THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY: ITS ROLE IN THE ARMS CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE

BY
DWIGHT C. SCOTT

A thesis
presented to the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
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in
The Faculty of Graduate Studies

Winnipeg, Manitoba

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union have held countless meetings on the issue of arms control. Although there have been successes, generally the arms race continues unabated. In 1961 President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to be the focal point for American arms control research, coordination, and negotiations.

The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1961 to 1983, as a first step in determining why U.S. arms control efforts have failed. This investigation reveals that the creation of ACDA has had little effect on the arms race. Successive administrations have not provided the agency with the necessary support to carry out its goals. ACDA has been kept small and dependent on the Departments of Defense and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. It has been only one of many departments involved in the negotiation process, and its influence has been minor.

The study also focuses on the common characteristics of the ACDA directors. They were all members of the corporate, legal, or government elites, had strong military backgrounds or connections, and had never held elective office. Only one, Paul Warnke, had access to the President of the United States.

One justification for the existence of an arms control agency is found in the examination of public opinion polls. Polling results show that Americans desire action towards arms control but fear the power of the Soviet Union. They also want to see their government working for peace, but generally support military spending.

The paper traces the history of arms control negotiations prior to 1961 in order to explain ACDA's position in the government. The evolution of the U.S. national security system has limited United States arms control efforts and has influenced the agency's history.

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PREFACE

Relations among nations since 1945 have been conducted in the shadow of nuclear weapons. The world has now reached a point where by accident or design the planet could be destroyed in minutes. For over forty years negotiations have been held with the goal of limiting, controlling, or ending the research, production, and deployment of nuclear armaments. But the arms race continues unabated. This study of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is one place to begin an investigation into the failure of arms control.

A survey of the literature in Chapter I examines how authors have dealt with the agency. Chapter II begins with a look at the optimism surrounding the establishment of ACDA in September 1961. It continues with a review of the history of U.S. arms control efforts prior to 1961 in order to clarify the new agency's position within the national security structure of the government. The focus of Chapter III is an analysis of several administrative factors which explain in part the inability of the agency to fulfill its formal mandate. Its minor role is further revealed by its participation in negotiations. ACDA's Directors are compared in Chapter IV, as another explanation for the agency's weak position. In view of ACDA's status in the government and its role in arms control negotiations, Chapter V investigates the influence of public opinion on its creation and its continuing existence. Chapter VI concludes the study by summarizing how all of the above factors have led to ACDA's weakness in the arms control arena.

CHAPTER I

ARMS CONTROL: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY

Modern concern over arms control is not a new phenomenon; it has been at or near the center of foreign policy for nation states in almost every historical era. With the detonation of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, however, and the subsequent development of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the entire planet, arms control has assumed unprecedented urgency. Regrettably, negotiations during the past forty years have neither halted the weapons build-up nor reduced the nuclear arsenals of either superpower. In the 1980s, the bellicose posturings of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union brought an apparent deepening of the Cold War, and inspired a new literature related to arms control.

Contemporary scholarship in Western bloc countries has focused on the need for arms limitation, and from it a debate has arisen over the reasons for the failure of effective negotiated agreements. Four explanations stand out. First, that the government of the Soviet Union impedes progress by being intransigent, insincere, bent on domination, and not allowing its representatives the flexibility to bargain. Second, that the allies cause moderation and delay by vacillating between the fear of being abandoned by the U.S. and entrapped in the superpower struggle. Third, that the rapid advancement of research and technology has made the slow negotiating process obsolete. Finally,

political matters within the U.S. such as partisan politics, a cumbersome bureaucracy, and public opinion act as obstacles to substantive progress.

While all the explanations are related, the debate centers on which point is most outstanding. Despite the importance of U.S. internal politics as a major impediment to arms limitations, little appears to have been written about the actors who make up the arms control community and their approach to the issue. And almost totally neglected has been an analysis of the history and operation of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The Congressional Act which created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961 specified that

> The formation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field.

The Act further states that this agency will prepare and manage arms control negotiations, research, verification systems, and the dissemination of public information.[1]

It would seem impossible, then, to discuss the history of arms control and disarmament, at least since 1961, without considering the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, because it is supposed to be the focal point for the entire arms control process. Yet in most cases the agency is mentioned only in passing, if at all. Further, one usually finds a certain dehumanization in the literature. Either entire nations are personified ("The United States believes this...." "The

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1 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Statutes at Large 75, Sec. 2551 (1961)

Soviet Union argued that....") or one or two high profile persons such as the President or Secretary of State are characterized as bearing the full responsibility for policy and action. This gives little information about how, where, and by whom policy is formulated, and suggests that there is little dissent within nations over arms control. By investigating the domestic side of the issue, including ACDA, it is possible to clarify the connection between the internal process and the failure of arms control.

One person who has analyzed the arms control bureaucracy is Steven E. Miller, Assistant Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. In "Politics Over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control",[2] he surveys the negotiated efforts over the past twenty-five years and reaches three conclusions: 1) there have been as many failures as successes; 2) the successes have been modest compared to the work invested in them; and 3) the image of arms control has been tarnished.[3]

In the U.S., arms control policy originates in the executive branch. The President, therefore, has the power to form and control the process. Nevertheless, there are several groups, some with contradictory goals, competing for influence. Miller identifies the major actors as those from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since each group approaches the issue from a different perspective, the

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2 Steven E. Miller, "Politics Over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control", International Security 8 (Spring 1984).

3 Ibid., pp. 75-78.

process is a slow one, consisting of internal negotiations, trade offs, compromises, and the "adjudication of disputes". What emerges, according to Miller, is an official policy which can only be modest and one which lags behind technological advances.[4]

The ratification phase, the other solely internal stage, takes place in the Senate, and the procedure of haggling is much the same. Since it takes only one-third plus one to block a treaty, intense bargaining between key Senators and officials from the executive branch is usually long and drawn out. Conservatives and liberals must find common ground. Legislative programs, related or not, are held hostage or traded off, and procedural maneuvering can further delay final action. Here, too, the product which finally survives is the one that does not offend the majority and is marked by its weakness.

Superimposed upon the problems related to policy making and ratification are the factors of electoral politics and public opinion. Miller believes that better management of all the impediments is possible if proposals are modest and if there is strong and direct involvement by the White House. He suggests placing less emphasis on final treaties and more on routine meetings that have less need for public relations exercises.[5]

While concentrating on the policy making phase, Miller mentions the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency only once, calling it a "weak player in its own game". There is no further elaboration of the agency

4 For a full discussion of the technological problems of arms control see: Christoph Bertram, "The Future of Arms Control (Part II): Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of a New Approach," Adelphi Paper, No. 146 (Summer, 1978).
5 Ibid., pp. 89-90.

which by statute must be at or near the center of the entire arms limitation process. Miller's investigation into the arms control community is superficial, and one is left wondering why the politics of arms control is so static, who specifically the actors are, if change is possible, and what management techniques should be developed to solve the problem.

Even with his shortcomings, Miller is one of the few analysts to bring forward the argument of domestic impediments as central to the failure of arms control. Journalist Strobe Talbott has also delved into the internal policy making battles in search for the reasons behind the failure of arms control.

Deadly Gambits is the story of the political maneuvering of the different factions within the Reagan Administration.[6] In it, Strobe Talbott concentrates on the development of the American positions for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). He reports that the Reagan Administration was motivated to consider arms control only because of pressure from the European allies and American public opinion.

The State Department and the Defense Department fought over what form policy would take, with the major protagonists being Richard Burt, head of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Talbott describes in great detail how Burt and Perle competed to win support from the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of

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6 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1984).

Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Advisor, and the arms control negotiators.

The encounters were replayed on all levels of the bureaucracy from the interagency groups to the Oval office. The disagreements centered on how flexible the U.S. would be in negotiating. Each side ultimately wanted to influence President Reagan. Talbott suggests, however, that Reagan was neither interested in nor knew much about arms control, and that he adopted the policies which were easy to understand and easy to sell to the Europeans allies and the American public.[7]

The book offers a rare look into the backrooms of the administrative branch. Talbott's description of the internal process clarifies the lack of progress in arms control during Reagan's first term. And even though he does not analyze collectively the characteristics of the policy makers, Talbott discloses that they were commonly opposed to arms control in general and SALT II in particular.[8]

Talbott's work is an important model in understanding the role of domestic politics in the failure of arms control. The approach needs to be extended over a longer period of time in order to discover if previous administrations have followed a similar pattern. And although he asserts that public opinion was a major factor in forcing the Reagan Administration to move on arms control, he is not specific about what the public's views were. He has clearly shown, however, that ACDA plays a definite role in the arms control process, and that policy is shaped by the political persuasion of the actors. While Talbott's conclusions

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7 Ibid., p. 73.
8 Ibid., pp. 11-18.

are based only on a short period of time, a group of Cambridge scholars who have examined the history of arms control have also found the process to be unsuccessful.[9]

The Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar produced a work entitled Defended to Death, edited by Gwyn Prins.[10] It is comprehensive in its scope, tracing the origins of the arms race, examining policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies, focusing on specific topics such as MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles) and counterforce, speculating about future developments, and assessing the success of arms control.[11]

Broadly asserting that the efforts at arms control have been a failure, the Cambridge study group traces the agreements which have been made since the late 1950s (see Table 1.1) and concludes that most of them fall into one of two categories. First are the "agreements not to do things which it was unlikely that anyone would wish to do", for instance placing nuclear weapons on the seabeds. And, second, those "agreements not to do what cannot be done", an example being the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 signed at a time when the militarization of space was not seen as possible.[12]

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9 Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended To Death, (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).

10 A collection including contributions by nine authors in all: John Barber, Pat Bateson, Andrew Collins, John Griffiths, Robert HInde, Ralph Lapwood, Martin Ryle, John Wells, and Jay Winter.

11 For further background information see, Sidney Lens, The Bomb (New York: Lodestar Books, 1982); Solly Zukerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality (New York: Vintage Books, 1982); Richard Barnet, Real Security (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981); and Louis Rene Beres, Nuclear Strategy and World Order: The United States Imperative (New York: Institute of World Order, 1982).

12 Prins, ed., Defended To Death, p. 125.

According to the authors, agreements over the past twenty years have failed to stop or even slow the growth of superpower arsenals. In fact they have institutionalized the arms race by providing a model of arms control in which the United States and the Soviet Union, without the active participation of the rest of the world community, have set out the ground rules for the arms competition.

TABLE 1.1

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

Agreement	Year
Antarctic Treaty	1959
Hot Line and Modernization Agreements	1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty	1963
Outer Space Treaty	1967
Latin Am. Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty	1967
Non-Proliferation Treaty	1968
Seabed Treaty	1971
Accidents Measures Agreement	1971
Arms Treaty and Protocol (SALT I)	1972
SALT I Interim Agreement	1972
Biological Weapons Convention	1972
Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement	1973
Threshold Test Ban Treaty	1974
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty	1974
Environmental Modification Convention	1977
Inhumane Weapons Convention	1981

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1983 (Washington D.C.: World Priorities, 1983), p. 125.

While presenting the essential features of what has happened in the recent history, the authors fall short of any explanations of why arms control has failed over the last twenty years. Their only explanation, that negotiators for both the United States and the Soviet Union have been practicing a sort of pragmatic diplomacy the end of

which is political expediency,[13] is insufficient. It does not explain who has developed the policy and why; it reduces a complex and long established process to one formula.

The nine contributors do a fine job in presenting the issues -- possession of nuclear weapons, treaties, alliances, the environment, accidents, etc. -- but in their 380 page volume, the agency charged with the central role of arms control in the U.S. is hardly mentioned. Similarly, William Baugh, Randall Forsberg, and Jan Oberg have analyzed different aspects of arms control and have overlooked the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In his book The Politics of Nuclear Balance, William Baugh stresses the complex interaction between the political and technological concepts of strategic doctrines of which arms control is one.[14] The major problem is quite clear. Since it is certain that the development of nuclear weapons is irreversible, control of them is essential. Arms control as defined by Baugh involves "limitations on the quantities and qualities of armaments or armed forces, on their deployment or disposition, or utilization of particular types of weapons".[15]

Unlike many researchers, Baugh labels the post-World War II arms agreements "accomplishments". Although he acknowledges that the number of weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union has risen steadily since 1945, he states that "the types, numbers, deployment areas, qualitative characteristics, and possible proliferation of nuclear (and a few other types of) weaponry" have been restricted by the

13 Ibid., p. 124.
14 William H. Baugh, The Politics of Nuclear Balance (New York: Longman, 1984).
15 Ibid., p. 197.

agreements.[16] It is curious, though, that throughout his discussion of seventeen successful and unsuccessful agreements involving the U.S. and dating back to 1955, he does not mention the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency once. Moreover, he asserts that a political institution whose primary function would be to achieve effective arms control has not yet appeared. Either Baugh has contempt for or ignorance of the congressional mandate creating ACDA. If he envisages an institution different from ACDA, he does not say what it should be.

Baugh analyzes the features commonly seen in arms control agreements. First are the negotiating mechanics. These include such things as the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and multilateral negotiations; tacit adherence to treaties which have not, for one reason or another, been ratified; and unilateral initiatives motivated by hopes of reciprocity. Second is the political price of agreements. This involves allowing programs that have already been funded to be completed; not destroying existing weapons; and prohibiting only acts not yet undertaken. Finally he suggests that the inability to reverse knowledge and the difficulty of banning future technologies act as "technopolitical" restraints to agreements.[17].

The book is important because it provides theoretical principles for the formulation of strategic policy. Its major weakness is that Baugh does not apply his models to existing conditions. He does not link the technological and political to specific actors, therefore missing an opportunity to test the connection between theory and practice. Finally, he does not focus on the military functions which

16 _Ibid._, p. 204.
17 _Ibid._, pp. 210-214.

necessarily demand the continuation of the arms race, a point stressed by the founder of the American Nuclear Freeze Campaign.

The examination of the arms race by Randall Forsberg aims at a close investigation of what is at the root of the buildup of weapons. Writing in World Policy Journal[18] she explains the interdependence of the conventional and nuclear forces. Since nuclear weapons have been developed primarily to deter the possible escalation of a conventional war, the issues which threaten to erupt into fighting must be solved if the nuclear forces are to be reduced. An understanding of the functions of military forces in general, therefore, sets the framework for the direction arms negotiations must take.

According to Forsberg, arms control negotiations have failed for three reasons. First, there has been a lack of consensus about what the arms race is all about, so accords aim at the lowest possible level that all can agree on, especially to gain the support of the military. Second, the focus of talks have usually centered on Europe and not on discussions of intervention in the Third World which represents the most dangerous aspect of relations between East and West. And, third, a powerful, popular constituency for arms control has not developed due to an uninformed public.[19]

Forsberg identifies politicians, experts, top bureaucrats, and journalists as the persons who have influence over arms control. She does not specifically identify the actors, however, or explain if they

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18 Randall Forsberg, "The Freeze and Beyond: Confining The Military Defense As A Route To Disarmament," World Policy Journal 1 (Winter, 1984).

19 Ibid., pp. 305-307.

have common background characteristics which motivate their actions. Nor does she consider the domestic political bureaucracy, including ACDA, which dominates the arms control milieu. Her work adds a critical focus to the literature by centering on the problems which fuel the arms race and not merely counting missiles and warheads.

Another researcher who has analyzed the framework upon which official policy is based is Dr. Jan Oberg. In an article printed in The Bulletin of Peace Proposals,[20] Dr. Oberg contends that the foundation upon which arms negotiations rests, which he calls "disarmentality", necessarily leads to failure. While acknowledging that modern nations need defense, he points out that negotiations deal only with restrictive aspects such as demilitarization, limits, and prohibitions, and not with innovative concepts which would provide equal security for all nations - thus preventing war.

Oberg does not want negotiations to stop, but he does advocate a re-thinking of the machinery, themes, rules, and who the actors should be. He criticizes negotiations for not linking weapons to the economic and political factors that lead to the need for armaments, for being centered primarily with the two superpowers, and for not encompassing public opinion. Further, he claims that the methods used for negotiations are outdated and make agreements impossible. The standard procedures include: implementation in stages, each stage to be reviewed, balanced, controlled, and verifiable, and ensuring national security. He also calls on diplomats to represent all people and not

20 Jan Oberg, "Why Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations Will Fail - And What Can Be Done", Bulletin of Peace Proposals 14, (1983), pp. 277-282.

just their own governments, although he does not explain how this can be accomplished.

Oberg's criticism of the negotiation process falls short because he does not identify who sets policy and why. Instead, he only mentions broad categories of politicians, journalists, consultants, and military leaders. His suggestions about linkage and his observation that negotiations rules are outdated add to the explanation of the failure of arms control.

The works cited above underscore the importance of the theoretical orientation of the policy makers. The association could be strengthened by an in-depth study of the arms controllers along the lines of Fred Kaplan's The Wizards of Armageddon.[21] Kaplan analyzed the RAND Corporation and focused on the strategic planners themselves. Before the history of arms negotiations can be completely understood, the motivation of the policy makers must be understood. Similarly, in order to discover the connection between the U.S. domestic political process and the failure of arms control, a study of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a necessary starting point.

