

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

A STRUCTURAL REINTERPRETATION OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVOLVING
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL

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MASTER OF ARTS
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BY
BRENT SASLEY

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL**

BY

BRENT SASLEY

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS**

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ABSTRACT

This purpose of this thesis is to examine and explain in detail the recent and developing military relationship between Israel and Turkey. To do so effectively, the thesis focuses on four aspects of this relationship, all of which are interconnected and equally important; without each of them, the thesis cannot be adequately understood. The first refers to the theoretical incentives that have driven Turkey and Israel to realise (relative) security in co-operation with each other. The second factor relates to the historical and geographic context in which both countries find themselves. To that end, a close look at the history of their regional relations will reveal that most of these relations have contributed to their physical insecurity and a need to overcome this deficiency by bringing their militaries closer together.

Third, the current state of these multiple relationships indicate that Turkey and Israel's situation has not improved, and in fact has even worsened in a number of ways. The reasons and motivations behind Jerusalem and Ankara's decision to collaborate militarily can be found in their relations with their regional neighbours--in particular with Syria, Iraq, and Iran--since both Turkey and Israel have substantial disagreements and disputes with each of these states, and in the case of Turkey, Greece as well. Finally, no relationship is without its problems, and the Turkish-Israeli one also faces difficulties. The thesis concludes, however, that the reasons and motives listed previously throughout this study are more than enough to overcome these potential stumbling blocks, and in fact provide for a strong basis for a continuation and strengthening of this relationship that has such an important effect on Middle Eastern politics in the last years of the twentieth century.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The Middle East is arguably the most volatile region in the world today, although there is no doubt that there are other areas prone to violence as well. Tensions run high in this realm, and most states are involved in one dispute or another with some, or sometimes several, of their regional neighbours. But the aspect of Middle Eastern politics that usually highlights its volatility is its inclination toward sudden, even unexpected, shifts and changes in the previously prevalent political, diplomatic, and military currents. The emergence of ties between Turkey and Israel since the 1990s can be cited as a very good example of this trend. The fact that this relationship has grown stronger each year, based on economic, diplomatic, political, and military facets, has forced many states within the region to reconsider their strategies. Both countries are regional military powers, both are pro-Western, especially pro-American, both are democracies, and both are viewed by the predominantly Arab and Muslim Middle East¹ as foreigners, outsiders, and even intruders.

This thesis focuses on the military relationship between these two states, beginning on February 23 1996, when the Turkish Deputy Chief of the General Staff,

¹ The terms “Arab” and “Muslim” are not used interchangeably in this thesis. The former includes all states whose inhabitants are predominantly Arab, while the latter encompasses those states whose official religion is Islam (the Arab states and Iran) or whose population is predominantly Muslim (Turkey). This comprises the entire Middle East except for Israel, but including Iran and Turkey, both of which are non-Arab (Persians and Turks, respectively).

General Cevik Bir, and the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, David Ivry, signed the Military Training Cooperation Agreement (MTCA). This accord became the forerunner of a number of military agreements, ranging from naval training exercises to joint missile production. There are other aspects to the Turkish-Israeli relationship, especially economic interactions, but these facets, as seen in the light of Middle Eastern politics,² do not have the same glaring effect on other states as the martial elements. Importantly, this thesis argues that this particular development affects the course of Middle Eastern politics at the end of the twentieth century to a greater degree than perhaps any other event in the Middle East in recent years; in short, this sudden shift in political and military currents has affected the balance of interests within the region, as well as the context of strategic relations in the Middle East.

The purpose of this thesis is to explain what is perhaps the most dynamic and consequential development in Middle Eastern politics within the last few years. The Turkish-Israeli military relationship has already had wide-ranging consequences within the Middle East and other nearby regions. It has shown its effects in the harsh condemnation of it by Muslim states, and some of their policies of re-evaluating former enmities within the area. The relationship's non-regional after-effects include the fact that the United States, while not having actively encouraged a Jerusalem-Ankara axis, can now appreciate the extent to which such a development contributes to furthering either its direct influence in the Middle East or a realisation of its own policies. This is done primarily through a strengthening of its two closest regional friends, who are both pro-

² This phrase encompasses an entire range of relationships between states within the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, Persian Gulf politics, inter-Arab relations, and inter-Muslim disputes. The Jerusalem-Ankara axis has the potential to

Western in an area known for its anti-Western, or more specifically anti-American, tendencies. The core examination is on the theoretical incentives behind the Turkish-Israeli decision, the historical context in which they are situated, the reasons and motivations, both within and without the region, and the potential stumbling blocks to at least military collaboration.

To better elucidate the main points to be drawn from the thesis, the following can be taken by the reader as the most important elements of discussion on both the Turkish-Israeli relationship and the thesis itself:

- The Military Training Cooperation Agreement and all subsequent accords dealing with defence-industrial and defence co-operation ties;
- The other supporting aspects of the Turkish-Israeli relationship, including cultural, financial, tourism, environmental, crime-fighting, and perhaps most importantly, economic affairs;
- The potential these combined facets have for a mature strategic alliance;
- The very nature of Turkey and Israel's relationships with other Middle Eastern countries, namely their shared distinct "otherness" (that is, Jews and Turks as settler-conquerors in an area overwhelmingly Muslim Arab) and their shared strategic relationship with the United States;
- The integral necessity of examining Israel and Turkey's regional relationships (particularly with Syria, Iraq, and Iran) in order to understand why the two have initiated closer military links;
- The effect the Military Training Cooperation Agreement, and broader military relations between the two, has had on Middle Eastern politics;
- The focus of Structural Realism on the system-level analysis of International Relations and the ability of this theory to adequately explain the developments in Turkish-Israeli relations;
- The fact that although potential stumbling blocks exist to any relationship within the complex web of Middle Eastern politics, the Turkish-Israeli link seems strong enough for the foreseeable future to withstand most changes within regional politics.

As mentioned, the increasing closeness of Israeli-Turkish ties is shown in this thesis to be theoretically coherent; indeed, for international relations, its result should have been expected with the change in the bipolar structure of the international system.

affect all of these currents, and therefore "Middle Eastern politics" is used to describe the extent to which it has influenced other states and other relationships.

As Kenneth Waltz argued, a change in the international structure will produce a change in state behaviour. Under the bipolar mantle of the Cold War, neither Turkey nor Israel had much incentive, although the reasons certainly did exist, to expand their ties. At the end of Soviet-American rivalry, and the subsequent lessening of nearly unconditional American support for its friends and allies in the face of a Communist threat, Jerusalem and Ankara correctly perceived their external security situations to have been altered. A relationship between the two makes much sense in the post-bipolar era, and as is argued later, these current developments in Turkish-Israeli relations point to the continued relevance and applicability of Structural Realism.

Whether or not this development represents a new power alliance in the Middle East is open to debate. As Chapter Five will discuss, it is still too early to predict with any certainty what will become of the relationship in the new decade. The potential does exist for an emerging power bloc, but the complexities of Middle Eastern politics prohibit any quick or easy solutions to a country's problems.

Details of Individual Chapters

An analysis of the recent and expanding military relationship between Israel and Turkey requires some historical background, as well as a description of the motives behind, and potential stumbling blocks to, this development. This thesis is divided into five chapters, including an introductory section. Chapter Two relates the more intangible, theoretical incentives behind Turkish-Israeli co-operation, namely the nature of Structural Realism as designed by Kenneth Waltz and its effects on the international system. This chapter argues that the theoretical forces pushing for Israel and Turkey to draw closer

militarily are just as important as, if not more than, the more concrete reasons explained in Chapters Three and Four, while these latter sections reflect the physical, visible motivations. Chapter Two thus lays the groundwork for understanding the Jerusalem-Ankara axis. However, since Structural Realism is only a theoretical tool to explain actual events, the proceeding chapters deal in more concrete issues.

Chapter Three summarises the historical relations between Turkey and Israel, as well as their relations with regional neighbours and the United States. Doing so will draw a picture of the circumstances both countries face within the Middle East. Since the purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader only with a contextual background to the thesis, it does not go into greater detail into the motivations behind Turkish-Israeli military collaboration. That is reserved for Chapter Four, which details the motives that spring from relations with Middle Eastern and regional states, as well as concerns arising from both countries' current state of relations with the West. In the process of this examination, it will be made clear what benefits Turkey and Israel derive from their military relationship. Finally, Chapter Five begins with a discussion on those aspects of the relationship that have the capability to disrupt and possibly even negate Turkish-Israeli collaboration, while at the same time refuting these arguments by maintaining that although there may be significant reasons for such a relationship to fail, current circumstances provide ample opportunity for the Jerusalem-Ankara axis to grow stronger and even flourish. This section will conclude with a discussion on the future of this developing friendship and its importance to both Middle East and security studies, and International Relations in general.

It should be noted that this thesis is indeed lengthy. However, since the topic is so important for both Middle Eastern politics and International Relations theory, much material needs to be covered and explained. Although each chapter examines a different aspect of this subject, they are all interdependent and equally important, and to leave anything out would be to remove a substantial explanatory section without which the Turkish-Israeli military relationship cannot be fully explained or understood. The overall argument would then be lacking, and the thesis itself unfulfilled.

Turkish-Israeli Military Co-operation

It must be mentioned here that of the original accord, the Military Training Cooperation Agreement, much has remained classified, and it can be safely assumed that many aspects of subsequent arrangements also are unobtainable for public consumption. What follows is a summary of information that is available, based on what little has been gleaned from official sources and what can be assumed and deduced from a study of Turkey and Israel's relations with Middle Eastern, regional, and other powers.

As stated previously, February 23 1996 began an era of overt military co-operation between Israel and Turkey.³ This agreement itself would have remained secret, but it was revealed after leaks to the Turkish press announced its existence and certain of its clauses. The Military Training Cooperation Agreement signed in Tel Aviv was agreed to last for five years, and without ninety-days notification of termination before the expiry date, will remain in force for an additional year. These same rules apply toward each subsequent yearly renewal.

Although the document itself is not available to the general public, certain aspects of this accord are known. The signatories agreed to allow for members of each state's air force to fly training exercises within the other country's borders, four times each year. A Turkish Foreign Ministry press release discussing the agreement read: "The fact that the Israeli and Turkish armed forces use the same type of aircraft, with the same specifications, makes technological cooperation both necessary and useful."⁴ The press release added that the aircraft, whether in Turkish or Israeli territory, would not be using either ammunition or electronic listening devices, intending to allay Iranian and Syrian fears that Israel would use Turkey's borders with their countries to establish intelligence posts and eavesdrop on government conversations. Naval exercises were also stipulated, as well as allowing the Israeli navy to train at Turkish diving facilities for lesser costs.

Much more has been declared by non-government sources, though, on what these agreements might contain. In fact, the Israeli daily, Ha'aretz, reported in June 1996 that Turkey would indeed allow Israel to conduct electronic surveillance flights along its borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.⁵ In April 1996, eight Israeli F-16s made the first visit to the Turkish air base of Akinci, near Ankara, for a week of training. This exercise was of great benefit to Israel, since Turkey's much larger area and mountainous terrain provide for more opportunity than is available in a small country such as Israel.⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that these flights "almost certainly"

³ Chapter Three relates aspects of the covert nature of Turkish-Israeli relations. The purpose of this chapter is to detail the (relatively) open military relationship between the two states.

⁴ Statement from Turkey's Foreign Ministry, 10 April 1996.

⁵ John Pomfret, "Turkey Strengthens Ties to Israel," The Washington Post, 2 June, 1996.

included reconnaissance missions aimed at Syria and Iraq.⁷ In June that same year, Turkish pilots made their debut flights over Israel.

Although both Jerusalem and Ankara have denied that their agreement is directed against any third country, as if to give substance to Muslim fears that Israel can in fact utilise Turkish airspace in any attack on Muslim territory, Turkish ambassador to the U.S., Nuzhet Kandemir, admitted that during the February 1997 Iraqi crisis, Ankara gave some thought to allowing Israeli war planes to fly through Turkish airspace to penetrate Iraqi territory were Baghdad to send SCUD missiles against Israel.⁸ It has also been reported that Iran is concerned that its nuclear program might suffer the same fate as Iraq's did in 1981⁹: the ability of Israeli planes to fly through Turkey certainly enhances the chances of success for such an operation were it ever to be contemplated.

Another aspect of air force co-operation lies in the establishment of a radar network to be used to pinpoint and identify migration routes of predatory birds in fall and spring. Seven radar stations are to cover Turkish and Israeli airspace, which allows each state to provide the other with advance warning of when the migrations begin. So far, ninety Turkish pilots have received Israeli training with regard to bird-plane collisions and safety regulations.¹⁰

The February agreement was also alleged to have provided for protocols for officer exchanges, visits by military delegations, joint air and naval training, intelligence

⁶ Michael Eisenstadt, "Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation: An Assessment," Policywatch No.262 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 24 July, 1997).

⁷ Stephen Kinzer, "The Mideast's New Friendship," The New York Times, 14 April, 1997.

⁸ Turkish Daily News, 21 February 1997.

⁹ Middle East Security Report No.52, 21 January 1998.

co-operation,¹¹ strategic dialogue meetings, and other points more related to defence industrial joint action.¹² With such a wide-ranging agreement, it is reasonable to argue that subsequent accords and agreements would not be long in the making. And indeed, they were not. A flurry of visits by military personnel followed.

About one month after the first agreement, the two militaries announced they had agreed to hold joint manoeuvres and training exercises, and that a security forum for strategic dialogue was set as an ongoing process. Near the end of May, Turkey's naval commander, Admiral Guven Arkiya, arrived in Israel as a guest of the Israeli naval chief, Major-General Alex Tal, for a four-day visit. At the beginning of June, the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) Deputy Chief of Staff, Major-General Matan Vilnai, flew to Turkey.

In June 1996 Israeli President Ezer Weizman visited Turkey for a United Nations Conference, but he did not meet with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel. Their discussion focused on ways to further cement the military co-operation between their armed forces. This meeting seems to have borne fruit. Ankara and Jerusalem had been quietly working on an arms deal for Israel to upgrade fifty-four Turkish F-4 Phantom fighter planes for \$650 million, but the agreement had been delayed because of financing problems. The Israeli Knesset agreed to grant loans to Israel Aircraft Industries, the company overseeing the overhauling of the Phantoms, but, due to the Turkish government's inability to pay the money up front, Israeli banks which would be funding the work were hesitant.

¹⁰ Amikam Nachmani, "Bridge Across the Middle East: Turkey and Israel in the 1990s," forthcoming, 25.

¹¹ As Amikam Nachmani states, "[t]his is a domain in which speculation is rife, but Turkey's location between three states of especial interest to Israel (Syria, Iraq, Iran) leaves little scope for assuming anything but the existence of close Israeli-Turkish intelligence ties." Source: *Ibid.*, 22.

On August 28 1996, this hesitation was relieved. Director-General Ivry and Turkish Undersecretary of Defense Tuncer Kilinc signed a second defence agreement, which dealt primarily with the exchange of technical expertise and knowledge. This accord was largely expected to pave the way for implementing the deal to upgrade Turkey's F-4s, although the details of the deal were considered secret.¹³

The February and August defence pacts were considered by most to be the defining landmarks in Turkish-Israeli military collaboration. Most of the clauses in both were deemed classified, both involved unprecedented exchanges, and both caused consternation and even fear in the surrounding Arab and Muslim states. The August agreement was later enhanced, in December: the modernisation of the Turkish Phantoms would cost \$650 million (\$800 million with interest) and include the installation of advanced avionics systems, such as radar, electronic warfare capabilities, and navigation systems.¹⁴ Twenty-six of the planes would be upgraded in Israel, twenty-eight in Turkey, within six to eight years. Further, that same month a pact was signed in which an Israeli company agreed to supply Turkey with Airborne Rescue Systems for helicopters, in a deal worth about \$15 million.

In May 1997, then-Turkish Defense Minister Turhan Tayan visited Israel, and toured the Lebanese and Syrian borders, and the Golan Heights. That same month, a report was written in a Turkish newspaper that claimed that Israel had given secret

¹² Kinzer, "The Mideast's New Friendship."

¹³ Arie O'Sullivan, "Turkey, Israel Sign Delayed Defense Industry Pact," The Jerusalem Post, 29 August, 1996.

¹⁴ Steve Rodan and news agencies, "Turkey Signs \$650 m. Phantom Upgrade Deal with IAI," The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, 8 December, 1996.

information about MiG-29 warplanes, the type flown by the Syrian air force, to Turkey.¹⁵ About two weeks later, Israel and Turkey announced they had agreed to jointly produce the Popeye II air-to-ground missile in a \$100 million deal (Turkey had already purchased fifty Popeye I missiles).¹⁶

Although these arms deals in themselves are large enough, Turkey announced in January 1997 that it has sweeping plans to completely overhaul its armed forces and modernise them effectively to meet all potential threats to its security. Retired General Sitki Orun, technical advisor to the state-run Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, declared that Turkey will spend \$150 billion over the next twenty-five years to modernise its military.¹⁷ General Orun further stated that Turkey prefers these plans to be made in conjunction with Israel and Israeli defence firms.¹⁸ At the end of 1997, the Turkish Deputy Defense Minister, Tuncer Kilinc, met with Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, while visiting Israel for two days.

Israel's Merkava tank is being touted as a possible replacement for Turkey's tank force, which has a program to produce eight hundred new battle tanks in a three billion dollar deal.¹⁹ In addition, at the end of December 1997, Israel Aircraft Industries won a tender to upgrade Turkey's F-5 fighter planes, for \$75 million. Ankara has also shown interest in co-producing the Phalcon airborne warning aircraft, the Arrow anti-missile

¹⁵ Turkey denied the report. Source: News Agencies, "Report: Israel Gave Turkey Data on the MiG-29," The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, 4 May, 1997.

¹⁶ Arie O'Sullivan, "Israel, Turkey to Make Popeye Missiles," The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, 18 May, 1997.

¹⁷ Turkish Press Review, "New \$150 Billion Military Agreement with Israel," 28 January, 1997. \$65 billion is to be spent on the air force, \$60 billion on land forces, and \$25 billion on the navy.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Steve Rodan, "Turkey Wants More Arms Deals from Israel," The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, 27 January, 1997.

system (which is funded largely by the United States), and missile and attack boats.²⁰ The two countries have already agreed to jointly produce the 400-kilometer range Delilah cruise missile, and engaged in discussions on satellite communications joint production. It has also been reported that Turkey would purchase from Israel the Python-4 air-to-air missile, and would manufacture the Israeli Galil infantry rifle.²¹ The two governments have even expressed interest in co-operating in the area of space research.²²

As though to underscore these expanding links, Turkey and Israel held for the first time a joint naval exercise, dubbed "Reliant Mermaid," on January 7 1998.²³ The United States also participated, and Jordan sent an observer, in a five-hour search and rescue operation that drew a storm of protest from the Arab states and Iran, seeming to confirm fears that the Turkish-Israeli relationship had reached strategic proportions. The exercise involved approximately 1000 sailors, an American destroyer, two Israeli Saar missile boats, two Turkish frigates, and a number of Israeli helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft.²⁴

As is explained in Chapter Four, part of Turkey's desire to collaborate with Israel is the disregard Turkey has received from European states and the United States. Norway has imposed an arms embargo against Turkey and in January 1997 Belgium cancelled a weapons sale due to human rights violations in Turkey. In the United States, Congress

²⁰ Eisenstadt, "Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation."

²¹ Nachmani, "Bridge Across the Middle East: Turkey and Israel in the 1990s." 22.

²² Amnon Barzilai, "Israel and Turkey Look to the Stars as Strategic Ties Deepen," Ha'aretz English Edition, 10 December 1997, 1.

²³ These exercises were originally scheduled to take place in the summer of 1997, but were postponed until November of that year, and then were postponed again until January 1998.

²⁴ Middle East Security Report No.50, 8 January 1998.

has been extremely reluctant to supply Turkey with armaments for the same reason, and a long-awaited deal for Super Cobra attack helicopters was eventually dismissed.

However, there are other determinants behind the co-operation agreements, as well. Both Israel and Turkey are surrounded by countries either internally unstable (as in the case of the Caucasus), ruled by dictatorial regimes (such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, even Saudi Arabia), or with a history of antagonism and enmity toward them (namely, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Greece). The proceeding chapters will examine and explain in greater detail the motivations pushing Israel and Turkey closer together, beginning with the chapter on theory and why Structural Realism is so important for this case study in helping to validate its viability.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL IMPERATIVES

Introduction

The field of International Relations theory has always been rife with various new models and paradigms to explain the workings of inter- and non-state relations within the international system. Some focus on the state-as-actor, some on inter- and supranational organisations; there are those that deal specifically with individuals, and those that seem to neglect completely these individuals. However, in studying the empirical evidence of the recent and growing military relationship between Israel and Turkey, one is drawn to the conclusion that the theory that best describes the “why” behind this new facet of Middle Eastern politics is Structural Realism. This theory, at its most basic and briefest level, relates most international political interaction to the influence of the structure of the international system. It is this particular theory, with its roots in the centuries-old theory of Realism, that this chapter argues is the best method for understanding this new regional development. In fact, the case study provides empirical confirmation that Structural Realism is a useful theoretical model for the study of International Relations.

Because no theory has ever been created on its own, without relying at least to some extent on previous modes of thought, it is necessary first to take a brief look at the theoretical context surrounding Structural Realism. In doing so, this chapter will explain the use of the term “Structural” instead of “Neo” as a prefix for Realism,¹ since many

¹ It is generally asserted that the term “Neorealism” was coined by Robert Cox. Source: Robert Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in

scholars are content with the latter. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that the term “Structural” serves as a more accurate description of the theory itself.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the debate between these two prefixes, followed by a detailed inquisition into Structural Realism itself. The main proponent of this theory, it is argued here, is Kenneth Waltz as he expounded it in his book, Theory of International Politics, in 1979.² Although there are other Structural Realists within the field, it was Waltz who raised the banner and who has been most closely associated with the theory, and therefore he will be studied in the greatest detail. The chapter will conclude with a reference to Turkish-Israeli military ties, and how Structural Realism helps one to understand this growing relationship.

Structural Realism

International Relations is a discipline of long standing, and it has inspired passionate and lengthy debates about its main theories. It is generally accepted among International Relations³ theoreticians that the discipline itself as a separate field within

Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 16. As far as this author can discern, the term “Structural Realism” was first coined by Robert Keohane in 1982. Source: Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ana Finifter (Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1983), 535, endnote #17.

² It is important to note, however, that in his 1959 (Man, the State, and War), 1971 (“Conflict in World Politics,”) and 1975 (“Theory of International Relations”) works Waltz had already begun to knit together the slender strands that would, in 1979, become his blanket theory.

³ When discussing all relations between all actors in the global system, the term “international relations” shall be used. When the latter is written with capital letters, it refers to the body of theory itself, as opposed to the actual fact of these relationships. Finally, the term “international politics” will be used to refer to the interactions and relations between states only.

Political Science came into its own in the period after the First World War,⁴ when the three theoretical waves that gave the new discipline its first legs to stand on evolved—namely, Idealism, (Classical) Realism, and Behaviouralism.⁵ As is explained below, Structural Realism took as its basis the older form of Realism and emphasised different aspects of the theory.

In writing Theory of International Politics, Waltz was primarily concerned with explaining the consistently repeating patterns of behaviours of states throughout the centuries, in the face of states' different domestic organisations.⁶ As he asserted in a later article, “[t]he behaviors of states, the patterns of their interactions, and the outcomes their interactions produced had been repeated again and again through the centuries despite profound changes in the internal composition of states.”⁷ As George Quester points out, in unwitting defence of Waltz's theory, “[s]tates may have varied in their territoriality, their ethnic nationalism, and their penetrability over the last several centuries, but may have varied less in their fundamental Hobbesian need for caution and concern about each other's intentions.”⁸ In other words, it matters little whether the units making up the system are tribes, city-states, kingdoms, empires, nation-states, or states: what matters is that they must always act in the same way to preserve themselves (see below) in order to

⁴ Numerous scholars remark on this. For a limited example, see Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Politics: 1919-1969,” in The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969, ed. Brian Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 30-55; and Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁵ Bull, “The Theory of International Politics,” 33.

⁶ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 65.

⁷ Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (Fall 1993): 45.

endure within their system, and that does not require an explanation of their individual make-up, but rather of the international system they inhabit.

Any structural theory focuses on continuities,⁹ and as related below Waltz is no different. These types of theories, as Waltz said, focused “our attention on those components and forces that usually continue for long periods.”¹⁰ He asked “[i]f changes in international outcomes are linked directly to changes in actors, how can one account for similarities of outcomes that persist or recur even as actors vary?”¹¹ The only answer, he felt, lay in a structural account of the international political system, and Structural Realism was his response.

Neo Versus Structural Realism

It has been asserted that Waltz’s Theory of International Politics has shaped much of the theoretical debate during the 1980s and into the 1990s, including both positive and negative responses.¹² But what Waltz was propounding has been the subject of some debate. There are many scholars who refer to Waltz’s theory as Neorealist, including Waltz himself.¹³ It is the contention of this thesis, however, that Waltz has posed a form

⁸ George Quester, “The World Political System,” in Handbook of Political Science: International Politics, Volume 8, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 203.

⁹ Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 23.

¹⁰ Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 329.

¹¹ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 65.

¹² Buzan, et. al., The Logic of Anarchy, 1.

¹³ See, for instance, Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory”; his response to his critics in Keohane’s Neorealism and Its Critics; and his article “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory.” In all these works, he seems simply to accept the Neorealist title as a description of his theory. In 1993, however, he did imply that the terms were interchangeable: see Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 45.

of Classical Realism, focusing on the system level instead of the unit level, and thus deserving of the prefix “Structural.”

Barry Buzan, et al., do not think Waltz was a Structural Realist; in their book they attempt to draw out their own theory of structure from Waltz’s Neorealism,¹⁴ and many theoreticians have also stuck with the “Neo” title. Not understanding that the concentration on structure is the key to understanding Waltz and Structural Realism, many thus fail to account for the differences between Classical and Structural Realism.

There are, however, some that have noted the distinctions. Robert Keohane seems to waffle back and forth, referring in 1982 to the theory as Structural Realism, but in 1986 discussing it as Neorealism; David Baldwin also does not think there is a difference between the two. Scott Burchill, on the other hand, has referred to Waltz’s Realism as Structural.¹⁵

This chapter takes the view that because the very essence of Waltz’s theory of international politics deals with the structure of the international system, and because he himself asserts that the structure is more important for the study of international politics than the units themselves, the term “Structural” is much more appropriate. As will be explained in more detail throughout the following pages, it is the structure of the system that constrains and shapes the actions of states, rather than their individual desires.

¹⁴ Buzan, et. al., The Logic of Anarchy, 2 and *passim*.

¹⁵ Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” and as editor of Neorealism and Its Critics; David Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 4; Scott Burchill, “Realism and Neo-realism,”

The Need for Structure

Although Waltz was not the first to utilise the legacy of Behavioural methods to mould Realism into an altered form, he was the first create a definitively structural theory of international relations.¹⁶ As a result, his theory has become a basis for both criticisms of Neo and Structural Realism, and the foundation for further developments of Realist theories. He wrote Theory of International Politics at a time when Realist theories had been deemed by many to be unhelpful, especially since they did not seem to offer any prospects of change, and centred instead on the gloomy repetitions of international political life—generally meaning conflict and war. As Robert Gilpin put it, “[m]any, especially among the younger generation of international scholars, abhor realism because it is believed to be an immoral doctrine at best and a license to kill, make war, and commit wanton acts of rapine at worst.”¹⁷ At the same time, these theories neglected non-military interactions between states.

Books such as Keohane and Nye’s Power and Interdependence (1977) brought out the notions that first, economics, and second, other non-state actors were becoming more important in international relations—implying that the state was neither monolithically rational, nor the only entity capable of shaping world events. Military force and security, the primary pillars of Realist thought, were no longer as important as they once were, according to the new theories. Economics was displacing military power as the indicator of state strength, and some pointed out that war, being no longer

in Theories of International Relations, eds. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), 8.

¹⁶ No-one else, according to Waltz, had in fact done so: Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 41-59.

profitable, was on its way out as an instrument of foreign policy, at least among certain states.¹⁸

But the Realists had faced theoretical criticisms before, and they did not intend to see their theories fall by the wayside. Economics soon became part of the Realist dialogue, more particularly for Structural Realists. International regimes and organisations, as developed by Structural Realists such as Stephen Krasner, were the mechanisms that allowed states the ability “to control international economic transactions in a way that restores explanatory power to Realist assumptions about the role of the power-maximizing state.”¹⁹

Waltz felt that theory in International Relations was “moribund,” and he intended to reinvigorate it.²⁰ His theory was designed as a “a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics.”²¹ For Waltz, the key to responding to these critiques was to sharpen the theoretical assumptions of Realism, putting away those that were no longer valid and devising newer ones. Waltz saw the repetitions of the international system as not necessarily so pessimistic and dismal, but simply the way of international politics: change was not the only thing that mattered in international political life, but continuity,

¹⁷ Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 319.

¹⁸ See, for example, John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (USA: BasicBooks, 1989).

¹⁹ Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 37.

²⁰ Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Relations,” in Handbook of Political Science: International Politics, Volume 8, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 68.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

as seen by a study of history, is important as well.²² The way to understand this constancy, and to build up a theory capable of withstanding heavy criticisms, was to drop the Realist concentration on the state as the most appropriate unit for study, and instead turn to the system.²³ Only by doing so can a strong theory of international politics be constructed. As others have noted, those who support structural theories “insist that social science must move beyond self-conceptions and motives because individuals are constrained by structural forces over which they have no control and of which they may possess no knowledge.”²⁴ Although this may be an overly strong description of Waltz’s intentions, it nonetheless illustrates the point that Waltz and all Structural Realists heartily believe in.

Waltz devotes three chapters to an examination of the need to explain continuity in terms of structure, including the fact that up until that time, there had been no proper structural theory constructed.²⁵ For him, the distinction is clear, as it was for J. David Singer: Either one focuses on the unit (state) level of analysis in international politics, or one focuses on the system level. Waltz classified the two as reductionist (national) and systemic (international) theories.²⁶

Reductionist theories claim that the whole will be known through the study of its parts; Waltz recognised that the urge to study in this manner is strong in International

²² Burchill, “Realism and Neo-realism,” 83.

²³ This assertion should not be taken to mean that Waltz no longer considered the state to be the most important actor on the world stage, as all Classical Realists do. On the contrary, as will be shown later, for Structural Realism the focus remains on the unitary, rational state.

²⁴ Buzan, et. al., *The Logic of Anarchy*, 8.

²⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. See Chapters 2-4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

Relations.²⁷ This was primarily because to theoreticians, “it must often seem that national decisions and actions account for most of what happens in the world.”²⁸ Aside from being inaccurate, this type of thinking was distracting: it led the theoretician away from concentrating on the necessary ingredients for a proper theory of international politics. In a discussion on how wars begin, Waltz made the point quite clearly:

To attempt explanation in unit terms is to reach conclusions about events at one level by drawing inferences from events, attributes, and interactions at a different level. Attempted explanations at the unit level leads to the infinite proliferation of variables because at this level no one variable, or set of variables, is sufficient to produce the observed result.²⁹

He later clarifies this idea even more, taking into account the fact that the failure of international political theorists to provide adequate models for study has only inflated the belief that a reductionist methodology is the most suitable:

It must often seem that national decisions and action account for most of what happens in the world. How can explanations at the international-political level rival in importance a great power’s answers to such questions as these: Should it spend more or less on defense? Should it make nuclear weapons or not? Should it stand fast and fight or retreat and seek peace? National decisions and activities seem to be of overwhelming importance. This practical conclusion, together with the failure of international relations theory to provide either convincing explanations or serviceable guidance for research, had provided adequate temptation to pursue reductionist approaches.³⁰

Unfortunately for Classical Realists, this was not an effective way of explaining and understanding state behaviour, because it did not establish the autonomy of the international political realm, something which Hans Morgenthau, who is sometimes known as the father of Classical Realism, had included as a necessary principle of

²⁷ Ibid., 19.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Kenneth Waltz, “Conflict in World Politics,” in Conflict in World Politics, eds. Steven Spiegel and Kenneth Waltz (Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971), 456.

Realism. Only “[b]y depicting an international-political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, [does] neorealism [establish] the autonomy of international politics and thus make a theory about it possible.”³¹

Due to this reasoning, Waltz was convinced that only a rigorous account of the structure of the international system could account for international political behaviour. In the same way economics theory focuses not on the personality of the managers but on the influences of the market, so must International Relations theory concentrate on the international system, rather than on the states themselves.³² Although he was not the first theorist to write about the system, Waltz did design a theory parsimonious enough that those who followed after him could easily use his theory either as a stepping stone or a target.

It should be mentioned that for all his reliance on structure as the primary determinant of state behaviour, Waltz did not believe in structural determinism, nor did he believe that structure explained everything. Throughout his writings he was always careful to admit that states were not the only actors in the international system, and also that unit-level attributes were also important in considering state behaviour. Structural Realism is not a panacea in the search for a perfect understanding of international relations; rather, it is the best theory currently available for comprehending the recurrent conduct of states down throughout history. As he wrote even before Theory of

³⁰ Waltz, “Theory of International Relations,” 16-17.

³¹ Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” in The Evolution of Theory in International Relations, ed. Robert Rothstein (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 29.

³² Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 108.

International Politics was published, “[s]tructure shapes and limits choices; it establishes behavioral tendencies without determining behavior.”³³

A final note must be added in this same vein. In addition to discussing only aspects that repeat themselves, theories must also of necessity ignore accidents that appear to disprove or falsify them. As Waltz argued, theory “obviously cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected events; it deals in regularities and repetitions and is possible only if these can be identified.”³⁴ It would be impossible to design a theory that considers all potential and possible occurrences and incidents; therefore, it is logical to create a theory to explain only what is knowable.

Structure According to Waltz

Since Structural Realism is the thread that binds this thesis together, and since this theory revolves around the use of structure in the international system to explain international politics, it is necessary here to include an explanation of the basic tenets of Structural Realism. Doing so will also provide the reader with a more effective illustration of how Waltz’s structural theory is relevant to the case study of Turkish-Israeli military relations.

Having ascertained what Waltz was seeking to do, and why, when he constructed his Structural Realism theory, the discussion can now turn to what the structure of the international system is, and how it comes to be the defining influence in the behaviours of states. A system, he believes, is composed of both a structure and of interacting units

³³ Waltz, “Conflict in World Politics,” 471.

³⁴ Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, eds. Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 39.

(which in the international political system are states).³⁵ The key to understanding structuralism is to understand structure as a system-wide component that allows the system to be thought of as a whole.³⁶ For this Waltz came up with a strict, parsimonious interpretation, which was free of unit attributes. For Waltz, structure is all about arrangement, and arrangement is all about relationships. The three elements of structure are: one, an organising principle; two, a differentiation of units, which includes a specification of their functions; and three, a distribution of capabilities across the units.³⁷ Each of these components must be looked at in detail in order to understand how the structure of the international system has shaped the relationship between Israel and Turkey.

Ordering Principles

Throughout his description of structure, Waltz is fond of comparing the international to the national, or domestic, system. The ordering principle is the first facet to structure, because it defines the order in which actors are engaged.

Within states, the ordering principle is one of hierarchical arrangement under a centralised authority. The different groups, organisations, and levels of government within a domestic society are bound by this order of hierarchy; as Waltz put it, all units within the state “stand vis-à-vis each other in relations of super- and subordination.”³⁸ For example, different levels of government must report to a successively higher level, and up the chain of command, until the executive (president, prime minister, parliament) layer is reached. Of course, this is not to say, and as Waltz himself points out, that a

³⁵ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 79.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 82.

³⁸ Ibid., 81.

national order is clear-cut, without ambiguities.³⁹ But it is to say that all political actors are “formally differentiated according to the degrees of their authority, and their distinct functions are specified.”⁴⁰ They are all given certain and particular responsibilities and duties, and these are, generally, different from those of other actors, whether those actors are above or below one on the scale of authority.

Internationally, the structure is anarchical under a decentralised order.⁴¹ In a domestic system an actor must conduct itself according to the hierarchic order which tells it who is its superior and who is its subordinate, but in an international system there is no central authority to delineate these boundaries: “None is entitled to command; none is required to obey.”⁴² The anarchy of an international system requires some detailing, since it also accounts for the behaviour of states.

In International Relations, anarchy is not taken to indicate a scenario of unmitigated chaos and pandemonium. Rather, it refers to the lack of overriding authority in the system to control states’ behaviours and maintain order—as the government of a state can, and does, within its borders. Without a central adjudicator to whom states can turn for protection from other states, each state must fend for itself within the international order as best as it can.

The notion of self-help must now be explained. Self-help is of necessity the “principle of action in an anarchic order.”⁴³ If, as Waltz has insisted throughout his writings, conflict and war between units (be they states, empires, kingdoms, or something else) are recurring events down through history, and if no authority can protect states

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 88.

⁴² Ibid.

from other states intent on war, then survival must be the bare minimum motive behind all states' actions. Before any other consideration, "[s]urvival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have."⁴⁴

The security dilemma and the insecurity it breeds are a direct product of this predicament. It matters little what other goals a state may have, although it is expected that there are other goals. These aims "may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone."⁴⁵ But without the ability to defend itself, a state will not achieve any of its objectives. Because the possibility exists that "some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors."⁴⁶ The only way out of this condition is for a state to have either the ability to defend itself by force, or to seek shelter within some form of alliance. As the following chapters illustrate, both Israel and Turkey, for various reasons, are trapped within this security dilemma, and their military agreements are their answers to their problem. And, as Chapter Four explains, the burgeoning Turkish-Israeli strategic relationship is a form of both alliance and self-reliance.

