

History and International Politics: An Examination of the
European International System from 1919-1939

by

JAMES G. FERGUSON

A thesis
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requirements for the degree of
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in
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HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FROM 1919-1939

BY

JAMES G. FERGUSSON

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

This study is based on three considerations. First, theory can be usefully developed through a merger of International Relations and History. Second, cumulative theory should be developed through the identification of international systems which are distinct in time and space. Finally, it is vital to examine the basic features of an international system, in this case Europe from 1919-1939, to create a foundation for explanation and theory.

This study shows that although the goals of researchers in the areas of History and International Relations may differ, there is commonality and compatibility in the research process. It shows that a fundamental aspect of historical inquiry is a concern for the context of events. It is from this perspective that several criteria are identified for delineating temporal and spatial system boundaries. The criteria are used to make the case for a distinct international system constrained to geographic Europe from 1919-1939.

The study proceeds to describe the system's structural hierarchy, dominant types of political relationships, and general trading patterns through the application of three empirical models. The structural hierarchy model reveals an increasing disparity of power shares between the Great Powers, and the emergence of a tri-polar system in the late Thirties. The system is also dominated by 'entente' political relationships, especially among the Great Powers. Finally, the study finds relative constancy in trade concentration in the system indicating its probable isolation from political events.

In conclusion, the study provides a general perspective for theorizing in International Relations. It also provides the basis for testing existing macro-theories on the Inter-war system. Finally, the study identifies several problem areas involved in empirical historical research. As such, the approach advocated and applied in this analysis must be continued and expanded before any concrete theoretical benefits can be achieved.

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Any errors of thought or omission are directly the responsibility of this author. I would like to dedicate this thesis to two individuals: S. Hoffmann, whose insightful analysis of the field provided the basis for this research approach; and Cardinal Richelieu, whose actions represent the epitome of international politics.

INTRODUCTION

Explanation, or more precisely the search for causality, seeks to provide answers to fundamental issues which affect human relationships and the physical environment. This endeavor has given rise to numerous analytical approaches and interpretations in the social sciences and humanities. They, in turn, have been manifested within disciplines which represent a particular research focus. These numerous disciplines have diverse effects with respect to explanation, even though there is a strong element of methodological unity across disciplines. However, there remain areas of contention with respect to methodological requirements.

An underlying methodological issue has to do with the distinction between normative and scientific methods of theory, and their utility. This issue has been accentuated, especially within the field of International Relations, with the emergence of the computer and its ability to manage large and disparate types of data. Although the initial debate on this issue has become part of the tradition of the field, it is now being debated in a new form. The contemporary debate includes several issues: the utility of different approaches to the study of international politics, the level of analysis issue, the appropriateness of different techniques, and disagreements about the nature of international politics. These debates, although more refined, contain elements which are similar to those which formed the traditionalist-behavioralist debate.

Despite these underlying epistemological issues, the field of international politics is unified, in the long term, in its search for general theory. The goal of general or nomothetic theory is partly motivated by the desire for cumulativeness and prediction. It is also the product of the contemporary world, its numerous complex issues, and their potentially disastrous outcomes. The predictive undercurrent dictates that theory has direct utility for decision-makers as they confront issues of contemporary international politics.

In greater detail, it has relevance for the scientific aspects of the normative-scientific debate in the international politics literature. The predictive undercurrent, influenced by the scale and urgency of contemporary issues, also contains a strong prescriptive element. This element increases the likelihood of the intrusion of subjective bias into research. For example, a researcher may be relatively objective or detached when examining some event in the distant past, but once it is related to a concern for a contemporary problem, subjective biases are more likely to be present.

A more specific concern emerges from research which is not geared towards understanding and explaining past events but rather to collecting evidence which supports some contemporary prescription for present policy-makers. This has two main implications for the field. First, if history is

simply a data base, there is a large potential for the misappropriation of evidence. When evidence is drawn solely for the purpose of testing propositions, the research has only limited concern for the relevance of the context of the evidence. The past is ransacked for the purposes of the present. While historical evidence employed in this manner can provide weight and appeal to propositions, scientific rigor is marginal, and it defeats the nomothetic goal subscribed to by the field. Naturally, this concern has relevance for the normative school, but it most strongly affects the scientific school.

Second, it also leaves the impression that the study of History, per se, is fundamentally different from the study of international politics. In this context, historians are seen to be concerned with the past for its own sake. They are able to be objective because their research goals are not directly linked to the present. They also are practitioners of a discipline which is focused on the particular or idiographic, and which has disdained general theory. This perspective has created a tendency within International Relations to either ignore the historian's explanations, or use historical work as pieces of evidence for their own purposes.

The interdisciplinary uses of inquiry and research in International Relations and History makes up the underlying theme in this thesis. The need to find a middle ground in

research stems from the vital role which historical evidence can play in the development of theory in International Relations. This thesis subscribes to the nomothetic goal of the latter field. However, in so doing, it is concerned with the proper use of historical evidence in the development and testing of propositions, and the application of existing historical research to the study of international politics. It adopts and expands on the initial steps outlined by Stanley Hoffmann in International Relations: The Long Road to Theory. This approach has remained unfulfilled in the field.

Chapter One of this thesis is initially concerned with the distinction between History and International Relations as distinct modes of inquiry. It is necessary to examine the nature of the historian's approach to ascertain whether it is truly unique and therefore inapplicable to research in the latter field. The discussion addresses the basic characteristics of historical inquiry and reveals little evidence for any claim to disciplinary uniqueness. It does show, however, that the historian's concern for the context of events is a vital criterion for research in International Relations.

The second section of the first chapter briefly presents the basic attributes of International Relations as a field. In so doing, it discusses the dominant assumptions which define the field and its research, as well as the uniqueness

of contemporary world politics in comparison to past conditions. It reveals that historical evidence and interpretations remain vital and relevant to research.

The final section presents Hoffmann's proposal for theory construction which bridges the gap between History and International Relations. Hoffmann presents a case for an historical sociological approach to theory which begins with the identification of 'diplomatic constellations' or historical international systems. The identification of distinct historical international systems, and their description and explanation, provide a basis for the comparative analysis of systems. Finally, the section presents Hoffmann's basic conception of an international system, and two characteristic examples of systems research in International Relations. It provides the basis for the subsequent empirical identification and analysis of the boundaries and structure of the European Interwar international system (1919-1939).

Chapter Two analyses the issue of system identification in time and space. It discusses the nature of periodization in history and system identification in International Relations. The discussion then turns to the criteria for identifying distinct international systems. The criteria are taken to be widely applicable to the overall task outlined by Hoffmann.

Chapter Three applies the initial stage of Hoffmann's method of analyzing international systems. It describes and categorizes the structure and behavior of the Interwar system in terms of its hierarchy, political commitments, and trade behavior. In so doing, it discusses the concept of structure, its relationship to behavior, and the application of specific quantitative indicators.

The thesis conclusion examines the study's findings in relation to existing historical interpretations. In so doing, it briefly addresses potential problems concerning the method and the data, and refines the empirical conclusions concerning the structure of the Interwar system.

This thesis is an initial stage in bridging the gap between History and International Relations. Future research must proceed in two related directions: the creation of a full explanatory sketch of this system from the descriptive framework established here, and the identification and analysis of other international systems. This type of comparative historical research can help to balance the general contemporary concerns of research and the contextual influences of the past. This task, as Hoffmann points out, is a long and arduous one. However, shortcuts to theory can only restrict rather than enhance cumulativeness and knowledge.

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Chapter I

HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Few would question the notion that history is a vital asset for inquiries in the social sciences and humanities. Kaplan points out that history is the laboratory of International Relations, and as such is vital to systematic research.¹ History provides the basis for the identifying and examining empirical relationships leading to the development of explanatory and predictive models. Thus one would generally assume a highly interdependent relationship between the disciplines of History and International Politics. However, with a few exceptions, the two disciplines operate within mutually exclusive categories.²

This division may be a product of the trend in modern society towards specialization.³ However, there are concrete reasons for this dichotomy not only between History and International Relations, but also between History and the other disciplines which study human behavior. Singer states:

¹ M. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 3.

² The most recent exception is the study undertaken by Gordon Craig and Alexander George; see Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, (Oxford: University Press, 1983).

³ Aron alludes to this impact; see Politics and History (New York: Free Press, 1978).

The moment that one goes beyond the telling of a single narrative or the interpretation of a single case, one is into the 'nomothetic' mode, and thus laying the groundwork for cumulative knowledge. Although most historians remain within the 'idiographic' mode, and seldom attend-in any explicit fashion-to matters of comparison, and accumulation, social scientists do invade their empirical domain, using a rather different intellectual style⁴

This perception of difference is echoed to a large extent by many historians.⁵

The central concern of this chapter is the division between History and International Relations, and the ways in which this division can be bridged. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the nature of historical inquiry. It focuses on three questions: (a) What is History? (b) What are the main components of historical analysis? (c) In what ways is History a unique discipline of inquiry?

The second section examines the field of International Relations. It investigates the field's uniqueness, its central concepts and research concerns, and the status of theory. The third section presents the means for bridging the divisions between History and International Relations which have been identified. In so doing, it analyzes Hoffmann's proposal for research and theory construction, identifies

⁴ J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates of War I: Research Origins and Rationale (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 186.

⁵ This is emphasized by G.R. Elton, The Practice of History (Sydney: University Press, 1967), pp. 1-50.

two preliminary steps for such research (the identification of system boundaries and system structure), and briefly addresses the nature of systems research in the field. The chapter, as a whole, provides the foundation for the subsequent case study of Interwar Europe (1919-1939).

1.1 HISTORY

Within broad boundaries, there is general agreement among historians as to what constitutes history. Marwick provides three meanings for the term history.⁶ First, history may be seen to represent the entire human past, or a section of it, as it occurred. Second, history is the intellectual endeavor to describe and interpret the past. Finally, history may be seen as a discipline of inquiry. Of primary importance is the process by which the entire course of past events is sifted by the historian into a manageable, logical, and sufficient whole.

The foundation of this process is the determination of significance out of the welter of the past. At a general level, it is based on the centrality of man. Dray points out that the basic focus of historical inquiry is the activ-

⁶ A. Marwick, The Nature of History (London: MacMillan, 1970), p. 15. See also W. Dray, The Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), L.O. Mink, "Philosophy and History", in G.G. Iggers, H.T. Parker, eds., Contemporary Handbook of Historical Studies: Contemporary Research and Theory. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), and E.H. Carr, What is History. (London: Penguin Books, 1964).

ities of man as a social animal.⁷ This is echoed by Leff, who states that "History is by common consent the study of man's past; and more specifically, man as a social being rather than as a species."⁸

The question of significance partly depends on the idea of historiography which may be defined as the critical or analytical philosophy of history. According to Walsh, historiography is a discipline in its own right.⁹ Historiography represents the study of the process of historical inquiry rather than history itself.

Historiography is thus a narrower and much less interesting study than history itself; it is part of historical study, and in rudimentary and perhaps unconscious form, a preliminary to any important historical study,...¹⁰

The current meaning of historiography, which is used interchangeably with the term philosophy, is relatively new to the discipline of History. Initially, it referred to attempts by historians such as Hegel, Marx, Spengler, and Toynbee, to discern an overall pattern in, and explanation of, the development of man. Thus history is explained in terms of progress towards a utopian world, or as cycles in the rise and fall of civilizations, or as representing the

⁷ W.H. Dray, The Philosophy of History, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 4.

⁸ G. Leff, History and Social Theory (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969), p. 11.

⁹ W.N. Walsh, cited in L.O. Mink, op. cit. p 17.

¹⁰ A. Marwick, op. cit., p. 16

struggle for survival in the Darwinian sense. The shift from this traditional view to the modern one (circa 1938)¹¹ has resulted in a great disdain for grand theorizing. This factor has implications for the meaning of the term historiography or the philosophy of history.

Aron argues that one must differentiate between the science of history and the philosophy of history. Historical science occurs when:

An effort is made to establish and reconstruct the facts in accordance with the most rigorous techniques and to fix the chronology; the myths and the legends themselves are used to discover the tradition underlying them and thereby to reach the events that produced them; briefly in Ranke's famous phrase, the highest aim of the historian is to discover and relate wie es geschehen ist -how it happened. His ultimate and sole objective is pure reality.¹²

The difference between these two concepts results in two distinct approaches to research and speculation. First, the philosopher is concerned with the whole whereas the historian is concerned only with a small portion. Second, although the latter may be writing about the whole, he generally does not seek to establish the truth about the development of man, but only to discover what has happened.¹³ Therefore the philosophy of history is defined in the traditional sense of its application in History. This definition leads one to

¹¹ This is the date L.O. Mink applies to this shift, op. cit., p. 17.

¹² R. Aron, op. cit. p. 6.

¹³ Ibid p. 11.

reject the philosophical uniqueness of History, and proceed with a consideration of the analytical case for a unique discipline.

It is obvious that history deals with the past, but the fundamental question is 'when does the past begin and end'? For the historian, the past does not refer to the immediate past but rather to a point in time divorced from the present. While there is no specific temporal span from the present that historians agree marks the beginning of legitimate inquiry, many argue that a span of approximately thirty years represents an appropriate interval. There are several reasons for this temporal gap. First, the historian primarily, but not exclusively, uses written documents as his basic sources, and access to the majority of government sources are restricted for a specific time span. This may be compounded by restrictions placed by individuals on the use of their private diaries.¹⁴

Second, studies of the immediate past are partially viewed as within the purview of other disciplines, such as International Relations or journalism. Third, the historian seeks adequate criteria for the judgment of significance

¹⁴ It may be argued that government restrictions only affect political history. However, the wide range of possible areas for historical research, such as historical demography, have material available up to and including the immediate present through such sources as censuses. It seems, however, that historians will limit their examination, despite available sources, to a time span detached to some extent from the present.

which requires a known future.¹⁵ Finally, there is a conscious desire to maintain a sense of objectivity with his material.¹⁶ This is not to say that all historians neglect or halt their studies at some arbitrary date which divides history from contemporary events or issues. The existing division does, however, seem to be a basic parameter for the discipline, and part of its claim to uniqueness.

The uniqueness of the discipline dissolves when one examines its analytical focus. Leff argues that the manner in which the analytical unit is selected produces major divisions within History as a discipline.

History has become increasingly a body of separate disciplines - economic, political, intellectual, ecclesiastical, social - each largely autonomous, with its own subdivisions, procedures, techniques and canons, and effectively divorced one from another. Expertise in one does not guarantee proficiency in another, or indeed a working knowledge even over an entire field.¹⁷

This factor in historical analysis has two implications. First it is consistent with Aron's argument concerning the collapse of a general philosophy of history. Second, the divisions in historical inquiry run contrary to an appeal to disciplinary uniqueness. Historians have, according to their

¹⁵ R. Jensen, "History and the Political Scientist", S.M. Lipset, Politics and the Social Sciences. (Oxford: University Press, 1969), p. 7.

¹⁶ This is not to argue for pure historical objectivity. Rather it represents a lesser degree of subjectivity in as much as the historian cannot divorce him/herself entirely from the values of the present era. This issue will be addressed shortly.

¹⁷ G. Leff, op. cit., p. 12.

analytical focus, more in common with scholars in other disciplines.¹⁸ The concern, therefore, relates to the process of historical inquiry in a discipline that is sub-divided along the lines of other disciplines.

Historical inquiry is the process by which historians sift through the welter of past events to identify and construct an interpretation of a particular event or situation. As Dray points out, the first goal of history is to establish what happened.¹⁹ This goal may be seen as a pronouncement on the historical facts. The fundamental question here relates to the actual existence of fact in an objective form. The identification of a fact by an historian or an individual, and its presentation, moves it from realm of objectivity. This process initially depends on the values of the individual historian.²⁰

The historian selects the topic and evidence, and imposes a structure on the material based upon the values which he holds.²¹ These values thereby influence inferences made about the past. The issue of objectivity/subjectivity is a product of the impact of these values. It is generally

¹⁸ Some historians criticize this development, although they recognize its existence. A. Marwick, op cit, pp. 178-180.

¹⁹ W. Dray, op. cit., p. 5; The second goal of history according to Dray is to explain what happened.

²⁰ C.A. Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973), p. 106.

²¹ Ibid, p. 30.

agreed in historiography that history is contemporary, in that the historian is unable to abstract himself from the surrounding contemporary milieu that has shaped his values.

As Carr points out

the practical requirements which underly historical judgement give to all history the character of 'contemporary history' because however remote in time events thus recounted may seem to be, the history in reality refers to present needs and present situations wherein those events vibrate.²²

The values of the historian impinge from the outset of the analysis. Once a topic has been selected, the historian then proceeds to exhaust all available sources and inductively describes and explains the phenomena. This is what Carr refers to as the input (the former) and output (the latter) process of historical inquiry.²³ However, the process of induction is shaped by the selection process.

The selection of a topic by the historian initially determines the type of material which will be examined. Therefore, the historian's first step is deductive. This process is also influenced by two characteristics of historical evidence.²⁴ First, historical material is not empirical in the sense that the historian can rarely, if ever, observe his facts. The historian bases his identification of what happened on sources contemporary to an historical period, reinforced by other historical sources about that period.

²² E.H. Carr, op. cit., p. 21.

²³ Ibid., p. 23.

²⁴ W. Dray, op. cit., p. 22.

It is often difficult to verify that the primary historical source was in fact the observer. Second, the historical record is always incomplete.

Some historians still believe that the researcher can be divorced from his values. This divorce is attained by writing from an actor's viewpoint.²⁵ There are certain problems with this view. The idea that a historian can re-enact the past presupposes that a historian can not only isolate himself from the present, but also vicariously empathize with the historical milieu. However, it is unlikely that one can understand the emotional and intellectual milieu of historical actors without undergoing their actual experiences. Second, the focus on the individual as the center of historical inquiry will not necessarily identify and explain the complete significance of a phenomenon. This problem is compounded if there is no identifiable individual on which to focus. Finally, this approach assumes an identifiable relationship between intention and action which may not be valid.²⁶

The identification of significance which is at the basis of inquiry and the subsequent selection of evidence, produces a description and explanation of what has occurred and a validation for the inquiry as well. The process of de-

²⁵ See R. Collingwood, The Idea of History. (Oxford: University Press, 1946).

²⁶ G. Leff, op. cit., pp. 33-35.

scribing an historical event results in a primitive explanation which provides a reader with an understanding of the temporal succession of events and actors subsumed by the topic. This process is the historical narrative. The historical narrative is one of three types of historical explanation identified by Atkinson.

The narrative develops from description of the events or chronology to explanation and progresses towards explanatory status to the extent that it is organized, purged of irrelevances, focus on questions left unanswered in earlier narratives or on new questions generated by new information or the changing interests and perspectives of later generations.²⁷

Gallie argues that explanations in history, however, are "aids to the basic capacity or attitude of following...and only in relation to this capacity can they be correctly assessed and construed."²⁸ This appears as the enunciation of causal generalizations or as an appeal to a theory of human behavior which serves to communicate the historian's ideas. The narrative, therefore, is not necessarily an explanation.²⁹ For example, the assertion of a causal sequence may occur within the narrative in such a manner as to make it self-explanatory. This may enhance the sufficiency of narrative as a whole but, as Gallie argues, it is not an explanation in the strict sense of the term.

²⁷ R.F. Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 96.

²⁸ W.B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding. (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 105.

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 108-109.

But in fact, no historical narrative is self-explanatory: every historical narrative stands in need of the kind of explanation which is intruded into it because it has failed to be self-explanatory, because it needs to be righted..., so that we can follow its progress as before.³⁰

The identification of a more complex form of explanation in history is revealed in the debate over the utility of the scientific method. It is defined in the literature as the 'covering law' theory.³¹ Scientific explanation consists of relating events, which are to be explained, to events which cause or condition it. Events are explained by reference to previously observed events of a similar type. Explanation occurs when an event is subsumed under a generalization or law.

Such a rule or universal hypothesis may be regarded as asserting a regularity of the following type: whenever an event of a specified kind C occurs at a certain place and time, an event of a specified kind E will occur at a place and time which is related in a specified manner to the place and time of the first event. Thus the explanation of a given event consists in (1) stating a universal law, or set of laws, (2) stating the existence of a set of initial conditions C1.....Cn, so that from the two statements a third statement describing the event in question follows.³²

³⁰ Ibid, p. 109.

³¹ Leff points out that Popper and Hempel diverge on a specific aspect of the applicability of the covering law model. Popper argues that the lack of a unifying theory or theories in history has resulted in numerous trivial laws that "are practically without interest and totally unable to bring order into the subject matter." The latter believes that general laws do have a function within history similar to the natural sciences and he offers the notion of the explanatory sketch as a preliminary step to the development of laws. G.Leff, op. cit. pp. 80-82.

The arguments against the covering law theory emphasize the uniqueness of historical explanations. At a general level, historians do not base their inquiry in general laws, given the lack of a unifying theory in history. The application of numerous methods in historical inquiry produces different interpretations from the same body of evidence.³³ However, this is not the product of a lack of theory, but of the influence of a historian's beliefs or values about the referent world, and human behavior. When the historian undertakes to write the narrative and/or explanation of an historical event, he implicitly appeals to these beliefs. This appeal takes the form of interpretation on the basis of a general law or laws.³⁴

This deductive process has not resulted in an explicit catalogue of general laws in history. The isolation and manipulation of experiments are not attainable in historical or the bulk of social inquiry. Historians isolate a particular event and proceed to explain its significance, but they are unable to replicate or falsify their findings in the scientific sense. This inability, reinforced by the historian's beliefs and values may explain the failure to develop general deductive laws.

³² P. Gardiner, ed., Theories of History, p. 212.

³³ G. Leff, op. cit. p. 14.

³⁴ C. Frankel, "Explanation and Interpretation in History", in P. Gardiner, ed., Theories of History, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 410.

This aspect of historical inquiry may be viewed in two forms.³⁵ First, the construction of an historical interpretation is of a form concerned with assessment, not truth telling. The process by which a historian subjectively selects certain factors as significant while rejecting others cannot be equated with the canons of scientific inquiry. The fact that historical evidence is not empirical in the pure sense demands a value-laden assessment. Second, causality involves more than inductive reasoning, including moral concerns which are influenced by the historian's milieu. These serve to mold the salient questions and issues from which interpretations/inferences are drawn.

The issue of a unique type of historical explanation is also based upon the perceived status of theory. While historians must be able to apply theories and laws from other disciplines, they are generally not expected to be originators of theory or to necessarily apply theories as a unifying theme for their work. It is also pointed out that although a historian may test the validity of a theory, it is not central to his work.³⁶ The downplaying of the role of theory in history is partly a product of the relationship between historians and their evidence. It also stems from the characteristics of the debate in historiography over the covering law theory. Finally, it is the product of two is-

³⁵ Dray, op. cit., p. 56.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 113.

sues which are seen to divide history and the social sciences: the scope of study, and the nature of causality.

