ISBN 0-315-54956-4

The Relationship of Faith and Good Works in the Thought of Martin Luther and Menno Simons

by

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A Thesis
Presented to the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in the

Department of Religious Studies

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba
August, 1989

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Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Bernard of Chartres used to say that we are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, so that we can see more than they, and things at a greater distance, not by virtue of any sharpness of sight on our part, or any physical distinction, but because we are carried high and raised up by their giant size.

John of Salisbury
Metalogicon (1159)
Book III, ch. iv.

This quotation summarizes quite accurately my own feelings toward the academic process. I consider it a privilege to have had the opportunity to spend countless hours in the writings of Martin Luther and Menno Simons from whom I have learnt much. To those many scholars who have spent much of their lives in the study of Luther and Menno and without whom the writing of this thesis would have been impossible I say thank-you. I can only hope that the writing of this thesis has added in some small way to our understanding of Luther and Menno and that it will hopefully advance, at least to a degree, the discussion between these two figures and their present day followers.

I would also like to extend my appreciation and gratitude to a number of people who have, in a more immediate sense, contributed to the completion of this thesis. First, to Professors Henry Schmidt and John E. Toews, both of the Mennonite Brethreen Biblical Seminary, Fresno, California for their interest, encouragement and friendship over the past number of years. Second, to the members of my thesis committee whose patience has been tried

as the writing of this thesis was frequently interrupted by extended periods of work and travel. To Professor Dawne McCance whose sense of style saved me from several infelicitous expressions, to Professor Victor Doerksen whose love of Menno is subtly infectious and to Professor Harry Loewen whose interest in the dialogue between Luther and Menno is more than perfunctory, I say thank-you. Your advice, criticisms and insights has been most helpful and encouraging.

Finally, and anything but least, to Professor Egil Grislis under whose teaching the idea for this thesis first began to take shape and who has carefully nurtured its growth each step of the way. His insights, advice, comments and direction were always kindly and graciously given and it was under his wise and expert hand that this thesis has achieved its final state. He has, in the process, become a friend whose advice has been sought and counsel heeded. It is with delight that I extend to him a very special thank-you.

To this list I must add one other, Victor Harder. He took a computer illiterate who, despite his best efforts, remains, at least in terms of computers, semi-literate. Thanks also to Vic for the use of his computer and printer when mine failed in the last week of writing this thesis.

ABSTRACT

In the politically, socially and religiously turbulent era of the Reformation a number of theological debates took place which even to this day have not been resolved. In the forefront of these debates where the major leaders of the Reformation: Luther, Calvin, Zwingli and Simons. One of the major debates of this era concerned the nature of faith and the implications any revision in the understanding of faith had for "good works". This thesis will focus on two major figures in this debate, Martin Luther (1483-1546) and Menno Simons (1496-1561), their views on faith, good works and their interrelationship. Such a comparison needs to be situated solidly within the context of historical tradition. To this end, four significant figures, Paul, Augustine, Aquinas and Biel were chosen and their views on faith and good works examined.

Set within this context, the views of Luther and Menno are carefully considered. While Luther's 1535 Commentary on Galatians" provides the textual basis for the study of Luther, the entire corpus of Menno's writings is taken into account in this study.

For Luther, "justification by grace through faith" functions not only as an item of faith but as a "metatheological norm" that guides the development of his

thought and results in his distinction between the Law and the Gospel. The role that conscience has, as a correlate of the Law and the Gospel, is also examined.

The discussion of Luther's view on the process of justification shows the inadequacy of calling it "forensic" and demonstrates that for Luther justification by grace through faith means that Christ is "most really" and "most effectively" present in and through faith. All of the concepts associated with Luther's doctrine of justification must be understood in this light of this relationship between Christ and the believer. Basically, for Luther faith and Christ have no meaning apart from one another.

Luther's view of good works is shaped by his understanding of Christ as a sacrament rather than as an example. The thoroughly eschatological nature of Luther's doctrine of justification is particularly highlighted when we consider his doctrine of imputation and his famous formula of <u>simul iustus et peccator</u>. Luther attempts to develop two models of relating faith and good works, an incarnational model and a linear one, both of which are unsuccessful. Finally, the continuing importance and place of the doctrine of justification even in the discussion of good works is highlighted.

Menno's views on faith and obedience, the term he prefers to use, are shaped in light of the medieval and Catholic doctrine of penance albeit one that is reshaped in light of the Reformation. Considerable attention is devoted to Menno's doctrine of repentance and how his views on

repentance shape his understanding of the Law and Gospel. Menno does speak of faith but, whereas Luther defines this as trust, Menno defines it as a "power". What faith, together with the Holy Spirit, creates is the "new creature". This "new creature" manifests its presence through obedience and love. In short, it is a moral conformity to the earthly person of Jesus.

In conclusion, the differences between Luther and Menno are categorized in terms of their differing Christologies, soteriologies and eschatologies.

ABBREVIATION

CWMS	Complete Writings of Menno Simons
LW	Luther's Works
ST	Summa Theologica
WA	Weimarer Ausgabe

Chapter One

Introduction

Although the terms "faith" and "good works' sound anachronistic they represent the loci of Christian theology and experience. They have traditionally been included in systematic theology texts and treated under the headings "justification" and "sanctification". Historically, the differences that now divide much of Christendom, notably the division between Roman Catholics and Protestants, arose because of the differences concerning the nature of faith, good works and their interrelationship.

Obviously, to describe these divisions in their enitrety and to carefully consider their nature and cause lies beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis will, rather, explore the nature of faith and good works and their interrelationship in the thought of Martin Luther and Menno Simons.

The choice of Luther and Menno as the figures to be used in this comparison can be justified on several counts. As for Luther, the reasons for choosing him are relatively obvious. Probably no other theologian has made the question of faith and good works as central to his thinking as has Luther. The rallying cry of the Reformation was "justification by grace through faith". It was Luther who made this formula famous and who sought to shape his entire theology

in accord with it. One of the results of a theology shaped along these lines is a certain attitude towards good works. Given the centrality of faith and good works in the theology of Luther it seems natural to make his theology one of the two foci of this thesis.

The reason for choosing Menno Simons as a counter part in this study of faith and good works may not be as readily apparent but this choice can be justified on several grounds. First, Menno was a contemporary of Luther (Luther: 1483-1546; Menno: 1496-1561) and lived through many of the same political, religious, social and cultural events as Luther. Second, Menno was considerably influenced by the writings of Luther and he expresses both his appreciation for Luther and his disagreement with him. Third, Menno was a leader of great importance among one of the three major streams of Anabaptism, namely Dutch Anabaptism. And finally, Menno, like Luther, also has a great deal to say about faith and good works, the central subject of this study.

However, while both Luther and Menno have a great deal to say about faith and good works they agree on relatively little and it is the nature of this conflict and the reasons for it that this thesis will explore. One of the reasons often given for this conflict and misunderstanding is that Luther and his opponents simply failed to understand one another. No doubt this is true given the turbulence of the Reformation but the disagreements that arose between Luther and Menno, in this case, were a result of more than simply

misunderstandings. That there is a difference of emphasis between these two figures there can be no doubt but does that explain their differences? For Luther, the theme of justification by grace through faith is the dominant motif of his theology. Given the dominance of this motif he was accused by Menno (and others, notably the Catholics) of stressing faith to the point of diminishing, if not excluding, good works. Menno, on the other hand, stressed the importance of repentance and obedience.

Even when allowance is made for misunderstanding and different emphases between Luther and Menno differences still remain. This thesis will argue that the difference between these two figures is genuine and real and that there is good cause for their disagreement with each other. The basic differences separating Luther and Menno, at least as far as the question of good works and faith is concerned, can be described in terms of three theological categories: Christology, soteriology and eschatology.

It is the attempt to describe and analyze these differences that gives rise to the basic form of this thesis. It must, however, be mentioned that the three areas of difference noted above do not form the interpretive categories for this work. They are, rather, the result of this study. Furthermore, the categories of justification and sanctification have deliberately not been employed as a means to analyze the thought of Luther and Menno because, while they may be useful heuristic and analytic tools for

our purposes, they do not represent the categories of thought which either Luther or Menno used.

The basic categories which are used in this thesis as a means to analyze the thought of Luther and Menno are those suggested by the title of the thesis itself, namely, faith and good works. Our treatment of the subject matter will largely follow from this simple outline. In the second chapter the historical background to the discussion of faith, good works and their interrelationship will be laid. Needless to say, neither Luther nor Menno were the first to deal with this problem and each of them, in varying ways and in various degrees, draws on this background, be it either positively or negatively. Four significant figures, Paul, Augustine, Aquinas and Biel, have been chosen as illustrative of the divergent manner in which the predecessors of Luther and Menno have attempted to deal with faith, good works and their interrelationship.

With this background in mind we turn immediately in chapter three to an examination of Luther's theology. Here we shall examine how the basic principle of "justification by grace through faith" functions as a "metatheological norm" rather than simply as one content item among others, even when it is seen as the most important one, to guide the formation of Luther's theology. The basic divisions of Law and Gospel and the role they have in biblical interpretation are, as we shall discover, the result of this metatheological norm. The role and function that Luther

attributes to the conscience is closely related to how and what Luther understands the function of the Law and the Gospel to be.

In the fourth and fifth chapters we shall move directly into a study of Luther's views on faith (chapter four) and works (chapter five) as he describes them in his 1535 Commentary on Galatians. The concern of chapter four will be to show the inadequacy of the viewing Luther's doctrine of justification as a "forensic" event. Luther elaborates a doctrine of justification in which Christ is "most really" and "most effectively" present in the life of the believer. It is this relationship that guides and informs Luther's thought on the nature of justification.

In chapter five the nature of works, both as to their nature and role, will be closely examined. The importance and eschatological nature of Luther's doctrine of imputation will be discussed here and the relationship of faith to hope and love will be examined. Luther's discussion of works could have been pursued under his treatment of "vocation" but this option will not be followed for several reasons, First, Luther's treatment of vocation has been widely analyzed and studied and second, by choosing to look at what Luther has to say about love we will be able to compare what he says on this subject with what Menno has to say on the same topic. (Menno does not employ the term or concept of vocation.)

As part of our discussion of "good works" we shall look

at two attempts or models, the incarnational model and the linear model, used by Luther to explain the relationship of faith and good works. This chapter will conclude with a very specific look at what Luther has to say about the contents of good works and why the doctrine of justification by grace through faith remains essential even in the midst of a discussion of good works.

Moving on to Menno we shall follow basically the same line of pursuit as we did with Luther but it will have to be structured somewhat differently in light of Menno's thought. Menno's thought is dominated by the twin themes of penance and holiness. In this sense, Menno clearly remains heavily influenced by his medieval and Catholic background but he does recast his understanding of penance in light of the discoveries of the Reformation. This shift in understanding is carefully analyzed in chapter six and Menno's new view of repentance, together with the changes this brings in Menno's understanding of the Law and Gospel, is explained.

In the final chapter on Menno, chapter seven, we will look at Menno's views on faith, the Holy Spirit and regeneration. This significant cluster of topics forms the core of Menno's theology and it is most significant in terms of our study of his views on faith and good works. We will note how the "new creature" expresses his willingness to be obedient in baptism and how he is conformed to the "image of Christ" in terms of a moral and ethical imitation of the earthly Jesus.

Having now examined the thought of Luther and Menno on faith and good works we are in a position to compare their positions. This will be done, as was noted above, under three categories: Christology, soteriology and eschatology.

We turn now to the immediate task at hand-- a survey of previous attempts to relate faith and good works.

Chapter Two

The Historical Background to the Discussion of Faith and Good Works

2. 1 Introduction

The concern of Luther and Menno to formulate correctly the relationship between faith and works stands in a long tradition of theological reflection on this problem. Both men are certainly heirs of this tradition but each also seeks to restructure the relationship of faith and works in a manner which they believe is more biblically consistent. To appreciate what Luther and Menno are attempting to achieve it is necessary for us to look briefly at what the theological tradition with which they worked offered to them. It is impossible to consider in depth the various contributors to this theological stream but a brief survey of several major sources in this tradition will acquaint us with the materials Luther and Menno were working with. This brief survey will begin with the earliest formulation of the problem as presented by the apostle Paul (ca. 65), then Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354-430), Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1224-1274), and conclude with Gabriel Biel (ca. 1410-1495), an immediate predecessor of Luther.

2. 2. The Apostle Paul

The history of early Christianity is both complex and fascinating. There emerges, from the documents that are available to us from this period, a picture of a dynamic movement that is spreading westward across the Mediterranean spearheaded by the Apostle Paul. To Jewish people, who formed the matrix of the new faith, Paul and his associates proclaimed Jesus as the Messiah[1] and to the Gentiles, the new Gospel audience, Jesus was proclaimed as Lord.[2]

The composite nature of the early church, of Jew and Gentile, caused considerable tensions within these communities[3], often threatening their very existence and calling forth from Paul letters of strong rebuke.[4] Many of these tensions revolved around the role of the Law, the Jewish Torah, in the life, worship and ethics of the believing communities. These tensions existed not only at the theological level, as Acts 15 makes clear, but also at the social level as the confrontation of Peter and Paul, recorded in Galatians 2 indicates.[5] Because of these tensions Paul was forced to emphasize the doctrine of justification by faith and its attendant exclusion of works as the means of obtaining a right standing before God.[6]

Paul attacks the incorrect belief that salvation is earned by works most forcefully in Galatians and Romans.[7] In the churches in Galatia and Rome certain individuals or groups, with fairly strong connections to Jerusalem, had appeared and had begun to teach that justification came only

as a result of keeping the Jewish law. This group of people, known as Judaizers, argued that it was only through doing "works of the Law" that a right standing before God could be obtained.[8] In this debate circumcision and the observance of both food laws and the Sabbath became points of conflict because the Judaizers argued the importance of these observances in obtaining justification.[9]

The attitude towards the Law of the Judaizers, who are probably to be identified as Jewish Christians[10], was shaped in no small part by their past heritage as Jews. For Judaism, the "great counterpoise" given to sin was the Law. It was the instrument given by God to conquer evil and to lead a moral and godly life. Obedience to the Law was the means by which salvation was earned. The attitude of Judaism toward the Law can be described in the following words:

> The predominant tendency is the doctrine, notinfrequently presented in a highly quantitative sense, of the meritoriousness of the works of the law, which eventually enable man to obtain eternal life. In the multiplicity of the commandments is the means of gaining much merit. Every fulfillment of the law, in the sense of an act in conformity with a concrete prescription of the law, contributes to the treasure of merit, just as, conversely, every concrete transgression brings the sufficiency of merit into jeopardy.[11]

Obedience to the Law was the fundamental means of salvation. It is no wonder that Judaism reacted with such hostility to Paul's attack on the role and value of the Law. To ask a Jew to abandon the Law was to deny the very essence of Judaism and to put his salvation at risk.[12]

Paul's change in attitude towards the Law, for Paul was

himself a Jew, was not the result of a depreciation of the Law as such, its weaknesses or even his own failure to live by the Law.[13] The event which decisively altered Paul's understanding of the Law was manifestation of the righteousness of God in Jesus Christ, particularly in the death and resurrection of Jesus.[14] Paul describes the benefits of Christ's death and resurrection in "forensic categories" of a righteousness which is a "human quality" that can stand before God, a righteousness that is valid in God's judgement. This righteousness is described as being "imputed" to the believer. Because this righteousness is now acceptable to God, the individual is now free of the judgement of God, not only in the future, but also in the present.[15] It is this insight, justification through faith in Christ, that is the constitutive center of Paul's thought.[16]

The means by which this "God-given righteousness" is appropriated is through faith and it is this concept that gives raise to the famous Pauline antithesis of "faith, not works". Rather than attaining salvation through the performance of numerous works which gain merit for one, faith, in contrast, is the ". . . means, instrument, way, foundation, channel by which, along which, or on which man participates in the righteousness of God".[17] Faith is nowhere designated as the ground or cause of justification but its object of attention, namely Christ, is the ground for justification. "Faith here stands over against works as that which is

absolutely dependent and receptive, over against that which is productive, which is able to assert itself".[18] It is this juxtaposition of faith and works, that is, trusting in God's work and word versus trusting one's own efforts and achievements, that characterizes Paul's message.

In light of these convictions, Paul's assessment of the "works of the Law" is very negative.[19] He clearly denies the efficacy of these works for obtaining salvation[20] and upon this conviction launches a highly critical and very polemical attack against the Judaizers who are urging obedience to the Law. The attempt to secure one's salvation through "works of the Law" fails on two related counts. First, it is quantitatively impossible to fulfill the Law for one error leads to judgement.[21] Second, the very attempt to fulfill the Law in such a quantitative sense is misguided because the Law contains requirements that only be fulfilled in a qualitative manner, that is, in love through the power of the Spirit. To attempt their fulfillment in one's own power is fundamentally a qualitative failure.[22]

While Paul is remembered mostly for his negative polemic against the hope of earning salvation through works he can also speak positively of the demand placed upon believers "to fulfill the Law".[23] Paul plainly expected the life of faith to be marked by clearly defined moral behaviour. The relationship between these works and faith has come to be characterized as the relation of the indicative and the imperative[24], a relationship that grows

out of Paul's understanding of the eschatological significance of the Christ event.

In Paul's thought, Christ, through his death and resurrection, has ushered in a new era in which the powers of the Law, sin, evil and death have been defeated.[25] The believer, through participating in the experience of Christ[26], also shares in Christ's defeat of these opposing foes and, while the Law, sin, evil and death have not been removed from life, they no longer exercise any dominion over the believer. Paul's understanding of this relationship must be stated with precision. "Nowhere does Paul say that sin [and we may include the Law, evil and death] has, as such, been abolished. It is not <u>sin</u> but the <u>sinner</u> who has 'died'. . . . To speak of being 'freed' from sin . . . implies that sin still seeks to enslave, even though, being 'dead' to it, one no longer stands under its dominion".[27] In the future these opposing forces in the Christian life will be abolished but, for the time being, they remain and continue to afflict the believer.[28] The gift of the Holy Spirit is the power present to make this new life a reality[29] but the gift of the Spirit is not an automatic guarantee of a sin-free life for the powers of the old age continue their war against righteousness.[30] It is this ongoing struggle that continually puts tension into Christian existence and checks Paul's eschatological thought.

It is in this situation that the relationship of the indicative and imperative emerges in Paul. The indicative

clearly arises from the believer's new situation in and with Christ but the imperative definitely indicates that the believer must deal with the old.[31] The paradox is that both realities exist together and, for Paul, while these two dimensions of the Gospel cannot be identified, they are closely and necessarily related and suggest the relationship that exists between God's gift and human obedience. "God's claim is regarded . . . as a constitutive part of God's gift. The Pauline concept of grace is inclusive of the Pauline concept of obedience.. . . For Paul, obedience is neither preliminary to the new life (as its condition) nor secondary to it (as its result and eventual fulfillment). Obedience is constitutive of the new life".[32]

Paul is confident that this new life which the believer is called to live in Christ will make itself manifest as a life of love. Love is of central significance in the Pauline ethic, so much so that the frequent appearance of faith and love together represent the epitome of Paul's theological and ethical concerns. Paul can summarize Christian exist-ence as "faith working through love", a phrase which suggests that love is the ethical outworking of the right-eousness that comes in faith.[33]

The centrality and "motive force" of love in Paul's thinking is derived neither from Jesus' own teaching nor from his earthly life (although it could be) but from a theology of the cross that sees Christ's death as the supreme expression of God's own love.[34] The Spirit

reinforces this awareness of God's love[35] and it serves as personal motive for Paul in his ministry[36] and, by inference, as a motive for other believers. Love is thus much more than a social virtue or grace; it is the gift and sign of the new eschatological age.[37] Freed from the dominion of sin, the believer's life is characterized by love.[38] Curiously, Paul rarely exhorts or even commands the believer to love God[39] but he does repeatedly and insistently teach and command that love be directed towards other believers.[40] The welfare of others is of primary concern and importance within the community, going so far as to enter into ethical decisions. It is always the community and its welfare that is upper-most, even to the point of self-abnegation.[41]

Paul's assessment of works performed in faith and love is very different from those which attempt to earn salvation. Paul will exhort, encourage and even command believers to perform these acts warning them that they will be judged according to their deeds.[42] Is Paul inconsistent at this point? Is this an "unassimilated remnant" of Judaic thought which Paul was unable to incorporate into his thinking?[43]

On Paul's behalf two points need to be made. First, salvation is by grace and faith. It may be that works condemn but it is only faith that saves.[44] Second, Paul apparently saw no tension between "living by faith" and "fulfilling the law"[45] because grace, rather than precluding

obedience, actually includes obedience for grace is both a gift and an obligation. Good works are thus to be expected for it is the gift that makes service, i.e., obedience, possible.[46]

Paul's attitude seems to be that faith and works are mutually exclusive only when faith and human achievement are considered as the ground of justification. When meritoriousness is not in question, faith and works belong inseparably together. It is precisely in the works performed that the true nature of faith is made evident.[47] Works do not merit salvation but continue to reflect the life of faith.[48]

2. 3. Augustine[49]

Augustine's importance for this study lies in several areas. Not only is Augustine important in his own right but he also stands as a significant interpreter of Paul[50] and, more importantly for our purposes, he was a major influence on Luther.[51] Augustine's doctrine of justification by faith emerged, just as Paul's did, within the context of debate with opponents. This context has several implications for understanding the Augustinian doctrine of justification. First, to understand Augustine we must note who his opponents were at that particular time[52] as well as the concerns and presuppositions that governed his writing on that occasion. Second, Augustine does not systematically present his doctrine of justification which leaves the interpreter with the difficult problem of integrating the various statements made by Augustine.[53] For these reasons, I

shall briefly trace the development of Augustine's thought on grace and justification before looking at the position he adopted in his final writings (419-430).[54]

From his earliest to his latest writings Augustine repeatedly wrestled with the problem of evil. Throughout his life Augustine remained an astute observer of sin[55], never able to deny the power and reality of evil.[56] It was this fascination with evil that led him to join the Manichaeans and, although he eventually left the movement, it represents an early attempt by Augustine to deal with the problem of evil.[57]

The intervening years between leaving the Manichaean movement and the writing of the Confessions (397-400) were years of momentous change for Augustine. They include his encounter with Platonists, notably Plotinus' Enneads,[58] his own conversion in 386, and the influence of Ambrose and last, but certainly not least, the influence of Monica, his mother. Following his conversion Augustine envisioned the the Christian life as akin to the Platonic tradition which called for a life lived in contemplative retirement from the world and dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom. The ideal life was one in which the body was subjected to the mind and carnal desires were controlled.[59]

This was the ideal to which Augustine aspired and which is reflected in his early work On The Free Choice of the Will.[60] The free will is a gift of God[61] which, when used rightly, results in a godly life.[62] Because the will is

free, it can prefer lower goods to higher goods and thus voluntarily turn away from God.[63] Free will is the cause of evil and since its actions are freely performed the individual is held responsible for both praise and blame.[64] True liberty is found in the eternal law which rightly directs human love away from the temporal to the eternal.[65] It is true that habit, ignorance and difficulty do frustrate, to some degree, the liberty of the will[66] but to those who cry out to God for assistance, God responds with grace, strengthening the resolve of the will as it turns toward the divine.[67]

At this same time Augustine continued to wrestle, both intellectually and personally, with the presence, power and persistence of evil. Slowly Augustine began to realize that he was fighting a losing battle on the behalf of free will[68] for even the choice or the impulse to believe comes from God.[69]

In conjunction with this reassessment of human capacity comes a new understanding of human motivation which was centered on the psychology of "delight". Delight is the only source of action because the will cannot be mobilized unless it is "affected" by the object of "delight" but being so affected does not lie within human control but beyond it in God: ". . . that those things that make for successful progress towards God should cause us delight is not acquired by our good intentions, earnestness and the value of our good will- but is dependent on the inspiration granted us by

God".[70]

It is with this attitude that Augustine writes his Confessions(397-400). Augustine delves into his past in search of clues that would help him to understand his own life and, more importantly, to understand God's gracious and mysterious working in his life.[71] It is a work in which Augustine confronts the questions of human motivation and action with searing honesty and poignancy.

In the opening chapter of the Confessions Augustine presents the thesis of this work: "You [God] stimulate him [man] to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they can find peace in you".[72] In the succeeding books and chapters Augustine goes on to detail how he, even though endowed with a natural and inalienable desire for God, was not able to fulfill this desire. In some cases it was result of pursuing other lesser goods while in other cases it was the direct pursuit of evil prompted by pride, ambition and curiosity.[73]

In Book VIII the problem of the will moves to center stage. Augustine described himself as bound by the "chain of habit": "I was held back not by fetters put on me by someone else, but by the iron bondage of my own will". This bondage was the result of repeated acts which became a habit and then a compulsive urge as binding as any chain could be. Despite his desire to turn to God Augustine discovered that the strong force of habit became the law of sin and he was

trapped, desiring to serve God yet unable to do so despite the resolve of his will.[74] What is required is a will that turns completely towards its object and is not plagued by indecision, doubt, and vacillation.

It was in this condition that Augustine heard the voice say to him "Take it and read it".[75] In that moment God called and with a heart now shot through with divine charity[76] and with new "delight" Augustine found from "what profound and secret depth . . . my free will [was] suddenly called forth in a moment so that I could now bow my neck to your easy yoke and my shoulders to your light burden".[77]

Theologically, Augustine is arguing that "though conversion is indeed an act of the human will, <u>whether</u> and <u>when</u> a man turns to God is not entirely at his own disposal; it takes place only when he is called in a way suited to his condition.. . . and this is a matter of divine prearrangement".[78] This explanation is in accord with Augustine's theory of volition. The will cannot be moved unless it is affected by an external object which both delights and attracts it.

With the Donatist controversy (400-420) Augustine was forced to continue his reflections on the operation of grace, particularly its efficacy, and to include charity as vital element in the Christian life.[79] In the course of the controversy with the Donatists Augustine shifted his emphasis from intellectual to religious elitism which gave rise to a stress on the Holy Spirit's gift of charity within

the social context of the church. The sin of pride no longer effected merely the God-person relationship but was manifest in a refusal to associate with the church[80], a refusal which struck at the very heart of Augustine's vision of the nature and function of the church as an international body which transcended the usual social bonds making it reflective of the unity of human race.[81]

Charity becames the criterion by which actions were judged and the true church identified. For Augustine, the principle of unity is the Holy Spirit, the selfsame one who is the bond of unity in the Trinity; and this unity, since it is based on the Holy Spirit, is organic, not institutional, an unity of faith, hope, and love. It is a unity marked by caritas unitatis without which no one can please God.[82] Even the sacraments bring no benefit to the communicant if partaken of apart from the unity of charity[83] for it is on account of the bond of peace that the Spirit is given.[84] The Spirit brings the gift of charity[85] and there can be no "remission of sins where there is no charity".[86]

It is precisely because of this understanding of the interrelationship of the Spirit, charity and unity[87] that makes the dissent of the Donatists not simply a difference of opinion, which the church can accommodate, but a schism which indicated a lack of charity and hatred of fellow believers, the worst of all sins.[88] To act against charity is to deny both Christ and the church.

In the final phase of his development (419-430)

Augustine's reflections on the nature of grace and faith answer the charges of Pelagius and his followers.[69] Several significant changes occur in Augustine's thought as he continues to reflect on the relationship of the human and divine actions in the drama of salvation.[70]

First, Augustine's analysis of human nature takes a marked shift. Formerly Augustine understood God to be the natural orientation of the human will. Now the will's natural desire is for personal beatitude. There are three possible orientations of the human will which are distinguished by the good in which each delights: charity which is a love of the supreme good and justice, pride which seeks a person's own power and good, and cupidity which is a delight in the lower goods. Without charity it is impossible for a person to choose the highest good for its own sake and consequently ". . . no other good is properly loved and no choice is morally good". It is the gift of charity that brings a delight in justice, reversing the sinful preference for lower goods, and provides not only the possibility of choosing the good for its own sake but moves the will to choose and to do the good.[71]

Such a changed assessment of the human capacity to seek the good necessitates a rethinking of the nature of conversion. Gone was the natural desire for God and innate pursuit of the good. Faith emerges here as the humble turning from one's own powers to a reliance on God. The question of whether this movement of faith is of human or

divine origin arises at this point. Augustine answers that it is both. In creation a person is given free choice and the response to the offer of grace emerges from an act of choice dependent on the original gift of nature. In this arrangement Augustine was able to maintain a role for human action and still to give grace the upper hand.[92]

The dangers and instability in such an arrangement were obvious and the Pelagians would quickly exploit such a position to their own advantage. Augustine clarified and strengthened his position in the tract On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin. Greater stress was placed upon the interior working of grace and, in reliance upon John 6, it was pointed out that it was God who called to faith[93] and this calling is effective not only in the process of coming to faith but also in its effective performance.[94] The point was made with greatest force in chapter 15:

> . . .if he does come [to God], it cannot be without assistance; and such assistance, that he knows not only what he ought to do, but also actually does what he thus knows. And thus when God teaches, it is not by the letter of the law, but by the grace of the Spirit.. . . By this mode, therefore, of divine instruction, volition itself, and performance itself, are assisted, and not merely the natural 'capacity' of willing and performing.[95]

Augustine's argument is not intended to exclude human decision, merely its autonomy. Grace not only assists the individual's decision but also prepares for the response and effects the choice itself. Thus grace precedes faith and precludes any claim of merit. In this formulation Augustine is able to establish both the gratuity and efficacy of grace

in conversion.

Yet conversion is not without subsequent effects. The effect of grace is to begin a healing process within the individual[96] which is characterized by the presence of the Spirit ". . . by whom there is formed in his mind [the believer's] a delight in, and a love of, that supreme and unchangeable good which is God, . . . in order that . . . he may conceive an ardent desire to cleave to his Maker".[97] No longer are commandments kept out of the fear of punishment but from a love of righteousness for it they are not kept out of love they are not kept at all.[98] Thus God imparts not only revelations of his truth to the mind but also a changed disposition.[99] This is the gift of charity which delights to do good and in obedience to God.[100] It is the gift of faith, now active in love, both of which are given by God, that makes up the Christian life.[101]

Augustine is adamant that faith must be active in love. It is this faith that saves. Augustine appeals to James 2:17 and argues that faith without works is dead[102] and that only a faith which is active distinguishes a believer's faith from the faith of demons.[103] What makes love so important is that carnal lust rules wherever the love of God does not. However, the believer is possessed by:

> . . . the mightier power of love [which] strives against the power of the flesh; and although there is still in the man's own nature a power that fights against him (for his disease is not completely cured), yet he lives the life of the just by faith, and lives in righteousness so far as he does not yield to evil lust but conquers it by the love of holiness.[104]

The sum of all commandments is love, both the love of God and the love of man. All the particulars of the law are but the specifications of this life of love and these laws are only rightly carried out when they are acted upon in love. Thus love is the norm, content and motive of Christian living.[105]

Any merits which may accrue to the believer as the result of works performed in this life are only to be attributed to the working of God's cooperating grace. God both prepares and perfects that which He initiates. Augustine summarizes the operation of grace in the following manner:

> He operates, therefore, without us, in order that we may will; but when we will, and so will that we may act, he cooperates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect the good works of piety without Him either working that we may will, or coworking when we will.[106]

In the performance of good works human activity is necessary but it is insufficient, subsidiary and dependent on divine resources.

From this position it was only a short step to the development of the doctrines of perseverance in the good and to predestination. Charity may incline one to love and choose the good but it does not guarantee its performance against the opposition of the world and the flesh.[107] The gift of perseverance ensures the willing and performance of that which charity inclines one to do.[108] The grace-gift of perseverance is neither a violation of free will nor an excuse for inactivity but rather a means whereby the freedom

of the will is ensured.[109] Predestination is, in effect, the assurance that the gift of perseverance is given without regard for the merits of good willing and performance based on charity.[110]

The culminative development and thrust of Augustine's theology on faith and good works is to assert the priority, gratuity, and efficacy of grace but not to the exclusion of human involvement in salvation. It was this understanding of faith, faith active in love, merit and predestination that Augustine bequeathed to the Middle Ages and left to them the difficult problems and tensions found within this constellation of thought.[111]

2. 4. Thomas Aquinas

In Aquinas' Summa Theologica the role and importance of grace and faith are plainly evident. The particular manner in which Aquinas has construed the doctrine of salvation (and indeed his entire theology) has often been called "Christian Aristotelianism" and, while this claim is certainly correct, it fails to note the tremendous influence that both Paul and Augustine exercised on Aquinas.[112] Under their influence, combined with his own insight, he formulated a doctrine of salvation that give priority to the activity of grace and stressed the roles of faith and love. Before turning to the doctrine of salvation proper a brief note on Aquinas' understanding of sin will clarify the necessity and importance of grace and faith.

Aquinas offers this basic definition of sin: "A sin is

an inordinate act". It is the ". . . privation of that which something ought naturally to have".[113] This deficiency will manifest itself in misdirecting either reason or the will or both. Corresponding to its two acts, reason fails in one of two ways. It may fail in knowing, through either ignorance or error, of "what it is able and ought to know". Second, reason sins ". . . when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them".[114] The will becomes corrupted or disordered "when it loves more the lesser good". In loving the temporal good more than reason, divine law or divine charity an inordinate will suffers the loss of some spiritual good in order to enjoy some temporal good.[115] This departure from God, who is the end of all order[116], results in disharmony of the soul which is essential to original justice. Aquinas summarizes his understanding of the will as follows:

> Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose functions it is to move all the other parts to the end . . ., so that the will being turned away from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate.. . . Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chief in their turning to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.[117]

The result of sin is that ". . . the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered".[118] Reason fails to direct aright and the will is fastened on incorrect goals.

It is only through the operation of grace that one can escape from this dilemma.[119] Aquinas is emphatic on this

point: "Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace".[120] The utter dependence of the sinner on grace is further reflected in the fact that he or she cannot prepare for grace but must rely upon the "gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly" to be turned toward God in the first place.[121] When God acts by infusing grace a renewal and reorientation of the sinner's inner being is effected.[122] The process of healing is begun[123] and the sinner is now possessed by the Holy Spirit who ". . . is like an interior habit [or disposition] bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it".[124] The Law is now fulfilled ". . . not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regard the mode of acting, i.e., their being done out of charity".[125] In fact, charity is the main characteristic of this new life for now God is loved as the object of beatitude and the lover of God enjoys a spiritual fellowship with him.[126] Aquinas does recognize, however, that in this life healing is not complete for while the mind may be whole the flesh remains subject to corruption[127] thus causing the believer to be ever dependent on grace.

Aquinas, like Augustine, is eager to preserve a role for the human will in this transaction. He does this by noting that God moves everything according to its manner and in the case of humans he must do so according their proper nature which includes free will. Thus, the movement to

justice cannot take place without free will so God infuses justifying grace at the same time he moves the will to accept the gift.[128] The classic example of God so working in an individual is Paul. Paul heard the voice, heeded it, cooperated and received grace immediately.[129] God will not justify without human consent but in the process of justification consent is given by a movement of free will, a movement which itself is the result, not the cause, of grace.[130]

As for faith, it, along with charity and hope, is a theological virtue. Theological virtues are distinct from natural virtues in several ways: first, they are due to a special infusion of grace which is entirely gratuitous; second, the theological virtues cannot be acquired in the same manner as natural virtues; third, theological virtues have no mean because one can never ". . . love God as much as he ought to be loved, nor believe in Him as much as . . . [one] should"[131]; fourth, the theological virtues are distinguished from others by having God as their object; and fifth, not only is grace needed to obtain these virtues but the knowledge of them comes only from revelation.[132]

In this triad of theological virtues it is faith that exercises a cognitive or epistemological role. Aquinas offers as the basic definition of faith "thinking with assent". Such assent is both internal in which certain propositions about God and his actions are affirmed and external in which confession is made.[133] Since the inward

act is the cause of the outer[134] Aquinas concerns himself with the former.

Faith, however, is a peculiar case of "thinking with assent". If the act of assent is to be meritorious it must be voluntary. Assent to propositions is not always subject to voluntary consent. In the case of first principles, once the proposition is understood, assent cannot be withheld.[135] Clearly than faith, if it must be voluntary, is of a different order. The other alternatives are doubt, suspicion and opinion but Aquinas identifies faith with none of these. Faith ". . . cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion, and opinion".[136] Since faith is not the result of intellectual insight it falls to the will to command faith. Infused with grace this is what the will does.[137] Faith can then be defined as ". . . a virtue whose primary act is the assent to propositions at the command of the will"[138] and, since this assent is freely given, it is meritorious.

As for the content of this faith, its formal object is the ". . . First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the church, which proceeds from the First Truth".[139] These truths must be revealed to humanity because they "surpass human knowledge". Since these matters are beyond the human intellect, assent requires a source beyond natural capacities which is what God offers in grace.[140]

The discussion so far leaves the impression that Aquinas understands faith as an intellectual matter but this is clearly not the case. Certainly faith does have a certain priority over hope and love because faith presents to the intellect the last end of which it has no inclination except as it is apprehended by the intellect.[141] Aquinas quickly adds that a faith which involves only the intellectual apprehension of the last end is a "lifeless" faith. For faith to be "living" it must precede from both the intellect and the will.[142] In faith, the intellect apprehends truths about God and the will is directed to the final and ultimate good who is God.[143] "This good [God], the end of faith's act, is the divine good, the proper object of charity. This is why charity is called the form of faith, namely because the act of faith is completed and shaped by charity" (Et idea caritas dicitur forma fidei, inquantum per caritatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur).[144] The point Aquinas wishes to make is this:

> Faith in its proper species and form is determined by its formal objective, God, the first truth; but he addresses the believer not as imparting information to mind alone, but as inviting to salvation . . ..Thus faith calls for love, self-commitment, and it is in this distinctive sense that it has its completion from charity; only in one who loves God does faith reach its fully intended meaning as the beginning of eternal life.[145]

It is important to note that Aquinas does not see faith, hope and love as three competing virtues but rather as three interconnected virtues, each of which relates to God in a unique manner.[146] Faith and hope[147] adhere to God

because of the benefits that accrue to the believer such as the knowledge of the truth and divine assistance for attaining happiness whereas love unites the believer to God for his [God's] own sake. Thus charity attains God himself rather than his benefits and for this reason it may well be called the "most excellent theological virtue".[148] It is for this reason that Aquinas can call charity ". . . a friendship of man for God".[149] This charity ". . . consists in man's loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God".[150]

It is the virtue of charity that gives value to the actions of the believer. Aquinas considers the question of merit in I-II, 114 immediately after his treatment of grace-a very significant juxtaposition of topics. The emphasis that Aquinas put on grace in discussing justification is also found in his discussion of human merit: "grace is the principle of all our good works".[151] Indeed it is impossible for anyone to merit eternal life, which is the end of human life, for two reasons. First, no act is able to exceed its powers and everlasting life is simply ". . . a good exceeding the proportion of created nature". Secondly, and more relevant to the present human condition, sin excludes one from eternal life since it is offensive to God.[152]

Any suggestion of placing God "in debt" by the performance of certain acts is quickly removed by Aquinas' opening argument: a) justice applies between equals, b) God and man are not equals, therefore c) "there can be no justice of

absolute equality between God and man, but only of a certain proportion . . .".[153] It is here that the notions of "congruity" and "condignity" appear. By condignity human acts cannot merit eternal life but by congruity they may be rewarded as acts which are done according to human powers. However, acts performed through the empowerment of the Spirit merit eternal life condignly because it is the Spirit who makes the act worthy.[154] These acts, because they display God's grace are, by equivalence, deemed worthy of eternal life.[155]

While Aquinas does deny that human actions can merit eternal life he does not by this wish to say that human willing has no value or place. It is here that Aquinas speaks of "cooperative grace".[156] Cooperative grace maintains the necessity of human willing but also the priority of grace. For actions to be meritorious they must precede from a free act of the will[157] and, although these actions cannot merit eternal life in and of themselves, it is fitting that God should reward human effort when it does what rightfully lies within its powers. That which lies most rightfully within its power is love and to love has two benefits. First, everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God and charity, and any other virtue informed by charity, directs the believer to God. Secondly, whatever is done in charity is done most willingly and this voluntariness assures one of merit.[158]

By so formulating his doctrines of grace, faith and

merit, Aquinas is able to combine his basic conviction regarding the priority of grace while retaining a proper and legitimate role for human freedom.[159] That these relationships were not without tension is obvious and in the nominalist reworking of these materials these tensions became readily apparent.

2. 5. Gabriel Biel and Nominalism

In the late medieval period of Christian history there arose a number of schools of thought, none of which was able to dominate the theological landscape.[160] In recent years Luther scholarship has devoted considerable attention to the diversity of thought in this era in its attempt to understand the relationship of Luther to his immediate predecessors. The one school of thought that has received considerable attention has been the nominalist school[161] and its leading theologian, Gabriel Biel, "the most influential theologian in Germany on the eve of the Reformation".[162] This school of thought, aside from its influence, is of particular interest to this thesis because Luther was trained in this tradition and it is the one he reacted to most critically[163] although he did acknowledge the benefits he received from this training.[164] Because of Luther's own first-hand acquaintance with Biel and the stature of Biel in the fifteenth century attention will be focused on his theology. One of the first distinctions, and one of the most important ones, that needs to be made in any consideration of Biel's theology concerns the difference

between the absolute and the ordained power of God.[165] The distinction suggests neither capriciousness nor arbitrariness but rather God's freedom. It emphasizes that God has chosen to do certain things according to laws which he has established, that is, according to his ordained power. The absolute power of God indicates that God is capable of anything that does not imply contradiction.[166] "Everything aside from God exists only with a hypothetical necessity: God could also not have wanted it to come into being. In this sense every-thing except God's own essence is contingent".[167] This is not to suggest any degree of instability or the undependable nature of God and the world; on the contrary, it indicates the fundamental trustworthiness of God's ordained arrangement of both the world of natural and revealed knowledge.[168]

The thrust of Biel's argument is to establish, on the one hand, the freedom of God and, on the other hand, the contingency of the created order. On this point Biel's emphasis on God's freedom is boldly stated:

> The divine will itself is the rule of all things that happen. Therefore, it is not because a thing is right or just that God does it, but, because God wills it, it is just and right. He could therefore destroy him who loves him; and if he should do so, he would not do it unjustly, for none can say to him, 'Why do you do thus?'".[169]

Through this radical relativizing of the present order Biel wants to make clear that God's free mercy is the basis for salvation. Precisely within the ordained order God's mercy is displayed: "when he [God] saves someone, does so in a

purely contingent manner, freely, and through his mercy, not for the sake of any form [the habit of grace] or any gift offered, except that God has mercifully ordained, that, having such a gift, he may merit eternal life".[170]

From such a discussion it may appear that Biel suggests that there are two possible orders of salvation, one in which justification is according to God's absolute power and the second according to God's ordained power. There is only one way of salvation as it is outlined in the Scripture[171]. The discussion of God's absolute power is to demonstrate what is logically necessary and what is contingent. The reflections on God's absolute powers are ". . . so to speak, on an altogether different plane from the church's proclamation of justification, since they are not derived from the Bible and lack all connection with the historical way of justification." To speculate on God's absolute power is a formal logical operation but one which has little religious motivation. The discussion of God's absolute power was never intended to cast doubt or to nullify the present order which results from God's ordained power. It was intended as a full discussion, done in a dialectical fashion, of all possibilities open to God and, in the end, would be resolved in harmony with what the church taught.[172]

Once the nature of the distinction between the absolute and ordained powers of God is understood a summary description of Biel's view of justification can be given.

God, in his mercy and liberality, has ordained to enter into an agreement, a pactum, with humanity. In this pact God is prepared to grant greater worth or value to human works than they are intrinsically worth. Thus God has chosen to reward moral goodness (bonitas moralis) according to meritum de congruo, that is, according to his generosity rather than strict justice (meritum de condigno). When an individual does the best that he or she is capable of (facere quod in se est) God responds in grace and justification is merited de congruo. God, having freely and willingly enter into this pact with mankind, is obliged to grant justification to the individual once the conditions of the agreement have been met. It is the terms of the pact that provide the contractual link between the temporal act and its eternal reward and, in the terms of the pact, the failure of God to grant such an eternal reward would be unjust.[173]

An appropriate point at which to begin a fuller discussion of Biel's understanding of justification would be with his doctrine of original sin. In his treatment of original sin Biel puts the emphasis on the role and fault of the intellect in directing actions. Due to the loss of original justice, inextinguishable concupiscence wounds the will so that it is more inclined to evil than good. Even after the sacrament of baptism, the concupiscence remains as an indication of human infirmity. Nevertheless, the will remains basically free because concupiscence constitutes a psychological rather than an ontological handicap for the

will.[174] The will no longer delights in doing the good and is hampered by fear and anxiety but the will has not lost its freedom to do good however great the psychological struggle surrounding it may be.[175]

When this psychological handicap of the will is coupled with Biel's view of synderesis (the innate grasp of moral principles) it becomes possible for Biel to urge everyone to do the best that they are capable of: facere quod in se est. The importance and centrality of this concept for Biel can be seen in the following description:

> By removing the obstacle and by a good movement toward God elicited by the power of the free will, the soul can merit the first grace de congruo. The proof of this is as follows: God accepts the act of a person ho does what is in his power as a basis for the bestowal of the first grace, not because of any obligation in justice, but because of his generosity. Now when the soul removes the obstacle by ceasing from the act of sin, by ceasing to consent to it and by eliciting a good movement toward God as its principle end, it does what is in its power (quod in se est). Therefore, God because of his liberality, accepts this act of removal of the obstacle and of the good movement toward him infuses grace into the soul.[176]

Biel buttresses this position by referring to Zechariah 1:3, James 4:8 and Revelation 3:20.[177] What Biel finds impossible to accept is that God would reject anyone who has recourse to him for to reject those who turn to him would be unjust on God's part: "Therefore it is impossible that God does not receive those who have recourse to him. But the person who does what is in his power has recourse to God. Therefore it is necessary that God should receive him".[178]

What Biel is looking for in such an act is that

whatever hinderance there may to grace, it is removed. The obstacle is any mortal sin. Biel is not asking for the removal of the guilt of a mortal sin that has been committed but that through the individual's own natural powers assent to the sin and to the sinful act is withheld. In fact, as in penance, the individual hates sin and desires not to sin.

Put more positively, facere quod in se est involves "choosing a good attitude toward God".[179] "Biel thus thinks that man can prepare himself for the reception of grace to such an extent that he can turn his will in a new direction, turn away from sin to the will of God".[180] In adopting such a position Biel has clearly taken a position on the question of free will. For Biel, ". . . free will must -in principle- be able to accomplish good just as evil . . . a will capable only of failing seems to him evil by nature".[181]

This morally good act which the will produces is not seen as meritorious of eternal life. Apart from grace, in a natural state, the individual is only able to fulfill the substance of the act (quoad substantiam actus), not the intention of the act as it was given by God (quoad intentionem legislatoris).[182] To perform an act according to the intention of its giver, in this case God, means that the act has as its aim eternal life as a reward, according to the principle: "God, who gives the command, intends by every command that by observing it we merit entrance into life eternal".[183] As a result of this distinction Biel is able to speak of meritorious acts and morally good acts. According

to these definitions Biel concludes that a "man's free will can produce an act that is morally good by virtue of his natural condition and without grace".[184]

The one act that demonstrates the believer's true intention is loving God above all else (super omnia). Biel's argument on this point is based on the supposition that if it is possible for an individual to love a created object above all others (obviously a false love), how much more possible must it be for the will, when rightly directed by reason, to love the supreme good, namely God, above all things?[185]

Biel is aware that this requirement is not easily met but he feels that this natural love of God is within the reach of an individual without the assistance of grace. There is a natural progression as the individual moves from a love of the self to a love of everything that is to his/her advantage to loving God as good for the self and finally to loving God as such since God is good.[186] Again, Biel is convinced that this progression can and may occur without the intervention of divine grace but, at this point, such acts are merely morally good acts. They are not acts worthy of meriting eternal life.

At this point in the argument attention must be given to the concepts of merit, meritum de congruo and meritum de condigno. Biel offers this definition of merit: "For the consideration of merit in an act, two things are required. First, its free choice; second, its acceptation for reward.

A meritorious act is an act freely chosen by the will and accepted for the granting of a reward".[187] In this definition two theological principles emerge. First, eternal life, by divine ordinance, is the reward for meritorious deeds. Second, eternal life can only be granted by grace, hence, the reward of eternal life is not in proportion to deeds done in this life. It is only on the precondition that there is grace, through which nature is accepted, and love, which relates the deed to love for God, that there is a meritorious act. Nature is accepted through divine mercy and when it is adorned with love or created grace as a super-natural gift, meritorious deeds are then produced. At no point does Biel suggest that eternal life is rewarded for mere human striving and effort.[188]

When eternal rewards are granted to certain deeds, grace is always presupposed for without grace no deed is worthy of reward. The gift of grace exists in a twofold manner. First, as uncreated grace which is the presence of the Holy Spirit himself and, second, as created grace which is the habit or quality of infused love which inclines to loving. Only when our works are "graced" by this twofold grace can they merit worthily (de condigno) eternal reward.

> If they [works] are considered as proceeding from the Holy Spirit dwelling in man [uncreated grace], and from cooperating grace [habit] as well as from the will of God which accepts them as worthy, they are worthy of such generous ... reward.... There is also found something in proportion to these in the meritorious act, for the Holy Spirit is there dwelling in man, by grace as it were, as the first cause who corresponds to the ultimate goal, the triune God, who is objective blessedness itself.

> There is grace, which makes man pleasing and is supernaturally infused, as it were, the seed of glory.[189]

If the above is a description of meritum de condigno, that is worthy or full merit, a quite different picture of merit emerges when meritum de congruo, partial merit, is considered. The basic difference between these two forms of merit consists in the basis upon which they are rewarded. If meritum de condigno is based on strict justice, meritum de congruo is based on generosity rather than justice. "A meritum de congruo is an act voluntarily chosen and accepted for a reward, not because it is justly due to the recipient but solely because of the generosity of the one accepting it".[190] In merit of this type there is no proportion between the act and the reward it receives nor need there be for the relationship of the two is based on generosity, not strict justice.[191]

The importance of meritum de congruo emerges in connection with the doctrine of facere quod in se est. Two questions need to be asked here. First, what is the basis for the reward and second, at what point in time is grace infused after the demand of doing what one is able to do has been fulfilled?

The doctrine of meritum de congruo is always linked to and emerges from a consideration of facere quod in se est. The reward of the first grace is based upon the presupposition that something has been accomplished already through the exercise of one's own natural powers. "The

meritum de congruo, which God rewards with the first infusion of grace, consists in the fact that the will, guided by right reason, chooses the right attitude toward God, thereby removing the obstacle to grace and avoiding the act of sin".[192]

As to the moment when grace is infused into the soul on the basis of meritum de congruo Biel is fairly clear. The infusion of grace occurs simultaneously with the act of loving God. "According to God's ordained power, the act of loving God above all things cannot exist in the pilgrim without grace and infused charity".[193] Biel makes this point again by stating that the act of naturally loving God above all else coincides temporally with the infusion of grace: "It is not possible to separate this act [loving God according to one's natural powers] from grace".[194]

Quite in keeping with medieval tradition Biel locates this entire discussion of justification and loving God in the context of the doctrine of penance. In terms of the medieval opinions concerning attrition and contrition[195], it is clear that Biel favors contrition as the only proper means of attaining forgiveness. Biel is concerned that there be a genuine act of contrition, one which arises from an interior disposition.[196] Such an act, in which God is loved above all else, is entirely possible without the aid of grace (ex puris naturalibus). Biel, due to sincere pastoral concern[197], puts no restrictions on the intensity and duration of this act but he will not allow anything less

than a genuine love of God to pass as contrition. If, however, this is a genuine love for God, grace is immediately infused and justification takes place. Infused grace does not create this love of God but is added to it.[198]

The requirement of doing one's best does not cease with the first infusion of grace. It marks the entire life of the believer and thus becomes the basis for merit. Any meritorious act must be freely willed and morally acceptable (bonitas). The requirements of God cannot be fulfilled unless the habit of grace informs this act however good it may be in and of itself.[199] The habit of grace is important not only because it makes an act acceptable to God but also because it is impossible for the human will to remain fully dedicated to God. Habitual grace stabilizes and perfects the will.[200]

From the foregoing description it may appear that the final outcome of the pilgrim's journey could be anticipated with confidence but such is not the case. This uncertainty results from Biel's efforts to treat fairly the twin themes of justice and mercy. According to his absolute power God could have created a system of standards and justice which no creature would be able to meet but in his mercy God ordained an order of justice to which his creatures would be subject. In the ordained world God's mercy and justice are clearly exhibited: his mercy and love is displayed in the Incarnation and self-sacrificing death of Jesus while his

justice is seen in the last judgement. Since God's justice and mercy are both active to suggest that salvation is solely by faith through grace is to scorn God's justice. God has ordained, in his mercy, that grace is merited through doing what one is able to do and to suggest otherwise is to ignore the just ordering of this world.[201]

Granted that God has ordained the present ordering of the world the pilgrim may never be certain of his status within it because how is one to know when the genuine and ultimate act of contrition has been produced. Since all motivations must be regarded with some suspicion, no more than conjectural certainty may be had regarding the pilgrim's status vis-à-vis the state of grace.[202] Even the doctrine of predestination offers no security because in the ordained order God has chosen to base salvation on his fore-knowledge of who will produce works of merit.[203]. What is required is that a balance be struck between mercy and judgement such that ". . . when they are combined in the heart of the sinner a subtly balanced fuducial certainty [is produced] which is at once safeguarded against despair and against presumptuousness".[204] Biel continually refers to the oscillation between fear and love experienced by the believer and he is concerned that the proper balance be established. Even when this equilibrium is established the pilgrim can be fully confident only objectively in that the object of hope, not its satisfaction, is certain. Subjectively, since the pilgrim lacks the gift of a stable

will, no more than conjectural certainty is possible.[205] This type of certainty is marked by a love of Christ, a determination to fulfill the law, and a fear of judgement. The struggle itself then becomes a sign of salvation.[206]

2. 6. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to look briefly at the question of faith and good works as it had been treated by various Christian theologians prior to the time of Luther and Menno. With the exception of Biel, the tradition reflects a considerable degree of unanimity. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and, in his own peculiar manner, Biel all stress the importance of grace. (Biel will be considered separately below.) For Paul, Augustine and Aquinas grace is prevenient and given independently of merit. Faith is stressed as the human response to God but once this relationship is established it is expected that faith will show itself to be an active force through the evidence of good works. Any merits which are earned from these works are attributed to the activity of grace. Love or charity is seen as the good work par excellence. It is here, in this larger tradition, that the main elements of the discussion which will follow concerning Luther and Menno can be identified: nature, grace, faith, justification, Christ, the law, love and good works.

The case of Biel is considerably different. While Biel speaks of many of these same elements, he does so in a manner that definitely places him outside of the larger

tradition. Through his division of God's activities in two powers, the absolute and the ordained, Biel attempted to find a place for grace but his emphasis really falls on "justification by works alone". The outer sphere or structure in which God was free to exercise his power is a "rational outer structure dependent on the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata". That which was preached and taught by the church was the inner structure itself which gave particularly strong emphasis to human initiative and activity. For this reason Biel's doctrine of salvation must be called Pelagian.[207] It can only be considered unfortunate that Luther, in his formative years, was more acquainted with this school of thought than the larger tradition.

Chapter Three

The Metheological Norm of Justification by Grace through Faith

3. 1. Introduction

The rallying cry of the Reformation was "justification by grace through faith". It was Luther who made this slogan famous and who sought to shape his entire theology in accord with it. For Luther the doctrine of justification by faith was not simply another doctrine to be adhered to or even the most important doctrine of the Christian faith but it was, rather, the center around which all other doctrine cohered and, as Luther never tired of repeating, any alternation of this critical point would certainly result in disruption of the whole.[1]

Luther's concern was not, however, to merely give heightened attention and importance to the doctrine of justification by faith. He was profoundly dissatisfied with what he considered to be serious misunderstandings of this doctrine, misunderstandings which were not only theologically unsatisfying but also very destructive to Christian life and practice as Luther's own experience in the monastery testified.[2]

Luther's new understanding of justification by faith also resulted in a different attitude and emphasis toward

"good works". The traditional formula of "faith formed by love" (fides caritate formata) was seen not only as ethically inadequate but as fundamentally misleading because it suggested that love, rather than faith, was the leitmotif of the Gospel and to this Luther was firmly opposed.

This reference to the center of Luther's theology sets the agenda for the following chapters of this work. In this chapter the parameters for this study will be established as we begin to explore the Commentary on Galatians and its relevance to the subject of faith and good works. After an intital examination of the Commentary on Galatians, we will turn to the doctrine of justification itself, noting the "metatheological" function of this doctrine, and its application to the question of the Law and the Gospel. The following chapter will examine in considerable detail Luther's new understanding of faith and the resulting relationship of the believer to Christ. Our study of Luther will conclude with a look at the implications that such a reshaping of the definition of faith has for Christian praxis.

3. 2. The 1535 Commentary on Galatians

Throughout his writings Luther found himself repeatedly dealing with the question of "faith", "good works" and their interrelationship because the correct understanding of these terms constituted, for Luther, the correct understanding of the Gospel. It is specifically in the Commentary on Galatians of 1535[3] where Luther, because of the material

contained in the text, deals extensively with the problem of faith and good works. Furthermore, given the time and occasion for the writing of this commentary, it stands as Luther's most important, if not definitive, treatment of the question of faith and good works. This, in addition to several other reasons which are stated below, indicates that the Commentary on Galatians of 1535 is the logical choice for our study of Luther's views on faith and good works.

Luther's personal affection and high esteem for this Pauline epistle is unmistakable. He lectured on it a number of times and published two commentaries on it.[4] On one occasion Luther spoke of Galatians as ". . . my epistle, to which I am betrothed. It is my Katie von Bora".[5] Several years later (1544) when a Latin edition of Luther's works was being prepared Luther commented that, should they heed his advice, ". . . they would republish only those of my books which have sound doctrine, such as the Commentary on Galatians".[6]

Aside from Luther's rather picturesque description of his attitude towards Galatians, there are other reasons for choosing it. First, it represents Luther at the height of his intellectual powers. Such an attitude toward the "mature" Luther is markedly different from that of many other scholars. Many regard the latter half of Luther's life, beginning after 1525, as the decline of his powers, both politically and personally, the latter due largely to his declining personal health. Luther, once the lonely

reformer, was now swept up in a movement which produced new and powerful leaders and a bewildering array of ideas and a movement which was as often as not profoundly at odds with what Luther considered to be the fundamental insights of his reforming work. Luther became increasingly distressed by the course of events, so much so that some scholars speak of his "Weltpessimismus".[7]

While it is true that Luther did see "the world cracking to pieces"[8] he also remained vigorously involved in the events of Europe through his correspondence and writing.[9] To be sure, his role in the Reformation had changed[10] but he continued to play a vital part in it, particularly in the dialogues and confrontations between the various other reform movements in Europe, notably Zwingli and his followers, and Catholicism.[11]

In terms of theological development there is certainly no need to pit the young Luther against the mature Luther.[12] This is not to suggest that there are not differences between the young and mature Luther but that these differences must not be allowed to obscure the fundamental continuities that pervade Luther's thought.[13] In fact, in many ways the mature Luther presents a much more lucid and coherent theology than the younger Luther.[14] In short, the study of the mature Luther is both valid and necessary.

Second, the Commentary on Galatians of 1535 is written in a genre that is characteristic of Luther. Any quick

glance at the collected works of Luther, in either Latin or English[15], indicates the enormous amount of energy Luther devoted to the exegesis of the biblical text. There is his magnum opus on Genesis[16], the sermons on the Gospel of John[17], the mature exegesis of Galatians[18], the lectures on Isaiah[19], the prefaces to New and Old Testaments and various books of the Bible[20], and, of course, the intense study of Psalms, Romans, Hebrews and Galatians[21] as Luther began his teaching career. Scattered throughout this body of work are numerous occasional writings which take as their theme a biblical text[22] and at the heart of many, if not all, of Luther's polemical exchanges was the proper exegesis of Scripture.[23]

Yet, even when this substantial body of work is taken into account, it still fails to do justice to Luther's attachment to the Scriptures. For Luther, Scripture was not simply the object of his intellectual and theological studies but it also established the norms, categories, and language in which the study of Scripture itself was to be undertaken.[24] Because of this understanding and use of Scripture Luther is best described as a "biblical theologian".[25] In fact, this designation seems to come closest to Luther's own understanding of his calling and mission as a Doctor in Biblia, a title which laid upon him the inescapable task of being a faithful teacher of the Word regardless of the consequences that obligation may bring.[26]

The third reason for choosing the Commentary on Gala-

tians is that, in it, Luther is dealing with the major themes that characterize his understanding of the Christian message and existence: faith, justification, Christ (as to both his person and work), Law, Gospel, imputation, reason, works, promise, the Word, and love. The Commentary on Galatians is rich in those very themes which will be explored in the these chapters.

The disadvantage in turning to this work is that the treatment of materials can be very uneven. Luther treats these topics as they appear in the course of exegeting the text and, even while Luther does not abide by the canons of modern historical-critical methods, often ranging over matters quite unconnected to the text immediately at hand, he makes no effort to synthesize his material.[27] The interpreter of Luther is left with the difficult task of attempting to understand Luther on his own terms and of formulating a broader and more comprehensive schema which brings greater order and clarity to Luther's thought.

Finally, although Luther finds himself battling on many fronts, against the Papists, the Enthusiasts, and the Fanatics, Luther does single out the Anabaptists as one group against which he must contend. Although Luther displays no particular acquaintance with Anabaptist teaching and it is difficult to determine to which particular group of Anabaptists Luther was referring[28], he does, at certain points, explain why he disagreed with the Anabaptists.[29] These comments will be taken into account as the relation-

ship of faith and good works is examined in Luther and Menno.

3. 3. The Occasion for the Galatians Commentary

Although Luther had come to know the doctrine of justification many years before he felt compelled to warn people that "the question of justification is an elusive thing- not in itself . . . but as far as we are concerned.. . .I know how slippery the footing is even for those who are mature and seem to be firmly established in matters of faith . . . this is a very elusive matter because we are so unstable". Luther had to acknowledge that even in times of difficulty he, too, was in danger of losing sight of this truth even though he clearly understood this truth and had taught it to others.[30]

Yet as Luther looked about he saw people not only slipping downhill but tumbling and falling and the cause of their fall-- the "sectarians" and "fanatical spirits", the forces of which do even greater damage than persecution.[31] Their greatest error was their firm insistence on works of righteousness. They called them by "new names" and invented "new works" but, whether they are done by a Turk, a Papist, or a Jew, they remain works, varying "only in appearance and in name".[32] When confronted with their error, they "cannot bear the condemnation of that which it regards as the best" and therefore they attempt to subvert the Gospel.[33] Just as a moth is drawn to the light, so are the fanatics drawn to those locales where the true Gospel is preached and "they

insinuate themselves among such people [Christians].. . . Sneaking into houses under false pretences, they spew out their venom and undermine the faith of the common people".[34] These wicked teachers, who oppose the Gospel, appear and the church becomes the arena of accusation and counter-accusation. "Meanwhile the poor common people are confused. They waver back and forth, wondering and doubting which side to take or whom it is safe to follow. For it is not given to everyone to make Christian judgements about such important issues". Consciences are disturbed, comfort is lost, and the church is disrupted when error is preached.[35]

Luther's list of those who oppose the true preaching of the Gospel is rather lengthy. It includes the Papists, the Sectarians[36], the Fanatics[37], and the Anabaptists but Luther is not inclined to make a distinction between them for "these wolves are joined at the tail, even though they have different heads. They pretend to be fierce enemies publicly; but inwardly they actually believe, teach and defend the same doctrine, in opposition to Christ, the only Savior, who is our only righteousness".[38]

After the lengthy, bitter and inconclusive debates of the 1520's on the Eucharist[39] and the rejection of the Augsburg Confession[40] by Rome, which squelched any hopes of a reconciliation between the two groups, Luther came to fear that the Gospel was truly in danger of being lost.[41] Surrounded by opponents on every side, battling a false church with its false prophets and facing suffering and death,

Luther quickly came to identify himself with Paul as the parallels between himself and Paul became more apparent. Luther would draw on Paul's experience to explain his own and, in other cases, he used his experience to fill out his interpretation of Paul.[42]

But Luther, like Paul, did not consider himself to be waging a war against merely opposing human factions. Behind the Papists, the Enthusiasts, and the Anabaptists_ there stood another mighty and even more dangerous foe-- Satan.