Differentiation of Units

In a domestic polity, the super- and subordination relationships between various levels of government and bureaucracy, and including other non-governmental actors such as interest groups, lobbies, non-profit organisations, and so on, implies their differentiation. That is, because one level must report to a higher one, and because there

⁴³ Ibid., 111.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 91.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 102.

is a central authority on which to rely for such ultimate ends as protection from violence, units have the ability and convenience to differentiate themselves by performing different responsibilities and specified functions.⁴⁷

In the context of the international system, states are theoretically equal in that they each seek the same end and have the same rights, and are not functionally differentiated. As noted above, survival is the primary end desired by every state, and this does not change regardless of the internal make-up of the state. As Waltz said, this element of structure is not needed when defining international-political structure, because as long as anarchy remains the ordering principle, states will remain like units and as such cannot be differentiated.⁴⁸ However, Waltz deems it productive to discuss these like units, because, as the definition of structure indicates, structures are created by the interactions of these units.

Prima facie, states seem to be very different from one another. However, a closer look will show this is not the case. There are two characteristics that allow for a sameness of all states across their domestic spectrum. The first is sovereignty, and the second is function.

To begin with, “each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit.”⁴⁹ The fact that previously in history, city-states, kingdoms, or other political/territorial units were the main actors in their international system has no effect on this notion. All states are sovereign, since all states have their own territory, and can make their own decisions regarding their behaviour. These decisions may be constrained by other actors or circumstances, but that does not take away from the fact that the ability

⁴⁷ Ibid., 93.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

to decide is there. As Waltz argues, to be sovereign and to be dependent are not mutually exclusive.⁵⁰ Great Powers may have more freedom of choice than lesser powers, but all have the inherent endowment to choose their own courses in their internal and external conduct.⁵¹

The second facet of the uniformity of all states across the international system is the same function that they all share: survival. Although the ability to perform their tasks may distinguish one state from another, all states must survive as political, sovereign units—otherwise they would not be states any longer. Most of the ends they aspire to and tasks they perform are similar, such as sheltering, feeding, and protecting their citizens.⁵² Even if certain units have very different ideas about what duties they have toward their inhabitants, in the end each one has the desire to survive in the system. This allows for Waltz to call units in the international system like units, despite the fact that they may vary in size, economic and military capability, and government.

Both Israel and Turkey have strong desires to remain as independent states in their region, but this is complicated by the presence of hostile and antagonistic countries surrounding them, and the negligence of greater powers outside of the Middle East. This aspect of their foreign policy remains uniform, and this is despite the fact that internally one is an overwhelmingly Muslim state and the other is the only Jewish country in the world.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 95.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 96.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

Distribution of Capabilities

In national politics, different units can sometimes fulfil the same tasks and operations. But because units in the international system are functionally the same, there must be some other method of accounting for their differences. Accordingly, they are “distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks.”⁵³ This is a key element of structure as defined by Waltz, and includes three subparts to it: the Great Powers, the concept of power, and the balance of power.

The very existence of a need to demarcate the differences of states allows for the existence of what have historically been called the Great Powers. These are states with more overall capabilities (in population, economic, diplomatic, production, political, and military terms⁵⁴) than all other states in the system. Traditionally, this conception has been associated with the European system, and tended to comprise around five states at a time, usually including Great Britain, France, Prussia (Germany), Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Other states have been Great Powers at different times, but fell from that auspicious caste in due time, although they continued to exist as sovereign states. After 1945, the Great Powers were usually referred to as the superpowers, and consisted of only the United States and Soviet Union.

The Great Powers are even more notable for the effect they have on the international system. In fact, it is they who have the most influence on structure, and therefore, Waltz argues, the international structure must be defined in terms of whatever Great Powers are in existence at a given time. Structural Realism, he explicitly states, is based on a system’s principle units, and “it would ridiculous to construct a theory of

⁵³ Ibid., 97.

international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica.”⁵⁵ The Great Powers are the ones who determine and constrain much of the behaviour of the majority of states; consequently, it follows that their interactions and the structure it produces should be what a theory of international politics is modelled on.

Of course, this is not to say that either non-Great Powers or even non-state actors are unimportant. Waltz himself admits that “[s]tates are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones.”⁵⁶ Also, “[t]o say that major states maintain their central importance is not to say that other actors of some importance do not exist.”⁵⁷ The search for a parsimonious definition of structure leads one to the exigency of neglecting an infinite host of minor factors in favour of using the ability of the Great Powers as states to set the scene for all other actors to define the structure of the international system. Historical fact is difficult to argue with, and as Waltz also argues, “[f]or more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and fall of great powers.”⁵⁸

These states have had comparatively more capability to perform their tasks than all other units in the international system, which raises them in the anarchic structure of the system. This capability is a direct result of the power these states wield. Although the “concept of power is one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations

⁵⁴ See A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), “Introduction.”

⁵⁵ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁵⁸ Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 44.

and, more generally, political science,”⁵⁹ and one can find several different meaning and denotations, this thesis accepts Waltz’s definition and applies it to the motivations behind Israel and Turkey’s growing relationship. It is power that accounts for the distribution of capabilities of like units.

According to Waltz, “[p]ower is estimated by comparing the capabilities of units.”⁶⁰ This seems logical, but it is clearly not enough. To be more specific, Waltz illustrated his point by arguing simply that “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.”⁶¹ This conception is applicable to any era of history. It matters little whether units require a combination of economic, military, and political might, or just one of these components, or any number of other factors. So long as a unit can influence another unit to do what it wants more times than vice versa, the first unit is more powerful. The distribution of capabilities of states within the system represents the amount of power a state has, and at the same time power is defined in terms of this distribution.

A final concept must be mentioned under the distribution of capabilities, primarily because this third element of structure strongly conditions the behaviour and foreign policy of states, and since one aspect of state policy is the balance of power, it seems prudent to note this idea here. Furthermore, balances of power are created as a result of different states’ abilities. Balance of power theory is a difficult concept to define strictly, since many different scholars attribute many different meanings and definitions to it. As

⁵⁹ Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.

⁶⁰ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 98.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 192.

with all terminology related to Structural Realism, this thesis will again use Waltz's image of balance of power.

The basic assumptions behind the balance of power are: first, that states are unitary actors that, at a minimum, seek their own survival; and second, that these states try in more or less sensible ways to use whatever means available to them to obtain their desired ends.⁶² These means can include either external or internal approaches.⁶³ The former relies on alliances, and the attempt to either strengthen one's own, or weaken another's. The latter means refer to an increase in a state's capabilities (that is, an increase in power) whether in economic, military, or other terms.

It is important to realise that the condition of balance of power need not be an end consciously or actively sought after by states within the system. This result may not necessarily be the intention of states. Since a "self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer, [then] [f]ear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power."⁶⁴ This means that because of anarchy and the lack of overriding authority in the international system, states must, whether they realise it or not, seek a balance of power to offset whatever disadvantages they may face in their struggle to survive. In one way or another, Waltz believes, all self-help systems are characterised by balance of power politics.⁶⁵

⁶² Ibid., 118.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 68.

The errors that, according to Waltz, many international relations scholars make in their assumptions of balance of power theory, derive from the belief that there is a “necessary correspondence of motive and result” and that rules for states can be inferred from the results of their actions.⁶⁶ But this is false. Because of the need to seek methods of maintaining their own survival as sovereign units, states apply whatever available means they can to ensure their preservation. Balances of power result from the actions of states, but this does not mean that states need actively seek such balances, nor does it imply that states must seek balances in order to survive. Again using an example from economics, Waltz refers to the theory of competition. In a purely competitive economy, he writes, the fact that all firms strive for greater and greater profits drives the profit rate down; subsequently, if such competition continues, everyone’s profit rate will eventually reach zero.⁶⁷ To infer from this result that all firms seek zero profits would be a total neglect and oversight of what firms really do strive for in a real market. Similarly, to infer that all states seek balances of power simply because balances of power occur, would be to attempt to account for supposedly necessary conditions for a balance of power to exist, where in an international system of sovereign states seeking survival, no other conditions are required. In other words, because a result is produced does not mean that everyone wants it or works for it.

The three elements of structure detailed above, and including their subcomponents, are the keys to understanding Structural Realism according to Waltz. Concerned as he was with maintaining a rigorous, strict theory of structure, Waltz was forced to ignore any number of other factors and facets of the international system, and

⁶⁶ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 120.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

focus instead on the ordering principle of the international system, the functional differentiation, or lack of one, between the main units of the system, and the distribution of these units' capabilities. Taken together, these provide a solid, parsimonious theory of International Relations that, contrary to his critics' remarks and beliefs, has been able to withstand a host of criticisms and critiques.

It is necessary and appropriate now to turn to the contemporary nature of the international system as it stands today, and what effect this has had on Turkish-Israeli military relations. Having already related in detail what is necessary to understand Structural Realism, mention can be made of the theoretical ramifications of the end of the bipolar Cold War and the resultant change in Ankara and Jerusalem's relationship.

Change in the International System

It is clear to all scholars that the Cold War has ended, and with it that structure of the international system. This structure was bipolar, because only two Great, or Super, Powers had the capacity to affect all other states within the system more times and with greater frequency than these other states affected them. Prior to the emergence of this type of structure, the international structure had been multipolar, with a number of Great Powers able to influence, constrain, and shape the behaviour of all other states. What is not agreed upon, however, is the structure of the current international system.

Waltz himself admits that for post-Cold War international relations, "the structure of international politics [is] hard to define in the present and difficult to discern in the future."⁶⁸ Although he suspects, in a 1993 essay, that the future system will be influenced

⁶⁸ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 50.

by a few Great Powers with strong regional bases in America, Europe, and East Asia,⁶⁹ the main point to be drawn from his analysis is the collapse of one type of structure (bipolarity) in favour of another one.

However, it seems clear that the international system has in fact become one of unipolarity. Although it is obvious that there are several states that have capabilities in any number of different areas (military, economic, political, technological) that are much greater than the capabilities of numerous other states, it should also be obvious that only one of them is powerful enough to affect all other countries more than they can affect it. This lone state is, of course, the United States.

International structure changes only when the distribution of units' capabilities change.⁷⁰ When, prior to the Second World War, a number of states had sufficient capabilities to rank them as Great Powers, the distribution of capabilities allowed for a multipolar world. When, after 1945, the United States and Soviet Union gained an enormous amount of power over their allies, friends, and neighbours, the distribution of capabilities in the system thus prevented others from wielding the same measure of power. The system became bipolar.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, only the United States remains with the capabilities it retained after World War II, and thus the distribution of capabilities in this new system has once again shifted. As John King believes, "[t]he United States today has no counterbalance in the world in general and the Middle East in particular."⁷¹ In fact, the Cold War could only end, as Waltz argues, once the international structure of bipolarity

⁶⁹ Ibid., 61.

⁷⁰ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 97.

⁷¹ John King, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace? (United Kingdom: Garnet Publishing Ltd., 1994), 137.

had given way to something new.⁷² International structures can thus only change when the numbers of Great Powers are significantly altered, which implies a shift in the distribution of capabilities of these states. Since it is obvious that the U.S.S.R. is no longer the superpower it once was, if one follows the logic of Structural Realism one reaches the conclusion that the structure of international politics has been modified to a unipolar system. As Waltz wrote in a 1989 article, "the Cold War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of post-war international politics, and will last as long as that structure endures."⁷³

Waltz asserted that "[s]tructures shape and shove."⁷⁴ The structure of bipolarity urged those states that were not neutral to remain in their respective camps, led either by Washington or Moscow. Without that constraining influence, and combined with the changing geopolitical circumstances surrounding them, Israel and Turkey have a greater ability to choose their own independent foreign policies without tailoring them to bipolar needs, since "[a]s the global Soviet-American confrontation softened, the Middle East's strategic value as a front of the Cold War correspondingly diminished."⁷⁵ Since Washington could pay less attention to this region of the world than it had previously, those states within the area had more room to manoeuvre.

Capabilities have changed, and inter-state relationships have also changed to accommodate the newer distribution of capabilities. Accordingly, more choices are available to Israel and Turkey. Previously, "[a]fter the Second World War, Turkey's

⁷² Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 49.

⁷³ Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," 52.

⁷⁴ Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," 343.

⁷⁵ Eugeny Bazhanov, "Russia's Middle East Policy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin," in From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993, eds. Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat, and Moshe Ma-oz (Sussex: The Sussex Academic Press, 1994), 208.

freedom of choice was severely restricted by the domination of world politics by two diametrically opposed socio-political systems.”⁷⁶ Currently, almost all scholarly research dealing with Turkey in the post-Cold War era is concerned with the sudden range of security issues facing it that were not readily obvious under bipolarity. One quote will suffice as evidence:

[i]n a bipolar world Turkey had had the luxury of an uncomplicated security policy in which, broadly speaking, it aligned with the West, opposed the Soviet Union, and ignored the rest. ... In the new security environment, Turkey’s geographical position and its military strength now made it a European, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Near Eastern, Caucasian, Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea power. Sharing borders with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Turkey’s control of the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles also made it a Black Sea neighbor of Russia, the Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. Turkey’s ethnic roots lay in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, influencing its interests, concerns, and sympathies. Its Muslim identity demanded a community of interest in the Middle East, through Pakistan, and across to South East Asia. None of the immediate and demanding post-Cold War issues of Bosnia, the Middle East Peace Process, Iraqi sanctions, Operation *Provide Comfort*, Trans-Caucasus separatism, Russian activities in the ‘Near Abroad,’ CFE flank issues, NATO enlargement, Cyprus, Central Asia, and energy pipelines could be discussed without reference to Turkey.⁷⁷

As this quote reveals, not all of the new freedoms associated with the end of the Cold War are desirable by those states involved. Turkey’s foreign policy must now be tailored specifically with its own interests in mind: “Turkey is now more likely than ever before to pursue its interests with lesser regard for American interests, simply because most issues will be far more important to Turkey and far less important to the United

⁷⁶ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 30.

⁷⁷ Simon Mayall, McNair Paper 56 - Turkey: Thwarted Ambition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997), 1-2.

States in the broader scheme of things.”⁷⁸ As an example of this, Turkish policy toward Iraq can be cited. Although Washington would like to maintain economic sanctions on Iraq, Turkey’s feelings are more ambivalent, given that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, cross-border trade between the two was worth several hundred million.

More choices in policy are also available to the United States vis-à-vis these countries than during the Cold War. In terms of Israel, this has altered the perception of Israel’s value in the eyes of many American policy-makers. Much has been made of the end of Israel’s role as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area, and its potential as a bastion against the much-vilified Islamic fundamentalism. However,

[t]he United States has in the event resisted up to the moment the temptation to make Israeli its champion in a new battle against militant Islam. On the contrary, America’s new freedom to choose foreign policy goals is what enabled Washington to decide to cease to make unquestioning support for Israel a central plan of its policy in the Middle East. [This means] that America is now in a position to make demands on Israel it has never made before, different demands from those it formerly imposed.⁷⁹

The reports in May 1998 that Washington was pressuring Israel to withdraw from thirteen percent of West Bank areas under its control, or face an American “reassessment” of its Israel policy, is an example of this range of choice available to the U.S.

This is not to say, however, that the U.S. does not care about developments in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington still maintains vital concerns within the region, and it views the Turkish-Israeli relationship as conducive to its own interests. At

⁷⁸ Graham Fuller, From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), 29.

⁷⁹ King, Handshake in Washington, 134.

the same time, as is explained below, Jerusalem and Ankara have drawn closer at least partly as a result of American initiatives after the Cold War.

The changes that have occurred in the international structure in the last decade have profoundly affected the foreign policies of Israel and more especially Turkey. The demise of a superpower and the consequent shift from a bipolar system to a unipolar one has created a new environment for Ankara and Jerusalem. This was not the result of a deliberate policy of the United States, or any other state, but rather an outcome of the theoretical forces at work within the structure of the international system.

Conclusion

Understanding Structural Realism and how it defines a change in the international system's structure helps to more clearly comprehend the changes that have taken place in recent years in the Middle East. The sudden appearance of a Jerusalem-Ankara axis had taken many by surprise; yet if one had followed the logic of Waltz, one might have expected such a shift in Middle East politics to take place.

The constraining nature of bipolarity had assured both Ankara and Jerusalem that they could seek relative solace in their relationship with the West, more particularly the United States. But the structure of the system soon "shoved" them into a new environment in which the familiar patterns of Cold War rivalry were gone, replaced by circumstances that dictated they formulate policies on the basis of not being able to count so heavily on Washington than they had previously. This is more so the case for Turkey, since as subsequent chapters reveal, the American-Israeli relationship has not been altered to any significant degree yet.

This chapter has served as the theoretical framework for understanding why Israel and Turkey should opt to publicly pursue stronger ties with each other. Surely, both the motivations and possibilities for such a relationship existed prior to the end of the Cold War, yet it has only been since then that links between the two countries have grown and expanded quite rapidly. Structural Realism is the theoretical imperative that has driven this relationship: with a change in the structure of the international system, Turkey and Israel are now better able to pursue alternate policies without having to be concerned with what effects this might have on American-Soviet rivalry, and in fact are better able to do so because of the disappearance of the constraining nature of rigid bipolarity.

Subsequent chapters illustrate in detail the regional and extra-regional motivations and reasoning behind Israel and Turkey's expanding links. Some of these reasons include a host of common enemies, dwindling American support, and a growing realisation, at least in Turkey's case, of its prominent position within several regions of the world. Structural Realism acts as the theoretical glue that holds together these practical and "real-world" considerations.

Understanding theoretical imperatives is important, for without theory one cannot fully understand why things happen, and how to predict, and knowing how to predict is helpful for policy. A good theory explains why certain events occur, or recur, and Structural Realism is useful for elucidating the change in international politics. The thesis can now turn to examining the non-theoretical incentives for the growing military relationship between Turkey and Israel. It must be borne in mind, however, that the motivations explained below, while emerging from regional circumstances, are at the same time a result of the change in the international system.

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

Introduction

William Cleveland, writing of the advent of the Young Turk era in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, noted that “events within the Middle East unfolded against the backdrop of a changing international order that contained elements of promise--and of danger--for the Middle Eastern region.”¹ Although these words were meant to describe the situation in 1908, they can also be applied to the circumstances currently unfolding in the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and bipolarity, and the appearance of relative peace between some of the parties to the Arab-Israeli, inter-Arab, and inter-Muslim dispute has forced many states to adjust their security and foreign policies. At the same time, many of the parties retain their hostility.

In order to better understand both the theoretical and practical context in which Israel and Turkey have enhanced their military relationship, it is important to discuss both the historical and, more importantly, the current relationships these two countries have with each other, their regional neighbours, and the United States as the lone superpower. It would be a serious deficiency to study a history of Turkey and Israel without taking into

¹ William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 125.

account their relations with other regional powers, since the apathy, antagonism, and hostility that has marked all Middle Eastern relationships, and especially those involving the non-Arab countries, has significantly affected the choice and intensity of relationships chosen by Ankara and Jerusalem.

For the purposes of this thesis, however, the discussion need not focus on all Middle Eastern states; rather, only Syria, Iraq, and Iran will be mentioned. This is primarily because both Israel and Turkey share these three states as common adversaries and enemies, for reasons that are better explained in the following pages. Egypt and Turkey are not engaged in any serious dispute, nor is Turkey at odds with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or any of the Gulf monarchies. In Israel's case, only Syria, Iraq, and Iran have been open and violent about their opposition to Israel's existence in the Middle East. Other states have secretly co-operated with Israel in the past, or are not interested in anything other than the occasional harsh rhetorical statement.

This chapter will focus only on the historical factors of these relationships, which includes a brief summary of contemporary relations. A closer examination of the dynamics behind these relationships, which comprise the motivations behind the military collaboration between Turkey and Israel, is reserved for Chapter Four. Both chapters deal with regional and bilateral relations, but the former is restricted to historical synopses while the latter includes a detailed discussion on all relevant relationships and their propulsive forces in terms of Turkish-Israeli military co-operation.

Therefore, this chapter will begin by tracing a brief unfolding of Israel and Turkey's development as modern states in the Middle East. This will help elucidate what has prompted each country toward certain policies throughout the years and why they are

now changing into a mutual desire to draw closer to each other. The historical relationship between the two will be covered, as will their relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. This will be followed by a summary of Israeli- and Turkish-American relations, since the end of superpower rivalry and the attendant bipolarity has, as the previous chapter suggested, played a significant role in determining the course of Jerusalem and Ankara's foreign policies.

A Brief History of Israel

The historical evolution of Israel is fairly simple to trace, given that it is only fifty years old. One of the most important defining features of the Jewish state, and indeed perhaps the main drive behind Israel's decision to co-operate militarily with Turkey, is what is broadly termed the Arab-Israeli conflict. This long-time antagonism is important because it has shaped both the policies of Israel, and its very outlook.

The hostility between Jews and Arabs began before the State of Israel was born. After the destruction of the Second Jewish Commonwealth by the Romans in 70 C.E., most of the Jewish people fled what then came to be called Palestine. However, there remained a small core of Jews, left to survive in the Roman province which eventually was conquered by Islamic warriors in the seventh century, C.E. This group was always small in number--by 1880, out of a total population of 590 000, only 35 000 were Jews.²

With the advent of the amalgamation in the late nineteenth century of political Zionism in Europe, a movement was created that sought to bring Jewish immigrants into

² Adam Garfinkle, "Genesis," in The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives, ed. Alvin Rubinstein, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1991), 8.

Palestine in the hope of eventually colonising it as a Jewish country. Not much thought was given about the Arab inhabitants already there, who lived on most of the land; even Theodore Herzl, the father of political Zionism, did not concern himself with social ideologies or political settlements very much.³

The large-scale immigration of Jewish settlers, with pioneering ideas about reshaping the land, clashed with the more traditional-minded Arab society already in Palestine, at about the time when these Arabs were themselves undergoing a transformation of way of life, brought about by the long, drawn-out departure of the colonial powers and a struggle for modernity.⁴ Driven by their ideological commitments to reclaim *Eretz Israel*, and with money and aid supplied by wealthy Jews in the Diaspora, mainly from Europe, the Jewish settlers found themselves unable to reconcile with the still feudal-oriented Arab society, which itself was just discovering its nationalistic roots and struggling with the Ottoman Empire.⁵

This tension was exacerbated by World War One. The British, in their fear of a German penetration of their Middle Eastern possessions, and thus the route to India (the jewel of the Crown), made a series of agreements and promises to various parties that not only confused all participants, but alienated them. The Sykes-Picot Agreement with France, the Balfour Declaration for the Jews, and the promises made to the *sherif* of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, were all designed to help London maintain its grip on the Middle East. But each of these agreements only served to anger those it had excluded. Against the

³ Ibid., 14.

⁴ Gil Carl Alroy, Behind the Middle East Conflict: The Real Impasse Between Arab and Jew (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 174.

⁵ Garfinkle, "Genesis," 8.

backdrop of continuing Jewish immigration, Arab rejection of Zionism, and British waffling, blood was spilled among all three parties.

The situation remained tenuous until the British finally announced, on February 14 1947, that they were turning to the newly-created United Nations for advice; but the continuing cycle of violence between Jew and Arab, and Jew and Briton, soon prompted the British to wash their hands of Palestine entirely.⁶ There was a flurry of activity in the United Nations, and on November 29 1947, the General Assembly approved the United Nations Partition Plan, which divided Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, by a vote of 35 to 13 (interestingly, Turkey voted against an independent Israel). The Plan was to come into effect on August 1 1948, but was subsequently moved up by the British to May 14. The Jews accepted the Plan; the Arabs rejected it.

On the day the British left, the State of Israel was proclaimed. The following day five Arab armies invaded,⁷ and in the course of the ensuing war Israel captured much of the territory that had been allocated to the Palestinian Arabs in the Partition Plan: by the spring of 1949, Israel had conquered one-third more territory (6500 square kilometres) than was originally designated for it, all at the expense of the Palestinians.⁸ The new State of Israel came to encompass approximately 20 700 square kilometres of the former Palestine, while the rest was divided between Egypt (the Gaza Strip) and Jordan (the West Bank). Jerusalem was divided between Israel and Jordan. In addition to the occupation of

⁶ Ibid., 29.

⁷ Those of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq.

⁸ Bernard Reich and Gershon Kieval, Israel: Land of Tradition and Conflict, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), 46.

lands that the Arabs saw as their own, the war caused about 700 000 Palestinian Arabs to become refugees.

The hostility engendered by the Arab defeat and the very existence of a Jewish island in the midst of a sea of Muslim countries was further exacerbated by the Six Day War, in 1967. Israel took the West Bank (which included all sections of Jerusalem), Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula (which was subsequently returned to Egypt in the early 1980s), and the Golan Heights from Syria. Indeed, the source of the current dilemma in the peace process springs from a lack of co-ordination, compromise, and concession over these very lands.

The formerly rigid Israeli position in the conflict with its neighbours, which has been modified somewhat in the course of the peace process, is a direct result of the fear generated by the proximity and numbers of Arab states hostile to Israel. From 1948 until the early 1990s, most if not all Arab and Muslim states had been committed, at least in their official proclamations, to the eradication of Zionism in the Middle East.⁹ In addition to this, Israeli leaders have powerful memories of both the pogroms that took place in Eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth century and the more recent horrors of the Holocaust.¹⁰ As Joseph Alpher writes, “instances of military aggression and terrorist violence, against Israelis and against Jews in general, trigger among many Israelis a recall

⁹ During Jerusalem Day in Iran, in January 1998, former President Rafsanjani said “he is certain the day will come when the ‘useless Zionist entity’ that entered the region will exit it.” Following this, Iranian authorities apparently published an official statement calling on all Muslims to bring about the destruction of Israel. Source: Israel Line, “Iran Calls for Complete Destruction of Israel,” 26 January 1998.

¹⁰ Herbert Kelman, “Acknowledging the Other’s Nationhood: How to Create a Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22 (Fall 1992): 34.

mechanism of the Holocaust and earlier attempts (throughout 3,000 years of Jewish history) physically to destroy the Jewish people or part of it.”¹¹ Many of Israel’s political elite, at least until the last decade or so, had emigrated from Europe. As the late publisher Robert Maxwell remarked in 1989, the failure of the Western democracies to rescue Jews during the Holocaust has shown Jerusalem that its safety depends only on the Israelis.¹²

These are the concepts that must be born in mind when contemplating Israel’s search for security within the Middle East. The current peace process, initiated by the late Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, has gone far to move, if not change, formerly immobile and intransigent bargaining positions. The Oslo Accords of 1993 have formally ushered in a new era of relative peace between Israelis and Palestinians, who were previously thought to have irreconcilable differences, and a 1994 peace treaty with Jordan was added to the official peace Israel already has with Egypt.

However, there remains much hostility between Israel and its Arab/Muslim neighbours, a condition which is a lingering remnant of the Arab-Israeli conflict and thus Israel’s position in a region filled with somewhat radical states (Syria, Iraq) and what have been called “rogue” states (Iraq, Iran). Although Rabin, the Israeli engineer of the Oslo Accords, felt that the probability of war with the Arab states was low for the near future, he still believed that Israel faced serious threats within the Middle East.¹³ Most recently, with the peace process with the Palestinians slowed, if not at a complete standstill,

¹¹ Joseph Alpher, “Israel: Security After Oslo,” International Affairs 70 (January 1994): 231.

¹² Andrew Hurley, Israel and the New World Order (Santa Barbara: Fithian Press & Foundation for a New World Order, 1991), 304.

¹³ Efraim Inbar, “Contours of Israel’s New Strategic Thinking,” Political Science Quarterly 111 (Spring 1996): 47.

relations between Israel and its neighbours have been cool at best, particularly since the election in May 1996 of a hard-line Likud-led Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu. As further proof, one need only look at

Israel's recurrence to military means in dealing with Hizbullah guerrillas in southern and eastern Lebanon, and occasionally with Syria, both during and after the Cold War, [that] underlines the bellicosity that still characterizes the situation currently existent between Israel on the one hand and Syria, Lebanon and other Arab countries, both radical and moderate, that still have ... not signed a peace treaty with Israel.¹⁴

Current conditions facing Israel within the Middle East still include hostile elements, even among officially friendly Arab countries. A March 9 1997, letter from King Hussein of Jordan to Netanyahu, in which the King chastised the Prime Minister for his stubborn policies, illustrates that relations with all Arab countries have remained stormy. Although it is unlikely that Israel and Jordan will revert back to a violent, war-prone relationship, this does not discount the possibility of non-official violence erupting at levels below government sponsorship.¹⁵ When asked during an interview about the possibility of a war in the region, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak warned: "It's not a question of *war*, but a question of *terror* that will be 10 times worse than anything we've seen before.

¹⁴ Makram Haluani, "I'll Love You Forever Today: The Coalition Scenarios in the Contemporary Middle East Balance of Power System," paper presented at Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997, 21.

¹⁵ On March 13 1997, a Jordanian soldier opened fire on a group of Israeli schoolgirls, killing several. Some have attributed this act to the atmosphere created by Hussein's letter, in which he had accused Netanyahu of humiliating the Palestinians. Source: "Deaths on the Island of Peace," The Jerusalem Report, 3 April 1997: 6. This incident is an example of how the state of inter-governmental relations do not always correspond to the feelings of "the masses."

Embassies, airplanes, diplomats will all be exposed to attack. There's uncontained hatred here, it's *terrible*."¹⁶

A Brief History of Turkey

Turkey has a long history, mostly in the form of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled much of the former Byzantine Empire including the Middle Eastern states based along the Mediterranean. The Republic of Turkey officially joined the community of modern states on October 29 1923. The predominant characteristic of Ankara's foreign policy, and perhaps the one that has also caused a national crisis of identity,¹⁷ is its attempts at balancing between West (Europe and the United States) and East (its Arab and Muslim neighbours). From the start, in its search for modernisation, Turkey turned toward the West. In later decades, it came to realise that it needed Muslim allies as well. Finally, in recent years, given its hostile and tense relationship with both its Arab and Mediterranean neighbours, Turkey has come full circle, to a certain extent, to attaching itself to the West. The agreements with Israel are both a product of and a step toward this goal.

The founding of Turkey as a modern state was largely the result of the efforts of Mustafa Kemal, later named Atatürk. Kemal was a former colonel in the Ottoman army, who gained his first reputation as a resourceful commander defending Gallipoli from the

¹⁶ Ranan Lurie, "Egypt's President Opens His Heart," The Jerusalem Report, 3 April, 1997: 26. Emphasis in original.

¹⁷ As one scholar has noted, "the question of inclusion or exclusion [in Europe] presents Turkey with the greatest problems concerning identity." Source: Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 10.

disastrous British invasion in 1915.¹⁸ His guiding principle was secularism and Turkish nationalism, both of which became official national ideology, and evolved from the series of events that led to the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Kemal had been associated with the movement known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a secret society made up of students from military and medical academies, which pressed for social and political change, as well as a rejuvenation of Ottomanism as the principle of the Ottoman Empire. The CUP, in turn, had its origins in the Young Turk movement that sprang up at the end of the nineteenth century, about the same time that the pogroms of Eastern Europe began to galvanise the Jews and Herzl into a political Zionist movement.

The Young Turk movement called for reform of the stagnating Ottoman Empire in the late 1880s and 1890s.¹⁹ Although many members of the CUP were exposed and arrested, the officers of the Ottoman Third Army (of which Kemal was a member) stationed in Salonika staged a revolt in the summer of 1908 and threatened to march on Istanbul unless the sultan, Abdul Hamid, restored the constitution and called for parliamentary elections, which Hamid had dissolved thirty years earlier.²⁰

After an attempt at a counter-revolution was made in 1909, the Third Army, calling itself the “army of deliverance,” marched to Istanbul, put down the disturbances, and gained control of the government with the help of the CUP. However, the well intentioned but inexperienced CUP, while still dedicated to reform, became increasingly repressive, using the principles of Ottomanism to guide its policies. Ottomanism referred

¹⁸ Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 143.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 125-127.

to a constitutional government that guaranteed the rights of non-Muslims within the Empire and incorporated them into the framework of the Empire.²¹ However, the Islamic foundation on which the imperial legacy lay could not be ignored, and so Islamic symbols were stressed to the detriment of the non-Muslim population.

By 1913, the Ottoman Empire had begun its final deterioration. Its Balkan possessions declared independence, and Italy invaded some of its territories. In 1912, Ottoman domains in Europe totalled 169 910 square kilometres and 6.1 million people; by the last treaty of the Balkan Wars in September 1913, Ottoman Europe was reduced to 28 293 square kilometres and 1.9 million people.²² It was the beginning of the age of Turkish nationalism which was to aid Kemal so well, because the practice of Ottomanism

demonstrated once again that neither the Great Powers nor the Balkan successor states were willing to respect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state, [it] showed that minority people preferred national affiliations to Ottoman citizenship, and [it] undermined the proposition that Muslim and Christian could share in a common Ottoman bond.²³

These events generated a new awareness of the Anatolian Turkish core of the Empire's identity, and made what was left of the Empire much more homogenous, which in turn produced a specifically Turkish cultural movement that stressed a pre-Islamic, pre-Ottoman heritage. In this same atmosphere, the CUP had begun to disengage the traditional Arab families from their traditional civil service roles in the government, and appointed Turkish officials as provincial administrators. The Arabs believed that the CUP was trying to "Turkify" the Empire. Gradually, these resentments coalesced into Arabism,

²⁰ Ibid., 126.

²¹ Ibid., 129.

²² Ibid., 130.

²³ Ibid.

which was not an organised political movement but rather a desire for recognition of cultural identity and equality. These notions, in turn, developed into louder calls for Arab autonomy in the provinces.

The final blow to the Ottoman Empire came in the form of the Treaty of Sevres, signed by the Ottomans under the last sultan, Mehmet VI, in 1920 after the CUP fled. It was an official end to the First World War for the Ottoman Empire, and an official end to the Ottoman Empire itself. It

stipulated that all its European territory except a small slice around Istanbul (occupied by the British) was to be cut away; all Arab lands removed; the region around Izmir given to the Greeks; the eastern Anatolian provinces divided between an independent Armenia and a potentially independent Kurdistan; and finally large regions of south and southwest Anatolia granted to France and Italy to administer as spheres of influence. The Straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were demilitarized and administered not by the Turks but by a permanent Allied commission in Istanbul, and Anatolia was placed under the control of the Allied Financial Commission.²⁴

It was in this atmosphere that local Turkish uprisings erupted throughout Anatolia. These were originally spontaneous, but, when in 1919 three experienced military commanders began to organise the movement, it became a war for national independence.

Kemal gradually asserted his leadership over the movement and was declared a rebel. The Greek invasion of Anatolia in May 1919, to support Athens' presence in Izmir, gave impetus to his movement. The Greeks proceeded to secure the city, slaughter many of the non-combatants, desecrate mosques, and press deeply into the peninsula. Kemal convened a body of representatives in 1920 in Ankara, made up of local resistance leaders

²⁴ Patricia Carley, "Turkey's Place in the World," in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri Barkey (Washington, D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 4.

and members of the dissolved Ottoman parliament. They called themselves the Grand National Assembly, agreed to form a government with Kemal as its head, and adopted the National Pact, which has been the basis of Turkish foreign policy ever since. The Pact renounced any territorial claims to the former Arab provinces but affirmed the right of full Turkish independence over the remaining portions of the Empire, which included Anatolia and the Thracian area around Istanbul.

By military and political means, Kemal drove out the Greeks and forced the British and Italians to withdraw. In 1923 the Republic was proclaimed and within the next few years the caliphate (as the head of Islam) was abolished and the country was taken on a road that led West. Secularism was established at the expense of *shari'ah*, Islamic law: the Swiss civil code was introduced, polygamy was forbidden, worship at Muslim shrines and tombs prohibited, and eventually even the fez was banned. There was a drive to establish a Turkish cultural identity that was based not on Islamic principles, but on secular foundations that emphasised pre-Islamic values and inheritances.

Education was a useful and key source for this new policy: "The state delegitimized religious education and established the supremacy of secular modern education nationwide."²⁵ This included not recognising the Kurdish peoples as culturally independent (they were called "mountain Turks"), which laid the groundwork for the rebellion that exploded in 1984 for Kurdish autonomy and has continued to this day. The intense secularism that was ingrained into the new republic has remained, and is

²⁵ Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites," The Middle East Journal 51 (Winter 1997): 49.

exceedingly evident in the constitutional stipulation that makes it illegal for a political party to advocate *shari'ah*.²⁶ In 1937, the state was officially declared secular.

As part of this new policy, Kemal announced that no additional territory would be sought, thus allowing Ankara (which became the capital in 1923) to largely neglect foreign entanglements in order to concentrate on internal reforms: "peace at home, peace abroad." However, by 1945, the international order had changed, and Turkey became one of the first countries to be drawn into the superpower rivalry, on the side of the West as a result of the American Truman Doctrine, where it remained for many years. By the 1960s, however, due to a clash with the United States over Cyprus policy, Ankara began to realise that it could not rely so heavily on the U.S.