First, History is contrasted with the social sciences on the basis of scope. The former is generally concerned with the unique case, the idiographic. The latter is concerned primarily with the identification of repetitive patterns of behavior, the nomothetic. There seems to be little in the way of a tentative synthesis or middle ground between the two orientations.³⁷ The concern with the unique is based upon the requirement that the historian must guard at all times against imparting statements, generalizations, and explanations outside of a phenomena's temporal and spatial context. It is also related to some extent to the perception that the nomothetic approach contains an appeal to historical determinism. This relationship is seen to contradict the strong tendency in history to ascribe importance to the role of the individual and the concept of free will.

The idea that history is concerned with the unique and the particular has both strengths and weaknesses. It is true that the historian conceives his topic within the context of a specific temporal/spatial era, or that of a specific theme/institution. He also proceeds to exhaust the available evidence and provide a logical narrative or explanation of the phenomena. Finally, he tries to ensure that

³⁷ H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and the Social Scientist", American Historical Review, Volume 66, 1960, p. 23.

the phenomenon is understood within its own context. Its weaknesses result, however, from the impact of the contemporary world and the nature of historical evidence. Mandelbaum addresses this issue by pointing out that "if it were true that events are wholly unique, then no historical event could be described let alone explained".³⁸

The historian must appeal to concepts which in themselves are not unique. For example, a discussion of the Russian revolution refers to a class or type of events, and the form of explanation of such an event is not necessarily determined solely by its context. Although an historian may rarely explicitly transfer the explanation to other events of a similar type, it is not because of any disciplinary law. It is rather a decision of particular historians.

A historian does implicitly transfer insights beyond the context of the event. At the same time a historian serves to test cases of theoretical propositions about relationships and even develop some propositions to account for behavior. The implicit nature of this activity reflects the disregard with which general theory is held by the framers of the discipline. That historians do make appeals to what are generally held as concepts and methods in the social sciences does, however, weaken the case for disciplinary uniqueness. These decisions are also made by scholars in

³⁸ M. Mandelbaum, "The Problem of Covering Laws", P. Gardiner, ed., The Philosophy of History. (Oxford: University Press, 1974), p. 53.

other disciplines including International Relations.

The second issue is the nature of causality. Theory in the social sciences is grounded in prediction. The conditions which precede an phenomena are valid if they can be seen to predict all cases of the phenomena. This view of causality presents problems to the historian. First, the historian identifies the causal conditions for an event but is unable in the scientific sense to falsify the causal chain. He is limited due to the inability to test the relative weight of multiple causal factors. Second, the concern for the unique leads to a rejection of universality. Third, the historian may comparatively analyze a class of events, but as the earlier discussion indicated this is not generally seen as the role of the historian.³⁹

This view of causation is not consistent, however, with its application in other disciplines. Causal agents need not be invariant but may simply express regularities in probabilistic terms. In the social sciences these may be expressed in statistical terms, but it is not necessary.⁴⁰ A historian refers to such regularities even if it is only done in a qualitative manner. The concern for the unique case does not necessarily mean that theory is unachievable. It can still lead to the development of theories which are

³⁹ For an example of a comparative study undertaken by an historian see, Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of a Revolution, (New York: Random House, 1965).

⁴⁰ H. Stuart Hughes, op .cit., p. 29.

able to account for changing historical circumstances.

The problem of causality, like explanation, relates to the lack of an overarching philosophy or theory of history.⁴¹ This can be expected given the nebulous nature of the discipline as a whole. But, it is certainly the case that causality is a key to historical explanation. "Any prospect of finding descriptions wholly free from causal intrusions is as hopeless of accomplishment as that of finding descriptions relating entirely to an instant of time".⁴² Yet there are indications in the literature that historians tend to shy away from any explicit reference to causality.⁴³ Cobban in discussing the tendency to move away from 'cause' states;

In the nineteenth century, the word 'cause' in either its noun form or its verb form would have done the work done by 'factor'.... But somehow, 'cause' got into trouble with the philosophers and the scientists and was dropped by all the best and some of the less good clubs. The work the word had been doing had to go on being done, however, since everyone found it necessary to go on talking about the species of relations which cause had formerly designated. So 'factor' was slid into the slot which 'cause' had once filled in the vocabulary of rational discourse and this made everyone happy. Thus the human mind progresses- sideways.⁴⁴

⁴¹ D.H. Porter, "History as Process", History and Theory, Volume 14, 1975, p. 297.

⁴² Ibid, p. 144.

⁴³ R.F. Atkinson op. cit., p. 143.

⁴⁴ cited by A. Marwick, op. cit., p. 178.

Attempts to downplay 'cause' are first of all a product of the debate in the discipline on the utility of the scientific method. Second, they reflect the idiographic and nomothetic dichotomy of research. Finally, they are the product of the perceived relationship between causation and historical determinism. This runs contrary to the centrality of the individual in shaping historical outcomes. The issue can be clarified by examining the manifestations of causality in research.

There are three types or conditions of causality in ascending order: necessity, sufficiency, and the two in combination. Conklin points out that sufficiency does not mean necessity. While sufficiency is directly related to prediction in the social sciences, "Any one of a number of conditions may, if it exists, be a sufficient cause of war, but none of these may be necessary for war".⁴⁵ The third type of causality, necessary and sufficient, is seen as the ideal model for science. Conklin argues that while some historians may subscribe to this level, in so doing they must appeal to some general law of cultural dynamics.⁴⁶ The issue here is the validity of these distinctions and more importantly the relationship between necessary and sufficient.

⁴⁵ Paul Conklin, "Causation Revisited," History and Theory. Volume 13, 1974, p.4.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 5.

The issue of necessary and sufficient is largely a manifestation of semantics determined in part by an individual's research goals. It is based on how one conceptualizes and communicates a 'cause'. The historian will conceptualize, for example, one of the causes of World War I as the decision to mobilize and its effect on the German strategic timetable. The social scientist in contrast will formulate the same statement in abstract terms: one of the causes of war is the nature of available military technology and its translation into a strategic posture, citing World War I as evidence. Both cases do not attribute sufficient or necessary to the cause, but present it as a partial explanation for the phenomena. The identification of the cause is addressed towards different ends. Neither goal as outlined is mutually exclusive. While the historian may be concerned with a specific event in the past, he is not restricted to such. The converse is true of the social scientist. The idea that there are different types of causal explanations between history and the social scientist is not valid, though the forms of communication differ.

At this point it is useful to reiterate the basic points of the discussion. The examination of the historical method indicates that it is not truly unique. The differences cannot be formalized in terms a specific type of historical explanation, but only in relation to the goals which the researcher establishes for the study. These goals are

generally related to phenomena with specific temporal/spatial restrictions placed on them.

The historian attempts to provide the reader with a coherent and logical narrative of a phenomenon explaining both why it occurred and why it is significant. In contrast, the social scientist is not generally concerned with a specific phenomenon, but a class of phenomena, and the conditions under which it would reoccur. The social scientist appeals to the historian for evidence of a relationship between phenomena and the historian appeals to the social scientist for theories about possible explanations of phenomena. The social scientist and the historian are readily compatible. The former may search for inductive evidence about the relationship between phenomena and the latter may develop propositions about phenomena. Both may be simultaneously inductive and/or deductive in this process. Both are also influenced by the contemporary world which frames the relevant issues.

1.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The field of International Relations in comparison to History is a phenomenon of the twentieth century. It has been observed that the discipline emerged in the wake of the World War One and that its birth can be attributed to that conflict. Prior to the war, the study of international re-

lations was subsumed under history within studies of diplomacy and law.

The horror of war as exemplified by the trenches, the cost in human lives and material, and the labelling of this conflict as 'the war to end all wars' focused interest on the immediate need to develop and implement procedures to ensure peace between nations. These included the need to establish democracies in all states, the rejection of 'balance of power' as a policy in favour of collective security, and the rejection of closed diplomacy for a process open to public scrutiny. The latter point contained the requirement for a body of learned individuals outside the government to act as a check upon its policies.⁴⁷

The impact of war provided the basic parameter for the field. Aron sees international relations as most aptly characterized by the soldier and the statesman.

The Ambassador and the soldier live and symbolize international relations, which, insofar as they are inter-state relations, concern diplomacy and war. Inter-state relations present one original feature which distinguishes them from all other social relations: they take place within the shadow of war, or, to use a rigorous expression, relations among states involve, in essence, the alternatives of war and peace.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ This may very well have been the original rationale behind the emergence of the discipline.

⁴⁸ R.Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 5-6.

While this factor serves to define the scope of the field, it is obvious that the field is not restricted purely to the issues of war and peace. One can, as McClelland does, define international relations more broadly as the "study of all exchanges, transactions, contacts, flows of information and meaning, and the attending and resulting behavioral responses between and among separately organized societies (including their components) in both the immediate and remote past".⁴⁹ Although the definitions differ in their scope, there are common elements.

International Relations is the study of relations between nations or states. At this level the definitions provide two means to approach the field. One is the examination of relations between states. This approach would include systems theory, field theory, and interaction studies. The second is to examine the state in terms of its actions or policies towards other states. This approach includes foreign policy and decision-making analysis.⁵⁰

Three characteristics of the state have dictated its centrality for analysis. First, the state is defined as a sovereign unit; sovereignty being the right for an actor

⁴⁹ C. McClelland, "Systems and History in International Relations: Some Perspectives for Empirical Research and Theory", General Systems. Volume 3, 1958, p. 221.

⁵⁰ There is a third area or level of analysis. This is the focus on the individual. It is my view that this area is intertwined with the state level and is more aptly viewed as a subset, although there are implications in terms of transferring inferences.

(state) to make law within its boundaries to the exclusion of all others.⁵¹ Therefore the state is differentiated from other types of social units because they are autonomous centers of authority. Hoffmann states;

It may be easy to exaggerate the degree to which, within a nation, the supreme political authority effectively controls, the lesser centers of power; nevertheless such an authority exists. This is not the case in the international sphere; international relations owe their distinctive character to the fact that power has been fragmented into competing or independent groups throughout the world's history.⁵²

The concept of territoriality forms the second major characteristic of the state. The state is defined in relation to a spatial or geographic unit in which it is sovereign and the attributes contained therein provide the data for the bulk of research into international relations. Historically, territory has been one of the main stakes in war between states, although they have been manifested under various rationale.⁵³ However, sovereign territorial units are abstractions to some extent. Such units are only evident in degrees in the actual world. There are numerous examples where a state's sovereignty is impinged upon by oth-

⁵¹ F.S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), p. 142.

⁵² S. Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 1-2.

⁵³ The importance of territory in the study of international relations is always present although it may not be explicit. The importance of territory is discussed by Q. Wright, The Study of War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 743.

er states. For example, one would be hard put to recognize the states of Eastern Europe as pure sovereign units. It also reflects the problem of dependency in the Third World at present.

The final characteristic of the state is related to the legitimacy of war. Only states have the capabilities to engage in war, and therefore are unique in comparison to other social collectives. Other collectives (eg. revolutionary movements) which use overt violence for political ends are generally defined as participating in different types of wars.⁵⁴ Other types of non-state actors which participate in international relations lack the capabilities to participate in war. International Organizations, for example, may engage in war, as the United Nations did in Korea, but this is an exception.

These three factors define the uniqueness of the field and its central dependent variable. International politics occurs in an environment of anarchy in which each unit is sovereign. The central dependent variable is the issue of war and peace. Even those studies which address areas such as integration appeal to this issue. For example, K. Deutsch's study of the North Atlantic Community, which examines transactions and communication flows, contains an im-

⁵⁴ This distinction is made in the Correlates of War project. It is also evident from the numerous studies which address these types directly; See for example, R. Higham, ed., Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1972).

plicit appeal to the issue of war and peace.⁵⁵

The definition of a discipline or field serves to focus and guide research. The lack of a clear definition, conversely, limits the cumulative aspects of a discipline.⁵⁶ It was previously pointed out that the lack of such a definition has limited the claim of historical uniqueness. The field of international relations, in contrast, contains such a definition albeit in an abstract form. The issue therefore is the degree to which this uniqueness has been manifested in existing research.

Vasquez argues that research in international relations has been directed by a paradigm.⁵⁷ The emergence of this paradigm can be attributed, according to Vasquez, to the work of Morgenthau. There are three basic assumptions or elements to the definition of this research paradigm:

- 1). Nation-states or their decision-makers are the most important actors for understanding international relations.

⁵⁵ Specifically this is the analysis of why war is no longer plausible within this community of states. See K.W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton: University Press, 1957).

⁵⁶ The goal of cumulation is stressed by J. David Singer, "Q.I.P. Sins on the Tribal Reservation", J.N. Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns. (New York: Free Press, 1976).

⁵⁷ A paradigm can be defined as a set of basic assumptions researchers make about the phenomena they study. J. A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 5.

2). There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.

3). International Relations is the struggle for power and peace. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways to regulate it is the purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least indirectly related to this purpose is trivial.⁵⁸

These points are clearly evident in the previous discussion of the field. However, recent research has questioned the utility and validity of this research paradigm.⁵⁹

Morganthau's 'realist' or 'grand' theory was initially criticised for being unclear in the definition and operationalization of its concepts.⁶⁰ The reasons for its rejection parallel those which have been advanced for the collapse of philosophies of History. Although History has rejected the role of philosophy, with the exception of the Marxist school, the role of these earlier philosophies is still evident. For example, the concepts of progression and

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 18.

⁵⁹ The literature points out that the realist paradigm became dominant after World War II. During the interwar period, the field was dominated by the 'idealist' school. The propositions associated with the 'idealists,' were presented in the introduction to this section. The events of the Thirties and Forties served to undermine the position of the idealists. These included the failure of collective security, the League of Nations, and the appeasement policy of the Western powers. The idealist school is critiqued extensively by E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939. (London: Macmillan, 1946).

⁶⁰ For a discussion of the realist school and its critique see J. Vasquez, op. cit and J.E. Dougherty, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York: Harper Row, 1981), pp. 84-124.

cycles in history continue to shape a large portion of research, although appeals to these ideas have remained implicit. This has generally not been the case in International Relations. Despite criticisms of Morgenthau, it has provided the basic theoretical criteria for defining research.⁶¹

The realist paradigm has recently been challenged by the rise of two distinct, but inter-related approaches: the globalist(trans-national) and issue area approach. The emergence of the former can be traced to Herz. He argued that the development of nuclear weapons resulted in the inability of the state to achieve a modicum of security, resulting in the decline of the state as an actor.⁶² The latter approach can be traced to work done by Rosenau and Young.⁶³ Both scholars felt that the stress on conflict in International Relations failed to capture the essence of a large part of the phenomena under study.

⁶¹ J. Vasquez, op. cit. p.17.

⁶² J. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State", World Politics, Volume 9, 1957, p. 333. It should be understood that Herz downplayed his argument in a subsequent piece, See J. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation State", Polity. Volume 1, 1968.

⁶³ J.N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics. (New York: Free Press, 1974); O. Young, "Political Discontinuities in the International System", J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy. (New York: Free Press, 1969).

The Globalist or Trans-national paradigm contains four characteristics that separate it from the realist paradigm.⁶⁴ First, the dominant issues in international relations have shifted from military security to other global issues, most notably those of economics. Second, states have become increasingly interdependent since 1945, and global economic issues for this reason have become more significant. Third, the centrality of war has been replaced by the increasing dominance of economic issues because war is no longer a viable option in the foreign policy of states, especially the most powerful ones. Finally, the role of the state has declined and the role of non-state and international actors has become more important.

The issue area paradigm stresses three factors which contradict the dominant paradigm.⁶⁵ First, significant actors are determined by the salient issue and are not necessarily states. Second, the process by which issues are raised and resolved is similar to domestic politics which, in terms of analysis, results in a interchangeable set of rules and stakes. Finally, international politics is to be conceived in terms of issues and their resolution, rather than in terms of nations and the struggle for power. The issue area paradigm is strongly dependent upon the assumptions of the

⁶⁴ M.P. Sullivan, "Competing Frameworks and the Study of International Politics", Millennium, Volume 7, 1978, pp. 93-95.

⁶⁵ J. Vasquez, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

globalist paradigm. Both paradigms argue from the basis of a unique contemporary era of international relations.

These two paradigms raise issues which have dramatic implications for research development in the field as a whole. First, they question the value of historical research for the development of theory in the field. If the world has reached a watershed and the present system is truly unique then there would be little, if any, value in historical research for theory construction. It also restricts the empirical foundation of the field to a small time span which in itself restricts theory development. Furthermore, the acceptance of such a claim reinforces the historians argument of disciplinary uniqueness. It is important, therefore, to show that the realist paradigm continues to have the greatest utility for research and theory development, and that the new paradigm is either inconsistent with the referent world, or a reformulation of the old.

There are certainly aspects of the present milieu which are radically different from previous epochs, but there is also a strong element of continuity. This continuity is evident in the continuing centrality of security issues. The notion that the dominant issues have changed is not clear-cut. The value placed on economic issues supplanting security issues is based upon a perception of no inter-relationship between them. The evidence, for example, from the Inter-War period reveals the close relationship between se-

curity and economic issues.⁶⁶ Further, the debate on imperialism contains a strong element of an economic/security inter-relationship. Certainly the stress placed on such issues serves to remind scholars that security issues are not unidimensional, but it does not mean that a new paradigm exists.

The rise of new non-state actors is by no means a new occurrence in international relations. History provides numerous examples of influential non-state actors such as religious, and ideological groups. There is also no strong evidence that the state is on the verge of obsolescence. If anything the record shows the tremendous staying power of the state. The multiplication of states in the post 1945 world as well as the failure of integration attempts reinforces the dominance of the state as the major analytical unit.⁶⁷

The claims for a new paradigm are partially based on the relationship between states and war. In a manner similar to the idealist approach, the new paradigm(s) seek to uncover forces that support the movement towards a system of

⁶⁶ D.E. Kaiser analyses the relationship between German economic (trade) policy and security issues in his work, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War. (Princeton: University Press, 1980).

⁶⁷ For a full discussion, see C. McClelland, "The Anticipation of International Crises", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 21, 1977, and S.J. Michalak Jr., "Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding International Interdependence", World Politics. Volume 32, 1979.

international politics which approximates the domestic environment. This belief is in part a product of the development of nuclear weapons. But it is a desire for what should be rather than what is. Furthermore, the possibility of war between the nuclear powers should lead to a stress on the continuing centrality of the issue rather than attempts to downplay or ignore it. Finally, while war may be a questionable option between the nuclear powers, its continued appearance among lesser states reinforces its centrality to the discipline.

The final point is the failure of the new paradigms to provide a radically different set of explanations for our referent world. Certainly one must credit these advocates for identifying areas of research that may have been ignored by scholars. But it is not the case that the literature has completely rejected these conceptual points. To accept a new paradigm on such a limited basis only serves to retard the development of theory in the discipline. The goal of the field must be to expand our knowledge from an agreed foundation rather than attempting to seek new frameworks whose validity and utility is questionable.

The acceptance of the realist paradigm leads to an examination of the goals and methods in the field. The goals of the field or more directly the development of theory according to Wright are four.⁶⁸ These are most suitably presented

⁶⁸ Q. Wright, "Development of a General Theory of Interna-

in three points. First, the development of theory serves as a guide to policy makers and, in this sense, it is prescriptive. It also serves to create a body of professionals who act as policy advisors for political actors. Second, theory has the purpose of educating not only students but also the general public which has, to some extent, the ability to influence policy. Finally it serves as a basis for stimulating research in the field.

These points contain a strong prescriptive appeal. Hoffmann argues that the prescriptive element within the discipline has limited theory development, and should be seen as a scholar's secondary goal.

His duty is to seek knowledge and understanding for their own sake; and this implies that the main purpose of research should not be 'policy scientism'. The fighting of crusades, the desire to advise policy makers, the scholar's dedication to national or international causes can, and perhaps should be, the occasion, but they should not be the purpose of theoretical research.⁶⁹

This view does not mean that there exists no theory in the discipline at present. International Relations contains numerous lower level theories related to the central issue. Luard identifies five uses of the concept theory in Interna-

tional Relations ", in H.V. Harrison, ed., The Role of Theory in International Relations. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 19-20.

⁶⁹ Thus Hoffmann recognizes the impact of contemporary issues on the field. This influence is identical to the one confronted by historians. S. Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory", World Politics. Volume 11, 1959, p. 349.

tional Relations.⁷⁰ First, theory may take the form of what to study in the sense of action/behavior or thought. These are basically theories about the manner in which one should study phenomena. Second, theory may simply be a framework for research. Third, it may be a set of a priori principles which are held to be universally true. These are generally simplified theories such as the proposition of the drive for power among states. Fourth, theory may consist of a set of relative propositions or generalizations. These are generally empirical and inductive in nature and focus on conclusions rather than premises. Finally, theory can be metaphoric. This type is prevalent in system's theory which are based on analogies to mechanisms or organisms.

These types of theory reflect differing degrees of detail. The first two meanings of theory are the loosest and the type to which all scholars appeal. It could be argued that they are not theories in the pure sense of the term. The remaining three uses of theory are more sophisticated in that they contain a stronger basis for explanation and prediction. The latter three types embody the notion of science.

Reynolds defines scientific theory as a "set of propositions derived from a logical argument and from which are established generalizations which explain the existence and

⁷⁰ E. Luard, Types of International Societies, (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 7.

behavior of phenomena.⁷¹ There are two types of scientific theory. First, theory is considered valid if it is held to be universal and predictive. The second type is probability theory. Although similar in nature to the former, it is not universal but allows exceptions, and appeals to norms which are generally statistical.

However, Luard points out that theory in the field must confront certain limitations.⁷² First theory has a tendency to be too abstract. It may have little value in terms of the referent world it is attempting to explain. Second, there is the problem of maintaining the boundaries of a theory. Third, there is the problem of the linkage between concepts and evidence. Finally, theory must simplify and in so doing may be unable to address the complexities of the referent world. These factors have major implications for research in the field. While there may be agreement on many aspects of the development of theory in the discipline, its translation into reality will not necessarily lead to agreement on its validity or the inferences which can be drawn from it. Also, attempts to develop theory in an inductive manner will be fraught with disagreement about inference and the nature of relationships.

⁷¹ C. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 27.