Satan stands as the "implacable enemy of faith"[43] whose intent is not only to cause trouble to believers but to destroy and extinguish the Gospel of Christ completely, a task from which he will rest until it is accomplished.[44] To achieve this goal Satan attacks the "purity of doctrine" and "the integrity of life"[45] with "all his might"[46], going so far as to disguise himself as an "angel of light".[47] Satan does not engage in this task alone for he recruits the sectarians and fanatics to join him in his assault upon the truth.[48] Like their master, they can appear in a brilliant disguise, simulating "love, concord, humility, and the other fruits of the Spirit, . . . they also praise one another, give preference to others over themselves, and say that others are better than they".[49] Their behavior is so virtuous that many are easily led astray by them.[50]

What Satan finds particularly offensive is the teaching of righteousness and justification in Christ[51] and to that end he seeks to "insert into the heart a false opinion, one

that is opposed to Christ"[52] so that he may "snatch Christ away from us and . . . rob us of all comfort".[53] In pursuit of this goal Satan attacks with all his guile and might, continually accusing the conscience and bringing to mind the memory of past sins.[54]

Satan is not unaccompanied in any of these battles. He has with him a host of forces, each very powerful in its own right, who assault true believers, hoping to cause them to waver in their faith in Christ. Luther refers to these forces as "tyrants" and they include the Law, sin, death, the flesh, the world, Satan himself and hell.[55] These tyrants are personified by Luther making the conflict, the "remarkable duel"[56], between Christ and these opposing forces even more vivid. The Law, sin and Satan are singled out by Luther as particularly ruthless oppressors[57] but all of them are "cruel and invincible tyrants"[58] who cannot be defeated by any human power[59] which allows them to "press in upon me and now create trouble for me".[60]

In light of the situation and the changed circumstances of the last decade, Luther felt compelled to address the doctrine of justification by faith again for it appeared to him in danger of being lost under the mounting pressure of the attack of the sectarians and the tyrants and "if this doctrine is lost, it is impossible for us to to be able to resist any errors or sects".[61] Paul's epistle to the Galatians was the natural choice for staging such a defense for its dominant theme is this doctrine. Luther turns to the

exposition of Galatians to confirm this teaching once again for "this doctrine can never be discussed and taught enough"[62] "for it cannot be grasped or held enough or too much".[63]

3. 4. The Doctrine of Justification by Grace Through Faith

3. 4.1. Justification by Faith- The Governing Principle

As indicated above, Luther turns to Galatians to expound the doctrine of justification by faith but before we turn to the content of this doctrine it would be well for us to explore the centrality that Luther attributes to it.

Luther spoke of justification by faith as "the article on which the church stands or falls" (articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae[64]) thereby indicating that this was not simply one doctrine among many. Luther will call it the most important doctrine, saying that in his "heart there rules this one doctrine, namely, faith in Christ. From it, through it, and to it all my theological thought flows and returns, day and night . . ."[65] but his primary concern is to point to the centrality of this doctrine in terms of its function. This doctrine is the locus for all other doctrines and in this one doctrine all others cohere for "in it are included all the other doctrines of our faith".[66] The correct doctrine of justification is also a "touchstone by which we can judge most surely and freely about all doctrines, works, forms of worship, and ceremonies of all men".[67] Given the foundational role this doctrine has, any

misunderstanding and discord on this point cannot be tolerated[68] for even a "tiny error [at this point] overthrows the whole teaching".[69]

Once this doctrine is grasped, it has a most salutary effect. It glorifies God because it recognizes him as the one who grants salvation, thus honoring the First Commandment.[70] Through this doctrine the conscience is freed, comforted, particularly in the hour of death[71], and given certainty.[72]

What Luther wants understood is that the doctrine of justification not only informs the content of other doctrines, which, in the final analysis, do depend on this one doctrine, but that the doctrine of justification also has a much larger role in that it exercises a "controlling function" in the proper and correct formation of other doctrines. In language which is not Luther's but which seems to capture the essence of this idea, justification by faith is not merely a doctrine but a "metalinguisitic stipulation"[73] or a "metatheological norm".[74] What this suggests is that "justification by faith" is not simply another "content item" along with others but it is "rather an attempt to state minimal identifying characteristics of the language activity we call 'gospel'". "Justification by faith" stipulates the "identifying language characteristics of the gospel language activity", characteristics which open to the hearers a justification that "faith apprehends rather than the justification that works apprehend". What such

language will reveal, when interpreted through the story of Christ, is an "unconditional promise of value".[75] These are the characteristics that all theologies of justification by faith must meet. They must foster a faith which clings to God in Christ alone and, the better a theology does this, the better it is.[76] What makes the study of Luther particularly worthwhile is the immense skill with which Luther applies this metatheological norm[77] generating a theology which is intensely Christocentric and oriented to faith as a mode of being.

Having looked at the function and importance of the doctrine of justification by faith we turn now to the application of this principle. We will begin with a brief study of Luther's understanding of the Law and the Gospel.

3. 4.2. The Law and the Gospel

The subject of the Law and the Gospel is a favorite one for Luther and Galatians, with its sustained treatment of the Law, offers Luther ample opportunity to examine this subject.[78] The distinction of the Law and the Gospel is Luther's standard terminology because, by acting as a guide to the heart of the Christian message, it provides theological clarity.[79] In Luther's estimation it is the ability to make this distinction that makes a "real theologian".[80] Once this distinction is made, the true Gospel can be maintained and perpetuated.[81]

In what, then, do the Law and Gospel consist? Luther offers this definition:

> From this it is sufficiently evident what the distinction is between the Law and the Gospel. The Law never brings the Holy Spirit; because it only teaches what we ought to do. But the Gospel does bring the Holy Spirit because it teaches what we ought to receive. Therefore the Law and the Gospel are two altogether contrary doctrines. Accordingly, to put righteousness into the Law is simply to conflict with the Gospel. For the Law is a taskmaster; it demands that we work and that we give. In short, it wants to have something from us. The Gospel, on the contrary, does not demand; it grants freely; it commands us to hold out our hands and to receive what is being offered. Now demanding and granting, receiving and offering, are exact opposites and cannot exist together. For that which is granted, I receive; but that which I grant, I do not receive but offer to someone else. Therefore if the Gospel is a gift and offers a gift, it does not demand anything. On the other hand, the Law does not grant anything; it makes demands on us, and impossible ones at that.[92].

The markedly different character of the Law and the Gospel does not lie in the existential impact that each has upon the individual (as seems to have been the case in the younger Luther)[93] but is rather to be located in the difference between "Moses and Christ, between demand and promise and . . . in the character of the law and gospel themselves".[94]

It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance that this shift in thought has for Luther. Not only does it mark Luther's thought as distinctive but it sets him off against much of medieval thought which stressed the "imitatio Christi" with its stress on Christ as an archetypal and paradigmatic figure rather than as a sacrament.[95] The shift in Luther's thought consists in this:

> the site of the gospel's efficacy is no longer the transaction in my soul, by which, per humilitatem,

> the Word of God works upon me to make me conformable to Christ. Rather, its efficacy lies solely in what Christ has accomplished. In other words, the gospel's efficacy is construed no longer as achieved within me, psychologically, but as achieved outside me historically. The gospel itself, therefore, has no other purpose than to tell me what Christ has done for me [that is, the gospel as a gift and promise].[86]

These comments, while revealing the essential difference between the Law and the Gospel, have led us far beyond the point at which we originally began. It is now time to return to take a more careful look at what each of these terms means for Luther.

The proper and correct place to begin any consideration of the Law is with human sinfulness. Luther begins by warning that sin is "no trifle"[87] but is rather "a very powerful and cruel tyrant, dominating and ruling over the whole world, capturing and enslaving all men. In short, sin is a great and powerful god, capturing and enslaving all men".[88] The deception and havoc that sin wreaks is especially evident in the worship which is offered to God. According to the general revelation of God there is a knowledge possible of the divine which includes his creation of the cosmos, his justice and the punishment of the wicked. What is unknown is God's speical revelation in which God states what he "thinks of us, what He wants to give and to do to deliver us from sin and to save us . . .". Lacking this vital piece of information, unaware of what is pleasing and displeasing to God, human imagination and reason quickly construct a god that it finds pleasing but which is really

idolatrous, vain and wicked.[89]

Ignorant of what God thinks of or intends to do for humanity, a person reasons:

> I shall undertake this form of worship; I shall join this religious order; I shall select this or that work. And so I shall serve God. There is no doubt that God will regard and accept these works and will grant me eternal life for them. For He is merciful and kind, granting every good even to those who are unworthy and ungrateful; much more will He grant me His grace and eternal life for so many great deeds and merits.[90]

It does not much matter whether the works chosen are those prescribed by the Mosaic Law or some traditions of the Gentiles for they are all attempts to gain God's good favor through meritorious actions.[91] To aid in this deceit a number of sophistical arguments have been advanced, particularly by the Papists. They speak of the "merit of condignity" (meritum de condigno) and "merit of congruity" (meritum de congruo)[92] which accompanies certain acts, acts which God cannot ignore, and is thereby obliged to reward.[93] Furthermore, they make a specious distinction in saying that the Law can be fulfilled in two ways. The first is according to the content of the act (Primo secundum substantiam facti) and the second is according to the intention of the one giving the Law (Deinde secundum intentionem praecipientes). This division mitigates the force of God's command by arguing that it lies within one's natural powers to attain to the first but not the second.[94] Lastly, they speak of a distinction between "mortal" and "venial" sin as though such a distinction really existed.[95]

On the basis of this deception, people become convinced that through their own efforts, in cooperation with the Law, they can merit salvation. They fool themselves because they have only a "speculative knowledge" of the Law and sin[96], keeping the Law only outwardly as hypocrites do.[97] Their apparent righteousness is only a "mask" (persona) hiding their real intent of hoping to be justified by works.[98]

What such individuals have failed to realize is that, in principle, no one can be justified by the works of the Law.[99] God has chosen, not works of the Law, but faith, and specifically faith in Christ, as the means by which the human-divine relationship is established. To attempt to establish this relationship on any other footing is to render Christ and his work superfluous, a claim that Luther finds intolerable because it "discard[s] the grace of God and regard[s] the death of Christ as pointless".[100] Furthermore, despite appearances, it is impossible to render unto God perfect obedience "for it is impossible for human nature to fulfill the Law".[101] Luther finds this conclusion confirmed by his observation of human nature, including his own, and by Paul, who in Galatians 3:22 states that "the Scripture consigned all things to sin". According to the principle of contraries "whatever is outside Christ and the promise . . . is consigned to sin".[102]

If the Law was not given for the misguided purpose of attaining salvation, what is its purpose? The proper understanding of the Law involves a knowledge of its "double use"

(duplex usus legis). The first use pertains to civic righteousness. The Law, as used here, restrains evil by checking baser impulses but it never produces righteousness. Rather, it is an indicator of human unrighteousness.[103]

The second use of the Law and the one that is of primary interest at this point concerns the "theological or spiritual" use of the Law. Luther describes this purpose of the Law as its "true function and [its] . . . chief and proper use" which is "to reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, death, hell, judgement, and the well-deserved wrath of God".[104] Thus, the intended purpose of the Law is exactly the opposite of what many thought it to be! Indeed, the Law is intended specifically for those people, who in their presumed righteousness and reliance on good works, are actually unaware of the dangerous situation they are in.

Yet, this "presumption of righteousness is a huge and horrible monster"[105] which is not easily destroyed. Luther, in a number of illustrations, demonstrates the kind of force God needs to use to attack this tenacious monster of self righteousness. God sends the Law as his mighty Hercules "to attack, subdue, and destroy this monster with full force". Its intent is to destroy no other beast, only this one.[106] The Law is also a hammer, a "large and powerful hammer", which is to break the "huge rock and solid wall, namely the presumption of righteousness by which the heart itself is

surrounded".[107] And, just as the fire, the earthquake, and the storm came first to Elijah to terrify him and only after that did the God speak to him, so the Law first terrifies and then God speaks.[108]

Luther's favorite illustration, however, is drawn from the events on Mt. Sinai. At the foot of the mountain the Israelite people were camped and, following the instructions of Moses, they sanctified themselves as they prepared to meet God. Yet when God approached them in the smoke and burning of the mountain, among the black clouds and the lightning in the darkness, the people were terrified and feared that they would die. Their righteousness was unable to shelter them from the terror they felt when God approached because their sense "of impurity, unworthiness, sin, judgement, and the wrath of God was so great they fled from the presence of the Lord . . .". Luther saw the same thing happening to self righteousness people around him who could see no reason to fear God and felt beloved by him but when, they confront the "thunder and lightning [coming] out of the blue, the fire and the hammer that smashes rocks, that is, the Law of God that reveals sin and that shows the wrath and judgement of God, they are driven to despair".[109]

The point of attack for the Law is the "conscience". Luther speaks repeatedly of the effect that this has on the conscience. There is the "troubled conscience"[110], the "suffering conscience"[111], the "terrified and desperate conscience" [112], the "anguish of conscience" [113] and the

"conflict of conscience".[114]

3. 4.3. Luther's View of the Conscience

Luther speaks candidly of his own experiences in the monastery where his own conscience nearly drove him to despair. He observed that many of the monks "tried with great effort and the best of intentions to do everything possible to appease their conscience. They wore hair shirts; they fasted; they prayed; they tormented and wore out their bodies with various exercises so severely that if they had not been made of iron, they would have been crushed". None of these efforts calmed the conscience in the face of the accusations of the Law. In fact, the very attempt to gain freedom from the Law through these efforts resulted only in a deeper enslavement to the Law. The failure of such self-attempted righteousness became most apparent at the hour of death, the time of greatest testing.[115]

Luther found that he was no different than any of his fellow monks.

> When I was a monk, I made a great effort to live according to the requirements of the monastic law. I made a practice of confessing and reciting all my sins, but always with prior contrition; I went to confession frequently, and I performed the assigned penances faithfully. Nevertheless, my conscience could never achieve certainty but was always in doubt and said: "You have done this correctly. You were not contrite enough. You omitted this in your confession". Therefore the longer I tried to heal my uncertain, weak and troubled conscience with human traditions, the more uncertain, weak, and troubled I continually made it. In this way, by observing human traditions I transgressed them even more; and by following the righteousness of the monastic order,

I was never able to reach it.[116]

Throughout the Commentary on Galatians Luther turns repeatedly to an examination of the health of the conscience.[117] The theological importance that Luther places on the conscience is due in large part to the new meaning which he gives to this term.[118] In medieval thought synteresis and conscience were closely connected. Synteresis was the innate power of reason to grasp the first principles of moral reasoning. Conscience became the product or manifestation of the application of these principle in particular cases. Conscience made concrete choices which were subject to the will's consent or refusal.[119]

Luther's innovation to the common understanding of these two concepts was twofold. First, Luther greatly devalued synteresis as soteriologically efficacious, leaving it useful only in directing human society toward civic righteousness. Before God, there is:

> . . . no anthropological structure and resource which can establish a saving relationship with God, and, no residence of grace in the faithful. . .. Not only must the synteresis be illumined and aroused by special (historical) divine activity, but it must be possessed and taken over by God. In itself, the synteresis is as soteriologically de-substantial as the creature. Only faith and hope, which by definition look to the promises of God and not to the resources of human nature, 'substantiate' human life before God and in the face of sin and death.[120]

Second, Luther came to understand the nature of the conscience very differently from preceding theologians. For Luther, with the diminishment of the role of synteresis, the conscience became an autonomous function or faculty of the

soul rather than the product or manifestation of synteresis. Greater importance was given to the emotional dimension of the conscience as opposed to the largely intellectual role traditionally given to conscience. Thus, the conscience became an affective or emotional, as well as cognitive, phenomenon. Since the conscience now included both the rational and affective powers, "its locus in human nature must be deeper or more primary than the distinction between reason and will; it lies at the core or heart of the person and its emotional manifestations, especially, decisively shape the affective context of the entire life of the individual".[121]

As a consequence Luther came to assess the role of the conscience in life quite differently. Formerly, the conscience had been primarily concerned with making moral judgements and, while this dimension of conscience remains important for Luther, it is not always primary. The conscience, rather than simply making judgements about certain actions, now judges the person, the agent of the actions.[122] For this reason it may be better to translate "conscientia", at least as used by Luther, by "consciousness" rather than "conscience" or "Gewissen". In English, conscience indicates a faculty or operation that discerns good and evil and consequently assesses either praise or blame. Conscience, for Luther, includes not only this moral operation but, more importantly, the standing an individual has before God as a person.[123] Conscience, or better, consciousness, is the

"place where man learns who and what God is"[124] and, conversely, it is the point at which God can speak directly and immediately to the individual.[125] Hence, conscience plays a very important part in Luther's theological anthropology[126], a role that seems comparable to the role of the heart in Hebrew anthropology.

It is at this point, having come to understand the nature of "conscience" as the point at which human life is open to the scrutinizing gaze of the divine[127], that we return to a discussion of the Law and explore its relationship to consciousness. It was the conscience that the Law attacked, tormenting it, and finally driving it to despair. This last statement contains two assertions which, although closely related, need to be separated and examined if we are to understand the point which Luther wishes to make here. The first concerns the "existential correlations" of conscience and the second, the nature of the judgement that is pronounced by the conscience.

Luther never looked at the conscience in and of itself but always in relation to the other elements of his theology. The conscience can easily be paired with these elements: law and conscience, death and conscience, Satan and conscience, and lastly, Christ (or the Word) and conscience.[128] It is only in these relationships and, more importantly, <u>because</u> of these relationships that the conscience is able to come to some judgement.

This leads to the second statement and it follows

quite naturally from the previous one. If Luther did make the conscience the bearer of an individual's relationship to God, did Luther credit the conscience with the intrinsic capacity to correctly judge about the self, that is, as God does? If the experience of the self-righteous is any indication the answer would have to be no, for when the judgement is left to the individual's conscience it is greatly mistaken. What is required is an "existential correlation" which is to say that the conscience "needs a foundation which lies outside the self".[129] Such a foundation may be the Law, death, Satan, or Christ and, for Luther, as the foundation is, so is the conscience.

3. 4.4. The Law and Conscience

The Law is just one such foundation which lies outside of the self and furnishes the basis for the conscience's judgement concerning itself. When the conscience is informed by or correlated with the Law, consciousness results in condemnation. The feelings of sorrow and despair that accompany this judgement of condemnation are more than regret and remorse for past wrong doings although this is certainly a part of it. "The judgement of conscience about the person as he stands before God's judgement, [is] . . . not something which the conscience produces from itself, but [is] . . . a divine judgement which is revealed to the conscience in Scripture".[130] Luther's new understanding of the conscience places an individual before God with a new force and directness and, in the immediacy of this

relationship, the conscience experiences God's wrathful condemnation in its fullest intensity. The powerful emotions that accompany the conscience are the result of the realization that the judgement under which one is placed is not merely the self's own disapproval but is the judgement of God himself as manifest in the Law.[131] The conscience, because it is the bearer of individual's relationship to God, is the first to feel the impact of divine judgement and for this reason it is troubled, suffering, terrified, desperate and filled with anguish and conflict[132], so much so that it is frightened even by the rustling of a leaf.[133] In light of these circumstances it is no wonder that Luther recalls some individuals who were driven to despair and suicide after experiencing the condemnation of the Law.[134]

Despite the failure of the Law and works to bring any peace and certainty to the conscience, the Law and the conscience have a natural tendency to cling to each other. Luther attributes this to the assumption, which is so easily made by reason, that if God, in his anger and wrath, can be appeased it would be by works. But there are never enough works to calm the conscience so more are done (a quantitative failure) but even in these sin is continually present so that certainty and peace are never found (a qualitative failure). It becomes a vicious circle in "which the heart trembles and continually finds itself loaded down with wagonloads of sins that increase infinitely, so that it

deviates further and further from righteousness, until it finally acquires the habit of despair"[135] and God becomes a hated enemy.[136]

What, then, is the purpose of the Law? Apparently the Law, even when used rightly, results only in a sense of guilt and, in some cases, despair and a hatred of God. Would it not, perhaps, be better to ignore the Law? Luther, following Paul, in his treatment of Galatians 3:19 attempts to answer this question. For Luther, the issue is really one of defining the "Law with a proper definition and keep[ing] it in its own function and use".[137] Just as each person has his or her "proper station and task"[138] in society and duties in accordance with that position, so the Law has a role and function that it is to perform.

For Luther, the role of the Law is very clear. Negatively, the Law "does not pertain to justification"[139] and to allow it to have any role in justification would be to let "the Law usurp for itself an alien function and use".[140] The Law is indeed <u>intended by God</u> (for God also speaks through the Law as well as the Gospel) "to reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, death, hell, judgement, and the well-deserved wrath of God"[141] after shattering the pride and smugness so characteristic of human life. The Law "illumines the conscience [to] . . . sin, death, judgement, and the hate and wrath of God"[142] and it turns the individual against God, causing him to hate and curse God,

thus increasing and inflaming sin.[143] In short, the "principal purpose of the Law in theology is to make man not better but worse".[144]

Were the condemnation of the Law only to leave humanity in this sorry plight its job would not be done. The wounding and crushing of the Law is for only one purpose, that "grace can have access to us".[145] When the conscience is humbled and oppressed, God can begin to work for it is "the nature of God to exalt the humble, to feed the hungry, to enlighten the blind, to comfort the miserable and the afflicted, to justify sinners, to give life to the dead, and to save those who are desperate and damned". Just as in creation when God made something out of nothing (ex nihilo), which is his "natural and proper work", he now makes something out of the sinful and impure by announcing the the Gospel, grace and Christ.[146]

Although the Law has done its duty, the battle is not always over. The human heart is so foolish, complains Luther, that even when the conscience is terrified it would rather turn back to the Law again, hoping to improve upon its performance by adding more works. What the human heart needs to do is the exact opposite of its natural inclination. It should speak to itself and say "'Now I have been crushed and troubled enough. The time of the Law has caused me enough misery. Now it is time for grace and for listening to Christ, from whose mouth there comes messages of grace'". What is required is that Christ be taken hold of and the

Law be sent away .[147]

The Law has served its purpose and contributed to justification "not because it justifies, but because it impels one to the promise of grace and makes it sweet and desirable". When applied correctly the Law is not only to terrify, crush, and humble but to also "to drive us to Christ". This is what the Holy Spirit intends in his use of the Law for God attends to those who are contrite in heart. So "do not use your contrition wrongly by burdening yourself with even more laws.. . . Listen to Christ . . .. When the Law drives you this way, so that you despair of everything that is your own . . . seek help and solace from Christ". Only when the Law turns one's vision from self to Christ has it served its true function.[148]

3. 4.5. The Relationship of the Law and the Gospel

On the basis of the foregoing description of the the Law and the Gospel one might easily be left with the impression that the relationship between the two is merely one of temporal or historical succession. Luther's understanding of the relationship between them is more complex and dialectical than that of historical succession.

In terms of the historical situation Luther does see the Gospel following the Law. The Law was established with Moses but it was intended to last only until "the Offspring should come to whom the promise had been made". The dominion of the Law was to last to this point but no further, for when the "Offspring" came, it would cease. The Law lasted

until Christ, the promised "Offspring", came and at that time "in a literal way the Law and the whole Mosaic system of worship came to an end".[149]

Even in what Luther calls the "spiritual sense" the Law can rule no longer than in the conscience once Christ has come. When the Law has performed its task of terrifying and humbling a person "it must stop exercising its tyranny, because then it has discharged its function . . . adequately". Having done its job, the Law must withdraw, for once the "Offspring" is present, namely Christ, "let the Law stop disclosing transgressions and terrifying. Let it surrender its realm to another . . .".

In the spiritual sense, however, the Law is not as easily cast aside as it was in the historical realm. The "Law clings very tenaciously to the conscience" because the mind cannot believe that God is merciful and wants to forgive sins. In the midst of this battle, faith must rise up again and grasp Christ.[150]

The above description would imply that the Law and the Gospel are exclusive alternatives. Either one is living under the tyranny of the Law or one is living in the grace of Christ. The Gospel comes only in distinction from and in opposition to the Law. This may be called the "disjunctive" usage of the Law and Gospel which highlights the contrast between them.[151] This disjunctive usage of the terms is a result of the very different character of the Law, which demands and asks, and the Gospel, which is a promise and a

gift.

There is, however, also a "conjunctive"[152] use of the Law and Gospel which implies a relationship that is necessary and important. To put it simply, the Law can only be understood rightly once the Gospel has appeared. Any attempt to understand the Law apart from the Gospel results in confusion. This was noted above in our discussion of the Law. Apart from the Gospel, the Law was seen as only condemnatory, driving one to despair, but when the Gospel came this despair, although painful, had a salutary effect by making one receptive to the Gospel. In short, the Gospel and the Law are directly related because "the proclamation of the law is indispensable and necessary presupposition for the preaching of the Gospel".[153]

The order of this relationship must be clearly be maintained if confusion is to be avoided between the Law and the Gospel. The Gospel is added to the Law, thereby changing the Law's nature, but the Law is not added to the Gospel. This relationship is not reversible and, if an attempt is made to add the Law to the Gospel, the Gospel is lost and only the Law remains.[154]

This apparent subordination of the Law to the Gospel is tempered by two facts. First, the Law is the Word of God and it has a "good, holy, useful, and necessary" function.[155] Second, the Law and the Gospel have a very different character which makes it difficult to compare their nature and function. It must be remembered that the Gospel "is not

a new or even a better and more perfect law, nor is it even a law which is purged of all ceremonial laws and concerned with pure morality.. . . It is a word of radically different nature, the word of faith".[156] It is only when the Law and Gospel are maintained in this relationship that their proper characters are preserved and upheld.

3. 5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to lay the foundations for an intensive study of Luther's doctrine of faith and good works. Before undertaking such a study it is important to note the manner in which the principle ofjustificaiton by grace through operates in Luther's thought because everything he has to say about faith and good works is shaped by this principle. The best manner to describe the manner in which this principle functions is as a "metatheological norm". The distinction that Luther makes between the Law and the Gospel is really a function of this norm and the very ability to make this distinction is a result of the function of this norm. We shall see the two following chapters the manner in which Luther applies his metatheological norm and how he shapes his theology in accord with it.

Chapter Four

Christ- The Form of Faith

Luther's New Definition of Faith

4. 1. Introduction

The discussion of the Law and the Gospel in the previous chapter should not be regarded as merely preparatory to the study of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith. In many ways, the distinction that Luther made between the Law and the Gospel is but a variation on the theme of justification by grace through faith. The fundamentally differing characters of the Law and the Gospel form the basic themes and dialectical structure of Luther's message.[1] Because of this, Luther repeatedly asserts that the ability to make the distinction between the Law and the Gospel is the first and most critical step in the proper understanding of the Biblical message.

What that message means for Luther is captured in his famous phrase "justification by grace through faith". For Luther, this is the Gospel. As such, it forms the dominant message of the Commentary on Galatians and Luther will, on the slightest provocation which the text provides, turn to this theme.[2] Having said this, it is absolutely imperative that we move to explore what this formula means for Luther. It will be the concern of this chapter to investigate as

fully as possible the meaning of this formula and to note how Luther uses it in his Commentary on Galatians.

If the outcome of this investigation may be anticipated for the moment, what we will find is that to speak of "justification by grace through faith" is to speak of Christ. Justification by grace through faith assumes importance precisely because it is "faith in Christ". It is for this reason that Luther takes such delight in Paul for he ". . . has nothing in his mouth but Christ".[3] To speak of justification by grace through faith apart from faith in Christ and Christ himself is a fundamental distortion of Luther's thought for "Christ and faith belong together".[4] Justification by grace through faith is one way to express the reality of Christ, and, conversely, the reality of Christ cannot be spoken of correctly unless he is related to justification. Only when Christ is beheld as Saviour is he truly understood and, apart from justification by grace through faith, it is impossible to grasp Christ as Saviour. To see Christ as the Saviour means that faith does not take a disinterested view of Christ but that its concern is to understand Christ and his work in relationship to the individual (pro me).[5] This is genuine and authentic saving faith.

Having provided a synopsis of the concerns and material in this chapter we will now turn directly to a study of the Commentary on Galatians. Our interest here, in light of the relationship Luther draws between justification and Christ-

ology, will be on the work of Christ and the implications of this for the believer's relationship to Christ. We will begin with a brief look at Christ's saving work.

4. 2. The Work of Christ

The recent discussion of Luther's soteriology has been dominated by Gustaf Aulén's Christus Victor. It is not easy to summarize this important work in a few words but the dominating impulse which seems to have guided Aulén's work has been described by A.G. Herbert in his introduction to Christus Victor as follows:

> Its important and original contribution is its strong delineation of the view of the Atonement which is summed up in such phrases as "Christus Victor", and "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself"- the view that sets the Incarnation in direct connection with the Atonement, and proclaims that it is God Himself who in Christ has delivered mankind from the power of evil.[6]

Aulén describes this view of the atonement as the "classic" view, one which can be found in the church fathers of both the east and the west and which was recovered by Luther. In this view, God, through the person of Jesus Christ, enters into human history and engages the forces of evil in a decisive battle. These evil powers are conceived of on a cosmic scale and they include the devil, law, wrath, death, and sin.[7] In Jesus Christ, God directly confronts these forces which dominate and oppress human life and defeats them thereby releasing mankind from its bondage to these forces. God's motive in this battle is love and the atonement is to be understood as the triumph of God's

love.[69]

Aulén contrasts this "classic" view, held by Luther and the patristics, with the "Latin" view, espoused by Anselm, and the "subjective" view held by Abelard. Aulén finds both of these latter views defective in their understanding of sin but, more importantly, in their view of God. In the classic view, God's love is set over against his wrath which creates a tension within God's own being. This tension is finally resolved in the victory of his love over his wrath. In the Latin view, God's love is present but the boundaries and activities of this love are prescribed by the demands of retributive justice. In the subjective view, there is no tension within God's being because the divine opposition to sin and evil has been eliminated. God is seen as only love. The superiority of the classic view, according to Aulén, lies in the primacy that it gives to love (rather than justice as in the Latin view) as the motivating factor in God's actions and in the radical opposition it maintains to sin and evil (in contrast to the subjective position).

The other important feature of the classic view which Aulén finds persuasive is the importance it attaches to the Incarnation. In the classic view, the Incarnation is of the highest importance because God now becomes the one who is now both Reconciler and Reconciled. It is purely a divine work. In the Latin view, the atonement is carried out by Christ but it is in his capacity as a man that this occurs. Since the classic view understands the atonement to be a

"continuous" act of divine work versus a "discontinuous" work in the Latin view (and also in the subjective view), Aulén finds the classic view superior.[9]

Needless to say, Aulén has not been without his critics. Several critics have raised serious questions concerning Aulén's description of Anselm's view of the atonement and have wondered whether Aulén has understood Anselm's view of the Incarnation and has taken seriously his argument that it is the God-man who makes atonement, not God acting as a man in Jesus. Conversely, this has also raised questions concerning the docetic tendencies of Aulén's Christology which emphasizes the divine element of Christ's action.[10] Other critics have questioned whether Luther's soteriology can be so easily classified as "classic". Siggins, in his study of Luther's Christology, points out that for Luther the ". . . sin bearing (the sacrifice motif) and atonement or payment for sin (the satisfaction motif) go hand in hand".[11] In fact, Siggins continues, "Christ's triumph over the tyrants is an <u>aspect</u> of His sacrifice, its pivotal consequence, [growing] out of the richness of His love and the merciful forgiveness of God".[12] Siggins concludes that "Luther's use of the victory motif, too, is applied with singleness of purpose to the assertion of Christ's all sufficiency-- not to the description of any cosmic dualism".[13]

If Siggins has misgivings about Aulén's "classic" view of Luther's soteriology, Althaus is convinced that Aulén has

entirely misunderstood Luther. Althaus argues that the "satisfaction which God's righteousness demands constitutes the primary and decisive significance of Christ's work and particularly his death. Everything else depends on this satisfaction, including the destruction of the might and authority of the demonic powers".[14] Althaus does admit that Luther employs the classic paradigm to describe Christ's work[15] but Luther combines it with the Latin paradigm in such a way that the Latin paradigm is the decisive one.[16]

The difference that Aulén and Althaus find in Luther's view of the atonement is more than a matter of divergent interpretations. It rests finally upon their varied understanding of the nature of God's wrath. Speaking of God's wrath, Aulén acknowledges that:

> . . . though the Wrath of God is identical with His will, yet it is, according to Luther, a "tyrant", even the most awful and terrible of all the tyrants. It is a tyrant in that it stands opposed to Divine Love. At this point the idea of God's own conflict and victory is brought by Luther to a paradoxical sharpness beyond anything that we have hitherto met; it would seem almost as if the conflict were carried back into the Divine Being itself.[17]

Aulén goes on to acknowledge that God's wrath is transcended (aufgehoben is the Hegelian term Aulén suggests) by his love but that his wrath ". . . remains latent in and behind the Divine Love, and forms the background of the work which the Love fulfills".[18]

Althaus is reluctant to grant this much independence and autonomy to God's wrath (in fact, to any of those forces which have been identified as tyrants).[19] In fact, the

forces or tyrants against which Christ struggles have their power and authority ". . . only through God's wrath and only so long as this is not stilled-- although they at the same same time are, and remain, God's enemies". Since God's wrath is aroused by sin, Luther, as Althaus sees it, places the emphasis upon human guilt rather than the battle with the demonic powers.[20]

Obviously such a long standing debate cannot be easily or quickly resolved. To do so would require a thorough study of all of Luther's writings-- a task far beyond the confines of this study. However, it would be appropriate to comment on this debate in light of Luther's 1531 Commentary on Galatians. When we turn to this work we find that Luther employs both sets of language. On the one hand, he speaks of Christ's mighty and fierce battle against a variety of tyrants which oppress and traumatize human life. On the other hand, he speaks of the "abundant satisfaction and merits" of the death of Christ. In fact, if justice is to be done to Luther's treatment of these paradigms it must be frankly admitted that Luther, in his Commentary on Galatians, freely utilizes both paradigms. In his lengthy comments on Galatians 3:13 Luther uses both metaphors to explain the death of Christ and its significance and he switches between them without the slightest indication of any uneasiness in doing so.[21] He will even go so far as to mix the language and metaphors of the two images. Speaking of Christ, Luther says that he was ". . . joined with us who

were accursed, [and] He became a curse for us; and He concealed His blessing in our sin, death, and curse, which condemned and killed Him. But because He was the Son of God, He could not be held by them. He conquered them and triumphed over them".[22] Thus, the debate over which paradigm is primary or foundational for Luther, the classic with its emphasis on the cosmic battle or the Anselmic with its emphasis on justice and satisfaction, is an inappropriate question to ask, at least as far the Commentary on Galatians is concerned. Luther uses both paradigms to explain the work of Christ and, rather than excluding one another, they supplement and enlighten one another.[23]

In terms of Luther's view of God's wrath, it must be stated that this concept plays a subservant role to the Law in the Commentary on Galatians. This should not surprise us since the conflict described in this book is between "justification by works" versus "justification by grace through faith". The Law is as an ally of those who strive to be justified by works and it is the Law that is pitted against God's grace, mercy and love. Thus, we find ourselves returning to the point made in the previous chapter, that it is the terms Law and Gospel which form the basic antithesis of the Commentary on Galatians, not the polarity of God's love and wrath. With this discussion in mind it is now time to turn to a direct study of Luther's understanding of the work of Christ as he presents it in the Commentary on Galatians.

Any reading of the Commentary on Galatians will reveal, just as Aulén argued, the presence of a cosmic battle between Christ and numerous other forces, "tyrants" as Luther calls them. Included among this list of tyrants are, first and foremost, the Law and then sin, the flesh, the world, death, hell, God's wrath, and Satan.[24] These powers wreak havoc on human life, on both a personal and societal level. They cause fear, terror, despair and a hatred of God.

Luther has vividly personified these forces and has Christ directly engaged in a battle with these powers. By speaking of these powers or tyrants in such a manner Luther has not fallen into an uncritical and naive use and belief in magic (as his sharp attack on the use of astrology indicates) but he is, rather, following the example of Paul who frequently personifies these forces, especially the Law.[25] Whether this language is, finally, to be taken literally or metaphorically, it does allow Luther the opportunity to give expression to the reality, the transcendent power, and the profoundity of sin.[26] The struggle against sin, as Luther explains, is much more than a conflict within a divided human psyche. There is a supramundane aspect to this battle which continually and constantly dooms the human will to failure in its struggle against evil. The tenor of this defeat is registered in the human conscience which is struck by fear and terror as it finds itself shackled by sin and alienated from God.

Throughout the Commentary on Galatians Luther often

identifies the Law as the foremost tyrant which controls human life. In the previous chapter we noted the disjunctive function of the Law and how it was intended by God, not for the betterment of the human race, but to make it aware of its sins.[27] As Luther puts it, ". . . the true function and the chief and proper use of the Law is to reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, death, hell, judgement, and the well-deserved wrath of God". But once the Law has achieved this goal, it does not act as a restraint upon evil and sin but actually serves to increase sin.[28] As the Law makes an individual aware of his or her sinfulness, of God's wrath and death he becomes angry and bitter towards God. It is the Law itself which produces this hatred of God. Hence, through the Law ". . . sin is not only disclosed and recognized, but that through this disclosure sin is increased, inflated, and magnified".[29] Thus the Law becomes a power, or, more accurately, a tyrant which drives people to sin and offers them neither the hope nor the possibility of escape.

Luther personifies a number of other elements, such as death, sin, the devil and wrath, and they are pitted not only against God but also against the individual believer. Luther describes sin as a ". . . very powerful and cruel tyrant, dominating and enslaving all men. In short, sin is a great and powerful god who devours the whole human race".[30] Hell, death, God's wrath, and the Law all take on a character similar to that of sin and become supramundane

forces which trap and bind humans in their sinfulness, rendering them helpless until another power greater than these intervenes on their behalf.

This is precisely what Christ does. He enters the stream of human history on the side of humanity and, on their behalf, engages these tyrants in what Luther calls a "remarkable duel".[31] Christ enters the battle as a third party on the behalf of humanity and he is "thrust into the middle between us and the evils that oppress us".[32] Speaking of the Law in particular as one of the oppressive tyrants, Luther notes, with amazement, that the Law, in its role as an opponent of mankind (what we previously called its disjunctive function) would be so bold at to attack the Son of God and thereby coming into conflict with its very own creator. The Law seized upon its opportunity to attack Christ when it saw that all the sins of the world had been placed upon him and, presuming that it could now rightly condemn Christ, it began ". . . to vex the Son of God with the same tyranny with which it vexed us, the sons of wrath".[33] The Law, presuming it could condemn the sin-laden Son of God, exercised its fullest power against him which caused the terrors, the loneliness and the bloody sweat Christ felt in the Garden of Gethesemane and his cry of misery on the cross.[34]

What the Law (and we may add the other tyrants) failed to realize in attacking Christ was that not only had they wrongly accused an innocent person but they had taken on a

foe much more powerful than they. In it precisely in the person of Christ that these powers ". . . come together and collide with such a powerful impact".[55] The course and nature of this battle will be further examined below but for now it is sufficient to note that it is Christ who emerges from this battle victorious, having defeated the tyrants which so eagerly seek to dominate human life. Luther concludes that "it is Christ's true and proper function to struggle with the Law, sin, death of the entire world, and to struggle in such a way that He undergoes them, but, by undergoing them [unlike us] conquers them and abolishes them in Himself, thus liberating us from the Law and from every evil".[56] Christ's victory is a "victory over the Law, sin, our flesh, the world, the devil, death, hell, and all evils" but Christ does not keep this victory to himself but gives his victory to us (pro nobis) so that even when these now defeated tyrants continue to attack "they cannot drive us into despair or condemn us. For Christ . . . is our righteousness".[57] In fact, the believer can now confidently oppose the Law with a greater "Law" [i.e. Christ], one which liberates and gives life.[58] As several scholars have observed, what Luther does is to insert the believer directly into the history of Christ so that the victory of Christ over the tyrants becomes not only his but also that of every believer. The personal and existential is incorporated into the historical and objective without either being lost.[59]

Yet, to describe Christ's saving work only in terms of a battle between mighty foes does not exhaust the richness of Luther's thought on Christ's work.[40] One way to begin to mine this richness is to look at the variety of titles that Luther uses to describe the work of Christ. He speaks of Christ as "Mediator", "Propitiator", "Comforter", "Saviour", "High Priest", "Pitier", "Justifier", "Reconciler", and "Redeemer".[41] Although Luther does use all the titles found in this list, he does favor certain ones and it is to these that some attention will be given.

Luther favors two terms above all others when he wants to describe Christ's work. These two are "Saviour" and "Mediator" and they are frequently found together[42] in contexts where they seem to exercise a mutual influence on each other. Luther's preference for "Saviour" is based largely on the fact that it is the "true definition of Christ"[43] and, as such, Christ is correctly understood as "Saviour". Christ is to be seen as the "Dispenser of grace , the Saviour, and the Pitier.. . .[as] nothing but sheer, infinite mercy, which gives and is given. Then you will depict Christ correctly". To be able to define Christ correctly is no small accomplishment: in fact, it is "the highest art among Christians to define Christ this way; [but] it is also the most difficult of arts".[44]

The constant temptation, fostered by the "sophists and fanatics", is to depict Christ as a "new lawgiver who, after abrogating the old Law, established a new Law. For them

Christ is a taskmaster and tyrant".[45] Luther, even at this point in his life, is forced to admit that he must struggle against the idea of Christ as a Lawgiver because he was taught this as a youth and it has "penetrated into . . . [his] bones like oil".[46] But to know Christ as a Lawgiver is not to know Christ "purely"[47] and sweetly.[48]

When the exact nature of Christ's accomplishment is spoken of Luther primarily describes Christ as a "Mediator" and secondarily, as "High Priest" and "Propitiator". As a mediator Christ, motivated by "sheer mercy and love"[49], "gives Himself for us and becomes our High Priest, that is, the One who interposes Himself as the Mediator between God and us miserable sinners".[50] In this role Christ acts "to placate God, to intercede and pray for sinners, to offer Himself as a sacrifice for their sins, and to redeem them [sinners]".[51]

Christ's actions as a Mediator are necessary because, as the word implies, someone is needed to mediate a dispute between two parties. Christ becomes the Mediator between sinners, who have offended against the Law, and God who has been offended. The offense is such that "God cannot forgive it or remove it. Therefore there is grave discord between God . . . and us. Nor can God revoke His Law, but He wants it observed. And we who have transgressed the Law of God cannot flee from the sight of God". Christ steps into this breach and restores the relationship.[52]

How does Christ accomplish this? Christ was "put under

the Law to redeem those who were under the Law".[53] In doing this, Christ "sets Himself against the wrath of the Law and abolishes it; in His own body and by Himself He satisifies the Law". To conquer the Law, Christ had first to perfectly fulfill the Law and then to undergo its punishment.[54] This punishment was, however, borne on the behalf of sinners for Christ was, in and of himself, innocent.[55] As a result "in His conflict with the Law He suffered its extreme fierceness and tyranny. By performing and bearing the Law He conquered it in Himself. And then, when He rose from the dead, He condemned the Law, our most hostile enemy and abolished it, so that it can no longer condemn or kill us".[56] In short, Christ stands between sinners and God and restores the relationship by bearing the condemnation of the Law on the behalf of sinners.

Luther also speaks of Christ as the "Propitiator for the sins of the whole world".[57] What Luther wants to draw attention to is the fact that Christ offered himself as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. What Christ offered as a sacrifice was not something he had or owned but himself, a pure and holy offering which was "complete and perfect".[58] As such, this offering provides a "righteousness more abundant than our sin, because the holiness and the righteousness of Christ, our Propitiator, vastly surpasses the sin of the entire world." This forgiveness, offered in Christ, is "so great, so abundant, and so infinite that it easily swallows up every sin".[59] As a consequence of the

offering of himself, Christ has "performed a superabundance of works and merits of congruity and condignity". So efficacious was Christ's self-sacrifice that "He might have made satisfaction for all the sins of the world with only one drop of His blood, but now He has made abundant satisfaction".[60]

As the language of the previous paragraph indicates, Luther's stress on the sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice negated the nominalist doctrine of merits and human effort. Luther explicitly attacks these notions, arguing that any suggestion of "doing what lies within you" (facere quod in te est) or "if a man . . . does what lies within, God infallibly gives him grace" (Si homo . . . facit quod in se est, tunc Deus infallibiliter dat ei gratiam) is rewarded with grace because God, "who is so good and just . . . cannot help granting grace in exchange for something good", is totally incorrect.[61] Any suggestion that natural endowments, such as the will or the intellect, although sound, are able to fulfill the Law as God requires it to be fulfilled are wrong. In things divine, the intellect and will are "depraved" and hostile toward God and any attempt to please him based solely on human abilities and accomplishments will fail.

It is because of the corrupt state of human nature that Christ's work is required. Christ, rather than leave humanity in its miserable state, takes the initiative and acts in love, giving his life to give life to others.[62]

It is for this reason that Luther views with such seriousness any attempt to reach God apart from Christ. First, "God does not want to be known except through Christ" for Christ "alone is the means, the life, and the mirror through which we see God and know His will". God wants to be knows as a gracious and merciful father who delivers people from the Law but, apart from Christ, he is seen as a "wrathful taskmaster and judge".[63] The Law presents only God's demands and rewards the individual on the basis of his or her performance. Since obedience to the Law is impossible, God inevitably appears as one who inflicts a heavy burden upon the individual and a harsh judge of one's many failures.

Second, the attempt to storm heaven by good works is wrong because it denies God and sets one's self in the place of God for the granting of salvation is the exclusive work of "Divine Majesty". It is to "arrogate to oneself a work that belongs to God alone, and to show that one is God" and thus to violate of the First Commandment.[64] The error of all hypocrites and idolaters lies in their claim to do "the works that properly pertain to Deity and belong completely and solely to Christ" and, while they do not actually say "'I am God; I am Christ'", they do so in effect because they "arrogate to themselves the divinity of Christ and His function".[65] As long as they continue to seek to be justified apart from Christ, be it by merit of congruity or any self imposed works such as indulgences, they bypass and

nullify the work of Christ and, in so doing, fail to acknowledge their own sinfulness and Christ's proper and true function.[66]

4. 3. The Historical and Contemporary Christ

4. 3.1. Historical and Saving Faith

On the basis of the foregoing discussion of Christ's work, it may appear that Luther's primary concern was the correct formulation of doctrine. In one sense this impression is entirely correct because Luther repeatedly stressed the need for correct doctrine[67] but, to Luther, this never meant the isolation of doctrine from life. The relationship between doctrine and life is like that of the Law and the Gospel. They have a disjunctive relationship in which doctrine clearly has priority over life and experience but there is also a conjunctive relationship which brings life and doctrine together.[68]

The relationship of doctrine and life can be clearly seen when Luther points out the difference between "historical" and "saving" faith. A historical faith is one that is hears only the facts concerning God and Christ. Luther calls it a:

> counterfeit faith . . . that hears about God, Christ, and all the mysteries of the incarnation and redemption, one that also grasps what it hears and can speak beautifully about it; and yet only a mere opinion and a vain hearing remain, which leave nothing in the heart but a hollow sound about the Gospel, concerning which there is a great deal of chatter. In fact, this is no faith

> at all; for it neither renews or changes the heart. It does not produce a new man, but it leaves him in his former opinion and way of life. This is a very pernicious faith, and it would be better not to have it.[69]

Historical faith is actually a dead faith for it cannot save. If it could save even the devil would be saved for he has a historical faith about Christ.[70]

What Luther wants is not a "historical and temporal" faith that is fully conversant with the facts but a faith that is "personal and spiritual".[71] Historically, Christ came once to abrogate the Law and to offer the sacrifice of himself but he must also come "spiritually every day" to continue and perfect in the believer the work he began at that time.[72] This is not to suggest that Christ's work is incomplete and somewhat ineffectual but it is rather the recognition of the fact:

> According to our feelings, however, sin still clings to the flesh and continually accuses and troubles the conscience. So long as the flesh remains, there remains the Law, the custodian who continually terrifies and distresses the conscience with his demonstrations of sin and his threats of death. But it is always encouraged by the daily coming of Christ. Just as He came once into the world at a specific time to redeem us from the harsh dominion of our custodian, so He comes to us spiritually every day, causing us to grow in faith and in our knowledge of him. Thus the conscience takes hold of Christ more perfectly day by day; and day by day the law of flesh and sin, the fear of death, and whatever other evils the Law brings with it are diminishing.[73]

In other words, what Luther wants is a faith that is alive and effective in renewing and changing life. Christ must come daily in saving faith for the Law continually wages war on the "consciousness", seeking to regain the

ground that it has lost.[74] It is a matter, again, of learning to distinguish the Law and Gospel, a matter which is difficult at best.[75]

Following Paul, Luther's designates what has here been called "saving faith" as "hearing with faith". The entire book of Acts bears testimony to the fact that justification and the Holy Spirit are given only when the Word is received with faith, i.e., apart from the works of the Law. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of Cornelius. He and his friends were sitting passively and listening to Peter preaching when they were given the Holy Spirit. The only conclusion one can come to is that the Holy Spirit was given to them on the basis of their faith.[76]

Since Luther is here concerned with the nature of the response to that which is heard, in this case the Gospel, he also argued that Abraham, along with other Old Testament figures, were also saved by "hearing with faith". It was not necessary for Christ to have appeared historically for him to be spiritually present.[77] As Luther puts it, "Abraham and the other patriarchs were justified by faith in Christ, just as we are- they by faith in the One who was to come, we by faith in the Christ who is present".[78]

4. 3.2.Christ-The Man for Others

At no point in his discussion of historical and saving faith does Luther bring these two aspects of Christ's work together as he does when he speaks about "Christ for us" (pro nobis). Luther so joins the historical and present

Christ that for him "Christ is both the historical and the risen and living Christ. . .. His work transcends the distinction between what has happened and what is happening, between history outside of us and before us and history within us, and thus also between past history and the Spirit who today works and creates faith".[79] Luther's argument is, in fact, that only when these two elements are fully united is genuine faith found. The union of these two elements is expressed by Luther in the phrase "Christ for us". Some of Luther's boldest, most imaginative, and striking language is found in connection with this theme.

Luther is emphatic that true faith is found only where this phrase is rightly understood. It informs us, first of all, of the seriousness of sin and what is to be done with it. The enormity of sin is clearly evident in that Christ, the Son of God, had to offer himself as "satisfaction" and "ransom" to prevail and overcome sin. In light of the "infinite greatness of the price paid" for sin, both the tyranny of sin and the niggardliness of human merit and work to remove it are obvious.[80] Although sin is a "cruel and powerful tyrant over all men throughout the world, . . . [that] cannot be overthrown and expelled by the power of any creatures, whether men or angels", it can be defeated by the "infinite and sovereign power of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was given for it".[81]

Every word of Paul's, when he describes Christ as the one "who gave Himself for our sin"[82], must be considered

carefully, but none more so than the pronoun "our" for the significance of the Scriptures ". . . consists in the proper application of pronouns". The temptation is to avoid approaching God until one is "pure and sinless"[93] for "our weak nature and reason" cannot accept "such a great treasure freely".[94] The human inclination is to present one's deeds to God and wait for him to judge and reward them, all the while failing to realize that Christ was not given "for sham or counterfeit sins, nor yet for small sins, but for great huge sins; not for one or two sins but for all sins; not for sins that have been overcome- for neither man nor angel is able to overcome even the tiniest sin- but for invincible sins".[95]

Precisely because he is convinced that Christ is the all sufficient satisfaction for sin, Luther can boldly encourage sinners to claim their sin but not to be driven to despair in doing so. When you claim your sin, Satan will "attack vigorously and will try to swamp you with piles, floods, and whole oceans of sin, in order to frighten you, draw you away from Christ, and plunge you into despair".[96] What the sinner must to do is counter the attacks of Satan and use his accusations to drive oneself to Christ who is properly defined as "Redeemer" and "Propitiator for the sins of the whole world". Once this definition of Christ is carefully learned and the force of the pronoun "our" is practiced[97], the sinner knows that Christ will "swallow up and absorb all your sins, that is, that you may be certain

that Christ has taken away not only the sins of some men but your sins and those of the whole world. . .. Hold . . . firmly [to] this sweet definition of Christ".[88]

4. 3.3. The Joyous Exchange

When Luther comes to Galatians 3:13 he turns again to the importance of that small pronoun "our" and he explains, at length, this time how Christ comes to bear the sins of the world. What we will find here is merging of Christology and soteriology so that the person and work of Christ become one and the same. The result of this union is the "joyous exchange" between Christ and the believer of sin and righteousness. As we noted in the previous section, Luther is emphatic that "Christ died for our sins". Galatians 3:13 explains how this happened: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse for us". Again, it is the small phrase "for us" (pro nobis) that provides the key to understanding Paul. As Luther sees it, the whole of Paul's argument can be summed up in these two words.

Luther begins by arguing that Christ, in and of himself, (or "privately"[89] as Luther puts it), was "innocent so far as His own Person is concerned".[90] Personally, he was "holy and righteous", the "purest of persons".[91] This being the case, why did Christ die under a curse as he hung upon a tree? It is in answer to this question that Luther explains the meaning of "for us".

Luther argues that, while Christ may personally be innocent and pure, to view Christ as "holy and righteous

only for Himself" is incorrect.[92] This is the error committed by the sophists and many of the church fathers, notably Jerome[93], because they see Christ as an "example to be imitated" thus "making Christ not only useless to us but also a judge and a tyrant who is angry because of our sins and who damns sinners".[94] Even when Christ is properly understood as "God and man", "you do not yet have Christ"[95] if he is segregated "from sins and from sinners".[96]

> You truly have Him only when you believe that this altogether pure and innocent Person has been granted to you by the Father as your High Priest and Redeemer, yes, as your slave. Putting of His innocence and holiness and putting on your sinful person, He bore your sin, death, and curse; He became a sacrifice and a curse for you, in order thus to set you free from the curse of the Law.[97]

This doctrine clearly teaches that when God, who is filled with "indescribable and inestimable mercy and love", saw the plight of humanity under the oppression of the Law, "He sent his Son into the world, [and] heaped all the sins of men upon Him".[98] Christ now "has and bears all the sins of all men in His body- not in the sense that He has committed them but in the sense that He took these sins, committed by us, upon His own body, in order to make satisfaction for them with His own blood".[99] All this Christ did of "His own free will . . . [because] He wanted to be an associate of sinners".[100]

Christ became the closest associate of sinners as possible "when he assumed the flesh and blood of those who were sinners and who were immersed in all sorts of sins".[101]

Luther speaks of Christ as the one who was "wrapped up in our flesh and blood"[102] and as the one who "clothed Himself in our person".[103] With some creative imagination, Luther describes Christ reasoning with himself in the following manner:

> "For my own Person of humanity and divinity I am blessed, and I am in need of nothing whatever. But I shall empty [nullius] Myself; . . . I shall assume your clothing and mask [assumam vestem et larvam vestram]; in this I shall walk about and suffer death". Therefore, when, inside our mask, He was carrying the sin of the whole world, He was captured, He suffered, He was crucified, He died; and for us He became a curse.[104]

The reality of Christ's sin bearing action is so vivid and powerful to Luther that he can say, in what is certainly one of his most shocking statements, that "whatever sin I, you, and all of us have committed or may commit in the future, they are as much Christ's own as if He Himself has committed them".[105] Just like the sinner who, in self-realization, comes to see that he is not only a sinner adjectivally but that, substantively, he is a sinner, knowing himself to "not only a sinner, and an accursed one, but sin and the curse itself", so, too, Christ, although innocent in his own person, bears and sustains all the curses of the Law so that "He was not only accursed; but He became a curse for us".[106]

Although Luther says no more than this about Christ assuming humanity, it is, nevertheless, the crux of his argument. Luther took Gregory of Nazianzus' dictum, "the unassumed is the unredeemed", so seriously that he insisted

that Christ must so identify himself with sinful humanity by taking its person that he, though sinless, took on himself the full consequences of sin and so died in the place of humanity as if here were a sinner.[107] The Incarnation becomes, for Luther, an integral part of the passion and resurrection of Christ so that "one does not appear without the other; they support and elucidate each other. The Incarnation is already the passion, in this sense that Christ became human in order to assume our sinful condition . . ." and, in taking on sinful humanity, to lead humanity from distress to promised victory.[108]

To return to Luther's argument proper, the Law, seeing Christ weighed down by sin, seized the opportunity, accused Christ of sin, found him guilty, and ordered him to bear his punishment. Since Christ was bearing the sins of all humanity, he was considered a violator of all the commandments and "all the curses of the Law were gathered together in him".[109]

It is in the person of Christ, who is both the scion of righteousness and the accursed one, that these two mighty forces, sin and righteousness, "come together and collide with such a powerful impact".[110] A furious battle is waged. This battle is confined not only to Christ's flesh but it also erupts in his consciousness. Sin and evil "overwhelmed him [Christ] once, for a brief time, and flooded in over His head, as in Ps. 88:7 and 16 the prophets laments in Christ's name when he says: 'Thy wrath lies heavy upon Me, and Thou

dost overwhelm me with all Thy waves' and : 'Thy wrath has swept over Me; Thy dread assaults destroy Me'".[111]

In this duel between righteousness and evil, sin wants to conquer and devour righteousness as it has in the past but it has not reckoned with the power of its opponent. Sin cannot conquer because if Christ, who is the grace, mercy, and blessing of God, is defeated, "then God Himself would be conquered" and this is clearly impossible.[112] Furthermore, "it belongs exclusively to the divine power to destroy sin and abolish death, to create righteousness and grant life"[113] for this is what is means to be "God by nature" and, "since Scripture attributes all these [accomplishments] to Christ, therefore He Himself is . . . God by nature and essence".[114] Even death, the greatest weapon of sin, was powerless against Christ since he was a "divine and eternal person". Death simply could not hold him and, after his resurrection, he lives eternally[115] having defeated the power of evil.

Christ, being God in nature and essence, "conquers and destroys these monsters- sin, death, and the curse- without weapons or battle, in His own body and in Himself". These curses have all now been put to death and abolished and, where Christ is known, they are unknown.[116] This victory is both great and certain and any defects that remain "lie not in the fact itself . . . but in our incredulity" in believing such "inestimable blessings". Despite any lingering disbelief, this doctrine, above all others, must

be insisted upon because it is the one Satan feels the power and results of.[117]

Just as the sins of the world are laid upon Christ, Christ, in return, places his righteousness upon believers. Luther calls this a "fortunate exchange" in which Christ "took upon Himself our sinful person and granted us His innocent and victorious person. Clothed and dressed in this we are freed from the curse of the Law".[118] There is a complete exchange of fortunes here for "wherever there is faith in Christ, there sin has been in fact abolished, put to death, and buried".[119]

For this exchange to occur, however, a historical faith is insufficient. The true import of Christ dying "for us" must be realized by seeing that "just as Christ is wrapped up in our flesh and blood, so we must wrap Him and know Him to be wrapped up in our sin".[120] With even more vividness, Luther speaks of immersing one's "conscience in the wounds, the blood, the death, the resurrection, and the victory of Christ".[121] Only as this identification occurs, of Christ bearing sin "for us", can human sin be exchanged for divine righteousness.

This "happy exchange" brings immense consolation to the conscience for it both "delights" and "comforts" the conscience. It teaches that sin has been defeated and guilt removed which relieves the conscience of its persistent attempts at self-justification because Christ is now the bearer of sin, not the individual. For this reason, any

suggestion of "faith formed by love" (fides caritate formata) must be resisted because it argues that works of the Law and charity, not Christ, are the means by which sins are removed. Such a faith attempts to "unwrap Christ and to unclothe Him from our sins, to make Him innocent, to burden and overwhelm ourselves with our own sins, and to behold them, not in Christ but in ourselves. This is to abolish Christ and make Him useless".[122] In other words, it attempts to reverse the "happy exchange" and, while it may result in a godly appearance, the sinner is left in his sin and Christ is made useless.

Luther recognizes that while this "happy exchange" may easily be described, it is much more difficult to make it a living reality. The conscience, burdened by sin and convinced that both God and Christ stand opposed to it, finds it difficult to believe that Christ was given by the Father for its sins. For this reason, the burdened conscience must turn away from itself and look to the Word of God and the Holy Spirit to bring confidence, encouragement and hope. When the conscience turns its attention away from itself to a source outside of itself, as it does in looking to the Word, it knows that "God is present most closely when He seems to be furtherest away".[123] In short, it is the life of faith.

4. 3.4. Conclusion

The theme of the "happy exchange" takes us to the heart of Luther's theology[124] and what is means to be "justified

by grace through faith". The only basis upon which any discussion of justification by faith can precede is Christology and soteriology, two topics which are linked in Luther's thought. Precisely for this reason considerable attention has been given to understanding Christ's person and work as Luther states it. For Luther, justification by faith is and can only be explained in terms of Christology.

Justification for sinners is a possibility only because of Christ and his work. Christ's victory over Satan and the tyrants, notably the Law, freed human life from their dominion and domination. Christ, as the true God-man, acted as the Mediator between God and humans, spanning the chasm between a holy God and sinful humanity. Wrapped in the mantle of sinful human flesh, Christ became the one who bore the wrath of God and the one who placated God by the offering of himself and, because of who he was, making full satisfaction for all the sins of the world.[125] He bore upon and in himself the curse rightly put on all mankind. Thus, Christ can rightly be called Saviour, Redeemer, High Priest, and Propitiator.[126] To speak of "justification by grace through faith" is, then, to speak of "justification by Christ". It is only Christ, on the basis of who he is and what he has done, that can restore the divine-human relationship.

To recognize that "justification is by faith" is, again, to be driven to Christ. Negatively, to realize that it is only faith that justifies is to sound the death knell

to <u>any</u> attempt at self-justification through works, merits, or "faith formed by love".[127] For Luther, this statement cuts two ways. First, it means that the sense of one's own sinfulness and an accusatory conscience were neither a true indicator and measure of the status of one's relationship to God nor was it a reason to despair. Second, it deflated any claim of self-righteousness which presumed to garner for one's self a claim upon God and to be able to relate to God directly.

Faith puts both God and humanity into the correct relationship with one another. "Faith is something omnipotent, and . . . its power is inestimable and infinite; for it attributes glory to God, which is the highest thing that can be attributed to him".[128] It is "faith alone that attributes glory to God" because it considers him as "merciful, truthful, and faithful to His promises". By not regarding God as a judge to be placated by works, faith sees the "majesty and divinity" of God.[129] In a striking phrase Luther describes faith as that which "consummates [<u>consummat</u>[130]] the Deity . . . it is the creator of Deity, not in the substance of God but in us.. . . Therefore faith justifies because it renders to God what is due Him; whoever does this is righteous".[131] It is faith then, that by turning to Christ and away from itself, brings justification.

"<u>Justification by faith</u>" is, for Luther, built upon and consists solely in turning to Christ.

4. 4. Christ- The Subject of Faith

Were our discussion of justification by faith and its relationship to Christology to conclude here it would be woefully inadequate. The description of the relationship of Christ and the believer, even as discussed above in terms of "saving faith" and in the "happy exchange", still fails to do justice to the richness and depth of the relationship Luther envisions between the believer and Christ. The foregoing discussion presents Christ as the "object" of faith but, for Luther, Christ is not only the object of faith, he is present in faith. It is for this reason that Luther stresses "apprehending faith", the faith which "takes hold", "clings", or "adheres" to Christ.[151] It is the intention of this section to explore the nature of this "apprehending faith" and the resultant relationship to Christ.

4. 4.1. Christ and Conscience

The relationship of Christ and conscience is but an extension of what Luther has to say about the "happy exchange". To describe this relationship Luther draws on the metaphorical imagery of marriage in which a new relationship is established between bride and groom. There is a rich history to the use of the "happy exchange" and bridal imagery in both church history and in Luther's own thought (i.e., prior to the Commentary on Galatians).

The ultimate origin of the bridal and marital language which Luther uses can be found in the biblical text itself.

The apostle Paul employed the conceptuality of an exchange as a basic tool in narrating the significance of the death of Christ. Such texts as II Corinthians 5:21, 8:9, Romans 8:3ff, and Galatians 4:4ff employ the motif of exchange as the fundamental image to explain the meaning of Christ's life and death.[132] The bridal imagery is part of Paul's language in Ephesians 5.[133]

This language also appeared in the early church. The theme of exchange was found in the Christmas liturgy of the early church which, as expressed by Athanasius, was "God became human in order that human beings might become divine". Although Luther did not use this formula, he did clearly see an exchange of divine righteousness and human sin happening in Christ.[134]

The motifs of exchange and marriage were foundational to medieval mysticism and had been clearly sketched since the time of Bernard of Clairaux.[135] But for Luther the source by which this imagery and language was meditated to him was much closer at hand. Staupitz, Luther's own confessor and superior, used this language to describe the relationship of Christ and the believer.

