

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIALISM: A CRITIQUE

by

Don Forgay

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

University of Manitoba

September, 1988

© 1988

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-47973-6

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIALISM: A CRITIQUE

by

Don Forgay

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

© 1988

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF MANITOBA to lend or sell copies of this thesis, to
the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this
thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and UNIVERSITY
MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the
thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or other-
wise reproduced without the author's written permission.

ABSTRACT

The concept of 'civil society' has recently re-emerged as a key term in social theory. Its central concern is with the social space of individual autonomy. Its retrieval, especially by socialist scholars, reflects a perceived decline of the 'public sphere' in advanced capitalism and the manifest eclipse of individual liberty in 'actually existing socialism'. This thesis examines some of the issues raised by the attempt to conjoin 'civil society' with socialist democracy. As a vehicle for this discussion David MacGregor's The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx (1984) is analyzed. Against MacGregor, it is argued that Hegel's doctrine of abstract right cannot provide a justification for workers' property rights, nor can his theory of the corporation provide a basis for socialist democracy. Drawing upon Marx's labour theory of value the thesis argues that no 'rational state' can be erected upon a basis of commodity production and exchange, with or without capitalists. MacGregor's form of 'market socialism' entails an abdication of the possibility of conscious rational control over the social division of labour. A 'socialist civil society' must continue to seek some basis for individual autonomy other than the right of private property.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a number of people whose support allowed me to finish this thesis. I would like to thank my advisor, John Hofley, for his patience and his encouragement. I am grateful to my committee members, Wayne Taylor and Mark Gabbert, for the care with which they read the thesis. My mother, Margery Forgay, deserves more thanks than I can ever give her. Most of all, I have to thank Catrina Brown. Without her unfailing support completion of this work would have been impossible. The thesis is dedicated to the memory of Shawn Cox and Ray Forgay.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
PREFACE	v
INTRODUCTION	1
Chapters	
I. INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF MACGREGOR'S 'COMMUNIST IDEAL'	34
II. CIVIL SOCIETY	51
III. CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIALISM	95
IV. MARX'S CRITIQUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY	154
V. CONCLUSION	213
APPENDIX	218
NOTES	237
BIBLIOGRAPHY	265

PREFACE

Today it seems most socialists in the 'West' (even more-so in the 'East') believe 'communism' has betrayed socialism. Communism in power has (where it not been even worse) resulted in "the grim, surveillance-minded, demoralized world of contemporary 'actually existing socialism'... where civil society and public life have been destroyed, and both marxism and moral vocabulary have become wholly devalued,... [it has produced a] general annihilation in such societies and beyond of the belief that the socialist project is worthy of allegiance, or even serious attention" (Lukes, 1987, xii). Of all the political, ideological and theoretical quandries that face those who still believe in the project of socialism as one of human freedom none is more serious or (seemingly) intractable as this.

There are few today that can without qualm explain away this pattern of development in 'post-revolutionary' societies -- as accident, the product of 'backwardness', imperialist/counter-revolutionary threat, of contingent bureaucratic or dictatorial usurpation, or whatever -- and fewer still (among those that socialism would convert to its cause) that will listen to such apologies. Something went seriously wrong in the history of the socialist movement. Things have not turned out, in the nations of 'actually

existing socialism', or elsewhere where the revolution failed to come, as most socialists would have expected or wished. If socialism is to have a future we must decipher the antinomies of the socialism we thought we wanted, of the means with which we sought to achieve it and of the consequences of that project. And we must be able to reconstruct the socialist project in such a way as to discover a reasonable and viable alternative to past patterns of development.

To many, among them all too many 'repentant' ex-socialists, the problem is socialism itself and the solution all too obvious: all socialism is unfreedom (a new 'serfdom' or 'barbarism') and the only freedom 'the open society' of 'free enterprise' -- we have only to realize that we (in the West) live already in 'the best of all possible worlds'. Many others, retaining some (moderate or radical) belief in the ideal of socialism have traced the problems of contemporary socialism to one or another fatal flaw in the 'theory of the communists', to the work of Karl Marx, or (more likely, but not inevitably, if the detective considers him or herself a 'Marxist') of his successors.

There are undoubtedly numerous errors, significant and innocuous, of omission and of commission, in the work of Marx and later Marxists, but this latter approach to the problems of socialism sometimes gives to ideas more credit (and blame) than they deserve. As Steven Lukes notes, it "falsely and naively suggests that the historical

developments were inherent in the theory, which could only come to fruition in these disasterous ways":

Theories are plundered and their ideas selected and interpreted by historical actors pursuing their interests within objective conditions and under pressure of historical contingencies: it is all of these, in combination, not simply the logic of the theories, which explains historical outcomes. That much, at the very least, marxism has taught us.
(Lukes, xiii)

But (this said), theories are important. They shape what we think it desirable to do, condition what we think it possible to do, and guide what we actually do. They are of especial importance to socialism, for socialism (at least in the only conceptions of it I find at all attractive) conceives a future of freedom and self-determination: a world of our own choosing and making, not one propelled by brute necessity, by unreflected habit or custom, by ungovernable social forces, or by the power of a few over the many.

Today socialism and human freedom hardly seem the immanent tendency of all social development. Nor do these two ideals any longer seem to have an intrinsic connection. That connection must be established and the possibility of its realization demonstrated in debates which must tie together concrete descriptions and analyses of both the nature and specific (institutional and political) structure of a 'viable' socialism and of the politics of its achievement, with due regard for the all-too-real possibilities of unforeseen and undesirable developments and

for methods of meeting such challenges.

Heretofore socialists (and perhaps especially Marxist socialists) seem to have, as it were, adopted the division of labour of a (constitutional) army: 'we will fight and win the war, the treaty, settlement and what come after are the responsibility of others'. But tactics and objectives cannot be separated. We cannot properly decide on the first without some knowledge of the second. One fundamental lesson that socialists must, I think, draw from their history (and so correct what is perhaps the movement's greatest 'sin of omission') is that it is as important to develop our conceptions of the goal of the socialist project as of the means of achieving it. The underdevelopment of the former is liable to encourage defects in the latter.

'Rethinking Socialism' is important. I would like to think of this essay as a part of that effort. But it is, in the main, a negative contribution. The revival of the concept of 'civil society' has been an element of the contemporary rethinking of socialism and this essay examines the relationship between these two concepts. In particular it will examine the proposition advanced by David MacGregor in his recent book The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx that the socialist project can be more profitably founded upon Hegel's theory of civil society and the rational state than upon Marx's theory of communism. It is not my intention to defend Marx's theory, but I will argue that MacGregor's Hegelian socialism does not provide a viable alternative.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of 'civil society' has recently re-emerged as an important category in socialist theories and debates on the future of socialism. In this essay I will undertake a critical examination of some aspects of the relation between these two ideas. In particular I will examine the recent Hegelian reformulation of the socialist project proposed by David MacGregor in his book The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx.¹ In this work MacGregor undertakes the most comprehensive retrieval of the idea of civil society yet attempted in the contemporary discussions. Where in the work of many commentators the reappropriation of civil society has involved revision of the concept, MacGregor returns to the paradigmic modern formulation of it by Hegel. He draws from the Philosophy of Right an alternative conception of socialism to Marx's theory of communism. I will argue that, whereas MacGregor's discussion draws attention to important questions and addresses itself to manifest difficulties in Marx's theory, no 'rational state', let alone socialism, can be established on the basis of Hegel's conception of civil society.

In the following sections of this introduction I will try to introduce and frame the issues to be addressed in

this thesis. In the first chapter I will look in more detail at the intellectual circumstances within contemporary Marxism with which MacGregor's discussion intersects. In chapter two the evolution of the concept of civil society will be explored and Hegel's theorization of it discussed. In the third chapter MacGregor's interpretation of Hegel's political theory as a 'communist ideal' will be presented. In this chapter I will also introduce two elements of my critique of MacGregor's theory. In the fourth chapter I will discuss Marx's critique of civil society and try to indicate how his Labour Theory of Value illustrates the impossibility of founding the socialist project on the basis of (what he, Hegel and MacGregor understand by) civil society.

- I -

The theory of the communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is allegedly to be the groundwork of all personal freedom and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

- The Communist Manifesto (CW6, 498)

Both Hegel and Marx sought a resolution, in philosophy, of the antinomies of bourgeois society. Both also sought to

make that philosophical resolution an actual one. Each sought to ground their conception of this possible resolution in an understanding of the historical dynamic of society and of the (subjective and objective) forces by which that resolution would be brought about. Thus for Hegel, "what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (PR, 10) and for Marx "communism[,] the real movement that abolishes the present state of things" (GI, 56-7). Both conceived of history as an intelligible whole, a "longitudinal totality" and the resolution of its antinomies as a new "normative totality" - the 'rational state' and 'communism', respectively.²

These alternative resolutions of the dilemmas of the modern world would appear to be utterly different. Hegel believed that all the elements of the rational state already existed in his time: what remained was to bring these elements to their full development and into their proper articulation. For Marx, on the other hand, the basic structures of the contemporary social world were the antithesis of humanity's proper 'species being' and had to be swept away if the 'realm of freedom' was to be realized.

Civil society, the realm of particularity, subjective freedom and private right grounded in the commodity/exchange economy of the 'system of needs', is, in Hegel's political philosophy, the necessary, if not the sufficient, basis of the rational state, Hegel's conception of 'the realm of freedom'. Hegel supports the "doctrine of the necessity of

private property", but "the rationale of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the supersession of the pure subjectivity of personality" (PR, para 46A,41A). "From the standpoint of freedom, property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a substantive end" (PR, para 43R). Property in turn necessitates the sphere of contract: "this relation of will to will is the true and proper ground in which freedom is existent... whereby I hold property not merely by means of a thing and my subjective will, but by means of another person's will" (PR, para 71). So emerges civil society: "a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness and rights of all" and "whereby their singularity and their natural condition are raised... to formal freedom and formal universality of knowing and willing -- the process whereby their particularity is educated up to subjectivity" (PR, paras 183, 187).

Hegel differentiates himself from liberal thought in holding that civil society is not a sufficient basis for the social order but must be complemented by the state embodying a 'positive freedom' and a renewed Sittlichkeit - ethical life (Taylor, 1975, 376ff). The sovereignty of (and citizens' life in) the state must be something more than the liberal's 'social contract' for the preservation of property and liberty, for in such a state the populace would be perpetually consumed in their private egoistic affairs, they

would have neither 'community' nor reason to give a positive substance to their subjective freedom (Marcuse, 1960, 173).

On the other hand, where the demand for radical autonomy is conjoined with a demand for "universal and total participation" in the life of the community, only a doctrine such as Rousseau's 'general will' could fill the gap. But this notion, objected Hegel (designating it 'absolute freedom'), "requires homogeneity". "It cannot brook differences which would prevent everyone participating totally in the decisions of society". It necessarily becomes intolerant of subjective freedom and individual difference: its "drive to absolute freedom thus becomes the fury of destruction" (Taylor, 1975, 410, 412, 373).³

To be adequate to the demands of both individual autonomy and community Hegel's rational state must therefore be an articulated structure of family, civil society and state, such that both subjective particularity and universality are given their due. Through the mediation of the Corporation and the Estates, individuals may transcend their particularity and partake of the universality of the state. Nonetheless, the particularity of civil society remains a necessary counterpoint to the universality of the state.

Marx, whose own understanding of civil society developed in his engagement with Hegel's political philosophy, was in accord with Hegel in viewing the growth of civil society as the basis for the development of the

individual in modern society. However, the freedom accorded the individual, in this society where state and society were bifurcated and where the accumulation of property dominated civil society, was, in Marx's view, a deficient, alienated, freedom which distorted rather than developed human potential. Where Hegel accepted private property as the necessary basis of the individual's autonomy, Marx came to a different conclusion. If civil society generated (a certain sort of) autonomous individual, the dynamics of the 'system of needs' also generate powerful forces undermining the individual. Marx concludes that if the individual is to be preserved, private property must be overthrown.⁴

Although the theory of communism cannot, as Marx and Engels put it polemically in the Communist Manifesto, "be summed up in [a] single sentence", the formula which they gave there -- "abolition of private property" -- is indeed the nub of the matter (CW6, 496). By private property Marx and Engels mean 'bourgeois' -- capitalist -- private property and encompassed within the call for its abolition are demands for the abolition of wage labour, of classes, of the alienated division of labour and of the circumstance where human beings' own self-created productive force appears as "an alien force existing outside them...which they cannot control,... independent of the will & action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these" (MER, 484, GI, 54).⁵

The call for the abolition of private property is at

the same time a call for the abolition of civil society, the social order that rests upon property. And the call for the abolition of civil society is a call for the abolition of the separation of state and society, the existence of the state as (another) sphere in which human powers become an alien power over humanity. In place of all this Marx envisages a new radically dis-alienated society -- communism: "In place of the old civil society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (MER, 491).

With the accomplishment of universal suffrage and a 'true democracy' the separate existence of the state over and against society will be done away with (Avineri, 1968, 33f). With the abolition of private property, of capitalist production and the commodity/exchange economy, the situation where humanity's "own social action takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers rather than being ruled by them" (CI, 79) will be abolished and humanity may become "associated producers rationally regulating their interchange with nature" (CIII, 820). And on the basis of the developed forces of production and productivity of labour inherited from capitalism (and further developed after its overthrow) the alienated character of labour and the division of labour will disappear (Ollman, 1978, 66ff).

- II -

The history of the past century and a half would not appear to recommend either Hegel's or Marx's prognosis. Hegel felt that all the necessary elements for the realization of the rational state were in place in his time. Yet, where private property prevails no stable articulation of civil society and the state that could be described as approaching Hegel's rational state has emerged. Civil society continues to dominate the state, particular interests the universal, and the inequities of luxury and poverty, power and dependence generated by civil society (defects of property which Hegel thought would be ameliorated by the state) have spread on a global scale in step with the growth of the capitalist world market. On the other hand, this society persists in spite of its manifest defects while the socialist movement that would overthrow it wanes. Where bourgeois society has undergone a revolutionary transformation the result has been anything but the realization of communism. The demolition of civil society has left a vacuum which has been filled by the state -- a state that is by no means the embodiment of freedom -- where, rather, as Marx put it in his critique of Hegel, "the bureaucracy has the state... as its private property" (CW3, 47).

The failure of Marx's vision of communism can perhaps be taken as the more problematic. For it has gone awry

despite being the conscious objective of a great mass movement, while the Philosophy of Right was never the manifesto of a popular political program. Both Marxism and the socialist movement, despite their travails, remain as important intellectual and political elements of the contemporary world; they must confront their history and condition as a practical problem to be resolved. Since 1917 the antinomies of 'post-revolutionary' societies have been as critical a question for Marxian analysis as those of capitalist societies. Yet Marxism has arguably been much less successful in its treatment of the former, despite the fact that many tendencies of Marxism, from Trotskyism, to Maoism, to 'Western Marxism' have been shaped largely by their critical attitude toward 'actually existing socialism'.

The failure of the post-revolutionary societies to realize (or even approach) the promise of socialism or communism is the combined result of many factors which cannot be explored here. One factor, perhaps (though perhaps not) of small import originally, has, however now become central to the future prospects of the socialist project: the failure to explore the social and institutional structure of socialism. The experience of 'actually existing socialism' and especially its political fallout in the West makes redressing this lacuna more urgent than ever. As Perry Anderson has written:

it is clear that without serious exploration and mapping of [the institutional terrain of socialism], any political advance beyond a parliamentary capitalism will continue to be blocked. No working-class or popular bloc in a western society will ever make a leap in the dark, at this point in history, let alone into the grey on grey of an eastern society of the type that exists today. A socialism that remains incognito will never be embraced by it. (1983, 98,99)

Marxism has traditionally eschewed the construction of utopian 'blueprints', inheriting this aversion from Marx himself. The task of socialism, Marx and Engels wrote, was not "to manufacture a system of society as perfect as possible, but to investigate the historical economic process from which these classes and their antagonisms had of necessity sprung and to discover in the economic position thus created the means of solving the conflict" (quoted in Lasky, 1976, 593). If the early 'utopian' socialists were noted for a tendency to elaborate fantastically detailed descriptions of life in the 'New Jerusalem', rooted in ahistorical conceptions of human nature, while leaving hazy what conditions and forces in the present would make such a world possible, or how the change might be effected, Marxism has tended to veer too far in the opposite direction. Its concentration, especially in the twentieth century, on the analysis of the dynamics of existing society and upon the 'Realpolitik' of gaining power have left little space for consideration of the object of the exercise -- socialism -- and its character.

The ironic result is that Marxism has, in some ways, been more utopian than the utopians. Its image of socialism,

or communism, has been left unelaborated and often has amounted to no more than a recitation of time-worn aphorisms. Even as Marxism's analyses of the contemporary capitalist world have grown into sophisticated and subtle appreciations of its complexities, there remained among socialists a "conviction of an inherent simplification of administration and production, economy and polity alike" under socialism "which virtually ruled out the possibility, or necessity, of conceiving political or economic arrangements of any complexity at all, after the overthrow of capital" (Anderson, 1983, 98).

Today this image must be questioned as must the presumption that no critical new social antagonisms can arise once capitalist private property is abolished. It seems just as reasonable today to presume that socialism will entail a growth in social and political complexity, and the experience of 'actually existing socialism' illustrates how disastrous the failure to address the institutional structures of socialism can be. This history has put the burden of proof on socialists: if the abolition of private property and the dissolution of civil society are necessary conditions for the establishment of socialism, what new institutional balance can be established that will ensure the preservation/realization of individual freedom while preventing the development of new forms of social exploitation and inequality? What will prevent a collapse into a 'mono-organizational'/'totalitarian' society

dominated by the state and smothering individual (and social) freedom?

This new debate is finally weaning Marxist thinkers of their anti-utopian bias -- that is their failure to project and analyze the social structure of socialism -- without, it is hoped, causing them to abandon Marx's critique of utopianism: that such a projection is futile if it cannot be connected with the dynamics of existing society (cf. Williams, 1983). At the same time there are optimistic signs that both Marxist and non-Marxist socialists can and are joining together to undertake this enterprise (Alec Nove's The Economics of Feasible Socialism and the debate it has raised is one hopeful indication of this).⁶

Debates over the preferable, possible and probable character of socialism, and over the means acceptable or required to bring it into being are not new. They have indeed dominated socialist discourse from its beginnings. Yet however vociferous has been the debate over means and with regard to the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, there has been enough filial similarity in most visions of the completed socialist society that these escaped detailed scrutiny. Socialism was to be the antithesis of capitalism in almost every way; that it would be so could be virtually taken for granted: for that was the very point of socialism (cf. Samuel, 1985). Marx's vision of communism was virtually indistinguishable from that of the anarchists who were in most other matters his bitter

political opponents (Forester, 1980). If anything distinguishes the debates developing today from those of the past it is an awareness that it can not be assumed, by definition, that socialism will be even a better world than that we know, let alone a perfect one. The political and practical fortunes of socialism require that every desire and every possibility be scrupulously examined.

- III -

The concept of 'civil society' was, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, one of the crucial organizing concepts through which the emergence of the modern world was interpreted. It was an indispensable concept in the work of both Hegel and Marx. But with the consolidation of the bourgeois capitalist world it went into eclipse and was little used in the past century and a half (Keane, 1988b). Yet today it is appearing again, with greater and greater frequency in political and sociological theory. But in its contemporary usage it has tended to receive rather different emphases than its earlier usage. It is of course quite normal for concepts to be adapted to, and transformed by different circumstances and needs. Indeed, the relative similarity of contemporary usage of civil society to that of the nineteenth century is an indication of the degree to which we inhabit a largely similar social universe. For the usage of Hegel and Marx differs far more

dramatically from that of their classical and feudal predecessors than that in current debates.

Through all of its changing meanings one theme is central to the concept of civil society: it is concerned with the character and circumstances of individual freedom and autonomy. The contemporary reemergence of the concept is evidence of renewed efforts -- especially on the left -- to rethink the possibilities for democracy both in the contemporary advanced capitalist world and in 'actually existing' and a possible future 'feasible socialism'. 'Civil society' has thus emerged as an important category in a project, of both means and ends, a discussion where the association of socialism with individual liberty and with democracy can no longer be taken for granted.

The most comprehensive rethinking of the socialist project in terms of civil society that has so far emerged has come from a non-marxist socialist, David MacGregor in his recent work The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx.⁷ MacGregor sets out to show that "something like Marx's vision of communism also animates Hegel's social and political theory"; that "the state Hegel refers to resembles what Marx calls communist society" (CIHM, 27,193).

In this Porter Prize winning work MacGregor aims to retrieve Hegel as a politically radical and socially progressive philosopher, arguing that in his social philosophy Hegel is far more than a 'precursor' of Marx. Throughout the book MacGregor promotes the idea of a near

identity of the views of the two thinkers -- repeatedly employing the device of placing quotations from both back to back to establish this similarity (occasionally, as MacGregor does not always identify in the text the author of particular statements, one is led to attribute to Marx a proposal that is in fact Hegel's, or vice-versa).⁸ This method is quite valuable in illustrating the profound influence upon Marx of Hegel's philosophy. "The division commonly made between Hegel and Marx", writes MacGregor, "is illusory; the parallels between their theories are much more compelling than the differences" (CIHM, 259).

And yet MacGregor conceives The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx as "an attempt to rescue Hegel's thought from the interpretation imposed upon it by Marx" (CIHM, 11). The parallels, therefore, are not conscious affinities. Rather, MacGregor contends, "Hegel's theory may have operated as an unconscious subtext in [Marx's] mind" (CIHN, 192, cf 161, 225). "Marx", he writes, did not transcend Hegelian philosophy; he merely developed and amplified ideas already available in the discussion of civil society in the Philosophy of Right" (CIHM, 259).

"Although his critique of capitalist private property has gone virtually unrecognized by all commentators... Hegel's answer to the dilemma of bourgeois society is identical to that of Marx with this difference: he offers a much more concrete solution than Marx ever manages to achieve" (CIHM, 193). MacGregor argues that the socialist

project had in fact gone off the rails from the point where Marx rejected Hegel's theory of civil society. The 'social state' that MacGregor finds in Hegel shares the same ends as Marx's theory of communism -- the realization of freedom in a rationally ordered society -- but preserves individual private property, civil society and the system of needs, and the distinction of state and society, all of which would be abolished in Marx's vision.

In Hegel's theory the separation of civil society and the state is the basis for the development and protection of individual liberty within community. Without the state civil society would be an atomistic mass within which no true community (and thus, certainly, no socialism) would be possible. But without the separate status of civil society, and without the security of private property, the state would consume the individual and negate individual freedom: society would become totalitarian. The post-revolutionary societies, inaugurated in the attempt to realize Marxian communism, have, it must be admitted, shown precisely the latter tendency.

The flaw in Marx's theory of communism that has led to this pass, according to MacGregor's analysis, is that Marx had adopted the abstract and self-consuming perspective of 'absolute freedom':

Whereas Marx located his ideal of communism in the revolutionary consciousness of the working class, Hegel postulated that the rational state could only emerge from social and political struggles within the business class and between it and the middle-class bureaucracy. Consciousness could never sink into an

abstract universal of the kind Marx envisions except at the cost of life and liberty in the state; and classes as functional entities rather than structures of inequality must continue to endure if the individual is to have an effective presence in government. (CIHM, 8)

The Marxist vision of communism -- of the abolition of private property, of civil society and the division of society and state -- as the realization of freedom, turns out to be a betrayal of freedom. With this program, MacGregor argues, attempts to realize Marxian communism have degenerated into "mono-organizational societies... a form of class rule unanticipated by Marx -- the dictatorship of... government bureaucrats" (CIHM, 212). Hegel's rational state, on the other hand, "retains the exuberant prodigality of life in modern society" including "class divisions and conflicts" which ensure the integrity of the state and secure the personal freedoms of the individual" (CIHM, 37).

How is this Hegelian rational state an alternative socialism, a 'communist ideal'? MacGregor is unique among modern commentators in finding in Hegel not only "one of the earliest radical [critiques] of the modern industrial system" (Avineri, 1972, 93), but a "devastating critique of capitalist private property" (CIHM, 189). The chief defect of contemporary civil society, in MacGregor's analysis, is the propertylessness of proletarians, a condition which deprives them of the full development of personality and citizenship. But MacGregor finds, within Hegel's doctrine of private property itself, a denunciation of the bourgeois 'insanity of personality' which differentiates 'possession'

(the worker's possession, use, of the means of production) and 'ownership' (the capitalist's appropriation of the product of the labour process) and thus a justification of property rights for the working class. "The competing property claims of the two sides of the business class demarcate the field of battle between worker and capitalist in civil society":

As members of the business class, both worker and capitalist are owners: they stand in relation to one another as participants in the production and re-production of commodities. Resolution of the conflict between them, therefore, can go only in one direction: 'Although their relation is not that of being common owners of a property, still the transition from it to common ownership is very easy'. (CIHM, 31)

The medium of this transition is the Corporation, the "means through which capitalist society will pass into the rational state where common ownership⁹ of the means of production will prevail" (CIHM, 235). "The corporation", writes MacGregor. "offers itself to the worker as the main arena of combat for property rights, the centre of educational struggle (Bildung) in civil society, and the foundation for full political participation in the state" (CIHM, 234). Once the proletariat has accomplished this 'very easy transition' and won property rights in productive property and product alongside the bourgeoisie (a development which, according to MacGregor, is in the process of coming about through the growth of trade unions, CIHM, 34, 231ff), the Corporation (and other social organizations) will become "organs of direct democracy and workers control"

constituting a "functional rather than geographic network of [parliamentary] representation" (CIHM, 256).

Productive property does not, however, become common, collective or social property. MacGregor approves Hegel's rejection of common property (CIHM, 186). Rather the capitalist and the worker must be recognized as "two owners standing in relation to each other" (CIHM, 194). The Corporation remains a joint stock company, with the workers' right to a share of the stock acknowledged (CIHM, 235). Beyond the internal structure of the Corporation, MacGregor gives no indication that the structure of civil society, of the 'system of needs', is changed in the rational state. Thus commodity production, money, the market (and consequently, one supposes, capital) remain as essential mechanisms of social and economic integration (see, e.g. CIHM, 209ff).

At the opposite pole of development "the giant corporation's stranglehold over the economic system produces in reaction a whole series of government agencies intended to control and regulate its activity" (CIHM, 198). In foreseeing this development (in which "civil society... loses none of its strength and creative power, although its impulses of irrationality and destruction are curbed and redirected"), MacGregor argues that "Hegel's account of public authority anticipates in many ways the broad direction of the state in advanced capitalist society" (CIHM, 38, 35). Through the medium of the 'universal class',

the state bureaucracy, "allied with state clients and public interest groups", "progress toward the rational state does not involve a complete departure from the governing institutions of capitalist society" (CIHM, 256, 254).

Important as this growth of public authority is in itself, its part in the constitution of the rational, or as MacGregor terms it 'social' state, is only realized when it is combined with the transformations of the Corporation at the political level: "in the higher sphere of the state... these institutions are unified with the circles of government and at the same time they are transformed or sublated" (CIHM, 36).

MacGregor's Hegelian socialism, then, resembles a sort of soviet/market socialism. Producers are organized into Corporations, which, while maintaining an internal division of labour between managers and workers, are jointly (though not commonly) owned by their members and internally democratic. They produce commodities and exchange them in the market. The Corporations are represented in the legislature by their own delegates in a quasi soviet manner. However, this legislature is not, as in the original soviet conception, the only element of the state. MacGregor retains Hegel's division of the state into the head of state, executive and legislature. The head of state need not be, as Hegel specified, a constitutional monarch whose function "is actually consistent with that of any democratic national leader" (CIHM, 257). The executive, composed of Hegel's

'universal class' of civil servants, is "responsible for the over-all guidance and administration of civil society", regulating the market, setting standards for consumer and environmental protection and providing for "public health, social administration, and so on" (CIHM, 255, 200). This articulated, multi-institutional, 'social' state, MacGregor argues will effect a reconciliation which is "not a disguised reform of capitalism, but rather [a] transcendence of the bourgeois order and the emergence of a society which embraces the ideal of freedom projected by Marx" (CIHM, 38).

The proposition that socialism can be based on market society is not, of course, original to MacGregor. Indeed versions of market socialism were advocated by some of the earliest socialist thinkers (Hardach, Karras & Fine, 1979, 15). Many later thinkers have discussed models of socialism that embody various mixtures of plan and market (Drewnowski, 1963; Lange, 1972) and today there is a significant resurgence of this line of thought (Hodgson, 1984; Nove, 1983). Though far less common there are even writers who, like MacGregor, advocate the development of socialism on the basis of a retention of private property in the means of production (Kernohan, 1987), even of "a capitalist road to communism" (van der Veen & Van Parijs, 1986).

MacGregor's outline of the 'social state' contains elements common to many proposals for market socialism: worker's participation and workplace democracy, and a mixture of market and planning (in the form of state

regulation, social service provision, etc.). The economic structures of socialism are worked out in far less detail than in, for example, Alec Nove's The Economics of Feasible Socialism (1983). Nonetheless, The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx is a particularly good vehicle for examining these issues. MacGregor has made the question of freedom and individual autonomy, rather than simply economic efficiency, the center of his analysis and derives his market socialism from this. The 'economic' aspects of his proposal are therefore an integral part of its politics.

Furthermore, MacGregor's arguments are incorporated within a very powerful Hegelian theoretical framework. This is surely a greater theoretical challenge to Marxism than the intellectual prevarications of social democracy. It gives to MacGregor's proposals a coherence and consistency that is frequently missing from schemes for socialist reform which draw eclectically from sometimes incompatible doctrines. This framework at the same time provides MacGregor with a theory of historical development, a perspective that allows him to trace developments toward the 'social state' in the contemporary world, and thus take seriously Marx's critique of utopian socialism.

Moreover, the implications of Marx's relation to Hegel have yet to be satisfactorily worked through by Marxists. One of MacGregor's reviewers rejects the return to Hegel, and particularly MacGregor's attempt to formulate a Hegelian 'communist ideal' because "MacGregor brings back

into Marxism the whole useless baggage of identity-theory" (Agger, 1985, 610). I am inclined to agree with Ben Agger that hopes for the future vitality of Marxism demand this theory be left behind. But has it yet been abandoned? The theory of communism -- demanding an absolutely dis-alienated and humanized social/natural world -- is surely an identity-theory of the first order. The tradition of 'Western Marxism' wrestled long and hard with this problem, but Western Marxism seems now to have passed away without an alternative 'totalization' having emerged. MacGregor has attempted to answer the dilemmas presented by a unitary totality by returning to the articulated totality of Hegel that Marx originally found so unsatisfactory. The "lessons of both intellectual and political history" (Agger, 1986) should require that such an attempt be given careful consideration rather than dismissed out of hand. Whatever one's judgement of Hegel or of Hegel's influence upon Marx, the derivation of MacGregor's proposals for the institutional structure of the 'social state' from Hegel is not sufficient grounds for its dismissal.

- IV -

It is not my intention to mount a defence of Marx's theory of communism against MacGregor. Any assessment, or defence, of the theory of communism would, in the first instance, face the problem of deciding just what the theory

of communism is, for Marx nowhere set down in any comprehensive way his thoughts on the character and social organization of communist society. Bertell Ollman has undertaken the task of assembling Marx's scattered comments and while he argues that these yield "a more complete and coherent picture than most people have thought to exist", still, many pieces are missing and others so vague as to be practically indecipherable" (1978, 50). On critical issues -- the nature of the 'public authority', centralization or decentralization, the meaning and means of overcoming the division of labour -- clear answers about Marx's meaning are difficult or impossible.

Moreover, some of the presumptions of communism must I think be abandoned (or set aside indefinitely). Communism may, or may not be realizable, but that is in any case a question for a (relatively) distant future. It does not provide a practical or a responsible program for any form of socialism that might come into being in the foreseeable future.¹⁰

The fundamental presupposition of communism, as Bertell Ollman observes, is that "the wealth which capitalism left and which the first stage of communism multiplied many times over starts communism on its way with a superabundance of material goods" (1978, 66). This single assumption sweeps away most of the political/economic and administrative difficulties faced by historical societies and thereby justifies the assumption that the exercise of public

authority will be uncomplex and uncontentious under communism.

However, if absolute scarcity is a possibility, absolute abundance is not. Abundance is always a function of the productivity of labour and of needs. And there is, on each condition, I think, good reason for assuming that a state of abundance is a long way off. Absolute poverty oppresses much of the world's population today, and the (relative) prosperity of the others has very nearly brought the global ecosystem to the breaking point (Nove, 1983, 15ff).¹¹ General abundance is so far off indeed, that to develop a political program for socialism on the basis of that assumption is irresponsible. And while that condition remains unmet we cannot expect, as Engels' remarked, that "the governance of men' [will give] way to 'the administration of things'" (Levine, 1987, 173).¹²

Capitalism has massively expanded humanity's productive capacity and the productivity of labour. But this historically unprecedented growth has not sufficed to create abundance. This is because need is historically and socially constructed, and capitalism has promoted an expansion and profusion of need that has, if anything, outstripped the growth of productivity.¹³ For capitalism such a growth of need, indeed an unceasing growth, is a necessity. Without it the single greatest need of capitalist societies, the need for an unceasing and ever expanding accumulation of capital, could not be met. Thus in capitalism there can be no

abundance. Some new 'need' (a portable personal solar powered microwave oven -- the 'cookman'?) will always appear causing the vision of abundance to recede.¹⁴

Socialists may of course reject this endless, pointless and dehumanizing proliferation of 'false needs' (Ollman, 1978, 63; Mandel, 1968, 660ff, 1986, 14ff; Leiss, 1976). If they do, then the promise of abundance -- that communist society will be relieved of any conflicts over the allocation of resources and labour -- will be annulled in any case. For abundance then ceases to be a technical/economic accomplishment and becomes a definition that must be determined politically.

And if there is to be, for a long time yet, (relative) scarcity, then there must be, for a long time yet, at least the potential of social conflicts over what should be made and how, by whom and for whom. As to what and how, the theory of communism is sometimes ambivalent. Production would certainly be socially determined, but alternatively by federated communes, or through centralized state planning (Ollman, 1978, 52-60). In any case there are complex decisions to be made and an even more complex process involved in carrying these decisions through. Something more than 'bookkeeping' must always be involved (cf. Forster, 1980, 106).

Furthermore, there is always the possibility that new social antagonisms will emerge within that process. To Bakunin's fear that the managers and representatives that

undertook these co-ordinating functions may "become rulers,... cease to be workers... and from the heights of the state... begin to look down upon the toiling masses" Marx responded that this could no more happen than "a manufacturer today [cease] to be a capitalist when he becomes a member of the municipal council", that if only Bakunin understood "the position of a manager in a workers' cooperative, he would send all his fears about authority to the devil" (Ollman, 1978, 61). (Yet thirty-one years earlier Marx had said of such disinterested public servants, the bureaucracy of Hegel's Universal Class, that it had "the state... in its possession as its private property" (CW3, 47)). Bakunin, Marx concludes, "should ask himself what form the administrative function can take on the basis of this workers' state, if he wants to call it that" (Marx, 1974, 337).

Something very like Bakunin's fear has unfortunately come to pass. And this, the stimulus of MacGregor's return to Hegel, makes Marx's question one that must be investigated thoroughly and answered convincingly (without presuppositions that eliminate the problem in advance).

That this has come to pass does not in itself invalidate the theory of communism, nor indicate that the theory is responsible for the eventuality (Lukes, 1987, xiii). Still less is it sufficient cause to abandon any of the parts of the theory of communism for their inverse. That the abolition of bourgeois private property (in particular

historical circumstances) has not realized freedom or democratic socialism, does not show that the preservation of such property can or will.

- V -

The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx attempts a comprehensive reappraisal of Hegel and of his relation to Marx. The discussion here will be restricted to a much narrower scope, concentrating on the more mundane questions of MacGregor's portrayal of the Philosophy or Right as a guide to the socialist future. Other questions raised in MacGregor's discussion, such as the relation of Hegel's idealism to Marx's materialism, are put aside, though I am aware that to do so does a certain violence to the thought of both thinkers.

15

MacGregor argues that Hegel's political economy, his grasp of the character and dynamics of the 'system of needs' was the equal of Marx's. I will argue, on the contrary, that it was not, and that in following Hegel's analysis of civil society MacGregor has missed and misinterpreted the significance of Marx's 'critique of political economy'. It is precisely in this sphere that Marx accomplished a decisive advance over, and (implicitly) a critique of, Hegel. Marx's signal accomplishment in this area -- the labour theory of value -- illustrated that the relations of a developed commodity economy escape the possibility of

conscious human control and become subversive rather than supportive of individual and social freedom.

Both Hegel and Marx believed in a classical ideal of a 'bios politikos' beyond the 'realm of necessity' and in which "citizens can be reborn within and through [an] informed inter-subjectivity" (Keane, 1978, 76). Perhaps the greatest contradiction of capitalism, of civil society founded upon the 'system of needs', is that despite producing a material productivity that outstrips all earlier societies it cannot allow any recession of the realm of necessity.

The overriding need generated by this system of needs is the need to accumulate capital. It must therefore, on the one hand, continually recreate the need for more labour -- in the old sense of a purely negative instrumental necessity -- even as it constantly expells a further portion of labour from the production of every commodity. On the other hand, it must reduce public life "from its classical concern with the good and exemplary life of speech and action... [to a] limited technique of reproducing civil society by organizing and deploying cunning, appearance, money and men" (Keane, 1978, 76-7).

The state cannot therefore rise above the realm of necessity, but, while the system of commodity production persists, must be continually dragged down into into it. Moreover, the 'system of needs' is in perpetual need of attention because its development is always marked by crisis

and upheaval. These characteristics, Marx argued in Capital, his 'critique of political economy', are not contingent features that may be eliminated through state intervention, or even by overcoming the antagonism between capitalists and workers.

In his Labour Theory of Value Marx showed that the chief characteristics of capitalist production, the exploitation of labour, the imperative to accumulate capital, periodic economic crises and the incapacity of society to exercise control over the division of labour, are inherent in the very nature of commodity production and exchange. In chapter four I will introduce Marx's theory in order to illustrate how MacGregor's expectation that socialism could be built on the retention of private property and the 'system of needs' is misguided.

I will further argue (in chapter three) that MacGregor's derivation of a "devastating critique of capitalist private property" and justification of property rights for the working class from Hegel's doctrine of Abstract Right is flawed and internally inconsistent. Lastly I will explore whether the institutional structure MacGregor advocates for the 'social state' does not prepare the way for the outcome he explicitly seeks to avoid - the mono-organizational or totalitarian state.

- VI -

Hegel, in contrast to Marx and contemporary Marxists, argues MacGregor, "is keenly aware of the factors in bourgeois society which are likely to increase the rational control of the public authority over corporations" (CIHM, 199). Hegel was certainly aware of the necessity for such control, the question is whether he, or anyone else, was ever right about the possibility of it.

Marx was certainly aware of the importance of the state in regularizing, protecting, promoting and even regulating the capitalist mode of production. He could not, any more than anyone else, foresee the myriad ways in which the state would adapt and expand its functions in guaranteeing the reproduction of capitalism. But he was sure that no manner of intervention could alter the fundamental dynamics of the capitalist system, unless that (revolutionary) intervention be such as to overthrow the system as a whole. He has not so far been proved wrong. On the other hand, all of those who have thought, at the dawning of a new era in capitalism's long eventful history, that a regular, efficient and permanent capitalism had come into being have been sorely disappointed, when it inexorably and inevitably came to an end.

Global capitalism is now embarked on its third 'great depression' in a century (Shaikh, 1987). In the past decade, all over the capitalist world, living standards have

deteriorated, trade unions have been crushed or displaced, social services have been starved and dismantled, state economic regulation and participation in the economy through nationalized industries have been rolled back.

The state, finding its ward in a condition of crisis and disarray has floundered about, scurrying this way and that to find some medicine that will help. Recovery will undoubtedly come with time (barring the -- unfortunately -- unlikely outcome of socialist transformation). The state may perhaps speed (or delay) this recovery, but it will not be the cause of it. Nor will it be able to prevent the recurrence of the disease down the road. Capitalism can build no antibodies to this ailment.

All this formed an ironic backdrop as I first read The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx. Where MacGregor saw "the rational control of the public authority... only now coming to fruition", the daily newscasts as I read the book, told of its impotence, resignation and retreat (the last, of course, being but the 'Chicago school's' recipe for intervention and assistance by disengagement). Our (yet unmastered) history is rarely kind to theoreticians.

Yet I had accepted at least a part of the premise of MacGregor's work: that 'actually existing socialism' had become a mono-organizational, and largely moribund, society. Now the newscasts are full of the most astonishing events from that quarter. It is far too early to say what way 'Perestroika' will turn out. However it goes the corollary of

MacGregor's premise still stands: if there is to be a future socialism that will "nourish the struggle for individual freedom" it must be reconceived with great care and with attention to its possible flaws.

Though my judgement on MacGregor's own proposal is negative, I think he has, by raising the question of civil society and the need to attend to the socio-economic and institutional bases of individual autonomy, assisted that task. I hope that this essay can also make a contribution.