In recent decades, given the end of bipolarity, the European Union's refusal to grant Turkey full membership, and a growing awareness of the need for Third World and Muslim allies in the U.N. (particularly on issues such as Cyprus), Ankara sought to balance its foreign policy more between the West and the Arab states, and to bolster ties with its immediate neighbours.²⁷ Yet some of its disputes with these very neighbours have the potential for full-blown crises or violent conflicts, and the agreements with Israel are designed to both allow Turkey to maintain its links with the West, and to reinforce its own regional position. The guiding principle of Turkish foreign policy has remained its Kemalist legacy, which infuses all Turkish governments and directs many of its inter-state relations.

²⁶ Jenny White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey's Welfare Party in Power," Current History 96 (January 1997): 26.

²⁷ Bilge Criss, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 1 January, 1997.

Although Israel and Turkey have different histories, spanning different lengths of time, they have certain things in common that have converged in recent years to form a military relationship that continues to develop. These include a shared sense of “otherness” within the Middle East, drawn from having the Muslim and Arab populations of the region view the Turks and Jews as having settled in the area at the expense of the Arabs already living there; a strategic relationship with the United States combined with a lack of support from other countries in such international organisations such as the United Nations; and enmity with most of their regional neighbours, which has produced a similarity of outlook on foreign policy.

Israeli-Turkish Relations

The historical relationship between Turkey and Israel has never been violent, but it has at times been stormy and has alternated between friendliness and mild anger. This fluctuation is largely due to the contrast between Turkey's concerns for its links with the West, and the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. Especially in the first few decades after Israel was born, after a brief flourishing of ties in the 1950s, Turkey vacillated between active support for the West (and thus tacit support for Israel) and advocacy of the Muslim world's goals, although generally speaking ties between the two countries remained low-level. It is only in the last decade that Turkey has come to see Israel as a potential strategic ally and, in the last eight years, gradually become more open about its desire for co-operation, military and otherwise, with Israel. As Meltem Müftüler-Bac has observed, “Turkey has always toyed with the idea of closer ties with Israel and there always was a political will to associate

with Israel, yet the favorable environment for this endeavor formed only in the 1990s.”²⁸ For its part, Israel was always also keen on calling Turkey an ally, both because of the countries it borders and because “relations with Turkey, a Muslim-majority state, have been useful in helping Israel dilute the religious component of its conflict with the Arabs and fend off charges that Zionism is somehow inherently anti-Islamic.”²⁹ Or, “[p]erhaps most important, Israel and Turkey share a ‘common sense of otherness’ in a region dominated by Arabs and nondemocratic regimes.”³⁰

Although the Truman Doctrine drew Turkey into the Western orbit soon after World War Two, Ankara did not wish to sever altogether its connections with its fellow Muslim states. It supported the Arab position in the United Nations in 1947 on Palestinian independence and rejection of the Partition Plan. However, “Turkey’s perception that the Soviets were a political and military threat caused it to lean toward the West,”³¹ and in December 1948, Turkey voted with the West to establish a reconciliation committee on Palestine. Further, on March 28, 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognise Israel, which immediately soured its relations with the Arab world.

The Suez Crisis in 1956 made Turkey’s policy of balance more untenable. To retain Arab goodwill, Ankara withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv in November 1956,

²⁸ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, “Turkey and Israel: A Strategic Realignment in the Middle East?” paper presented at the 39th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 18-21 March 1998.

²⁹ Alan Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish ‘Periphery Strategy’?” in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri Barkey (Washington, D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 152.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 169.

³¹ Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25 (February 1993): 92.

although it quietly explained that relations would remain friendly, and later the diplomatic relations were renewed at the lower, *charge d'affaires* level. Yet, during the same period, in 1954, the secret services of both countries began a relationship that has continued ever since.³² In 1958 Turkey and Israel signed a military pact that committed them to cooperate in military fields and exchange technical expertise. Israel also began to help Turkey in areas such as agriculture, industry, and construction, and to help secure financial credit for it from international bodies. John Nomikos argues that "Turkey sought the relationship in order to placate the West and also to obtain the support of the American Jewish community in Turkey's effort to join NATO. Israel courted Turkey in the context of its survival strategy of forging alliances with non-Arab states in the region."³³

In the early 1960s, Turkey, as a democratic and Western-oriented country, came to see the Soviet Union more as a political, military, and ideological threat; the March, 1965 issue of the "Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry" stated as much, and added that Turkey was firmly linked to the United States and the Western alliance (NATO). At the same time, it wanted to avoid friction with the Arab states.³⁴ To accomplish these ends, Turkey would refrain from involving itself in disputes between the Muslim world and the West. Doing so included not supporting the Arab world's position on complete Palestinian independence at the expense of Israel's security or safety.

Thereafter, Turkey refused to use harsh rhetoric against Israel, and after 1967 did not condemn the Jewish state as the aggressor, although it did call for a return to the pre-

³² John Nomikos, "Israel-Turkey Defense Relations: Will it Last?" Research Institute for International and European Studies, 3 October, 1996: 2.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 94.

1967 borders. At the Rabat meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Turkey agreed to criticise Israel for not conforming to U.N. resolutions, but it would not discuss the Palestinian issue except on humanitarian grounds. Turkey also refused to sign the final declaration of the Conference meeting that declared “full support to the Palestinian people for the restoration of their despoiled rights and in the fight for national liberation.”³⁵ Despite these acts, the Turkish-Israeli relationship was downgraded in the 1960s, mostly as a result of a rise of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, including the kidnapping and murder of Israeli diplomats and attacks on synagogues.

In the early 1980s, as Turkish-Arab relations flourished, Turkish-Israeli relations dimmed. The decision by the Israeli government to move its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in September 1980 put Turkey in a very difficult position: immediately following this decision, diplomatic representatives from fifteen Islamic countries and the PLO went to the Turkish prime minister and demanded that all ties with Israel be severed. The prime minister refused, but did summon back Ankara’s *charge d’affaires* from Tel Aviv and closed its consulate in Jerusalem. After the military intervention in 1980, it was announced that Turkey’s representation in Israel was being reduced to second secretary level.

Still, Ankara remained realistic about its foreign policy, and in February 1982 abstained from voting on a United Nations resolution condemning Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. As Turgut Özal, the leader of the Motherland Party in 1983, said, practical contacts with Israel were necessary “as a window ... on future events.’ For

³⁵ Ibid., 96.

Turkey 'to play a role in solving the problems of the Middle East,' he maintained, 'that window must be kept open.'³⁶

By the later 1980s, relations between Israel and Turkey were growing again. Turkey became concerned about the effect its image might have on the Jewish lobby in Washington, which it regarded as a strong ally.³⁷ In 1985, Israel's representative in Ankara was quietly appointed to the rank of *charge d'affaires*, and the next year Turkey followed suit with its diplomatic delegate. Since 1986, the two states have co-operated in economic matters, mostly in agriculture. In August, 1987, Israel demonstrated its value to Turkey when it helped convince the U.S. Congress to vote against a resolution setting aside April 24 in commemoration for the victims of the Armenian massacre perpetrated by the Turks in the early part of this century. In September 1987, the Turkish and Israeli foreign ministers met together after a U.N. General Assembly meeting. In 1989, Turkey for the first time voted in the U.N. against a proposed resolution to reject Israel's credentials.

However, it has only been in the last eight years that Israeli-Turkish relations have blossomed into full and overt co-operation. It was prompted initially by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, that "highlighted the similarities between Turkey and Israel, two democratic and Western-oriented countries subject to common dangers in an increasingly volatile region consisting of authoritarian Arab countries and beset by disputes, ethnic and nationalist animosities, an armament race, and terrorism."³⁸ For the first time, Turkey and Israel were siding with the United States against an Arab country.

³⁶ Ibid., 103.

³⁷ Ibid., 104.

³⁸ Ibid.

This was augmented by Turkey's increasing strains with the Arab world, which led it to believe closer relations with Israel was an answer to its growing tensions. These were the result of a combination of several factors, namely: the American use of Turkey's air bases in operations against Iraq; Turkey's military manoeuvres in northern Iraq to destroy Kurdish separatist camps there; Arab support of Kurdish rebels in Anatolia; its control over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and its water policies, including the desire to have Israel participate in the eventually aborted water conference of November 1991; general lack of Arab support for Turkey's international position; and its membership in NATO, which seemed to be increasing as Turkey's role in its original mission was transformed into regional security.

As a result of the convergence of these issues, Turkey began to feel that it needed to rely more on the West than it had hoped, and under the influence of President Özal in the early 1990s, Turkey tried to draw closer to the United States. It abstained from a General Assembly vote that repealed the 1975 U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism, and in December of 1991, it upgraded its diplomatic relationship with Israel to the level of ambassador (although it did the same for the PLO).

Since then, ties between the two countries have been steadily warming. In November 1993, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin became the first of his post to visit Israel. In an interview with an Israeli newspaper, Cetin said that Turkey and Israel faced the same source of terrorism, meaning that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fighting for an independent homeland in south-eastern Anatolia, and Islamic Jihad and

Hizballah, are all based in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley,³⁹ indicating where his government's policies toward Israel might lead. While Cetin was in Israel, Jerusalem and Ankara set up a working group to establish a free trade zone between them, which the Turkish parliament, under the Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, approved on April 4 1997. The zone will be fully established by 2000. The two governments also signed a twelve-article memorandum on cultural and intelligence co-operation.

In late January 1994, President Ezer Weizman became the first Israeli head of state to visit Turkey, where he met with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel. In April 1994, then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres went to Ankara, where he met with then-Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who stated: "I see a new friendship between Israel and Turkey, which will contribute to peace and to the establishment of a new Middle East."⁴⁰ Ankara and Jerusalem discussed the prospects of Turkey supplying troops to patrol a security zone in Hebron. In June of that same year, before the Military Training Cooperation Agreement was even signed, Israel and Turkey engaged in their first joint mid-air refuelling exercise with a variety of Turkish planes. Also in that same month, Turkey's President Demirel listed Israel as one of three countries with which Ankara should improve ties, and a Turkish parliamentary delegation visited Israel for the first time. On October 6, the two signed a draft agreement on joint efforts to combat terrorism, with which both have extensive experience, and discussed efforts to fight drug-trafficking and organised crime. A month later, Çiller became the first Turkish government leader to visit

³⁹ Near East Report, "In Israel, Turkish Foreign Minister Condemns Syrian Support for Terrorism," 23 November, 1993.

⁴⁰ Israel Government Press Office, "New Israel-Turkey Friendship," Jerusalem, 22 April 1994.

Israel, at which time the two governments agreed to sign a free trade agreement covering all sectors.

The political and military facet is only one part of the growing closeness, and this fact must be borne in mind when discussing broader Turkish-Israeli relations. There is a growing realisation in both countries that, martial support aside, the two have many reasons to co-operate and much to gain, in numerous ways, from such co-operation. Economic links are profitable, and growing. In 1993 the Turkish-Israeli Business Council was established. Around the time of Weizman's visit to Turkey in 1994, talks between the two countries were beginning to focus on economic issues, such tourism, trade, customs, monetary policy, and banking. The free trade agreement was signed in March 1996, and became effective on May 1 1997. Also in March 1996, an agreement for the prevention of double taxation was signed, which is expected to enter into force at the beginning of 1999, as well as an accord on mutual investment. About six weeks later another agreement was signed, on industrial and agricultural technology co-operation.

Tourism has also increased as a result of the openness of the relationship. Between 1994 and 1997 about 350 000 Israelis visited Turkey annually, spending an average of \$1000 each. Turkish casinos are also popular with Israelis: their yearly betting amounts to a further \$1.5 billion.⁴¹

Already, trade between the two has increased significantly. In 1991 mutual trade equalled \$100 million; in 1995 it passed \$440 million; as a result of the free trade

⁴¹ Amikam Nachmani, "Bridge Across the Middle East: Turkey and Israel in the 1990s," forthcoming, 28.

agreement, it is expected to reach approximately \$2.5 billion by 2000.⁴² On March 24 1998 Ankara and Jerusalem signed a protocol on trade, the contents of which have not been disclosed. However, it is known that Turkish exports to Israel include iron and steel products, cement, woven clothing, and synthetic fibres. Israeli exports to Turkey are based on chemical products, plastics, cotton, seeds, and optical equipment.⁴³ These facts and figures are significant, in that they point out that Turkish-Israeli military co-operation is one aspect of the relationship, and that both reinforce each other to significant degrees.

Co-operation has extended to the international political agenda, as well. When the European Union was voting on whether to form a customs union with Turkey, Israeli embassies in European capitals lobbied heavily on Turkey's behalf, and former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres used his contacts in the Socialist International to further the cause. The favour was returned when Turkey abstained during the United Nations vote at the beginning of 1996 condemning the Israeli military offensive in Lebanon.

During the rule of and despite the opposition of the Islamic *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) and its Islamic Prime Minister, which will be discussed in Chapter Five, the relationship has grown closer between Israel and Turkey, especially in the political-military sphere. On April 8 1997, then-Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy visited Turkey, where he met with the prime minister, deputy prime minister (Tansu Çiller), military commanders, and business leaders. And that same month, the first official Muslim religious delegation from Turkey arrived in Israel.

⁴² Amikam Nachmani, "Turkish-Israeli Military Co-operation: Changing Implications for Greece and Cyprus," forthcoming, 4.

Co-operation between Ankara and Jerusalem, which has fluctuated depending on both the Arab-Israeli dynamic and Turkey's foreign policy needs, has finally reached a relatively stable plateau, including a slowly but steadily rising plain. This is largely a result of the end of the Cold War, and Turkey's need for allies and friends. But it is also due in part to the advent of the Arab-Israeli peace process, especially the Declaration of Principles, which has allowed for a more open atmosphere in which Turkey can become more open and overt about its relationship with Israel. The need for careful balancing is gone, and Ankara can lean toward Jerusalem more so now than at any time in the past.

Israel and Turkey's Relations with Middle Eastern States

The relationship Israel and Turkey historically have had with their regional neighbours has contributed to the current levels of friendliness and hostility within the Middle East. These must be examined in order to lay the basis for understanding why Ankara and Jerusalem signed these agreements in the first place, which is discussed in Chapter Four. It must be remembered that there are significant and important reasons why Turkey and Israel have drawn closer militarily in recent years, and that the two countries have in many ways been pushed into this position. Their decision to sign the MTCA and all subsequent accords is based in large part on their specific regional relations, and therefore these must be discussed in detail. As mentioned previously, only Syria, Iraq, and Iran will be examined.

⁴³ Xinhua General News Service, "Turkey, Israel Sign Protocol on Trade," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal Seminar on Turkish Foreign Policy* in

Israel's Middle Eastern Relations

Israel's position in the Middle East is largely a reflection of the course the Arab-Israeli conflict has taken. The origins of this dispute have already been discussed and need not be detailed again. But it is important to understand the association the Jewish state currently has with its neighbours. For the purposes of understanding the military relationship between Turkey and Israel, it is only necessary to look at Israel's relations with Syria, Iran, and Iraq. It is primarily because of these countries and their policies and actions toward Israel that Jerusalem has been prompted into a military collaboration with Turkey.

Strategically and militarily, although only Syria is territorially contiguous with Israel, all three have the ability to harm Israel physically. Syria is able, through its geographical closeness, to invade Israel with greater ease, as the wars of 1967 and 1973 have shown. Iraq has sought the leadership of the radical Arab world, and as such was required to display a much harsher stand during the years after 1949. It sent a contingent to Israel during the 1948 war, and had been actively engaged in a nuclear arms program until Israeli aircraft bombed the plant where it was believed the weapons were being fashioned.

Iran, since 1979, has been active in supporting fundamentalist Islamic groups that have relied on terrorist methods of violence. HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah are all engaged in armed action against Israel, at times reserving their attacks for the civilian population of Israel. Other Arab states, while employing acrimonious rhetoric against the Jewish state, have largely refrained from any direct action against Israel. Importantly,

the Middle East, 24 March 1998.

those Arab states nominally involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict that have avoided confrontation with Israel are also friends and allies of the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.

When political Zionism became a reality for many Eastern European Jews at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the Arabs then living in Palestine began to resent the influx of Jews into their midst. More importantly, it was the surrounding Arab states that were vexed about the growing Jewish presence in the Middle East, with its pioneering methods of agriculture and expanding political (and, more slowly, military) cohesion. Especially after 1948, with the displacement of the Palestinian population, the Arab states took on the role of Israel's enemy, seeking its removal from the region.

Certain Arab states assumed the mantle of leadership in the conflict with Israel. Originally, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan shared this distinction, although Jordan had always assumed a lesser role in this respect and had co-operated secretly with Israel on numerous occasions.⁴⁴ After the 1967 war, Jordan ceased to be an important factor in the showdown with Israel. After the 1978 Camp David Accords, Egypt withdrew from the centre of the conflict. This left Syria as the only real confrontation state, geographically linked with Israel and able to translate its hostility into tangible outcomes.

⁴⁴ Lebanon, too, was one of the original confrontation states. However, its internal weaknesses were too great, and after the country was torn apart by civil strife in 1975 its focus turned inward. As Syria gained influence in the country, eventually ruling it through Syrian-backed regimes, it became simply an appendage of Damascus' foreign policy.

Israeli-Syrian Relations

In recent years, most notably after the Gulf War and the beginning of the peace process in Madrid in October of 1991, Israel's relations with its neighbours warmed. A peace treaty with Egypt, in place since 1979, was added to with the Declaration of Principles with the PLO in 1993, and a peace treaty was achieved with Jordan a year later. Relations with Syria, however, have not changed very much since the 1948 war, and continue to seethe with underlying tension and antagonism. Previously the leader of the radical Arab camp supported by the Soviet Union and opposed to the United States and Israel, Syria after the Cold War was pressured to show some flexibility in its bargaining position in the peace process. In the wake of the disruption of that process, Damascus can afford to be adamant about its policies, and retain the tacit support of other, more moderate Arab countries (such as Saudi Arabia).

Israel's greatest concern lies with Syria. This is important because Syria is also the Middle Eastern country with which Turkey has the most hostile disagreements; it has been estimated that if peace with Syria were achieved, enmity with Iran and Iraq would not be as consequential. However, disagreement over two main issues remains unsolved with no easy answers in sight: the Golan Heights and Lebanon. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Middle East has become a "modern symbol of irreconcilable nationalist passions, intractable religious exclusivism, and high political volatility."⁴⁵ Any negotiations have likely been "wrapped in memories of spilled blood,"⁴⁶ and in fact some

⁴⁵ Graham Fuller, "The Middle East in U.S.-Soviet Relations," Middle East Journal 44 (Summer 1990): 417.

⁴⁶ Carroll Doherty, "Whispers of Peace in a Volatile Region," Congressional Quarterly Special Report 50 (September 26, 1992): 2901.

believe that more blood will need to be spilled before any real peace can be achieved between Israel and Syria.⁴⁷ In the very first session of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, in response to then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's assertion that Syria was "one of the most oppressive tyrannical regimes in the world," Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa waved an old poster of Shamir depicting him when he was wanted by the British in the 1940s as a terrorist.⁴⁸

Syria, a country of twelve million, is primarily made up of Arabs and Muslims. President Hafiz al-Assad has total control over all facets of Syrian life. In 1963 Assad was part of a small group of Alawite⁴⁹ military officers that staged a coup that brought the Ba'ath Party back into power. In 1970 Assad seized power for himself, and has maintained a tight grip on it ever since.

In the 1967 war, Israel conquered from Syria the Golan Heights, a strategically placed plateau that was used for shelling Israeli settlements, and this has become a point of contention between the two since.⁵⁰ Israel took 1250 square kilometres out of the total of 1750 that was the Golan (100 square kilometres was eventually given back to Syria after

⁴⁷ Interview, official, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada, March 1997.

⁴⁸ Carroll Doherty, "Old Hatreds Boil to Surface as Peace Talks Begin," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 49 (November 2, 1991): 3217.

⁴⁹ The Alawites are a small and isolated group found in north-western Syria. They are from the Shi'ite division of Islam, comprising about twelve percent of the population, whose beliefs are so different from mainstream Islam that they are sometimes not considered Muslims at all. Assad has kept his people in repressive power over the overwhelming Sunni majority, and there are fears of a backlash against them once Assad dies and the Alawite grip on power is loosened.

⁵⁰ In 1981 the Begin government annexed the plateau. As of 1995, there were thirty-three Jewish settlements on the Golan, comprising 15 000 people. Source: Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Negotiations with Syria," Security and Policy Studies No.24 (The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Israel, December 1995) 89.

1973). Prior to the Six Day War, and after the armistice was signed in July 1949, a demilitarised zone was set up along the Israeli-Syrian border, which was constantly crossed by small raiding parties. There is much disagreement over the future of the Golan. Damascus claims that, before his death, Rabin promised to return the Golan in full, without a full peace treaty; the current Israeli government rejects this. The only constant is the fact that Syria regards the Golan as its national territory, and will not give up any slice of it. As a senior Syrian official stated, “[t]he Golan is our territory. It is a sacred cause for the Syrian people, and we will continue to struggle until we recover this territory to the lines of 4 June 1967.”⁵¹

The hostility and even hatred between the two has been vitriolic ever since. At the behest of Assad, Syrian newspapers consistently relate the “cruelty” and “barbarism” of Israelis, and rarely, if ever, show any sign of independent analysis or thinking.⁵² Before the 1991 Madrid peace conference (which was convened after the Gulf War and included Israel and most of its Arab adversaries), Israel was only referred to as the “Zionist entity,” or “the enemy” (lately, however, given Syria’s relative isolation in the region, Israel is now being recognised as Israel).

Syrian-Israeli relations are complicated by the situation in Lebanon. Israel invaded in 1982, in an attempt to destroy the PLO bases in Lebanon that were used to carry out terror attacks in Israel. The Israeli army remained until 1985, when it created a narrow strip in the south, its self-declared security zone. Syria has *de facto* control over the

⁵¹ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, “Interview: Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations, An Interview with Ambassador Walid al-Moudlem,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26 (Winter 1997): 90.

Lebanese government, backed by approximately 40 000 troops stationed in the small country, and the Israeli invasion was a direct challenge to its policies. The 1982 invasion was the last time there were significant clashes between the two states: Syria lost much in prestige and hardware, with ninety-two combat aircraft shot down, over thirty SAM batteries and 145 tanks destroyed, and 2000 casualties.⁵³

Previously Syria had been the leader of the radical Arab states against Israel, and after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, only Syria remained as a front-line state committed to confrontation with Israel.⁵⁴ The distancing from the Soviet Union started even before 1991, when Moscow under Gorbachev began to refrain from bolstering strategic alliances in regions such as the Middle East, where confrontational lines were a source of tension with the United States.⁵⁵

Relations since the end of the Cold War have thawed somewhat, if only due to the fact that the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union left Damascus without a superpower patron. This has deprived Syria of the ability to achieve a strategic parity with Israel, which was its previous goal. It has, as Barry Rubin writes, no military option anymore.⁵⁶ Israel has seemed to have given tacit acceptance of Syria's presence in Lebanon, and indeed can use it to Jerusalem's advantage: if Syria decides to rein in

⁵² Emad Mekay, "The View from Damascus," The Jerusalem Report, 20 March, 1997: 18.

⁵³ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Defence and Security Policies of Syria in a Changing Regional Environment," International Relations 13 (April 1996): 53.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁵⁶ Barry Rubin, "No Cause for Concern," The Jerusalem Post, 27 September, 1996.

Hizballah in southern Lebanon, Iran (which supplies the Islamic organisation) would not be able to get supplies past Syrian territory.

So far, peace talks between the two have not gone very far. Syria remains on the U.S. State Department's list of states that support terrorism. Yet at the same time, "U.S. emergence from the Persian Gulf conflict as the unchallenged, preeminent external power in the Middle East, to a degree not rivaled by any other outsider at least in this century"⁵⁷ has left Syria with no choice but to accede, as slowly and inflexibly as possible, to American pressure, if it wants to retain American economic aid.

As is argued in Chapter Five, an Israeli-Syrian peace would be detrimental to Syrian regional interests. It is primarily for this reason that one can safely state that this relationship will remain mired in its current impasse, without significant progress made in peace efforts, at least for the foreseeable future.

Israeli-Iraqi Relations

Hostility is the defining feature of the Israeli-Iraqi relationship. Iraq was one of the five Arab states to send regular forces in the invasion of Israel in 1948, and the hatred has remained ever since. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor plant, because it feared what Baghdad might do were it armed with atomic weapons. During the Gulf War, the people of Iraq could be seen jubilantly expressing their feelings when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein fired his SCUDs on Tel Aviv and threatened to burn half of Israel.

Iraq never signed an armistice agreement with Israel in 1949, nor has it accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has

⁵⁷ Robert Freedman, ed., The Middle East After Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1993), 68.

shown no sign or intention of accepting Israel's existence. In April 1993, Saddam's son, Uday, wrote a series of articles claiming that "the extinction of the Zionist entity was a necessity dictated both by the will of God, and the need to recover exclusive Arab rights on Palestine."⁵⁸

The danger that Iraq poses to Israel has lessened since the Gulf War. Saddam's military has been diminished, and its chemical and nuclear weapons programs are under strict monitoring, although as Chapter Four relates, U.N. efforts have not been as successful as originally hoped. Furthermore, the fact that Iraq has threatened Kuwait has put all the Gulf states under pressure and fear, and has contributed to the relative isolation of Baghdad in the Arab world, which in turn has relieved some of the pressure on Israel.

Israeli-Iranian Relations

Relations with Iran have been hostile and antagonistic since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Prior to that, Israel had hoped that the non-Arab states of the Middle East (Israel, Iran, and Turkey) might find common cause to ally themselves in the face of a (relatively) united Arab world. However, with the rise of the mullahs in Iran and their fundamentalist Islamic ideals, the dangers Iran poses to Israel have increased exponentially.

Jerusalem's biggest concern over Iran is its support of radical Islamic movements that are fighting against Israel, and its own ability to attain armaments capable of defeating the Jewish state. Iran, a Shi'ite Muslim country, has given aid to the Sunni Muslim groups Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS, and Shi'ite Hizballah: "Since Khomeini's rise to power in

⁵⁸ Ofra Bengio, "Crossing the Rubicon?: Iraq and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," The Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 2 (March 1998).

1979, Iran has maintained aspirations to lead the radical Islamic camp and continues to deepen its ties to extremist states and terrorist groups throughout the Middle East (Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza).⁵⁹ Islamic Jihad was formed in the 1970s in the Gaza Strip to combat Israeli occupation and, in fact, to erect an Islamic state on Palestinian soil,⁶⁰ and the U.S. State Department's counter-terrorism office's 1993 report established that Islamic Jihad received funding from Iran.⁶¹

HAMAS, a Sunni group located in the West Bank violently opposed to the peace process and determined to create an Islamic state over the remains of Israel, and Iran realised after the Gulf War that their interests had converged: opposition to peace with Israel. There have been regular contacts between Iranian political and military leaders with HAMAS' own administration, and there have been reports of financial aid from Teheran, as well.⁶²

Finally, Hizballah, the Islamic group created to drive Israel out of southern Lebanon, enjoys the support of both Syria and Iran. The former provides bases, shelter, and some arms, while the latter donates arms and money. It is estimated that Teheran supplies Hizballah with about \$80 million each year.⁶³ In January 1996, Turkish authorities intercepted three Iranian trucks loaded with weapons, that were driving to Lebanon via

⁵⁹ Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, "Iran and Hizbullah," Jerusalem, February 1997; gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/terror/970212.terror, accessed 23 April, 1997.

⁶⁰ Elie Rekhess, "The Terrorist Connection - Iran, The Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS," Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem (May 1995): 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶³ Leslie Susser, "Iran, the Real Target," The Jerusalem Report 16 May, 1996: 12.

Syria. In early April, a ship filled with arms from Iran was seized in Belgium, and was widely believed to be ferrying these armaments to Hizballah. A military agreement with Turkey, it was hoped, would help isolate Iran by allowing Israel access to Iran's northern border, and thus warn Iran that it, too, is vulnerable.

Teheran's fundamentalist Islamic outlook has contributed to its venomous hatred of Israel. Two examples of official Iranian speeches are enough to support this: On February 8 1996, Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini told senior officers of the Iranian Air Force that "the government and people of Iran are of the opinion that the Israeli entity is false and artificial. In fact there is no nation named 'Israel'"; that same month, Khomeini, in a sermon, preached that "the power of Islam will ultimately bring about the end of the usurpatory and rootless Zionist regime, which has forced its presence upon Palestinian land and which must be destroyed."⁶⁴ As recently as February 1997, on responding to the invitation to Israel to participate in an international fencing competition to be held in Teheran, then-President Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani stated that "Iran doesn't recognize the existence of Israel, so how can it invite something that does not exist?"⁶⁵

Turkey's Middle Eastern Relations

For the purposes of Ankara's agreements with Jerusalem, its relations with only three Middle Eastern states need to be looked at: Syria, Iraq, and Iran, which are also the three regional countries with whom Israel is most concerned. Turkey's Middle Eastern relations are centred on its geographical, territorial, political, and ideological disputes with these three states. With Syria, Turkey is engaged in disagreements over water policy and

⁶⁴ Information Division, "Iran and Hizballah."

⁶⁵ "Quote, Unquote," The Jerusalem Report 6, February, 1997: 12.

support for terrorism, and the area of Hatay; with Iraq over water sharing and territory; and with Iran over their distinct and opposing worldviews. Other Arab states, while they may have based their relations with Turkey on Ankara's disputes with Damascus, Baghdad, and Teheran, have nonetheless refrained from any rhetoric or direct action against the Turkey and so need not be considered here.

Although relations with each of these three states remain tense, Turkey has found some room for co-operation, such as the \$23 billion gas deal signed with Iran in August of 1996. Historically, in fact, tensions between Turkey and its Arab neighbours only simmered below the surface, and co-operation, despite disagreements over how to address the Israel-Palestinian dilemma, was steady. It is only in the last twenty years or so that these tensions have exploded into open hostility and antagonism.

However, the problems that exist between these states are far more consequential than the co-ordination, despite the fact when Turkey had an Islamic prime minister he had signalled his wishes to increase ties with Turkey's Muslim neighbours. Geostrategically, there are more reasons for animosity than there are for amiability, and the problems Turkey faces with one state always involves the other two. The Arab states and Iran hold deep-seated suspicions of Turkey, for several reasons: "first, it is the former imperial power in the region; second, it is too closely allied with the West; and third, it has abandoned the teachings of Islam for the sake of creating a Western secular, modern state."⁶⁶ Furthermore, in spite of Turkey's search for non-Western friends and allies, "Turkish foreign policy has always been designed so as to give priority to relations with

⁶⁶ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 38.

the West rather than the Middle East, and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has always been considered an extension of the Western-oriented Turkish foreign policy.”⁶⁷

Turkish-Syrian Relations

Of all Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours, relations with Syria are the worst, primarily due to two reasons: terrorism and water rights. To begin with, Turkey has been struggling with a violent Kurdish insurrection in south-eastern Anatolia since 1984, which has fought under the banner of the Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan*, or PKK). The Kurds in Turkey have, as previously mentioned, never been allowed their own cultural autonomy. After World War One, Turkey tried to assimilate the Kurdish population, which currently makes up about twenty percent of the population, in contrast to the former Ottoman practice of treating all subjects as first-class citizens. Not all wished to be incorporated, however, and there has been armed resistance ever since: in 1984 the rebellion gained momentum and initiative.

In recent years the military has been given the task of putting down the rebellion. Its harsh, repressive measures have not only earned Turkey a reputation for torture and violation of human rights, but also pressed the PKK into using terrorist tactics to achieve its goals. This insurrection is an extremely delicate situation for Turkey, for it takes a heavy toll on Ankara: about three percent of Turkey’s GDP is committed to fighting the rebellion,⁶⁸ and 250 000 troops and other security personnel have been pressed into

⁶⁷ Criss, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East,” 2.

⁶⁸ A report commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office estimates that in the last six years \$48 billion has been spent on this conflict. Source: Kemal Kirişçi, “Post Cold-

service to respond to this threat.⁶⁹ In addition, it is estimated that 21 000 Turks have died as a result of fighting the rebellion.⁷⁰

Although Ankara has, in the last few years, gained the upper hand in the struggle, it has accused Syria (and to a lesser extent both Iraq and Iran as well) of supporting the terrorists by providing some aid, but mostly refuge in Lebanon and Syria itself. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, resides in Syrian territory, and, much to the anger and dismay of Ankara, Damascus has rejected demands for his deportation. The refusal of Syria to co-operate on this matter has made collaboration between these two countries very difficult. In the middle of 1996, this atmosphere of mutual suspicion culminated in both states massing troops along their border after Damascus accused Ankara of sponsoring a series of bomb attacks in Syrian cities.⁷¹

The water issue involves Iraq as well, and deals with what many scholars are beginning to describe as a national security matter. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers both rise in the mountains of Turkey, and flow down through Syria and Iraq, where they form the Shatt al-Arab waterway that empties into the Persian Gulf. For several years these countries have argued over the allocation of these waters, and since the resource is so important for drinking, irrigating, and farming, and there are few if any alternatives to water, it has been called a vital resource.

Peter Gleick writes that “[f]resh water is a fundamental resource, integral to all ecological and societal activities, including food and energy production, transportation,

War Turkish Security and the Middle East,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 2 (June 1997).

⁶⁹ Henri Barkey, “Kurdish Geopolitics,” Current History 96 (January 1997): 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

waste disposal, industrial development, and human health.”⁷² Given these circumstances, it is easy to understand the need for a country to control its own water supplies. Gleick goes on to argue that in the twenty-first century, water and water-supply systems increasingly will become the cause and objective and military actions.⁷³

Syria and Iraq depend heavily on the Euphrates and Tigris; neither they nor Turkey are considered water-rich countries,⁷⁴ and the combined demand of all three countries of these rivers exceeds the total water volume of them (148% of the total flow capacity of the Euphrates, and 111% of the Tigris). Turkey is presently involved in a massive dike project, the Southeastern Anatolia Project (*Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi*, or GAP) to increase its hydro-electric power and irrigate about two million hectares of land. In 1990, it finished construction on the Atatürk Dam, the largest of twenty-two proposed dams and nineteen hydro-power plants. The GAP is extremely important for Turkey: once completed, it will generate twenty-seven billion kWh of electricity each year, and irrigate 1.7 million hectares of farm in south-eastern Anatolia, previously the least economically developed region in Turkey.⁷⁵ The project will also create 3.3 million jobs and will double or triple Turkey’s crop output.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Kirişçi, “Post Cold-War Turkish Security,” 2.

⁷² Peter Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security,” *International Security* 18 (Summer 1993): 79.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Water-rich countries are those that have 10 000 cubic meters of water per capita per year. Iraq has 2110 cubic meters; Turkey has 1830 cubic meters; and Syria has 1420 cubic meters. Source: *Center for Strategic Research*, “Facts About Euphrates-Tigris Basin,” Ankara, 1996, 4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Although Syria and Iraq were given advance warning of the completion of the dam, the construction interrupted the flow of water for a month to partly fill up a reservoir, although Turkey was careful to maintain a consistent flow of water to both riparian states. Syria and Iraq also claim that the GAP will harm their agriculture and reduce the amount of water flowing into their countries; also, they allege that Turkey releases polluted water across the borders. In addition, Syria and Turkey are at odds over the Orontes River, which rises in Lebanon and flows down through Syria to Turkey, through the disputed province of Hatay. Syria extracts about ninety percent of the total flow from this river.

In addition to these complaints, seventy-nine percent of Syria's river water, and sixty-six percent of Iraq's, originates outside of their borders. This gives Turkey incredible leverage over this vital resource, and in fact in mid-1990, then-Turkish President Özal threatened to restrict the water flow to Syria in an attempt to force Damascus to withdraw support for Kurdish rebels. When the GAP is finished, it will have the potential of cutting water to Syria by forty percent, and to Iraq by eighty percent.⁷⁷

Turkey and Syria are also in disagreement over another area, which does not hold the same influence over their foreign policies as the first two, but which nonetheless contributes to rancour between them. The area of Hatay (Alexandretta in Arabic) was originally part of the province of Syria under the Ottoman Empire. It is made up of a mixed Arabic-Turkic population, and had been under French administration since 1921. As his last decisive act as President, Atatürk opposed it being made part of an independent Syria, and in 1939 the French agreed to let Ankara annex it. The Syrians have never

recognised this act, and indeed all Syrian maps show Hatay to be part of Syria, and it remains a source of friction.

Turkish-Iraqi Relations

Aside from the issue of the division of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, Turkey historically has not had very much antagonism in its relations with Iraq, mainly because Turkey had for a long time neglected the Middle East in its foreign policy thinking, and was content as the ally of the United States to focus more on Europe. In fact, Turkey and Iraq historically had a profitable relationship, with Iraq supplying most of Turkey's oil, and a common interest in containing Kurdish aspirations. But, especially in the last decade, Turkey has grown wary of Baghdad's actions in and designs on the Middle East in general, and the Persian Gulf in particular, although "[p]resently Iraq does not constitute an immediate military threat to Turkey."⁷⁸ This could, of course, change should the U.S.-led pressure on Baghdad lessen or be removed.

