

THE EFFECTS OF AN ADULT'S PREACHING AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
HYPOCRITICAL BEHAVIOR ON CHILDRENS' ALTRUISM

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ABSTRACT

In an attempt to establish factors which determine effects of adult hypocrisy upon childrens' attitudes and behaviors, small groups of sixth grade boys were exposed to a non-donating female model who utilized High, Low, or No Intensity Preaching during a recorded interview played during a charity appeal in their schools. Her behavior conveyed either High, Low, or No Responsibility for her inaction. The possible effects of both variables were discussed from the viewpoints of attitude change theory, reactance theory, attribution theory and recent modelling research by Bryan et al. More intense preaching enhanced donations but had no effect on the childrens' evaluation of the model. The responsibility hypothesis that all ratings of the model would be significantly more harsh in the High Responsibility condition in which she deliberately chose to forego donation for purely selfish reasons was confirmed. Bryan's conclusions concerning preaching and hypocrisy were reassessed and research implications were discussed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years researchers have attempted with only partial success to link adult inconsistency with a variety of child behaviors such as altruism¹, delinquency, aggression, and various emotional, intellectual and academic deficiencies (Stouwie, 1971). The present thesis further investigates the effects of inconsistency of varying types upon prosocial behavior. In particular, it examines a charity appeal situation where an adult female model (M) preaches altruism (the donation of money in the absence of apparent material incentives) but fails to donate herself. More specifically, this thesis explores how the intensity of the model's preaching and the model's responsibility for her behavior affect both the children's donations and their evaluation of the model.

Several earlier investigations in this area have focused upon the relative impact of words and deeds. For instance the design developed by Bryan and Walbek (1970^{a,b}) and most frequently reported (Bryan, 1970; Bryan, Barnett, & Gault, 1970; Bryan & London, 1970; Bryan, Redfield, & Mader, 1971; Schwartz & Bryan, 1970) involved the factorial combination of three levels of preaching (generous, greedy, neutral) with two levels of practicing

¹The words within the following groupings are used interchangeably throughout the thesis as is the practice in the altruism literature: a) preaching, exhortations, verbalizations, verbal behavior, words b) practicing, overt behavior, deeds c) generous, altruistic d) selfish, greedy, stingy e) model evaluations, model ratings, attraction ratings f) donations, giving, self-sacrifice, altruism g) hypocrisy, inconsistency (self-indulgent) h) baseline level, basal level i) high intensity, hardsell, dynamic, forceful, strong j) low intensity, softsell k) innocuous, mild, weak l) deliberately, intentionally, purposely.

(generous and greedy). Most of their studies were conducted in a mobile laboratory on school property. Elementary age boys and girls individually met an experimenter (E) who was ostensibly testing a new miniature bowling game. In explaining the game and the criterion for winning three redeemable gift certificates, the experimenter also explained how subjects (Ss) could donate some to poor children if they wished. After a baseline donation level was established during ten test trials on which winnings were pre-determined at a fixed level with the aid of a shielded target area, Ss were exposed to live or video-taped models. "Generous" Ms donated one certificate each time they won three; "greedy" Ms kept all of their winnings. Dependent measures included a) mean attraction toward M on a four-point scale and b) the number of Ss putting at least one of the thirty certificates which they "won" into a March of Dimes canister during the experimental trials.

The results have been reasonably consistent but weak. Typically Bryan and his colleagues found that ratings of the M were influenced by both words and deeds. Specifically, ratings were lower when M either practiced or preached greed, with the converse applying when the M preached or practiced generosity. Donations, on the other hand, were exclusively affected by behavioral example. The latter finding must be qualified, however, since the practicing main effect was restricted to boys in two of the studies (Bryan and Walbek, 1970^a). A very low statistical association between preaching and donations together with the above findings lead Bryan and Walbek to conclude that (verbalized) "cognitions concerning charity are not sufficient to affect the behavior of the child" (p.346). Elsewhere, Bryan further claimed that "exhorters, be they adults or peers, cannot be powerless and still affect

responses" (i.e. donations, 1970, p.69).

The first purpose of this thesis was to re-examine the effect of preaching on children's altruism. For the following reasons, the author believed it was premature to accept Bryan's conclusions. First, the innocuous norm-reminders (e.g., "There are good reasons to give to kids like that") he used in preaching may have been too mild to produce an effect. Second, the low proportion of subjects donating anything at all in the Bryan studies suggest that his dependent measure of altruism may have been insensitive to effects of preaching that were "really" present. In one extreme study (1970^a) only 3% of the children gave any of the 30 certificates they won.

The final and most important reason for questioning Bryan's conclusions is that certain departures from his procedure have produced results which can be attributed to the behavioral impact of preaching. According to Bryan and London's review (1970) an unpublished study by White (1967) demonstrated that coercive instructions from a high-power model could increase rule adherence which was defined in terms of donations. Subsequent studies also showed that the degree to which subjects adhered to a strict rule of self-reward during the bowling game described earlier could be increased through coercive instructions from a high-power model (Rosenhan, Frederick, & Burrowes, 1968) or even through non-coercive instructions as used by a relatively powerless model in a donation situation. It is quite possible, therefore, that certain modifications would produce results quite different from those obtained by the Bryan group.

The present investigation will determine whether moral exhortations from a powerless model can also affect donations, despite Stein and Bryan's contention that such an effect depends upon the use of instructions or commands outlining "the specific motor acts deemed appropriate" (p.6).

Effects of Preaching Intensity

Although no prior experiment has ever investigated the effects of preaching intensity upon donation, enough related research has been conducted to generate a few predictions. Firstly, on the basis of the findings of Bryan and his associates we might expect a) that model evaluations will increase as a function of preaching intensity because of the beneficial effect of increases in model espousal of the norm of social responsibility and b) that more intense preaching will not increase donations beyond the control level since the factor reported by Bryan to be the sole determinant of donations was controlled by having M fail to donate in all conditions. Thus all groups were equated at zero on the allegedly all-important practicing variable. Bryan's position would therefore hypothesize no effect on donations and a main effect on evaluations. The latter prediction must be considered tentative since Bryan has never increased the level of preaching generosity. For the purpose of discussion, however, we shall refer to this as the Bryan hypothesis.

On the basis of studies reviewed by McGuire (1969) which primarily dealt with the effects of dynamic versus subdued language style and delivery upon speech effectiveness, one might postulate that both donations and evaluations would decrease as a function of preaching intensity. Although these studies provided only weak and unstable support for such a position, McGuire (1969) reports that it is conceivable that the more dynamic intense delivery might be "less effective in that the receiver would perceive it as more propagandistic and intending to persuade and hence discount its arguments somewhat" (p.207). Such reasoning also appears consistent with Brehm's (1966) theorizing on the nature of psychological reactance. In summary, Brehm claims that an increase in the perceived intent to persuade will result in a corresponding increase in the motivation to behave in a manner contrary to the advocated position,

provided that certain criteria are met (e.g. the actual or potential elimination of a highly valued freedom). This approach would therefore support the expectation of main effects upon both donations and evaluations, reflecting an inverse relationship with intensity. This will be called the resistance hypothesis. The applicability of reactance theory in this situation may, however, be questionable. Because they often find themselves in a subservient role, even very intense preaching may not arouse reactance in youngsters.

According to McGuire, the resistance hypothesis described above originated as an attempt to demonstrate that low "objectivity" on an issue would undermine credibility and message effectiveness. However, after examining ten separate types of research approach to this problem, he observes that the attempts to substantiate this "commonsense" claim have encountered "rather indifferent success". McGuire's personal conclusion is that:

"although there is much research relevant to the question, the evidence in support for the 'obvious' hypothesis (that sources lose persuasive effectiveness when their bias and persuasive intent are perceived by the audiences) is small almost to the vanishing point" (p.185).

The position which McGuire therefore leans toward is that we should:

"expect the more dynamic intense presentation to be more effective in that it would better hold the receivers' attention, indicate more clearly what the point was, and cause greater yielding because of its more vivid presentation" (p.207).

McGuire also suggests the possibility that the more subtle "softsell" approach may in fact create the impression of greater trustworthiness based upon more honourable motives and intentions. Such an impression could theoretically increase compliance as well. However the negative effect upon compliance which might be created by the failure of the softsell approach to clearly make its point would probably be stronger. If McGuire is correct in

concluding that any "resistance derives more from the subject's inability to learn what the sources wants him to believe, than from his unwillingness to yield to the sources pressure" (p.186) we should find that donations increase as a function of preaching intensity.

Further support for the hypothesis that preaching intensity would increase donations was provided by Mills (1966) who demonstrated that the perceived intention to persuade can actually increase a communicator's social influence over groups of college students, provided that he is thought to like them.