CHAPTER ONE
INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF
MACGREGOR'S 'COMMUNIST IDEAL'

David MacGregor's attitude to Hegel is clear. Even in the rare instances where he finds himself compelled to explicitly amend Hegel's scheme of the rational state he manages to find a warrant for the change in Hegel (as, for instance, with the question of whether the rational state need be a monarchy, or on the fate of the agricultural class, CIHM, 257f, 204f). His attitude to Marx is much more ambiguous. He wants to show the continuity of Hegel and Marx, but at the same time that Marx got it wrong, while Hegel got it right ('it' being any one of a number of issues). MacGregor's attitude to Marxism after Marx is more emphatic (although discussion of any later Marxists is for the most part restricted to occasional asides). Only Lenin (for his Philosophical Notebooks on Hegel) receives any more than the most guarded approval, Hegelian Marxism and Western Marxism generally receive much harsher judgements (CIHM, 193, 281n85, MacGregor, 1986).

Yet MacGregor clearly hopes to address a Marxist audience, and not only as an exercise in theory or intellectual history. His concluding paragraph encourages "students of Marx" in this endeavour, but it also extends the hope that such study could yield "insights that could

transform contemporary Marxism and nourish the struggle for individual freedom and the rational state" (CIHM, 259). And, while it does not engage directly with contemporary Marxist discourse, MacGregor's work does intersect with it in a number of ways, both directly and sometimes paradoxically. Therefore, in this chapter I want to survey some of the current developments within Marxism to which The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx must be related.

Marxism today is at a curious pass. During the past three decades Marxian theory and research has undergone a remarkable renaissance in the advanced capitalist world producing a profusion of works of great sophistication and diversity. Where it had earlier been debarred from (and had often eschewed) the universities, it has now won a place¹ among, and within, the social sciences and humanities. Despite this growth (and perhaps in some ways on account of it and its circumstances) developments in the past decade have left Marxism's future and theoretical coherence in doubt.

Contemporary Marxism is in large measure the product of the maturation and diffusion of the tradition that has come to be known as Western Marxism.² Paradoxically, even as it reached the apogee of its influence, Western Marxism "was finally becoming exhausted at the turn of the seventies" (Anderson, 1983, 18). It has been followed by a "crisis of Marxism" (especially in Latin Europe, which had been the centre of post-war Marxist culture) and at the same time a

proliferation of theoretical and empirical work (most importantly in the English speaking world) that developed themes very different from those which characterized Western Marxism (Anderson, 1983). The nexus in theory defined by these developments -- the decline of Hegelian-Marxism, the flight from totalizing theory, the neo-Ricardian challenge to value theory and the rise of analytic-Marxism -- constitutes the conjuncture with respect to which MacGregor's work must be situated.

The intellectual history of Marxist thought is inextricably bound up with its political history as a participant in the socialist and labour movements, an implication that is equally, and often especially, true of those currents of Marxist thought that, on the face of it, seem least involved with these movements. This linkage is not merely contingent. As Perry Anderson has noted, "Marxism, as a critical theory aspiring to provide the reflexive intelligibility of its own development, accords in principle a priority to extrinsic explanations of its successes, failures or impasses [although]... this is never an absolute or exclusive primacy, of a kind that would exempt the theory from any ultimate responsibilities" (1983, 33). In the brief survey of contemporary Marxist discourse that follows I will attempt to illuminate the context of MacGregor's intervention with respect to both the 'internal' history of Marxist theoretical debates and their 'external',
3
sociological and political, histories.

If, as Tom Bottomore writes, "the working class movement, and Marxist thought, have... since 1917... been divided between social democracy and communism" (DMT, 443), then the leading intellectual current of 'post-classical' Marxism -- Western Marxism -- has been caught, or left hanging, in between. ⁴ Western Marxism differentiated itself both from social democracy and its slide into 'revisionism', reformism and eventual abandonment of Marxism, and from the communist parties and their slide into Marxist-Leninist dogmatism and Stalinism. In this heterodox tradition was the seed of Marxism's contemporary intellectual renaissance. Despite the weaknesses engendered by the circumstances of its formation, and despite the internecine quarrelling between and among its various strands of Hegelian Marxism, Critical Theory, Existential Marxism and structuralist Marxism, Western Marxism exhibited an "enormous creative fecundity which sharply [set] it apart from its orthodox Marxist or Marxist-Leninist opponents" (Jay, 1984, 10).

Western Marxism was forged in the crucible of the First World War and its revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) aftermath. The old Second International, which had given the various tendencies of Marxism a semblance of unity, collapsed in the face of the majority of its member parties' support of the war, and through divergent reactions to the Bolshevik Revolution this fragmentation hardened into permanent schism. "The first Western Marxists", particularly Lukacs, Korsch and Gramsci, notes Russell

Jacoby, "claimed, and believed, that they worked within a Leninist framework" (DMT, 523). However, the progressive reification of Marxism-Leninism and the restriction of free theoretical inquiry within the Comintern eventually drove most Western Marxists from, or prevented them joining, the Communist movement. Western Marxism thus developed in a political wilderness, cut off from any close relation to the labour movement or its mass parties.

The failure of revolution in Western Europe (especially Germany),⁵ the problematic trajectory of the post-revolutionary Soviet Union and the subsequent political isolation of its main theorists conditioned Western Marxism's characteristic shift away from the political and socio-economic emphases of classical Marxism toward philosophical and aesthetic themes. These circumstances also gave Western Marxism a pessimistic colouration: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete", wrote Theodor Adorno, "lives on because the moment to realize it was missed... the attempt to change the world miscarried" (Adorno, 1973, 3). These tendencies were reinforced by the further defeats of the working class movement in the face of fascism and in the wake of the second World War (Anderson, 1983, 15).

In reaction against the anti-philosophical and, in their view, virtually positivist, materialism of both Second International and Soviet Marxism, "the Western Marxists reread Marx with particular attention to the categories of culture, class consciousness and subjectivity", emphasizing

Marxism as critique, "not a general science but a theory of society" (Jacoby, DMT, 524).⁶ "The vocabulary and concepts of [the first generation of] Western Marxism were resonant with Hegel", observes Jacoby, "and almost without exception its thinkers were schooled in German idealism" (DMT, 525). This return to Hegel, beginning with Western Marxism's paradigmatic work, Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness (1971), was indicative of a concern with the concept of totality, which Martin Jay has very appropriately employed as the theme of his intellectual history of Western Marxism. Lukacs sought a way out of the reified atomism of the bourgeois world, an alternative which would resolve the antimonies of "facts and values... free will and necessity, form and content, and subject and object". "To Lukacs the 'is' and the 'ought' would merge once the subject of history, the proletariat, objectified its ethical principles in the concrete mores of Communist society" (Jay, 1984, 110, cf. Vajda, 1981, chap.1). With the progressive effacement of the individual in the post-revolutionary Soviet Union, this solution, in its original form, no longer recommended itself and Western Marxism was launched upon a long circuitous search for a new totality.

In the post-war years and especially the 1960's Western Marxism was absorbed by a new generation of Marxist scholars beyond Western Europe, developing, as Jay puts it, 'outposts' in America, Britain and even in Eastern Europe. Growing with the 'New Left' and overwhelmingly situated in

academic settings, this new generation "has defined itself largely by reference to the absorption of themes from Western Marxism (Jay, 1984, 19). But this broadened base, from which so much of the work in Marxism's current renaissance has come, has not produced a theorist of the stature of the continental originators of Western Marxism. Even as it reached the apogee of its intellectual influence in the 1970's, Western Marxism was on the verge of exhaustion.⁷ The renewal of political and labour activism in the late 1960's and the end of the long post-war boom in the early 1970's, Anderson claims, created conditions that were, "both subjectively and objectively,... clearing the way for another sort of Marxism to emerge":

The grand Western Marxist tradition -- with its epistemological or aesthetic, sombre or esoteric tonalities -- has effectively come to an end, and in its stead there has emerged, with remarkable celerity and confidence another kind of Marxist culture, primarily oriented towards just those questions of an economic, social or political order that had been lacking from its predecessor (1983, 18, 20).

The decay of Western Marxism was emphasized by the eruption in the late seventies of the 'crisis of Marxism'. In Anderson's estimation this is a misleading label. For him, "what was really at issue was the crisis of a certain Marxism, geographically confined to Latin Europe...[within which] there was indeed something approaching a collapse... at the very moment when Marxism was conquering or consolidating new positions across a wide front outside it" (1983, 28). Anderson approaches his explanation of this

local crisis through both 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' histories of Latin Marxism's theoretical development. In the former respect French Marxism (which Anderson takes as paradigmatic for Latin Marxism as a whole) after,

a lengthy period of largely uncontested cultural dominance... finally encountered an intellectual adversary that was capable of doing battle with it and prevailing. Its victorious opponent was the broad theoretical front of structuralism, and then its post-structuralist successors. The crisis of Latin Marxism, then, would be the result, not of a circumstantial decline, but of a head-on defeat (1983, 33).

The substance of French Marxism's confrontation with (post-) structuralism was the question of "the nature of the relationships between structure and subject in human history and society" (Anderson, 1983, 33), the very question which (in the guise of 'totality') had dominated and confounded Western Marxism throughout its history. Neither the existential Marxism of Sartre (whose attempt to resolve the question in his Critique of Dialectical Reason went unfinished), nor Althusserian Marxism (which had already conceded the field) were able to answer structuralism's assaults on the subject, on historicity, and upon the project of human emancipation. When the 'May events' of 1968 appeared to confound both positions, French Marxism was already exhausted, but structuralism avoided this Waterloo by its segue into post-structuralism. The notion of a subjectless structure was progressively transmuted in the 1970's into "a subjectivism without a subject" (Anderson, 1983, 54).

However, in his estimation of the extrinsic history of

this crisis Anderson significantly discounts the effect of this intellectual confrontation, concluding that "its real determinants had very little to do with its overt themes":

What detonated it was essentially a double disappointment: first in the Chinese [Maoist] and then in the West European [Euro-Communist] alternatives to the central post-revolutionary experience of the twentieth century so far, that of the USSR itself. (1983, 76)

These political conditions are no doubt critical to both the extent and the rapidity with which the 'crisis of Marxism' developed in Latin Europe. However, they do not provide much reassurance against the threat of the crisis spreading beyond continental confines. After all, the disappointment of the 'new left' in North America, even if its prospects were from the beginning more ephemeral, has had its effect. There, by 1981, as eminent a representative of the new left as Stanley Aronowitz was writing of The Crisis in Historical Materialism. In Britain, after nearly a decade of Thatcherism, "The Odyssey of Paul Hirst" from radical Althusserianism to right-wing social democracy is no isolated phenomenon (Elliot, 1986). Today the very vehemence of such polemics against 'post-Marxism' as Ellen Meiksins Wood's The Retreat from Class (1986) is indicative of the spread of the 'crisis of Marxism' to the English speaking world. Seventy years after the October Revolution, and the genesis of the historical conditions which generated Western Marxism, the (sometimes pessimistic) search for an alternative totality is progressively giving way before a

denial and disavowal of totality altogether (Jay, 1984, 511-537).

The passing of Western Marxism and the crisis of Latin Marxism occurred even as Marxism in the West was experiencing an unprecedented resurgence of theory and research. As has been mentioned, this renaissance was significantly shaped by the absorption of Western Marxism. But, while the themes of Western Marxism - philosophy and culture -- have been preserved, the strengths of this new Marxism have been in retrieving 'classical' themes of politics, economics and sociology. This emergent formation has, as Anderson notes, generated a "genuinely internationalist discourse" where earlier it had tended to be nationally or regionally circumscribed (1983, 27). However, the most dramatic development has been the appearance of a distinctive 'Anglo-Marxism' in the English speaking world. "Today", Anderson writes, "the predominant centres of intellectual production seem to lie in the English-speaking world rather than in Germanic or Latin Europe, as was the case in the inter-war and post-war periods respectively" (1983, 24). Until recently Marxism had very little intellectual or cultural presence in the anglophone world, but today "the sheer density of ongoing economic, political, sociological and cultural research on the Marxist left in Britain or North America, with its undergrowth of journals and discussions, eclipses any equivalent in the older lands of the Western Marxist tradition proper" (Anderson, 1983, 24).⁸

Two recent developments within Anglo-Marxism illustrate its increasing distance from its Western Marxist antecedents. The first is the growth and increasing influence of Neo-Ricardian, or Sraffian, economics. The second, and related, development is the appearance of 'Rational Choice' or 'Analytical-Marxism'.⁹ The former has mounted an assault upon the Labour Theory of Value (LTV), while the latter has sought to bring about a fundamental shift in Marxism's methodological foundations.

The Neo-Ricardians have argued that the accumulated anomalies in Marxian economics are such as to compromise its whole structure, and that, in any case, a superior form of economic analysis - derived from the work of Piero Sraffa - is available, in which formulations on the basis of value are redundant. The 'mainstream' Marxist "embodied labour" approach to the LTV has had little success responding to this challenge, the consequence being that many have accepted the need to jettison the LTV if Marxism is to be saved. But, from the viewpoint of the "abstract labour" interpretation of the LTV the Neo-Ricardian attack is based on faulty premises (shared with the "embodied labour" LTV). The Sraffians operate on a "technological paradigm" which moves directly from the technical difficulty of production to price (or value) (de Vroey, 1982). It therefore overlooks entirely the form of production and presumes to develop a metric applicable to production in any society. By so doing it abstracts away the sociological element of the LTV and

obscures the features of capitalist production which differentiate it from other social formations. Like neo-classical economics (the object of Sraffa's original criticisms) the Neo-Ricardians have abandoned the project, common to both classical political economy and Marx, of deciphering what is different about capitalism. This dehistoricization (accomplished by de-socializing social production) represents an even more drastic withdrawal from Marxism and historical materialism than does the abandonment of the LTV.

The influence of such works as G. A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History (1978), John Roemer's A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (1982), and Jon Elster's Making Sense of Marx (1985), has propelled Analytical-Marxism to center stage in contemporary discussions of Marxist theory.¹⁰ Analytical-Marxism, like Neo-Ricardian economics, seeks to bring about a profound shift in the philosophical and methodological basis of Marxism. Here the Hegelian roots of Marxism (and dialectics especially) are discarded and in their place are substituted the Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy, methodological individualism, game and general equilibrium theory. These shifts carry Analytical-Marxism a great distance indeed from Lukacs' contention in 1922 that "orthodoxy... refers to method", though at least one partisan considers the analytical turn a continuation of the Western Marxist tradition (Lukacs, 1971, 1; Carling, 1986, 26).

To the Analytical-Marxists the distinctiveness of Marxism is established by its substantive claims: "its theory of the relationship between property rights, technical change, and class struggle (a positive theory), and its claim that capitalism suffers from unnecessary alienation and exploitation (a positive and normative claim)", but there is "no specific form of Marxist logic or explanation" (Roemer, 1986, 194, 191). In Roemer's view, "Marxian analysis requires micro-foundations... explanations of mechanisms, at the micro level, for the phenomena they claim come about for teleological reasons" and, therefore, "with respect to method,... Marxian economics has much to learn from neoclassical economics" (192,191). These foundations are to be found in the neoclassical tradition's assumption of 'rational choice' - utility maximization - as the basis of individual behavior (modified by an analysis of social preference formation) and in the perspective of methodological individualism. On the basis of methodological individualism social processes are explained as the consequences, intended and unintended, of individual actions and all appeals to holistic explanation, to supra-individual or objective social forces is banished. Totality, (rudimentarily) the notion that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and has effects different from the mere concatenation of individual events, has no place in the Analytical-Marxist perspective.¹¹

While remaining self-consciously Marxist, Analytical-

Marxism has effected the same retreat from totality that has characterized the 'crisis of Marxism' and the emergence of post-Marxism. The same sociological and political forces (the failure of 'actually existing socialism' and the failure of western socialists to discover or effect an alternative to it or to the atomizing conditions of 'post-industrial' capitalist society) have conditioned this retreat in each case, just as each has attached itself to the coattails of an anti-holistic philosophy (post-structuralist discourse theory on the continent; analytic philosophy, empiricism and positivism in Britain and America). That these two tendencies quarrel vociferously¹² obscures but does not eliminate their similarities.

These reorientations in method and theoretical fundamentals have occurred alongside shifts in substantive theory and political analysis which have also brought Anglo-Marxism closer to post-Marxism. Especially in Britain, in response to Thatcherism, there has arisen what Ralph Miliband has termed a "new revisionism" (1985). The failure of the Labour Party to defeat Thatcher's dismantling of the 'post-war concensus' and the welfare state has led many Marxist and socialist intellectuals to the project of 'rethinking socialism'.

"Increasingly", Leo Panitch notes, "this rethinking has placed under scrutiny the very nature of the socialist project itself, above all as it has been classically conceived by Marxism" and "brought into question... the

centrality... of the working class as the agency of social change". As he points out "the irony of this orientation to the problem is that it not only shifts attention away from the primary modern practice of the Western working class -- reformist social democracy -- but actually replicates, both in its critique of Marxism and in its strategic proposals, many of the essential tenets of that very practice" (Panitch, 1986, 52). Politically this 'new revisionism' has pulled in two directions. On the one hand, it has urged a moderation of Labour politics in order to build a coalition that might defeat Thatcher. On the other hand, there have been attempts to discern ways in which the 'forward march of labour' might be re-opened through a new, radicalised, 'social contract' and to reconceive a non-authoritarian socialism through market socialism models (73ff, 84ff). The chief, and fundamental, blindspot in these theories (in which he otherwise finds some merit) in Panitch's view is that they presume it possible, on the one hand to renew, on the other to extend radically, the 'social contract' which capital has already rejected, without a fundamental political confrontation (79). They have proposed, in other words, that a transition to socialism could be effected, as it were, under the nose of capitalism, without provoking a backlash (such as Thatcherism).

The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx intersects with these developments in Marxist theory in a paradoxical manner. In the first place MacGregor's return to Hegel is

out of step, coming as it does in the wake of the apparent demise of Hegelian-Marxism and the shift of philosophical consideration of Marx toward traditions far removed from Marx's Hegelian roots (Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History would have appeared at the time that MacGregor was researching CIHM in London). In this respect I believe MacGregor's intervention must be seen as salutary, forcefully reminding us that both the form and substance of Marx's work are inextricably bound up with his relation to Hegel. To read Marx as though Hume and not Hegel was his fundamental antecedent will certainly obscure much of his thought. This recognition certainly does not imply that we must join in MacGregor's judgement that Marx's work represents a continuation of Hegel's project, and that no significant differences separate them. The differences can be as telling as the similarities, but where Hegel is forgotten these will not be deciphered either.

On the other hand, the critique of Marx's theory of communism, which is the impetus to MacGregor's return to Hegel, is very much in step with contemporary trends. The experience of 'actually existing communism' has led many to a general rejection of socialism. Among those who have not abandoned the socialist project many have sought a way out of the conundrum of 'mono-organizational society' in various formulations of market socialism. MacGregor may be counted among these, although he goes beyond most (but not all) in advocating the retention of private property as the basis of

this "social state". And, MacGregor's socialism, in common with some of both the post-Marxist and Anglo-Marxist theorists, envisages this society arising out of an internal transformation, rather than a revolutionary break with the institutions of capitalist society.

Because of his orientation toward Hegel, MacGregor's option for this solution does not arise out of the equation made by others that totalizing theory = totalitarianism. Here, MacGregor's stance is, once more, salutary, especially where the contemporary retreat from totalizing theories is so influenced by theoretical orientations whose relativistic tendencies are almost boundless. However, the return to Hegel presupposes a unity between theoretical, ontological, longitudinal, expressive and normative totalities. The possibility or necessity of disentangling these does not appear as a question from a Hegelian absolute idealist position, but it is a critical (and open) question within a Marxist and materialist one.

CHAPTER TWO

CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of "civil society" is central to the issues addressed in this thesis. But civil society is far from a straightforward concept, and this chapter is devoted to elucidating it. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, the development and transformation of the concept of civil society, from its classical origins, through its meaning to Hegel and Marx, to the present day is outlined. In the second part Hegel's treatment of civil society, and the place of the concept in his political and social theory is explored. The use of civil society by Marx and MacGregor will be considered in subsequent chapters.

The Evolution of "Civil Society"

At the opening of an essay entitled "Civil Society in Capitalism and Socialism", in The Two Marxisms, Alvin Gouldner writes that "the more Marx ignored and devalued civil society the more he formulated a socialism without safeguards, a socialism whose rise to power could only take the form of centralization" (1980, 355). This thesis would appear to have much in common with the criticisms of Marx

advanced by MacGregor. However, as we read on in Gouldner's essay the similarity is clouded; Gouldner, it appears, does not understand by 'civil society' what either Marx nor Hegel and MacGregor indicate by the term. Yet, despite his lengthy discussion of its treatment in Marx and in sociology, it never becomes clear precisely what -- what set of institutions, or practices, or what social space -- Gouldner means to indicate by the concept. In his effort to contrast Marx's emphasis upon 'bourgeois society' with his inattention to 'civil society' Gouldner seems unaware that these are alternative translations of the same German phrase: 'Bürgerliche Gesellschaft' (1980, 356 & passim, cf. Draper, 1977, 32ff).¹

This imprecision is not uncommon in contemporary discussions of 'civil society' and is indicative of the concept's uncertain status. While remarkable, such confusions should perhaps not be unexpected. For 'civil society' has a long history and has always been, in part, a polemical concept. Moreover, while central to the work of Hegel, Marx, and others in the first part of the nineteenth century the concept has lain dormant since then and is just now in the process of regaining its topicality (Keane, 1988b).

The "shifting meaning of 'civil society'", write the authors of the Penguin Dictionary of Sociology, "indicates changing theoretical attitudes toward the relationship between economy, society and state", and they therefore

decline to attempt any singular substantive definition, rehearsing instead a number of the ways in which modern philosophical, political and sociological commentators have employed the term (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 1984, 37). Despite their differences, these modern usages -- in as much as they are modern -- share a family resemblance. However, the dominant modern usages have turned the classical meaning of 'civil society' inside out, as it were, a change which reflects more than 'shifting theoretical attitudes'. It is indicative of fundamental changes in the constitution of the social world itself. In the same way, twentieth century usages are significantly different from those of the nineteenth century.

The various usages of 'civil society' can be broadly divided into three categories -- what I will call the classical, modern and late-modern concepts (following Riedel, the classical and modern usages will, in parts of the following discussion, be referred to as the 'old', and the 'new' civil society. 1984, chap.6). The element which each of these usages has in common is a central concern with individual freedom. Otherwise, they have very different emphases. These can, to summarize the following discussions, be distinguished by the following formulae:

Classical: freedom from the economy and of the state.

Modern: freedom of the economy and from the state.

Late-modern: freedom from the economy and
from the state.

In very broad terms the modern concept of civil society covers, to use Hegel's formulation, that sphere of society "which intervenes between the family and the state" (PR, para 182A). It is the world of the private individual and the private economy, public inasmuch as it is beyond the family and in society, but exclusive of the state. Indeed the concept seeks to define society inasmuch as it is independent of the state. In the classical concept, Aristotle's koinonia politike, or its Latin equivalent, societas civilis, a very different meaning is conveyed: state and civil society are essentially identical (Riedel, 1984, 134). The family is excluded as in the modern concept, but along with it the economy (in Aristotle oikonomia: 'household management'). Civil society, 'political association', indicates precisely those activities which under the designation of 'state' are excluded from the modern concept.

In the classical polis, civil, or political, society was the public life of the citizen, a life co-extensive with the state. This was society and no differentiation was made between society and state. Those presuppositions which facilitated the citizens participation in the state, the family and the household (oikia) and with them the 'economy', were just that, presuppositions, and not part of the state, of civil society itself. "Neither the unfree of every kind, who must carry out the necessary elementary

nurturing labours underlying the public-political civil sphere in the private circle of the home, nor the artisan, equally active 'economically' but bound to the domestic workshop, nor women, belong to societas civilis sive res publica; since they are part of the oikos, 'domestic society', they lack the political standing which confers civility" (Riedel, 1984, 137).³

In this "old civil society", as Riedel argues, "state and society (which our contemporary consciousness conditioned by the nineteenth century naturally separates and juxtaposes) were politically tied together by a single concept... as late as the middle of the eighteenth century", an understanding which "remained in effect from Aristotle to Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Melachthon, even from Bodin to Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Kant" (1984, 134, 135).⁴ This continued adherence to the concept of the 'old civil society' reflects the continuing political disability (albeit in very different forms than in antiquity) of the mass of the population in post-classical, feudal and post-feudal Europe. The change to the modern, the "new" civil society comes at the end of the eighteenth century, in the wake of the industrial revolution:

It is only then that the citizen as bourgeois becomes the central problem of political philosophy. This occurs simultaneously with the evolution of modern society as it progressively dissolves the substance of the old household while it largely takes over the function of 'economics'... Hegel had already understood this process by around 1800 as scarcely any of his contemporaries was able to do; for it is only after him that citoyen and bourgeois stand side by side, the citizen of the state (a status extended to

all subjects) next to the private citizen. (Riedel, 1984, 140, 142)

This 'new civil society' locates a new social space such as did not exist in either classical or feudal society: a 'public' realm not identical with the state but no longer capable of being identified with the private, the world of the family or household, from which it had emerged. Rather it "intervenes between the family and the state". While Riedel attributes the modern concept of civil society to Hegel, and although Hegel gave the new meaning its first rigorous philosophical treatment, the shift in the concept, like the upheaval in society which it mirrored, was long in preparation.⁵

The evolution of the modern concept of civil society, concerned as it is with the world of the private citizen and the private economy, is bound up with the transition from feudal to capitalist society in Europe. In the following discussion only the broad contours of this transformation, and its influence on the concept of civil society, can be indicated. In every nation (the development of 'nations' being itself a part of this process) this transformation had its own emphases. Every nation is exceptional to the general pattern but the pattern nonetheless retains a general validity.⁶ There is a similar diversity within feudal society, the starting point from which we must trace the differentiation of the old and the new civil society. Developing, with diverse tempos and intensity, out of the Germanic societies which succeeded the collapse of Rome,

Feudalism endured, decayed and was recomposed in a multitude of forms down to the emergence and ascendancy of modern, capitalist, society between the 17th and 20th centuries.

The transformation of the concept of property is indicative of the shift from the old to the new civil society. In feudal Europe the concept of private property in the common modern sense was unknown and inapplicable. As Marc Bloch writes:

the word 'ownership' as applied to landed property, would have been almost meaningless. Or at least it would have been necessary to say... ownership or seisin of such and such a right over the ground. For nearly all land and a great many human beings were burdened at this time with a multiplicity of obligations... all apparently of equal importance. None implied the fixed proprietary exclusiveness which belonged to the conception of ownership in Roman law. The tenant who... ploughs the land and gathers in the crop; his immediate lord, to whom he pays dues and who, in certain circumstances, can resume the land; the lord of the lord, and so on, right up the feudal scale -- how many persons there are who can say, each with as much justification as the other, 'That is my field'. (1961, 115-6)

Not only was property in feudal Europe 'participatory' and divided, rather than exclusive or absolute, it was intimately bound up with an equally parcellized political sovereignty. Rights in the 'state', in the administration of justice, the raising of taxes, etc., were as much the 'private' property of individuals as any other property, indeed such rights were frequently tied to such other property. The state itself, in the person of the King or Emperor, was a 'private', rather than a public, authority. Thus, in a sense, feudal society lacked any 'public' sphere

at all (cf. Arendt, 1958, 33-5).

However, the bonds of fealty and homage which bound nearly every individual in feudal society divided (broadly) into two categories, vassalage and villeinage. Civil society, in the 'old' sense, can be roughly identified with the first of these (and was so identified by the medieval philosophers through whom Riedel traces the descent of the concept). Vassal homage, that "befitting a free man" bound together the various levels of the feudal ruling class and through it was constituted substantial aspects of the feudal polity and government (Bloch, 1961, 149).

In return for his lord's protection and support -- which came most commonly to involve a grant of land -- the vassal promised loyalty and service, normally military service. Succeeding tiers of vassalage bound together the various gradations of the feudal ruling and governing class. At different levels in this hierarchy public and political functions accrued to the vassal, who also, as part of his service, owed his counsel to his lord. This status constituted the vassal as a member of political society, and these private relations gradually transmuted into public ones institutionalized in the emergence of Estates and parliaments. On the other hand, the villein, who exchanged for a lord's protection and occupation of a tied tenement his fealty, rents in kind and money, and labour services on the lord's demesne, generally sank into the ranks of the unfree, and thus disappeared from civil society (Bloch,

1961, chap. XI; Sayles, 1950, chap. XVI).

The development, pervasiveness and decay of these features varied greatly in time and place. Feudal ties only slowly and incompletely supplanted as a basis of social organization ties of kinship and beside feudal law (Lehnrecht) the customary law of the German conquerors of the Roman Empire continued to operate (as did ecclesiastical law and in some areas remnants of Roman law). Nor did the tendency to privatized and parcellized sovereignty completely submerge the idea of a broader political and public power. Nonetheless, it is against this background of sharp distinctions of the free and the unfree and of personalized political sovereignty that the evolution toward the 'new' conception of civil society must be sought.

The emergence of the new civil society -- or, as it is significantly styled in German, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, 'bourgeois association' -- was a process of differentiation from the norms of feudal social organization. It was a process intimately tied up with the development of the towns and in them of an economy 'free' of state interference, that is, unencumbered by feudal ties of personal subordination and authority. The term burgensis, in Latin, or burgeois, in French, designating a 'free' -- but not any -- town dweller first appeared in the eleventh century (Wallerstein, 1988, 91).⁷

It is important to note that this evolution was accompanied by a parallel evolution in the state itself,

toward a more centralized and abstract political sovereignty and authority. As Marx and Engels put it in the German Ideology, "through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society" (GI, 80). We are therefore witness to a double differentiation out of the 'old' civil society of the feudal era (itself so very different from its classical antecedent): on the one hand of the state as a generalized sovereignty and on the other of the free economy of the bourgeoisie, both of which to a degree rehabilitated the Roman conceptions of sovereignty and property. Indeed the late medieval reclamation of Roman law played an important role in both developments (Anderson, 1974b, 24ff).

In an era when virtually every individual (and piece of real property) was tied in some relation of dependence or subordination to another the inhabitants of the slowly reviving towns fought a long historic battle to free themselves from such conditions (in Anglo-Saxon England a lordless man was considered an outlaw and Royal decrees required all such to find a lord. See Bloch, 1961, 182; Sayles, 1950, 126-7). The feudal division of society into 'those who fight, those who pray, and those who work' continued the ancient notion that those dominated by necessity were incapable of citizenship, could not be free men in the full sense (see note 3). For the townsmen the struggle to escape servile status involved a transformation

of the meaning of citizenship: "instead of the craftsman being incapable of citizenship, citizenship came to be bound up with membership of one of the companies" (W.J. Ashley, quoted in Arendt, 1958, 65).

Yet the winning of civic charters and the establishment of urban corporations did not excise the towns from the feudal order, but rather incorporated them as a distinct part of it. As Perry Anderson notes, "European feudalism -- far from constituting an exclusively agrarian economy -- was the first mode of production in history to accord an autonomous structural place to urban production and exchange.... The towns... were never exogenous to feudalism in the West... in fact, the very condition of their existence was the unique 'detotalization' of sovereignty within the politico-economic order of feudalism" (1974b, 21). While the townsmen sought to reduce the power of feudal magnates over them they also sought to win themselves a place in the feudal polity (through their corporate representation in the estates) and internally "the social structure of the cities... in important respects... mirrored rather than contrasted with the countryside" (Hilton, DMT, 169). We should be aware, then, that the growing divergence of the old and the new conceptions of civil society reflected not only tensions between town and country, but within town life itself.

Corporate freedom for the bourgeois is just the first step toward the 'new' civil society. The corporate

citizenship of the master craftsman still excluded the apprentice and, especially, the 'free' labourer, whose lack of property remained a political disqualification well into the nineteenth century and beyond. In terms of citizenship the towns tended to replicate the hierarchical structure of feudalism. It was in the growing commercialization of town life, and its reflection in the laws of property and commerce, rather than in the political life of the bourgeois, that the new civil society emerged. For the townsman, as Anthony Black writes, the idea of civil society came to overlap "with the concept of exchange, which also connotes equality of status between parties":

The values of civil society comprise, first, personal security... from the arbitrary passions of others, and freedom from domination in general. This involves freedom (or security) of the person from violence, and of private property from arbitrary seizure... This leads to the notion of legal rights... both in the sense of the right to sue in court on equal terms with anyone else - legal equality - and in the sense of claims, for example to property, recognised and upheld by the law. (Black, 1984, 32)

In this description Black is, to a degree, reading back to late medieval town life an understanding of civil society which developed over a long period. Nonetheless, he does manage to trace, in the writings of jurists and other commentators the development of an alternative conception of civil society which emphasizes the independence and legal status of the townsman rather than the 'political society' of the feudal order. These commentators are generally, but not exclusively, at a more 'mundane' level than the philosophical commentaries through which Riedel traces the

descent of civil society (Black, 1984, chap. 3; cf. Riedel, 1984, 134-137).

One need not choose one of these histories over the other: the differences between the two reflect a real bifurcation in the concept and the social reality that they articulate. Both emphasize different aspects of the classical concept. On the one hand the descent traced by Riedel emphasizes the notion of political society and the discrimination, in common with the classical concept, between those that are members of this society and those who are not. The emphasis traced by Black, of legal equality, security of person and of property, also has roots in the classical concept's focus on the equality and common rights and duties of members of the polis. The transformation of both state and society in the early modern period determined the ascendance, and dominance, of the latter version.

In the first place, the state was progressively transformed from a private power inhering in the hierarchy of the feudal nobility into a public authority, an abstract entity identified with the nation even though -- and indeed largely because -- it often took the form of monarchical absolutism (Anderson, 1974b). These states reversed the parcelization of sovereignty characteristic of feudalism, resuming more and more of the diffused political authority to the monarch and locating it in growing and ever more pervasive royal bureaucracies. At the same time these political powers were reappropriated by the state without at

the same time reappropriating the 'economic' power that had been their concomitant. The fief acquired more and more of the absolute characteristics of modern (or Roman) private property. The feudal lords became landowners, in the modern sense, and thus retained their class power in a still largely agrarian society, even if they no longer possessed the same (direct and immediate) political power:

The increase in the political sway of the royal state was accompanied, not by a decrease in the economic security of noble landownership, but a corresponding increase in the general rights of private property. The age in which 'Absolutist' public authority was imposed was simultaneously the age in which 'absolute' private property was progressively consolidated... Thus while capital was slowly accumulated beneath the glittering superstructures of Absolutism, exerting an ever greater gravitational pull, the noble landowners of early modern Europe retained their historical predominance, in and through the monarchies which now commanded them. (Anderson, 1974b, 429-30)

This consolidation of absolute private property reflected the dissolution of feudal relations which was the concomitant of the growth of the absolutist state during the 'crisis of feudalism'. As Robert Brenner has shown the class struggles between peasant and lord which led to the breakdown of feudalism did not, in western Europe, have a unique outcome. In France, for instance, the general result was a commutation of services and fixing of rents which, with inflation, had the consequence of turning the peasants into petty freeholders (Brenner, 1977, 73). On the other hand, in England the result was different and had very different consequences: The peasants won their freedom, but did not win the land. As a result they were, by and large,

transformed into a rural proletariat, and their 'free' labour was the basis for the development of capitalist agriculture (Brenner, 1977, 75ff; Holton, DMT, 485).

This decisive shift in the class relations of feudalism combined with the growth of the commercial culture of the towns (the spread of market exchange, of capitalist merchants and manufacturers, increasingly beyond the bounds of feudal or guild constraint), to create, at the opposite pole from the state, another powerful force of differentiation out of feudal society. The 'economy' was more and more transformed from a predominantly 'private' (household) activity co-ordinated and integrated by 'public' (political) processes, into the 'public' activity of 'private' production -- individualized and separated into myriad unrelated establishments -- with social production co-ordinated and integrated by the market without, at least tendentially, the interference of 'public' authority'.

It is impossible to construct a single unambiguous picture of the relation either of the aristocracy or the developing state to the emergence of the 'new' civil society. At different periods and places, they supported or opposed, facilitated or neglected, participated in or attempted to suppress the growing independence and self sufficiency of the new society that, tendentially, "put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations... [and] left remaining no other nexus between man and man than... callous 'cash payment'" (Marx & Engels, CW6, 486-7).

When in England the state sought to develop that royal absolutism which on the continent supplanted feudalism and retarded the development of the new civil society, "the 'reasonableness' of the sanctity of private property was imposed by the pikes of the New Model Army and confirmed by Dutch William's mercenaries" (Christopher Hill, quoted in Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, 94). Of the state which emerged from the 'Glorious Revolution', Locke, its philosophical apologist, could write that "government has no other end but the preservation of property" (quoted in Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, 98). Newcastle, the great Whig master of patronage in the eighteenth century, said that he was "bred up to think that the trade of this nation is the sole support of it" (quoted in Hill, 1969, 226). Pitt, the founder of the 'first British empire', made this idea the foundation of English foreign policy: "When trade is at stake it is your last retrenchment; you must defend it, or perish" (quoted in Plumb, 1950, 71).

Yet, however capitalistically inclined, and despite the fact that under it the industrial revolution was gathering steam, this Whig regime did not -- quite -- inaugurate the distinction of state and civil society. It remained, in the term which Adam Smith coined to describe it, a mercantilist system: its perspective remained the wealth & welfare of the state and for the members of the state, the 'political nation', place, perquisite and monopoly stood beside agriculture, industry and trade as sources of revenue and

profit. The political economists of the Scottish enlightenment finally drew the line sharply and unequivocally. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments developed a conception of human behavior that in The Wealth of Nations was manifested in his advocacy of laissez faire, free trade, and the restraint of state intervention in the economy (Roll, 1973, 145ff). What is "going on in the Scottish Enlightenment", write Corrigan and Sayer, is "the recognition of 'civil society' and the announcement of a new-reality society as such... Following the earlier reconceptualization of 'the population' as part creation, part object of state activity, what the Scottish philosophers announce is the recognition of labouring as having to be brought within society" (1985, 106).

Under the impact of the Scottish theorists and especially of the rapid growth of industry the bourgeoisie more and more saw the state as distinct from, and often opposed to society. Even while the the bourgeoisie were (in general) excluded from political representation in the state the preponderance of the 'new' over the 'old' civil society grew with the preponderance of capitalist production.⁸ As Marx and Engels put it in the German Ideology:

The term "Burgerliche Gesellschaft" [civil society] emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relationships had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. "Burgerliche Gesellschaft as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organization developing directly out of production and commerce. (cited in

Draper, 1977, 33)

With the 'new civil society' the tripartite division, formalized by Hegel, of family, civil society and state, replaces the old twofold division of private and public life -- of household and political life.

Despite his intensive study of British political economy as early as 1801 Hegel did not complete his reformulation of the concept of civil society until much later. The term itself first appears in his work in marginal notes to his own lecture copy of Encyclopaedia in 1818 (Pelczynski, 1984b, 7). Until then, despite his incisive comments upon the modern economy and upon the consequences of the revolution in France, Hegel "is unable", as Pelczynski observes, "to provide an analysis of the ethical, political and social consciousness of modern Europe to match his sympathetic analysis of the vanished world of the Greek polis" (1984b, 6). Hegel's nostalgia for the polis reflects the central concern of his political and social theory with Sittlichkeit -- 'ethical life' -- his concern that the subjective particularity and individualism of modern life were the enemies of a reconstituted polis (concerns reflected in his disillusionment with the French Revolution's failed attempt to reconstitute an ethical community on the basis of what Hegel was to call 'absolute freedom'). Once Hegel had fully worked through the distinction of civil society and the state he was able to develop, in the Philosophy of Right, a new conception of

Sittlichkeit which could accomodate the individuality and subjective freedom of the modern world.

In Hegel's conception civil society divides into three moments:

- (A) The mediation of need and one man's satisfaction through his work and the satisfaction of the needs of all others -- the System of Needs.
- (B) The actuality of the universal principle of freedom therein contained -- the protection of property through the Administration of Justice.
- (C) Provision against contingencies still lurking in systems (A) and (B), and care for particular interests as a common interest, by means of the Police and the Corporation. (PR, para 188).

Hegel's treatment of civil society will be examined further below, but at this point we should note that part (A), the realm of private property and the market economy, and part (B), the legal security of person and property, correspond to the two aspects of civil society identified by Black. Thus far Hegel follows the definition growing up spontaneously and practically in the world around him. The novel element in Hegel's definition is (C), the Police and the Corporation.

By Police Hegel indicates public authority, both what we would understand by 'police', the criminal law and its enforcement, and as well the public regulation of market practice and amelioration of its untoward effects, activities which we would tend to associate with the state. While conducted by the bureaucracy -- Hegel's 'universal class' -- in the public interest these functions are those of the 'external state' rather than of the state proper (PR, para 183, cf CIHM, 35). The Corporations are associations of

individuals within civil society, along lines dictated by the division of labour, both for their mutual aid and self-government and for their representation in the state (PR, para 252).

