

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

THE PRESENCE OF ARCHITECTURE:

an investigation into the man-object/world relationship

by

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES


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## PREFACE

This study is more of a discovery than it is new. As one who interprets and envisions, the architect faces the almost insurmountable task and responsibility of structuring the environment of man according to the 'condition' of man.

The study is a discovery because it brings us directly into contact with the primal question of the man-object/world relationship. It is a question that concerns itself with the origin, the beginning of things.

Architecture offers something to man. It is the duty of the architect to have his work speak of this something in the physical manifestations. Therefore the search for what this something is begins.

If the study begins by asking the question "What is architecture?", it soon focuses separately on the nature of man and the object. By talking about man and the object, we soon realize that they merge and intertwine. Our being in the world is of this intertwining substance. The creative act is of this substance.

The study begins to recognize that it is the nature of man to tend toward things in his act. Events are concretions of these acts. We participate in them and they in us.

But can we describe this unique event in man's life? If we can we are beginning to understand what this event in man's life is, then perhaps we can also understand what architecture is.

If there is one word that bears the meaning of architecture as something, as embodying the intertwining man and object relation, it clearly is Presence. For in presence there appear both the visible as the visual and concrete, and the invisible as that which has as its source, Logos itself.

Architecture is man manifesting himself; it is life. Architecture is presence; it is Logos. In short: Architecture as presence is reality transformed into meaning, it is man seeing himself from the outside. And this is what this study is trying to understand.

The thesis has some necessary acknowledgements to make which helped to achieve this end.

I am grateful to C.M.H.C. for the two years of fellowships I received, and to the Faculty of Architecture for recommending me. The thesis could not have been realized at this time had it not been for the fellowships.

I am grateful to Professor Lye and to Professor Jacques Collin (the chief advisor on the thesis) of the Architecture Department at the University of Manitoba for their patience throughout the year in the development of such an enigmatic subject matter as the man-object/world relationship. I am

also grateful to Professor Farrell Fleming of the Philosophy Department at the University of Manitoba for the time he has given me in hours of discussion on the issues dealt with in the thesis, and also for his sympathetic and understanding approach to the thesis itself when at times the whole attempt seemed futile.

I am especially grateful to Dr. Ron Bruzina, who teaches phenomenology at the University of Kentucky, for the few precious hours he could give me in relation to the thesis while on vacation in Winnipeg, at the beginning when the question was emerging and toward the end when its structure had been developed. I appreciated his insight and encouragement very much indeed.

Along with these appreciations I must also express my indebtedness to the works and writings of Frank Lloyd Wright, which have inspired me deeply and have generated in me a great enthusiasm for architecture. I must also express my appreciation for the philosophical writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Tillich. Both have been deeply concerned with 'reality' itself, as best as it can be understood in life. Both have said things which I as an architect identify very much with.

Finally, I am grateful to my family for sacrificing time and enduring many inconveniences, for sticking with it and for the encouragement and hours of help they gave me.

H. G. F.

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SECTION 1

## INTRODUCTION

Architecture presupposes man. Without the presence of man there is no architecture; without the presence of architecture there is no man. Self-presence in the world is a modality of a particular kind. In one and through the other rests the concept of presence. This paradox we wish to focus on in this study.

In the normal sense, architecture is thought of as a building. As a building it can be various things: a function, a utility, an environmental shelter, etc. In this sense, a building is a thing. The misconception of architecture as building begins the moment one declares that its primary value is to be an environmental shelter from the physical forces.<sup>1\*</sup> The misconception is further exaggerated out of true proportions when an architect thinks, as is quite common within the profession, that man can in fact live without the object and that if one gives man the object it is in the sense of romanticism an "enrichment," which is necessary in the sense of the excessive. Such misconceptions are naive and can only create further mistrust in the sphere of architecture--it is not synonymous with building. The role of architecture in man's world has been tarnished ever since he could not

understand his own objectified world, when it cared little how it related to man in return. Therefore, what architecture appears to be to people can range from a mere thing, a commodity, i.e., a house that one can buy as one could buy any item, to a style, a sculpture, a monument. In either case architecture has some arbitrary reality as a thing, as a word might have in Websters Dictionary. In this sense it has very little or no affinity with man.

The world of objects has succumbed to their own makers. Empirical reality, i.e., man confronted by a world of objects, has veiled the truth and validity of man's presence. Therefore, man has had to ask himself more in this century than in any previous age, "What is man?" We feel the absence of man as much more real than his presence.

As the world becomes more complex, the more gadgetry confronts man, the more the world hands us objects to amuse us, to keep us quiet and content for a moment longer as we do with babies to hush them up, the quicker man forgets who he was; and in his progress digresses into a despairing shell of nothingness.

Architects hope to avoid this disaster by their inexplicable intuitions--what intuitions? The architect cannot describe his thought, has no idea that could not be replaced, which stands firm and true to life. Architecture hopes to answer all undefinable questions of need and misgivings by some undescribable good feeling. And so


through these contradictions the architect lingers on in his busyness. He only sees the final object. In between are these undefined, undescribable, inexplicable intuitions. These architects are not the only ones to blame. There are those who would, through their methods, programs, and systems, rebuild the world, a world that would finally be founded on epistemological truth. Some critics would include the intellectual, who in tones of criticisms, would name those as Cartesians who build in their minds and not in the world. We cannot agree on what architecture is; there is a dichotomy between the conscious-unconscious creating self; the task of architecture is not clear.

Man has been conditioned to be misled. Unless man is keen and conscious of the fact, knowledge is that conditioned structure which can mislead him. For no other reason did Aldous Huxley once say, "if we want to understand we must uproot ourselves from our culture, by-pass language, get rid of emotionally charged memories, hate our fathers and mothers, subtract and subtract from our stock of notions."<sup>2</sup> For this reason phenomenology has devoted itself to the task of describing the "life-world" of man; his pre-predicate moment of life before all the methodologies, systems and personal or impersonal views creating barriers to man's mind and being.

And so the architect seems destined to doubt the premises and indexes upon which he thrives. Recent works

in architectural theory have questioned the intentions of architecture, its relationship to society. For example, semiology<sup>3</sup> is basically concerned with architecture as a language where there is a kind of "information flow" between the building and man; or the attempt to give a taxonomy on the kinds of meanings architecture has for us.<sup>4</sup> Central to these attempts is how man and architecture are engaged like gears or divorced. But the architect's responsibility is more and deeper. The validity of architecture goes beyond the commonsense structure of society; it deals with the nature of life. And this means more than the commonsense life; it means 'living' itself. If there are any intrinsic rules which architecture must obey or abuse, they are of another sort. The creative act always begins at the beginning. But this beginning is enigmatic.

Architecture presupposes man. And man presupposes life. But life is founded on meaning, a meaning that has remained to a large extent unintelligible. However, the paradox that winks at man is that what he is, is reflected in what he does. It is man's true nature to objectify himself, because he continually strives towards fulfillment, towards that which he is not.




Man operates within the throws of nonbeing-being. Therefore, if architecture presupposes man, the question "What is man?" is paramount, and man comes to understand himself as he learns to know what it means to be situated.

When we refer to man as being, as we already have, we have created distance from man, an objectified distance, like a reflected image of man in a mirror. There is no being unless man is able to see objects that present to man his being.

Therefore we have a world in which man is a conscious being. The world here is not meant in the empirical sense of a planet or globe or our environment where we move in and among things. We mean a world of open horizon of perceptual (or experienced) possibilities. This is a meaningful world of objects which are to man as his being is to him.


Architecture presupposes man; man presupposes life; life presupposes man as being; and being presupposes a world of perceptual or experiencable objects. That is to say, man as being is the vortex of architecture. Now the diagram can

be changed, not altered, to look like this.




This relationship of course is a world relationship of meaning. It could not be otherwise.

We began our introduction by saying that "in one and through the other" did the concept of presence rest. We are now prepared to show furthermore, that the new understanding we have of what constitutes a world for us could be the domain of architecture. Then our diagram would look like this: architecture synonymous with the world of meaning.



But if architecture is understood as world of meaning, the perceived open horizon of our experience essential to man as being, then we can furthermore diagram our relationship in this manner.



Presence is one's situation of reality where reality has been transformed into an infrastructure of meaning. It is a relationship in which man is present to himself through an objectified distance.

Now we have that unique relationship which shall take up all our effort in this study: the man-to-object relationship in the world of architecture which is a self-presence. In the sphere or moment of self-presence is the answer to the ambiguous question "What is man?" What man is cannot be established by setting him in isolation. What he is can only be learnt from his relationship to an objectified world presence.

The architect is essentially concerned with this one thing: the self-presence of man. And his architecture must serve that end. Presence presupposes both man and object.

Therefore the thesis is entitled: THE PRESENCE OF ARCHITECTURE: an investigation into the man-object/world relationship.

We have given a synoptic preview of what the thesis

sets out to investigate. However, before we can move directly into that investigation, we wish to show that this study came directly out of a laboratory experience in its various stratas, and also out of a limited understanding of architectural thought itself as we have record of it, particularly the period covering the 20th-century, where perhaps more than in any other period the man-object/world question has had a particular concentration in all the great personalities of architecture. Then we wish to describe the "program of research" itself as a matrix (which in latin means womb) which provides the form that will, it is confidently felt, enable one to tackle the question more coherently and consistently.

## LABORATORY

The need to investigate the man-object/world relationship has a definite source. If this were not so, the question would not exist. The question would have no meaning and the whole investigation would be a superficial exercise.

If there is one word that points to the source for the need for such an investigation it clearly is anonymity. Kierkegaard once wrote that "Nowadays one can talk with anyone, and it must be admitted that people's opinions are exceedingly sensible, yet the conversation leaves one with the impression of having talked to an anonymity."<sup>5</sup>

It is my contention that the kind of emptiness Kierkegaard is talking about prevails in the field of architecture. The source of our emptiness has been clearly focused on by B. W. Morgan when he writes in The Human Predicament that "we are far more concerned to 'get things done' than to think, even about what to do."<sup>6</sup> We agree with Morgan that through a shallow kind of busyness one loses all sense of life as wholeness. Anonymity is in direct opposition to all dreams of wholeness.

The business of architecture is an activity that cannot proceed without a clear understanding of its

terminology, its function of design, its architectural history, and its vital need of criticism. And yet these aspects, and others one might wish to add such as technology etc.,<sup>7\*</sup> are empty in themselves and cannot genuinely contribute towards a meaningful architecture as they revolve around an unknown centre. In themselves they represent a kind of active busyness, ignoring entirely the fundamental characteristic of life which is wholeness. Without a sense of wholeness in one's life, in his attitude towards the world, towards architecture, man remains within the grip of anonymity. He is enslaved; he is without freedom.


The dominion of anonymity over the whole of architecture as we encounter it in schools, in professional offices, is the chief source for the need to once again raise the issue of the man-object/world relationship. The purpose here is to describe briefly the kind of anonymity one encounters in his laboratory experiences. It is not too difficult finding evidence substantiating the claims being made here. However, as we point out the weakness in each, it is with the intention of pointing to a vacuous centre which must be investigated if any genuine meaning is at all to dominate architecture.

### Terminology

The problem with terminology is two-fold. In the first place, we see in the field of architecture an

infiltration of influences from other disciplines; in the second place, we recognize definite problems within the field of architecture itself.

1. There is a definite infiltration of influences from other disciplines, especially from the social sciences. We can easily diagram what is happening.




The relationship of man to architecture is drifting further apart. We presume that other bodies of knowledge will help clarify that relationship. The dangers are exceedingly acute. And the consequences can lead to a further rupture of the man-architecture identity.

Emilio Ambasz<sup>8</sup> thinks it is essential in any future design course to proceed by way of "structural models" based on all bodies of knowledge necessary to solve a problem. Synthesis will not be really relevant in the future unless there is a more meaningful and a more intensive interaction between the aspirations (of all the models) and synthesis. If the design is referred to, and with reason, as still the configurational maker, there is no guarantee that a more comprehensive design program will prevent the designer from degrading himself to the status

of a manipulator. In the end, the transformation between the aspirations or design program and synthesis, back and forth for greater parity between the two poles, the architect still remains the philosopher who must interpret meaning as some intentional relationship between program and design.

Therefore the role of other disciplines within architecture is on thin ice. We must agree with Reyner Banham that if there is any theory of architecture today, it is a "bag-carrier" in which disciplines are stuffed. "The reason why in the end, the question of theory is felt to be vacuous, is because of the absence of those particular reasons, which cause buildings to be created and cause buildings to be the precise way they are. Architects are committed to pragmatic positions."<sup>9</sup> Instead of separating the man-architectural world by inserting the other disciplines and creating a greater rupture, we must rather see these disciplines circumscribing that relationship.<sup>10\*</sup> It would be more accurate to diagram the relationship in this manner:



The knowledge of man must emerge and become reality, but by

what methods. It is the architects job to search for this reality which necessarily implies a knowledge of the relationship itself.

2. The other problem is perhaps more closely related to terminology itself. However, the infiltration of other systems have encouraged and caused this other problem relating to terminology which is now to be discussed.

The architect not only uses words to clarify his particular problem, but words have their way of influencing the nature of the problem itself. Such terms as intuition, imagination, perception, intention, subjective, objective, form, design, etc., bring with themselves their own meanings with which the architects understand the problem. We use words to clarify the problems to ourselves; we use words in our experiences.

For example, if we take the word "intention" and use it the way an architect would in his normal everyday context, he would perhaps say, referring to the solution, "My intention was this and that . . ." This kind of an expression only indicates the deliberateness and forcefulness of the architect solving the problem. On the contrary, "intention" should mean for the architect some relationship that the particular object designed has with man. As long as the architect uses the word in the former sense, it will be mistaken for expediency, indeed, arrogance.

Because an architect has informally learnt that

"intuition" is irrational or subjective, it must therefore be avoided. In response to this reaction he will deliberately try to be "objective," i.e., as a scientist would be. He does not realize that it is in fact through the intuitive act that he does grasp the significance of something. The designer cannot help but be dominated by misconceptions about words he uses to clarify the problem for himself. He is not master of the circumstances and the circumstances themselves control him instead. The composition of man is his language.

The evolution of a design begins within the spoken language, speech, of implicit structure into an explicit grammar<sup>11</sup> (referring to architecture as being itself a language). In another section<sup>12\*</sup> we will refer to speech as already being thought and not a representation of thought. Words are realities--"to see a certain object by the word."<sup>13</sup> We are not simply inserting this word-object reality into the architect's method. We are suggesting that this reality is fundamental to his method. But if words are used without the meaning they imply, then emptiness will breed further emptiness in the work of the architect.

If we criticize the present state of terminology in relationship to architecture, it is because we are really asking how reality is conceived in the first place. It is essential for the creative act to begin at a known origin

which presupposes a self-discovery. Without it our acts remain questionable, our efforts aimless and meaningless.

## Design

Design is a process by which architectural problems are solved. However the role of design within a process of solving problems remains ambiguous and perplexing.

"Student designers are still trained in pretentious 'ateliers' as configuration makers, rather than as problem 'solvers' preparing to provide a physical synthesis to the complex processes that affect man, the actor of the built environment."<sup>14</sup>

We have already referred to Ambasz's attempt to speak to the illusion surrounding design in schools and professional offices. Christopher Alexander recalls<sup>15\*</sup> that his earlier study Notes on the Synthesis of Form<sup>16</sup> was an attempt to understand more exactly the process implied by good form. He recognized that the primitive cultures were somehow able to create beautiful and unique forms whereas such unique forms were completely lacking in our present culture.<sup>17\*</sup> Today the designer faces a fast moving society where patterns never remain constant long enough for the kind of adjustments, adaptations and equilibrium that the primitive cultures achieved. "With the invention of a teachable discipline called 'architecture', the old process of making form was adulterated and its chances of success destroyed."<sup>18</sup> Alexander remains quite skeptical

about the chances of design achieving beautiful buildings.

It is worth showing how Alexander sees the complexity of a process deriving at form. A system is an ensemble which in turn is an intangible complex of both a form not yet designed and a context which cannot properly be described. The magnitude of the problem is obvious. In order to arrive at a form of "fit" we must detect all the "misfits" the context might conjure. In the unself-conscious culture the process between form and context is direct with man as the agent. In our society, the self-conscious society, the process is removed by concepts, categories and diagrams, therefore creating room for error. A way must be found to reach that direct process between form and context operating within the unselfconscious society.

The design process then indicates two things in Alexander's mind:

1. The ability to solve a problem demands that the problem be decomposed into sets and subsets of variables, intricately related misfits, into a tree-like hierarchial structure describing the nature of the problem without resorting to conceptualizing.<sup>19\*</sup>

2. Having decomposed the problem into its structural characteristics, it now remains to grasp internal patterns of each cluster which will help construct the final picture of the problem. Alexander maintains that

"every object is a hierarchy of components."<sup>20</sup> Every component has both a pattern and a unit: as a unit it has its own identity, as a pattern it helps specify an arrangement.

This very brief resumé of Alexander's process towards a form indicates several things:

1. The process he sketches helps to verify his earlier contention that problems are too complex to be disentangled because the context is so intangible, and because it may be difficult to reach a conclusiveness on misfits and unanimity over the misfits themselves.

2. No matter on what level design operates, no matter how well it is able to decompose the problem, the problem remains one of grasping. Alexander cannot avoid the heuristic leap by decomposing the problem into clusters of variables.

3. Although Alexander admits that his search for an understanding of form is rather functional, ironically enough, it could not be otherwise. The process is very objective: every attempt has been made to avoid the intuitive and the imaginative. To be sure, Alexander recognizes these weaknesses himself.

Design is not a method in itself. We solve problems through design. Design makes things. But design in-and-for-itself represents an anonymity however objective<sup>21\*</sup> or sensible it may be. It will resort to operational thinking

through such methods as "brainstorming" and "cybernetics." It will fall back on functionalism<sup>22\*</sup> when the decision-making process becomes too burdensome. It will establish rules and guidelines which, to be sure, control the design and dictate the end product. Design then manipulates; it operates arbitrarily; untrustworthily.

Design is motivated. If there is a desire to create more beautiful buildings, two things are implied:

1. that we are dissatisfied with the present condition of buildings which contribute to meaningless environments, and

2. that we have clear ideas of what "better buildings" might be which further presupposes where the source of meaning originates.

Therefore, design implies an origin as in a richer understanding of the man-object/world relationship. Man objectifying himself in the world--to understand the origin of this incredible event in man's life is our aim.

## History

We lack a historical consciousness today for reasons which we can only briefly entertain in the following discussion.

1. History as inhibition: The Modern Movement of architecture began rebelling against previous styles and architectural concepts. The trend today is still against

the traditional styles. Also, the student of architecture can feel that if he gets too much involved with historical examples his power of self-expression will be stifled. While this seems contradictory, the fear of inhibition nevertheless remains.

2. Design as inhibition of history: With less emphasis on style as such, more emphasis has been placed on design as a process shaping articulate and detailed programs. This has resulted in the discussion of architecture as functionalism. Some feel that functionalism has been the main thrust of the Modern Movement.<sup>23</sup> The emphasis is not so much on architecture as it is on design and the program. Such architectural concepts as space and form are end products of the design process itself. Hence, there is no need for history.

3. History as myth: Historians cannot agree among themselves as to the role of history in an architectural program or practise. Each historian has his own particular interpretation. Bruno Zevi is confident that design and history interact with each other like two faces of the same coin.<sup>24</sup> Sibyl Moholy-Nagy feels that the presentation of history of architectural facts from Vitruvius to Banham has been backward looking. She proposes her own concepts by which an architectural history can offer the future architect a "conceptual evidence of change in permanence."<sup>25</sup> Stephen W. Jacobs is concerned that architectural history

provide the architect with a proper 'orientation', that it become a "source of insight." "It must make clear the relation of his life and activities to those of others, both living and dead."<sup>26</sup> This sounds sensible enough but somehow still lacks that connection which architectural history has with architecture itself.

Charles Jencks, in my opinion, in his essay History as Myth<sup>27</sup> clearly indicates the difficulty with history itself. Historians present history as myth. By this he means for example, that S. Giedion mythologizes history as "space-time architecture," Bruno Zevi as "organic architecture," Vincent Scully as "Democracy," etc. This, writes Jencks, "provides him with a means to cut across the usual stylistic and ideological barriers."<sup>28</sup> This provides the historian with the unfortunate opportunity to ignore some historical facts and to emphasize others--(a kind of propaganda is encouraged even though this may appear a bit strong). While Banham himself falls into these pitfalls, Jencks regards him as perhaps the most scholarly of all historians who endeavors to connect stated intentions with the architect's design. "He is the only one to show sufficient interest for the architect's intentions to quote and discuss them at length."<sup>29</sup> The point Jencks makes is interesting and is applicable to both the historian and the architect. Architectural projects are not studied in relation to the writings by the same architect. Frank Lloyd

Wright is an example of one architect whose work we look at without reading his writings, without realizing the value the writings may have in relation to the work.

But there is another interesting point we can make about the historian in relation to architectural works themselves. Historians can be very descriptive and metaphorical as for example Scully<sup>30</sup> is in his writings. Two general feelings emerge as a result:

1. History takes on an existential description. In reference to architectural works, he refers to a great deal of literature outside the historical field itself. In relation to Le Corbusier's work, he brings in Greek mythology and Hellenistic influences. In relation to Wright's work he refers to Walt Whitman's poetic images. His historical descriptions are intertwined with Romantic-Classicism and Romantic-Naturalism fragmentations. There are all those references to periods and styles. One reference to a style, a period, the 'Hellenistic' influence, Greek mythology, etc., presupposes that the architect must come to his historical descriptions well prepared. And this is not always the case. Therefore its meaning to architects becomes questionable. We referred only to Scully, but similar references could be made to Giedion's space-time concept or indeed to Mumford's functionalistic interpretation of the modern movement of architecture and all the various meanings it implies, etc.

2. We have pointed out the hinderances history books can create for the student. However, this second implication perhaps brings us into the problem itself. Historians can only bring along with themselves their prejudices, preconceptions and interpretations.

Whenever an attempt is made to interpret history, it is personal and individualistic. The positivists would like to see history presented as fact, because the merely subjective presentations of history are personal and unreliable. There is this danger, but history presented as fact alone can only be empty and meaningless. "All history can give us is one view of the past, and different views, insofar as they are truthful, are complementary, like sketches of an object made from different angles."<sup>31</sup> For this reason we must go back over history--over and over again. To criticize one of not knowing his history is serious enough, but does one at the same time presuppose also the implications involved?

Merleau-Ponty writes, "Our contact with our age is an initiation into every age; man is a historian because he belongs to history and history is the amplification of practise."<sup>32</sup> Man is called to continue a vortex of experience which was set up at birth, at the point of contact between the "outside" and he who is called to live it.<sup>33</sup> The past and future meet in man and give rise to a search. To be cut off from an architectural history means the

amplification of an absence, a superficial architectural activity carried out in isolation. For the past and future to merge in man and give rise to a search presupposes once again a fundamental understanding of the man-object/world relationship. Understanding "discovers in its object its own origin."<sup>34</sup>

If we continue to proceed without this insight, we continue our busy activities anonymously and thereby encourage further dissatisfaction and discouragement. Jencks does not discredit the role of history or the historian: both make myth together. "If architecture is experienced morally, then at any moment in time there will be certain meanings which are dependent on sequence, on what has gone just before and what exists in the present culture."<sup>35</sup>

A final quote from Merleau-Ponty concludes this brief sketch of the problems and challenges the architect faces with history: "Knowledge is gained by putting ourselves in the position of those who have acted; it is action in the realm of imagination. But action is an anticipation of knowledge; it makes us historians of our own lives."<sup>36</sup> Only then does the architect begin to anticipate man in the realm of architecture, what he was and what he will be.

### Criticism

Finally, we come to the role of criticism in

architecture. Criticism has prompted this research for two reasons:

1. Criticism is essential in the laboratory in relation to the architectural problems one is solving. One is not solving problems so much as giving statements of the problems and through these statements understanding what it means for man to objectify himself. This must be his highest aim. When confusion prevails over such polarities as the objective versus the subjective, the intuitive versus the rational, etc., criticism is bankrupt. Within such treacherous terrain, criticism is vulnerable and vacuous. When this is the case criticism becomes half-hearted, superficial and pretentious. When opinions about the fundamentals of architecture vary with every critic, and one critic is more concerned with the technique of graphic presentation instead of the 'idea,' and another critic is more concerned with the 'logic' of concepts (and one could perhaps have followed many different independent logical concepts) which are held up in view isolated from man, then the student has one alternative left: to begin with the man-object/world relationship. In the teaching process, it is not so much for criticism to judge but to listen.

All the aspects we have discussed so far are inter-related. If one is misunderstood, the others are affected. And so the problem with criticism has to a large extent trickled down from misconceptions of other aspects:

terminology, design and history. Architecture is wholly related through the intertwining of all its stratas. By concentrating on parts alone, one loses sight of a unified and holistic understanding of architecture.

2. The second problem with criticism which has in part initiated this research is found among critics outside of the everyday laboratory situation--indeed in the world of architecture.

Alexander refers to the terrible state that architecture is in. His book is an outcome of this awareness.<sup>37</sup> Christian Norberg-Schulz talks about the visual chaos of architecture in his book Intentions in Architecture.<sup>38</sup> It is a study trying to acquire a better understanding of architecture in a society.

Then there are such vocal, perhaps even dogmatic, critics as Serge Chermayeff. He is critical of the fact that modern architecture has not produced any excellent buildings as past culture can claim. The "failure lies in the program, the 'why' of buildings, which has been overlaid by absolute cliches in a backward-looking culture."<sup>39</sup> According to him we are cowards of the worst kind.

In his most recent preface to Space, Time and Architecture, S. Giedion writes that architecture in the sixties represents a pause, a kind of exhaustion and fatigue which is normally accompanied by uncertainty. Fatigue breeds indecision, escapism and superficiality. He writes: "a

kind of playboy-architecture became en vague; an architecture treated as playboys treat life, jumping from one sensation to another and quickly bored with everything."<sup>40</sup> Such criticism is to be taken seriously; it cannot be ignored by any student of architecture and he is bound to wonder why such a variety of people think of architecture as being in such a chaos and where the real problem originates.

In contrast to this criticism there is some praise for what is happening in architecture. Banham is critical of the narrow and restricted tradition of architecture, but has praise for the new Brutalism in architecture of the late 50's and early 60's. He finds that a moral stand in architecture is possible in the sense of the new Brutalism. The moral stand in architecture has after all been the chief motivation behind the modern movement in architecture since the time of Berlage.<sup>41</sup> The ethic as opposed to the aesthetics which Banham so highly regards in Brutalism lies in its clear enunciation of its unified visual images of its parts and materials, of a clear expression of structure, of untreated materials. The sense that comes through is a truer sense of the relationship between architecture and society.<sup>42</sup>

The ethics praised by Banham is one of an unpretentious mood implied by Brutalism. In this sense, morality becomes a theme to be interrogated by the student of

architecture--the relation of morality to man. Has Giedion failed to look at architecture with Banham's eyes of morality?

It is not unwarranted that students today should face the ominous task of architecture with all kinds of apprehension. They face a need to know. They must face up to the problem of anonymity. Commitment and dedication must be found. The connection between the commitment of the one who "does" and that "what is to be done" is sincerity. Sincerity suggests an integritous relationship between the architect and his concern.

Peter Collins in his book Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture<sup>43</sup> describes the kind of Rousseauian sincerity that helped shape the modern age in architecture. He indicates five ways in which it happened.

First of all man must think of himself as playing a redemptive role in society. He sees himself as being uniquely aware of human needs. He sees himself perceiving more clearly that the "ideals" for people are through himself.

Second, he sees the need for self-consistency. The implication implied here will hopefully come through more clearly as we get into some of the other parts in this research. Here we can suggest that self-consistency implies a far-sightedness, for one to follow a path unwaveringly, to uphold a vision that the people he

associates with in most intimate ways are blind to.

Third, self-discovery was already presupposed in the second case. The self-discoveries of the pioneers came through self-education. The masters of the modern architectural movement were suspicious of schools, schools merely breeding insincerity.

In sincerity a virtue of spontaneity is reflected. Stylish methods are rejected. A pioneer such as Le Corbusier very carefully studied the styles of the past and claimed for himself any essential aspects having some relevance for architecture. By spontaneity is also meant the ignorance of rigidity of the previous schools such as the Beaus Arts which emphasized a study of detail and decorative triva.

And finally, frankness. Here sincerity can be rhetorical or indifferent: rhetorical in being serious and earnest, a desire to provoke; and indifferent, sometimes not really caring about the surrounding character of buildings, spaces, etc., which in itself could be rhetorical as well.

These aspects of sincerity perhaps show how some masterpieces in architecture came into existence, the kind of grounding that initiated them.

But we are more interested here in what Collins says in summing up in relation to sincerity: "Starting from scratch." In this lies that inexpendable motivation.

We must see through our cultural dead load--not drop it--in order to be free to act. As long as we revolve around an unknown centre we are not free to act. We are slowly absorbed by negation. Paradoxically, the very essence of life wants to create distance from that which negates it.

Words such as commitment, dedication, sincerity, understanding, freedom, . . . indeed life, presuppose an origin which no architect can effectively work without.

The human predicament man faces is wholeness, i.e., how to become whole. Wholeness is that diverse resource in man and diverse attitude directed toward a world where man and attitudes become unified, and do not exist merely side by side--the fallacy architects make today. This unified activity shapes the whole self.<sup>44</sup> By wholeness we mean man being in relationship with the world, and not merely part of it. "Without the world there are no values, no meanings, no relations; and hence no whole self: for the self exists and is unified in its commitment to things it values, in its discernment of meanings, and in its relation to another. Man--not as a product, an embodiment of a function, or a diminished and split-up being, but as one who is truly human and whole--must be in whole relationship to the world."<sup>45</sup> This describes well both the context in which sincerity is possible--possible within the sensibility of a world--and sincerity itself. It is like Collins concludes: "sincerity is only a virtue when it is unselfconscious"<sup>46</sup>--

sincerity born out of wholeness.