McEwan and Greenberg (1969, 1970) also obtained pertinent data suggesting that intensity might improve attraction to the model as well as donations. Defining language intensity in terms of the amount of deviation from evaluative neutrality in a source's statement about a concept, the authors presented college ss with one of two 250 word messages ("editorials"), varying only in the intensity of verbs and modifiers used. The high intensity message did produce a greater (though non-significant) amount of attitude change on a non-ego involving issue. However, the more interesting finding was that this message was regarded as significantly clearer and its source as significantly more dynamic. When the data were re-analysed on the basis of perceived intensity (high, medium, and low) it also emerged that ratings of message logicity and overall quality as well as clarity increased as a function of perceived intensity. Similarly, not only the dynamism but also the qualifications and trustworthiness of the communicator were rater high as a function of this variable.

In conclusion, on the basis of the available evidence, it was predicted that there would be a main effect for preaching intensity reflecting a direct relationship between this variable and donation. A main effect such that model evaluations would improve as a function of intensity was also predicted.

However McEwan and Greenberg's data using various source and message ratings provides only indirect support for such a prediction.

Effects of Responsibility for Failing to Donate

The second purpose of this thesis was to explore the effect of the model's responsibility for failing to donate. This was done in order to determine conditions under which children might devalue hypocritical adults. Responsibility was increased by making it obvious to the listeners that M deliberately chose not to donate despite the fact that she had ample resources to do so. For our purposes responsibility should be regarded as synonymous with accountability. It was assumed that a model would only be considered accountable for his non-donation if observers regarded his behavior as attributable to free choice rather than an accident or other extenuating circumstances.

Rosenhan et al (1968) contend that children learn to obey verbalized instructions largely because the strict imitation of adult behavior is frequently inconsistent with appropriate child behavior. If young children were responsive only to overt behavioral modelling cues they would abandon their studies and attempt to engage in many behaviors modelled by adults but forbidden to them. As a rule, children willingly respond to verbal cues suggesting that as long as they continue to learn and play they are not expected to assume some of the more difficult responsibilities associated with adulthood. Such tolerance notwithstanding, it is theoretically possible that children will take offense, as Rosenhan et al have predicted, once the discrepancy between imposed standards (preaching) and observed standards (practicing) becomes sufficiently large. For example, in the realm of

generosity a child may gladly accept parental advice to give money to a door-to-door canvasser despite the parents non-donation as long as he believes his father's excuse that he has "already given at work". However it is doubtful that the child would be equally trusting and compliant if his parents followed their moral exhortations with intentionally selfish statements to the canvasser implying that they had better things on which to waste their money, etc.

The above speculations would lead us to postulate that childrens' evaluations of an adult who fails to donate will be more negative when the adult is responsible for his action yet attempts to convince them that they should be very generous.

Two lines of research support such a notion. Firstly, even social learning theorists such as Bandura (1969) have experimentally confirmed Piaget's (1932) developmental view that by the time a child is 8-10 years old he tends to assign priority to the intentions or motivation behind an action rather than the tangible effects of the action itself in making moral judgments. Older children allegedly make allowances in their evaluations of a negative act if extenuating circumstances caused the action despite the actor's desire to behave in a socially acceptable manner.

The idea that responsibility for inaction through deliberate intention would be detrimental to attraction ratings and possibly donations, also receives support from the literature on the role of attribution processes in person perception. According to attribution theory, as reviewed by Jones and Davis (1965), people arrive at inter-personal evaluations as a result of a cognitive process consisting of several steps. Basically, observers infer

dispositions about others to the extent that they can ascribe causal responsibility (intentionality) to the other. Intentions are attributed if the observer is convinced that the actor was both aware of the consequences of his actions and capable of achieving them. The end result of the attribution process is basically that people who perform good acts are judged to be good people. People who perform bad acts are judged to be bad people.

Furthermore, our evaluation of the actor is influenced by the circumstances surrounding his decision to act. Jones and Davis (1965) discussed a role-playing experiment by Steiner and Field (1960) which illustrates this point. In the Steiner and Field study, a confederate of the experimenter's routinely assumed a segregationist's stance while discussing this issue with a pro-integrationist. Half of the subjects believed the confederate was playing a role; the other half did not. The confederate was evaluated more harshly in the condition where he "chose" his position than in the condition where his position was dictated to him by external factors.

Extrapolating to the present investigation, Steiner and Field's data suggest that the more responsible the model is for her negative behavior, the more negatively subjects will evaluate her.

It might be argued on intuitive grounds that if Ss ascribe negative attributes to models and generally devalue them because of their responsibility for behaving undesirably, they will refuse to be influenced by their exhortations and consequently give less. However, the traditional lack of correspondence between attitudes and behavior (Bryan & Walbek, 1970^a, Bryan et al, 1970) makes such correspondence between donations and evaluations somewhat improbable. Hence a prediction regarding the effect of the responsibility factor upon donations was not formulated.

Summary of Hypotheses

In conclusion, the following hypotheses are proposed:

1. main effects for preaching intensity such that:
 - a) donations will be greatest in the High Intensity condition, medium in the Low Intensity condition, and least in the No Intensity condition
 - b) evaluations of the model on all scales (altruism, trustworthiness, general attraction and combined attraction) will be most favourable in the High Intensity condition, medium in the Low Intensity condition and least favourable in the No Intensity condition.
2. a main effect for level of responsibility such that:

evaluations (on all scales) will be least favourable in the High Responsibility condition, medium in the Low Responsibility condition, and most favourable in the No Responsibility condition.

CHAPTER II

Research Design

Overview

In two neighbouring schools in a predominately middle class suburban district, the intensity of model preaching (high, low, or no) and the level of responsibility for failure to donate (high, low, or no) were varied in a 2x3x3 factorial design. Two schools were required because of the relatively small number of eligible subjects per treatment group at any given school. Prior to the experimental day all the grade six students in both schools were exposed to two events which were ostensibly unrelated to each other or to the experiment itself. Several days before the final session (day one) the students were promised 50¢ as payment for helping graduate students gather data. The following day (day two) students participated in a crude baseline assessment of initial greediness. A few days later (day three) children received their "pay", which was intended to provide them with a minimal amount of resources about which they could feel the sense of ownership required in genuine altruism research (Midlarsky, 1968).

Shortly after being paid, the boys were led to a special classroom where their donations were solicited after being exposed to a tape-recorded interview which constituted the experimental manipulation. Finally Ss went to another room where they filled out questionnaires about their recall of the experiment and evaluations of M, before returning to their classes.

Subjects, Models, and Experimenters

Data was obtained on the boys present on each day of the experiment. However, only the 84 boys present on all three days served as Ss. The M which Ss heard via taped interviews was an adult female because a) the results were intended to be interpreted largely in terms of elementary schools, in which

male teachers are rare (Bond & Phillips, 1970) and b) the only other intensive study of hypocrisy (Bryan et al, 1970) involved an adult female M. In all conditions, the model was interviewed by another female. The tape was introduced by a male graduate student (the author). He attempted to play a neutral and powerless role. The use of a relatively powerless male E with male Ss eliminated the possibility of effects which might otherwise be attributable to Ss' efforts of please an opposite-sex experimenter.

Pre-experimental Procedure

Resource equalization (day one). Each sixth grade teacher read a brief request (Appendix A) from graduate students at the university who offered to pay each child to write lists of words. The letter claimed that the purpose of the experiment was to "see how many words you can think of in a short time". Although girls were not included in the experimental design, they were involved in this session and the baseline session for the sake of credibility and fairness. Teachers called "time" after ten minutes and announced that the graduate students would be sending each child 5¢ for each minute (50¢ in all) within the next few days.

Baseline (day two). The following day teachers read a letter (Appendix B) which was supposedly unconnected with the first in which the children were asked whether they thought school children volunteering to collect money for charity from door to door should receive anything for their efforts. Those who answered in the affirmative then answered a more specific question: "out of every 10¢ that people gave you, how much would you want to keep for yourself if you could pay yourself anything you wanted?" Baseline data were utilized in assessing the effectiveness of randomization procedures and in the interpretation of experimental group differences (though analysis of covariance).

Experimental Procedures

Experimental session (day three). Three days later, the sixth grade

boys in both schools were assembled in their own gymnasium with their books. They were told they would be given the next few hours to do homework, study, etc. Early in the period a messenger entered with a box containing the bags of money promised earlier (see Appendix C for teacher's remarks). Eight nickels and ten pennies were included in each package (a pilot study revealed that most sixth grade children in a similar school parted with nearly all of their money when given only pennies). It would have been desirable to distribute the money earlier to avoid arousing suspicion about the connection between the money-for-words experiment and the modelling experiment itself. However, it would have been virtually impossible to guarantee that all Ss would bring their money to the gymnasium without seriously undermining credibility.

