were soon functioning once again, and the mail service was back to normal. Repairs to the damaged railroad bridges were begun immediately in order to restore rail traffic as soon as possible. The newspaper El Tepiqueño, which had been closed down by orders from General Ruiz, resumed publication, while another newspaper by the name of La Chispa announced that it would begin daily publication.<sup>34</sup>

The Maderistas lost no time in establishing electoral procedures in Tepic. On the evening of Sunday, May 28, a public assembly was convened in the Porfirio Díaz Theater to elect the members of the ayuntamiento of Tepic. Maderista leaders Martín Espinosa and Baltazar Peña attended the meeting and were greeted with applause and enthusiastic vivas from the crowd, which reportedly represented all the social classes. Carlos Castilla was elected president of the ayuntamiento.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Lucifer, May 28, 1911; El Regional, June 17, 1911.

<sup>35</sup> See Lucifer, May 31, 1911; El Regional, June 2, 1911.

Other aldermen elected at the meeting included Alfredo Naraváez, José Vargas, Manuel Varela, Quirino Ordaz, Francisco Flores, Gregorio Huerta, and José María Menchaca. On May 29, the ayuntamiento nominated Fernando S. Ibarra to serve as secretary of the corporation.

On June 16, the Benito Juárez Club was formed in Tepic for the purpose of supporting the candidacy of Francisco I. Madero for the presidency, and Francisco Vázquez Gómez for the vice-presidency—a slate that never would come to pass. A bi-weekly newspaper, La Tribuna, was also established to serve as a means of propaganda for the club. At about the same time another organization, the Francisco I. Madero Popular Club, was formed for the same purpose.<sup>36</sup>

In mid-June, Martín Espinosa was appointed jefe político of the Territory of Tepic. Around the same date Baltazar Peña, who had been second in command of the Maderista forces in the Territory, left for Torreón, and later proceeded to Mexico City. Apparently Peña was arranging the formation of a new business that was to be established in the Territory, but while he was in Mexico City he died of a sudden illness. Another Maderista supporter, Rafael Buelna, was appointed secretary of Government by Espinosa, but Buelna soon left this position to return to law school in Culiacán, Sinaloa.<sup>37</sup>

Martín Espinosa soon established ties with the Territory's upper classes, most importantly with the Aguirre company, and by mid-July everything appeared to be back to normal in Tepic. Many of the most influential landowners and busi-

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<sup>36</sup> Lucifer, June 17 and 21, and July 19, 1911.

<sup>37</sup> Lucifer, June 21, and July 22, 1911; and José C. Valadés, Las caballerías de la Revolución, new ed., (Mexico City: Leega-Júcar, 1984), p. 25.

nessmen had returned from their conveniently scheduled trips abroad, and once again the exclusive Casino Club was the center of banquets held in honor of the jefe político and members of the business elite. Most of those who attended were familiar names from the Porfirian epoch: Eugenio Hildebrand, Agustín Menchaca, Francisco Rivas Gómez, Leopoldo Romano, Gervasio Sarría, Doctor Carlos Fénélon, José Octavio Menchaca, and other members of the local business and professional establishment. The only changes were those of the new political elite, such as Jefe Político Martín Espinosa, and Colonel Rafael Buelna. The jefe político, who only a few months earlier had been disparaged and feared as a rebel and a bandit by these same members of Tepic's upper classes, was now admitted as a member of the Casino Club.<sup>38</sup>

The community of German citizens living in Tepic, led by German Consul Eugenio Hildebrand, resumed efforts to build stronger business ties between the Territory and their European homeland. An operating room that the Germans had intended to donate to the Territory as an improvement to Tepic's hospital in commemoration of Mexico's centennial the previous year, had been delayed because of difficulties in importing the materials from Europe. However, in an official ceremony on July 30, Hildebrand formally presented the operating room to Jefe Político Espinosa.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Lucifer, July 19, 22, and 26, 1911.

<sup>39</sup> Lucifer, August 2, 1911.

Relations between the Espinosa government and the United States, however, were somewhat more complicated. A complaint was lodged with the American Embassy by United States citizen William Lemke, who claimed that the American Agricultural Company, a United States based company that he represented, had been violently despoiled of land by Jefe Político Martín Espinosa. The land at issue was the La Bayona hacienda located near the Sinaloa border, and according to Lemke's estimate the land was valued at \$100,000. The dispute centered around Lamberto Cabañas, a Maderista supporter and owner of three-eighths of the La Bayona hacienda. The American Agricultural Company had apparently purchased the rights to the land from Cabañas's partner, but Cabañas had refused to allow Lemke's company to take possession of the land. The jefe político sided with Cabañas, however, and the American Agricultural Company was advised by Espinosa to turn to the courts if it intended to pursue the case further.<sup>40</sup>

The exit of Mariano Ruiz from the Territory was followed by a number of land claims by people who allegedly had been cheated by the former jefe político. The Tepic newspaper Lucifer, which had often defended and lauded Ruiz while the general was in power in the Territory, changed its tune by the middle of June 1911. Lucifer now claimed that Ruiz had "cost the Territory dearly," and the newspaper characterized his style of government in Tepic as having been akin

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<sup>40</sup> Lucifer, July 29, 1911.

to the way soldiers were ordered around in barracks. Lucifer plainly stated that during his administration such ranches as San Pablo, La Galinda, Chapalilla and others had been appropriated by Ruiz "without legal right." Ruiz was also accused of having forced loans arbitrarily from private citizens and municipal governments to finance his projects. The newspaper applied the slogan "Corruption, Lies, and Oppression" to describe Ruiz's government in Tepic, and it asserted that his administration had "passed into history like a stained page."<sup>41</sup>

In mid-June, there were reports that former Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz had been designated to be the new jefe político of Baja California Sur. Opposition to this appointment was voiced in the Mexico City press, as well as in Tepic, where Lucifer referred to Ruiz as having been an "arbitrary governor and a demoralizing element in the administration, who caused many damages to Tepic." As it turned out, however, Ruiz failed to receive the position in Baja California Sur, and by August he was actively supporting the candidacy of General Bernardo Reyes for the presidency. In the past, there had been animosity between Ruiz and Reyes, but with the current alliance between Porfirio Díaz's nephew, Félix Díaz, and Reyes, Ruiz now threw his support behind Reyes. Apparently in retaliation for Ruiz's support of the Reyes candidacy, a court martial was ordered for the charge of having abandoned his post in Tepic on May 24, when the

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<sup>41</sup> Lucifer, June 14, 1911.

Maderistas occupied the city. In September, however, Bernardo Reyes withdrew from the presidential race. By October 1911, many more land disputes were registered with the courts in connection with ex-Jefe Político Ruiz. Nevertheless, the government of the Territory was reluctant to act until the Madero government had been elected and installed in Mexico City.<sup>42</sup>

One land claim involved the lands of Camotlán in the municipality of Ahuacatlán, which were being disputed between former Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz and Manuel Espinosa Monroy. The dispute dated back to the Porfirian period when Manuel Espinosa Monroy claimed he had purchased the land in 1897 from the Fregoso family. The land deal was allegedly ratified in 1904, but in 1905, Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz sent the case to the courts for resolution, at the request of the ayuntamiento of Ahuacatlán. The ayuntamiento claimed that the sale of the land by the Fregoso family had contravened a condition that had been set on the land which prevented the alienation of this homestead land until it had been paid for. In 1906, the court granted Espinosa Monroy title to the land, but he had been unable to take possession of it because it had since been occupied by campesinos who enjoyed the protection of Jefe Político Ruiz. The campesinos, who based their land claim on ancient titles dating back to the Colonial period, were supported by the district

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<sup>42</sup> Lucifer, June 24, August 12, September 13, 23, 27, and October 7, 1911.

judge of Ahuacatlán, and in 1911, despite repeated attempts by Espinosa Monroy to have his Supreme Court injunction placed into effect, the campesinos maintained possession of the land.<sup>43</sup>

Another land dispute in this period involved the Higuera Gorda ranch near the community of San Pablo in the remote municipality of La Sierra. According to Andrés Muñoz, the title to this ranch, which he claimed he legitimately had inherited from his family, had illegally remained in possession of General Ruiz, who had despoiled him of his property. Muñoz claimed that José Natividad Alvarez, whom Muñoz described as having been a "fawner of the ex-jefe político, and cacique of the community of San Luis," had interested Ruiz in obtaining the ranch. When Muñoz and a neighboring landowner, Bonificio Mojarro, refused to sell their ranches because the price offered was insufficient, Mojarro was allegedly poisoned to death and Muñoz was forced into hiding. Muñoz retained Manuel Espinosa Monroy as his legal counsel to reclaim the land, but when Mojarro was encountered dead, Ruiz ordered Muñoz arrested in connection with the slaying.<sup>44</sup>

In Mexico City, a civil suit was filed against Ruiz by Santiago Larios, former editor of a defunct Tepic newspaper, El Eco de Tepic. During the Ruiz administration, Larios had

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<sup>43</sup> Lucifer, June 14, July 22, 26, August 19, 23, 26, September 2, 6, 9, 27, October 7, and 14, 1911.

<sup>44</sup> Lucifer, October 4, 1911.



been chased out of the Territory by the jefe político and forced to seek asylum in Mexico City. While in the nation's capital, Larios was arrested on March 4, 1911, at the request of Ruiz and by orders of Félix Díaz, who was at that time chief of police in Mexico City. Larios was accused of desertion, despite his never having been a member of the military. When Larios demonstrated his case, he was set free, but a few days later he was arrested once again, this time accused of fraud. Again he was set free by the court. As soon as Ruiz was forced out of the government of Tepic, Larios filed a suit against the ex-jefe político for slander, but as Ruiz had since become a member of the Chamber of Deputies, it was not possible to proceed with the suit. Larios petitioned Congress to have Ruiz expelled from the Chamber, and as there were other damaging cases against the ex-jefe político, speculation arose that the expulsion proceeding would be acted upon as soon as the Chamber's commission was convened once again.<sup>45</sup>

On October 21, Ruiz, in his capacity as deputy from the Territory of Quintana Roo, presented an initiative to reform Article 43 of the Constitution to elevate the Territory of Tepic to a State. The establishment in the Territory, however, satisfied with the status quo which provided the Territory with subsidies and protection from the federal government, was clearly opposed to the idea of statehood, and the news about this initiative brought immediate protest

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<sup>45</sup> Lucifer, October 11, 1911.

from Tepic. Municipal President Carlos Castilla telegraphed the deputies representing the Territory of Tepic advising them that the ayuntamiento of Tepic "energetically" protested Ruiz's initiative, and commented: "The ex-jefe político of this Territory does not cease to cause harm to a population that curses his dreadful administration." As it turned out, Ruiz's initiative was rejected by the Chamber, and one can only speculate on his reasons for having presented such an initiative. Perhaps the former jefe político hoped to bolster his image, both nationally and within the Territory, and thereby influence the legal proceedings and land claims that had been initiated against him. Perhaps he hoped to cut short the administration of Jefe Político Martín Espinosa by making the top political office an elective one, and he may even have aspired to seek election as governor there. On the other hand, Ruiz's motives may have been purely vindictive, and he may have been acting out of a feeling of betrayal by the Tepic establishment with whom he had until recently been aligned.<sup>46</sup>

In December, Ruiz issued a claim for reimbursement for a number of material improvements that had been made during his administration in the Territory of Tepic, alleging that they had been paid for from his own personal funds. Ruiz's claim was reprinted in the local newspaper Lucifer, and it scandalized the community. In response to Ruiz's request,

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<sup>46</sup> Lucifer, October 28, 1911, which quotes Castilla to Diputados del Territorio de Tepic, October 25, 1911; and November 18, 1911.

Martín Espinosa advised Secretary of Gobernación Abraham González that the ex-jefe político's claims were completely unwarranted. In some cases the material improvements had been done without authorization, and in other cases—such as the construction of telephone lines and repairs to government buildings—the costs had either been paid by donations from the hacendados or had come from the government budget.<sup>47</sup>

Meanwhile, labor discontent in the Aguirre textile factories had reached the point that the workers were prepared to take collective action. On September 4, workers from the Jauja factory presented a demand that their weekly wage of \$2.25 be increased by thirty-six centavos. The director of the factory refused to grant them the increase. What occurred next is not entirely clear, for there are conflicting reports. One source has claimed that the workers were fired, while Lucifer reported that the workers walked off the job and presented their demands directly to the Aguirre administrators. According to a suspiciously rosy report by Lucifer, the company not only yielded to the workers' request, but exceeded it by granting them a full fifty centavos a week. The newspaper commented that the company deserved "sincere applause for its noble action."<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Lucifer, January 6, 1912, which quotes "Relación de las cantidades que se me adeudan por mejoras materiales en el Territorio de Tepic y por pérdidas sufridas en mis intereses," by Mariano Ruiz, December 14, 1911; and also quotes Espinosa to Gobernación, Tepic, January 2, 1912.

<sup>48</sup> Lucifer, September 9, 1911; and a conflicting report in

The affiliation of the Madero government with the hacendados and business interests in general, was reflected in Tepic, where Martín Espinosa's relations with the establishment apparently remained in good condition. On November 12, the business elite of Tepic's Casino Club honored the jefe político with a sumptuous banquet to commemorate the day of his patron saint. The community's landowners, businessmen, and professionals were out in full force to express their gratitude and support.<sup>49</sup>

Espinosa's tendency to support the Tepic establishment was also demonstrated in a case involving campesinos from the pueblo of Sayamota, in the district of Acaponeta. In November 1911, a group of forty campesinos from that community petitioned Madero to protest the abuses they claimed to have suffered from the Aguirre company during the Porfirian period. The petitioners declared that the Aguirre company had appropriated their land, burned their huts, and forced them to pay rent. The campesinos had placed an appeal to Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz, but instead of helping them, Ruiz imprisoned one of their leaders. The campesinos claimed that the land title which had been granted to the pueblo in the years 1696 and 1697, had been extracted from the national archive. They asked Madero for his assistance in opposing the powerful company, because they were poor and

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Enciclopedia Mexicana, 2nd ed., s.v. "Nayarit, Estado de," by Eugenio Noriega Robles.

<sup>49</sup> Lucifer, November 15, 1911.

weak without government protection, and they closed with a pledge of support to the Maderista cause. Jefe Político Martín Espinosa was notified about the petition from the residents of Sayamota, and he answered Madero by maintaining that the case was within the jurisdiction of the courts. Espinosa added that he was sure that justice would be fulfilled "without the respectability nor the influence that the company has come to merit becoming an obstacle for it."<sup>50</sup>

A letter from Tepic citizen I. Justo Calderón to Madero gave further evidence of the resentment that was brewing within the Territory by November 1911. Calderón complained to the president that the influence of the rich and powerful still reigned in Tepic, seriously prejudicing those who relied only on justice. He explained that the opposing lawyer in the case at hand was Roberto Valadez, the former secretary of ex-Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz, and now attorney for the "millionaire Spanish firm," D.G. Aguirre Sucesores. Valadez was reportedly an intimate friend of the magistrate of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, and uncle of District Judge Salvador Arriola Valadez, who, according to Calderón, directly influenced the Civil Court judge deciding the case at issue. Calderón alleged that these circumstances "resulted in a linkage that, when a business affair of

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<sup>50</sup> Serapio Coronado et al., to Madero, Acaponeta, November 19, 1911, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Francisco I. Madero, (cited hereafter as AGN-M), 23/615/17835-36; and Martín Espinosa to Madero, Tepic, December 30, 1911, AGN-M, 23/615/17837.

importance must be decided, first the opinion of Counselor Valadez is consulted, and later it is resolved." According to Calderón, this situation was "public and notorious," and he insisted that the Minister of Justice should be notified about it. Furthermore, Calderón informed the president that the public prosecutor was an intimate friend of Valadez, and worried very little about the interests of prosecution. Calderón claimed that there were a number of cases in the Territory that needed "neutrality and absolute impartiality," and he asserted that the only solution was to name a substitute magistrate who was "disentangled from all compromise with the current petitioning lawyers, directors of powerful companies."<sup>51</sup>

Soon after Madero had been elected president, he began to experience political problems as a result of the divergent class interests that vied for his attention. On October 31, 1911, supporters of Emilio and Francisco Vázquez Gómez—liberal reformers and former members of Madero's interim cabinet—issued the Plan of Tacubaya calling for the overthrow of the Madero government and the elevation of Emilio to the presidency. The Vázquez Gómez brothers had also received the support of Pascual Orozco in Chihuahua, who had been one of the most effective rebel generals during the Madero uprising against Díaz.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> I. Justo Calderón to Madero, Tepic, November 18, 1911, AGN-M, 14/333-1/10728.

<sup>52</sup> For a copy of the Plan of Tacubaya, see Silva Herzog, vol. 1, pp. 278-86.

During the month of November, the anti-Madero rebellion gained momentum and unity. In Morelos, the Zapatistas issued the Plan of Ayala on November 25, 1911. This declaration called for the overthrow of the Madero government, and recognized Pascual Orozco as Chief of the Revolution. In the event that Orozco declined, Emiliano Zapata would lead the Revolution. Furthermore, the Plan of Ayala specifically called for agrarian reform to resolve the Nation's crisis.<sup>53</sup>

General Bernardo Reyes and Díaz's nephew, Félix Díaz, who had joined forces in opposition to the government, began to rally the conservative and military classes against the Madero regime. Their political movement inspired a rebellion in Tepic. In the early hours of the morning of November 23, the city of Tepic was startled by gunfire and shouts of "Viva Reyes." The chief guard of the penitentiary, Juan Uribe Osuna, in conjunction with Plácido Quintero, a former Maderista soldier who had been retired in the aftermath of the Revolution, renounced the Madero government and declared their support for Bernardo Reyes. Uribe rallied the majority of the territorial police in Tepic, and emptied the jail cells, forming a squad estimated to number about 150 men. The telegraph office wires were cut, and its funds were appropriated. The rebels confiscated weapons and machetes from the city's pawnshops, and they attacked the headquar-

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<sup>53</sup> For a copy of the Plan of Ayala, see Silva Herzog, vol. 1, pp. 286-93.

ters of the federal rural police force. The commander and twenty-two rurales defended their headquarters, forcing the rebels to move on. Two rurales were killed in the gun battle. The gang of rebels then went to the Aguirre mansion, knocked on the door, and announced that the milkman had arrived. When the door opened, the rebels forced their way inside, but all they were able to obtain from the servants found there was two rifles. They then proceeded to the municipal treasury to collect the funds from that office, but when they were advised that the funds were locked in a safe, they abandoned the building. The rebels then attempted to capture the Government Palace, but Espinosa managed to rally enough support to force them to retreat. They abandoned the city in the direction of the town of Jalisco. The Reyista rebellion in Tepic led by Uribe and Quintero utterly failed to gain public support. Businesses in the capital remained closed that day, and the residents rallied to form a militia to protect the city from an expected return of the rebels.

Meanwhile, Uribe and Quintero arrived at the neighboring town of Jalisco, where they captured the sub-prefect and threatened to kill him. They plundered the town, and continued south to Compostela. When they arrived in Compostela, they met resistance from a dozen residents under the command of Ramón Ibarría. The small group of defenders retired after killing one of the rebels and injuring another, and Uribe and Quintero took control of the town.



On November 24, troops under the command of Lino Cárdenas set out to track down the rebels. The next day, the prefect of San Blas, José María Paez, set out for the same purpose with another fifty men. On November 26, Paez caught up with the rebels at a point called Las Cuevas, not far from the haciendas of Mojarras and La Labor. The rebels were busy saddling their horses, and were taken by surprise. About twenty-five rebels were shot, and the remainder were dispersed. In the days that followed, most of the other rebels were hunted down and either killed or taken prisoner. Uribe was killed on December 1, near the hacienda of Mojarras. As a result of the Uribe and Quintero rebellion, Martín Espinosa was relieved of his duties as military commander of the Territory, and replaced by General Clemente Villaseñor, supposedly leaving Espinosa free to concentrate on his political and administrative duties as jefe político.<sup>54</sup> This was part of the trend of the Madero government to place its security in the hands of the military, which ironically it very recently had defeated to arrive in power, and

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<sup>54</sup> Lucifer, November 24, 29, December 2, 9, 1911; open letter by T. García to Tío Caralampio, published in Lucifer, December 2, 1911; and Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, pp. 491-92.

There are conflicting reports regarding some of the details of the revolt. Lucifer reported that between \$4,000 and \$5,000 were taken from the telegraph office, but Peña Navarro reported that only \$1,200 was taken. A third report in the form of an open letter from Rural Corps commander García claimed that \$2,294 had been robbed from police headquarters. Lucifer reported that the shooting started at 2:30 A.M., but Peña Navarro reported that it began at 1:00 A.M. Lucifer reported that the rebels abandoned Tepic at 6:00 A.M., while Peña Navarro reported that they left at 4:00 A.M.

which fatally would soon betray it.

Opposition to the Espinosa government continued to grow in the Territory. In a letter to Madero dated December 7, 1911, Francisco Ramírez, who qualified himself as being "only a spectator and without any official or private employment," provided the president with an itemized report on each of the branches of government in the Territory of Tepic. The report for the most part was very critical of the government of Martín Espinosa. Ramírez reported that caciquismo was abundant throughout the Territory, "the principal caciques being the political authorities, beginning with the jefe político, to the last sub-prefect." Ramírez claimed that Martín Espinosa lacked all the qualities necessary for the job of jefe político, and he asked Madero to remove Espinosa from that position as soon as possible, commenting that in Tepic they were in "worse shape than in the time of the dictatorship of Don Porfirio." After having provided his opinion on the various branches of government, Ramírez turned to the matter of the initiative that Mariano Ruiz had presented to Congress to turn the Territory of Tepic into a state. While Ramírez mentioned that Martín Espinosa was opposed to Ruiz's initiative, Ramírez asserted that Tepic should become a state in order to provide a saving for the federal treasury, and he insisted that this could be done "without prejudice to the best of government."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Francisco Ramírez to Madero, Tepic, December 7, 1911, AGN-M, 19/464/14721-22.

By December 1911, some progress in communications began to appear in the Territory. The Southern Pacific Railroad was busily arranging a project to establish telephone lines from Nogales, on the border of Sonora and Arizona, to Guadalajara. Branch lines were also planned for all the important towns near the proposed main line. The railroad from Sinaloa to Tepic was also near completion, and on December 12, the festive day of the Virgin of Guadalupe, Jefe Político Espinosa and Southern Pacific Railroad representative S.L. Wakulewicz, accompanied by thirty other Tepic residents, went on an excursion by train from the hacienda of Mora to Yago, about seventy-five kilometers from Tepic. On December 14, a champagne lunch and dance was held in the Calderón Theater to celebrate the inauguration of the Southern Pacific Railroad in the Territory, in anticipation of the railroad's arrival in the city of Tepic.<sup>56</sup>

The arrival of the railroad in Tepic was not entirely beneficial to all. In a letter to Madero dated December 14, Albino Casillas informed the president that with the arrival of the railroad line to the city of Tepic, the owners of the urban properties had raised housing rents "without consideration." To meet this problem, Casillas asked the president to aid in the financing of a project to construct what he called a "Colonia Mexicana" (Mexican Colony) on a rural property to the southeast of Tepic. The land was reportedly currently being used to cultivate corn, but Casillas claimed

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<sup>56</sup> Lucifer, December 9, 13, 16, 1911.

that this crop was not very profitable because the crop was not being cared for properly. He advised the president that although there were about 500 associates involved in the project, there was a lack of funds because ninety percent of them were "poor people." Casillas asserted that the project would be beneficial "as much for the increase of work, as for the suppression of the house rent, which is the greatest affliction for the proletarian class." According to Casillas, the construction of the project was to be funded by monthly contributions of one peso per associate, and the properties were to be distributed by raffle.<sup>57</sup>

On January 20, 1912, Vice-President José María Pino Suárez and Secretary of Communications Manuel Bonilla attended the inauguration ceremonies of the Southern Pacific Railroad in Tepic. Hundreds of campesinos and workers from Tequepexpan, La Escondida, Bellavista, El Rincón, La Fortuna, Puga, and other haciendas used this opportunity to protest conditions in the Territory. The vice-president was presented with a petition reporting the starvation wages and miserable working conditions found on all the haciendas in the Territory. According to the protesters, field and factory workers alike toiled from 6:00 A.M. to 8:00 or 9:00 P.M. for a meager 50 centavos a day. Muleteers fared only slightly better at 62 centavos a day, while wagon drivers were paid 68 centavos. The campesinos and workers com-

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<sup>57</sup> Albino Casillas to Madero, Jalisco, December 14, 1911, AGN-M, 14/345-2/11146.

plained about the harsh treatment they received at the hands of the overseers, and they claimed that sometimes they even were forced to work on Sundays or risk being thrown in jail if they refused. They also expressed their frustration for having to put up with the high prices and poor quality goods at the hacienda company stores. The vice-president accepted their manifesto with a vague promise to help them in their plight.<sup>58</sup>

By early 1912, the Madero government had serious problems in keeping the country under control. In the North, Pascual Orozco, who had aligned with the Vázquez Gómez brothers, continued to oppose Madero. On March 9, Orozco and his followers issued the Plan de la Empacadora from his headquarters in Chihuahua. Article 30 of the Plan declared that the Territories of Tepic and Baja California would be incorporated as States following consultation with their inhabitants with regard to the economic impact that statehood would have on these areas.<sup>59</sup>

Meanwhile in the South, the Zapatistas insisted on the redistribution of land to the campesinos. As a response to the threat by the Zapatistas, Martín Espinosa made an offer to Madero on February 1, to lead a battalion of 1,000 troops from Tepic to restore order in Morelos. Madero accepted

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<sup>58</sup> García, pp. 139-40; López González, Recorrido, pp. 195-97; and Enciclopedia Mexicana, 2nd ed., s.v. "Nayarit, Estado de," by Eugenio Noriega Robles.

<sup>59</sup> For a copy of the Plan de la Empacadora, see Silva Herzog, vol. 1, pp. 293-310.

Espinosa's offer, and arrangements for the campaign were begun.

On February 10, Lucifer published an editorial article entitled "Where Are We Going?", in which the author expressed the fear that was spreading among the upper classes throughout Mexico. The author of the article pointed out that Zapata's "socialism"—which it claimed was "impossible" and "unjust"—was growing more and more every day "like a dark cloud." He also discussed the Vázquez Gómez brothers, and in a statement revealing the position of the newspaper and reflecting the prevailing attitude of the establishment in Tepic at that time, the author wrote: "One has only to look at the Vázquez Gómez to be convinced that they have blood that is ninety percent Indian, in order to explain their stubbornness and to realize that it is incurable." While the underlying racism in this article at least partially explains the fear of Zapata and the Vázquez Gómez brothers, a fear of "socialism" had apparently also emerged as a factor.

Madero, who had been the scourge of the establishment both nationally and locally in Tepic as recently as a year ago, had now become the protector of this establishment, prompting the recruitment of the battalion for the campaign in Morelos. Moreover, Martín Espinosa, who had so recently suffered the embarrassment of the Uribe and Quintero uprising, was eager to prove his loyalty and effectiveness to Madero.

In the meantime, on February 15, Jefe Político Martín Espinosa got married before setting out on the campaign to Morelos. The ceremony took place in the private chapel of Bishop Andrés Segura y Domínguez, which would indicate that Espinosa's liberalism did not entail strong sentiments of anticlericalism. Likewise, the presence of the bishop at the wedding relected the Church's acceptance of the government. Indeed, there is no evidence that the Madero Revolution in the Territory of Tepic had any trace of anti-clericalism, and the Church was always allowed to proceed with its duties unhindered by the Espinosa government.

Nevertheless, the 1,000 man battalion that had been pledged for the anti-Zapatista campaign in Morelos was never to leave the Territory. The Vázquez Gómez rebellion began to unfold in various parts of the country, and on February 16, 100 troops from Tepic, and another 100 from Acaponeta, were sent to Sinaloa to help to quell the disturbances that had arisen in that neighboring State. On February 20, Espinosa announced that the campaign to fight the Zapatistas in Morelos had been suspended because of the uprising in Sinaloa.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Lucifer, February 3, 7, 10, 17, and 21, 1912.

### 2.3 THE MIGUEL GUERRERO REBELLION

The political instability of the Madero regime and its failure to resolve the social and economic problems that plagued Mexico had resulted in a series of rebellions in various parts of the country. Further evidence of rebellion against the Madero government began to appear within the Territory of Tepic by the end of February 1912. Juan Espinosa Bávara, municipal treasurer of San Blas and cousin of the jefe político, wrote to Martín Espinosa on February 27, to warn him that the current calm in the Territory could be disrupted by what Espinosa Bávara called "swindlers discontented with the new regime." Espinosa Bávara warned that in order to avoid such disruptions and "attacks against the interests of the landowners," the supporters of the government must be ready and alert to ward off the enemy. These words of caution by Espinosa Bávara to his cousin not only reveal fear of an uprising in Tepic, but also indicate that the threat of upheaval was class based, and of a social nature. Also evident in these statements was the allegiance of the Maderista government of Martín Espinosa to the interests of the propertied classes.<sup>61</sup>

On March 10, Espinosa Bávara wrote to Madero to pledge the support of his contingent in San Blas to "take up arms against the ambitious and banditry," should the need arise in the Territory of Tepic. Espinosa Bávara's use of the

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<sup>61</sup> Copy of Juan Espinosa Bávara to Martín Espinosa, San Blas, February 27, 1912, AGN-M, 34/915-2/26099.



word "banditry" to describe the activities of those in opposition to the government was reminiscent of the terminology that had been used to describe the Maderistas themselves less than a year before, when they were in opposition to the Díaz regime.<sup>62</sup>

Madero received another pledge of support from within the Territory, this time in reference to a possible foreign invasion. On March 8, José A. Agráz expressed his patriotism to Madero, and with reference to recent press reports that warned of a possible "American intervention," offered the president his services and those of forty or fifty men to "defend the national integrity."<sup>63</sup>

On March 11, Albino Casillas, who had written to Madero a few months earlier to request land for the construction of a housing project, wrote to the president once again to advise him of the danger of "disturbances" in the Territory of Tepic. Casillas asserted that the inhabitants of the Territory were "peaceful," but he warned against any delay in implementing a "well-considered preventive." He asked the president to send someone to analyze the Territory's situation in a "completely incognito manner." He claimed to have defended the "needy class" for many years, incurring the wrath of the hacendados to the point that his life was

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<sup>62</sup> Juan Espinosa Bávara to Madero, San Blas, March 10, 1912, AGN-M, 34/915-2/26100.

<sup>63</sup> José A. Agráz to Madero, Rosamorada, March 8, 1912, AGN-M, 30/836-2/23318.

endangered several times. An underlying message in the letter was that the political instability in Tepic was recognized to have been based on class tensions.<sup>64</sup>

Casillas's letter to the president also indicates the lack of confidence that the working classes in the Territory had in Jefe Político Martín Espinosa. The jefe político had clearly aligned himself with the interests of the latifundistas, and in April 1912, Espinosa wrote to Madero in defense of the Aguirre company in response to an anonymous letter that had been sent from Tepic to the president earlier that month. The anonymous letter had complained about the conditions of monopoly and slavery that existed on the Aguirre haciendas. Espinosa denied that such conditions existed on the company's haciendas, and while he allowed that it was accurate that there were company stores on the haciendas, he denied that the presence of these company stores constituted a monopoly, inasmuch as the workers were not paid in vouchers, but in cash, and they could therefore make their purchases wherever they wished. According to Espinosa, rather than being a monopoly, these company stores were a benefit inasmuch as they provided the workers with a convenience and helped them avoid having to go to the towns where they could succumb to the lures of alcohol and other vices injurious to their health, their families, and the fruit of their labor. Espinosa assured Madero that the Aguirre company "religious-

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<sup>64</sup> Albino Casillas to Madero, Jalisco, March 11, 1912, AGN-M, 14/345-2/11147.

ly" paid the wages of all their workers in cash, treated them with due consideration, and provided them with housing and emergency medical treatment. The jefe político added that the company had supplied his government freely with everything that had been solicited, and he pointed out that upon his arrival in Tepic the previous year, not one of the company's many workers wanted to enlist in his army, nor had they joined the rebel groups currently operating in the Territory. According to Espinosa, this fact demonstrated the "good treatment" the workers had been receiving from the company.<sup>65</sup>

The first evidence in 1912 of open rebellion in the Territory of Tepic against the Madero government appears to have occurred on March 11, when a small gang of rebels arrived at the hacienda of Puga attempting to convince the residents of the hacienda to rise up in arms. The rebels were pursued by guards employed by the hacienda, however, and forced to flee into the mountains.<sup>66</sup>

The situation escalated in the early hours of March 15, when Lieutenant Miguel Guerrero from the garrison stationed in Tepic, along with fifty-three men under his command at the penitentiary, rebelled in support of the Vázquez Gómez brothers. They freed the prisoners of the penitentiary,

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<sup>65</sup> Espinosa to Madero, Tepic, April 17, 1912, Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo Revolución, (cited hereafter as AGN-R), 2/20.

<sup>66</sup> Lucifer, March 13, 1912.

incorporating them into their ranks, and proceeded to the army barracks in an attempt to take control of the entire garrison. Guerrero's rebel troop was repulsed by soldiers loyal to the government, and near dawn the rebels retreated to the Loma de la Cruz on the outskirts of the city. Guerrero forced the administrator of the military hospital to hand over rifles and ammunition, and he left toward the town of Jalisco with his rebel force which now numbered about sixty-five men. Guerrero and his men went from Jalisco to San Luis de Lozada, where he joined forces with former territorial police commander José Natividad Alvarez. Together they travelled to Mojarras, where they camped. The rebels divided into two columns and proceeded to Santa María del Oro, where they took control of the town.

According to the version told by historian Peña Navarro, the entire rebellion had been caused by a drunken binge, and was entirely devoid of any political content and completely unaligned with any of the other political rebellions that menaced the Madero government in other parts of the country. Peña Navarro's account is highly suspect, however, because the historian personally fought as a Maderista against the Guerrero rebellion.<sup>67</sup>

The rebels abandoned Santa María del Oro without having inflicted any violence on the town, and arrived in Tequepexpan. A number of residents from the Tequepexpan area joined

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<sup>67</sup> Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, pp. 499-503.

the rebellion which had now grown to over one hundred men. By this point, contrary to Peña Navarro's interpretation, Guerrero's rebellion had grown from a simple barracks revolt—that either was or was not caused by too much mes-cal—to an expanding revolutionary movement with definite class and caste overtones. Quite apart from the campesino class connection of the members who were joining the rebellion, there were also racial and cultural Indian characteristics that distinguished these new recruits.

On March 16, the political prefect of Ixtlán, José María Morales, motivated by the Guerrero uprising in Tepic, rebelled against the Madero regime, declaring his support for Emilio and Francisco Vázquez Gómez. Morales attempted to convince the municipal president and officers from the local militia to turn over their weapons, and when they refused, he attempted to do so by force. This attempt was halted by a section of the militia under the command of Second Captain (later historian) Evarardo Peña Navarro, and Morales and his men were forced to flee town.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Lucifer, May 4, 1912; and Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol 2, pp. 499-503.

Peña Navarro quotes an extensive passage from a letter from Nicolás Ramírez Manjarrez to El Informador, Guadalajara, July 2, 1936. Ramírez reported that Morales revolted on March 19, and that the battle for Ixtlán took place on March 23, but he appears to have erred slightly on these dates, and therefore so too had Peña Navarro who quoted Ramírez without challenging these dates.

On March 20, the rebels under the command of Guerrero and Morales surrounded Ahuacatlán and issued a demand for the surrender of the town. The town's prefect refused to hand over the community, and with a force of twenty-five men prepared to defend the town. A detachment of troops from the nearby town of Tetitlán arrived, however, forcing Guerrero's rebels to abandon their positions and return toward La Yesca.

Meanwhile, newspapers in Nogales, Arizona, reported that chaos reigned in the Territory of Tepic. The Tepic newspaper Lucifer denied that this was the case, although elsewhere it admitted that many well to do families from Ixtlán, Compostela, and other towns in the Territory had abandoned their communities to seek shelter in Tepic.

On March 14, a group of twenty-five men under the leadership of Camilo Rentería joined the rebellion in Huaynamota. Apparently Rentería had been motivated to revolt by some problems with local officials. His force quickly grew to seventy-five men, and on March 22, in the village of Amatlán de Jora, Rentería placed himself under Guerrero's orders. The rebel army, now over two hundred strong, set out for Santiago Ixcuintla.

On April 10, the rebel army suddenly appeared in the mountains near Santiago Ixcuintla. They now numbered about 300 men, between cavalry and infantry. The government sent

a garrison of 125 soldiers and rurales to block the rebellion, and on April 11, the rebels battled the government troops at the railroad station at Ruiz resulting in a complete victory for the rebel forces. About 50 men from the 125 man government garrison lost their lives in the battle. According to Tepic newspaper Lucifer, had Guerrero attacked the capital of the Territory at that time, he likely would have gained control of it quite easily, for at that point Tepic had neither weapons nor garrison upon which to rely. According to another report that had been sent to Madero, had the rebels captured the city of Tepic, the entire Territory would have fallen under their control. Following the battle of Ruiz, however, Guerrero made the fateful decision to remain in Santiago.<sup>69</sup>

When the news of Guerrero's victory at Ruiz Station reached Acaponeta, José Barrón, alias El Chivas, rose up in arms with sixty men and joined the rebellion. Barrón, a grocer and butcher in Acaponeta, had been known as an upstanding member of the community who had served in the National Guard. Guerrero's rebel army now grew by leaps and bounds, and within a few days of the victory at Ruiz it had swelled to between 2,000 and 3,000 men. Many of these new recruits had presented themselves without weapons, however, and therefore Guerrero set out for Tepic with only 1,200

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<sup>69</sup> Manuel G. Ulloa to Madero, Ixtlán del Río, April 13, 1912, AGN-M, 45/1221-1/34021; and Lucifer, March 23, April 3, 6, 20, May 18, June 8, 1912, and January 8, 1913.

men. Moreover, only about 90 of the troops in the army had mausser rifles, and another 150 to 200 troops had carbines of various calibers. They were also low on ammunition.

On Friday, April 19, Tepic was alarmed to hear that a considerable army of revolutionaries was advancing on the city. It is significant to note that in the newspaper reports in Lucifer, the "revolutionaries" were no longer the Maderista troops under the command of Martín Espinosa, but those of the rebel leader Miguel Guerrero. On Sunday evening the electric lights in the city's main square went out, causing a general panic, for the inhabitants believed that the attack had begun. Calm was restored, however, when it was discovered that it had only been the result of a power failure.

On Monday, April 22, there were reports that Guerrero's men had arrived at the nearby hacienda of Trapiche. Troops were sent from Tepic to serve as advance men. Tepic prepared for battle, and that evening men were posted in trenches and on roof tops. Meanwhile, since the battle of Ruiz earlier that month, the garrison in Tepic had been reinforced by 250 men from the State of Jalisco.

Guerrero's army arrived at about 11:00 A.M. on the morning of April 24, on the hillside of Los Metates on the outskirts of Tepic. At about 2:00 P.M., a dynamite explosion near the civil hospital could be heard, which apparent-



ly was the signal for the rebels to begin their attack. It was answered by another detonation on the southeast end of the city. At 2:15 the shooting began, and by 10:00 that evening the city was surrounded by a circle of gunfire. The fighting continued all afternoon and into the evening, and it seemed that it would only be a matter of hours before the rebels took over Tepic.

Early in the battle, however, Morales lost heart when he realized the capture of Tepic would be more difficult than they had at first suspected. Some time before 8:00 on the evening of April 24, Morales retreated from Tepic with the 300 men under his command. He used his troops as an escort to get as far as the nearby village of La Cantera, where he abandoned his men to make a get away into the mountains.

The situation got even worse for the rebel army when another of their leaders, Camilo Rentería, was shot at about 11:00 that same night. Rentería continued to fight until 4:00 the next morning, but his injuries finally forced him to retreat from the city. On the afternoon of April 25, Guerrero was shot in the thigh, forcing him to retire from the battle. He left the city by horseback, but the severity of his injury made it necessary for him to transfer to a stretcher. An escort of about thirty men carried their leader to Santiago Ixcuintla. Disheartened by their failure to capture Tepic easily, low on ammunition, and lacking

leadership because of the injuries to Guerrero and Rentería, the rebels began to move out of their positions and slip out of the city. By 6:30 that afternoon, the forces defending Tepic had triumphed.

Casualties on the government side included about fifteen dead and forty injured, while casualties on the rebel side were reportedly four times as great. Nevertheless, the rebel leaders Guerrero and Rentería succeeded in escaping. Guerrero arrived in Santiago on the morning of April 27. His men appropriated some carriages, and they proceeded north, through Tuxpan and on to Rosamorada. Rentería managed to encounter forty of the men who had been abandoned by Morales in La Cantera. They travelled to San Isidro, where they spent the night of April 25. The next morning they made their way into the mountains to Huaynamota, where Rentería stayed for the next twenty-two days recovering from his injury. Morales, however, was captured on April 29, in the village of Hostotipaquillo, and he was subsequently charged with rebellion, abuse of authority, and abandonment of office. In the aftermath of the Guerrero rebellion, the government of the Territory offered promotions to some of its employees who had distinguished themselves in defense of the city. Civil servants who had refused to lend their help were fired.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Lucifer, April 24, 27, Extra [no date, April 26, 1912?], May 1, 4, 18, June 19, 1912, and January 8, 1913.

As a result of the disturbances in Mexico during this period, a group calling itself the American Alliance had established contact with United States Senator George Clement Perkins, Republican from California and an owner of the Pacific Coast Steam Ship Company, to solicit the aid of the United States government in leaving Mexico, because they believed themselves to be in danger. In response to this request, an American transport ship the Buford was sent to evacuate United States citizens located along the Mexican Pacific coast. A total of 364 Americans fled Mexico on board the Buford, mostly from Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, and Manzanillo, Colima.<sup>71</sup>

The situation in the Territory of Tepic apparently was not as volatile. Another group describing itself as "American citizens residing in Tepic," issued a statement asserting that the American Alliance's claims were "alarmist," and denying that there was any basis for the claims that had been made. The group of "American citizens residing in Tepic" completely dissociated themselves from the American Alliance, and maintained that they had enjoyed full personal protection as well as guarantees to their business interests, and they expressed absolute confidence that this would continue in the future.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, p. 256.

<sup>72</sup> J.A. Castillo et al., "Protesta de americanos residentes aquí," Tepic, May 2, 1912, published in Lucifer, May 4, 1912.

On May 12, this same group of American citizens sent a telegram to United States Special Consul Claude E. Guyant on board the Buford anchored in San Blas, declaring that conditions in Tepic were "practically normal," and informing the American vice consul that they were rapidly restoring relations with the Mexicans after these relations had been altered by the "imprudent conduct" of the members of the American Alliance. The telegram urged Guyant to establish a consular agency in Tepic. He also was advised that forty Americans remained in the Territory, and that they represented a capital investment of several million dollars. The American citizens reiterated that they enjoyed all kinds of considerations and guarantees from the Mexican authorities, and that they did not consider themselves to be in any danger whatsoever.<sup>73</sup>

The Vázquez Gómez rebellion disintegrated as a result of internal competition for the leadership of the anti-Madero movement. Pascual Orozco dissented and challenged Emilio Vázquez Gómez's claim to the leadership and the presidency. Orozco arrested Vázquez Gómez and forced him to renounce the leadership and leave the country. The entire movement declined after that incident, and by September, Orozco's forces had been liquidated and he too was forced to flee to the United States. Inadvertantly, the Madero government had been given a reprieve, although widespread opposition to his

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<sup>73</sup> Henry M. Hale et al., to Vice Consul General Guyant, Tepic, March 12, 1912, published in Lucifer, May 15, 1912.

regime continued to brew throughout the country.<sup>74</sup>

#### 2.4 THE TENSIONS CONTINUE

The defeat of the Guerrero rebellion in Tepic forced Miguel Guerrero out of the Territory, but did not put an end to unrest in the region. On June 1, Camilo Rentería entered Pochotitán with an army of one hundred men. The rebels gathered supplies and weapons, and imposed a number of "loans" on several residents of the community. They broke down the door to the jail—which was an entirely symbolic act considering that there were no prisoners inside—and put the telephone service out of commission. They then left town without having committed any major disturbances, lending credence to their claim that they were rebels and not a gang of bandits. Rentería's rebel army then struck the neighboring community of San Luis de Lozada, imposing more forced "loans" and gathering horses and weapons. They also burned down some selected houses in an act of private vengeance against the owners. At least one of these houses belonged to one of the wealthier people in the area. In another apparent act of vengeance, one of Rentería's nephews was killed by orders of the rebel leader himself.