Marx's use of civil society follows Hegel's, with some crucial distinctions. In the first place, Marx, like more modern commentators, tends to include both the Administration of Justice and those functions which Hegel designates by 'Police' within the state, reflecting his reevaluation and rejection of Hegel's conception of the state as the realm of Sittlichkeit.⁹ Second, there is no place for the Corporation in Marx's treatment of civil society. But then there existed, in Marx's time, no such entity in the sense which Hegel intended it -- an authorized and revitalized version of the medieval guilds. These had long since passed from relative to absolute decline and were abolished in most jurisdictions (cf GI, 69-79).¹⁰

This re-evaluation and re-allocation of the elements of Hegel's definition of civil society leaves the 'system of needs', or, in Marx's usage, the capitalist mode of production, as the central and defining aspect of civil society. It is this development in Marx's treatment of civil society that is lamented by Gouldner and by some other modern commentators (Gouldner, 1980; Cohen, 1982). Such criticisms, adopting the perspective of what I will call the 'late-modern' sense of civil society, miss the fact that the elements whose exclusion by Marx they bemoan (a free press,

public opinion, voluntary associations concerned with public affairs) were not encompassed in civil society even in Hegel's theory. There they were discussed as elements of the state (PR, paras 315-20). Hegel of course is perfectly aware that these emerge out of civil society, out of "the formal subjective freedom of individuals [which] consists in their having and expressing their own private judgements, opinions and recommendations on affairs of state" (PR, para 316). But only when taken up in the state can these lose the accidental and arbitrary character with which their origin marks them. On the other hand, Marx is not ignorant of anything but commerce in civil society, as is witnessed by his discussion of the relegation of religion to civil society where political emancipation enfranchises religious minorities or disestablishes the church (CW3, 150ff).

But both Hegel and Marx would agree that both the character and the possibility of such activity and associations are the consequence of the 'system of needs', the capitalist market economy, and that the latter, not the former, are the decisive feature of civil society. The German term for civil society is, as mentioned earlier, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, and this may be translated either as 'civil society' or 'bourgeois society'. In German, Hal Draper notes, the term can mean either the one or the other "depending on its context and the user's intentions". Further, "the German usage did not necessarily involve a consciousness of the alternatives" (Draper, 1977, 33). Hegel

and Marx, though doubtless aware of the nuances, may not have seen the two senses as opposed or very different at all. "The anatomy of this civil society" Marx wrote in the famous 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, "has to be sought in political economy" (CPE, 20). Hegel wrote: "When subjective particularity is upheld by the objective order in conformity with it and is at the same time allowed its rights, then it becomes the animating principle of the entire civil society" (PR, para 206A). Hegel's formulation may not be as direct as Marx's but the sense of their statements is the same: it is the autonomy facilitated by the market economy, and its complement mutual dependence, also constructed through the market, that is the substantial basis both of the individual's particular subjectivity and his universality.

In part the objections of commentators like Gouldner and Cohen result simply from their having assumed a different definition (to be explored below). But in that case they might as well have disputed Aristotle's far more divergent definition.

During the nineteenth century 'civil society' fell out of currency, a development that, in itself, reflects the extent to which what had been polemically advanced through the concept had become a general reality. Recently, however, the term has been emerging into political discourse once more. And in this revival the usage has shifted once again. If the classical concept differentiated the public and the

private, and the modern concept recognized the insertion of a new order between the family and the polity, the late-modern concept is tending to insert yet another dimension, this time between the state and the economy. This change once more reflects a changing social structure, and like the modern concept in the period of its development, there is an important polemical dimension to it.

Antonio Gramsci's use of civil society has been very influential and has encouraged the growing distinction between civil society and the economy, even if it has at the same time contributed to an erosion of the distinction between civil society and the state (Sassoon, DMT, 73-74). Gramsci's use of the concept is by no means uniform, and, as the editors of the English translation of his Prison Notebooks point out, Gramsci was well aware of its various uses by Hegel, Marx, classical and contemporary liberals (political economy and, especially, Croce) and by the church. According to the context and object of his discussion Gramsci both accommodated and differentiated his usage to these other definitions (Hoare & Smith in Gramsci, 1971, 206-9).

In general by civil society Gramsci indicates a broad range of social institutions and spaces which are not, strictly speaking, either economic or state organs, including the church, schools, labour unions and intellectuals. In those of his discussions in which civil society plays the largest part -- those concerning the

processes by which the ruling class establishes its hegemony over society (and so with the conditions which may constrain revolutionary movements) -- the distinction between civil society and the economy is firmly established but that between civil society and the state tends to fade (Gramsci, 1971, ptII, chap.2, cf. Jessop, 1982, 145-7). As the institutional nexus and forces through which hegemony is organized civil society is the necessary complement to the circumscribed 'night-watchman state' ("which anyway has never existed except on paper as a limiting hypothesis"): "one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 1971, 261, 263). As Jessop observes, "provided one interprets such definitions in relation to the exercise of state power... rather than as an attempt to establish the boundaries of the state apparatus itself" the appearance of inconsistency or contradiction in Gramsci's use of civil society "do not seem very significant" (Jessop, 1982, 147). However, the influence of Gramsci's discussion has had significant effects. On the one hand, it contributed directly to formulations, such as Althusser's 'ideological state apparatuses' in which the distinction of civil society and state virtually disappears (Althusser, 1971, 127-186). On the other hand, Gramsci's more pervasive differentiation of the economy and civil society has been reproduced almost universally in contemporary discussions and thus helped to consolidate a decisive shift away from the usage of Hegel

and Marx.

Curiously, although Gramsci's usage is influential in shaping contemporary discussions of civil society, his treatment attributes considerable power to civil society while later commentators are frequently concerned with its decline and with the possibility of rejuvenating it. This is possibly due to Gramsci's emphasis upon the class character of civil society. When Gramsci writes that "the superstructures of civil society are like the trench systems of modern warfare", providing a defence 'in depth' for the state, it is clear that those occupying the trenches are the bourgeoisie and their allies (church, intellectuals, etc.) and that the assaulting force is the proletariat, in Marx's words, "a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society" (Gramsci, 1971, 235, CW3, 186). Gramsci is writing at the fulcrum point where the modern conception is becoming the late modern form. Where his emphasis lies on the role of civil society as a defence of the state and of the existing social order, the emphasis will later lie on the role of civil society as a defence against the state. The critical influence in this shift is clearly the rise of totalitarianism both in capitalist Europe and post-revolutionary Russia. In light of this development a new consideration, and appreciation, of 'bourgeois freedoms' was required and this has shaped the further evolution of the idea of civil society.

An important contribution to this redefinition has been

made by Jurgen Habermas, although he has spoken in terms of the "public sphere" (Offenlichkeit) rather than 'civil society'. This public sphere is "a realm of social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed", where citizens, in such fora as clubs, newspapers and journals, can "confer in an unrestricted fashion -- that is with the guarantee of freedom of association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions -- about matters of general interest" (Habermas quoted in Held, 1980, 260)¹¹

Although situating the emergence of this public sphere within, and as a function of, the growth of the capitalist market economy, Habermas does not treat the public sphere as as part of a civil society which also (as in Hegel and Marx) encompasses the economy (Held, 1980, 260-1). "The bourgeois public sphere, occasionally referred to by Habermas as classical, constituted itself in the the 17th and 18th centuries as a sphere (sui generis) situated between the absolutist state and bourgeois society, i.e., between the world of social labour and commodity trade" (Hohendahl, 1979, 92). While he holds up this classical public sphere as a normative category for critical purposes Habermas is aware of its limitations (if he perhaps, in my opinion, also overestimates its strengths). The model itself conceives the public sphere as a forum for the development of rational consensus among citizens, excluding manipulative discourse or direct coercion, and recognizing "neither social differences or privileges" (Hohendahl, 1979, 93). But

historically these conditions were never met:

The public sphere was thought to represent the general interest, although those who participated in it were generally of 'high standing' (people with education and property). Members of the bourgeoisie were the 'reasoning public;... they sought to change society into a sphere of private autonomy free from political interference, and to transform the state into an authority restricted to a limited number of functions and supervised by the 'public'. (Held, 1980, 261)

This classical public sphere always presupposed property as its qualification for participation and it similarly presupposed property as the limits of 'discursive will formation' and the definition of the public good: proletarians and those who would polemicize against property who sought to enter this public debate could expect to be met with violent repression and censorship. To win for the great mass of the population a right to be heard in the public sphere required a long and very difficult struggle against those, already included, who sought to keep all others out (see, inter alia, Thompson, 1968).

Despite Habermas's differentiation between the public sphere and the economy, he sees the fortunes of the former as intimately tied up with developments in the latter. "The erosion of the classical public sphere begins, according to Habermas, after 1870, when liberal competitive capitalism gives way to the organized capitalism of cartels and trusts" (Hohendahl, 1979, 94). The commercialization and commercial exploitation of communications media and the growing influence of monopoly capitalist firms and of the interventionist state over the public sphere have led to its

"refeudalization":

The creating and probing of public opinion through 'publicity', public relations work' and 'public opinion research' replaced discursive will formation. The critical functions of the public sphere were thoroughly weakened. (Held, 1980, 262)

This degradation and occupation of the public sphere by capitalism and the state produces an image of civil society not unlike that of Gramsci -- a site where hegemony is organized to defend capital and the state and disperse popular opposition.

The lead given by Gramsci and Habermas has been followed by most of those contemporary commentators who have taken up the concept of civil society. John Urry, for example, draws upon both, but also on an original reading of Marx: "that when Marx employs the concept of 'civil society' in Capital [it is]... no longer... seen as comprised of individuals and of their needs and dispositions -- individuals who are subject to the economy. Rather, civil society refers 'to the individualizing sphere of the circuit of of capital's path to expanded reproduction'" (Urry, 1981, 25). Urry defines civil society as:

that set of social practices outside the state and outside the relations and forces of production in which agents are both constituted as subjects and which presuppose the actions of such subjects -- first, in the sphere of circulation directly; second, in those social relations within which labour-power is reproduced economically, biologically and culturally; and third, in the resultant class and popular democratic forces. (1981, 31)

Urry's usage has its distinctive features (he, for instance, includes child-rearing in civil society, a facet

of life given separate treatment by Hegel -- and in a rather different way by Marx -- under the family, and frequently ignored by others) but in general his approach typifies what I have called the 'late-modern' concept of civil society: a sphere of social life lying outside and between the state and the economy. This is the same emphasis given to the concept by Gouldner's account (see above and note 1) and in that of Jean Cohen, who (very much influenced by Habermas) describes the "key features of civil society" as:

legality (private law; civil, political, social equality and rights), plurality (autonomous, self-constituted voluntary associations), and publicity (spaces of communication, public participation in the genesis, conflict, reflection on and articulation of political will and social norms)... contradictory to the extent that the institutions of a new, differentiated capitalist economy and, in some countries, the institutions of the absolute state infringed upon societal independence and sought to functionalize it. (1982, 225)

Cohen goes on to comment that, however hedged about by the economy and the state, this civil society has survived except in twentieth century totalitarian regimes. And indeed the dilemmas posed to social and political theory by such regimes -- especially those of 'actually existing socialism' -- have been an important spur to the contemporary revival and redefinition of civil society. Indeed, this late-modern concept has become a rallying cry of Eastern European dissidents.¹² In the West this concern that under socialism "civil society and public life have been destroyed" (Lukes, 1987, xii) has been coupled with concerns that the older popular institutions -- trade unions, political parties,

etc. -- have become incorporated into the structures of the economy and the state, and by interest in the 'new social movements' (cf. Habermas, 1985, 99ff).¹³

For early modern theorists (excepting Hegel) the state had been viewed as the antithesis and nemesis of civil society (at least until the bourgeoisie wrested control of it from the ancien regime). The experience of statism in the twentieth century, whether that of 'actually existing socialism' or of the Western welfare state, has revived this perception. On the right this has been theoretically reflected in the Friedmanite revival of the virtues of the free market and politically in the regimes of Thatcher and Reagan. As David Held and John Keane observe:

According to this so-called 'libertarian' ideology, comprehensive state regulation saps both individual initiative and social resources that make self-organization and 'mutual aid' possible. Such claims have enjoyed considerable success... because they mobilise that massive body of cynicism, distrust and dissatisfaction with which people have come to regard the interventionist state. In other words, the success of Thatcher and the new right is parasitic upon the difficulties faced by an excessively bureaucratic, state administered socialism. (1984, 37)

Statism is a trap into which socialism (east and west) has fallen and from which, in the view of Held and Keane, it must escape if it is to have any future. Defining civil society as, potentially, a "non-state sphere comprising a variety of social institutions -- productive units, households, voluntary organizations and community-based services -- which are legally guaranteed and democratically organized" (while also taking account of the more

'traditional' definitions now championed by the new right) they argue that socialists must "reject the assumption that the state could ever replace civil society or vice versa":

the separation of the state and civil society must be a permanent feature of any democratic social and political order in which productive property, status and the power to make decisions would no longer be privately appropriated. (1984, 38)

This formulation completes the transformation to what I have called the late modern conception of civil society inasmuch as it, implicitly, rejects the Marxist vision of communism as a unitary and absolutely dis-alienated social world, but, equally, rejects a nostalgic (and vain) retreat to a mythic Bürgerliche Gesellschaft of the past. It retreats from the utopian ambitions of communism without abandoning the ambition to socialism. Civil society has been separated both from the semi-public world of the private economy and from the false universality of the state. Freedom and autonomy are lodged in a middle ground but without the prospect that this sphere can ever become total.

This reorientation of the usage of civil society is an emerging aspect of very important and significant attempts to come to grips with the possibilities for freedom in both advanced capitalist and post-capitalist societies. This is a welcome development and to quibble about the meaning attributed to 'civil society' would be out of place. By the same token, however, the attempt to find the "theoretical basis... [of] a link between Marxism and authoritarianism" in a reductive definition of civil society by Marx is

misplaced (Cohen, 1982, 29). The flaw in Marx's vaguely elaborated and, to my mind, frankly utopian projection of communism is not his rejection of civil society but the assumption that communism, to become a realization of human freedom, has no need of particular institutional and material supports upon which something like civil society (in the late-modern sense) could be supported. Posed in this way it becomes apparent that the contemporary retrieval of 'civil society' has only glimpsed and not yet properly formulated the question.

Marx rejected civil society because, as Cohen correctly observes, "for Marx, the emergence and development of civil society could appear simultaneously as the sine qua non for freedom, autonomy, individuality, and social justice and the basis for new forms of domination, restriction, alienation, and inequality" (1982, 22). This paradox reflects the roots of civil society, and both everything that is good about it and everything that is bad, in a single complex of social relations: private property, market exchange and (therefore) capitalist production. On this Marx and Hegel were in perfect agreement. They differed on what its consequences would be, and hence on what should be done about it. Hegel believed that the evils could be ameliorated and that there was anyway no other basis than private property and market exchange for individual freedom. He would therefore tolerate whatever evils had to be tolerated. Marx saw the evils of the capitalist economy as progressive, destined to make a

charade of civil society's freedom, even while maintaining its outward appearance, and concluded therefore that civil society must be abolished. Neither would have countenanced the idea that civil society could survive separated from its social basis: private property.

So, if something like civil society -- meaning as the contemporary commentators do the realm of personal autonomy -- is to be preserved in a socialist society (or, rather if the phoenix concept of civil society is to be recast once again) then what is important is to discover a social and institutional basis which can sustain it. It is no use simply bemoaning the colonization of civil society by the economy on the one hand and the state on the other. Such a complex of social practices does not simply appear, suspended in mid-air. What basis could a socialist civil society have?

MacGregor, who follows closely the understanding of civil society developed by Hegel and Marx, understands this predicament. But he follows Hegel in concluding that property is the necessary basis for civil society, particularity and subjective freedom. He therefore does not search for an alternative but seeks to make private property the substantive basis of socialism! Marx was perhaps mistaken in his conclusion that communism did not require such an institutional grounding for individual freedom, but in this thesis I will try to show that he was quite right when he concluded, against Hegel, that property provided

only a transient and ephemeral freedom.

Thus, however important polemically the recent retrieval of 'civil society' is for focussing the issue of personal autonomy and freedom, the conception of civil society with which we must be concerned here is that which Hegel and Marx shared: one in which the market economy of capitalism is an essential and indispensable element. In the next section Hegel's conception of civil society, its basis in property and dependence upon the 'system of needs' will be examined in more detail.

Hegel and Civil Society

The starting point of Hegel's political philosophy, as David MacGregor observes, is "the free will of the individual" (CIHM, 175, cf. 29). And freedom is indissolubly bound up with reason: "Reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth... Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to wield this power" (Marcuse, 1960, 9). The realization of the 'realm of freedom' requires that the world be remade in accordance with reason.

But reason demands that freedom be conceived in accordance with it. For Hegel the 'negative' freedom of civil society was deficient in just this way. The atomism of the bourgeois world could never give any substantive

content to freedom, it remained abstract and its expression arbitrary and accidental (Taylor, 1975, 373). To develop a content that is in accordance with reason, freedom must take its form in a community, in a substantive whole that is greater than the individual and can give meaning to individual freedom. This was the problem that shaped Hegel's political philosophy: "how to combine the fullness of moral autonomy, with the recovery of that community whose public life was expressive of its members and whose paradigm realization in history was the Greek polis" (Taylor, 1975, 365). Hegel's thought, argues Raymond Plant, "was dominated by two interrelated ideals":

the restoration of wholeness and integrity to the human personality; and the restructuring of society on a more harmonious, reciprocating basis, restoring a sense of community. A crucial influence on the formation of these ideals was a romanticized and idealized picture of the Ancient Greek and particularly the Athenian polis. In such a society, so it was believed, a real sense of community had been achieved.... [He] extrapolated from Greek political culture a deep and abiding political conviction about the need for society to recapture some sense of the harmony of Greece -- albeit in a modified, contemporary form. (1977a, 80)

The freedom of the polis was a direct identification of the individual with the community, an immediate and unreflected unity. This unity Hegel saw being upset by the principle of subjectivity with the ascendancy of Rome and later of Christianity. This development posed a contradiction which, as Pelczynski observes, Hegel could not resolve until his reading of political economy allowed him to recast the notion of civil society (1984b). The

dilemma is that while Hegel recognized this development of subjectivity as an advance for the idea of freedom, "the freedom of the private citizen codified in [Roman private] law is equated with the loss of substantial universality and the binding ethical life of the Greek polis":

individuals as private persons... withdraw from the ethical immediacy of the ethico-political structure of the state... to live an atomized existence as separate individuals.... [T]he common source of subjectivity and abstract private law... betokens 'a tragedy for the ethical life'. (Kortian, 1984, 200)

Hegel therefore "regarded subjectivity and particularity (twin elements of individualism in his view) as enemies of ethical and political life: he had not yet recognized civil society as an arena where individualism found legitimate scope and could express itself safely without harming the community" (Pelczynski, 1984b, 5, cf. Avineri, 1972, 84). How Hegel came to this resolution will be discussed below. To introduce civil society we should first review Hegel's doctrine of property (which itself emerges from that resolution as it reflects a reconciliation with the notion of private right).

Hegel's theory of property is developed in the first part of the Philosophy of Right. As this theory of 'abstract right' and MacGregor's interpretation of it will be discussed further in the following chapters, I will limit myself here to describing its basic features.

Hegel supports the notion of the necessity of private property, though unlike other theorists he does not do so

merely on utilitarian grounds or on the grounds that property is an end in itself for human beings (Mapherson, 1985, 87). Rather private property is necessary because "a person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea":

If emphasis is placed on my needs, then the possession of property appears as a means to their satisfaction, but the true position is that, from the standpoint of freedom, property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is itself a substantive end. (PR, paras 41, 45R).

The doctrine of abstract right develops a theory of property at three levels; possession, use and alienation (PR, para 53). Possession is itself divided into three parts; "we take possession of a thing (a) by directly grasping it physically, (b) by forming it, and (c) by merely marking it as ours" (PR, para 54). Of these three modes of possession Hegel views (b) as the most adequate form. Of (a) he writes "this mode is only subjective, temporary and seriously restricted in scope" and of (c) that "in its objective scope and its meaning this mode of taking possession is very indeterminate" (PR, paras 55, 58). "To impose a form on a thing is the mode of taking possession most in conformity with the Idea to this extent, that it implies a union of subject and object" (PR, para 56R).

As Anthony Smith has observed, Hegel is here approaching property outside of any social relationships (1987, 486). This characteristic, plus Hegel's option for imposing form as the preferred means of possession, gives Hegel's doctrine of possession some resemblance to Locke's

position that when one "hath mixed his labour with and joined to it something that is his own [i.e., his labour D.F] [he] thereby makes it his property" (quoted in Arthur, 1985, 44). In this pre-social element Hegel's doctrine of property appears to draw on natural right theory. Man, as Man, has "the absolute right of appropriation over all 'things'" (PR, para 44).

Use, as the extension and continuance of the original forming of a thing, is a more developed and adequate form of property. Repeated and continued use are an expression of will in a universal manner and therefore superior to mere possession. Use is indeed so important that "if the whole and entire use of a thing were mine" although another has abstract title to it, then it would be mine (PR, para 62). This formulation is, as we shall see in the next chapter crucial to MacGregor's interpretation of Hegel. We should note, however, that in the same paragraph Hegel denies any right of ownership to those with only temporary use.

The true significance of property is revealed in the third and most adequate form: alienation of property. Alienation brings property into the realm of social relations and implies through the other's recognition of the thing as my property, their recognition of my own will and personality:

This relation of will to will is the true and proper ground in which freedom is existent. -- The sphere of contract is made up of this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by means of a thing and my subjective will, but by means of another person's

will. (PR, para 71).

Any physical object which is mine I may alienate to another because this thing is "external by nature". However, "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute my own private personality... are inalienable". But, where I may transform these into a limited and external form then "the relation here between myself and my abilities is the same as that between the substance of a thing and its use". Therefore, "single products of my particular physical and mental skill and my power to act I can alienate to someone else". Furthermore, Hegel very significantly adds that "I can give him the use of my abilities for a restricted period" (PR, paras 65, 66, 67, 67R).

Much of the discussion in the next two chapters is concerned with the meaning and consequences of this last provision. Here we may simply note, as does Joachim Ritter, that with this provision Hegel brings labour out of the unfree realm of necessity to which it (and the labourer) had been consigned since the time of the polis: "That is for Hegel the rational meaning of modern labour relations... employer and laborer no longer... act toward one another as master and slave in the state of nature, but as persons... the freedom of all makes itself prevail" (1982, 141).

Exclusivity and alienability are therefore fundamental aspects of Hegel's doctrine of property. "Only as a proprietor among proprietors am I free", Chris Arthur sums it up (1985, 52). Arrangements which infringe either are an

abridgement of my right of property and thus an offence against my freedom. The notion of common property, Hegel argues, "violates the right of personality" (PR, para 46R). The social element of Hegel's theory we should note is founded upon the earlier pre-social aspect. Recognition is therefore not the final justification of property but a secondary one. Even were recognition realizable in another form than alienation and contract, still on Hegel's theory there could be no justification for infringing private property as the prior doctrine of possession and use would still oppose such a move (cf Cristi, 1978).

Hegel proceeds from property, through contract to the realm established by the generalization of such relations: civil society. By his study of political economy, especially of Steuart and Smith, Hegel was finally able to posit a way in which subjective particularity, abstract right and private law, could be made compatible with a new universal community. From Steuart, as Plant and Dickey have shown, Hegel drew upon the idea of the 'statesman' and the possibility that the state could impose some order on the accident and caprice of commercial society without wholly transgressing the individual and private right of the bourgeois (Plant, 1977a, 85, Dickey, 1987, ch5). On the other hand, "Hegel integrates the Smithian model of a free market into his philosophical system, by transforming Smith's 'hidden hand' into dialectical reason working in civil society, unbeknownst to its own members" (Avineri,

1972, 146-7). Hegel puts it this way:

When men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally related to one another in their work and the satisfaction of their needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into a mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man in earning, producing and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else. (PR, para 199).

Private right need no longer be seen as predominantly destructive. In his early writings on political economy Hegel had incisively perceived the degradation that the market economy was capable of producing (see Avineri, 1972, 87ff). This recognition remains in the Philosophy of Right but it is now tempered by a more positive evaluation of the 'system of needs' as a whole. There he writes: "when complaints are made about the luxury of the business classes and their passion for extravagance -- which have as their concomitant the creation of a rabble of paupers... we must not forget that besides its other causes (e.g. increasing mechanization of labour) this phenomenon has an ethical ground" (PR, para 253R). Civil society may produce great extremes of wealth and poverty but it also produces, behind the backs of its members, a social integration which can form the basis for the emergence of a new form of Sittlichkeit. In the corporation this community begins to take shape: "the moments of subjective particularity and objective universality... sundered in civil society to begin with... are united in an inward fashion, so that in this

union particular welfare is present as a right and is actualized" (PR, para 255). At the same time the interventionist strain of political economy represented by Steuart allowed Hegel to conclude that the system of needs could be brought into accordance with reason by the administration of justice and the Police or public authority, so that its worst excesses would be ameliorated. The role of the corporation and the public authority will be discussed in the next chapter when MacGregor's interpretation of them is presented.

The sphere of particularity is not in itself, however, sufficient to create a new ethical community. The realization of freedom and community must therefore take place in another sphere -- in the state. But to Hegel, 'the state' is a term that in many circumstances is interchangeable with 'ethical community' (Pelczynski, 1984b, 8, 1984c 55-6). The state as 'the actuality of the ethical ideal' is greater than mere government, or what Hegel calls 'the external state'. In this broad sense, observes Pelczynski, "it corresponds in most respect to our contemporary concept of culture... a political community because it is a cultural community, because its constitution is grounded in a national culture, because its political institutions are deeply interwoven and interdependent with all other aspects of culture" (1984c, 56-7):

The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and

yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself. (PR, para 260)

Hegel's reconceptualization of civil society as the sphere of private right and subjective particularity recognizes the emancipation of labour in modern society. No longer can the community be conceived, as it was in the classical concept, as comprising only that part of the population within a territory which is free of the necessity of labour. This acknowledges the effective appropriation of the concept of civil society by the bourgeois in the course of their long struggle against the political, legal and social disabilities imposed by feudal society. But at the same time Hegel retrieves the classical meaning of civil society in his treatment of the state. The Philosophy of Right could therefore be said to present two civil societies standing side by side.

The incapacity, in Hegel's view, of the modern civil society to create an ethical community results in part, as Pelczynski observes, from the fact that in this sphere "social interdependence is brought about to some extent by the external forces of needs, labour, the division of labour and the market and not merely through inner individual commitment and choice" (1984c, 74). Marx, in his own study of civil society, concluded that this incapacity was a direct consequence of the private property and commodity exchange relations that established this 'system of needs'. In chapter four I will argue that Marx's critique of civil

society shows further that the attempt to create an ethical life in a sphere supplementary to and materially dependent on such a system is also doomed to failure. Before turning to that critique, however, David MacGregor's attempt to reinterpret Hegel's rational state as a 'communist ideal' will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIALISM

In this chapter I will outline David MacGregor's socialist interpretation of Hegel in The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, his description of the shape and character of the future 'social state' and the theory of transition from capitalist society that accompanies it. In the later sections of the chapter I will present two parts of my critique of his proposition. In the first I will argue that MacGregor's defence of proletarian property rights on the basis of Hegel's doctrine of abstract right is internally flawed. In the second I will present an argument for the possibility that the corporate form of representation, proposed by MacGregor for the social state, may not prove a defence against the development of a 'mono-organizational' state, but may rather be a form facilitating rather than discouraging the development of political dictatorship. The third element of my critique of MacGregor, that he, and Hegel, misconstrue the true character of the commodity/exchange economy, and that such a form of social integration of labour is inimical to any rational society, is taken up in the following chapter. Lesser points of criticism will be raised, in the text and in notes, in the course of the exposition in the first part of this chapter.

As discussed in the introduction, an important part of MacGregor's method is his practice of placing quotations from Hegel and Marx back to back, usually to illustrate the similarity of their views. In the discussion of many of the issues addressed in this chapter MacGregor employs quotations from Marx in support of his arguments. In most circumstances I will omit such quotations in my presentation of MacGregor's position. In my view he has misinterpreted Marx in many cases. However, to address every such case would make any coherent presentation and discussion of MacGregor's arguments impossible.

MacGregor's critique of Marx's theory of communism argues that by socializing all productive property and attempting to dissolve the separation between society and the state Marx has swept away the conditions which are necessary to support individual autonomy in the modern world and paved the way for the collapse into a 'mono-organizational' or totalitarian state. There is a certain prima facie case for this argument, inasmuch as something very like this outcome has resulted from attempts to develop socialism on the basis of Marx's theory.

MacGregor's presentation of the Philosophy of Right as an alternative formulation of the socialist project hinges upon four major issues: (1) Hegel's doctrine of abstract right interpreted as a critique of capitalist production and a justification of workers' legitimate rights to a share of productive property, (2) Portraying the Corporation both as

a medium through which such rights are achieved and as the fundamental institution of socialist democracy, (3) The continued independence of the different institutional elements of society, with, however, the state and the 'Universal Class' of civil servants exercising a general "oversight and care" of civil society, (4) a theory of transition in which "progress towards the rational state does not involve a complete departure from the governing institutions of capitalist society" (CIHM, 254). Each of these themes will be reviewed in turn, excepting the last as the different elements of MacGregor's theory of transition must be brought up in the earlier sections. The general shape and institutional structure of MacGregor's 'social state' will be reviewed before passing on to the critiques of MacGregor's theory in the final sections of the chapter.

The Justification of Proletarian Property

The crux of MacGregor's argument, the fundamental point by which his presentation of Hegel as a socialist theorist must stand or fall, is his interpretation of Hegel's treatment of the sale of labour power and the rights of workers in their contract with capitalists. The prevailing circumstance, writes MacGregor, is that:

in the exchange between worker and capitalist, the capitalist provides commodities in the universal form of money while the worker provides labour power. Labour power in turn... transforms the capital of the

employer into commodities. The commodities produced, therefore, are not produced by the capitalist but rather by the worker. At the end of the labour process, the employer is presented with an increased amount of capital while the worker has only wages to spend on consumer goods. (CIHM, 173)

MacGregor's discussion culminates in what he calls "Hegel's devastating critique of capitalist private property" (CIHM, 189). As this is so central to the thesis of The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, MacGregor's argument (interwoven with his quotations from Hegel) must be reproduced at some length.

'If the whole and entire use of a thing were mine', Hegel declares, 'while the abstract ownership was supposed to be someone else's then the thing as mine would be penetrated through and through by my will.. and at the same time there would remain in the thing something impenetrable by me, namely the will, the empty will of another. As a positive will, I would be at one and the same time objective and not objective to myself in the thing - an absolute contradiction. Ownership is in essence therefore free and complete'

The modern worker in 'laying hold of the means' of production, as Hegel expresses it,... is in effect laying claim to the ownership of the means of production. The commodities he or she produces embody the will of the producer and not the abstract will of the capitalist. They are therefore the private property of the worker.... The distinction posited by the bourgeois mind between the abstract ownership of capital and the concrete ideality of the worker is nothing less than an 'insanity of personality'. Hegel's corrosive critique of capitalist private property should be quoted in full: 'To distinguish between the right to the whole and entire use of the thing and ownership in the abstract is the work of the empty Understanding for which the Idea -- i.e. in this instance the unity of (a) ownership (or even the person's will as such) and (b) its realization -- is not the truth, but for which these two moments in their separation pass as something that is true'. What Hegel means is that the bourgeois mind distinguishes between ownership as possession and ideality, i.e., the labour of the worker and ownership of the product of this relation, i.e., the ownership by the capitalist of the commodities produced by the worker.

'This distinction, then', he continues, 'as a relation to the world of fact', i.e., in the bourgeois world of commodity production, 'is that of an overlord to nothing, and this might be called an "insanity of personality"... because "mine" as applied to a single object would have to mean the direct presence in it both of my single exclusive will and also the exclusive will of someone else'.

In Hegel's view... the distinction between the property of the capitalist and that of the worker is completely hollow -- a mystified creation of the bourgeois mind. (CIHM, 189-91)

We might expect, from this argument, that MacGregor (and Hegel) therefore oppose and find illegitimate the wage relation, the sale of labour power by the worker to the capitalist, as the root cause of this 'insanity of personality'. On the contrary, just three pages earlier MacGregor asserts that "the pre-eminant external manifestation of property is one's ability to alienate or sell for a limited time one's own labour power or ideality... [by which] relation, freedom becomes 'concrete, i.e. social': that is the individual's freedom in property is recognized and respected by other individuals". (CIHM' 186).

MacGregor wholeheartedly supports Hegel's defence and justification of private property as "the external manifestation of a person's freedom, the embodiment of his or her own consciousness and will". Property, MacGregor continues, "represents an extension of the person's individuality and will -- an extension that is inviolable" (CIHM, 185-6). Moreover, he also concurs with Hegel's condemnation of common property:

Each individual is entitled to, and has the right of, private property.... For Hegel, the notion that the private property of individuals should be held or shared in common is merely an abstraction of the understanding consciousness.... Private property is a determination of individual freedom; lack of private property negates that freedom. (CIHM, 186).

Finally, "the most important aspect of private property is that, with its emergence, the individual was set free to the extent that his or her labour-power or ideality could be his or her private property. This is the world-historical significance of private property" (CIHM, 184).

The "insanity" of capitalist production, then, does not result from the sale of the worker's labour power per se, but from peculiarities of this contract as it is conducted with the capitalist. "Hegel", asserts MacGregor, "argues that the contract between the worker and the capitalist is a formal contract only, since the exchange between them is not the same as that between two equal commodity owners" (CIHM, 192). A valid contract, Hegel writes:

implies two consenting parties and two things. That is to say, in a contract my purpose is both to acquire property and to surrender it. Contract is real when the action of both parties is complete, i.e. when both surrender and both acquire property, and when both remain property owners even in the act of surrender. Contract is formal where only one of the parties acquires property or surrenders it. (PR, para 76A, quoted in CIHM, 192)

Just such a situation prevails in the contract between capitalist and worker in MacGregor's view: "only one... receives property -- the capitalist; the worker receives only wages which, instead of being property in the sense of a self-renewable resource, are only adequate to keep the

worker alive and fill his or her immediate consumption requirements". Wages provide only subsistence, and "'subsistence', as Hegel points out, is not the same as possession'²". MacGregor therefore concludes that because "the worker gets only a part of the value of what he creates... [and] the capitalist pockets the rest... [this] 'annuls the obligation arising out of the making of the contract'". "The worker, by possessing the means of production, becomes their real owner" (CIHM, 192).

MacGregor thus discerns in Hegel a critique of capitalist production with two facets: on the one hand, the capitalist and the worker relate in the labour process to the same property, but the capitalist's relation is abstract and empty, while the worker's is concrete, active and sensuous.³ The resolution of this contradiction must therefore be in favour of the worker. On the other hand, the contract between the capitalist and the worker for the latter's labour power, is unbalanced, merely formal and invalid. Again, it must be amended in favour of the worker. This critique, MacGregor implies is precisely the same as Marx's treatment of exploitation in the theory of surplus value ("Hegel's theory may have operated as an unconscious subtext in his mind" -- CIHM, 192). The difference between them is that Hegel "offers a much more concrete solution than Marx ever manages to achieve": "The resolution of the contradiction between the capitalist and the worker", writes MacGregor, "therefore, can only go in one direction" (and

here he quotes Hegel): "Although their relation is not that of being common owners of a property, still the transition from it to common ownership is very easy" (CIHM, 194).

We should observe that in the course of this discussion the emphasis has been put on the 'empty' and 'abstract' character of the capitalist's will in relation to the means of production and the commodities produced, while the worker has the 'whole and entire use of the thing'. By this stark antimony the 'absolute contradiction' is posed which must result in the product becoming -- 'free and complete' -- 'the private property of the worker'. But now, at the end of the section, MacGregor adds the comment that "in so far as the capitalist plays a direct role in the production process... his or her relation to the means of production is not entirely abstract" (CIHM, 193). To the extent that this is the case, the capitalist thereby retains property rights alongside the worker. Warrant for this solution is again found in Hegel:

'Were there nothing... in these two relationships' to the means of production 'except that rigid distinction' between the real ownership of the worker and the merely formal ownership of the capitalist, 'in its rigid abstraction, then in them we would not have two overlords (domini) in the strict sense, but an owner on the one hand [i.e., the worker: D.M.] and the overlord who was the overlord of nothing [i.e., the capitalist: D.M.] on the other. But on the score of the burdens imposed there are two owners standing in relation to each other'. (PR, para 62R quoted in CIHM, 193-4, with MacGregor's interpolations)

Now the worker is not to become the sole owner, but "both the worker and the capitalist are owners: they stand in relation to one another as participants in the production

and reproduction of commodities" (CIHM, 31). This, at least, is consistent with the stress MacGregor elsewhere places on the the active role of the capitalist (CIHM, 177ff). It is less clear, at least to me, that this now less-than-absolute contradiction must then be resolved in the same manner as Hegel's 'absolute contradiction' (condemning dual 'title' to a single thing when its use is entirely that of one party). MacGregor clearly feels that it must, but it might perhaps have been discussed.

We should further note that this 'devastating critique of capitalist private property' is drawn almost entirely from two paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right (paras, 61, 62) and that both the argument on the 'very easy transition' and that on 'two owners in relation' are drawn from the discussion in the Remark to paragraph 62 concerning the dissolution of feudal land tenure. This transposition to the worker/capitalist relation may be a legitimate parallel, but surely calls for some supporting argument?

As the editor of the Philosophy of Right, T. M. Knox, observes Hegel's discussion is explicitly directed to the relation between lord and vassal (PR, 325). Considered as a discussion the lord/peasant relationship a very different interpretation is possible. In the new world of absolute private property the old feudal mixture of tenure (see the quote from Bloch in chapter two, above) cannot be maintained. It certainly seems incompatible with Hegel's perspective of 'free and complete' ownership. But here we

have a feudal lord with title (dominium directum) and a vassal with the use of the land (dominium utile). Somehow this situation must be brought into accordance with the new "principle of the freedom of property". Hegel's solution: "the yield of the property is calculated and looked upon as the essential thing, while that incalculable factor in the overlordship of the property, the factor which has perhaps been regarded as the honourable thing, is subordinated to the utile" (PR, para 62R). Hegel, it appears, metes out the same observation made by Johnson after the dissolution of highland feudalism: "The chiefs, divested of their perogatives, turned their thoughts to the improvement of their revenues, and expect more rent as they have less homage" (quoted in Hill, 1969, 224). Hegel's argument can more easily (and more literally) be read as a defence of the Junkers than as an advocacy for proletarians!

MacGregor's representation of Hegel's 'devastating critique' will be examined in detail in a later section of this chapter. One or two further observations may be made here, however. In the first place we might ask what the consequences might be if MacGregor's conditions on the contract between worker and capitalist were applied to other contracts. MacGregor follows Hegel in insisting that equal property (equal in value) must be exchanged for a contract to be valid (PR, para 77, CIHM, 192). More than this, he insists that only property of the same sort may be validly contracted for (property that is not a 'self-renewing

resource' may not be exchanged for that which is not) and further that the acquisition of 'subsistence' does not make a valid contract. But if, for example, I visit my neighborhood restaurant for lunch does not something very like this happen? I exchange money for food. The food is to me merely subsistence, but the money, since the restaurateur is a capitalist, is to him a 'self-renewing resource' (an exchange of his commodity capital for money capital). The same quandry would seem to infect all contracts over consumer goods. Are all such contracts invalid? In the second place, if this relation between capitalist and worker is not a proper contract, in just what circumstances would a proper contract for labour-power (as opposed to labour -- see below) take place?

Finally, neither MacGregor nor Hegel make any comment on their previous condemnation of common property (PR, para 46, CIHM, 186) and this subsequent 'very easy transition' to common property. Once again this ought to be discussed even though the general conclusion appears fairly clear. There is no 'common', collectively owned, property in the new relationship of worker and capitalist; there is merely individual private property held as in a joint stock company. This I take to be the shape of MacGregor's socialist ownership. However, to what degree this is to be "an inherently dissoluble partnership in which the retention of my share is explicitly a matter of my arbitrary preference", is, unfortunately, not made clear (PR, para

46). There are, surely, some very important questions that must be answered in this regard. How long must a worker have the 'whole and entire use' of the means of production before he or she is entitled to a share in the enterprise? What is the size of this share and what form does it take? (stock?, co-operative membership?). May the worker then immediately withdraw from the enterprise and receive in compensation that portion of its capital? Can a worker cash in his or her share of the capital without withdrawing from employment? What is to prevent the rise of a class of proletarian 'corporate raiders', hiring on then absconding with the capital of the firm? If these things are prevented does this not abridge the individual's right of private property? A 'concrete solution' to the 'dilemma of bourgeois society' must attend to such questions.