Shortly after the distribution, the school principal arrived and explained with the aid of a prompt sheet (Appendix C) that during the free period the boys would be called out by E in small groups so that they could find out about a project to raise money for poor children. In an attempt to maximize attention to the experimental manipulations, advance notice was given at this time that before returning to their classes, the boys would be required to answer questions about the project. Through the use of pre-arranged sequence (gym to experimental room to post-experimental room to classroom) contamination of the untested portion of the subject pool was virtually impossible. Such contamination could only be prevented for the half-day during which isolation was feasible. Hence the necessity of exposing Ss to the nine treatment conditions in groups (4-6). By relying upon individual sessions, previous researchers have uniformly risked leakage of information.

Within each school, Ss were randomly assigned in advance to the nine

experimental conditions. The number of Ss in each treatment cell is presented in Table 1. Upon arrival at the experimental room, Ss heard E introduce himself vaguely (Appendix D). He then explained that he had been asked to bring some tape-recordings to the school as a favour to a group of citizens so that the children could learn about a project "some people from downtown are working on to raise lots of money to help buy toys and other Christmas presents for poor children who don't have mothers and fathers". E explained further that one of these people had gone around to many of the schools in the area and asked for teachers to help with the project by saying what they thought children should do to help and giving what they could themselves. Since the Ss were soon to be asked to donate, they were being given an opportunity to hear one of these conversations in order to help them make up their minds. Since it was highly doubtful that Ss would believe E's "cover" (that he was collecting donations on behalf of a volunteer citizens' group) if he deliberately chose to play a tape on which the only adult interviewed actually failed to donate, they were given the impression that E had absolutely no choice in the selection of the interview. Specifically, Ss were told that the "sample" case which E displayed contained an interview with one teacher from each of many elementary schools in the district (in actuality it contained the nine experimental tapes). After each group had democratically decided upon a school, E merely selected the interview appropriate for the treatment condition and introduced it as the real thing.

Before playing the experimental tape, E informed Ss that "the people from the project said I should remind you to pay very close attention to everything you hear on the taperecording because it's very important that you hear and understand it. I think you will be asked some questions about it

TABLE 1.

Number of Subjects Per Cell
in the Experimental Design

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Totals
		High	Low	No	
High	A	6	4	4	14
	B	5	5	5	15
	Sum	11	9	9	29
Low	A	4	4	4	12
	B	4	6	4	14
	Sum	8	10	8	26
No	A	5	5 ^a	4	14
	B	4	5 ^a	6	15
	Sum	9	10	10	29
Column Totals		28	29	27	84

^a There is no data on the questionnaire items for one subject (n=4). Therefore in several analyses (see Table 4,6, and Appendix M) this subject was not included, thus reducing the df by one in each case.

when you're finished too". Attention was intentionally focused away from the deliberately non-committal E and onto the M manipulations, to minimize possible effects attributable to E's actions or reactions. Absolutely no conversation was permitted after the recorded interviews began in order to reduce the effects of running Ss in groups.

General introduction by interviewer. In her remarks to the teacher (Appendix E) the interviewer first articulated the purpose of the appeal stressing the terrific neediness of poor children in Winnipeg. She then clearly defined the purpose of the interview in terms of the moral leadership she could provide for the children who would hear the tape, in helping them make up their minds "since they look up to you". The microphone then changed hands in an intentionally amateurish manner. It was hoped that this message would heighten the relevance of the teacher as a potential model. The interview then continued along the different paths which constituted the experimental treatments in this study.

Preaching Manipulations

High intensity manipulation (hardsell). Model. "This project sounds so important I hardly know where to begin. But I must say that I'm thankful that you've given me the chance to talk to the boys and girls about my feelings about giving. I've always believed very strongly in giving til it hurts. As they say, 'if you don't do it, it won't get done'. I think that you would have to be a very mean and cruel child to turn your back on these poor children. Some of them don't even have anyone to call 'mommy' or 'daddy'. In fact, they are lucky if they ever meet anyone nice enough to buy them any extra food or candy, or even proper clothes to wear through the cold winter months.

"You know, while you lucky kids with nice big warm houses are opening all your presents, and playing, and eating a big turkey dinner, many children will be sad and lonely and hungry unless you help them out. Those of you who are good children must give up every penny you have in your pockets today to do your part. It's your duty.

"Another thing I just remembered is that there's a professor at the University who's been giving away 50¢ to a lot of classes in this area for just writing down a few words. That's not work! It's more like a gift. If any of you got in on that deal you should give it all to the project. How could you live with yourself this Christmas if you didn't?"

Interviewer. "would you mind telling the children why you feel the way you do?"

Model. "Of course not! For one thing you have a God-given duty to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves. As for myself, I have always tried to follow 'the Golden Rule' which says 'do unto others as you want others to do for you'. And what would you want others to do for you if you were really poor? Why, you would probably cry yourself to sleep at night dreaming of having some of the things that other kids have, and hoping that somehow they could share some of their blessing with you."

Interviewer. "How much do you expect the children who are listening to put in their envelopes as a gift?"

Model. "You shouldn't even have to think about it. If you've got 10¢, then put it all in. Even if you've only got 10¢ put that in. That's what I'd do if I were back in school and had a chance to do something so helpful and kind for others."

"I don't know why this lady is even giving you a choice in such an important thing as this, especially if you got that easy 50¢ from writing those words. You should all have to give at least 50¢."

"Remember children, it's always 'better to give than to receive'. If you listened to what I said and do what I told you, you'll be doing the right thing. You'll see."

Low intensity manipulation (softsell). Model. "Well, I can't think of much to say, really, except that I think this project is a great idea. Kids shouldn't have to miss out on Christmas just because their parents can't afford presents or because they don't even have any parents. People should give up a few things to help them have some happiness too."

Interviewer. "Would you mind telling the children why you feel the way you do?"

Model. "Well for one thing I think it's always good to help those who can't take care of themselves. Also, it will make them a lot happier to get a few presents at Christmas."

Interviewer. "How much do you expect the children who are listening to put in their envelopes as a gift?"

Model. "Everyone including children should give what they can afford even if it's only a few pennies. Of course this is only my feeling. The kids shouldn't have to give if they don't think it's right or if they can't afford it."

"All I can say children is that it's your money and your choice to make. It's up to you how much you decide to give. But as for me, I would give every cent I could spare if I were asked to give." (Last sentence much slower and emphatic.)

No intensity manipulation (neutral control). Model. "Well, actually I can't think of anything to say. I really have a hard time around taperecorders, you know. Could you please give me a little time to think about what to say?"

Interviewer. "I don't think that will be necessary. I will be interviewing lots of other teachers anyway. I'll just ask somebody else."

Responsibility Manipulations

Interviewer. "Do you think I could have just a few more moments of your time ma'am?...Thank you. I have given you an opportunity to set an example for the children through expressing your views on giving. But there is another way to set an example - through your giving. Although our emphasis is really upon 'children helping children', we are not ignoring you teachers. We know that teachers are dedicated to helping children and that they will set a fine example through their generosity.

"You know, it's not every day that I get a chance to accept a donation from a teacher who has just been paid and has no one to support. Oh, in case you're wondering what the other teachers have been giving, the majority have given \$10, with most of the rest giving \$15 or \$20. Some have given \$5 and a few as low as \$1. Pledges and cheques are as good as cash."

Model. "Just a second, let me look in my purse. (sound of rummaging through purse). I'm really sorry, but all I could afford right now would be small change and I don't seem to have any with me. I guess I won't be able to donate anything at all to your project."

Interviewer. "Are you saying that you just can't afford to give anything to help these kids?"

High responsibility manipulation

Model. "I think I made myself quite clear. I said I didn't have any small change with me. And that's all I'd be prepared to give. So I can't afford it. Do you understand?"

"And besides it's really none of your business whether I can afford to give or not. I have my own good reasons for not giving. For instance, I don't want my good money to be wasted. Half of it probably would go to pay the salaries of the people who give out the money. It's alright for the kids to give away a few cents to the project because it's different for them. What's a few cents - especially if it was given to them? But I work hard for my money and I'm not going to waste \$5 or \$10 on a project I really don't know anything about. It's true that I'm not married and have no children but that doesn't mean that Christmas isn't going to be expensive for me this year. There are all kinds of presents to buy. And then there are all the Christmas parties I go to every year. A few drinks here, a few drinks there, you know what I mean. It all adds up. Then there's all the new clothes I'm going to have to buy if I'm going to look my best at the parties. With all that coming up, I've got to be very careful what I do with my money."

Low responsibility manipulation

Model. "That's right. The only reason that I have nothing to give is that I've bought a lot of new things for myself lately which I have to make high monthly payments on. For instance, I finally decided to buy a new house, and you know how much it costs to furnish a house these days. Believe it or not, I have only a few dollars left over each month for spending money. In fact, I won't even have enough to buy presents for anyone except my parents this year. I'm sorry that I'm broke right now but if you come around again next year I promise things will be different."

No responsibility manipulation

Model. "Well, I really don't know. I don't have any money with me. But I might have some out in the car. Would you mind coming back to see me later when I've had a chance to get it. Thanks."

Conclusion: subject donation instructions.

