

OPERATIONAL CODE: AN EVALUATION OF THEORY
AND A CASE STUDY OF DAVID BEN GURION

BY

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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INTRODUCTION

The analysis of individuals, particularly those who occupy upper-level political offices, has become increasingly important in the field of International Relations partly because of the increasing personal involvement of the upper-level policy-makers in the decision-making process.¹ While the individual level of analysis has been recognized for some time (Simon, 1947; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1954, 1962; March and Simon, 1958), the theoretical literature has traditionally given greater attention to the properties of states or collectivities and to the attributes of global or regional systems. This emphasis has not been misplaced in so far as some characteristics of international politics can be more adequately explained at the level of states or systems without the introduction of any variables concerning the individual policy-maker and his perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behavior. As Verba has observed:

. . . the introduction of variables dealing with individual behavior would complicate the model without commensurate payoff in terms of increased understanding and prediction. This would be true if the impact of individual decision-making on the behavior of nations in their relations with other nations were slight, or if the impact varied randomly (because, for instance, of idiosyncratic factors) among the population of international events that one was trying to explain. (Verba, 1961, p. 93)

¹Personal involvement in decision-making has been exemplified by Summit Conferences, "Shuttle Diplomacy", etc.

However, as recent studies have revealed (Kaplan, 1968; Ball, 1974; Yanarella, 1975) there are severe limitations to such traditional models. Verba points out that those models which either ignore or make grossly simplified assumptions about the individual decision-maker may yield imperfect explanations and a large residual variance which could be attributed to the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behavior of foreign policy decision-makers. For example, Wilkenfeld attempted to explain foreign conflict behavior on the basis of the following predictor variables: the amount of conflict directed to a state by other states; the domestic scene; and prior conflict behavior (Wilkenfeld, in McGowan, 1973). The percentage of unexplained variance ranged from 28% to 77%. Rummel (1963), Tanter (1966), and Haas (1968) attempted to explain foreign policy behavior on the basis of the attributes of states, for example, the relationships between domestic-conflict variables and foreign-conflict variables. In each of the studies only internal relationships between the variable sets were found. That is, relationships were found between the domestic-conflict variables or between foreign-conflict variables, but not between domestic-conflict and foreign-conflict variables. In Rummel's study the variables could account for only 45.8% of the variance.² The question thus becomes whether or not the residual variance can be attributed to random or systematic components. If it is the former, then the theories are good but the measures are poor. If it is the latter, then the traditional models do not account for all of the variance and the theories (reasons) are misspecified. Wilkenfeld speculated that the unexplained variance may be accounted for by the personality attributes of the leaders. Other studies also suggest that idiosyncratic and personality variables may account for the unexplained

²See Greenstein and Polsby (1975, Vol. 8) for a complete analysis of the different studies. See also Jones and Singer (1972).

variance. Recent empirical studies by Holsti (1967, 1972), de Rivera (1968), Janis (1972), Jervis (1976) and Steinbruner (1976), indicate that there are definite circumstances under which analysis of beliefs will provide a powerful explanatory tool for explaining behavior. In fact, Shapiro and Bonham hypothesize that beliefs of decision-makers may indeed "account for more of the variance than any other factor." (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973, p. 161).

The above argument, if valid, points to two conclusions. First, there is a need to better understand the cognitive processes and beliefs of decision-makers so that foreign policy behavior can be more adequately explained or predicted. Second, any approach which seeks to explain behavior of decision-makers on the basis of their beliefs and cognitive processes, must satisfy the requirements of systematic research as well as specific standards of theory building, and it should be relevant to the political phenomena under investigation. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate one such approach, Operational Code, in line with these requirements and to test its relevance in deriving those beliefs which affect political behavior by means of a case study.

The Operational Code was formulated by Nathan Leites in his study of the Soviet Politburo and the Bolsheviks (1951, 1953). The Code referred to the set of beliefs the Bolsheviks had about the nature of the universe and politics. Alexander George (1969) synthesized the many facets of Leites' work into a comprehensive framework by identifying five philosophical or epistemological beliefs and five instrumental beliefs which are at the core of an individual's perspective of the nature of politics, history and the social environment. These beliefs permit an individual to organize and simplify what may be "a confusing array of signals picked up from the environment by his senses." (Holsti, 1977, p. 3). The beliefs which comprise the Code are not

a fortuitous, unconnected set of beliefs rather they are concerned with the central and fundamental beliefs of political life. (Holsti, 1977, George, 1978b). The argument is that the central beliefs will display those qualities and consequences that influence decision-making more than those secondary beliefs which occupy a peripheral role in a cognitive belief structure.³ George asserts that the construct should be parsimonious enough to yield an economical guide to research, that it should yield a large number of assumptions which are likely to be salient in any decision-making situation and that it avoids the pitfalls of over-determination. In addition, if the beliefs have to be stable over time, then one should be able to predict the presence of the salient beliefs in a decision-maker's belief system and one should be able to set out propositions and predictions concerning the impact of those beliefs on policy outcomes.

Operational Code makes a distinction between the Philosophical Beliefs and the Instrumental Beliefs. The Philosophical Beliefs are assumed to be "ends" desired by the decision-maker and the Instrumental Beliefs are the "means" for obtaining those "ends". The Philosophical Beliefs deal with the beliefs one has about the political universe and the Instrumental Beliefs deal with the strategies and tactics one employs to achieve one's goals and aspirations. Should there be a change in the more central "ends" there should be a compensating change in the less central elements of the configuration. For example, David Ben Gurion believed that a Jewish Israel was the most immediate goal prior to 1948. Once the State was established, it was then merely a means to the fulfillment of his ultimate goal--the end of Zionism.

The structure of the ten beliefs included in the Operational Code can be set out as follows:

³ Holsti (1965) examined John Foster Dulles' beliefs using the George construct and found that the ten questions did address themselves to the more fundamental rather than to the more peripheral beliefs.

Philosophical Beliefs

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's opponents?
2. What are the prospects for eventual realization of one's political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or pessimistic on this score? And in what respect the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predicatable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving and shaping" history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs in historical development?

Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals and objections for political action ?
2. **How are goals** of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?
3. What is the utility and role of different means of advancing one's interest?

Proponents of Operational Code stipulate that there are two theoretical premises regarding the role that Operational Code beliefs may be expected to play in the decision-making process. First, "beliefs of this kind influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information processing tasks that precede and accompany the decision-maker's choice of action. Second, such beliefs do not unilaterally determine his choice of action; other variables are also at work in determining what he will do." (George, 1978b, p. 11-12).

Information processing tasks include defining the situation, searching for relevant material, evaluating the material, and selecting one or more of the possible alternatives for formulating the policy outcome. It is assumed that a decision-maker's Operational Code beliefs will influence all or some of these tasks during the decision-making process. For example,

We assume (and available empirical evidence of an impressionistic kind supports the assumption) that an actor's image of the opponent. . . is particularly important in shaping the actor's definition of the situation, particularly as regards his assessment of the threat posed by the adversary's behavior in that situation. A general image of one's opponent as fundamentally hostile encourages the actor to define situations of interaction with that opponent as posing dangers to the actor's side. (George, 1978b, pp. 12-13).

Heradstveit's (1978) study of Arab and Israeli Elites found that if the image of the opponent is hostile then ambiguous information (which may lead to a variety of interpretations) is more likely perceived as evidence reinforcing the image of hostility. Discrepant information is ignored or disregarded enabling elite members to maintain consistency within their belief systems. Thus, information search and retention is bounded by a decision-maker's belief system. For example, the general predispositions or beliefs a decision-maker has about the enemy will tend to limit his search for evidence to that which is consistent with his established belief patterns. This, in turn, will affect the choice propensities which lead a decision-maker to choose one course of action over another. For example, it may be that a decision-maker who is very optimistic about obtaining his goals (Philosophical Belief 2) will tend to choose optimal goals (Instrumental Belief 1) and to pursue those goals by limiting the means rather than the ultimate ends (Instrumental Belief 2). While it is unlikely that a decision-maker would choose a course of action that does not reinforce his beliefs, the beliefs themselves must be analyzed in terms of the situation or circumstances confronting the decision-maker. In short, his perceptions of that situation are important attributes of an Operational Code approach.

The second premise of Operational Code is that the beliefs themselves are not the only determinants of an actor's policy actions. A decision-maker may be influenced by structural, situational and systemic variables, by national interest, domestic constraints, bureaucratic and personal pressures.

If the system is relatively open, allowing the decision-maker to evaluate and act on information "independently on its own merits and in accordance with the inner structural requirements of the situation" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 58), it may be difficult to discern the weight of the Operational Code beliefs in relation to other variables which are present in a given situation. If the system is relatively closed, limiting search to that information which is consistent with the established belief patterns, then the beliefs contained in the system will tend to be the dominant or the most powerful factor in evaluating the situation and processing information. To the extent that the decision-making system operates under conditions of uncertainty, complexity, stress or crisis, decision-makers may be limited in making decisions on the merits of the individual situation. Under such conditions the influence of beliefs may become greater. In order to discern the impact of beliefs on decision-making it may be more fruitful to concentrate on those processes which precede a decision than on the actual policy outcome.

While most research utilizing Operational Code has been consistent with the George construct,⁴ some researchers have modified the construct to "fit" their studies of political and historical leaders. For example, Anderson's analysis of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, (1971) contained the argument that the George construct failed to provide a complete spectrum of a decision-maker's political beliefs. Anderson therefore added a third

⁴See for example, Holsti, 1967; (John Foster Dulles); McLelland, 1971; (Dean Acheson); Stupak, 1971; (Dean Rusk); Johnson, 1973; (Senator Frank Church) Tweaser, 1973; (Senator William Fulbright); Nossal, 1976; (Chaing Kai Shek); Kavanagh, 1977; (Ramsay MacDonald); Walker, 1977; (Henry Kissinger).

set of questions which relate to a decision-maker's views of the contemporary international political universe.⁵ Heradstveit (1978), on the other hand, concentrated on one image--that of the opponent--in his assessment of Arab and Israeli elites. Two other researchers, White (1969) and Ashby (1970) each compared the Operational Codes of two political leaders drawn from the same political environment.⁶

The existing research on Operational Code does lend credence to the assertion that the ten beliefs are interrelated. For example, support has been found for the premise that Philosophical Belief 1--the view of the political universe and the image of the opponent--is a dominant or "master" belief, in that any change in the status of this belief appears to require some psychologically-compensating change in the status of the other beliefs within the Operational Code structure. The overall result of the studies which build on the George construct is that they are only weakly cumulative in that they tend to be "uneven in quality and none is a wholly adequate model." (Holsti, 1977, p. 41). As Holsti observed, there has been a lack of uniformity in the meanings attached to the belief-types comprising the Operational Code and in the evidence used for an empirical evaluation of these beliefs. In order to identify the most salient dimensions of each belief and to systemize the rules for data collection, Holsti revised the Operational Code construct to allow for a more quantitative and rigorous analysis. My evaluation of the Operational Code framework, in this thesis, will employ

⁵Gutiérrez (1973) followed the Anderson revised construct in his analysis of Dean Rusk.

⁶White examined the Operational Codes of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. Ashby examined the Operational Codes of Willy Brandt and Kurt Schumacher.

Holsti's revised scheme. It will address itself to several key questions, including the following:

1. What are the theoretical foundations of the Operational Code?
2. What criteria does Holsti employ to examine the belief system of decision-makers? Do they go beyond a systemization of existing research?
3. What kinds of evaluation of theory can be drawn from a case study application of Holsti's framework?
4. Overall, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Operational Code?

Given the nature of International Relations theory and the relative lack of systematic research at the level of individuals, the Operational Code offers a very attractive approach, at least at first glance. However, the quality of theory subsumed by the approach must be evaluated. Therefore, Chapter One will be devoted to two basic tasks, namely: (1) a description and an evaluation of explicit criteria for theory construction and comparison; (2) an evaluation of the Operational Code in terms of those concepts and relationships which figure prominently in comparable theories of decision-making. Regarding the first task, the criteria which will be put forward as standards of evaluation include: units and levels of analysis; parsimony; linkages and predictive value. With respect to the second task, the Operational Code will be evaluated in relation to other theories, specifically Consistency theory, (Abelson, et al, 1968), dissonance theory, (Festinger, 1957, 1964), cognitive mapping, (Axelrod, 1976), and a cybernetic theory of decision-making, (Steinbruner, 1976).

Chapter Two will build on the theoretical discussion in Chapter One and it will evaluate Holsti's Operational Code construct, the coding manual and code rules. This chapter will examine the theoretical and methodological problems which may be inherent in the construct. The methodological assessment will center on content analysis and the related problems of reliability and validity.

Chapter Three will utilize Holsti's framework for a case study of David Ben Gurion, the former Prime Minister of Israel. Briefly, the justifications for a case study are: the revised Holsti framework has yet to be used extensively; additional case studies enhance the cumulative nature of theory development; case studies assist in the examination of theoretical criteria; and comparative studies enhance the development of typologies of foreign policy decision-makers. Ben Gurion was selected for the case study for several reasons. Ben Gurion possessed many characteristics which make him an excellent candidate for Operational Code analysis. For example, he had high ego-esteem. He was dynamic and charismatic. More importantly, throughout his leadership situations of uncertainty and stress were commonplace. As I noted previously, situations of uncertainty increase the possibility that the personal beliefs and cognitive processes of the leader will be influential in the decision-making process.

Chapter Four will examine the strengths and weaknesses of Operational Code based on the case study and on the evaluation of theoretical concepts carried out in Chapter One. Finally, the conclusion will suggest possible additions or deletions to the construct which will strengthen the theoretical base of Operational Code.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

There are many studies of cognitive approaches to foreign policy decision-making. The underlying premise of all the cognitive approaches is that a simple "black-box" formulation (Singer, 1961)¹ provides an insufficient explanation of the variables associated with decisions. Further, cognitive model proponents assume that the manner in which a policy-maker forms perceptions, selects options, diagnoses situations, and engages in political behavior, is strongly linked to the "content and structure of belief systems, information processing styles and strategies for coping with stress" (Holsti, 1977, p. 28) particularly under conditions of uncertainty.

The diversity of the cognitive process models can be described briefly under several headings: scope, theoretical categories and concepts, data and analytical procedures. As Holsti has noted in his review of the cognitive process literature,² there is a marked overlap in the manner in which theoretical concepts are applied in the various models. For example, the Operational Code refers to a decision-maker's beliefs about the political universe,

¹Singer describes "black-box" formulation as the misleading assumption which denies or discounts any discernable differences among nations as actors and thus presents a highly homogenized image of nations.

²Holsti presents an excellent overview of the diverse nature of cognitive process models. (Holsti, 1977, pp. 27-34).

whereas Brecher (1973) refers to an "Attitudinal Prism" and a decision-maker's "world view".³ In addition, the models tend to be weak in their ability to account for the variable nature of the situation which may affect the impact of cognitive processes on choice behavior. For example, the amount of stress, the attainment of goals, the degree of uncertainty, have effects which must be explicitly evaluated. (Holsti, 1972; Axelrod, 1973; Holsti and George, 1975; Steinbruner, 1976).

An extensive application of cognitive approaches to foreign policy decision-making has been inhibited by major theoretical and practical problems. Holsti identified the most severe difficulties as:

. . . disillusionment with some of the previous efforts of related kinds; skepticism about the relevance of psychological theories, insights and evidence to analysis of political phenomenon; the canon of parsimony; problems linking beliefs to foreign policy actions; difficulties of access to data, the labouriousness of coding and related methodological problems. (Holsti, 1977, p. 6).

An additional inhibition is found in the appeal of the traditional rational models, although as the personal attributes of leaders become increasingly influential in foreign policy in such areas as "shuttle diplomacy" and summit conferences, the limitations of the rational modes are becoming more apparent. The question then becomes--what are the limitations, and how can cognitive models overcome these limitations and supply a more powerful explanation of foreign policy behavior?

Limitations of the Rational Models

While the image of the "unitary rational actor" is still powerful recent discussions of decision-making have criticized the core requirements of the

³Putnam (1973) refers to "central" or "primitive beliefs" (Rokeach, 1960) as "cognitive predispositions".

of the rational models. Researchers have found weaknesses in the basic assumption which is that foreign policy is best conceptualized as a series of rational choices, that is, choices being made after all the possible alternatives and consequences in a given situation have been considered.

Rational models assume that decision-makers are rational human beings who have perfect knowledge of all events and information relevant to the decision situation. Further, it is assumed that they are capable of calculating all the possible alternatives and the consequences attached to each alternative and establish a preference ordering (utility function) from which the most preferred consequence is selected. (Simon and March, 1958). Perfect knowledge and the elaborate calculations required by the rational decision-maker are unlikely. Individuals do not, in fact, make decisions in this manner. As Verba (1961) has noted, decision-makers deviate from a means-ends rationality model for several reasons. First,

. . . individuals do not have a clear set of the value preferences that exist independently of the situation and can be matched against a variety of alternatives to see which gives the best value outcome. Instead, one's values depend in part upon the situation one is facing and which is attainable in that situation. One's preference can change during a decision process. (Verba, 1961, p. 110).

This weakness becomes more evident when the rationality model is applied to group or coalition foreign policy behavior. Joint preference ordering is not only more difficult but "logically impossible" (Verba, 1961). Members of the group may have goals and preferences that conflict. In addition, the criteria for identifying goals or even the membership of the group may be imperfectly worked out. Such situations are not uncommon in decision-making organizations and rationality models are limited in their ability to explain how decisions are derived when there are inconsistent goals and preferences within the group. (Verba, 1961, p. 112).

Second, there is a weakness in assumptions concerning information acquisition. It is impossible for a decision-maker to amass information

concerning all the possible alternatives relative to any given situation. An exhaustive search for such information would not only be difficult and time-consuming but highly unlikely. Etzioni (1968) argues that decision-makers have only part of the information they would need to examine all the possible alternatives and all the relevant consequences.

As a rule, they do not even know what information would be necessary and, hence, they do not know how much of this information they hold or its validity. Nor do they have the assets or time to collect more than an additional fraction of the needed information.

The necessary calculations cannot be carried out because, first, this capacity assumes that the . . . earlier prerequisites have been met--that criteria for evaluation (or weighing of utilities) have been provided, and that information about the consequences has been made available. Second, this assumes that there is a limited universe of relevant consequences that can be exhaustively surveyed; . . . (Etzioni, 1968, p. 265, emphasis in text)

Since a decision-maker cannot consider all the possible alternatives, he tends to seek those alternatives that are "as similar as possible to past choices so that experience can be used as a guide." (Verba, 1961, p. 112). Similarly, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) would argue that decision-makers do not make a comprehensive search of the situation but rather, they investigate only those alternatives which differ in a limited degree from existing policies. Such a limited search will reduce the cost of information gathering and the elaborate calculations required by the rational models.

Simon (1957) argues that a decision-maker does not choose the best alternative (optimizer) and he will settle for something that will provide a satisfying alternative to achieving his goals. Should there be any difficulty with the selected "satisficing" alternative, another search is employed but at no time is the search geared to find the optimal value.⁴

⁴Etzioni offers another approach to decision-making called "mixed-scanning". Briefly, the method suggests a synthesis of both a rational and instrumental approach. A decision-maker would scan the situation without expansive details and specifications and then take a bit-by-bit approach to solving the problem: The decision-maker distinguishes between fundamental decisions, such as the decision to declare war, and bit decisions, which are incremental, but set in

The inherent weaknesses in the rational models do not render them useless in the analysis of foreign policy but the researcher must be aware of the limitations and the consequences of using the models. For example, Allison (1971) applied three conceptual models to an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He found that each model, the unitary rational actor, the governmental politics, and the bureaucratic model, provided an incomplete theoretical and empirical account of events and generated many unresolved questions about the crisis and the decision-making process.

The deficiencies of the rational model are further illuminated by complexity and uncertainty in the foreign policy environment. Under conditions of uncertainty, alternatives and outcomes are likely to be unknown. The rational model assumes that all outcomes are known and that the "rules of the game" are stable or explicitly specified. However,

. . . for complex problems neither of these assumptions can be held. Rather the imposition of enough structure on the situation, so that possible outcomes can be described and their probabilities of occurrence estimated is itself a matter of uncertainty. This special form of uncertainty can be labeled structural uncertainty. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 18, emphasis mine).

Faced with the limitations and inadequacies of the rational models some researchers have turned their attention to an evaluation of cognitive process models in order to account for the residual variance left by the traditional approaches. For example, Allison suggested at the conclusion of his comprehensive analysis that the variance unexplained by the rational models might

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the context of the fundamental decisions. "Bit-incrementalism overcomes the unrealistic aspects of comprehensive rationalism (by limiting it to contextuating decisions), and contextuating rationalism helps to right the conservative bias of incrementalism." (Etzioni, 1968, p. 283).

be more adequately accounted for by the application of a cognitive process model.⁵

The Impact of Personality Variables on Foreign Policy Decision-Making

In recent years there have been developments in cognitive psychology which have had a great impact on the study of foreign policy decision-making and on the practice of foreign policy. The developments have occurred despite a variety of criticisms. For example, some have argued that the personality of the decision-maker has little effect on political behavior. (Verba, 1961; Kirk, 1976). Others have cited the failure of earlier models of decision-making to adequately account for the effect of beliefs and cognitive processes on foreign policy behavior. In addition, some well-known models as that developed by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954, 1962) tended to emphasize sociological factors as opposed to psychological traits, belief systems and cognitive processes. This point was made clear in Snyder and Paige's (1958) application of the framework to the American decision to invade North Korea. Finally, some have argued that for example, the "war is in the minds of men approach", the "power school" and others⁶ had given rise to results which cast doubt on the argument that the individual and his psychological traits were necessary for an adequate explanation of international politics and foreign policy. In this regard, Greenstein argues that the "situation" is the dominant factor because individual decision-makers "are severely limited in the impact they have on events and because individuals with varying

⁵An interesting study by Jack Snyder (1978) compares the models as developed by Allison (1971) with a cognitive cybernetic model developed by Steinbruner (1976) to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis. He found that the use of a cognitive theoretical approach such as cybernetics, appears to account for more of the variance than the rational models.

⁶Holsti (1977, pp. 7-8) provides a brief description of some of the earlier models of decision-making and some of the critical reactions they received.

individual characteristics will behave similarly when placed in common situations."⁷ (Greenstein, 1969, p. 332). Thus, while personality variables may be present, they are thought to have little or no impact on decision outcomes. Etheredge (1974) poses two questions in his rejoinder to the situationists:

Is there significant intra-elite disagreement on certain important policy issues? If so, can these disagreements be attributed to relatively enduring differences in personality traits? (Etheredge, unpub. Ph.d thesis, 1974, p. 9)

If the answers to the above questions are yes, then, Etheredge maintains that "a systematic account must be taken of unique personality characteristics of top-level decision-makers if a satisfactory theory of foreign policy decision-making is to be developed." (Etheredge, 1974, p. 9). Alker (1972) also disputes the claim of the situationists on the grounds that situational specificity is itself a personality variable. Situations can be conceived of as having two dimensions: the ontological reality of the situation which is a "given" and the individual's perception of that situation which is his definition of the reality of the situation. Individuals do not approach situations with a "totally naive" mind. Rather, they have personality variables such as beliefs, preferences, and psychological traits, evolved through experience, on which they can draw to define the new situation. Alker claims that interaction of personality variables and the situation provides the largest source of unexplained variance. Hermann (1976) would agree that the needs associated with individual character traits, as well as the options generated by the perceived political situation, determine leadership behavior. Moreover, in a pluralistic society, a leader in one situation may not be a leader in another situation. How a

⁷Proponents of this argument say that leaders may come and go but government and policy change little, if at all, with the emergence of a new leader or new personnel. Ben Gurion was once quoted as saying that political parties and governments may come and go but the State remains. (Pearlman, 1965).

decision-maker defines a situation may not depend so much on the "where you stand depends on where you sit" premise⁸ as on the decision-maker's basic beliefs about the nature of his political environment, his opponents, etc.

There is however, general agreement that psychological traits, belief sets, and the preferences of a decision-maker are more important for those who hold high political office. Paige (1972), Hermann (1976), and Holsti (1977), suggests that there are certain circumstances or conditions in which the behavior of a leader is most influential. These conditions or circumstances can be briefly summarized as follows:⁹

1. Solitary actor--Decision-makers at the highest levels of government tend to be free from the hierarchical constraints of government bureaucracy and have more latitude to develop their own policy choices.
2. Crisis--Situations in which the standard operating procedures are inappropriate for arriving at decisions. (For example, decisions to terminate or initiate wars, alliances, aid programs, intervention, and self-defense) will likely be influenced by the personality characteristics of the decision-maker. For example, Ben Gurion of Israel was continually faced with crisis situations throughout his terms of office. His perceptions of these situations and his ability to cope with the circumstances played an important part in Israel's foreign policy decision-making. How the decision-maker deals with stressful crisis situations, the kinds of coping mechanisms he uses (for example, over-reaction, underreaction, withdrawal of forces, etc.) can set the tone for the decision process.
3. Ambiguity or Uncertainty--In ambiguous situations there may be a variety of interpretations available. Ambiguity can arise as the result of a lack of adequate information, contradictory information, and information derived from questionable sources. It is important to note that the situations

⁸The failure of the "where you stand depends on where you sit" premise was effectively demonstrated in Allison's bureaucratic politics analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Robert McNamara's initial diagnosis of the Soviet placement of missiles ("a missile is a missile") was not a view shared by his colleagues nor did it reflect his role in the Kennedy administration. In fact, only U.N. Ambassador Adali Stevenson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted in a manner which could be predicted from their bureaucratic role prescriptions. See Allison (1971) for a complete discussion of this point.

⁹The conditions outlined by Hermann, Paige and Holsti, overlap considerably. I have presented a summary of those which may be relevant to an Operational Code analysis and which are common to the authors.

are only ambiguous if they are perceived to be so by the decision-maker. Whether or not a decision-maker defines a situation as a crisis depends perhaps. . . "at least in part, on his basic beliefs about the political universe and these beliefs and attitudes will not always correspond to or be predictable from his role." (Holsti, 1977, p. 20). The means of identifying the most reliable information may itself be unreliable. Second, the greater the degree of ambiguity or uncertainty, the more likely it is that the information processing mechanisms of the decision-maker will influence policy behavior.

In a new situation in which the decision-maker has no previous experience, his initial reactions will most likely reflect his own cognitive style and cognitive mapping of the situation. In highly complex situations, cues are widely varied, relatively few in number or contradictory. In such situations a decision-maker would rely upon his own image of the situation rather than on its objective attributes.¹⁰

4. Unanticipated Events -- In circumstances where the unexpected occurs, the initial reaction of the decision-maker will reflect his cognitive style or belief set.

5. Long Range Policy Planning -- The decision-maker must deal with a considerable amount of uncertainty in arriving at future policies. In such situations the policy-maker's own beliefs and values will have a measurable impact.

6. Information Overload -- Too much information may be as much a hindrance as too little information. Information overload may force a decision-maker to use a variety of strategies to cope with the situation, (for example, queuing, omission, error filtering, reducing of categories of discrimination, employing multiple channels, and escape). (Holsti, 1972, p. 115).

7. Stress -- Stressful situations will hinder decision-makers.¹¹ Sources

¹⁰When cues are few in number the interpretations of the situation by the decision-maker is very likely to reflect his own image of that situation. For example, President John F. Kennedy sent two advisors to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. The situation was highly complex and ambiguous and as such had a considerable effect on the perceptions of the two advisors. The resulting separate reports were so contradictory that Kennedy questioned whether the advisors had, indeed, been in the same country. The reports had reflected the advisors' own images rather than the objective reality of the situation.

¹¹The literature of decision-making under stress is wide and varied. "Research in both experimental and natural settings indicates that intense and protracted stress may have a considerable impact on those qualities of cognitive structures and abilities that are most needed to cope with the complex intellectual problems posed by many decision-making situations." (Holsti, 1977, pp. 33-34) See for example, Easton, 1965; Holsti 1972; George and Holsti, 1975, and the literature cited therein.

of stress vary from the dramatic stress situations such as wars, to the more prosaic stressful situations arising out of daily pressures from the political and social environment. The anxieties or fears a decision-maker experiences may have a destabilizing effect on his behavior and subsequently on his decision-making performance. The cognitive constraints on rational decision-making may cause stress for a policy-maker who must choose between alternative courses of action. Knowledge of how a decision-maker copes with cognitive complexity will enhance our understanding of decision-making behavior.

The above conditions are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. It should be noted, however, that the applicability or generality of Operational Code as a theoretical tool may be restricted to such decision-making situations. If conditions such as the above inhibit the utility of examining decision-makers, then they will also inhibit the applicability of Operational Code. However, what is important to recall at this point is that such conditions as outlined, are prevelant in the foreign policy decision-making arena. While there may be a temptation on the part of researchers to regard the Operational Code beliefs as a "necessary condition" for decisional outputs (George, 1978b) and consequently to exaggerate the influence of the beliefs on the decision process, the above conditions may provide extensive areas of research in which Operational Code beliefs will be most relevant for describing the foreign policy behavior of the subjects. For example, Holsti (1967) effectively demonstrated that John Foster Dulles' cognitive beliefs were a "necessary condition" to explain his behavior. In a more recent study, Walker (1977) examined the impact of Henry Kissinger's beliefs on the peace negotiations in Vietnam. Walker demonstrated that any actor in the same situation but with beliefs different than Kissinger's would not have displayed the same behavior and would not have produced the same policy preferences. One outcome of Walker's research is the assertion that Kissinger's beliefs were a "necessary condition" for explaining foreign policy behavior. The results of this argument would refute Greenstein's

contention that the situation is all-important as well as the premise that "where you stand depends on where you sit". If Walker is correct, then we can expect situational variance to be less important than variance in beliefs in accounting for foreign policy behavior.

Theoretical Criteria

Good theory requires that a model provide a valid and reliable explanation and description of phenomena. The operative word here is "explanation" as it is the primary purpose of theory to explain the phenomena in question. Should a conflict exist between the explanation and the descriptive requirements, the explanatory requirements should be given priority. As Kenneth Thompson (1955) stated, theory "gives order and meaning to a mass of phenomena without which it would remain disconnected and unintelligible." (in McClelland, 1966, p. 15). In addition, good theory requires that specific criteria be met. First, as the level of unit of analysis one uses to explain phenomena will directly affect the data that is collected, the theory must specify who or what are the acting units or levels that one is examining. Second, the model must be parsimonious enough to generate a variety of propositions from a relatively small number of assumptions. In addition, they must be derived at the least possible cost, so that replication will be economical. Third, the independent and dependent variables must be identified and their relationships made explicit. Fourth, the model should yield predictive statements. "If these conditions are not satisfied statements (models) can still be interesting and useful; but they are not 'theory'" (Eckstein, in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, Vol. 7, p. 90). Each of the above conditions will be examined in relation to Operational Code as the preliminary stage in the theoretical evaluation of

the framework. The first criterion to be examined is the unit or level of analysis.

Units and Levels of Analysis

The researcher must be aware of who or what are the "primary", perceiving, deciding and acting units . . . (Holsti, 1968, p. 126). The level or unit of analysis¹² will affect the quality of data collection, inference, and the overall character of description of predictions. Perhaps, more importantly the level or unit of analysis selected will restrict or constrain the evidence a researcher gathers in describing phenomena or testing theory.

The problem of which level or unit of analysis one chooses to explain political phenomena has been a frequent source of debate. (Singer, 1961; Holsti, 1968; Jervis, 1976). In any event, choosing the level or unit of analysis should not be an arbitrary decision but rather it should depend on the degree of accuracy required for an adequate explanation and description of the given phenomena. (Singer, 1961). In part, this is because such choices are a "product of beliefs . . . about the nature of the variables that influence the phenomena that concerns one." (Jervis, 1976, p. 15). Consequently the choice of level or unit of analysis will have considerable impact on the theoretical explanation of the phenomena.

¹²It is difficult to distinguish between these terms because they have been used interchangeably. For example, Holsti refers to nations as a unit of analysis while Singer refers to nations as a level of analysis. Perhaps it is least ambiguous to say a unit of analysis is a unit of conceptualization or unit of evidence gathering while a level of analysis is a unit of inference or correlation.

The most comprehensive level of analysis is the systemic which encompasses all the interactions of the international system. Generalizations made at this level concern such phenomena as the creation and dissolution of coalitions, alliances, and configurations of power. (Singer, 1961, p. 80). It is only at this level that we are able to examine the interactions of the international system as a whole. However, the systemic level implies a "black-box" formulation according to which all nations are assumed to have a high degree of homogeneity in their "foreign policy Operational Codes" (Singer, 1961, p. 81) and differences among nations are discounted. Singer also argues early on, that "causal" accounts are not possible at this level. Accounts at this level tend to exaggerate the influence of the international system on national actors and they subsume the impact of national actors on the international system.

Lower levels of analysis such as the nation-state allow for a more detailed examination of the differences between nations. The greater the degree of specificity the greater the range for comparison. In the systemic model, for example, goal-seeking is either ignored or identical goals are attributed to all nations. Hans Morganthau (1968) attributes "power" as the goal of all nations. In contrast, the more we know about a nation the less similar it will appear to other nations and the more we can say about its variations in behavior. At lower levels of analysis the "black-box" formulation is rejected and the goals and motivations of the nations are not assumed to be identical. Subsequently, the analyst may be forced to investigate goal-seeking behavior at the lower levels in order to provide us with an adequate explanation of foreign policy behavior.

While the nation-state has been the most popular level or unit of analysis for examining foreign policy behavior, the decisions ascribed to the

nation are the product of individuals acting in the name of the state. Analyses made at the systemic level tend to ignore decision-makers, their perceptions, and their beliefs as sources of foreign policy behavior.¹³ As I noted above, there are particular circumstances under which an examination of individual decision-makers would provide a more fruitful explanation of behavior. Examination of an individual decision-maker does not, however, necessarily preclude an examination of the more inclusive units of levels of analysis. Rather it would enrich the study of institutions, nations and systems because the individual decision-maker cannot be analysed without reference to the larger units of which he is a part. (Holsti, 1968, p. 127). The second criterion of theory to be examined is parsimony.

Parsimony

Parsimony has been defined as the "ability of a theoretical approach to generate a large number and variety of significant propositions from a relatively small number of assumptions." (Hart, 1977, p. 138). There has been a constant search for common variables which will provide a common core for theory and generate broad explanations of political behavior. Studies undertaken by Snyder, et al (1954); Simon, (1957); Deutch, (1963); Janis, (1972); and others¹⁴ were generated in pursuit of such variables.

¹³While Singer acknowledges that it is only at the level of nation states that the decision-making approach can be utilized, he does not advocate using individuals as a unit of analysis.

¹⁴The studies undertaken covered such broad categories as decision-making, networks, and groups.

Although studies of the behaving individual and his cognitions generate propositions from a relatively large number of assumptions, they provide detailed accounts of political behavior which cannot be produced directly by the traditional models. While the "unitary rational actor" model may be viewed as an over-simplification of reality, given its normative presentation of how a decision "ought to be made", it may owe a portion of its popularity to its theoretical parsimony. Cognitive models, on the other hand, generally have to sacrifice parsimony to gain explanatory power. As it is the prime purpose of theory to explain (Singer, 1961) explanation must take precedence over other considerations.

The use of a scheme which is more comprehensive than parsimonious may lead to over analysis, supplying information and explanations which may cloud the purpose of the research. As Holsti states:

Those whose work is informed by what Waltz (1959) has called "second image" theories--that the causes of international conflict can be located in the malignant institutions of certain politics...--clearly have little reason to introduce into their analyses such concepts as bounded rationality, cognitive dissonance, information processing capacity, coping with stress, and related concerns of cognitive process models. These are not regarded merely as unnecessary embellishments that complicate the investigator's task; they are diversions that cloud the analyst's insight into the fundamental sources of international behavior. (Holsti, 1977, p. 15).

From an empirical point of view, such additions lead to over-determination and the model cannot be tested. However, attainment of a parsimonious theory can only be derived through refinement and testing. As Paige and Snyder noted:

If one must err, it ought initially to be on the side of over-elaboration of categories which can be eliminated after empirical investigation demonstrates the need to do so. (Snyder and Paige, 1968, p. 200).

Holsti advocates a similar position with respect of Operational Code. His framework is very elaborate and includes numerous categories for data collection. For example, Philosophical Belief Ib - Image of the Opponent - contains fourteen sub-categories. Such over-elaboration is necessary at this stage of the development of Operational Code so that the testing and refinement required to produce a more parsimonious scheme can be accomplished.

Linkages Between Beliefs and Foreign Policy Actions

There has been strong critical reaction to the assumption that beliefs and foreign policy have a direct, one-to-one relationship. (Singer, 1968; Rosenau, 1969). Scholars such as Holsti and Rosenau are dissatisfied with the "standard conception"¹⁵ of direct relationships between actors and foreign policy outcomes. They suggest the interrelationships are far more complex and subtle.¹⁶ Holsti suggests that while decision-makers may share certain beliefs, variations in their beliefs may be more important in a decision-making situation. "This is precisely the reason for focusing on the individual policy maker, rather than assuming a homogeneity of beliefs among them". (Holsti, 1977, p. 23).

Holsti adds that it is not very fruitful to assume direct linkages between beliefs and foreign policy actions:

¹⁵See Rosenau (1969, p. 10-11) for a complete description of the standard conception of linkages. Rosenau's concern for linkage politics is more relevant at the macro-level of analysis. However, the problem of linkage occurs at the micro-level of analysis as well.


¹⁶Heradstveit (1978) found that linkages in Arab-Israeli perceptions, especially those relating past the future, were far more complex than he had originally hypothesized.

. . . because the role beliefs may play in policy making is a much subtler and less direct one (Figure 1). Rather than providing direct guides to action, they are one of several clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision-making behavior. They may serve the policy maker as a means of orientating him to the environment; as a lens or prism through which information is processed and given meaning; as a diagnostic scheme; as a means of coping with the cognitive constraints on rationality; and as a source of guidelines that may guide or bound - but not necessarily determine - policy prescriptions and choices. (Holsti, 1977: 24-25).

Establishing the linkage between belief systems and the dependent variable - the foreign policy outcomes - is difficult in cognitive models. Holsti (1977) and George (1979b) therefore suggest that researchers concentrate on the effect beliefs have on those tasks which precede a decision. They hypothesize that it is at the information processing stage, when a decision-maker defines the situation, searches for relevant clues, and analyses the situation, that the belief system may establish guidelines which constrain policy preferences. Beliefs therefore do not necessarily determine policy choices (George, 1979b). Rather the manner in which a decision-maker defines his situation eliminates certain policy options and highlight others. (Holsti, 1977, p. 25).