An investigation into the man-object/world relationship therefore must focus on the following issues. It must describe the problems that the issues present and how these problems can be resolved to the satisfaction of the creative act.

1. Design we said is motivated. Unless our investigation can tackle meaningfully what motivation means in relationship to design, we will continue to flounder over the problems of design. Our investigation must not seek to further strengthen the process itself so that the motivation lies in a more systematic method, in a stronger operational approach--it is clear from the attempts that have already been made that nothing has been enthusiastically forthcoming--rather, we will have to understand motivation in relation to design as some relationship indeed coming from a phenomenological understanding of the role of the subjective.

2. Words are meanings. The dialectical relationship of man and object emerges as in experiences. Meanings come to fill in those empty relationships. These relationships come into view as meanings. Therefore, terminology can no longer be window dressing for the architect.

3. There is no need to study history unless there is some qualifying need. That history seems to be an inhibition to many architects comes as a result from the

strong emphasis placed on the 'process' in design, that is, design guided by a program. Therefore the man-object/world relationship will have to show that the present is in dialectical relationship with the past and future. The past, present and future are bound up within the man-object/world question.

4. Criticism is a direct result from reflection. And an investigation into the man-object/world relationship necessarily implies a reflective look at that relationship-- to get at the relationship itself, the basis which we have by habit and uncritical minds taken for granted, assumed, or logically deducted.

Therefore, if the laboratory experiences have ended in failure they have at least led us to a re-investigation of an age-old relationship, but which in the meantime has become what today we have called bureaucratization. We are suggesting that an investigation into the man-object/world relationship will indirectly give some basic clarity to these questions. We are not saying that this investigation will give us a direct design process, but we are suggesting that the problems that we face with such aspects as design is basically attributive to a lack of understanding of the man-object/world relationship.


## ARCHITECTURAL BACKGROUND

Man's quest for self possession and search for meaning and certainty has received the attention no other age has; nor has it balked at permanence or change which the architect and the man is faced with in today's society. In the conflict of permanence and change, there is really little difference between the commonsense man and the architect. Both struggle with it in the same way; both have not yet understood the phenomenon. But nevertheless the architect carries on with his intuitions as he calls them, whether he can describe them to himself or not. He carries on whether a pause has set in or not. He carries on without having understood the phenomenon called architecture as we have seen it develop, particularly in the 20th century.

"What is architecture?" is the question of every architect in our century. There is no real style one can follow unless he deliberately chooses to do so. The architect's mind quivers with wonder or even confusion, as the kaleidoscopic patterns of variations wink into his view. And so, if he pauses to ask "What is architecture?" he has exposed himself. He then does not really understand what the essence of architecture is, nor the seriousness of the

problem he faces.

Our century begins with a new awareness of the Man-Machine-Material world.



New life stirs within man. The influences of new ideologies make him aware of the bondage that has imprisoned him in the traditions and styles dead to his new inner awareness of life. The new vision in man makes his present world ugly. This new sense of life is touched with vitality and imagination; the spirit, with rationalism and utopia. There is a sudden realization that "the art of building is not in advance of its times".<sup>47</sup> Such Futurists as Sant'Elia see the problem of architecture as

' . . . establishing forms, new lives, new reasons for existence, solely out of the special conditions of modern living, and its projections as authentic value in our sensibilities. Such an architecture cannot be subject to any law of historical continuity. . . . We no longer feel ourselves to be the men of the cathedral and ancient moot halls, but men of the Grand Hotels, railway stations, giant roads, colossal harbours, covered markets, glittering arcades, reconstruction areas and solutary slum clearances. . . . Real architecture is not, for all that, an arid combustion of practicality and utility, but remains art, that is, synthesis and expression . . . architecture must be

understood as the power freely and boldly to harmonize environment and man, that is, to render the world of things a projection of the world of the spirit.'<sup>48</sup>

Another Futurist, Boccioni, talks about beginning

'from central nucleus of an object as it strives for realization, in order to discover the new laws, that is, the new forms, that relate it invisibly but mathematically to the plastic infinite within, and visible plastic infinite without. . . . We split open the figure and include the environment within it.'<sup>49</sup>

The new century begins with a spirit, radical and visionary--man is strangely in possession of himself. The De Stijl is the fountainhead of all the previous movements such as the futurists, cubists, etc., as well as being a movement itself, spearheading philosophical and aesthetic ideas in that early period, in the works and writings of such prominent figures as Piet Mondrian and Theo van Doesburg. It describes the Zeitgeist of the time. Much like the Futurists, the De Stijl group sees "new life" as the phenomenon of the age, that it seemingly can do without the past. Mondrian's insights to what this new age is and implies for man's predicament are profound.

"All life has its outward manifestations through which it is known, and conversely, through which it exists. . . . If man matures through reciprocal action of outward and inward life, his environment must be extremely important."<sup>50</sup> Mondrian sees that the reconciliation of the matter-mind duality, which the new age experiences, can be achieved only through the plastic means of equilibrated relationships. Clarity, a necessary function of

consciousness, comes through a relationship of harmony, an inherent unity of spirit. Nature in itself veils the truth, the relationship man can have with the environment. As long as life sees "things" only, life remains obscure and the truth hidden. The relationship he sees essential for man's conscious life is an "abstract-real" life, life in its fullness and wholeness. As long as man lives by "imitation" he has not "come of age."<sup>51</sup> "The life of truly modern man is directed neither toward the material for its own sake, nor toward the predominantly emotional; it is rather the autonomous life of the human spirit becoming conscious."<sup>52</sup>

Man is just beginning to reach that equilibrium necessary for a unity of spirit of man with world through the means of neoplasticism. Neoplasticism is that "abstract-real" standing in between absolute reality and the natural world of things itself.<sup>53</sup> Neoplasticism is a living plastic representation of life, that is to say, that "essence" is the relationship of man to things, what conscious life is all about. As long as man continues to represent things as merely things and does not abstract from things their reality, he lives an unconscious life.

Van Doesburg has much the same philosophical view of the man-to-nature relationship. He chooses however, to call abstract-real just "real." He rightly thinks that Mondrian's view remains a static experience and introverted in his application of neoplasticism to painting. In

relationship to architecture, van Doesburg chooses to call neoplasticism "Elementarism," reality seen in its variation of elements such as space, plane, line, color, mass, materials, time, etc. Reality is a presentation of elements. Life is in dialectical relationship with the elements of nature. Conscious life therefore sees nature in a structure of its elements.

In De Stijl, says van Doesburg, we have come to the edge of life. We no longer talk about various disciplines such as religion, art, science, etc. Elementarism is not simply an application:

The great struggle which began with Elementarism is concerned with the following: destroy completely the illusionist view of the world in all its forms (religion, stupor of nature and art, etc.,) and yet, at the same time, construct an elementary world of exact and splendid reality. It has the task of destroying, piece by piece, . . ."54



Doesburg sees a pure state and says almost nothing about the ambiguous aspect in man. His view as Mondrian's, is highly prejudiced toward the existing structures and sees one collective utopia, an ideal society. Man becomes a wanderer in the world of abstracts.

The De Stijl movement, while highly idealistic and anti-materialistic has nevertheless pointed to problems man faces in search of truth. He must forever abstract the real, distinguish the imitation from the real, and architecture has benefited greatly in the work of Mies van der Rohe, J. J. Oud and Le Corbusier to mention only a few, who

were influenced by De Stijl philosophies of the conception of man in relationship to a world in which he must live. But what the De Stijl pressed for have become things for us. We have not been able to give further clarity to their ideals, to their proto-typical ideas. We have not strengthened their weakness. We just follow their style, which indicates we have failed to catch their vision, however visionary it was.

In the new century, man takes possession of the machine and material. To harness technology is his supreme effort. The production of the machine, giving clear straight lines, provides man with a new aesthetic outlook. It was Muthesius already in 1911 who expressed a new aesthetics in objects as grain silos, American factories, ocean liners, etc.<sup>55</sup> Materials become more a part of the environment, the context, in their essential properties such as concrete, and materials which have been machined in such a supreme example as Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House (Chicago, 1908).

But the uniqueness of the early decades in their concentration on the Man-Machine-Material relationship lies in the fact that man must understand himself in relation to the world. Space becomes the medium by which reality is measured.<sup>56\*</sup> How else could man take possession of the world if not by definition of space? And so we see a new phenomenon developing in architecture, a phenomenon which



The ROBIE HOUSE by Frank Lloyd Wright, 1909 . . .  
 Man in possession of machines and materials . . .

is to take hold of the pioneers in their efforts to see life and architecture related. We shall now investigate some of these views for their meaning of architecture. For the vortex of our architectural heritage is rooted in these pioneers, whom we emulate no matter how badly they are misunderstood in both their writings and works.

### Frank Lloyd Wright

Wright speaks of architecture as man's greatest sense of himself embodied in a world of his own making. A building is a by-product of a living force which man interprets, not imitates. The machine and materials provide the means by which he sees architecture objectified as a reality. The Robie House marks the end of a period in which the machine has shaped the architecture. After this period, machine and materials are the by-products of an interpretation.

Architecture must perceive man as spirit. To understand man as spirit is always to begin at the beginning. Man is not for architecture but, as he says, architecture is made for man. The architect must have the knowledge of the relation of form and function--it is the root of it all. He says "to design is to pattern-forth."<sup>57</sup> This must be the artist's contribution to society.

If one cannot understand Wright's principle of life, he cannot understand his architecture--he may like it but he will not understand it. Wright constantly personifies

architecture as the embodiment of spirit, which is life. Therefore he talks about integrity--integrity in both the sense of purpose and harmony. He uses such terms as plastic and tenuity and continuity as generically personifying man in the building. He uses integrity in the sense of human integrity. Continuity describes for him the relation of parts to each other and to space.

Together with integrity and continuity he talks about "pattern," one of Wright's favorite terms to describe the essence coming into being. Pattern means structure made visible. Earlier we quoted "to design is to pattern-forth." To pattern is something Wright believes only the imagination can conceive correctly. He feels this concept of nature-pattern has been least understood in architecture.<sup>58</sup>

Architecture is abstract. Abstract form is the pattern of the essential. It is, we may see, spirit in objectified forms. Strictly speaking, abstraction has no reality except as it is embodied in materials. Realization of form is always geometrical. That is to say, it is mathematic. We call it pattern . . . all architecture must be some formulation of materials in some actual significant pattern. Building is itself only architecture when it is essential pattern significant of purpose.<sup>59</sup>

While Wright wonders ceaselessly about the principle of nature-pattern as one finds it in a leaf or a flower, the principle of growth is more terrifying to him than the principle of death--the principle of growth without which there cannot be life.

All these existential principles merge into one concentration: and that is space. Space is the reality of

the building of which Unity Temple (Oak Park, Chicago 1906) is his earliest empirical example. If space "is not," architecture has not arrived. Here perhaps lies the greatest contradiction for many architects. Wright said that architecture is space but at the same time goes to great length to articulate walls, windows, ceilings, eaves, etc., in contrast to the International Style which created space with the pure plane. As Wright explains "reality is the space within which you can put something. In other words, the idea."<sup>60</sup>

Having fully exploited these principles--also principles without which human life cannot live--as describing his "organic architecture," Wright in 1939 after nearly 50 years of architecture can say "I know that architecture is life; or at least it is life itself taking form and therefore it is the truest record of life as it was lived in the world yesterday, as it is lived today or ever will be lived. Such architecture I know to be a Great Spirit."<sup>61</sup>

Edgar Kaufmann writes that "Wright's very personal forms have not proved viable in other hands."<sup>62</sup> Wright always claimed one's expressive style to be one's own grammar. Therefore if Kaufmann's statement is correct it is because we have failed to see past the grammar for the essentials that meant so much to Wright in architecture.

## Le Corbusier

Perhaps no architect has influenced today's architect as much as Le Corbusier. He is for this reason an interesting architect to ponder over. There is a greater paradox in relation to Le Corbusier than to Wright, of whom we said earlier that his forms had proved unsuccessful with the present day architect. While Wright could say "I know that architecture is life," Le Corbusier said "Architecture has evaded life in place of being an expression of it."<sup>63</sup> Yet both expressed architecture itself very differently in their respective works. Yet Wright's writings, in my opinion, are clearer and more expressive of his work than that of Le Corbusier's writing. Architects willingly use Le Corbusier as their icon, but do they understand his rhetorical writings? For if you would ask Le Corbusier "What is architecture?" these are the answers we would get.

Architecture is a plastic thing. The spirit of order, a unity of intentions.<sup>64</sup>

Architecture is a matter of 'harmonies, 'it is a pure creation of the spirit.'<sup>65</sup>

We have often seen this definition of architecture by Le Corbusier:

Architecture is the masterly, correct and magnificent play of masses brought together in light. Our eyes are made to see forms in light; light and shade reveal these forms; cubes, cones, spheres, cylinders and pyramids are the great primary forms which light reveals to advantage; the image of these is distinct and tangible within us and without ambiguity.<sup>66</sup>

These definitions are poetic and difficult.

Together with words such as "masterly, correct and magnificent," "plastic thing," "spirit" and "unity of intention," he uses over and over again the concept of the "regulating line" as the unifying principle, that which sets up order, the inspirator, the line which sets up qualities of rhythm, determines geometry, that gives "reassurance"; the line against willfulness, a means to an end and not a recipe. He talks about style as a unity of principle, as a state of mind. We cannot here go into Le Corbusier's background of influence as Banham<sup>67</sup> or Scully<sup>68</sup> do, but these descriptions speaking of an intentionality intrinsic to architecture only emphasize to us the formidable task architecture is without the slightest understanding of these principles and relationships.

Le Corbusier talks about the object deliberately created; it is conceived. "The perfect object is a living organism; it is animated by the spirit of truth. . . . The true object shines with power; between one true object and another, astonishing relations develop. Our dynamic spirit bases its acts on the true objects which human genius creates. The supreme joy, the true joy, is to create."<sup>69</sup>

Le Corbusier, in the tradition of European rationalism, has a different view of the 'mathematical' than Wright does. He praises the engineer for his exactness, while at the same time saying architecture is not engineering. Architecture is a phenomenon of passion and emotion. At the

same time it is an operation of the mind, a sense of order, proportion, volume. His rational mind comes through most clearly when he says that with "objectivity, architecture rouses the most brutal instinct; in the same way, with the abstraction, it encourages the noblest feelings. Architectural abstraction has this magnificent quality: that while it is rooted in brute fact, it nevertheless spiritualizes that fact, for the brute fact is nothing but the materialization or symbol of a possible idea."<sup>70</sup>

And it has been his belief that a "driving intention" will be an aim everyone can afterwards see for himself without an interpreter.<sup>71</sup> His belief is strong in reality once expressed to make its presence felt to mankind. Can we judge fairly today how his work makes that presence felt communicating to us? If so, we must also understand that invisible aspect in all his work--the 'reality' of his building. Intention is clear in his mind. He concludes Towards a New Architecture with "Architecture or Revolution?" to indicate his seriousness.<sup>72</sup>

Louis I. Kahn

Kahn has been characterized as the "glowing arc lamp" between a Wright and a Le Corbusier. Kahn directs the student to such conflicts of conscious-unconscious dichotomy in design, and what the creative act is all about.

He talks about institutions: the architecture of

the institutions of man. Kahn sees the architect's creative task "to sense that every building must serve an institution of man, whether the institution of government, of home, of learning, or of health, or recreation."<sup>73</sup> Over and above programming, the architect must define the institution of man. Kahn feels intensely that man is confronted by institutions and is suddenly distrustful of his institutions. It seems like a paradox. Kahn is beginning to spell out what Le Corbusier meant by "Architecture or Revolution." Revolution is intrinsic to man and to reality, and erupts when man stands in the way of its natural process, or when the nature of man is confronted instead incorporated in the objectified world. He defines architecture conclusively as "the thoughtful making of spaces."<sup>74</sup>

In the notion of institution Kahn brings into focus both the existential and the universal: the personal and the impersonal, the finite and infinite, the measurable and the immeasurable--a world within a world. Kahn says "What a thing will look like will not be the same, but that which it is answering will be the same."<sup>75</sup> To talk about the institution of man, he talks about Form (the what) and Design (the how). Form concerns itself with the existent will of this institution; Design gives occasion to this will of the institution. Maria Bottero suggests that this finite-infinite understanding of Kahn resolves itself in following both Wright's subjective, contingent, temporal,

existential situation and Le Corbusier's rational view, and by so doing he recognizes in the institution both the natural and historical. Thus she writes, "Kahn limits himself to observing that the architectonic organism, in that it is a subjective and finite product, is always forshadowed in the natural and cosmic infinite."<sup>76</sup> In this sense Kahn says architecture is the embodiment of the immeasurable. "The greatness of an architect depends more on the power to realize that which is 'house' than on his ability to design 'a house'--something prescribed by circumstances."<sup>77</sup>

The brief considerations we have given to Wright, Le Corbusier and Kahn do not encapsule their own philosophies or indeed the philosophy of architecture. They do however, indicate two things to us:

1. Each architect has to begin at the beginning. Wright sees architecture as a resolution of man with nature, the total organic order. Nature, man and world objectify themselves in what we here are considering, architecture. Le Corbusier sees life predominantly as an expression of a universal order. And being the artist he is, truth is the search for the universal expression in plastic primary shapes. Kahn sees architecture as a resolution in a rediscovery of the institution of man. "Every system is a world in itself, a coherent and organic whole in which the architect limits himself to creating what a thing wants to be within the laws of the system. But at the same time


everything refers back to its origin, to that desire for life and for being, which presides over every human institution and over every realization of Man's being."<sup>78</sup> Thus we have Wright concentrating on the existential, organic whole, Le Corbusier on the universal and inorganic, Kahn on man's institution--each reaching ever deeper into man as being.

2. We have already presupposed this point: each has a profound way of understanding architecture. It is a self-discovery of each architect as it must be for us. We cannot hope to understand what is demanded of us without an inkling of the existential being, the universal being and the institutional being. However, if only to make us more aware of our difficulty, two dutch architects, Habraken<sup>79</sup> and Aldo van Eyck, today warn that we can no longer naively build for people who once built and created their own (unique) environments. We must heed van Eyck's words when he writes that "Get closer to the shifting centre of human centre and build its contraform--for each man and all men, since they no longer do it themselves (if society has no form, who can build the city-contra-form?)."<sup>80</sup> Architecture must think of man and what it means to objectify.

Perhaps a third point could have been discussed in conjunction with the previous two, but I chose to discuss it separately. It marks the continuous line of architectural development of this century. I want to refer to new Archigram,<sup>81</sup> to The Time House<sup>82</sup> by Martin Pawley, and

finally to the new development of Osaka 70, Japan. Implied in this continuous line of architectural development is the conflict of permanence and change. Commitment and understanding are intertwined within this conflict. Wright, Le Corbusier and Kahn understood this well. While each embodied architecture very differently, and hence there is change implied between their works, each grasped the essence of permanence. But the change within recent architectural movements has made it more difficult to understand the phenomenon of permanence itself. In fact it is questionable whether the recent movements really understand this phenomenon.

In the early 60's a neo-Futurist movement called Archigram burst upon the scene. It has made use of industrial images as generalized structures which become the source of power, the fabric of the community or the city, of service and support with habitable clip-on cellular units. Certainly the imageable generalized structure of service and clip-on units and people is indeed a necessary one. But while the images are somewhat utopian, the sense of permanence we wish to draw from Archigram is the extension architecture is of man from his clip-on capsule to the totality of the generalized structure. So far Archigram has been more concerned with the generalized structure as a visual image and the tiny capsule which is extremely functional in character, and less with the relation of the





ARCHIGRAM . . .

two extremes. And one gets the feeling that there is more preoccupation with the image or the object and the function than with the phenomenon of permanence itself. It is not so much a criticism of Archigram as it is a question of permanence in its complex images.

In The Time House, Martin Pawley suggests how our environment can be solved. One is not sure that Pawley is all that serious about his proposal. His argument is that present housing conditions are not suitable for the kind of privatization phenomenon that is happening in our present society (stewing in one's apartment watching the 'eye' all weekend). He believes Habracken's proposal of "support structures" which now provide places within which people move and create their own spaces as they used to, is a total failure from the outset.<sup>83</sup> Pawley proposes a radically different idea. With the two key concepts of replication<sup>84</sup> and behavior Pawley develops his Time House which can be summarized briefly as:

1. the need to create a presence of both subject and object as a necessary condition for consciousness;
2. this presence is authentic only in the individual world of experience (hence privatization);
3. the realm of dwelling must be the realm of authentic experience;
4. as replication has shown, places and objects are proof of individual experience--to destroy them would



The TIME HOUSE by Martin Pawley

be to destroy evidence of being, as is done continuously in the public realm, and;

5. a continuous record of individual object relations in time and place which could unlock the key to man's behavior necessary for understanding his personal existence.<sup>85</sup>

Therefore, in the "act of dwelling" the Time House listens, smells, sees, touches, remembers and replays when wanted. Man lives "now" together with time and change. No other realm can provide man with this necessary condition of man except the Time House as described. Pawley concludes that: "The purpose of the Time House is to make behavior intelligible."<sup>86</sup> The act of dwelling now combines, through Pawley's super-electronic mechanization, the self, the ego, and the reflection on it in a single moment of recall. Man, in reflecting, becomes another observer.

The question we now face is this: Are we still asking "What is architecture?" or, "Is architecture something else?" and, "How does replication and behavior now combine in a new way for "architecture" to become more intelligible, or does Pawley in fact (for the first time I believe anyone has) make man see what the problem of architecture really is? I have some snapshots of myself which amuse me now upon reflection--indeed, where is the architecture? However, if Pawley is trying to ask the question "What is man" through a kind of anthropological

philosophical act of dwelling, then he is breaking exciting new ground in the field of architecture. But he first needs to write this chapter. Pawley's concern is not "What is architecture?" but with the act of dwelling. Thus he is concerned with the phenomenon of permanence. But the question remains whether the phenomenon of permanence is really grasped with his concepts of replication and behavior.

Le Corbusier talked about the "quantum interest" in architecture: the human manifestation, the achievement of the imponderable.<sup>87</sup> Pawley is suggesting that today, especially in his Time House and at Osaka 70,<sup>88</sup> a new quantum leap is struggling for existence: (1) a leap from static images to mobile images, from form to content; (2) a substitution of the laws of perception for the laws of force, mass and weight (which in my opinion points to a grave error on Pawley's part). To this end Pawley cites Le Corbusier's 'poenre electonique' as an early example in existence in 1958. By separating form from context as the Geodesic Dome of Expo 67 did, and creating a visual field of images instead, and introducing drugs, halography, etc., . . . some new environment results. Pawley writes "architectural form becomes irrelevant, and content becomes itself a binary problem of creative and technical vision-- just what architecture used to be before the idea of simple enclosure got a foothold . . . with a few slide projectors,

tape recorders and strobe lights they [architects] could create visions of gothic splendour unequalled by the labour of thousands in the middle ages."<sup>89</sup>

Implied in the forgone conclusion is a new sense of architecture. We seem to be led away from the question of "What is architecture?" to the nature of experience itself.

In 1967 John Johansen said:

'The experience we derive from our building (in the future) will be drawn from a fusion of the senses: the impact swift, instant, condensed, total; the message immediate, direct, possibly crude, unedited, unrehearsed, but real.'<sup>90</sup>


In 1970-71 Johansen designed Mummer's Theatre which in some way begins to describe what he possibly had in mind in his statement above.

But it is clear from some Japanese architects that they are prepared to be even more radical about the nature of architecture as their pavilions and its contents begin to suggest--a new sense of permanence within a new and great flux of change unknown to man in such a real way.

Noriaki Kurokawa writes:

'I think architecture is designed to become a very metaphysical thing . . . an interpretation between very spiritual, very visual things and the physical world that we now work with. . . . I see the multi-screen, mixed media pavilion as a training center for just that.'<sup>91</sup>

By "metaphysical thing" Kurokawa must have in mind some transcendental meaning which he cannot quite describe. He contends that architecture will not simply concentrate on



MUMMER'S THEATRE  
by Johanson, 1970

FUJI PAVILION, OSAKA / 70

walls, floors, doors, windows, etc., but will become a concentration more on imaginable images.

We have a final challenging statement by another Japanese architect when he writes:

'Architecture must now take on multiple meanings: its presence can no longer be determined by form; rather it must be flexible and responsive to the flow of time and the needs of a succession of occasions. I call such an architecture 'soft architecture'. '92

As we move through this short period of architectural history we encounter a variety of views about the nature of architecture itself. We sense a very different approach to the manifestation itself between the pioneers and, for example, the architects of the Osaka 70' pavilions. We sense a great flux of change in the expression itself--so much so that we are led to wonder about the place of permanence in this great flux of change. This is equally true for the expressions themselves and the writings where architects have the chance to express their views in words.

The bewilderment of the relation of permanence to change is simultaneously associated with the enigmatic question: "What is Architecture?" They cannot be separated. Therefore, the search for the meaning in architecture is, perhaps believing the question can be resolved for us as architects in its present form.

Recent studies presuppose the question in their works but are their results satisfactory? That is, do they in fact deal effectively with the enigmatic question

of what architecture is?

Whereas the pioneers talked about life in relationship to architecture (even though it appears highly ideological at times for example, as in De Stijl), today there is much emphasis on the meaning of architecture. And there are a variety of studies in this area. There is Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture by Robert Venturi. His book characterizes the clarity of meaning as contradictory and ambiguous. He uses projects to illustrate his point. Therefore, he opts for richness of meaning instead.<sup>93</sup> The book begins with the premise that the object--which obviously is architecture--is presupposed. Meaning is thus richness in the relation of element to element of the part to the whole. Venturi places himself into the mainstream of architecture and speaks the language of a designer. Architecture has arrived as it were and he is not so much concerned with the origin of architecture itself as with the rules of the game. It is fair to say that his book is concerned with the ambiguities one faces in design and not so much the relation of it to life.

Semiology is concerned with the clarity of meaning in architecture. It is interested in the "information flow" a building will give its participant. The area of study is new and therefore criticism may be premature, but one is not so sure what the expectancy-surprise continuum is to measure, and the relation of meaning to this measure. Semiology

builds upon the parole (speech) and langue (grammar) as in language.<sup>94</sup> The meaning that a building may have must be its capacity for irony as is the case in language. But if it is in the area of speech that the continuum could have any meaning, the meaning seems to be no more than the commonness which it presents. Semiology seems to falter in the end in terms of the question of origins which every architect must necessarily face, by being concerned more with interwoven strands of society that intertwine with each other than with the 'holes' in between.

In reference to meaning we must also show that psychological studies too, presuppose architecture as an empirical reality to which people react. The architect in this frame of mind<sup>95</sup> finds that people do not react to objects but rather to a multiplicity of meanings that make up the object. An attempt is made to learn how people react to parts of buildings, i.e., such as entrances, and through such observations the architect will in a more knowledgeable way design meaning into the building. The architect is faced with the danger of being unconcerned with the object as a totality, and its break up into parts; and secondly he enhances the commonsense attitude by sticking to a commonsense meaning. Architecture is something "holistic" and the architect hopes to discover it in the building over and above the commonsense need and function.

The criticism we charge each of the above views with is that while they explicitly study the relation of meaning to architecture, they completely ignore its relation to life. The contention is that meaning is a relation to life and research must account for this relation as in architecture. For this reason Le Corbusier's anxiety in his pioneering days, which is equally true today, was that "Architecture today is no longer conscious of its own beginning."<sup>96</sup> The error seems to be that architecture is coupled with buildings as speech is to commonness, as meaning is to psychologism. Architecture is presupposed as an object and not as a relationship of life. And as long as this kind of 'coupling' revolves around an anonymity the enigmatic question reappears "what is architecture?"

It is an inappropriate question because it subconsciously presupposes the object. The permanent is not discovered within the domain of the question. For as soon as we ask the question we presuppose the object and all the concepts such as space, time, form, and structure etc., are taken for granted. It is premature to immediately couple architecture with the building. Le Corbusier's skepticism has resulted from this premature correlation of architecture to building. To ask "what is architecture?" is paradoxically the wrong question to ask. It in itself cannot tell us where the permanence in the great flux of change lies. In a similar way it would be unprofitable to

ask "what is man?" since he himself does not know either. And yet the concepts belong to architecture only as they belong to man. The question is circular. We must realize that to ask what architecture is, is necessary but not the end in itself; it is only the means (Architecture presupposes man). But space, time, order are structures of man as being. Therefore, as architecture refers back to man, it refers to the structures of his being situated in the sense of time, space, order, etc.

Therefore, if we understand man as man somehow situated, we shall understand the permanence at the base of all change and which is also the condition for there being architecture.

To come back to the question of meaning, it is a question of life; hence a question of origin. The pioneers struggled with it. It is a question for the sincere, not for the faint-hearted. In life, man is condemned to meaning. The permanent must be recognized as meaning, and meaning gives reality to the man-object/world tension. Man in relationship with gives rise to meaning and to reality. The architect must begin with the man-object/world relationship as if it were the origin itself. "Just as the seed must lie in darkness of the earth before it flowers and vegetables, so the artist must plunge into the depths of life and language before creating something new.<sup>97</sup> Despite the ambiguities of man, we must discover

his presence.