Dan Caldwell was commissioned by ACDA is to trace the different arms control and disarmament agreements of this century, but even within its own volume the agency's role is hardly discussed.[22] Caldwell identifies and reviews eight classifications of agreements. They are: Nuclear Weapons-Free Areas, Nuclear Testing Limitations, Crisis

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21 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

22 Dan Caldwell, introduction to Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984).

Management and Crisis Prevention, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, Environmental Protection, Strategic Nuclear Arms Limitations, and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/INF.

Caldwell's pattern of analysis reflects a strong bias. In most cases he portrays the officials of the U.S. as the ones initiating, proposing, compromising, or making sacrifices, while describing the Soviets as intransigent, disapproving and not serious. Although he is writing for ACDA, Caldwell only mentions the agency twice. He misses the opportunity to explain the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and to clarify its role in the arms control infrastructure. One of the few authors who has written in-depth about ACDA is Duncan Clarke.

A former Central Intelligence Agency and Congressional analyst, Clarke set out in the mid-1970s to give an account of the American arms control process, and specifically the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. One of his stated purposes in writing Politics of Arms Control was curiosity about the actual workings of the agency. Yet, to say that Clarke is free from bias would be to overlook his long association with the organization and the fact that he comes to the subject as an 'insider'. It is immediately apparent in his work that he has warm feelings about ACDA and desires to enhance its position. Throughout Clarke's political history he paints a picture of a small, struggling, but gallant agency constantly battling against the giants of the Departments of State and Defense.

As a result of nearly 250 interviews (many of which were given in confidence) and extensive examination of congressional documents, Clarke tells the story of an agency whose history has never been easy. Few of its directors have had direct access to the president; there has

always been an intense competition with its parent the State Department; its leadership has been denied hearings on crucial issues and has even been excluded from specific arms control decisions. It has had to overcome roadblocks erected by the Pentagon, whose chiefs suspected ACDA's personnel of being "soft on communism", "naive", "unrealistic". There was fear in the beginning that the agency was "going to be a Mecca for a wide variety of screwballs ... a natural magnet for ... the give-up groups".[23]

Recognizing that ACDA has been ineffective in carrying out the vision of its creation, i.e. to facilitate arms control, Clarke acts as the agency's chief apologist. He places primary responsibility for its failure on external factors. He blames Congress for not giving the agency enough budgetary support, and the Department of Defense for not sharing research information. He is critical of Senator Henry Jackson's opposition to arms control and Henry Kissinger's domination of the process during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. The major problem throughout has been the low priority given to arms control by both the executive and legislative branches of the government. Finally, there has never been a powerful constituency to lobby on ACDA's behalf. However difficult the above obstacles have been, Clarke does not balance them with an in-depth investigation of the agency's internal workings.

Stating that "an organization's vitality depends on the quality and nature of its leadership",[24] Clarke at least introduces the reader to a few of the people who have been in leadership positions in the agency. Since he limits his characterizations of the actors with terms

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23 Duncan L. Clarke, Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 21-22.
24 Ibid., p. 41.

such as "moderate", "responsible", "Republican", we are left without any analysis of their social or economic affiliations, and we learn little about their ideology or their backgrounds.

Clarke's stated goal is to tell the story of what has happened at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He argues that the staff has downplayed its advocacy role especially in not pushing for a ban on MIRVed weapons during SALT I. He tells of constant instability caused by weak administrators, staff transfers, and uncertain budgets. Since the emphasis is on the what of the story we are left without a sense of the deeper why. There is no clear understanding of who the actors are, so the workings of the institution remain a mystery. It appears that Clarke identifies his primary audience to be those people who have an interest in arms control but who are also either in or connected with the government.

Clarke has made a valuable contribution to the historiography of arms control, for his concentration on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency remains one of the few in the field. He ignores, however, ACDA's actual role in the arms control process and provides no in-depth study of the directors. He admits that his scope has been arbitrary and that there is a need for further research. Left unanswered is the question of what lies at the root of the failure of arms control and disarmament. Turning to an essay by one of the actual policy making actors might shed some light on that question.

Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,[25] Gerald C. Smith (head of ACDA from 1969-1973) is thoroughly critical of the

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25 Gerald C. Smith, "The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: An Unfinished History," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1984, pp. 13-17.

direction that arms control has taken since the election of Ronald Reagan. He places the blame for the lack of progress on both the Reagan Administration's bias against arms control and the lack of assertiveness on the part of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Smith confirms the picture painted by Clarke. He reports that budgets have been cut by legislators who have not embraced arms control and there have been personnel purges attempting to staff the agency with those who are sympathetic to the views of the agency's critics. ACDA has also had to operate much of the time under the scrutiny of a hostile legislative and executive branch of the federal government.

According to Smith, prior to 1980 the agency's record was one of accomplishment. Unlike Clarke, he claims that the leadership of the agency fought hard for a ban on multiple targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). He also asserts that the agency played a central role in achieving the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and in negotiating treaties which excluded weapons from seabeds and outer space. Smith's evaluations of past ACDA efforts differ sharply from those of other writers and one wonders if his interpretation has not been skewed by his own participation in what he calls "accomplishments."

Critical of the recent rearmament process, Smith contends that the cessation of the Anti-Satellite Weapons Talks (ASAT), the continuation of the "Star Wars" program, and the lack of progress on new arms control agreements proves that the Reagan Administration is opposed to arms control. He further claims that since 1980 ACDA has not played a very significant role in policy making. He wonders if the agency has pressed for ASAT to continue, if it has presented any arguments for a policy of

no first use of nuclear weapons, if it has fought to save the ABM Treaty, or if it has taken part in the MX debate. As if to answer the questions, he poses another -- "did it 'go along' with the Pentagon?"[26]

The only information that Smith gives about the internal workings of the agency is that agency officials are bureaucrats and technicians who usually favor arms control, and that no person who has worked for the agency has ever held an elected office. He acknowledges that the level of significance that the agency will have in any arms control process is dependent upon the quality and experience of its staff. And he concludes that if the staff is persistent and strong it will become the principle factor in arms control decisions.

Like Clark's work, Smith's article is worthy of consideration because it is one of the few which deals primarily with the agency. But also like Clarke's, it is written by someone who comes to the subject as an 'insider'. While this factor should lend itself to insights that could otherwise be missed, in this case the appearance of the lack objectivity lessens its credibility. Finally, it is important to note that Smith reinforces the notion that a key to arms control progress lies with the personnel at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Another person who has written about ACDA is Betty G. Lall, who was a member of the commission which established the organization and worked at the agency from 1961-1963.[27] According to her, ACDA was created because no government body, prior to 1961, had the responsibility for research and preparation for arms control negotiations. She acknowledges that ACDA has not lived up to

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26 Ibid., p. 14.

27 Betty G. Lall, "Disarmament Agency at 25," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1986, pp. 30-32.

expectations and that many of the agreements the agency has helped to negotiate are not significant. Lall claims that the most productive period for the agency was during the Nixon and Johnson Administrations, and that of all the Directors Fred Ikle and Kenneth Adelman were the least concerned about arms control. ACDA's success, she concludes, rests solely on the commitment of presidents.

As one of the founding members, Lall's assessment could have added significant information regarding political factors behind the creation of ACDA, but she is mute on the subject. Like Clark and Smith, her account is limited by her closeness to the agency and by her bias as an insider.

The literature on the arms race has grown in recent years almost as fast as the megatonnage of the weapons it addresses. From it one can easily discover the facts of the matter -- how many SS20s the Soviet Union has deployed, the most recent basing schemes that have been proposed for the MX, how many physicians, lawyers, or teachers would perish in a nuclear war. And the polemics have flourished as well, with one side accusing the other of failed policies.

A close study of the recent literature on United States arms control and disarmament reveals two trends which represent glaring omissions in the historiography. The first is an almost absolute exclusion of any in-depth and systematic analysis of the history or operation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The second is the lack of substantive investigation into the characteristics and ideology of the actors who make up the arms control community. And one question persists: why have those who have been charged with bringing these destructive weapons under control failed?

Much research needs to be done to understand the complexities of this question. For the United States this would include a study of the history, policies, politics, and leaders of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Since it represents a major gap in the literature, particular attention should be given to a collective biography of those who have directed the agency. By studying the common background characteristics of these people, one could determine the cohesion of the group, thus discovering the roots of their collective actions. This would lead to a deeper understanding of the workings of the institution as a whole.

In researching questions of 'who' rather than 'what', the human element is brought back into the question and a more concrete 'why' of the failure of arms limitations can be estimated.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

On May 25, 1961 President John F. Kennedy announced his intention to create a governmental agency whose focus would be arms control and disarmament. Addressing a joint session of Congress, the President vowed that disarmament would be kept high on his agenda. He planned to send Congress a proposal for the creation of a "strengthened and enlarged disarmament agency," and he intended "to make an intensified effort to develop acceptable political and technical alternatives" to the arms race.[1]

The two sentence announcement came near the end of the speech in which the President had called on Congress to assist in building America's military capability. He advocated the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. He asked Congress to appropriate additional funds for five Polaris submarines for NATO, new military helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, and howitzers. Citing the rising tide of communism in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa, Kennedy urged the legislators to make monies available for new military assistance

1 Bureau of Public Affairs, "Urgent National Needs," United States Department of State Bulletin 44 (June 1961), p. 908.

programs, for increased Marine Corps strength, and for making the military reserve forces more efficient. He assured the lawmakers that a military build-up was not a preparation for war but merely to "discourage and resist the adventures of others."[2] Even though the announcement of an arms control agency came in the context of a request for greater military armaments, President Kennedy's draft legislation to Congress to establish a U.S. Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security was met with consistent sentiments from both sides of the political aisle and from various sectors of the American society.

The congressional hearing which followed brought forth witnesses representing a wide variety of groups. Testimony was taken from church leaders, academics, former and present governmental officials, representatives from peace groups and organized labor, and military personnel. A large majority of those who submitted briefs or appeared in person supported the creation of the agency. Most believed that an organization such as the one proposed would enhance the continuity and coordination of arms control efforts. The need for long term planning, a competent and permanent staff, and concentrated research centered in a separate agency was underscored during both the Senate and House committee hearings.

Several influential Democrats and Republicans appeared before the congressional committees to press for approval of the legislation. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, testified that one of the primary goals of American foreign policy was to foster world-wide peace and freedom, and to promote an atmosphere where force would not have to be used as an

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2 _Ibid_.

instrument of foreign policy. Claiming that peace must be seen as a distant goal, made more complex by the actions of the Soviet Union which had forced the arms race upon the U.S., Rusk saw the creation of the arms control agency as fundamentally important to the fulfillment of peace, and as having an "encouraging impact upon the peoples of the world."[3]

United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, echoing Rusk, blamed the arms race on the U.S.S.R., but noted that an arms control agency would enhance national security. He believed that it was a "simple necessity that our government be adequately equipped to deal in an orderly, efficient way with all the scientific, economic, and political aspects of the problem that will occupy our attention for many years to come."[4]

Henry Cabot Lodge, the former Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the proposal represented the seriousness with which the United States was approaching arms control. He stated to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that "no forward motion on the disarmament question is possible unless there is an agency capable of rapid and penetrating analysis, of detection of errors, and of imaginatively creating new and constructive proposals."[5] He told the lawmakers that not only would decision making within the government be improved by

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3 Bureau of Public Affairs, "Secretary Rusk Supports Creation of U.S. Disarmament Agency," United States Department of State Bulletin 45 (September 1961), p. 494.

4 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency, 87th Congress, 1st sess., 1961, p. 100.

5 Ibid., p. 60.

enacting the legislation, but passage would have an important psychological impact on world public opinion.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recounted how disappointing disarmament efforts had been and urged adoption of the legislation as a way to achieve realistic arms control. He stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the need for a centralized body to direct arms control efforts and agreed with the objectives of the legislation. The Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, Leland J. Haworth, pledged AEC support, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric testified that the Defense Department expected the greatest contribution of the new agency to be in the area of policy formulation.

The architect of the plan to create an arms control and disarmament organization was John McCloy. Once an Assistant Secretary of War who had also worked on the Manhattan Project and had advised the Baruch Committee for the control of atomic energy in the early days of the United Nations, McCloy pointed to the reality that in the future the U.S. would be negotiating arms control matters. Therefore, it was imperative that there be an organization which could systematically put forward well thought out and thoroughly researched positions.

McCloy acknowledged that past efforts had been marked by a lack of continuity and coordination by impermanent staffs made up of volunteers and ad hoc panels. He said that the creation of the agency would demonstrate to the allies that the U.S. government was sincere and practical regarding disarmament, and the legislation would give the American public assurance that their government desired to do something

positive about the arms race. He declared that an arms control organization was needed to "prevent war, curb the arms race, and create lasting conditions for peace."[6]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act which had been co-sponsored by fifty-seven members of the House of Representatives and fifteen Senators, was supported by 90 per cent of editorial comment in the U.S. media.[7] On September 8, 1961, the U.S. Senate voted 73-14 in favor of the bill, and on September 19, the Act passed in the House of Representatives 290-54. Four days later the congressional conference committee report was approved unanimously in the Senate and by a 250-50 vote in the House, and the Act was sent to the White House for presidential approval. Announcing that "this act symbolizes the importance the United States places on arms control and disarmament in its foreign policy," President Kennedy signed into law the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).[8]

Despite the optimism, enthusiasm, and promise that accompanied the establishment of ACDA, the national security framework within which the agency was to be placed had been entrenched for a long time. In order to understand ACDA's role in the arms control infrastructure, it is necessary to examine the patterns which developed prior to 1961 - specifically, to discover the characteristics of those chosen to lead

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6 Ibid., p. 6.

7 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency, 87th Congress, 1st sess., 1961, p. 137.

8 Bureau of Public Affairs, "President Signs Bill Creating U.S. Disarmament Agency," United States Department of State Bulletin 45 (October 1961), p. 646.

and to determine policy. By tracing the history of arms control from 1945 to 1961 those patterns can be clarified.

The primary objective of the scientists working on the Manhattan Project during the Second World War was to beat the Germans in developing a functioning atomic weapon.[9] By early 1944, however, it was clear to many in Los Alamos that the purpose of perfecting the bomb was not so much aimed at defeating the Germans or the Japanese, but directed at the then U.S. ally, the Soviet Union, in preparation for the politics of the post-war world.[10]

The atomic bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 were followed by the end of the Second World War. And, although the United States government had been involved in the development of atomic energy since 1941, by the end of the war no clear strategy had been formulated for the future use or control of the new technology. From the time the government first discovered that bombs could be produced, policy direction had been marked by "drift, default, and delay."[11]

The first postwar arms control issue that faced the American government was international control of atomic energy. The United States monopoly on atomic weapons was at the root of the debate and the strategy upon which policy would be built. A Board of Consultants was assembled by Secretary of State James Brynes to study the issue and make

9 Martin J. Sherwin, "How Well They Meant," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 1985, p. 9.

10 Joseph Rotbast, "Leaving the Bomb Project," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 1985, p. 18.

11 Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning of Sanity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1946, p. 11.

recommendations. The group was headed by David E. Lilienthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The board consisted of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the senior scientist on the Manhattan Project; Chester I. Bernard, president of New Jersey Bell; Charles A. Thomas, vice president of Monsanto Chemical Company; and Henry A. Winne, vice president in charge of Engineering for General Electric.[12] Thus, the Board was more notable for its technical and business expertise than its experience in the social ramifications of public policy.

The committee's final product, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, called for the creation of a international Atomic Development Authority (ADA) which would promote and guide the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The board underscored the importance of cooperation among nations and proposed a blend of international and national programs. Noting that the American monopoly could not last, a step by step negotiated transition was suggested with surrender of the U.S. monopoly the final stage.[13] The government intended that the Acheson-Lilienthal Report would be the basis for a proposal to be presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in June of 1946.

President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch to head the American delegation at the UNAEC. Baruch, 75, was a millionaire Wall Street stock speculator who had been head of the War Industries Board (WIB) during the First World War. The WIB had been the major instrument in directing the industrial side of the war. He also had been a member of the economic section which had assisted President Woodrow Wilson at the

12 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950, (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 154.

13 U.S., Congress, House, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, H. Doc. 709, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946.

Versailles peace conference following World War I. A friend of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, Baruch had never held elective office, but had been an unofficial advisor to several U.S. Presidents.[14] Concerning the UNAEC appointment, a member of the Secretary of State's Committee, Vannevar Bush, called Baruch "the most unqualified man in the country for the task."[15]

Nevertheless, on the strength of Brynes' recommendation and Baruch's good relations with Congress, Truman gave Baruch a free hand at appointing the delegation which would carry to the United Nations the first United States proposal for international control of atomic energy. Baruch chose for his staff: Herbert Bayard Swope, journalist and member of the New York Racing Commission; John Hancock, Wall Street banker and partner in Lehman Brothers; Ferdinand Eberstadt, a New York investment banker; and Fred Searls, a New York mining engineer.[16] His military aides were General Dwight Eisenhower, army chief of staff, and Admiral Cherster Nimitz, chief of naval operations. The principal advisor to Baruch was General Leslie Groves, the wartime director of the Manhattan Project. As with the Lilienthal Board, the civilian members of the Baruch delegation were primarily known for their business credentials.