Staupitz used marital imagery to explain how Christ and his merits are communicated to the believer. Just as the husband gives himself to the bride in marriage, so Christ, in justification, gives himself to the Christian. This is not an ecstatic experience reserved for a select few but is the experience of all[136] because in the sacrament of baptism

the believer is united with Christ in the fellowship of the church. With Christ come his merits. His person and work are not separable. Negatively, Christ bears the sin of the believer, while positively, the Christian receives Christ through the Spirit and, with Christ, all his gifts and benefits. Only as this relationship becomes an ongoing one does the believer remain united to Christ and enjoy the benefits given by Christ. The relationship must always remain an ongoing one for the benefits of Christ never do become, in any manner, the property of the believer.[137]

Luther's own use of this language appears as early as his Commentary on Romans. In his comments on Romans 2:15 Luther argues that "Christ has died for me. He has made His righteousness my righteousness, and my sin His sin".[138] It is just this orientation to Christ, the incarnate Word, that distinguishes Luther's "mysticism" from others. Before any mystical experience can occur, the heart must be justified, purged and purified through Christ.[139] In his sermon, "Two Kinds of Righteousness" (1518 or 1519), Luther develops the idea of exchange and unity between Christ, the believer, and the church. Faith in Christ means that "Christ's righteousness becomes our righteousness and all that he has becomes ours; rather, he himself becomes ours. . . . he who trusts in Christ exists in Christ; he is one with Christ".[140]

The locus classicus, however, of Luther's discussion of the "happy exchange" and the combination of this idea with

marital imagery is to be found in the 1520 treatise "The Freedom of a Christian". One of the benefits of faith, according to Luther, is that it "unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom . . . [and] Christ and the soul become one". Luther here cites Ephesians 5:31-32 to support his idea. Because the bride and groom are now united, "they have everything in common". Christ, being God and man, is sinless but by the "wedding ring of faith" he takes upon himself the sins of his bride and "makes them his own and acts as if they were his own and as if he himself had sinned". Since death and hell could not swallow up Christ, a "mighty duel" resulted in which Christ defeated sin and death. As the bride of Christ, the soul now enjoys union with Christ and his benefits.[141]

The "Lectures on Isaiah" (1527-1530) also continue the theme of the "happy exchange" although they do not add anything to what has said before.[142] When we turn to the Commentary on Galatians the "happy exchange" and bridal imagery are again brought together by Luther and applied this time to the conscience.

Here, just as we noted above, the conscience is always related to a second element.[143] Previous to Christ, the conscience is linked to the Law, resulting in condemnatory judgements of the conscience, but, with the coming of Christ, both historically and spiritually, this linkage is broken and the conscience is now linked by faith to Christ. The changed relationship of the Law, the believer and Christ

is described in terms of the "happy exchange" and, while there is a genuine exchange of goods or possessions in this transaction[144], in the "happy exchange" a new relationship between Christ and the believer is also effected. The conscience is now "mated" to Christ[145] and it is at this point that Luther turns to the bridal imagery to describe this relationship. Citing Galatians 3:13, Luther goes on to explain the nature of this relationship:

> Therefore, let the godly person learn that the Law and Christ are mutually contradictory and altogether incompatible. When Christ is present, the Law must not rule in any way but must retreat from the conscience and yield the bed to Christ alone, since this is too narrow to hold them both (Isa. 28:20). Let Him rule alone in righteousness, safety, happiness, and life, so that the conscience may happily fall asleep in Christ, without any awareness of Law, sin or death.[146]

Luther is particularly emphatic that this new relationship of the conscience and Christ be kept pure from any contamination, especially from any that may come from the Law. The Law shall not be permitted to rule in the conscience "for that queen and bride must not be polluted by the Law but must be kept pure for Christ, her one and only husband . . .. Therefore let the conscience have its bridal chamber . . . [and] let only Christ lie and reign . . ." therein.[147] The relationship between Christ and his bride is a private one which is not to be violated by any intruders, for "this Bridegroom, Christ, must be alone with His bride in His private chamber, and all the family and household must be shunted away".[148] The relationship of the conscience and Christ is private, highly personal and very intimate.

Luther does not wish, however, to reduce the relationship of Christ and the believer to one that is purely individualistic and immanental only in an individual sense.[149] Luther is sensitive to the corporate aspects of this relationship, calling Christ "the Head and Bridegroom of the Church"[150], but his concern in the Commentary on Galatians is almost exclusively on the individual.

Obviously, Luther's language at this point is metaphorical[151] but, through this metaphorical language, he wants to establish one point very clearly: a real relationship does exist between Christ and the believer and this relationship is not a matter of absorption into the divine (an ontological transformation) but a matter of faith and Christ. For Luther, the presence of Christ was a real one, not just a psychic event or matter of consciousness, but a spiritual reality[152] effected by faith and based solidly upon the historical event of Christ's death and resurrection. In his comments on Galatians 3:28 Luther eloquently and passionately states his understanding of this relationship.

> Thus if I am to gain comfort in a struggle of conscience or in the agony of death, I must take hold of nothing except Christ alone by faith , and I must say: 'I believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who suffered, was crucified, and died for me. In His wounds and death I see my sin; and in His resurrection I see victory over sin, death, and the devil, and my righteousness and my life. I neither hear nor see anything but Him'. This is the true faith of Christ and in Christ , through which we become members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones (Eph. 5:30). Therefore in Him we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28).

> Hence the speculation of the sectarians is in vain when they imagine Christ is present in us "spiritually", that is, speculatively, but is present really in heaven. Christ and faith must be completely joined. We must simply take our place in heaven; and Christ must be, live, and work in us. But He lives and works in us, not speculatively but really, with presence and with power [sed realiter, praesentissime et efficacissime].[153]

This lengthy quotation captures what is at the heart of Luther's understanding of "justification by faith". Salvation rests neither in a recognition of the historical facts concerning Christ nor in a marked change in self-understanding but in a relationship with the crucified and risen one who now reigns in power. It is precisely in this relationship to Christ, a relationship in which Christ is described as "really present" and, adverbially, as working "most presently" and "most efficaciously"[154], that Luther distinguishes his understanding of faith and Christ from that of others. It is neither a historical faith nor merely an existential event--it is the presence of Christ himself in a real relationship.[155] The heart of the Gospel consists precisely in setting Christ forth ". . . in such a way that apart from Him you see nothing at all and that you believe that nothing is nearer and closer to you than He. For He is not sitting idly in heaven but is completely present with us, active and living in us . . .".[156] This understanding of the relationship of the believer and Christ enables Luther to both retain and combine the objective and subjective elements of faith without destroying the character of either which would result in faith becoming either a historical

recital of facts or pious introspection and interiorization.[157]

4. 4.2. Christ the Form of Faith[158]

Luther's understanding of the relationship of Christ to the believer, in which not only are the benefits of Christ communicated to the believer but the presence of Christ himself, has implications for Luther's understanding of faith itself. Much of what Luther has to say in this context occurs in his attack on the scholastic notion of "faith formed by love".[159] Luther faults the scholastic theologians for failing to understand the nature of faith, love and the relationship that exists between them.

Luther did not disagree with his opponents on the need for faith to be "infused", that is, it must be divinely granted.[160] The critical question, for both Luther and his opponents, concerned 1) the nature of this faith and its object and 2) the relationship of this faith to the individual.

4. 4.2.1. The Nature of Faith and Its Object

As for the nature of this "infused faith", Luther's opponents saw it as "unformed". "According to their opinion", at least as Luther understands it, "faith <u>by itself</u> is like a picture or a beautiful thing in the darkness, which is perceived only when light, that is love, reaches it. And so love is the form of faith, and faith is merely the 'matter' of love".[161] Infused faith, in and of

itself, is a ". . . shapeless chaos without the power to be or do anything. . . . some sort of shapeless and unformed quality . . ."[162]". . . without any work, efficacy, or life, a purely passive material".[163] Such a faith in such a condition cannot bring salvation. For this reason faith needs to be supplemented by love.

This love, too, is a supernatural gift, granted by God in response to human love of God.[164] This gift of supernatural love effects faith in such a way that it becomes "formed faith", that is, a "faith informed by love" (fides caritate formata). It is to say, in effect, that "faith does not justify; in fact, it is nothing unless love the worker is added, which forms faith". Love becomes the form of faith since it is love that grants power and movement to faith.[165] It is this love, as opposed to faith, which is called "formal righteousness" because it "informs and adorns and makes it justify us. Thus faith is the body, the shell, or the color; but love is the life, the kernel [nucleus], or the form".[166] In short, it is love, not faith, that justifies.

Against this misreading of Paul Luther has sharp words. Those who read Paul in this manner are "lazy readers" who "superimpose their own ideas on . . . Scripture" when they plainly distort the meaning of the text by failing to observe even the elementary rules of grammar. These so called interpreters of Paul have failed to understand Paul on this critical point. Paul attributes justification to

faith, not love. It is faith that works because it is "effective and active" and this faith works through love. It is this faith and faith alone that justifies.[167] To attribute righteousness to love nullifies and vilifies faith making faith "vain and completely useless" and depriving it of its task with the result that "faith amounts to nothing at all".[168]

When faith is bypassed in this manner Luther is outraged. Faith is both displaced and misunderstood at the expense of love but, more importantly, Christ is lost in this process. If it is the case that "faith does not justify unless it does the works of love . . . [than a] faith that believes in Christ becomes idle and useless, for it is deprived of the power to justify unless it has been 'formed by love'".[169] Such a doctrine:

> . . . calls men away from Christian doctrine, from Christ the Mediator, and from the faith which takes hold of Christ. For if love is the form of faith, then I am immediately obliged to say that love is the most important and the largest part in the Christian religion. And thus I lose Christ, His blood, His wounds, and all His blessings; and I cling to love, and I come to a moral kind of 'doing', just as the pope, a heathen philosopher, and the Turk do.[170]

Here Luther clearly states his objection to the idea of "faith formed by love". It attributes righteousness to love rather than faith and, in so doing, removes Christ from the center of faith and replaces him with moral striving and doing, with works, saying "What have I done? What do I deserve?". More is attributed to love than faith for it is love that God regards and accepts and by which the believer

is reconciled to God and, consequently, makes Christ of no use. It is, in short, to be caught in the Law and works which only brings fear and uncertainty to the conscience.

The true Gospel consists not in works or love (the terms are equivalent) as the ". . . ornament or perfection of faith; but faith itself is a gift of God, a work of God in our hearts, which justifies because it takes hold of Christ as the Savior. . . . faith in its proper function has no other object than Jesus Christ . . . who was put to death for the sins of the world".[171] To divert one's gaze from Christ as the Savior, in whom there is forgiveness of sins, is to turn from the promise (the Gospel) to the Law which terrifies and drives to despair. For faith to be sure it must take hold of Christ and Christ alone. It is only the faith that takes hold of Christ that justifies and it does so before and apart from works of love thus making faith certain.[172]

If faith needs to be formed or needs to adorned, it should be formed and adorned by Christ. In contrast to the scholastics:

> . . . where they speak of love, we speak of faith. And while they say that faith is the mere outline but love it its living colors and completion, we say in opposition that faith takes hold of Christ and that He is the form that adorns and informs faith as color does the wall. Therefore Christian faith is not an idle quality or an empty husk in the heart, which may exist in a state of mortal sin until love comes along to make it alive. But if it is true faith, it is a sure trust [fuducia] and firm acceptance in the heart. It takes hold of Christ in such a way that Christ is the object of faith, or rather not the object but, so to speak,

the One who is present in the faith itself.

Therefore faith justifies because it takes hold of and possesses this treasure. But how He is present- this is beyond our thought.. . . it is Christ who forms and trains faith or who is the form of faith. Therefore the Christ who is grasped and who lives in the heart is true Christian righteousness on account of which God counts us righteous and grants us eternal life.[173]

For Luther, it is the relationship between faith and Christ that forces him to disagree with the traditional formula of "faith formed by love". This insidious phrase negates the primacy and efficacy of faith by replacing Christ with love. The value and power of faith lies precisely in its turning to Christ. Luther agrees with his opponents that faith, in and of itself, is insufficient to bring Christian righteousness. The decisive, and divisive, issue centered on what faith was to be brought into relationship to. Was it with "love" or "Christ"? Luther, in accord with his theology, more particularly his Christology, argues that faith is effective only as turns its attention to Christ. Only as Christ is possessed in faith is true righteousness granted. For Luther, it is "faith living in Christ" or "faith formed by Christ" that has replaced "faith formed by love".[174]

4. 4.2.2. The Relationship of Faith and the Individual

Luther has a further objection to this troublesome phrase, "faith formed by love", because it appears to suggest that ". . . righteousness is a certain quality that is first infused into the soul and then distributed through all the members".[175] When things are considered in this

metaphysical manner[176] love becomes a . . . quality that is attached to the [human] heart . . . [and] they call it 'formal righteousness' . . . [Thus] man is righteous by means of his formal righteousness, which is grace making him pleasing before God, that is, love. Thus they attribute formal righteousness to an attitude and 'form' inherent in the soul, namely, to love . . .".[177]

Again, the problem for Luther is not a lack of recognition of the fact that grace and love are supernatural gifts. The problem occurs in defining what relationship these gifts have to powers, abilities and potentialities of the person as understood in scholastic terms. The scholastics understood grace as a "habitus", a quality of the soul that made grace a supernatural faculty or virtue. Although not self acquired, grace was given a psychological interpretation which focused on its moral operation and realization. The point of contact and transformation now lie within the human soul. On the basis of this endowment it was expected that grace would realize itself in actions (works) with the result that a person is justified to the extent that this grace is realized in works.[178]

For Luther, as a result of his Christocentric theology, such a view of grace is unacceptable. "Christian righteousness is, namely, that righteousness by which Christ lives in us, not the righteousness that is in our own person". For Luther, any talk of habitus and inherent forms suggested that righteousness was the product or property of human

activity. When Christian righteousness is discussed, it becomes necessary to completely reject the person. If any attention is paid to the person, then, ". . . whether intentionally or unintentionally . . . , the person becomes a doer of works who is subject to the Law" and, in terms of justification, once ". . . you divide Christ's Person from your own, you are in the Law . . . which means you are dead in the sight of God and damned by the Law".[179]

The heart of Luther's objection to seeing grace as a "habitus" is in allowing it to be lodged at any point in the soul[180] because Christian righteousness, as Luther never tires of repeating, is found only in relationship to Christ. To sever this relationship by any means, through works, love or "inherent forms", cuts the believer off from Christ, leaving him under the condemnation of the Law.

4. 4.3. The Ex-centric Character of the Christian Life

As a consequence of Luther's understanding of righteousness which is available not only through but in relationship to Christ he altered his understanding of the nature of human existence. Luther saw human life in terms of relationships and the importance of these relationships, notably the relationship to Christ, led him to a different understanding of personhood.

In Luther's thought a person is never "self-defining" or "self-contained". Scholastic theology saw the person as relatively self-assured, self-reliant, and capable.[181] It is true that Luther saw human capabilities in a much paler

light but this, for him, was not the crucial question. For Luther, a person was not defined by what they are in themselves but rather by what they stand in relationship to.

There are only two fundamental but exclusive alternatives to which one can be related. It is either the Law or Christ and, depending on which of these is chosen, a person's life and character are shaped by that center.[182] In his comments on Galatians 2:20 ("Nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ lives in me") Luther describes the relationship between the ego and that to which it relates itself and how that relationship stamps the nature of one's existence:

> That is, "I do not live in my own person, but Christ lives in me". The person does indeed live, but not in itself or for its own person. But who is this "I" of whom he says: "Yet not I"? It is the one that has the Law and it obliged to do works, the one that is a person separate from Christ. This "I" Paul rejects; for "I", as a person distinct from Christ, belongs to death and hell. This is why he says: "Not I, but Christ lives in me". Christ is my "form", which adorns my faith as color or light adorns a wall.[183]

For the Christian Luther envisions a relationship between Christ and the believer that is so close that it is not sufficient to say that "Christ . . . is fixed and cemented to me and abides in me. . . ." but that it is "Christ Himself [who] is the life that I now live. In this way, therefore, Christ and I are one". In this relationship to Christ the "terror of the Law, sadness of mind, sin, hell and death" not only yield but are replaced by "peace, comfort, righteousness, and life".[184] This encounter and new

relationship to Christ so alters life that:

> . . . the essence and power of what one does coram Deo is not in oneself but in another who has appropriated one's person. Righteousness is not a quality inhering in a subject, but is the action of God now become the subject of one's life activity. This appropriation by God is so decisive that Luther frequently reverses the structure of predication: man does not do good, truth and mercy, but God does these in him.[185]

The fact that it is God who is the agent of good, truth, and mercy is, again, a natural extension of Luther's Christocentric theology. According to Luther, any human effort or attempt to achieve a righteousness which is acceptable to God is doomed to failure, for it is done, consciously or unconsciously, through the Law. Hence, the source of righteousness must lie outside of the human sphere of activity and accomplishment which, for Luther, is Christ. If this spatial imagery may be continued, it becomes the case that the person only obtains righteousness as he moves to Christ rather than Christ moving to him. Luther speaks of this movement in a variety of ways:

> And this is the reason why our theology is certain: it snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside ourselves [Quia rapit nos a nobis et ponit nos extra nos], so that we do not depend on our own strength, conscience, experience, person or works but depend on that which is outside ourselves [extra nos], that is, on the promise and truth of God, which cannot deceive.[186]

> . . . righteousness is not in us in a formal sense, as Aristotle maintains, but is outside us in the grace of God and in His imputation [sed extra nos in sola gratia et reputatione divina].. . . To take hold of the Son and to believe in Him with the heart as the gift of God causes God to reckon that faith, however imperfect it may be, as perfect righteousness.[187]

> . . . we must form the habit of leaving ourselves behind as well as the Law and all our works, which forces us to pay attention to ourselves. We must turn our eyes completely . . . to Christ nailed to the cross. With our gaze fastened firmly to Him we must declare with assurance that He is our Righteousness and Life. . . . For the Christ on whom our gaze is fixed, in whom we exist, and who also lives in us, is the Victor and the Lord . . ..[188]
>
> This attachment to Him [Christ] causes me to be liberated from the terror of the Law and of sin, pulled out of my skin and transferred into Christ and his Kingdom. . . . Christ and I must be so closely attached that He lives in me and I in Him. In this way Paul seeks to withdraw us completely from ourselves, from the Law, and from works, and to transplant us into Christ and faith in Christ, so that in the area of justification we look only at grace . . ..[189]

Luther's understanding of Christ as the "form of faith" leads to him to speak of righteousness as that which is found in a realm outside of the believer (extra nos). It was only in turning away from one's self, Luther was convinced, that any surety, confidence and peace of conscience could be found. The point of such language as extra nos was to indicate that the source and resource for righteousness lies not within the believer but in the righteousness of Christ[190] and it is precisley because it lies outside of a person that it is effective. It is precisely this righteousness that lies outside of the believer in the person of Christ (and for this reason Luther calls it "passive righteousness"[191]) that is now manifest in the life of the believer.

When Luther tries to explain how the life of righteousness is now manifest in the life of a believer he speaks of

a "double" or "alien" life that is lived under a "mask". The behaviour and activities of a Christian are not noticeably different from those of a non-Christian but, while appearing similar, there is the greatest possible difference because the life of a Christian proceeds from an entirely different source. The normal outward appearance is a mask that hides the profound differences between the two. The life of a Christian is an "alien life" because it is lived in Christ or, rather, "with Christ living in him [the Christian], he lives an alien life. Christ is speaking, acting and performing all actions in him . . .. There is a double life, my life and an alien life". The old life, the individual's natural life, is dead, having been put to death by Christ for if it were not so, the self would still be enslaved by the Law. The alien life, which is new, is the "life of Christ, which is not inborn . . . but is granted . . . in faith through Christ".[192]

4. 5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored in some detail Luther's famous phrase "justification by grace through faith". Basic to understanding of this phrase is an accurate picture of the work and person of Christ. Luther is profoundly and utterly convinced that only Christ, being both God and man, can be the bearer of righteousness. All human efforts, dominated as they are by false illusions concerning God and undertaken through the Law, are not only insufficient but fundamentally misguided in their attempts to gain any merit

that could stand before the holiness, majesty and divinity of God. Christ, through the "happy exchange", gifts the believer with his righteousness thus establishing a relationship between God and the believer. But in this process, as was noted above, not only are the benefits of Christ communicated to the believer but Christ himself is "most present" in the believer's life, not in the distant heavens, and he works "most effectively". Because Christ is present in or through faith and faith assumes its importance because it brings one into relationship with Christ, "faith" and "Christ" because terms which assume their fullest meaning only in relationship to one another.

The joining of Christ and faith results in a new mode of existence for the believer. Christ and the conscience are now linked in a relationship that is described in mystical terminology. The point of this mystical terminology is to highlight the intimate relationship of Christ and the conscience. It is the presence of Christ in faith that leads Luther to reformulate the traditional formula of "faith formed by love" with "faith living in Christ", a phrase which indicates Luther's understanding of the nature of faith, as opposed to love, and the relationship that this faith has to the person. Faith is not valued because it releases or endows the individual with new (and supernatural) gifts and abilities but because it attaches and adheres itself to Christ. Christ now becomes the source of the believer's actions having appropriated the believer's

being. Righteousness is clearly not a quality found within the believer's own person but the action of Christ through the believer. The believer's true life (or "alien life" as Luther calls it) lies outside of his own being, that is, it is ex-centric to his own personhood. The believer's personal center of existence is based on the actual presence of Christ. At the center of Luther's understanding of "justification by grace through faith" was Galatians 2:20, "It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me", a verse which Luther takes with deadly seriousness and a stark literalness.[193] For Luther, the Christian life is none other than the literal and actual presence of Christ in a believer's life.[194]

Needless to say, such a view of the relationship of Christ and the believer profoundly shaped Luther's understanding of the Christian life, both as to the source and foundation of this life and in the manner in which this life manifested itself. The concern of the following chapter will be to explore the implications of "faith living in Christ" in terms of its effect on human life and activities.

Chapter Five

The Implications of Luther's Doctrine of Justification for "Good Works"

5. 1. Introduction

> Luther's ethics is determined in its entirety, in its starting point and in all its main features, by the heart and center of his theology, namely, justification of the sinner through the grace that is shown in Jesus Christ and received through faith alone. Justification by faith determines Christian ethics because, for the Christian, justification is both the presuppositi-tion and the source of ethical life.[1]

If, as we saw in the previous chapter, "justification by grace through faith" is the center of Luther's theology, it is no less true that his ethics is determined by this same "metatheological" rule.[2] Luther's new understanding of faith and its role in the Christian life (versus the traditional formula of "faith formed by love"[3]) and of the real presence of Christ in the life of the believer also reshaped his understanding of the nature of the ethical life of a believer. In short, what Luther has to say about the ethics, or "good works", is but an extension of the Christological principles of his theology.

It is the intention of this chapter to explore the manner in which this Christological principle shapes Luther's understanding of ethics, both positively and negatively. Luther knew that, despite the importance he

attached to Christ and faith (which accounts for his polemical statements against the traditional importance given to works[4]), it still remained for him to positively and constructively relate "good works" to this new understanding and role which faith had. Just how Luther achieved this in his 1535 Commentary on Galatians will be the concern of this chapter. Luther does have much to say on "works", both "good" and "bad", in the Commentary on Galatians but rather than become involved in the details of these arguments, such as Luther's two kingdom theory, his views on the state or his understanding of marriage, we will try to discover those principles and underlying presuppositions which govern Luther's argument. Before turning to this task it would be profitable for us to note briefly the role to which Luther assigns works.

5. 2. The Role of Works

Throughout the Commentary on Galatians Luther is engaged in a sustained attack on those who would claim that by their efforts, their works, they can stand justified before God. Luther is not opposed to works per se but he is opposed to any understanding of works such as the notion of "faith formed by love" which would displace "faith formed by Christ"[5], from the center of Christian theology and, just as importantly, Christian experience. As long as his opponents were willing to concede that it is faith in Christ which saves Luther affirmed a willingness to be tolerant of them.[6]

Although it may be relatively easy to make a distinc-

tion between works done in the hope of establishing one's own righteousness before God and faith in or by which one passively accepts righteousness from God, there is actually considerable confusion on this point. This confusion is caused by a number of factors. First, human nature has a natural inclination to obey the Law of God, an inclination which is strengthened by the use of the very impressive title, "Law of God". If this Law comes from God, it ought to be kept.[7] Second, this impression created by the Law is confirmed by the natural workings of human reason. In terms of faith and Christian righteousness, reason is to be avoided because it naturally turns to its own understanding of righteousness, which is based on keeping the Law but displaces Christ from the center of faith. Yet in terms of experience "you will find the Gospel a rare guest but the Law a constant guest in your conscience, which is habituated to the Law and the sense of sin; reason, too, supports this sense".[8] Luther concludes that faith is often defeated by reason with the result that conscience is once again enslaved to the Law.[9]

Luther has observed many, including himself, who have attempted to live according to the Law and who have, at least outwardly, lived quite impressive lives. They have excelled in "good works, holiness, and austerity of life".[10] Their notable achievements seemed to confirm the widespread and readily accepted doctrines about "human traditions, works, vows, [and] merits . . . as the surest and best".[11]

Luther finds this situation particularly distressing because this outward devotion and piety only hides a cesspool of sin.[12] The contradiction that exists between the external and the internal conditions of life has been caused by confusion over the Law and Gospel, with the Law being turned into Gospel and the Gospel into Law.[13] This confusion has distorted the "proper function and use"[14] of the both the Law and the Gospel. The Law was given to reveal to mankind its sinfulness, the wrath of God against sin and evil and the futility of any human efforts to attain salvation. The Gospel is the word of promise and salvation. Since the Law and the Gospel are so distinct each, consequently, has its own function. It is the function of the Gospel, and only of the Gospel, to justify. Any addition, such as the "works of the Law" at this point, negates the Gospel, displaces Christ and denies the divinity of God.[15] Even though the "Law is holy, righteous, and good; [and] therefore the works of the Law are holy, righteous, and good.. . . nevertheless, a man is not justified in the sight of God through them".[16] In short, the Law can neither justify nor was it ever intended to.

Although this is the true function of the Law, it nonetheless remains the case that the "Law often produces trust in works".[17] Reason fosters and supports the belief that one can be justified through keeping the Law because it believes that it was for this reason that the Law was given. Having failed to understand the nature and purpose of the Law[18]

those who are engaged in the strict observance of the Law deceive themselves. By their talk of "merit of congruity", "merit of condignity" and "inherent forms" they believe that they can merit grace by their efforts.[19] These apparently righteous people "who refrain from sins outwardly and seem to live blameless and religious lives, cannot avoid a presumption of confidence and righteousness . . .".[20] It is this "presumption of righteousness" or desire to be justified by works that Luther finds not only obnoxious but highly deceptive.

> No one will persuade them that by their self-chosen works and their religion they are only provoking the wrath of God, not placating it. No self-righteous people believe this, but they suppose the very opposite. Therefore, the presumption of righteousness is the dregs of all the evils and the sin of all the sins of the world. For all other sins and vices can be corrected, or at least prohibited by the punishment of the magistrate. But this sin, each man's personal presumption of his own righteousness, peddles itself as the height of religion and sanctity, because it is impossible for the nonspiritual man to judge rightly about this issue. Therefore this disease is the highest and greatest empire of the devil in the whole universe, truly the head of the serpent (Gen. 3:15) and the snare by which the devil captures all men and holds them captive (1 Tim. 3:7). For by nature all men think that the Law justifies.[21]

It is precisely this "presumption of righteousness", found in those who attempt to live a holy life, that Luther is so vehemently opposed to. The apparently religious and observant keeper of the Law is actually the victim of a cruel deception which distorts not only his self-perception but also his standing before God. The Law was never given as a means to obtain salvation but to reveal to humanity the

sad plight it was in and how God viewed its errant ways.[22]

While he can be particularly sharp and critical of those who, by their works, attempt to impress God, Luther can also enthusiastically affirm the need for works. Luther agrees that "good works and love must be taught"[23] and where faith is truly present, good works will naturally flow forth from this faith.[24] The Christian should even ". . . exert himself in good works that are commanded in the Law".[25] True believers are often busily engaged in good works and, while some of them seem quite insignificant and mundane, it nonetheless remains the case that ". . . these works are so outstanding and brilliant that the whole world cannot comprehend their usefulness and worth; indeed, it cannot estimate the value of even one tiny truly good work".[26] Luther will even agree with his opponents that "faith without works is worthless and useless . . .. [it] is a false faith and does not justify".[27] For all of his polemic against good works, Luther, amazingly enough, suggests the presence or absence of works is a reliable indicator of the quality of faith.

What are we to conclude from Luther's statements concerning "good works"? How can he, on the one hand, criticize "good works" as thoroughly detestable and deceptive and, on the other hand, endorse them as reliable indicators of the presence of true faith? Was Luther ambivalent on the nature and role of works in the Christian life? Luther's attitude towards "good works" can, again, only be understood if we return to his Christocentric under-

standing of faith.

5. 3. Christ- Gift or Demand?

One of the most important keys to understanding Luther's view of works is found in his attitude towards Christ. Luther is convinced that much of the confusion and misunderstanding concerning works comes from the failure to properly and correctly define Christ.

Considerably earlier Luther had come to see the sharp difference between viewing Christ as a "sacrament" and as an example".[28] Luther succinctly summarized the difference as follows:

> The sacrament of Christ's Passion is His death and the remission of sins.. . . Therefore he who wants to imitate Christ insofar as He is an example must first believe with a firm faith that Christ suffered and died for him insofar as this was a sacrament. Consequently, those who strive to blot out sins first by means of works and labors of penance err greatly, since they begin with the example, when they should begin with the sacrament.[29]

At this point in his theological development (The Lectures on Hebrews, 1517-1518) the emphasis that Luther placed on Christ as a sacrament was due to his concern to show how Christ's death as pro nobis (for us) was the basis for Christ's work in nobis (in us). At this point in time it was ". . . not a question of excluding imitation but of asserting the essential priority of Christ's 'sacramental' influence.. . . a priority of personalized faith over efforts to model our conduct upon Christ's example".[30]

By the time we reach the 1535 Commentary on Galatians

the situation has changed dramatically. It is no longer the case that Christ can be spoken of as both a sacrament and an example with priority and emphasis given to seeing Christ as the former. The two terms, now gift, (the former sacrament), and demand, (the former example), have polarized and have acquired opposing meanings which have, by and large, fractured the relationship between the two terms.

"Gift" and "demand" are terms that are fundamentally related, respectively, to the Gospel and the Law. The Gospel is a "proclamation about Christ: that He forgives sins, grants peace, justifies and saves sinners".[351] Only when Christ is known in this manner, which gives rise to his various titles such as High Priest, Saviour, Justifier, Comforter, Propitiator, and Mediator, is he properly and correctly defined. The human response to "Christ the gift" is passivity, one of the hallmarks of true faith, through which Christ and his gift of righteousness is received.

When Christ is not understood as a gift, he is incorrectly portrayed as a "law giver", just as Moses was. In fact, the fundamental mistake made when Christ is perceived as dispenser of new laws is to confuse him with Moses. Seen in this light, Christ becomes a judge who must be placated by works.[352] It is the Papists, above all others, who have adopted this view of Christ. They see him as a new lawgiver, as the one who demands works, and as the one who has left an example to be followed.[353]

Such a view of Christ results in a distorted view of

the human divine relationship. Instead of seeing God as consoling and encouraging father he is seen as a "tyrant, an angry judge, or a tormentor".[34] Seen in this light, it becomes impossible for the believer to enjoy a filial relationship with God.[35] Caught before a harsh judge and plagued by an uneasy conscience, the natural response is to turn to one's own resources and strengths in the hope of satisfying the harsh judge by one's efforts. This, however, is the ultimate sin for it violates the First Commandment and denies God altogether by making him unnecessary for the attaining of righteousness. To save one's self is to attempt to perform a work that properly and ultimately belongs to God.[36]

In light of the confusion that can so quickly and easily occur between the Gospel and the Law, as has been the case with the Papists, it is absolutely necessary that Christ and his function be properly and correctly defined. Luther achieves this goal by contrasting as sharply as possible the difference between Christ as a gift and as a demand. In developing this contrast Luther uses Moses as a foil against which he contrasts his understanding of Christ as a gift.

At the heart of Luther's definition of Christ as a gift is his understanding that the death of Christ was pro nobis. Christ must be seen as the one who died for the sins of the whole world and it is this fact that shapes Luther's definition of Christ: "Christ is, in the strictest of terms,

not a Moses, a tormentor, or an executioner but the Mediator for sins and the Donor of grace, who gave Himself, not for our merits, holiness, glory, and holy life but for our sins".[57] When this definition of Christ is misunderstood or abandoned Christ becomes another "teacher of the Law, who teaches the same thing that Moses did.. . . [and] a cruel tyrant, who, like Moses, demands the impossible which no man can produce.. . . [and the New Testament] a book containing new laws about works". The Gospel, which is the proclamation of Christ, in contrast to the Law, has an intrinsically different character. It is about Christ who "forgives sins, grants peace, justifies, and saves sinners".[58]

So convinced is Luther of the intrinsic difference between the Law and the Gospel, between Moses and Christ, that, if required to, he would pit Christ against the biblical text itself. In this hypothetical case Luther argues that if it were possible to produce from the Scriptures themselves "six hundred [passages] in support of the righteousness of works and against the righteousness of faith, and if you were to scream that Scripture contradicts itself" he would respond by pitting Christ, "the Author and Lord of the Scripture", against these texts.[59] So persuaded is Luther that Christ is not in any way to be entangled with the Law that, if it were required, he would turn away from the Scriptures themselves in favor of Christ if there were any contradiction! The point Luther wishes to make is now clear-- when Christ is properly and correctly defined he can

only be understood as both a gift himself[40] and the giver of grace, both of which are received by faith, i.e., passively.

This conclusion, and the force with which it is drawn, creates another problem for Luther. While Christ may not be another Moses, it is also clear that the Gospel (by which Luther here means the Synoptic Gospels) contains specific texts in which Christ teaches and interprets the Law.[41] How can Luther reconcile these texts with his firm insistence on Christ's role as a "gift"?

Luther's answer is quite simple. Those texts in which Christ teaches or interprets the Law need to be separated from those texts which speak of Christ as Justifier and Saviour. Furthermore, it must be clearly understood that "teaching the Law is <u>not the proper function of Christ</u> on account of which He came into the world; it is an accidental function, just as when He healed the sick, raised the dead, helped the poor, and comforted the afflicted". Luther goes on to argue that Christ is only comprehended rightly when his unique and peculiar work is seen, namely in engaging and overcoming the tyranny of the Law over humanity. The fact that there were other prophets and teachers of the Law indicates that while "teaching the Law and performing miracles are special benefits of Christ, [they] . . . were not the chief reason for His coming".[42] As a result of this distinction Luther can conclude that "although there are commandments in the [Synoptic] Gospel, they are not the Gospel [of justification by grace through faith]; they are

expositions of the Law and appendices to the Gospel".[43]

Having relegated Christ's words on the Law to a subordinate position it is but a short step to declaring them contraries, a step which Luther takes. Luther does not deny that Christ did present himself as an example to imitated[44] but this role must be held in sharp contrast to Christ's role as Justifier. As Luther puts it, the "Christ who blesses and redeems is vastly different from Christ the example".[45] Only when the antithesis between Christ as a "gift" and Christ as a "demand" is clearly grasped, the latter being clearly subordinated and distanced from the former, is Christ properly and correctly defined.

Having clearly defined Christ's two contrary roles, it now becomes necessary for us to look at the implications of these two roles in Luther's understanding of the "good works".

5. 4. Christ and the "Imputation" of Sin

If Luther defined Christ as the "Donor of grace", which is but one of many similar phrases that Luther uses to define Christ, what relationship does this gift bear to the individual? In what manner is this gift communicated to the believer and what is the the resultant nature of that relationship between the gift and the recipient? Both of these questions can be answered by an examination of Luther's statements on imputation.

In the previous chapter the basic themes of human sinfulness, Christology and soteriology were outlined and it is

these themes which form the context for a discussion of the doctrine of imputation. The basic question which dominates all of Luther's theology is his concern to find a gracious God who will accept him. Luther fears condemnation because of his inherently sinful nature and actions. The discovery that Luther made, one which reshaped his own life and that of his time, was that in Christ both the judgement and graciousness of God have been made manifest and that, through faith in Christ, it is possible to enjoy a filial relationship with God. At the heart of Luther's understanding of the interaction between the individual and Christ was the "joyous exchange". In this exchange, or better put, in this relationship, Christ imparts to the individual his holy righteousness and, in exchange, takes upon himself the the pain, punishment and guilt of human sinfulness.[46] The implications of this for the believer are described, by Luther, under the term "imputation".

The term imputation is important to Luther because it is built upon and reflects his understanding of "passive" and "active" righteousness. Passive righteousness, as Luther defines it, is where "we work nothing, [and] render nothing to God; we only receive and permit someone else to work in us, namely, God. Therefore it is appropriate to call the righteousness of faith or Christian righteousness 'passive'".[47]

If this is the mode in which passive righteousness operates, what is it that is received? It is the "promise of

grace offered in Christ", the "righteousness of faith", the "righteousness of grace, mercy, and the forgiveness of sins", the "righteousness of Christ and the Holy Spirit" and it is accepted "when God the Father grants it . . . through Jesus Christ".[48]

As to the manner in which this passive righteousness is communicated to the recipient, it is through imputation: "thus we can obtain it only through the free imputation and the indescribable gift of God".[49] The importance of the term "imputation", as well as "acceptance", both of which Luther uses in a technical sense, will become apparent after a brief look at what Luther calls "active righteousness".

Active righteousness can be of several different kinds--political, legal, or ceremonial, but, of whatever kind it is, they all share one common characteristic. They are performed in and through natural human abilities. In and of itself this is not necessarily bad for there is a necessary and legitimate role for this type of activity, notably in the realm of political life. What Luther repeatedly objects to is the confusion of this type of righteousness with "passive righteousness". It is only that latter type which is proper and acceptable in the Kingdom of God but the scholastic theologians, with their distinctions and philosophical reasoning, have done much to confuse the issue.[50]

Luther's doctrine of imputation, coupled as it is with his understanding of passive righteousness, is a direct

response to the errors he sees in the scholastic doctrines, especially their doctrine of merit. The fundamental difference between Luther and his opponents lies in the fact that for Luther "acceptatio refers only to Christ, for whose sake God accepts the sinner. Imputation does not mean taking moral achievement into account [such as meritum de congruo or meritum de condigno] but rather means the regular overlooking of our defects and crediting of our faith in Christ".[551]

Indeed, when we turn to the Commentary on Galatians, it is precisely these terms, faith, Christ and imputation, that we find linked together. Luther describes the relationship between these three terms in this manner:

> Faith takes hold of Christ and has Him present, enclosing Him as the ring encloses the gem. And whoever is found having this faith in the Christ who is grasped in the heart, him God accounts as righteous. This is the means and the merit by which we obtain the forgiveness of sins and righteousness.[552]

It must be quickly added that Luther is not suggesting that faith has become the "new work" which merits the good favor of God for that would be to see religion as a quid pro quo arrangement, albeit with faith replacing works. Any such suggestion goes against the entire tenor of Luther's theology. What Luther intends is better expressed when he speaks of Christian righteousness as "trust in the Son of God or a trust of the heart through Christ".[553] This type of trust is not to be construed as a moral virtue but is rather to be understood as a "reflexive response" to God's self-

disclosure in Christ, in and through which God is perceived. As a response to the divine self-disclosure, faith is:

> constitutive of the divine-human encounter on its human side. The believer does not earn divine imputation with his faith. . . . God counts the confidence of the heart as 'right' because that is what it is. Its rightness lies in the fact that faith, for its part, does not make God an idol but takes him exactly for what he is: the author and giver of every good, the precise counterpart of the believer's confidence. In a sense, faith, by believing, is the 'creator of deity' in us; it lets God be God. In short, it is right thinking about God.[54]

If faith stands as one of the critical elements in the doctrine of imputation, the other critical factor is Christ. Christian faith sees Christ as the one who was given by God specifically for dealing with sin and guilt.[55] The benefit of faith lies in its ability "to take hold of the Son and believe in Him with the heart as the gift of God [which] causes God to reckon that faith, however imperfect it may be, as perfect righteousness".[56] In turning to Christ, faith avails itself of a righteousness that is external to itself and, hence, certain and thoroughly righteous.[57] Hence, whatever language may be used to speak about imputation it must retain as one of its characteristics that it is the language of a personal relationship with Christ. It cannot degenerate into explaining imputation as though it were an accounting system with debits and creadits.

While the righteousness of Christ may be, in and of itself complete, faith's apprehension of this righteousness is imperfect. As Luther quickly points out, the fault is totally due to the limited nature and quality of faith.

Speaking of this faith Luther describes it as not giving:

> God enough formally, because it is imperfect; in fact it is barely a little spark of faith, which only begins to attribute divinity to God. We have received the first fruits of the Spirit, but not the tithes. Nor is reason completely killed in this life. Hence lust, wrath, impatience, and other fruits of the flesh and of unbelief still remain in us. Not even the more perfect saints have a full and constant joy in God.[58]

Faith is, furthermore, limited by the fact that it is precisely that-- faith. While it is true that by faith Christ is present to the believer, it is also true that faith is also "a sort of knowledge or darkness. . . . a cloud in our hearts, that is trust in a thing we do not see. . . . Christ is present [to the believer], in that very cloud and faith".[59] Faith, in its apprehension of Christ, finds that it must proceed on this journey alone. Faith must free itself from two of its frequent companions in this life, reason and the Law, if it is to apprehend Christ.[60] Thus, while faith, having forsaken its two adversaries, does apprehend Christ in the darkness, it does so in a weak and faltering manner.

Given its limited capacities, faith is in need of assistance if it is to be accepted before God, namely imputation, for while "[F]aith is indeed a formal righteousness; . . . [it does] not suffice, for after faith there still remains remanents of sin in the flesh. . . . Therefore, the second part of righteousness has to be added, which perfects it [faith] in us, namely, divine imputation".[61] What this means for Luther is that faith is not able to

fully effect a total transformation of the individual which would enable the believer, negatively, to abstain completely from sin and, positively, to love God and Christ completely. Since it is not God's desire to punish anyone for those remaining sins, although he could justly do so, he, that is, God, "overlooks these sins, and in His sight they are as though they were not sins. This is accomplished by imputation on account of the faith by which I begin to take hold of Christ; and on His account God reckons imperfect righteousness as perfect righteousness and sin as not sin, even though it really is sin".[62]

It is the doctrine of imputation that allows Luther to conjoin his thesis that it is faith that justifies by taking hold of Christ and that sin remains a constant factor in the believer's existence. Faith does really and truly justify but sin also remains, which is unacceptable to God. God, in light of the believer's faith in Christ, overlooks these sins by imputing to the believer the righteousness of Christ. The doctrine of imputation is characterized by this reciprocal action in which Christ's righteousness is granted to the believer and how the lingering presence of sin is handled.

In summary, four functions of the doctrine of imputation can be identified. First, it establishes the initiative of God in the human-divine relationship by indicating that it is God who not only initially grants the gift of faith but also maintains its existence. Second, and

closely connected to the first, imputation both opposes and discredits the scholastic doctrine of merit by showing that the forgiveness of sins is a divine operation that cannot be coerced by any human claim. Third, the "alien" or foreign [extra nos] character of the gift of righteousness is established by this doctrine. And fourth, as a result of the extrinsic character of righteousness, the certainty of salvation is secured because it rests in the divine character.

5. 5. The Eschatological Dimensions of Imputation

While it is unusual to find any mention of Luther's doctrine of eschatology in connection with his understanding of faith and good works it is just this connection that we find Luther introducing in his discussion of imputation[63] and which gives rise to his famous phrase simul iustus et peccator.

Luther's doctrine of imputation, as a reading of the Commentary on Galatians will indicate, is set thoroughly within the context of eschatology. The gracious and divine act of imputation is necessary, as Luther notes, because "we are not yet purely righteous, but sin is still clinging to our flesh during this life".[64] It is only with the coming of death that the "remnants of sin" are finally eliminated, i.e., they are rendered powerless and removed. Because of the remaining presence of sin in this life we must "always be supported and nourished at the bosom of divine mercy and forbearance, until the body of sin (Rom 6:6) is abolished

and we are raised up as new beings on that Day.. . . Under the present heaven meanwhile . . . the godly have sin".[65]

The same sober realization of the continuing presence of sin but of hopeful anticipation of its future elimination is found in Luther's understanding of the presence of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit has indeed been granted to believers but they have received only the "first fruits" which enables them to keep the Law but only imperfectly because of the lingering effects of sin.[66]

In sharp contrast to this life stands the life to come. In that life:

> believing will cease, and there will be a correct and perfect keeping and loving. For when faith ceases, it will be replaced by glory, by means of which we shall see God as He is (I John 3:2). There will be a true and perfect knowledge of God, a right reason, and a good will, neither moral nor theological but heavenly, divine, and eternal.[67]

It is the both the contrast and overlapping of these two states or stages of life that introduces the eschatological tension into Luther's theology. It is this dialectic that characterizes Christian existence for Luther. This dialectic is created by <u>having</u> and <u>not having</u> righteousness. Faith does possess a true and genuine righteousness but it does not possess it fully. It is the eschatological aspect of justification, expressed as "formal righteousness" and "imputation", that characterizes it as a <u>having</u> which is now off-set by a <u>not-having</u> but a <u>not-having</u> (which is really a <u>not-yet having</u>) which is offset by the

present *having*.[68]

5. 6. The Nature of Eschatological Life

The nature of the new life, or Christian life, that Luther describes in the *Commentary on Galatians* can only be understood from this eschatological perspective. Both the doctrine of imputation and Luther's famous formula, *simul iustus et peccator*, to be understood correctly must be seen in this light. The doctrine of imputation and *simul iustus et peccator* formula form the basis for what Luther has to say about good works.

From the discussion above concerning the nature of imputation it may appear as though faith provides the initial impetus to begin the Christian life but it is actually imputation that completes and perfects this life. The believer begins in faith but, left to his own devices, he quickly falters and needs to be helped by imputation. If, as many scholars believe[69], Luther holds to a forensic, purely legal or juridical doctrine of justification then it is to be expected that no or little substantial change takes place in the believer's life and behaviour and imputation does actually cover those sins which are present in the believer's life.

Such an understanding of Luther is plainly contradictory to what Luther has to say himself. In the *Commentary on Galatians* Luther, as we noted above, spoke of the importance and role of good works, going so far as to make them a test of the presence of genuine faith.[70] Luther also speaks quite

freely of the change or renewal that happens in baptism, describing it as a "rebirth and renewal. . . . For in those who have been baptized a new light and flame arise; new devout emotions come into being, such as fear and trust in God and hope; and a new will emerges". This change is, according to Luther, what it means "to put on Christ" and to enjoy his righteousness and, once "we have put on Christ, the garment of our righteousness and salvation, then we also put on Christ, the garment of imitation", i.e., of good works.[71]

Karl Holl's understanding of Luther's doctrine of justification does take the reality of the new life into account and also reflects the eschatological situation in which it is cast.[72] The key to understanding Holl's position lies in his use of the term "analytical". By pronouncing an "analytic judgement" God declares the sinner to be righteous on the basis of what he [God] sees that sinner becoming when the process of justification is brought to its complete fulfillment. The analytic statement is, in essence, a proleptic judgement concerning the final outcome of the process of justification, i.e., it is an eschatological statement.

The strength of Holl's position lies in the emphasis and seriousness with which it takes "the beginning of a new creation", i.e., in forgiving and declaring man righteous God wills to renew him and has already begun to do so. For Luther, the forgiveness of sins, as Holl notes, is not merely forgiveness but is the first step in the Christian

life. Holl's mistake, however, lies in taking this initial condition and making it the sufficient basis for God's verdict of justification. Imputed righteousness becomes a temporary loan to be used until this growth in righteousness is completed. Holl abandons the alien righteousness of Christ, making it a temporary condition until the "new creation" has reached full fruition.[73]

For Luther, however, while he does grant a new beginning in life, he never abandons the alien or foreign character of righteousness. Luther speaks of the necessity of Christ coming "to us spiritually every day, causing us to grow in faith and in our knowledge of Him".[74] To maintain that righteousness, in any way, shape or form, becomes the possession of the believer is to fall into the same error that the Scholastic theologians did with their understanding of "inherent forms" and "virtues" and to reduce the presence of Christ to that of a causal agent. The alien (extra nos) character of righteousness must always be maintained when reading Luther, for only when its alien origin is maintained, is it both effective and certain.

Only when imputation is thoroughly cast in an eschatological context can we begin to understand the character of righteousness. Imputed righteousness cannot be understood as a mere starting point or temporary condition which can, at the appropriate time, be left behind. The believer must always live in and out of imputed righteousness and it is only in such a state that Luther's statements

regarding progress (sanctification) can be understood. Forde has captured well what is at the heart of Luther's argument:

> The progress Luther has in mind is not out movement toward the goal but the goal's movement in on us. Imputed righteousness is eschatological in character; a battle is joined in which the totus iustus moves against the totus peccator. The 'progress' is the coming of the kingdom of God among us. That is why complete sanctification is always the same as justification . . .. Complete sanctification is not the goal but the source of all good works. The way is not from the partial to the whole, but from the whole to the partial. Good works do not make a person good, but a good person does good works . . .. Imputed righteousness is not a legal fiction but the 'power of God unto salvation' which attacks sin as a total state and will eventually reduce it to nothing. It is always as a whole that it attacks, as unconditional, freely given, absolute gift. . . . The good works that result are not building blocks in the progress of the Christian; they are the fruit of the whole, the 'good tree' . . ..
>
> Sanctification always comes from the whole, from the penetration of the eschaton into time, and thus involves the death of the old and the rebirth of the new.[75]

The expulsion of sin, seen in this light, precludes understanding sanctification as a progressive development and sees it, rather, as the continual intrusion of an alien righteousness, proleptically present through imputation, defeating the powers of sin. This conquest, as Luther never tires of repeating, takes place only in and through faith because it is only in faith that the judgement of God, both as to the defeat of sin in Christ and to actual presence of Christ in the life of the believer, occurs. In faith, than, the believer begins to live a new life, a new life reckoned or imputed to him by God, which is truly productive of good works because now he has become a "good person", the person

who bears good fruit as a tree bears good fruit.[76]

Luther's famous formula, simul iustus et peccator, needs also to be understood in this context.[77] This formula is not to be understood in psychological/temporal terms which would suggest that a believer suffers from acute psychological tension or that Christian existence is marked by the alternating but successive presence of either terrifying guilt or utter joy.[78] To do so is to avoid the formula for it states that the believer is simultaneously justified and a sinner. Furthermore, it does not represent the outer bounds between which the Christian life is lived and the Christian as one who rapidly and repeatedly oscillates between these two extremes.[79]

The best way to describe what simul iustus et peccator means is through the following diagram.



The way of the sinner, the totus peccator, is not an upward ascent but is, rather, the descent of the totality of righteousness towards the lower reality. It is not the gradual improvement of the sinner that marks progress but the descent of the totality of grace.[80] It is true that there remains a drive towards fulfillment but this drive is characterized the overcoming power of grace which, through time, will conquer the totus peccator and will enable the

believer, by grace, to love God fully and perfectly. "The growth envisaged is [always] growth in grace and just so is it growth in truth about ourselves vis-à-via God and God's righteousness".[91]

It must always be remembered that Luther's understands the formula simul iustus et peccator to be primarily a theological statement, more particularly, an eschatological one. The formula is not to be reduced to a psychological or moral one although it does have implications in these realms. As a theological statement, it is descriptive of Christian experience prior to the attainment of complete righteousness. From the perspective of the divine, the believer can be pronounced completely righteousness but from the human perspective the believer is still totally dominated by sin.[92]

To describe Christian experience in terms of simul iustus et peccator is not to present a pessimistic assessment of the possibilities of Christian experience.[93] It is, for Luther, a realistic but not hopeless analysis of the human situation before God. It is only in the realization that all human righteousness, in whatever form it takes, is condemned before God (the function of the Law) that the basis is laid for faith. Faith, while it stands for the antithesis of human striving, also represents a turning to God on his own terms. In turning to God not only is the believer pronounced righteous through the imputation of Christ's righteousness but this imputation also brings with

it a judgement of innocence and the presence of Christ in faith. Christian experience is, thus, both the pronouncement of innocence and the effective presence of Christ to achieve this righteousness. The imputation of righteousness does not stand as the cause of righteousness for that is only to be found through Christ's presence. As Joest puts it, "In und mit uns wird es recht und durch uns geschieht Rechtes von dem Mitsein dessen her, der allein der Gerechte ist".[84] Christian righteousness is both an forensic judgement and the impartation of new life, both based upon Christ but tempered by the eschatological realities of life, that is, imputation and simul iustus et peccator.

5. 7. Faith and Hope

Although the formula simul iustus et peccator may appear infrequently in the Commentary on Galatians, the same tension that is expressed by this formula as a description of the Christian life can also be found in the relationship that Luther describes between faith and hope. Whatever uneasiness Luther may have had concerning the relationship between faith and love disappears when he turns his attention to the relationship between faith and hope.[85] So closely allied are faith and hope that Luther considers it difficult to distinguish, and certainly impossible to separate, the two.[86] Peter Manns, in his masterful article, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith-- Luther on Justification in the Galatians' Commentary of 1531-1535"[87], has noted both the role and manner in which hope makes its contribution to

the Christian life: "Luther concedes decisive functions to hope with regard to righteousness and justification".[88]

Luther's lengthy comments on hope arise in connection with his exegesis of Galatians 5:5: "For through the Spirit, by faith, we wait for the hope of righteousness". Luther begins by noting that the hope spoken of in this verse can be taken in two different senses. It may refer, first of all, to that which is "hoped for", which is here identified as the "hoped-for-righteousness". It may refer, second, to the subjective feeling of hope with which the believer waits for the promised righteousness.[89]

Luther considers both of these interpretations possible and each of them contributes, in its own way, to sustaining the Christian life. It is true that in or by faith the believer has begun to be justified but there still remains an ongoing battle in the life of the believer because of the "sin that clings to our flesh". This ongoing battle indicates "we are not yet perfectly righteous. Our being justified perfectly still remains to be seen, and this is what we hope for. Thus our righteousness does not yet exist in fact [in re] but it still exists in hope [in spe]".[90] This distinction introduces an eschatological dimension into Luther's doctrine of justification which is similar to the one which we noted in our discussion of imputation.[91]

Christian existence, for Luther, is characterized by both "having" and "not-having" righteouesness, that is to say, whatever righteousness does exist presently is

concealed by the coexistence (simul) of sin. In fact, this righteousness, limited as it is, is continually in danger of being overcome because the believer is more aware of sin than righteousness. Hope, rallying to the side of faith, brings comfort and assurance in this battle that the believer is truly righteous and that, given time, this righteousness will be fully revealed.

> Brother, you want to have a conscious righteousness; that is, you want to be conscious of righteousness in the same way you are conscious of sin. This will not happen. But your righteousness must transcend your consciousness of sin and you must hope that you are righteous in the sight of God. That is, your righteousness is not yet visible, and it is not yet conscious; but it is hoped for as something to be revealed in due time. Therefore you must not judge on the basis of your consciousness of sin, which terrifies and troubles you, but on the basis of the promise and teaching of faith, by which Christ is promised to you as your perfect and eternal righteousness.[92]

Luther employs both senses of hope in maintaining the Christian life. Hope looks for the righteousness which is yet to be revealed, or, as Luther puts it, "not yet conscious", and, in the battle of faith against the overwhelming consciousness of sin, the subjective experience of hope is also necessary to avoid becoming disheartened. Luther does seem to be suggesting, that faith, left to its own resources and its own introspection, would soon be overcome.[93] Therefore, hope stands as faith's invaluable ally in the continuing battle against sin.

It is important to note the role of hope in this battle. Faith and hope each play an important role in the battle but they do so in different ways. Luther argues that

"we wait by hope for that righteousness which we already possess by faith".[94] As this statement indicates, faith does possess a genuine reality but, in terms of the believer's self-awareness, he is more conscious of sin than righteousness. Faith asserts that this conclusion is not true and that faith must orient itself to the Word of God which contains divine promises concerning Christ and sin. Luther does not see the main contrast between faith and hope in the fact that hope possesses what faith can only anticipate. Rather, both possess righteousness but they do so in different ways. The distinction between possessing righteousness "in fact" [in re] and "in hope" [in spe] does not lie in "the reality and existence of righteousness but of the mode of its givenness, which in turn determines the way in which it is experienced. In re, that is, directly and really, we do not experience righteousness, but rather the sin which conceals the righteousness". In this present life, faith believes in a righteousness granted by Christ and confirmed by the Word of God but the reality of this promise stands in sharp contrast to the continual battle with sin. "In this situation it is hope that promises a troubled faith, at least in spe, what it lacks in re, namely the disclosure at the end of time of the righteousness that up to now lies hidden".[95]

It would, however, be entirely contrary to Luther's intent if hope was understood in a strictly futuristic sense. It is true that hope is oriented to the future

appearance of righteousness but it does not wait idly until until this righteousness is revealed but, rather, becomes involved, here and now, in this process. For Luther, "expectation" is neither the primary nor the proper concern of hope.[96]

Hope is actively engaged in the experience of the believer as it leads him in battling, daring, enduring and grasping sin. Hope joins faith in the battle against sin:

> When I have been thus justified by faith or by this knowledge, then immediately the devil comes and exerts himself to extinguish my faith with his tricks, lies, errors and heresies, violence, tyranny, and murder. Then my battling hope grasps what faith has commanded; it [hope] becomes vigorous and conquers the devil, who attacks faith. When he has been conquered, there follow peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.[97]

Thus, hope has its object of intent not only the righteousness which is yet to be revealed but also the immediate advancement of that righteousness. It remains true that consummated righteousness is an eschatological gift but this future gift does have implications for the present moment in that it advances the battle of faith. So important is hope in this continuing struggle that Luther can call hope the captain in the battle[98] and the one who leads in conquest.[99] It can only be concluded that faith, although it precedes all else, does not and cannot stand alone but that it does require, in a very real sense, the aid of hope if the battle of faith is to be successful.

Hope moves the battle forward for otherwise faith would be overcome by the contradiction imposed by the overcoming

experience of sin. In Luther's view:

> . . . hope is not restricted merely to making the tension tolerable by assuring us, to a degree corresponding to the level of temptation, that we can expect righteousness at the end of time. Rather, it enters directly into the battle against sin and the devil, and thus struggles actively for the revelation and perfection of the righteousness given now only [by faith] in a hidden and seminal fashion.[100]

Luther's phenomenology of Christian existence includes hope as an important and vital element. Having secured the foundation for Christian existence in faith, Luther can speak of the important role that hope has in Christian faith because it in no way endangers the primacy of faith. Once Luther senses that the danger of undermining faith is past, he speaks unhesitatingly of the complementary nature and roles which faith and hope play for each other. For Luther, the battle against sin which is waged by faith is both secured and advanced by a hope which lays hold of righteousness.

5. 8. Faith and Love

In our discussion thus far we have noted how Luther has recast his understanding of both faith and hope, two of the three cardinal virtues of Christian faith. We now turn to love, the third of these virtues, where we find that Luther has, again, recast love in terms which are congenial to his new understanding of faith. The traditional formula of "faith formed by love", at least as it was understood by Luther, suggested the possibility that grace was unnecessary for Christ could be grasped by moral effort. As a result,

faith became redundant. In Luther's estimation this formula was a very subtle but clever cloak to camouflage that great evil-- "works righteousness". As such, Luther had no choice but to abandon this formula and to replace with a formula that made faith and Christ indispensable. This Luther did and the result was the formula "faith formed by Christ" or "faith living in Christ".[101]

The revitalized role that Luther gave to faith and Christ in his new formula certainly avoided any taint of "works-righteousness" but it also created another problem for Luther, one which was difficult for him to address because of the polemical and combative attitude with which he addressed the problem. Having separated both "charity" and "good works" (terms which are in many ways interchangeable) from the process of justification by grace through faith, it remained for Luther to positively reconstruct and link faith and good works subsequent to the event of justification. The larger theoretical framework for such a reconstruction was suggested in our discussion of the eschatological nature of the Christian life but it now remains for us to explore the several steps by which Luther attempted to achieve this.

5. 8.1. The Moral Grammar of "Doing"

There is no doubt in Luther's mind that true and genuine faith must include "good works" and that "good works" can function as a true indicator of the presence of genuine faith.[102] However, this "doing" must be understood

in a manner befitting a theology of faith. Luther, therefore, develops a "moral grammar of 'doing'".

Fundamental to this grammar is the difference between the Law and the Gospel, each of which is characterized by differentia which are completely opposite to one another. Their differences are briefly summarized in the following chart:

Law	Gospel
works	faith
curse	blessing
sin	righteousness
political, legal or ceremonial	moral, divine and spiritual
command	promise
physical and temporal	heavenly and eternal

Although this chart cannot capture the varied nuances of these terms, it does, however, indicate clearly the polarity of the Law and the Gospel.

Once it is granted that the Law and Gospel are contrary to one another, Luther goes on to argue that there is a mode of behaviour and language which is appropriate to that realm and only to that realm.[103] This is not to say that the realm ruled by the Law is necessarily inferior, for it does carry with it certain benefits[104], but only that it cannot be confused with the realm of the Gospel.

The confusion of these two realms has done much to foster the growth of "works-righteousness" because the difference between a moral and a theological performance of the Law has not been understood:

> Therefore "doing" is one thing in nature,

> another in philosophy, and another in theology. In nature the tree must be first, and then the fruit. In moral philosophy doing means a good will and right reason to do well; [but] this is where philosophers come to a halt. . ..
>
> Therefore we have to rise higher in theology with the word "doing" so that it becomes altogether new. For just as it becomes something new when it is taken from the natural area into the moral, so it becomes something much more different [sic] when it is transferred from philosophy and from the Law into theology. Thus it has a completely new meaning; it does indeed require right reason and a good will, but in a theological sense, not in a moral sense, which means that through the Word of the Gospel I know and believe that God sent His Son into the world to redeem us from sin and death. Here "doing" is a new thing . . .. In theology, therefore, "doing" necessarily requires faith as a precondition.. . . Therefore "doing" is always understood in theology as doing with faith . . . because in theology we have no right reason and good will except faith.[105]

Luther's argument is quite simple. It may be possible for an individual to perform certain actions repeatedly, Luther uses as an example a lutenist, and thereby to acquire the skills necessary to perform a certain act, in this case playing a musical instrument. This same principle can be applied to the moral life but it does carry the same assured results. A moral work can be performed and, externally, it cannot be faulted but, internally, it does not spring from a "sincere heart, a good will, or a true command of reason".[106] The potential for hypocrisy and deception is ever present in judging human actions and it is abundantly clear that immoral motives can never produce moral actions, something even the philosophers will admit. Arguing from the lesser to the greater, Luther goes on to say "if this is true in philosophy, it is much more necessary in theology

that a good will and a right reason <u>based on faith</u> should procede a work".[107] Luther concludes, quoting the philosophers themselves, that "it is necessary for the person to be justified morally before the work. Thus the tree is prior to the fruit, both in essence and in nature . . . in nature being precedes working and that in ethics a good will is required before the work".[108]

For Luther, this is the basic point in the "moral grammar of doing". What is required before there can a true keeping of the Law is neither additional effort nor even the imparting of new powers and abilities from God. What is required is faith because "faith makes of you and of Christ as it were one person, so that you cannot be divided from Christ, but cling to him, as though you were called Christ".[109] Therefore, "doing" always requires a new person, one changed in "nature" (or to use the language of Aristotle, in substance, not in accidents), a change that can come only from Christ. It is for this reason that Luther stresses that doing always requires faith because it renews the person, the doer, who is then enabled to act because he does so in faith.

Luther's reformulated grammar of "doing" has yet to tackle directly the relationship of faith and good works. Luther has drawn attention to the important role that the moral agent has in determining ethical actions, notably in terms of their motives and intentions, through focusing attention on the role of faith. What Luther has done, how-

ever, in his moral and spiritual psychology is to prioritize being over act and, consequently, he has diminished the role and importance of good works.