Architecture is some permanence of man. The changes of the "in-between" have veiled that truth. The 20th century will again discover that permanence because of the number of changes we experience in a life time. Le Corbusier wrote that there was architecture in the telephone as well as in the parthenon. In short then, the architect must make his role relevant in society. For example, the relevancy of his role will explain why a client who wants a house built would come to him, an architect, instead of the local house builder. His relevance will be measured in terms of the humanity he provides for man.

## PROGRAM OF RESEARCH

The proposed outline of research is a program that can be justified in this study but cannot be dealt with in any complete sense. It is a program of research which could last a lifetime. In this study we can do no more than point to relationships and factors that begin to answer our man-object/world question.

The study is interrelated with a variety of sources pertinent to our question. Therefore a problem of terminology could interfere. It will be our concern not to cause unnecessary terminology difficulties. Wherever we can do so, we shall give analogies or examples of terms unfamiliar to architects.

One has to see the outline as one idea, as wholeness, as expression, as attitude or understanding, i.e., architecture as thought worked out in a coherent sequence. No part can stand alone; each is interconnected with the other. One could see the outline as a few links of a conscious moment, of a continuous chain of time. Or, one could see the creative act as the centre itself, that is the conscious act, from which radiates logical spheres of relationships to infinity, like a raindrop in a pond where the impact manifests itself in the crests that are sent out from its centre.


One could also think of the outline as a brief conscious moment for the duration of a project, a painting, a sculpture, etc.; perhaps just a lifetime in this infinite cosmic order.

The outline is an inspirator and a program which brings to it ideas, personalities who have encountered the problem of reality in life in architecture as I have. The outline is a way of seeing through a problem, a way of getting a glimpse of our own ambiguity; it is also an inspiration in the way it may lead to an understanding. It is the problem as well as method.


I see the outline as a matrix (which in latin means womb). Therefore it remains as a happening, as continually coming into being. In this sense it strives for fulfillment, for maturity; its intrinsic nature is growth. It has as Kahn would say its own "existent will" and as Tillich would say "power of being".

I am not merely speaking in cliches, or empty metaphors; it is not simply a worshipful attitude. The outline represents a long, serious and difficult search for a form that would begin to express the inner struggle of someone who is searching for a meaning of the creative act. It represents the beginning of a long program of search. Now I hold it at my fingertips; in the future I hope to affirm it also in some architectural projects.

STRUCTURE OF THESIS



STRUCTURE OF THESIS




## MAN AND OBJECT

The man-object world is a section by means of which we will, in some very direct ways, come to a deeper appreciation of man and his ambiguities, his oscillation within the sphere of being and nonbeing in his life. Man objectifies out of an inner drive for fulfillment. Man is not pure being. He strives for being in itself. Architecture must be seen as an activity which helps man toward fulfillment. Man objectifies himself in his ceaseless march toward ultimate reality. Architecture is part of that march. That is to say, man is a pilgrim; architecture the caravan.

But the section will focus on the object too. The object is that thing we see in the world; things, world as a stage of things. We do not question them but we live in and among them. In this instant, man is the centre of the world. But, things do not remain as signs forever. As man becomes aware of the object, it begins to dissolve and an intentional relationship develops. In other words, man and object do not exist apart. As man begins to question himself in relationship to the world of objects, they merge synergically. A conscious act emerges and man and the object (or subject and the object) form the two poles of consciousness.

STRUCTURE OF THESIS




## OBJECTIFICATION

If the section on the conscious act is looking for the 'conditions' which make the creative act or event possible in the first place, the act of fulfillment as objectification focuses on the 'realization' of the event itself, i.e., act or event as standing forth at a distance from man. By realization we mean the transformation of reality into meaning. The process of transformation proceeds by asking the questions of what and how. Both questions are responsible to or derivations of an underlying thought as in Being, where Being is referred to as the metaphysical nature of man, or the essential nature of life. Objectification is a struggle of the essential coming into existence, where existence is empowered by the essence.

But objectification is also an acknowledgement of man's historical inherence. To refer to thought as co-extensive of Being means at the same time that we are grafted to a historical situation. The man-object/world question of the present implies a vortex of our entire past. Therefore, the questions of what and how implied by objectification takes into consideration the whole of architectural history.

Objectification in the sense of actuality, is the ultimate condition of transcendence expressed most beautifully in the statement "I see according to it". Objectification touches the very being of man itself. Architecture is nothing more than man present to himself.

STRUCTURE OF THESIS



## THE CONSCIOUS ACT

Man and object merge in consciousness, or if you will, subjectivity is impregnated with objectivity (which the study of ontology is concerned with).

The creative act (1) must understand the phenomenon of the subject directed towards an object. An event occurs as an interrelationship of the subject-object polarity. This has been understood in the theoretical writings of art since the time of Vasari. Consciousness is consciousness of something; it is an act. It is the infra-structure of "intentional being." And as such it is a mode of perception; it is an intuitive act of grasping the essentials of a thing or life.

The creative act having the bi-polar structure, (2) must be understood, as the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. The bi-polar structure has its origin in the situation itself. Being-in-the-world simply means to be situated. To be situated however ranges from one's implicatedness to the world to one's self-manifestation in the world.

Once the creative act is understood as belonging to the structure of consciousness but also as having its roots in the existential, the intent is to understand architecture as knowledge, not so much in the sense of epistemology but in the sense of experience--objectification.

STRUCTURE OF THESIS

INTRODUCTION

terminology ----- LABORATORY ----- history  
 anonymity ----- design ----- criticism ----- sincerity  
 pioneers ----- ARCH. BACKGROUND ----- movements -----  
 life ----- permanence ----- change ----- meaning

What is architecture?  
why

client ----- architecture

house  
PROGRAM OF RESEARCH

MAN AND OBJECT

The primary aspects  
of the  
COMMONSENSE  
WORLD

MAN AS BEING

-ontological elements  
(Tillich)  
-distance and relation  
(Buber)  
-ontological categories  
(Tillich)  
-dimension of spirit  
(Tillich)

synergical merging of  
MAN and OBJECT

OBJECT AS EVENT

everyday attitude-  
(Wild, Schutz, Husserl)  
sign-  
(Schutz)  
language-speech-  
(Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur)  
-symbol-  
(Langer, Schutz, Ricoeur)

"Speech is Thought"

THE CONSCIOUS ACT

inextricable relationship

faith----- PROCESS----- reflection  
 (subjective-objective dichotomy)  
 subject----- (CONSCIOUSNESS AS OF SOMETHING)----- object

BEING-IN-THE-WORLD  
(sedimentation-spontaneity)

PRESENCE  
OF SELF

implicatedness  
-inhabitation  
incarnation

BODY-SUBJECT

actional  
synergical-  
manifestation

PRESENCE  
TO WORLD

Architecture as knowledge  
"Architecture is Life"

OBJECTIFICATION

transformation of reality  
into meaning

What ----- THOUGHT----- -how  
 Form ----- (Kaelin, Kahn) ----- Design  
 World ----- (Heidegger) ----- Earth

Appresenting ----- APPRESENTATION ----- -Appresented  
 plane/colour ----- -elementarism----- time/space  
 motif ----- pattern----- rule  
 relation ----- context----- encounter

architect----- COMMUNICATION ----- client

"I see according to it"

SELF-PRESENCE

"The Kingdom of God is within You"  
(Wright)

virtuality ----- -The Poetic Image----- -reality  
 (Bachelard)  
 Man----- -FLESH----- object  
 (Merleau-Ponty)  
 Visibility ----- Vision ----- -Tangibility

THE PRESENCE OF ARCHITECTURE

EPILOGUE

## SELF-PRESENCE

We can best begin to understand the sense and significance of architecture in the ultimate notion of presence. It embodies both the visible and the invisible and subtends a kind of thickness, a field of depth, in which man is present to himself by creating a distance in relation to himself. In this sense, presence can be simply defined as myself seen from the outside.

The notion of presence is unique to architecture because it incorporates both the meaning and the visual in one body. It does not advocate the mystical connotation. This would lead to further illusionary views on architecture and its purpose. Architecture is part of the self-fulfillment of man in virtue of the existential categories of time, space, form and reason in which he lives. Architecture cannot add anything more that these categories do not already imply. But architecture can give rise to the self-presence they speak of.

Through the event we call architecture, the categories take on, so to speak, Flesh. And life takes on meaning.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Andre Martinet, "Structure and Language," Structuralism, ed. Jacques Ehrmann, 1st ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1970). "Buildings are intended to serve as protection from the elements for man, his domestic animals and the products of his industry. That is their first and basic function. Of course, an edifice not seldom serves, in reality, more to impress those who look at it or visit it than to ensure effective protection," p. 2.

Note: an asterisk (\*) beside some footnote numbers during the draft refer to aside remarks and some quotations that may be of interest to the reader.

<sup>2</sup>Aldous Huxley, "Knowledge and Understanding," a paper given to the students in an Ideology Class in the Faculty of Architecture, 1971.

<sup>3</sup>Charles Jencks, and George Baird, eds., Meaning in Architecture, 2nd ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1970); Robert G. Hershberger, "Architecture and Meaning," Journal of Aesthetic Education, No. 4 (October, 1970).

<sup>4</sup>Robert G. Hershberger, "Architecture and Meaning," Journal of Aesthetic Education, 4 (October 1970), 37-55.

<sup>5</sup>Soren Kierkegaard, The Present Age (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 76.

<sup>6</sup>George W. Morgan, The Human Predicament: Dissolution and Wholeness (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 16.

<sup>7</sup>When we consider the man-object/world relationship we could include--eventually every aspect should be included--other aspects such as technology or ecology, etc. However this study is interested in considering the more immediate aspects of architecture, the ones one encounters in the laboratory. Terminology, design, history, and criticism by no means cover the whole spectrum of architecture and a more ambitious study would have to be made of this spectrum.

<sup>8</sup>I am referring to the first lecture at my disposal by Emilio Ambasz, "The formulation of a Design Discourse," pp. 57-70.

<sup>9</sup>Reyner Banham, "Convenient Benches and Hardy Hooks: Functional Considerations in the Criticism of the Art of Architecture," The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture, ed. Marcus Whiffen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 94.

<sup>10</sup>I am not suggesting that Ambasz has dealt exhaustively with the whole question of environmental design, especially to the question of 'transformation' from aspiration to synthesis.

<sup>11</sup>See Ambasz's "Formulation of a Design Discourse," p. 59.

<sup>12</sup>For a fuller description of this phenomena of speech being already thought, see part II, the section on "Object," p. 95.

<sup>13</sup>Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (North Western University Press, 1964), p. 82.

<sup>14</sup>Ambasz, "Formulation of a Design Discourse," p. 57.

<sup>15</sup>AD, "Sector," 12/71. Max Jacobson interviews Christopher Alexander. He says in this interview "I wanted to be able to create beautiful buildings. I didn't know how, and nothing that I was learning in school was helping me. . . . So I began to find out what to do. This really meant going to the roots of form." p. 769.

<sup>16</sup>Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966).

<sup>17</sup>I feel uncomfortable about Alexander's comparison of the unselfconscious culture with the selfconscious one. The primitive man came upon the scene of the object-reality world entirely different than today's object-reality world. His was a world of magic; in ours man stands in a triadical relationship with the object and reality. See George W. Morgan, The Human Predicament, pp. 284-285. Therefore Alexander's comparison is valid only from the point of design and not design in relation to reality itself. His reference to beauty must take reality into consideration.

<sup>18</sup>Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, p. 58.

<sup>19</sup>Ambasz comes to similar conclusions in his preliminary study of an environmental design. His design program envisions "models" of every kind which he calls "aspirations" which could influence the form. These models would indicate design characteristics, and one would check and recheck the design with the models to make sure.

<sup>20</sup>Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, p. 130.

<sup>21</sup>Morgan writes "impersonality and objectivity have become synonymous with 'lack of prejudice' and 'respect for evidence', and we therefore infer that a personal attitude inevitably brings prejudice and falsehood. This is unwarranted. What is bad are prejudice, falsification, and distortion of fact." The Human Predicament, p. 177.

<sup>22</sup>I am referring to a more recent discussion on this subject by Martin Pawley in "The Time House," in The Meaning in Architecture, ed. C. Jencks and G. Baird, (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 131ff.

<sup>23</sup>M. Whiffen, ed., The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 4.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 18ff.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>27</sup>Charles Jencks, "History as Myth," Meaning in Architecture, eds. C. Jencks and G. Baird (New York: George Braziller, 1970), pp. 245-266.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 255.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 259.

<sup>30</sup>Vincent Scully, Modern Architecture (New York: George Braziller, 1961).

<sup>31</sup>Morgan, The Human Predicament, p. 175.

<sup>32</sup>Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1963), p. 33.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>35</sup>Jencks, "History as Myth," p. 264.

- <sup>36</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures, p. 31.
- <sup>37</sup>Max Jacobson, "Interview: Christopher Alexander," AD 12/71, 768-771.
- <sup>38</sup>Norberg-Schulz, Intentions in Architecture, 2nd ed. (Universitetsforlaget: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966)
- <sup>39</sup>Whiffen, The History, Theory and Criticism, pp. 25-26.
- <sup>40</sup>Siegfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture, 5th ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. XXXII.
- <sup>41</sup>Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism (London: The Architectural Press, 1966), p. 135.
- <sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 127.
- <sup>43</sup>Peter Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1967), pp. 248-251.
- <sup>44</sup>Morgan, The Human Predicament, p. 331.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 77.
- <sup>46</sup>Collins, Changing Ideas, p. 253.
- <sup>47</sup>Reyner Banham, Theory and Design in the First Machine Age (London: The Architectural Press, 1960), p. 158.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 128-135.
- <sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 112.
- <sup>50</sup>Hans L. C. Jaffe, De Stijl, Trans. R. R. Symonds (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc. Publishers, 1971), selected writings of the De Stijl members, p. 81.
- <sup>51</sup>A theme which recurs in Diedrich Bonhoeffer's, Letters and Papers from Prison, 7th ed. (New York: The McMillan Co., 1966), p. 200ff.
- <sup>52</sup>Jaffe, De Stijl, p. 36.
- <sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 78.
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 216.
- <sup>55</sup>Banham, Theory and Design, p. 80.

<sup>56</sup>As attention is drawn away from the styles of traditional architecture, a new concept of architecture as space comes into focus. But the shades of meanings that are given to space in this early period are subtle and important to understand if the new movement is to have meaning for us. For example, the Dutch pioneer, H. P. Berlage in 1908 talks about architecture as the art of "creating space" and not sketching of facades. But Banham indicates in Theory and Design, that Berlage's conception of space is still interior space, building envelope, p. 140. Banham, however, feels, pp. 66-67, that the unique conception of space in architecture receives its first theoretical view by Geoffrey Scott, The Architecture of Humanism (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 210ff. I think however, Peter Collins would disagree with Banham and in his Changing Ideals, p. 286, gives Frank Lloyd Wright the credit for having first exploited the spatial possibilities which lay dormant since the end of the Baroque period, in his Unity Temple (Chicago, 1906). Such a difficult concept as space is barely seventy years in conception. And De Stijl's conception of space as Neoplasticism and Elementarism surely finds its roots in Wright.

<sup>57</sup>Frank Lloyd Wright, An American Architecture, ed. Edgar Kaufmann Jr. (New York: Bramhall House, 1955), p. 58.

<sup>58</sup>Frank Lloyd Wright, The Natural House (1954 New York: New American Library, 1970), p. 55.

<sup>59</sup>Frank Lloyd Wright, The Future of Architecture (1953 New York: New American Library, 1970), p. 60.

<sup>60</sup>Wright, An American Architecture, p. 80.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>62</sup>Edgar Kaufmann, Jr., "Frank Lloyd Wright: The Eleventh Decade," Architectural Form, 120 (June, 1969), p. 38.

<sup>63</sup>Le Corbusier, When the Cathedrals were White (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 115.

<sup>64</sup>Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 11.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>67</sup>Banham, Theory and Design, pp. 220-246.

<sup>68</sup>Vincent Scully, Jr., Modern Architecture (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 40-48.

<sup>69</sup>Le Corbusier, New World of Space (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948), p. 37.

<sup>70</sup>Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture,

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 181-182.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 249.

<sup>73</sup>Louis I. Kahn, Louis I. Kahn: Talks with Students Architecture at Rice 26 (Published by Students at Rice University, 1970), p. 6.

<sup>74</sup>Louis I. Kahn, "Spaces Order and Architecture," RAIC Journal (October, 1957), 375.

<sup>75</sup>Kahn, Talks with Students, p. 24.

<sup>76</sup>Maria Bottero, "Organic and Rational Morphology in Louis Kahn," Zodiac, p. 245.

<sup>77</sup>Louis I. Kahn, "Not for the Faint-Hearted," AIA Journal (June, 1971), 30.

<sup>78</sup>Bottero, "Morphology in Louis Kahn," p. 244.

<sup>79</sup>N. J. Habraken, "Housing: The Act of Dwelling," The Architect's Journal Information Library, 22 May 1968, 1187-1192.

<sup>80</sup>Aldo van Eyck, "Plan and Occasion," Progressive Architecture, Sept. 1961, p. 155.

<sup>81</sup>Peter Cook, Architecture: Action and Plan (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1969).

<sup>82</sup>Pawley, "The Time House," pp. 121-148.

<sup>83</sup>Simply providing "support structures" in which dwellings units are arranged by the people themselves, demands the need for an architect more than ever. This is in complete contradiction to Habraken's intent: to give the people the opportunity to create their own environments. People themselves will not solve the problem of environment. It is the job of the architect.

<sup>84</sup>George Kubler, The Shape of Time (London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 71-76.

<sup>85</sup>Pawley, "The Time House", p. 143-144.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>87</sup>Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, p. 113.

<sup>88</sup>Martin Pawley, "Architecture versus Movies," AD, June 1970, pp. 288-311.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 292.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 292.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 293.

<sup>93</sup>Robert Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (New York: Modern Museum of Art, 1966), p. 29.

<sup>94</sup>I am referring to articles in Meaning in Architecture by C. Jencks, "Semiology & Architecture," and G. Baird, "'La Dimension Amoreuse' in Architecture." Norberg-Schulz's Intentions in Architecture is another source in reference to Semiology.

<sup>95</sup>Robert G. Hershberger, "Architecture and Meaning," pp. 37-56. See his Ph.D. thesis "A Study of Meaning and Architecture" (University of Pennsylvania, 1969).

<sup>96</sup>Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, p. 21.

<sup>97</sup>Bottero, "Morphology of Kahn," p. 245.

SECTION II

## SECTION II

There are undoubtedly many ways of tackling the problem of the man and object world in order to see each phenomenon separately and the relation of each to the other. It would be of great benefit to investigate more fully 'why' we in everyday life have the tendency to take each phenomenon for granted and as a result bypass the vital relations they have to each other. However, it is more difficult to consider each phenomenon on more general levels because each presupposes the other, as will become evident. Therefore this section on Man and on Object may seem rather abrupt in relation to section I.

### BEING OF MAN

In the introduction we said architecture presupposes man. This simply means that (1) architecture is an act carried out by man, but it at the same time means that (2) it is a fundamental act of man. This awareness led the pioneers to claim a new grip on architecture in the relationship of MAN-MACHINE-MATERIALS. This relationship still appears to be vital today. Martin Buber's observation in 1938 seems as valid today as then: "Man is no longer able to master the world which he himself brought

about: it is becoming stronger than he is, it is winning free of him, it confronts him in an almost elemental independence, and he no longer knows the word which could subdue and render harmless the golem he has created."<sup>1</sup> More recently Paul Tillich has said something similar:

"Twentieth-century man has lost a meaningful world and a self which lives in meanings out of a spiritual center. The man-created world of objects has drawn into itself him who created it and who now loses his subjectivity in it. He has sacrificed himself to his own productions." However Tillich goes on to say, "man still is aware of what he has lost or is continuously losing. He is still man enough to experience his dehumanization as despair."<sup>2</sup> With such recognition of man's predicament, the question "What is man?" has received new attention and the question has been pushed to frontiers previously unknown to man. It will take more such effort to repossess the world which man has brought about; it takes a long time for a people to regain its freedom, having once lost it.

Van Eyck is well aware that the question of man is implied in architecture when he so subtly says: "Whoever attempts to meet man in the abstract will speak with his echo and call it a dialogue."<sup>3</sup> Whoever works with echoes does not work with man. A designer must make the centre of his thought the question "What is man?", knowing full well that a "design can never be a solution to a problem;

it can only attempt to clarify the question."<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the question must keep burning in the architect's mind; he must manifest the question in his work, he cannot proceed illegitimately.

It would be to our benefit to cover the history of the historical question as Buber has done so well in his book Between Man and Man, and Paul Tillich has done more recently; but this would mean more space than we can grudgingly spare. It is essential however, to make a sketchy outline of the image of existential man, in order to discover his existential spirit. Tillich has, without question, given us an ontology of man, gleaned from philosophy and history all the perspectives on man, particularly those of our age, and from the experience of man in his existential situation. We can benefit from a brief sketch of this ontological structure.<sup>5</sup>

Man and animals both have environments. Only man transcends his environment and has a world. This means that man has a self-consciousness in that he is able to separate himself from the world. This is man's uniqueness: while he is bound to an environment he also transcends it; while he lives in a world he also transcends it. His horizon goes out beyond his immediate surroundings.<sup>6</sup>

An animal in the realm of its perception is like a fruit in its skin; man is, or can be, in the world as a dweller in an enormous building which is always being added to, and to whose limits he can never penetrate, but which he can nevertheless know as one does know a

house in which one lives--for he is capable of grasping the wholeness of the building as such.<sup>7</sup>

Another view holds that "openness beyond the world is even the condition for man's experience of the world."<sup>8</sup> It is this openness that distinguishes man from animal. We have the capacity to set at a 'distance' man as such, and then to enter into 'relation' with him or his objectified world.<sup>9\*</sup>

Man's basic ontological position springs from his ability to set apart and enter into a relationship with. Implied is the subject-object structure. Self-consciousness is founded and all the consequent ontological elements and categories on this principle.<sup>10</sup> Tillich writes, "The self without the world is empty; the world without a self is dead."<sup>11</sup> This then must be our first basic recognition: man, while he lives in this world, while he is an object in it like other objects, is a self and not a thing; he is somebody who imagines and perceives a world. Therefore, he can create independence of the world by setting it apart and opposite to himself. The world does not remain opposite me as an object. To enter into 'relation' means that one can first set at a distance--both constitute one act: to set apart is to establish a presence and this presence is one's relation.<sup>12</sup>

How can we understand the ontological concept of man as life? We can by looking at the elements which contribute to his ontological nature of being. The

ontological concept is difficult to apprehend but then so is the real nature of life. The 'ontological' as I understand it, deals with the intrinsic nature of man that is not just true for today, but that implies the bare significances of life and its nature. In the Courage To Be<sup>13</sup> Tillich shows that different things or aspects have preoccupied man, some have stood out more than others, but none have ever been denied. Some have received greater clarification than others. Some have even been wrongly presupposed because undue attention was given to others. But the nature of man is not that contingent; it is not true just for today and not for tomorrow. The implications may change but not the essence itself. Therefore when I refer to man's ontological elements as Tillich does, I do so because they are representatives of the infrastructure of being. And of course the whole difficulty of understanding of man as being is to describe his being--that is all the ontological concepts want to accomplish. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that when we deal with man we are not dealing with any kind of formula. And if our discussion of man takes the form of such ominous terms as being, ontological, spirit, existential or essential, it is because these terms have to grow within us. We must, so to speak, experience them, identify with them. And because the architect must deal with life, it is his responsibility to at least have the barest knowledge and understanding of the essentials of

life itself. To simply talk about life without really understanding its essentials is to remain naive about architecture as well. Therefore, to briefly consider the ontological structure of being is to make us aware of the real invisible forces that in effect objectify man in his situation. That is to say, we need to, as architects, turn our attention away from our busy preoccupations with the object which simply treat man as some mysterious echo, and begin to build a bridge between man and object. And this bridge remains an invisible link between them. The significances of the ontological elements and categories as we shall come to see in the barest sense, indicate to us how tightly man's existence is held in the world, how delicate the balance of being really is in the face of life. And that is the purpose and intent of this study: to bring us to the edge where man and object meet in actuality.

#### 1. Individualization and participation:

Every being exists in and for itself as a centered and indivisible self, but at the same time belongs to a realm of reality outside itself in which the self participates. Individualization actualizes itself in "personality." Personality is acquired at the same time through participation in all levels of life. Man can participate only on the levels of being and life which he himself is. Community is founded upon this level of participation. "Man can become whole not in virtue of a relation to himself, but in

virtue of a relation to another self."<sup>14</sup> What man is can be discovered only by breaking down individual barriers and entering into a relation with one another:

one life opens to another--not steadily, but so to speak attaining its extreme reality only from point to point, yet also able to acquire a form in the community of life, the other becomes present not merely in the imagination or feeling, but in the depths of substance, so that one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of one's own. The two participate in one another's lives in every fact, not physically, but ontically.<sup>15</sup>

In this polarity of ontological reality no individuals exist without participating as well.

Both cognition and empirical knowledge are dependent upon "the participation of the individual in the universal and the participation of the knower in the known."<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Form and Dynamics:

The polarity of form and dynamics appears in man's immediate experience as a polar distinction of vitality and intentionality. It is the vitality in man that sends him beyond a natural biological existence. Dynamics reaches out beyond nature only in man; in this sense man alone has vitality. Vitality is a form of openness we referred to above. "Man is able to create a world beyond the given world; he creates the technical and spiritual realms."<sup>17</sup> Dynamism goes hand in hand with expression. Dynamics peculiar only to man, implies creativeness: "It is directed, formed; it transcends itself toward meaningful contents."<sup>18</sup>

Form and dynamics interact with each other to create meaningful structures. They, as one, live in universals; they grasp and shape reality. And the principle of transcendence implies that there cannot be being without a becoming inherent in being. What is present in the process of becoming is change and change within being. In change, being is preserved--being as the permanence within change. If nothing remained preserved in the process of change, becoming would be impossible. An obvious example is growth: self-transcendence based on self-conservation.<sup>19</sup>

Man lives in the forms he makes, but at the same time transcends these forms. Man finds no final satisfaction in his own creation and leaves it for new ones. Therefore his destiny moves beyond culture.<sup>20</sup> It could be said that the polarity of form and dynamics are in constant reformation.

### 3. Freedom and Destiny:

Freedom in polarity with destiny is the structure which makes existence possible because it transcends the essential necessity of being without destroying it.

Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision, and responsibility. To make a decision means to cut off possibilities that were real possibilities. The person who decides "must be beyond what he cuts off or excludes."<sup>21</sup>

To make decisions means to be responsible as well. Decisions

and responsibilities point to a 'center' in man. No one can answer for him.

Destiny is the broad base upon which the self and freedom is centered. Decisions are made from the concrete totality of being, not an epistemological subject. Destiny is the basis of freedom and freedom participates in shaping destiny. Only he who has freedom has destiny, and he who has destiny has freedom.<sup>22</sup>

The polarity of freedom and destiny is unique to man only (as the other polarities are) in that he makes decisions and is responsible for them. Only by way of analogy could this polarity be applied to nature, and then in terms of spontaneity and law. Spontaneity interacts with law. "In nature spontaneity is united with law in the way freedom is united with destiny in man. . . . Each being acts and reacts according to the laws of the larger units in which it is included."<sup>23</sup> This larger unit in which man participates is infinitude.

These ontological polarities are in essence the background against which man operates. If we take for example the polarity of freedom and destiny, one is impressed with the delicate balance that one needs to struggle for in life to meet the satisfaction of this ontological polarity. In fact we never quite reach that perfect balance. The opposite of freedom of course is imprisonment which implies that man lacks a destiny. To really be free implies that

man has a destiny. For example, the architect is not free to act as long as his destiny is not caught up with being itself. All the ontological elements are aspects of being, and Tillich wants to show furthermore, that they are in a continual dialectical relationship: one does not really precede the other; they emerge together. And it isn't too difficult to see the relationship of man-to-object in a similar dialectical way as any of these polarities, separate or all together, as in life.

#### Man's Finitude

Tillich defines finitude as "being limited by non-being."<sup>24</sup> Hence man is a finite creature by nature. But the question of being does not even arise until one is faced with the shock of non-being. Then man asks the ontological question about his mysterious being. Logically, being precedes non-being. Man can, however, envisage nothingness. Being and non-being are dialectically related.

As finite being, man presupposes that (1) being is continually threatened by non-being and that (2) finitude implies an infinitude. While man strives for being-itself, he can never become infinity itself; for being-itself is not infinitude. Finitude is a driving principle of being toward being-itself. Infinitude is an abstract possibility.

Non-being has an ontological quality in relation to being. Anxiety is the existential awareness of non-being

which manifests itself in different types.<sup>25</sup>

1. Ontic self-affirmation: Nonbeing threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, that is to say, the most basic self-affirmation in simple existence.

2. Spiritual self-affirmation: Nonbeing threatens man's spiritual center relatively in terms of emptiness or absolutely in terms of meaninglessness.

3. Moral self-affirmation: It is a loss of ultimate concern. It threatens man relatively in terms of guilt or absolutely in terms of condemnation.

Anxiety, Tillich says, has to be modified into an object of fear in-order-to escape its nakedness. Once one is faced with nothingness there is no escape from it.<sup>26</sup>

These forms of anxiety are real in life. We can all attest to it . . . so what? Are not these forms of anxiety really superfluous to this study and to the discussion of the man-object relationship? I think not. They are indeed necessary to an understanding of the man-object/world relationship. How does man dissipate anxiety in one's life? He does it through his life of objectification. Therefore in the work of architecture one must strive towards a negation of anxiety rather than to enhance it. If objectifications delimits man, that is to say, situates him, surely it is done with some apprehension of the nonbeing-being structure of man.

Man is no homogenous being. He struggles within

the polarity of non-being and being. In non-being he is faced with absence; in being he strives towards presence.