Ankara also has aroused Baghdad's ire at times by sending armed forces into northern Iraq to stop Kurdish infiltrations across the porous border. In 1996, Turkey announced it would create a ten-mile "danger zone" south of its border in Iraqi territory, that would be patrolled and extensively monitored by Turkish troops, without permanently stationing these forces there. Iraq was not happy with this intrusion into its sovereign lands, despite the fact that the area north of the thirty-sixth parallel has been ostensibly off-limits to Iraqi forces since the end of the Gulf War. Coincidentally, this action has given Turkish-Israeli similarities a new angle: "Not surprisingly, Ankara has found itself

⁷⁷ Gleick, "Water and Conflict," 89.

⁷⁸ Kirişçi, "Post Cold-War Turkish Security," 3.

enmeshed in a controversy with Arab governments and public opinion, which accused it of imitating the Israeli security zone in south Lebanon.”⁷⁹

Turkish-Iranian Relations

The principal problem Ankara has with Teheran is its fundamentalist Islamic outlook, with its hostility toward secularism, which Turkey sees as a threat to its own secular establishment and has created an ideological gulf between the two states. As Ahmed Hashim writes, “[t]here is an intrinsic ideological antipathy between the Muslim world’s most secular state, Turkey, and its self-professed leading theocratic state, Iran.”⁸⁰

In connection with this, Iran, one of the most diplomatically isolated states in the world, is in the habit of supplying aid to radical Islamic organisations, many of them terrorist groups, and what is sometimes described as exporting its Islamic revolution. Turkey is suspicious that Iran has been aiding militant Islamists inside Turkey.⁸¹ Also, Iran is in the process of attempting to acquire long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction; given the long border these two countries share, Ankara has been vigilant over Iran’s foreign policies.

Historically, however, Turkey and Iran had been on co-operative terms, given that both are non-Arab and both, after 1945 and until 1979, were part of the Western attempt to prevent the U.S.S.R. from encroaching on Western interests in the Middle East. During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, it was reported that Turkey and Iran were co-operating to provide arms to the Bosnian Muslims, in violation of an arms

⁷⁹ Barkey, “Kurdish Geopolitics,” 4.

⁸⁰ Ahmed Hashim, “The Crisis of the Iranian State,” Adelphi Paper No. 296 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 39.

embargo. In recent years, though, Turkey has accused Iran of providing some logistical support to the PKK, and allowing the group to shelter behind the Iranian border. Teheran's reaction to the 1996 Military Training Cooperation Agreement was very negative, at all levels. It was denounced as an American-Israeli attempt to encircle Iran.

In addition, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey (which the United States supports) and Iran have been in competition for influence in the five Central Asian republics⁸² and Azerbaijan, all of which are predominantly Muslim. Turkey, however, has a common cultural and linguistic bond with them, except for Persian-speaking Tajikistan, which is also the least important for Ankara economically, militarily, and politically.⁸³ These new states have large natural resource deposits, which Turkey hopes to tap into, and is in the process of lobbying heavily for a large share in the energy currently being drawn from the Caspian Sea. The West hopes that Turkey's secular influence will act as a shield from Iranian fundamentalism; secular, democratic states, combined with a common Turkic heritage, would have closer ties to Ankara than to Teheran, which is geographically nearer to Central Asia. Currently, these countries have shown a tendency to lean more toward Russia than either Turkey or Iran, but that has not lessened the prospects of closer relations with either non-Arab state.

⁸¹ James Wyllie, "What Future for the Turco-Israeli Alliance," Jane's Intelligence Review August, 1996: 364.

⁸² Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Israel and Turkey's Relations with the United States

Although the Soviet Union has dissolved, and Russia no longer has all the requirements to fulfil the role of superpower, the Cold War did at one point largely determine Turkey and Israel's relationships with the United States. This section will focus mainly on the United States, because it is this relationship that is key to understanding the historical development of Ankara and Jerusalem's ties to the West. In this same vein, Turkey and Israel's relations with the U.S.S.R. are primarily a product of their connection to the West. Relations with the Soviet Union/Russia will therefore be only briefly discussed.

As the dominant external power in the region, the United States cannot be unhappy with the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Although it did not coerce or initiate the Military Training Cooperation Agreement and all subsequent agreements and accords, it nonetheless benefits from them, and its support remains much desired, though not necessarily integral. In this context, it must be remembered that the Middle East holds nearly seventy percent of the world's petroleum reserves; some American officials have been heard to call the area the most strategically important in the world.⁸⁴ Unhampered commercial access to Persian Gulf resources, which means a stable region filled with friendly states, is a prime U.S. concern,⁸⁵ and when one discusses the role of the U.S. in the Middle East, one must bear that in mind.

⁸³ Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States," Middle East Journal 47 (Fall 1993): 597.

⁸⁴ Stephen Zunes, "Hazardous Hegemony: The United States in the Middle East," Current History 96 (January 1997): 20.

Israeli-American Relations

Israel has long been thought of as a tacit ally of the United States, and the most pro-Western and democratic state in the Middle East, whose ideological ties and military usefulness to the U.S. were strong enough to withstand most, if not all, political storms that lashed against it. Yet it was not really until the 1960s that Israel and the United States came to see how much their interests converged.

Since its inception, Israel had been living in fear of an Arab attack that would cripple it enough so that it could not fight any longer. David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Yishuv in pre-state Palestine and prime minister of Israel for most of the state's early years, until his retirement in 1963, felt that the fledgling state needed a great power patron, one that could provide political and military support.⁸⁵ In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Israeli government believed that Europe was the place to seek such allies, specifically Britain and France. This policy quickly became untenable, as France and Britain, seeking to maintain their influence in their former Mandates (Syria and Lebanon for France, and Jordan and Iraq for Britain), showed little inclination in disrupting their relations with the Arab states (unless national interests were deemed at stake, such as the 1956 Suez crisis).

For its part, Israel under Ben-Gurion had begun to turn to the U.S. for four main reasons: first, there was a lingering mistrust of Britain due to its role during the Mandate period; second, Britain's Middle Eastern interests lay more with the Arabs than with the Jews; third, Israel could use public opinion in the United States to a degree that was not possible in Britain, and consequently American Jewry could accomplish more than British

⁸⁵ Fuller, "The Middle East in U.S.-Soviet Relations," 419.

⁸⁶ Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," 43.

Jewry; and forth, Britain was quickly being supplanted by the U.S. as the dominant Western player in the international arena.⁸⁷ The 1956 Suez War proved this beyond doubt; even with the backing of two Great Powers, Israel's aims could not be realised without American support.

By the 1950s, the United States was seen as the logical Great Power supporter. Originally, Israel had hoped for a formal alliance, but as it became obvious that due to the sensitive nature of Western-Arab relations that was not possible, Israel gradually came to the conclusion that engaging itself in such a coalition would be self-defeating, because it would become too much of a constraining force.⁸⁸ Israel needed its freedom to act, Jerusalem felt, because the Jewish state's survival depended on offensive wars, as evidenced by the pre-emptive attacks it undertook in 1967 and 1981. In addition, after 1967 proposals for a formal American-Israeli defence alliance were linked to Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands.

Much has been made of the Jewish lobby in Washington, primarily the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and its ability to shift American policy in favour of Israel. This ability was the result of the fact that in its infancy, Israel had no recourse to the "normal" diplomatic leverages most states had acquired long before. Israel was forced to rely on unconventional methods. Under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, support for Israel was more than balanced by a policy of support for the Arab states, led primarily by an Arabist bureaucratic elite ensconced in the Department of State. It was then that Israel began the process of going over the executive head and appealing directly

⁸⁷ David Tal, "The American-Israeli Security Treaty: Sequel or Means to the Relief of Israeli-Arab Tensions, 1954-55," *Middle Eastern Studies* 31 (October 1995): 830.

to Congress, utilising its connections with American celebrities, not all Jewish, memories of and guilt over the recent Holocaust, and promises of financial and voter support.⁸⁹

The change in American-Israeli relations came with the growth of a warmer, more personal relationship under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.⁹⁰ Truman had maintained an arms embargo on Israel, and Eisenhower had rarely broken it. The decisive shift in the American-Israeli relationship came in 1962, when then-President John Kennedy pledged to then-Foreign Minister Golda Meir that the U.S. would come to Israel's assistance in the event of an Arab attack, telling her that "the United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to that which it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs."⁹¹

That administration later negotiated the first direct sale to Israel of American arms. It was President Lyndon Johnson, however, who broke even newer ground. For fiscal year 1964, the last budgeted by Kennedy, aid to Israel amounted to \$40 million; for fiscal year 1965, it jumped seventy-five percent to \$71 million, then to \$130 million the following year.⁹² In addition, Johnson was the first president to allow the use of American aid money to pay for American weapons, whereas previously U.S. aid had been limited to loans and foodstuffs. Finally, although Kennedy had sold Israel only defensive weapons, Johnson

⁸⁸ Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," 43.

⁸⁹ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Hyperion, 1994), Chapters One and Five.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Chapter Six.

⁹¹ Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 79.

⁹² Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, 110-111.

agreed to the sale of offensive armaments: 250 M-48 tanks and forty-eight Skyhawk bombers.⁹³

Israel's contribution to American Middle Eastern interests was enhanced during the 1970s. In September 1970, as Jordan's King Hussein was fighting a civil war for his regime and kingdom against PLO and Palestinian guerrillas, Syrian tanks rolled into Jordan in support of the Palestinians. President Richard Nixon, concerned that the fall of the King would lead to Jordan becoming a pro-Soviet stronghold, intimated to the Israelis that Washington would look favourably on an Israeli attack on the Syrian tank column.⁹⁴ As soon as Damascus noticed the IDF gearing up for battle, the tanks retreated back into Syria. In the three years after this crisis, American military credits to Israel totalled over \$1.15 billion.⁹⁵

After 1973 Israel became more isolated in world politics, and its political, military, economic, and diplomatic reliance on the U.S. deepened. Consequently, after the U.S. airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, America began to depend more heavily on the Jewish state, primarily as a bulwark against radical Arab states in the Middle East (and thus Soviet expansionism), but also as a backdoor through which to export arms to countries that Washington itself could not be seen to be aiding.

During President Ronald Reagan's years at the White House, "strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel reached record levels largely because of

⁹³ Ibid., 111-112.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 154.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 155.

Israel's assumed importance as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism."⁹⁶ During his first presidential campaign, Reagan called Israel a "strategic asset," and said that it could be counted on as America's "trusted ally."⁹⁷ Reagan also established the Joint Political Military Group, a contingent of military and political aides that met twice each year to discuss issues that affected both countries and how to co-operate more effectively in security matters. Finally, he agreed in 1985 to set up a free trade area between the two countries, which was fully implemented in 1995. In the last decade, recent developments such as the end of bipolarity, the peace process, and internal changes have led to a new strategic thinking in Israel, and reshaped Jerusalem's dependence on the U.S., and America's use for Israel as a strategic asset. Some have argued the case that during the Gulf War, Israel was more of a liability.

However, Washington has not done very much in practical terms to lessen the relationship: as overall foreign assistance levels fall, Israel retains its customary aid levels. During fiscal year 1992/93, the Bush Administration asked Congress for its "normal" \$3 billion in aid for Israel, on top of voicing the U.S. commitment to Israel's qualitative weapons edge over the Arabs, and another \$320 million for the second stage of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile research, even though tests at the time were not all that encouraging.⁹⁸ \$1.8 billion of that aid is billed as military aid under the Foreign Military Financing

⁹⁶ Steven David, "The Continuing Importance of American Interests in the Middle East After the Cold War," in U.S-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1997), 94.

⁹⁷ Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, 189.

Program, while \$1.2 billion of it falls under the Economic Support Fund. In addition, Israel receives numerous special privileges. It is allowed to spend \$475 million of annual military aid in Israel as opposed to the U.S.; Washington funds its defence programs, such as the Arrow program; only Israel receives all of its aid at the start of a fiscal year, so that it is able to buy U.S. Treasury notes and thus acquire more interest on them.⁹⁹ It is estimated that including these special privileges, Israel receives \$500 million more in American aid.¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, Washington has been unwavering in its diplomatic and political support for Israel, blocking U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, a formal U.S. ally, was outraged when the U.S. failed to heavily criticise Israel after its April 1996 attack on Hizballah in Lebanon killed scores of civilians.¹⁰¹ It has also continued to support most of Israel's adamant positions with regard to the peace process with the Palestinian Authority.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is the unchallenged dominant external power in the region, and many believe that its need for Israel is not as great as it once was. Chapter Four gives greater detail to this argument. Yet, "[d]espite serious reservations about Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, Americans have a long-standing

⁹⁸ Anthony Rusonik, "Israeli Defense Doctrine and US Middle East Diplomacy: From Suez to the Loan Guarantees/Settlements Dispute," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14 (1992): 46.

⁹⁹ Duncan Clarke, "US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?" The Middle East Journal 51 (Spring 1997): 201.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 201-202.

¹⁰¹ Eric Watkins, "The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East," International Affairs 73, no.1 (January 1997): 6.

moral commitment to Israel's survival."¹⁰² Coupled with this is the fact that Israel remains a strategic asset, although not in the same sense as it did during the Cold War. It has served to keep Syria in check, has acted as a test-case for American arms, assists in U.S. intelligence-gathering, and is a bastion of pro-Western and democratic leanings and values in a region where the general population seems to be increasingly turning to a stricter, more orthodox version of Islam, to which Western ideals are anathema.

Israel's relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War were relatively stable, based on friction due to the American-Soviet rivalry. The Soviet Union was, paradoxically, the first country to recognise the new state of Israel, primarily because it had hoped that it could use a friendship with socialist Israel to achieve a foothold in what had historically been a Western stronghold. When it became clear that Jerusalem had set its eyes on the U.S., the U.S.S.R. began to support the radical, anti-Western states and supplied massive amounts of military aid to those regimes in conflict with Israel.

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the Soviet Union was backing rejectionist¹⁰³ Arab states such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria (and also the PLO) in their confrontation with Israel. There were no diplomatic ties between Moscow and Jerusalem, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was less than 1000 per year, and Moscow still championed the 1975 U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism. Since 1991, Russia and Israel have increased contact in several different areas: Jewish emigration skyrocketed, the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Israel was allowed to

¹⁰² Zunes, "Hazardous Hegemony," 23.

¹⁰³ Those that rejected both the existence of Israel in the Middle East, and peace with it. These states also were characterised by their anti-American rhetoric and usually their pan-Arab declarations.

photograph Communist Party archives dealing with Jewish matters, the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences opened a branch in Israel, and Natan Sharansky, an Israeli cabinet minister, was cleared of all charges of spying for the U.S.

As recently as March 1997, Netanyahu visited Russia, where President Boris Yeltsin and he proclaimed a new era of Russian-Israeli friendship. Barring any radical take-over of the government, Russia is currently more content to focus on relations with the United States, Europe, and China. The United States remains integral to Israel, and as such occupies by far the lion's share of its greater power concerns.

Turkish-American Relations

In contrast to the development of the Israeli-American relationship, the Turkish-American one started out much more positively and cohesively than it has ended up in the last two decades. When the modern republic of Turkey was first created, its focus lay with Europe, whose political and economic systems and values it attempted to emulate, in the drive for modernisation. Most other foreign relations were neglected, unless it was to smooth over territorial disputes. The United States was far from Ankara's core of concerns.

Turkey and the Soviet Union had relatively stable and somewhat co-operative relations prior to World War Two. By 1945, however, Moscow had begun to encroach on Turkey's national territory,¹⁰⁴ and Ankara realised that, "[g]iven the new international system, characterized by the [C]old [W]ar and by direct Soviet pressure on Turkey, the

¹⁰⁴ Moscow was claiming some lands in eastern Anatolia and demanding a greater role in the administration of the Turkish Straits.

Turks had to redefine their place in the world.”¹⁰⁵ In the addition, Turkish rejection of these Soviet stipulations impressed itself on the United States, which “took [this] as an example of Soviet expansionism and was awakened to Turkey’s strategic importance and to the desirability of including the country within the merging U.S. alliance against communism.”¹⁰⁶

This meant joining the Western world in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, and Turkey became a member of NATO in February 1952. It was conceived of as the southern flank of the alliance, and as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Middle East. After the Iranian Revolution, it was meant to act as a check on Iran, because it was still geographically close enough to the Persian Gulf to be able to play a strategic role for the U.S.

However, it did not take long for relations between Ankara and Washington to sour, and it occurred over the Cyprus dilemma. Prior to this issue, however, Ankara was already upset over the unilateral American decision to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from its territory after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Turkey had long been at odds with Greece over a number of issues, to be discussed in the next chapter, but the main sticking point has always been Cyprus. The island, with a predominant Greek population, was conquered by the Ottomans in 1571, and over the course of the next 300 years Turks from the mainland

¹⁰⁵ Udo Steinbach, “The European Community, the United States, the Middle East, and Turkey,” in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 104.

¹⁰⁶ Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 260.

were settled there. Today, thirty-seven percent of the northern coast is home to 140 000 Turks, while Greek Cypriots control the rest of the island.¹⁰⁷

In 1878 the British occupied Cyprus and administered it until the 1950s, when the Greek Cypriots launched a movement for union with the Greek mainland. Ankara was concerned over the fate of the Turkish minority, and alarmed at the prospect of a Greek presence so close to its heartland--eighty kilometres off the coast of Anatolia. In 1960, Britain, Greece, and Turkey negotiated Cypriot independence, but included in the treaty was a clause that guaranteed the right of all three countries to militarily intervene if the constitution was violated in any way.¹⁰⁸

In 1964 the Greek Cypriots sought to limit the rights of the Turks living on the island. Ankara immediately threatened invasion, and on June 5, President Johnson sent a devastating letter to the Turkish government stating that if Ankara persisted in its policy, it would not come to Turkey's defence should the U.S.S.R. be drawn into the conflict. This marked the beginning of Turkey's realisation that it could not rely solely on the United States, and was reinforced in 1974 when a second Cyprus crisis prompted an actual Turkish invasion and the U.S. Congress passed an arms embargo on Turkey. Ankara felt it was not being treated like an ally, but rather a Third World country that needed to be disciplined instead of listened to.¹⁰⁹ After the 1964 crisis, "[t]he consensus among the Turkish public and state officials was that the cause of the Cyprus debacle had been Turkey's political dependence on the United States."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 261.

¹⁰⁹ Steinbach, "The European Community," 104.

¹¹⁰ Müftüler-Bac, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe, 32.

These actions contributed to anti-Americanism in Turkey (“go home Yankee” signs appeared for the first time in Turkish universities), which in turn made the Americans more critical of Turkey’s policies, foreign and domestic. Turkey promptly closed its military bases that had been designed for NATO, forcing the U.S. to negotiate another Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1976, which granted Turkey more military and financial aid.

In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, Turkey’s strategic value was seen in terms of European security. The Gulf War, however, proved that Turkey’s worth lay in other areas as well--namely, as a vigilant ally over fundamentalist Iran and radical Iraq, both of which consistently proclaim their anti-American attitudes and designs for greater regional control. In co-operation with the U.S., Turkey closed Iraq’s oil pipeline to the Mediterranean, which cuts across Anatolia (and which caused a staggering monetary loss to Ankara¹¹¹), deployed 100 000 troops along the Turkish-Iraqi border, and allowed the use of NATO airbases for the coalition to attack Iraq and, after the war, carry out Operation Provide Comfort.

Unfortunately for Turkey, however, the U.S. is also seeking to enhance and strengthen its ties with other Arab Gulf states, which would make it less reliant on Turkey. This is not to say that in the next few years the United States will neglect Turkey; it will not, for Turkey’s very geographic location provides enormous possibilities for it to expand its influence, which is secular, democratic, and pro-Western. Another consideration is

¹¹¹ Turkey lost its trade with Iraq, tourism revenues and fees from the oil transit, a suspension on repayment of Iraqi debts, and remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq and Kuwait. In the first three months of the crisis alone, Turkey lost \$2 billion in revenue. Source: Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991): 37.

Turkey's relationship with the European Union, which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

The E.U. seems reluctant to allow Muslim Turkey to become a full member. Coupled with Turkey's record on human rights and the Greek refusal to allow Turkey entry before their disputes are resolved (see below for detail), Europe has not provided very much political or military support to Ankara, and the United States has drifted in the same direction. This is a primary reason why Turkey has sought to expand its military ties with Israel: to gain greater access to Western technology and to begin building up its own indigenous defence industry, so as not to have to rely on the West anymore.

None of this is to say, however, that Turkey and the U.S. are about to effect a final, decisive break. The international political arena is far too complicated for either to throw away such a relationship for the near future. In 1991 the two states agreed to upgrade their co-operation to the status of Enhanced Partnership, and the Iranian and Iraqi threats remain. There continues to be many valid reasons for these two states to maintain their co-operative relationship, and as events in the Middle East has proven time and time again, it is not so easy to predict what forces might come into play in the region.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to define the historical context in which Israel and Turkey base their current relationship on with each other, their Middle Eastern neighbours, and the United States. The give and take of international politics allows for disagreements to run their course without sufficiently damaging relations between states. Furthermore, given the changing nature of international politics, there are always reasons

that crop up for states to overlook their differences and co-operate to achieve a certain set of goals. Turkey and Israel are no different.

Israel's relations with the Arab world have never been positive or amicable, at least until 1993, and as the events of the past year have shown, even this new-found reconciliation is not as strong as some might have believed. Despite having formal treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO, Israel remains at odds with all of these entities and others who have not reconciled themselves to peace with Israel--namely, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and even Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. The chances of violent conflict have not disappeared, and given the changes that have recently occurred in the international structure, as Chapter Two has outlined in theoretical terms and Chapter Four in more concrete terms, Israel cannot rely on the United States as its only defender. A military relationship with Turkey serves the purpose of gaining a regional ally in the face of continued Arab hostility.

Turkey's situation is very similar. Its usefulness to the United States has been called into question, although it is too early for a definite answer. Ankara has come to the realisation that co-operation with Israel can help in two ways: one, by bringing it a regional ally to cope with regional insecurities which the United States has not been very helpful with; and two, allowing Turkey to upgrade its military to deal with these insecurities without relying on the West, whose military support has been lacking in several areas over the past few years, as Chapter Four explains in greater detail.

Given that both Israel and Turkey face threats and potential dangers from the three same countries in the Middle East (that is, Syria, Iraq, and Iran), it seems a natural evolution that they should grow closer militarily. However, their relationship with the

United States must not be overlooked. The U.S. is the unipolar power, and it has much to offer both Turkey and Israel, although its support to Israel has far outweighed the aid it has given to Turkey.

As pointed out in Chapter One, Ankara and Jerusalem have been co-operating to a greater degree since the early 1990s, and with the signing of the Military Training Cooperation Agreement at the beginning of 1996, their military collaboration has continued to grow and expand. Based on the current relations each country has with its neighbours and external powers, it is difficult to imagine a scenario serious enough to disrupt what appears to be a very profitable relationship, militarily and economically. As Chapter Four will argue, it is Turkey and Israel's relations with these same Middle Eastern and Western states that provide practical impetus for their closeness, and it is for these reasons that one can argue that the relationship, grounded as it is on solid (in)security issues, is both necessary and beneficial.

CHAPTER FOUR: REGIONAL MOTIVES AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CONCERNS

Introduction

Having examined the historical and current context in which Israel and Turkey initiated and maintained their close co-operation, especially in the burgeoning military sphere, it is now necessary to probe in greater detail the reasoning and motives behind Ankara's and Jerusalem's decisions. Syria, Iraq, and Iran will again be the main focus, for the same reasons as provided in the previous chapter: these states' relations with Israel and Turkey have been the primary consideration on which these two latter countries have based their analyses. For Turkey, however, the antagonistic and even hostile relationship with Greece remains as important a consideration, and therefore this association will also be investigated more closely.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more in-depth analysis of Israel and Turkey's motives behind the signing of the Military Training Cooperation Agreement and the ensuing closeness of their militaries. Although both states hope to achieve certain goals by maintaining a close military relationship, the main driving force behind the relationship emanates from their relations with their regional neighbours. Syria, Iraq, and Iran all pose dangers for Israel and Turkey, and afford ample impulse for Ankara and Jerusalem to work together through their military-industrial collaboration efforts. For Turkey, such forces can also be found in Greece, with which Turkey has a long-standing, multi-faceted antagonism.

Therefore this chapter will begin with a more detailed investigation of Israel and Turkey's motives in terms of their territorial relations with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and, in the case of Turkey, Greece. This will be followed by a discussion of the aims Israel and Turkey hope to achieve with their military relationship that are not tied in to their regional relationships, which mainly refers to the interactions between these two states and the United States on one hand, and Europe on the other. The question of what benefits Turkey and Israel accrue from these agreements will thus be answered during the course of the analysis.

Israel and Turkey's Regional Motives

As stated above, the principal driving force behind the growing military ties has been Israel and Turkey's relations with their Middle Eastern and regional neighbours. The area has been described several times as a region filled with antagonisms, enmity, and armed conflict. An axis between Ankara and Jerusalem, no matter how undeveloped it may appear, is a good indication that both countries feel their security would be better enhanced by closer co-operation, at least in the military and economic sectors. Quarrels with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Greece all have the potential to erupt into violent friction, probably more so with Turkey, for reasons that will be discussed below.

However, Israel has a long history of war with its Arab neighbours, and the possibility of armed violence erupting again in the future cannot be discounted, despite moderate American pressure on Syria, Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, and Iran's relative isolation. It is the relationship of these three states to Israel and, including Greece, Turkey that provides the impetus for closer military co-operation which Jerusalem and

Ankara believe will bring greater stability to the region, and thus to their own regional interests.¹ Stability here is defined most effectively by the adequacy of the military partnership to deter other states from taking hostile actions against either Israel or Turkey.

It is obvious that Israel and Turkey were prompted to sign the Military Training Cooperation Agreement because they felt their regional security interests were threatened by a number of shared sources. From this, it is arguable that as events unfold in the Middle East on the current course, the need for ever closer collaboration will reveal itself. Already, as previously mentioned, there have been reports that Turkey is seeking a multibillion dollar deal with Israel to supply and upgrade several of Turkey's military components.

Aside from the monetary and military hardware benefits, the MTCA and all subsequent agreements have the added and perhaps even more important advantage of acting as a warning to Syria, Iraq, Iran, and even Greece. That is, all three Muslim states share a border with Turkey; given the fact that Israel now has use of Turkish airspace, the ability to outflank any hostile military action carried out against the Jewish state or Turkey must be taken into consideration by Hafiz al-Assad, Saddam Hussein, and the Iranian mullahs.

Israel and Turkey wield the two most powerful militaries in the area.² Both share common regional adversaries; both also are under pressure from domestic terrorism

¹ Following the signing of the agreement, in April 1996, a Turkish Foreign Ministry statement read: "We believe that Turkish-Israeli cooperation will contribute to regional peace, stability, as well as to the furthering on the Middle East peace process." Source: Statement from Turkey's Foreign Ministry, 10 April, 1996.

² James Wyllie, "What Future for the Turco-Israeli Alliance," Jane's Intelligence Review August, 1996: 364.

(Palestinian rejectionist groups in Israel and the PKK in Turkey); and both have close ties with the United States. It seems, as Ehud Ya'ari believes, a natural progression that the two should become allies.³ Alan Makovsky, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says "I think that the Turkish policy elite has always seen Israel as a natural ally," while Daniel Pipes argues that Turkey is now looking for an ally, and "what better ally than Israel?"⁴ As one senior Turkish military official stated: "We are surrounded on all sides by trouble. We are in the hot seat. It is critical for us to jump outside this circle of chaos and find friends in the region. Israel was the perfect choice."⁵

Israel's Regional Motives

Martin Sicker writes that "the dominant and most characteristic motif of Israeli political life is the perennial quest for security, in the most fundamental sense of the term."⁶ As noted in Chapter Three, it is this constant, all-encompassing search for safety that drives much of Jerusalem's thinking in terms of regional and even extra-regional matters, and also has a profound effect on the country's day-to-day life. As Sicker continues, "the problems of security underlie the social and economic life of the country ... its foreign policy, its very manner of thinking. This pervasive concern with security persists today primarily as a consequence of Israel's perception of the ongoing threat to the existence and peace of the country."⁷

³ Ehud Ya'ari, "Natural Allies," The Jerusalem Report 18 April, 1996: 34.

⁴ The Forward, "Turkey, Israel Quietly Forge Pact on Intelligence, Use of Air Space," Washington, D.C., 12 April, 1996: 4.

⁵ John Pomfret, "Turkey Strengthens Ties to Israel," The Washington Post, 2 June 1996, A24.

⁶ Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

As noted above, this extensive concern is a direct result of Israeli fears brought about by the proximity and hostility of the Arab and Muslim states that make up the Middle Eastern region. In fact, “until very recently, nearly all Arabs felt that Israel did not have a right to exist, at least not in Palestine, and the ideal solution from their point of view, was Israel’s destruction.”⁸ It is logical to deduce that, after nearly fifty years of living under pressure of this sort, the pursuit of relative security should be so overwhelming.

This quest for security, it should be remembered, has been part of Israel’s political and military doctrine since its inception. Even for “David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, protecting the Jewish state was first and foremost a matter of ensuring its survival.”⁹ This concern has not disappeared, despite the fact that Israel has signed peace treaties with two Arab countries and the Declaration of Principals with the PLO. The reasons for Israel’s need to remain vigilant can be found in its associations with its regional foes.

Given the omnipresent nature of Israel’s contentious relations with its regional neighbours as described in the previous chapter, it is also understandable that Israel should seek allies, or at least friends on which to rely in moments of need. This search has culminated in the American-Israeli relationship¹⁰ and everything it entails. However, it would be unrealistic to believe that Israel does not also need regional friends. As such, the

⁸ Adam Garfinkle, “Genesis,” in The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives, ed. Alvin Rubinstein (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1991), 2.

⁹ Michael Margolian, “Israel Cannot Let Its Guard Down,” The Canadian Jewish News, 27 February, 1997: 9.

relationship with Turkey, which has fluctuated for the last five decades but which, nonetheless, has remained generally productive, is a natural outcome of Israel's quest for security.

As discussed in Chapter One, the Military Training Cooperation Agreement and all subsequent accords do not provide Israel with any physical, material gains in the same manner it benefits Turkey.¹¹ For Israel, the agreements provide a counter-weight to any hostile movements Syria, Iraq, or Iran might make toward the Jewish state; that is, if Damascus were plotting an assault on the Golan Heights, it would have to take into account both what the position of Ankara might be, and the possibility that its northern border could be used by Israel as a second staging front.¹² This represents a shift in Israeli military thinking, based on the potency of modern, technologically sophisticated weaponry. As Efraim Inbar argues, "the dangers of missile and nuclear proliferation have generated greater openness to exploration of alternative cooperative and regional security arrangements."¹³ Missile technology is important for Israel's enemies, since in the fifty years of Israel's existence no Arab air force has yet penetrated its air space; missiles are a much simpler method of achieving such a perforation.

¹⁰ It is not the purpose of this thesis to describe the U.S.-Israel relationship in any great detail. For a more explicit account of its nature, see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov's Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987).

¹¹ The main benefits Turkey accrues from the agreements is a qualitative supply or repair of armaments from Israel. Israel is more concerned with the intelligence cooperation the MTCA allows for.

¹² COMPASS: Middle East Wire News Service, "Special Report: Syrians Start to Feel Encircled," [database on-line]; available from <http://www.compass-news.com/cgi-bin/sharchst.cgi?File=06181057.25&Country=Israel>; accessed 3 October 1996.

¹³ Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," Political Science Quarterly 111 (Spring 1996): 59.

Aside from these purely physical benefits of the agreements with Turkey, Israel also gains an intangible edge over its adversaries; namely, the ability to use the potential threat of co-operative action, political or military, with Turkey to deter hostile Syrian, Iraqi, or Iranian actions. This facet is a direct result of the peace process and the limited successes it has enjoyed: "The greater acceptance of Israel in the region makes it more difficult for Israeli to apply its traditional security doctrine, which emphasises the use of force to enhance deterrence."¹⁴ In place of military might, Israel can now substitute an alliance with the region's other major military power.

Israel's purpose behind the signing of the agreements is, as is usual in the case of international political or military realignments, a mix of several complex factors. This includes the changes in the last decade of the international political order, as discussed in Chapter Two, but also a combination of regional and extra-regional entanglements and relationships. These were briefly explored in Chapter Three, but will now be studied in more detail. Although the Arab-Israeli conflict, in its broad sense, refers to Israel's quarrel with all of its regional neighbours, as stated above only three states are important to the analysis. It should be noted here that, whereas Turkey's tensions with the previously mentioned states are based on concrete, physical disputes (for example over water rights), Israel's frictions with its regional enemies are the result primarily of ideological and religious differences that have simply been compounded since 1948, and worsened since 1967. It is open to debate which of these types of discord has greater potential for violence and is more irreconcilable.

¹⁴ Ibid., 53.

Israeli-Syrian Enmity

Israel's contentious relationship with Syria is far more important for the security of Israel than is Jerusalem's relations with either Iraq or Iran. To begin with, Syria is the only one of these three Muslim states that actually shares a border with Israel, and thus is the closest geographically. It has historically been able to do the most physical damage to the Jewish state. This border was used to launch a northern invasion of Israel in 1948 and 1973, and was used continuously to conduct raids into Israeli territory following the declaration of cease-fire lines in 1949. In fact "the 1949-1967 armistice disputes between Syria and Israel over small ... patches of land were critical in shaping relations between the two countries during that period."¹⁵

Increasingly during the 1950s, these raids became more vicious and far ranging. Also, the Golan Heights was used by the Syrians as a strategic plateau from which to fire projectiles onto the northern Israeli settlements. In addition to the dispute over the Golan, Syria and Israel are at odds over the situation in Lebanon. The Lebanon question refers to Israel's occupation of a self-declared security zone in the south of the country, and the violent opposition to it by the Syrian-supported Hizballah group.

Currently, the Golan Heights, which Israel seized from Syria in the 1967 Six Day War, remains the thorniest issue in Syrian-Israeli relations: Israeli forces on the Golan are only about thirty-five kilometres from Damascus. More importantly, President Assad regards the Golan as sovereign Syrian territory, and maintains that Israel's continued occupation and settlements are illegal and the plateau must be returned in full. This view is

¹⁵ Muhammad Muslih, "The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculation," Middle East Journal 47 (Fall 1993): 611.

shared by most of the populace: as one engineer in Damascus put it, “the Israelis do not want to even partially withdraw from the Golan. We cannot accept that. It would be like sharing your wife with another man.”¹⁶

Although the situation in Lebanon does not contribute to direct Israeli-Syrian interaction, it remains nonetheless a sore spot in their relations and does contribute to tension between Jerusalem and Damascus. In 1982, in response to continuing terrorist attacks from PLO factions based in Beirut, then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin launched Operation Peace for Galilee in an attempt to root out and evict the PLO groups operating out of Lebanon. The war, which achieved its ultimate aim of ousting the Palestinian terrorists from the country but was otherwise disastrous for Israel, lasted from June to September 1982, but the consequences and aftermath are still reverberating today. During the fighting, Israel had for the first time besieged an Arab capital, destroyed much of Lebanon’s infrastructure, contributed to the deaths of scores of civilians, and was held indirectly responsible for the slaughter of Palestinians in the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps by Lebanese Christian militiamen.¹⁷

Together, these components placed enormous internal pressure on the Israeli government, which eventually had to resign and be replaced. By June, 1985, however, Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanon, except from the small security zone in the south, measuring twenty-three kilometres at its widest, and four kilometres at its narrowest. Israel maintains relative control in the area by proxy through the South

¹⁶ Emad Mekay, “The View from Damascus,” The Jerusalem Report, 20 March, 1997: 22.

Lebanese Army, and regularly engages in retaliation strikes and raids against Hizballah, a small Shi'ite faction formed and supplied by Syria and Iran.

Although Syria's primary role is to co-ordinate Hizballah's actions, it also serves as a conduit through which Iran drives, flies, or ships weapons and supplies to the Shi'ite group. Jerusalem believes that Hizballah's attacks on the South Lebanese Army and its shelling of northern Israel can only be curtailed or halted altogether with Syrian acquiescence. Aside from Syria's sustenance of Hizballah, Assad also maintains approximately 40 000 troops in Lebanon, based primarily in the Bekaa Valley. The presence of these forces allows Syria to exert *de facto* control over the Lebanese government,¹⁸ and the maintenance of Israel's security zone is a direct challenge to Syrian authority there.

In addition to these two main issues, Israel is also concerned over Syria's shelter of radical Palestinian factions intent on sabotaging the peace process and continuing the armed conflict with Israel. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command is based in Syria, and is committed to "no peace" with Israel, at times contradicting what Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority has had to say about the peace process and its progress. The U.S. State Department Counterterrorism section adds that, in addition to support for the Kurdish PKK, Syria also allows HAMAS to operate a political office in Damascus, the leader of Islamic Jihad to reside in Syria, and

¹⁷ Itamar Rabinovich, "Seven Wars and One Peace Treaty," in The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives, ed. Alvin Rubinstein, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1991), 53.