By mid-June, Rentería's army had grown to about 400 men. They passed through Mojarras and Santa María del Oro, and on June 16, a battle broke out near the community of

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<sup>74</sup> Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis, pp. 190-98; and Ross, pp. 256-67.

Tequepexpan between the rebels and a garrison of 148 federal soldiers. The federal soldiers were outnumbered, but they emerged triumphant. Thirty-two rebels were reportedly killed in the battle, while the federal force only suffered one death and seven injuries. The surviving rebels managed to flee, but they lost significant quantities of weapons to the government force, including fifty sticks of dynamite.<sup>75</sup>

Apart from the rebel movement in the Territory, the Espinosa government also had political and economic problems with which to contend. A number of former civil servants were embittered when they lost their jobs. They accused the jefe político of constantly yielding to the wishes of the elite. Espinosa was also criticized for filling government positions with members of his own family and people recommended by the local political bosses.<sup>76</sup> The civil servants that remained suffered when Espinosa implemented a program of salary reductions for public employees as a method of dealing with the increasing war expenditures.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Lucifer, June 5 and 19, 1912.

<sup>76</sup> Luis Puente to Madero, Tepic, February 15, 1912, AGN-M, 31/860-1/23831-2; Puente to Madero, Mazatlán, June 5, 1912, AGN-M, 31/860-1/23834; José A. Agráz to Madero, Rosamorada, August 14, 1912, AGN-M, 6/146-2/4287-90; and copy of Madero to José A. Agráz, Mexico City, August 20, 1912, AGN-M, 6/146-2/4291.

<sup>77</sup> Administrador Principal del Timbre [Tepic] to Madero, Tepic, June 8, 1912, AGN-M, 38/1035-3/29464-65.

In a letter to Madero dated June 18, 1912, Francisco Ramírez mentioned that he had been informed through the press that Martín Espinosa—who had been in Mexico City to confer with Madero—would return to Tepic and continue as jefe político. Ramírez alleged that the Tepic community was "exceedingly disgusted" with this news, and he asserted that Espinosa "could scarcely be a policeman, never mind jefe político of this Territory." He beseeched the president, for the sake of the Territory, to send someone "worthy" to fill that position.<sup>7 8</sup>

On July 31, Lucifer reported that the Madero government had decided to present an initiative to Congress to elevate the Territory of Tepic to statehood. The newspaper reported that the news had been "sensationally disagreeable," and that many of the residents of the Territory were making dire predictions about the initiative. Lucifer recalled that the same initiative which had been made by former Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz a few months earlier had been unanimously rejected by public opinion, and that when Ruiz made the proposal he had been heckled out of the Chamber. Nevertheless, the initiative had returned, and Lucifer claimed that this time the matter was "serious" because it reportedly had originated from President Madero himself.

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<sup>7 8</sup> Francisco Ramírez to Madero, Tepic, June 18, 1912, AGN-M, 19/464/14708.

Lucifer advised its readers that according to one version, the initiative to turn Tepic into a state had been introduced because of the recent disturbances in the Territory. The newspaper's editor countered this version with the argument that the disturbances in Tepic had not been all that serious, and that in any event the most serious problems in the Territory were not political, but economic in nature. The most pressing problem had to do with the lack of communications, specifically the need for the resumption of traffic on the Southern Pacific Railroad. The newspaper also asserted that even if the argument that these problems were political and administrative in nature was accurate, it would be a powerful reason against the projected elevation of the Territory to statehood, for if the federal government with its abundant resources and powers could not impose order on the Territory, a local government, "poor and abandoned to its own efforts," could do so even less.

Jefe Político Martín Espinosa, who at that time was returning to Tepic from Mexico City, was quoted by one Mexico City newspaper as having declared that the news of the initiative of statehood for the Territory would be "undoubtedly received with genuine jubilation in Tepic." Lucifer, however, asserted that the declaration attributed to the jefe político must be false, because Espinosa previously had vigorously opposed the initiative before Congress when it had been proposed by Ruiz.



On August 9, the ayuntamiento of Tepic resolved to issue a declaration through Espinosa to Madero, advising the president about the "general alarm" that the news of the resolution had created in Tepic, and informing Madero about the current conditions in the Territory, as well as the "great disturbances" that such a resolution would cause. As an alternative, the ayuntamiento suggested that the Territory be provided with the means of communication and transportation with which to develop the agricultural wealth of the region.<sup>79</sup>

A similar message was sent to Madero by the ayuntamiento of Jala. On behalf of the ayuntamiento, its municipal president beseeched Madero not to present the initiative to elevate the Territory of Tepic to the category of a state. He informed the president that almost all the residents of the region were convinced that by elevating the Territory to statehood, "in not a very long time it would be seen reduced to the most complete misery."<sup>80</sup> The businessmen in the Territory clearly recognized that the fiscal responsibilities of statehood would be a burden on Tepic's limited resource base. They obviously preferred the subsidies and protection of the federal government, to the more nebulous status and rights of state government.

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<sup>79</sup> Lucifer, August 10, 1912; and telegram from Ayuntamiento de Tepic to Martín Espinosa, Tepic, August 9, 1912, published in Lucifer, August 14, 1912.

<sup>80</sup> Enrique Delgado to Madero, Jala, August 28, 1912, AGN-M, 15/370-1/11967.

Meanwhile, some progress had been achieved on the Southern Pacific Railroad in the Territory. On September 30, railroad traffic was resumed between Mazatlán and Tepic. In December, the railroad company announced that it was considering the construction of a line from Nanchi Station to the port of San Blas. Company spokesman Epes Randolph mentioned that if the company decided to proceed with the plan, it would take advantage of the abandoned tressels that had been built by the Central Railroad in the 1880s. Randolph reiterated the company's decision not to proceed with the construction of the railroad from Tepic to Guadalajara until the country had been pacified completely. The Sinaloa newspaper El Correo de la Tarde, however, reported that a reliable source had claimed that work on the Tepic to Guadalajara line would resume within a month.<sup>81</sup>

On New Years Day 1913, Lucifer reported that engineers commissioned by the Secretariat of Communications had arrived in Tepic to study a project that involved the construction of a railroad from San Blas to Zacatecas, which would provide transcontinental rail service from the Pacific port of San Blas to the port of Tampico on the Gulf coast. The Tepic newspaper pointed out that such a project would not only benefit agriculture, mining, and commerce, but would also be an important "civilizing" work among the Territory's Indian communities, "ridding them of their state of barbarism to enter fully into the florid regions of intel-

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<sup>81</sup> Lucifer, October 2, and December 21, 1912.

lectuality." Nevertheless, despite the exuberant—if ethnocentric—report by Lucifer, it is doubtful that the project was feasible, or at all serious, in light of the formidable natural mountain barrier and the problems of security in the regions controlled by the Cora and Huichol Indians.<sup>82</sup>

Meanwhile, government authority was continuously challenged in various parts of the region, and in October 1912, federal troops set out on a campaign to defeat gangs of rebels and bandits operating in the Territory. A garrison of federal troops battled a gang of rebels near Santa María del Oro. The federal troops then set out in pursuit of another gang that had attacked the pueblo of Garabatos. Another gang was attacked by federal troops near San Felipe, in the district of Acaponeta, resulting in the death of the gang's leader.

Rebels under the leadership of Camilo Rentería continued to control the mountain regions of La Sierra and La Yesca. On November 8, a battle took place between Rentería's army and another rebel gang under the leadership of Manuel Miramón, a nephew of the nineteenth-century caudillo Manuel Lozada. Apparently Miramón had been harassing the Indian communities in Rentería's territory, and his gang was crushed by Rentería's gang at a ranch named El Cordon.

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<sup>82</sup> Lucifer, January 1, 1913.

In early November, the Maderistas sent a message to Rentería requesting an interview to discuss an offer of amnesty to the rebel leader and his men. Rentería accepted the invitation, and on November 11, the rebel leader met army officials near Huaynamota. Not only did Rentería accept the offer of amnesty, but he also became a commander of the Territory's police force, with the duty of policing the same mountain region he already had controlled when he had been considered a rebel leader.<sup>83</sup>

On December 1, elections were held for the delegates who would choose the new ayuntamiento of Tepic. Lucifer reported that there had been little activity among the political clubs as well as at the polls. Apparently the various liberal clubs were politically divided, leaving the political party affiliated with the Catholic Church ample room to make political gains. The election was not decisive, however, resulting in approximately an equal number of victories for Catholic delegates and liberal delegates. On December 18, the delegates met to elect the ayuntamiento, and the voting resulted in the election of Carlos Castilla as municipal president.<sup>84</sup>

Meanwhile in the northwestern community of Tuxpan, campesinos who had lost their communal landholdings to latifundistas during the Porfiriato began to repossess their lands.

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<sup>83</sup> Lucifer, October 23, 26, 30, November 6, December 7, and 25, 1912.

<sup>84</sup> Lucifer, December 4 and 18, 1912.

Under the direction of a peasant leader named Ferrer, the campesinos subdivided the lands for distribution among the members of the community. According to the interpretation offered by Lucifer, Ferrer and a half-dozen other men in Tuxpan had been "instigating the lower classes to commit sedition, inculcating in them socialist ideas of a foolish and inadequate type." The newspaper further maintained that Ferrer had no in depth knowledge whatsoever of such socialist doctrines.

The latifundistas appealed to government authorities to restore hacendado control over the confiscated lands, but the campesinos found support in the seven man rural police force garrisoned in Tuxpan under the command of Carlos A. Padilla. On December 9, the prefect of Santiago Ixcuintla arrived in Tuxpan to investigate reports that Padilla and his men were protecting the campesino movement. The prefect demanded that Padilla stop supporting the campesinos, but the commander steadfastly refused to obey the orders. The prefect was forced to escape from town on foot, and he went directly to the house of Federico González, brother of latifundista Constancio González. They tried to place a telephone call to request military help, but the telephone lines had been cut, forcing the prefect to go to a nearby ranch to solicit help from the Compañía Agrícola's guardia blanca. The company's paramilitary force accompanied the prefect to Tuxpan to reestablish his authority. They arrived in Tuxpan

around midnight, but by then Padilla and his men, as well as the campesinos involved in the uprising in Tuxpan, had fled toward Rosamorada. The garrison in Rosamorada joined the rebel movement when it arrived in their pueblo, increasing their number to around fifty men. The rebels blew up a strategic railroad bridge near Rosamorada, and headed into the mountains. They were pursued by rurales loyal to the government, resulting in the eventual capture and imprisonment of the campesino leaders, and Padilla's death. As a result of the uprising, Tuxpan's sub-prefect was replaced. The rebellion also may have motivated latifundista Constan-  
cio González to divest himself of some of his real estate, for within a few weeks of the rebellion, González was reportedly negotiating with American clients in an attempt to sell them some of his lands.<sup>85</sup>

By the beginning of 1913, the Territory of Tepic appeared to have been successfully pacified. Rebel leader Camilo Rentería arrived in Tepic under amnesty in early January, and according to Lucifer, the amnesty granted to the rebel leader and his men signified the surrender of the "only seditious group" operating in the Territory. The newspaper asserted that the government maneuver of placing Rentería in charge of the police force operating in the remote mountain regions would assure the complete pacifica-

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<sup>85</sup> Lucifer, December 11, 18, 21, 1912, and February 19, 1913; and Declaration by Mesa Directiva de la Sociedad de Campesinos de Tuxpan, Tuxpan, August 21, 1916, AGN-GPR, 222/31.

tion of the Territory.<sup>86</sup>

The wave of strikes that swept Mexico in the early months of the Madero regime was a clear indication that the enactment of labor reform was imperative. Madero created the Department of Labor as an office within the Secretariat of Industry, to promote improved labor-management relations, and where necessary to act as a mediator in disputes between workers and employers. A conference of industrialists organized by the Department of Labor in January 1912 failed to generate substantial results, and it was followed by another round of strikes, particularly among textile workers. This prompted the government to hold another convention in July of that year, this time with both industrialists and labor representatives taking part in the negotiations. The workers were in a much better bargaining position now, for the relative freedom to organize that came with the fall of the repressive Díaz regime led to widespread unionization and the formation of a labor confederation, the Central Workers' Committee. After a month of negotiations, there emerged a general agreement on a minimum wage of \$1.25, a ten-hour work day, regulations on workplace safety, and the designation of fifteen specific holidays to be observed by the employers. The Madero government, however, failed to provide a mechanism to enforce this labor code, and within weeks the workers were forced to resort to strike action when factory owners failed to comply with the

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<sup>86</sup> Lucifer, January 6, 1913.

terms of the agreement. In December 1912, the Madero government enacted tax legislation as a means of encouraging the owners of the textile factories to observe the labor code. The federal tax of 5 percent paid by textile factory owners since 1853, was increased to 8 percent; factory owners who observed minimum wage schedules, however, were eligible for a 50 percent rebate, effectively reducing the tax to 4 percent.<sup>87</sup>

In the Territory of Tepic, the Aguirre company responded to the labor code and the accompanying tax legislation which was to take effect on January 1, 1913, by intimidating the workers with threats to close down the factories. On January 2, workers at the Jauja and Bellavista factories were locked out without prior notice or explanation. Work resumed on January 5, but according to appeals on behalf of the workers to the Madero government by the Central Workers' Committee, regulations and minimum wage schedules were not being observed. For its part, the Aguirre company used personal network links within the Madero government to facilitate the issuing of the necessary certificates to receive the tax rebate, despite the workers' complaints. The controversy was never resolved during this administration, for the Madero government was overthrown before the workers could present their case.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis, pp. 221-28; Ross, pp. 246-47; and García, pp. 140-43.

<sup>88</sup> Documentation of the dispute between the workers and the Aguirre company, including representations by the Comité



Meanwhile, early in 1913, the 22nd Battalion stationed in Tepic was reinforced by 196 levied recruits originating from the States of Mexico, Puebla, and Morelos. The arrival of these recruits caused some apprehension among the Tepic population, and one Tepic businessman reportedly commented that problems could be expected for there were now "Zapatistas in the house." On February 10, Tepic received news about the outbreak of disturbances in Mexico City—disturbances that were soon to lead to Madero's overthrow—and that same night 139 of the new recruits deserted. Following a pattern similar to the Osuna and Quintero uprising and to the Miguel Guerrero revolt, the recruits fled to the Loma de la Cruz, and then proceeded to the pueblo of Jalisco. The rebellious recruits robbed the Jalisco municipal treasury and burned that office's archive. They soon dispersed in order to escape, but as they were foreign to the Territory and had no support from the local population, the majority of them were easily hunted down and captured.<sup>89</sup>

Events in Mexico City continued to unfold, however, and the overthrow of the Madero government on February 18, would lead to the demise of the Espinosa administration in the

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Ejecutivo de Obreros de la República to the Department of Labor on behalf of the workers, representations on behalf of the Aguirre company by Adolfo Prieto y Alvarez to Director of the Department of Labor Antonio Ramos Pedrueza, anonymous complaints from Aguirre factory workers, and direct correspondence between the parties involved, can be found in Archivo General de la Nación, Departamento del Trabajo, (cited hereafter as AGN-DT), 18/20; 32/5; 34/7; 48/7; and 48/8.

<sup>89</sup> Lucifer, February 12, 1913.

Territory of Tepic. On February 22, President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suárez were assassinated. In Tepic, Espinosa, who had marched triumphantly into the Territory less than two years earlier, would be forced to flee with little having been accomplished during his term of office.

## Chapter III

### THE TERRITORY OF TEPIC AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION, 1913-1914

#### 3.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE ANTI-HUERTA REBELLION

With the demise of the Madero regime, the territorial government of Jefe Político Martín Espinosa was left in a precarious situation. In Tepic, there was no immediate, widespread protest against the takeover of the federal government by Victoriano Huerta. The latifundistas and commercial classes of the Territory abandoned Espinosa when the promise of a return to a Porfirian style government emerged in Mexico City with the overthrow of Madero, and the jefe político found little support from the campesinos and working class, whom he had by and large ignored during his administration. While the strength of the legend of the martyrdom of the president and vicepresident at the hands of Huerta would grow with time, the inhabitants of the Territory of Tepic apparently were not greatly disturbed initially by the fall of the Madero regime and the assassination of Madero and Pino Suárez.

The details of Espinosa's fall from power are not entirely clear, and reports about the events are contradictory. According to the version narrated by José Valadés,

and repeated by Alvaro Peña y Peña, Martín Espinosa made the decision to rebel against the Huerta regime on the evening of February 27. By then Rafael Buelna had arrived from Sinaloa, disenchanted by the refusal of Sinaloan Governor Felipe Riveros to pronounce immediately against Huerta. In attendance at the meeting with Jefe Político Espinosa were his cousin, Isaac Espinosa, Buelna, and five other people. The jefe político announced his opposition to the Huerta regime, and he handed out a pistol, a rifle, and a supply of ammunition to each of the co-conspirators. Espinosa did not have the support of the federal garrison in Tepic, so he was forced to lead his group quietly out of the capital. Their departure was detected early the following morning by the garrison commander, who sent a squad of soldiers after the rebels. Espinosa managed to incorporate several more individuals to his troop as they passed through the villages, but he failed to rally significant support. On March 5, the federal soldiers attacked Espinosa's rebel squad, and the superior numbers of the federal force, combined with the rebels' shortage of ammunition, forced Espinosa and his men to disperse and flee for safety. They finally made their way through the mountains to Sinaloa, where they made contact with other rebel groups.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Valadés, pp. 26-30; Alvaro Peña y Peña, Estado de Nayarit, Monografías de México, (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1968), pp. 25-27.

There is, however, evidence that this account of the birth of the Constitutionalist Revolution in the Territory is more fictional than factual. Newspaper reports in Lucifer indicate that the escape of Espinosa and Buelna from Tepic did not take place until March 19—some three weeks later. On February 22, a communique was issued on Huerta's orders, advising that José María Vargas—an established figure in Tepic politics—had been appointed jefe político of the Territory. Within a week, however, these orders were rescinded by Huerta, and Martín Espinosa was reinstated as jefe político. Espinosa apparently served as jefe político until March 19, when Espinosa, his cousin Isaac Espinosa, and Buelna fled the Territory.<sup>2</sup>

According to reports in Lucifer, their escape from the Territory followed an incident that occurred on March 17, in which Isaac Espinosa and his territorial police force engaged in a battle with federal soldiers. This would suggest that the Espinosa rebellion against the Huerta usurpation of the Madero presidency was not as automatic, nor as heroic, as Valadés portrayed it in his romantic biography of Rafael Buelna. It appears that Espinosa may have considered remaining in power as jefe político under a Huerta government, as implied in a passage from an article in Lucifer on

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<sup>2</sup> Gobernación "Acuerdo," Mexico City, February 22, 1913; Gobernación to Vargas, Mexico City, February 22, 1913; Gobernación to Vargas, Mexico City, March 7, 1913; Gobernación to Vargas, Mexico City, March 14, 1913; and Gobernación to Vargas, Mexico City, March 15, 1913, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Gobernación, (cited hereafter as AGN-G), 1a/913/12/2; and Lucifer, March 1, 1913.

March 19, which posed the question: "Why this sudden decision when the government of General Huerta had so much esteem for Mr. Espinosa?"<sup>3</sup>

Not only do contemporary press reports of that time disagree with the Valadés narration of these events, but the Valadés version is also contradicted by a letter from Martín Espinosa to Venustiano Carranza later that year. In that letter, Espinosa commended his cousin, Isaac, for having been the only one to have supported his movement in Tepic, "repudiating the government of the assassin Huerta on March 17 of this present year [1913], with weapons in hand, along with seventy men of the mounted police force, which he then commanded."<sup>4</sup>

When Espinosa abandoned his post on March 19, Juan Martín del Campo, secretary of Government in the Espinosa administration, took over these responsibilities as interim jefe político, until Colonel Jesús López del Haro arrived in the Territory to assume the office of interim jefe político.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, Pascual Orozco, the rebel leader from Chihuahua, declared his support of the Huerta regime, and when Miguel Guerrero—the leader of the Orozquista rebellion in the Territory of Tepic a year earlier—learned about Martín

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<sup>3</sup> Lucifer, March 19, 1913.

<sup>4</sup> Martín Espinosa to Carranza, Hermosillo, December 28, 1913, Fondo Venustiano Carranza, (cited hereafter as VC), 5/707.

<sup>5</sup> Lucifer, October 25, 1913.

Espinosa's decision to lead the rebellion in the Territory against the Huerta regime, he offered to lead a military campaign against the former jefe político. In an interview published in Lucifer, Guerrero expressed his amazement that Espinosa had resolved to lead the revolution. Guerrero asserted that the majority of the community did not like Espinosa, and that the lower classes in particular held an extreme hatred for the former jefe político.<sup>6</sup>

There may have been some substance to Guerrero's assessment of Espinosa's popularity, for when the former jefe político of the Territory arrived in southern Sinaloa following his escape from Tepic, a dispute arose between Espinosa and Lino Cárdenas over who would be in charge of the revolt in the region. Lino Cárdenas emerged as the victor in the struggle for the rebel leadership, and Espinosa's rebel squad disbanded. The former jefe político accompanied only by his assistant, crossed the Sierra del Nayarit into Zacatecas, and eventually ended up in Cuba. Espinosa sent for his wife, and once reunited with her, left for the United States. Espinosa eventually crossed back into Mexico, and met with Carranza in Piedras Negras, Coahuila. Carranza appointed Espinosa military commander and jefe político of the Territory of Tepic once again, and Espinosa travelled to Sonora accompanied by his cousin Isaac, Felipe Riveros, and Rafael Buelna. In Topolobampo, Sonora, Espinosa issued a revolutionary proclamation, but he only managed to gather

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<sup>6</sup> Lucifer, March 29, 1913.

about thirty men who were willing to follow him.<sup>7</sup>

The failure of the Madero government to contain the revolutionary process that had already spread throughout the country contributed to the downfall of the regime. It soon became clear, however, that Madero's assassination eliminated the last possible hope of restraining the forces for social change that had developed during the Porfiriato. The Huertista coup ignited the insurrection that changed the Mexican Revolution from what initially had been principally a political struggle, into a full scale social upheaval.

Huerta succeeded in winning over Pascual Orozco to his side, but he failed to persuade Zapata to abandon the principles of his Plan of Ayala. Zapata's belligerent stance was a significant threat to the Huerta regime, and it encouraged the Maderista governor of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, to disavow the Huerta government. On March 26, 1913, Carranza proclaimed the Plan of Guadalupe, formally repudiating Huerta. The Plan also established the Constitutionalist Army as the vehicle for recovering the national government, and Carranza designated himself as the First Chief of the Revolution until elections could be held to choose a presidential successor to Madero.

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<sup>7</sup> Valadés, p. 30; and Lucifer, March 29, April 5, and August 23, 1913.



By the end of March, Governor José María Maytorena of Sonora had pronounced against Huerta, and the revolutionaries in that State made their first military strikes against the federal forces there. In Sinaloa, various rebel groups had appeared both in the northern and southern regions of the State. The first revolutionary incursion into the Territory of Tepic took place on the night of March 25, when a squad of 200 men under the command of Lino Cárdenas attacked the army barracks at Acaponeta. They were repulsed by the soldiers from the 22nd Battalion who received help from the town's police force under the command of the political prefect. The revolutionaries were forced to retreat to Escuinapa, Sinaloa.

Within the Territory of Tepic, there was little evidence of rebellion against the Huerta regime. Camilo Rentería, who had helped Guerrero lead the Orozquista rebellion against the Maderista government of Martín Espinosa a year earlier, and had recently received an amnesty from the Espinosa government as well as a position as a commander in the police force, remained in step with Orozco and Guerrero, and declared his loyalty to the Huerta regime.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, the fall of the Madero government apparently was propitious for former Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz. In a declaration to Gobernación dated February 24, Ruiz repeated his claim that he had paid for public material improvements

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<sup>8</sup> Lucifer, March 26, 29, and April 5, 1913.

from his private, personal wealth, and he accused the government of the Territory of having threatened him with "scandalous libels" in order to avoid reimbursing him. Ruiz maintained that the papers and archives that verified these expenses had been destroyed in the assault on his La Quinta villa, that had been led by former Maderista—and later anti-Maderista rebel leader—Plácido Quintero on May 25, 1911. Ruiz asked that the debt and the interest accruing be paid, or at least that it be recognized in the event that the government was temporarily short of funds. He attached an itemized inventory of the funds totalling \$161,080, which he claimed was owed to him.<sup>9</sup>

The collapse of the Madero regime and the arrival of Huerta to power meant that the labor reforms adopted at the convention of July 1912 would have even less chance of being fully implemented. With regard to the complaints of the workers at the Aguirre factories, the company responded to the Department of Labor on March 6, assuring the director that the minimum wage had been introduced as of January 1. The company expressed surprise about such a worker manifestation, and wrote that it was unaware who the disgruntled workers were, and upon what their "inconformity" was based. The company attached a letter from the manager of the Jauja factory, Alberto Stephens, stating that the minimum wage schedule had been adhered to in the factory, and declaring

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<sup>9</sup> Mariano Ruiz to Gobernación, Mexico City, February 24, 1913; and Ruiz to Gobernación, Mexico City, August 19, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/13/1.

that he had yet to receive a complaint from the workers of the factory.<sup>10</sup>

On March 10, the director of the Department of Labor replied to the company, apparently without having investigated the matter any further. The director acknowledged that he had received the statement by the manager of the Jauja factory, and he apologized to the company, writing: "I am very sorry that the complaint presented by some laborers was unjustified and should have motivated the intervention of this office."<sup>11</sup>

On April 12, the Central Workers' Committee notified the director of the Department of Labor that their organization had received news from the Jauja factory that the minimum wage schedule and regulations established by the convention of July 1912, had yet to be introduced in the factory, but that according to reports they had received, the Department of Labor had nevertheless extended the certificate for the tax rebate. The labor confederation reported further that the workers at the Jauja factory appeared to be "excited and to a certain degree discontented" with the factory manager, Alberto Stephens, whom the workers accused of being the "cause of their earning miserable wages that are barely

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<sup>10</sup> D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, March 6, 1913; and A. Stephens to D.G. Aguirre Sucesores, Tepic, March 5, 1913, AGN-DT, 34/7.

<sup>11</sup> Director del Departamento del Trabajo to D.G. Aguirre Sucesores, Mexico City, March 10, 1913, AGN-DT, 34/7.

sufficient to eat poorly."<sup>12</sup>

On April 16, the Department of Labor advised the union that it had been assured by Stephens that the company had been complying with the minimum wage schedule since January 1. The department informed the labor confederation that in order for them to make a decision on the matter, the complaining workers would have to supply it with pay slips and detailed descriptions of the work they were performing.<sup>13</sup>

### 3.2 JEFE POLÍTICO AGUSTÍN MIGONI

The prevailing assumption throughout the country was that the Huerta regime would be an interim government until elections could be held to choose a successor to the deposed Madero. It was widely speculated that Félix Díaz, a nephew of Porfirio Díaz, would emerge victorious from the electoral process, and that he would restore the Porfirian style of government to the floundering nation. In Tepic, a group of prominent citizens comprised of most of the Territory's political and economic elite met on April 9, to form a political club to promote the Félix Díaz-León De la Barra slate for the next presidential election. In a second meeting held on April 16, the club chose a board of directors and unanimously decided to name itself the Juan Escutia

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<sup>12</sup> Comité Ejecutivo de Obreros de la República to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Adalberto Esteva, Mexico City, April 12, 1913, AGN-DT, 34/7.

<sup>13</sup> Departamento del Trabajo to Comité Ejecutivo de Obreros, Mexico City, April 16, 1913, AGN-DT, 34/7.

Club.

One additional clue that reinforced the idea that a Félix Díaz presidency was in the offing was the appointment in early April of Brigadier General Agustín Migoni as military commander and jefe político in the Territory, replacing Colonel Jesús López del Haro. The choice of Migoni was politically appealing to some in the Territory, for Migoni was a native son, having been born and raised in Tepic. Migoni had been a supporter of the unsuccessful Félix Díaz rebellion during the Madero presidency, and he had been imprisoned along with Félix Díaz in the San Juan de Ulúa penitentiary. Following the overthrow of Madero, Migoni had been promoted to brigadier general on March 4. He arrived in Tepic on May 2, amid eulogies and fanfare, and on June 2, he formally assumed office as jefe político.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, following the proclamation of the Plan of Guadalupe, the rebellion against the Huerta regime began to coalesce around Venustiano Carranza. On May 13, Carranza appointed Solón Arguello to organize forces and carry out military operations for the Constitutionalist Army in the State of Jalisco and the Territory of Tepic. Arguello, a former Nicaraguan who had become a nationalized Mexican citizen, had been known as a poet and teacher in Tepic. He was now given the rank of 2nd captain in the Constitutionalist

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<sup>14</sup> Lucifer, April 9, 19, May 31, August 27, and October 25, 1913.

Army.<sup>15</sup>

Another revolutionary group that began to operate in the Territory was the Maytorenistas, affiliated with Governor Maytorena of Sonora. In early June, rural police from the Acaponeta garrison engaged in a shootout with Maytorenista rebels at Cabo de Hornos in southern Sinaloa. On June 23, the rurales once again battled with the rebels, this time at Boca de Teacapan.<sup>16</sup>

Similar incidents of rebellion began to occur in the southern region of the Territory by a gang of rebels under the command of Ramón Ibarría. During the Madero period, Ibarría had fought in defense of Compostela against the Uribe-Quintero rebellion. Now himself a rebel leader, on June 19, Ibarría and a gang of fifteen men attacked Amatlán de Cañas, and engaged in battle with the rurales defending the outpost. On the afternoon of June 29, Ibarría and his gang approached Compostela. The garrison from Compostela together with the town police rode out to prevent the gang from entering Compostela, attacking Ibarría and his men in an enclosure outside of town. The rebels were pinned down for an hour and a half, but they escaped into the night without being pursued.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Carranza to Solón Arguello, Piedras Negras, May 13, 1913, VC, 2/153.

<sup>16</sup> Copies of two affidavits by Manuel Ambriz, Tepic, July 4, 1913, made by Gobernación, July 17, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2.

<sup>17</sup> Agustín Migoni to Gobernación, Tepic, June 20, 1913,

Reports of incidents such as these prompted the Guadalajara newspaper La Gaceta to comment that the Territory of Tepic found itself in conditions similar to the times of the nineteenth-century caudillo Manuel Lozada. Tepic newspaper Lucifer, however, denied that the comment by La Gaceta was accurate. While Lucifer admitted that there had been some disorder, it maintained that these rebel groups were being chastised rigorously. Meanwhile, throughout the month of July, the rebellion in the Territory continued to grow. On July 13, the rural police garrison in Camotlán was attacked by rebels, and forced to flee. The same garrison battled the rebels again on July 30, near Huajimic.<sup>18</sup>

Solón Arguello's squad of Constitutionals engaged in a series of battles with federal forces at Apozolco in the Sierra del Nayarit. On July 23, the insurgents twice engaged in battles with the rurales, and they succeeded in driving the police away. On August 6, federal troops attacked Arguello's squad at Apozolco. The rebels were forced to flee to the Los Encantos ranch, where they were pursued by government soldiers. The next day, another bat-

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enclosing 2/o Comandante del Cuerpo de Gendarmes to Migoni, [n.p.], June 19, 1913; and Migoni to Gobernación, Tepic, July 5, 1913, enclosing 2/o Comandante del Cuerpo de Gendarmes to Migoni, [n.p.], June 30, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2.

<sup>18</sup> Lucifer, June 14, 1913; copy of an affidavit by Porfirio Flores, [n.p.], July 13, 1913, made by Gobernación, August 12, 1913; and Agustín Migoni to Gobernación, Tepic, August 6, 1913, enclosing 2/o Comandante del Cuerpo de Gendarmes del Territorio de Tepic to Migoni, [n.p.], August 4, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2.

tle took place on the El Dondero mountain, and the rebels were forced to retreat from their positions abandoning supplies that included sixty-six sticks of dynamite. On August 10, the federal soldiers encountered Arguello's rebel squad in Santa Cruz de Buenavista, where a furious battle broke out. After four hours of fighting, the rebels were defeated and the survivors fled. Their losses included eight dead, four taken prisoner, and the confiscation of more supplies including ten weapons, two boxes of dynamite, two hundred grenades, ammunition, a machine for loading ammunition, and eighteen saddled horses. Arguello was one of those who managed to escape, but he had been wounded in the encounter.<sup>19</sup>

On August 27, Lucifer reported that the Huerta government had granted a concession for the construction of a railroad line between San Blas and Tepic. The name of the company was not disclosed, but it was announced that work on the line was to commence the following year, as long as the country had been pacified successfully.

The political and economic elite in the Territory continued to lend its wholehearted support to the Huerta regime and Jefe Político Agustín Migoni. The announcement of the granting of the railroad concession from San Blas to Tepic was cause for celebration. On August 28, a reunion took place to honor Migoni. The gathering was held at the country estate of former Jefe Político Mariano Ruiz. To the

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<sup>19</sup> Affidavit by Antonio Carmona Ojeda, La Yesca, July 24, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; and Lucifer, August 16, 1913.



refined guests attending the banquet, it must have seemed like the Porfirian epoch had been restored to them. Ironically, most of these same guests had attended similar functions in honor of the deposed Maderista jefe político, Martín Espinosa, less than a year earlier. Just as they had quickly disowned the Maderista government when it stumbled, many of these guests would eventually disown the Huerta regime. Nevertheless, for the moment they eulogized Huerta and Migoni, confident that these generals would deliver them from the growing threat of Constitutionalist rebellion, and restore a business climate favorable to capitalist development.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, the Constitutionalist rebel movement continued to grow throughout most of the country. By late August, Martín Espinosa had made his way to La Noria, Sinaloa, although he was reported to be short of weapons and ammunition. He passed into the Territory of Tepic, and began to operate in the region of Acaponeta. On the morning of September 4, Espinosa and his men were camped at the Cucharas

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<sup>20</sup> Lucifer, August 27, and 30, 1913.

According to a report by Lucifer, some of the guests in attendance at the reunion included the following: Fermín Maisterrena; Colonel Jesús López del Haro; Eugenio Hildebrand; Leopoldo Romano; Lic. J.G. Luna; M. Maldonado; Maximo Delius; J.A. de Zuazo; Lic. Juan Martín del Campo; Lic. G. Arreola; Lic. E. Azpeitia P.; Dr. E. Lever; A. Garmendia; M. Fregoso; Lic. R. Valadez; F. Rivas Gómez; G. Gangoiti; G. Sarría; A. Talamantes; J.M. Narvaez; T. Zepeda; F. Ibarra; F. Sánchez; E. Gangoiti; Lic. S.A. Valadez; J. Bertrand; Lic. E. Garmendia; J.M. Varela; J.C. Castañeda; Prof. A.L. Díaz; Juan F. Parkinson; R. Valadés; and J. Artee.

mine in the vicinity of Huajicori. At 6:00 A.M. federal troops attacked the rebels, and the two sides battled for six hours. According to a report in Lucifer, seventeen rebels were killed and another twenty-two injured, including Martín Espinosa. Federal losses were reported to be only two injured. These casualty statistics, however, are more than highly suspicious, because the government force lost the battle, and was forced to retreat. Apparently, reports in Lucifer on this and subsequent battles were intended more for propagandistic purposes than to inform the public accurately. On September 13, the rurales returned to the Cucharas mine hoping to dislodge the Carrancistas. The rebels were victorious once again, however, and the police were forced to retreat.<sup>21</sup>

The operations of Constitutionalist rebels in the region indirectly led to the killing of an American citizen at the El Tigre mine in the district of Acaponeta. According to a signed statement made by another American citizen working at the mine, the victim had been in the workers' quarters with the other miners, who reportedly had been reading one of the proclamations issued by Martín Espinosa, drinking tequila, and singing. The incident apparently occurred when the victim was relieved of his pistol during

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<sup>21</sup> Copy of an affidavit by Manuel Ambriz, Huajicori, September 4, 1913, made by Gobernación, October 15, 1913; copy of an affidavit by Manuel Ambriz, Huajicori, September 13, 1913, made by Gobernación, October 15, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; Lucifer, August 23, September 6, 10, 13, 16, and 20, 1913; and Obregón, p. 84.

the carousing. When the victim tried to grab his pistol he was stabbed in the left lung, killing him. The fellow American citizen who witnessed the killing assured the authorities that it had not been a premeditated act, but the "effect of the drunkenness and the circumstances with the passions aroused by the proclamation that they were reading."<sup>22</sup>

On September 8, a squad of Constitutionlists under the command of Isaac Espinosa entered Huajicori and robbed the general store there of \$3,000 worth of merchandise and cash. The store owner, José L. Chan, a Chinese national, petitioned the Chinese Legation in Mexico to initiate proceedings with the Mexican government for an indemnity. Rurales were sent to that region, and on September 15, in nearby Mexcaltitán, the police engaged in a battle with what District Corporal Crispín Larios described as an "unruly gang." The rurales succeeded in driving the rebels away.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Agustín Migoni to Gobernación, Tepic, September 20, 1913, enclosing a report from Prefect of Acaponeta Lezama Reguera to Secretario de Gobierno del Territorio de Tepic Juan M. del Campo, Acaponeta, September 17, 1913, in turn enclosing a declaration by John A. Baker, [n.d.], AGN-GPR, 67/48.

<sup>23</sup> Relaciones Exteriores to Gobernación, Mexico City, November 14, 1913; Jefe Político D. Servín y V. to Gobernación, Tepic, April 18, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/13/1; and a copy of an affidavit by Crispín Larios, Mexcaltitán, September 15, 1913, made by Gobernación, February 11, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2.

By September, the interests of the Aguirre company were being affected by the disturbances in the northern region of the Territory. On September 9, the company notified the secretary of Industry that it was doing its best in the Jauja and Bellavista factories to abide by the government decrees for improving the condition of the working classes, but that the "revolt" had become an obstacle to the company's operations. The company specifically referred to the "paralyzation" of the Southern Pacific Railroad in the stretch from Mazatlán to Tepic, which it claimed was impeding the delivery of cotton to the factories. The company mentioned that it had two thousand quintals of cotton at Chilapa station, in the district of Acaponeta, and that it was awaiting the resumption of railroad service to ship it to Tepic. Due to the effects of the rainy season, the roads had become inaccessible, making transport by any other mode impossible. The company insisted that if the supply of cotton was not replenished within forty days, it would have to suspend work in the factories, which would not only be damaging for their own interests, but also for the working classes; and the company warned that the workers, "finding themselves unoccupied, could hasten the disturbances in the public order."

The Aguirre company claimed that they had asked the managers of the Southern Pacific Railroad to resume rail service, but that the railroad managers had only expressed

the fear that a resumption of rail service would expose the railroad to the destruction of its bridges by the revolutionaries. Only one bridge on the line currently had been destroyed, but the railroad managers refused to accept that the "public equilibrium" had returned in the region, and they declined to repair the damaged bridge and resume service on the line. The company beseeched the secretary of Industry to exert his influence to have rail service continued on the Mazatlán to Tepic stretch.<sup>24</sup>

In response to government inquiries, the Southern Pacific Railroad claimed that it could not run trains on the line, citing "abnormal conditions in that region, where gangs of bandits maraud and constantly destroy bridges, and make traffic impossible." The railroad company noted that this was particularly the case between Rosario, Sinaloa, and Acaponeta, Tepic, and that the last incident consisted of the burning of the bridge over the Rosario River. It also insisted that it would have to suspend traffic on the line until the "reestablishment of calm."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Fomento, Colonización e Industria, Tepic, September 9, 1913, AGN-DT, 40/23.

<sup>25</sup> Fomento to Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, Mexico City, September 20, 1913; and Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, to Adalberto A. Esteva, Director del Departamento de Trabajo, Mexico City, November 29, 1913, enclosing Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México to Secretaría de Comunicaciones, [n.p.; n.d.], AGN-DT, 40/23.

The Southern Pacific Railroad's decision to suspend traffic on the Mazatlán to Tepic line may also have been influenced by the problems that had arisen between the Huerta government and the government of United States President Woodrow Wilson. In August 1913, Wilson presented an address to the United States Congress, in which he severely criticized the Huerta regime and expressed the need for a presidential election in Mexico. Huerta, on the other hand, strongly resented Wilson's intervening in Mexico's internal politics, and United States special envoy to Mexico John Lind was informally asked to leave the country. On September 30, the American steamship the Buford anchored in San Blas to pick up American citizens who wished to leave Mexico. Lucifer reported that only nine of the forty-five American residents in the Territory chose to leave on the Buford to return to the United States.<sup>26</sup>

In September 1913, a commission was sent to Mexico City to lobby for improvements to the port of San Blas. The commission, led by German Consul Eugenio Hildebrand, won the support of Secretary of Industry Garza Aldape, and the government agreed to dredge the port, with an initial outlay of \$35,000, contingent upon the pacification of the country. During the proceedings, the secretary of Gobernación inquired about the opinion of the members of the commission from Tepic regarding the advisability of statehood for the Territory. The commission allowed that the change would be

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<sup>26</sup> Lucifer, September 27, 1913.

feasible providing that the central government established means of communication in the Territory, including the upgrading of the port of San Blas, and the extension of the railroad from Tepic to Guadalajara.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile, military strikes by the rebels in the northern part of the Territory continued to occur. In late September, 400 rebels under the command of Rafael Buelna attempted to take over the Pánuco mine. They were resisted successfully by federal troops stationed at the mine. On the morning of September 28, federal troops exchanged light gunfire with the rebels near the pueblo of Picachos. The rebels camped there were forced to retreat from their positions. The government soldiers pursued the rebels, and on September 30, another battle broke out near Pueblo Viejo. This encounter was more intense, and after about two hours of fighting, the rebels were forced to retreat. In early October, the rebels under the command of the Arrieta brothers took control of the Pánuco mine. The mine was placed under Buelna's control, and the rebels extorted a sum of money in exchange for forty bars of silver found at the mine.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> The other members of the commission accompanying Hildebrand were Francisco Mora, Epitacio Lorenzana, and Luis G. Hernández. See Lucifer, September 6, and October 1, 1913.

<sup>28</sup> Lucifer, September 27, and October 1, 1913.

### 3.3 JEFE POLÍTICO MIGUEL GIL

On October 8, Miguel Gil was appointed jefe político of the Territory of Tepic, in substitution for Agustín Migoni. Gil had arrived from Sonora, where he had served as commander of the military zone in that region. On October 15, Gil disembarked in San Blas, and he arrived in Tepic the next day. On October 17, inauguration ceremonies took place. The following day, a banquet was held in honor of outgoing Jefe Político Migoni, and new Jefe Político Miguel Gil. The guest list included the most prominent members of the Territory's business and political elite, and was similar to the guest list of the banquet held in Migoni's honor two months earlier. There was no sign as yet that the upper classes of Tepic were abandoning the Huerta regime, despite frequent reports of rebel activity in the northern districts of the Territory.<sup>29</sup>

Meanwhile, on October 15, 800 revolutionaries under the command of Rafael Buelna attacked the federal garrison in the southern Sinaloan town of El Rosario. Buelna left some of his soldiers inside the houses, and retreated from the town. When the federal soldiers reoccupied El Rosario, they were attacked from within and from outside simultaneously.

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<sup>29</sup> "Recuerdo del Ministro," Gobernación, October 8, 1913; Gobernación to Gil, Mexico City, October 8, 1913; Gil to Gobernación, Tepic, October 17, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/12/2; Lucifer, October 15, 18, 22, and 25, 1913; and Héctor Aguilar Camín, La frontera nómada: Sonora y la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977), pp. 284-86.



The defeat of the federal soldiers in El Rosario, and their retreat to the northern region of the Territory of Tepic, sparked an exodus of middle and upper class residents from the northern districts to the capital of Tepic.<sup>30</sup> In coordination with Buelna's campaign from Sinaloa, Constitutionalist forces also began to enter the Territory from Jalisco. On October 22, rebels and federal soldiers engaged in battle at El Hormiguero, in Jalisco near the Territory's southeastern border. On October 29, another battle took place within the Territory's border, at Amatlán de Cañas.<sup>31</sup>

On October 30, the Secretariat of Foreign Relations received a message from the German Legation, advising the secretary that the legation had been informed that the Territory of Tepic had been invaded by "powerful gangs of bandits commanded by Martín Espinosa and other ringleaders," and that these gangs seriously threatened economic interests there, including the interests of several German subjects. The message reported that the revolutionaries were strongest in the districts of the Sierra del Nayarit, Compostela, and San Blas, and it maintained that the threat from these gangs was increasing from one day to the next. The legation reported that the hacendados and farmers in these regions

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<sup>30</sup> Copy of an affidavit by Felipe Hernández, Acaponeta, October 20, 1913, made by Gobernación, November 11, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; and Lucifer, October 25 and 29, 1913.