5. 8.2. "Faith and Good Works"- Two Models

In his attempt to positively and constructively relate faith and good works Luther offers several other explanations of their relationship. These explanations follow one of two models. The first is an "inclusive model" (or "incarnational model" to use Luther's term) in which faith and good works are integrally related and one is but the manifestation of the other. The second model is a "linear" one in which good works are seen as subsequent and unconnected to the act of faith itself. In the first model, good works play an important role while in the second model their importance is diminished and tends to fade.[110]

5. 8.2.1. The Inclusive Model of Faith and Good Works

Luther's first attempt to relate faith and good works begins with his appeal to the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in Christ as an analogy by which the relationship of faith and good works can be understood. Luther's attempted parallel is interesting, promising and fraught with difficulties.[111]

Luther begins by noting that faith can be understood in two quite different ways. It can be considered "apart from the work", as "an abstract or an absolute faith" and "sometimes with the work" as "a concrete, composite, or

incarnate faith". When justification is spoken of, it is abstract or absolute faith that is in focus; when the discussion turns to works and rewards "then it is speaking about faith as something compound, concrete or incarnate [and] . . . where mention is made of "doing", Scripture is always speaking of doing in faith". It is to this "working" or "incarnate faith" that rewards are promised.[112]

The distinction between abstract and incarnate faith can be further clarified, Luther believes, by looking at the analogous relationship of the human and divine natures in Christ. Scripture speaks in a variety of ways about the Christ figure: "sometimes it speaks about His whole person, sometimes about His two natures separately, either the divine or the human".[113] Absolute faith corresponds to the divinity of Christ; incarnate faith corresponds to the union of the human and divine in Christ. What is important to Luther, and the crux upon which his argument turns, is the communication of attributes and, more particularly, the communication of the divine properties to the human.[114]

The communication of attributes allows Luther to argue that even as an infant, lying in Mary's lap, Christ can be called "Creator of the heavens" and "Lord". The word "man" obviously takes on a new sense when applied to Christ for it:

> . . . stands for the divinity; that is, this God who became man created all things. Here creation is attributed solely to divinity, since humanity does not create. Nevertheless, it is said correctly that "the man created", because the

divinity, which alone creates, is incarnate with the humanity, and therefore the humanity participates in the attributes of both predicates. . . . Here everything is attributed to the man on account of the divinity.[115]

Analogously, faith is spoken of in two senses: as absolute and incarnate, but "justification belongs to faith alone, just as creation belongs to the divinity; nevertheless, just as it is true to say about Christ the man that He created all things, so justification is attributed to incarnate faith or faithful 'doing'".[116] The parallelism is now complete. Faith corresponds to the divinity of Christ and, just as the whatever the man Jesus did was attributed to divinity, so, whatever works the believer may perform, they are to be attributed to faith. The divinity of Christ has its soteriological counterpart in faith: "everything that is attributed to works belongs to faith.. . . let faith always be the divinity of works, diffused throughout works in the same way that the divinity is throughout the humanity of Christ".[117]

By describing the relationship of faith and good works in these terms Luther has clearly identified faith as the operative element in good works.[118] Yet Luther is not content to isolate faith from good works. He proposes a new definition of faith which includes works:

> Therefore faith always justifies and makes alive; and yet it does not remain alone, that is, idle. Not that it does not remain alone on its own level and in its own function, for it always justifies alone. But it is incarnate and becomes man; that is, it neither is nor remains idle or without love.[119]

This definition is, again, related to the humanity and divinity of Christ. Just as it is true that divine nature or essence is of quite a different character than the human nature of Christ, it remains the case, nonetheless, that the divine and human are combined in Christ with each still retaining its distinctive character. Luther argues that just as "the humanity is not the divinity , and yet the man is God" so "the Law is not faith, and yet faith does works. Faith and works are in agreement concretely or compositely, and yet each has and preserves its own nature and proper function".[120]

Luther's explanation of the relationship of faith and good works via the analogy of the hypostatic union calls for several comments. Congar has correctly identified the problematic nature of Luther's formulation of the relationship of faith and good works in saying that Luther allows for no significant human involvement in the process of salvation and appears to view salvation as Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes. Luther's faulty understanding of the role of the human in the economy of salvation is, according to Congar, the direct result of Luther's Christology in which only the divine is emphasized.[121] While Congar is certainly correct in the problem he has identified, his analysis of the cause of these problems needs to be questioned. Luther's statements need to be read much more cautiously and contextually than Congar has done. Both Lienhard[122] and Manns[123] have noted that the passage from the Commentary on Galatians on which

Congar builds his argument is not in any way to be taken as indicative of Luther's Christology. Lienhard agrees that Luther does "strongly emphasizes the the action of God in Jesus Christ . . . [but] he does not thereby wish to exclude the human activity of Jesus, but rather to oppose the works of Jesus Christ, . . . to our works and our righteousness".[124] Lienhard sets Luther's statements in context when he notes that Luther is "contending against the persons who exalt human activity while reducing the grace of God to the level of an aid . . . [and] to affirm that God is the author of salvation is not, for Luther, to exclude the activity of the man Jesus, but to combat the idea of merit".[125]

This is precisely what we find Luther doing in his comments on Galatians 3:10, the verse on which he is commenting when this issue arises. The full weight of Luther's attack is against those who would seek to be justified by works; hence, the statements made are concerned with soteriology, not Christology and must be read in this light. Manns is certainly correct when he describes Luther's statements here as an ad hoc Christology and to conclude, as Congar does, that Luther's lack of clarity on the hypostatic union results in his confused statements regarding justification is misleading. As Manns suggests, it is the polemical captivation of asserting justification by faith against a justification gained by works that leads Luther to propose this ad hoc Christology.[126]

Varied assessments can be offered of Luther's attempted

explanation of the relationship of faith and good works in light of his Christological analogy. First, the polemical context of these statements requires that they be read with a certain degree of caution. As an attack on justification by works, it is highly successful. Luther has effectively excluded the independent activity of the human will and made it totally reliant on grace. Second, Luther has failed to make clear the relationship of the human and divine, of faith and good works, because he holds to both the disjunction and the conjunction of the human and the divine. (These comments apply to both Luther's Christology and soteriology.) Luther's position is, as Manns points out, contradictory because, in making salvation totally dependent on grace, Luther has excluded precisely what, at other times, he wishes to include.[127] Third, what is patently obvious is the opportunity that Luther has missed for developing the idea of "faith incarnate", of faith becoming works, by developing the analogy of the Incarnation. Whether it was Luther's intention to solve the problem of justification by appealing to the Incarnation as a model for relating faith and good works is questionable.[128] What is surprising is that, in light of his broader and more balanced Christology and the role the Incarnation plays in his thought, Luther did not take advantage of this opportunity to develop this model which could do justice to the relationship of faith and good works that he seems to suggest at other points.[129]

5. 8.2.2. The Linear Model of Faith and Good Works

Luther often speaks of good works following faith in a cause and effect manner. Typical of Luther's statements are the following:

> Christ is not the Law, and therefore He is not a taskmaster for the Law and for works; but He is the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29). This is grasped by faith alone, not by love, which nevertheless must follow faith as a kind of gratitude.[130]

> Therefore we conclude with Paul that we are justified solely by faith in Christ, without the Law and works. But after a man is justified by faith, now possesses Christ by faith, and knows that He is his righteousness and life, he will certainly not be idle but, like a sound tree, will bear good fruit (Matt. 7:17).[131]

Luther does not at any point attempt an explanation of the linkage he sees between faith and good works. He assumes that good works will inevitably and necessarily follow faith, as the example of the tree indicates, but why and how they follow is not made clear. Luther is adamant on the order in which faith and good works must appear and, on the basis of what says at many other points, it must be assumed that this ordering is theological rather than temporal or psychological. Due to the emphasis Luther puts on this ordering it is no surprise that he never attempts an explanation of this relationship because his energies are focused on maintaining and defending the correct ordering in this relationship, that is, the priority and gratuity of grace, which, for him, is the crucial question.

This same thrust can be observed in Luther's numerous appeals to the example of a fruit bearing tree.[132] Luther's

frequent references to this imagery all have this one point in common: works can only follow from grace, faith and justification. Again, Luther's concern is to protect the priority of grace and faith and to show that true faith is necessarily operative in bringing forth good works. As Manns points out, Luther is not so much opposing the role of good works and human involvement and cooperation as such but is, rather, opposing those who would argue that the works of the Law bring righteousness.[133]

What Luther was searching for can be discovered if we continue to pursue his reasoning in this imagery. Under attack is an understanding of justification which is "externalized, reified, and mechanical . . . which, by accentuating works, habits, and qualities, forgets that the person, the heart, the intention must take on life from and before God".[134] It is for this reason that Luther speaks so powerfully of the actual and living presence of Christ in the life of the believer, a presence which precludes any formal, compulsory or virtuous attempts to live the Christian life.[135] As the image of the tree suggests, there is a natural and spontaneous, indeed organic, connection between faith and good works, so much so that Luther can make the presence of good works the evidence of a true and genuine faith.[136] What Luther envisions is a Christian, blessed with the grace and righteousness of Christ, freed from the Law and its command to merit salvation through undertaking good works in his own power, who can now freely

and naturally do good works through the power of the Spirit and the renewed movement of his own heart.[157]

If this is the positive side on Luther's emphasis on the priority of faith, there is also a negative side. Under pressure from his opponents Luther will argue that :

> But this is what He [God] now requires of you: that you believe in Christ, whom He Himself has sent. Then you will be made perfect in Him and will have everything. Now if to faith, the worship that is most pleasing to God, you want to add laws, then you should that in this very brief commandment, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself", all laws are included.[158]

The danger for Luther, once he has made this separation between faith and good works, is that, under pressure, good works fall into the category of optional additions to the Christian life. Luther's intent is to preserve faith and its primacy, which also included good works, but this objective can easily be subverted when Luther feels too much attention is placed on good works.

5. 8.2.3. Conclusion

If we take an overall view of Luther's statements concerning faith and good works, several points emerge with clarity. First, Luther, by all means and in all circumstances, is committed to maintaining and defending the priority of grace and faith. Second, Luther's attack is directed primarily against any suggestion of the value of any form of works righteousness. It is this polemic that prevents Luther from attaining clarity on the relationship of faith and good works. His overwhelming concern, to

emphasize faith, certainly understandable within his historical context, leaves him in a position of making faith the "divinity" of good works or of making them optional. Although Luther stresses the necessity of good works, he does not develop a model that would thoroughly integrate faith and good works. As Manns notes, Luther's fear of works righteousness and the necessity of stressing the role of faith in justification prevented Luther from linking faith and good works.[139]

5. 8.3. The Contents of Good Works

Although there is a lack of clarity in Luther's explanations of the relationship of faith and good works, Luther remains insistent on the necessity of good works, done in faith, and he has much to say on the nature and content of these good works. Our discussion of these good works will bring us once again to the subject of love but, in this case, Luther's statements are positive affirmations of the role of love, particularly as it is directed towards one's neighbour.[140] Outside of the polemical context, in which Luther argued that justification is by faith rather than love, Luther can make some surprising statements regarding the significant role of love in the Christian life:

> When we have taught faith in Christ this way, then we also teach about good works. Because you have taken hold of Christ by faith, through whom you are righteous, you should now go and love God and your neighbor. Call upon God, give thanks to him, preach Him, praise Him, confess Him. Do good to your neighbor and serve him; do your duty.[141]

> Then let works and love begin. . . . [Christ] is the Lamb of God . . .. This is grasped by faith alone, not by love, which must nevertheless follow faith as a kind of gratitude.[142]

> For the believer has the Holy Spirit; and where He is, He does not permit a man to be idle but drives him to all the exercises of devotion, to the love of God, to patience in affliction, to prayer, to thanksgiving, and to the practice of love toward all men.[143]

> Therefore "to do" is first to believe and so, through faith, to keep the Law. For we must receive the Holy Spirit; illumined and renewed by Him, we begin to keep the Law, to love God and our neighbor.[144]

Luther has no reason to disagree with Paul's statement in Galatians 5:6 that "faith works through love" and he is most impressed with Paul's summation of the intent of the Law in the short phrase, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Galatians 5:14).

Indeed, Luther can go even further in characterizing love as the cardinal, even the sole, mark of Christian living:

> If we were pure of all sin, and if we burned with a perfect love toward God and our neighbor, then we would certainly be <u>righteous and holy through love</u>, and there would be nothing more that God could require of us.[145]

The primacy of faith is, for Luther, temporal and provisional, lasting only as long as the fullness and perfection of love remains unrealized. Furthermore, only love remains, while faith and hope end when sin has been completely destroyed.[146]

This love, as Luther never tires of repeating, is directed primarily towards the neighbor, of whom Luther can

speak in glowing terms. It is in loving one's neighbor that the presence of true faith can be discerned. Luther was well aware of the distortions and abuses that the doctrine of justification by grace through faith was exposed to. There are those, on the one hand, who are unable to believe that Christ alone saves and, under the persistent pressure and continued presence of sin, they begin to doubt and turn to the Law and works to be saved.[147] On the other hand, there are those who, having heard that justification comes by faith, conclude that they can do anything they please. Their liberty becomes the opportunity for "license and lust of the flesh", a means by which they please themselves and defraud others.[148] Such a legalistic and/or antinomian response indicates that the message of the Gospel has not been properly understood for, when the message is correctly grasped, Christian freedom is transformed into the occasion to serve one's neighbor.[149] The deeds of love that are performed for a neighbor need not be, in and of themselves, spectacular or even peculiarly Christian.[150] What distinguishes them as deeds of love is that they are done "in faith, a joyful spirit, obedience and gratitude toward God"[151] (contra the legalists) and that they are done for the benefit of the one's neighbor (contra the libertines). Thus, Christian freedom is not wanton but is always responsive to the needs of the neighbor, whatever they may be.[152] Indeed, the neighbor is the most worthy object of one's service. In tones that sound like those of any

Renaissance humanist, Luther praises the neighbor:

> Finally, no creature toward which you should practice love is nobler than your neighbor. He is not a devil, not a lion or a bear or a wolf, not a stone or a log. He is a living creature very much like you. There is nothing living on earth that is more pleasant, more lovable, more helpful, kinder, more comforting, or more necessary. Besides, he is naturally suited for a civilized and social existence. Thus nothing could be regarded as worthier of love in the whole universe than our neighbor.[153]

Luther can conclude that love is to be ". . . preferred to all laws and ceremonies, and that God does not require anything of us as much as love toward neighbor".[154] To appreciate fully what Luther is saying here we need to recall that Luther's basic metaphor for the power and effect of sin was <u>incurvitas se</u>, to be curved or turned in upon one's self. Everything is viewed and evaluated from the perspective of one's own ego which is completely turned in upon itself. Even the good gifts of God are bent to one's own personal and selfish use and they are enjoyed for the benefits they bring to one personally.[155]

If being a sinner means to be completely bound by limits of one's own ego, the ability to love one's neighbor stands as the antithesis of this state. Rather than being turned in upon one's self, the believer is one who, to continue the metaphor, is opened and turned toward the needs of the neighbor. As Hauerwas puts it, in another context but one that is certainly applicable to Luther, "The call to such service we find only <u>in the presence of another</u> [my neighbor], whose need is often the <u>occasion of our freedom.</u>

For it is through the need of another that the greatest hinderance to my freedom, namely my own self-absorption, is finally . . . overcome . . .".[156] The domineering power of the ego or self, caught as it is in sin, is finally overcome in the experience of faith, i.e., the powerful presence of Christ, which liberates the self from a narcissistic preoccupation with itself[157] and now orients the believer to the needs of neighbor, i.e., to the social context of salvation in terms of the community and society.[158]

In this discussion it may appear that the doctrine of justification by faith through grace, if it has not been superseded, has, at least, diminished importance but such is not the case. In the midst of this discussion of loving the neighbor Luther turns again to the doctrine of justification, finding in it the resources necessary to loving one's neighbor.

To understand what role justification by grace through faith plays in loving one's neighbor it is necessary to recall several facts about the Law and the somewhat different role that Luther now ascribes to it. Following Paul, Luther summarizes the Law in one brief sentence: "The Law prescribes and commands that we love God with all our heart . . . and our neighbor as ourselves".[159] God is to be loved perfectly, just as the Law intends, and Christians are to become servants of one another through love.[160] It is this command and obligation to love that prevents the radical freedom given the Christian through faith from becoming

license.[161]

Luther can only marvel here at Paul's ability to interpret the biblical text: "This is the real way to interpret Scripture and the commandments of God".[162] In a short phrase Paul is able to both summarize the entire Law and to indicate its true intent which is love of God and neighbor because he understands the Law "in faith".[163] Only when the Law is understood through faith does it become for the Christian an aid in the struggle against the flesh.[164] However, the manner in which the Law is a genuine resource for Christian living must be explained. The Law does show the believer what he is to do, i.e., to love God and his neighbor, but it is incapable of providing the resources for or actually achieving this goal. This is, as Luther hastens to add, not the fault of either the Law or faith but of the flesh and sin because a perfect love ". . . in this present life is hindered by our flesh, to which sin will cling as long as we live. And thus our corrupt love of ourselves is so powerful that it greatly surpasses our love of God and neighbor".[165] It is important to note where Luther lodges the fault for being unable to love God and the neighbor as the Law requires. The fault lies neither with the Law, God, the believer, nor faith. It is the fault of that "sin which clings to our flesh".

This being the case, what is the value of attending to the Law? Does it not create a rather hopeless and frustrating situation for the believer? It does-- but there is

an answer-- "Walk by the Spirit".

> It is as though he [Paul] were saying: "When I command you to love one another, I am requiring that you walk by the Spirit. For I know that you will not fulfill the Law. Because sin clings to you as long as you live, it is impossible for you to fulfill the Law. But meanwhile take careful heed that you walk by the Spirit, that is by the Spirit you battle against the flesh and follow you spiritual desires". Thus he [Paul] has not forgotten the matter of justification. . . . "When I [Paul] speak about the fulfilling of the Law, I do not intend to say that we are justified by the Law. But what I am saying is that there are two contrary guides in you, the Spirit and the flesh. For the Spirit struggles against the flesh, and the flesh against the Spirit. All that I am requiring of you now-- and for that matter, all you are able to produce-- is that you follow the guidance of the Spirit and resist the guidance of the flesh. . . . Therefore when I teach the Law and urge you on to mutual love, do not suppose that I have retracted the doctrine of faith and am now attributing justification to the Law or to love. What I mean to say is that you should walk by the Spirit and not gratify the desires of the flesh.[166]

Luther is here engaged in a rather complex interpretation of the the Pauline text, one which will enable the believer to fulfill the Law, i.e., to love. This reinterpretation is necessary because, as Luther bluntly puts it, "you will not fulfill the Law". This failure is not caused by any inherent defect in the Law but rather by that sin which so persistently clings to the flesh. As an alternative Luther, following Paul, argues that it is the Spirit who will enpower the believer to resist the power of the flesh. Thus, the Spirit stands opposed to the flesh, not the Law but as to what relationship this puts the Law and Spirit in, Luther is unclear.

Luther seems to propose two quite different answers to

this problem. At one point he suggests that the Spirit and the Law stand opposed to one another: "'We have not yet attained the fulfillment of the Law. Consequently, we must walk and be exercised by the Spirit, so that we think, say, and do what is of the Spirit and resist what is of the flesh'".[167] For the Law to be fulfilled the believer must resort to something quite different than the Law, namely, the Spirit.

Shortly thereafter Luther again addresses the issue of the Law and the Spirit but he comes up with a different answer as to their relationship:

> The commandment "You shall love your neighbor" makes the same requirement, namely, that you not submit to your flesh-- which hates, bites, and devours when it is offended-- but that you fight back at it by the Spirit and that through the Spirit you continue in your love for your neighbor . . .".[168]

Here, the Law ("the commandment") makes the same demand that the Spirit does ("that you not submit to your flesh"). Following the Spirit, this text suggests, is the true fulfillment and keeping of the Law. The Law and the Spirit here work in concert to enable the believer resist the flesh and to "love your neighbor".

Are these two answers compatible or do they mutually exclude one another? The answer to this problem is both complicated and dependent upon another "detour" which Luther takes in the above explanation. In the midst of his explanation as of what it means "walk by the Spirit" Luther introduces the "doctrine of faith" and he suggests that

this holds the key to understanding what "walking in the Spirit" means. How this is so is not readily apparent. Why should the doctrine of justification by grace through faith rather than the direct guidance of the Spirit resolve the Christian's failure to keep the law of love?[169] An initial clue to solving this puzzle is provided in the following quotation:

> For the more aware they [Christians] are of their weakness and sin, the more they take refuge in Christ, the mercy seat (Rom. 3:25). They plead for His assistance, that He may adorn them with His righteousness and make their faith increase by providing the Spirit, by whose guidance they will overcome the desires of the flesh and make them servants rather than masters.[170]

Several things emerge from this text. First, the guidance Christians need and seek comes not from pursuing the Spirit but rather from turning to Christ. From this it follows, second, that it is not the Spirit but Christ who provides immediate assistance to the believer. Third, what believers seek is not the Spirit directly but Christ's righteousness and the increase of their faith. "Indeed, it is through Christ's assistance that the guidance of the Spirit is mediated, that is, through that justifying 'righteousness' with which Christ 'adorns them', and through that 'faith' which, though it is provided by the Spirit, means to 'take refuge in Christ'".[171] The argument appears to have come full circle and to have returned to the doctrine of justification by grace through faith as the basis for good works and this is precisely what Luther will argue.

Again, close attention to the text will provide us with

an answer as to why Luther argues this way. Luther begins by noting that as Christians become more aware of sins and weakness the more they will seek refuge in Christ, i.e., to be justified in Christ. Why is this so? We need to recall what provoked this crisis for the believers. It was their attempt to fulfill the law of love and what they discovered as they attempted to keep this law was that they were unable to do so. Hence, they turned to the Spirit. Yet the Spirit, although mighty, provided no easy answer. Why? Because of the opposition of the sin and the flesh:

> . . . the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit. Therefore every saint feels and confesses that his flesh resists the Spirit and that these two are opposed to each other, so that he cannot do what he would want to, even though he sweats and strains to do so. The flesh prevents us from keeping the commandments of God, from loving our neighbors as ourselves, and especially from loving God with all our heart, etc. Therefore it is impossible for us to be justified by works of the Law. The good will is present, as it should be-- it is, of course, the Spirit Himself resisting the flesh-- and it would rather do good, fulfill the Law, love God and the neighbor, etc. But the flesh does not obey this will but resists it.[172]

Luther goes on to argue that "the godlier one is, the more aware he is of this conflict".[173] This conflict is an ongoing, persistent and unending battle which continually harasses the believer. It is a battle which the believer may often as not lose[174] and one which could drive even the most faithful of believers to despair.[175] The encounter with one's own sinfulness, manifest as hatred, lying, malice, etc., raises the question of how one is justified. For Luther, the answer is by faith through grace. Hence, the

attempt to live a holy life raises again the question of how one is justified before God. It is for this reason that "Paul cannot forget about his doctrine of faith; but he keeps on repeating and emphasizing it, <u>even when he is dealing with good works</u>".[176] It is this, presumably, that Luther speaks of when he says that "faith" must always be added to "good works".

The Law, expressed in "You shall love your neighbor as yourself", is reinterpreted more faithfully when it is stated that "through love be servants of one another" but stated in this form it drives the believer beyond the Law to to "walking by the Spirit". In this manner the Law is negated, for in and of itself it cannot about that to which it obligates the believer, but it is also transcended and fulfilled as the believer turns to walking by the Spirit. Yet it is precisely in this apparent triumph that the believer is forced once again to turn to justification by grace through faith for in walking by the Spirit he encounters once again the presence of his recalcitrant flesh to which "sin so persistently clings". Justification by faith becomes both the source and the means by which the believer is enabled to undertake good works.[177]

An annoying question lingers if this is how good works are to be understood. If the flesh continually interferes with the life of the Christian, how and in what sense can "good works" be called good for are they not continually vitiated by the malaise of sin?

Luther compounds the problem by his firm insistence on calling sin by its rightful name-- sin. "Sin is really sin, regardless of whether you commit it before or after you come to know Christ. And God hates the sin; in fact, so far as the substance of the deed is concerned, every sin is mortal".[178] Nor will Luther lessen the demand placed upon the believer in the Law to love both God and neighbor. Even the powerful desires of the flesh remain for in no way does "walking in the Spirit" destroy them.[179] If anything, the Christian experiences an intensified battle as the "desires of the flesh" and the "desires of the Spirit" do battle with one another.

The key that Luther finds to explain this situation is the distinction that Paul makes between "desires of the flesh" and "works of the flesh". The desires of the flesh, Luther concludes, will always be with the believer but, due to the presence of the Spirit, he does not have to follow them. As Luther puts it in this play on words: "And so the desires and the conflicts of the flesh will not vanish [abesse]; yet they will not vanquish [obesse] those who are aware of them".[180] Temptation is a fact of life for the Christian and it will always be present but, through the Spirit, it can "restrained".[181] In the midst of this struggle Luther admonishes the believer to:

> . . . take pains to be righteous outwardly as well, that is, not to yield to our flesh , which is always suggesting something evil, but to resist it through the Spirit.. . . To the extent that by the Spirit we struggle against the flesh, to that

> extent we are outwardly righteous, even though it is not a righteousness that makes us acceptable in the sight of God.[182]

Even here Luther is quick to remind the believer that on those occasions when the flesh is subjected to the Spirit (an "outward righteousness") these apparent "victories" do not constitute a claim to righteousness for they remain "imperfect and impure".[183]

Luther continues his argument several paragraphs later when he notes that believers, while they continue to battle against their flesh through the Spirit, ". . . fortify themselves with their faith".[184] What Luther means in this reference to faith he explains several lines later, a statement which merits close attention:

> For when his [the believer's] impels him to sin, he is aroused and incited to seek forgiveness of sins through Christ and to embrace the righteousness of faith [not the Spirit], which he would otherwise not have regarded as so important or yearned for with such intensity. And so it is very beneficial if we sometimes become aware of the evil of out nature and of our flesh, because in this way we are aroused and stirred up to have faith and call upon Christ. Through such an opportunity a Christian becomes a skillful artisan and wonderful creator, who can make . . . righteousness out of sin . . . when he restrains his flesh for this purpose, brings it into submission, and subjects it to the Spirit.[185]

As we noted above, the believer's first response in this battle is not to seek the aid of the Spirit but to turn to Christ. Why? Because it is through Christ that the power of sin and that of its ally, the Law, is taken away. "And so the godly are not under the Law, namely by the Spirit; for the Law is unable to accuse them and carry out its sentence

of death against them, even though they are conscious of their sin and confess that they are sinners".[186] In turning to Christ the Law is deprived of its "legal hold" on sinners and, whatever sin exists, it is not imputed to the believer because he is now covered with the righteousness of Christ.[187] Jesus Christ, the Mediator, interposes himself between the believer's otherwise incriminating flesh and the Law which does the incriminating. In effect, "the believer's flesh, never to be minimized in its sinfulness, is nevertheless also not to be predicated ("imputed") as his".[188] The difference between the sinner and the believer lies in the interpositioning of Christ between him and his sin, not the sin itself:

> A believer's sin is the same sin and sin just as great as that of the unbeliever. To the believer, however, it is forgiven and not imputed, while to the unbeliever it is retained and imputed . . . . This is not because of a difference between the sins, as though the believer's sin were smaller and the unbeliever's larger, but because of a difference between the persons. For the believer knows that his sin is forgiven him on account of Christ, who has expiated it by His death. Even though he has sin and commits sin, he remains godly. . . . even if they [the godly] have sins and commit sins, they know that because of their faith in Christ these are not imputed to them.[189]

Thus, justification by faith through grace forms, for Luther the very basis upon which good works can be undertaken. It frees the believer from the Law who, in turn, does ". . . spontaneously, without any legal constraint, . . . more than the Law requires". When the Law attacks the believer, he turns to Christ who "has been grasped by faith". So Christians do ". . . what the Law requires, if

not by means of perfectly holy works, then at least by means of forgiveness of sins through faith. So a Christian fulfills the law inwardly by faith . . . and outwardly by works and the forgiveness of sins".[190]

What makes works "good" then? Neither the quality of the work itself, for that is always tainted by the presence of sin, nor the person because no believer is ever freed in this life from his sinful flesh. What makes a work good, then, is the presence of Christ in faith who both forgives and overcomes the power of the flesh by the giving of the Spirit. In other words, justification by faith through grace.

5. 9. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to look at not only what Luther has to say about good works in general but to look at the fundamental assumptions which guide his statements about them. It must be stressed that Luther is not opposed to works *per se* but he is opposed to any suggestion, in whatever form, that would displace Christ and faith from the center of Christian theology and experience. Luther's opposition to the attempt to garner righteousness before God on the basis of works is reflected in his Christology which sees Christ as a "gift" rather than a "demand". It is this definition which causes Luther to subordinate any of Christ's ethical sayings to a secondary position.

How Christ's righteousness, the gift which he brings, is granted to believers and the effect this has on the

believer is described by Luther in terms of imputation. The eschatological nature of this doctrine was highlighted because this is frequently overlooked and it is the basis upon which Luther's famous formula, simul iustus et peccator is to be understood. It is because of the eschatological nature of the Christian faith that hope plays such a large part in Luther's theology of faith and forms a necessary counterpart to faith.

Having described the nature of faith and its relationship to hope we next turned to look at the manner in which Luther related faith and hope. Once past his polemical statements, it was noted that Luther has many positive things to say about the nature, role and importance of love. However, Luther always formulates this relationship in which the both the priority and gratuity of grace and faith are protected, such as in his "moral grammar of 'doing'". When Luther did attempt to reconstruct the relationship of faith and good works he employed two models, the inclusive model and the linear one, to do so but neither of these models was entirely satisfactory.

Nevertheless, Luther, as we noted, did have much to say about exactly what was a "good work", namely, to love and serve one's neighbor. In serving one's neighbor, we noted how Luther's thinking on this relationship took him once again to the very basic foundation of his entire theology, that of "justification by grace through faith", and how this formed both the basis and continuing possibility for a life

of good works.

This study of Luther's 1535 Commentary on Galatians began with an attempt to understand some of the very basic impulses of Luther's thought as contained therein. What we have discovered is just how tightly governed Luther's theology is by the metatheological norm of "justification by grace through faith". Both Luther's understanding of Christ and faith reflect this orientation as well as his statements about "good works" and just what it is that makes "good works" good-- their reliance upon the forgiveness of Christ.

In the following chapter we will turn our attention to a contemporary of Luther, Menno Simons, and explore how he has dealt with these same issues. Only after this has been done will an attempt be made to evaluate the theology of either figure.

Chapter Six

The Foundations of Menno's Thought

6. 1. Introduction

After considering Luther and his theology of "justification by grace through faith" and its implications for understanding faith and good works and their interrelationship, we now turn to one of Luther's contemporaries, Menno Simons. Although certainly less well known than Luther, Menno, like Luther, played a decisive role in the formation of a religious group that was to bear his name. If the measure of greatness is to leave one's stamp on a group, then Menno, along with Luther and Calvin, stands as one of the major figures of the sixteenth century Reformation.

Our interest in Menno, as far as this study is concerned, will largely follow from the issues that we have examined in our previous study of Luther. Our attention will be focused on the twin themes of faith and good works and their relationship. In our exploration of these two themes in Luther it was often impossible to separate them from other issues, such as Christology. In Menno we will observe the same pattern although in Menno's thought his statements on faith and good works are more easily isolated from the rest of his thought. Many of the same themes that were

touched upon in our study of Luther's view of faith and good works will appear again, particulary the Law and Gospel, and their reappearance will furnish us with an opportunity to compare the views of Luther and Menno on these points. Before turning directly to a study of Menno, several introductory comments on the nature of Anabaptist and Menno studies will seek to situate our discussion of Menno in its larger context.

6. 2. Anabaptist and Menno Studies

It must be frankly admitted that until recently Anabaptist and, in particular, Menno studies have attracted little scholarly attention. For many years Anabaptist studies were the preserve of Mennonite scholars who often had a vested interest in the field. This statement should not be taken as a negation of the work of these scholars, notably H.S. Bender, but as a recognition of the limitations of their work.[1]

The last thirty years has seen, however, a veritable explosion in the field of Anabaptist studies and many scholars from both within and without the Mennonite tradition have become involved in this area of research.[2] Accompanying this increasing interest in Anabaptist studies has a been a multiplication in the perspectives through which Anabaptist studies have been undertaken[3], a development which parallels the present day trends in the larger field of Reformation studies. The result is that today anyone entering Anabaptist studies will find it as

confusing and complicated as any other field.

While it would be impossible here to explore in detail the present state of Anabaptist studies, it would be helpful to mention briefly the terminology by which the Anabaptist movement has been labeled for contained within these labels is an implicit statement as to the relationship of Anabaptism to the larger Reformation movement. Bainton referred to the Anabaptist movement as the "left wing of the Reformation" thereby suggesting that the Anabaptists were extremists who carried the ideas of the Reformers to their limit.[4] George H. Williams, in his important book, The Radical Reformation, suggested another view of the Anabaptists which set them within the larger context of other reform groups and stressed their emphasis upon religious freedom, in contrast to the Magisterial reformers, namely Luther, Calvin and Zwingli.[5] Leonard Verduin, after expressing his dissatisfaction with both of these labels, proposes that these reformers be called "stepchildren of the Reformation" for that expresses the tension that existed in the relationship between the main line reformers and their wayward offspring.[6]

The wide variety of names by which the Anabaptist movement has been labeled is indicative of a much deeper question which Anabaptist studies has yet to answer. Wherein does the essence of Anabaptism lie? H.S. Bender, the father of American Anabaptist studies, in his formative little booklet, The Anabaptist Vision, saw the early

Anabaptists as ". . . the culmination of the Reformation, the fulfillment of the original vision of Luther and Zwingli".[7] For Bender and many others of his generation the Anabaptists were simply Protestants par excellence. Others have not been quite so convinced. Alvin Beachy, in The Concept of Grace in the Radical Reformation, has argued that what set the radical reformers, including Menno, apart from the other reformers was their understanding of grace: "grace is for the Radical Reformers not so much a forensic change in status before God as it is an ontological change within the individual believer".[8] If this is the case, the core of Anabaptism is essentially different from that of the other reformers.

The difference between Anabaptism and the other movements of the time has led Walter Klaassen to argue that Anabaptism, while drawing upon Catholic and Protestant streams of thought, is neither Catholic nor Protestant but a movement that is fundamentally different from both.[9] Yet others have seen similarities between Anabaptism and Catholicism.[10] Still others have noted the influence of the medieval ascetic traditions and have argued that this holds the key to the origins and essence of Anabaptism.[11]

This brief survey can in no way hope to resolve the question as to the origins and essence of Anabaptism but it does raise the fundamental question of the relationship of Anabaptism to other movements in the sixteenth century, notably Lutheranism. For the purposes of this thesis it

raises the problem of the nature of the relationship between Luther and Menno. Should they be seen as fundamentally compatible, with perhaps different emphases, but in essence the same (Bender and Bainton)? Or are they basically differing movements (Beachy) or a movement which in many ways draws upon upon a several sources, including Catholic, Protestant and medieval (Klaassen, Davis and Loeschen)? How one labels Anabaptism is indicative of the relationship that is seen between these reform movements.

The problem of identifying the relationship of Anabaptism to other movements in the sixteenth century is compounded by this lack of consensus as to what the genius of Anabaptism is. While this is true of Anabaptism at large, it is particularly true of Menno studies. There is as yet no consensus as to the core of Menno's thought. A number of possibilities have been proposed such as ecclesiology[12], the new creature[13], the new man[14], the doctrine of regeneration[15], Christology leading to the Melchiorite doctrine of the incarnation[16], discipleship[17], anticlericalism[18] or penitence[19].

Of these many possibilities, it seems to this writer that the theme of penitence offers the most promising guide to the center of Menno's thought. First, it accounts for one of the major emphases in Menno's thought. Second, it takes into account and provides a center which explains the importance a number of other themes, such as eschatology, Christology, regeneration, and ecclesiology, have in Menno's

theology. Third, the emphasis on penitence places Menno's theology solidly within the social, religious and cultural setting of his time.[20] It is from this perspective that our study of Menno will be undertaken.

Before moving directly into our study of Menno, and implicit within that a comparison of Luther and Menno, a few comments need to be made on the sources that will be drawn upon for our study of Menno and the nature of these writings.

As with Luther, one of the questions that must be faced again is the difference between the younger and older Menno. Meihuizen, in his article, "Spiritualistic Tendencies and Movements Among the Dutch Mennonites of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", has argued in Menno's early writings were characterized by an emphasis on the individual and the personal experience of regeneration, with the church scarcely receiving any mention. By the end of his life the church that had become the center of Menno's thought.[21]

While it is true that Menno does initially stress the individual over the church neither this emphasis nor the later one in which Menno reverses his position is to be made normative or absolutized. Account must be taken for the historical and social context in which Menno worked and for the possibility of development within his thought without positing unnecessary polarities and antinomies.[22] Furthermore, if the fundamental unity of Menno's thought lies in penitence, a theme which runs through the entirety of

Menno's writings, not in his soteriology or ecclesiology (as the argument above suggests), it is then unnecessary to posit a difference between the younger Menno and the older one at least in terms of what the center of his theology is.

As for the nature of Menno's writings, they are of a markedly different character than those of Luther. His writings have been called "spiritual aids in an emergency situation"[23] and, indeed, that is what they were. Menno's tracts were written under stress to encourage a small and persecuted group to maintain their faith in difficult times. Menno did not prepare his writings, as Luther did his Commentary on Galatians, in an academic institution for the instruction of a group of students. This is not to say that Menno was not able to theologize and reflect at a profound level[24] but that his writings were tied to more immediate and practical concerns and/or polemical needs.[25]

There are two characteristics of Menno's writings which require further comment, both of which are related to the contemporary study of Menno. First, many of Menno's writings are difficult to read because Menno wrote as he spoke, that is, they have an oral style, which, when transcribed to a written text, makes tedious reading. Second, Menno's writings, as a rule, are composed largely of biblical words, phrases, entire verses and often lengthy quotations from the biblical text.[26] Initially, such a style of writing does not easily lend itself to theological analysis. The text is often unclear, non-technical, informal

and imprecise, in that it avoids the language of the professional theologian (which may very well be Menno's point!) and it is frequently hortatory rather than explanatory. Yet, if we assume that Menno was at least somewhat trained as a theologian and possessed some skills as a writer, the profusion of biblical allusions and quotations cannot be without a point or effect. Loeschen is absolutely correct when he suggests that within the ". . . malestrom of biblical allusions in his [Menno's] text reflects a more or less conscious selection among the possible choices, and that the relative frequency of various word choices reflects Simons' own emphases".[27] Despite the initial unattractiveness and difficulty[28] in reading Menno, a careful reading of the text repays one with rich dividends.

As for critical editions of Menno's work, this is the most disappointing aspect of our inquiry. As of yet there is no critical edition of Menno's entire work. H.W. Meihuizen has prepared a critical edition of one of the most important and popular of Menno's tracts, "Foundation of Christian Doctrine"[29] and Victor G. Doerksen and Hermina Joldersma have edited and translated Menno's "Confessions on the Triune God".[30] Also invaluable for this type of research is I.B. Horst's bibliography on the writings of Menno Simons.[31] As can be seen, the most pressing need in Menno studies at this point is a critical edition of Menno's writings.

6. 3. Menno on Luther

Menno, as was the case with the other reformers of the

sixteenth century, was influenced by Luther. It may safely be assumed that Menno and Luther did not know each other personally but there are definite indications in Menno's writings of his familiarity with at least several of Luther's works.[32]

When Menno recounted his conversion, in his "Reply to Gellius Faber", he mentions the significant influence that Luther had on him. In the year following his ordination to the priesthood (1524) Menno found himself plagued by doubts concerning the transubstantiation of the elements during the celebration of the Mass. Menno feared he was losing his faith and, despite his efforts to resolve the issue, he could not and his doubts and fears continued. About this period in his life Menno writes:

> Finally, I got the idea to examine the New Testament diligently. I had not gone very far when I discovered that we were deceived, and my conscience, troubled on account of the aforementioned bread, was quickly relieved, even without any instructions. I was in so far helped by Luther, however: that human injunctions cannot bind unto eternal death.[33]

How Menno received this information from Luther he does not say but it was presumably through reading one of Luther's tracts and, if it was through a particular writing of Luther's, Menno does not supply its title.[34]

Shortly thereafter (1531) Menno found himself troubled as he sought for a biblical basis for infant baptism. Unable to find any biblical texts to support the practice of infant baptism yet unwilling to trust his own judgement, Menno turned again to Luther, as well as Bucer and Bullinger, for

help but this time he found no help in reading Luther or, for that matter, in reading the others. Menno was forced to conclude ". . . that these writers varied so greatly among themselves, each following his own wisdom, then I realized that we were deceived in regard to infant baptism".[35]

Menno's comments on Luther were to become more critical. Menno found himself disillusioned by Luther's contradictory attitude displayed in his continued practice of infant baptism while openly acknowledging that such a practice lacked biblical support. Menno, displaying considerable familiarity with Luther's writings on infant baptism, notes that:

> Luther writes that children should be baptized in view of their own faith and adds, If children had no faith, then their baptism would be blaspheming the sacrament. It appears to me a great error in this learned man, through whose writings at the outset the Lord effected no little good, that he holds that children without knowledge and understanding have faith, whereas the Scriptures teach so plainly that they know neither good nor evil, that they cannot discern right from wrong. Luther says that faith is dormant and lies hidden in children, even as in a believing person who lies asleep, until they come to years of understanding. If Luther writes this as his sincere opinion, then he proves that he has written in vain a great deal concerning faith and its power. But if he writes this to please men, may God have mercy on him . . . .[36]

It seemed to Menno that Luther violated not only the plain sense of Scripture but also his own principles of biblical interpretation for had not Luther written that anything ". . . which is not commanded of God in religious matters of faith is by that token forbidden"?[37] Menno concluded that, while Luther had begun well, he had now

abandoned his earlier insights.[38] It was for this reason, no doubt, that Luther earned the derisive title "Doctor Pussy-foot" (Doktor Leisetritt) among Protestant reformers who saw his break with the Roman Catholic Church as half-hearted or even insincere.[39]

More importantly, for the concerns of this study, Menno also makes some comments on Luther's doctrine of faith and good works. Not speaking directly of Luther but of his followers, Menno charges that "they preach nothing but the grace, the favor, the mercy, and the love of God . . .". They talk "loudly about faith and love".[40] To Menno, such an emphasis had resulted in the belief that ". . . faith alone saves, without any assistance by works. They [the Lutherans] emphasize this doctrine so as to make it appear as though works were not even necessary; yes, that faith is of such a nature that it cannot tolerate any works alongside of it". As for Luther's statements on the "strawy epistle" of James, Menno can only disagree in the sharpest of terms, calling James an "important and earnest epistle".[41]

The mistake which Luther and his followers had made was that, while they had correctly perceived that the teachings of the pope and monks for what they were, namely works-righteousness and, as such, they were not to be followed, they had failed to follow the apostle Paul's teaching in its entirety in which he stressed obedience as the true fruit of faith. When Menno urged the importance of godly living upon them, he was slandered in return and accused of preaching

salvation by works:

> God be praised, we [the Lutherans] caught on that all our works avail nothing, but that the blood and death of Christ alone must cancel and pay for our sins.. . . Anyone who can recite this on his thumb, no matter how carnally he lives, is a good evangelical man and a precious brother. If someone steps up in true and sincere love to admonish or reprove them for this, and point them to Jesus Christ rightly, . . . and to show that it is not right for a Christian so to boast and drink, revile and curse; then he must hear from that hour that he is one who believes in salvation by good works . . ..[42]

As we have seen, Menno does express a true and genuine appreciation of Luther, for Luther did play a significant part in freeing Menno from his Catholic past, yet he is also very critical of the shortcomings and the inconsistencies that he finds in Luther's theology.[43] Menno certainly spoke harshly (but quite in keeping with the standards of the time) of the failures of Lutheran theology and it was this failure that Menno sought to redress in his writings. It is to Menno's treatment of the relationship of faith and good works that the remainder of this chapter will be devoted. We will begin with a consideration of Menno's treatment of the Law and the Gospel.

6. 4. The Law and the Gospel

In our study of Luther we noted the central and programmatic role that the Law and the Gospel had in Luther's theology and how they functioned as key terms in understanding both human experience and the biblical message. Menno, too, deals with the Law and the Gospel but they do not have for him the same formalized and program-

matic role that they have in Luther's theology. In fact, Menno rarely joins the terms which results in a somewhat different treatment of them.[44]

Menno's most thorough treatment of the Law and the Gospel is found in his "Reply to Gellius Faber" (1554). In a reply to one of Faber's question Menno deals with the question of the Law and the Gospel at length:

> Wherever the Law is rightly preached and taken to heart so that it reveals its nature and power, there we find a broken spirit, a penitent, humble heart, and a conscience which trembles before the Word of its God, which checks and drives out sin, as Sirach says.
>
> This is the real function and end of the law: To reveal unto us the will of God, to discover sin unto us, to threaten with the wrath and punishment of the Lord, to announce death and point us to Christ, so that we, crushed in spirit, may before the eyes of God die unto sin, and seek and find the only eternal medicine and remedy for our souls, Jesus Christ.
>
> So also where the Gospel is preached in true zeal, according to the pleasure of God, and unblameably in the power of the Spirit, so that it penetrates the hearts of the hearers, there we find a converted, changed, and new mind, which joyfully and gratefully gives praises to its God for His inexpressibly great love toward us miserable sinners, in Christ Jesus, and thus it enters into newness of life willingly and voluntarily, by the power of a true faith and a new birth.
>
> If Gellius [Faber] would hammer at the innermost heart of his followers, and of himself, with the hammer of the law, and zealously kindle fire in them with the zeal of the holy Gospel so that they would in true repentance forsake their unclean and hateful hearts and their pagan pride and pomp . . . [and] enter with Christ into newness of life . . . .[45]

This rather lengthy quotation indicates both the similarities and differences that exist between Menno's and Luther's understanding of the Law and the Gospel. First, and

most obviously, Menno and Luther agree that a distinction is to be made between the Law and the Gospel. Menno, like Luther, can speak of "the threatening Law" and the "comforting Gospel"[46] but there is also a significant difference in the way in which Menno and Luther view the operation of the Law. First, Menno does not link the operation of the Law and its resultant effects with the conscience as Luther did. Second, Menno tends to see the Law and Gospel functioning more separately and successively than Luther does. Luther allows for a more dialectical relationship between the Law and the Gospel with the Law continuing to exercise its condemnatory function even after one has turned to the Gospel. Third, Menno grants the Law several roles and functions which Luther would regard as unacceptable.

If we turn our attention to the Law in particular now, the degree to which Luther and Menno agree on the role of the Law is plainly evident. As Menno indicates in the above quotation the Law 1) reveals the will of God, 2) it reveals human sinfulness, 3) it announces God's wrath and punishment, 4) it warns that the punishment for sin is death, and 5) it points and drives the sinner to Christ. Luther would heartily agree with Menno on the role of the Law as it has been described so far but Menno goes on to add to other functions to the Law with which Luther would not agree.

The Law, as Menno describes it, has not only a negative function in that it makes sin manifest but positively, it also "checks and drives sin out". How does the Law

accomplish this? It achieves this by crushing the spirit and causing the individual "before the eyes of God [to] die unto sin". "That is to say, the Law not only convicts man of his sin but and drives him to despair, but it brings about repentance, turning away from sin to God. When sinful man repents and dies to sin, then the Gospel comes to give comfort and transforms the repentant one to a new life by a new birth".[47]

The differences between Luther and Menno, both in terms of their understanding of the Law and the response it effects, are significant. First, while Luther may attribute some positive function to the Law subsequent to turning to the Gospel[48] but, prior to that, he could not agree that the Law serves any positive function such as to "check and drive sin out". Second, and equally as important, is the manner in which Menno describes repentance. Repentance, the forsaking of an "unclean, hateful heart" and "pagan pride and pomp", must precede the proper work of the Gospel which is to "enter with Christ into newness of life". While this may sound similar to Luther there is a substantial difference between Menno and Luther on this point.

Luther sees the process by which the Law and the Gospel operate quite differently and, hence, repentance is accorded a different role. "For Luther, sinful man is completely helpless, killed by the Law, and the Gospel ministers to him the Divine Word [sic] of justification. Man's repentance consists in passively receiving the 'promise' in faith".[49]

For Menno, repentance must precede the proper work of Gospel.[50] Menno is emphatic on this ordering, as can be seen in reading in his very important booklet, "Foundation of Christian Doctrine": "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent and believe the Gospel".[51] For Menno repentance has a very broad meaning which includes both "do penance" and "mend your ways". He also clearly offers a non-sacramental interpretation of this term. In fact, Menno is very critical of the traditional forms of penance which consist of:

> . . . outward appearance and human righteousness, such as hypocritical fastings, pilgrimmages, praying and reading lots of Pater Nosters and Ave Marias, hearing frequent masses, going to confessionals, and like hypocrisies . . .. Such things will be a provocation rather to stir up divine displeasure. These are empty and vain commandments of men, the accursed and magic wine of the Babylonian harlot . . ..[52]

Rather, penitence is to be "possessed of power and works" in which we "die unto sin, and all ungodly works, and to live [sic] no longer according to the lusts of the flesh". These are the "noble fruits of repentance, acceptable to the Lord". Even the merits of Christ[53] are of no avail unless there is a true repentance: "Such a repentance we teach and no other, namely, that no one can piously glory in the grace of God, the forgiveness of sins, the merit of Christ, <u>unless he has truly repented</u>."[54]

It is clear that both the importance and role which Menno gives to the Law, while somewhat akin to that which Luther ascribes to it, is clearly different, particularly in

terms of the importance which Menno attaches to repentance. Menno's doctrine of repentance will receive further consideration when we examine this subject together with Menno's understanding of the Holy Spirit. We turn now to a consideration of the second element of Luther's famous phrase, the Gospel, where we shall find again that Menno speaks in terms reminiscent of Luther but that he also differs from Luther at several crucial points.[55]

Menno's most concise definition of the Gospel is found in a statement which he makes in the "Foundation of Christian Doctrine":

> Believe the Gospel. That Gospel is the blessed announcement of the favor and grace of God to us, and of the forgiveness of sins through Christ Jesus. Faith accepts this Gospel through the Holy Ghost, and does not consider former righteousness or unrighteousness, but hopes against hope (Rom. 4:18), and with the whole heart casts itself upon the grace, the Word and promises of the Lord, since it knows that God is true, and that His promises cannot fail. In this the heart is renewed, converted, justified, becomes pious, peaceable, and joyous, is born a child of God, approaches with full confidence the throne of grace, and so becomes a joint heir of Christ and a possessor of eternal life.
>
> . . . To such, Christ who is a comforter for all troubled hearts says, Believe the Gospel, that is, fear not; rejoice and be comforted; I will not punish nor chastise you, but will heal you, comfort you, and give you life.
>
> . . . I am the Lamb that was sacrificed for you all. I take away the sins of the whole world.
>
> . . . [you] who are justified by faith and have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by who also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in the hope of the glory of God; and all this, as Paul says, of grace and love.
>
> There is none that can glory in himself touching this faith, for it is the gift of God.[56]

Menno concludes this section with the exhortation,

"Believe the Gospel, that is, believe the joyful news of divine grace through Jesus Christ".[57] In Menno's definition, like Luther's, the Gospel consists in none other than the divine promise of grace, bestowed in Christ, of forgiveness and divine acceptance, all of which is done in faith. In short, the Gospel is the unmerited divine promise to the sinner.

As for the charge that he taught "salvation by merit" or "works righteousness", Menno was quick to defend himself: "We are saved solely by grace through Christ Jesus . . .". It was because of grace that Christ was sent by the Father, by grace that Christ taught and died for sinners, by grace one is enabled to believe and by grace the Holy Spirit and eternal life was granted.[58] This is, for Menno, the nature of justification.

Against any accusation that he and his followers are "heaven stormers", Menno replies that ". . . we cannot be saved by means of anything in heaven or on earth other than by the merits, intercession, death, and blood of Christ".[59]

On the matter of the Gospel, we can see that there is a substantial degree of agreement between Luther and Menno. Both agree on the centrality of Christ and his grace and merit for the effecting of justification and they are united in the condemnation of any suggestion of works-righteousness or human merit.

However, as we pursue the issue further, it becomes apparent that a significant difference exists between Luther

and Menno on this point despite their similarities in language and emphases. The difference lies in their exact definition of the Gospel and the manner in which it is responded to. For Luther, the primary feature of the Gospel is its declaratory statement of justification of the sinner by grace through faith and of the actual and effective presence of Christ in faith.[60] For Menno also the Gospel is indeed the promise of unmerited justification and that is presupposed but the emphasis in Menno falls on the effect that the Gospel has in terms of repentance and regeneration, terms which we shall examine at greater length below.[61]

Menno's language at this point must be carefully noted. There can be no doubt that Menno believes as firmly as Luther in justification by grace through faith but, for Menno, "it is not the Good News itself that saves; it is the change effected by the Gospel that constitutes true salvation". This distinction bears some resemblance to Luther's distinction between historic and saving faith but differs, and differs most significantly, in terms of what this faith effects. For Luther, the difference between historic and saving faith lies in the manner in which Christ is present to the believer for Christ is only truly and effectively present in saving faith. For Menno, true faith is present only when a change has been wrought in the believer. Note carefully what Menno states: when faith receives the Gospel, "in this the heart is renewed, converted and justified, becomes pious, peaceable, joyous,

is born a child of God, approaches with full confidence the throne of grace, and so becomes a joint heir of Christ and a possessor of eternal joy".[62]

That Menno had in mind a very different concept of justifying faith is particularly evident when, immediately following upon the exhortation to "Believe the Gospel", he goes on to define what this means: "Cease from sin; manifest repentance for your past lives; submit obediently to the Word and the will of the Lord; and you will become companions, citizens, children, and heirs of the new and heavenly Jerusalem, free from your enemies, hell, death, sin and the devil, if only you walk according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh".[63]

In short, what Menno proposes is a very different ordo salutis. The order in which Menno understands the process of salvation is one in which a person is first confronted with the proclamation of the Gospel as a new commandment (the call to penitence) that makes known one's sinfulness and disobedience in its call for obedience and discipleship. Only obedience to Christ forms the basis for individual and corporate discipleship. "Subsequently the Gospel is heard as the promise of forgiveness and everlasting life to all who obey. Only penitent and obedient believers may claim the promise of grace, as a power to retain the new doctrine and the sanctified life, in expectation of the eschaton".[64]

Although Menno continually emphasizes the gratuity of God's grace, quite in keeping with Luther, his continual

emphasis upon faith coupled with obedience and fruits leads to a very different emphasis and tone than the one found in Luther. Menno, by continually tempering the free offer of grace by his persistent references to penitence and obedience, does raise serious questions as to the gratuity of grace, the nature of repentance, the role of human effort in the ordo salutis, and the work of the Holy Spirit. In short, does Menno convert "justification of the sinner" into "justification of the penitent and obedient sinner"?[65]

6. 5. The Pivotal Role of Repentance

Even a cursory reading of Menno will make readily apparent the importance he attaches to penitence. The call to forsake sin and the accompanying summons to a life of obedience and conformity to Christ runs throughout the entire corpus of Menno's writings. Indeed, Menno's theology and, for that matter, that of the entire Dutch Anabaptist movement[66], can be aptly characterized as a penitential-holiness theology. The urgency of this message was only heigthened by the pressing immediacy of the Last Judgement.[67] "The core of the Anabaptist message was formed by themes such as penitence, the mortification of the flesh, conversion and new creation. Radicality was not expressed in original theological ideas, but in a reformist, non-sacramental interpretation of penitential practice, which was now founded exclusively on the Bible".[68] Such an orientation led to an intense emphasis on sanctification for both the individual and the community. In light of this,

"baptism was seen as an apocalyptic sign and as the beginning of a penitent and regenerated life, which had to be observed by means of strict discipline in the congregation of the regenerated believers, in preparation for the return of the Lord".[69]

In light of the importance which Menno attaches to penitence and holiness a more careful examination of this theme is certainly warranted. As we shall discover, there are a number of other themes in Menno's theology, all of which play an important role in his thought and in someway bear upon his treatment of penitence and holiness. Menno's doctrines of sin, the wrath of God, the Holy Spirit and regeneration are all shaped by the emphasis which he places upon penitence and holiness. In due course each of these doctrines will be examined but we will begin with a study of Menno's doctrine of penitence and take up the others in the following chapter.

6. 5.1. Menno's Doctrine of Penitence

Something of the importance that Menno attaches to the doctrine of penitence can be shown simply by looking at the texts and contexts in he speaks of penitence or repentance (Menno seems to use the terms interchangeably).

In one of his earlier writings, "The New Birth" (1537), Menno warns the reader that God:

> . . . will not save you nor forgive your sins nor show you His mercy and grace except according to His Word; namely <u>if you repent and if you believe</u>, if you are born of him, if you do what He has

> commanded and walk as He walks. For if He could save an unrighteous and carnal man without regeneration, faith, and repentance, then he did not teach us the truth. . .
>
> But if you wish to be saved, by all means and first of all, your earthly, ungodly life must be reformed. For it is naught but true repentance that the Scriptures teach and enjoin upon us with admonitions, miracles, examples, ceremonies, and sacraments. . . Wherever true repentance and the new creature are not . . . there man must be eternally lost . . ..
>
> This regeneration of which we write, from which comes the penitent, pious life that has the promise, can only originate in the Word of the Lord . . ..[70]

If Menno is emphatic on the need for "true repentance", an emphasis he has here coupled with regeneration, he can be equally forceful on that which is to be avoided in the pursuit of true repentance.

> Therefore, I tell you again that you cannot be reconciled by means of all the masses, matins, vespers, ceremonies, sacraments, councils, statutes, and commandments under the whole heavens, which the popes and their colleges have made from the beginning. For they are abominations and not reconciliations, I warn you. In vain, says Christ, do they honor me, teaching commandments of men.[71]

Even fervent belief in the righteousness of Christ and faith in him is of no avail unless such belief is accompanied by true repentance. To say that an ". . . unbelieving, refractory, carnal man without regeneration and true repentance was or can be saved, simply because he boasts of faith and the death of Christ, or hears masses and service of the priests . . ." is simply foolishness and a direct contradiction of the Scriptures. What the Scriptures do say is that ". . . the unrepentant must perish in his sins".[72] It is for this reason that Menno can say ". . . I

admonish and entreat you, as one who loves your soul, to repent. Repent, I say, and without delay. The ax is laid unto the root of the trees . . .".[73]

To be avoided at all costs are the ". . . high and mighty lords, princes, and rulers, . . . all the popes, cardinals and bishops, and wise and learned ones, who from the beginning have perverted and darkened the Scriptures" in that they have failed to teach the necessity of repentance thus becoming the purveyors of a Gospel that promises free grace but calls for no repentance.[74]

In conclusion, Menno addresses those who are inclined to regard the Word of the Lord with less seriousness than it deserves, warning them that "it is high time for you to reflect that God's promise of grace is not given to the unregenerate and impenitent, but to the regenerate and penitent".[75] It is the ". . . true regenerate, repentant, and baptized Christians that have the promise . . . who are zealous for God . . . [and are] rightly satisfied with truth unto eternal salvation". In conclusion, Menno again urges the reader to "believe God's reliable Word, reform your sinful lives, pray with confidence, and be obedient to the Gospel of Christ in order that you may receive the eternal promise to your everlasting joy and salvation".[76]

The same emphasis that Menno placed upon penitence in "The New Birth" can also be found within several of his other writings, most notably, "Foundation of Christian Doctrine" (1539). Immediately following the preface Menno

begins an extended exposition of Mark 1:15: "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent and believe the Gospel".[77] Menno treats this verse under three headings: "the day of grace", "of genuine penitence", and "faith". Our attention will be focused on the section which deals with penitence in which the same emphases will be found as that in "The New Birth".

Again Menno strikes at those who would delight in the merits of Christ, as many reform minded people did, but whose life was unchanged by this fact:

> Ah, dear sirs, it will not help a fig to be called Christians, boast of the Lord's blood, death, merits, grace, and Gospel, so long as we are not converted from this wicked, immoral, and shameful life. It is vain that we are called Christians, that Christ died, that we are born in the day of grace, and baptized with water, if we do not walk according to His law, counsel, admonition, will, and command and are not obedient to His Word.[78]

Menno concludes with this stinging question: "What does it profit to speak much of Christ and His Word, if we do not believe Him, and refuse to obey His commandments?".[79]

This repentance must, however, be of a sincere nature. There is an outward and hypocritical repentance, which consists of "fastings, pilgrimages, praying and reading lots of Pater Nosters and Ave Marias, hearing frequent masses, going to confessionals"[80], but such a penitence is ineffectual, vain and misguided for it stands opposed to everything taught and commanded in Scriptures.

What Menno wants is a "penitence possessed of power and works". To paraphrase Menno, in such a penitence there is a

death unto sin and all ungodly works and life is no longer lived according to the lusts of the flesh. It is, in short, a penitence in which evil is immediately forsaken and sin is no longer committed.[81] Menno finds numerous examples of such a penitence in the Bible, such as David, Peter, Matthew, Zacchaeus, and the "sinful woman".[82] What Menno notes about each of these individuals was that, after being confronted with their sins, they turned away from their sin to Christ. These are "the noble fruits of repentance".[83] Most significantly, then, Menno concludes ". . . no one can or may piously glory in the grace of God, the forgiveness of sins, the merit of Christ, unless he has truly repented".[84] It is only to the one who ". . . with all his heart turns from evil and learns to do well, to him the grace of God is proclaimed throughout the whole Scriptures".[85]

What this penitence means for Menno, in specific terms, is outlined shortly thereafter:

> In short, this matter we teach from the Word of God as much as in us is, in order to restrain those carnal lusts which war against the soul. We are to crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts, not to conform to this world, to put off the works of darkness and put on the armour of light; not to love the world, neither the things that are in the world. We must put off the old man with his deeds, and put on the new man, which is renewed in the knowledge after the image of Him that created him. It requires that we put off the old Adam with his whole nature and deceitful lusts, such as pride, avarice, unchastity, hatred, envyings, gluttony, drinking, idolatry, and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness, whose fruits are faith, love, hope, righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. We must be patient in suffering, merciful, compassionate, chaste,

sincerely hating and rebuking all sin, having a sincere love and zeal for God and His Word.[86]

Particularly instructive for understanding Menno's view of repentance is his recounting of the conversation that occurred between Jesus and the two criminals who were crucified with him.[87] Menno is astonished at the response of the one criminal to whom Jesus spoke only briefly but who, upon hearing Jesus speak, was "touched and changed". He promptly "confessed his own sins and wickedness . . . [and] acknowledged [Jesus] to be just, innocent, pure, and without sin.. . . [and] in full confidence drawing near to Him, as to the throne of divine grace, that he might obtain the remission of sins, saying, Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom". Menno calls this a "true Christian faith, and a truly worthy fruit of penitence and repentance" for which the penitent thief received a "consoling joyful word of divine grace and eternal peace from Christ".[88] What impressed Menno about this incident and the thief in particular were two things. First, the immediacy with which he responded once he heard the message and second, his response was one in which he acknowledged his own sinfulness and decisively turned from it. Menno summarizes the whole transaction in one sentence: "For as soon as he [the thief] heard the Gospel of grace he received it in pure conscience through faith and became penitent, regenerated, and pious".[89]

Much more could be written concerning Menno's view of repentance but the basic features of this doctrine are

readily apparent. Menno understands repentance to be the first and most basic step in the Christian life, both preceding and preparing for faith but still remaining as an continual mark of true Christian existence. This penitence is understood in a nonsacramental manner and often stands opposed to the traditional sacrament of penance which Menno views as deceptive because it fails to expose and confront one with his own sinfulness as Menno could testify from his own personal experience.[90] Penitence was, as Menno repeatedly urged, to be sincere and whole hearted and involving much more than the engaging in certain activities or affirming beliefs in certain statements.

Menno was not in any manner attempting to abolish the practice of penance. What he wanted to do was to reinstate it upon a much firmer basis, namely a biblical one, and to free it from any human considerations and to retrieve and deepen the essence of penance.[91] Menno wanted penitence to pervade every aspect of a believer's life. It called for a life in which sin was forsaken and a complete trust in the mercy and grace of God as evidenced by acts of charity and mercy.[92] If penitence does form the core of Menno's message, as has here been argued, then Menno's real call is not to faith but to repentance and good works.

There are, however, several very problematic aspects to Menno's theology of repentance, particularly when it is viewed in light of Luther's emphasis upon <u>sola gratia</u>. First, despite Menno's rejection of any doctrine of human

merit or works-righteousness, he frequently argues that the promise of grace is dependent upon a penitent life and that it is a precondition to receiving grace. Second, Menno fails to specify whether the origin of penitence lies within the range of human possibilities or whether it is dependent upon the initiative of divine grace. These two questions, both of which raise problems concerning the relationship of the divine and the human, or nature and grace, in Menno merit further consideration and will take us further into a study of Menno's theology. We will consider the latter question first.

6. 5.2. The Origins of Repentance

One scholar, Egil Grislis, in writing on Menno's view of good works, has succinctly stated the dilemma Menno has created for himself with his views on grace and freedom: "Indeed, on the surface it may appear that Menno's position is somewhat ambiguous: while on the one hand celebrating the gift of grace that opens for humans the possibility of salvation, Menno on the other hand seems to attribute some freedom of initiative to the human will before grace has been received".[93] Texts can be found in both the early and late writings of Menno supporting both positions.