When the interview was completed the interviewer explained in detail (see Appendix F) how Ss could make their donations in secrecy on their way out of the room. Anonymity was emphasized in order to minimize the effects of approval-seeking behavior. Each child was also entitled to a "free" 5¢ chocolate bar (to be collected after donating). It was explained that every penny donated beyond the 5¢ cost of the bars would go directly to the needy children. Ss were told not to give more than 45¢. For scoring purposes, the cost of the bars was ignored and gross donations were used as the dependent variable (range=0-50¢). Just before Ss left the room E summarized these procedures.

Tabulation of the data was facilitated by giving out numbered envelopes matching a class list. Consequently both the donation and baseline level for each S was easily determined.

Post Experimental Measures

Once magnitude of donations had been assessed and Ss had left the experimental room, they entered another room where they were met by a female assistant who explained and administered two questionnaires. The assistant was totally unaware of the experimental hypotheses and the differential experiences to which Ss had been exposed and was therefore not expected to bias results in any way. The first questionnaire was designed to assess Ms' attractiveness to Ss on a number of dimensions. Ss rated M on a 5-point adjective check-list (Appendix H) comprised of ten items. The items were mostly the same as those used by Bryan et al, 1970. Items which were thought to be correlated were collapsed into summary scales for scoring purposes. The generosity scale

(1=least generosity, 10=greatest generosity) consisted of the following items: selfish-unselfish and greedy-generous. The trustworthiness scale (range 1-10) which was intended to reflect perceived hypocrisy included the following items: honest-dishonest and fair-unfair. The general evaluation scale (1-15) included the following items: kind-unkind; wise-foolish; likeable-unlikeable. For the purposes of analysis a combined rating scale (1-50) comprised of the above scales and three additional items (patient-impatient; nice-mean; and narrow-minded vs open-minded) was utilized. Computation of Kuder - Richardson (Alpha) reliability coefficients revealed that the 10-item composite scale was internally consistent for all but two treatment groups. The selection of the above combinations of items was considered preferable to separate analyses for each of the ten items because it constituted a more conservative test of the model's impact in terms of attraction.

For each of the scales, scores were computed such that the lowest extreme represented the most favourable rating and the highest extreme the least favourable rating.

A second questionnaire was then administered (see Appendix H) which was intended primarily to assess accuracy of recall. Basically, Ss were asked to identify the alternative which best described the "teacher's" behavior. Specifically, Ss rated her 1) verbalizations: from "strongly against" to "strongly in favour" of giving; 2) donation behavior: from "nothing" to "more than \$5"; 3) consistency: she practiced what she preached from "very poorly" to "very well"; 4) excuses for not donating: from "very good" to "very poor" and 5) pressure to donate: from "didn't talk about giving" to "very great pressure". Data was also collected on 6) Ss' main reasons for donating the amount they did, 7) their reaction to the hypothetical possibility of the

"teacher" substituting for their own teacher "for awhile" and 3) their prior knowlege of the experiment.

Upon completion of the questionnaires, Ss were given a de-briefing letter (Appendix I) signed by the district school psychologist (E) summarizing the project for the benefit of parents.

CHAPTER III

Results

Baseline Data

The baseline greediness scores were subjected to a 2x3x3 factorial analysis of variance procedure (using an unweighted means solution adjusted for unequal ns) in which all three factors were treated as fixed effects. The initial analysis for each subsequently considered variable involved the same procedure. No main effects or interactions even approached significance. We may conclude as anticipated that there were no gross systematic initial differences in pre-disposition to which results might have been attributed. Furthermore, the baseline cell means (Table 2) were not systematically related to either donation or evaluation cell means. Analyses of covariance demonstrated that the effects of the experimental treatments remained the same even after these baseline differences were partialled out (see Appendix N).

Effectiveness of Manipulations

Post-experimental questionnaire items revealed that the preaching manipulation partially differentiated the low and high intensity M's. On a 5-point scale ranging from one (strongly in favour of giving") to five ("didn't say anything about giving"), verbalizations of the high intensity M were typically remembered as being more positive (1.18) than those of the low intensity M (1.71), a highly significant difference by t test ($p < .001$). Ss not only perceived the high intensity M as taking a stronger stand on the issue of giving. They also felt somewhat more pressured by a high intensity M. In fact, ratings of the amount of pressure felt by Ss ranging from one ("very great pressure") to four ("didn't talk about giving") increased as a function of the preaching intensity level (2.84, 2.32, 1.98 in the No, Low,

and High groups). The summary of the analysis of these data are presented in Table 4 and the means are recorded in Table 5. An examination of these tables reveals that although the expected intensity main effect was obtained ($F=8.99$, $df=2/65$, $p<.005$) this variable also interacted with responsibility level ($F=4.53$, $df=4/65$, $p<.06$), thus qualifying the effect. The effect must be further qualified by the fact that (contrary to expectation) only 30% of the High Intensity Ss actually reported feeling "very great pressure" although 60% did feel "some pressure". In addition, only 60% of the Low Intensity Ss appropriately felt "some pressure" while 35% reported no felt pressure. It is not surprising therefore that when the data for the Low and High Intensity groups alone were re-analysed by t test that the difference between the High (1.81) and the Low (2.27) Intensity groups failed to reach significance. The three Ss who reported that the preaching M's "said nothing" were not included in this analyses since such a blatant recall error cast doubt on the validity of their responses. Their inclusion would have reduced the significance level even further.

The responsibility variable produced a less equivocal effect upon subject perceptions. Although Ss generally found M's excuses for non-donation ranging from very poor (1) to very good (5) to be unacceptable (or "O.K." at best) at all three levels of responsibility, Tables 6 and 7 show that there was a main effect ($F=5.15$, $df=2/64$, $p<.01$) such that High Responsibility excuses were judged to be least tolerable. In fact 92.9% of the Ss rated them "very poor" or "poor", indicating that subjects in this condition probably did not attribute benevolent motives to the model on the basis of perceived extenuating circumstances. A main effect for schools ($F=6.47$, $df=1/64$, $p<.025$) reflected the tendency of Ss in one school to judge excuses more harshly. This difference

TABLE 2

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School
on Baseline Generosity: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	1.41	0.17	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	13.87	1.66	.02
School (C)	1	.40	0.05	.00
A x B	4	6.59	0.79	.00
A x C	2	.51	0.06	.00
B x C	2	9.02	1.08	.00
A x B x C	4	3.42	0.41	.00
Within Cells	66	8.36		

TABLE 3

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility,
and School on Baseline Generosity: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	7.00	5.00	6.50	6.17
	B	5.40	4.20	9.00	6.20
	Mean	6.20	4.60	7.75	6.18
Low	A	7.50	5.75	5.75	6.33
	B	6.25	6.00	6.75	6.33
	Mean	6.88	5.88	6.25	6.33
No	A	6.20	5.40	6.75	6.12
	B	5.00	6.00	6.00	5.67
	Mean	5.60	5.70	6.38	5.89
Column Mean		6.22	5.39	6.79	6.14

Note. - These ratings were based on subjects' responses to the question "How much out of every 10¢ collected would you want to keep". Responses were tabulated in such a way that 0 = least generous and 10 = most generous.

TABLE 4

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School on Perceived Coerciveness: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	5.19	8.99**	.14
Responsibility (E)	2	0.95	1.64	.01
School (C)	1	0.94	1.63	.01
A x B	4	2.61	4.53**	.12
A x C	2	1.79	3.09*	.04
B x C	2	0.13	0.23	.00
A x B x C	4	0.43	0.75	.00
Within Cells	65	0.58		

* $p < .06$

** $p < .005$

TABLE 5

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School
on Perceived Coerciveness: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	2.67	1.75	1.25	1.89
	B	2.80	1.60	1.80	2.07
	Mean	2.73	1.67	1.52	1.98
Low	A	2.50	2.00	2.50	2.33
	B	2.75	2.17	2.00	2.31
	Mean	2.63	2.08	2.25	2.32
No	A	2.80	3.40	3.50	3.23
	B	2.00	3.00	2.33	2.44
	Mean	2.40	3.20	2.92	2.84
Column Mean		2.59	2.32	2.23	2.38

Note. - These ratings were based on subjects' responses to the question "How much pressure did you feel the teacher was putting on you to donate during her remarks on giving?" Subjects responded on a scale ranging from 1 ("very great pressure") to 4 ("didn't talk about giving").