The Corporation and Socialist Democracy

"Marx never fully worked out his theory of social class" observes MacGregor, adding that "by contrast, Hegel's discussion of class in the Philosophy of Right is thorough and comprehensive" (CIHM, 206). The first part of this statement is undoubtedly true. But then, to Marx a theory of class is not a normative or typological ascription by which individuals may be slotted into different pigeon holes but an attempt to describe the processes in reality by which classes are constituted. The principal conclusion of his own

studies was that classes are constituted in relation to the 'means of production' or, to put the same point in both more general and more specifically correct terms, in the complex of relations that constitutes and reconstitutes the division of labour by which the means of production are set in motion. The fundamental characteristic of such systems of relations through which classes are constituted, which is at the same time "the essential difference between the various economic forms of society... [is] the mode in which surplus-labour is in each case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer" (CI, 209).

To describe classes in terms of their relation to the means of production means, in capitalist society where every means of production has a double character as useful thing and as value/capital, to describe their relation to capital. Two classes are relatively easy to spot: there are those that set capital in motion, the capitalists; and those who are set in motion by capital, the working class. An alternative way to describe this relation -- as Marx does in the fragment on classes in volume three of Capital -- is to detail the source and form of revenue of different groups. The revenue of the working class is from the sale of their labour-power in the form of wages, that of the capitalist class (principally) from their advance of capital in the form of profit (CIII, 886).⁴ In that same fragment, however, Marx begins (just as the manuscript breaks off) to discuss the inadequacy of a description in terms of source

of revenue. One such inadequacy that may be pointed out here is that such a description, focusing on the final distribution of social wealth, does not necessarily illuminate how that distribution came about. 'The mode in which... surplus-labour is... extracted' is always also a relation of power, of control over and subordination within, the relations of production. This element cannot be excluded from the notion of class, whether the final distribution of product be equal or highly uneven.

The vast majority of the population in contemporary Western society falls into the two great classes of bourgeois and proletarians (mostly the latter). But there are endless possible complications both within and beyond this central opposition. In the first place, these relations are but the constitutive core of these two great classes upon which a wealth of cultural elaboration and differentiation develops. The consciousness of a class is no simple function of its location in the relations of production (Thompson, 1968). Such conditions have sometimes led to class consolidations and solidarity. Just as often they have resulted in different sections of the class of wage labourers considering themselves to be separate from that class (if they retain any consciousness of class at all).

Second, these relations are not always clear and unequivocal. Many who in terms of 'revenue' appear to be working class (living off a wage or salary) appear to be in

a "contradictory class position" as they exercise through their placement in the complex organizational structures of modern business enterprises a greater or lesser control over the disposition of capital, and, again to a greater or lesser extent, "the power of disposing of the labour-power of others" (Wright, 1978, GI, 52-3). In combination with cultural factors such circumstances have frequently led their incumbents to consider themselves members of classes distinct from both workers and capitalist. The treatment of such hybrid groups in class theory has been equally fraught with uncertainty. Third, there are significant groups in capitalist society who do not sell their labour power but their labour (on which distinction see below). The 'doctors' mentioned by Marx in his fragment on classes might (normally) be considered of this sort. The archetype of this sort of position is the classical petit bourgeois, who produces commodities (either as a physical good or as a service) but neither employs wage labour nor sells his or her labour-power.

Finally the class composition of capitalist societies is complicated by the fact that capitalism is not a universal mode of production. That is, the whole complex of relations necessary for the reproduction of society cannot be organized through capitalist relations. Capitalism is necessarily dependent on an articulation with alternative sets of relations of production. The state and the relations through which procreation are organized should especially be

mentioned (Vadja, 1981, Bradby, 1982 and note 7 to chapter four, below).⁵ If Marx's theory of class is incomplete the reason is, at least in part, that the very complexity of such inter-relations defies any easy analysis or conclusion.

The 'thorough and comprehensive' character of the Hegelian theory of class is possible in large measure because all individuals that are involved with a given 'mode of production' are defined as members of a single class. Agriculture, commodity production and the state all (at least in the forms in which Hegel deals with them) can be taken to represent different modes of socializing labour, modes of production. To each of these corresponds a single class: "(a) the substantial or immediate [or agricultural] class; (b) the reflecting or formal [or business] class; and finally, (c) the universal class [the class of civil servants]" (PR, para 202, interpolations in the original).

Of these classes only the agricultural class appears to be given an explicit internal differentiation. This class seems in fact to be a reflection of the feudal mode of production. Its place in the state is through the direct and personal involvement of that "section of the agricultural class... summoned and entitled to its political vocation by birth without the hazards of election"; i.e. the feudal lord (PR, para 307, also 305, 306). This 'representative' of the agricultural class necessarily has 'his' opposite number in the peasant.⁶ For the business and universal classes it is not made explicitly clear that such an internal division

exists. Some commentators have thus concluded that Hegel has omitted the proletariat, either obscuring their existence or -- as was certainly common at the time -- merely denying them any place in the state (Avineri, 1972, 109).

Such a conclusion, MacGregor responds, is clearly wrong: "the worker was certainly included in what Hegel calls 'the business class'; this class is a unity which includes the opposites, capitalist and worker, just as the 'agricultural class' includes both great landowners and peasants" (CIHM, 181).⁷ The business class is defined not by its members' ownership of capital but by its necessary social role: "its function is to form and adapt raw materials in order to satisfy human needs" a function in which both the worker and capitalist participate together (CIHM, 31).

The failure of commentators to see that the worker is actually part of Hegel's business class derives from their unspoken assumption (perhaps prejudice) that the worker is a simple pawn in the system of production dominated and controlled by the capitalist, an assumption not shared by Hegel. (CIHM, 181)

The ideality, the creative will and labour, of both the capitalist and the worker are inextricably bound up in the labour process and its product. "The ideality of the capitalist, therefore includes the worker; and the ideality of the worker includes the capitalist. Together they form an organic unity" (CIHM, 180). However, in the form that it has taken hitherto the business class expresses a "contradictory or polar unity", "a conflicted, divided class broken into

the antagonistic poles of worker and capitalist" (CIHM, 206, 233). Despite their common participation in the production of commodities these are appropriated by the capitalists denying the workers their full humanity:

Ownership of property, Hegel suggests, is the means whereby an individual in civil society affirms his or her personality and gains recognition from others. The worker, however, is defined precisely in his or her lack of property; hence the element of recognition vital for establishing the worker's personality is missing. In civil society, therefore, the education or Bildung of the worker takes the form of a struggle for property rights. (CIHM, 30)

"Bildung is the desperate struggle of work and self-realization; it is a class struggle, where the individual attains self-consciousness within the framework of his or her social role in the system of production" (CIHM, 214). The fundamental locus of this educative struggle for recognition of their property rights on the part of proletarians is the Corporation, an organization that is a private business enterprise identical with the capitalist firms with which we are familiar, yet tendentially very different. Just as the business class encompasses the antagonistic poles of capitalist and worker, "in dialectical fashion the Hegelian business corporation also includes its opposite: the labour union":

The corporation offers itself to the worker as the main arena of combat for property rights, the centre of educational struggle (Bildung) in civil society, and the foundation for full political participation in the state.... Condemning... efforts to crush the proletariat, Hegel deliberately defines the corporation as a contradictory organization representative of the opposing interests of capitalists and workers. Thus if his corporation bears some resemblance to the giant businesses that straddle the economies of con-

temporary western capitalism, it also corresponds to the opponents of the multinationals formed within big business itself -- the labour unions. (CIHM, 34, 234)

MacGregor is aware that each aspect of his interpretation of the Corporation is controversial. As he admits, few commentators have seen much resemblance between Hegel's Korporation and the joint stock corporation of later times. He insists, however, that "Hegel's corporation certainly refers to incorporated business organizations, as may be determined by consulting his references to the corporation as a business licenced and regulated by the state" (CIHM, 232, cf 197). When we turn to this discussion in the Philosophy of Right we find (in part) the following discussion of the Corporation:

251.... [The Corporation's] universal purpose is... wholly concrete and no wider in scope than the purpose involved in business, its proper task and interest.

252. In accordance with this definition of its functions a Corporation has the right, under the surveillance of the public authority, (a) to look after its own interests within its own sphere, (b) to co-opt members... (c) to protect its members against particular contingencies, (d) to provide education requisite to fit others to become members...

The Corporation member... who is, or will become, master of his craft... is to be distinguished from a day labourer...

253.... The corporation member needs no external marks beyond his own membership as evidence of his skill and his regular income and subsistence...

Unless he is a member of an authorized Corporation (and it is only by being authorized that an association becomes a Corporation), an individual is without rank or dignity... (PR, paras 251-3 and Remarks).

The elements to which MacGregor in particular referred our attention, (a 'purpose... wholly concrete and no wider than the purpose involved in business', and 'by being authorized... an association becomes a Corporation') occur in the first excerpt and the last (paras 251 & 253R). Between them, and following them is a great deal of discussion of the quasi-judicial, regulatory, educative and mutual-aid functions of corporations. The most direct and obvious conclusion would seem to be that Hegel does not mean to indicate singular, unitary, business enterprises but associations of the practitioners of particular trades gathered together from many separate enterprises which remain distinct economic entities. Under this interpretation, the one drawn by Anthony Black, the corporation is a revitalized form of the crafts guild:

The corporation is concerned to pursue the well-being of all those involved in a given profession... [Its functions] correspond closely to the traditional functions of the guild.... Next, the corporation has legal functions;... 'to manage the private property and interests' of 'particular spheres', by which he appears to mean the general regulation of economic affairs and the administration of justice in economic matters, that is to say in matters which traditionally had come within the scope of guild and municipal courts (prices, wages, conditions of work, weights and measures, quality of goods). In these areas, Hegel (vaguely, but characteristically) combines authorization from below and from above.... His 'functional' notion of political representation via corporations was a systematization of the role guilds had often played in city government. (1984, 204-208)

If there is a modern equivalent it is not the joint stock company, but more likely the professional, trade or industrial association. Some of these (e.g., the Bar

Association or College of Physicians and Surgeons) have just the sort of functions and powers indicated. They are authorized by the state, have regulatory and disciplinary powers over their members, educative functions, act on behalf of all members with respect to setting or negotiating fees, and generally concern themselves with a purpose 'no wider in scope than the purpose involved in business, its proper task and interest'. While it is hard to find many rank-and-file employees in the councils of the Canadian Association of Manufacturers, the inclusion of labour unions is not inconceivable if we return to the guild model for the corporation (though these would have to be 'trade' rather than 'industrial' unions, as the 'day-labourer' types who generally make up the latter have, explicitly, been shown the door). What is nowhere indicated in Hegel's discussion is that the corporation should consist of a single enterprise or unit of capital.

Despite these possible objections, MacGregor insists that "Hegel's corporation is a hybrid that borrows equally from the feudal crafts guild that still existed in his Germany and the modern joint stock companies that made their appearance in England around the end of the eighteenth century" (CIHM, 7). And the corporate form of organization of capital brings in its wake a series of developments (through the struggle of the workers) that will bring about the eventual "transformation of the capitalist firm into a social institution":

With the appearance of the corporation, domination of the worker by the arbitrary will of a single capitalist gives way to a system in which the worker has increasing authority and control over the conditions of work.... The various schemes put forward by modern-day corporations, in co-operation with labour unions to reduce alienation at the workplace, such as flexible hours, job-enrichment, involvement in management, and so on, are necessary products of the development of capitalism itself.... [There is a growth of] job protection and mobility schemes, retirement and health plans, and so forth. these along with the universal scope of the modern corporation, distinguish it dramatically from the narrow character of the early capitalist firm which denied absolutely the rights of the worker and offered little in return. (CIHM, 34, 231-2)

At the end of this process and the "gradual recognition of the property rights of the worker", "the Hegelian corporation [remains] a productive enterprise with an accordingly limited and particularistic scope, but it is also a democratic political organization with direct links to the state" (CIHM 34, 233). The Corporations "will be transformed through a process of conflict and struggle into organs of direct democracy and workers' control" (CIHM, 256). "Leading positions within [the] corporation are staffed through elections among their members and subject to 'ratification by higher authority' in the state" (CIHM, 233).

The character of the changes in the modern corporation rehearsed above by MacGregor raises a question. In what sense are job-enrichment schemes, health plans, job protection, (one might add safety and environmental agreements), and so on to be considered property rights? It is quite possible that they could be considered property

rights, or, rather, that they might yet develop into property rights. But today's mostly revokable arrangements seem too tenuous to be described as property. Should they become property it seems to me that most would not likely become the sort of absolute, alienable, private property sanctioned by Hegel's doctrine. Such property rights seem to me more likely to take the form of a conditional right to participation in the use or enjoyment of something with only very limited -- or no -- right of alienation (MacPherson, 1975). Such 'property rights' might even develop in a negative form, a right to freedom from the nuisance or damage generated by others use of their property (a right to be free of the 'externalities' of pollution for example). These too might properly be called property rights but hardly fit the form of individual absolute property. If MacGregor can see a way in which all of these various forms can be fitted into a theory of absolute property rather than common or participatory property, this ought to have been developed. Otherwise the developments he mentions can as easily be read as an abridgement of private property as an extension of it.

Hegel opposed universal suffrage on the geographic model as encouraging the 'atomization' of the electorate and promoting apathy. "Universal suffrage, far from calling forth the old republican virtus of political involvement, is 'not so attractive as to provoke strong claims'; when it is provided, 'what seems to prevail in the electorate is great

indifference'" (Avineri, 1972, 212-3). Worse, to adopt this "vision of the state as a mere mass, an aggregate of individuals... is to abandon any hope of a substantive common life... [and the] people, once it identifies itself as a mere multitude is 'a formless mass whose commotion and activity itself could therefore only be elementary, irrational, barbarous and frightful'" (Taylor, 1975, 445).

MacGregor follows Hegel in advocating in place of universal suffrage on a geographic basis a system of functional representation. In this role the Corporation becomes "the most important mediating institution between the isolated individual in civil society and the complex apparatus of government... by electing parliamentary representatives or deputies from within the corporations themselves" (CIHM, 233). In the introduction I commented that in combining an emphasis upon the Corporation as an organ "of direct democracy and workers' control" with its function as the medium of representation of civil society in the state, MacGregor's scheme resembled a 'soviet' system of government and representation. If we now take note of the emphasis MacGregor places on the "'ratification by higher authority' in the state" of the Corporation's own internal officers and the fact that while the Corporation has developed "'into a known and thoughtful ethical mode of life', nevertheless they 'must fall under the higher surveillance of the state'" we might almost describe the political shape of his 'social state' as 'democratic

centralism'.

The explicit objective of MacGregor's proposal to retain individual private property, the independence of civil society and the corporate form of representation, is to permit the power of the universal class of civil servants to be "counterbalanced by the business class from below". Thereby he hopes to forestall the collapse into a "'mono-organizational societ[y]' controlled not by market relations, but... by 'hierarchies of appointed officials under the direction of a single overall command'" (CIHM, 213, 212, quote is from T.H. Rigby). In a later section of this chapter I will explore whether the corporate socialist democracy advocated by MacGregor might not, paradoxically, lead to this very outcome.

The External and the Social State

"Hegel is keenly aware", writes MacGregor, "of the factors in bourgeois society that are likely to increase the rational control of the public authority over corporations". (CIHM, 199). This is the other side of the dynamic of transformation of bourgeois society. In combination with the workers' struggle for property rights in the Corporation the growth of the interventionist state will "restore unity to the disintegrating fabric of industrial capitalism " though in a manner which is "not a disguised reform of capitalism but rather [a] transcendence of the bourgeois order and the

emergence of a society which embraces the ideal of freedom projected by Marx" (CIHM, 33, 38). When these two developments come to fruition, the rational, or as MacGregor styles it, the social state will come into being.

The state of Hegel's day or even the contemporary state is far from this ideal. "For Hegel", writes MacGregor, "the bourgeois state is merely 'the state external' -- government devoted primarily to the protection of private property and abstract freedom":

The external state, which for Hegel includes the capitalist economic system along with its institutions of law and public authority, is precisely 'the modern representative state' described by Marx as 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (CIHM, 35, 195)

This external state "is powerless before the dynamic of civil society, unable to overcome the 'blind necessity' of the economic system". Nonetheless, "progress towards the rational state does not involve a complete departure from the governing institutions of capitalist society" (CIHM, 35, 254). The external state must develop into the social state: "despite its manifest inadequacy... [it] conceals under 'a motley covering' the form and inner structure of a truly rational order" (CIHM, 35).

As was the case with the development of the Corporation MacGregor sees many of the developments by which "the impulses of irrationality and destruction [in civil society] are curbed and redirected" developing within the public authority of today (CIHM, 38). In the first place "the giant corporation's stranglehold over the economic system produces

in reaction a whole series of government agencies intended to control and regulate its activity":

The proliferation of government agencies to regulate and control industry -- a development especially remarkable in the battered and polluted north American heartland of the multinational corporation, where working conditions and consumer products are gradually being placed under health and safety controls almost unknown in many countries -- is inevitable....

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel adumbrates a whole range of developments that are only now coming to fruition, such as the modern consumer movement which has achieved a strong and extending grip especially in North America.... [T]he great shift in the outlook of consumers which occurred in the 1960s... and which focused initially on automobile safety and food prices realized an advance in consciousness urged by Hegel... 'both the defence of the public's right not to be defrauded, and also the management of goods inspection, may lie, as a common concern, with a public authority'.

In addition to these activities, the external state also expands to include a range of services that facilitate the scope, expansion and efficiency of industry, as well as economic direction per se... The state also takes a much greater role in such areas as public health, social administration and so on. (CIHM, 199-200)

Hegel's rational state is suggestive for an analysis of contemporary liberal democratic society. The huge modern bureaucracy, allied with state clients and public interest groups, may have its own class interests that could set it in opposition to dominant groups from civil society. Thus government initiatives in education, health, safety, and welfare may be seen as expressing the interests of the universal class and its constituency among the poor and unorganized (this is certainly how they are interpreted by the capitalist class in the United States). (CIHM, 256)

In this tendency to exercise a growing "oversight and care" of civil society the Hegelian 'universal class' of civil servants finds its historic mission. Unlike the business class "the universal class is free of internal

schisms based on property relations, while its consciousness and functions are themselves aspects of state power" (CIHM, 212). There is a danger, however, that the bureaucracy may go beyond its regulatory and social administration functions. As MacGregor quotes Hegel (but in a context where he is approving rather than attacking the growth of public authority), "When reflective [i.e., bourgeois: D.M.] thinking is very highly developed, the public authority may tend to draw into its orbit everything it possibly can, for in everything some factor may be found which might make it dangerous in one of its bearings" (PR, para 234A, quoted in CIHM, 199, MacGregor's interpolation). The result as in "the socialist republics and many Third World countries... is an arbitrary tyranny of the intelligentsia, and since no one is less tolerant of the expression of divergent ideas than the intellectual, the free exchange of ideas* in communist countries is severely curbed". Therefore:

The power of the [universal] class must be counter-balanced by the business class from below and also by the head of state from above. Only these forces 'effectively prevent it from acquiring the isolated position of an aristocracy and using its education and skill as means to an arbitrary tyranny'. (CIHM, 213).

However, MacGregor appears sanguine that the proper balance can be reached. The state must be independent and strong enough that it does not remain "powerless before the dynamic of civil society". On the other hand state intervention must not be of such scale and scope that the independence of civil society is threatened. The former has proved impossible in capitalist society, the latter in

'actually existing socialism'. The constitution of the rational state, it seems, is the secret.

"If Hegel is correct", writes MacGregor, "future political constituencies... may be rooted in a functional rather than geographic network of representation, so that voters will elect candidates at the level of the business organization, school or government department (CIHM, 256). In combination with corporate internal democracy this pattern, as was observed in the last section's discussion of the Corporation, resembles a soviet system of democracy. Unlike the original conception of the soviet, however, this is not the only element of the state. MacGregor argues that the social state will maintain "the three moments of the rational state,... the head of state, the executive, and the estates or parliament... but these are separate aspects of a unitary process of government rather than autonomous, conflicting powers" (CIHM, 255). The structure of the rational state is such, it appears, that so long as these divisions are maintained in form there is little worry that substantial conflicts will arise:

Since deputies from the corporations are elected by the business or working class itself, they 'eo ipso adopt the point of view of society, and their election is therefore either something wholly superfluous or else reduced to a trivial play of opinion and caprice'... Hegel argues that the parliamentary guarantee is misconstrued by bourgeois political theorists, who believe that the public has a deeper insight and knowledge of affairs than government bureaucracy.... Hegel contends, however, that senior public servants and their professional and administrative personnel have a better understanding... they are experienced and skilled in the mechanisms of

government and are able to run it without parliament... parliament fulfils its role as guarantor of public freedom in the rational state... by virtue of the additional insight elected deputies offer bureaucracy... [and] through its ability to influence the conduct of the bureaucracy; anticipation of criticism from the estates -- and from elsewhere -- induces officials to pay attention to their duties and administer programs in an efficient and responsible manner. (CIHM, 255-6)

This expectation of an easy symbiosis between the state and civil society is rather remarkable given their stormy relationship heretofore. But then this is not expected to result merely from the evolution of the external state or the new social character of the Corporation. The balance achieved by the rational state requires more than the harmonization of these, so to speak, 'sub-political' functions; it reflects a transformation of consciousness. "For Hegel, the Idea of the state is to be found at the political level, in the integration of civil society and the state through the emerging constitutional structure of government":

In the higher sphere of the state... these institutions are unified with the circles of government and at the same time they are transformed or sublated. According to Hegel, the state becomes the guiding power in society precisely because the institutions of bourgeois society are educated up to its level.... In the rational state, 'individuals.. do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end'. (CIHM, 36)

Unfortunately, it is hard to see that this formulation provides any sounder guarantees against the development of future social antagonisms or oppressions than the theory of

communism to which it is intended to offer a corrective. The only guarantee seems to be that 'individuals (or classes) will not disturb the social balance because they will not want to'. This might very well be true in the rational state or in communism, but we have a very long way to go before we reach either one. Until then we need rather more than an assurance that bureaucrats will behave if we threaten to chastise them if they don't. We need more than the assumption that deputies will automatically represent the needs of their constituencies. And we need more than the assumption that all good self-conscious citizens will concern themselves with the universal interest because they are good self-conscious individuals. On all these points it is remarkable that MacGregor gives scant attention to either the effective powers of parliament or to its limits. Even more remarkably, there is not a single mention in the book of political parties.

The Structure of the Social State

The basic feature of the future social state is the retention of the division of contemporary society into the family, civil society and the state, but articulated into a coherent rather than antagonistic whole. Civil society and its 'system of needs' remain an autonomous sphere of abstract right and subjective particularity. The state remains, in part, the external state of government

regulation, administration of justice, police, etc., but becomes as well the state proper, the ethical community in which citizens express and develop their true freedom.

As the sphere of subjective particularity and abstract right, civil society remains a world of private property and contract, of commodity production and exchange, a market economy. But its characteristic institution, the Corporation, has been transformed by the resolution of the contradiction between workers and capitalists in the business class. All now enjoy the right to property and capital that was previously monopolized by the capitalist's 'insanity of personality'. Each member of the business class now has a stake, individual private property, in the Corporation for which he or she works. With respect to other Corporations and the 'system of needs' the Corporation's sphere of interest remains its own particular business and the welfare of its members.

The Corporation becomes internally democratic and along with similar institutions; schools, government departments, etc., the basis for legislative representation (although elections on both levels are subject to review by -- presumably -- the state executive). Representation in the state therefore reflects the citizen's concrete particularity rather than reducing him or her to an isolated atom in an undifferentiated mass. As particular interests are thus articulated by the very means of representation, the contemporary mediating institution of political parties

are superfluous. The upper house of the legislature is (presumably) done away with as the agricultural class which comprised it has been absorbed into the business class. The head of state, however, remains as crucial an element of the constitution as the legislature, although he or she will be an elected official, not a monarch, and will have only the appearance of power.

General oversight and guidance of the economy, administration of justice, and social administration is in the hands of the government executive, the universal class of civil servants. Their role is conscious concern with the general interest of civil society, the protection of citizens as consumers (as opposed to producers) and advocacy for those displaced in the operation of the economy.

The principle focus of MacGregor's argument is to illustrate within Hegel's Philosophy of Right a vision of the socialist project and decipher within the contemporary world a dynamic which will bring that vision to fruition. The structure of the resulting social state is presented, but not in any great detail. In this section I want briefly to draw attention to some important questions regarding that structure which are left unclear or unresolved in MacGregor's discussions.

MacGregor clearly takes the antagonism between capitalist and worker to be the fundamental contradiction of bourgeois society. This much at least he has in common with Marxists. However, his 'more concrete solution' reveals a

very different understanding of the meaning of this contradiction than that of Marx. With this opposition resolved through the recognition of the worker's legitimate property rights, and with the external state ameliorating those "accidental and capricious" elements that remain in civil society, the way is paved for a transition to the rational state, within the forms of capitalism itself:

The struggle of the individual, which in civil society is necessarily class struggle, implies growing control over social forces even within the bourgeois mode of production, and is likely to turn aside all predictions of capitalism's imminent collapse.... The transitory nature of capitalism results from its contradictory character which 'appears in such a way that the working individual alienates himself.. relates to the [product of] his labour as... an alien wealth...' But alienation is abolished within capitalism itself; in fact, abolition of alienation is a pre-supposition of the rational or communist state. (CIHM, 244, quote from Marx, my interpolation).

So, redressing the unjust distribution of property between bourgeois and proletarian will be the "abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself" (Marx quoted in CIHM, 231).⁸ No need therefore to concern oneself with the form of property. The reconciled members of the business class, "both worker and capitalist[,] are owners: they stand in relation to one another as participants in the production and re-production of commodities" (CIHM, 31, my emphasis). If they did this, Marx, I'm sure, would declare that it was the quintessence of alienation! Each would become their own exploiter, perpetually fated (as MacGregor approves Marx saying of capitalists) to be "a machine for the

transformation of surplus-value into surplus-capital" (Marx quoted in CIHM, 197).

This question will be explored in the next chapter. For the moment we need to note that it appears that in MacGregor's social state commodity production and exchange remains the basis for the social integration of labour. The social individual remains homo mercator. Yet the shape and scope of the market in the social state is never addressed by MacGregor, nor is the question of its regulation. The elements of regulation mentioned by MacGregor, such as weights and measures, health and safety rules, etc. (see above) leave the fundamental dynamics of the market, and their consequences, untouched. No scheme for overcoming or controlling what has been the most destructive and the most irrational aspect of bourgeois production is even mentioned. All this, accumulation for the sake of accumulation, overproduction of goods and capital, crises and depressions, MacGregor clearly views as but the 'insanity of personality' of the capitalists: it will disappear when their monopoly over the means of production is broken. Not so, Marx argues.

While commodity production and exchange remain the form in which labour is socialized (or, we might say, while property remains absolute, alienable, private property) there will always be dislocations, local and general, mild and catastrophic, in the division of labour. MacGregor's communist ideal has not even considered what is to be done about this. Nonetheless, the rational state, it would

appear, is to have a market economy.

Another question that receives little comment in MacGregor's presentation is the fate of the capitalist. While he repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the capitalist's contribution to the production process, and therefore concludes that the capitalist is entitled to retain a share in the social Corporation we never (any more than with the worker) learn what form this retained property right is to take. Do both the capitalist and the worker become stockholders? And does the capitalist become just another stockholding worker with the rest? Or does the capitalist retain his or her special place in the management of the production process, becoming part of a technocratic caste separated from the rank and file? What, in any case, is the structure of management to be? MacGregor tells us no more than that the leading positions in the Corporation are to be filled by election (with the ratification of the state). Were we to follow MacGregor's example and look for indications in current development we might expect 'quality circles' at the bottom, representation on the board of directors at the top, and a wide swathe of professional managers in between. That something like this could be called 'the abolition of alienation' is not immediately apparent.

The basis of election is also unspecified. If the new social Corporation is not to repeat capitalism's perpetration of a merely formal and invalid contract with

its members, then each must receive compensation and capital rights in accordance with the value of their individual contributions to the Corporation. If value is the measure then we must presume that the forces in the labour market that determine wage differences will continue to operate, and be reflected in the capital stake in the Corporation acquired by each worker. Some will accumulate more shares than others. It would further seem an abridgement of the right of private property to deny equal voice in the operation of the Corporation to each unit of property. Should we presume, therefore, that different workers will accumulate different numbers of votes in (both internal and legislative) elections in accordance with the number of shares they possess? It is hard to see how "unequal⁹ privileges and wealth [will] disappear" in such a system. The choice would appear to remain one between property and equality. Hegel very clearly chose property and thus inequality (PR, para 49, 49R). MacGregor fudges the issue by leaving it unaddressed.

Abstract Right versus Proletarian Property

According to F. R. Christi, "Hegel's theory of pre-contractual property in his Philosophy of Right should... be considered as one of the most radical formulations of possessive individualism in modern political philosophy"

(1978, 121). Such a judgement could hardly be further from the interpretation advanced by MacGregor, in whose estimation the same part of Hegel's doctrine of abstract right is the basis for overcoming the "insanity of personality" by which capitalism makes "the accumulation of private property... and end in itself" in place of property being "the fulfillment of will without which individuals are not fully human" (CIHM, 190, MacPherson, 1985, 87). Christi effectively makes of Hegel a natural rights theorist, indeed a radical one who strove "to close [the] door... [against] any conditions that may weaken the right of property" (1978, 120). MacGregor's treatment veers sharply in the opposite direction, interpreting Hegel as holding that "the right of property indicates a social relation... a determination of individual freedom... [which] is not a natural, but a social relation; it has nothing to do with nature" (CIHM, 185, 186, 187).

A third alternative is suggested by the very divergence of these interpretations: that Hegel's doctrine of property contains elements of both a natural right and a social theory of property. To what extent such a mixture can be accomplished without contradiction between the parts is a question that cannot be explored here (cf. Arthur, 1985). However, this double nature of Hegel's theory has important consequences for MacGregor's interpretation and its assessment. As Anthony Smith, one of MacGregor's reviewers, argues, in the theory of possession "Hegel is operating on

an extremely abstract level... prior to the introduction of social institutions into the theory" (1987, 486). On this level MacGregor's argument that possession and use imply ownership is consistent with Hegel. But with the later introduction of social relationships the situation is transformed:

Although Hegel believes that, in a situation without social institutions, use grants possession, we cannot conclude that he holds that the means of production should be owned by those who use them once institutions have been introduced in the theory. Hegel in fact states that one's lot in civil society (i.e., after socio-economic institutions have been introduced) is a function not just of one's skill and luck, but also of one's unearned capital. He could not have asserted this if MacGregor's interpretation were accurate. (Smith, 1987, 486)

MacGregor does not, as we have seen, argue that either the sale of labour power or capital, are illegitimate social relations. Without the first -- "the pre-eminant manifestation of property" -- the individual's ideality could not be properly recognized and the substance given to personality and individual freedom by property would be incomplete. Without the second -- although MacGregor has far less to say about this -- civil society, the system of needs, could not subsist. Nonetheless, I think that Smith's criticism is fundamentally correct. MacGregor attempts to force a compromise between the immediate and unconditional right of possession and the validity of the contract for labour-power. In this section I will attempt to show that this compromise is indeed incompatible with Hegel's doctrine of property. Furthermore MacGregor himself contradicts his

own solution when in different contexts he voices support for arguments (chiefly by Marx) which are inconsistent with his depiction of "Hegel's devastating critique of capitalist private property".

Marx's theory of property, by contrast with both natural right theory and that advanced by Hegel (and MacGregor) is social from the very outset. There could be no place in Marx's work for a discussion denuded of social determinations. "Production by an isolated individual outside society" and hence, too, property, for it is but a "tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a precondition of production", "is as much an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other" (G, 84, 86). Marx could no more condone Hegel's theory of Abstract Right than tolerate the 'robinsonades' of the vulgar political economists. All such schemes, whether in Rousseau, Smith or (we may conclude) Hegel, are to Marx but the collective genesis myth of the bourgeois:

The eighteenth century Robinsonades... in no way express merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to misunderstood natural life, as cultural historians imagine.... this is [but] the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the Robinsonades, great and small. It is rather the anticipation of 'civil society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc., which in earlier historical periods make him accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate... The product... of the dissolution of feudal forms of society... [and] the new forces of production... appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. (G, 83)

Hegel is rather more sophisticated than most apologists for homo mercator, for him the bourgeois is the teleological end of history, implied but not immediately actual, at the beginning of social development. All roads lead to absolute private property. For Marx, property, but not any particular form of property, is an indispensable condition of society: "The various stages in the development of the division of labour are just so many different forms of ownership" (GI, 43). No single form of property is necessary or uniquely legitimate; property is but a reflex of the form in which the division of labour is governed in a particular society. Its 'legitimacy' is governed by its capacity to reproduce these relations.

The mode of social integration of labour that prevails in capitalist society requires a particular form of property. Arguably this form of property is just as much dependent on the maintenance of these particular relations of production. Social integration occurs through commodity exchange; property must therefore be absolute, alienable, private property: "In reality", write Marx and Engels, "I possess private property only insofar as I have something vendible" (GI, 101). As will be discussed in the next chapter, not only commodity production and exchange, but the sale of labour power, appropriation of surplus value and accumulation of capital are essential features of value relations, of private property.

MacGregor's treatment of Hegel's doctrine of abstract

right is the crux of his whole interpretation of Hegel as providing a program for the socialist transformation of bourgeois society. But MacGregor's solution appears to ensnare both Hegel and himself in a contradiction. In The Philosophy of Right Hegel provides an extensive justification for the sale of labour power, and MacGregor, just pages before introducing Hegel's "devastating critique of capitalist private property", has supported this justification (PR, paras 67-69, CIHM, 186). MacGregor's assertion of the worker's rights in the means of production and product renders the capacity to alienate labour power, which is basic to Hegel's doctrine of abstract right, false and meaningless.

Hegel holds that "single products of my particular physical and mental skill and of my power to act I can alienate to someone else and I can give him the use of my abilities for a restricted period, because on the strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire an external relation to the totality and universality of my being" (PR, para 67). "It is only when use is restricted that a distinction between use and Substance arises", Hegel continues, and adds that "the distinction here explained is that between a slave and a modern domestic servant or day-labourer" (PR, para 67R, 67A).

Citing this discussion MacGregor credits Hegel with having understood the distinction between the sale of labour and of labour-power, implying even that Marx drew this

distinction from Hegel (as he refers to this passage in his own discussion in volume one of Capital). MacGregor however lays the emphasis on the distinction between free labour power and slavery (and it is in this regard that Marx cites Hegel). That, however, is not the end of the matter. The sale of free labour must also be distinguished from the sale of labour-power. MacGregor manages to get it wrong: "The capitalist merely purchases a person's ability to labour for a particular period; only a slave owner purchases labour, i.e., the entire substance of a slave" (CIHM, 163, 164).

If a free individual makes a contract with another for the performance of a specified service it is not their labour-power that they sell but their labour. If this service is to fabricate a particular object then (assuming the tendency of commodities to exchange at their value, and abstracting from the cost of materials, etc.) the individual providing the service would receive the entire value of the good produced by their labour. Were it sold this product would fetch exactly what the producer was paid for building it. This, of course, is the ultimate nightmare of the capitalist (CI, 185).

Such a relation corresponds to the first part of Hegel's formulation: it is the sale of 'single products of my particular physical and mental skill and my power to act', i.e., of my labour, and I am therefore entitled to the full measure of the value created by that labour. But if only such a sale were possible, capital (the transformed

form of appropriated surplus labour) could not exist, a vital element of the commodity/exchange economy would be missing, and this system would, we may speculate, atrophy and die out.

The really pertinent distinction between labour and labour-power is not the difference between the free labour and slave labour, but that between free labour and wage labour. Only in the latter case, the constitutive relation of 'the process of production of capital', is labour-power the commodity that is vended. Hegel provides for this in the second part of his formulation: 'and I can give him the use of my abilities for a restricted period'. In the sale of labour the seller remains in full possession of his or her ideality, only the product of its use is finally exchanged. In the present case, however, that ideality is itself transformed into a commodity. Like any other commodity exchange the seller will receive full value for surrendering the good on offer. But ownership being 'free and complete', once the pact is made the seller gives up any right to determine the subsequent use of the good sold or to the profit that may be gotten from its use.

The value of labour-power, and thus the amount that may equitably be garnered for its sale, is, as with any commodity, the cost of reproducing it. (MacGregor gets this wrong too when he writes, "like any commodity the exchange value of labour is determined by the labour-time necessary for its production" (CIHM, 165, emphasis added). The value

of labour-power is so determined, the value of labour depends on what it produces. His formulation may be an oversight or even an error in typesetting, but it compounds the appearance of a general confusion between labour and labour-power). To expect more than its value from the sale of labour-power would violate Hegel's stipulation that in valid contracts equal values should be exchanged (PR, para 77).

When the contract for the sale of labour-power is executed the worker "retains the same property with which he enters the contract" (PR, para 77). He or she has received in money, the universal form of social wealth (which, MacGregor argues in a different context, "procures the worker a certain social power" -- CIHM, 211), what is necessary to restore the labour-power surrendered.

It is the capitalist, if anything, that is getting a 'pig in a poke' (in terms of contract). The capitalist purchases the worker's capacity to labour, not their actual labour. Whether the capitalist will manage to get this capacity translated into the real thing is not guaranteed in the contract. The armies of overseers, time-and-motion men, productivity experts and the like that fill the history of the capitalist labour process testify to the capitalists' anxiety over the uncertainty of their end of the deal. Even where the translation from labour-power to labour is made the capitalists' worry that they may have gotten the short end of the stick is not over. That labour must be in

sufficient quality and intensity, such that the commodities produced reflect the 'average socially necessary labour time' and in sufficient quantity that the mass of commodities produced will return the capitalist's outlay plus an adequate rate of profit. The poor capitalist has no end of worries while the worker is off converting "the money into whatever use-value he desires" (CIHM, 211).

The realm of contract, "within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact", Marx writes sarcastically, "a very eden of the innate rights of man":

There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say labour-power, are constrained only by their own free will.... Equality, because each enters into relation with the other as a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself.... Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-schrewd providence, work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all. (CI, 172)

A pretty fair summary of Hegel's theory of civil society! (Compare PR, paras 66, 77, 71, 199). Oh, the exploitation that goes on behind the door marked "No admittance except on business" is real and tragic enough. But it cannot be seen from the world of private property. It only becomes visible when we admit that abstract right is but a temporary and transitory set of relations which people adopt "independent of their will, namely relations of

production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production" (CPE, 20).

It cannot be argued of Hegel (as James Tully has with regard to Locke) that his doctrine of abstract right supported only the alienation of specific predetermined services or products of labour, nor that it distinguished, and approved, the master/servant relation while excluding other wage labour. Hegel has explicitly included "my power to act", "the use of my abilities" and the day-labourer, alongside the domestic servant, in his discussion (cf Isaacs, 1987). It might be argued that the repeated sale of his or her labour-power forced upon the day-labourer by their lack of other property effectively negates the restriction approving the alienation of labour-power "for a restricted period". Hegel was clearly aware of the condition of day-labourers and did not draw this conclusion. To advance this argument takes one beyond the framework of Hegel's abstract right, directly to Marx's critique of 'wage slavery' (cf. Arthur, 1985). MacGregor must chose between acceptance of alienable labour power, and hence the perpetual propertylessness of proletarians, or its rejection -- and with it the whole structure of The Philosophy of Right grounded in the doctrine of abstract right.

We may ask again just where, if not in the capital/wage-labour relation, MacGregor expects there to be a legitimate sale of labour-power. By his own argument the possibility of such a contract is 'the pre-eminent external

manifestation... [by which] the individual's freedom in property is recognised" (CIHM, 186). And yet this right appears to be a nullity because it can never be given effective expression. I can sell my labour because the money I receive is equal in value to that which might be realized by the sale of the product of my labour. But another cannot purchase my labour-power without accepting that this should really be understood as a contract for labour only. Such a condition is surely, in terms of abstract right, an infringement of the purchaser's right to employ their property (my labour-power) in the manner of they choose. It is the will of the worker that 'illegitimately' intrudes upon the 'free and complete' ownership and 'whole and entire use' of their property, not vice-versa.

MacGregor has failed to appreciate the full significance of Marx's distinction of "the two-fold character of labour, according to whether it is expressed in use value or exchange value" (of which Marx comments: "all understanding of the facts depends upon this") (SC, 180). In his discussion of the labour contract MacGregor argues that:

in the exchange between worker and capitalist, the capitalist provides commodities in the universal form of money while the worker provides labour power. Labour power in turn... transforms the capital of the employer into commodities. The commodities produced, therefore, are not produced by the capitalist but rather by the worker (CIHM, 173).

This passage indicates how MacGregor confuses who exactly, in the terms of abstract right and prevailing capitalist relations, is using who or what. The worker does

not enter the production process as a 'free and independent individual', but as a 'thing', a form of capital, a commodity purchased, for his or her use, by the capitalist: labour-power. In other passages MacGregor uses the term 'employer' to designate the capitalist without realizing what the term implies: It is the capitalist who 'employs', uses, the worker, directing the transformation of the labour-power he or she has purchased into actual labour, not the worker who uses the means of production.