⁷² E. Luard, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

At the heart of the question of theory in International Relations, if not all inquiry, is the nature of evidence. As in the case of historians, the evidence can rarely be directly observed. This is especially the case with research that attempts to develop theory from a historical inductive mode. In this case the limitations confronted by the historian are exactly the same as those encountered by the international relations scholar. One is unable to isolate phenomena in a laboratory, and changing temporal environments detract from replication. The development of theory in a rigid scientific manner is greatly limited. Although there may be underlying laws which govern behavior in international relations, attempts to discover these have not yet been successful.

Besides the problem of evidence, the researcher must confront the difficulty in the selection and measurement of the key concepts. For example, the central concept of 'power' in the field lacks agreement not only in terms of abstract definition, but also in selection of variables and their measurement.⁷³ These difficulties are not unique for they must be confronted in all areas of research related to human phenomena, including History.

⁷³ A discussion of the multiple applications of the concept power is provided by C.A. McClelland, Theory and the International System. (London: MacMillan, 1966).

The debate about the value of the scientific approach in International Relations is reflected within the field by the split between the traditionalists and the behavioralists. Although the debate takes many forms, one of the central issues relates to the utility of quantitative methods.⁷⁴ It is argued that the use of quantitative methods by the behavioralists limit their ability to access other types of research. This criticism, however, is equally applicable to the traditionalists. There are certainly problems with quantitative methods in terms of selection and measurement, but they are not drastically different from the problems that a traditionalist must confront in qualitative explanations. Both are based upon the concept of regularity. Also, one does not need to quantify to be considered scientific. The concept of science relates in the field to the need for precision and rigor, which is needed as much in a qualitative study as in a statistical one. This fact bodes well for greater cross-over research.

It is valuable to briefly examine two more issues which have been dealt with in the discussion on History. First, there is the question of causality. It is interesting to note that the concept is viewed with a similar degree of caution as in History. The concept of causality has been rejected in favour of explanation. This rejection is due to

⁷⁴ The basic reader which presents the various aspects of this debate is K. Knorr, and J.N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics. (Princeton, University Press, 1969).

the recognition that several variables may cause a phenomenon, and that there exists some degree of unexplained variance that cannot be attributed to a causal agent(s).⁷⁵ This view of causality is directly related to the assumptions of a divergence between the unique and general thrusts of the two areas under study. Galtung states;

the idiographic studies will tend to be rich in detail with propositions embracing a high number of variables—and correspondingly poor in rigor where theorizing is concerned.... the nomothetic studies will tend to be poor in detail with propositions covering one or two variables and correspondingly developed in rigor where theorizing is concerned.⁷⁶

These two approaches are not mutually exclusive, nor are they restricted to any discipline. There are numerous examples of the idiographic study within International Relations, as there are examples of the nomothetic in History. Our discussion of History pointed out that historians appeal to higher levels of generality and in so doing appeal to nomothetic information. Similarly, the theorist in International Relations appeals to detail and idiographic material for indications of variable selection and measurement. Though the intent differs, this does not preclude the crossover between them, and the need to develop a middleground.

⁷⁵ J. David Singer, The Correlates of War Volume I: Research Origins and Rationale, (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 184.

⁷⁶ J. Galtung, "The Social Sciences: An Essay on Polarization and Integration", in K. Knorr, and J.N. Rosenau, eds., op. cit., p. 258.

1.3 HOFFMANN'S PROPOSAL FOR RESEARCH AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:

The preceding sections reveal the need to find a middle-ground between the unique focus of History and the general focus of International Relations. This middleground is available in the proposal for theory construction as outlined by Hoffmann. Hoffmann views the past as predominantly empirical and as one of two avenues for systematic research.⁷⁷ He believes that research into the past will lead to the creation of a reliable depiction of world politics which will emphasize its central features. His approach is based on a belief that attempts to provide the field of International Relations with a central theory and/or concepts has failed. Hoffmann states;

The search for timeless propositions and the deductive method are, at present, disappointing. We must proceed inductively and, before we reach any conclusions about trends manifest throughout history, we should resort to systematic historical research, not in order to turn our discipline into history, but in order to accomplish the tasks which I will now try to describe in general terms.⁷⁸

Hoffmann identifies three tasks or stages in his research agenda. First, historical situations, or 'diplomatic constellations', a term borrowed from Aron, need to be identified and described. Second, these historical situations or 'systems' need to be compared to identify various types of

⁷⁷ Hoffmann sees the future as the other avenue of research. S. Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 369.

⁷⁸ Ibid.,

systems, and their requisite characteristics. Finally, a comparison of these international systems with domestic political systems should be undertaken to identify similarities and contrasts.

The completion of these stages, according to Hoffmann, would provide the foundation for theory construction in International Relations. These three stages also contain the means to overcome the division between History and International Relations as well as the divisions within Political Science as a whole. The identification of historical situations or systems fulfills the historians concern for the unique. It will ensure that research accounts for the temporal context of events and actors. The development of a typology of systems will provide an awareness of change. The final stage will create a basis for crossover research and cumulation in which relevant findings at the domestic level can be applied to the international sphere.

Hoffmann identifies three assumptions on which his approach is based. These assumptions are consistent with our preceding analysis of History and International Relations. First, Hoffmann argues that research should benefit from relativism and pluralism. No single conceptual basis for examining the field provides the only means to formulate questions and answers, but each has something to contribute. Second, research needs to be open to the borrowing of methods and analytical findings from other disciplines. Hoff-

mann cautions, however, that this borrowing should only take place if it is relevant and useful to the subject matter. He also adds that the formulation and testing of hypotheses must be based on actor values, beliefs, and purposes rather than analogies to impersonal mechanistic or physical forces. Finally, Hoffmann believes that the distinction between pure science and normative or 'value' theory must be eliminated. He points out that pure science is a myth because it also contains a philosophical basis with normative implications. He argues that a researcher evaluates regardless of approach or method, and a mixture of empiricism and values is necessary for adequate policy prescriptions.

These assumptions and aforementioned stages provide the basis for Hoffmann's discussion of the requisities for the identification of historical situations. He identifies four data sets which need to be exhausted for each situation.⁷⁹ First, the structure of an international system must be established. This encompasses the number and types of actors, the distribution of power among the actors, the hierarchy of the actors, the number of separate diplomatic fields in the world at that particular point in time, and the relationship of major tension. The second set of data consists of the forces which act as givens for the decision-makers in the system. These forces are sub-divided into two categories. Objective forces include the nature of technology and the

⁷⁹ Ibid, pp. 371-372.

level of economic development. The second category is defined as transnational forces which include international organizations, and ideological values which cross state borders. The third data set concerns the relationship between the domestic and foreign policies of the units. This set includes three considerations; objective factors inclusive of geography, resources, population, and military potential; the nature of the domestic political system; and the political culture of each actor. The final data set concerns the outcomes of unit interaction and its influence on subsequent behavior. In sum, a researcher must examine behavior from the perspective of each actor, and the system as a whole.

The immediate concern which emerges from this agenda is its breadth. To satisfy the requirements for one historical situation is an extremely large and complex undertaking. Each of the four data sets contains numerous complex research decisions. Each concept contains a plethora of definitions, and operationalizations which may restrict rather than enhance cumulation. Furthermore, one must be concerned with the historical expanse needed to fulfill Hoffmann's overall agenda. Generally, the study of international politics is restricted to the period demarcated by the emergence of the nation-state in Europe (from the eighteenth century onwards). Hoffmann contends that systematic historical research should encompass eras beyond the nation-state to include empire periods and non-Western civilizations. This

contention creates further problems. The further one moves in time, the greater the problem with available evidence. Also, when one moves beyond the scope of the state, the value of resulting analytical generalizations becomes open to greater debate and disagreement.

This brief critique does not negate the basic value of Hoffmann's approach. The approach contains a common sense gradualist view of research and theory construction. It also reflects the means to incorporate the historian's concern for the unique with the generalist focus of the social scientist. The approach also contains a recognition of the central role of description and categorization as a prerequisite for theory construction. Finally, the approach appeals to the multi-disciplinary value of research, within the confines of the unique characteristics of international politics as noted in the second section of this chapter.

This approach serves as the framework for the ensuing analysis of Interwar Europe as a historical situation. Hoffmann provides the basic rationale for identifying distinct historical situations.

"An understanding of world politics or of any aspect thereof presupposes an understanding of the characteristics of the International system. The behavior of a given variable depends on the kinds of situations in which it figures, and these situations in turn are largely the function of the international system in which they occur. In particular, the basic unit's freedom of action is limited and their choices are conditioned by the

nature of the system."⁸⁰

From this statement, one is able to infer that the identification of historical situations is equivalent to identification of system boundaries. The kind of situations or constellations refer to the structure of the system. Although these two concerns are the focus of the second and third chapters, respectively, it is useful to briefly identify Hoffmann's conceptualization in a latter study.

Hoffmann conceives the international system as an analytic scheme which must correspond to historical reality.⁸¹ An international system exists only if it meets three conditions. First, regular relations must be evident containing a certain amount of intensity. Second, the actors must be aware of their interdependence. Third, the system must be specified in terms of space and time with the latter as the key organizing concept.

Hoffmann points out that the criteria of system change, and therefore system boundaries, is dependent on the selection of key variables. He chooses the criteria of units, technology, and goals as conditions of change. It is unclear, however, whether or not all three conditions must be present for a system change to occur. For example, Hoffmann's typology of stable and revolutionary systems defines

⁸⁰ Ibid, p.370.

⁸¹ S. Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), p.91.

change as the appearance or disappearance of moderation in actors' goals.⁸² This definition leads one to infer either that the nature of actor goals is sufficient for change or his criteria represent causes of change rather than rules for boundary identification.

Furthermore, one must query the consistency of Hoffmann's approach when he identifies stable and revolutionary systems. For example, he identifies the periods of European history from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the French Revolution, and from the Congress of Vienna to World War I as stable Balance of Power systems. The French Revolution/Napoleonic era is, by default, revolutionary. These divisions represent the traditional view of the European state system, and one is at a loss to uncover what his application as added to the field. Furthermore, the large time span does not account for major fluctuations in the system which have a bearing on generalizations. For example, few, if any, historians and political scientists would argue that the unification of Germany in 1871 had only a minor impact on systemic relationships. This event violates one of the conditions of change which Hoffmann himself identifies.

Similar questions emerge in an examination of structure. Initially, Hoffmann refers to structure as equivalent to the type of units.⁸³ Later, Hoffmann, in his analysis of a Bal-

⁸² Ibid, p. 93.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 92.

ance of Power system, identifies three characteristics which seem to represent the system's structure. The system is defined as containing more than two powers, a relative equilibrium of power, and the existence of available territory.⁸⁴ The former two characteristics, which are consistent with traditional concepts of system structure, are not presented with a specific method to identify them for various systems. According to Waltz, Hoffmann defines structure as a combination of factors which are viewed to have an affect on foreign policy and interaction.⁸⁵ Waltz argues that this combination confuses levels of analysis, and contains elements which may be affected by the actual structure of the system.

The value of Waltz's critique must be tempered with a more fundamental problem. Hoffmann does not clearly specify what he means by structure. It is clouded by his focus on conditions of system moderation. This problem is also evident in his discussion of system change. His framework, therefore, is not developed to any adequate extent. This failing creates a significant gap. One is left with a research shell which must be filled out if the presupposed gains from such an approach are to be realized. It leads us to briefly examine how system's research has been manifested in International Relations.

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 94-95.

⁸⁵ K.Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979), p. 46.

The application of systems analysis in the field can be traced to two relatively distinct research foci: General Systems Theory (GST), and the level of analysis concern. The application of GST, developed by the natural sciences, was born out of the desire by researchers to overcome disciplinary compartmentalization, enhance cumulation, and expand general theorizing as a whole.⁸⁶ Its application in International Relations has taken three forms: mechanistic, organic, and organized complexity.⁸⁷ The mechanistic approach tries to explain state behavior by reference to static laws. The organic approach explains behavior by identifying the functions which elements of a system play. Finally, the organized complexity model combines the mechanistic and organic approaches in the sense that each individual approach represents degrees of analytical complexity.

Systems analysis, within the context of the levels of analysis, can be viewed in two forms. First, it represents one of the three main methods to examine international politics. Second, it has been identified as the fundamental explanation for the occurrence of war.⁸⁸ As a level of analysis, system is concerned with the structure and processes of

⁸⁶ O.Young, "The Impact of General Systems Theory on Political Science", General Systems, Volume 9, 1974, p. 239.

⁸⁷ R. Little, "Three Approaches to the International System: Ontological and Epistemological Considerations", British Journal of International Studies. Volume 3, 1977, p. 270.

⁸⁸ See K. Waltz, Man, the State and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

states aggregated as a whole. Singer argues that the system is the most comprehensive level of analysis.⁸⁹ A system focus emphasizes the system as an independent variable, or set of variables, and posits a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy of states.

There are major similarities and differences between the two manifestations of systems. Both seek to identify the impact of system on actor behavior. They are also concerned with the identification of systems in time and space. However, they differ in the degree to which they focus on analytic and concrete systems. The GST variant stresses the analytic, deductive approach to the field with a greater emphasis on general theorizing. System, as a level of analysis, tends to stress the referent world with a greater disposition towards the inductive method.

To clearly understand these differences, and their relationship to Hoffmann's agenda, it is valuable to briefly examine two studies which are representative of each approach; Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics and Rosecrance's Action and Reaction in World Politics. Both studies bear not only on the general concerns of system identification and system structure, which will be addressed in the subsequent chapters, but also on the concrete case of

⁸⁹ J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem", in K. Knorr and S. Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays. (Princeton; University Press, 1961), p. 80.

Interwar Europe.

Kaplan's study represents the first major attempt to apply systems theory to the field, and remains the benchmark in the field. It is based primarily on the mechanistic model of system's theory, although some consideration is given to system functions. Kaplan presents six structural models of the international system; two which represent historical systems. He identifies the types of actors, essential rules, stability conditions, and transformation rules for each system. In so doing, Kaplan seeks to identify recurrent patterns, regularities, and high level generalizations about international systems and their effect on actor behavior.

The 'Balance of Power' system, which has a historical reference to European international politics from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century, bears directly on the present analysis. This system contains a minimum of five national actors. Kaplan identifies six essential rules which characterize the system. These rules represent hypotheses about actor behavior which produce systemic equilibrium. They are:

"(1) Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight; (2) Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities; (3) Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (4) Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system; (5) Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles; (6) Permit defeated or constrained national actors to reenter the system as

acceptable role partners."⁹⁰

There are general and specific problems related to these rules. Stephens points out that it is unclear whether or not these rules are necessary considerations for system equilibrium and continuity, descriptive rules which characterize the system, or prescriptive rules which enhance actor security.⁹¹ He argues that this lack of clarity limits the utility of the model. Waltz, in a similar view, argues that the rules, which he believes are prescriptive, render the approach reductionist.⁹² The hypotheses concentrate on the units rather than the effect of the system on behavior.

Critics also identify inconsistencies among the specific rules. Kaplan himself notes that rules three and five conflict. Actors who hold supra-national goals may be engaged in war with other actors, and will not be eliminated even if they refuse to renounce these goals.⁹³ Weltman points out that the status of rule four is unclear.⁹⁴ If the system contains more than five actors, the destruction of one actor does not violate the system's boundaries which the essential

⁹⁰ M. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 23.

⁹¹ J. Stephens, "An Appraisal of Some System Approaches in the Study of International Relations", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 16, 1972, p. 331.

⁹² K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. p. 56.

⁹³ J. Stephens, op. cit., p. 334.

⁹⁴ J.J. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1973), p. 25.

rules represent. Weltman also argues that the fifth and sixth rules are merely restatements of the fourth and third rules respectively. Furthermore, Weltman asserts that only the fourth rule clearly results from the system and is consistent with the regulatory hypothesis concerning the maintenance of systemic equilibrium.

Overall, Kaplan's approach has limited use for merging History and International Relations. There is little, if any, concern for setting out the conditions for defining a concrete system, its boundaries, and relationship with its environment. Kaplan's conceptualization of a 'closed' system contradicts his own assertion of environmental influence, as well as the common sense realities of world politics.⁹⁵ Analogies to mechanistic or biological principles fail to address the importance of domestic determinants and the individual. Hoffmann points out that Kaplan's assertions are largely a reformulation of Morgenthau's determinist power theory at the system level.⁹⁶ One is unable to determine the system's hierarchy, variable inter-relationship, and the relevance of the approach beyond pure system theorizing and model construction.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ K. Waltz, op. cit., p. 53.

⁹⁶ S. Hoffmann, "International Relations and the Long Road to Theory," World Politics. p. 361

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 361.

One of the presumed benefit of GST is the development and application of concepts to aid intra and inter-disciplinary research. However, this benefit has not been attained. General concepts have created greater disagreement among scholars in definitional and operational terms. The Kaplan study presents a sophisticated terminology which simply reformulates the traditional postulates of balance of power. This terminology serves to obfuscate the principles of balance of power. Finally it explains little, in concrete sense, of the relationship between the system and unit behavior.

Rosecrance's Action and Reaction in World Politics. represents the application of system in the second manner. It analyzes concrete historical systems through an inductive approach. Rosecrance's study is an application of Hoffmann's proposal for research. He identifies nine historical systems in Europe from 1740 to the post-World War II era. The study is divided into three sections. The first section presents a survey of the historical literature for each system. In the second section, Rosecrance applies a system's model to categorize the behavior of the system. In the final section, Rosecrance identifies the basic cause of system stability or instability.

Rosecrance's system model consists of four elements. Actor disturbance or input represents the actions emitted by states into the system. The regulator is formal (International Organizations such as the League of Nations), or in-

formal (alliances) processes which seek to limit the variety of inputs and enhance stability. The environment represents physical constraints which influence actor behavior and may aid system stability. For example, Rosecrance points out that the existence of available territory in the peripher-ies during the Bismarckian Concert (1871-1890) was a major factor in stability.⁹⁸ Outcomes are the nature of inputs af-ter the influence of the regulator and environment. Stabil-ity, the dependent variable, is defined as outcomes which "fall within limits generally accepted by the major partici-pants."⁹⁹

In the final section, Rosecrance explains stability by reference to four determinants of actor behavior. Three of these determinants are subsets of the input. Direction is the individual actor's values, attitudes, and goals. At the system level, they are translated into a measure of ideolo-gical harmony or discord. The second determinant identifies the relationship between the ruling elites and masses. Fluctuations in the internal stability of elites, according to Rosecrance, are correlated with significant changes in the stability of the system.¹⁰⁰ Rosecrance refers to the available technology, primarily military, and mobilization

⁹⁸ R. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: In-ternational System in Perspective. (Boston: Little & Brown, 1963), p. 252.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 231.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 285.

patterns available to actors as the third determinant. For example, he argues that changes in resource patterns, as exemplified by the nation in arms, was a basic factor in Napoleon's actions.¹⁰¹ The final determinant, capacity, is the sum of the system model. It is the degree to which the system, specifically the regulator and environment, can restrict or limit disruptive influences. These system elements, Rosecrance believes, explain why disruptive influences are controlled in one system but not another.

Rosecrance's study is hampered by numerous problems. First, his operationalization of the dependent variable is inconsistent with its definition, and becomes largely tautological. Stability simply becomes the absence of large scale war. Historical systems, therefore, are unstable by definition with the appearance of war.¹⁰² In its use, Rosecrance fails to address the functional role of war in terms of the Balance of Power.¹⁰³ For example, the destruction of Germany in 1945 is an acceptable outcome to the Allied Powers.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 285.

¹⁰² J.J. Weltman, op. cit. p. 53.

¹⁰³ Bull points out that the chief function of the Balance of Power was to preserve the state system, and it required war as a means to check the power of potentially dominant state. H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (London, MacMillan, 1977), p. 107.

Waltz points out that Rosecrance fails to provide an analysis of system effects on actor behavior.¹⁰⁴ The actors explain the changes and stability of the system. Waltz also points out that this feature leaves such characteristics as bipolarity, used to describe two international systems (1789-1814; 19180-1945, as an empty concept. Bipolarity does not explain the actor's policies, but is simply a descriptive outgrowth of alignments.

These criticisms lead to a concern for the study's goals. It is not a system's explanations, but an explanation of the causes of war. There is nothing explicitly wrong with such a focus of inquiry. As noted previously, the central concept of war as the dependent variable in the field is consistent with this focus. However, this goal seems at odds with the general thrust of Rosecrance's analysis, which is the influence of the system on actor behavior.

A further concern is the failure to adequately specify the conditions for system identification and change. Rosecrance points out that international systems can be demarcated by significant changes in diplomatic style and objectives.¹⁰⁵ However, he does not specify what a significant change looks like, and identifies his systems on the basis of existing historical interpretations. Rosecrance identifies changes in the regulator and environment as related to

¹⁰⁴ K. Waltz, op. cit. pp. 41-42.

¹⁰⁵ R. Rosecrance, op. cit. p. 6.

stable or unstable outcomes. These perhaps are related to his definition of diplomatic style although they are not specifically applied as such. Finally, his conclusion on the causes of instability or war leads one to postulate the potential of war as a system demarcator. However, it is not applied by Rosecrance, and it is unclear why or how systems can be demarcated when war is absent. Overall, it is unlikely that the method used and the systems identified by Rosecrance will provide a basis for inter-subjective agreement, or are useful in identifying other international systems in time and space.

It is also valuable to briefly examine Rosecrance's analysis of the interwar system, given its relevance to this study. He defines this system as totalitarian militarism.¹⁰⁶ It is characterized as bipolar in which one group of actors, the Fascists, sought to transform the system, presumably the outcome of World War I, and the other group of actors, liberal democracies, sought to maintain the status quo. At the heart of this system, fundamental ideological antagonisms defines bipolarity. He concludes that the system is characterized by diametric opposition in which disruptive influences increased, and the regulatory (the League of Nations) and environmental mechanisms were unable to contain outcomes within acceptable limits.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, pp. 257-261.

Rosecrance's analysis of Interwar Europe is not of the system as a whole but limited to the division between Germany and the Anglo-French relationship, and the years beginning with Hitler's ascension to power. The system consists of three actors from 1933 onward. It tells us nothing about the system prior to 1934. Furthermore, one is left to query the status of the Soviet Union. One can infer that it either belongs to one of the two groups or is not considered a system member. Finally, one is left to assume that Italy was a direct partner of Germany throughout the time frame. If this is the case, how does one explain Italy's attempt to act as a mediator in late 1939 and her unwillingness to enter the war until France was on the verge of collapse.