The concept of life can be further clarified in its ontological categories: the forms of reality which manifest themselves in our immediate experiences and with which we participate whether as an expression of absence or presence of man.

1. Time: To be means to be present. If the present becomes illusory, being is conquered by non-being. All things have a transitory nature. It is impossible to fix the present within the never-stopping temporal flux. Time moves "from a past that is no more towards a future that is not yet through a present which is nothing more than the moving boundary line between past and future."<sup>27</sup> Out of this change of time must emerge a presence--or, be denied. In the transitoriness of time man must seek self-affirmation even in the face of death in time. Things change with time; and we face death. These are essential to man's being and must be resolved in one's existence. Courage gives man the power to affirm himself in the moment between the past and the future.

2. Space: Here architects take notice with alertness--space! What is space, let alone the problem of time? To be is to have space. It is implied by the reality of the present as a mode of time. "Time creates the present through its union with space. In this union, time comes to

a standstill because there is something on which to stand."<sup>28</sup> Man is not a pilgrim on earth in the sense that space is not needed, but needed only by way of functional necessity. The finitude of man necessitates space because he is a pilgrim, never laying claims to space in a permanent way. Therefore, to have no space as in the sense of presence encourages insecurity, and insecurity is an invitation to anxiety. Because space is an ontological category it requires man to be able to affirm his space, his situation, whether a social space or space in the sense of "house." To have space is an affirmation of being. As Tillich says so well, "the present always involves man's presence in it and presence means having something present to one's self over against one's self. . . . The present implies space."<sup>29</sup>

3. Causality: Things and events have no aseity, that is to say, they have no being in and by themselves. It could be said that only God has this by nature. Therefore the question of cause of a thing or some event presupposes that it does not possess its own power of coming into being. To use a Heideggarian expression, things are "thrown" into being, implying that a source exists outside of it. Causality implies the inability of anything to be real in itself but only real in relation to something else. And man as a creature has no necessity by itself and therefore is a prey to non-being. Man as being is contingent and only courage can take within itself

the contingency of causality.

4. Substance: In substance, mind encounters reality. It is present whenever we speak of something. The anxiety over substance is that it will be lost in the flux of time or change. "Changing reality lacks substantiality, the power of being, the resistance against nonbeing."<sup>30</sup> Anxiety is expressed well when one feels the loss of ground on which a person or a group has stood, the loss of one's self-identity or group identity; the fear of accidents. The question of unchangeable substance cannot be silenced. We must face it with courage.

In summary, the ontological elements and categories of being which participate in the being-nonbeing polarity of finitude express most vividly man's predicament, the substance and reality of life itself. They indicate to us the intrinsic nature of man which the architect cannot overlook, the delicate balance he requires in order to exist.

Man faces the possibilities of losing his self-centeredness and subjectivity by being collectivized. In the second polarity, dynamics may lose itself in rigid forms which could then move in the other extreme of formlessness. Or man may be threatened with the loss of freedom because of that which his destiny necessitates, and a contingent freedom implies a loss of destiny.

The categories are of great interest to the architect. It seems as if they speak a language he is more used

to. The meaning that time, space, cause and substance have for existence were already experienced by the De Stijl members but not felt as acutely as Tillich has described them. Time and space have been major preoccupations of the architects; both are 20th century concepts.<sup>31\*</sup> But the reality of them are empty, at least time and space have not been given the existential attention that they should have. Architects know that their forms must take into account both time and space but the tendency is to situate them to one or the other extreme; on the one, as abstraction as it was with De Stijl, on the other, as functional, which is a common expression today.

The ontological elements and categories are also present in Wright's principle of "organic architecture." In this principle they all exist together in dialectical tension. Architecture has no other origin except in the ontological concept of life. Reality is implied in and through the ontological.

With substance we meet the problem of what and how: both go deep into the being of man, for substance goes hand in hand with form, and of course there exists a whole field of arguments between the relationship of what and how that go together in making the form.<sup>32</sup> This issue of what and how remains the pitfall of all architects. It points to the ambiguous nature of substance--permanence in change, the varied forms of permanence itself. And when we

take possession of the form-thing, we lose its substance.

This brings us briefly to the essential--existential dichotomy. Usually we struggle with this dichotomy in terms of which comes first. This struggle is to be avoided. The essential and the existential have a definite relationship to each other.

Essence can be understood in two ways: (1) it is logical, concerned with the "what it is", and therefore it is the universal; (2) it is valuational of that which is imperfect and distorted in a thing. "Essence empowers and judges that which exists."<sup>33</sup>


Existence "stands out" of mere potentiality; it is more than the mere state of potentiality and less than its essential nature. "Existence is the fulfillment of creation; existence gives creation its positive character."<sup>34</sup> The relation that the essential has with the existential follows close to the Aristotelian view: the actual is real but the essential provides its power of being.

Life is the "actuality of being."<sup>35</sup> Life presupposes the polarity of "living being" and "dying being." Life is generic in that it implies a potentiality of being. One is led to the concept of 'life' through the ontological notion of actualization. It unites both the essential and the existential: it has the potential power to become actual, i.e., the potentiality of tree to become treehood. Therefore life is actuality of being. "If the actualization

of the potential is a structural condition of all beings, and if this actualization is called 'life', writes Tillich, "then the universal concept of life is unavoidable."<sup>36\*</sup>

Therefore, it is the ontological concept of life that lifts it out of the organic realm into the existential. Life participates with the universal in its existential realm-- this is the root of its ambiguity.

Life as the dimension of spirit:<sup>37\*</sup>



To see the dimension of spirit in life we must see it as a pyramidal structure based on the Morality-Culture-Religion relationship. They are intricately related so that if one fails to function within the pyramid the others are effected as well; hence the spirit of man suffers and anxiety sets in.

The dimension of spirit-as-morality presupposes a self-integration of life. It is a circular movement going from self-identity to self-alteration and returning to the

self again. The ontological polarity of individuation and participation influence one's morality and self-integration of centeredness which are essential to it.

The dimension of spirit-as-culture presupposes a self-creativity. Its movement is horizontal from centeredness to centeredness. And growth also presupposes centeredness, without which growth could not happen in the first place. The ontological polarity of form and dynamics influences self-creativity. Life lives on life as well as through life. Life as being also implies form. Whereas centeredness is an inorganic dimension, i.e., such as a star, growth is an organic dimension. Culture as a dimension of spirit cultivates everything it encounters in a dialectical fashion in its function of theoria and praxis.

Culture creates the universe of meanings in the dialectics of theoria and praxis, the manifestations of which occur as language and technics. The elements of the cultural creativity are (1) subject matter, i.e., such as architecture, (2) form, as that which is intended and as the configuration of reality, and (3) substance, as the soil out of which one chooses and configures.

The dimension of spirit-as-religion presupposes self-transcendence in a vertical movement. If the polarity of freedom and destiny is not in balance, self-transcendence is jeopardized. While both morality and culture are also self-transcendences, self-transcendence in religion reaches

toward the sublime.

Religion gives morality its ultimate aim, and culture the depth of a cultural meaning; culture gives morality its contents of forms and religion its form of meaning; while morality gives religion a moral self and culture its personal communal forms. Each rests upon the other and an eruption of this balance is detrimental to life as spirit. Perhaps we can better understand Wright's continual reference to architecture as a great spirit of life or at Kahn's obsession with man's institution which rests upon this pyramid. The architect must anticipate this pyramid upon which "spirit" is grounded if he is at all concerned about man as a whole. Tillich, in describing life as an ontological concept in the elements and categories, and the dimension of spirit in life in the separate functions of morality, culture and religion has produced a system which is relevant to all students of architecture. If we begin at the apex of the pyramid of spirit and follow it through to its logical place in the dimension of culture, we must as architects design environments in relation to the other function as well.

Whereas reason is of structure of the mind and the world, spirit is a dynamic actualization of life, and life is ambiguous from our previous discussion.

## OBJECT AS EVENT

In everyday life, man goes about the business of his life without really being aware of its ontological significance as we have described it above. It is worthwhile to describe the everyday life attitude to show the naivety of it against the ontological concept itself.

The commonsense person has an ontic validity and certainty of his world.<sup>38\*</sup> He is surrounded with objects of meaning; he has his modes of validities. Objects are not present to him as manifold but as one. That is to say, the world of objects is taken for granted for what it is, for at least two reasons: (1) most of his world awareness is socially derived and therefore he accepts it without question; (2) he is practical, pragmatical or action oriented. This implies that he operates upon already established indices, and that he is basically a non-reflective individual. The world, as we have said, is meaningful upon this basis: he either affirms or rejects that which comes to be questionable. He is the center of his world because he has this ontic relationship with reality, the world. He moves in and among things in the world. Meanings are 'established' for him. He is project-oriented; he lives in his acts. He experiences the world in its typicality,

i.e., he does not see color spots, incoherent noise, but a world of trees, mountains, animals, buildings, for example, churches, houses, schools, etc., in and among which he moves and which in return resist us, and upon which he acts. The world he knows is one which he must dominate if he wants to carry out his purposes. The world is a centre; it is organized in space and time around one's centre which we could refer to as the centre "0" of a system of coordinates which determine certain dimensions and perspectives of the actions therein: they are above or underneath, before or behind, right or left, nearer or farther, his actual "now" in the origin of all the time--perspectives under which we organize the events within the world, such as the categories of fore and aft, past and future, simultaneity and succession, sooner or later, etc.

A man whose attitude toward his life-world is the natural attitude takes his world, its objects and other people with which he interacts for granted until cause arises to question them. The natural attitude is based upon assumptions and constancies: constancy of the world structure, validity of our experience of the world, the ability to act upon the world and in the world.

The commonsense man reacts to situations and is motivated to respond to new situations through typicalities of past experiences and through systems of relevancies. Some motivation arises that needs explication and

interpretation. But these responses in the natural attitude are pragmatic only, again, because man is basically a project oriented, act-living individual.<sup>39</sup>

### Sign

It is to our benefit to describe the natural attitude of the commonsense world by referring to its sign system. That is, through a sign system man expresses some relation to a world of objects and fellowmen.<sup>40</sup>

First of all, there are the private experiences of the individual in "marks" and "indications," by which he transcends his "here and now" situation in the world. Marks are subjective reminders. It is the simplest form of the appresentational relationship.<sup>41\*</sup> The mark has an arbitrary character; as a vehicle it is relatively irrelevant. Its duty as a mark, be it a broken branch, a pile of stones, etc., has an eminently practical character where one's actual situation within one's manipulatory sphere will be restorable again. An "indication" comes to one's notice when object, fact or event (A) produces object, fact or event (B) without one's knowledge of the interrelationships i.e., smoke indicates fire.

Both marks and indications are forms of appresentational relations of pragmatic motives within one's reach. They have nothing to do with another person, that is, the face-to-face relationship (intersubjectivity).

In the natural attitude the other person "is not

given to me in ordinary presence but only in copresence; it is not presented, but appresented."<sup>42</sup> Thus we have the various systems of signs, expression and language. In these systems man takes for granted that his experience, world-view would be typically the same for the other persons as for him. He assumes that objects, events or facts are empirically identical to one's fellow-man. And while I can never be the other, and the other not me, the world within my actual reach overlaps with his. That is, my world transcends his and his mine. But our environment is common to both. Thus, a sign as a vehicle is necessary to mediate appresentationally between the cogitations of two persons of object, facts or events of the outer world. Signs can be various things: a gesture, an expression, a picture, a language of both the spoken and the written. Signs can be non-discursive, where the structural elements in composition have no independent meanings, therefore speak more spontaneously; and discursive, where the individual signs have independent meanings and can therefore be built up successively to produce thought.<sup>43</sup>

The sign-function establishes itself as a communicative process through typification, abstractions, and standardization. In the natural attitude then, one takes for granted: (1) that we perceive objects, facts and events of the outer world guided by the same system of relevancies until a motive originates which indicates a typicality;

(2) that objects, facts and events are apprehended not as "selves" but as standing out and "calling forth;" (3) that what I say linguistically will be understood by the other as I intended it to.<sup>44</sup>

The sign as we have shown very briefly refers to a commonsense attitude among the people. "The world of everyday life is thus permeated by appresentational references which are simply taken for granted and among which I carry on my practical (working) activities"<sup>45</sup> in terms of commonsense thinking. This world is one of paramount reality to man because it is the world in which he communicates to others.

John Wild summarizes the person in the natural attitude who confuses himself with things (being with beings), and the world with things in the world when he writes:

Failing to recognize the overarching personal structures which give them meaning and their basic ambiguities, he ceases to ask fundamental questions, and gradually gives up his freedom. Losing himself in busyness and care for things, he is easily persuaded by science and objectivistic philosophy to regard himself also as a thing in a world which is fixed and closed. Instead of struggling with language in a creative way to find the real meaning of his world and his own existence, he is content with the unselfconscious patterns of daily talk, accepting their halfconcealed selfcenteredness, and their gaping ambiguities. Abandoning himself to the care for things and to the others who are ready to use him, he talks and lives in the mode of oneness, seeing the objects that one sees, talking as one talks, and doing the things one does.<sup>46\*</sup>

We have some implications so far. It is essential for us to see the naive world of man--an impoverishment

that the person is not alone to be blamed for.

1. The life-world of our everyday world is pretty much taken for granted. This is true mainly because of a pre-established and ordered world into which we are born--a world that will survive us. In real life we are born into the institutions of man. But his relationship to objects and fellow-men in the world are assumed. Because man is practical oriented, his project, his decisions, his communications, etc., become forms of expediences. Man is nonreflective in orientation. Hence, one sees there a house, here a house; our daily lives are filled with objects that we manipulate, i.e., cars, household objects, etc. And as we have seen in the brief review of marks, indications and signs, man uses them too in his manipulatory sphere as means to ends. The awareness of this common attitude has caused recent phenomenologists to reflect upon what the life-world is really like.

2. The architect is caught up as well in this manipulatory sphere. He is destined to work within the commonsense world. And he too must ask the question all over again what the life-world is really like. The architect should not theorize or conceptualize apart from the question of the life-world. This however, is the anxiety of the architect: he too can be caught up in commonsense thinking where one's relationship to the world of objects is a manipulatory sphere. If he remains naive

about the nature of the life-world<sup>47\*</sup> he can only project himself into his work for all other kinds of reasons none of which come to terms with the life-world. The architect then has two alternatives: (i) either he remains in the common-sense attitude where the life-world is not what it appears to be (natural attitude); or, (ii) he chooses to find out what that life-world is all about, the way man fundamentally lives and transcends in life. If the architect sees his work to be a creative act then knowledge of the life-world is essential. In contrast to this is the manipulatory sphere.

3. We could say now that because of our naive attitude, our manipulatory motives, other areas have received undue justice. Because we are unable to relate ourselves to the reality of the life-world itself, we have discussions in aesthetics<sup>48\*</sup> such as, "we like" or "we do not like" objects, creating further distance between man and object with the result being a worsening relationship; we have the various views on language as a system of signs which formulate our thoughts and communicate them, about representation, art, etc.

4. Finally, in view of the fact that a plenum of substitutes and impoverishments separate the naive man from his life-world, the architect has a double foreboding challenge: (i) to see through the "cloak of ideas" of everyday life where things are seen as things, and (ii) to

diminish that impoverished reality with a clearer understanding of the nature of the life-world. It is the duty of the architect to transcend the commonness of everyday life.

For the most part of his life, man lives naively because he lives in a world already structured for him, but also because he takes it for granted. To take something for granted is something quite different from implicatedness or inhabitation which we shall encounter in section III. The sign operates in the pejorative sense of the object. It is indifferent and manipulatory and an end in itself. The sign is non-reflective. In appresentation the appresented term is a given as it were, and not part of consciousness itself.

John Wild is correct when he says that a "war of the world"<sup>49</sup> is on. In the one sense the sign operates arbitrarily as it does in science; in the other sense sign has meaning and is the means by which our life transcends the situation itself.

Therefore, while the sign has the tendency to be indifferent, it does not depict the reality of the life-world itself. We must now understand the sign also in the sense of meaning and being. When the object is understood as meaning and being then man and object merge: it is a relationship of self-knowledge.

## Language

Language is generally a system of signs. If we are interested in getting back to the origin of things, how can language help towards that end? Man is a being of language, or as some might prefer, language is man's being. Language in the spoken sense, is form of man's objectified world. And in this sense it is of value to enquire into its nature.

Views held to by both the idealists and the realists hold that the world itself has no meaning: the one, that words are concepts for meanings; and the other, that words are psychical phenomena.<sup>50\*</sup> Merleau-Ponty surpasses both views by going back to speech itself which tradition has seemingly ignored when he says, "language and the understanding of language apparently raise no problems. The linguistic and intersubjective world (an obvious reference to the natural attitude world) no longer surprises us, we no longer distinguish it from the world itself and it is a world already spoken and speaking that we think."<sup>51</sup>

Emulating the Saussurian concept of language as a bi-polar structure of la langue (which is the 'tongue' of a culture) and la parole (which is the spoken language), Merleau-Ponty plunges directly into la parole (which we shall hereafter refer to as speech) to get at "meaning" itself. The concern must be (for us as architects) "the object's mode of presence to the subject."<sup>52\*</sup> And speech does this in relation to language.

From studies carried out in relation to "aphasia," Merleau-Ponty carefully notes that a patient has not 'lost' a certain supply of words but a certain 'way' of using them. Hence, it is no longer simply a question of an automatic language, of word-images; rather, a question of attitude, of relating<sup>53</sup>--an orientation or, if you will, a Weltanschauung. And on the basis of a "gesture," which has meaning in its movement, or simply in its appearance, i.e., anger does not convey a concept of anger, the gesture is anger. Thus together (1) one's lost ability to use words, and (2) the notion of gesture as meaning, Merleau-Ponty concludes: "the word has meaning."<sup>54</sup> Speech does not presuppose thought; it is not a representative of thought; recognition does not follow designation. Rather, "the word bears the meaning, and by imposing it on the object, I am conscious of reaching that object."<sup>55</sup> To a child the name of an object is the very essence of that object. Therefore, in one's simple existence one learns that "thought is speech."<sup>56</sup>

The sound-image of a word as signifier and its concept as signified dissolves in the word and gives it meaning; it is a sign, an essence in speech, reflecting and constituting meaning-as-lived. By going back to speech Merleau-Ponty goes deep into the existential situation, the preconscious mode of existence. "Communication among people is a holistic system of signs moving through the synergism of individual perception and expression, towards a state of

equilibrium which is personal or shared meaning."<sup>57</sup> This, in my opinion, is the main point about Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on language.

In speech we discover the simultaneity of perception and expression, in other words, the personal experience of self, the human embodiment. In one's living acts, mind and body are present in a unitary presence. The whole investigation of speech centers in the notion of the body-subject--an unhyphenated existence--which will be discussed again in the next section. Here we want to suggest that in the situation, in the moment of living, doing, speaking and silence, in the act of speech, the existential mode of being is also simultaneously the human embodiment; it is one's objectified orientation in one's life-world. This is important for us to understand.

Speech stresses the primordially of embodiment. As Merleau-Ponty says:

Thought and speech overlap one another like two reliefs . . . . Expression is a matter of reorganizing things-said, affecting them with a new index of curvature, and bending them to a certain enhancement of meaning. . . . Speaking to others (or to myself), I do not speak of my thoughts; I speak them, and what is between them--my afterthoughts and underthoughts. . . . Thus things are said and are thought by a Speech and by a Thought which we do not have but has us.<sup>58</sup>

Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the risk that is involved in existential speech; for the moment I speak I am incontestably linked together with the other.<sup>59</sup>

In speech we get to the fibres of a person's lived-

experience. However, the existential rests upon the sign-to-signification, that is the sedimented experience of a person, a culture which has made up their language (empirical speech). In contrast to sign-to-signification, we encounter in speech (authentic speech) the sign-as-signification preconscious phenomenon. This is the lived situation. Speech as a preconscious mode of existence means that I hear the word as I say it silently to myself, or audibly to others. This is referred to as sign-as-signification. Thinking before speaking occurs on a conscious level only and thus rests on the sign-to-signification. Merleau-Ponty says, "Speech, as distinguished from language, is that moment when the significative intention (still silent and wholly in act) proves itself capable of incorporating itself into my culture and the culture of others--of shaping me and others by transforming the meaning of cultural instruments."<sup>60</sup> The act of speech looks for its equivalences in a system of available significations represented by language itself.<sup>61</sup> But in one's use of words the sentence gives it its meaning. The variations that a word can really have are discovered in speech. Language thrives on speech; it is "both the repository and residue of acts of speech."<sup>62</sup> In speaking, the meaning comes into being.

Meaning is produced in the synergic connection of the sign and not in the individual signs themselves. The synergism comes through word and silence and word, and so


on. As we said earlier, in empirical speech words are joined together (structure and grammar) synthetically; it is restricted to the in-itself of language as a whole. In contrast, in speech words are joined synergically and meaning is a derivative of the whole; it creates lived-experiences. "A speaker in his use of communication elements (language, voice, gesture, etc.,) can express transcendent signs that form an existential meaning not dependent on empirical meanings,"<sup>63</sup> where transcendent signs refers to speaking. A word in speech belongs to a field.

In perception speech gives rise to thought; in expression speech is empirically expressed. That is to say, existential speech is a mixture of authentic speech and empirical speech joined and indivisible. The will to express and means of expression are like the productive forces and the forms that produce. Perhaps Merleau-Ponty said it most subtly when he said that "the more energetic our intention to see the things themselves, the more the appearances by which they are expressed and the words by which we express them will be interposed between the things and us."<sup>64</sup>

### Symbolism


By briefly considering symbolism we reinforce what we have already concluded in language, and enhance our investigation into the world of objects.

Schutz distinguishes the symbol from the sign in that the symbol is an appresentational relation requiring the appresenting member and the appresented member (by copresence) and the interpreter.<sup>65</sup> It differs from the sign-relation in that the member in copresence with the appresenting member transcends the reality of the natural attitude.



And the way one usually transcends his natural attitude, or the way one encounters the mode of symbolism is through a "shock,"<sup>66</sup> that is, the moment producing self-consciousness, not unconsciousness. We could by way of example say in the outset that a building as a symbolic presence is the essence of architecture.

In contrast to Schutz's definition of symbolism there is i.e., Langer's definition in which the symbol-function has four terms: subject, symbol, conception, and object,<sup>67</sup> which can be diagrammed like this:



Langer exceedingly complicates the symbol-function. Here we meet the familiar problem that we found with the idealist notion of the 'word', namely, that the word is a concept for a meaning. Here we have the same treatment given to symbolism. It is a conception of an object for us.<sup>68</sup> She says "a symbol is an instrument of thought."<sup>69</sup> We encounter the same problem we encountered in language. Langer says a name does not signify a person; it just denotes him: a word does not have a meaning; it is a concept for a meaning. This would be her argument. A symbol does not have meaning; it is a conception of a meaning. Merleau-Ponty has clearly demonstrated above, that thought does not presuppose speech: they occur simultaneously. This is essential for embodiment.

Therefore Schutz has clarified the problem of symbolism in his definition. Symbolism, as difficult as it may be for someone to apprehend, simply is an existential experience, an awareness transcending the everyday world.

Jasper has written

'The symbol cannot be interpreted except by other symbols. The understanding of a symbol does not, therefore, consist in grasping its significance in a relational way but in experiencing it existentially in the symbolic intention as this unique reference to something transcendent that vanishes at the limiting point.'<sup>70</sup>

This means a continual sense of embodiment in further clarification to ourselves of the symbolic. Surely the symbolic is wrapped up with the essentials of transcendence that is so peculiarly unique to man in his continual struggle for self-fulfillment. Symbolism has its root in the human condition, therefore, implied is a certain mode of being different from the empirical sign of the everyday world. In speech the sign testified to one's existential presence, that is, to man's objectified presence in a preconscious mode. The symbol also calls for an objectified presence of man but in a fully conscious one. The sign could be manipulated in the natural attitude; the symbol cannot be manipulated--unless it condescends to becoming an empirical sign--because it does not exist on that level; it exists on a conscious level only. Symbolism is a call to experience. Cassirer writes that the symbolic realm of man in the more primitive societies, man, nature and myth came to dominate as a superstructure of life.<sup>71</sup> In this world, totemism served the primitive by ordering his superstitious world--whatever totemism meant, however superficial it may have been, it was as close to him as

speech is to us.

But we face a different problem in our reflective world. Our situation is neither that of magic, although our naiveness seems like magic, nor the pure scientific world where symbols are arbitrary. The architect's world of creation is not arbitrary; it must seek that ontological identity of man to object as thought to speech. The presence of man rules out the pure magic or the pure science. "Man's apprehension, expression, and communication are fundamentally involved in whatever exists between symbols and what is symbolized."<sup>72</sup> Man grasps through symbolism: this is his existence. Paul Ricoeur says that symbols give rise to thought. We said earlier that the "thought is speech" awareness was preconscious and symbolism was this kind of dialectical tension; it also occurred on the conscious mode. Ricoeur agrees with this when he says "a meditation on symbols starts from speech that has already taken place, and in which everything has already been said in some fashion; it wishes to be thought with its pre-supposition."<sup>73</sup> This means that one stops in his speech and remembers.

The preceding has tended towards a collusion of the man-object/world. We may now come to some brief provisional conclusions before we proceed into that mysteriousness of the "conscious act."

1. We said that architecture presupposes man. We

can already see how. It is the nature of man to strive for fulfillment. The ontological categories and elements indicate how delicately being is composed. Any imbalance causes anxiety. This reflects itself in our everyday thoughts and work. Even the architect can experience this moment of anxiety which causes him to stop and think. The existential continually actualizes the essential which gives existence the power to be. Man's spirit is built upon a pyramid whose point is out of sight, but we nevertheless keep on looking. This too is part of man's mysteriousness. Can man afford to shatter any hope there might be in this 'look'?

2. The commonsense world shows despairingly the impoverishment of one's existence. The world is propagandized and the people are suckers. People together with objects in the world are things. And we think ourselves as the centers of the world. A thing has one unquestioned meaning instead of manifold meanings.

3. The insight we have gained into language by Merleau-Ponty that thought is speech, the existential mode of embodiment that it implies and symbolism which builds upon this existential base, shows us that what is ontological in man is correctly fulfilled in objectification. In other words, to be means to objectify. As Merleau-Ponty has said "that one does not go beyond the world except by entering into it and that the spirit makes use of the world, time, speech, and history in a single moment and

animates them with meaning which is never used up."<sup>74</sup> It is the function of architecture to give visibility to this meaning as an accomplished fact; it must give architecture to man's existence.

The ontological concept is best visualized if we suggested that by the 'ontological' we see invisible strands which link the object to man as do the strings from the puppet to man, who animates the puppet with life, where our attention is not the man with the strings but the animated puppet, then perhaps we begin to understand the man-object identity--the object as an ontological extension of man.

4. We see man and object merge as the essential meets the existential in the actual. They cannot be thought of separately. In fact, by talking about the ontological, we are talking about the object and vice versa. And the ontological is never satisfied, it forever wants fulfillment. Architecture must serve that fulfillment, be part of its process. And as such it cannot be arbitrary, or create imbalance.

5. The moment man and object meet, as consciousness does in its bi-polar structure, subjectivity tending toward objectivity, we reach the edge of the creative act. We have then reached the moment of thought. And as Ricoeur says with which we agree: "It is this articulation of thought positing and thinking that constitutes the critical point of our whole enterprize."<sup>75</sup> His statement can easily

be applied to our enterprise as well which is engaged in the man-object/world question, which is really the enterprise of life.

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (1947; rpt. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 193. "'Galen' means animated clad without soul."

<sup>2</sup>Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, 7th ed. (1952; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 139-140.

<sup>3</sup>Van Eyck, "Place and Occasion," p. 155.

<sup>4</sup>Arthur Erickson, "The University: A New Visual Environment," The Canadian Architect, 13, No. 1 (1968), p. 28.

<sup>5</sup>Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1 (1951), 2 (1957), 3 (1963), (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), number of volumes in one. A knowledge of man presupposes an understanding of his world, its structures and values. In other words, a knowledge of man presupposes an understanding of the nature of man. We refer to this knowledge as ontology. Whereas ontic refers to one's basic and simple existence or situation, as "being," ontology refers to the philosophical nature of being itself.

<sup>6</sup>Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 61.

<sup>7</sup>Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man?, 1962 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 8.

<sup>8</sup>Buber, The Knowledge of Man (New York: Harper and Row Pub., 1965). His article in it entitled "Distance and Relation".

<sup>9</sup>Edmund Husserl is the chief exponent of influence of the subject-object polarity. At the beginning of the 20th century he found phenomenology whose chief principle is that there can be no consciousness of the subject without an object; they are interdependent in consciousness.

<sup>10</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1, p. 171.

<sup>11</sup>Buber, Knowledge of Man, pp. 62-63.

<sup>12</sup>Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 204.

<sup>13</sup>Tillich, The Courage to Be,

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>15</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p. 178.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 180-181.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>19</sup>Pannenberg, What is Man?, p. 9.

<sup>20</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p. 184.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>24</sup>Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963), p. 94.

<sup>25</sup>Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 40ff.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>27</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p. 193.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>31</sup>The problems of space and time have been encountered in philosophy since the time of Aristotle. However, Existentialism has situated space and time in a new existential sense, beyond the scientific and universal sense of empiricism and intellectualism. The same could be argued in architecture. To be sure, space and time have received considerable attention in the architecture, for example of the Renaissance and Baroque Periods. In these Periods space and time were very processional in conception. However, today space and time are quite existential in nature. I am thinking of the work of Wright and the whole De Stijl movement. The essence of 20th century architecture is its conscious consideration of time and space.

<sup>32</sup>John Dewey, Art as Experience, 14th ed. (1934); New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), "Substance and Form," p. 106ff.