<sup>31</sup> Lucifer, October 25, 1913; and Gil to Gobernación, Tepic, November 13, 1913, enclosing 1/er Comandante del Cuerpo de Gendarmes del Territorio, November 11, 1913, in turn enclosing Felipe Contreras to 1/er Comandante, Ahuacatlán, November 6, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2.

had been obliged to abstain from cultivating their lands for the season as a consequence of the prevailing general uncertainty in the Territory. Federal troops stationed in the district were deemed "inadequate to combat the seditionists," and the legation closed by describing the situation as being untenable.<sup>32</sup>

On November 11, Jefe Político Miguel Gil denied the report by the German Legation. Gil claimed that it was "inaccurate" that powerful gangs were to be found in the districts mentioned, and he also denied that these gangs were under the command of ex-jefe político Martín Espinosa. On the latter point, Gil was accurate, for Rafael Buelna, not Espinosa, was now in command of the rebel forces in the region.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile the Constitutionalist campaign continued its drive south from Sonora. In November, the capital of Sinaloa, Culiacán, fell to the revolutionaries. Mazatlán was placed under seige by the battalion under the command of General Juan Carrasco. Rafael Buelna's vanguard forces battled the federal garrison in Concepción, Sinaloa, and pressed into the Territory of Tepic, where another battle was fought in Tecuala. On November 12, the Constitutionlists advanced on Acaponeta, and on November 14, they engaged

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<sup>32</sup> Relaciones Exteriores to Gobernación, Mexico City, November 1, 1913, enclosing transcript of a verbal note from the German Legation, October 30, 1913, AGN-GPR, 50/11.

<sup>33</sup> Gil to Gobernación, Tepic, November 11, 1913, AGN-GPR, 50/11; and Aguilar Camín, La frontera, p. 397.

in a furious battle with the federal forces. The federal army was forced to evacuate and retreat to Santiago Ixcuintla. Following the loss of Acaponeta, Lucifer reported an exodus of families from Santiago Ixcuintla had arrived in Tepic, and that many families in the capital were making preparations to travel to the interior of the country. On November 15, the German Legation notified the Secretariat of Foreign Relations about the defeat of the federal army in Acaponeta, describing the situation as "desperate." The German Legation asked the Huerta government to take the necessary measures without delay to protect the property and lives of German subjects residing in the Territory.<sup>34</sup>

In the meantime, the government did what it could to prevent the entire Territory from falling to the revolutionaries. Jefe Político Gil threatened to imprison anyone who issued false news reports. Under the pretext of protecting the public against "alarmists," Gil censored and softened the news reports that arrived from the northern region of the Territory in an attempt to curtail a groundswell in favor of the rebels. On November 21, a column of federal soldiers arrived in San Blas to reinforce the garrison in Tepic. The column was outfitted with machine guns and other modern war equipment with which to fend off the Constitu-

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<sup>34</sup> Obregón, p. 100; copy of an affidavit by Manuel Ambriz, Santiago Ixcuintla, November 17, 1913, made by Gobernación, February 13, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; Lucifer, November 8, 15, and 19, 1913; and Relaciones Exteriores to Gobernación, Mexico City, November 15, 1913, enclosing La Legación de Alemania to Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City, November 15, 1913, AGN-GPR, 50/11.

tionalist campaign.<sup>35</sup>

In the northern part of the Territory, the districts of Acaponeta and Santiago Ixcuintla were firmly under Constitutional control. On November 25, the federal column that had recently disembarked in San Blas was attacked at Sauta by a squad of revolutionaries, and the Constitutionalists managed to score an important victory. Meanwhile the Constitutionalists had advanced along the Southern Pacific Railroad line as far as Yago station. By early December their vanguard had pushed as far south as Navarette. Their advance sparked another exodus, and on December 6, Lucifer published a list of the families who had abandoned Tepic for the interior of the Republic. The list totalled 376 people, and it included most of the upper class of the region.<sup>36</sup>

Following the rebel attack on the federal column at Sauta, the postmaster at San Blas suspended mail deliveries because of the insecurity of the region around San Blas. This policy led to friction between the postmaster and the political prefect of San Blas. The prefect demanded that mail deliveries to Tepic be resumed via Jalcocotán, and he threatened to "oblige" the mail contractor to make the trip. The postmaster insisted that the roads were still dangerous, and he refused to turn the mail over to the contractor.

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<sup>35</sup> Lucifer, November 8, and 22, 1913.

<sup>36</sup> Copy of an affidavit by Crispín Larios, Tepic, November 27, 1913, made by Gobernación, February 13, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; and Lucifer, December 3 and 6, 1913.

According to the postmaster, the prefect had also clashed with the personnel of the telegraph office and the lower court judge over "difficulties of this sort" in the past few days.<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile, in the Territory's eastern region of Ixtlán del Río, the residents were also showing signs of a lack of confidence in the Huerta regime. On November 1, Lucifer reported that local elections had been held in Ixtlán "with complete order and the most absolute indifference." The "indifference" reported by the newspaper, might have been described better as protest, for only 500 votes were reportedly cast in the election. In the weeks that followed, the political situation in Ixtlán worsened, for on December 15, the town's political prefect sent a telegram to the jefe político advising Gil that the electoral college of Ixtlán was not installed because only one elector had presented himself, the remainder apparently having boycotted the process in the belief that the Huerta regime was doomed to defeat. In response to the situation, Gobernación ordered the jefe político to conduct new elections in Ixtlán.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Copy of Administrador Local de Correos [San Blas], José Rebeles, to Director General de Correos, Sección de Personal, December 28, 1913, made by Dirección General de Correos, January 22, 1914, enclosing Administración Local de Correos, San Blas, Tepic, to Visitador de la Primera División Postal en Guadalajara, December 8, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1.

<sup>38</sup> Lucifer, November 1, 1913; Gil to Gobernación, Tepic, December 15, 1913; Gobernación to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Mexico City, December 19, 1913; Gil to Gobernación, Tepic, December 21, 1913; and Gobernación to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Mexico City,

By mid-December, Buelna's revolutionary army was camped at the hacienda of La Escondida, a few kilometers from Tepic. Rather than wait for the rebels to attack Tepic, Jefe Político Gil advanced the soldiers and rural police force under his command to the hacienda. A furious battle ensued, and the federal soldiers forced the Constitutionalists to retreat toward El Rincón. Lucifer reported that twenty-seven Constitutionalists were killed in the battle, while the government forces allegedly had only seven killed and eight injured.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, Buelna and his revolutionary army were prepared to take Tepic.

#### 3.4 JEFE POLÍTICO DOMINGO SERVÍN

On December 15, Brigadier General Domingo Servín was appointed jefe político and military commander of the Territory of Tepic, to replace Miguel Gil. Servín arrived in Tepic on December 26, accompanied by a column of 400 troops. That same day, the federal forces left Tepic to engage in battle with the revolutionaries who were now camped at the Puga hacienda. When the government forces arrived, the revolutionaries took cover in the buildings and high points in the hacienda, and they displayed flags proclaiming "Viva the Constitutionalist Army." The fighting broke out at 5:30 that afternoon, and by 8:30 the revolutionaries began to

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December 31, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/12/2.

<sup>39</sup> Copy of an affidavit by Crispín Larios, Tepic, December 19, 1913, made by Gobernación, February 11, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; and Lucifer, December 20, 1913.

abandon the hacienda, taking advantage of the nightfall to make their escape. Lucifer reported that twenty-one Constitutionalists had been killed in the battle, while the federal forces allegedly had only one killed and six injured.

One group of sixty revolutionaries reorganized under Santos Rentería, and reappeared in San Luis de Lozada. From there they rode to San Pedro Lagunillas, but were pursued by government soldiers and rurales. The revolutionaries were overtaken by the government forces and defeated, with forty-five of them reportedly killed in the battle.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile, on December 27, Servín took the formal declaration of office as jefe político of the Territory of Tepic. On December 30, Servín issued an appeal to the hacendados and farmers of the Territory to rid Tepic of what the jefe político called the "invading rabble of this Territory." Servín requested five saddled horses from each hacienda, and he asked the farmers and small landowners to aid in the project by "spontaneously donating" more saddled horses. Servín asserted that he knew well that the residents of the Territory were "enemies of revolts and seditions," and he asked for their cooperation in the formation of "mutual security guard forces" throughout the Territory to protect

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<sup>40</sup> Gobernación memorandum, December 15, 1913; Gil to Gobernación, Tepic, December 15, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/12/2; copy of an affidavit by Crispín Larios, Tepic, December 27, 1913, made by Gobernación, February 11, 1914; copy of an affidavit by Juan Meza, San Pedro Lagunillas, December 31, 1913, made by Gobernación, February 13, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; and Lucifer, December 27 and 31, 1913, and January 3, 1914.

them from attacks by what he termed "the enemies of order and tranquillity."

In addition to this appeal to the residents of the Territory, Servín made a request to Gobernación to authorize an increase in the Territory's rural police force from 152 men to 400 men. The jefe político asserted that the larger force was needed to launch an active campaign against the "thick gangs of rebels." Servín reported that the gangs were rustling cattle, both for food and to sell to the slaughter houses, and he alleged that shipments of cattle were being made to the neighboring State of Sinaloa.<sup>41</sup>

Following their loss at the Puga hacienda, many of the revolutionaries were sighted in the area of San Blas, where the local postmaster described them as "defeated and dispersed, wandering in different directions." Eventually the Constitutionalists regrouped in Santiago Ixcuintla. With the fortunes of the revolutionaries at a low point, Martín Espinosa wrote to Carranza to advise the First Chief of his decision to go to the United States for the "complete cure" of his injured leg. Meanwhile, the Constitutionalists retained control of the northern region of the Territory. In Tuxpan, Carlos Sánchez, the "socialistic" prefect ousted

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<sup>41</sup> Declaration of acceptance of the Jefatura Política, Tepic, December 27, 1913; Servín y V. to Gobernación, Tepic, December 27, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/913/12/2; and Servín y V. to Gobernación, Tepic, December 30, 1913, enclosing a circular memorandum from Servín y V. to Prefectos Políticos del Territorio, Tepic, [December 30, 1913], AGN-G, 1a/913/13/1.



from office during the Madero period, took over once again as subprefect of the district.<sup>42</sup>

On January 2, the revolutionaries continued the campaign in the southern region of the Territory by attacking Compostela. The rebels succeeded in taking control of a section of the town. The following day, however, a column of government soldiers arrived, and the rebels were driven out of the town.<sup>43</sup>

That same day, a column of government troops set out from Tepic on a campaign to restore the authority of the Huerta government in the northern regions of the Territory, which had remained under Constitutionalist control since the beginning of December. On January 4, the federal soldiers encountered a Constitutionalist army of 600 to 800 soldiers in the vicinity of El Gileño, located near the hacienda of Salazares. The rebels retreated to Nanchi Station, where they were pursued by the federal column. On January 5, a battle broke out, and after two hours of fighting, the rebels retreated in a train they had prepared for just such a

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<sup>42</sup> Copy of Administrador Local de Correos [San Blas], José Rebeles, to Director General de Correos, Sección de Personal, San Blas, December 28, 1913, made by Dirección General de Correos, January 22, 1914, enclosing Administración Local de Correos, San Blas, Tepic, to Visitador de la Primera División Postal en Guadalajara, Jal., December 28, 1913, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1; Martín Espinosa to Carranza, Hermosillo, December 28, 1913, VC, 5/707; and Lucifer, January 3, 1914.

<sup>43</sup> Copy of an affidavit by Refugio Castañeda, Compostela, January 3, 1914, made by Gobernación, February 13, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/14/2; and Lucifer, January 7, 1914.

purpose. Lucifer reported that fourteen Constitutionals were killed in the battle, while government forces suffered two casualties.

The federal troops followed the Constitutionals to the south shore of the Santiago River, near Yago. The two armies battled again, and according to questionable reports in Lucifer, fifty rebels were killed in the encounter, while the federal army had only one killed and ten injured. To prevent the federal troops from pursuing them, the Constitutionals burned the wooden railroad tressel at Yago. The Constitutionals camped on the El Tesorero mountain situated on the north bank of the river, and the government troops began to build rafts to cross the river in order to continue their pursuit of the revolutionaries. On January 16, government soldiers battled a group of Constitutionals at the Navarrete hacienda. According to Lucifer, twenty-nine revolutionaries were killed in the fighting. No mention was made of government casualties.<sup>44</sup>

On January 5, the German Legation informed the Mexican government that the situation in San Blas had become "quite critical." The German Legation reported that the garrison posted at the port was comprised of, at most, one hundred men, and the Germans expressed their fear that the people would "rise up and commit the customary depra-dations." They asked the Mexican government to take the necessary measures

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<sup>44</sup> Lucifer, January 3, 7, 10, 17, and 28, 1914.

to prevent injuries and damages to their economic interests. Gobernación asked the jefe político to provide a report on the situation in San Blas, and Servín replied that there was a garrison of 125 men stationed at the port, and that neither the garrison commander nor the prefect had reported that the town was threatened. Servín gave his assurances that nothing new was happening there.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile, the Huerta government made further plans to defend the Territory of Tepic against the Constitutionalists. In January, the Territory once again fell under the control of Mariano Ruiz, when Huerta appointed Ruiz the chief of military operations for the Division of the West. Huerta also extended a promise to Jefe Político Servín to send a contingent of 200 men within a month to bolster the government force in Tepic. One indication of just how desperate Servín assessed his situation to be in the Territory of Tepic, was his request to Gobernación on January 23, for permission in the meantime to utilize criminal offenders who had received sentences of approximately two years, for military service. Servín argued that these offenders would not only be valuable in the military defense of the Territory, but that the federal and municipal treasuries would also benefit from such a program by not having to incarcerate these offenders. Nevertheless, Gobernación officially ref-

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<sup>45</sup> Relaciones Exteriores to Gobernación, Mexico City, January 7, 1914, enclosing a transcript of a verbal communication from the German Legation to Relaciones Exteriores, January 5, 1914; and Servín to Gobernación, Tepic, January 15, 1914, AGN-GPR, 50/11.

used to grant Servín permission to resort to the use of prisoners to battle the revolutionaries.<sup>46</sup>

Following the unsuccessful campaign to capture Tepic, Buelna was forced to regroup his forces and replenish their supply of armaments. Frustrated by the lack of support from Carranza and Obregón, Buelna sent his brother, Miguel, with fifteen bars of silver to purchase weapons in the United States. Carranza, however, was determined to maintain control of the revolutionary campaign, and Miguel Buelna was detained in Nogales by Constitutionalist customs officials who refused to allow him to cross the border with the silver. Miguel Buelna was forced to purchase the weapons through established Constitutionalist channels, causing a full month's delay. Tensions between Obregón and Rafael Buelna were aggravated when Obregón further slowed the arms delivery by subjecting the shipment to a rigorous inspection in San Blas, Sinaloa.<sup>47</sup>

Meanwhile, Lucifer reported that Buelna had abandoned his troops in the Territory, and that he had absconded with the funds belonging to the revolutionary movement. The unfounded reports alleged that Buelna was living in luxury in the United States, while his men anxiously waited for these supplies. Like the disinformation with regard to cas-

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<sup>46</sup> Lucifer, January 21, 1914; Servín to Gobernación, Tepic, January 23, 1914; and Gobernación to Servín, Mexico City, January 25, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1.

<sup>47</sup> Valadés, pp. 51-52; and Aguilar Camín, La frontera, p. 397.

ualty statistics in the battles between government troops and the revolutionaries, this false report points to the propagandistic style of Lucifer and the continued allegiance of the newspaper to the Huerta government. This attitude of the newspaper serves as a barometer for measuring the fortunes of the revolutionary campaign, for Lucifer tended to be most supportive of the government when the opposition was at its weakest.<sup>48</sup>

In late January, an artillery section arrived in San Blas to reinforce the federal forces in the Territory. The section was reportedly well equipped with artillery, machine guns, ammunition, and provisions. A group of nurses and medical supplies arrived with the artillery section. The new section was forced into action immediately, for on January 31, the government forces battled the Constitutionalists at the Salazares hacienda. The rebel army was estimated to have numbered 800 men, and they reportedly had good mounts and were well equipped. However, with the addition of the artillery section, the federal army proved to be the superior force. The battle lasted until the following day, when the rebels were forced to flee over the Santiago River. Lucifer reported that eighty revolutionaries had been killed in the battle, while federal casualties were said to have included thirteen dead and twenty-six injured.

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<sup>48</sup> Lucifer, January 21 and 31, 1914.

On February 10, the federal army crossed the Santiago River to begin the campaign in the northern region of the Territory, which had now been under Constitutionalist control for over two months. A battle took place at the San Antonio hacienda, where the federal troops succeeded in driving the revolutionaries from their positions. Later that month the federal army reoccupied Santiago Ixcuintla and Tuxpan, and replaced the local governments with new appointments.<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, in Tepic, the feud between the honorary German Consul, Eugenio Hildebrand, and Jefe Político Servín continued. Perhaps miffed over the appeals that had been made by the honorary consul through the German Legation, or perhaps jealous of the influence that Hildebrand had long been accustomed to in the Territory of Tepic, Servín sent a request to Gobernación to consult with the Secretariat of Foreign Relations to inform the territorial government exactly what "jurisdictional perimeter" Hildebrand enjoyed as honorary consul.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Lucifer, January 31, February 4, and 11, 1914; copy of Servín to Gobernación, Tepic, February 11, 1914; Gobernación to Cosme O. Frayde, Mexico City, February 18, 1914; Servín to Gobernación, Tepic, March 3, 1914; and declaration by J. Luis Bertrand, Santiago Ixcuintla, February 26, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1.

<sup>50</sup> Servín to Gobernación, Tepic, March 23, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/12/2.

On March 3, Carranza sent a memorandum to Commander of the Army of the Northwest Alvaro Obregón, in which the First Chief dictated his instructions on how the military campaign on the west coast should be conducted, and in which he gave Obregón the broadest authority over both military operations and civil administration in the States of Sonora, Sinaloa, Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Colima, and the Territory of Tepic. Regarding the Territory of Tepic, Carranza specifically instructed Obregón to incorporate Rafael Buelna's brigade into his troops when Obregón's army corps arrived in the Territory, until they had taken absolute possession of Tepic. Once this had been carried out, Buelna was to remain in Tepic as military commander and jefe político, along with the troops of his brigade, whom Carranza described as being "strictly indispensable to maintain order and to repel the incursions by small bands that could go there from other States."<sup>51</sup>

By the end of February, the government began to encounter difficulties in meeting the payroll for the civil servants of the Territory. The government was forced to resort to loans from the Aguirre company in order to meet government obligations.<sup>52</sup> Meanwhile, the Huerta government contin-

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<sup>51</sup> Alvaro Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros en campaña, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959), p. 103.

<sup>52</sup> A. de la Lama to Ignacio Alcocer, Mexico City, March 6, 1914; and memorandum entitled "Situación de fondos en la Administración de Rentas del Territorio de Tepic del 21 de febrero ppd. a la fecha," March 9, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1.

ued to drag its feet with regard to investigating the workers' complaints that the Aguirre company was not complying with the minimum wage schedule approved in the convention of July 1912. Finally, on April 15, the Department of Labor commissioned a labor inspector to visit the factories of Colima and the Territory of Tepic to ensure that the wage schedule was being fulfilled. By then, however, the Constitutionalists were beginning their sweep into the Tepic, and the inspector was ordered to return to Mexico City before having arrived in the Territory. The Aguirre factories in Tepic remained to be inspected.<sup>53</sup>

During the final weeks of the Huerta regime in the Territory of Tepic, a dispute arose between the ayuntamiento of San Blas and the estate of General Leopoldo Romano, a former jefe político during the Porfiriato. In a petition to Huerta dated April 15, 1914, the municipal president of San Blas appealed for Huerta's help in overcoming obstacles that had been presented by the Romano estate with regard to the improvements to the port of San Blas that recently had been approved by the Huerta government. The Romano estate had managed to obtain an amparo (an overriding judicial writ) dated October 2, 1912, from the district judge, which in effect blocked the project. According to the municipal

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<sup>53</sup> Director del Departamento del Trabajo, "A quien corresponde," Mexico City, April 15, 1914; telegram from Miguel G. Casas to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Colima, April 24, 1914; and memorandum of a telegram from Director del Departamento del Trabajo to Miguel G. Casas, Mexico City, April 24, 1914, AGN-DT, 54/47.



president, the Romano estate had forced residents of the district to pay "exorbitant" rents for the use of the wilderness, which he maintained "correspond only to the ejidos of the people." Insisting that there was even more to what he called the "macabre history of the Romano estate and its henchmen," the municipal president traced this history of violence back to the epoch when General Romano had been jefe político, when it was alleged that Romano bilked landowners by having them deposit their deeds with him in confidence, never to see them again. The municipal president went on to allege that the representative of the Romano estate had been charging the "needy" who went to gather palm tree fronds, wood, and other products from the coast for use in the construction of houses or other jobs. These fees were being collected despite the disposition from the Lands Agency in Tepic which authorized the free extraction of these products by order of the secretary of Industry. While the Huerta regime did not last long enough to act on this appeal from the local government of San Blas, it is significant that such a challenge to the powerful Romano family was submitted to the Huerta government. Not only does it indicate that the Huerta government was perceived with a certain amount of confidence by the hopeful residents of San Blas, but it is evidence of the climate of social change that had arrived in the Territory with the Revolution.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Presidente Municipal Luis G. Lecluiga to Huerta, San Blas, April 15, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/12/2.

Another incident that provides some indication of the political climate toward the end of the Huerta period, especially with respect to Huerta's rivalry with the United States government of Woodrow Wilson, involved a Canadian citizen who lived and practiced medicine in Tepic, Dr. Guillermo (William) Brente. According to statements made by the Canadian doctor—which were subsequently verified by the Constitutionalist government—popular demonstrations were held in Tepic because of the national ardor that had been aroused by the Huerta government when it divulged the "false and deceitful" impression that the United States had declared war on Mexico. These demonstrations were reportedly of a hostile character, and they were directed toward foreigners, principally North Americans, who were judged to be accomplices of their government. Unfortunately for Dr. Brente, the demonstrators were unable to appreciate that he was not a citizen of the United States, but a Canadian citizen. During one of these demonstrations held on April 27, this mistaken identity led to the destruction of Dr. Brente's office, furniture, reference books, surgical instruments, and medications, which was later estimated to have come to a total value of \$4,975. The incident led to the even greater loss of Dr. Brente's services in the Territory, because the Canadian physician who had gained a reputation for providing important medical help to the needy classes in the Territory, decided to relocate in Mazatlán.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Dr. Guillermo Brente to Carranza, Mazatlán, June 25, 1917, which includes an inventory of the physician's

By May 1, conditions in the Territory had deteriorated to the point that Jefe Político Servín found himself obliged to send a telegram marked "urgent" to the secretary of Gobernación, in which he described the situation in Tepic as "untenable." Servín beseeched the secretary to arrange for the delivery of funds, reminding him that government employees there were owed two months salary. The jefe político advised the secretary that "under personal credit," he had obtained \$50,000 from the Aguirre company. He reported having gathered another \$18,000 from "private donations" for war expenses. Servín also mentioned that he had acquired cereals and other provisions from private persons, and he claimed these would be distributed as soon as possible.<sup>56</sup>

At the end of April, the main corps of the Constitutionalist Army of the Northwest began to invade the Territory. On May 5, by orders from Obregón, Constitutionalist brigades under the command of Generals Manuel M. Diéguez, Lucio Blanco, and Rafael Buelna surrounded the federal garrison in Acaponeta. The federal garrison consisting of 1,600 men under the command of General Solares surrendered without a battle. The Constitutionalist army took possession of more than two thousand mausers, three cannon, and

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losses; telegram from Guillermo Ledrente (*sic*) to M. Aguirre Berlanga, Mazatlán, September 7, [1917]; J.M. Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, [n.d.]; and Government of Nayarit to Gobernación, Tepic, June 27, 1917, AGN-GPR, 220/52.

<sup>56</sup> Copy of a telegram from Servín to Gobernación, Tepic, May 1, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1.

one million cartridges. Many of the federal troops voluntarily incorporated themselves in the Constitutionalist ranks, while the commanders and officers were placed under arrest and transported to Hermosillo. In the days immediately following the capture of Acaponeta, the Constitutionlists regained control of Rosamorada, Tuxpan, and Santiago Ixcuintla.

On May 15, the Constitutionlists attacked the city of Tepic, which was defended by 2,000 federal soldiers. After twenty-four hours of battle, the Constitutionlists had completely routed the federal army, inflicting 150 casualties, taking 1,000 prisoners, and capturing an important booty of war supplies. Many of the prisoners were scarcely fifteen years old, and had recently enlisted for the purpose of fighting the Yankee invasion in Veracruz. Nevertheless, by orders from Obregón, some prisoners were sent before a firing squad, much to the consternation of Tepic society. The Constitutionlists lost about 100 men in the battle, including Colonel Soto who had been an important officer in Rafael Buelna's brigade.

The battle of Tepic proved to be an early indication of the rift that was developing within the Constitutionalist movement. According to Obregón, a large body of federal soldiers managed to escape the city, and in their escape they burned the railroad bridge over the Santiago River, causing as much damage as they possibly could to the tracks

as they went. Obregón blamed General Lucio Blanco for having allowed half of the federal garrison to escape because Blanco had not followed Obregón's orders to take up positions at the south end of Tepic, and not to undertake any attack until Diéguez initiated the attack from the north with infantry and artillery. Apparently Blanco had suspected that Obregón's strategy had been designed to allow Diéguez's brigade to enter Tepic first in order to gain control of the best positions and booty in the city, and this prompted Blanco to move prematurely. In retrospect, Blanco's suspicions were probably justified, although his failure to execute the battle plan made the victory at Tepic somewhat less decisive than it would have been had Blanco followed Obregón's orders.<sup>57</sup>

Servín and the soldiers, federal rurales, and territorial police who had managed to escape from the city left the Territory via the mountain pass La Garita de Jalisco. On May 17, Roberto Quintero, the political prefect of Ixtlán del Río, sent a telegram to Gobernación, to inform the secretariat that he was the "only remaining political authority in the Territory," and that he did not know the whereabouts of Jefe Político Servín. Quintero asked for permission to incorporate with the column of Colonel Alvear, and to march to Guadalajara, because a powerful rebel column was approaching in their direction. On May 18, Gobernación

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<sup>57</sup> Obregón, pp. 115-20; Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol 2, p. 505; and Aguilar Camín, La frontera, pp. 396-98.

approved Quintero's request, leaving the Territory of Tepic completely under Constitutionalist control.<sup>58</sup>

Thus ended the Huerta period in the Territory of Tepic. The Huertista administration, which had begun with hopeful support from the landowners and business classes of the Territory, had enjoyed only a few months of power before its authority was seriously challenged by the Constitutionalists. A series of three Huertista jefes políticos attempted to govern the Territory, but they all failed as Tepic fell increasingly under the control of the revolutionaries, led by the audacious young rebel leader, Rafael Buelna.

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<sup>58</sup> Guerra y Marina to Gobernación, Mexico City, July 2, 1914, AGN-GPR, 26/29; Declaration by 1/er Comandante Alfonso Garmendia, et al., May 16, 1914, attached to Garmendia to Gobernación, San José del Conde, June 30, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/913/13/1; telegram from Roberto Quintero to Gobernación, Ixtlán del Río, May 17, 1914; copy of a telegram from Gobernación to Roberto Quintero, Mexico City, [May 18, 1914]; and Gobernación to Huerta, Mexico City, May 18, 1914, AGN-G, 1a/914/9/1.

## Chapter IV

### THE TERRITORY OF TEPIC AND THE POLITICS OF THE CONVENTION OF AGUASCALIENTES, 1914-1915

#### 4.1 THE WIDENING RIFT

The victory over the Huerta regime was not yet complete when the revolutionary movement began to divide into opposing camps. Venustiano Carranza had already begun to perceive Pancho Villa to be a threat to his leadership by early 1914. Carranza decided to travel from Coahuila to Chihuahua to meet face to face with Villa to alleviate the tensions that had grown between them. Meanwhile, Secretary of War Felipe Angeles resigned from the Carranza government. Angeles entered the United States, travelled by train to El Paso, Texas, and crossed back into Mexico at Ciudad Juárez, arriving in Chihuahua before Carranza, to join the Villa camp. As a result of the recent American occupation of Veracruz, Carranza chose the difficult trek through the deserts and mountains of northern Mexico, rather than enter the United States and risk damaging his image as a fervent nationalist, and it was not until March that he arrived in Chihuahua. Carranza and Villa failed to come to an understanding, however, and the hostilities between them grew in the months following Carranza's visit, as Villa continued to

act independently, challenging Carranza's authority.<sup>1</sup>

The Constitutionalist Army of the Northwest led by Alvaro Obregón was sweeping through the Territory of Tepic when the rift between Carranza and Villa began to widen. In Tepic, a dispute between Obregón and Rafael Buelna broke out along similar lines, and where Obregón chose to remain loyal to Carranza, Buelna's loyalties shifted to the Villista camp. The relationship between Obregón and Buelna had already been strained earlier in the year when Buelna, anxious to maintain the momentum of his campaign against the Huerta government, clashed with Obregón who refused to extend enough equipment and manpower to allow Buelna to complete the campaign in Tepic. There was every indication that with only a modicum of support from Obregón, Tepic could very easily have been captured by Buelna's vanguard battalion as early as December 1913, or soon into the new year. Nevertheless, it appears that Carranza's strategy was to curtail the advance of the Army of the Northwest along the Pacific coast, thereby allowing Huerta to concentrate the main part of his forces against Villa's Division of the North.<sup>2</sup>

As soon as Obregón received news that Tepic had been captured and that difficulties had arisen between Generals Diéguez and Blanco as a result of Blanco's failure to follow

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<sup>1</sup> Hall, p. 52; Ulloa, vol. 4, p. 19; and Aguilar Camín, La frontera, pp. 398-404.

<sup>2</sup> Gilly, pp. 103-05.



the orders for the attack on Tepic, Obregón set out for Tepic by railroad handcar. Having resolved the problem that had arisen between the generals in Tepic, Obregón returned to his military headquarters in Casa Blanca, Sinaloa. The experience of the breakdown of authority during the battle of Tepic, and the subsequent problems with Blanco and Buelna, seem to have prompted Carranza to activate the advance of Obregón's Army of the Northwest on the center of the country. On May 16, Obregón received the order from Carranza to move speedily toward Mexico City, because Carranza, according to Obregón, "had begun to suspect the conduct of Villa and Angeles." Obregón left General Ramón F. Iturbe in charge of the campaign in Sinaloa, and translated his military headquarters from Casa Blanca to Tepic.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, in accordance with the orders that had been issued by Carranza prior to the advance of the Constitutionalist Army of the Northwest into the Territory of Tepic, Rafael Buelna took charge as jefe político. Buelna immediately began to organize the municipal government in the capital, appointing Carlos C. Echeverría as municipal president. When Obregón arrived in Tepic, he reprimanded Buelna for having appointed civil authorities. Obregón ordered that Buelna be relieved as jefe político by General Juan Dozal. There were violent discussions between Obregón and Buelna, and Carranza was notified about the altercation. Carranza temporarily resolved the dispute in Buelna's favor,

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<sup>3</sup> Obregón, p. 121-22; and Hall, pp. 52-53.

and Buelna remained in power in Tepic for the time being. Nevertheless, with Obregón's presence in the Territory, Buelna's government was overshadowed by the chief commander of the Army of the Northwest.<sup>4</sup>

Obregón also clashed with the clergy in the Territory. In his chronicle of the campaign, Obregón accused the Catholic clergy in Tepic of having interfered in political affairs during the Huerta period. Obregón claimed that the clergy had gone to the point of becoming the patron of two newspapers in the city, El Hogar Católico and El Obrero de Tepic, which he alleged had defended the Huerta government and attacked the Constitutionalists. A military tribunal was convened, and Bishop Andrés Segura was found guilty of "antirevolutionary work," for which he was sentenced to eight years in prison. The bishop was incarcerated, and eight priests allegedly involved in what Obregón called "defamatory work" against the Constitutionalist movement, were taken to the border at Nogales, and deported to the United States. The charges against the Tepic clergy appear to have been trumped up, and apparently Obregón resorted to the anticlerical issue to reassert himself as a radical in light of the criticism from supporters of Blanco and Buelna who were becoming suspicious of the leadership of Carranza and Obregón. Within Tepic, however, Obregón's decision to persecute the clergy caused widespread rancor among the Territory's inhabitants, and this ill will toward Obregón and

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<sup>4</sup> Peña y Peña, p. 30; and Obregón, pp. 120-25.

the Constitutionalists in general, would remain for years to come.<sup>5</sup>

Because of the sudden urgency to set out for the campaign south toward the center of the country, and because of the isolation of Obregón's Army of the Northwest from the Carranza headquarters, Obregón found it necessary to issue a new emission of provisional currency in Tepic, in order to finance the military campaign. The value of the vouchers issued totalled \$60,000, and in effect they were a forced tax on the business community of the Territory, for the commercial establishments were forced to honor the provisional currency. This served to make the business community even more bitter toward the Carrancista Constitutionalists than they already had been. The provisional currency was used to purchase supplies, and as there was no railroad track between Tepic and San Marcos, Jalisco, carts and mules also had to be acquired in order to transport the provisions and equipment across the mountains.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, on June 4, Obregón instructed Buelna to order Captain Cruz Medina to set out for the Islas Mariás on the steamship Union to capture the federal garrison on the islands, destroy the radio station, and return with the Constitutionalist soldiers who had been imprisoned there, as

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<sup>5</sup> Cumberland notes: "The evidence that the clerics had been responsible for the newspaper attacks is thin indeed, but it convinced Obregón." See Cumberland, Constitutionalist, p. 219; and Obregón, p. 123.

<sup>6</sup> Obregón, pp. 124-25.

well as with salt and other useful provisions that could be found on the islands. Medina set out for the Islas Mariás that same afternoon, arriving at María Magdalena Island at 4:00 the next morning. They surprised a platoon of eleven soldiers, who were taken prisoner. The radio transmitter was disconnected from its electric generator to prevent any communications from being made that could jeopardize the operation. Discovering that the director of the Islas Mariás penal colony, Manuel Navoa, had taken to sea in a boat headed for Manzanillo, Medina gave chase, catching up with Navoa and placing him under arrest. On orders from Obregón, the director of the penal colony underwent a court martial, and was shot by firing squad.<sup>7</sup>

Preparations for the march to the south of the Territory had already begun, when Obregón received a message from Villa requesting a conference by telegraph between the two generals. Obregón went to the telegraph office and the conference began. Villa initiated communications by relating to Obregón the problems Villa had encountered with Carranza, and he accused the First Chief of obstructing the advance of the Division of the North toward the center of the country. Villa suggested that he and Obregón arrive at an accord to continue operations on the center of the country without heeding Carranza. Obregón, however, resisted Villa's overture, and he encouraged Villa to remain loyal to the First

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 126-27.

Chief.<sup>8</sup>

On June 10, preparations for the march to San Marcos were complete, with more than 200 carts and 2,000 mules assembled for the journey. The 5th Battalion of Infantry from Sonora under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Esteban Baca Calderón, which formed part of General Diéguez's division, was sent to Ixtlán del Río to form an advance post. On June 12, Diéguez was appointed governor and military commander of Jalisco, and he established his military headquarters in Etzatlán, Jalisco, which became the temporary seat of Constitutionalist government in that State until such time as Guadalajara could be captured from the Huertista forces. Despite Obregón's charges that Lucio Blanco had disobeyed orders in the battle of Tepic, Blanco was promoted to commander of the cavalry division of the Army of the Northwest. Martín Espinosa, who had been convalescing in Durango, joined Obregón in Tepic following the Constitutionalist victory in the capital of the Territory. Although Espinosa had not yet fully recovered from his injuries, he accompanied Obregón on the campaign south toward Jalisco. On June 14, Obregón made his exit from Tepic with the remainder of his infantry which had been placed under the command of Generals Cabral and Hill, and the artillery under the command of Major Juan Mérito.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 127-28.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. 124-28.

Recognizing Buelna's power in the Territory, Obregón allowed Rafael Buelna to continue as jefe político and military commander of Tepic. When Obregón arrived in Ixtlán, however, he sent an order to Buelna ordering him to hand over the command of the Territory to General Juan Dozal. Infuriated by Obregón's underhandedness, Buelna went to Ixtlán with 200 men, found Obregón in his hotel, and ordered his arrest and execution by firing squad. Fortunately for Obregón, Lucio Blanco arrived in time to dissuade Buelna from placing Obregón before the firing squad. More violent discussions took place between Buelna and Obregón, and they culminated in the two men embracing each other, and the appointment of Buelna at the head of the vanguard of the Army of the Northwest. As part of the arrangement between Obregón and Buelna, one of Buelna's most trusted assistants, Carlos Echeverría, became jefe político of the Territory in Buelna's place.<sup>10</sup>

While Obregón and the main corps of the Army of the Northwest camped in Ixtlán, the rift between Carranza and Villa continued to grow wider. On June 18, Obregón prepared a message to Carranza, expressing his loyalty to the First Chief. Before transmitting the message to Carranza, Obregón gathered the principal officers of his army for their approval. All were in accord with Obregón, with the exception of Generals Buelna and Blanco, who asserted that no support should be pledged to Carranza until the problems

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<sup>10</sup> Peña y Peña, pp. 30-31.

between the First Chief and Villa had been resolved. The message of loyalty was sent, and within days Carranza ordered Obregón to continue his march toward Guadalajara. On June 23, Obregón left Ixtlán, and marched into the State of Jalisco.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.2 JEFE POLÍTICO CARLOS ECHEVERRÍA

On July 1, 1914, the new jefe político of the Territory, Carlos C. Echeverría, issued a budget of expenses for the fiscal year 1914-1915. The budget was ostensibly based on the budget for the fiscal year 1912-1913, the last budget submitted by a government recognized as legitimate by the Constitutionalists. However, features that had since been added by the Huertista government of Jefe Político Miguel Gil reappeared in Echeverría's budget. The new budget also included hefty raises in pay for the top three government positions: the jefe político's annual salary was increased from \$4,015 to \$6,570; the secretary of Government's salary went from \$3,285 to \$5,475; and the first official's salary rose from \$1,825 to \$2,920. The pay raises for these three top officials ranged from 60 percent to 66.7 percent.

The new budget also altered the salaries of the government district agents. Strangely enough, the government agents of the two most important districts of the Territory, Tepic and San Blas, received no pay increase, and indeed the

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<sup>11</sup> Obregón, pp. 128-31.

agent of Tepic had his salary cut by 9 percent. The agents of Santiago Ixcuintla and Ixtlán del Río were suddenly deemed to be worthy of salaries that were 33.3 percent higher than the agent of the capital city of Tepic. Echeverría apparently was favoring the government agents in districts that were under Buelna's control, and neglecting the government agents who were not directly affiliated with Buelna's clique. Echeverría defended the disparate pay hike by asserting that the increases were necessary because the importance of the districts of Santiago Ixcuintla and Ixtlán del Río demanded that "competent people" be attracted by the enhanced salaries. Echeverría's budget trimmed a number of clerical jobs both in the government of the Territory and in the local districts. Despite the increase in the work load of the remaining lower echelon government employees brought on by the paring down of the government work force, the salaries of these officials remained the same. This was in stark contrast to the hefty salary increases of certain upper level officials. While Buelna had a reputation for being a progressive, the budget introduced by the Buelnista Jefe Político Carlos Echeverría not only was modelled on the budget of the Huertista Miguel Gil, but was regressive with respect to the vast majority of government employees.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Carlos Echeverría, "Presupuesto de Egresos del Ramo de Gobernación que deberá regir durante el año fiscal de 1914 a 1915," Tepic, July 1, 1914, AGN-GPR, 77/52; and Juan Dozal to Gobernación, Tepic, September 9, 1914, enclosing Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic [Echeverría], to Hacienda y Crédito Público, Tepic, July 6, 1914, AGN-GPR, 20/12.



Meanwhile, in Guadalajara, Rafael Buelna prepared for the campaign to recover Mexico City from Huerta. Buelna took some time out from military activities to attend to personal matters. On July 20, he set out from Guadalajara to San Marcos by train, to accompany his wife and her father, Gervasio Sarría, a manager in the the Aguirre company, to San Marcos. Also travelling with the group was a daughter of the former provisional Jefe Político Juan Martín del Campo. The Revolution, it seemed, had swept through the Territory of Tepic, and now it was safe once again for the upper classes to return home. As for the young General Buelna, his future in the Territory seemed rosy, for not only did he command the loyalty of the current jefe político, but he had personal ties with the very important Aguirre company. When Buelna left at the end of July to participate in the conquest of the Huerta regime in Mexico City, he likely anticipated that at the very least he could hope to return as jefe político of Tepic as his share of the booty in the victory over Huerta.<sup>13</sup>

Following the collapse of the Huerta regime and the entry of the revolutionaries into Mexico City, Obregón summoned Echeverría to Mexico City. The jefe político took a one month leave of absence from his duties, and left for the Nation's capital accompanied by his private secretary, Miguel Buelna.<sup>14</sup> In the flush of the Constitutionalist victory,

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<sup>13</sup> Boletín Militar, Guadalajara, July 21, 26, and 29, 1914.

<sup>14</sup> Boletín Militar, August 8, 1914.

Echeverría may not have realized that his temporary leave of absence was to become permanent.

Meanwhile, the condition of the majority of the Territory's inhabitants was aggravated by inclement weather and problems deriving from the Revolution. In mid-August, train traffic between Tepic and Mazatlán came to a halt because heavy rains had swelled the rivers, washing out a number of bridges. Traffic between the two cities was reduced to travel by cart or by animal. Further disruptions to the economy of the Territory occurred when the currency that had been issued by Obregón in Tepic had to be taken out of circulation in August, when it was discovered that the bills had been counterfeited.<sup>15</sup> The uncertain political situation caused an added burden, for as the feud between Villa and Carranza escalated, the Carranza government refused to approve the budget that had been submitted by Jefe Político Carlos Echeverría.

While Echeverría was in Mexico City, General Juan Dozal—an appointee of Obregón—took over the administration of the government of the Territory, and on September 9, Dozal submitted the budget to the federal government for a second time. On September 25, Carranza approved the budget, and therefore in effect provided de facto recognition of Dozal as jefe político of Tepic.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Boletín Militar, August 21, and 22, 1914.

<sup>16</sup> Juan Dozal to Gobernación, Tepic, September 9, 1914; Gobernación, Sección 1/a, Memorandum, "Presupuesto de Tep-

Meanwhile in Mexico City, a remedy to the disintegration of the revolutionary movement was being sought. On the one hand, those loyal to Carranza wanted the various revolutionary caudillos to acquiesce to the authority of the First Chief. Those opposed to Carranza, however, looked for a solution in a convention of the leaders of the various factions, from which it was hoped a revolutionary government would emerge.

Rafael Buelna played a leading role in the revolutionary committee which met in Mexico City from October 1 to 4. When the committee was dissolved in favor of establishing a convention, Buelna was instrumental in setting up the Convention of Aguascalientes. While Buelna did not play a major part in the Convention's assembly, he was active behind the scenes making frequent trips between Aguascalientes and Zacatecas, where Villa had established his headquarters. Buelna was also a member of the committee commissioned by the assembly to travel to Morelos to invite Zapata to send delegates to the Convention. According to Buelna's biographer, José C. Valadés, Buelna and Felipe Angeles were the ones who most influenced Zapata to accept the invitation to send delegates to Aguascalientes.

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ic," September 19, 1914; and Gobernación to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Mexico City, October 12, 1914, AGN-GPR, 20/12.