Linkages within Operational Code are also determined by the centrality of given beliefs. The more central or dominant a belief the more impact it will have on the other beliefs. It is hypothesized that if a decision-maker views the political universe as basically harmonious, -- one in which conflict is temporary and the source of conflict is nation states (Philosophical Belief 1)--he will tend to be very optimistic concerning the achievements of his long term goals (Philosophical Belief 2) and he will cope with risks by limiting means (Instrumental Belief 3). Thus, his basic view of the political world will affect how he formulates

Figure 1



Shaded area = shared beliefs among policy makers A, B, and C

* Constraints imposed by organizational processes and bureaucratic politics are especially likely to be operative between decisions and actions.

Note: This diagram suggests an unrealistic degree of orderliness in the decision-making process. Diagnosis, search, analysis and prescription are unlikely to proceed in a neat sequence. Even the two-way arrows may fail to capture the iterative aspects of the process. Moreover, one or more stages of the process may be bypassed altogether; for example, upon diagnosis of the situation, the policy maker may move directly to prescription rather than engaging in adequate search and analysis.

policies. Holsti and George state that an examination of a decision-maker's belief system will establish boundaries for his policy preferences, but not the actual policy outcomes. They suggest that analysts regard policy preferences of a decision-maker and not the actual policy outcome as the dependent variable. In summary, an examination of the decisional tasks prior to policy outcomes establishes a prima facie case for expecting theoretical complexity and for demanding some guidelines concerning the relations between variables. A coherent body of empirical theory will only be fashioned "after all the relevant variables have been identified and their relative potency assessed . . . (Rosenau in Singer, 1968, p. 17). Rosenau can be criticized for suggesting nothing more than a "fishing expedition". But, at a preliminary stage of theory building, it is only after the relevant variables have been assessed that we can examine the relationships among them.

Wilkenfeld (1974), Rummel (1963), Haas (1965), Tanter (1972), and others have demonstrated that the relationship posited by a theory must exist empirically if the theory is to be viable. If the relationship between the variables is non-existent or of a limited potency, the ability of the theory to predict or explain the dependent variable will be severely constrained. The theory must then be modified or discarded. In Operational Code, the linkages are determined by the beliefs and Philosophical Belief I is assumed to be a dominant or master belief. While support for this premise is available in existing research (Holsti, 1967; George, 1969; Putnam, 1973) the reasons are not specified. At this early stage of development of Operational Code, the lack of specificity can be expected. If we are to advance beyond a simple framework of categories, however, the potency of the relationships must prove to be empirically viable

to permit prediction and explanation. Given the evidence in the existing research, the Operational Code construct does appear to be more than a simple framework of categories. Care must be taken however, to avoid making tautological statements about the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This can occur frequently in studies of belief systems because beliefs are not observable so inferences about beliefs are drawn from the observed behavior. Tautology results because the beliefs are derived from the observed behavior and then the same behavior is used to explain the beliefs.¹⁷ In such cases the relationships between the beliefs and the behavior are "not held open to revision or disconfirmation." (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 26). Tautology can be circumvented in Operational Code to the extent that the same data are not used as evidence for both beliefs and behavior.

By establishing the dependent variable as the policy preferences of a decision-maker rather than the actual policy outcome, Operational Code allows for the more subtle role the beliefs play in decision-making and in the relationship between the beliefs. It becomes obvious that an examination of the linkage between the beliefs in Operational Code is crucial to the evaluation of the theoretical strength of the Code.

¹⁷In Holsti's examination of J.F. Dulles' beliefs both expressions of beliefs and policy-making behavior were used as evidence in reconstructing his Operational Code. Any firm conclusions relating to political beliefs and behavior must be stated with care to avoid the dangers of circularity.

Predictive Power

The predictive power of a theory refers to its ability to predict, with some degree of accuracy, the correct policy outcome in a given situation. For a theory to have a high predictive value there should be strong linkages between the independent variables. In cognitive process models the linkages are subtle and complex and predictive power may be weakened as a consequence.

Predictions derived from Operational Code are often so general that they lose their applicability to concrete policy problems. In many cases the specific action is of interest, not the general propensities of a decision-maker to act in certain ways. (Heradstveit, 1978). Operational Code is limited in its ability to predict specific actions that a decision-maker will take in a given situation. At present, Operational Code will only establish the boundaries within which the decision may be made.

The theoretical core of Operational Code lies in the statement and assessment of the Code's ten basic questions. The beliefs derived from these questions yield the essential belief dimensions of the policy-maker. Instead of predicting specific choices it explains how these general dimensions may constrain and channel information processing. Knowledge of a policy-maker's Operational Code should act as a guide to predicting and explaining a political actor's behavior, but it is unlikely that such knowledge will yield fine-grained predictive capability. Other cognitive theories such as Cognitive Mapping, (Axelrod, 1976) are much stronger in their predictive capacity. Cognitive Mapping depends upon an extensive mapping of causal concepts for its predictive power. In order to predict outcomes, all known concepts are mapped. Should new developments occur that were not previously considered, "the predictive value of the model

declines rapidly." (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978, p. 30).

Summary

In sum, there are certain theoretical criteria which are essential for building a comprehensive theory. The first is to establish the level or unit of analysis that is essential to explain the phenomena in question. The unit of analysis that can be most relevant as sources of foreign policy behavior is individual decision-makers, their beliefs, and their perceptions. Although good theory should be parsimonious, at times it is necessary to sacrifice parsimony to gain explanatory power - the prime tenet of any theory. Operational Code tends to be comprehensive rather than parsimonious, at least at this early stage of its development. Parsimony can only be achieved after all the variables have been examined and their relation to the dependent variables has been assessed. Once the relationships have been assessed we should be able to predict the presence of the other beliefs with some degree of accuracy. Utilizing just one belief to generate a large number of propositions would result in a more parsimonious framework.

An examination of other cognitive models should further illuminate the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of Operational Code. In Part II I will examine the consistency theories first as they form the basis for the cognitive approaches. Second, I will examine two cognitive approaches, Cognitive Mapping and Cybernetics in relation to Operational Code. The examination will concentrate on the basic differences between the models. The relationship among variables (linkage) will be analysed in all the models. As assumptions are made about the predictive power of Cognitive Mapping they will be addressed in relation to Operational Code. All the approaches utilize decision-makers, their beliefs and cognitions as units

of analysis. In addition they tend to be more comprehensive than parsimonious at this stage of their development. These two aspects of the cognitive models will not be evaluated here. Parsimony in Operational Code will be examined further in Chapter Two.

COGNITIVE APPROACHES

Introduction

The mind's capacity to impose inferential structure is critical to cognitive theory because,

. . . the critical propositions of cognitive theory concern themselves with the structure of beliefs, that is with the way in which the relationships between beliefs are organized and with the manner in which information is processed in reference to existing beliefs. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 95).

It is generally recognized that individuals cope with their environment by forming "simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of their world." (Holsti, 1977, p. 3). The construction of these "simplified structured beliefs" is the first consequence of what Simon (1957) terms the principle of bounded rationality. Briefly, bounded rationality refers to the idea that the human mind is limited in its capacity to formulate and solve the complex problems of the real world. In order for the mind to even approximate objective rationality it creates a simplified structure of reality so that it can better deal with the complexities. If the principle is correct then an empirical investigation of decision-maker's psychological properties is necessary in order to better predict behavior. Predicting behavior of a decision-maker will depend on our understanding of how the structure of the decision-maker's simplified model of beliefs is constructed. Its construction will "certainly be related to his psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking and learning animal." (Simon, 1957, p. 199). As foreign policy is usually characterized by structural uncertainty--that is, all the alternatives and consequences are not known--knowledge of how a decision-maker deals with uncertainty will be important. It is in such situations that a decision-maker's be-

liefssystem may have the greatest impact. As mentioned earlier, decisions made under conditions of uncertainty will most likely reflect the psychological traits, beliefs and attitudes of the decision-maker. Further, the decision-maker's information processing under conditions of uncertainty will be severely constrained by his belief system.

As new information becomes available the actor does not make adjustments to his existing belief structure rather he integrates the new information where it may activate or amplify existing beliefs, or they may be inconsistent with existing beliefs, or they may have no effect (in which case the information is discarded). An individual will try to maintain his existing beliefs at the lowest possible cost. To maintain consistency, consistency theorists argue that an individual will try and avoid any information which may conflict with their existing beliefs.

Consistency and Dissonance Theories

Consistency theories (Feldman, 1966; Abelson, et al, 1968)¹⁸ provide an explanation of how beliefs are related and how this relationship relates to behavior. Consistency theorists argue that there will be a tendency towards balance in the cognitive process. For example, if a person "p" likes a person "o" and "o" likes object "x" then "p" will tend to like "x" as well. Cognitive theorists argue further that the learning process or the absorption of new information will depend on the individual's established patterns or images. "For the mind it is necessary to make events similar or minimally different" (Heradstveit, 1978, p. 28).

¹⁸For a thorough review of the literature in this field see McGuire (1966) and Abelson, et al (1968) and the literature cited therein.

The individual will strive to maintain consistency with his established patterns or images and this will tend to constrain the decision process.

(Stenbruner, 1976, p. 97). One outcome is that

. . . the mind craves certainty and will look to establish it when it is unwarranted by objective conditions. Selective processing and recall of information, in accordance with the principles of reinforcement and cognitive consistency, can create such certainty. (Snyder, J.L., 1978, p. 363).

Linkages

According to Snyder (1978) and Holsti (1971) consistency constraints on decision-makers will make them more inflexible¹⁹, by strengthening the linkages between the established cognitions. For example,

. . . Unless isolated cognitive elements are related in some manner, pressures toward accommodation are nonexistent . . . this assumption is basic for all consistency theories . . . if a cognitive system is maximally interconnected . . . then it should be difficult for an inconsistent element to penetrate the system (System closes); if an inconsistent element is implanted, tension should be more intense because more extensive changes will be required to incorporate the element; and resolutions should involve removing the element or minimizing its importance through greater attention to other portions of the interconnected system. (eg. the mechanism of bolstering)²⁰. (Weick, in Abelson et al, 1968, p. 512).

¹⁹Holsti argues that a decision-maker under stress will tend to be more inflexible because the "ability to resist the pull of closure decreases." (Holsti, 1971, p. 61-52).

²⁰"Bolstering" refers to a mechanism wherein a person will add cognitive elements that are in balance with existing cognitions and increase the linkage of existing beliefs, when inconsistent elements enter the system. For example, a person who smokes and is anxious about cancer will add additional elements to his system such as smoking relaxes me, keeps me from gaining weight, etc. to avoid the discomfort the thought of what the smoking may be doing to his body. (Weick, 1968).

Alternatively, the more open the system, the less interconnected the elements of the system and the more likely it is that inconsistent elements will be allowed to enter. Moreover, inconsistent elements will generate tension which is less intense than in a closed system, given that fewer changes will be required to incorporate the new information. While both systems are functional, the degree of immunity to inconsistency and the degree of discomfort due to the presence of inconsistency will vary. Under conditions of uncertainty the decision-maker will attempt to avoid inconsistency at all possible cost and this will reduce the opportunities for trade-offs. As Snyder illustrates:

. . . the decision-maker will tend to conceptualize his decision environment so as to avoid recognizing trade-off relationships between his values. Trade-offs violate the principle of cognitive consistency. Hence when the environment is sufficiently unstructured to permit some interpretive latitude, the decision-maker will suppress the trade-offs by conceptualizing his world in such a way that the values do not appear to conflict. (Snyder, 1978, p. 348).

By avoiding conflict the decision-maker avoids dissonance or inconsistency.²¹ Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957, 1963) states that individuals may tolerate a certain amount of strain with inconsistent cognitions but each person has a "threshold" beyond which inconsistency is unbearable and the decision-maker will be forced to strive for consistency within his cognitive system. The more cognitions one has about a situation or the more choice propensities, the more chance there is for inconsistency. This suggests that the more open a system the greater the risk

²¹ Festinger argues that there is a sharp distinction between conflict and dissonance, saying that the dissonance process of re-evaluating attitudes occurs after a decision in order to make relevant cognitions consistent with choice behavior. (Festinger, 1963, p. 10). Janis (1959) and others argue that this process of re-evaluation takes place both before and after a choice or decision.

of inconsistency. However, if the inconsistency is of lower intensity than those cognitions that are consistent, then dissonance is avoided. Measurement poses serious problems for the conceptual definitions of dissonance. In order to determine inconsistency we must know all relevant cognitions or beliefs. What might appear to be inconsistent on the surface may be quite consistent once the underlying beliefs have been examined.²²

The "weight" of dissonance is a function of the relations between the beliefs. As Festinger states:

The total amount of dissonance that exists between two clusters of cognitive elements is a function of the weighted proportion of all the relevant relations between the two clusters that are dissonant. The term "weighted proportion" is used because each relevant relation would be weighted according to the importance of the elements involved in that relation. (Festinger, 1957, p. 18).

The amount of dissonance that may occur before the decision may result in inadequate search for alternative options. The amount of dissonance that may occur after a decision may result in a conservative revision of opinion in light of changes in the environment. Put in another way, the less central beliefs may alter after the decision, or the decision-maker may interpret the consequences of his decisions in a manner such that the consequences are supportive of his central beliefs. In effect the decision-maker "rationalizes" his decision to himself and to others.²³ Evaluation of the consequences and the analysis of the cost-benefits of the decision may, therefore, be faulty.

²²See Heradstveit (1978) for a more detailed discussion in this regard.

²³Nossal (1976) stated that U.S. Ambassador Odium, who was posted to China in the last years of the Chaing Kai Chek regime, avoided dissonance when he received information that unbalanced his positive view of Chaing. He pursued a number of strategies to reduce cognitive dissonance: discredit the source of information to fit existing attitudes; modify or change attitudes to fit new information; seek support for his own opinion; and thereby sustain the positive image and provide in the process a strong self-justification for his original judgment.

Further, in his attempts to avoid inconsistency or dissonance, the decision-maker may fail to consider available trade-offs, between military and political goals, for example. If the assumptions about consistency and dissonance are true, then we can expect that a decision-maker who holds certain beliefs about the political universe, for example, will tend to maintain those beliefs by avoiding information which is discrepant to his established belief sets. Thus, if we know an individual's Operational Code we should be able to state, with some degree of certainty, that these beliefs will have considerable influence on his information processing and his subsequent choice propensities because he would strive to avoid dissonance and to maintain consistency within his belief set at the least possible cost. Consistency and dissonance theories add to our theoretical understanding of "why" beliefs are influential in the decision-making process.

Cognitive Mapping and Cybernetics offer two further approaches to identifying the relationship between beliefs in a decision-making process. The two models will be examined in relation to the Operational Code approach.

Cognitive Mapping

A cognitive map is essentially a representation of the cause and effect relationships formulated by an actor in a decision-making situation. The basic principle of cognitive mapping is that a decision-maker has some pre-existing assumptions about the way in which the world is organized (that is, cognitive predispositions, beliefs systems, response repertory, etc.). The argument continues that, given certain rules for deducing these assumptions, an analyst can map out how a decision-maker makes a choice between different alternatives. It is further argued that as a decision-maker receives information about a situation, he will attempt to "fit" the new information into a pre-existing model or pattern he has used in the past to analyse information about the same

or similar situations. With each new situation there will be some pre-existing beliefs which will structure the causal relationships in a decision-maker's cognitive map and restrict or bound the information processing.

The cause and effect relationships in cognitive mapping are the independent and dependent variables and they take on different values. The map of a decision-maker's values and assertions is represented by a set of points and arrows. The points represent concepts and the arrows signed assertions. The sign of any given arrow can be positive, negative or zero. An arrow sequence can be any logical combination of these signs. The more concepts a decision-maker has, the more relationships he will see between them and the more complex the mapping will be. By mapping an individual's beliefs in this way, Axelrod (1974) believes that it will be easier to understand how or more importantly, why, certain policies emerged as they did. The direction of the arrow paths between the concepts denote the linkage between the idea-elements of the mapping. For example, in the sentence, "Security is in the best interest of my country", the cause is the amount of security, while the amount of interest for the country is the effect. There is a positive relationship between security and national interest and in a diagram or cognitive map of the sentence the sign of the arrow between security and the interests of the country would be positive. Negative relationships are also possible. For example, in the sentence, "The ability of the British to put pressure on the Persian government inhibits the removal of the better (local) governors of Persia." (Axelrod, 1974). In this instance, the pressure on Persia would inhibit (a negative relationship) the removal of the local governors.

Linkages

Linkages between concepts reflect the consistency or balance of the map. Inconsistency exists when two parallel paths between two concepts have different values, that is negative and positive. Cognitive mapping assumes that the decision-maker strives for consistency and that his map will tend to be balanced in any given policy situation. A map is balanced if the sum of the arrows of parallel paths between the independent variables and the dependent variables is even. Balance is itself a pre-requisite for consistency (Hart, 1977) and complete balance occurs when the decision-maker argues just one side of the question. For example, in the sentences used above, if there were more than one policy which had an effect on the interest of the country or the removal of the local governors, the map of the decision-maker would be in balance only if the sum of the positive or negative signs between the relationships declared by the decision-maker yielded an even number.

Centrality in cognitive mapping and in Operational Code refers to the degree to which other beliefs or concepts are dependent on the belief or concept in question. In cognitive mapping this is represented by the number of arrows that link any one concept to other concept variables. A central belief will be one that is shown to have the most arrows going to or from it on the cognitive map, that is "How many concepts are linked to a concept as causes and how many are linked to it as effects." (Heradstveit, 1978, p. 10). The definition of centrality within cognitive mapping is therefore represented numerically by a frequency criterion. Inconsistency in cognitive mapping exists when the signs between the same two concepts on different but parallel paths differ. If the sum of the signs on one path is positive and the sum of the signs of the other path is negative there will be inconsistency or imbalance. When inconsistency occurs the cognitive map model proposes that the decision-maker will suppress the inconsistent path and choose the more central path.

Thus consistency, like centrality in cognitive mapping, is represented by a frequency criterion. A person who displays the same beliefs at different times and in different situations will display cross-temporal and cross-situational consistency. Frequency, however, tends to be an unreliable measure of centrality and consistency because it does not necessarily demonstrate consistency across situations. "What appears in high frequency at one point in time may be altered by a change in situation at another point in time." (Heradstveit, 1978, p. 10). The reliability of using a frequency criterion for measuring cross-situational and cross-temporal consistency, thus becomes suspect.

In Operational Code basic assumptions concerning consistency and centrality have been made before the data are collected. Consistency is based on the inter-connectedness between the idea-elements of the belief system. The assumption of consistency exists because, as George and Holsti suggest, the beliefs which comprise the code are not a chance collection of unrelated beliefs but are part of a belief system. In Converse's terms they form a "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."²⁴ (Converse, 1964, p. 207). Converse also refers to the dimension of "centrality" of the idea-elements of the belief system. That is, beliefs may vary in centrality. If the status of one belief changes as new information is absorbed, there should be changes elsewhere within the system as well. Consequently, the constraints

²⁴The idea of "constraints" between beliefs of a system differentiates a "belief system" from a random collection of cognitions. The utility of constraints is in their value in information processing and in the choice and the diagnostic propensities of an actor.



which bind the belief system together will be important in both a static and dynamic sense.

In the static case "constraint" may be taken to mean the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specific attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes.²⁵ . In the dynamic case "constraint" refers to the probability that a change in the perceived status. . . of one element would psychologically require, from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration. (Converse, 1964, pp. 207-208).

The search for centrality in Operational Code concentrates on an examination of which of the ten beliefs which comprise the code is most stable over time and which of the beliefs has the greatest impact on any of the other beliefs within the configuration. As I have noted, the first belief, (Philosophical Belief 1) is presumed to be the most central belief and it is therefore expected to have the greatest effect on other beliefs. A change in Philosophical Belief 1 is presumed to cause changes in at least some of the other beliefs in the system.²⁶

In cognitive mapping no such prior assumptions about centrality or consistency are made. Centrality and consistency are represented by a frequency criterion in cognitive mapping. However, what may be central and consistent for one situation may not be central or consistent for other situations. You cannot be sure that the concept designated as the most central belief, that is having the highest frequency, is truly a fundamental belief across time and across situations.

²⁵The "static" case suggests a certain amount of cognitive balance and consistency.

²⁶Rokeach(1958) states that beliefs, attitudes, and values are all organized together to form a functionally integrated system so that a change in any one part of the system will affect other parts and culminate in a behavioral change. See also Luttbeg, (1968, pp. 398-409).

Inconsistency in cognitive mapping and Operational Code appears to increase the larger the cognitive map is in the first instance and the broader the beliefs are found to be. This point is evident in Axelrod's cognitive map studies. Axelrod states that decision-makers tend to avoid imbalanced cognitive maps by keeping them structurally simple and by avoiding feedback cycles. (Axelrod, 1976, p. 245). By avoiding imbalance the policy-maker reduces the likelihood of psychological stress that would result from inconsistency. At the same time, by limiting the structure of the cognitive map to its most simplified and balanced state the actor's cognitive system becomes more closed in Rokeach's sense of the term.²⁷ A more open system would lead to a larger and more complex map and it would permit the decision-maker to evaluate more information. Axelrod suggests that decision-makers could easily be trained to create their own maps and thus improve decision-making.

An opportunity for improving decision-making is through the externalization of one's own cognitive map. If a decision-maker could be trained to write out his or her own set of causal beliefs about a policy domain, then . . . the decision-maker could learn to identify and avoid the use of completely balanced maps by learning how to write down more separate beliefs than might be manageable without some external aid. (Axelrod, 1976, p. 265).

Predictive Power

The predictive power of cognitive mapping and Operational Code is based on learning which beliefs or concepts are the most central. Predictability is a function of centrality in both methods of analysis. Cognitive mapping tends

²⁷Rokeach states that the more "closed" the system the less cognitive discrimination we can expect between information, beliefs and subsequent action. The extent to which a belief system is closed represents a "cognitive network of defenses against anxiety." (Rokeach, 1960, p. 347). Scott (1965) states: "closedness" is the extent that the person regards the attributes included in it (images) as completely defining the object. The more open a person's system the more he is willing to entertain the possibility that essential variables about the situation have not been recognized and that these variables may have important consequences for the decision-making.

to be more ambitious in that it proposes to explain decision-makers' policy choices and exact preference orderings on the basis of the cognitive variables derived from their causal assertions. Axelrod argues that by understanding how people make decisions, by analysing their cognitive maps, we should be better equipped to predict decisions. Bonham and Shapiro (1976) in their analysis of the simulated cognitive map of a Middle East Specialist, were able to predict some of the decisions later made by the specialist during an actual crisis situation which closely matched the simulation situation. Bonham and Shapiro's empirical study of a cognitive mapping model found that the cognitive map,

. . . using data generated in an imaginary crisis game, is able to predict many responses of a policy adviser in a subsequent, real international crisis, although it was not able to generate the exact ranking of the policy options he favored. (Bonham and Shapiro, in Axelrod, 1976, p, 140).

When the Bonham and Shapiro model failed to predict the exact "nature of the diplomatic measures recommended by the Middle East Specialist" (Bonham and Shapiro, 1976, p. 137) the authors felt that the model relied too heavily on historical precedent.²⁸

Reliance on history inhibits the search for new information which may have relevance for the decision-maker. If new information becomes available which was not included in the cognitive map analysis the maps predictive power diminishes quickly. Successful predictions in cognitive mapping are dependent upon an exhaustive list of concepts and their causations. Successful prediction means that all relevant concepts be accounted for. If new and relevant

²⁸de Toqueville's warning that misapplied lessons from history may be more dangerous than ignorance of the past (Holsti, in Rosenau, 1976-77) seems to apply to the Bonham and Shapiro analysis. Bonham and Shapiro state that each plausible antecedent path contains at least one relationship that has "historical support" A decision-maker scans his memory and chooses the historical event with the most concepts in common with the new situation. (Bonham and Shapiro, 1976, p. 118).

information is overlooked or unknown the model no longer has predictive validity. The assumption in cognitive mapping is that all causal variables are known to the decision-maker before coding the map. Thus the status of the raw material to be coded is critical to the predictive nature of the model. Cognitive mapping is very sensitive to new incoming information and requires a continual updating of concepts and causal beliefs as new information develops. Once the map is plotted only one policy option will emerge in the policy-maker's map as being the best of all possible alternatives. Only one choice will be consistent with the simulated thought process of the decision-maker. (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978).

The whole notion of prediction in Operational Code is based on the constraints on the way the beliefs go together. By establishing analytical constraints with respect to the thinking process of the decision-maker, Operational Code can define the range of policy choices that may occur. Because a range of alternatives may be consistent or congruent with the belief system, new information can be easily absorbed without any effect on the range of alternatives. In addition, if new behavior of the decision-maker is inconsistent with the Operational Code beliefs, then other variables such as social or environmental factors will be used to explain the behavior. Operational Code analysis can generate general choice propensities of the decision-maker. However, there is no guarantee that the policy-maker will select those options which are consistent with the analysis.

Centrality of the beliefs within the system will have an impact on the predictive power of Operational Code. Existing research does indicate that the image of the political universe and the opponent are the most dominant beliefs and from knowledge of the policy-maker's beliefs about these images, investigators are able to say something about the content of the other beliefs.

For example, if a decision-maker believes that the nature of the political universe is basically harmonious and that the source of conflict is human nature (Philosophical Belief 1) then it can be hypothesized that the decision-maker will pursue goals within a framework that emphasizes flexibility, conciliations, and negotiations (Instrumental Belief 2). (Holsti, 1977).

Validity in both approaches depends on obtaining valid representations of beliefs of a decision-maker which in turn depends on the reliability of the coding methods. Coding in cognitive mapping is very concrete. Raw data do not have to fit into a prescribed set of categories as in Operational Code. This avoids transforming data into the more general but selective Operational Code. Recent studies utilizing the George construct have had a great deal of difficulty enhancing intercoder reliability and construct validity. (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978). Different interpretations of the meanings of the categories of the code have led to some confusion and to a lack of cumulativeness and construct validity. Holsti's coding rules appear to be a step in the right direction in attacking the problem of intercoder reliability. He believes that establishing a more rigorous and explicit methodology for the coding rules, should act as a safeguard against data contamination. Hart's analysis of the cognitive maps of three Latin American leaders illustrates that the problem of maintaining intercoder reliability is also pertinent to cognitive mapping. What may pose a greater problem to cognitive mapping is validity. Cognitive mapping assumes that all statements made by a decision-maker are valid representations of "true beliefs".

Cognitive maps have the advantage and disadvantage of taking the causal assertions of political elites as they are, not as they should be. The approach requires a temporary suspension of criticism so that the beliefs of the observer do not contaminate the beliefs of the observed. If this temporary suspension turns into a permanent one, the normative power of the approach is greatly diminished. (Hart, 1977, p. 139).

Because cognitive mapping assumes that the "representational model" is justified (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978, p. 28), there is less sensitivity to and fewer checks on "the extent to which statements given in various contexts are 'representational' or 'instrumental' " (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978, p. 29) than there is in Operational Code. The ten questions which comprise Operational Code refer to those beliefs which are fundamental to the decision-maker rather than to concepts which relate to a particular policy situation. Consequently, the beliefs derived from an Operational Code analysis will tend to be more generalizable over time than those concepts derived from a cognitive map analysis.

Summary

Cognitive mapping appears to concern itself more with causation than with beliefs about causation. (Hill, 1977). As a consequence, cognitive mapping is unable to say anything about the basis for a decision-maker's statement. For example, does a General increase bombing in enemy territory because he has a strong sense of duty to his country, because he wants a promotion, or because he wants to aid the military industrial complex? Are the images of a General who wants to retire and join an aero space company the same or different than images of a General who wants to retire and go fishing? (Axelrod, 1976).

Does knowing an actor's beliefs make a difference? Proponents of Operational Code think so. As the Operational Code beliefs are assumed to be the most central beliefs, they will constrain the actor's information processes and his subsequent policy choices. Knowing an actor's beliefs will allow us to say something about the choices he may prefer and the reasons for such preferences. In cognitive mapping there are no assumptions about centrality. The centrality of the causal relationships in cognitive mapping is based on a frequency criterion--a poor indicator of cross-situational and cross-temporal

behavior. By knowing the Operational Code beliefs, on the other hand, we will be able to say something about the constraints on the decision-making behavior of an actor over time and in all situations.

Cognitive mapping does not easily lend itself to comparison. There are no key identifiable variations between individual cognitive maps to explain different decision outcomes or concepts. Are the differences based on thematic motivational linkages (Barber's active-negative characteristics), on ideology (Hawk-dove), or Operational Code beliefs? (Hill, 1976). Hart (1977) suggests that cognitive maps might be compared in terms of balance or in terms of the frequency with which the concept variables appear in the maps. The cumulative nature of Operational Code has been weak due to the ambiguous nature of the questions and the different interpretations attributed to them by the various researchers using the construct. However, the revised Holsti construct should alleviate the problems of cumulativeness.

Etheredge's (1976) review of Axelrod's model suggests that there are three potential uses for cognitive mapping: as a tool to aid decision-makers and the development of systems simulations; as an educational tool; and as an early warning system for policy-makers. Etheredge notes that there were few feedback loops in any of the spontaneously generated maps drawn out in the study. Feedback mechanisms are a vital aspect of complex environmental and cognitive dynamics.²⁹ (Axelrod, 1976, p. 232). The absence of feedback signifies a weakness in the explanatory power of the model and in the lexicographic decision

²⁹This point has been effectively argued by Steinbruner (1976), Easton (1965), and others.

calculus³⁰ used by Heradstveit (1978) in the cognitive map analysis of Norwegian Oil Policy. Axelrod warns decision-makers that the number of possible alternatives for a decision will be limited if feedback is not considered. In comparison, Operational Code allows for a wider range of alternatives to be considered by the decision-maker. The code is not as sensitive as cognitive mapping to new information. The beliefs are over-arching in the sense that a greater range of information can be readily absorbed that will be consistent with one or more of the beliefs, than in cognitive mapping.

The idea that people think in a causal manner as cognitive mapping suggests, should enhance our theoretical understanding of the structure of the Operational Code system. That is, the holding of one belief should have a causal effect on the other beliefs within the system. The more dominant one belief is the more impact it will have on the decision-maker's information processing and choice propensities. This takes us one step beyond the simple belief structure based on the principle of "bounded rationality". We are now aware of the possible causal linkages between the beliefs of the structure. Steinbruner's cybernetic model should add to our understanding of the theoretical basis of Operational Code.

³⁰The lexicographic decision-calculus assumes that a decision-maker selects a policy alternative and sees how this affects his most important policy values to which it is connected. It implies that a decision-maker is constantly rating his alternatives as to their effects and then choosing one alternative as better than the others--in other words, a transitive preference ordering. Thus, $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$ (A has a positive effect on B which will have a positive effect on C and C must then have a positive effect on A to be consistent) would be the cognitive map, but this map is not cyclical. Heradstveit and his colleagues compared cognitive maps of Norwegian Oil Policy officials before and after the Bravo blow out in Norway's Ekofisk oil field and they suggest that the model is able to replicate the thinking adjustments to accommodate new events. See Heradstveit et al (1978) for a complete description of the model.

Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making

The cybernetic theory of decision-making advanced by Steinbruner (1976) rejects the analytical assumptions of the rational model. In particular, it rejects the assumptions related to information handling and it posits a much more limited process. The cybernetic thesis states that a decision-maker has sets of established responses. The actor also has decision mechanisms which screen out information which the established sets of responses are not programmed to accept. The response sequence adjusts to a very narrow range of information, screening out most incoming information. The decision-maker does not calculate all the possible outcomes and consequences and thus (s)he may not be sensitive to pertinent information.

The cybernetic decision-maker is sensitive to information only if it enters through an established highly focused channel, and hence many factors which do in fact affect the outcomes have no effect in his decision process. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 67).

The lack of sensitivity to pertinent information does not affect the utility of the cybernetic model in analysis of decision-making as it does describe a way in which an actor may simplify all the vast signals and messages he receives from the environment. Thus cybernetics is potentially useful in understanding how policy-makers actually operate in the complex environment. What is affected by complexity is the decision-maker's response repertory.

Steinbruner describes Ashby's example of a cat trying to find the most comfortable spot in front of a fire as an example of simple cybernetic mechanisms at work. The cat will move closer to the fire as the flames go down. Should the fire be fed with more wood, the cat moves again, this time away from the heat to a more desirable spot. The cat does not calculate the optimal spot but maintains a set of "critical variables" and changes position only as those variables move outside tolerable ranges. Ashby suggests the cat's moves are random, not in any sequential order, as he searches for the perfect spot in

relation to the heat of the fire. Each time the temperature range becomes intolerable the cat moves again. According to the paradigm, the cat is operating with two feedback loops. The first is a simple environmental input and represents the process of perception. The first feedback loop produces minor or incremental adjustments within a given state (the cat's moves). The second feedback loop monitors the "critical variables" and their changes (the change in the heat of the fire). As the heat changes there is a major change in state. (Steinbruner, 1976). The cat does not have any theoretical understanding of "why" he moves but he is able to maintain stability within his environment by his moves away from and closer to the fire. If, as Ashby suggests, the cat's moves are random, then we should expect the cat to have moves which place him closer to the fire when it is hot as well as farther away. This of course, is unlikely to happen. The cat's moves are not random but rather systematic. He moves to avoid being too hot or too cold in a systematic manner, either away from the fire or closer to it. In analytical terms the process of movement by the cat to find the most satisfactory spot by the fire would require an elaborate set of calculations which would be impossible for the cat. Steinbruner uses this example plus several others to illustrate the notion that decision-makers avoid uncertainty by operating with a short-cycle information feedback and few, if any calculations. The simple decision mechanisms are servomechanisms which avoid the "preference ordering, the explicit calculations of alternatives and outcomes and the optimizing process which are the core of the analytical paradigm." (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 53). In other words, the analytical paradigm represents a total view of the environment and the decision-maker acts in accordance with this view. The cybernetic paradigm, on the other hand, offers a recipe-like sequence of operations which produce the desired result without the total view being known.

The decision-maker has a repertory of operations which he performs in sequence while monitoring a few feedback variables. He produces an outcome as a consequence of completing the sequence but the outcome need not be conceptualized in advance. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 55).

Conflicting values and trade-offs are disaggregated and attended to sequentially within cybernetics. Moreover the model is essentially a "satisficing" rather than an "optimizing" model, in that there is a limited response repertory and the simplicity of decision-making is maintained.³¹

The cybernetic thesis is difficult to apply in a complex environment. Cybernetics requires a highly structured, stable, hierarchical environment. Complexity means that the environment is not "at once small, stable and hierachically arranged" (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 67), rather it entails greater variety to which the decision-maker must respond. Consequently complexity demands that the decision-maker employs a more elaborate response repertory,³² and such demands compromise the cybernetic tenet of simplicity. Steinbruner suggests that the cybernetic simplicity would be maintained if a number of decision-makers were involved in the situation, each focusing on some limited area of the problem, that is specialization. This would explain the maintenance of mass bureaucracies and orgainzational behavior. (Cyert and March 1968).

Linkages

As complexity imposes structural uncertainty and as the structure of the environment is very significant for the cybernetic process, it is necessary

³¹ The cybernetic logic fits the Cyert and March agrument closely. Their model of the firm is a 'satisficing' model in which goals are attended to sequentially in a recipe-like fashion, with several decision-making groups within the firm focusing on limited areas of the overall policy problem. Uncertainty is avoided partly by search and information gathering and partly by concentrating on short term rather than long term consequences. See Cyert and March (1968) and also Koutsoyiannis (1979) for a complete description of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

³² The more complex the environment, the less clearly defined the structure and the less defined the structure, the greater the variety of structural uncertainty.

for the paradigm to be supplemented by a cognitive approach to establish the constraints in which the cybernetic process can operate. The reader will recall that a cognitive approach assumes that there are systematic regularities that the human mind uses to deal with the varieties and the structural uncertainties present in complex situations. Inherent in cognitive theory is the general structure of beliefs, "the way in which the relationships between the beliefs are organized and with the manner in which information is processed in reference to existing beliefs." (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 95). The most highly constrained structure of beliefs is one in which the beliefs constrain each other. One or more of the beliefs may be more dominant and will influence the substance and operation of the other beliefs. Steinbruner states that the belief patterns are developed over time and more importantly,

. . . independent of duration the basic patterns must be established early in a person's maturation process. Regardless of whether belief strength is established by mechanisms of reinforcement or simply by the weight of stored information, it is clear that time must elapse during which the mind processes and stores information. Strong beliefs are thus the result of a gradual process of strengthening. The importance of early experience in a system biased toward stability is obvious, and it is established as an empirical matter that fundamental attitudes appear early and tend to persist throughout the life cycle. Established belief patterns cannot be uprooted without massive disruption to the highly interactive well-structured system of memory characteristics of the mature mind. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 133-134).

This is critical to our understanding of the logical form of the Operational Code belief system. Rokeach (1958, 1960) states that these early (primitive) beliefs relate to the social world in which we live, that is whether the world is friendly and harmonious or unfriendly and conflictual; whether people can be trusted or feared; and whether the future should be regarded with feelings of security or apprehension. Such early beliefs and attitudes relate to the substance of the philosophical beliefs of Operational Code, particularly to Philosophical Belief 1. This belief refers to an actor's essential belief about the nature of the political world: is it harmonious or

conflictual; are one's opponents temporary or permanent; can they be trusted or are they only to be feared; etc. This belief should have the greatest impact on the nature and operation of the other beliefs within the Operational Code system. As Rokeach argues--such primitive beliefs are the most central and they are most resistant to change. From cognitive theory we know that the central beliefs will be more dominant and stable over time. Subsequently they will tend to have the most influence on the other beliefs within the system.

A cognitive approach such as Operational Code provides a theory to account for the structural constraints used to control uncertainty and eliminate variety. The five philosophical beliefs are generated from past experience. These early beliefs are the hardest to change and they occupy the central position in an individual's belief system. Under conditions of uncertainty the mind will tend to preserve these beliefs or images, limiting the propensity of the decision-maker to search for alternative policies which may not support his established image or pattern of beliefs.