The Baruch delegation disregarded those sections of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report that had stressed international cooperation and balance, and approached the negotiations at the United Nations with an

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14 "Baruch, A Wall Street Broker at 21, Became Advisor and a Friend of Presidents," New York Times, 21 June 1965, p. 16.

15 Barton Berstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," Journal of American History, March 1974, p. 1033.

16 "Baruch Named U.S. Member of UNO Atomic Commission," New York Times, 19 March 1946, p. 1.

attitude that international controls must be on American terms or not at all. They hoped that at a minimum they would be able to score a propaganda victory over the Soviet Union. David Lilienthal, reflecting upon the revisions that the Baruch delegation had made to his original report stated that "the greatest danger is that they will put forward proposals in the spirit that will insure their refusal."[17]

Lilienthal's words were prophetic. On June 14, 1946, the Baruch Plan was tabled at the United Nations. The proposal was bound to inspire resistance from rival states, especially the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. had no bomb of its own at this point in time. Baruch recommended the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority with the power to control, inspect, license, manage and own "all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security." At the heart of the plan was the insistence by the U.S. negotiators that "enforceable sanctions" be set up to punish any nation which violated the program. In order to insure that proper punishment was forthcoming, Baruch demanded that the Security Council's veto power granted in the charter of the U.N. to China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States be suspended. Abolition of the veto surfaced as the point upon which the negotiations would later become bogged down and eventually fail.

Vaguely referring to America's "winning weapon", Baruch proposed a plan which would proceed through successive stages. Only after all the systems of control, including sanctions, were set up and operating would the United States begin to relinquish its monopoly of atomic bombs.

17 Herkin, Winning Weapon, p. 163.

First, it would stop manufacturing them and finally it would destroy existing stockpiles, thus insuring the maintenance of U.S. atomic superiority for many years to come.

In his concluding remarks, the chief U.S. negotiator said, "The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just -- a way which if followed, the world will forever applaud."[18] The United States, however, was following the way of atomic diplomacy, for only seventeen days after presenting the first post war proposal for arms limitations, the U.S. government underscored its position by conducting a well publicized atomic bomb test near Bikini Atoll, the first atomic explosion since the destruction of Nagasaki.

When the Soviet Union vetoed the Baruch Plan in December 1946, hopes for early international cooperation collapsed and even though Baruch resigned his post in 1948, the proposal which carried his name continued to be the basis for U.S. policy in the United Nations until 1954 when it was formally withdrawn. The approach embraced by the United States government, first in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and later in the Baruch Plan, began to lay the foundation for arms limitation and national security doctrine. The strategy was to guarantee U.S. superiority while still conducting negotiations. When the Soviet Union detonated its own atomic bomb in August 1949, a study commissioned by the National Security Council (NSC) further expanded the guiding principles of arms control and became the nucleus for on-going policy.

18 Bernard Baruch, "The American Proposal for International Control," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2 July 1946, pp. 4-5.

Designated NSC 68, the report had been ordered by President Truman on January 31, 1950, at the same time that he had approved the development of the H-bomb. In his instructions, the President directed the Secretaries of State and Defense "to undertake a re-examination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in light of the probable fission bomb capability of the Soviet Union."[19]

The ad hoc State-Defense policy review group that was formed to conduct the investigation was staffed by fifteen people, headed by Paul Nitze, Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Nitze, who was independently wealthy, had worked on Wall Street as the vice-president of an investment banking firm, and had entered government in 1940 as a favor to his business associate friend James Forrestal, Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy. Nitze's first years in government were spent in the War Department where he headed the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, directed the Foreign Procurement and Development Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration, and was vice chair of the Strategic Bombing Survey which studied the effects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. After the war, Nitze moved to the State Department working first as deputy director of the office of international trade policy, then as deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. In 1950 he replaced George Kennan as Director of the Policy Planning Staff.[20]

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19 Steven L. Reardin, The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 19.

20 Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class: Portraits of the President's Top 100 Officials, (Washington D.C.: Presidential Accountability Group, 1982), p. 519.

NSC 68 has been described as "more than a change of policy - it was a change in the American way of life"[21] and "a document of seminal importance in the post-World War II evolution of basic American security policy."[22] The report was written in an effort to bring coherence to the national security policy making process at a time when the historical geo-political position of the United States was rapidly changing.

Although classified 'top secret' and meant for internal government use, NSC 68 is characterized by a rhetorical style.[23] This is evident in a number of melodramatic statements. Thus, "the concentration camp is the prototype of the [Soviet] society." Again, "the Kremlin is inescapably militant" and cannot "tolerate the existence of free societies."[24] Nitze has claimed that the technique was used for the purpose of "clarity".[25] Dean Acheson maintained, however, that "the purpose of NSC 68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of 'top government' that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out."[26] Nevertheless, the manner in which the facts were presented assured limited analysis of content by those in government circles whose vital interests the report addressed.

The new policy direction which was suggested in NSC 68 reflected the end of the short-lived era of American atomic monopoly, but declared the U.S. desire to maintain a position of world-wide military

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21 Reardin, The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, p. 4.
22 Ibid., p. 7.
23 The text of NSC 68 is reprinted in Steven Reardin's The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, pp. 89-131.
24 Ibid., p. 95.
25 Ibid., p. 25.
26 Fred Kaplin, The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 140.

superiority. At the core of the program was the call for a rapid and sustained military, political, and economic build-up. Citing the probability of a rising Soviet atomic capability which would allow them the means of attacking and seriously reducing the U.S. "superiority in economic potential,"[27] the Nitze group strongly advocated further development and stockpiling of thermonuclear weapons. If a general war did break out, the ad hoc committee asserted that "it must be anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side."[28]

Negotiations with the Soviet Union were considered to be merely a course of action designed to gain public support for the building of military strength. Any agreement on international control of atomic weapons was ruled out until the U.S.S.R. changed its policies. Even though the review group saw no possibility of a settlement, they did recognize the importance of going through the motions of negotiating.

First, NSC 68 viewed negotiation as a condition required by the general public. By taking negotiating positions which were seen as consistent with popular opinion in the West but sure to be rejected by the Soviets, negotiation would become "an essential element in the ideological conflict."[29] Secondly, once strength had been increased, negotiations might be possible on limited issues, and indeed necessary in order to determine the degree of accommodation by the U.S.S.R. to the build-up in the West. Any agreement must be enforceable, and should produce a gradual withdrawal of influence of the Soviet Union. In the unlikely event the Soviets would accept the position of the West on

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27 Reardin, <u>The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine</u>, p. 112.
28 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 113.
29 <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 116-117.

atomic energy and conventional armaments but not change its other policies, the United States would reconsider accepting such an agreement, in order to "foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system." Finally, negotiations with the Soviet Union were seen as important especially if they failed. If the United States could demonstrate that the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to bargain seriously, then other countries would support a U.S. military build-up.[30]

Central to the success of the program outlined in NSC 68 was both the rapidity of the build-up and the sustantive quality of the effort.. There was concern that over time, without constant economic, military, and political support, the allies would lose their determination to resist the U.S.S.R. and drift towards neutrality. More serious was the risk that the citizens of the U.S. itself would lack the will to bear the costs for an indefinite length of time.

President Truman received the final report from the Nitze group on April 14, 1950, and submitted it to his economic advisors to assess the cost of the build-up. Before a thorough analysis could be made of the program (which would increase military spending from $12.5 billion to $40 billion),[31] war broke out in Korea, boosting the advocates of NSC 68. Truman signed the document "as a statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years."[32] With the adoption of NSC 68 and the Baruch Plan before that, national security policy was firmly and clearly set, and any further discussions on armaments fell within this framework. As a result, the process of arms control in the post-war

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30 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
31 Paul Nitze, "The Development of NSC 68," International Security, Spring 1980, p. 173.
32 Reardin, The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, p. 27.

years was be carried out on an ad hoc basis, marked by operations which were understaffed, inconsistent, confused, and given low priority.

From 1945 until 1961 the United States government sent representatives to seventy conferences on disarmament at which officials from the Soviet Union were also present. In the U.S., however, there was no central office to do research or to guide negotiations. Rather, the responsibility was scattered among various departments and agencies primarily under the auspices of the State Department. During the sixteen-year period there were sixteen different chiefs of the U.S. delegations whose commissions were set up on ad hoc basis without statutory authorization.[33]

Much of the work on arms limitation in the early years after the Second World War was done in the United Nations. The policy of the U.S. was formulated and coordinated by the State Department Office of United Nations Affairs and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1946 to consider international control of atomic energy, with the Baruch Plan representing the U.S. position. The following year non-atomic arms control issues were taken up when the U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments was created.

In 1952 the U.N. established the Commission on Disarmament. This merged the two existing bodies, which were separately considering atomic and conventional armaments. One year later a sub-committee was established to negotiate in private, after the principals involved had

33 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Establishing A U.S. Arms Control Agency Report #1165, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp.2-6.

failed to make any progress and discussions had become enmeshed in propaganda. The members of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament were France, Canada, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[34] During the 1946-1955 period, the U.S. was represented by ten different delegation heads at the four different U.N. forums on arms control.[35]

In March of 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower named Harold Stassen as head of the newly created Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. Stassen, a lawyer, was a conservative Republican who had been Governor of Minnesota from 1938-1943. He had resigned his post to join the U.S. Navy during World War II. After the war, he was one of the Republican representatives at the San Francisco Conference that created the United Nations. And, upon finishing a five year term as President of the University of Pennsylvania in 1953 he was appointed Director of Mutual Security by President Eisenhower. As Director of Mutual Security, Stassen was directed to develop and administer programs of assistance designed to sustain and increase military efforts.[36]

The new post of Special Assistant was a cabinet rank position, with a fifty-four member staff to be financed through the White House Special Projects appropriation. Stassen was charged with conducting a review of arms control policy, reporting his findings and making

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34 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Control and Reduction of Armaments: A Decade of Negotiations 1946-1956, Staff Study No. 3, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, pp. 7-10.

35 U.S., Congress, H. Rpt. #1165, p. 2.

36 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Harold E. Stassen to be Director of Mutual Security, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1953, p. 1.

recommendations to the National Security Council. Eisenhower also formed a Special Committee on Disarmament Problems to be chaired by Stassen, to coordinate policy direction among the various departments and agencies in the executive branch.

In his meetings with representatives of the Soviet Union, Stassen was close to reaching agreements on the installation of monitoring inspection stations to be placed in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., a twenty-four month suspension of nuclear testing, and the establishment of an armaments regulation organization through the United Nations to supervise the nuclear test suspension.[37] In the struggle over policy within the American government, however, he was transferred to the State Department in March 1957. Then all proposals were withdrawn, and in February the following year Stassen resigned.

Soon after Stassen's resignation, an advisory group to consult with the Secretary of State was created, and a month later responsibility for disarmament policy was placed with the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs, an office with a staff of twenty. In addition, Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer, was soon appointed by the State Department to head a seventeen person study project on disarmament. In 1959 a Committee of Principals made up of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Scientific Advisor to the President, was formed to enhance interdepartmental coordination.

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37 Informal Memorandum to Secretary of State from Harold Stassen, September 23, 1957. This Memorandum is found in the U.S. Declassified Documents (78) 305C, collection at the National Library, Ottawa, Ontario.

Near the end of the Eisenhower years, a U.S. Disarmament Administration responsible to the State Department was brought into being. Although fifty-four people were hired to staff the Administration, no director had been appointed by the time John F. Kennedy became President of the U.S.

Moreover, Washington's negotiating position included proposals likely to be rejected by Moscow. Most noteably was the U.S. insistence on on-site inspections.

Kennedy appointed John McCloy as his advisor on disarmament with the task of recommending a direction for policy formation and organizing a staff with primary responsibility for disarmament. Just as during the Eisenhower Administration, the appointment of McCloy created tension between the Disarmament Administration in the State Department and the presidential advisor. But on June 29, 1961, President Kennedy sent a draft bill to Congress to establish a Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security.

During the sixteen years following the war, arms control efforts were intricately linked to a revised concept of national security and an expanding technological capability. Talk of disarmament was usually politically appealing and accompanied schemes for military build-ups. Yet substantive progress in the field clashed with and was blocked by a set of ideological beliefs which were codified in NSC 68.

Soviet political and economic goals were seen as the greatest threat to American hegemony, and the U.S.S.R. was identified as the rival. The relationship among the two superpowers moved towards a state

of perpetual cold war. In order to create an atmosphere in which American vital interests could flourish, the U.S. government mobilized to maintain a military strength superior to that of the Soviet Union. Successive administrations developed even greater armaments, and did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. The rationale was that the United States must constantly be on vigil against a surprise attack, must not allow the European allies to drift towards neutrality, and must keep the American public educated to the constant need for a strong military establishment. Negotiations were useful for propaganda purposes, with a strategy which emphasized positions certain to be rejected by the U.S.S.R.

The characteristics of the people chosen to lead the effort further blurred the distinction between national security and arms control. They were generally politically conservative, wealthy men who had strong ties with the business community. Their credentials reflected a history of involvement in war planning and the military establishment. Although their motivations are beyond the scope of this study, there is little evidence that the background of the arms negotiators prepared them to make serious efforts.

Prior to the passage of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, arms control efforts were ineffective partially because of the disorganized, ad hoc manner with which they were undertaken. The need for coordination and continuity were manifest. But having been created in the context of a military build-up, would ACDA have the authority, support, and leadership necessary to bring order into the process? And,

would it be able to unite all the divergent actors, and be forceful enough to make arms control a credible policy in U.S. foreign relations?

CHAPTER III

THE ARMS CONTROL AGENCY'S FUNCTION

Characterizing arms control and disarmament as "an important aspect of foreign policy," the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 specifies that such doctrine must nevertheless "be consistent with national security policy as a whole." With the creation of ACDA, on September 26, 1961, Congress clearly demonstrated its belief that such policy formation and implementation could best be handled in one centralized organization. In outlining the statutory responsibilities, the lawmakers were explicit about the broad mandate of ACDA, while imposing sufficient limitations to constrain the agency's position within the executive branch.

The agency was given four main functions to be carried out under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State:

a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formation;
b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;
c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and
d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.[1]

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1 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Statutes at Large 75, Sec. 2551 (1961).

One of the major rationales for the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was that the preparation for and management of arms control negotiations needed to be centralized in one organization. But in actual practice that has not happened. ACDA has been a minor member of the American delegations. The State Department, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department are larger and more powerful, and have bigger budgets. The agency has not been the place where divergent opinions came together or where a consolidated bargaining position was formulated. But regardless of the number of representatives the agency has had on any particular mission and in what capacity, or how much research has gone into the efforts, the influence of the organization has been determined by its participation in the decision making process.

ARMS CONTROL DECISION MAKING

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act authorizes and directs ACDA to prepare policy recommendations on arms control and disarmament for the President, Secretary of State, and other government bodies.[2] All important foreign policy decisions, however, are made through the framework of the National Security Council. During the first years of the agency, the recommendations went to the Committee of Principals, a body established by President Eisenhower in 1958. The Director of ACDA became a member, joining the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the

2 U.S., General Accounting Office, Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research Programs To Be Improved (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 22.

U.S. Information Agency, the Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the C.I.A., the Administrator of NASA, and the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs.

President Nixon abolished the Committee and replaced it with the Verification Panel of the National Security Council headed by National Security Advisor Kissinger. The make-up of the new body was smaller and slightly different. The members included: The Attorney General, the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of ACDA. Arms control measures fell within the jurisdiction of the panel and a number of interagency working groups were formed for specific negotiations and problem areas. One such group was the Under Secretaries Committee which oversaw the ACDA-chaired Backstopping Committee.[3]

The primary arms control policy making body within the NSC became the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) headed by the National Security Advisor and comprised of the Secretaries of State and Defense, and heads of the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ACDA. Among the working groups of the SCC have been the SALT (later START) Interagency Group, the Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation, the Sub Group on Nuclear Export Coordination, the Working Group on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and ASAT (anti satellite) Working Group. In 1983, there were a total of twenty-two interagency policy making groups: thirteen are

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3 U.S., Congress, House, Eleventh Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, H. Doc. 92-255, 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 8.

chaired by the State Department, four by the Defense Department, two co-chaired by State and Defense, two by the Commerce Department, and one by the NSC. ACDA did not chair any group that made arms control policy.[4]

Besides being buried in the National Security system, ACDA has not had a role in such accords as the Vietnam and Middle East peace agreements which contained provisions regarding levels, deployments, types and replacements of armaments. Nor was the agency involved in the formation of strategic doctrines which had implications on arms control policy direction, such as Presidential Directive 59. Signed by President Carter on July 25, 1980, PD 59 officially committed the United States to a strategy of targeting Soviet nuclear and conventional military sites rather than cities. The policy planned for the possibility of fighting a nuclear war over an extended period of time.[5] Similarly, ACDA was not part of the Scrowcroft Commission set up by President Reagan in 1983. The Commission recommended changing existing land-based weapon policy by developing a small, mobile, single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile.[6]

The National Security Council emerges as the body which dominates all facets of arms control. And although the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the only executive body with statutory arms control obligations, the agency does not hold a permanent seat on the NSC. It is only represented when the the Director is invited to attend.