When Menno speaks of the role of grace in the economy of salvation he attributes to it, without question, priority and effectiveness. In his "Meditation on the Twenty-Fifth Psalm" Menno acknowledges his own waywardness from which he turned only after the "God of grace" taught him the truth.[94]

It is only this grace which can effect repentance: "Therefore, dear Lord, do draw them near, rebuke them, and admonish them and teach them so that they may yet repent, acknowledge the truth, and be saved".[95]

As for faith, Menno affirms that "faith is the beginning all righteousness which avails before God" and this "faith that counts with God is a gift of God, from whence all righteousness proceeds and comes by hearing the divine Word". Furthermore, "all righteousness issues from faith".[96] Menno, along with Augustine, can ask, "What do we, miserable sinners, have that we have not received from Thee?"[97]

To underscore this point, Menno denies the value of any works as a means of gaining divine favor or even the suggestion that faith itself should be seen as a means to merit God's favor.[98] Rather, one should speak of the election or covenant of grace whereby the believer both enters into belief and is sustained in belief (the doctrine of perseverance) through the enabling grace of God.[99]

Menno reinforces this point by clearly describing "good works", which he expects to mark the life of a Christian, as the result, not the precondition, of grace. Typical of Menno's many statements is the following: "where sincere and true faith exists, the faith which avails before God and is a gift of God, . . . there through the blossoming tree of life all manner of precious fruits of righteousness are present . . .".[100] There can be little doubt but that Menno

viewed not only good works but the entire sum and substance of the Christian life as both resulting from and dependent upon divine grace.

Yet, there stands, as we noted above, another strain which runs through Menno's's theology which seems to suggest that the offer of grace is dependent upon human initiative, particularly, the response of repentance.[101] Speaking of Abraham, Menno argues that although "he obeyed and believed the Word of the Lord, and submissively accomplished it without delay, knowing full well that no grace or blessing would be his unless he believed God's Word and did as he was commanded; for obedience inherits the promise".[102]

There is yet another set of texts in which Menno combines both approaches and coordinates rather than opposes human initiative and divine grace.

> Wherever there is faith, called the gift of God by Paul, there also are the power and fruit of faith. Where there is an active, fruitful faith, there is also the promise. But where such a faith does not exist (we speak of adults), there also is no promise. For whoever hears the Word of the Lord and believes it with the heart, manifests it by his fruit and faithfully observes all things the Lord has commanded. This must be done before the just shall live by faith, as Scripture teach, and the remission of his sins is announced to him as Peter in this passage [Acts 2:38] teaches and instructs.[103]

Menno would seem to present three different paradigms for explaining the relationship and role of grace in human actions. At certain points Menno stresses the priority and gratuity of grace and argues that the human response to God, such as repentance, is both divinely initiated and

sustained. At other times, the promise of grace is made dependent upon the human response and, at still other times, Menno attempts to hold both these positions simultaneously.[104]

How is this ambiguity in Menno's position to be understood? Aside from assuming that Menno was either inconsistent or simply incompetent, is there some logic which guides Menno's thought? The problem is complicated by the manner in which Menno addresses the problem. For whatever reason he does not engage the question with the language, interests and precision of a scholastic theologian but, while making it difficult, this does not preclude us from making several observations and offering a tentative solution to this problem. First, it needs to be stated that any treatment of Menno's thought on this issue needs to take into account both sides of the issue, which is, in effect, precisely the cause of the problem. To ignore either alternative is to avoid the tension that is inherent in Menno's theology and so to misrepresent him.[105] Second, the relationship that exists between the polarities in Menno's thought must be noted and their tension described. These polarities can be described as "complexities" and a "perception of depth" rather than contradiction and confusion[106] or justified on the basis of an appeal to precedent such as a following a certain tradition or even Scripture itself.[107] Another alternative would be to rank each of these alternatives in terms of their importance to Menno and to label one a

"minority report".[108] Each of these approaches does have merit and could throw further light upon Menno's thought but, whatever conclusion one comes to, one point needs to be made. Menno's conceptualization of the problem was very different from that of Luther. For Menno, an emphasis upon the role and involvement of the human will, both prior to and subsequent to conversion was not intended to be a negation of the role of grace but was intended to have exactly the opposite effect, that is, Menno's intent in stressing human initiative was to take seriously the offer of grace, not to preclude it, render it superfluous or to usurp its initiative. At this point the contrast between Luther and Menno is plainly evident. Luther chose to oppose divine grace and human freedom for to do otherwise was, he feared, to fall into Pelagianism. For Menno, human initiative is necessary precisely because he wishes to take the offer of grace seriously but he attaches no merit to any such actions.

6. 5.3. The Motivating Factor in Repentance

Our treatment of penance would be incomplete if we did not look briefly at what Menno has to say about the wrath of God for this stands as the motivating factor in causing a person to repent of sin. In reading what Menno has to say on the wrath of God one cannot but be struck by the vividness of his language and his certainty in the wrath of God.

Menno speaks of God as a "righteous Judge" who will appear in due time to judge the wicked because he hates

wickedness and loves goodness.[109] His "stern judgement and awful wrath" will come upon those who seek falsehood and obstinately avoid the truth.[110] God's wrath will come without fail[111] and, when it does come, it will fall without partiality upon all those deserving of it.[112] Even the apparent delay in the coming of God's wrath should not give comfort or cause for complacency because "the threatened punishment must come in time, even though it should be delayed a thousand years" for "the Word of God . . . [is] true and unchangeable".[113] Therefore Menno warns his reader that "Now it is today; yesterday is past; tomorrow is not promised us. Short is the time; the Judge is at the door. Therefore do not postpone to turn unto the Lord, and do not defer it from day to day, for His wrath will soon overtake you".[114] Do not hope at that time to experience God's benevolence for "God the Lord is a God who adheres to His Word so firmly that he brought calamity upon Adam and Eve and their posterity . . .".[115]

This wrath can, however, have a very salutary effect for when ". . . you would consider and realize how earnestly the righteous God insists upon His holy Word, and how terribly his wrath has always burned against those who did not abide in His divine Word, then you would without doubt, . . . tremble in your inmost soul before God on account of your disobedience".[116] This godly fear "acknowledges the judgement and wrath of the Lord over all transgressions and sins which are committed against His will and Word".[117] Such

fear is actually the initial "fruit" of faith for the "fear of the Lord" is "really the power which expels, buries, slays, crushes, and destroys the sins of believers, and is the first part of true repentance".[118] Even the power of original sin can be broken by a "pure fear of the Lord".[119]

For Menno the wrath of God is an abiding and terrible reality that is to turn the sinner away from his sin by confronting him with the reality of his sinfulness. This fear, which is the beginning of faith, is most beneficial for it is the cause of repentance and starts the sinner on the road to faith.[120] Menno is not primarily interested in the theological problems and subtleties that speaking of God's wrath raises because he utilizes this theological concept in a hortatory manner to provoke repentance.

Menno does balance his view of God's wrath with an emphasis upon God's love. He can speak eloquently and poetically about God's love manifest in Christ's incarnation and death upon a cross.[121] One of the reasons the Lord's Supper is celebrated is to provide the assemblied group of believers with an opportunity to recall Christ's love for them evidenced by his willingness to die on their behalf.[122]

Although there are fewer explicit references to God's love than to God's wrath in Menno's writings there is little doubt that Menno does, like Luther, have a very lively sense of both of these attributes of God. What makes Menno very different is the manner in which he relates them to one another. Menno seems to view the God's love as following

upon his wrath, both in historical and individual terms, that is, the era of God's wrath is succeeded by the era of love. In historical terms, prior to the coming of Christ, Menno seems to envision God's wrath as the mode in which he related to the world but with the coming of Christ, the love of God is now made plain. Menno does not reflect upon what relationship may exist between God's wrath and love in the being of God himself or as to which of these motives is dominant in God's own being.

The same relationship seems to exist in terms of the individual believer's experience. Initially the believer experiences God's wrath but when this wrath has had its desired effect and driven him from his sin it is replaced with the experience of God's love.[123]

6. 6. Conclusion

If we understand Menno's theology to be one that can be characterized as a penitential-holiness theology then this chapter has laid the foundations for our study of Menno. Menno was no doubt deeply influenced by Luther and learned a great deal from him but Menno was shocked at the moral laxity he saw among the Lutherans. The proclamation of the "full Gospel" meant, for Menno, teaching that repentance was the first and most basic step in the life of faith and this should and must lead to obedience.

For Menno the first step in the proclamation of this "full Gospel" was preaching repentance. There was no attempt on Menno's part to abolish the practice or institution of

penance itself but rather to offer a nonsacramental interpretation of it which was both more biblically based and personally affective. Menno's real call, at many points, is to repentance and good works rather than faith.

Menno's formulation of this doctrine is imprecise at points because of his over riding concern to stress the importance and necessity of repentance. On occasion Menno will make the promise of grace dependent upon repentance and obedience but he does not do so to preclude grace or to suggest that there is any merit in such efforts. In the final analysis, Menno sees even repentance as a gift of God.

Chapter Seven

The Power of Faith and the Effects of the Holy Spirit

7. 1. Introduction

In our discussion of Luther it was very easy to speak about faith and good works separately since Luther himself draws such a sharp line between the two. Menno, however, is different. As we have seen already, good works, while not the same as faith or equivalent to it, are an inherent part of faith in Menno's understanding. Therefore, in this chapter shall treat faith and good works, or obedience as Menno often speaks of them, together. Menno particularly emphasizes the "power" of faith to effect a change in the human heart and the effect of this power is the "new creature". It is because of what Menno understands this new creature to be that he can speak of the possibility and obligation of obedience. What we shall discover is that Menno's doctrine of the Incarnation plays a critical role in both his understanding of the new creature and his ethics.

7. 2. Faith and Its Powers

At several points in his various writings Menno offers quite an extended treatment of faith in which he identifies its uniqueness and importance to Christian life. By and large the language which Menno uses to describe faith is

quite common and sounds very much like that which Luther would use but Menno does, in a way peculiar to himself, develop the concept of faith as an "active and effective power". This latter concept plays a crucial role in Menno's understanding of regeneration and the new creature which will be examined in turn but, for now, our attention will be focused on the nature of faith.

Throughout Menno's discussion of faith there are several notes which he consistently strikes when he speaks on this subject. First, "faith . . . is not every man's possession , but it is a gift of God".[1] This gift of faith is dependent upon hearing the "divine Word" and the activity of the Holy Spirit.[2] As such, this precludes infant baptism for children of such a tender age cannot understand the Gospel for they have not yet reached "the age of understanding".[3] Upon hearing the message and under the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit, faith accepts as sure and true the Word of God and puts its trust in the promise of God.[4] Faith, however, is not merely the "belief of the words of God, accepting them as true; but . . . accepting God for what he is, as he has revealed himself in the living, spiritually incandescent Word. Faith, in other words, is not solely intellectual in character".[5]

Such a faith, because of its belief in the promise and power of God, brings justification. Relying on the words of several biblical texts, Menno proclaims that believers are "justified by faith and have peace with God, through our

Lord Jesus Christ, by whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand . . .".[6] It should not be thought that faith, by virtue of any inherent quality, brings a reward but, rather, that faith is effective only because God has attached his promise to true faith.[7] In short, "true faith is the fullness of all righteousness (Rom. 3 and 5); yes, it is the mother which bears all Christian virtues, and by reason of this, the Word of God ascribes everything to it, such as righteousness, blessing, salvation, and life everlasting".[8]

This true faith is readily recognizable because "faith and its fruits are inseparable".[9] A fruitful faith is one in which faith is "active through love"[10] "for that powerful, active faith constrains him [the believer] to all obedience and to every good work".[11] If the fear of God was the initial step in coming to faith because it led to repentance, then faith, when it comes about, "produces the love of God whereby we love Him". Once faith understands "the unsearchably great riches of grace which our merciful good Father, through Christ, has so graciously granted" faith cannot but be moved to love God in return and faith is "thus freely urged, through the constraining power of love issuing from such unfeigned faith, to obedience to all the commandments of God".[12] Menno finds it so difficult to conceive of a faith which does not issue in works such that "if true faith and obedience are separated from each other . . .", he draws the conclusion that "such faith does not profit us,

for it has no promise because of disobedience, and is useless and dead before God".[13]

To strengthen his argument that faith must make its presence known in and through works, Menno frequently appeals to the imagery of the tree and its fruit (Matthew 7:16-20). Menno employs this proverb in three different but related senses. First, Menno uses it to explain what justification by faith means. The phrases, "the just shall live by faith" and "a good tree brings forth fruit", are taken to be equivalent phrases.[14] Just as a "good , fruitful tree of its own accord, without any compulsion, always brings forth its own good fruits, so also the true Christian faith must bring forth its own good fruits. For it is infallible, The righteous must live out his faith".[15]

Menno uses the analogy of the tree and its fruit to explain the relationship that is to exist between faith and good works. Faith is to naturally and spontaneously give rise to good works, just as a tree naturally produces fruit. Such a relationship illustrates both the nature of faith, which is to perform good works, and the relationship of faith and good works, which is that of a fundamental unity.

Second, the analogy provides Menno with a criteria by which the presence of true faith can be detected. Simply put, the principle is that "every tree is known by its fruit".[16]

> True faith, which is acceptable before God cannot be barren; it must bring forth fruit and manifest its nature.. . . Every tree which bringeth not

> forth good fruit although loaded with leaves, must be subject to the curse and consumed by fire.. . . A fruitless impotent faith . . . which does not work by love, be it ever so learned, wise, eloquent, fine-appearing, and miraculous, is in the sight of God unclean, dead, and accursed.[17]

Menno uses this principle against those who were persecuting the Dutch Anabaptists and against the leaders of the state churches, be they Lutheran or Reformed, declaring that anyone who would take up a sword against innocent and defenseless people who are only trying to live out their faith peaceably cannot possess a true faith.[18]

Third, Menno employs this proverb, just as the New Testament does (which is where Menno got it from) as a warning against the coming of future judgement: "The ax is laid at the root of the tree. Therefore every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire". In light of the coming of God's judgement, Menno speaks only one word: "Repent".[19] The proverb here functions to provide motivation for repentance.

Our discussion so far has highlighted several facts concerning Menno's view of faith. Faith is a gift of God and it arises from a trust in God's promises. It is the source and cause off all virtues manifest in the Christian life and, as Menno never tires of repeating, this faith manifests itself in good works. On the basis of this relationship between faith and works Menno makes two deductions. First, faith must issue in good works if it is true faith and second, the presence or absence of good works is a certain indicator of the nature of faith that is present. It is the

emphasis that Menno puts upon this latter aspect of faith, the unity of faith and good works, that is one of the unique aspects of his thought.

If we press the question further and want to know upon what basis Menno grounds this relationship between faith and works the answer lies in Menno's novel conception of faith as a "power" or "activity". Several scholars have noted that one of the unique aspects of Menno's thought is the emphasis and frequency of the "language of power" that occurs in Menno's writings.[20] "Effective" and "power" are among some of the most frequently occurring terms in Menno's writings.[21] Conceiving of faith as a power gives rise to a fundamental principle which guides much of Menno's thought and particularly his understanding of faith: "spiritual reality must by its very nature express itself; it cannot remain hidden but must find expression".[22]

One indication of how deeply this notion runs in Menno can be seen in his description of God. He speaks of God not so much as being but as a power or activity. Menno speaks of the three persons of the Trinity as "names, activities, and powers".[23] To be certain, Menno does not reduce the Godhead to a "modalism of power" but he certainly places the emphasis upon the power and actions of God. This "language of power" will become more evident when faith is examined.

As already indicated, the principle which guides Menno's thought is that spiritual reality must express itself. Such a statement demands a definition of what

"nature" and "property" mean but Menno does not offer a full definition of these terms. The closest Menno comes is in his debate with Micron where, in a discussion on Christological union of natures, he defines "nature" as a "property possessed by a person".[24] Menno, as is typical of him, does not press the philosophical discussion of this point but he does, in one of his earliest works, "The Spiritual Resurrection" (1536), work out what this means in very practical terms.

The principle which Menno states here is that "all creatures bring forth after their kind, and every creature partakes of the properties, propensities, and dispositions of that which brought it forth".[25] Menno immediately spells out what this principle means in terms of two contrary natures:

> As Christ says, That which is born of flesh is flesh, and cannot see eternal life; and, that which is born of the Spirit is spirit, life and peace . . . .. That which is born of flesh, out of the earth through corruptible seed, is carnally minded, earthly and speaks of earthly things, and is desirous after earthly and perishable things.

Menno follows this statement with a lengthy description of the characteristics of what he has called the flesh and the spirit. Speaking of the flesh Menno says that:

> all its thoughts, feelings and desires are directed toward earthly, temporal, or visible things . . . .. That which is born of flesh and blood is flesh and blood and is carnally minded, because the carnal mind is at enmity with God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. For they are altogether deaf, blind, and ignorant in divine things. A carnal man cannot comprehend divine things, for his nature is not

> thus, but to contrary his mind is adverse and hostile to God.

The reason the carnal man cannot understand divine things is that he "has nothing of the divine nature dwelling in him, has nothing in common with God, but is much rather possessed of a contrary nature, namely, unmerciful, unjust, unclean, quarrelsome, contrary, disobedient, without understanding, and irreverent". In short, he is a "stranger to the divine nature".[24]

When Menno turns to those who are born of the spirit his comments reflect the development of the principle noted above, that "all creatures bring forth fruit after their kind". The principle is invariable, only the fruits vary as is plainly evident in the case of those born of the Spirit. Menno states the principle positively now: "all those born and regenerated from above out of God, through the living Word, are also of the mind and disposition, and have the same aptitude for good that He has of whom they are born and begotten". This is an astonishing claim but Menno quickly tempers it by his following statements:

> For what the nature of God or Christ is, we may readily learn from the Scriptures. For Christ has expressly portrayed Himself in His Word, that is, as to the nature which He would have us understand, grasp and follow and emulate, not according to His divine nature, seeing He is the true image of the invisible God . . . but according to His life and conversation here on earth, shown forth among men in works and deeds as an example set before us to follow so that we might thereby become partakers of His nature in the spirit, to become like unto Him.

Again, Menno spells out what this likeness entails in

very specific terms: "Christ is . . . represented to us as humble, meek, merciful, just, holy, wise, spiritual, long-suffering, patient, peaceable, lovely, obedient, and good, as the perfection of all things; for in Him there is an upright nature". This model of Christ, which Menno understands in terms of a moral imitation, is to stand as an "example [to believers] until we become like it in nature and reveal it by our walk".[27] What Menno is calling for, above all else, is a moral conformity to Christ, especially one that follows the example of his earthly life.[28]

Menno goes on to explain this process in language that is more theological:

> . . . they have moritified their flesh and have buried their sinful body which Christ in baptism, with its lusts and desires, and now no longer serve sin unto unrighteousness, but much more righteousness unto sanctification. For they have put on Christ and are purified through the Holy Ghost in their consicences from dead works to serve the living God; bringing forth through the Spirit the fruits of the Spirit . . .. [They] have quit the service of sin, no longer to live in sin or serve it . . . [but] as faithful servants voluntarily obligated themselves to God . . ..[29]

The question immediately arises for Menno's theology as to what is the means by which a "translocation from carnality to spirituality"[30] is effected? For Menno, the answer is simple. It is faith. It is faith because "true faith which counts before God, is a living and saving power, which through the preaching of the holy Word is bestowed by God upon the heart; a thing that stirs, changes, and regenerates it to newness of mind; restrains all ungodliness in us; destroys all pride, ambition, and selfishness; and

makes us like children in malice."[351]

Menno has numerous statements along this line where faith is repeatedly described in the language of power and its effects are clearly outlined.

> For all who eat of this bread and drink of this cup worthily must be changed in the inner man, and converted and renewed in their minds through the power of the divine Word. By faith they must become new creatures, born of God, and transplanted from Adam into Christ; they must become of a Christian disposition, sympathetic, peaceable, merciful, affectionate, of a humble heart, obedient to the Word of the Lord.[352]

> . . . for that powerful, active faith constrains him to all obedience and every good work.[353]

> The new birth consists, verily, not in water nor in words; but it is the heavenly, living, and quickening power of God in our hearts which flows forth from God, and which by the preaching of the divine Word, if we accept it by faith, quickens, renews, pierces, and converts our hearts, so that we are changed and converted from unbelief to faith, from unrighteousness to righteousness, from evil to good, from carnality to spirituality, from the earthly to the heavenly from the wicked nature of Adam to the good nature of Jesus Christ.[354]

> . . . true faith that avails before God and has the promise of Scriptures; namely, which has drive, power, effect, and fruit, agreeing with the Gospel of Christ and the doctrine of the apostles.[355]

> For the true evangelical faith which makes the heart upright and pious before God, moves, changes, urges, and constrains a man so that he will always hate the evil and gladly do the things which are right and good.[356]

What emerges from this brief survey (more passages could be quoted, all to the same effect[357]) is Menno's definition of faith as power to transform. Although faith does include cognitive (the ability to intellectually understand faith) and verbal (the ability to articulate faith)

elements, these aspects are overwhelmed by Menno's emphasis upon the transforming effect that faith has. Faith, for Menno, is known by the effect which it creates. Hence, faith must give rise to good works or it simply cannot be faith.

If, however, we ask what is it about faith that enables it to effect such a change we must lie another set of texts alongside of those which are quoted above. Menno is very clear that faith itself has no inherent virtues or qualities that allow it to act[38] but that it is the Holy Spirit, not faith per se, to whom the language of power rightly belongs.

> God's work is not keeping a dead letter, an imitation, nor is it the sounding of bells and organs and singing; but it is a heavenly power, a vital moving of the Holy Ghost which ignites the hearts and minds of believers; pervades, comforts, anoints, encourages, rouses and stirs . . . .[39]

> But they are the true congregation of Christ who are truly converted, who are born from above of God, who are of a regenerate mind by the operation of the Holy Spirit through the hearing of the divine Word, and have become the children of God, have entered into obedience to Him, and live unblamably in his holy commandments . . . .[40]

> For a genuine Christian faith cannot be idle, but it changes, grows, renews, purifies, sanctifies, and justifies more and more. It . . . receives the Holy Ghost, becomes partaker of the divine nature, and is renewed after the image of Him who created him. It lives out the power of Christ which is in it; all its ways are righteousness, godliness, honesty, chastity, truth, wisdom, goodness, kindliness, light, love, peace.[41]

The Holy Spirit clearly plays a major role in the theology of Menno.[42] The Spirit is the agent who effects the radical change causing a believer to be born of the Spirit as opposed to the flesh. The distinction that Menno draws between the flesh and the Spirit, the world and the

church, or the two kingdoms, is so sharp and the gap between them unbridgeable, at least from the human perspective, that only a divine act can transform human nature. It thus becomes the task of the Holy Spirit in Menno's theology to cause this metamorphosis of character. How and what this change means for Menno will be explored below but for the moment we will continue our study of Menno's language of power as he applies it to the Holy Spirit.

John Loeschen, in his book, The Divine Community: Trinity, Church, and Ethics in Reformation Theologies, has drawn attention to several other interesting facts concerning Menno's doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Using the methodology of statistical analysis and applying it to a careful study of Menno's "Foundation of Christian Doctrine" he has concluded that Menno consistently associated "Spirit" and "power"[43], a conclusion that is well confirmed in Menno's other writings. Loeschen also, on the basis of his study of "Foundation of Christian Doctrine", draws several other conclusions which our significant for our study.

Loeschen found that Menno speaks of grace as God's power and that he most frequently associates grace with the terms "Spirit" and other cognate forms, such as "Spirit of God" and "Holy Spirit". "The basis of this close association of grace with the cognate forms of 'Spirit' is power. More precisely, grace as power is associated with those official, facilitating, or initiating functions which Simons consistently ascribes to the Holy Spirit . . .".[44] Nowhere

is this more evident that in Menno's own recounting of his conversion where grace, Spirit and power are the most frequently mentioned terms and terms that are associated with one another. The mutual association of these terms creates a context in which they interpret one another and, again, they speak of power.[45]

For Menno, the Spirit is eminently but not exclusively associated with power which is understood within two perspectives. When speaking about the natural world and general relationships to God, Menno's language is vague, general and broadly orthodox but he really shows little interest in this world. Menno's real interest in the power of God's Spirit is as it acts to bring people to conversion:

> In this pre-Christian evaluative perspective, it is the Holy Spirit who is the moving force effecting those official, "signpost" decisions and acts which signal either the beginning of the Christian fact (e.g., the incarnation, the baptism of Christ, Pentecost, the Great commission), or the beginning of man's entrance into that fact (e.g., the stirring of the heart of the faithful to repentance, desire to conform to Christ's teachings, and baptism). The terms for the functions of the Holy Spirit are now more intimate. Instead of "power", we have now "an urging", a "vital moving", "piercing", "unusual regenerating, renewing, vivifying" action.. . . Simons' own theological term for power, "grace", is correspondingly modulated in meaning.[46]

Understood in this manner it is clear why faith is of such importance to Menno and what it is about faith that makes it so vital. Faith is tied to the ability to hear, read and understand the Bible and, as such, is very much a human possibility but this does not, in and of itself, lead to salvation. For that, the Spirit, moving powerfully, is

the effective agent. Only as the Spirit works, creating a new spiritual and fruitful faith, is salvation attained. What Menno understands to be the after effects of the Spirit's working he calls the "new creature"..

7. 3. The New Creature

If Menno's theology is characterized as a penitential-holiness, there can be little doubt that his conception of the "new creature" stands at the center of what holiness means to him. The "new creature" is that which has been wrought by repentance, faith and the power of the Holy Spirit. Everything that Menno has said so far leads up to this point and everything which follows presupposes it.[47] Central to Menno's understanding of the "new creature" is his understanding of regeneration which we shall examine in some detail.

Writing in the "Foundation of Christian Doctrine" Menno describes regeneration as an ". . . inward change which converts a man by the power of God through faith from evil to good, from carnality to spirituality, from unrighteousness to righteousness, out of Adam into Christ".[48] Such a transformation cannot originate in any ceremony or ritual but must be achieved through faith. How this occurs and what its results are are explained by Menno:

> In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature. All who are born of God are changed and renewed in the inner man, translated from Adam into Christ. They are ready to obey the Word of the Lord . . .. [They] submit to the Word and ordinances of the

> Lord without reluctance or opposition.. . . [They become] fruitful branches of Christ, the true vine and as comrades in the church of the Lord. They receive forgiveness of their sins and the gift of the Holy Ghost. They put on Christ; enter into the ark of Noah; and are secured against the dreadful deluge of the wrath to come . . .. This, however, not by the power of water alone or the sign, but by the power of the divine Word received through faith. For where there is not faith through love working obedience . . . there is no promise.[49]

How important the "new creature" is to Menno he explains in a later writing, "Brief Confession on the Incarnation" (1544): ". . . before God neither baptism, nor Supper, nor any other outward ordinances avail, if partaken of without Spirit and the new creation. But before God, only faith, love, Spirit, and the new creation or regeneration avail . . .".[50] For Menno, the new creature, which has it locus beyond external forms, is more important than even the scriptural ordinances of the church.[51]

Menno's concern to stress the importance of the new creature will even guide his interpretation of certain texts. One of the earliest booklets Menno wrote was "The Spiritual Resurrection" (1536) and on the title page of that booklet, in addition to his standard quotation of I Corinthians 3:11, Menno quotes Revelation 20:6: "Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power".[52] In its context this verse refers to those who have been martyred for their faith and their resurrection from physical death. Menno gives this verse a spiritualized interpretation. It now applies to those presently living but who are to die to their old way

of life, to sin and their Adamic nature and to live a new life of righteousness. This renewal or rebirth is now the first resurrection.[53]

To more fully understand how the "new creature" is begotten and what this process entails we shall look at the work of two scholars who have both attempted to explain Menno's understanding of the "new creature". The first of these is Alvin Beachy and the second is William Keeney.

Beachy begins by arguing that the Anabaptists had a very different view of salvation than that held by the other reformers because of their different understanding of grace. The Anabaptist view was unique because it went beyond the concept of grace as found in Paul to the Gospels, notably the Gospel of John. Salvation is now understood, according to the Johannine writings, as the divinization of man. This view of salvation shaped, in turn, their understanding of grace. "Thus grace is for the Radical Reformers . . . an ontological change within the individual believer. Grace is God's act whereby He renews <u>the divine image in man through the Holy Spirit</u> and makes the believer <u>a participant in the divine nature</u>". This divine gift of grace, seen in this light, ". . . did enable one to rise higher in the scale of Christian perfection than was generally thought possible".[54]

Beachy's emphasis on "renewal" and "divinization" as the unique feature of Anabaptism needs greater attention. Beachy argues that the Anabaptists emphasized divinization

because of their view of sin. In contrast to the reformers who understood sin primarily as the bondage of the will, the Anabaptists looked upon sin as the ". . . corruption of man's physical nature or upon the loss of his ability to distinguish between good and evil".[55] As a consequence of defining sin in this way, grace and its effects are understood to be the ". . . restoration of man's original nature and the renewal of lost facilities and virtues through participation in the divine nature . . .".[56] Beachy describes the views of Denck and Hubmaier, two other Anabaptist leaders, who see God's grace effecting an ontological change in which ". . . the lost image of God [as given at creation] is restored, and a divine power indwells the life of the believer thus making it possible for him to accomplish what was previously impossible".[57] Marpeck speaks of the Spirit as the one who transfers man from the natural to the supernatural, the realm in which it is possible to fulfill God's law.[58]

The Dutch Anabaptists (Beachy here includes Menno and Dirk Philips) prefer to speak of the "new birth" or "birth out of God". The prepositions which are used to describe this event are very carefully chosen and applied so that any suggestion of pantheism is avoided. The process of rebirth is described as one in which:

> man is born out of (uit) and not from (van) God so that man's divine nature can only be created or conferred. On the other hand Christ and the Holy Spirit are begotten from (van) God so that their divinity is uncreated.. . . Jesus Christ who is

> from (van) God but born out of (uit) man partook of human nature with its weaknesses and mortality, yet was without sin. Man, on the other hand, is born anew out of (uit) God and now partakes of the divine nature and becomes like Christ in holiness, glory, purity and eternal life.[59]

The significance of the careful use of these prepositions lies in the relationship that is suggested by them to the body of origin. The preposition "van" is more possessive and suggests that the offspring is very much a "part of" that from which it originated. It is used to describe the relationship between a mother and her child. The other preposition, "uit", suggests a more distant relationship. It is used like the German "aus" and is used, for instance, when saying that a plant grows out of the soil.

Beachy describes those who are regenerated as those who are ". . . again created in God's image and share in the nature of Christ, the second Adam, in a quasi-physical manner. Christians are bone of Christ's bone and flesh of Christ's flesh".[60] Menno understands this new nature which is received in regeneration as one in which the believer is conformed to the nature and image of Christ as Christ is conformed to the nature and image of God:

> . . . you must be conformed unto Christ in mind, spirit, heart, and will, both in doctrine and in life, as Jesus Christ is conformed unto the nature and image of His blessed heavenly Father to which He was begotten so that He did nothing but that which He saw the Father . . .. In the same manner those who are begotten of the living, saving Word of our beloved Jesus Christ are by virtue of their new birth so joined to Christ, are become so like unto Him, so really implanted into Him, so

> converted into His heavenly nature, that they do not teach nor believe any doctrine but that which agrees with the doctrine of Christ . . . .[61]

Such confidence in the process of transformation makes the perfectionist tendencies in Menno's thought apparent but Menno remained aware that the struggle with the old Adamic nature would continue until the end of life.[62]

In Beachy's estimation, at the core of Menno's belief in regeneration is his belief in "birth out of God" which Menno very carefully describes. Beachy's argument can be summarized in the following lines: "Through the Holy Spirit the image in man which was lost through the Fall is restored, and the believer is made a participant in the divine nature itself. Thus, the result of grace in man is a reversal of the incarnation in which the eternal Word becomes man in order that man may become God".[63]

While Beachy's argument is fundamentally correct in that he stresses the importance of regeneration in Menno's thought there are several points which he does not clarify. First, there is a confusion in the language Beachy uses to describe the event of regeneration. He describes it as "the renewal of the divine image" and "divinization". Are these two phrases simply different perspectives on the same event or are they two different processes which speak of different things? Beachy's use of these two phrases seems to be quite indiscriminate, and therefore, confusing. Second, Beachy draws attention to the role of the Incarnation in regeneration but he does not spell out the relationship that

exists between these two events although he does hint at it. Third, Beachy does indicate that there is some relationship between between ethics and regeneration but he does not develop the significance of this relationship to the degree to which it is possible.[44] Finally, my reading of Menno does not support Beachy's claim that he relied on the Johannine writings more so than any others. Actually, Menno's doctrine of "birth out of God" is a result of theological convictions (as will be shown below) rather than his biblicism.

One of the strengthes of Keeney's work on Dutch Anabaptism[45] (Keeney looks at Menno and Dirk Philips) is the attention he draws to the direct relationship that exists between the Incarnation and soteriology in their thought. To understand this relationship it is necessary to explain briefly Menno and Philips' understanding of the Atonement and then to show what relationship this has to the Incarnation.

Both Menno and Philips employed an Anselmic conception of redemption.[46] The basic assumption of Anselm's theory of the Atonement was that satisfaction for the transgressions committed by man must be made. The crux of the problem lies in human sinfulness which renders the individual incapable of redressing the situation since all human efforts are marred by sin which God, in his holiness, finds unacceptable. If man is unable to offer the necessary restitution for his sin then God must do it but, since it is man who has

sinned, it is necessary that man make satisfaction for his sins. The solution to this dilemma is that God became man, the Incarnation, and, as a man, Christ's sinless life was of infinite value and could cover the sins of all of humanity.[67] The Dutch Anabaptist explanation of the sinlessness of Jesus, the critical point in Anselm's atonement theory, constitutes one of the unique features of their theology.

The major concern of Menno and Philips was to preserve the sinlessness of Jesus. Menno writes of Christ that:

> . . . in accordance with the Lord's Word, that the Scriptures exempts none from sin but Him that is free indeed, namely Jesus Christ (Isa, 53:13); whereby it is plainly shown that he is not from (van) Mary's flesh, which was also included under sin; but that the Father's most glorious Word, which knew no sin, became flesh, John, 1:14.[68]

Through their precise formulation of this problem, both Menno and Philips attempted to explain the natural birth of Jesus as like that of any other human but to allow for a different origin, namely divine, which would eliminate the sinful human nature. Through their careful use of certain prepositions they argued that "Jesus Christ was conceived in [in] Mary through [door]or from [van] the Holy Spirit , but was born out of [uit] and not from [van] Mary. They also say that Jesus was born from [van] God out of [uit] of Mary."[69] Menno, in particular, is very explicit on the use of these prepositions and he discusses the alternatives and their implications for his theology.[70]

The reason for Menno's precision in the use of these

terms lies in his conviction that if Jesus was born "from", that is, van, Mary then he would have inherited the corrupt and sinful nature of humanity and his death would be ineffective. Menno supported this contention with what he considered to be a sound physiological theory which stated that in generation only the male seed was active. The women was only a receptive field.[71] If Jesus was conceived by the Spirit, by which Menno means the elimination of a human father, he would be preserved from sin with Mary functioning only as a carrier of the child.[72]

To accomplish this Menno argued that Jesus had "celestial flesh" which was true human nature but that this ". . . human nature was a creation of God but of prelapsarian Adamic nature which was both sinless and immortal".[73] Thus Menno avoided Gnosticism, Docetism and Monophysitism for Jesus was of the same nature as man albeit of a prelapsarian one. Menno never attempted to explain how God could do this, preferring to regard it as a miracle.

In order to understand more fully the nature of this new creature a brief look at Menno's view of the creation and fall of man would be helpful. Menno's view of creation is a traditional one. Humanity was created with a dual nature. Adam was earthly since he was made of dust but he was also endowed with a divine nature, the divine image. Soon after being created man fell away from God as a result of his disobedience to God's commands.[74] Lost in the fall was man's original purity and immortality but, even though

the divine nature was lost, God made provision for this and promised its restoration.[75] The guilt and loss which resulted from this original disobedience was passed on to each successive generation through physical transmission.[76] Even though the original image of God in man was lost, the ability to distinguish between good and evil remained although man could not always successfully act on this knowledge because the will to obey had been lost. The promise of God was to restore this original nature which man was unable to do for himself.[77]

Having said this about creation and the human fall into sin, it is also necessary to nuance Menno's statements because, while true in their broad outline, they do not indicate the role these doctrines actually play in Menno's thought. First, it must be noted that while Menno does state his belief in original sin, the term occurs relatively rarely in his writings and, when it does appear, it is usually in connection with a discussion of the practice of infant baptism.[78] Therefore, the exact role and importance this doctrine has for Menno needs careful consideration seeing as it appears primarily in one particular context which is often a very polemical one. Second, Menno is as much concerned with the specific acts which issue from sin as he is in the condition in which original sin left humanity. To say that Menno is interested primarily in specific sins (sins which Menno often spells out in long lists[79]) is to misunderstand Menno. His thought seems to

move in both directions-- from stating that sin is caused by a disordered nature to reasoning that since man sins, he must have a sinful nature.[80] Third, although Menno affirmed that humans were created in the image of God, only rarely does he refer to this original creation.[81] Much more common are Menno's references to being created "in" or "after" the image of God following conversion and the new birth.[82]

> If this good and perfect gift of the new birth be given us of the Father of light, by grace, then we are chosen children of God.. . . Then we are conformed unto Christ. Then we are created after the image of God. Then we have the sign Tau on our foreheads.[83]

It is just this emphasis that we find in Menno's discussion of justification which results in the "new birth" or the "birth out of God". In this event the divine nature is again restored to man through an act of the Holy Spirit. The result is an ontological change which affects the total person. The principle which governs this transformation was one that was noted before: "creatures bring forth after their own kind", the flesh after the flesh and the spirit after the spirit.[84] Keeney explains well this process of new birth:

> . . . man was born once of Adam and had a human nature that was carnal and sinful, earthly and corruptible, so that he receives another nature which was Adam's originally, but is now given through the second Adam, Jesus Christ. This is spiritual and divine, it is incorruptible and heavenly.. . .
>
> Through no work of his own, man becomes a partaker of the divine nature. He is transplanted into God through the Holy Spirit. This does not mean that man is like God and Christ in true being and person [recall Menno's careful use of certain

> prepositions]. The creature cannot become the Creator. Man still retains his human nature along with its weaknesses as long as he is flesh and blood. But the divine nature which restores the divine virtues and grants eternal life is added.[85]

Menno is very careful to avoid any suggestion of pantheism in which man is absorbed into God. The point of distinction between man and Christ, who also has the same prelapsarian Adamic nature, is that man's new nature is created or conferred while Christ's is begotten from, van, God so that his divinity is uncreated.[86] Yet, by virtue of this new birth, man can be called "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh" in reference to Christ.[87] In this process what man gains is the nature he had lost and could not regain on his own.

These distinctions have clarified how Menno understands the process of regeneration and "birth out of God". In his new life, man receives (again) his original prelapsarian nature. Seen from this perspective, man is a renewed being. Christ also has this prelapsarian nature and it is he who confers it upon man. Man does receive a divine nature because, in its origin, it does come from God but this nature is conferred rather than begotten. It can be no wonder, in light of Menno's understanding of the Incarnation and its relationship to his soteriology, that he both expected and emphasized obedience and a fruitful faith. We turn now to explore what Menno has to say about "post-conversion" life and the fruit of faith.

7. 4. The Manifestation of Faith

Menno's doctrine of "good works", like his understanding of repentance and faith, is deeply rooted in the late medieval doctrine of penance. To be sure, this medieval doctrine underwent substantial revision in light of the insights of the Reformation, notably in the role and involvement of the priest[88], but it basic impulses remained. The most basic of these was the emphasis upon affective repentance and a marked betterment in one's moral life. This emphasis is plainly evident in the writings of Menno, as we have seen already in our discussion of repentance, faith and regeneration, but this theme will be treated more explicitly now and giver the fuller attention it deserves. We will begin with a fuller comparison of the medieval doctrine of penance and Menno's thought.

7. 4.1. Menno and the Medieval Doctrine of Penance

Menno, as was any other priest of his time, was charged with the task of preparing his parishioners for the after life through making a good confession here and now. As a result of the growing interest in this subject, a considerable body of literature had developed in the medieval ages to help and guide the priest in his administration of this sacrament. The essential elements of this consisted of (1) repentance, which could be based on a genuine desire for God's forgiveness (*contritio*) or out of a less than satisfactory desire to avoid divine punishment (*attritio*). At least once a year sins were to be heard by a

priest in (2) private confession. The confessor had the authority to grant (3) absolution for the sins committed which reversed the effects of eternal punishment and (4) to impose various forms of satisfaction through which the temporal aspects of the sin(s) could be corrected.[89]

In its essence the sacrament of penance is both a virtue and a sacrament. "The virtue of penance consists in a persons' voluntarily using every means to feel regret for their sins and outwardly chastising their bodies to break their sinful inclinations". It is for this reason that Menno so heartily enjoins repentance as necessary for and preliminary to the Christian life. "Priestly absolution forms the substance of the sacrament of penitence. And these two-- virtue and sacrament-- must go together if penitence is to be truly good".[90]

In light of the Reformation, it was impossible to retain this medieval form of penance in its entirety. The proclamation of unconditional forgiveness in Christ meant that sins no longer had to be confessed before a priest but could be brought immediately before God and, for the Anabaptists at least, in certain cases before the congregation[91]. However, in other aspects, the practice of penance (for it could no longer be called a sacrament) was retained. Most notably, Menno defined true repentance as the "indissoluble linking of virtue and acquittal" and he maintained the traditional order: "first penitence (actually, the dying of the old sinful life, and the

resolution to be obedient to Christ) and then absolution (claiming Christ's merits with a view to the Judgement Day)."[92]

It is within this context and in the light of this background that Menno's emphasis upon good works needs to be seen. Good works, of what ever nature and type they may be, ". . . remain expressions of faith as true penitence--however, now in nonsacramental form." These good works are also the basis upon which acceptance and participation to the community of fellow believers is granted. In the congregation this penitential life takes a social form and it is sustained within the community by the practice of mutual confession, forgiveness and, when the need arises, the practice of shunning and banning.[93]

7. 4.2. The Practice of Baptism

While to fully explore the significance of baptism for either the Anabaptists or Menno would take us far astray, one aspect of baptism holds considerable interest for our study. This different understanding of baptism and its restricted use among adult believers is also related to seeing Dutch Anabaptism and Menno in particular as practitioners of a penitential-holiness theology.

For both Anabaptists and Catholics baptism was the process by which one was initiated into membership in the church. In the course of history, the practice of infant baptism became institutionalized within the Catholic church and was practiced widely which resulted in a loss of meaning

and significance for this practice.[94] So convinced were the Anabaptists of the harmful impact of this practice on the church that they, without exception, regarded infant baptism as a sign of apostasy.[95]

The Catholic Church itself was not insensitive to these problems and a renewal movement, namely monasticism, began within the church as a means of recovering the vigor, discipline and spirituality of the early church. What is significant for our study is the understanding that accompanied baptism as a means of entrance into a monastic order. Without any doubt, entrance into a monastic order was considered a "second baptism" as is clearly reflected in the monastic rite of initiation. Both rites, Christian baptism and the rite of initiation, were amazingly similar in that "both symbolize a dying to the world and the resurrection to a new life. Both require the candidate to renounce Satan and the world and, before being initiated into their respective institutions, to make a public and positive profession of faith."[96]

As a member of the monastic community the monk was called to life of penance[97] and obedience to his community's rule which often embodied the principles of the Sermon on the Mount.[98] Although the monasteries began as a result of a renewal movement, they did not always faithfully adhere to their ideals but they did represent a sincere attempt to return to apostolic Christianity.

In terms of the role of baptism and its significance

within the movement, Anabaptism took up the same call as that within the monastic community.[99] It is no small wonder, then, that the issue of baptism became such a major concern of the Anabaptists.

> Water baptism becomes both a witness to conversion through personal repentance and faith, and a pledge of one's firm intention or desire to continue in the penitent life. Thus baptism itself takes the form of a penitential exercise, both a first fruit of repentance and a first step in obedience in the penitential life.[100]

This is clearly the case for Menno. Baptism, as Menno understands it, is a token or symbol "of obedience which proceeds from faith, as proof before God and His church that they firmly believe in the remission of their sins through Jesus Christ".[101] Being baptized is result of both obedience to Christ and an imitation of his example when he was baptized by John and, just as Christ resigned himself to doing his Father's will and expressed that willingness in baptism, so should the believer be baptized to express his willingness to be obedient to God.[102] This baptism has no merit in itself for the water itself cannot cleanse anyone and its only benefit comes because, by grace, God has attached the promise of forgiveness to it.[103] Finally, baptism, aside from being an indication of faith, regeneration and obedience, is also the means of entry into the church.[104]

Menno combines all of the concepts in one statement when he is explaining what true faith is and entails:

> In baptism, they [believers] bury their sins

> in the Lord's death and rise with Him to a new life. They circumcise their hearts with the Word of the Lord; they are baptized with the Holy Ghost into the spotless, holy body of Christ, as obedient members of His church, according to the true ordinance and power in all their conduct. They fear God with all the heart and seek in all their thoughts, words, and works, nothing but the praise of God and the salvation of their beloved brethren.[105]

Understood in this manner, baptism, especially as seen from within medieval monasticism, is the manifestation of a life of penance and a determination to live a life of obedience. Menno certainly reflects this same understanding of baptism and emphasizes the obligation that baptism places upon the believer to be obedient. It is no wonder that Menno and his followers were called "new monks", a title which, although applied dersively by their opponents, they were not unwilling to accept.[106]

7. 4.3. The Fruit of Faith-- Love

Menno has insisted throughout that faith make itself known by the fruit it bears and the one fruit above all that should faith should bear is love.

Menno envisions several stages through which the believer moves before the full fruit of love is evident in one's life. In the first stage a person is motivated by fear to repent. Such a fear "acknowledges the judgement and wrath of the Lord over all transgressions and sins which are committed against His will and Word".[107] Second, the believer comes to know the divine love for her or him: "For our sign of grace is Christ Jesus alone, by whom God's

abundant love is freely dispensed and declared unto us."[108]

Third, the believer responds in kind to this divine love:

> Next, faith also produces the love of God whereby we love Him. For faith knows from the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, . . . the unsearchably great riches of grace which our merciful good Father, through Christ, has so graciously granted us. Therefore it loves in return, loving God, being moved by the manifest benefit of the aforesaid grace.[109]

Such a response is not at all unexpected for the "effective power and nature [of love] may be seen [even] in natural love" as the love of parents for their children or of a husband and wife for one another amply demonstrates. The power and effect of divine love upon those who experience it is to constrain them ". . . to serve the Lord, to seek the Kingdom of God, to use baptism and the Lord's Supper according to the ordinance of Scripture, to exercise control over heart and tongue, to ponder the law and will of God with all earnestness, to obey Christ and follow Him". In response, the believer's love of God ". . . urges and constrains, moves and operates in their hearts so effectively that they are prepared . . . to do what He has commanded and to leave undone that which He has forbidden . . .".[110]

This is a constant theme running throughout Menno's writings. Having experienced the love of God in Christ and responding in a like manner, the believer is "freely urged, through the constraining power of love issuing from such unfeigned faith, to obedience to all the commandments of God. As Christ says, If a man loves me, he will keep my words."[111] Such a response is to be expected because "true

faith or true knowledge begets love, and love begets obedience to the commandments of God".[112] Faith is to be active in "love working obedience"[113] "for in Christ nothing matters but faith working by love, the new creature, and the keeping of the commandments of God".[114] Such a love is "unfeigned [and] fervent" and is attended by a "contrite heart, true penitence, a humble mind . . . and with peace and joy in the Holy Ghost".[115] These people live an "unblamable life in all love"[116] for they realize that "without love it is all in vain that we believe, baptize, celebrate the Lord's Supper, prophesy, and suffer".[117]

This love is directed to three different but related parties. First, as already indicated, there is human love of God. In loving God the believer gives demonstrable evidence of his response to God's love. As a consequence of this love, they are ready to obey God's "holy Word, will, commandments, counsel, doctrine, ordinances . . .. They show indeed that they believe . . ." by their obedience.[118] Second, there is to be brotherly love which is extended without limit to other members of the believing community. Within the confines of the believing community "love conducts and behaves itself without reproach, and is careful of its words and works lest it sin against God and give offense to a brother, trouble or sadden him".[119] Nowhere is the love of fellow believers to be more evident than in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. Although the Lord's Supper does recall Christ's love of the church, it is also a

celebration of love which binds all the members of the church together.[120] It is a love that is willing to help a fellow believer in whatever way is necessary, be that in a word of encouragement, instruction or even correction[121] and the application of the ban.[122]

Finally, this love is directed towards the neighbour. In fact, love of God and the brother cannot be separated from this love of neighbour.[123] Such love delights in the "free service of their neighbor"[124] for believers are "constrained by love to [serve] God and neighbor".[125] In such love, it provides whatever "service [is] laid upon" it.[126]

For Menno, faith must find expression and it does so no more clearly and no where more effectively than in love. It is a love that is both generated and directed, in return, to the divine love which is experienced in Jesus Christ but it also displays itself in the love directed towards one's fellow believers in the church and to one's neighbors outside of the church.

7. 4.4. Jesus Christ- The Norm for all Ethical Behavior

In writing to the scattered group of believers of which Menno was the leader he would often exhort them, in their following of Christ, to "keep His Spirit, Word, and example"[127] or to "follow and emulate" him[128], "conform" to the pattern of his life[129], to "walk" his way after the "pattern or example He left"[130], "look to the Spirit, Word, conduct, and example of Christ"[131], to "contrast your desire

with Christ's, your doctrine with Christ's, your spirit with Christ's, and your life with Christ's"[132], to acknowledge Christ's "Spirit, doctrine, and holy life as a perfect Spirit, doctrine, and life"[133] and, finally to obey "Christ and His Word, ordinances, commands, and example".[134]

There can be little doubt that for Menno the life of a believer had only one norm and model-- that of Jesus Christ. Menno states this principle explicitly in one of his earliest writings:

> For Christ has expressly portrayed Himself in His Word, that is, as to the nature which He would have us understand, grasp, and follow and emulate, . . . according to His life and conversation here on earth, shown forth among men in works and deeds as an example set before us to follow so that we thereby might become partakers of His nature in the spirit, to become like unto to Him. So Christ is everywhere represented to us as humble, meek, merciful, just, holy, wise, spiritual, long-suffering, patient, peaceable, lovely, obedient, and good, as the perfection of all things; for in Him there is an upright nature. Behold, this is the image of God, of Christ as to the Spirit which we have as an example until we become like it in nature and reveal it by our walk.[135]

Not only is Jesus Christ himself the pattern or example for all of Christian life, he is also the "Lawgiver and Teacher of the New Testament"[136], the "wholly dependable Teacher and Master"[137], he is "Christ Jesus, the true Teacher, sent of the Father"[138], and the "Teacher and Prophet promised of God".[139] As a teacher, Christ left not only his personal example to be followed but also explicit "commandments" which are to be observed[140], particularly in regard to the practice of baptism. Menno is not hesitant to speak of the "plainly expressed commands of Christ"[141] and

the "illustrious precepts of the Gospel".[142]

Plainly Menno has a very different attitude towards the Law and New Testament commandments than Luther. For Menno, "the New Testament commands are an integral part of the Gospel. The Gospel is, in fact, equated and used interchangeably with the New Testament commands".[143] Obedience is the evidence of a true faith and not merely an appendage to faith proper. "Obedience to the New Testament commandments represents the true way of receiving Christ by faith, and his Word is a binding authority for life".[144]

The emphasis that Menno places upon the moral and ethical life of a believer is a direct result of his understanding of the Incarnation. In the Incarnation there are revealed the norms and standards by which a believer is to live for the Incarnation reveals the perfect and highest manifestation of what it means to be human. This is what is at the heart of Menno's understanding of the Incarnation when he says that Christ had "unblemished, pure, human nature (like unto the nature of Adam before the fall)".[145] If the Incarnation is the norm for ethical behavior, it also establishes the firm basis upon which this obedience is expected. Menno understands the process of regeneration to be that process whereby sinful, fallen man is again renewed in the image of God, that is, the restoration of his pristine state. If this regenerated nature means that man partakes in his original purity and sinlessness, Menno expects that it will, by its own nature, manifest its

presence in accord with its own nature.[146]

It is for this reason that Menno expects the life of a believer to be, literally, "Christ-like" in that it is conformed to Christ's character. This new life is marked by a number of qualities such as as peacefulness, patience and joy but, above all, by love.[147] The effort to follow Christ is not a matter of sentimental piety, a cheap imitation, or a legal moralism but a ". . . dynamic encounter of evil with goodness because one's very nature is repulsed by evil and moves even as Christ did to overcome it with suffering love wherever it is discovered".[148]

7. 4.5. The Charge of Perfectionism

Running throughout Menno is a powerful impulse towards perfectionism. Statements about the "unblamable new life"[149], particularly when understood in light of Menno's doctrine of regeneration, and statements about the church as "pure and spotless"[150] can easily give one the impression that Menno believed that it was possible to attain a sinless life here on this earth.[151]

Menno repudiates this idea at a number of points. Baptism does not cleanse the believer of his "inherited sinful nature which is in . . . [the] flesh, so that it is entirely destroyed . . ., for it remains . . . after baptism" and even though the believer may want to defeat this "inherent, sinful nature, and destroy it so that it will no longer be master in our mortal bodies", such a victory is not always assured for the believer may be "over-

come by sin".[152] It comes as no surprise then that Menno's opponents can find fault in his life because he of "the sinful, failing flesh of Adam".[153] Believers are, therefore, to fight against their old nature and their "inherited Adamic nature, with a sorrowful and broken heart and lament daily before God over their human weaknesses, failures, and transgressions".[154] Christians are "very much retarded in the works, fruits, and fulfillment by the heavy burden of the sinful flesh"[155], and those works they are able to perform are "mixed with imperfection and weakness" because this sinful flesh stands as an obstacle to attaining the "original righteousness required in the commandments".[156]

There thus exists in Menno's theology a tension which is not easily resolved. He speaks powerfully and urgently about the need to be conformed to Christ, which is a real possibility as established by his understanding of Christ's incarnation and regeneration, but there is a recognition that such an attainment is checked by the persistence of the old sinful nature. Perhaps this tension can best be summarized as saying that "perfection is to be sought . . . but not proclaimed".[157]

7. 4.6. Conclusion

In this section we have explored at length Menno's understanding the outworkings of faith , that is, good works (although Menno rarely uses this term). Menno draws heavily upon his medieval heritage and, in particular, the sacrament of penance in his explanation of what faith entails. He has

certainly reshaped certain aspects of this sacrament in light of his new "reformation" convictions but the fundamental order and purpose remain. Menno's understanding of baptism as the sign of true obedience clearly reflects the medieval and monastic background to his thought.

In terms of the actual good works, Menno speaks of love for it is by this "fruit", above all others, that faith makes itself known. Jesus Christ, as the embodiment of this love by both his own life, example and teaching, stands as the norm for this life of love.

7. 5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to deal with Menno's understanding of faith, good works and their relationship. Menno was considerably influenced by Luther in the development of his theology but he was deeply distressed by the lack of emphasis that Luther placed upon obedience. Menno, working within the bounds and influence of the medieval doctrine of penance, sought to formulate a theology that stressed both faith and good works. Menno, as aware as Luther was of the need for God's grace, stressed the importance of repentance as the starting point for the Christian life. Repentance was the decisive turning point in an individual's life where he turned away from sin and to God. Faith, now granted by God, unleashes a mighty power within a believer's life, namely the Holy Spirit, who, through the process of regeneration, restores to the believer the capacity and the ability to love and obey. For Menno, there simply can be no believing

in God or no loving God if there is not obedience. Simply put, love begets obedience. Such a life is now modeled upon the incarnate life of Christ and, as such, is literally an attempt to incarnate Christ again in a contemporary setting.

Yet Menno's theology is not without its tensions and problems, several of which will be explored further in the conclusion, but for now we note two. First, at several points Menno appears to make the offer of grace and the promises of the Gospel dependent upon repentance. Although Menno speaks in these terms at no point does he suggest that repentance is meritorious in any manner or to any degree. How Menno would have us understand this relationship is not clear since, in his concern to stress obedience, he has moved too quickly and too imprecisely over an important question.[158] Second, while we have noted that Menno does take note of human failings, weaknesses and sinfulness, there still remains in his thought a strong emphasis upon perfection and holiness, as we would expect in a penitential-holiness theology. The question is whether this expectation needs to be tempered more, a consideration we shall take up in the conclusion.

Chapter Eight

A Comparison of the Views of Luther and Menno On Faith and Good Works

8. 1. Introduction

The concern of this thesis throughout has been to explore the thought of Luther and Menno on the subject of faith, good works and their interrelationship. To accomplish this goal a brief history of this problem was presented. We shall now return to this historical summary and briefly compare Luther and Menno with this tradition. This comparison will highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of their thought on faith and good works. Having done that we will move to a direct comparison of Luther and Menno.

8. 2. Luther and Menno and the Historical Tradition

8. 2.1. Luther, Menno and Paul

The thought of Luther and Menno is deeply informed by the biblical text itself and by Paul in particular. Luther identifies very strongly with Paul except that his opponents are what he regards to be the new Judaizers, the Roman Catholic Church.[1] Menno's familiarity with Paul is amply indicated by the presence of Pauline language in his writings and by the emphasis that he, like Paul, places upon

the Holy Spirit.

If, however, we compare both Luther and Menno with Paul on one crucial point, it should be on grace. In Paul's thought we noted that grace and obedience are closely and necessarily related: ". . . the Pauline concept of grace is inclusive of the Pauline concept of obedience. . . . For Paul, obedience is neither preliminary to the new life (as its condition) nor secondary (as its result and eventual fulfillment). Obedience is constitutive of the new life".[22]

If we compare this with Luther, the difference is immediately apparent. For Luther, faith is primary but obedience, that is, good works, is clearly secondary. In fact, Luther's greatest fear is the subversion of this primacy of faith which will, once again, lead to a works righteousness. Luther, unlike Paul, is unable to see grace as both a gift and enpowerment for obedience.

In contrast, Menno clearly sees that grace is not only a gift but that it is also brings with it both the obligation and enpowerment for obedience. Menno's doctrine of the Holy Spirit and "new creature" make this particularly clear.

Menno's position, however, cannot be endorsed wholeheartedly. The dangers that Menno's doctrine faces are twofold. First, the emphasis which Menno places upon obedience has a strong tendency to degenerate into legalism and formalism, both of which happened within Menno's own lifetime among his followers. The concept of grace as a

gift was often in danger of being lost. Second, there are perfectionist elements in Menno's thought which tends to remove the eschatological tension found in Paul's thought concerning the possibilities of obedience. More will be said about this below.

8. 2.2 Luther, Menno and Augustine

Both Luther and Menno are, directly or indirectly, the heirs of Augustine's doctrine of grace and the problems that his formulation brought with it. The most readily apparent and difficult of these problems bequeathed by Augustine to successive generations is his attempt to relate the divine and human elements in justification. Luther, although deeply appreciative of Augustine, denies any positive role to the human will in the process of salvation. For Luther, the process of justification must be, in its entirety, of grace or it is open to the charge of Pelagianism. Menno stresses the role of the human will in repentance and obedience but he is unclear on the relationship that exists between the human and the divine.

On a more positive note, both Luther and Menno, like Augustine, stress the importance of love in the Christian life with both making it the sign of true faith.

8. 2.3. Luther, Menno and Aquinas

What immediately strikes the reader of Aquinas, when compared to Luther and Menno, is the difference in language and conceptuality of Aquinas. He speaks in the language of

Scholasticism and, more particularly, of Christian Aristotelianism.

Aquinas gives thorough consideration to the question of grace, faith and love and, in each case, he stresses the importance and priority of God's action, just as Luther and Menno do, but Aquinas, like Augustine, wishes to retain a significant role for the human will in the economy of salvation. Again, Luther would object and call this Pelagianism and Menno may have had concerns about what Aquinas calls "cooperating grace".

Aquinas also maintains the importance of charity as a theological virtue, a concept with which Luther, as we saw, has considerable problems. Luther speaks of faith as the most important "theological virtue" and clearly regards charity as secondary although Luther, in his less guarded moments, could speak quite positively about love.

For Menno, while he indicates no familiarity with Aquinas, certainly follows the broad outlines of Aquinas in stressing faith and love but he puts a much greater emphasis on obedience as the mark of true faith. Menno does include love as part of obedience but love is only one of the many qualities of the Christian life, not <u>the</u> defining essence of Christian faith.

8. 2.4 Luther, Menno and Biel

It is between Luther and Biel that we discover the sharpest opposition that we shall see. While Luther has considerable familiarity with nominalism, he has no sympathy

for it. He simply labels it Pelagian because of the freedom it attributes to the human will in the process of salvation. Particularly objectionable to Luther is the distinction between meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo. Luther sees this distinction as the epitome of Pelagianism in that it suggests that salvation could be earned.

As for the ability of humans to love God apart from divine grace, Luther is pessimistic. Upon encountering the Law, the human inclination is to fear and curse God, not to turn to him.

As for Menno, he would object as strongly as Luther to Biel's emphasis on the role and freedom of the will and the possibility of attaining salvation apart from God's grace but once this initial objection is passed, further questions need to be asked. Biel, quite in keeping with the medieval tradition, situated his entire discussion of justification and loving God within the context of the sacrament of penance. This is the same context in which Menno's discussion of justification is found. Is Menno's understanding of repentance and the change it effects in one's life comparable to the emphasis that Biel places upon contrition? This question merits further study.

8. 2.5. Conclusion

When Luther and Menno are looked at in the light of this tradition what emerges is that it is Luther who is the radical and Menno who is the traditionalist! Luther deviates

from this larger tradition in three ways. First, he elevates and isolates faith from hope and love. This represents a radical shift as love had been regarded as the primary virtue. Second, Luther diminishes the role of the human will. He allows it no place in his theology and speaks very negatively about what it is able to accomplish. Augustine, Aquinas and Biel had all attempted to retain a significant role for the will in the accomplishing of salvation. Third, Luther does not attempt to hold faith and works together. Luther does attempt to develop one model (the inclusive model) that would relate faith and good works but he does not develop it successfully.

If we turn to Menno we find that he is the traditionalist. First, he situates his discussion of faith and good works within the traditional context of penance. Second, his understanding of repentance leaves room for the activity of the human will. Third, he maintains a better balance of faith and good works than Luther. Fourth, Menno maintains an integral relationship between faith and good works.

8. 3. A Comparison of Luther and Menno

8. 3.1. Introduction

It has been the concern of this thesis to compare the thought of Martin Luther and Menno Simons on faith and good works and their interrelationship. As such, the first task in pursuing this comparison was to describe the views of Luther and Menno on faith and good works. Having completed this description, we now turn to our second task, a direct

comparison of their views. Rather than attempt an exhaustive comparison of Luther and Menno on a number of points, I will compare them on three main points which, in my estimation, are the critical points of difference. These three areas are Christology, soteriology and, what may the most important one, eschatology.

8. 3.2. The Christology of Luther and Menno.

There can be little doubt that the person of Christ was of the highest importance to both Luther and Menno. Christ was the one who came to rescue humanity from its enslavement to sin by the offering of his own sinless life. Both the Latin and Anselmic views of the atonement can be found in the writings of Luther and Menno. For both Luther and Menno the critical element in this divine redemptive drama was that Christ, in addition to being human, was also divine. It was this latter aspect of his personhood that was crucial to both Luther and Menno but there were also critical differences between Luther's and Menno's understanding of the Incarnation and the implications of these views for various other aspects of their thought.

Luther's theology is characterized by its dialectical nature. The contrasts that characterize Luther's theology are between righteousness and unrighteousness, love and wrath, faith and works, Law and Gospel, and grace and sin. These dualisms, which pervade Luther's thought, form the basis of the contrast we find in his thinking. He does not posit an ontological or metaphysical dualism between the

transcendent and the immanent but a moral and theological dualism that can and is overcome in the person and work of Christ. Such a moral and theological dualism is particularly evident in Luther's Christology.

For Luther, it was only because Christ was divine that he was able to defeat the powers of sin, death, the Law, hell and God's wrath, forces which Luther in the Commentary on Galatians calls the tyrants. Hence, the Incarnation and, more specifically, the communication of attributes in Christ played a crucial role in the theology of Luther for it is by these that Luther was able to explain how Christ was able to overcome the tyrants and achieve salvation.[35]

While we do not need to rehearse what Luther has to say on the nature of the atonement, the Incarnation and the nature of faith[4], it is necessary that several of the implications stemming from Luther's Christology be mentioned. First, because the dualism in Luther is not a metaphysical one but a moral one, the importance of the Incarnation lies in the implications that it has for epistemology. No longer can God be considered abstractly or philosophically but he must be understood in terms of Christ. Apart from Christ there is no true or valid relationship or knowledge of God. Second and more important for our purposes, the communication of attributes in Christ reflects and is based upon another theme in Luther's theology: the fundamental unity of creation and redemption.[36] Luther can thus speak boldly of Jesus who created the world[6]

or the God who, in Christ, died on the cross. As a result of the fundamental unity Luther sees between creation and redemption he can speak about vocations within the created order. In these vocations "God is always presently active and at work . . ., acting with and against all men in the direction of the disciplined service of man to man [i.e, the neighbor]. God uses human vocations as his mask (larva) in exercising His continuing and sovereign lordship in the world".[7] While a discussion of Luther's notion of vocation would take us far astray the basic premise of its structure is founded upon and reflected in the Incarnation: the fundamental unity and compatibility of the orders of creation and redemption. From this arises Luther's mundane ethic of service and love to the neighbor with its freedom to be fully at the disposal of another's needs.