In relation to the cybernetic paradigm, Operational Code provides one image of the general structure or assumptions within which the cybernetic thinker may operate. The cybernetic paradigm cannot explain how these important structural constraints come to be established nor how the decision-maker maintains his beliefs or images. Therefore, it relies on the assumptions of cognitive theory to explain how a decision-maker thinks under conditions of uncertainty. For example, I have noted that a decision-maker will tend to minimize inconsistency. Steinbruner suggests that a decision-maker may manage inconsistencies under uncertainty by relying on images and analogies to bolster his beliefs. To illustrate, Ben Gurion would use analogies and images from Jewish history and

the Bible to reinforce his beliefs. Steinbruner also suggests that a decision-maker may use "wishful thinking" to avoid inconsistency, by projecting beliefs into long term goals that will be inevitable over time and thereby avoiding discomfort arising from the failure of goals in the short run.³³ Again, Ben Gurion projected the end of Zionism and redemption into the distant future so that he could avoid any discomfort of failure to establish his goals in the short run.

In each of the above examples we can see how a decision-maker can maintain both consistency and simplicity in his thinking in complex situations. In Operational Code, simplification is based on the strength with which an individual holds certain beliefs over time and the manner in which these beliefs relate to his perception of the world around him. Consequently, it is necessary to know what these beliefs are so that we can better understand decision-making behavior.

Cybernetics highlights the importance of establishing structure on the many beliefs held by an individual. The belief sets that are established in an actor's mind simplify the actor's processing of information especially in highly complex and uncertain situations. In such situations the beliefs provide a highly circumscribed channel through which the vast array of information from the environment is filtered. In relation to Operational Code, this would explain the logic of a set of beliefs which relate only to an actor's view of the political universe since we are concerned here only with his political behavior. Cybernetics also enhances our knowledge of the need of individuals

³³See Steinbruner (1976, pp. 113-122) for a complete outline of his suggestions for inconsistency management.

to strive for simplicity. The principles of cognitive/cybernetic processing assert that "the mind operates so as to establish strong beliefs and act upon them" (Stenbruner, 1976, p. 109) despite conditions of uncertainty. Structure is imposed on uncertain situations and uncertainty is resolved not by probabilistic judgments of the analytical paradigm, nor by ranking as in the cognitive map, but rather by categorical inferences. That is, individuals persist in trying to simplify uncertainty by inferring some "single, clear knowable pattern" (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 111) or belief to the situation. This implies that decision-makers may rely on one belief more than on any other belief in a decision-making situation. Individuals rely on their established structured sets of beliefs, which have been generated over time and reinforced through experience, in times of uncertainty and complexity. In order to create certainty an actor will tend to rely on those belief patterns and responses which were useful in similar past situations. Cybernetics thus supports the Rokeach argument that central beliefs will have the most impact on other beliefs. In relation to Operational Code, this helps to explain why Philosophical Belief 1 is assumed to be a dominant belief within the Operational Code system-- it has been formulated early in a decision-maker's mind and reinforced through experience.

Summary

The traditional literature has been limited in its ability to explain a large percentage of the variance in foreign policy behavior. The relatively new cognitive approaches have tried to account for the unexplained variance by emphasizing the beliefs of a decision-maker as an important source of explanation. The cognitive models that have been developed to date have not been cumulative or focused, but they do share some basic premises. The first is

that the simple "black-box" formulation of the traditional models and the assumptions of the rational models provide an inadequate explanation of foreign policy behavior. Second, the beliefs of an individual, his information processing, and his ability to cope with situations of uncertainty and complexity, will have a measurable effect on his decision-making behavior. Third, these beliefs have been generated over time and are very resistive to change. Any critical change in one belief will cause changes in the beliefs with which it is linked. Knowledge of the relatedness of these beliefs, the content and the structure of these beliefs, are therefore important to our understanding of an actor's decision-making behavior.

The models that were examined in this chapter were diverse in theory, scope, and content. The cognitive models underlined the importance of knowing the empirical content of an actor's beliefs and the manner in which beliefs are related. Cognitive mapping emphasized the centrality of beliefs, their relatedness as causes and effects, the consistency with which beliefs are held and the predictive power of the model. Cybernetics emphasized the importance of belief structure, the formulation of beliefs over time and the effect of beliefs on the learning and information processing of an individual. In addition, cybernetics emphasized the need of the individual to strive for simplicity to control uncertainty. Although these models are useful we are still unable to say exactly which beliefs influence decision-making and information processing, nor do we know precisely the nature of the relatedness or connectedness of the beliefs within a belief system. The Operational Code should be useful in this regard in several ways. First, the Operational Code can supply the analyst with a list of beliefs which are germane to the decision-making process. Second, the code emphasizes the inter-relatedness of the beliefs within a belief system. Third, we can expect these beliefs will provide the basis for a typology of belief system types which can be used to compare decision-makers.

From the argument presented here Operational Code appears to be an approach worthy of consideration. The examination of other cognitive models has provided us with some insights into how beliefs operate and how they may be derived, But none of the models offer fully adequate methods for revealing the nature of these beliefs. An examination of Operational Code and a case study utilizing the Holsti framework should provide the answers to several questions arising from our knowledge of the cognitive approaches:

1. What are the beliefs that are essential to our understanding of a decision-maker's behavior? How are these beliefs categorized for research purposes?
2. How are these essential beliefs related?
3. Is it possible to predict the content of other beliefs from knowing one of the more central beliefs within the system?
4. What problems, if any, are there in the analysis of data to reveal the Operational Code beliefs?
5. Are beliefs obtained from the data valid? Is the coding scheme reliable?
6. Are there any related methodological problems? If so, what are they and how can they be alleviated?

CHAPTER TWO

OPERATIONAL CODE: AN EVALUATION

Chapter Two presents an evaluation of Holsti's revised scheme for the Operational Code. The evaluation will concentrate on six main areas, which briefly stated are: (1) presentation of the code and Holsti's reasons for the expanded format; (2) the relationships or linkages between the beliefs of the code; (3) Holsti's typology of the actor/leader types which are derived from the code; (4) data acquisition, content analysis and the related problems of reliability and validity; (5) Holsti's coding instructions; (6) reliability tests and hypotheses for the case study.

Introduction

In the previous chapter we noted that cognitive theory and cognitive variables are critical to the analysis of decision-making. However, researchers have had difficulties in synthesizing the various "theoretical, methodological and practical" (Holsti, 1977, p. 37) tasks from the various cognitive approaches into a comprehensive framework applicable to political behavior. In addition, evidence concerning an actor's experiences and socialization is scarce and difficult to collect. The Operational Code offers one type of comprehensive framework which the analyst can use to assess an individual's cognitions concerning his political life. The questions which comprise the code relate to those beliefs which are likely to have an impact on a foreign policy decision-maker's information processing, his choice and diagnostic propensities, and his behavior in foreign policy situations.

Holsti's Revised Operational Code

The reader will recall that several analysts employed the original George construct and interpreted the code to fit their research purposes. For example, Heradstveit (1978) used the image of the enemy and a belief which he termed "self-image" for his research. Anderson (1971) and Gutierrez (1973) added a third set of questions relating to an actor's beliefs about the contemporary political system. These examples suggest that there is a lack of uniformity in the meanings of the ten questions and that the original categories are not exhaustive. The lack of uniformity, the non-exhaustive nature of the code, the lack of empirical validity and the resulting lack of cumulativeness, led Holsti to elaborate the definitions of the beliefs within the construct.

Holsti added several questions and sub-categories to each belief and he provided an extensive set of coding rules which he argued will clarify the ambiguity contained in the original code. In addition, Holsti made several changes in the general Philosophical Belief categories of the code. He divided Philosophical Belief 1 into three parts: Philosophical Belief 1-a deals with the image of the political universe--that is, those features of the political universe which are more or less permanent--for example, sources of conflict, conditions of peace, scope of conflict; Philosophical Belief 1-b deals with the image of the opponent; and Philosophical Belief 1-c deals with the image of the contemporary political system--that is, those features which characterize the contemporary political system such as the structure of the contemporary system, is it harmonious or conflictual, how stable is the contemporary system? Further, Holsti combined Philosophical Belief 3 (Predictability of the political system) with Philosophical Belief 5 (The role of chance). Holsti reasoned that the difficulty that Operational Code analysts have had in distinguishing between

the two beliefs could be circumvented by combining them since the beliefs appear to be closely related. The questions and the sub-categories which Holsti added can be more readily assessed in the context of a full outline of Holsti's revised format which follows:

Philosophical Beliefs¹

- 1-a. What is the 'essential' nature of political life?
 - Is the political universe basically conflictual or harmonious?
 - What are the sources of conflict?
 - What are the conditions of peace?
 - What is the nature of conflict?
 - What is the scope of conflict?
 - What is the role of conflict?

- 1-b. What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents and of other significant political actors?
 - What is the nature of the opponent's goals?
 - What are the sources of the opponent's goals?
 - Is the adversary's opposition permanent and general or limited and specific?
 - How is the opponent likely to respond to our conciliatory actions?
 - How is the opponent likely to respond to our policies of firmness?
 - What is the opponent's image of one's own nation?
 - What is the opponent's view of conflict?
 - What is the nature of the opponent's decision-making process?
 - What is the opponent's 'operational code'?

- 1-c. What is the nature of the contemporary international system?
 - Is the international system basically conflictual or harmonious?
 - What are the sources of conflict?
 - What are the conditions of peace?
 - What is the structure of the contemporary international system?
 - How stable is the contemporary international system?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score? And in what respect the one and/or the other?
 - What is the nature one's fundamental goals?
 - Should one be optimistic or pessimistic? About long term goals? About specific undertakings?
 - Is the optimism or pessimism conditional?
 - On whose side is time?

¹The beliefs below are quoted from Holsti, (1977, pp.47-48)

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?
 - Is political life capricious, or does it conform to a more or less discernible pattern?
 - What aspects of political life are predictable or unpredictable?
 - What degree of predictability exists in political life?
4. How much control or mastery can one have over historical development?
What is one's role in 'moving' and 'shaping' history in the desired direction?
 - What is the role of the leader?

Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
 - How should one establish the goals for political action?
 - Should one seek optimal goals or is it better to seek satisfactory ones?
 - How many paths are there to the achievement of ultimate goals?
 - How should one deal with value conflicts?
2. How are the goals of political action pursued most effectively?
 - Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon a goal?
 - What approaches should be used in the pursuit of goals?
 - Under what circumstances should one push harder, be prepared to compromise, or retreat from a previously held position?
 - Under what circumstances is unilateral action preferred? Multi-lateral action?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
 - How are risks assessed?
 - What approach should be used to limit or control risk?
 - How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs associated with risk?
 - Under what circumstances are high risk (or low risk) policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?
 - How important is timing in the achievement of major, long-term aspirations?
 - How important is timing in the success of specific policy undertakings?
 - When is action required, permitted or prohibited?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? What resources can one draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?
 - What are the preferred tactics?
 - How is power conceptualized?

The code presents a set of questions relating to each belief. In addition, Holsti specified further questions in the coding which are used in the content analysis. For example, each belief has an additional question which focuses on the actor's epistemology--"What are the sources of politically-relevant knowledge? What are the relevant diagnostic tools for understanding the nature of politics?" (Holsti, 1977, p. 60). The expectation is that evidence on this point will indicate whether an actor is relying on faith, history, theory or ideology, historical trends, experience or specific events. It is also possible that there will be no evidence on this point. Philosophical Belief 1-b includes three additional questions, the first of which--"What is the opponent's operational code?"-- contains subsidiary items which refer to the actor's image of the opponent's operational code; the opponent's choice of objectives; the opponent's method(s) of pursuing goals; the opponent's risk calculations and the manner in which the opponent copes with risk. The second deals with the evidence required for an opponent to show good faith--at times this might mean only minor concessions on a particular issue; at other times it may mean nothing short of unilateral disarmament, surrender, etc. (Holsti, 1977, p. 64). The third question deals with those terms which the actor uses to describe the opponent. This question will reveal whether the actor uses a particular set of characteristics to evaluate his opponent. For example, Holsti demonstrated how moral characteristics increasingly dominated John Foster Dulles' evaluation of the Soviets over a five year period from 1953 to 1958. For example, in 1953, domestic attributes (despotic, totalitarian, dictatorial)

and external attributes (aggressive, hostile, dangerous, Imperialistic) accounted for 72.4% of the frequency of terms used to describe the Soviets while moral attributes (materialistic, lacking moral law, atheist), accounted for only 27.6% of the frequency. By 1958 the frequency of moral attributes dominating his evaluation of the Soviets had increased to 42.0%.²

As the above examples demonstrate, Holsti's general format of the Operational Code cannot be examined in isolation from the more comprehensive set of code rules. I have provided a sample of Holsti's code rules for Philosophical Belief 1-b below. The other beliefs of the code are set out in a similar manner.³ Holsti provides an extensive description of the precise meanings of each of the questions and the sub-categories set out in the code. Using the example in Figure 2, we are asked whether the actor believes his opponent's fundamental goals are basically unlimited--universal hegemony, radical transformations of the existing international system, elimination of other actors. Or is the opponent interested in expanding his political influence and power--short of a radical transformation of the international system? The opponent may be considered defensive if his interests and goals are directed to the maintenance of his own nation's security and international status quo. A conciliatory opponent would be viewed as one willing to undertake at least limited accommodation when necessary.⁴

²For a complete analysis of this point see Finlay, Holsti and Fagen 1967, p. 50.

³See Appendix I, p. 185

⁴Refer to Holsti, (1977, pp. 55-148) for a complete outline of the coding definitions.

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____ Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Opponent's goals:

1. Destructionist [] 2. Expansionist [] 3. Defensive [] 4. Conciliatory []
5. Peace [] 6. No ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

B. Source of opponent's policy:

1. Ideology [] 2. Historical [] 3. Internal needs [] 4. Leader []
5. Power politics [] 6. External [] 7. No reference [] 8. Other (specify) _____

C. Generality of adversary's hostility or opposition:

1. General/permanent [] 2. Specific/limited [] 3. No reference []
4. Other (specify) _____

D. Likely response of adversary to our conciliatory moves:

1. Reciprocate in this situation [] 2. Reciprocate in other situations []
3. Ignore [] 4. Take advantage in this situation [] 5. Take advantage in other situations []
6. No reference []
7. Other (specify) _____

E. Likely response of adversary to our policies of firmness:

1. Back down [] 2. Ignore [] 3. Reciprocate this situation []
4. Reciprocate in other situations [] 5. Respond impulsively []
6. No ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:

1. Destructionist [] 2. Expansionist [] 3. Defensive [] 4. Conciliatory []
5. Peace [] 6. No Ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

G. Opponent's view of conflict:

1. Inevitable [] 2. Avoidable [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

1. Desirable [] 2. Undesirable [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

H. Opponent's decision-making processes:

1. Model I [] 2. Model II [] 3. Model III [] 4. No. ref. []

5. Other _____

1. Calculating [] 2. Impulsive [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

I. Opponent's "Operational Code": Choice of objectives:

1. Optimize [] 2. Satisfice [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

1. Realistic [] 2. Unrealistic [] 3. No. ref. [] 5. Other _____

1. Flexible [] 2. Inflexible [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

1. Predictable [] 2. Unpredictable [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

J. Opponent's "Operational Code": Pursuit of objectives:

1. Prepare ground [] 2. Try-and-see [] 3. Incremental [] 4. Blitzkrieg

[] 5. No. ref. [] 6. Other (specify) _____

K. Opponent's "Operational Code": Risk Calculation and Coping with Risk:

1. Maximize gains [] 2. Minimize losses [] 3. No. ref. []

4. Other _____

L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:_____
_____M. List here all terms used to describe the adversary and his actions:_____
_____N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []

5. Specific event(s) (specify) _____

6. Faith [] 7. No. ref. [] 8. Other (specify) _____

The code questions as illustrated, are multi-dimensional and comprehensive. Holsti argues that comprehensiveness is necessary at this stage of development because there is insufficient evidence to distinguish between those belief dimensions which may have the greatest impact on the decision-making processes. Some of the earlier studies which I have cited, did attempt to narrow the scope of the code to one or two belief dimensions. Heradstveit's (1978) belief dimension "self-image" subsumes some of the characteristics of the "image of the opponent". In Holsti's revised code format it is possible to derive an actor's self-image from: Philosophical Belief 2 (goals and aspirations); Philosophical Belief 1-a (beliefs about conflict); Instrumental Belief 3 (risk-taking) and Instrumental Belief 1 (approach to goal selection). If a theory is weak it is better to collect information at the lowest level of aggregation. This provides flexibility if one wishes to use the same set of observations for several research purposes or questions.

Evaluation of the Code Categories

Holsti's revisions of the George construct are intended to eliminate ambiguity. For the most part, the additional questions and sub-categories do lend clarity and conciseness to the definitions of the general belief categories. For example, the fourteen questions and sub-categories for Philosophical Belief 1-b clearly define the identity of the opponent, his goals, source of policy, generality of hostility of the adversary, and establish a fairly concise image of the opponent's own operational code. By inserting a question which relates to the generality of hostility or the adversary, Holsti has also addressed Anderson's criticisms that the image of the opponent is not a basic philosophical belief. Anderson (1971) believes that the image of the opponent is "system-specific" rather than a generalization which fits every opponent through history. Holsti's revision allows the investigator to record temporary and

specific opponents as well as those which may be considered permanent and general.

Further criticisms of the George construct were also addressed by Holsti. For example, Anderson had sought to clarify what he considered overlap and repetitions in Philosophical Beliefs 3 and 5 by eliminating Philosophical Belief 5. He argued that an inquiry about an actor's beliefs about the role of chance (Philosophical Belief 5) is necessarily covered by the actor's beliefs about his ability or inability to predict the political future. (Philosophical Belief 3). Holsti meets this same criticism by combining Philosophical Belief 3 and 5 rather than eliminating Philosophical Belief 5. The combined belief category--Philosophical Belief 3--however, appears to strengthen the definition of predictability with little or no emphasis on the role of chance. For example, previous studies using the George construct coded such statements--chance more than anything else played an important role in McGovern's choice of a running-mate in the U.S. presidential elections--as Senator Frank Church's belief about the role of chance. (Johnson, 1973). In addition, Senator William Fulbright made several statements about war which Tweaser (1973) coded as beliefs about the role of chance, for example, war is caused by misperception and war by miscalculation is the greatest danger to peace.⁵ Under Holsti's revised scheme, these statements cannot be adequately coded since they do not appear to relate to questions included in Philosophical Belief 3 such as: Is political life capricious or predictable? What aspects of political life are predictable? The statements by Senator Fulbright above, might be better

⁵Holsti coded similar statements made by Dulles as beliefs about the role of chance. See Holsti (1970, p. 139)

coded under a category which deals with the inevitability of war. Anderson added such a category to his intermediate set of beliefs in his revised scheme. Based on these points, I would expect some difficulty in coding statements relating to chance in my analysis of Ben Gurion.

The rest of the Philosophical Beliefs are adequately enhanced by Holsti's additional questions and sub-categories. They provide clear, concise definitions of the exact nature of the beliefs.

There is one major problem in the Instrumental Belief Categories. The definitions provided for Instrumental Beliefs 2 and 5 are not exact enough to differentiate between "strategy" and "tactics". Instrumental Belief 2-- How are goals pursued most effectively--includes questions and sub-categories which deal with means (or strategy). Instrumental Belief 5 deals with the utility and role of the means used for advancing one's goals and includes questions on the appropriate tactics one uses. The definitions which Holsti provides for these two beliefs are not discrete enough to avoid overlap because both strategy and tactics can be considered means. Based on these points, I would expect difficulty in coding statements relating to strategy and/or tactics in my analysis of Ben Gurion.

Anderson attempted to clarify the overlap in these two beliefs by defining Instrumental Belief 5 as the general guidelines of policy and Instrumental Belief 2 as the tactical maxims that one should follow. (Anderson, 1973, pp. 30-33). However, Holsti insists that Instrumental Belief 2 refers to the general strategy one uses to pursue goals and that Instrumental Belief 5 refers to the specific tactics. (Holsti, 1977, pp. 75 and 79).

Holsti does not include a category which refers to one's own source of policy, similar to the questions in Philosophical Belief 1-b. The omission of the category will cause an incomplete picture of the actor's beliefs concerning

why a particular policy may be more desirable than any other. This will subsequently affect the predictive value of the code in analysing an actor's choice propensities. Perhaps Holsti expects his additional question for each belief--What is the Source of Knowledge--to subsume any reference to the source of one's own policy. However, the sub-categories under Source of Knowledge are not discrete enough to capture the essence of one's own source of policy. I stated in Chapter One that the second premise of Operational Code permits other factors--situational variables, domestic variables, personal pressures, etc.--to influence the information and decision-making processes. Perhaps the source of one's policy can be considered as "other factors" although the basis for this type of inference is not made clear in Holsti's code rules. I expect that my analysis of Ben Gurion will provide several statements relating to the source of one's own policy which cannot be adequately coded in the Holsti scheme.

Linkages in Operational Code

In Chapter One I noted that belief systems have constraints which link the beliefs together so that a change in one belief will yield a concomitant change in the other beliefs in the system. Holsti states, however, that the relationships between the beliefs are subtle and complex. We should not expect that knowledge of one belief will automatically reveal all of the other aspects of an actor's belief system. What we can expect is a co-occurrence of beliefs; that is, whenever one belief is present other related beliefs should also be present.

Linkages or constraints in a belief system may depend on: the centrality or consistency of any or all the beliefs in the system; on the self-esteem of the actor; or on other sources. Rokeach (1969) has argued that motivational consistency is linked to an individual's self-esteem. It follows that a decision-maker with high self-esteem will be inclined to have a higher degree of self-

confidence in his own opinions and will have a high resistance to discrepant information. On the other hand, persons with low self-esteem (for example, Barber's negative-passive type⁶) will be more easily persuaded to alter their attitudes to avoid inconsistency.

Although complexity in assessing the linkages between the beliefs of a belief system does exist, empirical investigation has revealed that there are systematic linkages between operational code beliefs. (Holsti, 1977, p. 152).

As Holsti states:

If empirical investigation revealed that this were not the case it would raise serious questions about the utility of the operational code construct, at least as a way of describing belief systems. (Holsti, 1977, p. 152, emphasis in original).

Existing studies do provide consistent evidence that Philosophical Belief 1 is a master belief and that changes in this belief does cause concomitant changes in the other beliefs. For example, Tweaser's analysis of Senator Fulbright discovered two major changes in the Senator's image of the enemy (part of Philosophical Belief 1). Changes in Fulbright's image of the enemy resulted in "concomitant changes in the image of the international system; changes in the U.S. national role; principal ends and means; and changes in Presidential-Congressional Relations". (Tweaser, 1973, p. 37).

Studies on Operational Code do provide interesting insights into the beliefs of certain decision-makers but it is only with the establishment of typologies of belief types that some initial "meaningful comparison(s)--a prerequisite to cumulation of findings as well as to theory construction--will be achieved." (Holsti, 1977, p. 169).

⁶For a more detailed examination of these types, see Barber, 1977.

Holsti has made a preliminary move to create a typology based on the evidence provided by existing studies. The typology is constructed from the answers to two parts of Philosophical Belief 1--the nature of the political universe and the fundamental sources of conflict. Sufficient evidence exists in the Operational Code and from other sources (Putnam, 1973) to suggest that politicians "differ in the basic assumptions about the extent of conflict inherent in society and these orientations, stressing harmony and cooperation or discord and controversy, seem to guide their thought and behavior across a remarkably wide range of activities." (Putnam, 1973, p. 125).

Holsti's Typology

Holsti's typology, originally formulated in June, 1977 and further refined in December, 1977, is a two by three matrix of belief types based on the views of the universe (conflictual or harmonious) and on the source of conflict (human nature, attributes of nations, or the international system). The six different types are depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3

TYPOLOGY OF BELIEF TYPES

Sources of Conflict	Nature of the Political Universe	
	Harmonious (Conflict Temporary)	Conflictual (Conflict Permanent)
Human Nature	A	D
Attributes of Nations	B	E
International System	C	F

According to Holsti the general characteristics of the types are as follows:

...Type A includes those who locate the sources of conflict in certain aspects of human nature (ignorance, prejudice, ethnocentrism and the like)...Type B...believe that, because the sources of conflict are to be found in the attributions of certain nations or classes of nations, the necessary and sufficient conditions of peace are their reform or elimination...Type C includes those who deny that specific states or classes of states are the primary roots of conflict...they emphasize that...because a conflict is inevitable in an anarchical system in which each nation is ultimately responsible for its own security, peace requires fundamental transformation of the system...Type D (includes those who find the source of conflict) in certain permanent features of man's nature: selfishness, greed, power-seeking, or similar attributes... Type E are skeptical about the perfectibility of human institutions, including the nation-state...Type F locate the roots on (sic) conflict in an anarchical environment in which the search for security and self-preservation requires actors to behave in ways that are certain, in the long run, to bring them into conflict with others. (Holsti, 1977, p. 158-160).

Holsti discovered that the types D and E share many similar features.

First, they share the belief that conflict is rooted in human nature; a man is considered to be innately selfish, power-seeking and greedy, and harmony among men is a utopian ideal doomed to failure. Second, since the nation-states and international institutions are a product of imperfect man, they will reflect man's imperfections. Thus a positive transformation of these political arrangements would be unlikely. Third, perpetual peace may be utopian but peace can be maintained by "deterring and containing those who seek to overrun the status quo by force." (Holsti, 1977, p. 160). The distinctions between the types therefore only appear to be precise since empirically the distinctions "between them may turn out to be less precise than suggested here." (Holsti, June, 1977, p. 11).

Holsti assessed his typology first by developing a plausible set of relationships between the six types and the other beliefs within Operational Code. For example, if a person believes that the political universe is basically harmonious and that the source of conflict is found in the attributes of nations, he should then believe that transformation, elimination or reform

of the warlike states will bring about peace. Holsti is able to identify linkages in many, but not all, cases. He is unable to identify any logical relations between a Type C actor, who views the universe as basically harmonious and finds the source of conflict in the international system, and the Instrumental Beliefs. There may be several reasons for this gap in theory. As I mentioned before, linkages among beliefs need not necessarily be derived logically. Other sources such as self-esteem, psychological sources, social sources, etc., may constrain the beliefs. It may therefore be difficult to discern relationships in a single probe of actors' behavior. Holsti acknowledges this problem and states that the gap may indicate a flaw in the typology.

Alternatively, it is also possible that, among those who find the sources of conflict in the nature of the international system and who advocate that it should be fundamentally restructured, we should not expect to find much uniformity on questions of means. It is also possible that linkages between some beliefs are very strong (that is, almost invariably persons of a particular 'type' will respond similarly to some other operational code questions), whereas, in other cases the linkages occur little more frequently than one would expect by chance. (Holsti, 1977, pp. 169 and 179).

Holsti warns us that the typology is tentative. Derivations may occur first because of other sources of constraints. Second, the typology crosses two dimensions. Subsequently, distortions may arise in which "differences within the cells may actually be greater than those between the cells." (Holsti, 1977, p. 166). Finally, the relationships which are logically postulated may not be found empirically.

Holsti submitted his hypotheses to several empirical tests based on existing operational code studies. The tests resulted in moderately strong support for his hypotheses. The evidence suggests that the two beliefs "on which the typology is based are strongly correlated with responses to other questions about the nature of the political universe." (Holsti, 1977, p. 202).

The degree of support for the hypotheses varies among beliefs. Philosophical Belief 4 (the role of the leader) is relatively independent of the other beliefs. The third Instrumental Belief (Risk-taking) is also only weakly related. Holsti finds this last finding difficult to explain. He suggests that perhaps risk-taking beliefs are independent from the beliefs of the political universe. "Alternatively, this result may be a consequence of role." (Holsti, 1977, p. 268). I suspect that the reasons for the lack of evidence for Instrumental Belief 3 rests in actor rationalizations for behavior which they have undertaken. That is, actors view their behavior as the only options available, irrespective of its degree of risk. For example, I expect that Ben Gurion's Operational Code will show that his decisions - for example to declare Israel a state or to engage in the Sinai Campaign - were made because he believed that in such circumstances, risk assessment had little bearing as there was but one decision available which was consistent with his belief system.

Holsti's empirical evidence exposed some additional limitations in the typology. The tests only examined twelve Operational Code studies. The existing studies overrepresents American Senators and Secretaries of State (8 of the 12). Further all of the studies dealt with leaders from highly structured societies. In addition, Holsti was only able to fit the actors into four of the six actor/leader types. Two of the types were overrepresented (Type A--5 cases; Type B--3 cases). None of the studies revealed a Type C or Type F actor.⁷ It is possible that Type C or Type F leaders do not exist

⁷Type C: universe is harmonious, conflict is based on the international system. Type F: conflict is permanent and based on the international system.

empirically and the typology can be reduced to a four celled matrix. Reduction of the size of the typology would yield a more parsimonious construct. If meaningful typologies are to be constructed, we must examine the Operational Codes of leaders from as wide and diverse a background as possible. Previous studies have been limited in diversity and scope. While a few studies (White, 1969; Ashby, 1970; Kavanagh, 1977; and Heradstveit, 1978) have dealt with non-American leaders it still remains to be seen whether the Operational Code can be applied to leaders from developing, relatively unstructured societies. The sample size must be increased and must reflect a broader spectrum of political backgrounds and development before any conclusive statements can be made about the generality of the typology.

Holsti suggests the possibility of creating a typology based on Philosophical Belief 4--the role of the leader in shaping history. Such a typology would probably be similar to Barber's classification of leaders which consists of four types: active-negative, active-positive, passive-negative, and passive-positive. These types have been assessed empirically using American Presidential material. The characteristics used to construct these types are similar to those subsumed under Philosophical Belief 4. Under this belief, investigators are asked to determine whether a decision-maker actively uses politics (active-positive-usually of high self-esteem); intervenes when possible (active-negative) mediates between contending forces (passive-positive); or avoids intervention (passive-negative--tends to withdraw, escape from conflict, of low self-esteem).⁸ A more limited typology based on Philosophical Belief 4 may be more valuable in some cases;⁹

...(1) for identifying the most salient differences among political leaders.

⁸ Holsti includes two other determinants: 1) discern historical trends and 2) control uncertain but must act.

⁹ Heradstveit (1978) used a typology based on "war-monger" and "peace-monger" types.

(2) for predicting other aspects of leaders' beliefs; and (3) for predicting other aspects of political behavior, such as decision-making propensities. (Holsti, 1977, p. 271).

My case study of David Ben Gurion will allow for a further evaluation of Holsti's construct and his hypotheses regarding the linkages between Philosophical Belief 1 and the other beliefs, and the independence of Philosophical Belief 4 and Instrumental Belief 3. I expect the results of the case study will "type" Ben Gurion as a Type B actor/leader but I do not expect he will fit all the categories set up by Holsti. A comparison of Ben Gurion's Operational Code with Holsti's typology will be presented following the case study in Chapter Three.

Data Acquisition and Content Analysis

It is difficult to gain direct access to individual decision-makers in their organizational context. As Holsti noted:

The standard method of attitude measurement--the personal interview, the questionnaire, or the direct observation of the decision-maker in action--can rarely be used by the social scientist who seeks to study human behavior at the international level. (Holsti, 1977, p. 129).

Analysts have had to rely on data acquired from the speeches and writings of the decision-maker. My selection of the late David Ben Gurion as the subject of the case study in this thesis precludes direct access to the decision-maker himself. Data have been collected from material written or articulated by Ben Gurion. In raw form the data consist of translated versions of Ben Gurion's books, speeches and letters. The books were published from 1954 to 1973. However, the material in several books, for example, Letters to Paula (1968) and Rebirth and Destiny (1954) consist of letters and speeches which were written during the period 1918 to 1954. His book, My Talks With Arab Leaders (1971), is a collection of negotiations between himself and the Arab Leaders of the Middle East from 1918 to 1963. Another source of data is Moshe Pearlman's record of his interview with Ben Gurion in 1965. Several biographical

sources have been used for supporting evidence only.

George and Holsti are concerned about investigators deriving a belief system solely from official statements made by the decision-maker since they may reflect a decision-maker's rationalization of his actions rather than his policy calculations. Official documents may present a biased version of beliefs given that such documents usually present a positive view of government actions.¹⁰ Any material written or articulated by a decision-maker may be subject to biases also. Decision-makers may articulate and write only those ideas they feel the public wants to hear and read and not what they truly believe. The truthfulness of verbal statements may be clouded by the decision-maker whose words may be expressed strictly to enhance his position and may not necessarily reflect his actions. Singer concurs with this statement. He states that an elite member may speak in order to generate an image, persuade an audience, demonstrate solidarity, plead a case, or merely blow off steam. (Singer, 1964, p. 28). However, if we were to consider the statements of elites as biased and continually misrepresenting their beliefs then the credibility of the elites would certainly be suspect. Singer argues that the beliefs of a decision-maker may not be reflected in his action. I have stated before that many other variables affect behavior. The social, economic, domestic situations may impede a decision-maker from acting on his beliefs. The concern here is not with the effect of beliefs on the final outcome but rather with those processes which precede the action. The use of the less formal writings of decision-makers is more likely to reveal the decision processes than the more formal writings.

¹⁰Zinnes and Koch present some insights into the analysis of official documents in North et al (1963, pp. 17-36).

The data which I collected for my study are limited in somewhat different manner as all but one of the books--Israel: Years of Challenge (1963) have been translated from the original Hebrew. The translated versions of Ben Gurion's writings represent only a small proportion of his works. Whether or not an Operational Code analysis of Ben Gurion, drawn from his prolific Hebrew writings would be significantly different than the analysis presented here remains to be seen. I would expect that, given the consistency of the beliefs in an Operational Code belief system and the assumption of their affect on the decision-making processes,(that) the beliefs which I will draw from my sample would be the same as those drawn from a larger sample of material. A larger sample therefore would only supply further examples of similar beliefs.

Content Analysis

One of the methods used to analyze verbal data is content analysis. This technique allows a researcher to make inferences from specified characteristics to some aspect of an actor's behavior or to some specified relationship(s). Inferences are made in accordance with the set of categories used for the content analysis. Hence investigation depends on the categories of the coding scheme. As Berelson points out:

Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Particular studies have been productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem, and to the content. Content analysis studies done on a hit or miss basis, without clearly formulated problems for investigation and with vaguely drawn or poorly articulated categories are almost certain to be of indifferent or low quality as research productions...Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories. (Berelson, in Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976, p. 136).

Two processes are necessary for content analysis. First, the content attributes must be specified. Second, a set of coding rules must be constructed so as to identify, and control the recording of content characteristics. The recording and context units used in a content analysis vary with the research

design. The former refers to the unit actually used in the observation/measurement process; a word, for example. Generally it is the smallest content unit in which the features or attributes of interest are to be found. The context unit refers to some larger body of content characteristics, for example a sentence, a paragraph, or a whole text. For the purposes of Operational Code the recording unit is usually the sentence or theme, and the context unit is usually the paragraph in which the sentence or theme occurs.

The questions in Holsti's format are the indicators that determine which recording unit falls into which category. For example, statements made by an actor which reflect his beliefs as to the nature of conflict--War is zero-sum--would be categorized under Philosophical Belief 1-a since the "nature of conflict" is an indicator of this belief. Similarly, the statement--War can determine a people's destiny--refers to the role of conflict in historical development--another indicator of Philosophical Belief 1-a. Holsti added the subcategories to ensure that material drawn for one belief would not be drawn for any other belief. In addition, the subcategories should exhaust all the possible responses for any one belief category. For example, under the indicator of Sources of Conflict for Philosophical Belief 1-a, Holsti has listed twelve possible alternatives, including: human nature; national attributes (four sources); international system (four sources); and no reference or other sources. Exhaustiveness of the categories should ensure that all the recording units relevant to the beliefs will be recorded.

The choices available for the context unit in Operational Code include the paragraph, the page or the whole text. In order to provide answers for all the sub-categories information may be drawn from any or all of the contextual units.

The coding categories in Holsti's Operational Code may pose some difficulties in recording beliefs because of a possible lack of precision in the

coding instructions. If this proves to be the case, then the code will be weakened because it will not be possible to maintain mutual exclusiveness.

As the Nachmias state:

...mutual exclusiveness means that no recording unit can be used more than once within any given category-system. The researcher also has to specify explicitly the indicators that determine which recording units fall into each category. This enables replication, which is an essential requirement of objective and systematic content analysis. (Nachmias, D. and Nachmias, C., 1976, p. 137).

Content analysis can either be quantitative or qualitative. The former will obtain fairly precise, objective and reliable results concerning

...the frequency with which given content characteristics occur either singly or in conjunction with one another. In other words, the quantitative approach substitutes controlled observation and systematic counting for impressionistic ways of observing frequencies of behavior. (George, in Pool, 1955, p. 8).

Qualitative analysis is more concerned with the presence or absence of content characteristics than with the number of times the content characteristic occurs. While a precise definition of qualitative analysis is difficult¹¹ the distinction becomes clear when one examines the validity and reliability of content analysis. Operational Code can be adapted to either a qualitative or quantitative analysis. (Holsti, 1977). The case study in Chapter Three will be a qualitative analysis as the single presence of a belief statement should be of equal significance as those belief statements which occur more frequently.

Validity

Nachmias and Nachmias discuss three kinds of validity tests: face validity, construct validity and empirical validity. Face validity tests whether the measuring instrument "appears to measure according to the researcher's subjective assessment." (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976, p. 60). The main validity

¹¹See George (1969, p. 9) for a description of some of the uses of qualitative analysis.

question in Operational Code is whether the code categories actually tap the beliefs which are germane to a decision-maker's political view of the world. Janis (in Lasswell, 1968) points out that no matter how explicit the rules are it is inevitable that there will be borderline cases in which the meanings are unclear and the rules of the content analysis offer little guidance in coding the material.

It is obvious that some sort of evidence is needed to ensure that Operational Code does measure the beliefs of a decision-maker. There is sufficient empirical evidence to support the claim that the ten questions contained in Operational Code do in fact reveal those beliefs which are central to a decision-maker's views of his political milieu. That is, Operational Code has face validity.

Construct validity involves relating the measurement to the overall theoretical framework of which it is a part. In Operational Code there is evidence to suggest that expected relationships between the beliefs do, in fact, hold. Knowledge of the content of one master belief should be an indicator of the other beliefs to which it is related. For instance, if we know that an actor is an optimist or pessimist with respect to goal achievement, we might be able to say something about his choice of goals, namely that an optimist will tend to choose optimal goals.

The third test of validity is empirical validity.

...if a certain instrument is valid, then there should exist certain empirical relations between the results produced by the instrument and other properties or variables. Evidence to support the existence of a relation is obtained by measures of correlation appropriate to the level of measurement. (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976, p. 61).