A final anomaly in MacGregor argument may be mentioned. MacGregor stresses, following Hegel, that the contract for labour-power is only valid on the condition that it is "for a restricted period" (PR, para 67, CIHM, 163-4). If this sale is for a restricted period then the worker's possession (sic) of the means of production must similarly be of a restricted, temporary nature. In the very paragraph from which MacGregor draws the notion of 'free and complete' ownership and 'absolute contradiction' upon which his justification of proletarian property rights is based, Hegel writes: "My merely partial or temporary use of a thing, like my partial or temporary possession (a possession which itself is simply the partial or temporary possibility of using it) is therefore to be distinguished from ownership of the thing itself" (PR, para 62). MacGregor never mentions this passage, and with good reason. Not only is Hegel's doctrine of abstract right unable to support MacGregor's interpretation, it is explicitly formulated against such an

argument. The worker (to the extent that his or her ideality may be considered as something independent of their labour-power, which is not their property but the capitalist's) has only temporary use of the means of production. This according to Hegel gives them no right of ownership of those means of production.

MacGregor has attempted to 'read back' into Hegel Marx's critique of bourgeois production and property relations, but the attempt is doomed to failure because it tries to frame in the doctrine of abstract right an analysis which is in fact a critique of abstract right itself.

Corporation and Dictatorship

MacGregor's scheme of functional legislative representation through the Corporation resembles a 'soviet' vision of socialist democracy, although it does not appear to encompass the "fusion of legislative and administrative functions... [that was] the originality of the soviet form" in Lenin's conception (Wohlforth, 1981, 73). It may do so as far as the internal management of the Corporation is concerned but this is not clear from MacGregor's discussion. His attention to the capitalists' management function as the basis of their continued property rights in the corporation suggests that he may see management as continuing to be a separate professional function, separately staffed, within the Corporation. So to does his statement that "the Hegelian

business corporation also includes its opposite[,] the labour union", a distinction that might imply that rank and file participation in the operation of the enterprise follows a different institutional path than management. The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx does not, however, provide much evidence of MacGregor's views on such questions.

The object of the soviet structure of representation was at once to break the power of the capitalists and of the state. MacGregor clearly intends the new structure of the Corporation to do the former, and if he does not intend the latter, he certainly expects Corporate socialist democracy to be a check on the untrammelled power of the universal class and to prevent 'the dictatorship of civil servants'. In this, at least, it resembles a soviet type of organization as it does in its advocacy of representation in a manner that reflects individuals' subjective particularity, their working class identity, rather than abstractly as 'citizens'. In this section I will argue that the similarity of these two forms is great enough that we may expect MacGregor's corporate democracy to suffer the same deficiencies and fate that befell the experiment in soviet democracy.

The lack of any detailed discussion by MacGregor of the internal structure of the Corporation, its scale or scope, or the the manner in which Corporations and their members are to be represented in the legislature, requires, for the purposes of this discussion, that some assumptions

be made. MacGregor does not, for example, indicate what the scale and scope of the Corporation is to be. We do not know whether all existing corporations are to remain as independent firms, whether conglomerates would be broken up into individual enterprises or left as is, or whether there will be a 'rationalization' of the corporate landscape. MacGregor, for instance, mentions trans-nationals and multi-nationals at a number of points but never discusses how these are to be fitted to the nation states he expects will continue to prevail with the coming of the rational state. Are these to be broken up into national units?

Perhaps it is best, in the absence of any other indication, to follow Hegel's lead. "The labour organization of civil society", writes Hegel, "is split in accordance with the nature of its particulars, into different branches", and "the likeness of such particulars to one another becomes really existent in an association" (PR, para 251). It would seem that Hegel expects each branch of industry to be organized into a particular corporation. This would require a tremendous reshuffling of assets given the tendency of contemporary firms to be involved in many different fields. Still, single industry firms are probably more rational than the current hodge-podge. Secondly, Hegel appears to imply that there be only a single corporation for each branch of industry. How, where the Corporation is MacGregor's business enterprise rather than a guild association, market integration and commodity valuation is

to take place when all commodities of a particular type are produced by the same monopoly firm is impossible to say. But all of MacGregor's contradictions cannot be solved for him. Finally, from the general shape of Hegel's discussion we may presume that corporations are national in scope.

Let us presume, therefore, that all enterprises engaged in a given branch of production in a given country are organized into a single Corporation. Thus, the railways, the steel industry, bakeries, etc., would each be separate Corporations. It is obviously out of the question that each workplace could be organized as a separate Corporation with its own representation in the legislature.

Corporations of such a scale cannot be internally undifferentiated and clearly the same criticisms that are brought to bear against the abstraction of universal suffrage with respect to the legislature would apply vis-a-vis the organization of Corporations. We may therefore presume a hierarchy of representation within the Corporation with individual workshops electing representatives to councils of the entire works which in turn would send representatives to local or regional councils which send representatives to a national council of the Corporation, which, finally, selects a representative of the whole Corporation to be sent to the Legislature.

The individual is thus separated by a number of intermediate bodies, only the first of which he or she has a direct part in selecting, from their Corporation's

legislative representative. At each stage -- if MacGregor intends to follow Hegel once more -- the deputies' "relation to their electors is not that of agents with a commission or specific instructions" (PR, para 309). In such a circumstance the legislative representatives would be subject to almost no influence at all from the rank-and-file members of their Corporations, who are not their electors, or even the electors of their electors. They would, on the other hand, be subject to a great deal of influence from above in as much as they are "subject to 'ratification by higher authority' in the state" (CIHM, 233). The stage is set, by the very nature of this institutional structure, for a reversal of the order of representation: the lower organs, selected by the higher, become transmission belts of its authority over the rank-and-file rather than a means whereby the lower may control the higher.

Analysing the experiment of soviet government in the Russian revolution, Tim Wohlforth concludes that "the pyramidal electoral structure could only be viewed as an extension of democracy when the important decisions that affected the lives of the masses had been decentralized downwards" (1981, 79). The soviets thus served well, as 'defence organizations to protect the revolution' in its early stages, but as they became more and more the organized form of government the decentralized democratic structure succumbed to the needs of centralized decision making. "Under this pyramidal system only local Soviet bodies were

directly elected"; "these bodies elected representatives to regional bodies which in turn elected delegates to the... Congress of Soviets [which] elected the... Central Executive Committee... which finally selected a Soviet of People's Commissars (Sovnarcom)" (76). Where there is little call for centralized co-ordination and decision making such a system could be democratic but "once power shifted from the local to the national level what was democratic under the former system became highly undemocratic under the latter system. 'All Power to the Soviets' had become 'all Power to Sovnarkom'" (76).

Wohlforth notes that the involvement of political parties was crucial to the evolution of the Soviets. Their involvement made possible the co-ordination of policies and programs within and between Soviets, but it also meant that "the basic decisions made in the Soviet bodies were largely decided ahead of time in party caucuses" (73). Parties therefore infringed upon the direct democracy of soviets but they also provided a vehicle by which some degree of articulation between national and local decision-making could be made. Still the pyramidal structure of indirect elections was such that "the obstacles to popular invigilation of Sovnarkom's activity were very great... with the final concentration... of all power into the hands of a single party it became an impossibility" (76).

The centralization of authority in the higher organs of the soviet pyramid could perhaps be moderated by the

existence of a pluralistic system of political parties, even though these would have to fight a constant battle against the 'natural' tendency of this organizational structure. The internal organization of political parties would then become an important determinant of the extent to which the rank and file had an effective voice in central organs of the Corporation/soviet and state. But even this check is not available to MacGregor who makes no mention of political parties whatsoever: they presumably have no place in the rational state because of their identification with the defective doctrine of absolute freedom. He does mention such organizations as consumer and environmental groups, etc., but these remain in the status of 'interest groups' clients and allies of the universal class, but without status in the constitution, and without a role in the politics of the Corporation (which represents people as producers rather than as consumers or the abstract 'public').

The structure of political representation proposed by MacGregor in The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx would seem to be subject to all the defects and pressures that led the similar Soviet system down a path from direct democracy to dictatorship. All the more so, as while the Soviet system had been organized on the basis of suspicion and supervision of state bureaucracy, on the presumption of the predominance of politics over administration, the object of the Hegelian system is "to incorporate civil society... in the common will of the state" and presumes the proposition "that the

people or their representatives know their own best interests, or... the general good... [is] certainly more false than true when we compare deputies to civil servants" (Taylor, 1975, 444). MacGregor once more follows Hegel in this conclusion: "Parliament fulfills its role as guarantor of public freedom... by virtue of the additional insight elected deputies offer bureaucracy and its ministers", but, "senior public servants... have a better understanding of the nation's organization and requirements than does the average citizen... and are able to run [the government] without parliament" (CIHM, 256).

With such a general devaluation of politics as a presupposition of the institutional structure, further displacement and marginalization of the lower (more 'particularist') by the higher (more 'universalist') bodies of the Corporation and the state would not be impossible, or unlikely. The result might well parallel that which Trotsky, in 1904, warned could be the consequence of Lenin's proposal for the reorganization of the Russian Social Democratic Party: "Lenin's methods lead to this: the party organization at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; then the central committee substitutes itself for the organization; and finally a single 'dictator' substitutes himself for the central committee" (quoted in Deutscher, 1965, 90).

In seeking an alternative to the Marxist conception of communism that would forestall the collapse of society into

a 'mono-organizational society' MacGregor has, paradoxically, proposed an institutional structure which, beneath its surface details, reproduces the same problematic dynamic.

Tim Wohlforth concludes his analysis of soviet representation with an argument for the continued importance of representative democracy, "the direct election by universal suffrage and secret ballot, through the free competition of parties, of the highest decision-making body of the government":

As long as centralized decision-making is imposed by the historical circumstances of counter-revolution, war or scarcity, such practices are absolutely essential to ensure the 'extension of actual democratic usages' in post-capitalist society.... Representative democracy is necessary to mediate the contradiction between sovietism and centralism, and to guarantee the space for the gradual transfer of power from centralized, representative institutions to decentralized, participatory bodies of a Soviet or communal type. (1981, 79-80)

There are it seems to me more reasons to expect a continuing need for centralization than 'counter-revolution, war and scarcity'. A complexly interrelated global society cannot possibly be conceived of as an autarky of communes within which a face-to-face democracy operates and between which only intermittent, temporary, congresses are needed. Given this reality the whole force of Wohlforth's discussion argues for a retention of representative democracy in the long term. Only by the election of the highest bodies of the government, and other large scale institutions, directly by the citizenry and rank-and-file can the undemocratic

tendency of the soviet/corporate hierarchy of representation be counter-balanced. Such a parliament need not, and in a socialist society, should not be the only forum of democracy, but it is just as essential as the works council or local soviet.

CHAPTER FOUR
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Hegel and Marx, as MacGregor points out, were in perfect accord as to the aims of human ideality, or praxis: freedom in accordance with reason (CIHM, 11f, 27). Marx's abandonment of Hegelianism, therefore, was not a result of differences in their objectives, but rather of Marx's disillusionment with Hegel's solutions which he came to see as partial and obfuscatory. Hegel is rejected because he cannot accomplish what he set out to do.

Marx attacked Hegel's theory of civil society and the state in some of his earliest political writings, and this critique will be considered briefly in the first part of this chapter. In his later work, however, Marx developed a critique of civil society on a very different basis. It is this later critique of civil society, embodied in Marx's critique of political economy and the Labour Theory of Value, that forms the subject of the main portion of this chapter.

Marx's Early Critique of Hegel

As a young radical democrat Marx developed his attack

on Hegel's political philosophy in his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, continued it, indirectly, in On the Jewish Question and brought it, in the later Introduction to the first essay, to the verge of communism (CW3). In these early works it is the 'political' aspects of Hegel's theory, that is his discussions of the state and of the relations between the state and civil society that, for the most part, attract Marx's attention. It is only later, when Marx has himself discovered political economy that he is able to shift his critique from a philosophical and political to a sociological standpoint.

In these works Marx applied Feuerbach's method of transformative or invertive critique to uncover the antinomies of Hegel's political theory (Avineri, 1968, 10, Cohen, 1982, 29). For Feuerbach, Hegel had inverted subject and predicate in assigning to the Idea or Spirit the true reality of which humanity was but an expression. The correction for this error is to invert it in its turn and to realize that "'Absolute Spirit' is just 'finite spirit abstracted and self-estranged'". Feuerbach applied this critique to Hegel's philosophy and, particularly, to religion: "religion is just man fantastically projected to a transcendent realm; it is man's nature divorced from him, projected on an external realm, and given independent existence" (Lichtman, 1970, 49, 50). Marx applied the same critique to Hegel's theory of the state and the separation of state and society. Here I want only to draw attention to

a few of the features of Marx's discussion.

The central concern of Marx's critique is the disintegration of modern society, the fracture between civil society and the state (and so the bifurcation of the person into bourgeois and citizen), and the falsity of Hegel's attempt to mediate and reconcile these divisions. Unlike modern society the ancient polis and feudal society had not suffered such a division; civil and political life were unified and identical, even if, in feudal society this unity had been a democracy of unfreedom -- estrangement carried to completion" (CW3, 32).

In the modern world, on the other hand, the state has differentiated itself from society and in civil society individualistic egoism has escaped all bounds of social constraint. Civil society is completely depoliticized and privatized while the state is set apart as an institution over and above society. This division is at once real and fallacious. It is a 'fact' but it is false because it is inadequate to humanity's true 'species being' (cf Marcuse, 1960, viii). Marx "like the classic political philosophers", Jean Cohen observes, "considered the differentia specifica of humans to be political action.... Accordingly participation by individuals in their political life is the true expression of their humanity" (1982, 31). In the modern world, and (in Marx's assessment) in Hegel's treatment of it, however, political life, monopolized by the state, is the prerogative of a minority, while the majority in civil

society is reduced to "depoliticization, privatization and atomization" (32). Political emancipation is no solution to this division in Marx's view, because political emancipation is its very cause: "The establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals... is accomplished by one and the same act" (CW3. 167).

The supposed universality of the state was also, according to Marx, a fiction. The state in the power of the monarch and of officialdom represented an alienated form of society's own powers. (Marx was not, by the by, impressed that Hegel would have the civil service open to all candidates on the basis of talent: "Every Catholic has the opportunity to become a priest... Does the clergy confront the Catholic as an other-worldly power any less on that account?" (CW3, 50)). "In analogy to Feuerbach's method, which restored religion to man", writes Julius Loewenstein, "Marx wanted to restore all political forms to the people, that is, he wanted to eliminate the political forms of individual rights, intermediate institutions and the separation of powers, and replace them with a direct democracy" (1980, 41). "Hegel", Marx writes, "starts from the state and makes man the subjectified state: democracy starts from man and makes the state objectified man" (CW3, 29). If the form of this critique was determined by Feuerbach, its content, as Loewenstein points out was indebted to Rousseau. Marx, however, never answered the

critique of the latter advanced in Hegel's theory of absolute freedom.

Despite its differentiation from civil society, the state, Marx concluded, had a dependent relationship to private property. In the political revolution, he writes, it appears that:

the state as state annuls, for instance private property, man declares by political means that private property is abolished as soon as the property qualification... the last political form of giving recognition to private property... for the right to elect or to be elected is abolished.... Nevertheless the political annulment of private property not only fails to abolish private property but even presupposes it... The political state stands in the same opposition to civil society, and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion prevails over the narrowness of the secular world, i.e., by likewise having to acknowledge it, to restore it, and allow itself to be dominated by it. (CW3, 153-4)

The state, therefore, does not overcome particularity, but comes to be dominated by it. Not only is it an alien institution over and against society, but an institution whose apparent domination of society hides its own domination by society, by the private interests of private property. From these considerations Marx concludes that political emancipation "is, of course, a big step forward... the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing world order... [but] not the final form of human emancipation itself" (CW3, 155). That emancipation can only come when both the domination of private property over civil society and the separation of state and society are overcome: with communism.

This vision of communism as a radically dis-alienated and undivided life remains an animating principle of Marx's work throughout his life. But it is one, as Michael Foster points out, that comes into conflict with his own realistic assessment of the "material limit" to eliminating institutional social mediation (1980). Such an undifferentiated 'real democracy' is both practically impossible and subject to the danger (for which MacGregor criticizes Marx's theory of communism) that it may end up as a coercive 'absolute freedom' that in fact re-establishes a despotic state. This makes Marx's theory of communism problematic as a political program, though it would perhaps be too hasty to give up the 'dream of the whole man' as an ideal against which a more practicable politics of 'feasible socialism' might be measured.

Nor does the problematic status of communism reduce the force of his critical commentary on Hegel. The state has both been an alien power over society rather than a community of free individuals and it has been in a continuing dependent relationship with private property. If there is a fault with this analysis it may be that Marx has too far assimilated Hegel's presuppositions. The scope of Hegel's conception of the state as ethical community is very nearly as great as that of Marx's re-united state and society. Perhaps such all encompassing conceptions are not the only ones that would facilitate the development of community. One of the innovative features of at least some

of the recent late-modern discussions of civil society is the proposal more, rather than less, institutional differentiation within society may promote the development of community by weakening the powers of each individual opposition (cf. Held & Keane, 1984).

The Critique of Political Economy

Hegel was aware that the 'system of needs' operates not as a "form of conscious cooperation but as external necessity... [as] economic laws stemming from the framework of competition" (Cohen, 1982, 25). But he, and MacGregor following him, accept Adam Smith's optimistic estimation of the operation of the market's 'hidden hand' and conclude, as Hegel puts it, that:

When men are thus dependent upon one another and reciprocally related to one another in their work... self-seeking turns into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man in earning, producing and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else. (PR, para 199)

Hegel was further aware that the operation of this law was not always and everywhere benign. He took careful notice of the destructive effects of the unrestrained market. But with the aid of further integrating institutions, the Corporations and the Administration of Justice, and through the agency of the Universal Class, these 'side-effects' could be controlled and ameliorated, if not abolished.

Certainly private property and the market are not, in themselves, problems to be solved, but the basis of the very possibility of freedom in the modern world.

MacGregor follows Hegel's account and with him concludes that the form of property is unproblematic. What separated civil society from socialism is the propertylessness of the working class: the distribution of property, not its nature. And so MacGregor's socialism is founded upon his discovery of a justification for proletarian property rights within the framework of existing civil society. With such property rights expressed in a new and mutually (but not commonly) owned Corporation, civil society will achieve a transition to socialism. Private property, the market and universal commodity production are no impediment, but the very foundation of this new 'communist ideal'.

Marx, on the other hand, put the form of property, rather than its distribution, at the center of his analysis of political economy.¹ The distribution of incomes, of social power and of individual capacities for self determination are not the product only of the nominal distribution of property rights but of the whole complex of relations which make up the 'mode of production' (CIII, 883). MacGregor (not unlike some Marxists) has reduced these relations to that of the capitalist's proprietorship and the proletarian's propertylessness:² if only the workers' are given their fair share in productive property all would be right with the contemporary system of production relations.

But this may be a vain hope. The prevailing relations of production regulate the distribution of incomes (and property) among the capitalists as much as between capitalists and workers; changing the scope of ownership without transforming the context, the relations of production, within which this property is meaningful does not guarantee any significant change in the operation of the system (not even of the distribution of income).

Marx looked behind the 'hidden hand' and discovered the fallacy of the optimistic presumption that the market's self-regulation served the best interests of all. He recognized, as did Hegel, that through the operation of the market, the "individual in bourgeois society is supremely independent; but also thoroughly dependent (CIHM, 156). MacGregor quotes Marx from the Grindrisse to this effect, but cuts short his quotation just before Marx's conclusion: "There can therefore be nothing more erroneous and absurd than to postulate the control of the united individuals of their total production, on the basis of exchange value, of money" (G, 159; cf. CIHM, 156).

Hegel was not sanguine about the capacity of an unrestricted market economy to provide social integration and he certainly believed that, in itself, it was incapable of constituting a new 'ethical life'. In this, as Laurence Dickey has shown, Hegel shared the fears of his contemporaries in Germany that the emerging capitalist economy would dissolve the normative order of society. This

fear inclined them, in their reception of the new political economy developed in the Scottish Enlightenment, to those writers who saw it more as an 'art' than a 'science' and who moderated their economic liberalism with an accommodation toward state intervention. So Steuart, with his emphasis on the role of the 'statesman' and who "made it possible to ascribe to the essentials of economic liberalism without having to give up the idea of politics as a means of economic containment" (Dickey, 1987, 196), was in some ways more digestible than Smith. So it was with Hegel, on whom, as Raymond Plant has documented, Steuart was a major influence (1977). Steuart's statesman was not an absolute monarch but but "a technician, a manager, a planner... [whose] economic responsibilities would prove to be 'the most effective bridle ever... invented against the folly of despotism'":

By this Steuart meant that as industry developed, and as the mechanisms for the policing of industry became more complex, the sovereign power, whatever its form, would become "so bound up by the laws of... political economy, that every transgression of them would run into new difficulties". (Dickey, 1987, 198)

Here, perhaps, is the early inspiration for that complex articulation and mediation of civil society and the state that Hegel was later to develop. Yet here also there is perhaps a hint of its unseen contradiction: the state must regulate and contain 'the system of needs' by recourse to the laws of political economy. What if those laws operate through the very sort of transformations, dislocations and

crises which it is the object of state intervention to prevent? The contradiction facing state anti-crisis or counter-cyclical interventions is that crises are not, as it were, the disease of the commodity/exchange economy but the cure -- a violent purgative that rids the system of disabling disequilibria that have developed during its period of apparently 'healthy' operation (Weisskopf, 1978, 253). Marx's theory is not only a system of political economy, but a 'critique' of political economy because it aims to show precisely how the rationality of the market (the "dialectical advance", as Hegel saw it, by which "subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal") is dependent on periodic spasms of self-destruction. Here was a system of social relations whose manifest irrationality should deny it any place in the 'rational state'.

In such a situation the state's interventions in the 'system of needs' could have two sorts of general effect. On the one hand, it could hamper the market's rationalization through crisis, in which case the disequilibria in the economy which cause and require the crisis would be perpetuated (alternatively it may internalize these contradictions to itself, again only putting off the day of reckoning). On the other hand, the state may adopt policies that attempt to direct or accelerate the crisis, forcing the direction and pace of rationalization and restructuring -- or, externalizing its effects onto other nations through

trade and real wars (Harvey, 1982, 311, 449).

To Marx the 'system of needs' constituted by the commodity/exchange economy was not only inadequate in a practical sense (so to speak) -- incapable of producing a general material prosperity in which great inequalities and poverty did not abound -- but inadequate from the standpoint of freedom. It developed and operated by means of autonomous, almost, it seemed, 'natural' laws, laws which though they are formed out of the concatenation of myriad acts of individuals have a coercive effect on the behavior of each individual. The 'system of needs' is not benign, but inevitably leads to outcomes that would not be chosen by any individual, though it provides them no opportunity (within its terms) to choose alternative outcomes. Rather than becoming masters of their fate as a result of their increasing material productivity people in an exchange economy become the servants, and the victims, of their own creations (commodities, money, capital). This outcome is the product of the whole complex of relations of production making up the capitalist commodity/exchange economy, not merely of the exclusive nature of capitalist proprietorship. The granting of (partial) title to workers, or even the ending of private property in means of production would not eliminate these contradictions while the commodity/exchange system of production is retained.

'Embodied' and 'Abstract' Labour Theories

The elaboration of this critique of political economy occupies the greater part of Marx's mature works. It is, beside the elaboration with Engels of the 'materialist conception of history' (Historical Materialism) the chief accomplishment of his intellectual career. The critique of political economy is the core of Marx's analysis of bourgeois society (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft/civil society) and the core of that critique is the Labour Theory of Value.

In the following discussions Marx's critique will be discussed in terms of the Labour Theory of Value (hereafter LTV), giving the latter a deliberately broad definition. Very often the LTV is defined within a much narrower scope -- as a theory of the nature and origin of value -- with the other elements of Marx's critique of political economy -- theories of money, of the labour process and exploitation, of crises, etc -- treated as relatively discrete theories. In grouping all of these under the LTV it is not my intention to slight the degree to which (in certain circumstances) they can be, and have been, examined discretely, but to emphasize Marx's effort to show how the general features and dynamics of commodity/exchange economies are developmental consequences of their basic property forms and division of labour. In this sense it is justified to group the other elements of the critique under the LTV, to pose the LTV as Marx's theory of the Capitalist

Mode of Production (cf Weeks, 1981, 48-9). In a different context one could with equal justification designate this complex of theories, as Trent Schroyer does, as 'Marx's Crisis Theory' (Schroyer, 1973, ch5).

Marx adumbrated his theory of capitalist development (incompletely) in the three volumes of Capital. The full analysis cannot be rehearsed here.³ Rather, I will seek to explicate certain facets, selectively, with the aim of illustrating how the critique of political economy sought to show the (ultimate) incompatibility of (absolute) private property and commodity production/exchange (as the predominant means of the social integration of labour) with human freedom or a 'rational society'. With this specific focus certain elements of Marx's theory which usually are given pride of place -- exploitation through surplus value production and appropriation, class and the development of class antagonism, for example -- will receive only cursory mention. In no way do I mean to devalue the significance of these issues but to include them would distract from the principle object of the discussion and render it unwieldy.

The LTV has always been an object of controversy, both within Marxism and without. It has its origins in the Scottish Enlightenment and in the development of political economy. Smith and Ricardo were its two greatest pre-Marxist proponents. Even before Marx brought the theory to its maturity, however, bourgeois economists were abandoning the theory because its discoveries had dangerously radical

implications (Clarke, 1982, 41).⁴ Since the publication of Capital, debate over the theory has been unceasing, and anything but 'academic' (Mohun, DMT, 507ff). In recent years the growth of 'neo-Ricardian' economics has brought this debate within Marxism itself, and a significant number of Marxist thinkers have disavowed the LTV.⁵

Within Marxism there have been two principal interpretations of the LTV, which we may call the 'embodied labour' and 'abstract labour' theories (de Vroey, 1982, 39). In this essay I shall be following the latter approach, which has been the minority tendency within Marxism. This 'abstract labour' interpretation has been advanced by such writers as Rubin (1973), Weeks (1981), Harvey (1982) and de Vroey (1982). The 'abstract labour' interpretation of the LTV gives greater salience to its qualitative rather than its quantitative aspect; that is its sociological dimension is highlighted over its narrowly 'economic' dimension⁶ (Weeks, 1981, 12).

The Requirements of a Theory of Value

One of the fundamental tasks facing the sociology of any society is to explain how it distributes labour to various necessary tasks and thus manages to assure its survival.⁷ As Marx wrote to his friend Ludwig Kugelmann in response to critics of Capital, "that this necessity of the distribution of social labour in definite proportions cannot

possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production but can only change in the mode of its appearance, is self evident. Natural laws cannot be done away with at all". What can change, Marx continues, is the manner in which these laws are satisfied:

And the form in which this proportional distribution of labour asserts itself, in a social system where the interconnection of social labour manifests itself through the private exchange of individual products of labour, is precisely the exchange value of these products... The essence of bourgeois society consists precisely in this, that a priori there is no conscious social regulation of production. The rational and naturally necessary asserts itself only as a blindly working average. (SC, 197)

This 'ex post' socialization of labour via its products differentiates capitalist production from that in other forms of society. In other societies there exists an 'ex ante' socialization of labour through direct social relations; habit, custom, law or force (as understood and practiced by the members of those societies) socialize labour by directing it to various tasks before they are performed (Rubin, 1973, chap. 2). "Where labour is communal", wrote Marx, "the relations of men in their social production do not manifest themselves as 'values' of 'things'" (quoted in Sayer, 1987, 41). What Marx refers to here as 'communal' production encompasses a wide variety of social formations, in essence all but commodity/exchange societies, whether they be (for example) tribal, slave, feudal or socialist (G, 157-8).

These two general methods of the social integration of labour appear to be the only known or possible means. ⁸ Each

has, of course, a range of variation, though commodity/exchange systems, because -- Marx argues -- they have a particular developmental dynamic, exhibit rather less variation. Certainly market economies differ less from each other than do, say, classical Greece from contemporary centrally planned economies. In the contemporary world some form of sophisticated planning, however conducted (rather than an economy regulated by religious precepts, custom, or whatever) would seem the only alternative to market integration. Socialists have commonly contrasted the rationality of planning to the anarchy of the market (Samuel, 1986). How problematic this stance has become will be discussed in a later section.

Planning and market integration are not entirely mutually exclusive. Within the capitalist firm a logic of planning rather than market valuation is dominant. Indeed Marx noted the ironic effect that the anarchy of the market promotes an intensification and extension of such planned production -- through the increasing scale and mechanization of the labour process, and the concentration and centralization of capital (CI, 340f; KI, 1026, 1034ff).⁹ The capitalist nature of the production process sets limits to this process however. The further removed from market valuation the more uncertain that eventual valuation becomes. Market forces therefore exert what David Harvey calls "forces of repulsion" counteracting the tendency to centralization and limiting the scope of planning that can

develop in capitalist economies (Harvey, 1982, 149).

While the pervasiveness of socialization of labour via the market exchange of commodities is the 'differentia specifica' of capitalist society, exchange relations are not, of course, unique to capitalism. Throughout history they have played a greater or lesser role in the economies of most social formations, but it is only with the emergence of capitalism that they become the general and dominant form of the socialization of labour. In pre-capitalist societies where exchange is subordinate to other direct methods of the socialization of labour, value does not develop the directive power that it has under capitalism. Indeed before the development of generalized exchange it is largely inappropriate to speak of exchange 'values': exchange ratios are arbitrary (Clarke, 1982, 73). As John Weeks shows value only develops fully and achieves this directive power when the inputs to the production process (including labour) as well as its product take the form of commodities (Weeks, chap.2).¹⁰

Value relations -- the relations established by the exchange of the products of formally independent and separated producers (firms) in the market -- are social relations, the form taken by the 'relations of production' in bourgeois society and the means by which the social division of labour is regulated. The necessary form of the social product is the commodity and the necessary form of social labour is value. No labour is socialized except after

the fact of its expenditure and only indirectly by means of the exchange of its product. Only when the commodity is sold does the labour that has gone into its production become socialized. "Relations among people acquire the form of equalization among things" (Rubin, 1973, 16):

In other words, the labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society, only by means of the relationships which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things. (CI, 78)

It is this phenomenon that Marx spoke of as "commodity fetishism". Fetishism implies the attribution of properties to an object which do not naturally or properly belong to it. The value relation is quite literally a fetishism as properties belonging properly to human beings - the conduct of social relations of production - become "social relations among things". This is a real rather than a merely psychological phenomenon, although, as its operation tends to obscure production relations behind "a material veil", it does have significant psychological, social and political effects (see Sayer, 1987, 39ff; Colletti, 1972, 76ff; Rubin, 1973, *passim*).

The fetishism of commodities does not involve any false attribution by people of social qualities to things. There is a very real appropriation of social functions by the

products of labour: in the quotation above from Capital Marx emphasizes that in their appearance these relations reflect "what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things" (CI, 78, emphasis added). To assume that Marx meant that people mistakenly perceive commodities to be acting out a social relation, is to entirely misconstrue the LTV.¹¹

The distribution of labour is a fundamental requirement of all human society. But in commodity/exchange societies this task is not conducted by direct social relations between the members of the society. They decide separately and independently what to produce and how to produce it. Then their products are thrown onto the market and the concatenation of all these individual acts of production there produces systematic results. By the 'blindly working average' of the market the labour expended upon each is measured against that expended upon all others and against the social need for items of each sort. "The price of the individual commodity is determined, then, by expressing its use-value as an aliquot part of the aggregate product, and its price as the corresponding aliquot part of the total value generated by the capital invested" (KI, 957). These values are entirely independent of the subjective assessments of any particular individual:

The character of having value, when once impressed upon products, obtains fixity only by reason of their acting and re-acting upon each other as quantities of value. These quantities vary continually, independently of the will foresight and action of the producers. To them, their own social action takes the

form of the action of objects, which rule the producers rather than being ruled by them. (CI, 79)

The power which their own products exercise over the producers is no fiction. They are compelled to obey the signals of the market expressed in the value accorded their commodities. If my product does not sell (that is it satisfies no social need expressed in 'effective demand') it has no value, the labour expended upon it was not value producing labour because it served no social need. If I wish to eat I had better pay attention to this signal and switch to making something else. By the same token the market constrains me to employ only certain techniques of production. I may lavish long labour and great care on my product, but if all other producers can by employing some labour saving technology produce similar goods with far less expenditure of labour, my commodity will fetch no more than theirs and my labour will not be repaid. Only a part of it will be valorized because only a part of it was socially necessary.

Similarly, if a commodity is produced in too great or too little quantity the market will produce signals that induce a change in the distribution of labour. If too little is produced, demand may push the price far beyond the commodity's value. The exceptional profits to be had in such a situation will attract new investment and labour. Likewise if too much is produced a part of the labour expended will not be validated, profit will be depressed or expunged and capital flight or bankruptcies will follow. Thus as social

need (rather 'effective demand', for the commodity economy acknowledges no need that is not supported by purchasing power) and methods of production change producers are compelled, whether they wish or no, to adapt accordingly. Thus the division of labour is formed and transformed. All this, and more, the market accomplishes with an automatic regularity.

The commodity is the elementary form in which the social relations represented by value appear, but it is not the only form. Money, originally merely another commodity which by long social evolution is set aside as a general equivalent against which other commodities are measured, is another. In developed commodity/exchange economies money develops its power, becoming, as Hegel put it in a marvelous turn of phrase, "the abbreviation of all external necessity" (in Avineri, 1972, 95 n35).¹² with the transformation of money into capital an even more mysterious form is created, value that is capable of its own self-reproduction and expansion. But this transition from money to capital is dependant on the prior conversion of labour power into a commodity.¹³

Human beings are capable of performing more labour than they need immediately consume. That is, an individual can produce more in a given period than is required to sustain him or her through that period. This is the basis of humanity's capacity to reproduce itself over generations and of the potential for increasing material wealth in any

society. In a commodity/exchange economy it is the secret of capital and the possibility of profit.

In a capitalist economy the worker does not exchange his or her labour with the capitalist. The worker does not agree to construct a table in exchange for the value of the table (less the cost of materials, if these were the property of the capitalist). He or she sells their labour power -- their capacity to labour -- in exchange for the value of the labour power. The value of labour power, like that of any other commodity, is equal to the cost of reproducing it.¹⁴ That the worker may produce commodities equal to the value of their labour power (i.e., equal to the wage they receive and by which they reproduce themselves) in half a day's work, does not prevent them from labouring on the other half day (if the capitalist is able to compel them to do so). This 'surplus labour', or rather the commodities in which it is incorporated, is appropriated by the capitalist and through this 'exploitation' (the difference between 'necessary' and surplus labour) he or she realizes a surplus value on selling the whole mass of commodities produced.

The subtitle to volume one of Capital is "The Process of Production of Capital", a marvelous double entendre as the book examines both how capital produces -- the distinctive forms of organization of the labour process under capitalism -- and how capital is produced.¹⁵ The very title of the book therefore reflects Marx's injunction that

capitalist production must be understood as "always an indissoluble union of labour process and valorization process, just as the product is a whole composed of use-value and exchange-value, i.e. the commodity (KI, 952). More than this it conveys how the object of production is transformed by the creation of capital. The objective of production becomes only incidently to produce use values that will satisfy human wants and needs. The fundamental purpose, which becomes the whole criterion for initiating production, is the production of more and more capital, accumulation for its own sake:

The process of production has become the process of capital itself... with the sole purpose of using money to make more money. (KI, 1020)

This result is not merely the consequence of avarice on the part of capitalists. Capital is self-valorizing value, value in motion in the process of augmenting itself: capital that is not reinvested in an effort to produce even more surplus value is 'negated', it ceases to be capital (G, 519, Harvey, 1982, 85). The same sorts of market forces that compel producers to continually adapt their product and technique, compel the capitalist into a never-ending search for greater profits, market advantage over competitors and new opportunities for investment. If he or she does not assiduously pursue profit they will be swept aside. One might say that the capitalist is not a capitalist because he is greedy, but is greedy because he or she is a capitalist (which is not to say that greed exists only under

capitalism).

This is, by the by, a point on which MacGregor seems unable to make up his mind. He writes at one point that "the capitalist is no mere pawn of the economic system; rather the driving force of capital lies in the rational avarice -- the consciousness and will -- of individuals who personify capital". Yet twenty pages later MacGregor approvingly cites Marx to the effect that "the drive for profit turns the capitalist into a 'machine for the transformation of surplus-value into surplus capital.... [Profit] is therefore the determining, dominating and overriding purpose of the capitalist... [I]t is plain that the capitalist is just as enslaved by the relationships of capitalism as is his opposite pole, the worker, albeit in a quite different manner'" (CIHM, 177, 197).¹⁶ MacGregor has virtually stumbled over Marx's argument for the abolition of civil society, and yet mistaken it.

For MacGregor the deformation of civil society is the product of the capitalists' 'insanity of personality' a defect that will be corrected once the workers too comes into their rightful possession of productive (private) property. To Marx, on the other hand, this civil society is from the beginning a distortion of human social life. The abandonment of our capacity and responsibility to determine the shape of our society to a fetish in the form of the commodity and value is the true insanity of this society. The domination of capital and accumulation over all social

decision making flows ineluctably from the generalization of commodity production.

Civil society indeed generates a 'system of needs', but it is the needs of the value system, of capital and of accumulation that are served not the human needs of the members of society. Their needs count only in so far as they are expressed in 'effective demand' that is capable of sustaining accumulation. Human needs are accounted in civil society only in so far as they may be expressed in the commodity form, and the coercive power of the generalized commodity economy is such that the commodity form becomes more and more the defining content of personality. Substantive individuality, subsumed under the commodity form, is reduced to a 'one dimensional' selection of consumption commodities. With the 'formal subsumption of labour to capital' in the wage relation the worker is rendered, not an individual, but an abstract part of capital (just as the capitalist becomes its expression in another form) and in the 'real subsumption of labour to capital' becomes one material part of capital among others (plant and raw materials) in the labour process (cf KI, 1019-38). Civil society, which gave rise to the 'sovereign individual' also embodies powerful tendencies toward the effacement of individuality.

The object of a theory of value, that is also a critique of political economy, is to draw out the consequences of the value form taken on by labour in

commodity/exchange societies. The object of Marx's analysis is not the development of a heuristic device that would facilitate 'resource allocation', 'utility maximization' or allow capitalists to make educated guesses about opportunities for profit. His aim is to uncover those "real relations" by which (labour) resources and utilities are distributed in commodity/ exchange systems even in total ignorance of political economy. Systems of political economy which, like Adam Smith, take 'labour commanded' as only a convenient yardstick for value, or which substitute an alternative measure, like the 'Coal Theory of Value' recently advanced (as an exercise) by Robert Paul Wolff, have missed the point (Clarke, 1982, 24, Laibman, 1986). Whether or not there is a heuristic model capable of (more or less) predicting the movement of the economy, and whether that model be based on corn, coal, marginal utilities or the movements of the stars, all of these reduce value to an invention of political economists, to something occurring

17

merely in people's minds.

"Value is a relation between persons'... a relation between persons expressed as a relation between things" and labour, "the only attribute that all commodities have in common", is its substance (CI, 79, Harvey, 1982, 14). Nothing but (socially necessary abstract) labour enters into the value of a commodity. This does not mean that everything that is sold and has a price is a product of labour or has a value. Marx remarks that even one's conscience may be sold

for a price, but this, though it may be a consequence of the moral 'values' (in the non political economy sense) generated by generalized commodity production does not mean that consciences have a value (in the political economy sense) (CI, 105). Unique objects (since they cannot be reproduced) are in something of the same position, though they may originally have been the products of labour (the price of an archeological artifact might be expected to reflect the labour that unearthed it, but as there is only one Champlain's astrolabe, the price will likely be much higher. A recent news item reported efforts to repurchase from a New York Museum, for \$200,000., the astrolabe found at the end of the last century by a farmboy near Cobden Ontario: he sold it to a merchant for \$5, who resold it in Toronto for \$200.) Whatever price such articles fetch, this does not reflect their value in political economic terms.

Nor do animals, machinery or robots employed in commodity production create values. If there could be a robot built without labour, that produced -- without the assistance of living human labour -- goods from materials which it took no labour to obtain, then the product would be valueless. Where robot produced goods appear to produce value because the product can be sold for the same amount as a similar product produced by human labour, this is because circumstances allow the product to be sold above its value. Containing less labour, the product of the robotized production process has a smaller (individual) value than the

same product as previously produced by human labour. But where other firms have not converted to robotic production the (social) value -- the average socially necessary labour -- is greater than individual value for the former, and less for the latter. The robotized firm may (temporarily) garner super-profits, while the profits of the non-innovating firms will be diminished.

Once the other firms have been either driven from the market or adopted the innovation a new equilibrium value will be established at a lower level. The super-profits, and so the appearance of value creation by the robot, will evaporate (though, probably not in the minds of capitalists, believing in the productivity of capital as a 'factor of production' if they hold to any value theory at all). The commodity will be cheaper than before reflecting the fact that less socially necessary labour is required to produce it than before. ¹⁸ This process is fundamental to the dynamics of commodity/exchange economies and its ramifications will be explored in the next section.