The very fact that the Convention took place was a setback for Carranza and a challenge to his leadership. Carranza chose not to participate in the Convention, although Obregón did attend. The assembly disavowed the Carranza government, and on November 1, it established a Conventionist government with Eulalio Gutiérrez as provisional president of the Republic. Moreover, on November 4, Buelna sent a message to Carranza urging the First Chief to step down from the leadership of the Revolution, rather than risk a continuation of civil war.<sup>17</sup>

The idea of statehood for the Territory of Tepic suddenly surfaced once again at the Convention of Aguascalientes. On October 28, the delegate from Aguascalientes, David G. Berlanga, presented an agenda of proposals to the Convention, which included a section dealing with a series of eleven so-called "geographic-economic reforms." The seventh proposition on the agenda dealt with the Territory of Tepic and it stated: "The Territory of Tepic will be elevated to the rank of State, annexing to said Entity the Cantons of Mascota and Autlán, which belong to the State of Jalisco." There is no indication of the proposition receiving any further mention in the Convention, although it did serve to keep the idea of statehood for Tepic alive.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Valadés, pp. 65-69; and Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960).

<sup>18</sup> "Proposiciones relacionadas con el Programa de Gobierno," submitted to the Convention of Aguascalientes by David G. Berlanga, October 28, 1914, Archivo General de la Nación,

Meanwhile in Tepic, Echeverría had returned to resume the administration of the jefatura política. The imminence of the rift in the revolutionary movement occasioned by the Convention, and the particularly active role of Echeverría's political patron, Buelna, in promoting the Convention and calling for the First Chief to resign, apparently prompted Carranza to hold back finances that were due the Territory. The money was eventually released, but not before Echeverría had been forced from office.<sup>19</sup> On November 10, Echeverría sent a message to General Coss expressing his loyalty to the First Chief, and specifically mentioning that he had no intentions of disavowing Carranza and joining in an armed movement against the First Chief. Carranza, however, could not take a chance on Echeverría's loyalty, and on November 12, Echeverría's short and ineffectual term of office came to an end when he was replaced once again by Juan Dozal.<sup>20</sup>

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Fondo Convención Revolucionaria de Aguascalientes, (cited hereafter as AGN-CA), 4/1.

<sup>19</sup> Echeverría to Gobernación, Tepic, October 30, 1914, enclosing El Administrador de Rentas del Territorio de Tepic to Echeverría, Tepic, October 20, 1914, in turn enclosing Tesorero Municipal [de Tepic], to Administrador de Rentas del Territorio, Tepic, October 19, 1914; and Gobernación to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Mexico City, November 6, 1914, AGN-GPR, 77/31.

<sup>20</sup> Boletín Militar, November 14, 1914; and record of the proceedings of the handing over of the office of Jefe Político by Carlos Echeverría to General Juan Dozal, November 12, 1914, attached to Juan Dozal to Gobernación, Tepic, November 13, 1914, AGN-GPR, 23/2.

On November 24, the Zapatistas occupied Mexico City, and Carranza was forced to flee to Veracruz. Villa's Division of the North entered the national capital on December 3, along with the government of the Convention. Obregón allied himself with Carranza, and he became Carranza's leading general. In Tepic, Dozal remained as jefe político although it was only a matter of weeks before Buelna would return to reclaim the Territory in the name of the government of the Convention.

#### **4.3 THE AGUIRRE TEXTILE FACTORIES**

Following the overthrow of the Huerta regime, the Carranza government set out to establish a working relationship between the workers and the factory owners. On September 25 and 26, the Board of Industrialists met in the assembly room of the School of Engineering in Mexico City. As a result of this meeting, the Department of Labor issued a questionnaire to the factory owners, as well as some proposals regarding worker benefits.

In response to the questionnaire, Fermín Maisterrena on behalf of the Aguirre company wrote that it "viewed with pleasure the tendency to improve the proletariat," and he asserted that the company had at any rate always attended to the well being of its workers. Maisterrena seized the opportunity to complain about the poor conditions of communications in the Territory of Tepic, noting particularly the

rail interruptions and the devastated roads, which he described as being the "principal obstacle" facing the company. Maisterrena reported that the only railroad in the Territory, the Southern Pacific Railroad, was paralyzed, forcing the company to resort to maritime transport through the port of San Blas, continuing from that point by mules and carts to the Bellavista and Jauja factories. The company administrator added that an extension of the railroad to the hacienda of La Quemada in the State of Jalisco, to meet the line leading to Guadalajara, would greatly facilitate the export of the company's manufacture.

Maisterrena claimed that, as much as the Aguirre company wanted to create more favorable circumstances for the workers in their factories, under the current "depressive" conditions it was unable to offer improvements to the workers above and beyond those stipulated by the minimum wage schedule, which he nevertheless assured was being fulfilled. Maisterrena reported that the company had always provided worker benefits for on the job accidents, including lodging and maintenance to those injured who needed them, medical assistance, medicines, and half-salary during their convalescence. The administrator also declared that, in conjunction with the government school system, the company was providing premises for schools and for dwellings for teachers in Bellavista.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Fermín Maisterrena for D.G. Aguirre Sucesores, to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, October 13, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

The workers, however, perceived the situation in much different terms. Workers from the Jauja factory wrote to the secretary of Industry to complain that they had been working only a four day week since October 1913, and that since April 1914, they were no longer being paid weekly, but only every fifteen days. The workers also alleged that they were not being paid in accordance with the 1912 wage schedule. They advised the secretary of Industry that the Jauja factory soon would be closing, making their situation "desperate." They beseeched the secretary to do what he could to remedy the situation, either by obliging the company to continue operations, or by having the government purchase the factory from the Aguirre company along with the property of La Laguna, where cotton could be sown immediately for use in the factory. They asked the secretary to consult with the Secretariat of Hacienda to determine the value of the Jauja factory, and they promised to pay for the factory "among all the operators who work in it, over a term of five years, in monthly or annual payments, working for our [their] own account and with a social character." The workers incidentally mentioned that they had forwarded an identical letter to the jefe político.<sup>22</sup>

On October 6, the director of the Department of Labor sent a telegram to the Aguirre company to inquire whether the company was disposed to sell the Jauja factory, and if

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<sup>22</sup> Leonardo P. Juarez et al., Operarios de la Fábrica de Jauja, to Ministro de Fomento de la República Mexicana, Tepic, September 27, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.



so, the price and conditions that would be acceptable to it. The director also asked the company to explain the reason why jobs had been suspended in the Jauja factory.<sup>23</sup>

The following day, a company representative replied to the director of the Department of Labor, advising him that the sale of the factories could not be resolved until the owners, who resided in Europe, had first been consulted. The company also denied that jobs in the factory had been suspended, and it assured the director that operations would continue as long as cotton was available.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, the secretary of Industry replied to the workers of the Jauja factory, advising them that the copy of the letter that they had reportedly sent through the jefe político had not yet arrived at the office of the Department of Labor. Apparently provisional Jefe Político Juan Dozal had declined to forward the workers' petition to the Department.<sup>25</sup>

Company administrator Fermín Maisterrena admitted that it was true that the workers in both the Jauja and Bellavista factories had been working only four days a week since

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<sup>23</sup> Director del Departamento del Trabajo to Srs. G. Aguirre, Sucs. [sic] [D.G. Aguirre Sucesores], Mexico City, October 6, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

<sup>24</sup> Telegram from D. Aguirre, Sucs. [sic] to Director, Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, October 7, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

<sup>25</sup> Secretaría de Fomento, Colonización, E Industria, to Ramón F. Pintado y demás firmantes, obreros de la fábrica Jauja, Mexico City, October 8, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

October of the previous year, and he also conceded that since April workers had been paid every fifteen days, rather than weekly as before. Maisterrena claimed that in both matters, these steps had been taken with the previous agreement of the workers, who allegedly had been "notified opportunely." Maisterrena attributed the four day work week to the "impossibility" of acquiring cotton as a result of the lack of transportation in the Territory, specifically the Southern Pacific Railroad, which was in need of repairs. As for the change from the weekly to the fifteen day pay period, the administrator claimed that it had been necessary to establish because of a lack of currency in small denominations. Maisterrena insisted that the workers in both the Bellavista and Jauja factories were being paid according to the minimum wage schedule approved by the Convention of 1912. He added that the company had not yet thought of closing these factories, asserting that this would be against the company's own interests. He claimed that the company had already purchased a sufficient quantity of cotton in the United States, but that the lack of railroad service in the Territory prevented its delivery. Maisterrena warned that the company's supply of cotton would only permit limited operations until mid-November, when it would be necessary to suspend jobs unless the company could deliver the cotton from the United States.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Fermín Maisterrena to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, October 15, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

On October 18, workers' representative Antonio Zepeda wrote to the Department requesting a mediator from the Labor Office. While Zepeda reported that the workers were already being paid weekly again, he went on to complain that part of the factory had been paralyzed and that it had been closed completely during that current week.<sup>27</sup> The Department of Labor, however, apparently accepted the company's explanation that the poor state of transportation routes in the Territory had resulted in a scarcity of cotton. It advised the workers of the situation, and it went on to indicate the absolute impossibility for the Aguirre company to improve the conditions of the workers, given the "current depressive circumstances."<sup>28</sup>

The Department of Labor advised the Southern Pacific Railroad of the problems suffered by the Jauja factory as a result of the paralyzation of railroad service in the Territory of Tepic, and it requested an explanation of the causes of this interruption.<sup>29</sup> The Southern Pacific Railroad company replied by advising the Department of Labor that the interruption of traffic in the Territory of Tepic was caused by the Revolution, although it gave its assurances that

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<sup>27</sup> Telegram from Antonio Zepeda to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, October 18, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

<sup>28</sup> Telegram from Director del Departamento del Trabajo to Gerente de la Fábrica Jauja, Mexico City, October 19, 1914; and Departamento del Trabajo to Antonio Zepeda, Mexico City, October 22, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

<sup>29</sup> Departamento del Trabajo to Agente General de Fletes y Pasajes del Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico, Mexico City, October 22, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

everything possible was being done to continue rail service in Tepic.<sup>30</sup>

When the Department of Labor asked the workers of the Bellavista factory to accept a nine hour day in place of the ten hours that they were accustomed to working, worker representative Enrique Elías replied that the workers were indeed willing to accept the reduced work day. Elías claimed that the workers "heartily applauded the attitude of the government in improving the situation of the proletarian class." He pointed out that the lack of cotton had left the workers with a four day week for a period of more than a year, and he further alleged that since the capture of Tepic by the Constitutionalist forces, the businessmen had raised the prices of the merchandise in a "scandalous way." This, claimed Elías, left the workers in a precarious situation. He reported that candlewick makers in the factory made between \$1.75 and \$2.50 per week, and that as a result of the cotton shortage the textile workers made about the same amount. Elías indicated that with the one hour less per day and the four day work week, the workers "would not make enough even to eat." Elías asked that the workers be given a small raise in pay, and he requested that an inspector be sent to the factory to determine whether the minimum wage schedule had been established properly, as well as to hear the complaints of several workers whose job classifications

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<sup>30</sup> Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México to Departamento del Trabajo, Mexico City, October 27, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

had apparently been overlooked, and who received no benefits and continued to earn 55 centavos per day.<sup>31</sup>

Similar complaints were expressed to the Department of Labor by Jauja workers' leader Antonio Zepeda. He informed the Department that the preparation and spinning sections of the factory had been closed since mid-October, while the rest of the factory—with the exception of the mechanics shop—had been shut down in the third week of October. Zepeda also alleged that the workers were not being paid for cleaning their machines, and he accused the company of not accurately tallying the production of the workers. He complained that the factory manager never wanted to show the wage schedule to the workers under the pretext that they would not understand it. Zepeda accused the company of taking advantage of the insecure employment situation by making the workers put in extra time, and he reiterated the workers' request for a mediator from the Department of Labor. With regard to the cotton shortage in the Jauja and Bellavista factories, and the company's allegations that it was caused by the lack of rail service in the Territory, Zepeda argued that there were workers who had been employed in the factory for forty years, when it had belonged to the Barrón, Forbes and Company and before the arrival of the railroad in the Territory, and that these workers could attest to the fact that the factory had never been paralyzed for lack of

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<sup>31</sup> Copy of Enrique G. Elías to Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, October 24, 1914, made by Departamento del Trabajo, AGN-DT, 84/18.

cotton. The labor leader asked: "Inasmuch as they have always transported from the port of San Blas on mules and carts, why not do it now, too?" He closed by asking for the protection of the Department of Labor against the "arbitrariness" of the manager of the Jauja factory, Alberto Stephens.<sup>32</sup>

Clearly, the Aguirre company felt threatened by the tide of the Revolution, and justifiably so, for the Revolutionary Convention taking place in Aguascalientes had taken a radical complexion dominated by an ideological interplay between the Villistas and the Zapatistas. Meanwhile, the Carranza government was forging ties with the labor unions, including the textile workers. The Aguirre company reacted by slowing down its operations, closing its factories, and pressuring its workers.

Fermin Maisterrena responded to the workers' allegations by assuring the Department of Labor that they were being paid according to the minimum wage schedule. Maisterrena answered the suggestion that the cotton shortage could have been resolved by mule transport from the port of San Blas as had been done before the construction of the railroad, by reminding the Department that the Jauja factory

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<sup>32</sup> Antonio Zepeda to Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, November 2, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4; Departamento del Trabajo to Gerente de la Fábrica Bellavista, Mexico City, October 30, 1914; Departamento del Trabajo to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Mexico City, October 30, 1914, AGN-DT, 84/18; and copy of Departamento del Trabajo to Gerente de la Fábrica Jauja, Mexico City, November 9, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

had been closed for several years before the company had acquired it. The company administrator explained that the construction of the railroad had caused the various transportation services that had existed before the railroad, including the once busy mule traffic and several ships that used to pass through the port of San Blas, to disappear. Maisterrena claimed that there was a scarcity of pack mules, which he alleged was caused by the Constitutionalist forces, who, in passing through the Territory earlier that year, had confiscated the mules for war service. The company administrator claimed that the mules had yet to be returned, thereby preventing the company from using these pack animals for transporting cotton to the factories. Maisterrena advised the Department that the Jauja factory had indeed been shut down, but he gave his assurances that the workers were receiving half the wage they would have earned working.<sup>33</sup>

The Aguirre company enlisted the support of Jefe Político Juan Dozal in their struggle with the workers. On November 16, Dozal informed the director of the Department of Labor about what Dozal termed the "gratuitous imputations" that had been made against the Jauja factory by its workers. Dozal confirmed the company's version that the cotton shortage had been the result of the disruptions in railroad service in the Territory for the past two and a half years. Dozal also verified the impossibility of trans-

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<sup>33</sup> Fermín Maisterrena to Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, November 16, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

port by mule pack because of the scarcity of mules which had been taken by the Constitutionalist forces when they passed through the Territory, and he added that on a recent trip to Mexico City and Guadalajara, he had personally lobbied with the First Chief and the staffs of Generals Obregón and Diéguez to rectify the situation regarding the mules. Dozal had clearly decided that the workers' complaints were out of line, and he stated that he had arrived at the conviction that some "mal-intentioned" were exploiting the "dullness of the ignorant," making the workers sign petitions and complaints that involved them in schemes that only worsened their situation. Dozal attributed the workers' protests to greed and envy, and he assured the director of the Department of Labor that had the complaints been remotely reasonable, he would have been the first to call the Aguirre company to order.<sup>34</sup>

Meanwhile, the Zapatistas and Villistas had occupied Mexico City, forcing the Carrancista government to flee to Veracruz. This left the Department of Labor under the control of the Conventionist government. Nevertheless, the workers of the Jauja and Bellavista factories fared no better under the Conventionist government than they had under the Carrancista government.

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<sup>34</sup> Juan Dozal to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, November 16, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.



On December 19, the Department of Labor replied to the Aguirre company expressing the Department's esteem for the company's aid to the workers during the work stoppage. The Department also advised the company that an inspector would be sent to visit the factory as soon as the present conditions changed.<sup>35</sup>

Apparently the Aguirre company had already established its influence with the Conventionist government, as it had with the Carrancistas. One can only speculate that Rafael Buelna—whose wife, Luisa Sarría, was the daughter of one of the Aguirre company's managers—provided at least one linkage between the company and the Conventionist government. The request by the Jauja workers to take over the ownership of the factory, and the complaints of the Bellavista and Jauja workers in general, had been overlooked by the Department of Labor for the sake of good relations with the latifundistas.

Despite the radical rhetoric that animated the Convention of Aguascalientes, labor conditions in the Territory under the Conventionist government failed to improve. Like the Carrancistas, the Conventionists—Rafael Buelna included—were ingrained with a petty bourgeois ideology, which predisposed them to the logic of bourgeois property rights over demands from the working classes for worker control and ownership of the factories.

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<sup>35</sup> Departamento del Trabajo to D.G. Aguirre Sucesores, Mexico City, December 19, 1914, AGN-DT, 73/4.

#### 4.4 JEFE POLÍTICO JUAN DOZAL

One of the less heroic figures to pass through the government of the Territory of Tepic was General Juan Dozal. Dozal's appointment as jefe político of the Territory was the result of the dispute between Obregón and Buelna when the Constitutionalist Army of the Northwest swept through Tepic in May 1914. While Obregón's designation of Dozal as jefe político was overridden by Carranza's orders restoring the government of the Territory to Buelna and eventually to one of Buelna's trusted aides, Carlos Echeverría, Dozal assumed the position of jefe político and military commander when Echeverría was summoned to Mexico City by Obregón in August 1914. Echeverría returned to Tepic in October to resume his duties, but the schism in the Convention of Aguascalientes that divided Constitutionlists from Conventionists led to the removal of Echeverría from the government of the Territory, and his replacement once again as jefe político by Dozal.<sup>36</sup>

As a result of the unpopularity of a number of Obregón's policies affecting Tepic, Dozal inherited a difficult situation in the Territory. Obregón's prosecution of Bishop Andrés Segura and eight priests from the Territory earlier that year left a feeling of bitterness among a large part of the population, for Tepic was by and large a region in which

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<sup>36</sup> Record of the proceedings of the handing over of the office of Jefe Político by Carlos Echeverría to General Juan Dozal, November 12, 1914, attached to Juan Dozal to Gobernación, Tepic, November 13, 1914, AGN-GPR, 23/2.

traditional Catholic beliefs and values still dominated. Obregón's levy of a war tax on the hacendados of the Territory, the forced emission of provisional currency, and the confiscation of mules for the campaign against Huerta alienated Tepic's landowners and commercial classes, and this resentment spread throughout the population as the effects of the economic depression caused by these measures were inevitably felt by all classes. Dozal attempted to reestablish relations with the powerful Aguirre company by siding with the factory owners in their dispute with the workers, but this only led to the further alienation of the working classes from Dozal's government.

One of the most bitter disputes involving the Dozal government was with the latifundista Rafael Valdivia. Valdivia refused to pay the war tax of \$20,000 that had been levied on him by Obregón on June 3, 1914, and on June 16, while Dozal provisionally occupied the jefatura política, Valdivia's properties were expropriated by order of Dozal. Valdivia lobbied with the Carranza government to have his properties restored, and in November, Dozal—once again in the jefatura política—submitted a report to the Carranza government opposing the restitution of the properties solicited by Valdivia. According to Dozal, Valdivia had acquired these properties illegally, through a loan sharking operation that included an agreement of retroactive sale when the loan payments, augmented by the excessive interest rates,

could not be met. Dozal alleged that many families in the Territory had been left in misery as the hacendado amassed his fortune through such methods. The jefe político further argued that Valdivia was guilty of tax evasion, because the valuations listed with the Revenue Department were "trivial" compared to the real value of his properties.<sup>37</sup>

Dozal remained loyal to Carranza following the division of the revolutionary forces that resulted from the Convention of Aguascalientes. In mid-December, Rafael Buelna, who had opted for the Villista camp, set out with an army of 500 men to regain the Territory of Tepic. On December 29, Buelna attacked the city of Tepic, and although the forces at the command of Dozal were numerically superior to Buelna's army, the jefe político abandoned the capital and fled to San Blas with his wife, a group of civil servants, and a part of his army. Buelna, however, remained in Tepic only a few hours, and when it was apparent that Dozal was retreating to San Blas, Buelna followed close on the trail of the Carrancistas to prevent them from fortifying themselves in San Blas.

Upon arriving in San Blas, Dozal embarked immediately for Mazatlán, accompanied by his wife and a few civil servants and military personnel, leaving the greater part of his army and the civil servants abandoned in the port along

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<sup>37</sup> Juan Dozal to Gobernación, Tepic, November 19, 1914, enclosing "Report by Juan Dozal on the Restitution of the Properties Solicited by Don Rafael Valdivia," November 18, 1914, AGN-GPR, 23/24.

with all the war supplies and food provisions. When he arrived in Mazatlán, Dozal reported that he had been forced to abandon Tepic because the Villista forces attacking the city were superior in number to his own. While in Mazatlán, Dozal reportedly dedicated himself to the purchase of American gold, for which he paid high rates of exchange. The former jefe político left Mazatlán in a government boat, accompanied by his wife, on the pretense of travelling to Veracruz via Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, to meet with Carranza. As soon as he had set sail, some members of his government presented an accusation against Dozal. Three days after having embarked, however, Dozal's ship was forced to return to Mazatlán, having run out of fuel. It was then discovered that Dozal had been sailing north to San Francisco, California, rather than south to Salina Cruz. Dozal was immediately arrested and placed under court martial, and on the night of January 23, 1915, he was executed by firing squad.<sup>38</sup>

#### 4.5 CONVENTIONIST GOVERNMENT IN TEPIC

With the hasty exit of the Dozal government from the Territory, Tepic became an important center for the Conventionist government which was coming to be more and more dominated by Pancho Villa. Villa left the Territory of Tepic in the hands of Rafael Buelna, who was also known as "El Granito de Oro" because of the gold tooth that decorated his

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<sup>38</sup> Ernesto Damy, "Informe," June 8, 1915, VC, 41/4512; and Valadés, pp. 73-74.

smile. Buelna, however, had returned to Tepic without one of his most able lieutenants, Rafael Garay, who had been killed in Mexico City a week after the Buelnistas had entered the nation's capital at Villa's side. The loss of Garay was the result of an argument between Buelna and Juan Banderas, a Zapatista from Sinaloa who had risen in arms against the Madero government. The argument led to a scuffle between the two men, and a threat by Banderas to kill Buelna. The incident was contained by bystanders, and Buelna left the hotel. Buelna's lieutenant, Garay, however, arrived at the hotel a few minutes later, and when he was informed of the incident he confronted Banderas, firing his pistol at him. Banderas returned the fire, killing Garay.<sup>39</sup>

Ironically, Buelna did not begin to implement the sweeping changes that would benefit the lower classes, but instead set out immediately to reverse the orders that had been given by Dozal for the expropriation of some of the haciendas in the Territory. On January 2, 1915, Buelna sent a telegram to the president of the Convention's Chamber of Deputies, claiming that the haciendas that had been placed under government control by Dozal not only had failed to produce profits for the public treasury, but moreover had proven to be a drain on the treasury because they did not yield enough even for their expenses. As such, Buelna requested permission to restore the lands to the latifundi-

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<sup>39</sup> Valadés, pp. 70-71.

stas.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile Buelna was having difficulty in placing a representative to the Convention's assembly. On January 7, Buelna was advised that his representative, Javier Urrea, had not been accepted by the Convention, and he was asked to designate a new representative. In a subsequent telegram to Buelna, the secretary of the Convention advised Buelna that the military leaders were permitted to send representatives in their place, on condition that these be persons "perfectly identified with the revolution, and who in some way have lent their services to it."<sup>41</sup>

Following Dozal's retreat from Tepic, the designated commander of the Carrancista campaign in the Territory of Tepic and southern Sinaloa was General Juan Carrasco. An illiterate farmer from El Potrero, in southern Sinaloa, Carrasco had risen in rebellion against the Huerta government in 1913, along with six other men from the community. Carrasco's star rose quickly with the successful campaign in the region against the Huerta regime, and by the end of 1914, General Ramón Iturbe, commander in chief of Sinaloa, placed Carrasco in charge of the campaign to recover the Territory of Tepic from the Villistas. One of the many corridos about Juan Carrasco that was sung not only throughout

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<sup>40</sup> Rafael Buelna to Presidente Soberana Convención Militar, Cámara Diputados, Tepic, January 2, 1915, AGN-CA, 3/1.

<sup>41</sup> L. Galván to Buelna, Mexico City, January 7, 1915, AGN-CA, 3/5; and Genaro Palacios Moreno to Buelna, Mexico City, January 11, 1915, AGN-CA, 3/2.

southern Sinaloa and the Territory of Tepic, but also throughout the entire country, and which reflects the political background of Carrasco's movement, went as follows:

Carrasco was not in accord  
 With the death of Madero,  
 With six armed soldiers  
 He rose up in El Potrero.

Carrasco is very offended  
 With the death of Madero,  
 For he is not a turncoat  
 Nor a traitor.

Fly little dove, fly,  
 Perch on this large rock,  
 For master of the Villistas  
 is General Carrasco.

One of the main themes of the corrido underscores the notion that the Villistas were traitors to the Constitutionalist cause. On the other hand, what is not expressed by this corrido is a similar feeling held by the Villistas that Carranza and his followers had betrayed the ideals of the Revolution.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Alvaro Espinosa Ramírez, Historia política del Estado de Nayarit, 1917-1931: Época revolucionaria, 1915 (Acapone-  
 ta: El Regionalista, 1931), pp. 17-18.



Meanwhile in Mexico City, the Conventionist government was proving to be innocuous. Faced with the same basic problems that had led to the demise of the Madero regime, but bound as it was by its predominantly petty bourgeois character, the Conventionist government failed to take the legislative steps toward the social changes needed to resolve the situation. One of the main protectors of the Conventionist government, however, was Zapata, who demanded the implementation of agrarian reform in accordance with the Plan of Ayala. When Zapata sensed that the Conventionist government was not about to institute a land reform according to the principal that "the land belongs to those who work it," Zapata and his followers left the capital and returned to their homes in Morelos. Villa also became disinterested in the fate of the Conventionist government, and he left the capital to concentrate on the consolidation of power in his own region of Chihuahua. This left the Conventionist government without an adequate power base, and Gutiérrez was forced to leave office and flee the capital. Gutiérrez was replaced by Roque González Garza on January 16, 1915, but González Garza was faced with the same demand by the Zapatistas to implement the Plan of Ayala. On January 28, Obregón reoccupied Mexico City in the name of Carranza, forcing the Conventionist government of González Garza to flee to Cuernavaca.

While the Conventionist government continued on its irresolute course, the Constitutionals continued to rally behind the leadership of Carranza, who had set up his government in exile in Veracruz. Carranza astutely cultivated support from a number of sources during this period, and he succeeded in amalgamating a wide variety of classes and interests into a national coalition that would carry him to power within a few months.

One of the bases of Carranza's national coalition was his agrarian reform program as defined by his Lands Law of January 6, 1915. This decree was formulated by Carranza's advisor Luis Cabrera, who had already delineated the main ideas of the program in a speech to Congress on December 5, 1914. Carranza's Lands Law decreed the creation of a National Agrarian Commission, state agrarian commissions, and local agrarian committees as vehicles to administer the agrarian reform. Governors and military commanders were authorized to order the expropriation of lands recommended by the state agrarian commissions within their jurisdictions, either to restore illegally seized lands to the villages, or to provide land grants to needy campesinos. These expropriations were to be provisional measures, and each case was to be reviewed individually by the National Agrarian Commission. Villages that received approval by the National Agrarian Commission were then to be issued definitive titles to the land by the national government. From

Carranza's perspective, the Lands Law of January 6, 1915, was politically expedient in that it attracted extensive support from the campesinos without actually compromising his personal bourgeois ideals and allegiances. To the campesinos and radical Constitutionalists, the decree suggested that the First Chief was committed to genuine agrarian reform; however, the provisional aspect of the expropriations, and the bureaucratic safeguard of the National Agrarian Commission allowed Carranza to backtrack once he had consolidated power, and to overturn decisions that had been made by state agrarian commissions and governors.<sup>43</sup>

Carranza also received the support of urban industrial workers. The urban proletarian class was relatively small, but it would provide an important contribution to the Constitutionalist movement. Gerardo Murillo (pseud. Dr. Atl) served as an important emissary between the Constitutionalists and the anarchosyndicalist Casa del Obrero Mundial. Alvaro Obregón was also effective in wooing the anarchosyndicalists by confiscating a Catholic monastery and college, and giving it to the Casa to use as a headquarters and meeting center. In mid-February the Casa entered into a pact with the Constitutionalists, in which the workers pledged their allegiance to Carranza in return for a commitment from the First Chief to recognize workers' rights and aspirations. By early March, more than 7,000 workers from the

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<sup>43</sup> Cumberland, Constitutionalist, pp. 233-36; and Silva Herzog, vol. 2, pp. 166-73, including a copy of the Law of January 6, 1915, pp. 203-11.

Mexico City area had joined the Constitutionalist Army, organized into six "Red Battalions." Nationwide, approximately 12,000 urban workers were inducted into the Constitutionalist cause. While the immediate gains for the workers were quite limited compared to the crucial military support lent to the Constitutionalist Army, the recognition of the labor movement as a distinct element of Mexican society that the Casa had won from Carranza would prove to be an important victory for the workers in future negotiations.<sup>44</sup>

Meanwhile in Tepic, Buelna felt confident enough to continue the campaign against the Constitutionalists in the northern part of the Territory. He succeeded in driving Carrasco out of Acaponeta, and pursued the Constitutionalist army to La Muralla, a strategic point located between Acaponeta and Escuinapa. Buelna placed Manuel A. Gándara in charge of the offensive into Sinaloa. Colonel Gándara and his army arrived at La Muralla on February 3, and very early the following morning the battle for La Muralla began. Carrasco had the advantage of good defensible positions, and despite two days of continuous battle, the Buelnistas were unable to defeat Carrasco before reinforcements from General Herrera's army had arrived from Mazatlán. Nevertheless, after two more days of heated battle, Gándara finally drove

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<sup>44</sup> Cumberland, Constitutionalist, pp. 255-62; John Mason Hart, Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class, 1860-1931 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), pp. 130-36; and Silva Herzog, pp. 166-74, including a copy of the Casa del Obrero Mundial manifesto of February 17, 1915, pp. 211-17.

the Constitutionals from their positions and won La Muralla, forcing Carrasco to retreat to Escuinapa.

Buelna decided to pursue Carrasco in an attempt to take Mazatlán. Carrasco's advance force was dislodged from Gacho Station, and on February 16, Buelna's troops attacked Carrasco's army in Escuinapa. The battle began at two in the afternoon, and the two armies fought all night. About 400 Buelnista soldiers were reportedly killed in this battle, and Carrasco's losses were probably at a similarly high level, for at eight the following morning, the Constitutionals retreated to Rosario, where they remained the next day and night. When they received news that the Buelnistas were advancing on Rosario with an army of two thousand men, Carrasco notified Iturbe in Mazatlán, and Iturbe ordered an evacuation of his troops from Rosario, and their retreat to Mazatlán.<sup>45</sup>

Buelna continued his advance on Mazatlán, arriving at the outskirts of the port before deciding to retreat to Villa Union, located about 44 kilometers from Mazatlán. Buelna left Gándara in charge of his army, with instructions to prevent the Carrancistas from leaving, while he returned to Tepic to organize new forces with which to continue the campaign into northern Sinaloa and on into Sonora. Gándara, however, feeling overly confident from the recent string of successes, failed to take appropriate measures to contain

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<sup>45</sup> Carrasco to Carranza, Mazatlán, February 19, 1915, VC, 28/2968; and Valadés, pp. 74-75.

the Constitutionnalists. The Carrancistas attacked the Buelnistas at Villa Union, forcing them to retreat toward the south. Pursued by the Carrancista cavalry, the Buelnistas fled to the safety of La Muralla, where they established a line of defense fortified by the natural terrain of the mountain pass.<sup>46</sup>

Buelna's forces succeeded in defending their position at La Muralla against a series of attacks by Iturbe and Carrasco. According to one report, Buelna's tactic had been to maintain a force of two or three hundred men under the command of Colonel Del Real near the border of Durango. When the Constitutionnalists attacked Buelna's position at La Muralla, Del Real's force would advance to La Noria as though they intended to attack Mazatlán. Iturbe was forced to divide his men, leaving some with Carrasco and taking the remainder with himself to halt Del Real's advance. Del Real, however, would not engage in battle with Iturbe's contingent, instead retreating little by little, having already achieved his objective of distracting the Constitutionalist forces from the strategic point of La Muralla.<sup>47</sup>

Meanwhile, in Tepic, Buelna continued to govern as jefe político of the Territory. The performance of his government during this period, however, was less than impressive.

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<sup>46</sup> Carrasco to Carranza, Mazatlán, March 9, 1915, VC, 30/3214; and Valadés, pp. 75-77.

<sup>47</sup> S. Magallán to Carlos Félix Díaz, Mazatlán, March 22, 1915, VC, 32/3408; and Damy, "Informe," June 8, 1915, VC, 41/4512.

Even José C. Valadés, a friend and admirer of the jefe político, was disappointed in the record of the Buelna administration. According to Valadés, Buelna, "swelled by power, forgot the hopes that the masses had placed in him." Rather than implement social programs for the benefit of the lower classes, Buelna established a strong relationship with the powerful Aguirre company, an alliance that was strengthened by his recent marriage to the daughter of one of the company's managers. This alliance with the latifundistas, however, soon led to the loss of the support of the lower classes.<sup>48</sup>

By April, Buelna's supplies of ammunition had been all but depleted. Fearing defeat at La Muralla, Buelna slowly withdrew his forces and retreated to Tepic, where he intended to form a new line of defense, in the hope that supplies from Villa would arrive on time. The supplies failed to arrive, however, and Buelna was forced to retreat to Ahuacatlán, leaving Tepic to the Carrancistas. Carrasco's army entered Tepic on April 15, and Carrasco assumed the government of the Territory.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Valadés, p. 77.

<sup>49</sup> Carrasco to Carranza, Tepic, May 18, 1915, VC, 40/4316; Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33; and Valadés, pp. 77-79.

#### 4.6 THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The Territory of Tepic had arrived at a low point in its history by the year 1915. The Revolution had degenerated into a brutal power struggle between the leaders, and the ideals that once seemed to motivate the revolutionaries apparently had been forgotten in the quest for personal ambition. The local economy, like the national economy, was in chaos. A variety of currencies flooded the marketplace, as the various generals printed money that was soon devalued through inflation; and often these currencies completely lost their value when the generals who issued them were defeated in battle. The revolutionary struggle had left fields uncultivated, and as an added burden, the Territory suffered a plague of locusts, further aggravating the situation. The Territory of Tepic during this period has been described by one historian as being "frightened, inactive, and demoralized."<sup>50</sup>

The Constitutionalist occupation of Mexico City lasted only a short time, for on March 10, Obregón ordered his troops to evacuate the capital. The Conventionist government of González Garza returned to the capital, but the rift between the Conventionist president and the Zapatistas over land reform only grew wider.

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<sup>50</sup> Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 21-22; and Peña Navarro, vol. 2, pp. 506-07.



Meanwhile, in the Bajío region between Mexico City and Guadalajara, the dramatic military defeat of the Villistas by the Constitutionalists under the military leadership of Obregón, unfolded from April to June 1915. During this brief period, Obregón's army inflicted four decisive defeats on Villa's Division of the North. Disenchanted with the experience of the Conventionist government, Zapata refused to participate in the campaign against Carranza, choosing instead to return to Morelos. By June, Villa was forced to flee to Chihuahua, and Carranza remained the dominant national political figure.

When Juan Carrasco assumed command of the government of Tepic after occupying the Territory's capital on April 15, he appointed Ernesto Damy as military commander and proceeded with the nomination of the civil authorities for the Territory. Carranza designated Carrasco to be chief of military operations for southern Sinaloa and the Territory of Tepic. In substitution for Carrasco, Carranza appointed Damy provisional jefe político of the Territory, and Damy assumed the office upon his arrival in Tepic from Mazatlán. At the same time, Colonel Isaac Espinosa was named military commander in Damy's place. Nevertheless, one week after having taken office, Damy fell ill, and he was forced to return to Mazatlán for medical attention. In Damy's absence, the duties of jefe político were carried out by Colonel Ignacio M. García from May 1, until Damy returned on June 4.

The Constitutionalist immediately began to rebuild a communications network in the Territory of Tepic. Train service to Tepic on the Southern Pacific Railroad had been discontinued for two years, but by mid-May, Carrasco had succeeded in repairing enough of the railroad to establish an irregular military rail service from Mazatlán to Tepic. The Constitutionalist installed a telegraph line from Tepic to Navajoa, Sonora, and within the Territory there was telegraph service from Tepic to San Blas, Santiago Ixcuintla, Acaponeta, and Rosamorada. There was also telephone service from the Territory's capital to the communities of Jalisco, Sentispac, Navarrete, Trapichillo, Santiago Ixcuintla, El Venado, and Tuxpan. Post offices had been established in Tepic, Santiago Ixcuintla, San Blas, and Acaponeta, and the mail was being delivered by stage coach for lack of regular train service. Marine traffic had also been established from the port of San Blas.<sup>51</sup>

By May 25, Carrasco reported to Carranza that the situation in the Territory of Tepic, as well as in Sinaloa, was "satisfactory." Carrasco asserted that they had achieved a "complete triumph" over their enemies, although he requested that the First Chief send ammunition and rifles to enable his forces to continue the campaign in the region. He added that many volunteers had presented themselves to enlist in the campaign, but that he had been unable to organize them

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<sup>51</sup> Carrasco to Carranza, Tepic, May 18, 1915, VC, 40/4316; and Dany, "Informe," June 8, 1915, VC, 41/4512.

because he lacked these essential war supplies.<sup>52</sup>

Nevertheless, it appears that Carrasco was overly optimistic, for just two weeks later, a somewhat less rosy report was submitted by Jefe Político Damy. Damy reported that widespread resistance to the Constitutionalist cause was noticeable in all the Territory, and he stated that its inhabitants, "from the richest to the poorest," were actively opposed to the Constitutionalist government. Damy pointed out that even the labor law giving all workers the benefit of an eight hour day and a minimum daily wage of \$1.50, was criticized by the workers on the haciendas as being "intrusive." Damy commented: "This demonstrates the state of backwardness in which these people are found to be, and their great habit toward slavery." Nevertheless, Damy claimed that it appeared that the hacienda workers had "lost hope in the return of the reaction,"—by which he meant Buelna and the Villistas—and that little by little they were entering into the realm of reason. As for the owners, Damy reported that after having sustained discussions that were "more or less absurd," in what he claimed was an attempt to detract from the "libertarian action" of the Constitutionalist Army, the majority of the owners had already yielded to the government's demands.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Carrasco to Carranza, Tepic, May 25, 1915, VC, 40/4374.

<sup>53</sup> Damy, "Informe," June 8, 1915, VC, 41/4512.

Meanwhile, the Conventionist forces under the command of Buelna, retained control of Ixtlán del Río, Ahuacatlán, and Santa María del Oro. Upon establishing his headquarters in Ahuacatlán, Buelna sent a commission of twenty-five men, led by his brother, Miguel, to deliver an urgent request to Villa to solicit the war supplies needed to continue the Conventionist campaign in the Territory of Tepic. Miguel Buelna encountered Villa in Zacatecas, and they met in the railroad car that served as Villa's headquarters. Villa authorized a shipment of five million rounds of ammunition, two thousand carbines, and clothing for five thousand men, and he also provided a guard of three hundred men to deliver the shipment to the Territory of Tepic. However, just before the convoy left for Tepic, Villa notified Miguel Buelna that as a result of the Conventionist defeat in the battle of León, he was ordering all his soldiers to regroup in Aguascalientes. As such, Miguel Buelna had to return to Ahuacatlán empty handed, and his brother was obliged to dispatch a squad of men to Zacatecas to transport the war supplies. Rafael Buelna personally led the convoy to Zacatecas, taking advantage of the opportunity to confer with Villa. Three weeks later, Buelna returned to Ahuacatlán with the needed war supplies. Nevertheless, he arrived demoralized, reportedly disgusted by the ambitions of the self seeking leaders of the Conventionist Army, including Villa himself. Buelna also recognized that it would be difficult for the Conventionists to recover from the defeats

suffered in Celaya and León.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the blow to his morale, Buelna resolved to continue the struggle in the Territory of Tepic. He reorganized his forces—which currently numbered about three thousand men—and mobilized an offensive against the Constitutionalists in the Territory. The offensive consisted of a two pronged attack—one on Tepic, and a second assault on the rear guard of the Constitutionalist forces at Santiago Ixcuintla. Carlos Echeverría was commissioned to lead a column of 1,000 men to carry out the attack on Tepic. The Buelnistas attacked at about 2:00 A.M. on the morning of June 25, just as Tepic was preparing to celebrate the birthday of the region's chief of operations, Juan Carrasco. Buelna apparently had hoped to gain an advantage by arriving "to sing a birthday song" to Carrasco, as the Buelnistas ironically termed their daring attack. As it turned out, however, Carrasco was in Mazatlán at the time. Buelna's army successfully penetrated the center of the city, where a furious battle took place. The Carrancistas, under the command of Ernesto Damy, however, successfully defended the city, and by 7:00 that morning, Buelna's army was forced to retreat. In human terms, the battle was costly for both sides. Carrancista losses included Colonels José María del Haro and Isaac Espinosa. Buelna's army reportedly lost eighty-five men, including fifteen officers, as well as more

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<sup>54</sup> Valadés, pp. 81-84.

than sixty injured.<sup>55</sup>

The second phase of Buelna's offensive occurred on June 29, when a column under the command of José Natividad Alvarez and Manuel Llantada attacked Santiago Ixcuintla. The Buelnistas succeeded in capturing Santiago Ixcuintla, but they retreated from the city a few hours later, when they were informed that a powerful Constitutionalist column was approaching them from Sinaloa.<sup>56</sup>

Carrasco's campaign in the Territory of Tepic, like that of his opponent Buelna, was limited by the quantity of war supplies that arrived for his army. In this regard, Carrasco tended to have an advantage, because the Constitutionlists were receiving weapons and ammunition through the port of Mazatlán. A major shipment of arms arrived in that port in June 1915, on board the gunboat General Guerrero. This shipment was supposed to have been distributed equally between the forces of the region, but Carrasco failed to

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<sup>55</sup> Espinosa Ramírez and Peña Navarro claim that the attack took place early in the morning of July 24. Both authors also maintain that Buelna himself did not give the orders for the attack on Tepic, but rather that the decision to execute the attack had been made by his subordinate officers. Valadés, on the other hand, maintains that the order came from Buelna, and that it was part of a two pronged attack—one on Tepic, and the other on the Constitutionalist rear guard at Santiago Ixcuintla. Valadés's version is more credible on this point, as it is on the date of the attack, for it complies with Carrasco's reports and newspaper reports in Boletín Militar. See Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33; Valadés, pp. 84-85; Boletín Militar, July 3, 1915; Espinosa Ramírez, p. 20; and Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 506.

<sup>56</sup> Valadés, pp. 84-85; and Boletín Militar, July 27, 1915.

receive the supplies and payroll intended for his column. This left the Constitutionalists in the Territory of Tepic in a precarious position, considering that Buelna's forces had recently received a large shipment of supplies from Villa.<sup>57</sup>

Following the attack on Tepic at the end of June, the Constitutionalists redoubled the vigilance of the city, in preparation for a second attack by Buelna's army. Buelna, however, waited until July 10, when his army attacked Tepic at 7:00 that evening. The two forces battled throughout the night, and the following day, Damy led the retreat of the Constitutionalist troops by the west side of the city, in the direction of Sinaloa. Once again, Buelna assumed the government of the Territory.<sup>58</sup>

The Constitutionalist newspaper, Boletín Militar, published in Guadalajara by Manuel M. Diéguez, openly admitted that the allegiances of the population in the Territory of Tepic were with their enemies, the Villistas. Near the end of July, the newspaper reported that it had been fully confirmed that both the commercial class and the Spanish overseers of the haciendas were Villista. The following week, the newspaper reported that Damy had led the Constitutionalists out of Tepic on July 11, as part of a "strategic plan" to ascertain the strength of the Villistas, and to determine

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<sup>57</sup> Coronela R.R. Flores to Carranza, Mazatlán, July 1, 1915, VC, 44/4758.