The weight Rosecrance places on ideological factors is also questionable. His assertion that the Fascist (read Nazi Germany) actors are bent on the overturn of domestic regimes in non-Fascist countries does not stand up to inspection. Fascism did not contain an internationalist component or linkage as the case for Soviet ideology. The German and Italian variants are markedly dissimilar. Fascist movements did act as restraints on the actions of the liberal-democracies, but they were not dominated and controlled by Germany. Weltman points out that: "While Rosecrance may have accurately assessed the semantic structure of the ideology, its conversion into operational necessities in the

actions of German elite remains to be proven."¹⁰⁷ Finally, the actions of Germany after the onset of war seem to provide post facto reasoning for the system prior to 1939. German actions towards the conquered states of Europe are transformed into German goals prior to 1939.

The Rosecrance study, despite these criticisms, is a valuable attempt to merge a system's model and history. However, it fails on two counts related to the Hoffmann agenda. First, it fails to identify a specific set of rules for system identification. Second, the study fails to identify the structural attributes and requisite hierarchy within each system. These two failings are also evident in the Kaplan study.

1.4 CONCLUSION:

The preceding discussion is divided into three sections. The first section is concerned with the uniqueness of history as a discipline of inquiry. The second section identifies the basic features of International Relations as a field of inquiry. The final section presents the Hoffmann proposal for research in international politics as a means to unite History and International Relations. The three sections, in conjunction, provide the foundation for our subsequent analysis of Interwar Europe.

¹⁰⁷ J.J. Weltman, op. cit., p. 53.

Our discussion of History reveals a discipline which is only relatively unique. Its uniqueness stems from two basic factors. First, History is concerned with the past, Second, historians focus on the unique or idiographic to understand the context of events, and to ensure the creation of relevant generalizations within this context. This uniqueness is only relative because the historian is not the only researcher who focuses on the past, and he is equally influenced by the contemporary world.

The discussion of International Relations reveals the uniqueness of it as a field of inquiry. This uniqueness is based on the absence of a central authority to govern the relations between states. The discussion also reveals the continuing validity of the realist paradigm for research in which war serves as the basic dependent variable. The analysis shows that the nature of research methods are similar when compared to History, and the division between the scientific and traditional method is arbitrary. However, it is noted that the field stresses the nomothetic or general in contrast to History.

The third section identifies a means to merge the historians focus on the unique with the international relations concern for the general. It argues that Hoffmann provides a general method to overcome this divergence. This method is represented by the identification international systems in time and space, although Hoffmann fails to provide specific details. A brief analysis of two representative studies on

international systems reveals the problems of system research and the failure to fulfill Hoffmann's proposal. The section identifies the two major concerns, system identification and system structure, which form the focus for the following analysis in Chapters Two and Three.

Chapter II

THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SYSTEM

The complex history of Interwar Europe has produced many studies which have sought to explain the events that occurred during this time span. This material spans many foci and methods of research, though it is somewhat limited at the systems level. It has also concentrated, in terms of international relations, on factors related to the outbreak of war in 1939. There are numerous general and specific reasons for studying this era.

First, the impact of the contemporary milieu on analysis places the present day analyst in a relatively new genre. This is a product of being divorced, in the personal sense, from the era. Second, there is disagreement with the idea that a single agent caused war in 1939.¹ Finally, it is the product of the impact of history on succeeding events and policy. For example, the stress in American policy since 1945 on containment is partially a product of the 'lessons

¹ There are numerous debates evident in the field but they generally can be reduced to a bivariate relationship in which Hitler is the central causal agent. The major exception is A.J.P. Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin Books, 1964). Taylor's thesis has not resulted in further revisionist scholarship. The debate between Taylor and the orthodox view is presented in E. Robertson, ed., The Origins of the Second World War, (London: MacMillan, 1971).

of Munich'. It is vital to gain a clear understanding of this period in order to understand developments in the following years.

The construction of boundaries for a system, in this case Interwar Europe, may be seen at a general level as a stress on the unique. In so doing, such an approach may defeat the nomathetic goals of the field. However, the development of theory must be based on an understanding of that which is to be explained. This development requires an initial classification of relationships which can only occur through the analysis of specific or unique cases. Boundaries serve the central role of placing relationships within their proper context, which ensures a proper environment for the requirements of theory construction.

This chapter presents the case for Interwar Europe as a distinct international system. It is divided into three sections. The first section addresses the nature of periodization in History and the concept of system identification in International Relations. It provides the abstract foundation for examining our empirical case. The second section identifies the place of this system within a larger context based on the centrality of the state, and identifies the members of the Interwar European system. State membership or the system's spatial boundaries is based on two general criteria for the bulk of the actors, and an additional criterion for Great Powers. The two general criteria are geo-

graphic position and a historical tradition of community membership. The criteria for non-European Great Powers is participation in a security relationship with at least one of the European powers.

The third section presents various criteria for establishing the temporal boundaries of an international system, and the Interwar system in particular. System transformation primarily occurs due to systemic war which results in substantive changes on three criteria. They are: dominant issues; dominant military thought and technology; and Great Power composition. The analysis, as a whole, presents an abstract case for system identification. This case provides the basis for the identification of a wide range of international systems in time and space. The discussion also sets the stage for our subsequent analysis of within system variation in the next chapter.

2.1 THE ISSUE OF BOUNDARIES IN HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The concept of boundaries or periods are central to historical inquiry. Without the organization of material on the basis of periodization there probably would be little history to speak of.² Periodization initially depends on the subject of the study, which may be delineated in terms of themes, institutions, specific historical epochs, or a com-

² G. Leff, History and Social Theory, (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), p. 143.

ination of the three. Our concern is with historical epochs or periods, although it is partially expressed in terms of an institution or analytical unit (in this case the state).

Periodization entails marking off a series of temporal and spatial divisions.³ The identification of some distinctive element(s) form the framework for periodization. These elements or characteristics are based upon the interaction between the personal interest of the historian, intuition, and a set of assumptions about the historical record, derived deductively, inductively or in combination.

The historian posits, within an identifiable period, a degree of unity which forms a whole. Theoretically, then, one period has little or no relationship to the preceding or succeeding period although the element of historical continuity still exists.⁴ As such, periods are analogous to models or mental constructs. They are arbitrary in the sense that they represent, but do not correspond directly to, empirical entities. As Leff points out, as long as periods are treated as models there is no compulsion to force the evidence to conform to the conceptualization.⁵ These models

³ Periodization does not directly encompass spatial boundaries. However, any historical study, depending on its focus, contains implicit spatial limits.

⁴ R.F. Berkhofer, A Behavioral Approach to History (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 227.

⁵ G. Leff, op. cit., p. 132.

must, however, be developed with regard to the referent phenomena.

The historian rarely outlines in detail the reasons for identifying a period. They are usually evident only through a careful examination of the historical narrative. They occur in statements which refer to elements outside the period in a comparative sense.⁶ Therefore the evidence rather than the propositions or rules are central to periodization in history. Although the implicit criteria(on) could be identified through a detailed examination of historical works, they are generally not directly related to a 'system'.

Historians have generally ignored the system level of analysis in favour of a focus on the individual or the state. This is not to argue that historians do not generate statements about a system. On the contrary, there are numerous examples of system level statements although they are not central in the majority of cases.⁷ The lack of a system level focus in conjunction with the implicit nature of historical periodization dictates a concern for the criteria of system identification in the literature in International

⁶ Leff argues that the underlying comparative nature of historical periodization does not permit casual analysis. Ibid, p. 147.

⁷ For example, L. Dehio's study of European history and the wars against Spanish, French and German hegemony contains 'system' level statements related to the Balance of Power, similar to the mechanistic model in systems theory. See L. Dehio, The Precarious Balance, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1962).

Relations. This literature provides the means by which historical evidence can be applied. In so doing, it is necessary to first examine the abstract conditions of system identification and its application in a major study of an international system.

A system can be defined as "a group of objects or elements standing in some characteristic structural relationship to one another and interacting on the basis of certain characteristic processes."⁸ Young identifies two alternative means to identify a system.⁹ First, a system only exists when the elements reveal a significantly high level of interdependence. This method includes the identification of precise time and space boundaries, inter-subjective agreement, and significant evidence of within system variation. The second means is to regard any set of elements, which seem interesting in research, as a system for the purpose of data collection and analysis. A final decision on the validity of the system is made on completion of the analysis when the evidence legitimates a conclusion.

The differences between these two alternative methods are artificial.¹⁰ Although the former requires a number of dif-

⁸ O. Young, Systems of Political Science, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 15.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰ Young argues that the former method is unable to adequately distinguish between analytic and concrete systems. This problem, questionable at any rate, is irrelevant to our study. Hoffmann's approach dictates an

ficult and potentially arbitrary decisions on criteria and measurement at the outset, the latter also demands a series of similar decisions concerning the type of data. The central question is the need to specify the criteria and evidence for system boundaries at the outset of a study.

The system's literature tends to differentiate between the concepts of change and transformation.¹¹ Change relates to what may be defined as fluctuations around the central tendencies which have served to define the system. Transformation relates to historical periodization in that it posits a fundamental change in these tendencies. System transformation is related to the identification of independent variables which define the structure of the system. Transformations in independent variables (type and/or nature of them) will suffice to transform the system, because they serve to transform the relations between components.¹²

exclusive focus on concrete systems.

¹¹ See O. Young, A Systemic Approach to International Politics, (Princeton: University Press, 1968), pp. 44-49.

¹² Waltz points out three conditions of system transformation; a fundamental change in the organizing principles of the system (eg. from an anarchic to hierarchic system), change in the function of units; and change in the distribution of capabilities (i.e. multipolar to bipolar). The first two conditions relate more to the basic features of international politics and are of little value for system identification as proposed in this study. The third condition is directly related to the basic structural features of any system, and will be dealt with in both this discussion and the next chapter. K. Waltz, op. cit. pp. 100-101.

The importance of identifying systems in time and space stems from the basic impact of the system on the individual actors. This is pointed out by K. Waltz who argues that while writers conceive of the system as a product of its parts, they fail to consider the impact of the system on its parts.¹³ Northedge also points out the need to understand international politics in terms of a system;

International politics form a system in the sense of a 'complex whole', with the implication that these politics add up to something more than the sum of the political actions of the constituent units in the system.¹⁴

System transformation is based on the identification of the salient independent variables (criteria). The validity of their application is based on the empirical or historical evidence. This has two benefits. First, it ensures that the European International System from 1919-1939 can be grounded in inter-disciplinary agreement. Second, it strengthens the value of the criteria for identifying other potential international systems. There is a body of literature, however, which argues against the value of boundaries as applied in this study.

The Correlates of War (COW) project takes a historical developmental approach and identifies an international system from 1815-1965.¹⁵ The authors cite numerous reasons for

¹³ K. Waltz, op. cit., p. 65-67.

¹⁴ F. S. Northedge, The International Political System, (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), p. 22.

this approach. Singer believes that the system remains constant despite the appearance of change within it. He argues that the burden of proof lies with analysts who postulate shorter temporal time spans on the basis of radical change.¹⁶ Wallace argues that the delineation of shorter time span has certain implications for hypothesis testing.¹⁷ First, divisions may be restricted due to problems of evidence. Second, smaller temporal periods restrict the examination of polarity or configurations of nations as variables. A final point against smaller temporal systems relates to its impact on cumulation. Singer states: "How can we combine findings and integrate them in a cumulative fashion if they are based on observations in a 'different' system."¹⁸

Although the Correlates of War project represents a valuable heuristic exercise in the creation and application of quantitative models, its case against smaller temporal systems is unconvincing. First, regardless of temporal span, a researcher must provide an explicit case for a system's

¹⁵ J. David Singer, The Correlates of War I: Research Origins and Rationale, (New York: Free Press, 1959) p. 185.

¹⁶ J. David Singer, M. Small, The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook, (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 15.

¹⁷ M. Wallace, "Clusters of Nations in the Global System 1815-1964", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 19, 1975, pp. 68-69.

¹⁸ J. David Singer, "Tribal Sins on the QIP Reservation", in J.N Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns, (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 171.

boundaries. This case is completely absent from the COW project. Second, the recognition of within-system change should have created an awareness of potential research problems which will affect inferences. For example, their examination of the relationship between alliance commitments and war provides evidence of these problems. They found a negative correlation for the nineteenth century, but a positive correlation for the twentieth century. While this finding may have been partially the result of the applied model, operationalization, and measurement time spans (every 5 years), it also provides tentative evidence of two international systems (at a minimum). Furthermore, the lack of concern for significant change, such as the unification of Germany in 1871, leads one to question the utility of their findings and approach.

Third, the formulation and testing of hypotheses must be related to their proper historical context. While a general hypothesis may provide evidence of a relationship or a temporal boundary, the failure to account for the historical context may result in the formulation and testing of an irrelevant or trivial hypothesis. Fourth, the development and application of models must also be done with reference to the historical environment. While the project did account for changes in industrial resources, as evidenced by moving from coal to iron and steel measures, it did not account for significant changes in military capabilities. For example,

military capabilities changed dramatically with the development of the dreadnought, airpower, and nuclear weapons. Fifth, the potential application of models to identify systems is questionable. Models tend to account for a single index which can only lead to boundaries validated by the model rather than the referent world. Also, different models which examine the same or different phenomena may produce contradictory evidence.

Finally, the failure to specify international systems with reference to the historical record will restrict cumulation. This failure may readily produce invalid inferences which either limit cumulation or lead research in a direction with little payoff. Furthermore, there exists no case for the rejection of an existing body of knowledge (History) as an aid in the identification of temporal divisions.

However, the Correlates of War project does provide a specific set of rules for system membership. These rules are potentially useful because a system's spatial boundaries are determined by its components states. The criteria developed by Singer and Small are based on a state's ability to play a moderately active role in a system.¹⁹ These criteria are; a population of at least 500,000 and the reception of diplomatic missions from any two major powers. Pop-

¹⁹ J. David Singer, M. Small, *op. cit.*, p. 21: The authors also apply membership in an international organization as a criterion. This issue is dealt with at a later point in our discussion of system components.

ulation serves as a rough indicator of a state's activity because it is highly correlated with other elements of state power, and there exists sufficient data for its use. The second criterion, according to the authors, represents a unique measure for composition because it recognizes the key role of major powers.²⁰

There are general and specific problems with these criteria. First, they do not measure a state's activity, but assume that it follows. Second, a state may play an active and vital role in a system, regardless of population, due to its geopolitical position. Third, the reception of diplomatic missions does not mean that a particular state is a member of a wider system. It may only indicate that certain major powers participate in more than one system. For example, the case made by these authors for the independent states of Latin America as members in the European Interwar system violates common sense.

The weakness of the case made by Singer et. al. and our discussion of the abstract nature of historical periodization and system identification is the basis for the following analysis of Interwar Europe as a distinct system. This analysis will examine the linkage of the Interwar system to a larger expanse of time, the components of this system, and its spatial and temporal boundaries. In so doing, the cri-

²⁰ See J. David Singer, M. Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System 1815-1965", World Politics, Volume 18, 1966.

teria which will be applied have utility in identifying other distinct systems in time and space.

2.2 THE COMPONENTS OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS AND THE SPATIAL BOUNDARIES OF INTERWAR EUROPE

It is useful to initially examine the place of this system under the rubric of the modern state system. F.S. Northedge differentiates the modern system from previous systems by noting that;

before the advent of the modern system of independent states, security for the individual state tended to be sought through weakening, and if possible the total overthrow, of hostile states. After the coming of the modern International System, security has tended to be sought through certain means for organizing the world international system as a whole, of which the classical balance of power is one.²¹

Northedge further points out that the pre-conditions for such a change were the perception of states being themselves rather than a part of a whole (Christendom) and the belief that the role of government was the maintenance of the security interests of the sovereign territorial state. He concludes that the origins of the modern state system began in the 16th century and was completed by the acceptance of fragmentation in the 19th century.²²

²¹ Ibid, p. 44.

²² Northedge also discusses and criticizes Hinsley's view that this process concluded with the collapse of Napoleon's attempt at continental hegemony, Ibid, pp. 51-64. See F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, (Cambridge: University Press, 1963).

It is generally held by historians and international relations scholars that the Treaty of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), marked the birth of the modern state system. This treaty embodied the concept of sovereignty and the widespread recognition of the existence of multiple states. Although the acceptance of fragmentation was completed by the 18th century, the process has been a constant and basic feature of international politics. This has been shown by the steady proliferation of states up to and including the present. This process, however, has not been constant. The 19th century witnessed the decline within Europe of fragmentation, and the rise of empires, as shown by the emergence of Germany and Italy from the numerous smaller petty states of Europe.

The decision to focus on the state as the central component of the system is supported by elements of the 'realist' paradigm. The exclusion of non-state actors, specifically the League of Nations, is based on two considerations related to the paradigm. First, as compared to states, the League did not have the capabilities to participate in system relationships. Specifically, it lacked the authority and capability to participate in the major phenomenon of international politics: war. Second, the League was itself a manifestation of the relationships between states or more specifically of each individual states' policy.²³ It was a

²³ This view of international organization provides a basis for its examination as a reflector of the system. For

product of system relationships rather than an independent initiator or active participant.²⁴

The centrality of the state in boundary definition is affected by certain characteristics of the international system and international politics. Aron points out that a basic characteristic of a system is oligopoly. System oligopoly is defined as the condition where "the principal actors have determined the system more than they have been determined by it."²⁵ This characteristic reflects the dominance of the Great Powers in the literature. According to Taylor:

The Great Powers were, as their name implies, organizations for power, that is in the last resort war. They might have other objects --- the welfare of their inhabitants on the grandeur of their rulers. But the basic test for them as Great

information on the relationship of International Organizations to an International System, see: S. Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System", International Organization, Volume 24, 1970; W. F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems", In Falk and Hanrieder, eds., International Law and Organization, (Philadelphia: W.B.Lippencott, 1968); and Chadwick F. Alger, "The Researcher in the United Nations: Evolution of a Research Strategy", in J.N. Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1979).

²⁴ There is also little value in applying it as a membership criterion. The specific composition of the League through the period is inconsistent with the system. For example for certain lengths of time Germany and Soviet Russia were not members. There are also problems with the use of this criterion for the pre-1914 system(s) because such an organization did not exist. Finally, its value in the post 1945 era is limited by the fact of incongruency in membership, for example the People's Republic of China from 1950-1971.

²⁵ R. Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Rela-

Powers was their ability to wage warthe difference between the Great Powers was much less than that between any of them and the strongest of the smaller states. The test of a Great Power is then the test of strength for war.²⁶

Bull presents three qualitative distinctions which serve to define Great Powers.²⁷ They are: the existence of two or more states that are comparable in stature; they are in the first rank in military strength; and they are recognized by others as having special rights and duties. Quantitative measures of Great Powers also stress the importance of military capabilities.²⁸ The inclusion of economic/development categories in these measures reflect their important influence on an actor's military capabilities. From this basis, we can examine Great Power membership in the Interwar system.

The literature identifies seven Great Powers for the period. They were the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Germany, the U.S.S.R., and Italy. We will first examine the two non-European powers in order to clarify the spatial issue. The emergence of these two states to the status of Great Powers may be attributed to their success in

tions, (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 95.

²⁶ A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford: UnOxford University Press, 1954), p. XXIV.

²⁷ H. Bull, op. cit., pp. 200-202.

²⁸ See W. Ferris, The Power Capabilities of Nation-States, (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1973); M. Wallace, War and Rank Among Nations, (London: D.C. Heath, 1973).

war. The United States by virtue of her victory over Spain (1898) and the key role played in the Allied victory in World War I was recognized as a Great Power. The emergence of Japan as a Great Power resulted from her defeat of China (1895), and Russia (1904-1905).²⁹ Japan also participated in the First World War, albeit restricted to the seizure of German colonies in the Far East. Therefore it is clear that these two states had the ability to play an active role in the politics of the system.

The issue is whether this was the case. Aron defines a system as "an ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular relations with each other and are capable of being implicated in a generalized war."³⁰ He points out that politico-military participation is the most important aspect in defining membership.³¹ Politico-military participation does not necessarily mean the existence of a specific commitment in the sense of an alliance. It relates more directly to the existence of a tacit understanding, at a minimum, which clearly embodies some form of commitment to security issues directly related to a specific region and/or actor contained therein (in this case Europe). These two powers clearly fail to meet this criteria.

²⁹ Japanese status was also enhanced by her alliance with Great Britain (1902).

³⁰ R. Aron, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 95.

Even though Britain and France desired active American participation in post World War I affairs, the United States rejected any such commitment.³² Furthermore, American policies did not provide evidence that the United States was a system member in politico-military terms. The American divorce from Europe, politically, militarily, and spiritually, was revealed by her refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty because of the articles related to the League which included an American commitment to collective security.³³ These policies culminated in the unilateral American enunciation of neutrality in 1935. This factor was reinforced by the perception in the United States that the Pacific, not the Atlantic, was of primary concern.³⁴ For example, the Washington Conference on Naval disarmament was concerned almost entirely with issues in the Pacific (although it did expand to encompass France and Italy).

³² A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of The Second World War, (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 56.

³³ The issues as they arose in the United States are discussed by D.M. Smith, "Robert Lansing 1915-1920", and J. Vinson, "Charles Evans Hughes 1921-1925", in N.A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

³⁴ A.A. Offner, The Origins of the Second World War: American Foreign Policy and World Policy 1917-1941, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 116. American participation in the European war in 1941 directly resulted from the German declaration of war, not the reverse.

The United States did participate in the system in the reparations issue, and in the various disarmament talks which culminated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. American participation in the former issue was conditioned, however, by the inter-relationship of German reparation payments to outstanding debts of the Allied powers owed to the United States, a product of World War I. Furthermore, the United States attempted to take an unofficial posture in relation to the negotiations on reparations.³⁵ American participation in the disarmament talks was conditioned by the desire to ensure that the United States did not become committed to any security relationship with Europe. The American refusal to become involved in an overt sense in the European system was the result of the strong current of isolationism in the U.S., and its resultant liability to players in the American domestic arena. Therefore it seems clear, given the conditions outlined, that the United States was a peripheral power, albeit with the ability to participate, but lacking the will to do so.

A similar case may be made for Japan. Japanese policies directly influenced the European actors, primarily Great Britain and Soviet Russia. But the interaction between Europe and Japan was conditioned by issues in the Far East, not Europe in a direct sense. These issues related to the

³⁵ American participation was led by private businessmen rather than officials of the United States government. N.A. Graebner, op. cit., p. 144

Japanese threat to Great Britain's imperial position in Asia, and the Japanese dispute with Russia over the Chinese (Manchurian) question which would lead to major border clashes in 1937-1938. Therefore Japan focused directly upon security concerns in the Far East with little if any concern for the problems of Europe. Japanese participation in the Anti-Comintern pact with Germany and Italy, which resembled a security relationship, did not result in any co-ordination of policy between the adherents.³⁶ It did not result in Japanese participation in the European war in 1939, or in the attack on Soviet Russia in 1941, the target state of the pact. Finally, the Japanese issued in 1934 a statement on her special role in East Asia similar to the American Monroe doctrine.³⁷ Therefore the evidence points to Japan as periphery actor in the European system. Certainly events in Europe affected Japanese policy and vice-versa. But there is no strong case for membership due to the lack of Japanese participation directly into European security affairs.