¹⁸ Prior to 1990, Syria used mainly threats and military postures to bully Lebanon into acceding to its wishes. In 1990, while most of the world's attention was focused on Kuwait, Assad moved his forces in and took much of the country by force.

allows Hizballah to operate out of Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory.¹⁹ Other terrorist groups that are known to operate from or are based in Syria include the Palestine Liberation Front, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Struggle Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–Special Command, and al-Saiqa.²⁰

Although the chances of an all-out war breaking out between Syria and Israel are low, the border remains volatile, and the current impasse in the peace process contributes to a mistrustful atmosphere, which in turn allows for suspicions among the political and military leaders of the two countries to grow out of proportion. In late December 1995, a war scare broke out in Damascus: someone in the ruling elite interpreted large Israeli exercises along the border as a precursor to an attack set, it was believed, for December 30.²¹ In August 1996, Jerusalem was affected by Syrian troop movements in the Bekaa Valley, interpreting them as possible hints of future army action (although the IDF was not sufficiently alarmed to mobilise any defences). The Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff, Major-General Matan Vilnai, announced a year later that the Israeli Defense Forces were working on the assumption that war with Syria in 1997 was a distinct possibility.²² Furthermore, since the election of the Netanyahu government, with its inflexible stance on the peace process, Assad believes “at least according to the statements of his Foreign

¹⁹ Testimony from Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Department of State), before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 25 July 1996; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/960725.html>; accessed 2 July, 1997.

²⁰ The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 145.

²¹ Leslie Susser, “The Drums Beat,” The Jerusalem Report, 23 January, 1996: 22.

²² *Ibid.*

Minister and Vice President Abd el-Khalim Khadam--that Netanyahu will look for any excuse to attack Syria."²³

Although these war scares may just be another method of sending messages to each other, the tensions between Israel and Syria remain real, and do have the potential to erupt into armed conflict, even if of a minor skirmish sort. It is widely believed that President Assad has given up on both his previous goal of strategic parity with Israel, and the notion that Syria alone can defeat Israel militarily.²⁴ Muhammed Muslih, a scholar who has spent much time interviewing senior Syrian officials, confirms that the Syrians are very much aware that the military/technological balance of power is in favour of Israel.²⁵ Realities prohibit the realisation of this goal, as the Syrian military is in dire need of repair: much of Syria's military hardware is old and outmoded; about half of its tank force is inoperative, for example.²⁶

However, none of these particulars seem to have affected Assad's position with regard to the peace process, and Syria remains at this time an implacable foe of Israel. Like Iran, Syria is continuing, mainly in secret, to build up a non-conventional arsenal of weapons, including chemical agents and ballistic missiles. Syria has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (Israel has signed the document but not officially ratified it), and there have been reports that it is attempting to produce the VX nerve gas, with

²³ Zvi Barel, Ha'aretz, English Edition 29 January, 1997.

²⁴ Interview with an official from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, March, 1997.

²⁵ Muhammed Muslih, "The Golan Between Syria and Israel," presentation given at the Senate Hall, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, 22 December 1997.

²⁶ Susser, "The Drums Beat," 23.

secret Russian aid.²⁷ This action in itself may be cause for the initiation of armed engagement. As a newspaper article reports,

Israeli officials are calling for a review of the country's ability to protect itself against a chemical weapons attack amid reports that Syria has begun to arm surface-to-surface missiles with a new, highly fatal nerve gas [the VX]. At the same time, Israel has warned Syria that any attack with chemical warfare would be met with a severe response.²⁸

For Syria, the peace process is contrary to all of its goals and hopes within the region. Were Israel to achieve a genuine peace with Syria, including a thawing of its current cool relations with Egypt and Jordan, "Syria's standing in the Arab world, and Lebanon in particular, would decline. Israeli regional influence would grow and it could oppose Syrian ambitions far more effectively."²⁹ Taken together, all these circumstances point to the fact that a real peace between Israel and Syria remains tenuous at best, and will not be achieved any time in the near future.

The military co-operation with Turkey is a means of putting pressure on Syria, in the form of warning Damascus that Israel may have the use of Turkish territory in any armed conflict with Syria. Muhammad Faour points out that President Assad is clever enough to know that even minor armed conflict with Israel may be enough to achieve his own ends, and co-operation with Turkey may be just enough to deter such thinking:

Although a large-scale war [between Syria and Israel] may be unlikely to occur in the short run and would be bound to fail in the long run due to the qualitative superiority of the Israel military, one should not rule out a Syrian assault against Israel. The objective of trying to restore the Golan by force could be to mobilize public support for the regime if it reaches a serious state of domestic vulnerability. After all, the Syrian military build-

²⁷ Daniel Leshem, "Syria's Deadly Secret," The Jerusalem Post, 6 May, 1997.

²⁸ The Jewish Post & News, "Israel Reviews Security Capability Amid Reports of Syrian Nerve Gas," 7 May, 1997: 19.

²⁹ Barry Rubin, "No Cause for Concern," The Jerusalem Post, 4 October, 1996.

up with Scud missiles does not signal a retreat from confrontation with Israel. Rather, it underscores the danger of a future war that, despite its almost certain military outcome, could inflict heavy casualties on Israel and reshuffle the political cards in the region.³⁰

In this same vein, the MTCA is also a means to promote stability in the region, that elusive dream that has not stood up in the face of inter-Arab, inter-Muslim, and Arab-Israeli rancour and feuding. An Ankara-Jerusalem axis, combining the capabilities of the region's two foremost military powers, could not help but act as a deterrent or brake on another state's adventurous, irredentist designs.

Israeli-Iraqi Enmity

Although, as stated previously, Iraq currently does not pose any direct physical threat to Israel, this cannot be guaranteed in the near future. In addition, Iraq has the potential to cause several problems with Israel simply by allying or aligning itself with others that are Israel's enemies. Even Turkey, with whom Iraq has had strained relations for the last several years, asserts that Iraq's sovereignty must be maintained,³¹ thus allowing for the feasibility of a resurgent Iraq in the coming century.

Iraq's losses in the Gulf War were staggering. Estimates range that, as a result of military action, economic blockades, and President Saddam Hussein's domestic repressions, well over 100 000 Iraqis may have died; approximately 1 million foreigners,

³⁰ Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 117-118.

³¹ In November, 1995, H.E. Deniz Baykal, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, repeated this belief in a statement to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Policy Statement by H.E. Deniz Baykal Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister," available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupf/Minister.html>; accessed 6 April, 1997.

many of them skilled workers, left Iraq.³² Economic losses were also tremendous: about eighty percent of Iraq's infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged, including as much as ninety percent of electricity facilities, oil refineries, and industrial establishments; all of Iraq's modern communication systems were damaged, as well as thirty-five of about ninety bridges. The final tally of reconstruction costs totals over \$50 billion, and losses of oil revenues, which before the war accounted for nearly all of the country's export earnings, contributes to this massive burden.³³

Despite this ruination, Iraq has continued to defy the United Nations, especially the United States. It remains to be seen how quickly the Iraqis can rebuild their economy and lives, but Israel has not believed its security to be safely assured. After Iraq's nuclear power plant at Osireq was destroyed in 1981, Saddam's nuclear ability was thought to be severely curtailed. Only after the Gulf War did U.N. monitors realise just how far Iraq's secret nuclear program, and chemical and biological weapons program, had developed³⁴ (Iraq is also not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention). When Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil (who had overseen Iraq's non-conventional weapons program) defected in August 1995, it was learned that much of Iraq's lethal agents had survived the Gulf War and were concealed from U.N. inspectors; since the defection, for example,

³² Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 17.

³³ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁴ During the November, 1997, crisis in which Iraq expelled American arms inspectors, it was widely believed that Baghdad had the capacity to produce Anthrax and VX nerve gas within a matter of days or weeks. Source: Middle East Security Report No. 45, 19 November, 1997.

Baghdad acknowledged that it had produced since 1991 2265 gallons of anthrax--inhalation of nine-tenths of a millionth of a gram of which is fatal in most instances.³⁵

As David Kay writes, “[a]t the time of the [1991] Gulf war Iraq was probably only 18 to 24 months away from its first crude nuclear device and no more than three to four years away from more advanced, deliverable weapons.”³⁶ In mid-January 1998, the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency expressed its concern that Iraq may have still been hiding information on its nuclear program, seven years after the end of the Gulf War.³⁷

Also, Saddam’s use of chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War and against Kurdish civilians was seen as a harbinger of things to come: “The message was not lost on Israel: Iraq had the capability and the will to use weapons of mass destruction.”³⁸ It also seeks to acquire an arsenal of ballistic missiles, able to carry its non-conventional warheads. Rolf Ekeus, former director of the U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq, believes that Baghdad already has missiles hidden within the country, and is only waiting for the inspectors to leave before bringing them out into the open.³⁹

Aside from any non-conventional weapons threat it represents, Iraq is also devoted to an ideological hatred of Israel, stemming from Jewish immigration and, to some extent, displacement of Arabs in Palestine beginning at the end of the nineteenth century. This has carried over into current events: Iraq still believes Israel is a foreign presence in the

³⁵ Laurie Mylroie, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 1997 Gulf Crisis,” Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 1 (December 1997).

³⁶ David Kay, “Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond,” The Washington Quarterly 18 (Winter 1995): 85.

³⁷ Middle East Security Report No.52, 21 January 1998.

³⁸ Geoffrey Aronson, “Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question,” The Middle East Journal 46 (Fall 1992): 618.

Middle East, "a state built on the conquest of Arab land,"⁴⁰ has rejected the peace process with Israel, and is angered at any attempt at integrating Israel into the region's political and economic web.⁴¹

The Israeli-Turkish co-operation agreements, coupled with signs of existing and future military, political, and economic collaboration, are indicative of, as previously stated, Israel's realisation that in many ways a regional alliance would serve its interests far better than its relationship with the United States can. Quite obviously, Iraq, or rather Saddam Hussein, while he may regret provoking Washington into a military confrontation, has showed himself to be unimpressed with threats and sanctions. Israeli or Turkish reaction against any infringements by Iraq on their regional interests or safety is likely to be met with a much harsher response than a declaration in the United Nations General Assembly. In 1981, Israel openly struck at Osireq, without prior warning; similarly, Turkey has several times sent its forces into northern Iraq to engage Kurdish rebels sheltering there, without consulting Baghdad.

The impunity with which these two states have acted when their national interests have been deemed threatened may be increased by military co-operation between them. The knowledge that Israel has use of Turkish air space, including areas near the Turkish-Iraqi border, might also affect Saddam enough to check any warlike gestures he might otherwise have made. Such judgement must be reserved, however, for any actual

³⁹ Iraq News, "First UNSCOM Presentation--Amb. Rolf Ekeus: An Informal, Unofficial Summary of its Remarks," 10 June, 1997.

⁴⁰ Margolian, "Israel Cannot Let Its Guard Down," 9.

⁴¹ Although official Iraqi response to the 1996 Military Training Cooperation Agreement has been subdued, unofficial reactions have been much more negative. Source: Interview with an official from the Turkish Embassy to Canada, Ottawa, March 1997.

instances: Saddam did choose to absorb an American military attack in 1991 rather than back down from the confrontation.

Israeli-Iranian Enmity

Israel's dissonant relationship with Iran is in many ways a combination of the Jewish state's strife with Syria and Iraq: it is made up of an ideological component similar to that of Iraq, represented by its strict opposition to the peace process and even a recognition of Israel, and a desire to confront Israel militarily, as Syria does, represented by Teheran's support for radical terrorist and Islamic factions. It is this political, economic, and military support for terrorist organisations which has taken the lives of scores of Israelis that is the primary reason behind Israeli decision, with regard to Iran, to co-operate militarily with Turkey. The ability of Israeli planes to fly within Turkish airspace also allows for the possibility for Jerusalem to use its high-tech surveillance equipment to monitor Teheran, and to give it advance warning of any hostile moves the Islamic state might be making toward Israel. As Chapter One indicates, there have been reports that such manoeuvres have occurred, despite official denial.

In 1979 the Iranian government of the Shah fell and was replaced by a revolutionary council dedicated to Islamic culture and values and headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious leader who was fervently devoted to creating an Islamic state. At the end of March of that year, a referendum gave overwhelming approval to an Islamic republic and government.⁴² This government came to be associated with the exporting of

⁴² M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, 2nd ed. (England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1996), 344.

Islamic revolution; that is, the creation of states based on the Koran and rejection of Western values, and the use of violent means to achieve its ends.

Quite naturally, Israel's occupation of Arab lands, which had not endeared it to the previous Iranian regime, was even less appreciated by the *ulema* who had taken control of the country, as was the very existence of Judaism in a region overwhelmingly Muslim. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Teheran's dislike of Israel has been augmented by its support for terrorist groups that are fighting against Israel, both in Israel proper and in areas it has occupied as a result of the 1967 and 1982 wars. The foremost of these organisations are HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, which operate in the West Bank, and Hizballah, whose focus is southern Lebanon.

The association of Iran with terrorism, in the Middle East and elsewhere, is well documented. It has been claimed that the Islamic republic uses the third level of its embassy in Bonn, Germany, as a "veritable terrorism center," with a permanent staff of twenty Revolutionary Guards.⁴³ There have also been reports that Teheran, based on a creeping break with Syria, is seeking to open action branches in Cyprus. These would be commercial companies intended to be used as future shipping points for goods, weapons, and money to Hizballah and other areas of influence in Lebanon.⁴⁴ In other words, Iran has shown no signs of joining in the peace process, and is continuing to regard the fight

⁴³ David Horovitz, "Getting Away with Murder," The Jerusalem Report 22 August, 1996: 15.

⁴⁴ Barel, Ha'aretz.

against Israel and the maintenance of Islamic ideals as goals worthy of both attention and duration.⁴⁵

The relationship between Iran and HAMAS is also fairly well recorded. Although Iran, a country predominantly Shi'ite, was not at first accepted by the Sunni Muslim HAMAS, after the Gulf War and the onset of the peace process, the two realised that their opposition to both the peace process and Israel's continued existence on what they deemed Arab land coincided. HAMAS rendered many advantages to Iran it could not otherwise have obtained:

It offered another vehicle to demonstrate Iran's Islamic leadership [and] a channel for involving itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, Hamas seemed determined to fight, had the potential to strike inside Israel, and attracted great public interest. It totally rejected Israel's right to exist and was resolved to combat Israel and imperialism. All these were in line with Iranian doctrines and tactics and thus were worthy of Iranian support.⁴⁶

Iran also supports Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organisation formed in the 1970s to violently eject Israeli forces out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Islamic Jihad's interests also intersect with those of Teheran. It views the Iranian revolution as an ideal movement to be implemented in other areas of the Muslim world; its former leader, Fathi Shqaqi, had acknowledged to a New York newspaper that Islamic Jihad had, in fact, been receiving funds from Iran since 1987, partly through its links with Hizballah, which is also

⁴⁵ Iran's budget for fiscal year 1992/1993 formally allocated \$20 million for Palestinian rejectionist groups. Source: Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, "Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Winter 1993): 126.

⁴⁶ Elie Rekhess, "The Terrorist Connection - Iran, the Islamic Jihad, and Hamas," Jerusalem, February 1997; available from gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/terror/950500.terror; accessed 23 April, 1997.

connected to the revolutionary regime in Teheran.⁴⁷ Elie Rekhess, at a conference at Tel Aviv University on Iran's attempts to export its revolution, believed "the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a puppet in the hands of Iran. It is a fearless, ruthless, fanatic, extremist organization which does not hesitate to do whatever is ordered."⁴⁸

Iran's support for Hizballah is much more expansive. With the acquiescence of Syria, Iran is able to supply Hizballah with training and equipment to carry on its war against Israel. In January 1996, Turkish police apprehended six Iranian trucks packed with weapons and intended for Hizballah.⁴⁹ Former Israeli Foreign Minister Levy has charged that at least thirty jumbo jets carrying Katyusha and Saager missiles from Iran intended for Hizballah have landed in Syria in one year.⁵⁰ The arms supplied to the Shi'ite group have done their share of damage: since 1985, 219 Israeli soldiers have died in southern Lebanon and 694 have been injured; 358 South Lebanese Army soldiers have also been killed.⁵¹

The preamble to the Covenant of HAMAS declares that "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it"; Article Seven states "the Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight Jews and kill them."⁵² Furthermore, at Teheran's prodding, in February of 1997, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nassrallah at a rally held in honour of Ramadan called for Palestinians to renew the *jihad* against Israel, resume the suicide bombings, and exhorted Palestinians to step forward and execute the

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Pomfret, "Turkey Strengthens Ties to Israel," A24.

⁵⁰ The Jerusalem Report 6 May, 1997: 8.

⁵¹ Peter Hirschberg, "Lebanon: Israel's Vietnam?" The Jerusalem Report 11 December, 1997: 8.

P.A. leadership that had betrayed. he claimed, the Palestinian people by signing the Declaration of Principles with Israel.⁵³

Iran's nurturing of these Islamic groups is combined with ideological opposition based on religious, territorial, and historical issues--including the belief that Israel is merely an appendage of the "Great Satan," the United States, which seeks with its loose morals and unclean values to undermine and tarnish the core beliefs of Islam. Iran has refused to deal on a bilateral basis with Israel. Iran's then-Foreign Minister Velliati, in an interview on February 6, 1996, stated without equivocation that "when others talk about liberating Palestine they mean the 'annexed' territories of 1967, we mean all Palestinian land. ... Iran is the only country which is opposed to the basic existence of Israel."⁵⁴

Although Israel has had to face the physical facts of groups such as HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah, it is this emotional and psychological friction with Iran that has set Jerusalem on edge. Although Iran had not yet contributed any direct action to sabotaging the peace process, the very fact that Teheran remains committed to acquiring a nuclear and other non-conventional weapons arsenal and long-range ballistic missiles, cannot help but force Israel to deal with the possibility that Iran in the near future could very well be the next enemy it faces on the battlefield.⁵⁵ Although the exact size of Iran's

⁵² Israeli Foreign Ministry, Information Division, "The Covenant of HAMAS - Main Points," Jerusalem; available from gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/terror/880818a.terror; accessed 23 April, 1997.

⁵³ Israel Foreign Ministry, Information Division, "Iran and Hizballah," Jerusalem, February, 1997; available from gopher://israeli-info.gov.il:700/00/terror/970212.terror; accessed 23 April, 1997.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ In fact, Germany's intelligence chief predicts that Iran might well acquire a nuclear weapon a little after the year 2000. Source: Barry Rubin, "The New Middle East:

ballistic missile arsenal remains unknown, it is thought to include 300 SCUD-Bs (with a 300-kilometer range) and 100 SCUD-Cs (with a 600-kilometer range).⁵⁶

It should be noted here that many scholars have cast Teheran's search for a nuclear capability in some doubt. Certainly, Iran did recently purchase nuclear power plants from North Korea, and it has engaged Russian aid in completing these reactors. But some have argued that Iran's nuclear potential remains very underdeveloped, and International Atomic Energy Agency officials have found no cause for complaint during inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities.⁵⁷

Israel, with the open secret of its nuclear arsenal, has thus far maintained a level of military preparedness far above those of its Arab enemies. But the Arab/Muslim world's search for non-conventional weapons to offset this advantage has not been restricted to Iran, since "Arab nations ... have [long] viewed the achievement of a nuclear balance of terror with Israel--and failing that the development of a chemical weapons capability--as a key element of their respective national security doctrines to attain a strategic deterrent to Israel's nuclear arsenal."⁵⁸ Since 1987 Iran has had the capability to produce chemical agents, including mustard gas and hydrogen cyanide,⁵⁹ and Iraq's capacity to use these weapons of mass destruction have already been mentioned.

What this means is that, although Iran may not be the only Muslim or Arab state to seek a non-conventional military capability, at the moment it is the only one of Israel's

Opportunities and Risks," Security and Policy Studies No.19 (The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Israel, February 1995): 16.

⁵⁶ James Moore, "An Assessment of the Iranian Military Rearmament Program," Comparative Strategy 13 (1994): 374.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 385.

⁵⁸ Aronson, "Hidden Agenda," 618.

regional adversaries whose search for such a capacity is relatively unhindered (since Iraq's ability was destroyed during and after the 1991 Gulf War). Iran has recently embarked on a rearmament program that, while still less in cost than the Saudi Arabian military program, has cast a shadow of fear over its neighbours. North Korea and Russia appear to be Iran's largest suppliers: army purchases from the former are estimated at about \$1 billion per year; over the past five years Iran has completed agreements with Russia for the sale of 200 advanced MiG-29 planes, 500 T-72 tanks, 300 heavy artillery pieces, an unspecified number of SAMs, and two kilo-class submarines.⁶⁰ Therefore, Israel must be more concerned with Iran's posture than, for example, that of Iraq.⁶¹ To maintain a watchful eye on Iran, the Turkish-Israeli military co-operation allows for Israel to maintain access to signal intelligence sites along the Turkish-Iranian border,⁶² although this has also been denied by Jerusalem and Ankara.

The ability of Syria, Iraq, and Iran do damage to Israel has not lessened significantly, despite recent events which may seem to confirm the opposite, and in fact have grown appreciably. As Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler argue, Israel can no longer rely on its own efforts to withstand the new challenges emerging in the Middle East.⁶³ Military co-operation with Turkey provides an answer to many of Israel's security needs

⁵⁹ Moore, "An Assessment of the Iranian Military Rearmament Program," 382.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 373-374.

⁶¹ Peter Frisch, Germany's chief of counterterrorism, has stated that Iran already has ballistic missiles able to penetrate deep into Europe (and thus obviously Israel as well), and is working diligently to develop its nuclear program. Source: Israel Internet News Service Ltd., "Iran Going Nuclear," 28 May 1997.

⁶² The Forward, "Turkey, Israel Quietly Forge Pact," 4.

⁶³ Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, "The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: Toward a Security Regime," Security and Policy Studies No.23 (Ramat Gan, Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, June 1995), 54.

and therefore Israel's regional relations are important to examine, in order to better understand the regional motives that drive Israel's strategic thinking.

Turkey's Regional Motives

Whereas Israel has lived under constant regional threats throughout its existence, modern Turkey's horizons have been relatively free from armed conflict with adversary states in the region (this is not to say that Turkey has not militarily engaged other, non-state actors). As explained in Chapter Three, Turkey's relationships with its Arab and Muslim neighbours has been passive and, in most cases, relegated behind concerns about its relations with the United States and the West. Only in the last decade or so has Ankara's eyes turned toward the Middle East, and only because its relations with the West have, if not deteriorated, then at least not delivered what Turkey had once hoped they would.

As mentioned above, Turkey's disputes with its neighbours are based on concrete, tangible differences over issues such as water rights, territory, and terrorist support.⁶⁴ The controversies Ankara is engaged in with Damascus and Baghdad centre on two issues in particular: the division of the waters from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and the ability of the Kurdistan Workers' Party to seek shelter and even military aid from Syria and Iraq. The ability of these three states to untangle these disputes remains doubtful, for three reasons. First, the Middle East has remained an area of intense antagonism, and so far the Arab states have shown little willingness to make concessions to resolve their differences

⁶⁴ These issues are all part of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well; however, in Israel's case, the ideological and religious element also plays a large role; for Turkey, most of its quarrels can, theoretically at least, be solved through concrete measures taken. It is far

with others. Second, Turkey's pacts with Israel allow the Turks to maintain their powerful military, have a direct link to the United States, and links them with the other most powerful regional military. Third, the recent resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan has demonstrated that despite the rise of Islamic parties in Turkey, their ability to hold on to power and direct the country's affairs free from interference, including initiating closer relations with other Muslim states, is a long way off (see Chapter Five).

The secular nature of Turkey's regime has placed it at odds with many of the region's more religious or observant states, most particularly Islamic Iran. This dispute resembles somewhat the Iranian-Israeli enmity, since both are based primarily on ideological reasoning. The mullahs of Iran are annoyed with Kemal's strict and unyielding legacy of secularism in Turkey, and its military's staunch defence of it. Turkey, on the other hand, is annoyed at Iranian support for terrorism, some of which makes it way to Anatolia, and is in competition with Iran for influence in Central Asia, although Ankara is not as concerned over the future of the Turkic republics as it once may have seemed in 1991.⁶⁵

easier to resolve the differences over Turkey's and Syria's sharing of the Euphrates River than it is to end decades of ideological and psychological hatred between Israel and Syria.

⁶⁵ This aspect of the Iranian-Turkish relationship does not fit into this thesis, primarily because Ankara has largely given up on bringing Central Asia into its political orbit for the immediate future, for two reasons. First, historically there is almost no connection between the two areas, and aside from linguistic and religious links, they have nothing in common. The sudden surprise at the appearance of these republics in 1991 concealed this fact for the first few years. And second, the existence of Russia, still the largest and most powerful country in the region and which regards Central Asia as falling within its sphere of interests, has prompted the Turkic republics to be careful about how open or expansive their bonds with other countries are. See for example Patricia Carley, "Turkey in Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling," in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, eds. Alvin Rubinstein and Oles Smolansky (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1995), 169-197.

This is not to say, of course, that co-operation has not played a role in Turkey's regional relations. In fact, for much of this century, modern Turkey has largely maintained cordial, if not warm, relations with its Arab and Muslim neighbours, even going so far at times to give active support to the Arab cause: During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Turkey refused to allow the U.S. permission to use its air bases to resupply Israel, but it did allow the Soviet Union to pass through its airspace to equip Egypt and Syria.⁶⁶ In addition, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran do agree on one issue: none of them wish to see an independent Kurdish homeland established in Iraq, where the Kurds are the closest to autonomy. Dismemberment of Iraq to accommodate Kurdish aspirations for a homeland would encourage, they believe, the Kurds in their own respective countries to secede.

It has only been recently that circumstances have dictated that Turkey seek an alliance of some sort with Israel: quarrels with Syria and Iraq have threatened to reach critical points several times, and have the potential for eruption into armed conflict-- Turkey, for example, has not hesitated to send troops into northern Iraq to hunt down the Kurdish rebels hiding out there. In addition, the proliferation of missile technology and the search by many Middle States for a nuclear capability has alarmed Ankara. Although Turkey has two nuclear research centres of its own and is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is concerned that acquisition of these weapons by states considered unfriendly or antagonistic to it might alter the power balance in the region against it. As Duygu Bazoglu Sezer put it, a

⁶⁶ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (February 1993): 97.

nuclear-powered Iraq would be in a position to dictate its preferred solution to, above all else, the water dispute. A nuclear-powered Iran would be in a position to claim leadership of the Islamic world, and to exercise increased influence on Turkish domestic politics to the detriment of Turkey's Western-type secular democratic regime and Western-oriented foreign policy.⁶⁷

Relations with non-Muslim Greece are perhaps Turkey's biggest headache outside of its Middle Eastern context, and in fact the differences between these two countries have even greater potential for violence. Historically, their relationship has focused on national interest concerns in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus, and in recent years these two issues, among others, have threatened to rupture into open violent conflict.

It is for these regional reasons that Turkey has sought a new military co-operation with Israel. Ankara does not need to worry over its national safety in the same manner Israel does. The probability of a war breaking out between Turkey and Syria, Iraq, or Iran (but not Greece) is far less likely than it is for Israel. Nevertheless, Turkey has recognised that the Middle Eastern and international order has changed, and this requires a new foreign policy on its part to better deal with the rising new challenges. Ankara has concluded that collaboration with Israel is the best method to achieve its goals.

In the same way that Israel can use the Military Training Cooperation Agreement to put pressure on its Muslim adversaries to think twice about any hostile actions they might take, so too can Turkey: Whereas Syria can use the PKK card to offset Turkey's water policies, Ankara can now use Israel to play up to Syrian concerns of encirclement. In the case of Greece, it is not assumed by Ankara that Israel would offer direct aid to Turkey in the event of Greco-Turkish armed conflict. Rather, it is the military supply from

⁶⁷ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons

Israel to Turkey that is important, because although this may not mean direct Israeli support during combat, it does provide for a strengthening of Turkey's armed forces relative to Greece's military. Turkey has been described as a dormant regional power that is now awakening to its potential and regional responsibilities.⁶⁸ The agreements with Israel are simply a means to achieve its desired ends and to help ensure Turkey's continued existence as a regional power.

It should be noted here that official Arab and Muslim reaction against Ankara's growing ties with Israel has generally been negative, at least as expressed by Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Syria, in particular, has been very vocal about its opposition to this relationship, and at the December 1997 meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) sought to issue a declaration by the Conference condemning Turkey for its partnership with Israel. It considers this relationship "as the greatest mishap the Arab world has endured since 1948."⁶⁹ Ankara, for its part, seems to shrug off these criticisms and implicit warnings, arguing that it has similar pacts on military co-operation with nineteen other members of the OIC, that it is not a strategic alliance, and that it is not directed against any other country.⁷⁰

and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy* 14 (April/June 1995): 165.

⁶⁸ Chanan Naveh, "Foreign Policy of Regional Powers in the 90's: The Cases of Israel and Turkey," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 29 March-1 April, 1994: 7.

⁶⁹ Amikam Nachmani, "Bridge Across the Middle East: Turkey and Israel in the 1990s," forthcoming, 1.

Turkish-Syrian Antagonisms

Ankara's disagreements with Damascus are fraught with the most dilemmas and problems, and lack easy solutions, in comparison to Ankara's other Middle Eastern disputes. This can in part be explained by the fact that, despite its lack of a superpower patron, Syria has remained a regional power capable of disrupting the peace process and playing a large, watchful, and seditious role in any other regional dialogues. Iran has remained one of the most diplomatically isolated regimes in the world, and very few Arab or Muslim states would openly ally itself with Teheran (except for Syria), thus marginalising its efforts. Since the Gulf War Iraq has also been relegated in regional matters; the destruction of much of its military power and the strict monitoring of its weapons programs by the United Nations has, at least for now, diminished its influence in Middle Eastern affairs.⁷¹

As explained in the previous chapter, arguments over the water rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, which rise in Turkey but flow down through Syria and Iraq, are a key feature of Turkish-Syrian hostility, as is Syria's support for Kurdish terrorism. These two issues must be examined here.

John Cooley credits the French poet, Antoine de Saint Exupéry, with saying that "water is not necessary to life but rather life itself."⁷² It is difficult to argue with this assertion, and thus it is understandable that Turkey and Syria might come to blows over

⁷⁰ Agence France-Presse, "Turkey Rejects Arab Criticisms over Israeli Pact," via Clarinet, correspondence with Martin Rudner, professor at the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, 24 December 1997.

⁷¹ Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 106.

⁷² John Cooley, "The War Over Water," in Conflict After the Cold War, ed. Richard Betts (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), 413.

the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, given that “[t]hese [types of] conflicts will continue--and in some places grow more intense--as growing populations demand more water for agricultural, industrial, and economic development.”⁷³ This cannot be overemphasised. The Middle East is one of the most arid regions in the world, and almost all states in the area are short of water, since “on the whole the region simply does not receive enough rainfall to support even subsistence agriculture without extensive irrigation.”⁷⁴ Amikam Nachmani found that “[a]lmost three quarters of the land from Morocco to Iraq is desert, lacking the water resources required to support urban and sedentary populations.”⁷⁵ A report conducted by the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1988 predicted that by 2000, water, not oil, would become the dominant resource issue of the Middle East.⁷⁶

As stated in Chapter Three, an overwhelming amount of Syria’s (and Iraq’s) river water is supplied by sources originating outside its borders. Riparian countries have always had the excuse of water for going to war, and the situation is complicated by Syria’s support for the PKK, which Damascus holds as a trump card should Ankara ever decide to use its control of river headwaters to decrease the amount of water flowing to Syria.

The differences over these two waterways are not easy to solve: the combined demand from Turkey, Syria, and Iraq for use of their waters exceeds the total water

⁷³ Peter Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security,” International Security 18 (Summer 1993): 83.

⁷⁴ Cooley, “The War Over Water,” 415.

⁷⁵ Amikam Nachmani, “Water Jitters in the Middle East,” Security and Policy Studies No. 32 (The BESA Center for Strategic Studies: Ramat Gan, Israel, June 1997), 71.

volume from both rivers. Of the Euphrates River, Syria demands thirty-two percent; Iraq sixty-five percent; and Turkey fifty-two percent. Of the Tigris River, Syria wants a little over five percent; Iraq claims ninety-two and a half percent; and Turkey about fourteen percent.⁷⁷ The combined demand of these countries surpasses the total flow capacity of these waterways.

This already complex situation is further complicated by Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), an immense undertaking designed to built dams and hydroelectric plants. Thomas Homer-Dixon estimates that, with Syria's population growth at almost four percent each year, its demands for water will grow exponentially, and the water that will pass through Turkey's new dam and dike system will, he believes, be laden with fertilisers, pesticides, and salts.⁷⁸ For its part, Ankara views with concern Syria's use of the Orontes River, which rises in Lebanon and flows downstream through Syria then Turkey. Ankara claims that Syria extracts ninety percent of the Orontes's total water flow, leaving very little for Turkey to use.⁷⁹

These disputes form the backdrop against which Syrian-Turkish tensions rise. The military accords with Israel are Ankara's counterweight to Syria's use of the PKK. Although the issue of the sharing of the river waters may not be easily solved, the fact that the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, can take refuge in Syrian territory and is

⁷⁶ Christopher Savage, "Middle East Water," *Asian Affairs* 22 (February 1991): 5.

⁷⁷ Center for Strategic Research, "Facts About Euphrates-Tigris Basin," Ankara, 1996: 6-7.

⁷⁸ Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," in Conflict After the Cold War, ed. Richard Betts (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), 438.

⁷⁹ Center for Strategic Research, 17.

sometimes able to receive aid from Damascus⁸⁰ to continue its terrorist uprising against Turkey is a much more emotional matter. In 1980 Ocalan settled in Damascus and with the help of the Syrian government established training camps for PKK members in the Bekaa Valley; in July of 1981, the first Kurdistan Workers' Party Congress was held on the Syrian-Lebanese border.⁸¹ As previously mentioned, several thousand Turks have lost their lives due to PKK's attacks, and the insurrection, though the Turkish military has gained the upper hand in recent years, shows no sign of abating.

This distraction with terrorism is of major concern for the Turkish government, and therefore the association of Syria (and Iran) with terrorism only fuels the flames of their feuding. In a speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1995, then foreign minister H.E. Deniz Baykal firmly stated that

the regions opposite Turkey's southern border are unfortunately areas from where extensive terrorist activities are directed towards Turkey and other countries. ... Those countries which tolerate terrorism wittingly or unwittingly or even encourage and support terrorism or provide safe-havens will sooner or later suffer the consequences. ... Turkey has the power and the determination to confront effectively those countries which protect, encourage and support terrorist activities.⁸²

(Syria, of course, rejects this argument as the grounds for their friction, pointing instead to unfair Turkish control over the Euphrates and Tigris). In April 1996, the prime minister, losing patience, declared "[s]ome of our neighbors shelter those who seek to destroy the unity of our land. ... Either this neighbor puts an end to the situation or it will sooner or

⁸⁰ Henri Barkey, "Kurdish Geopolitics," *Current History* 96 (January 1997): 5.

⁸¹ Erik Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1993), 311.

⁸² Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Policy Statement by H.E. Deniz Baykal."

later surely be punished for its enmity. We Turks are a patient people, but when our patience runs out our reaction will be violent.”⁸³

Over the last few decades, and particularly since the signing of the beginning of the 1990s, Israel and Turkey have collaborated on efforts to combat terrorism—especially the Kurdish terrorism that Turkey faces. In fact, part of the recent agreements signed between the two call specifically for Israel to transfer to Turkey its expertise, knowledge, and technology in counterterrorism, such as helping Ankara to build an electronic fence to ward off Kurdish infiltrators, and establishing a protocol for intelligence gathering and sharing. Israel has also provided Ankara with intelligence on Kurdish insurgents. In 1982, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Jerusalem handed over to Ankara captured files on Kurdish terrorists and ASALA, the secret Armenian Liberation Army, whose terrorist operations were killing Turkish diplomats at the rate of about one per month.⁸⁴ Consequently, Israeli aid in the fight against regional terrorism is an important motivation behind Ankara’s pursuit of strategic ties to the Jewish state.

Mention must also be made here about the purported Syrian-Greek military pact.⁸⁵ This supposed collaboration, coupled with Ankara’s long-standing differences on a number of issues with Greece, had prompted Turkey to begin feeling as though an

⁸³ Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,” The Middle East Journal 52 (Winter 1998): 35.

⁸⁴ ASALA’s leader disappeared shortly after, and the killings stopped. Source: Leslie Susser, “Cold Turkey?” The Jerusalem Report 19 September, 1996: 24.

⁸⁵ Although many scholars and policy-makers have written about just such a pact, the only fact this author has discovered is that Syria has granted Greece landing rights for its military planes. Otherwise, this author can find no concrete reports about it, aside from allusion to it in various news articles and a very brief discussion of it with an official from the Turkish Embassy to Canada. Many other scholars who this author has corresponded with believe that such a pact is more talk than substance.

encirclement by its enemies is taking place. The Israeli-Turkish alliance would effectively nullify Syria's role in this enterprise.

Turkish-Iraqi Antagonisms

As explained in Chapter Three, Turkey and Iraq historically have had, if not cordial relations, then at least did not have any pressing disputes that needed a quick solution to avoid friction. In fact, prior to the 1958 coup in Baghdad, both countries were part of the regional security alliance, the Baghdad Pact. Once a radical, anti-Western, pan-Arabic government seized power, an alliance with secular and democratic Turkey became untenable. The issues that remain unresolved between the two include water sharing rights, Baghdad's adventurous regional policies (and Saddam's desires to accumulate more regional influence), and the method by which Turkey deals with Kurdish separatists that sometimes flee into northern Iraq.