The difficulty here is choosing an appropriate criterion for the correlation. If we wished to correlate optimism with some criterion we might use measures derived from personality tests, or the assessment of outside judges, or we

could employ measures of risk-taking since it is hypothesized that optimists are low risk takers under conditions of complexity.¹² The burden of evidence would then rest on the strength of the correlations between measures derived from the Operational Code analysis and the measures derived from outside sources. A second strategy could compare the results of an Operational Code analysis with other types of analysis of the same decision-maker(s). For example, Brecher (1973) used the idea of an "Attitudinal Prism" and found that Ben Gurion's actions were dominated by his beliefs in the necessity of a Jewish State and the fulfillment of Zionism. (both attributes of Philosophical Belief 2--Fundamental Goals). Part of the difficulty here is that the Operational Code categories are not presently developed much beyond the nominal level. Correlation requires ordinal or interval level data. Consequently, Operational Code has to be developed in terms of dimensions. Validity of Operational Code as a measure of foreign policy behavior will have to rely on face validity and construct validity at this stage of its development.

Reliability

Reliability refers to the ability of a measure to provide consistent results when replicated. Holsti summarizes some of the difficulties which could affect the reliability of Operational Code measurement procedures:

1. Inability to determine whether a particular passage should be coded in one category or another; that is, the instructions are not sufficiently precise to enable you to make decisions with any degree of confidence.

¹²A contrary view is posited by McClelland (1968) who hypothesizes that a person who wants to succeed and is a nonconformist will enjoy an element of high risks. According to his achievement motivation scale (N Achievement) a person who has a high frequency of instances of achievement ideas or images will be a high risk taker. (See also, Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976, p. 134) If McClelland is correct then there will be some serious problems in the validity of the typology which Holsti has constructed, since the part of the construct concerning risk-taking was based on the George and Holsti hypothesis that optimists tend to be low risk takers.

2. Materials in the text seem highly relevant for one of the Operational Code beliefs, but the instructions give no guidance on how to deal with them.
3. The set of specific questions that are used in the second and fourth stages of the coding are inadequate for dealing with some types of materials.
4. Inconsistencies and contradictions are found in the instructions.

Holsti's extensive coding instructions are meant to enhance inter-coder reliability. He describes precisely the kinds of information which would be relevant for each belief. For example, Instrumental Belief 4 refers to an actor's beliefs regarding the establishment of goals for political action. We are instructed to focus on the decision-maker's most effective strategies for pursuing these goals including: the conditions for goal substitution; goal modification, or the abandonment of goals. These categories are themselves described in considerable detail. For example, goal modification means scaling up and scaling down or compromising the original goal. Strategies are: pushing harder, employing force, coercive diplomacy, escalating the conflict, etc. Holsti's comprehensiveness may be a weakness as well as a strength. The complexity of the coding task as a whole increases the likelihood of miscoding in replicated studies.

In view of the possible problems in achieving validity and reliability in Operational Code, I decided to employ a second coder--a graduate student from the Department of Political Studies. The results of the coding tests follow a brief overview of the instructions for coding.

Holsti's Coding Instructions

The coding instructions set out by Holsti are far too extensive to be included in their entirety in this thesis.¹³ What follows is a brief overview of the instructions and an evaluation of their relative utility.

¹³For a complete outline of Holsti's rules and instructions see Holsti, (1977, pp. 54-142).

Holsti divides the instructions for coding into four stages. In Stage I, the coder is asked to read each paragraph of the document and determine whether the material is relevant. If the paragraph contains relevant material the coder indicates this in the margin with the appropriate code. For example, P-I(a) for Philosophical Belief 1-a; P-I(b) and so on. No theme which is the recording unit, is to receive more than a single code as double coding creates inference problems. There are however, certain conditions in which a sentence may receive more than a single code. In such cases, the sentence is divided into smaller themes, each containing a separate belief and a separate code. The code assigned to the first theme in the sentence does not automatically determine how the additional themes are coded. Consider the following sentence:

(The difficulty of keeping open the link with Tel Aviv is great but not unsurmountable [P-2--an expression of optimism] and remember that we can paralyze the Arab lines of communication. [I-2--a strategy suggestion]).

In Stage II, the researcher deals with the answers to the detailed sets of questions about each paragraph identified in Stage I. The coding is done on forms resembling a closed-ended questionnaire. This format forces the analyst to focus on one structural problem at a time. Stages III and IV repeat the steps taken in Stages I and II, this time for the Instrumental Beliefs.

Throughout all four stages, the coder(s) must be certain to

...code only what appears in the text, and not to assume the existence of unstated beliefs just because they are likely to be associated with others that are found in the material being coded. (Holsti, 1977, p. 53, emphasis in original).

Coders must also omit purely factual material such as, "Israel is the smallest country in the Middle East" or "Israel receives reparation payments from Germany."

Many of the derivative coding rules in Holsti's scheme provide definitions of the sub-categories for the main belief categories. In general, the definitions are concise and should identify those passages which match the definitions precisely. The difficulties will arise when passages appear to be relevant for

one belief but the definitions are not precise enough to be able to code the passage, or when judgments have to be made by the coder concerning the fit between a given theme and the main belief category.

Methodology for Reliability Tests

Holsti's code rules were applied to a random sample of the material collected for the case study of Ben Gurion. The second coder was given instructions on the application of the code and he was instructed to read Holsti's guidelines carefully. Some specific instructions were given to assist the coder:

1. The recording unit is the theme or the sentence. The contextual unit is paragraph. There may be instances in which the evidence for the sub-categories is likely to be found outside the recording or the immediate contextual unit and this must be coded at the appropriate stage.
2. Code only the material directly attributable to Ben Gurion. Exclude any reference made by other actors.
3. Each coding sheet is to be designated by the source of the material, page number, issue, statement, circumstances in which the statement was made, the adversary (if relevant) and the date the statement was made.
4. The Philosophical Beliefs are to be coded first then the Instrumental Beliefs.
5. Any sentence which you feel should be coded but which falls outside the rules as stated in the coding instructions, should be noted in the notebooks provided. All the information as to its designation (Rule 3) should be noted.

Some preliminary tests were made between the coder and myself to ensure that we were coding the same material, but, for the most part, the second coder worked independently.

The entire sample that I had originally collected consisted of six books, eleven speeches or documents written by Ben Gurion and one interview text. This material was divided into units. Each book was divided by chapter; Letters to Paula was divided by dates; each speech or document was considered a single unit. A total of 120 units resulted from this procedure. A random

sample of 24 units (20%) containing 270 pages, was then drawn for the first reliability test.

In the first test, I coded (Coder A) 138 sentences from the sample of 270 pages of which 49 sentences were not coded by the second coder (Coder B). Coder B coded 161 sentences from the sample, of which 72 sentences were not coded by Coder A. Of the total of 299 sentences, 121 sentences were different (40.4% error). These results are displayed in Table 1.

In the first test, which was a preliminary assessment of the coding scheme, only 89 sentences were coded by both Coder A and Coder B from the total of 299 coded sentences. Only 4 (4.5%) of the 89 sentences received identical codes in all categories. Gross Belief Errors accounted for 9.4% of the error and occurred when one coder coded a sentence as a Philosophical Belief while the other coded the sentence as an Instrumental Belief. Belief Category Errors accounted for 36.4% of the error and occurred when the coders placed the same sentence in different belief categories within the same general section. Internal Category Errors accounted for 30.6% of the error and occurred when both coders placed a sentence in the same belief category but did not agree on the coding of the sub-categories. There were 20 sentences (23.6%) which were ambiguous; that is, both coders felt the sentences related to the political beliefs of the decision-maker but the rules or instructions did not permit a coding decision. The results of the first test, depicted on Table 2, bear out Holsti's concern with coding problems. The low level of intercoder agreement in the various coding decision indicates that the coding rules are not explicitly distinct to avoid miscoding, especially in Belief Category and Internal Category Errors. In addition, the number of ambiguous sentences reflect Holsti's concern that there may be passages which appear relevant for one belief but the instructions are inadequate to deal with them. Given the extent to which these results undermine the purposes of Operational Code and the validity of a case study based on Operational Code categories, two other reliability tests were designed

TABLE 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF STATEMENTS CODED BY BOTH
CODERS FROM THE FIRST SAMPLE

Coder A	-	138 Statements	49	Not Coded by B
Coder B	-	161 Statements	72	Not Coded by A
		-----	-----	
TOTAL CODED:		299 Statements	131	Different Statements
ERROR:		40.4%		

TABLE 2
 PERCENTAGE OF ERROR TYPES FROM FIRST SAMPLE

	(N)	(%)
TOTAL IDENTICAL STATEMENTS	89	100%
EXACT MATCH ALL CATEGORIES	4	4.5%
ERROR	85	95.5%
GROSS BELIEF ERROR	8	9.4%
BELIEF CATEGORY ERROR		
Philosophical Statements	15	17.6%
Instrumental Statements	16	18.8%
	—	—
TOTAL STATEMENTS	31	36.4%
INTERNAL CATEGORY ERROR		
Philosophical	13	15.3%
Instrumental	13	15.3%
	—	—
TOTAL STATEMENTS	26	30.6%
AMBIGUOUS	20	23.6%

so as to locate the major sources of error.

The first of these was designed to assess the nature of the Belief Category Errors. This test used a random sample of 14 sentences drawn from those sentences which had Belief Category Errors in the first test. Of the 14 sentences, three (26.4%) were recoded identically. In two instances a sentence which had been coded in one gross belief category in the first test was recoded in the other gross belief category in the second test. (Gross Belief Changes). In the first instance, a sentence was coded as Instrumental Belief 2 by Coder B and Instrumental Belief 5 by Coder A in the first test. In the second test, both coders coded the sentence as Philosophical Belief 2 with no internal category disagreements. In the second instance, Coder B had originally coded a sentence as Philosophical Belief 1-awhile Coder A had coded it as Philosophical Belief 2. In the second test, both coders coded the sentence as Instrumental Belief 2, disagreeing only as to the Source of Knowledge. Eleven sentences (78.6%) had Internal Category Errors. Five of these (35.7%) were Philosophical Beliefs and six (42.9%) were Instrumental Beliefs. The results of this test are displayed on Table 3.

The second test had a higher percent of statements coded identically than the first test. Perhaps the increased familiarity with the code increased the understanding of the definitions and consequently Gross Belief Errors generated in the first test were avoided in the second test. However, increased familiarity with the code should have prevented other errors as well.

A third test was devised to assess whether familiarity with the code would increase the reliability of the inferences drawn from the coding rules. A new sample was drawn consisting of four units, for a total of ten pages of text. Coder A coded 14 sentences from the sample of which four were not coded by Coder B. Coder B coded 17 sentences of which eight were not coded by Coder A. Of the total of 31 sentences, 13 sentences were different (41.9% error). These results are displayed on Table 4. In the third test, nine sentences were coded by both coders. Of these, only one was coded identically (11.1%). There

TABLE 3

RELIABILITY TEST TO ASSESS THE NATURE OF THE
BELIEF CATEGORY ERRORS

	N	%
TOTAL STATEMENTS	14	100%
EXACT MATCH ALL CATEGORIES	3	21.4
ERROR	11	78.6
GROSS BELIEF CHANGES		
	1st Test	Retest
Coder A	I-5	P-2 Exact Match
Coder B	I-2	
Coder A	P-2	1-2 One Subcategory Error
Coder B	P-1a	
INTERNAL CATEGORY ERROR		
Philosophical	5	35.7%
Instrumental	6	42.9%
	---	---
TOTAL STATEMENTS	11	78.6%

TABLE 4

TOTAL NUMBER OF STATEMENTS CODED BY BOTH CODERS

FROM THE THIRD SAMPLE

Coder A	-	14	Statements	5	Not Coded by B
Coder B	-	17	Statements	8	Not Coded by A
		—		—	
TOTAL CODED:		31	Statements	13	Different Statements
ERROR:		41.9%			

was one sentence (11.1%) which Coder A coded as an Instrumental Belief 1 and Coder B coded it as a Philosophical Belief 1-a. (Gross Belief Error). Three sentences (33.3%) were coded as either a Philosophical Belief or an Instrumental Belief but were not in the same category. (Belief Category Error). Two sentences (22.2%) were coded in the same Philosophical Belief Category but had different sub-category codes. (Internal Category Errors). Two sentences (22.2%) were ambiguous. The results of this test are on Table 5.

The results of the third test did not have a high degree in intercoder reliability. In fact, Gross Belief Error in the third test was 11.1% compared to 9.4% in the first test. Increased familiarity with the instructions and the definitions did not increase reliability. It may well be that the smaller sample size also distorts the reliability scores yielded by the third test.

In order to assess the exact sources of errors made in the coding I have specified all the coding errors in detail on Tables 6A, 6B, and 6C. Table 6A specifies all the error types in each of the three tests. Table 6B and Table 6C display the errors made in coding the sub-categories for each belief.

The most common Belief Category Error occurred when one coder, coded a sentence as Philosophical Belief 1-a while the other coded it as Philosophical Belief 2. The most common internal category errors occurred in coding Philosophical Belief 3. Table 6B and Table 6C show the exact errors for each coded statement. For example, when coding Philosophical Belief 3 in the first test, there were three cases out of six in which there was no agreement on any of the sub-categories.

Several reasons can be presented for the poor results of the reliability tests. First, the second coder may have received inadequate training. Due to time constraints the second coder, who was unacquainted with the Operational Code, was trained in the space of two days. The training was informal and it was based on his reading of the code rules and on my specific instructions.

TABLE 5
 PERCENTAGE OF ERROR TYPE FROM THIRD SAMPLE

	N	%
TOTAL IDENTICAL SENTENCES	9	100%
EXACT MATCH ALL CATEGORIES	1	11.1%
	—	—
ERROR	8	88.9%
GROSS BELIEF ERROR P-a/I-1	1	11.1%
BELIEF CATEGORY ERROR		
Philosophical	1	11.1%
Instrumental	2	22.2%
	—	—
TOTAL STATEMENTS	3	33.3%
INTERNAL CATEGORY ERROR		
Philosophical	2	22.2%
Instrumental	0	
	—	—
	2	22.2%
AMBIGUOUS	2	22.2%

TABLE 6A
ERROR TYPES - ALL TESTS

GROSS ERRORS

TOTAL STATEMENTS:

8

CODER A	CODER B	FREQUENCY	%
I-3	P-3	2	25
I-1	P-1a	1	12.5
I-3	P-2	1	12.5
I-3	P-3	1	12.5
P-3	I-1	1	12.5
P-2	I-1	1	12.5
P-2	I-2	1	12.5

BELIEF CATEGORY ERRORS

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

TOTAL STATEMENTS:

16

CODER A	CODER B	FREQUENCY	%
P-2	P-1a	6	37.5
P-1c	P-3	3	18.5
P-1a	P-1b	1	6.25
P-1b	P-1a	1	6.25
P-2	P-3	1	6.25
P-3	P-2	1	6.25
P-1c	P-2	1	6.25
P-1c	P-1a	1	6.25
P-1a	P-3	1	6.25

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

TOTAL STATEMENTS:

16

CODER A	CODER B	FREQUENCY	%
I-5	I-2	5	31.25
I-2	I-1	4	25
I-5	I-1	3	18.75
I-1	I-2	2	12.5
I-5	I-4	2	12.5

INTERNAL CATEGORY ERRORS

PHILOSOPHICAL

TOTAL STATEMENTS:

21

BELIEF	TOTAL SUBCATEGORIES	FREQUENCY	TOTAL ERRORS	%
P-3	32	8	21	65.62
P-1a	14	2	9	64.2
P-1b	28	2	12	42.8
P-2	44	9	18	40.9

INSTRUMENTAL

TOTAL STATEMENTS:

26

BELIEF	TOTAL SUBCATEGORIES	FREQUENCY	TOTAL ERRORS	%
I-2	55	11	19	34.5
I-4	24	6	6	25.0
I-1	20	4	5	20.0
I-5	15	5	3	20.0

TABLE 6B
INTERNAL SUBCATEGORY ERRORS

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS				
TOTAL STATEMENTS (ALL TESTS):		21		
FIRST TEST - 13 STATEMENTS				
BELIEF	FREQUENCY	NO SUB-CATEGORIES	STATEMENT ERRORS	% ERROR
P-1a	1	7	A,B,E,G	57%
P-1b	1	14	B,K,N	21.4%
P-2	5	6	1.E 2.AE 3.CDE 4.CDE 5.BDEF	43.3%
P-3	6	4	1.ABD 2.ALL 3.ALL 4.ALL 5.ABD 6.D	79.16%
SECOND TEST - 6 STATEMENTS				
P-1a	1	7	ABCEG	71.42%
P-1b	1	14	ACDGHILMN	64.28%
P-2	3	6	1.BD 2.E 3.EXACT	16.6%
P-3	1	4	D	25%
THIRD TEST - 2 STATEMENTS				
P-2	1	6	C,F	33.3%
P-3	1	4	D	25%

TABLE 6C
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

TOTAL STATEMENTS (ALL TESTS)				
FIRST TEST - 17 STATEMENTS		26		
I-1	3	5	1.ACD 2.B 3.EXACT	26.6%
I-2	8	5	1.AB 2.EXACT 3.AB 4.AE 5.AE 6.A 7.AE 8.A	30.0%
I-4	4	4	1.C 2.EXACT 3.D 4.D	18.75%
I-5	2	3	1.A 2.EXACT	16.6%
SECOND TEST - 8 STATEMENTS				
I-1	1	5	1D	20%
I-2	3	5	1C 2.BE 3.ABDE	46.6%
I-4	2	4	1.EXACT 2.ACD	37.5%
I-5	2	3	1.EXACT 2.BC	33.3%
THIRD TEST - 1 STATEMENT				
I-5	1	3	EXACT	0%

In retrospect, I believe that coder training must be intensive in order to enhance understanding of the nuances of the code questions and the boundaries set out by each category. Second, the cultural background of the coders may have had an effect. The second coder was from Bangladesh and although he had an excellent command of the English language, interpretive differences may have accounted for part of the error. This may be one reason why there was a high degree of Belief Category Errors. What I interpret as a fundamental goal, the second coder interpreted as the essence of the political universe. Third, the coding definitions and instructions were ambiguous. Errors in coding of Instrumental Belief 2 and Instrumental Belief 5 were due to the ambiguity of the words "strategy" and "tactics". The differences in the words were not discussed as part of the training and obviously should have been made explicit.

I have no doubt that a further reliability check made with a coder with a similar cultural background as myself and with the benefit of intensive training would yield a much higher reliability score.

The results point to several problems in the code rules. First, there is ambiguity in some of the meanings attached to the questions, for example, Instrumental Beliefs 2 and 5. Second, the large number of internal sub-categories increases the possibility of coder error. For example, the results of the tests show a high error rate for Philosophical Belief 1-b. In one instance, as many as nine out of fourteen categories were not coded identically. Third, the large percentage of ambiguous sentences leads one to suspect that the code is not exhaustive. For example, a question relating to the Source of One's Own Policy, would have accounted for much of the ambiguity in the tests presented here. Fourth, there is a marked degree of overlap in Philosophical Belief 1-c (Image of the contemporary universe) and Philosophical Belief 3 (Is the political future predictable?) Both coders found it difficult to differentiate between the two. Consequently, a high

degree of error occurred when one coder coded a sentence as Philosophical Belief 1-c while the second coder coded the sentence as Philosophical Belief 3.

The code would be improved if the two categories, Philosophical Belief 1-c and 3 were combined into one category which subsumed all the major elements of both beliefs. This would allow for example, statements referring to the future of the contemporary international system, to be coded under one category and avoid the ambiguity of the present code.

Inference problems are, of course, not unique just to Operational Code. Content analysis and behavioral studies are, however, subject to bias of this kind. This creates a dilemma. If you increase the number of categories and/or sub-categories, you may achieve a clearer definition of the precise meanings of each of the beliefs. However, the increased chore of coding additional categories leads to a higher degree of probability that error in judgment will be made. In addition, the increased time to code additional categories will deter replication. The original sample of material took me over a month to code and consisted of over 1000 pages of data.

The following chapter on Ben Gurion's Operational Code is derived from those inferences made by me. Only in those instances in which passages were identically coded by both investigators were coding from the reliability test samples used. Possible errors which may have occurred in the analysis consisted of inference errors between Instrumental Beliefs 2 (Selection of Strategy) and Instrumental Belief 5 (Tactics); and between Philosophical Belief 1-c (Image of the Contemporary System) and Philosophical Belief 3 (Predictability of the future).

Chapter Three

A Case Study - David Ben Gurion

Introduction

The case study presented here is a combination of what Eckstein describes as the plausibility probe, the heuristic case study, and the disciplined-configurative case study. The plausibility probe allows the investigator to employ case study methods at a preliminary stage in order to judge whether the hypotheses warrant further investigation. The heuristic type stimulates the imagination to discover new general problems and possible theoretical solutions. It is less concerned with the overall configuration (Gestalt) than with the potentially more general relations between different aspects of the configuration. The disciplined-configurative type analyses and describes the evidence in terms of the theoretically relevant nomological variables. (Eckstein, 1976). Both the heuristic and plausibility probe type of studies can be conducted seriatum in a "building-block" technique. As Eckstein observes:

One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct. The construct, being based on a single case is unlikely to constitute more than a clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to achieve better case interpretations; and the process is continued until the construct seems sufficiently refined to require no further major amendments. (Eckstein, 1976, p. 104).

George states that Eckstein's discussion of the case study method does not make explicit the ways in which single case studies link up with the comparative method. (George, 1978a, p. 21). The Operational Code construct was designed to facilitate "structured, focussed, comparisons of belief system". (George, 1978a,

p. 33). For Operational Code case studies to be suitable for controlled comparison requires a more elaborate three-phase design:

In Phase One, the design and structure of the study are formulated. In Phase Two, the individual case studies are carried out in accord with the design. In Phase Three the investigator draws upon results of the case studies in order to assess, reformulate, or elaborate the initial theory stated in Phase One. (George, 1978z, p. 21).

However, George's elaborate design is nothing more than a simple description of the research process applicable to almost any study. It is not, in any rigorous sense, comparative. A suitable design for comparison would develop Holsti's preliminary typology of belief types which was discussed in the last chapter. If we can classify decision-makers into types according to their beliefs we can generate predictions from Operational Code studies and compare them with predictions derived from other models of foreign policy decision-making. The case study presented here will compare the derived beliefs from the content analysis of the case study with the hypotheses derived from Holsti's typology of belief types.

The choice of David Ben Gurion for my case study is justified on several counts. Ben Gurion was one of the most important political figures in Israel's formative years. The reader will recall that people at the higher levels of government tend to have more control in the decision-making process and their beliefs will tend to have more influence on policy decisions. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, and indeed prior to its establishment, circumstances were continually in a state of uncertainty. In such situations the beliefs of the leader are likely to have a greater influence on policy formation. As Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Israel, Ben Gurion's influence on Israeli policy was marked. Evidence of Ben Gurion's influence was noted by one of his critics:

The policy of Israel and the form of its regime in this period were determined to a critical extent by his personality and by the prestige and authority of the leadership he had won for himself. . . (He) ruled absolutely in his party

and in Israel's political life so that even those among his comrades who questioned his path and methods negated their will before his, and recognized his almost sole authority to make decisions in defense matters, and consequently in foreign affairs as well. Among wide classes and circles he was accorded popularity bordering on worship. (Leibowitz, in Avi-hai, 1974, p.1).

Leibowitz describes Ben Gurion as a man with a high level of self-confidence in his own ability and with a high level of self-esteem. He was a man of considerable power, significance and competence. I have noted that those leaders with high self-esteem are excellent subjects for Operational Code analysis as their strong beliefs tend to have a direct influence on their policy actions.¹ Coopersmith (1967) states that there are four criteria for defining self-esteem:

. . . the ability to influence and control others--which we shall term Power; the acceptance, attention, and affections of others--Significance; adherence to moral and ethical standards--Virtue; and successful performance in meeting demands for achievement--Competence. We should note that it may be possible for an individual to attain high self-esteem by notable attainment in any of the four areas. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 38, emphasis in original).

In addition to the qualities of power, significance and competence, Ben Gurion also possessed or adhered to a high sense of moral and ethical standards. The Bible shaped his thinking, not in a religious sense, but rather in a very profound historical sense:

It shaped his thinking as a child, and when other gods failed--socialism and organized Zionism--the Bible provided an ideational and historical frame of reference. It was consonant with his needs and able to provide a source for moral values; it lent itself to social and historic interpretations applicable to the situations in which Ben Gurion was leading himself and his people. (Avi-hai, 1974, p. 42).

In this sense, Ben Gurion, had a secular rather than a religious orientation.

¹See also Etheredge (1974). Etheredge's thesis explores in part, the effects of high self-esteem as an "important predictor of attitudes (such as) the tendency to use force. (He finds that) a man's self-esteem becomes crucial for determining his policy views in interaction with other facets of his personality or role." (Etheredge, 1974, pp. 228-229).

Coopersmith has stated that persons who adhere

. . . to ethical and religious codes which they have accepted and internalized assume a positive self-attitude by successful fulfillment of these 'higher' goals. Their feelings of esteem may frequently be tinged with sentiments of righteousness, uprightness and spiritual fulfillment. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 41).

Ben Gurion's "higher goal" was to fulfill the end of Zionism and be part of the messianic redemption--a time when there will be eternal peace, when the land of Zion (Israel) will be the center of learning and teaching, and the Jews of the world will be restored to their own land.

Persons with high self-esteem are unlikely to modify or change established attitudes or beliefs to fit new or discrepant information since such persons will have a high level of confidence in themselves and in their own judgements. Furthermore, if the decision-maker is a person of high self-esteem, such as Ben Gurion, we should expect his beliefs to be very consistent over time. The stability of Ben Gurion's beliefs was acknowledged by Brecher:

Ben Gurion's actions were always dominated by a single-minded purpose--the rebirth and survival of a Jewish state. It is not surprising, therefore, that his View of the World changed little over the decades.² (Brecher, 1973, p. 256).

The case study of Ben Gurion spans the period from the earliest years of his life in the Yishuv (Pre-statehood Israel, 1904-1948), until his final retirement from public office in 1963.³ The time span is long enough to allow for an analysis of his beliefs over time. Both George (1978b) and Gutierrez (1973) suggest that an examination of a belief system at one time interval can be compared with the belief system at a subsequent time interval. This allows the investigator to make state-

²What Brecher terms "world view" is image of the universe in Operational Code.

³Ben Gurion retired briefly from office in 1953 until early in 1955

ments about beliefs and about changes or consistency in the relations between beliefs. For example,

If a researcher established the nature of a decision-maker's Operational Code belief dispositions in time period one, an analysis of the same dispositions in time period two may assist in detecting the relationship between the beliefs in both periods, i.e. change or consistency. If the sequence were altered and time period two was established first, an analysis of time period one may also assist in the formulation of explanatory hypothesis regarding the belief dispositions characterized by time period two. (Gutierrez, 1973, p. 16).

Methodology for Presentation of Ben Gurion's Belief System

In the case study presented here several relationships will be examined. For example: 1) Is Philosophical Belief 1-a related to any other belief(s); if so, what are the relationships? 2) Are Philosophical Belief 4 and Instrumental Belief 3 independent of the other variables in the belief system? 3) What type of leader is Ben Gurion in terms of the typology set out by Holsti? 4) How do relationships among Ben Gurion's beliefs compare with the relationships predicted by Holsti? I expect that Ben Gurion will compare favorably with most of the hypotheses generated by Holsti but there will be some discrepancy especially with aspects of Philosophical Beliefs 1-a and 2, and Instrumental Beliefs 1 and 3. Ben Gurion's Philosophical Beliefs will be presented first followed by the Instrumental Beliefs,

Summary analyses will be presented for the sub-categories of each belief. However, there are cases in which categories are closely related or in which the evidence is insufficient. In these cases, for example, Philosophical Belief 1-b, and Instrumental Beliefs 1, 3 and 4, some of the categories have been combined to provide a more thorough and orderly view of Ben Gurion's images or beliefs. After each belief, I will present a summary of the belief statements which will relate to the comparison of Holsti's typology with Ben Gurion's belief system. In addition, some of the summaries will contain expectations of relationships between the presented beliefs and the beliefs which follow.

The Operational Code of David Ben Gurion

Avi-hai has stated that Ben Gurion was the embodiment and personification of history. He was a man whose beliefs were molded by the Prism of Jewishness (Brecher, 1973); by the tenets of practical Zionism; and by a belief in messianic redemption which could only begin with the rebuilding of a Jewish State in Palestine. Jewishness embodies the role of Israel as the only Jewish state in the world and the definitions of "Who is a Jew"? and "What is Judiasm"? Defining what constitutes a Jew has been the source of many debates from which several definitions have been formulated. One is that Jews and Judiasm constitute a religious community; another is that they constitute a nation. The role of Israel in relation to the Jews of the world was crucial to Israel's policy. Israel was created as a Jewish solution to the "Jewish problem" and as such Israel carries the burden of all the Jews of the world. The total awareness of this fact pervades Israeli policy, both domestic and foreign. No policy formulated by Israeli decision-makers can be fully comprehended without understanding this "cardinal feature" which bounds the Israeli people to the Jewry of the world. (Brecher, 1973).

Ben Gurion did not enter the debate of "Who is a Jew". He believed that he was a Jew without definition. "I don't need any definition. I am what I am." (Brecher, 1973, p. 230). However, Ben Gurion was well aware of the dependence of the future of Israel on world Jewry.

The two groups are interdependent. The future of Israel--its security, its welfare, and its capacity to fulfil (sic) its historic mission--depends on world Jewry. And the future of world Jewry depends on the survival of Israel. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 241).

Zionism has both a political and practical definition which were crucial to Ben Gurion. In the former sense Zionism constituted the belief that only by negotiation with the powers of the world could a territory be secured which would become a homeland. For a small group of Zionists - who were referred to as "territorialists" - any territory could conceivably be suitable. What was import-

ant was that the Jews have their own land. However, for the majority of the Zionists, Palestine was the only territory which was negotiable and which fulfilled both the tenets of Zionism and Judaism. Practical Zionists believed that the only way to rebuild a home for the Jews in Eretz Israel was to rebuild the land with the "ingathering of exiles" (Jews from outside of Israel). Only with the labour and toil of Jews on the land could Israel be redeemed. Practical Zionism contains contradictions as to the role of the rebuilt State. The State was to become both a "light unto the nations" (Isaiah 49:6) and at the same time it was to be "like all other nations". (Samuel 18:20). Israel was to become the teaching and learning center of the world--a model society. At the same time Israel was to be like all the other nations of the world and be part of the family of nations. It was Practical Zionism which Ben Gurion espoused and which dominated his beliefs.

Messianic redemption and the love of Zion have a timelessness that characterizes all of Jewish history and which pervades Ben Gurion's belief system.

Redemption is a

. . . fixed goal which does not wither with the passage of time. Transient events come and go and are subject to the effect of time. This is not only the case with a highly cathected hope for the future or a heavily emotionally invested aspiration for a redemption that has yet to come. (Gonen, 1975, p. 4).

Redemption could not take place until the State of Israel was established.

Establishing the State was a preliminary goal toward the end of Zionism and the realization of the coming of messianic redemption.

When redemption takes place and the glory of the past is being restored, two major events will happen concurrently. One is the 'ingathering of the exiles' and the return to Zion' the other is hev'lai mashi'ah, which means pre-messianic cataclysms. (Gonen, 1975, p. 4).

Ben Gurion believed that messianic redemption was inevitable. What occurred beforehand was part of the birth pains of redemption. Wickedness, evil and cataclysms may be part of those birth pains. However, before redemption came to pass a "model society" had to be created which would be a "light unto the nations". Only then was universal redemption possible. Universal redemption meant that peace would reign

all over the world and there would be a time in which "'the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea' and 'nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more'". (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 342).

Ben Gurion's belief system was dominated by these three ideas and they pervaded many of his policy statements and his decision-making processes during the years he was a leader.

Philosophical Belief 1-a: What is the essential nature of the political universe?

A. The Nature of the Political Universe--The universe is conflictual with latent harmony.

Ben Gurion believed that conflict has been a major force in history. Since the beginning of time there had never been an end to conflict.

In the history of mankind to this very hour, there has always been political conflict between nations, and over and over again it turned into physical, into military strife. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 314).

Ben Gurion qualifies his belief by stating that there is a latent harmony that will become manifest with redemption. His vision of redemption meant that with the establishment of the model society in Israel there would be universal redemption and peace.

The vision of which I speak. . . has had in it the power to stir the Jewish people to revolutionary and creative action at various times in their history, and, in our own day, to achieve statehood in the land of their forefathers. This vision encompasses the fulfilment (sic) of the aspiration of our prophets and teachers for the restoration of Jewish national life on its own soil and for the establishment there of a model society which will become a 'light unto the nations'. Through it will come universal redemption, the reign of righteousness and human brotherhood and the elimination of wickedness. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 230).

B. Sources of Conflict--Conflict is based on ideas and ideologies of nation-states

While ideas and ideology were to lead to the establishment of the State and to the path to redemption they were also a perpetual source of conflict which existed

between nation-states.

Since man grew up, there is no end of the conflict of ideas. It has perhaps played a greater part in our history than in any other. Hardly a quarrel in history, of politics or soldiery, but was linked to it. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 315).

Ideas and ideologies changed regimes, politically, socially and economically. Israel had to understand this "ideological warfare" which existed between states if she was to achieve her destiny. This aspect of Ben Gurion's belief system can be further illustrated in the context of his domestic policy. Ben Gurion believed that redemption for the Jews of the world could only be achieved through a unity of purpose. For Ben Gurion this purpose was often paradoxical. At first he believed in a unity of Zionism and socialism. Redemption would be achieved by the labour of the Jewish people in Israel. In 1920 he stated:

Labour settlements whose social value is no less than their national importance have proved that not only is there no contradiction between Zionism and socialism, but on the contrary they are bound together as one form and matter. (Ben Gurion, 1956, p. 45).

In later years, Ben Gurion grew impatient with the rigidity of the socialists and their failure to bend for the betterment of the State. Ben Gurion believed that Zionist ideals took precedence over the class struggle of the socialists. His frustration with socialism grew because of two problems involving, on the one hand, the collective settlements and on the other hand, the communist socialist parties in the government.

The collective settlements--the Kibbutzim and the Moshavim--were unwilling to relinquish their ideal of voluntarism despite the mass influx of immigrants and refugees after World War II. Ben Gurion's request to absorb new Israelis as day labourers on the settlements was denied by the members of the settlements. A further impetus to Ben Gurion's ideological disenchantment with socialism was the intransigence of the communist socialists who continually maintained a pro-Soviet

stance during the Stalin era and adhered blindly to the Moscow doctrines.⁴ By the 1950's socialist ideology was no longer an important element of Ben Gurion's belief system but was reduced to nothing more than an idea that was the opposite of capitalism:

One may say, in general, that socialism is basically the opposite of capitalism: the economy does not rule the workers, but the workers... rule over the economy. Socialism is the supremacy of labour (work) in society and the state, as opposed to the supremacy of property... (Avi-hai, 1974, p. 81).

C. Conditions of Peace--Peace can only be achieved when inequalities are eliminated and totalitarian and autocratic nations are transformed into democracies.

Ben Gurion believed that all men were created equal and the injustice done to the people of Israel and the Jews could only be righted when the inequalities which existed were eliminated.

Every people has a share in the heritage of the human race, just as every man, without distinction of race, religion or birthplace, is equal in rights and duties, and of equal worth. The relations of men and of peoples must, therefore, be set firm upon equality of rights and duties. (Ben Gurion, 1960, p.2)

To ensure that equality prevailed there must be a world based on justice and mercy.

The hope of the world for deliverance from the dangers of total destruction lies in a regime of justice and peace, loving kindness and mercy, and respect for man who was created in the image of God. A three-word Hebrew sentence in the Bible says it all: 'The world shall be built in mercy'. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 250).

Although Ben Gurion often grew impatient with the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, he still believed that the principles of justice and equality upon which the U.N. was created were the essential ingredients for achieving

⁴In a debate in the Knesset (Israel's parliament) Ben Gurion exemplified his disdain for the communist socialist party. "I do not wish to debate anything with the Communist Party a) since I have no common Jewish background with them; b) one does not debate with a phonograph record even if it is a living people." (Avi-hai) 1974, p. 82.

universal peace. In 1956 he spoke to the Knesset (Israel's parliament) about the role of the United Nations.

. . . Israel must regard the United Nations as a great institution of mankind, a hope for the future of world peace. We were interested more than any other nation in protecting its moral authority, and we had implicit faith that the day would come when, in the fullness of its strength, it would establish a universal reign of peace and justice. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 115).

Peace was dependent upon democratic nations who could ensure the basic freedoms of man. The democratic nations which Ben Gurion envisaged would be based on a "two-or three-party system". Totalitarian or autocratic states suppressed individual freedoms and they must be transformed into democratic states. A man must be free to choose his government, and must be free to challenge the government, for no government, even government by majority has the right to subject a man's thoughts. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 280).

Man is not instrument but end, each man is as free as his fellow, his rights and freedom of action restrained only by his fellow's. What goes beyond the personal concerns of the individual and is done on behalf of the people must be determined by the free choice of the many, unbound by wish of ruler or rival. A nation that is not free to challenge its rulers, and replace them as may be its will, is no free nation, but a miserable multitude that exists only by a despot's favor. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 280).

The totalitarian states which existed and suppressed basic freedoms could not be tolerated.

Totalitarianism knows no fine shades: it recognizes only the completely black and the completely white, only the wholly innocent and the utterly guilty. So crude a distinction of men and nations is quite untenable. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 384).

Only a firm and orderly democracy wherein man could choose between two or three alternative parties could ensure that minorities could not get the upper hand. This was always a very contentious point with Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion was constantly at odds with his colleagues over the problems inherent in the multi-party system which provided the context for government formation in Israel. He believed that Israel, based on the multi-party system and proportional representation, was weakened

by coalition governments and the concessions that had to be arranged in order for a majority party to rule. In order to form a government in Israel the party with the most seats in the Knesset would normally hope to form a coalition with one or more of the smaller minority parties. Throughout Israel's formative years and until 1974, Ben Gurion's party, the Mapai, formed Israel's government. However, Ben Gurion was forced to form coalition governments with the religious parties among others. His concessions to the religious parties gave him some of the freedom he needed to formulate policies on defense and foreign relations. The concessions and compromises were necessary to avoid a bitter encounter between the religious and secular factions. This led to numerous conflicts over Cabinet positions and hindered the progress of the majority party. For example, although the religious parties had never achieved more than 15% support of the electorate, they insisted on the maintenance of the religious status quo in return for their support in coalitions. As a consequence it is not easy to separate the religious from national aspects. For example

Matters of marriage, divorce and maintenance between Jews (were) the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts, and the religious court justices (dayanim) became state employees, with appointment procedures and states... comparable with those of justices in secular courts." (Avi-hai, 1974, p. 94).