It is also necessary to specify the physical boundaries of the system and its remaining members. The physical boundaries of the Interwar system are determined by geography and tradition.³⁸ Geographical position serves to identi-

³⁶ A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit. pp. 145-146.

³⁷ E.H. Carr, International Relations Since the Peace Treaty, (London: MacMillan & Co., 1945), p. 243.

³⁸ The importance of geography to international politics has a long tradition under the rubric of geo-politics. It has also been important in studies of international re-

fy the primary security concerns and requirements of a state. The centrality of geographical position may be limited due to technology (Nuclear Weapons), but, by and large, it remains central. Wright states that:

The importance of geography has been reduced by modern inventions, decreasing the time of travel, transport, and communication, but the significance of geography with respect to cultural distinctiveness, military strategy, political interests, and public administration is likely to continue indefinitely. There will continue to be nationalities giving distinctiveness to areas whose population has cultural characteristics and historic memories in common. The military action of states will continue to be most effective in regions within or just outside of their frontiers.³⁹

The prominent exception to this factor would be the Great Powers outside of geographical Europe, which have already been dealt with. The remaining independent states, outside of geographic Europe, were unable to play a role in the politics of the continent.

The role of geography is reinforced by the historical traditions of Europe as the center of civilization. John Herz makes the connection between these two elements in his discussion of the territorial nature of states:

gions and sub-systems. For an outline of the development of this area of research in International Relations see J.E. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., op. cit., pp. 54-79; L.J. Cantori, S.L. Spiegel, The International Relations of Regions, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970); and M. Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia." in J.N. Rosenau, op. cit.

³⁹ O. Wright, A Study of War, (Chicago: University Press, 1964), p. 418.

Forming a comparatively pacified whole, Europe was set off sharply against the world outside, a world beyond these lives which by common agreement separated a community based on territoriality and common heritage from anarchy, where the law of nature reigned supreme and no standards of civilization applied.⁴⁰

Herz refers specifically to pre-twentieth century Europe, but the concept of a European community distinct from the remaining world in the Interwar period is still valid. Even the rise of ideology in the Interwar period does not necessarily preclude the validity of a European community delineated by its geographical boundaries. Despite Soviet Russia's anti-capitalist disposition, Europe still represented the center of Soviet concerns and goals, and was the birthplace of her ideological rationale. Furthermore, it is evident that a large portion of the American rationale for isolationism was the product not only of geographical distance, but of a political and cultural distance as well.

Our final concern regarding spatial boundaries is the status of colonial actors. Colonial actors are the dependencies of European states in the peripheries. Their exclusion can be initially based on their failure to meet the criterion of sovereignty. The issue however relates to the potential impact of the resources represented by these colonies. For example, resources such as manpower and raw materials could have a direct impact on the distribution of

⁴⁰ J. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State". World Politics, Volume 9, 1957, p.481.

capabilities in the European system itself. Conversely, these dependencies could represent a drain on the resources of the metropolitan powers. There is also the unique position of those states in the British Commonwealth which were granted independence by the Statute of Westminster (1931). The cultural and political bonds between these states and Great Britain facilitated their participation in World War II.

This study excludes these actors from the system for three reasons. First, the determination of their positive or negative impact on the system is extremely complex. Second, our focus is primarily on Europe and a concern for the impact of these states would entail an examination of the relationships between Europe and other systems (such as the Far East). Third, the linkages and inter-relationship of this system and its environment eventually must be addressed in order to fully depict the European system. However, this task is beyond the scope of this initial study.

The preceding discussion fulfills the major requirements of our study. First, it provides three criteria for the delineation of a system's spatial boundaries. They are the existence of some form of security commitment from a non-European power to an actor in the region, or the geographic position of a state within a physical region reinforced by a modicum of historical tradition. Second, it specifies the spatial boundaries of the Interwar international system as

restricted to geographic Europe. The following table lists the members of our system.

SYSTEM MEMBERS 1919-1939

Albania	Finland	Norway
Austria	Germany	Poland
Belgium	Great Britain	Portugal
Bulgaria	Greece	Rumania
Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Spain
Denmark	Italy	Sweden
Eire	Latvia	Turkey
Estonia	Lithuania	USSR
France	Netherlands	Yugoslavia

2.3 TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES AND THE INTERWAR SYSTEM

The case for the temporal boundaries of 1919-1939 evolves from the status of war in the field of International Relations and in Great Power identification. First, within the field, several studies have linked systemic attributes to war propensity among states, particularly the Great Powers.⁴¹ Second, war has a direct impact on the nature of subsequent system relationships which result from structural changes.

There are numerous types of war identified in the literature. Given our spatial boundaries, it is necessary only to deal with two general types of inter-state war: limited and systemic. A limited war may be defined as one in which not all the Great Powers are participants and in which the goals of the participants can be satisfied short of unconditional surrender. They may include wars of territorial adjustment in which the whole system does not participate for example. Systemic war is defined as one in which all the Great Powers are participants and the goals of the participants are essentially total.

⁴¹ A prominent example is the balance versus preponderance of power debate on the likelihood of war. For example see, A.F.K. Organski and J. Kugler, The War Ledger. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). For a critical analysis of the state of the empirical literature in this area see. R.M. Siverson, and M.P. Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War", Journal of Conflict Resolution. Volume 27, 1983.

The very nature of systemic war suggests the role it plays in system transformation and this role is evident in the case of Interwar Europe. For example, in writing on the relationship between World War I and system building, George and Craig state:

The war of 1914-1918 had far exceeded the conflicts of the nineteenth century in duration and ferocity, and in another sense it was revolutionary.....indeed there were really no non-combatants in this war, and the suffering of civilian populations was greater than it had been since the horrors of the Thirty Years War. That war, as we have seen, started as a religious conflict and ended as a political one. One could say of the First World War that it marked a reversal of that process, beginning as a political conflict and ending as a religious one.⁴²

The role of systemic war in system transformation can be specified by three criteria: dominant issues; dominant military thought and technology; and the composition of the Great Powers. Dominant issues refer to the locus and number of security concerns prevalent at any particular time for the life of a system. For example, after the Napoleonic Wars, the issue of revolution and its relationship to war serves as the dominant issue for that system. The emergence of a new dominant issue in form and/or substance, therefore reflects the status of systemic war as an engine of system transformation.

⁴² A. George, C. Craig, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, (Oxford: University Press, 1983), p. 50.

The European Interwar system was primarily dominated by the German problem. Although Germany was a major concern in pre-World War I Europe, Taylor points out that the problem is qualitatively different after 1918:

"The History of Europe between the wars revolved around 'the German problem.' If this were settled everything would be settled; if it remained unsolved, Europe would not know peace....This was new. The problem of German strength had existed before 1914, although not fully recognized; but there had been other problems --- Russia's desire for Constantinople; French desire for Alsace-Lorraine; Austria-Hungary; the endless troubles in the Balkans. Now there was nothing of any moment except the position of Germany."⁴³

In the post-World War II era, international politics is dominated by the issue of the American-Russian struggle. This issue has had a major impact on the discipline itself. Many of the key concepts in the discipline were reformulated or generated as a result of this struggle. The ideas of bipolarity and deterrence theory are simply two illustrations of the conceptual shifts.

However, in both cases the concept of dominant issue has certain limitations. It is a relatively narrow focus which overlooks other potential key concerns as exemplified by the problem of Bolshevik Russia. The relative ranking of the German problem also is the product of its importance in the literature on the Interwar period as a whole. Therefore, the criterion is unable to justify a transformation by itself.

⁴³ A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 66.

The second criterion reflects the vital importance of military factors and contains two sub-categories: military technology, and strategic thought. Both elements generally witness some modicum of change due to systemic war. Technological change, inclusive of tactical change in the conduct of war, is a relatively constant feature of systemic war. This change includes not only the emergence of new technology, which is not always the case, but also the development of novel applications of existing technology during or immediately following a war. Numerous technological changes emerged out of World War I. Two prominent developments were the tank and aircraft. The tank represented the means to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare. Its value, however, was only recognized by a few, and they were essentially concentrated within the German military.

In contrast, the influence of aircraft or airpower was recognized by the majority of European powers. During the Interwar period, theorists laid the foundation for deterrence theory in the nuclear age.⁴⁴ It is clear that airpower in the Interwar period lacked the ability to perform as it does in the nuclear age; nonetheless it became a major concern for decision-makers. For example, Slessor wrote;

⁴⁴ Their writings included analysis of such concepts as counterforce and countervalue targeting, and first and second strike forces. See R. Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain 1918-1939, (Rutgers: University Press, 1966), Barry Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule, (London: Croom-Helm, 1976), and G.H. Questor, Deterrence Before Hiroshima, (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1966).

Air power did indeed have a decisive effect in 1938. It was above all, the 'thug with the bomber force' as someone called him at the time, that caused our bloodless defeat at Munich. . . ⁴⁵

While this exaggerates the decisiveness of airpower during the period, the fact that domestic populations would no longer be immune from war and the ensuing perceptions of its impact upon civilian morale had an influence on relationships.

The appearance of nuclear weapons, their development by the two superpowers, and their subsequent proliferation among three other states are well known aspects of post 1945 politics. The acceptance of deterrence theory and its subsequent impact on strategic doctrines have changed actor perceptions on the relationship of war to policy. The impact of technological change also caused a reassessment of strategic and political policy.

Strategy in the Interwar system was directly influenced by the presumed lessons of World War I which in turn affected the policies of the powers. The major lesson was the belief in the paramountcy of defence over offence. Questor points out the implications of these perceptions on the system.

The renewal of the defensive might have seemed a powerful reinforcement again for a continental balance of power system, the system that had generally prevented European hegemony and often maintained peace. A war such as World War I would

⁴⁵ Cited in Barry Powers, op. cit., p. 235.

become much less likely if no one expected victory for whoever struck first. Dividing alliances would now be unnecessary and even undesirable, since decisions on intervention could be held back for a longer period of reflection; in a partial return to a balance of power posture. Britain thus now declined to maintain a commitment to the defense of France, after the United States on somewhat different reasoning had also reneged on promises of alliances with the French.⁴⁶

The perceived paramountcy of the defence led to a reliance upon the construction of major defensive fortifications such as the Maginot Line. It was also revealed in the various disarmament conferences which bogged down over the issue of defining defensive versus offensive weapon systems. Therefore the images imparted to war from the conflict of 1914-1918 played a role in defining the uniqueness of the system. These included not only perceptions but also the development of new technology. The results of World War II were qualitatively different. These led to perceptions of the need for alliance systems to balance the threat posed by blitzkrieg warfare, as well as airpower and submarines.

These lessons are manifested in comparatively unique political relationships between the pre-1914 system, the Interwar system,, and the post-1945 system. Prior to 1914, Europe was divided into two camps: the Entente consisting of Britain, France, and Russia; and the Triple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. During the Interwar period, the only alliance between Great Powers con-

⁴⁶ G. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1977), p. 120.

sisted of France and Russia (1935-38), and this alliance was relatively worthless. In the post-1945 system, the bipolar relationship between Russia and the United States was reinforced by the rigid alliance systems of the Warsaw Pact and NATO respectively.

The final criterion which emerges from systemic war is changes in the composition of the Great Powers. This change may include a change in the number of and/or specific makeup of Great Powers. The importance of this criterion is evident in the existing literature. Specifically, changes in the number of Great Powers are believed to influence the conditions and propensities for war among the Powers. This is manifested in the literature in terms of the relationship between polarity (eg. number of Great Powers) and system stability.⁴⁷ Systemic war represents the major means by which actors rise and fall from the status of Great Powers.

The pre-1914 European system contained five Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Russia) and is referred to as the classical Balance of Power or Multi-polar system.⁴⁸ Following World War I, the total number

⁴⁷ For the various sides of the debate see K. Deustch and J. David Singer, "Multi-Polar Power Systems and International Stability"; K. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force and the Balance of World Power; and R. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future", in J.N. Rosenau, ed., 'International Politics and Foreign Policy,' (New York: Free Press, 1969).

⁴⁸ Italy is generally seen as a state seeking such status but lacking the capabilities and recognition prior to 1914.

of Great Powers remained constant; Austro-Hungary's place among the Great Powers being filled by Italy. At the conclusion of World War II only two states could generally claim the status of Great Power (U.S.A. and Soviet Russia). Although Britain and France had some of the attributes of Great Powers, for example their status as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and their role as occupying Powers, their capabilities were greatly exceeded by that of the Superpowers. The system had been transformed to a bipolar type.

Although the Interwar system was multipolar, the fact that the specific makeup of the Great Powers changed legitimizes our conception of system transformation.⁴⁹ The number of Powers may remain constant, but if one of the Powers collapses and is replaced by a new Power, the system has undergone a transformation. The centrality of the state and the importance of the Great Powers serves to reinforce this reasoning. Each independent state in a system has unique requirements which are to be satisfied within its environment. Therefore the ascension of a new state to Great Power status serves to change some existing relationships because of its attempt to satisfy these relatively unique needs.

⁴⁹ Many historians would argue that only Great Britain and France were actual Great Powers in the Twenties because of restrictions on Germany and the weakness of the U.S.S.R. after the revolution and civil war. The issue of actual power will be addressed in the next chapter. I have argued for a multipolar system, and the position is in general agreement with the literature as a whole.

These requirements will have a direct impact on the nature of the system.

The preceding discussion of the relationship of war to system transformation provides comparative evidence concerning Interwar Europe as a distinct international system. This argument also has utility for defining other international systems in time. For example, the post 1815 European system can also be defined on the basis of these factors. Although we have limited the analysis to systemic war, it is also possible to apply the criteria using limited war. For example, the limited European wars in the nineteenth century (the Crimean, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian wars) provide evidence of system transformation. Following 1871, essential actor transformation occurred with the emergence of Germany, an alliance system, as well as the strategic significance of railways.

Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to address the standard periodization applied by historians to this era. Historians have largely divided the era into two periods demarcated by the ascension of Hitler to power. The fundamental reason for this division stems from the causal relationship between Hitler and war in 1939. Although this relationship is disputed by Taylor, our concern is with the abstract utility of this division for system identification.

This division can be identified within the relevant system's literature as the concept of regime change.⁵⁰ However, there are several difficulties with this criterion for system identification. The regime change may be a regressive step to a previous type of domestic system.⁵¹ Furthermore, numerous regime changes, as occurred in France during the nineteenth century, do not validate the division of that system into several small and inconsequential parts. Finally, the concept of regime change is not consistent with the system focus. Although regime change within a Great Power may affect behavior of the system's components, it is more useful to mark it as a condition of within-system change, rather than system transformation.

⁵⁰ Aron argues that a regime change in one of the Great Powers will result in change in style and sometimes the course of international politics. op. cit., p. 95; The concept of regime has been applied in the recent literature on complex interdependence. For its meaning in that context, see J.S. Nye and R.O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1977).

⁵¹ Also, a regime change may have little effect on policy and on the system as a whole. It has been argued that this was the case for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. For example, Taylor argues that Hitler was not unique in German politics, op. cit. Writers have identified a strong element of continuity, domestically and internationally, between Tsarist and Soviet Russia. See I.J. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, (Yale: University Press, 1962).

2.4 CONCLUSION:

The preceding division has identified the abstract nature of boundaries in History and international systems, and has made the case for a distinct system spatially defined by geographic Europe, and temporally defined by the period 1919-1939. In so doing, it has identified a set of criteria which are potentially applicable to other international systems. These criteria fulfill the basic task identified by Hoffmann as being necessary to theory construction in the field of International Relations.

The identification of spatial boundaries is based on three criteria. First, Great Power membership is defined by the willingness of states to participate in system security relationships or the inability to withdraw from system security issues due to geographic location. Second, membership is defined on the basis of a state's geographical position which is directly related to the concept of generalizable war. Finally, an historical tradition or community reinforces the general boundaries of the system.

Temporal boundaries are identified by the appearance of systemic war. Systemic war results in changes on three criteria; dominant issues, military thought and technology, and changes in the composition of Great Powers. Our analysis reveals evidence of a unique set of conditions operating during the period which validate its treatment as a distinct international system.

This discussion, as a whole, provides the basis for our analysis of the structure and behavior of the Interwar European international system. Also, our brief discussion of structure in this chapter provides the basis for a detailed analysis of within-system change. Assumptions related to the multipolar structure of Interwar Europe will be examined in order to trace the specific structural evolution of the system. It is to this task we now turn.

Chapter III

THE STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE SYSTEM

The preceding discussion examined the issues of system identification. In so doing, the international system is defined within the geographical limits of Europe between the years 1919 and 1939. This chapter will identify and categorize elements of system structure. In Hoffmann's terms, this is a necessary step towards the complete description of this system. Such a description provides a strong basis for future explanatory analysis. Finally, the methods used in this chapter can also be applied to other international systems, thereby enhancing the potential for theory development.

The basic thrust of this chapter is the establishment of measures of system structure and their application to the Interwar system. The identification of system structure has certain benefits for future studies. The structure of a system provides the most general or macro setting in which individual actors or states carry out policy. The observation of structure at numerous points in time facilitates the examination of within-system change. Structural variance provides refinement of the descriptive elements of the system by indicating how actors responded to factors or issues and concerns. Finally, any measure of structure entails an

examination of actor behavior because it is the individual actors which provide the relevant data. However, such an analysis does not explain how or why any single state behaved in any given circumstance. It only provides a macro indication of the system's behavior as a whole.

Structure is defined as the arrangement or positioning of system actors in relation to each other. This chapter measures three aspects or categories of a system's structure; hierarchy, political commitments, and economic interaction or trade. The first section examines the abstract nature of structure as it has been used in the relevant literature. The final three sections represent each of the three aspects of structure. System hierarchy is based on the distribution of capabilities or power in the system. Political commitments are the various types of arrangements, such as alliances, nonaggression pacts, and ententes, which actors engage in. Finally, economic interaction is a measure of trade concentration which serves to identify system behavior and change in this area.

3.1 SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR

The fundamental structural element is based on the number of Great Powers and measured by the distribution of capabilities among the system's actors as a whole. The distribution of capabilities, according to Waltz, enables one to distinguish between functionally similar units according to

their capability to perform tasks.¹ This differentiation, consistent with Bull's definition of a Great Power, may be measured by comparing state attributes or the power capabilities of states.² Power capabilities, although a state attribute, do not contradict the level of analysis as long as estimates or measures are comparative.³ The distribution of capabilities enables one to distinguish between classes of actors.⁴ These classes of actors represent a system's hierarchy. Also, the measurement of power capabilities over time permits one to examine variation in the structure or hierarchy.

Hierarchy is the ranking of units in a system on the basis of an aggregate score of individual unit capabilities. Measures of power traditionally encompass demographic, economic and military indicators which roughly represent an actor's ability to survive, wage war, and to influence and participate in international issues.⁵ The general tendency

¹ K. Waltz, op. cit., p. 97; see also M. Wallace, War and Rank Among Nations (London: D. C. Heath, 1973).

² Bull's definition of a Great Power points out their special responsibilities and duties in international politics, H. Bull, op. cit., p. 202.

³ K. Waltz, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

⁴ There are numerous terms applied in the literature used in the same sense as the distribution of capabilities. For example, Aron uses the 'configuration of relations' and Brecher uses 'configuration of power' in the same sense. R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 97-98 and M. Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia" in J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 158.

in the literature is to identify categories or classes of actors such as Great Powers, Middle or Secondary Powers, and Lesser Powers. The specific demarcation points between these classes are, however, rarely identified. They generally result from qualitative ranking instead.⁶

The concept of status is also used in a manner which closely relates it to hierarchy. Wallace notes that the use of this concept in International Politics is largely the product of attempts to apply sociological theories. He points out, however, that this concept and these theories must undergo a transformation to be useful in the context of international politics. This transformation is required because status at the international level is more "analogous to a pecking order rather than status relationships between individuals and groups in human societies."⁷

Wallace argues that the traditional measure of status is difference of power capabilities between states. However, he believes that power is an oversimplification which produces a single ranking of units, when in actuality, states do not have a single status but a status set.⁸ Wallace provides four reasons for his assertions.⁹ First, unit rankings will

⁵ K. Deutsch cited in M. Wallace, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶ Ibid, p. 4.

⁷ Ibid, p. 4.

⁸ Ibid p. 6.

⁹ Ibid, p. 5. This critique of power is echoed in tradition-

vary from geographic area to area. Second, unit rankings are different depending on the issue area. Third, capabilities do not necessarily equate to influence. Finally, factors such as a nation's social and political organization, which are part of a nation's attractiveness or status, cannot be subsumed within the concept of power.

Wallace's critique of status measured strictly by power is inconsistent with the basic thrust of system research. First, the basic thrust of theoretical research concerns the relationship between structure and systemic war. As a result, non-capability factors are largely irrelevant. For example, individual states concerned with the breakdown of system equilibrium or balance will align with states having dissimilar social or political attributes to redress this breakdown.¹⁰ Second, attempts to extend the basic properties of the system focus often involve differentiations of status regionally or in different issue areas. Different rankings in geographic areas may reflect actor membership in other systems, or they may reflect a specific analysis of a subset or subsystem of the international system. A high capability actor may rank low in certain issue areas because these issues are extra-systemic and/or largely peripheral to central security concerns.

al criticism's of the concept in the field.

¹⁰ Aron points out that the concern for equilibrium is one of the conditions for alliance formation exemplified by British policy. Ibid, p. 98.

Third, influence on security issues is by and large a direct product of capabilities.¹¹ Actors with relatively low capabilities exercise influence in dominant security issues only at the sufferance of the dominant actors. Fourth, the inclusion of non-power facets of status such as ideology and leadership, although important for the understanding and explanation of international politics as a whole, are questionable in relation to the influence of structure on actor behavior. For example, it is unclear whether or not the influence of the post-1945 bipolar structure would alter if the actors antagonistic ideologies were complementary. Finally, the widening of status measures is the product of the aforementioned attempt to apply sociological theories to the field. This widening is necessary to examine such theories as status inconsistency.¹² Wallace's position, therefore, is the product of a different research interest beyond the traditional application of structure as used in this study. The concept of status, therefore, will be avoided in this study, and hierarchy will be used.

¹¹ M. Wallace, op. cit., p. 6.

¹² Wallace discusses at length different measures of status. For example, he identifies 'achieved' status measured by capabilities; 'ascribed' status as determined by the comity of nations; 'societal' status as measured by how resources are used for the collective welfare of the nation; and 'attribute' status as the goals through which states seek status such as colonies. Ibid, pp. 14-17.