In recent years the dispute over the Tigris-Euphrates river basins has soured relations between the two. Iraq argues that, based on the fact that these rivers had supplied the people of Mesopotamia in centuries past, Iraq now has "acquired rights" relating to its "ancestral irrigations," traced all the way back to Sumerian times, from which no upstream riparian state is entitled to take away. Iraq has 1.9 million hectares of agricultural land in the river basins, and the GAP would infringe on these ancient rights.⁸⁶ Turkey, for its part, refuses to accept this contention, arguing that when these historical and ancestral rights were first acquired, the peoples who used the rivers for irrigation could not foresee the future need of them by other states; hence, this argument should

⁸⁶ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Arguments of Iraq," available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/water/CHAPTER2/CHAP2A.HTML>; accessed 6 April, 1997.

only be one of several factors taken into account when discussing the distribution of the Euphrates and Tigris waters.⁸⁷

Baghdad's, or perhaps more appropriately Saddam Hussein's, expansionist and power-seeking appetites have also recently conflicted with Turkish Middle Eastern interests. This is the primary reason why the agreements with Israel serve Turkey's interests with regard to Iraq: to contain its militaristic designs. It would be a clear-cut threat to Turkish national security were Iraq to ever fully complete its non-conventional weapons program.

For many years after Egypt's signing of a peace treaty with Israel, Iraq and Syria competed for leadership of the radical, rejectionist states of the Arab world. The destruction of Iraq's military machine in 1991⁸⁸ has reduced Baghdad, for the moment at least, to a far less active role in regional politics than it once enjoyed. But this has done nothing to reduce Saddam's desires for Iraq to play a major role in the region's political future.

Turkey feels, therefore, that it must remain vigilant, and the military co-operation with Israel is a strategic means of checking Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction, which would be cause for great concern to Ankara.⁸⁹ As recently as February, 1997, Rolf Ekeus, the former chief inspector of the U.N. agency monitoring Iraq's weapons capability, warned Turkey to beware of Iraq's programs, remarking that Ankara

⁸⁷ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Views on the Arguments of Its Neighbours," available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/water/CHAPTER2/CHAP2C.HTML>; accessed 6 April, 1997.

⁸⁸ Iraq lost at a minimum \$40 billion in military equipment. Source: Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 19.

⁸⁹ Editorial, "Turkish Pragmatism," The Jerusalem Post, 10 April, 1997.

would be wise to “follow closely the threats that might come from Iraq’s weaponry.”⁹⁰ Allying itself to the most advanced military power in the area gives Ankara another state to rely on for aid were Iraq to become belligerent and take some form of hostile action against Turkey.

Finally, although Turkey fully supports an intact, sovereign Iraq, it has nonetheless on occasion sent troops into northern Iraq, where a jumble of Kurdish factions are warring with each other under a nominally autonomous region of Iraq, to hunt down PKK members. In May of 1997, Turkey sent in as many as 50 000 soldiers into northern Iraq to destroy bases there used by the PKK.⁹¹ During the Iran-Iraq War, in 1984, Baghdad concluded a “hot pursuit” agreement to allow Turkey to pursue PKK rebels into northern Iraq; however, with the end of that war, Saddam has considered the agreement a dead letter, and Turkish incursions are an irritant now.

The Kurdish insurgency, coupled with the unstable Kurdish regimes in northern Iraq, has pushed Turkey into a difficult position. On the one hand, Ankara would prefer a strong, cohesive Iraq to better control the “Kurdish dilemma”; on the other hand, a stronger Iraq would mean a stronger Saddam Hussein, and Ankara is concerned about his future ambitions and possible desire for revenge for Turkey’s role in the Gulf War.⁹²

Although Turkey’s apparent disregard for Iraq’s sovereignty has irked Baghdad several times, it is primarily the first two issues that have caused the most stress between

⁹⁰ Seva Ulman, “UN Warns Turkey to Beware of Iraqi Weaponry,” UPI 26 February, 1997.

⁹¹ This figure was an estimate from the Turkish media; other sources have put the number closer to 25 000. Source: The Globe and Mail, “Turks Move Deeper into Iraq,” 16 May, 1997: A12.

⁹² Barkey, “Kurdish Geopolitics,” 5.

Ankara and Baghdad, and which are the main reasons why an alliance with Israel allows Turkey to better keep Saddam's ambitions in check.

Turkish-Iranian Antagonisms

It should be noted that Ankara and Teheran, despite their disagreements, have found reason to work together on occasion in the past, and it is only since 1979 that tensions and suspicions have come to mark their relationship. The most notable example is the rumour that both countries conspired to supply Bosnian Muslims with weapons in violation of a U.N. arms embargo.⁹³ However, this complicity lasted only so long as there was a reason for it. Once the Dayton Accords were implemented, Ankara and Teheran fell back into the familiar patterns of tension. Aside from Turkey's position as an American ally, there are few concrete national interest issues between them, as there are between Turkey and Greece.⁹⁴ The antagonism stems mainly from the ideological chasm that separates them, and Iranian regional ambitions.

As stated, the main difference between Ankara and Teheran lies in their ideological and political outlooks. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes in a strict interpretation of the Koran as the basis for all social, political, and religious life within the country, and it has shown itself willing to export these values and ideals to other areas with or without invitation: "From [1979], Iran's new rulers did not hide their desire to export their revolution whether by force or example."⁹⁵ For Turkey, secularism has remained the

⁹³ John Nomikos, "Israel-Turkey Defense Relations: Will It Last?" Research Institute for European Studies, 3 October, 1996: 1.

⁹⁴ Henri Barkey, "Iran and Turkey: Confrontation Across an Ideological Divide," in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, eds. Alvin Rubinstein and Oles Smolansky (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995), 149.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 150.

principal guiding tenet, a legacy left over from Kemal Atatürk's drive for modernisation.⁹⁶ Although Yalman Onaran's assertion is meant for the Middle East as a whole, its contents can be applied most specifically to Iran: although "Turks share a common religion with most Arabs ... the hostility toward secularism and democracy which prevails in most of the Arab-Islamic world has created an ideological gulf between Turkey and its neighbours."⁹⁷ These competing ideological outlooks represent a threat to each other's regimes, and in fact are the basis for most of their competition. As Henri Barkey writes, "the Iranian and Turkish regimes found themselves at odds with each other precisely because the underlying principles governing their establishments could not have been more opposite."⁹⁸

Coupled with this political and religious fissure is the fact that Iran diligently pursues its own regional interests which, by their very nature, clash with those of Turkey's and threaten Ankara's security interests. Iran's quest for non-conventional weapons arsenals has caused particular anxiety in Ankara (as it has in Jerusalem). Although there is no independent monitoring agency at work in Iran, as there is in Iraq, there is general agreement that Teheran is actively pursuing a nuclear and chemical weapons capability.⁹⁹ Furthermore, Ankara, Jerusalem, and Washington have become apprehensive about Iran's

⁹⁶ This discrepancy in philosophies is exemplified by the reaction of each state's populations to the Turkish-Israeli accords: Iranians are hostile to any co-operation with Israel, while the majority of Turks are pleased with the growing economic, tourist, and military ties with the Jewish state.

⁹⁷ Yalman Onaran, "Israel, Turkey Begin New Era of Cooperation," Near East Report 28 February, 1994: 36.

⁹⁸ Barkey, "Iran and Turkey," 151.

⁹⁹ Makram Haluani, "I'll Love You Forever Today: The Coalition Scenarios in the Contemporary Middle East Balance of Power System," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 18-22 March, 1997: 10.

program of ballistic missiles development, and “a growing military presence at the Persian Gulf choke points.”¹⁰⁰ The co-operation with Israel is another method of warning Teheran that Ankara will brook no threats to its national safety.

Turkey is concerned also with the Damascus-Teheran axis: although collaboration between the two countries is mainly economic, there are fears in Ankara that a political alliance which has manifested itself several times over the last few decades¹⁰¹ will eventually evolve into a military pact that could put more pressure on Turkey. In fact, there have been concrete signs of growing closeness between the two. Syria and Iran have always had reason to co-operate. During the Iran-Iraq War, Syria was the only major Arab power to support non-Arab Iran, in the face of almost united Arab support for Iraq, and as such struggled to defend Teheran’s interests in the Muslim world.¹⁰²

As recently as March of 1997, there were reports by U.S. intelligence that the PKK, having lost their training camps in northern Iraq, has moved to Iran, where Teheran has provided military training.¹⁰³ In addition to co-operation with Syria, Iran has also turned to Greece to outflank Turkey. In December, 1997, Iran, Greece, and Armenia, (which also bears historical bitterness toward Turkey) signed a Memorandum of Understanding intended to pave the way for long-term co-operation in economic and

¹⁰⁰ JINSA, “Turkey and Israel to Cooperate on Security,” Security Affairs 19 (February-March 1996): 1.

¹⁰¹ The best example is Syria and Iran’s co-operation in supplying and training Hizballah, in its fight against Israel, something which both countries are only too happy to contribute to. Iran also has 3000 Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon, to aid Damascus with its unofficial rule over that country.

¹⁰² Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Defence and Security Policies of Syria in a Changing Regional Environment,” International Relations 13 (April 1996): 58.

¹⁰³ Turkish Press Review, “PKK Moves Into Iran,” 7 March, 1997.

commercial areas.¹⁰⁴ Although this is an economic agreement, given that these three states have been antagonised by Ankara in recent years, Turkey's apprehension at such developments is understandable.

As with Syria, Iran also views Turkish-Israeli co-operation negatively. A newspaper article claimed a few days after Reliant Mermaid that "Turkey which has turned its back towards its Muslim brothers and neighbours has opted for co-operation with Israel, thereby endorsing the Zionist aggression and their hostilities against the Palestinians in particular and the Muslim world in general."¹⁰⁵ This has served to enhance Iranian suspicions of Turkey, although by the spring of 1998 this has not been translated into any negative repercussions against Turkey.

The MTCA can thus be used as a counter-weight to any union Iran can cobble together with Syria, Greece, or any other regional state. The chances of war breaking out between Turkey and Iran remain low, for the near future at least. The Turkish-Israeli axis is thus meant, in terms of its relevance to Iran, to convince and warn Teheran to avoid any regional adventures that collide with Turkish national interests.

Turkish-Greek Enmity

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that "although Turkey and Greece are NATO allies, associates in the EU and WEU, and share the same geography and the common values and ideals of the Western world, there are a number of problems

¹⁰⁴ This is the third such meeting between these states. The first two took place in August 1995 and December 1996. Source: Vahe Khachaturian, "Iran, Armenia, Greece to Expand Multilateral Regional Cooperation," Armenian News Network/Groong, 16 December 1997.

between the two countries.”¹⁰⁶ This acknowledgement fails to convey the extreme tensions and suspicions that arise out of a host of these problems, namely conflict over Cyprus, and islands and fishing rights in the Aegean.¹⁰⁷ Turkish-Greek antagonisms are well documented and play themselves out in many different arenas. Although hostility between Turkey and Greece does not have a direct effect on Ankara’s moves toward closer cooperation with Israel in the same manner as do its relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, nevertheless, the Greek-Turkish relationship is hostile enough that Ankara must take this into account when considering its regional security problems.¹⁰⁸ In 1978 then-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit identified Greece as Turkey’s top security concern; in 1986 Athens approved a new defence doctrine naming Turkey as its major threat.¹⁰⁹

Greek-Turkish hostility has a long history. Ottoman Turks began seizing Greek lands from the Byzantine Empire in the 1300s, and by the time Constantinople fell in 1453, almost all of the Greek territory was in Turkish hands. Almost four hundred years later, in 1829, Greece threw off Turkish rule and achieved independence; over the course of the next century it gradually began to seize back the lands and islands surrounding and dotting

¹⁰⁵ Tehran Times, “Iranian Security Considerations in the Wake of Joint Manouvers of Turkey, U.S. and Israel,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal Seminar on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 14 January 1998.

¹⁰⁶ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy”; available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/princip.html>; accessed 6 April, 1997.

¹⁰⁷ The two are also at odds over the preferred method of resolving these disputes: Greece insists that all issues be brought before the International Court of Justice, while Turkey maintains that bilateral discussions would be more effective.

¹⁰⁸ Concern over the antagonisms with Greece prompted a former Turkish diplomat to write an article that calls for Turkey’s strategic calculations to be based on potentially having to fight two and a half wars at the same time, one of which is against Greece (the other two involving Syria and the PKK). See Sükrü Elekdag, “2½ War Strategy,” Perceptions (March-May 1996): 33-57.

the Aegean Sea. However, when Kemal Atatürk proclaimed the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923 and declared that it would not claim any areas outside of Anatolia (and Istanbul), relations between the two began to warm. To avoid any possible future points of contention the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne called for a massive population exchange between the nationals of the two countries.¹¹⁰

Relations from the 1930s on improved, especially with the 1930 Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration, and a 1933 pact declaring the inviolability of common borders. During World War Two Turkey provided regular food shipments to German-occupied Greece and aid to Greek guerrillas.¹¹¹ In addition, both countries were party to the Balkan Pact. However, by the late 1950s differences over Cyprus and territorial waters and the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea began to impose themselves on the relationship. These issues have contributed to and enhanced suspicions between Ankara and Athens, which has gradually turned into hostility and enmity. Greek ambitions in the area have a direct impact on Turkey's national and even vital interests, so it is natural that Turkey seek all means available to combat what it perceives as the Greek danger.

Cyprus, about 1290 kilometres from the Greek mainland and eighty kilometres from the shores of Anatolia, has never officially been part of any Greek state,¹¹² although

¹⁰⁹ Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," 34.

¹¹⁰ The population exchange forced 1.3 million Greek living in Turkey to be transplanted to Greece; 400 000 Turks were resettled from Greek lands in Anatolia. Source: William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 167.

¹¹¹ Nuri Eren, Turkey, NATO, and Europe: A Deteriorating Relationship? (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977), 33.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 37.

it has usually been recognised as falling into the Greek orbit. Although Britain occupied and administered the island in 1878, the Greeks living there eventually came to regard a union with mainland Greece as its best future. Accordingly, in the 1950s a movement was formed with this goal in mind (called ENOSIS). This goal has remained intact for some members of the Greek-Cypriot community, despite a 1960 treaty that declared the independence of Cyprus. Currently, Turks make up about eighteen percent of the island's approximately 730 000 population, while seventy-seven percent are Greek.

In 1964 the first Cyprus crisis erupted. At the beginning of the year, the leader of the Greek community, Archbishop Makarios, a proponent of ENOSIS, incited an attack that left several hundred Turkish Cypriot farmers dead and 20 000 fleeing their homes.¹¹³ Ankara, fearing for the safety and lives of the Turks living there, made preparations for a military invasion.¹¹⁴ In 1974, the second Cyprus crisis began with a Greek-Cypriot move to achieve ENOSIS and ended with a Turkish invasion (which drove 180 000 Greeks out of the north to the south and occupied thirty-seven percent of the island) and a splitting of the island (Turks in the north, Greeks in the south). In 1983, the Turkish community in Cyprus declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was subsequently recognised only by Turkey. Since then, there have been sporadic outbursts of violence and killings, which has intensified the friction between Athens and Ankara. Currently, Turkey maintains about 35 000 troops on the island.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹¹⁴ Under the terms of the 1960 London-Zurich Agreements, Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain were allowed to use military means on the island to enforce and defend the constitution that recognised the status quo.

Although the Republic of Cyprus is governed by a Greek leader, the Turkish enclave has *de facto* autonomy in the northern part of the island. Both communities have as their patrons Greece and Turkey, respectively. It has proven a point of contention between the two because of these inter-communal tensions, and because were Greece to achieve a union with the island, it would place Turkey in a strategically vulnerable situation.

The hostility between these two littoral states has given their disagreements over Cyprus a military edge that has caused much apprehension in both capitals. Turkey, for its part, is concerned with the ability of the Greek-Cypriots, and thus the Athens government, to maintain a military presence so close to the Turkish heartland. In September 1995, the leader of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides, announced that a Greek-Greek-Cypriot defence agreement called for the joint building of an air base on the island, which would bring Greek fighter planes in much closer range to vital Turkish areas in Anatolia.

The Republic of Cyprus currently spends approximately \$3 million per day on defence expenditures and has signed a defence agreement with Greece that calls for Athens to respond to any perceived attack against Cyprus.¹¹⁵ Ankara has been alarmed at these developments, and distressed at the recent decision of the Greek-Cypriot government to purchase from Russia S-300 missiles, a “modern, highly-lethal system capable of intercepting any kind of aircraft, cruise missiles or tactical ballistic missiles,” with a range of 150 kilometres and thus able to reach areas within the Turkish heartland.¹¹⁶ They are due to arrive in Cyprus in mid-1998. Turkey’s threatening

¹¹⁵ Stephen Bryen, “This ‘Grumble’ is Real,” The Jerusalem Post 29 January, 1997.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

statements made after this announcement in turn elicited a Russian offer to sell Cyprus Tor-M1 missiles to protect the S-300s. The fact that an arms-build-up is threatening to take place in such a volatile area has caused much anxiety in Ankara. A statement by Turkey's then-foreign minister, Tansu Çiller, in January of 1997 read: "Turkey cannot become a spectator to Greece [trying] to encircle her also from the south and to alter the balance between the two countries or to turn Cyprus into a festering wound in the Eastern Mediterranean."¹¹⁷

Disputes involving the Aegean Sea are the second major cause of Greek-Turkish hostility. These involve the continental shelf, territorial waters, air space, and the eastern Aegean islands. These issues affect the economic, political, and security rights of the two littoral states, and have as yet defied any easy solutions.

The continental shelf dispute refers to which areas are to be attributed to Turkey and which to Greece. In 1981 Greece began seismic and related activities and planned drilling operations for these disputed areas. The argument over the territorial waters deals with how much of the Aegean should be considered Greek, and how much Turkish. Currently, under the six-mile limit, Greek waters account for just over forty-three percent of the Aegean Sea. Turkish territorial waters amount to seven and a half percent, with the remaining forty-nine percent declared open, high seas.¹¹⁸

Athens, however, is demanding that its territorial water limit be extended to twelve miles, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (which

¹¹⁷ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Prof. Dr. Tansu Çiller"; available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/Grupf/rusmis3.html>; accessed 6 April, 1997.

Greece has ratified but Turkey has not). Due to its ownership of the islands scattered across the sea, Greece would then acquire about seventy-one percent of the water, while Turkey's limits would grow to fewer than ten percent, leaving the high seas with only nineteen percent.¹¹⁹ This would constitute a direct threat to Turkish interests, as it would effectively bottle up the Turkish navy and make it very difficult for Turkish ships to navigate their way out of the Aegean without crossing through Greek waters. Furthermore, Turkish fishermen would be severely constrained in their catch, which would have a direct impact on the Turkish economy. Turkey has warned that any extension of Greece's sovereign limits would be seen as a *casus belli*.¹²⁰

The same application of territorial water limits applies to the airspace above the Aegean. Extension of Greece's limits would affect the airspace in the same manner, decreasing Turkey's airspace and the international areas above the sea, and have the same effects on Turkish national security. There have been a number of recriminations over this issue already: On January 6 1998, Greece accused Turkey of violating its airspace during Turkish military manoeuvres in the Aegean Sea.

Finally, the two states are at odds over the status of the eastern Aegean islands. Under several treaties signed between the littoral states, these islands, commonly referred to as the Dodecanese, were to remain demilitarised.¹²¹ However, in violation of these accords, Greece has admitted that since the 1970s some of the Dodecanese have borne a

¹¹⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute"; available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/aegean.html>; accessed 6 April, 1997.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Sükrü Elekdag, "2½ War Strategy," *Perceptions* (March-May 1996): 39.

military presence; recently, Greece deployed a battery of EXOCET missiles within the area on the island of Lemnos, which is directly opposite the Dardanelles. This has the effect of targeting, at point-blank range, the Turkish navy in its home waters in the Sea of Marmara.

Politically, Greece has used its position as a member of the European Union to effectively hinder Turkish chances for membership, using its veto to override any possible economic or political benefits that are proffered to Ankara. In December 1997, Greece declared it would maintain its veto on Turkish admittance until Ankara agreed to submit their bilateral disputes to the International Court of Justice.¹²² On April 27 1998, Athens vetoed the release of E.U. financial aid (about \$410 million) to Turkey which had been voted to Turkey in 1995 to help it cope with the customs union.¹²³ Greece's E.U. partners were displeased with this action, as they had hoped the money would be a gesture to Turkey after the Luxembourg summit rejected Turkey's membership application, once again.

Clearly, these conflicts pose a threat to Turkish national interests, in the political, military, and economic spheres. An outbreak of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey is unlikely in the near future; the Greek military is no match for the Turkish army.¹²⁴ But the possibility exists, given that these differences have a direct impression on

¹²¹ The Athens Decision of 1914 of the Six Powers; certain articles in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty; the 1936 Montreux Convention; and the Treaty of Paris of 1947 all confirmed the demilitarised status of these islands.

¹²² Turkish Press Review, "Greece Insists on Its 'Turkey Veto,'" 2 December 1997.

¹²³ Reuters, "Greece Defies EU Partners, Vetoes Funds for Turks," from Simon Aynedjian, Armenian News Network/Groong, 28 April 1998.

¹²⁴ Elekdag, "2½ War Strategy," 39.

Turkey's national security. The military agreements with Israel help ensure Turkey's military edge, as well as provide a counterweight to any Greek-Syrian or Greek-Iranian axis.

For the same reasons that Israel cannot rely on its own military power to defend itself against newly emerging threats and challenges, as it once did, so too must Turkey rely on a regional friend that can support it in matters that directly affect Ankara's national security. Furthermore, Turkey's reasons for closer links with Israel include the need for a steady supply of technologically-superior arms and armaments, something which few other countries have shown themselves willing to help with, as explained below.

Israel and Turkey's Extra-Regional Concerns

As stated above, Israel's and Turkey's relations with their regional neighbours are the primary driving force behind their military co-operation. Syria, Iraq, and Iran all pose dangers to Turkish and Israeli national security, and therefore an Ankara-Jerusalem axis serves as a deterrent to any hostile Arab or non-Arab action. However, the Military Training Cooperation Agreement affords the two signatories other benefits, which, although also providing certain advantages for their regional relations, is more directly associated with their relationships with states outside the region. It is therefore necessarily of second importance; not in terms of its strategic usefulness, since it bears directly on Israel's and Turkey's regional motives, but more in the sense that it is an added bonus to an arrangement that is responsible for adding to the security of each country.

This section of this chapter refers to the fact that what Israel and Turkey seek from the United States and the West (namely, military aid and a guarantee of political and even

military support in the event of hostile action), the MTCA and all subsequent accords provide these two signatories some semblance of both. In the case of Israel, the focus will remain on the United States, since Israel's relationship to Europe does not affect in any serious way the reasons for Jerusalem co-operating with Ankara. As for Turkey, the relationship with Europe is just as consequential as is the relationship with the U.S., and so both will be dealt with.

This section's purpose is not to say that Israel intends to replace the United States and Europe in their relationship to Turkey, or that Turkey is looking to substitute itself in place of the U.S. in terms of American-Israeli relations. It would be impossible for either state to do so, given, for example, the preponderant influence of Washington in international relations and the fact that the E.U. represents a potential market seventy times greater than that of Israel. At the same time, however, given the state of relations between Turkey and the European Union and U.S., on the one hand, and the fact that Israel has come to the realisation that the need for regional friends or partners has grown, it is to say that a military closeness between Turkey and Israel does allow for both countries to supply much of each other's needs without necessarily giving up any goals they might have regarding their extra-regional relationships.

Israel's Extra-Regional Concerns: Offsetting Declining American Support

For its part, Israel need not be so keen to link itself with a powerful friendly state; the U.S.-Israeli relationship already provides for much of that, and does not seem to be in any danger of fading away in the near future, at least not to any significant degree (see Chapter Three). However, this does not preclude the fact that, given the changing order of

the international system, Israel might need a close regional ally to help bolster its security in the volatile Middle East. Although the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue has been arrested amid bitter accusations and is in danger of collapse,¹²⁵ in its regional considerations Jerusalem must be prepared to deal with a still adamant and strong Syria, a possibly resurgent Iraq, and/or a burgeoning Iranian military power.

As explained in the preceding chapter, Israeli-American relations are facing a crossroads, despite the fact that U.S. aid to Israel has not fallen in any significant amount¹²⁶ (see Chapter Three for details and figures). In 1986 Congress declared Israel a major non-NATO ally of the United States, for the purposes of participating in joint military research and development, and Israeli firms are allowed to bid for U.S. defence contracts, despite the fact that severe restrictions have been placed on other foreign aid recipients¹²⁷ (in 1992, of the \$690 million in American contracts awarded to foreign companies, \$412 million went to Israel).¹²⁸

Although there has been much debate about Israel's strategic value to the West since the end of the Cold War, and many have argued that instead of a bulwark against the Soviet Union Israel is now a bastion against Islamic fundamentalism, the co-operation Washington built up with the Arab states during Desert Storm cannot be ignored. As the

¹²⁵ As recently as June 4, 1997, a HAMAS rally in the West Bank drew 30 000 Palestinians. The crowd demanded violence against Jews and HAMAS leaders threatened a new *intifadah*. Source: Associated Press, " Hamas Rally Draws 30 000 Palestinians," The Globe and Mail 5 July, 1997: A7.

¹²⁶ Anthony Rusonik, "Israeli Defense Doctrine and US Middle East Diplomacy: From Suez to the Loan Guarantees/Settlements Dispute," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14 (1992): 46.

¹²⁷ Duncan Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Transfers," Foreign Policy no.99 (Summer 1995): 92.

U.S. has come to stand alone as the world's superpower, many Arab states have had no choice but to turn to it for monetary aid and qualitative military supply. This has not yet directly affected the Israeli-U.S. relationship, but it cannot be discounted. As Rosemary Hollis writes, "[t]he ending of the Cold War meant that Israel could no longer present itself as a 'strategic asset' to the United States, able to aid Washington in its quest to contain the spread of Soviet influence in the region."¹²⁹

One of the main benefits Israel accrues from its affinity with America, aside from the political advantages brought about through the U.S. role in the United Nations, is a consistent supply of technologically up-to-date weaponry, ensuring that Israel retains its qualitative edge over its Arab neighbours. No Arab state can defeat Israel in a traditional battle; however, in the age of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, confidence in Israel's military might is declining, and there is fear in Jerusalem that in any future war the casualties will be highest among civilians rather than military personnel.¹³⁰

Given this factor, and the fact that Israel faces the prospects of missile attacks from a host of states, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Saudi Arabia, Jerusalem can only be relieved at the co-operation Washington has extended in the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile research. Aside from such major projects as the Arrow, however, the Israeli defence industry has largely become quite self-sufficient and adept at providing Israel with modernised weaponry. This is a holdover from the days of Israel's birth, when very few friendly states supplied it with armaments; Israel learned how to upgrade the

¹²⁸ Duncan Clarke, "The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel, and Strategic Cooperation," *Middle East Journal* 48 (Summer 1994): 478.

¹²⁹ Rosemary Hollis, "Israel's Search for Security," *Asian Affairs* 22 (October 1991): 279.

older, outmoded models it received and transform them into capable and even in some cases superior weapons. As a result, its own defence industry has burgeoned.

Having recorded all this, what must be born in mind is the fact that Israel, despite its need for a superpower ally, was never keen on tying itself down in a formal alliance with the U.S., primarily because to do so would severely hamper its ability to conduct its foreign and military policy in its own, offensive-minded way.¹³¹ With the end of the Cold War, Israel's strategic value to the West has, as mentioned, been questioned; or at least, is being considered to lie in a direction other than how it was previously thought of. A formal alliance with the U.S. now would possibly be even more constraining, because Washington can now look out for its own Middle Eastern interests with greater manoeuvring room (since it no longer has to concern itself with possible Soviet countermeasures).

Therefore, in an atmosphere of growing suspicion and distrust of the peace process and an accumulation by Israel's enemies of missiles and non-conventional arsenals, Israel has sought out a military relationship with Turkey that will offset a possible U.S. withdrawal of support (though not drastic). Israel is a tiny country, greatly outnumbered by the surrounding Arab states. The agreements with Turkey are a fundamental method of reducing these vulnerabilities and ensuring that, aside from fighting alone in any future war, Israel might also be able to count on using Turkish territory as a possible flanking attack on any of its enemies. Alvin Rubinstein devotes substantial efforts to explaining Israel's need:

¹³⁰ Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," 48-50.

the perennial shadow cast by proximate Arab military forces means that any territorial concessions made by Israel concerning the Golan and the West Bank would result in far less favourable lines of defence, established nearer to its centre of population and industry, and in circumstances that would complicate defensive dispositions in the event of a simultaneous attack from several directions. Precisely because modern weapons technology initially gives an aggressor a lethal edge, Israel's diminutive size, small population, reliance on civilian rather than standing army, and limited resources make real estate a valuable asset in any planning for survival.¹³²

Clearly, the Israeli-Turkish collaboration is a means to compensate for this lack in strategic depth, in that it provides for potentially new territory from which to launch attacks (although it must be stressed that no such agreement has been reached on this issue, or even mentioned by either of the two parties, as far as is known, bearing in mind the secrecy which shrouds the MTCA).

Turkey's Extra-Regional Concerns

Although Turkey remains one of the strongest military powers in the Middle East, and wields the second largest army in NATO after the United States, its search for a guaranteed supply and upgrading of modernised and updated technological weaponry can only be fulfilled through its military relationship with Israel. It is primarily its relationship with the U.S. that has prompted Ankara to search elsewhere for military suppliers, but the fact that Turkey has been effectively shut out of the E.U. is also important. A good example of this perceived oversight is the fact that Jordan, which had supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, was given an exemption to trade with Iraq; Turkey, which

¹³¹ Ibid., 43. This refers to Israel's previous strategy of pre-emptive wars that were won quickly, and that carried the fighting away from Israel's own territory.

¹³² Alvin Rubinstein, "Transformation: External Determinant," in The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives, ed. Alvin Rubinstein (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1991), 63.

supported the U.S.-led coalition and lost a great deal in trade and oil revenues because of it, has not been given any exemptions.¹³³

American Neglect

Although Turkey was one of the first non-Western European states to join the United States in its stand against Soviet Communism and expansionism, the U.S.-Turkish relationship tended to be shunted aside as the U.S. came to rely more on Israel as the Middle Eastern state which was the front line against Soviet-backed Arab aspirations. Throughout the Cold War, this relationship was been marked by accusations and recriminations, but by far the most important consideration here, and the event which caused Ankara to rethink its complete reliance on the U.S., was the 1964 Cyprus crisis

The first significant point of contention was the decision by Washington, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, to remove Jupiter nuclear-armed missiles from Turkey. Although the loss of these missiles was not particularly distressing, since that system was obsolete and about to be replaced by Polaris submarines, “the withdrawal of the missiles gave Turkey the feeling that it was no more than a pawn in the American game.”¹³⁴

In the decades that followed, the Cyprus dilemma, which only served to exacerbate matters, was usually discussed in the United Nations, where Turkey had few friends, and very rarely on a bilateral basis with American support.¹³⁵ In fact, Cyprus weaned Turkey away from total reliance on the West, and forced it to look elsewhere for allies.¹³⁶

¹³³ Jenny White, “Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey’s Welfare Party in Power,” Current History 96 (January 1997): 28.

¹³⁴ Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 288.

¹³⁵ Andrew Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally (California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1975), 35.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

In the early 1960s, Greek-Cypriots were agitating for ENOSIS. The 1960 treaty had guaranteed the bi-communal aspects of the island, and allowed for Turkey, Greece, or Great Britain to militarily intervene were the constitution threatened. As mentioned above, the government of Archbishop Makarios attempted to change the constitution by shifting the population centres on the island, and endeavouring to unite with the Greek mainland by repudiating the London-Zurich Agreements that had created independent Cyprus. Neither Athens, London, or Washington seemed prepared to do anything about this and Ankara, alarmed at the prospect of having a Greek presence so near its heartland and fearing for the safety of the island's Turkish inhabitants, saw no other option save the military one.

At the height of Turkey's military preparations, President Johnson sent a dramatic letter to Ankara, warning that

a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct intervention by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.¹³⁷

This U.S. dismissal of the NATO pledge hit Ankara hard, and anti-Americanism swept the country. The Johnson letter

severely unsettled the government, the MFA, and the military. It heightened a Turkish sense of insecurity by calling into question their assumption of support from an organization they had loyally supported. It highlighted their dependency on the Americans and exposed to them how

¹³⁷ "Document: President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu," The Middle East Journal 20 (Summer 1966): 387.

internationally isolated they were if their security concerns did not coincide totally with those of the West.¹³⁸

However, despite the accusations that flew across the Atlantic Ocean, it took two more incidents before Turkey felt betrayed enough to begin its search for Third World and Muslim supporters.

The first event involved the rampant drug problem in the United States. By the late 1960s, U.S. officials were concerned over domestic drug use, and after discussing this problem with Turkey, Ankara reluctantly agreed to reduce poppy production from forty-two to seven provinces, despite the fact that the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics found that only three to eight percent of illicit opium in the world came from Turkey.¹³⁹ Under further American pressure, Turkey relented and, humiliatingly, banned domestic poppy production. Compensation from the U.S. became bogged down in negotiations, and 1.5 million farmers were incomeless. To make matters worse, for domestic reasons, Washington announced plans for Walla Walla and Phoenix to begin poppy production. The bitterness from this controversy has lingered ever since.

This embarrassing incident for Turkey was followed by the second Cyprus crisis in 1974. In July of that year, Greek military forces staged a coup that ousted Makarios' government and brought to power a regime absolutely committed to ENOSIS. Ankara did not hesitate this time: within a week of the coup, Turkish forces landed in northern Cyprus, and by August controlled several regions beyond where the Turkish population

¹³⁸ Simon Mayall, McNair Paper 56 - Turkey: Thwarted Ambition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997), 47.

¹³⁹ Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally, 24.

was centred.¹⁴⁰ The U.S. Congress responded angrily, suspending all military aid and enacting an arms embargo against Turkey. Although this was eventually cancelled in 1979, Turkish trust in American support had all but vanished.

In addition to these milestone events in American-Turkish relations, Ankara has been upset with what it considers Washington's neglect in attempts to solve the Cyprus dilemma. This lack of confidence and trust has convinced Ankara that the American military aid it currently receives¹⁴¹ is not enough to ensure Turkey's military remains powerful and modernised enough to deter any threat or repel any attack on its territory or interests. The December 1996, deal between Ankara and Jerusalem which called for Israel to upgrade fifty-four of Turkey's fighter planes for \$650 million is a good example of the ability of Israel to fill Turkey's military needs. Sitki Orun, a retired general and advisor to the state Turkish Armed Foundation, told The Jerusalem Post that Turkey needed Israel to help carry out Ankara's military build-up, "notably due to the reticence in the United States and Europe to selling large quantities of weapons to Ankara."¹⁴² The most recent examples of this reluctance of the West is the January, 1997, cancellation by Belgium of weapons sale to Ankara, and the hesitation of the U.S. to grant an export license for Super Cobra attack helicopters to Turkey. Both governments cited concerns over Turkey's

¹⁴⁰ Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 270.

¹⁴¹ Unofficial American aid ratio to Greece and Turkey stands at about 7:1. However, as a reward for Turkey's role in the Gulf War, Turkey's annual U.S. assistance package was raised from \$553.4 million to \$635.4 million, with a high proportion of grants (as opposed to Congressional loans that Greece receives). This has the effect of mitigating some of the discrepancies in the Greek-Turkish ratio. Source: Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991): 35.

¹⁴² Agence France Presse, in The Jerusalem Post 27 January, 1997.

alleged human rights violations as their reasoning. Israel, it should be noted, does not attach any such preconditions for its arms sales.¹⁴³

This is not to say that the Turkish-American relationship lacks any substance; rather, it is a sign that in the near future, Ankara believes that given its past history with the U.S., it makes strategic sense to link itself with a regional state that has both better access to American armaments and a highly capable defence industry of its own. As mentioned above, Turkey's geostrategic locations (at the crossroads of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucuses and close to the Persian Gulf) will ensure that it remains an asset to the U.S. The 1991 accord of Enhanced Partnership between the two is proof of this.

European Disregard

In addition to an aversion on the part of the United States to sell armaments to Turkey, Europe also has not been too keen on cementing ties with Turkey, in the political and military arena (the incident with Belgium is a good example). Also, Brussels has been reluctant to allow Turkey entry into the E.U., based primarily on Turkey's human rights record and the fact that Turkey's industrialisation and economic development are significantly lower than the West European average; many scholars believe that until this gap narrows, there will be no integration.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ In fact, Washington is extremely unhappy and concerned with Israel's weapon deals with states that the U.S. has refused to sell to because of their dismal human rights records or their hostility toward the U.S. Source: Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Transfers," 89.

¹⁴⁴ Ziya Önis, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity," The Middle East Journal 49 (Winter 1995): 54.

Historically, Turkey and Western Europe have had both contentious and cordial relations.¹⁴⁵ Feelings of adversary can be traced back to when the Turks were constructing their empire at the expense of certain European powers. During later Ottoman times, the major European powers had exacted humiliating concessions from a dying Empire, and although this rankled many Turks, Atatürk was able to shunt these feelings aside in his drive for modernisation. For this goal he turned to London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome. Many Turks were sent abroad to study the art of modern government.

After the Second World War, when it became obvious that the United States was by the far the strongest of the world's major powers, Ankara began to develop its relationship with Washington in the context of European security, as a massive land barrier to Russia and a staging front into Eastern Europe and the Caucuses. In this manner Turkey came to regard financial and military aid from the U.S. as a primary goal of its foreign policy, thus breaking with Atatürk's cautious neutralism.