Although this example of religious jurisdiction was inherited from the Mandate system other similar matters which the religious parties felt infringed upon the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts were legislated in the Knesset.

These domestic issues also have a great influence on foreign policy. As I mentioned earlier, the impact of Jewishness on Israel's foreign policy was marked. One of Israel's Foreign Officers, Shabtai Rosenne has remarked that the element of Jewishness and all the facets connected to it, including the religious and secular definitions of "What is a Jew" and "What is Judiams", are

"cardinal feature(s) dominating all Israel's policy, domestic and foreign. This makes Israel unique. Without full appreciation of this elemental factor, it is impossible to understand Israel or any aspect of Israel's policy--domestic or foreign." (Rosenne, in Brecher, 1973, p. 230).⁵

⁵For a more complete analysis of the effects of Jewishness on Israeli foreign policy see Brecher (1973) and Rosenne (1961).

D. Nature of Conflict--Conflict can be zero-sum but war is not decisive.

Ben Gurion believed that the nature of conflict could be zero-sum, that is, there could be conflicts in which the victor wins all. However, wars did not guarantee the fulfillment of the victor's purpose. A victor may win a war but his purpose may still be as unobtainable as before. Ben Gurion believed that it was the final battle which was decisive. Success in all the earlier battles count for naught, if in the last battle, you should lose.

...it is only the final victory that counts, that decides the issue; you may win every battle from the start almost to the finish of war but if you lose the last you lose all, and your earlier victories are in vain. To know whether we have really won or not, we must have fought the last battle...(Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 265).

Since the formation of the State of Israel until the present, Israel has existed either in a state of war with her Arab neighbours or in a state of "lack of peace". Never has there been a state of "peace" in the area. Thus, the many successful battles or campaigns which Israel fought against the Arabs were, Ben Gurion believed, only ephemeral. If Israel should lose the last battle, she would lose everything. This belief is related to Ben Gurion's belief that Israel must always be prepared for any eventuality in its relations with the Arab nations (Instrumental Belief 2) and that peace in the area depended upon Israel attaining a qualitative balance in arms and population in relation to the Arab states (Philosophical Belief 1-c). That is, as Israel could never match the Arab nations in the terms of quantity of arms and in the terms of number of people, she would have to achieve a balance in which her inferior size would be compensated by her superior ability to match one Israeli for every ten Arabs in strength and ability. (Philosophical Belief 1-c).

E. The Scope of Conflict--All issues are linked.

The sphere of a conflict may be limited to a specific area but the issues about which the conflict was being fought inseparably link all nations. Ben Gurion believed that all nations were interrelated in all things, spiritual and material.

The world had become totally interdependent and no nation or issue could exist in isolation.

No people can stand alone whether it is a small nation or a great Power. There is an interdependence of peoples and in that sense we too need to be dependent. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 208).

This interrelatedness was essential for the political and economic growth of all nations. There were "necessary links between nations and States, economic, political, and in ways of thought, ...We may learn from other nations and gain from the stored up experience of mankind." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 208)

F. Role of Conflict--War and different types of revolutions may be functional.

Conflict and war were not something to be glorified but at the same time they did have their uses. While Ben Gurion doubted that war could solve historical problems it was sometimes unavoidable "to stave off some great and growing immediate danger, as in the struggle against Hitler on the world scale or in the Sinai Campaign in the Middle East." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 189), Revolutionary phenomena were ubiquitous and Ben Gurion believed the "Jewish Revolution" to be part of that phenomena. Revolutions which could free mankind from servitude, prejudices, and intellectual and spiritual bondage were necessary.

Ours is part and parcel of the world revolution, to free mankind from bondage, exploitation and all manner of restraints and prejudices. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 140).

Another revolution which was of paramount importance was the revolution in science and technology. The scientific revolution was the source of greater achievements for the future. With science man could harness all the energies of the universe and enhance the lives of all mankind.

We are living on the eve of one of the greatest revolutions in the history of man and his mastery of science--we stand face to face with the era of atomic energy...there is no doubt that in a few years man will harness the mighty and wonderful forces latent in the invisible atom for the purposes of industry, agriculture and transport, as he already utilizes them in war. (Ben Gurion, 1956, p. 18).

Ben Gurion was able to perceive possibilities which Israel could achieve through science and technology. Through science and technology the State could achieve greatness and the model society would indeed, be a "light unto nations".

G. Source of Knowledge--Knowledge was based on the Bible, faith and history.

Ben Gurion based his beliefs on the Bible, an unshakeable faith in man and history. He would continually reinforce his beliefs with analogies and references to the Bible. The creation of the State and messianic redemption were biblical ideas. The Bible is the history book of the Jewish people and, as such, its historical commandments are basic to Ben Gurion's beliefs. The historical forces impelled each nation on its path to destiny. Ben Gurion had absolute faith in man's capacity and ability to achieve greatness under conditions of adversity. His faith had been reinforced when he witnessed the courage, tenacity and spiritual strength of the English during the Blitz of 1940. As Ben Gurion recalled in 1964, his experiences in London and his early experiences with the pioneers of the Yishuv enabled him to declare independence in 1948, cognizant of the imminent danger of war and possible annihilation by the numerically superior Arab armies.

And this knowledge was a part of me, pervading my mind at all times, and especially in moments of major decisions. I said that the British experience of 1940 had made an impact on me, and I remembered it in 1948 on the eve of our independence. Coupled with my knowledge of what my own people had done, it enabled me to make one of the greatest decisions of my life with comparative ease--that is with a minimum of doubt and a maximum of confidence. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 17).

Ben Gurion's beliefs about the essential nature of the political universe can be summarized in six main points:

1. In the history of mankind to this very hour there has always been political conflict between nations, but there is a latent harmony that will be revealed with the coming of redemption.
2. Conflict is derived from ideas and ideologies of nation-states.
3. Peace can be obtained only when inequalities are eliminated and totalitarian states are transformed into democracies which can ensure justice, equality and the rights of man.

4. Conflict can be zero-sum but war is not always decisive.
5. All issues tend to be linked.
6. War and different types of revolutions may be functional.

Ben Gurion is identified as a Type B actor/leader relative to Holsti's typology because he believes the political universe to be temporarily conflictual and that conflict is based on attributes of nations. However, Holsti hypothesized that a Type B actor/leader will believe that the basic sources of conflict are warlike states or classes of states whereas Ben Gurion attributed the sources of conflict to ideas and ideologies of nation-states. Similarly, Holsti predicted that a Type B actor/leader would believe that the conditions of peace were the "containment, reform or elimination of warlike actors" (Holsti, 1977, p. 164), whereas Ben Gurion believed that the conditions of peace were the elimination of inequalities and the transformation of totalitarian states into democracies. Ben Gurion's beliefs, while they appear to conflict with Holsti's predictions, are consistent with his fundamental belief in messianic redemption and Zionist ideology. Redemption and the end of Zionism required a transformation of states and the creation of a universe based on equality and justice. His beliefs were dominated by ideas and ideology from the Bible, Zionism and socialism. Consistent with these beliefs is his belief that conflict is based on ideas and ideologies of nation-

states. The apparent disagreement with Holsti's hypotheses will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Ben Gurion's beliefs about the nature of the political universe should be related to other beliefs within his belief system. For example we could expect Ben Gurion to view the opponent as expansionist and/or destructionist and basically a Model I actor. That is, the adversary will be a unitary actor but not necessarily a rational unitary actor⁶ (Philosophical Belief 1-b). Ben Gurion should be optimistic about achieving his long term goals (Philosophical Belief 2); he should limit means rather than ends (instrumental Belief 3); and he should believe that the end justifies most, if not all, means (Instrumental Belief 5). These and other relationships will be examined and each of the remaining Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs, beginning with Philosophical Belief 1-b, the image of the opponent.

⁶Allison's description of a Model I actor implies that the national actor will be rational; carefully planning and thinking through each option and consequence. See Allison, (1971, p. 32-35).

Philosophical Belief 1-b: What are the fundamental characteristics of one's political opponents and other actors?⁷

Ben Gurion's image of the opponent was based on his view that the nature of conflict in the political universe is temporary. Consequently, his opponents were only "enemies" because of the specific time and situation. Further, his image of the opponent was tempered by a firm commitment to the supreme command of Judaism-- "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". The State of Israel was to be guided by this commandment in its legislation and in its dealings with other states.

(The State of Israel) will be tested by the moral image it will lend to its citizens, by the human values which will determine its internal and external relations, by its faithfulness, in deed and in word to the supreme command of Judaism: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'. (Avi-hai, 1974, p. 45, emphasis in original).

A. Nature of the Opponent--The Arab opponent is dictatorial and anarchical and in some respects a Model I actor.

Ben Gurion believed that the Arab nations were led by despots and dictators. Arab policies were formed at the whim of the totalitarian leaders. Arab masses were not the enemy but they had the misfortune to be led by elites who sought personal glory by urging the Arab nations to unite in a "holy war" against the people of Israel. After the rise of Nasser in Egypt in 1953, Ben Gurion stated:

. . . but it is the nature of dictatorships that they are eager for easy and rapid victories, and the new rulers of Egypt believed that it would be easier to achieve intoxicating victories in the field of foreign policy than to rectify the wretched and shameful situation at home.

Nasser, apparently, came to the conclusion that the least difficult and costly method of gaining hegemony of the Arab world was to strike at Israel. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 66).

Arab rulers courted popularity to maintain their positions and the surest way to

⁷ Due to the constraints within this thesis, the image of the opponent will relate only to Ben Gurion's view of the Arabs. Ben Gurion had other political opponents about which he expressed many views, for example, the British before the establishment of the State of Israel; the Gentile world; and internal opponents in the Zionist organization.

increase their hold over the masses in the Arab world was to strengthen their view of Israel as an expansionist and destructive enemy and to insist that Israel's annihilation was the only policy to be countenanced. After the War of Independence in 1948, Ben Gurion wrote:

I had no doubt that the ambitious Arab rulers, dependent on spectacular promise and emotional bluster for their prestige rather than upon good government and expanding social welfare, would continually be tempted to wage war against us. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 61).

Ben Gurion viewed Arab leaders basically as Model I actors, that is they were unitary, and their political systems were monolithic. Decisions were made by the ruling elites and differences between political beliefs of the ruling classes and individuals within the society were quickly suppressed by the dictatorial authorities. Allison (1971) states that Model I actors are unitary rational actors; that is decisions are based on rational thought processes and reasoning. As the above quotations illustrate, Ben Gurion believed that Arab rulers based their decision-making on the maintenance of prestige and thus the Arabs believed that to remain in power they would have to achieve "popular victories" in foreign arenas. While Ben Gurion believed that the Arab leaders thought that such reasons for mobilization were quite rational in view of their tenuous positions as rulers, he also believed that such a basis for decision-making was quite irrational:

No leader can advance the interests of his country if he is concerned only with courting popularity. I think that is one of the major weaknesses of Arab leadership. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 164).

B. Nature of the Opponents' Goals--The opponents' goals were destructionist/expansionist and they desired a union of all the Arab nations.

Arab leaders saw the Israelis and the State of Israel as a threat to their dream of an Arab union that would cover all of the Middle East and Africa. The only way to achieve this union was to annihilate the Zionists in Palestine and prevent a Jewish majority forming in their midst. Arab intransigence became most

prevalent after the Second World War. The Jewish people in the Yishuv wanted the British Mandatory government of Palestine to permit the immigration of refugees from the concentration camps of Germany. Arab leaders, fearing the possibility of a Jewish majority in Palestine, increased their hostilities. In 1947, Ben Gurion stated:

. . . the Arab threat is back and on a much larger scale. This time there await us not only 'disturbances' stirred up by the Arab leadership in Palestine, but also aggression led by the rulers of the Arab states--and we had better lose no time in getting ourselves ready to face this threat. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 24).

In 1955, the threat of the Arab leaders was still present, and they were still urging their people to war against the Israelis. "Our adversary was making ready, as many Arab leaders publicly avowed to hurl us into the sea." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 69).

C. Generality of Adversary's Hostility--The opponents' hostility is transient, due to circumstances.

Although Ben Gurion viewed the Arab leaders as countenancing war as the only policy against Israel, he also believed that war-like relations with the Arab people were only of a transient nature. Eventually these two semitic people who had so much history, geography, and culture in common, would enjoy peace. In his early negotiations with Arab leaders in the 1930's he believed the Jewish settlers could assist the Arab people to realize their goals of Arab unity. In 1934 he spoke to a Palestinian Arab leader, Auni Hadi:

If the Arabs agreed to our return to our land, we would help them with our political, financial and moral support to bring about the rebirth and unity of the Arab people. (Ben Gurion, 1971, p. 20).

Ben Gurion believed that the differences between Jew and Arab were not permanent and in 1945 he compared the Arab-Jewish conflict with that of the British-Jewish

conflict:

The differences between Jew and Arab are transient, just as the momentary clash of the Jews and Bevin's (British Foreign Minister) policy is no perennial feud between Great Britain and the Jewish People. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 173).

In 1956 and again in 1959, Ben Gurion reiterated his belief that the Arab nations were the enemy only because circumstances and reasons of history had maintained their intransigence. "It is not an historical imperative that they should hate us interminably." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 310), and, "Those closest to us from the point of view of language and race are the Arabs, who for reasons of contemporary history, are our bitterest enemies--though I believe these reasons will prove only temporary." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 114).

While the above beliefs reflected Ben Gurion's views of the "enemy" in general, he was very specific in his views concerning one Arab leader--President Abdul Nasser of Egypt. After Nasser took power, Ben Gurion at first thought he might be a leader strong enough to bring about peace in the area:

Only a strong Arab leader would brave popular revulsion, which he had himself helped to foster, should he reverse his policy towards Israel and negotiate with her. I once thought that Nasser might have been strong enough to do so, and might have had the courage. I am afraid I was wrong. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 157).

To fully understand Nasser the man, his goals, and his objectives, Ben Gurion read and re-read Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution. In his view, Nasser had laid out three objectives:

(1) to gain power over all the Arab countries, (2) to become the head of all the Moslem peoples, and (3) to become the leader of the entire African continent. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 65).

If internal reforms were ostensibly the source of Egypt's revolution in 1952-53, they were quickly shunted aside for Nasser's political ambitions. Other Arab states

also feared Nasser's ambitions:

. . . Nasser has directed his hostility not only toward Israel but to several other Arab States, and each has been deeply concerned over his attempts to undermine them and put them under his influence. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 156).

- D. Response to our conciliatory moves--Conciliation is viewed as a weakness.
- E. Response to our policies of firmness--There is a danger of irrational action.

Ben Gurion had continually held out the promise of peace to Arab leaders and had tried since his early years in the Yishuv to meet and negotiate a peaceful alliance between his own people and the Arabs. He believed that King Abdullah of Jordan, with whom he had conducted secret negotiations, had the courage to establish peace but the negotiations ended with Abdullah's assassination in 1951. When Naguib and then Nasser came to power in Egypt, Ben Gurion again tried to negotiate a peace but each time it was rejected.

But I had long felt that Egypt was the one State that might have considered itself strong enough to break through. When Naguib seized power and crushed the corrupt regime of King Farouk, I extended my hand, publicly welcoming the hope of a 'free, independent, progressive Egypt'. I stated that 'there was not at any time, nor is there now, any reason for strife between Egypt and Israel. . . no occasion for political, economic or territorial conflict between the two neighbours' Naguib's response was to show that Egypt's face was turned to war and not to peace. When Naguib was deposed by his fellow revolutionary, Nasser, my immediate reaction was again to offer Israel's friendship. I was again rejected. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 156).

During the years just prior to the 1956 Sinai Campaign, Ben Gurion tried on several occasions to negotiate peace with Nasser, through emissaries such as Dag Hammarskjold and representatives from Moscow. (Ben Gurion, 1971 and Pearlman, 1965) but each time the Arab leader refused to negotiate. After the Sinai Campaign Ben Gurion saw no hope for an early peace.

We did not wage war to seize Sinai or to force peace on Nasser, and after the Sinai Campaign I had no hopes for an early peace. Nasser was in no hurry; he could wait. . . and I believe that even if we had remained in the Sinai for as long as five years, Nasser would still have bided his time and not made peace. He did not want peace. He could have feared that if he were reconciled with

Israel, somebody else in the Egyptian army would arise and depose him. . . . No one who understood the harsh realities of Arab politics could have expected peace at that time. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 184).

Ben Gurion believed that the circumstances in the Arab political arena were such that conciliatory policies would be ignored and any effort by an Arab leader to negotiate with Israel would be "tantamount to recognition of Israel's existence" (Pearlman, 1965, p. 156) which none of the leaders could afford politically. In response to any policies of firmness, Ben Gurion believed that the irrational nature of Arab politics increased the danger of possible war:

But the politics of the Arabs are irrational. Certain personalities and their confederate cabal, the fear of a competitor--all these play an important, sometimes decisive, part, and there is no warranty that Egypt or the Lebanon will act according to its real political requirements and world status. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 484).

Brecher (1973) has stated that Ben Gurion had an "inherent bad faith" perception of the Arabs. This suggests that Ben Gurion had a rigid image of his "enemy" as evil and that any information which challenged his rigid image would be disregarded or ignored.

Inherent bad faith models in effect rule out the existence of data which might challenge the model itself. . . . Under these circumstances it is unrealistic to expect that single acts, or even a short series of acts, can break down high tensions and mutual distrust. (Holsti, 1962, p. 244-52).⁸

While such a model may have relevance for Ben Gurion during part of his years as leader, I do not think that the model is applicable to Ben Gurion over the entire period. Ben Gurion conducted numerous negotiations with Arab leaders during the years of the Yishuv, and was always willing to listen and meet with them in order

⁸See also Holsti in Finlay, Holsti and Fagen (1967) for a more complete analysis of the "inherent bad faith" model.

to achieve an understanding between the Jewish people and the Arab nations. The "inherent bad faith" model may therefore be most applicable to Ben Gurion in the years beginning with the rise of Nasser up to the Six Day War in 1967. It was during these years that Ben Gurion, after careful assessment of Nasser's goals and aspirations, realized that the Egyptians and the Arab nations were not ready for peace. In his interview with Pearlman, Ben Gurion stated:

At every opportune moment, I proclaimed my readiness to meet with any or all of the Arab leaders at any time and in any place to negotiate a peace treaty or, if that was too much for them, a non-aggression pact. . .

I understand their problems. Conflict with the Arab world is such that each government feels it has to show that it hates Israel as much as any other. Negotiating with Israel would be tantamount to a recognition of Israel's existence. This would bring down the wrath, either genuine or artificially worked up, of the other Arab States, who would exploit the opportunity to undermine the authority of the negotiating government and increase their own influence among its people. These governments feel they just cannot afford to take the chance, even if they wish to. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 156).

Given the intransigence of Arab leaders at the time and their fear of possible overthrow by competing internal factions, Ben Gurion saw no possible hope for peaceful negotiations until after the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967. But, at that time, Ben Gurion was no longer in power.

Only after the Six Day War did he perceive a compelling Arab need for peace--and the logical derivative, a policy of concessions. Not by accident did he advocate a virtual return to the 4 June borders, apart from Jerusalem and the Golan Heights--in exchange for a genuine peace settlement. (Brecher, 1973, p. 285).

F. Source of Knowledge--Source of knowledge is based on experience.

Ben Gurion based his source of knowledge about his "enemy" on the experiences he had in negotiations with Arab leaders throughout his years in the Yishuv and after the War of Independence. This point was illustrated in an interview in 1966:

I understand the Arab problem from experience not from books. . . in 1909 . . . I understood what the Arabs' hatred of us was. . . in 1915 (an Arab friend said to Ben Gurion about his imprisonment by the Turks and subsequent expulsion) 'As your friend--I am sorry. As an Arab--I am glad.' And I know that both things were sincere. . . that was the first time I had heard a sincere answer from an Arab intellectual. . . in 1933. . . I held the first talk with

Mussa Alami (a close confidant of the Mufti of Jerusalem).. I began with the old tune I had prepared myself: ' Look, the Jews will bring prosperity to the Arabs,'. . . and all that story. The Arab interrupted me: 'Listen . . . Ben Gurion, I would rather there be a barren waste here for another hundred years, another thousand years, till we can make it flourish and redeem it.' And I knew that (he was) telling the truth. And the facile Zionism, the verbose fuss, appeared to me more ridiculous than ever. (Ben Gurion, 1966, p. 83, emphasis in original).

Ben Gurion's beliefs about his opponent can be summarized as follows:

1) The opponent, the Arab leader, is basically a Model I actor;(2) the opponents' goals are destructionist and expansionist and arise from the basic features of the Arab regimes; (3) any concilliatory moves would be met with disdain or ignored; recognition of Israel's existence is a sign of weakness; (4) Arab politics are irrational; (5) the nature of the opponent is transient, not permanent. Ben Gurion's view of the opponent will have some relation to his view of the contemporary system especially in relation to conditions of peace.

Philosophical Belief 1-c: What is the nature of the contemporary international system?

A. Nature of the contemporary international system--The international system is conflictual in the short run.

Ben Gurion's view of the contemporary international system was not unlike his basic view of the political universe, that is, conflictual in the short run. Two distinct time intervals are relevant to Ben Gurion's view of the contemporary system--the years prior to the establishment of the State, and the years after the State of Israel had been created. While conflict in both these time frames was considered temporary, their sources of conflict were different.

B. Sources of Conflict--Prior to the establishment of the State the source of conflict was power politics. After the State was established the sources of conflict were ideas and ideologies, and the leaders of the totalitarian states.

The sources of conflict prior to the establishment of the State were based on power politics. In 1938, Ben Gurion was frustrated in his attempts to amass support for the Jewish cause. Britain had issued a White Paper which restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine just prior to World War II. Ben Gurion and his colleagues failed in their attempts to have the White Paper withdrawn, as the "friendly nations"⁹ were caught in a power struggle:

The time we are living in is one of power politics. Moral values no longer have any force. The ears of the leaders are closed, and all they can hear is the sound of cannons. And the Jews of the Diaspora have no cannons.¹⁰ (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 188).

However, Ben Gurion viewed his political milieu as highly transient. His definition of the sources of conflict reflected his assessment of the situation at the time. Power politics were a source of conflict in 1938 but with the advent of the Cold War the source of conflict reflected Ben Gurion's basic belief that conflict was based on ideas and ideologies.

. . . the cold war is not only a technological and military struggle but basically a war of ideas. In the concrete terms of the modern world it is a struggle for the souls of the African and Asian nations who comprise the majority of the human race. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 148).

Ben Gurion's view of the Cold War reflected his belief that the contemporary system was polarized.

C. Structure of the Contemporary System--The contemporary system tends to be polarized.

The structure of the contemporary system tended to be polarized. The Cold War had seen the rise of the two major powers--Russia and America. While

⁹The 'friendly nations' were Britain, America and some European nations. The British feared that support for the Jewish cause would incense the Arabs; the Americans were still locked into an isolationist foreign policy; and the Europeans feared the rising power of Hitler.

¹⁰The Diaspora refers to all the Jews living outside of Israel.

the Soviet Communist Bloc was relatively homogeneous, "subordinated to a single supreme authority which dwells in the Kremlin" (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 458), the Western Bloc was not homogeneous in any respect. There was no one "single supreme authority" nor did the western nations have the same political, economic or cultural environments. While some western nations may be committed to each other through alliances, their commonality lay only in their rejection of Soviet authority. Classifying nations into "uncommitted" or "committed" did not reflect the opinions of the peoples of the nations, "but only the attitudes of the rulers, a fact which accentuated the Cold War, that ideological, political and propoganda struggle for the souls of nations." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 221).

Ben Gurion viewed Nasser as one of the rulers who would continually play one of the Cold War adversaries against each other. At home, Nasser would persecute the Communists, while at the same time he would accept military and economic aid from the Soviets. He would applaud the anti-imperialist stance of the Communist Bloc and simultaneously accept aid from the "arch-imperialist", the United States. Ben Gurion believed that the competition between the Soviet Bloc, the democratic West and China, exacerbated world tensions by allowing "consciousless dictators, without any political and social creed, to incite and subvert among their neighbors and extract from each side 'aid and comfort' for their troublemaking." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 221).

C. Conditions of Peace--Peace can be obtained by eliminating inequalities and transforming totalitarian states into democracies.

Peace in the contemporary international system meant peace in the Middle East. This was the only peace Ben Gurion was concerned about. In the Middle East there was a distinct difference between "peace" and a "lack of war". To maintain a "lack of war" between the Arabs and Israel meant that there was a need for

Israel to have a qualitative balance of arms and population in comparison with her Arab neighbours. As the discussion of Philosophical Belief 1-a pointed out, a qualitative balance meant that Israel would have to have superior military ability relative to the Arabs. After the 1948 War of Independence, Ben Gurion stated:

We would not hope to equal numerically the forces of our avowed enemies, or match the quantity of their armaments but we had to achieve a qualitative balance in both. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 62).

Later, just prior to the Sinai Campaign in 1956, this theme was still central to Ben Gurion's security policy.

We believed that external military intervention in the Middle East would precipitate a grave threat to world peace and that war could be prevented only by achieving a balance of arms between Israel and her Arab neighbours. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 98).

A lasting peace could only be achieved when Israel increased her population to a qualitative balance with the numerically superior Arab nations. In addition, Arab leaders had to realize the needs of their own people for education, freedom from poverty, and economic and social bondage. Most important however, and reflecting his basic philosophical view of peace in the political universe, Ben Gurion believed that only a transformation of the nations comprising the Arab system into democratic states would ensure justice and equality.

Obviously this can only come about when both sides face each other on a basis of equality, in a mood of mutual respect and with the common desire for reciprocal help. The prerequisite of this is the liberalization of the Arab regimes and the introduction of democracy. . . With the possible exception of Lebanon and Tunisia (in 1965) every Arab country is under totalitarian rule, be it of a military dictator or of a medieval dynasty which still allows traffic in slaves. These rulers are less concerned with meeting the true needs of their people than they are in preserving their power and competing with each other in the expansion of their spheres of domination. The competition is nourished by the competition between the two world blocs; but its roots lie in the internal condition of the Arab people, the heritage of generations of servitude, poverty, backwardness, both spiritual and material. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 160)

E. Stability of the System--All issues are linked.

Ben Gurion's beliefs about the stability of the political contemporary system reflects his beliefs about the stability of the political universe. In both cases, Ben Gurion believed that all the issues were linked and that the world was interdependent and no longer made up of separate and isolated entities. Conflict in any one nation would have effects all over the world. For example, if a bomb went off in Jerusalem the news would be flashed "all over the world within five minutes, and all the nations shared the news, for good or ill, in joy or dread." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 156). Similarly, in formulating any policy a leader must consider the world effects of that policy. Ben Gurion exemplified this in his interview with Moshe Pearlman when he spoke of the Sinai Campaign:

I do not know what will be the fate of Sinai. . . I imagine that there will be powers who will force us to withdraw. There is America, there is Russia, and there are the United Nations, Nehru, Asia, Africa. . . (Pearlman, 1965, p. 147).

This reflects Ben Gurion's view that there are power blocs which have considerable impact on the world situations. While the issues are linked, the responses from the power blocs are not necessarily homogeneous. There may be wide variations in the nations reactions to the crisis situation, in their response to aid and in their assistance to other nations.

Summary of Ben Gurion's Essential View of the Political Universe

The addition of Philosophical Belief 1-c to the other two main aspects of Philosophical Belief 1 does not add a great deal to what we already know about Ben Gurion's basic beliefs about the political universe. Most of the data which were found for Ben Gurion's view of the contemporary system were the same or similar to his basic view of the political universe. For example, the nature of conflict and conditions of peace. We did gain some insight into Ben Gurion's view of the Cold War, the place of power politics in Ben Gurion's scheme of things and the structure of the contemporary system which could not have been achieved without the categories

of Philosophical Belief 1-c. However, this belief category is not an essential part of a leader's overall view of the universe. Holsti's typology does not list any hypotheses for this part of Philosophical Belief 1 and one must assume from this omission that Holsti also believes that Philosophical Belief 1-c is adequately covered in Philosophical Belief 1-a and 1-b. As the beliefs are assumed to be consistent and stable over time, we should expect a decision-maker's beliefs about the political universe (Philosophical Belief 1-a) to be consistent or the same for the contemporary system. This is certainly true of Ben Gurion's beliefs. Thus while Philosophical Belief 1-c did not add a great deal of additional information about Ben Gurion's beliefs it does support the hypothesis that beliefs that are fundamental to a decision-maker will be consistent and stable over time.

According to the hypotheses established by George (1969) and Holsti (1977), the beliefs of a decision-maker regarding the essential state of the political universe and his opponents will have a relationship with the other beliefs in his belief system. Some of these hypotheses have been examined earlier in this thesis.

From Ben Gurion's view of the political universe we should expect Ben Gurion to

- 1) be fairly optimistic about achieving his goals (Philosophical Belief 2)
- 2) believe that the political universe is relatively predictable (Philosophical Belief 3).
- 3) believe that it is necessary to have control over the major elements of history (Philosophical Belief 4).
- 4) establish a comprehensive framework for achieving goals (Instrumental Belief 1).
- 5) pursue goals vigorously; strategies of "muddling through" will be most inappropriate. (Instrumental Belief 2).
- 6) limit means rather than ends in coping with risk (Instrumental Belief 3).
- 7) believe that timing is of the essence (Instrumental Belief 4).
- 8) believe that the end justifies most if not all means (Instrumental Belief 5).

As I mentioned earlier Ben Gurion is a Type B actor/leader but I do not believe that he will fit all of Holsti's hypotheses for this type. The data will

be weakly related to Holsti's hypotheses for aspects of Philosophical Belief 2 and Instrumental Beliefs 1 and 3. The weaknesses will be apparent because of Ben Gurion's strong belief in messianic redemption and the end of Zionism. Ben Gurion believed that the ultimate goal of redemption was inevitable, therefore short term or feasible goals will be selected if it means being one step closer to the achievement of one's ultimate aim. Holsti's hypotheses for a Type B actor/leader state that such a leader will choose only optimal, not feasible goals. Further, a Type B actor/leader will not believe that the achievement of one's ultimate goals are inevitable. In regards to Instrumental Belief 3, the relationship will be weak because the data collected for this belief were insufficient for adequate analysis.

Philosophical Belief 2: What are the fundamental prospects for realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or pessimistic?

A. Nature of one's fundamental goals-- Fundamental goals are the end of Zionism and messianic redemption.

Ben Gurion's fundamental goal was to fulfill his Zionist aspirations. All other goals became the means for achieving the end of Zionism, which for Ben Gurion meant the time of messianic redemption. In order to begin the path to redemption, the Jewish people had to establish a nation in Palestine. The viability of the State depended upon the "ingathering of the exiles" from the Diaspora into Palestine. The Jews were to labour on the Land in order to ensure the messianic redemption of Israel and, eventually, of all the people of the world. Universal redemption would be achieved when Israel became a model society--"a light unto the nations".

- B. Should one be pessimistic or optimistic regarding goals--One should be optimistic.
- C. Does optimism/pessimism refer to long term goals, policy undertaking, etc?--
Optimism refers to long term goals.
- D. Is optimism/pessimism conditional?--Yes, it is conditional but long term goals
are inevitable.

Ben Gurion tended to be very optimistic about achieving long term goals. His optimism, however, was often tempered by conditions. While he was optimistic that peace between the Arabs and the Jews was inevitable, there were two conditions which must first be met. The first condition is that Israel must develop a strong economy and political framework which would deter any thoughts she may be weak. The second is linked to Ben Gurion's belief that peace could only be obtained if the Arab nations established liberal and democratic regimes. (Ben Gurion, 1954). He spoke of the eventual peace with the Arabs in 1951:

This may to many of you sound far-off and unreal. Yet I hold it a goal we shall assuredly reach beyond today's narrowed horizons. Toward that goal let us set our faces steadfastly, and in that aim instruct our children and ourselves. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 398).

An Arab-Israeli alliance, Ben Gurion believed, was historically inevitable, and a political, economic and cultural necessity. While peace may not be inevitable in the short run, in the long run historical forces will move Israelis and Arabs together.

In the long run. . . I see an Israel-Arab alliance. It is not only that I believe political, economic and cultural cooperation between Jews and the Arab peoples to be a vital necessity for both. The facts of geography and history make it inevitable however long it may take to come about. (Pearlman, 1965, pp.161-162).

Any evidence of pessimism was found in Ben Gurion's writings prior to World War II and it was conditioned by certain events in the contemporary system at the time. In his negotiations with Britain to increase immigration his outlook

for the success of the negotiations was usually pessimistic, but his pessimism was conditional on the situation. In 1938 he stated:

. . . if our politicians, practical men of affairs and intellectuals panic and give in--then the youth of all ages, those who are young in spirit, will lift high the torch of rebellion and fight. I believe implicitly in both these kinds of people. And so I am not pessimistic, despite my pessimistic appraisal of the situation. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 193).

Ben Gurion's foreign policy goals were based primarily on his long term goals for establishing and securing the State of Israel. In addition, Ben Gurion was concerned about world Jewry as events in Israel had enormous impact on the Jews of the Diaspora. In the formative years of the Yishuv, policy was concentrated on increasing immigration (aliyah) to Palestine. Aliyah would supply the security, the renaissance, the ingathering--all that was needed to rebuild the State. Once the State was established, its security became the most important facet of Israel's foreign policy. Whether the policy was one of force or peace, it was to be settled according to those values which were fundamental to the Jewish people. In foreign policy, these goals were summarized as follows:

The aims of our foreign policy are: the consolidation of our security; the ingathering of the exiles; the welfare of World Jewry and the liberty of all Jews to join us in the homeland; cooperation with new nations as far as lies within our power; and the support for world peace. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 212).

E. On whose side is Time--In many things time is on our side.

Time was essential in achieving one's goals and Ben Gurion believed that in many things time was on his side. In 1952 he stated:

Time in many things is on our side. Severance from the Arab countries vexes our economic state somewhat but, on the other hand, it enables us to develop our economy without being beholden to our neighbours or dependent on them. In the period of transistion, as it were, from war to peace, it is our business to put all our energy into our reinforcement, our growth, and the consolidation

of our internal resources. Every year, every month validates our positive achievements. . . Even in the question of Arab refugees, time is not working against us. . . (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 484).

For short term policies time was often on the side of the opponent. As mentioned earlier, Ben Gurion believed that Nasser was forced to bide his time when it came to peace initiatives because the Arabs were not ready for peace. If Nasser made any move to initiate peace, there was a chance that he would be deposed.

F. Source of Knowledge--Knowledge was based on faith.

As the discussion of the other beliefs has shown, Ben Gurion had implicit faith in the capacity of his people to achieve greatness and realize the goals of Statehood and redemption. Prior to Statehood he said:

Knowledge I cannot claim, but invincibly I believe that not only the younger generation, but all of us present here and all our comrades wherever they may be, will be vouchsafed to behold that wondrous consummation. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 141).

Ben Gurion's beliefs about the nature of his fundamental goals can be summarized briefly as follows: (1) he was optimistic in the long run and his pessimism was situationally founded; (2) optimism was conditional but the ultimate aims were inevitable; (3) time was on his side in the long run. These beliefs agree with the hypotheses stated in the summary of the last belief. That is the beliefs are consistent with Ben Gurion's basic beliefs about messianism but they are not consistent with Holsti's hypotheses for this belief.

Philosophical Belief 3: Is the political future predictable? What is the role of chance in historical development?

- A. Is political life capricious or predictable--It is risky in highly complex situations but predictable in long run.
- B. What aspects are predictable--Opponents' goals and historical development are predictable.
- C. Degree of predictability--Nothing happens by chance.

Ben Gurion's optimism and faith led him to believe that most long term developments in political life were relatively predictable. However, short term actions were difficult to assess as to their final outcome. This was particularly relevant in his observations before the Sinai Campaign. "I do not know what will be the fate of Sinai. . ." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 119). In the long run some things were inevitable such as the end of Zionism and peace between Arabs and Israelis. There may be requisite conditions which would have to be met first, such as the formation of liberal democracies in the totalitarian Arab nations, but such things would eventually take place.

The change, I am sure, is inevitable. But the process is likely to be slow and painful; and in the meantime Israel will continue to be subjected to siege, pressure and threat--and will continue to take the appropriate safeguards. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 161).

The goals of Ben Gurion's opponents were predictable because these leaders were despots and dictators who had to rely on popularity to maintain their positions. Their dependency on popularity made war with Israel an ever present danger. The leaders were determined to "push Israel into the sea". One could not count on the stability of the Arab political system and Israel had to be constantly prepared for any eventuality including protracted spells of "lack of war". (Ben Gurion, 1954).

Historical development was also predictable to the extent that history shows that nothing remains the same--change will happen.

History has shown us the absurdity of regarding patterns prevailing at any particular moment of time as fixed and immutable. Nations which have been at each other's throats one moment have fallen on each other's necks as peaceful partners a moment later, or five, ten, fifty or one hundred years later. This has happened at the dictate of history, geography or common need--or, as in our case, all three. And it has happened when the pace of the world was much slower. Today, with the pace of change so rapid, and change itself so revolutionary, hopeful advances in the Arab-Jewish relationship may come even sooner than I think. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 161).

At the same time, Ben Gurion believed that in history nothing happened by chance:

No one can positively foresee how the future will turn out. In nature as in history nothing happens by chance; there are laws that govern all things and which none may break, although it is not easy to prove it incontrovertibly. There can be no creation out of nothing, no event is repeated out of the void. Today is the child of yesterday, and the sire of tomorrow. History, like nature, is an unbroken chain of events dovetailed and interdependent. Yet we cannot see ahead, with assurance what the future may hold. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 481).

Therefore, while we may not be able to predict the outcome with assurance, it is not beyond our capacity to predict coming events, "though our prediction is neither complete, certain, nor exact. We must be content to foresee probabilities." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 481).