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4 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85, 98th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2.

5 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 383.

6 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 304.

ACDA has not been known for strong or threatening advocacy, and its absence leaves the top policy making group without even the appearance of an on-going arms control presence. Its placement in the bureaucracy has tended to limit the government's arms control perspective. Nevertheless, Congress gave ACDA a tool that had the potential of giving the agency a more powerful role in policy making -- the arms control impact statements.

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS

In 1975, an amendment to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was passed which required the Director of ACDA to submit regular reports to Congress analyzing the impact on arms control of strategic weapons programs. Specifically, the agency was to detail plans with a total cost in excess of $250 million or an annual cost in excess of $50 million, or any other weapon or technological program that the Director determined would have an impact on arms control policy or negotiations.[7] The objectives of the Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) were to improve executive branch decision making, to increase legislative branch participation in decisions on proposed defense programs, and to enhance the function of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the national security policy making process.[8]

In practice, the ACIS procedure was taken over by an executive branch interagency steering committee chaired by a representative of the

7 U.S., General Accounting Office, Statements That Analyze Effects of Proposed Programs On Arms Control Need Improvement, October 20, 1977, pp. 1-2.

8 U.S., Congress, Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, Untied States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1980 Annual Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 129.

National Security Council. The committee included staff from ACDA, the Office of Budget and Management, the Department of Defense, CIA, and the Energy Research and Development Administration. In the beginning, ACDA advocated including in the ACIS nuclear energy-related research programs with no direct relationship to weapons, and research projects in their conceptual stage for which no application had yet been developed. The agency also pushed for a larger voice in the discretionary selections of programs to be analyzed. But ACDA lost the debates, setting precedents for its weakened position.[9]

The selection of projects to be subjected to ACIS became an interagency process. ACDA was given the task of preparing the initial list, the NSC of making the final selection, and the interagency committee of producing the statement. The result was that while many programs met the requirements for inclusion in ACIS, few were actually analyzed. For example, in 1977, sixteen out of seventy were reported on, and in 1978, twenty-six of 102 reached Congress.[10]

Regardless of the process, the impact statements were the statutory responsibility of ACDA, to be attached to the agency's yearly requests for authorization and appropriation. The ACIS reflected the U.S. approach to arms control. Thus, in the fiscal year 1979 statement, for example, the Director's report stated that "the specific programs to be carried out during fiscal year 1979 are not inconsistent with U.S. arms control policy or with U.S. positions in ongoing arms control

9 Statements That Analyze Efforts of Proposed Programs on Arms Control Need Improvement, pp. 7-8.
10 Ibid., p. 9.

negotiations."[11] Yet, among the weapon systems included in the report were the Minuteman, MX, Trident II, Air-Launched and Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles, B-1 Bomber, Pershing II missiles, and biological and chemical weapons. The MX was described as a technologically advanced MIRVed system, with the potential of improved accuracy and higher yield, that enhanced hard-target kill. This description fits that of a first-strike weapon. The statement included arguments for and against the MX, and concluded that the weapon did not violate any existing treaties. Likewise, the report speculated that further development would either force a treaty, lead to an increase in the arms race, or have no effect on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. The final recommendation was for Congress to allocate an additional $58.2 million to the $293.8 million already spent and to "defer final judgment on issues concerning MX deployment, while the system is developed and the prospects of mutual limitations pursued."[12]

By the fiscal year 1984 ACIS, the impact of the MX on arms control was reported to be the same as in previous years, and the executive branch, through ACDA, recommended further development of the MX missile system.[13] The MX was clearly described as a weapon which the U.S.S.R. would see as a threat to its ICBM force, causing the Soviets to "seek ways to make their land-based ICBMs less vulnerable."[14] Thus, the ACIS have been used to convince a not too reluctant Congress to appropriate

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11 U.S., Congress, Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, Fiscal Year 1977 Arms Control Impact Statements, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, p. xiii.

12 Ibid., p. 27.

13 U. S., Congress, Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, Fiscal Year 1984 Arms Control Impact Statements, 98 Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p. 33.

14 Ibid., p. 35.

enormous amounts of money for weapons which often fuel the arms race and are sometimes destabilizing. ACDA has been the government body which submits and defends the impact statements. The manner with which the Arms Control Impact Statements are dealt with, explains in part how the arms control organization adapts to its position within the national security state. In addition, the status of the agency, and by implication its function, can be further clarified by examining the level of allocated resources, and how the budgets have affected the disposition of its research and staffing.

BUDGET

When President Gerald Ford stated the "arms control policy and defense policy must be complementary,"[15] he was expressing what every president from John F.Kennedy to Ronald Reagan has publicly maintained -- that arms control and military preparedness are co-equal pillars of national security. As Table 3.1 shows, however, the difference between rhetoric and reality shows up when a comparison is made in the annual budgets of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Defense Department.

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15 U.S., Congress, House, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1976 Annual Report, H. Doc. 95-50, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. i.

TABLE 3.1

ACDA AND DEFENSE BUDGETS

COMPARATIVE BUDGETS (in millions)

DATE	ACDA	DEFENSE	RATIO
1962	1,831	51,987,000	.000035 to 1
1963	6,500	53,303,000	.000122 to 1
1964	7,500	55,032,000	.000136 to 1
1965	9,000	51,613,000	.000164 to 1
1966	10,000	60,218,000	.000166 to 1
1967	9,000	73,672,000	.000122 to 1
1968	9,000	83,828,000	.000107 to 1
1969	9,000	84,594,000	.000106 to 1
1970	9,500	84,285,000	.000113 to 1
1971	8,645	82,295,000	.000105 to 1
1972	9,116	83,141,000	.000110 to 1
1973	10,000	81,459,000	.000123 to 1
1974	8,065	85,920,000	.000094 to 1
1975	9,410	94,148,000	.000100 to 1
1976	11,680	97,505,000	.000120 to 1
1977	12,420	105,804,000	.000117 to 1
1978	16,320	114,102,000	.000143 to 1
1979	17,720	126,870,000	.000140 to 1
1980	18,270	146,137,000	.000125 to 1
1981	18,500	170,730,000	.000108 to 1
1982	16,768	198,668,000	.000084 to 1
1983	15,142	223,320,000	.000067 to 1

Source: Department of Defense figures - U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Budgets of the United States Government, Fiscal Year, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 3.3-4.2. ACDA figures for 1962-73 - Arms Control and Disarmament Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85, p. 103. ACDA figures for 1974-83 - U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriation, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, 98th Cong., 1st sess., p. 272.

As arms control matters have become more complex due to rapidly changing technology, more multilateral participation, and an increasing number of issues, ACDA's ability to carry out its responsibilities

number of issues, ACDA's ability to carry out its responsibilities efficiently has decreased. The agency is given primary responsibility for the administrative expenses of bilateral negotiations, and must support its own staff at multilateral meetings. As the number and types of conferences have increased, the budget limitations have also damaged the support capability of the organization. Table 3.2 shows how the percentage of dollars spent on external research has fluctuated but generally declined since 1962, resulting in a heavier dependence on research from other government departments.

TABLE 3.2

ACDA OUTLAYS



Source: U.S., Congress, Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1980 Annual Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 142.

Director Fred Ikle, who served as head of the agency from 1973-76, reported to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations in 1974 that "in all ACDA research efforts, extensive liaison is maintained with government agencies (particularly the Department of Defense and intelligence community) for coordination and to prevent duplication of effort."[16] Since by law the agency must coordinate the arms control research of the executive branch, the "liaison" relationship would seem to be a necessary and important part of the agency's information gathering. An investigation by the General Accounting Office found, however, that ACDA had not fulfilled the responsibility because it did not have the influence to gain access to important information from other departments.[17] The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has thus spent its limited funds procuring research projects from governmental bodies whose central missions are sometimes antithetical to arms control. Among the contractors benefiting from ACDA's research budget are: the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Navy.

Many of the private contractors who have been awarded business by ACDA have also been heavily entrenched in the military sector of the government. Those working on arms control research also include: the RAND Corporation, Westinghouse, Bendix, TWR, McDonnell-Douglas, General Electric, Sylvania, Martin Marietta, Sperry-Rand, and Raytheon. The use of defense-oriented companies and government departments for research

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16 U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies for Fiscal Year 1975, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 457.

17 U.S., General Accounting Office, Efforts to Improve Management Practices and Increase Resources at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1984, p. 22.

increases the likelihood that the arms control and disarmament direction of ACDA will be generally consistent with the defense policies of the government in power. Expressions of independent judgment, according to former Deputy Director Philip Farley, "must be recognized as advocacy within the general framework of national security interests."[18] The austere budget has also limited ACDA's ability to reach the level of staffing needed to develop and maintain an arms control posture which would be "complementary" to defense policy.

PERSONNEL

Throughout the history of the agency, the authorized personnel numbers have been maintained at a constantly low level, from eighty-nine in the first complete year of operation to a high of 199 in 1979-80. Besides the permanent staff, the personnel levels have been increased by approximately 26% by the assignment of people by the State and Defense Departments.[19] As indicated in Table 3.3, there have been two periods of significant staff declines. The first occurred during the Nixon Administration in the mid-1970s, and the second beginning with the presidency of Ronald Reagan.[20]

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18 U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Development, Committee on Foreign Affairs, <u>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1982-83</u>, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 60.

19 An average compiled from: U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, <u>Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies</u>, for Fiscal Years 1965-1985.

20 <u>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85</u>, p. 104.

TABLE 3.3

ACDA STAFF LEVELS



Source: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85, 98th Cong., 1st sess., p. 104.

Section 24 of the Arms Control Act provides for four assistant directors. One of these has usually been a military officer in charge of weapons evaluation, arms transfers, multilateral affairs, or science and technology. Director Smith testified that the use of the officers

"brings valuable professional military experience and judgment to the center of our arms control efforts."[21]

As with any organization, employees at ACDA have differed in their commitment to the goals of the agency. Professor Duncan Clarke, Foreign Affairs instructor at the National War College, has conducted extensive research related to ACDA and characterized the staff as being "bright" and "innovative".[22] Former Deputy Director Philip Farley, in a report to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, praised the middle-level staff for being "highly skilled, motivated and effective." He added that

> Individuals at all levels of ACDA have, of course, varied greatly in their enthusiasm for disarmament and their degree of mental assent to particular national security measures or decisions; for the most part, the key staff have been people recruited from and comfortable in dealing with such agencies as the White House, State, Defense, CIA, and their contractors.[23]

NEGOTIATIONS

The operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have defined its role in actual negotiations. ACDA's level of participation at the international conferences has been consistent with its position in the administrative branch. Further, its responsibilities have varied according to whether the meetings have been multilateral or bilateral. The major multilateral forums have been: The Conference on Disarmament

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21 U.S., Congress, House, Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments, 1970, H. Rpt., 16200, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 4.

22 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1982-83, p. 24.

23 U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Review of Arms Control Legislation and Organization, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, pp. 13, 24.

in Geneva, the United Nations, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks.

MULTILATERAL

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has been the principal multilateral assembly dealing with arms limitations since 1962. First known as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC),[24] the organization's initial goals were to negotiate treaties on general and complete disarmament and to ban nuclear tests from all environments. By 1979, membership in the body had grown to thirty-nine and the name was changed to Conference on Disarmament. The Geneva meetings were the primary focus of international arms control activity in the 1960s and early 1970s. The assembly's major successes came early in its history. They were the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided leadership during ENDC's first years. ACDA Director William Foster led the American delegation, and Deputy Director Adrain Fisher accompanied Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman to a spin-off conference in Moscow in 1963.[25] The Moscow negotiations led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 1963 which banned all testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, but not underground.

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24 The eighteen nations were: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, United States, Canada, Italy, Untied Kingdom, and France. (France did not take its seat until 1979).

25 U.S., Congress, House, Third Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, H. Doc. 219, 88th Cong., 2n sess., 1964, p. 6.

Following the signing of the LTBT, and the successful atomic weapon's test at Lop Nor, making the People's Republic of China the fifth nuclear weapons state, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference turned its attention to non-proliferation. After several years of negotiations, officially at Geneva and informally between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature on July 1, 1968. Sixty-two states signed, including three of the five nuclear powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.[26]

The provisions of the Treaty required that non-nuclear nations pledge not to manufacture or acquire through arms transfer nuclear explosive devices and to submit to international safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The purpose of this treaty was to prevent nuclear materials from being diverted into weapons. The nuclear powers, for their part, promised to assist the other signatories in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control."[27] The NPT called for review conferences to be held every five years beginning in 1975.

Non-proliferation has been one of the top priorities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since the early 1960s. Much of the

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26 Dan Caldwell, introduction to, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984), p. xxvi.

27 Marek Thee, "Arms Control: The Retreat From Disarmament - The Record to Date and the Search For Alternatives", Journal of Peace Research, 14 (1977), p. 98.

agency's staff and resources have been aimed at developing verification techniques and to supporting the work of the IAEA. Specifically, ACDA's research has been directed at creating unintrusive, unmanned inspection devices and instruments using chemical and physical sensors, acoustics, and photographic and spectroscopic technology.[28] The agency, also, worked with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to design tamper-resistant, unattended safeguard instrumentation, to enhance the agreed upon national technical means of verification. ACDA is responsible for encouraging additional adherence to the NPT, mobilizing domestic support for increased funding for IAEA, and preparing for the quinquennial review conference.

With 127 countries adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the 1980s, the agreement stands as the most widely supported arms control measure negotiated since the Second World War. The principal policy making body dealing with the issue in the U.S. has been the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation. The body is chaired by the State Department and includes the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Security Council, and the intelligence community. According to Herbert Scoville, Jr., the President of the Arms Control Association and former Assistant Director of ACDA, without the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in devising a treaty which was acceptable to the Defense Department, the State Department and the Atomic Energy

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28 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, H. Doc. 256, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 16.

Commission in protecting America's predominate position over non-nuclear states, the NPT would never have succeeded.[29]

In the early 1970s the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency no longer headed the U.S. delegation at the Conference on Disarmament. A special ambassador was appointed by the President and assigned to the agency. The change was perhaps the result of greater demands being placed on the Director in the bilateral realm, and the desire of Presidents to use the position for political purposes. ACDA did continue to provide staff and advisors. The American delegation throughout also included representatives from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Energy. In other multilateral arms control efforts, ACDA has been represented on the U.S. mission but has had even fewer responsibilities.

At the United Nations, the American delegation's leader is the Ambassador, but officials from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency serve on committees, act as advisors, and direct the day-to-day support or backstopping duties. ACDA staff also take part in the First Committee debates, and were members on the planning committees for the Special Session on Disarmament held in 1978 and 1982. As with the Conference on Disarmament, the agency's role has been just one of many.

Another major on-going multilateral forum for arms control has been the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna,

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29 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85, p. 24.

Austria. Out of the meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO in 1968, came a proposal to begin negotiation with the Warsaw Pact countries aimed at reducing military forces in Central Europe, in particular in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. Preliminary discussions began in Vienna in 1973 and included representatives from twelve NATO countries and seven Warsaw Pact countries.[30]

Negotiations for the United States have been headed by a special ambassador chosen by the President. ACDA has provided a senior official to the delegation and some staff personnel. The chief negotiator has been instructed to report to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who is a member of the National Security Council's Special Coordinating Committee. ACDA has participated on the interagency working group concerned with MBFR, and has been the focal point for preparation and instruction to the U.S. delegation in Vienna and to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels.[31]

There have been other multilateral arms control forums since 1961 such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, the Comprehensive Test Ban Talks, and the Conventional Arms Talks. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's major role has been to provide day-to-day support, called backstopping. Members of the agency have also served on various

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30 U.S., Congress, House, Special Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Committee on Armed Services, Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, pp. 3-4.

31 U.S., Congress, Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, United States Arms Control And Disarmament Agency 1982 Annual Report, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p. 18.

interagency groups concerned with particular negotiations and ACDA's research efforts have contributed to negotiating positions and verification of final accords.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, international meetings were at the center of arms control discussions. The very essence of the arms race was debated, and the goals and expectations for progress were high. Later, as the United States and the Soviet Union grew in power and came to dominate all aspects of the armaments issue, bilateral meetings became the main avenue for negotiations.

The role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has also changed. In the first years of ACDA, the Director led and was the chief spokesperson for the American representatives. Later, the leadership of the delegation was given to Presidential political appointees, chosen for a limited task, who, while technically responsible to ACDA, many times ignored the agency.

The arms control organization has been relegated to being at best one among many players, rather than having a central role. Its staff represents only a fraction of the delegates, and for the most part in support positions.[32] ACDA has not been in the position of "management of U.S. participation in international negotiations" as directed by the Arms Control Act. In the bilateral conferences the agency has had a stronger role.