Menno shared many of the concerns of Luther in that he too wanted a redemption that was effective. Working largely within the constraints of the Anselmic understanding of the atonement Menno adopted a position that has come to be known as a "Celestial flesh" Christology. The basic reason Menno felt compelled to adopt such a Christology was his conviction that if Christ had flesh, i.e., a body, which was like that of sinful humanity, he would not have been able to redeem mankind. Now, whatever one may wish to make of such a Christology[8], one of the basic problems of such a conception is the statement that it makes about the created order. For Menno, there is no unity or compatibility between the orders

of creation and redemption and this is clearly reflected in his understanding of the Incarnation.

Menno, as several scholars have noted[9], comes very close to identifying creation and its material nature with evil. As a result, Menno cannot envision any continuity between the orders of creation and redemption. They are discontinuous realms. Involvement and commitment in one precludes any role in the other. Such an attitude is clearly reflected in Menno's ecclesiological dualism and the Incarnation as is attested by his appeal to the "celestial flesh" of Christ. This same disparaging attitude towards the order of creation will be reflected in Menno's understanding of soteriology which we shall examine shortly.

While Luther and Menno's Christologies are reflective of a much more basic disagreement which exists at the philosophical level there is also one very practical difference. For Luther, Christ can only be defined rightly and properly as the "Donor of grace" or as a gift. He is a "sacrament", not an example. Menno, on the other hand, speaks of Christ as both a "Donor of grace" (the phrase is Luther's) and as a teacher. The difference in these two perspectives on Christ is more than simply a question of semantics and labeling. It reflects a certain attitude toward the Law and the Gospel and their relationship.

For Luther, the Law and the Gospel are mutually exclusive categories and any infringement by either one upon the other distorts and destroys the character of the other.

For Menno, while he agrees with Luther on many of his statements concerning the Law and Gospel, they do not have the same antipathy in his thought. Hence, Menno, quite in keeping with his penitential-holiness theology, lies a greater stress upon obedience and Christ's role as a teacher and example without having it infringe upon the Gospel (as the message of the Gospel).[10] For Menno, Christ exercises a normative function, in terms of ethics, that is not present in Luther's theology.

8. 3.3. The Soteriology of Luther and Menno

Many times comparisons have been drawn between Luther and Menno in terms of their soteriologies. It is generally argued that Luther proposed a "forensic" versus the Anabaptist view of an "ontological" or "experiential" salvation. In the light of the findings of this thesis such an argument needs to be recast, particularly as regards Luther's understanding of soteriology.[11]

As this thesis has shown, to characterize Luther's view of justification as forensic is inadequate. To be sure, Luther will at points speak in terms of a forensic judgement that God passes upon man but he will also speak of man actually becoming righteous.[12] To conclude that Luther's understanding of the process of justification is only a forensic one is to seriously misunderstand Luther.

For Luther, what is at the heart of justification is a changed relationship with Christ and to understand the terms that Luther uses to describe this relationship apart from

this relationship to Christ is to distort their meaning. At the heart of Luther's understanding of justification is the notion of the "joyous exchange". Foundational to Luther's understanding of the joyous exchange is that Christ's death is "for me", pro nobis. Christ did not die as a "private person", as Luther so eloquently puts it, but for the sins of the world. As a result of saving faith (versus historical faith) a sinner enters into the "joyous exchange". In this relationship, for it cannot be accurately described as a transaction, the sinner exchanges his unrighteousness for the righteousness of Christ but, more importantly, he establishes a relationship with Christ. Luther describes this relationship as one in which Christ is present most effectively and with power.[13] In justification, as Luther puts it, you cannot divide "Christ's Person from your own, [and if you do] you are in the Law; you remain in it [the Law] and live in yourself".[14] This relationship to Christ, as Luther describes it-- intense, personal and intimate-- is what justification means for him.[15] To speak of justification apart from this understanding of a believer's relationship to Christ is to misunderstand Luther.

This same relationship to Christ can be noted in Luther's description of imputation and extra nos. Although the believer is righteous in Christ there is, as Luther notes repeatedly, sin which remains in the flesh. The remaining sin is dealt with through imputation which is possible only as a result of a relationship to Christ.

Imputation, at least to Luther's mind, is not merely a legal transaction or a readjusting of accounts with the credits of Christ's life off setting the debits of the sinner. Rather, it is the result of being related to Christ.

The same thing can be said of Luther's doctrine of righteousness as extra nos. In Luther's doctrine of justification, righteousness must always remain external to the believer for it to be effective. To do otherwise, Luther feared, was to fall into the same mistake as that made by the scholastic theologians with their talk of habits and infused faith. Therefore, righteousness is always external to the believer but not in such a way that it was rendered ineffective or inoperative.[16] It was, rather, that in remaining external to the believer it was effective: "our theology is certain: it snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside ourselves, so that we do not depend on our own strength, conscience, experience, person, or works but depend on that which is outside ourselves, that is, on the promise and truth of God".[17]

Luther's emphasis on the fact that it is only through the agency of Christ that any good is effected in the life of the believer is not without its problems. While the emphasis that Luther puts on God as the agent of good in a believer's life[18] is a natural extension of his Christocentric theology, it raises serious questions as to the nature and extent of human involvement in the process of transformation. Both Augustine and Aquinas faced the same

question but they resolved it in a manner that included the activity and involvement of the human will. Luther seems, however, to have lost sight of this emphasis in his theology in his wish to avoid any taint of Scholastic or nominalist theology.

Menno's soteriology grows out of his medieval heritage and in particular the sacrament of penance. Although Menno has modified his understanding of penance in light of the insights of the Reformation and eliminated its sacramental nature and the involvement of a priest, he still retains the same emphases that were common to the rite of penance. Menno stresses the importance of an affective and effective repentance for sin and the necessity of good works. In his mind, penance continued to consist of the "indissoluble linking of virtue and acquittal".[19]

Peculiar to Menno's thought is the emphasis that he places upon the Holy Spirit and the "new creature". The Holy Spirit is understood by Menno largely in terms of his power and effectiveness. One of the ways in which this power is demonstrated is in the creation of the "new creature". The nature and importance of this concept in Menno's theology was examined in the course of our study[20] so it will not be recounted here but rather some comments will be made upon it.

In our discussion of the Christology of Luther and Menno we noted that underlying their Christology is an understanding of the nature of the relationship between the

orders of creation and of redemption. There is in Luther a unity and compatibility between these two orders that is lacking in Menno. This incompatibility manifests itself not only in Menno's Christology but also in his soteriology which begins with the lack of interest Menno displays in the original creation.[21] Menno is much more interested in the new creation which he understands to be in the image of God and, although Menno uses the language of participation and deification to describe this "new creature", "Menno's understanding of the new creation assumes a disjunction between old and new creations. The old fallen church and the old, fallen creation have been completely superseded [in Christ]".[22] Again, this is reflected in Menno's Christology:

> God has started again de novo in Christ. Hence Christ cannot have had any link to that tainted original creation.. . . Menno's apocalyptic understanding of the new creation, i.e., his view of history, which is linked so closely to his celestial flesh Christology, does not permit a theology of embodiment . . . this despite the insistence . . . that Menno was not Gnostic, that Menno did teach the full humanity of Christ. He taught the full humanity of Christ, yes, but that humanity was unable to loop back to connect with the old creation and the image of God in humans . . .. Menno's new creation, his human or incarnate Christ, is too new, too pure, to permit linkage with and redemption of the old creation. In his struggle . . . to solve the problem of how Christ could take on created flesh yet remain sinless, Menno salvaged sinlessness at the expense of the old creation . . ..[23]

As this quotation so accurately indicates, Menno's soteriology was bought at a heavy price. His antiworldly, antimaterial attitude clearly manifests itself in his soteriology but it also has implications for Menno's views

on ecclesiology, the sacraments, the priesthood and church/world relationships. In none of these areas was Menno able to tolerate any form of embodiment or any involvement with the existing order. The present order was, at worst, downright sinful; at best, to be tolerated.

In such a context, given Menno's understanding of the Holy Spirit, the "new creature" and his understanding of the material order, it is no surprise that perfectionist tendencies emerge within Menno's thought. Such tendencies caused problems for Menno and his fellow leaders of Dutch Anabaptism as the difficulties and divisions that the practices of shunning and banning created for the community testify.[24] Menno's intent seems to have been to have a "church without spot and wrinkle" but, as the practice of excommunication indicates, this was not attained.[25] It may indeed have been the case that Menno ". . . had too low an estimate of the persistence and power of sin within the regenerated believer and within the Church".[26]

8. 3.4. The Eschatology of Luther and Menno

In our discussion of Luther's views on imputation and simul iustus et peccator we found that his view of these issues was thoroughly cast within an eschatological context. The eschatological context of the famous formula simul iustus et peccator was, as we noted, absolutely essential to understanding this formula because Luther does not intend that it be understood in a psychological or temporal context or terms. Eschatology, while infrequently connected to

Luther's doctrine of justification, plays an important role in his understanding of justification.

Basic to Luther's views on eschatology is the overlapping of the Age to Come with this present world order. This creates the tension between presently having righteousness but not having, which is really a not-yet having this righteousness fully because that will happen only in the Age to Come.[27]

Needless to say, such a view creates considerable tensions within Luther's theology, tensions which are not satisfactorily resolved. Luther can speak vividly of the battles and tensions the believer faces in the contest between these two ages as he is caught up in the battle between God and Satan. For Luther, the entire life of the believer is one of tension and turmoil and he describes these turmoils as Anfechtungen. It may have been the uncertainty caused by this battle that created in Luther the tremendous need for the objective assurance of forgiveness such as we find in his doctrine of the sacraments, particularly baptism, and the Scriptures. Keenly aware of the struggles that faith faced and aware:

> . . . that before God the believer is always in the wrong, helped him [Luther] at times to lose sight of the new creation in Christ as an already accomplished fact . . .. It was not that Luther has no sense of the new creation either as regards the Church or as regards the individual, but that his weak stress on the renewal of the whole creation tended to rob it of temporal relevance and force. In the end Luther's doctrine of Anfechtung, . . . means that the believer does not

> really learn to live on the resurrection side of the Cross. So far as Luther enter into the triumphant eschatology of the New Testament, it was employed rather as consolation in Anfechtung than as actual anticipation of the final victory of the Son of Man.[28]

It is no surprise then that hope plays such an important role in Luther's doctrine of justification because it must be continually employed to overcome the overwhelming sense of sin that surrounds the believer. In fact, hope often stands directly opposed to what is presently being experienced.[29] Furthermore, this explains the hidden character of the Christian life and the Christian Church because it is always living with and under the presence of sin which makes it difficult to discern the reality of the new life, i.e., obedience and good works. The result is that the new creation remains concealed until the advent of Christ. The weakness of Luther's theology can be seen in the ". . . distinct failure at crucial points to give the doctrine of resurrection its full significance and weight".[30]

When we turn our attention to Menno we find that his theology is also plagued with difficulties concerning eschatology along the same lines as Luther. John Tonkin has pointed out the problems which afflict Menno's theology. He characterizes Menno's theology as one of radical dualism which, as we noted, is based on Menno's attitude toward the created order. Central to Menno's radical dualism is his understanding of "regeneration through Christ".[31] Tonkin has also noted the presence of perfectionist elements in Menno's

thought, particularly in regard to Menno's tendency to regard post-baptismal sins as "weaknesses".[52]

> The clear implication is that what remains in the regenerate in not a real battle against a sinful will and against actual sin but minor and unintentional infractions and weaknesses. One could maintain, of course, that inasmuch as even weaknesses and frailties indicate a state short of perfection, Menno is strictly speaking not "perfectionist", but such a position amounts to playing with words. The real point is that, despite Menno's obvious intention of preserving the eschatological nature of Christian holiness, his restriction of continuing sin to such minor and unintentional shortcomings resolves the eschatological tension of the Christian life too easily and projects an understanding of Christian existence considerably removed from Paul's anguished testimony concerning the continuing struggle with his sinful will.. . . it is hard to escape the conclusion that he [Menno] was not able to maintain a properly eschatological understanding of Christian holiness.[53]

Menno's intent was not in and of itself to preach a form of perfectionism but he was inexorably driven in that direction by his desire to give full weight to the doctrine of regeneration. This tendency did not exist unambiguously in Menno for it was checked by his own personal experience and his own reading of Scripture but the tendency remained.[54] This is particularly evident in Menno's understanding of the church and the Christian life. First, it calls for a life of radical separation from the world for there can be no toleration or comingling of sin and righteousness. Second, the church and the individual believer as part of that are to create a church order that is reflective of this order. As such, Menno's view of the church is not an anti-institutional but, rather, it calls

for a form of the church that is reflective of its inward nature. It is at this point that Menno's "realized eschatology" appears.

Menno has no use for the distinction between visible and invisible church because faith cannot be separated from its reality and visibility in life. Hence, Menno has a strong tendency to identify the present and visible order of the church with its transcendent order. This identification of the visible and invisible church is merely reflective of the larger problem that Menno's theology faces-- the collapse of eschatological tension that should exist between this present order and the order of the Age to Come.

In the final analysis, Menno's dualism and eschatology ". . . though originating in New Testament themes, [are] . . . ultimately made too absolute and undialectical to stand his own test of Scriptural validity".[35] If Luther erred by failing to give due emphasis to the reality of the new life in the eschaton, Menno erred by over emphasizing this reality to the point where the eschatological tension inherent in the Christian life was minimized if not removed.

8. 4. Conclusion

The differences in the understanding of faith and good works and their interrelationship in the thought of Luther and Menno is substantial. The three crucial areas of difference, Christology, soteriology and eschatology, have been outlined above. These differences have manifest themselves in the respective attitudes of Luther and Menno to

faith and good works. It is impossible to boil the differences down to one particular element such as Christology, soteriology or eschatology. It is the combination of these three factors that accounts for the difference between Luther and Menno. We could best summarize these differences by saying that for Luther it is the coming to faith itself that is the struggle of the Christian. Faith is always primary and works, while they should be present, are not essential. For Menno, the struggle is that of obedience. There are many who believe, Menno grants, but few who actually live a Christian life. For Menno, the ultimate test of faith is not believing but doing.

Chapter Two

[1] See Romans 5:6,8; 6:4,9; 8:10,34; I Corinthians 5:7, 15:12ff., 16f., 20,23, Galatians 2:20f., 3:16, 5:1. The title of "Messiah" or "Christos" was used in the Jewish context. See F. Hahn, The Titles of Jesus in Christology, trans. H. Knight and G. Ogg (New York and Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 136-269 and O. Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, trans. S.C. Guthrie and C.A.M. Hall (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), pp. 111-136.

[2] Romans 10:9, 14:9; I Corinthians 12:3; 15:25,28; Philippians 2:5-11. See Cullmann, Christology of the New Testament, pp. 193-237, Hahn, The Title of Jesus in Christology, pp. 68-135, and W. Bousset, Kyrios Christos, trans. J.E. Steely (New York: Abingdon Press, 1970), pp.119-152. "Of the 717 passages in which Kyrios occurs in the NT, the majority are to be found in the Lucan writings (210) and in the letters of Paul (275). This one-sidedness can be explained by the fact that Luke wrote for, and Paul to, people who lived in areas dominated by Greek culture and language" in Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. C. Brown (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), s.v. "Lord, Master", H. Bietenhard. As Bietenhard also warns, this simple division is not without its problems.

[3] On the theological diversity within the early church see James D.G. Dunn, Unity and Diversity Within The New Testament (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977).

[4] The letter to the Galatians stands without peer as an example of Paul's sharpest rebuke to a church. I and II Corinthians and Philippians are also critical but much less so. Romans seems to have a different character as a letter, perhaps as an "ambassadorial" letter since Paul had never been to this church. See Romans 1:9-13; 15:22-29.

[5] Cf. Acts 6:1-7 which indicates that tensions existed among ethnic groups from the beginning in Christianity.

[6] In the last two decades a considerable debate has emerged over the nature and role of justification by faith in Paul's thought. See E. Käsemann, "'The Righteousness of God' in Paul" in New Testament Questions of Today, trans. W.J. Montague and W.E. Bunge (London: SCM Press, 1969), pp. 168-182. As part of this debate the role of the Law in Paul's thought has also been vigorously debated. See Douglas Moo, "Paul And The Law In The Last Ten Years", Scottish Journal of Theology, 40 (1987), pp. 287-307.

[7] Romans 1:16-17; 3:19-5:21; Galatians 2:16-3:29.

[8] Romans 3:20, 27, 28; 4:2-5; Galatians 3:2,5,10.

[9] Galatians 2:12; 4:10; 5:11-12. This line of interpretation of Paul has a long and distinguished history. It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace this history and the debate but see George Howard, Crisis in Galatia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 1-19. For a contemporary scholar who takes this approach see F.F. Bruce, Commentary on Galatians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), pp. 19-32 and John Drane, Paul: Libertine or Legalist? (London: SPCK, 1975), pp. 78-94. On the importance of the observance of the Sabbath, circumcision and food laws see James D.G. Dunn, "New Perspectives On Paul", Bulletin of the John Rylands University 65 (1983), p. 111. Hans Hübner, Law in Paul's Thought, trans. J.C.G. Greig (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,1984), p. 22 argues that Paul's sees this attitude toward the observance of certain aspects of the Law as a decision in principle regarding the salvific efficacy of the Law.

[10] Howard, Crisis in Galatia, pp. 2-4. For the opposing view see J. Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind, trans. F. Clarke (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1959), 87ff..

[11] Herman Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, trans. J.R. DeWitt (Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1975), p.133. See also pp. 160, 170-171.

[12] Ridderbos' understanding of Judaism is typical of many Christian theologians. For the history of how such a view became entrenched in scholarship see E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 33-59. Sanders has soundly challenged this view of Judaism and of the Law. Any new work on Paul and Judaism will have to come to terms with Sanders' entire recasting of our understanding of Judaism. The view described by Ridderbos can also be found in Martin Luther. See Luther's 1535 Commentary On Galatians, LW 26, pp. 4-12 and 253-254. Luther understood the Judaizers of his day to be the Roman Catholic Church which appears to Luther to support the concept of salvation by works. The comments of a prominent biblical exegete of this century, H.D. Betz, on Luther's Commentary On Galatians are worth noting in this regard: "There is at least one commentary which in this commentator's opinion expresses an extraordinary and profound understanding of what Paul intended to say: Luther's commentary of 1535. . . . Luther's commentary is more than a scholarly commentary upon Galatians. It is a recreation of Galatians in the sixteenth century. Luther speaks as Paul would have spoken had he lived at the time when Luther gave his lectures" in Galatians (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), p. xv.

[13] See Paul's statement on his past in Philippians 3:3-16, Acts 22:3; 23:1; 26:14. On Acts 26:14 see Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind, p. 20, n.2. See also Stendahl's two essays, "Paul Among Jews and Gentiles" and "The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West" in his Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 1-77, 78-96. "Nowhere in Paul's writings is there any indication that he had difficulties in fulfilling what he as a Jew understood to be the requirements of the law", Stendahl, p. 13. There is every indication that after his conversion Paul continued, in the presence of Jews, to observe the Law. See Acts 21:17-26; I Corinthians 9:19-20; Romans 15:22-29; and Galatians 2:1ff..

[14] See especially Romans 3:21-26.

[15] Ridderbos, Paul:An Outline of His Theology, pp. 163-164, C.E.B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), Vol. I, pp. 199-218, S. Kim, The Origin of Paul's Gospel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), pp. 269ff. especially 285-286 and R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. K. Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951, 1955), Vol. I, p. 270-287. It needs to be pointed out here that we are dealing with Pauline interpretation, not Paul directly.

[16]This is the position held by Luther in the famous formula of "justification by faith". In this century, the centrality of justification by faith, although understood somewhat differently, has been championed by both Bultmann and Käsemann as the center of Paul's thought. See Dunn, "The New Perspective on Paul", p. 99, n. 14 and Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, pp. 434-442. A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of the Apostle Paul, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1931) argues that mysticism was the center of Paul's thought and that justification was really a subsidiary theme for Paul. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, p. 460 ff. argues that both "juridical" and "mystical" terminology are to be found in Paul.

[17] Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology. In Galatians 2:21 Paul argues that if "righteousness comes through the Law, then Christ died needlessly". Since Paul is utterly convinced that God's righteousness can only be seen in Christ, he is forced to conclude that the Law and any human efforts dependent on the Law are doomed to failure. See Paul's arguments in Galatians 3 where he repeatedly contrasts "faith" and the "works of the Law". See Sanders' interesting use of this argument in Paul and Palestinian Judaism, pp. 474-475.

[18] Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, p. 172. It

is for this reason that Bultmann, in his Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, argues that "faith is the absolute contrary of boasting" (p. 281) because it is an attitude of "sinful self-reliance" (p. 242) based on the Law and the flesh which results in a false security (p. 321). Faith is "self-surrender to the grace of God . . . which signifies the utter reversal of a man's previous understanding of himself-- specifically, the radical surrender of his human 'boasting'"(p. 300). The challenge of faith is the surrender of this sinful self-understanding and its replacement with an understanding that is based on the grace of God (p. 301).

[19] For a history of the interpretation of this phrase see J. Tyson, "'Works of the Law' in Galatians", Journal of Biblical Literature 92 (1973), pp. 423-431 and Moo, "Paul and the Law in the Last Ten Years", pp. 292-298.

[20] Romans 3:20, 28; Galatians 2:16, 3:2, 5, 10.

[21] See Galatians 3:10. Cf. 5:3. This argument puts great emphasis on all. For an opposing view see E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 21-29.

[22] Galatians 5:14. Cf. Romans 2:17-29. Hübner, Law in the Thought of Paul, p. 41: "The man presupposed in Gal. 3:10 vainly images in his flesh . . . that he can 'do' the Law and in his illusion ses himself in the quantity he has to produce, and because he does not know that true fulfillment of the Law is possible and real only as a fruit of the Spirit, he deceives himself in seeking to obey a quantitative standard". The issue of how the Law after Christ is to be understood in Paul is very problematic. See Moo, "Paul and the Law in the Last Ten Years", pp. 298-304.

[23] Romans 13;3-10; Galatians 5:4; 6:2. For a summary of Paul's description of how Christians should live see Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, pp. 94ff.. On the third use of the Law see Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, pp. 278-288.

[24] Romans 6:2ff., 6ff., 11, 14, 18, 20; 8:2ff., 12:1ff; I Corinthians 6:11; II Corinthians 7:1; Galatians 5:1, 13, 16 are a few examples of this relationship.

[25] Romans 5-8; I Corinthians 15; Galatians 2:19-20; 5:1, 16-25. These few references cannot hope to do justice to such an important and rich theme in Paul. For further see J. Christian Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980).

[26] Romans 6 is the locus classicus of the discussion on "participationist" language. See also I Corinthians 6:14; II

Corinthians 4:14, Galatians 2:20; Philippians 3:10. For a discussion of this theme see Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, pp. 453-463.

[27] V.P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (New York: Abingdon Press, 1968), p. 173. Author's emphasis. Note the aorist and perfect tenses of the verbs used in Romans 6.

[28] On the futurity of salvation see Romans 6:5,8.

[29] Romans 8; I Corinthians 12, 14; II Corinthians 3; Galatians 5. This theme is also worthy of further attention.

[30] Galatians 5: 16,17.

[31] R. Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul: A Comparison of Ethical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.118.

[32] Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, pp. 225-226. Author's emphasis. This view is very similar to Käsemann, "'The Righteousness of God' in Paul", p. 170: "The gift itself has thus the character of power.. . . Paul knows of no gift of God which does not convey both the obligation and the capacity to serve". Cf. p. 176. Bultmann's formulation of this phrase as "Become what thou art" in his Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 332, sees obedience as derivative. See the comments of Käsemann on Bultmann in "'The Righteousness of God' in Paul", pp. 175-176. See also Beker, Paul the Apostle, pp. 263-264, 275-278.

[33] Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul, p. 101. Paul will also add hope to these two to form the familiar triad of faith, hope and love which summarizes the nature of the Christian life. See I Corinthians 13:13; Galatians 5:5f,14; I Thessalonians 1:3; 5:8.

[34] Romans 5:6-10; 8:31-39; II Corinthians 5:14-21; II Corinthians 5:14-21; 8:9; Philippians 2:1-11.

[35] Romans 5:5.

[36] II Corinthians 5:14ff..

[37] II Corinthians 1:22, 5:5. Not all are convinced that this eschatological understanding of ethics has any relevance to today. See Jack T. Sanders, Ethics in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 29,48,66 who argues that eschatology renders the ethics of Jesus and Paul irrelevant for today. In contrast, J. Christian Beker, Paul's Apocalyptic Gospel: The Coming Triumph of God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), pp. 79-121 argues that precisely because of Paul's eschatology his ethics is relevant.

[38] Galatians 5:13, 14, 22-24; Romans 15:30.

[39] Romans 8:28; I Corinthians 2:9, 8:3, 16:22.

[40] Romans 12; I Corinthians 12-14; Galatians 5,6; Philippians 2:1-11; I Thessalonians 1:3, 3:12, 5:15; Philemon 4f..

[41] I Corinthians 8-9. On motivation see Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul., p. 66.

[42] Romans 14:10, 12; I Corinthians 3:16ff.; 4:5, 10:5-12, 22; Galatians 5:21, 6:7f.; I Thessalonians 4:6.

[43] F.V. Filson, St. Paul's Doctrine of Recompense (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichssche Buchhandlung, 1931), pp. 8, 92-97, 126-132. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, pp. 105f., 119, n. 38, like Filson, sees no contradiction between grace and reward for they speak to different issues. Grace speaks of the means of entry into the community while works and reward are maintenance language for those now in the community. For a brief history of the discussion of this topic see Calvin J. Roetzel, Judgement in the Community (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), pp. 1-13.

[44] Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul, p. 63.

[45] Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, p. 114.

[46] See above p.7. and n. 32

[47] Paul does seem to entertain the notion that there are varying degrees of reward (I Corinthians 3:5-4:6) but the exact nature of these rewards is unclear. See Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, pp. 108-109 and Karl P. Donfried, "Justification and Last Judgement in Paul", Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 67 (1976), pp. 105-110. Donfried's argument, while helpful, puts too much emphasis on the futurity of salvation and fails to understand the motivational nature of Paul's language on judgement. On the nature of rewards see Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, pp. 119-121.

[48] This is the view of Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, pp. 179-180. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, p. 119, n. 38, while critical of Ridderbos, offers an alternative that is not substantially different from from Ridderbos.

[49] Due to the limitations of time and space it is simply impossible to trace the development and use of the Pauline doctrine of justification through the early church. For

literature on this subject see K. Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 83, n.7.

[50] Ibid., p. 85. Augustine also commented on Paul's letters, notably Romans, and refers frequently to Paul throughout his writings. On Augustine's use of Romans in the Pelagian controversy see J. Patout Burns, "The Interpretation of Romans In The Pelagian Controversy" in Augustinian Studies 10 (1979), pp. 43-54. Augustine also cites I Corinthians 4:7 throughout his Pelagian writings.

[51] Heiko Oberman, Masters of the Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 64-110, points out the influence of Augustine in the late medieval ages and in the Reformation. See also William J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism. Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought" in Itinerarium Italicum, Heiko Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, eds. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975): 3-60 and the appendix of Denis Janz, "Towards a Definition of Late Medieval Augustinianism" in his Luther and Late Medieval Thomism (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983), pp. 158-165, in which he briefly traces the history of the debate on medieval Augustianism. See as well David C. Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), pp. 30-34 in which he concludes there there was a lively school of Augustinian thought in the late middle ages. Luther's own comments on Augustine are most noteworthy. Initially Luther did "not merely read Augustine", he "devoured" him, LW 54, #347. Leif Grane, in Modus loquendi theologicus. Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie: 1515-1518 (Leiden, 1975), p. 21f., describes this encounter as one which would be unequalled in Luther's experience. It was Augustine's antiPelagian writings that Luther found particularly helpful: "Augustine writes nothing special about faith except when he disputes against the Pelagians. They woke Augustine up and made him into a real man", WA Tr 4, 55-56, #3984, quoted in Carter Lindberg, The Third Reformation? (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1983), p. 35. What Luther appreciated and took from Augustine was the latter's understanding of Pauline theology, notably his grasp of justification by faith. See LW 27, p. 219. Having garnered this from Augustine, Luther moved out on his own. See LW 54, #347. For further discussion see Bernhard Lohse, "Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther", Kerygma und Dogma 11 (1965), pp. 116-135 and Walther von Loewenich, "Zur Gnadenlehre bei Augustin und Luther" in Von Augustin zu Luther (Witten: Luther Verlag, 1959), pp. 75-87.

[52] While it is generally assumed that it was during the Pelagian controversy that Augustine formulated his doctrine of justification, J. Patout Burns, The Development of

Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1980), pp. 53-88, points out the major importance of the Donatist controversy for shaping Augustine's views on justification.

[53] For a brief survey of attempts to harmonize Augustine's statements on grace, faith and predestination see Ibid., pp. 9-12. While Burns' conclusion that a grand synthesis of Augustine's statements is impossible may be generally correct it overlooks the considerable degree of continuity that does exist in Augustine's position. See Peter Ivar Kaufman, Augustinian Piety and Catholic Reform: Augustine, Colet and Erasmus (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1982), pp. 16-23 and Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong? An Ecumenical-Theological Study of Luther's Major Work, The Bondage of the Will (New York: Newman Press and Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), pp.63-78.

[54] For a convenient chronological listing of Augustine's work see Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 11-14.

[55] See Augustine's observations on sin in Bks. I and II of the Confessions, trans. Rex Warner (New York: New American Library, 1963). All quotations from the Confessions will be from this edition.

[56] John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2d. ed. (London: MacMillan Press, 1977), pp. 37,39.

[57] For details of Augustine's involvement with the Manichaeans see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 46-60 and TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, pp. 28-29.

[58] See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 88-127 and especially Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge,Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968) and St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey of The Soul (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969).

[59] Augustine, "Exposition of the Sermon on The Mount", I, ii, 9: "For those are peacemakers in themselves, who, in conquering and subjecting to reason . . . all the motions of their souls, and having their carnal desires tamed, have become in themselves, a Kingdom of God.. . . They enjoy the peace which is given on earth to men of good-will . . . the life of consummate and perfect man of wisdom. . .", quoted in Brown, Augustine of Hippo, p. 147.

[60] Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. A.S. Benjamin (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964). This

work was begun in 387-388 and completed in 395. See Ibid., p. ix.

[61] Ibid., II, 18.

[62] Ibid., II, 1.

[63] Ibid., III, 1.

[64] Ibid., III, 17, 18.

[65] Ibid., I, 15.

[66] Ibid., III, 18.

[67] Ibid., III, 22. "The idea of free will, this cornerstone of Augustine's religious and ethical thought- without which his concept of justice, reward and punishment loses its meaning- is nevertheless, in view of the fact of original sin and after the loss of man's original freedom, completely oriented toward grace: the rationality of his entire outlook now depends on the freedom to accept or reject grace". G. Nygren, Das Prädestinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins, Bd. 5 (Göttingen: 1956), p. 41. Quoted in McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?, p. 73. No doubt Augustine's defence of the free will is largely inspired by his opposition to Manichaeanism. It was this position that Pelagius was later to cite against Augustine. See Augustine's later position in his Retractions, I, 8, trans. Mary I. Bogan, R.S.M., Vol. 24, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1968).

[68] Augustine, Retractions, II, 27: "In the solution of this question [the role of grace] I, indeed, labored in defense of the free choice of the human will; but the grace of God conquered".

[69] Ibid.. Augustine appeals frequently to I Corinthians 4:7 to prove the gratuity of grace. This transition is clearly seen in Responses to Various Questions from Simplicianus (396-397).

[70] "Who can embrace whole heartedly what gives him no delight? But who can determine for himself that what will delight him should come his way, and, when it comes, that it should, in fact, delight him?", Responses to Various Questions from Simplicianus, I, 2, 21 as quoted in Brown, Augustine of Hippo, p. 155. Augustine is developing a theory of volition which argues that unless the will is moved by love, it cannot act. In the Confessions, XIII,9, Augustine explains that love works in a way analogous to gravity (as understood in Augustine's time): "A body tends to go of its

own weight to its own place, not necessarily downward toward the bottom, but to its own place". In terms of love this means that "My weight is my love; wherever I am carried, it is my love that carries me there". For further development of this theme in Augustine see his City of God, XI, 28; XIV, 28; XV, 22; and The Trinity, VIII-XV, especially X,8. Given this emphasis on love as the motive force in life, Augustine's distinction of uti/frui becomes extremely important. The classic formulation of this distinction is found in On Christian Doctrine, I,3. See also H.A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of Augustine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 39ff..

[71] For a very suggestive argument on the occasion and construction of the Confessions see Alberto Pincherle, "The Confessions of St. Augustine", Augustinian Studies 7 (1976), pp. 119-133. On the mystery of God, see Confessions, VI,5.

[72] Confessions, I,1.

[73] Confessions, II,4-10.

[74] Confessions, VIII,5.

[75] Confessions, VIII,12.

[76] Confessions, IX,2.

[77] Confessions, IX,1.

[78] TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, p. 39. Author's emphasis. Kaufman, Augustinian Piety and Catholic Reform, p. 15 calls this "prevenient grace" but that is too strong a claim. Augustine gives more freedom to the will than Kaufman allows.

[79] For a survey of the Donatist controversy see W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa (Oxford:Claredon Press, 1952), G.G. Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London: SPCK, 1950), and R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of Saint Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and Brown, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 212-243.

[80] Augustine, On Baptism, Against the Donatists, trans. C.D. Hartranft, in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, Vol. IV (Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1956). Citing the example of Cornelius Augustine argues that "all the good that he had done in his prayers and alms could not benefit him unless he were incorporated into the Church by the bond of Christian brotherhood and peace . . . and being by his [Peter's] orders, he was joined by the tie of communion to the fellowship of Christians . . .. And indeed it would have

been most fatal to despise what he did not yet possess, vaunting himself by what he had. So too those who [Donatists] by separating themselves from the society of their fellows, to the overthrow of charity, thus break the bond of unity", I, 8-10. Cf. IV,22-29.

[81] Brown, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 223-234.

[82] G.G. Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy, p. 114.

[83] Augustine, Answer to the Letter of Petilian, Bishop of Cirta, in The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV, III, 40-20. Also On Baptism, Against the Donatists, II, 7-11.

[84] On Baptism, Against the Donatists, III, 16-21.

[85] Augustine cites Romans 5:5. The Correction of the Donatists in The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV, II, 50.

[86] On Baptism, Against the Donatists, I, 11-16, Cf. I,10-14.

[87] See the discussion of the close relationship of these three in S.J. Grabowski, The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of Saint Augustine (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1957), pp. 387-392, especially 388-389.

[88] On Baptism, Against the Donatists, I, 11-16. The role of charity in Augustine has been vigorously debated. Most of this debate has been sparked by Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1938), pp. 449-558. For an insightful critique of Nygren see Oliver O'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in Augustine (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 10-14, 141-159. John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), looks closely at Augustine's doctrine of love and is also quite critical of Nygren. See pp. 15ff., 92f., 121f., 275ff.. See also William R. O'Connor, "The Uti/Frui Distinction in Augustine's Ethics" Augustinian Studies 14 (1983), pp. 45-62 for a critique of Nygren and O'Donovan.

[89] For a treatment of Pelagius see Brown, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 340-407 and also Brown's two essays, "Pelagius and His Supporters: Aims and Environment" and "The Patrons of Pelagius: The Roman Aristocracy Between East and West" in Religion and Society in the Age of St. Augustine (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), pp. 183-207, 208-226.

[90] The question of the continuity of this phase of Augustine's thought with the previous ones is again raised. W.H.C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity (Philadelphia:

Fortress Press, 1984), p. 673, argues that "thirteen years before Pelagius set foot in Africa Augustine had already reached his main conclusions. His most lasting legacy to Western Christendom was not the product merely of the Pelagian controversy. It arose out of the core of the North African theological tradition, accentuated by his meditations on the meaning of his own experience". It is certainly true that Augustine did continue to reflect on his own experiences and that in broad strokes Augustine knew his position but Pelagius forced Augustine to work it out with greater care and detail than he would have otherwise.

[91] Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, pp. 111-113. See particularly Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, 25 and On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin, 19-22 in Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, W.J. Oates, ed., Vol. I (New York: Random House, 1948). All subsequent and references to these two works are from Oates' edition.

[92] Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, pp. 127-130. This discussion is carried out at length in On the Spirit and the Letter, 5,7,26,32,54,57-59 and especially in 60.

[93] Augustine, On The Grace of Christ And On Original Sin, I,chap. 1.

[94] Ibid., chap. 13.

[95] Ibid., chap. 15.

[96] Augustine, On The Spirit And The Letter, chap. 47. See also Augustine, On Nature And Grace, chap. 29 in Oates, Basic Writings of Saint Augustine. All subsequent references are to this edition.

[97] Ibid., chap. 5.

[98] Ibid., chaps. 26, 31.

[99] Augustine, On The Grace Of Christ And On Original Sin, I, chap. 25: "Let them therefore read and understand, observe and acknowledge, that it is not by law and teaching, uttering their lessons from without, but by a secret and wonderful, and ineffable power operating within, that God works in men's hearts not only revelations of truth, but also good dispositions of the will". Brown, in Augustine of Hippo, points out that "the final union of knowledge and feeling would involve a man in the object of his choice in such a way that no other alternative is available . . .. The healthy man is one in whom knowledge and feeling have been united", p. 374. A similar opinion is expressed by TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, p. 334.

[100] Generally Augustine distinguishes between the grace of faith and the grace of charity as two stages in the operation of God. See Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, p. 144, n. 6. There is one point in On The Grace Of Christ And On Original Sin, I, 27 where Augustine collapses the sequential process of faith and charity into a single movement.

[101] Augustine, On The Spirit And The Letter, chap. 56: "This, in short, is the faith which works not by fear, but by love, not by dreading punishment but by loving righteousness. Whence, therefore, arises this love- that is to say, this charity- by which faith works, if not from the source whence faith itself obtained it?". Charles P. Carlson, Justification In Earlier Medieval Theology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 66-72, identifies two streams of thought in Augustine on justification. One involves only the remission of sins and the second the renewal of the will making it capable of the good. In the period which we are studying Augustine does stress justification as renewal much more than justification as remission of sins. For an interesting discussion on grace in Augustine see Peter J. Riga, "Created Grace In Augustine", Augustinian Studies, 3 (1972), pp. 113-130. Riga points out the influence of Greek Fathers of the Church, notably their emphasis on divinization, on Augustine.

[102] Augustine, The Enchiridion, chap. 67, in Oates, Basic Writings of Saint Augustine. All subsequent references to this work are from this edition.

[103] Augustine, On Grace and Free Will. Augustine appeals to James 2:19.

[104] Augustine, The Enchiridion, chap. 118.

[105] Ibid., chap. 121.

[106] Augustine, On Grace And Free Will, chap. 33. See also the Confessions, IX,13.

[107] Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. V, 12, 35, 36.

[108] Brown, Augustine of Hippo: "What occupied Augustine, therefore was no longer the mobilization of love that caused a man to act, but the mysterious resilience that would enable some men to maintain this love for the full course of their lives", p. 405.

[109] In both On Grace and Free Will and On the Predestination of the Saints Augustine seeks to relate grace and free will in a complimentary fashion. One interpreter of Augustine, E.

Gilson, in The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1961), pp. 143-164, has attempted to present this complimentary relationship in as positive a light as possible.

[110] Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, pp. 168-178. The relationship of grace, faith and predestination is treated by Augustine at length in On Rebuke and Grace, On The Predestination of the Saints, and On the Gift of Perseverance. This latter is found in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. V.

[111] Heiko Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation, trans. Paul L. Nyhus (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 123. I have not attempted to deal with the difficult theological and philosophical problems that arise from Augustine's doctrine of justification by faith, notably the problem of predestination. For this see Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine Of Operative Grace, pp. 175-178 and the essays by William L. Rowe, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will", and John M. Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination", in Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, R.A. Markus, ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 209-252. On the developments between Augustine and Aquinas see Charles P. Carlson, Justification In Earlier Medieval Thought and Denis R. Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism: A Study In Theological Anthropology, p. 44.

[112] Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong? pp. 141-142. For a comparison of Augustine and Aquinas on faith see Peter J. Riga, "The Act of Faith in Augustine and Aquinas" The Thomist 35 (1971): 143-174.

[113] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1946), I-II, 75, 1c. Hereafter the Summa Theologica will be designated ST. All quotations are from this edition unless otherwise noted.

[114] ST, I-II, 74, 5c. In II-II, 7, 2 ad 3 Aquinas distinguishes between natural weakness of the human intellect in this world from the "darkness" that results from sin. In I-II, 83, 2 it is pointed out that sin lies in the essence of the soul, not only in its powers.

[115] ST, I-II, 78, 1c.

[116] ST, I-II, 79, 1c and 2c.

[117] ST, I-II, 82, 3c.

[118] ST, I-II, 109, 7c. For a further discussion of the nature of the fall and its impact on humanity see R.P.

Scharleman, Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 62-82.

[119] M.G. Lawler, "Grace and Free Will In Justification: A Textual Study in Aquinas" The Thomist 35 (1971): 601-630 looks at the development of Aquinas' thought on grace. He identifies three significant changes in this process: "first, St. Thomas puts in greater relief the divine initiative and the necessity of divine help to prepare oneself for grace; second, he characterizes this divine help as an immediate and interior motion of the will; third, he subordinates the idea of grace-habitus to that of sanctifying grace-divine motion", p. 624. Lawler suggests these changes resulted from the study of biblical materials and the Fathers, notably Augustine, but most decisively from a growing awareness of the dangers of Semipelagianism.

[120] ST, I-II, 109, 7c. Cf. 109, 2c.

[121] ST, I-II, 109, 6c. See also 111, 3c; 114, 5c: "Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace". Aquinas' treatment of free-will in the context of justification is quite typical of the thirteenth century in that it is concerned with the relationship of grace and free choice rather than the relationship of human and divine justice.

[122] ST, I-II, 109, 2c.

[123] In ST, I-II, 110, 3c and 112, 1c Aquinas speaks of participation in the divine nature: "But the infused virtues dispose man in a higher way, and in view of a higher end; and, also, it follows, with reference to some higher nature. Now this in fact is the divine nature as possessed by participation" ("in ordine naturam divinam participation") and "For just as it is impossible for anything to make fiery but fire alone, so it is necessary that God alone should make godlike, by communicating a share in his divine nature by participation and assimilation" ("communicando consortium divinae naturae per quamdam similitudinis participationem") respectively. English and Latin quotations are from the Blackfriars edition of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Latin text and English translation; introductions, notes, appendices, glossaries (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964--). All Latin quotations are from this edition.

[124] ST, I-II, 108, 1, 2ad.

[125] ST, I-II, 109, 4c.

[126] ST, I-II, 109, 3, 1ad.

[127] ST, I-II, 109, 8c and 9c.

[128] ST, I-II, 113, 3c.

[129] ST, I-II, 112, 2, 2ad.

[130] ST, I-II, 111, 3, 2ad.

[131] ST, I-II, 64, 4c.

[132] T. Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas", Religious Studies, 13 (1977), pp. 134-135.

[133] ST, II-II, 2c and 3c.

[134] ST, II-II, 3, 1, 3ad.

[135] ST, I-II, 17, 6.

[136] ST, II-II, 2, 1c. See also II-II, 4, 1c. For a consideration of the rationality of faith see Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas", pp. 143-148. For a fuller look at faith in Aquinas see Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 226-265.

[137] ST, II-II, 2, 9c: "Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious". See also II-II, 5, 2c.

[138] Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas", p. 139. See also Riga, "The Act of Faith in Aquinas and Augustine", pp. 167-170.

[139] ST, II-II, 5, 3c.

[140] ST, II-II, 6, 1c.

[141] ST, II-II, 4, 7c.

[142] ST, II-II, 4, 2c and 5c. Aquinas is willing to attribute some value even to even a lifeless faith. See II-II, 7, 2, 2ad.

[143] ST, II-II, 2, 2c.

[144] ST, II-II, 4, 3c. The English and Latin text is taken from the Blackfriars edition.

[145] Summa Theologiae, (Blackfriars edition), p. 125. See also ST, II-II, 6, 2ad. This point is made emphatically by Otto H. Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas Von Aquin: Versuch eines systematisch-

theologischen Dialogs (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald Verlag, 1967), p. 736. I quote only the concluding line of his argument: "Das thomanische sola fide bliebt auch als sola fide formata ein echtes sola fide". See also Karl Rahner, "Questions of Controversial Theology on Justification" in Theological Investigations Vol. 4 (Baltimore: Helicon Press and London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), pp. 199-205. I quote from p. 203 of Rahner: "Hence this love is precisely the truest climax of what takes place in faith. It is not something which comes after faith, like a work. It is radical, loving capitulation of man before God". Pesch's definition of love as cited in Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin is remarkably like Rahner: ". . . was caritas heisst: die ganzheitliche, selbstvergessene, masslose, nie ans End kommende Selbstuber-gabe an Gott", p. 736. Pesch's assessment of the difference between Aquinas and Luther on this point is that Aquinas' understanding of love and Luther's view of faith are functionally equivalent, pp. 738ff.. What Aquinas calls "lifeless faith" and what Luther calls "historical faith" are the same and "der Gegensatz zwischen Thomas und Luther durfte sich also tatsachlich im wesentlichen auf einen Unterschied der Sprechweise reduzieten", p. 745.

[146] Aquinas does allow that "Hope can exist without charity but not without faith; charity demands both faith and hope; faith alone can exist without the other two", W.J. Hill, "The Distinctive Nature of Hope" in Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars edition, Vol. 33, p. 157.

[147] For the relationship of faith and hope see Ibid., p. 158.

[148] ST, II-II, 17, 6c and 23, 6c. This emphasis is also in keeping with the biblical text- I Corinthians 13: 9-13.

[149] ST, II-II, 23, 1c.

[150] ST, II-II, 24, 12c. Aquinas offers three different models of the individual's relationship to God: teleology, charity, and justice. Each of these models creatively interacts with the others and together they suggest the richness and fullness of the human-divine relationship. See the discussion of these three models in Steven A. Edwards, "Structure and Change in Aquinas's Religious Ethics", Journal of the American Academy of Religion 54 (1986), pp. 281-302. Edwards also describes the importance charity had for Aquinas.

[151] ST, I-II, 11, 5c. The comments of Pesch in Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin are worthy of being repeated: "die innere Teleologie der Gnade auf ihre Entfaltung zur ewigen, ungebrochenen Gemeinschaft

mit Gott zur Sprache bringen. Wir können auch sagen: Sie solle- in einer paradoxen Formel- festhalten, dass Gott auch vollendet, was er in der Rechtfertigung begonnen. Die Wirklichkeit des >Verdienstes< ist nur die Verlängerung der Wirklichkeit der Rechtfertigung auf die Ewigkeit hin und sie hinein. Die Verdienstlehre ist darum Verlängerung der Rechtfertigungslehre und damit Rede von der Reichweite des Handelns Gottes, nicht vom Wert des menschlichen Tuns", pp. 781-782. Pesch also concludes that the difference on the question of merit between Aquinas and Luther is "nicht schwer", p. 784!!

[152] ST, I-II, 114, 2c.

[153] ST, I-II, 114, 1c.

[154] ST, I-II, 114, 3c.

[155] J. Wawrykow, "The Role of Faith In The Eucharistic Doctrine Of Thomas Aquinas In The Summa Theologiae". (M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1980), p. 141.

[156] ST, I-II, 111, 2c for this distinction.

[157] ST, I-II, 114, 1, 1ad: "Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought by free will . . .".

[158] ST, I-II, 114, 4c.

[159] On the relation of Aquinas and Luther see Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin, pp. 935-948 and "Existential and Sapiential Theology- The Theological Confrontation Between Luther And Thomas Aquinas" in Catholic Scholars Dialogue With Luther, Jared Wicks, ed. (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp. 61-81. Pesch concludes that Aquinas and Luther reach remarkably similar theological conclusions despite their very different styles of theologizing. Pesch labels Aquinas' theology "sapiential" and Luther's as "existential". Harry McSorley, "Thomas Aquinas, John Pupper von Goch, and Martin Luther: An Essay In Ecumenical Theology" in Our Common History as Christians, John Deschner, Leroy Howe, and Klaus Penzel, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 99 concludes that had Luther known Aquinas he ". . . would not only have accepted this doctrine, but would actually have cited it, along with the teaching of Paul and Augustine, against the errors he found in some of the late Scholastics concerning the unaided powers of man's fallen nature in respect to justification". For a thorough discussion of Luther's knowledge of Thomism see Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism.

[160] For a survey of this period which points out the

diversity present in this time see Magaret Deansley, A History of the Medieval Church, 590-1500, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1925), pp. 166-178. Deansley points out that within this plurality of approaches each was considered legitimate. However, the study of this era is not without its its problems. See E. Jane Dempsey Douglass, Justification In Late Medieval Preaching (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), pp. 1-4.

[161] For a recent survey of nominalism and its interpretation see William J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion" in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, Charles Trinkaus and Heiko Oberman, eds. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974): 26-59.

[162] McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?, p. 199. McSorley's conclusion seems overstated to me but it is, nevertheless, indicative of Biel's influence. Biel's influence was felt at both the academic level through his writings and at a popular level through the influence he had upon several of the most popular preachers of the day, notably Geiler of Keisersberg and Michael Menot. For the latter see E. Jane Dempsey Douglass, Justification In Late Medieval Preaching, p. 3.

[163] Many of Luther's teachers, Jodocus Trutvetter, Bartholomaus Arnoldi, Johannes Paltz and Johannes Nathin, who had been a student of Biel's at Tubingen, were nominalists. Lewis W. Spitz, The Protestant Reformation, 1517-1559 (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 61-62. For Luther's criticism of Biel see Jared Wicks, Man Yearning For Grace: Luther's Early Spiritual Teaching (Washington and Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1968), pp. 184-188 and Paul Vignaux, "On Luther and Ockham", trans. Janet Coleman, in The Reformation in Medieval Perspective, Steven E. Ozment, ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971): pp. 107-118.

[164] McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?, p. 189-190 questions whether Biel had any positive influence on Luther. For a more balanced view of the influence of Biel on Luther see Brian Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study In The Theology of Luther (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). When asked in 1520 about his philosophy Luther identified himself in this manner: "I belong to the Occamist party". In 1532 Luther still called Occam his teacher and identified him as "the greatest dialectician". Quoted in Walther von Loewenich, Martin Luther: The Man And His Work, trans. Lawrence W. Denef (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1982), p. 48. Even in his Ninety Five Theses (1517) Luther would agree with nominalist positions. See Theses 7 and 38 in LW 31, 25,29. The most thorough treatment on Luther's relationship to Biel is Leif Grane, Contra Gabrielem: Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der

Disputatio contra Scholasticam Theologiam, (Gyldendal, 1962). The other significant influence on Luther was mysticism. For a brief survey of Luther's relationship to mysticism see Bengt Hägglund, The Background of Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), pp. 2-16.

165 The distinction between God's absolute and ordained powers is not original with Biel. It dates back to Peter Damian (d. 1071). Thomas Aquinas also discusses the distinction in ST, I, 25. For Aquinas, however, ". . . the wisdom of God displayed in the potentia ordinata has very nearly rendered the question of the potentia absoluta superfluous. That God could have chosen otherwise is granted; that He could have chosen more wisely is denied". David C. Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 52. Dun Scotus makes the same distinction but he uses it to defend the freedom of God. See Ibid.. For a brief look at Luther's use of this distinction see John M. Headley, Luther's View of Church History, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 3-4. John Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1953), passim.

166 This same concern is found in Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, 25, 3: "Therefore, everything that does not imply contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them".

167 Heiko Oberman, The Harvest Of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 39. Author's emphasis.

168 Ibid., pp. 30-36. Oberman discusses the ways in which Biel's distinction between the absolute and ordained powers of God has been misinterpreted. To the Oberman's list of "misinterpreters" of Biel we could add Gordon Leff, Gregory of Rimini (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1961), pp. 90-95 and Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 127-139. Leff sees this distinction causing skepticism regarding the knowledge of God. Leff argues that this skepticism produced a climate of doubt and heresy. See Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), p. 307.

169 Gabriel Biel, Collectorium super quattor libros sententiarum, Lib I, dist. 17, art. 2, concl. 3, corol. 1. quoted in Hägglund, The Background of Luther's Doctrine of

Justification In Late Medieval Theology, p. 22. All quotations from Biel are from this work unless otherwise noted.

[170] Ibid., Lib. I, dist. 17, art. 2, concl. 3. Hägglund, p. 22.

[171] "No one can be dear and accepted in the sight of God for eternal life according to the law as it has been ordained if he does not have some quality infused him, which is love and grace". Lib. I, dist. 17, qu. 1, art. 2, concl. 2. Hägglund, p. 22.

[172] Hägglund, pp. 22-24. It is Grane's opinion, Contra Gabrielem, p. 71 that Biel's emphasis falls squarely on the ordained order. For a contrary opinion see Jared Wicks, Man Yearning For Grace, p. 291, n. 16: "When one takes the trouble to work through Biel's extended treatments of one or more topics, then the impression cannot be avoided that his theology is not primarily concerned with the present order of salvation. This theology moves in a realm of non-contradictory, logically possible". The discussion of the Christian dispensation occurs "only as an afterthought to laborious discourses on how it could conceivably be otherwise".

[173] Alister E. McGrath, "Mira et nova diffinitio iustitiae: Luther and Scholastic Doctrines of Justification", Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 74 (1983), p. 53.

[174] Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 127-129. See also Wilhelm Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation: Eine Untersuchung zur Moralphilosophie und -Theologie Bei Gabriel Biel, (Leipzig: St. Benno Verlag, 1972), p. 313: The will ". . . hat nicht seine natürliche Rechtheit, nämlich seine Freiheit verloren. Der Mensch ist auch nach dem Fall frei von Zwang und Nötigung, er hat seine Grundbefähigung zu kontingenten Handlen behalten. Er ist nicht in dem Sinne der Sünde unterworfen . . .".

[175] Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei, p. 65. For a fuller discussion of the impact of ignorance on the will see Lawrence F. Murphy, "Gabriel Biel and Ignorance as an Effect of Original Sin in the Prologue to the Canonis missae expositio", Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 74 (1983): 5-24; 75 (1984): 32-58. For the relationship of Biel to Thomas Aquinas see Lawrence F. Murphy, "Gabriel Biel As A Transmitter of Aquinas to Luther" Renaissance and Reformation, 7 (1983), pp. 26-41. Murphy, pp. 36-37, concludes that Biel's understanding of Aquinas on original sin was "simplistic and partially incorrect".

[176] Biel, Collectorium, Lib. II, dist. 27, art. 1, concl. 4.

Quoted in McSorley, Luther: Right Or Wrong?, pp. 200-201.

[177] Biel, Ibid., Quoted in Mcsorley, Luther: Right Or Wrong?, p. 201.

[178] Biel, Ibid., Lib. II, dist. 27, quest. 1, art. 2, concl. 4. Quoted in McSorley, Luther: Right Or Wrong?, p. 201.

[179] Biel, Ibid., Quoted in McSorley, Luther:Right Or Wrong?, p. 200.

[180] Hägglund, The Background of Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology, p. 26.

[181] Paul Vignaux, Philosophy In The Middle Ages: An Introduction, trans. E.C. Hall (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959), p. 211.

[182] Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 48. Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation, p. 326: "Der Mensch kann durch das liberum arbitruim mit seinen natürlichen Kräften die göttlichen Gebote hinsichtlich der Substanz des Aktes erfüllen, nicht aber nach der Intention des Gesetzgebers . . . .".

[183] Biel, Collectorium, Lib, II, dist. 28. quest. 1, art. 1. Quoted in Hägglund, p. 27. The position that Biel is arguing for here is one that had been specifically rejected by Aquinas in ST, I-II, 109, 6. In fact, the position Biel adopts is raised by Aquinas in a series of possible objections to the position he adopts: "It would seem that man, by himself and without the help of grace, can prepare himself for grace" (obj. 1) and "Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him, since if man does what is in him to do God will not deny him grace" (obj. 2). Aquinas argues that God gratuitously moves or inspires the soul and that once God has acted, the individual can then, and only then, respond to God. What is noteworthy is that Biel can, at one point at least, cite Aquinas as being in agreement with his position. See McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?, p. 202. What explains this discrepancy is the substantial change that exists between the young and the mature Aquinas. For the differences between the young and the mature Aquinas on this question see Denis Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism, pp. 43-59, especially pp. 55-57. The young Aquinas does adopt a position similar to that of Biel and it is this earlier position that was most familiar to the tradition in which Biel was working. See Heiko Oberman, "'Iustitia Christi' and 'Iustitia Dei': Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification", Harvard Theological Review 59 (1966), p. 5.

[184] Hägglund, The Background of Luther's Doctrine of

Justification in Late Medieval Theology, p. 28. In this discussion of what an individual is able to do apart from grace, Biel does take note of the general influence of grace, "the general influence of God without which man can do nothing whatever", Collectorium, Lib. II, dist. 27, quest. 1, art. 2, concl. 4, as quoted in McSorley, Luther: Right Or Wrong?, p. 201, but this general influence of God plays no great part in Biel's thinking.

[185] Biel, Collectorium, Lib. III, dist, 27, quest. 1, propose. 1. Quoted in Hägglund, p. 28.

[186] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 133-134. See also Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation: "Der menschliche Wille des viator kann aus seinen natürlichen Kräften Gott über alles lieben", p. 327.

[187] Biel, Collectorium, Lib. II, dist. 27, art. 1, nota 2. Quoted in Hägglund, p. 30.

[188] "In reality God accepts no one for eternal life unless he has poured into him the quality [habitus] of love". Ibid..

[189] Ibid., Lib. II, dist. 27, quest. 1, art. 2, concl. 1. Quoted in Hägglund, pp. 30-31.

[190] Ibid., Lib. II, dist 27, quest. 1, art. 1, nota 3. Quoted in Hägglund, p. 31.

[191] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 171.

[192] Hägglund, The Background of Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology, p. 32.

[193] Biel, Collectorium, Lib. III, dist. 27, quest. 3, dub. 2. Quoted in Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation, p. 384, n. 340. My translation.

[194] Biel, Ibid., Lib. III, dist. 27, quest. 1, prop. 4. Quoted in Hägglund, p. 29. On this particular point there has arisen some debate between Oberman The Harvest of Medieval Theology and Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation. It is Oberman's contention that Biel argues that ". . . this absolute love [of God] is within the reach of natural man without the assistance of grace", p. 133 (author's emphasis). For this reason Oberman concludes that Biel's doctrine of justification is essentially Pelagian, p. 177. Ernst has countered Oberman's argument suggesting that Biel understands grace to be infused simultaneously with the act of loving God above all, p. 384f., 394. Thus the individual does not prepare for the reception of grace and this removes the Pelagian charge against Biel. Ernst's error

is to separate the final act of loving God from the preparatory steps that lead to this, acts which even Ernst acknowledges lie within the individual's power. Thus, Biel cannot be saved from the charge of Pelagianism. For a fuller critique of Ernst see Denis Janz, "A Reinterpretation of Gabriel Biel on Nature and Grace", Sixteenth Century Journal 8 (1977): 104-108.

[195] For a brief survey of medieval opinions on contrition and attrition see Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei, pp. 97-100.

[196] Biel regards penance as a virtue although he does want to tie the sacramental act together with it. His concern is for moral integrity in that the internal and external act must be matched and balanced. See Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 156-157. Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei, notes that Biel was not interested in an extrasacramental road to justification, pp. 99-100.

[197] Biel's pastoral concern is described in Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation, pp. 5-35 and R.P. Post, The Modern Devotion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. 441-448 and 486-490.

[198] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 152-160. Oberman concludes that Biel's view of contrition necessarily enhances scrupulousness and despair. Biel is aware of the problem and would have liked to mitigated this requirement by following Scotus' parum attritus solution but he was prevented from doing do by his doctrine of facere quod in se est and his high view of the natural capacities and dignity of man. Luther was keenly aware of the difficulties that this requirement produced. On Luther see Walther von Loewenich, Martin Luther: The Man and His Work, pp. 72ff.

[199] "In addition to the fact that one's sins are remitted through the merit of Christ's suffering or that grace is infused, either the initial justifying grace or that which follows the first and augments it, there is required, in the case of an adult, a good disposition of the will and a right attitude toward God, whether it be attrition and compunction for the sins of his past life or love to God or the desire for salvation or the voluntary reception of the sacraments de congruo, or, for the growth in grace, good works are required proceeding from the grace previously received, which is merit de condigno." Biel, Collectorium, Lib. III, dist. 20, quest. 1, concl. 5. Quoted in Hägglund, p. 32. Oberman's argument that grace contributes an "additional impetus and ornamentation" to an act which is already good underestimates the importance of grace in Biel's thought. See Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 162.

[200] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 176.

[201] Ibid., p. 181-183. Luther's fear of God's punishing righteousness is completely understandable given this balancing act. Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953) quotes Emmanuel Hirsch to the effect that "Biel, though admitting, even stressing the need for grace, and for the divine 'Misericordia', normally preferred to reserve 'Justitia' for the retributive justice of God which punishes sinners", p. 125. On Biel's understanding of justice see Alister E. McGrath, "Mira et nova diffinitio iustitiae: Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification".

[202] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 219. For a discussion of the anxiety this caused at the time of the Reformation see Bernhard Poschmann, Penance and The Anointing of the Sick (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), pp. 155-193, Thomas N. Tentler, Sin and Confession On The Eve of The Reformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), and Steven Ozment, The Reformation In The Cities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 12, 28, 118-119, 176-177 and The Age of Reform: 1250-1550 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 209, 216-219. For a contrary view which argues that such statements of medieval anxiety are overstated see Lawrence G. Duggan, "Fear And Confession On The Eve Of The Reformation", Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 75 (1984): 153-175. Duggan's argument can be summarized in the following statement: "Strictly speaking little direct evidence exists to support the assertion that late medieval penitential practices induced widespread anxiety", p. 155.

[203] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 192-193.

[204] Ibid., p. 223.

[205] The theoretical balance between God's mercy and justice is ". . . not maintained in fact. From the viewpoint of the viator the work of Christ as Redeemer lies largely in the past. The present and future are filled with the work of Christ as Judge. Ever since the Ascension Christ is absorbed in the task of scrutinizing the viatores to see whether they are making use of the benefits offered to them through the past work of reconciliation", Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei, pp. 129-130.

[206] Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 217-230.

[207] Ibid., pp. 177, 426. The assessments of Biel's "catholicity" are highly varied. For a survey of some major positions see Hägglund, The Background of Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology, pp. 17-18 and E. Jane Dempsey Douglass, Justification In Late Medieval Preaching, pp. 129-134. Of these, Lortz's view, found in Die

Reformation in Deutschland, 2 ed. (Freiburg, 1941), Vol. I, p. 473, that the "occamistic system is radically uncatholic" is probably the most famous. Oberman, in The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 177, 426, labels Biel's system as essentially Pelagian. In a recent article Alister E. McGrath, "The Anti-Pelagian Structure of 'Nominalist' Doctrines of Justification", Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis 57 (1981), pp. 107-119, has attempted to defend Biel against charges of Pelagianism by stressing the gracious nature of the pactum and the traditional and Catholic emphasis on freedom of the will. Although McGrath does not mention McSorley, Luther: Right Or Wrong? the objections that McSorley raises against Biel, pp. 205-215, support Oberman's charge of Pelagianisn against Biel, particularly as they relate to the role of prevenient grace, a role that plays such a large part in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas.

Chapter Three

[1] Upon first reading Luther's theology it may appear quite confused. This is often due to the situational and polemical context in which Luther writes. Kerr, in commenting on Luther's writings, is certainly correct when he says: "it may be argued that from a negative point of view Luther's theology was simply a rebuttal or condemnation of Roman Catholicism. Certainly much of his writings aimed at refuting what he regarded as a gross error. But he was no mere theological iconoclast. He could be positive and forthright, and when all polemic is eliminated there still remains a considerable corpus of affirmative theology. This positive theology, in the final analysis, is extremely simple. It is concerned with the elaboration of a few fundamental themes, such as the sin of man, the grace of God in Christ, the Christian life, the sacraments, and the hope of eternal life". Hugh T. Kerr, A Compend of Luther's Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. ix. Helmar Junghans, "Interpreting the Old Luther (1526-1546)", Currents in Theology and Mission 9 (1982), p. 275 states that "Luther created this diversified opus out of some fundamental insights of reformatory theology".

[2] The most concise and dramatic statement by Luther on the personal harm he experienced as a result of this misunderstanding of justification can be found in his "Preface To The Complete Edition of Luther's Latin Writings", LW 34, 327-338, especially 336-337; WA 54, 179-187.