There is a degree of overlap between this belief and the categories in Philosophical Belief 2. Ben Gurion's optimistic statements regarding his long term goals, for example the end of Zionism and peace with the Arabs, are also statements reflecting his view of the degree of predicatability of political life. That is, Ben Gurion believed that the accomplishment of both goals were inevitable. His beliefs about the predictability of the political universe can be summarized as follows: (1) political life is risky in highly complex, short run situations, but predictable in the long run; (2) the opponents' goals and major directions of historical forces are predictable; (3) nothing happens by chance.

Philosophical Belief 4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history?

A. Role of the leader in shaping history--The leader must be purposive, foresighted and have an active and creative will.

Moshe Pearlman asked Ben Gurion whether his years at the "grass-roots" level of the Histadruth¹¹ and the Ahudut Avodah¹² gave him the political experience he needed when he became Prime Minister. Ben Gurion's response outlined explicitly his beliefs regarding the role a leader must have in the historical development of nations. Ben Gurion agreed that his political experiences in the Yishuv were of inestimable value and he declared:

And I would add that my fundamental approach in political life to the struggle for power and the use of political power once it has been achieved has remained virtually unchanged since my Histadruth days. Whether you hold humble office in a municipality or in a small union or high office in a national government, the principles are the same; you must know what you want to achieve, be certain of your aims, and have these goals constantly in mind. You must fix your priorities. You must educate your party, and must educate the wider public. You must have confidence in your people--often greater confidence than they have in themselves, for the true political leader knows instinctively the measure of man's capacities and can rouse him to exert them in time of crisis. You must know when to fight your political opponents, and when to mark time. You must never compromise on matters of principle. You must always be conscious of the element of timing, and this demands a constant awareness of what is going on around you--in your region, if you are a local leader, in your country and in the world if you are a national leader. And since the world never stops for a moment, and the pattern of power changes its elements like the movement of a kaleidoscope, you must constantly reassess chosen policies towards the achievement of your aims. A political leader must spend a lot of time thinking. And he must spend a lot of time educating the public, and educating them anew. (Pearlman, 1965, pp. 52-53).

¹¹Jewish Labour Union

¹²Labour Party which merged with the Hapoel Hazair Labour Party in 1939, to form the Mapai Labour Party which held the majority of seats in the Knesset during Ben Gurion's terms of office and until 1974.

Ben Gurion believed that a key function of a leader is to fix priorities but to do so wisely required that a leader have

. . . a set of basic aims, he must have judgement, he must be able, in the army term, to 'appreciate the situation', both the national and the international, and he must be able to judge the character and capacities of his Ministerial colleagues and the experts. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 121).

The leader must at all times have effective control over his ministers and Cabinet. He must have absolute confidence in his own judgment and be able to view all decisions with an open mind. Once he makes a decision he must stick to it.

The beliefs Ben Gurion had regarding a leader's role in shaping historical development do not appear to be dependent on any other belief. Professor George hypothesized that Philosophical Belief 4 may be an independent variable in one's belief system.¹³ That is this belief would be similar, although perhaps not as central as, Philosophical Belief 1. This underscores Holsti's findings that

. . . there is virtually no systematic relationship between it and beliefs about the nature of political life. This points to one strong candidate for further development of the present typology. (Holsti, 1977, p. 271).

Other beliefs may be linked to Philosophical Belief 4 in a causal way. For example, self-confidence as a leader may be linked to a leader's self-esteem. That is, for a leader to have a role in historical development, he must possess self-confidence in his judgment and in his selection of aims. He must leave nothing to chance. Possession of such self-confidence should make one optimistic about the realization of one's goals.

¹³I am extremely grateful to Professor Alexander George for the time we spent together at a recent meeting at Stanford University, January 16, 1979. The material he generously gave me and our verbal discourse have been invaluable in preparing this thesis.

Philosophical Beliefs: A Summary

Holsti's predictions regarding the linkages among the Philosophical Beliefs for a Type B actor/leader are supported by some of the evidence presented. Holsti hypothesized that a Type B actor/leader who views the political universe as temporarily conflictual and believes the source of conflict is based on attributes of nations will view the opponent as destructionist/expansionist; will be optimistic about achieving his long term aims; will view political life as predictable in the long run and will believe that a leader will be able to exert some influence over major developments in history. The evidence for Ben Gurion's Philosophical Beliefs has shown support for these hypotheses. However, there are aspects of some of the Philosophical Beliefs in which Ben Gurion's beliefs do not support Holsti's predictions. For example, Holsti hypothesized that a decision-maker who believes that conflict is temporary would believe that the sources of conflict are warlike states or classes of states. Ben Gurion believed that the source of conflict is based on ideas and ideologies of nation-states. Holsti hypothesized that a Type B actor/leader would believe that the conditions of peace included the containment, reform or elimination of warlike actors. For Ben Gurion, peace could only be achieved when the totalitarian systems were transformed into democracies and inequalities were eliminated. Further, Holsti hypothesized that a decision-maker who was optimistic in the long run would believe that the optimism was conditional and that nothing was automatic about the success of one's ultimate goals. Ben Gurion believed that optimism was conditional but that the ultimate goals, the end of Zionism and messianic redemption, and peace with the Arabs, were inevitable.

While Ben Gurion's beliefs in the above circumstances may not be consistent with Holsti's hypotheses, they are definitely consistent with his belief in messianic redemption and Zionist ideology. Ideas and ideologies shaped Ben Gurion's thinking from his earliest years in Russia and in the Yishuv. Zionist ideals and the idea of messianic redemption were instilled in Ben Gurion as a small child by his father and grandfather. Redemption required the transformation of states into

liberal democratic systems that could ensure the equalities of man. Although redemption and peace with the Arabs were conditional on the establishment of a model society in Israel and the transformation of the totalitarian Arab States, their achievement would be automatic, once these conditions had been met.

Ben Gurion's epistimological beliefs were consistent and stable over time. His fundamental beliefs did not alter throughout his years in the Yishuv and his years as leader of Israel. We should expect these beliefs to have a strong influence on his Instrumental Beliefs. The hypotheses regarding the linkages between Ben Gurion's Philosophical Beliefs and his Instrumental Beliefs have been discussed earlier. The Instrumental Beliefs will be presented in a similar manner as the Philosophical Beliefs.

Instrumental Beliefs

Introduction

The Instrumental Beliefs had the highest degree of coder error in the reliability tests. Instrumental Belief 2 is one of the categories with a high degree of coder disagreement. (See Table 6A). In recording the following results I have used only those statements which were coded by me or those statements which both coders had coded identically. Some of the error and ambiguity in the coding arose because of the nature of the words "strategy" and "tactics" in Instrumental Belief 2 and 5 respectively. The words were interpreted to mean "the overall plans to achieve aims"--strategy; and "the actual method to achieve those aims"--tactics. Given these interpretations the results for Instrumental Beliefs 2 and 5 appear to fit Holsti's hypotheses quite well.

A Type B actor/leader should believe that goals are established within a comprehensive framework; that optimal goals should be sought; that at any one time there is only one path to achieving goals; that goals are to be pursued vigorously; that means should be limited rather than ends; that strategies of "muddling through" are most inappropriate; that timing is very important; that the end justifies most

if not all means; and that force may be necessary. I expect that the following description of Ben Gurion's Instrumental Beliefs will fit some of Holsti's hypotheses for a Type B actor/leader. However, as the discussion will show, Ben Gurion had a pragmatic approach to establishing and pursuing his goals. While his basic fundamental goals did not alter, his approaches to achieving his goals were based on what was most practical at any given time and circumstance. Thus there will be discrepancies between Hosti's typology and Ben Gurion's beliefs.

Instrumental Belief 1: What is the best approach for selecting goals? What are the objectives of political actions?

A. Establishing goals for political action--A comprehensive framework is essential.

Ben Gurion believed that comprehensive frameworks were absolutely essential to the achievement of goals. In the years before Statehood, Ben Gurion insisted on definite plans for establishing the State from his colleagues in the Zionist Organization: ". . . they should give a clear and comprehensive lead to the movement and they should chart our path for the future. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 77). These plans were to include setting up a varied Jewish economy and a highly effective defense force. After the establishment of the State, plans were needed for security and for the settlement of the Negev.¹⁴ In 1937 Ben Gurion wrote his son Amos about the necessity of having clear, concise and unemotional plans in politics:

There is no room in politics for sentimental considerations. The only thing we must weigh up is: what is desirable and good for us, what is the path that leads to the goals, what policy will strengthen us and what policy will weaken us. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 153).

¹⁴ Ben Gurion's plans for the Negev, the southern desert of Israel, are discussed in his reports for the Israel Yearbook, 1956 and 1965.

- B. Nature of the goals to be sought--Goals can be feasible in the short run. One should be prepared to strive for goals that advance one a limited distance toward long term goals.
- C. Paths to achievement of ultimate goals--Path depends on goal(s). A tactical withdrawal may be necessary to achieve ultimate goals.

Long term goals were never to be abandoned but, on occasion, it may be necessary to settle for less if it meant being one step closer to the ultimate goals. For example, prior to the establishment of the State, there was a plan to partition Palestine into two States, one Jewish and one Arab. Although Ben Gurion's long term goal was a Jewish State in all of Palestine, he was more concerned with the establishment of a Jewish State, even a small Jewish State. He wrote to his son in 1937:

Naturally, I don't like the partitioning of the country. . . If partition is implemented we shall receive more than we hold at present: but less, far less than what we are entitled to and what we want. True. But the question is: would we receive more if there were no partition? What we want is not that the country should be whole and unified, but that the country should be Jewish. . . I am an enthusiastic advocate of the Jewish State, even if it involves partitioning Palestine now, because I work on the assumption that a partial Jewish State will not be the end, but the beginning. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 155, emphasis in the original).

Thus, what was important to Ben Gurion, was not the size of the State but rather that there be a Jewish State because with the existence of a Jewish State, the messianic era could begin and the end of Zionism could be achieved.

Ben Gurion was a Practical Zionist and his pragmatic approach to achieving one's aims was similar to that of Lenin. Ben Gurion thought that Lenin was a great man and he admired Lenin's tactics to achieve one's goals. In 1923, Ben Gurion wrote about Lenin--a description that is very reflective of Ben Gurion himself:

The man possesses courage and heroism of thought, which do not falter before the inertia of accepted and common concepts; he has a long-viewing eye, which breaks through and penetrates into the complications of reality and draws upon

those forces which are destined to rule. But the fixed aim also determines the road for this master tactician, from which he does not depart to the right or left, but knows how to reach it by various paths, according to the situation. For there is one road for him--that which leads to the aim. (Ben Gurion, in Avi-hai, 1974, p. 286).

Similar qualities were later reflected in Ben Gurion's discussion with Pearlman in 1965. Pearlman had questioned Ben Gurion about the fact that Ben Gurion and his ministers were often compelled to make decisions which retarded long term goals. Ben Gurion replied:

In peace, as in war, the tactical aim must be set in the context of the strategic aim, but often a tactical withdrawal on one front may be necessary in order to advance on another and thereby reach the strategic goal. (Pearlman, 1965, p1 125).

Ben Gurion, however, insisted that all his ministers keep the long term aims in mind when deciding day-to-day issues. Their decisions would be based on whether they "would advance those aims and enable Israel to reach its goals more quickly." (Pearlman, 1965, p. 125). Establishing policy and goals would rest with the elected representatives. While experts may tell the representatives the most efficient ways of carrying out their plans, it is up to the representatives to decide which path to take based on priorities and on the fundamental values of the Israeli people.

D. Value conflicts--Goals are compatible. The achievement of one enhances the prospects for achieving others. Coping strategies would be to establish a hierarchy of priorities.

Ben Gurion believed that important goals were compatible. For example, Zionism and messianic redemption did not conflict with each other. The realization of one meant the realization of the other. The establishment of the State enhanced the prospects for realizing the end of Zionism and messianic redemption. One could deal with any value conflict by establishing a hierarchy of goals. The fundamental values of the Israeli people were prioritized by Ben Gurion as: security, immigration, World Jewry, Jewish and Arab peace, world peace, freedom and democracy, and friendly relations with States. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 391). The priorities

were to be continually reassessed in order to achieve one's ultimate aims. For example, in the early years of the Yishuv immigration was the paramount issue--without an increase in the number of Jewish settlers in Palestine there could be no foundation upon which to build the State. Once the State was established, maintaining security against the Arab armies became the paramount issue. To ensure security there had to be an overall defense strategy which would protect the State but at the same time "not drain the economy of manpower needed to develop the land". (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 37). Only by bolstering the State's physical and spiritual strength would Israel be able to deter its opponents. Ben Gurion believed that the strategy presented by his General Staff would achieve the economic and strategic goals of the State:

It comprised four main elements: a small regular army, consisting almost exclusively of officers, national service conscription for both boys and girls from the age of eighteen; reserves; and the frontier settlements. (Pearlman, 1965, pp. 141-142).

The strategy offered the possibility of national security and, at the same time, economic development. The mobilization procedures of the reserves in Israel allows the reservists to keep their civilian jobs during the "periods without war" and thus help the economy of Israel maintain a level of development. The frontier settlements supplied both protection from attacks and, at the same time, produced marketable goods and food. The girls in the army would take the non-combatant army jobs, thus freeing the men for fighting. On the settlements, both boys and girls provided armed protection.

Ben Gurion's beliefs regarding the establishment of goals for political action are related to his philosophical beliefs. For example, Ben Gurion believed all issues were linked to the achievement of his ultimate goals. However, as a pragmatist, Ben Gurion believed it was acceptable for one to settle for less in the short run if it meant that the delay brought you one step closer to achieving your final goals. This finding does not agree with Holsti's hypothesis for this belief. Holsti hypothesized that a Type B actor/leader would choose only optimal goals and would thus believe that settling for "half a loaf" rather than the whole would be to jeopardize the attainment of the optimal goal. Ben Gurion did not

fear using a "stepping stone" approach to attain his ultimate aims--a small state was better than no state, as long as it was a Jewish State.

Ben Gurion believed that a leader must fix his priorities, be certain of his aims. (Philosophical Belief 4). This belief is related to Ben Gurion's belief that there must be a comprehensive framework and hierarchy of goals for success. Philosophical Belief 2 outlined what Ben Gurion believed to be the goals of his foreign policy:

In determining foreign policy when I was Prime Minister, my obvious criterion, as is that of any leader of a State, was the degree to which a particular course would advance the interests of Israel. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 167).

Instrumental Belief 1 shows that Ben Gurion believed that the establishment of those goals depended on the fundamental values of the Israeli people: security, immigration, World Jewry, etc. The values were to be reassessed continually in line with situational events or with the achievement of one's goals.

Instrumental Belief 2: How are goals pursued most effectively?

A. When may a goal be modified, substituted, or abandoned?--Goals may be modified if doing so brings one closer to long term aims.

The evidence for this sub-category is sparse but there were a few instances in which Ben Gurion stated that modification of a goal may be permissible if it meant the long term aim was more obtainable. The most important adversaries related to the evidence coded for this belief were either the British before 1948 or the Arabs. Ben Gurion believed that although lesser goals could be modified, long term aims must never be abandoned or modified. For example, in his early talks with Arab leaders during the years of the Yishuv, Ben Gurion was very willing to accommodate the Arabs if it meant that an alliance between the Jewish people and the Arabs would result and a Jewish State would be created. In 1936 he had talks with George Antonius, a Christian Arab, who asked Ben Gurion if he would be prepared to modify his goals if the two sides, Arab and Jew, were

irreconcilable?

I said I did not wish to answer that hypothetical question, especially as I was convinced that there was no contradiction, unless one saw a contradiction in our return to Palestine.

Antonius said that he did see a contradiction, in that a Jewish State stood in opposition to the aspirations of the Arabs.

I asked: "What is a Jewish State?"

He replied that a Jewish State meant that all of this country would be handed over to Jewish rule, and the Arabs merely tolerated; the state would be sovereign and separate, and none of the Arabs would have any share in it.

I commented that if in his opinion that was the only definition of Jewish aspirations, and if these were blocking the possibility of an understanding, I was willing to consider a change in definition. (Ben Gurion, 1972, p. 44).

Ben Gurion was willing to offer concessions if it meant that the concessions would bring the Arab and the Jew closer to alliance and bring the Jewish people closer to the realization of their own State.

A second example of Ben Gurion's willingness to modify a goal was his acceptance of the partition plan for Israel. Size was not crucial. Establishing the Jewish State was the most important consideration. In 1937 he wrote his wife: "If we receive the minimum of territory that we need now, I think that would be the most desirable solution at this time." (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 118).

B. Approaches to the Pursuit of Goals--One must pursue goals vigorously and be prepared at all times. A mixed approach may be warranted, but strategies of "muddling through most inappropriate.

Evidence for this sub-category contained three different approaches to the pursuit of goals: prepare ground, incremental and a blitzkrieg approach. Prior to the establishment of the State, there was a definite sense of urgency in Ben Gurion's desires to see his goals fulfilled. In 1917, after the Balfour Declaration had been published he wrote:

The implementation of this goal (a Jewish Commonwealth)--which in view of the present misfortune of East European Jewry had become a matter of life and death

for the Jewish masses who were seeking work--was possible only by the vigorous and complete development of all the agricultural and industrial resources of Palestine. An impetus was needed for the activity of the Yishuv, which would pave the way for large-scale immigration and for mass settlement was a just solution to the question of the boundaries in the north and east. (Ben Gurion, 1972, pp. 9-10).

Again, in 1944, the urgency to establish the State was present. "We must let nothing, nothing, impair the independence of our movement, its inner freedom, moral and intellectual." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 140).

While goals were to be pursued vigorously, there were different approaches which were sometimes necessary. Most of the findings show that Ben Gurion believed that being prepared was the most essential approach in pursuing goals, especially when the adversary was the Arab nations.

. . . I think our immediate and central task at this time (1938) should be to prepare, organize and equip the Yishuv so that it can face the decisive battle which might be coming. We must prepare in spirit and in matter. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 192, emphasis in original).

In 1948 Ben Gurion wrote:

We cannot be sure; for all that, of the war being over, but there is not much doubt that we are on the brink of a terrific political struggle. So we must stick to our guns, prepared for the worst, and doubling our preparations. There is no other way to success in war or politics. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 261).

Israel would have to be prepared for any eventuality. "The state of preparedness is to see things clear and true." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 231). One must have vision to see the dangers ahead, and have the strength within oneself to withstand those dangers. Ben Gurion was optimistic about an eventual peace between the Arabs and Israelis, but he realized that the process would be slow. In the meantime, he continually emphasized that the Israelis must be prepared for anything.

Ben Gurion was quite willing to use an incremental approach if it meant that the cumulative effect would achieve the ultimate goals. Incrementalism and the "muddling through" approach have often been used interchangeably in some of the

literature.¹⁵ However, Holsti defines a "muddling through" approach as a "try-and-see" approach. That is, of "trying this strategy and then that in the hope that something would work." (Holsti, 1977, p. 170). Incrementalism in Operational Code is defined as an approach which

. . . emphasizes the value of limited gains on various parts of the problem. This view denies the argument that settling for a slower, piece-by-piece approach constitutes an abandonment of fundamental goals; instead it takes the position that an incremental approach is not only prudent, but that a series of limited achievements on parts of the problem will have an important cumulative effect. (Holsti, 1977, pp. 136-37).¹⁶

Ben Gurion was prepared to use an incrementalist approach in the creation of the State of Israel. He was quite willing to accept a partitioned smaller state, to redefine the definitions of Jewish aspirations to the Arabs, etc., if the effect of each bit-by-bit issue meant that there would be a Jewish State and the eventual realization of his fundamental goals of the end of Zionism and messianic redemption.

Under certain circumstances it was also permissible to use the blitzgrieg approach, that is, "committing a major portion of one's resources and a full-scale effort to deal with the problem." (Holsti, 1977, p. 137). For Ben Gurion, the blitzgrieg approach was necessary in order to develop the south of Israel--the Negev. Developing the Negev was central to Ben Gurion's plans for Israel. In 1935 he wrote:

(Settling the Negev). . . require(s) large resources and great political strength. And they can only be realized if we enlist the support of the entire Zionist movement. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 78).

¹⁵ See Lindblom and Braybrooke (1963) and Etzioni (1968) and the literature cited therein for a more thorough discussion of the "muddling through" and the incremental approaches.

¹⁶ Holsti's definition of the "try-and-see" approach is closer to Lindblom's incrementalist "muddling through" approach.

This theme was still relevant in 1962: ". . . we need to concentrate a growing proportion of our efforts and resources on the still barren southern half of the country." (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 189), and

It is absolutely vital for the State of Israel to move southward; to direct the country's water and rain, the young pioneers and the new immigrants, and most of the resources of the development budget, to the south; to a considerable proportion of our workshops and factories and transfer them to the south; . . . (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 201).

The apparent conflict in the style of approaches used by Ben Gurion may be the result of the coding categories. The coding categories do not allow for a mixed strategy of approaches for pursuing goals. Holsti appears to circumvent this problem in his typology by categorizing only the approach(es) which would be the least appropriate. Ben Gurion believed that one must be continually prepared for any eventuality, peace or war, when dealing with the Arabs. In achieving his fundamental goals, Ben Gurion believed that an incrementalist approach could be appropriate if it meant being one step closer to the realization of those basic goals. The evidence for a blitzkrieg approach concerned only the development of the Negev and did not concern any of his adversaries. As a pragmatist, Ben Gurion believed that he must constantly be able to appreciate every situation, assess his aims and re-evaluate his priorities when necessary. In doing so, there may be different approaches to obtaining one's goals. A leader must be flexible enough to see that goals can be achieved in more than one manner--the important thing is that they are achieved. From the evidence regarding Ben Gurion's selection of approaches to pursuing his goals, the least appropriate approach would be the "try-and-see" approach.

C. What type of strategy should be used to pursue goals?--One should push harder yet be willing to accommodate and at times step back.

Ben Gurion believed that as there were several approaches for pursuing goals there is also a variety of strategies which may be used, depending on the circumstances. In order to "sell" the cause of the Jewish people to the British and the Arabs, the Jewish people had to "push harder": "The tiresome business of justifying our case and cause we must conduct with greater energy." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 37). While they had to push harder in some areas to achieve the strategic goal, there were times when it was necessary to "accommodate". One had to be prepared, but at all times one must be willing to enter into negotiations:

Come what may, we will not surrender our right to free Aliyah, to rebuild our shattered Homeland, to claim statehood. If we are attacked we will fight back. But we will do everything in our power to maintain peace, and establish a cooperation gainful to both. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 220).

A strategy of taking a few steps back was also permissible if it meant that the delay would ensure one would be closer to achieving one's ultimate goals. The evidence for this sub-category overlaps with Instrumental Belief 1 which shows that Ben Gurion believed at times it was necessary to yield in order to attain long term aims. Yielding as such did not mean a compromise on principles or goals:

The weak may have to yield to the strong--even when the strong has not law and right behind him, but he yields under compulsion and only as far as he is compelled; yielding thus is not acquiescence, nor betokens it the philosophy of 'offering the other cheek'. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 184).

In his hopes for peace with the Arab nations, Ben Gurion was also prepared to accept something less than perfection. In 1952 he wrote:

About peace with the Arabs. I have no illusions; it will not be achieved by ideological blandishments. But equally, why regard today's Middle East as immutable, why not plan ahead for a less imperfect reality? (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 398, emphasis mine.).

Thus, Ben Gurion believed that, although there would be eventual peace and cooperation with the Arabs, one should be prepared to accept the imperfect realities of the moment.

D. What type of action is preferred?--Multilateral action is necessary to bring about a "balance" between Israel and the Arabs, and to become "like all other nations."
Unilateral action may be necessary in war.

This aspect of Ben Gurion's instrumental beliefs appeared to be strongly related to his beliefs regarding the role of a leader (Philosophical Belief 4); his beliefs regarding the conditions for peace in the contemporary system (Philosophical Belief 1-c); and his optimism for achieving his foreign policy goals (Philosophical Belief 2). As a leader, Ben Gurion believed that it was necessary to be continually aware of the trends around one as the timing of action depended upon this knowledge. Similarly, it was necessary when developing relations with other countries, "to examine the realities of the world in which we lived and try and foresee the trends of international groupings." (Pearlman, 1965, p. 165). While other countries were allied through mutual political or military pacts, Israel was non-alligned, politically or militarily; nor through bonds of a common language or religion.

Israel is almost the only country in the world which lives alone, having no membership in no military or political alliance--though she is by no means morally neutral--sharing her religion and language and customs with no other State, and being cut off, through hostility, from her geographic neighbours. Her task of developing international relationships is therefore that much harder, though it must be said that because of it the friendships that are established are also more solidly based. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 166, emphasis in original).

Ben Gurion believed that international relations were crucial in order to maintain a military balance with her Arab neighbours (Philosophical Belief 1-c); thus friendship with other nations could ensure the supply of armaments.

Because of the international groupings of which I have spoken, the aims of foreign policy must be to develop friendship not only with a particular country but if possible also with the group of which it is a part, promoting ties with friends of friends. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 166).

Mutual needs and interests were the basis of political action and friendships. Just as France had grown closer to Germany out of mutual needs and interests, so too must Israel. Israel's foreign policy was based on the fundamental needs of the Israeli people and security was the prime concern. To ensure security Israel opened negotiations with Germany for reparations and armaments.

For the enemies threatening our very existence can always be certain of receiving the finest and most modern equipment all the time. If Germany can be a source for the strengthening of Israel, then surely we must do what we can to keep that source open. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 169).

Ben Gurion's goal of redemption meant that Israel would be "like all other nations" and to ensure this facet of his basic fundamental goals, friendly multilateral relations were necessary.

Unilateral action was also necessary although such action was not always a matter of choice. Ben Gurion believed that the Jewish people could not rely on their allies and friends in all circumstances. Only the Jewish people of the world could bring about redemption and only through their immigration to Palestine could the Jewish State be established and secured. In 1944 he stated:

We must beware not to pin our hopes on the forces of tomorrow, of the future, of other peoples. Our orientation must point toward the inner strength. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 138).

A few years after the above statement, in 1948, Ben Gurion warned the Provisional State Council that no one would help the Jewish people win independence except themselves. He quoted Isaiah to emphasize his point:

This war will settle our fate, and all Jewry's. We cannot look to external aid. We must depend on ourselves. . . 'For the day of vengeance was in mine heart, and my year of redemption was come: and I looked, and there was none to help; and I wondered and there was none to uphold; therefore mine own arm brought salvation unto me; and my fury, it upheld me'. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 250)

Multilateral action was necessary to achieve a balance between Israel and her Arab neighbours, but to achieve redemption, Israel would have to rely on her own people.

Ben Gurion's beliefs regarding Instrumental Belief 2 can be summarized as follows: (1) goals are to be pursued vigorously when there are important gains to be made; (2) means are limited when such action brings the ultimate goal closer to fulfillment; (3) mixed strategies are permissible, depending on circumstances but a strategy of "muddling through", trying this approach and then that, would be the most inappropriate; (4) preparedness is crucial but there are times when accommodation and taking one step backward may be necessary; (5) multilateral action is preferred but unilateral action may be necessary. As in other beliefs, Ben Gurion based his source of knowledge on biblical history and his faith in the Jewish people.

Ben Gurion's beliefs concerning the pursuit of goals were related to what he believed to be the role of a leader in shaping history (Philosophical Belief 4). He believed that goals had to be pursued in relation to given situations which in turn had to be assessed. Priorities could then be established so as to achieve success in that situation. Because conflict was temporary and leaders of Arab nations were irrational (Philosophical Belief 1), one had to be prepared for any eventuality and at the same time be willing to negotiate a peace settlement should the opportunity arise. Most of the statements made by Ben Gurion relating to this belief appear to agree with Holsti's hypotheses for a Type B actor/leader. Holsti stated that such a leader would pursue goals vigorously, limit means rather than ends; and find that a "muddling through" strategy would be most inappropriate. Holsti did not make any hypotheses about the type of action preferred. My analysis indicated that multilateral action is preferred but unilateral action may be necessary at time.

Instrumental Belief 3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

Very few coded statements related to Ben Gurion's belief regarding the assessment of risk. Therefore, the analysis of this category is rather limited, since data were not found for all of the sub-categories. The following, therefore, is a summation of the data relating to Ben Gurion's belief regarding the assessment of risk.

Ben Gurion believed that risks were calculated within a comprehensive framework. As all issues were linked, each step or undertaking was part of the grand design to achieve redemption. Although he realized that it would be folly to minimize the risks or intentions of one's opponents, he believed that the greatest risk lay in complacency, a lack of confidence, or a failure of Israel to demonstrate determination credibly.

But the real risk is lest the capacity be dulled, in the protagonists of our revolution, to assess sturdily the forces that will shape our future, lest confidence be shaken in our own potentialities as the focal and final authors of the morrow and of our own small universe within the larger, lest we may belittle ourselves and our creations, being few and infirm beside the proud catalogue of great nations. . . (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 138).

A further risk lay in the conflicts within the Yishuv and within the Zionist Organization. Internal rifts may destroy Israel: "It would be folly to minimize the risks or intentions of foreign powers but what may destroy us is a rift in the Yishuv or in Zionism." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 178). One had to control such risks by establishing cohesion within the organization. Risks must be assessed in relation to one's ultimate goals. As one could not compromise on the fundamental goals, one must be careful not to endanger the chances of achieving those goals. For example, Zionist terrorist groups became a source of trouble for the Provisionist Council in 1944. Ben Gurion warned the Zionists that actions such as those taken by the "terrorist murderers" stood in the way of achieving statehood, and such risks could not be countenanced. In order to control the risks which terrorist groups posed for the negotiations for statehood, Ben Gurion believed that everyone

in the Yishuv should be aware of the risks and understand that action against the terrorists was necessary.

It is salutary to explain the origins, in history, ideology and society of this virulent and criminal phenomenon. It is important to spread the information among all sectors of the Yishuv and of the Histadruth. The true state of affairs must be made known by every means, so that every one may understand the harm and risk involved. . . I wished to sound a warning. Explanations, indictments, fine or labent phrases are pointless now: deeds must follow them. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 145).

Risks could be controlled by creating a balance of arms between Israel and her Arab neighbours. This theme was very relevant in 1956, when the threat of war with the Arab nations was intensified.

We believed that external military intervention in the Middle East would precipitate a grave threat to world peace, and that war could be prevented only by achieving a balance of arms between Israel and her Arab neighbours. The longer defensive arms were withheld from us, the greater the risk of war. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 99).

This also reflects Ben Gurion's belief that multilateral action was necessary in order to achieve the balance between the Arab nations and Israel. (Instrumental Belief 2).

In battle, Ben Gurion believed that risks could be minimized if one avoided mistakes. Mistakes could be averted by being prepared for each new battle. "We should prepare now for the next battle, so as to avoid the mistakes which will weaken us when it comes." (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 226).

In order to minimize risks one could limit the means of attaining one's goals. Ben Gurion believed that the State was a means to messianic redemption. If accepting the partition plan and a subsequent smaller state would minimize the risk of war with the Arabs, this was permissible since the ultimate goal of redemption was not compromised. Brecher(1973) has stated that Ben Gurion saw the State as an instrument of war. He quotes Ben Gurion as having said:

I find it difficult now to understand any other language than the language of war. . . I feel that the wisdom of Israel now is the wisdom to wage war, that and nothing else, that and only that. (Brecher, 1973, p. 276).

Continual war and the perception of the State as a means to achieving his goals gave rise "to the most distinctive element in Ben Gurion's image of the global system--the two-camp thesis. Israel and world Jewry constitute one camp, the rest of the world the other." (Brecher, 1973, p. 276). However, Ben Gurion's "image of the world" must be examined in terms of his final goals, Zionism and messianic redemption. If the State was a means, an instrument of war, or a unifying symbol for World Jewry, the goals were still the same. World Jewry depended on the survival of Israel and Israel depended on World Jewry. The rest of the world could assist Israel in achieving her aim to "be like all other nations" but only the Jews of the world could be constant in her loyalty to Israel, and could bring about messianic redemption.

George and Holsti hypothesize that a person who tends to be optimistic about his ability to attain his goals (Philosophical Belief 2) will tend to avoid choosing those options which involve high risk situations. In this regard, the evidence uncovered by the case study is ambiguous. High risk policies were mandatory in those situations in which other options were unavailable. For example, during the War of Independence and the Sinai Campaign the Arab armies outnumbered the Israelis ten to one. In the first situation, Ben Gurion was faced with the choice of declaring the independence of the State and the possible annihilation by the Arab armies, or deny the Jewish people a chance to establish their right to return to their homeland. For Ben Gurion, this was not a choice.

When I say: 'We have no choice', I am thinking of those Jews in Israel and beyond who can live only one way of life: independent, Jewish and in the Homeland. Such, be they here or still to join us, have no choice. They will never bend the knee to the Mufti, to the masters of the Arab League or to Bevin's policy and its supporters. They are bound to defend themselves and their nation's right by force, and by force they will guard it. To them it is a right of ages won by their forefathers, by the creativity of pioneer generations, a right recognized by international authority, barter of Jewish suffering and tragedy down the years. For them there is no choice. (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 235).

Similarly, in the Sinai Campaign Ben Gurion was again faced with annihilation by the Arab armies and again, for him there was no choice. The high risk policy was forced upon him:

We are compelled to make a supreme effort for security. It is forced upon us by external factors and hostile forces. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 110, emphasis in original).

It is apparent in each case that Ben Gurion denied any value tradeoffs in making his decisions. This point would be consistent with the assumption from cognitive theory that tradeoffs violate the principle of consistency.

Under the assumptions of cognitive theory, the information-processing mechanisms of the mind operate to deny the trade-off relationship unless compelled to recognize it by a highly structured external situation (the reality constraint). Under uncertainty, the reality constraint is weakened, and the cognitive criterion of consistency forces a mental dissolution of the trade-off. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 108).

There is some degree of relationship between Philosophical Belief 2 and Instrumental Belief 3. In each situation above, Ben Gurion was optimistic that his people would succeed in achieving their military goals. However, the relationship between Instrumental Belief 3 and the other beliefs in the code does not appear to be very strong. For example, Instrumental Belief 3 does not appear to be related to Ben Gurion's basic view of the universe. Holsti found that Instrumental Belief 3 did not have strong relationships with other beliefs in the typology of actor/leader types. He offered two possible explanations for his findings:

Perhaps beliefs about risk are also relatively independent of beliefs about the nature of the political universe. Alternatively, this result may be an indirect consequence of role. Perhaps persons in some roles may less often be required to articulate their beliefs on risk. (Holsti, 1977, p. 268).

Holsti's alternatives should not be considered comprehensive. A third alternative is also possible, and that is that risk is considered part of the situation. In this case, risk may become involved in the definition of role. In a situation in which there is continual uncertainty and a continual threat of war, every policy would carry a high degree of risk. The risk factor would become an "understood" part of the policy-making and a leader may not express his beliefs about risk often. In the Israeli situation the dangers and risk of war have been present on a daily basis. For example, after 1948 there was an Armistice Treaty between Israel and some of her Arab neighbours. Although Egypt signed the treaty she declared that a "Stale of War" would continue to exist between the two countries. Further, Egypt's policy was aimed at the elimination of Israel by force. To this end Egypt initiated the fedayeen raids, the blockade of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. The daily raids and subsequent bombings by Egypt and the continual blockade of Israeli shipping created a very tense and uncertain situation in Israel. Added to this was Ben Gurion's belief that Arab politics were irrational and thus the unexpected might happen at any time. Israeli decision-makers would not have to remind their audiences of the dangers present in decision-making situations. Therefore, their assessments of the risks are less likely to appear verbally.

Instrumental Belief 4: What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests?

- A. How important is timing for achieving major aspirations?--Timing is important.
- B. How important is timing for achieving specific undertakings?--Timing is important
- C. When is action required, permitted, prohibited?--Action is prohibited when marking time. Action is required when conflict is inevitable.

Timing was essential for Ben Gurion and reflected his belief that a leader must be very aware of the importance of timing. "You must always be conscious of the element of timing, and this demands a constant awareness of what is going on around you. . . (Pearlman, 1965, p. 52). Ben Gurion believed that timing was essential both in fighting's one's political opponents and in knowing when "to mark time". In 1938, he wrote:

Our main strength lies in Palestine, and in my opinion--which I have held for a long time--we might have to use the little power we control. The time for this has not yet come. For two reasons: 1) We are not yet facing the critical moment; (2) At present the main thing is to bolster our strength in the policy force, in the army, in immigration as far as this is possible. The task of the hour is to increase our strength, not to use it. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 178).

Action at this time was not permitted, but what was permitted was to bolster the strength of one's forces so one could be prepared for the critical moment when action would be necessary. This reflects Ben Gurion's belief that one had to be prepared for any eventuality. (Instrumental Belief 1).

The importance of timing was an issue in Ben Gurion's later years as well. In 1956, when the Arab States were preparing for war against Israel, Ben Gurion believed that conflict was inevitable and that action was necessary.

A sudden combined attack by the three (Arab) countries¹⁷ under a unified Egyptian command, could thus leave us entirely defenseless. The time had come for action. (Ben Gurion, 1963, p. 117).

¹⁷The three countries were Egypt, Syria and Jordan. A few days prior to the beginning of the Sinai Campaign, these countries had formed a tripartite military alliance. This action was an impetus to Ben Gurion's decision to mount the Campaign.

Ben Gurion's course of action led to an overwhelming military victory in the Sinai Campaign. This situation was not unlike that of the 1948 war, at which time, Ben Gurion had stated: "Let us resolve at the right moment to attack all along the line. . . (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 239). For each specific undertaking there was always the right and the wrong time for action and one had to be very careful in choosing the right moment. Any neglect or miscalculation when security was involved could be catastrophic. "Where security is involved, time is of the essence, and neglect may be, literally, catastrophic." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 385).

Ben Gurion's source of knowledge for this belief is related to his experiences as a leader and his assessments of history (Philosophical Belief 4). A leader had to know when to attack, when to accommodate and when to pull back. He had to be aware of when he had the superior position from which he could negotiate. To negotiate from a weakened position would be disastrous. This belief is also related to Ben Gurion's beliefs about the predictability of the future. While he believed that the change in the Arab States from totalitarianism to liberal democracies would eventually take place, one had to bide time, to be prepared for any eventuality, and to take whatever precautions were necessary to ensure the security of Israel. In the long run, time was with the Israelis (Philosophical Belief 2) and the task of the leader was to identify the best time for action. Ben Gurion's beliefs about the importance of timing are highly comparable with Holsti's expectations concerning a Type B actor/leader.

Instrumental Belief 5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? What resources can one draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?