TABLE 6

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School
on Perceived Responsibility: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	0.34	0.28	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	6.31	5.15**	.08
School (C)	1	7.92	6.47*	.05
A x B	4	2.28	1.87	.04
A x C	2	1.33	1.08	.01
B x C	2	1.53	1.25	.01
A x B x C	4	2.14	1.74	.03
Within Cells	64	1.22		

* $p < .025$

** $p < .01$

TABLE 7

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School
on Perceived Responsibility: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	1.83	3.00	2.00	2.28
	B	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
	Mean	1.62	2.20	1.70	1.84
Low	A	1.50	3.50	1.33	2.11
	B	1.00	2.50	2.50	2.00
	Mean	1.25	3.00	1.92	2.06
No	A	1.40	2.40	3.50	2.43
	B	1.50	1.50	1.67	1.56
	Mean	1.45	1.95	2.58	1.99
Column Mean		1.44	2.38	2.07	1.96

Note. - These ratings were based on subjects' responses to the question "How good were (the teacher's) excuses for failing to donate?" Subjects responded on a scale ranging from 1 ("very poor") to 5 ("very good").

might have been expected in view of the reputation this group had for questioning adults. However, other findings could not be attributed to the minor school difference on this variable.

In general, preaching was recalled fairly well in the Low and High Intensity conditions, with errors largely confined to the ambiguous Control conditions. Practicing was recalled even better with less than 16% of all Ss making errors. Since such errors were expected and also failed to systematically affect donations no Ss were excluded on this basis (only one S was excluded, because of his prior relationship with E).

In summary, both manipulations were fairly successful. Ss were moderately accurate in perceiving the level of M's verbal and behavioral generosity. Also, a trend towards the perception of greater pressure and poorer excuses was observed in the High Intensity and High Responsibility conditions, respectively.

Donation Behavior

The analysis of individual donation totals summarized ⁱⁿ Tables 8 and 9 yielded one significant main effect, that of preaching intensity ($F=6.66$, $df=2/66$, $p < .005$). There were no main effects for responsibility or schools. Tukey's HSD test (Kirk, 1968) revealed that Ss exposed to "hardsell" exhortations donated significantly more (32.6¢) than Ss who heard either "softsell" (23.8¢, $p < .05$) or neutral (19.5¢, $p < .01$) verbalizations across all levels of responsibility for both schools.

Although there were no significant two-way interaction, the three-way interaction was statistically significant at the .025 level ($F=3.07$, $df=4/66$). The results reveal a very complex relationship between the three variables (see Figure 1). On the basis of visual inspection of both Fig. 1 and Table 9

TABLE 8

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Donations: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	1244.50	6.66**	.11
Responsibility (B)	2	133.06	0.71	.00
School (C)	1	2.57	0.01	.00
A x B	4	60.43	0.32	.00
A x C	2	27.68	0.15	.00
B x C	2	269.77	1.44	.01
A x B x C	4	572.61	3.07*	.08
Within Cells	66	186.75		

* $p < .025$

** $p < .005$

TABLE 9

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School on Donations: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	36.50	26.75	31.25	31.50
	B	29.00	39.00	33.00	33.67
	Mean	32.75	32.88	32.13	32.58
Low	A	31.25	30.00	9.25	23.50
	B	13.75	25.00	33.75	24.17
	Mean	22.50	27.50	21.50	23.83
No	A	11.40	25.20	24.50	20.37
	B	18.25	20.00	17.50	18.58
	Mean	14.83	22.60	21.00	19.47
Column Mean		23.36	27.66	24.88	25.30

Note. - Donations ranged from zero to a maximum of 50 cents.

the following observations were made: a) the difference between the two cell means for schools A and B was relatively great in the low intensity preaching condition for both the High and No levels of responsibility b) differences between high, low, and no intensity means appeared slightly greater at the High (versus the Low or No) level of responsibility. However, despite the slight qualifying influence of the school and responsibility factors upon the intensity effect, it was clear that Ss exposed to the High Intensity preacher gave the most and the No Intensity preacher least for both schools and all three levels of responsibility.

Evaluation Behavior

S's ratings of M on the ten 5-point bi-polar adjective pairs (Appendix H) were organized into three separate scales and one composite scale based on responses to all ten adjective pairs. Specifically, the four dependent measures used to test the hypotheses were altruism (range 1-10); trustworthiness (1-10); general evaluation (1-15); and combined attraction ratings (1-50). The data and analysis for the latter are summarized in Tables 10 and 11. Data on the remaining variables are summarized in the Appendix (J,K,L).

Ratings of M on all four dependent measures were almost exclusively affected by the main effect of M's level of responsibility for inaction. The summary (Tables 10, 11) of the analysis for the combined attraction rating scale ($F=24.16$, $df=2/66$, $p<.001$) is an accurate reflection of the subtest results. It is based upon responsibility (high, low, no) means of 39.0, 27.9, and 27.4 and intensity means of 31.1, 31.0, and 32.1.

In general, Ms who were portrayed as being highly responsible for failing to donate were viewed as being the most selfish and greedy, as measured by the altruism scale ($F=19.56$, $df=2/66$, $p<.001$), most dishonest and unfair as

TABLE 10

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School on Combined Attraction Ratings: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	10.21	0.21	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	1192.00	24.46*	.36
School (C)	1	10.71	0.22	.00
A x B	4	67.21	1.38	.01
A x C	2	118.92	2.44	.02
B x C	2	63.41	1.30	.01
A x B x C	4	33.55	0.69	.00
Within cells	66	48.73		




* $p < .001$

TABLE 11

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School on Combined Attraction Ratings: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	39.83	23.75	33.25	32.28
	B	39.40	26.40	24.00	29.93
	Mean	39.62	25.07	28.63	31.11
Low	A	37.25	25.25	22.50	28.33
	B	43.25	29.00	29.00	33.75
	Mean	40.25	27.13	25.75	31.04
No	A	36.00	31.00	30.75	32.58
	B	38.00	31.80	25.17	31.66
	Mean	37.00	31.40	27.96	32.12
Column Mean		38.96	27.87	27.44	31.42

Note. - Scores could range from 1 to a maximum of 50 (least attraction).



measured by the trustworthiness scale ($F=11.43$, $df=2/66$, $p<.001$), and most foolish, unkind, and unlikeable as measured by the general evaluation scale ($F=22.31$, $df=2/66$, $p<.001$). The three miscellaneous items included only on the combined attraction scale revealed the same individual pattern for patience, niceness and open-mindedness. Finally, an analysis of response to the questions pertaining to the perceived discrepancy between practicing and preaching (hypocrisy) as summarized in Appendix M, though not significant, also supports the above pattern.

On all four scales the Low and No responsibility overall means were almost identical. However, High Responsibility scores and means were lower and almost without exception mutually exclusive from the Low and No responsibility scores and means. The minor exceptions involved three "trustworthiness" means which were comparable to the least negative High responsibility mean.

Basically Ss felt neutrally ("not sure") about all Ms, regardless of their preaching intensity or responsibility level, unless Ms were highly responsible for their non-donation. The latter Ms were typically seen as "quite" selfish and greedy (non-altruistic); dishonest and unfair (untrustworthy), unkind, foolish, and unlikeable (unattractive), and impatient, mean, and narrow-minded. These Ms were also seen as failing to practice what they preached to a (marginally) greater extent than other Ms.

Summary of Results

The data indicate that the manipulations were at least moderately effective in inducing the requisite perceptions among Ss. In general, they reacted to increases in preaching intensity with corresponding increases in donations (which were not reflected in evaluations). Donations were also slightly

affected by the interactive effect of intensity, responsibility and school. Donations were completely unaffected by level of responsibility. However, Ss consistently devalued models who were highly responsible for their failure to donate.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

The general hypothesis that childrens' donation and evaluation responses to a hypocritical female model could be systematically altered through manipulating the intensity of her exhortations and the level of responsibility for her inaction was clearly supported.

Effects of Model's Preaching

Replacing the mild verbalizations used by previous researchers with more forceful, intense messages did produce larger donations than the less intense preachings, as hypothesized. Specifically, these data support the prediction which was derived in Chapter 1 from attitude change research. At least in some circumstances, the effectiveness of social influence is a direct function of its intensity. However, it cannot be assumed that intensity as manipulated in this research is a pure factor. Probably it is comprised of several factors operating jointly. For instance, both persuasive intent and semantic intensity were purposely confounded in the present study. Also, intentionally embedded within the preaching manipulation were the number, type, and quality of arguments presented as well as the length of the message (150 versus 450 words in the Low and High conditions). Now that it has been demonstrated that a combination of various intensity variables can facilitate donation behavior it will be necessary for future research to isolate and control or vary each of them systematically in order to determine their relative contribution to the intensity effect.

The present results directly contradict two other previously discussed predictions concerning donation behavior.

Firstly, the ordering of preaching means from No to High Intensity is precisely the opposite of the ordering predicted by the resistance hypothesis on the basis of the anticipated detrimental effects of the perceived intent to persuade. According to most of the studies showing resistance effects reviewed by McGuire, the perception of strong persuasive intent should at least have produced a decrement in trustworthiness ratings. The data provided no support for this notion. In view of the clear failure of High Intensity preaching to produce even a slight increase in any type of devaluation it would seem logical that donation behavior would not suffer. However, according to Brehm it should theoretically be possible for a communication to produce a "boomerang" effect (or other types of resistance to manipulation) even without lowered trustworthiness as a function of a number of other criteria. No special effort was made in the present study to include or even control for these factors.