[3] LW 26 and 27, WA 40:I,II. Luther actually delivered these lectures in 1531, between July 3 and December 11, in 41 lectures. It was in 1535 that the lectures were actually published. In 1538 Luther wrote a preface to the edition-see LW 27, 145-149; WA 40:I, 33-37.

[4] In addition to the 1519 and the 1535 commentaries on Galatians, there are three other interrelated commentaries on Galatians. See LW 27, ix. It is not my intention to compare any of these commentaries although that would be a most informative study of Luther's theological development. The 1519 and 1535 commentaries on Galatians have been studied by Karin Bornkamm, Luthers Auslegungen des Galaterbriefs von 1519 und 1531 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1963). See also the careful textual work of Heinz Bluhm, Luther: Translator of Paul: Studies in Romans and Galatians (New York: Peter Land Publishing Co, Inc., 1984). The commentary on Galatians was first translated into English in 1575. See LW 27, x. For critical comments on this text see Brian Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the

Theology of Luther (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1962), pp. 58-61.

[5] Quoted in LW 26, ix.

[6] WA 2.

[7] This description is drawn in part from Gordon Rupp, "Miles Emeritus? Continuity and Discontinuity Between the Young and the Old Luther" in Luther: Theologian for Catholics and Protestants, ed. Charles Yule (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1985), pp. 75 and 83.

[8] WA DB 11:2, 380. As quoted in Rupp, "Miles Emeritus", p. 83. Cf. LW 27, 147; WA 40:I, 35, 5-14: "Thus I want to arouse my brethren to resist the wiles and the malices of Satan. In these most recent and final hours of history he has been provoked into such a rage against the knowledge of Christ in its revived form that men who previously seemed to be possessed by demons and to be insane now seem to have become demons themselves, possessed by even more horrible demons and by an insanity that goes even beyond the demonic. This is caused by the awesome realization which this enemy of truth and life has that the horrible day of his destruction is near and imminent . . . because it spells the end of his tyranny". This apocalyptic expectation and imagination is evident throughout the 1535 commentary. On Luther's apocalyptic expectations see John M Headley, Luther's View of Church History , pp. 224-265 and Mark U. Edwards, Luther and the False Brethren (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 97-114.

[9] Junghans, "Interpreting the Old Luther", p. 271 presents some very interesting statistics on the literary output of Luther in the the latter half of his life: "two-thirds of Luther's extant work date from this last period of his life". If for no other reason than literary output this era of Luther's life merits much closer study.

[10] Rupp, "Miles Emeritus?", p. 77, describes Luther's changing role in the Reformation as moving from a "striker" to a "goalkeeper".

[11] The role and influence of Melanchthon in this era, both upon Luther and the new religious movement, continued to grow during this period. Melanchthon's influence is particularly noticeable in the Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Smalcald Articles (1537). On the influence of Melanchton on Luther see L.C. Green, How Melanchton Helped Luther Discover the Gospel (Fallbrook, California: Verdict Publications, 1980).

[12] See for example Karl Holl's essay of 1906, "Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Licht der Geschichte des Protestantismus"

in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. III, (Tübingen: J.C. Mohr, 1928), pp. 525-527.

[13] Rupp, "Miles Emeritus?", p. 76: "Not in his thought and in the quality of his writing, and in the depths of his achievement is it permissible to drive a wedge between the Young and the Old Luther. There were great and important and lasting continuities. Not that there were no changes". Cf. p. 78: "there is an inner coherence and consistency in Luther's thought". Junghans, "Interpreting the Old Luther", p. 275, prefers the term "unfolding" to "development" to describe the movement in Luther's thought saying that "there is essentially no disagreement between the young and the old Luther".

[14] It must be noted that even after a century of intensive study of Luther's early thought (1509-1525) it still remains a matter of debate as to what the exact changes where that took place in Luther's thought. One of the major problems is that neither the exact date nor the nature of Luther's "Turmerlebnis" (the nature of the latter often deciding the former) has been determined. Almost every date from 1512-1513 to 1520, and in some cases even later, has been suggested. This author finds the years of 1518-1519 as the most convincing date. See U. Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), F. Edward Cranz, An Essay On The Development of Luther's Thought On Justice, Law, And Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) and E. Bizer, Fides ex Auditu (Neukirchen, Kreis Moers, 1966).

[15] The LW and WA series.

[16] LW 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8; WA 42,43,44 dating from 1535-1544.

[17] LW 22,23,24; WA 33,45,46,47 dating from 1530-1532 and 1537-1538.

[18] LW 15,16,17; WA 31:II dating from 1528 and 1539.

[19] LW 26,27; WA 40:I,II dating from 1531.

[20] LW 35; WA DB 6,7,8,9. Various dates.

[21] Psalms- LW 10,11; WA 55: Romans- LW 25; WA 56 dating from 1515-1516; Hebrews- LW 29; WA 57:III dating from 1517-1518; and Galatians- LW 27; WA 2 dating from 1519.

[22] See for example "The Four Psalms of Comfort" (1526) in LW 14; WA 19.

[23] J. Pelikan, Luther The Expositor (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 109-110: "Luther's commentaries on the Bible constantly argued with opponents living and

dead . . .. On the other hand, Luther's polemical works fairly bristled with Biblical citations and Biblical expositions. This mutual influence of commentary and controversy was . . . basic to Luther's expository work". Pelikan goes on to suggest that "possibly it was only in controversy that Luther found the true meaning of Scriptures" because ". . . as a debater, lecturer, and preacher accustomed to think on his feet Luther seems frequently to have developed insights ad lib which had escaped him during the calm reflection of his study. Thus the problem of the mutual influence of commentary and controversy in Luther is a complex one. He was not merely defending his view of the exegesis of the Scriptures in a controversy; he was shaping it. He was not merely using the Scriptures to support his previous exegesis; he was re-examining his exegesis in the light of further study of the Scriptures".

[24] Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. R.C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 3-11, 72-102. From this position grows Luther's opposition to the use of philosophy in theology. On this see G. Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R.A. Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), pp. 76-92.

[25] J. Pelikan, Luther The Expositor, p. 46.

[26] Ibid., pp. 46-47. See also B.A. Gerrish, "Doctor: Doctor Martin Luther: Subjectivity and Doctrine in the Lutheran Reformation" in Seven Headed Luther, Peter Newman Brooks, ed. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1983), pp. 2-11. The older discussion, as Gerrish mentions, can be found in Hermann Steinlein, Luthers Doktorat (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1912).

[27] The most glaring example of this unevenness of treatment that topics receive is seen when Luther begins to talk about the Word, LW 26, 375-382; WA 40:I,572,16-582,33. This theme suddenly appears in a context that can only, at best, be described as tangential to the text and then quickly disappears and is left unrelated to other themes.

[28] See Harry Loewen, Luther and the Radicals (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1974) and John S. Oyer, Lutheran Reformers Against Anabaptists (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). See also Luther's tract "Concerning Rebaptism" in LW 26,229-262; WA 40,144-174.

[29] Luther comments in LW 27,34-35; WA:40:II,42,33-43,14 very perceptively reveal the differences between himself and the Anabaptists.

[30] LW 26,63-64; WA 40:I,128,32-130,22.

[31] LW 26,14; WA 40:I,53,21-54,14.

[52] LW 26,11; WA 40:I,49,10-20.

[53] LW 26,13; WA 40:I,52,23-53,9.

[54] LW 26,23; WA 40:I,66,32-67,25.

[55] LW 26,51-52; WA 40:I,111,20-112,10. For a fuller discussion of the problem of church unity see Lawrence B. Porter, "Luther on Church Unity: The Commentary on Galatians (1535)", Mid-Stream 20 (1981), pp. 159-176.

[56] The sectarians included Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Osiander, Brenz, Agricola, and Bucer. These were reformers who agreed with Luther on the fundamental point of justification by faith but disagreed with Luther on church order and polity and, in this case, most notably on the question of the Eucharistic presence of Christ.

[57] The fanatics were a loosely defined group who were also called "Enthusiasts" and "Schwärmer". They included anyone who departed from Luther's insistence on the priority of the Word and who, consequently, stressed the role of experience and the interior working of the Spirit apart from the Word.

[58] LW 27,149; WA 40:I,36,21-24. Cf. LW 26,397-398; WA 40:I, 604-605. See also Headley, Luther's View of Church History, pp. 250-251. Peter Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith-Luther On Justification in the Galatians' Commentary of 1531-1535", in Catholic Scholars Dialogue With Luther, Jared Wicks, ed., p. 121 and passim charges that, because of the polemical nature of his writing, Luther never attained theological clarity on the issues of faith and good works. I.D.K. Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 105, makes a similar charge but a much less harsh one: "Hence the peculiar dogmatic form into which the doctrine of justification is cast for polemical purposes is an inadequate key to the richness of Luther's faith. Not justification, but Christ alone, is the material norm of his theology and the lifeblood of his faith". Manns' claim is overstated and fails to take account of the manner and nature of Luther's theology and, I would argue, Luther's claim for faith and good works has more clarity than Manns is willing to grant. I would also agree with Siggins that Christology is really the heart of the issue for Luther, not justification by faith.

[59] The Colloquy of Marburg was called in 1529 in an attempt to create some degree of unity among the various Protestant groups. See Hermann Sasse, This Is My Body (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1959), pp. 273-295, especially pp. 281-284 and Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career, 1521-1530, Karin Bornkamm, ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress

Press, 1983), pp. 501-551.

[40] In 1530 Charles V called the Diet of Augsburg hoping that with his personal presence it would be possible for the Protestants and Catholics to come to a theological agreement which Charles hoped would secure the Empire against the threat of the Turks.

[41] Luther gave expression to his hopes for a reconciliation between himself and Rome at the Diet of Augsburg in his "Exhortation to All Clergy Assembled at Augsburg", LW 34, 9-61; WA 30:II,268-356. His somewhat misfounded optimism turned to bitter disappointment with the results of the Diet as can be seen in his "Warning To His Dear German People", LW 47,11-55; WA 30:III, 276-320, written in 1531. The possibility of a war or rebellion loomed large, all caused by the intransigency of the papal party. The same attitude is reflected in the Galatians commentary. The Pope is called the "Antichrist" because he usurped the authority of Christ and exercised his tyranny over the conscience through human laws, laws which were of his own making. On Luther's view of the Antichrist see Headley, Luther's View of Church History, pp. 195-224. Luther's concern, as expressed in these attacks is always to warn people against the dangers of the papacy and its deceptions. Luther combines "theological argumentation with polemical expression in order to fulfill the duty of a pastor who believes he must warn his people against an insidious enemy" in Scott H. Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), p. 156. In the Galatians Commentary, although Luther wages a polemical war on the papacy, he is not opposed to the institution of the papacy but to its corrupt practices. See LW 26,224; LW 40:I,357,18-25. If the papacy could be reformed doctrinally, Luther appears willing to accept it. Cf. LW 26,24; WA 40:I,69,23-70,10.

[42] On Luther's identification with Paul see Mark U. Edwards, Luther and the False Brethren, pp. 112-126. Edwards makes numerous references to the Galatians commentary.

[43] LW 26,31; WA 40:I,80,22-23.

[44] LW 26,53; WA 40:I,113,28-32.

[45] LW 27,109; WA 40:II,139,18-21.

[46] LW 27,123; WA 40:II,156,22-24.

[47] LW 26,65; WA 40:I,155,36-156,9. Cf. LW 26,49; WA 40:I, 108,18-109,13.

[48] LW 26,14; WA 40:I,53,21-24.

[49] LW 27,99; WA 40:II,125,18-21.

[50] LW 26,153; WA 40:I,264,15-26; LW 27, 33, 53, 85, 89; WA 40:II,41,18-27; 66,18-32; 107,22-108,16; 112,18-21.

[51] LW 26,13; WA 40:I,52,20-53,11.

[52] LW 26,197; WA 40:I,322,13-14.

[53] LW 26,381; WA 40:I,19-22.

[54] LW 26,36-37; WA 40:I,89,19-90,24. It is for this reason that Luther exhorts wariness and watchfulness. See LW 27,3; WA 40:II,2,17-27.

[55] LW 26,14; WA 40:I,53,12-14; LW 26,22; WA 40:I,65,12-14. Luther will also speak of these forces as "savage monsters"; LW 26,287; WA 40:I,447,32, and the devil as "Behemoth", WA 26,428,452; WA 40:I,647,15; 678,28

[56] LW 26,371; WA 40:I,566,18.

[57] LW 26,281; WA 40:I,439,18-21; LW 26,368; WA 40:I,562,28-30.

[58] LW 27,5; WA 40:II,5,16-17.

[59] LW 26,33; WA 40:I,84,25-85,16.

[60] LW 26,160; WA 40:I,274,26.

[61] LW 26,176; WA 40:I,296,24-25. Martin Greschat, in Melanchthon neben Luther: Studien zur Gestalt der Rechtfertigungslehre zwischen 1528-1537 (Witten: Luther Verlag, 1965), p. 80, speaking with reference to the events at the Diet of Augsburg says that "Luther hat diesen Vorgang geschichtstheologisch als das letzte Stadium des satanischen Widerstandes gegen die Herrschaft Christi gedeutet".

[62] LW 26,3; WA 40:I,39,14-28: "We have taken it upon ourselves in the Lord's name to lecture on this Epistle of Paul to the Galatians once more. This is not because we want to teach something new or unknown, for by the grace of God Paul is now very well known to you. But it is because, as I often warn you, there is a clear and present danger that the devil may take away from us the pure doctrine of faith and may substitute for it the doctrines of works and of human traditions. It is very necessary, therefore, that this doctrine of faith be continually read and heard in public. No matter how well known it may be or how carefully learned, the devil, our adversary, who prowls around seeking to devour us (I Peter 5:8), is not dead. Our flesh goes on living. Besides temptations of every sort attack and oppress us on every side. Therefore this doctrine can never be discussed or taught enough. If it is lost and perishes, the

whole knowledge of truth, life, and salvation is lost and perishes at the same time. But if it flourishes, everything good flourishes . . .".

[63] LW 26,26: WA 40:I,72,22-23. The question of how far reaching a reform Luther expected to see must be raised. At one point Luther describes the Reformation as taking place while he and Melanchthon drank beer in Wittenberg, LW 5,77; WA 10,3,18-19. For a more critical assessment of the accomplishments of the Reformation and the effects it had on changing society see Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in the German Reformation (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 299, 307-308. Strauss admits that prior to the period of his study there have been some positive change accomplished by the Reformation but "this resonance was probably confined to a segment of the urban population". The assessment of Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform, 1250-1550 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 437 is slightly more positive but hardly encouraging: "The great shortcoming of the Reformation was its naive expectation that the majority of people were capable of radical religious enlightenment and moral transformation, whether by persuasion or by coercion".

[64] Luther makes a comparable statement in the Galatians commentary: "For by this doctrine alone and through it is the church built, and in this it consists" (Ex illa enim et in illa sola doctrina fit et consistit Ecclesia), LW 26,10; WA 40:I, 49,26-27. See the cautionary note sounded by Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 104-106 and 144-145, in which he stresses that faith and Christ belong together.

[65] LW 27,45; WA 40:II,33,7-9.

[66] LW 26,283; WA 40:I,441,30.

[67] LW 27,9; WA 40:II,10,15-16.

[68] LW 26,424-425; WA 40:I,642,20-32.

[69] LW 27,37; WA 40:II,46,16-17.

[70] LW 26,257-258; WA 40:I,404,27-405,24.

[71] LW 26,445; WA 40:I,669,30-670,17. On the fear of death in Luther see Margaret R. Miles, "'The Rope Breaks When It Is Tightest': Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word", Harvard Theological Review 77 (1984), pp.253-258.

[72] LW 27,6; WA 40:II,6,10-17.

[73] E.W. Gritsch and Robert W. Jenson, Lutheranism: The

Theological Movement and Its Confessional Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 42.

[74] George A. Lindbeck, "Article IV and the Lutheran /Roman Catholic Dialogue: The Limits of Diversity in The Understanding of Justification", Lutheran Theological Seminary Bulletin 61 (1981), p. 6.

[75] Gritsch and Jenson, Lutheranism: The Theological Movement and Its Confessional Writings, p. 43.

[76] Lindbeck, "Article IV and the Lutheran/Roman Catholic Dialogue", p. 6. Lindbeck goes on to specify a number of these rules. For this approach to doing theology see Lindbeck's book, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984). In LW 27,9; WA 40:II,10,15-16 Luther's statement that the doctrine of justification is the "touchstone" (see n. 64 above) suggests a somewhat similar function to Lindbeck's metatheological principle.

[77] Lindbeck, "Article IV and the Lutheran/Roman Catholic Dialogue", p. 11.

[78] On the relationship of the Theology of the Cross to the Law/Gospel distinction see Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 64-66. Siggins argues that the distinctions found in the Theology of the Cross as to Christ's "strange" and "proper" work, while not disappearing from his later work, become ". . . a theme of so little importance to the older Luther that its appearances are few and very far between. Furthermore, insofar, as remnants of the distinction do persist, it has undergone a decisive change. It has, in fact, been swallowed up by the law/gospel dialectic.. . . This is precisely one of the points at which Luther's distinction between the law and the gospel is a decisive move away Augustine (and from mysticism)"(p.65). Aside from Siggins few comments I am not aware of any attempt to treat the relationship between the Theology of the Cross and the Law/Gospel distinction.

[79] Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 110.

[80] LW 26,115; WA 40:I,207,17-18.

[81] "I have often heard before that there is no better way to hand down and maintain true doctrine than by following this method, that is, of dividing Christian doctrine into two parts, the law and the gospel", WA 39:I,361,1-4 as quoted in Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 111.

[82] LW 26,208-209; WA 40:I,336,22-337,22. My emphasis.

[83] See for example the lectures on Romans, LW 25,210-218; WA

56,225-233. See also the discussion in Jared Wicks, Man Yearning for Grace: Luther's Early Spiritual Teaching, pp. 60-72, 114-115, 140, 153.

[84] Siggins, Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 65-66.

[85] This theme is most fully detailed in D. Lage, "Martin Luther: Christology and Ethics: An Examination of Luther's Understanding of the Imitatio Christi and its Relationship to 'Good Works' In the Context of Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought" (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University, 1982).

[86] Siggins, Luther's Doctrine of Christ, p. 65. My emphasis. Cf. p.6. See also Brian Gerrish, "By Faith Alone; Medium and Message in Luther's Gospel" in his The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), p. 80, where Gerrish points out that the word of judgement, for the young Luther was itself redemptive when the sinner acknowledged it but in the mature theology judgement is "redemptive only indirectly by making the sinner hear the other Word, the Word of forgivenss that God speaks in Jesus Christ". For Gerrish, the move is from psycholoigcal to historical.

[87] LW 26,33; WA 40:I,84,24.

[88] LW 26,281; WA 40:I,439,18-21.

[89] LW 26,399; WA 40:I,607,26-609,14. The discussion in Galatians 4:8 is the locus classicus, at least in the Galatians commentary, on general and particular revelation. For a fuller treatment of this theme see P.S. Watson, Let God be God! An Interpretation of the Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1950), pp. 73-101 and Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 15-19. On reason, see Watson, Let God be God!, p. 88: "The burden of Luther's complaint against ratio, then, is that it subserves the egocentricity of the natural man". The nature of reason, in both its negative and positive meanings, in the Galatians commentary is treated at length by Brian Gerrish, Grace and Reason, pp. 57-113. Gerrish points out that Luther is so critical of reason because it "identifies itself with the blasphemous error of 'work-mongers'" (p.113). Siggins, Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 79-84, rightly warns against confusing Luther's treatment of reason and deus absconditus.

[90] LW 26,400-401; WA 40:I,609,15-21.

[91] LW 26,396; WA 40:I,603,15-20.

[92] For a discussion of these terms, see supra, pp. 40ff.. For a definition of these terms see Oberman, The Harvest of

Medieval Theology, pp. 471-472.

[93] LW 26,124; WA 40:I,220,4-16.

[94] LW 26,128-129; WA 40:I,227,21-228,17.

[95] LW 27,76; WA 40:II,95,26-96,16. Luther rails again and again at the errors of the papacy and the wickedness they have caused by their invented rules.

[96] LW 26,148; WA 40:I,257,30-31.

[97] LW 26,153; WA 40:I,264,15-18.

[98] LW 26,202; WA 40:I,328,20.

[99] LW 26,141; WA 40:I,246,20.

[100] LW 26,185; WA 40:I,308,24-27. See also LW 26,180-185; WA 40:I,302,18-307,34. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, pp. 442-447 also adopts a similar approach to Luther's in which he argues that Paul's thought moves from "solution to plight".

[101] LW 26,148; WA 40:I,256,30.

[102] LW 26,332-333; WA 40:I,513,26 and 514,27-29. B.A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 106, provides a list of ten reasons why Luther argues that works cannot justify.

[103] LW 26,308; WA 40:I,479,17-29.

[104] LW 26,309; WA 40:I,481,13-16.

[105] LW 26,310; WA 40:I,482,22.

[106] LW 26,309-310; WA 40:I,481,23-25.

[107] LW 26,310; WA 40:I,482,23 and 482,19-21.

[108] LW 26,310-311; WA 40:I,483,14-19.

[109] LW 26,311-312; WA 40:I,483,20-483,31.

[110] LW 26,305; WA 40:I,475,14.

[111] LW 26,306; WA 40:I,475,18.

[112] LW 26,310; WA 40:I, 483,11-12.

[113] LW 26,310; WA 40:I,483,14.

[114] LW 26,315, WA 40:I,489.18.

[115] For Luther's view of death and dying see H. Bornkamm, Luther's World of Thought, trans. Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), pp. 115-133.

[116] LW 27,13; WA 40:II,14,28-15,25. On the large role of experience in the Galatians commentary see Marc Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, Stages and Themes of the Reformer's Christology, trans. E.H. Robertson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House,1982), p. 274, but, as Lienhard notes, "personal experience enters here to an astonishing degree into the theological exposition, [but] without thereby reducing it to the level of mere autobiography".

[117] A.B. Holmes, "Conscience as a Soteriological Battlefield: The Concept of Conscientia Operative in Luther's Galatians Lectures of 1531" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Drew University, 1971), p. 284, has tallied 198 references to conscience (conscientia) scattered throughout the commentary. While conscience is referred to throughout the commentary the references often appear in clusters (references are by verses, not pages): 1:3 (15X); 1:4 (4X); 2:24-21 (42X); 3:19 (8X); 3:23 (6X); 3:25 (6X); 4:3 (13X); 4:7 (8X); 4:9 (7X); 6:4 (5X).

[118] The major work on Luther and conscience still remains Emanuel Hirsch, "Drei Kapitel zu Luthers Lehre vom Gewissen" in Lutherstudien, Band I, 9-220 (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1954). Hirsch's thesis built on the work of Karl Holl, "Was verstand Luther Unter Religion?" in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1948), translated into English as What did Luther Understand by Religion?, ed. J.L. Adams and W.F. Bense, trans. F.W. Meuser and W.R. Wietzke (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977),p. 48, who identified Luther's religion as a "religion of conscience". For a review of studies on Luther's view of conscience see George W. Forell, "Luther and Conscience" in Encounter With Luther, ed. E.W. Gritsch (Gettysburg: Institute for Luther Studies, 1980), pp. 218-226. For a more recent treatment of conscience see Michael G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977).

[119] See Thomas Aquinas, ST,I,79,13 and Baylor, Action and Person, pp. 209-211.

[120] Steven E. Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson and Martin Luther (1509-16) In the Context of Their Theological Thought (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969), 157-158. For a general treatment of Luther's view of synteresis see, pp. 87-216.

[121] Baylor, Action and Person, pp. 209-210.

[122] Ibid., p. 210.

[123] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 300, n.37 and Miles, "'The Rope Breaks When It Is Tightest': Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word", p. 239, n.1: "'Consciousness' is . . . more accurate in denoting Luther's meaning in contemporary usage. 'Conscience' carries connotations that emphasize a socially conditioned sense of guilt, while 'con-sciousness' designates a subjective activity in which thinking and feeling are coordinated in the construction of a world view and self-image that govern, in turn, the formation of one's perceptions, values, and behavior". See also Miles' discussion of the Word and its reformation of consciousness, pp. 241-244. There is a note in LW 26,10,n.4 to this same effect.

[124] B. Lohse, "Conscience and Authority in Luther" in Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era, ed. H.A. Oberman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 163.

[125] Ibid..

[126] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 53-54.

[127] Hirsch speaks of the conscience as the "bearer of man's relationship of God", in "Drei Kapitel zu Luthers Lehre vom Gewissen" as quoted by Lohse, "Conscience and Authority", p. 163.

[128] Günter Jacob, Der Gewissensbegriff in der Theologie Luthers (Tübingen, 1929), pp. 6,8 as quoted in Lohse, "Conscience and Authority", p. 160, n. 2. The same idea of the conscience's dependence on an external resource can be seen in Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, pp. 120, 261; "what Luther understands by 'conscience' is the reliance of man upon the word, in the sense that he is always, and not merely in some particular respect but in his very person, claimed, commanded, questioned, and subjected to judgement, so that in one way or another he is always a determined, listening and receiving conscience . . .".

[129] Baylor, Action and Person, p. 218. Baylor points out that such an assertion places one in conflict with Holl's statement that Luther's religion is one of conscience.

[130] Ibid., p. 215. See also Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 180.

[131] Ibid., pp. 212-217.

[132] Miles, "'The Rope Breaks When It Is Tightest': Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word", p. 243. She quotes from Luther's Lectures on Jonah, LW 19,72-74: "it is impossible for nature to act or conduct itself contrary to

what it feels. And now that it feels God's anger and punishment, it cannot view God otherwise than as an angry tyrant".

[133] LW 26,148; WA 40:I,257,21. Cf. LW 1,170-174; LW 3,8. and LW 25,401; WA 56,410,24-30.

[134] LW 26,195 and 320; WA 40:I,320,25-29 and 496,13-24. See Ebeling, "Theological Reflexions on Conscience" in Word and Faith, trans. J.W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 422 on the accusatory nature of the conscience.

[135] LW 26,405; WA 40:I,615,20-30.

[136] LW 26,314,320,329,337; WA 40:I,487,24-25; 496,30-31; 508,32-34; 519,32-34.

[137] LW 26,307; WA 40:I,476,28-29. In this initial treatment of Galatians 3:19 Luther refers over and over again to the need for the correct definition, use and function of the Law. I cite only the Latin references: WA 40:I,476,16-17; 478,15-24; 481,13-14; 484,16-18; 485,23-28; 486,20-21; 490,27-29.

[138] LW 26,308; WA 40:I,478,18-19.

[139] LW 26,306; WA 40:I,476,21-22.

[140] LW 26,308; WA 40:I,478,22-23.

[141] LW 26,309; WA 40:I,481,13-16.

[142] LW 26,327; WA 40:I,506,20-21.

[143] LW 26,314; WA 40:I,486,26-27.

[144] LW 26,327; WA 40:I,506,24-25.

[145] LW 26,314; WA 40:I,488,13-14.

[146] LW 26,314-315; WA 40:I,488,16-29.

[147] LW 26,315; WA 40:I,488,30-489,26.

[148] LW 26,315-316; WA 40:I,489,27-490,24. Cf. LW 26,328-329; WA 40:I,508,29-509,33.

[149] LW 26,316-317; WA 40:I,491,15-492,16.

[150] LW 26,317-318; WA 40:I,492,17-493,27.

[151] This term comes from John R. Loeschen, Wrestling With Luther: An Introduction to the Study of His Thought (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1976), pp. 17-18.

Loeschen has taken particular note of the word-pairs that Luther uses and explores the dynamics and tensions within these pairs. See pp. 15-39. Cf. Ebeling, An Introduction to His Thought, pp. 24-26.

[152] This term comes from Loeschen, Wrestling With Luther: An Introduction to the Study of His Thought, pp. 17-18.

[153] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 258.

[154] LW 26,302; WA 40:I,469,350-470,14. See also Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 125.

[155] LW 26,348; WA 40:I,534,12-13.

[156] Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 121.

Chapter Four

[1] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 278.

[2] Ibid., p. 271.

[3] LW 26,32; WA 40:I,82,31-32.

[4] Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, p. 105. Siggins' comments are taken from LW 26, 88-89; WA 40:I,165,12-24.

[5] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 271. See also J. Wicks, "Justification and Faith in Luther's Theology", Theological Studies 44 (1983), pp. 20-21 and Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 225-226. The attempt of Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, to make "justification by faith" an ancillary theme of Christology (pp. 75, 104-105) is misguided in this respect. Luther is certainly very interested in Christology but this interest is never an interest in Christ in and of himself. Luther's concern is always to bring Christ and the individual into relationship.

[6] Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor, trans. A.G. Hebert (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1969), p. xxi.

[7] Edgar M. Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1948), p. 68. Carlson notes that Luther added two new tyrants, Law and God's wrath, to the traditional list of three: sin, death and the devil. Carlson goes on to describe how Luther two additions function as tyrants, pp. 69-72.

[8] Ibid., p. 59. Carlson provides a good summary of Aulén's work, pp. 58-77.

[9] Carlson, Ibid., pp. 60-62, presents a short summary of the major differences Aulén sees between the three different models. The difference between "continuous" and "discontinuous" is explained by Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 5: the classic view sees the atonement ". . . as from first to last a work of God Himself, a continuous divine work; while according to the other view, the act of Atonement has indeed its origin in God's will, but is, in its carrying-out, an offering made to God by Christ as man and on man's behalf, and may therefore may be called a discontinuous Divine work".

[10] Eugene R. Fairweather, "Incarnation and Atonement: An Anselmic Response to Aulén's Christus Victor", Canadian Journal of Theology, 7 (1961), pp. 167-175 and John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1954), pp. 197-200.

[11] Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, p. 130.

[12] Ibid., p. 133. My emphasis.

[13] Ibid., p. 140.

[14] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, P. 220.

[15] Aulén, Christus Victor, pp. 119-120, does admit that Luther can, at various points, use language that would appear to be Anselmic in nature.

[16] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 222. Cf. Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther, pp. 76-77, recognizes that the Latin view exists in Luther but it is not dominant. Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 120, states that Luther's structure of thought is such that ". . . the Latin doctrine of the Atonement simply cannot be fitted into it".

[17] Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 114. My emphasis.

[18] Ibid., p. 115.

[19] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 171: ". . . it is false to speak of God's wrath as though it were an essential part of God's true being".

[20] Ibid., p. 220. Cf. p. 210: "God's wrath is one of them [the tyrants] and is the real threatening and killing power in them all". For a discussion of God's wrath as understood by Luther see Egil Grislis, "Luther's Understanding of the Wrath of God", Journal of Religion, 41 (1961), pp. 177-192.

[21] LW 26,276-279; WA 40:I,432,20-452,26.

[22] LW 26,290; WA 40:I,451,18-23.

[23] Leon Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), p. 400, points out that the atonement is a complex event and no one explanation or theory can capture the complexity of this event.

[24] Given the prominence that these tyrants have in the Commentary on Galatians, it is impossible to agree with Siggins' claim, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, p. 137, that the proclamation of Christ's victory "rarely receives extended treatment in his preaching and exposition". On the

medieval use of this theme see Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 268-270.

[25] K. Bornkamm, Luthers Auslegungen des Galaterbriefs von 1519 und 1531, p. 168 specifically but also pp. 165-173. See also the discussion in John Loeschen, Wrestling with Luther, pp. 52-58.

[26] Loeschen, Wrestling with Luther, pp. 53 and 55.

[27] See above, p. 62ff..

[28] LW 26,309; WA 40:I,480,32-481,16.

[29] LW 26,313-314; WA 40:I,487,16-29.

[30] LW 26,281; WA 40:I,439,18-22.

[31] LW 26,371; WA 40:I,566,18.

[32] LW 27,6; WA 40:II,5,26-27.

[33] LW 26,370; WA 40:I,565,18-20.

[34] LW 26,372; WA 40:I,567,23-31 and LW 26,369-370; WA 40:I,564,26-565,10.

[35] LW 26,281; WA 40:I,439,16.

[36] LW 26,373; WA 40:I,569,18-21.

[37] LW 26,22; WA 40:I,65,10-18.

[38] LW 26,163-164; WA 40:I,277,30-279,29.

[39] See Lienhard, Luther:Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 273.

[40] It is Siggins' contention in Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ that Luther offers no theory of the atonement if this is taken to mean "some sort of coherent explanatory discourse about how the atonement works" (p. 109). Siggins notes that Luther's sermons abound in motifs drawn from historic atonement theories but Luther never attempts to impose a fixed theory on this material, preferring, like the Bible, to propound no theory (pp.111-113). Siggins comments appear to be a reaction to Aulén's Christus Victor in which all themes are subsumed under this classic motif. I would agree with Siggins' statement as it is directed against Aulén but Siggins has failed to recognize that Luther's thought does move in discernible patterns. On the variety of atonement theories in Luther see Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther, pp. 66-68.

[41] For Luther's use of these titles see the index in LW 26, 463 ff., s.v.. and LW, 27, 413 ff., s.v.. For the use of these titles and several others which are not found in the Galatians Commentary see Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 108-143. It should be noted that the title "Mediator" serves two purposes for Luther. First, it has an epistemological role for Christ is the means whereby knowledge of God is gained and, second, Christ is a mediator in a relational sense in that it is through him that God and man are brought into relationship.

[42] The pairing of titles frequently used by Luther is "Justifier and Savior" See LW 26, 11,37 and 131 for example. What is also noteworthy is the infrequent use of the title "Lord" as a reference to Christ.

[43] LW 26,132; WA 40:I,232,26.

[44] LW 26,178; WA 40:I,298,19-24.

[45] LW 26,177; WA 40:I,298,13-15.

[46] LW 26,178; WA 40:I,298,27.

[47] LW 26,178; WA 40:I,299,14.

[48] LW 26,38; WA 40:I,91,23. More will be said below concerning Christ's role as a "Lawgiver" and "Taskmaster".

[49] LW 26,177; WA 40:I,298,16-17.

[50] LW 26,178-179; WA 40:I,299,24-26.

[51] LW 26,177; WA 40:I,297,35-298,12.

[52] LW 26,325; WA 40:I,503,31-504,21.

[53] LW 26,274; WA 40:I,428,27.

[54] LW 26,325; WA 40:I,503,20-21.

[55] LW 26, 287-291; WA 40:I,448,17-452,26.

[56] LW 26,373; WA 40:I,569,14-21.

[57] LW 26,37; WA 40:I,569,14-21.

[58] LW 27,86; WA 40:II,107,31-34.

[59] LW 27,68; WA 40:II,86,15-19.

[60] LW 26,132; WA 40:I,232,30-33. On the concept of "satisfaction" in Luther and the reason for his uneasiness

with the use of the term see Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 202, n.5 and Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 181-182.

[61] For the use of these terms see above, p. 38ff..

[62] LW 26,173-175: WA 40:I,291,29-294,30.

[63] LW 26,396; WA 40:I,602,18-603,13.

[64] For Luther's view on the First Commandment see The Large Catechism of Martin Luther, trans Robert H. Fischer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), pp. 9-15 and "Treatise on Good Works", LW 44, pp. 30-39; WA 6,209,24-216,39. See also Ronald M. Hals, "Luther and the First Commandment" in Interpreting Luther's Legacy, eds. F.W. Meuser and S.D. Schneider (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), pp. 2-13 and Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther and the Old Testament, trans. E.W. Gritsch and R.C. Gritsch, ed. V.I. Gruhn (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969), pp. 133-134; 165-179.

[65] LW 26,257-258; WA 40:I,404,27-405,24. On the dangers of approaching the "naked God" see LW 26,28-29; WA 40:I,75,27-78,26.

[66] LW 26,182; WA 40:I,304,15-29. As Siggins correctly observes, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, p. 141, "any hint of human merit impugns the all-sufficiency of Christ".

[67] LW 54, #624: "Doctrine and life must be distinguished. Life is bad among us, as it is among the papists, but we don't fight about life and condemn the papists on that account . . . I don't scold myself into becoming good, but I fight over the Word and whether our adversaries teach it in its purity . . . to treat doctrine is to strike at the most sensitive point.. . . When the Word remains pure, then the life (even if there is something lacking in it) can be molded properly. Everything depends on the Word . . .". Certainly in his commentary on Galatians, Luther's concern for correct doctrine is plainly evident and it is this concern that accounts for the polemical nature of the text.

[68] LW 26,343; WA 40:I,526,33-527,27:"Thus Paul distinguishes . . . between the time of Law and the time of grace. Let us learn also to distinguish the times of both, not in words but in our feelings . . .. For although these two are utterly distinct, yet they must be joined completely together in the same heart". At one other point Luther adds that "all these words are to be read with feeling and emphasis", LW 26,138; WA 40:I,242,16. Wicks, in "Justification and Faith in Luther's Theology", p. 28, notes that one of distinctive features of Luther's theology was his drive ". . . to relate theological discourse to lived

religious existence (experience). In Luther's doctrine of justification the systematic and experiential concerns came together again in creative renewal . . .. Theology, rediscovering a center in Pauline writings, is in Luther's work vitally connected with lived religion".

[69] LW 26,269; WA 40:I,421,21-27.

[70] LW 26,168; WA 40:I,285,20,23.

[71] LW 26,340; WA 40:I,523,31-524,16.

[72] On the difference and relationship of "historical" and "saving" faith see Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 186-189. While Luther wants to distinguish clearly between these two types of faith at no point does he ever wish to separate them. Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 110-111, is certainly right when he writes that the ". . . useful distinction" between these two types of faith "ultimately breaks down, since the man who does not know that this history was accomplished for him does not properly know the facts themselves: that it was accomplished for us is one of the facts". See also the excellent discussion of these two forms of faith in Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 211-218, especially p. 213, n. 57 in which Althaus quotes R. Prenter, Schöpfung und Erlösung, trans. C. Boehncke-Sjoberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1960), Vol. II, p. 365: "The subjective appropriation of reconciliation is not something which follows an 'objective' work of God but is itself a part of this 'objective' work of God . . .".

[73] LW 26,349-350; WA 40:I,536,21-537,16. Luther here introduces a note of eschatological tension into his understanding of Christian existence, a theme which will be explored below.

[74] LW 26,340-341; WA 40:I,524,16-525,21.

[75] LW 26,343; WA 40:I,526,33-527,27.

[76] LW 26,202-211; WA 40:I,328,24-340,21. On Luther's shift in emphasis from the importance of "seeing" to that of "hearing" and the implications this had for Luther's theology see Miles, "'The Rope Breaks When it is the Tightest': Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word", pp. 248-251.

[77] On Christ in the Old Testament see H. Bornkamm, Luther and the Old Testament, pp. 96-97, 200-207.

[78] LW 26,239-240; WA 40:I,378,30-31.

[79] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther. My emphasis. Althaus, p. 217, n. 72, quotes Luther as follows: "Christ is not yet completely revived in his believers but in them, as the first fruits, he begins to be revived from death", WA 39:I,356.

[80] LW 26,33: WA 40:I,84,10-11: "But since He was given for them, it follows that we cannot remove them by works of our own".

[81] LW 26,33; WA 40:I,84,12-85,16.

[82] Galatians 1:4.

[83] One of the foundational principles of medieval theology was the belief that "likeness to God was the indispensable condition of both saving knowledge of him and a true saving relationship with him. In medieval theology, only like could truly know like", Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe, p. 242. To see how Luther differed and changed this idea see Steven Ozment, "Homo Viator: Luther and Late Medieval Theology" in The Reformation in Medieval Perspective, ed. Steven Ozment, pp. 142-154. In LW 26,34; WA 40:I,86,29-30 Luther notes that "human reason would like to present to God an imitation and counterfeit sinner, who is afraid of nothing and has no sense of sin".

[84] LW 26,34; WA 40:I,86,18.

[85] LW 26,34-35; WA 40:I,85,26-87,31.

[86] LW 26,35; WA 40:I,87,33-88,10.

[87] LW 26,179; WA 40:I,299,29-34: "Therefore read these words 'me' and 'for me' with great emphasis, and accustom yourself to accepting this 'me' with a sure faith and applying it to yourself. Do not doubt that you belong to the number of those who speak this 'me'". These words are emphasized in the Latin text through the use of capital letters.

[88] LW 26,38; WA 40:I,91,17-24.

[89] LW 26,287; WA 40:I,448,17.

[90] LW 26,277; WA 40:I,433,17-18.

[91] LW 26,287; WA 40:I.448,19-20.

[92] LW 26,287; WA 40:I,448,17.

[93] LW 26,287; WA 40:I,448,17. Luther has, at this point in his life, a very negative and critical view of Jerome, an

attitude that is in marked contrast to the positive view he had of Jerome in the 1519 commentary on Galatians.

[94] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,434,24-28. The important transition that Luther made in his thought from seeing Christ as "example" to "sacrament" has been traced by Norman Nagel, "Sacramentum et Exemplum in Luther's Understanding of Christ", in Luther for an Ecumenical Age, ed. C.S. Meyer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), pp. 172-199 and Erwin Iserloh, "Sacramentum et Exemplum, ein augustinisches Thema lutherischer Theologie", in Reformata Reformanda, Festgabe für Hubert Jedin, eds. E. Iserloh and K. Repgen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1965), pp. 247-264. See also Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 156-164 and Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 46-49, 72-74, 144 n. 31.

[95] LW 26,288; WA 40:I,448,20-21.

[96] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,434,23.

[97] LW 26,288; WA 40:I,20-26.

[98] LW 26,280; WA 40:I,437,18-22. Such a view of God certainly results in a quite different view of Christ and his work. For a discussion of Luther's view of the relationship of God and Christ, at least as far as it pertains to soteriology, see George Yule, "Luther's Understanding of Justification by Grace Alone in Terms of Catholic Christology", in Luther: Theologian for Catholics and Protestants, ed. George Yule (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), pp. 87-111, especially p. 88 and Heiko Oberman, "'Iustitia Christi' and 'Iustitia Dei': Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification", pp. 1-26, especially pp. 19 and 25.

[99] LW 26,277; WA 40:I,433,32-434,12. In LW 26,325; WA 40:I,503,23-24 Luther has Christ speak these words: "I take your place and make satisfaction to the Law for you".

[100] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,434,16-17.

[101] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,434,17-19.

[102] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,434,26-27.

[103] LW 26,283; WA 40:I,442,33-34.

[104] LW 26,284; WA 40:I,443,26-31.

[105] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,435,16-17. My emphasis.

[106] LW 26,288-289; WA 40:I,448,35-449,32.

[107] Yule, "Luther's Understanding of Justification by Grace Alone in Terms of Catholic Christology", p.99. See also pp. 99-101 for a fuller elaboration of this theme.

[108] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 286. My emphasis. As Lienhard points out, Luther understood that for Christ to be human meant ". . . to take on himself the sins of human beings. There are not two stages: a first stage when he begins to become human and, later, at the end of his life, a second stage, that of accomplishing the redemptive work. From the beginning, the incarnation coincides with the redemption. To become human is, for him, to accept out situation and take on himself our sins. And he can triumph over these sins because he is God and man. The work of salvation is thus transposed into the very person of Jesus Christ", p. 133.

[109] LW 26,288; WA 40:I,449,30-31.

[110] LW 26,281; WA 40:I,439,16-17. Precisely because these two forces collide in Christ, it is possible to understand the unique situation that a Christian lives in: "These two things are diametrically opposed: that a Christian is righteous and beloved by God, and yet that he is a sinner at the same time.. . . how can these contradictory things both be true at the same time . . .? Here nothing can intervene except Christ the Mediator", LW 26,235: WA 40:I,371,33-372,18.

[111] LW 26,290; WA 40:I,452,17-20. See also the discussion of the reality and genuineness of Christ's suffering in Yule, "Luther's Understanding of Justification by Grace Alone in Terms of Catholic Christology", pp. 101-103, and Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 204-208

[112] LW 26,282; WA 40:I,440,19-21.

[113] LW 26,283; WA 40:I,442,21-22.

[114] LW 26,282; WA 40:I,441,19-21. It is statements such as these that lead Yves Congar, "Consideration and Reflections on the Christology of Luther", Dialogue Between Christians: Catholic Contributions to Ecumenism, trans. P. Loretz (London, Dublin: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966), p.383-384, to say "that in the salvation achieved in Jesus Christ, his divinity alone is effective, his humanity contributing nothing in the order of efficient causality.. . . for Luther, God remains the sole agent of subject as far as salvation is concerned and that in the case of Christ his famous Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes (all-sufficiency of God), hold good. Even in Christ, the man is in no way a co-operator or co-subject with God in the work of salvation". J. Wicks, "Justification and Faith in Luther's Theology", p.

22, n.79, agrees with Congar. Congar's view of Luther's Christology has been ably refuted by Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 290-298 and Peter Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", pp. 127-131. Luther can easily be misunderstood on this point because he does strongly emphasize the action of God in Jesus Christ but Luther does not by this ". . . wish to exclude the human activity of Jesus Christ, but rather to oppose the work of Jesus Christ, raised up and given by God, to our works and our righteousness.. . . By this affirmation, Luther does not wish to deny the human activity and liberty of the man Jesus" (Lienhard, p. 292). Manns sees Luther's lack of clarity at this point as a result of Luther's reluctance to give any credit to "human cooperation in the area of justification. Still, it is typical of Luther's deep seated inhibition in this matter that he does not let himself fall into a formally heretical formulation. Luther neutralizes and diminishes the human element in the divine-human activity without contesting the reality and necessity of the Incarnation" (p. 129).

In summary, Congar has identified a problem in Luther's Christology but he has misunderstood Luther on this point.

[115] LW 26,284; WA 40:I,443,31-34.

[116] LW 26,282; WA 40:I,440,22-23.

[117] LW 26,285; WA 40:I,444,14-18. See also Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 133-134 and Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 212-213: "Christ's victory is not a metaphysical event of the kind that would enable us to say that since the time of his victory the demonic powers are no longer present. Rather, it is a victory in the sense that the victory depends on him and that the enemies are overcome and no longer present when he is present. We may describe the reality of his victory with this spatial image of 'where he is present' and not with the temporal image of 'since'. The demonic powers . . . are still there, but they are overcome for those in whom Christ lives through faith. For this reason, Christ's work of reconciliation and redemption is not a material achievement which would be valid and effective even without our knowing it and without personal sharing with Christ".

[118] LW 26,284; WA 40:I,443,23-24.

[119] LW 26,286; WA 40:I,445,32-33.

[120] LW 26,278; WA 40:I,434,26-28.

[121] LW 26,369; WA 40:I,564,12-13.

[122] LW 26,279; WA 40:I,436,27-31.

[123] LW 27,26-27; WA 40:II,30,28-33,34.

[124] Brian Gerrish, "Atonement and 'Saving Faith'", Theology Today 17 (1960), p. 181: "The interpretation of the atonement in both Luther and Calvin can be understood as turning on the central and pivotal conception of a 'happy exchange' in which the believer's sins are laid on Christ and Christ's own innocence is communicated to the believer. From this center . . . the Reformers' thinking moves outwards to the various other soteriological concepts, including the two about which modern opinion is chiefly divided, namely, 'victory' and 'substitution'. First and foremost, the Christian is one who has been united with Christ so intimately that an exchange of qualities has somehow taken place".

[125] I am not attempting by this description to suggest any particular theory of atonement but to move in terms that are closest to Luther's own terms.

[126] The title of "Propitiator" reverses the image of Christ as judge. See Wilhelm Maurer, Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, trans. H. George Anderson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), p. 315.

[127] Luther's attack on "faith formed by love" will be examined in greater detail below.

[128] LW 26,227; WA 40:I.360,19-21.

[129] LW 26,229; WA 40:I,363,16-28.

[130] The Latin "consummare" means "to add together, sum up, to form a whole, complete, to bring to perfection, perfect, consummate". See Cassell's Latin Dictionary, s.v. "consummo".

[131] LW 26,227; WA 40:I,360,24-25 and 361,12-13.

[132] Morna Hooker has used the motif of exchange as a fundamental to understand the work of Christ. See her "Interchange in Christ", Journal of Theological Studies, ns 21 (1971), pp. 349-361; "Interchange and Atonement", Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 60 (1978), pp. 462-481, "Interchange and Suffering" in Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament, ed. W. Horbury and B. McNeil (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 70-83, and "Interchange in Christ and Ethics", Journal for the Study of the New Testament 25 (1985), pp. 3-17.

[133] It was Schweitzer, The Mysticism of the Apostle Paul, who argued that mysticism and the union of Christ and the believer was the center of Paul's thought.

[134] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 132.

[135] Maurer, Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, p. 318. Maurer points out the sharp contrast of the Anselmic and Lutheran views on justification.

[136] Heiko Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism", in The Reformation in Medieval Perspective, ed. Steven Ozment, p. 230 notes that there was a "democratization of mysticism" in late medieval devotional literature. Although mysticism was democratizated "there is still a margin left for the 'aristocrats of the Spirit', but the traditional mystical terminology is appropriated for the description of the Christian life of the believer". One of the questions that Oberman fails to answer, however, is whether, in this reapportionment of terminology, any change has taken place in the understanding of mysticism and its terminology. On the changes in terminology which mysticism undergoes in Luther's writings see Bengt R. Hoffman, Luther and the Mystics (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976), pp. 151-155.

[137] Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei, pp. 90-91. On the distinction between proprietates and possessio see Heiko Oberman, "'Iustitia Christi' and 'Iustitia Dei': Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification", p.21. The nature of Staupitz's influence on Luther may not be as direct as that indicated in the text. It may have been Luther who influenced Staupitz. See Ibid.,p. 25, n.52.

[138] LW 25,188; WA 56,203-204.

[139] LW 25,287-288; WA 56,300-301. For a discussion of this concept see Heiko Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism", pp. 228-228, 231, 233-237.

[140] LW 31,298; WA 2,145-152. My emphasis. Yule, "Luther's Understanding of Justification by Grace Alone in Terms of Catholic Christology", pp. 92-94 relies heavily on this sermon in his treatment of Luther's Christology. Calvin's language is remarkably similar to Luther's. In his Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John NcNeill (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), book III, ch. II, sec. 24 Calvin argues that Christ has "ingrafted [us] into his body, [making us] participants not only in all his benefits but also in himself.. . . We ought not to separate Christ from ourselves or ourselves from him".

[141] LW 31,351-352; WA 7,49-73. The remarkable similarity of language and imagery with the Galatians Commentary is very evident. On the use of nuptial metaphors in the early Luther see F.T. Ruhland, Luther und die Brautmystik nach Luther's Schriftum bis 1521 (Giessen: Münchowsche Universitäts-

druckerei, 1938). On the use of these images in "The Freedom of A Christian" see Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 131-135, 142. For a survey of the various ways in which mysticism and Luther's relationship to mysticism has been treated see Hoffman, Luther and the Mystics, pp. 25-128. Hoffman, while providing a useful summary, has been heavily influenced in his interpretation of mysticism by R. Otto's The Idea of the Holy. Hoffman's book also lacks the more nuanced judgements of Heiko Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and the Mystics".

[142] This theme is particularly prominent in Luther's treatment of Isaiah 53. See LW 17,219-232; WA 31:II,430-441. It is Oberman's conclusion that there is a considerable degree of continuity between the young and the old Luther in terms of Luther's understanding of mysticism despite his encounter with Tauler and the Schwärmer. See Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism", p. 229.

[143] See above, p. 67, for "Luther's View of Conscience".

[144] This language is taken from Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 130.

[145] Luther comments that "Justifying faith must be understood correlatively". Quoted in B. Gerrish, "Atonement and 'Saving Faith'", p. 183, n. 8.

[146] LW 26,366; WA 40:I,558,33-559,15.

[147] LW 26,120; WA 40:I,213,30-214,20.

[148] LW 26,137; WA 40:I,241,12-14.

[149] Hoffman, Luther and the Mystics, p. 156.

[150] LW 27,43; WA 40:II,53,31-32. For further on the relationship of Christ to the church see Hoffman, Luther and the Mystics, pp. 157-159 and Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, pp. 259-261.

[151] See Hoffman's comments, Luther and the Mystics, p. 263, n. 38, on Luther's use of metaphorical language. Hoffman is certainly correct in that he has noted the use of nuptial language in Luther but he has moved too quickly to the conclusion that Luther spoke of an "inner, mystical experience".

[152] Erwin Iserloh, "Luther's Christ Mysticism", in Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, p. 39. Iserloh goes on to suggest that the union of Christ and the believer takes place at the level of the "Seelengrund". If by this Iserloh is suggesting a relationship that determines a person's life

than I can agree with him. If, however, he is using the word in the sense in which mysticism used it, I cannot agree. See Steven Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Compartive Study of the Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson, and Martin Luther (1509-1516) In the Context of Their Theological Thought, pp. 215-216 and R. Prenter, Spiritus Creator, trans. John M. Jensen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1953), pp. 28-31.

[153] LW 26,357; WA 40:I,546,16-28.

[154] Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism", p. 232.

[155] Wilfried Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 367 ff. Statements of this type are to be found in both the young and old Luther. See Ibid., p. 368, n. 28. The same conception of Christ's actual presence to the believer can be found in "Theses Concerning Faith and Law", LW 34, 109-132, especially theses #2,7,10,12-14, 20-25,29, and 48. WA 39:I, 44-62.

[156] LW 26,356; WA 40:I,545,26-29. Cf. LW 26,240; WA 40:I,378,29-319,17.

[157] This explanation of Luther's understanding of the actual presence of Christ in a believer's life invites a consideration of the thorny problem of Luther's relationship to mysticism. The most recent treatment of this problem is Hoffman, Luther and the Mystics. Carter Lindberg, The Third Reformation? (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1983), p. 30, has the best explanation of Luther's "yes and no" relationship to mysticism when he notes that mystical language offered a convenient vehicle of expression for Luther's own understanding of the Gospel. Lindberg continues on: "The good news is the unconditional promise of the Gospel. This is the origin of religious ecstasy for Luther, the unconditional promise of God grasped by faith. Thus while Luther can utilize mystical terminology about religious experience, the crucial point of distinction between him and his tradition is that he emphasizes the priority of faith over love. For Luther religious ecstasy has its origin not in synderesis, nor in ascetic discipline, not in doing what lies within one, but rather in faith alone. Religious ecstasy is not based on ascent to God, nor like being known by like, but to the contrary, on the promise of God to real sinners".

[158] For a fuller discussion of this topic see Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, pp. 141-158; K. Bornkamm, Luthers Auslegungen Des Galterbriefs von 1519 und 1531, pp. 93-105, especially pp. 96-97. The best discussion,

however, is found in Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, pp. 233-274.

[159] My concern is not to present the scholastics understanding of this formula but to look at Luther's understanding of it and his reasons for attacking it.

[160] LW 27,28; WA 40:II,34,11-12. See also Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 154. To suggest otherwise would be to fall into Pelagianism. For a definition of "infused faith" see Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 469.

[161] LW 26,269; WA 40:I,422,16-19. My emphasis.

[162] LW 27,29; WA 40:II,36,8-12.

[163] LW 26,270: WA 40:I,422,29-30.

[164] See the discussion of Biel above, especially p. 40. See also LW 26,128; WA 40:I,226,20-27.

[165] LW 27,28-29; WA 40:II,34,19-20 and 35,18-21.

[166] LW 26,129; WA 40:I,228,24-26.

[167] LW 27,28-30; WA 40:II,35,14-37,25.

[168] LW 26,270; WA 40:I,422,26-28.

[169] LW 26,160; WA 40:I,274,20-22.

[170] LW 26,270; WA 40:I,422,31-423,19. My emphasis.

[171] LW 26,88; WA 40:I,163,28-164,30. My emphasis.

[172] LW 26,88 and 137; WA 40:I,163,28-165,24 and 239,31-240,16. My emphasis.

[173] LW 26,129-130; WA 40:I,228,27-229,30. My emphasis. Luther has a large vocabulary to speak of the relationship between the individual and Christ. He speaks of "taken hold" (LW 26, 182, 270, 348-350, 357,369, 382), of "immerse" (LW 26, 369), of "joined to" (LW 26, 280-290), of "cling" (LW 26, 378, 381, 395); of "grasping" (LW 26, 139,255), of "fixed" or "cemented" (LW 26, 267), of "attachment" (LW 26, 167), of "abide" and "live" (LW 26, 167), of "embrace" (LW 26, 177), of "clothed" (LW 26, 283).

[174] Oberman, ""Iustitia Christi' and 'Iustitia Dei': Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification", p. 20. See also LW 26,167; WA 40:I,283,19-32. Also LW 32,235-236: "Observe, faith is not enough, but only faith which hides

under the wings of Christ and glories in His righteousness".

[175] LW 26,233; WA 40:I,370,21-23.

[176] LW 26,285; WA 40:I,445,25.

[177] LW 26,284; WA 40:I,225,26-226,16. My emphasis.

[178] Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, pp. 156-157. See above on Biel's understanding of man as a "viator", pp. 45ff.. See also Loeschen, Wrestling With Luther: An Introduction to the Study of His Thought, p. 163: "Luther seldom becomes more enraged than when he hears righteousness and love discussed as inherent forms, virtues and qualities, and distinctions made which assume that these are virtues which belong to the world . . .". See also Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, p. 368.

[179] LW 26,166,168; WA 40:I,282,16-21 and 285,14-18. My emphasis. For Thomas Aquinas' view on this see Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin, p. 645 and p. 656. Again the LW is misleading with its references to Thomas Aquinas which suggests that Luther is directly engaging Aquinas on these points.

[180] In his comments on Psalm 51 (LW 12,377-378) Luther speaks of grace as the ". . . continuous and perpetual operation or action through which we are grasped and moved by the Spirit of God . . .".

[181] It is to this that Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, p. 235, refers to as "concentric".

[182] Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 156: ". . . grace does not alter something within man, but alters his situation, and so alters man himself in respect of his standing in the sight of God, the way he is regarded from God's point of view".

[183] LW 26,167; WA 40:I,283,20-27. My emphasis.

[184] LW 26,167; WA 40:I,283,30-32 and 284,13-14. Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, calls this the "ex-centric" life, pp. 238 ff. See also Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin, pp. 234-247.

[185] Jared Wicks, "Luther on the Person Before God", Theological Studies 30 (1969), p. 293. See also Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, pp. 244, 248-249, and 263 where Joest says ". . . Gott allein Subjekt des Guten ist".

[186] LW 26,387; WA 40:I,589,25-28. My emphasis. Here Luther

employs mystical language (raptus, extra nos) but uses it in a manner that is consistent with his Christology and soteriology. See the comments of Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism", pp. 236-237. Lindberg, The Third Reformation?, pp. 30-31: "Luther transferred the mystical function of ecstatic love . . . to faith using the notion of being outside or beyond oneself (extra nos) to characterize justification by faith . . .. For Luther this moving outside oneself is not a silent interior event but rather occurs in the knowledge of faith in which the person's being is disclosed before God . . .".

[187] LW 26,234: WA 40:I,370,28-371,21. My emphasis. Note that here extra nos is connected to imputation.

[188] LW 26,166-167; WA 40:I,282,33-283,17. My emphasis.

[189] LW 26,167-168; WA 40:I,284,16-33. My emphasis.

[190] Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism", p. 237.

[191] LW 26,25; WA 40:I,70,11-22.

[192] LW 26,170-171; WA 40:I,287,28-290,31. My emphasis. The reality and force with which Luther presents the idea of Christ's presence in the believer threatens to overwhelm any human response and involvement in the life of faith. See Wicks, "Luther on the Person Before God", pp. 309-311 for these criticisms. Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, pp. 274-319, attempts to deal with problem.

[193] Wicks, "Luther on the Person Before God", p. 296.

[194] Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, pp. 390-391 argues that Luther's newness lies in the role and emphasis that he placed on the actual presence of Christ in the believer's life.

Chapter Five

[1] Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 3. Einar Billing, in Our Calling, trans. Conrad Bergendoff (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), p. 4 claims that "anyone wishing to study Luther would indeed be in no peril of going astray were he to follow this rule: never believe that you have a correct understanding of a thought of Luther before you have succeeded in reducing it to a simple corollary of the thought of forgiveness of sins". On the usefulness of Billing's maxim see George W. Forell, Faith Active in Love (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1954), pp. 64-69.

[2] See above, p. 59-60 for a discussion of metatheological norms.

[3] See above, p. 117ff. for a discussion of the concept of "faith formed by love".

[4] See above for a discussion of the role of works in Biel, p. 37ff..

[5] For a discussion of the phrase "faith formed by love" and "faith formed by Christ" see p. 120-121.

[6] LW 26,90; WA 40:I,166,30-168,14.

[7] LW 26,80; WA 40:I,152,14-153,16.

[8] LW 26,117; WA 40:I,209,20-23.

[9] LW 26,113-114; WA 40:I,204,11-205,9.

[10] LW 26,70; WA 40:I,138,7-8.

[11] LW 27,19; WA 40:II,21,27-30.

[12] LW 26,70; WA 40:I,137,24-25.

[13] LW 26,116-117; WA 40:I,208,26-209,15.

[14] LW 26,306; WA 40:I,476,16-17.

[15] See the discussion above, p. 91ff..

[16] LW 26,123; WA 40:I,218,21-23.

[17] LW 26,112; WA 40:I,202,21.

[18] See above, p. 62f. for a discussion of the Law and its function.

[19] LW 26,124-129; WA 40:I,220,17-228,17. For a discussion of these terms, see above, p. 37ff.. In terms of Aquinas Luther was certainly mistaken for Aquinas clearly states both the priority and gratuity of grace. See above, p. 28ff..

[20] LW 27,14; WA 40:II,15,35-16,13. My emphasis.

[21] LW 26,307; WA 40:I,477,18-478,12. My emphasis.

[22] See pp. 53ff. for a discussion of the Law.

[23] LW 26,137; WA 40:I,240,17.

[24] LW 26,133; WA 40:I,234,18-23.

[25] LW 26,215; WA 40:I,345,16-17.

[26] LW 27,56; WA 40:II,70,33-71,21. See also LW 26,334; WA 40:I,516,18-26.

[27] LW 26,155; WA 40:I,266,16-19. See also LW 27,127; WA 40:II,162,20-23.

[28] For the literature on this subject, see chapter 3, n.70.

[29] LW 29,123-124. For a similar statement see LW 26,165; WA 40:I,280,25-281,20.

[30] Wicks, Man Yearning for Grace, p. 201. A similar opinion is shared by Kenneth Hagen, A Theology of Testament in the Young Luther: The Lectures on Hebrews (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 104-106 and 114-115. Cf. Biel, see pp. 44ff. above.

[31] LW 26,150; WA 40:I,259,33-260,13.

[32] There are numerous references throughout the Commentary on Galatians on the danger of confusing Christ and Moses and consequently turning Christ into a judge. See LW 26, 142-143,172-173, 178, 200, 367; LW 27, 10,16.

[33] LW 26,246; WA 40:I,389,12-13.

[34] LW 26,389; WA 40:I,591,32.

[35] LW 26,290; WA 40:I,593,20-594,12: "But He is not a father to me unless I respond to Him as a son. First the Father

offers me grace and fatherhood by means of His promises; all that remains is that I accept it. This happens when I cry out with that sigh and and when I respond to His voice with the heart of a son, saying, 'Father'. Then Father and son come together, and a marriage is contracted without any ceremony or pomp". This quotation reveals the richness of the term "son" for Luther and the relationship that is established thereby.

[36] LW 26,258; WA 40:I,406,11-26.

[37] LW 26,38; WA 40:I,91,24-27.

[38] LW 26,150; WA 40:I,259,26-260,13.

[39] LW 26,259; WA 40:I,458,19-38.

[40] See chapter 4 for a discussion of the actual presence of Christ in the life of the believer.

[41] Although Luther cites no texts at this point, one need think only of the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5-7, as a case of Jesus teaching and, in this case, in specific relationship to the Mosaic Law. See also Mark 7:1-23 and Luke 4:1-30.

[42] LW 26,372-373; WA 40:I,568,25-569,24. My emphasis.

[43] LW 26,150; WA 40:I,260,13-14. My emphasis.

[44] LW 26,246; WA 40:I,389,16-17 and LW 27,34; WA 40:II,42,24-25.

[45] LW 26,247; WA 40:I,390,17-18.

[46] See above, p. 101-107 for a discussion of the "joyous exchange".

[47] LW 26,5; WA 40:I,41,18-21. The entire introduction to the Commentary on Galatians is designed to point out the differences between active and passive righteousness.

[48] LW 26,5-6; WA 40:I,42,26-43,17.

[49] LW 26,6; WA 40:I,43,24-25.

[50] LW 26,4; WA 40:I,40,15-41,26.

[51] Wilhelm Maurer, Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, p. 340. My emphasis. See also pp. 314-315 and 335-341. See also Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin, p. 171, n.49. See also LW 26,230-231; WA 40;I,364,29-366,21.

[52] LW 26,132; WA 40:I,233,17-20. My emphasis. See also LW 26,245; WA 40:I, 386,26-387,22.

[53] LW 26,231; WA 40:I,366,24-25.

[54] B.A. Gerrish, "By Faith Alone: Medium and Message in Luther's Gospel" in his The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago:Chicago University Press, 1982), p. 86. In this quotation Gerrish refers to LW 26,227 and 238; WA 40:I,360,21ff. and 376,23. This entire paragraph has been shaped by what Gerrish has said on this point. Cf. Maurer, Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, pp. 333-334. On the ability of faith to respond and understand God correctly see LW 26,226-227; WA 40:I,360,17-361,18. Luther sees faith itself as a gift of God: LW 26,231; WA 40:I,366,28.