A. Tactics--Tactics depend on the goal one is trying to achieve. Almost any means are acceptable to achieve security.

Prior to the establishment of the State, Ben Gurion believed the Jews of the Yishuv were living in an "era of implementation", that is, through their labour,

through immigration and through the work of their youth, they would implement statehood and unity. Many of his Zionist colleagues did not agree with him concerning the means for achieving Zionism. After his election to the Zionist executive in 1935 (a position he did not want because of the disunity in the organization and its conflict with the Labour Union),¹⁸ Ben Gurion stated:

But I saw that many of my comrades did not agree with me. These disagreements were not about the aim, but about the way it should be attained. However, during an era of implementation, the way, the path is all important. (Ben Gurion, 1968, p. 93, emphasis in original).

Once the State was established and security was the prime concern, Ben Gurion utilized all possible means to ensure that security, even if they met with dissatisfaction. For Ben Gurion, courting popularity was not the role of the leader. Security was all that mattered, for Israel. In the 1950's security meant an alliance with Germany to secure foreign exchange in the form of reparations and to establish goodwill by selling arms.¹⁹ To negotiate with the country that had been responsible for the death of six million Jews just a few short years earlier, was reprehensible to many Israelis. This action reflected Ben Gurion's pragmatic approach to the pursuit of goals. (Instrumental Belief 2). It was essential for Israel to align itself with friendly nations and friends of friendly nations which would eventually supply needed political and military support. He recalled this policy orientation in his interview with Pearlman:

We had to safeguard security. . . What must the answer be? Clearly both to maintain a military force skilled and well-equipped to serve as a deterrant

¹⁸Disunity in the Zionist party in the 1930's was a great source of anguish for Ben Gurion. Each faction within the organization expressed their own ideological paths to statehood. For Ben Gurion there had to be one united path and that was through labour of the Jewish people in Palestine.

¹⁹The German-Israel alliance was an "arms-length" relationship at this time based on security needs. As well, Ben Gurion believed that a hostile Germany could endanger Israel's relations with other nations.

and to develop friendly relations, with as many States as possible in Europe, and America, Africa and Asia. This is important politically, since such friendships can eventually bring about a weakening of the Arab wall of hatred and pave the way for regional peace, and also militarily, since it guarantees a source of supply of needed armaments. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 165).

There is a marked degree of overlap between this facet of Ben Gurion's beliefs and his beliefs concerning the use of multilateral action. (Instrumental Belief 2). The overlap may be due to the ambiguous nature of the words "strategy" and "tactics" as mentioned in the introduction to this section. The overall strategy was to secure the safety of Israel in light of her hostile neighbours. The actual tactics used to secure the safety of Israel included the development of friendly relations with States, the maintenance of a security force (a deterrent), and the use of force if necessary. Ben Gurion believed that force was a necessary although not a sufficient, tool of diplomacy. "Military and foreign affairs are intertwined and neither one nor the other can be the single decisive factor affecting a country's security." (Pearlman, 1965, p. 145).

Diplomacy was not Ben Gurion's most efficient tool and he did not admire the skill of diplomacy in others.²⁰ To Ben Gurion the State existed because of the daring of the Israelis not because of the diplomatic battles in the United Nations. Positive and concrete acts would ensure the viability of the State. As Brecher pointed out:

Thus the diplomatic struggle, especially at the UN, was peripheral. In its most extreme form the BG interpretation would assert that, regardless of the outcome at the United Nations in 1947-8, the state would have or could have survived provided that courage and will and daring were present in the Yishuv. Conversely no UN resolution could have created the state if that determination were lacking. (Brecher, 1973, p. 257)

²⁰ Brecher wrote that when Ben Gurion would talk of Weizmann, Israel's first President, and Herzl, the founder of Zionism, he would denigrate their contributions of "vision and diplomacy". For further details see Brecher, 1973, p. 258.

As Prime Minister, Ben Gurion insisted on holding the portfolio of Defense and stated that an Israeli Prime Minister should also be his own Foreign Minister:

. . . but I would say quite openly that an Israeli Prime Minister must be his own Foreign Minister. Foreign Affairs, like defense, can be affected by a right or wrong decision at the lowest level, which is not the case with other ministries. . . I would read all the important diplomatic cables each morning and make whatever suggestions I thought fit. . . if it differed from that of the Foreign Minister he could either accept my line or bring it before the government. ²¹ (Pearlman, 1965, pp. 127-28).

Thus, although Ben Gurion did not have much faith in diplomatic measures to ensure goals, he realized that diplomacy did have some contribution to make. As Moshe Sharett, one time Foreign Minister under Ben Gurion, stated: "Deep in his heart, Ben Gurion knows the vital role of the diplomatic battle at the United Nations but he cannot bring himself to admit this in public." (Brecher, 1973, p. 258)

B. How is Power conceptualized?--Power is not based solely on military strength.

Ben Gurion conceptualized power as more than military might. Spirit and morale were important resources.

I don't say there is a limit to the odds that can be faced and overcome. I do say, however, that the will of a people and the spirit and morale of its army are immeasurably powerful factors in war and can be decisive. (Pearlman, 1965, p. 12).

The spirit and morale of the army and the will of the people will make an important contribution to achieve military victory. The War of Independence had been won with the endurance, spirit and morale of the Israeli people. Such inner resources were necessary for each battle the Israelis had to fight and they were necessary to achieve the ultimate goals of redemption and the end of Zionism.

Ben Gurion's beliefs regarding the tactics one should use to obtain one's

²¹ Ben Gurion was often accused of being his own Foreign Minister and this led to many confrontations with the Foreign Minister of the day. It also led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett in 1954.

goals set within the context of the strategy one employed. (Instrumental Beliefs 1 and 2). The means depended upon the goal one was attempting to achieve. Because Ben Gurion would often make the strategic goals a means to achieving long term aims, it is difficult to discern means from ends. For Ben Gurion, goals like security meant that any acceptable tactic could be employed as long as the security of the State could be ensured. A secure state, of course, was a means to achieving the end of Zionism. Ben Gurion's overall belief as to the tactics required for advancing his goals--the end justifies most if not all means, and force may be utilized when necessary--has a strong relationship to Holsti's typology.

Instrumental Beliefs: A Summary

The Instrumental Beliefs proved to be the most difficult to code and analyse. This was due in part to the coders finding Holsti's code rules and definitions ambiguous, and in part, to the lack of data found for some of the categories. However, the findings that were analysed tend to agree substantially with Holsti's hypotheses for a Type B actor/leader. There were insufficient data to assess the degree of fitness for Instrumental Belief 3 for the reasons mentioned earlier.

There is a strong relationship between the Instrumental Beliefs and the Philosophical Beliefs. One of the most dominant epistemological beliefs in relation to the Instrumental Beliefs was Ben Gurion's belief in Zionism and messianic redemption. (Philosophical Belief 2). As the discussion of Ben Gurion's Philosophical Beliefs has shown, his beliefs were centered around these two basic goals. His outlook of the political universe was governed by the belief in the eventual realization of his ultimate aims. Consequently, his belief in Zionism and redemption had considerable effect on his Instrumental Beliefs.

Ben Gurion's goals for political action (Instrumental Belief 1) were established in relation to his fundamental goals. All issues were linked to the ultimate aims of Zionism and redemption. For Ben Gurion lesser goals became the means to the establishment of the ultimate goals. Thus it was permissible to limit these lesser goals or means if it meant that you could be closer to realizing the final aims. For example, Ben Gurion was quite willing to settle for a partition state as long as it was a Jewish State. The establishment of the Jewish State was the beginning of the realization of redemption and the end of Zionism. Instrumental Belief 1 is also related to Philosophical Belief 4 (The role of a leader). A leader had to set priorities and establish a hierarchy of goals or values. This required establishing goals in a comprehensive framework and continually reassessing goals as values and situations changed. For example, immigration and the establishment of the State were the most important fundamental values/goals of the Jewish people before Independence. After the State was created, the most important fundamental goal became the security of the State.

Instrumental Belief 2 is related to Ben Gurion's optimism for achieving his long term goals, and to Instrumental Belief 1. Short term goals or means could be modified or limited but the long term goals could not be compromised. Many different approaches could be used to achieve goals, but the least appropriate would be to "muddle through" to try this approach and then that and see what happens. This also related to Ben Gurion's beliefs about the role of a leader. A leader must be able to "appreciate the situation" and be receptive to the possibility of applying different approaches to accomplish his goals. However, once a decision is made he must stick to it.

While information regarding Ben Gurion's beliefs concerning risk assessment was limited, there were statements which found that Ben Gurion used different approaches for controlling risks. Control of risk depended on the situation and the type of risk involved. For example, the data showed that Ben Gurion spoke of risks pertaining to internal rifts in the country, risks pertaining to war with

the Arab nations, and risks pertaining to battles. For each of these situations, there were different methods that could be used to control risk and this reflected Ben Gurion's belief that while the means can be limited the ultimate ends must not be compromised. There is some relationship between this belief and Ben Gurion's optimism (Philosophical Belief 2) but the evidence is inconclusive. Ben Gurion accepted high risk policies in certain situations, such as declaring independence, the Sinai Campaign, German reparations, etc., but his acceptance of these high risk policies does not appear to support George's and Holsti's hypothesis that leaders who tend to be optimistic about obtaining long term aims also avoid high risk policies. However, the quality of the data does not allow for any conclusive statements in this regard. I would suspect that Ben Gurion was prepared to accept high risk policies if it was necessary to the fulfillment of the fundamental aims of Israel.

Instrumental Belief 4 is very closely related to Ben Gurion's belief that a leader must be continually aware of the importance of timing. Ben Gurion believed that he could only negotiate with such leaders as Nasser from a position of strength and superiority. This meant knowing the exact time to act, to negotiate and to pull back. This is also related to Ben Gurion's belief that time, in the long run was on his side (Philosophical Belief 2).

Instrumental Belief 5 is related to Philosophical Belief 2 and Instrumental Beliefs 1 and 2. The tactics one employed had to be framed within the fundamental strategic goals which included security, immigration, World Jewry, etc., and the means for achieving those goals. Power was not the only resource available to achieve success.

The following chapter will provide a comparison of Ben Gurion's belief system with Holsti's typology for a Type B actor/leader, as part of the summation and conclusions for the preceding case study and evaluation of Holsti's framework.

Chapter Four

Conclusions

Introduction

The preceding chapters have attempted to evaluate the Operational Code as a theoretical approach to the analysis of foreign policy decision-making. The approach was evaluated in relation to other cognitive approaches and by application of Holsti's revised framework to a case study of David Ben Gurion of Israel. The original premise of this thesis was that Operational Code was a viable approach but that it was theoretically weak. Evidence has been found in the research which supports the contention that the code is a viable method for deriving the belief system of a decision-maker. The evidence also illuminates the weaknesses as well as the strengths of Operational Code. This chapter will summarize the findings and suggest possible additions or deletions to the Holsti construct which will strengthen the theoretical base of Operational Code. The first part of this chapter will present a comparative summary of Ben Gurion's Operational Code with the hypotheses derived by Holsti for a Type B actor/leader. The summary will relate to the theoretical considerations discussed in Chapter One and will be followed by a discussion of the weaknesses in the framework and future considerations.

A Comparison of Holsti's Typology with Ben Gurion's Operational Code

The comparison of Holsti's typology and Ben Gurion's Operational Code are reported on Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 records the results for Philosophical Belief 1-a. Table 8 records the results for the other Philosophical Beliefs and the Instrumental Beliefs. The first two columns represent summary questions from the code and Holsti's hypotheses regarding these questions. The third column

is summary evidence from the case study. The degree of "fit" between Holsti's hypotheses and Ben Gurion's Operational Code is recorded in the last column according to the following rating system:

- ++ - very substantial agreement
- + - agreement on balance
- 0 - insufficient or inconclusive data
- - disagreement on balance
- - substantial disagreement

Information from the first belief is used to assess the hypothesis that the two dimensions of Philosophical Belief 1-a--the nature of the political universe and the source of conflict--are dominant beliefs. The results recorded on Table 7 indicate that there is substantial agreement between Holsti's hypotheses and Ben Gurion's beliefs. The comparison is slightly weak regarding the source of conflict and the conditions of peace.

Ben Gurion's image of the political universe was governed by his belief in messianic redemption which would bring harmony to the world. Messianic redemption required a transformation of states into democracies so that the equalities and the rights of man could be ensured. In terms of Holsti's typology, Ben Gurion did attribute conflict to the attributes of nations. However, Ben Gurion was greatly influenced by ideas and ideologies throughout his life. While ideas and ideologies were the foundation of his fundamental beliefs in messianism and Zionism, they were also the cause of conflict. Holsti's examination of John Foster Dulles' Operational Code identified Dulles as a Type B actor/leader. Dulles believed that conflict was based on the "clash between opposing universalistic faiths. . . Communism versus Christianity, atheism versus spiritualism, or materialism versus religious faith..." (Holsti, 1970, p. 130). Each of the "faiths" can be viewed as ideologies. Holsti states that Dulles' image of the sources of conflict strongly relates to the hypotheses for a Type B actor/leader. Therefore, Ben Gurion's beliefs regarding the sources of conflict would also agree with the hypotheses.

TABLE 7

Ben Gurion: Beliefs About the Nature of the Political Life

	Holsti's Hypotheses	Coder Evidence	Goodness of Fit
<u>PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF 1-a</u>	<u>NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE</u>		
What is the nature of the political universe	Conflict is temporary; in a world of peaceful states there will be peace	There has always been conflict latent harmony will become manifest with redemption	++
What are the basic sources of conflict	Warlike states or classes of states	Conflict is based on ideas and ideologies of nation-states	+
What are the conditions of peace	Containment, reform or elimination of warlike actors.	Transform nations to democracies; get rid of totalitarian rulers; eliminate inequalities	+
What is the nature of conflict	Zero-sum	Conflict can be zero-sum but war not decisive	++
What is the scope of conflict	Issues tend to be closely linked	All issues linked	++
What is the role of conflict in historical development	Very functional in some circumstances	War/revolution may be very functional	++
Scenario of a major danger of war	War from miscalculation, appeasement model	negotiate from strength; danger of appeasement to leaders shows weakness	++

The fine line of distinction between Holsti's hypotheses and derived beliefs from the Operational Code is tenuous. One must step back and examine the coded statements from an overall perspective of the belief categories. Slight nuances in interpretations of terminology from the coding system and the coded statements can cause confusion. This point is apparent in the data derived for "conditions of peace". The terms "reform" in Holsti's coding system and the term "transform" in the derived beliefs for Ben Gurion are synonymous. Holsti describes a Type B actor/leader as one who believes that peace would be achieved when certain nations were reformed or eliminated. He used "the Marxist vision of a world without capitalist states and the Wilsonian vision of a world of democratic states" (Holsti, 1977, p. 159) as examples of this type. Certainly from the evidence in the case study, Ben Gurion beliefs are very similar to the Wilsonian vision of the world. To exemplify this further, Holsti's coding rules state that data regarding the sub-category "eliminate offending nations" are coded if "the author indicates that the necessary or sufficient conditions of peace require the elimination or transformation of a specific nation or classes of nations." (Holsti, 1977, p. 90). Ben Gurion certainly advocated this condition. Thus what may appear at face value as disagreement with Holsti's typology, is, in fact, in agreement with the hypothesis.

The results on Table 8 generally support the hypotheses. Beliefs which are weakly related have been discussed earlier, but it is important to recall them here. Ben Gurion's belief regarding the Arab response to policies of firmness is weakly related to Holsti's hypothesis but it is in concordance with Ben Gurion's belief that Arab leaders, while in some respects are Model I actors, are dependent on emotional bluster, prestige and popularity to remain in power. Consequently, such leaders may react in a purely irrational manner to maintain their tenuous leaderships. Holsti, on the other hand, hypothesized that a Type B actor/leader would view the opponent as a rational unitary actor who carefully plans his actions. Such an opponent would therefore be deterred by policies of firmness and would "think

Table 8

OPERATIONAL CODE OF DAVID BEN GURION

Philosophical Beliefs	Holsti's Hypotheses	Coder Evidence	Goodness of Fit
<u>PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF 1-b</u>			
<u>NATURE OF THE ADVERSARY</u>			
Nature of the Opponent	High correlation between opponent and his foreign policy (eg. nature of leader political and economic structure) Opponent is Model 1 Actor - (careful planning)	Politics of Arabs irrational; certain personalities; policy determined by need of leader for prestige and popularity--Basically Model 1 actor	+
What are the Opponent's goals	Range from expansionist to destructionist arise from basic feature of adversary's regime	"Push Israel into sea" Holy War against Israel"; Arab Unity--goals destructionist/expansionist	++
Response conciliatory moves	Likely to view conciliatory actions as a sign of weakness or lack of commitment; adversary pursue expansion; appeasement model relevant	Any conciliatory moves met with disdain or ignored--sign of weakness	++
Response to policies of firmness	Adversary will be deterred from expansion policies--danger of impulsive response from adversary is minimal	Balance of arms is deterrance Arab politics are irrational	+ -
<u>PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF 2: OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM</u>			
Is one optimist/pessimist	Optimist in long-run; short run full of dangers, especially if one demonstrates inability or unwillingness to pursue effective policies of deterrance	I am not pessimistic despite pessimistic appraisal of situation; optimist in long run	++
Is optimism conditional	Definitely. Nothing automatic about the success of one's ultimate goals	Conditional on establishment of model society transformation of nation-states; the end of Zionism and peace with Arabs inevitable	++ -
On whose side is time	On one's own but conditional	Time is on our side in long run but conditional	++

Table 8 continued

Operational Code of David Ben Gurion

Philosophical Beliefs	Holsti's Hypotheses	Coder Evidence	Goodness of Fit
<u>PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF 3: PREDICTABILITY OF FUTURE</u>			
Is the political universe predictable	Political universe relatively predictable; goals of opponent predictable, even if short term strategies have element of surprise	Risky in highly complex situations, but predictable in long run	++
	Events rarely occur by chance, accident, etc.	nothing happens by chance	
What aspects are predictable	Goals of the adversary.	goals of opponents	++
	Major directions of historical development.	historical development	
<u>PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF 4: ROLE OF LEADER</u>			
What is the role of the leader in shaping history	Control over major elements of historical development is possible, but there are ever present dangers of losing control (e.g. inviting miscalculation by the adversary, owing to one's failure to make commitments sufficiently credible).	Effective control necessary Absolute confidence in judgment	++
Instrumental Beliefs			
<u>INSTRUMENTAL BELIEF 1: SELECTING GOALS FOR POLITICAL ACTION</u>			
How are goals established	Establish political goals within a comprehensive framework; all issues are linked.	Comprehensive framework All issues linked to ultimate aims	++
What goals should be sought	Seek optimal goals; compromise and withdrawal may be necessary but don't abandon important goals	feasible short run goals but optimal long run goals don't abandon important goals	+ 171
How many paths	Relatively few; at any given time, one	may be more depending on goal	+

Table 8 continued

Operational Code of David Ben Gurion

Instrumental Beliefs	Holsti's Hypotheses	Coder Evidence	Goodness of Fit
<u>INSTRUMENTAL BELIEF 2: HOW ARE GOALS PURSUED</u>			
What strategies should be used	Pursue goals vigorously when there are important gains; limit means rather than ends	Pursue goals vigorously; limit means rather than ends	++
What strategies are especially inappropriate	Strategies of "muddling through", of trying this strategy and then that in the hope something will work	Strategies of "muddling through" most inappropriate	++
<u>INSTRUMENTAL BELIEF 3: COPING WITH RISK</u>			
How are risks assessed		Assessed in relation to one's ultimate goals; be prepared so as to minimize risk; limit means rather than ends	
How are risks controlled	Limit means rather than ends		0
How to deal with trade-offs associated with risk			
<u>INSTRUMENTAL BELIEF 4: TIMING OF POLITICAL ACTION</u>			
How important is timing in political action	Timing is very important; lost opportunities for gains may not recur, and premature actions may unduly risk future prospects	Timing is of the essence	++
<u>INSTRUMENTAL BELIEF 5: UTILITY OF VARIOUS MEANS</u>			
What tactics are most appropriate in what circumstances	End justifies most, if not all means	Security must be achieved by any means	++
What is one's conception of power	Do not hesitate to use force when it offers the prospects for large gains with limited risks	Power is more than military Force may be necessary in certain situations	++

twice" about impulsive actions. Although Ben Gurion believed that Arab politics were irrational, he also believed that a qualitative balance of arms would be a deterrent against war.

The only other major finding which was in substantial disagreement with Holsti's hypothesis was Ben Gurion's belief that the ultimate goals were inevitable compared to Holsti's hypothesis that there was nothing automatic about the success of one's ultimate goals. This facet of Ben Gurion's beliefs can be explained by cognitive theory. In order for Ben Gurion to avoid the dissonance which would be caused by the possibility that redemption and the end of Zionism, or peace with the Arabs might not be achieved, he was able to remove these goals to some distant future; that is, inferential transformation or wishful thinking.

When a set of beliefs is under pressure from inconsistent information being processed in a short time frame, it is possible to maintain consistency without changing the beliefs by casting them in a long-range time frame and adopting the inference of transformation; namely, that the immediate situation will succumb to a favorable trend over time. (Steinbruner, 1976, p. 117)

The mind is constrained by the realities of the world around us. However, when uncertainty exists the reality constraint is weakened. That is, it becomes difficult for the information processing of the mind to discern what is reality and what is not. Under such circumstances, beliefs will be generated which will be limited to a comparatively short time frame. Thus, Ben Gurion, whose life was centered in a world of uncertainty and highly complex situations, was able to maintain consistency with his fundamental beliefs by viewing, for example, the opponent as temporary, relative to the time and circumstance. By transferring his belief that peace would come eventually in the distant future, he was able to deal with the "intransigent Arabs" in the short term. Similarly, in coping with the emergence of a less than "model society" in Israel, Ben Gurion again was able to transform the achievement of the "model society" to the future so that he was able to avoid dissonance in the present situation in Israel.

Individuals may employ several other methods to cope with discrepant information. For example, they may rationalize decisions to themselves and others: or they may bolster their decisions with positive reinforcements or cognitions so that they can maintain a strong self-justification of his own opinions. Ben Gurion was constantly reinforcing his beliefs with biblical quotations which supplied the justification for his actions. People with high self-esteem require less information to cope with inconsistency because they tend to have extreme self-confidence in their own opinions and are able to resist discrepant information. Their belief systems tend to be more closed than those held by individuals with low self-esteem. The decision-maker with high ego-esteem will thus rely more on his own preconceptions, perceptions, beliefs, to interpret situations and process information. This point is illustrated in the case study of Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion, a man of high ego-esteem, believed that a leader of Israel should insist on holding the portfolios of Defense and Foreign Affairs because these ministries were too crucial to be handled by any other person except one who might have the most influence in the decision-making. Thus the information received would be interpreted according to one set of beliefs. Although Ben Gurion never held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, he was able to sway others to agree to his decisions regarding the policies of this ministry. When a Foreign Minister disagreed with Ben Gurion, he would either have to change his own opinion or as in the case of Moshe Sharett, resign.

I stated in Chapter Two that there was some evidence that Ben Gurion would prove to be a Type B actor/leader but that all the hypotheses outlined by Holsti for this type would not agree with Ben Gurion's belief set. The findings of the case study have supported my hypothesis. While the above discussion explains why Ben Gurion believed the ultimate goals were inevitable, and why he believed that Arab politics were irrational, it does not explain why there are discrepancies between Ben Gurion's beliefs and the typology. The discrepancies may be idiosyncratic to Ben Gurion. Other Type B actor/leaders (Dulles, Schumacher and the Bolsheviks) categorized by Holsti showed a very substantial degree of agreement between their

beliefs and Holsti's hypotheses for these beliefs. (Holsti, 1977, p. 266). The discrepancies may pose a problem. If Ben Gurion's beliefs are idiosyncratic, other leaders can also have idiosyncratic belief systems and the utility of Operational Code may be severely limited. However, the overall high degree of agreement between Holsti's hypotheses and Ben Gurion's other beliefs belies this contention. Every person has their own idiosyncratic beliefs but there will still be a degree of similarity and/or sameness in the beliefs which are contained in the Operational Code which will enhance its utility. Holsti found that out of twelve decision-makers which he examined, seven had a very high degree of "fit" with his hypotheses and only three had a comparatively low degree of "fit".

The discrepancies may also be the result of ambiguity in the coding rules. The results of the reliability tests have shown that Philosophical Belief 1-b had one of the highest degrees of coder error. While Philosophical Belief 2 also had a high degree of coder error it was considerably lower than Philosophical Belief 1-b. This may indicate that the coding rules for these two categories may not be comprehensive. Philosophical Belief 1-b, for example, requires the coder to code statements which relate to whether an author sees an opponent as a Model I, II or III type actor--based on Allison's (1971) criteria. However, Allison's criteria are very comprehensive¹. Model I actors, for example, are identified according to six extensive characteristics. Holsti's coding rules make no allowance for a view of an opponent which may not exhibit all the characteristics of a Model I actor. Ben Gurion believed the Arabs to be a unitary, monolithic actor but action was not necessarily the result of rational choice. Perhaps the category should refer to whether an opponent is viewed as rational, irrational, acting within a bureaucratic structure (Model II), or acting as one

¹For a complete description of the models see Allison, 1971, 1977.

of several decision-makers with a single governmental system. (Model III).

There have been difficulties in the past in linking beliefs with foreign policy behavior. Operational Code assumes that the beliefs inherent in the code are linked to and have an effect on each other. Previous studies have shown the dominance of Philosophical Belief 1 relative to the other beliefs. From the case study and the comparative analysis we can say with some assurance that there is a definite co-occurrence and dependence of Philosophical Belief 1 relative to the other beliefs. Support was found in the case study for the hypotheses that if a decision-maker believes the universe to be basically harmonious and that conflict is temporary, he will tend to: be optimistic about achieving his fundamental goals (Philosophical Belief 2); believe the universe to be relatively predictable (Philosophical Belief 3); believe that a leader must exercise effective control and that events rarely happen by chance (Philosophical Belief 4); establish goals within a comprehensive framework (Instrumental Belief 1); limit means rather than ends (Instrumental Belief 2); believe that timing is very important in political action (Instrumental Belief 4); and believe that the end justifies most means (Instrumental Belief 5). These findings agree with the hypotheses outlined by Holsti in his typology for a Type B actor/leader. Furthermore, the findings support the premise that Operational Code is indeed a belief system of the type envisaged by Converse. That is, there are internal constraints among the beliefs. For example, a belief that the conflict in the universe is temporary will tend to make a decision-maker optimistic about achieving his goals.

Support was also found for some of the dominant expectations of Holsti regarding Philosophical Belief 4--the role of the leader. This belief does not appear to be dependent on Philosophical Belief 1. That is, the beliefs which Ben Gurion had about his role as a leader did not seem to be related to his basic view of the political universe. However, the findings in the case study also demonstrated that the beliefs Ben Gurion had concerning the role of a leader had

an influence on some of the other beliefs within his belief system. For example, the role of a leader had an influence on how goals should be selected and the importance of timing for political action. (Instrumental Beliefs 2 and 4). The dominance of this belief leads one to assume that the role of a leader would be, as George and Holsti suggest, a candidate for further typology development. Holsti suggested that a typology based on role conception might be more valuable in one or more of the following ways: "(1) identifying the most salient differences among political leaders; (2) for predicting other aspects of leaders' beliefs; and (3) for predicting other aspects of political behavior, such as decision-making propensities." (Holsti, 1977, p. 271).

The relationships among the beliefs of the Operational Code suggest that there will be considerable influence on a decision-maker's beliefs during the decision-making process. The evidence also supports the contention that beliefs which are central to a decision-maker are the most resistant to change and the most stable over time. Ben Gurion's most central beliefs were a belief in the end of Zionism and messianic redemption. These beliefs were formulated early in Ben Gurion's development and were most influential in his decision-making. While Ben Gurion used different means to achieve these goals, the goals remained constant. For example, at first socialism was a means to achieve the end of Zionism. When the socialist tenets no longer suited Ben Gurion's idea of how to achieve redemption, he no longer used socialism as a means. Similarly, the establishment of the State was at first a goal and then a means to achieve the end of Zionism.

Although the evidence in support of the hypotheses regarding the relationships between or among the beliefs of Operational Code is considerable, there are some apparent weaknesses which should be examined before any conclusions can be derived.

Weaknesses in Operational Code

Holsti's coding rules did clarify some of the ambiguities which have been found in earlier studies using the George construct. For example, Holsti addressed Anderson's (1973) concerns about the permanence of the image of the opponent by adding a sub-category which questions the generality of the adversary. This allows the investigator to code those opponents who may be "system-specific" as well as those opponents who may be thought of as more permanent enemies. By combining the category "Role of Chance" with the beliefs about Predictability (Philosophical Belief 3) rather than eliminating it as did Anderson, the investigator is able to code relevant statements about the decision-maker's beliefs in this regard. However, the sub-categories under the combined belief do not allow for further analysis of the role of chance in decision-making. For example, a sub-category which dealt with the scenario of war might be appropriate so that one could code statements such as "war is caused by misperception" or "appeasement models" or "spiral models are the greatest danger to peace". While Holsti places such a category in his typology there is no detailed question in his scheme which addresses itself to this issue.

The reliability tests revealed some degree of ambiguity in coding some of the beliefs. I suggested in Chapter Two that combining Philosophical Belief 1-c with Philosophical Belief 3 may alleviate some of the problems in coding. Nuances about the nature of the contemporary international system (Philosophical Belief 1-c) were interpreted as a degree of predictability about the future. (Philosophical Belief 3). The view of the contemporary system is not an important aspect in Holsti's typology and therefore aspects of this belief could be combined with the sub-categories of Philosophical Belief 3, or perhaps Philosophical Belief 1-a. As beliefs are assumed to be stable and consistent over time there should be little if any, difference between a decision-maker's basic beliefs about the political universe and the contemporary system. For Ben Gurion, any differences were peripheral to his basic view of the political universe. That is, in a specific time,

and in relation to a specific problem, beliefs might be established which differ from the fundamental beliefs. For example, in his attempts to amass support for the Jewish cause prior to World War II, Ben Gurion believed that the nations of the world were caught in a power struggle and thus the source of conflict at that time and place, was power politics. However, this did not conflict with his overall assessment that the fundamental source of conflict was ideas and ideologies of nation-states. This brings us to the problem outlined by Tweaser (1973):

What is the minimum time period within which operational codes may be considered stable? Do rates of change differ according to actor roles? What are the temporal differences in the relative strength among different components of the operational code? Some of these questions obviously cannot be answered even tentatively without considering variables other than the operational code, especially in the field in which behavior occurs. (Tweaser, 1973, p. 37).

Analysis of Ben Gurion as a pioneer, a Labour Union Leader and as the Prime Minister of Israel has shown a strong consistency and stability of beliefs within the Operational Code, particularly his view of the political universe, his fundamental goals, and his beliefs about the role of a leader. Ben Gurion's image of the opponent was definitely a time-orientated perspective. The Arabs were only the enemy because of the specific situation and time in history. This belief, however, was consistent with his belief that there would be eventual peace between the Arabs and Jews.

I suggested in Chapter Two that an additional category which deals with a decision-maker's own source of policy may be relevant. Evidence for the case study moderately supports this premise. Several statements made by Ben Gurion which related to his source of policy and which were thought to be essential to the belief system by both coders, could not be coded adequately in Holsti's coding system. For example, a statement as: "The moral content of Zionism and its necessary practical objectives demand a policy of rapprochement and mutual understanding towards the Palestinian Arabs in economic enlightenment and politics." (Ben Gurion, 1954, p. 37), could not be coded in the present scheme. The statement

relates to the source of policy which Ben Gurion proposed in relation to the Palestinian Arabs. The policy was based on the tenets of Zionism. At present this statement would probably be coded as an Instrumental Belief 2 (Strategy for Pursuit of Goals) with the source of knowledge based on ideology. However, Instrumental Belief 2 does not capture the full intent of the statement, since the statement explicitly details the actual source of Ben Gurion's policy towards the Arabs. Holsti considers a category relating to source of policy important to a decision-maker's view of the opponent. I would suggest that it is also important to consider a decision-maker's own source of policy.

The case study supports Holsti's findings that Instrumental Belief 3 is weakly related to the other beliefs within the Operational Code. Holsti found that the results for his examination showed that Instrumental Belief 3 did not match the predicted responses for the decision-makers. The reasons for this have been addressed earlier in Chapter Three. My findings support Holsti's contention that perhaps this belief is an independent belief. However, unlike Philosophical Belief 4, which was also found to be independent, there does not seem to be any relationship between one's assessment of risk and any other belief within the code. Further, there is little evidence to be found in my case study, or in Holsti's analysis of previous Operational Code studies regarding a decision-maker's assessment of risk.² In view of these findings, perhaps future revisions of the Operational Code could eliminate this belief from the coding or combine aspects of the belief, such as beliefs relating to trade-offs, as part of the strategy sub-category of Instrumental Belief 2.

²See Holsti, (1977, p. 268) for a further discussion regarding Instrumental Belief 3.

Future Considerations

The typology developed by Holsti has substantial research promise. Further refinements and synthesis of Operational Code, perhaps as suggested above, will enhance the present typology. Further replication will add substantial information to the kinds of actor/leader types which may exist. Studies however, should be done on leaders who are neither western leaders, nor from highly developed states. The problem here, of course, is finding relevant data to code, especially from non-developed nations.

At this stage it would be difficult to overcome the dilemma posed by the many sub-categories under each belief. While the additional categories do lead to a higher degree of coder error, such as that recorded for Philosophical Belief 1-b on Table 6, the limited tests of the Holsti scheme are insufficient to assess which categories should be eliminated or combined. Further replication of the Holsti scheme is needed before any conclusions can be made in this regard. Replication of the coding scheme poses further difficulties. To ensure the reliability of an Operational Code study it is essential that independent judge(s) pre-test the coding. Thus, an investigator would have more confidence in his own coding. Further, it is crucial that the coders have extensive training in using Holsti's coding scheme. This of course, leaves one to question the viability of replication as the time involved for training and pre-testing would be considerable. However, it is only by further replications that conclusive statements can be made regarding the validity of the coding categories. Furthermore, additional replication may find that there are categories which, as suggested here, can be omitted or combined. Such findings could lead to a more parsimonious scheme.

Future studies might focus on the rigidity of the beliefs during crisis situations. The time span for Ben Gurion's analysis covered crisis situations. That is, the entire period during which Ben Gurion was a leader involved continual crises and uncertainties. A close examination of Ben Gurion's behavior during one or more particular crisis decision-making situations would probably show that a decision-maker with high self-esteem would tend to rely on his own perceptions and

beliefs and be unreceptive to inconsistent information. The case study did not examine the causal role of beliefs in a particular crisis situation in great detail. Some assessment was made in regards to Ben Gurion's decisions to declare independence and to initiate the Sinai Campaign. However, this cannot be considered a definitive assessment of the effect of Ben Gurion's beliefs on the decision-making processes. The effects of other variables must also be examined. For example, the effects of the political situation at the time, the social and humanitarian concerns, and the effects of pressure from outside or internal forces. Some work has been done in examining the rigidity of beliefs in the Arab-Israeli dispute by Heradstveit (1978). He has found that beliefs become more rigid.

Operational Code can be used as a dependent or independent variable in other cognitive approaches. For example, it may be possible to enhance Cognitive Mapping with the addition of Operational Code beliefs as an independent variable. Axelrod (1976) queried whether the images of an issue domain would have any effect on a decision-maker's cognitive map.³ For example, do the images for a scientific domain differ from images of a policy domain. In the case study of Ben Gurion, it was found that different issue domains elicited different beliefs as to the type of approach necessary to pursue those issues. (Instrumental Belief 2). Ben Gurion believed that in issues related to Arab intransigence it was necessary to be continually prepared; in issues related to the achievement of his fundamental goals an incrementalist approach may be appropriate; and in issues related to the Negev, a blitzkrieg approach was the most appropriate. By combining Cognitive Mapping with Operational Code in this manner we may be able to better understand the causal relationship of the beliefs derived from Operational Code on foreign policy behaviour. George is studying the "role of cognitive beliefs in Franklin

³See Axelrod, (1976, Chapter 11) for a complete outline of his suggestions for future research projects using cognitive mapping.

D. Roosevelt's policy of

. . . seeking post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union. Taking the image of the opponent (Philosophical Belief 1) as the starting point, this study attempts to show how a large number of more specific beliefs about the Soviet Union supported the different interrelated components ('Grand Design', 'Grand Strategy' and 'Tactics') for FDR's over-all policy. The specification of these detailed beliefs carries the operational code close to the cognitive mapping approach. (George, 1978c, p. 11).

George also reported on a study which examines the extent to which

. . . and individual's operational code belief system creates a propensity to favor use of an 'analytical', 'cognitive' or 'cybernetic' approach to decision-making (as the three modes of decision-making are treated in Steinbruner, 1974 and Stein and Tanter, in progress). To this end working with existing operational code studies, Crawford (1978) is developing a parsimonious operational code typology that appears to be associated with each of these three modes of decision-making. (George, 1978c, p. 12).

A further study reported by George combines Operational Code with Attitude Theory.⁴ Heradstveit's (1978) study combines Attitude Theory with Operational Code. He found that while attributional variables accounted for a substantial degree of variance, it was necessary to consider the differences in Operational Code beliefs between the Arab and Israeli elites in accounting for the differences in policy positions and processing of information.⁵

The thesis has provided an evaluation of Holsti's framework of the Operational Code. In terms of theory, the evaluation has shown that the framework, although not parsimonious, does derive the belief set of a decision-maker. There are definite linkages between and among the beliefs. Further, the evaluation has supported the hypotheses that Philosophical Belief 1 is a dominant belief and that there is a definite co-occurrence and dependence of beliefs within the derived belief

⁴See George, 1978c for further research studies.

⁵See Heradstveit (1978, pp. 201-203) for an analysis of his findings.

set. Since the present format of Operational Code can only offer measurements at the nominal level it is not possible to state whether any of the beliefs is more or less strongly related to any of the other beliefs. For example, the evaluation found that Philosophical Belief 4 (the role of the leader) to be an independent belief. Both Philosophical Belief 4 and Philosophical Belief 1 (the nature of the political universe) were related to goal selection. (Instrumental Belief 1). However we are unable to state whether an individual's conception of role is more influential on goal selection than his view of the political universe.

The linkages between the beliefs in the case study and in the typology comparison attest to the predictive power of the model. That is, there is a high degree of agreement between the predicted responses of the typology and Ben Gurion's Operational Code. While we are unable to assess the relative strength of the predicted responses on a decision-making situation, we can say with assurance that they will have a definite influence on the information-processing. That is, information will be processed in accordance with a decision-maker's perception and beliefs regarding the situation.