If Brehm's specifications were indeed relevant we might expect that the intensity effect would be reversed (or at least eliminated) only in those studies in which psychological reactance was activated by a model who threatened or actually did exercise genuine power over observers by eliminating a high proportion of instrumentally important perceived options in a forceful manner.


Even if Brehm's criteria were satisfied in the present context, there would not necessarily be an obvious weakening of the intensity effect since he acknowledges that if the appeal contained good arguments, the persuasiveness factor could easily be more influential than the reactance factor. This explanation seems especially applicable to the present findings in view of a) the number and type of arguments used and b) the characteristics of the

subject population. It is possible that the majority of grade six boys fully expect to be influenced by the opinions of adults (especially teachers) and are therefore very uncritical of and vulnerable to intense appeals such as the High Intensity model delivered.

Unless future investigations exploring hypocrisy-related variables are also able to control and accurately report subject status on the crucial reactance-related variables it will be extremely difficult to make meaningful comparisons between studies.

Secondly, the Bryan hypothesis inaccurately predicted no group differences on the donation variable. It was reasoned that equating all model donation behavior at zero would be sufficient to bring about a uniformly low level of giving if it were true as Bryan and his colleagues maintain that the model's behavioral generosity is the sole determinant of donations. Charitable behavior did in fact significantly increase in response to the intensification of exhortations. Contrary to the Stein and Bryan (1972) conclusions, this was true even though the powerless model's preaching consisted of mere moral exhortations about giving rather than game-specific instructions about rules of self-reward. Consequently, the generality of the Bryan hypothesis that neither exhorters nor cognitions can affect the behavior of a child must be questioned, since it appears to apply only to relatively mild exhortations.

Evaluations were completely unaffected by the intensity of model preaching. The failure of both ^{the} Bryan and the experimental hypotheses to anticipate this finding was somewhat surprising. Both Bryan et al's finding that generous exhortations enhance model ratings and McEwan and Greenberg's (1970) observations on the positive impact of language intensi-



fication upon source and message variables were cited in support of predicted increases in attraction corresponding to those in giving. However, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, this prediction was only tentative. For instance, it was reasoned that if evaluations improved from greedy to neutral to generous preaching (Bryan & Walbek, 1970^a), that they might continue to improve through increasing levels of generous preaching. The McEwan and Greenberg study similarly provided no ground for firm predictions.

It may be of significance that the decrease in attraction predicted by the resistance position also failed to appear. Since the resistance inducing properties of the messages covaried with the level of expressed generosity, it is theoretically possible that the hypothesized intensity effect was cancelled out by an undetectable resistance effect. However, if there is any validity in the above speculations about donation behavior which suggested that the children are not nearly as resistant to verbal social influence as adults, the cancellation interpretation would be untenable.

In view of the inconclusiveness of predictions and post hoc speculations on the effect of preaching upon evaluations, it would appear that the only sound basis for a prediction would have been the previously observed tendency of high levels of donation to be associated with medium or low levels of attraction. Until an adequate causal explanation of this relationship is formulated we can only conclude that evaluations (attitudes) and donations (overt behaviors) probably have quite different determinants and thresholds. A crucial question yet to be answered by research on the preaching intensity and other hypocrisy variables is whether it is possible to experimentally induce correspondence between evaluations and donations. In other words, are there some types of preaching which can simultaneously produce either favour-

able or unfavourable outcomes on both variables?

It is now clear only that the particular message which we have labelled "High Intensity" produced significantly more donation behavior than another message entitled "No Intensity". What is less clear is the relative importance of several specific variables which constituted the intensity manipulation. Those which have been singled out for further attention are: degree of expressed persuasive intent; degree of semantic intensity; message length; and the number, type, and quality of arguments. Although these variables in combination have demonstrated the behavioral impact of exhortations, it may well be that when both High and Low Intensity messages are equated on all variables except the variable of interest, that the results will not be at all dramatic.

Another challenging task for any researcher exploring the intensity variable is to determine at what point (if any) the manipulation of each component of the intensity effect leads to a "boomerang" effect as explained by McEwan and Greenberg (1970) in reference to the "intensity ratio" (ratio of intense modifiers and verbs to total words) and implied by Brehm (1966) in reference to persuasive intent and serious threats to freedom. For example, McEwan and Greenberg have speculated that potential intensity effects may actually be cancelled out (because of a competing fatigue or satiation effect) once messages reach a certain length.

In summary, the preaching intensity hypothesis was supported by the data on donations but unconfirmed by the data on evaluations. The findings on the latter variable were theoretically compatible with all three positions (Bryan, resistance, and intensity) although not directly supportive of any.

Effects of Model's Responsibility for Failing to Donate

The hypothesized main effect for responsibility emerged very strongly on all four evaluation measures (combined ratings, altruism, trustworthiness and general evaluation). In each case, the High Responsibility model elicited significantly poorer ratings than the other two models who did not differ from each other. Clearly the verbalization of statements conveying the deliberate intention to withhold charity leads to a sharp increase in negative judgments about the speaker. This pattern applied to all levels of intensity and for both schools on combined ratings, altruism ratings, and general evaluation ratings. Mean trustworthiness ratings deviated only slightly from this pattern.

The finding that ratings of the High Responsibility model and the remaining two models were mutually exclusive demonstrates the stability of the effect. Its strength is further substantiated by the high proportion of variance (36%) accounted for by the relationship between responsibility level and evaluations, especially in the High and Low Intensity conditions.

Donations were not significantly affected by the responsibility variable. Ss exposed to the High Responsibility model donated no less to the charity than other Ss. This was not surprising since there was no basis for a prediction on this variable.

The responsibility data are consistent with the theoretical formulations presented earlier which stressed the importance of "subjective responsibility" (Piaget, 1932) and attributed intentions (Jones & Davis, 1965) in the making of moral decisions. The model who demonstrated her selfish intentions by rationalizing her non-donation through questionable excuses was invariably viewed more negatively than the models who gave plausible excuses or who temporarily avoided the decision. Basically, Ss attributed negative dispositions

to Ms who demonstrated their responsibility for inaction. As expected the "hypocrite" was not harshly judged to be a bad person unless her questionable behavior was clearly premeditated and avoidable.

Clearly the generality of another of the assertions of the Bryan group must be qualified on the basis of the strength of the present evidence. One such conclusion has been made in studies in which words had a much greater impact upon ratings than deeds. Specifically, Bryan and Walbek contended that "if one preaches good things, one is esteemed even if behavior reflecting such verbalizations is not evident" (1970^a, p.340). This observation did not apply to the High Responsibility condition. A rider should therefore be included stating "as long as one does not make a defense of one's failure to donate which relies primarily upon obviously self-indulgent excuses".

Triple Interaction Effect

The three-way interaction also suggests that there may have been one or more powerful extraneous variables operating in a few of the groups which could have helped to qualify the preaching effect. It appears that subjects' initial level of generosity had much less to do with the three-way interaction than the extraneous variables. If future researchers are to reap the advantages of running subjects in groups in experiments such as the present one, they might consider thorough precautions in order to minimize the possibility of obtaining subtle cues from one another. This factor may well have been at least partly involved in the three-way interaction obtained in the present study.

Summary

In summary, Ss' feelings and perceptions of M were determined solely by the level of responsibility attributed to M, while donation behavior was

determined exclusively by the intensity of pressure placed upon S. These findings were predicted and explained from two separate theoretical vantage points. The former finding is consistent with attribution theory, which would predict a negative evaluation on the basis of M's questionable motives in the High Responsibility condition. The latter (intensity) finding provides support for the hypothesis derived earlier from the communication and attitude change literature, while disconfirming alternate hypotheses derived from the work of Bryan and his associates and Brehm (1966).

CHAPTER V

Conclusions

Although this has been the first systematic investigation of the variables affecting hypocrisy, some tentative conclusions are in order.

Firstly, preadolescent boys have demonstrated that they are able to overlook even the most blatant inconsistency between words and deeds, provided that the adult model does not accompany her refusal to donate with rationalizations which clearly expose a degree of selfishness which cannot be reconciled with her lofty exhortations. M was not disliked and judged to be greedy, untrustworthy, and hypocritical unless she increased perceived responsibility for non-donation by attempting to justify her behavior. This finding could account for the failure of previous researchers to detect negative reactions to the hypocrite. One implication is that hypocritical adults may well receive "the benefit of the doubt" as long as they avoid the mistake of attempting to rationalize their inconsistency. Future research on this variable will be necessary in order to determine the degree of responsibility required to provoke devaluation. It may be possible, for example, to achieve the same results with very brief statements.

The above observations suggest that it is not completely accurate to conclude with Bryan and Walbek that "the child in middle childhood years has not yet learned that moral exhortations given by a peer or adult ought to be accompanied by appropriate actions" (p.350). However, in fairness to Bryan and Walbek, it appears that the threshold for negative reaction (among the grade six boys sampled at least) is quite high.