However, Ankara never forgot about Europe, and in recent years has stepped up its lobbying for E.U. entry. In 1963 Europe and Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement, which made Turkey an Associate Member and laid the foundations for eventual integration into the European economic and political system through evolution and negotiations--but eventual entry was the goal. For Turkey, Europe is economically important: in 1973, just under eighty percent of Turkey's trade was with the European

¹⁴⁵ Relations with Eastern Europe had historically fared much worse, and so when discussing Europe this thesis refers to Western Europe. A good example is the first Bulgarian crisis, when, after the Korean War, the Communist government expelled 250 000 Turkish-speaking Muslim. In 1989, in response to the government's repressive policies, 340 000 of the Turkish-Muslim population fled to Turkey. Source: Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 280 & 312.

members of the OECD¹⁴⁶; Today, the E.U. accounts for more than fifty percent of Turkey's trade and remains Ankara's goal, with its large, stable market of over 350 million people (as compared with Turkey's declining trade with the more unstable, volatile Middle Eastern markets).¹⁴⁷ This was followed by the Additional Protocol of 1973, and in 1987 Ankara applied for full membership in the E.C. Despite the fact that a Customs Union went into effect on January 1 1996, there has been little progress since regarding Turkey's entrance to the E.U.

Turkish-E.U. relations took a turn for the worse in mid-December 1997, when the Union convened in Luxembourg for a summit on expansion and enlargement. The summit ended with a declaration that talks on entry would begin in 1998 with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus (by which they meant the internationally-recognised state led by the Greek-Cypriots, not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus); countries not on the immediate list but scheduled for discussions at a later date are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. Turkey, which deemed itself a long and loyal ally of the West, was conspicuously missing from the agenda.

Furious, on December 14 1997, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz announced that Turkey would cut its political ties with the E.U., although it would keep the economic relationship intact and would not withdraw its membership application, and rejected a hasty European afterthought calling for a pan-Europe conference, that included Turkey, to

¹⁴⁶ Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally.

¹⁴⁷ Önis, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era," 56.

discuss enlargement issues.¹⁴⁸ He also threatened that Turkey would fully integrate the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus if the Republic of Cyprus were admitted to the E.U.

Brussels's attitude is primarily due to concern over Turkey's human rights record (in 1982 it launched an official investigation into these affairs), and to its apprehension over Turkey's economy. Turkey's population of over sixty million is already larger compared to most E.U. countries, and it is growing at an impressive rate. Several European countries have begun curtailing their military relationship with Turkey. As noted in Chapter One, Norway and Belgium have expressed their displeasure in an arms embargo. In March 1992, Germany also imposed an arms embargo on Turkey because, it claimed, the Turkish military was using German arms to fight the PKK (this embargo was later dropped in June).

Some in Europe are also concerned over what the inclusion of Turkey might do to the European Union's security policies. Given the fact that Turkey is surrounded by regions of instability, "[m]any Germans do not want [E.U.] borders to be extended to adjoin Iraq, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Armenia."¹⁴⁹

However, most Turks feel there are ulterior reasons that not only affect the likelihood of Turkey's entry into the E.U., but also the manner in which Europe deals with Turkey—including the sale of arms and support in the United Nations on the Cyprus dilemma and other concerns of Ankara. In his speech before the Grand National Assembly,

¹⁴⁸ Agence France-Presse, "Dust Must Settle on Turkey-EU Relations: Van Der Broek," via Clarinet, correspondence with Martin Rudner, professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, 16 December 1997.

¹⁴⁹ Graham Fuller, From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), 26.

former foreign minister Baykal mentioned some of the aspects of the human rights issue: The European Commission, he stated in 1995, had only 154 files against Turkey in this matter, and only three times had the Commission ruled against Turkey; whereas rulings on violations of human rights had been passed against Italy 240 times, France fifty, Austria twenty, and Portugal fifteen.¹⁵⁰

It is precisely this type of treatment that Ankara feels is unfair and discriminatory, and in fact “generat[es] suspicions that Europeans [are] reverting to nineteenth-century Euro-Christian discriminatory practices against the Muslim Turks.”¹⁵¹ In fact, many have argued that there is a “growing perception in Western Europe that Turkey’s Islamic identity would be a major problem in regard to Turkey’s cultural integration into the [European Union].”¹⁵² Europe does, after all, have a long history of cultural and religious “togetherness,” of which Islamic Turkey has never been a part.¹⁵³ A comment by a high-level E.U. statesman seemed to emphasise the point. He remarked that “Yugoslavia was a lesson for us. Europe can best stay together if it remains white and Christian.”¹⁵⁴ In addition, there is a history of conflict between Europe and the Turks, and “[i]n inheriting the conflicts of their past, the two cultures have formed mutually hostile perceptions of one another. These perceptions have in turn exerted a perfidious influence on relations

¹⁵⁰ Turkish Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Policy Statement by H.E. Deniz Baykal.”

¹⁵¹ Eren, Turkey, NATO, and Europe, 19.

¹⁵² Sabri Sayari, “Turkey: The Changing Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,” The Middle East Journal 46 (Winter 1992): 12.

¹⁵³ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 12.

¹⁵⁴ James Nathan, “Turkey on Edge,” International Relations 13 (August 1997): 19.

between Turkey and Europe [today].”¹⁵⁵ Combined, these two aspects form a powerful barrier to political unity.

Given the rise of Islamic political power in recent years, Turkey’s image has gradually transformed itself into one of Muslim sentiment at odds with many Christian values, ideals, and practices. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia between heavily armed Christian Serbs against much less well-defended Muslims, some believe, “confirmed a growing Turkish conviction about European hatred for Islam and Muslims.”¹⁵⁶ As discussed in Chapter Five, the advent of social and economic change and even displacement within Turkish society has driven many Turks, especially those with rural ties, to seek solace in their religion’s core morals.¹⁵⁷

Given this Turkish-E.U. interaction, and Turkish disappointment and resentment at the E.U.’s refusal to allow Turkey entry, especially given the fact that a number of other European countries are beginning to line up for acceptance, it is understandable that Ankara has decided to look elsewhere for its friends. In the 1970s and 1980s it had focused on its Muslim and Middle Eastern neighbours. In the 1990s it has increasingly been tying itself closer to Israel, from whom it can achieve a host of benefits that are denied it on a bilateral basis with Europe and the United States.

¹⁵⁵ Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, 13.

¹⁵⁶ Pipes and Clawson, “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors,” 136.

¹⁵⁷ Richard Bulliet, “The Future of the Islamic Movement,” Foreign Affairs 72 (November-December 1993): 39.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to draw out the reasoning behind the Military Training Cooperation Agreement and all subsequent military, political, and economic agreements and understandings between Turkey and Israel. Primarily, the focus can be found in the regional security interests of both countries, but motives can also be discerned in each state's relationships with other major world powers, notably the United States and the European Union.

Syria, Iran, and Iraq all have long-standing disputes with both Israel and Turkey (and, in the case of Turkey, Greece as well). For Israel's part, these frictions centre around ideological and religious enmity, which has been compounded over the course of this century, and Israeli occupation of Arab lands. As the current peace process proves, these contentions are very difficult to resolve. The autocratic Muslim regimes have proven themselves unwilling to make peace with Israel, and indeed have usually done whatever they could feasibly get away with to undermine Israel's acceptance and integration into the region.

Turkey's disputes, without denying that Israel's national security interests are threatened by the Arab-Israeli conflict, tend to converge over geological claims—such as water rights, territory, and air space. At times, these differences have been distended by political and religious contrasts between Ankara on the one hand, and Damascus or Teheran on the other.

However, the growing closeness between Israel and Turkey is a result not only of regional threats, but international dynamics as well. The growing gulf between Turkey and the U.S., and Turkey and the E.U., both of which have been building for decades, has

contributed to a way of thinking in Ankara that forces it to look at other countries to supply its needs. Of course, "there is broad agreement throughout Turkish society that such a strong military posture and close ties to the West are essential to the country's national security."¹⁵⁸ These needs can be supplied by Israel, which maintains a close relationship with the U.S. and thus has access to technologically superior weaponry. Furthermore, Israel's own defence industry is more than capable of meeting Turkey's needs, as is shown by Ankara's desire for more military deals between the two countries (see Chapter One).

For Israel, too, although there is much argument about this and it is open to debate, there is a decreasing utility for the United States to rely so heavily on the Jewish state. This is primarily due to the fact that Washington, since 1991 especially, has enhanced its own relationships with some of the more moderate states of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. A Jerusalem-Ankara axis meets many of the regional security needs of Israel that the U.S. might not necessarily fill in the future. Israel, it should be remembered, has no official allies.¹⁵⁹

Unfortunately for Israel and Turkey, these new arrangements are not without their obstacles and challenges. Domestic opposition within Turkey, although nascent at the moment, can easily grow stronger. Also, any regional détente between Israel and its enemies or Turkey and its adversaries might call into question the need for Turkish-Israeli collaboration; and in fact might be seen more as a liability. These potential hazards will be

¹⁵⁸ Dankwart Rustow, *Turkey: American's Forgotten Ally*, 2nd ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1989), 61.

¹⁵⁹ Joseph Alpher, "Israel: Security After Oslo," *International Affairs* 70 (January 1994): 231.

discussed in the following chapter. The reader will then be able to judge whether or not the benefits of Israeli-Turkish co-operation are strong and attractive enough to withstand all the buffeting that domestic and external storms can heave at them.

As this chapter shows, however, there are several advantages that both Jerusalem and Ankara gain as a result of their growing military closeness. It is true that Middle Eastern politics can shift very quickly and change directions over even insignificant events. Perhaps, as Tansu Çiller hopes, this relationship will indeed grow stronger and in doing so promote greater stability in a volatile and dangerous region.

As can be seen from both Chapter Four and Chapter Three, Turkey and Israel exist in an international system whose driving force remains the structural determinants as explained by Kenneth Waltz and Structural Realism. Both countries retain the characteristics that allow for a sameness of all states throughout the system, and both perform tasks similar to all states, within the region and without.

To begin with, it cannot be disputed that Turkey and Israel are sovereign states, a requirement under Waltz's "differentiation of units" principle of Structural Realism. In addition, as the previous two chapters illustrate, Israel and Turkey face a host of security problems that call into question, if not the actual existence of the state itself, then at least portions of it or the composition of it as it currently exists. Domestic terrorism, natural resource disputes, territorial conflicts, historical enmities, clashing interests: all play a central role in Jerusalem and Ankara's calculations in terms of their regional policies.

Second, the capabilities Israel and Turkey wield include the capacity for their military forces to be able to deter hostile actions taken against them by adversary states. The ability to deflect a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights or a Greek offensive in the

Aegean Sea, by Israel and Turkey respectively, reflects the relative power each country has and can bring to bear on others.

However, at a time when Great Powers seem to be scaling back their support for both Turkey and Israel, and when the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction has spread throughout the Middle East and nearby regions, the balance of power seems to be shifting against Jerusalem and Ankara, at least according to their calculations. The distribution of capabilities of regional states is undergoing a change, and this has affected the security interests of Israel and Turkey--and, indeed, of all states within the area, including Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Military Training Cooperation Agreement and all following agreements are designed to offset this changing balance of power.

As Waltz noted, balances of power can be effected through external means, in the form of alliances. Inter-state conflict, competition, and rivalry in the Middle East require that all countries, Arab and non-Arab, create regional arrangements by which they can rely on certain other states to defend, protect, or support them in the face of hostility or aggression from others. These can take the form of alliance or a number of separate and different agreements. Although it is too early to title Turkish-Israeli military relations a full-fledged alliance, one can see that there are many facets to this developing relationship that include detailed aspects of defence and defence-industry co-operation, designed to compensate for any disadvantages accruing to both states as a result of changing regional circumstances. Their capabilities are thus increased by military collaboration, in several ways as explained throughout Chapter Four.

Without the blanket protection of the United States under the mantle of bipolarity, Israel and Turkey have had to make choices previously unnecessary. Under the rubric of structural change, Jerusalem and Ankara have sought closer relations in order to better survive in the international system and increase their own security and capabilities. This resulted in the Military Training Cooperation Agreement, which served as the beginning of a relationship that has continued to grow ever since.

**CHAPTER FIVE:
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCKS
AND RELEVANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Introduction

The four previous chapters have related in great detail the most important aspects of the military relationship between Turkey and Israel. They have included a description of the military co-operation agreements and accords signed and discussed between the two, their historical relationship, their relations with their Middle Eastern and regional neighbours, and their relations with certain states of the West. The purpose of this chapter is to mention those barriers that have the potential to hinder further co-operation, or negate what has already been achieved, and to relate the importance of this recent development in Middle Eastern politics to International Relations, both in theory and in practice. Since each previous chapter has already delved in detail into what this collaboration means for International Relations theory and for Middle Eastern studies, by outlining and explaining the current circumstances surrounding the Jerusalem-Ankara axis, this chapter will serve primarily as a summary and reiteration of what has already been said.

The discussion begins with the possible impediments to Turkish-Israeli military co-operation, and a discussion on why these potential hindrances are not as important as they may at first seem. This refers to the Syrian-Israeli peace process, which does have the potential to settle most disputes between Israel and Syria and thus negate at least some of Israel's reasons for military ties with Turkey. Next will be a consideration of the

domestic situation in Turkey, namely in terms of the success of the *Refah Partisi* in elections in the 1990s. Thus, the disadvantages for Ankara's closeness with Jerusalem will be highlighted. Finally, these concerns will all be responded to with an analysis of their likelihood ever coming to pass, in which case the problems and stumbling blocks to Turkish-Israeli relations are not so serious as some might believe.

This is followed by a comprehensive summary of Structural Realism, and what the case study of Turkish-Israeli relations means for this theory. The main purpose of this section is to prove that Kenneth Waltz's theory remains a viable model through which to view International Relations. This will be followed by an examination of what role this relationship plays in the study of Middle Eastern politics, and the wider discipline of International Relations. The chapter will end with a brief conclusion, which includes a preliminary judgement on the future of Turkish-Israeli relations.

Potential Stumbling Blocks and Arguments Against Them

The discussion has thus far focused on the theoretical, regional, and international reasons why Israel and Turkey would sign the Military Training Cooperation Agreement and further their co-operation in the military and security spheres. Although these reasons are compelling, there are still some concerns about the eventual success of Turkish-Israeli military collaboration. In fact, there are domestic and regional political factors that need to be taken into consideration when one discusses the evolution and future of Israeli-Turkish relations. These considerations vary with the actors involved: for Israel it is the external potentialities that are most consequential, while for Turkey it is the domestic. The former refers to the prospects of an Israeli peace with Syria (as an Israeli peace with

any other Muslim neighbour is so far-fetched as to not warrant serious consideration). The latter point deals with the domestic conditions inside Turkey, because of the rise of political Islam as a powerful force within Turkish society and its public declaration of opposition to ties with Israel.

The conclusion of this section, however, will reveal that despite these future prospects, the danger of them having any real effect on Turkish-Israeli relations is not very high, primarily due to the fact that the Jerusalem-Ankara axis has many legs to stand on; the military aspect, while important, is supported by other factors. Furthermore, the probability of any of these occurrences taking place is even more dubious, for reasons that will be explained throughout the chapter.

Impediments to Israeli-Turkish Military Co-operation

The regional factors that might preclude close collaboration between Israel and Turkey stem solely from their relationships with those states with which they have hostile or antagonistic relations: Syria, Iraq, and Iran. There have been several arguments put forth to explain both the need and the probability that Israel and Turkey would come to terms with their neighbours. The most important by far is the proclaimed existence of a newer “global order” wherein harmony between states is far more beneficial for them than discord—and that states realise this and will act accordingly. This means, for example, that Israel would seek a settlement with its Arab neighbours because regional economic integration would serve it far better than regional enmity. A good example of this argument is the need for water. As mentioned in previous chapters, water is a vital interest in the region because of the area’s aridity and the lack of fresh water resources. In addition, much of the rivers and other sources for water are shared by two or more states,

making their division an issue of political and national security. The need to co-operate, while it may not be obvious at this point in time to the riparian or littoral states, cannot be overlooked when determining the potential for collaboration in this field.

A second argument is that in the Middle East, a state of war has existed long enough that the countries involved are beginning to grow weary of its psychological¹ and economic costs. Both of these arguments will be answered within the context of the following sections. However, the reality is that the Arab-Israeli peace process, for all the progress it has made, has not improved the economic conditions of any of the states involved, nor does it seem likely to in the short term.² In addition, Turkey's disputes with its bordering countries has simmered over many years, and also shows no sign of abating in deference to regional co-operation.

In terms of Israel's potential for reconciliation of sorts with its former enemies, the focus here is Syria. Jerusalem's relations with Baghdad and Teheran have shown no indication of any improvement, and the 1997 crisis brought on by Saddam Hussein's refusal to allow American arms inspectors into his country in the middle of November is proof that Iraq has no intention of relinquishing its quest for regional military

¹ This argument is directed primarily at Israel, because fifty years of living in a near state of war has taken its toll on the Israeli public, and Israel's democratic nature permits its citizens to voice their objections to unpopular actions by the government. The growing support for withdrawal from Lebanon and a willingness to trade land for peace is an example of this. An authoritarian state such as Iraq does not allow its people a say in government decisions.

² For a more thorough examination of this assertion, see Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International Politics," Security and Policy Studies No.31 (Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, February 1997).

superiority.³ In addition, despite the May 1997 election in Iran of a more moderate president, Iran continues to fund and supply Hizballah, and the rhetoric against Israel has not lessened in any appreciable way. In fact, in any new regional arrangement that results from an improvement in Israeli-Arab relations, Israel will have more incentive “in supporting the [Persian] Gulf monarchies’ sovereignty against more radical—and more anti-Israel—rulers in Tehran and Baghdad.”⁴ Syria, on the other hand, has shown a willingness, albeit cryptic at best, to bargain with Israel on certain points of contention, namely the Golan Heights, and so will be the focus here.

An Israeli-Syrian Détente

Israeli relations with Syria have the inherent potential to proscribe a more secure border between the two, based primarily on a solution to the thorny issues of the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon (see Chapter Four). Both countries have grounds for pushing for a mutual peace.

For Syria, the decision to make peace with Israel would come solely from President Hafiz al-Assad. Assad is well known for his calculating nature, and for making national interest decisions based on careful consideration of strategic circumstances. The 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath (that is, the peace process that started in Madrid in 1991) provided the context for Assad’s change of political calculation.⁵ As Daniel Pipes argues, “Damascus is simply making the best of a difficult situation. [T]here has been no

³ This incident has also worried many in Washington, who fear that Iraq’s alleged capacity to produce anthrax and VX nerve gas within a matter of days or weeks might impel Israel to take matters into its own hands to end this bid for military superiority, as it did in 1981. Source: Middle East Security Report No. 45, 19 November 1997. Received from MSANEWS, 20 November 1997.

⁴ Barry Rubin, “The New Middle East: Opportunities and Risks,” Security and Policy Studies No. 19 (Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, February 1995), 35.

change of heart toward Israel, but some timely, tactical adjustments.”⁶ This is evident in the approach Damascus took to the U.S.-sponsored talks: Syria no longer insistent on its previously adamant position that Israel agree to a binding international conference and a full withdrawal from the Golan before any bilateral discussion take place.⁷

The overriding incentive for Damascus to move toward some sort of reconciliation with Israel is to help stabilise and increase the growth of its economy, which would thus make it more capable of asserting its ability to maintain a leading role in Muslim and regional affairs. This can be achieved through strong ties with the West, more particularly the United States:

Following the retrenchment and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, Damascus saw good relations with the United States as the factor that would make the difference between Syria’s inclusion in the new regional order emerging after the Gulf War and its exclusion from that order, between peace on favourable terms and no peace at all, and between economic revival and economic stagnation.⁸

Muhammad Muslih, writing in 1994, asserted that, based on these premises, “highly placed Syrian officials explained to [him] on numerous occasions that their country is ready for peace and the concessions that are required to make it happen.”⁹ There is good reason for this hope. The Syrian economy, languishing under a police state regime that neglects domestic improvements in favour of massive military expenditures,

⁵ In fact, Efraim Inbar asserts that the decision to sit with Israel in Madrid “reflected President Hafiz Asad’s accommodation to changing international realities.” Source: Efraim Inbar, “Israeli Negotiations with Syria,” Security and Policy Studies No.24 (Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, December 1995), 90.

⁶ Daniel Pipes, “Is Damascus Ready for Peace?” Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1991-92): 49-50.

⁷ Inbar, “Israeli Negotiations with Syria,” 90.

⁸ Muhammad Muslih, “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready,” Foreign Policy no.96 (Fall 1994): 150.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 153.

is, aside from the oil the country produces, in somewhat dire straits. Around the time of the recent Gulf War, Syria had

an annual inflation rate of some 50 percent, a grossly overvalued Syrian lira and debts of some \$6 billion to the West and \$9 billion to the U.S.S.R. Although 30 percent of the work force is engaged in agriculture, grain has to be imported. Cities routinely experience electricity shortfalls, and ordinary items such as toilet paper are unavailable for long stretches of time.¹⁰

Israel's reasons for seeking a peace with Syria run along similar lines as those of Damascus. As explained in Chapter Two, due to international political dynamics, the United States need no longer support Israel whole-heartedly or without reservation as it once did. This is, of course, not to say that the U.S.-Israeli relationship has deteriorated to any significant degree: despite the fact that the U.S. Security Assistance Program is declining in the amount it doles out, Israel still receives the lion's share of its foreign aid.¹¹ There is, however, a need to recognise that the United States has other interests that may clash with its seemingly exclusive support for Israel in the ongoing peace process, and that there is no longer a need to present a united front to a Soviet-inspired Arab front. In "the new American-dominated international order, the different points of view between Jerusalem and Washington on their territorial contours of a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict are resurfacing to Israel's disadvantage."¹² The U.S. tolerance for Israeli military action is consequently decreasing; the most effective means for Israel to

¹⁰ Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" 39.

¹¹ Ninety-two percent of this security assistance is allocated to Israel and Egypt. Of these funds, Israel receives at least \$1 billion more than Egypt. Source: Duncan Clarke, "US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?" The Middle East Journal 51 (Spring 1997): 200-201.

¹² Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, "The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: Toward a Security Regime," Security and Policy Studies No.23 (Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, June 1995), 48.

counter this potential constrain is to ensure that military action will no longer be necessary. Hence, stability with Syria serves this very purpose.

Were Israel to make peace with Syria, this would be a fundamental step toward its slow acceptance into the region, which, based on theoretical and even realistic predictions, is important in light of the fact that Washington's strategic calculus is changing. Given that Syria holds the key to power in Lebanon and ties down a considerable amount of Israel's military and intelligence forces because of the dispute over the Golan Heights, "[p]eace with Syria will pave the way for Israel's integration in a region that has, in the past, rejected it."¹³ As Barry Rubin asserts, "only Syrian peace with Israel would make possible a full resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict."¹⁴ Moshe Ma'oz echoes Rubin's words: "Syrian-Israeli relations are pivotal to the Middle East peace process; no comprehensive, stable, and durable peace can be achieved without a political settlement between the two countries."¹⁵ Such a development would bring Israel relative security on the borders of all its immediate neighbours.

Another factor that Jerusalem must take into consideration is the growing strategic balance with its neighbours. The continual Iraqi quest for non-conventional weapons is a threat to Israel's security. Iran, too, has been engaged in a search for ballistic missiles with which to dominate at least the Persian Gulf.¹⁶ As many analysts

¹³ Muslih, "Dateline Damascus," 152.

¹⁴ Rubin, "The New Middle East," 57.

¹⁵ Moshe Ma'oz, "Syria, Israel and the Peace Process," in From War to Peace: Arab-Israel Relations 1973-1993, eds. Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat, and Moshe Ma'oz (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 1994), 157.

¹⁶ Israeli and U.S. intelligence sources have confirmed that Iran has already acquired, or is in the process of acquiring, Shahab-3 and -4 missiles with ranges of up to 1995 kilometres, easily enough to hit targets in Israel (and Turkey as well). Source: William Safire, "Iran Girds for War," The New York Times, reprinted in The Jerusalem

have noted, "odds are that before the end of the decade the strategic balance in the region will undergo radical change inimical to Israel's nuclear hegemony."¹⁷ Gerald Steinberg, Senior Research Associate and the Director of the Arms Control and Proliferation Research Project at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, believes that once U.N. inspectors depart from Iraq, Saddam potentially could acquire a nuclear bomb in about eighteen months; similarly, although he notes that it is difficult to be totally certain, Iran is currently about five years or so away from its own nuclear weapon acquisition, although this can be reduced with accelerated aid from Russia or China.¹⁸ Syria, although not the most powerful Arab state in the region, is a major player, for reasons already noted. A peace treaty or agreement between Damascus and Jerusalem would afford the latter a much needed respite from the pressures of the Arab-Israeli conflict, reduce its military commitments that are focused on Syria, and bring relative stability to the last of its borders.

A last motive for peace that needs to be briefly considered is the war-weariness that is increasingly self-evident in Israeli society.¹⁹ While this cause may not be as strong a driving force as the heretofore-mentioned ones, nonetheless it does need consideration.

Having been involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict for fifty years, beginning with the 1948-49 war, Israeli society has begun to wonder whether its country needs to be so militarised any longer, given the changing regional circumstances. Wars with Arab states used to be backed with near unanimity in Israel. The last times armed conflict broke out

Post, 28 September, 1997: 7. There are many who believe, however, that Iran lacks the capability to produce nuclear weapons in the near future.

¹⁷ Geoffrey Aronson, "Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question," The Middle East Journal 46 (Fall 1992): 625.

¹⁸ Correspondence between Gerald Steinberg and author, 19 December 1997.

between Israelis and Arabs were the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the government's response to the *intifadah*. The aftermath of the outcomes of these events have proven how domestically unpopular and societally divisive these policies have become.²⁰ A good example is the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, which many deem necessary for the state's national security interests. However, this occupancy has been subject to increasingly vocal opposition. The February 4 1997, crash of two Israeli helicopters ferrying troops to southern Lebanon that killed seventy-three "triggered an unprecedentedly heated debate over the pros and cons of Israel's presence across the northern border."²¹

This dissatisfaction seems to have reached even the upper echelons of the military. At the end of November 1997, a controversy swirled around the alleged comments made by a senior IDF commander that alluded to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.²² Although the officer may have been misquoted, as is averred, the very fact that an Israeli retreat was referred to has shown the willingness of Jewish Israeli citizens to contemplate such an action, where once it would have been unthinkable. To prove this point even more effectively, and perhaps to give substance to the rumours of the commander's suggestions, one need only note the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a right-winger and a hawk by Israeli political standards, has agreed to accept U.N. Resolution 425, which calls for a withdrawal from the security zone

¹⁹ Inbar and Sandler, "The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation," 53.

²⁰ Lecture given by Professor Itzhak Galnoor, from the course "Israel: Politics and Society," Jerusalem, Israel, 5 November, 1997.

²¹ Peter Hirschberg, "Withdrawal Symptoms," The Jerusalem Report 6 March, 1997: 13.

²² Ha'aretz: English Edition, "Mordechai Backs 'Misquoted' IDF Commander," 28 November, 1997: 1.

(although Netanyahu has stipulated that this will only be achieved with concrete security guarantees from the Lebanese government).

At the same time, it must be remembered that the Oslo accords were widely favoured by Israelis (at least until the spate of suicide bombings in the first half of 1996), and that the election of a hard-line Likud government does not necessarily mean the opposite has occurred: Netanyahu was elected by a very slim margin (of 30 000 votes), and his campaign slogan was "Peace with Security," not "Security Without Peace." Having endured half a century of war, Israelis are becoming increasingly unwilling to bear the costs and burdens of their country's previously inescapable regional problems. As further proof of this, studies conducted on Israeli public opinion since the end of the 1980s have noted a dovish trend.²³

Turkey's *Refah* Opposition to Israel

As previously noted, Turkey's regional relations are characterised by tensions and bickering almost as much as Israel's. And, again similar to Israel, none of these disputes seem on the verge of ending in mutually beneficial resolution. While initially Ankara was concerned that improved relations with Israel would damage its links with the Arab/Muslim world, "at present heightened Turkey-Israel relations seem to have little real cost in terms of Turkey-Arab relations."²⁴ Therefore, the external, regional effects on the Jerusalem-Ankara axis, from Turkey's point of view, need not be considered.

However, internal changes can have a very deleterious effect on the MTCA and any further co-operation between Ankara and Jerusalem. This refers to the growing

²³ Gad Barzilai and Efraim Inbar, "The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options," Armed Forces and Society 23 (Fall 1996): 57.

²⁴ Barry Rubin, "Notes on Turkey-Israel Relations," The Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 1 (July 1997): 3.

strength of Islamist²⁵ parties within Turkey, primarily the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party), that ran on a platform of increasing links with the Islamic world at the expense of ties with Israel and the West. This phenomenon has been in effect almost since the creation of modern Turkey.

When Kemal Atatürk began Turkey's drive for modernisation, which meant strengthening ties with Europe, in 1923 many Turks were unhappy with the vigour with which he pursued this objective. As mentioned in Chapter Three, several symbols of Islamic culture were banned or discontinued, and the government worked hard to ensure that secularism, rather than religion, became the guiding tenet for both domestic and external policies. While there was little outright or violent opposition to this legacy in the beginning, the 1960s and more particularly the 1970s saw a growing awareness of and longing for Turkey's Islamic legacy, and this culminated in the formation of avowedly Islamic parties. This is important because, as Nilüfer Göle points out, "Islamist," as well as having religious connotations, implies a political consciousness and social action format, which has formed the basis for Necmettin Erbakan's attempts to form a political Islamic party.²⁶

The growth of Islamic ideals, as opposed to the secular Kemalist legacy, started slowly, with the advent of a multiparty system in 1950, but gained momentum toward the end of the 1960s. Necmettin Erbakan, a former professor of engineering and the leader of the Welfare Party and the first Islamic Prime Minister of modern Turkey, has been active on the political scene for many years. In 1969 he established the National Order Party,

²⁵ Those who wish to see Islam play a greater role in society and/or polity.

²⁶ Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites," The Middle East Journal 51 (Winter 1997): 47.

which was closed down after the 1971 military coup for using religion for political purposes. Next came the National Salvation Party, and it, too, was dissolved after the third military take-over in 1980. However, this party won almost twelve percent of the vote in the 1973 elections, and between 1974 and 1977, the National Salvation Party was the junior partner in three successive coalitions, with Erbakan as deputy prime minister each time--although this can also be attributed simply to the inability of the secular parties to agree on a division of power.

The Welfare Party, formed in 1983, was the third of Erbakan's attempts to gain political legitimacy (although he did not take over the leadership until 1987, due to a ban placed on him by the military government before it gave up power), and it seems he has been successful: in the general elections of 1995 *Refah* garnered the most votes (twenty-one percent of the total vote), which enabled him to form a coalition government and he became prime minister in the next year, although this only lasted for eleven months. However, in an apparent setback, the Welfare Party was closed down in January 1998, by Turkey's highest court, the Constitutional Court, for anti-secular activities (a crime according to Turkey's constitution). Erbakan and six other *Refah* leaders were banned from political activity for five years. But Erbakan's aides wasted no time in forming another party, the *Fazilet Partisi*, or Virtue Party: by March, 134 of *Refah*'s 147 deputies had joined the new party, making it the second largest in the Grand National Assembly. Although Virtue has claimed it no longer supports harsh anti-Western and anti-Israel policies, and has become much more pragmatic, it remains to be seen how different *Fazilet* actually is. Therefore, and because virtually all of Welfare's deputies have

become members of this new party, it will be assumed that the elements of continuity between these two parties are greater than the contrasts.

The Welfare Party would not have become so popular if the ground had not already been prepared for it. In much the same way that the low living standards and conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have prompted many Palestinians to support HAMAS because of the tremendous amount of social work it does for those who require assistance (which is the majority), Erbakan's party ran on a platform of social reforms, of pensions, health care, employment, and housing.²⁷ Turkish society has undergone great change in recent years, as economic growth has fallen and strict International Monetary Fund-mandated fiscal policies have forced many Turks into the lower classes, thus necessitating the need for such programs.

This has made Welfare very popular among the provincial lower middle classes and urban lower classes,²⁸ a sector of society that is growing increasingly dissatisfied with Turkey's economic and social policies. Welfare's popularity had grown with its 1994 winning of key mayoral races in Turkish cities, and its subsequent social reforms that have noticeably improved the social services the municipalities provide,²⁹ including the providing of much-needed coal, clothing, soup, and food.³⁰ Furthermore, peoples of all religion tend to comfort themselves with the blanket of their religion when events around them are happening too quickly for understanding: "if people cannot explain what is happening around them or to them on rational grounds, they are likely to turn to

²⁷ Jenny White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey's Welfare Party in Power," Current History 96 (January 1997): 26.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

traditional analyses and remedies.”³¹ The changes being wrought on Turkish society have provided just such events for the people to attempt explanations to satisfy them. As Iltter Turan argues, “those who have been attracted to [Welfare] appear to have been individuals who have been unable to cope with change and have been pushed into marginal status in society.”³²

It is this social and political characteristic of Islamism in Turkey that has proven dangerous to ties with Israel. Islamism “indicates the reappropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis for an alternative social and political agenda (to that of the state),”³³ including a sense of belonging and group identity, a notion that religion is much more effective at conveying than is secularism. Secularism, it must be noted, is a distinctly non-Muslim way of life.

Although it cannot be described precisely as “Islamic fundamentalism,” Welfare and its political ideals are distinctly anti-Western.³⁴ In fact, it publicly declared that “the

³⁰ Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?” The Middle East Journal 51 (Winter 1997): 36.

³¹ Iltter Turan, “Religion and Political Culture in Turkey,” in Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, ed. Richard Tapper (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1994), 44.

³² *Ibid.*, 46.

³³ Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal 50 (Winter 1996): 48.

³⁴ In addition, there are several other radical Islamic groups within Turkey that have not shied away from using violence to achieve their ends. These include The Great Eastern Islamic Fighters Front, Islamic Operation (or Action), Islamic Movement, Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah (not the same organisation that operates in Lebanon), and the Islamic Liberation Organization. Although these are small groups operating without any kind of popular backing, their existence is a symptom of the growing utility of Islam to many Turks.

weakness and backwardness of the Islamic society is not due to Islam but to Western domination of Muslims,"³⁵ and

[t]hey have complained about the degeneration of morals in society, the rise in the use of alcohol, gambling and prostitution. These 'unfortunate' developments, they have argued, may be traced to the imitation of Western patterns. Therefore, life should be lived according to the principles of Islam, and it is incumbent on the political authority to promote this.³⁶

This view reflects a belief held by many of its adherents, and there is no sign of it lessening. Such views, coupled with the "[a]nti-Israel and anti-Zionist arguments [that] have become standard in *Refah* political discourse and have frequently acquired anti-Semitic tones as well,"³⁷ allow little room for compromise and, given the fact that Erbakan has already once been the head of government, provide for a potentially powerful brake on, or even deterrent to, Turkish-Israeli ties in general. Erbakan has also made public his feelings toward Israel: In the middle of 1996, Erbakan, at a private meeting, mentioned that he did not like Jews. Later, he told others that he had trouble coming to terms with the sight of the Israeli flag.³⁸

Since the 1970s Erbakan has been calling for a severing of all ties with Israel,³⁹ the closure of military bases in Turkey in use by the United States, a renunciation of attempts to join the E.U., and a strengthening of ties with all Muslim countries in all

³⁵ Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State," 54.

³⁶ Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey," 46.

³⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, "Post Cold-War Turkish Security and the Middle East," The Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 2 (June 1997): 7.

³⁸ Oded Granot, "Netanyahu Sent a Greeting, Erbakan Has Yet to Reply," Ma'ariv 14 August, 1996: B6.

³⁹ *Refah* consistently promised to annul the MTCA once it came to power.

areas.⁴⁰ Despite the fact that Erbakan has been forced out of office by the staunchly secularist military, his party remains active in the Grand National Assembly, and neither he nor Welfare has shown any indication that they will quietly slip out of the national political limelight. The very fact that an Islamic party that has called for a severing of ties with Israel has been in power once, and that Turkish society's economic and social ills have not been eased and remain fertile ground for an Islamic party, does cause some concern in Jerusalem.

Incentives for Israeli-Turkish Military Co-operation⁴¹

Having mentioned the possible scenarios that might preclude a further strengthening of Israeli-Turkish military ties, or even reverse them, it is now necessary to bring to light the evidence that suggests such potentialities are hardly enough to bring down the Jerusalem-Ankara axis. In other words, while concerns remain, given the volatile nature of Middle Eastern politics, the motivations for a continuation of Turkish-Israeli military links significantly mitigate against these concerns. The main responses are: First, that the chances of a Syrian-Israeli reconciliation are far from certain, and in fact there are good reasons mitigating against such a circumstance. Second, the rhetoric of the *Refah Partisi* was significantly more vitriolic than its actual policies that it carried out once in office. In fact, Israel-Turkish ties did not suffer any relapses when Erbakan was Prime Minister.

⁴⁰ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (February 1993): 98.