Dynamics of Commodity/Exchange Systems

The Labour Theory of Value does not propose that commodities always exchange at their values. Indeed such an occurrence is likely to be rare and, as it were, accidental. Rather the system of value relations acquires its power as a system for the socialization of labour and trans-formation

of the division of labour precisely from the regular ways in which commodities fail to exchange at their values. The commodity/exchange economy is one of dynamic disequilibrium, always tending towards, and at the same time always diverging from an equilibrium state. The disequilibria signalled to producers through the market guide -- and force upon them -- their future actions. These responses help move the economy towards equilibrium again, until overcorrection or new forces again upset it. If anything, however, the commodity/exchange economy tends, in the normal course of its operation, to produce less equilibrium and more disequilibrium and disproportionalities in the economy, sometimes to a very dramatic extent. But the system does have its method for resolving these: "'Crisis', [Marx] argues, 'is nothing but the forcible assertion of the unity of phases of the production process which have become independent of each other'" (Marx quoted in Harvey, 1982, 82).

One of the basic ways in which new dis-equilibria are introduced into commodity/exchange systems is by the introduction of new techniques of production by individual firms. As described above with regard to robotization, such innovations give those who introduce them an advantage to which all their competitors must either respond or succumb. Because they all produce independently of each other, firms can reach no common agreement to abolish this competition by innovation.¹⁹ Out of this process of innovation and

response a whole chain of consequences flow which perpetually transform the division of labour. "The bourgeoisie", wrote Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society" (CW6, 487).

The object of this process of 'revolutionizing the instruments of production' is to further the capitalist's drive to accumulate capital. The introduction of new technologies, machinery and organizational forms allow firms to raise the productivity of labour, producing more with less labour. In the short term the innovating firm is able to profit by undercutting its competitors and extending its market share and/or by reaping super-profits. Competitors find that their rate of profit and market share dwindle. At the same time their own capital, their plant and machinery, is de-valued as a part of the labour required to make it productive is now made unnecessary by the new technology (If a new machine requires the addition of an hour's labour to produce a certain quantity of product, where the old machine required the addition of two hour's labour, the older machine, with half the productivity, is now worth considerably less than the new one whatever its original cost -- the value represented by this difference has evaporated as though it never was).

Some of these firms will be unable to adjust to these

new circumstances and will be forced into bankruptcy. Their depreciated plant may be bought up for pennies on the dollar by their old competitors thus leading to an increasing concentration of capital. In other cases it may be broken up for scrap and the workforce thrown on the dole queue.

In the long term, once the competing firms that are not forced out of the market have adopted similar labour saving innovations, the result is that the product is cheapened (though its use-value remains the same). The same commodity now has a smaller value because it requires less (socially necessary) labour to produce it. The firm that first adopted the innovation now finds that its advantage has been eroded. All (surviving) firms are effectively back at square one. If the commodities in question are consumption goods they may have improved their profit situation, along with that of other capitalists, as in cheapening their product they have reduced the value of labour power by lowering the cost of its reproduction. To realize this benefit, however, they must win a struggle with the working class who will seek, in this instance by maintaining their wages, to raise their standard of living.

One of the byproducts of such technical innovations is that the value structure of the industry is changed. There is now a larger amount of fixed capital ('dead labour' -- machinery) in proportion to variable capital ('living labour'). A great paradox asserts itself through this rising

'organic composition of labour': the capitalist's drive after increased profits by raising the productivity of labour results in a fall in the rate of profit. For only living labour can create new value, and only from living labour can surplus value, the source of profit, be appropriated. The machinery can do no more than pass on the value of the labour incorporated in it at its making. "Thus the same factor which fuels the competitive struggle among individual capitalists also produces a slow but steady downward drift in the economy wide average rate of profit" (Shaikh, 1987, 4).

Just as commodity prices will tend toward the equilibrium point that represents their value, so too does capital have its equilibrium price, and the forces of the market tend to produce an average rate of profit throughout the economy despite the different value structures of various industries. ²⁰ There is a tendency, in effect, for the forces governing the movement of capital to produce a redistribution of surplus value between industries of high and low value structures so that the rate of profit as a percentage of advanced capital becomes similar. This redistribution does not, however, alter the overall mass of surplus value. Its consequence therefore is to spread the effect of the rising organic composition, and hence falling profit rates, of particular industries to the economy as a whole, depressing the overall average profit rate.

Still, like other equilibria in the capitalist economy

this is one that is continually being disturbed and reformed (cf. Naples, 1988) New industries that develop with low organic compositions of capital and consequent high rates of profit will become magnets for capital. The inflow in capital will, in turn, promote technical innovation. And this will lead to a rising organic composition and a depression of the profit rate. The same scenario is repeated over and over. On the other hand, capital will flee industries with low rates of profit. Some industries may develop such persistently low profits that the whole industry may be forced into bankruptcy. Where the industry in question provides some essential good or service a common outcome has been state intervention and operation. By maintaining the industry's essential production but not reaping a profit the state is effectively subsidizing other sectors of capital, keeping the average profit rate abnormally high (Harvey, 1982, 199). This is what passes for socialism in the advanced 'mixed economies'.

This last circumstance indicates one avenue by which the tendency of the rate of profit to fall can be (partially and temporarily) offset. The general trend, however, persists. The problem is aggravated by the very success of capitalist accumulation; an ever larger mass of capital chases after ever diminishing prospects for profitable investment. Capital being 'value in motion' this mass must find some outlet or face extinction, de-valuation (Harvey, 1982, 193). The demand for investment opportunities leads

capital into more and more marginal and dubious enterprises. Speculation creates the appearance of higher profits, without actually affecting the underlying production of surplus value. Finally the bubble must burst:

Once the crisis break out, the whole scenario changes. Inventories pile up, and profits fall, often quite sharply. Firms increase their borrowing to tide them over the bad times, and this drives up interest rates -- which only makes matters worse for firms, though of course it makes banks happy. On the other hand as businesses start to fail, they default on their debts, and this puts banks into jeopardy. The rising tide of business bankruptcies begins to trigger bank failures. Interest rates reverse themselves and begin to fall. The stock market index slides downward. (Shaikh, 1987, 7)

Capitalism's apparent self-immolation in crisis is the necessary condition for its phoenix like rebirth. The crisis interrupts the circuits of capital at innumerable points and leads to widespread devaluation of capital. Wealth is destroyed on a vast scale, but this, paradoxically, restores the possibility of the continued accumulation of wealth (as capital). The crisis reverses the trend to a rising organic composition of capital by slashing the value of existing fixed capitals, making their profitable employment once more. This in turn makes new investment in fixed capital a possibility. At the same time the widespread unemployment and uncertainty caused by the crisis allows a devaluation of labour power, real wages and working class living standards are depressed and this permits (at least temporarily) a rise in the level of absolute surplus value exploitation.

Nothing illustrates better the overall irrationality of

the commodity/exchange system than the fact that this system, more successful in creating wealth than any former system of social production, must periodically destroy great portions of that wealth as a condition of accumulating even more. The foregoing bare-bones sketch of Marx's crisis theory illustrates the possible violence of this process. But crises represent an interaction and confluence of innumerable factors in patterns of great complexity which will never appear the same way twice. Each crisis plays itself out in a unique fashion. Nor are crises only of one sort. Their fundamental commonality is the devaluation of capital, but this can come about in a great variety of ways, both dramatic (as in stock market crashes) and chronic (as in inflation). Neither are all crises of the same proportion or scope. Some are local, restricted to particular nations or sectors, others encompass the whole economy and potential on a global scale.

Like most other questions pertaining to Marx, the theory of crisis is a hotly disputed topic (Shaikh, 1978, DMT, 138-143). This has especially been true since the end of the long post-war boom in the early 1970's (which forced most economic theorists to abandon theories -- optimistic or pessimistic, depending on individual attitude -- that capitalism had discovered a crisis free growth path). The preceding discussion presents the 'falling rate of profit' version of crisis theory. This theory has a central place in Marx's own treatment of crises, but it is by no means the

only form of crisis he investigated or expected. Indeed, his presentation of the basic features of the capitalist mode of production emphasizes that crises, local or general, are a perpetual threat and may appear at almost any turn. Every firm faces the prospect of its own crisis whenever it produces for an uncertain market. As Capital remained unfinished, Marx, David Harvey points out, was unable to draw together all these various strands into a general theory of crises. The overaccumulation/devaluation/falling rate of profit theory is, however, "more than just a first approximation" of crisis theory. By elaborating "the contradictions inherent in commodity production and exchange as basic to understanding crisis formation... it reveals, rather, the underlying rationale for the evident instability of capitalism as a mode of economic and social organization" (Harvey, 1982, 77, 192).

If the nature of crisis mechanisms is a matter of hot dispute the existence of crises is not. Indeed crises of different scope and intensity return with such regularity that economics describes them blandly as 'business cycles' (Lamontagne, 1984). The severe general crises induced by the 'falling rate of profit' are associated with the longest of these cycles, averaging fifty years. Employing newly developed techniques of econometric modelling Anwar Shaikh has found that the expectations of the 'falling rate of profit' theory are confirmed for the contemporary American economy, indicating that the most recent long cycle entered

its crisis phase in the early 1970's (Shaikh, 1987). Ever since the capitalist economy achieved a relative maturity and world predominance there has been, at each of the crisis points of these long waves, a 'great depression':

The Great Depression of 1873 (the original "Great Depression") lasted twenty years. This was a period of great social turmoil and of great restructuring of the capitalist system. It was marked by widespread concentration and centralization of capital, and culminated in the age of imperialism. The Great Depression of 1929 lasted 10 - 12 years. It too was a period of great social change and turmoil. It culminated in a bloody and devastating world war. And now, the profit motive which dominates the system has once again brought us to the brink of another devastating collapse. So far, the state has managed to stave off such a collapse by propping up the credit and banking system and by occasionally pumping up the economy. It has therefore succeeded in stretching out the crisis, transforming potential collapse and deflation (as in the 1930's) into stagnation. (Shaikh, 1987, 15)

The state, as Shaikh emphasizes, is unable to prevent or 'solve' the crisis in the sense of preventing its necessary features from asserting themselves. In each Great Depression the state has, however, had a major role in organizing and facilitating the eventual recovery. The possibility of that recovery, however, does not emanate from the state's action but comes about because the required devaluation of accumulated capital eventually occurs despite the state's efforts to prevent it. Indeed, the state's action to assist and maintain the recovery once it becomes possible (imperialism, Keynesian counter-cyclical interventions) later become contributing factors to the following general crisis. "Because these [crises] arise from capitalist accumulation itself... they cannot be simply

'managed' away by state intervention no matter how progressive its intent (Shaikh, DMT, 142). Such crises are an inherent part of capitalist production, and can only be avoided by abolishing the system of private property and commodity exchange which generate them. In the next section the consequences of this for the notion of 'market socialism', and so, MacGregor's hope of creating an Hegelian socialism on the basis of civil society will be investigated.

Plan and Market

Plan or market, 'ex ante' or 'ex post'. These most commentators agree are the only alternative means (in a complex modern economy) for the social integration of labour. The problem, for socialists, with this dicotomy is that neither alternative seems capable of producing a socialist society that anyone would desire to live in. It has long been a socialist objective that the market, so intimately associated with capitalism and decried for its irrationality, should be abolished. But the alternative, a planned economy, has been, if anything, (in the experience of 'actually existing socialism') less successful in providing for the needs of the populace. Nor has it exhibited much in the way of a superior rationality. The "self-devouring economy" of actually existing socialism is, observes the Soviet critic Boris Kagarlitsky, "oriented

not to the satisfaction of human need but to self-reproduction" (1988, 80). It suffers, then, precisely the same fault for which socialists have traditionally indicted capitalism!

The centrally planned, post-revolutionary, economies have, at times, accomplished prodigious feats of economic growth. But the social costs that have usually been exacted for such accomplishments (whether forced collectivization or arbitrary rule by a privileged bureaucratic 'nomenclatura') have hardly been recommendations for socialism. And now it seems that this system, in the USSR at least, has more-or-less run out of steam altogether. Stagnation, and a chronic inability to provide quality or even basic consumer goods seem the most obvious characteristics of such economies (Aganbegyan, 1988). The blame for the failure of these 'command economies' has frequently been laid at the door of putatively malevolent and conjunctural social circumstances -- pre-revolutionary backwardness, imperialist aggression, bureaucratism, lack of democratization. But it is possible that the failure is inevitable, the unavoidable consequence of attempting a task beyond human capacity.

Alec Nove relates the following statement from what he calls a "doubtlessly sarcastic" soviet author: "Mathematicians have calculated that in order to draft an accurate and fully integrated plan for material supply just for the Ukraine for one year requires the labour of the entire world's population for ten million years" (Nove, 1983, 33).

The serious point which is here made in sarcasm is that it is impossible to have an economy that operates entirely in accordance with a plan: it is simply impossible to carry out the billions of computations needed to co-ordinate the distribution of labour and goods in a complex economy producing many millions of different goods. In the absence of such a capacity the general result is that "given the centralized system, itself the consequence of the elimination of the market, the powerful bureaucracy becomes a functional necessity (34).

The 'plan' cannot begin to fathom the social need for, say, size 9 brown brogues -- it is difficult enough to specify the demand, and consequently the required labour and supplies, for footwear in general. To generate the plan into reality, a hierarchical system of offices and decisionmaking bodies must translate the aggregate plans of the center into more and more detailed production and supply plans, down to the level of the individual enterprise. At the enterprise level -- as ignorant as any other of specific social need -- the objective must be plan fulfillment: for success in this it is rewarded, and for failure penalized. And since it receives its orders in aggregate terms, tons, yards, thousands, the emphasis is naturally enough on volume production at least cost -- not on quality. Moreover, as the enterprise is expected to fulfill its quota, despite the fact that due to the very complexity of the plan there are sure to be disequilibria and disruptions in inputs,

individual enterprises are in effect encouraged to hoard scarce resources for which there may be greater need elsewhere, and even to acquire them illegally or through 'old-boy' barter networks established (outside the plan) between enterprise managers.

That the result of such a system is stagnation, perpetual shortages, bureaucratization and the marginalization of consumer needs does indeed seem almost inevitable. And in its inability to satisfy to satisfy basic wants, let alone the sophisticated luxuries-cum-needs merchandised to (broad sections of) the general population of the advanced capitalist states, the performance of this system is judged intolerable by its inhabitants and by those outside it whom socialists would hope to win to the cause of socialism. A friend of mine is this summer being visited by relatives from East Germany: they do not have hot running water in their house, nor have they been able to have it painted in many years. The profusion of commodities in our local Superstore is virtually incomprehensible to them.

Such comparisons are not necessarily fair, nor accurate. A more appropriate comparison of the relative success of capitalist/market and centrally planned economies would have to compare the two systems as a whole: an average living standard ranging on the one hand from the GDR and Hungary to Burma and Vietnam, and on the other from the USA and Sweden to Guatemala, The Phillipines or Namibia. In the circumstances of the world market and international

division of labour such a comparison makes more sense, if one aims at a true assessment of the accomplishments of the two systems. It is unlikely that the capitalist world fares better than actually existing socialism in such a comparison. Nonetheless, it is the comparison between the USA and Western Europe and the USSR and Eastern Europe that would seem to be politically and socially decisive (at least for their populations). Nor is such a comparison unjust, for socialists have held out the promise of surpassing capitalism at its best, not merely of a more equitable sharing of ubiquitous poverty.

Socialists might, of course, (indeed should) question both the social and individual worth of the profusion of consumer gadgets and gimmicks that today trivialize human life in advanced capitalism. But even were the option to do without or away with much of this junk taken it would likely not solve the problems of the centrally planned economies. Presuming that such societies would pick and choose among the range of possible goods (keeping kidney dialysis machines but ridding themselves of most of the brands of diet microwave macaroni) the economy would remain tremendously complex.

In socialist debate the failure of central planning has led (along with calls for de-centralization) to a re-evaluation of the market and to various proposals for 'market socialism'. In the West the most prominent contemporary example of such a tendency is Alec Nove's The

Economics of Feasible Socialism (1983, see also, inter alia, Hodgson, 1984). Far more significant, practically, are the various reform programs of China, Hungary, and the USSR. Almost all commentators seem to be agreed that the reform of 'command economies' necessarily involves a return to the market: "the only viable alternative to administrative price setting" writes one commentator on 'Perestrioka', is the traditional market mechanism" (Zaslavsky, 32). Political and economic debates then center on the proper mix of market and plan. Few seem to doubt that there must be, as Abel Agangegyan, an advisor to Gorbachev, remarks, a "change in... economic management from a system of administrative commands to regulation by economic means -- prices, interest charges, wholesaling", in a word, by the market (Abenbegyan, 91, my emphasis). (It seems worth noting that the language of this statement identifies the 'economic' with the autonomous logic of the market, an interesting assumption for a Soviet economist -- see Appendix).

Teodor Shanin's observation "that the Soviet Union is moving along its own trajectory towards something not yet seen or known", something that cannot be encompassed within "the belief in only two possibilities or a scale between them, the 'free market' or 'state planning'" seems, to me virtually unique among contemporary discussions of the question. (1988, 88). But if Shanin has any intimation of what this 'unknown' third way may be, he does not elaborate. This is an area in which 'rethinking socialism' is

imperative. My own suspicion, though it cannot be developed here, is that such a third way must consciously seek to develop a basis for what might be called 'de-socialized' production -- personal production for personal use. Something of this sort of idea has recently been advanced by Andre Gorz. However, Gorz is, I think, mistaken in his belief that a large and growing sector of autonomous self-directed production can be developed alongside a sector of socialized production that is allowed to become increasingly routinized socialized production (Gorz, 1982, ch8). The individual and collective effects of the manner in which labour is conducted cannot be so easily compartmentalized. Any third way must therefore address not only the conditions of individual autonomy outside social production but must equally address the problem of self-determination within socialized labour.

Can socialism exist under conditions of market integration and regulation of the division of labour? Marx (or for that matter Hegel) was quite clear about the destructive effects of the capitalist market economy. Yet the market (as advocates of market socialism like Nove or Hodgson indicate), offers consumers an opportunity to register -- by buying or not buying, paying more or paying less -- their judgements about the production decisions taken by planners or enterprises. Perhaps this advantage of the market (as against command economies) can be retained, but the destructive effects of the market eliminated or at

least controlled once social (or co-operative, or mutual, etc) ownership replaces capitalist proprietors?

What should first of all be noted about such proposals is that the necessary concomitant of this notion of consumer autonomy and 'sovereignty' is the dominance of production for profit in the economy. Only if the producers' continued existence (as a co-operative, autonomous enterprise or whatever) can be threatened unless they pursue markets by innovation, reinvestment, etc., can the market signals from consumers have any effective impact upon productivity or product mix (in short upon the division of labour). At a minimum then market socialism must retain, at the level of the firm, the contingency of the capitalist economy. Any widespread interference with this principal, by easy credit or direct government support of enterprises would lead to such distortions of market signals as to render the consumer's market power ineffective as a directing force in the economy. By the same token, producers must be allowed to retain and independently determine the disposition of their revenues and profits. Market socialism, then (as many of its advocates realize) must allow -- even enforce -- bankruptcy, unemployment and inequalities in wealth (cf. Nove, 1983, 209).

For many socialists who have made workplace democracy and self-management central to their vision of socialism this contingency has seemed an acceptable cost if authoritarian hierarchal control can be replaced with

worker's collective self-determination. It is questionable, however, whether any meaningful freedom in decision making can be achieved in self-managed enterprises under market socialism. From a study of self-managed enterprises in Hungary Peter Bihari has concluded that "as commodity-producer units [they] do not have any option concerning the general strategy to be followed" in the management, organization and objectives of production:

Even their survival is only possible if they have a profit-maximizing and expansive nature... In market self-management, the collectivity is the captive of an illusion: workers can subjectively decide on the fate of realized profit, but at the same time "external circumstances" force market rationality upon them... In the expectation of survival and higher income tomorrow, they must permanently accumulate capital... [T]here is no capitalist who would be responsible for workers' inability to enjoy the results of their work... Workers renounce of their own "free will" what is theirs. They collectively personify capital. (Bihari, 1985, 29-30)

The only freedom that workers in self-managed enterprises have is whether to comply with the imperative demands of the market or to go bankrupt. It does not even offer workers a real capacity to determine their own incomes, Bihari concludes, because they would be compelled to forego consumption in favour of capital accumulation and reinvestment. Nor should we expect that such enterprises would have any significant control over the introduction of new technologies, even if these would result in displacement and unemployment for their own members. Such decisions would be imposed from without by market pressures, just as they are in capitalist economies. Even if the allocation of

credit is under general political control investments, if they are not to undo the supposed advantages of the market as a means of allocating resources, must be made in accordance with market forces. There is no reason then that we should expect the market to behave any differently, or to produce any difference in results just because ownership has been socialized, made co-operative, or in MacGregor's case kept private but broadly distributed. Market socialism would mean that social development would remain crisis ridden and largely outside any conscious control.

Alec Nove, who has produced a very sophisticated economic argument in favour of market socialism, concedes that "an unregulated market can give rise to large-scale bankruptcies and mass unemployment" and that a market socialist society must therefore rely on extensive public intervention through regulation, subsidies and guiding investment, and the removal of entire sectors from the market in order to insure that such defects do not get out of hand (1987, 103, 1983, 208-9). Here, however, historical experience must put the burden of proof on the advocates of market socialism. Why should such regulation be expected to succeed when, as Ernest Mandel remarks in his rebuttal of Nove, "more than two hundred years... of attempts at 'regulating' markets... have failed to prevent periodic crises, periodic mass unemployment?" (Mandel, 1988, 110).

Such regulation, Mandel argues, could only be effective -- as a corrective measure -- "if public investment were a

huge -- and growing -- part of total investment, and if the public sector were largely insulated from the consequences of the business cycle, i.e. if it were essentially of a non-market nature" (111). As a preventative measure such regulation would be even more problematic because of the impossibility of accurately predicting market shifts and because such intervention would itself distort the operation of the market economy in unforeseeable ways. The very logic of market regulation would therefore seem to require the progressive elimination of the market!

The Commodity Form of Social Life

Capitalism is never static. To each of the barriers to its continuance and growth it must find a solution (even if this only contributes to the eventual development of further barriers). It combats limitations on its growth not only by extensive development (the development of the world market) but by intensive development within its native country -- a constantly renewed process of capitalizing already existing spheres of production which were not previously so organized, and the invention of entirely new spheres of production with new products. The latter form of development entails obvious risks; perhaps no-one will want the new invention. The nature of capitalist production precludes the possibility that such uncertainty can be wholly overcome,

but this does not prevent capitalists from trying.

Beginning during the Great Depression of 1873 efforts to organize the market so as to insure an outlet for consumer commodities underwent a dramatic change. The relative maturity of the world market at the time required that capital depend on the domestic market, rather than exports, more than it had previously. The monopolization, cartelization and growing scale of production that developed in the period also required that mass production should be matched by mass consumption. So the consumer, and twentieth century capitalism's myriad techniques for recruiting him/her to their task, is born. There is a dark significance, as Raymond Williams has pointed out to "the popularity of 'consumer', as a way of describing the ordinary member of modern capitalist society in the main part of his economic capacity":

The description is spreading very rapidly, and is now habitually used by people to whom it ought, logically, to be repugnant. It is not only that, at a simple level, 'consumption' is a very strange description for our ordinary use of goods and services. This metaphor drawn from the stomach and the furnace is only partially relevant even to our use of things. Yet we say 'consumer' rather than 'user' because in the form of society we now have, and in the forms of thinking which it almost imperceptably fosters, it is as consumers that the majority of people are seen. We are the market, which the system of industrial production has organized. We are the channels along which the product flows and disappears. In every aspect of social communication, and in every version of what we are as a community, the pressure of a system of industrial production is towards these impersonal forms. (1980, 187)

"The fundamental choice that emerges, in the problems

set to us by the system of modern industrial production", Williams concludes, "is between man as consumer and man as user" (186). The world of commodity production and exchange is unlikely to accommodate the latter choice. Human beings as users might discover, as Marx put it, that "labour [can be] not only a means of life, but life's prime want" (CGP, 18). A populace engaged in its own creative self-realization may not turn out to be one willing to 'consume' an ever increasing mass of commodities to satisfy the reckless need of the commodity/exchange system for an ever greater volume and velocity of purchases and sales:

The consumer asks for an adequate supply of personal 'consumer goods' at a tolerable price... The user asks for more than this, necessarily. They ask for the satisfaction of human needs which consumption, as such, can never really reply. (Williams, 1980, 188)

The commodity/exchange economy dare not leave, and has not, left this decision to chance. Armies of advertisers, market researchers, and public-relations experts have fought hard to obscure any alternative and "associate [with] consumption human desires to which it has no real reference" (189). The terrible success of this effort is reflected in the personality of the citizens of advanced capitalism:

Both as a worker and as a consumer, the individual learns... that the self image he projects counts for more than accumulated skills and experience. Since he will be judged... according to his possessions, his clothes, and his 'personality' -- not, as in the nineteenth century, by his 'character' -- he adopts a theatrical view of his own 'performance'... The conditions of everyday social discourse, in societies based on mass production and mass consumption, encourage an unprecedented attention to superficial impressions and images, to the point where the self becomes almost indistinguishable from the surface...

another commodity offered up for consumption on the open market. (Lasch, 1984, 30-31)

MacGregor is almost contemptuous of such attacks on the commodification of modern life and develops, on the contrary, a very positive view of consumerism and even of the advertizing system that has grown up to sustain it. Once more he finds support in Hegel: "the very multiplication of needs in civil society", observes Hegel, "involves a check on desire, because when many things are in use, the urge to obtain any one thing which might be needed is less strong, and this is a sign that want altogether is not so imperious" (CIHM, 210). But have any of these needs actually become less imperious? MacGregor's very next quotation from Hegel suggests otherwise:

What the English call "comfort" is something inexhaustible and illimitable. [Others can discover to you what you take to be] comfort at any stage is discomfort, and these discoveries never come to an end. Hence the need for greater comfort does not exactly arise within you directly; it is suggested to you by those who hope to make a profit from its creation. (PR, para 191A, quoted in CIHM, 210, interpolation in original)

If the true ethical life, the bios politikos, lies beyond the realm of necessity it is hard to see any rational element in such a wanton and unexamined proliferation of 'needs' (especially as the only real need satisfied by their promotion is that of accumulation for the sake of accumulation). As MacGregor himself writes in another context (quoting Marx approvingly):

To the capitalist nothing could matter less than how his or her products are consumed provided they are sold at a profit. 'A large part of the annual

product... consists of the most tawdry products... designed to gratify the most impoverished appetites and fancies'. And commodities are produced and sold precisely .. to produce and sell more commodities. (CIHM, 196, quote is from KI, 1045)

If enough 'impoverished appetites' cannot be found ready to hand, then capitalism is, of course, prepared to produce these too. "They must", MacGregor observes, with curious approval, "be stimulated and goaded by advertising and example; otherwise they would not exist" (CIHM, 210). MacGregor's approval of consumerism envisages no qualitative assessment of these new needs nor of their social and psychological context. Just as the animating spirit behind the development of so many of these commodities is not the satisfaction of human felt needs but the satisfaction of the imperative to accumulate, so the elaboration of this system transforms the use of goods from a fulfilment of particular requirements into consumption for the sake of consumption (a recent radio news item reported a poll in which a significant minority of respondents answered that they preferred shopping to romance).

On this occasion MacGregor recruits 'classical Marxism' in support of his defence of consumerism, citing Trotsky's advocacy of the automobile. A more unfortunate example would be difficult to find. If there ever was a commodity which exemplified the destructive and irrational atomism of civil society and the intusion of its absurd particularisms into the state, this is it! Even so devoted a Trotskyist as Ernest Mandel is repelled by such a vision of unrestrained

consumerism:

The most devastating example [of the market as a irrational 'measuring rod'] is the privately owned motor car... a source of economic waste of monstrous proportions. Here you have a fleet of millions of cars with four or five seats, but which only transport one or two persons each, which do not run more than one or two hours a day and obstruct our cities... making traffic slower and slower if not paralyzing it altogether and simultaneously polluting town and country under an increasingly murderous cloud of poisonous exhaust. In addition, this... fleet is an instrument of mass murder on a scale only comparable to big wars. (1988, 117)

Of course a great deal of employment is generated by the automobile industry. Mountains must be torn down and valleys dug up for iron ore and coal, more mountains must be reduced to rubble so that the lowlands may be paved to supplement always inadequate roads and parking lots, oil must be gathered from the corners of the earth to fuel engines and spew out uncounted tons of effluent, millions of these 'consumer durables' must after a few short years be crushed melted down or buried to make way for the latest crop of 'improvements' and contemporary styles. Thousands must be employed to pick up the broken (human and car) bodies that regularly meet catastrophic ends on the road. Armies of planners and construction workers must be employed in the sisyphian task of providing some semblance of rationally ordered facilities for the anarchistic mass of car owners.

One could go on. Can there be any doubt that here we have evidence of the innate rationality of private property, commodity exchange and consumer satisfaction! We might

paraphrase the statement from Trotsky quoted by MacGregor and say that 'so long as even a modest Ford remains the privilege of' the many sovereign consumers, 'there survive all' the irrationalities of market production and little hope of conscious rational management of resources. Nor is there much hope while this and other systems of profligate consumption are allowed to proliferate that the realm of necessity will recede in favour of a community in which men and women might find a common ethical life.

It is not that capitalism's "development of a constantly expanding and more comprehensive system of different kinds of labour, to which a constantly enriched system of needs corresponds" is in each case necessarily irrational and destructive (G, 409). However, neither irrationality and destructiveness, nor their opposites, are criteria by which the commodity/exchange economy chooses whether some good will be produced or not. The critique of consumerism is not an advocacy of material asceticism, nor does it suggest "that working-class individuals are somehow different from their bourgeois counterparts" (CIHM, 209). It does suggest that while we are all lost in the supermarket we are all induced to accept bogus satisfactions which promote a passive 'lifestyle'. At the same time the fixation with immediate and purely personal gratification promoted by advertising dissuades us from considering the social ramifications of millions of individual acts of consumption. Where MacGregor argues that Marx saw advertising as "a

necessary and progressive force which allows the worker 'his only share of civilization which distinguishes him from the slave'," he fails to relate that Marx saw the progressive moment in this "widening [of] the sphere of his pleasures" as the opportunity it holds to participate "in the higher, even cultural pleasures, the agitation for his own interests, newspaper subscriptions, attending lectures, educating his children" (CIHM, 210-11; G, 287).

MacGregor also appeals to another discussion in the Grundrisse, and there, in speaking of "the cultivation of all the qualities of the human being" Marx does appear to lend some support (G, 409). But among those qualities must be counted those "most impoverished appetites and fancies" mentioned above. The realm of 'absolute spirit' (art, religion, philosophy) is not accorded any privilege in the market of consumer goods, and philosophy, at least, has yet to find a marketing technique that could make it profitable
21
on the mass market.

Conclusion

David MacGregor is not unaware of Marx's theory of crisis (reviewed above in the section on the dynamics of commodity/exchange economies). However, his own discussion of crisis theory is an attempt to display the similarity of Hegel and Marx's understanding of crisis. Hegel's own theory, which does show remarkable perception, is a theory

of overproduction/underconsumption. MacGregor is quite right to observe that Marx developed a similar theory. But this is only one aspect of Marx's theory of crisis. Overproduction/underconsumption crises give the lie to the so-called 'Say's Law' which in effect holds that supply produces its own demand.

The possibility of such crises are inscribed directly in the wage labour/capital relation. If the worker receives only the value of his or her labour-power from the capitalist but is induced to perform surplus-labour and this is reflected in a mass of commodities whose value is greater than the sum of wages, then who is to buy these surplus goods? The capitalist may consume some in the form of revenue but this will detract from rather than augment the reinvestment that the capitalist is compelled by competition to undertake. An outlet may be found for another part of the surplus in the world market, a fact that as Hegel observes, drives capitalist economies to imperialism, but this too is a limited device. This dilemma can and does lead to crises, to, as MacGregor says, "the destruction of capital, the wastage on a grand scale of raw materials, commodities, and of human labour-power" (CIHM, 224).

Can there be any solution to this problem of insufficient 'effective demand'? MacGregor never says outright, and his discussion is ambivalent. On the one hand he cites approvingly Hegel's arguments that "any attempt [by the government] to assist the poor or provide them with

employment simply intensifies the contradiction... [and] would provide no permanent cure". On the other hand, he writes cryptically that "it required 'the Keynesian Revolution', the establishment of the welfare state, and so on before bourgeois society began to take seriously the problem of poverty and the lack of 'effective demand'" (CIHM, 226). Has this revolution discovered the elusive remedy for crisis? If so, the world would certainly be glad of its use today.

Marx saw that while crises of overproduction might break out on a local basis, capitalism generated its own solution -- it "drives over and beyond [this] barrier" as MacGregor quotes him (CIHM, 224). It's solution, as David Harvey points out is the creation of fictitious capital, new money lacking a solid basis in production that may be employed, through the credit system, to realize the mass of commodities produced (Harvey, 1982, 95). Disaster is thus staved off and capital drives onward toward yet another barrier and the potential of even more catastrophic crises (cf. MacGregor's very optimistic evaluation of the wonders of consumer credit, CIHM, 290, n68). Even if the Keynesians had the answer to the problem of insufficient demand, this would not smooth out capitalism's crisis ridden path of development.

Ultimately the problem is not an overproduction of goods, but an overaccumulation of capital in relation to opportunities for investment. This, as I tried to illustrate

above, is the product of a dynamic that inheres in the very nature of commodity production by isolated firms in the market. MacGregor, though he chronicles in some detail the destructive capacity of capitalism, never seriously questions the commodity form itself. In fact, indications of what he expects will be the form of the socialization of labour in the social state are so few and far between that it seems likely that he has not really considered that the commodity, value, money and capital are the necessary corollaries of the absolute, alienable, private property on which he would build the social state.

One might argue that it would be acceptable to retain a system for regulating the division of labour that was largely outside of conscious human control if that system did actually produce results with which everyone was pleased. Such external "compulsion", to quote Hegel, might be justified if it clearly supported human ends. But the commodity/exchange economy does not, and would not even if capitalists were disposed of. "There can therefore", to cite again Marx's conclusion, "be nothing more erroneous and absurd than to postulate the control by the united individuals of their total social production, on the basis of exchange value of money (G, 158-9).

CONCLUSION

The question of how individual autonomy is to be preserved in an era of big business and big government has rightly preoccupied political and social theory in this century. It has become an increasingly crucial question for socialists, who can no longer assume that the advent of socialism will embody a realization of individual freedom. The dissolution of the separation between society and the state in those countries where the capitalist mode of production has been overthrown has not shown the slightest tendency towards the 'withering away of the state' that Marxists have expected. It has, rather, led to the apparent absorption of society into the state, with devastating consequences for individual liberty.

Fearing such an outcome Max Weber preferred to keep the two great institutional complexes of modern society apart:

The state bureaucracy would rule alone were private capitalism eliminated. The private and public bureaucracies which now, at least according to possibility, work against each other and thus hold each other in relative check, would be merged in a single hierarchy. (quoted in Vajda, 1981, 78)

In The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, David MacGregor has also advocated maintaining the separation between civil society and the state, although he is of a less pessimistic frame of mind than Weber and hopes to find for the individual rather more than an uncertain 'no-man's-

land' between two bureaucratic leviathans. MacGregor expects a transformation within each of these sets of institutions by which both will come to foster rather than frustrate or repress the individual and community.

The contemporary re-emergence of 'civil society' as a key term in political and social theory presents a hopeful development in the search for a new institutional balance that will accomodate individual autonomy. 'Civil society', as I argued in chapter one, has always had the freedom of the individual as its central concern, although the social space that it has been used to describe has changed radically during its history: from the classical polis, to the private market economy, to the contemporary non-state, non-economy 'public sphere'.

The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx is a sustained attempt to rethink the socialist project in terms of civil society and the maintainence of the distinction between state and society. In returning behind Marx to Hegel for his inspiration MacGregor has conceived civil society in what I have called its modern sense: the sphere of private property and the market economy. If this seems a curious basis on which to fashion a socialist commonwealth, MacGregor has a good reason to look to it. Unlike many who are today exploring the idea of civil society MacGregor has clearly realized that its viability as a sphere in which individual autonomy can subsist, requires that it be given a substantial social and material basis -- a basis such as

that provided for early modern bourgeois individualism by the institution of private property.

Hegel's political philosophy appears a natural quarter in which to seek such a basis, in as much as this very problem was so fundamental to his thought. Whether it can provide both a defence of personal liberty and socialist equality is however another question. MacGregor's attempts to reinterpret the Philosophy of Right as a communist manifesto must, on this score, be judged a failure. In the first place MacGregor's proposal that there may be found in Hegel's doctrine of abstract right a defence of the worker's right to productive property is flawed. As I argued in chapter three, not only does Hegel specifically allow the sale of labour-power upon which capitalist exploitation and monopolization of the means of production is based, but MacGregor's proposed solution would in fact compromise the integrity of Hegel's theory of property.

Secondly, MacGregor's interpretation of Hegel's theory of the Corporation as the institutional locus of socialist democracy paradoxically recreates the danger of a 'dictatorship of civil servants' which it was specifically formulated to avoid. The hierarchically stepped pyramid of soviet/corporate councils that such a scheme would entail would so attenuate the influence of the rank-and-file Corporation member on its higher management bodies and its legislative deputies that effective popular control would be impossible. The 'natural' tendency of such a system, I

argued in chapter three, would be for functionaries and delegates to come more and more under the influence and dictates of officers and organs higher up the pyramid than themselves. They would become the medium through which centralized control was exerted rather than representatives of their constituents.

Finally, in chapter four I drew on Marx's Labour Theory of Value to argue that the retention of commodity production and market exchange as the fundamental mode of socialization of labour was incompatible with any practical conception of a 'rational state'. On the one hand such economies are by their nature prone to crises that regularly lead to economic dislocation, the bankruptcy of enterprises and mass unemployment. Because such crises are not a flaw of the system but its own method of correcting flaws that inevitably develop in periods of apparently trouble free development, they cannot be eliminated but at best supervised by interventions of public authority. Moreover, such an economy is hardly in accordance with the ideal of freedom and individual and social self-determination. The formation and reformation of the division of labour is removed from conscious human control to the automatic workings of the market. Socially, collective choices about the preferred allocation of labour can be effected to only a very limited extent without compromising the operation of the market and exacerbating its crises. For the individual and for individual enterprises, decisions

about choice of technique, conditions of labour, reinvestment and division of revenue are almost wholly imposed by external circumstances. Such constraints on freedom would plague a socialist commodity economy as much as they do capitalism.

The impetus which led MacGregor to explore this alternative Hegelian socialism is the profound failure of the regimes of 'actually existing socialism' to provide either an economy that can be brought under conscious collective control, or to protect the freedom of the individual. This failure has called into question Marx's theory of communism and the hope that a planned economy can easily replace 'the domination of men with the administration of things'. Achieving a socialism that is worth achieving is, it appears a much more difficult transition than most socialists have presumed. If MacGregor's particular formulation is unsuccessful, still I think that in some ways he has been looking in the right direction. Institutional pluralism and complexity, a variegated field of forces, rather than unitary structure and simplicity, may be the fate and the hope of socialism. It remains to be seen whether a socialist civil society can discover a strong enough basis to make individual autonomy count as one of the most powerful of those forces.

APPENDIX

A NOTE ON THE 'ECONOMY' (AND THE STATE)

This note on 'Economy' was already drafted, when I recently happened to pick up Mihaly Vajda's The State and Socialism, from which the following quotation is drawn:

Marx... never wanted to derive the division of labour qua division of labour, much less the state as state, from -- in the narrow sense of the word -- private ownership of the means of production. (As he had written in The German Ideology, the division of labour and private property are two sides of the same coin. He interpreted private property -- this is absolutely clear from the text -- as a much broader phenomenon than its capitalist form.) In this respect Marx's analysis in this book is one-sided only with regard to capitalism, namely when he attempted to ultimately integrate... [all] relations of oppression into the capitalist relation...

It is indisputable that the existence of the state, or if we wish to employ its genus proximum, political power in general, can and must be explained by the division of labour. What Marx had not taken into account is the following: (a) it is impossible to abolish every type of division of labour, since this would signify the abolition of society, that is... there is no society without power; (b) in capitalist society too, there exist alongside one another a number of types of the social division of labour... In capitalism we have to perceive alongside the specific capitalist type of division of labour... the division of labour according to other roles. (1981, 70, emphasis added)

This seems to me to be of the utmost importance, and, while I do not necessarily follow Vajda in each of the corollaries he develops from this insight (though neither do I reject them -- they deserve more time and study than I have been able to give them), he has formulated a point of

major significance, and an aspect of the issues I want to address in this note (and so in respect of the particular focus of his interests I have added 'the state' to its title). There are, besides Vajda, a number of others that I might choose to discuss and cite in this context (notably Derek Sayer, whose The Violence of Abstraction appears to corroborate a number of the positions that I have been groping toward for some time, but which, again, I have not had time to digest). However, as the object of this note is at once declaratory -- to clarify my perspective on certain issues which enter into the present thesis at the margins, but which cannot be introduced in detail -- and exploratory -- to clarify, for myself, dimensions of these issues for later investigation -- I intend to conduct the discussion without attempting to relate it to the work of others.