A system can be characterized by the nature of and change in its hierarchy. It is appropriate to review some points of contention which affect the treatment of this concept in the literature. These include: 1) the conceptual overlap between hierarchy and polarity; 2) the identification and treatment of vertical and horizontal conceptions of system structure; 3) the relationship between the time intervals used to collect observations of system structure and inferences made concerning that structure.

The polarity of a system is based on the distribution of capabilities and is generally equivalent to the number of Great powers.¹³ In this sense, polarity categorizes the system according to the number of members contained in the system's upper class (i.e. Great Powers). This view, however, is contrasted by definitions of polarity based on clusters of states. Haas, for example, defines polarity on the basis of the number of "militarily" significant clusters of units within an international area."¹⁴ A significant cluster of

¹³ Although the literature specifies two power (bipolar), and three (tripolar) systems, there is generally no differentiation between a four or four-plus actor system. These systems are uniformly defined as multipolar. However, I believe that, at a minimum, a distinction between a four and five power system should be made. For example, one would expect the greater probability of a balancer state in a five-power than four-power system. This study will specifically identify the number of poles in the Interwar system rather than rely on the concept of multipolarity.

¹⁴ M. Haas, "International Sub-Systems: Stability and Polarity, American Political Science Review, Volume 64, 1970, p. 99.

units in this context refers not only to the Great Powers, but also to units established by formal commitments between states. The problem with specifying system polarity on this later basis is threefold.

First, a commitment between actors contains conditional clauses which may limit its applicable scope, and therefore may not be valid for a system as a whole. Second, it is not clear that a commitment legitimizes or directly entails the aggregation of member capabilities. For example, the aggregated capabilities of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia) during the Interwar period would put this cluster into the lower ranks of the Great Powers.¹⁵ However, there is no evidence of the grouping being treated, or acting as a Great Power.¹⁶ Finally, the nature of commitments are indeed structural aspects of the system, and they are of sufficient importance to merit separate treatment. For example, one might compare the fluid relationships in the eighteenth century to the rigid relationship prior to World War I.¹⁷ In conclusion, the aggregation of two powers

¹⁵ For example, our calculation of composite capability shares for these three states in 1931 is 7.5%, only marginally less than Italy. See Table 1 which follows.

¹⁶ Kann points out that some of the framers of Versailles in 1919 saw the Little Entente as a replacement for Austria-Hungary. This illusion was rapidly realized shortly thereafter. R.A. Kann, "The Defeat of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the European Balance of Power," Central European History, Volume II, 1969, p. 243.

¹⁷ Polarity, in the former sense, has been part of an existing debate on the relationship between polarity and stability. It surrounds the issue of whether one particular

into a description of system polarity should be used with great caution and only in circumstances where it is clear that the two powers can be treated as one.¹⁸

The ranking of actors according to capability measures is defined by Ray as representing the vertical dimension of the system.¹⁹ He argues that this dimension is comparative in nature because the rank of any individual actor depends on the scores of all other actors. He also identifies a horizontal dimension of a international system structure, defined in terms of the linkages between states. This later dimension is measured by the type of political, economic, or social bonds between states. It permits one to identify the dominant type of linkages, change in type and number of linkages, and the relationship between hierarchy, average system capabilities, and political/economic linkages.

However, even in Ray's analysis there is ambiguity with respect to the application of horizontal or vertical measures to system structure. For example, according to Ray,

type of polarity is more stable than another. For the various sides of the debate see: K.W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", and K. Waltz, "National Force and the Balance of World Power", and R. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future" in J.N. Rosenau, *op. cit.*, For an analysis of the debate see J.J. Weltman, *op. cit.*.

¹⁸ An example of this is provided in the concluding chapter when the Anglo-French relationship in the late Thirties is briefly dealt with.

¹⁹ J.H. Ray, "The Measurement of System Structure", in J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War II*, (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 32.

military power can provide a description of the horizontal structure of a system in terms of power concentration. Normally, military power is used as a measure of vertical structure. Further, power concentration tells one nothing about linkages or clusters in the system. Conversely, linkages provide only one perspective of system structure.²⁰

This brief discussion leads to the conclusion that it is useful to maintain the sense of vertical and horizontal system structure and to do so in a manner which treats the properties of each separately. Both dimensions are consistent with our general definition of structure as the arrangement or positioning of system actors. In so doing, the observation of structure at yearly intervals enables one to describe within-system change.²¹ This study will measure system structure for the years 1920-1938. The exclusion of the initial year (1919) and final (1939) year of the system results from their proximity to war and the lack of avail-

²⁰ One confronts a similar problem with trade, the second linkage measure used in this study. A state's status may in part be determined by the absolute level of goods in which it trades: for example in terms of total volume, type, and trade pattern. But it is questionable whether a large volume, or evenly distributed trade is evidence of a high ranking. First, any indicator of a state's place in the hierarchy will include economic capabilities because of their relationship to war fighting capabilities. Second, hierarchy on the basis of trade does not provide a clear method for making ranking decisions.

²¹ It should be noted that the use of any time interval for measurement will have implications for inferences. W. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Re-Considered" Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 6, 1973, p. 509.

able data at this time.

3.2 SYSTEM HIERARCHY AND THE CENTRAL TENDENCY OF THE SYSTEM

The identification of system hierarchy is based on state capabilities. The centrality of capabilities to the measurement of hierarchy turns on three considerations. First, capabilities provide an indication of the relative ability of states to engage in war. Second, capabilities roughly indicate a state's capacity to exercise influence.²² Finally, actors may employ their relative capability in relation to other states as a means of identifying potential threats.²³

Power or capability measures are often divided into three categories: demographic, military, and industrial. Demographic indicators generally include measures of total population as well as measures of demographic structure, such as urban/rural population, age/sex groupings, and/or work force. They can be measured individually or in some combination.

²² The measurement of capabilities does not provide an indication of the amount of influence a state will exercise, or the willingness to exercise power in the system. This element would entail a more detailed examination of this system based upon the foundation created here.

²³ J. David Singer, S. Bremer, and J. Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War 1816-1965", in B. Russett, ed., Peace War and Numbers, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 21-23.

Military indicators include measures of force size in terms of standing forces, mobilizable forces, or levels of training (reserves vs. professionals). They may also reflect variation in military development, for example the number and type of munitions available to each actor. Third, they can be sub-divided in terms of the various elements of the armed forces: army, navy, and air force. Finally military indicators may include measures of the extent of support received by the armed forces from the government. Common measures include the ratio of military spending to total state expenditure, or to the total production of goods (GNP).

Industrial indicators are measures of the level of economic development of the state. They may be based upon a breakdown of the type of goods produced, agricultural/industrial, or on a more detailed sectoral classification such as primary, secondary and tertiary. One may also examine a specific type of goods, such as crude steel production. Indicators may also be based on a measure of energy consumption which may take into account consumption of pre-modern and modern fuels. Finally, consumption itself can be sub-divided into civilian and business components.

These three types of indicators are highly interdependent, although it is analytically useful to treat them individually. The three together provide a composite measure of relative state power or capabilities. They provide evidence

of the nature and amount of capabilities available to states, but they do not measure the ways in which such power may or can be applied in relations with other states. While it is true that they do become considerations not only for each actor in terms of its own capabilities, but for actors and their decision-makers in terms of available options in relation to other actors or targets of policy, the manner in which they do so is beyond the purview of the thesis.

There are certain limitations regarding these indicators as well as the wide range of potential indicators which are available or have been applied in other studies.²⁴ First, many indicators are used simply due to problems with available data. Second, there are no clear rules as to which set of indicators is most appropriate for measuring power and structure. Any single or set of indicators only approximates a state's power, and different indicators may produce different results.²⁵ Third, one must attempt to balance the relative merits of focusing on actual power, such as military force strength, and potential power, such as iron and steel production. In this context, a state may rank high in immediate or actual power, but low in terms of potential

²⁴ The wide range of indicators available are evident in Siverson and Sullivan's analysis of the distribution of power literature. See R.M. Siverson and M.P. Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 27, 1983.

²⁵ Further research into this area would benefit from the application of several different models of power as a means to enhance conclusions.

power. The use of a composite power score, as outlined below for this study, may create highly debateable results. Finally, such indicators ignore many non-quantifiable elements which are vital to a state's ability to influence other actors and wage war. These include such elements as moral, leadership, and efficiency.

Despite these concerns, there exists strong inter-subjective agreement within the field that the existing indicators are quite useful research. Furthermore, it is vital that new studies apply existing indicators and models to enhance the potential for cumulation and meet the need for replication in research. It is with this in mind that this study applies the model developed by Singer, Bremer and Stuckey in their study of the relationship between capability distribution, uncertainty, and the occurrence of major power war.²⁶ Their indicators have been amended slightly to take into account available data. It will apply five measures of hierarchy and capabilities. These indicators are defense expenditures, armed force size, crude steel production, energy consumption, and population.

The two military indicators (expenditures and force size) are drawn from the Statesman Yearbook (1920-1940), and cross-referenced to the single available issue of the Armaments Yearbook. This procedure revealed a high level of

²⁶ Ibid.

compatibility in the data.²⁷ The major source did not, however, provide a full set of annual data for each actor. In limited number of cases in which data were unavailable, estimates were generated on the basis of three procedures. First, missing data for a single year was estimated by calculating the mean amount of the previous and succeeding years. Second, in those few cases where missing data existed for two years in succession, the figures were estimated by examining the trend in reported figures for earlier and later years. The differences were broken down to account for a gradual change in the data on the basis of identified trends. This process was applied as well to the few cases in which there was missing data for the last year of the study (1938). Third, in one case, Czechoslovakia (1938), the figure for military size was taken from a secondary source.²⁸

The figures for military expenditure were taken from entries in the Statesman's Yearbook for the yearly budgets for each state. The budgetary data were normally identified by the source Ministry of Defence, Ministry of War, or by individual service (army, navy, air force). The data for the

²⁷ At the time of data collection only one volume of the Armaments Yearbook was available. A comparison of that year with figures from the Statesmans Yearbook were relatively similar with both citing the same sources for their data (government documents). League of Nations, The Armaments Yearbook, (Geneva: League of Nations Publications, 1932).

²⁸ Henderson B. Braddick, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Grand Alliance in the May Crisis 1938, (Denver: University Press, 1968), p. 38.

individual services were aggregated to provide an estimate of total expenditure. They were primarily in the form of estimates, although in some cases actual expenditures were available. In all cases where available, actual expenditures were used²⁹ Finally, expenditures in the majority of cases were not broken down between amounts being spent on the armed forces, the civil defence bureaucracy, or other possible non-defence related items. For all the actors, the figures represent the total defence expenditure excluding funds spent on colonial defence if such a breakdown was available.

The reported defence expenditures were standardized to the value of the American dollar which was fixed until 1933. Exchange rates for each state were derived from the Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations. They were cross-referenced with available issues of the Statistical Abstracts of the United States, and were found to be compatible. The exception was currency exchange rates for the Soviet Union. The rate of exchange for this state was derived from the Statesman Yearbook, which cited the fixed exchange of roubles in British pound sterling. This rate of exchange was then converted from pounds to U.S. dollars.

²⁹ There was no specific trend in terms of the relationship between estimates and actual expenditure for each nation across time. At various times actual expenditures were equal to, less than, or greater than the estimates. This dictated the use of figures which were consistent in form over time for each state. The same procedure was applied to ordinary and extra-ordinary classes of expenditure.

The figures expressed in the subsequent data are in millions of U.S. dollars.

Armed force levels represent the total military force levels for each state. They include available naval and air force manpower. These figures refer to the standing military only; reserves are excluded. The figures for smaller states include the number of conscripts under training yearly. The data were consistent for the majority of smaller states such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. For larger states no such breakdown was available. Finally, forces identified as colonial, frontier guards, and military police were excluded from the study. Therefore, these annual figures represent available metropolitan manpower specifically trained for war in the system.

The indicators for crude steel production, energy consumption, and population were derived from European Historical Statistics 1740-Present. The cases in which data were unavailable for actors on the former two indicators were entered as zero in the data. It is assumed that missing data resulted from negligible production/consumption. Finally, population figures were only available for census years and these varied for the actors. The missing years were calculated using a simple moving average for the intervals between censuses.³⁰

³⁰ Singer and Small apply a sixth indicator, that of urban population. This was excluded from this study because sufficient and consistent data for all states during the

All five indicators were weighted equally in the study. Although a case for some degree of relative weighting could be made for the indicators, such a weighting would entail refinement of the data and a set of assumptions which as of yet are not directly available for application. The separate indicators were summed for each year, and the percentage shares calculated for each component actor. These shares were collapsed to provide a composite score for each actor in the system on a yearly basis. This process provided a ranking of the actors and a description of the system's hierarchy.

An annual measure of system concentration was constructed according to the method employed by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey.³¹ This was done separately for the system as a whole and for the smaller subset of Great Powers. First the standard deviation of the composite score was calculated. Second the standard deviation was divided by the maximum possible deviation for a given N which would result if one actor held 100% of the shares for the system. This produced an index from zero (perfect equality) to 1.0 (shares held by one actor entirely). Separate values of this index were then compared in order to produce data for annual changes in capability concentration.

period were unavailable. Also, urban population may be seen as a measure of development. To some extent, it is therefore taken into account in the economic measures.

³¹ J. David Singer, S. Bremer, J. Stuckey. op. cit.

Finally, this study is concerned with the average capability or the central tendency of the system on two key indicators. They are military expenditures and armed force levels. The mean for each indicator was calculated yearly for the system and the Great Power subset. This measure will reinforce structural and behavioral inferences from the previous two procedures.

In Table 1 below, the composite ranks of actors with a minimum of 2% of the system's capabilities are presented. It reveals that four of the actors (Germany, France, Soviet Russia, Great Britain) each consistently account for more than 10% of total capabilities in the system. Italy, which the literature identifies as a Great Power for the period, averages approximately 7% of the system's capabilities in the 1920's, increasing to 8% in the earlier 1930's, and 10% in 1935. The Italian percentage from 1936 to 1938 decreases from roughly 7% to a low of 6%. Although Italy ranks below the other powers cited above, it still accounts for nearly double the percentage shares of the next actor (Poland). The results support the earlier arguments concerning the Great Powers, the high ranks of the four main states, and the marginal rank of Italy.

The identification of the Great Powers in the system permits one to tentatively examine the nature of the distribution for the period. The distribution changes dramatically, beginning in 1930, with a substantive increase in the share

TABLE 1

Composite Shares Held by System Actors

Year	State	%Share	Year	State	%Share	Year	State	%Share
20	U.K.	23.15	21	Germany	19.11	22	Germany	17.31
	USSR	16.97		U.K.	17.30		U.K.	16.06
	Germany	16.33		USSR	16.25		USSR	15.96
	France	10.60		France	13.05		France	13.82
	Italy	6.89		Italy	6.49		Italy	6.59
	Spain	2.72		Poland	3.19		Spain	3.48
	Norway	2.63		Czech	2.77		Poland	3.33
	Czech	2.57		Norway	2.73		Belgium	3.13
	Belgium	2.44		Spain	2.53		Czech	3.01
	Poland	2.28		Belgium	2.28		Norway	2.56
Sweden	2.11			Sweden	2.23			
23	U.K.	18.40	24	U.K.	17.57	25	U.K.	16.51
	France	14.77		Germany	15.04		Germany	16.07
	Germany	13.41		France	13.65		France	13.72
	USSR	13.11		USSR	12.31		USSR	12.38
	Italy	7.10		Italy	7.13		Italy	7.52
	Poland	3.98		Poland	4.63		Poland	4.74
	Czech	3.65		Spain	3.85		Spain	3.55
	Belgium	3.49		Belgium	3.54		Czech	3.24
	Spain	3.06		Czech	3.37		Belgium	3.15
	Norway	2.54		Sweden	2.25		Sweden	2.18
Sweden	2.45	Norway	2.21	Norway	2.07			
Romania	2.04			Romania	2.02			
26	Germany	16.29	27	Germany	16.48	28	USSR	15.79
	USSR	15.23		U.K.	15.43		Germany	15.62
	U.K.	14.19		USSR	15.27		U.K.	14.83
	France	13.65		France	12.92		France	13.63
	Italy	7.49		Italy	7.77		Italy	7.83
	Poland	4.05		Poland	4.62		Poland	4.74
	Belgium	3.42		Spain	3.27		Spain	3.24
	Spain	3.32		Belgium	3.15		Belgium	3.18
	Czech	3.13		Czech	2.91		Czech	3.12
	Sweden	2.19		Romania	2.09		Romania	2.15
Norway	2.05							

Table 1 (continued)

29	USSR	16.57	30	USSR	17.92	31	USSR	18.35
	Germany	15.63		Germany	14.72		France	14.67
	U.K.	14.62		France	14.65		Germany	13.30
	France	12.86		U.K.	13.89		U.K.	13.09
	Italy	7.87		Italy	6.40		Italy	8.20
	Poland	4.63		Poland	4.77		Poland	4.44
	Spain	3.32		Spain	3.37		Belgium	3.41
	Belgium	3.16		Belgium	3.19		Spain	3.15
	Czech	3.02		Romania	2.63		Romania	2.75
	Romania	2.45		Czech	2.49		Czech	2.55
							Yugosl	2.25
32	USSR	22.10	33	USSR	23.14		USSR	24.90
	France	13.45		France	13.55		Germany	14.00
	U.K.	13.08		U.K.	13.13		U.K.	12.94
	Germany	12.20		Germany	12.62		France	12.29
	Italy	8.45		Italy	8.04		Italy	7.70
	Poland	4.46		Poland	4.46		Poland	4.28
	Belgium	3.57		Belgium	3.16		Spain	2.98
	Spain	3.04		Spain	2.99		Belgium	2.73
	Romania	2.54		Romania	2.59		Czech	2.30
	Czech	2.19		Czech	2.26			
35	USSR	27.10	36	USSR	29.58	37	USSR	31.53
	Germany	15.13		Germany	16.52		Germany	16.68
	U.K.	11.72		U.K.	13.46		U.K.	12.91
	Italy	10.56		France	9.09		France	9.34
	France	10.06		Italy	6.80		Italy	6.00
	Poland	3.66		Poland	3.82		Poland	3.64
	Spain	2.61		Czech	2.37		Czech	2.41
	Czech	2.39		Belgium	2.27		Belgium	2.33
							Romania	2.30
38	USSR	32.51						
	Germany	18.17						
	U.K.	12.45						
	France	8.46						
	Italy	5.95						
	Poland	3.56						
	Czech	2.85						

³² Specific concerns related to the utility and validity of these measures will be discussed in the final chapter when we compare these findings with historical interpretations.

held by the Soviet Union.³² The remaining three actors maintain a relatively equal distribution of shares in comparison to each other until 1935 when the German share begins to show a substantial discrepancy in comparison to Great Britain and France. This becomes most pronounced in 1937 and 1938. The marginal Great Power, Italy, remains at a constant level in proportion to the other major powers with the exception of 1935. That year shows the Italian share as slightly greater than France.³³ Therefore this indicator reveals a change in the equilibrium of the system from relative even distribution to marked stratification among the top ranked powers.

The score for states obtaining at least 2% of system capabilities are also presented in Table 2. Among these actors, Poland consistently ranks at the upper level of secondary powers. It is followed by Spain until 1935 at which time the impact of the civil war effectively eliminates her position in the system. Czechoslovakia and Belgium also maintain a constant share above 2%. Norway and Sweden meet this criterion in the Twenties, but drop well below 2% in the Thirties. Finally, Romania exceeds the requirement during the early part of the 1930's, and in 1937, but otherwise holds approximately 1.5% of the system share.

³³ This is the product of a dramatic increase in the size of the Italian Armed Forces. This was probably the result of the onset of the Italian adventure in Ethiopia.

There are two interesting inferences related to this group. The secondary powers, with the exception of the Scandinavian states, border at least one of the Great Powers. Also, these actors were either new system members (Poland and Czechoslovakia) or part of the winning coalition of World War I (with the notable exception of Spain). These factors may have served to influence the behavior of these states.

The concentration index for the system as a whole and for the Great Powers is shown in Table 2. It provides a clear indication of the distribution of capabilities in the system over time. The measure of annual change in the concentration index is also shown in this table. The lowest concentration figure for the system as whole is recorded in 1924 (.260). The highest figure appears in 1938 (.370). The index reveals a general and gradual decline in concentration from 1921-1931, interrupted by slight increases during the period from 1925-1927. The remaining years show a strong rise in concentration with the largest changes occurring in 1932, 1935 and 1936. A comparison between the first year of the study (a full year from the conclusion of war) and the last year (a year prior to war) reveals a difference of .062. Finally, the total change from the lowest figure (1924) to the highest (1938) is .110.

The index for the Great Powers mirrors to large extent the index for the system as a whole in terms of direction.

TABLE 2
Capability Concentration Index

Year	Total System		Great Powers	
	Index	Average Change (To-T1)	Index	Average Change (To-T1)
1920	.308		.181	
1921	.291	-.017	.150	-.021
1922	.278	-.013	.136	-.014
1923	.263	-.015	.125	-.011
1924	.260	-.003	.118	-.007
1925	.261	+.001	.106	-.012
1926	.262	+.001	.109	+.003
1927	.267	+.005	.106	-.003
1928	.266	-.001	.105	-.001
1929	.266	.000	.111	+.006
1930	.271	+.005	.149	+.038
1931	.267	-.004	.123	-.026
1932	.283	+.016	.162	+.039
1933	.292	+.009	.174	+.012
1934	.305	+.013	.193	+.019
1935	.323	+.018	.191	-.002
1936	.345	+.022	.254	+.063
1937	.358	+.013	.280	+.026
1938	.370	+.012	.294	+.014

Capability is least concentrated among the Great Powers in 1928 whereas it is most concentrated in 1938. The largest increase in the index is recorded in 1936. However the concentration among the Great Powers and the system as a whole differs primarily in 1935, but as noted in the previous section this was the result of Italy. In sum, capability tends to be least concentrated in the early years, most likely as a result of the redistribution entailed by World War I and the Russian revolution. Concentration grows as the most powerful states reassert themselves. A comparison between

the initial and concluding years show a net increase of .113 in concentration.

The data in Table 3 have to do with the central tendency of the Interwar system. The variables selected for examination are: military expenditures, armed force levels, and crude steel production. The data in Table 3 refers to the whole system; Table 4 provides similar evidence for the Great Powers. Average military expenditures for the system declines in the early Twenties to a low of 60.26 (mil. US) in 1924, followed by a relatively gradual increase which levels off in 1932. An abrupt increase is recorded for 1933, relative to the preceding year and the data clearly illustrate the overall growth in expenditures across the last six years of the period. The average armed force size follows a similar pattern. It does differ somewhat in the early Thirties. The increase experienced in 1931 is followed by three years of decline.