<sup>33</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p. 203.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 203-204.

<sup>35</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, pp. 11-12.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., Tillich describes the self-actualization of life in his 3rd volume pp. 30-106. My reference to "pyramid" is not explicitly implied by Tillich. It is my way of seeing the relationship of the three functions which operate together to create the dimensions of spirit in man and life.

<sup>38</sup>See footnote 5.

<sup>39</sup>Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1954; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 1 (1967), 3 (1966), referring especially to articles "Some structure of the life-world", Vol. 3, and "Common-sense and scientific interpretation of human actions," Vol. 1.

<sup>40</sup>Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society," Collected Papers 1.

<sup>41</sup>Appresentation is a concept employed by Husserl in Cartesian Meditations, 4th imp. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), sections 50-54. Schutz develops his articulate views on sign and symbol referentials with the concept of appresentation, pp. 294-300. Collected Papers 1. Appresentation is a kind of pairing or coupling where two or more data are intuitively given in consciousness as a unity. For example, I see an object which I apperceive as a cube because while I see only one side at a time I apperceive by analogy the unseen sides. Therefore, in appresentation I have the presence of both the appresented and appresenting members which are given together in a mode of consciousness. Appresentation can also be referred to as "analogical apperception."

<sup>42</sup>Schutz, Collected Papers, p. 314.

<sup>43</sup>Susan Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: The New American Library, 1951).

<sup>44</sup> Schutz, Collected Papers 1, pp. 327-28.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 328.

<sup>46</sup> John Wild, "Man and His Life-World," (ls-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 104.

<sup>47</sup> The life-world is a new and difficult concentration in phenomenology. In the history of philosophy the question of origin, which refers to the life-world, has received attention from such eminent philosophers as Kant and Hume. Kant held that minds never get to things as they really are; it only sees them in its own terms--mind seeing its own represented thing. Hume held that no mind can defend the validity of knowledge, nonetheless, man cannot help but know things. Other views would hold that you do not really have two substances, mind and non-mind, but end up saying that mind generates this kind of spiritual substance itself. In trying to get back to the so-called life-world, is to say, "What springs from it when it turns towards its own origin misrepresents itself--misrepresents those origins, misrepresents its own roots." Therefore the efforts of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others have devoted themselves to the task of describing the life-world as it really is before methods and theories are pronounced upon it. And the way you get to the life-world as Husserl has pointed out is to see the mind-nonmind in a bi-polar tension or significance, which are in an intentional thrust. The conscious act is a moment where the "intentional" points to a bi-polar significance. This discussion is a summary of a discussion with Dr. Ron Bruzina who has studied phenomenology in U.S.A., and in Paris with the eminent phenomenologist, Paul Ricoeur, and is presently teaching in Kentucky. He has been of great help to me in my study in the few times I have seen him. Any shortcomings are attributed to my fairly recent contact with Existentialism and Phenomenology as such, and not to Dr. Bruzina (June 2, 1972).

<sup>48</sup> Arnold Berleant, The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1970). This book discusses the various aesthetic theories developed so far in philosophy. Berleant characterizes them as being "surrogate" and set out to describe aesthetics as a "field of awareness." This point is in sympathy with the emphasis of this project: aesthetics talks about things while we are concerned with life as world of manifold experiences.

<sup>49</sup> Wild, "Man and His Life-World," p. 107.

<sup>50</sup>The Wittgensteinian view regards the word "as the sign of a concept in a thinking subject who thinks without speech. When the concept is present in the inner mind, the word comes automatically as a mere instrument." Wild, "Man and His Life-World," p. 102; the Bloomfieldian view holds that words are psychical phenomena comparable to neurological stimulus (behaviorist's view), Philip E. Lewis, "Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenology of language," Structuralism, Jacques Ehrman, ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 12, 18. In both views man is not present but adrift.

<sup>51</sup>Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 4th imp. (1945; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967), p. 184. The remark in parenthesis is mine.

<sup>52</sup>"The reason why the return to the Lebenswelt (and particularly the return from objectified language to speech) is considered absolutely necessary is that philosophy must reflect upon the object's mode of presence to the subject-- upon the conception of the object and of the subject as they appear to the phenomenological revelation--instead of replacing them by the object's relationship to the subject as an idealistic philosophy of total reflection conceives of it." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, 2nd pr. (1960; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 92.

<sup>53</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 175ff.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>57</sup>Richard L. Lanigan, "Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Communication," Philosophy Today, 14 (Summer, 1970), pp. 80-81.

<sup>58</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 19.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>62</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 196.

<sup>63</sup>Lanigan, "Phenomenology of Communication," p. 86.

<sup>64</sup>Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy (1953; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 20.

<sup>65</sup>Schutz, Collected Papers, 1, p. 343. See footnote 5 for the concept of appresentation.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 342-343.

<sup>67</sup>Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 63.

<sup>68</sup>Langer follows Wittgenstein in her development of the symbol-function, *ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>70</sup>Schutz, Collected Papers, 1, p. 332.

<sup>71</sup>Ernest Cassirer, An Essay On Man (1944); New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 83f.

<sup>72</sup>Morgan, The Human Predicament, p. 283.

<sup>73</sup>Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 348.

<sup>74</sup>Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy, p. 9.

<sup>75</sup>Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, p. 349.

SECTION III

## THE CONSCIOUS ACT

By investigating the man-object/world relationship we are indirectly concerned with the conscious act, or the creative act as the artist refers to it. The preceding has been background work towards this end. Perhaps it is to our benefit to recapitulate what has been said to prepare the way for further clarification of the man-object/world question.

1. In the laboratory experience we are primarily concerned with the process of design. Here we do not want to again separate the laboratory experience into terminology, design, history and criticism as we did in section I. They, in my opinion, are all a synergical part of the process itself. They are the background against which the process operates. But we are now concerned with this process, the attitude with which it proceeds, especially in relation to the man-object/world question we have posed for ourselves.

An architectural work is an object assembled through a process. Different processes will inevitably give different objects as end results. That is to say, there are very different attitudes that can guide the whole process. We can distinguish between the attitudes of process as subjective or as objective. In philosophy this

distinction would be referred to as idealism or as realism.<sup>1</sup> In both cases the process remains an abstract. And it is this form of abstraction (by which we mean either being out of touch with man himself or being independent of the being of man) of process that interests us and which we wish to look into briefly.

In architecture there is the erroneous notion that the subjective attitude is not tolerated. As a result we have different reactions to this notion: (1) the architect will make every effort possible to avoid the so called subjective attitude and be as 'objective' as possible; (2) the architect will pride himself with his subjective attitude as an advantage over other architects who criticize him. With this subjective attitude the architect feels that while he isn't able to tell one too well what it is he is doing or how he goes about it, that it is all very inexplicable, he nevertheless looks upon it as the work of his intuitions.

In the first case the architect avoids any subjective involvement on his personal part, and strongly emphasizes the program as the operative schema around which design then occurs. The computer is used to aid the program, collect its data, organize it, and even suggest concepts and ideas for design. The process as such turns out to function as a process of translation. The designer remains impartial towards the program, not permitting his

personality to influence the outcome and thereby jeopardize the program itself. The object grows out of the program and becomes an independent objective entity.

In the second case, the architect who remains true to his so called intuitive ability, has fears that perhaps his attitude towards architecture is naive and that the object is indeed too complicated, the context too amorphous for him to simply just think of beautiful objects.<sup>2</sup> Such fears have the effect of slipping into the other attitude.

Hence, the objective view emphasizes the program, and process is translation. With the subjective view the emphasis is on beautiful objects and the process is intuition.<sup>3</sup>

We could go on contrasting the two views held by architects which to a large degree guide their process implicitly. The point of observation that we want to make and which is critical in our investigation is that neither view really tackles the problem. Kierkegaard's point about anonymity is true in both cases.<sup>4</sup> There is no centre to either--in both cases there is an urgent need to know more about the man-object relationship. For example, the architect who tries to carry out faithfully the demands of the program, paradoxically encounters the problem of manifestation. In manifestation occur all the problems; it is a problem of knowing. The designer cannot remain faithful to objective demands. As an architect he is

called to make a commitment. He could argue in return that it was the program that held his hand of every move, every line, every shape, etc., the form, throughout the whole process. Therefore, he would remain true to the program. But then a critic says that it is unimaginative (whether he means by imaginative, eidos or just fancy). Implied is the disturbing fact that imagination is invariably linked up with process. The architect who only cares about beautiful objects fears that it lacks the theory to support the manifestation itself. Here process mixes with the question "What is beautiful?" Process becomes an infra-structure of the perceiving and the perceived.

Both types of architects inevitably encounter the problem of the heuristic leap; that is, one can make that leap meaningfully only through a commitment. But neither attitude recognizes the problem as such. The one is afraid of "imagination" and avoids it by becoming frozen in the program; the other imagines beautiful objects but fears fancy, in case there is no theory to support it.

In its emerging struggle, the creative act is engulfed by a process that either translates or blindly follows its inexplicable intuition. And this kind of procedure of process is without any form of faith whatever. The architect who would find his work as a derivative of some abstract process, functioning and willing, independent of man, would emulate the philosopher who reflects without

faith and calls his reflections experience, truth.<sup>5</sup>

So our first issue points out the contradictions in the architect-object relationship. Process emerges as some superstructure encompassing the man-object polarity relationship. The architect's work while carried out in a business fashion, is not a business but a work concerned with life.

2. We must not misunderstand the presupposition within our first issue. It is the process itself that is devoid of any faith. As architects we are, however, apprehensive about the dehumanizing effect that the process can have in one's work. This is evident by the way we move to either extreme; they are positions taken by us because we are aware of our own misgivings in the actual act of creating the object. But how can we in our apprehensions be guided back to that relationship which arcs between man and object?

One would think that guidance should come from the history of architecture itself. The architecture in our century is amazingly continuous and diverse, if not also proliferous. It is marked with a flux of change which indicates that a great deal of thought is being given to the phenomenon of architecture. The century begins with such buildings as the Steiner House by Adolf Loos which exemplifies a new age against ornament, and the pure plane becomes a new experiential and visual force in architecture especially in the work of such architects as Mies van der

Rohe and Le Corbusier and others in the 1920's. Such concepts as universal space (which in my opinion is characteristic of Mies' work--"Less is more") the pure plane and the primary shape in their implementation, are 20th century concepts. Then we have the pioneering work of Wright in his prairie style houses especially in the Willitts, Martin and Robie houses, in Unity Temple and Larkin Building, etc.,-- all before 1910, as expressions of existential space, organic unity, mastery of machine and materials. In 1952 Louis Kahn introduced into the history of architecture his Yale Meuseum and later on the Richards Laboratory building, as expressions of order, space and structure, as expressions of the brutal and muscular, as expressions of the systems and parts that together make the whole, as expressions of man's intuitions, his finitude and architecture as the expression of man's search for infinitude. The Smithsonians also advance a brutal architecture which Banham characterizes as a 'moral' architecture. But in the last decade new, bold and mysterious advances have occurred in the field of architecture: the cities of Archigram which are obsessed with industrial images such as Peter Cook's 'Plug-in-city', a network megastructure of lifts and service tubes, or his vertical city planned for Montreal in the image of an oil refinery; Dennis Crompton's 'Computer City' in the image of miniature solid state electronic circuits; or, Ron Herron's walking cities, gigantic monsters in the image of

tanks. "Architecture will become infinite and transient. At last the dividing line between the things which carry around in the palm of the hand and the whole city will merge together as parts of the hierarchy of designed, phased, chosen objects; to suit the condition and requirement of the time they will be able to be changed for something better."<sup>6</sup> On the family scale we have The Time House to which we have already made a reference; the Pavilions at Osaka 70 by Japanese architects where an emphasis is on the separation of content and form, for the pneumatic and the metaphysical. Within this change one wonders how something permanent could be manifested so dexterously. As long as the architect is concerned with the notion of permanence within the vast flux of change, he will also be confused about the nature of architecture. The question of permanence is at the same time a question of, "what is architecture?" Therefore, one must first solve the question of permanence.

Our century also does not lack in architectural writings. However, as we indicated in section I, the writings themselves, the definitions great architects of our modern age have given architecture, are cryptic. They talk about man and meaning and the metaphysical. The writings search for the essence of architecture as much as we are searching for it. But one thing is clear: these architects talk about architecture as some extension of

man. "As the man, so the drama, so the architecture."<sup>7</sup>

The question of permanence is at the same time a question about architecture. And these questions with which we struggle are the invisible inner forces of the process itself. So once again we have arrived at the beginning of our investigation: to reflect about the man-object/world relationship. As long as we wonder about permanence we will remain uncertain about the process too. The whole enterprise of architecture is a question of life. The question of life appears against the background of history as such. "History is the manifestation of essential being under the conditions of existence."<sup>8</sup> We have our architectural history but we need to understand it's sense of human embodiment for it to be the ground of understanding in our work. The problem we face is how we can recognize history as meaning in the first place. And here the essential problem of process itself as we face it in the laboratory is our starting point.

One thing that we recognize most forcefully is that this inextricable relationship of the man-object/world question must be elucidated within the field of architecture. Since it is the relationship, the world relationship itself that we question, our reflection must begin by reflecting on man as being, and on the object as an extension of that being.

3. Our brief investigation into the man-object

dichotomy has already implied a basic relationship as far as our study is concerned. Tillich has captured it in a nutshell:

Whenever man has looked at his world, he has found himself a stranger in the world of objects, unable to penetrate it beyond a certain level of scientific analysis. And then he has become aware of the fact that he himself is the door to the deeper levels of reality, that in his own existence he has the only possible approach to existence itself.<sup>9</sup>

While man "dwells" in his objectifications, he at the same time transcends the act of dwelling.

In section II we were concerned with the essence of man, since architecture is an extension of man and therefore responsible to him. But we cannot find the 'essence' in man alone.<sup>10</sup> The essence of man lies in his relation to something, hence we are referred to the situation where essence as such is actualized. In section II we showed the relationships between the essential and the existential. The ontological structure of man is a dialectic of this relationship.

Tillich describes the finitude of man through an ontological description, i.e., the being-nonbeing dichotomy, and the "ultimate concern" that it implies. Man is continually striving towards that which he is not. Tillich's ontology however is based on the self-world correlation. Ultimate reality takes on significance as in one's situation. The ontological character of the situation, of Dasein (being there) is an incitement to seek after ultimate reality. If

this incitement after ultimate reality can be described as a vertical movement, then Tillich shows at the same time that it cannot be achieved without the horizontal movement as well; hence the self-world correlation. The entrance of the ontological concept of life occurs in the act of dwelling. The ontological concepts explain the form of objectification. The creative act aims at creating presence.

In the second part of section II where we discussed the world of objects, we mainly contrasted the everyday world of man where man seems to occupy the center "O" where everything is taken for granted: the world, its objects, man's institutions, etc., and the world as a manipulatory sphere, to the world of phenomenal man where the world is an open horizon with experienceable possibilities. In the first mode of being, man is nonreflective; in the second he is reflective, for example, man in relation to the symbol according to Schutz and Ricoeur.

The kind of criticism that this contrast is susceptible to is the kind given by Erazim Kohák. He feels and rightly so that in a state of crisis the existentialist has overreacted and that his categories are inadequate to account for immediate experience itself. His basic thesis is that "it is that things initially present themselves in immediate experience not as objects but as fellow beings, capable of functioning both as it and as thou."<sup>11</sup>

Existentialism has affirmed the uniqueness of man's subjectivity by leaving the thing-world to the scientist.<sup>12</sup> In everyday experience the thing-world is neutral. Kohák illustrates what he means with a "play-experience" of a child with her teddy bear. In 'play' the object does not present itself first as a thing or an it; it presents itself either as an it or a thou. "It is by going out and giving herself to her bear that the child brings out the bear's capacity for being a companion."<sup>13</sup> He therefore sees the man-object relationship being dependent upon a giving-receiving action, precisely one of encounter.

The conclusions we can draw from Kohák's work is that it confirms our understanding of the world relationship so far, or at least we hope to avoid contrasting the everyday world as simply being out of relation with the world of things, and that only in an intense being-there situation every moment of our lives is the situation to be in the world. The thing-world has the potential of entering into a meaningful relationship with man. But Kohák's affirmation that a meaningful man-object relationship as a thou relationship is a conclusion in harmony with our understanding of the existential, meaningful situation. His conclusion helps in part to explain why people in their everyday attitude can get along in an impoverished world. While this isn't the place to argue about our impoverished world, as architects we are keenly interested in the thou-relation

of being-in-the-world. Kohák agrees that if the thing-world remained in our daily lives as an it-relationship, life would indeed be tragic.

Therefore of underlying importance for any further investigation is the notion of world: it is the background against which one really can understand the man-object dichotomy. By world Merleau-Ponty means a "world no longer conceived as a collection of determinate objects, but as the horizon latent in all our experience and itself ever-present and anterior to every determining thought."<sup>14</sup> John Wild says much the same thing. The world is not a timeless, abstract, universal concept, but a spatio-temporal, concrete situation. It is not a thing or a collection of things. "It is rather the horizon of real meaning within which any such thing or collection must occur, if it is really to be."<sup>15</sup> For the purposes of our study we want to think of world horizon as being the horizon of our lived existence.

With these three introductory remarks we proceed to inquire about the conscious act. But before we do so, some ideas are already apparent.

First of all, the conscious act operates within the subject-object dichotomy. We must clarify this structure for our selves--an operation not independent of man but which is vitally of man. Second, we must then clarify to ourselves what is meant by Being-in-the World. How does man begin to situate himself? By attempting to investigate

these questions we hope--and if only faintly--to grasp the roots of the creative act.

Edmond Husserl's notion of consciousness has immediate implications to the designing architect, or for that matter, to any creative person. Husserl says in his Ideas: "It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something."<sup>16</sup> Husserl refers to the peculiarity of consciousness as "consciousness of something" as intentionality.<sup>17</sup> That is to say, every subject is directed towards an object, i.e., perceiving in the perceiving of something or a thing, loving in the loved, etc. Explained in another way, "every act of consciousness, in order to be an act, demands a certain object because every conscious act intends something."<sup>18</sup> In my act, the intentional act, the subject-object polarity is present. Thus, we have the self-world correlation, i.e., in Tillich's ontological concepts in the preceding part. The character of the act is such that in consciousness the object is co-determined with the act.

Husserl goes to great lengths to show how the intuition grasp of the object in the act is carried out through his famous reductions, which suspends everything that would prevent him from explicating the act as such under consideration. It is beyond the scope of this study to get involved in methodical procedures because of the complexity of its nature. However, a further study of 'method'

in architecture would benefit from an investigation of the phenomenological methods developed by Husserl. Here we can only imply briefly what the way of phenomenology is all about. First of all, everybody has experienced a kind of 'shock' in his daily experiences where he had to stop and take stock as the particular incident demanded. That is, we had to set distance, so to speak, within this shock and re-evaluate the problem at hand. At this level taking stock perhaps is still on the naive level since most of the time they are fairly minor, and they tend to be carried out within our act of everyday life. The second way to explain what phenomenology is all about is to say that it's philosophical hope is to 'make explicit' what has hitherto been implicit. In the process, it suspends everything that one normally tends to take for granted--even the epistemological propositions of traditional philosophies. For example, I set the task of understanding my own beliefs which I know are a result of my whole background. I gained my beliefs by rejecting some and affirming others. But to focus on 'belief' as such I must disengage myself from the so called 'lived-in' situation of acceptance or rejection as such and study it in respect of its complexity, scope, stratafication, evidence, placement, presuppositions, and the like. Important is the shift-of-attention from the lived-in situation to that of an observer, disclosing the correlation between

myself-as-believer and the belief-as-believed-by-me. In other words, it is an inquiry for the knowledge of belief. As Husserl says "instead of living in them (i.e., our beliefs) and carrying them out, we carry out acts of reflexion directed towards them, and these we apprehend as the absolute Being which they are. We now live entirely in such acts of the second level, whose datum is the infinite field of absolute experiences--the basic field of phenomenology."<sup>19</sup> It is essentially a critical enquiry of origins and understanding, the logos of being as such. The final way to explain what phenomenology is all about is to explain it as a theory of consciousness: the whole noetic-noematic complex. It is a process of consciousing of which its most generic feature is its attentiveness to objects. What this reflective turn amounts to is to explicate the intentional-character of the process and activity of consciousness. "It is in virtue of this character that physical and cultural objects, animate beings, other humans, the life-world and myself come to have the various and complex meanings they are reflectively discovered to have."<sup>20</sup> In this disengaged and neutral reflective state, objects are considered strictly as intended, as meant or as experienced. Therefore, involved first of all is a neutrality from the 'lived-in' situation of normal engagement, and secondly, a stepping-back-from to be able to apprehend and explicate the phenomenon itself.<sup>21</sup> Phenomenology simply is getting

back to the things themselves, to the origin of relationships.

What is at stake is understanding and all its implications. I design 'within' some mode of understanding. But this understanding is critical for the designer; that is, the foundation of understanding itself. When I design I bring with me into the act of designing, the whole process, my whole being. And therefore the being-process so to speak is what is our ultimate concern. For this reason our study is concerned with the intentional act of the process as we encounter it in the laboratory. We reduced the issue of process in the laboratory as belonging neither to the subjective attitude nor the objective. This is so because the subjective-objective dichotomy just mentioned is not understood as within the framework of consciousness itself as we have explained it. The act of consciousness as that involving the intending-intended correlation in the noetic-noematic complex, can be illustrated for example, in the man-house correlation of a design project. It is not an abstract correlation, but one where its intentional act is being itself. Man is directed towards the object, house, as in being. The 'relationship' between man and house is important in this example.

Whether Mondrian or van Doesburg knew of Husserl's writings in the 20's is not known for sure, but certainly there is an affinity between their thoughts. The criticism

that we directed to the De Stijl movement of course was their tendency to slip into idealism. Husserl has been criticized also for his idealism. His goal was to obtain absolute certainty and absolute apodicticity. It would be of benefit to any architectural method to compare the work of Husserl's with the philosophy of De Stijl. There certainly is some similarity in the notion of consciousness.

The subject-object dichotomy seems to have been a theoretical preoccupation for some time. Already in the Renaissance Period and thereafter the artist has been concerned with the concept of idea. The concept of idea as such seems to have fluctuated between the subjective in the personal, and the ideal in the metaphysical sense. Erwin Panofsky detects that Vasari had much the same understanding of the subject-object correlation originating out of one's experience. Vasari sees that "an idea is no longer present a priori in the mind of the artist (i.e., it does not precede experience) but is brought forth by him a posteriori (i.e., it is engendered on the basis of experience), its role is no longer that of a competitor with, much less that of an archetype for, the reality perceived by the senses, but rather that of a derivative of reality."<sup>22</sup> The idea is born out of one's imagination, but one is not sure what is meant by "imagination". In phenomenology imagination would result from an intuition of essence.

In relation to our present consideration of the

intentional act of consciousness, it is my opinion that Louis Kahn's<sup>23</sup> preoccupation with the creative act in terms of "what it wants to be" is in the line of thought of phenomenology. He distinguishes in the act or process between the what and the how: the former being concerned with the essence, the nature of the thing, and the latter being concerned with its manifestation. The manifestation is necessarily dependent upon the nature of the thing. Therefore eidetics<sup>24</sup> is essential to his work in architecture. Kahn, like every great artist before him, questions the source of understanding out of which his work becomes manifested.

Perhaps it is appropriate in our initial consideration of the creative act to ask ourselves who the artist is. The artist realizes in deep anxious moments that he can face 'reality' only as he can understand it, or only as he 'understands' can he face reality. It is as ambiguous as that, not a contradiction. The artist wonders about the roots in which he stands; the soul out of which his inspirations come. He wonders about what it means to create, the meaning it can have for others, if they too see reality as he does. He wonders about the limits out of which he delimits his created object; what contribution he can make to advance the being of man. He wonders about wonder; how it could be so. He wonders about the Being which transcends the situation itself.

The second consideration of the creative act must now press towards an understanding of such allusive statements made by Frank Lloyd Wright when he says that "architecture is life," or by Le Corbusier when he says that "architecture has evaded life," or even such a statement by Boccioni when he says that "We split open the figure and include the environment within it."<sup>25</sup> These statements are themselves like objects, experiences and commitments. They are highly generic, and we cannot avoid their meanings, because they presuppose a knowledge of the man-object dichotomy. These statements are reflective; they point back to themselves or beyond themselves to an understanding understood, i.e., to some reality of it.

It may seem impossible to talk about the creative act itself since it is a "happening". But that would be like saying that we cannot reflect on life, since it too takes place only as in the lived-situation. The creative act is as in the radical rootage of consciousness as in Being-in-the-world. This presupposes the ontological conditions that make man and world possible as a union.

We must therefore set aside the traditional views that would prevent one from focusing on these ontological conditions such as they are in our lived-situations. For what we face in the man-object dichotomy is the whole question of ultimately understanding what "in ourselves and in the world, is the relation between significance and

absence of significance."<sup>26</sup> This demands an inquiry into the aspect of meaning and being. Being and meaning are equitable<sup>27</sup> insofar as there is meaning only as there is being. There is creative act only as in the reality of this union. Affectivity of the creative act comes about as an emerging of being which points once again to an understanding of the man-world relation.<sup>28</sup> This affectivity is not the result of some 'cause' or some 'reason'. Rather, it is an emergence.

The task at hand has been stated very clearly by Merleau-Ponty:

We must discover the origin of the object at the very centre of our experience; we must describe the emergence of being and we must understand how, paradoxically, there is for us an in-itself.<sup>29</sup>

It is only within this sense, or attitude that such a statement "architecture is life" can have any meaning at all. But that the generic meaning of these words should be misconstrued or even denied as a reality can be seen by the traditional views that have been unable to come to grips with the relationship of man and his world. The life of man in the world is hemmed-in and gripped by illusions, no less philosophy than painting or architecture. As we try to get at the origin we tend to lose our way and assume a false experience.

We cannot here engage in a full discussion on the various positions held by different philosophical views,

except in a general way to amplify the necessity of whole research.

Neither empiricism nor intellectualism, referring mainly to the Cartesian position and in part to the Husserlian position of the pure ego, have been able to explain how the object originates in our experience. Empiricism like our experiences of the objective view in the laboratory which proceeds in an atomistic fashion where form is applied to a program, has not been able to connect the object with the act, the act which internally triggers off the object. It does not regard the evidence of the consciousness or the subjective as adequate. Rather, it moves forward by theoretical concepts and naturalistic thought. The empiricist operates as the scientist does in his experiments; nature is reduced to a collection of stimuli and qualities. Therefore, it can explain neither the culture object nor the natural object.

Intellectualism, on the other hand, realizing that empiricism totally disregards the experiences of objects, over reacts in its own approach by prejudging the object in question. It contends that to perceive is to judge. But in its judgement it passes over the meaning, for to perceive is not to judge or to conceptualize in an absolute manner as it would insist; to perceive is to experience a meaning where judgement is an optional expression only. It does not understand the contingency of the occasion, that

one does not have the truth once and for all times. The issue involved in the man-object relation is to make comprehensible the meaning itself. It is blind "to the life which steals across the visual field and secretly binds its parts together."<sup>30</sup> Intellectualism contracts into its corner to 'think' about the world and its objects, the relations between the object and man. And its process leaves untouched the presence as such.

Neither view understands the predicament of man, his finitude. It is only by understanding finitude that the categories of essence and existence take on meaning at all. Therefore, in summarizing the positions of empiricism and intellectualism in their attempts to clarify how we experience objects, Merleau-Ponty says,

Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally again we should not be searching. They are in agreement in that neither can grasp consciousness in the act of learning, and that neither attaches due importance to that circumscribed ignorance, that still 'empty' but already intention which is attention itself.<sup>31</sup>

In the first, man is an observer of a world from which he can remove himself; in the second, the world is an object of pure consciousness. In both traditions there is an appeal to the absolute: the one to absolute truth external to the thinker; the other as absolute consciousness.

Man and object do not coincide: he is not in the object, and neither is the object in him.

It is with these illusions of our world in relation to the mystery of our being-in-the-world that this century has suffered major crises through wars and ideological revolutions and social movements that have had their effects on man and caused him to stop and re-evaluate. They have been shocks to all the peoples in the world and man has had to take a deeper look at himself. It seems that ever since the industrial revolution, values were deliberately mislaid and man was forced into the background, never giving in to these inhuman forces. Violence and strikes--deadlocks--still persist as efforts to find human balance. In and among all these forces generated by man himself, there has been new effort in search of meaning. And upon reflecting on the finitude of man, he is discovering as if all over again that he is neither idea nor thing, but that he is some peculiar balance between being and nonbeing. Martin Buber refers to this sphere of between as the "narrow ridge."<sup>32</sup> And within these moments of upheaval and moments of silence, in the moments of settling, we find traces of meaning shining through, but is it winning? Man as a subjectivity has a precarious hold on the world:

It does not constitute the world, it divines the world's presence round about it as a field not provided by itself; nor does it constitute the word, but speaks as we sing when we are happy; nor again the meaning of the word, which instantaneously emerges for it in its dealings with the world and other men living in it, being at the intersection of many lines of behaviour, and being, even once 'acquired', as precise and yet as indefinable as the significance of a gesture. The

tacit cogito, the presence of oneself to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to any philosophy, and knows itself only in those extreme situations in which it is under threat.<sup>33</sup>

Here in a capsule is man's precarious situation in the world that we must understand before we make any further attempts in interpreting the imbalance of man's standing in the world. Man has not got the hold on the world that his systems tell him he has. Therefore, his new effort to "discover the origin of the object at the very centre of our experience" must begin by understanding the mode of our life-world: our reflections must emulate our pre-reflective lives.