[55] LW 26,234; WA 40:I,370,28-371,25.

[56] LW 26,234; WA 40:I,371,18-21.

[57] See the discussion, pp. 123ff., concerning the "ex-centric" character of the Christian life.

[58] LW 26,229-230; WA 40:I,364,14-22. Cf. LW 26,260; WA 40:I,408,12-13. Luther's reference to the "first fruits of the Spirit" comes from Romans 8:23; II Corinthians 1:22, 5:5 and Ephesians 1:14. See the discussion in James D.G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975), p. 311.

[59] LW 26,129-130; WA 40:I, 229,15-25.

[60] LW 26,113-114; WA 40:I,204,24-27. See also LW 26,227-228; WA 40:I,361,12-362,27.

[61] LW 26,229; WA 40:I,364,12-16.

[62] LW 26,232; WA 40:I,367,17-21.

[63] On the neglect of seeing the connection between justification and eschatology see G.W. Forell, "Justification and Eschatology in Luther's Thought", Church History 38 (1969), pp. 164-174. Other scholars have noted the thoroughly eschatological character of Luther's doctrine of justification. See Gerhard O. Forde, "Christian Life" in Christian Dogmatics, eds. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, Vol. I (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 425-444; Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck and Ruprecht, 1961) and T.F. Torrance, "The Eschatology of Faith" in Luther: Theologian for Catholics and Protestants, ed. George Yule, pp. 145-213, especially pp. 149-151, Pesch, Theologie Der Rechtfertigung bei Martin

Luther und Thomas von Aquin, pp. 345 ff. and Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 404-410. Althaus does not explicitly connect justification and eschatology although he wants to cast all of Luther's theology in an eschatological mode. What Althaus means by this is not clearly explained.

[64] LW 26,132-133; WA 40:I,233,25-26.

[65] LW 26,235; WA 40:I,372,28-32. Cf. LW 26,260; WA 40:I,408,12-14.

[66] Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit, p. 311, clearly and accurately describes the eschatological nature of the Spirit's presence in the life of the believer.

[67] LW 26,274; WA 40:I,428,29-429,14.

[68] Torrance, "The Eschatology of Faith", p. 151. See also Forde, "Christian Life", p. 411.

[69] See for example L.C. Green, How Melanchthon Helped Luther Discover the Gospel, pp. 201 ff. and 242 ff.. See also L.C. Green, "Faith, Righteousness, and Justification: New Light on Their Development", Sixteenth Century Journal 4 (1973), pp. 65-86. The question of Melanchthon's influence on Luther continues to be a debated one. Melanchthon and later Lutheran orthodoxy are generally credited with introducing a forensic understanding of justification.

[70] On the role and necessity of good works, see above, pp. 131ff..

[71] LW 26,352-353; WA 40:I,540,17-541,35. Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 226, describes Luther's use of the term justify as follows: "Luther uses the terms 'to justify' [justificare] and 'justification' [justificatio] in more than one sense. From the beginning, justification most often means the judgement of God with which he declares man to be righteous (justum reputare or computare). In other places, however, this word stands for the entire event through which a man is essentially made righteous . . . that is, both the imputation of righteousness to man as well as man's actually becoming righteous. Justification in this sense remains incomplete on earth and is first completed on the Last Day. The twofold use of this word cannot be correlated with Luther's early and later theology; he uses 'justification' in both senses at the same time, sometimes even shortly after each other in the same text".

[72] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 241, n.80 is the source I am drawing on here. See also Forde, "Christian Life", p. 443, n. 16.

[73] This section is based on ALthaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 241f. and Forde, "Christian Life", pp.

[74] LW 26,350; WA 40:I,

[75] Forde, "Christian Life", pp. 435-436. Forde bases his work on Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, pp. 55-99.

[76] Luther frequently appeals to the analogy of the good tree producing good works. In the background to this analogy may very well be an Aristotelian understanding of substance and accidents. What Luther wants to suggest is that in justification a substantial change occurs. He also wants to avoid psychological language which would suggest that justification is a matter of new attitudes or self understanding. Justification is for Luther essentially an eschatological judgement.

[77] As Otto Pesch, Hinführung zu Luther, 2d. ed., (Mainz: Matthias Gründewald, 1983), p. 190, rightly warns that this needs to be seen as one formula, not the one for understanding Luther's doctrine of justification. On pp. 191-195 Pesch provides a very helpful clarification of Luther's use of the simul formula. Pesch has, however, underestimated the difficulty of interpreting this phrase, which is precisely the reason it has attracted so much attention. On the use of paradox in Luther, see M. O'Rourke Boyle, "Stoic Luther: Paradoxical Sin and Necessity", Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 73 (1982): 69-93.

[78] Baylor, Action and Person, p. 231.

[79] Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, p. 62, suggests the diagram below to illustrate this:



[80] Ibid., p. 70. suggests this diagram to illustrat this concept:



[81] This section is a paraphrase of Forde, "Christian Life", p. 437.

[82] LW 26,350; WA 40:I,537,21-34. Luther does not focus so much on particular sins but on sin as the fundamental orientation which turns one away from God.

[83] Pesch, Hinführung zu Luther, pp. 196-198, asks the question of whether Luther is necessarily pessimistic.

[84] Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, p. 268.

[85] On the relationship of faith, hope and love in young Luther see R. Schwarz, Fides, Spes und Caritas beim jungen Luther (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1962). For some of the reasons why Luther joins faith and hope in the Commentary on Galatians see Peter Mann's "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 131.

[86] LW 27,23; WA 40:II,27,20-22.

[87] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", in Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, ed. J. Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp. 121-156.

[88] Ibid., p. 132.

[89] LW 27,21; WA 40:II,23,27-24,22.

[90] LW 27,21; WA 40:II,24,19-22.

[91] See above on imputation, p. 141ff.. Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 210, n.66, also notes the eschatological element but he does not connect it with other elements in Luther's theology. This is no doubt due to Manns over riding concern to establish the present, though limited, reality of justification. In the terms in which this debate is usually cast, Manns is arguing for impartation rather than imputation. Manns also fails to note the pitched battle that is waged in the conscience.

[92] LW 27,21; WA 40:II,24,27. My emphasis. Cf. LW 27,25-26; WA 40:II,30,28-32,24.

[93] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 132, points out those elements of Luther's definition of faith which are in agreement with the general tradition of the church. As Manns notes, faith, for Luther, ". . . is thoroughly in need of supplementation through hope and [faith] does not assume, as so often it does, the rank of a Protestant universal virtue".

[94] LW 27,25; WA 40:II,

[95] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 133. My emphasis. See also LW 27,22; WA 40:II,25,20-25: "For my

righteousness is not yet perfect or conscious. Yet I do not despair on that account: but faith shows me Christ, in whom I trust. When I have taken hold of Him by faith, I struggle against the fiery darts of the devil (Eph. 6:16); and through hope I am encouraged over against my consciousness of sin, since I conclude that perfect righteousness has been prepared for me in heaven. Thus both things are true: that I am righteous here with an incipient righteousness; and that in this hope I am strengthened against sin and look for the consummation of perfect righteousness in heaven".

[96] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 135.

[97] LW 27,23; WA 40:II,27,16-20.

[98] LW 27,22; WA 40:II,26,18.

[99] LW 27,23: WA 40:II,27,18.

[100] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 136. My emphasis.

[101] See above, p. 120-121.

[102] On the presence of true faith and works see above, p. 131ff..

[103] LW 26,115-116; WA 40:I,207,17-208,25.

[104] LW 26,250-251; WA 40:I,394,17-395,18. Luther includes among those benefits which civic righteousness brings as government, civic and political ordinances, family life and personal property.

[105] LW 26,262-263; WA 40:I,110,24-412,24. My emphasis.

[106] LW 26,256; WA 40:I,402,23-403,27. It should be recalled that part of Luther's teaching responsibilities included Aristotelian ethics.

[107] LW 26,294; WA 40:I,457,25-27. My emphasis.

[108] LW 26,261; WA 40:I,410,18-21.

[109] WA 40:I,285,5-7. As quoted in Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 168. Ebeling has a very helpful chapter dealing with the relationship of faith and love in Luther's thought.

[110] Cf. Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 125. He charges Luther with a lack of clarity on this point: "Accordingly, in Luther's positive assessment of the role of good works under grace in justification there is not the

theological clarity that characterizes his denial of works-righteousness. Instead, the relevant statements developing our theme are ambiguous, contradictory, in need of clarification, and therefore misleading".

[111] On some of these difficulties see Yves Congar, "Considerations and Reflection on the Christology of Luther", in his Dialogue Between Christians, pp. 372-406.

[112] LW 26,264-265; WA 40:I,414,24-415,26.

[113] LW 26,265; WA 40:I,415,25-30.

[114] There is an excellent discussion of this topic in Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 169-176, 290-298, 377-379 and especially 335-346. There may be some confusion as to exactly what Luther's view is and the problems associated with this concept but as to its importance there is no doubt. Lienhard says that "one can say without exaggeration that the communication of attributes is one of the key concepts of Luther's Christ-ology after 1530 . . ." (p. 337).

[115] LW 26,265; WA 40:I,415,31-416,17. My emphasis. See also LW 26,267; WA 40:I,417,29-418,11.

[116] LW 26,266; WA 40:I,416,23-25.

[117] LW 26,266; WA 40:I,417,13-17. See also LW 26,266-267; WA 40:I,417,26-418,11: "Thus faith is universally the divinity in the work, the person, and the members of the body, as the one and only cause of justification; afterwards this is attributed to the matter on account of the form, to the work on account of the faith. The kingly authority of the divinity is given to Christ the man, not because of His humanity but because of His divinity.. . . the humanity would not have accomplished anything by itself; but the divinity joined with the humanity did it on account of the divinity. So here faith alone justifies and does everything; nevertheless, it is attributed to work on account of faith".

[118] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 127: "the humanity of Christ and the works of the believer have no independent function with regard to redemption and sanctification, respectively. They are simply modes of transparency for what in fact is alone effective-- the divinity and bare faith . . .".

[119] LW 26,272; WA 40:I,427,11-14.

[120] LW 26,272; WA 40:I,427,14-24.

[121] Congar, "Considerations and Reflections on the

Christology of Luther", pp. 372-389, especially p. 380, n. 28 and 382-387. On Luther's Christology, Congar comments that "even in Christ, the man is in no way a cooperator or co-subject with God in the work of salvation" (p. 384). Jared Wicks, "Justification and Faith in Luther's Theology", p. 22, n. 79, agrees with Congar.

[122] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 290-298.

[123] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", pp. 127-129.

[124] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 292.

[125] Ibid., pp. 293-294.

[126] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", pp. 127-128. Manns goes on to argue, p. 129, that "the inaccurate formulations can be explained by Luther's lack of interest in a Christology as such. Beyond this, one can speak of Luther being inhibited from giving an exact theological account of how the theandric acts of Christ entail a true and actual cooperation of the humanity in salvation. There can be no doubt that this inhibition with regard to Christology is grounded in the difficulty Luther found with regard to human cooperation in the area of justification. Luther neutralizes and diminishes the human element in the divine-human activity without contesting the reality and necessity of the Incarnation". This statement is correct if it applies only to Luther's comments on Galatians 3:10. A more balanced treatment of Luther's exegesis of Galatians 3:10 and of his Christology as a whole in the Commentary on Galatians can be found in Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 290-298, especially 296-297.

[127] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 129.

[128] Ibid.. By his comments here, on Galatians 3:10, Luther does not intend to use this explanation as the key to his Christology. If that were his intent, why does Luther appeal to this example only once? I am not convinced that this is what Luther intended and that he merely failed in the execution of this plan.

[129] See LW 26,272-273; WA 40:I,427,11-14.

[130] LW 26,138; WA 40:I,241,18-21. My emphasis.

[131] LW 26,154-155; WA 40:I,265,29-32. My emphasis.

[132] Ibid., LW 26,169; WA 40:I,287,22-23; LW 26,255: WA 40:I,402,13-20; LW 26,261; WA 40:I,410,19-20; LW 26,264; WA 40:I,414,25-26.

[133] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 154.

[134] Ibid..

[135] See above, pp. 121ff..

[136] LW 26,155; WA 40:I,266,15-19

[137] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith". p. 154.

[138] LW 27,25; WA 40:II,70,18-22.

[139] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 155 and p. 140 from which I quote: "Insofar as Luther means the total dependence of charity on grace, this position does not present the slightest difficulty, since he is here emphasizing a basic Catholic truth. The problem begins when he seems to formulate so exclusively the 'consecutive' relation of love and its works to grace and faith that any 'final' reference of charity to salvation by reason of grace becomes impossible. In the case of love, Luther seems to go even further. There are a number of quite important statements in which love is clearly not viewed as the necessary fruit of faith, but as independent and optional addition".

[140] The conclusion of Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans. Olive Wyon, 2 vols. (New York; The Macmillian Company and London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931; reprint ed., Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 2: 471-472, that Luther's stress on faith leads to a "principle of a pure spiritual ethic . . . [in which] 'good works' exist no longer: all that matters is the general spirit and attitude of the individual" is overstated. Luther does stress the role of faith but his lively concern for the neighbor prevents this from becoming a private concern.

[141] LW 26,133; WA 40:I,234,16-21. My emphasis.

[142] LW 26,138; WA 40:I,241,19-21.

[143] LW 26,155; WA 40:I,265,32-36.

[144] LW 26,255; WA 40:I,400,31-33. The question of the role of the Law once one has become a Christian is one that is much debated in Luther scholarship. I would agree with Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 271-273, that while Luther does not use the phrase, "the third use of the Law", he does suggest it in substance. Joest, in Gesetz und Freiheit, p. 196ff., argues that Luther proposes a "practical use of the Gospel". See also Otto Pesch, "Law and Gospel: Luther's Teaching in the Light of the Disintegration of Normative Morality" The Thomist 34 (1970), pp. 104-110.

Pesch concludes that the key note of Luther's ethical thought is his emphasis on "radical freedom".

[145] LW 27,64-65; WA 40:II,80,31-33. Cf. LW 27,64: WA 40:II,79,25-28: "Therefore faith is our righteousness in this present life. In the life to come, when we shall be thoroughly cleansed and shall be completely free of all sin and fleshly desire, we shall have no further need of faith and hope" and LW 26,274; WA 40:I,428,29-30: "But in the life to come believing will cease, and there will be a correct and perfect keeping and loving".

[146] Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith", p. 145.

[147] LW 27,7-8; WA 40:II,6,29-9,23.

[148] LW 27,50; WA 40:II,62,22-63,12. Luther is very aware of the dangers that his doctrine of justification creates for ethical living. See LW 27,48; WA 40:II,60,17-39.

[149] LW 27,51: WA 40:II,64,15-19: "Therefore every Christian should know that in his conscience he has been established by Christ as a lord over the Law, sin, and death, and that they have no jurisdiction over him. On the other hand, he should know also that this external obligation has been imposed on his body, that through love he should serve his neighbor". These words are remarkably similar to the opening lines of Luther's famous treatise "The Freedom of a Christian". Luther is particularly conscious in 1531 of the problems that can arise when "internal" and "external" freedom are confused. The Peasants' War accounts, in many ways, for the stress that Luther places in the Commentary on Galatians on the legitimate role of government and for the need to keep realms and doctrines distinct from one another.

[150] LW 26,376; WA 40:I,573,25-29 and LW 27,56: WA 40:II,70,33-71,17. Our discussion has not touched upon Luther's understanding of vocation. For a full discussion of this subject see Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, trans. Carl C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957). Luther's concept of vocation is closely connected to role and importance that Luther attributes to the neighbor. See John C. Raines, "Luther's Two Kingdoms and the Desacralization of Ethics', Encounter 31 (1970), p. 133: "The key to a proper understanding of Luther's view of vocations is his idea that they provide for the ordered and continuous service of the neighbor.. . . It is not so much that God has created these vocational structures at the beginning of time. Rather, for the reformer the key notion is that God is always presently active and at work in these vocations, acting with and against all men in the direction of the disciplined service of man to man".

[151] LW 26,376; WA 40:I,574,15-16.

[152] LW 27,58; WA 40:II,72,27-29: Love "is ready to be of service not only with its tongue, its hands, its money, and its abilities but with its body and its very life".

[153] LW 27,58; WA 40:II,72,31-36. See also the article by Lewis W. Spitz, "Man on This Isthmus" in Luther for an Ecumenical Age, pp. 23-66. Spitz shows that the Renaissance view of man also included the pain and suffering of life and that the Reformation view of man was capable of rather exalted statements.

[154] LW 27,55; WA 40:II,69,32-34.

[155] See the "Lectures on Romans", LW 25,291,345 and 513.

[156] Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 44.

[157] Luther labels those who are caught in the trap as those who perform "pious" works, ceremonies and rituals as opposed to those who do "good" works which demonstrate love towards the neighbor. See the discussion in Pesch, "Law and Gospel". p. 110, for the difference in these terms.

[158] It is true that Luther does tend to stress the love of one's neighbor but Luther does also speak of the believer's love of God as the quotations in ns. 140-143 indicate. When pressured Luther will speak of the love of the neighbor first because of his fears of reintroducing the concept of "faith formed by love" into a discussion of faith.

[159] LW 27,63; WA 40:II,79,23-24.

[160] LW 27,66; WA 40:II,83,16-17.

[161] LW 27,48; WA 40:II.59,35-65,23.

[162] LW 27,51; WA 40:II,64,31-32.

[163] LW 27,53: WA 40:II,66,30-32: "Nevertheless faith must be implanted first; for without it one cannot understand what a good work is and what is pleasing to God".

[164] Robert Bertram. "The Radical Dialectic Between Faith and Works in Luther's Lectures on Galatians (1535)", in Luther for an Ecumenical Age, ed. Carl S. Meyer, p. 227: "Yes, the Law-- not the existence sub lege , of course, but the lex-- is definitely here aligned with the Christian against his flesh".

[165] LW 27,64; WA 40:II,79,28-31.

[166] LW 27,65-66; WA 40:II,81,28-82,21. My emphasis.

[167] LW 27,66; WA 40:II,82,23-26.

[168] LW 27,67; WA 40:II,83,30-33. My emphasis.

[169] Bertram, "The Radical Dialectic Between Faith and Works in Luther's Lectures on Galatians (1535)", p. 229.

[170] LW 27,86-87; WA 40:II,108,28-109,11.

[171] Bertram, "The Radical Dialectic Between Faith and Works in Luther's Lectures on Galatians (1535)", p. 229.

[172] LW 27,75; WA 40:II,94,31-95,16. My emphasis.

[173] LW 27,74; WA 40:II, 94,14-15.

[174] Luther candidly admits that the battle against sin is often lost but this does not cause despair but should drive the believer to realize that the basis of Christian life is being justified by faith through grace.

[175] LW 27,72-74; WA 40:II,90,33-94,17.

[176] LW27,77; WA 40:II,97,18-19. My emphasis.

[177] Cf. the opening statement of this chapter, p. 130, taken from Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, p. 3.

[178] LW 27,76; WA 40:II,95,27-29.

[179] LW 27,66: WA 40:II,82,28-83,15: "No saint has a flesh so holy that when it is offended it would not rather bite and devour or at least subtract something from the commandment of love. Even at first impact he cannot restrain himself from irritation with his neighbor, a desire for revenge, and hatred for him as though he were an enemy- or at least less love that he should have according to this commandment. This happens even to saints".

[180] LW 27,80; WA 40:II,100,33-34.

[181] LW 27,68: WA 40:II,85,28. Although Luther does not state it he seems to be battling against the expectation that temptation would be eliminated in the life of a believer.

[182] LW 27,72; WA 40:II,90,26-32. My emphasis.

[183] LW 27,64; WA 40:II,80,18.

[184] LW 27,74; WA 40:II,93,18.

[185] LW 27,74; WA 40:II,93,19-94,11. My emphasis.

[186] LW 27,77; WA 40:II,97,29-31. My emphasis.

[187] LW 27,63-65; WA 40:II,79,22-81,25.

[188] Bertram. "The Radical Dialectic Between Faith and Works in Luther's Lectures on Galatians (1535)", p. 234.

[189] LW 27,76; WA 40:II,96,7-16.

[190] LW 27,96; WA 40:II,121,15-23.

Chapter Six

[1] See the excellent discussion of this by Werner Packull, "Some Reflections on the State of Anabaptist History: The Demise of a Normative Vision", Studies in Religion, 8 (1979), pp. 313-323, especially 313-316. See also James Stayer, "The Swiss Brethren: An Exercise in Historical Self Definition", Church History, 47 (1978), pp. 174-195 and James Stayer, Werner Packull and Klaus Deppermann, "From Monogenesis to Polygenesis: The Historical Discussion of Anabaptist Origins", Mennonite Quarterly Review 49 (1975), pp. 83-121. For a very critical view on the possibilities of confessional historians writing history see Hans-Jürgen Goertz, "History and Theology: A Major Problem of Anabaptist Research Today", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 53 (1979): 177-188.

[2] There are a number of reviews of Anabaptist studies, several of them are mentioned above, but the most recent one is James R. Coggins, "Towards a Definition of Sixteenth Century Anabaptism; Twentieth Century Historiography of the Radical Reformation", Journal of Mennonite Studies 4 (1986), 183-207. On the Reformation in the Netherlands see I.B. Horst, "The Early Reformation in the Netherlands in Recent Historical Writing: A Bibliographic Survey" in The Dutch Dissenters, I.B. Horst, ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill), pp. 207-224. The most recent survey of Menno studies is Walter Klaassen "Menno Simons Research, 1937-1986", Mennonite Quarterly Review 60 (1986), pp. 483-496.

[3] James Coggins, "Towards a Definition of Sixteenth Century Anabaptism", pp. 196-202.

[4] Roland Bainton, "The Left Wing of the Reformation", The Journal of Religion, 21 (1941), pp. 124-134. Heinold Fast, ed., Der linke Flügel der Reformation, (Bremen: C. Schünemann, 1962), p. xi also used this classification. For a critique of this designation see J.A. Oosterbaan, "The Reformation of the Reformation: Fundamentals of Anabaptist Theology", Mennonite Quarterly Review 51 (1977), p. 173. Oosterbaan discusses the whole issue of how Anabaptism is to be located within the Reformation.

[5] George H. Williams, The Radical Reformation, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), pp. xxii-xxxi. For a critique see Oosterbaan, "The Reformation of the Reformation: Fundamentals of Anabaptist Theology", pp. 173-174.

[6] Leonard Verduin, The Reformers and Their Stepchildren, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), pp. 11-13.

[7] H.S. Bender, The Anabaptist Vision, Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1944), p. 19.

[8] A. Beachy, The Concept of Grace in the Radical Reformation, (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1977), p. 28.

[9] Walter Klaassen, Anabaptism: Neither Catholic nor Protestant, (Waterloo, Ontario: Conrad Press, 1981).

[10] John Loeschen, The Divine Community: Trinity, Church and Ethics in Reformation Theologies (Kirksville, Missouri: The Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1981), pp. 189-220, especially p. 219. See also Dennis D. Martin, "Catholic Spirituality and Anabaptist and Mennonite Discipleship", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 62 (1988), pp. 5-24 and Abraham Friesen, "Anabaptism and Monasticism: A Study in the Development of Parallel Historical Patterns", Journal of Mennonite Studies, 6 (1988), pp. 174-197.

[11] Kenneth Davis, Anabaptism and Asceticism: A Study in Intellectual Origins, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania and Kitchner, Ontario: Herald Press, 1974). Davis presents, at least in my reading, a very persuasive case. He has, of course, revived the old thesis of W.J. Kühler, Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Doopsgezinden in de Zestiende Eeuw, (Haarlem, 1932). See also C. Arnold Synder, The Life and Thought of Michael Sattler, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania and Kitchener, Ontario: Herald Press, 1984).

[12] Cornelius Krahn, Menno Simons (1496-1561): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Theologie der Taufgesinnten, (Amsterdam: Gleijsteen; reprint, Newton, Kansas; Faith and Life Press, 1982), pp. 103 ff., 178-179 and William Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1968), p. 145. H.S. Bender, in The Anabaptist Vision, also stressed the new vision of the church but in his later writings he moved away from an ecclesiological emphasis to what he saw as the distinct Anabaptist emphasis of Nachfolge Christi. See Bender's article, "The Anabaptist Theology of Discipleship", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 24 (1950), pp. 25-32.

[13] H.W. Meihuizen, Menno Simons: IJveraar voor het heistel van de Nieuwtestamentische gemmeente (1496-1561), (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink and Zoon, 1961), p. 179.

[14] I.B. Horst, "Menno Simons: The New Man in Community" in Profiles of Radical Reformers, Hans Jürgen Goertz, ed., Walter Klaassen, English editor, (Kitchener, Ontario: Herald Press, 1982), p. 206.

[15] Christoph Bornhäuser, Leben und Lehre Menno Simons: Ein Kampf um das Fundament des Glaubens (etwa 1496-1561), (Neukirchen/Vluyn: Newkirchener Verlag, 1973), pp. 69,74: ". . . sondern die Lehre von der Wiedergeburt des Menschen bildet die Mitte der Theologie Menno Simons", p. 69. See also R.S. Armour, Anabaptist Baptism, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1966), pp. 135-138.

[16] J.A. Oosterbaan, "Die theologie van Menno Simons", Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, 15 (1961),pp. 270-281. Reprinted in English as "The Theology of Menno Simons", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 35 (1961), pp. 187-196, 237. See Oosterbaan's later article, "The Reformation of the Reformation: Fundamentals of Anabaptist Theology", p. 181, in which he moves to a broader view of the center of Menno's theology, saying it is to be found in his views on Christ and grace. Also Sjouke Voolstra, Het Woord is vlees geworden: De melchioritisch-menniste incarnatieleer, (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1982), p. 178: "De melchioritische menwordingsleer is aldus articulus stantis et cadentis menniste traditie".

[17] H.S. Bender, "The Anabaptist Theology of Discipleship", 24 (1951), pp. 25-32.

[18] Hans-Jürgen Goertz, "Der fremde Menno Simons", in The Dutch Dissenters, ed. I.B. Horst, pp. 160-176, especially pp. 164-165. For Goertz's treatment of anticlericalism in the Reformation see his Pfaffenhass und gross Geschrei. Die reformatorischen Bewegungen in Deutschland 1517-1529, (Müchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1987).

[19] Sjouke Voolstra "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 62 (1988), pp. 387-400.

[20] Ibid., p. 388. Voolstra relies heavily upon the work of Thomas N. Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977) which emphasizes the importance of the rite of penance and how uncertainty over this sacrament, as practiced in the medieval Roman Catholic Church, played a large part in generating the impulses that began the Reformation. Further anticlericalism was created by the failure of the clergy to rightly instruct parishioners in penance in preparation for the second coming. See Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 388, n. 9. On eschatological expectations in the Netherlands see Walter Klaassen, "Eschatological Themes in Early Dutch Anabaptism", in The Dutch Dissenters, ed. I.B. Horst, pp. 15-31. Granted the importance of eschatological thought in Dutch Anabaptism, there is, as Werner Packull puts it in "The Sign of Thau: The Changing Conception of the Seal of

God's elect in Early Anabaptist Thought", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 61 (1987), p. 370: "An emerging scholarly consensus now recognizes that initially Münster was not a great aberration but an inspiration for much of early Anabaptism in the North". For the influence of sacramentalism see Helmut Isaak, "The Struggle for an Evangelical Town" in The Dutch Dissenters, ed. I.B. Horst, pp. 66-82 and Cornelius Krahn, Dutch Anabaptism: Origin, Spread, Life, and Thought, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1981), pp. 21-43. Krahn also talks about the socio-ecomonic conditions that played a part in the emergence of Anabaptism, see pp. 76-77. On socio-ecomonic conditions see Lammert G. Jansma, "The Rise of the Anabaptist Movement and Societal Changes in the Netherlands", in The Dutch Dissenters, ed. I.B. Horst, pp. 85-104. He argues that Dutch Anabaptism was relatively uneffected by socio-economic conditions. For an opposing view see Gary K. Waite, "The Anabaptist Movement in Amsterdam and the Netherlands", 1531-1535: An Initial Investigation into Its Genesis and Social Dynamics", The Sixteenth Century Journal, 18 (1987), pp. 249-265. See also the articles by Martin Haas, Karel Vos and W.J. Kühler in The Anabaptists and Thomas Müntzer, trans. and eds. James Stayer and Werner Packull, (Dubuque, Iowa and Toronto, Ontario: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 72-103.

[21] Mennonite Quarterly Review, 27 (1953), p. 271. The same argument is made by William Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, pp. 122, 200.

[22] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", pp. 387-388.

[23] I.B Horst, "Menno Simons: The Road to a Voluntary Church", in The Dutch Dissenters, ed. I.B. Horst, p. 197.

[24] On Menno's education see George K. Epp, "The Spiritual Roots of Menno Simons" in Mennonite Images: Historical, Cultural and Literary Essays Dealing with Mennonite Issues, ed. Harry Loewen, (Winnipeg: Hyperion Press Limited, 1980), pp. 51-59 and his later article, "The Premonstratensian Connection of Menno Simons: Confirmations, Revisions and New Evidence", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 62 (1988), pp. 349-355: I.B. Horst, "Menno Simons and the Augustinian Tradition", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 62 (1988), pp. 419-430; Cornelius Augustijn, "Erasmus and Menno Simons" in Mennonite Quarterly Review, 60 (1986), pp. 497-508 concludes that Menno's references and writing style, particularly in his Latin epilogue to his "Meditation on the Twenty-Fifth Psalm", indicate that he possessed considerable theological and writing skills. Augustijn also concludes, p. 506, that Menno's thought reflects considerable exposure to Erasmus.

For a list of Menno's references to contemporary reformers see Cornelius Krahn, Menno Simons (1496-1561): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Theologie der Taufgesinnten, pp. 43-47.

[25] Augustijn, "Erasmus and Menno Simons", p. 500 has identified three genres in Menno's writings: 1) purely meditative works, 2) expositions of the faith, such as "Foundation of Christian Doctrine" and 3) adversial writings addressed to opponents within and critics beyond.

[26] Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 68, estimates that 60% of Menno's writings are composed of biblical materials. On Menno's use of biblical texts see Egil Grislis, "Menno Simons' Account of His Conversion and Call in Light of the Bible", Journal of Mennonite Studies, 3 (1985), pp. 73-82.

[27] Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 70, outlines the statistical analysis that he has used to study Menno's writings. Dennis D. Martin, "Menno and Augustine on the Body of Christ", Fides et Historia, 20 (1988), p. 58, n. 49, alludes to a similar method he has used to study Menno.

[28] Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 67, speaks of Menno's writing style as being "boringly repetitious".

[29] H.W. Meihuizen, ed., Menno Simons: 'Dat Fundament des Christelychen leers', (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967). This is the beginning of a critical text on Menno but the major problem in Menno studies is the lack of a critical text for the rest of Menno's writings. For the history of Menno's "Foundation Book" and critical comments see Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, pp. 202-221.

[30] Victor G. Doerksen and Hermina Joldersma, trans. and eds., "Menno Simons on the Truine God", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 60 (1986), pp. 509-547.

[31] I.B. Horst, A Bibliography of Menno Simons, ca. 1496-1561, Dutch Reformer, (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1962).

[32] Although the influence of Luther on Menno has often been noted, it is important to recall that many of the opponents of Dutch Anabaptism were Calvinists. See Andrew Pettegree, "The Struggle for an Orthodox Church: Calvinists and Anabaptists in East Friesland, 1554-1578", Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester, 70 (1988), pp. 45-59. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between Calvin and the Anabaptists see Willem Balke, Calvin and the Anbaptist Radicals, trans. W.J. Heynen, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981).

[33] Leonard Verduin, trans. and ed., The Complete Writings of

Menno Simons, c. 1496-1561, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania and Kitchener, Ontario: Herald Press, 1956), p. 668. Hereafter this will be abbreviated as CWMS.

[34] Needless to say, scholars have not been reluctant to speculate as to what tract Menno may have read. Bender, in his introductory biography of Menno in CWMS, p. 6, suggests two possibilities: 1) Luther's 1518 pamphlet "Instruction on Several Articles" and 2) his 1520 booklet, "On the Freedom of a Christian Man". Menno does not say that he gained any insight into the problem of transubstantiation but he simply labels it a "human injunction", p. 668. What role Luther's writings had is also not clear. Where they merely an aid to Menno, playing a clearly subsidary role or did Menno read the Bible now in light of Luther's teachings? We should not be quick to adopt Bender's argument that what Menno discovered in Luther was the priority of Scripture over tradition for Menno appears, at this point, to be still firmly within the grip of the Catholic church.

[35] CWMS, p. 669. For a fuller account of Menno's conversion see Grislis, "Menno Simons' Account of His Conversion and Call in the Light of the Bible" and James Stayer, "Oldeklooster and Menno", Sixteenth Century Journal, 9 (1978), pp. 51-67.

[36] CWMS, p. 126. Cf. pp. 133,241-242 and 279.

[37] CWMS, p. 514.

[38] CWMS, p. 550.

[39] David C. Steinmetz, Luther in Context, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 72.

[40] CWMS, p. 167.

[41] CWMS, p. 333.

[42] CWMS, p. 334.

[43] For the impact that persecution has on Menno's view of his oppnents see Egil Grislis, "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", Journal of Mennonite Studies, 5 (1987), pp. 120-127. Further discussion of Menno's dependence on Luther can be found in Heinhold Fast, "The Dependence of the First Anabaptists on Luther, Erasmus, and Zwingli", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 30 (1956), pp. 104-119 and Hans Hillerbrand, "Anabaptism and the Reformation: Another Look", Church History, 29 (1960), pp. 404-423 and "The Origin of Sixteenth Century Anabaptism", Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, 53 (1962), pp. 152-180.

[44] Richard C. Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons Viewed against the Background of Martin Luther's Thought", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 43 (1969), p. 200. My dependence on Detweiler's article is obvious but it will also be noted that I disagree with his description of Luther's view of justification as "forensic". Detweiler states that Menno does not reflect on the the Law and Gospel distinction "with Luther's theological penetration and is more ambiguous in his use of terms". In one sense this statement is true but it is also misleading for these terms do not have the same signficance for Menno as they do for Luther, therefore, they do not need to be treated the same manner or in the same depth.

[45] CWMS, pp. 717-718.

[46] CWMS, p. 329.

[47] Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons', p. 201. My emphasis.

[48] See above, p. 118 on third use of Law.

[49] Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons", p. 201. My emphasis. For a comparison to Luther see Alister McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 161-162: "It is evident that Luther regards the central message of Scripture- both Old and New Testaments- to concern the acta Dei. Three particular areas of this work of God are identified: the acta Dei in Christ, the church, and in the individual. Luther's frequent assertion that power lies with God in his Word, and not in us, inevitably leads to an emphasis upon acta Dei, rather than facta nostra".

[50] Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons", p. 201. Detweiler has too quickly assumed that for Menno the emphasis upon repentance is the residual effect of Menno's believing in the freedom of the will. The text Detweiler quotes from Menno (CWMS, p. 718) does not suggest or does it need to presuppose it. The question of repentance and human initiative will receive further consideration below.

[51] CWMS, p. 108.

[52] CWMS, p. 111.

[53] The frequency with which Menno uses this phrase and the terminology of merits is striking. He has no hesitancy in using the phrase but he applies it strictly to Christ. Furthermore, Menno does not engage in polemics on this point but, perhaps by applying the term strictly to Christ, he is

implicitly doing so.

[54] CWMS, pp. 111-112. My epmhasis. See Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", pp. 390-392.

[55] My indebtedness to Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons" is again obvious.

[56] CWMS, pp. 115-116.

[57] CWMS, p. 116.

[58] CWMS, pp. 506-507

[59] CWMS, p. 569.

[60] A comparsion to Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons", p. 206 will quickly show that I disagree with his characterization of Luther's understanding of justification as being forsenic.

[61] Ibid. Again my disagreement with Detweiler is obvious but this time it is with his characterization of Menno's theology. Such disagreement does not negate or preclude the use of Detweiler's article but it must be read with some caution.

[62] CWMS, p. 115. My emphasis.

[63] CWMS, p. 116.

[64] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 393. My emphasis.

[65] Ibid., p. 394.

[66] For a survey of Dutch Anabaptism see Krahn, Dutch Anabaptism: Origin, Spread, Life, and Thought.

[67] Walter Klaassen, "Visions of the End in Reformation Europe", in Visions and Realities: Essays, Poems, and Fiction Dealing with Mennonite Issues, eds. Harry Loewen and Al Reimer, pp. 13-57. See also Klaassen's "Eschatological Themes in Early Dutch Anabaptism" in The Dutch Dissenters, ed. I.B. Horst, pp. 15-31. It is Voolstra's, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 388, n. 9 who argues that "the Dutch Anabaptist movement was anticlerical primarily because of its apocalyptic expectations".

[68] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 388.

[69] Ibid., p. 389. Williams, The Radical Reformation, pp. 124, 171, 300, 305, 397, 499, sees baptism as the sign of a penitent life. Fritz Blanke, Brothers in Christ, trans. Joseph Nordenhaug, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania and Kitchener, Onatrio: Herald Press, 1961), pp. 35-36 stresses the importance of penitence among the Swiss Brethren.

[70] CWMS, p. 92. My emphasis. Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 399: "In the theology of penance the Old Testament functions principally as paraenesis; it contains commandments and examples that must convince believers of their sins and will incite them to change . . .". For other views on the Old Testament see Beachy, The Concept of Grace in the Radical Reformation, pp. 146-149 and Krahn, Menno Simons (1494-1561): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Theologie der Taufgesinnten, pp. 107-110.

[71] CWMS, p. 92.

[72] CWMS, p. 95. See also pp. 96-97.

[73] CWMS, p. 96.

[74] CWMS, p. 95.

[75] CWMS, p. 100.

[76] CWMS, pp. 101-102.

[77] The opening chapters of this book have been examined in some detail by Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", pp. 389-394.

[78] CWMS, p. 111. My emphasis.

[79] CWMS, p. 111.

[80] CWMS, p. 111.

[81] CWMS, p. 111.

[82] CWMS, pp. 111-112. Except for David all these figures come from the Gospels and had an encounter with Christ.

[83] CWMS, p. 112.

[84] CWMS, p. 112. My emphasis.

[85] CWMS, p. 112. My emphasis.

[86] CWMS, p. 113. My emphasis. This quotation is literally a collage of Scriptural phrases, words, ideas and allusions. It is built around a number of antithesis frequently found

in the Bible: light/dark; new man/ old man; flesh/spirit; first Adam/ second Adam and world/church. The lists bear close resemblance to those in Galatians 5:19-23.

[87] Menno bases his thoughts on Luke 23: 39-43.

[88] CWMS, p. 371 from "True Christian Faith", 1541.

[89] CWMS,p. 372.

[90] One of the things Menno was most critical of was hyporcrisy and insincerity, no doubt because he detected these in his own life. See CWMS, pp. 77, 207, 668.

[91] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 394. Martin, "Catholic Spirituality and Anabaptist and Mennonite Discipleship", where he carefully points out the difference between Catholic and Anabaptist spirituality which would prevent any identification of Anabaptist thought with the medieval practice of penance.

[92] What is worthy of note is how <u>in</u>frequently Menno speaks of forgiveness.

[93] Grislis, "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", pp. 127-128.

[94] CWMS, p. 77.

[95] CWMS, p. 67.

[96] CWMS, pp. 239-240. Cf. CWMS, p. 605.

[97] CWMS, p. 76.

[98] CWMS, pp. 397-398.

[99] For references, see Grislis, "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", p. 130.

[100] CWMS, p. 342.

[101] Such texts can be found in Gislis, "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", p. 131.

[102] CWMS, p. 349. My emphasis.

[103] CWMS, pp. 130-131. My emphasis.

[104] The presence of synergism in Anabaptist thought has been long noted. For a discussion see Davis, <u>Anabaptism and Asceticism</u>, pp. 149-191. Grislis, in "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", pp. 128-129, suggests that the background

of Menno's ideas here may lie in Dutch mysticism and in John Ruusbroeck in particular. Such suggestions, while not to be ruled out, need to be checked in light of Epp's suggestion that Menno's origins lie in a Premonstratensian education. Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 72: "Menno and Dirk were somewhat contradictory when they attempted to recognize the paradox of a fully sovereign God, and man created with sufficient freedom to remain morally and ethically responsible for his behavior, and, therefore, of his destiny. They recognized some election, but very clearly asserted that it was conditional and not 'irrestible'. . .. The proffered grace is conditional because it depends upon the belief and obedience of the individual".

[105] Voolstra's article, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", falls into this error. He has understood penance, as least as explained by Menno, as being entirely a movement of the human will. Other evidence, which Voolstra does not examine would, at least, temper this judgement.

[106] Grislis, "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", p. 129.

[107] Ibid., pp. 129, 132.

[108] Ibid., p. 132.

[109] CWMS, p. 72.

[110] CWMS, p. 233.

[111] CWMS, p. 297.

[112] CWMS, pp. 90, 118.

[113] CWMS, p. 345.

[114] CWMS, p. 375.

[115] CWMS, p. 349.

[116] CWMS, p. 292.

[117] CWMS, p. 329.

[118] CWMS, p. 337.

[119] CWMS, p. 949.

[120] Menno does emphasize that God's wrath is to cause one to repent but he does not say that it is strictly God's wrath that is to motivate repentance. God's love can also motivate

repentance: "Reflect on the abundant marvelous works of grace which Christ Jesus has shown you. If His great love cannot move you to forsake idolatry, disobedience, and accursed life, then remember His stern judgement".

[121] CWMS, pp. 306-307.

[122] CWMS, p. 147.

[123] For a similar view see Beachy, The Concept of Grace in the Radical Reformation, pp. 59-60.

Chapter Seven

[1] CWMS, p. 605.

[2] CWMS, pp. 605, 240, 671, 81, 328, 241.

[3] CWMS, pp. 124, 267. For Menno there is definitely a cognitive aspect to faith. See Willis Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 25 (1965), pp. 6-7.

[4] CWMS, pp. 659, 346, 348.

[5] Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", p. 7.

[6] CWMS, p. 116.

[7] CWMS, p. 398.

[8] CWMS, p. 267.

[9] CWMS, p. 96.

[10] CWMS, p. 80.

[11] CWMS, p. 141.

[12] CWMS, p. 329.

[13] CWMS, p. 266.

[14] CWMS, p. 182.

[15] CWMS, p. 391.

[16] CWMS, p. 510.

[17] CWMS, p. 116.

[18] Grislis, "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", pp. 120-127.

[19] CWMS, p. 607, 270.

[20] Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", p. 5 and Loeschen, The Divine Community, pp. 77-96.

[21] Martin, "Menno and Augustine on the Body of Christ", p. 58, n. 49, makes this comment: "'Effective' and 'power' are among the most frequently occuring terms in a preliminary sorting of a computer database composed of excerpts from Menno's writings". Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 225, lists the following among the "language of power": "sword of, through the, led by the, resist the, constrained by, ruled by, impulsion of, driven by, renewing of the, moving of the, spark of the, motivated by the, quench the, freedom of, liberty of, threatened by the, inspiration of the".

[22] Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", p. 5.

[23] CWMS, p. 496. For a fuller discussion see Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", pp. 5-6.

[24] CWMS, p. 901. See also Loeschen, The Divine Community, pp. 79-80.

[25] CWMS, p. 54. My emphasis.

[26] CWMS, pp. 54-55. My emphasis.

[27] CWMS, pp. 55-56. My emphasis.

[28] Note the presence of certain words which suggest the theme of imitiation: "emulate, follow, example, become like, conformed". In terms of the contemporary division of "the Jesus of history" and the "Christ of faith", Menno's interest lies in the "Jesus of history" although he would never conceive of the problem in these terms. Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 80, speaks of "the horizontal axis which runs from Simons' reality back to Jesus". On p. 75 Loeschen states that Menno's interest is really in what he calls the "immanent Trinity" of "Christ's nature, Word, and Spirit". Loeschen explains this concept on p. 94. Loeschen also identifies the main problem of Menno's theology as one of historical distance: "It is rather, for Simons, the brute fact of the historical or 'horizontal' gap between sixteenth-century northern European life and the life of Jesus of Nazareth. The Mennonite ideal was to be complete conformed . . . to Christ's words and example, thereby completely (love, order) one with his nature".

[29] CWMS, p. 56.

[30] This phrase is borrowed from Richard Weingart, "The Meaning of Sin in the Theology of Menno Simons", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 41 (1967), p. 37.

[31] CWMS, p. 709. My emphasis.

[32] CWMS, p. 146. My emphasis.

[33] CWMS, p. 141. My emphasis.

[34] CWMS, p. 265. My emphasis.

[35] CWMS, p. 328. My emphasis.

[36] CWMS, p. 337. My emphasis.

[37] CWMS, pp. 423, 496, 507, 588, 611, 1032.

[38] CWMS, p. 398.

[39] CWMS, p. 149. My emphasis.

[40] CWMS, p. 300. My emphasis.

[41] CWMS, p. 396. My emphasis.

[42] Loeschen, The Divine Community, pp. 76 and 86. He describes the role of the Spirit in Menno's theology as "richer, more varied, and more important to his theology than is the case with any other major Protestant reformer of the sixteenth century" (p. 86).

[43] Ibid., p. 82.

[44] Ibid., p. 84.

[45] CWMS, pp. 668-674. For other such associations see CWMS, pp. 70, 82, 108, 113, 132, 249, 262f., 266, 315, 318, 326, 341, 504ff., 688, 692, 696, 705ff..

[46] Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 86.

[47] Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", p. 10. I am here arguing that the center of Menno's thought is to be found in his soteriology, rather than his ecclesiology.

[48] CWMS, p. 123. My emphasis.

[49] CWMS, p. 123. My emphasis.

[50] CWMS, p. 453. My emphasis. On the importance of this argument see Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", p. 10.

[51] Stoesz, "The New Creature: Menno Simons' Understanding of the Christian Faith", p. 10.

[52] CWMS, p. 52. This verse is quoted as given in the

introduction by Dr. Wenger to this booklet by Menno.

[53] CWMS, p. 53.

[54] Alvin Beachy, "The Grace of God in Christ as Understood by Five Major Anabaptist Writers", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 37 (1963), p. 6.

[55] Ibid., p. 17.

[56] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[57] Ibid., p. 19.

[58] This is quoted from Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, pp. 73-74. Cf. pp. 219-220. See Keeney, pp. 207 ff. for a very careful study of the use of these prepositions. I have quoted the statement more fully than Beachy has in "The Grace of Christ as Understood by Five Major Anabaptist Writers", p. 21.

[59] For Menno's use of these prepositions see Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 219. He lists the following uses as found in Menno: "On the other hand, all those who are born and regenerated from (van) above out of (uit), through (door) the living Word, are also of the mind and disposition and have the same aptitude for good that He has whereof (waer of) they are born and begotten." CWMS, p. 55. Opera, p. 180B; "You see worthy readers, all those who are thus born of (uyt) God with Christ . . .". CWMS, p. 93, Opera, p. 125B; ". . . you must be born of (uyt) God", CWMS, p. 96, Opera, p. 127B; "However, the surest and best fruits are so to preach the Word of God in power that many are born of (uyt) God by it, are turned to God . . .". CWMS, p. 653, Opera, 245B; "By faith they must become new creatures, born of (uyt) God, and transplanted into from (uyt) Adam into Christ", CWMS, p. 146, Opera, p. 26B; and ". . . if you are born with Christ of (uyt) God the Father (uyt) the heavenly seed of the divine Word . . .", CWMS, p. 409, Opera, p. 632A. The references to Opera are to Opera Omnia Theologica of 1681 in which Menno's writings are collected. It is written in Dutch.

[60] Beachy, "The Grace of God in Christ as Understood by Five Major Anabaptist Writers". pp. 23-24. Menno's use of the phrase "bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh" is frequent but he does not develop it. Does Menno understand this phrase literally (doubtful) or is it a metaphor to express both intimacy and imitation? The phrase has its source in mystical writings but the whole theme of mysticism in Dutch Anabaptism has received little attention. The most extensive treatment can be found in Beachy, The Concept of Grace in

the Radical Reformation, pp. 187-230. He concludes that the mystics had some influence upon the Dutch Anabaptists but that they also went their separate ways. This subject is also treated in Davis, Anabaptism and Asceticism, passim. Davis sees a substantial degree of influence from mystics on Anabaptism but he treats Anabaptism as a unity and gives relatively little attention to Dutch Anabaptism. Steven Ozment, Mysticism and Dissent: Religious Ideology and Social Protest in the Sixteenth Century, (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1973), has looked at the influence of mysticism on the Radical Reformation and has concluded that it played a vital part in generating their theologies and social protest but, again, no Dutch Anabaptists are examined. Werner Packull has looked at the influence of mysticism on south German Anabaptism, in Mysticism and the Early South German-Austrian Anabaptist Movement, 1525-1531, (Scottdale, Pennsylvania and Kitchener, Ontario: Herald Press, 1977). Packull, p. 176, attributes considerable influence to mysticism in the South German Anabaptists. Krahn, Dutch Mysticism: Origin, Spread, Life, and Thought, devotes a few pages to mysticism, pp. 21-23 but is much too brief an examination. Grislis, in "'Good Works' According to Menno Simons", pp. 128-129, has briefly examined Dutch mysticism and suggested the possible influence of John Ruusbroec on Menno. W. J. Küler, Geschiedenis der Nederlandische Doopsgezindeer in die Zeitende Eeuw, pp. 25-32, 251ff.,has argued that the Brethren of the Common Life had considerable influence on the Dutch Anabaptists. Also G.H. Williams, "German mysticism in the Polarization of Ethical Behavior in Luther and the Anabaptists", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 48 (1974), pp. 275-304. This is an area of study that for Anabpatism in general and, in particular, Dutch Anabaptism, requires much work.

61 CWMS, pp. 409-410.

62 Beachy, "The Concept of Grace as Understood by Five Major Anabaptist Writers", pp. 21-22.

63 Ibid., p. 17.

64 Beachy, The Concept of Grace in the Radical Reformation, pp. 153-155.

65 Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 73ff..

66 Menno employs both the Anselmic and classic models to explain the significance of Christ's death. On the Anselmic see CWMS, pp. 70, 79, 108, 145, 152, 154-155, 219, 283, 336, 391. For classic usages, see CWMS, pp. 70, 74, 108, 143-144, 152, 154, 246. Menno often uses both these models together but when it comes to a discussion of Christ's celestial

flesh then the Anselmic model is clearly the one employed.

[67] For an analysis and critique of Anselm, see Gustaf Aulèn Christus Victor, pp. 84-92 and above, pp. 81ff..

[68] CWMS, p. 870. As quoted in Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, pp. 90-91.

[69] Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 91. Author's emphasis. For a tabulation on the use of these prepositions see pp. 207-209.

[70] CWMS, pp. 832 and 439.

[71] For a discussion of this physiology see Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, pp. 92-93. See CWMS, pp. 863, 866-867.

[72] Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 92. Menno's argument, by implication, also recasts the Catholic understanding of Mary.

[73] Ibid., p. 93. My emphasis. The whole issue of Christ's celestial flesh is also discussed in Williams, The Radical Reformation. pp. 325-337, 394-396, 502-503. Williams suggests quite a different origin for this doctrine, thinking that it may be found in medieval mystical and Eucharistic language. The sixteenth century interest in this doctrine may result from an effort to "restate the Christ-ological problem in the language of Eucharistic piety, experientially much more real that the philosophical terms . . . employed earlier . . ." (p. 327). Another suggestion for the origin of this idea is given by Sjouke Voolstra, in his doctoral dissertation abstract, "Het Woordis Vless geworden. De melchioritische-Menniste Incarnatieleer", (University of Amsterdam, 1982) as given in Mennonite Quarterly Review, 57 (1983), pp. 155-160. He argues that this doctrine originates with Melchior Hoffman in his fight against clerical manipulation of the means of salvation. The celestial flesh does away with the mediatorial role of the clergy. Voolstra's conclusions largely agree with those of Keeney, rooting the doctrine of rebirth in Christology.

[74] CWMS, p. 503. Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 67: "Menno and Dirk's conception of original purity seems to resemble closely the loss of the theological virtues but it is never so defined in explicit terms or limited to just the traditional three".

[75] CWMS, pp. 503-504.

[76] This can be clearly seen in Menno's doctrine of the Incarnation.

[77] This description is based on Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, pp. 67-68.

[78] CWMS, pp. 130, 134, 244, 563ff.. I.B. Horst, "Menno Simons and the Augustinian Tradition", pp. 424-425: "Clearly, Menno did not share Augustine's view of the nature of sin; in his own personal experience he shared an intense perception of the gravity of sin and understood its basic spiritual character but saw its outworking in human conduct as an essential part of the radical sinfulness of humanity. Thus, he went behind Augustine to the Gospels to indicate that sin is a matter of the heart that issues in evil deeds. For him, ethics could not be divorced from faith".

[79] See for example, CWMS, pp. 172-177. Several explanations have been offered for Menno's fondness for listing vices and virtues. Richard E. Weingart, "The Meaning of Sin in the Theology of Menno Simons", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 41 (1967), p. 26, argues that Menno's lists of sins result from his conception of sin as a "concrete transgression of the divine will". Egil Grislis, "The Concern for Christian Liberation According to Menno Simons", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 55 (1981), p. 55, suggests a quite different attitude towards these lists: "Menno preferred to present abstract lists of transgressions, detailing particular sins, vices, offenses and evil deeds with eschatological intensity.. . . Menno achieved an almost annihilating effect with complete seriousness. At times Menno appears to have followed a carefully thought outlines". Horst, "Menno Simons and the Augustinian Tradition", p. 424, suggests that Menno's attitude toward sin may have largely been shaped by the medieval penitential system which give attention to such overt behaviour and sexual irregularities. Another possible source for Menno's listing of sins is the Bible itself. See I Corinthians 5:11; Galatians 5:19-23 and II Peter 1:4-7.

[80] CWMS, p. 563: "Wherever original sin, which is the mother, and actual sin, which is the fruit, are connected, there is no forgiveness nor promise of life . . .". See also pp. 54-57 where Menno reasons both ways. Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 81, has argued that for Menno "sin is purely acts of sin". Horst, "Menno Simons and the Augustinian Tradition, pp. 424-425, takes a more balanced view in seeing that Menno uses both concepts. See the quotation above in n. 78.

[81] CWMS, pp. 305-306, 503, 804.

[82] Martin, "Menno and Augustine on the Body of Christ", p. 50.

[83] CWMS, p. 416. My emphasis. On Tau see Packull, "The Sign of Thau: The Changing Conception of the Seal of God's Elect in Early Anabaptist Thought", pp. 363-374. See also CWMS, pp. 56, 396, 409.

[84] CWMS, p. 54.

[85] Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice from 1539-1564, p. 73. My emphasis. See CWMS, pp. 92f., 130, 506, 819f..

[86] Keeney, The Development of Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice, 1539-1564, p. 73. William Keeney, "The Incarnation, A Central Theological Legacy", in A Legacy of Faith, ed. C.J. Dyck, (Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press, 1962), p. 59: ". . . the origin of a substance determines in a real sense its nature. Jesus Christ has His nature from God. His human nature is from God and out of man. In the reverse fashion, man's human nature is from Adam, but he is born anew out of God. His divine nature is a conferred nature and so can never become identical with God, or the divine nature in Jesus Christ".

[87] CWMS, pp. 146, 148, 151, 410, 515, 967ff..

[88] See Martin, "Catholic Spirituality and Anabaptist and Mennonite Discipleship", pp. 5-25 and Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", pp. 397-398.

[89] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology". pp. 395-396 and the literature cited there.

[90] Ibid., p. 397.

[91] The process of banning and shunning are the means for the maintenance of group identity. Baptism is the control mechanism for admission into the group. Clerical control is now replaced with group control. For an insightful comparison see Dennis D. Martin, "Catholic and Anabaptist and Mennonite Discipleship", pp. 17-19.

[92] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", pp. 397-398.

[93] Ibid., pp. 398-399.

[94] Such a brief statement hardly does justice to the long and complex history of monasticism. For further details and literature see Abraham Friesen, "Anabaptism and Monasticism: A Study in the Development of Parallel Historical Patterns",

Journal of Mennonite Studies, 6 (1988), pp. 174-197.

[95] Walter Klaassen, "The Anabaptist Critique of Constantinian Christendom", Mennonite Quarterly Review, 55 (1981), pp. 218-230. See CWMS, pp. 130ff. for Menno's refutation of infant baptism.

[96] Friesen, "Anabaptism and Monasticism: A Study in the Development of Parallel Historical Patterns", p. 181.

[97] Martin, "Catholic Spirituality and Anabaptist and Mennonite Discipleship", pp. 18-19.

[98] See the Rule of St. Benedict, chapter 4, #27- "Not to swear, for fear of committing perjury", #29-"Not to return an evil for an evil", #30- "Not to return an evil for an evil",#31- "To love one's enemies", and #33- "To suffer persecution for the sake of justice". Quoted from The Rule of St. Benedict, Trans. A.C. Meisel and M.L. del Mastro, (New York: Doubleday, 1975), pp. 52-53.

[99] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 398.

[100] Davis, Anabaptism and Asceticism, p. 167.

[101] CWMS, p. 244.

[102] CWMS, pp. 120-121. Cf. p. 126 where the logic is reversed: "Since infant baptism is not expressly commanded of God as he [Bucer] acknowledges it cannot be acceptable to the Lord, and consequently no promise can follow".

[103] CWMS, p. 245.

[104] CWMS, p. 93.

[105] CWMS, p. 93.

[106] CWMS, pp. 567-568.

[107] CWMS, p. 329. Is this Menno's use of attritio?

[108] CWMS, p. 125. My emphasis. Cf. pp. 144-145, 244, 307, 329, 336, 340, 505.

[109] CWMS, p. 329.

[110] CWMS, p. 338. My emphasis.

[111] CWMS, p. 329. My emphasis.

[112] CWMS, p. 307.

[113] CWMS, p. 123.

[114] CWMS, p. 124. My emphasis.

[115] CWMS, p. 149.

[116] CWMS, p. 186.

[117] CWMS, p. 149.

[118] CWMS, p. 505.

[119] CWMS, p. 1033.

[120] CWMS, p. 145.

[121] CWMS, p. 1033ff..

[122] CWMS, p. 480ff..

[123] CWMS, p. 161.

[124] CWMS, p. 94.

[125] CWMS, p. 161.

[126] CWMS, p. 354.

[127] CWMS, p. 89. Cf. pp. 206, 213, 527, 555, 558, 620, 645, 648-649, 722, 735, 755, 777, 928.

[128] CWMS, p. 55.

[129] CWMS, p. 186. Cf. p. 481.

[130] CWMS, p. 195.

[131] CWMS, p. 201. Cf. p. 202.

[132] CWMS, p. 209.

[133] CWMS, p. 215.

[134] CWMS, p. 387. Cf. p. 637.

[135] CWMS, pp. 55-56.

[136] CWMS, p. 129.

[137] CWMS, p. 586. Cf. pp. 555, 620.

[138] CWMS, p. 274.

[139] CWMS, p. 216.

[140] CWMS, p. 120ff..

[141] CWMS, p. 129.

[142] CWMS, p. 229.

[143] Detweiler, "The Concept of Law and Gospel in the Writings of Menno Simons", p. 209.

[144] Ibid..

[145] CWMS, p. 902.

[146] Keeney, "The Incarnation, A Central Theological Legacy", p. 64.

[147] Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 85, has noted the frequent association of Christ and love. Although this correlation can be found in Menno I do not find as complete a linkage as Loeschen argues for.

[148] Keeney, "The Incarnation, A Central Theological Legacy", p. 65.

[149] CWMS, p. 339. Cf. p. 342.

[150] CWMS, pp. 161, 221, 299, 304, 449, 468.

[151] Keeney, The Development and Practice of Dutch Anabaptism from 1539-1564, p. 118, points out a number of changes that Menno made in later editions of "Foundations of Christian Doctrine" which tempered Menno's perfectionist impulses.

[152] CWMS, p. 245.

[153] CWMS, p. 233.

[154] CWMS, p. 527. On Menno's categorizing of sins see pp. 479, 506, 563-564, 984. At several points Menno refers to the failings of Christians as "weaknesses", pp. 57, 129.

[155] CWMS, p. 447.

[156] CWMS, p. 654.

[157] Horst, "Menno Simons and the Augustinian Tradition", pp. 426-427.

[158] The conclusion that Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", p. 399: "The proclamation of the gospel as a gift of grace and liberation remained for Menno

under the sign of God's Word as commandment and rule of conduct for complete obedience. According to Menno, faith is determined, then, also much more by human obedience to God's commandments than by God's offer of love and forgiveness. Justification through faith is understood as a promise to those, who, through fear of God's judgement, have set foot on the way of penitence, betterment and obedience", is a gross misrepresentation of what Menno has to say. There is, it is true, within Menno a stress upon the importance of obedience but this stress is balanced, at least minimally, by the importance of God's grace. How this balance is to be understood remains a question but Voolstra's description of it quite incorrect. Cornelius Krahn's suggestion, Menno Simons (1496-1561): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Theologie der Taufgesinnten, p. 129, that repentance may be the "Anknüpfungspunkt für die Gnade Gottes" has considerable merit as a possible suggestion. It suggests a point of contact without compelling one to attach any merit to the resultant human action.

Chapter Eight

[1] The description of Paul that has been presented in this thesis is a very traditional one and one that has been shaped to a large degree by Luther. Any current attempts to understand Judaism must deal with E.P. Sanders' revisionist view of Judaism in his Paul and Palestinian Judaism.

[2] Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, pp. 225-226.

[3] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, pp. 335-346.

[4] See above, chapter 4.

[5] Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 342. See also Loeschen, The Divine Community, p. 40.

[6] WA 39,II, 93,2-9; 101; 280,16. References from Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 342.

[7] Raines, "Luther's Two Kingdoms and the Desacralization of Ethics", p. 133.

[8] Keeney, "The Incarnation, A Central Theological Concept", p. 68 makes this interesting comment on Menno's view of the Incarnation: ". . . it is regretable that controversy over the particular way in which an event happened becomes the focal point of the argument which obscures the significant theological truth established by the event. Even with what could be considered a false physiology on the part of Menno, the central importance of the Incarnation protected him and others from errors more basic, which others with more accurate physiology have committed".

[9] For this literature see Martin, "Menno and Augustine on the Body of Christ", p. 60, n.60.

[10] The dualism found in Menno is one of historical distance as we noted above, pp. 237.

[11] Present day Anabaptist scholars can hardly be blamed for holding such a view because this is the view of many Lutheran scholars.

[12] Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 226 and above, pp. 123ff. on the new being in Luther.

[13] LW 26,357; WA 40:I,

[14] LW 26,168; WA 40:I,546,23-28. My emphasis.

[15] Note Luther's language as he describes this relationship to Christ. He uses terms such as "cling", "adhere", and "cemented". See above, pp. 345, n. 173 for other terms.

[16] Oberman, "'Iustitia Christi' and 'Iustitia Dei': Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification", p. 21, makes these comments: "The extra nos is for Luther the connection between the doctrine of justification and a theological anthropology. This expression should, however, not be understood in the forensic sense of the word. The central concept extra nos does not stand on the side of an imputatio-justification over against a unio-justification. It does not prove that we are justified 'outside ourselves' before the chair of God the judge (in foro Dei), in such a way that grace would not be imparted but 'only' imputed. The intention of the extra nos is to show that justification is not based on a claim of man, on a debitum iustitiae. The righteousness granted in not one's property but one's possession. It is not proprietas but rather possessio".

[17] LW 26,387; WA 40:II,589,25-28.

[18] See above, p. 117, for further comments.

[19] Voolstra, "True Penitence: The Core of Menno Simons' Theology", pp. 397-398.

[20] On the new creature, see above, pp. 242ff..

[21] On Menno's lack of interest in creation see above, pp. 251ff..

[22] Martin, "Menno and Augustine on the Body of Christ", p. 50.

[23] Ibid., pp. 50-51.

[24] Keeney, The Development and Practice of Dutch Anabaptism from 1539-1564, p. 162ff..

[25] Ibid., p. 166. Cf. p. 118.

[26] Ibid., p. 167.

[27] See above for comments on this relationship of "having" but "not yet having", pp. 149.

[28] Torrance, "The Eschatology of Faith: Martin Luther", p. 199. My emphasis. For a similar comment see Robert E. Cushman, "Reconciliation, Yesterday and Today" in Faith Seeking Understanding: Essays Theological and Critical

(Durham: Duke University Press, 1981), pp. 222-223.

[29] LW 27,21; WA 40:II,24,27.

[30] Torrance, "The Eschatology of Faith: Martin Luther", p. 183.

[31] John Tonkin, The Church and the Secular Order in Reformation Thought (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 135.

[32] Ibid., pp. 138-139. See CWMS, pp. 479, 506, especially 563-564, 984.

[33] Tonkin, The Church and the Secular Order in Reformation Thought, p. 139.

[34] Ibid., p. 140.

[35] Ibid., p. 157.

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