The central tendency for the Great Powers is shown in Table 4, and the results for expenditures and force levels are graphed on subsequent pages. The variables are again those of military expenditure, armed force levels, and crude steel production. This table shows that the direction of the average for the Great Powers reflects the evidence for the entire system. As in the previous case, the most interesting discrepancy is between expenditure and force size in the early thirties. This discrepancy may indicate that actors

TABLE 3
Central Tendency of the System

s	Year	Mil.Exp (Mil. US\$)	Armed Forces (Manpower)	Crude Steel (000 M.Tons)
	1920	85.063	260409	997.654
	1921	75.074	227280	811.077
	1922	68.668	171036	1045.704
	1923	60.482	126711	1007.000
	1924	60.260	117385	1211.071
	1925	70.922	101419	1343.214
	1926	70.817	109770	1317.536
	1927	79.090	112131	1718.679
	1928	82.846	108968	1747.821
	1929	84.982	108537	1913.036
	1930	92.068	102388	1643.071
	1931	90.162	118143	1290.643
	1932	87.726	115299	1063.750
	1933	153.382	113923	1294.107
	1934	282.708	110008	1636.536
	1935	430.038	136692	1977.821
	1936	338.386	148582	2391.296
	1937	419.813	171011	2642.667
	1938	520.209	180642	2527.075

were investing in hardware, and may be partially related to domestic issues. Given the decline of crude steel production in this period, it is possible that a greater percentage of this production was being used for military purposes.


The tables related to hierarchy and capabilities identify some consistent trends in the behavior and thereby structure of the system. First, the system in the 1920's shows a simultaneous decline in the average expenditures and force sizes, concentration, with a relatively equal distribution

TABLE 4
Central Tendency for the Great Powers

Year	Mil.Exp (Mil. US\$)	Armed Forces (Manpower)	Crude Steel (000 M.Tons)
1920	355.869	961260	4432.800
1921	296.032	780261	3555.600
1922	266.041	551914	4705.600
1923	247.849	370683	4380.400
1924	233.461	332614	5438.000
1925	280.835	274946	6163.400
1926	283.038	331176	5860.800
1927	330.289	334551	7818.200
1928	342.269	335447	7772.800
1929	353.252	322085	8545.600
1930	389.268	283034	7385.600
1931	383.457	335539	5684.400
1932	395.624	332964	4815.400
1933	712.663	339446	5998.400
1934	1335.871	341298	7722.600
1935	2160.855	468083	9503.200
1936	1602.405	518581	11258.600
1937	2033.165	610492	12150.200
1938	2554.896	648414	11947.600

of shares for the Great Powers. This trend is reversed in the Thirties with the exception of crude steel production. The distribution of capabilities among the Great Powers becomes more markedly unequal which may have influenced lesser actors. This behavioral change in the system seems to occur gradually, with one deviation (1930), until 1934, at which point it becomes more marked. These factors can now be examined in relation to the other two dimensions.


CENTRAL TENDENCY OF THE SYSTEM
(MILITARY EXPENDITURES)



GRAPH II

CENTRAL TENDENCY OF THE SYSTEM
(FORCE LEVELS)

FORCE
LEVELS
(000's men)




TIME
(min)

126

GRAPH IV

CENTRAL TENDENCY OF THE GREAT POWERS
(MILITARY EXPENDITURES)

MILITARY
EXPENDITURES
(000,000's U.S.)




TIME
(YEARS)

GRAPH IV

CENTRAL TENDENCY OF THE GREAT POWERS
(FORCE LEVELS)

1983
FORCE
LEVELS
(100's men)



3.3 POLITICAL COMMITMENTS

The most prominent linkage attribute is an indicator of political commitments. This study will not ascertain the specifics of diplomatic behavior but rather examine its manifestations in terms of commitments. Alliances are an integral component of international politics and they have also drawn attention from system analysts.³⁴ This attention has been concerned with the relationship between alliances and war. Alliances are also perceived as an important manifestation of the balance of power. The concern in this study is only with the identification of commitments between states. They provide an indication of the degree to which the system has a strong or weak focus on relationships. The foundation and data for this section are derived from the study by Singer and Small.³⁵

The above study divided commitments into three types: Defence Pacts; Non-Agression/Neutrality Pacts; and Ententes. Defence pacts were defined as a commitment by the signatories to intervene with force on the behalf of one another. Non-Agression pacts committed signatories to neutrality if

³⁴ For a discussion of the state of research into alliances see Brian L. Job, "Grins without Cats: In Pursuit of Knowledge of International Alliances", P. T. Hoppmann, D. A. Zinnes, and J. David Singer, eds., Cumulation in International Relations, (Denver: University Press, 1981) and R. Friedman, ed., Alliance in International Politics, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970).

³⁵ J. David Singer, M. Small, "Formal Alliances 1816-1939," Journal of Peace Research, Volume 3, 1966.

either were involved in war. Ententes referred to a condition of consultation between the signatories under specific conditions. The remaining types of commitments, as noted by Singer and Small, are excluded; "Because they did not reflect, in any appreciable fashion, the coalitions and divisions in the system."³⁶

Observing these types of commitments enables one to identify the extent to which horizontal clusters were evident in the system. They are broken down to identify their frequency for the Great Powers and the system as a whole. This produces groupings of: commitments for the system as a whole; between Great Powers; between Great Powers and Lesser Powers; and between lesser powers. The nature of these patterns can then be compared to the evidence derived from the previous dimension. It should be noted that the extent to which commitments may or may not be honoured, dependent upon the conditions specified within the agreement, is not a factor in this study. It would require an examination of the individual states and their decision-makers and these are not directly systemic variables.

There are two differences between this study and that conducted by Singer and Small. First the system in this study is more limited, in that the Singer and Small study included independent states outside geographical Europe. Second, this study includes three entente agreements exclud-

³⁶ Ibid, p. 5.

ed by those authors. They are the Rapallo agreement (1922-1926), the Locarno Pact (1925-1936), and the Stresa Communique (1935). The first commitment provided for consultation basis and represented the break out of political isolation by Germany and Soviet Russia. It was superceded by the Berlin Treaty of 1926 which was included by Singer and Small. Locarno was a multilateral treaty of guarantee which was excluded by their criteria. It was, however, a key agreement which attempted to create a basis for solving the Franco-German question. It had a major impact in that it symbolized a new era in relations between the adherents, and with its collapse in 1936, signalled an important change. Its coding as an entente reflects its status in the period as identified by historians. Finally, Stresa was a conference which sought to establish a consultative basis between France, Italy and Great Britain on the German issue. Although it would collapse with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in late 1935, this agreement did represent an important set of relations during the period.

Table 5 shows the extent to which political commitments were prominent in this system. It does not differentiate between multilateral and bilateral agreements.³⁷ It reveals

³⁷ Defence pacts and neutrality/non-aggression pacts were primarily bi-lateral agreements. The only exceptions for the former were the Little Entente, and the Greek-Turkey-Rumania-Yugoslavia defence pacts. Both of these emerged out of a series of bi-lateral agreements. Ententes, in contrast, were primarily multi-lateral agreements. All neutrality/non-aggression pacts were bilateral.

that the system experienced a steady growth in the number of actors engaged in some form of political commitment. There were only four states (14.8%) in the system engaged in political commitments in 1920, subsumed entirely within defence pacts. This rises to a high of twenty states (71.4% in 1934-35, and 74.1% in 1936) for the later part of the period. There were eighteen states (72.0%) engaged in some form of commitment at the end of the period.

The evolution of commitments is similar for all three individual types of commitments. They all experience increases over time. However, the early Twenties reveal the greatest number of commitments in defence pacts. Non-aggression pacts come to dominate the system in 1926, remaining constant for the remainder of the period. Ententes have the lowest number of actors involved throughout the period. Commitments of this type do increase concurrent with the highs recorded by the other two categories. Overall, the system in all categories shows a marked trend to increased commitments within the system, falling off slightly in the concluding years.

The figures for the political commitments of the Great Powers are presented in Table 6. It shows that non-aggression pacts represent the major form of commitment with lesser powers. They account for up to 88% of all non-aggression commitments. Ententes represent the major form of commitments between the Great Powers. But at no time are all the

TABLE 5
Political Commitments: Whole System 1920-1938

Year	N	% States Alliance	% States Non-Aggr.	% States Entente	% States Any
1920	27	14.8	0	0	14.8
1921	27	22.2	7.4	0	25.9
1922	28	21.4	7.1	7.1	32.1
1923	28	28.5	7.1	7.1	39.3
1924	28	28.5	14.2	14.2	42.9
1925	28	32.1	25.0	25.0	50.0
1926	28	28.5	35.7	25.0	53.6
1927	28	35.7	39.3	25.0	57.1
1928	28	35.7	35.7	25.0	60.7
1929	28	35.7	39.3	25.0	64.3
1930	28	35.7	39.3	25.0	64.3
1931	28	35.7	39.3	17.8	64.3
1932	28	35.7	53.6	17.8	67.9
1933	28	35.7	53.6	17.8	67.9
1934	28	42.9	53.6	35.7	71.4
1935	28	46.4	53.6	35.7	71.4
1936	27	48.1	55.5	37.0	74.1
1937	27	44.4	55.5	29.6	66.6
1938	27	44.4	55.5	33.3	66.6

Great Powers engaged in an entente or in any other form of commitment between them. Finally alliance relationships are the weakest form of commitments between the Great Powers. There was only one alliance (1935-1938) between any two Great Powers for the entire period. Although a percentage of alliance relationships throughout the period contain a Great Power, these were subsumed almost entirely by the French alliances with secondary actors in Europe.

These tables provide a basis for generating some basic statements about the structure and behavior of the system. First, there is a lack of positive commitments between the Great Powers which would lead one to infer that the system evidenced a degree of fluidity in relationships. Second, the structural tendency in the system appears to favor negative commitments to non-action. The stress on ententes between the Great Powers, therefore, reinforces the general impression that the system was relatively fluid. This tendency seems to decrease in the 1930's especially among the lesser actors. Finally the data reveal a marked contrast between the behavior of lesser powers and Great Powers, with the former involved in alliances and the latter in non-aggression pacts. This favors the argument for a relatively pure four power system, excluding Italy because of its marginal capability rank. Overall, the period exhibits Great Power indifference or indecision regarding relationships.

These results can also be compared to the capability dimension. The relationship between these two dimensions provide interesting insights which are not totally consistent. The rise in commitments in the 1920's is accompanied by a decrease in capabilities and concentration. There does seem to be some relationship between the evolution of the categories in the 1930's. Furthermore the increasing concentration of capabilities and the status gap between the major powers in the 1930's. is not accompanied by the emergence of agreements to recreate an equilibrium. The only such

agreement, the Franco-Soviet pact (1936-1938, is between the first and fourth power.

TABLE 3

Political Commitments of the Great Powers

YEARS	ALLIANCES			NON-AGGRESSION PACTS			ENTENTES					
	N	% GRTPWR- MINOR	% GRTPWR- BRTWPWR	% TOTAL	N	% GRTPWR- MINOR	% GRTPWR- GRTPWR	% ANY	N	% GRTPWR MINOR	% GRTPWR GRTPWR	% ANY
1920	2	50.0	-	50.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1921	6	33.3	-	33.3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1922	6	33.3	-	33.3	1	-	-	-	1	-	100.0	100.0
1923	7	28.6	-	28.6	1	-	-	-	1	-	100.0	100.0
1924	7	28.6	-	28.6	2	50.0	-	50.0	3	33.3	33.3	66.6
1925	8	37.5	-	37.5	3	66.6	-	66.6	3	33.3	33.3	66.6
1926	8	37.5	-	37.5	6	66.6	16.7	83.3	4	50.0	-	50.0
1927	9	44.4	-	44.4	8	75.0	12.5	87.5	4	100.0	-	100.0
1928	9	44.4	-	44.4	9	77.8	11.1	88.9	3	100.0	-	100.0
1929	9	44.4	-	44.4	11	72.7	9.1	81.8	3	100.0	-	100.0
1930	9	44.4	-	44.4	13	69.2	7.7	76.9	3	100.0	-	100.0
1931	9	44.4	-	44.4	13	69.2	7.7	76.9	1	100.0	-	100.0
1932	9	44.4	-	44.4	18	72.2	11.1	83.3	1	100.0	-	100.0
1933	9	44.4	-	44.4	21	61.9	14.3	76.2	2	50.0	50.0	100.0
1934	8	50.0	-	50.0	22	63.6	13.6	77.2	4	50.0	25.0	75.0
1935	10	50.0	10.0	60.0	18	77.8	16.7	94.5	6	33.3	50.0	83.3
1936	10	50.0	10.0	60.0	17	82.4	11.8	94.2	4	50.0	50.0	100.0
1937	9	44.4	11.1	55.5	17	88.2	5.9	94.1	4	25.0	50.0	75.0
1938	9	44.4	11.1	55.5	18	83.3	5.6	88.9	5	20.0	60.0	80.0

KEY: GRTPWR = GREATPOWER

MINOR = LESSER POWERS

3.4 SYSTEM TRADE

The final systemic dimension to be examined is trade. The level of economic interaction or trade between actors in the system is a plausible indicator of the degree of integration evident between the actors.³⁸ The utility of trade as an indicator of structure also reveals a measure of commitment. Trade may be examined in terms of actor concentration with other system members, and with non-system actors. It may also be examined in terms of the extent to which the trade of individual actors is concentrated within subsets of the system. Finally, one could distinguish between the type of goods which are flowing across state boundaries.

This study will focus upon two aspects of trade as a system indicator. First it will examine the level of trade concentration for each actor in the system. This procedure is based on Hirschman's concentration index.³⁹ The index is constructed by taking the percentage imports (exports) held by the trading partners of each state. The sum of the squares is calculated for each state on a yearly basis and the square root is extracted. This creates an index in which 100 would represent its value if one country holds

³⁸ H. Alker Jr., D. Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area 1928-1963", in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics, (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 288.

³⁹ A.O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), pp. 98-101.

100% of a state's trade. The lowest value of the index is dependent upon the number of trading countries. In this case, the number of trading countries is held constant, equal to the number of actors in the system. Therefore, if a country had no cited figure for a state in any year, it was still included in the procedure. It is assumed that missing data represented a negligible amount of trade. Those amounts which represented trade to actors outside the system were excluded. Therefore, the index represents only levels of trade concentration within the Interwar European system.

The study will also identify the average amount of trade in the system, and the relationship between intra-system and inter-system trade. The average amount of trade is expressed in U.S. dollars, calculated annually. The percentage share of intra-system trade to total trade was also calculated. These procedures provide us with a basis for comparing the directionality of trade with movement in terms of capabilities. It also provides an indication of the extent to which the system is penetrated by non-systemic actors.

The trade figures for the actors were derived from statistics prepared by the League of Nations.⁴⁰ These figures are comparable for all the system members. The bulk of the

⁴⁰ League of Nations, World Trade Statistics 1920-1939, (Geneva, League of Nations Publications, 1920-1939).

data, however, were only available for the time span 1922-1938.⁴¹ The data were presented in terms of value of trade in each individual country currency. These were translated into U.S. dollars on the same basis employed earlier in the capability section. The data for 1923 are excluded because the inflationary impact of the Ruhr crisis makes it extremely difficult to standardize German currency.

Table 7 below provides the concentration index for the system as a whole from 1922-1938. The highest import concentration is recorded in 1923 (49.50) and the lowest in 1934 (41.71). For exports, the highest figure is 48.00 (1926) and the lowest is 45.48 (1930). A comparison between the indices reveals that imports fluctuate much more than exports (7.79 and 2.59 respectively). The opposite is true in terms of the actual levels of the index. On average, exports are more concentrated than imports, although imports record the highest concentration during the period. One could infer that exports in the system, although more concentrated, were relatively stable whereas system imports were influenced more by other factors.

⁴¹ For 1920-1921, data were available only for five and six countries respectively. There is a full set of data for most of the remaining years with the exception of 1924, 1926, 1933, and 1936. In these cases there was one missing case. Finally, in 1938 the Soviet Union was missing and there were only figures available for British exports. Spain as previously noted, is dropped from the study in 1936, but remains as part of the calculation for the index.

The directionality of the concentration indexes also provides some insight into the system and in this respect the export index reveals a clearer pattern of direction than imports. There is a gradual increase in export concentration from 1922 (46.37) to 1926 (48.00) followed by a decline to 45.48 in 1930 (with the exception of 1928). From 1930 to 1936 the concentration index rises at a slow but steady rate. The index declines from 1936 (47.20) to 1937 (46.54) but resumes its rise in 1938 (48.21). The import index, however, does not reveal a consistent pattern. First, imports show a decline in concentration from 1931 to 1934 in marked contrast to the increase in export concentration. Second, although the two indexes are relatively comparable during the twenties, imports tend to reveal no direct relation to exports. Imports decline from 1923 to 1925, followed by an increase in 1926, a marked decline in 1927 and a subsequent increase on 1928. It thereafter declines with the exception of 1931.

These data permit certain inferences to be made about the system. First, there is little evidence that the system as a whole underwent a major shift in trading patterns. Certainly change did occur, and this is especially evident in the import index, but it is not of any great magnitude. Second, there seems little evidence that the economic depression of the thirties had an influence on trade concentration. The decline in import concentration is offset by an

increase in export concentration. The lack of clarity in these figures may be investigated further by examining the

Year	Import Index	Export Index
1922	47.95	46.37
1923	49.50	47.37
1924	48.33	47.64
1925	47.29	47.85
1926	48.78	48.00
1927	44.88	46.86
1928	46.55	47.03
1929	45.27	46.22
1930	44.60	45.48
1931	44.84	45.61
1932	44.13	45.73
1933	43.28	45.91
1934	41.71	46.18
1935	43.88	46.92
1936	44.88	47.20
1937	43.11	46.54
1938	45.91	48.21

concentration indexes as determined by capability shares.

Table 8 presents the concentration indexes for imports and exports for three groups of states: the Great Powers; the secondary powers; and the lesser powers.⁴² The table provides the mean and standard deviation (std) for each group. A comparison of the means between the three groups

⁴² Secondary powers include all states that had at a minimum 2% of system shares for at least one year during the period.

reveals a positive relationship to social structure. For the import concentration index, the major powers record a high of 43.9 (1923) and a low of 34.4 (1934); secondary powers, 48.6 (1923) and 39.0 (1934); and lesser powers, 52.9 (1924) and 45.6 (1934). The figures for the export index are; 40.9 (1922) and 35.3 (1933); 45.8 (1923) and 37.8 (1937); and 55.1 (1938) and 48.7 (1922) respectively. This relationship is mitigated slightly by the fact that secondary powers reveal the lowest std, followed by the great powers, and finally lesser powers. However, it is clear from Table 8 that the Great Powers exhibit the lowest import and export concentration levels. Clearly, minor and secondary powers are more dependent on others in the system than the major powers.

An examination of the Great Powers in terms of concentration yields some inferences about the relationship with capability averages for the group. Import and export concentration levels generally decline throughout the twenties until 1933/1934 in which the group shows an increase in concentration. These changes however are not consistent and their magnitude is not very significant. This would lead one to infer that trading patterns in terms of concentration were not greatly influenced by changes in capabilities. Also the increase in actor commitments does not seem to be reflected in trade behavior.

TABLE 8

Trade Concentration Index by State Groupings

Year	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930
Major									
I Mean	38.5	43.9	40.4	39.5	38.4	36.9	39.8	37.4	36.8
Std	7.5	7.1	8.2	8.2	8.6	8.9	11.6	8.9	9.2
E Mean	40.9	40.6	38.5	40.0	39.9	36.6	37.4	36.5	36.7
Std	8.4	7.3	6.5	7.7	6.7	6.6	7.3	7.0	7.5
Secondary									
I Mean	46.4	48.6	45.2	44.3	43.9	42.5	45.0	43.4	43.1
Std	6.4	7.8	5.1	5.3	4.8	4.4	5.2	5.0	4.5
E Mean	43.9	45.8	44.2	43.6	44.3	42.7	43.6	41.7	40.2
Std	8.1	8.1	6.2	6.2	3.3	4.3	3.1	3.1	5.3
Minor									
I Mean	50.5	52.1	52.9	51.5	50.2	48.8	49.5	48.9	48.0
Std	10.1	14.3	17.6	17.1	15.9	16.5	15.3	15.2	15.1
E Mean	48.7	50.8	52.9	52.7	52.4	52.5	51.8	51.8	51.2
Std	11.6	13.3	16.7	16.5	15.9	16.5	17.5	17.4	17.8

Table 8 (continued)								
Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Major								
I Mean	39.3	40.0	38.8	34.4	38.5	37.6	35.3	38.3
Std	13.5	14.8	13.4	6.1	13.6	11.3	8.5	12.9
E Mean	37.8	36.5	35.3	35.7	39.3	38.7	37.2	35.5
Std	8.3	6.4	5.8	6.9	11.2	9.7	9.9	9.4
Secondary								
I Mean	42.9	41.1	40.3	39.0	39.1	41.3	40.1	42.7
Std	4.9	4.9	4.5	4.4	2.9	2.9	3.6	3.4
E Mean	39.3	39.2	38.0	39.0	39.3	38.6	37.8	40.7
Std	5.3	4.9	3.5	3.8	4.3	4.2	4.5	3.7
Minor								
I Mean	47.7	47.1	46.2	45.6	48.2	49.3	47.1	48.9
Std	15.0	14.2	12.0	11.1	11.5	12.5	11.7	11.4
E Mean	51.6	52.3	53.2	53.5	53.5	54.6	53.8	55.1
Std	18.0	18.9	19.0	16.2	15.9	16.9	17.2	16.4

Table 9 provides the average amount of intra-system trade expressed as a percentage of total system trade, and the average value of that trade. The system is consuming slightly more of total exports in comparison to imports, although the value of intra-system imports is higher than exports. In terms of percentages, both imports and exports reveal general declines as we move further into the Interwar period; they increase during the early Thirties, and then decline until the final year of the study. The highest figures for

both imports and exports is recorded in 1931 (75.62 and 80.53 respectively, and the lowest in 1937 (69.77 and 75.74 respectively). The high points recorded in 1931 may be partially explained by the depression. The rise in the final year for both categories may relate to a drift to war.