<sup>58</sup> Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33.

who the enemies of the Constitutionalist movement were in that city. While the claim that the retreat from Tepic was part of such a "strategic plan" is doubtful—especially because it was contradicted by a subsequent report by Carrasco—it is significant that the newspaper reported that "the entire population of Tepic, like that of Guadalajara, and certain foreigners, were Villistas."<sup>59</sup>

After having abandoned Tepic, Damy and his troops retreated to Santiago Ixcuintla, and from there to Mazatlán. Buelna sent a column of his troops to San Blas, where they once again took possession of the port, forcing the Constitutionalists, who reportedly lacked ammunition, also to retreat to Mazatlán. The Villistas enjoyed only a brief stay in San Blas, however, for on July 21, Colonel Francisco Santiago and the 23rd Brigade from Sonora disembarked in San Blas and took control of the port. The 250 Villistas defending the port were forced to flee, reportedly leaving 26 dead on the battlefield. Once the port had been secured for the Constitutionalists, General Damy disembarked with another force of 200 men. The next two days were spent unloading provisions, ammunition, and horses from the ship, although this operation was hindered by stormy weather. On July 24, the brigade set out for Tepic.

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<sup>59</sup> Evidence contradicting the statement made in the newspaper that the retreat was part of a "strategic plan" can be found in a subsequent report by Carrasco that stated that the Constitutionalists under Damy's command had made "desperate efforts to defend" Tepic. See Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33; and Boletín Militar, July 25, and August 1, 1915.



Meanwhile, Carrasco advanced on Tepic via Santiago Ixcuintla, while Constitutionalist Colonel Ascención Escalante advanced on the Territory's capital through La Sierra. The Villistas attempted to stop the advance of Carrasco's brigade at the Yago bridge, but they failed in preventing the Constitutionalists from crossing the Santiago River.

The troops under the command of Dany and Santiago were forced to camp at La Libertad, where they were met by an advance brigade of Villistas. They remained in La Libertad until the morning of July 27, when they set out for the hacienda of Navarrete, where Buelna waited with an army of 800 troops. Buelna retreated, however, when he learned that Dany's brigade was advancing toward him, and the Constitutionalists took control of the Navarrete hacienda after a short battle that lasted only a few minutes. The next day, Dany was joined by Carrasco's brigade of 800 men, and the entire corps set out for Tepic. Buelna abandoned Tepic without a fight, pursued by Carrasco's troops. Carrasco's brigade overtook the Villistas at the Golondrinas Pass, where they recovered a booty of equipment, war supplies, and provisions from Buelna's army. Buelna and his men, however, escaped into the Sierra de Alica.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> S. Magallán to Dirección General de Aduana, Mazatlán, May 20, 1916, VC, 79/8680; Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33; and Boletín Militar, August 1, 3, 4, and 11, 1915.

In compliance with orders from the First Chief, Ernesto Damy assumed the office of jefe político of the Territory of Tepic once again.<sup>61</sup> According to a subsequent report by Carrasco, Buelna had levied a one million dollar war tax on the well-to-do people of Tepic. Because of the haste with which the Villistas were forced to evacuate the city, however, Buelna was unable to collect the subsidy.<sup>62</sup>

It was only a matter of a few days, however, until Buelna began to regroup his forces in preparation for another attack on Tepic. Villistas were arriving from the interior of the country, having been dispersed by the defeats suffered in the Bajío region. Rather than wait for Buelna's army to swell with these remnants of Villa's armies, Carrasco received orders to engage Buelna in battle. On August 14, Carrasco led his troops to La Labor, where there ensued one of the bloodiest battles in the history of the Territory of Tepic. The opposing armies reportedly numbered about three thousand men each, but Buelna's army managed to take superior positions on a hillside, from which a group of machine guns caused numerous losses to Carrasco's brigade. Many troops were also killed by the stings of scorpions which infested the area. After two days of continuous battle, the Constitutionalist began to run low on ammunition, forcing Carrasco to order his troops to retreat.

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<sup>61</sup> Carranza to Gobernación, Mexico City, July 19, 1915, AGN-GPR, 154/100.

<sup>62</sup> Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33.

The Constitutionalist left a hundred dead on the battlefield, and they also suffered many injuries as well as the loss of 500 troops who had been dispersed in the battle. Carrasco retreated to Santiago Ixcuintla, where he waited for reinforcements to be sent to him from Mazatlán.<sup>63</sup>

With the retreat of Carrasco to Santiago Ixcuintla, Buelna freely entered Tepic once again. On August 19, the Villistas captured the port of San Blas. Buelna's forces occupied Tepic for only a short time, however, because the advance of Constitutionalist General Enrique Estrada's brigade prompted Buelna to abandon the city for the Sierra del Nayarit. Estrada's column occupied Tepic on August 24. Sensing that the struggle was futile, Buelna resolved to lead his men to Chihuahua, where he intended to turn them over to Villa, and leave the country for the United States. Buelna sent a message to Carrasco informing the Constitutionalist general of the plan to evacuate the Territory, in order to avoid any further bloodshed. Carrasco, however, denied Buelna's request for safe passage, and led his army into the mountains to engage Buelna's retreating army in battle. Buelna's army inflicted a total defeat on the Constitutionalist forces, obliging Carrasco to retreat to Santiago Ixcuintla. This left Buelna free to make his final exit from the Territory of Tepic, unhindered. After meeting with Villa in Chihuahua, Buelna stole a locomotive, which he

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<sup>63</sup> Valadés, pp. 85-87; Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33; Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 19-20; and Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 506.

commandeered to Ciudad Juárez. Villa issued orders to have Buelna apprehended and shot by firing squad, but Buelna managed to cross into El Paso, Texas, accompanied by his wife, his brother, and two aides.<sup>64</sup>

Thus ended a chaotic and disillusioning period in the Territory of Tepic. Buelna and Villa had enjoyed broad support in the Territory, not only from the lower classes, but also from the latifundistas. Nevertheless, the civil war with the Carrancistas had forced Buelna to concentrate his efforts on military matters, and the social programs for the benefit of the campesinos and working class which had been vaguely promised, never materialized. Ultimately, however, Buelna—like Villa himself—had failed to produce a revolutionary agenda for social reform. Unlike Zapata, Buelna did not champion agrarian reform, choosing instead to accommodate himself with the upper classes and lobby for the restoration of lands to the latifundistas. Popular support for Buelna

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<sup>64</sup> Valadés, pp. 86-93; S. Magallán to Dirección General de Aduana, Mazatlán, May 20, 1916, VC, 79/8680; Carrasco to Gobernación, Mazatlán, September 3, 1915, VC, 51/5606; Carrasco to Gobernación, Tepic, November 15, 1915, AGN-GPR, 156/36; and Carrasco, "Informe," January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33.

Following his escape over the border, Buelna retired from active participation in Mexican politics, dedicating himself to personal business affairs in the United States and Cuba. He returned to Mexico City in November 1919, impoverished, and managed to obtain a government appointment as administrator of abatoirs and markets. In 1920, Buelna participated in the rebellion against Carranza in the rebel force of his former school mate Enrique Estrada. In 1923, Buelna joined Estrada in opposition to Obregón's imposition of Plutarco Calles as his presidential successor, and Buelna was killed in battle in January 1924. See Valadés, pp. 89-156.

withered away, and in the wake of Villa's defeat the latifundistas quickly turned to Carranza to reestablish ties with the new government. Meanwhile, the economy of the Territory lay in shambles and much of the land lay idle. For the campesinos and working classes conditions had deteriorated to the point that life had become a struggle for survival.

## Chapter V

### NAYARIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF QUERÉTARO, 1916-1917

#### 5.1 REESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONALIST GOVERNMENT

Following the series of defeats suffered by Pancho Villa's Division of the North in the Bajío region of central Mexico between April and June 1915, the Constitutionalists under the leadership of Carranza began to reestablish their control over most of the country. By order of the chief of military operations for Sonora, Sinaloa, and the Territory of Tepic, Manuel M. Diéguez, Juan Carrasco became jefe político of the Territory of Tepic on October 4, 1915.

One of Carrasco's first tasks was to reconstruct the public administration and a judiciary. Civil and penal courts of justice were established in the capital of the Territory, although difficulties were encountered in setting up courts in other communities for lack of "competent" people to fill the necessary positions. In accordance with Carranza's policy of national reconciliation, Carrasco granted amnesty to the officers and soldiers who had supported the Conventionist government.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Carrasco to Gobernación, Tepic, November 15, 1915, AGN-GPR, 156/36; and "Informe" by Carrasco to Gobernación, Tepic, January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33.

Following the power struggle between the Villistas and the Constitutionals loyal to Carranza, the Territory of Tepic was left in complete economic chaos. In a report to Gobernación, Juan Carrasco claimed that one of the causes of the economic turbulence in the Territory was the lack of confidence in paper money. He explained that although the paper money was compulsory currency, there existed the "fear that from one moment to the next, it could be retired from circulation by superior disposition." Carrasco also reported that experience had demonstrated that each time it had been necessary to declare issues of bills null and take money out of circulation, or when the government was forced to impose a war subsidy, the businessmen of the Territory—whom he referred to as the "executioners of the people"—salvaged what they considered lost by doubling and tripling the prices of their goods, and even came out benefitting with larger profits. Nevertheless, the jefe político also claimed that despite his attempts to impose price controls, only a few consumers had presented themselves before the authorities to report infractions. This prompted him to refer to the inhabitants of the Territory as being "conscious victims of their own censurable silence." Carrasco advocated allowing foreign companies to compete with the local companies in order to normalize business conditions in the Territory.

The jefe político's remedy for the economic woes of the Territory of Tepic did not endear him to its business commu-

nity. Carrasco originated from the neighboring State of Sinaloa, and such policies as those presented in his report to Gobernación were viewed by the Territory's business elite as being self-serving and designed for the benefit of the business communities of Sinaloa and Jalisco, more than their own. This may explain—at least in part—Carrasco's short term of office as jefe político of the Territory of Tepic.

Regarding communications in the Territory, Carrasco reported that the postal service suffered "frequent interruptions," but that the mail was being delivered by his soldiers, and by the Ordaz and Company firm of Tepic, which "gratuitously" lent their services with the stagecoaches that travelled to San Blas, Santiago Ixcuintla, and San Marcos, Jalisco. Carrasco claimed that the mail was being delivered twice a week, and he added that regular mail service was not possible given the "excessive" prices charged per trip. He reported that the telegraph service was functioning well except for occasional interruptions in service caused by fallen posts, and that the government telephone service was providing communication with some communities which had no telegraph service.

In the Territory of Tepic, the "pacification" process was somewhat more difficult for the Constitutionalist forces to complete, given the mountainous terrain of most of the region. Furthermore, the Territory provided one of the main routes of escape for the Villistas fleeing from the Bajío



region toward the Pacific coast, or north to Durango and Chihuahua. On December 16, 1915, Ixtlán del Río was captured by the Villistas under the command of Generals Medina, Parra, and Caloca, but the Villistas retreated, and the town was recovered by government forces without a battle. Carrasco claimed that by the end of 1915, there remained in the Territory only "small gangs of the reaction converted into highway robbers," which he maintained would be no problem to extirpate. Carrasco's solution was to punish those "bandits" who were caught, by shooting them and hanging the bodies on trees to decompose for a few days, in view of passersby, to serve as a warning to other "criminals." Nevertheless, despite his best efforts, the rebels maintained control over the remote northern regions of La Yesca and La Sierra, where the jefe político was unable to establish local authorities.<sup>2</sup>

Relations between the United States and Mexico had been strained since Porfirio Díaz had fallen from power, and the recent occupation of the port of Veracruz by United States marines had kindled further resentment by the Mexican government. The nationalist stance of the Carranza administration led to the confiscation of property belonging to an American citizen, Howard R. Levyck, Jr., which was located on the Islas Mariás. On October 20, 1915, the port commander of San Blas refused to permit the American steamship the

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<sup>2</sup> "Informe" by Carrasco to Gobernación, Tepic, January 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/33.

South Coast, bound for San Francisco, California, loaded with 7,000 railroad ties that had been cut on the Isla María Madre, to cast anchor. The company appealed to the military authorities of the Territory, and obtained an order to permit the ship to embark. The port commander, however, notified Division General Manuel M. Diéguez about the matter. Diéguez sent a ship to the Islas Mariás, and the ties were confiscated and transported to Mazatlán. Gobernación ordered the expropriation of Levyck's properties on the Islas Mariás until the customs duties owed to the Mexican government had been paid.<sup>3</sup>

Carrasco, who had been a farmer before joining the Revolution, and had never had the benefit of a formal education, was not well prepared to continue as jefe político. Moreover, Carrasco had encountered opposition from the latifundistas of the Territory, at a time when the Carranza government in Mexico City was pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the bourgeoisie. On January 1, 1916, Carrasco was replaced by Colonel Guillermo Valle, who became provisional jefe político and military commander of the Territory of Tepic.

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<sup>3</sup> Guerra y Marina, Departamento de Marina, to Gobernación, Mexico City, August 9, 1916, enclosing Jefe de Puerto en San Blas to Departamento de Marina, San Blas, May 26, 1916, and enclosing General Juan [Ríos, crossed out] Torres S. to Departamento de Marina, Tepic, July 18, 1916, AGN-GPR, 85/19.

## 5.2 PETITIONS FOR AGRARIAN REFORM

During the Madero administration, a group of Tepic citizens led by Albino Casillas had petitioned Madero for land to form a cooperative colony on the southeast corner of the city. The project was abandoned with the fall of the Madero government and the factional strife of the Revolution. By early 1916, Casillas had organized a group of seventy-eight residents of Tepic, and they petitioned the new jefe político for land to resume their project. Complaining that the property owners were increasing housing rents with a "complete lack of conscience," the petitioners asked Jefe Político Valle for the expropriation of a field to the west of the city for the purpose of establishing their colony. They asked that the matter be resolved as soon as possible, in order that they might take advantage of the dry season to build as much as they could.<sup>4</sup>

In reply to a request by Gobernación for a report on the installation of the agrarian commission to administer agrarian reform in the Territory, Valle responded that he had attempted with all his determination to bring about the installation of the commission, but that it had not been possible for the lack of competent people. He asked Gobernación to send qualified people to the Territory to fulfill this task. Valle also indicated that he was prepared to

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<sup>4</sup> Handwritten copy of Casillas et al., to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Tepic, January 12, 1916, AGN-GPR, 144/66.

grant provisional possession of lands to various villages until the agrarian commission could be established in the Territory.<sup>5</sup>

On January 25, Valle reiterated his request for qualified people to come to the Territory to make up the agrarian commission. He elaborated further that he was unable to find competent people who were able to "honorably and judiciously perform the duty in benefit of the natives, having noted an inclination toward the classes favored by fortune."<sup>6</sup>

In a subsequent letter to Valle, the group led by Casillas elaborated further on their proposed colony. The petitioners offered to purchase the land "in cash or in the terms decided by its owner, and according to the fair price that he should ask." They stated that they planned to divide the land into 128 equal lots, and that it would be paid for in equal shares. They claimed that at the time there were seventy-eight applicants for lots, but they assured the jefe político that the number of holders would soon be filled. The petitioners delineated the legal procedure, specifying the articles in the Civil Code, and Article 7 of the Colonization Law of December 15, 1883, by which they hoped to acquire the land and subdivide it. The obli-

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<sup>5</sup> Valle to Gobernación, Tepic, January 25, 1916, enclosing telegram Valle to Gobernación, Tepic, January 9, 1916, AGN-GPR, 122/34.

<sup>6</sup> Valle to Gobernación, Tepic, January 25, 1916, AGN-GPR, 122/34.

gations that the individual holders of the lots would have to fulfill were described, including the stipulations that they would have to build on their property by themselves and that one could not sell before building a house. They also specified that for a term of five years no one would be permitted to alienate their right of ownership. The petitioners offered to help the government in the construction of a bridge in return for a lot expropriated from the train station land, where they could manufacture the material for both the colony and the bridge.<sup>7</sup>

That same day, the Tepic residents sent another letter to Gobernación, advising the secretary about their projected colony, and providing him with copies of their two petitions to the jefe político. They complained that they had yet to receive a decision from Valle, let alone results. They stated that the delay constituted a desecration of the Lands Law, and that the government's failure to comply was causing them a "horrible misery" that they dreaded would only grow worse. They asked Gobernación to intervene on their behalf in order to obtain the land that they had petitioned for their proposed colony, as well as to protect their ownership over the lots that they had already been granted by the Madero government, but that after having built on the uncultivated land, they were now being forced to rent.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Copy of Casillas et al., to Jefe Político del Territorio de Tepic, Tepic, January 28, 1916, appended to Casillas et al., to Gobernación, Tepic, January 28, 1916, AGN-GPR, 144/66.

On February 15, the Casillas group sent a letter to Carranza, advising the First Chief that his Lands Law of January 6, 1915, had not been carried out in practice in the Territory of Tepic, and that to that date, the local agrarian commission had yet to be constituted. The group of Tepic residents blamed the "caciques, landowners, and supporters of the clergy," for this failure to implement the Lands Law, and they reported to Carranza that they were presently in a "desperate and anxious situation because of the immoderate and unconscionable rise in all the articles of prime necessity." They complained that it was difficult to obtain these basic necessities even with money in hand, because of what they called the "manipulations" that the conservative classes had been able to execute. The protesters reported that a detailed study of the reasons for their "bitter situation" had been carried out, and it was discovered that it all proceeded from "illegal hoarding." Two reasons for the lack of progress in the Territory were offered:

First, because the large landowners are the ones who have all the large businesses and the only enterprises that sustain the general commerce of the Territory, which precisely is the regulating key of the monopoly. . . .

Second, because the lands that used to form the ejidos are in the power of these same [large landowners], who have obtained them by criminal acts; the proletariat has nowhere to gather firewood for its use, nor anywhere to pasture a cow, for everything must yield to the whims of the hoarders. The banks of the river that passes on the edge of the city, except for a very small part

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<sup>8</sup> Casillas et al., to Gobernación, Tepic, January 28, 1916, AGN-GPR, 144/66.

that is for public service, is all possessed by the same [large landowners], because of which it is dedicated only to pasture, when it should be planted for irrigable crops, at least during the summer season.

Casillas and his group reported that prices had "intentionally" been forced up by the landowners, and they claimed that they had seen "groups of families in the streets searching for corn, and the owners so sarcastic as to laugh at them, ridiculing the agony of the people." The protesters complained that corn had risen to \$30 a hectoliter; beans to \$150 a hectoliter; cotton cloth to \$2 and even \$3 a meter; sugar to \$1.20 and \$1.50 a kilogram; meat to \$2 a kilogram; cattle to \$150 a head; alcohol to \$2 a liter; and coffee to \$6 a kilogram. They pointed out that when there had been competition, cloth had sold at 12 centavos (cents) a meter; sugar at 22 centavos a kilogram; alcohol at 25 centavos a liter; a head of cattle at \$15; and coffee at 40 centavos a kilogram. They reported that prices lately had been "moderated ever so slightly," but that nevertheless, when the wages of a day's labor were only \$1.50, there simply could be "no equivalence."

The petitioners presented a simple, but nevertheless significant, balance sheet on the Aguirre company's cloth business in the Territory, which indicated that between the two factories, Jauja and Bellavista, the company made a daily profit of \$26,000, apart from the rest of the businesses it controlled. The balance sheet showed that 1,000 workers

worked at \$1.50 per day, for a total of \$1,500 in labor costs for the company. The expenses for taxes and the prime material, cotton, were said to be \$2,500, bringing the total expenses to \$4,000. The balance sheet reported that 500 pieces of cloth, at 30 meters each piece, were being manufactured daily between the two factories, and assuming at least \$2 per meter, this brought the gross value to \$30,000. The balance sheet was clearly oversimplified, and did not consider other expenses such as transportation and other marketing costs, which would have reduced the company's profit margin. Nevertheless, it is significant that the protesters did not perceive the problem of poverty in the Territory to be caused by backwardness, but rather approached their plight through an analysis of the means of production and the exploitive class relations that existed in the Territory. Casillas and his group had clearly arrived at the conclusion that the monopolistic situation that the Aguirre company currently enjoyed was responsible for the poverty of the working classes. In conclusion, they asked Carranza to name a commission to pass through the region in order to investigate what they had exposed, and they asked that it be done "without touching the official spheres of the Territory."<sup>9</sup> This was a clear indication that the lower classes had little confidence that the government of the Territory would remain unbiased in such an investigation.

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<sup>9</sup> Casillas et al., to Carranza, Tepic, February 15, 1916, VC, 67/7423.



### 5.3 JEFE POLÍTICO JUAN TORRES

On March 1, 1916, Guillermo Valle handed over the office of jefe político to General Juan Torres, and command of the military forces in the Territory to General Juan Carrasco.<sup>10</sup> The Juan Torres government differed from the previous administrations of Carrasco and Valle, both in style and approach. Within a few days of his arrival in the Territory, Torres proceeded to organize and establish municipal stores, or general supply stores, in order to provide articles of prime necessity to the needy classes, government employees, and troops of the garrisons in the Territory at prices lower than those that currently were found in the market place. Torres reported that this action had been taken because prices had risen to the point that these classes could no longer afford basic products considering the low level of their wages.<sup>11</sup>

On April 18, Torres reported to Gobernación that he received "well founded" petitions for salary increases daily from federal and municipal employees of the Territory. Torres explained that he only had the authority to raise the salaries of the municipal authorities, and that he had granted them small increases. The federal employees had received no raise at all. Torres went on to relate that in

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<sup>10</sup> Valle to Gobernación, Tepic, March 1, 1916, AGN-GPR, 144/69.

<sup>11</sup> "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21; and "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34.

the budget that he had submitted on March 9, the salaries of the employees had been determined without then taking into consideration that these articles would go up in price, and he stated that, in his opinion, the salaries would not be enough for the employees "to cover even their most urgent needs." The jefe político recommended a 50 percent increase, which he claimed to be "very indispensable" in view of the high cost of living in the region.<sup>12</sup>

Torres attempted to regulate the cost of living in the Territory by controlling rent increases on urban properties. In May 1916, a measure was dictated stipulating that rents charged for houses generally must be the same as was charged in April of that year. Torres also placed a freeze on the price of electric power. In response to the general conditions of poverty, a commission was designated for the general welfare of widows, orphans, and parents who had lost relatives in the campaign, and for soldiers who had been maimed in service. Torres also took steps to upgrade conditions in the hospital and in the poorhouse.<sup>13</sup>

Unlike Carrasco, who had attempted to resolve Tepic's economic problems through a policy of free trade with the rest of the country, Torres placed restrictions on the export of merchandise from the Territory. The restrictions

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<sup>12</sup> Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, April 18, 1916, AGN-GPR, 144/68.

<sup>13</sup> Guerra y Marina to Carranza, Mexico City, March 24, 1916, VC, 71/7803; and "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21.

on exports were opposed by the businessmen affected by the policy. Amador E. Reza, owner of a shoe factory in Guadalajara, wrote to Carranza complaining that he was having trouble shipping two hundred tanned leather hides out of the Territory. Reza pointed out that the city of Tepic had more than five tanneries of good capacity that produced more than was necessary for the consumption in that city. He also indicated that the export of leather—which he claimed was not an article of absolute necessity—would benefit both the owners and the workers of the tanneries. Nevertheless, claimed Reza, "Juan Torres did not permit the exit of merchandise from that entity, on any scale." Reza alleged that he had been told he would have to pay an export tax of twenty-five percent on his merchandise. The shoe manufacturer reminded the First Chief about a disposition that Carranza had issued the previous year, repealing all decrees or dispositions of the governors of the States and Territories that prohibited the free exit of merchandise to other States. For these reasons, as well as to keep the workers in his factory working, Reza asked Carranza to order the appropriate secretariat to issue an order specifically permitting him to ship leather out of the Territory without having to pay an export tax of any kind.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Reza to Carranza, Mexico City, April 28, 1916, VC, 75/8236.

Torres also lent his support to the organization of workers' unions in the Territory. On May 1, 1916, the workers of La Escondida, San Andrés, Puga, Mora, Pochotitán, San Cayetano, and Tepic, celebrated for the first time the Day of the Worker, in the capital of the Territory. On May 7, the Men's and Women's Workers Union of the Textile Factory of Bellavista was formed in a ceremony held in the street outside the factory. On May 14, the workers of the Puga hacienda formed their union. The workers of the Jauja factory unionized on May 26, and the following day the typesetters union was organized. This was followed by the unionization of workers in other trades, including pressers, tailors, and shoemakers. These unions all received support from Jefe Político Torres, as well as the solidarity of the unions in Guadalajara.<sup>15</sup>

The minimum wage was also increased during the Torres administration. In a subsequent report on the matter, the jefe político claimed that the salaries in the Territory prior to this increase were "not even enough to provide for the sustenance of the proletarian classes." Torres claimed that the workers needed the raise, in order to "tear them away from the claws of misery." The daily minimum wage was set at \$1.50 oro nacional, or its equivalent in infalsificable. The workday was set at eight hours, and those who worked more than eight hours were to be paid overtime.

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<sup>15</sup> Enciclopedia Mexicana, 2nd ed., s.v. "Nayarit, Estado de" by Eugenio Noriega Robles; and García, pp. 153-61.

Torres maintained:

This measure became necessary to avoid the abuses that the capitalists and the entrepreneurs had been committing in an infamous way against the suffering working classes of this region [Tepic], where, I have felt, the benefits proclaimed by the Revolution have yet to arrive.<sup>16</sup>

In response to the increased minimum wage, the Aguirre company sent an appeal to the Department of Labor. The company complained that, as this order was not general for the manufacturing industry throughout the country, their interests would be damaged by the increased labor costs. The Department of Labor was asked to issue orders toward placing the company in the same conditions as the other manufacturers in the rest of the country. Otherwise, warned the company, it would be impossible for their textile factories to compete in the marketplace, even at cost.<sup>17</sup>

On May 20, the director of the Department of Labor wrote to the secretary of Industry about the appeal from the Aguirre company, advising the secretary to bring the matter to Carranza's attention. The director went on to write about what he called the "disturbances of grave consequences" caused by the governors of the federal entities, who dictated decrees on such "delicate" matters of labor. While

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<sup>16</sup> "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21.

<sup>17</sup> Director del Departamento del Trabajo to Ministro de Fomento, Colonización e Industria, Mexico City, May 20, 1916, enclosing telegram D.F. Aguirre (sic) to Director del Departamento del Trabajo, Tepic, May 11, 1916, AGN-DT, 108/29.

he recognized the good intentions of these governors, the director also maintained that in the majority of cases, like the one at hand, such a decree could be the cause of "lamentable damages" to the very workers that they aspired to benefit. He also indicated that, if the Aguirre company was forced to close its textile factories in the Territory of Tepic, it would be seen, although too late, that an administrative error had been committed, and that it would have to be corrected with the "rational annulment" of the accord.<sup>18</sup>

The steps Torres had taken on behalf of the working classes alarmed the Carranza government in Mexico City, and Carranza ordered Torres to submit a report on his administration in the Territory of Tepic. In June, Torres sent his secretary of Government to Mexico City for a private interview with Carranza, and to present the First Chief with the report on his administration in the Territory to date. With regard to the raise in pay that he had dictated for the workers, which he claimed had been met with approval by the workers, Torres reported that the patrones (bosses) were doing everything they could to "obstruct" him in whatever form they were able.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Director, Departamento del Trabajo, to Ministro de Fomento, Colonización e Industria, Mexico City, May 20, 1916, AGN-DT, 108/29.

<sup>19</sup> "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916; and Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 7, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34.

Despite the active campaign to keep prices down, Torres was forced to admit by October of that year that he had been able to achieve very little. He claimed to have convened meetings with the merchants of the Territory, in which he reported having impressed upon them the "hardship and the censurability of their iniquitous conduct," and in which he allegedly threatened to "energetically castigate" any refusal to accede to his demands to lower the prices of the basic necessities. The jefe político added that the merchants and capitalists of the Territory, like those of the rest of the Republic, had "left out no means possible to obstruct the benevolent work of the government."<sup>20</sup>

The lack of confidence in the currency continued to cause a general problem for the economy. According to Torres, the abolition of the provisional Veracruz currency had increased the crisis in the Territory in an "alarming" manner. This resulted in a scarcity of goods, and caused prices to rise even further. The jefe político also reported that the municipal treasuries were functioning poorly as a consequence of the civil war, and he reiterated the point that the Revolution was "greatly resented in this part of the country by the private interests."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21.

<sup>21</sup> "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34; and "Informe" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21.

Torres also implemented a program to promote agriculture in the Territory, particularly the cultivation of basic cereals. Land was being distributed to the campesinos in areas where it had been left uncultivated by the landlords. In reporting on this program, Torres expressed the hope that with such measures, the situation generally would be remedied, although he indicated that it would require a "struggle with the resistance of the latifundistas, who attempt at all costs to procure the defeat of the government." The jefe político reported that the development of agriculture in the Territory of Tepic was also hampered by a plague of locusts. He gave his assurances that all possible steps were being taken to eradicate the plague, and he added that some experiments had been done to see if the locust could somehow be exploited as feed for pigs and barnyard fowl.<sup>22</sup>

The Justice Branch proved to be one of the points of friction within the Constitutionalist camp in the Territory of Tepic during this period. Torres took it upon himself to issue nominations of judges, and he ordered the installation of courts of justice in Ahuacatlán and Ixtlán.<sup>23</sup> Federal Secretary of Justice Roque Estrada, however, had commissioned Jesús Munguía Santoyo to organize the courts in the Territory. On May 19, Torres sent a telegram to the secretary complaining that Munguía Santoyo had "designated with-

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<sup>22</sup> "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34.

<sup>23</sup> Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, [April 25, 1916], AGN-GPR, 122/34.



out a single exception reactionary people and enemies to occupy these positions." Torres also mentioned that it had caused a bad impression in the Territory that an individual of "Spanish origin"—like Munguía Santoyo—should have been appointed, rather than a local figure.<sup>24</sup>

Secretary of Justice Roque Estrada answered Torres's complaint by advising him that Munguía Santoyo had been directed to proceed more carefully in the nomination of judges. Torres was invited to help in the selection of personnel, and Estrada also welcomed further reports from the jefe político. Nevertheless, in his report to Carranza in June 1916, Torres complained that Munguía Santoyo was not complying with Estrada's directive to heed the suggestions of the jefe político regarding the nominations of judges, and according to Torres, "was continuing in his work with no one to detain him." Torres assured Carranza that he was not making the declarations against the commissioner and his appointments in a "spirit of opposition or intrigue," but because his government had received numerous demands for justice. Torres claimed that Munguía Santoyo and his appointees had a long history of being "enemies of the Cause," and Torres frankly declared that he had been "tempted to exercise some kind of violence against the present authorities."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916, enclosing Torres to Secretario de Justicia, Tepic, May 19, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34.

<sup>25</sup> "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, June 8, 1916, enclos-

Such charges of past collusion with the enemies of the Constitutionals were understandably abundant in the Territory of Tepic, in that its inhabitants had tended to support both Huerta and Villa over Carranza. Previous dealings with the Villistas returned to haunt at least one government official. The customs administrator in San Blas, Salvador Magallón, wrote to the General Office of Customs, to report that the new government agent in San Blas, Salvador R. Dávila, had been the customs administrator of that town during the Villista period, and that furthermore, Dávila, along with the controller, were "immediately responsible" for having taken the funds and the archive of the customs of that port when the Villistas fled San Blas in March 1915. Magallón also accused Dávila of having served the Huerta regime, and he explained that the new government agent had since been granted amnesty and obtained his new post, "aided by the influence that the important commercial firm of D.G. Aguirre Sucesores had with the present government."<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile, the poor transportation and communications links continued to hamper the Territory's economy. The mail service was irregular, and the Territory still relied on the gratuitous services provided by the Ordaz and Company stage-coaches. Construction on the Southern Pacific Railroad on the stretch from Tepic to La Quemada—to connect Tepic with

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ing Secretario de Justicia to Torres, Mexico City, May 20, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34.

<sup>26</sup> Magallón to Dirección General de Aduana, San Blas, May 20, 1916, VC, 79/8680.

Guadalajara—was paralyzed. The rail line north to Sinaloa had been repaired as far as Acaponeta, but extensive repairs would be needed to tracks and bridges to complete the link with Sinaloa. The Territory's roads, which had been neglected for years because of the Revolution, remained in disrepair. To make matters worse, the Territory had been beset by heavy rainfall in July and August 1916, leaving the roads impassable. This left the telegraph service as the only remaining means of communication. One Tepic citizen reported that by the end of August more than forty inches of rain had fallen already that season, and he noted: "The houses that have not already fallen over, are threatened with ruin."<sup>27</sup>

With regard to the pacification of the Territory, Torres reported that most of the districts of the Territory had maintained a state of "relative tranquillity," although he added that there had been problems of attacks by gangs just over the State line, at El Rodeo, Jalisco. The jefe político claimed that their proximity to Ixtlán made the pursuit of these gangs necessary, and he reported that in the last of these attacks "some of the enemy were killed, and some taken prisoner." Torres reported that military agencies, "for the persecution of bandits or other motives," had been established in four districts of the Territory,

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<sup>27</sup> Arsenio Pesqueira to Aguirre Berlanga, Tepic, August 30, 1916, AGN-GPR, 71/7; "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34; and "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21.

including Acaponeta, Santiago Ixcuintla, San Blas, and Ixtlán.<sup>28</sup> One notable incident involved an Englishman connected with the Aguirre company, and two of his relatives—both Mexican citizens—who were killed apparently while being robbed. Six men were apprehended for the crime, and they were executed by firing squad.<sup>29</sup>

On August 30, 1916, a Tepic citizen, Arsenio Pesqueira, sent a letter to Manuel Aguirre Berlanga, reporting on the "deplorable" situation in the Territory of Tepic, and emphatically declaring that it was urgent that the government remedy the worsening situation. Pesqueira's letter provided a comprehensive report on the Torres administration, that was highly critical of the jefe político, commenting that Torres had "done nothing, neither politically, nor militarily."

Pesqueira's report differed with Torres's reports regarding law and order in the Territory. Pesqueira reported: "The Territory is full of bandits who assault, rob, and kill, marauding with impunity in the countryside and settlements, because they are not pursued." He claimed that on a recent journey through the districts of Ixtlán and Ahuacatlán, he witnessed the fear in which all the public employees lived because of the proximity of the danger from bandits.

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<sup>28</sup> "Memorandum" by Torres to Carranza, Tepic, June 8, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/34.

<sup>29</sup> Gobernación to Relaciones, Mexico City, March 23, 1916, enclosing telegram Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, March 19, 1916, AGN-GPR, 131/29.

He added that some of the authorities in Ahuacatlán abandoned the town at night, "leaving their homes to go to sleep in the orchards or some place they thought more secure." Pesqueira reported that a few days prior to his letter, the army garrison from Ixtlán had mobilized on Amatlán de Cañas, a settlement he described as "occupied or threatened by bandits." Pesqueira claimed that twenty men from this garrison had deserted with their combat gear to the enemy. He said this was just an example of the signs of discontent in the 4th Battalion, and he added that the indolence had reached the point that even the necessities of the troops were being neglected, for they did not receive their wages, provisions, and clothing on time. Pesqueira also alleged that the government agents frequently had to resort to loans from private individuals in order to pay the garrison.

Pesqueira went on to report that some districts were "thick with bandits," and he complained that Torres was committing the "stupidity" of having garrisons of four or six men. He claimed that a few days earlier, in El Venado, a detachment of five soldiers and one officer had been attacked and killed. He also reported that on August 27, an army captain had been killed by bandits as he left the capital. That same night, a place he described as being "at the most a distance of one hour" from Tepic, had been attacked by a group of about 200 men. The garrison from Tepic went out at about two in the morning to search for the attacking

party, but according to Pesqueira, they returned "without news." Pesqueira claimed that the forces in Tepic needed to be increased by at least two hundred cavalry, one hundred for the north of the Territory, and one hundred for the south.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, Pesqueira's report may be somewhat exaggerated regarding the military situation during this period, for it not only runs counter to the jefe político's reports, but also accounts by historians Peña Navarro and Espinosa Ramírez that claim that by mid-1916 the Territory of Tepic enjoyed a relative calm.<sup>31</sup>

According to Pesqueira, civil affairs were in the same poor condition as the military situation. He claimed that public services were completely neglected, and that one only had to take a tour of the city to see this. He alleged that the streets, plazas, and markets were in "complete abandon," and he further claimed that he had yet to see a street sweeper perform his duties, nor even one municipal wagon collect garbage. With regard to the policing of the Territory's capital, Pesqueira reported that he doubted Torres's claims that there were seventy policemen in the city. He complained that there were no police around during the day or night, and he claimed that he had counted a dozen at most. According to Pesqueira, their only weapons were a carbine, and he described their apparel as being "Zapati-

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<sup>30</sup> Pesqueira to Aguirre Berlanga, Tepic, August 30, 1916, AGN-GPR, 71/7.

<sup>31</sup> Peña Navarro, vol. 2, p. 507; and Espinosa Ramírez, p. 23.

sta." Pesqueira asserted: "Really, they look like bandits from head to toe." He accused the Torres government of failing to comply with the circulars from Gobernación. He also charged that the labor laws and decrees were not being fulfilled, and that there was no local agrarian commission. Pesqueira lamented: "All in all, the government here, in all ways, is a disaster."

Pesqueira also alleged that one of the things for which Torres was criticized most, was that he had "all the people in his family occupying a government position of more or less importance." According to Pesqueira, the supplier general was José Torres, brother of the jefe político; another brother, Jesús Torres, was chief of the warehouse of this general supplier, and later became supplier in Santiago Ixcuintla; the general's son, Alfredo Torres, was first clerk of the same warehouse; the general's sister, Juana Torres, was in charge of one of the retail stores; and his father-in-law, Angel Dávalos, was in charge one of the other retail stores.

Pesqueira then alleged that the jefe político was "not well accepted here by the Constitutionalist element." Pesqueira added, however, that Torres had been "very loyal" to their cause. He also alleged: "General Torres believes that when presidential elections are called, the candidacy of General Obregón will be launched and will triumph."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Pesqueira to Aguirre Berlanga, Tepic, August 30, 1916, AGN-GPR, 71/7.

On September 3, elections for ayuntamientos based on the principle of the "Free Municipality" were held, and they reportedly were carried out without major disturbances. This resulted in the disappearance of the the agencies and sub-agencies of government which, Torres claimed, "were continually in an open antagonism against the municipal corporations." Torres optimistically reported that there would no longer be difficulties now that the municipal governments counted with the "general sympathies." In Valle de Banderas, Tecuala, and La Sierra, where no municipalities existed, the sub-agents of government continued to function under the new name of political trustees.<sup>33</sup>

Relations between the Torres government and the Church were damaged by an incident that occurred early in the Torres administration involving a Tepic priest, Father J. Trinidad Hinojosa. According to a declaration by the priest, he had been called to Tepic's Bola de Oro Hotel one night in April 1916, to lend his services as a Catholic priest to an editor of a newspaper published in that city. Apparently the newspaperman published some of the remarks the priest had made on that occasion, and as a result Father Hinojosa was imprisoned for eleven days before being exiled. In October, the priest wrote from Guadalajara to the secretary of Gober-

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<sup>33</sup> Hacienda y Crédito Público to Gobernación, Mexico City, September 11, 1916, AGN-GPR, 197/67; "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, October 27, 1916; Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 20, 1916, AGN-GPR, 48/46; Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 21, 1916, AGN-GPR, 222/31; and Pesqueira to Aguirre Berlanga, Tepic, August 30, 1916, AGN-GPR, 71/7.



nación, asking that the penalty of exile be lifted, arguing that the fact that he had been summoned to the premises to perform his priestly functions proved that it was "not at all unlawful." Father Hinojosa went on to say that his ministry was in Tepic, and moreover, his parents found themselves in "dire poverty." He begged the secretary not to overlook the services that he had hitherto lent, even at the "risk of his life," of which, he claimed, all the residents of Tepic could give testimony.<sup>34</sup>

Gobernación asked the jefe político for information on the matter, and Torres replied that Hinojosa had been ejected from the Territory "for having uttered from the pulpit, statements against the ideals of Constitutionalism." Torres claimed that the priest had done "obstructionist work against the Cause of the Revolution," and that he had an extremely bad history in the city of Tepic. Torres added, however, that Father Hinojosa had "imparted the aid of his ministry" to various offenders who had been executed.<sup>35</sup>

On another matter related to the Church, Torres reported that none of its properties had been expropriated, with the exception of the Catholic schools which had been converted into public schools.<sup>36</sup> Torres also claimed that the

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<sup>34</sup> Hinojosa to Gobernación, Guadalajara, October 17, 1916, AGN-GPR, 220/89.

<sup>35</sup> Gobernación to Torres, Mexico City, October 25, 1916; and Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, December 2, 1916, AGN-GPR, 220/89.

<sup>36</sup> Torres to Carranza, Tepic, September 2, 1916, VC,

civil court judge of Tepic had achieved "optimum results" in having the priests comply with the regulation that required the presentation of a certificate of civil registration for baptisms and marriages.<sup>37</sup>

#### 5.4 THE CAMPESINOS OF TUXPAN AND MEXCALTITÁN

During the Porfiriato, the campesinos of Tuxpan lost their communally held lands to hacendados, while in nearby Mexcaltitán, the indigenous fishermen lost their traditional fisheries to these same latifundistas. The campesinos began to take collective action to repossess their lands and fisheries during the Madero administration, but it was not until General Juan Torres became jefe político of the Territory that they received significant government support.

In compliance with Carranza's Lands Law of January 6, 1915, Torres began taking steps to initiate agrarian reform in the Territory. On June 5, 1916, Torres issued an order granting provisional possession of the disputed lands in Tuxpan to the ejidos. The hacendados affected—Constancio González, D.G. Aguirre Sucesores, and the Menchaca family—protested, but the jefe político left the burden of proof on the latifundistas to exhibit the documents or titles to support their claims to these properties. The hacendados declined Torres's challenge to support their land claims,

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93/10503.

<sup>37</sup> "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, October 27, 1916.

and instead decided to impede the jefe político's order through the office of the sub-agent of Tuxpan. On August 10, the sub-agent, Ignacio Aldrete, issued an order on behalf of the latifundistas forbidding the campesinos to exploit the natural products of these lands. On August 15, the sub-agent—reportedly in a state of inebriation—arrived in Tuxpan with several soldiers and police, to apprehend the directors of the campesino association of Tuxpan. Clemente Martínez, who had served as sub-agent before Aldrete, was arrested and imprisoned. The directors appealed the arrest to Torres, pointing out to the jefe político that the latifundistas' scheme was to "oblige the community to commit a blunder in the defense of its rights, in order to be able to declare it seditious." The jefe político supported the campesinos, and Aldrete was replaced as sub-agent in Tuxpan.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile, on September 1, 1916, Juan F. Parkinson was nominated president of the local agrarian commission of the Territory of Tepic.<sup>39</sup> Despite its long awaited arrival, however, the agrarian commission failed to initiate an immediate program of land distribution.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Copy of the Declaration by Ayuntamiento de Tuxpan to Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, August 28, 1917, AGN-GPR, 173/28; "Declaration" by Mesa Directiva de la Sociedad de Campesinos, Tuxpan, August 21, 1916, AGN-GPR, 222/31; Fonseca to Gobernación, Tuxpan, August 23, 1916; and Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 21, 1916, AGN-GPR, 222/31.

<sup>39</sup> Mentioned in Pastor Rouaix to Gerzayn Ugarte, Mexico City, September 7, 1916, VC, 94/10613.

<sup>40</sup> "Informe" by Torres to Carranza, October 27, 1916.

On September 30, Jefe Político Juan Torres sent a telegram to Carranza, reporting that almost all the local residents of the haciendas and indigenous communities had presented him with repeated petitions that they be given small plots of land to plant for the impending dry season. The jefe político advised Carranza that he had taken an observation tour of the entire Territory, and he emphatically pointed out the "extremely urgent need" to distribute land to these families, "to ameliorate somewhat their critical economic situation." Torres asked Carranza that, while the agrarian commission that had been designated for the Territory made a definitive decision regarding the distribution of lands, in the interim, he be given the authority to request from the large landowners half of their workable lands. Torres assured the president that with this measure, they would achieve the "absolute extinction of the brigandage," which, the jefe político asserted, had its origin in the prevailing misery, and of which the capitalists took advantage to create difficulties for the government in its efforts of reorganization. Torres accused the landowners of exerting an "infamous pressure of what seemed to be vengeance against the campesino villages." He ended his message to Carranza by reminding the president that the campesinos constituted "that worthy class that contributed most with its personal contingent to obtain the triumph of the ideals pursued by the Revolution."<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, September 30, 1916, enclosing Torres to Carranza, Tepic, September 30, 1916,

Meanwhile, latifundista Constancio González appealed to his personal friend, Jesús Munguía Santoyo, acting head of the Justice Commission in the Territory. González complained that law and order had yet to be established in the Territory of Tepic, and that the roads were insecure because of roving gangs. González alleged that assaults against the haciendas were common, and that their employees were often held for ransom. The hacendado advised Munguía Santoyo, that the lands continued to be distributed among the campesinos, and he alleged that all of the lands that had been appropriated remained uncultivated. According to González the campesinos had not seeded, nor was he, nor his lessees, allowed to do it, notwithstanding that the lands had been prepared for the planting. González claimed that the same would likely happen with the planting of the dry season, because the campesino association members passed their time "celebrating their triumphs with revelry and disorders, making propaganda, and demanding that the peaceful residents of the farms go to enroll in the association." The hacendado complained that the authorities not only looked upon the disorders with "indifference," but that they even took part in them, "aggravating the situation of the peaceful people."