32 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, <u>Arms Control and Disarmament Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85</u>, 98th Cong., 1st sess., p. 64.

BILATERAL

With the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, which was an attempt by the nuclear states to slow and control the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union turned their attention to control of their strategic nuclear arsenals. But before discussions could begin, the U.S.S.R. invaded Czechoslovakia, and even though the U.S. at the time had over half a million troops in Indo-China, the Americans reacted to the Soviet invasion by canceling the negotiations indefinitely. Only after new leadership had taken over the executive branch of the U.S. government was the topic reopened. Then on November 17, 1969 the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in Helsinki, Finland.

Gerard Smith was appointed to lead the American delegation, which consisted of representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Smith had negotiating experience and was Director of ACDA. Although he was a Nixon appointee, he was never able to gain the confidence of the White House staff. They were suspicious of anyone connected with arms control.[33]

Prior to the opening of SALT, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had played a prominent role in the preliminary talks. The agency had set up and chaired all the preparatory working groups, but by the time the discussions opened only fourteen of the fifty people who made

33 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1973), p. 43.

up the SALT delegation were from ACDA.[34] Responsibility for coordinating the positions of the various departments was turned over to the Backstopping Committee of the National Security Council.

After seven official meetings spanning thirty months, agreement was reached, and at their Moscow summit meeting in May of 1972, President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev signed the SALT Agreement. It included the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The ABM Treaty limited the deployment of antiballistic missile systems to two geographical areas near each capitol, Washington and Moscow, and put limits on ABM launchers, inceptor missiles, and radar. The Interim Agreement restricted for five years the overall levels of strategic offensive missile forces, launchers, light and heavy ICBM's, sea-launched ICBM's, and modern ballistic missile submarines. Verification of the agreements was to take place by national technical means, rather than international inspection. A Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was created to promote implementation and deal with questions of compliance to the treaty.[35]

The manner with which the negotiations at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks unfolded underscored ACDA's status within the Nixon government. Although arms control was the agency's only mission, all aspects of SALT I were dominated by Nixon's National Security Advisor,

34 U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 7-8.

35 U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies for Fiscal Year 1974, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 565.

Henry Kissinger. The overall approach to the negotiations became known, after the fact, as "front channel-back channel".

The front channel represented the forum at which the delegations from both countries met formally to present proposals and work toward an agreement. The back channel was the private meetings between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, where the substantive issues were decided. Later the details were fleshed out by the official delegates.[36] Not even Smith, the head of the delegation and statutory "principal advisor to the President on arms control", was informed of the Kissinger-Gromyko meetings.[37] Further, the ACDA Director was not consulted about the initial ABM proposals worked out by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor was he made aware of additional settlements beyond SALT I, agreed to at the time of the accords were signed.[38]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's impotence extended into the crucial policy decisions of SALT. Perhaps the most important was the debate on the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV). The issue arose out of the belief that deployment of MIRVs would be destabilizing and would proliferate the arms race by increasing the number of warheads but not the number of missiles. The new weapons innovation would also enhance first strike capability which in turn would trigger an arms build-up on the other side. The United States,

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36 Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, p. 11.

37 Newhouse, p. 44.

38 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, pp. 33, 134-135.

however, had been working on the device for several years and had a clear lead over the Soviet Union in MIRV technology.

In the policy debates Gerard Smith along with others at ACDA, actively argued for a ban, showing that verification was possible using national technical means.[39] But on this pivotal arms control question, the Nixon-Kissinger bias did not coincide with the advice from its arms control agency. The administration's desire to increase U.S. strategic position plus pressure from the military industrial complex, which had been developing the technology for years, overshadowed arguments for limitations -- MIRV was not banned by SALT I. Whether it was because of the lack of power and independence, or lack of conviction and assertiveness, ACDA did not carry its case on this critical issue to Congress or to the public. Nor did the agency oppose the MIRV tests which took place on the eve of the talks.[40]

After SALT I had been signed and ratified, two events occurred that further downgraded the already weak ACDA. First, upon the resignation of Smith, who felt that he had been denied the responsibilities he should have had,[41] Nixon separated the job of ACDA Director and the head of the SALT delegation by naming an Ambassador-at-Large in the State Department to lead the U.S. negotiating team.

Second, even though the SALT I treaty did not limit the quantitative or qualitative development of all armaments, and even though ACDA's role had been small, many top and middle-level agency

39 Arms Control and Disarmament Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85, p. 139.
40 Newhouse, p. 44.
41 Ibid.

employees were fired. The action came as a result of pressure on the White House by those in the U.S. Congress, led by Senator Henry Jackson (Democrat - Washington), who opposed any agreements with the U.S.S.R. The purge was carried out because the critics considered ACDA to be excessively liberal and overly aggressive in its pursuit of a negotiated settlement.[42] The new Director, Fred Ikle, was associated with Senator Jackson, and the new SALT negotiator, U. Alexis Johnson, had had little experience at arms control and was not instructed to report to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Discussions aimed at further limiting strategic armaments opened in Geneva in November 1972 under the rubric of SALT II. ACDA continued to be responsible for chairing the Backstopping Committee, and was represented on the delegation, as were the State Department, Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Also, as with SALT I, the entire administrative expense was charged to the ACDA budget,[43] and from the opening of the negotiations, SALT II occupied the top priority at the agency.

When President Jimmy Carter came to office, he upgraded the role of the ACDA Director. He appointed a new director, Paul Warnke, a lawyer and strong arms control advocate. Warnke was also named to head the SALT II delegation. During the long course of the second phase of SALT, the practice of 'front channel-back channel' was resumed. Unlike

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42 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, pp. 54-56, 70.

43 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, pp. 7-8.

the Kissinger era, though, the ACDA Director was involved in the back channel discussions. When Warnke resigned after nineteen months, the duties of the chief negotiator and Director were again divided. President Carter had had much confidence in Warnke, whose leadership had been controversial because of his strong advocacy, but now Carter needed to satisfy those in Congress who opposed SALT II. He named George Seignious, a retired military officer, to become the new head of ACDA, and Ralph Earle, Warnke's assistant took over the leadership of the SALT delegation.

In June of 1979 President Carter and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev signed the SALT II accords which had been negotiated in Geneva. Due to the pressure from a well-financed opposition within the United States, however, Carter used the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to ask the U.S. Senate to delay ratification.

A year and a half after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, with SALT II unratified but still voluntarily observed, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. began the third phase of the discussions on limiting strategic armaments. The bilateral deliberations this time were called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The new round of negotiations was headed by a presidential appointee, and as with SALT, ACDA chaired the Backstopping Committee and was represented on the delegation.

In 1961, the major argument for the creation of an arms control body within the Executive Branch was that if progress were to be made, the process needed to be centralized into one organization. The key qualifier of the Act was that doctrine must be "consistent with national security policy." Arms control direction is ultimately set by the

administration in power, and small agencies cannot supercede that authority. But by holding ACDA's history up to the light of the statutory provisions, the low degree of prominence that arms control has had within every administration since 1961 becomes clear. Further, the approach revels that the rhetoric has not been followed by political will or intent.

Arms control has not been centralized in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The organization has been surrounded by and dependent upon departments which are larger, more powerful, and that many times pursue different objectives. The agency has been kept small, and its influence has generally declined. It has had to operate within the national security structure of the government. And even though its focus is unique within the system, it has not been conspicuous in promoting its formal mandate. Decision making within ACDA has kept the organization's work tied to the policies of the National Security Council. Some of the reasons for its acquiescence can be found in the profiles of those who have led the agency.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIRECTORS

Once the framers of the 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act had settled on the primary functions of the new agency, they turned their attention to outlining the responsibilities of the Director, a process which would also define the type of person who would be recruited to give leadership. As the "principal advisor to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the President, the head of ACDA was assigned the "primary responsibility within the government for arms control and disarmament matters." The Director was authorized to set up the systems necessary to carry out the operation of the agency and under the direction of the Secretary of State and the President, to consult with foreign governments and international organizations, and to conduct negotiations. Further, the supervisor of the agency was given the responsibility of reporting to Congress and coordinating arms control management and research procedures of other executive branch departments.[1] An examination of the characteristics of those involved at all levels of arms control would make a more explicit picture of how different administrations have viewed the issue and where the process fits in overall policy. A first step is to study collectively the ACDA Directors.

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1 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Statutes at Large, 75, Secs. 2562, 2574, 2575 (1961).

The characteristics of leadership which appear to be called for in the Act are: organizational skills, the ability to comprehend and synthesize complicated principles of politics and arms control, a talent to communicate, assertiveness, patience, leadership and decisiveness. A model director would therefore have administrative background, and would be knowledgeable in history, political science, and the natural sciences. The person would have experience in negotiations, be familiar with conflict resolution techniques, have worked in some aspects of arms control, have national and/or international political experience, and be motivated by a desire for peace.

During a 1983 confirmation hearing, Senator Charles Percy, Republican Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that "the one quality which should most distinguish the individual who fills this office is the determination to aggressively represent the cause of arms control at the highest levels of decision making in our Government."[2] His colleague Senator Alan Cranston (Democrat-California), added that in order "for ACDA to function effectively, it must be led by an experienced arms control advocate who will press relentlessly for negotiated strategic arms reductions."[3]

Since 1961 there have been eight Directors confirmed by Congress. Table 4.1 shows who they were, how long they served, and under which presidential administration.

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2 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 6.

TABLE 4.1

DIRECTORS

Directors	Presidents
1961-1968 William Foster	1961-1963 John F. Kennedy 1963-1968 Lyndon B. Johnson
1969-1972 Gerard Smith	1969-1972 Richard Nixon
1973-1976 Fred Ikle	1972-1974 Richard Nixon 1974-1976 Gerald Ford
1977-1978 Paul Warnke 1979 George Seignious 1980 Ralph Earle III	1977-1980 Jimmy Carter
1981-1982 Eugene Rostow 1983- Kenneth Adelman	1981- Ronald Reagan

All the Directors have been male and white. There is little in their educational backgrounds which indicate any special training in arms control, and half have come from the legal profession (see Table 4.2). Only Fred Ikle had a record which suggests academic preparation for work in the field. He had specialized in the technical and political problems of arms control at the University of Chicago, the Harvard Center for International Affairs, and at the RAND Corporation, a defense oriented think tank. A co-worker described him as being "more a scholar than an activist" and not the kind of person who would be likely to stir up controversy. Ikle was the first academic arms control specialist to head the agency.[4] Prior to being nominated to head ACDA,

4 "Nominee for Arms Agency Chief", New York Times, 7 April 1973, p. 12.

most of the men had had some experience in arms control matters, but within the context of established government policy.

TABLE 4.2

BACKGROUNDS

Name	Occupation	Academic Discipline
Foster	Business	Law
Smith	Lawyer	Law
Ikle	Academic	Sociology
Warnke	Lawyer	Law
Seignious	Military	Military Science
Earle	Lawyer	Law
Rostow	Lawyer	Law
Adelman	Government	Political Science

William Foster had served as a disarmament advisor to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower administration, and in 1958 had led the American delegation to the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Geneva conference aimed at averting surprise attacks. He had also worked with President Kennedy's disarmament advisor, John McCloy, in the study process that culminated in the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[5]

Gerard Smith had likewise worked as a disarmament advisor for Dulles, and while at the State Department had been a liaison officer to the congressional Foreign Relation Committee on Disarmament Affairs,

5 Oral history Interview with William C. Foster, Washington, D.C., by Charles C. Morrissey for John F. Kennedy Library, U.S. Declassified Document Collection, 1979 109C, p. 5.

deputy chief delegate at the negotiations which created the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the principal political advisor to the first Atoms for Peace Conference in 1955.[6] Smith was credited with first proposing the idea of a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow which was adopted and negotiated by the Kennedy Administration.[7] Kenneth Adelman held the post of Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. in the year an one-half before coming to ACDA. Under the close supervision of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, he headed the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Disarmament Committee.[8]

Two of the Directors had been involved in the SALT II process before being appointed to lead the agency. George Seignious, who had previously been a military advisor at the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, was chosen as a Delegate-at Large in 1977 to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.[9] Ralph Earle represented ACDA at the SALT negotiations from 1974-1978, was the deputy negotiator under Paul Warnke, and upon Warnke's resignation became head of the delegation.[10]

The Directors as a group also had strong executive credentials. Prior to their appointments they all worked in areas in which their administrative skills were most likely developed. Seignious was the

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6 U.S., Congress,Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Gerard C. Smith To Be Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 1.

7 "In Search of Amity", New York Times, 10 February 1969, p. 24.

8 Nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman, p. 1.

9 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of George M. Seignious II of South Carolina, To Be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, pp. 4-5.

10 U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies for Fiscal Year 1981, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, p. 11.

president of the Citadel University, Eugene Rostow was the dean of the Yale Law School, Ikle worked as the head of the Social Science Department at the RAND Corporation, and the five others all held high positions within the executive branch of the U.S. government.

It is essential that the head of a government department be familiar with how to get through the bureaucracy. Here again the Directors have been well-qualified. All but one, Ikle, served in the federal government before being selected to head ACDA. There is little doubt that the eight men had the ability to run a federal agency. What is of specific concern, though, are those factors which might have impaired their willingness to pursue the goals of this particular agency, arms control and disarmament.

Over half of the people who occupied the top job at ACDA had a past record of working for the Department of Defense. The fact is particularly noteworthy in view of the Defense Department's opposition to arms control on principle.[11] William Foster was Deputy Secretary of Defense, both Warnke and Earle had worked as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Seignious was a military assistant to the Secretary of the Army, and Adelman served as Special Assistant to the Defense Secretary. Further, Smith and Rostow held positions in the State Department, sometimes considered to be a rival to ACDA. Smith worked as Assistant Secretary of State and Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and Rostow had been Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

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11 Duncan Clarke, Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 29.

Since the military establishment has shown a long-term hostility to the agency, it is worthwhile to note that all but two of the Directors, Ikle and Adelman, served in the military, with Seignious having been a career officer, serving for thirty-two years. The extent to which the military experiences shaped their subsequent lives and decisions is unknown, but cannot be put aside. In the case of Seignious, some in Congress opposed his nomination, fearing that ACDA's role as a counterbalancing influence to the Department of Defense would be destroyed and that his presence would add to the excessive military influence in the councils of government.[12] His first act as Director was to replace the civilian Executive Secretary of the agency with a retired military officer.[13]

The strong military and Defense Department ties are not the only factors that give the appearance that arms control has not been the top priority of the nominating presidents. President Kennedy nominated a Republican businessman who had strong Pentagon ties to be the first director. William Foster had been the person charged with soliciting G.O.P. support for ACDA, he was an old friend of John McCloy, and Kennedy felt that Foster's membership in the Republican Party would help fend off attacks against the agency.[14] President Nixon's selection of Fred Ikle was a direct response to those in Congress who opposed the SALT I agreement. Ikle was Senator Henry Jackson's hand-picked choice for ACDA Director. Jackson was the influential Chair of the Senate Armed Forces Committee and one of the strongest "hawks" in Congress. The appointment of Seignious by President Carter was again an attempt to

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12 Nomination of George M. Seignious II, p. 61.
13 Ibid., p. 81.
14 Oral history interview with William C. Foster, pp. 5,11,40.

satisfy the conservatives in Congress and to save the SALT II Treaty.[15] And the nomination of Rostow was based on his forceful opposition to the arms control efforts of the previous administration. President Reagan's advisors also believed that Rostow would be an effective counterbalance to Secretary of State Alexander Haig who was looked on with suspicion since he had served in high positions in administrations that had negotiated Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, and had embraced detente as a legitimate policy toward the Soviets.[16]

The personal ideologies of the men chosen to lead the arms control body, as reflected in their previous work, political associations, and official testimonies, reveal a consistent pattern of supporting the long established principle of peace through dominance. As shown in Table 4.3, while political party membership is divided evenly between Republican and Democrats, the Republican Directors have served for eighteen and one-half of the first twenty-three and one half years that there have been confirmed directors.

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15 Clarke, Politic of Arms Control, p. 230.
16 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984),.pp. 10-11.

TABLE 4.3

PARTY/YEARS AS DIRECTOR

Democrat	Years	Republican	Years
Warnke	1.7	Foster	7
Seignious	1	Smith	4
Earle	1	Ikle	3.6
Rostow	1.6	Adelman	4

The political credentials of three of the Republicans are not hard to find. Foster, a lifelong member of the G.O.P., had held several positions in the military establishment including Deputy Secretary of Defense during the Korean War, Director of Purchases Divisions for the War Department during World War II, and was co-chair of a special blue ribbon commission during the Eisenhower administration called the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, better known as the Gaither Committee.[17] The original mandate of the group was to produce a recommendation on a massive civil defense program for the U.S. By the time the final report was submitted, however, the focus had shifted to America's military preparedness.

Rowen Gaither, the Chairman of the Board at the Ford Foundation and the RAND Corporation, assembled a research team of over seventy people including John McCloy, Herman Kahn of RAND, former Secretary of

17 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 125.