It is common among Marxist writers when discussing feudalism, or other pre-capitalist modes of production, to speak of the role of 'extra-economic coercion' in the securing of economic surplus (to mention only the most recent example I have come across, Ellen Meiksins Wood, addressing pre-capitalist societies, writes of "the typical combination of peasant-production and extra-economic exploitation" (Wood, 1988, 15)). This has always struck me as a very odd sort of formulation indeed, and long ago got me thinking about what is to be considered 'economic' and what is not.

'Economy' in General

Now at this point I am looking for a definition of the economic at a very general level indeed. I wholeheartedly concur with Marx's criticism of general concepts -- or rather his specification of their limited usefulness for the very reason that they are general -- but he by no means denies them any utility at all. Indeed, the concrete concept is unimaginable without the general and could have no validity if it were incompatible with the general concept. The concrete concept is precisely the general concept applied to a particular case and 'concretized': elaborated so that the differentia specifica of the circumstance it must grasp are incorporated, thus transforming the general concept from a banal truism into a rounded and nuanced appreciation.

The following passages have always impressed me as revealing important aspects of the general idea of the 'economy':

The premise from which we begin are not arbitrary ones... they are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity...

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence... indirectly producing their actual material life...

This mode of production must not be considered simply as production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on

their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. (GI, 42)

Life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself... The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need... leads to new needs... The third circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family...

The production of life, both of one's own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship. By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end... This mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force". (GI, 48-51)

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. the totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society... (CPE, 54)

Every child knows that a nation which ceased to work... would perish. Every child knows, too, that the volume of products corresponding to the different needs require different... amounts of the total labour of society. That this necessity of the distribution of social labour in definite proportions cannot possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production but can only change the mode of its appearance, is self-evident. (SC, 196)

Now, what can we glean about the meaning, in general, of 'the economy' from these statements? We can, I think, distinguish four major issues.

(1) First, and perhaps foremost (but this is in a 'chicken and egg' relationship with (3)), the economy must include

those activities (of labour) by which people secure their own continued corporeal existence. (I have interpolated 'labour' here because, as perhaps deserves a separated fifth point of its own, it is labour -- teleologically organized activity -- by which "man can be distinguished from animals". This point is fundamental certainly to Marx's understanding of the economy -- and of everything else about humans -- and he was fulsome in his praise for Hegel for having recognized and given it shape). Securing food, shelter and (at least where climate makes it physiologically necessary) clothing are definitely part of the economy.

But how far does this extend? A couple of thousand calories worth of berries each day should secure survival -- so should the 'economic' be cut off after that point (measured in the labour requirement) and the extra energy required in preparing, say, Bouillabaise, Beef Wellington and Baked Alaska be considered 'non-economic'? This certainly seems nonsensical: most everyone, I'm sure, will allow that activity aimed at producing food, shelter and clothing is part of the 'economy' even beyond physical subsistence levels.

(2) Marx and Engels allow that in the course of their activity human beings discover -- create -- new needs and the means of satisfying them and that these this belongs with the fundamental premises of the 'materialist conception of history'. Is the activity intended to satisfy these new needs to be counted as part of the economy? If they were not

then absolutely everyone today would be mistaken as to what the economy is (there were no microwave ovens at the dawn of time). But are all of these historically developed needs and the means to satisfy them to be considered as part of the economy? If not, what criteria do we have for differentiating between them, including some while rejecting others? I can think of only one criterion that would seem consistent with Marx and Engels' premises: those that involve labour are part of the economy.

This means, however (to recall the difference between berries and banquets from (1)), that we must include some radically 'unnecessary' items and activities, things such as the writing of sermons (even perhaps those that no-one will hear?) in the economy. This may seem a trifle bizarre at first glance, but then so does the manufacture of mustard gas and hydrogen bombs, and no-one doubts that their production is part of the economy. Once we have moved beyond subsistence is there any viable way to differentiate between the needs that human beings might come to feel they have? Can a felt need for, say, digital watches or exotic imported fruit be somehow considered more fundamental than the need for tomes on political economy or sermons (whether to hear or write them)? I cannot think of any (apart, perhaps from ethico-religious judgements, but these could not be made compatible with the scientific premises and objectives of either sociology or historical materialism). So, any labour devoted to the satisfaction of any human need, must be

included in the definition of the economy.

(3) It seems fairly clear, from the quotations above, that, for Marx and Engels at least, you can't have an economy without people and that therefore the 'production' of people has to be included as part of any economy. They don't call it 'labour' for nothing! (Whether this makes sex 'work' is an issue that I hope I may defer to another occasion).

Despite the above quoted formulation -- one that is repeated at the close of their oeuvre just as it appears here at the beginning -- it is possible that Marx and Engels were equivocal on this point. Inasmuch as they differentiate humans from animals on the basis of (conscious, teleological) labour, they might well exclude from the economy those aspects of species reproduction which 'occur naturally', as it were. Or, rather, those aspects that are essentially unchanged from before human beings were human beings, before they began to "produce themselves" by teleologically organized labour, might be hived off into a limbo category: the family ("on the one hand... a natural, on the other hand... a social relationship"). However, it seems to me that such a 'solution' would involve a fruitless and tortuous regression back the evolutionary chain, involving a genetic fallacy, confusing origin with essence in a way foreign to their general methodological stance. Whatever their status at some earlier evolutionary stage, all the activities of procreation have been 'remade' through their social elaborations. Any other human activity,

including teleological labour, could be just as easily traced to its purely 'natural' roots and nature's continued influence (labour without opposable thumbs? But, then again, opposable thumbs without labour?).

If it seems impossible to write procreation out of the social by virtue of its 'natural' element, then this "circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into historical development" must surely be encompassed in the economy, as it is an activity to which society must direct labour, on pain of extinction.

(4) "Every system of divided labor is at the same time a system of distributed labour" (Rubin, 1973, 64). The "mode of co-operation" -- "no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end" -- would seem, axiomatically, to be included within the economy. But just what sorts of activities and relationships are we to understand as modes of co-operation?

In any community in which the 'decision' is made to distribute different labours to different individuals, rather than having each participate equally in each form of labour, there must be some surveillance of that distribution to insure that essential labours are in fact done and hopefully in something close enough to the right proportions to ensure the survival of the group. (There may once have been societies that decided just to 'wing it' and let everyone do whatever they wished, but these were probably about as successful as those 'potlucks' to which everyone

brings three-bean salad). This co-operation -- "no matter... in what manner": by custom, coercion or consensus -- must certainly be counted as part of the "economic structure of society".

Just as labour directed to non-subsistence needs is counted as part of the economy, so, presumably, must the activities which allow/effect the distribution of labour to such 'unnecessary' activities. There is no reason, a priori, why any particular methods should be excluded as modes of co-operation and divisions of labour. Thus, if a peasant growing grain is tithed so that a monk may devote himself to copying manuscripts, this, it seems to me, is an eminently 'economic' relationship (just as both activities, inasmuch as they satisfy needs in the community -- for bread and for classical texts -- are eminently 'economic' activities).

This example deals with labour which is positively -- consciously and deliberately -- distributed and it is obviously and directly 'socialized' labour. We may identify, sometimes easily, sometimes not, the complex of institutions, and relations within them by which such distributions are effected. In other circumstances, the gender division of labour, for instance (which, at least in part, is organized by ubiquitous but frequently 'invisible' relations of custom and ideology), it can be very difficult indeed to decipher fully the principles by which labour is distributed. Still, we may speak of a positive division and distribution of labour as it is clear that, by whatever

means, these tasks are directed to particular people.

But what of sermons that no-one will hear, written by a lonely parson for his own amusement, edification or salvation? Can such labour be considered to be distributed? And part of the economy? In a certain, negative, sense they can be considered a part of the division of labour. That is, they are allowed, if not stipulated. They are even facilitated, as most societies make deliberate allowance for 'leisure activity', by which members to individually 're-create' themselves in an activity of their own choosing (or apparently of their own choosing, or of their own choosing from a range of culturally defined or 'authorized' alternatives).

Now, inasmuch as the object of the whole exercise (the economy) is to 're-create' the whole community, not in any particular fashion or for any particular purpose, but just to re-produce it, why should the labour one expends at 'work' (on, say, assembling 'have a nice day' buttons) be considered part of the economy while the labour one expends 'on one's own time' (on, say, producing a critique of political economy) is not? Since there is no overarching purpose to labour besides the satisfaction of human needs (and, beyond subsistence, there is no over-arching criteria to differentiate needs) I can see no reason why 'recreation' is not part of the economy.

The objection will be raised that I have obliterated and distinction between production and consumption, but this

is not so. At the level of the economy in general, consumption can only be the satisfaction of human need, while production can only be the activity, labour, that brings about that satisfaction. But then, in general, labour is one of our chief needs, and its performance among our chief satisfactions:

Labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need -- the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species -- its species character -- is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species character. life itself appears only as a means to life. (EPM, 113)

(Political Economy no doubt considers such speculative anthropology foreign to its science, but, bent as it is with its nose to the grindstone of examining alienated labour, or at least its consequences and phenomenal forms, it misses the point about what labour 'in general' is -- even if many of its practitioners actually enjoy doing political economy.)

It is essential that any system of divided labour, in its divisions provide for the necessary labours of distributing other labours and re-distributing the products of these differentiated labours, "no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what ends". Whether the labour is distributed and the product re-distributed by democratic consensus and equal division, by market forces and 'according to the contribution of the various factors of production' [sic!], by military compulsion and in accordance

with the rights of 'divinely ordained estates', or whatever, this "mode of co-operation" is the central feature of any economy in which there exists divided labour.

To summarize, then, the economy 'in general' is humanity's self-creation through labour. And, since there are no outside yardsticks against which to measure that self-creation, it is not possible to say that such-and-such sort of labour (resulting in one sort of human self-transformation) is not economic, while another sort (resulting in a different self-transformation) is.

Some activities are, of course, more fundamental than others: if we do not provide ourselves with certain minimal quantities and qualities of food, clothing and shelter, and we do not assure the propagation of the species, we will not be around very long to debate the fine points about whether all the rest of the things we do are part of the economy or not. Lamentably, the distinction between these fundamental elements of the economy and the rest remains crucial today for an appalling number of the earth's inhabitants, but thankfully, in the economies of many more, these have become a small fraction of economic activity (even under the restricted definitions of economy that tend to prevail today).

Like any other general concept the concept of the economy in general is limited in its utility by its very generality, by its universal applicability to any period or place. Perhaps its chief utility is to remind us of the

need to develop a particular 'concrete' concept of the economy when investigating any given society, and, especially, to remind us that we may not presume that what fits as a concept of the economy for one society will be appropriate in studying another.

Capitalism and the 'Economy'

To return, then, to the question that originally prompted these thoughts: how is it possible for the lord's direction of labour to his demesne and appropriation of the product thereof (and rents on the peasants' own plots) to be termed 'extra-economic' compulsion?

I can think of only one answer: the notion of extra-economic compulsion is the product of a reification of the concept of economy to the (ideologically distorted) definition given to the economy in one particular mode of production (capitalism) and its application (in defiance of all of Marx's warnings about the necessary historicity of concepts), willy-nilly to any other social formation one happens to come across. (it did in passing occur to me that perhaps it is believed that coercion cannot be a characteristic of 'economic' relationships, but I dismissed this explanation as it could not possibly be believed by any (on balance) rational person, unless they were liberals: in which case we are looking at a variant of the first

explanation).

That differentiated and circumscribed part of social life which we today understand as 'the economy' is the invention of capitalism. Political economy -- economics to the moderns -- is the theoretical and ideological legitimation of this demarkation. The peculiar thing about capitalism is that a major part of the activity of "production and reproduction of material life" are not part of this particularized 'economy'.

Restaurants, we all agree, are a part of the economy. After all, we all require food to 'reproduce our material life' and the labour of the restaurant employees in producing a meal to satisfy that need is clearly an economic activity. The peculiar thing is: if, in a capitalist 'economy' I prepare for myself, at home, a substantially similar meal, this labour is not part of the economy! If I seek emotional solace by attending the Sunday sermon at my local church, the effort writing of the sermon is not considered an economic act, but if I seek such solace by attending the Sunday matinee of the latest Hollywood blockbuster at my local theatre, the efforts of the usher, projectionist, actors, director and all and sundry involved with making the film are all, certainly, economic labours.

If I raise my children at home, this very involved and demanding labour, is not normally counted as part of the economy, but if I avail myself of professional child care services, involving very similar labours, these most

certainly are 'economic'. To give a last (perhaps, today, less certain) example, if I hire security guards to protect my property their labour is clearly a part of the economy, but if I rely on the police for my security, they are accounted part of the state, not of the economy. There is, of course, an 'economics of the family' and an 'economics of the state', but such formulations tend to relate the family or the state to the economy externally. They are not considered to be in themselves 'economic' institutions and activities.

Capitalism (if I may be excused an anthropomorphic metaphor which I certainly do not mean to imply subscription to some sort of functionalist holism) is concerned with its economy, and the weight of capitalism in our experience has been such that we have all come, almost universally, to accept its definition of the term. This is a definition which has considerable practical effect (or, to put it rightly, has grown out of its practical effect) and which has afterward been reflected in our conscious definitions, both popular and 'scientific'. It basically amounts to this: All those activities whose product takes the commodity form, and all those relationships which bind together such activities are part of the economy; activities which do not produce commodities, together with the relationships which organize them are not part of the economy.

The dimensions of this economy are thus highly variable. If we all eat at home the economy is smaller, but

if we all go out to eat in restaurants, it grows. There is perhaps less labour being expended on food preparation in the latter instance, but that does not matter; if we do it for ourselves that's not economic activity, if we pay someone to do it for us, it is.

When we come to look at the economies of other sorts of societies we tend to import this very peculiar definition. We may very carefully abstract from those basic features (the commodity form, wage labour/capital relation, market exchange, etc) that shape our concept: we have to because these are often not present, and we can't bring ourselves to believe such societies have no economy at all. But we often tend to describe as economic only the sorts of activities -- in a material, or technical sense -- that are considered economic under capitalism. We think making steel is an economic activity, so it is everywhere counted as one. We think, on the other hand that religion, or child-bearing are not part of the economy, so they are nowhere considered part of the economy.

State and Division of Labour

To conclude this note, I want to return briefly to Mihaly Vajda's comments that I quoted at the outset. Because the is, in societies where the capitalist mode of production is dominant, supposed to be a 'non-economic' institution

(and even though, as Gramsci observed, such a state "has never existed except on paper, as a limiting hypothesis") its activity requires acquires a differentiating label as 'political'. Similar activities to those which the state organizes today are therefore classed as 'non-economic' in other societies. The supposed differentiation of state and economy is projected backwards onto earlier societies even where the facts make it impossible to overlook the economic effects of the state. Thus when a band of 'authorized' armed men ride around to collect the direct producer's harvest this has to be described as the political organization of 'extra-economic' exploitation, rather than the central economic relation of such a society.

The best way to escape such an absurdity seems to me to be to follow Vajda's suggestion that the state "can and must be explained by the division of labour". The state must be explained as an economic activity, a medium by which labour is socialized, divided and distributed and through which social product is appropriated and redistributed. It is a mode of production. In some pre-capitalist societies it is the mode of production -- the predominant means of organizing the division of labour -- and it appears to have become so again in some post-capitalist societies. But it can also be considered a mode of production where capitalism prevails.

I have already noted that capitalism does not organize all of the labour necessary for the reproduction of society.

By one of its fundamental internal conditions, the need for free individuals who may sell their labour-power, it is rendered incapable of directly organizing child-bearing and rearing (it cannot, in other words, force these entirely into the commodity form, however mercenary it may render them). Some separate mode of socializing such labour must exist in articulation with capitalism for society to be reproduced. We are not yet, I think, in possession of a fully adequate conception of this mode of socialization, but that form of it with which we are most familiar we have come to call 'patriarchy'. (Marx sometimes called feudal society the patriarchal mode of production because of the relations of personal dependence that connected and determined most activities, whether they be child-bearing or the division of national income. Could our patriarchy be this same mode of production with, so to speak, its head chopped off? That is, capitalism has replaced the feudal hierarchy in determining most of the division of labour outside and between households, while the old system of personal dependence still determines procreative labour through the family?)

Just as capitalism requires some other mode of production to guarantee its human raw material, so it requires the state to guarantee other conditions of its existence which it cannot organize directly. Early capitalism and its spokesmen, the political economists, sought to restrict the state's production to the production of the security of property. But this is still (from the

perspective of economy 'in general') production and the state may be considered a mode of production which organizes this activity (the patriarchal mode with its body cut away from under it?).

However, as Vajda notes, this mode of production "was already in place as the separation of civil society and the state occurred... [it] has a continuity through history... [and] is an organ for the regulation of society as a whole" (1981, 74). Capitalism has wrested from it a great part of its former power in determining the division of labour, but capitalism has also been forced -- by its own crisis ridden development -- to hand a part of this power back. And the state has had to make its compromise with capital, accepting that in many areas where it still has power over the division of labour it must exercise this through capitalism's regulatory forms: the commodity, money, capital, credit.

The balance between these three articulated modes of production is not predetermined by the internal logic of any one of them, but together "the totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society".

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

[1] Abbreviations of titles will be employed for textual citations of certain works by MacGregor, Hegel and Marx and for the Dictionary of Marxist Thought. A Key to these abbreviations will be found at the beginning of the bibliography. Hegel's Philosophy of Right (PR) is cited by paragraph rather than page number. An 'R' following the paragraph number indicates the Remarks appended by Hegel to the main text, while an 'A' indicates Additions compiled later from students' notes of his lectures.

[2] On the role of these concepts of totality in Hegel and Marx see Jay, 1984, chapter 2. Hegel's totality was also an "expressive totality" that posits an identity of subject and object, and the "genetic" role of the subject in the constitution of the object. Such a conception has also had a role within Hegelian Marxism, especially in Lukacs positing the proletariat as the emerging subject of history's totalization (See Jay, 1984, chapt. 2).

The notion of a "longitudinal totality" raises the question of the degree to which either Hegel or Marx were historical determinists. I will restrict myself here to saying that, in my view, Hegel was, and Marx was not -- or rather need not be -- an historical determinist. Hegel's ontology of geist loses its integrity without spirit's realization and his system, therefore, requires both social and historical resolution. Marx's vision of history was, in my opinion, an uncertain amalgum which retains aspects of Hegel's teleology but also encompasses an alternative non-teleological conception of history.

[3] "Participation of all in a decision is only possible if there is a ground for agreement, or of underlying common purpose. Radical participation cannot create this; it presupposes it. This is the point which Hegel repeatedly makes. The demand for absolute freedom by itself is empty. Hegel stresses one line of possible consequences, that emptiness leads to pure destructiveness. But he also mentions another... a group can take over and imprint its own purpose on society claiming to represent the general will. They thus 'solve' the problem of diversity by force" (Taylor, 1975, 413).

[4] The association of capitalism with individualism has been developed by many besides Hegel and Marx. Like them, many have concluded this to be a necessary relation: a conclusion that has become a leitmotif of anti-socialist polemic. In the dominant discourse, however, the order of priority is often reversed. The characteristics of 'possessive individualism' (MacPherson, 1962) are presumed to be eternal and universal and the social order of capitalism derives from these, not the other way round as Hegel and Marx would have it. For a recent reassessment of the relationship see Abercrombie, Hill & Turner (1986), who come to a third conclusion: that the relation between individualism and capitalism is not necessary but accidental and historically contingent.

[5] In the quotation from the Communist Manifesto at the beginning of this section Marx and Engels comment that there is no need for communists to insist upon the abolition of the property of the 'petty artisan' as it is being destroyed by the development of capitalism itself. Today the partisans of 'private enterprise' are fond of citing 'small business' as the creator of most new jobs. But the small business of today is infrequently much like the petty artisan of Marx's day. They are far more likely to be dependent appendages of large capital, either directly through such arrangements as franchising or in more mediate form through "functional subcontracting" and "technological dependence" (Murray, 1987). The supposed independence of the petit bourgeois is abolished even as the form is preserved.

The call for the abolition of wage labour opposes the circumstance where the alienation of his/her human essence -- "my own private personality and the universal essence of my self consciousness" as Hegel describes it -- becomes necessary to the worker's continued existence and where it, and the activity that expresses it, become merely a means to his/her continued existence, not an end in themselves (PR, para 66, EPM, 110f). This question will be addressed in considering Hegel's and MacGregor's treatment of the sale of labour power.

[6] See Nove (1983, 1987), Mandel (1986, 1988), Brus (1985) and Lew (1986). However, the contemporary debates do not always adopt a fraternal (sic) tone. See, for example, the exchanges between Geras (1987, 1988) and Laclau & Mouffe (1987).

[7] Another study, of Democracy and Civil Society has just been published by John Keane (1988a) along with a collection of essays on civil society (Keane, 1988b). Unfortunately these works have not yet appeared in Canada and I have only

been able to see the publisher's notices.

[8] If this technique lets Hegel and Marx speak for themselves, they do not do so entirely without aid. MacGregor, writes Herb Gamberg, "presents Hegel's words, then interprets them (they are always in need of interpretation) in ways consonant with Marx and finally follows with a Marx quotation to complete the analogy. With MacGregor providing the transition, Hegel and Marx became almost identical social theorists" (Gamberg, 1985, 360). Still, some of the parallels revealed are striking, although in some cases MacGregor's proposal of similarity of views is, I think forced and erroneous.

[9] In part MacGregor's argument hinges on the assumption that the 'corporation' discussed by Hegel is indeed equivalent to the present day joint stock company. On the surface Hegel's corporation resembles more the medieval crafts guild, whose modern equivalent (if any) might be the business or professional association, or, at the other pole, the trade union. All these three are associations of the persons occupied in a trade (or in certain grades of it) bound together for mutual aid, mutual defence, or agitation for their common interests. In none is there the intimation that members all belong to the same establishment, enterprise or firm. It is unitary ownership, not common pursuit of a trade, that characterizes the modern corporation. So that the accident of a common designation should not in itself aid MacGregor's case, I will capitalize 'Corporation' when using it in his sense (see chap. 3).

[10] Marx did not expect communism to spring immediately into being, fully formed, upon the overthrow of capitalism, and he did pay attention to the "period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the other" (CGP, 26). While there would in this period need to be an accommodation with 'bourgeois right' on account of scarcity still Marx appears to have expected a rapid progress towards abundance and communism proper (Ollman, 1978, 62ff).

[11] Nove quotes Aiden Foster Carter to the effect that "for Marxists abundance is out; arguably it was always a meaningless notion, but henceforth scarcity will have to be accepted as more than just a bugbear of bourgeois economics" (1983, 16).

[12] Engels' statement is remarkable and perplexing in a Marxist perspective. Only in conditions of absolute scarcity (or uniqueness) would 'things' need to be the object of

social administration. Otherwise what is at issue is always the labour required to obtain, transform and distribute them, thus inevitably 'the governance of men'.

[13] See the discussion of needs in the appendix.

[14] Nor is it clear why it can be presumed that socialism or communism will continue the characteristic 'revolution in the means of production' and of the productivity of labour of capitalism. Capitalism is driven to this by the imperative of capital accumulation, but whether Marx expected a similar dynamic to prevail in communism, or what basis it might have, is uncertain.

[15] That this is not a completely adequate manner in which to address the relation of Hegel to Marx can only be admitted, not corrected in an essay of this scope:

Martin Nicolaus has suggested that the proper way to grasp the dialectical debt of Marx to Hegel is to first read the Grundrisse, then The Science of Logic in order to grasp where the logic is germane to Marx's development, and finally to read Capital so as to grasp fully the link between Capital and the Grundrisse. Someone has pointed out, without contesting the wisdom of Nicolaus' program, that such a task is possible only for those serving long prison terms... [S]uch a prison term will not be served as "easy time." (Harvey:1984,317)

Chapter One

[1] The comments in this chapter are largely restricted to Marxism as it has developed in the metropolitan centres of advanced capitalism. As the examples of the Praxis group in Yugoslavia, KOR in Poland and the (now largely emigre) Budapest school in Hungary show, Marxism is not dead in the 'second World' despite the efforts of Party/State imposed dogmatism (cf Arato, DMT, 316ff). In the West the move into the universities is one of the most significant sociological determinants of contemporary Marxist theory. This is especially true of American Marxism, which after its incubation in the New Left (which did not begin as, and was never predominantly Marxist - see Isserman), has characteristically been situated on campus rather than in factory or ghetto. For a survey of Marxism in American universities see Ollman & Vernoff (1982).

[2] Other elements in the mix include Trotskyism, Maoism and a derivative form of Leninism, especially via Eurocommunism.

[3] The following is no more than a quick sketch and does not aspire to present a "Marxism of Marxism", as Anderson puts it (1983, 11). Anderson's distinction of the intrinsic and extrinsic histories of theoretical development, and of their asymmetrical but not onesided relation is characteristic of Marxism's sociology of knowledge. Its classic statement is the passage in the famous 1859 Preface to CPE where Marx writes: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness" (CPE, 21). This statement has often, and erroneously, been taken to imply that consciousness is strictly and unequivocally determined by external circumstances. But social being is not a circumstance external to consciousness; rather, consciousness is one element of a complex of factors that make up social existence. Consciousness is thus a factor in its own determination, but never an autonomous one. It is a reflexive totality encompassed within the greater articulated totality of social being. It is always conditioned by other factors - as diverse as biology, the structure and historical content of language, cultural norms and the prevailing relations of production (to cite only a few) - and its contribution to this articulated totality is historically, individually and contingently variable. "Men

make their own history", Marx pointed out, "but they do not make it just as they please... but under circumstances directly found given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living" (MER, 595). This weight conditions not only what they may do but what they may conceive as possible and desirable.

The reciprocal but unequal conditioning of social consciousness and social being presented in the 1859 Preface can be clarified if we understand 'determination' in the manner advocated by Raymond Williams as "the settings of limits" and "the exertion of pressures" (1977, 83-89). Social being, the full complex of natural, historical and socio-economic factors including social consciousness, sets limits upon both the contents and the capacities of consciousness and exerts pressures which incline this circumscribed consciousness toward particular contents and expressions. Yet there remains a certain 'space' in which consciousness is 'relatively autonomous' so that its expression - "as human sensuous activity, practice" - in turn conditions and transforms social being: "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice" (MER, 143-4).

"A Marxism without some concept of determination", as Williams notes, "is in effect worthless", which is true of any science (1977, 83). But any Marxism which conceives determination as total and invariable with regard to consciousness has effectively abandoned the project of human emancipation. The "realm of necessity" imposed by nature and the social nature of human life cannot be done away with, but a "realm of freedom", "that development of human energy which is an end in itself" is not thereby precluded (MER, 441). Marxism presupposes, not that consciousness is autonomous or the genetic principle of being as does idealism, nor that it is the mechanical reflex of external forces as does a passive or crude materialism, but that it is an emergent element of an articulated totality whose 'space' is not forever prescribed but which may push back the limits and attenuate the pressures upon it.

[4] The designation 'Western Marxism' originates with Merleau-Ponty who employed it to differentiate the strand in Marxist theory that had developed in Western Europe since the appearance of Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness, from 'official' Soviet Marxism. In this usage Western Marxism, as Martin Jay notes, "identified a subterranean tradition of humanist, subjectivist and undogmatic Marxism" that "has often been equated with Hegelian Marxism" (Jay, 1984, 3). Perry Anderson's influential essay Considerations on Western Marxism shifted the usage by

including a number of explicitly anti-humanist and anti-Hegelian theorists (1976, chap. 2). If this expanded Western Marxism was more theoretically heterogeneous than under the earlier definition it was still tied together by characteristic themes and sociological circumstances, and Martin Jay follows Anderson in this broader usage. Russell Jacoby's usage is closer to Merleau-Ponty's original, specifically excluding, e.g., Althusser's structuralist and anti-Hegelian Marxism (DMT, 523-6). For the purposes of this discussion I will follow the broader definition employed by Anderson and Jay (although they do not produce exactly equivalent lists of theorists for inclusion. See Jay, 1984, 3-6).

[5] Revolution in Germany eventually subsided into an unstable bourgeois republic under the government of the, now reformist, Social Democrats, which eventually succumbed to the Nazis. In Italy a wave of factory occupations at the end of the war were contained and the fragmented socialist movement was crushed by the fascists in the 1920's. In Hungary a short lived 'Red republic' succumbed to fascist reaction in 1919. All over the industrialized world a wave of labour unrest and uprising raised the 'spectre of communism' in the minds of the ruling classes.

[6] On the side of its 'intrinsic' history the theoretical development of Western Marxism was profoundly shaped by the publication, for the first time, of many of Marx's early works (Jacoby, DMT, 524).

[7] 'Exhaustion' is the term which Anderson employs, in 1983, to describe the condition of Western Marxism by the opening of the 1970's, reiterating a judgement that he had made in the mid-seventies. See Anderson (1983, 18; 1976, 101f). Also writing in the early 1980's Martin Jay has a different judgement, arguing that the tradition is "by no means at its end" (1984, 15). It is interesting that the figure on whom Jay rests a substantial part of his expectation for the future of Western Marxism, Jurgen Habermas, is not even present in Anderson's roll of theorists in 1976. Though in 1983 he calls this omission a "major error of appreciation" and expresses an appreciation for Habermas' "modest and straightforward desire for affiliation to historical materialism" (59). What he has then to say of Habermas' work emphasizes its discontinuities with the characteristic themes and premises of Western Marxism, whereas Jay has emphasized the continuities (see Anderson, 1983, 58-68; Jay, 1984, chap. 15). Thus Anderson maintains his judgement about the closing of the Western Marxism tradition. Anderson is, of course, writing (as Jay notes) from outside the tradition, whereas Jay, though

acting as the historian of the tradition rather than a participant, clearly considers himself a member of its American 'outpost' and this may account in part for his own less conclusive attitude toward it (for if Western Marxism has remaining vitality it is in this American outpost). Yet, his analysis of the tradition also acknowledges its decline even as he holds out the hope that "amidst the debris" there is a potential for a new synthesis (Jay, 1984, epilogue).

[8] The first strength of Anglo-Marxism has been in history and its grounding in historiography has been an element in its shift toward concrete and empirical analyses. The work of Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawm, E. P. Thompson and others has had an influence beyond history and beyond Marxism.

[9] Carling reviews a number of alternative titles for this tendency and chooses 'Rational Choice' Marxism. John Roemer, one of the leading theorists of this new brand of Marxism also employs 'Rational Choice' Marxism on some occasions, but chose 'Analytical Marxism' as the title for his reader on the school. I will employ the latter, if only because it seems a little less cumbersome.

[10] Carling provides both an enumeration of other theorists who have been grouped with these Analytical-Marxists and an overview of the development of the perspective to date (including, it is worth noting, the reciprocal influence of Neo-Ricardian economics and Analytical-Marxism). For a more critical assessment see Kieve (1986).

[11] It would be misleading to present Analytical-Marxism as though there were no methodological differences between various theorists. Thus Cohen endorses a form of functional explanation while Elster rejects it, and from Roemer's perspective functional and teleological explanation appear to have much in common. Nor is there complete agreement on methodological individualism. Wright, Levine and Sober argue, against Elster's thorough-going methodological individualism, that "to ban social types as objects of social science is to impoverish the explanatory objectives of social science" (1985, 83). In the end, however, they are closer to Elster than they believe, because the social types that they defend are heuristic devices, not ontological entities.

[12] See, for example, Norman Geras (1987, 1988), (whom Carling groups with Analytical-Marxism, although noting

Geras's rejection of the label) on Laclau & Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and their rebuttal (1984, 1987).

Chapter Two

[1] Gouldner asks why Marx's studies of civil society were "aborted" and answers: Marx generally emphasized that the social structures of civil society [Bürgerliche Gesellschaft] were not independent entities generating bourgeois society [Bürgerliche Gesellschaft] but were, rather, forms in which bourgeois society [Bürgerliche Gesellschaft] had emerged; that is they were the products rather than the producers of the bourgeois class" (Gouldner, 1980, 356). Emphases in original except for parenthetical interpolations). I have inserted the original German term in order to show that Gouldner's inattention to it and to the substance of both Hegel's and Marx's treatment of civil society reduces his thesis to this: 'Marx says bourgeois society didn't produce bourgeois society, rather it was produced by bourgeois society'. Gouldner's confusion is a consequence of his accepting the contemporary emphases on 'civil society' (see below) and failing to understand that the meaning of concepts is not immutable over time, any more than the realities with which these concepts attempt to grapple.

"While civil society was only a residual concept for Marxism", writes Gouldner, "it was focal for sociology... [which] associated civil society with elements contributing to the maintenance of order and stability in society that spontaneously and 'naturally' developed... The voluntary group, whose members came together spontaneously and voluntarily, is seen as the healthy social unit" (363-4). In the course of his discussion, while he refers to such organizations as guilds and civic corporations, Gouldner gives no list, typology or parameters for what is to count as part of civil society in this sociological tradition. He implicitly excludes not only the state (but not the local state?) and the 'economy' (but not guilds?) and at other moments appears to include the family and religion (but not the established church?). Voluntary, non-state organizations is as precise a definition as we get of "civil society as infrastructure of the public sphere" without which "no emancipation is possible in the modern world" or "haven from, and... center of resistance to the Behemoth state" (371). Nowhere does Gouldner address the central problem: what is the basis for the subsistence of these organizations and what basis could they have, if socialism eliminated private property and capitalist production?

[2] In certain senses the term 'society' can be taken as the

equivalent of 'civil society'. As Hannah Arendt points out, the notion of 'society' (first in a restricted, particular, sense of 'association', later in a broader sense encompassing the whole community) was a Roman innovation which "has no equivalent in Greek language or thought" (Arendt, 1958, 23). Where the Greeks differentiated the public and the private, the polis and the oikia (household), "the emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon", consequent upon "the admission of household and housekeeping activities to the public realm" (28, 45).

[3] To be subject to 'necessity' was, to the Greeks, the antithesis of freedom. To be free and a citizen a man (and only a man) had both to possess a household of his own that gave him a basis for social independence, and be free of necessity, of a life dominated by labor. Women, slaves, craftsmen and merchants, no matter how wealthy they (even a slave) might be, were disqualified from citizenship by the pre-occupation of their labor (see Arendt, 1958, 25-37).

The instance of classical civil society which has had the greatest influence upon later thinkers -- including Hegel, even as he formalized a radical shift in the concept's meaning -- is the Athenian democracy. But the principle of the citizen state, of the state as a community of citizens, but the citizens only being a fraction of the community population had much wider application in the Graeco-Roman world, even under monarchial, oligopolistic or despotic forms of government. This citizen/state relationship was recognized by Marx as the basis not only of the polity of antiquity but of its mode of production (G, 474ff).

[4] Locke while continuing to speak of civil society as political society or community, nonetheless differentiates this from 'society', in an uncertain manner: "Locke is nowhere clear as to what precisely does arise by the 'original compact'. Is it society itself or only government? That the two are different he emphatically asserted... where he argued that a political revolution which dissolves the government does not as a rule dissolve the society which that government rules" (Sabine, 1951, 451).

[5] Riedel, in the quotation reproduced above, attributes Hegel's reformulation of the concept to 'around 1800'. However, Z. A. Pelczynski argues that the term does not appear in Hegel's writings until 1818. See below.

[6] Were any greater specificity attempted the history of

civil society might easily escalate into a structural history of the western world and a replication, especially, of the 'transition debates' on the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. I hope to keep my exposition much simpler, and therefore, of necessity, much more schematic than it might be. In particular I intend, out of expediency, to gloss over the major issues that shaped both the original 'transition debates' among Marxist scholars and their recent re-emergence in the 'Brenner debate'. Did capitalism 'dissolve feudalism from without' by the growth of trade and later of capitalist production in urban bourgeois islands in a feudal sea, or did feudalism transmute into capitalism, at least partially, through an internal class struggle between peasants and landlords resulting either in the peasants appropriation of the land as independent petty producers (the French tendency?) or their eviction and reduction to agricultural wage labour (the English case)? These are critical questions both for the understanding of social structural transformation in general and for grasping the different tonalities of bourgeois (civil) society as it grew to dominance in Europe. But they can, I hope, be largely abstracted in tracing the major shifts in meaning of 'civil society'. On the 'transition debates' see, R. Hilton, 1978, and R. Brenner, 1977.

[7] Our entire vocabulary in this area, whether in German, French or English, is caught up in the differentiation of the principles of urban (and, tendentially, capitalist) life from those of the rural feudal order. A fascinating tour of the byways of this evolution can be had in the entries on 'Bourgeois', 'City', 'Civilization', 'Country', and 'Society' in Raymond Williams' Keywords (1983a). Today we more easily perceive the relations between 'city', 'civilization' and 'civil society', or Burg and Bürgerliche Gesellschaft (an association absent in the ancient world, despite the prevalence of 'city states', where, Williams points out, the city was urbs, while civis indicated a body of citizens and was more more akin to the modern 'national' 1983a, 56), than the derivation of 'state' from 'status' and the Latin for condition' and its consequent entanglement with the feudal hierarchal ordering of society (292-3).

[8] While the towns often had representation in the Estates and parliaments of the late feudal era, it was also frequently the case that, as in England, capitalist development shifted out of these old towns, frequently still dominated by guild organizations, and grew up in unincorporated areas which therefore lacked political representation. In the developing absolutist states of the continent the feudal estates frequently atrophied at an early stage of development or were not called for long periods of time, with the result that there was often very

little formal political representation at all.

[9] This should perhaps be qualified. In Marx's early and most extensive explicit discussion of civil society, On The Jewish Question, he writes, for example, that "Security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property" (CW3, 163). Thus Marx, certainly in this period when he was still very much influenced by Hegel, acknowledges the place within civil society of the police, Administration of Justice, etc.. But, without forgetting how vital these presuppositions of civil society are, Marx after his break with Hegel in the mid 1840's tends to follow the formula of those other champions of civil society, the liberals, in treating these as elements of the state. Thus, in the German Ideology, he and Engels write: "Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily adopt for both internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests" (GI, 80). And in their famous (or infamous) characterization of "the executive of the modern state [as] but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (CW6, 486), Marx and Engels are following the lead of Smith who wrote that "laws and governments may be considered in this and indeed in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress the poor and preserve to themselves the inequality of the goods" (in Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, 107).

[10] In England guild and Handicraft rights were whittled away throughout the 18th century, where the government and courts eroded Elizabethan guild and apprenticeship regulations: "Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen," Adam Smith observed, "its counsellors are always the masters" (Hill, 1969, 266). In France guilds were outlawed by the revolutionary regime in 1791 and either due to french domination or influence, in most of Germany by 1811. During the restoration at least a part of Guild authority was returned in many German states, but they were then a defensive and declining part of an anti-revolutionary and anti-modern reaction and clearly in retreat in the face of bourgeois, laissez faire, industrial organization. The guilds became the political expression of an increasingly desperate and impoverished artisanate, whose program to return industrial regulation continued to lose ground despite intermittent support of reactionary governments before and after the revolution of 1848 (Landes, 1969, 145;

Hamerow, chap. 2 & passim).

[11] Habermas's theory of the public sphere is developed in Strukturwandel Der Offenlichkeit, which has not been translated. The argument is outlined in Held (1980, 259ff). Critical evaluations are provided by Hohendahl (1979) and by Keane (1982).

[12] Its use in this context is noted in a recent article in Newsweek (April 25, 1988, 37), which indicates, by the manner in which it places civil society in inverted commas, the foreignness of the term to mainstream Western discourse. Western political scientists have also begun to discuss the USSR in terms of civil society. See Starr, 1988.

Chapter Three

[1] It is difficult to quote more than a sentence or two from the Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx without also quoting Hegel. As Hegel's judgements are so important to MacGregor's own I have used such passages in this chapter where it seems the best way of portraying MacGregor's arguments. These quotations are indicated by single quotation marks. All such passages in MacGregor's statements are by Hegel, unless otherwise indicated. In order to distinguish between MacGregor's abbreviation of one of Hegel's arguments and my own condensation of MacGregor's discussion, I have employed only two ellipsis points where the change is MacGregor's and three where it is mine.

[2] This seems to me a very unfortunate misuse of the quotation. The statement is taken from the Remark to PR, para, 49. The full paragraph from which it comes reads:

We may not speak of the injustice of nature in the unequal distribution of possessions and resources, since nature is not free and therefore is neither just nor unjust. That everyone ought to have subsistence enough for his needs is a moral wish and thus vaguely expressed is well enough meant, but like anything that is only well meant it lacks objectivity. On the other hand, subsistence is not the same as possession and belongs to another sphere, i.e., to civil society.