González advised Munguía Santoyo that the sub-agent of Tuxpan had been forced to turn that office over to the recently elected municipal president, who was none other than the secretary of the campesino association. González

invited the Justice commissioner to imagine how that would be, lamenting that they had "placed the Church in Luther's hands." González claimed that the campesinos of Tuxpan had "invaded both margins of the river up to Los Realitos, and down river along both margins up to La Boquita; and all the Menchaca [family] lands, past El Boquete to the border of La Palma." The campesinos of Mexcaltitán, he claimed, had appropriated "all of La Palma and Corrientes." González reported that his lessees had been told they must enroll in the association, or they would not be given lands, and that Torres had ordered him to surrender half the family's cultivated lands to the campesinos. Meanwhile, González lamented that the campesinos of the association ultimately would not plant, because they were "not cut out for work," but that neither would they allow those who were able to plant do so. The hacendado maintained that hunger would persist in the region, and that as a result of these actions the price of corn in Santiago had risen "to \$50 and \$60 for a measure of five liters."

González reported similar problems in Mexcaltitán, where he had other financial interests. He claimed that when his brother, Dionicio, had recently passed by the island community with a launch of corn, the village judge had obliged him to distribute a part of the corn among the people of the community. When Dionicio was about to leave, three men appeared and forcibly took three more sacks of

corn, and later further down the river, he was robbed of the remainder of the corn. González also reported that he had received news that Dionicio had more recently "miraculously" escaped from being assassinated by residents of Mexcaltitán.

Meanwhile, Torres had served as a mediator in negotiations between González's brother—Federico—and the campesinos of Mexcaltitán. The parties apparently had arrived at an arrangement whereby the Mexcaltecos would leave half the catch from the shrimp fishing grounds to González's lessee, Juan Mú, on the condition that Mú would pay them for their work. According to González, however, the jefe político had scuttled the accord, and sent an agent to purchase shrimp from the Mexcaltecos and to negotiate contracts for all they harvested. The hacendado added that Torres's envoy was "a power of the nature of nothing less than a godson of General Obregón."<sup>42</sup>

On October 5, Constancio González sent a subsequent letter to Munguía Santoyo, in which he reported that the "urgent situation" continued in Tuxpan. He also claimed that he had received a telegram, advising him that his tobacco warehouses in Tuxpan were "insecure." González went on to report that he had received another telegram—which he claimed had been set in German under an assumed name and

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<sup>42</sup> González to Munguía Santoyo, Guadalajara, September 27, 1916, VC, 97/10995. According to dates of subheadings in the body of the letter, this letter was apparently written over a three day period (September 27, 28, and 29), but it is dated September 27, in the heading.

sent to a German in Guadalajara, so that it would be allowed to pass by telegraph—which stated:

Jefe político has bad intentions with proprietors of lands, especially with us. He calls us thieves. He has distributed all the lands of La Palma, without respecting our compact, and nothing can be done here at this moment. He says he will hand over the fisheries after two more harvests, but without guaranteeing it. He raises a complaint about disorders and abuses. They had robbed the oil palm grove Cuautla, which we later recuperated. Situation bad: nobody works, only Aguirre.

González explained to Munguía Santoyo that the "compact" to which the telegram referred was the order from the jefe político forcing him to surrender half of his cultivated lands to the campesino association of Tuxpan, to which he allegedly "acceded, because there was no other recourse." González reported that he wanted to continue the struggle against the jefe político, but, he wrote: "not only are my interests in danger, but also the lives of my relatives and children, and of the few loyal men who are still in my service."<sup>43</sup>

Justice Commissioner Munguía Santoyo intervened directly with Carranza on behalf of Constancio González. He advised the First Chief about the "abuses and plundering of which don Constancio González, honorable resident and worker of the community of Tuxpan, of the Territory of Tepic, was victim." Munguía Santoyo beseeched Carranza to order a suspension of Torres's actions, "for the benefit of the good

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<sup>43</sup> González to Munguía Santoyo, Guadalajara, October 5, 1916, VC, 97/10995.



name of the Constitutionalist cause."<sup>44</sup>

Munguía Santoyo's intervention on González's behalf was effective, and it moved Carranza to order another report from Torres. In response, Torres advised Carranza that, as they were still waiting for the agrarian commission to initiate its work in the Territory, he had, in the meantime, decided to give provisional possession of some lands that he said had been "usurped by ambitious aims devoid of legality," to the indigenous natives of Sentispac and Mexcaltitán, in the municipality of Santiago Ixcuintla. The jefe político affirmed that it was completely proven that those lands belonged to what were once the ejidos of the expressed villages. The jefe político explained that the fisheries of Acajala and San Andrés had been ceded to the campesinos during the colonial period, and that they had been issued "well legalized and authorized primordial titles to the respective properties." Unfortunately, according to Torres, "ambitious and audacious parvenus" who wanted to seize the lands and fisheries at any cost, had demanded a review of the titles, declared them to be invalid, and took possession of the properties. Torres claimed that the "first usurper" was Agustín de la Peña, who sold them "without legitimate right" to Carlos Castilla, who in turn sold them "in an arbitrary way" to Constancio González. Torres advised Gobernación that González had been the political subprefect of Tuxpan, a

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<sup>44</sup> Munguía Santoyo to Carranza, Coyoacán, October 11, 1916, VC, 99/11206.

circumstance that Torres claimed González took advantage of to "adjudicate" himself various lots and lands corresponding to the ejidos and the legal foundations of these villages. The jefe político indicated that, especially in the case of the Indians of Mexcaltitán, if their properties were not returned to them, they would remain in a "lamentable state of ruin, misfortune, and misery." The jefe político also declared that the "usurpation" of the ejidos had also been practiced by the "omnipotent" Aguirre company, Manuel Fernández del Valle, and others, and he asserted that, given these circumstances, the establishment of the agrarian commission in the Territory was an "urgent and imperative necessity."<sup>45</sup>

Despite the jefe político's entreaty, the Carranza government decided in favor of the latifundistas, and in decrees issued on October 20, and November 8, the lands in question were ordered returned to the González and Menchaca families. Torres was forced to oblige the campesinos to hand over the lands, which they had already prepared for seeding. When the campesinos resisted, they were driven off the lands by a force commanded by Colonel Arnulfo Iriarte.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> "Informe" by Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, October 27, 1916, AGN-GPR, 81/21.

<sup>46</sup> Declaration by Ayuntamiento de Tuxpan to Congreso, August 28, 1917, AGN-GPR, 173/28; and Silvestre Robles et al., to Gobernación, Tuxpan, November 20, 1916, AGN-GPR, 172/75.

On December 3, 1916, the municipal president of Tuxpan, Clemente Martínez, wrote to the secretary of Gobernación, regarding entries that existed in the municipal treasury's receiptbook for that current year, concerning the land census. Martínez referred to a number of entries in the ledger registered under the names of Celso Bogarin, Plácido González, Constancio González, and the Estate of A. Menchaca, and he asserted that it remained proven that the said gentlemen were not the legitimate owners, because they had not paid for the whole extension that they currently had in their possession. The municipal president also claimed that the latifundistas had made token "advance payments," in order to demonstrate a de facto ownership of lands that belonged to the community.<sup>47</sup>

On December 5, the campesino association of Tuxpan addressed the secretary of Gobernación, once again stating the case regarding their land claims. They indicated that, although their region was the "richest" in the Territory, and had traditionally supplied a great part of it with its products, they found themselves "overwhelmed by the most dreadful misery because of the hoarding and concealment of cereals by the reactionary landowners." The association accused the landowners of having been supporters of Villismo, and they claimed that the latifundistas had obstructed the "beneficent action" of the Carranza government by pre-

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<sup>47</sup> Martínez to Gobernación, Tuxpan, December 3, 1916, AGN-GPR, 88/4.

venting the establishment of the local agrarian commission in order to prevent the Lands Law from being fulfilled. The campesinos stated that they believed that Carranza was not aware of the manner in which his decrees had been ridiculed by the large landowners. They also commended Jefe Político Torres for the way he had treated their problem. The letter went on to describe the work they had invested in the properties, preparing and seeding the lands, and they claimed they had even rented oxen at prices of up to forty pesos a day. Nevertheless, more than three hundred ejidatarios had lost their lands. The campesinos stated that they were "desperate" because their future had been destroyed, and because the haciendas did not plant corn, but tobacco. They exclaimed: "What, then, awaits our families? Death!" The letter closed with an urgent request for a quick resolution to their problem, because the time for seeding was already passing. However, despite these urgent pleas, the request by the campesinos from Tuxpan was turned down by the Carranza government on the grounds that legislation warranting such intervention had yet to be approved.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Sociedad de Campesinos de Tuxpan to Gobernación, Tuxpan, December 5, 1916, AGN-GPR, 87/25; and Gobernación's note appended to copy of Gobernación to Silvestre Robles, Mexico City, January 3, 1916, AGN-GPR, 87/25.

## 5.5 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

While Carranza seemed determined to avoid convening the Constitutional Convention to which he had made allusions as early as September 1913, and which he had specifically pledged in a speech on February 3, 1915, the mounting political pressures finally motivated the First Chief on September 14, 1916, to convoke a Constitutional Convention that was to be held on December 1, in Querétaro. Elections for delegates to represent the Territory in the Convention were held, and the victorious candidates were Lieutenant Colonel Cristóbal Limón, for the first district of Tepic; Major Marcelino Cedano, for the second district of Santiago Ixcuintla; and Juan Espinosa Bávara, for the third district of Ixtlán. Limón had political ties to Plutarco Calles, and he had once held the rank of military commander of the plaza of Tepic. He was also Juan Torres's military chief of staff. Juan Espinosa Bávara, who was forty years old, had worked as a civil servant in the Territory for a number of years, and his most recent position was in Hacienda as the principal administrator of the seal. Cedano, who was 28 years old, served in the Constitutionalist Army under Limón's command. Of the three deputies representing the Territory of Tepic, only Espinosa Bávara originated from the Territory. There were two other deputies representing other States, who had been born in the Territory of Tepic: Esteban Baca Calderón, representing Jalisco; and Andrés Magallón, representing

Sinaloa.<sup>49</sup>

The elections for deputies to the convention were embroiled in controversy. Brigadier General Ernesto Damy, who had been one of the candidates for the first electoral district of Tepic, submitted a formal protest on November 28, to the Congressional Board For the Review of Credentials, complaining about the illegality of the electoral proceedings, and asking for its nullification. Apparently Limón had won in both the first and the second electoral districts, and the victorious candidate called upon his substitute, Cedano, to represent the second district of Santiago Ixcuintla where José Santos Godínez—who would be elected governor one year later—had been the defeated candidate. Moreover, the file of documents corresponding to the first and second electoral districts were lost when the guard who was transporting them to Querétaro was ambushed and robbed. This left the deputies with only the credentials that had been issued by their respective electoral boards. The controversy carried over into the Convention, where many deputies would only accept two deputies from the Territory of Tepic. In the end, however, the credentials of all three

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<sup>49</sup> E.V. Niemeyer, Jr., Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 25-26, and 264; Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 507; Gutiérrez Contreras, p. 97; Espinosa Ramírez, p. 23; Calles to Carranza, Agua Prieta, February 20, 1915, VC, 28/2989; Pedro Sánchez to Gobernación, Tepic, August 30, 1917, AGN-GPR, 224/64; and Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, May 17, 1916, AGN-GPR, 165/111.

deputies were approved.<sup>50</sup>

The First Chief arrived in Querétaro on November 24, although he did not actively participate in the discussions regarding the credentials of the constituents that took place in the days leading up to the Convention. On December 1, Carranza inaugurated the Convention and delivered a long discourse in which he proposed the reforms to the Constitution of 1857 that he wanted the assembly to approve. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the delegates were generally determined to do more than just reform the previous Constitution. Three distinguishable groups emerged from the Convention: on the right, a faction of about fifty to sixty moderate liberals, loyal to Carranza; on the left, another faction, approximately equal in number, of more radical liberals, who proudly accepted the label of "Jacobins" and who tended to rally around Alvaro Obregón; and a third group comprising the majority of the delegates, who can be described as a balancing, centrist faction.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Gutiérrez Contreras, pp. 97-98.

<sup>51</sup> For historical treatments of the Convention, see E.V. Niemeyer, Jr. Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); Gabriel Ferrer Mendiola, Historia del Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 1957); and Berta Ulloa, La Constitución de 1917. El Colegio de México, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, vol. 6 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1983). For a statistical study of the politics of the Convention, see Peter H. Smith, "La política dentro de la Revolución: El Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917," Historia Mexicana 22 (January-March 1973): 363-95. For a treatment along the lines of the philosophy of law, see Jorge Carpizo, La Constitución Mexicana de 1917, 6th ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1983).

The idea of statehood for the Territory of Tepic suddenly appeared once again from within the Carrancista faction. There is every indication to suggest that the initiative to reform Articles 43 and 47 of the Constitution, which elevated the Territory of Tepic to the category of statehood, was exclusively Carranza's. There is no evidence that it was an issue in the election campaigns for deputies to the Convention, nor apparently did anyone from the Territory promote such an idea, which in any rate would likely have been considered ludicrous given the Territory's battered condition in 1916.

According to an account by one of the deputies, Juan Espinosa Bávara, the Tepic representation first heard of Carranza's project to elevate the Territory to the State of Nayarit on the morning of December 6, when the Convention secretaries, Fernando M. Lizardi and José María Trechuelo, presented the Convention with Carranza's projected draft of the Constitution. Espinosa Bávara claimed that the reform for the Territory was met with "satisfaction" by the three representatives from Tepic, because the new State was to maintain the boundaries that had been established for the Territory of Tepic, and because they were pleased with the name of Nayarit in that it evoked the region's proud Cora heritage. Historian Evarardo Peña Navarro has pointed out that this memoir by Espinosa Bávara demonstrates that it was not through the lobbying or work of the deputies represent-



ing the Territory that the new State was born, but that the promotor was none other than the First Chief. According to Peña Navarro, "The Tepic deputies then, were the first to be surprised by Mr. Carranza's proposal."<sup>52</sup>

On December 13, the three deputies from the Territory, in conjunction with the Sinaloan representative, Andrés Magallón, notified their compatriots in Tepic about the proposed reform to elevate the Territory to the State of Nayarit. On December 17, Limón received a reply from the municipal president of Tepic, Alberto González, expressing the city's congratulations for having arrived at the "great" project of erecting the new State of Nayarit, and claiming that they were all anxious for the victory to be achieved. Perhaps more significantly, however, the telegram quickly turned its attention to a matter that seemed to remain the prime concern in Tepic, and beseeched the deputies to use their influence on this occasion to petition the First Chief to establish the agrarian commission in Tepic.<sup>53</sup>

The bill to reform Article 43 received first reading on December 27. On January 26, 1917, Tobías Soler submitted an amendment to the bill, proposing that the new State be named Carranza, but his proposal was ignored.<sup>54</sup> The bill to modify

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<sup>52</sup> Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, pp. 507-09, quoted passage, p. 507; and Espinosa Bávara, "La institución de Nayarit como Estado libre y soberano," Tepic, El Nayar, Special Edition, December 1, 1949.

<sup>53</sup> These telegrams are quoted in Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 98.

Article 43 was then passed with only four dissenting votes, while the bill to amend the correlative Article 47 received unanimous approval. On January 31, the Constitution was signed, and on February 5, it was promulgated. It became effective on May 1.

Carranza's motives for having the Territory of Tepic elevated to the State of Nayarit can only be surmised. The three deputies representing the Territory of Tepic did not participate very actively in the proceedings of the Convention. While it may be that the debate on their credentials affected their confidence, it is also likely that they were compromised by Carranza's proposal to elevate the Territory to statehood. Indeed, this was probably a factor in the First Chief's decision to issue the initiative to begin with. Carranza apparently used the project to neutralize some of the support that he must have suspected Obregón was rallying for the Jacobin faction. Two of the deputies from Tepic, Limón and Cedano, were military men and sympathetic to their commanding general, Alvaro Obregón. Carranza may have hoped to swing their support to his side with the issue of statehood for the Territory. It must also be remembered that the Territory of Tepic had been Villista, and even the latifundistas of the Territory had supported Buelna over the Constitutionalists. Faced with factory closures by the Aguirre company, Carranza may have perceived that granting statehood to the Territory would effectively shift the tax

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<sup>54</sup> Gutiérrez Contreras, p. 99; and O'Gorman, p. 150.

burden from the federal government to the business community in the new State of Nayarit. Furthermore, the initiative added to the aura of reform that Carranza hoped to give to his projected draft of the Constitution, despite the fact that he would really have preferred not to tamper very much with the Constitution of 1857. Nevertheless, such thoughts remain purely speculative, for there is nothing to indicate how Carranza arrived at his decision to change the status of the Territory of Tepic.

On December 18, Carranza sent a message to the "United Reform and Worker" Permanent Electoral Committee, advising them that Deputies Juan Espinosa Bávara, Cristóbal Limón, and Marcelino Cedano had given their support in the name of the committee to Carranza's candidacy for the presidency of the Republic in the upcoming elections. In a subsequent New Years Day letter greeting the First Chief, the labor committee reaffirmed their support for Carranza's candidacy.<sup>55</sup>

One of the Territory's native son's, Esteban Baca Calderón, however, participated very actively, in the Convention, and he was one of the leading voices for the radical Jacobin faction. Calderón—who preferred the use of the second of his surnames—had been one of the leaders of the strike against the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company in 1906. Along with Manuel M. Diéguez, Calderón had been imprisoned for his activities in the Cananea strike, and

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<sup>55</sup> Comité Electoral Liberal to Carranza, Tepic, January 1, 1917, VC, 109/12451.

upon his release from the San Juan de Ulúa Penitentiary at the outbreak of the Revolution, he had enlisted in the revolutionary cause along with Diéguez and other veterans from the Cananea strike such as Pablo Quiroga and Juan José Ríos. Calderón's military career followed that of his former labor leader, Diéguez, and when Diéguez rose to division general in the ranks of the Army of the Northwest under the command of Obregón, Calderón rose to general. Diéguez became governor of the State of Jalisco, and in reward for his loyalty during the battles of 1915 against Villa, Calderón became the chief tax officer in that State. Less than a year later, Esteban Baca Calderón, who was born in Santa María del Oro in 1876, would be an unsuccessful candidate in the first gubernatorial election in Nayarit. He later became provisional governor of the State from 1929 to 1930, and he also would eventually represent Nayarit in the Federal Congress.<sup>56</sup>

Calderón assumed an active role at the convention from the start. He just missed becoming provisional president of the assembly, losing by a vote of fifty to forty-nine to Carranza's close friend, Manuel Amaya. In the proceedings for the very important task of choosing the committees, Calderón very actively opposed the proposals of one of Carranza's staunchest supporters, José Natividad Macías, who as chairman of these proceedings attempted to ensure that mem-

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<sup>56</sup> Niemeyer, pp. 40, 171, and 227; and Aguilar Camín, La frontera, pp. 116, 240-41, and 285-92.

bers loyal to Carranza held the majority on the committees. Calderón reportedly impugned Macías, and pointed out that if the chair kept on making proposals, the assembly would continue to reject them and an agreement would never be reached. Calderón was active in many of the most crucial debates, and when Luis Manuel Rojas stepped down from the presidency of the Convention for the second time, chastising the Jacobins for their radicalness and their loyalty to Obregón over the First Chief, a trembling Calderón rose to deny that Obregón was the leader of the Jacobins, and exclaimed: "We do not have any chief, least of all in this Convention."<sup>57</sup>

The radical role that Esteban Baca Calderón played in the Convention may indirectly have had an unforeseen effect on events in the Territory of Tepic. In a letter dated December 4, Diéguez informed Carranza that in accordance with the "agreement" Carranza had extended to him in their conversation relative to General Pablo Quiroga,—another veteran of the Cananea strike of 1906—Quiroga would be "leaving with the object of receiving the nomination of jefe político and military commander of the Territory of Tepic." In a second letter from Diéguez to Carranza—apparently a confidential letter delivered personally by Quiroga, but not read by him—Diéguez informed Carranza that Quiroga had been his "right arm in the campaign against Villismo." Diéguez also mentioned that Quiroga was in "bad pecuniary condi-

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<sup>57</sup> Niemeyer, pp. 40, 44, 63, 121, 171-72, and 227.

tions," and he asked the First Chief to give him all the help he could in this respect.<sup>58</sup>

On December 9, 1916, Carranza ordered the removal of Torres, and his replacement as jefe político and military commander by Quiroga.<sup>59</sup> Despite these arrangements to have Torres replaced, the order was apparently rescinded before Quiroga could arrive in the Territory to assume command. Carranza had already initiated his plans to elevate Tepic to statehood by the time he had released his orders to have Quiroga assume the position in Tepic, which indicates that the change in status for the Territory was apparently not a factor in this decision. Again one can only speculate, but the circumstantial evidence exists that Calderón's radical stance at the Convention may have cast enough doubt on the loyalty of the Cananea clique of Diéguez, Quiroga, and Calderón, to make Carranza think twice about allowing them to control the Territory of Tepic, which was the strategic passageway to Obregón's home base of Sonora. On the other hand, the loyalty demonstrated by Limón and Cedano who had been under the command of Torres, may very well have contributed to the fact that, at least for a few months longer, Torres was to remain in power in the Territory of Tepic.

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<sup>58</sup> Diéguez to Carranza, Guadalajara, December 4, 1916, VC, 105/11992; and Diéguez to Carranza, Guadalajara, December 6, 1916, VC, 105/12031.

<sup>59</sup> Carranza to Gobernación, Querétaro, December 9, 1916, AGN-GPR, 87/5.

The Constitution that emerged from the Convention in Querétaro was in many ways a truly remarkable document, and it has often been described as being the most progressive constitution of its time. Nevertheless, the new Constitution would require a genuine, wholehearted commitment from the president and other leading officials of the state apparatus in order for the enlightened ideas contained in that charter to become effective. Unfortunately, Carranza, who had been in opposition to many of the reforms adopted at the Convention of Querétaro, failed to uphold some of the most important articles of the Constitution, especially those articles pertaining to land reform, worker rights, political democracy, judicial and legislative independence, and state ownership of the nation's resources.

Chapter VI  
NAYARIT AND STATEHOOD, 1917-1920

6.1 PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR JESÚS FERREIRA

Having compromised on the constitution, Venustiano Carranza managed to broaden his political base by appealing an assortment of interests, and thereby gain the nomination of the revolutionary coalition for the presidency. The elections of 1917 were carried out without a real struggle for power, and Carranza assumed the presidency with the "unanimous assent, not of the nation, but certainly of the political groups."<sup>1</sup> This set both Mexico and the fledgling State of Nayarit into a new stage of the Revolution. Carranza no longer had to assume a conciliatory stance in relation to labor leaders and agrarian reformers, and this allowed him greater latitude to shape government policy

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<sup>1</sup> Alvaro Matute, La carrera del caudillo. El Colegio de México, ed., Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, vol. 8 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1980), p. 13.

In the Territory of Tepic, Torres advised Gobernación on March 29, that the elections there had produced the following results: for President of the Republic, Venustiano Carranza; for First Senator, Dr. Bernardo S. Martínez, and for Substitute, Jerónimo Meza; for Second Senator, Quirino Ordaz, and for Substitute, Luis Castillo Ledón; for Deputy and Substitute for the First District, Lic. Salvador Arriola Valadés, and Fernando Ruiz; for the Second District, José R. Padilla and Rosendo González Rubio; and for the Third District, José María Retes Zepeda and Marcelino Medina. See Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, March 29, 1917, AGN-GPR, 182/2.



according to his own, evidently bourgeois ideals. The Carranza regime soon arrived at an understanding with the latifundistas, and the government began to help repress the factory workers and undermine land distribution programs.

In the final months of his administration as the last jefe político of the Territory of Tepic, Juan Torres lacked the initiative and commitment that he had demonstrated before the events of December 1916. It seems apparent that Torres was either aware that he would not be assuming the position of provisional governor, or that he was exhibiting a more subdued attitude in the hope of receiving the nomination. While Carranza and Obregón had parted company during the Constitutional Convention, Obregón astutely recognized Carranza's political hegemony, and he chose to cooperate with the president rather than rebel. Torres, who was known to be an Obregón partisan, apparently had received a signal to discontinue active support of the unionists and agrarian reformers in Nayarit. Whatever the reason may have been, it left Tepic in a period of drift during the final months of its existence as a Territory, and without the strenuous leadership Torres had given it in the first nine months of his administration.

Possibly motivated by the relative calm that began to settle over Mexico after mid-1916, and also perhaps prompted by the ramifications of the convocation of the Constitutional Convention, a number of unresolved land cases involving

Tepic surfaced around this time. In one such case, on November 11, 1916, the Honorary Consul of Mexico in Salt Lake City, Utah, E.D. Hashimoto, wrote to the Mexican Consular Department to advise them that he was negotiating with General Mariano Ruiz for the purchase of two ranches named Ocotillo and Caminjal, located in the Territory of Tepic. Hashimoto asked the Consular Department to confirm whether General Ruiz's titles for the properties were valid, and he indicated that he had been informed while he was in Guadalajara in February of that year, that the mentioned properties had been confiscated by the government. A series of communications between various government departments reveal the government's confusion regarding these properties. A list of the properties confiscated by the government in the State of Nayarit, which was dated June 16, 1919, however, listed fifty properties formerly belonging to Ruiz, including the ranches Ocotillo and Caminjal.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding another land case, Acaponeta resident Lamber-to Cabañas, an engineer and manager of the San Juan de Guadalupe Mining Company, wrote to Carranza on January 27, 1917, claiming that he had been despoiled in late 1913 by

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<sup>2</sup> Consular Department translation of E.D. Hashimoto to L.A. Peredo, Jefe del Departamento Consular de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Salt Lake City, November 11, 1916; Hacienda y Crédito Público to Gobernación, Mexico City, December 15, 1916; Gobernación to Luis Cabrera, Secretario de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Mexico City, February 26, 1917, AGN-GPR, 87/11; and Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección General de Bienes Intervénidos, "Relación de las Propiedades Intervénidas en el Estado de Nayarit," June 16, 1919, AGN-GPR, 177/22.

the "disloyal" Rafael Buelna of two rural properties named El Coatepetl and El Arrayan located in that municipality, and one urban property in the town of Acaponeta. Cabañas alleged that the confiscation of the properties arose from personal differences with Buelna, and that the rebel leader had also jailed him and extorted the sum of forty thousand pesos. Cabañas enclosed letters of reference from Brigadier General Juan Carrasco and Major Ignacio M. García, both former jefes políticos of the Territory of Tepic, attesting to his services to the Constitutionalist cause, and he asked Carranza for help in obtaining the return of the properties. On April 28, 1917, Gobernación advised Cabañas that by resolution of the First Chief, the government would proceed with the "disintervention" of his properties, provided he formally agreed to renounce any reclamation for damages. Apparently Cabañas agreed to the government's condition, and his properties were returned to him.<sup>3</sup>

In another land case, Bernabé and Emilio Pérez of Santa María del Oro, asked Gobernación to resolve a land dispute between them and latifundista Manuel Fernández del Valle, concerning a property named El Puente, located in that municipality. Bernabé and Emilio Pérez alleged that they had originally launched a land claim on December 19, 1912,

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<sup>3</sup> Cabañas to Carranza, Mexico City, January 27, 1917; Declaration by Ignacio M. García, Mexico City, January 27, 1917; Torres to Gobernación, Tepic, April 9, 1917, enclosing Presidente Municipal de Acaponeta to Torres, March 26, 1917; Gobernación to Cabañas, Mexico City, April 28, 1917; and Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, May 16, 1917, AGN-GPR, 177/103.

during the Madero administration. They claimed to have proof that the La Labor hacienda, property of Fernández del Valle, had appropriated their land just as it had done to others in the municipality. Gobernación replied to Bernabé and Emilio Pérez on January 25, 1917, informing them that a search of the secretariat's archive had not uncovered the application of 1912 that they had referred to in their letter, and their land claim apparently remained unresolved.<sup>4</sup>

On April 15, 1917, Gobernación sent a telegram to Governor Diéguez of Jalisco, asking him to instruct Brigadier General Jesús M. Ferreira to go to Nayarit to take over the administration there as provisional governor.<sup>5</sup> Torres turned over the administration of the Territory of Tepic to Ferreira on April 24. On April 26, Ferreira issued a public manifesto, in which he pledged to remain "completely neutral" in the forthcoming local elections, and that he would act only to ensure that the rest of the authorities in the State did likewise.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Bernabé Pérez and Emilio Pérez to Gobernación, Santa María del Oro, December 16, 1916; and Gobernación to Bernabé Pérez and Emilio Pérez, Mexico City, January 25, 1917, and subsequent correspondence between the Pérezes and Gobernación, AGN-GPR, 215/80.

<sup>5</sup> Gobernación to Diéguez, Mexico City, April 15, 1917, AGN-GPR, 178/69.

<sup>6</sup> For copies of the declaration by Torres and Ferreira, April 24, 1917, and Ferreira's "Manifiesto al público," April 26, 1917, see Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, pp. 509-12; and Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 28-31.

Meanwhile, the formalities for elevating the Territory of Tepic to statehood were carried out. On May 1, in a public ceremony at the Calderón Theater attended by a large congregation of citizens, many of them reportedly moved to tears by the emotion of the event, the governor solemnly declared the creation of the Free, Sovereign, and Independent State of Nayarit.<sup>7</sup>

Once in office, one of the first things on Ferreira's agenda was to obtain funds in order for his government to operate. On April 26, Ferreira apparently solicited a loan from Carranza for \$300,000 to cover the State's initial expenses.<sup>8</sup> Ferreira also lost no time in reviewing his salary as governor, and on May 2, he requested a raise. Ferreira pointed out that it was inappropriate that the tax administrator, who was subordinate to the governor, currently was paid a higher salary than his superior. Ferreira claimed that either the governor's salary should be raised, or the tax administrator's salary should be lowered accordingly; although Ferreira suggested the former way, "given the economic conditions he had to face."<sup>9</sup> On May 7, Ferreira was advised that his salary had been set at \$25 per day until

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<sup>7</sup> For descriptions of the ceremony and copies of the Act, see Peña Navarro, Estudio histórico, vol. 2, p. 512; and Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 31-32.

<sup>8</sup> Ferreira to Carranza, Tepic, October 27, 1917, VC, 118/13402.

<sup>9</sup> Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, May 2, 1917, AGN-GPR, 220/74.

the State Congress could fix the amount it desired.<sup>10</sup> In the meantime, Carranza offered the governor of Nayarit a loan of \$200,000 to the State, for initial expenses. On May 12, Ferreira expressed his gratitude for the loan, and he beseeched Gobernación to deal with the arrangements of the loan promptly, because of what he called the "seriousness of the situation."<sup>11</sup>

Ferreira wasted no time in attending to the protection of the interests of the latifundistas. On May 3, the governor commissioned Lieutenant Colonel Torres Ortiz to confiscate weapons that some residents of the haciendas of Puga and Bellavista reportedly had in their possession. The lieutenant colonel and his troops first went to the hacienda of Puga, where he ordered the members of the hacienda's workers union to hand over the weapons in their possession. The workers refused to surrender their weapons, and Torres Ortiz ordered the arrest of the union leaders. One worker was killed by the soldiers, allegedly for inciting rebellion. Union leaders Sabino Villegas and Norberto Vázquez were taken into custody. Torres Ortiz reported that seven-

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<sup>10</sup> Gobernación to Ferreira, Mexico City, May 7, 1917, AGN-GPR, 220/74.

<sup>11</sup> Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, May 12, 1917, AGN-GPR, 213/2.

The stated amount of the loan from the federal government to the State of Nayarit varies. In some places it is reported to be \$200,000, while in other places it is reported to be \$300,000. For documents relating to this loan, see AGN-GPR, 212/13, 213/2, 220/74; and VC, 118/13402.

teen weapons of various types and calibers had been seized from the two haciendas.<sup>12</sup>

In his report to Carranza, Ferreira advised the president that the residents of the haciendas of Puga and Bellavista were "extremely turbulent," and he alleged that these workers had "risen up in arms" against former Jefe Político Juan Torres, even though it was Torres who originally had provided them with the weapons and ammunition. Carranza responded to Ferreira's report on the events that had taken place on the haciendas of Puga and Bellavista, by advising the governor to take the measures required to maintain the due respect to the authorities and the law, punishing all those who attempted to disturb the public order.<sup>13</sup>

In a letter dated May 7, a group of thirty-seven women workers from the sugar mill in Puga wrote to the governor to demand justice for what they described as the "abuse of authority" that had been committed against the executed member of their union during the government raid. The women reported that on the "insinuation" of one of the members of the hacienda's guardia blanca, the martyred worker had been "ordered shot at once, without formal procedure, being defenseless when they apprehended him." The women workers asked the governor for the guarantees that the law provided,

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<sup>12</sup> Ferreira to Carranza, Tepic, May 4, 1917, enclosing report from Torres Ortiz to Ferreira, May 4, 1917, AGN-GPR, 181/66.

<sup>13</sup> Ferreira to Carranza, Tepic, May 4, 1917; and Gobernación to Ferreira, Mexico City, May 8, 1917, AGN-GPR, 181/66.

and they specifically asked for the removal of Tirso Preciado from the hacienda, alleging that the guardia blanca to which Preciado belonged had formerly worked in the service of the federal soldiers under the command of Victoriano Huerta. The women workers described Preciado as being an "acrimonious enemy" of Sabino Villegas, the arrested leader of the Puga union, and Preciado was also linked to the Alvarista faction of Rafael Buelna's forces. The women declared that a "traitor" should not be placed in a position of authority, and that Preciado was a "threat" to the residents of the hacienda.<sup>14</sup>

On May 17, the thirty-seven women workers wrote to the secretary of Gobernación, supplying him with a copy of the letter they had written to the governor, and reiterating their plea that those responsible for the "crime" be punished. They declared that the ones responsible for their afflictions were the "Spaniards, who in an act of vengeance sent the execution squad to commit this deed, availing of the hired ruffian, Tirso Preciado." They asked the secretary of Gobernación to advise the president, so that Carranza could provide them with justice.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Note that the women referred to the executed worker as Gómez, while Torres Ortiz's report, as transcribed by Ferreira, named him González. Copy of Manuela C. Aguilar et al., to Gobernador de Nayarit, Hacienda de Puga, May 7, 1917, AGN-GPR, 181/66.

<sup>15</sup> Manuela C. Aguilar et al., to Gobernación, Hacienda de Puga, May 17, 1917, AGN-GPR, 181/66.



In a subsequent report on the matter, Ferreira claimed that the two workers from Puga, Sabino Villegas and Norberto Vázquez, had been taken to Tepic because they had "exerted resistance" to the orders of the authority, as well as for having asked the workers from the neighboring Bellavista hacienda for help in preventing the disarmament. The governor went on to explain that the object of the detention had been to oblige the workers to hand over the weapons they had hidden, and once this had been done, Villegas and Vázquez were placed in liberty. Ferreira claimed that since that date the roads in the region of Puga had been calm, and that no disorders or assaults had been registered. He added that the many incidents of this nature that had occurred there and in other parts of the State, had continued to occur "precisely for the lack of prudence with which weapons and ammunition had been handed out in the outlying communities." Alluding to the nineteenth-century caudillo, Manuel Lozada, Ferreira reminded Gobernación about

the urgent need to intensify the campaign undertaken against brigandage, because otherwise it will not be remote that a new Lozada attract the elements of disorder that are found scattered in all parts of the State, and succeed in coordinating a nucleus as powerful as that which for so long dominated the Sierra de Nayarit and its environs.<sup>16</sup>

Apparently Ferreira was either inadvertently or purposely confusing the issue of "brigandage" with a labor protest and the determination of the workers of Puga and Bellavista to

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<sup>16</sup> Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, June 22, 1917, AGN-GPR, 181/66.

arm themselves in defense of their rights.

In another case, in June 1917, George M. Howat, attorney for the El Cambio Gold Mining Company, of Acaponeta, notified the secretary of Gobernación that his firm had received a message from the superintendant of the mine, Otto Land, informing him that there were twenty-five thieves in the vicinity of the mine, who had been killing people for more than a year, and that action had yet to be taken against them. Land reported that the thieves had attempted to kill him and take over the mine. The superintendant claimed that he and his men had battled for many hours before the thieves were repulsed. He complained that now he was "neither able to work, nor leave the house." The company's attorney, Howat, asked the secretary of Gobernación to remedy the situation in the area, and he added that the El Cambio Gold Mining Company had invested "a great deal of money" in that district, and that it seemed to him that they were worthy of receiving the "protection and guarantees" of the government.<sup>17</sup>

The poor condition of transportation facilities continued to be a problem in Nayarit. On behalf of Nayarit's business class, Ferreira presented a proposal to the Carranza government for the development of the port of San Blas, which included plans for both the "conditioning" of the

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<sup>17</sup> Howat to Gobernación, Mexico City, June 11, 1917, enclosing Otto Land to Abogados Taylor y Howat, Acaponeta, June 9, [1917], AGN-GPR, 169/23.

port, and its "apt fiscal regulation." The governor's plan was organized in two parts: the first part titled "Material Improvements;" and the second part "Economic Improvement." The material improvements proposed in the first part of the plan were identical to those recommended in the Cerizola study that had been carried out in 1907, and which had been accepted conditionally by the Huerta regime in September 1913, subject to the pacification of the region. As for the economic improvement that was described in the second part of his plan, Ferreira pointed out that the businessmen of the State had indicated that apart from the poor port conditions at San Blas, they were faced with high import and export duties, as well as the high cost of overland transportation by mule. According to the governor, these conditions prompted the trading ships to bypass San Blas, and caused local commerce in Nayarit to be "forever a tributary of Mazatlán commerce." In order to stimulate the State's economy, Ferreira suggested the reduction of both customs duties and import and export taxes for the port of San Blas. In this way, the "excessive" freight charges that the merchants had to pay because of the lack of a railroad, would be compensated. Despite the validity of the arguments presented, however, Ferreira's proposal was not acted upon by the Carranza government.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, August 30, 1917, AGN-GPR, 177/82.

Meanwhile, the process of establishing the State government apparatus in Nayarit continued. On September 22, Ferreira convoked the first elections for governor and local deputies. The date of the election was set for November 24, and the State Congress was scheduled to meet on December 25, to review the elections of its members and of the governor. Once this had been done, the successful gubernatorial candidate was to be declared the Supreme Executive of the State, and he would take immediate possession of the government. The representatives would assume the role of Constitutional Congress, and they would be charged with creating a new constitution within forty-five days.<sup>19</sup>

In an official memorandum dated September 26, 1917, printed in poster format, the governor declared that any functionary or public employee who "meddled in an active manner in local politics" would be punished by suspension from his functions. The circular also declared that military commanders who exercised pressure in favor of any of the candidates would be given a severe punishment. The governor added, however, that this restriction had been imposed without affecting anyone's right to conserve his opinions in

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<sup>19</sup> For a copy of the decree, see Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 32-37.

The victorious candidates for deputies to the State Congress were as follows: Antonio de Paula Monrroy; José María Ledón; Marcos Esmerio; Francisco Arroyo; Alfredo Robles; Miguel Madrigal; Federico Ramón Corona; Matías López Urbina; José Aguiar Vejar; Manuel Guzmán; Fidencio Estrada; Francisco Amézquita; Francisco R. Pérez; Pablo Retes Zepeda; and José Trinidad Solano. See López González, Recorrido, p. 204; and Espinosa Ramírez, p. 39.

private, and vote as he wished. The memorandum ended with an invitation to the public to denounce any offenders of this disposition, but reminded potential informers that documentary proof or testimonials would be necessary.<sup>20</sup>

There were three candidates for governor: Esteban Baca Calderón; Enrique G. Elías; and José Santos Godínez. According to local historian Espinosa Ramírez, Baca Calderón was supported by the "ideologically revolutionary element"; Elías was supported mainly by the "workers and agraristas"; and Godínez was the "candidate of the men who had distinguished themselves as enemies of the Revolution." It was well known that the winning candidate, Godínez, was a practicing Catholic, and he openly—and according to Espinosa Ramírez, "scandalously"—exercised his faith. In Espinosa Ramírez's opinion, it was the prevailing "mystical and religious ambience" that decided the contest, and he asserted: "There is no doubt that Godínez owed ninety percent of his election to the religious influence, which saw in him one of its best friends."<sup>21</sup> Other historians have stated that Godínez was a supporter of Carranza, and his victory has been attributed to this affiliation with the president.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> "Importante Circular: Número 26" by Ferreira, Tepic, September 26, 1917, VC, 116/13285.

<sup>21</sup> Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 37-38.

<sup>22</sup> See Cumberland, Constitutionalist, p. 370; García, pp. 173-74; and López González, Recorrido, p. 204.

During the campaign there were a number of incidents that were characteristic of electoral contests during this epoch. On one occasion, a Godínez election rally was disrupted by a hail of stones that his supporters claimed were hurled at them by men from the military detachment in Tuxpan. Nevertheless, the commander of the detachment assured the governor that the report was inexact, claiming that the stones had come from the houses surrounding the hall where the meeting had taken place. The commander asserted that Godínez was the one responsible for the attack, allegedly because Godínez had verbally attacked the supporters of the candidate Baca Calderón, and thereby induced the people to upset the order in this manner. The commander of the detachment added that according to private information he had received, those who had thrown the stones were supporters of the worker candidate Enrique Elías, and that they were reportedly "of considerable number" in the community of Tuxpan.<sup>23</sup>

There are indications that Godínez's victory had not been completely acceptable to certain sectors of the military. Governor Ferreira was reported to have worked against Godínez, presumably in support of Baca Calderón.<sup>24</sup> The commander of the detachment of Tuxpan had suggested that his

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<sup>23</sup> Ferreira to Carranza, Tepic, October 22, 1917, enclosing Jefe del Destacamento de Tuxpan to Ferreira, [n.d.], VC, 118/13381.

<sup>24</sup> Godínez to Aguirre Berlanga, Tepic, January 4, [1918], AGN-GPR, 267/34.

own sympathies lay with Baca Calderón. General Juan J. Ríos—who had been a fellow labor leader with Baca Calderón at the Cananea strike—considered Godínez's election "a shame and a joke of the revolutionary promises."<sup>25</sup>

In the final days of his term as provisional governor, Ferreira became embroiled in a dispute involving the State Congress. In response to a complaint by the president of Nayarit's Chamber of Deputies, Pablo Retes Zepeda, that Ferreira had ordered the suspension of the State Congress's sessions, Secretary of Gobernación Manuel Aguirre Berlanga advised the governor that Carranza had ordered him to abstain completely from taking part in the functioning of the legislature, and the secretary reminded Ferreira of the limitations of his role as governor.