⁴¹ See Chapter Four for a more detailed examination of Israel and Turkey's relations with their Middle Eastern neighbours and the incentives inherent in these relationships for Turkish-Israeli ties. The purpose in this section is simply to highlight the

The Middle East remains a turbulent area where the use of force is still considered an option by state leaders and still welcomed by many Arab populations. There is a proliferation of missiles and missile technology and several states are in the process of attempting to acquire unconventional weapons of mass destruction.⁴² Mistrust remains the hallmark of Israel's relationship with most of its regional neighbours, and there are inter-Arab and –Muslim tensions and quarrels as well. Chapters Three and Four go into greater detail on these subjects, so it is enough here to remind the reader that despite any Arab-Israeli peace agreement, the use of force remains a viable option in the Middle East.

In addition, the growing attraction of Islamic ideals and values, and the ability of their adherents to translate their popular support into political power, remains. Not only does this phenomenon show no sign of abating, its appeal is also spreading throughout the region. Although Necmettin Erbakan has been ousted from power for now and his party dissolved, any Islamic party remains a potent tool for the dissatisfied among Turkish society to express their discontent and their desire for change.

This part will go into more detail regarding these two responses to the potential disruptions mentioned above to Turkish-Israeli military relations. Although there is evidence to argue both side, it seems that the situation in the Middle East remains such that Jerusalem and Ankara will remain compelled to tie themselves together in the new regional order that has emerged since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War.

current events which have added to Jerusalem and Ankara's calculations in contrast to those that detract from them, and refute the argument put forth in the above pages.

⁴² Rubin, "The New Middle East," 10.

Israeli-Syrian Discord: No Chance for Peace

Most analysts agree that, despite Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the seemingly more conducive political atmosphere to co-operation that has resulted from these and the start of peace talks in 1991, "the region contains serious interstate competition and potential internal instability which could produce wars or crises."⁴³ Given the historical context of Israel's relations with the Arab and Muslim states of the region, it will be a long time before any type of "warm" peace develops between the two parties. As Barry Rubin argues, "[e]ven having peace agreements with all its neighbors, Israel could still likely face a situation of 'cold peace' in which diplomatic, cultural, and economic links were limited,"⁴⁴ in much the same way that Israel's relationship with Egypt has unfolded. In the end, one need only realise that "[t]he Middle East has historically been and undoubtedly will remain one of the last redoubts of scepticism, if not to say cynicism, about the feasibility of any meaningful security co-operation,"⁴⁵ both between Israel and Muslim states, or between the Muslim states themselves.

It is Syria's motives for postponing reconciliation with Israel that need to be examined because although Israel would not allow the excuse of peace with Syria to affect the condition of its own security and foreign policies, it is nonetheless the state that desires peace more so than the other.⁴⁶ It has been usually Syria that has refused to

⁴³ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁵ John Steinbrunner, "The Strategic Implications of Emerging International Security Conditions," in U.S.-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1997), 25.

⁴⁶ It has, however, been suggested by some Israeli officials that a suspension of Israeli-Syrian talks would benefit Turkey, and as such has been supported by some in the Israeli elite. Source: Amikam Nachmani, "Bridge Across the Middle East: Turkey and Israel in the 1990s," forthcoming, 7.

upgrade bilateral talks between the two to higher political levels, suspended discussions, and declined to return to the negotiating table.⁴⁷ Basically, Assad “seems to be in no hurry to regain the Golan Heights in exchange for normal relations with Israel.”⁴⁸ Therefore, Syria must have the more reasons for delaying acceptance of and integration with Israel.

During the Rabin and Peres governments in Israel, from the time of Oslo’s signing in September 1993 until the election of the Likud government at the end of May 1996, Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours did appear to be strengthening, mainly on the basis of economic co-operation and diplomatic recognition. However, the Netanyahu government currently in power has been blamed by many for a slowing down, if not stoppage altogether, of the peace process, and consequently Jerusalem’s relations with its former enemies have also been somewhat reversed.⁴⁹ At the 1997 Middle East-North Africa Economic Development Conference in Doha, Qatar, only Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, and Yemen sent official representatives,⁵⁰ out of over twenty Arab countries invited. Egypt, once one of Israel’s closest supporters, if not the only one, in the Arab world boycotted the conference, citing Israel’s lack of progress on the peace process as the reason. If those Arab countries that have made official peace with Israel are

⁴⁷ For a brief overview of the recent history of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, see Efraim Inbar, “Israeli Negotiations with Syria.”

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁴⁹ Some have taken this argument to its extremes, believing that “[u]nless powerful challenges from within and without Israel can deflect Likud from its stated course, the world it likely to see the opening of another bloodstained era before the reach for peace can resume.” Source: James Noyes, “Does Washington Really Support Israel?” *Foreign Policy* no.106 (Spring 1997): 150. Undoubtedly, the Likud government has caused some damage to Israeli-Arab relations, but the grounds for Israel to make peace, as stated above, are evident even to the current Israeli government.

themselves reluctant to allow any meaningful integration of Israel into the region to take place, it is unreasonable to expect that Syria, a state that has since the beginning been one of the most vocal opponents of Israel (and proved it with military action on numerous occasions), would.

Although there may be good political and strategic reasons for Assad to accept peace offerings from Israel, there are as many, if not more, incentives for Damascus to avoid any real peace with Israel. These are related to both the nature of state relations within the Middle East, and the domestic situation of Assad and the Alawite regime.

The one aspect that links these two reasonings together is the fact that Syria has been for a long time a leader of the radical sector of the Arab world in the dispute with Israel, as a front-line state. As such, it has needed a powerful military which, although much of its equipment is currently out-of-date, it did manage to maintain under Soviet patronage. This military machine was needed as much for the fight against Israel as for protection from domination from Damascus's Arab enemies, such as Iraq. There is, as Eliyahu Kanovsky maintains, "very little prospect of a major reduction in military spending, given Syria's longstanding disputes with Turkey and Iraq and the regime's continued need to suppress internal dissent."⁵¹

In fact, Syria has come to rely so heavily on having a strong military, and used it so often, it would be extremely difficult to disengage this facet from all other aspects of its internal and external policies and activities. All states in the Middle East have retained

⁵⁰ Although businessmen from several of the countries that did not officially attend did show up.

⁵¹ Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Middle East Economies and Arab-Israeli Peace Agreements," Security and Policy Studies No.24 (Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, December 1995), 30.

high defence budgets, since all states have quarrels between them – the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is only the most recent example of overt aggression between two Muslim countries. As Barry Rubin points out,

Damascus's militant self-image is not easily shed, arising from its political culture, the regime's radical ideology, and the dominant Alawite minority's need to prove nationalist and Islamic credentials to a skeptical Sunni Muslim majority. ... Militancy was Syria's main card in inter-Arab struggles, used in the 1970s and 1980s to gain hegemony in Lebanon; to isolate its main rival, Egypt, after the Camp David accords; to intimidate Jordan from negotiating with Israel; to split the PLO; to blackmail wealthy oil-producing states; and to exclude its strongest neighbor, Israel, from a normal role in regional affairs. Syria has been a leading sponsor of terrorism against Turkey and opponents of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, has sought control of the PLO, has fought Israel, and has prevented a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵²

The arguments that Syria will do what it can to please Washington because it desires foreign aid is also not as convincing as it might seem at first glance. Syria has managed well enough for Assad since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and is in no real danger of being driven from the Arab League the way Egypt was after 1979 and thus losing Gulf state oil money. "Syria's strategic and economic weakness forces it to bend to a balance of power favoring America,"⁵³ but so long as Jerusalem continues to slow progress on Palestinian autonomy, thus angering and alienating both its moderate partners in peace (the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt) and the moderate states that either have peaceful relations with Israel or are not vitriolically opposed to it (the Gulf monarchies, Tunisia, Morocco, even Saudi Arabia), Syria is itself in no danger of being isolated. And thus the need for peace with Israel is not as powerful or convincing at might seem.

⁵² Rubin, "The New Middle East," 18-19.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 18.

In fact, peace with Israel would run counter to most of Assad's political calculations and goals. Such a development would block Syrian interests and ambitions in the Fertile Crescent (in Jordan and the nascent Palestinian enclaves), and more especially in Lebanon, where Israeli influence would compete with Syrian. Furthermore, the removal of Israeli troops from the Golan would detract from Damascus's rationale for the stationing of its own troops in Lebanon.⁵⁴ This would have a profound effect on the Syrian economy, since "the occupation [of Lebanon] appears to benefit the Syrian economy in various ways, and may, in fact, be a net gain rather than a loss."⁵⁵ Approximately one and a half million Syrians are employed in Lebanon, which reduces unemployment in Syria, and the remittances sent home from these workers is estimated at \$1-3 billion annually.⁵⁶ In addition, Lebanon is the source of many of the consumer and other goods sold in Syria, mainly through illicit means, and the Syrian army is reported to be involved in the flourishing and lucrative Lebanese drug trade (most of the trade is centred in the Bekaa Valley, which is under undisputed Syrian control).⁵⁷ Clearly, Lebanon represents an issue of national, perhaps even vital, interest to Damascus.

Given these arguments, it is easy to notice that Assad's signs of flexibility on the peace process have been far more rhetorical than practical. Syria has seemed more intent on keeping the U.S. happy than it is on achieving real peace with Israel. In fact, given the current Israeli government's seeming intransigence on further headway with the PA and Yasser Arafat, some believe that "[u]nder certain circumstances, a Syrian war of attrition

⁵⁴ Ibid., 19.

⁵⁵ Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International Politics," Security and Policy Studies No.31 (Israel: The BESA Center for Strategic Studies, February 1997), 22.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 23.

or a limited incursion on the Golan Heights would not necessarily be regarded as an affront to the United States.”⁵⁸ Whether this might actually be the case in practice is open to debate, but the point remains that given the current deadlock in progress on peace, Syria is under no real pressure to show more pliancy toward its own peace with Israel.

Without Syrian acquiescence, Israel can never become fully integrated into the Middle East. One need only “remember that peace with Israel is only one option in Asad’s strategic menu. As a matter of fact, in light of Asad’s ideological predispositions, it is the least palatable,”⁵⁹ and so he can be expected to slow implementation of progress on peace talks as long as he is able to. Ankara is well aware of this, and although there is cause for concern should Damascus and Jerusalem come to see eye to eye on key issues, for the present and near future this is highly unlikely. Therefore, the argument that Israel’s external situation’s improvement is a potential barrier to a strengthening of Turkish-Israeli ties is inappropriate at this time. This may change in the future, but it is difficult to argue, given the continuing Arab-Israel and inter-Arab and inter-Muslim rivalries, competitions, and tension that such a development would take place.

Refah in Turkey: Continuity, not Change

Having noted that the emergence of popular Islamic political parties in Turkey, with their opposition to links with Israel and the West, has reached such proportions that Turkey was given its first avowedly Islamic prime minister since the state’s founding in 1923, it is important now to look at the evidence that proves that this phenomenon, while

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Inbar and Sandler, “The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation,” 48.

⁵⁹ Inbar, “Israeli Negotiations with Syria,” 96.

it may have significant repercussions for Turkish society, has no bearing at all on Turkish-Israeli military ties.

The explanation for this has two prongs: First, and more importantly, the domestic popularity of the Welfare Party and now the Virtue Party rests far more on their appeals for social and economic reforms (and the actual beneficial policies it has carried out in this regard) than they do on their calls for Islamic values to be instituted as part of the state structure. Second, the regional situation in which Turkey finds itself is conducive to links with Israel; that is, Turkey is simply better off with close military collaboration with Israel than it is without. As noted in detail in Chapter Four, Ankara's relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran remain filled with tensions and antagonisms, and show no sign of changing. In fact, relations between these three states seem to be improving, and while it is far too early, given the hostility that has historically marked these three states' relationships, to say whether this will last to any significant degree, it is enough to further prompt Turkey to strengthen its own links with the other moderate, status quo power in the region, Israel.

The arguments given to explain the rise of *Refah* can also be used to support the contention that Welfare's success is entirely due to matters unrelated to Islamism, and thus have no bearing on Ankara's desire for close co-operation with Jerusalem. In fact, fully forty-one percent of those who voted for *Refah* in 1995 declared themselves secular,⁶⁰ and a poll conducted that same year revealed that two-thirds of Turkey supports

⁶⁰ Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity," Middle East Report 26 (Spring 1996): 10. This figure does not take into account those who would not describe themselves as secular, but nor would they ascribe their beliefs to strictly Muslim tenets. Zubaida continues, "[p]robably a majority of Turks do not perceive a contradiction

strong ties with Europe.⁶¹ Recently a reporter that travelled throughout Turkey speaking to various leaders of all spectrums declared that Turkey “is not ready to embrace Islamic fundamentalism to toss aside its Western convention.”⁶² A 1994 poll found that sixty-nine percent of Turks identified themselves as Turks, twenty-one percent as Muslim Turks, and only four percent as Muslims⁶³; in 1996, in Konya, one of Turkey’s most religiously conservative cities, an Islamic school offering intensive religious instruction, as well as English as a language, received fewer applicants than did the city’s other foreign language schools that do not offer religious instruction.⁶⁴

The changes that Atatürk wrought in Turkish society in the first decades of this century have remained with both the elites of and the majority in Turkey (excepting the rural masses, who have generally remained traditional and wedded to Islamic values--but even these bastions of Islamic identity have been altering their strict adherence to the religion as they have emigrated in droves to the urban centres). Turks generally perceive their future as lying in the same direction as Europe, and wish to receive the same benefits of modernisation and industrialisation that the European Union has bestowed on its own secular peoples, and tend to view secularism as the best route to achieve this.⁶⁵ President Süleyman Demirel declared in 1997, during Erbakan’s tenure, that “[o]ne of the

between Islam and their attachment to Kemalist symbols, viewing both as integral to national identity.” Ibid.

⁶¹ White, “Pragmatists or Ideologues?” 30.

⁶² Philip Taubman, “A Warning for Turkey’s General,” The New York Times, reprinted in The International Herald Tribune 11 November, 1997: 8.

⁶³ Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” 34.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 35.

⁶⁵ Göle, “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey,” 49.

main thrusts of Turkish foreign policy is to realize Turkey's perennial drive to integrate fully with Europe."⁶⁶

The social and economic problems that have underscored Turkish society in recent years is the reason the *Refah Partisi* achieved such a high standing, as explained in the above pages of this chapter. Jenny White gives a host of percentages showing that while Welfare did in fact receive twenty-one percent of the total vote, the tally of votes that went to different political parties reveal that non-Islamic parties received fourth-fifths of the total popular vote in Turkey; given the high voter turnout of eight-five percent, it is easy to understand that Welfare was not given as popular a mandate as many Islamophobes had at first feared.⁶⁷ She adds that Turkish dissatisfaction with the previous governments had led many Turks to reconsider their options,⁶⁸ and voting for a political party whose mayors had already done much to enhance the living conditions of their urban areas seemed the logical choice. Mehmet Geyikdag, a Turkish scholar, offered this analysis:

As far as the majority of people are concerned, they are inclined for the party that manipulates religion as long as they feel that the competing parties are the same in other respects. However, if a relatively secularist party looks more promising in the economic sphere, the majority of the voters are likely to vote for it rather than the less secularist party which manipulated religion but whose economic policy does not look promising to the voters.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Süleyman Demirel, President of the Republic of Turkey, "Commentary," The Middle East Journal 51 (Winter 1997): 11.

⁶⁷ Thirty-nine percent of the vote went to centre-right parties; twenty-five went to centre-left parties; just over eight percent to an ultranationalist union; and about four percent went to the Kurdish-affiliated People's Democratic Party. Source: White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues?" 26.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Heper, "Islam and Democracy," 35-36.

Having noted that the support Erbakan has received over the last two years is not as unconditionally Islamic as first seemed, one can now look into Erbakan's policies that he chose as Prime Minister. The evidence shows that he followed a line not of change, but of continuity, and that the relations that he attempted to cultivate with Islamic countries were an extension of the overall policy Ankara had been following for a number of years.⁷⁰ On Erbakan's first day in office, he declared that he would honour all international agreements that do not threaten national security; furthermore, after being briefed by the military on the necessity of the MTCA, he opted not to cancel it, as he and his deputies had demanded must be done, but agreed to allow it to remain in force.⁷¹

In fact, since Erbakan came to office in June of 1996, several agreements and deals were signed between Israel and Turkey, indicating that while the Islamic prime minister still had his more religious followers to answer to, he could not stand in the way of the staunchly secular military, which pressured (some say bullied) him continually to not change the course of Turkey's policies toward Israel. In July, 1996, Welfare's contingent in the parliament agreed to extend the U.S. use of the Incirlik air base, which it had been using to enforce the no-fly zone over northern Iraq and which Welfare had been consistently demanding be shut down. In August 1996, Erbakan signed the second major defence agreement with Israel, which paved for the way for a later deal on the upgrading of Turkey's F-4 Phantoms by exchanging technical and scientific expertise. In December he signed the actual agreement that provided for the implementation of these military modernisation plans, worth \$650 million (see Chapter One).

⁷⁰ Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan," Survival: The IISS Quarterly 39 (Summer 1997): 83.

⁷¹ Aluf Ben, "Strategic Alliance at a Low Point," Ha'aretz, 8 August, 1996: B1.

Most of these about-faces that Erbakan and Welfare conducted once in power can be explained by the ever-vigilant posture that the Turkish military maintains on the secular nature of the state. Since the founding of the republic the military has been a loyal supporter of Atatürk, who achieved fame as a brilliant commander during the Gallipoli campaign in World War One, and a strict adherent to his legacy, which emphasises secularism at the expense of religion. The military has always been the protector of this heritage, and three times, in 1961, 1971, and 1980, performed coups to overthrow the Turkish government when it deemed the state in danger of collapse (although it always returned power to civilian control, seeing its role more to influence democracy rather than undermine it).

These self-proclaimed guardians of the state lead the fight against any relaxation of strict constitutional guidelines that prohibit the use of Islam in politics or in the formation of Turkey's social and economic policies. The latest Turkish constitution, enacted in 1982, has "entrenched the military's veto power in the political system to such an extent that it made crude military intervention into politics redundant."⁷² Guardianship of the national interest was at stake, and the armed forces felt they were the only ones suited to the task. The National Security Council institutionalised the military's role in political life: nominally under the chairmanship of the president, the council includes the prime minister, ministers of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the chief of the general staff, and the heads of the air force, navy, and army and Gendarmie. And the

⁷² Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," Comparative Politics 29 (January 1997): 153-154.

defence budget has never been debated in parliament, or in the press, nor has it ever been criticised.⁷³

Erbakan's decisions to endorse agreements he had previously called for being annulled, was without doubt a result of the pressure the military leaders put on him.⁷⁴ They value the relationship with Israel for all the benefits it accrues to them (see Chapter One) and have no intention, given the regional and international circumstances facing Turkey, to neglect a valuable asset to what they perceive to be to their national security benefit. The military grew increasingly apprehensive about the rhetoric and actions Welfare had taken during its tenure in power: the chief of military intelligence declared in June 1997, that "[t]he republic is facing an extremely serious threat. Political Islam is working closely with Iran and some other Islamic countries to pull Turkey into an endless darkness."⁷⁵

While the involvement of outside actors in *Refah*'s activities is open to debate, the military took no chances: five days later the Turkish generals forced Erbakan to submit his resignation amid growing fears that Islamic groups were undermining the secular traditions of Turkey, and threatened to use force to combat what it perceived to be the dangers emanating from the Islamic onslaught.⁷⁶ Erbakan had no choice in the face of the

⁷³ Ibid., 160.

⁷⁴ COMPASS: Middle East Wire News Service, "Turkey's Islamist-led Government Bows to Generals," [database on-line]; received from <http://www.compass-news.com/cgi-bin/sharchst.cgi?File=08090849.16&Country=Israel>; accessed 3 October, 1996.

⁷⁵ Stephen Kinzer, "Turkish Army Rattling Sabres Right Under Prime Minister's Nose," New York Times News Service, reprinted in The Globe and Mail, 13 June, 1997: A9.

⁷⁶ Associated Press and Reuters, "Turkish PM Agrees to Hand Over Power," The Globe and Mail, 14 June, 1997: A10.

military's powerful influence and grip on many aspects of the government's decision-making processes.

The advent of the Welfare Party and its anti-Israel rhetoric led many to fear that Turkish-Israeli ties would soon be dissolved.⁷⁷ However, the social and economic ailments currently besetting Turkish society fuelled the Turkish population to vote for a party that had already undertaken several measures to raise the living standards of many people and provide for their economic needs. Although Welfare does have many religiously inclined followers and adherents, the vast bulk of its voting support came from those who wished to see an end to what they perceived as the do-nothing attitude of the previous governments. This did not include a mandate for severing ties with either Israel or the West.

Thus, Erbakan was forced to tone down his rhetoric once in office. This was in no small way helped along by the Turkish generals continuously standing over his shoulder, pressuring him into furthering military co-operation with Israel and eventually demanding his resignation. Coupled with the external threats Turkey faces within the region, it seems plausible to conclude that although the chances for an Islamic political revival remain, this would not affect in any long-term significant way Turkish-Israeli relations.

The buffeting winds of Middle Eastern politics have not ceased with the peace process between Israel and the Arab regimes, or with Turkey's policy of maintaining at least cordial relations with its antagonists. Furthermore, domestic instability has always been a concern for states in this region, and although the Turkish state is in no danger of

⁷⁷ Granot, "Netanyahu Sent a Greeting," B6.

immediate collapse, the growth of Islamic political parties and their ability to translate their relative popularity into political power does presage a conflict between secular elites and Islamic groups.

The ability of Syria and Israel to make peace is much greater now than it has ever been in the past. Israel has peace agreements with two other states, Jordan and Egypt (which was once, along with Syria, the front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict), and has reached understandings with the Palestinians on the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Syria has lost its superpower patron, and its economy is in need of support. Since the forced expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, America has emerged as the strongest and in fact the only outside power capable of influencing all parties involved. Syria is not exempt from this new development, and making peace with Israel is perhaps the surest way of earning U.S. gratitude and aid. Israel, for its part, is eager to normalise relations with all Arab states and end the state of war that has existed since 1948 and has taken a heavy economic, social, and psychological toll on its country and its citizens. But there are significant reasons that have thus far mitigated against any potential Syrian-Israel settlement, and Ankara cannot help but be relieved. This is not to say that Damascus will not eventually come to believe that agreement with Israel is better for it, but that currently and for the near future, Turkish-Israeli ties are in no danger of being disrupted by any cold or warm peace between Syria and Israel.

Turkey's external situation remains much the same as Israel's. Yet its internal situation differs significantly. There is within Turkey a sizeable portion of the population that is turning more and more toward Islam as a panacea for all its social, economic, political, moral, and psychological ailments. The *Refah Partisi* was the political

manifestation of these longings. Necmettin Erbakan, its leader, has led the campaign which many devout Muslims believe will rectify the situation and increase their living conditions, by charging that relations with Israel are not to be encouraged, and in fact should be discouraged. This implies, of course, a reduction of the ties with the United States and Europe as well. Were Erbakan to achieve a more complete political victory, perhaps the MTCA would become null and void, and Israel would be left without its only strategic friend in the region. However, this development is extremely unlikely, mainly because although the Turkish population had been turning more toward Welfare to solve its problems, it was due far more to Welfare's ability to alleviate the social and economic problems currently besetting many Turks, and not because it had espoused Muslim values and ideals as the proper way of life. Polls and percentages show that support for *Refah* was achieved mainly through its good-works policies, and not because it wanted to turn Turkey into an Islamic state.

Furthermore, so long as the Turkish generals maintain the watchful and tight grip on power they currently possess, they will not allow any deviation from the course that Kemal Atatürk set them on over seventy years ago, toward modernisation and the West. Israel is the key to this development, and the military is not likely to give up such a strategically important asset.

The previous chapters have shown that Turkey and Israel have sound reasons, based on theoretical, international, and regional changes that have occurred within the last decade, to align themselves more closely than they have in the past. Both have much to gain from co-operation, in all areas but more especially in the military field. And although certain challenges do crop up to threaten this relationship, this section has

shown that these impediments are fewer in number than might be otherwise expected, and that they are, in the end, no more than minor irritants that can be overlooked so long as Middle Eastern politics remain what they have been for over fifty years: volatile and prone to the use of violence and aggression to achieve political goals. This does not seem likely to change in the near future, and therefore the increasingly strong links between Israel and Turkey do not seem likely to change either; they will keep on their current promising course, and thus provide security and stability for both states, which they would otherwise not have attained.

Relevance for International Relations Theory

Structural Realism is devoted to explaining how change in the international system is brought about through change at the structural level. This means that only a shift in the distribution of capabilities of the system's units (in this case, states) can alter the structure. At the end of World War Two, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were the predominant powers, heavily outweighing their nearest friends, allies, or competitors. Since the end of the Cold War, America has emerged as the greatest power in the international system.

The rise and fall of states is a direct product of a change in their capabilities. The Soviet Union lost its ability to compete effectively with the United States, and so it was dissolved. Although Russia remains the largest country in the world, with a significant natural resource base and population, its economy is in great need of repair. As such, it can no longer affect other states' behaviour as it once could. The mid-1990s war in Chechnya showed that Russia had trouble influencing events even within its own borders.

As Chapter Two argues, the changes wrought by the end of bipolarity have significantly affected Washington's regional policies, as well as those of Israel and Turkey. Structural imperatives shape and shove the behaviour of states. As Waltz indicated, one cannot examine the domestic politics of states too closely when determining change, because then one is trapped by a multitude of factors that do not give a clear indication of why another state, with a different set of domestic ingredients, has acted in the same manner. In other words, according to Structural Realism, one should not examine the domestic economic pressures that prompted the dissolution of the Soviet Union; rather, one should realise that the shift in the distribution of capabilities forced a former superpower into a position of lesser power relative to that of the other superpower.

The theory of balance of power attests that a state will either seek alliances to bolster its security situation, or will embark on an internal program intended to increase its ability to defend itself in the anarchic system. According to the theory, a state in any type of international system will seek to accomplish these ends; Turkey and Israel have followed these tenets with increasing vigour since the end of the Cold War. As Chapter Three relates, the two countries have much in common, and in following a balance of power, have deemed it most effective to align themselves on the same axis. The end of bipolarity has meant a change in the nature of both countries' relationship with the United States. Therefore, both need to realise different foreign policies to protect their interests.

In the case of Israel, it does not need to turn to domestic programs to increase its ability to defend itself--this has already been proven in five Arab-Israeli wars and the fact that even Syria, previously Israel's most implacable foe, has acknowledged it does not

have the ability to defeat Israel militarily. A military relationship with Turkey is thus Israel's method of using external means to obtain a more favourable security environment. As Chapter One has indicated, for example, the ability to utilise Turkish airspace in any potential confrontation with Syria, Iraq, or Iran increases Israel's fighting abilities immeasurably.

For Turkey, the Military Training Cooperation Agreement serves both external and internal ends. First, through external means, it allows Turkey to acquire a friend in the region, something Turkey is severely lacking in international politics. And second, through an internal program, it affords Turkey a remarkable opportunity to modernise its armed forces to a degree not possible were Ankara to rely solely on the United States and the European Union. Without the protective umbrella of the United States to shield both countries from unfavourable actions on the part of their adversaries, Jerusalem and Ankara have changed their policies to suit their new security environments which has led them to begin aligning themselves closer together.

The change from a bipolar international system to a unipolar system has not led to any significant change in the behaviour of Middle Eastern states, in that conflict remains as part of the currents of Middle Eastern politics. Syria, Iraq, and Iran are intent on acquiring either non-conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, or both, since they believe such arsenals will better serve their regional interests. Turkey and Israel, despite the advent of the peace process, remain at odds with many of their neighbours regarding issues deemed of national and vital interest to them.

However, the change that has occurred as a result of the change in the international structure is that Jerusalem and Ankara are drawing closer in an attempt to

“circle the wagons” as it were, to protect both themselves and their interests. While the two certainly had reason to co-operate during the Cold War, it was not until its end that their relationship expanded to its current state of affairs. Such is the significance of Structural Realism, because while the system-wide element of conflict has remained, the states embedded in this conflict have had to turn to other means of surviving within the anarchic system.

Relevance for International Politics

The Turkish-Israeli relationship is important for the study of the discipline of International Relations. This is so because it has had a profound effect on the course of Middle Eastern politics, forcing many states to change their strategic outlooks. The relationship has affected the power of both states, relative to other regional states.

Although this thesis has argued that it is the regional situation both Israel and Turkey are involved in that prompted them to seek a closer relationship, many have argued that since the Military Training Cooperation Agreement was signed in February 1996, it has paradoxically worsened their security situation. This refers to the reaction to the military accords by Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

As stated in Chapter Four, Syria in particular has been uneasy about this relationship, since it appears to be the country most affected by a Jerusalem-Ankara axis. Consequently, it has embarked on its own program to enhance its security. In 1980 Syria and Iraq broke off diplomatic relations as a result of Damascus’ support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. However, in 1997 there were indications that the two were beginning to re-establish a positive, working relationship: In November of that year, Iraqi Deputy

Prime Minister Tariq Aziz met with Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, and “[a]nalysts say that the need by both countries to improve ties stems from regional factors such as a recent military pact between Israel and Turkey and Ankara’s incursion into northern Iraq.”⁷⁸ As if to prove the existence of such a need, intelligence sources have noticed an increase in traffic at supposedly closed border areas.⁷⁹ And Turkish President Süleyman Demirel declared in May 1998 that Syria was agitating other Arab and Muslim capitals against Turkish-Israeli ties, although he added that such actions would not affect the relationship.⁸⁰

The Turkish-Israeli military relationship allows both countries a way out of their relative regional isolation. Both are viewed, as previously mentioned, as outsiders and both are surrounded by states at best described as unfriendly. The injection of this new development into the broader stream of Middle Eastern politics has meant that Syria, Iraq, and Iran must reconsider their political and military strategies. A stronger Turkey able to contain more effectively the PKK insurgency would pose a tougher challenge for Syria and Iraq to overcome in their water disputes. Similarly, Turkey’s borders with these three states provides Israel with another facet to its military deterrence posture. This certainly has caught the attention of Damascus, Baghdad, and Teheran.

Also, a strong link between Turkey and Israel provides Jordan, a moderate Arab state with a history of living under stronger Arab states’ dictates, a chance to escape from the baleful glares emanating from Arab capitals displeased with its inclination to help

⁷⁸ Guy Bechor, “Iraq and Syria to Boost Ties,” Ha’aretz English Edition, 23 November 1997: 2.

⁷⁹ Douglas Stranglin, “Friends Again?” U.S. News and World Report 121 (October 1996): 19. Received from Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal Seminar on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 30 October 1997.

integrate Israel into the region. The decision by King Hussein to send a high-ranking observer to the January 1998 Reliant Mermaid exercises is a case in point: although Egypt declined to do the same, Amman was harshly criticised by its Arab neighbours. However, the King's decision earned him the goodwill of Ankara, Jerusalem, and Washington. Eager for financial and military aid from the West, Amman can gain much from its approving posture regarding the Israeli-Turkish relationship; indeed, both Ankara and Jerusalem have expressed their appreciation for his moderate stance on this development.

The growth of the Turkish-Israel relationship can have broader, extra-regional effects as well. Although Washington was not the instigator of the Military Training Cooperation Agreement, it is nonetheless pleased that this relationship has showed signs of expanding. At a U.S. State Department briefing in June, 1997, spokesman Nicholas Burns stated that the "United States fully supports the efforts of Turkey and Israel to become friends."⁸¹ In addition to the American policy of "dual containment," in which Iran and Iraq are put under heavy pressure until they redeem their "rogue state" status, Washington is still concerned about unhindered access to Persian Gulf oil. The fact that Iraq continues to defy U.N. inspectors and Iran is embarked on a program of rearmament (although it is considered small next to the programs of countries such as Israel or Saudi Arabia) and has not given up hopes for regional leadership, means that the Persian Gulf remains an area worthy of scrutiny. The American Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain

⁸⁰ Turkish Press Review, 7 May 1998.

⁸¹ Nicholas Burns, State Department Briefing, "King Hussein, Lebanon, Arab summit, Palestine, Bangladesh, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, North Korea, China, OAS"; available from http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/june/sd1_6-11.htm; accessed 6 April 1997.

for this reason. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is also of concern for American policy-makers. A strong Turkish-Israeli relationship could serve as a vehicle through which American concerns might be safeguarded. At the very least, a Jerusalem-Ankara axis, friendly to Washington, would not endanger American interests anymore than they might already be.

As stated in Chapter Four, the Turkish-Israeli military collaboration is also designed to offset the perceived lack of support from the European Union. The resentment and even bitterness experienced by Western-oriented Turkish elites at the results of the 1997 Luxembourg summit has prompted Turkey to begin considering ties in other regions. It is open to debate what type of role Turkey could play were it to become a member of the E.U., but as many scholars have argued, there can be no doubt that in the newly emerging global conditions, Turkey's position offers it the opportunity to play an active role in several different areas.

Turkish-Israeli military relations are based on serious security considerations and are supported by other legs such as political and economic factors. These relations represent a shift in the current of Middle Eastern politics, and have the potential to affect extra-regional states' policies as well. At the time of writing, the relationship has shown no signs of diminishing; on the contrary, ties seem to be expanding, as Turkey considers Israeli aid in modernising its armed forces in numerous different aspects a viable option. However, what possible direction this relationship might take remains to be discussed.

As Waltz argued, one of the structural determinants of the international system is the distribution of capabilities among states, and this distribution of capabilities contains the assertion that the power of a state is relative to the power of other states. The Turkish-

Israeli military link is significant for international relations because such a working arrangement fundamentally affects both regional powers. The MTCA began a process that improves the relative capabilities of Israel and Turkey, and thus their ability to deal with both enemies and non-enemies alike. As such, Turkish-Israeli military relations play a significant role on the international political stage.

The Future

As a preliminary conclusion, it can be said that the future of Turkish-Israeli relations looks bright, but it remains to be seen how long it will last, both in terms of intensity and length. The free trade agreement signed between the two is a good indication of long-term thinking on the part of policy-makers in Jerusalem and Ankara. But like every relationship, there are difficulties. Although this chapter relates the most prominent of these, and attempts to refute the seriousness of their ability to curtail military collaboration, it must be remembered that Middle Eastern politics is in reality a complex set of intertwining issues. Sometimes religious and ethnic elements play the determining role in its course, and other times political and security considerations are predominant.

It is difficult to predict with any certainty what the future holds for this relationship. It seems as though the prospects for long-term co-operation are positive. The advent of some success in the Arab-Israeli peace process afforded Ankara the opportunity to become more open about its desire to link itself with Israel, especially as the Palestinians were themselves signing agreements with Israel. It can be argued that were the peace process to begin to unravel (and the current Israeli right-wing, hard-line

factions that keep Benjamin Netanyahu in power would not be unhappy with such an outcome) Turkey might become more wary of its ties with Israel.

The fate of the Palestinians has always been important to Turkey, and although Ankara has a great deal to gain from military collaboration with Israel, this issue also has the potential to restrict ties. As President Demirel said in December 1997, Turkey's position on the Palestinians' future has not changed, and Ankara is holding Netanyahu responsible for an absence in peace process results.⁸²

The security environment Turkey and Israel face has not changed for the better with the end of the Cold War, and both have much to gain from an established relationship. As of yet, this has not been translated into concrete defence pacts between the two countries; all relations have been based on co-operation agreements, and neither Jerusalem nor Ankara have referred to any strategic alliance.

The Arab and Muslim regimes in the Middle East show no sign of fading, or changing. Although Presidents Assad and Saddam Hussein are ageing, and in May 1997 Iranians overwhelmingly elected a moderate cleric as president who has since alluded to the need for dialogue between Iranians and Americans, all three states have acquired political and military and religious elites that are loyal to the current rulers' policies. The possibility that after Assad or Saddam's death a more passive leader might take power, one committed to peace and integration with Israel, remains low and difficult to imagine.

For Turkey and Israel, this means that their external situations will in all likelihood not change in the near future, and so military collaboration between the two

⁸² TASS, "Demirel Says Turkey is Not Going to Change Mideast Policy," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal Seminar on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 4 December 1997.

will continue to benefit them both. As related throughout this thesis, there are very good reasons and motives for the relationship. Conflict has remained endemic in the Middle East since the age of recorded history began, when empires marched and clashed over its length, width, and breadth, and there have not been serious indications that this is about to end. Indeed, Structural Realism says that conflict will remain within the international system, so long as it remains anarchic.

However, the Military Training Cooperation Agreement was signed only in 1996, and it is still too early to relate with any real certainty what form this relationship might take in the foreseeable future. There remain several disputes between all states within the Middle East. For example, those analysts who study water politics are convinced that this rare natural resource will become a point of contention, perhaps even violence, in the near future. Given that Turkey controls the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and given that Israel will soon be in desperate need of water for itself, one can assume that water politics will become ever more important in the coming years. This assertion carries with it the prospect of more conflict and even war. The Turkish-Israeli military relationship may become even more consequential as a result of these future possibilities.

Turkey and Israel are compelled by strong theoretical and practical reasons to draw close together. However, as Kenneth Waltz himself admitted, things change, and even theories prevalent at any one time can be discarded in favour of newer ones better able to explain the course of international politics. What cannot be denied about this recent development, though, is the effect it has had on regional politics. Whether or not

the Turkish-Israeli relationship will remain strong, or fade away, it can be argued with certainty that it will affect the course of Middle Eastern politics for some time to come.

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




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1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
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