The trade values provide similar evidence. The low point is recorded in 1932, and with the exception of a slight decline in 1935, rises steadily until 1938. Both categories show a marked decline in the last year of the study. Although trade is moving towards expansion beyond the system, its value within the system is gradually rising, with the exception of the time frame of the depression. One could thereby argue that the distinctness of the system spatial is declining concurrently with greater integration within the system as shown by increasing value.

TABLE 9
Intra-System Trade in Relation to Total System Trade

Year	Imports (% of All)	Exports (% of All)	Imports (000 \$US)	Exports (000 \$US)
1922	74.80	79.72	-----	-----
1923	73.52	78.01	-----	-----
1924	72.30	78.82	297627	283901
1925	70.23	77.69	324192	303508
1926	71.09	75.31	482348	281289
1927	73.37	79.25	370119	342640
1928	70.18	77.75	377702	349622
1929	72.33	78.19	387181	359816
1930	74.64	79.01	352646	326186
1931	75.62	80.53	272475	249100
1932	73.55	78.37	167768	153948
1933	74.29	78.10	244758	233037
1934	72.22	77.94	383357	357569
1935	70.10	76.50	360462	339189
1936	71.07	76.27	407458	374810
1937	69.77	75.74	479554	446729
1938	72.26	76.80	360087	401210

3.5 CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion focused on three dimensions of the European International system from 1919-1939. It was argued that the identification of structural attributes in a system is based upon indicators of the behavior of states. This does not mean that structure is simply the product of states behavior. It is clear from several sources in the literature that structure influences the behavior of system members. The problem has been related to the uncovering of this relationship. In the long run, this would require a concern for how individual actors (states and their deci-

sion-makers) identify and react to system structure in the formulation and execution of policies (behavior).

The application of specific indicators of three system dimensions identified some characteristics of the Interwar system. These were characteristics related to the hierarchy of the system, the directionality of capabilities, the nature of political commitments, the concentration of system trade, and the nature of intra-system trade in comparison to total system trade and its value. These characteristics permitted modest inferences to be made about the system.

It was found that the system moved from a relatively even distribution in capabilities between the Great Powers to marked stratification. This movement was accompanied by an increase in commitments but they were not in the form of positive relationships between the Great Powers. The only exception to this trend was the Franco-Russian alliance in 1935 between the first and fourth ranked powers. The major thrust in relationships between the Great Powers was of a neutral form: consultation agreements (ententes). The lesser powers in the system, in contrast, revealed a stronger tendency towards positive (alliance) relationships with each other and to some extent with the Great Powers. Overall, there seems to be a relationship between the increasing concentration of capabilities in the system and the increase in political commitments by the system, although it is not very direct.

There also seems to be only a limited relationship between capabilities and trade. The increase in capability concentration in the Thirties is accompanied by a rise in trade concentration, especially with regard to exports. The system also reveals a decline in intra-system trade. The value of such trade increases steadily throughout the period while the system undergoes change on the capability dimension. These factors seem to indicate that trade may operate independently of the other dimensions of the system. This would lead one to conclude that further studies related to trade should be undertaken to clarify this relationship.

The application of these indicators only provides a description of some properties of the European International system from 1919-1939. It is necessary to expand the indicators and subsequent measures in order to fill out the rough sketch provided by this study. This would then provide a stronger basis for comparative and explanatory analysis. If this section has served to identify some interesting features of this system which could lead to further research then it has served its purpose. It has provided a depiction of part of the system based upon a perceived need to re-examine the period. Two further steps are needed before robust inferences can be drawn about the system: first, more models need to be compared in order to qualify the inferences; second, the inferences drawn from the quantitative analysis must be assessed against existing histori-

cal interpretations. The concluding chapter of this study will explore some of the linkages between historical interpretation and the evidence made available in this empirical investigation of the European Interwar system.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION

In concluding this study, it is useful to compare our findings with existing historical interpretations. Three considerations underlie this task. First, the basic thrust of this study is inter-disciplinary. Second, the historian's concern for the distinct context of events is central to the development of distinct international systems and theory. Finally, historical interpretations may provide refinement to our findings enhancing our depiction of this system. This refinement will provide a firm basis for inferences, and any subsequent analysis of this system.

There are, however, certain limitations which must be recognized in undertaking this task. Historians have largely ignored the system level in favor of foreign policy and decision-making analysis. In so doing, they have ignored the possible impact of the system on actor behavior. System level work done by historians is concerned primarily with interaction processes, and presented as secondary factors in their explanations. Therefore, the effect of structure is further removed from their work.

There is also a problem with concepts, although it has been shown that the usage of concepts widely differ in the

systems literature. Historians do use such system concepts as balance of power and anarchy. Furthermore, there is agreement on the importance and general definition of Great Powers. However, historians rarely provide a precise definition of concepts or their applications directly compatible to their usage in the international systems literature. For example, Taylor points out that international anarchy reappeared in Europe due to Germany's re-militarization of the Rhineland in 1936.⁴³ Anarchy, in this sense, refers to the collapse of security measures instituted in 1919, not the general characteristic of the international system.

These distinctions have three implications for our present task. First, it restricts the amount of historical literature which can be accessed. It forces one to ignore the wealth of material which is country and/or issue specific. Second, there is the problem of translating relevant historical views into a compatible system focus. This task includes the potential for misinterpretation and/or the overlooking of key explanatory points in this literature. Finally, the explanatory thrust of historical inquiry may lead to transgressing the basic descriptive limits of this study.

⁴³ A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 102.

There are basic similarities between the structure as indicated in this study and historians' perceptions.⁴⁴ There is general agreement on the basic Great Powers, inclusive of the borderline status of Italy and decline of French power. However, historians would question the ranks of Germany and the Soviet Union in the Twenties identified in this study. To understand this issue, it is necessary to initially address questions related to the applied measures.

The major concern, which not only historians would raise, is the type of measures used in this study. Our use of capability or power measures to identify the system's hierarchy ignores many factors which are vital to explanation. These include factors of leadership, political and military morale, social systems, ideology, and certain socio-economic factors such as health, welfare, and education measures. These factors are certainly vital in any explanation of specific events, or decisions made by the actors in this system. They represent the analysis of intra-actor variation which is a vital component in any future explanatory analysis, along with variation at the inter-actor level. Furthermore, these factors are evident in the third data set advocated by Hoffmann. However, they represent factors outside of the immediate descriptive goals of this study, and are incompatible with our focus.

⁴⁴ These similarities are evident in the majority of historical work on the period. Specific positions will be identified in our subsequent analysis.

First, the bulk of these factors are state or individual level variables. Their direct inclusion would violate the system thrust of this analysis creating a reductionist study. Second, these factors are largely concerned with specific explanations. This study, in contrast, is concerned with a macro-level description of this period in international politics. Third, this study is based on the initial requirement of depiction and categorization prior to explanation in research. A logical expansion of this study into the explanatory realm would naturally result in the inclusion of these factors. Finally, there is a major gap in the literature, concrete and analytic, on the explanatory role of the system as an independent variable.⁴⁵ This gap can only be filled by concentrating on system variables such as structure.

A further concern stems from problems entailed by the data itself. Any reliance on government statistics has certain limitations. There is no guarantee that our data represents the true amounts of forces, expenditures, and production. Governments have a well known history of using various accounting techniques producing different figures with different meanings over time. This problem is further compounded by the closed nature of some of the societies in

⁴⁵ This gap is largely drawn from the extensive criticisms of the systems literature by Waltz. He argues that this literature creates theoretical explanations not from the system, but from the individual actors. K.Waltz, op. cit..

our study, especially the Soviet Union. It is highly unlikely that Soviet figures, given their paranoia to the outside world, are completely accurate. These figures may be inflated or deflated depending on the image it is trying to convey to other actors.⁴⁶ While this issue serves to raise questions about the validity of the Soviet Union's ranking, especially in the thirties, one must also query the rankings of all the systems' members. However, I would argue that the actual figures, if available, would only marginally affect our rankings, slightly reducing the Soviet share, but still leaving it as the strongest power in the system. Furthermore, it must be stressed that any research can only provide a representation of the real world, not reality itself.

The ranks attained by the Soviet Union and Germany in our analysis differ strongly with existing historical interpretations. Historians point out that, in terms of actual capabilities, Germany and the Soviet Union were not Great Powers. They would point to the following evidence. At the Treaty of Versailles, German capabilities were limited by the restrictions placed on the size of her armed forces, the loss of territory and population, and the occupation of the Rhineland by the Allied powers. Furthermore, German weak-

⁴⁶ Given Soviet perceptions, especially under Stalin, of the threat from the capitalist West, I would assume that the Soviet figures are most likely inflated. While this perception would reduce the strength of the Soviet ranking, as well as the other actors, it is unlikely that our findings would change too drastically.

ness is evident in the French occupation of the Rhine in 1923 due to the German failure to meet reparation obligations. These limitations were in place until the mid-Thirties, when Germany unilaterally renounced the military restriction, and proceeded to re-militarize the Rhineland in violation of the Locarno Pact.⁴⁷

Soviet weakness is apparent due to the effect of the revolution in 1917 and subsequent civil war. Even though the Soviet Union maintained a large military force during the Twenties, the destruction of her limited infrastructure, and the socio-economic upheaval of Russian society created a technologically inferior society and military. Soviet Foreign Policy, particularly in the twenties, was guided by a perception of weakness and the fear of an anti-Soviet coalition among the Western powers.⁴⁸ It was not until the mid-Thirties, due to Stalin's industrialization of the Soviet economy, that the Soviet Union's capabilities were believed to justify a high ranking. Even then, the poor standard of

⁴⁷ The Locarno Pact, in which Britain and Italy guaranteed the borders of Western Europe, included a provision to maintain the status quo regarding a de-militarized Rhineland and led to an early withdrawal of Allied occupation troops from the Rhineland.

⁴⁸ Soviet concerns explain the decision to sign the Rapallo agreement with Germany. For a discussion of Soviet Foreign Policy in these formative years see T.H.von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G.V. Chicherin Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs", in G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert, The Diplomats, (Princeton: University Press, 1953), and T.Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1930 (London: Sage Publications, 1979).

Soviet troops and the purges of the Thirties were limitations on her actual power.

However, this evidence must be balanced by certain considerations. These arguments are largely based on the isolation of key components of power. For example, they ignore Germany's industrial base which emerged relatively undamaged from World War I, her population (the second largest in Europe after Russia), and the secret German-Soviet military relationship in which Germany avoided many of the key restrictions of Versailles. In the case of the Soviet Union, one cannot ignore its population, raw material base, and the military essence of its new society.

These results, given existing questions related to the method, conflict with interpretations of the system's early years. Carr points out that, during the period 1920-24, France reached the summit of her prestige and power.⁴⁹ Holborn argues that France and Britain, in conjunction, could have built and maintained the system which emerged from World War I.⁵⁰ Our results are contrary to both views. Although France did reach the summit of her power in the early twenties, especially when compared to the rest of the period, it still did not rank substantially above, if at all, the other powers of the system. As Taylor points out, once

⁴⁹ E.H.Carr, International Relations Since the Peace Treaties, (London: MacMillan Press, 1945), p. 12.

⁵⁰ H.Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 120.

the victors of World War I decided against the dissolution of Germany as a national actor and withdrawn from the Russian civil war, the paramountcy of France is largely an illusion.⁵¹ Certainly France and Britain did seem to dominate the system during these early years. However, once these decisions were made, it was simply a matter of time until behavior reflected the reality of the system's hierarchy.

Historians also argue that Germany was the potentially dominant power in Europe after World War One.⁵² This view is the product of certain considerations. First, German dominance is identified from the necessary involvement of the United States, a non-system power, in the defeat of Germany in 1918. Second, the dramatic success of the German armies from 1939-41 provide unconcious post facto evidence of potential German dominance. Finally, the immoral behavior of the Hitler regime, domestically and in the occupied countries, may also reinforce this view.

However, our findings reveal the Soviet Union, from 1928 onward, as the first ranked state in the system. If any actor had the potential to dominate the system, the Soviet Union seems to be the most likely candidate. This view leads

⁵¹ A.J.P.Taylor, op. cit, p. 24.

⁵² G.L.Weinberg, "The Defeat of Germany in 1918 and the European Balance of Power", Central European History, Volume II, 1969, pp. 248-260. See also A.J.P.Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, (Oxford: University Press, 1954) and R.A.Kann, "The Defeat of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the European Balance of Power", Central European History, Volume II, 1969, p. 243.

us to ask the following question: why is it that historians have neglected the potential power of the Soviet Union but stressed the same characteristic for Germany? The answer lies in the aforementioned considerations of the Soviet Union and Germany. First, there seems to be an underlying question of Soviet membership in the system. For example, Taylor points out that the center of the system during this period moved from Berlin to the Rhine.⁵³ However, the questionable membership of the Soviet Union has not resulted in her absence from existing studies on the period. Second, the Soviet rejection of the traditional principles of international politics, expressed ideologically, and Western attempts to isolate the Soviet pariah state reflect the low level of importance placed on Soviet power. But, such considerations did not stop Western attempts to negotiate an alliance against Germany, although it did hinder them. Furthermore, the manifestation of Western attempts to isolate the Soviet Union, the French alliance system in Eastern Europe (cordon sanitaire) was as much, if not more, directed against Germany. Finally, the downplaying of Soviet power is based on evidence related to her military capabilities. Stalin's purge of the military in 1937 raised concerns among actors about the quality of her forces. Soviet military capabilities were also divided because of the Japanese threat on her Far Eastern border. These issues, however, must be

⁵³ A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, pp. 20-21.

raised for other powers. For example, Adamthwaite points out that British and French elites had a negative effect on their respective capabilities.⁵⁴ Also, both France and Britain had military liabilities in the Far East. There certainly is a need to account for the impact of non-system commitments on indicators of systemic hierarchy. However, it is highly unlikely that this accounting would dramatically effect our rankings.

The importance of the Soviet ranking is also reinforced by problems with the assertions made about Germany. First, by the time the United States actively entered World War I, Germany was exhausted. The last major German offensive in 1918 was halted by the allies prior to direct American involvement. Second, the Soviet Union remained neutral in the war which broke out in 1939. Prior to Spring 1940, the balance of forces on the Western front would not necessarily have led to a prediction of the decisive victory achieved by Germany in May 1940. Finally, the central focus on Hitler should not override the actual distribution of capabilities in the system. Overall, it was the collapse of Russia in 1917 and Soviet neutrality in 1939 which are central factors in understanding the nature of our findings.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ A.P. Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second War, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), pp. 68-69.

⁵⁵ Calleo argues that Hitler was motivated by a perception of the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States to superpower status. This perception dictated German expansion to ensure it remained as a major power. A. Calleo, The German Problem Re-Considered, (Cambridge: Uni-

The ranks of the Soviet Union and Germany in the mid to late Thirties provides a basis for identifying system polarity. Our findings strongly indicate a four power system. This inference is based on the marginal rank of Italy. Historians also identify increasing Anglo-French cooperation and policy coordination from 1935 onward, even though no formal alliance existed between them.⁵⁶ This relationship may have not only been motivated by the need to balance increasing German power, but also to maintain the equilibrium of the system.

In the first section of this chapter, polarity based on political commitments was criticized. However, the acceptance of the Anglo-French relationship as equivalent to a system pole reflects a strong degree of intersubjective agreement. For example, historians are in general agreement that France during the Munich crisis abrogated its independence to follow the British lead. In contrast, the Franco-Russian alliance of the period is not equated to a system pole because the historical evidence reveals its hollow nature.⁵⁷

versity Press, 1978) p. 98.

⁵⁶ For example, E.H.Carr, op. cit., p. 231, and A. Adamthwaite, op. cit., p. 75.

⁵⁷ A.J.P.Taylor, op. cit., p. 47.

These considerations lead to a depiction of the Interwar system from 1935 onwards as tripolar. The emergence of tri-polarity, potentially a partial response to changes in the distribution of capabilities, may provide a partial explanation for the policy of appeasement. Traditionally, one of the explanations for appeasement is British fear of Bolshevism. A military confrontation with Germany in 1938 could have led to the Bolshevik entrance into Central Europe, given the Soviet alliance with Czechoslovakia. If one removes the ideological component, the decision may be partially explained by the structural characteristics of the system.⁵⁸ This inference provides evidence of the explanatory nature of the system which may be important for subsequent theoretical developments.

It is also valuable to examine the patterns of change in average military force levels and expenditure with historical inferences. Historians have also sub-divided the period into three eras: the immediate postwar era (1919-1924); the Locarno era (1925-1933); and the Hitler era (1934-1939). Our findings support these general divisions. The first era

⁵⁸ For the traditional interpretations of appeasement see K.G. Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, (London: Archow Books, 1970), M. Gott, The Appeasers, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967), and L.W. Fuchser, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History, (New York: Norton, 1982). For general discussion, see W. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, ed, Appeasement of the Dictators: Crisis Diplomacy, (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1970). For its implications in the field see R.I. Barry Jones, "The Study of Appeasement and the Study of International Relations", British Journal of International Studies, Volume 1, 1975.

shows a relative decline on the military indicators. The second era is relatively static, and consistent with the view of the Locarno years as relatively harmonious. Finally, the Hitler era shows a dramatic growth. The initial increase in this last era can be partially attributed to the German rearmament decision. However, its continued growth reveals evidence of a substantial shock to the system.

This findings supports Adamthwaite's contention that from 1934 onward rapid change occurred in the system.⁵⁹ He also points out that this era exhibited an atmosphere of undeclared war. This view supports the normative assertion of a strong correlation between rising tensions and increases in military capabilities. However, this relationship must be refined to identify the causal ordering between tensions and capabilities.

It is also valuable to briefly provide a comparison of the historical literature with our findings on political commitments and trade. It has already been noted that the only formal alliance between Great Powers was largely inoperative. Adamthwaite raises questions about the actual value of the alliances between France and secondary powers of Eastern Europe.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the tacit alliance between Britain and France, used to identify system tripolarity, is not included in our data. Finally, Adamthwaite also argues

⁵⁹ A.P. Adamthwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

that the emergence of buffer states resulted in the appearance of satellites in the system due to Great Power pressure.⁶¹

These limited number of interpretations provides support for the inferences identified in the political commitment section. Specific alliance commitments are largely avoided by the actors. This finding supports the view of a perceived relationship, held by the actors, between alliance commitments and war. It may explain the dominance of non-aggression pacts between the Great Powers and other actors, and the general disposition toward entente relationships between the Great Powers. Furthermore, it supports our temporal argument, outlined in Chapter Two, on the distinct nature of this system. However, our findings are unable to judge the contention of the emergence of satellites, although the tendency to engage in relationships with the Great Powers provides tentative support.

Our study of trade must be initially related to two points. First, the bulk of the relevant historical literature ignores this element. Second, economic historians have stressed the politicization of trade during this system.⁶² However, the results of this study tend to support the rejection of trade as a vital factor in this system. There is

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² S.Pollard, The Intergration of the European Economy Since 1815, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 77-78.

evidence of a great deal economic upheaval and change, especially with the dominance among some actors of autarkic policies, but its impact on the system is questionable.

Pollard asserts that trading agreements shifted from a multilateral to bilateral form.⁶³ Kaiser contends that Germany consciously used its position and dominance over Central-Eastern European trade to its strategic advantage, and the West failed to counter these actions.⁶⁴ However, our findings on trade concentration provide evidence of little actual change in the overall pattern of system trade. Furthermore, this general consistency raises questions about the actual ability of the West to counter German policy. Although specific trading relationships may have changed to some degree, the general patterns remained constant. Therefore, any specific changes in the twenties away from German dominance in this region of the system are probably slight and reflect an abnormal condition resulting from the economic dislocations of the political divisions in Versailles.

Our trade category, as well as political commitments, need to be refined in a subsequent study to identify specific clusters of actors. One possible method is Guttman's Small Space Analysis (SSA). According to Wallace, this

⁶³ Ibid, p. 72.

⁶⁴ D.E.Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Great Britain, France, and Eastern Europe 1930-1939, (Princeton: University Press, 1980), pp. 316-318.

method has certain benefits for the identification of clusters.⁶⁵ First, it does not require interval level data, ordinal will suffice. Second, SSA does not need any new theoretical assumptions or complex analytical decisions. Finally, the results can be spatially represented in a two or three dimensional matrix. However, the method does require a relatively large population to ensure validity, a problem due to the relatively small size of our system.

In summation, the purpose of this study was to examine research issues in History and International Politics and apply a specific type of research to an historical system. It was based on the belief that disciplinary divisions have been a negative force in the development of knowledge and explanation. Although this study focused on the overall utility of developing a comparative systems approach to the study of International Politics, there is a need to integrate other approaches and levels of analysis in order to develop theory. But this can only occur through the development of agreement over how to divide the past.

It has been stressed that cumulation must be one of the goals of disciplinary or field research. Yet cumulation, it is argued, is limited unless agreement occurs on the means to study phenomena. This is not only confronted in International Politics as a field, but within and between

⁶⁵ M.D.Wallace, "Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cutting, and International War 1815-1964." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 17, 1973.

disciplines. Perhaps it is overly idealistic to feel that such problems can be overcome. Certainly any survey of epistemological issues within a discipline provides ample evidence of deeply held divisions. But this author feels that these divisions can be overcome by first developing a greater interaction between History and the other social sciences.

History represents the only significant laboratory for the development of theory. There is also a large degree of compatibility between historians and social scientists depending on the focus of their work. There is nothing characteristically unique about their work in comparison to the social sciences. Finally, historians must confront the same issues and problems as other researchers into social phenomena.

There are also numerous gains which can be made through such interaction. The historians concern for the past within its own milieu is a factor which many social scientists ignore. The nuances of historical change which are so central to History as a discipline can aid in the development and operationalization of models of referent phenomena. Research can only benefit from increased interaction. This is the path which this thesis advocates and applies to the examination of an international system.

This thesis analyzed the various criteria for identifying distinct international systems and applied them against the evidence supplied by historical interpretation. This process is certainly not new or unique. But it is hoped that this thesis has avoided the pitfall of historical ransacking of which many such studies are liable. Although this process is applied to only one system, it is felt that the criteria are equally applicable throughout history. It is necessary to expand the application of these criteria throughout history in order to lay the foundation, and if necessary to re-examine their utility, for comparative systems analysis and theory construction.

This thesis also examined some aspects of the Interwar European International System. It did not attempt to fully depict the system's structure and behavior. As a result its inferences are only tentative at best. There is a need to round out the depiction of international politics during this period, not only in systems terms, but also in relation to the other levels of analysis. This would include the application of other models, foreign policy analysis, and studies on individual and state perceptions. This is naturally a mammoth undertaking, but it is unlikely that our knowledge about that period will expand until such a process is undertaken, and furthermore the application of comparative analysis must be made from such a foundation. As noted earlier, this would include a re-examination of existing historical interpretations.

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