Ferreira answered Aguirre Berlanga by explaining that his government had become involved in the matter because laws issued by the executive branch of government had been violated, and also because eight of the fifteen members of the Chamber of Deputies had requested that he intervene to prevent further illegalities from occurring. According to Ferreira, the only intervention that had taken place was to transmit to the Senate the complaint of the nonconforming deputies, who reportedly constituted a majority. He denied having used any violence or coercive methods, even though he

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<sup>25</sup> Ríos is quoted by Cumberland, who claims that the Archivo de la Defensa Nacional has ample documentation on the election; see Cumberland, Constitutionalist, p. 365.

claimed he had been asked to do so by the alleged majority. Ferreira advised the secretary of Gobernación that the "minority" led by Retes Zepeda functioned without a legal quorum, and made laws and resolutions that violated expressed laws. Ferreira further explained that the chairman of the Chamber had personally offered to suspend sessions until the Senate had reached a resolution on the matter, but that Retes Zepeda had broken his word and convened Congress. The governor assured Aguirre Berlanga, however, that he had not disrupted these sessions. Ferreira went so far as to offer his resignation, "to prevent being depicted as partial." Nevertheless, Ferreira's gesture was declined by Aguirre Berlanga, who accepted that the governor had acted "in good faith," and the secretary instructed Ferreira to carry on with the planned exchange of power according to the procedure outlined in the election decree.<sup>26</sup>

## 6.2 FERREIRA AND THE CAMPESINOS OF TUXPAN

In response to the failure of their petitions with the Carranza government, the campesino association of Tuxpan persisted with their petitions for the restitution of their ejido lands, and on February 19, 1917, they succeeded in winning an order from the National Agrarian Commission in Mexico City to take possession of these lands. On March 19, a district agrarian committee composed of Apolinar Sánchez as

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<sup>26</sup> Transcript of a telegraphic conference between Aguirre Berlanga and Ferreira, Mexico City and Tepic, December 21, 1917, AGN-GPR, 192/51.



president, Silvestre Robles as speaker, and Manuel Alaniz as secretary, was set up in Tuxpan to administer the land reform. Despite support from Jefe Político Torres, however, the reform was derailed by the Carranza government. On March 23, the large landowners and their lessees contacted Carranza by telegraph, and managed to obtain an order from the president forbidding Torres from carrying out the order that had been issued by the National Agrarian Commission because the lands were in cultivation with crops of corn and tobacco by the latifundistas González, Menchaca, and the Aguirre company.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile, in a letter to Gobernación dated March 25, a group of fifty-five residents of Tuxpan accused municipal president José S. Balcazar of being "in connivance" with the principal latifundistas and speculators of the area, as well as with bandits who marauded in the region, and they charged the municipal president with constantly obstructing all the matters that were beneficial to their families. The Tuxpan residents complained that Balcazar had become a "despot and dictator," and they reported that he had suspended the two aldermen and the trustee from the municipal government. The Tuxpan residents asked that Balcazar be replaced as municipal president by one of the aldermen, and that the other alderman and the trustee be reinstated in their positions.

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<sup>27</sup> Copy of petition by Clemente Martínez, Mateo Magallón, and Simón Sánchez to Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, August 28, 1917, and copy of petition by Apolinar Sánchez to Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, August 28, 1917, AGN-GPR, 173/28.

The residents stated that they "did not seek to use violence." They further explained that Balcazar had proceeded on this matter in accord with the landowners, and they reported that moments after having suspended the aldermen, he went to the house of José María González, brother of the latifundista Constancio González, where "together with other enemies of the government, they celebrated the order by the arbitrary functionary."<sup>28</sup>

In another letter to the secretary of Gobernación dated March 25, the suspended aldermen and the trustee declared that for some time they had been "struggling against following in accord with the ideals" of the municipal president. They claimed that Balcazar had originally "hypocritically" expressed Constitutionalist convictions, but that he had become a "reactionary, despot, and dictator," and they accused him of being "in connivance" with the latifundistas of the region. They went on to complain that Balcazar sometimes failed to summon them to meetings, and they reported that when they had presented themselves in the meeting hall that afternoon, Balcazar had informed them that they were suspended from their functions. They asked to be reinstated as aldermen and trustee, and they called for the removal of Balcazar, accusing him of having forged contacts with the latifundistas and gangs of bandits in the region. They claimed they had proof of this in the form of a message—

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<sup>28</sup> Rómulo Ramos et al., to Gobernación, Tuxpan, March 25, 1917, AGN-GPR, 189/13.

which they appended to their letter—addressed to Balcazar from a leader of one of these gangs. They maintained that this was proof that Balcazar had served as a "rival to interrupt the pacification" which the government had given to their communities, "at the cost of blood spilled" by the sincere followers of the Constitutionalist cause.<sup>29</sup>

On May 11, Ferreira, who had since taken over as provisional governor, sent a letter to the secretary of Gobernación, reporting that the municipal president of Tuxpan had indeed "proven to be an enemy of the people he governs, and an extreme reactionary." Ferreira claimed he had not removed Balcazar from the municipal presidency because there was no legal basis for the procedure, but he did state that he had already ordered the reinstatement of the municipal representatives who had been dismissed by Balcazar.<sup>30</sup>

On May 3, the National Agrarian Commission in Mexico City issued a second order granting the campesinos of Tuxpan possession of their ejido lands. However, the order was not acted upon by Ferreira, who instead issued a bulletin on May

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<sup>29</sup> The message they referred to had been written on rough brown paper, and contained a number of spelling errors. Nevertheless, it was clearly addressed to Sr. Balcazar [sic], and it was dated February 23, 1917, and signed El Kapitán [sic], Camilo Relles. The message quite simply stated: "Please ask the Menchaka [sic] firm for the fifty pesos we had agreed to on the night we spoke to you, and I am your friend." See Núñez et al., to Gobernación, Tuxpan, March 25, 1917, with appended message Relles to Balcazar (sic), Sentispa[c], February 23, 1917, AGN-GPR, 189/13.

<sup>30</sup> Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, May 11, 1917, AGN-GPR, 189/13.

22, harshly criticizing the ayuntamientos, and supporting the claims of the latifundistas. Nevertheless, the district agrarian committee of Tuxpan continued with its duties of distributing parcels of land to the campesinos.

On July 21, a municipal meeting was reportedly interrupted by the arrival of the president of the State agrarian commission, Cesareo Morales. In a loud voice, Morales questioned the municipal trustee, Simón Sánchez, demanding to know with what right Sánchez had distributed parcels of land when allegedly he, Morales, was the only one authorized to do such things. The trustee reportedly answered that he had done so according to the authorization that had been granted on June 5, 1916, by Jefe Político Juan Torres, and above all with the authorization of the ayuntamiento of Tuxpan. Morales responded that General Torres had not had authority over such matters, and that whatever had been done by Torres would remain ineffective from that date on in accordance with a report that he intended to file with the governor.

Soon after this exchange, Governor Ferreira arrived, accompanied by a group of landowners that included Federico González, Manuel Segura, Luis López, Sr., Luis Stephenes, José María Ramos, José María González, Luis López, Jr., José María Ledón, Fermín Maisterrena, Jr., Carlos Sánchez, Plácido González, Jacobo González, Cirilo González, and José Guerrero, along with other supporters of the latifundistas affected. They reportedly entered the meeting without

observing any of the due courtesies and formalities, and began to ridicule the proceedings, calling those assembled a "pack of shameless bandits." The governor then harshly continued with the interrogation of Sánchez, demanding to know with what authority the trustee had distributed parcels of land for the construction of houses, claiming that such acts constituted a punishable offense. The trustee responded that on the date he had distributed the lots, he had been authorized to do so by the current jefe político of that time, General Juan Torres. The trustee also told the governor that the lands belonged to the legal foundation of the community because the latifundistas were only lessees given that they paid tax on the lands, and that furthermore, as it was of imperious necessity to provide shelter for the many families, according to his faculties as trustee and for reasons of public utility, he had rescinded the leases of the latifundistas. The governor allegedly responded by insisting that only he and no one else was invested with authority in the matter, and he ordered the trustee to recognize the property rights of the latifundistas. Ferreira then continued by addressing the entire meeting, emphasizing to the campesinos their obligation to respect the properties of the latifundistas, and ordering those dwelling in the houses that had been constructed to leave and hand over all the properties in the condition they had been found. The acting municipal president, Clemente Martínez, then immediately indicated to the governor that they had in their office

orders to the contrary from the central government regarding the ownership of the lands. Ferreira, however, maintained that the rights of the landowners took precedence over the disposition by Juan Torres in favor of the campesinos of Tuxpan, and he claimed that he found it strange that the municipal authority should support such arbitrariness. Ferreira allegedly commented that if the campesinos wanted land, they should work first in order to buy them later. Ferreira was even reported to have made a verbal attack about the private life of the acting municipal president, and he was then described to have "left the hall with his retinue, with the arrogance and impulsiveness with which he had entered, like a despotic dictator."

The meeting resumed, and the campesinos discussed the way in which they should defend the liberty of the ayuntamiento against the governor's attack. It was decided that Gobernación would be advised of all that had occurred, and that they would request a serious reprimand of Ferreira for his abusiveness, and ask that he be ordered to leave their corporation in absolute liberty according to the ideals of the "Free Ayuntamiento."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Copy of the proceedings of the Ayuntamiento of Tuxpan, folios 50, 51, and 52, July 21, 1917, made on July 27, 1917, and attached to petition by Clemente Martínez et al., to Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, August 28, 1917, AGN-GPR, 173/28.

In the days following the disrupted municipal meeting, Ferreira ordered the arrest of the president of the district agrarian committee, Apolinar Sánchez. At the petition of landowner José O. Menchaca—who was reportedly the governor's first cousin—Ferreira also ordered the arrest of the third alderman of Tuxpan, Mateo Magallón, for the alleged crime of stealing wood. The order was not carried out, however, since it had to do with wood that was deemed to be municipal property. This was followed by the arrest of all the members of the ayuntamiento, by order of the judge of Santiago Ixcuintla.

Upon their release from jail, agrarian committee president Apolinar Sánchez and municipal government members Clemente Martínez, Mateo Magallón, and Simón Sanchez went to Mexico City to present a petition to the Federal Chamber of Deputies. They arrived on August 6, and on August 28, they were finally allowed to present their petitions in which they outlined the history of their dispute with the latifundistas. The petition from the members of the municipal government closed by rhetorically asking the Chamber of Deputies if they recognized the sovereignty of the communities, and whether the ayuntamientos enjoyed the autonomy given to them by the constitution. Agrarian committee president Apolinar Sánchez closed his petition by accusing the local agrarian commission of Nayarit of being made up of a staff that was contrary to the Constitutionalist Cause, and who

were "only interested in the capitalist who unduly has taken power of what justly pertains only to the community." Apolinar Sánchez claimed that, fearing to be a victim of more abuses, he found it necessary to travel to Mexico City, and that "after having suffered a thousand calamities for lack of funds for a period of twenty-two days," he was appearing before the Chamber of Deputies to solicit justice and to find out whether the orders issued by the National Agrarian Commission would be carried out.<sup>32</sup>

The two petitions by the delegation from Tuxpan were dealt with by the Chamber of Deputies on October 20, and in accordance with the recommendation by the Congressional Committees of Justice and Constitutional Items the deputies decided that the subject was beyond the jurisdiction of the Chamber, and they referred the matter to President Carranza.<sup>33</sup> While the campesinos of Tuxpan were anxiously awaiting a resolution of their land claims as they watched another planting season pass them by, their petitions in Mexico City were slowly shuffled from one secretariat to another, with no action being taken.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Petition by Martínez et al., to Diputados, August 28, 1917, and petition by Apolinar Sánchez to Diputados, August 28, 1917.

<sup>33</sup> Cámara de Diputados to Gobernación, Mexico City, October 22, 1917, AGN-GPR, 173/28.

<sup>34</sup> See Gobernación to Fomento, Mexico City, November 15, 1917, Gobernación to Cámara de Diputados, Mexico City, November 19, 1917, and Fomento to Gobernación, Mexico City, November 27, 1917, AGN-GPR, 173/28.



### 6.3 GOVERNOR JOSÉ SANTOS GODÍNEZ

At the stroke of midnight on the final day of the year 1917, Provisional Governor Ferreira handed over the government of Nayarit to the first constitutionally elected chief executive of the State, Governor José Santos Godínez.<sup>35</sup> While it marked the end of an administration that had been clearly supportive of the latifundistas at the expense of the workers and campesinos, it also marked the beginning of a politically tumultuous period that was to extend well into the 1930s.

Although Ferreira had been obliged to give up the office of governor which he had held provisionally, he remained military commander of the State. On January 4, however, Godínez sent a telegram to Gobernación asking for the removal from Nayarit of General Ferreira and the 11th Battalion, whom the governor described as his "political enemies during the past electoral campaign." Godínez expressed the need for a politically neutral garrison in Nayarit in order that his government be allowed to work "with complete confidence and activeness." General Ferreira and the 11th Battalion were further described as a "continuous threat" impeding the pacification and the full development of the State. In reply, Godínez received a telegram the following day, advising him that Carranza would decide

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<sup>35</sup> Ferreira to Gobernación, Tepic, December 31, 1917; and Gobernación to Aguirre Berlanga, Mexico City, January 1, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

which forces would remain in Nayarit upon the president's return to Mexico City.<sup>36</sup>

Regarding the relationship between Godínez and the Catholic Church, it is apparent that the Church had not had such a harmonious relationship with the chief executive of the State—and formerly the Territory—at least since the Huerta period. By way of illustration, on April 18, Gobernación advised Godínez that Carranza's general decree to determine which Church properties would become the property of the Nation would soon be forthcoming. The governor was asked to give his opinion with respect to any Church property in Nayarit that he believed should become consolidated to the Nation. Godínez answered:

Considering that the inhabitants of this State almost all practice the Catholic religion, surely the Catholic temples that presently exist in this State should be dedicated permanently to said cult;. . . as for what I think, these same temples should not definitively become part of the national property.<sup>37</sup>

Although Godínez was sympathetic toward the Church, and despite allegations by political foes that his allegiance to the Church indicated that he was a reactionary, Nayarit's first constitutionally elected governor took a number of bold, progressive measures during this administration.

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<sup>36</sup> Godínez to Aguirre Berlanga, Tepic, January 4, [1918]; and [Gobernación] to Godínez, Pachuca, January 5, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

<sup>37</sup> Gobernación to Gobernador del Estado de Nayarit, Mexico City, April 18, 1918; and Godínez to Gobernación, Tepic, June 6, 1918, AGN-GPR, 265/85.

Moreover, Godínez was known as a Carranza partisan, and his election as governor was largely the result of this presidential support. Nevertheless, Godínez's policies eventually led to a conflict with the central government and the business classes in Nayarit, which not only ran counter to Carranza's appeasement of commerce, but also represented an early constitutional challenge and an example of the domination of the central government over the State's rights.

Soon after having taken office, Godínez began a program of restricting food exports that was similar to the efforts of the Juan Torres administration. In early January, the governor ordered the municipal presidents to prohibit the export of corn, beans, rice, and lard outside the State. This was followed by a subsequent order to "prohibit unequivocally" the export of sugar and panocha outside the State as long as the producing companies did not guarantee sufficient quantities of these products for consumption within the State at the price of twenty-five centavos per kilogram for sugar, and twenty centavos per kilogram for panocha.<sup>38</sup>

The trade restrictions that had been imposed by Godínez were soon met by a series of complaints from the business sector. On January 21, a businessman from Ixtlán sent a telegram to Carranza, asking the president to order Godínez to allow the export of three thousand hectoliters of corn

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<sup>38</sup> Godínez to Gobernación, Tepic, June 15, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

from Nayarit to San Luis Potosí.<sup>39</sup> Gobernación advised Godínez that Carranza was aware of the governor's prohibition on the export of cereals from Nayarit, and the governor was reminded of the president's order to permit the free import and export of these cereal grains.<sup>40</sup> Apparently Godínez did not heed the warning from Gobernación, for on February 12, the governor was advised that former Jefe Político Juan Carrasco had complained of not being able to export a shipment of corn from Nayarit. Gobernación reminded Godínez that the federal constitution guaranteed liberty of commerce, and he was asked to allow Carrasco to transport the shipment of corn from the State.<sup>41</sup>

Ignoring Gobernación's request, Godínez ordered the municipal presidents to proceed immediately to assure sufficient supplies of corn for their respective municipalities, leaving the rest of this cereal completely free for export. Identical orders were dictated with respect to beans, which were reportedly "also in short supply and rapidly rising in price." On February 15, Godínez received a telegram from Gobernación referring to various complaints against the prohibition of the export from the State of articles of prime necessity. The governor was asked again to repeal his

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<sup>39</sup> Adolfo Brier to Carranza, Ixtlán, January 21, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

<sup>40</sup> Gobernación to Godínez, Mexico City, January 28, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

<sup>41</sup> Gobernación to Godínez, Mexico City, February 12, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

orders on the grounds that they directly contravened Article 117 of the Constitution of 1917, which assured the absolute liberty of commerce. On February 16, the State Chamber of Deputies also demanded that the governor revoke his orders prohibiting the free export of the articles of prime necessity, again because they violated the constitution. The State Congress, however, did allow the governor temporarily to maintain the decree restricting the export of corn and beans in the municipalities situated in the eastern and southeastern parts of the State, including the municipalities of Tepic, Jalisco, Compostela, and San Pedro Lagunillas, until the municipal presidents could demonstrate adequate supplies of these products to warrant their export. On February 20, Godínez reportedly informed the municipal presidents about the demand from the State Congress, and he revoked all his previous decrees regarding their export, which effectively authorized the free export of all products in the north and northeast regions of the State, and of sugar, panocha, rice, and lard in the rest of the State.

According to Godínez, however, the order to lift the restrictions on the prohibition to export these articles of prime necessity resulted "first in the scarcity in the State of those cited articles, then the rise in their prices, and finally the hunger that came to torment the popular masses." As a response to this desperate situation, on April 3, the governor asked the State Congress to issue a law that would

allow him to expropriate quantities of these articles of prime necessity on the grounds of public utility, and to sell these articles at "fair prices." On April 13, Godínez repeated this request. The State Congress, however, did not act upon these requests, and on June 14, the governor dictated his own expropriation law. Godínez immediately telegraphed the municipal presidents, advising them that his government had received reliable information about the "alarming proportions" that the misery of the people had reached because of the "extraordinary" scarcity and high prices of the articles of prime necessity in all regions of the State. The governor declared that "a crisis was beginning, and later would accentuate, that could be of fatal consequences for the subsistence of the people." He summarized the history of the events that had led to the expropriation law, and he declared:

In these critical circumstances, and faced with the terrible disjunctive of violating the law or leaving the people to die of hunger, the executive in my charge has chosen the first in order to prevent the second, if it can be considered an infraction of the law to do the only thing possible for the sustenance of the needy classes, and if one did not take into account that the health of the people is the Supreme Law, for the Rights of Man are the basis and the object of the social institutions.

The expropriation law decreed by Godínez suspended the export of corn and beans from Nayarit, and placed the municipal presidents in charge of administering the expropriation and the retail sale of these cereals to the inhabitants of

the municipalities at fair prices determined by the circumstances in each municipality. The proceeds of the sale of these cereals were to be returned to the owners, with a deduction to be made for storage and administration. As soon as adequate supplies could be verified, corn and beans would once again be allowed to be exported outside the State. The municipal presidents were also instructed to institute similar programs for the other articles of prime necessity according to their own judgement, and they were exhorted to follow the procedures set out, "attending to the shortages and need of the proletariat."<sup>42</sup>

Apparently some of the municipal officials had chosen to leave office rather than comply with the governor's expropriation law, either out of protest, or out of fear that they would be caught in the middle of a struggle between the governor and the latifundistas. On June 14, Godínez advised the municipal presidents that he had been informed that some of the municipalities in the State were extending leaves of absence and accepting the resignations of municipal presidents and aldermen without the previous knowledge of his government. Godínez ordered a halt to this practice, and he announced that those resignations and leaves of absence that had been tendered were to be considered ineffective and that the officials were to be advised

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<sup>42</sup> Godínez to Gobernación, Tepic, June 15, 1918, enclosing Godínez to Presidentes Municipales del Estado [Nayarit], Tepic, June 14, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

that they had to return to their functions.<sup>43</sup>

On June 29, the Compañía Agrícola de Quimiches of Acaponeta sent a telegram to Carranza, complaining that the municipal president had received orders from the governor prohibiting the export of corn from Acaponeta, "greatly harming" the interests of commercial firms from Sonora and Sinaloa that the company represented. They argued that the corn had been grown for export long before the governor's decree, and therefore its export did not contradict the decree. The company alleged that officials had threatened to "seize individuals," and they asked Carranza to see to it that the corn be allowed to be shipped, and to ensure that the authorities did not confiscate the corn.<sup>44</sup> On July 18, Gobernación advised Godínez about the complaint that had been received from the Compañía Agrícola de Quimiches, and reminding the governor that this prohibition was in conflict with the liberty of commerce that had been proclaimed by the constitution, asked him to repeal the order.<sup>45</sup> Bowing to the request from the central government, Godínez allowed the company's corn to be exported from the State.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Godínez to Presidente [de la] República, Tepic, June 15, 1918, enclosing Godínez to Presidentes Municipales del Estado [Nayarit], [Tepic], June 14, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

<sup>44</sup> Jefe de Estado Mayor to Gobernación, Mexico City, July 2, 1918, enclosing telegram from Compañía Agrícola de Quimiches to Presidente de la República, Acaponeta, June 29, [1918], AGN-GPR, 233/95.

<sup>45</sup> Gobernación to Godínez, Mexico City, July 18, 1918, AGN-GPR, 233/95.



#### 6.4 THE FINANCIAL LAW OF MARCH 1, 1918

Once the initial flush of civic pride over the elevation of Tepic to statehood had quickly dissipated in the presence of the many economic and political problems facing the State, many residents began to question the wisdom of this unsolicited change. The strongest criticism came from the latifundista and commercial classes, for they were the first to realize that the newly acquired status would entail the expensive responsibility of meeting the costs of a State administration. They soon began not only to long for the subsidies that they had enjoyed as a federal territory, but also to openly and formally request a return to their prior status. As the initiative to create the State of Nayarit had been Carranza's, it was highly unlikely that such a request had any chance of success. It did, however, serve as a convenient bargaining plank to lobby for a more advantageous taxation schedule, improved infrastructure, and federal investment subsidies for Nayarit.

On May 6, 1918, the Nayarit Chamber of Deputies issued the Financial Law of March 1, 1918, which codified the tax regulations that were to serve as the basis for the collection of revenues to finance the State administration. The Financial Law was declared retroactive for the months of March and April of that year.

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<sup>46</sup> Godínez to Gobernación, Tepic, July 22, 1918, AGN-GPR, 233/95.

On June 8, the Tepic Chamber of Commerce presented a formal petition to the State Congress, asking for the reconsideration of the Financial Law. In a declaration published in a twenty-five page booklet, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, José Somellera, and the other member merchants complained that, just as it had been with the Territory of Tepic, the State of Nayarit remained "isolated, unknown, almost disdained, unworthy of public interest;" and furthermore, they pointed out that not one of the nation's newspapers paid any attention to them or their situation. The Chamber of Commerce claimed that as an administrative center, the city of Tepic, with many employees paid by the Federation, was able to maintain a certain "appearance" of a capital, but that it had never been an agricultural center, nor of mining, nor of industry, and that as such it "never produced a higher level of value, but only circulated what flowed through, be it from another part of the State, or provided by the Federation." The report pointed out that the wagon trails in Nayarit were impassable, the railroad had been left incomplete, lacking the important link with Guadalajara, and the State's port, San Blas, was "devastated and abandoned." So backward was the region, that the Territory of Tepic had received a large subsidy from the Federation. Nevertheless, the Chamber of Commerce indicated, this lamentable situation had been aggravated even more when they were suddenly elevated to the category of State. After thirty-four years of territorial administration, the Federa-

tion "stopped towing" Nayarit, in conditions that were much more unfavorable than the pre-Territory days when they had been the Seventh Canton of the State of Jalisco.

As for the outlying districts of the State, the Chamber of Commerce claimed that they could have no opinion about these communities because of the lack of communication with them. The report reminded the State Congress that there was no postal service, and the insecurity of the roads had practically suspended all traffic. The merchants from the various communities were alleged to be "in refuge" with their families in the State capital, forced to abandon their towns because of the constant looting and assaults of which they had been victims. As for agriculture, the report claimed that no more than 40 percent of what had been planted in "normal" years was currently under cultivation, because the communities, both large and small, were "constantly victims of assaults and plundering by rebels and bandits." The State's mining industry which had always been weak, was allegedly now "completely paralyzed." As for industry in the State, the report indicated that outside of two sugar refineries and a few distilleries, there were only two textile factories and one soap factory, and that they had been advised that two of these three factories were near closing for lack of material.

According to the Chamber of Commerce report, the situation in Nayarit had completely changed overnight. Whereas

formerly the federal government had helped to defray the administrative expenses, Nayarit now had to maintain its own administration which was reportedly three times more costly, and moreover pay a surplus of thirty-eight percent that they would have to pass on to the Federation. The report maintained that Nayarit's new Financial Law "apparently in its essential parts was copied from the State of Jalisco law." The merchants insisted that this arrangement had not worked when the region was subject to the law as the Seventh Canton of Jalisco, and would work less with quotas even higher. They pointed out that Nayarit had never transcended its condition as the Seventh Canton of Jalisco, and that it had been the "poorest, most remote, gloomiest, and in relation to its area the least densely populated" canton. They added that as a State, Nayarit "would want to exchange its economic conditions for those that prevailed in it thirty-five years ago."

The Tepic Chamber of Commerce pointed out that Nayarit's wealth was latent. The fertility of its soil and its many other resources had yet to be realized, and for the State to develop, capital and energies would be needed. The merchants insisted that the problem with taxes in their State was particularly difficult, because capital and the spirit of enterprise had to be treated with a great deal of tact to prevent them from being frightened away. They pointed out: "It is an old axiom that capital is cowardly."

The report indicated that the direct tax on the fiscal value of rural property in Nayarit of 24 percent, along with an additional federal increase of 60 percent of that value, brought the burden in that State to 38.4 percent. The Tepic merchants claimed that the neighboring States of Jalisco and Sinaloa were charged a quota of only 14 percent, which with the additional federal increase of 60 percent brought their total to 22.4 percent. The Chamber of Commerce argued that the 38.4 percent tax on rural property in Nayarit was out of proportion, considering that their neighboring States had good communications by sea and by land, a topography that was more favorable for the construction of roads, a more abundant manual labor pool, and better access to the principal consumer markets. Moreover, the merchants argued that there were a number of transactions that had occurred between 1908 and 1910, with the construction of the railway, which gave rise to "erroneous appreciations," and which subsequently were reflected in inflated land tax assessments. They offered three examples of land purchases during the period mentioned: San Antonio or San Nicolás; La Cañada del Tabaco; and Quimiches. In all three cases the buyers were reportedly Americans, and the prices they paid were described as "relatively fabulous." In the case of the San Antonio hacienda, the lessee reportedly wanted to rescind his contract because he was unable to gain enough even to pay the rent. Likewise, La Cañada del Tabaco had reportedly proven not to be cost efficient and had been completely

abandoned. The Quimiches hacienda, despite its being situated closer to the sea and nearer to Mazatlán, nevertheless reportedly had not prospered.

The Chamber of Commerce report also criticized the 18 percent tax on the fiscal value of urban property, which with the additional federal increase of 60 percent, brought the total to 28.8 percent. Landlords allegedly were only receiving an income of between 4 and 6 percent, which reportedly explained the "ancient aspect" of the houses in the capital, and the low level of new housing starts. They claimed that the rise in taxes would elevate rents by 25 to 30 percent, and would not only hinder new housing starts, but also lead to the decay of existing housing. The Chamber of Commerce also maintained that the high level of taxation was causing the emigration of Tepiqueño families, who left to invest their capitals, large or small, in other places with milder revenue laws.

The report also complained about the high level of other types of taxes, including a total tax of 3.2 percent on the transfer of real estate, taxes on manufacture, a direct tax on industrial establishments, income tax on salaries above \$30 per month, mining taxes—although this tax reportedly did not currently apply in practice because there were no mines in production under the present circumstances—inheritance taxes, as well as a variety of other specific taxes. The merchants pointed out that the new levels of taxa-

tion were particularly damaging under the current circumstances of poor transportation and communications in Nayarit. They indicated that freight rates from Tepic to Mexico City were \$60 per ton, which had been calculated to represent a surcharge of 30 percent on the value of these products. The merchants argued that this clearly put them at a disadvantage when competing with the rest of the country. Furthermore, the main road that traversed the State from Sinaloa to Guadalajara was reportedly in such bad shape due to abandonment that it was "difficult very often even for the mule traffic on it."

The Chamber of Commerce pointed out that from March to December, 1918, the State's budget of expenses was \$512,525, and with the additional 60 percent federal tax, this brought the tax load in the State to \$830,200. On an annualized basis, this represented \$615,150, and \$984,240, respectively. The merchants insisted that it was too great a burden for such a small State to bear. They pointed out that, although the census of 1910 indicated that there were 171,000 inhabitants in the Territory of Tepic by June 1918, with the alleged emigration of the past three years, the population of the State was no more than 140,000. Furthermore, the merchants pointed out that 20,000 of these inhabitants were in the mountains, outside the dominion of the government, and "practically all in armed revolt against the government." The Chamber of Commerce also indicated that

the natural richness and mild climate of their State allowed many to sustain themselves as hunters and gatherers, using little clothing, and without the need for formal housing. The merchants asserted that, while these inhabitants added to the administrative costs, they contributed nothing to the public treasury. The number of inhabitants currently dedicated to jobs of some kind was estimated at no more than 20,000, if that many.

In conclusion, the Chamber of Commerce declared that the State budget had to mold itself to the economic potential of Nayarit. The merchants explicitly asked the State Congress to initiate the procedures for the reform of Article 43 of the Mexican Constitution, to return Nayarit to territorial status, and in closing they explained:

Our promotion to the category of State was decidedly violent, and we now find ourselves disoriented. If the Federation gives us a hand to go forward, above all in communications, if in the meantime we are able to develop the remains of the wealth that we have left, if the exterior and interior situation of the country be more to our advantage, perhaps some day and after a sufficient period of preparation, we will be able to occupy with dignity the place corresponding to a free entity.<sup>47</sup>

In a subsequent protest of the Financial Law of March 1, 1918, a group of seventy-five landowners, merchants, agriculturalists, and industrialists sent a petition from

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<sup>47</sup> Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Tepic, "Memorial elevado por la Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Tepic al H. Congreso del Estado de Nayarit, pidiendo sea reconsiderada la Ley Hacendaria de Marzo 1 de 1918," (Tepic: Imprenta Ruiz, 1918), AGN-GPR, 266/22.



Ixtlán del Río to Carranza, declaring that the Territory of Tepic had been elevated to the category of the State of Nayarit precisely at a time when they found themselves isolated from the rest of the country. The petitioners pointed to the "impassable" roads, the suspended traffic on the railroad, and a marine traffic that was "almost without movement" in their only port, San Blas. They also complained to the president about the numerous gangs of bandits that had devastated the region, pillaging communities as important as Ixtlán, Compostela, Santiago Ixcuintla, and Tuxpan, reportedly "leaving all the commercial and industrial shops in ruins, and the fields without cattle and crops." The petition stated that to add to their problems, they currently found themselves oppressed by fiscal laws that they described as being "almost insane." To demonstrate their point, they compared the annual budget of expenses for Nayarit to the budgets of the neighboring States of Colima, Jalisco, and Sinaloa, including the expenses on a per capita basis, as follows:

Nayarit.....	\$ 615,150.40	.....	\$5.13
Colima.....	\$ 225,413.05	.....	\$2.90
Jalisco.....	\$4,980,246.20	.....	\$3.39
Sinaloa.....	\$1,125,811.00	.....	\$3.48

The petitioners pointed out that Colima was the State with conditions most similar to those found in Nayarit, and they reported that the daily cost of public administration in Colima was \$617, while in Nayarit it reached a total of

\$1,685. The source of the problem in Nayarit was alleged to be the "extremely high salaries of its many, many employees." The petitioners also complained about the values that had been assigned in the property tax assessment, claiming that these values were "ridiculous for their enormous disproportion." They declared that petitions that had been made to the State Congress by the Chamber of Commerce and groups of private citizens, asking that the Financial Law be reconsidered, had been futile, and that the government had only initiated new, and more burdensome programs. As a result, the petitioners told Carranza that they were turning to him, to ask the president to use his influence with the State's functionaries in order to organize a "prudent" economic administration, and to avoid the "complete ruin of all the elements of production."<sup>48</sup>

The petition from Ixtlán's landowners, merchants, agriculturalists, and industrialists clearly expressed the concerns of the upper and middle classes regarding the elevation to Statehood and the new Financial Law that had been applied to the fledgling State. Their petition, however, also indicated a change in their attitude toward the Carranza government. Carranza's power and legitimacy were no longer in doubt, and, moreover, there were signs that these classes looked to Carranza for a return to the political stability that Mexico had not experienced since the Porfiri-

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<sup>48</sup> Alberto Ramírez et al., to Presidente de la República, Ixtlán del Río, September [n.d.], 1918, AGN-GPR, 245/106.

an epoch. Once again, the presidency had become the center of authority in Mexico, and whereas Nayarit's middle and upper classes had generally opposed Carranza as recently as 1916, they now looked to him to protect their interests. While this was a logical result of their resignation to Carranza's hegemony, it also reflected a change in their perception of Carranza following the moderate stance he had adopted in the Constitutional Convention, and in the accommodations his administration had made to business since he had been elected to the presidency.

#### **6.5 THE AGUIRRE FACTORY SHUTDOWNS**

From the perspective of the Aguirre company, the situation in Nayarit in 1918 had begun to deteriorate rapidly. The company had to face the government's initiatives for tax programs to cover the new costs of a State administration after having enjoyed the status of a federally funded territorial government for decades. Moreover, the shifting market conditions—both national and international—had contributed to the erosion of profitability in the textile factories. The transportation facilities in the State were still in very poor conditions, and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company was reluctant to proceed with either the repair of the railroad from Sinaloa to Tepic, or the construction of the new line from Tepic to Guadalajara, without subsidies and guarantees from the Carranza government. The

Carranza government on the other hand, was disinclined to enter into any such negotiations with the United States based railroad company in light of the current bitter relations between the two countries. With the departure of Ferreira, the Aguirre company no longer had a sympathetic governor to support them in their disputes with the campesinos and the workers, and Godínez had begun to challenge the latifundistas almost as soon as he had assumed the office of governor.

The Aguirre company also faced renewed threats of rebellion. The Bellavista factory was attacked and plundered by an armed gang on the night of February 7, and the Jauja factory was placed under seige from March 25 to 27. The Bellavista factory was raided again on March 30, and its warehouses were set on fire, diminishing the company's short supplies of cotton even further. The same gang attacked the main house at the company's hacienda of Chilapa. Company men were shot in the skirmish, and the hacienda's administrator was kidnapped along with a member of his family and held for ransom. The warehouses were set on fire, and the company lost 70,000 kilograms of cotton.

In response to this threatening situation, the Aguirre company decided to close down some of its operations in the State. The company closed its alcohol factory in La Escondida on April 4, because of a lack of acid used in its manufacture, and for lack of tin plate for containers. On June

15, the Jauja textile factory was closed and its 290 workers were dismissed. The company indicated to the government that the scarcity of cotton had forced them to close one of their two textile factories, and the fact that the machinery in the Bellavista factory was more modern led to their decision to close the Jauja location.

On June 19, Industry, Commerce, and Labor advised the Aguirre company that the secretariat had understood that the company would be providing alternate employment for the workers of the Jauja factory. The secretariat made it clear that it had "simply manifested that it was advised, but did not authorize the work stoppage, and emphasized that the operators should be employed in something else."<sup>49</sup>

The Aguirre company responded that it had given the workers a two month notice of the closure of the Jauja factory, and that it had become necessary to close the factory on June 15, because of the "impossibility to continue operating for lack of cotton." In addition to the losses at their Chilapa hacienda, the company also reported that the United States government had refused to issue an export permit for cotton. The secretariat was assured that the work stoppage affected the company "profoundly," and it further stated that the workers were being provided corn and sugar for a period of two months, which it claimed was "sufficient" time for them to find new occupations. The company

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<sup>49</sup> Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo to Aragón, Mexico City, June 19, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

expressed its regret that it was unable to transfer any of the workers to their other factory in Bellavista, because jobs there were completely filled and all the machines in activity. As for other kinds of work with the company, for example on its sugar plantations, the Aguirre company claimed to have more people than it needed, and that owing to unspecified "abnormal conditions" in the State, the company was unable to expand cultivation in order to occupy the workers in these jobs, explaining further: "for to add to it, they are for the most part women."<sup>50</sup>

On June 25, the Central Conciliation and Arbitration Board of Nayarit commissioned Julian Lara and Antonio Zepeda to determine whether the workers dismissed from the Jauja factory had been provided with new jobs by the company. As of July 2, Lara and Zepeda reported that only twenty workers had obtained alternate employment from the Aguirre company.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> D.N. Aguirre Sucs. (sic) to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, Tepic, June 25, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

<sup>51</sup> Francisco Serrano to Secretario de Industria y Comercio, Tepic, July 3, 1918, enclosing Presidente de la Junta Central de Conciliación y Arbitraje to [Government of Nayarit], Tepic, July 3, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

The Central Conciliation and Arbitration Board had been established in Nayarit on February 25, 1918, consisting of the following members: president, Aurelio Guerrero, representative of the government; Julian Lara, representative of the Union of Workers of the Hacienda of Bellavista; Antonio Zepeda, representative of the Union of Workers of the Hacienda of Jauja; Eduardo García and José Vargas, representatives of the owners in Tepic; Silverio Cárdenas and Modesto Castañeda, substitute board members for the workers; Manuel Varela and Abraham L. Ortiz, substitute board members for the owners; and San-

On July 2, Industry and Commerce advised Governor Godínez that despite the fact that the Aguirre company had offered to provide alternate employment for the dismissed workers of the Jauja factory, as many of the dismissed were "women" and others lacked "ability and will for agricultural work," the secretariat now apparently accepted that it would "not be possible to comply with all the offer." Under the circumstances, the secretariat now beseeched the governor to provide as much as was necessary "for the relief of these poor people."<sup>52</sup>

In a letter dated July 30, Fermín Maisterrena of the Aguirre company advised the secretary that the Jauja factory remained closed and that the Bellavista factory was working half time because of the lack of cotton. Maisterrena claimed that the company had acquired some cotton in Santiago Ixcuintla, but they were unable to transport it because of the inclement weather of the rainy season. Maisterrena claimed that they had made attempts to transport the cotton in May and June, before the arrival of the rain, hiring packs of mules and carts for the job, but that they were unable to complete it because "daily, with few exceptions, the muleteers were surprised by armed groups of bandits who robbed them of what they carried, of load and team." Maisterrena reported that the bandits not only struck in the

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tiago Andrade, secretary. See A. Guerrero to Gobernación, Tepic, February 25, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/3.

<sup>52</sup> Industria y Comercio to Gobernador del Estado de Nayarit, Mexico City, July 6, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

uninhabited areas, but sometimes even in the small settlements. He claimed that the company found itself on the brink of closing the Bellavista factory, and that it would soon become unavoidable to do so if the roads remained impassable either due to weather conditions, or even if these should improve, the insecurity which made them "virtually impassable."<sup>53</sup>

On August 22, Industry, Commerce, and Labor asked the secretary of War to do what he could in Nayarit to alleviate the situation.<sup>54</sup> The secretary of War reported that its chief of military operations in Nayarit had given his assurances that to date (September 11), the situation had "already entirely improved," and that this would facilitate the transport of the company's cotton.<sup>55</sup> On October 18, the Aguirre company advised the secretary of Industry, Commerce, and Labor that the company did not have to suspend work at the Bellavista factory, and cited the successful campaign undertaken against "banditry" in the State as the reason. The chief of military operations in Nayarit, General Francisco D. Santiago, was commended by the company for having noticeably improved the situation, and for having "earned

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<sup>53</sup> Maisterrena to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, Tepic, July 30, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

<sup>54</sup> Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo to Guerra y Marina, Mexico City, August 22, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

<sup>55</sup> Guerra y Marina to Industria y Comercio, Mexico City, September 27, 1918, enclosing General Jefe de las Operaciones en Nayarit to Guerra y Marina, [Tepic?], September 11, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.



the applause of all the inhabitants of this region for the resources he put into play with such intelligence and activity."<sup>56</sup> But while the threatened work stoppage at the Bellavista factory had been averted by the arrival of new shipments of cotton, the Jauja factory, along with almost all of its workers, remained idle.

#### 6.6 GODÍNEZ AND THE CAMPESINOS OF TUXPAN AND MEXCALTITÁN

The latifundistas found themselves increasingly challenged, not only by the political and constitutional changes resulting from the Revolution, but also—and perhaps more significantly—by the growing demands of the campesinos for land, and of the workers for better wages and working conditions. The Aguirre company and other hacendados ruthlessly protected their interests, not only with work stoppages, factory closures, and food shortages resulting from the export of food, but also through an extensive campaign of violence to eradicate any threats to their privileged position. Not only did they employ their own representatives and the paramilitary guardias blancas to carry out their wishes, but they also sought the support of state institutions, including the Carranza government, the army, the judiciary, governors, municipal authorities, and the police.

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<sup>56</sup> D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, Tepic, October 18, 1918, AGN-DT, 125/30.

Governor José Santos Godínez, however, played an active role in assisting the campesinos of Tuxpan and Mexcaltitán in their struggles against the latifundistas. On January 26, the municipal president of Tuxpan, Lauro García, reported to the delegate of the National Agrarian Commission in Tepic, that the chief of the garrison in that town had arrested the president of the local campesino association, Silvestre Robles. The municipal president also complained that armed forces from the haciendas had been causing problems for their community.

The delegate of the National Agrarian Commission informed Godínez about the telegram from the municipal president of Tuxpan, and he advised the governor that it was true that the various guardias blancas that had been established by the owners of the haciendas committed "arbitrary acts" and were a "constant threat" to the authorities of the district. The delegate asked the governor to do whatever was necessary to oblige the Aguirre company to order the guardia blanca from the hacienda of Chilapa to respect government decrees, and to remind them that they had no authority to supervise the acts of public officials. The delegate indicated that the information about the arrest of community representative Silvestre Robles by the garrison commander was accurate, and the delegate alleged that the latifundistas were responsible for the measures that had been taken by the military authorities, for the latifundistas had "man-

aged to buy the referred to [military] authorities for the benefit of their interests." The delegate beseeched the governor to dictate the necessary measures to make the latifundistas respect the government, and to put an end to "so much abuse that was committed daily in that village, with irreparable injury to the citizens." Godínez immediately informed Carranza about the situation, transcribing the messages from the municipal president of Tuxpan and the delegate of the National Agrarian Commission.<sup>57</sup>

The Secretariat of War reported that it had been advised by the chief of military operations for the State of Nayarit that as soon as he had knowledge of the "arbitrary acts" committed by the commander of the garrison in Tuxpan, which had resulted in the detention of Silvestre Robles, the garrison commander had been summoned to explain his actions. The outcome of the investigation was that the commander reportedly had overstepped his authority "because of his ignorance." The Secretariat of War advised that the officer had been "duly admonished to abstain from meddling in affairs extraneous to his duties."<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Gobernación to Guerra y Marina, Mexico City, January 30, 1918, enclosing Godínez to Carranza, [Tepic], [n.d.], in turn enclosing Delegado de la Comisión Nacional Agraria to Godínez, [Tepic], [same unspecified date], in turn enclosing Lauro García to Delegado de la Comisión Nacional Agraria, [Tuxpan?], January 26, 1918, AGN-GPR, 264/88.

<sup>58</sup> Guerra y Marina to Gobernación, Mexico City, March 8, 1918, AGN-GPR, 264/88.