The case study of Ben Gurion should add to the cumulativeness of previous case studies. Although Ben Gurion was found to be a Type B actor/leader--a Type which is overrepresented in the previous studies--he was an actor from a country other than the United States and furthermore, the study is one of the first studies done on a leader who was involved in creating a new state, and who was considered the "father of the country".

The extent of on-going research using the Operational Code attests to its utility in foreign policy behaviour studies. Synthesis of the categories to promote a more parsimonious framework would encourage further replication of Operational Code studies. Additional case studies are needed to enhance Holsti's typology of belief types. The evaluation and the case study presented in this thesis should offer some additional data in this regard.

CODE RULES AND QUESTIONNAIRE

STAGE ONE: IDENTIFYING PASSAGES RELEVANT TO PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

The pages that follow provide an introductory discussion of each philosophical belief. These general instructions are intended to guide the first stage of coding, in which coders will read each paragraph and indicate whether it contains materials relating to one or more of the philosophical beliefs. Once these passages have been identified in the first stage, coders will be asked to answer a series of questions about each passage. More specific instructions on answering these questions about the materials--stage 2 of the coding process--are provided in the next section.

Document Identification Information

Before the actual coding begins, a certain amount of information about the document should be entered on a document identification form.

1. Identification number for document. This number should also be entered on each page of text that is being coded, as well as all coding forms relating to the document.
2. Author.
3. Date. This is the date of the press conference, memorandum, appearance before a Congressional committee, etc. The date of the publication in which the document is found should be entered under item 8 below.
4. Type of document. In this space indicate whether the document is a press conference, speech, private memorandum, memoirs, etc.
5. Audience. Identify to whom the document is addressed; for example, nationwide television, the American Society of Newspaper Editors,

President of the United States, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, etc.

6. Date document first made public. This will usually be the same or or very close to the date given under item 3. Exceptions would occur in the case of classified documents that are made public much later.
7. Any additional information about the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the document [for example, testimony in support of appropriations for the Department of Defense, memorandum was written in response to a request from the President, television address was one of a series of speeches by the President in support of his party's congressional candidates, it is reported that the transcript of the press conference was altered later, etc.].
8. Source. In the appropriate space provide the required information about the book, newspaper, document collection, etc., in which the coded material appeared.

A copy of the form on which the above information is to be recorded appears on the next page.

Before beginning to code, number the paragraphs in the document consecutively, placing the number in the left hand margin at the top of the paragraph [that is, by the indentation which indicates the beginning of a new paragraph]. Indented quotations within a paragraph should also be assigned a separate paragraph number.

Philosophical Belief No. 1(a). What is the "essential" nature of political life?

This category encompasses basic beliefs about the more or less enduring characteristics of politics, history, and social life--the core beliefs about the universe and relationships within it. This is in contrast to diagnoses that are applicable only to specific actors, situations, events, or actions. If, however, such single examples are cited for the purpose of illustrating some more general truths about the nature of the political universe, the passage should be coded as relevant for philosophical belief 1 (a).

As described above, there is an immensely large body of material that might appropriately be included. Because of the purposes for which we shall be using analysis of operational codes, our concerns are somewhat more focused. Beliefs about the prevalence, sources, scope, nature and functions of conflict are of special interest. Discussions that center on the following questions should be coded.

1. What is the essential nature of the political universe?
 - a. Is conflict the normal state of affairs, or is it an aberration that occurs from time to time in an essentially harmonious universe? Is the political universe a Hobbesian one [a war of all against all] in which only a thin veneer of civilization or strong social controls stand in the way of the constant danger of anarchy, or is there a basic harmony of interest among men and nations? In the latter case the author may believe that the underlying harmony of interests exists even though it may not necessarily be reflected in the contemporary situation. That is, the harmony of interests is latent rather than manifest.

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Nature of the political universe:

1. Conflictual [] 2. Mixed [] 3. Harmonious [] 4. No reference []
 5. Other (specify) _____

B. Sources of conflict:

1. Human nature []
 2. Attributes of nations: a) Ideology [] b) Political [] c) Economic []
 d) Other (personal refernces) _____
 3. Attributes of international system: a) Ideology [] b) Nationalism []
 c) Economic [] d) Power politics [] e) Other _____
 4. No ref. [] 5. Other (specify) _____

C. Conditions of peace:

1. Education/communication [] 2. Eliminate offending nation(s) []
 3. Eliminate inequalities [] 4. Balance of power [] 5. Transform
 system [] 6. No ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

D. Nature of conflict:

1. Zero-sum [] 2. Non-zero-sum [] 3. Mixed [] 4. No reference []
 5. Other (specify) _____

E. Scope of conflict:

1. All issues linked [] 2. High spillover [] 3. Issues separable []
 4. No reference [] 5. Other (specify) _____

F. Role of conflict in historical development:

1. Necessary [] 2. Functional [] 3. Mixed [] 4. Dysfunctional []
 4. No reference [] 5. Other (specify) _____

G. Source of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []
 5. Specific events [] 6. Faith [] 7. No reference []
 8. Other (specify) _____

- b. In what respects [for example, for what types of issues, in what kinds of circumstances] is political life consensual? Conflictual?
- c. Does the political universe consist essentially of friends and enemies, or are intermediate positions such as non-involvement or non-alignment recognized and accepted? A slight variation on this work might be: "Those who are not with me are against me," versus, "Those who are not against me are with me."

2. What are the basic courses of conflict?

- a. Is conflict rooted in relatively permanent, non-manipulable features of the political universe? For example, is its source to be found in some aspect of "human nature" [for example, "aggressiveness is part of man's biological nature"]? Alternatively, can conflict be traced to more or less transitory, relatively easily-correctible phenomena?
- b. Does conflict arise from fundamental and relatively permanent differences of principle [for example, ideology, religion, world views, etc.] or does it arise from rather specific, concrete issues [for example, West Germany and East Germany cannot both enjoy full sovereignty over West Berlin]?

3. What are the conditions of peace?

Does the author discuss the necessary or sufficient conditions for establishing or maintaining peace? There are a wide range of possible answers to this question. Probably most of them will fall into one of three clusters, focusing on: the individual (better education, knowledge, or communication among people and nations to break down misunderstanding, suspicions, etc.); the nation (eliminate or transform a specific nation, or nations of a particular class, or otherwise affect changes in the attributes of nations); and the international system

(eliminate inequalities among nations, maintain a balance of power, transform some basic features of the international system, etc.).

4. What is the nature of conflict?

- a. Is conflict viewed as a zero-sum situation [one actor's gain is another's loss], or is it non-zero-sum [both parties may gain, or both may lose in a given situation] in nature? Alternatively, what types of conflict are zero-sum in nature, what types are non-zero-sum?

5. What is the scope of conflict?

Are all issues linked as part of a broader, more fundamental conflict, or are the issues separable so that one may deal with each one on its merits? In the former case, one would expect to find (a) conflict readily "spilling over" from one issue to another, rather than remaining contained within the original issue, and (b) a similar line-up of friends and enemies on each issue.

6. What is the role of conflict in historical development?

- a. Is conflict viewed as a necessary if not sufficient condition in historical development, progress, to achieve important goals, etc., or is it regarded as dysfunctional?
- b. Is conflict or struggle valued for its own sake (for example, as a way of ensuring survival of the fittest, to prevent decay, backsliding, to provide one's society a superordinate goal, etc.)?

7. Upon what sources and types of knowledge can one rely for understanding the essential nature of the political universe?

This question, which will appear in connection with each of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs, focuses on the author's epistemology. What are the sources of politically-relevant knowledge? What are the relevant diagnostic tools for understanding the nature of politics?

Quite often there will be no evidence on this point. In other cases the author may indicate that he is relying upon theory or ideology, experience, extrapolation of historical trends, historical analogies or "lessons", specific events, etc.

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark P-1(a) in the right hand margin of the document, and enclose the relevant passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided in the section describing stage two of the coding.

Philosophical Belief No. 1(b). What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents and of other significant political actors?

This category includes beliefs about the goals, strategies, tactics, sources of motivation, approaches to political calculation and other characteristics of major actors. It is possible that some of the most revealing assessments of the adversary will occur when comparisons are made of the opponent and other key actors, including oneself. Such statements may also reveal aspects of the author's typology of political actors. Because there is a large number of actors about whom there may be some passing references, making the task of coding extraordinarily complicated, unless otherwise stated we shall confine the coding to beliefs about adversaries. In later analyses of specific cases it may be necessary to include a large number of actors. Discussions centering on the following questions should be coded.

1. What are the adversary's basic goals and aspirations?

What does the author believe are the fundamental goals of the opponent? Are they essentially limitless aspirations that include achievement of a hegemonial position, elimination of other key actors, or a basic restructuring of the international system? Or, is the adversary regarded as pursuing the same kinds of goals [for example, extension

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____ Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Opponent's goals:

1. Destructionist [] 2. Expansionist [] 3. Defensive [] 4. Conciliatory [] 5. Peace [] 6. No ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

B. Source of opponent's policy:

1. Ideology [] 2. Historical [] 3. Internal needs [] 4. Leader []
5. Power politics [] 6. External [] 7. No reference [] 8. Other (specify) _____

C. Generality of adversary's hostility or opposition:

1. General/permanent [] 2. Specific/limited [] 3. No reference []
4. Other (specify) _____

D. Likely response of adversary to our conciliatory moves:

1. Reciprocate in this situation [] 2. Reciprocate in other situations []
3. Ignore [] 4. Take advantage in this situation [] 5. Take advantage in other situations [] 6. No reference []
7. Other (specify) _____

E. Likely response of adversary to our policies of firmness:

1. Back down [] 2. Ignore [] 3. Reciprocate this situation []
4. Reciprocate in other situations [] 5. Respond impulsively []
6. No ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:

1. Destructionist [] 2. Expansionist [] 3. Defensive [] 4. Conciliatory [] 5. Peace [] 6. No Ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

G. Opponent's view of conflict:

1. Inevitable [] 2. Avoidable [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

1. Desirable [] 2. Undesirable [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

H. Opponent's decision-making processes:

1. Model I [] 2. Model II [] 3. Model III [] 4. No. ref. []

5. Other _____

1. Calculating [] 2. Impulsive [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

I. Opponent's "Operational Code": Choice of objectives:

1. Optimize [] 2. Satisfice [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

1. Realistic [] 2. Unrealistic [] 3. No. ref. [] 5. Other _____

1. Flexible [] 2. Inflexible [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

1. Predictable [] 2. Unpredictable [] 3. No. ref. [] 4. Other _____

J. Opponent's "Operational Code": Pursuit of objectives:1. Prepare ground [] 2. Try-and-see [] 3. Incremental [] 4. Blitzkrieg
[] 5. No. ref. [] 6. Other (specify) _____K. Opponent's "Operational Code": Risk Calculation and Coping with Risk:

1. Maximize gains [] 2. Minimize losses [] 3. No. ref. []

4. Other _____

L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:_____
_____M. List here all terms used to describe the adversary and his actions:_____
_____N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []

5. Specific event(s) (specify) _____

6. Faith [] 7. No. ref. [] 8. Other (specify) _____

of power and influence] that are not dissimilar from those of other nations? Are the opponent's goals such basically conservative ones as attempts to maximize security, maintain the status quo, etc.?

Alternatively, is the opponent believed to be willing to pursue policies of at least limited accommodation, or even to take an active role in the search for better relations with other international stability, etc.?

2. What are the sources of the adversary's goals and policies?

In formulating goals and policies, is the opponent believed to be acting primarily as a result of its own qualities and dispositions [for example, the ideology, beliefs, values, or personality traits of a particular leader or group of elites; its historical goals and policies; structural and other characteristics and requirements of its society, government, major institutions, etc.]? Alternatively, does the author believe that the adversary is acting in response to situational forces [for example, pressures and constraints from the international environment; the search for security within a system of power politics; policies of other actors, including one's own nation, etc.]? This distinction largely corresponds to the beliefs that the opponent's motivations come from internal and external forces, respectively.

3. How general and permanent is the adversary's opposition?

Is the adversary regarded as a permanent enemy, with conflict ranging across most if not all issues? Alternatively, does the author view relations with the opponent on a issue-by-issue or case-by-case basis? One holding the latter view would be likely to agree with Palmerston's aphorism that, "In politics there are no permanent enemies, only permanent interests."

4. How is the adversary likely to respond to conciliatory moves? How is the adversary likely to respond to policies of firmness?

These questions center on the author's assessment of the way in which the opponent would react to various policies that one might pursue. Would the opponent respond in kind, ignore, or attempt to take advantage of conciliatory initiatives? Would policies of firmness cause the adversary to back down or to escalate the conflict? Any assertion taking the form, "If we do X, the opponent is likely to respond with Y" should be coded.

5. What is the opponent's image of oneself?

What does the author believe is the opponent's image of his own nation? More specifically, how does the adversary view one's own motives? Are they unlimitedly aggressive? Expansionist? Defensive? Conciliatory?

6. What is the opponent's view of conflict?

This question focuses on the author's beliefs about the manner in which the opponent regards conflict. Two aspects of this question may be of special interest. First, is the opponent believed to regard conflict as inevitable, either in the long run or in the more immediate future, or avoidable? Second, is the opponent believed to regard conflict as desirable--as serving some important goals and aspirations--or as undesirable?

7. How can the opponent's decision-making processes be described?

This question includes two dimensions. First, is the adversary regarded as a unitary actor, or is there a recognition that certain characteristics of institutions and processes, including organizational

inertia and bureaucratic politics, may affect policy choices? Second, is the adversary believed to act in a calculating manner, or is it possibly prone to acting impulsively?

8. What is the opponent's "operational code"?

Of the full range of questions that comprise the "operational code", the beliefs about three of them may be of special interest. What is the opponent's approach to the choice of goals and objectives [corresponding to instrumental belief No. 1]? What is the opponent's approach to the pursuit of objectives [corresponding to instrumental belief No. 2]? What is the opponent's approach to the calculation and control of risks [corresponding to instrumental belief No. 3]?

9. What would be required for the opponent to demonstrate good faith?

What policies or actions would the opponent be required to undertake in order to satisfy the author of its good faith, interest in better relations, peace, etc.? There is some reason to expect that a wide range of answers may appear. For some it may be sufficient to make minor concessions on a particular issue; for others nothing short of actions that are unprecedented in the history of international relations may suffice [for example, unilateral disarmament, surrender of vital interests, etc.].

10. Upon what sources and types of knowledge can one rely for understanding the fundamental nature of the opponent?

This question is similar to that described earlier for philosophical belief 1(a). One of the more interesting distinctions may be between those who are concerned with "what the adversary is" and those who rely

on evidence about "what the adversary does." That is, does one deduce motivations from certain attributes, or does one look at only the adversary's behavior as a source of evidence? A variant of this distinction is between "what the adversary says" and "what the adversary does."

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark P-1(b) in the right hand margin of the document, and enclose the relevant passages in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage two of the coding.

Self Images

Several analysts using the "operational code" construct have suggested the value of a category to deal with self-images, comparable to P-1(b) for images of the opponent.¹³ However, virtually all of the above questions about the adversary are already included for one's own nations under the present coding scheme. For example: goals and aspirations [philosophical belief No. 2]; beliefs about conflict [philosophical beliefs No. 1(a) and 1(c)], approach to selection of goals [instrumental belief No. 1], approach to the pursuit of goals [instrumental belief No. 2], calculation and control of risks [instrumental belief No. 3]. Thus, although categories relating to self-images are somewhat more scattered than those of images of the opponent, the present coding scheme may be sufficient to encompass the main elements of one's self-image.

¹³For example, the scheme used by Daniel Heradstveit to code interviews with Arab and Israeli elites.

Philosophical Belief No. 1(c). What is the nature of the contemporary international system?

Whereas belief 1 (a) focused on the more or less permanent features of political life, this one is concerned with the author's beliefs about the most salient characteristics of the contemporary international system. The answers to questions P-1 (a) and P-1 (c) may be closely related. They may also differ, however, as in the case of one who sees the political universe as fundamentally harmonious, and yet who views the contemporary international system as highly conflictual owing to some more or less temporary condition [e.g., the policies of a particular state or leader which threaten peace and stability].

Some materials may appear to be related to both P-1 (b) and P-1 (c); for example, when the discussion centers on the interaction or linkages between the opponent's policies and the international system. The following guidelines may be helpful in making a distinction. If the material refers to the impact of the international system [for example, as a source of constraints, etc.] on the opponent's policies, motivations, etc., it should be coded as part of the image of the opponent [P-1 (b)]. If, on the other hand, the passage discusses the impact of the opponent's actions on the international system [for example, the system is described as polarized as the result of X's policies], then P-1 (c) is the appropriate category.

In summary, the rule to follow in coding such materials is to determine where the impact of the interaction is located. If the discussion emphasizes the impact on the adversary's policies, it should be coded as P-1 (b). If it focuses on the consequences for the system, then code is as P-1 (c). Finally, if the passage discusses the impact of both directions, then the two statements should be separated--that is, a separate pair of parentheses placed around each--and the appropriate code should be assigned to each.

Discussion of the following should be coded as P-1 (c).

Coder: _____

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Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Nature of the contemporary international system:

1. Conflictual [] 2. Mixed [] 3. Harmonious [] 4. No reference []

5. Other (specify) _____

B. Sources of conflict:

1. Human nature []

2. Attributes of nation(s): a) Ideology [] b) Political [] c) Economic [] d) Other _____

3. Attributes of international system: a) Ideology [] b) Nationalism [] c) Economics [] d) Power politics [] e) Other _____

4. No ref. [] 5. Other (specify) _____

C. Conditions of Peace:

1. Education/communication []

2. Eliminate offending nation(s) [] 3. Eliminate inequalities []

4. Balance of power [] 5. Transform system [] 6. No reference []

7. Other (specify) _____

D. Structure of the system:

1. Polarized [] 2. Pluralistic [] 3. No reference []

4. Other (specify) _____

E. Stability of the system:

1. All issues linked [] 2. High spillover [] 3. Issues separable []

4. No reference [] 5. Other (specify) _____

F. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/idology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []

5. Specific event(s) (specify) _____

6. Faith [] 7. No ref. [] 8. Other (specify) _____

1. What is the nature of the contemporary international system?
2. What are the major causes of war, or of the threat of war, in the contemporary international system?
3. What are the necessary or sufficient conditions of peace in the contemporary international system?

The questions above parallel the first three questions discussed earlier for Philosophical Belief P-1 (a).¹⁴

4. What is the structure of the contemporary international system?
 - a. Is the system polarized or pluralistic? Is it characterized by overlapping cleavages [basically similar alignments of actors on most important issues], or by cross-cutting cleavages [each issue tends to give rise to somewhat different political groupings]?
 - b. Is a position of non-alignment or non-involvement on significant issues recognized and accepted as a legitimate one?
5. Is the system basically stable or unstable?
 - a. Which of the essential structures, process, and "rules of the game" are relatively enduring? Relatively transitory?
 - b. What are the sources of stability in the system? Of change?
 - c. What is the "spillover" potential of conflict within the system. That is, does conflict on one issue have a high probability of spreading [to other issues, to other actors, to other geographical areas], or does each conflict tend to remain relatively self-contained? Alternatively, are issues closely linked, or are they usually separable?

¹⁴ See pages 58-61 above.

- d. In what direction is the system moving?
6. What sources of knowledge or evidence may be used to determine the nature of the contemporary international system?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1(a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark P-1 (c) in the right hand margin, and enclose the relevant passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage two of the coding.

Philosophical Belief No. 2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score? And in what respect the one and/or the other?

Expressions of optimism or pessimism do not exist in isolation. They are meaningful only when they are linked to some goal or value. Thus, for Philosophical Belief No. 2 it will also be necessary to code materials related to the author's values and aspirations. In order to render the task of coding more manageable, we shall limit it to assertions about one's own strategic goals.

1. What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?

The materials to be coded here will parallel beliefs about the opponent's strategic goals, as described above under Philosophical Belief No. P-1 (b), item A.¹⁵

What are the author's fundamental strategic goals? Are they essentially limitless aspirations that include achievement of a hege-

¹⁵ See pages 61-62 above.

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?

1. Destructionist [] 2. Expansionist [] 3. Defensive [] 4. Conciliatory []
 5. Seeker of peace [] 6. No. ref. [] 7. Other (specify) _____

B. Regarding the goal above, one should be:

1. Optimistic, unqualified [] 2. Optimistic, qualified [] 3. Mixed []
 4. Pessimistic [] 5. No ref. [] 6. Other (specify) _____

C. Optimism/pessimism reference to:

1. Long term goal [] 2. Policy undertaking [] 3. No. reference []
 4. Other (specify) _____

D. Optimism/pessimism conditional on certain action or event?

1. Yes [] 2. No [] 3. No reference []

4. Other (specify) _____
 If "yes" checked above, identify action/event _____

E. On whose side is time?

1. Own [] 2. Opponent's [] 3. No reference []
 4. Other (specify) _____

F. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []
 5. Specific event(s) (specify) _____
 6. Faith [] 7. No reference []
 8. Other (specify) _____

monial position, elimination of other key actors, or a basic restructuring of the international system? Does the author seek to achieve the extension of his nation's interests within the existing international system? Or, does he define the basic strategic goals in conservative terms, such as protecting the security of the home territory, maintenance of the status quo, etc.? Alternatively, does the author seek significant accommodation with adversaries as a fundamental strategic goal?

2. With respect to fundamental goals, should one be optimistic or pessimistic?
3. Does one's optimism refer to long term goals, or to shorter term undertakings?
4. Is the optimism or pessimism conditonal?

Does the author discuss actions, policies, events, etc., that, were they either to occur or fail to occur, would alter the optimistic or pessimistic appraisal?

5. On whose side is time?

In what direction is the tide of history moving? How is time likely to affect the prospects for realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? How is it likely to affect one's prospects relative to other actors, especially opponents? Note that this question does not overlap with instrumental belief No. 4 [what is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?]. The former question is concerned with one's broad general outlook on historical development and the likelihood that things will get better or worse for one's cause. The latter question focuses on the much narrower problem of how to time action in order to improve the prospects for success in an undertaking. There are,

of course, some circumstances in which the two beliefs may be linked. For example, one may believe that each passing year will improve one's position relative to that of opponents, and then follow this up with the suggestion that it would therefore be wise to delay action until a more favorable moment in the future. In that case the first statement should be coded P-2 [time is on our side], and the second one should be coded as I-4 [it is best to delay action until one's position relative to that of the adversary improves].

6. What sources of knowledge or evidence suggest that one should be optimistic or pessimistic?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark P-2 in the right hand margin of the document and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage two of the coding.

Philosophical Belief No. 3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? What is the role of change in human affairs and history?

A number of persons undertaking operational code studies have experienced some difficulty in making a distinction between Philosophical Beliefs 3 and 5. Whether or not the problem is insoluble, it seems to make sense to combine the questions relating the predictability and the role of chance, as they appear very closely related. This category includes discussion centering on such questions as the following:

1. Is political life capricious, or does it conform to a more or less discernible pattern?

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Is political life capricious or predictable?

1. Predictable [] 2. Capricious [] 3. No reference []

4. Other (specify) _____

B. What aspects of political life are predictable or unpredictable.

1. Historical development [] 2. State of system [] 3. Opponent []

4. Policy outcomes [] 5. Specific events [] 6. No reference []

7. Other (specify) _____

C. Degree of predictability:

1. Certainty [] 2. Probability [] 3. Uncertainty []

4. No reference []

5. Other (specify) _____

D. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []

5. Specific event (specify) _____

6. Faith [] 7. No reference []

8. Other (specify) _____

- a. To what extent are important events linked together? What is the nature of the linkage?
 - b. What range or types of events must be attributed to chance, accidents, or other unpredictable causes?
2. What aspects of political life are predictable or unpredictable?

Does the author discuss one's ability to forecast major historical trends? Future states of the international system? Developments relating to major opponents? Outcomes of particular undertaking or policies? Specific events?

3. With what degree of confidence may one forecast features of the political future?

What aspects of the future are regarded as certain, probable, or uncertain?

4. What sources of knowledge or evidence indicate what aspects of the political future are predictable, and to what extent?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark P-3 on the right hand margin of the document and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage two of the coding.

Philosophical Belief No. 4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

Philosophical Belief No. 4 concerns the feasibility for shaping or controlling historical development and of "making a difference" with respect to important goals. It deals with beliefs about the leader's role and

Coder: _____

Coding 207

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific circumstances: _____

A. Role of leader in shaping history:

1. Actively use politics []
2. Intervene when feasible []
3. Mediate between contending forces []
4. Discern historical trends []
5. Avoid intervention []
6. Control uncertain, but must act []
7. No reference []
8. Other [specify] _____

B. Sources of knowledge

1. Theory/ ideology []
2. Trends []
3. Experience []
4. History []
5. Specific events [specify] _____
6. Faith []
7. No reference []
8. Other [specify] _____

obligations in the sphere of political action. Discussion of the following questions should be coded.

1. How much control can one have over historical development?

How broad or narrow are the limits within which one's choices and actions are likely to "make a difference"? Can one significantly affect the fundamental direction of historical development, or are the possibilities largely limited to affecting the pace, costs or details of steps leading to outcomes that are largely determined? What constraints on action must be recognized and respected? Should the leader accept an active role in attempting to shape historical development, or must he resist the temptation to do so? What role should the leader play in defining goals, selection means, managing conflict, etc.? For what goals or values should one actively attempt to "move" history? For what should one adopt a more passive role?

2. What sources of knowledge or evidence suggest what one's role should be

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark P-4 in the right hand margin of the document and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage two of the coding.

Some question has been raised about whether Beliefs P-2 [optimism-pessimism], P-3 [predictability], and P-4 [control over historical development] are so closely linked that they are not independent. It may in fact turn out that they are closely linked, at least for some leaders. However, at the coding stage it is important to code only what is found in the material, and not to infer linkages between beliefs. Thus, a statement about the ability to shape the course of events [P-4] should not also be coded

as a statement of optimism [P-2] or about predictability [P-3]. While it is possible that beliefs about control, predictability and optimism may go together, one can be optimistic that "all will turn out for the best" without having any sense of being able to control events, or even of knowing what the essential features of the future will be.¹⁶ Similarly, one can be quite certain that the future is predictable, and yet be intensely pessimistic about it.

Philosophical Belief No. 5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

STAGE THREE: IDENTIFYING PASSAGES RELEVANT TO INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

Coding procedures for the instrumental beliefs parallel those for the philosophical beliefs. We are interested in any discussions of strategy and tactics, as well as in prescriptive statements about those that are most likely to prove effective. However, assertions about the adversary's pursuit of goals, timing, resources, and the like, should be coded as part of Philosophical Belief No. 1 (b)--the character of the opponent. If a particular discussion compares the adversary's approach to calculating risk with one's own, the materials about the opponent should be picked up under P-1 (b), whereas those about one's own risk calculations are to be coded under I-3. A discussion of the opponent's timing of political action, combined with some general maxims about the implications that this has for one's own choice of tactics in pursuing policy goals should be treated in the same way. That is, the former should be coded under P-1 (b), and the latter should be coded as I-2. These procedures permit the materials to be coded in the appropriate categories without violating the injunction against "double coding" (see pages 50-51 above.)

¹⁶ For evidence that the fourth philosophical belief is relatively independent of other beliefs, see Part III of this report.

Instrumental Belief No. 1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

The nature or substance of goals are considered as part of Philosophical Belief No. 2. The first of the instrumental beliefs deals not with the substance of the goals, but with the best approach for selecting goals. Thus this belief focuses on questions such as the following:

1. How should one establish the goals for political action?
 - a. How does one determine what are feasible goals?
 - b. In selecting goals, can issues be separated and dealt with individually, or must they be considered as an integral part of a wider framework?
2. Should one select optimal goals, or is it better to settle for those that seem more attainable in the prevailing circumstances?
3. What paths lead to the achievement of ultimate goals?

Is there only a single correct sequence of actions or policies that can lead to the achievement of one's goals? Is it possible to identify a number of paths, any of which can provide reasonable prospects for success?

4. How does one cope with tradeoffs and other problems?
 - a. How does one cope with incomplete knowledge and uncertainty?
 - b. How does one calculate the relationship between long-term and short-term objectives, and how does one cope with possible tradeoffs between them? That is, do long-term goals dominate and determine those that may be pursued in the short or intermediate term, or should preference be given to a strategy of judging the possibilities for short-term gain on their own merits?

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Establishing goals for political action:

1. Comprehensive framework [] 2. Mixed strategy [] 3. Individual issues [] 4. No reference []
5. Other (specify) _____

B. Nature of goals to be sought:

1. Optimal [] 2. Feasible [] 3. Mixed [] 4. No reference []
5. Other (specify) _____

C. Paths to achievement of ultimate goals or aspirations:

1. Single correct path [] 2. Multiple paths [] 3. No reference []
4. Other (specify) _____

D. Value conflicts:

1. All goals compatible [] 2. Tradeoffs necessary [] 3. No ref. []
4. Other (specify) _____

For answers other than 3, indicate the values, and the coping strategy

E. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []
5. Specific Event (specify) _____
6. Faith [] 7. No reference []
8. Other (specify) _____

- c. How does one cope with the tradeoffs between values in a situation [that is, with the inability to achieve all of them simultaneously with any single policy]?
 - d. How does one establish a schedule of goals?
5. Upon what sources of knowledge or evidence should one rely for guidance in the selection of goals or objectives for political action?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark I-1 in the right hand margin of the document and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage four of the coding.

Instrumental Belief No. 2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

The first instrumental belief is concerned with establishing the goals for political action. Instrumental Belief No. 2 focuses on the most effective strategies for pursuing these goals. Thus, the materials of interest include such questions as the following:

1. Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon a goal?
 - a. Under what circumstances is one prohibited from doing so?
 - b. Under what circumstances is it mandatory to do so?
2. What approach should one take in pursuing goals?
 - a. What preliminary steps in planning, preparing the ground, etc., should be undertaken?
 - b. Should one commit resources gradually, on a try-it-and-see basis, to

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. May a goal be:

1. Modified? [] 2. Substituted for [] 3. Abandoned? [] 4. No ref. []
 5. Other (specify) _____

For answers except 4, indicate the goal or type of goal:

B. Approaches to the pursuit of goals:

1. Prepare ground [] 2. Try-and-see [] 3. Incremental approach []
 4. Blitzkrieg [] 5. No ref. [] 6. Other _____

C. Strategy:

1. Push harder [] 2. Accomodate [] 3. Pull back [] 4. No. ref. []
 5. Other (specify) _____

For answers other than 4, indicate the strategy cited:

D. What type of action is preferred:

1. Unilateral [] 2. Multilateral [] 3. No reference []
 4. Other (specify) _____

E. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []
 5. Specific event (specify) _____
 6. Faith [] 7. No reference []
 8. Other (specify) _____

determine what is feasible? Alternatively, is it better to employ all of one's resources at once in the hopes of gaining one's objective quickly and decisively?

3. Under what circumstances should one push harder, be prepared to compromise, or retreat from a previously held position?

In what circumstances [types of issues, situations, adversaries], should one engage in or avoid using: negotiation, compromise, concessions, threats, force, intransigence, "brinkmanship," coercive diplomacy, ultimatata, escalation, increasing demands, retreat, surrender, conciliation, etc?

4. Under what circumstances is unilateral action preferred? Multilateral action?
5. Upon what sources of knowledge or evidence should one rely for guidance about the most effective manner of pursuing goals?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark I-2 in the right hand margin of the document and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage four of the coding.

Instrumental Belief No. 3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

Discussion of the following questions would indicate material that should be coded for this belief.

1. How are risks calculated?

Is it best to do so within a comprehensive framework, or should one do so by assessing the risks associated with each step or part of an undertaking?

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Assessment of Risk:

- 1. Comprehensive framework [] 2. Specific undertaking [] 3. Specific tactics [] 4. No reference []
- 5. Other (specify) _____

B. Approaches to controlling risks:

- 1. Limit goals [] 2. Limit means [] 3. No reference []
- 4. Other (specify) _____

C. Dealing with tradeoffs associated with risk:

- 1. Maximize gains [] 2. Minimize losses [] 3. No reference []
- 4. Other (specify) _____

- 1. Action [] 2. Inaction [] 3. No reference [] 4. Other _____

- 1. Act immediately [] 2. Delay [] 3. No reference []
- 4. Other (specify) _____

- 1. Innovation [] 2. Familiar policies [] 3. No reference []
- 4. Other (specify) _____

D. High risk policies:

- 1. Mandatory [] 2. Permissible [] 3. Prohibited [] 4. No ref. []
- Circumstances _____

E. Low risk policies:

- 1. Mandatory [] 2. Permissible [] 3. Prohibited [] 4. No ref. []
- Circumstances _____

F. Sources of knowledge:

- 1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []
- 5. Specific event (specify) _____
- 6. Faith [] 7. No reference []
- 8. Other (specify) _____

2. What approach should be employed to control risks?

As a means of controlling the risks in a situation, does the author favor: limiting or scaling down the goals to be pursued; limiting or scaling down the means to be employed; or does he favor some other strategy?

3. How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs associated with risk?

a. Should one pursue policies that maximize potential gains, or is it preferable to pursue those that minimize potential losses?

b. How does one deal with the risks of action versus those of inaction?

c. How does one deal with the risks of immediate action versus those associated with delay?

d. How does one deal with risks of innovation in policy versus those associated with familiar, "tried-and true" policies?

4. Under what circumstances [what situations, what issues, what opponents] are high-risk policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?

5. Under what circumstances [what situations, what issues, what opponents] are low-risk policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?

6. Upon what sources of knowledge or evidence should one rely for guidance on calculating, controlling, and accepting risks?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark 1-3 in the right hand margin of the document and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage four of the coding.

Instrumental Belief No. 4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

This question focuses on the rules used to identify circumstances that are especially timely or untimely for taking various types of action. Materials dealing with the following questions would be relevant to this belief.

1. How important is timing in the achievement of major long-term aspiration.

- a. Does it possibly spell the difference between success and catastrophe in the pursuit of long term goals? In the success of a particular undertaking? Or, can one be somewhat more relaxed about it? Alternatively, what are the perceived costs of mistiming political action?
- b. Is timing of action a matter of fundamental strategy--that is, a crucial element of one's entire long-run program--or is it more a matter of managing one's resources prudently and efficiently as problems and opportunities arise?

2. How important is timing in the success of specific policy undertakings?

This question parallels the previous one, except that the focus is on the role of timing in specific policies, rather than with respect to fundamental, long-term aspirations.

3. When is action required, permitted, or prohibited?

- a. Under what circumstances [types of situations, types of issues, types of adversaries] is action required? Permissible? Prohibited? [That is, when is it best to delay, temporize, do nothing, etc.]?
- b. What circumstances offer especially promising opportunities for advancing one's interests?

4. What sources of knowledge or evidence should one rely upon for guidance on the timing of action?

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Importance of timing for achievement of major aspirations:

1. Important [] 2. Not important [] 3. No reference []

4. Other (specify) _____

B. Importance of timing for specific policy undertakings:

1. Important [] 2. Not important [] 3. No reference []

4. Other (specify) _____

C. Discussion of circumstances when action is:

1. Required [] 2. Permissible [] 3. Prohibited? []

4. No reference []

5. Other (specify) _____

For answers other than 4, indicate the circumstances and type of action:

D. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []

5. Specific event [] 6. Faith [] 7. No reference []

8. Other (specify) _____

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark 1-4 in the right hand margin of the document, and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage four of the coding.

Instrumental Belief No. 5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? What resources can one draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?

Whereas Instrumental Belief No. 2 is concerned with broad strategies that can be used to pursue policy goals [for example, when should one push harder, compromise, retreat, etc.?), this final instrumental belief focuses on the specific tactics and resources that may be applied to advance one's interests. Resources may be both tangible [for example, industrial capacity] and intangible [for example, high quality information and analytical capabilities], and capable of being mobilized in the short run for specific undertakings [for example, mobile military forces] and in the long run [for example, widespread public support]. Answers to the following questions would be relevant for this belief.

1. What tactics can effectively be employed in what circumstances?

What tactics are likely to be effective in what situations? On what types of issues? Against what opponents? This question covers such a broad range of possible answers that the coding should focus on references to the most appropriate and the least appropriate tactics that might be employed in a given circumstance.

2. How is power conceptualized?

a. What are the key resources that constitute politically-relevant power? That is what are the resources that one may call upon--or

Coder: _____

Document No.: _____ Page No.: _____ Paragraph No.: _____ Coding Sheet No.: _____

Issue: _____

Adversary: _____

Specific Circumstances: _____

A. Tactics:

1. Most appropriate [] 2. Least appropriate [] 3. No reference []

4. Other (specify) _____

For answers other than 3, indicate the tactics discussed _____

B. Conception of Power:

1. Military only [] 2. No reference []

3. Other (specify) _____

1. Resources available [] 2. Resources not available [] 3. No ref. []

4. Other (specify) _____

For answers other than 3, indicate the resources discussed _____

C. Sources of knowledge:

1. Theory/ideology [] 2. Trends [] 3. Experience [] 4. History []

5. Specific event (specify) _____

6. Faith [] 7. No reference []

8. Other (specify) _____

the absence of which may constrain one--in the pursuit of political goals? What resources are available and are most useful for particular undertakings? Which are lacking or are least useful? Coding should focus not on resources per se, but on references to resources that make possible the pursuit of certain interests and goals, or those whose absence acts as a constraint upon action.

- b. How does one calculate the expenditure of resources vis-a-vis given goals and undertakings? That is, what types of cost-benefit analyses are undertaken?
3. What sources of knowledge or evidence should one rely upon for guidance in the selection of means?

This question is similar to that described earlier for Philosophical Belief No. 1 (a).

For each paragraph that contains materials relevant to this belief, mark I-5 in the right hand margin of the document, and enclose the passage in parentheses. More detailed guidelines are provided below in the section describing stage four of the coding.

STAGE TWO: FILLING IN CODING FORMS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

After relevant materials for the philosophical and instrumental beliefs have been located in the text, coders will be given a set of scoring sheets resembling a questionnaire or interview schedule for recording more specific information about each passage identified in Stages 1 and 3 of the coding.

Ideally the questionnaires should encompass all of the information contained in the passages identified in Stages 1 and 3. The present version of the coding sheets will, however, almost certainly be deficient in various

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