Defense Robert Lovett, Ernest Lawrence of Livermore Labs, and Spurgeon Keeney who would later become Deputy Director of ACDA. Foster and Robert Sprague, President of Sprague Electric Company of Massachusetts, took over as co-chairmen of the commission when Gaither fell ill. The report produced was officially entitled "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age", the final draft of which was written by Paul Nitze, and sounded much like NSC 68.[18]

The document outlined an increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union, speculating that the U.S.S.R. had surpassed the U.S. in military capability making the United States, and specifically the Strategic Air Command bases all over the world, vulnerable to Russian attack. The Gaither Committee recommended "prompt remedial action" which it described as an immediate increase in the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range missiles, and a nationwide fallout shelter program. The price tag for the program was set at $44 billion over a five year period.[19] In addition to his leadership on the Gaither Committee, Foster strongly advocated the immediate resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing by the Kennedy Administration, just prior to his appointment as ACDA chief in 1961. He believed that the tests were necessary for the development of the neutron bomb.[20]

Fred Ikle came to the agency from the RAND Corporation, a military-oriented think tank. RAND had been invented by the Air Force immediately following Second World War, as a way of continuing civilian scientific participation in future war planning. Some of the people

18 Ibid., p. 141.
19 Ibid., pp. 142-145.
20 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy In the White House (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 457.

responsible for the creation of RAND were Don Douglas of McDonnell Douglas, Henry Ford, Rowen Gaither, and Arthur Raymond of TWR.[21] The organization hired a large staff of biologists, physicists, mathematicians, engineers, economists, historians, political scientists and others to develop theories and plans for fighting and winning a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.[22] As Director of ACDA, Ikle clearly supported the idea that in order to limit armaments the U.S. had to build up a strong military establishment. He reported to Congress that "one of the basic techniques of arms control ... paradoxically, is to improve the military forces...by making them less vulnerable to attack." While at the agency he supported both the B-1 bomber and the Trident as essential to United States deterrent capability.[23]

Ikle is also a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. The Committee, founded in 1976, is a powerful association that lobbies for a rapid military expansion. It has supported the increase of such nuclear weapon systems as the MX, the Cruise, and production of the neutron bomb. The lobby group led the fight to defeat the SALT II Treaty and advocates a dramatic increase in the defense budget. After leaving ACDA, Ikle worked the halls of Congress for increased military spending, greater freedom for the C.I.A., and for more pressure on Japan to increase its military strength.[24]

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21 Helen Caldicott, Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), pp. 176-177.

22 Ibid., p.22.

23 U.S., Congress, House, Fifteenth Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 10.

24 Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class (Washington, D.C.: Presidential Accountability Group, 1983), pp. 440-450.

Kenneth Adelman studied under Jeanne Kirkpatrick at Georgetown University and later became her deputy at the United Nations when she was named as Reagan's first U.N. Ambassador. During the Senate hearings to confirm Adelman as the head of ACDA, Senator Paul Tsongas (Democrat-Massachusetts), described him by saying "you come from a very conservative ideology, you are a loyalist, there is no rebellion." He further noted that the director-designate had limited arms control expertise and no constituency.[25] Senator Alan Cranston testified that Adelman was "clearly scornful of past strategic limitation efforts, scornful of arms control advocates, scornful of public opinion on nuclear issues, and lacks the professional experience necessary to qualify him for the important post."[26]

The Republican-dominated committee rejected the nomination on a vote of 9-8, mainly due to Adelman's philosophy on arms control negotiations which he had expressed in an interview with Ken Auletta of the New York Daily News in 1981. Adelman reportedly said that "one reason not to rush into any negotiations is that in a democracy the negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs."[27] He was further quoted as saying "the United States might have to pretend to negotiate, a sham to placate European allies."[28] He was also credited with telling the reporter, "I would negotiate for political reasons and I think we should not emphasize arms negotiations because we have to emphasize the build-up of defense forces, and the political constituency one needs for that."[29] Despite the findings and the recommendation of

25 Nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman, p. 61.
26 Ibid., p. 6.
27 Ibid., p. 145.
28 Ibid., p. 154.
29 Ibid., p. 173.

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Reagan let the nomination stand and the Republican-controlled Senate voted in favor of the nominee.

As Director of ACDA, Adelman, who is also a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, has lobbied for Reagan's military build-up. He testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the agency, saying, "I strongly support the recent strategic modernization...the timely deployment of 100 Peacekeeper [MX] missiles will serve to demonstrate the necessary U.S. resolve."[30] At the same hearing, he rejected the notion of no first use of atomic weapons, claiming that the idea "is a cry that has been around and part of the Soviet propaganda effort since the end of World War II in order to try to decouple American security from that of Western Europe."[31]

Of the Democrats, George Seignious was the first retired military officer to hold the position of Director. Although in the United States the position of Secretary of Defense cannot be held by a person who has spent a career in the military, the prohibition does not extend to the agency charged with arms control. Seignious had previously worked as Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, a Pentagon weapons sale program. At the same time, one of ACDA's goals is to bring about restraint in the arms trade. He had been a staff director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander of the Third U.S. Infantry Division in Germany.

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30 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984-85, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p. 24.

31 Ibid., p. 22.

Several months before being nominated to head ACDA, Seignious joined the American Security Council's education program called the Coalition of Peace Through Strength. The organization is a pro-defense association which opposed the SALT II agreement and advocated U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. The General resigned from the group three days before officially being named by President Carter as Paul Warnke's replacement at the agency. During his confirmation hearing, Seignious expressed strong support for the development and deployment of "massive numbers of cruise missiles",[32] a weapon which is destabilizing for arms control because its small size makes the system virtually unverifiable.

Another one of the Democrats, Eugene Rostow, had actively supported the election of Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election. He was the Director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, an organization of Democrats who wanted to reform the Party which in their view had become too "liberal". He was also the Vice President of the Atlantic Council, a Washington, D.C. based group which is concerned with international security matters and produces the Atlantic Community Quarterly. Rostow, along with Paul Nitze was one of the founders of the Committee on the Present Danger and for five years had been the chairman of the executive committee.[33] He too had worked against the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and testified at his confirmation hearing that he believed that the only successful arms control agreement that had been negotiated by the U.S. had been the

32 Nomination of George M. Seignious II, p. 20.
33 Brownstein and Easton, Reagan's Ruling Elite, p. 506.

Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817.[34] He testified that his approach to negotiations would be to link arms control to the effective revival of the Truman Doctrine.[35] Believing that the United States had fallen behind the Soviet Union in the arms race, he applauded the Reagan Administration's rearmament program, and after intense questioning was characterized by Senator Cranston as maintaining that the U.S. should negotiate arms control with the U.S.S.R. only after the Soviets had accepted the U.S. interpretation of international law.[36] The former Yale professor viewed the Russians as expansionists, designating them the principal factor in global disorder.

Rostow argued that a limited nuclear war was possible and survivable. When asked about the outcome of such a conflict, he testified: "The human race is very resilient...Depending on certain assumptions, some estimates predict that there would be 10 million casualties on one side and 100 million on the other. But that is not the whole population...Japan, after all not only survived but flourished after the nuclear attack."[37]

Paul Warnke, a Democrat, alone stands out as someone with strong arms control leanings. In a New York Times article, he was described as "an articulate advocate of arms control with the Soviets," and as someone who "thinks that arms control is an end in itself rather than only an instrument of our overall national security policy."[38] Warnke

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34 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Eugene V. Rostow, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 7.

35 Ibid., p. 13.

36 Ibid., p. 85.

37 Ibid., p. 49.

38 "For Warnke, Uphill Fight In Arms Job," New York Times, 2 February 1977, p. 9.

had been an outspoken critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1967-69 was part of a group of officials who had helped persuade Defense Secretary Clark Clifford to oppose a continued military build-up in Southeast Asia. Later he served on the staffs of presidential-hopefuls Edmund Muskie and George McGovern. President-elect Carter had considered nominating him for Secretary of State or Defense,[39] but in the end perhaps felt that Warnke's support of arms reductions, defense spending cuts, and negotiated control agreements made him a better candidate to lead ACDA.

Congressional opposition to Warnke was strong. At issue was his past record of objecting to such weapon systems as the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine, and favoring a cut-back in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.[40] Further, President Carter had decided to resume the practice of making the ACDA Director also head of the SALT delegation, and many of those opposed to Warnke did not want an arms control advocate to be the chief arms control negotiator.

One of the strongest opponents to his nomination was Paul Nitze, who not only took issue with Warnke's stand on favoring a cut in the defense budget, but also questioned the candidate's patriotism.[41] Warnke did not believe that the goal of absolute U.S. superiority was compatible with a useful bargaining position, he testified "that if you try to be number one across the entire board, then you foreclose any

39 "Arms Nominee Under Scrutiny," New York Times, 9 February 1977, p. 9.
40 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Paul C. Warnke, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 54.
41 Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, p. 184.

chance of effective arms control negotiations because the other side will not accept such a position."[42]

As an arms control activist, Warnke served as a board member at the Center for Defense Information, a lobby group founded in 1972 by retired Admiral Gene LaRoque. Although the group supports a strong defense, it has been consistently critical of arms build-up and defense spending. If Warnke's arms control views were not exactly in the official Washington mainstream, his membership in the Trilateral Commission clearly demonstrated his ideology. The Commission had been created by David Rockefeller in 1973 to foster closer economic and political cooperation among North America, Western Europe, and Japan. The group feared that economic nationalism threatened the industrial capacity of America's post-war alliance and that military security had been jeopardized.[43]

The political backgrounds of the remaining two Directors, Gerard Smith and Ralph Earle, are not as easily defined as the others. Smith, a Republican, had years of government experience in arms control, atomic energy, and foreign policy, before coming to ACDA. He had held high positions in the State Department in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. Smith is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations, whose purpose is to study the international aspects of American political, economic, and strategic problems. The Council is headquartered in New York, and publishes Foreign Affairs. He is also a member of the Atlantic Council, and was the founder of Interplay

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42 Nomination of Paul C. Warnke, p. 6.
43 "A White House Supply Depot," New York Times, 13 February 1977, p. E5.

Magazine, a journal designed to encourage discussion on foreign affairs, specifically on European-American relations.[44]

Earle, also a member of the Council of Foreign Relations, had been involved with the SALT discussions for eight years prior to being named to head ACDA. He had served as a consultant to the Defense Department, and representative of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before being named Paul Warnke's alternate at the strategic weapons negotiations. Upon the resignation of Warnke, Earle became the chief negotiator for the U.S., and although he had been instrumental in bringing about SALT II, he felt that the treaty did not go far enough in reducing arms but did provide a base upon which to build.[45]

Earle's nomination came shortly after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, and opposition to his candidacy came from the strong defense lobby in Congress, led by Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina), who claimed that the confirmation would send the wrong signal to the U.S.S.R. by giving the impression of business as usual. Further, Helms accused Earle of not allowing enough Joint Chief of Staff participation in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and of having negotiated an agreement which reduced the leverage of the U.S. over the Soviet Union.[46]

At a time of strong anti-Soviet rhetoric because of Afghanistan, Earle attributed the invasion to several factors, including the fall of the Shah of Iran, the U.S. military build-up, and a lack of progress

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44 "In Search of Amity," p. 24.

45 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Ralph Earle II, Executive Report #96-33, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, pp. 23-24.

46 Ibid., p. 3-5.

with SALT. He also countered Helm's appraisal, which held that the Soviet Union had gained military superiority over the United States. He testified that both sides held advantages in some areas, but were equal in others.[47] With President Carter's postponement of arms talks with the U.S.S.R. prior to Earle's confirmation, and with the change of government several months later, the directorship was brief and generally uneventful.

None of the Directors had held elective positions, but their political connections and interrelationships placed them solidly in the mainstream of the U.S. government. Foster had been brought into the Executive Branch by Averall Harriman, the Secretary of Commerce under President Truman, and had taken the ACDA job at the request of his friend John McCloy. The second Director, Smith had been recommended for the top job at ACDA by Foster. Smith in turn strongly supported the nomination of Warnke, who had originally been brought into government by Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense in the Johnson Administration. Warnke had also worked with two of his successors at ACDA, George Seignious and Ralph Earle. Senator Henry Jackson was prominent in promoting the nomination of two of the Directors. Fred Ikle had been convinced to take the position by Jackson's close aide Richard Perle, and Eugene Rostow had been a long-time friend of the Senator from Washington State. Rostow's appointment had been inspired by National Security Advisor Richard Allen, who was forced to resign from the Reagan Administration in a power struggle with Secretary of State Alexander Haig after having been cleared of wrongdoing in keeping a $1000 honorarium intended for Nancy Reagan, accepting three watches from

47 Ibid., p. 25-27.

Japanese businessmen, and for errors in his financial disclosures. Finally, Adelman was a close friend to both Ikle and Rostow.

It might be expected that people who have headed an organization whose mission was as important and urgent as arms control would continue to be conspicuously involved with the issue. Foster, Ikle, and Earle all left their positions as the result of the change in governments. Foster, who had been President and Chairman of the Board of United Nuclear Corporation before being named to administer the agency, returned to the private sector as Chairman of the Board of Porter International, a company which deals in steel and specialty alloy, rubber, asbestos textiles, and electrical equipment. He also became President of the Arms Control Association, a non-partisan organization connected with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and formed to promote public education of arms control issues. Ikle became chairman of the Advisory Council on National Security for the Republican National Committee, Coordinator of Reagan's Foreign Policy Advisory Committee, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Development in the Reagan Administration. Earle, the son of the former Governor of Pennslyvania, returned to that state as Director of the Provident National Bank.

Two of the Directors resigned officially for "personal reasons", but their resignations were forced by political considerations. Smith was known to have been disenchanted when his role as chief SALT negotiator was usurped by Henry Kissinger, and he left the agency shortly before the Jackson-orchestrated purge. He stayed in the government and was appointed Ambassador-at-Large. He became chairman of

the Arms Control Association, and has written extensively in support of arms control.

At the time of his resignation, Warnke claimed that when he had originally been asked by President Carter to head ACDA, a deal had been struck which limited the time he would serve, and that he had stayed on four months longer than he had agreed. Also, he complained that the SALT negotiations had kept him separated from his wife on too many occasions,[48] and that the death of one of his law partners had put pressure on him to return to the law practice. Warnke's departure, however, was part of the strategy of having Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the Pentagon lead the ratification effort for SALT II.[49] Warnke returned to his law practice with his partner Clark Clifford, but also continued to work in the government as the Special Counsel to the Secretary of State on Arms Control.

One ACDA Director was fired from the post. Eugene Rostow had come to ACDA as a hard liner on the issue of arms control in an administration that was not committed to serious negotiations. But the Reagan White House considered Rostow to be an outsider.[50] The arms control Director became more assertive about being involved in policy making. He authorized a secret meeting between INF negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kvitsinsky seeking limits on medium-range missiles in Europe. And even though the meeting resulted in an agreement which both governments later rejected, the stage was set

48 Supplementary material from the New York Times News Service and the Associated Press, 29 October 1978, pp. 42-43.
49 Supplementary material from the New York Times News Service and the Associated Press, 11 October 1978, p. 1.
50 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 168.

for Rostow's downfall. When a feud erupted over the White House refusal to support his choice for Deputy Director, Rostow was fired,[51] and the former law professor returned to teaching at Yale University. The dismissal was also intended to give Secretary of State George Shultz more influence in arms control matters. Finally, George Seignious resigned after a year at ACDA due to ill health and was named to the Board of Directors at Daniels International Corporation, an engineering, construction and maintenance company, which deals in power, hydrocarbon, and government projects. Only Warnke and Smith have continued to be visibly active in advocating arms control.

Senator Claiborn Pell (Democrat-Rhode Island), one of the sponsors of ACDA, has described the original intent of the organization's congressional supporters as an effort to create "an agency that would more often than not counterbalance what was coming out of the Pentagon." Pell stressed that "the last thing we wanted was for ACDA to be an echo chamber for policies developed at the Pentagon."[52] For the presidents whose appointments have guided the direction of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, however, the intent appears to have been just the opposite.

While those who have held the top position at ACDA have been professional managers with administrative and organizational skills, intellectual competence, and political-bureaucratic experience, their arms control credentials did not represent the clear alternative expected or needed for an organization designed "to deal with the

51 "A Classic Washington Squeeze Play," <u>New York Times</u>, 5 January 1983, p. B8.

52 <u>Nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman</u>, p. 3.

problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament."[53] One of the major factors in the nomination of Foster, Ikle, Seignious, Rostow, and Adelman, was an attempt to appease the political wishes of those who opposed limitations on armaments. Paul Warnke's nomination was strongly contested mainly due to his reputation as a vigorous arms controller who had been conspicuous in his opposition to the arms race and new and potentially destabilizing weapon systems. His tenure at ACDA lasted for only nineteen months.

All of the men nominated for the directorship seemed to recognize the inherent dangers of an escalating arms race. But virtually every one of the candidates came to the agency from a position either directly related to the Pentagon or with opinions ideologically consistent with the military view. Five had worked in the Defense Department, two in the State Department, and one at RAND.