There is no evidence that even blatant self-justification affects anything other than Ss' perceptions of M. Donations were increased strictly

through the intensity and persuasiveness of messages independently of attraction ratings, perceived hypocrisy, attributed responsibility, etc. Basically, Ss did what they were told. They obediently listened to an unknown taperecorded voice and gave away up to \$.50 to an unpublicized, fictitious cause even when they disliked the model and found her greedy and untrustworthy, rating her poorly on several dimensions supposedly relevant to credibility. Perhaps there is some validity in the previously unconfirmed assertion by Rosenhan et al (1968) that

"Adult behaviors are so visibly different from childrens' in both lenient and strict directions...that reliance upon verbal instruction is necessary in order to make appropriate age- and sex-graded discriminations for children...Rewards and punishments from adults are much more contingent on obedience to verbalized than observed standards." (p.300).

Since the present study utilized exhortations rather than coercive instructions (as described by Rosenhan et al) perhaps these conclusions are applicable to a wider range of situations than Bryan et al (e.g. Stein & Bryan) would have predicted. Further study should be devoted to determining to what extent children of late elementary school age actually expect to be influenced by adults (especially teachers). More importantly, the ages and situations in which reactance will supercede uncritical compliance need to be established. Until this is done we may only conclude that it is quite possible for very intense, moralistic exhortations (from an adult who is poorly esteemed because of her deliberate refusal to practice what she preached) to facilitate her positive social influence upon childrens' charitable behavior. In fact, a favourable outcome is possible even when the children perceive a high degree of persuasive intent. It is entirely possible, however, that the fulfillment of Brehm's criteria for inducing psychological reactance would produce a very unfavourable outcome.

This experiment achieved its primary purpose of delineating the nature and action of variables which influence the impact of the hypocrite. No longer do "the conditions under which viewers will devalue the hypocrite remain unknown". It now remains for further research to demonstrate at what level of intensity (if any) a hypocritical model begins to lose social influence as compared to a neutrally behaving M who uses the same exhortations. It is clear from the present study that even a dramatic increase in preaching intensity (and therefore the discrepancy between words and deeds) is not one of the hypocrisy variables which is likely to result in devaluation.

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APPENDIX A

LETTER FROM GRADUATE STUDENTS (DAY ONE)

University of Manitoba
Fort Garry Campus
Manitoba

Dear Students,

At the University we are doing many things to find out how children learn. One of the things that comes from learning is the number of words you know, how hard the words are, whether you can spell them, or explain what they mean, and so on.

As part of our study, we would like to see how students in your class compare with students in other classes in only one thing. The only thing we want you to do is to write down all the words you can in 10 minutes, even if you don't know the exact meaning or spelling of the words. In a way this is like a race because you only have 10 minutes. But, it's also like work. Since you are taking time from your studies for this, we will pay you each 5¢ per minute or 50¢ (this is 25¢ more than most schools are getting since we are giving you 10 minutes instead of the usual 5 minutes). The money will be sent to your teacher as soon as your word lists are returned to us. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Graduate students
University of Manitoba

APPENDIX B

BASELINE MEASURE (DAY TWO)

Name: _____

Dear Children,

As a group of local citizens, a few of us are curious about your thoughts about volunteer canvassing from door to door to raise money for special projects. We know that many school children have been very helpful in giving their time on cold nights to collect money. We are wondering whether children would be even more enthusiastic about the idea if they got to keep for themselves some part of the proceeds which they collected.

We only wish to have a general idea about how kids feel about this. Remember, we are not connected with the school or any organization that collects money. We are just a few curious citizens. If many of you think you should get something in return for door-to-door canvassing, we will then see if we can find a group who might be interested in talking further about it. Just don't get your hopes up.

The question is simply:

"Do you think school children who are asked to canvass door-to-door to raise money for special projects should get paid anything at all for what they do?"

Yes _____ No _____

If you answered 'yes' also answer this question:
"How much would you personally think to be a reasonable amount to keep for yourself if you could keep as much as you wanted?"

(Answers go from "nothing" to "everything" which is 10¢ out of every 10¢ you collect).

Circle:

How much out of every 10¢ collected would you want to keep?

0¢	1¢	2¢	3¢	4¢	5¢	6¢	7¢	8¢	9¢	10¢
↑		↑			↑		↑			↑
nothing		1/4			1/2		3/4			everything

APPENDIX C

PROMPT SHEET FOR TEACHER AND PRINCIPAL (DAY THREE)

After receiving money from messenger at beginning of free gym period, teacher announces:

"These bags of money are the ones which were promised to you a few days ago. There is 50¢ in each one. We were told to pass on our thanks from the people at the University who are working on the word list study."

Principal asks grade six teachers if he might speak to their classes for a few moments (later in free period)

"Boys we have a visitor in the school this morning. His name is Mr. Anderson and he would like to have a few minutes with each of you in small groups. I have decided that we could save all the trouble it would take to have groups of you going in and out if all of you had a free period in the gym for a few hours. During your activity there you will be called out.

"I do not know exactly what you are going to hear but it sounds worth listening to.

"I would like you to do your best to remember what goes on this morning so that you can report back to us later. The reason for this is that we will be using your impressions to decide what kind of people to allow to come to speak with you in the future."

APPENDIX D

EXPERIMENTER'S INTRODUCTION FOR EXPERIMENTAL SESSION (DAY THREE)

"Hi there. I guess you wonder what you're doing here. Well, first of all I should tell you what I'm doing here. I'm here as a favour to some parents who needed someone to play this taperecorder in some schools. The reason they wanted me to do this was so that they could pass on some personal information about a money raising project to as many children as possible.

"The people behind the project are hoping to raise lots of money to help buy toys and other Christmas presents for poor children. One of these people has apparently been going around to all the schools in this area and taperecording interviews with teachers. During these interviews the lady always asks the teachers what they think children should do to help. Then she asks them how much they are personally prepared to help.

"I have been asked to play one of these interviews for you in order to help you make up your mind since you will be asked to make a contribution in a few minutes.

"Which interview I play is completely up to you. Teachers have been interviewed from most schools in the district. I'll play the one which most of you request." (voting ensues)

(just before starting tape) "The people from the project said I should remind you to pay very close attention to everything you hear on the taperecording because it is very important that you hear and understand it. Also, you will be asked some questions about it when you're finished."

APPENDIX E

GENERAL INTRODUCTION BY INTERVIEWER

"You have been a teacher for several years now. So I imagine that you must have heard much about the hunger and suffering of children in other parts of the world. In fact, I know that the children from your own school went out on Hallowe'en night and collected a lot of money to help out. But now that Christmas is approaching, many of us who are parents have decided to get out and remind people about the poor children right here in Winnipeg who don't have enough food or clothes all year and who probably won't get any presents at all for Christmas. Many of them don't even have anyone they can call 'mother' or 'father'.

"We are planning to go to schools to ask children to give up as much of their pocket money as they can afford, to help other kids have a happy Christmas. But before we do that, we are visiting teachers in many schools and finding out how they feel. We think that hearing what teachers have to say about giving will help them make up their minds since they look up to you.

"Now if you don't mind, I'm going to give you the microphone so that you can leave a message for the children we play this for. (pause) Go ahead, say anything you want ...and remember to speak right into the mike."

APPENDIX F

CONCLUSION: SUBJECT DONATION INSTRUCTIONS BY INTERVIEWER

"O.K. children, you've had a chance to meet one of the teachers that I've spoken with about the project. I hope you've had a chance to make up your minds about how much you are going to give. Now, I'd like you to make your donations one at a time on your way out. I have left a message for someone in your school to give you an envelope. Make sure you have one. Notice that there is no name on it and it can be sealed. The reason for this is so that no one will see how much you give.

"This is how we will do it. On your way out you will find a screen. Behind the screen is a donation box full of 5¢ treats such as chocolate bars and peanuts. Each of you may pick one of these up after you make your donation. (pause) If you put 5¢ in the envelope you're not really giving anything to the poor children because the goodies cost us 5¢. But every penny more than 5¢ will go directly to the poor kids for toys and food and Christmas things. Just seal your money in the envelope, put it in the donation box, take one of the goodies and go to the desk outside the door where you will be asked to answer a few questions. We cannot accept more than 45¢ from you today. That is our limit for this project. Thank you."

APPENDIX G

FIRST POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE (DAY THREE)

Full Name _____

Below are 10 lines of words. On each line you will circle the words which you think best describe the teacher who was interviewed. You should have 10 circles altogether. You may circle "not sure" if you feel none of the other words on that line describe the teacher you heard.

- | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|------------------------|----------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1. | very
selfish | quite
selfish | not sure | quite
unselfish | very
unselfish |
| 2. | very
greedy | quite
greedy | not sure | quite
generous | very
generous |
| 3. | very
honest | quite
honest | not sure | quite
dishonest | very
dishonest |
| 4. | very
kind | quite
kind | not sure | quite
unkind | very
unkind |
| 5. | very
foolish | quite
foolish | not sure | quite
wise | very
wise |
| 6. | very
likeable | quite
likeable | not sure | quite
unlikeable | very
unlikeable |
| 7. | very
patient | quite
patient | not sure | quite
impatient | very
impatient |
| 8. | very
nice | quite
nice | not sure | quite
mean | very
mean |
| 9. | very
fair | quite
fair | not sure | quite
unfair | very
unfair |
| 10. | very
narrow-minded | quite
narrow-minded | not sure | quite
openminded | very
openminded |

APPENDIX H

SECOND POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE (DAY THREE)

Full Name _____

Recall Questions

For all questions simply circle the letter opposite the best answer.

1. At the beginning of the taperecording when the interviewer asked the teacher to use the microphone to say something about giving, the things she said were mostly:
 - (a) strongly in favour of giving
 - (b) in favour of giving
 - (c) against giving
 - (d) strongly against giving
 - (e) she didn't say anything about giving

2. When asked to make a personal donation later in the interview, the teacher gave the interviewer
 - (a) nothing
 - (b) less than \$1
 - (c) between \$1 and \$5
 - (d) more than \$5

3. How well do you think the teacher practised what she preached?
 - (a) very well
 - (b) well
 - (c) o.k.
 - (d) poorly
 - (e) very poorly

4. (Answer this question only if the teacher you heard failed to donate)
How good were her excuses for failing to donate?
 - (a) very poor
 - (b) poor
 - (c) o.k.
 - (d) good
 - (e) very good

5. How much pressure did you feel the teacher was putting on you to donate during her remarks on giving?
 - (a) very great pressure
 - (b) some pressure
 - (c) no pressure
 - (d) didn't talk about giving

6. What was your main reason for donating the amount you did?
- (a) because of the nice reasons the teacher gave for giving
 - (b) because of the amount she gave
 - (c) because the teacher told us to
 - (d) because I figured everyone else would
 - (e) because I didn't want anyone to think I was greedy
 - (f) other (specify) _____
7. From what you know about the teacher you heard, how would you feel if you heard that she was going to substitute for your teacher for awhile?
- (a) very happy
 - (b) happy
 - (c) o.k.
 - (d) sad
 - (e) quite sad
8. Had you heard anything about this project before today?

yes _____ no _____

If you answered "yes" what had you heard?

APPENDIX I

DE-BRIEFING LETTER TO PARENTS (DAY THREE)

December 20, 1971

Dear Parents,

As a parent you are probably quite interested in how children react to various approaches which adults use in communicating with them. During the last few days a project has been conducted in schools in your area which will hopefully shed some light upon this issue. With the kind cooperation of the superintendent, principals, and teachers I have exposed the children to one of several types of tape-recorded interviews in which an adult expressed her views on giving to poor children at Christmas. It was arranged that the children would also be given 50¢ just prior to being asked to donate. In other words we intentionally avoided allowing them to give any of their own money.

Rest assured that none of the questions which your child was asked were related to personal or family matters.

For most children such experiences are both enjoyable and educational. In fact, the project will be used as a basis for a class discussion which should be of considerable value to the children.

Of course, if my observations from this project appear to have wide appeal for parents, I will not hesitate to send you a summary.

Thank you for your interest.

Yours sincerely,

John A. Anderson
School Psychologist
Westwood Area

APPENDIX J

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Altruism Ratings: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	1.92	0.67	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	56.09	19.56*	.30
School (C)	1	.00	0.00	.00
A x B	4	5.69	1.98	.03
A x C	2	3.81	1.33	.01
B x C	2	3.99	1.39	.01
A x B x C	4	1.92	0.67	.00
Within Cells	66	2.87		

* $p < .001$

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and School on Altruism Ratings: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	9.00	5.00	7.50	7.17
	B	8.40	5.80	5.20	6.47
	Mean	8.70	5.40	6.35	6.82
Low	A	8.25	5.25	5.00	6.17
	B	9.00	5.83	6.00	6.94
	Mean	8.63	5.54	5.50	6.56
No	A	7.80	7.00	6.50	7.10
	B	8.25	7.60	5.33	7.06
	Mean	8.02	7.30	5.92	7.08
Column Mean		8.45	6.08	5.92	6.82

Note. - Scores could range from 1 to a maximum of 10 (least altruistic).

APPENDIX K

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Trustworthiness Ratings: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	.79	.23	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	39.11	11.43*	.19
School (C)	1	.06	0.02	.00
A x B	4	7.76	2.27	.05
A x C	2	9.06	2.65	.03
B x C	2	4.60	1.34	.01
A x B x C	4	3.78	1.11	.00
Within Cells	66	3.42		

* $p < .001$

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Trustworthiness Ratings: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	7.83	4.50	7.25	6.53
	B	7.80	4.80	4.40	5.67
	Mean	7.82	4.65	5.82	6.10
Low	A	7.00	4.75	3.75	5.17
	B	8.75	5.00	5.75	6.50
	Mean	7.88	4.88	4.75	5.83
No	A	6.20	6.20	6.50	6.30
	B	6.75	6.40	4.83	5.99
	Mean	6.47	6.30	5.67	6.15
Column Mean		7.39	5.27	5.41	6.03

Note. - Scores could range from 1 to a maximum of 10 (least trustworthy).

APPENDIX L

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on General Evaluation Ratings: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	1.62	0.26	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	139.75	22.31*	.34
School (C)	1	7.40	1.18	.00
A x B	4	9.74	1.56	.02
A x C	2	11.41	1.82	.01
B x C	2	7.88	1.26	.00
A x B x C	4	7.18	1.15	.00
Within Cells	66	6.27		

* $p < .001$

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on General Evaluation: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	12.17	5.50	10.25	9.31
	B	11.00	8.20	6.80	8.67
	Mean	11.58	6.85	8.53	8.99
Low	A	11.75	7.50	6.25	8.50
	B	13.75	9.50	8.00	10.42
	Mean	12.75	8.50	7.13	9.46
No	A	10.80	8.60	7.75	9.05
	B	11.50	9.00	8.17	9.56
	Mean	11.15	8.80	7.96	9.30
Column Mean		11.83	8.05	7.87	9.25

Note. - Scores could range from 1 to a maximum of 15 (lowest evaluation).

APPENDIX M

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Hypocrisy Ratings: Analysis of Variance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	1.25	0.78	.00
Responsibility (B)	2	3.33	2.07*	.03
School (C)	1	3.92	2.44*	.02
A x B	4	6.65	1.04	.00
A x C	2	0.41	0.25	.00
B x C	2	2.17	1.35	.06
A x B x C	4	.33	.20	.00
Within Cells	65	1.61		

*N.S. $p < .1$

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Hypocrisy Ratings: Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level	School	Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	A	3.00	2.75	4.00	3.25
	B	3.20	2.60	2.80	2.87
	Mean	3.10	2.67	3.40	3.06
Low	A	4.25	3.00	3.50	3.58
	B	4.25	3.33	2.50	3.36
	Mean	4.25	3.17	3.00	3.47
No	A	4.20	3.40	3.50	3.70
	B	3.25	3.25	2.50	3.00
	Mean	3.72	3.32	3.00	3.35
Column Mean		3.69	3.06	3.13	3.29

Note. - These ratings are based on subjects' responses to the question "How well do you think the teacher practiced what she preached?" Subjects responded on a scale ranging from 1 ("very well") to 5 ("very poorly").

APPENDIX N

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Donations: Analysis of Covariance

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	Omega Squared
Intensity (A)	2	1359.46	7.06**	.13
Responsibility (B)	2	226.25	1.17	.00
School (C)	1	2.91	.02	.00
A x B	4	75.91	.39	.00
A x C	2	20.96	.11	.00
B x C	2	187.92	.98	.00
A x B x C	4	488.16	2.53*	.06
Within Cells	64	192.58		

Note. - Covariates were baseline and combined attraction scores.

* $p < .05$
** $p < .005$

Effects of Preaching Intensity, Level of Responsibility, and
School on Donations: Adjusted Mean Scores

Preaching Intensity Level		Level of Responsibility			Row Mean
		High	Low	No	
High	Adjusted	31.25	35.94	31.751	32.85
	Unadjusted	32.75	32.88	32.13	32.58
Low	Adjusted	20.13	28.00	22.63	23.92
	Unadjusted	22.50	27.50	21.50	23.83
No	Adjusted	13.60	22.90	21.05	19.39
	Unadjusted	14.83	22.60	21.00	19.47
Column Mean	Adjusted	23.47	28.18	24.54	25.44
	Unadjusted	23.36	27.66	24.88	25.30

Note. - Covariates used in the adjustment through analysis of covariance were baseline and combined attraction scores.