We can begin to discover our way of being-in-the-world by reflecting upon our own practical lives. For example, thought in relation to man--does it relate us to life itself or does it in fact by some model-in-thought separate us from understanding life? In architecture--do our models-in-thought in fact obscure man's existential situation? As existentialism has shown paradoxically, our desirous solutions are hidden in the act of dwelling itself. Le Corbusier saw his task before him as decisive as this: "architecture or revolution". But he believed revolution could be avoided.<sup>34</sup> That was 1923. Today Kahn says that "many hope architecture is dead, because they want to take over."<sup>35</sup> Revolutions occur when people are confronted with objects. For this reason Boccioni wants to split open the

object and include the environment.

The creative act involves more than just solving for needs. There are needs in our environment. But those that were solving for needs were functionalists at heart, and hence, by-passing the question implied in the creative act itself. To solve for the environment of man is to solve it with a knowledge of man.

Architecture is a process that implies the emergence of being. Can architecture be defined any other way? We have already admitted that to ask "What is Architecture?" is an illusionary question and that only by understanding man as in the world will we understand architecture too. The essence is implied in the ontological conditions of man-to-object relation. In The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger makes it very clear in the outset that the "artist is the origin of the work," and that "the work is the origin of the artist," but neither is the sole support of the other; rather, "in themselves and in their inter-relations artist and work are always by virtue of a third thing which is first, namely by virtue of that which gives artist and work of art their names, art."<sup>36</sup> The essence of art is in the work; it does not exist apart from the work engaged by the artist. This is what we meant earlier when we said that to inquire about the origin is not to think in terms of 'cause' or 'reason' as though they existed independent of art itself.

In the same sense, architecture must be understood to be the source to both the architect and the building or whatever kind the structure may be. Architecture is the origin to the work of the architect as it is also the origin to the architect working. Therefore, we are from now on distinguishing between the usages of architecture. Up until now we used architecture in the normal sense (although at times it began to shift in the direction of which we are now referring to) where it defines a field as in the sense of the building. Now, while it still presupposes the building, it refers to the whole dialectical process of being-in-the-world. Architecture is a reality as in being, where being is the relationship implied in the man-object/world investigation.

To illustrate what we mean by saying that architecture implies being we must refer to the article Eye and Mind which Merleau-Ponty published just before his death. In a near poetical, rhythmical and epigrammatical style, he takes a look into the life of an artist, such as Klee or Cezanne, his proto-types, whose aim it was to discover life itself in their painting, just as music was for Mozart, chess for Bobby Fisher, or architecture for Wright.

He is critical of science and its operational methods that regard man indifferently. In relation to this allegation he calls for a return to the "there is" which underlies the object-in-general; "to the site, the

soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body."<sup>37</sup> Speaking in relation to painting, he says, art works with "brute meaning" where the object is brought along with the body, which haunts me and whom I haunt. And so, interested in the secret science by which the artist achieves his painting as a philosopher, he describes the relationship which is of interest to us as well.

In another work Merleau-Ponty says one begins with an "ontological relief" where "there is being, there is a world, there is something; . . . there is cohesion, there is meaning."<sup>38</sup> This is where the artist begins and the process that he goes through. The artist "lends" his body to the world and changes the world into paintings. The process is an intertwining of vision and movement. Openness being the uniqueness to man alone, the artist opens himself up to the world. The enigma of the body is that it sees and is seen simultaneously. This is how Merleau-Ponty describes this mysterious "power of looking" of the body:

I say of a thing that it is moved; but my body moves itself, my movement deploys itself. It is not ignorant of itself; it is not blind of itself; it radiates from a self. . . . It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself. It is not a self through transparence, like thought, which only thinks its object by assimilating it, by constituting it, by transforming it into thought. . . . [It is] a self, therefore, that is caught up in things, that has a front and a back, a past and a future. . . . Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves

itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are incrustated into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the same stuff as the body. <sup>39</sup>

It is a moving passage invigorated with humanity. Humanity is a passage moving between the sensing and the sensed, the intending and the intended. Things have an internal equivalence in the body. Things "arouse in me a carnal formula of their presence."<sup>33</sup> And these correspondences give rise to "visible shape" or if you will, a "carnal essence" of this internal equivalence. The equivalence that Merleau-Ponty is referring to here, he explains, means that which is out there in the world is also here in the heart of vision. He refers to this equivalence as the "metamorphosis of Being."<sup>40</sup> Therefore the painting is only according to the analogue of the body. This is crucial in his whole consideration of painting and art. The painting "does not present the mind with an occasion to rethink the constitutive relations of things; . . . rather, it offers to our sight [regard], . . . it offers to vision its inward tapestries, the imaginary texture of the real."<sup>41</sup> This is so for Merleau-Ponty, as it is for the painters Cezanne and Klee, of whom he frequently refers to, because "painting awakens and carries to its highest pitch a delirium which is vision itself, for to see is to have at a distance; painting spreads this strange possession to all aspects of Being, which must in some fashion become visible in order

to enter into the work of art."<sup>42</sup> The painter's way of seeing things is the "prehuman way" and for this reason art and phenomenology have been compared to set out to achieve the same kind of human understanding.<sup>43</sup>

The prehuman way of the painter sets aside the scientific and mental cognitive categories of the theorist, which are not capable of the uncovering experience itself, and turns to the precognitive givens of experience, that is, the pre-predicative sphere of our lives, and manifests its behavior in his work. Perhaps it is good to reiterate that by experience we do not mean one's subjective feelings, which degenerates into mere excitement, but experience which is understanding itself.<sup>44</sup> Man is in the world, thus he does not know himself apart from it. And since the world is in the continual act of assuming a structure, we must account for the simultaneity in the phenomenal field of both openness and presence in perception.<sup>45</sup> We can provisionally define perception as "the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them."<sup>46</sup> The problem is to grasp and understand the 'reciprocal' relation between the subject and the object: for example, the process of vision<sup>47</sup> in which we set at a distance and look, the gaze which presents itself as actual, where no distinct memory or explicit conjecture synthesizes the object in one's perspective. The problem is to understand the 'motivation', or the original relationship of motivation

which makes something comprehensible before science begins to explain it with its categories.<sup>48</sup>

It is essential for us to sketch what being-in-the world is as a concrete ontology of human existence<sup>49\*</sup> before we can show its relevance to architecture. On the other hand, the implications, in my opinion, are to a large extent self-evident.

Human existence in the world is concrete engagement. This concrete engagement by means of the body, is an act in life which Merleau-Ponty refers to as subjectivity. The body is a subjectivity, a body-subject, a mode-of-being to one-self and to the world--both senses refer to the body-subject as its embodiment in the world. The body-subject goes beyond the traditional dualism of mind and body and incorporates both into one; it goes beyond the dualism in the sense of a new corporeal schema. But even more significant of this union and already implied in it, is the 'third term' between the for us and the in-itself. It is as in the body-subject that experience occurs as meaning at all; it is the "'Logos of the aesthetic world', an 'art hidden in the depth of the human soul' one which, like any art, is known only in its results."<sup>50</sup> We can characterize this embodiment of the body-subject in the world in two general ways: (1) presence to one-self, and (2) presence to the world.

## 1. Presence to one-self

To make it easier to understand we shall circumscribe this presence to ourselves in three general categories which are by no means distinct from each other but overlap and give perhaps different profiles of the body-subject. These three general categories are: implicatedness, inhabitation, and incarnation.

(i) Implicatedness: My body and the world are no longer objects that embrace each other by scientific approaches. Their functional relationships cannot be pre-established in the mind as the intellectual would insist to ensure his world. No . . .

I have the world as an incomplete individual, through the agency of my body as the potentiality of this world, and I have the positing of objects through that of my body, or conversely the positing of my body through that of objects, not in any kind of logical implication, . . . but in a real implication, and because my body is a movement towards the world, and the world my body's point of support.<sup>51</sup>

Man is in possession of the world in the sense that 'I have it' instead of 'it having me'. For this reason Merleau-Ponty insists that phenomenology which proceeds by the 'reductions' cannot suspend one's implicatedness, that man cannot be reduced to pure mind or pure object, but that it must explicate the ontological conditions of belonging and being in the world. The highly generical terms of 'belonging' and 'being' have meaning for us in the relations that they hold us to, the relations that we dare not sever. To have

or to belong implies embodiment. There are no intermediaries such as "representations" or "concepts as encountered in the case of symbol and word, or "ideas" that would hold us to abstract forms of knowledge. The provisional definition of perception is beginning to take on meaning as we begin to understand the important sense of implicatedness: perception which is our whole background and mode of being, places us at things. Man exists as a 'form' in the world; he has a world; he has an environment. Implicatedness in this sense means to dwell in being. The example of the "gesture" is good because it is not like "representation" in the sense that representation is always thought of as a 'thought' of something and not this something itself. The gesture in contrast implies spontaneity, as the genesis of meaning.<sup>52</sup> And in this sense are we implicated in the world.

The next two categories will throw more light on the sense of implicatedness as we consider them now.

(ii) Inhabitation: The body "dwells" in the world and is at home in it. To belong to the world is to inhabit it. The subject perceives the object to be older than himself. Our actions and given surroundings are starting points of our self-knowledge. "All consciousness is consciousness of something: it is essential for us to move towards things, and consciousness seeks in them, so to speak, a stability which it lacks."<sup>53</sup> Consciousness is not

a matter of 'I think' but a matter of 'I can'. In this sense habit is a power of dilating our being in the world, or by which our existence is appropriated. There are examples to illustrate it.

Take for example the phantom limb. An amputee often 'feels' the absent member and often quite painfully so. The phenomenon involved is an unwillingness to accept mutilation. Merleau-Ponty says that this can be explained with anosognosia (the refusal to accept the loss of a limb) where a patient ignores his paralyzed right hand and holds out his left hand when asked for his right, suggests a refusal to recognize his deficiency.<sup>54</sup> The sense of inherence or belonging to the world in this example highlights the habit of the body. The actual body with the phantom limb resides in the habitual body; it is our habitation in the world. The point to catch is that the body behaves in a general and impersonal way, by way of an inarticulate consciousness, which is also referred to as incarnation, which we will be discussing as the next point. Things that were manipulatable before are now only manipulatable in themselves and not by the habitual body as such.<sup>55</sup>

Another sense in which the body is our habitation in the world is as a special kind of permanence--not as complete object--to which all other objects stand in relation. The body exercises power over the perceptual

domain of the absence or presence of objects.<sup>56</sup> The body is the condition for the being of other objects.

As a subjectivity, the body is our home base. Final examples we can give of the body as our habitation are its "double sensation" where in touching the hand the touching indicates the reflex of our body. Also, non-causal relation between sensation of pain and our body, and the kinesthetic sensation, one's direct and immediate relation with the body are other examples. The function of the body is not primarily to know but to act.<sup>57</sup>

These references to the nature of the body, the integration of the parts implied by them is referred to the body image (or corporeal schema). It is a structure of consciousness for the structure of an appearing object on the horizon. The involvement of the body is always tacitly understood in the figure-background structure. It forms a system with the world by its involvement with the world. The body image is an "existence towards" the world. The habitation implied by the body is referred to as the "spatiality of situation."<sup>58</sup> If our habitation in the world is impoverished, we have an impoverished grip on the world, because the body is a projecture towards the world.<sup>59\*</sup> Thus, "to the extent, then, that the body ceases to be projecture, it ceases to have a 'world'."<sup>60</sup> As the body-subject indicates, our habitation in the world is never our objective body as empiricism or psychology

would think, but a habitual body. Consciousness bears with it in life its sedimentations in its movement of existence. These sedimentations however do not fix the world for us but must be reconciled with a dynamic character of existence. It is the energy of consciousness that must take up one's sedimentations in existence.<sup>61</sup>

When the body can no longer define itself as sense-giving it relapses into the condition of a thing, and ceases to be a consciousness. "If a being is consciousness, he must be nothing but a network of intentions,"<sup>62</sup> an underlying condition of our habitation in the world. This life of consciousness is described by Merleau-Ponty as an "intentional arc" which subtends us, "projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical ideological and moral situation, or rather, which results in our being situated in all these respects."<sup>63</sup> Intentionality is consciousness "being toward the thing through the intermediary of the body."<sup>64</sup> The emphasis given here for the moment is that of the body, intermediariners of the body, or if you will, incarnation, meaning that the body is a vehicle to one's presence to things and the natural world. The spontaneity of the body as in intentionality, in the sense of motility, therefore, does not conceive the body in space and time but as inhabiting space and time.<sup>65</sup>

Consciousness then animates a habitual body. Man lives in his institutions, the soul of his inhabitation.

For the body to comprehend its movements in the world, it must already have its stamp of movement in it. For example, one must be in the 'habit' of dancing before one can discover new movements or reconstructions in the pattern of dance. To get used to a car or a house, one must be, so to speak, 'transplanted' into them, be incorporated into them. But the dynamics of any habit is that it must be cultivated in order to be grasped to unveil its meaning. The body as a focal point of meaning, as a synthesizing power, is to be compared to a work of art:

A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is undistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning, accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal and spatial situation. It is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of art.<sup>66</sup>

On this note it is fitting to introduce the sense of incarnation of the body-subject.

(iii) Incarnation: As we have become aware so far, the body is an impersonal subjectivity that brings with it to the surface of every moment its past and its heritage. The body being a vehicle to the thing and natural world was already at work in the case of the phantom limb. The habitual body was repressed by the actual body with a missing limb in the sense of 'refusal' which we discussed above. The body never quite got over the accident. This phenomenon of repression also reveals our incarnate condition in life: my experience of each moment ceases to be

an integrated and unique totality. Therefore, in the sense that "there appears round our personal existence a margin of almost impersonal existence . . . which I rely on to keep alive."<sup>67</sup> Remembering and emotion are modes of being situated. We can neither forget nor escape. Life is condemned to meaning.

The other sense of incarnation is related to sexuality and speech. Here incarnation's role is to be present to one-self as well as to the other, or the other's being to me.

In sexuality we have between the relation of terms "sex" and "existence" one of sign and significance, and of expression and the expressed. This is not to say that the expressed should become soul and the expression, body. As the body allows something to be actualized it expresses existence. The relation of sex and existence rests upon the impersonal body. The relation of the expression (the body) with the existence that it expresses (the sign with its signification), is the intimate union of the two: "the body is satisfied or generalized existence and existence [is] a perpetual incarnation."<sup>68</sup> Sexuality is co-existence with life where life is existence. Sexuality does not express existence as a sexual drama, or reduce existence to a fact, but existence as an ambiguity expressing being, where mind and body, sign and significance are only abstract moments.

We can understand speech in a similar way. Body expresses existence; word expresses thought. We have already discussed speech elsewhere,<sup>69</sup> therefore we shall be brief here. The example used in relation to the word is the "gesture". The gesture of anger is the meaning it expresses. The same is true of the word. It has meaning; hence, "speech is thought". The incarnating aspect of thought involves the simultaneity of expression and perception: as I speak I grasp. "Speech prolongs into the invisible, extends into the semantic operations, the belongingness of the body to being and the corporeal relevance of every being," and further on Merleau-Ponty says speech "speaks according to it, or lets it speak and be spoken within me, break through my present."<sup>70</sup> Again the body-subject in speech brings with it to the surface its sedimented language without which it could not speak. But in existence "the consciousness of embodiment is precisely an awareness and understanding of the unitary presence of mind and body living in the acts of expression and perception that are the synoptic acts of doing and creating speaking and silence."<sup>71</sup> Language moves beyond itself in the act of speaking. "Language seeks to disappear; it seeks to die as an object."<sup>72</sup> Language becomes secondary to the momentary event in the act of saying-- this is the sense of incarnation that we have in mind and that life is concerned with.

## 2. Presence to the World

This concentration focuses on the body as a prolongation into the world. The body and the world are enveloped together in perception. As Merleau-Ponty says, a theory of the body is also a theory of perception. The previous categories have shown us that our body is an 'anchorage' in the world. Our world-structure is based upon its two stages: (1) sedimentation, (2) spontaneity. And while the presence to-one-self dealt more with the sedimented aspect of our conscious lives, this presence to the world will now deal mainly with the aspect of spontaneity.

(i) Actional: The body is a potency which co-ordinates with a certain milieu of existence. It is a certain puissance, a certain power in the world.

We have discussed the habitual body animated by a consciousness. As a consciousness it "projects itself into the physical world and has a body."<sup>73</sup> It provides itself with one or several worlds, it "brings into being its own thoughts before itself, as if they were things."<sup>74</sup> Thus, presence to the world is a situation of diffused meaning: a world speaking to the subject of himself to himself, where one's thoughts are given a place in the world.

Therefore, if consciousness is understood as this directive force, this actional way of being in the world,

how can it be described? What we are asking is how man's life is intentional. Sense experience opens us into the world. Sensation is in essence intentional because it is by it that "I" and the "thing" participate and commune together. Sensation is corporeal in nature instead of intellectual. Kandinsky said that green makes no demands on man, and Goethe said blue . . . "'yields to our gaze.'"<sup>75</sup> Thus sensation is this intentional force between subject and object. For example, when I dwell on the blue of the sky "I do not possess it in thought . . . I abandon myself to it . . . 'it thinks in me.'"<sup>76</sup> The subject-object belong together as in a field of sense. And the sense here must be clearly understood as not "me" experiencing, but rather as one in me perceiving. It is as impersonal as that in sense-giving. "Vision is a thought subordinate to a certain field, and this is what is called sense."<sup>77</sup> All the senses have their own structural sense-giving. For example, sight is instantaneous while touch is successive. But all the senses run into each other and integrate and interpenetrate one another, i.e., we see the rigidity of glass and feel the tenuity of steel. Thus, by saying that our body is a source of power and potency we say it because it "is the fabric into which all objects are woven."<sup>78</sup>

If by actional we also mean engagement, then the phenomenon of depth in space speaks to the intentional relationship of body to world. For example, we do not see

a cube in one's perspective vantage point, as having six equal sides as the intellectualist would. Depth is not a mode of measurement in that sense. Depth, as existential phenomenon, is a function of space. Depth is not the object itself but belongs to the perspective. Depth has its relationship with motivation. If the object is near we are likely to be called into communion or engagement; if it is far away obviously the detail is less and therefore one's participation becomes less. Depth is a possibility of a subject becoming engaged to the world. Depth is an existential polarity of man and the object.

In the sense of communion and participation, the body-subject is as "being-to" the world. To see the table and chair is to "be-at" them. Embodiment is a system of actual or potential actions. And only as the body-subject "opens onto the world" can it be a correlative of the world. Existence is strictly this possibility of being a correlative to the world. Merely living is ambivalent; rather "to have" and "to hold" is in perception "to have at a distance."

(ii) Synergetics: The body-subject represents a unity-in-diversity. It can be this unity-in-diversity only in the third term between pure object and pure subject, for being in between them it is neither pure nor transparent and thus inextricably linked to the world. The body, the thing and the world are related as in a "system of

experiences." To understand this relationship we must essentially learn to see that our point of view, or perspective, as also our insertion in the world, is not constituting a pure object, but as in perception, our 'inherence' to the world.<sup>79</sup> "To look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect in which they present to it."<sup>80</sup> The body is a synergic system not as a collection of adjacent organs, but as an intercommunicating sensorial system pressed against the world of things.

Another sense vitally significant is the body's sensorial system (itself an interconnected relationship) in relation to the world into which it opens up. This delicate set of relations--the body as a sensorial system (synergical systems) and the object, the world--is referred to as a "system of equivalence." This is the real sense of synergetics. I have the world by a sort of exchange with my body--"the thing is correlative to my body and, in more general terms, to my existence, of which my body is merely the stabilized structure."<sup>81</sup> Our senses question things and the things reply back to them. The power of synergetics is that it secretes meaning. Just as to look is to inhabit the object, in the same way does significance inhabit the thing as the soul does the body. By some sort of exchange implied by synergetics there is "human body when, between the seeing and the seen, between touching and the touched,

between one eye and the other, between hand and hand, a blending of some sort takes place--when the spark is lit between sensing and the sensible, lighting the fire that will not stop burning until some accident of the body will undo. . . ."82 The painting is an analogue or likeness only according to the body. The subjectivity implied in the body-subject is bound up with the body and the world and thus our situation. The system of equivalence we have in mind here is that the outside and inside are inseparable, that is, "the world wholly inside and I wholly outside myself."83 And this relationship is the ontological condition of man's being-in-the-world.

(iii) Manifestation: The human subject as a consciousness is wholly present in its manifestations. Man living in his institutions is an incarnating subject, as we have seen for example, in speech. In this ontological event, the use of gestures or words give rise to being in consciousness. This is the relationship in the man-object/world question.

The ontological event is a mode of expression. The preceding hopefully has helped us to see, even if vaguely, the ontological conditions rising out of our pre-cognitive life. Earlier we stated the dialectics of expression simply and precisely: "there is being, there is a world, there is something; . . . there is cohesion, there is meaning."84 The path is circular. The starting point is situational

thought. There is not one layer of pre-cognitive life and another of cognition. Cognition rises out of our pre-cognitive situation. The question of being is implicitly implied in the act of dwelling. But we "must reverse the natural relationship in which the body stands to the environment, and a human productive power must reveal itself through the density of being."<sup>85</sup> We begin with our perceptual faith, in which we are implicated, but the process of reflection and interrogation reduces the crude conviction we have to what it signifies and means. In this sense, faith and reflection are in polarity. The dialectics involved is "Self-manifestation, disclosure, in the process of forming itself. . . ." <sup>86</sup> But as a life of disclosure, the path does not merely close in on itself; it is a spiralling path, transcending the point of departure.

Man as a subjectivity, resides in an infrastructure of temporality. This means that the future is not yet; the past is no more. But man lives in the present which contains both the past and the future--without the past and the future there is no present. The essence of subjectivity is motivation. The future is present because value transcends its simple presence. Subjectivity is a continual unfolding. The ambiguity of life is its sense of incompleteness and its concern with ultimate reality. While we know nothing absolutely, we must know 'how' to move ourselves and 'look', to be free to act, which can only mushroom out

of an understanding of the ambiguity of our situation. The spirit of the world is ourselves. Therefore, subjectivity is temporal; time is someone. We cannot have absolute certainty of the future and yet time traces out in advance a network of intentions.<sup>87</sup> This we call the spirit of subjectivity.

Man is not the cogito in possession of absolute certainty. He is not an isolated, withdrawn, "I think" cogito, in the psychological sense. This is the downfall of the Cartesian Cogito, who 'thinks' he is in complete possession of the object in his cogitations. Neither is the cogito perfectly transparent to itself like an essence. If it were, it would have no need to doubt. The cogito implied above, however, is one who grasps in the act of its own operation. Perception is primary in this act; it is nothing but temporality. "I grasp myself, not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and experience, but as a particular thought, as a thought engaged with certain objects, as a thought in act; and it is in this sense that I am certain of myself."<sup>88</sup> The thinking cogito implied is a tacit cogito, seeking clarity rather than absolute possession, because clarity is not possible when it is subjected to dogma, or creating truth rather than finding it. Perception resides in the phenomenon it makes us aware of, it does not posit the object in a literal manner: Being is linked up with this

phenomenon. By the primacy of perception Merleau-Ponty means

. . . that the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it summons us to the task of knowledge and action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but to assisting at birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality. This experience of rationality is lost when we take it for granted as self-evident, but is, on the contrary rediscovered when it is made to appear against the background of non-human nature.<sup>89</sup>

The sensible is within man, and perception is the reflex which seeks not to posit an object of knowledge in which it is not involved, but which seeks to open itself up to the 'meaning' of a situation which we call being-in-the-world. Perception opens us up to Being; it wants to make visible the other side of things we so often naively speak of already in the environment in which we live.

Life is an inherence to both the perceived world as well as to the human world. The paradox is that while man belongs to the world, he helps create or re-create it and helps contribute to its making. This 'inherence' is fundamental to the creative act; it is consciousness confronted in perception as a quality of life. A creative act either knows the conditions fundamental to life for the fulfillment of life, or presupposes its conditions and commits aggression.

Consciousness is expression only as it dwells and

inhabits man. That is to say, consciousness is not a deliberate functioning faculty of man, but a fecund force in man rising out of the situation and giving rise to existence.

One thing is clear in the investigation so far: the struggle with the nature of the creative act is at the same time a struggle with the essentials of being-in-the-world. It is a plea for the emergence of a new cogito, a new sense of temporality as reality transformed into experience and meaning, and a new sense of freedom as having a destiny. The creative act is not creating objects per se; it is life. And in its objects the act finds new being.

The difficulty remains with perception as a nascent logos. While it lays down the conditions for life, at the same time it is birth-giving. And we stare wonder in the face. Consciousness is not simply an emulation of the pre-consciousness: the one is the condition of the other. Logos is the question of being implied in life: life is logos. But while it is accurate to say that logos is unfinished life, it is by the conditions intrinsic to life that the creative act can give evidence of logos. It remains for us as actors in life to find this evidence.

In perception the thing and the world are given as a correlative of the body. But this is only the beginning. The very significance implied in the relationship must receive expression. In a sense consciousness places the significance in front of it as things. This significance

is put together in the act of 'design'--"in its significance precedes existence and clothes itself."<sup>90</sup> We must however see significance and existence as lodged in each other; they are inseparable.<sup>91\*</sup>

Finally, the self-world correlation is our field of inter-subjectivity; being-in-the-world is an expression of this inter-subjectivity. We never start from nothing, in freedom we take up our situation as it is and search for the meaning latent in it. Freedom is a propensity of the mind: in choosing something, freedom sees "a symbol of itself."<sup>92</sup> Perhaps this can be our conclusion: the man and the object are two abstract moments of a unique structure, which is presence, whose infrastructure is a subjectivity in which the presence to oneself and presence to the world are linked together as in some symbol which we call architecture.

#### Architecture as Knowledge

We have barely begun to trace the existential path that is needed to understand the significance and essence of architecture as a symbolic infrastructure of man in the world. First of all, Merleau-Ponty's work is voluminous and therefore more time and concentration is needed to benefit from his thoughts. From his work we have so far gleaned (and perhaps naively at that) only the pertinent thoughts essential to us as far as understanding the ontological conditions of being-in-the-world is concerned.

Second, this effort is to help us focus upon our architectural work as rising out of the relationship itself, which is perceptual consciousness. The creative act belongs to this realm of thought which is co-extensive with being. And therefore, this effort has only scratched the surface (1) because it isn't merely objective thought and independent of man, but it must be experienced to be understood, (2) because in the final analysis it is in the act itself where the meaning takes place. This then leads to the third point: we can postulate the relationship between the man-object/world dichotomy by showing that relationship residing in our implicated-actional, inhabitation-synergical, and incarnation-manifestation categories as we did above. We have talked about the bed of seeds out of which a creative act can be understood and realized. However, and this is the beautiful part about this research for those who feel this is nothing but theory, that the existential mode of the creative act does not take us to the intellectual camp or the objectivist camp, but to the situation itself. In other words, what our research tells us is that in subjectivity, in design itself does significance appear as an object to man.

But this subjectivity is referred to by Merleau-Ponty in his final work as Being (with a capital B).<sup>93\*</sup> We must be careful not to misconstrue the notion of design; its motivation rises out of Being itself and nothing else.

Therefore, our claim is that architecture is not some objective realm, or merely a thing which confronts man. "We must grant man a very special way of being--intentional being--which consists of being oriented towards all things but of not residing in any."<sup>94</sup> Architecture cannot escape nor ignore the condition of man. Architecture is not a subject constructing the objects, or as in idealism where the object seemed to be the construction of the subject--a relationship of knowing in this sense, but as we have already stated before, a relationship of being in which "paradoxically, the subject is his body, his world, and his situation, by a sort of exchange."<sup>95</sup> Frank Lloyd Wright said something similar with similar intent: "Whether people are fully conscious of this or not, they actually derive countenance and sustenance from the 'atmosphere' of the things they live in or with. They are rooted in them just as a plant is in the soil in which it is planted."<sup>96</sup> The relation of knowledge is based on a relation of being. All knowledge is subject to being.

"Architecture as knowledge" does not mean that we possess in advance in theories, in concepts, in methodologies a knowledge of architecture. It is not responsible to any theory of architecture. The path that architecture must follow is one from brute being to acknowledged being. Our existence is an objectified meaningful existence. Speech is thought; architecture is life. Both speak of the same

Leaf blank to correct numbering.

ontological condition of man which is existence itself. But if we have difficulty understanding what is implied by saying, "Architecture is life," we must look at what is implied by saying "speech is thought." If we recall, we spoke of sign-to-signification as belonging to the language structure, and sign-as-signification belonging to speech. In the moment that I speak, I perceive and express a thought simultaneously, which is an act of grasping. It is an event in that I say something. And as such it brings to the surface, as an expression of visibility, the deep-rooted relations of lived experience from which it takes form.<sup>97</sup> Language is our sedimented past, but in a moment, in the act of saying, it can become a present, and a presence to oneself.

Let us take a closer look at speech before we draw our analogy. Speech is a relation to the signification as well as through being to Being. It has the magic about itself, if you will, of attracting other significations into its web.

But even more, it is a solidarity and an intertwining between the language that it belongs to and the realm of meanings that it brings to the surface and speaks of. We quote for a second time this passage: "speech prolongs into the invisible, extends into the semantic operations, the belongingness of the body to being, which for me is once and for all attested by the visible, and

whose idea each intellectual evidence reflects a little further."<sup>98</sup> Speech is that intertwining mode of thought of Being between the subject and the object, between man and his language. But also as an act it is an expression testable of that halo of thought around Being. Speech is not in possession by the signification but signification possesses it and speaks according to it.