The point of the statement is therefore to direct us to another part of the text, not to imply that the means of subsistence are not property. (It is however the concluding part of a discussion in which Hegel attacks as an 'empty and superficial... intellectualism' the idea that there should be equal division of property). When we turn to the section that Hegel directs us to consult we may read:

A particular man's resources, or in other words his opportunity of sharing in the general resources, are conditioned, however, partly by his own unearned principal (his capital) and partly by his skill; this in turn is itself dependent not only on his capital but also on accidental circumstances...

Men are made unequal by nature... and in civil

society the right of particularity is so far from annulling this natural inequality that it produces it out of mind.... To oppose to this right a demand for equality is a folly of the understanding. (PR, para, 200 & 200R)

Capital and unearned principle are here described as a right which it is folly to oppose!

[3] MacGregor is not unique in advancing such a theory. A similar argument, but on the basis of natural rights theory is advanced by Ellerman (1973). He argues that "all those who work in an enterprise have, as a group, the moral responsibility for their productive activities' and that they therefore have "the natural right to appropriate the whole product of production" (5-6). Since "moral responsibility for one's actions cannot be 'transferred' or 'alienated' by consent or contract" the "property-theoretic" consequence is that "people have the natural right to the results of their actions, i.e. to the assets and liabilities that they create... [S]ince these property rights result from the agents' moral responsibility, they are inalienable" (4-5). Ellerman goes on immediately to assure us that "of course, material goods that have been rightfully appropriated can be exchanged", but he does not explain why the moral responsibility restriction does not restrain such contracts (5). However, if we may not legitimately alienate our abilities and labour-power, even if we wish to, it is not obvious that we should be able to alienate the products into which these have been incorporated. If we must always retain moral responsibility for our actions, and this is the not only the basis of property but an imperative to property, then it might just as well be argued that we must always retain that property for which we are responsible. All forms of alienation and transfer become inadmissible. Two sorts of economies might ensue. Either an autarchy of self-sufficient separated producers (a world of Robinson Crusoes) which is a physical impossibility. Or all producers in a self-contained society would have to be immediately associated as co-producers in a single 'firm' within which distribution of product would not count as exchange or alienation. How the latter case could be differentiated from the social ownership or 'state socialism' that Ellerman deplors is not clear.

[4] The third class which Marx identifies in this fragment is the class of landlords who receive their revenue in the form of rent. MacGregor finds in Marx's statement of "the tendency... [for] the transformation of all landed property into the form of landed property corresponding to the capitalist mode of production" corroboration for his presentation that the agricultural class is progressively

absorbed in the business class (CIII, 885, CIHM, 206). In terms of revenue, of course, rent remains a form distinct from profit, even if the capitalistically inclined landowner calculates his revenue in terms of a rate of return on money advanced for the land. On MacGregor's treatment of the agricultural class see note 6, below.

[5] To describe the state, at least in capitalist society, as a 'mode of production' is, I realize, a very controversial proposition. Nor is it one that can be defended here. However, following Mihaly Vajda's suggestion that the state "can and must be explained in terms of the division of labour", I would argue that it ought to be understood as an independent form by which labour is socialized and distributed and its product appropriated (Vajda, 1981, 70, & see appendix to this essay). This makes it a mode of production.

[6] 'His', because Hegel makes explicit reference to the importance of primogeniture for preserving the political integrity of the agricultural class. MacGregor argues that Hegel had envisaged the dissolution of the agricultural class into the business class and the end of its political role in the constitution. He bases this argument on Hegel's statement that "the character of this class as 'substantial' undergoes modifications through the working of the civil law... of education, instruction and religion". But as Hegel continues, and MacGregor himself quotes, "these modifications do not affect the substantial content of the class but its form and the development of its power of reflection" (PR, para 203R, quoted in CIHM, 32). Why MacGregor concludes that the class is dissolved while its 'substantial content' remains intact is unclear. Nor does Hegel attack primogeniture as MacGregor argues he does. Rather Hegel argues that primogeniture, which is otherwise an infringement on the right of property, is justified by the political necessity of the class (which forms the upper house of the estates) (PR, para 306A).

Hegel also writes that while "in our day agriculture is conducted on methods devised by reflective thinking, i.e., like a factory... [s]till, the agricultural class will always retain a mode of life which is particular" (PR, para 203A). Why one would speak in terms of 'always' for a class one expects to shortly disappear is a mystery which MacGregor does not seek to explain. The agricultural class has clearly disappeared, at least in any form that in which Hegel's class can be recognized. In England there is an aristocracy, but no peasantry, in France there remains a peasantry, but the nobility has been abolished. How is a class which nowhere exists to "always retain" a particular mode of life?

[7] MacGregor stresses the importance of class membership for the establishment of an individual's substantive personality: "Class membership defines the manner in which an individual's personality is actualized in the world... Social class, in other words, is the mediating institution between the individual and society" (CIHM, 204). Given this emphasis it is to be expected that MacGregor casts rather a wider net for membership in the business class and Corporation than other interpreters of Hegel have done. Yet he too seems to feel that some members of modern society do not fall into (or, rather, fall out of) particular classes: "The universal class", he writes, is "increasingly allied with those poor and dispossessed who are excluded from the corporations of the business class" (CIHM, 254). The poor and dispossessed would not seem to become members of the universal class by this alliance (they become rather 'state clients') and they have clearly been expelled from the business class. Given MacGregor's support for Hegel's scheme of functional representation rather than 'abstract' universal suffrage, it is not clear that the dispossessed do not also become the disenfranchised, with no proper place or role in the state.

[8] Here MacGregor's use of Marx deserves some comment, as the passage quoted seems in fact to contradict MacGregor's own position. Marx refers to the 'abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself'. The statement occurs in the context of a discussion of the effect of stock companies on the scale and concentration of capitals. By the agglomeration of many individual capitals the absolute character of private property is indeed compromised because the individual stockholder's right is reduced to a right of revenue and of a voice (proportional to the size of the stockholding) in selecting the management of the company. They lose the right to direct possession of the capital assets of the company as the ownership of any particular item -- be it a paper clip or a blast furnace -- is divided between all the stockholders (cf Kernohan, 1987, 154). Capital becomes, to a limited extent, the common property of a collective group of the bourgeoisie. To no one of them is ownership any longer 'free and complete', for each thing into which they put their will is also inhabited by the will of each other stockholder. But MacGregor can hardly cite such a development in support of his argument as he has no wish to see 'free and complete' private property compromised. He might also have looked a few sentences further in Marx's discussion and discovered another consequence of the joint stock form: "It reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new variety of parasites in the form of promoters,

speculators and merely nominal directors" (CIII, 438). The arguments that MacGregor has looked to for support actually indicate that those features of capitalism that MacGregor would do away with are thriving, while those he would retain are the ones that are in retreat in this historic development.

[9] MacGregor argues here that "with the development of the social state, classes as groups with unequal privileges and wealth disappear" leaving it unclear whether this refers to differences within or between classes (CIHM, 254). If the latter, then this seems an almost irrelevant distinction given the scope of Hegelian classes and the fact that the vast majority of the population would be part of the business class. If the former, then it is incumbent on MacGregor to square this with Hegel's dismissive attitude toward the idea of equal property distribution (cf PR, para 49R, see above note 2). The only way in which an equal distribution of property could develop under abstract right would be if all individuals have the same natural talents and abilities. Otherwise such differences must lead to differences in wealth, unless the right to property is abridged.

Chapter Four

[1] As MacGregor puts it: "Marx's analysis of the inner dynamic of bourgeois political economy begins with the nature of the commodity, [whereas] Hegel's theory of civil society and the state starts with the notion of personality... with the free will of the individual" (CIHM, 29,175). Still, MacGregor concedes that Marx, despite his failure to adopt Hegel's starting point, "never loses sight of the consciousness and will -- the ideality -- of the individual" (CIHM, 175). Marx acknowledged his debt to Hegel on this point when he wrote that "the outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology... is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process... as the outcome of man's own labour" (EPM, 177). And this might be taken to be the starting point of Historical Materialism: Human beings "themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence... [thus] indirectly producing their actual material life" (GI, 42). Human ideality, or, as Marx said at the opening of the methodological introduction to the Grundrisse, "individuals producing in society, and hence the socially determined production of individuals, is of course the point of departure" (G, 83). But this starting point does not necessarily terminate in freedom. Capital begins with the commodity, with human labour in an alienated and reified form, and thus with the unfreedom of civil society. Presuming freedom Hegel cannot but conclude with it. Despite Marx's statement at the conclusion of Capital that "capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation" it is equally valid to interpret Marx as holding that human freedom is always at best a contingent possibility, that he (as Terrell Carver puts it) "concluded... that revolution was, we might say, as good as inevitable, without invoking a notion of historical necessity" (CI, 715; Carver, 1981, 50).

[2] Marxists have commonly portrayed the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie as the centerpiece of Marx's analysis, but deprived of an understanding of its context in social production such a focus may become unintelligible, as has unfortunately been the case in (for example) much of the contemporary 'labour process debate' (cf. Cohen, 1987).

[3] Given the scope of even these selected aspects of Marx's theory the following discussion must as well be of a general

nature. Even the smallest details of Marx's theory are today the focus of a voluminous literature, and each point in the following could be expanded into a very long discussion indeed.

[4] The classical school of political economy that grew up in the Scottish Enlightenment was concerned with elaborating a theory of (a then new, emergent) society, not merely an 'economics'. This school, as Meghnad Desai observes, "constitut[es] the origins of social science" (DMT, 376). The contrast, in terms of sociological depth, between classical political economy and the modern discipline of economics is considerable. In a recent essay Robert Heilbroner has drawn this contrast in a manner worth quoting at length. The great classical political economists, notes Heilbroner:

were not seeking to explain transient market prices... so much as to discover the background forces that imposed a hidden order in them. The post-classical economists, in contrast, investigated the immediate forces that gave rise to prices... The early great figures primarily engaged in exploring the large-scale, long term dynamics -- the growth and decline -- of the economic system. The later practitioners were mainly searching for a tendency to equilibrium... The founding fathers all discussed the dynamics of economic change with reference to classes, meaning by that word not merely functionally differentiated groups within the population but socio-political groups with characteristic behavioral tendencies... Nothing of this sort is found in the work of postclassical theorists who expunged the notion of class by spreading the veil of "productivity" over differences in social station and thought... The earlier thinkers began from conceptions of natural law and from generalizations about historical experience, the later school from Benthamite assumptions about the individual's drive for pleasure and from a desire to go beyond the untidy stuff of history to precise answers to small questions of household matters or business management. It is not surprising that the first approach led to economic theories centering on historical problems of capital accumulation, and the latter to ahistorical theories directed to the most efficient allocation of resources. (Heilbroner, 1987, 44-45)

[5] The chief standard bearer of the neo-Ricardians, also known as 'Sraffians' has been Ian Steedman. See Steedman (1977) and for some of the debates that have been generated Steedman, et al (1981), Mandel & Freeman (1984), and the various contributors to The Review of Radical Political

Economics, special issue, 14/2 (1982). The neo-Ricardian critique has for the most part been aimed at the 'embodied labour' interpretation of Marxist value theory which shares many of its presuppositions. Both are more strictly 'economic' theories lacking the sociological objectives and dimensions of the 'abstract labour' interpretation.

[6] The priority given to the qualitative aspect of the theory is not just a prioritization of its sociological over its economic dimension, but consistent with Marxism conceived as a realist rather than a positivist science. Bourgeois economics follows an essentially positivist epistemology, refusing investigation of underlying structures of reality and concentrating upon empirical regularities at the level of appearance. Such a perspective gives priority to mathematically formulated descriptions and predictions. To Marx, on the other hand, the object of science is precisely to discover those underlying, and frequently not directly observable, relationships and structures which generate those observable relationships. This 'realist' approach does not reduce science to the capacity to measure something, nor would it conclude that some theory is untrue only because means of mathematically modeling its categories have not been developed. On the difference between positivist and realist accounts of science see Bhaskar (1986), and Keat & Urry (1975).

[7] Marx and the LTV have recently come under attack from yet another quarter, by feminists who argue that Marxism is "sex blind", that it has theoretically devalued 'reproduction' (that is the biological reproduction of the species) by the central place it gives the concept of 'production' and that the LTV ignores domestic labour -- overwhelmingly performed by women (see, e.g. the essays in Eisenstein, 1979 and Sargent, 1981). Sociologically, politically and theoretically many of these criticisms are valid for the practice and theory of many (most?) Marxists, and indeed for Marx and Engels. Without entering into what has become a very large and polemically charged discourse, I simply want to note that, with regard to the LTV, some of these criticisms have been misdirected.

The LTV does not attempt to construct a transhistorical theory of labour distribution or production. It 'merely' attempts to comprehend the manner, and the consequences of the manner, in which labour is distributed within the Capitalist Mode of Production. The LTV is a 'Marxist' theory rather than a 'Historical Materialist' theory, in the sense that it is a theory pertinent to the capitalist mode of production (the object of 'Marxism') and not human history as a whole (the object of 'Historical materialism'). It therefore has nothing to say about the organization of

labour in pre-capitalist societies (except in so far as, as Marx put it, "the categories which express [capitalist] relations... provide an insight into the structure... of all formerly existing social formations the ruins and component elements of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society", CPE, 210-11) nor does it attempt to theorize the relations of labour which falls outside the commodity/market economy within bourgeois society (except in so far as it may illuminate how these are conditioned by capitalism).

Both Marx and Engels explicitly included species reproduction as one of the fundamental moments of social production within the general theory of Historical Materialism. In The German Ideology they list production to satisfy needs, production of new needs and the production of new human beings as the three "fundamental conditions" of human history. This awareness of the centrality of procreation within Historical Materialism is not forgotten: in 1884 Engels wrote that "according to the materialist conception, the determining factor in history is, in the last instance, the production and reproduction of immediate life... of a two-fold character: on the one side, the production of the means of existence... on the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species" (Engels, 1972, 71).

But the propagation of human beings does not appear as an object of study or theorization in most of Marx's mature works as "individuals are dealt with [there] only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories" and the categories with which these works are concerned are those of the capitalist mode of production (KI, 92). The LTV is not a general theory of bourgeois society, rather it analyses a specific part of that society, the system of commodity/market relations which dominates the distribution of labour in that society, the "light of a specific hue... tinging all other colours and modifying their specific features" (CPE, 212). As species reproduction and domestic labour do not fall within capitalist relations of production (in as much as they are not mediated by commodity relations and their product does not take the form of commodities) they do not fall within the ambit of the LTV.

The separation made between value relations and species reproduction is one made in reality by the capitalist mode of production: it is reflected in, not constituted by, theory. Still, as a number of LTV theorists have recognized, a fully adequate theory of the capitalist mode of production must integrate a theory of social reproduction and labour outside of value relations (Harvey, 1982, 163, Lebowitz, 1983, Bradby, 1982). "This omission", notes Harvey, "is, perhaps one of the most serious of all the gaps in Marx's own theory" and remains intractable because these social relations are "hidden in such a maze of complexity that they

seem to defy analysis" (163). Lebowitz, observing that value relations do not constitute a 'closed system' argues that there is a "'degree of freedom', a critical opening" in capitalism that is hidden in Capital (6). This is true, and thankfully so, but it in no way diminishes the critical importance of the system of value relations as a basic determinant of contemporary society.

[8] As Mandel emphasizes, a great part of social relations through which production is conducted and the division of labour regulated are, in all societies, informal direct relations between individuals. The 'formal' systems of market or plan could not subsist without such relations (Mandel, 1986, 22f).

[9] Some theorists have identified this development as the the nucleus of "new superior relations of production... [maturing] within the framework of the old society", something which must occur before any mode of production can give way to its successor according to Marx's famous "1859 Preface" (CPE, 21). See especially the work of Alfred Sohn-Rethal (1976, 1978). However, Marx's own work, especially the chapter (XIV) on "Machinery and Modern Industry" in Capital volume I and his discussions of the "real subsumption of labour under capital" in the so-called "Resultate" (KI, 948-1084, see especially 1023-1038), calls this conclusion into question. It seems just as likely that modes of production, or at least the Capitalist Mode of Production, have as strong a tendency to mold the forces of production so as to support and enforce the existing relations of production as to create ones (tendentially) incompatible with them. In this case it is difficult to see in the hierarchal and regimented 'relations in production' of the capitalist labour process the nucleus of socialist relations of production (cf. Gordon, 1976).

[10] Capital opens with what appears to be, and has often been taken as, a discussion of value relations in an economy of petty commodity production, that is one with separated producers but without wage labour. Marx is not however attempting to present such an economy as a real historical possibility. Rather capital begins with the simpler, more elemental, determinations of the capitalist mode of production introducing further determinations until a concrete picture of the Capitalist Mode of Production is elaborated. This is a question of the requirements of logical exposition not of historical evolution (CPE, 205-208, 213, Engels, in CPE, 225ff). At the opening of the "Resultate" (the draft for a concluding chapter to Capital, Vol. I, which Marx did not publish), Marx writes that:

As the elementary form of bourgeois wealth, the

commodity was our point of departure, the prerequisite for the emergence of capital... On the other hand, a highly developed commodity exchange and the form of the commodity as the universally necessary social form of the product can only emerge as the consequence of the capitalist mode of production. (KI, 949)

Commodity production and capitalist production evolve reciprocally, at each step the development of one is the premise and necessary condition for the further development of the other. The idea of universal petty commodity production - the ideal of Jefferson - is an abstraction which cannot in fact occur. "It is only with the emergence of capitalist production that use-value is universally mediated by exchange-value" (KI, 951).

[11] Such an error forms, for example, the very premise of of William Leiss's The Limits to Satisfaction in which he assumes that "Marx's concept of commodity fetishism refer[s] only (or chiefly) to 'ideological' elements in economic theories up to his day" (1976, xviii). Mistaking any production in which the product is distributed beyond the immediate producers for commodity production Leiss finds that Marx's characterization of fetishism as a product of the commodity 'form' theory must either be false or universal and inescapable. In either case Leiss concludes it ceases to be useful, and he therefore proceeds to reconstruct the theory as one of the symbolism and psychology of needs. This is not an unimportant project, but it is not what Marx's theory of fetishism is about.

[12] Marx's theory of money is, at least to me, one of the most difficult aspects of the LTV. Money is, like the other elements in the value system, an embodied and reified social relation, not a thing. But Marx's is not a theory of money as a medium of payment, a mere social convention. Money incorporates value in as real a sense as does the commodity, but abstracted from any particular use-value, it becomes a universal claim on social wealth. Marx appears to hold that the simple forms of money must reflect and be tied to the value of a money commodity such as gold. Money as capital, however, may have more esoteric forms. Credit money, for instance being a claim on social wealth not yet produced, has a precarious existence in comparison to commodity money. Furthermore, money must be understood as money of different sorts, measure of value, means of payment, credit money, money capital, etc.. Each of these forms has its own characteristics and consequences within the value system. Here I must, unfortunately repeat what Harvey rightly describes as the "distressing... way in which general works on Marx... shunt the problem of money to one side" (1982, 10, n7).

[13] There is an apparant 'catch 22' here: if capital and wage labour are preconditions of each other's existence, how then does either come into existence? Marx addressed this in his section on "Primitive Accumulation" in Capital (CI, part viii). Primitive accumulation Marx observes is capitalism's 'original sin': by violence, theft, and naked power the mass of the population, on the one hand, is forcibly separated from the means of production, dispossessed of its traditional rights and so reduced to the status of 'free labour' while a minority, on the other hand, gathers to itself the pre-existing social wealth which may then become an original stock of capital to employ these labourers.

[14] The determination of the value of labour power is no simple matter. Marx, as Harvey points out, was not a subsistence wage theorist (1982, 49). What is required to reproduce labour power is not some permanent material given but a historical product of culture and politics. What is accounted sufficient to reproduce a worker will therefore differ according to the cultural expectations of the time and place, and according to what the worker can 'effectively demand' [sic]. Refrigerators are required for the reproduction of labour power in Canada today, they are not in Calcutta and were not in Canada a century ago. Today the several hours of leisure allowed by a working day of eight hours is required for the reproduction of labour power, it was not a century ago when the working day may have been ten or twelve hours (or, for that matter in Korea, where it still is).

If capitalism is to reproduce itself over the long term the value of labour power must cover not only the sustenance of the individual worker, but the reproduction of new generations of workers. In Marx's day capitalism was only just emerging from an era in which it so chronically flouted this necessity that its normal operation was virtually genocidal. Once instituted such rapine became a competitive necessity that only state action, which changed the conditions of competition for all capitals, could bring to an end.

[15] Curiously, I have not seen this commented on by any other interpreters of Marx. This subtitle I take from the Progress Books edition of the Moore/Aveling translation. The original German subtitle, Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals, also conveys this double sense (see the facsimile of the original 1867 title page on page i of the International Publishers edition, 1967). However, the Title page of the International Publishers edition (from the same Moore/Aveling translation) gives the subtitle as "The

Process of Capitalist Production", and the new Penguin/New Left Review, Vintage edition, translated by Ben Fowkes, retains "The Process of Production of Capital" but removes it from the title page to the table of contents.

[16] Just ahead of the first statement quoted MacGregor remarks that "changes in society may be traced in the last instance only to the rational activity of individual human beings" (CIHM, 176). If this were true it would certainly add support to his first assessment of the capitalist's activity. But surely it is not true? Has nature no impact whatsoever on human society? And is all human activity rational? May rational acts not have unintended irrational consequences?

[17] See note 4, above. In a recent seminar given at the University of Manitoba Anwar Shaikh, observed that new non-linear mathematical techniques appear to allow econometric modelling, impossible with older techniques, that supports Marx's theory. He drew attention in particular to the recently developed 'chaos' theory for modelling complex and discontinuous systems.

[18] There is a section in the Grundrisse where Marx speculates upon the eventual demise of capitalism through the extension of this process. In this scenario (which I call 'science-fiction Marxism') capitalism's progressive diminution of living labour from the production process in search of competitive advantage eventually expels all living labour. But then, since value is the product of living labour only, the value of all goods will be reduced to nothing, there will be no value for capitalist's to appropriate and communism will arrive by capitalism's self-negation without any revoltion required (G, 700ff). This idea has influenced the 'social-capital' school of Marxist theory (cf. Tronti, 1980). The scenario illustrates the self-imposed reductio ad absurdum of capital, but forgets that capital's equally powerful urge to discover new sectors for investment leads it to constantly invent new forms of labour.

[19] This innovative ferment may be checked in a number of ways, by patent laws, state organization of scientific and technical research, by monopolization and even by workers' struggles against introduction of new technologies (Harvey, 1982, 117, 122f). However, any comprehensive conscious oversight of it would represent a massive shift away from market towards planned direct socialization of labour and become a threat to capital accumulation. Managing technological change does not in any case overcome its

basic contradiction for capitalism (discussed below), it can merely ameliorate the contingency such change causes to particular capitals.

[20] Here we come to the murky waters of the 'transformation problem', one of the longest running and most byzantine of all disputes in Marxist theory (cf. Foley, DMT, 391-3). I have no desire whatsoever to enter this swamp. However political economy may analytically present the shift from profit in surplus value terms to prices of production it is clear that something of this sort is accomplished, in reality, by the capital markets.

[21] The hegemony of the commodity form has lately conquered new ground in the world of the arts. Modernism in the arts has been characterized by its equivocal attitude to capitalist modernization. The recurring urge to épater les bourgeois has been in part a resistance to the commodification of the aesthetic object, an effort that has been expressed in art forms that will not -- or cannot -- be accepted as commodities (the artist, it must be said, has usually lost the battle, either by succumbing to the blandishments of money, or because the bourgeoisie have shown a willingness to accept even objets trouve as media for speculation). However, one of the characteristics of contemporary 'post-modern' art, as Fredric Jameson argues, is that it seems to revel in integrating aesthetic production with commodity production (1984).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations employed in citations:

CI (IIorIII)	<u>Capital</u> - Marx (Progress edition)
CGP	<u>Critique of the Gotha Program</u> - Marx
CPE	<u>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</u> - Marx
CIHM	<u>The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx</u> - Macgregor
CW (& vol no.)	<u>Collected Works</u> - Marx & Engels
DMT *	<u>A Dictionary of Marxist Thought</u> - Bottomore
EPM	<u>The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844</u> - Marx
G	<u>Grundrisse</u> - Marx
GI	<u>The German Ideology</u> - Marx & Engels
KI (IIorIII)	<u>Capital</u> - Marx (Vintage/Penguin-NLR edition)
MER	<u>The Marx-Engels Reader</u> - Tucker, ed.
PR	<u>Philosophy of Right</u> - Hegel

* While the authors of individual essays in DMT have been cited in the text, there are not individual entries under their names in this bibliography.

Abercrombie, Nicholas, Hill, Stephen & Turner, Brian, S. (1984). The penguin dictionary of sociology. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

_____. (1986). Sovereign individuals of capitalism. London: Allen & Unwin

Adorno, Theodor. (1973). Negative dialectics. New York: Seabury.

Aganbegyan, Abel. (1988). New directions in Soviet economics, New Left Review, 169, 89-96.

Agger, Ben. (1985). [Review of The communist ideal in Hegel and Marx]. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 22(4), 610-612.

Althusser, Louis. (1971). Lenin and philosophy and other essays. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Anderson, Perry. (1974a). Passages from antiquity to feudalism. London: New Left Books.

- _____. (1974b) Lineages of the absolutist state. London: New Left Books.
- _____. (1976). Considerations on western marxism. London: Verso.
- _____. (1983). In the tracks of historical materialism. London: Verso.
- Arendt, Hannah. (1958). The human condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Aronowitz, Stanley. (1981). The crisis in historical materialism. New York: Praeger.
- _____. (1986). Theory and socialist strategy. Social Text, 16, 1-16.
- Arthur, Chris. (1983). Hegel's master/slave dialectic and the myth of marxology. New Left Review, 142, 67-75.
- _____. (1985). Personality and the dialectic of labour and property -- Locke, Hegel, Marx. In R. Edgley & R. Osborne (Eds.), Radical philosophy reader (pp. 43-68). London: Verso.
- Avineri, Shlomo. (1968). The social and political theory of Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. (1972). Hegel's theory of the modern state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bahro, Rudolf. (1978). The alternative in eastern europe. London: New Left Books.
- Bhaskar, Roy. (1986). Scientific realism and human emancipation. London: Verso.
- Bihari, Peter. (1985). Hungary: Towards a socialist market economy? Studies in Political Economy, 18, 13-37.
- Black, Anthony. (1984). Guilds and civil society in european political thought from the twelfth century to the present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bloch, Marc. (1961). Feudal society, (vol. 1). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bottomore, Tom, et al, (Eds.). (1983). A dictionary of marxist thought. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Bradby, Barbara. (1982). The remystification of value".

- Capital & Class, 17, 114-133.
- Brenner, Robert. (1977). The origins of capitalist development: a critique of neo-Smithian marxism. New Left Review, 104, 25-93.
- Brus, Wlodzimierz. (1985). Socialism feasible and viable. New Left Review, 153, 24-62.
- Carling, Alan. (1986). Rational choice marxism. New Left Review, 160, 24-62.
- Carver, Terrell. (1981). Engels. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Clarke, Simon. (1982). Marx, marginalism and modern sociology. London: MacMillan.
- Cohen, G. A. (1978). Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, Jean L. (1982). Class and civil society. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Cohen, Sheila. (1987). A labour process to nowhere?. New Left Review, 165, 34-51.
- Colletti, Lucio. (1973). Marxism and Hegel. London: New Left Books.
- _____. (1974). From Rousseau to Lenin. New York: Monthly Review.
- Corrigan, Philip & Sayer, Derek. (1985). The great arch. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Cristi, F.R. (1978). Hegel on possession and property. Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 2(3), 111-124.
- de Vroey, Michel. (1982). On the obsolescence of the marxian theory of value: A critical review. Capital & Class, 17, 34-59.
- Deutscher, Isaac. (1965). The prophet armed. New York: Vintage.
- Dickey, Laurence. (1987). Hegel: Religion, economics and the politics of spirit, 1770-1807. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Draper, Hal. (1977). Karl Marx's theory of revolution: State and revolution (vol. I). New York: Monthly Review.

- Drewnowski, Jan. (1963). A dual preference system. In Wayne A. Leeman (Ed.), Capitalism, market socialism and central planning (pp. 28-45). New York: Mifflin.
- Eisenstein, Zillah R. (1979). Capitalist patriarchy and the case for socialist feminism. New York: Monthly Review
- Eliot, Gregory. (1986). The odyssey of Paul Hirst. New Left Review, 159, 81-105.
- Ellerman, David. (1973). Capitalism and workers' self-Management. In Gerry, Hunnius, G. David, Garson, & John, Case (Eds.), Workers' control (pp.3-21). New York: Vintage.
- Elster, Jon. (1985). Making sense of Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Engels, Frederick. (1939). Anti-Duhring. New York: International.
- _____. (1972). The origin of the family, private property and the state. New York: International.
- Forster, Michael. (1980). Marx on the communist state: A partial eclipse of political reality. Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory. 4(1), 103-118.
- Frisby, David & Sayer, Derek. (1986). Society. Chichester & London: Ellis Horwood & Tavistock.
- Gamberg, Herb. (1985). [Review of The communist ideal in Hegel and Marx]. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 10, 359-361.
- Geras, Norman. (1987). Post-marxism?. New Left Review, 163, 40-82.
- _____. (1988). Ex-Marxism without substance. New Left Review. 169, 34-61.
- Gordon, David, M. (1976). Capitalist efficiency and socialist efficiency. In Harry Braverman (Commentator), Technology, the labor process and the working class (pp.19-39). New York: Monthly Review.
- Gorz, Andre. (1982). Farewell to the working class. Boston: South End Press.
- Gouldner, Alvin. (1980). The two marxisms. New York: Seabury.
- Gramsci, Antonio. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks. New York: International.

- Habermas, Jurgen. (1985). A philosophico - Political profile. New Left Review, 151, 75-105.
- Hamerow, Theodore, S. (1966). Restoration, revolution, reaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hampson, Norman. (1968). The enlightenment, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hardach, Gerd, Karras, Dieter & Fine, Ben. (1978). A short history of socialist economic thought. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Harvey, David. (1982). The limits to capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- _____. (1984). The logic of commodity circuits. The Philosophical Forum, XV(3), 280-322.
- _____. (1987, May). More on the limits to capital. Monthly Review, 54-59.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1949). The phenomenology of mind. London: Allen & Unwin.
- _____. (1952). The philosophy of right. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heilbroner, Robert. (1987). Economists at high noon. The New York Review of Books, XXXIV(17), 44-46.
- Held, David. (1980). Introduction to critical theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Held, David & Keane, John. (1984). In a fit state. New Socialist, 16, 36-39.
- Hill, Christopher. (1969). The pelican economic history of Britain: Reformation to industrial revolution (Vol. 2). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hilton, Rodney. (Ed.). (1976). The transition from feudalism to capitalism. London: New Left.
- Hodgson, Geoff. (1984). The democratic economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hohendahl, Peter. (1979). Critical theory, public sphere and culture: Jurgen Habermas and his critics. New German Critique, 16, 89-118.
- Isaacs, Jeffrey. (1987). Was John Locke a bourgeois theorist? A critical appraisal of Macpherson and Tully.

- Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 11(3), 107-129.
- Jameson, Fredric. (1984). Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism. New Left Review, 156, 53-93.
- Jay, Martin. (1984). Marxism and totality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jessop, Bob. (1982). The Capitalist State, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Johnson, Carol. (1980). The problem of reformism and Marx's theory of fetishism. New Left Review, 119, 70-96.
- Keane, John. (1978). The legacy of political economy: Thinking with and against Claus Offe. Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory. 2(3), 49-92.
- _____. (1982). Elements of a radical theory of public life: From Tonnies to Habermas and beyond", Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, VI(3), 11-49.
- _____. (1984). Introduction to Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- _____. (1988a). Democracy and civil society. London: Verso.
- _____. (Ed.). (1988b). Civil society and the state. London: Verso.
- Kernohan, Andrew. (1987). Democratic socialism and private property. Studies in Political Economy, 22, 145-165.
- Kieve, Ronald A. (1986). From necessary illusion to rational choice? A critique of Neo-Marxist rational choice theory. Theory & Society, 15, 557-582.
- Kortian, Garbis. (1984) Subjectivity and civil society. In Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.), The state and civil society (pp. 197-210). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laclau, Ernesto, & Mouffe, Chantal. (1984). Hegemony and socialist strategy. London: Verso.
- _____. (1987). Post-Marxism without apologies. New Left Review, 166, 79-106.
- Lamontagne, Maurice. (1984). Business cycles in Canada. Toronto: Lorimer.

- Landes, David S. (1969). The unbound prometheus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lange, O. (1972). On the economic theory of socialism. In Alec Nove & D. M. Nuti (Eds.), Socialist economics (pp.92-110). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Lasch, Christopher. (1984). The minimal self. New York: Norton.
- Lasky, Melvin J. (1976). Utopia and revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lebowitz, Michael A. (1983, March). One sided marxism. Paper presented at the Marx Centenary Conference, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg.
- Leeman, Wayne. (Ed.). (1963). Capitalism, market socialism and central planning. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Leiss, William. (1976). The limits to satisfaction. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Levine, Andrew. (1987). The end of the state. London: Verso.
- Levine, Andrew, Sober, Elliot, & Olin Wright, Eric. (1987). Marxism and methodological individualism. New Left Review, 162, 67-84.
- Lew, Roland. (1986). A feasible socialism? The Socialist Register 1985-86, London: Merlin, 414-435.
- Lichtman, Richard. (1970). An outline of marxism. Toronto: Forum House.
- Lipietz, Alain. (1985). The enchanted world. London: Verso.
- Loewenstein, Julius I. (1980). Marx against marxism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Lukacs, Georg. (1971). History and class consciousness. London: Merlin.
- _____. (1975). The young Hegel. London: Merlin.
- Lukes, Steven. (1987). Marxism and morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MacGregor, David. (1984). The communist ideal in Hegel and Marx, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- _____. (1986). Response to Ben Agger's review of The communist ideal in Hegel and Marx, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 23(1), 148-149.

- MacPherson, C. B. (1962). The political theory of possessive individualism. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- _____. (1975). Liberalism and the political theory of property. In Alkis Kontos (Ed.), Domination (pp.89-100). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- _____. (1985). The Rise and fall of economic justice and other essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mandel, Ernest. (1968). Marxist economic theory. London: Merlin.
- _____. (1986). In defence of socialist planning. New Left Review, 159, 5-38.
- _____. (1988). The myth of market socialism, New Left Review, 169, 108-121.
- Mandel, Ernest & Freeman, Alan. (Eds.). (1984). Ricardo, Marx, Sraffa. London: Verso.
- Marcuse, Herbert. (1960). Reason and revolution. Boston: Beacon Press.
- _____. (1964). One-Dimensional man. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marx, Karl. (1954). Capital, (Vol. 1). Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1956). Capital, (Vol. 2). Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1959). Capital, (Vol. 3). Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1964). The economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. New York: International.
- _____. (1967). Capital, (Vol. 1). New York: International.
- _____. (1970). A contribution to the critique of political economy. New York: International.
- _____. (1971). Critique of the Gotha program. Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1973). Grundrisse. New York: Vintage.
- _____. (1974). The First International and after. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- _____. (1977). Capital. (vol. 1). New York: Vintage.

- _____. (1978). The poverty of philosophy. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.
- _____. (1981). Capital. (Vol. 2). New York: Vintage.
- _____. (1981). Capital. (Vol. 3). New York: Vintage.
- Marx, Karl & Engels, Frederick. (1970). The German ideology. (parts). New York: International.
- _____. (1975). Selected correspondence. (3rd ed.). Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1975). Collected works. (Vol. 3). New York: International.
- _____. (1975). Collected works. (Vol. 4). Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1976). Collected works. (Vol. 5). Moscow: Progress.
- _____. (1976). Collected works. (Vol. 6). New York: International.
- Miliband, Ralph. (1977). Marxism and politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. (1985). The new revisionism in Britain. New Left Review, 150, 5-28.
- Murray, Robin. (1987). Ownership, control and the market. New Left Review, 164, 87-112.
- Naples, Michelle, I. (1988). Is a uniform profit rate possible? Science and Society, 52(1), 83-93.
- Nove, Alec. (1983). The economics of feasible socialism. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- _____. (1987). Markets and socialism. New Left Review, 161, 98-104.
- Ollman, Bertell. (1978). Social and sexual revolution. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Ollman, Bertell, & Vernoff, Edward. (Eds.). (1982). The left academy. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Panitch, Leo. (1986). The impasse of social democratic politics. The Socialist Register 1985-86, London: Merlin, 50-97.
- Pelczynski, Z. A., (Ed.). (1984a). The state and civil

- society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. (1984b). Introduction: The significance of Hegel's separation of the state and civil society. In Z. A. Pelczynski (Ed.), The state and civil society (pp. 1-13). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. (1984c) Political community and individual freedom in Hegel's philosophy of state. In Z. A. Pelczynski (Ed.), The state and civil society (pp55-76). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Plant, Raymond. (1977). Hegel and political economy. New Left Review, 103, 104, 79-93, 105-113.
- _____. (1984). Hegel on identity and legitimation. In Z. A. Pelczynski (Ed.), The state and civil society (pp. 227-243). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Plumb, J. H. (1950). England in the eighteenth century. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Reeve, Andrew. (1986). Property. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.
- Reidel, Manfred. (1984). Between tradition and revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ritter, Joachim. (1982). Hegel and the French revolution. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
- Roemer, John. (1982). A general theory of exploitation and class. Cambridge, Mass.
- _____. (1986). Rational choice Marxism: Some issues of method and substance. In John Roemer (Ed.), Analytical Marxism (pp.191-201). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roll, Eric. (1973). A history of economic thought. London: Faber and Faber.
- Rosdolsky, Roman. (1977). The making of Marx's 'Capital'. London: Pluto.
- Rubin, I.I. (1973). Essays on Marx's labour theory of value. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Sabine, George. (1951). A history of political theory. London: Harrap.
- Samuel, Raphael. (1985). The vision splendid. New Socialist,

27, 24-28.

_____. (1986). The cult of planning. New Socialist, 34, 35-29.

Sargent, Lydia. (1981). Women and revolution. Boston: South End Press.

Sayles, G. O. (1950). The mediieval foundations of England. London: Methuen.

Schroyer, Trent. (1973). The critique of domination. Boston: Beacon Press.

Shaikh, Anwar. (1978). An introduction to the history of crisis theories. In Crisis Reader Editorial Collective (Eds.), U.S. capitalism in crisis (pp.219-241). New York: Union for Radical Political Economics.

_____. (1987). The falling rate of profit and the economic crisis in the U.S. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Shanin, Teodor. (1988). Introduction to Aganbegyan. New Left Review, 169, 85-88.

Smith, Anthony. (1987). [Review of The communist ideal in Hegel and Marx]. Science and Society, L(4), 485-8.

Sohn-Rethel, Alfred. (1976). The dual economics of transition. In Conference for Socialist Economists (Eds.). The labour process and class strategies (pp.26-45). Andover, Hants: Chapel River Press.

_____. (1978). Intellectual and manual labour. London: MacMillan Press.

Starr, S. Frederick. (1988). Soviet Union: A civil society. Foreign Policy, 70, 26-41.

Steedman, Ian. (1977). Marx after Sraffa. London: Verso.

Steedman, Ian, et al. (1981). The value controversy. London: Verso.

Taylor, Charles. (1975). Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, E. P. (1968). The making of the English working class, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Timpanaro, Sebastiano. (1975). On materialism. London: Verso.

- Tronti, Mario. (1980). The strategy of refusal. Semiotext(e), 111(3), 28-35.
- Tucker, Robert C. (1978). The Marx-Engels reader. (2nd ed.). New York: Norton.
- Urry, John. (1981). The anatomy of capitalist societies. London: MacMillan.
- Vajda, Mihaly. (1981). The state and socialism. London: Allison & Busby.
- van der Veen, Robert J. & van Parijs, Phillipe. (1986). A capitalist road to communism. Theory and Society, 15(5), 635-656.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1988). The bourgeois(ie) as concept and reality. New Left Review, 167, 91-123.
- Weeks, John. (1981). Capital and exploitation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Weisskopf, Thomas, E. (1978). Marxist perspectives on cyclical crises. In Crisis Reader Editorial Collective (Eds.), U.S. capitalism in crisis (pp.241-260). New York: Union for Radical Political Economics.
- Williams, Raymond. (1977). Marxism and literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. (1980). Problems in materialism and culture. London: Verson.
- _____. (1983a). Keywords (2nd ed.). London: Fontana.
- _____. (1983b.) The year 2000. New York: Pantheon.
- Winfield, Richard, Dien. (1980). The social determination of the labor process from Hegel to Marx. The Philosophical Forum, XI(3), 250-272.
- Wohlforth, Tim. (1981). Transition to the transition. New Left Review. 130, 67-82.
- Wood, Ellen, Meiksins. (1986). The retreat from class. London: Verso.
- _____. (1988). Capitalism and human emancipation. New Left Review, 167, 1-21.
- Wright, Eric Olin. (1979). Class, crisis and the state. London: Verso.
- Zaslavsky, Victor. (1987-88). Three years of Perestroika. Telos, 74, 31-41.