Most of the Director's political affiliations were with groups whose world view held that the Soviet Union was the source of unrest and instability in the world and only American military dominance could counter the threat to peace. Some had worked against previous efforts to limit armaments, not on the basis that the treaties had not gone far enough in reducing weapons and the danger of war, but because they thought the treaties put too many restrictions on U.S. military growth.

By their choices of Directors, the nominating Presidents have clearly demonstrated that their interest in ACDA had been to insure that the agency would not stray too far from established arms control dogma, the first principle of which has been the maintenance of U.S. military

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53 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, sec. 2551.

superiority. Only Paul Warnke enjoyed access to the Oval office. And as the Nixon and Reagan purges revealed, success, especially in bilateral negotiations, carried severe consequences. When such factors as leadership, history, placement, size, budget, and ideology, are considered together, a question that arises is: why does the agency continue to exist?

CHAPTER V

THE PUBLIC OPINION FACTOR

Efforts by successive U.S. Administrations to deflect progress in arms control were apparent from the manner in which ACDA was regulated. Given the high moral assignment of working towards the ultimate goal of world disarmament, the agency has been systematically disempowered and diverted from its purpose through limitations in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, budgetary restraints, its position within the government, and by the selection of those chosen to leadership positions. Why then was ACDA created in the first place? What purpose does the agency have in the overall arms control scheme? And why does it continue to exist? The answers to these questions lie at the heart of the American body politic and represent one major factor in understanding the overall arms control intentions and activities of the United States government.

Public opinion, however formed, plays an important role in the American political system. Measuring and responding to the concerns of the population insures stability and the maintenance of power. If the public feels that its interests are being discussed and acted upon by those in leadership positions, citizens are more likely to support the government's decisions and to reinforce the results through the ballot box, with their tax dollars, and by their acquiescence. Planners of

strategic policy have been aware of this principle and have long been concerned about the will of the people. A clear example is found in NSC 68.

The authors of the National Security Council document knew that before the public would finance the biggest peacetime military build-up in history, opinion would have to be favorable. The government would have to initiate the process by supplying the necessary information to formulate a public consensus as to the nature of the political, economic, and military competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Once a common view had been built the leaders would be free to sponsor the actions that would express that national will.[1]

In addition to convincing the people that military preparedness was necessary, the government would have to consider another aspect of public opinion. Americans wanted to believe that their leaders were more interested in peace than war, and therefore would insist that negotiations with the Soviets be an essential ingredient of defense policy. For Paul Nitze and his colleagues, negotiations meant form not substance, "an essential element in the ideological conflict". They wrote:

> In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms ... Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic [arms control negotiations] both to gain public support for the programs and to minimize the immediate risks of war.[2]

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1 Steven L. Reardin, The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 102.
2 Cited in Ibid., p. 117.

Arms control negotiations became the concomitant of a massive military and armaments build-up in the early post Second World War years. By tracing and analyzing the views of the American people, using Gallup Opinion Polls, two main questions can be further analyzed: whether the NSC 68 approach continued; and whether arms control decisions (including those related to ACDA) were the results of attempts to appease public opinion.[3] There are many factors, such as current international or domestic problems, government propaganda, media interpretation, and economic stability that contribute to the formation of attitudes on any particular issue. Little effort has been made here to explain the reasons behind the responses to each poll, but by focusing on trends, first during the pre-ACDA days and then in the period after the agency was created, a clearer picture of the domestic politics of arms control emerges. Throughout, public opinion has been marked by ambiguity. Americans have wanted both a strong defense and also progress in arms control; they have feared another world war, but have been willing to threaten other nations with nuclear weapons; and they have not trusted the Soviet Union, but have believed that successful negotiations were possible.

When asked, "What do you consider to be the most important problem facing this country today?", respondents consistently showed an awareness and concern about issues related to arms control. While winning the war was the most important matter in 1945,[4] by 1946 only 10% named maintenance of peace as a top priority and just 3% saw the bomb as

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3 Gallup Opinion Polls claim to have a sampling tolerance within 3%, 95% of the time.

4 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, Report No. 185 (New Jersey: The American Institute of Public Opinion, 1981), p. 13.

a problem.[5] But debate over control of atomic weapons was reflected in the polls in 1947. Forty-six percent of those asked were worried about questions of peace. The poll asked about the importance of getting along with other nations (22%), preventing war and working out peace (21%), and controlling the bomb (3%).[6] From 1947 until 1961 the awareness level was consistent.

As Table 5.1 indicates, war, preventing war, and keeping the peace topped the list of concerns for the public. Combined with related issues, there seemed to be enough interest to pressure the government to respond on a concrete and on-going way. However, taken with other variables, the manner of that response was not obvious.

5 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 590.
6 Ibid., p.666.

TABLE 5.1

PRE-1961 PUBLIC CONCERNS

YEAR	MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM	(%)	PROBLEMS RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL	(%)
1947	High cost of living	24%	Foreign policy, preventing war, controlling bomb	46%
1948	Preventing war, danger of war, working out peace	38%	Foreign policy, getting along with USSR	27%
1949	Preventing war	16%	Foreign policy,	11%
1950	War, threat of war	40%	Control A-Bomb	6%
1951	War, foreign policy, USSR, threats to peace, Cold War	56%	N/A	
1952	Korean War (listed a top problem - no %)		N/A	
1953	Korean War	54%	Peace, avoiding World War III	7%
1954	Threat of war, war in Asia, USSR	18%	Peace, H-Bomb, defense	15%
1955	Working out peace, foreign policy	48%	Atomic energy	2%
1956	Threat of war, Suez, foreign policy	46%	Defense	2%
1957	Keeping out of war, relations with USSR	34%	N-tests, atomic control	6%
1958	Keeping peace	30%	Sputnik, space	11%
1959	Keeping peace	51%	N/A	
1960	Keeping peace (listed without percentages)		N/A	

Source: The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 626,857, 907, 1018, 1108, 1118, 1225, 1345, 1447, 1514, 1539, 1632, 1656.

Increases on defense spending have generally been favored since the end of the Second World War. During a 1946 Gallup Poll, respondents were told that about half the cost of government went to support the military. When given the option of either cutting taxes by reducing the army and navy or keeping the military the same size, 70% favored the latter, while 20% wanted to reduce taxes.[7]

By 1950 with the Korean War just beginning, 63% of the American people advocated an increase in defense spending, and although 24% wanted to keep military spending at current levels, this actually meant supporting a rise over what had been spent the year before. Only 7% preferred a decrease.[8] An exception in the public's thinking came when the defense outlay rose by $10 billion in 1951, 57% believed that the government's spending for national defense was too high.[9] But that view was short lived.

Within a yeár, even though monies disbursed increased by 51%, the number of people who wanted less spent on the armed forces was down to 26%, and while only a few more - 29% favored an increase, another 25% were satisfied with maintaining the budgetary status quo, which meant a large boost over the year before.[10] The public's opinion had shifted even more in favor of higher defense spending by 1960 when two-thirds expressed either satisfaction with the level of spending (45%), or wanted more allocated (21%). Those who favored restraint now made up only 18% of the population.[11]

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7 *Ibid*., p. 615.
8 *Ibid*., p. 906.
9 *Ibid*., p. 1016.
10 *Ibid*., p. 1108.
11 *Ibid*., p. 1663.

Underlying the public's desire to maintain high levels of military spending was the fear of the Russian factor -- a belief that the Soviet Union was ahead in weapons development. Shortly after Sputnik was launched in 1957, a poll asked: "Do you think Russia is moving ahead of the United States in the development of missiles and long-range rockets, or not?" Forty-nine percent answered "yes", while 32% said "no".[12] When asked the same question the following year, the gap had narrowed to 40%-37%. Meanwhile, 51% of the American public feared that the U.S.S.R. could destroy most U.S. cities in a matter of a few hours,[13] thus further confirming the perception of the Russian threat.

Missile-gap politics during the 1960 election campaign added to the scare, convincing 47% of those questioned that the Soviet Union was ahead in long-range weapons, while only 33% believed that the U.S. held the lead.[14] But one month after President Kennedy was inaugurated and three months before he announced the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the myth of a gap had been temporarily debunked and the numbers dramatically reversed. Now a clear majority of 49% felt that America had more and better missiles and only 30% thought that the Russians still had the weapons advantage.[15] The image in the psyche of Americans that the U.S.S.R. was a menacing power had been reflected in opinion polls prior to Sputnik. Politicans nurtured these attitudes which helped the strategic planners and the defense industry.

Polls conducted in 1948, 1949, and 1955, found that most people felt that the government in the Soviet Union was building up their

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12 _Ibid_., p. 1521.
13 _Ibid_., pp. 1538, 1570.
14 _Ibid_., p. 1654.
15 _Ibid_., pp. 1720-1721.

military forces not for defense but in order to rule the world, and would therefore not cooperate with the United States in world affairs. With the idea that the U.S.S.R. was becoming a dominant power, in 1948 almost three-quarters of those surveyed thought that the U.S. was being too soft in its foreign policy. A significant minority (27%) wanted to prepare to fight, and another 17% wanted immediate war.[16] In 1949 an overwhelming 72% did not believe that the leaders in the Kremlin were sincere about seeking peace, and in a similar poll taken nine years later, 80% said that the Soviet desires to end the Cold War and to seek peace were nothing more than propaganda.[17]

Americans were therefore generally pessimistic about the prospects of averting war. As Table 5.2 shows, when asked if they believed that the United States and other Western countries could continue to live more or less in peace with the Russians or if war was inevitable, an average of 57% expected war sooner or later. However, in 1960 when the question was worded with a more immediate tone, the results were remarkably different, less than one-third predicted war. Possession of nuclear weapons further affected the way the public viewed the probability of war.

16 Ibid., pp. 721. 826. 827.
17 Ibid., pp. 788, 1366.

TABLE 5.2

PEACE OR WAR?

QUESTION:

Do you think the United States and other Western countries can continue to live more or less peacefully with the Russians -- or do you think there is bound to be a major war sooner or later?

QUESTION:

Would you say there is much danger of war between Russia and the West, or not much danger?



Source: The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 1277, 1309, 1374, 1673, 1655.

Since 1945, many Americans have had a love affair with the bomb. It has been a symbol of power and technological achievement, and the public has not been timid about advocating its use. Shortly after the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been destroyed, a hugh percentage of those questioned (85%) approved of the atomic attacks. At the same time they rejected by 49%-40% the idea of using poison gas for the same

stated purpose of reducing American military casualties in Japan.[18] In the immediate post-war years there was broad consensus for continued development of atomic weapons. In 1947, 55% believed that the creation of the bomb was a good thing, two years later the approval rating was up to 59%. When word leaked out that production of a weapon perhaps one thousand times more powerful was under consideration, 78% urged continuation of the project. As Table 5.3 points out, the public did not believe the bomb made the danger of war any greater.

18 *Ibid*., pp. 521-522.

TABLE 5.3

IMPACT OF THE BOMB

Question:
Do you think the Atom Bomb has made another world war more likely or less likely?



Question:
Do you think the Hydrogen Bomb has made another world war more likely or less likely?



Question:
Now that Russia and other countries have the bomb, do you think chances of war are greater or less?



Source: The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 680, 797, 895, 1230, 1365.

But when war did come Americans were decisive as to what strategy they approved. Immediately after hostilities broke out in Korea, those who favored using atomic weapons in that country were a distinct minority; only 28% supported the idea, while 60% opposed such a plan. When the possibility arose that the United Nations forces might encounter the Chinese, however, the public in the U.S. made a quick

about-face. A December 1950 poll found 52% favoring a nuclear strike against China, and by December 1951 a similar number (51%) wanted the atom bomb to be used in Korea.[19]

As the United States became more and more militarily involved in Indochina, the public's willingness to repeat the 1945 war solution increased. By 1954 the Americans were willing by a two-to-one margin (58%-29%) to use atomic artillery in Southeast Asia, but in a reversal from the Korean War thinking, they were not prepared to support the nuclear bombing of China. Nor were 76% of the people ready to use their nuclear superiority against the Russians. Even though they were ready and willing to deploy weapons of mass destruction against small non-nuclear states, Americans firmly believed that another world war would bring nuclear destruction to their own land.[20] Therefore, thoughts of arms control and disarmament became increasingly salient in U.S. public opinion.

As far back as March 1951, a majority of those questioned believed that the government was not doing enough to prevent a Third World War. Throughout the decade prior to ACDA, most of those questioned favored the concept of attempting to work out agreements with the Soviet Union for controlling and reducing nuclear armaments. As the graph below illustrates, the public did not believe that the U.S. government should act unilaterally, but in accord with its allies and in response to the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, the people strongly favored intervention by the United Nations or some other world-wide body in the inspection process of any arms control agreement.

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19 Ibid., pp. 749, 938, 1027.
20 Ibid., pp. 1236, 1271, 1434, 1460.

TABLE 5.4

ARMS CONTROL PLANS

Question	Response	Percent
Should the U.S. try to work out an agreement with Russia before trying to build an H-Bomb? (1950)	Should	-----------48%
	Should Not	----------45%
Should the U.S. try to work out an agreement with Russia to control the Atom and Hydrogen Bombs? (1950)	Yes	-------------- 68%
	No	-----23%
If all major nations agree to reduce their armaments, should the U.S. do so? (1955)	Should	--------------67%
	Should Not	-------28%
If all other nations agree to stop nuclear weapons tests, should the U.S. agree to stop? (1957)	Should	--------------63%
	Should Not	-----27%
Should the U.S. and Allies agree to ban nuclear tests if Russia also agrees? (1958)	Should	-----------49%
	Should Not	--------36%
Would you favor setting up a world-wide organization which would make sure by inspection that no nation, including the U.S. and the USSR, make hydrogen bombs, atom bombs, and missiles? (1958)	Favor	---------------70%
	Oppose	---16%
If Russia agrees to disarm under U.N. inspection, should the U.S. agree to disarm to the same extent? (1960)	Should	----------46%
	Should Not	---------41%

Source: The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 973, 888, 895, 1353, 1487, 1541, 1562, 1691.

Even though many Americans were willing to give the arms control process a chance, few expected positive results. In 1950 only 11% had

faith that an agreement to regulate nuclear weapons would be successful. One year later, 46% thought that an accord with the U.S.S.R. would be impossible to negotiate. And when asked in 1958, "Do you think that if there were high level talks between the West and Russia, there would be much or little chance of them being successful?", only 24% responded in the affirmative.[21]

Shortly before President Kennedy came to office, opinion changed. A poll conducted in February 1960 found that 66% of those questioned believed that there was a possibility that a peaceful settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union could be reached. But within a year confidence had slipped back by sixteen percentage points.[22]

In 1961 the new administration in Washington, D.C. was faced with a public sending mixed messages. The people had for a number of years expressed a high degree of concern and awareness about issues related to foreign policy and peace, and were specifically worried about the prospects of war. Americans had a strong distrust of the Soviet Union, fearing that the U.S.S.R. had hostile intentions and a nuclear capacity that could destroy the United States. The citizens generally supported steadily increased defense spending and arms build-up, and had come to believe that the U.S. was ahead in military strength. They were enchanted by the possession of nuclear weapons and had an apparently cavalier attitude towards threatening their use. Perhaps most significant was the strong desire to pursue an arms control process even to the extent of relinquishing sovereignty to an international body.

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21 Ibid., pp. 888, 972, 1541.
22 Ibid., pp. 1655, 1699.

And public opinion had recently shifted to the belief that a peaceful settlement of issues with the Soviet Union was conceivable.

Creating a new governmental agency which was not large enough nor independent enough to threaten foreign policy objectives or the defense direction of the government, and having a high sounding moral mandate of pursuing world peace, would appease the will of the people and thus lessen public pressure. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, coincidently, contained all the elements which would satisfy the concerns of the public. The very existence of the agency projected the image of seriousness about the issue. Arms control was to be the only task of the new body and therefore would always be seen to be on the government's agenda. Americans' anxieties would be lessened by the knowledge that professionals would be constantly researching, negotiating, and consulting with other government bodies. And, since ACDA was to operate under the direction of the Secretary of State, the work would be kept consistent with national security concerns. Finally, the creation of the agency would send a positive message to allied and neutral countries and would win propaganda points in the international community. In advocating the creation of ACDA, Henry Cabot Lodge testified that

> ...even if no progress is made on disarmament it is still essential for the United States to appear before the world as a country which can evolve constructive ideas in this crucial field. This is a matter that has great importance for psychological reasons, for world opinion.[23]

23 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Establishing A U.S. Arms Control Agency, H.R. 1165, 87 Cong., 1st sess., p. 7, 1961.

Since its creation ACDA has played only a minor role in formulating and carrying out policy. This has been according to plan and compatible with the lack of enthusiasm with which the Executive Branch has embraced arms control. The domestic political risks involved in adopting such a posture and not achieving concrete and meaningful progress is borne out by the reaction of the public to polls conducted after 1961.

During the period of 1962-1984, the American people worried less about problems associated with arms control then they had in the pre-ACDA days. When asked what they considered to be the most important problem facing the country, issues relating to war and peace steadily took on less importance. From a high of 63% in 1962, fear of war and concern about international problems fell to a low of 5% by 1979 (see Table 5.5). The Vietnam war was top concern from 1964-1972; thereafter the public became most troubled by domestic matters such as race relations, Watergate, unemployment, and the high cost of living.