In this sense we must also understand architecture as significance. In its operations it is also related to being of man and becomes that solidarity, that intertwining relationship of man and his world. Architecture must be understood to be an ontological extension of being as speech is of thought--this in the parallel sense. But both have the same origin and therefore it is more than just an analogy that someone may want to ignore. By speaking and stopping to think of what he has spoken and then to begin speaking again, man is manifesting himself as he seeks clarity and understanding--he is in the present certain of his presence, even though he may have to reassert it in the next moment. Architecture must be an assertion of our being in the world; it must be a mode by which our Being after which we strive, can become a presence. Architecture in this sense is not an independent symbolic realm. Architecture is a symbolic process by which man looks at himself. It is a process within his finiteness, a process of symbolism; and as such it calls up presence which can initiate more symbolism because nothing is ever completed

in relation to Being, and therefore Being is itself a symbolic process.

In conclusion then, we had to follow this path in order to see the depth out of which the creative act is possible. It originates out of the depth of man himself and the totality within which he stands--Being. The process that stood in dichotomous terrain, now stands or is suspended within the relationship of the man-object/world, and is not a movement independent of man and of life. The permanence that we questioned along with its counterpart "What is architecture?" has been silenced, and rests with this intentional relationship. Our permanence rests within Being, and "what is architecture?" is a contradictory question because it presupposes the object as the intellectualist does. Rather, it presupposes man, who is, we said earlier, a network of intentions; therefore our beginning is this point of view.

Our man-object/world question has given us a new world relationship: a new architect as in a new cogito, and a new architecture as in Being, as an expression of the condition of man. Only within this sensible relationship can we really know what Wright meant when he said "I know that architecture is life," and win a new point of departure.

Architecture is not something special to man, something he could do without. We could say that architecture

is a condition fulfilling the delicate balance required in the relationship of the man-object polarity. Architecture is thought and therefore co-extensive of Being.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The terms realism and idealism are references mainly to empiricism, with emphasis on the object, and to intellectualism, with emphasis on the subject.

<sup>2</sup>To a large extent, Christopher Alexander's Notes in the Synthesis of Form was a research that developed out of a similar concern.

<sup>3</sup>Intuition: it is a difficult term to use properly especially in connection with process in architecture. The process is abstract, divorced so to speak, from man himself; therefore the intuition used in this context means a personal, subjective, inexplicable attitude; it is naive and not associated with the attitude, "to grasp" which is the true sense of it.

<sup>4</sup>See footnote 5, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup>Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 47, 99, 130.

<sup>6</sup>Cook, Architecture: Action and Plan, p. 95.

<sup>7</sup>Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, p. 153.

<sup>8</sup>Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 133-134.

<sup>9</sup>Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1, p. 62.

<sup>10</sup>Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 208.

<sup>11</sup>Erazim V. Kohák, "I, Thou, and It: A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Being-in-the-World." The Philosophical Forum, 1, No. 1 (1968), p. 36.

<sup>12</sup>The scientist approaches the world of things with the attitude of inspecting as an observer, where every effort is made to subside one's subjective nature.

<sup>13</sup>Kohák, "I, Thou, and It", p. 65.

<sup>14</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 92.

<sup>15</sup>John Wild, "Being, Meaning and World," Review of Metaphysics, 18 (1964-65), p. 414.

<sup>16</sup>Edmund Husserl, Ideas, 1931 (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969), p. 108.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 222ff.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 140-41.

<sup>20</sup>Richard Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 135.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., I am following Zaner in this brief outline.

<sup>22</sup>Erwin Panofsky, Idea: A Conception in Art Theory (1924, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 62.

<sup>23</sup>Louis Kahn's understanding of "what it wants to be" has been discussed by Vincent Scully in Louis I. Kahn, 2nd. ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1962), and Jan C. Rowan, "Wanting to Be," Progressive Architecture (April, 1961).

<sup>24</sup>Eidetics referring mainly to nature, essential, principle, or as Kahn does, to the form of a thing.

<sup>25</sup>See footnote 49, p. 34.

<sup>26</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 428.

<sup>27</sup>Wild, "Being, Meaning and World," discusses being and meaning on a broader level. However, I want to stay with "meaning as there is being as in consciousness."

<sup>28</sup>Kaelin, E. F. "Notes toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 67.

<sup>29</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 71.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>32</sup>Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 246.

<sup>33</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 404.

<sup>34</sup>Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, p. 249.

<sup>35</sup>Kahn, Talks with Students, p. 15.

<sup>36</sup>Heidegger, Martin, "The Origin of the World of Art," in Philosophies of Art and Beauty, ed. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (New York: The Modern Library, 1964), p. 650.

<sup>37</sup>Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 160.

<sup>38</sup>Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 88.

<sup>39</sup>Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, pp. 162-63.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>43</sup>Kaufmann, Fritz, "Art and Phenomenology", Essays in Phenomenology. Ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martenus Hijhoff, 1966)

<sup>44</sup>Paul Tillich warns that a two-fold danger can happen in expressionistic art: (1) that it "remains arbitrary and does not penetrate into reality itself," and (2) voicing one's troubled spirit rather than authentic being, Charles W. Kegley, "Paul Tillich on the Philosophy of Art."

<sup>45</sup>Albert Rabil, Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 19.

<sup>46</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, preface p. xi.

<sup>47</sup>Perhaps the notion of vision which Merleau-Ponty uses in an unorthodox manner, is not so unfamiliar to us as the notion of the body. But they are inextricably related. It is through one that the other is understood. The notion of the body should not be that unfamiliar to the architect as it perhaps is, nevertheless it is central to his whole existential philosophy.

<sup>48</sup>I am referring to the precognitive aspect of one's life, which has been referred to as the life-world already encountered previously in this study. By motivation in this context we are referring to Merleau-Ponty's definition: "the phenomenological notion of motivation is one of those 'fluid' concepts. . . . One phenomenon releases another . . . by the meaning which it holds out," Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 49-50.

<sup>49</sup>In "Merleau-Ponty's Theory of the Body-Proper as Etre-Au-Monde," Richard Zaner is of the opinion that it was Merleau-Ponty's intention "all along to develop a concrete ontology of human existence, a logos of anthropos," Journal of Existentialism, VI, No. 23 (Spring, 1966), p. 32.

<sup>50</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 429.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 350. My italics for the word implication.

<sup>52</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 69.

<sup>53</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non Sense (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1964), p. 73.

<sup>54</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 76.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 90-92.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 93-97.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>59</sup>In a clinical case involving abstract and concrete bodily movement, a patient was unable to make abstract movements when asked to knock on an imaginary door; however, when he was asked to pick up a pen in front of him he had no difficulty. In the more concrete situation the patient seemed to be a 'projective' towards the object. And while the patient did have an impoverished world habitation as a result of war injuries, the point is clear. *Ibid.*, see chapter on Spatiality.

<sup>60</sup>Rabil, Merleau-Ponty, p. 22.

<sup>61</sup>John F. Bannan, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), p. 74.

<sup>62</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 121.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 136.

- <sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 138-39.
- <sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 139.
- <sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 151.
- <sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 84.
- <sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 166.
- <sup>69</sup>See Section II, "speech,"
- <sup>70</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, p. 118.
- <sup>71</sup>Lanigan, "Phenomenology of Com." p. 81.
- <sup>72</sup>Paul Ricoeur, "Structure-Word-Event," Philosophy Today, 12 (Summer 1968), p. 119.
- <sup>73</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 137.
- <sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 130.
- <sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 210.
- <sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 214.
- <sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 219.
- <sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 235.
- <sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 350.
- <sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 68.
- <sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 320.
- <sup>82</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, pp. 163-64.
- <sup>83</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 407.
- <sup>84</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, p. 88.
- <sup>85</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 112.
- <sup>86</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, p. 91.
- <sup>87</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 416-17.
- <sup>88</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, p. 22.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>90</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 323.

<sup>91</sup>We should at another time enter into a discussion of the perception-imagination dichotomy. Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the notion of perception over against imagination because in perception the material present takes on significance and form. In the realm of the imagination "I have no sooner formed the intention of seeing than I already believe that I have seen." It has no depth because it does not respond to our point of view as perception does, and does not offer itself to our observations (pp. 323-24). Imaginary is the improbable. The point is, does the imaginary break with the illusion? (V.I., pp. 38-41) The only role imagination can have with perception is that I imagine by way of perception; even this is open to further question--in what sense imagination is involved in perception.

<sup>92</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 437.

<sup>93</sup>So far we have referred fairly consistently to being with which we mean the existential situation as such. Hereafter we shall refer more frequently to Being as the metaphysical condition without which the being of man would not be possible in the first place.

<sup>94</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Nonsense, p. 72.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid.

<sup>96</sup>Frank Lloyd Wright, The Natural House (New York: New American Library, 1970), p. 23.

<sup>97</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, p. 126.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

SECTION IV

## OBJECTIFICATION

The creative act within consciousness is the simultaneous act of perception and expression, as for example in speech. We refer to this act as objectification. It can be defined as transforming reality into meaning. Reality is the relationship of Being, in the metaphysical sense, which has to do with subjectivity. And when we speak of subjectivity we are at the same time speaking of objectivity. It is a process of detaching oneself from the illusionary world surrounding our lives.

But we have already introduced this problem we face in objectification by the contradictions apparent in speech, i.e., speech as a simultaneous perceptual and expressive act, and that of "transformation" thereafter. Speech implies the situation-as-lived, whereas transformation implies a duration, unknown to speech, which precludes stages or sequences between perception and expression. That is, transformation does not appear to be a simultaneous act as such. And yet, in objectification the desired end result is one like speech, since in our previous section we characterized architecture, as speech, as an ontological extension of man. This is not to say that there are no ambiguities in speech; its expressions are by no means pure objects; they simply exemplify one's presence to himself in

the moment. Life is ambiguous, because if it were not, we should not be questioning; we would be fulfilled and not becoming.

But in architecture where the expressed purpose is to objectify by giving a meaning to reality in our world, we are concerned about the process and how the process proceeds. We are all the more concerned with the process of the creative act since neither the architect nor his work are the sole origins of each other but rather the third term in between, architecture. We are also reminded that while the subject and object encroach upon each other and sort of overlap each other eccentrically, the split implied further implies that there is no absolute method with which to bridge the gap.<sup>1</sup> What this means is that there is no other route except by way of life itself. The relationship between the man-object/world is generic: it is growth, movement, cultivation, grasping, etc.--forever transcending. If we ask, which is inevitable, "what is being?" we cannot expect to fill the seemingly void with significations, or with objectives, implications. "What is being?" is an interrogative process implying a circular movement: it aims at the state of things. At the same time it aims at itself as a question. In other words, it is a dialectical process of questioning: the place of significance within Being is not a solution. The significance again takes the form of a philosophical question i.e.,

what "to question" is and what "to respond" is.<sup>2</sup> We often say our solutions are not really solutions but rather ways of understanding what the problem is.

In the man-object/world the relationship which is a potential of Being and is therefore ambiguous, reflects itself again in the ambiguity of the means whereby the object evolves, since no method as such can guarantee the desired end results. And yet the task remains to find the appropriate type of discourse to achieve the architecture by the means of some end results, where the emergence of being is expressed. This section preoccupied with objectification faces this challenge. However, the task is beyond the scope of this thesis and must be part of a future research. Objectification can be considered to concern itself with three general areas: (1) thought, the process and procedure, the discourse for dealing with the relationships as such, which presupposes that the relationship is essentially understood in the way we have described it in Section III; (2) appresentation, where (i) history can be understood as us in our situation, where history of architecture can illuminate the man-object/world relation, where (ii) looking at specific works such as Frank Lloyd Wright's, can provide concrete representation of architecture concerned with architecture as life, where (iii) the engagement of relation and encounter is the context, and where (iv) a description of an actual project can help

characterize the process of objectification; and finally (3) communication, which is of great concern to the architect, since his prime objective is to communicate, not only in the sketches and drawings that he presents to begin with, but also the final object in its actual context.

#### 1. Thought

By thought we do not mean abstract thought in the pejorative sense or idealist sense as either residing in the object or in the subject; rather, it is understood to be the expression that represents the relationship itself--between the subject and the object. It is never static therefore, but always dynamic and taking on new form. It can never be understood to be less in conception. Herbert Read's view that "the image always precedes the idea in the development of human consciousness"<sup>3</sup> is what we have in mind here. Thought as idea can easily become separated from man, while the image always remains a perceptual thought of man.

In Art and Existence Eugene Kaelin says that "if the arts can truly be said to compose a language, then one ought to be able to describe that language, both generically and specifically."<sup>4</sup> By language, of course, Kaelin has in mind language as an expression of Being. But he argues that the question to be answered is not what is expression in a work of art, but rather, how perceptual expression is achieved by the means of the process of the creative act,

in the acquiescence of objectification. His argument is that none of the existential views really did deal effectively with the question of how.<sup>5</sup>

The uniqueness of man is his openness. And in a real and vital sense, this 'openness' opens up the creative process where the what and the how that the process makes use of, are two abstract movements in dialogue. Disclosure is an actual situation where "whenever we find ourselves, we do so in feeling; and we bring that feeling to the level of understanding (Verstehn) by the act of expression."<sup>6</sup> Thought is this simultaneous perceptive and expressive act.

Kahn, for whom architecture is the "thoughtful making of spaces," and for whom there is "no style, no method"<sup>7</sup> for making these thoughtful spaces, has expressed his creative process this way (see Kahn's philosophy in sketch form on plate 5). Kahn uses a different terminology to describe his process, but it basically emulates our description thus far.<sup>8</sup> He says that an existence is the making of order; it comes about through actual doing. Things do not have a consciousness, but man imbues them with his consciousness. Thus we see the essential polarity between man and object. This polarity has about it what he calls an "existence will." It is impersonal feeling and thought. And truth is found in this relationship. This leads Kahn to the notion of Form--a search for truth. But Form is derived from a process transcending






Diagram of Kahn's Philosophy.


both thought and feeling. Therefore, it is impersonal. If we recall earlier when we introduced Kahn's finite-infinite struggle of man's institutions, the impersonal is linked up with the infinite. Form is a search for the "what," the essence represented by the immeasurable. To grasp the what is the creative act.

Opposite to this--which is not an over emphasis-- Kahn places design: it is a measurable quality, a personal act, a circumstantial act, it is the shaping process and is not a creative process. For this reason he can boldly say that "the greatness of an architect depends more on his power to realize that which is "house" than on his ability to design "a house."<sup>9</sup> But lest we should think that the process is always a procedure from Form to Design he admits that Form can in fact be discovered through Design itself. The crucial point is that Form--the immeasurable--be the sole origin of architecture. In the end the object too must join the immeasurable realm. Design is therefore a means to an end. Form is its motivation; without it Design is helpless. Therefore the architect has to be concerned with what a thing wants to be. For example, House is the Form and is concerned with what it is, and "a house" as a conditional interpretation of the Form.


Kahn has demonstrated his process in architecture most clearly in the Rochester Unitarian Church, New York (see plate 6). The Form diagram resulted from the nature



FIRST DESIGN  
close translation  
of realization in  
Form






Rochester Unitarian Church



No!

Test of the  
Validity of  
Form



Design resulting  
from circumstantial  
demands

of the community of people itself. It is interested more in the 'question' than in the answer. When the people responded by suggesting a separation between the school activity and church activity, Kahn demonstrated that it was not the "existence will" of the community to be separated in that way.

For many, Kahn's way of transforming reality into meaning is incoherent, if not to say the least, unintelligible. But is this in fact the case? Or does Kahn not explain his process too well? Form is a search for order, which presupposes structure and light. In the act of design "the thoughtful making of spaces" is a process of giving order to man's institution by way of structure and light. For it is only in light that an object can have a distance from man to begin with. And when Kahn speaks of Form, he is indirectly qualifying what this immeasurable distance shall be in the creative act of object to man. If we may improvise for Kahn for our benefit, what he really wants to say is that the origin of the creative act finds its source in the notion of Form. And when he qualifies that Form is a search for truth and for the existence will, he is not merely conceptualizing. He is in fact speaking about that relationship of Being as we have done, which is the essence of architecture. It is the third term to which both architect and building have their ground of commonality or relation. Therefore, the two possible objections that might be raised are (1) the strong emphasis given to the

mysterious, almost platonic realm of Form, (2) the dichotomy given to the Form and Design continuum. We only need John Dewey to help emphasize that the what is because of how it is done. "In the act there is no distinction, but perfect integration of manner and content, form and substance."<sup>10</sup> Dewey defines form as something that organizes materials, that is a completion of relations. The relations cannot be told apart from what they relate. Relations are direct and dynamic, active and energetic, and experience in the fullest sense. These relations have no reality as being dynamic or energetic outside of experience. Hence, form is defined "as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene and situation to its own integral fulfillment."<sup>12</sup> Dewey, however as an advocate of the existential contributes the skill or design not so much as part of the designer but rather as enhanced expression of the form; it belongs to the product and not to the producer, because it is a constituent of form.<sup>13</sup>

The Aristotilian notion of form, to which Dewey basically subscribes, is also subscribed to by Heidegger. Form of something is a dynamically standing forth and shows itself for what it is. To have something stand forth, to use Heideggerian language, is to have truth take concrete form in the struggle of "world" and "earth". This truth-struggle is one where world is an occurrence of Being which is not an object but a space-time Being, of the totality

of thoughts, ideas, beliefs, customs, and feelings, whereas earth is that aspect of Being as physis, as appearance. Reality or truth takes on meaning in material reality. However the world-earth struggle is one of disclosure versus concealment. The material is an occasion for the occurrence of Being. The world wishes to disclose and will not tolerate concealment. The earth however, in its steadfastness wishes the opposite: to conceal and preserve. The struggle is such that each tries to dominate the other and neither can be without the other. World and earth are modalities of illuminating--concealing the event of truth. It is a positive ontological event where the parties posit each other in self-assertion in a world of art.

But the world-earth struggle is only part of his conception of form, and has spoken mainly to the what. Creating or objectification is also a producing. The world-earth struggle as a manifestation of truth refers to the what but at the same time is dependent upon the how. Truth is necessarily a shaped and transformed material and this implies craftsmanship. It is not a practical or a technical skill; rather, as in the Greek sense of techne', it is a mode of knowing: "To know is to have seen."<sup>14</sup> Techne' is a knowing connected with the making. Another way of saying it is, "techne' is a foreseeing, or even an anticipation of the object which is to be made."<sup>15</sup> Hence, if techne' is a foreseeing and a foreknowing, it is apparent

it does not belong to skills but to Being, and techne' is a skilled knowing, a giving of entrance of the appearance of being's Being. Therefore creating is truth; it is structure itself occurring. But the knowing here is not to have a representation of; it means being concerned with; it is understanding, and understanding is a situational discovery.

Heidegger's description of the creative act as in objectification is much more holistic than Kahn's in the way the essentials merge in the concrete establishment of truth. However, once we look beyond Kahn's attempt to be explicit about his actual creative process by showing the decisive distinction between Form and Design, the similarities are obvious. Techne' like design is a condition of skill and in this sense belongs to the individual. But if as Kahn says, design can lead to form, it then is also a knowing process as well. And the emphasis is similar: merely designing is trivia; it is floundering. Design cannot proceed without an intrinsic knowing and this is the only real sensible way Kahn can be understood. The key is insight; it is a property of the object, and is not of self. The power of intuition happens as a moment of truth; it is a power, a formative power happening between that of ripeness and discovery--a power that is known to the artist as well as the scientist.<sup>16</sup> Merleau-Ponty has defined intuition in the following way: "everything one gives to Being is taken from experience, everything one gives to experience

is taken from Being."<sup>17</sup>

If we must conclude that the what is only in terms of how it is done, then the problem we face is clear but difficult. We cannot prescribe the how because the how and the what presuppose each other. Therefore, to try to sketch a rudimentary how without considering simultaneously the what is being superficial and unfaithful to one's obligatory task. Again, our research has made us admit, we cannot divorce thinking from doing. We must go through our search for discovery in experience, where we encounter risks as well as moments of truths.

Coming back to thought, then, means that the artist grasps Being in his work in the act. Being is all comprehensive: it incorporates the maker and the mode. This further implies that essence is a common nerve, so to speak, between the sign and the significance, i.e., it is the spread between words.

If we are going to talk about ideas--because as architects we somehow cannot refrain from doing so,--if there is an ideality, it is thought that has future in man and nothing less, because "life becomes ideas and the ideas return to life . . . ideas are the texture of experience."<sup>18</sup> There is an implicit pattern to life; there are structures, rules, laws within our sedimented lives. Subjectivity is a logical function, unchangeable psyche. The establishment of what we have repeatedly referred to as Being, truth, is

a practical attitude. What C. A. van Peursen tries to bring across in Life-World and Structures<sup>19</sup> is that sedimentations of our life-world are in fact the structures of our empirical reality in actual life. We recall Kohák who expressed the view that things are neutral to us and present themselves either as an It or a Thou. But this still does not answer the awesome question of how. Philosophy is still struggling with the transcendence of life in relation to empirical reality. And it remains the difficult task of architecture to somehow express this relationship. It must become possible within its stamp of movement.

We are left to think of how as vision. Vision as thought is first of all a reflective vision and second as an instituted vision.<sup>20</sup> Vision describes the process of thought, the union of body and world, and seeks to distinguish between significance and absence of significance. The artist within the halo of vision deals with the emergence of Being, how the in-itself is experienced by us. "Vision is not a certain mode of thought or presence to self; it is the means given me for being absent from myself, for being present at the fusion of Being from the inside-- the fusion at whose termination and not before, I come back to myself."<sup>21</sup> If this is true for the painter, it is, to be sure, true for the architect who structures the world of our immediate experience. We create not so much to possess but to place our lives before us.

This dialogue we have had about thought in the movements of Form and Design, what and how, is only the beginning. Further research will have to zero in on the ramifications and implications the separate movements have within a process towards objectification of thought which is co-extensive with Being. The architect embodied within perceptual vision, expresses reality. "Vision encounters, as at a crossroads, all the aspects of Being."<sup>22</sup> Man, as an incomplete object and as a subjectivity objectifies towards a fulfillment of life.

## 2. Appresentation

In the part on symbolism we used the concept of appresentation to characterize the function of symbolism.<sup>23</sup> The character of appresentation means that what is 'there' perceptually motivates belief-in something else being there too. Appresentation fulfills the function of the relationship of the man-object relation, where the interpreter as man and appresenting as object function together where the third partner in the triad, appresented, presents itself as a presence. Appresentation helps to avoid the ambiguity surrounding the concept of "representation," which in one instant can mean an idea as force on man, or the next moment as a re-presentation which then implies a replica. It has the tendency to break that direct link between man and object, whereas appresentation means man

is present to himself in the moment of encounter with an object. In appresentation man is an animated organism.

Thus the historical is an analogical apperception to the present. Man is present to himself as the context of encounter communicates its network of relations, as man and object come together in an event.

(i) Historical: The relation that the man-object/world has to each other, which is a manifestation of enigmatic Being, is not an external relation to history i.e., the history of architecture. History is inherent to this manifestation. Process cannot out of fear exclude the historical aspect as inhibition to his work. Rather the historical is a habitation out of which the present is possible. In the man-object/world question we again take up the historical manifestations and actualize them in the present; "it reanimates and rectifies a genesis which could miscarry without it,"<sup>24</sup> which is possible only by seeking the motive within history. Architecture objectifies our living and traditional socialities. And as such our design activities cannot realistically consider this moment of life a passing reality. If we did, we would merely be representing a world for ourselves, unsympathetic to life, which the various processes at the beginning of section III pointed to. No . . . the world we live in is not merely a representation of the world but the presentation itself. And those authors such as Langer, who

continually speak of "representation", are vulnerable to misconception, misrepresentation of the place of the work of art in our lives.

We live in history; we are hemmed in by it and cannot escape it. As architects we must absorb it into our confidence. The only inhibition we are faced with in history is our understanding of it. The relationship we question in the man-object/world, necessarily takes us into history. This underlying thought of the whole research, I discover, has been underscored by Merleau-Ponty when he too says that "it is the very concept of the relationships of mind to its object that historical consciousness invites us to reshape."<sup>25</sup> Truth is to be found through historical inference. If our wish as architects is to be "radical," if our expressed purpose in architecture is to find and build upon new ideas, this radical expression can result from a historical situation to which we are grafted. Our present knowledge is historical inherence. We must first learn this relation of our inherence to history, and this inherence which history in us implies is an apperceptual understanding.


(ii) How can we apperceive the historical for our present architectural work? How do we go about taking the historical into our confidence? There are no absolute principles by which we become an apperceptual part of history, however, history must proceed by method. And,

something that is true of everything else is also true here: method and understanding intertwine in establishing truth.


Painting and music are excellent examples where method and understanding merge in expression. Klee, Matisse, Von Gogh, Cezanne are prominent examples in philosophy, and Picasso, with whom we haven't caught up yet--these painters "see" and "understand" in painting. In music there are such composers, for example, as Bartok who developed his own scale system, belonging neither to the harmonic scale nor the serial scale. Through his scale based upon the golden section, in which a dialect of light and dark is possible through inversions, he was able to give expression to his folk themes.<sup>26</sup> These are examples to illustrate that method and understanding intertwine in a process. No doubt we could learn more from these artists by further interrogating the relation of method and understanding through which they give expression to truth as they see it in life. This is in essence the question of objectification.

In a provisional and preliminary start, here is how we could begin to understand our recent historical past in architecture. Here are some examples that this research should continue to investigate.

For example, we would want to interrogate the De Stijl concepts, particularly Theo van Doesburg's ideas on architecture, since he felt that architecture presented the form which man encounters nearly every moment of his life.





Elementarism




Plan

Plan

A house conceived within the principles of Elementarism by van Doesburg, 1923.




COUNTRY HOUSE by Mies van der Rohe, 1923



Elementarism was for Doesburg, a vital and necessary means of expression. It appears from his writings that it was a destructive force as well as a creative force: it was a process which concerned itself only with the essentials of reality. The task, as De Stijl saw it, was to avoid the imitation and the illusion. With the notion of elementarism, van Doesburg could, through a relation of the vertical-horizontal-diagonal forces represent the space-time, plane-colour, function-form continuums and situate the realities of life. As one can see in plate 7, the way the elements come together to give shape and form to actual situations, they at the same time seem to appear as non-existent, as if they are not there in reality. The context is an abstraction of reality.


The De Stijl's concepts of space and plane intertwining in time, are expressed very simply and eloquently in Mies' early country house shown in plate 8. The work of Le Corbusier however, expresses more the "plasticity" of mass in light.




For two general reasons the whole generating principle throughout his work is the primary shape: (1) the man-object interface is understood by Le Corbusier, and the entire earlier period in which he lives, as plasticism, as a special sense of human manifestation; (2) architecture, Le Corbusier firmly believes, is man's first manifestation in his world in some geometrical form of which the primary shapes are of the most visual and perceptual clarity.

The Domino House (plate 9) showed the type of construction that a simple dwelling unit could be adapted to and allowed for the dominance of plasticism in the new architecture of which plate 10 shows some variations. Both the primary shape and what he calls the "regulating line" are dominant principles in these and all his projects. The Villa Savoie is a classic example of his early period (plate 11).


Certainly the notion of plasticism is felt visually. But we must think no less that plasticism also had for Le Corbusier a far deeper significance of a human dimension-- a significance incomplete and struggling to exist in the




DOMINO HOUSE by Le Corbusier in 1914.



Section





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

Plan

1





"... easy technique, picturesque and dynamic ... can discipline it by identity and hierarchy."

2





"very difficult (intellectual satisfaction)."

3



"... very easy ... practical and combinable ..."


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

"very generous ... exterior architecturally very strong, forceful and powerful ... interior, all functional needs satisfied: penetration/space, flow/insulation ..."




VILLA SAVOIE  
by Le Corbusier, 1929




Section



Ground plan



Roof plan










Main plan

work of the artist.


The notions of De Stijl and those of Le Corbusier in particular, have had a profound influence in such recent architectural works as Peter Eisenman's.<sup>27</sup> While his work is their influence, his conception and language of architecture is very different indeed. Three essentials are at the base of his approach: (1) the use of a building is incidental only, (2) technology today provides for more than pure representative structure and therefore the grid and the column, for example, can take on new significances, (3) the plane is used as an abstract idea as in the sense of cardboard architecture. Implied is an important difference: the architectural synthesis has no cultural meaning. He simply talks in linguistic terms about a "transformational grammar" of interrelated units.

First of all, he talks about a "syntactic structure," which is the generative activity interrelating the three primary physical systems of the line, plane and volume. Then he talks about a "deep structure" which further implies the opposites at work in the synthesis of the interrelated units: column/wall, volume/column, volume/wall. House II, illustrated by plates 12-16, shows the dialectical interplay between the column and the wall, of which something similar was the case with Le Corbusier's Domino House. In House II the column is read either as additive, as a build-up of planes, or as subtractive, as a residue of







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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
18



HOUSE II




Ceiling plan




Second level

1 playroom, 2 evening  
 terrace, 3 kitchen,  
 4 summer terrace,  
 5 morning terrace,  
 6 entry, 7 winter  
 living, 8 bedroom,  
 9 bath, 10 study.



First level

Plate 15






Plate 16


planes. By "layering" he refers to the interrelations of the units in three-dimensions; hence, the representations in isometric drawings. Layering helps to establish both the formational and transformational structures from which relations of opposites such as tension and compression, or as centrifugal and centripetal, etc. can accrue. Thus from these transformational units, a spatial system is conceived.