Under the protection of the Godínez administration, the campesinos of Tuxpan again were given provisional possession of their ejido lands. On August 17, however, municipal president Lauro García sent a telegram to Carranza complaining that the State Congress, "violating all the laws," had that day resolved to remove the ayuntamiento of Tuxpan. García explained to Carranza that the objective of the procedure was "to impose the candidate of the capitalists, who had been defeated in the last election." García asked Carranza to intervene to resolve the conflict.<sup>59</sup>

In a related telegram to Carranza on the same day, the campesinos of Tuxpan reiterated García's complaint that the State Congress had resolved to remove their legally constituted ayuntamiento and give it to the "candidacy" that the capitalists had supported, even having come out with a minority of the votes." The campesinos explained further that the latifundistas were seeking to seize the land that was in the provisional possession of the community, and therefore wanted the support of the "municipal government cacique" in order to obstruct the orders that had been issued by the current government. The campesinos asked Carranza for his help to resolve the conflict.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> García to Carranza, Tuxpan, August 18, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

<sup>60</sup> Comunidad de Indígenas [de Tuxpan], to Presidente de la R[epública], Tuxpan, August 17, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

A similar conflict between the latifundista Constancio González and the natives of Mexcaltitán over the fisheries of the region again saw Governor Godínez defend the interests of the campesinos, much to the chagrin of the latifundistas. On September 20, Constancio González received an order of amparo from the Supreme Court to counter the actions that had been taken against him by Governor Godínez with regard to the conflict between González and the campesinos of Mexcaltitán. Godínez, however, refused to comply with the court order, and the Mexcaltecos retained provisional possession of the fisheries.<sup>61</sup>

On November 2, a group of thirty-one residents of Mexcaltitán petitioned the minister of Gobernación regarding the dispute with Constancio González over the fisheries of their region. The Mexcaltecos declared that they had obtained the required permit from the General Agency of Agriculture and Development in Sinaloa and Nayarit to fish for shrimp in the lakes of Acajala and Las Lomas, and in the tidelands of Tecolota and El Pochope, fisheries that they claimed had belonged to them "since time immemorial." They further related that these fisheries had been taken away from them during the Porfirian period through the "great arbitrariness" of Constancio González, who had counted with the support of Porfirio Díaz. The Mexcaltecos explained that they had since been allowed to return to this liveli-

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<sup>61</sup> Arriola to Carranza, Tepic, January 21, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/61.

hood in intervals with the triumph of the popular struggles through petitions that had been presented before the Madero government, as well as the current Constitutionalist government. They also referred to the clause in the Constitution that had stipulated that the Nation's waters were the property of the Nation, and they stated that they "did not claim to be owners." The Mexcaltecos, noting that González had not solicited a permit, accused the latifundista of using brutal methods. They alleged that they had been forced from their work on October 24, by an armed gang that was sustained by a Chinese firm and was under the command of the ex-Villista Pioquinto Partida. The Mexcaltecos claimed that Partida's gang followed them, attempting to provoke a conflict between them and the gang. Upon arriving in Mexcaltitán, Partida's gang allegedly broke into their houses, searching them and outraging their families, and concluded by killing the treasurer of their association, Gregorio Trinidad, "in the most cruel way." The Mexcaltecos beseeched the minister of Gobernación to send investigators who would be completely impartial and incapable of selling themselves to González, claiming that they had always had the "misfortune of gold dazzling the people" who came to hear their complaints. In closing, the residents of Mexcaltitán referred the minister of Gobernación to Colonel Mariano Rivas, senator from Sinaloa, who they claimed was incorruptable and trustworthy, to supply the necessary

details about their case.<sup>62</sup>

On December 16, the municipal president of Santiago Ixcuintla attempted to execute the order of amparo on behalf of Constancio González, but again the governor supported the campesinos of Mexcaltitán, and refused to comply with the Supreme Court order. District Court Judge Salvador Arriola complained to Carranza on behalf of González that Governor Godínez was not complying with the amparo that had been issued by the Supreme Court.<sup>63</sup> Federico González also addressed the president, complaining that Godínez refused to recognize the writ. González reported that the governor was sustaining his attitude "alleging reasons of public order." He challenged the governor's stance by offering testimony from the Congress and the State's chief of arms that such causes did not exist.<sup>64</sup>

On February 8, Gobernación, on behalf of Carranza, sent a telegram to Godínez, asking the governor for what reasons he had not fulfilled the order regarding the amparo promoted by Constancio González.<sup>65</sup> It is not known what the governor replied, and it is a moot point anyway, because the mounting

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<sup>62</sup> Victoriano Aguilar et al., to Gobernación, Mexcaltitán, November 2, 1918, AGN-GPR, 246/101.

<sup>63</sup> Arriola to Carranza, Tepic, January 21, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/61.

<sup>64</sup> Federico González to Carranza, Tepic, January 21, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/61.

<sup>65</sup> Gobernación to Godínez, Mexico City, February 8, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/61.

political pressures that surrounded the governor were to drive him from office in a matter of weeks, leaving the campesinos of Tuxpan and Mexcaltitán at the mercy of the latifundistas.

### 6.7 THE FADING LIGHT

As 1918 drew to a close, Nayarit's business elite led by the Aguirre company relentlessly continued to oppose the strategy and programs of the Godínez government, resulting in a polarization of political forces in the State. The rift between the governor and the State Congress grew increasingly wider, and the various political factions in the State directed appeals to Carranza, either in support of Godínez, or in opposition. The Liberal Union Party reaffirmed their allegiance to Godínez on November 11, reproving the "immoral and obstructionist acts" of the local Congress. On November 13, the Worker Reform Party declared a broad vote of confidence for Godínez, praising his "impartial attitude in defense of the people," and they asked Carranza to lend his support to the governor. On November 19, in a united show of support, the Worker Reform Party and the Liberal Union Party joined forces to send a telegram to Carranza, in what was called a "grand manifestation of allegiance, sympathy, and admiration" for Godínez, for his attitude in defense of the interests of the people of Nayarit.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Florencio R. Aceves and Nicolás Lomeli to Carranza, Tepic, November 11, 1918; E. Núñez and Primo E. Cerano to Carranza, Tepic, November 13, 1918; and Enrique Núñez and



By January 1919, the conflict between the governor and the State Congress had turned to wrangling over procedural issues surrounding the budget for the upcoming year. Godínez appeared before the local Chamber of Deputies to ask what internal regulation had been placed in effect by the legislators—as stipulated by Article 50 of the State's constitution—in order that he would be able to give instructions to his representative to the sessions on the budget. The governor questioned the very legality of all the legislation that had been approved by the Chamber since its inception the previous February. Godínez immediately informed Carranza about the issue. Gobernación responded to Godínez's message, advising the governor that Carranza considered that the lack of an internal regulation did not invalidate the acts executed by the State Congress.<sup>67</sup> Godínez had been effectively overruled by the president.

The Godínez administration was also increasingly affected by the insecurity caused by banditry and acts of rebellion throughout the State. In one such incident sixty-one bags of mail were destroyed in Navarrete, on June 11, 1918, during a local revolt.<sup>68</sup> In its session of October 5, the State Legislature resolved to send a telegram to the

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Florencio R. Aceves to Carranza, Tepic, November 19, 1918, AGN-GPR, 267/34.

<sup>67</sup> Godínez to Carranza, Tepic, January 27, 1919; and Gobernación to Godínez, Mexico City, February 8, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/61.

<sup>68</sup> Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Tepic, "Memorial," AGN-GPR, 266/22.

Senate of the Republic to complain about the frequent assaults on mail drivers, killings, and theft of cereals in rural communities of Nayarit. The Senate was asked to use its influence to convince the president to increase the garrison in Nayarit by 500 men, at least temporarily, to subdue the banditry.<sup>69</sup>

Under these unstable conditions, private citizens as well as some officials were more inclined to act outside the law. On September 10, 1918, the foreman of the Cañada del Tabaco hacienda was the victim of an assault which resulted in the amputation of his right arm. On January 20, 1919, however, four individuals were apprehended and taken to the foreman at the hacienda, where they were executed without formal process.<sup>70</sup> Meanwhile in February 1919, about one hundred fifty soldiers from the detachment in the town of El Venado had rebelled, killing the captain of the garrison. The rebels reportedly left El Venado, travelling in an unknown direction, having taken weapons and ammunition with them.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Cámara de Senadores to Gobernación, Mexico City, October 11, 1918, enclosing telegram from Legislatura del Estado de Nayarit to Cámara de Senadores, Tepic, October 8, 1918, AGN-GPR, 264/11.

<sup>70</sup> Godínez to Carranza, Tepic, February 10, 1919, enclosing Presidente Municipal de Santiago Ixcuintla to Godínez, February 2, 1919, in turn enclosing Juez Auxiliar de la Cañada del Tabaco to Presidente Municipal de Santiago Ixcuintla, February 1, 1919, VC, 130/14858.

<sup>71</sup> Godínez to Carranza, Tepic, February 19, 1919, enclosing telegram from Presidente Municipal de Santiago Ixcuintla to Godínez, Santiago Ixcuintla, [February 18, 1919], VC, 131/14918.

In March, a group of residents from the community of Tecuala petitioned the State Congress to complain that despite the fact that the creation of the new municipality of Tecuala had been decreed by the Constitution of Nayarit, the formation of that municipal government had yet to be acted upon. The petitioners explained that the political director of the municipality who had been appointed over a year earlier still occupied that position. The political director was described as being "obstinate to the liberal institutions in force," and inclined only to his own personal convenience. Reference was also made to the "frustrated aspirations of the working class," and the continual dissension that was allegedly taking place in the community because of the "obstructionism and bad faith in administering justice." The petitioners called for the removal of the political appointee, and they offered suggestions as to who his substitute should be.<sup>72</sup>

The greatest threat to the Godínez administration, however, proved to be the State's military commander, General Francisco Santiago. Santiago had won the confidence of Nayarit's business elite, including the Aguirre company. Conspiring with various deputies who were opposed to the governor, Santiago mounted an obstructionist campaign against Godínez, and managed to gain the support of a majority of

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<sup>72</sup> José María Ledón and Alfredo Robles to Gobernación, Tepic, March 11, 1919, enclosing a petition by Francisco Lora et al., to Congreso del Estado de Nayarit, [n.d.], AGN-GPR, 277/90.

the State Congress. Even historian Alvaro Espinosa Ramírez, who was not particularly sympathetic to Godínez, reported that the governor was the victim of "false accusations" of alleged serious crimes committed in the exercise of his functions.

On March 18, 1919, the State Congress issued a decree impeaching Governor Godínez, and designating General Santiago as provisional governor of Nayarit. According to Espinosa Ramírez, the "illegitimate" overthrow of the Godínez government sparked an "open and categorical" protest throughout the State. Espinosa Ramírez attributed this protest to the esteem that the governor had managed to win from a large part of Nayarit's population. In a begrudging statement that is probably not entirely fair to Godínez, nor an accurate assessment of his fourteen months in office, Espinosa Ramírez writes: "while it was certain that he [Godínez] had not done anything good, neither had he done anything that was notably bad." Furthermore, indicates Espinosa Ramírez, the person responsible for Godínez's overthrow, General Santiago, was not a native son of Nayarit, and his reputation as a "cruel, severe, and arbitrary man" had earned him the hatred of many of the State's inhabitants.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 40-42.

General Francisco Santiago formally became provisional governor on March 19, 1919, and he immediately named Fernando S. Ibarra as the secretary of Government. Santiago was granted a leave of absence on March 27, and Ibarra took over as provisional governor while Santiago was away. Santiago resumed power on April 5. The overthrow of Godínez, and his substitution by Santiago, were not only heralded by the business and latifundista classes, but also clearly condoned by the Carranza administration.<sup>74</sup>

The ascent to power by General Santiago signalled a low point of the Revolution in the State of Nayarit. Santiago defended the interests of the latifundistas, and instituted a campaign of terror against the agraristas, dashing the hopes for the distribution of land that had been kindled in the campesinos by the Constitution of 1917. Those campesinos who tried to put the promises of the constitution into effect were brutally eliminated by the governor. His macabre style of rule was manifested by the notorious "Christmas Tree," a giant ash tree that stood about three kilometers from Tepic on the road to the town of Jalisco, and from which the corpses of as many as nine campesinos hung simultaneously as an ominous warning to agrarian reformers.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Santiago to Gobernación, Tepic, March 19, 1919; Ibarra to Gobernación, Tepic, March 27, 1919; Flores Hermanos to Gobernación, Santiago Ixcuintla, March 27, 1919; and Gobernación to Santiago, Mexico City, April 5, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/62; and Santiago to Gobernación, Tepic, April 5, 1919; and Gobernación to Santiago, Mexico City, April 9, 1919, AGN-GPR, 279/63.

<sup>75</sup> Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 42-45.

On May 16, Industry, Commerce, and Labor sent a message to the Aguirre company requesting information on the progress of the work stoppage in the Jauja factory.<sup>76</sup> The company advised the secretariat that work had not yet resumed in the Jauja factory, and added that it probably would not resume production until the end of that year or the beginning of the next, because it reportedly was making repairs and modifications to the machinery to upgrade it from the manufacture of crude weave fabric to white cloth. The letter went on to explain that the company's principal motive for suspending production of the crude weave fabric at the Jauja factory was "the quality and the cost of production because of the nature of the machinery, already old and very slow moving in its performance." The company added that they were switching over to the finer white cloth at their Jauja factory in order to avoid competing with their own factory at Bellavista, which produced only the crude weave fabric, perceiving this to be harmful to their own interests. The company went on to claim that the workers "suffered no damage at all," because they had been advised of the work stoppage two months in advance, and had been provided wages for two months after the work stoppage.<sup>77</sup> The secretariat apparently had a short memory, for the original reason that had been given for the work stoppage was the

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<sup>76</sup> Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo to Gerente de la Fábrica de Hilados y Tejidos Jauja, Mexico City, May 16, 1919, AGN-DT, 118/3.

<sup>77</sup> D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, Tepic, May 30, 1919, AGN-DT, 118/3.

alleged shortage of cotton for manufacture. The secretariat apparently overlooked the fact that the workers had been led to believe that the factory would resume production once cotton supplies had been restored, and promises of providing the workers with alternate employment had clearly been long forgotten.

In January 1920, the secretariat received a complaint from eight workers from another of the Aguirre company's businesses, the La Escondida sugar mill, who alleged that the previous day they had not received their regular weekly wages. The workers reported that they had expected to receive their pay—which they mentioned was at the rate of 62 cents per day—as was the custom every Saturday afternoon, but the company refused to pay their entire wage, offering only \$1.00 each, with an offer to pay the rest later. The protesting workers alleged that they, and many others, resisted, and were therefore not paid at all. The company responded by declaring that the complaint that had been made by the workers was "absolutely false," maintaining that they had taken sufficient money to the factory to pay the workers, but that because of the current scarcity in Nayarit of money in small denominations, it had been necessary to oblige two or three workers to unite to share one gold coin, and that the workers themselves had decided to wait until the following week, when they were, in fact, paid in full with one gold coin. The interim governor supported the com-

pany's version, and the secretariat did not pursue the worker's complaint.<sup>7 8</sup>

On June 16, 1919, Hacienda's General office of Intervened Properties issued a report listing the properties in the State of Nayarit that had had been confiscated by the government, their fiscal values, and the causes of the intervention. The only two proprietors that appear on the list are the clergy and ex-General Mariano Ruiz.

The clergy had eleven properties, all of them urban, on the list of confiscated properties: the Cathedral, the diocese offices, the Chapel of San José, the Sanctuary of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and the San José printing shop, all in Tepic; the curacy and parish property in Jalisco; and the parish property and three houses in Tuxpan. The fiscal value of the properties were all listed as "unknown," and the cause of the interventions was reported to be: "For belonging to the clergy."

Ex-General Mariano Ruiz had fifty confiscated properties listed: thirty urban properties, all listed as being houses; and twenty rural properties. The fiscal values of the twenty-three urban properties for which values were given came to a total of \$33,080; seven values were listed as

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<sup>7 8</sup> Gregorio Murillo et al., to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, La Escondida, January 25, 1920, AGN-DT, 213/10; and Ibarra to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, Tepic, March 3, 1920, enclosing D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Gobierno de Nayarit, Tepic, March 2, 1920, AGN-DT, 213/10.



"unknown." Seven of the rural properties had values listed as "unknown;" and the thirteen rural properties with values given had a total listed fiscal value of \$33,958. The total value of the thirty-six properties, both urban and rural, that were given fiscal values, was \$67,038. The cause of the interventions in Ruiz's case was listed as: "For being an enemy of the government."<sup>79</sup>

In December 1919, General Lucio Blanco was rewarded for his loyalty to the Constitutionalist cause, when Secretary of Industry Plutarco Elías Calles, granted Blanco and a partner permits to exploit guano on the Islas Mariás. Blanco's partner had to renounce his Spanish nationality in order to conform to the contract. A related contract to exploit lime deposits on the Isla María Madre was reportedly still being negotiated.<sup>80</sup>

In the final months of the Carranza government, the campesinos of Tuxpan did manage to win back at least some of their lands. In response to a petition to the National Agrarian Commission dated March 23, 1919, the campesinos received a definitive award in August of that year of 1,739 hectares of land. Following the overthrow of the Carranza government, the campesinos of Tuxpan and other communities

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<sup>79</sup> Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección General de Bienes Intervenidos, "Relación de las Propiedades Intervenidas en el Estado de Nayarit," June 16, 1919, AGN-GPR, 177/22.

<sup>80</sup> Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo to Gobernación, Mexico City, December 5, 1919, and the contract between Gobernación and Blanco's partner, Ernesto Alvarez Guerra, Mexico City, December 4, 1919, AGN-GPR, 274/85.

in Nayarit received more substantial land awards.<sup>81</sup>

In April 1920, important officers in the northwestern region of Mexico, including Nayarit, began to rebel against Carranza's attempt to impose Ignacio Bonillas to succeed him in the presidency. Obregón's supporters issued the Plan of Agua Prieta, which called for the overthrow of the Carranza government. Article 4 of the Plan of Agua Prieta recognized José Santos Godínez as constitutional governor of Nayarit.<sup>82</sup>

The illegitimate overthrow of Godínez from office was sent to the Senate for study, and the Senate decided that Godínez would remain governor. This set off a storm of protests by the majority of the State's municipal presidents, who were supporters of General Santiago, led by the municipal president of Tepic, Isaac Jiménez. Nevertheless, Santiago resigned, designating Ibarra as his successor. A few days later, Ibarra requested a leave of absence, designating Salvador Arriola Valadéz to succeed him. In June, the Obregonista troops under the command of General José María Ochoa occupied Nayarit, and Arriola resigned as provisional governor. On June 12, Godínez resumed the governorship of Nayar-

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<sup>81</sup> Richmond, Carranza, p. 116; and López González, Recorrido, p. 209.

<sup>82</sup> Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Constitutionalist, p. 410.

For a copy of the Plan of Agua Prieta, see Píndaro Urióstegui Miranda, ed., Testimonios del proceso revolucionario de México, (Mexico City: Argrin, 1970), pp. 648-52.

it.<sup>83</sup>

Meanwhile, the Aguirre company was content to wait for the better circumstances that they expected would come with the completion of the railroad through the State. The Jauja factory remained closed, and the new government in Mexico City restricted itself to periodically inquiring about the "progress" of the work stoppage.<sup>84</sup> Nayarit's small working class was left in an almost impossible bargaining position. When the worker representative, Ireneo Fuentes, attended the meeting of a special commission on the minimum wage that had been convened in Tepic on July 24, the president of the commission called for a fifteen day recess to allow each representative to prepare a report. At the next meeting, on August 9, following the presentation of the report from worker representative Fuentes, the president of the commission once again postponed action on the matter, alleging that the local Chamber of Commerce had not yet submitted its report. On August 16, Fuentes presented himself at the scheduled meeting, but once again the president of the commission deferred the meeting to the following Thursday. This final meeting was not even held. In his report to the Bellavista union, Fuentes complained about the "censurable tardiness" of the president of the special commission, and

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<sup>83</sup> Espinosa Ramírez, pp. 45-47; and Enciclopedia Mexicana, 2nd ed., s.v. "Nayarit, Estado de," by Eugenio Noriega Robles.

<sup>84</sup> D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Industria y Comercio, Tepic, May 29, 1920; and D.G. Aguirre Sucesores to Industria y Comercio, Tepic, July 17, 1920, AGN-DT, 118/3.

the lack of respect by the Chamber of Commerce for the authorities and the laws.<sup>85</sup>

Neither the rise of Obregón to national power, nor the return of Godínez as governor of the State were to revive the revolutionary spirit that had been all but crushed in the six years that followed the high point of the Revolution in the Convention of Aguascalientes in the latter part of 1914. The promise of hope that had been rekindled once again at the Constitutional Convention in Querétaro in late 1916 and early 1917, was all but extinguished by the onslaught of the latifundistas and other business interests. In Nayarit, the Santiago regime completed the job that had been begun by the Ferreira regime, and by 1920, the latifundistas led by the powerful Aguirre company were once again in control.

Godínez faced a political opposition that had grown even stronger during his exile, and in 1921, he was forced from office a second time before his term of office expired. Such political chaos was to continue in the State until the mid-1930s, only to the benefit of the latifundistas, for the political disintegration in Nayarit helped to prolong the oppressive class structure that favored the very few large landowners at the expense of the masses. The agrarian movement in Nayarit had been dispersed by the terror that had

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<sup>85</sup> Francisco Ortega to Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo, Bellavista, September 3, 1920, enclosing Ireneo Fuentes to Secretario General [Bellavista Workers Union], September 1, 1920, AGN-DT, 216/4.

been unleashed during the Santiago government, and the small, incipient working class was too weak to pose any threat to the owning classes.

In 1920, the fruits of the Mexican Revolution were not readily apparent in Nayarit. The region had suffered from the disruptions of the civil strife, and the working classes remained impoverished. The benefits that were to derive from the Revolution that had been unleashed a decade earlier were not to be realized until the mid-1930s, during the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas, when the gigantic estates of the Aguirre company and the other latifundistas would begin to be distributed extensively to the campesinos. In the meantime, the great majority of the people of Nayarit, its campesinos and its working classes, were condemned to many more difficult years of servitude, suffering, and despair.

## Chapter VII

### CONCLUSION

The experience in Nayarit during the decade that stretches from 1910 to 1920, is entirely consistent with the thesis that the Mexican Revolution was an interrupted social revolution. It is a bitter truth that by 1920, the Revolution had accomplished little in practical terms for the campesinos, industrial workers, and middle classes of Nayarit. The limited gains they had won along the way were overshadowed by the hardships and sacrifices of the epoch. The economic disruptions caused not only by the extended period of civil war, but also by the changing international business environment, resulted in a general decline in social conditions. The latifundistas continued to dominate, although their position had been seriously challenged by the movement for agrarian reform, as well as by the demands of the various revolutionary caudillos who had taken political and military control of the region. Class relations changed dramatically from 1910 to 1920, but the revolutionary impetus was derailed by the political opportunism of the caudillos.

The history of Nayarit from 1910 to 1920 also confirms that the Mexican Revolution was not a struggle of the lower

classes versus the upper class, but a series of uprisings led by frustrated members of the upper and middle classes against favored groups of these same classes. As such, the economic and social causes of the Revolution ultimately were less important than the bourgeois civil war. While there was evidence of agitation for labor reform in Nayarit, and while important gains were made during the period, the major reforms like the ten-hour then the eight-hour workday and the unionization of workers, were not the fruits of victories won in Nayarit, but rather were concessions granted and directed by the federal government. In a similar way agrarismo in Nayarit was not so much a movement as a series of local struggles for possession of lands which often had a history of spoliation by the hacendado class during the Porfiriato. The struggles for labor and agrarian reform existed during and before the Porfirian period, and remained after 1920.

The social gains of the Revolution in Nayarit—as in Mexico in general—were less objective than subjective. The attitudinal development that took place among workers and campesinos was the essential aspect of the upheaval that qualifies it as a revolution, inasmuch as it represented a defeat for these classes as reflected by various tangible social indicators. The victors were the revolutionary caudillos who became the new bourgeoisie in conjunction with the Porfirian bourgeoisie. The latifundistas—particularly

the Aguirre company—still retained most of their landholdings in 1920. They had been challenged, but had won a reprieve. During the Carranza, Obregón, and Calles periods, agrarian reform was suppressed, and land grants to the campesinos were limited and isolated. The Lázaro Cárdenas administration, however, provided the leadership that led to the general breakup of the haciendas in Nayarit, and authorized collective land grants to groups of campesinos organized in ejidos. Labor reform too, was retarded when labor leaders like Luis Morones were recruited by succeeding governments. Domination of the labor movement by Morones and his Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) served to stifle Mexican labor until the Cárdenas period, when further advances for the working class were realized.

An attendant effect of the Revolution in Nayarit was the increased integration of the region with the rest of the country. Enlistment with a revolutionary band or induction to the federal army took inhabitants of the region to other parts of the country on various military campaigns. The Revolution also brought outsiders into Nayarit, as soldiers, political appointees, and refugees from other parts of Mexico found their way into the region and mingled with local residents. This contact not only promoted cultural admixture, but also enhanced the national identity by drawing the region into the vortex of the country's civil war.



The economy of the region in 1910 was already poised for increased integration with other areas of the country as well as with the United States, and awaited the anticipated benefits of the railroad. The Revolution slowed this development by disrupting construction schedules and with the destruction of bridges and tracks; but ultimately the Revolution redoubled the trend to increased integration with central Mexico, Sonora, and the United States.

Accompanying this integration was an expansion of the role of the central government, particularly the presidency. This trend toward political centralization had been established during the Porfiriato, and the Revolution further reinforced the pattern. Despite some of the weaknesses of the Madero government, the political legitimacy resulting from his decisive electoral victory, and the reforms that were carried out during his administration, reaffirmed the influence of the presidency on the political life of the country, including the Territory of Tepic. Huerta's coup reestablished autocratic rule in Mexico, and the Territory of Tepic was particularly eager to co-operate with the general's regime. The personalistic style of leadership by the revolutionary caudillos culminated in an authoritarian regime during the Carranza presidency. Meanwhile, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 left extensive powers to the presidency, while at the same time enhancing the role and authority of government in the affairs of the nation.

While Nayarit was not as important a theater of action as areas like Morelos, Chihuahua, Sonora, and the Bajío region, it did contribute to the cumulative, national experience of the Revolution. Personalities associated with Nayarit, like Martín Espinosa, Rafael Buelna, Esteban Baca Calderón, and Juan Carrasco, were rewarded subsequently with government positions for their military victories, and they have been recognized for their parts in historical accounts of the Mexican Revolution. Others, like Solón Arguello, suffered defeat and martyrdom, and for the most part have been overlooked by historians. The ambiguity of the roles played by other characters, like Juan Uribe Osuna, Plácido Quintero, José Natividad Alvarez, Miguel Guerrero, and Camilo Rentería, have made it difficult to determine whether they should be classified as revolutionaries or counterrevolutionaries. The campesinos of Nayarit—most notably in Tuxpan and surrounding areas—persisted in their struggle to regain communal lands that had been appropriated by the hacendados, thereby augmenting the national movement for agrarian reform. Nayarit's industrial workers, guided by such leaders as Albino Casillas, Gregorio Elías, Enrique Elías, Justo Calderón, Sabino Villegas, and Norberto Vázquez, made their contribution to the labor movement with struggles for wage increases, improved labor conditions, unionization, and job security. They also agitated for low-cost housing, price controls, and subsidies for basic food items for workers and the underclasses, and their demands included petitions for worker ownership of the factories.

One of the tasks of this study has been to determine who was in power in Nayarit during the Revolution, and to assess their respective records while in office. The office of jefe político, which became the office of the governor after statehood was conferred, was held by at least thirteen men from 1910 to 1920, not counting a number of others who held this top post provisionally for a few days or weeks. While the evidence at hand is still too sketchy to allow any definitive judgments of the various administrations, some characteristics do emerge regarding these individuals and their terms in office.

Despite the fact that the Madero government arrived in power by overthrowing the Díaz dictatorship, and swept to an easy victory on a reformist platform in what has been recognized as one of the cleanest elections in Mexico's history, the Martín Espinosa administration in the Territory of Tepic was not nearly as popular as one may have expected. Moreover, Espinosa's predecessor, the Porfirian appointee Mariano Ruiz, does not seem to have been as unpopular an individual as anticipated by many standard treatments of the Díaz epoch, and indeed, Ruiz continued to serve during the Madero period as a deputy in the federal congress, and was under consideration for appointment as jefe político in Baja California Sur. While electoral procedures were quickly established and adhered to during the Madero period, little action was taken on agrarian reform. Espinosa took immedi-

ate steps to align himself with the hacendados, and any steps that were taken on land issues remained isolated cases, not unlike what had occurred during previous administrations. Important labor reforms were undertaken during the Madero period, but the Espinosa administration failed to provide the support needed to ensure that the new regulations were adhered to by the factory owners.

Following the overthrow of the Madero government, there was little indication that Huerta's appointees—Augustín Migoni, Miguel Gil, and Domingo Servín—were viewed with widespread antipathy during their respective sojourns in Tepic. On the contrary, it was Martín Espinosa and a very small group of followers who found it necessary to flee the Territory. While the Huerta government ultimately failed to provide the return to the old regime that the hacendados had hoped for, it is also significant that the insurrection in the Territory of Tepic arrived, for the most part, from outside its borders. It was the Huerta government, in fact, that succeeded in rallying lower-class support in Tepic to protest the American invasion of Vera Cruz.

The rift between Carranza and Villa became apparent just as the Constitutionalist Army of the Northwest under the command of Alvaro Obregón began its sweep into the Territory of Tepic. Rafael Buelna, who had commanded the Constitutionalist vanguard force in southern Sinaloa and the Territory of Tepic for the past year, had been designated by

Carranza to become jefe político upon the capture of Tepic. Obregón, however, appointed Juan Dozal to the position, and the rivalry between Buelna and Obregón reached such a crescendo that Buelna came close to assassinating Obregón. When Obregón declared his loyalty to Carranza, Buelna sided with Villa, and became an active promoter of the Revolutionary Convention of Aguascalientes.

Buelna chose Carlos Echeverría to administer the office of jefe político in his place, so that he himself could continue to participate in the vanguard of the campaign against Huerta. Nevertheless, Echeverría's administration was short and ineffectual, and ironically he adopted the same fiscal budget as the previous Huerta administration had proposed. Once the rift between Carrancistas and Conventionists became irretrievable, Echeverría was replaced as jefe político in Tepic by Juan Dozal. Dozal made every effort to align himself with the hacendados, but within a few weeks he was forced to flee the Territory when Buelna returned to recapture Tepic for the Conventionists.

The next eight months were chaotic for the Territory of Tepic, as the Constitutionalist under the command of Juan Carrasco battled the Conventionists under the command of Buelna, and the government of Tepic changed hands repeatedly between the two opposing sides. There was little to distinguish between the two camps. The Revolution had become an open competition for power, with no apparent revolutionary

agenda. It was a time of dissolution and violence in the Territory of Tepic, and social conditions deteriorated sharply. The Carrancistas themselves admitted the disfavor they encountered from all social classes in the Territory of Tepic, including the hacendados. Buelna on the other hand had extensive support, and he collaborated closely with the hacendados.

Following the defeat of Villa and the restoration of order by the Carrancistas, the contradictions within the Constitutionalist movement began to rise to the surface. These were the incongruities inherent in the Bonapartism of the Carranza regime, which was dedicated to the preservation of property rights and privileges, while at the same time promising agrarian and labor reform. This caused wide variations in government policies in Tepic between one jefe político and another. Juan Carrasco promoted a favorable environment for commercial trade between the regions. Juan Torres, on the other hand, supported the agrarian movement, labor reform, and programs to aid the underprivileged.

Ironically, Torres's successor, Jesús Ferreira, apparently was commissioned by the Carranza government to suppress the reformism that Torres actively had promoted. Nayarit's first constitutionally elected governor, José Santos Godínez, arrived in office as a Carrancista, and previously has been portrayed as a reactionary representative of the interests of the hacendados and the Church. The evidence,

however, indicates that once Godínez arrived in office, he clashed with the Carranza government in his efforts to support land reform and to prevent food shortages and price increases from afflicting the poor. On the other hand, Francisco Santiago, the general who conspired with the hacendados and members of the State Congress to have Godínez impeached, then succeeded him, apparently deserves his notoriety as a gruesome suppressor of the agrarian movement. Godínez was restored as governor following the overthrow of Carranza, but he was once again forced from office before his scheduled term had ended.

In retrospect, the continuity of the various administrations in Tepic during the 1910 to 1920 period—whether Porfirian, Maderista, Huertista, Constitutionalist, or Conventionist—was as salient as any differences between them. They all worked toward progressive, capitalist, economic development, although there were variations in government policy and style.

The Nayarit region often tended to run contrary to the flow of the so-called "official" version of the Revolution. It remained under federal military control until Porfirio Díaz surrendered power to Madero, at which time Mariano Ruiz evacuated Tepic, allowing Martín Espinosa to enter and assume power. Serious uprisings occurred in the Territory, threatening the survival of the Espinosa administration, and when the Madero government was overthrown, Espinosa found

himself to have little support, forcing him to flee for safety. The Huerta regime was readily accepted in the Territory, and it remained under federal control until the final weeks of his administration. Obregón encountered resistance in Tepic following his purge of the clergy in the aftermath of the capture of Tepic, and a number of high-ranking Carrancistas plainly admitted that their movement generally was not highly regarded there. The Territory tended to be more hospitable to the forces of Villa and Buelna, than to those loyal to Carranza and Obregón.

The granting of statehood to Nayarit was the conclusion of a process that had begun in 1867, when the Seventh Canton of the State of Jalisco was declared the Military District of Tepic, directly dependent on the federal government. The Territory of Tepic was created in 1884, and this was followed by a series of initiatives over the years to have the Territory elevated to statehood. Nevertheless, these initiatives invariably were denounced by the establishment in the Territory, who recognized the fiscal costs of this status, and who wanted to maintain the subsidies and stability that came with the federal territorial administration. Even after statehood had been conferred, the business community in Nayarit petitioned for a return to territorial status on the grounds that the financial burden of the state administration was too great to support.



While Nayarit may have been on a path that made statehood inevitable eventually, it came at a time when the region was least prepared to make the adjustment. The civil war had disrupted the Territory, especially the struggle of 1915 between the Carrancistas and the Buelnistas-Villistas. This was accompanied by bad weather conditions and locust infestations, which led to crop failures and food shortages. The railroad was damaged, and years of construction would be needed to complete the track through the mountains to Guadalajara. To make matters worse, the international business environment was affected by the First World War, contributing to the closure of the Jauja textile factory.

It appears that the initiative to grant statehood to Nayarit came from Carranza alone, and that he apparently never revealed what had motivated him to submit the relevant amendments to Articles 43 and 47 of his proposed draft of the Constitution. In the heady atmosphere surrounding the Convention of Querétaro, the proposal was approved virtually without debate, as though it were a reform, a victory of the Revolution. Ultimately, this may have been exactly what Carranza had hoped for—the prestige of appearing to be reformist, when his real agenda was to circumvent the more radical reforms advocated by his rivals, the Jacobins. More specific to Nayarit, Carranza managed to appease the three constitutional delegates from Tepic and thereby influence their role in the convention, when they could very easily have been mobilized by Obregón and the Jacobins.

Another aspect of statehood was the difference between the role of the jefe político of the federal territorial administration, and the governor of the State of Nayarit. In practice, the two positions were for the most part identical, in that both positions indicated the highest ranking civil—and sometimes also military—authority in the region. Nevertheless, the first constitutionally elected governor, José Santos Godínez, was unique during this period for his autonomous posture in relation to Carranza and the federal government. This attitude apparently was based on the newly acquired status and legitimacy that came with statehood, as well as with the constitutionally prescribed electoral process that brought the governor to power. Godínez bravely responded to the needs of the campesinos and the working classes with his support of land reform, and with his Expropriation Law and export restrictions to prevent food shortages and price increases. These efforts, however, alienated the hacendados and vexed the Carranza government, and they led to the impeachment of the governor.

In 1910, a regional identity already had been established in the Territory of Tepic, and the social forces and events of the Revolution further enhanced this identity. The experience in Nayarit was often quite distinct from what had occurred in the neighboring States of Sinaloa and Jalisco. The geographical features of Nayarit shaped the military and political struggles. The natural mountain barriers

made the region ungovernable from Guadalajara, a fact which had become apparent during the Manuel Lozada period, and had become even more conspicuous during the Revolution. Likewise, the ascendant political and military movement from Sonora and Sinaloa encountered great resistance in the Territory of Tepic, and the Mazatlán to Tepic corridor was easily disrupted by local insurgents. Clearly, while Nayarit itself contained a number of diverse districts, the viability of the region, with Tepic as its capital city, had been confirmed by the Revolution.

Central government policy was not always consistent, as the various secretariats viewed situations from different perspectives. Moreover, the personalities and ideas of the officials occupying these posts influenced the responses of their respective departments, while political exigency and personal connections played their parts in defining government decisions. The presidency remained the dominant office of government that it had been during the Porfiriato, and the trend toward the centralization of government continued.

The movement for local, municipal autonomy spread through the region during the decade of the Revolution, although the meaning of the "Free Municipality" may not have been the same to all inhabitants. The liberals took it to mean elected local councils. Municipal authorities in Tuxpan, however, extended the concept to include powers to seize hacienda lands for redistribution to the ejidos. The

impetus for municipal government helped to sweep Madero to power, as resentment toward the political bosses appointed to the districts was felt throughout the country. After the fall of the Madero government, Huerta reverted to the delegation of district authorities, and the Constitutionalist resumed the struggle for representative government. The Torres administration in the Territory of Tepic conducted municipal elections in 1916, and this reflected favorably on the Carranza regime, increasing its support in the Territory.

The judiciary, on the other hand, often served a more reactionary function. Hacendados were well connected to members of the legal profession through numerous business dealings, and they naturally turned to the minister of justice, justice officials, and judges to protect their interests. Campesinos and workers also made appeals to the judiciary, but as these were appointed rather than elected officials, the support of the masses was of less consequence than legal considerations and solidarity with the upper classes. Likewise, the various police organizations were often predisposed to the protection of the interests of the oligarchy, where there were more opportunities for personal gain.

Nayarit's congressional representatives played a more ambiguous part in the Revolution. More research is needed to assess the roles of federal deputies during this period,

including the Territory's delegates to the Convention of Querétaro. Deputies to the State Congress served a variety of constituents, although more research is needed to determine the class allegiances of individual members. Unfortunately, the loss of its documents in a fire in the 1920s has obscured much of the early history of this legislative body. The role of the State Congress in its impeachment of Governor Godínez is also of great interest, and requires further investigation.

Most of the landholdings and privileges that the Catholic Church and clergy in Mexico had accumulated during the colonial period had been dissolved by the sweeping reform legislation of liberal governments in the nineteenth century. Many revolutionary leaders wanted to diminish the role of the Church in Mexican society even further, and the Constitutional Convention of 1916 to 1917 provided them with the opportunity to place additional restrictions on the Church and its clergy. Under the leadership of Manuel Lozada, the Nayarit region had provided stubborn opposition to the liberals in the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Constitutionalists encountered widespread resistance in the Territory of Tepic, and their anticlericalism was one of the major causes of these sentiments. Obregón took harsh measures to deal with the clergy in Tepic after the capture of the Territory, and this may have been a factor in the preference that the majority of the inhabitants had for Buelna

and Villa over the Constitutionalists. Governor Godínez was known to have been a practicing Catholic, but this did not prevent Obregón from reinstalling him in office after the overthrow of Carranza. Nayarit continued to be an area of support for the Church in the 1920s, and many of its inhabitants fought against the Calles government in the Cristero Rebellion.

The widespread, sustained resistance in Nayarit to the Constitutionalist faction has caused the region to be overlooked in most studies of the Mexican Revolution. Clearly, the regional history did not harmonize with the "official" version of the Revolution. It lent itself less to a celebration of heroes and victories, than to an examination of political opportunism and the defeat of the popular movement. Moreover, Nayarit was a remote region and not very prosperous, and therefore it was easily disregarded. This has resulted in a gap in the historiography, and the risk that a number of false assumptions or inaccurate interpretations could be accepted as fact.

A view of the Revolution from the perspective of Nayarit, nevertheless, has uncovered a number of themes worthy of attention and further investigation. One more facet of the Mexican Revolution has emerged, and while it is not a particularly flattering profile, it remains a significant variant that should be taken into consideration. Moreover, it points to the need for more comprehensive work on the histo-

ry of Nayarit and the various personalities and factions involved, as well as the study of other neglected regions in the Mexican Revolution.

## Appendix A

### NAYARIT: POPULATION BY OCCUPATION, 1920

Occupation in Spanish Occupation in English	Number Employed
Abogados Lawyers	33
Administradores de Campo Rural Administrators	16
Administradores Industriales Industrial Administrators	5
Agricultores Farmers	1,420
Adoberos Adobe Brickmakers	13
Alfareros Potters	183
Agentes de Negocios Business Agents	3
Aguadores Water Vendors	34
Albañiles Masons	725
Arquitectos Architects	6
Arrieros Muleteers	587
Administradores de Minas Mining Administrators	37
Almindoneros Starchers	3



Banqueros Bankers	1
Bordadores Embroiderers	4
Bizcocheros Biscuit Makers	6
Cantantes Singers	2
Canteros Extractores Stonecutters: Extractors	9
Canteros Talladores Stonecutters: Carvers	11
Carboneros Fabricantes Charcoal Makers	61
Carreteros Teamsters	153
Carroceros Cart Builders	95
Cargadores Stevedores	41
Carpinteros Carpenters	610
Canoeros Canoeists	34
Cereros Candle Makers	4
Cigarreros Cigarette Makers	165
Cocheros Coachmen	92
Coheteros Fireworks Makers	51
Comerciantes Merchants	3,329
Corredores Brokers	2

Costureras Seamstesses	587
Criados y Sirvientes Maids and Servants	2,488
Curtidores Tanners	182
Dentistas Dentists	4
Dependientes Salesclerks	242
Dulceros Confectioners	54
Ebanistas Cabinetmakers	3
Empleados Públicos Public Employees	510
Empleados Particulares Private Employees	540
Encuadernadores Bookbinders	26
Ensayadores de Metales Metal Assayers	7
Escultores Sculptors	3
Escritores y Periodistas Writers and Journalists	4
Escolares Elementary Students	11,431
Estudiantes Highschool Students	44
Farmaceúticos Pharmacists	19
Floristas Florists	9
Fundidores en General Foundrymen	7

Fusteros Whip Makers	18
Ganaderos Ranchers	6
Grabadores Engravers	3
Herradores Cattle Branders	26
Herreros Blacksmiths	323
Hojalateros Tinsmiths	64
Ingenieros en General Engineers	47
Individuos de Tropa Troop Personnel	1,032
Jaboneros Soap Makers	7
Jardineros y Hortelanos Gardeners	107
Jarcieros Riggers	1
Jefes de Ejercito Army Officers	79
Jornaleros Day Laborers	45,145
Fotógrafos Photographers	13
Ladrilleros Brickmakers	10
Lapidarios Lapidaries	3
Latoneros Braziers	3
Lavanderos Launderers	597

Leñadores Woodcutters	7
Maestros de Obras Building Contractors	10
Marineros Sailors	77
Matanceros Slaughterers	32
Mecánicos Mechanics	130
Médicos Altópatas Doctors: Allopathic	27
Médicos Homeópatas Doctors: Homeopathic	19
Menores de Edad Minors	42,104
Mesalinas Prostitutes	40
Mineros Miners	349
Modistas Dressmakers	31
Molenderas Millers	15
Músicos Musicians	257
Notarios Públicos Notaries Public	2
Obreros Hda. Beneficio Commissioned Hacienda Workers	11
Obreros Industriales Industrial Workers	317
Panaderos Bakers	498
Parteras Midwives	33

Pasteleros Pastry Bakers	23
Pasamaneros Banister Makers	2
Peluqueros Barbers	158
Pescadores Fishermen	147
Pintores Decoradores Painters and Decorators	2
Pintores Artistas Artist Painters	58
Plateros Silversmiths	58
Policías Policemen	224
Pureros Cigar Makers	102
Plomeros Plumbers	12
Profesores Teachers	288
Propietarios y Rentistas Landlords and Financiers	390
Porteros Doormen	10
Quehaceres Domésticos Homemakers	65,013
Reboceros Shawl Makers	5
Relojeros Watchmakers	8
Sacerdotes Católicos Catholic Priests	68
Sacerdotes de Otros Cultos Priests of Other Religions	1

Sastres Tailors	168
Sin Ocupación Without Occupation	666
Sombrereros Hatters	125
Talladores de Fibra Fiber Cutters	2
Tablajeros o Carniceros Meatcutters or Butchers	270
Tapiceros Upholsterers	5
Talabarteros Leather Workers	215
Taquígrafos Stenographers	2
Tejedores de Palma Palm Weavers	28
Telefonistas Telephone Operators	19
Telegrafistas Telegraph Operators	16
Tintoreros Dyers	1
Topógrafos Topographers	59
Toreros Bullfighters	3
Tortilleras Tortilla Makers	166
Toneleros Coopers	4
Vendedores Ambulantes Peddlers	189
Veleros Sail Makers	34

Veterinarios Veterinarians	4
Yeseros Plasterers	1
Zapateros Shoemakers	425
	<hr/>
TOTAL	181,309

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SOURCE: "Nayarit," AGN-DT, 210/14.

NOTE: No date appears on the document, but its location in the archive suggests that the data pertains to the year 1920.

While the subheading "Total" appears in the original document, no figure was entered. The sum of the "Number Employed" was more than the total population because some individuals worked in more than one occupation.

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