TABLE 5.5

TOP PUBLIC CONCERNS

Question:

What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today? (Answer combines concern about: Fear/threat of war, Vietnam War, international problems, foreign affairs)



Sources: The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 1765, 1812, 1898, 1973, 2009, 2151, 2180, 2252, 2292. The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Opinion Index (New Jersey: The American Institute of Public Opinion, 1972-1980), Reports no.86, p. 12; no. 100, p. 10; no. 140, pp.1-3; no. 118, p. 2; no. 127, p. 3; no. 142, p. 24; no. 157, p. 8; no. 167, p. 7; no. 175, p. 11; no. 181, p. 9. The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report (New Jersey: The Gallup Poll, 1981-1984), Reports no. 185, p. 12; no. 198, p. 26;, no. 213, p. 4; no. 220/221, p. 28.

In a related poll conducted eleven times from 1963-1984, respondents were asked if they thought the coming year would be more or less peaceful than the preceding one. Only in 1974, by a margin of 65%-24%, did people predict a more peaceful year. In the remaining ten polls, the public expressed a gloomy outlook. The widest disparity was in 1980 by a 80%-14% ratio, and in six of the polls more than 50% anticipated a less peaceful year.[24] The changing attitudes towards important problems did not change the way Americans viewed defense spending. As interest in war, peace, and international issues faded and as the public became pessimistic about the future, the corresponding support for higher military budgets was significant.

Although Gallup did not ask if too much, too little, or about the right amount of tax dollars were being spent for military purposes from 1960-1969, from 1969-1974 most respondents answered that too much was being allocated. But even before the end of the direct American military involvement in Vietnam in 1975, the public had begun to react by calling for increased spending. Whereas only 12% believed not enough was being designated in 1974, the number jumped to 22% the next year and up to 51% by 1981. Since the defense outlays had risen from $52.3 billion in 1962 to $209.9 billion in 1983, those who supported the status quo were in fact advocating annual increases (in 1971 and 1973 the defense outlays fell slightly).[25] As Table 5.6 shows, from 1976-1983 a clear majority either wanted more spent on defense or were satisfied with the year-to-year raises. As in the years before ACDA,

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24 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, Reports no. 196, p.11; no. 208, p.8.

25 U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Budgets of the United States, Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 6.1(1)-6.1(8).

the fear of the Russian factor remained a constant theme and the intensity correlated closely with the trend for increased defense spending.

TABLE 5.6

DEFENSE SPENDING

Question:
There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?

Combined totals for "too little" and "about right"

Year	%
1969	39%
1970	44%
1971	41%
1973	43%
1974	42%
1976	54%
1977	67%
1980	73%
1981	73%
1982	55%
1983	41%



Sources: The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, pp. 2210, 2265, 2298. The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Opinion Index, Reports no. 101, p. 16; no. 112, p. 20; no. 129, p. 20; no. 146, p. 4; no. 175, p. 10. The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, Reports no. 186, p. 23; no. 199, p. 39;, no. 208, p. 12.

During the 1960s and 1970s most Americans continued to believe that the power of the Soviet Union was growing. From 1960 until 1969, however, a greater number of those surveyed were convinced that the U.S. strength was increasing (Table 5.7). But as the outcome of the American war in Vietnam became more obvious, the way Americans viewed their own country reversed. Polls conducted in 1974 and 1976 showed that by a margin of 50%-29% and 44%-42% most people predicted that the United States' power would decrease in the coming year. When comparisons were made between the two superpowers from 1968-1979, fewer people thought that the U.S.S.R. was growing weaker.

TABLE 5.7

POWER PROJECTIONS

Question:

Which of these do you think is likely to be true of (year): A year when America (Russia) will increase her power in the world, or a year when American (Russian) power will decrease?



Source: The American Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Opinion Index, Reports no. 138, pp. 6-8; no. 154, pp. 54-55; no. 173, pp. 18-19.

By 1982, 43% saw the Soviets as a stronger military power, only 22% thought America was on top. In three polls taken from May 1982 to May 1983, the Russians were seen as having greater nuclear strength by an average of 37%-18%.[26] The public's view that the United States was declining as a world power coincided with their advocacy of increased military spending. But the logical conclusion of the fear and the military build-up left the people even more apprehensive.

In 1961, 59% were either very worried or fairly worried about atomic weapons being used if another world war broke out, and 83% thought that they personally had only a 50% chance or less of living through such a conflict. Sixty percent believed in 1963 that nuclear weapons would be used against the United States in the next war, and by 1973 the number had risen to 68%.[27] The pessimism was further reflected from 1981-1983 when an average of 51% predicted that there was a better than 50% chance of a world war within the next ten years.[28]

Yet the apocalyptic outlook was not reflected in responses to questions of policy and weapons development. When given the hypothetical choice of fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under communism, respondents in 1961 gave a resounding 81% affirmation to

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26 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, Reports no. 199, p. 38; no. 208, p. 11; no. 212, p. 27.

27 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, pp. 1726, 1734, 1808.

The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977 (Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1978), p. 190.

The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Opinion Index, Report no. 101, p. 18.

28 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, Report no. 220/221, p. 41.

nuclear war. At the height of the Vietnam war in 1967, a strong minority of 42% promoted the concept of using atomic weapons, and in 1975, 53% of the public wanted the U.S. to continue to maintain a policy of militarily propping up anti-communist governments. The American people did not shy away from wanting development of new and destabilizing weapons. Forty-three percent of those surveyed favored supplying the United States and allied armed forces with the neutron bomb, and in 1981, 48% approved of the Reagan Administration's decision to start production of the weapon.[29] But the public continued to send out confusing messages.

Various polls conducted after the creation of ACDA reinforced the public's demand for action towards arms control. Unlike earlier attitudes, there was a substantial number of people who believed that a peaceful settlement of differences could be reached between the two superpowers. In polls conducted in 1962, 1963, and 1964, an average of 56% of those questioned felt that an accord could be successful, compared to 31% who saw rapprochement as impossible.[30] Americans surveyed in 1971, 1975, and 1981, believed by an average of 47%-43% that war had become an outmoded way of settling differences,[31] and in the early 1980s still had faith in international intervention in the arms control issue.

In 1981-82, while the Reagan Administration was calling for massive rearmament and attacking the credibility of the United Nations,

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29 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, pp. 1741, 2088.

30 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, pp. 1754, 1758, 1799, 1909.

31 The American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, Report no. 189, p. 29.

the public was reacting to the bellicose posture through the polls. Fifty-six percent said that they would vote "yes" if the U.N. sponsored a referendum on nuclear disarmament, and 83% favored setting up a world-wide organization to make sure, by regular inspection, that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would violate an arms accord if one could be successfully negotiated. Further, 72% would support an agreement between the two superpowers not to build more nuclear weapons, and while 72% approved of reducing one-half of the nuclear stockpiles, 47% favored the total destruction of all atomic weapons.[32]

The profile of the American people after the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was not too different from what it had been prior to 1961. The public seemed to be less concerned that issues related to arms control outweighed any other, but they still feared the Soviet Union, and except for a short period of time, favored a steady increase in military spending. Although many continued to sanction the use of U.S. atomic weapons against smaller, non-nuclear states, most remained worried about the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used against them, and hence feared a war with the Soviet Union or China. They also believed that each new year would be less peaceful than the preceding one. This anxiety led many to favor reductions in armaments and an enhanced role for international organizations in the arms control process. Finally, the public concluded that it was possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to settle their differences peacefully.

32 Ibid., Report nos. 188, pp.5, 9; no. 193, p. 14; no. 196, pp. 14-15.

Since the end of the Second World War an essential goal of the strategic policy of the U.S. had been to achieve military superiority over the U.S.S.R., particularly in both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. One impediment to the outright pursuit of this objective has been the fear of the loss of public support. Americans, like most people, desire to see their government working for peace, and since they have a certain degree of access to information, it is possible for them to know and understand the direction of their government, and therefore to hope they might exercise controlling power. But the public consensus is a puzzling mosaic having sufficient contradictions to allow for a broad interpretation as to the nature of the national will.

The extent to which the government is influenced by the polls is debatable, but ACDA has perhaps played a vital role in coalescing the diverse attitudes in a non-threatening way. It has allowed the government to proudly point to the agency as proof of its sincerity, and along with high-profile negotiating meetings and political rhetoric, the government is free to proceed with its strategic goals.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

On August 6, 1945, in Hiroshima, the world witnessed the greatest mass destruction ever by a single weapon. Three days later the act was repeated in Nagasaki, Japan. Since that time nuclear weapons have become more powerful and accurate. The world-wide stockpile has grown from the single bomb in the American arsenal after Nagasaki, to over 50,000. The types range from small single artillery shells to intercontinental ballistic missiles with several warheads. The nuclear-weapon states, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, allocate large proportions of their yearly budgets to researching and designing new, exotic, increasingly lethal weapons and weapon systems. The strategic interests of the two superpowers virtually engulf the planet, which leaves the earth's population vulnerable and in peril. Scenarios abound as to how a world-destroying nuclear war could be triggered by miscalulation, technological malfunctions, or political instability.

Arms control efforts that aim at the reduction of nuclear arsenals have generally failed. As a result of negotiations since 1945, no nuclear weapon, delivery system, submarine, missile, ship, aircraft, or major military program from either side has been dismantled. Agreements which have been successfully negotiated have dealt with exotic weapons

or weapon systems, such as antiballistic missile systems and space weapons. Alternatively, they have outlawed the placement of weapons in non-critical areas for example, on seabeds or in the Antarctic. Accords like the Non-Proliferation Treaty have formalized the superpower control over all aspects of the armament process, and strategic arms limitation treaties have placed ceilings at higher rather than lower levels. Progress in arms limitations has explicitly not matched the rhetoric of political leaders.

A study of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency further emphasizes the low priority the American government has given arms control. While it is true that ACDA is a small organization within a vast government system, and that the overall policy direction of any administration is set by the President, the symbolism the agency carries is unmistakable. The organization has clearly represented the American government's approach to arms control.

The creation of ACDA was a collaborative effort. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act was drafted by the executive branch of the U.S. government, and studied, debated, and passed into law by Congress. During the hearings the formal mandate of the new agency was unmistakable. ACDA was to be at the center of arms control research, coordination, and negotiations. The centralization of the process would be a departure from the past ad hoc operations so that substantive progress could be made in controlling and reducing weapons of mass destruction. In practice, however, neither of the sponsoring branches have provided the needed support to allow the goals to be met. The agency, along with the concept underlying it, became part of the

national security apparatus. ACDA has been surrounded by and dependent upon the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council.

The U.S. government's approach to arms control through the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has remained consistent, with its roots going back prior to 1961. NSC 68, adopted as official doctrine in 1950, contained the conceptual underpinnings for policy, and although modified to fit different administrations, has framed the American perspective. The key to the position has been that a high level of defense spending must be maintained to protect U.S. military superiority and to defend Western Europe from the U.S.S.R. One of the principle elements required for public support of the program was on-going arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. One result has been that the arms control process has not been solely focused on reducing the threat caused by the armaments build-up, but has been concomitant to military aims. As the 1977 ACDA Annual Report stated: "it is a fundamental U.S. principle that any such [arms control] agreement must leave the United States and its allies as strong relative to the Soviet Union as they would be in the absence of such an agreement."[1]

Another common aspect of the process has been the government's reaction to arms control personnel when substantial progress has been made towards limiting armament programs. In 1957, Harold Stassen was forced out of his position as primary negotiator when it appeared that agreement with the Soviet Union was near. After the successful

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1 U.S., Congress, Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1977 Annual Report, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1978, p.6.

completion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972, many top and middle-level employees at ACDA were fired due to pressure from the powerful Congressional defense lobby. Again, as a result of high level opposition to SALT II, staff levels at the arms control agency were dramatically cut in the early 1980s. Even though ACDA had not had the significant role in either negotiation, the message to arms controllers could not be disregarded.

Although the appointments of ACDA Directors had to fall within a range of political acceptability, those who have been chosen have generally fit the model of earlier arms control policy makers. From the Acheson-Lilienthal Board of Consultants and Bernard Baruch and his staff, to Paul Nitze and John McCloy, a similarity of background is present. They were primarily drawn from America's upper class, were members of the corporate, legal, or government elites, had strong military backgrounds and connections, and none had ever been accountable to the electorate for the program they promoted or had a consistent history of arms control advocacy.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as the only government body with the exclusive mission of arms control has also embraced strategies which were contrary to it own goals. The contradiction was caused by the role all executive branch organizations have vis-a-vis the President. As the former Deputy Director Philip Farley testified before the House Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs in 1981

> I have the unpleasant personal experience of going up before Congress many times and explaining why a comprehensive test ban was not judged

> feasible. I did not enjoy that, but I did not see how I could go up and take a position different than the President.[2]

ACDA's influence within the executive branch is largely dependent upon the Director's relationship with the President, and only one Director, Paul Warnke, had direct access to the Oval Office. Further, no President has given the agency a sustained role on the National Security Council, which has diluted the arms control voice even more. The White House also has determined the budget and staff levels of the arms control body, and has thus minimized the agency's size and function. Democratic Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island pointed out in 1983 that "there are about two-thirds as many military bands in toto - trumpeters, drummers, and all - as there will be people permanently assigned to ACDA this year."[3]

Along with the external impediments over which the agency has had no control, decisions made internally under the leadership of those chosen by the President, have kept the workings of ACDA consistent with the large defense-oriented goals of the main foreign policy departments. Congress intended that the agency be the focal point for conducting and coordinating arms control research. Since it is a small agency not all of ACDA's work has been done in-house, and the organization has had to depend on other sources for information. In order to fulfill the external research requirements, the decision makers have often contracted with the Defense Department, the C.I.A., military branches, and large defense contractors.

2 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization For Fiscal Year 1982-83, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p.60.

3 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p.3.

Further, within the executive branch a considerable amount of research related to arms control is conducted or sponsored by other bodies. These projects fall within the coordinating function of ACDA. But a 1980 General Accounting Office investigation (ID-80-6, March 17, 1980) found that ACDA had not identified the different projects, had not maintained a comprehensive inventory or evaluated research performed or sponsored by other federal agencies, had not collected data from other departments since 1974, and had generally failed to fulfill its coordinating responsibilities.

In 1974 Congress gave ACDA a tool intended to increase the effectiveness and role of the arms control body. The Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) were designed to assess the effects of military programs on arms control. ACDA officials were reluctant, however, to accept the new power, not wanting to criticize Defense Department proposals.[4] The process, therefore, eventually fell under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council. Congress had considered it possible for ACDA to exercise a leadership role in the area of arms control, but from the beginning the agency has not been allowed or willing to take the lead.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was born in the midst of an arms build-up. Throughout the hearings to bring the agency into existence, people from various fields testified that one major reason arms control efforts had failed during the sixteen years following the Second World War was because the process on the U.S. side had not been centralized. The vision of an agency made up of arms control experts,

4 U.S., Comptroller General, Statements That Analyze Effects Of Proposed Programs On Arms Control Need Improvement October 20, 1977, p. 14.

having the capabilities of planning, research and negotiation that would give the United States a consistent, professional and coherent arms control regime, was promoted and advertised. Many who testified underscored the urgent need for arms control and saw ACDA as needing to be at the heart of decision making.

But after almost three decades, arms control is still a distant goal. The creation of a centralized agency has had little effect on slowing the quantitative or qualitative development of weapons of mass destruction. To a certain extent the ad hoc nature continues. The Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Energy, the National Security Council, and ACDA each have their own arms control positions. Leadership at major negotiations changes with different administrations and when political and public relations conditions need to be met. Joseph Lehman, an ACDA official, told the New York Times, that "arms control is often used as a pawn in this town."[5] A central question, however, continues to persist: What is at the root of the failure of arms control?

This study of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a step towards answering the question. Since ACDA has the official legislated mandate for arms control, the agency represents a significant point of reference in understanding how the U.S. government has addressed the issue. At the very least the investigation points to how successive administrations have not provided ACDA with the necessary support to advance substantive arms control. The history of the agency also

5 "Friction at the Top Throws Off Sparks at Arms Control Agency," New York Times, 15 January 1983, p.5.

highlights the position of the organization within the executive branch, and gives insight into the policy making process. But in order to get to the heart of why arms control has failed, the research needs to be expanded to investigate questions which emerge from the ACDA study. Has the selection of arms control personnel in the State Department, the National Security Council, and on other levels at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency itself followed the same pattern as for those selected to be ACDA Director? Are there common personality traits among those who the government recruits to be involved with the issue? How are policies arrived at in the other departments which are involved in the process? How do economic and other questions influence the negotiating positions? And how, specifically, is public opinion integrated into policy decisions?

If the studies reveal a consistency to the pattern found at ACDA, they will support the contention that arms control programs are designed to appease public opinion in order to facilitate arms proliferation, and to satisfy domestic political considerations. If the ACDA model is found to be widespread and continues unabated, it represents an intentional impediment to the progress of international arms limitations.

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