But of more significance is what Eisenman refers to as "double deep structure" and "surface level." The surface level is not important as a final product as it traditionally is. Surface level is not merely concerned with 'appearance'; it is what it is as one reads the operations of the deep structure that generates it. This is accomplished by creating a dialectic between "what exists" and "what is implied." He refers to this conceptual ambiguity as "double-deep structure." Eisenman notes that:

'One way to provide access to a conceptual relationship--to shift the primary intention from the physical object to a formal relationship--might be to provide in the object two conceptual readings, so that the object can never be held in the mind as a single entity, but rather as in a state of tension or as a dialectic between two conceptual notions. In House II, there are two alternatives posited as a neutral referent. The first, marking one of the . . . aspects of the deep level, are the shear walls, which can be read as a datum, especially when seen from the north, whereupon the columns may be read as a residue of these planes, transposed diagonally from them. Alternatively, the columns can be read as neutral, or deep level referents, especially when seen from the south, whereupon the shear wall may be read as having been shifted from the column-wall ambiguity.'<sup>28</sup>

This is how the surface level emerges. The transformational


grammar is finally synthesized through the opposition of explicit-to-implicit.



In everyday language, one can satisfy the rules of the grammar without meaning, but meaning cannot appear without the grammar. Eisenman's architectural theory of "transformational grammar" is exceptionally relevant to any future architectural theory. His notion of the structure in depth, the idea of the conceptual ambiguity provided by the "deep structure which necessarily involves the participant, and the fact that he considers the project not a finished product, but the operations that give rise to it, are of great interest.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, any future work in architectural theory cannot by-pass the work of Eisenman. But the criticisms to semiology earlier, is valid here too. He talks about the grammar, the rules that generate the system, and entirely omits the meaning that generates the rules. The system has set aside man and is devoid of him. The grammar must comply to the man-object/world interface and appear as meaning.


Meaning, which Eisenman seems to take for granted in his work, is the main undercurrent in the works of Wright



and Kahn. If we studied Kahn, we should have to understand his work in the sense of order: "architecture is the thoughtful making of spaces."



To understand order implies an understanding of structure both in the visible sense as in light and in the invisible. An understanding of order implies an understanding of structure in the sense of both the visible as in light and in the invisible as in spirit. It is not the intent to go into any further depth on the work of Kahn in this context except to point out that by "order" Kahn means man giving reality to his presence. This attempt to find order is clearly expressed in his Trenton Bath House (see plate 17).

If we were to do an in-depth study of Wright's work, we would find two orders inextricably related and undifferentiated as if the one made the other possible.







The TRENTON BATH HOUSE by Louis Kahn, 1956

When Wright says that to design is to "pattern-forth," he speaks a highly generical language. In his concept of pattern, structure and space come together as in some organic whole, as an animated organism of an inseparable man-object relationship. He has said on many occasions that if the space of architecture<sup>30</sup> does not come through, there is no architecture. Wright has his notion of what space is just as the whole De Stijl movement had, or Eisenman has in his work. In fact, the notions of space are extreme indeed. While De Stijl emphasized the pure plane, Wright takes great care to articulate the plane--sometimes meticulously detailed. While the pure plane either reflects more deeply or seems to disappear, the articulated surface in Wright's case, gives dominance to one's presence. The pure plane of De Stijl, of Corbusier, of Eisenman has some special meaning in relation to what they refer to as being conceptual. The articulated surface of Wright is related to his notion of pattern which in turn is related to a deep and personal meaning of the existential.


In his notion of pattern, two opposites are ultimately intertwined in his profound understanding of life as Logos expressed in the notions of democracy, freedom, spirit, etc. On the one side we have the rudimentary tarten grids of his early period (see plate 18),<sup>31</sup> and later on his simpler grids such as the square and the hexagon (see plate 19), with clearly defined axes movement and time,




"In the Froebel patterns the parts have . . . surrendered their identity to the whole."




"A typical pattern consists of two interpenetrating cruciforms breaking through a square."



". . . the characteristic intersection of square and cruciform into three dimensions."



The ROSS HOUSE by Wright, 1904.



The VIGO SUNDT HOUSE by Wright, 1941.

and elements situated on the axial grid in an orderly fashion, and materials giving definition. On the other side we have the defined space with its sheltering, existential motifs, earth bound lines and cantilevers to give greater expression to the spatial conception. Space, in the work of Wright, is very clearly the result of an anatomical network of rigid rules and existential motifs.

The rules do not generate their own activity per se; they generate an activity inspired by meaning. Here we have meaning with an implicit grammar. We could say that the deep structure in Wright's work is the meaning implied. Architecture is a language, because the meaning it implies as in life, must enter the world and become an empirical reality in a grammatical form.

The layering that Eisenman spoke of in relation to his work, is also consciously expressed in such works of Wright as the Kaufmann House (Fallingwater, 1939), but in a much more dramatic way (see how the plans progress from the first level to the third level on plate 20).

Within the concept of appresentation one experiences the network of relations as appresented, as implicitly implying the meaning of the motifs. In the 'two' abstract movements of the rule and the motif, like the what and the how, meaning emerges as thought.

If "architecture is life," to use Wright's own words, then architecture must take up the movements such as








Plate 20

FALLING WATER HOUSE by Frank Lloyd Wright, 1939.

rules and motifs that are implicitly related to both a world of materials and machines, and to life in the sense of meaning. When these conditions had been satisfied, architecture had arrived.

What have we said here that is any different from our discussion on being-in-the-world? Organic architecture must be interpreted as the enveloping of man and object. We can refer to this presence as the animated organism. I touch myself by creating distance from myself, or I touch myself only by escaping from myself. The only underlying unifying force which dissolves the rule and the motif into one existential presence as it does in Wright's work, is significance.

If Kaufmann has the opinion that Wright's forms have proved unsuccessful in other hands, the problem clearly lies in the failure to establish what the significance was that his work embodied. And this implies furthermore that if someone honestly understood the significance, the need would not exist to replicate Wright's forms.

In general, objectification evolves through its abstract movements, as we see in the case of rules and motifs, to create the so called animated organism or body-subject. It is not possible to go into greater depth than we have in analyzing what new light could be shed on the man-object/world relationship in the work and ideas of the architects mentioned and others that we have not mentioned.

It is clear that as architects we must inhabit the history of architecture as all the great architects had to do. They could not have been as decisive and as radical as they were had they been unfamiliar with their historical past.

Both architectural history and the writings of various prominent architects are essential to a further understanding of the man-object/world question. But the opposite is also true: the architect must learn to value both his writing and his work: both are part of a process towards understanding.<sup>32</sup>

(iii) Relation and encounter: By taking up our historical past we acquaint ourselves with the problem of relation and encounter as well. Rules and motifs are relations that are encountered in grids and elements, materials and space. By this we mean that a network of relations are made affective in material reality. If we desire a space for meditation, we must encounter it by a boundary context of planes, lines, materials and light. In the same way that Cezanne had to encounter the reality he experienced in the landscape surrounding him with each brush stroke, by group and groups of brush strokes together with colours, so the architect must learn to encounter the network of relations in visual form and shape.

The architect has all of technology, its various materials, both structural systems and organizing systems, various prefabricated elements and methods of fabrication,


etc., at his disposal. Yet it is this vast technology of materials and systems that the architect must bring into relation with man and his being. The task of unifying the network of relations and encounters is perhaps best said by Wright when he spoke of to "pattern-forth," or as we have said, to give ontological extension of man's being.

(iv) Perhaps it is fitting to discuss at some leisure a project I have recently completed. It is a director's pavilion for a private camp. It is a good example where numerous constraints (such as site, cost and materials, unskilled labour, lack of equipment, remoteness, construction time, etc.) influenced the manifestation of the pavilion as a complete thought. Simplicity dominated as far as construction was concerned, but in reality it became complex as the network of relations of one's visual and spatial experiences at camp were concerned. (See the plates on the following pages.)


The purpose is not to discuss the meaning of the pavilion, or to justify it in any way. Rather the purpose is to reflect upon the experience which helped to discover its expression--the kind of reflection that must necessarily take place in any creative act. The expression must be discovered. To experience means to discover the essence of the expression, because self-presence happens in discovering the expression, and expression is directly related to a perceptual experience.




Plate 21




West Elevation




Main plan



East Elevation




Deck level



Section

CAMP KOINONIA



Director's Pavilion by  
Harold Funk, 1972,  
(under construction).

The building is a complete thought. The what and how, the network of relations and their encounters are the visible and invisible forces of reality. The question to which we have frequently referred "what is Being?" is discovered in principle in the relation of the visible to the invisible. Since it never is completely either one, Being questions itself and things it aims at simultaneously.

By having the question return upon itself, i.e., what to question is and what to respond is we give expression to this dialectic of "what to question is" and "what to respond is." The architect takes up this dialectic fully inhabited in the knowledge of architecture, with all the means that are at his disposal. The architect inhabits his mode of vision as the painter does his.

The pavilion represents such a question--response, dialogue and the resolution in a rule-motif encounter. In this sense it is a complete thought--dominance and integration--temporal and experiential--change and relief--nature and freedom--shelter and outdoors--direction and anticipation--ground and foliage--light and integrity--materials and strength--these and other thoughts had their influence in conceiving. We do not begin by asking "what is Being?" We begin by asking what it means to 'experience' camp and reflect this response as an aspect of Being. The struggle of the creative act is one of engaging this experience with empirical encounters.

I see the expression of the building take visual form in experience like words, which germinated deep within man and bubbled up from the bottom, giving expression to a thought. As words are the most valuable witness to Being, and structure it, so the architectural expression must be that witness of Being too. Even though we have a language in which our meanings are stored for us and to which we recall to express a new thought, even though this sedimented structure is there, we must bring words together not in repetitious manner so that ideas are no longer thoughts, or no longer speak, but relations of words that give new thought and hope--this task is as difficult in poetry for example, as in architecture. Architectonics reveals and conceals the meaning that it would store. The expression of the building must bring to the surface this deep-rooted relation of perceptual experience.

The incarnating contact one has with nature from a lived-situation on the undulating path, from which on the one side the water glitters and reflects against a silhouetted band of distant trees which sweeps around and engulfs the water and me standing on the path, and merges with the low-lying vegetation and deep-dark foliage above on the other side, is a lived moment of truth and an expression and witness to Being. The experience brings with it wonder and inspiration, truth and reality. One is surrounded with this sense of experience. And this

recalls a statement which Merleau-Ponty has made which complies to this thought that fact and essence mix up in one's experiences. "Being no longer being before me, but surrounding me and in a sense traversing me, and my vision of Being not forming itself from elsewhere, but from the midst of Being."<sup>33</sup> The experiences are not representations of experiences; they are encrusted in us.

The building cannot shut out this experience. It would then be unfaithful to an existence it was to have. Its challenge is to 'institute' this insight of an experience at a camp; it must be an interpretation; be and embody simultaneously. In short, it must vibrate ontologically with Being.

How is the architect to approximate the experience of contact and beauty at camp? The building must interpenetrate with the total experience one can have with nature. It must let nature complete its form, allow it to enter its space, to lend its shade. The building must light up its structure and reveal its intimacy and liveliness. It must ponder the ground on which it stands and open itself to the light. It must shelter and give one a point of perspective. The building cannot be indifferent but must challenge the proliferous profiles of one's experiences in nature in its own embodiment.

In short: by some sort of exchange, by a system of equivalences, a logos of lines, planes, slopes, of solids

and voids, grids and elements, of structure in light and colour, the endless network of relations that comprise this experience in nature merge with visual and spatial encounters. Man is in contact with himself; he is enveloped within a field of an animated presence. The creative gesture rises out of this experience with hope and challenge. And in the process we are giving expression to Being. We encounter reality with all the means at our disposal. The building is a witness to one's incarnating experience of sensuous being.

In the end, no matter what methods, what systems, what materials, what space went into the expression, the method must merge with the motif as in some relationship, as in some cohesion, some meaning for the expression to be of value.

As this short description of how an expression comes about has shown--we do not begin by asking "what is Being?" as if it had some ready-made definitions--we find it. We say that architecture is that relationship dealing with the aspect of Being, but there are no rules that give us being. Rules combine with confirmations to give expression of Being. As the research has indicated: it is not an attempt to provide answers; it is an attempt to make us more aware, more conscious that the creative act is a perceptual act under the guidance of the faculty of vision which reflects and institutes, perceives and expresses simultaneously.

### 3. Communications

In the normal sense of the term, communication takes place only in the everyday world where people, accustomed to a style of life, a language, a sign-system, etc., take them for granted and normal operations continue uninterrupted.

Communication is critical in objectification. In architecture it has to do with the general appearance of a building. A church should be recognizable as one, otherwise all communication would break down. This point of view advocates that architects learn the symbol system of a culture as Norberg-Schulz does to prevent a communications gap. But is this communication?

In the man-object/world question communication is an inherence of the implied relationship. We recall again that thought is co-extensive with Being. This is what the architect is set out to communicate. Our communications should lead to our origin.

The architect is not alone in setting out to find the origin which generates all truth. The layman too has this goal in life. Both search the expressions of meaning. The layman must therefore rethink the thoughts of the architect. Both are responsible to the relationship of Being. Both ultimately hope to be able to say "I see according to it."<sup>34</sup> Man leads a life of significance according to the expression of meanings he discovers in it. Architect and layman are both partners and participants of this significance.

#### FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Tillich, Systematic, Vol. 3, p. 71.
- <sup>2</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, pp. 119-120.
- <sup>3</sup>Herbert Read, Icon and Idea (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 1.
- <sup>4</sup>Eugene F. Kaelin, Art and Existence: A Phenomenological Aesthetics (Lewisburg: Buckness University Press, 1970), p. 35.
- <sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 334-35.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 337.
- <sup>7</sup>Kahn, Talks with Students, p. 35.
- <sup>8</sup>Jan C. Rowan, "Wanting to Be," Progressive Architecture (April, 1961), pp. 131-163.
- <sup>9</sup>Kahn, "Not for the Faint-hearted," p. 30.
- <sup>10</sup>John Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 109.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 117.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 139.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 140.
- <sup>14</sup>Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 683.
- <sup>15</sup>Lambert van de Water, "The Work of Art, Man and Being: A Heideggerian Theme," International Philosophical Quarterly, IX (June, 1969), p. 222.
- <sup>16</sup>Arthur Koestler, Act of Creation (1964: New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), pp. 108-120.
- <sup>17</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 122.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>19</sup>C. A. van Peursen, "Life-World and Structures," Patterns of the Life-World, ed. James Edie, Francis Parker, and Calvin Schrag. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp. 139-153.

<sup>20</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, p. 176.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>23</sup>See footnote

<sup>24</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 107.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

<sup>26</sup>Erno Lendvai, "Duality and Synthesis in the Music of Bela Bartok," Module, Proportion, Symmetry, Rhythm (Ed.) Gyorgy Kepes. New York: George Braziller, 1966.

<sup>27</sup>Mario Gandelsonas, "On Reading Architecture", Progressive Architecture (March 1972), pp. 80-87.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>30</sup>See Wright's disciplined explanation of his conception of space in An American Architecture, pp. 75-85.

<sup>31</sup>See Richard C. MacCormac's article "The Anatomy of Wright's Aesthetic," Architectural Review, CXLIII (Feb. 1968), pp. 113-116.

<sup>32</sup>Eisenman says that he feels he values his writings as much as his work, Gandelsonas, "On Reading Architecture," p. 85.

<sup>33</sup>Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and Invisible, p. 114.

<sup>34</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, p. 164.

SECTION V

## SELF-PRESENCE

The enigmatic question of architecture finds its centre in the intentional relationship of the object-subject polarity. The subject and object are two abstract movements of a unique infrastructure which is self-presence. That is to say, the presence as in the subject-object polarity, is 'more' than just, for example, the object being a correlative of man: it is a revelation of the self to the self.<sup>1</sup> If this sounds mystical, it is intentional. The architect must learn to understand architecture as the sphere of self-presence, or be misled and be misleading.

The anxieties we experience in the field of architecture about its essence refers us to the man-object/world question. Life and architecture themselves, are the terms of this relationship. Architecture as self-manifestation therefore is an acknowledgement of the dichotomous intertwining of the polarity. Architecture in this sense is not merely an enrichment of life, it is life itself. The object does not serve man's life merely as some enrichment of it-- objects can and should enrich life. However, the object has a much more fundamental role than enrichment; it serves life by denying impoverishment which can swallow man up. It is true however that the object can enhance impoverishment.

If life is bounded by nonbeing on the one side and being on the other, man objectifies to negate the nonbeing. Life aspires towards Being, which it is not, by negating that anxiety which threatens his being. Therefore, the object is not something that man can do without; it is not a romantic attitude; it is not simply an expensive enrichment; it is not applied to man over and above his subsistent level--it is necessary to his life.

The emphasis is that the subject-object relationship, as in consciousness in moments of awareness, can be as minute as a seed and as full-grown as a tree. Nothing has changed that is not of the same essence. This fundamental realization is as true for architecture as it is for speech.<sup>2\*</sup> Self-manifestation remains true to this life of consciousness in which the object is a correlative of the subject. It is signification giving itself a body.


This corroboration of architecture with life is what we have referred to as self-presence. It can be defined very simply as myself seen from without. Architecture is a concretion of this visibility and sensibility, the essence of which is Being. But the notion of presence does not merely belong to the essential realm alone. Presence must become actual and only in the actual sphere of the situation does it have meaning. The essential however gives the actual the power of presence. Kahn refers to this power of presence as "order is." It is a discovery.

Wright had a much more rhetorical way of saying what self-presence was when he said on a number of occasions, "the kingdom of God is within you." He clearly had in mind the existential situation and not just a mystical conception. Unless the existential situation had this power of presence in life, which he felt organic architecture disclosed, the statement well known to many people, had no meaning at all.

We who are so used to conceptualizing, are so unfamiliar with the existentialist's description of the body (which I am only 'beginning' to understand and which we described at some length in Section III). But 'to speak' or 'to think' of presence is difficult without also understanding the notion of the body. The body is a synergical system not only of the body to the self but also to the world. It is difficult to imagine how the categories such as implication, inhabitation or incarnation can have any meaning at all without the presence of the body: from implicatedness where body is an anchorage to an environment/world in the sense of "to dwell," "to be at home," to the notion of self-manifestation in the sense of self-presence. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty comes back to his theme of the body which is both the sensible as object among the other objects of the world, and the sentient as the phenomenal body, by which a world is real to us and subtended by us. It is useful at this point to refer again to the body as we try to give further clarity

to the notion of self-presence.

Presence refers to the reciprocal relation that the body has with the thing in the world and the thing has with the body. The relationship (between man and object) is one of touching and being touched, of the visible and the tangible. Presence is this "doubling-effect" of the one by the other which however never merge but remain as two separate patterns which overlap. The relation of the object to the subject, where for example, vision is palpation with the 'look', "it must also be inscribed in the order of being, that it discloses to us; he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that he looks at."<sup>3</sup>



This visibility of the body is also the stuff of the world in which it lives. By visibility we mean "a quality pregnant with a texture, the surface of a depth, a cross section upon a massive being, a grain or corpuscle borne by a wave of being. Since the total visible is always behind, or after, or between the aspects we see of it, there is access to it only through an experience which like it, is wholly outside of itself."<sup>4</sup> The difficulty in all this is the fact that man is not pure vision and the object is not

pure visibility or essence, or else the two would be superposable. But we who see the object see more than just their being perceived. The relation is such that there is an invisible connection between man and the object, but while being part of each other, as the palpation of the look and the touch will attest to, there is at the same time a distance of the look and touch, a kind of thickness, separating the object from man--a distance which constitutes the visibility of the thing and the corporeity of the body looking. This distance is an inexhaustible depth of the phenomenal body--a thickness of the body: "I have to go into the heart of the things, by making myself a world and by making them flesh."<sup>5</sup> The sensible body inhabits the thing by its touch and vision, and is "caught up in the tissue of the things" by its senses, and everything resembles it on the outside. In this moment of presence the body incorporates the thing, encloses it without superposition.

Therefore this presence is a strange adhesion of the man, and the thing is a Visibility and a Tangibility which is neither qua body or qua fact but, if you will, the condition for facticity--what makes something a fact with which man participates. As the painter, Klee, is to once have said:

'In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, speaking to me . . . I was there . . . listening. . . . Perhaps I paint to break out.'<sup>6</sup>

This intertwining and reciprocal insertion of me looking at and being looked at, as if I were seen from the outside, to exist within the thing as if I had emigrated to it and had been captivated by it so that in this reciprocation one could, as it were, no longer distinguish which was seeing and which was seen.

This phenomenal presence Merleau-Ponty ingeniously refers to as Flesh.<sup>7</sup> And he sees its function as serving this thickness in depth of the body and the look between the body and the things as an incarnating principle in the sense of as "element" of Being, where element is understood in the traditional sense of air, fire, water and earth. It is as we said earlier, that which makes facticity a possibility--it is an ultimate notion which absorbs me and the thing.

The idea of the element is also one that Gaston Bachelard has in mind in Poetics of Space in reference to the "poetic image." For example, with the association of memory and imagination he uses images such as the "original shell" and the "universe" to describe the essence of what it means to "inhabit" as for example, in a house. The house is not the object; it is the totality of thought and experience subject to life. Perhaps it is best to quote at length what Bachelard means by house as a poetic image, and the essence and actuality of the image itself.


. . . in the most interminable of dialectics, the sheltered being gives perceptible limits to his shelter. He experiences the house in its reality and in its virtuality, by means of thought and dreams. It is no longer in its positive aspects that the house is really "lived," nor is it only in the passing hour that we recognize its benefits. An entire past comes to dwell in a new house. The old saying: "We bring our LARES with us" has many variations. And the daydream deepens to the point where an immemorial domain opens up for the dreamer of a home beyond man's earliest memory. . . . memory and imagination remain associated, each one working for their mutual deepening. In the order of values, they both constitute a community of memory and image. Thus the house is not experienced from day to day only, on the thread of a narrative, or in the telling of our own story. Through dreams, the various dwelling-places in our lives co-penetrate and retain the treasures of former days. And after we are in the new house, when memories of other places we have lived in come back to us, we travel to the land of Motionless Childhood, motionless the way all Immemorial things are. We live fixations, fixations of happiness. We comfort ourselves by reliving memories of protection. Something closed must retain our memories, while leaving them their original value as images. Memories of the outside world will never have the same tonality as those of home and, by recalling these memories, we add to our store of dreams; we are never real historians, but always near poets, and our emotion is perhaps nothing but an expression of a poetry that was lost.

Thus, by approaching the house images with care not to break up the solidarity of memory and imagination, we may hope to make others feel all the psychological elasticity of an image that moves us at an unimaginable depth. Through poems, perhaps more than through recollections, we touch the ultimate poetic depth of the space of the house.<sup>8</sup>

Flesh, like the poetic image, incorporates the visible and the invisible as in facticity, for the invisible gives the visible its power of being. The visible, as the tangible and the touched, coils over the body and presence is the uniqueness of the body seeing and touching itself.

Moreover, the flesh is the actual presence of thought: the implied idea in the thought is already a seed

in my body because thought has a simultaneous three-dimensional relationship:



Hence, Flesh is a bond with the idea; it is the lining and depth of the invisible that gives reference to the visible. Flesh therefore does not simply imply object or matter; Flesh could not be presence to self if the invisible, the depth with which the object is concealed, did not shine through. In presence then, visibility is sustained and nourished by the invisibility of the world; it possesses us.

But once we have entered into this strange domain, one does not see how there could be any question of leaving it. If there is an animation of the body; if the vision and the body are tangled up in one another; if, correlatively, the thin pellicle of the quale, the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if finally, in our flesh as in the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but is its principle, that is not the proper contribution of a "thought" but is its condition, a style, allusive and elliptical like every style, but like every style inimitable, inalienable, an interior horizon and as exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a provisional partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles--then (the immediate and dualist distinction between the visible and the invisible, between extension and thought, being

impugned, not that extension be thought or thought extension, but because they are the obverse and the reverse of one another, and the one forever behind the other) there is to be sure a question as to how the "ideas of the intelligence" are initiated over and beyond, how from the ideality of the horizon one passes to the "pure" ideality, and in particular by what miracle a created generality, a culture, a knowledge come to add to and recapture and rectify the natural generality of my body and of the world.<sup>9</sup>

If it seemed that the discussion of the body and the notion of Flesh as the intertwining of the subject-object dichotomy in the sense of presence, was digressing, it appeared that way only in disguise--the architecture is implied. Presence is a beautiful notion implying the essence of architecture. It bodies forth the visible and the invisible--the seed that grows into full-fledged treehood. We have not denied architecture the visible, the object. For meaning to be manifested at all, architecture is dependent upon the object for the visible as it is upon man for the invisible. For this reason, we suggested in the previous section that we should have to inquire in-depth into the various notions held by previous artists, who searched for this presence so vital to life. In Elementarism, presence was an abstraction made real with all the means at man's disposal--space, line, plane, time--which at times have removed themselves to mere conceptual realms. By far the more powerful notions of presence have been such notions as Wright's pattern, and as Kahn's order is. With pattern, the rules and motifs

search to approximate the law intrinsic in self-presence. With 'order is', if understood correctly, the universal (man) and the existential (institution) bridge in a structured order. It is truth--a feeling which comes across very clearly in a rather lengthy quote from Kahn's recent writings:

I really feel very religiously attached to this idea of belief because I realized that many things are done with only the reality of the means employed, with no belief behind it. The whole reality isn't there without the reality of belief. When men do large redevelopment projects, there's no belief behind them. The means are available, even the design devices that make them look beautiful, but there's nothing that you feel is somehow a light which shines on the emergence of a new institution of man, which makes him feel a refreshed will to live. This comes from meaning being answerable to a belief. Such a feeling must be in back of it, not just to make something which is pleasant instead of something which is dull: that is no great achievement. Everything that an architect does is first of all answerable to an institution of man before it becomes a building. You don't know what the building is, really, unless you have a belief behind the building, a belief in its identity in the way of life of man. Every architect's first act is that of either revitalizing a prevailing belief or finding a new belief which is just in the air somehow. Why must we assume that there cannot be other things so marvelous as the emergence of the first monastery, for which there was no precedence whatsoever? It was just simply that some man realized that a certain realm of spaces represents a deep desire on the part of man to express the inexpressable in a certain activity of man called a monastery. It's really nothing short of remarkable that a time comes in the history of man when something is established which everybody supports as though it were always eternally so.<sup>10</sup>

The visible and the invisible, of which we spoke earlier, is implied in the emergence of the monastery.

The presence is not the object; it is the

architecture: the light which gives sense to order. To say that a building means something but not everything is on the one hand, true, and on the other, naive. The building is everything, as in every other aspect in life, the relationship implied by the object. The building is not just an object, because if it were, it would be a mere thing and things can have a relation to man quite apart from life itself. The object in confrontation to man is nothing to him. The relation is in quite the opposite direction: it is a relation of transcendence. It is not the object alone, nor man alone; but together in something far more significant which we have called self-manifestation, of which both are a part of. And self-presence is a dialectical residue.

In conclusion we could say that in architecture, presence can become a reality in our buildings, sheltering spaces, in terms of this question: "What do I know?" Fundamentally the architect's task is to know what to question is and what to respond is. He does not operate in a vacuum but belongs to institutions which need to be cultivated in order to be understood. The knowing of space and knowledge gives self-evidence of itself; the idea of knowing invokes some intelligible place where the ideas, understanding I lack, can be found; it intimates the region and limits of question-knowing. "What do I know?" calls for a disclosure and exhibition. When we have learned this lesson, the subtle differences between them, we can say

that disclosure is instituting but not exhibiting. Behind the question of knowing and self-presence is Being, the imponderable which never stops opening up to us in our discovery.

Architecture is self-presence in the truest sense; it is life; it is the object split open allowing man to enter in. Architecture does not confront man but surrounds him. It is not before him; it is all around him. In this sense we can say that the presence of architecture is a relationship of the man-object/world.

## EPILOGUE

We have reached moments of struggles only to realize that the creative act cannot emerge without a conscious awareness of its beginning.

The thesis began wondering about the architect's attentiveness towards the object; about meaning and willfulness in architecture. The thesis struggled for freedom.

Freedom belongs to the realm of the man-object/world relationship. There the reasons and the motives for self-manifestation, the conditions for what it is "to question" and what it is "to respond" emerge. Meaning and willfulness are enemies, unless meaning can come to dominate willfulness. Then meaning is also a willing; willing, the manifestation of meaning. To will then means to be free.

We wondered about the essence of architecture and found it to be a self-presence. We came across this notion by asking the man-object/world question. But the beauty in all this was the fact that the question could not be asked without a method by which to proceed and a structure within which to realize the notion. This thesis is its most immediate example of what it means for understanding to be inextricably bound to a method of procedure. Discoveries are only potentialities and possibilities within a method itself. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that a structure

does not precede the discovery so much as it accures with it.

In the beginning we wondered but we could not immediately respond. When we began to question by asking about the man-object/world relationship, we began to respond as well.

Now that we have introduced the notion of architecture as presence, we must next clarify our question in order to respond more satisfyingly in the future. A new horizon has been opened up. We must now proceed with surer steps as in the spirit of phenomenology. Architecture is a relationship of Being; it gives presence to itself by symbolizing, which in turn gives rise to further symbolization. This giving process of self-presence we have frequently referred to as the work of Logos. It remains for the architect to continue to clarify to himself all the significations implied in life.

Architecture is life symbolizing itself; it is logos.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>John O'Neill, Perception, Expression and History (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>The question that frequently comes up is one of scale. Meaning can easily be expressed in words. For example, it does not cost anything. But when manifestation comes up against the project such as a house or an office building, the argument is that other criteria govern such as economic control. Means and motivation can dictate if they are not concerned with the actual being as such. However, this criticism does not affect this particular study. It could, when the section on objectification receives a fuller study. At the present time we are more concerned with Being as such and architecture as an extension.

<sup>3</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 134.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>6</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, p. 167.

<sup>7</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 139.

<sup>8</sup>Gaston Bachelard, Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 5-6.

<sup>9</sup>Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 152.

<sup>10</sup>Louis I. Kahn, "Perspecta 9/10", The Yale Architectural Journal, No. 11, 67, p. 305.

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